Abstract
The canonical solution concept used in matching problems is pairwise stability, whose premise is that harmony is disrupted by any two agents intentionally leaving their partners to be with each other. We instead focus on scenarios in which harmony is disrupted merely by a single agent unilaterally initiating contact with a member of a different pair, whether or not his approach is reciprocated. A variety of solution concepts are proposed in which taboos, status, or power systematically limit such initiatives in order to achieve harmony.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 1 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 17 Dec 2023 |
Keywords
- Matching problems
- Pairwise stability
- Unilateral stability
- AEA Classification: C78