Memory and mineness in personal identity. / Roache, Rebecca.

In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2016, p. 479-489.

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Memory and mineness in personal identity. / Roache, Rebecca.

In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2016, p. 479-489.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Harvard

Roache, R 2016, 'Memory and mineness in personal identity', Philosophical Psychology, vol. 29, no. 4, pp. 479-489. https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216

APA

Vancouver

Author

Roache, Rebecca. / Memory and mineness in personal identity. In: Philosophical Psychology. 2016 ; Vol. 29, No. 4. pp. 479-489.

BibTeX

@article{aca291e1817849f99b506f26457472e2,
title = "Memory and mineness in personal identity",
abstract = "Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.{\textquoteright}s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols{\textquoteright} characterisation of R.B.{\textquoteright}s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.",
author = "Rebecca Roache",
year = "2016",
doi = "10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216",
language = "English",
volume = "29",
pages = "479--489",
journal = "Philosophical Psychology",
issn = "0951-5089",
publisher = "Routledge",
number = "4",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - Memory and mineness in personal identity

AU - Roache, Rebecca

PY - 2016

Y1 - 2016

N2 - Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterisation of R.B.’s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.

AB - Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterisation of R.B.’s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.

U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216

DO - 10.1080/09515089.2015.1102216

M3 - Article

VL - 29

SP - 479

EP - 489

JO - Philosophical Psychology

JF - Philosophical Psychology

SN - 0951-5089

IS - 4

ER -