Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities

Sergio Currarini; Francesco Feri

doi:10.1016/j.rie.2006.02.002

Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	112-119
Number of pages	8
Journal	Research in Economics
Volume	60
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rie.2006.02.002
Publication status	Published - Jun 2006
Externally published	Yes

Keywords

Centralization
Contracts
Delegation
Externalities

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10.1016/j.rie.2006.02.002

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title = "Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities",

keywords = "Centralization, Contracts, Delegation, Externalities",

author = "Sergio Currarini and Francesco Feri",

year = "2006",

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doi = "10.1016/j.rie.2006.02.002",

language = "English",

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journal = "Research in Economics",

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T2 - The role of externalities

AU - Currarini, Sergio

AU - Feri, Francesco

PY - 2006/6

Y1 - 2006/6

KW - Centralization

KW - Contracts

KW - Delegation

KW - Externalities

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DO - 10.1016/j.rie.2006.02.002

M3 - Article

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VL - 60

SP - 112

EP - 119

JO - Research in Economics

JF - Research in Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Delegation versus centralization: The role of externalities

Keywords

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