A Formally Verified Mutual Authentication Protocol for Low-Cost RFID Tags

In this paper, we propose a lightweight mutual
authentication protocol for low-cost Radio
Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags. Although
RFID systems promise a fruitful future, security and
privacy concerns have affected the proliferation of
the RFID technology. The proposed protocol aims to
protect RFID tags against a wide variety of attacks
and especially Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. We
found that the majority of the proposed protocols
failed to resist this kind of attack. To analyse our
proposed protocol, we provide an informal analysis.
In addition, we formally analyse the security of the
proposed protocol via using automated formal
verification tools such as CasperFDR and AVISPA.
We also employed an up-to-date privacy model to
evaluate the privacy of the RFID protocol. The
results show that the proposed protocol achieves
tag’s data secrecy, privacy and authentication under
the presence of a passive adversary.