A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags. / Abu Ghazalah, Sarah; Markantonakis, Konstantinos; Mayes, Keith.

In: International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC), Vol. 3, No. 2, 12.2014, p. 156-169.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Published

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A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags. / Abu Ghazalah, Sarah; Markantonakis, Konstantinos; Mayes, Keith.

In: International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC), Vol. 3, No. 2, 12.2014, p. 156-169.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Harvard

Abu Ghazalah, S, Markantonakis, K & Mayes, K 2014, 'A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags', International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC), vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 156-169.

APA

Abu Ghazalah, S., Markantonakis, K., & Mayes, K. (2014). A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags. International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC), 3(2), 156-169.

Vancouver

Abu Ghazalah S, Markantonakis K, Mayes K. A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags. International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC). 2014 Dec;3(2):156-169.

Author

Abu Ghazalah, Sarah ; Markantonakis, Konstantinos ; Mayes, Keith. / A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags. In: International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC). 2014 ; Vol. 3, No. 2. pp. 156-169.

BibTeX

@article{86ffc267f3164eff8a1dea16175a5fb6,
title = "A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags",
abstract = "In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutualauthentication protocol for low-cost RadioFrequency IDentification (RFID) tags. AlthoughRFID systems promise a fruitful future, security andprivacy concerns have affected the proliferation ofthe RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims toprotect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacksand especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Wefound that the majority of the proposed protocolsfailed to resist this kind of attack. To analyse ourproposed protocol, we provide an informal analysis.In addition, we formally analyse the security of theproposed protocol via using automated formalverification tools such as CasperFDR and AVISPA.We also employed an up-to-date privacy model toevaluate the privacy of the RFID protocol. Theresults show that the proposed protocol achievestag{\textquoteright}s data secrecy, privacy and authentication underthe presence of a passive adversary.",
author = "{Abu Ghazalah}, Sarah and Konstantinos Markantonakis and Keith Mayes",
year = "2014",
month = dec,
language = "English",
volume = "3",
pages = "156--169",
journal = "International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC)",
issn = "2046-3715",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags

AU - Abu Ghazalah, Sarah

AU - Markantonakis, Konstantinos

AU - Mayes, Keith

PY - 2014/12

Y1 - 2014/12

N2 - In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutualauthentication protocol for low-cost RadioFrequency IDentification (RFID) tags. AlthoughRFID systems promise a fruitful future, security andprivacy concerns have affected the proliferation ofthe RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims toprotect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacksand especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Wefound that the majority of the proposed protocolsfailed to resist this kind of attack. To analyse ourproposed protocol, we provide an informal analysis.In addition, we formally analyse the security of theproposed protocol via using automated formalverification tools such as CasperFDR and AVISPA.We also employed an up-to-date privacy model toevaluate the privacy of the RFID protocol. Theresults show that the proposed protocol achievestag’s data secrecy, privacy and authentication underthe presence of a passive adversary.

AB - In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutualauthentication protocol for low-cost RadioFrequency IDentification (RFID) tags. AlthoughRFID systems promise a fruitful future, security andprivacy concerns have affected the proliferation ofthe RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims toprotect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacksand especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. Wefound that the majority of the proposed protocolsfailed to resist this kind of attack. To analyse ourproposed protocol, we provide an informal analysis.In addition, we formally analyse the security of theproposed protocol via using automated formalverification tools such as CasperFDR and AVISPA.We also employed an up-to-date privacy model toevaluate the privacy of the RFID protocol. Theresults show that the proposed protocol achievestag’s data secrecy, privacy and authentication underthe presence of a passive adversary.

M3 - Article

VL - 3

SP - 156

EP - 169

JO - International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC)

JF - International Journal of RFID Security and Cryprography (IJRFIDSC)

SN - 2046-3715

IS - 2

ER -