Unilateral Stability in Matching Problems

Michael Richter, Ariel Rubinstein

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.
Original languageEnglish
Article number105780
Number of pages9
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume216
Early online date28 Dec 2023
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2024

Keywords

  • Matching problems
  • Pairwise stability
  • Unilateral stability
  • AEA Classification: C78

Cite this