Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief

Ryan McKay, Daniel Dennett

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Abstract

The commentaries raise a host of challenging issues and reflect a broad range of views. Some commentators doubt that there is any convincing evidence for adaptive misbelief, and remain (in our view, unduly) wedded to our “default presumption” that misbelief is maladaptive. Others think that the evidence for adaptive misbelief is so obvious, and so widespread, that the label “default presumption” is disingenuous. We try to chart a careful course between these opposing perspectives.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)541-51
Number of pages11
JournalBehavioral and Brain Sciences
Volume32
Issue number6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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