Unilateral Stability in Matching Problems

Michael Richter; Ariel Rubinstein

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780

Unilateral Stability in Matching Problems

Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein

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Abstract

The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.

Original language	English
Article number	105780
Number of pages	9
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	216
Early online date	28 Dec 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780
Publication status	Published - Mar 2024

Keywords

Matching problems
Pairwise stability
Unilateral stability
AEA Classification: C78

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10.1016/j.jet.2023.105780Licence: CC BY

Final published versionFinal published version, 642 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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