Memory and mineness in personal identity

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

66 Downloads (Pure)


Stanley Klein and Shaun Nichols describe the case of patient R.B., whose memories (they claim) lacked the sense of “mineness” usually conveyed by memory. Klein and Nichols take R.B.’s case to show that the sense of mineness is merely a contingent feature of memory, which they see as raising two problems for memory-based accounts of personal identity. First, they see it as potentially undermining the appeal of memory-based accounts. Second, they take it to show that the conception of quasi-memory that underpins many memory-based accounts is inadequate. I argue that Klein and Nichols’ characterisation of R.B.’s experience is implausible; as a result, the problems that they describe for memory-based accounts of personal identity do not arise.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)479-489
Number of pages11
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Issue number4
Early online date15 Apr 2016
Publication statusPublished - 2016

Cite this