

**Negotiating Agency and Dependency in Africa's International Relations: How Ideologies
have Shaped Ghana's Foreign Policy since Independence**


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Declaration of Authorship

I, Emmanuel Kwaku Siaw, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: 

Date: December 2021

Abstract

International relations literature on Africa has tended to overlook the importance of ideologies in foreign policy-making, either because the rhetoric and actions of policy-makers do not conform to dominant ideologies, or because external influences appear to override the ideological objectives of African governments. However, previous studies relied heavily on dominant Western frameworks that barely capture how ideas influence foreign policy in African contexts, thus leaving much unexplained regarding Africa's international relations. In this thesis, I propose a contextual approach that captures how well-established ideologies operate within context to shape foreign policy, capturing what has been missed in much of the African-centred literature.

Ghana makes a good case study. It was the first country in sub-Saharan Africa to gain independence and has, therefore, a long track record of foreign policy-making to explore. I examine three central and interrelated themes of Ghana's foreign policy – neighbour-relations, regional integration and economic diplomacy – which between them represent Africa's attempts at development and activism in international relations. Further, Ghana presents a classic, yet underexplored case of a series of governments whose leaders have not shied from expressing ideas. I look at foreign policy-making under the Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor administrations, which represent significant epochs of Ghana and Africa's international political and economic diplomacy. My analysis builds on empirical material drawn from twenty-two elite interviews with members of the administrations and archives covering parliamentary policy debates, government correspondence, speeches and news about foreign policy events to provide information on ideological debates, political, economic and international contexts, and reflections on decisions taken.

I find that Ghana's ideologies and foreign policies have been exemplified by an interplay of four context-driven components – good neighbourliness, African consciousness/Pan-Africanism, economic independence and anti-colonialism – each of which were interpreted variedly by the three governments to describe and pursue variations of a nationalist project. These varieties of Ghanaian nationalism can be traced back to the post-independence Nkrumaist and Danquah-Busia-Dombo ideological tension, highlighting an ideological debate that has continued since independence.

Finally, the thesis uses findings on the importance of ideology to demonstrate how African agency goes beyond the show of influence or resistance. It argues that paying attention to actors' ideas is a way to understand agency amidst the diversity of preferences, strategies, and outcomes.

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Dedication

Dedicated to my mother Justina and sister Ruth. To the loving memories of my late sister Paulina Agyei, late father Samuel Yeboah and late brother Collins Owusu.

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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction and Research Design

1.1 Research Question and Context

The key question underlying this thesis is: *How has ideology shaped Ghana's foreign policy since Independence?*

This question matters for two interrelated developments. First is the 're-emergence' of Africa's saliency in international relations. In recent years Africa's international relations, which was once putatively thought of as passive and given, took centre stage again. This is what some scholars and commentators thought of as the return of the Cold War¹ or 'new scramble':² this time between the West and China and, in some cases, the struggle between the Western countries themselves for political and economic supremacy in some countries on the continent (Carmody, 2017; Langan, 2020; Schraeder, 2000; Shubin, 2008; Zhao, 2019). This 're-emergence' means that perennial questions regarding Africa's international relations are being given fresh insights and theoretical vitality.

Second, we are in an era where African states and actors have been engaged centrally in critical world issues such as climate change, terrorism, conflict intervention and prevention and aid (Bolduc et al., 2017; Chan, 2021; Fløttum & Gjerstad, 2017; Gastrow & Hübschle, 2006; Jaensch, 2021; Schmitt, 2020; Staeger & Gwatiwa, 2021). Brown & Harman (2013, p. 1), observes that African decision-making elites "have made strategic choices in how they reshape existing relations with Western donors and... have been critical both to the definition and implementation of policies in fields as diverse as governance, security, health, environment and migration".

However, unlike the late pre-independence and early post-independence eras, where scholars ascribed ideologies to many African leaders - though in a pejorative way - this new era has been dominantly described as 'pragmatic', dominated by realist interpretations of economic utility. Furthermore, African states' apparent marginalisation, extraversion tactics and 'perceived' lack of agency (Akokpavi, 2001, 2005; Bayart, 2000; Jackson, 1990; Jaiswal et al., 2019; Lubin, 2015; Williams, 2017) have been regarded as almost synonymous with the demise of ideologies in their explicit or implicit influence on foreign policies.

However, in this thesis, I intend to take ideology seriously in a way that previous studies have not done. I argue that although factors such as dependency, the relegation of issue politics, lack of an industrial revolution, and weak links between African parties and auxiliary organisations such as trade

¹ Alexey Arbatov (August 8, 2007) Is a New Cold War Imminent. №3 2007 July/September. Accessed February 17, 2021. Retrieved from <https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/is-a-new-cold-war-imminent/>

² BBC (February 24, 2020) How Africa hopes to gain from the 'new scramble'. Accessed February 17, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-51092504>

unions have been cited for accounting for the lack of ideology (Elischer, 2012; Omotola, 2009; Sprinzak, 1973), these conditions and ideologies are not mutually exclusive. As I will show in chapter six, even the extraversion and agency literature that focus on African activism have also not given the needed attention to ideology, though focusing on ideologies generally is a way of thinking about policies from the countries' perspective. I argue that the problem is not in the existence of these factors but a problem of approach and mischaracterisation of ideology.

To deal with this, I propose an alternative ideological contextualisation approach, inspired by Michael Freedman's studies of ideology and political theory, where he emphasises on ideological morphology, contestations and decontestations, and more importantly, the fusion of thought and action (Freedman, 1996, 2021c). This approach goes beyond the conventional meanings and applications of existing bigisms to how they interact with variables within a context. Based on this, I suggest a novel Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) framed around two issues. First is the internalised part of the framework, which encompasses established ideologies like socialism and liberalism that are core to the political beliefs of many governments. Second is the contextual part typifying ideas that develop within each context, either from their historically evolving conditions like economic independence and anti-colonialism or from contextual structures such as the African Union and World Bank, to which the internalised ideas will adjust to in different ways. The interaction between the internalised and contextual produces ideas for Africa's international relations. Put together, within the Ghanaian setting, I call it varieties of Ghanaian nationalism. I do not engage in a theoretical analysis of individuals but rather analyse ideas of governments that are exemplified by their policy outputs. To clarify, this framework is not an ideology; instead, it provides a broader frame that can be adapted in different contexts for diverse ideological mixes. Thus, even conditions typifying dependency and relative weakness can create historically evolving ideological variables that shape foreign policy.

Leaders on the continent have not wholly discounted this 'reality' of limited room for manoeuvre but have responded to it in various ways. It has manifested, for instance, in the 'love-hate' relationship between the West and Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe (Chun, 2014);³ the consistent overt hatred but covert economic negotiations between the West and Muammar Gaddafi (Forte, 2012; Pradella & Taghdisi Rad, 2017; Tsourapas, 2017); and the topsy-turvy relations between the West and Museveni (Fisher, 2012; Golooba-Mutebi & Hickey, 2016; Hauser, 1999). It became quite intense in 2009 when there were suggestions of tying Western aid to acceptance of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender

³ AfricaNews (September 9, 2019) Highlights of Mugabe's love-hate affair with the West. Accessed February 17, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.africanews.com/2019/09/08/highlights-of-mugabe-s-love-hate-affair-with-the-west/>

(LGBT) rights. Even the calmer leaders like President John Atta Mills of Ghana protested that donors did not have the right to “direct to other sovereign nations as to what they should do”.⁴

This suggests that the ways African states align, negotiate, and enact their agency within networks of international alliances are more dynamic than is often thought. For instance, countries with known longstanding economic relations with the West, in recent times, have strengthened their relations with the East or Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS), especially China. While it might be tempting to assume that relationships with China would be straightforward, considering the better largesse and non-conditionalities, African governments have responded differently to China’s offers. These responses have taken several forms ranging from wholehearted embraces to resentful acceptance and outright rejection (Whitaker & Clark, 2018; Zeleza, 2014). This phenomenon of diverse bilateral relations was also witnessed during the cold war (Saul, 2005; Westad, 2000). To some extent, it demonstrates the point that economic diplomacy goes beyond just ‘financial diplomacy’ (Lee & Hocking, 2010). While the latter is concerned with financial stability like what some International Monetary Fund (IMF)-World Bank programmes do, the former makes economic relations broader, links it to other aspects of foreign policy and has deeper meanings to the actors beyond financial dividends.

This is not only typical of African countries’ economic diplomacy but also cuts across their neighbour-relations and efforts towards regional integration, characterised by different or similar levels of commitment, approach and sometimes power struggle. These three – neighbour-relations, regional integration and economic diplomacy – are usually the core, interrelated areas of foreign policies that many African countries and governments pay much attention to (Bunte, 2019; Magu, 2021; Whitaker & Clark, 2018). In the analysis chapters (three, four and five), I will discuss and demonstrate that this unparalleled focus is partly due to the demands of Africa’s socio-economic context and the peculiar circumstances in which most African states were formed. Like many previous exegeses on African politics, commentaries on these have dominantly been approached from the perspective of the ‘big countries’ and ‘pragmatism’ than from what African elites or decision-makers perceive and interpret their context to serve as fundamental bases of ideas for shaping their international relations (Akokpari, 2001; Akonor, 2013; Clapham, 1996; Khadiagala & Lyons, 2001; Nanjira, 2010; Whitaker & Clark, 2018). The place of ideologies in these analyses has been regarded as minimal.

Globally, the notion that ideologies are essential variables to understanding foreign policy might seem like a commonplace (Cassels, 2003) despite the habitual perception that African states behave without

⁴ BBC News (November 2, 2011) Ghana Refuses to Grant Gays' Rights Despite Aid Threat. Accessed February 17, 2021, Retrieved from <https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15558769>

any concerted idea, but from a more porous constellation of pragmatic actions (Akokpari, 2005; Thompson, 2016). However, a review of works on the ideologies-foreign policy relationship has shown an increasing willingness to take seriously the impact of ideology on foreign policy decisions using different frameworks and conceptualisations of ideology to make a case. However, these studies mostly explore cases in Western contexts. The few existing studies on Africa suggest that ideology in foreign policy-making in African contexts is quite different from those of Western settings. It has shown that decisions do not necessarily conform to Western-oriented ideological models; that ideological strands of leaders or decisions have historical contexts that often pitch them at variance with Western models typically developed from studies of countries and decisions which have dissimilar backgrounds to that of African states (Bamikole, 2012; Elischer, 2012; Hendrickson & Zaki, 2013; McCain, 1975, 1979).

However, the Africa-centric literature has not kept pace with the theoretical advances in the mainstream of the discipline. Most of these studies have primarily been a “resemblance of personal predictions rather than empirically grounded research” (Elischer, 2012: 644). This is because many have approached the topic of ideology in a less systematic manner involving not much attention framing theoretical insights into how the topic of ideology and foreign policy could be pursued. It is thought that many scholars of previous generations, such as those working in the early post-independence era, analysed the relationship between ideology and foreign policies for diverse purposes such as propaganda, wooing newly independent countries, or ‘selling’ the foreign policies of their respective countries (Rivkin, 1962; Gromyko, 1981). In addition, many of the works that took up ideology and foreign policy-making in Africa were pioneered by scholars who were either Marxists, realists or ‘pragmatists’ (Cowan, 1966; Zartman, 1966a, 1966b)⁵ whose ideological leanings predisposed them to analytical tools that examined ideologies either from a pejorative perspective or as purely epiphenomenal to ‘hard’ materialist concerns and interests.

Critics of ideology as an explanatory tool for Africa’s international relations have been concerned that because of the fluid nature of Africa’s political milieu, the dominant role of ethnicity and other primordial factors, and the ‘inconsistent’ approach of governments, one can rarely talk about ideologies. As will be discussed below, this is particularly more problematic for scholars who highly emphasise the philosophical and logical consistency attributes of ideology (Clapham, 1970; Erdmann & Basedau, 2008; Omotola, 2009) – a characterisation I call narrow and pejorative due to their strict and totalitarian nature. In some instances where references have been made to ideology, it has been

⁵ Here Cowan and Zartman have in mind scholars who believe ideology is opposed to a straightforward ‘national interest’ (much like realists), including Zartman himself.

used to explore dogma, the untimely end of regimes, [unwitting] resistance; but rarely of a programmatic value in African politics (Bing, 1968; Chazan et al., 1999; Socialist Forum Ghana, 2006; Thompson, 1969). While the fears of critics are well-founded, on the face value, a deeper and recalibrated look at the ideology-foreign policy interaction suggests otherwise.

The analytical trajectory carved by scholars like Michael Freeden, Lawrence Bamikole and Alan Finlayson sets us on a new path to looking at ideologies differently: as living variables rather than immovable, abstract processes “superimposed by manipulative and power-thirsty individuals and groups, and opposed to the pragmatism of political life”⁶ or as pure concepts in themselves (Bamikole, 2012; Cassels, 2003; Finlayson, 2012; Freeden, 1996). Freeden’s conceptualisation of ideologies as actual political thinking presents ideologies as having the potential to “provide interpretations of history, and explanations of present events” (Thompson, 2016, p. 32) as well as setting a consistent standard of values, principles and traditions for policy-making and analysis.

Thus I agree with Thompson (2016, p. 32) that:

if the study of ideology helps political scientists to understand the politics of the West, then the same should also be true for post-colonial Africa. Any book seeking to explain the politics of this continent, therefore, needs to identify and explore the dominant ideologies that are at work in this environment.

However, I disagree with what he calls ‘dominant ideologies’ because the term tends to side-line or declare the non-existence of ideologies for ideas that fall outside ‘dominant ideologies’. Using narrow conceptions or dominant ideologies like liberalism is often an over aggregation although these ideologies encompass diverse worldviews. They tell us very little about the scale and nature of these aggregations and do not fully capture the heterogeneous nature of ideas adopted by different governments on the continent. This is not to say that ‘big-isms’ (socialism, Marxism, liberalism, communism) are irrelevant. They have their place in a heterogenous framework, but they do not necessarily constitute the ample gamut of ideas that shape the foreign policy of African states. According to Maynard (2019, p. 638), only using ‘big-isms’ can “obscure unconventional, hybrid or contextually specific ideologies”.

I believe that a more viable way to study ideology is to focus on the connections between internalised political beliefs and contextual variables and how such interrelations manifest to produce ideological changes and shape foreign policy. A combination of these, in the Ghanaian context, produces what I call ‘varieties of Ghanaian nationalism’. The core of this thesis will show that it has been nationalism, in its different variants, that has shaped Ghana’s foreign policy since independence. Nationalism

⁶ Michael Freeden (December 18, 2013) Michael Freeden on Political Ideologies. Accessed February 27, 2021, Retrieved from <https://blog.politics.ox.ac.uk/michael-freeden-political-ideologies/>

because of the historically evolving components that cut across all administration. As I will discuss further in chapter two, this can be explained by ideological components that stress the shared struggle against colonialism/imperialism, the desire to develop less dependent economies, the tension between neighbouring countries partly caused by conflicting bordering and cross-national ethnics, and the shared aspiration to establish some form of cohesion between all African states. Varieties because of the changing interpretations of these nationally evolving ideological components, occasioned by each administration's internalised ideologies and the ideological influence from contextual structures.

This thesis focuses on Ghana because, as the first to gain independence in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana offers a case with the longest streak foreign policy-making and has a wide range of governance systems and leaders who have been relatively vocal about their ideas. While many studies of Ghana's foreign policy treat it as simple, it is more complex. (Addo, 1967; B. Agyeman-Duah & Daddieh, 1994; Aluko, 1975; Armah, 2004; Boafo-Arthur, 1993, 1999b, 2007; Chazan, 1984; Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). I focus on three administrations that also manifest this complexity in the three areas of neighbour-relations, regional integration efforts and economic diplomacy. These administrations are the Nkrumah (1957-1966), Rawlings (1981-2001) and Kufuor (2001-2009) administrations.

The three administrations adopted different ideological positions and operated in different international environments, but we can also trace continuing preoccupations and conditions. Four main issues underpin the interconnectedness of foreign policy dynamics between the early post-independence period and contemporary times: first, that a lot of the earlier post-colonial challenges still exist and different governments have had to deal with them; second, just like the challenges, the solutions proffered by early nationalist leaders remain relevant amidst varied adaptations; third how African states were framed, and boundaries demarcated meant that neighbour-relations were going to be a critical part of foreign policy beyond conventional relations between countries sharing borders; and finally, the developmental needs that foreign policy serves for African countries mean that there is always an interaction between the three key foreign policy strands thus economic diplomacy, neighbour-relations and regional integration efforts are not mutually exclusive. Ghana's foreign policy has experienced some notable and conspicuous shifts and continuities in these periods. For instance, at the grand strategic level of economic diplomacy, Ghana has moved from a non-believer and critic, a hesitant believer and critic, to a believer and non-critic of the Bretton Woods or Western institutions. Beneath this, Ghana has shuffled between open and private economic relations with the East and West during the Cold War and a consistent mix of bilateral and multilateral relations after the Cold War (Amo-Agyemang, 2017; Boafo-Arthur, 1999b). Parsimoniously, Ghana's efforts towards regional integration have swung back and forth on the radical-moderate spectrum in approaches across different administrations (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009; Leshoele, 2020).

As the first country to gain independence in sub-Saharan Africa, Ghana has a history of ideological influence across the continent, and the Ghanaian people have historically expressed ideological attachments as a way of either critiquing or justifying governments' ideas, actions and inactions and as a way to evaluate how much 'things' have changed (McCain, 1979). This reflects a deep commitment to the idea that Ghana's history and ideologies matter to elites and non-elites alike, not only in understanding the past but also in understanding and explaining the present and perceptions into the future.

Ghanaian foreign policy is not an exception, as ideologies in other African countries present us with something less conventional but contextual, requiring a contextual approach proposed in this thesis. For instance, examining the politics and foreign of Ethiopia and Rwanda – two countries that “have proven to be perplexing case studies of post-1990s African governance” (Matfess, 2015, p. 182) – shows that history and perceptions of it and the present are critical ideological components that constitute their ideology for foreign policy. The governments of both countries since the 1990s have been characterised by a mix of free-market and state-interventionist ideas. This has translated into a foreign policy characterised by uncomfortable international relations that harness foreign investments and military support but have been less receptive to relations accompanied by democratic scrutiny and human rights improvements (ibid). These ideas, or what has been referred to as an ideological paradox, stem from a broader ideological agenda to embedded in elite's interpretation of history and evolved into an agenda to unify the nation against internal and external threats (Matfess, 2015). Particularly for Rwanda, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has carved an ideological niche for itself in foreign policy that is not just “the instrument to manufacture consent and manipulate external audiences, whether domestic or international” (Chemouni & Mugiraneza, 2020, p. 116) or based on the myth of post-genocide exceptionalism for donor privileges (Desrosiers & Swedlund, 2019). Instead, it is partly based on the Rwandan ideology of 'agaciro', involving a matrix of contextual perceptions and understandings of Rwanda's history, present condition and future aspirations (Chemouni & Mugiraneza, 2020; Reyntjens, 2016).

More mundanely, the constant reference to grand ideologies and Ghana's history by decision-making elites reflects an interest in ideologies that stretches far beyond mere magniloquence. This thesis combines elements from the disciplines of History and International Relations to explore the relationship between historically evolving ideological constructions within Ghana's policy-making contexts and foreign policy decisions of three administrations since independence. I suggest that the findings will form the basis of a partial causal explanation for Ghana's foreign policy.

The core question for this thesis and the theoretical framework used to answer it are designed to shed light on what is missing in the literature and how what exists can be reinterpreted to generate a new understanding of Ghana's foreign policy. The Ideological Contextualisation Framework, which guides this thesis, captures the internal and external factors described in existing literature as the environmental sphere of ideological influence that sometimes shapes ideology. Nevertheless, it also seems that these internal and external factors alone and interpreted in existing literature from realist or liberal perspectives, cannot explain Ghana's international behaviour. Constructivism, therefore, gives this thesis a more helpful theoretical spectrum to build on.

It is now possible, therefore, to break my core question: *How has ideology shaped Ghana's foreign policy since Independence?* into smaller questions to pay attention to the different trajectories of the core question.

- Is ideology an important factor in Ghana's foreign policy-making?
- How can ideology be reconceptualised to become more useful to understanding Ghana's foreign policy?
- In what ways can such a reconceptualisation enhance our understanding of ways in which African elites negotiate their agency and dependency?

1.2 Argument

Although I argue in each of the empirical chapters for the varied and relevant utility of taking ideology seriously to understand the three key areas of Ghana's foreign policy, the foundation of ideology's relevance lies in reconceptualising the concept to focus more on its construction, context and components. I suggest a broad conception of ideology that avoids the explanatory gaps and limitations of narrower and pejorative conceptions. This culminates in what I call Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF): a framework that splits ideologies into two main strands – internalised and contextual. The interaction between the internalised and contextual ideological variables produces ideological change and generates new meanings for ideological components, either during the same administration or when there is a change in government. Out of this, we can deduce several roles depending on the actors, issues and contexts, as I do in chapters three, four and five. Applied to the Ghanaian case, I argue that it is the varieties of Ghanaian nationalism characterised by its historically evolving components that partly explains Ghana's neighbour-relations, efforts towards regional integration and economic diplomacy. Therefore, contrary to much widely held assumption that post-Nkrumah Ghanaian political parties, for instance, associate with ideologies for marketing value, gravitate around ideological images and founding fathers' mythologies and exhibit little ideological

competition, I argue that this does not necessarily suggest that ideologies do not influence policies of Ghanaian governments. Rather it demonstrates a seemingly consistent trend between two ideological divides of Ghanaian nationalism – Danquah-Busia-Dombo and Nkrumaist – traditions who have differed, at different levels, in rhetoric and policies. On a much broader continental level, I argue that this approach to analysing the relationship between ideologies and foreign policies show that African agency goes beyond the show of influence or resistance, and it is through an understanding of actors’ ideas that we can unravel some aspects of the diversity of African agency.

1.3 Chapter Outline of the Thesis

Based on observations of Ghana’s international behaviour, I intend to demonstrate that ideology is an essential analytical tool for understanding Ghana’s foreign policy. Particularly, I emphasise the argument that Ghana’s foreign policy in the areas of neighbour-relations, regional integration and economic diplomacy has been a reflection of core historically evolving ideological factors that cut across different administrations but also change and respond to the environment through the actions and inactions of the respective administrations. This thesis concentrates on three administrations that represent cardinal epochs of Ghana’s governance and the international environment since independence. These administrations and the analysis of their foreign policies based on data gathered from archives and interviews, form the core of the analytical chapters of this thesis.

In terms of structure, the thesis comprises of three broad sections: conceptual; empirical; and conclusion. The conceptual section consists of two chapters that set the background and theoretical foundation for the later empirical chapters. Chapter One (this one) focuses mainly on research design. It contextualises the research question and the argument, outlines the scope of the thesis and defines the key concepts. I then review existing studies that have explored how ideologies influence foreign policies both in Africa and other parts of the world. Here, I highlight the relatively few scholarly works on ideology and Africa’s international relations and the gap created by the inability of the African-centred literature to catch up with the dynamic changes in ideology and ideological analysis. I argue explicitly in the case of Ghana, that what matters in foreign policy decision-making is not simply the material reality or economic (inter)dependency as realists, pragmatists or liberals put it, but different interpretations of history and varieties of Ghanaian nationalism which influence how policy-makers approach their different contexts. This is followed by an account of the methodology and methods.

Chapter two discusses the theoretical foundation of this thesis. First, I explore and problematise the general discourse on ideology and make a case for an ideological contextualisation framework that seeks to synthesise thought and action within the policy-making environment. Consequently, the argument deduced is that the ideological components within the varieties of Ghanaian nationalism

influence the nature of Ghana's international behaviour. I then justify the choice of nationalism as an ideological lexicon for this thesis. Second, I situate my discussion within the broader constructivist international relations theory. Here, I critique constructivism and show how this thesis pushes the frontiers of constructivism beyond its traditional remit of international norms, identities and intersubjectivity.

For the following empirical chapters three, four and five, the thesis analyses how these ideological factors can help explain foreign policies of the three administrations in the areas of neighbour-relations, efforts towards regional integration and economic diplomacy – one area in each chapter. The third and concluding, section projects the observations from the empirical chapters into the broader conversations on Africa's international relations. In chapter six, I pick up on two central debates in Africa's international relations – agency and extraversion – and make an argument for the utility of ideology to further enhance our understanding of the relations between African actors and wider structural constraints both within and outside the continent. Here I pick on aspects of these debates based on my empirical findings to suggest that these two debates are missing a vital complementary variable: ideology. Chapter seven provides a review of the main empirical findings and their implications for future research and policy-making. Taken together, these chapters provide resources for thinking about Ghana's foreign policy on a more critical and theoretical platform than it currently is.

1.4 Definition of Key Concepts

Although this section introduces the definitions of some key concepts for this thesis, a detailed explanation and application of these concepts will be demonstrated throughout the rest of the thesis.

1.4.1 Ideology

For this study, I define ideology as *a set of interrelated assumptions, whether intended or unintended, by an individual or group that provides a framework over a period of time not only for constructing and understanding their political/socio-economic context but also form the foundations for their actions and inactions while serving as an interpretive tool to understand the dynamics of such actions/inactions*. With this definition, the contextual uniqueness and historical relevance of every case under study are brought to bear.

One of the useful steps in any study of ideology and policy-making is to conceptualise or establish a working definition for the term. This is because ideology means different things to different people and has inadvertently led to numerous definitions of ideology. John Gerring observes that:

To some, ideology is dogmatic, while to others it carries connotations of political sophistication; to some, it refers to dominant modes of thought, and to others it refers primarily to those most alienated

by the status quo (e.g., revolutionary movements and parties). To some, it is based on the concrete interests of a social class, while to others, it is characterised by an absence of economic self-interest (Gerring, 1997, p. 957).

In this thesis, ideology is a decision-making and an analytical tool. Hunt, (2009 p. xi) concedes that “ideology is hard to pin down” yet he also gives a working definition. Similarly, Gerring (1997, p. 957) further observes that ideology “remains a highly flexible conceptual tool” that attracts different attributes and, at some points, contradictions. While these comments demonstrate the abundance of different definitions, I will create a parsimonious categorisation of the ways ideology has been discussed, cutting it along two axes: Narrow and broad; pejorative and non-pejorative.

Narrow definitions present ideologies as fanatical, idealistic and highly systematic in contrast to what Freedman (1996, p. 3) presents as “systems of political thinking, loose or rigid, deliberate or unintended”. The deficiency in such narrow definitions lies in their analytical weakness to fully capture the aspects of political actions beyond the effects of dogma and political/elite manipulations and ideology’s tendency to disregard the importance of strategic interests. The argument against broad definitions has been that they are “all-encompassing that they banally guarantee that ideology matters and lack[s] substantive implications (Mullins, 1972: 498 cited in Maynard, 2019). However, according to Maynard (2019, p. 637), and justifiably so, “a broad definition does not make everything ideology, and the fact that political actors all have ideologies does not guarantee that ideologies actually matter”. Further, a broad definition demonstrates and emphasises that the “tendency to separate ideological factors from ‘pragmatic’ or ‘strategic’ concerns with security and power involves a false dichotomy” (ibid).

Another way, I suggest, to think about the existing definitions of ideology is the pejorative and non-pejorative dichotomy. Pejorative definitions are those that emphasise more on the mythical, totalitarian and domineering values of ideology that shroud reality and are used as instruments by elites to manipulate the followers. For instance, Sartori’s description of ideology as “typically dogmatic, i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics”; Rejai’s description as “emotion-laden, myth-saturated” typifies pejorative definitions (Rejai, 1991; Sartori, 1969 cited in Gerring, 1997, p. 959). A more elaborate description of ideology by Hannah Arendt fully captures the sentiments of pejorative definitions. She posits that ideologies “pretend to know the mysteries of the whole historical process - the secrets of the intricacies of the present, the uncertainties of the future - because of the logic inherent in their respective ideas” (Arendt, 1953, p. 316). She further adds that “ideologies always assume that one idea is sufficient to explain everything in the development from the premise, and that no experience can teach anything because everything is comprehended in this consistent process of logical deduction” (ibid, p. 317). For the most part, these definitions either limit

ideology to the realm of deception or overestimate ideology in certain cases – something that conceals a lot of its analytical dynamics, value and utility.

On the other hand are definitions that emphasise the dynamic utility of ideologies and their ability to become a compelling conceptual tool for academic research. Ugarriza & Craig (2013, p. 450), for instance, defines ideology as “a set of political beliefs that promotes a particular way of understanding the world and shapes relations between members of a group and outsiders, and among members themselves”. For Ugarriza & Craig (2013), approaching ideology this way acknowledges the diversity of ideas, even within the same group, instead of “assuming them to be shared by heterogeneous groups” (ibid). According to Freedman (1996), internal contestations and decontestations are a key feature of ideologies; however, pejorative definitions overlook these. As I will show in chapter five, what this means is that even within a group formed based on a particular ideology, there can be diversity influenced by many factors, including how they perceive the practical application of their ideas.

One key thing that sets non-pejorative definitions apart from pejorative definitions is that non-pejorative definitions emphasise that ideologies alone do not intend to explain everything. Instead, ideologies exist in a mutually constitutive relationship with other variables and ideational phenomena that constitute the context within which they operate. In their studies on conflict, Juan Ugarriza and Christopher Cohrs strengthen the argument towards treating such mutually exclusive relations between ideologies and norms, identities and frames as complimentary instead of an explanatory competition with them (Cohrs, 2012; Ugarriza, 2009). Non-pejorative definitions also give key credence to context specificity, which pejorative definitions rarely pay attention to. According to Gerring (1997), ideology needs not to be all-purpose, useable at all times and places. He argued that making ideologies all-purpose “will deprive the concept of its utility precisely because its utility is (usually) context-specific” (ibid, p. 983). The point here is that these definitions and theorisations are primary to any analysis of ideologies and shape how analyses are pursued.

While pejorative/non-pejorative and broadness/narrowness are not necessarily mutually exclusive, there seems to be a general trend that those who define ideology narrowly interpret it pejoratively and those who define it broadly interpret it non-pejoratively. My approach to ideology, in this thesis, belongs to the latter cluster and will be discussed in detail in chapter two.

1.4.2 Ideological Contextualisation

Ideological contextualisation is a coined concept that connotes that ideologies and ideological analyses should consider the immediate environment and historical experience of the cases being explored. Ideological contextualisation is the process whereby any particular ideology becomes

located. In the process of policy-making, large abstract political ideas must be translated into actual decisions, policy documents, plans, and programmes of action. To do that, ideological concepts need to be made to 'fit' a particular place, time, and cultural context. For instance, although a liberal or Marxist in Ghana may share some basic tenets with liberals or Marxist elsewhere, they go beyond these basic tenets to espouse ideas and pursue policies that reflect a response to their context and condition. McCain's (1975, 1979) experimental analyses of scientific socialism in Ghana reveal that it does not conform to the assumptions of orthodox 'African Socialism'. Instead, what a leader like Nkrumah meant with this ideology was to exploit its political mobilisation feature within the Ghanaian cultural context. This is because it was a response to the needs at the time. Emphasis is, therefore, placed on the "native point of view" and "whatever that happens to be at any point in time" (ibid, p. 46). I will discuss this further in the next chapter through the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF).

1.4.3 Foreign Policy

I define foreign policy as a course of action or inaction chosen from a set of alternatives in situations where actions or inactions constitute state behaviour towards other entities or states in the international system. The salient point here is *alternatives* which imply that states do not necessarily have one choice. At the very least, they are to choose between whether to act or not to act. This definition also makes way for the point that, sometimes, dealing with internal matters or entities can constitute a foreign policy when that attracts external attention. This is critical in an African setting where either foreign policies address domestic problems or domestic problems attract foreign policy attention and shape negotiations within historical colonial links/entitlements and the more contemporary globalisation trend.

Just like many concepts in the field of social science, there is no single universally accepted definition of foreign policy. Cooper (1972), for instance, concedes to this difficulty in defining foreign policy. Yet he emphasises that even though foreign policy could be described in a broader sense as any contact between the citizens of different countries, this is too broad because it ignores the limitations the word *policy* places on the term. Cooper (1972) further opines that the word "policy" narrows down the meaning to the contacts between the governments. Therefore, the term could be understood in the broader sense, as "a grand conception of the world economic and political order that provides a consistent framework for, and guidance to, the month-to-month decisions that nations must take in their relations with other nations" (Cooper, 1972, p. 160). Hermann (1990, p. 5) defined it as "a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policy-makers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policy-maker's political jurisdiction". Reynolds, (2014, p. 54) rather categorises foreign policy around three basic approaches. The first is "a range of actions taken

by varying sections of the government of a state in its relations with other bodies similarly acting on the international stage, in order to advance the national interest.” The second refers to foreign policy as consisting “of the external actions taken by decision-makers with the intention of achieving long-range goals and short-term objectives.” In his third approach, Reynolds opines that “foreign policies are not made in a vacuum. They are made in relation to other bodies similarly acting in the global arena”. These definitions offer a useful background for operationalising the concept of foreign policy for this thesis. They provide variables that should be clarified in any definition of foreign policy, making its differences explicit with other policy areas. These are considerations of environment or context, who is making the policy and the targeted audience.

1.5 Scope of the Study

The scope of this thesis is in two tiers. The first focuses on three main facets of Ghana’s foreign policy, which have been salient since independence – neighbour-relations, regional integration, and economic diplomacy. These three have not been chosen out of vacuum but by studying the historical trajectories of foreign policy-making in Africa and how elites themselves speak about them. In many foreign policy speeches, one is bound to find numerous references to these areas. Historically, the post-independence national leaders also conceptualised these parameters as the core launch pad for Africa’s post-colonial development. Neighbour-relations have historically been important to international relations study and practice. Particularly for African states, they have consequences on regional integration efforts and, in some instances, economic relations and are also critical to regional geopolitics. Under neighbourliness, I will examine the concept of the neighbourhood; how relations between Ghana and her neighbours are conceptualised across different administrations; and how such interpretations shape Ghana’s neighbour-relations. By the end of the analytical chapters (chapters three, four and five), it will be demonstrated that these parameters are not mutually exclusive but linked, as the (mis)fortunes of one may affect the others.

For regional integration, the study will analyse Ghana’s position, accounting for shifts in ideological positions and their effects on shaping Ghana’s foreign policy. Though it may seem that Ghana’s efforts towards regional integration have simply moved from being aggressive or radical to gradual or, as some say, nothing at all, there is more to it than just a lack of interest in regional integration. All Ghanaian governments have expressed deep but varied interest in regional integration, and their ideologies are a way of understanding their approaches without simply interpreting it as a shift from more interest to less interest.

Economic diplomacy is an important foreign policy area for any country because its consequences impact directly on the state’s economy. For a developing country like Ghana, how governments relate

with other states or international organisations for economic purposes is crucial for the economy and general political stability (Schiel, 2019). At different times, it goes beyond just borrowing, or what Lee & Hocking (2010) calls finance diplomacy, to functionally establishing political and socio-cultural links. Under this theme, I will explore the ideological undercurrents and the trade-offs in Ghana's economic diplomacy encompassing how Ghana's economic relationships evolved between the Eastern and Western Blocs during the Cold War and the more contemporary relations with the Bretton Woods Institutions.

For the second layer, three regimes are studied in this thesis. The first is the Nkrumah governments cumulatively spanning the period 1957 to 1966. Though this regime had two phases – the independence government between 1957 and 1960 and the republican government from July 1960 to February 1966 – there was no substantial change in its membership and structure over the two periods. The Nkrumah regime represents a significant historical moment in Ghana's political history and Africa in general: the first experience of post-colonial self-government in sub-Saharan Africa (Afari-Gyan, 1991, p. 6; Nkrumah, 1962, p. 102). As I will show in each of the empirical chapters, the Nkrumah administration's unique opportunity to carve a niche for Ghana foreign policy and, in general, the outlook of Africa's international relations also presented a challenge, especially for a new country that attempted to take on Africa's challenges with the rest of the world – a challenge some analysts think he could not handle so well and partly accounted for the government's overthrow. However, in dealing with either opportunities or challenges, it also revealed the government's ideological inclinations and approaches to building not only a newly independent Ghanaian state but also as he characteristically framed his international relations within the broader African context. A lot of studies on Ghana's foreign policy have noted the Nkrumah era as framing the key foreign policy spaces for Ghana (Armah, 2004; Gebe, 2008; Odoom & Tiekou, 2012). This makes the period necessary and important for any study on Ghana's foreign policy. However, as a point of departure from earlier studies, I focus more on the historically evolving ideological frames for constructing those spaces of Ghana's foreign policy and how they played out in subsequent administrations.

The second regime is the Rawlings governments spanning from 1981 to 2001. Like the Nkrumah administration, the Rawlings regime had two phases – military administration from 1981 to January 1993 and democratic administration from 1993 to 2001. As I will demonstrate more clearly in chapter five, the transition was more of a change of name from the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) to the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and system of government than a substantial foreign policy and personnel change (Danso-Boafo, 2014; Shillington, 1992). Most members of the government remained and their policy focus largely remained the same (Asamoah, 2014). The Rawlings administration was Ghana's longest military government. Overall, it was the longest

government in terms of years in power; and the government that ushered Ghana into the current and longest democratic dispensation. On the international front, two significant confrontations influenced the government's perspective. First, the Cold War was ending, and the US was gradually reinforcing its unipolar status and, consequently, signalling the beginning of the third wave of democracy. Second, the international economic context in Africa was saddled with economic decline, thereby enabling the intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions. On regionalism, Rawlings served as the Chairperson of ECOWAS (1994 and 1995) and was actively engaged in conflict resolution in countries such as Rwanda, Liberia and Sierra Leone. This is the broader context within which the Rawlings government framed its foreign policies and, to some extent, shaped their ideas, consequent responses and approaches to the international system.

The third regime is the John Kufuor government. Unlike the Nkrumah or Rawlings administrations, the Kufuor government had just one phase cutting across two electoral cycles (2001-2005 and 2005-2009). Domestically, the government represented the first time a democratic transition occurred in Ghana. It was also the first time a former deputy foreign affairs minister became President. This influenced his perspective and approach to foreign policy and diplomacy (Agyeman-Duah, 2003; Landsberg, 2011). On the international front, there was a unique reception for this new government that emanated from a democratic transition for the first time since independence. It was also a time that was much-touted as the 'golden age of diplomacy', and the Kufuor government was among the pioneers alongside other states including South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, Mozambique and Tanzania. While Kofi Annan championed the era of African renaissance as the first UN General Secretary from sub-Saharan Africa, this was an era where African leaders decided to pursue regional integration further and through diverse means. As I will show in chapter four, the results were programmes such as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and strengthening sub-regional organisations. The Kufuor government was the first to subject itself to peer review under the African Peer Review Initiative Mechanism (APRM). Kufuor himself served as the Chairperson of ECOWAS (2003 and 2004) and the African Union (2007-2008).

These three regimes represent the different epochs of political administration in Ghana as well as the different phases of the nature of the international environment. The Nkrumah government represents the nature of early post-independence governments and the international system that was fixated on the Cold War and anti-colonialism, and a domestic scene centred on constructing a new national identity for a new country and personality for a new continent. The Rawlings governments (PNDC and NDC) represent a middle-belt between the immediate post-independence era and contemporary African international relations. They also represent a period where African governments had to either

radically readjust their foreign policy to fit or contest the shifting global order in the context of the end of the Cold War due to their deteriorating domestic economic condition.

The Kufuor government represents the ideas of renaissance and diplomacy with purpose that characterised Africa governments that emerged in the late 1990s. This was the era when the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) became the African Union (AU), a time that most claimed to be the closest point where the union of African governments could have been declared at the July 2007 conference in Accra. I will discuss, in detail, what this meant for the government in chapter five. The different and similar dynamics of the three governments and their reflection of the political and international relations euphoria on the African continent make them justifiable cases for this study regarding neighbour-relations, regional integration, and economic diplomacy. Consequently, the three administrations reflect a diversity of approaches in which Ghana's foreign policies have been advanced.

1.6 Literature Review

While critiquing the narrowness, rigidity, and the limited utility of a group of literature that analyse or view ideology pejoratively, I acknowledge and take inspiration from the efforts of a stream of literature pursuing more dynamic conceptions of ideologies. However, the African-centric literature is yet to fully catch up with these new developments, even though some studies have revealed that ideologies manifest differently on the continent than elsewhere. Some existing literature has emphasised this point and offered some effects ideologies have on foreign policy. However, they have typically presented ideology at two opposing sides: either as a very strong variable of foreign policy that sometimes leads governments into failure or not at all essential but gets mentioned in passing, especially in the situations when it is jettisoned for 'pragmatic' causes or has minimal influence. In an 'unconventional' context like Africa, it is more than this, and none of these approaches is able to capture the diverse connections between thoughts and actions that characterise ideologies. With this in mind, I propose a contextual approach to studying ideologies in Africa: an approach that broadens the conceptualisation of ideologies by emphasising the links between internalised ideas and their contexts; and show how they shape foreign policy. Brought together in the Ghanaian context and Ghana's foreign policy, I call it the 'varieties of Ghanaian nationalism'. I discuss these studies further under the subsections below.

1.6.1 Ideology and Foreign Policy-Making

Answers to the question regarding the extent of ideological influence on foreign policies have been diverse. Yet, the grand takeaway from the studies has been that a relationship exists between these two variables. Studies exploring the link between ideology and foreign policy-making approached it

either in a strictly historical way (Cassels, 2003; Halliday, 2005; Warnaar, 2013) or through a blend of history and theory (Fawn, 2004; Gries, 2004, 2014; Haas, 2005; Hunt, 2009); exploring ideological variables such as nationalism, liberalism, socialism, identity, Marxism with case studies that go as far back as the late eighteenth century when the coinage of the word emerged from its prime proponent Antoine Destutt de Tracy⁷. But as Alan Cassels laments, the important role of ideology in world politics has generally been taken for granted rather than systematically analysed. He observes that most studies on ideologies “make only glancing and generic reference to foreign policy” (Cassels, 2003, p. 240). His *Ideology and International Relations in the Modern World* is a bid to salvage this situation. The book traced the political impact of ideology in world politics, arguing that ideology has played a more central role in world events than often assumed by other social scientists, philosophers, and historians. Even though his work is dominantly historical with very little theoretical analysis, it appreciates “the emergence of ideology on to the world stage and then its percolation throughout the entire spectrum of interstate relations” (ibid). Usefully, he emphasises the deficiencies of recent theoretical works on international relations which focus on the explanatory power of grand theories in explaining phenomena. He argues that “the impact of ideology on international relations is hardly exhausted by reference to a few total or pure ideologies” (ibid: 242). To him, “partial, unsophisticated ideology—ideology in the sense of a collective subconscious mentality or belief system — “or what is dominantly referred to as thin or contextual ideologies “has brought just as much weight to bear, and over a longer time span” (ibid). This thesis is an attempt to meet or support his assertion.

The lack of ideological contextualisation features quite prominently in some earlier works on ideology and foreign policy-making in Africa. Scholars whose works either implicitly (Cowan, 1966; Mazrui, 1977; Gromyko, 1981) or explicitly (Good, 1964; Zartman 1966), explore ideology sought to draw attention to the fact that ideological variables are useful in explaining Africa’s foreign policy.

For example, Zartman (1966a) presents a dichotomy between ideology and national interest that alternate as viable sources of foreign policy in the new Africa, with the former being ‘maladaptive’ while the latter remains ‘adaptive’. Ideology and national interest, he argues, are two extremes of criteria for foreign policy, yet overlapping. Stereotypically, he conceptualised ideologies as idealist, activist, combative, revisionist, visionary, purist, maladaptive, and deductive while national interest is realistic, modest, constructive, conservative, evaluative, compromising, adaptive and inductive. He further argued that “purely ideological policies do not exist” (Zartman, 1966a p, 48). Therefore, a combination of both ideology and interest is needed to understand foreign policies. In bridging and analysing the ideology-interest gap he created three categories of African countries – states that

⁷ See Destutt de Tracy, Comte Antoine (1970). *Eléments d'idéologie*, ed. H.Gouhier. Paris.

profess ideology but act in the national interest, those that mix the two for the same purpose and lastly, those states that are revisionist and tend to produce a new environment in cases where ideology meets the pressures of reality. Very importantly, Zartman (1966a) observes that national interest and ideology have varying influences on foreign policies depending on the situation at hand: there are instances where ideology is a dominant motivation for decision making and other instances where national interest is.

While the use of 'adaptive' and 'maladaptive', to some extent, connotes a difference between good and bad, it also exemplifies his distinction between ideology and national interest based on the "attitude toward the environment within which the state finds itself" (ibid). He further argues that "ideology and national interest are two extremes of a range of foreign-policy criteria" (Zartman, 1966b, p. 48), and conceptualises ideology in a way that makes the concept contrary to national interest. However, what we know is that national interest is a slippery, vague concept (Nye, 1999). Even though this thesis does not directly address the national interest debate, I still hold as a priori assumption that ideology is an influential determining factor for national interest. This fits the narrow and pejorative conceptualisations of ideology as discussed under the '*Definition of concepts*' in section 1.4. Zartman's pejorative view of ideology inspires his typification of ideologically based policies as manipulative, idealist, revisionist, class/self-seeking, undeveloped and anti-national interest; an explanation akin to Marxists views of ideology. This view permeates his analysis of all the functions enumerated. For instance, reducing 'ideologies' to 'ideology' closes space for discussion and argument, presenting us with a very different idea of how political elites make policy choices. Also, power, even though it is a central feature of ideologies because they cause political action, cannot be reduced to myths, oppression, and exploitative tendencies as explained pejoratively by the Marxist tradition. Ideology here is primarily seen as strict dogma unfamiliar to adaptability. Yet his analysis shows that there is some ideology in how African governments behave internationally. The focus of this thesis is to show how nuanced such underpinnings continue to be much more relevant in shaping international relations than is often perceived.

While Zartman's (1966a) work gives sufficient grounds to appreciate the role of ideology in Africa's international relations, the essential background to his analysis is problematic and hinders acknowledgement of the dynamic role of ideologies in Africa's international relations. In his study, he fundamentally distinguishes between policies based on national interest and those inspired by ideology. He argues that whilst national interest policies accept and fit within their environments, ideologically inspired policies do not, but seek to create a new environment and conditions for it to thrive since it "can find no secure place for itself within the extant state system" (Zartman, 1966a: 47). Another point of divergence Zartman attempts to establish between interest and ideology is

exemplified by his comment that: “Both problem-solvers (decision making based on interest) and solidarity-makers (decision making with ideological criteria), then, are reacting to the needs of pressures of their situation, as they see it” (Zartman, 1966a: 29). Zartman’s study still sustains the question about the place or relationship between ideologies and foreign policy decision making. Perhaps even if his claim is accepted, it beckons the question: ‘what influences or sets the framework for how they (decision-makers) see what they see and how they respond to it?’ An answer to this rests on ideology but in a heterogeneous, broader and non-pejorative framework that pays more attention to contexts and internal changes in the ideologies themselves.

In a bid to highlight ways in which ideologies can be contextualised to explain foreign policy-making in Africa, Robert Good’s work develops new ideological categorisations to understand the changing reactions of states towards the Congo Crises in 1960 and the formation of OAU in 1963 (Good, 1964). He classified the independent African states into what he calls radicals, moderates, and conservatives. The radical states - Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and United Arab Republic (now Egypt) - agitated for a systematic change in Africa’s international relations, which sought to break colonial and neo-colonial ties and recommended a United States of Africa. The conservatives were mostly former French colonies who formed the Afro-Malagasy Union (UAM) and were interested in maintaining an alliance with former metropolises as well as legitimising the foundational state system inherited from colonial metropolises instead of a rapid shift to an autonomous paradigm of state-building. Therefore, for Good, what makes one country radical or conservative is whether or not they prefer a united Africa devoid of intra-regional borders and disrupts colonial ties.

For the moderates, Good (1964) could not explicitly define their features, yet he defined them by what they are not. To him, the moderates were states that did not want to be either radicals or conservatives. These countries such as Togo, Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia had peculiar circumstances that deterred them from joining either group. For instance, he argues that even though Tunisia and Togo were formerly associated with France, they had very little to do with the other conservative members of UAM in terms of identity. On the other hand, Togo’s uncomfortable relations with Ghana at the time made it problematic to join the ‘Radicals’ within which Nkrumah was a major player. The main argument underlining this categorisation is that the formation of the OAU symbolised an ideological consensus among the ‘radical, moderate, and conservative’ African states. Consequently, the strict ideological disparity between the nations became blurred, though not entirely vanished, after the formation of the OAU. This, he argues, was due to the similarity of challenges facing all African countries. These challenges included dealing with the fragility of regimes, addressing regime legitimacy, and economic decline. Good, however, admits to the malleability of ideology in Africa, arguing that there is a tendency for states to react differently or adopt a different ideological approach

to different situations. However, whether these shifts are internal ideological changes or a total movement from one ideology to the other is unclear. It is also unclear, from his analysis, how these changes happen and the possible policy manifestations of it. These are concerns that a more heterogeneous, broader and contextualised framework addresses.

Although Good's attempt at contextualising ideological variables to explain a phenomenon was successful, the narrowed nature of his parameters for analysis limits the viability of the variables. He focuses on African states' relations with the Soviet Union, colonial metropolises, and intra-Africa relations. This is understandable as the Africa of 1964 had not built stronger relations with other entities in the international system, as they have now with multinational corporations, intergovernmental organisations and bilateral relations with countries who were not necessarily their colonial metropolises. More seriously, his failure to define ideology is a limitation. It partly leads him into concluding or assuming a seeming end of ideology in Africa's international relations which was quite premature. I would argue that new forms of ideological differences and changes could not be captured by his strict categorisation of 'radicals, conservatives, and moderates'. Good (1964) reveals some of these changes in Mali, which sought to build an open and stronger relationship with France, while Senegal became the first UAM member to establish diplomatic relations with the USSR. However, he characterises the changes as an apparent end of ideology in the international relations of Mali and Senegal. Notwithstanding, he was successful in drawing attention to the idea that there exists a strong relationship between a system of thinking or ideologies and foreign policy decision-making in Africa that is not essentially realist, Marxist, liberal or socialist but ideologies that are negotiated from African history and experience.

A limitation that cuts across both Good's (1964) and Zartman's (1966) accounts, but is more evident in the latter, is a reliance on Western-derived models to explain ideological stances in Africa's international relations. The use of the term 'Western-derived ideological models' does not necessarily mean ideals that only apply to the West or do not apply to Africa. Rather it is the strict interpretation of ideological families whose genealogical contents do not feature the experiences of Africa. The original meanings of these ideologies are essentially Western because they emanated from experiences in the West (Freedon, 1996; Freedon et al., 2013). They can be universally useful when adapted to reflect the context within which they are being applied, in this case, Africa. However, some analysts on ideology in Africa maintain this original meaning, making it difficult to understand the policy decisions from African perspectives or bottom-up⁸ (Du Bois, 1965; Gromyko, 1981; McCain,

⁸ Bottom-up is used here not to mean grassroots, but an understanding that ideas from African perspective that eventually feeds into the broader meaning of established ideologies instead of trying to fit Africa into those ideologies

1975). Also, rather than finding the place of the principles and components of these grand ideologies in Africa's decision-making processes, an attempt is made to situate Africa within these ideologies. Imbued in such analyses is the nurturing of a belief that African ideological beliefs should necessarily find expression in one of the grand Western ideologies. To demonstrate this Macgaffey (1981, p. 227) argues that,

although the models of society constructed by its members and the models constructed by outside observers are phenomena of the same order, the models belong to different cultures, meet different requirements, cannot be reconciled, and should not be confused, although they often have been in the past, in African studies in particular.

This explains why some studies of ideologies in Africa have shown that African political ideology is an eclectic mix of ideas from grand ideologies (Bamikole, 2012; Elischer, 2012; Martin, 2012; A. Mazrui, 1977). I would argue that an African ideology or a study of ideologies in Africa should not be restricted within the confines or be reconciled with the principles of grand ideological labels constructed externally. Instead, attention should be given to how these models are socially constructed by political actors or society in general.

As a response to calls to consider the weight to which 'unsophisticated ideologies' bring to bear on foreign policies, more recent studies have aimed at developing ideological frameworks to explain foreign policy-making in Africa. Taking inspiration from Karl Mannheim, Khadiagala (2010) examines how two critical moments in Africa's international relations – pan Africanism and African renaissance – influenced the creation of continental and sub-regional institutions. These two critical moments provided the ideological framework on which his work hinged. He lamented that even though these systems of ideas have emerged over the past fifty years to explain foreign policy-making and Africa's international relations, in general, "these systems have lacked the autonomy that would have yielded a concrete and universal African set of ideas to meaningfully shape interstate relations" (Ibid, p. 376). To Khadiagala, this is due to the political, territorial and geographical fragmentation of African states. He further argues that the production and dissemination of ideas have been the reserve of how a few political actors have been able to influence their national policies but not Africa as a whole. Notwithstanding, he forecasts ideologies as playing a dominant role in influencing the extent of continental or sub-regional integrations even though he believes in institutional rather than individual production of ideas.

While this analysis is a good basis for analysing regional integration, as it diverges from realist and materialistic analyses, Khadiagala's adoption of Mannheim's approach to conceptualising ideology is problematic. Not only does it hinder his analysis of dynamic shifts within each ideological moment,

but it also restricts the success of the ideas to only when there is a monumental change in Africa's power to secure a complete and effective continental or sub-regional integration.

Landsberg's (2011) assessment of African leadership as pivotal in asserting agency in world politics is an attempt to divert from the existing literature that examines African agency from a realist standpoint - economic power and resource perspectives. Using the 'golden decade' (the period between 1998 and 2008) of African diplomacy as a yardstick, he argues that the extent of African assertiveness in the international system depends largely on the ideational role of leaders. He proves, with examples, how changing leadership shaped the international impact of Ghana, South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Ethiopia, and Senegal. Notwithstanding his realist perspective and focus on power, the adoption of the theory of African continentalism in explaining the actions of leaders makes the work distinct from that of studies on pan Africanism. He explores African continentalism as a unique variant of Pan-Africanism that focuses on answering the question 'how do Africans wish to be governed in their quest for economic emancipation'? This stresses how ideas can change over time, especially as the problem, phenomenon and the environment, in general, changes while having some ideological strings with history. It is part of what the contextualisation framework, used in this thesis, proposes as a viable approach to understanding the ideology-foreign policy relationship in Africa.

Nathan (2011) makes a compelling argument for the role of leadership and party ideology in foreign policy decision making in South Africa. Unlike Landsberg (2011), Nathan adapts the ideological principles of the African National Congress (ANC) and Thabo Mbeki and analyses them within John Campbell's typology of ideology. Nathan (2011) argues that South Africa's position on the Darfur crisis was not unfathomable or realist but a vivid reflection of the principles and ideology of the ANC and President Thabo Mbeki. He contends, contrary to the assertion that South Africa's position on Darfur was inhumane, that ideological principles such as African renaissance, quiet diplomacy, solidarity with governments under Western pressure, and anti-imperialism provided a viable ideological framework within which foreign policy under President Mbeki can be analysed. This is very useful because it is less restrictive than the *continentalism* explored by Landsberg (2011). More importantly, Nathan (2011) did not strictly use Western-derived ideological models as a framework for analysis. Nathan's (2011) is a bottom-up approach to understanding ideologies and international relations without being superintended by original or 'Western' meanings of grand ideologies such as liberalism, socialism or Marxism. However, Nathan's (2011) situational case for analysis, the Darfur crisis, is insufficient because it peruses a single case. This, therefore, makes it difficult for his ideological variables to be more representative of the regime or be used in analysis beyond intra-Africa relations. To demonstrate this difficulty, I argue that even though the study observes a change in South Africa's position on the Darfur crisis after Jacob Zuma took office, the ideological principles enumerated above

could not explain the sudden change in foreign policy decisions. This, therefore, limits the application of these ideological principles to other regimes in order to understand changes and continuities.

The works on ideology and foreign policy-making in Africa have made attempts at providing a rich and important contribution to the constructivist theory of international relations. Not only have they highlighted a less focused facet of constructivism – ideas – but they have also presented it from a non-Western perspective. However, most of these studies have either downplayed or neglected the lingering possibility of how other factors, importantly Africa's historical encounter with colonialism, can essentially culminate in a system of thoughts or ideologies that, to a large extent, have driven foreign policy-making since independence. Taking Cassels (2003) assertion into account, and pushing the frontiers of constructivism further, what if we interrogate whether or not post-colonial thinking and a new context, in general, have a considerable influence on shaping ideologies for foreign policy. Some works have highlighted the eminence of a post-colonial ideology in several facets of the post-colonial states, including intergroup relations (Sibley & Osborne, 2016), political party preference (Greaves et al., 2014), health policies (King, 2002), territorial sovereignty and maximisation of status (Miller, 2013) as well as some general societal considerations (Steinberg, 2007; Young, 1998). The inference that can be made from these studies is that, notwithstanding the end of colonial rule and ideologies that sought its end, the remnants of colonialism and its resultant impacts persist in post-colonial states, especially in Africa. It also hinges on the belief that these ideologies or theories with such historical and contextual components are still useful for understanding societal relations. Yet the possibility that these feed into ideologies that shape the formulation of foreign policy decision making is rarely systematically analysed, especially in Africa.

A further absence in the existing literature, particularly stark in considering the relationship between ideologies and foreign policy decision making in Africa, is the exploration of the ongoing significance of colonial ideologies. This could include broader national history and colonial traditions which have survived into post-colonial administrations, colonial frames (example, the persistence of the identities of colonial 'masters' and 'subjects' in Africa's encounter with modern China, and explicitly post and anti-colonial theory being incorporated into African foreign policy (example, members of Rawlings administration's readings of Kwame Nkrumah, Karl Marx and Amilcar Cabral). These variables possess the possibility to consistently shape foreign policy since independence. In the contextual framework proposed in this study, these considerations are captured as components under contextual variables. Taking into account how Africa's colonial past is perceived and responded to can assimilate into a set of thoughts or ideology, we can better comprehend what otherwise will be puzzling, or we can get fresh insights into foreign policy-making in Africa.

1.6.2 Works on Ghana's Foreign Policy

There have been multiple works of scholarly analysis attempting to understand Ghana's foreign policy from different perspectives. They seek to answer the broader question: What are the determinants of Ghana's foreign policy? Two major strands can be identified from a survey of these works. First is a group interpreting Ghana's foreign policy from structural and international perspectives (Akopari, 2001, 2005; Etsiah, 1989; Kim, 2014; Roland, 1976; Sanusi, 2016). The overriding argument in these works is that the structure of the international acts as a determinant of Ghana's foreign policy. Akopari (2001), in particular, argues that Ghana's foreign policy in the post-colonial era was shaped by the interplay of both domestic and international or systemic factors. He, for example, cited the Cold War and the polarised nature of the global system in the 1960s, which engrossed Ghanaian and other African leaders' attempts to build alliances with blocs perceived to be supportive of their governments. Critically, he downplayed the relevance of leadership traits on foreign policy, just like the other works in this category. While they mention some domestic factors, like the economy, they tend to regard Ghana's foreign policy as given and highly dependent but with little emphasis on how these international events are understood, interpreted and acted upon through ideologies.

The second strand of works focuses on how domestic factors shape Ghana's foreign policy. Here, two main sub-themes can be identified. First is the theme concerning the role of individual leaders in Ghana's foreign policy. The argument put forward is that the personality of the presidents of various administrations was a determinant of Ghana's foreign policy (Chazan, 1984; Gebe, 2008; Grilli, 2015; Kumah-Abiwu, 2016; Pantah & Arthur, 2014; Price, 1971). This is based on the premise that individual leaders are powerful agents in shaping Ghana's foreign policy. Due to the nature of their leadership analysis, the scope of these studies has predominantly covered military regimes – Colonel Acheampong under the National Redemption Council (NRC) and Supreme Military Council (SMC1); Jerry Rawlings under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) - and authoritarian administrations such as the Nkrumah administration. For instance, Acheampong's foreign policy is noted by this group of scholars to have been influenced by his sympathy for and likeness to Nkrumah (Chazan, 1984; Dapaah-Agyeman, 2003). On Rawlings, Felix Kuma-Abiwu highlights how his personality traits influenced foreign policy during his administration (Kumah-Abiwu, 2016). Even though Busia's Progress Party (PP) administration was a democracy, Naomi Chazan presents an argument that Busia's long stay in opposition and Nkrumah's aggressiveness towards him predisposed him to make efforts towards reversing Nkrumah's foreign policies (Chazan, 1984). However, I reckon that Busia's opposition and Nkrumah's 'aggressiveness' were occasioned by a history of ideological contestations between Nkrumah and the other leaders of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) and later United Party. These ideological differences made Nkrumah 'aggressive' towards him as the

opposition was perceived to be undermining the Nkrumah's bid for independence and African unity. This characterises the broader tendency, in the literature, to explain such relations without a further consideration of their ideological trajectories which can, in part, be revealed by a historical analysis.

The second theme is the role of domestic institutions. Three scholars are very important in this regard. Dei-Anang (1975, p. 8) focuses on demonstrating how "administrative support for the aspirations and policies of African governments must not deny the framework of established norms and principles". As a former Ambassador Extraordinary (and head of the African Affairs Secretariat) during the Nkrumah administration, Dei-Anang (1975) observes Nkrumah's distrust for Ghana's civil service to carry out and interpret his African policies with his similar vision and enthusiasm. This therefore occasioned the establishment of parallel institutions, such as the Bureau of African Affairs and the African Affairs Centre, aimed at delivering revolutionary and unorthodox diplomatic activities (Manu, 1976). As will be discussed in analytical chapters, these organisations were key to how the Nkrumah administration executed its African policy and deliverables. Aluko (1975) argues, in his analysis of post-Nkrumah foreign policies, that Ghanaian bureaucracy was a continuity mechanism. What he highlights is the institutional memory of the bureaucracy due to its members' long service and consistency. Grilli (2018) in his bid to counter the anti-Nkrumah narratives of foreign policy failure, highlighted how three leading institutions established by the Nkrumah administration shaped Ghana's foreign policy. He argues that the Bureau of African Affairs, the African Affairs Secretariat and the Ideological Institute were important institutions that directly and indirectly influenced African nationalist movements and radicalised the Ghanaian civil service. However, these institutions can be seen as tools or effects/manifestations of the ideological predisposition of the government rather than influencers on their own. Both themes emphasise domestic structures and variabilities as influential factors of Ghana's foreign policy.

While the works mentioned above are dominantly single administration analyses, there is a third group that analyses continuities and changes in Ghana's foreign policy across different administrations (Boafo-Arthur, 1993, 1999b, 2007). They make the argument that Ghana's foreign policies, defined in the 1960s by Nkrumah, has largely been followed by subsequent governments. Specifically, they identify three features of Ghana's foreign policy that has been consistent through the course of Ghana's history since independence: support for liberation struggles and subsequently for the formation of the Organisation of African Unity which later became the African Union; the principle of non-alignment; and support for inter-governmental organisations or supra-national institutions such as the United Nations (1992 Constitution of Ghana; Austin, 1970; Odoom & Tiekou, 2012; Yakohene, 2009). Out of these principles, they identify trends in Ghana's foreign policy. In the Fourth Republic (since January 1993), these are also defined in the 1992 constitution of Ghana. However, a look

beyond these constitutional restraints reveals the dynamic shifts and continuities that these narrow principles do not capture. A branch of the continuity and change studies focuses on neo-realist and neo-liberal interpretations of Ghana's foreign policy. They argue that the dependent nature of the Ghanaian economy is a principal factor that explains the continuities and changes (Boafo-Arthur, 1993, 2007). None of their analyses prioritises ideology; instead, foreign policy changes and continuities are attributed mainly to pragmatism rather than a possible shift in ideology or interpretation due to the demands of the circumstances. Ideology, therefore, has little or no space for analysis in these works.

1.6.3 Works explicitly on ideology and Ghana's foreign policy

The most theoretically grounded, so far, is that of Scott Thompson. The work offers a realist critique of the ideological underpinnings of Nkrumah's foreign policies, which he dominantly referred to as scientific socialism. His work is an evaluation of how Nkrumah's bid for 'ideological clamour' blinded him from an objective view of Ghana's actual national interest. He, therefore, portrays Nkrumah's ideology and approach to foreign policy as a misguided choice that eventually led him (Nkrumah) to face the 'penalty of failure' (the 1966 coup) for his defiance towards 'Ghana's national interest' (Thompson, 1969). Concerning the variables for analysis, he made constant reference to the international and domestic. However, in his bid to link Ghana's domestic politics to foreign policy, he focuses more on the intra-party factionalism within the CPP, the crippling of the civil service and how it stemmed from and reinforced Nkrumah's personalisation of Ghana's foreign policy. Thompson neglects the mutual interaction between the general demands of the circumstances the CPP government found itself as well as the general development of the country and how that can constitute a viable contextual understanding for ideological shifts/continuities and the international attitude of Ghana at the time. On the international front, Thompson's work followed what Fourre (1970, p. 158) describes as the

simpliste paradigm of the cold war, wherein the 'eastern' powers are constantly on the look-out for an easy kill and the new states are glibly labelled as either those, the majority, that are 'moderate', or the few that are 'troublesome', while the formidable presence and activity of the western powers, and particularly the United States (as during the Congo crisis), are rarely and ever so discreetly mentioned

Therefore, not only is his conceptualisation of ideology pejorative (a factor that inadvertently influences his conclusions), but a lot of contextual explanations are left untouched. And this thesis will highlight these areas, not in defence of the Nkrumah regime, but to offer a comprehensive analysis of ideology and foreign policy under the Nkrumah regime and beyond.

As a response to such critiques of Nkrumah's foreign policy from different sources, Kwesi Armah published his *Peace without Power: Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966*. Having served as High

Commissioner to the UK and Minister of Foreign Trade under the administration, Armah set out to give a personal and insider account in order correct existing misconceptions and criticisms of the Nkrumah administration's foreign policy with more focus on ideology and providing reasons for policy failures. On ideology, Armah argues that the Nkrumah administration was driven by Pan-Africanism based on the ideas of black pride, black identity, African emancipation and unity (Armah, 2004). To him, this framework defined Nkrumah's foreign policy.

In defence of the Nkrumah administration, Armah offers a more poignant explanation for Ghana's policy failures which Thompson had blamed on Nkrumah's ideological clamour. Externally, Armah (2004) blames the colonial economy that directly and indirectly served the interest of the West. Internally he blames the lack of requisite human resource expertise and nature of domestic political opposition parties that preferred federalism to the unitary system Nkrumah was proposing (between 1954 and 1957) and their efforts at making the country ungovernable through a series of coup/assassination attempts on Nkrumah's life (1960-1966) of which they eventually succeeded on 24th February 1966. It is, therefore apparent that Armah's work was aimed at defending Nkrumah's foreign policy just as his earlier books such as *Nkrumah's Legacy* and *Africa's Golden Road* were meant to exalt Nkrumah's role on the continent and his domestic policy (Armah, 1965, 1974).

Invariably the two main seminal works that directly address the relationship between ideologies and Ghana's foreign policy have been locked into a blame game about why Ghana's foreign policy under Nkrumah was a failure or success to some extent. Therefore, they not only miss the context, but their ideological frameworks are narrow. They are also restricted to the Nkrumah administration. Notwithstanding, this genre of works does attempt to identify the intellectual or ideological underpinnings of Ghana's foreign policy. In so doing, it embraces the broader concept of ideology as a driving force of Ghana's foreign policy. However, there is a dearth of a comprehensive genre of work on Ghana foreign policy that attempts to identify long term patterns and changes from an ideological perspective. In other words, not many existing works answer how ideology shapes Ghana's foreign policy over a long-term period. Therefore, not much attempt has been made at identifying historically evolving ideological factors that influence Ghana's international behaviour.

Although Thompson's work emerged as the most theoretically grounded on the subject matter, it still showed some indifference to theory as an enormous amount of the work relies on his personal evaluation metrics of Nkrumah's foreign policy and Ghana's national interest. Meyers (1971, p. 164) argues that although the book is a compendium of information on unique events under Nkrumah, "a detailed index lends itself to such selective use" and the greatest problem of it lies in "Thompson's attempt to posit his interpretation of what was Ghana's national interest during this period and his

conception of the limits of what a small state could "realistically" hope to accomplish through its diplomacy" (ibid). Although Thompson has done better than later writers on this, his work still falls under what Elischer (2012, p. 644) describes as a "resemblance of personal predictions rather than empirically grounded research". These are the characteristics of the limits of theoretical depth, and they make attempts at a comparative study of ideologies and foreign policies difficult. However, in this thesis, I suggest a more systematic framework that brings together internalised and contextual variables of ideologies to demonstrate and evaluate how ideologies influence foreign policies. This framework, I believe, can be adapted in different cases for analysis unlike the attempts by Thompson or Armah. The ideological contextualisation approach and the adaption of nationalism as an ideological framework help this study in identifying and analysing the dynamics of such historically evolving ideological factors and their influence on Ghana's international behaviour.

1.7 Methodology and Methods

Methodologically the thesis is grounded in the constructivist approach to research that views the goal of social science as one to understand human behaviour through "an interpretation of the meaning, beliefs and ideas they give" as motivations for their actions and inactions (Halperin & Heath, 2017, p. 40). It assumes a fundamental difference between the social world and the natural world; hence, the reality is not mind-independent but subjectively created. In so doing, scientific knowledge can be gained through interpreting and generating subjective meanings (Biggam, 2008; Creswell, 2007; Halperin & Heath, 2017). Constructivists such as Alexander Wendt argue that by studying how norms and ideas are socially constructed over a period of time, we may further unravel how they are institutionalised, internalised and influence behaviour (Stefano & Leander, 2006; Wendt, 1995). Approaching this from a constructivist paradigm provides avenues to separate this thesis from existing strict approaches and pejorative characterisations of ideology. As I will show in chapter two, this is in line with the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) that focuses on how ideas are internalised and interact with its environment to influence state behaviour.

Social constructivism introduces the contextual aspect to this analysis; thus, ideologies and general motivation for policies have the propensity to emanate from imbued social values, norms, activities and assumptions rather than being the sole product of individual thoughts (Finnemore, 1996; Zehfuss, 2002). This stresses the impact of historical, cultural and political forms as well as issues of path dependence or departure that provide incentives or disincentives for political behaviour which is, in this case, the international relations of states. Scholars highlighting this assumption focus on how these social constructions directly shape ideas, thereby treating them as a primary source. This is because society should be seen as more than just a milieu for pursuing predefined material and logical interests; rather, it should be seen as an environmental platform susceptible to different dynamics

that influence ideas, identities and interests of actors thereby shaping policy decisions. This study treats this process of social construction and individuals' products of thought and ideas as interdependent and context relative. In essence, interest and ideas are not given but emanate from social interaction either between actors or between actors and their society; and they are also subjected to change occasioned by the outcome of these relations. Although a more comprehensive discussion and critique of constructivism will be offered in chapter two, methodologically, I intend to pursue a constructivist approach further to explain context and ideas not only from the perspective of resisting change but also as receptive to change.

This study, therefore, rejects the assertion that institutions or material logic alone form the basic unit of social and political analysis, but emphasises the interdependence between the social environment, ideas and meanings attached to it by decision-makers; which in turn becomes an incentive or disincentive for actions and inactions. Any study of ideologies that focuses on strict institutional structures with given ideas and interests will fall short in adequately exploring the full purview of the ideological space. Rather, it is a shift from this restrictive analysis – not limited to identifying causal laws for policy behaviour – that a study of ideologies such as this can find space by combining inductive reasoning with a comprehensive analysis of deductive assumptions.

Methodological precedence set by the new stream of scholars in the study of ideologies is very instructive in this case. Most of these studies, being interpretivist-inclined, peruse approaches ranging from hermeneutics, anthropology, social psychology, discursive, conceptual, to linguistics (Finlayson, 2012; Freedon, 1996). Yet, as indicated earlier, these studies focus more on the semiotic than the behavioural and so give more attention to the thought in the thought-action synergy. However, as this study shuffles between thought and action, it goes beyond what is/was being said to what is/has been done to understand meanings, beliefs and ideas that precipitated these actions. Chapter five will emphasise social construction, including tracing genealogies and historically evolving attributes of ideologies that also find place in constructivism.

Some specific studies on ideology and Ghana or Africa's international relations set the inspiration for this thesis and helped push this study in very important directions. One of the earliest studies by Scott Thompson draws on how ideology and power play out in Ghana's international relations (Thompson, 1969). But this ideology-power synergy is just one of the pejorative connotations, and the eventual conclusions of Thompson's work justify this. In addition, Kwesi Armah's clash with Thompson's overbearing focus on Nkrumah misses the dynamics that existed within the government (Addo, 1967; Armah, 2004). More recent studies, not on Ghana but Africa generally, have been accused of being a reflection of scholars' subjectivity than an objective analysis of ideologies (Elischer, 2012). This is partly

because in most of these studies there was little emphasis on the empirical collection of data for analysis of ideology. However, this thesis draws on the relatively little literature on Ghana's foreign policy, domestic politics, ideology in Africa and Ghana over the three periods this study covers. There is a vast literature on Ghana's domestic issues but a few on foreign policy, and even less on the relationship between ideologies and Ghana's foreign policy. Therefore, while it is a commonplace to hear the voices and opinions of Ghanaian policy-makers in an analysis of Ghanaian politics, far fewer policy-makers' voices are heard in international relations analysis. This is a challenge for any study that seeks to gain insights not just into ideology but also into its effects on the behaviour of states in international relations.

These observations led me to build the empirical core of this thesis around two main data sources – archives or documentary evidence and interviews – whose main essence was not just to enumerate foreign policy events but also explore discussions by policy-makers about those events. The documentary sources used include audio-visuals and actual documents – both of which are archival. I extracted transcripts and information from previous interviews of policy-makers, especially the three leaders (Nkrumah, Kufuor and Rawlings) from online platforms such as *YouTube* and Ghana News Agency (GNA) reports. Newspapers were crucial because they contained not only a narrative of foreign policy events but also news about public statements and reactions to them by policy-makers. In this regard, I focused on reviewing the *Daily Graphic* and *Ghanaian Times*, the two oldest and comprehensive newspapers in Ghana. I accessed them from the Balme Library and African Studies Library both at the University of Ghana. A further key archival source was the Parliamentary Hansards kept at the library of Ghana's Parliament. This provided data on parliamentary motions, statements and bills relating to Ghana's foreign policy during the era of the three administrations under study.

Another significant source of documentary evidence was private and public documents reflecting the ideologies of the administrations selected. These were drawn from copies of public statements, press releases or speeches made by key members of the administration and the leaders themselves either in Ghana or outside, accessed at the Ghana News Agency (GNA) and Public Records and Archives Administration Department (PRAAD) offices in Accra and Kumasi. In all, I scanned and photocopied over three-thousand pages of public documents, including personal correspondence between Nkrumah and his ambassadors, envoys, representatives and presidents of other states; speeches of Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor; policy statements; bilateral agreements with the US, UK, Germany and some Eastern European Countries. These helped show the aspirations of administrations, as well as their ideological standpoints, which find articulation in speeches and policy documents. According to Quinn (2010, p. 28) "when focusing specifically on ideology – as opposed, for example, to bureaucratic politics – there is a sound argument to say that public material still represents

appropriate source material". This is because ideology is not defined in this thesis as a private construction; rather, it entails shared understandings and assumptions held by a group of people, which in this case is an administration. Public statements, in some measure, give us insight into these shared understandings even if they do not always conform to the private thoughts of the speaker. This is an 'at-a-distance technique', which does not necessarily require any form of cooperation from politicians. Studies that employ this mechanism for analysing a series of different cases have demonstrated, more often, that leaders or policy-makers are broadly sincere in the ideological framework they offer as a justification or reasoning for their policies. Any assumption of some extent of insincerity does not make their statements meaningless (Hermann, 1999; Kaarbo, 1997; Kesgin, 2012; Quinn, 2010).

The second primary source was senior politicians, current party officers, and foreign service officers who served under these administrations. Under this step, I carried out in-depth interviews through semi-structured questionnaires with policy-makers and diplomatic officers who had direct or indirect dealings with the foreign policy-making process. These participants added personal experiences to data obtained from the archives. They served to validate and explain facts obtained from documentary sources and provide information on the many issues in Ghanaian foreign policy which are not documented. The office of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has not been given any special mention here because my checks revealed that few primary documents on Ghana's foreign policy for the administrations under study can be found there, following the fire which burnt down the ministry's old building on Wednesday October 21, 2009.

Secondary sources on Ghana's foreign policy and history were obtained from books and articles collected from electronic sources, university and national libraries in Ghana and the UK. More attention was given to literature on Ghana's history to help establish a viable reflection of Ghanaian history of international relations and ideology from a variety of historical writings that do not give it much attention. The argument for this study will, therefore, be demonstrated through a balanced interpretive weight given to data from primary interviews, archival data, documentary sources and secondary historical and biographical literature.

1.7.1 Sample Selection for Interviews

Twenty-two elite interviews (see appendix for full list of respondents), including with former President Kufuor, were conducted mostly in Accra and parts of the Eastern region of Ghana where some retired diplomats live. Two sampling techniques were used for this study: purposive sampling and snowballing. Purposive sampling is useful for a study that focuses on members of the elite who have been involved in foreign policy-making. Respondents under purposive sampling are selected

deliberately because of their perceived knowledge of the subject matter and their practical experience in the cases or subject under study. In this regard, I interviewed former ministers/politicians, party executives, bureaucrats/ambassadors/diplomats at the ministry or offices in charge of Ghana's international relations and independent policy analysts, all of whom have lived experience of foreign policy events that fall within the scope of this thesis.

As a complementary sampling technique for this thesis, snowballing allowed me to be directed to other research participants or subjects for interviewing based on personal contacts or social networks. This was particularly useful because it helped me to gather data from participants I had no prior knowledge of. For instance, Ambassador Francis Tsegah⁹ directed me to another experienced foreign service official who requested that his name be kept anonymous. All recommendations were subjected to my responsibility to ensure a reasonable balance among respondents in order to avoid skewing.

Interviews and archival data lie at the heart of the empirical chapters and demonstrate my epistemological commitment to making the voices of policy-makers more evident in Ghana's foreign policy analysis. The individual semi-structured interviews provided open-ended questions designed for each respondent to comfortably talk about their policy-making and implementation experiences as well as their diverse perspectives on Ghana's foreign policy. That explains why my average interview time was about an hour. Face to face interviews or conversations with the elites across the three administrations offered me insights into personal reflections on Ghana's foreign policy that is rarely seen in the literature. In addition to the interviews, the archival data provided further insights into potential respondents who are dead or challenging to meet. Although I interviewed Ghana's first AU ambassador under the Nkrumah administration, Mr Ebenezer Moses Debrah, almost all the people directly involved in foreign policy at the time are unfortunately not alive. Nevertheless, a study of Parliamentary Hansards was a suitable alternative and gave such insights into the discussions that ensued between and among the Convention Peoples Party (CPP) government and opposition.

In line with a constructivist approach, analysis in this thesis focuses on generating an understanding of the ideological underpinnings of Ghana's foreign policy and discourses around it from the interviews and archival documents. These conversations provided insights that formed the preliminary variables and frames, significant to the theoretical discussions at the heart of this study. Here also, the intention was to project the relevance of context, how elites see and describe it, its accentuated influence on ideology and how such ideological interpretations shape Ghana's foreign policy. For constructivists,

⁹ Ambassador Francis Tsegah is a retired career Diplomat and a Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Democratic Development - Ghana

the discourses generated by state actors around issues are influential in shaping state behaviour and, in this case, when state actors were asked to reflect on certain decisions they made during their tenure, their answers provided insights into how they understand their decisions during their tenure from hindsight.

In spite of the relative ease with which my respondents spoke about Ghana's foreign policy there were some difficulties with methodology. While some scholars have noted the challenge of consistency and the researcher having to deal, to some extent, with shifting realities and contradictions in conducting elite interviews in Africa, my experience was quite different (Gokah, 2006; Johnstone, 2016; Morse, 2019; Nilan, 2002; Sowatey & Tankebe, 2019). There was a consistency in how interviewees narrated foreign policy events partly because I was mainly dealing with government/party officials and diplomats who had similar sources of information or lived experiences. The only time there was diversity, not contradiction, was in their interpretation of events. One new challenge I came across, which has rarely been highlighted in the literature, was how they talk about ideology. I had to grapple with the question of how to make a reluctant policy-maker who saw ideology from a pejorative perspective talk about it regardless.

Although I discuss the difficulties and further issues in the last chapter, one of the most important realisations from my interviews was the fluidity of conceptions and terms, because there was rarely any contemporary attempt at developing an ideological lexicon that cumulatively captures the ideas of Ghanaian or African policy-makers. This did not prevent many respondents from talking freely and candidly about what they understood to be the ideational motivations and explanations for Ghana's foreign policies. In some cases where I asked directly about the ideological predispositions of the administrations, they seemed to quickly shift to being prescriptive and sometimes expressions of exasperation at how Ghana had been short-changed in its international relations. This was common in particular with party representatives and diplomats. To a larger extent, this demonstrates the contextual limits and norms within which Ghana's international relations had to be framed and the gap between what was expected and what was achieved. More importantly, it reveals the extent of ideological diversity even within a single administration and how different officers interpret their ideologies in relation to foreign policy-making.

What the archival documents provided and interviewees said present wider conceptions of ideologies, what they mean and how they influence Ghana's international relations. Much of the contributions here are based on elite actors' experiences and discourse on the ideational foundations of Ghana's foreign policy. This has influenced how I have used data from both sources to frame a broader ideological framework to depict the relationship between foreign policy decisions and ideologies.

Since a large part of this study is based on an interpretive reading of foreign policy events and discussions, my analytical judgement comes to play. As argued by Allan Kellehear, my task, like most qualitative researches, is to persuade instead of prove – which is the preoccupation of the alternative quantitative methods (Kellehear, 1993 cited in Johnstone, 2016).

The data obtained from interviews, archival sources and secondary documents followed a three-step process for analysis. The first involved transcribing interview data and an initial archival and documentary data review to create a timeline of foreign policy events in Ghana since independence. This was particularly useful in associating administrations to events and ensuring critical events are not missed. Knowing these events and the preliminary theoretical variables that shaped the search for data and interviews, the second step was to develop themes that cut across all the administrations or were specific to any of them. This step was very critical for transposing the raw data to analysis in the thesis as it helped clarify theoretical variables and formed the basis for the third step. In the third stage, these themes were coded into NVivo analysis software, and all documents were uploaded to the software and properly associated with these themes. Through NVivo, specific words, statements and speeches were linked to various themes that helped identify additional variables and connections for the theoretical framework and analysis in chapters three, four, five and six.

1.7.2 Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations are vital in social science research because it is human behaviour and society centred, and most especially in research that deals with vulnerable respondents. Even though this research is not on vulnerable groups or poses a threat of any form to participants, ethical considerations regarding informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality are necessary. Through informed consent, participants were briefed on the scope and purpose of the study either by phone call, text or in person. They were also briefed about how vital information they provided was for this study, and the assurance of it being used solely for research purposes. Therefore, the use of other recording devices besides notetaking depended on the acceptance/comfortability or otherwise of the participants. Secondly, the extent of anonymity was solely reliant on the preference of the participant. It was assumed that while some respondents may have wanted to be named in the study, others preferred their identity to be concealed. Only one respondent requested that their identity be kept anonymous. This respondent will be highlighted and qualified in parts of the thesis where they are referenced.

1.8 Conclusion

While the primary objective of this thesis is to understand the relationship between ideologies and foreign policy-making in Ghana, it is also to help us gain insights into how such relations can be understood and demonstrated within the broader African context. This is borne out of the belief that there is more to the foreign policy of African states than what realists, pragmatists, dependency theories, or liberal theories have offered so far. One common denominator for these positions has been their overlooking of ideology as a useful variable to explain the foreign policy of African states, partly due to Africa's dependency. However, new and broad conceptions of ideologies as actual political thinking, instead of early narrow conceptions, show that even dependency does not necessarily mean the non-existence or irrelevance of ideologies. Instead, it shows how ideologies are dynamic and manifest variedly in political actions. This is not to say that ideologies are everything. I argue that ideologies interpreted from a constructivist perspective have more to offer than earlier analyses have done. This can be done if we frame a new route that focuses more on construction than strict acceptance of what exists since such strict ideological interpretations have become anachronistic in the face of the changing and 'unconventional' nature of Africa's political context and international relations. The next chapter attempts to craft this initial framework based on varied literature and primary data for this thesis.

CHAPTER 2 - Theoretical Framework: Ideological Contextualisation Framework and the Varieties of Ghanaian Nationalism

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I propose a contextual framework that is based on construction, context and components. This, I argue, is a viable alternative approach to understanding ideology and foreign policy relations in an unconventional context. As discussed in chapter one, the conventional theoretical approach to ideology and international relations has been one that attempts to establish a link between states' behaviour in international relations and ideologies of either governments or some key personalities in the government (Cassels, 2003; Gries, 2004, 2014). However, a lot of the literature that establishes this theoretical linkage between ideology and international relations are sometimes thin or vague and can rarely allow for comparison or be applied in an African or Ghanaian context. Studies that have attempted to use the same theoretical approach have been more judgemental and either pronounced ideology as dead or detrimental and unfit to policy-making (Chazan et al., 1999; Ungar, 1985; Zartman, 1966b). However, as I will show later in this chapter, some studies have tried alternative theoretical approaches, although in most cases, their pejorative, narrow or totalitarian approach to ideology has revealed imminent weaknesses that hinder further analysis of ideologies across different contexts (Geysler, 1976; Khadiagala, 2010; Nathan, 2011).

The ideology-foreign policy theoretical nexus emphasises that how policy-making elites frame a state's foreign policy is partly a reflection of the government's ideology. It gives credence to the thinking that even in a much-touted non-ideological and realist world, ideology is still relevant to understanding foreign policy-making and international relations in general. The theoretical questions that remain contentious even within the ideology-centred literature are: How do we reconceptualise ideology to meet changing international and domestic contexts? How do we streamline the application of ideology to policy analysis or the relationship between ideology and policy? In what ways do ideologies manifest or influence a state's international behaviour? It is around these questions that my theoretical contribution is situated; in bridging the gap between IR literature and the new literature on reconceptualising ideological frameworks for more broad policy analysis.

From a constructivist perspective of international relations, I unravel the inherent limitations of how ideology has been utilised even by constructivists and offer an alternative approach. Recognising that many existing theoretical accounts of ideology fall short in theorising the diversified nature of the relationship within ideological variables themselves, and between them and actions, I advocate for a contextualised approach. This approach pays more attention to heterogeneity and transcends assumptions of strict dogma and logical coherence, internally, and with other components, to a fusion

of thought and action. Heterogenous here is used not in the sense of depicting the existence of different ideological families, as has been done in much of the literature, or in anti-establishment ideologies like populism (Aguilera et al., 2021; Colantone & Stanig, 2019; Fossati et al., 2020; Kirkland, 2014; Verhoeven, 2020). Rather, heterogeneity here concerns with diversity of ideological components and the varied nature in which these are perceived, understood and interpreted in ways that do not conform to the internal consistencies of any of the existing big-ims. Such diversity is often due to contextual variance of the ideas' origins (Thomassen, 2005) and, I argue, the interpretation they get from other ideological components.

My approach to heterogeneity deals with the micro-foundation of what might look like a constellation of different ideological families on the surface. This framework comprises of two main parts – the internalised and the contextual; and with seven pathways – commitment, adoption, indigenisation, conformity, adaptability, instrumentalisation and dualisation – demonstrating how the ideas become part of governments' ideologies. The first three pathways fall under the internalised strand, while the latter four fall under the contextual. When applied empirically, this typology helps explain ideologies and focus on the often-overlooked internal dynamics and components and their role in ideological changes and foreign policy.

Altogether, the aim of this chapter is to set out a theoretical framework based on contextualising ideology and building a thought-action synergy from a constructivist perspective to explore the relationship between ideology and foreign policy-making. The rest of the chapter is structured in five sections. The first section focuses on further clarifying the concept ideology, including its elements and level of analysis. The second section sets out a detailed explanation of the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) within which the ideological components for this study are embedded. The third section details why nationalism was chosen as an umbrella term for the ideology for Ghana's foreign policy. The fourth section explains why all these fit within the constructivist international relations theory, including some critiques. In the last and fifth section, I conclude with a reflection on this chapter and its relevance for the next chapters.

2.2 Reconceptualising Ideology

In chapter one, I defined ideology as *a set of interrelated assumptions, whether intended or unintended, by an individual or group that provides a framework over a period of time not only for constructing and understanding their political/socio-economic context but also forming the foundations for their actions and inactions while serving as an interpretive tool to understand the dynamics of such actions/inactions*. The intention of this definition is to make ideology a context-induced concept and acknowledge how the dynamics of contexts can make governments' ideologies

varied from the norm of conforming to existing ideological frames. I argue that how one defines ideology shapes one's analysis by either narrowing or broadening its analytical remit for a more or less dynamic analysis. I will further demonstrate this in my empirical chapters – three, four and five. As highlighted in chapter one, narrow conceptions of ideology limit its analytical purview and sometimes lead to pejorative interpretation while broader definitions are usually non-pejorative conceptions and allow for the flexibility to consider other ideological variables beyond logical consistency and systematic philosophy. I demonstrate this by discussing next how some scholars have conceptualised ideology by categorising these definitions as pejorative and non-pejorative.

While pejorative characterisations began in earnest with Marx and Engels, it is worth noting that it has been sustained by others who are not necessarily Marxists. These characterisations are undermining in six main ways. The first is that ideology implies 'false consciousness'. Although Karl Marx himself never used the term 'false consciousness', his critique of Kant and Hegel's idealism that not only does matter exist independent of ideology, but it is also reality itself, is what later Marxists deduced the term from (Folson, 1973). Essentially, they argued that ideology presents a fuzzy and unreal picture of reality, and obscures broader societal interest in favour of the interests of a few elites. This makes ideology exploitative and illusory for all but the ruling class. Secondly, Marxists like Louis Althusser and Karl Marx himself understand ideology as *legitimizing exploitation* (ibid). They argued that the exploitative nature of ideology aims to secure the material interests of those involved in creating it.

Third, ideology is innately associated with power acquisition through what these scholars see as its dominantly mythical component, oppressive, exploitative and dehumanising possibilities (Arendt, 1973). Rejai (1991, p. 11 cited in Gerring, 1997), for instance, described ideology as "emotion-laden, myth-saturated". Another definition by McClosky (1964, p. 362) characterised ideology as "systems of belief that are elaborate, integrated, and coherent, that justify the exercise of power...". Fourth, linked to the preceding characterisations, is the totalitarian nature of how ideology has been conceptualised. This emanates from both Marxists and non-Marxists who argued that the ideology of a society, which in this case is the ideology of the ruling class, is total and hence permeates every facet of that society (Folson, 1973). This explains why they speak of *ideology*, not *ideologies*.

Fifth, it thus follows that ideology has been generally described as restrictive – restraining meaning, structure and scope. Interpretation and epistemological restriction imposed on ideology generally present it as a preserve of a select few who either were willing to maintain the status quo or seek a total revolutionary makeup of the existing reality for a new society whose principles are at total variance with the (perceived) principles of the existing societal organisation. Correspondingly, Karl

Mannheim calls this ideological and utopian mentality (Bamikole, 2012; Cristea, 2013; Leach, 1991). Seliger's (1976, p. 11 cited in Gerring, 1997) definition reflects this point. He defines ideology as "Sets of ideas by which men posit, explain and justify ends and means of organised social action, and specifically political action, irrespective of whether such action aims to preserve, amend, uproot or rebuild a given social order".

Sixth, other scholars regard ideology as a unitary entity which is internally logically consistent. They articulate ideologies as consisting of logical components that establish dialectical relationships with each other, thus entailing universally accepted meaning and connections. To illustrate this point, Sartori (1969, p. 402) defined ideology as "A typically dogmatic, i.e., rigid and impermeable, approach to politics". Essentially, they ignore the inter-subjectivity and cultural/societal uniqueness and exceptions of ideology and ideological concepts/components – making it difficult to differentiate ideology from the dialectical rigour of mainstream philosophy as critiqued by Freeden (1996). Consequently, this explains their view of ideology as a strict and unchanging stream of concepts and renders it a less enterprising venture for most academics. This approach, therefore, 'misled' scholars to prematurely declare an end of ideology in the 1960s in lieu of a situation that could best be described as a manifestation of ideological malleability (Bell, 2000; Knight, 2006).

The definitive, rigid and categorical manner in which these scholars describe ideology makes it difficult to research the concept. For instance, ideology may not necessarily be a product of class but a product of a different kind of social or political group. Just as different groups co-exist in a society, so is there a propensity for one ideology to exist with another ideology in a single society or state hence, *ideologies*. However, due to popular ascription to pragmatism and since most of these scholars argue that ideology does not change or has ended, there is virtually nothing new to study; nothing to apply to or evaluate actual policy.

It is against this backdrop of misperception and prejudices, coupled with alleged dogmatism and pragmatism, that a different group of scholars have introduced more nuanced definitions of ideology – placing emphasis more on contextualisation than on rigidity; reflecting on actual decision making; and providing a less judgemental or, what Geertz (1973b) calls evaluative, non-illusory view of ideology. The overarching priority of these scholars, notably Laclau, Freeden and Van Dijk and Gerring, has been to 'resurrect' ideological studies through novel approaches that are not only drawn from political theory but also philosophy, linguistics, history and anthropology (Finlayson, 2012; Freeden, 2006, 2021a; Gann, 1995; Gebregziabher, 2019; Gerring, 1997; Harrison & Boyd, 2003; van Dijk, 2006). Ultimately, ideology is seen as actual political thinking that is reminiscent of daily political life, and this approach emphasises its ubiquity, intrinsicity and necessity. Hunt (2009, p. xi) for

instance, defines ideology as “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.” The conceptualisation of ideology for this thesis is situated within this non-pejorative and broad perspective, as discussed in chapter one. What this means for the ideological contextualisation framework and this thesis as a whole is that I can look at ideology not as static, but a living variable whose internal components or their interpretations are susceptible to change depending on the interrelationship between it and the context.

I agree with Maynard (2019) that this broad conception does not mean everything the government does is ideological, instead, it emphasises that separating ideological concerns from strategic and pragmatic security concerns can be a false dichotomy. It also shows that ideologies matter in a way that narrow conceptions hardly capture. In the next section, I discuss the elements of ideology from this broad and non-pejorative perspective.

2.2.1 Elements of Ideology

From the preceding conceptualisation of ideology, four core elements stand out. The first is *location*. The element of location is the claim that ideology is situated within an external environment whose features influence the meaning, shape and the nature of changes within ideologies. The features of the external environment include history (here, particularly colonial history), levels of development or economic health, the political system, and the nature of domestic political cleavages. Several scholars have assessed how each of these variables shapes foreign policy decisions but their cumulative contribution to ideologies is rarely highlighted (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1997; R. Macridis & Thompson, 1967; Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Ray & Kaarbo, 2008; Whitaker & Clark, 2018; Wiarda, 2013). This forms the basis of what I call ideological contextualisation. Emphasis on relativity and contextualisation allows for the full expression of variants of the same ideology. This is particularly useful for ideological studies outside the Western context that tend to produce contextual meanings that may be quite different from their ascribed meanings in Western settings.

Second is the *thought-action synergy*. The element of fusing thought and action is meant to move ideology from the pejorative emphasis on false consciousness and impractical dogmatic belief to an understanding of ideology that proffers actions, especially policy-making, emanating from conscious thinking about reality. However, these scholars, including Michael Freedman who proffer a ‘thought-action’ fusion agenda of ideology, offer an approach that seems to lay more emphasis on thought than action. In his analysis of ideology, Freedman locates the source of political thinking or ideology in the “semiotic rather than the behavioural” (Finlayson, 2012, p. 756). His approach fundamentally rests on how ideological meanings are produced and organised through conceptual configurations, either

intentionally or unintentionally. A major focus is laid on the internal structure, logic and cultural or situational relativity of ideologies. Freedman's (1996) approach, therefore, severs the genetic and social-reality functional role of ideologies which, cumulatively, forms the basis of the 'action' in the 'thought-action' synergy.

While Finlayson (2012) is comfortable with rhetoric forming the basis of the 'action', this approach is still quite limited because ideologies are exemplified more by what actually happens in terms of policies and programmes. This is especially critical in an African context where ideological communications are perceived to be at variance with actual policy decisions; or in situations where no formal efforts are used to justify and as rationale by decision-makers towards certain policy decisions; or where decision-makers fail to articulate their ideas within a concerted ideological family; and, for Zolberg (1966), even in some cases in Africa, where leaders are either 'unaware' of their own ideology or do not articulate publicly. More so, focusing on just rhetoric in Africa's peculiar situation may be misleading as scholars identify numerous discrepancies between rhetoric and action (Clapham, 1970; Good, 1964; Omotola, 2009). In this case, rhetoric is treated primarily as an intermediary between 'thought' and 'action' but not 'action' itself. Therefore, ideological studies, in a complex contemporary world of 'thin centred ideologies', must include but move beyond concept analysis and rhetoric to a more nuanced analysis of policy decisions. In this way, the thought-action cycle can be comprehensively covered. It can therefore be deduced, from the first and second elements listed here (location and thought-action synergy), that ideology is not fixed. Rather it is susceptible to adjustments through the direct persuasion of the leadership of an administration or as a result of the changing environment and national conditions at both domestic and international level.

Third is the *interpretive* element. With the interpretive element, emphasis is placed on the explanatory function of ideology. Gerring (1997) explains this as a vital core definitional attribute of ideology. Clifford Geertz posits that with ideologies, we are able "to render otherwise incomprehensible social situations meaningful, to so construe them as to make it possible to act purposefully within them" (Geertz, 1973b, p. 220). Zartman (1966) also argues that ideology, to a large extent, explains the behaviour of African states in the international system. To him, ideologies explain who states choose as friends or enemies and who they essentially relate with. Yet his pejorative connotation of ideology limits the range of his ability to understand the power of ideologies.

Fourth is *possibilities*. Possibilities express the element of choice ideologies offer. As a critique of the more restrictive definition of ideology, I argue that ideologies proffer choices that are available to decision-makers at a particular point in time. 'Possibilities' emphasise the existence of more than one ideology as a framework or pathway to understanding a phenomenon. Zartman (1966a) points to this

element as vital for providing African leaders with choices. This element is also salient in my definition of foreign policy. From these elements, this thesis rejects the assumption of ideology as a determinant of decisions in a narrow sense. Rather, ideology constructs a framework of limits and opportunities within which decision-makers operate.

2.2.2 Level of Analysis

The level of analysis for this thesis is the governmental level. It is not the aim of this study to deconstruct the ideologies of presidents Kwame Nkrumah, Jerry Rawlings, and John Kufuor. But I take into consideration the common ideologies of the various administrations that influenced foreign policies made in their respective regimes.

Analyses at the governmental level, which is sometimes referred to as the group level analysis, is based on the claim that we can sometimes ascribe an ideology to a group of people even when not all members of the group, or in this case government, internalise the beliefs of the ideology. Internalisation here means a situation where members or individuals possess internal strong internal convictions concerning those beliefs (Wendt, 1999; 2004). But, if members are able to identify and recognise a set of assumptions or beliefs as core to the government, then they may confidently espouse and take decisions that conform to those beliefs even though they may privately not have any real conviction for them. These core assumptions or beliefs become an operational framework for the government's actions. A foreign minister, for instance, may personally disagree with some of their government's alliances or other international commitments but may feel obliged to make decisions that comply with it. While taking cognisance of the former, the latter is what I will focus on as that represents the broader ideological disposition of a government.

A real case scenario in Ghana, outside this thesis's cases, was when President John Mahama reversed the near-isolationist policy of his predecessor, President John Mills, towards Côte d'Ivoire – a policy he had hitherto defended as the vice president. The National Democratic Congress (NDC), under the leadership of President John Mills and Vice President John Mahama (2008-2012) took an isolationist stance towards the Ivorian conflict and declined to send in military troops in 2011. This stance was defended by the then Vice President Mahama, who later reversed it when he took over as President after the death of John Atta Mills and pursued a more assertive pro-ECOWAS foreign policy. Therefore, it was evident from his post-takeover rhetoric and action that he ideologically did not support the isolationism of his predecessor but had to conform to the general ideology of the government. There are other rare exposing moments in international relations or governance where critical members of governments have espoused ideas that do not conform to those of their government. Most often, these are hidden, especially when the government aims to portray internal unity to the public, yet

there are cases where such members have to leave the administration. This is to show that even though it is possible for individuals in a government to have different beliefs, understanding the policy-making-ideology synergy may require that we take into consideration the summation of shared ideas that cut across the individuals and underpins policy-making.

Analysing the ideology of a government is a familiar approach to ideology-foreign policy analyses. In Hunt's analysis of ideology and US foreign policy, he emphasises on how decision-making elites of various governments have shaped US ideologies of foreign policy "rooted in the process of nation-building, in domestic social arrangements broadly understood, and in ethnic and class divisions" (Hunt, 2009, p. 16). Maaïke Warnaar does a similar analysis in her *Iranian Foreign Policy during Ahmadinejad: Ideology and Actions*. Instead of focusing on deconstructing the ideas of Ahmadinejad, she explores how a variety of ideas from within the foreign policy-making elite machinery provided a context for Iranian foreign policy behaviour under Ahmadinejad (Warnaar, 2013).

On the African scene, quite a large number of works on ideology and foreign policy-making focuses more on the individual level analysis (Khadiagala, 2010; Zartman, 1966b). More useful is Scott Thompson's *Ghana's Foreign Policy 1957-1966 Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State* where Kwame Nkrumah was his analytical subject. As a critique of Thompson's analysis, Armah (2004) argues that it was an inherent limitation for Thompson to assume that Ghana's foreign policy was shaped only by Nkrumah. A member of the Conventions Peoples Party (CPP) government, Kwesi Armah¹⁰ contends that members of the Nkrumah government played an active role in shaping Ghana's foreign policy. Deductively, the ideological foundation of Ghana's foreign policy under the CPP could not only be attributed to Nkrumah's private convictions but to the government as a unit. Notwithstanding, I analyse the source of government's ideologies – one of which could be the leaders. While these contestations are interesting, this thesis is interested in exploring the ideological foundations of the government in general while acknowledging that individuals may have their private ideas that may, at a point in time, synchronise or be at variance with the final policy decisions of the government.

2.3 Ideological Contextualisation Framework

The Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) is an initial attempt to craft a broad outline of the relationship between ideology and foreign policy-making in an unconventional context. To summarise, this framework is made up of two parts. The first part is the internalised ideas that capture established ideologies or big-isms. Internalised ideas are necessary because they form the fundamental frame of thinking about the world when one takes ideologies seriously. It is common for many African

¹⁰ He served as a local organiser of the Convention People's Party in the 1950s, as Ghana's High Commissioner in London in 1961-1965, and as Minister of External Trade in 1965-1966.

governments to associate with one of the big ideologies that are close to their political beliefs, although they may vary in meanings due to the demands of their context. The second is the contextual ideas that capture the variables within each context capable of developing into an ideational structure that internalised ideas adjust to. In the context are ideological components and contextual structures. Ideological components are historically evolving conditions that internalised ideologies, regardless of wherever they came from, either take on board or respond to it. In this study, they include good neighbourliness, African consciousness/Pan-Africanism, economic independence and anti-colonialism.

Although these are common ideological components to all Ghanaian governments, there is no objective interpretation. They get their meaning and approaches from governments' internalised ideologies and contextual structures. For instance, I will show in chapter four that a classical liberal Kufuor administration pursued Pan African approaches from a functional sub-region economic integration and saw former colonial metropole (Britain) as a relationship "to maximise our economic efforts and benefits".¹¹ This is different from the Nkrumah administration that favoured rapid political union of African and was wary of neo-colonialism. This was shaped by the administration's broad thinking of international 'class' marginalisation of states and the need to amass resources and nations to survive and project an African personality to the rest of the world. So, they preferred rapid political union from which the rest flows. Nkrumah's idea of "seeking first the political kingdom" (Mazrui, 1966, p. 113) expressed this approach.

¹¹ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview 2019

Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF)
Ideology-Foreign Policy-making Process




Figure 2. 1 A flow diagram for the ideology-foreign policy-making process as captured within the Ideological Contextualisation Framework. Source: Researcher

However, figure 2.1 shows that this is not the only thing happening in the context. Contextual structures are those institutions, domestic or international, historical or not, that tend to create ideas that governments respond to. These institutions include the IMF and World Bank, the UN, AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional bodies. Constructivists have long emphasised norm diffusion by international organisations (Carlsnaes, 2013; Finnemore, 1996; Ray & Kaarbo, 2008). However, this emphasis has always been a top-down analysis with little emphasis on the interaction between governments and these institutions on the level of ideas. This framework proposes that while some governments conform to it only for a short period out of pressure, others genuinely adapt for the long term. Some can instrumentalise the ideas to achieve the government’s ideological purposes or dualise when the government shuffles between conforming to structural ideas and their own ideas. These ideological adjustment pathways are not mutually exclusive. Instead, governments can shuffle with the pathways for a single institution or idea. I will justify these parts and their pathways in detail in the sections below.

On June 27, 2020, former President Kufuor made a profound statement to clarify the ideology of the New Patriotic Party (NPP). It was on the NPP’s acclamation of Nana Akuffo Addo and Dr Mahamudu

Bawumia as presidential and running mate candidates for the 2020 national elections where he took the opportunity to articulate and clarify the party's ideology. He declared that:

People ask whether this party is leftist or socialist; we are not. But I tell you we respect *capitalism with conscience*, capitalism that is human, and this is why we fit the safety nets. The safety nets below which we do not allow any human to fall under...¹²

What Kufuor said is similar and resonates with what came to be known as 'compassionate Conservatism' during the David Cameron administration and the Bush administration, in the sense of an approach that allowed a role for the state in protecting welfare against some of the excesses of capitalism (Bochel & Powell, 2018; Brainard, 2003; Newman & Hayton, 2021). However, Africa's history and its impacts in creating different socio-political and economic conditions across the continent make the factors for consideration different from those of the US and UK, especially in foreign policy. For instance, the US still does not have to deal with regional integration approaches as African countries do; neither does the UK have to deal with neighbour-relations interwoven with ethnicity, fluidity and tensions as many African countries must (Aluede, 2017; Olorunsola, 1978). This demands a search for new ideas, or revisions to existing ones in ways that make them fit for purpose within an African and Ghanaian context.

Historically, many African leaders and governments have made efforts to frame ideas to help them understand goals, including decolonisation and socio-economic development. Hendrickson & Zaki (2013) lists a number of them, including African Abolitionism and anti-colonialism, African Socialism and Marxism, the Non-Aligned Movement, Negritude, Ujamaa, Ubuntu, African feminism, environmentalism, and postcolonialism. In Ghana, Nkrumah crafted a new ideology for Africa's development called philosophical consciencism (Nkrumah, 1964). One of my respondents, a retired career diplomat who requested anonymity, argued that this constant search happens because none of the existing big-isms emanated from Africa. This has occasioned them in a constant search for ideas to address the continent's challenges.

These numerous ideological manifestations depict a heterogeneous nature in the sense that while their beliefs and ideas resemble some established ideologies, none of those ideologies can adequately represent their aspirations and approaches. In some cases, their ideas are contradictory when analysed within a single big ideology. For instance, in an analysis of political parties in Ghana, Whitfield (2009, p. 630) argues that there is "a gap between the ideological images constructed by the parties

¹² A speech delivered by Former President John Agyekum Kufuor, on 27th June 2020, at the acclamation of President Nana Akufo Addo and Dr Mahamudu Bawumia as President and Running mate for the New Patriotic Party's (NPP) 2020 election. Retrieved from <https://www.graphic.com.gh/news/politics/kufuor-on-how-akufo-addo-bawumia-beautifully-articulate-political-leadership.html>. Accessed August 20, 2020.

and the actual policies pursued by those parties when in government". She further argues that this has occasioned a situation where the policies of the NPP and NDC since the 1990 have not been that different regardless of their pronounced ideological differences. This means that their policies contradict the ideas they pronounce. Yet when these 'contradictory' ideas are placed within contexts faced by decision-makers, they can be well understood within an analytical framework that acknowledges the dynamic nature of their heterogeneity. This is close to what Michael Freedon calls thin-centred ideologies, although his focus was more on the semiotic construction than their contextually manifesting nature (Freedon, 1996).

Africanist scholars are not oblivious to this situation. However, they have still not made enough advances to ideological studies to adequately capture the conceptual and practical issues or challenges that emerge. Scholars including Bamikole (2012), Elischer (2012), Hountondji (1996), Kronenfeld (1975), and Sprinzak (1973) have revealed that the African context is so diverse in comparison with the Western world that ideas cannot be identified with one big ideology, especially those with roots outside Africa. Clapham (1970), in his bid to critically examine whether the expressions and opinions of African political leaders match their ideologies, concludes that their statements could not meet the standard of what can be called political philosophies, theories or ideologies. This is because, for him, just like many earlier and later (ideology pejorative/narrow) scholars, consistency and strict coherence are the mark of political ideologies, and since ideas espoused by African leaders do not conform to these principles, they cannot be regarded as ideas with analytical utility. He suggests that these statements and opinions should be seen as responses to the situations faced by these leaders.

Therefore while I agree with Bamikole (2012, p. 71) that "Clapham's observation is essentially correct but based on the wrong premise", I add that it is rigid and lacks a framework that acknowledges contextualisation and heterogeneity.¹³

Generally, research has identified the various effects that ideologies have on states' foreign policy decision-making process and international relations behaviour (Cassels, 2003; Fawn, 2004; Warnaar, 2013). On the African continent, some scholars have also identified the effects of ideologies on foreign policies (Good, 1964; Schramm, 2010; Zartman, 1966b). I argue that such ideological effects are a result of different kinds of interaction between actors' or elites' internalised ideologies and the informed perception of their environment. This raises some key foundational questions: what is the

¹³ The challenge with Bamikole's (2012) analysis is when he calls some ideas pragmatic and others ideological without explaining what counts for each of them after he had initially explained the fluid and non-conforming nature of ideologies in Africa in terms of established western standards.

interaction between ideologies and their environments? How exactly are ideologies able to influence such foreign policy behaviour? In what ways do these influences manifest?

Existing studies rarely answer these questions explicitly. Typically, scholars rely on either analysing leaders or governments, like the Nkrumah administration, who have a strong inclination to certain ideologies, so they take foreign policy decisions based on their ideologies which are sometimes considered irrational and anti-national interest, especially when they do not provide positive dividends. In chapters three and four, I will discuss how although the Nkrumah administration was touted as one of such governments, there was more happening in terms of ideology and context interactions. Or the governments, like the Rawlings administration, who have ideologies but drop them to make decisions regarded as pragmatic. These governments are usually regarded as either not having an ideology, or attachment to it if they do. Here, many scholars establish a dichotomy between 'ideologues' and 'pragmatics'. This divide between the two is problematic. The former struggles to explain changes to ideologies, while the latter finds it difficult to explain ideologies or even identify nuances of ideologies. It is problematic because together, they both ignore contextualisation and the subtleties that characterise ideologies. They only explain the extremes of total ideology and no ideology. In this study, such approaches to ideology cannot account for ideology under a Kufuor government, as I will show in chapter five on relations with the Bretton Woods Institutions (BWI), because such relations are often called pragmatism. Also, these approaches do not fully capture the diverse correlation and processes through which ideologies may influence foreign policy decisions.

In a study of ideology and conflict behaviour, Maynard (2019 p. 639) argues that distinctions such as this do not do "justice to modern social scientific understandings of the diverse causal processes through which ideas may influence action". Also, these approaches typically do not help us put a theoretical structure on how this happens, especially in a continent where the heterodox nature of ideology is evident. Part of the reason for this problem is the narrow definition of ideologies, as highlighted above, which restricts conceptions of ideologies to logical consistency and cognitive attributes. Kufuor's statement, "capitalism with conscience" typifies the limitations of such conceptions in reflecting the dynamics of their context and demonstrates how African governments navigate their way through ideologies. It also presents us with the heterodox nature of ideologies in Ghana, reflecting the condition of many African governments. His statement sends us on a theoretical journey to understand the relationship between ideologies and contexts and, for this thesis, how such relations shape foreign policy. This section proposes an Ideological Contextualisation Framework that accounts for the diverse ways in which ideologies link to foreign policy and transcends the two approaches mentioned earlier. I move on to discuss the various parts of the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF).

2.3.1 Internalised Ideas

Internalisation happens when there is a sincere belief in the values and preferences in certain schemas that influence the perception and understanding of individuals or groups' context and decision-making (Berry & Kenny, 2013; Hatzopoulos, 2008; Laborde, 2013; Malesevic, 2006; Maynard, 2019). Internalised ideas are necessary because they form the fundamental frame of thinking about the world when one decides to take ideologies seriously. It is common to find that in many of the memoirs of African elites there are mentions of their wide reading of philosophy along with ancient and medieval political theories. Kwamena Ahwoi,¹⁴ one of my interviewees who served as a cabinet minister under the Rawlings administration, revealed that before they joined the PNDC government, many of his colleagues had engaged in wide reading of Marx, Engels and Nkrumah among others.¹⁵ He added that this gave them their primary experience of the world of political theories and shaped their ideologies. Therefore, it has become a norm in Ghana and many African states that key members of governments need to know about dominant ideas before they subscribe to one or frame new ideas if they want to. In my interview with Kufuor, he emphasised how he was socialised into the party ideology of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition leading him to eventually choose Busia as his mentor. Kufuor's inclusion of 'capitalism' in his remark, "we respect *capitalism with conscience*", represents this internalised idea which is the same as the ideology of his party and later government.

According to Maynard (2019, p. 639) internalisation is the "most familiar and obvious way in which ideologies can influence behaviour". Hatzopoulos (2008, p. 31) argues that while ideologies can be "conceived in a generalised, seemingly common-sense, and 'neutral' fashion" internalisation is where ideology is completed as 'passive acceptance' of ideologies may not matter much in the understanding of the relationship between ideologies and actions. Similarly, Sari et al. (2019) argues that internalisation is the last of the three steps – introduction, understanding and internalisation – of ideological socialisation and its influence on behaviour.

This can be demonstrated in different ways, but one way governments show their internalised ideologies to the rest of the world is by belonging to like-minded international ideological associations. For instance, the NPP and NDC belong to the International Democrat Union (IDU) and the Socialist International (SI), respectively (Socialist International, 2008).¹⁶ While they might not have the same

¹⁴ Kwamena Ahwoi served as member of the PNDC: Minister for Local Government and Rural Development from 1990 to 2001 He also briefly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997 and was acting minister of Foreign Affairs during much of the 1990s.

¹⁵ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

¹⁶ International Democrat Union (IDU) membership list Accessed on May 17 2021, Retrieved from <https://www.idu.org/members/>

thinking as all political groups in the association, membership is a broader indication of their internalised ideologies or indication of ideas they do not subscribe to.

As I will show in the empirical chapters but more detailed in chapter five due to how ideology played out in economic diplomacy, all the three administrations have different internalised ideologies. The Nkrumah administration internalised a socialist ideology that came to be known as Nkrumaism after series of conceptualisations and contestations between members of the administration. The Rawlings administration rather internalised a complex mix of socialism-Marxism and later social democracy. Chapter five shows that this is partly a result of the many groups from different ideological backgrounds that make up the PNDC/NDC. The Kufuor administration internalised classical liberalism or what the New Patriotic Party (NPP) refers to as property-owning democracy. I will show in chapter five that although the government has been historically committed to this internalised idea, the *capitalism with conscience* statement by Kufuor demonstrated their bid to adapt the idea to the realities of the Ghanaian context.

These are called internalised ideologies because they form the foundation of how they think about politics, and in chapter five, I will demonstrate how given a similar situation with the Bretton Woods, the Rawlings and Kufuor administration acted differently partly based on their internalised ideology.

However, as discussed below, governments and parties internalised these ideas through different means that eventually shaped their policy responses. The process of internalisation occurs through three main pathways: commitment, adoption and indigenisation.

2.3.1.1 Commitment

There is a general acceptance in the ideology literature, both old and contemporary, broad and narrow, that decision making can be greatly influenced by ideologies when governments or individuals feel sincerely committed to the ideas involved (Freeden, 1998; Freedon et al., 2013; Geertz, 1973b; Halliday, 2005; Schubiger & Zelina, 2017). According to Maynard (2019), this does not necessarily need to be systematic, fanatic or reflective to affect foreign policy behaviour. Rather, these ideas may need to carry what psychologists refer to as intrinsic resonance for individuals and governments, which directly influences perception and decision-making. For instance, contrary to the assumption that a lot of African leaders simply used ideologies as rhetoric for either public consumption or to make themselves more useful in the international ideological Cold War, this thesis and some new studies along with archives have revealed that even in private correspondence and actions, these governments took ideologies very seriously: making decisions in light of ideologies which they appeared to be sincerely committed to. In chapters four and five, I generally show that, the fact that, in some cases, the leaders had to go through ideological battles leading to the formation of ideological

clusters like the Casablanca and Monrovia groups; the popular disagreement between Nkrumah and Nyerere (Wapmuk, 2009; Žák, 2016); the disagreement on how to treat colonial relations in a postcolonial world; and the later disagreement over the right time and approach for regional integration, all showed that some leaders had a sincere commitment to ideational interpretations of the African context (Good, 1964; Khadiagala, 2010).

More specifically, I show in chapter five that the Kufuor administration's commitment to classical liberalism shaped how they received policies of the Bretton Woods and worked towards its relative success. Although African governments' relations with the Bretton Woods institutions are generally analysed in the context of extraversion and lack of agency, I show in chapter six that this was not the usual manifestation of lack of agency but a government that believed in the viability of the Bretton Woods policies to. Essentially when we unravel a government's commitment to certain ideas, actions that conform to such ideas cannot be bluntly regarded as extraversion or lack of agency regardless of who initiated it. Rather, it is a good place to begin to analyse the dynamics of agency.

2.3.1.2 Adoption

Adoption is where individuals or governments do not feel intrinsic ideological commitments to certain ideas, but they sincerely accept those ideological positions. Political psychologists, sociologists and communication theorists have long held that individuals or governments usually adopt ideas when they fill the gaps their intrinsic ideas cannot address (Jervis, 1976; Jost et al., 2009; Nussio, 2017). For instance, a government or people with no clear, consistent and intrinsic ideas tend to sincerely adopt an ideology that addresses a primary objective. In chapter five I propose that the CPP and PNDC/NDC adopted their socialist and socialist-Marxist ideology as a middle-ground as these administrations were constituted by different groups from various ideological backgrounds who came together to overthrow colonialism (CPP) and imperialism (PNDC/NDC). According to Kelman & Hamilton (1989), adoption is usually rooted in identification: governments who do not have sincere intrinsic ideological commitment tend to adopt ideas close to their thinking and express their grievance or ideas of organisations that are sincerely spearheading those objectives. Chapter three will describe the PNDC/Rawlings relations with the socialist world as part of their identification with an international proletariat group of states whose intention is to 'overthrow' capitalism's dominance and cease their exploitation. I argue that it partly explains how the government defined its conceptual neighbourhood and friendship to include countries like Libya and Cuba who at the time had governments fighting a similar course.

Maynard (2019) argues that it is likely that individuals who adopt ideologies are more tolerant to compromises and deviations due to their lack of intrinsic commitment to those ideas. I show in chapter

five, with the ideology dynamics of the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, that groups that adopt ideologies are equally susceptible to internal ideological disagreements and contestations. This is because they come from different ideological backgrounds, and once the primary objective that brought them together is settled, they tend to disagree on the future of their government or party.

The difference between commitment and adoption is more apparent by comparing the three administrations. Primarily, the three empirical chapters demonstrate that the Kufuor administration seemed relatively stable and internally consensual in its ideological convictions than the other two administrations who had to manage different groupings and ideological orientations.

This is not to say that the Kufuor administration was replete of ideological disagreements. Like many groups, they did, and several studies on Ghana's elite politics have shown these in relation to electoral politics (Frempong, 2019; Frempong & Siaw, 2021). However, the long existence of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition, before the Kufuor administration government in 2001, gave them enough time to deal with these differences and build a broad consensus that concealed such disagreements.

2.3.1.3 Indigenisation

Indigenisation is the process of framing ideas and localising them from their foundations contrary to either committing or adopting existing ideologies. It occurs when there is a genuine effort to frame new ideologies outside existing ones that reflect the socio-cultural, political, historical and economic conditions of their environment.

At every stage of the global political process, groups or individuals propound theories or frameworks in their bid to understand the present situation and make proposals for the future or address particular frameworks or create broader frameworks within which people frame their perceptions, understandings and actions. When they last for a long time, they become grounded as ideologies.

This frequently happens when there is a feeling that existing ideologies do not fully express their context, did not emanate from their environment or do not have enough components to grapple with the context and issues under consideration fully. In such cases, instead of adopting or committing to existing ideologies and inducing changes through the contextual pathways, some governments attempt to create new ones. This was a common phenomenon for new governments in Africa during the immediate post-independent era, although they did not last for long. One such elaborate effort was created by Nkrumah who tried to develop an ideology for African development, Consciencism. It was Nkrumah's bid to "map in intellectual terms of disposition of forces which will enable African society to digest the Western and Islamic and the Euro-Christian elements in Africa and develop them in such a way that they fit into the African personality" (Bamikole, 2012, p. 72; Nkrumah, 1964). This

is essentially what Mazrui later referred to as the triple heritage thesis that highlights the traditional African, Islamic and Western cultural influences on African ideologies (Mazrui, 1986). Although several attempts have been made, efforts at indigenisation have not been a very successful venture for African governments. I will show in chapter five that although indigenisation did not happen on the grand scale, it still manifested and was critical in how the government's especially the CPP conceptualised its ideological components.

The fundamental argument of this framework is that the internalised is only one part of the whole thought (ideology) - action (foreign policy) process. Internalisation is not an end in itself, but a means to an end in the cyclical relations with context. It becomes an end when you conceive ideologies as singular concepts framed outside their immediate environment – a narrow view of ideology that this contextual framework contests.

2.3.2 Contextual Ideas

Throughout this thesis, one of the arguments I have been making concerning ideologies is the importance of context to understanding how ideologies influence foreign policies. Focusing just on the internalised component underestimates the impact of ideologies, narrows its purview, and even makes ideological change an analytical mystery that sometimes gets called 'pragmatism'. Ideologies are embedded in an environment, and governments are influenced not only by their sincere internalised ideologies but also by the interaction between these beliefs and their socio-economic environment (both domestic and international). This is the essence of the ideological contextualisation approach. Many scholars have theorised about how ideologies are intertwined with contexts and lived experience (Althusser, 1994; Cristea, 2013; Gramsci, 1971; Hatzopoulos, 2008). Their focus has dominantly been on moving ideology from the "reality/falsehood, truth/illusion binary opposition" (Hatzopoulos, 2008, p. 36) to "shaping what people are effectively doing" (ibid, p. 34) by providing a framework through which ordinary people can make sense of their social world.

In other words, they place more emphasis on a one-way relation between ideologies and actions but little on the reciprocal links between ideology and context. They cannot adequately account for ideological change and how social structures shape meanings and interpretations of ideological components. However, the point being made here is that states' activities in different national sectors manifest into policies, paradigms and path dependence that create opportunities, threats, incentives and constraints for people or governments to comply with, irrespective of the committed, adopted or indigenised ideologies. These either shape internalised ideas or get their meaning from them. As I will demonstrate later in chapter five, Kufuor's use of the word 'conscience' exemplifies such an attempt to understand and frame the relations between internalised ideas and contextual elements.

There are three key things to note under contextual ideas: components, structures and pathways. Contextual components are the elements of a country's condition that has historically become part of their ideology. Structures are institutions and external entities that, though not core to the country's condition, have some penchant for shaping ideas of government. Pathways are how this influence of government's internalised idea by structures happens. I explain these next beginning with components, contextual structure and pathways.

Contextual components are historically evolving conditions of a country that has attained ideological value and feature is governments' ideologies. In this study of Ghana, these conditions include good neighbourliness, African consciousness or Pan-Africanism, economic independence and anti-colonialism. The argument here is that every Ghanaian ideology has something to say about these components, even if they do not form the core of that ideology.

The goal of good neighbourliness is to live in peace with neighbours. This idea has been one of the most consistent norms of Ghana's foreign policy since independence, and it features in almost every foreign policy statement. This is partly because neighbour-relations are crucial for other key aspects of foreign policy, including regional integration and domestic political and economic stability. However, a distinction is made between what I call conceptual and geographical neighbours. While the latter deals with geographical proximity as a basis for considering a country as a neighbour, the former is the pursuit of good neighbour-relations with countries whose governments share similar ideological views. I will argue, in chapter three, that it is the difference between the geographical and conceptual neighbourhood that creates the idea of friends and enemies as a basis for foreign policy, and ideologies are critical to creating this phenomenon.

Pan-Africanism or African consciousness comes with the dominant goal to recognise and empathise with other Africans as joint victims of the international system's colonialism, racism and globalisation. This dominant goal drives two subordinate goals: a union of African states and functional integration. Chapter four shows that these goals are inherent to Ghanaian nationalism, and their pursuit shapes Ghana's efforts towards regional integration. In this thesis, I use Pan-Africanism and African consciousness interchangeably to mean the level of awareness of the African condition and the extent of willingness that governments show in their knowledge and commitment to some form of integration among the people on the continent.

Economic independence is the idea that characterises the bid to wean Ghana's economy from its dependence on foreign economies for basic support and recovery. Its principal goal is to stimulate domestic economic development to a point where, according to Kufuor, Ghana would not need foreign assistance to cater for a substantial part of its budget. Nkrumah, like earlier Gold Coast

nationalist leaders, usually distinguished political independence from economic independence. To Nkrumah, in particular, political independence was achieved in 1957, but economic independence was not (Esseks, 1967). This has been a common theme in Ghana's politics and a consistent driver of economic diplomacy of all governments since independence.

The last component is anti-colonialism and the urge to cut Ghana from perceived colonial stranglehold. 'Perceived' is used here because there is no agreement between the different administrations on colonialism; how its effects are perceived, the role of former colonial metropolises and what kind of relations should be fostered between Ghana and former colonial metropolises. In chapter all the empirical chapters, I demonstrate how a government's interpretation of anti-colonialism shapes the policies in the three foreign policy areas. For instance, one key feature of anti-colonialism that tends to shape interpretations and approaches of the other components is the extent to which governments blame colonialism/neo-colonialism and deliberate uneven international system for Africa's woes and under-development. In chapter five, I call this the externalisation – internalisation spectrum of Africa's challenges. The meaning of these two is literal and different from internalised ideological strand framed as part of this thesis's theoretical framework. Governments that emphasise the neo-colonial, uneven global environment and sometimes pessimistic overview of Africa in such a world externalise Africa's challenges. Governments that focus more domestic deficiencies such as corruption, history of maladministration and misappropriation, since independence, internalise Africa's challenges. Typically, while governments that internalise Africa's challenges see the West or former colonial metropolises as development partners for stronger cooperation, governments that externalise are mostly wary of such relations and constantly search for alternatives even if they are 'forced' conform. Chapter five demonstrates this phenomenon in Ghana's economic diplomacy, especially under the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations. These two are not mutually exclusive. Instead, a government's emphasis on one or position on the spectrum shows its ideational position on Africa's past, present, future, and eventual approaches to dealing with the challenges.

To reiterate the argument I made at the beginning of explaining this framework, though these components are common to all administrations, their meanings and interpretation change according to the internalised idea of governments or influences from contextual structures.

It is widely acclaimed that context can constitute structures or avenues of path dependence, based on the ideas of powerful international and domestic agents, that many governments are usually bound to follow regardless of their ideologies (Robertson & East, 2005). An ideological structure that many African countries and developing countries have to deal with its mutually constituting elements is the Bretton Woods institutions. As argued above, even those governments which reject these structures

have something to say about them. Whether pro or anti, they feature in their ideologies. While these seem like structures or contexts based on history in the international system, others are located within the government's immediate environment. These include domestic political and economic conditions as well as public opinion. These structures create some sort of ideological convergence that produces a self-reinforcing dynamic and expectations that sustain an ideological character. This has to be taken on by the ideologies of new governments regardless of their internalised ideas. The focus on the Bretton woods is due to how critical they are in general African politics and economic diplomacy, specifically (Moosa & Moosa, 2019; Thompson, 2016). Other contextual structures that will be discussed in chapter three and four, for their impact on neighbour-relations and regional integration, are: the United Nations (UN), African Union (AU) or Organisation of African Unity (OAU), and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

The next discussion focuses on how contextual structures influence governments' ideologies. This adjustment happens four ways – conformity, adaptability, instrumentalisation and dualisation – and how they happen influence foreign policy behaviour.

2.3.2.1 Conformity

Social and political psychologists have emphasised the tendency for individuals or groups to comply with societal pressures or ideological structures (Feldman, 2013; Jost et al., 2008). Conformity is one of the most dominant pathways that the pragmatist and 'no ideology' scholars use to denounce ideologies. The conventional argument is that once a government shifts to take on policies that embedded in the ideas of contextual structures, it becomes a classic exemplar of pragmatism or 'no ideology'. As discussed above, this thinking overlooks the utility and malleability of ideologies that a broad conception offers. In chapters three and five, I show that the Rawlings administration move from socialist-Marxist to social democracy, with elections as an integral part, was by conforming to these ideas from external and internal institutional pressures and later internalising them. One key feature to note is that once a government conforms to a contextual structure, it reduces the power of sincere internalised ideas. It, however, does not mean the total annihilation of it. In chapter five, I will show that while the Rawlings administration's enrolment on the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) is a case of conformity, there were hints of instrumentalisation – a pathway I will explain below.

2.3.2.2 Adaptability

Adaptability is when an internalised ideologies takes on new shapes by adjusting to accommodate contextual ideological structures. This usually happens when an internalised ideology is unable to fully capture the realities, aims, and aspirations of governments, but a contextual structure presents an alternative. Unlike conformity, adaptability is a conscious effort to induce ideas from contextual

structures into an internalised ideology. In all the empirical chapters I show how regardless of the ideology a Ghanaian government internalised, they take on some values from contextual structures such as the United Nations and African Union. Adaptability fits into what constructivists have long acknowledged as states' and governments' learning feature and function. Governments tend not just to conform to ideas but can learn to internalise these norms ideas (Kratochwil, 1981; Stefano & Leander, 2006). In these instances, in Finnemore's (1996) lens, states are viewed as autonomous entities who scout the global environment to learn good practices that, in turn, shape their national interest. This also reveals the different levels of agency, as I will discuss further in chapter six.

2.3.2.3 Instrumentalisation

The instrumentalisation of ideology is a key feature which scholars in different fields have highlighted to demonstrate the relationship between rhetoric and ideologies; but also the power of such a relationship, even if there is no sincere intrinsic commitment (Maynard, 2019; Schubiger & Zelina, 2017; Thaler, 2012). In foreign policy, instrumentalisation efforts are mainly an ideological pathway to take advantage of a contextual ideological mood or structure to achieve certain goals based on one's intrinsic sincere ideological commitment. Instrumentalisation is linked to conformity in a way that when governments are pressured to conform, another viable way they adjust their internalised ideologies to contextual structures is by instrumentalising the ideas of those structures. In chapter five I show that although PNDC accepted the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), which was contrary to their dominant socialist-Marxist ideas, they used this programme to achieve different purposes. I also discuss in chapter six how this demonstrates subtle forms of agency that we can unravel by paying much attention to ideology.

Although instrumentalisation works without any sincere ideological commitment, it can only be efficient within an ideological context. It can work efficiently when the targeted audience has internalised and sincerely committed the ideas that the governments are instrumentalising (Maynard, 2019). Instrumentalisation works when there is a goal to be achieved by the audience. This goal could be based on the audience's committed, adopted or indigenised ideologies and depends on how salient they regard that goal. It works well when, by instrumentalising, the 'perpetrator' indirectly achieves strategic goals based on their internalised ideas. This is when instrumentalisation is a means to an ideologically inspired end – an argument I make in chapter five regarding the Rawlings administration's relations with the BWIs. These conditions can work in tandem: some audiences may respond due to sincere sympathies to their internalised ideas; and, for perpetrators, to achieve certain ideological goals.

2.3.2.4 Dualisation

For most of the above pathways, the interaction between internalised ideologies and contextual factors results in some sort of ideological malleability. However, with dualisation, internalised ideology is typically more powerful as governments decide to shuffle between their internalised ideology and ideas from contextual structures. This shifts and interplay happen when the contextual structures are not strong enough to pressure governments to adjust their internalised ideologies, unlike conformity. I will show in chapter three that this is a key ideological feature of Ghana's neighbour relations because there are relatively weak contextual structures compared to economic diplomacy and regional integration. Scholars have used duality to explain different phenomena, especially in conceptions and actions with internal paradoxes (Hassel, 2014; Rovny & Rovny, 2017). For instance, the defining feature of political dualism in domestic politics is the interaction between constitutional and administrative or traditional state (Denoeux & Maghraoui, 1998; Holzinger et al., 2016). This domestic dualism can translate into a dualism in foreign policy where there is a similar interaction between appeal to international law and to the institutions of global governance, notably the UN and AU on the one hand and a determination to act as an independent agent based on an administration's internalised ideology, on the other. In chapter four, I argue that dualisation was key in the Nkrumah administration's attempts at regional integration because contextual structures such as the OAU were relatively weaker.

The framework I have proposed here is a broader approach to analysing ideology and how it influences foreign policy contextually. It does not recommend any specific ideologies but argues that although big-isms exist, are powerful, and people or governments can easily associate with; there are context-specific ideological components and structures that are equally powerful in not just directly influencing policies per se, but also shaping internalised ideologies. The intention is to take any established ideology, treat it as an internalised component in this framework – because it is usually the foundation for many ideologies - and then analyse how it adjust to the dynamic ideas within a specific context. This is why for the remainder of this thesis, I associate the Nkrumah administration with socialism and later Nkrumaism; Rawlings administration with socialism-Marxism; and Kufuor administration with classical liberalism.

The seemingly unsettled nature of the internalised ideologies, which are meant to be established ideas, is a manifestation that these big-isms are originated from a different context. Therefore, there is a constant search and adjustment of ideas, demonstrating ideological malleability and the relevance of contexts. It demonstrates the essence and the need for a contextual framework to analyse ideologies in an unconventional context instead of dismissing or overlooking their relevance.

This interaction between the internalised and contextual part and conceptualising how it happens makes this framework different from any existing analysis of ideology and Africa's international relations.

From the above discussions, we can say that the utility of ideology in African foreign policy is far beyond what the majority of scholarship allows. However, there are other more concrete and conceptually useful ways ideologies manifest beyond identifying roles. Its heterogeneous nature means that it is not the objective of the framework to fit within any established ideology but to reveal the link between its components, which can be clustered under various lexicons. One of the vocabularies that fit the intention of this study and the framework outlined above is nationalism. This framework leads to the existence or creation of varieties of nationalism that captures, even, the diversities within government instead of understanding them strictly in terms of cohesion and continuity. I explain the justification for the choice of varieties of nationalism in the section below.

2.4 Why Nationalism?

To demonstrate the application of the ICF Ghana's foreign policy, I have deliberately chosen varieties of Ghanaian nationalism to represent the overall dynamics of ideology in Ghana. I use nationalism to characterise the ideological components - good neighbourliness, African consciousness or Pan-Africanism, economic independence and anti-colonialism - as these have become a central component of ideologies of Ghanaian governments. Essentially, the ideologies of Ghanaian governments have something to say about these. I add varieties to the nationalism to demonstrate that although these are common conditions and components that every government deal with, they have no objective interpretation and approaches. Therefore, governments interpret these ideological components differently. These differences in interpretations are due to the differences in either their internalised ideologies or ideas from contextual structures at a particular period. However, these changes characterise their historically evolving nature and shape foreign policy.

The term nationalism is very controversial, so I clarify how I intend to use it in this thesis. Nationalism is defined as a deliberate attempt towards fostering a movement through the consciousness of origin, common destiny and a common purpose (Kimble, 1965). For Hans Khon, it is the "first and foremost state of mind, and an act of consciousness" (Khon, 1945, p. 10), conceived "by the decision to form a nationality" (Khon, 1945, p. 15). Fallers (1961, p. 677) describes it as an "ideological commitment to the pursuit of the unity, independence, and interests of a people who conceive themselves as forming a community".

These early conceptions of nationalisms were largely reflected the context within which they were propounded and mainly highlighted their irredentist nature. It was the era where most nations were

on the edge of state formation. Therefore with the limits of periodisation in mind, Geertz (1973) divides nationalism into four main phases, helping us put the limits of earlier definitions into proper perspective. The first phase is the period where nationalist movements were formed and took over the domestic political scene; the second phase is when they triumphed in their bid to win political independence. The third is the period when they organised into new independent states. The fourth phase is when these organised states entered a bid “to define and stabilise their relationships both to other states and to the irregular societies out of which they arose” (Geertz, 1973a, p. 238).

The most obvious changes and manifestations of ideas into political actions that attracted the attention of the world occurred in the second and third phases. The first and fourth phases, on the other hand, were periods where ideas that fashioned the practical events were framed. This thesis covers the fourth phase, similar to the first phase where the foundations of nationalist actions are framed.

Theoretically, variants of nationalism have been distinguished by three conceptual languages. The first is primordialism. “Primordialist approaches depict the nation as based upon a natural, organic community, which defines the identity of its members, who feel an innate and emotionally powerful attachment to it” (Brown, 2000, p. 6). Primordialists view nationalism as based on instinct. They subscribe to the consociational democracy argument that elite consensus is an important variable to secure democratic consolidation in plural societies (Andeweg, 2000; Lijphart, 1977). The second conceptual language is situationalism. The situationalist story sees nationalism from a position of interest. Essentially, it argues that the contemporary politics of nations are “in the process of being transformed by situational changes in the structure of the global economy” (Brown, 2000, p. 4). Situationalists pursue an instrumental view of nationalism that explains ethnic and national identities as resources employed by a group of people at a particular time to pursue a common interest.

The third is the constructivist view of nationalism. “Constructivist approaches suggest that national identity is constructed on the basis of institutional or ideological frameworks which offer simple and indeed simplistic formulas of identity, and diagnoses of contemporary problems, to otherwise confused or insecure individuals” (Ibid p, 20). This constructivist view is based on ideology while the situationalist and primordialist views are based on interest and instinct, respectively. These approaches provide the nodal points within which various scholars have analysed nationalism in different cases and generated different stories of ethnicity and nationalism, the rise of states, contemporary politics of nationalism (Ibid; Ozkirimli, 2005). Each of these approaches is surrounded by confusion, but this study does not go deeper into these because nationalism here is being used quite loosely as an ideological framework. However, an outline of these approaches supports this

thesis's suggestion that nationalism is an ideology, as viewed from the constructivist conceptual language, rather than an instinct or interest as seen by primordialism and situationalism respectively.

Some core themes and characteristics make nationalism a useful broad ideological lexicon for this study. Nationalism is stimulated by competing interests. Though uniformly called nationalism, it has not always been uniformed in practice. Ghanaian nationalism, at different phases, has been characterised by different groups with different interests. Between 1954-1957, nationalism in Ghana was shaped by the Conventions Peoples Party preference for a unitary state; the National Liberation Movement's preference for a federal state; while the Ewe people were divided between joining French Togoland, soon-to-be part of the independent Gold Coast, or an independent British Togoland. This was not novel as a survey of the history of nationalism reveals more of these competing interests during colonial rule, pre and post-independence (Austin, 1970). In more recent times, relations with China have also become a dilemma where the inclinations of different groups are motivated by different interests (Alden, 2005; Dietz & Kolokouris, 2012). This, therefore, highlights how the internal balance of power eventually shapes the dominant nationalist interest.

Nationalism is not sporadic but borne out of a conscious effort to understand and address challenges the environment presents. It is worthy to note the reactive nature of nationalism. Both early and contemporary conceptualisations of nationalism view it, primarily, as a reactive ideology that responds to conditions rather than being proactive. The environment, therefore, creates conditions for such reactive response and approaches to thrive. During the colonial period, the colonial conditions occasioned the resultant nationalist actions or approaches in Ghana, like other colonies (Miller, 2013). In contemporary politics, different situations have created different responses over the years. Chief among them is how the urge to develop has shaped the nature of economic diplomacy approaches by different countries. It is worthy of note that the environment, even within a particular timeline, is not static. Kimble (1965) establishes that just as the colonial condition was not static, so was the nationalist response to it. All these points support the assertion that the perspectives, approaches and objectives of nationalism change depending on the era. Also, history is an important factor in understanding nationalism. Nationalism is embedded in history, and its changes or continuities are largely stimulated by the past. Finally, nationalism is treated as a major causal factor in politics (Brown, 2000).

Contemporary definitions of nationalism do not overemphasise the idea of it being the first and foremost state of mind. They rather emphasise the diversity of objectives that has resulted in tensions "between contending civic, ethnocultural and multicultural nationalist visions" (Brown, 2000, p. 49; Gries, 2004). However, the overfocus on primordial identity-based factors limit the purview of

nationalism as an ideological bracket for different ideological components beyond these factors, and its ability not just to influence conventional irredentist motives but other aspects of political relations. This is the core advantage that broader conceptions of ideologies and a contextual framework affords us: that given the fact that African states are relatively new and still building socio-cultural and political institutions, nationalism and what it stands for is generally important. But we should not overlook modern tenets and understandings of ideological components which have received extended meanings due to the changes in context since the first phase. Here, we can focus on historically evolving ideological factors.

Therefore, the term nationalism has not been chosen out of vacuum but from an African and Ghanaian context where the term has long roots of usage and has attracted diverse practical approaches. It is established that nationalism in Ghana predates the late pre-independence nationalism and has deep roots in long traditions founded in well-established institutions (Fage, 1966; Kimble, 1965; Metcalfe, 1964; Miller et al., 2009; Padmore, 1953; Shillington, 1995; Ward, 1966). However, different generations of political leaders (either chiefs or educated elites) have adapted and drawn emotional inspiration or intellectual backing from previous forms of nationalism to shape governance systems or pursue a policy objective. One popular example is how the institution of chieftaincy has been altered over the years though it remains an important institution of modern democratic governance in Ghana (Austin, 2004; Bonoff, 2016; Odotei & Awedoba, 2006; Padmore, 1953; Siaw & Frempong, 2019). I argue that these forms of changing ideologies of Ghanaian nationalism influence domestic governance and the international behaviour of Ghana.

While there have been disagreements and different approaches in Ghana, like all nations always in history, the argument being pursued here is that Ghanaian nationalism is the dominant ideological framework used to support Ghana's approach to international relations. Specifically, I argue that an appreciation of two main issues best explains Ghana's modern ideological posture in international relations. The first is the idea that varieties of Ghanaian nationalism comprise the interaction between internalised and contextual strands shaped through seven pathways. The second concerns how different administrations managed the ideological transitions of the components of nationalism in different timelines. This is not exclusively aimed at identifying continuities and changes in Ghana's foreign policy. It also aims to analyse the way ideological shifts occurred and the critical influence of the interaction between the demands of the circumstances and limits or opportunities embedded in the ideological history of Ghana.

2.5 Why Constructivism?

By placing more emphasis on ideology and how it shapes the international behaviour of Ghana, this thesis can be situated within constructivist approaches to international relations. Constructivist approaches emphasise the role of ideas and how states' interests are shaped by socially constructed identity and norms in international relations (Wendt, 1995; Zehfuss, 2002; Kaufman, 2013). My interest in constructivism does not lie in exploring deeply the main tenets of constructivism such as the socially constructed structure of norms, intersubjective meanings, or identities and their influence on Ghana's foreign policy. Rather, I account for the emergence and dynamics of varieties of Ghanaian nationalism as a dominant framework of ideology that shapes Ghana's foreign policy-making. I focus more on Ghanaian governments' interpretation of both contextual components and structures.

Worth mentioning are some limitations in constructivism that this study, to some extent, addresses. First, emphasis on norms and identities have emerged as a core constructivist concern causing the subtle neglect of ideologies in constructivist studies. Identity became a major 'thriving trading zone' for constructivist accounts of global politics by the 2000s (Vucetic, 2017, 2020). Works such as Carlsnaes (2013), Kaarbo (2015), and Onuf (2016) show that identity still takes a large part of constructivist analyses. Similarly, a lot of constructivist studies have prioritised norms, especially norm diffusion. More of this research focuses on how specific actors propose particular norms that eventually come to be accepted by actors/states in the international system (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). Related to this limitation is the top-down approach of many constructivists. The seeming interdependency between individual agents/states and the global ideological or norm structures is missing. Constructivist studies have dominantly portrayed individual agents as passive recipients of norms from the global structures thereby facilitating a disconnect in the interaction between structures and agents. Finnemore (1996), for instance, not only reduces the level of state agency, even for 'powerful' states, but she concedes enormous power to international organisations to become what could be termed 'norm tutors' of states. This approach to international relations is less viable for this thesis that seeks to explore the decision-making of specific administrations whose thinking may be deeply embedded and engaged in the formation of ideological configurations that influence decision making.

Thirdly, constructivist FPA is constrained by what Adamson (2005, p. 547) refers to as 'liberal bias'. This emphasises the extent to which constructivist analyses have overly focused on exploring cases used by liberal actors in promoting liberal norms in the international system. To Adamson, constructivists have made universal claims through a study of carefully selected contending norms that conforms to the liberal argument and have essentially "lost sight of the fact that liberalism is only one possible ideological framework that can be used for framing political action" (ibid). Therefore, the

thrust of this thesis, to explore ideologies that do not necessarily conform to any particular grand ideology in a non-Western setting is an attempt to overcome some of these limitations. More so, because the analysis employed in this thesis emphasises the need to treat African decision-making elites as agents whose interpretation of both the external and internal environment influences their ensuing decisions.

The empirical analysis and discussion in chapter three reveal a fourth weakness in constructivism that this thesis highlights and complements. This chapter on neighbour-relations complements attempts to enhance our understanding of the idea of 'friendship and enemy' in international relations theorising by bringing a particular focus on ideology and from an African context where those friends and enemy identities are relevant. (Berenskoetter, 2007, 2014; Berenskoetter et al., 2017; Hoef & Oelsner, 2018; Pashakhanlou & Berenskötter, 2020). The idea of friendship in IR, pursued by a new group of scholars, captures dynamic relationships in which certain roles are embedded and creates bonds between states (ibid).

Friendship is not a new concept in international relations theory but has long been explained by realist and liberal scholars as the opposite of enmity. The challenge with their interpretation, as argued rightly by Felix Berenskoetter, is that "realists reduce 'friendship' to instrumental alliances, whereas liberals use the label to describe states that don't fight each other, expressed in the notion of 'security communities' between democracies" (Berenskoetter et al., 2017, p. 3). Enemies have simply been interpreted as the opposite of this. Although constructivist approaches that are most sympathetic to these assumptions are yet to take it as seriously as norm formation, identities and structures, a constructivist perspective to friendship and enmity frees the concepts from the realist and liberal frames and their preoccupation with purely material interpretations.

Here I take inspiration from scholars like Berenskoetter (2017) and adapt a conceptualisation of friendship and enemies that proposes that international friendship/enmity is a bilateral relationship in which both sides recognise each other as either friends or enemies (dis)connected by ideological bonds formed out of shared/dissimilar biographical narratives and idea of international order. This bond or disagreement is expressed in shaping foreign policy in discourse and practices such as privileged access, symbolic activities, solidarity, reciprocity, mutual responsibility and threat, sanctions and reprisal attacks in bilateral relations.

2.6 Conclusion

From the foundations set by chapter one, the purpose of this chapter is to frame an alternative route to understanding the relationship between ideology and foreign policy that relies mainly on construction, components and context – attributes that the strict and narrow conceptions of ideology

barely possess. The initial result is what I call the ideological contextualisation framework. At the core of this framework are two main parts – the internalised and contextual. The internalised part encompasses the broader ideas that government have some sincere belief in or are committed to. These can either be an already established ideology like Marxism or socialism or originally framed like Nkrumah’s consciencism. The contextual part consists of ideological components and ideas from contextual structures that typically lie outside the frame of the internalised, thus within the environment. However, they get intertwined with the internalised ideologies as they (internalised) have to respond or react to the components due to their current and historical dominance within the context. This response happens in four ways – conformity, adaption, instrumentalisation and dualisation. To get a lexicon that can closely reflect these sentiments, I chose varieties of Ghanaian nationalism to represent both the historically evolving ideological components and the variety of interpretations shaped by the internalised ideas and ideas from contextual structures.

The usefulness of this framework comes from its points of departure from existing attempts to do the same. This usefulness is demonstrated by the way it locates ideas and ideological components within the context; the way it is historically embedded; the way it accounts for ideological changes through an interaction between internalised ideas, contextual ideological components and the pathways; and the way it resonates with the heterodoxy and heterogeneity of ideas within an unconventional context. The intention of this chapter was to outline the beginnings of a framework for analysing the relationship between ideologies and foreign policy-making in Africa that can help understand different aspects of Africa’s international relation. The next three chapters do this for the Ghanaian context regarding neighbour-relations, regional integration efforts, and economic diplomacy respectively.

CHAPTER 3 - Ideology and Ghana's Neighbour-relations: A Contested Neighbourhood and Neighbourliness

3.1 Introduction

The central point of this chapter is that although good neighbourliness has been the key idea for neighbour relations, it meant different things to the three administrations. And the ideologies of the governments explain these differences. Here, I argue that internalised ideologies are more important to understanding neighbour relations and good neighbourliness because there are fewer and less strong contextual structures, unlike regional integration and economic diplomacy. This means less stability and the tendency for dramatic changes in neighbour-relations when there is a change in government, unlike the other foreign policy areas. While I demonstrate different levels and nuances of agency in the remaining chapters, Ghana's agency in neighbour relations is relatively more emphatic. I will show in this chapter that, under the three administrations, Ghana's relations with neighbours moved from being hostile to cordial. This was partly due to how each administration interpreted Pan-Africanism or African consciousness, anti-colonialism, fear of Balkanisation and who a good neighbour is. Ghana also moved from the Nkrumah administration, where disagreement with neighbours over the interpretation of these components created tensions, to the Kufuor administration, where it did not.

I draw on the relationship between the internalised ideologies of the administrations and their interpretation of the contextual ideological components and pathways to demonstrate how such dynamics shaped neighbour-relations in varied ways. Particularly with the pathways that demonstrate how ideas from contextual structures get into governments' ideologies, I argue that dualisation is the most important in neighbour relations. As explained in chapter two, dualisation is when the transfer of ideas from contextual structures to governments' ideas is asymmetrical – in the sense that governments' internalised ideas are more powerful than ideas from contextual structures. Therefore, governments' actions and inactions are shaped ideas from contextual structures, only when those ideas conform to the internalised ideas of the government. In this case, there is a constant shuffling between the two, demonstrating weaker contextual institutional structures and governments' bid to take control over the neighbourhood.

The idea of good neighbourliness or the bid to maintain cordial relations with neighbours has remained a crucial contextual normative ideological component in Ghana's foreign policy since independence. Although none of the constitutions specifically mentions neighbours or good neighbourliness, they feature prominently in speeches and government statements to the extent that If Ghana's foreign policy is like concentric circles, neighbour-relations constitute the layer closest to

the centre. In the 1957 and 1965 sessional addresses, Nkrumah highlighted that his government's singular objective within the neighbourhood was towards "restoring normal relations between us [Ghana] and our neighbours".¹⁷ Rawlings made this quite clear in his 1994 sessional address to parliament when he stated that "as an essential part of this [African] policy, the government will continue to focus on activities that foster friendly and mutually beneficial relations with all our neighbouring countries".¹⁸ In my interview with Kufuor, he indicated that his aspiration for the neighbourhood was that he "wanted us [Ghana and neighbouring countries] to coexist like brother nations".¹⁹

This is important for all leaders because peaceful co-existence with neighbours is not only imperative for national security but also helps facilitate other desirable aspects of foreign policy such as regional integration, the dividends from economic cooperation and fostering socio-economic relations among citizens, especially those from the same ethnic group and living on the borders. However, in reality, Ghana's neighbour-relations have historically been relatively unstable and characterised by escalation and de-escalation of tensions.

If all governments agree to good neighbourliness, why have neighbour-relations historically been one of Ghana's contentious foreign policy areas? I argue that part of understanding this rests on the ideologies, in their broader and contextual understanding, of the three administrations and how their ideas defined the neighbourhood, shaped who they chose as friends, enemies and neighbourly behaviour towards these groups. Essentially, ideology performs three key functions in neighbour relations under all three administrations: shaping where the neighbourhood is situated, defining friends and enemies as a basis for foreign policy; and defining what is neighbourly.

The remainder of this chapter explores the dynamics of these ideological roles across the three administrations under study. I begin by fashioning a theoretical understanding of these roles and then proceed to utilise it in analysing all three administrations under each strand. The rest of this chapter proceeds in five main parts. The next section discusses a theoretical gap in the literature on neighbour-relations and friendship in IR. In the three subsequent sections, I analyse the three ideological roles identified in the theory across all three administrations. The final section concludes by drawing on insights into what these mean for the rest of the analytical chapters.

¹⁷ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 24th August, 1965, col. 19; Kwame Nkrumah (1965, September 3) [Speech by Osagyefo the President to the National Assembly]. Collection of President Nkrumah's speeches. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

¹⁸ Flt.-Lt Jerry John Rawlings: OFFICIAL REPORT of 6th January, 1994, col. 26

¹⁹ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview 2019

3.2 Theorising Neighbourliness

Neighbourliness is typically associated with the dialectic concepts of friendship and enmity. According to Felix Berenskoetter, friendship, in particular, has been overlooked due to the “common assumption of survival and the state as an autonomy-seeking entity, and it is argued that a conceptualisation of friendship as an intimate relationship must be rooted in an understanding of the human condition different from Hobbes” (Berenskoetter, 2007, p. 647). The concept of enemies has also been taken over by liberals and realists who use it as a justification for war (Jackson et al., 2018; Slaughter, 2011; Walt, 1998). Constructivism is yet to adequately engage with the particular link between ideology, friendship and enemy, especially from an African context that presents different dynamics and influence to broader IR theorising and policies towards other countries. This policy influence goes beyond what IR theorists think of in terms of the causes and the consequences of war and peace but translates into different foreign policy approaches, as the sections below will demonstrate. More specifically, it is a diversion from the conventional point-by-point historical account of Ghana’s relations with immediate neighbours to a concept of the neighbourhood that is theoretically grounded.

Studies on neighbour-relations in Africa did not begin as analyses of foreign policy. Instead, they were more focused on ethnic and interstate conflicts fuelled partly by (post)-colonial boundary disputes, resources and migration (Brown, 1980; Kobo, 2010; Nugent, 2010). These analyses miss the foreign policy perspective that focuses not only on the effects of government actions but also on the fundamental dynamics of such decision-making processes. The few that deal with neighbour-relations as a foreign policy area focus on these same factors but on how they influenced instability and conflicts, and on their effects on nation-building (Aluede, 2017; Barolsky, 2016; Barratt, 1988; Woodward, 1980). More attention has been given to colonial history, (counter) insurgency, resources, religion, leadership personalities, security threats, civil wars, economic decline, territorial encroachment and refugee flows as the driving forces and key characteristics of neighbour-relations (Asare & Siaw, 2018; Evans, 1993; Folarin et al., 2014; Iqbal & Starr, 2008; Pantah & Arthur, 2014; Stapleton, 2011).

A lot of these factors are the effects rather than the possible explanatory variables associated with how African states relate with neighbours. Besides, a lot of such studies consider neighbour-relations only when they have repercussions on regional integration (Lalbahadur & Otto, 2013; Padonou, 2016) and do not consider them in their own right as arrangements that begun before and outside the sphere of regional integration. But also, they can survive and take on different forms regardless of broader regional arrangements. Such studies often overlook government agency in terms of their understanding and conceptualisations of the political and economic context. This is because they pay

little attention to how the ideational dynamics of African governments might explain why different governments have more cordial relations with some countries than others.

Based on archival data, Parliamentary Hansards, interviews with Kufuor himself and policy-makers during the Rawlings administration, I analyse the policies or actions of the governments against their statements. This approach allows us to evaluate rhetoric against policy and develop broader and deeper understandings of the thinking behind policy decisions. I argue that each government's ideological position partly underpins its relations with neighbouring states. Through this, we will appreciate the nuanced roles of ideologies in neighbour-relations as integral to foreign policy.

Over the years, a lot of African states have been in the business of proving to neighbouring countries that they are an opportunity (friends) rather than a threat (enemies). Several studies have established how border tensions are a critical part of African politics, since independence, due to the inorganic nature of border demarcation towards independence (Aluede, 2017; Nugent, 2010). This situation has created a foreign policy dilemma that clashes with the different objectives of governments who try to neutralise these tensions through covert and overt means. However, these efforts have been perceived and attracted different responses from governments. Hence, relating with friends and enemies have come with different approaches, and it is the argument of this chapter that ideologies of governments shape this diversity in approaches. Therefore, approaches have been diverse since states relate differently to friends and enemies. But the dominant theme has been good neighbourliness – a component that means different things to different governments.

Generally, good neighbourliness is a vital aspect of international relations and analysis. As a general principle of international law, it finds explicit expression in the solemn declaration of UN member states to “practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours”.²⁰ Although all Ghanaian governments have professed good neighbourliness as a primary foreign policy objective, it has historically been the most contentious area of Ghana's foreign policy (Asare & Siaw, 2018). Internalised ideas are more powerful in this area because there is little or weaker structural interventions that can impact foreign policy unlike they do for the areas of regional integration and economic diplomacy. Therefore, what counts as neighbourly behaviour or good neighbourliness is very fluid. For instance, a typical Rawlings or Nkrumah administration action would have been to support dissidents seeking to overthrow a neighbouring government that they consider to be imperial or ‘corrupt’. For them, a good neighbour does not overlook the masses suffering along their borders. My respondents from the PNDC/NDC administration confirmed how new military regimes in Africa

²⁰ Preamble of the Charter of the United Nations; Also see Sucharitkul Sompong (1996, pp. 1–19) ‘The principles of good-neighbourliness in international law’, GGU Law Digital Commons, 4.27,.

counted on the support and charismatic leadership of the Rawlings administration. However, a typical Kufuor administration's response to this same situation, as a good neighbour, would have been to use non-interventionist institutional approaches. As will be discussed below, these are not just differences in methods but also in goals.

Besides the fact that no Ghanaian constitution has specifically emphasised neighbour-relations, there is very little effort towards any structural guide for neighbour-relations by international and regional organisations such as ECOWAS and the AU (Aluede, 2017; Shaw & Okolo, 1994b). Although the establishment of Permanent Joint Commissions for Cooperation (PJCC) are attempts to provide contextual normative ideas of good neighbourliness, their lifespan and effectiveness, over the period, have been dictated to by the government in power, thereby hampering their capacity to institutionalised ideas for good neighbourliness. National collective thinking is weaker in neighbour relations than even domestic politics.

Based on this understanding, I argue that ideologies perform three key roles in neighbour-relations which are critical in shaping the foreign policies of African states. First, ideologies shape what the neighbourhood is or where the neighbourhood is situated. This addresses questions like: Does the neighbourhood change? Is the neighbourhood the same for everyone? Is the neighbourhood an ideological project? It is based on the assumption that different periods and governments define and understand their borders differently. This complexity is what I call a distinction between geographical and conceptual neighbours. Geographical neighbours are neighbours based on topographical proximity. For instance, geographically, Benin, Chad, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea and Niger are Nigeria's neighbours. But at different times, Ghana is regarded as a neighbour to Nigeria not only by citizens but also by various governments, although the two countries do not share a border. This typifies the conceptual neighbourhood. In contrast, to geographical neighbours, conceptual neighbours exist in the realm of concept, accounted for by factors such as history and initial personal ethnic contacts. But in this chapter, my argument is that ideology not only shapes this realm of conceptual neighbour but also accounts for the shifts in general thinking about physical borders and where the neighbourhood is. While geographical neighbourhood can involve friends and enemies, conceptual neighbourhood deals with friends within and outside immediate proximity and institutionalised frameworks of neighbourhoods, such as ECOWAS. It is formed when there is an ideological connection between countries, and just like geographical neighbours, they have significant political and economic consequences for the neighbourhood or countries involved.

Second, and related to the first role, ideologies shape a government's identification of friends and enemies as a basis for alliances and foreign policy in general. Zartman (1966) identifies this role as a

basis for a continent-wide coalition (rather than in the context of the neighbourhood). Utilising this role in the context of neighbourhood changes the dynamics since dealing with a friend or enemy on one's border is different from one afar. The argument here is that administrations that agree on certain fundamental principles are more likely to become friends. Those that do not agree become enemies and potential threats to each other. Different ideological components are involved here. For administrations like Nkrumah, it was a country's position on African consciousness (unity) with the fear of Balkanisation, and relationship with former colonial metropolises that was critical in its decision of friends and enemies. For the Rawlings administration, it was a country's perceived imperial relations with former colonial metropolises and domestic developmental approach. Although for the Kufuor administration a clear distinction cannot be made between friends and enemies like the other administrations, some countries were more friends than others. It was also administration's position and approach to African consciousness (unity) that fashioned out such a difference in intimacy.

The third role of ideologies is the way they define neighbourly behaviour. In the case of Ghanaian governments and many other governments across the world who have emphasised good neighbourliness as their neighbourhood objective, in rhetoric, this role of ideology is akin to good neighbourliness in practice. It answers the final question of how governments' behaviours towards neighbours reflect their ideological positions. From the previous role of ideology – identifying or defining friends and enemies -, the further question here is how does being a friend or enemy matter in foreign policy?

Under the three administrations, Ghana's relations with neighbours exhibited all the rudiments of the ideological roles discussed above. Also, all three functions are significant sources of crises and cooperation between African states, sharing borders and those afar. In the following three main sections, I discuss the three roles by demonstrating how the three administrations operated within each of them.

3.3 Scope of the Neighbourhood: How Ideologies Created the Neighbourhood

Ghana is geographically bordered by three former French colonies – Togo, Burkina Faso, and Côte d'Ivoire. But for all three administrations, the neighbourhood was more than just geography. It was a project that also rested on a creation through each administration's ideological position. This introduces the difference between geographic and conceptual neighbours exemplified by how a government perceives other states within or outside their immediate territory.

Under Nkrumah, the CPP government's idea of the neighbourhood was shaped by the African consciousness or Pan-African components of their ideology which was inherently and radically anti-colonial. Also inherent in this idea was their fear for the Balkanisation of African for, what the

administration thought of as, suiting neo-colonial purposes and undermining progress and development in Africa.²¹ It conceived neighbourhood as fluid not only in concept but also physical borders were seen to be malleable. Thus, the Nkrumah government was willing to change the frontiers of topography and conceptual neighbourhood in line with its anti-colonial and Pan-African objectives. Nkrumah argued that “it is preposterous for anyone to think that such inhuman artificial barriers can be guaranteed as unalterable. We shall alter them by the will of the people”.²² Not only did this anti-colonial thinking influence the government to see the early post-independence period as opportune for a unification of the continent since new (weaker and smaller) states were springing up; it was also an opportunity to assert an African personality in international relations. For African personality, the CPP government pursued a foreign policy that was ready to defy existing systems or remnants of colonialism. And the government saw artificial borders as one of its key legacies.²³ Next, I discuss why I make this claim with two examples of the administration’s neighbour relations: Togoland question and Sanwi Affair.

The Togoland Question and assimilation of Togo as Ghana’s ninth region and the Sanwi Affair were two critical issues that signalled not a realpolitik but an ideological intent As discussed extensively by Asamoah (2014) and Brown (1980), the Togoland Question was mainly about deciding whether British Togoland should join an almost independent Ghana or French Togoland.²⁴ The Sanwi Affair was also about the ‘liberation’ of the Sanwi people, from Côte d’Ivoire, and their unification with independent Ghana.²⁵ ‘Liberation’ was used to typify the administration’s perception that Sanwis were being abused by the Felix Houphouët-Boigny (President of Côte d’Ivoire from 1960 to 1993) administration and being joined with them was akin to joining a neo-colonial French federation since Houphouët-Boigny was drawing on French support to oppress fellow Africans.²⁶ In both cases, the CPP government’s foreign policy was to support extra territories into Ghana. Yet, for Togo, the CPP wanted more, even in an aggressive way. In March 1960, Finance Minister K. A. Gbedemah threatened that, whether Sylvanus Olympio (Prime Minister and later President of Togo from 1958 to 1963) liked it or not, Togo would be united with Ghana. These efforts to alter the physical and conceptual borders have

²¹ In a speech to open the All-African People’s Conference on Monday December 8, 1958, Nkrumah argued that “Powers divide us, for our division is their gain”. Source: Kwame Nkrumah (1958, December 8) Collection of President Nkrumah’s speeches. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

²² Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL RECORD of 14th March 1960, col. 7

²³ *ibid*

²⁴ See Amenumey, D. E. K. (2008). *Ghana: A concise history from pre-colonial times to the 20th century*. Woeli Pub. Services.

²⁵ The Kingdom of Sanwi (1959, July 07) [Declaration Concerning the Request for the Annexation of Sanwi to the Independent State of Ghana]. Collection of the Sanwi Affairs. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana; 1959, June 29 p. 3) [Minutes of Meeting Held Between the Bureau and African Affairs and the Sanwi Delegation]. Collection of the Sanwi Affairs. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

²⁶ *ibid*

been explained in different ways, including within realpolitik agenda of seeking power and resources to project a stronger Ghana, and for Nkrumah's bid to become the president of the proposed continental government (Gebe, 2008; Thompson, 1969). However, a more nuanced explanation rests on ideology and how the Nkrumah government pursued such policies regardless of the 'pragmatic' or 'realpolitik' consequences.

The result of the 1956 Togoland plebiscite shows that even though there was enough vitality to push the pro-Gold Coast unification to victory, there was still sizeable support for the alternative options of either joining French Togoland or an independent British Togoland.²⁷ It explains why S. G. Antor,²⁸ an MP and leader of the Togoland Congress, contended that just as the Irish troubles started in 1792 but still existed, the Togoland trouble would continue to exist until they had achieved a unification of the Togoland territories.²⁹ But the Nkrumah government still pushed for assimilation, despite the risks to stability and political capital in the region. A more pragmatic policy would have been for the government to be content with the victory of assimilating the British Togoland. Yet the government felt the need to push for more, despite the impending dangers of a probable destabilisation and threats to the CPP administration as the rest of Togoland was dominated by anti-CPP sentiments.

Assimilating Togo into Ghana would have destabilised the electoral fortunes of the CPP. From the first general election of 1951, British Togoland had not been a stronghold of the CPP due to the existence of other regionally based political parties such as the Togoland Congress and Anlo Youth Association (AYO). More instructively in the 1960 constitutional referendum and presidential election, the Volta Region produced the only two constituencies where Nkrumah and the constitution lost (Frempong, 2017). It was politically imprudent, at the time, to continue to add the rest of French Togoland to Ghana especially when it had produced anti-Nkrumah nationalist leaders like Olympio and Eyadema. Members of the CPP government were aware of this danger.

The dangers and material support of annexing Sanwi outweighed the benefits such annexation would have offered Ghana – except for fulfilling the government's ideological objectives. Togo and Sanwi were relatively small countries and offered few benefits to Ghana's economy at the time. Sanwi, for instance, comprised about 40,000 people with 119 settlements and little to offer materially. This explains their numerous visits and letters to the Nkrumah administration for financial and other sorts of support, including food. Yet, the Ivorian government at the time had a massive capacity, including

²⁷ Ibid; The figures of the raw votes showed that, the opposition polled 67,492 against 93,093 votes for the union with Ghana.

²⁸ S. G. Antor was an MP and a member of the United Party (opposition to Nkrumah). He was also the leader of the Togoland Congress – a party that campaigned for a unification of the Togoland instead of joining British Togoland to Ghana.

²⁹ S. G. Antor (UP – Kpandu North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th December 1958, col. 603

support from France, and the will to crush any form of upheaval that undermined its sovereignty.³⁰ Technically, the territory had no colonial links with Ghana, unlike British Togoland which was administered together with the Gold Coast by Britain. The Sanwi people had signed the Franco-Aowin treaty of 4th July 1843 making them a French protectorate.³¹ Archival data shows that even though the Nkrumah government did not officially show support to the Sanwis either through parliamentary approval or the official ministry of foreign affairs,³² it supported the Sanwis through the African Bureau.³³ The government was also sponsoring dissidents in Togo and reports of its apparent joy or talk of a 'golden opportunity' after the death of Olympio supports this. Only ideology can explain why Ghana could risk its resources, a debacle with a regional giant like Houphouët-Boigny and almost a direct confrontation with France.

While this is in line with Nkrumah's Pan-African thinking that the small states could not stand alone and the only way Africa could thrive was for a reverse 'Balkanisation', some scholars have revealed an inherent irony: for a government seeking African unity, annexing smaller territories from other countries would undermine that objective (Gebe, 2008; Thompson, 1969). However, when interpreted together with the anti-colonial component of the administration's ideology, there is some consistency in the government's attempts to 'save' smaller states from colonial domination by attempting to forge a merger with Ghana. In both instances, and later with Mali and Guinea, the administration was wary of neo-colonial French domination. Therefore, to better understand the Nkrumah administration's conception of the neighbourhood, a combined overview of the components of the government's ideology is important; looking at just one component misses the full dynamics.

The dynamics of the scope of the neighbourhood under the Rawlings administration were different from the Nkrumah administration partly for ideological reasons and differences between the administrations, although both administrations shared some anti-colonial sentiments. As will be discussed in detail in chapter five the Rawlings administration from the onset was critical of former colonial metropolises and Western countries. The presence of the West within the neighbourhood was seen as an imperialist threat by the administration. This is similar to sentiments expressed by members of the Nkrumah administrations. Part of the similarities stemmed from the existence of an Nkrumaist faction within the PNDC/NDC administration and how key members of the administration's read

³⁰ For instance, after forming the Provisional Government of Sanwi, its leaders, including the paramount chief and several other chiefs were arrested by the Houphouët-Boigny government.

³¹ The Kingdom of Sanwi (1959, July 07) [Declaration Concerning the Request for the Annexation of Sanwi to the Independent State of Ghana]. Collection of the Sanwi Affairs. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

³² George Padmore (1959, June 23) [Letter to Kwame Nkrumah on the Policy Advice on the Sanwi Affair]. Collection of the Sanwi Affairs. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

³³ See National Liberation Council (1966) *Nkrumah's subversion in Africa: documentary evidence of Nkrumah's interference in the affairs of other African states*. Accra: Ministry of Information

Nkrumah. However, the administrations acted on this rhetoric differently in how they defined their neighbourhood. For instance, the malleability of geographic borders, which was key in the Nkrumah government's ideological interpretations of anti-colonialism and African consciousness or Pan-Africanism and showed in the government's handling of the Togoland Question and Sanwi Affair, was very different to the Rawlings administration's interpretation of the same components of their ideology. Although both administrations originally had similar sentiments in their internalised ideologies towards framing the neighbourhood, there were differences in how they interpreted the components and the approaches.

One way to account for this dichotomy towards framing the neighbourhood lies in the ideas embedded in the contextual structures and condition of Africa at the time – post 1980. During the period, the UN principle for territorial integrity had shaped popular discontent for taking borders and annexation (Elden, 2006); anti-colonial sentiments were not as charged as had been under Nkrumah's government since most African countries had gained independence; Ghana had gradually assumed a leadership position in conflict resolution and peacekeeping within the subregion instead of creating border, extraterritorial and annexation conflicts.

Within the contextual framework, these conditions and ideas from international organisations were fused into the administration's socialist-Marxist ideology through the adaptive pathway. Adaptation is when internalised ideas genuinely adjust to new conditions and ideas from contextual structures for a long term instead of conforming for a short period. When adapted, members of government tend to own the ideas and treat them as part of their political beliefs. This is why in my interview with Kwamena Ahwoi, he admitted to how ideological norms within ECOWAS shaped their government's ideas for both regional integration and neighbour-relations.³⁴ Yet, the dualisation pathway is significant to understanding the government's actions as it maintained autonomy to act outside these contextual ideological structures. For instance, in talking about the principle of non-interference, Rawlings argued that the principle does not "...legitimise transgressions against the genuine interest of the people or shield bankrupt or corrupt leadership".³⁵ This indicated the government's willingness to 'invade' other neighbouring states unilaterally when it felt they were acting against the people. Their way of detecting this was through their ideology as they did with the Hilla Limann (President of Ghana from 1979 to 1981) administration, which they overthrew for being a neo-colonial stooge. This demonstrates that nature of agency in neighbour relations compared with the other areas of Ghana's foreign policy to be discussed in the next two chapters. Although the non-institutionalised nature of

³⁴ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

³⁵ J. J. Rawlings (November 6, 1982) Uniting Solidly behind the Revolution. Address at Hogbetsotso festival at Anloga.

good neighbourliness as an idea gave way for dualisation, the extent to which the Rawlings government pursued this pathway differed from the Nkrumah's due to such contextual ideational structures.

Therefore, even though disputes over border demarcation remained an intractable feature in Ghana's neighbour-relations, their escalation and de-escalation were primarily an effect of the approaches of different governments and shaped by their ideologies. Definitions of the neighbourhood were similarly fluid in their conceptual form. Like the Nkrumah administration, ideological considerations were critical in determining where the neighbourhood was situated and how it was framed under the Rawlings administration. The Rawlings administration conceived Ghana then as part of a Third World project for asserting the unified power of the 'peripheral' parts of the world. It agitated for the overthrow of the capitalist or imperialist establishments that consistently inhibited the development and independence of the Third World. Any country or government that expressed these sentiments was included in the neighbourhood - in the spirit of proletarian internationalism with some hints of Pan-Africanism. Although I will explain this idea further in chapter five, proletarian internationalism positioned the government as part of a larger union fighting to overthrow imperialism and change the social and economic order in the Third World. It shaped how secure or insecure the government felt within a jurisdiction or area.

This was typical of the inclusion of countries like Libya, Jamaica, and Cuba into Ghana's neighbourhood. As I will show in chapter four, Ghana is dominantly regarded as a spiritual, cultural, and ancestral homeland by many Africans in the diaspora with the rise of Nkrumah and what subsequent governments have done position Ghana as a leader of the Pan-African movement and conversations. Particularly, Ghana and Jamaica have a long history predating colonialism as it is believed that Ghana was a major shore in slave trade. Many studies have traced the roots of Jamaica to Ghana and emphasised the many cultural similarities as justifications (Marshall, 2007; Middleton, 2006; White, 2007, 2010).

The Rawlings administration stressed on the importance of these relations based on its interpretation of Pan-Africanism and pursued relations specifically with the People's National Party (PNP), of Jamaica, based on socialist links. As an ambassador to the Americas, under the Rawlings administration, Kwaku Danso-Boafo³⁶, in my interview, indicated that countries like Cuba and Jamaica were considered neighbours not only for the much-touted pragmatic reasons for seeking benefits but also for

³⁶ Professor of Political Science; Member of the PNDC; Author of the controversial *Biography of Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia* (1996), and also *JJ Rawlings and the democratic transition in Ghana*, (2017). Ambassador to Cuba with simultaneous accreditation to Jamaica, Trinidad, Nicaragua and Panama – 1997 to 2000. Cabinet Minister in charge of Health under NDC.

underlying ideological considerations.³⁷ The Socialist/Marxist ideology made them think of Cuba as a neighbour, while in addition to that, their Pan-African thinking brought Jamaica into the scope of the neighbourhood. Ghana's inclusion of Jamaica in its conceptual neighbourhood, under the leadership of Prime Minister Percival James Patterson was a classic manifestation of the conceptual neighbourhood. Ideological similarity played a role here as Patterson believed in what Rawlings pursued and described his coups as "military action to remove the stench of corruption which he regarded as inimical to the foundation of accountability and good governance".³⁸ He further described Rawlings, with pride, as a strong Pan-Africanist who fought imperialism and to preserve and promote the African identity.³⁹ This is the key to what brought Ghana and Jamaica together, under the two administrations, into forging stronger relations across different sectors.

Although some studies suggest that the Rawlings administration's neighbourliness with the Gaddafi administration was purely an economic relation intended to secure economic benefits (Agyeman-Duah, 1987), I argue that the rewarding economic dividends were just the effects. Instead, the underlying drive was ideological. This explains why Rawlings and members were frequently in Libya between 1979 and 1981 when they were out of power.⁴⁰ Frequenting Libya was a gesture that other influential leaders on the continent saw as a threat. Among Ghana's geographical neighbours, it was almost a direct confrontation. It is intriguing that besides the initial economic benefits the Rawlings administration received from Libya, few benefits were accrued from the mid-1980s after the government had enrolled on the Structural Adjustment Programme (Asamoah, 2014). However, the government still considered Libya in the ambit of its neighbourhood with a series of engagements. In my interview, Kwamena Ahwoi, a former cabinet minister during the Rawlings administration, posited that Ghana's support and friendship with Libya were in the interest of Pan-Africanism. However, I will argue below that this consideration of neighbourliness and friendship was stimulated by the also by their socialist-Marxist inclinations and common positions on anti-Western or colonial imperialism.

The Kufuor administration's conception of the neighbourhood was influenced by its laissez-faire liberal idea of good neighbourliness. Earlier administrations have mentioned good neighbourliness policies, but they always came with a caveat, premised on a willingness to be peaceful or if the bid to coordinate friendly relations was mutual. In the early years of the PNDC government, Rawlings emphasised Ghana's willingness to build cordial relations with 'progressive' neighbouring states

³⁷ Kwaku Danso-Boafo: Personal Interview, 2019

³⁸ Tribute to His Excellency Jerry John Rawlings by P. J. Patterson (former Prime Minister of Jamaica 1992-2006). Accessed January 15, 2021, Retrieved from <https://heisconsults2.com/selected-speeches>

³⁹ Ibid

⁴⁰ Kwame Asamoah Tenkorang: Personal Interview, 2019; Ambassador D. K. Osei: Personal Interview, 2019

(Asamoah, 2014). This principle of reciprocity was enforced through how the administrations interpreted ideological components which shaped who formed part of the conceptual neighbourhood.

Due to the less institutionalised contextual structures to good neighbourliness, the dualisation pathway was a key route – although more for Nkrumah’s administration than Rawlings’ due to the relatively strong regional institutions post-1980. This is partly because their interpretations mainly of the anti-colonial and African consciousness or Pan-African components of the ideologies were at variance with those of governments in Francophone neighbouring countries and at a time where France was still a key player in the domestic affairs of its colonies – something that both the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations were not pleased with. The ideology of the Kufuor administration spoke to these Pan-African and anti-colonial components, but the interpretation was different from the radical antagonistic interpretations of the other two administrations.

As I will show this more in chapters four and five, the Kufuor administration preferred a functional regionalism through the economic route and showed more willingness to work with former colonial metropolises or the West in Africa’s renaissance. Although the government had a position on anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism, it did not influence any imbalance between the administration’s identification of conceptual and geographical neighbourhood. At the time, ruling governments across Ghana’s geographical neighbourhood (Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Burkina Faso) had stronger economic ties with France – a phenomenon the Kufuor administration does not disagree in principle, but as I will show in chapter four, had some concerns with how such relations undermine economic relations within ECOWAS. Also, as I will show below, the Kufuor government, unlike the Rawlings administration, did not consider how other governments rule domestically, therefore, a neighbour’s political system was not a key ideological variable in how they constructed their neighbourhood. The administration’s internalised liberal ideas inspired a *laissez-faire* attitude toward conceptualising the neighbourhood. It, therefore, fell in line with the conscious projection of its framing of the neighbourhood within the ECOWAS structure. Although this is typical of the adaptive pathway within the ideological contextual framework, the internalised liberal ideology of the government meant that it was receptive to involving more countries in its conceptual neighbourhood regardless of ideological differences or similarities.

Generally, the formation of ECOWAS introduced a new dynamic twist to the conceptualisation of the neighbourhood. It meant that beyond the government’s core ideological standpoint, the subscription to the notion of sub-regionalism was a new framework within which the government’s idea of the neighbourhood could be situated. Also, it meant institutionalising the frontiers of the neighbourhood, but the administrations responded and pursued this differently, under different motivations. Some

members of the Rawlings administration argued that their subscription to Nkrumah's idea was challenged by contextual realities with the formation of ECOWAS. This meant that even though they favoured a continent-wide union, my PNDC/NDC respondents argued that the formation of ECOWAS bounded them into conforming to sub-regionalism as an approach. Within this ECOWAS framework, Rawlings and members of the administration, at different times, referred to Liberia and Nigeria as neighbours.⁴¹ But as I will show below, their commitment to these was undermined by their hard-line ideological notions. This means that even in ECOWAS, some countries were enemies and others were friends.

For the Kufuor administration, it was ideologically and historically fitting to frame neighbourhood within the subregion. As I will show in chapter four, seeing the British West African countries (and later all West African countries) as the neighbourhood regardless of the colonial heritage and ideologies of the governments has been the core idea of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo Tradition since the pre-independence era. Their notion of regional integration was particularly a neighbourhood or West African economic integration approach before an eventual continental integration – which they were not keen on at the time because most of the countries outside West Africa were less sophisticated ideologically and resource-wise.⁴² Dr Paa Kwesi Nduom's speech at the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) conference highlighted that the new Kufuor administration identified the neighbourhood within ECOWAS.⁴³ Therefore, the Kufuor administration largely pursued this West African neighbourhood approach under the ECOWAS framework. It pursued a purely economic policy of seeking help from Libya. Conceptually, it did not mean that Libya was included in its idea of neighbourhood, but it signalled that the government did not care much about ideological similarity with other states, unlike the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration that pursued framing the neighbourhood outside the subregion because for some ideological intents.

While the geographical neighbourhood remained, the conceptual neighbourhood shifted during all three administrations, mainly due to ideological differences. Although the Nkrumaist factions in the PNDC consciously attempted to follow the Nkrumaist path, there were differences partly due to the growing institutionalisation of contextual structures such as OAU/AU, UN and ECOWAS, that shaped their interpretation and actions. Also, key was their perspective on Pan-Africanism. As I will show in chapter four, while the Nkrumah administration was willing to surrender Ghana's sovereignty for a

⁴¹ J. J. Rawlings: OFFICIAL RECORD of 6th January 1994, col. 26

⁴² West African Students' Union (WASU) (December 1926) Publication, No. 2, J. B. Danquah was also the publisher of this Newspaper

⁴³ Nduom, P. K. (2002). Ghana's Relations with Her Neighbours and Role In ECOWAS. In Ghana's Foreign Policy Options: A Conference Organised by The Legon Centre For International Affairs and Diplomacy (pp. 63–78). Accra: LCIAD.

continental union, the PNDC/NDC administration was silent on that. These partly explain the shifting conceptual neighbourhood between the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration. Furthermore, the governments in countries that were crucial parts of the Nkrumah administration's conceptual neighbourhood had changed, and the new administrations came with different ideologies. Therefore, even if the Rawlings administration maintained the Nkrumah ideologies in their pure form, there was little guarantee for a stable conceptual neighbourhood. Kufuor's government, whose ideological history had been institutional conformity and West African neighbourhood based, was comfortable working with new ECOWAS arrangements. Different administrations added different states into their conception of the neighbourhood and new administrations either replaced them or turned them from friends to enemies and vice versa. In the next section I discuss this relationship between the conception of the neighbourhood and the selection of friends and enemies.

3.4 Defining Relationships: How Ideologies Defined Friends and Enemies

I have argued and demonstrated from the preceding section that when it comes to framing the neighbourhood, ideas and interpretations of anti-colonialism (and fear of Balkanisation), Pan-Africanism/African consciousness (ideas towards African unity) are very important. In chapter one, I argued that the interpretation of these contextual components are not objective but linked to the administrations' internalised ideas. Additionally, for the Rawlings administration, the ideology behind how another government ruled domestically, due to the PNDC/NDC's Marxist inclinations of societal inequalities. This shows that the Nkrumah and Kufuor administration distinguished ideas for foreign policy from domestic political systems in other countries. Essentially, what a government does in their country did not affect their friendship as much as it did for the Rawlings administration.

This section explains these components further and demonstrates how relevant they were in the administrations' selection of friends (opportunities) and enemies (threats).

The argument here is that ideology influenced who the Nkrumah administration called friends or foes and, as explained later in this chapter, formed the basis for foreign policy decisions. This highlights the point that even when the question of the neighbourhood was settled, partly by ideology, ideologies still shaped who the administrations called friend/opportunity or enemy/threat. The rest of the discussion in this section is organised around the two key components – anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism/African consciousness. I will later discuss how the ideology for domestic rule in the neighbouring countries shaped these choices under the Rawlings administration.

Although all nationalist groups and post-independence governments in Africa were anti-colonial, their interpretation and approach varied. That is to say that nationalism was not a unified ideology. These varied interpretations of anti-colonialism and the fear of Balkanisation made the Nkrumah

administration see some governments as foes or collaborators of imperialism and others as friends. The Nkrumah administration's position on colonialism was very radical, just like the other members of the Casablanca group (Anglin, 1958; Good, 1964). It sought not only to end colonialism but also to frustrate and eventually end it in its new form, neo-colonialism. This explains why the government took a firm position against France. The administration believed it was unwilling to let go of its colonial territories and pursued detrimental actions on the continent. The Nkrumah administration, for instance, supported Algerian independence after joining the Casablanca group and recognised the Algerian Provisional Government in exile in 1958 (Ahlman, 2010; Jackson, 1977; Mostefaoui, 2014). The government also endorsed Guinea's independence movement by providing finance in 1958 when France deserted it immediately after independence. Nkrumah was also a staunch critic of French atomic bomb tests in the Sahara in 1960 as he conceived it as an expression of imperialist entitlement and neo-colonialism. He argued that France's action was not only a

flout of world opinion by France [but] must convince us in Africa that we must stand together to resist imperialism and colonialism in its naked or hidden form. The African peoples will never forgive France for a repetition of the atomic test in the Sahara.⁴⁴

Ghana, therefore, led an international protest against France, which further strained relations between the two countries and had repercussions for Ghana's relations with its Francophone neighbours.

The stance on colonialism taken by leaders such as Houphouët-Boigny and Olympio and the administration's perception of them made them enemies or threats to the administration. During the mid to late 1950s, Houphouët-Boigny was one of the leaders who argued against independence on the basis "that it would mean at least a partial severance of necessary ties with France" (Moss, 1970 p. 120). In my interviews, Ebenezer Debrah who served as a diplomat under Nkrumah, revealed that as members of the Nkrumah administration they held the view that Houphouët-Boigny was comfortable being a minister in France, and that was worrisome.⁴⁵ This is because, even after independence in 1960, France still had a stranglehold on the Cote d'Ivoire economy with no practical steps like what the Nkrumah administration was doing to wean itself from that. It became a key point of departure between the Houphouët-Boigny and Nkrumah administration as members of the administration perceived Cote d'Ivoire's relations with France as undermining African unity and promoting neo-colonialism.

⁴⁴ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL RECORD of 14th March 1960, col. 8

⁴⁵ Ebenezer Moses Debrah: Personal Interview, 2019. E. M Debrah is a retired career Diplomat who served during the Nkrumah administration; a Pioneer of Ghana's Foreign Service and Ghana's first representative to the OAU

For the Rawlings administration's anti-colonial stance, I will show in chapter five that while the administration enrolled on a pro-Western Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), it maintained some extent of its anti-Western position in rhetoric and deeds even in the sphere of economic diplomacy. However, unlike economic diplomacy, where contextual structures reduced the extent of decisional flexibility and agency for the government, neighbour-relations have less institutionalised contextual structures, which means relatively more agency. This meant the freedom to act based on what anti-colonialism meant to them – an idea inherently anti-Western. Anti-Western, in practice, meant non-Western. According to my interview with PNDC/NDC members, it was the administration's dislike and weariness for the intentions of Western countries in Africa.

With this context given, the Rawlings administration's anti-Western stance became a defining factor for who they conceptualised as friend or enemy, opportunity or threat. Therefore, countries with similar anti-Western ideological outlook became friends and opportunities while those perceived to be on the other side were seen as threats or enemies. Leaders such as Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Fidel Castro of Cuba, Muammar al- Gaddafi of Libya, and Thomas Sankara's of Burkina Faso anti-Western ideologies made them friends from the Rawlings administration's perspective. In particular, Gaddafi was considered a revolutionary example for the Rawlings administration, while Sankara was considered a 'student'. At some point in the administration, between 1983-1987, Sankara's Burkina Faso was the only friend of the administration within the sphere of Ghana's geographical neighbourhood. After Sankara's death, the Rawlings administration relied on friendship in the realm of the conceptual neighbourhood from countries such as Libya, Cuba, Nicaragua and Zimbabwe. This was not because these countries could offer valuable socio-economic benefits. They provided an ideological camaraderie that the rest of the world, especially those within Ghana's geographical neighbourhood, could not offer.

Like the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, the Kufuor administration had a position on anti-colonialism and African unity, but it was not critical in the choice of friends (opportunities) or enemies (threats). A possible explanation is that the administration came to power when no African country was under European colonisation. However, it was significant in shaping the depth of friendship since the administration conceptualised every state in the neighbourhood as a friend. From its historical antecedents, the Kufuor administration maintained an anti-colonial position that is relatively less radical in rhetoric and practice. For instance, the Kufuor administration seemed less suspicious of the West than the previous governments. In my interview with Kufuor, he argued that instead of seeing Britain as a threat or a relationship that needed to be severed, he saw it as a relationship that needs

to be harnessed “to maximise our economic efforts and benefits”.⁴⁶ This is a position the Nkrumah and Rawlings governments had broadly contested, although I will show in chapters five and six that, at some point, these administrations had to conform due to limited opportunities for manoeuvre.

This meant that even though the Kufuor administration had friends in the neighbourhood, regardless of that government’s anti-colonial position, they were closer to the liberals or what Kufuor himself called “open-minded” than with the leftist or radicals.⁴⁷ An example was how Kufuor related to Gaddafi of Libya and Obasanjo of Nigeria (during his second administration between 1999 and 2007). Obasanjo held a much more liberal or less radical position on anti-colonialism during his second administration.⁴⁸ Kufuor described him as “a brother of mine [Kufuor] from the very first month”,⁴⁹ and Nigeria’s economic support for Ghana buttressed such friendliness. On the other hand, after the financial and petroleum bailouts in the early years of the Kufuor administration, Gaddafi did not pass as a close friend because the relationship can be described as a purely pragmatic gesture for support. In my interview with him, Kufuor implied that it was Gaddafi who pushed for a closer relationship. Kufuor revealed that Gaddafi would usually send a plane for them to meet in Libya. Yet Kufuor was not impressed by all these glistering gestures mainly because of their ideological differences. Talking about Libya, in my interview, Kufuor described Gaddafi and his approach as becoming “burdensome”.⁵⁰ I will show below that, during the latter part of the Kufuor administration, Gaddafi intensified his bid for a continental government while Kufuor favoured a gradual and functional regional integration approach, thereby making Gaddafi’s approach similar to what Nkrumah pursued and what the Kufuor administration’s forerunners challenged. And ‘burdensome’ is not a word that Rawlings would have used to describe Gaddafi’s interpersonal relations with him and actions considering the fact that the administration sent envoys to Libya right after the coup and took ideological inspiration from Gaddafi.

Therefore, while anti-colonialism and fear for Balkanisation were critical to the Nkrumah administration and its anti-Western/imperialism variant for the Rawlings administration, it was not critical for the Kufuor administration. However, such similarity in ideas influenced which governments

⁴⁶ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

⁴⁷ Ibid (a term President Kufuor used in my interview to describe liberal leaders and governments)

⁴⁸ See: Adeniran, T. (1976). Olusegun Obasanjo. *Africa Report*, 21(3), 37. Retrieved from <https://search.proquest.com/docview/1304052206?accountid=11455>; Olorunyomi, B. R. (2016). Nigeria’s Foreign Relations under Olusegun Obasanjo’s Civilian Administration. *Covenant University Journal of Politics and International Affairs*, 2(1); Itugbu, S. (2017). *Foreign Policy and Leadership in Nigeria: Obasanjo and the Challenge of African Diplomacy*. Bloomsbury Publishing.

⁴⁹ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

⁵⁰ ibid

were considered close friends. The example above shows that regardless of Gaddafi's effort, he did not secure that friendship with the Kufuor administration.

The second ideological component is Pan-Africanism or African consciousness, which captures efforts towards regional integration or African union. I will show below and further in chapter four that, although the idea of Pan-Africanism was meant to bring African states and people of African descent together politically and economically, it was also a point of difference and even conflict between governments. This ideological battle culminated, on the broader African stage, into the Monrovia and Casablanca division in the early 1960s before the formation of the OAU in 1963 (Good, 1964). The creation of these larger continental ideological blocs was a result of the differences between individual states, manifesting in neighbour-relations. The Nkrumah administration's position on African unity was to seek a radical political union of African countries, in any shape or form, and eventually economic union. This was tied to the government's idea of seeking economic independence for Africa – the next stage of autonomy after political independence. This idea not only contradicted what Ghana's neighbouring states proposed, but it practically signalled that Nkrumah had ambitions to assimilate either part or the whole of neighbouring countries into Ghana. These dynamics came out clearly in Ghana's relations with Cote d'Ivoire, Togo, Guinea and Mali.

On Ghana's geographic west was Houphouët-Boigny who, although a Pan-Africanist, conceived the idea differently. It influenced his actions, which eventually shaped the Nkrumah administration's thinking of him as an enemy or threat. It was not only because he was a gradualist, while Nkrumah was a radical, he argued for the establishment of economic ties first before a possibly eventual political union. In 1963, Houphouët-Boigny made a speech that indirectly attacked Nkrumah's approach to African unity and his idea of moving beyond colonially bounded territorial sovereignty. Houphouët-Boigny emphasised that

we are also conscious of the fatal error that we should commit in letting ourselves be carried away by enthusiasm, and in underestimating the difficulties by attempting to pass through the necessary stages too rapidly... Although the reasons that lead us to aspire to unity are political, they are also of an economic character... it appears to us that economic unity constitutes the best possible approach to political unity... Our unity will thus in no way exclude outside cooperation.⁵¹

Nkrumah disagreed with most of the arguments raised by Houphouët-Boigny, and this led to animosity. As I will discuss in chapter four, the main point of disagreement concerns their different

⁵¹ Houphouët-Boigny's speech at the 1963 OAU conference. Accessed July 20, 2021, Retrieved from <https://au.int/en/speeches/19630508/speeches-and-statements-made-first-organisation-african-unity-oau-summit-1963>

approaches towards regional integration and how to fashion out future relations with former colonial metropolises. For the most part, it was the Nkrumah administration's understanding that leaders or governments which opposed this relatively rapid political, economic and military unity of African states were comfortable with Africa's continuous dependency on colonial metropolises even after independence.

On Ghana's east border is Togo, led by the Olympio administration from 1958 to 1963. Olympio was not only seen in this light but also unique events leading to Ghana's independence made him an undesirable neighbour for the government, especially in its bid to live beyond colonial border restrictions and pursue an organic African integration. It is worthy of note that Olympio and Nkrumah were close friends during the early decolonisation campaigns of the former, with reports of Nkrumah supplying him aid for his anti-colonial fight.⁵² However, they later had a bitter and unresolved enmity due to ideological disagreements over the best route and approach to regional integration. Their broader anti-colonial ideology to end colonialism made them friends, but their later ideological disagreement over African unity turned them into enemies. Most dominant was Olympio's opposition to the 1956 Togoland plebiscite, which was an affront to the Nkrumah administration's Pan-African idea. Nkrumah described Olympio as a leader "capable of gross betrayal of a whole people by volte-face tactics when the unification of the suffering Ewes is now within reach".⁵³ Olympio himself later argued that "no two African states can agree on a single interpretation of Pan-Africanism" (Olympio, 1961, p. 50). Contrary to the Nkrumah administration, Olympio further argued in 1961 that "existing governmental units are in administrative sense workable and that it would be a grave mistake to undercut at this early date the frail but growing roots which sustain them" (Ibid, p. 54). He further argued for an alternative to Pan-Africanism which he called "the homely word cooperation" (Ibid).

For the Nkrumah administration, this position was a threat because it delayed the prosperity of Africans and created opportunities for imperialists. Later Olympio's death was seen by some members of the government as "decidedly edifying... and the chances of Ghana-Togo union (and African unity as a whole) has been greatly enhanced beyond all expectations by the absence of the Togo President".⁵⁴ Sanaa-Poku Juantua, then head of Ghana's embassy in Brazil, wrote a congratulatory letter to Nkrumah for the "most brilliant part you have played thus far in this most intricately delicate

⁵² African Heritage (March 29, 2011) Video. Interview of Sylvanus Olympio during his trip to the USA in the 1960s. YouTube. Retrieved January 15, 2021, from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZLO3FNS2te8>

⁵³ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL RECORD of 14th March 1960, col. 7

⁵⁴ Ibid

matter”⁵⁵ or what he referred to as “the golden opening”.⁵⁶ These show that in a foreign policy area where the dualisation pathway was dominant, it was relatively easier for dissenting voices to become enemies due to the lack of strong contextual ideological variables that can intervene, sometimes outside of the full control of both governments.

However, countries with a similar ideological position like Guinea and Mali were considered as friends to the administration. For instance, Sekou Touré’s government in Guinea opposed France to the satisfaction of the Nkrumah administration, who came to its aid after France decided to abandon it after independence. At some point, Sekou Touré described Houphouët-Boigny as ‘France’s man in Africa’ because he supported the ‘no’ vote in the French constitutional referendum of 1958 – a referendum meant to give French colonies full control in deciding whether to remain under French government or not (Padonou, 2016, p. 7). Similarly, for Modibo Keita of Mali, just like the 1960 Republican constitution of Ghana, Article 48 of the Malian independence constitution specified partial or total relinquishment of national sovereignty in favour of any organisation for or of African unity. Although later he made statements that showed some inherent inconsistencies with the approaches of Nkrumah, they shared a common conviction of rapid unification of African states and their radical perspectives on anti-colonialism. It shows how critical Pan-African and African consciousness, interpreted from a neo-colonial perspective, was for the Nkrumah administration. It also shows how contested the idea of Pan-Africanism was, at the continental level. However, I will show in chapter four that this was also the case at the domestic level between Nkrumah and the opposition during the same period.

Unlike the Nkrumah regime, I will show more thoroughly in chapter four that the PNDC was not keen on any form of rapid or radical continental union. Instead, its ideological stance undermined the very objective of African union due to the antagonism that characterised its neighbour-relations – similar to the tension during the Nkrumah era. Whether or not a country favoured a continental union was not critical in deciding who was a friend or enemy to the administration. Besides, the PNDC/NDC was not keen on integrating with neighbours, unlike the Nkrumah administration, which wanted the assimilation of Togo and the Sanwi regions into Ghana. Instead, it was pursuing, in the long-term, a broader integration in West Africa⁵⁷ and the short-term integration with progressive states such as Burkina Faso under Sankara.⁵⁸ This idea removed the element of ethnicity and the notion of assimilation for African unity as a crucial variable for neighbour-relations under the Rawlings

⁵⁵ Kwame Sanaa-Poku Jantuah (1963, February 08) [Private Letter to Nkrumah]. Collection of Togoland Letters and Special Committee. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

⁵⁶ Ibid

⁵⁷ J. J. Rawlings (30th May 1982) Speech at ECOWAS Summit

⁵⁸ Asamoah, O. Y. (2014). *The Political History of Ghana (1950-2013)*. Bloomington: AuthorHouse.

administration. On ethnicity, Rawlings argued against state restructuring through ethnic origins.⁵⁹ Based on his socialist/Marxist orientation, he argued that ‘we only have two tribes in Ghana today, and that is, the rich and the poor’.⁶⁰

As will be explained later, this made the administration more concerned with how neighbouring states were governed. However, it explains why, although the friends of the administration had quite diverse views on approaches to regional integration in Africa, it did not affect their friendship. Except for Gaddafi, who was quite radical about Pan-Africanism during the latter part of the Rawlings administration, the rest were more concerned about the internal developments of their respective nations. Interpretation, conceptualisation and approaches to Pan-Africanism could not have made the Gaddafi and Rawlings administrations the friends they became. Gaddafi was more aggressive in his bid for African union, while the Rawlings administration was relatively comfortable working within the framework of existing subregional institutions for regional integration. What made them friends was their anti-colonial posture and their common socialist/Marxist revolutionary agenda. Likewise, Sankara and Mugabe had just won power and were looking to restructure their countries through novel anti-Western ‘democratic’ approaches to national development, just as the Rawlings administration was. The aspiration of an eventual anti-Western continental union was a cohesive force that kept them together in this regard.

On Pan-Africanism, I will show in chapter four that the Kufuor administration, has historically conceived it differently and pursued a different approach from the CPP. However, they maintained that the fundamental objective is an eventual continental union. The Kufuor administration was not only gradualist in its approach to African union, it also understood the continental union from the perspective of economics – almost like how Houphouët-Boigny preferred which attracted antagonism from the Nkrumah administration. Edward Asomani, one of my respondents who was the head of the Danquah Institute (DI)⁶¹, argued that the New Patriotic Party’s tradition had historically favoured less of a political union and more of an economic integration.⁶² Baah-Duodu⁶³, a retired career diplomat, reasoned that the events of the 2007 AU conference in Ghana confirmed that the Kufuor administration still followed the pattern of its predecessors in being “passionate about Africa going

⁵⁹ J. J. Rawlings (6th November 1982) Uniting Solidly behind the Revolution. Address at Hogbetsotso festival at Anloga.

⁶⁰ J. J. Rawlings (June 4, 1982) Speech on the occasion of commemorating the June 4, 1979 revolution

⁶¹ The Danquah Institute is a think-tank in Ghana that regards itself as an ambassador of liberalism and how its promotion will benefit Ghana and Africa, in general. It is known to be associated with the Kufuor administration and the New Patriotic Party.

⁶² Edward Asomani Personal Interview 2019

⁶³ Kwabena Baah-Duodu is a Diplomat-in-Residence at LECIAD, University of Ghana. Retired career Diplomat: former Ambassador to Switzerland and Austria and Permanent Representative to the European Offices of the UN and other International Organisations

the way the European union is going but not the continental union government that Nkrumah wanted".⁶⁴ Kufuor himself argued that instead of the rushed political union, African states should rather pursue the cooperation of different societies in Africa such as academia, finance and different leadership roles. For him, this would help "lift Africa in its various nations and societies up to mainstream itself into the global society that everybody is forced to live in".⁶⁵ In other words, unlike Nkrumah's idea, the Kufuor administration believed the way to a united Africa and economic independence was the economic route and coordination of other sectors instead of the Nkrumah's political route (echoing its approach to the choice of friends and enemies). However, this showed the level of intensity of friendship or who the administration was more comfortable with. In other words, the administration got closer to governments that shared its Pan-African approach such as the Obasanjo, Thabo Mbeki (President of South Africa from 1999 to 2008) and Eyadema governments.

On the other hand, the government did not share such close relations with radicals like Mugabe and Gaddafi even though they were not considered enemies. Kufuor revealed that "Gaddafi till the end in 2007 or so became very close with me".⁶⁶ I argue that the frazzled relationship, after 2007, was a result of Kufuor's position during the 2007 AU conference. The 2007 AU conference was the highest point of the African renaissance where the radicals campaigned and expected a concrete statement on a continental government. With Ghana being the host, Gaddafi expected a more definite position in support of his stance. In other words, he wanted to reap the fruits of his years of courting Kufuor's love, including his support for Kufuor's candidature for AU chairperson. But Ghana's position of indifference was closer to the moderates, and radicals like Gaddafi were not happy about it. But this shows that Kufuor chose a route consistent with the administration's ideology than the friendship and eventual economic dividends he might have expected to get from Libya.

Beyond these common ideological components, other ideological considerations influenced the choice of friends and enemies. There are two important ideological considerations here. First is the broader internalised ideology each administration subscribed to and how it influenced their choice of friends and enemies. The second is how much emphasis the administrations placed on this ideological position as a yardstick for consideration of friendship. Put differently, how concerned were these administrations about how other states within the neighbourhood were governed? For the Nkrumah administration, little attention was given to how their friends or enemies ruled domestically. As argued

⁶⁴ Kwabena Baah-Duodu: Personal Interview, 2019

⁶⁵ Uongozi Institute of African Leadership for Sustainable Development, (March 7, 2013) Video. Interview with J. A. Kufuor. YouTube. Accessed September 20, 2020, Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rD5TV91xMZs&t=1378s>

⁶⁶ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

above, they were more concerned with the government's international outlook regarding ideological components like anti-colonialism, Pan-Africanism or Africa consciousness.

For the Rawlings administration, how neighbouring governments administered power domestically was a very important yardstick in selecting friends and enemies. At the core of the Rawlings administration's socialist-Marxist ideology was the idea of spreading a populist revolution to overthrow elite and non-performing governments who have monopolised national resources. This means that the Rawlings administration relied not only on ideological similarity in foreign policy but also in domestic governance. It explains why Kwamena Ahwoi and other leading PNDC members were quite pleased and saw it as an affirmation when the young revolutionary members in Nigeria typically requested that Rawlings be loaned to them for a week.⁶⁷ That was the example they pioneered with the overthrow of the Limann administration in 1981. Although revolutionary or authoritarian rule is not widely considered as an ideology, the Rawlings administration created elements of democracy, socialism and Marxism in its version of authoritarianism that made it seem like an ideology. These elements are linked to their anti-Western stance. For the Rawlings administration, the 1981 'revolution' was not only socialist but democratic. The government adopted the famous Abraham Lincoln definition of democracy as 'a government of the people, by the people, for the people' and justified political representation and participation of the people through local deliberation and making institutions such as the National Commission for Democracy, Peoples' Tribunals and Local Defence Committees in towns and villages.⁶⁸ Through these institutions, they conceptualised their revolution as a people's revolution meant to overthrow a "system of organised opportunism, injustice and brutal oppression of honest, hard-working, selfless and patriotic soldiers, ordinary workers".⁶⁹ Rawlings argued that what happened after the 1992 election and the transformation from PNDC to NDC was not a change from authoritarianism to democracy but the fusion of constitutional and democratic rule.⁷⁰ One key reason for this complex mix, as I will show in chapter five, is the membership of the administration.

However, what dominated the administration even after the 1983 ideological shift to enrol on SAP – I will discuss this in chapter five - was that, members of the PNDC/NDC government saw these much-touted novel approaches to democracy as socialist and anti-Western. States or governments that denounced these approaches were seen as enemies. Chris Atim declared that socialist countries were

⁶⁷ Kwamena Ahwoi revealed this in my interview with him. This was also corroborated by Nana Ato Dadzie.

⁶⁸ See Oquaye, M. (1980). *Politics in Ghana, 1972-1979*. Tornado Publications.

Oquaye, M. (2004). *Politics in Ghana, 1982-1992: Rawlings, revolution, and populist democracy*. Tornado Publications.

⁶⁹ Letter of resignation from the PNDC by Chris Atim on 3rd December, 1983

⁷⁰ J. J. Rawlings Speech commemorating the 41st Anniversary of the June 4th Uprising held on June 4 2020

not only the administration's true friends but also the real friends of Africa (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 636). This explains why even though the Eyadema administration was authoritarian, it was not considered ideologically similar to the Rawlings administration, and hence not a friend. The Rawlings administration viewed it as a foothold of Western influence in the neighbourhood, just like Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët-Boigny – an example they wanted to eliminate. And even though the administration in Côte d'Ivoire was a de-facto one-party quasi-democracy, regarded to have comparatively accomplished phenomenal economic achievements (Hachten, 1967; Prosperetti, 2018), the Rawlings administration practically conceived it as not serving the interest of the people but the elites. What this shows, regarding the ideological contextualisation framework, is a confirmation of dualisation as the dominant pathway for the administration's choice of friends and enemies. While defining the neighbourhood comes with some contextual ideological norms and structural limitations such as geography that governments have to deal with, there is more freedom hence relatively more dualisation in the choice of friends and enemies. This is because internalised components of ideologies have more traction in neighbour-relations in a context where there is either less institutionalisation or with governments that have relatively stronger inclinations towards their internalised ideas. This also shows the wide laxity of forms that dualisation can take.

On the other hand, countries with similar thinking in their domestic politics or 'democratic' process were considered as friends. For instance, in Burkina Faso, Sankara followed a similar path and established such institutions as the People's Revolutionary Courts.⁷¹ Regardless of coming to power through a coup he and Rawlings believed that they were democratic, and their governments were representative because of such institutions (Skinner, 1988). The point has to be made that, from the perspective of the neighbouring countries, especially those which were seen as threats, it was a mutually conceived threat. And as will be discussed in the next section, the mutual threats created security consciousness that led to covert attempts at political influence in both countries.

3.5 How Ideologies shaped Relations with Friends and Enemies

Once ideology sets the stage by defining the scope of the neighbourhood and influencing who the administration's friends and neighbours are, the next phase is the actual policy or behaviour towards neighbours. In this section, I argue that while each of the administrations tried to harness their anti-colonial and Pan-African objectives with friends, they attempted pursuing some form of diffusionism or ideological evangelism with their enemies – which, for both the Nkrumah and Rawlings, it resulted in tensions but for Kufuor, there was a more sublime mutual respect as it tried to channel those reforms indirectly through regional structures such as ECOWAS, AU, and the Joint Commissions for

⁷¹ See Michel Prairie (ed) Thomas Sankara Speaks: The Burkina Faso Revolution 1983-1987

Cooperation (JCC). I will also demonstrate here that, for the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, relations with enemies undermined the anti-colonial and pan-African progress they were achieving with their friends. In the following three subsections, I discuss how each administration related with friends and enemies within their broad ideological framework and in the context of foreign policy-making.

3.5.1 Nkrumah Administration

The Nkrumah administration's attitude towards friends was exemplified by two cases: the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union and the Congo. These cases show us situations where friendship based on ideology and ideological telepathy dominated the administration's foreign policy decisions contrary to what some might consider as either pragmatic concerns or irrational. It demonstrates the administration's drive for African consciousness or Pan-Africanism by forging political and economic union, including offering protection and showing solidarity, with countries considered as friends even outside its geographic borders.

The first example of this approach was the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union. This was an attempt by the Nkrumah administration to forge a preliminary alliance that showed a taste of what the rest of Africa could benefit from and the nucleus of the impending union of African states. It was also to prove the government's idea that "African problems can only be satisfactorily solved by Africans"⁷² as it provided conditions for shared political, economic, diplomatic, educational and collective security. Nkrumah, for instance, offered a relaxed loan of about £10 million to Guinea and Mali (Asamoah, 2014). This was after 1958 when Ghana's economy was picking up after barely a year of independence. It made no economic sense to provide such a loan, especially for a country that did not show much promise of repayment. But for the CPP government, this aligned with its indigenous problem-solving approach and a means towards a more effective economic cooperation. This singular gesture became the conduit for the much-touted Ghana-Guinea-Mali union. Although Ghana-Guinea-Mali though was a step towards regional integration, it was an expression of the conceptual neighbourhood shaped by the administration's understanding of the components of their internalised ideology.

The administration was ready to protect its friends on the continent. One example was its willingness to unilaterally intervene during the Congo crises. At the time, Ghana's military power could not practically match its vaunted responsibilities. Ghana's actions were not only going to be a flagrant disregard for the UN resolution; they would leave Ghana defenceless. At a point, some key members

⁷² Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL RECORD of 14th March 1960, col. 7

like Krobo Edusei declared that they were personally going to fight in Congo and South Africa due to his frustration with the opposition and the perceived UN's apathetic attitude.⁷³

Even with a compromised stance and staunch disapproval from opposition parties, Ghana sent half its military to Congo, consisting of three battalions and a brigade headquarters.⁷⁴ The outcome was unsatisfactory because Patrice Lumumba was killed despite earlier promises by members of the administration to Lumumba at all costs.⁷⁵ For the CPP government, it was not about the material or human cost to be incurred; it was a fight against neo-colonialism, imperialism, the projection of African personality and solidarity with a fellow friend in the fight against neo-colonialism. The understanding of a CPP government Cabinet member was that

the situation in Congo has come about not because the Congolese are unable to manage their own affairs but because of the imperialistic infiltration and subversive activities. The imperialists want to be masters of the African continent. We are prepared, and Ghana has demonstrated that we are ready to safeguard the interest of the African continent and to safeguard the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of African states.⁷⁶

Another member argued that "we [Ghana] rush to Congo not to share in the joys that independence has brought to them but in the sorrows that it has brought. We go to wipe a tear and not to give a cheer".⁷⁷ These statements express how ideology was essential to the CPP government's relations with friends regardless of the practical negative consequences. As argued above, when governments have a strong inclination to their internalised ideologies, they can rarely be influenced by contextual ideological norms, especially when those contextual ideological norms are relatively weaker. They also act on it to isolate any country or government that belongs to the opposing side of that idea.

The Nkrumah administration's attitude towards enemies or countries that are seen as threats, is what I call anti-colonial diffusionism and it exemplified the administration's relations with Ghana's geographic neighbours. The government's idea was to assume leadership in the neighbourhood and clear it of all colonial and imperialist domination. Even though the gap in the timing between Ghana's independence and that of its neighbouring states was not wide, members of the CPP government held

⁷³ Krobo Edusei (Minister of Transport and Communications): OFFICIAL RECORD of 9th August 1960, cols. 714-720; Motions (The Congo Situation): OFFICIAL RECORD of 9th August 1960, cols. 674-720; Statements (Ghana Troops in Congo): OFFICIAL RECORD of 29th July 1960, cols. 339-343; The opposition at the time (UP) preferred not only a uniformed approach with all other African countries but also to work through the institutional setup of the UN

⁷⁴ C. de Graft Dickson (Minister of Defence): OFFICIAL RECORD of 29th July 1960, col. 339

⁷⁵ Ako Adjei (Minister of Foreign Affairs): OFFICIAL RECORD of 9th August, 1960, cols 673-679

⁷⁶ Mumuni Bawumia (Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting): OFFICIAL RECORD of 18th July 1960, cols. 53-54

⁷⁷ J. A. Braimah (Gonja East): OFFICIAL RECORD of 18th July 1960, col. 41

a peculiar view about nationalist leaders of French colonies as leaders. They perceived them as unenthusiastic about attaining independence – especially in the way that the CPP sought freedom in its political and economic forms. And their post-independence conditions which allowed some measure of control or influence by France over them confirmed the fears of the Nkrumah administration. With this anti-colonial ideology, the CPP government was eager to obliterate what it called artificial boundaries imposed by colonialism.⁷⁸

On the one hand, this meant a disregard for ethnicity to bring people of different ethnicities together. On the other hand, it also meant bringing people of the same ethnic group who had been separated by artificial colonial borders together. Both became a source of tension for the CPP government and neighbouring countries. This is why although some of the government's efforts were meant to improve relations between Ghana and its neighbours, it was, for the most part, characterised by the politics of accusations of attacks and counter-attacks. There was a two-pronged approach to such influence: through soft power and covert activities (or carrot and stick diplomacy) aimed at influencing change in political leadership.

First was the government's genuine commitment to help neighbouring states to be in the good books of the neighbouring governments and in consonance with the dictates of the OAU. Ghana's relations with Togo and Burkina Faso demonstrates this commitment. At a rally in Ho (the capital of the Volta region or former Togoland) in 1958, Nkrumah declared his willingness to hold talks with Togo to solve problems created by the artificial boundaries between the two countries. Nkrumah even visited Olympio in early 1960 right after Togo's independence to, according to Asafo Adjei, "solve in a few hours what months and years may fail to solve".⁷⁹ Practical efforts were made to achieve these targets of cooperation. For the CPP administration, this was in good faith since it was in fulfilment of a practical solution to the yearning of Ewes who wanted a unification with other Ewes in Togoland. Nkrumah also sent a twenty-member delegation to attend Côte d'Ivoire's independence celebrations.⁸⁰ Records of Nkrumah's travels show that he probably visited Burkina Faso more than any of Ghana's neighbours, although it was the farthest and riskiest journey (in one of these trips the Kulungugu bombing to assassinate Nkrumah occurred). These efforts were to establish trust and build personal relations with President Yameogo.⁸¹ Ghana and Burkina Faso signed the Paga Economic Agreement on June 27, 1961. This agreement had several prospects and rapid achievements including

⁷⁸ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL RECORD of 14th March 1960, col. 7

⁷⁹ D. E. Asafo-Agyei (CPP – Kumasi North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th July, 1960, col. 46

⁸⁰ Speaker of Parliament: OFFICIAL REPORT of 5th August 1960, col. 626

⁸¹ R. M. Abbey (CPP – Accra West): OFFICIAL RECORD of 7th September 1962, col. 106

free movement across the Ghana/Burkina Faso border; breaking down a wall constructed on the border as a symbol of open relations.

Second was the deployment of covert means that resulted in public accusations, counter-accusations and even confrontations. As discussed above, even some members of the party were happy to acknowledge their role in Olympio's overthrow and saw it as an opportunity to pursue the government's 'assimilation' policy.⁸² With Olympio's overthrow, a two-year ban on free movement at the Togo border was removed in March 1963.

These two approaches express the duality of the Nkrumah administration's foreign policy as an inherent part of its anti-colonial and Pan-African ideology. As I defined in chapter two, dualisation is when, on the one hand, there was the need for institutional consensus to pursue certain policy agendas. On the other, there was the need to take unilateral actions as part of the government's fight against imperialism, driven by the belief that some of these institutions are apathetic to the cause of African emancipation. Although the administration believed in establishments, such as the UN, Commonwealth and even the EU, they were wary of its intentions due to their distrust of Western influence. In one of Nkrumah's foreign policy speeches in parliament, in 1960, he emphasised that:

the government will continue to take positive steps through the United Nations Organisation to promote and maintain peace and security among nations. We shall always adopt whatever positive policies will do most to safeguard our independence and world peace. To that end, we solemnly reaffirm their faith in the charter of the United Nations and undertake to be friends with all nations and enemy to none.⁸³

While this presents an institutional dilemma and is justified for a government who is still suspicious of the West, it also demonstrates the level of agency the government had in its neighbour-relations compared to other areas of foreign policy.

3.5.2 Rawlings Administration

The Rawlings administration's behaviour towards enemies or countries perceived as threats can be termed authoritarian diffusionism or soft power. This was evident in how the administration related especially with geographical neighbours or countries that share physical borders with Ghana.

By this, the administration meant the transfer of what they called the people's revolution to neighbouring countries and even the rest of Africa. The idea was that it was not only democratic development that could be diffused to other countries. Instead, authoritarian developments are

⁸² Rev. C. K. Dovlo (CPP – Keta): OFFICIAL REPORT of 26th September 1963, col. 245

⁸³ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 4th July 1960, col. 8

equally able to transmit ideas and understandings to surrounding states. The thinking was that once an authoritarian overthrow proved successful, there was the tendency for a spill-over to other countries. A leading member of the PNDC, Chris Atim⁸⁴ also declared that the new wave of revolution and transformation could not be truncated but would move to states that have people who desire for change (Boafo-Arthur, 2007).. As has been argued above, the Rawlings administration also cared about what happened within neighbouring states, in terms of how they are governed and was willing to intervene by support. This approach made Ghana's neighbours perceive the administration as a threat. It encompasses a direct evangelical bid, common under both Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, to spread their ideas. This emphasises that strong inclination to what Kufuor called 'non-liberal'⁸⁵ ideologies that are typically enhanced through the dualisation pathway. In chapter two, I defined dualisation as an approach where governments shuffle between obedience or disobedience to ideas or norms of contextual structures. This freedom to shuffle occurs when contextual structures are not strong enough to pressure governments.

Kwamena Ahwoi, in my interview, reflected that "Jerry's emergence got almost all the other West African leaders panicking".⁸⁶ "It was a bad example,"⁸⁷ especially for leaders who had been there for a long time and saw his emergence as having potential for young soldiers in their respective countries to emulate. The regime, therefore, pursued an authoritarian soft power meant to produce social and economic democracy/justice or what they called 'real democracy'. In line with the administration's internalised socialist-Marxist ideology, this was a transformation of the social and economic order. As discussed above, what this means in practice is far from liberal democratic tenets such as periodic elections, free press and an independent judiciary. Rather, the focus was on representation through setting up local institutions. Through these institutions, the 'people' would participate in decision making and "democracy will really work for the ordinary man not just for small groups of people who exploit them and ride over their misery" (speech by Rawlings cited in Abbey, 2018, p. 19). Ahwoi recalled a visit to Nigeria when the young revolutionary members "were saying that we [Ghana] should lend them, Jerry, for only one week".⁸⁸

The Rawlings administration was pleased with this and pushed an extra-territorial agenda to make its revolution a reality in other African countries. Groups of political dissidents were willing and ready to overthrow the government of their home countries by enemy governments, in this case, Togo and

⁸⁴ Chris Atim was one of the seven original members of the PNDC that took power in Ghana on 31 December 1981. He later resigned in 1983 for the failure of the administration to achieve its revolutionary objectives.

⁸⁵ J. A. Kufuor Personal Interview 2019

⁸⁶ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview 2019

⁸⁷ Nana Ato Dadzie: Personal Interview, 2019

⁸⁸ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

Côte d'Ivoire. According to Ahwoi, "there were Togolese dissidents in Ghana working to overthrow him [Eyadema], and there were Ghanaian dissidents in Togo working to overthrow us [PNDC]."⁸⁹ Even though both the Eyadema and Rawlings administrations were authoritarian, they conceived each other differently. Here, ideological semblance in terms of authoritarian governance could not secure peaceful relations. Rather, it was their different conceptualisations of anti-colonialism, and the desire to seek political change in each other's country, to avert any form of potential threat. The PNDC/NDC's internalised socialist-Marxist ideology fuelled this discord. In one of those situations, three armed personnel who were captured and executed in 1984 were identified as members of dissident groups that had plans of infiltrating the country through Togo and Côte d'Ivoire (Asamoah, 2014). There was another case where a house in Kumasi was demolished on suspicion that Ghanaian dissidents from Côte d'Ivoire had arrived there on a mission of subversion. Also, when J. H. Mensah⁹⁰ and his colleagues were arrested in the US for attempting to smuggle arms into Ghana in December 1985, it was revealed that they had meetings with dissidents in Abidjan and Lomé before the journey (Ibid). The PNDC/NDC government was not only perceived to have offered support to revolutionary groups but also Ahwoi revealed in my interview that, new revolutionary governments, including Yahaya Jammeh of Gambia sought inspiration from the PNDC/NDC administration.⁹¹ These supports spanned from education, electrification, telecommunication and broadcasting. This offer of assistance was a way of projecting its ideology and positioning the administration as a best example of an anti-imperial and Pan-African government.

The Rawlings administration's reactions to political changes that did not reflect its ideological preference were dominantly bitter. Before Sankara, Ghana's relations with Burkina Faso were at a stalemate. After the overthrow of Sankara in 1987, Ghana-Burkina Faso relations returned to their less vibrant pre-Sankara character. For the first few years after the overthrow, Ghana's embassy in Burkina Faso was not active.⁹² The break and the subsequent deterioration of the relations between Ghana and Burkina Faso were not only because Blaise Compaoré had overthrown a friend to the Rawlings administration. It was also a bad example for the revolution as it threatened stability within the subregion. For once, the Rawlings administration feared a reverse authoritarian spill-over or soft power as the events surrounding the overthrow of Sankara might infiltrate the PNDC government at a time where there were some intra-government disagreements over Ghana's subscription to the

⁸⁹ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

⁹⁰ J. H. Mensah served as Finance Minister under the Progress Party (PP) government when Kufuor was also serving as a deputy Foreign Affairs minister. He also served as the Senior Minister under the Kufuor administration

⁹¹ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

⁹² Ibid; Kofi Attor: Personal Interview, 2019

IMF/SAP programme. Kwamena Ahwoi asserted that “the relation between Sankara and Compaoré was like the relations between Rawlings and Tsikata”⁹³ and for them what Compaoré did might trigger a Tsikata overthrow of Rawlings. The administration did not take it lightly. For Nana Ato Dadzie,⁹⁴ the Compaoré coup “cuts a dream short really, it was a difficult one to swallow particularly because it comes from within”.⁹⁵ The new government was considered a neo-colonial stooge.

The Rawlings administration’s relations with countries and neighbours considered as friends was typified by a show of solidarity and establishment of cooperation at different levels. I have argued above that the internalised socialist-Marxist ideology of the Rawlings administration coupled with its anti-Western interpretation of anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism brought countries within and outside Africa into the government’s conceptual neighbourhood. As argued above, it shows how dominant the internalised ideological components are when they are ‘non-liberal’ and in a context with relatively few institutionalised ideological variables. This was demonstrated in Ghana’s relations with countries like Burkina Faso, Cuba, and Libya.

Economically, the Rawlings administration made efforts at creating and sustaining economic cooperation with friends like Libya, Burkina Faso and Jamaica. Politically there were talks of commencing some sort of political union between Ghana and Burkina Faso. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Ghana at the time, Dr Obed Asamoah, was convinced that the prospects of a political union with Burkina Faso under Sankara were brighter and argued for a Ghana-Burkina Faso union like the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union under Nkrumah (Asamoah, 2014). This relationship was also seen in the light of the administration’s close collaboration with progressive states. Nana Ato Dadzie revealed that with that “progressive bond of friendship we[Ghana and Burkina Faso] saw ourselves as a united country”.⁹⁶ Danso-Boafo disclosed that “as ambassador that was my responsibility to meet whoever [I] needed to meet, to assist the black organisations with whatever assistance we could garner... if it’s political, education whatever, we would help”.⁹⁷

To sustain continuous relations with governments in the Caribbean, the Rawlings administration provided financial support to black-dominated socialist parties. An example is when the administration supported P J Patterson’s People’s National Party (PNP) to win the Jamaican elections in 1992.⁹⁸ Rawlings was made the first Guest of Honour when Jamaica decided to restore Emancipation

⁹³ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview 2019

⁹⁴ Nana Ato Dadzie was a member of the PNDC: former Chief of Staff and Special Assistant to Rawlings

⁹⁵ Nana Ato Dadzie: Personal Interview, 2019

⁹⁶ *ibid*

⁹⁷ Kwaku Danso-Boafo: Personal Interview, 2019

⁹⁸ *ibid*

Day as a holiday on its own.⁹⁹ In a tribute to Rawlings, he emphasised how the Rawlings administration “Ghana joined with the Caribbean in our struggle to abandon the inequities of a global system,” involving actions such as support for Jamaica’s health service.¹⁰⁰ More instructively, the Rawlings administration pioneered the establishment of the Ghana-Jamaica Joint Commission – something that was traditionally a reserve of countries within the geographical neighbourhood or at least in close proximity. But this action by the Rawlings administration was a manifestation of what states or governments do for others within the conceptual neighbourhood or considered as friends.

Culturally and ideologically, the Rawlings administration established exchange programmes with Cuba and Jamaica or the Caribbean. Ghana reopened missions with Cuba, soon after the PNDC came to power, and Rawlings’ administration requested that Fidel Castro permit the creation of a Kwame Nkrumah School and the Isle of Youth. Under this scheme, Ghanaians were sent to be trained in medicine and liberal arts in Cuba. In my interview, Danso-Boafo argued that most of the scheme’s beneficiaries were deliberately selected from deprived communities or regions in Ghana to project the government’s socialist/Marxist idea. While receiving their professional training, they were also trained ideologically, and some of them later became Ministers of State under the 2009-2017 NDC administration. The Rawlings administration also entered into an exchange programme agreement with Jamaica for Ghanaian nurses. Jamaicans were invited to visit their homeland, and some of them were granted posthumous citizenship. P. J. Patterson, at a state banquet organised for him by Rawlings, called himself a son of the land who was home at last.¹⁰¹ There were even efforts to build relations through sports. This aligned with the government’s Third World agenda and Pan-Africanism.

Symbolic solidarity was significant in how the Rawlings administration related to its friends. In solidarity and in contradicting the dictates of the West, the Rawlings administration made two policy advancements in their neighbour-relations, thereby sending a clear unfriendly signal to the West. First was the PNDC/NDC government’s attendance at the boycotted OAU conference in Tripoli, Libya in 1982. Much of the controversy began in February 1982 over the admission of the Polisario guerrilla front as the organisation’s 51st member, representing Western Sahara.¹⁰² However, for the Rawlings administration, this boycott action by about nineteen states led by Morocco was akin to the US government’s Cold War strategy, which had already pressured African countries into withdrawing

⁹⁹ Ghana News Agency (November 18, 1999) Rawlings holds banquet for Jamaican Premier. Accessed October 20, 2020, Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Rawlings-holds-banquet-for-Jamaican-Premier-9028>

¹⁰⁰ Tribute to His Excellency Jerry John Rawlings by P. J. Patterson (former Prime Minister of Jamaica 1992-2006). Accessed January 15, 2021, Retrieved from <https://heisconsults2.com/selected-speeches>

¹⁰¹ Ibid

¹⁰² The New York Times (July 25, 1982) O.A.U. Conference Faces Major Split. Accessed March 13, 2020, Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/25/world/oau-conference-faces-major-split.html>

from the 1980 Olympic games in Moscow. The second was Ghana's participation in the 1982 African Cup of Nations (AfCON), also, in Libya. Even though Ghana had already qualified, the Ghana Football Association (GFA) and the Limann administration had no intention of going due to the impact of the political instability that brought the Rawlings administration to power. Just like the OAU conference, in my interview with Kwamena Ahwoi, he blamed the US government for frightening African leaders into withdrawing. But the administration assembled the dismantled team, which eventually won the trophy after a symbolic final match with Libya. The Rawlings administration's decision to participate in these two activities was not only a show of its understanding of Pan-Africanism and pursuance of anti-Western stance: it was also to show solidarity for a friend.

3.5.3 Kufuor Administration

Unlike the radicalism and interventionism that characterised the ideologies of Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, good neighbourliness under Kufuor was less intrusive. However, the Kufuor government walked the tightrope between its laissez-faire liberal principles and intervention against self-determination or territorial integrity. As argued earlier, this position can be explained in two ways: the administration ideologically favoured interstate relations based on these principles, so they were already part of its internalised ideological components; that the way the Kufuor administration accepted and pursued these principles, and to some extent evangelically through the established institutions, can only be explained through the adaptive pathway. This shows that ideological evangelism is not the preserve of the dualisation pathway but also the adaptive pathway. More importantly, it indicates a genuine commitment to an ideology and sincere feeling that it is the right approach for others. The difference between the evangelical nature of the dualisation and adaptive pathways is that while the former pursues it unilaterally, the latter pursues it within established institutions that embody those ideas. For the Kufuor administration, this was in one way a cautious attempt to prevent the recurrence of the hostile events seen during the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations. This idea meant two things for the Kufuor administration in terms of how it approached neighbour-relations: friendly relations and economic cooperation.

The administration's pursuit of friendly relations with all states, regardless of their ideologies, was through what I call Kufuor's charm offensive diplomacy. The term Charm offensive was popularly theorised by Joshua Kurlantzick¹⁰³ to mean something broader than Joseph Nye's¹⁰⁴ conception of soft power which "excluded elements like investment and trade and formal diplomacy" but focused

¹⁰³ Joshua Kurlantzick theorised this concept in his book titled *Charm offensive: How China's soft power is transforming the world. Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power Is Transforming the World*. Yale University Press. <https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.45-2865>

¹⁰⁴ Joseph S. Nye Jr., (2004) *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*. New York: Public Affairs, pp. 5–6.

“purely on the attractiveness of a nation’s brand of its values and ideals and norms” (Kurlantzick, 2007, p. 6). A charm offensive rests on the ability of a government not only to build a brand to influence other nations but also to shape investments and trade. Even though it has later been replaced by the term public diplomacy, Tony Tai-Ting Liu emphasises that China’s charm offensive diplomacy is not devoid of economic and cultural prowess (Tai-Ting Liu, 2019). However, the term has since been used in the study of international relations to describe China’s soft power across the globe to improve its global status, image and influence. The Kufuor administration did not have the benefit of China’s economic prowess – which was a limitation – but it pursued formal diplomacy with a blend of neighbourhood economic diplomacy. For the most part, it was built on three things: Ghana’s legacy as the first country to gain independence in sub-Saharan Africa, the historical contacts of the Danquah Busia tradition with some of Ghana’s neighbours during their periods in exile; and Kufuor’s personality.

The fact that members of the government and Kufuor himself continually emphasised Ghana’s desire for stability and peace with all nations, especially those on its borders, was a classic charm offensive strategy. In his sessional address 2002, Kufuor declared, “we consider it imperative that we have the most peaceful and harmonious relationship with our neighbours”.¹⁰⁵ At a Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD) conference on Ghana’s foreign policy options later that year, Kufuor reiterated that “it is only within the framework of understanding and peace particularly within the West African subregion that we can pursue the economic social and political goals that we as a nation have set for ourselves”. In other words, he saw good neighbourliness as a pre-condition for the economic and social development of Ghana. It was a way of moving away from Ghana’s threatening past to, what the NPP election 2000 manifesto called, a positive change environment. The NPP manifesto for the 2000 election clearly stated that the government would “establish and deepen friendly relations with other countries, respecting their values and customs and enduring reciprocal treatment”.¹⁰⁶ The government, therefore, developed strategies needed to achieve these goals in its neighbour-relations.

The government executed this on two interrelated levels. First was Kufuor’s numerous travels, personal contacts, and communication with leaders of Ghana’s neighbouring countries. Of all the three administrations under study, Kufuor travelled the most. Most controversial was his first official visit to Togo. In less than four days after being sworn into office, Kufuor visited Togo to participate in an anniversary commemorating Eyadema’s rise to power. He received criticism both from the

¹⁰⁵ President John Agyekum Kufuor, Sessional Address 2002. Filed by the Ghana News Agency (GNA). Retrieved September 20, 2020 from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/20059/highlights-of-presidents-sessional-address.html>

¹⁰⁶ Agenda for Positive Change: Manifesto of the NPP, 2000

opposition and international media as it did not look good for an avowed liberal to be closely associated with an authoritarian.¹⁰⁷ To some scholars, this action and the subsequent consorting with Blaise Compaoré was a contradiction between the Kufuor administration's rhetoric on foreign policy and the reality. It legitimised the ills of the Eyadema government if an avowed liberal chose to pay such a symbolic visit (Kwesi-Aning, 2007). But it was in line with the government's ideological position that sought to build good neighbour-relations regardless of tensions with previous administrations. It also meant the government took the principle of non-interference and territorial integrity more seriously than the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations had. In other words, Ghana would have no influence in deciding who ran Togo, and it was solely the people of Togo who would determine the type of political system they wanted. For D. K. Osei, the fact that Togo was undemocratic should not affect the sustenance of good relations.¹⁰⁸ In my interview with Baah-Duodu, he argued that these direct tours improved Ghana's relations not only with neighbouring countries but the whole of Africa.¹⁰⁹ They moved Ghana away from its popular neighbourhood image as a threat to a Ghana that was a peace-loving and friendly neighbour ready to create opportunities for deeper cordial relations.

At the second level, the administration's respect for the doctrine of non-interference in the politics of neighbouring countries was unlike the era of security consciousness under the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration. Kufuor's interpretation of the previous administrations was one of presidents who "wanted to posture like strong men".¹¹⁰ According to Kufuor, the rationale behind his political life was "not to portray myself like original thinker or strongman or anything. I didn't want to sort of meddle or grab power or any piece of land from any of our neighbours."¹¹¹ The implication was that some of his predecessors, including Nkrumah and Rawlings, portrayed the opposite. As a result, he did not want it to seem as though "I have inherited enmity",¹¹² rather that "I wanted us to coexist like brother nations"¹¹³ because, just like the other administrations, Ghanaians and neighbouring states "have been brothers from centuries".¹¹⁴ This was tested in the Ivorian conflict where even though it was clear to the administration that Gbagbo did not like it, Kufuor still conceived its role as a neutral mediator. As a result, the Kufuor administration played a vital role in ensuring the end of the first Ivorian crisis in 2004. His efforts included a series of both formal and informal talks, acceptance of refugees and efforts culminating in the eventual signing of the Marcoussis Accord in France on January

¹⁰⁷ The Chronicle (February 6, 2001) Ghana: Issue: The Furore Over Pres. Kufuor's Visit To Togo. Retrieved from <https://allafrica.com/stories/200102070193.html>

¹⁰⁸ D. K. Osei: Personal Interview, 2019

¹⁰⁹ Kwabena Baah-Duodu: Personal Interview, 2019

¹¹⁰ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

¹¹¹ Ibid

¹¹² Ibid

¹¹³ Ibid

¹¹⁴ Ibid

23, 2003. Kufuor's personal engagement or role in the peacebuilding process, as a neighbour, was to prevent a spill-over to Ghana. As the Chairman for ECOWAS, he had the responsibility to facilitate a peaceful subregion.¹¹⁵ According to Kufuor, he was a friend of both parties. Beyond ideology, the practical conditions at the time shaped the direction of Ghana's neighbour-relations both under Kufuor and Rawlings to tackle contemporary challenges with pragmatic responses. But the Kufuor government chose to approach this through non-interventionism.

One other instance the Kufuor administration confirmed this was the renaming of the Sankara interchange in Accra to Ako Adjei interchange in 2005. This symbolic interchange had undergone different name changes until the Rawlings administration renamed it Sankara circle, in memory of Thomas Sankara. Even though Sheikh I.C. Quaye ¹¹⁶argued that it was primarily to honour the contributions of Dr Ako Adjei in Ghana's political history,¹¹⁷ the change was designed to send positive signals to the Compaoré government eventually. The approach contrasted with the PNDC/NDC government where Compaoré was still wary of the tendency of the Rawlings regime to instigate an overthrow as payback or retributive justice for his overthrow of Sankara. Actions such as these smoothed Ghana Burkina relations.

The Kufuor administration also pursued friendship through economic relations. While China had the economic and cultural prowess to pursue a comprehensive public diplomacy, Ghana had less economic power to share. Instead, it was able to demonstrate its commitment through real initiatives of economic cooperation. The Kufuor administration facilitated the revitalisation of the Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation (PJCC), in the area of trade and technical economic assistance, between Ghana and neighbouring countries. These PJCCs had been less functional during the Rawlings administration due to the shifting conceptualisations of friends and enemies based on the ideology of the neighbouring states' administration. It yielded positive results and dividends for Ghana and the other beneficiaries within the sub-region. For instance, the government was able to set up a 90-day credit facility for 30,000 oil barrels a day in 2001 when Ghana was in a fuel crisis. It also negotiated a free grant of 100 Peugeot vehicles for the Ghana Police Service (GPS). Rather than pursuing a more radical approach to the attainment of great power status, Ghana redefined its position as an economic facilitator or much-touted 'gateway to Africa' under the Kufuor administration.

¹¹⁵ The New Humanitarian (December 20, 2003) ECOWAS Creates Peace Fund, Retains Kufuor as Chairman. Accessed October 10, 2019, Retrieved from <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/47765/west-africa-ecowas-creates-peace-fund-retains-kufuor-chairman>

¹¹⁶ Sheikh I.C. Quaye was the Greater Accra Regional Minister at the time

¹¹⁷ Ghana News Agency (March 12 2005): Sankara Overpass Renamed After Ako Adjei. Accessed June 20, 2020, Retrieved from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/27058/1/sankara-overpass-renamed-after-ako-adjei.html>

I will show in chapter five that the government promoted economic relations through the framework of integrated economic diplomacy, which combined efforts aimed at attracting foreign investments, promoting international trade and diaspora economic relations with satisfying the conditions of the Bretton Woods. All the government's economic relations, both within and outside the continent, were linked. For instance, Ghana's pioneering role in pushing the agenda for the construction of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) brought Ghana, Benin, Togo and Nigeria into close economic cooperation. The WAGP was an initiative to initiate energy and economic cooperation between the five countries by transferring Nigeria's by transporting excess gas from Nigeria to support energy generation in the other four countries through undersea pipes. From its internalised liberal ideology, the Kufuor administration pursued neighbour-relations in a way that yielded economic benefits. As argued at different points of this chapter, this indicates how powerful internalised ideologies of governments are regarding neighbour-relations.

3.6 Conclusion

At the core of this chapter is the demonstration of how relevant ideology is to understanding Ghana's neighbour-relations. While this chapter makes a case for the relevance of ideology to understanding Ghana's neighbour relations, it is worthy of note that ideology is not everything and does not explain everything domestically. Instead, ethno-regional factors, resource struggles, historical re-enactments, and perceptions of ethnic marginalisation have driven aspects of neighbour relations. These dynamics have been highlighted by studies such as Aluede (2017), Aluko (1976), Kwesi-Aning (2007) and Bening (1983).

I argue that although good neighbourliness has been touted as the objective of Ghana's neighbour-relations, this has been complicated by different interpretations and approaches. The three administrations typify these dynamics. Due to the limited, often vague and relatively weaker contextually institutionalised variables, these interpretations and approaches are shaped by a combination of governments' internalised ideologies and their interpretations of ideological components, mainly anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism or African consciousness. By 1981 when the PNDC/NDC came into office, some contextual structures had emerged. However, the relations between these institutions and the PNDC/NDC administration can be characterised as dualisation – where the government, at different times, shifted between their ideology and adherence to the ideas from the institutions or structures because those structural ideas conform to the government's ideology. This is not just limited to the PNDC/NDC government as due to the relatively weaker contextual structures governments have much freedom to pursue policies based on their ideologies without being hindered by ideas from contextual structures. It is an interpretation of the components and relations with contextual structures that defined good neighbourliness as an idea and plan of

action. While this demonstrates agency at different levels, it makes neighbour-relations relatively unstable and susceptible to changes, especially when there is a change in government.

Following this, I argue that ideologies perform three specific roles regarding neighbour-relations: framing the scope of the neighbourhood, defining relationships within the neighbourhood and shaping behaviour within such relationships. Inherent in these roles are a combination of how the different administrations conceived ideas around the ideological components. The lack of conceptualisation and institutionalisation of good neighbourliness in Ghana's neighbour-relations have had harsh repercussion on political stability within the neighbourhood and amongst citizens of neighbouring states. Therefore, even though neighbour-relations progressively improved under the Kufuor administration, the quality of such improvement is yet to translate into concrete policy restructuring for coordinated and mutual development. Part of the relevance of this chapter is to enhance our understanding of the idea of friendship and enemy in theorising IR. The link between ideologies, friends and enemies from an African context where such friendship and enemy identities are very relevant is an enhancement of what existing constructivists have offered, and presents a shift from realist and liberal interpretations. This chapter and the next two empirical chapters provide a springboard for a broader analysis of Africa's international relations where ideology offers critical insights and complements existing understanding of international relations.

CHAPTER 4 - Ideology and Ghana's Efforts Towards Regional Integration: Deconstructing Pan-Africanism as an Ideological Component

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I focus on regional integration as one key area of foreign policy which African governments pursue from socio-political, cultural, economic and activist perspectives. Socio-political and cultural foreign policy stems from thinking and argument around how colonisation 'balkanised' ethnic groups and communities in Africa by dividing them into different states, thus separating people who were hitherto united. Economic foreign policy stems from the need for trade and other economic activities and cooperation between people or states on the continent. Activist foreign policy emerges because, for leaders like Nkrumah, regional integration is one way of projecting the African personality and rejecting domination or neo-colonisation of the continent by foreign powers. These three explanations, from the onset, depict an ideological divide between African elites on issues concerning regional integration.

In this chapter, I argue that while Pan-Africanism,¹¹⁸ in its variants, has been the dominant ideological component that shapes Ghana's efforts towards regional integration, the differences in conceptualisation and ensuing approaches are occasioned by two main factors: the three administrations' interpretations of other ideological components, usually shaped by their internalised ideologies; and the pathways through which the governments' internalised ideologies adjust to the ideas from contextual structures like the AU and ECOWAS. As shown in chapter two and the ICF figure 2.1, pathways are important because how governments' ideologies adjust to ideas from contextual structures shapes and helps us understand policies. In other words, how governments adjust to ideas from contextual structures tells us a lot about their policymaking processes and policies themselves. In this chapter, I argue that although contextual structures such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), ECOWAS and AU provide ideas for regional integration and all four

¹¹⁸ 'Pan-Africanism' and 'pan-Africanism' has a long history of controversy in terms of what the capital 'P' and the small 'p' are, when, how to use them. See George Shepperson (1962). *Pan-Africanism and "Pan-Africanism": Some Historical Notes*; Alice Hoover (1971) *Pan-Africanism: A Selective Bibliography*. Pan-Africanism with the capital 'P' rose to become the name for the dominant group that organised the series of Pan African congresses (1919, Paris; 1921, London; 1923, London and Lisbon; 1927, New York; 1945, Manchester) after which Nkrumah took over with the All-African People's Conference in Accra (1958). It has its roots in George Padmore's publication, *Pan-Africanism or Communism?* in 1956. 'pan-Africanism' with the small 'p' has been used for groups or movements that are relatively smaller, in terms of influence, coverage, organisations/events and often transient. These groups are regarded to have more cultural components than those with the capital 'P'. But as will be discussed later in this chapter, this thesis treats Pan-African as an ideological component which, together with other components, shapes integration efforts or works of the Pan-African movement. I acknowledge these dynamics but will use the capital 'P' for the sake consistency and also to mean that, as an ideological component, Pan-Africanism has grown consistently over the years to become a dominant part of Ghanaian nationalism – something the capital 'P' represents.

pathways are important, the adaptability and dualisation pathways are dominant. This means that the dominant ideological process has been a situation where governments readjust their ideologies to take on ideas from contextual structures – just like some the members of the PNDC/NDC revealed in my interview that, with the emergence of ECOWAS and subregional approach to African integration, the PNDC/NDC government adapted their ideas for regional integration to suit a more functional approach to integration. Or a situation where governments prioritise their ideologies but accept ideas from contextual structures only when they (ideas from the structures) resonate with their (government's) ideas.

While this demonstrates the relative weakness of these structures, it also demonstrates that the idea of regional integration transcends the post-independence era (I will explain this further below). What is also particularly important here, beyond the pathways, is the interaction between Pan-Africanism and the other ideological components – good neighbourliness, anti-colonialism and economic independence. This approach depicts Pan-Africanism, not as an independent ideology but reliant on and shaped by other ideological components and a government's internalised ideology. It is typified by the link with the other two key areas of Ghana's foreign policy – neighbour-relations and economic diplomacy - analysed in the thesis.

This chapter will also demonstrate that Ghana's approach towards regional integration has moved from a dominant focus on rapid political unification to functional economic integration under the three administrations – moving from an immediate goal to an ultimate long-term goal. Particularly, throughout this period, the idea of Pan-Africanism moved from being a highly contested term in across Africa and within Ghana to a seeming consensus in interpretation and approach due to the rise and dominance of contextual structures.

In this thesis, I use Pan-Africanism and African consciousness interchangeably to mean the level of awareness of the African condition and the extent of willingness that governments show in their knowledge and commitment to some form of integration among the people on the continent. This reduces the temptation to analyse Pan-Africanism as an ideal that many regional integration policies fail to meet. Pan-Africanism was shaped by personalities, regarded as pioneers, and key people whose ideas have dominated the international scene over time, especially during decolonisation struggles (Carrington, 1965). There is the tendency to use their conceptualisation to evaluate the idea and policies thereof. This misses the fact that there have been many conceptualisations of Pan-Africanism by nationalist leaders even at the time. The 'radicals' became more popular because the context in the run up to independence was charged and thus conducive for how they interpreted other ideological components such as anti-colonialism and its interaction with Pan-Africanism (Shepperson,

1962). Therefore, I analyse Pan-Africanism component and other ideological components within Ghanaian nationalism whose various interpretations and conceptualisations have shaped Ghana's efforts towards regional integration, under the Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor administrations.

Studies on regional integration have proceeded along two main lines. The first focuses on what can be called the pragmatic evaluation of integration policies (Adedeji, 1970; De Melo & Tsikata, 2014; Gebe, 2008; Olivier, 2009; Qobo, 2007; Yakohene, 2009). The second addresses the subject matter of ideology - in this case Pan-Africanism (Grilli, 2018; James, 2015; Potekhin, 1968). However, some of these studies have treated Pan-Africanism as a farfetched ideal that has little impact on reality, leaving the actions and inactions of governments broadly non-ideological in the sense that they are unaffected by it (Baron, 2012; Eze, 2013; Muchie, 2000). Pan-Africanism, therefore, emerges as an idea in which every other action lies outside its confines.

Works on Pan-Africanism and regional integration reveal three main challenges, especially in the case of Ghana. First, Pan-Africanism is analysed as an ideology on its own (Gerits, 2015; Kumah-Abiwu, 2013). This situates it out of context and downplays its relations with other ideological components beyond thinking about Africa – something that the contextual framework of this thesis pursues. Second, there is a tendency to treat Pan-Africanism as if it is an ideology that ended after the overthrow of Nkrumah (Biney, 2012; Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009; Kah, 2016; Socialist Forum Ghana, 2006). This is a common phenomenon in the pro-Nkrumaist papers and some of my respondents highlighted this sentiment. Third, even for Nkrumah's administration, many (including critics) dominantly attribute his government's regional integration efforts to his personality and ideals rather than on his [or government's] interpretation and conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism (Commander, 2007; Gebe, 2008; Howe, 1997; Kumah-Abiwu, 2013). A question that emanates from these is: How do we better understand regional integration efforts beyond the narrowed approach to Pan-Africanism, assumptions of pragmatism and idealism?

The answer lies in a constitutive analysis of both Pan-Africanism and regional integration with other ideological components for the former and other related foreign policy areas for the latter. At its broadest level, Pan-Africanism can be called a 'thin centred' ideology. 'Thin centred' is not used here to distinguish between elite and anti-elite ideologies (Chryssogelos, 2017; Schulz et al., 2018) but to mean ideologies that usually have less internal integration but are "thickened by ingesting part of other ideologies" (Freedon, 1996, p. 485, 2005). This means that Pan-Africanism counts on and takes shape in its influence on foreign policy and approaches through its interaction with an administration's broader internalised ideologies.

Generally, the Nkrumah administration that pursued it from a socialist internalised ideological strand with a radical view of anti-colonialism and economic independence tended to favour and prioritise urgent political integration, to build unity to deter external domination. In contrast, when you analyse this from the Kufuor administration's liberal perspective, which had a less radical stance on anti-colonialism and economic independence, it becomes a 'distant' objective which can be understood through functional integration approaches.

In the following sections, I will first discuss the link between regional integration and Pan-Africanism, followed by a historical overview of the development of Pan-Africanism and African consciousness in Ghana. I will then discuss the variations of Pan-Africanism in each of the three administrations and explore how they reflect in the government's efforts towards regionalism. A conclusion follows.

4.2 The Link between Regional Integration and Pan-Africanism

Regional integration is used in this chapter to mean a deeper form of interaction between countries in areas such as politics, economics, technology, and human resources to achieve a common goal, usually inspired by history. These countries usually share geographical location, a common sense of identity and purpose, similar economic stature and position, and level of development (Yakohene, 2009). Regional integration in Africa, also stretches integration beyond countries to people of African descent around the world. Notwithstanding, ideologies are the frameworks within which the most important questions on regional integration, such as 'with who', 'where', 'how', 'why' and 'when' are answered – whether consciously or unconsciously.

The idea of Pan-Africanism or African consciousness defines the broader aspiration of regional integration, thus, some deeper form of relations on the continent. However, it is Pan-Africanism's, as an ideological component, interaction with the other ideological components within a governments' broader internalised ideologies that defines the purpose, nature and scope of regional integration. This dynamic range has been demonstrated in different ways but primarily exemplified in how Pan-Africanism has been variedly conceptualised, especially by decision-making elites. Just like other social science concepts, Pan-Africanism has been defined variably and subjected to different interpretations. At the Annual Conference of the American Society of African Culture held in 1960, key speakers failed to reach a concrete agreement on the definition of the ideology. While some saw it as an anti-colonial struggle for independence of sub-Saharan African countries, others saw it as a movement for a unified continent calling for a mass return to the continent of all people of African descent. S. K. B Asante reveals how francophone delegates framed the concept contextually. Alioune Diop, the founder of the journal *Presence Africaine*, argued that "each country or cultural region had its terminology; in France, we invented *négritude* (negroness); in the Anglo-Saxon countries, they invented Pan-

Africanism".¹¹⁹ Geographically, some did not think of the North African countries as part of this movement as they belonged to the pan Arabism movement.

Further, a deeper look the speeches of African leaders at the 1963 Addis Ababa conference that formed the OAU, shows that the internalised ideologies of leaders were brought to bear on how they conceptualised their Pan-African aspirations. For instance, while 'liberals' or 'gradualists' proposed a Pan-African organisation and route that was largely economic, functional and not necessarily wary of neo-colonial influences, antithetical to the 'socialist-Marxists'. The 'liberals', like Houphouët-Boigny, were therefore less inclined to pursue the political and activist Pan-African route espoused by Nkrumah and Sékou Touré. Thus, answers to the questions of 'with who', 'where', 'how', 'why' and 'when' of regional integration were varied. This is the broad fundamental divide that inspired the formation the Casablanca and Monrovia group years before the formation of the OAU in 1963. The difference between these two groups was not just the former being radical and the latter being gradual, as Good (1964) points out in his study of the changing patterns of African international relations. Instead, there were fundamental inherent differences, for instance, in how they perceived anti-colonialism or the kind of relationship they wanted to have with former colonial metropolises, the nature and limits of the union or integration, their perception of the 'African personality', and even which territories on the continent should be included. These are elements or concerns developed from an interaction between all the ideological components and the broad internalised of governments ideologies (such as Liberalism, Socialism, Marxism, Communism). The case among academics is not much different. They differ in the interpretation and evolution of the idea¹²⁰ (Kumah-Abiwu & Ochwa-Echel, 2013).

The African Union (AU), during its 50th-anniversary celebrations, themed *Pan Africanism and African Renaissance*, provided a relatively comprehensive explanation of pan Africanism. According to the AU:

Pan-Africanism is an ideology and movement that encourages the solidarity of Africans worldwide. It is based on the belief that unity is vital to economic, social and political progress and aims to 'unify and uplift' people of African descent. The ideology asserts that the fates of all African peoples and countries

¹¹⁹ S. K. B. Asante (March, 2007) Ghana and the Promotion of Pan Africanism and Regionalism. *The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lecture Series 40*. Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.

¹²⁰ See also Agyeman, Opoku. (1975). The Osagyefo, The Mwalimu, and Pan-Africanism: A Study in the Growth of a Dynamic Concept. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 13(4):653- 675; Biney, Ama. (2011). *The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan Press; Biney, Ama. (2008). The Legacy of Kwame Nkrumah in Retrospect. *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 2 (3):129-159; Okhonmina, Stephen. (2009). The African Union: Pan-Africanist Aspirations and the Challenge of African Unity. *The Journal of Pan African Studies* 3(4):85-100.

are intertwined. At its core Pan-Africanism is a belief that African peoples, both on the continent and in the diaspora, share not merely a common history, but a common destiny.¹²¹

My elite interviews reveal an additional sentiment on pan Africanism ranging from high optimism to pessimism regarding approaches and evolution. Kwame Tenkorang, one of my respondents who served as a career diplomat and former personal assistant to the former Minister for Foreign Affairs Obed Asamoah, observed that:

Nkrumah's commitment to African unity was total. I don't think that anybody else has gone as far as he did...the idea has been stable except that in Nkrumah's day that was the beginning, he was a pioneer, and his focus and attention was very critical in the initial stages. And then also for a time, you know we were very quiet even in Africa...¹²²

Although this observation seems plausible if you are an Nkrumaist (Ahlman, 2017) or analyse Pan-Africanism and regional integration as an independent facet of foreign policy while overlooking the other ideological components within broader government ideology as done in many studies (Grilli, 2019; Shepperson, 1962), I argue and show below that the efforts towards regional integration are more dynamic than this. For instance, Kufuor would reckon that regional integration was more streamlined during his administration than under earlier presidents due to the relatively fewer tensions within the neighbourhood.¹²³

The deliberate use of 'African consciousness' in this thesis allows me to analyse governments' perceptions and the extent of this consciousness through policies instead of placing a particular conception as standard. Historically, Pan-Africanism has been associated with some leaders more than others, usually based on how popular and acceptable their conception was/is. This is sometimes used as a standard to evaluate policies and the ideas of other governments. This approach to studying efforts towards integration misses the fundamental point that, for instance, each Ghanaian administration had some sort of consciousness towards African unity (Ahlman, 2017). Therefore, it is for us to develop a framework to better understand what shaped such consciousness and its eventual effect on foreign policy. In this thesis, the proposed approach is a contextual framework that treats Pan-Africanism as an ideological component within each government's broad ideology and gets its conceptualisation from the interaction with the other contextual components and internalised ideas.

¹²¹ Special Edition for the 20th AU Summit. 2013. AU Echo.

¹²² Kwame Asamoah Tenkorang, Personal Interview 2019. He is a retired career Diplomat who also served as first secretary and counsellor of Ghana's permanent mission to the UN office in Geneva from 1987 to 1991; Personal assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Obed Asamoah; Chargé d'Affaires at the Embassy of Ghana in Tokyo, Japan; Chief of Protocol at the Ministry; Ambassador to Libya, Kenya, Malta, Singapore, and Community of Sahel-Saharan States.

¹²³ Personal Interview: John Agyekum Kufuor, 2019

A review of all these different sources shows that regardless of the many different versions and definitions, there are common themes, yet they have to be complemented due to their limitation of context and all-encompassing approach to Pan-Africanism as an ideology. From this observation, I define Pan-Africanism as an ideological component that problematises the African condition in global affairs – racial oppression, underdevelopment and exploitation - and believes that the viable respite for such conditions lies in a joint commitment of African states and African people, both at home and abroad, to initiate and streamline programmes for such purposes. Pan-Africanism has therefore developed into a vital force in global politics and thought. In practice, it is expressed in a variety of ways beyond politics and economics, including literature, performing arts, clothing and food (Botwe-Asamoah, 2005).

One way such conceptualisation has been demonstrated lies in how some ministries were framed, and the Ghanaian case shows this. It is a common phenomenon in African countries for governments to set up institutions to facilitate regional integration. In Ghana, it has dominantly been in the form of assigning roles to ministries, yet the constitution only specifies the attorney general and ministry of justice, leaving the rest to the discretion of governments. This means that the creation of ministries is susceptible to change, especially after regime changes.

This susceptibility, however, shows us how governments conceptualised Pan-Africanism and regional integration based on their ideologies. Nkrumah, for instance, set up institutions in his office to be in charge of his Pan-African and regional integration activities: The Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs - headed by a staunch Pan-African, George Padmore himself - and the African Affairs Centre (AAC). Through these institutions, unofficial material and financial support were given to freedom fighters/nationalist leaders and secessionist groups like the Sanwis. This showed the government's intent, commitment and objective shaped by its interpretation of Pan-Africanism and its interaction with other ideological components like anti-colonialism. It also explains how such interpretations were critical to Ghana's neighbour-relations and, sometimes, instigated tensions when neighbours like Olympio and Houphouët-Boigny perceived Pan-Africanism and regional integration differently.

Similar dynamics can be seen from the Kufuor administration, where the ministerial organisation in relation to regional integration ambitions came in two parts. During the first part – between 2001 and 2006 – regional integration was handled by the Ministry for Regional Co-Operation and NEPAD under the leadership of Dr Paa Kwasi Nduom (an economist and astute businessman) and later Dr Kofi Konadu Apraku, also an economist. During the second part – between 2006 and 2009 – the Ministry for Regional Co-Operation and NEPAD was merged with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Regional Integration and NEPAD under the leadership of Nana Akuffo Addo, a renowned human rights lawyer. The use of the word cooperation, the addition of NEPAD, and the fact that the new ministry was headed by two ministers who were economists and businessmen and later by a renowned human rights lawyer, suggest the government's functional, economic outlook, and the bid to pursue good governance and democracy within the region instead of a political, military and economic union as understood and promoted by the Nkrumah administration.

Within the varieties of Ghanaian nationalism adopted by this study, Pan-Africanism fits four main features. First, it is reactive in the sense that it is a response to European imperialism that deprived Africa of its economic and human resources within a racist ideology (Chrisman, 1973; Katembo, 2008). Expressions of deeply felt emotions characterise it. However, this reactive nature is selective. It does not call for the return to a glorious past or a return of all black people to the continent. Instead, it seeks to modernise and encourage investment from the diaspora while pursuing an agenda that can remedy or reverse the continuous effects of Africa's painful past of colonialism, slave trade and racism.

Second, it is not sporadic. It originates from a string of conscious intellectual debates in and outside Africa to address Africa's perennial challenges. It boasts serious scholars and activists, including Martin Delany, Alexander Crummel, W.E.B Du Bois, Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo Kenyatta and Julius Nyerere¹²⁴(Adogamhe, 2008; Ahlman, 2017; Chrisman, 1973). The stream of Pan-African gatherings, from the first conference held in France in 1919 to the fifth Manchester conference in 1945 and the Accra conferences organised by Nkrumah, was used for debate, ideological education and as engagement forums for the critical appraisal of Pan-Africanism.

Third, is shifting objectives. Shifting objectives does not mean inconsistencies. Rather, it reflects the concept of ideological contextualisation where meanings, objectives or conceptualisations of ideologies are aligned, whether consciously or unconsciously, to fit the demands of the time. For instance, one crucial Pan-African goal during the colonial period was to seek liberation from Europe (Emerson, 1962). This objective no longer features in Pan-African discussions since the end of South Africa's apartheid regime in 1994, although some Pan-African commentators and governments with internalised Pan-African ideas still maintain that the decolonisation fight has been transformed into a fight against neo-colonialism or economic dependence.

Fourth, it is historical. The historical element of Pan-Africanism manifests in two ways. First, the idea was primarily stimulated by activities of the past, hence its reactive nature. Second, contemporary pan Africanism has its source in the thoughts and actions of nationalist groups during the colonial

¹²⁴ Peter Kuryla (April 2016) Pan-Africanism. *Encyclopaedia Britannica, inc.* Accessed July 4, 2020, Retrieved from <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Pan-Africanism>

period. Therefore, it is important that any analysis of post-independence Pan-Africanism pays attention to the nature of Pan-Africanism during the colonial period as a primary source of its contemporary dynamics (Chrisman, 1973; Grilli, 2018). Such historical trajectories set the tone for reinforcing mutual conditions that different internalised ideologies, regardless of their source, reflect. Therefore, it is a norm for the ideologies of African governments to respond to say something about their conceptions of African unity. When such historical conditions are deemed critical, there are efforts to institutionalise their activities. This is what happened with the formation of OAU in 1963 and subsequent regional bodies to facilitate such integration. In chapter two, I argued that once these structures exist, there is a constant interaction with governments' internalised ideologies which adjust to the structures through four pathways: conform, adapt, instrumentalise and dualise. Later in this chapter, I will show how the internalised ideologies of the three administrations adjusted to these contextual structures.

In the next section, I discuss the dynamics of this historical condition and show that even before Ghana's independence, the idea of Pan-Africanism and its objective of African integration was as contested in Ghana like it was across the rest of the world. This contestation was stimulated by the internalised ideologies of governments and how they interpreted the other contextual components such as economic independence and anti-colonialism.

4.3 Historical Overview of the Development of Pan-Africanism in Ghana

There are claims that Ghana's luck as the first country to attain independence made it an automatic forerunner of Pan-Africanism and regional integration in Africa (Commander, 2007; Shepperson, 1962). As I will discuss later in this chapter, the three administrations worked in different ways to project Ghana's evangelical Pan-African stature. The country's engagement with Pan-Africanism dates long before the return of Nkrumah in 1947. I categorise its development into three main phases. One of the earliest calls for some sort of Pan-African integration was by the Gold Coast Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) co-founded in 1897 by J. W. de Graft-Johnson, Jacob Wilson Sey, J. P. Brown, J. E. Casely Hayford, and John Mensah Sarbah. The core agenda of the ARPS was to protest the Lands Bill of 1897. However, its interest in race relations, interactions with Pan-Africanists in the diaspora, their participation in the Booker T. Washington's mini pan African conference in 1912, and their idea and commitment to forging trade relations between "blacks in the Gold Coast and their brothers in America... and all of us who are black" (Asante, 1975, p. 36) demonstrate their commitment to the idea of Pan-Africanism and some sort of collaborative arrangements between blacks around the world. The group's Pan-African activities were crowned with its active role in the planning and eventual declaration of the 1945 Pan-African congress in Manchester.

The second phase was dominated by three activists who were also intellectuals. The first two were Hutton Mills and J. E. Casley Hayford, a co-founder of the ARPS, whose calls for regional integration culminated in forming the National Congress of British West Africa (NCBWA). The core objective of the NCBWA was to agitate for a union of all four colonies of British West Africa – Gold Coast, Gambia, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The third was J. B. Danquah, regarded as the ideological father of the NPP. Danquah's pan African approach was a united West Africa which, he thought, had more advanced material and human resources which might give hope to the rest of the continent. He argued that:

you cannot make a nation of Africa, but by securing unity in West Africa, and by securing African rights in the Western portion, you thereby raise the general standard of African welfare and lay down an ideal of life which the African in the East and South will strive to realise.¹²⁵

With this statement, Danquah explicitly reveals the Pan-African evangelical role of Ghana that characterised not only the two nationalist organisations mentioned above but also future efforts towards regionalism.

The third phase was ushered in with the organisation of the 1945 pan African congress. Even though it was an international congress, the pioneering role played by the then Gold Coasters and Gold Coast nationalist movements makes it relevant as a distinct era in Ghana's integration and Pan-Africanism journey. Out of the 26 delegates from Africa, about 10 were Ghanaians.¹²⁶ Most importantly, Nkrumah was instrumental in the organisation and wrote the congress's declaration titled *Declaration to the Colonial Peoples of the World*. On the question of the Pan-African approach to regional integration, Nkrumah supported the conference recommendation to establish a West African Economic Union to combat colonial economic exploitation and initiate indigenous industrial development.¹²⁷ Whether by coincidence or the conscious ideological design of Nkrumah, these objectives conformed to his government's idea of economic independence through import substitution industrialisation. It also revealed the economic aspects of an ideology that has popularly been thought of as more political.

Following this and before the formation of the CPP, Nkrumah continued to emphasise his Pan-African approach through the idea of a union of West Africa. Statements like "the idea of West Africa came into our mind",¹²⁸ and "I stood for West African unity, Padmore stood for Pan-Africanism"¹²⁹ made his

¹²⁵ West African Students' Union - WASU (December 1926) Publication, No. 2., J. B. Danquah was also the publisher of this Newspaper

¹²⁶ S. K. B. Asante (March, 2007) Ghana and the Promotion of Pan Africanism and Regionalism. *The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lecture Series 40*. Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.

¹²⁷ Ibid

¹²⁸ Proceedings of the Watson Commission of Enquiry into the Disturbances in the Gold Coast, No. 231, 194

¹²⁹ Ibid

position more explicit.¹³⁰ Here, Nkrumah made a distinction between West African unity and pan Africanism. The former was restricted to the West African sub-region, while the latter was for the whole of Africa and the African diaspora. In his autobiography, Nkrumah admits that West African unity was his “basic personal philosophy”.¹³¹ However, what differentiates his approach from early nationalists such as J. E. Casely Hayford of the NCBWA is that Nkrumah’s approach transcended colonial distinctions, disregarding whether a territory was colonised by Britain, France, Portugal or Spain. He later argued strongly in 1961 that “Pan-Africanism mean nothing unless it transcends the artificial barriers and boundaries imposed by colonialism”.¹³²

Throughout these three phases, there was a consensus on some interpretation and approach – anti-colonial and West African integration – even for Nkrumah who would later argue for a much broader union. Three factors accounted for this consensus. First, nationalist leaders were restricted in their links to other dependent territories on the continent, with little exposure to Africa beyond the British and French West Africa. Also, there were some negative perceptions they held regarding the other regions. As indicated above, Danquah did not think the East and South of Africa were advanced enough for unity. For Danquah, there was a domestic caveat, beyond liberation, for integration. As will be discussed later, this is an approach that the Kufuor administration held on to several decades later. Also, the North African dilemma was still something that nationalist leaders had mixed feelings about. Not only was their association with pan-Arabism a challenge for nationalist leaders, but the history of the transatlantic slave trade between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa was an emotional scar that some nationalist leaders were yet to reconcile with Pan-Africanism. Danquah, in the quote above, talked of the West, East and South but not the North of Africa.

Second, Nkrumah in particular was not only nurturing his ideas; he needed a foothold in local politics before he could launch a more ambitious and comprehensive African policy. It would have been politically reckless for him to oppose a group of older politicians who had established a significant political base on the territory. C. L R James, who was one of Nkrumah’s ideological mentors, talked about Nkrumah’s ideological shortfalls after meeting him in New York. In a letter James wrote to Padmore when Nkrumah was moving to London, he referred to Nkrumah as “not very bright” because “he used to talk a lot about imperialism and Leninism and export of capital, and he used to talk a lot of nonsense”.¹³³ However, James argued that Nkrumah’s speech on imperialism at the 1945 “was an absolute masterpiece” and demonstrated that “he had learned all there was to be learned from

¹³⁰ Ibid

¹³¹ Kwame Nkrumah (1957 p. 43) Ghana: Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah

¹³² Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 8th June, 1961, col. 45

¹³³ C. L. R, James (July-August 1968, p. 26) Document: C. L. R. James on the Origins, *Radical America* Vol 2 No. 4

Padmore”.¹³⁴ Third, it seemed to be the most reasonable approach at the time since it was much easier to build relations with nearby territories that shared a similar history and culture. A union for countries with these links seemed more organic and sustainable.

One reason for the sustained interest in the conversation on Pan-Africanism is that there has been a sustained intellectual environment in Ghana for such a discourse. All administrations have paid some attention to exploring how their policies reflected their thinking on Pan-Africanism. The shape of Ghana’s foreign policy is like a concentric circle with Africa at the centre. I will show in the subsequent sections, all three administrations emphasised Africa as the centre of their policy thinking and discourse. However, despite some similarities, this core theme tended to manifest variedly in their actions. The sections below will discuss each of the three administrations, demonstrating how ideology shaped their regional integration efforts.

4.4 The Nkrumah Administration

For the CPP government, Pan-Africanism meant projecting an ‘African Personality’ with Ghana as its launching pad. The concept was first popularised at the first Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) in 1958. There was not much clarity to it beyond “recognising that Africa now has its personality, its own history and its own culture and that it has made valuable contributions to world history and world culture” (Potekhin, 1968, p. 39). Later in 1960, Nkrumah conceptualised African personality to include African unity and safeguarding hard-won freedom of African states. It was to demonstrate to the world “optimism, cheerfulness and an easy, confident outlook in tackling the problems of life, but also disdain for vanities and a sense of social obligation which will make our society an object of admiration and of example”.¹³⁵ Pan-Africanism and the African personality are, therefore, not unrelated ideas. Rather, they reflected the ideological components in the government’s conceptualisation of African socialism or Nkrumaism, including the ideas of anti-colonialism and economic independence. A. J. Dowuna argues that “African personality is a basic element of Nkrumaism”.¹³⁶ For Kofi Baako, “destroying the principles and ideals of socialism hampers the projection of the African personality”.¹³⁷ Nkrumah in his book *Class Struggle in Africa* called for “the total liberation and unification of Africa under an All-African socialist government”¹³⁸ as the consequence of “all Black revolutionaries throughout the world”.¹³⁹ This means that Pan-Africanism

¹³⁴ *ibid*

¹³⁵ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 4th July, 1960, col. 19

¹³⁶ A. J. Dowuna: OFFICIAL REPORT of 9th August, 1960, col. 687

¹³⁷ Kofi Baako (Leader of the House): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October, 1963, col. 120

¹³⁸ Kwame Nkrumah (1970, p. 88) *Class Struggle in Africa*

¹³⁹ *ibid*

was embedded in the Nkrumah administration's socialist ideas. For the government, socialism was the practical approach through which a true Pan-African objective could be achieved.

Similarly, indigeneity was key to the government's conceptualisation of pan Africanism and African personality. As I argued in chapter two, although there was no successful attempt at creating a full-fledged indigenous ideology, the Nkrumah administration particularly tried to achieve bits of indigeneity in many of its ideological components. Throughout colonialism, different sectors of Ghanaian society were, according to Nkrumah, firmly set under a pattern of Europe's monopolistic control and influence – something most nationalist leaders argued did not reflect the ideals and aspirations of Ghanaian society.¹⁴⁰ Hence it was natural for a radical anti-colonial CPP government to chart a new course and create something of their own. A CPP member of parliament argued that “this is Ghana, we are building our own African personality, and we do things to suit our Ghanaian way of life”.¹⁴¹ They mentioned Africa, but they essentially meant Ghana as the government believed that a true interpretation of the “aspirations and hope of the people of Ghana will give full expression to the African personality”.¹⁴² It was the CPP government's bid to project Africa partly through Ghana's experiences, achievements and establish an “all-African approach to the problems of the African continent”.¹⁴³ One aspect of Africa personality is to flatten the differences between African (Gallagher, 2018). This thinking was also key to the CPP government's pursuit of regional integration.

The CPP government had two primary goals for its Pan-African agenda. The first was to seek the independence of all African territories from European colonialism. The second was the integration of Africa that cut across the different spheres of state-society relations to project an African personality that exuded liberation, affluence and excellence. The government's broader socialist ideas meant that it perceived the international system as domination and an example of class struggle, this time between states. The only way for Africa to be among the giants was through total unity at different levels. At some point, Nkrumah talked about an All-African Trade Union, the solidarity of all workers, or a Socialist Workers Union.¹⁴⁴

What features most in the speeches and statements of the CPP government was the word unity. However, the term was more complicated even for the government to explain regarding the kind of integration the government preferred in scope and form. From Nkrumah's statements before the formation of CPP in 1949, he made a case for a West African integration. However, after

¹⁴⁰ Kwame Nkrumah (1963) Africa Must Unite

¹⁴¹ Ebenezer Adam: OFFICIAL REPORT of 7th September 1962, col. 152

¹⁴² Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 30th June, 1960, col. 249

¹⁴³ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 16th December 1965, col. 150

¹⁴⁴ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 4th July, 1960, col. 12

independence, both Nkrumah and members of his government were more confident that the unity they agitated for was beyond West Africa and even included North Africa. On North Africa, Nkrumah believed that “we have, however, now overcome this ancient disunion. The Sahara no longer divides us; it is no longer a physical or a political barrier between us”.¹⁴⁵ This unity, according to Nkrumah, was a political and economic union accompanied by a common foreign policy and an African military high command. The scope or coverage of this unity was clear but what was not clear from government’s speeches and policy statements was the nature of the unity being pursued. During the debate on Nkrumah’s 1960 Sessional Address to parliament, a leading opposition member, S. G. Antor, questioned the nature of the CPP government’s African Unity. He asked:

What do we really mean by African unity? That union of independent African states – what does it mean? Other African leaders want to know exactly what type of union Ghana is talking about. They are asking whether this union means the unconditional surrender of their respective sovereignty and to whom. Our good friend, the Liberian President Mr Tubman does not seem to have understood our Nkrumah’s Union of African States.¹⁴⁶

Yet three key members of the CPP government – Resident Minister of Guinea, Rev Dzirasa, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ako Adjei, and Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Mumuni Bawumia – could not provide concrete answers to the questions.

The 1960 Republican constitution of Ghana expressed the hope that “our actions this day will help to further the development of a Union of African States”,¹⁴⁷ but also made an entrenched commitment to “provide for the surrender of the whole or any part of the sovereignty of Ghana”¹⁴⁸ to a “union of African states and territories”.¹⁴⁹ The fact that the constitution says ‘in part or full’ suggests that even though the government wanted some kind of integration or unity, it was not very confident about the nature such unity would take. Regardless, the goal of unity was the focal point around which Pan-Africanism revolved. Without unity, Pan-Africanism or the African personality would be “be lost and in fact destroyed by the imperialists”.¹⁵⁰ It also shaped the approaches of the government. However, with a less clear goal, policies are bound to be inconsistent and sometimes misplaced.

¹⁴⁵ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 8th August, 1960, col. 54

¹⁴⁶ S. G. Antor (UP MP, Kanda North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 19th July 1960, col. 86

¹⁴⁷ Preamble of the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Ghana

¹⁴⁸ Part 1 of the 1960 constitution of the Republic of Ghana

¹⁴⁹ Ibid

¹⁵⁰ Mumuni Bawumia (Private Secretary to the Minister of Information and Broadcasting): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th July, 1960, col. 53

4.4.1 How did this play out in the government's approaches to integration?

First, the government's strong opposition to regionalism reflected its ideological position on Pan-Africanism. As argued above, in his early years, Nkrumah supported a West African union, but after the formation of the CPP, he shifted to a broader approach. This is because the relatively quick achievement of independence in Ghana gave him more hope that bigger things could be achieved.¹⁵¹ In addition, Ghana's independence, with the CPP at the helm, gave the government a unique opportunity to continue Ghana's leading role on the continent. Ghana had the resources to pursue such an objective with all its financial ramifications. Nkrumah summarised the relatively good fortune of Ghana at the time in a speech delivered to the Council on Foreign relations in 1958:

Ghana, in part by good fortune and in part, I hope, by good management, is not in the dire straits of some other newly-independent lands. There is as yet no extreme pressure of population on our resources. We have been fortunate in that our export crop, cocoa, has commanded a very high world price since the war and has not fluctuated as violently as some other primary products... On the other, we have been able to set aside some \$500,000, 000 for development which, in a country of only 5,000,000 people, gives us some elbow room for the future.¹⁵²

Ghana's human resources were relatively advanced. It had a sophisticated educational system that had already begun producing graduates, and citizens were already incorporated in essential services such as security and bureaucracy (Kooperman & Rosenberg, 1977; MacBeath, 2010). Although this was, in part, a legacy of British colonial rule and transitional policy, such a satisfactory domestic scene gave the Nkrumah administration some scope to pursue bigger dreams of the forefathers.¹⁵³

As discussed earlier, Nkrumah himself also had a long run-up and experience with the 'African condition' and Pan-Africanism before independence. The early years were formative, and by the late 1950s, Nkrumah was mature and ideologically confident regarding his African policy. He argued that regionalism in Africa would compromise the objective of broader African unity – that while federations are good, they have the tendency to hamper the best, which was a continental union. This was because federations can create a dilemma of loyalties where regional groupings become competitive instead of cooperative and complementary. They can also create a power vacuum, and this would create opportunities for the imperialists to step in and create a replica of European Balkanisation.¹⁵⁴ In this context, for a government that opposed federalism, initiating the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union

¹⁵¹ S. K. B. Asante (March, 2007) Ghana and the Promotion of Pan Africanism and Regionalism. *The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lecture Series 40*. Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.

¹⁵² Kwame Nkrumah's speech delivered to the Council on Foreign Relations on 28th July 1958

¹⁵³ Kofi Baako (Leader of the House): OFFICIAL REPORT of 26th September 1963, col. 255

¹⁵⁴ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 8th August 1960 col. 627

looked like an ideological contradiction. And in practice, it gave more credence to the suspicions that African leaders like Houphouët-Boigny about Nkrumah's hegemonic ambitions.

Second, the government opposed economic agreements with European organisations. This was consistent with its radical anti-imperialist/colonial interpretation of Pan-Africanism. Particularly, it was concerned with the potential threat of neo-colonialism from Africa's association with the European Economic Community (EEC). In 1961 Nkrumah described the operations of the European Common Market as schemes that "will not only discriminate against Ghana and other independent states of Africa but what is more important is that it will perpetuate by economic means the many artificial barriers which were imposed on Africa by the European colonial powers".¹⁵⁵ The fear was that such agreements would keep African countries in a position of suppliers of raw materials for imperialist powers. The only remedy was for a united Africa to negotiate economic agreements with other global economic power blocs. At some point, Nkrumah believed that Britain's membership of the EEC was disruptive to the Commonwealth (Aqui, 2017). He also revealed the government's willingness to leave the Commonwealth since it had the potential of compromising its stance on African unity. Because "Ghana's membership within the commonwealth has made it difficult for her to pursue boldly and effectively her African objectives".¹⁵⁶

Third, ideology shaped the government's response to the formation of the OAU. For a government seeking the end of colonialism and imperialism in Africa, the Addis Ababa conference and the formation of the OAU represented a victory. But I argue that it was rather the beginning of the end or a defeat to the CPP government's idea of Pan-Africanism. After the conference, many CPP leading members expressed hope and feelings of victory. It was a Ghanaian-led agenda that signified "a definite blow for which the imperialists and neo-colonialists may never recover again".¹⁵⁷ Nkrumah himself believed that the formation of the OAU was the first step towards African unity, yet inadequate as there still existed a power vacuum on the continent which imperialists could take advantage of. The dilemma lay between the government's cardinal objective of Pan-Africanism, on the one hand, and the name, and what the OAU represented. The Organisation of African Unity presents the OAU as an end in itself – meaning that was the organisation that represents African unity. Key Nkrumaist and CPP leaders still hold this view. In my interview, Kwabena Bomfeh¹⁵⁸ argued that the OAU was "an advance party that is to go and prepare the grounds for the actual work to begin"¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁵ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 4th July 1961, col. 8

¹⁵⁶ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 16th December 1965, col. 151

¹⁵⁷ C. D. Tay: OFFICIAL REPORT of 17th October 1963, col. 25

¹⁵⁸ James Kwabena Bomfeh at the time of this interview was the General Secretary of the Conventions Peoples Party (CPP)

¹⁵⁹ James Kwabena Bomfeh: Personal Interview, 2019

but the “advance party became the party itself because they have failed in carrying out the task of the search party”.¹⁶⁰ In my interview with Samia Nkrumah¹⁶¹, she opined that “the OAU it came into being as a very diluted form of what he had envisaged, but he [Nkrumah] thought okay accept this and try and progress from there.”¹⁶² What would have instead reflected the CPP government’s perspective on Pan-Africanism would have been an Organisation *for* African Unity – making it a means to an end (a unified government). This explains why leading members of the CPP government expressed mixed feelings about it during debates in parliament.¹⁶³

Fourth, the CPP government’s Pan-Africanism is reflected in the use of security and peacekeeping arrangements to pursue a united Africa. This was based on two fundamental ideas. First was the idea of an African solution for African problems¹⁶⁴ and to prove Africa’s capabilities.¹⁶⁵ The government believed that taking charge and resolving African conflicts portrayed a capable African personality to the world. The second was the reading of imperialist or neo-colonial narratives into African conflicts. A conflict that is presumed to have the trappings of European influence in another African country is seen as a challenge to the whole of the continent and a threat to African unity. One example is the government’s response to the Congo crisis, amidst complications, which shows this understanding of Pan-Africanism. As I showed in chapter three, the government was ready to commit Ghanaian troops to Congo even when the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) had not made any concrete decision regarding its peacekeeping measures. The government was not only willing to bypass the Ghanaian

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

¹⁶¹ Samia Nkrumah is a former Chairperson of the Conventions Peoples Party (CPP), the daughter of Kwame Nkrumah and the Director of the Kwame Nkrumah Pan-African Centre in Accra

¹⁶² Samia Nkrumah: Personal Interview, 2019

¹⁶³ Government Motions (Sessional Address): OFFICIAL RECORD of 6th July 1961, cols. 38-112; There were several debates specifically on Ghana’s position on a continental union before and after the 1963 conference. However, it also featured intermittently in debates either by the opposition criticising the government’s foreign policy approach failure or the CPP MPs expressing hope and justification for a closer political union.

¹⁶⁴ There is a large number of literature on this phenomenon with a dynamic trend, in terms of meaning, over time. See Solomon, H. (2015). African solutions to Africa's problems? African approaches to peace, security and stability. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 43(1), 45-76; Ani, N. C. (2019). Three schools of thought on “African Solutions to African Problems”. *Journal of Black Studies*, 50(2), 135-155.

In recent times, the phrase was revived by political economist George Ayittey who used the term in response to how the international community/organisations tried to solve the Somalia crisis in 1994 after the US withdrew from the conflict. See *The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution* by George Ayittey. Retrieved from <https://www.cato.org/policy-analysis/somali-crisis-time-african-solution>. The idea has also practically been the motivation for policy-makers and politicians to address a variety of African challenges including dealing with Ebola, peacebuilding attempts in Rwanda and intervention in Côte d’Ivoire. See Jonathan Fisher’s 2018 article titled *AMISOM and the regional construction of a failed state in Somalia*. It has also attracted criticisms from those who believe leaders and policy-makers on the continent instrumentalise this idea in their relations with donors for their parochial interests. The idea, however, remains a powerful motivation for policy-making among Africa’s decision-making elites to pursue and justify distinct problem solving approaches. The point I want to highlight for its usage in the paragraph is linked to the idea of African personality and an activist role of Africa in international relations.

¹⁶⁵ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 16th December 1965, col. 150

parliament to do this, but also forgo any delay that came with consensus building with other African states. At the time, the opposition suggested the reconvening of another Conference of Independent African States (CIAS) to decide on a continent-wide multilateral action in the spirit of African unity. However, to the members of the CPP, this approach is synonymous with “folding one’s arms whilst your brother’s house is on fire”.¹⁶⁶

Finally, is the assumption of a leadership role on the continent. The practical applicability of the idea of Pan-Africanism also took the form of Nkrumah and Ghana taking an African leadership role in the world. The CPP government achieved this in different ways. The government engaged in ideological mentoring of freedom fighters and the organisation of Pan-African conferences. It is worthy of note that, before Nkrumah organised the much-known first All-African Peoples’ Conference (AAPC) or Conference of Independent African States (CIAS), both in 1958, (Johnson, 1962) he had already organised a West African conference and revived the activities of West African integration groups¹⁶⁷ in the 1940s (Asante & Chanaiwa, 1993; Sherwood, 2019). This conference is rarely mentioned in literature and public discourse because it was small and narrowly focussed. The West African nationalist conference was held in Kumasi in 1953 and attended by representatives of both French and English-speaking territories, including Nnamdi Azikiwe. Its core objective can be found in its recommendation to “establish a national congress of West Africa to promote West African unity”.¹⁶⁸ Even though scholars like Immanuel Wallerstein argue that the AAPC was a “true successor to the Pan-African congresses”¹⁶⁹ the West African conference was one of the ways the nationalist leaders continued to keep in touch. This also supports the argument about Nkrumah’s initial thought of a West African unity. Beyond the conferences, the more institutionalised Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (KNII) trained African freedom fighters in ideological and approaches to revolutions, including guerrilla warfare.

The government also provided material support to other newly independent states and freedom fighters - making Ghana the “Mecca of African nationalism” (Thompson, 1969, p. 46). The government also commenced the Ghana-Guinea-Mali union as the nucleus of a bigger African union. While studies by Gebe, (2008) and Thompson (1969) and even the opposition party at the time saw this union in light of Nkrumah’s ambition to be the eventual leader of Africa, I read a nationalism twist into this.

¹⁶⁶ Motions (The Congo Situation): OFFICIAL RECORD of 9th August 1960, cols. 674-720

¹⁶⁷ There were several associations and groupings whose activities were geared towards seeking independence for the West African region. These included the Congress of British West Africa, a West African Press Union and a British West African Co-operative Association, and the West African Students Union (WASU). See Ali Mazrui and Christophe Wondji edited volume (1993), *General History of Africa. VIII Africa since 1935*.

¹⁶⁸ S. K. B. Asante (March, 2007) Ghana and the Promotion of Pan Africanism and Regionalism. *The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lecture Series 40*. Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.

¹⁶⁹ See Immanuel Wallerstein (1967, p. 33) *Africa: The Politics of Unity*. Freedom House: New York

The projection of Ghanaian leadership and exceptionalism had been an integral part of the conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism in Ghana. The CPP government's actions, regardless of readings of personal ambition, fit into the idea of Pan-Africanism and Ghana's leadership role in the bid to integration. This feature continued to be demonstrated in the subsequent Rawlings and Kufuor administrations. This position, although amiable to the CPP members, was complex. Other countries, especially those with more economic power, saw it as a threat and did not relent in their efforts to frustrate the Nkrumah government's efforts. At the time, Nkrumah could rely on Ghana's relative economic might, but the Rawlings and Kufuor regimes would use revolutionary/populist leverage and soft power, respectively, to pursue a similar agenda. In addition, the CPP government established institutions purposely for coordinating efforts towards African integration. The two institutions established for this purpose were the Office of the Adviser to the Prime Minister on African Affairs, headed by George Padmore, and the African Affairs Centre or the Bureau for African Affairs. In this regard, I agree with Grilli (2018) that this was the Nkrumah administration's way of ideologically coordinating liberation and nationalist movements to create or gain a sizeable mass to support for African unity. This explains why the institutions were at the heart of the CPP government. Amate¹⁷⁰ recalls that "Nkrumah attached so much to African affairs; he moved the department of Africa to his own office at Flagstaff House. And that was where he was formulating the policies of Africa".¹⁷¹

One major characteristic of the Nkrumah administration was its over-concentration on colonialism and imperialism. The government's idea of Pan-Africanism was shaped around it. This is justifiable because it was a time where most of Africa's territories were dependent. It achieved much success in that area through the support it gave to liberation movements. The CPP government sustained the Pan-African conversations, which subsequent governments inherited, albeit with some variations occasioned by their ideological orientations and ideas from contextual structures like the OAU/AU that were becoming relatively stronger.

4.5 The Rawlings Administration

The Rawlings administration's attempts to ideologically associate with the Nkrumah administration meant that parts of its interpretations of anti-colonialism and economic independence reflected what the Nkrumah administration thought of regional integration. However, there were significant differences due to the Rawlings administration's military revolutionary approach and, as argued in chapter three, their preoccupation with the internal politics and governance systems of other African

¹⁷⁰ C. O. C. Amate is a former MP during Ghana's First Republic; Speech Writer to Nkrumah; Career Diplomat and former Ghana representative at the OAU

¹⁷¹ C. O. C. Amate: Personal Interview, 2019

countries, especially neighbours. I discuss these differences below to clarify the ideas underlying the Rawlings administration's efforts towards regional integration.

Among the things that Nkrumah predicted as a result of Africa's disunity was the reoccurrence of coups d'états due to the weakness of continental unity and institutions to curb the foreign 'invasion'. It was his argument that there is the tendency for the West, which feels threatened by Africa's burgeoning unity, to instigate coups, cause instability and take back control of the continent. From this logic, Nkrumah suffered, but the Rawlings administration benefitted from the weakness of the OAU, and Africa's disunity as their assumptions of power in 1979 and 1981 came through coups d'état. Therefore, one primary difference between the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration's thinking on Pan-Africanism is that Nkrumah would think of a coup as 'non-organic' and imperialist driven while for the Rawlings administration, it was a people's revolution that overthrew an inefficient government regarded as an imperialist stooge (Assensoh & Alex-Assensoh, 2001, p. 171).¹⁷²

Beyond this contrast, members of the PNDC/NDC administration I interviewed conceptualised their Pan-Africanism as close to that of the CPP administration. Kwamena Ahwoi argued that "we PNDC adopted many of Nkrumah's positions in foreign policy and on ideology to formulate foreign policy. For example, we were very very strong on African unity and African liberation".¹⁷³ However, unlike the CPP government, the PNDC was more comfortable with the statutory programmes and operations of the OAU. The PNDC/NDC's conceptualisation of Pan-Africanism reflected aspects of the CPP's African personality thinking. For instance, the government's show of solidarity to Libya in attending the 1982 OAU summit in Tripoli and participating in the African Cup of Nations (AFCON) that same year was in defiance of US sanctions. This is something Nkrumah would have done. But also, the action of the PNDC can partly be explained in light of an ideological resemblance between Gaddafi and Rawlings, as I show in chapter three. As a thin ideology, different governments always conceive Pan-Africanism from the perspective of their ideological orientations. For the PNDC/NDC government, their close relations with the much-touted 'progressive states' were also in expressions of Pan-Africanism. However, a lot of these 'progressive states' such as Burkina Faso under Sankara and Libya under Gaddafi, also had ideological resemblances with the PNDC government.

Just like the CPP administration, the PNDC/NDC interpreted Pan-Africanism from an anti-colonial/imperial perspective. The above examples represent the PNDC government's distaste for neo-colonialism and how they saw the actions of the West from that perspective. Rawlings was not

¹⁷² Pranay Gupte (January 1, 1982) *Ex-Officer Ousts Ghana's Government Again*, The New York Times. Accessed July 6, 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/01/world/ex-officer-ousts-ghana-s-government-again.html> Accessed February 20, 2021

¹⁷³ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

alone in his attacks on neo-colonialism, especially at Non-Aligned Movement conferences (since there were no more Pan-African conferences). For a government made of what can be called anti-West elements who traced parts of its ideological lineage to the Nkrumah administration, the anti-colonial interpretation of Pan-Africanism remained and was very profound in its rhetoric.

In 1984, Rawlings made an emphatic statement that the foreign policy of his administration was to seek the eventual unification of the African continent (Asante, 1997, p. 47). Like the CPP government, the generic aspiration of African unity was the PNDC/NDC's Pan-African goal. According to Kwamena Ahwoi, the PNDC/NDC administration's "conviction was that African unity was the way to go".¹⁷⁴ The difference between the two administrations was the question of 'when'? For the PNDC/NDC, this goal was a strategic or visionary one – in other words, long-term.

On the other hand, the CPP government said it was ready at any time to enter into an agreement that took part or full sovereignty from Ghana's national government. Unlike the 1960 constitution under Nkrumah's administration, the 1992 constitution orchestrated by the PNDC, made no provision for an eventual surrender of Ghana's sovereignty for African unity. Also, just like the Nkrumah administration, the PNDC/NDC's had the objective of liberating the remaining dependent territories, including South Africa and even Western Sahara, still under the rulership of Morocco. However, the degree of efforts varied based on the differences in their interpretation of, and interaction between Pan-Africanism and other ideological components partly occasioned by the context and their broader socialist/Marxist ideology.

4.5.1 How did this play out in the government's approaches to integration?

First, similar to the CPP government, PNDC/NDC had a distaste for economic agreement with European countries, although they acted less antagonistic, partly due to how contextual structures like the OAU and ECOWAS were streamlining and shaping government's ideas. The government raised concerns, particularly, against former French colonies for their continuous subscription to the French monetary zone. The three PNDC/NDC members I interviewed emphasised the fact that francophone countries' interest in the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) was a threat to Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deflecting Francophone countries' interest in it. It was one of the reasons, they believed, that accounted for the slow pace of the progress of ECOWAS. Also, their high number meant that if any decision were to be determined by a vote, the Anglophones would lose. Yet members of the PNDC/NDC were divided on this issue. While some

¹⁷⁴ Ibid

leading members of the NDC like Margaret Kwesie¹⁷⁵ lauded the efforts of the French government and even referred to it as becoming “an important development partner to Ghana”¹⁷⁶, other members pushed a different agenda – one that revealed the malicious intent of the French towards ECOWAS. Modestus Ahiable, the then NDC MP for Ketu-North and later Ghana’s Ambassador to Benin, maintained that “it is not in the interest of the sub-region to promote UEMOA to the disadvantage of ECOWAS”.¹⁷⁷

Yet the government benefitted a lot from the French government and France-based Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) through economic programmes and direct aid. Such benefits included a \$5 million French assistance to the Ghana Rubber Estates in the Western Region to rehabilitate the coconut plantations destroyed by the Saint Paul wilt disease.¹⁷⁸ A French NGO, Initiatives Identiques, provided credit facilities to Ghanaian women in some selected constituencies.¹⁷⁹ Also, the Agence Francais de Development (AFD) began full operations in Ghana in 1985, and by 1999 its total commitment in Ghana stood at €305 million.¹⁸⁰ More significantly, Ghana’s relations with France culminated to Ghana’s elevation to the ranks of Priority Solidarity Zone (PSZ) made of former French colonies which still enjoyed close bilateral relations with France.¹⁸¹

The PNDC/NDC government’s antagonism towards France was only limited to the area of regional integration. When faced with the realities of the need for economic assistance for development and social relief programmes, the NDC could not resist the temptation of French assistance. They accepted help from a country whose activities in the sub-region, they conceived, were detrimental to the development of economic cooperation among West African countries.

The second way in which ideology shaped the integration approaches is that, unlike the CPP government, the PNDC/NDC supported regionalism as an approach to African unity. In this case, the internalised ideology of the Rawlings administration adjusted to the ideas from contextual structures. As I show above, the idea that dominates regional integration structures on the continent is more towards regionalism and building functional integration, unlike the rapid political integration approaches the Nkrumah administration preferred. It is worthy of note that after the formation of the OAU in 1963, there was a conscious effort to dissolve other regional integration groupings like the

¹⁷⁵ Margaret Clarke-Kwesie is a former NDC MP and Deputy Minister of Health from 1993 to 2001 under the Rawlings administration.

¹⁷⁶ Margaret Clarke Kwesie (NDC MP – Ga South): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2932

¹⁷⁷ Modestus Ahiable (NDC MP – Ketu North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2947

¹⁷⁸ Kojo Armah (Peoples Convention Party (PCP) MP – Evalue-Gwira): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2950

¹⁷⁹ Theresa Ameley Tagoe (NPP MP – Ablekuma South): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2944

¹⁸⁰ Margaret Clarke Kwesie (NDC MP – Ga South): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2932

¹⁸¹ Ibid

Monrovia-Casablanca groups (Good, 1964). This led to the gradual take-over of the OAU in terms of integration approaches. All three PNDC/NDC members interviewed admitted that even though the administration tried to follow Nkrumah's pattern, the demands of the time meant they had to work for African unity through regional blocs. Ahwoi explains that "in Nkrumah's time we didn't have these regional groupings in Africa, but today or when the PNDC came, we had them. We had the ECOWAS; we had the SADCC, the East African Community, COMESA and the preference was for trying to gain regional integration first before we strive for continental unity".¹⁸²

However, the PNDC/NDC's anti-imperialist and militant outlook, coupled with its close association with 'progressives', undermined its ECOWAS agenda. The neighbouring states, especially Togo and Côte d'Ivoire, saw the PNDC regime as a threat. The tensions eventually led to border closures (counter)attacks that hampered free movement of goods, services and persons between the countries. It was not until the PNDC metamorphosed into the democratic NDC in 1992 that such tensions minimised. This demonstrates that unlike neighbour-relations (in chapter three), where contextual structures are weak and rarely acted on the Rawlings administration, there are relatively stronger contextual structures for regional integration. As I will show in chapter six, the existence and building of African integration around the ideas of regional structures introduce a dilemma of agency. While such integration can enhance African agency in world politics, it also undermines the agency of states who will be overlooked or overshadowed by bigger states on the continent.

The third is the assumption of leadership. Like the CPP administration, Ghana's Pan-Africanism was exhibited through its leadership and evangelical approach. As I show in chapter three, within Ghana's neighbourhood, there is always a consistent attempt by all the administrations to shape politics and governance of other countries, albeit different approaches. The assumption of leadership is one way the administration pursued this in regional integration. Although the PNDC/NDC regime, in its early years, was more widely unpopular within ECOWAS bigwigs like Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire due to its ideological posture and antagonism with neighbours, it was performing its Pan-African leadership role among the 'progressives'. Kwamena Ahwoi recalls that new 'revolutionary' leaders including Charles Taylor of Liberia, Valentine Strasser of Sierra Leone, Johnny Paul Koroma also of Sierra Leone, and Yahya Jammeh of the Gambia, all visited Ghana at some point for inspiration and support. This can be explained from two perspectives: It was the era of coups in Africa, and coup plotters always sought inspiration from others who have succeeded. The fact that the PNDC "emerged by the force of events"¹⁸³ supports the argument that the context was conducive for such inspiration from any

¹⁸² Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

¹⁸³ Ibid

burgeoning African leader who emerged in this way. Rawlings' charming personality was also instrumental. But for the PNDC, the 1981 'revolution' signalled a new wave of Pan-African peoples revolution to save themselves from imperialism and its 'compradors'. While under Nkrumah, Ghana became a 'Mecca' for nationalist leaders, "Ghana also became a kind of Mecca [under the PNDC administration] for the young military officers who staged coups d'état in their countries".¹⁸⁴ However, in the years leading to the shift from PNDC to NDC, the Rawlings administration took on a new form of leadership in West Africa. In 1990, it jointly took the initiative with Nigeria to form the Economic Community of West African Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) for peacekeeping in Liberia, Sierra Leone in 1997 and Guinea Bissau in 1999 (Yakohene, 2009). Also, Rawlings served as a two-term chairman of the ECOWAS from 1994 to 1996, which meant an appreciation of the administration's leadership role in the subregion.

Fourth and linked to this third point is the use of security and peacekeeping arrangements to pursue the Pan-African agenda. Ghana was an important stakeholder in ECOMOG. The first commander of the group was a Ghanaian, Lieutenant General Arnold Quainoo. Ghana and Nigeria provided a majority of the 2,500-troop force to Liberia.¹⁸⁵ This became a significant turning point for ECOWAS, an economic organisation, at a period when its economic and political performance had been dismal.¹⁸⁶ It took on a new security responsibility and Ghana's willingness to be active, even when the economy at home was relatively weak, demonstrates aspects of the administration's thinking of Pan-Africanism. Rawlings himself played a crucial role in resolving the Liberian civil war. Between September and December 1994, he was able to get the warring factions to sign the Akosombo and Accra agreements resulting in a temporary ceasefire.¹⁸⁷ By the time the NDC lost power in December 2000, the government was yet to bring its influence to the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. But the variation here is that some members of the NDC believed that the primary responsibility for resolving the conflict belong to France¹⁸⁸ because of its interventions and control on the politics of Côte d'Ivoire. It is also worthy of note that while Ghana's relations with Côte d'Ivoire had improved from an acrimonious beginning, in 1983, they were not very cordial and that affected the government's response to the conflict when it began. Notwithstanding, Ghana under the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations always showed the willingness to help other African countries.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid

¹⁸⁵ Economist (August 18, 1990, p. 53) Imposing peace. *The Economist Historical Archive*, 1843-2014. Accessed December 20, 2019, Retrieved from https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/GP4100220381/ECON?u=rho_ttda&sid=ECON&xid=e6f67570

¹⁸⁶ Ibid

¹⁸⁷ "Shambles." Economist, 24 Sept. 1994, p. 70. *The Economist Historical Archive*, 1843-2014, https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/GP4100258546/ECON?u=rho_ttda&sid=ECON&xid=0de2e925. Accessed 20 Dec. 2019

¹⁸⁸ Modestus Ahiable (NDC MP – Ketu North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2948

Finally, the government was selective and strategic in its behaviour and response to the OAU even though it made serious efforts to support it. Although this sent signals of dualisation, as discussed in Chapter two, it was also a genuine effort to revive Ghana's historical leadership role. It can be said that the Rawlings administration, in touting bits of its Nkrumalism, 'forced' parts of it to conform to a historical context of providing support for the OAU and the decolonisation cause just as Nkrumah had. It gave material and financial assistance to the organisation's liberation committee and, in 1987, it contributed US\$5 million to the African Fund set up by the Non-Aligned movement to assist liberation movements in southern Africa. In the same year, Ghana was elevated to a permanent steering committee member of the OAU.¹⁸⁹ Also, beyond the statutory mandates, such as attending OAU meetings and following some of its diplomatic Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), the PNDC/NDC government conformed to the OAU in so far as such obedience was consistent with the government's conceptualisation and interpretation of Pan-Africanism. Certain key incidents typified these dynamics, and I discuss them below.

In 1982, there was a major split in the OAU caused by the dispute over Western Sahara. Also, Libya was chided globally by the West and Western-leaning countries in Africa for Gaddafi's overt backing of opposition to pro-Western Chadian government of Hissene Habre.¹⁹⁰ As discussed in chapter three, this was a period where many African leaders were wary of the potential for a Gaddafi-inspired wave of revolutions on the continent. This resulted in many countries boycotting both the OAU conference and African Cup of Nations tournament held in Libya. Only sixteen countries, out of the fifty-one (including Western Sahara) attended the [illegal] conference,¹⁹¹ while eight countries participated in the football tournament. It was touted as illegal because it could not meet the two-thirds requirement of thirty-four countries to form a quorum and convene a conference. Ghana's participation in the tournament was instructive because the preceding Limann administration, had resolved to boycott the tournament.¹⁹² The intention of this boycott was to stage a protest against Gaddafi's leadership, his position on Chad and Morocco and support for 'terrorist' actions around the world (Francis, 1982).

Although Ghana opted for the unpopular option of attending the conference and tournament, it was less for the government's love for OAU but more for its anti-imperialist and socialist or militant agenda

¹⁸⁹ The Organisation of African Unity and the Rest of Africa. *US Library of Congress*. Accessed March 7, 2020, Retrieved from <http://countrystudies.us/ghana/111.htm>

¹⁹⁰ Alan Cowell (July 25, 1982) OAU Conference Faces Major Split. *New York Times*, Section 1, Page 11 Accessed November 20, 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1982/07/25/world/oau-conference-faces-major-split.html>

¹⁹¹ Anne Shutt (August 6, 1982) An African Parley in Libya Fades for Lack of Turnout. Compiled From Wire Service Dispatches with Analysis from Monitor Correspondents around the World. *The Christian Science Monitor*. Accessed November 20, 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.csmonitor.com/1982/0806/080619.html>

¹⁹² Ghana News (September, 1981) Debate over whether to go to Libya. vol. 10 no. 9 p. 4

and also because Gaddafi was a friend to the administration. The PNDC's Secretary for Youth and Sports, Zaya Yeebo argued that "we are going to Libya to prove to the world that Ghanaians can take decisions for themselves".¹⁹³ With just less than a month to the tournament, the administration sent a twenty-one-person delegation to Libya to assure Gaddafi of Ghana's participation and support for the fight against Western domination and imperialism. In a statement delivered to Gaddafi on behalf of Rawlings, he stressed that, "we will stand together against all these enemies and we will work together to develop our relations in various fields because consolidation of relations between Ghanaians and Libyans would give Africa a solid force".¹⁹⁴ In chapter three, I discussed how Libya was an important player in the Rawlings administration's conceptual friends which shaped the administration's policy towards Libya. Also, in 1993, the NDC government decided to restore diplomatic relations with Israel when the OAU maintained its 1973 decision to boycott Israel.¹⁹⁵ Decisions based on these considerations, regardless of how brave or genuine they were, could be self-defeating. They ran the danger of undermining the authority of the organisation and inadvertently hurting the administration and Ghana's efforts towards regional integration.

The Rawlings administration was less vocal on regional integration than the Nkrumah administration. However, contextual structures played a crucial intervening role in shaping the government's actions in ways that did not reflect its original ideas, for a government that tried to follow the ideas of the Nkrumah administration. Initially, its approach was revolutionary change across Africa, which began with neighbouring states to create socialist-Marxist and anti-imperialist governments. The government did not give integration much attention. It was more interested in what it called 'workers revolution'. After the ideological shift, the government began to make meaningful contributions to the OAU, including financial and military support. Another observation is that the ideology to regional integration had changed, thereby affecting the nature or radicality of approaches towards a union of African states. The OAU/AU, therefore, became a platform for a functional response to regional crises than a practical plan towards a union of African states as envisaged or pioneered by Nkrumah in the First Republic.

Remarkably, while the Nkrumah government's integration agenda led to strained relations with neighbours, the Rawlings administration's relationship with neighbours negatively affected the administration's approach to regional integration. Essentially, this means a relationship between a

¹⁹³ Fiifi Anaman (March 19, 2017) How Ghana Managed an Unlikely Ascension unto the African Football Throne. *Business Insider Africa*. Accessed November 20, 2020. Retrieved from <https://africa.businessinsider.com/sports/the-last-time-how-ghana-managed-an-unlikely-ascension-onto-the-african-football/g8kswsx>

¹⁹⁴ *ibid*

¹⁹⁵ Obed Asamoah (Minister for Foreign Affairs): OFFICIAL REPORT of 3rd November 1993.

government's approach to neighbour-relations and the effectiveness or otherwise of their regional integration approaches. However, the Kufuor administration built a fine balance between relationship with neighbours and regional integration. This was due to the administration's liberal ideas which, at the time, seemed like the popular choice and dominated the ideas of contextual structures. I will discuss the Kufuor administration next.

4.6 The Kufuor Administration

From a classical liberal perspective, the Kufuor administration's interpretation of anti-colonialism and economic independence took a different turn from the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration. As I will show in chapter five, the administration was less radical to colonialism its views on economic independence. These interpretations shaped how they thought of Pan-Africanism and approaches towards regional integration.

While both the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations externalised Ghana and Africa's problems, the Kufuor administration marked a shift to a lot more internalisation. As explained in chapter two, I use externalisation and internalisation here to mean how governments link colonisation to Africa's problem. Governments that emphasise the woes of colonisation as the continuous explanation of Africa's underdevelopment externalise Africa's problems. Like the CPP and PNDC/NDC administrations, such governments tend to be more vocal and critical about neo-colonialism, economic dependence and wary of further relations with the West. Originally, they tend pursue policies that can antagonise the West. On the other hand, governments that focuses less on such colonial relations but more on internal deficiencies and domestic maladministration as the explanations for Africa's underdevelopment internalise Africa's problems. These governments tend to be less vocal about the rhetoric of neo-colonialism and are more comfortable with relations with the West or former colonial metropolises.

These two are not mutually exclusive but may be skewed to one part depending on how it interprets colonial and post(neo)colonial relations. This shaped the government's interpretation of Pan-Africanism, thereby influencing its approach towards African unity.

Similar to the Rawlings administration, the goal of a united Africa shifted from being an immediate objective, as it had been during the Nkrumah administration, to an ultimate desire during the Kufuor administration. The Kufuor administration, just like the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, conceptualised Pan-Africanism as an "eventual movement towards continental unity".¹⁹⁶ However, its conceptualisation was also embedded in history. The forerunners of the Kufuor administration –

¹⁹⁶ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

UGCC, NLM and UP - while in opposition, introduced the term *Ghanaian personality* to counter the CPP government's *African personality*. By Ghanaian personality, they meant "giving more meaning to this freedom [republican status] to express our innermost selves".¹⁹⁷ This meaning was contextual as it was the period after two harsh laws were passed. The Avoidance of Discrimination Act (ADA) of 1957 banned all regionally based political parties and forced all opposition parties to merge into the United Party (UP). The Preventive Detention Act (PDA) of 1958 allowed for people to be detained without trial for five years if their actions were deemed a threat to national security. For the opposition, the best way to project an African personality, in the spirit of freedom and unity as I have discussed above, was first to project a Ghanaian personality that prioritised the same rights. Therefore, the difference in the meaning of Ghanaian personality and African personality lies not only with one being an activist or radical and the other being non-activist or gradualist, but also in the priorities of the government and good governance.

Unlike the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, the Kufuor government's interpretation of Pan-Africanism moved from externalisations and anti-imperial rhetoric that sought to blame the colonial powers for Ghana or Africa's problems. Instead, the party's interpretation of Pan-Africanism was an internalisation of responsibility and accountability. This means that, for the Kufuor administration, Africa's problems were partly a consequence of internal maladministration, not dues only to external factors. This approach required a new attempt at integration that focused primarily on building and strengthening domestic institutions for globally accepted democratic norms. While this fits the 'Ghanaian personality' concept, as introduced by the NPP's forerunners, the broader African context was also receptive to this interpretation. The New Partnership Agreement for Development (NEPAD) with its review instrument, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), showed a continent-wide commitment to this call. This also means that, unlike previous administrations, the Kufuor government was less inclined to take an aggressive position when other African or European states entered into agreements. I will show this more in chapter five on economic diplomacy. Therefore, the administration's actions gave practical meaning to the rhetorical shift of European/Western countries from being imperialists to development partners.

As argued above, one way to understand the Kufuor was the creation of Ministries purposely for integrations and the persons he appointed to head those ministries. This was a signal of interpretation and intent on how the government wanted to approach regional integration. As I will discuss below, it showed in how the government pursued its efforts towards regional integration.

¹⁹⁷ S. D. Dombo: OFFICIAL REPORT of 30th June 1960, col. 250

4.6.1 How did this play out in the government's approaches to integration?

First, the Kufuor administration gave more attention and support to regionalism than a continental union. However, unlike the PNDC/NDC regime, this position was not by 'contextual accident' but one that had historically been the fundamental approach to Pan-Africanism by the party's pioneers, since the colonial period. In our interview, Kufuor maintained that "the tradition of our party really appreciates the continental movement towards eventual unity... but we subscribe to sub-regional groupings like ECOWAS".¹⁹⁸ Kufuor's view was that better regional integration could only be achieved through economic integration and "that we [Africa] should do it through building the economic communities and integrating them and use them as a platform for continental unity".¹⁹⁹ He did not believe that it was going to happen from the top governmental political union as Nkrumah envisaged. In describing J. B. Danquah's (the ideological father of the NPP) stance on this, Edward Asomani²⁰⁰ told me that "the thinking was that we have the Southern African Development Community (SADC), ECOWAS, we have other blocs. If these blocs are more united or are coherent during the introduction of the ECOWAS currency that was floated, it would be easier to put maybe 4 or 5 regional blocs together than unite 50 or so countries".²⁰¹ According to Kwadwo Afari,²⁰² one of my respondents who is the Director of Protocol for the NPP, "Danquah and others said that there should be competition".²⁰³ The Kufuor administration, therefore, committed much effort to building ECOWAS relations through its trade liberalisation policies aimed at meeting the ten convergence criteria for the common regional currency, the Eco. In my interview with D. K. Osei, retired career ambassador and former personal secretary to President Kufuor, he argued that this was in the belief that such competitive and enhanced relations "will automatically bring about improvements in communication, in energy sharing and road infrastructure. So, trade will improve. We will then be taking collective political decisions".²⁰⁴ But I argue that such a laissez-faire approach to regional integration, without any superstructure, tends to stir unhealthy competition. This competition will, in turn, give more credence to Nkrumah's fear – the infiltration of imperialist to take advantage of it.

Furthermore, just like the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations, the Kufuor government pursued conflict resolution and peacekeeping as a Pan-African agenda. As discussed above, Ghana was willing to step in and negotiate peacebuilding strategies. This national behaviour was typified by Ghana's willingness to intervene in Congo, under the Nkrumah administration, and Ghana's efforts to

¹⁹⁸ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

¹⁹⁹ D. K. Osei: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁰⁰ Edward Asomani is a former Executive Director of the Danquah Institute

²⁰¹ Edward Asomani: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁰² Kwadwo Afari is the Director of Protocols for the NPP

²⁰³ Nana Afari: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁰⁴ D. K. Osei: Personal Interview, 2019

peacekeeping and resolving the first Liberian Civil War under Rawlings. During the Kufuor administration, the various interventions were Ghana's involvement in the brokering of peace in Côte d'Ivoire and the Kenyan election crisis in 2007. The government was also instrumental in events leading to the 2003 signing of the final peace agreement for the Second Liberian Civil War in Accra.

In addition, while the Nkrumah administration raised serious concerns and sometimes antagonised both African and European countries that entered economic agreements together, the Kufuor administration did so rarely. The Nkrumah administration discouraged such relations, but the Kufuor administration was open to the benefits of such links. Almost all the ambassadors I interviewed raised concerns, for example, about how France's economic relations with its former colonies have jeopardised, and continue to jeopardise, any hope for an economically strong ECOWAS. Yet, key members of the Kufuor administration did not give much credence to this, pursuing stronger economic ties with France themselves. On the occasion of the French National Day on 12th July 2000, Dr Kofi Konadu Apraku who later became the Minister for Regional Integration and NEPAD revealed that if the NPP wins power in the December 2000 elections, it will consider either joining the CFA or form a union between Ghana-Nigeria and other African states.²⁰⁵ He further congratulated France for their show of leadership in economic integration just as Ghana had been a trailblazer within the sub-region and the whole continent.²⁰⁶ During the same event, Nana Akufo-Addo, who later served as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, emphasised the position of the NPP as one that does not recommend the exiting of France from West Africa, as Nkrumah envisaged or Rawlings became suspicious of. Instead, the NPP position was that "France exercises its influence positively in the region and does so in a manner that encourages the coming together of the peoples across the colonial and linguistic barriers".²⁰⁷ He further clarified that "I certainly do not say France has the key, but it certainly has an important role to play".²⁰⁸ For the Nkrumah administration, this role was for the French to leave, the Rawlings administration also preferred a disintegration of UEMOA but the Kufuor administration desired economic liberalisation between UEMOA and ECOWAS. In fact, the initial amount paid to investigate the feasibility for the administration's flagship programmes and legacy – Ghana's Health Insurance System (GHIS) – was a grant from France.

Even beyond the economics of the French in the West Africa sub-region, Akwasi Osei Adjei who later became the Minister for Foreign Affairs (2007-2009) under the Kufuor administration, saw France as an inspiration to the rest of the world. He argued that one significant point worthy of note with

²⁰⁵ Dr Kofi Konadu Apraku (NPP – Offinso North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2938

²⁰⁶ *ibid*

²⁰⁷ Nana Akufo-Addo (NPP – Abuakwa): OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col 2936

²⁰⁸ *Ibid*

France's winning of the Euro 2000 football tournament "is the racial integration of the French people" since about 60% of the French team were black players.²⁰⁹ On the one hand, one might think of this as a pragmatic gesture of the Kufuor administration to "go where the money is"²¹⁰ to address a prevailing health care delivery challenge and to pursue social intervention policies. However, there is a history to this thinking and what the Kufuor administration did is not new if we reflect on the ideological stance of the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC) or United Party (UP) in the events leading to Ghana's independence and how they interpreted Ghana's relations with the West or Britain, in particular. Unlike the CPP, the UGCC wanted independence in the shortest possible time; in a way that does not antagonise Britain but foster good relations through the institutions they leave behind. It reinforces the point that under the Kufuor administration, the practical manifestation of the status of Europeans/former colonial metropolises or Western countries changed from imperialist to development partners.

A further regional policy was the assumption of a leadership role on the continent. Like that of Nkrumah and Rawlings, the Kufuor administration took on leadership roles as its Pan-African responsibility. Besides serving as chairman of ECOWAS from 2003 to 2005 and the African Union in 2006 and 2007, the NPP government took the leadership drive further in three ways. First was the building of stronger relations with neighbours. Unlike the Rawlings and Nkrumah regimes, the Kufuor administration had cordial ties with Ghana's neighbours through its less militant and conservative approach. The second was the government's decision to be the first country to be subjected to governance review under the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). APRM is a voluntary African instrument that monitors general governance practices with the aim of "fostering the adoption of policies, standards and practices that will lead to political stability, high economic growth, sustainable development and accelerated regional and economic integration".²¹¹ One way of looking at this homegrown review instrument is how it asserts African independence from reviews by institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). It also shows Ghana's commitment to the regional integration process. According to Kofi Konadu Apraku²¹², Ghana took the lead in this programme "as a committed Pan-Africanist country and through the prism of our own history" to make "a major contribution towards Africa's renaissance and turn around the poverty

²⁰⁹ Akwasi Osei Adjei: OFFICIAL REPORT of 12th July, 2000, col. 2948

²¹⁰ Nana Afari: Personal Interview, 2019

²¹¹ See S. K. B. Asante (March, 2007) Ghana and the Promotion of Pan Africanism and Regionalism. *The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lecture Series 40*. Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences.

²¹² Dr Kofi Konadu Apraku is a former Minister for the Regional Cooperation and New Partnership for Africa's Development between 2003 and 2006 under the Kufuor administration.

and marginalisation of our continent”.²¹³ While this programme’s sustained effects can be felt on the domestic scene, its further contribution to a continental unity remains unclear. It limits the politics of continental union to the domestic while pushing aspects of the economics to the sub-regional. In contrast to Nkrumah’s idea of “seeking first the political kingdom” (Mazrui, 1966, p. 113), which meant seeking for political unity regardless of the fallibilities of governance in each country, this programme stipulates the reverse – build domestic political responsiveness and accountability before seeking a continent-wide union. It highlights the Ghanaian personality as discussed above.

The third was the creation of dedicated institutions for regional integration. For instance, upon assuming office in 2001, the responsibilities of regional integration were jointly handled by three ministries – for Foreign Affairs, Finance and Economic Planning, and Trade and Industry. In 2003, a dedicated Ministry of Regional Cooperation and NEPAD was created with the responsibility of coordinating Ghana’s effort towards regional integration. The fourth was the government’s reach to the diaspora. It became known as the ‘Joseph Project’²¹⁴; launched in 2007 as part of Ghana’s 50th independence anniversary celebrations. The goal was “to reconcile and unite the African Peoples so that their positive spirit and strengths are released in a focused manner to elevate Africa and Africans worldwide”.²¹⁵ The significance of the project lies in how it sought to provide a structural design for the continuous relations between the African diaspora and the continent. It also signalled a deliberate intention to make Ghana the biblical Israel for Joseph and his family, who were stuck in captivity, to return home.

The Kufuor government’s approach towards the AU was influenced by its conceptualisation and interpretation of Pan-Africanism. Under the Kufuor administration, Ghana’s African policy or strategy to African integration was built around the idea of conservative intergovernmentalism. Without being urgently radical like Nkrumah or a revolutionary diffusionist like Rawlings, the Kufuor administration pursued what can be called the diplomacy of ‘gentle persuasion’. Regarding the bid to unite the African continent, politically, the government believed in the idea that (1) African unity was not a prerequisite

²¹³ Kofi Konadu Apraku (NPP – Offinso North and Minister for Regional Integration and NEPAD): OFFICIAL RECORD of 29th June, 2005, col. 1389

²¹⁴ The Joseph project was jointly initiated and funded by Ghana’s Ministry of Tourism and Diaspora Relations (MOTDR) United Nations World Tourism Organisation (UNWTO) and the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation (UNESCO) to position Ghana as the most preferred homeland for blacks in the diaspora. The name Joseph was chosen intentionally based on the biblical story of Joseph from Genesis chapter 37 onwards. In this story, Joseph was sold into slavery but later became a noble man in Egypt and invited his family. This family invitation became the backdrop for the mass movement of Israelites to Egypt, enslavement and subsequent exodus back to their land.

²¹⁵ Ibid; See The Ghana Joseph Project. Accessed September 20, 2020 Retrieved from <https://www.africa-ata.org/gh9.htm>; Tourism Ghana (March 7, 2007) Joseph Project: Calling all Diasporan Africans. Accessed September 15, 2020, Retrieved from https://newafricanmagazine.com/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ghana_march_07_new_african_tourism_special.pdf

for an African renaissance and (2) there are no forced deadlines for African unity. Yet the Kufuor government intended to pursue African renaissance through the soft power of Ghana's democratic exemplariness. Ghana was one of the few countries on the continent that had undergone a peaceful democratic turnover and had relatively vibrant and independent democratic institutions, including the media and civil society organisations. It was the idea of the government that these democratic credentials and sustained economic growth will make a positive example to the rest of the continent, and through that, Ghana can take its rightful place as the 'black star of Africa' (Kufuor, 2002; Owusu-Agyeman, 2002). When Kufuor was eventually appointed as leader of the regional bodies – ECOWAS and AU - he made these ideas more apparent. At a time that most claimed to be the closest point where the union of African governments could have been declared at the July 2007 conference in Accra Kufuor stated that: "I am confident that at the end of our deliberations, we should be able to arrive at a common understanding on the sort of continental government we want for ourselves, and a roadmap with timelines on its realisation".²¹⁶ Ideologically, the Kufuor government and its forerunners have never been in a rush for a continent-wide unitary government.

Lastly, the Kufuor administration's high emphasis on the pursuit of economic goals with the West African subregion represented a blend of the government's economic liberalisation with the core ideas of Pan-Africanism. It manifested in two ways. One was the revival it gave to the Permanent Joint Commissions for Cooperation (PJCC). These are bureaucratic designs between Ghana and neighbouring states, set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ensure continuity even in a period of political instability. However, the acrimonious relations between Ghana and neighbouring states under the previous administrations had made the arrangements redundant. The Kufuor administration revived them and used them as a channel for sustained economic relations between Ghana and the neighbouring states. The other was the establishment of the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP). The significance of this project, regarding regional integration and Pan-Africanism, lies in how it brings together Nigeria, Benin, Togo and Ghana under one cooperative mechanism to share the massive gas reserve of Nigeria. While in terms of politics, programmes such the APRM show how much domestic factors influenced the Kufuor administration's approach to African integration, the economics of it was different. Also, projects such as the WAGP and the positive ripple effects of the PJCC reveal aspects of how domestic challenges can be resolved through such sub-regional agreements.

²¹⁶ BBC News (July 1, 2007) Summit Focuses on African Unity. Accessed March 10, 2018, Retrieved from <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6258072.stm>

4.7 Conclusion

Ghana is widely known for its pioneering role in the efforts towards regional integration. This prominence owes much to Nkrumah's role in early Pan-African conferences and subsequent support for other African countries and nationalist leaders. However, since independence, this role and efforts have become more dynamic with the changing governments to a point where it was regarded that Ghana has abandoned this prestigious position in favour of a more collegiate approach, one amongst equals. This background led me to ask how important ideology is in Ghana's efforts towards regional integration? And how can we account for the dynamic shifts in efforts and approaches? Although Pan-Africanism is commonly regarded as the ideological drive behind Africa's regional integration efforts, little emphasis has been given to analysing it in its variants, and how it shapes these efforts. In this chapter, I suggest that Pan-Africanism should be treated not as a full or independent ideology but as an ideological component that relates to other components within the broader ideologies of African governments. I argue that in this interaction between Pan-Africanism and other ideological components, we can better understand the efforts of different governments towards regional integration. I note that contextual structures such as ECOWAS and AU provide ideas that are important in shaping regional integration efforts and approaches. In reflecting on the ICF, the most dominant pathways through which these ideas get attached to governments' ideologies are dualisation and adaptation. However, with the dominance of neoliberal and functionalist approach in the early 2000s, the Kufuor administration which has historically shared similar ideas with with the pioneers of these contextual structures did not need to adapt or dualise. Rather what the Kufuor administration shared in common with the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration was how each of the government's interpretation of the other ideological components was significant in shaping answers to the 'with who', 'where', 'how', 'why' and 'when' questions of African integration. This helps us to analyse how other ideological components, such as anti-colonialism, economic independence and good neighbourliness, relate and give meaning to aspects of Pan-Africanism that shape governments' actions. It shows that perhaps what some might refer to as 'lack of political will' may just be an expression of a variant of Pan-Africanism and, ultimately, an expression of their agency. It also demonstrates how a contextual framework that accounts for the heterogeneous nature of ideologies in an 'unconventional' context can also show how they mutate. Finally, it provides a blueprint to understanding how Pan-Africanism and efforts towards regional integration also shape other aspects of foreign policy such as neighbour-relations and economic diplomacy. The latter is the subject for the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5 - Ideology and Ghana's Economic Diplomacy: Reacting to Economic Independence

5.1 Introduction

The focus of this chapter is to explore what was ideological about Ghana's economic diplomacy under the three administrations. Economic independence is a key ideological component in economic diplomacy, but these components cannot be analysed in isolation, as the two previous chapters have shown. I demonstrate that across the three administrations, Ghana's economic diplomacy was a varied reactive response to Ghana's developmental challenges and conditions. This is a result of the interaction between each government's internalised ideas - spanning socialism/Nkrumaism, socialism-Marxism and classical liberalism -, contextual components, mainly anti-colonialism and economic independence, and ideas from contextual structures.

The diversity of the sources of ideas means that pathways, which are essentially the different ways governments adjust to these ideas, are very essential to understanding economic diplomacy. Unlike the neighbour-relations and regional integration, all the four pathways for ideas from contextual structures are relatively more relevant here. As I will show below, different governments at different times conformed, adapted, instrumentalised and dualised these ideas for policy-making. In chapters three and four, dualisation was key in neighbour relations and regional integration due to the relatively weaker contextual structures that provided ideas and policy frame for neighbour-relations and regional integration. However, this chapter shows dualisation is minimal or relatively less important because there is little room for governments for such unilateral shifts between their ideas and ideas from contextual structures. Across the three foreign policy areas, economic diplomacy is where internalised ideas adjust more to ideas from powerful contextual structures such as the Bretton Woods Institutions. These adjustments also have implications for agency where, on the surface, the more you adjust, the more agency you lose. However, this chapter and chapter six will demonstrate that agency is more than this.

In chapters three and four, I argued and demonstrated that although these components and structures are common, their interpretations are different across all the administrations. The internalised ideology of governments causes these different interpretations. For instance, as I will show below, classical liberals like the Kufuor administration perceived anti-colonialism and Ghana's relations with the Bretton Woods differently from the imperialistic perceptions by a socialist-Marxist Rawlings administration.

As a study of both policy-making and theorising about it, the relevance of this is not only to gain deeper insights into one of the critical areas of Ghana's foreign policy but also to provide fresh insights into

the international relations of African states. The core of this chapter is not to evaluate the relative successes and failures of the three regimes. However, in situations where ideologies influenced policy reception and partly accounted for policy success, I will discuss such dynamics. In this chapter, the debate on extraversion and agency is more profound because, of all three areas, economic diplomacy involves African states dealing with powerful governments and international organisations to directly address domestic developmental challenges. The rest of this introductory section situates Ghana's economic diplomacy within the broader African economic diplomacy context before proceeding to analyse each of the three administrations.

The economic diplomacy of African states has dominantly been conceived as an exercise in seeking financial support for development projects or resuscitating economies. Since independence, Ghana has borrowed from different sources, including the private sector, through the issuance of bonds and the programmes of international financial institutions such as the World Bank and IMF (Aryeetey & Fenny, 2017; Jones, 2016). With the emergence of BRIC (Brazil, India, Russia and China) creditors, there has been a recent upsurge in borrowing by African countries that has led to numerous cautions on the possibilities of default debts due to the magnitude of borrowing (Alden & Jiang, 2019; Bofo-Arthur, 1999b; Bunte, 2019).

However, there is a high level of heterogeneity in the set of Ghanaian and African governments' creditors. Attraction to these loans can be explained from two main perspectives. The first is that BRIC loans can provide developing countries with the means to avoid uncomfortable interference, especially for countries whose foreign policy and domestic politics clash with Western norms. Bunte (2019) argues that with Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) loans, African countries have the opportunity to avoid the stringent measures and conditionalities that come with aid from Western governments and organisations. In my interview with Kwamena Ahwoi, he opined that: "the other reality is that China, they only negotiate with you on economic parameters. They don't bring in human rights, rule of law and this and that... so for them to impose it on you and deprive you. But if there is a guy [China] who may not demand it and nevertheless provide the funds, why not?"²¹⁷ Second, BRIC loans are supposed to give African governments opportunities to pursue the ideal alternative models of development early nationalists dreamt of. This has been the long-standing dilemma between state-led as opposed to the International Financial Institutions' (IFIs) free-market approach (Kennedy, 1994; Langan, 2015). This shows us a clash of objectives between African governments and some of their financiers. However, in this chapter, I will show that this is a demonstration of the dynamism of

²¹⁷ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

economic diplomacy, emphasising how it reflects activism, developmental needs and diversity in the kind of relationship African governments pursue in their economic diplomacy.

From the realist perspective, economic diplomacy involves the pursuit of economic security within an anarchic international system, usually involving the use of intelligence gathering, lobbying, representation, negotiation and advocacy to further the foreign economic policies of the state (Okano-Heijmans & Asano, 2018; Okano-Heijmans & Okano-Heijmans, 2012). Thus, more often than not, realist thinkers conceive economic diplomacy as concerned with the economic agenda in diplomacy, distinguished from the political agenda. However, not all African states' diplomacy and economic diplomacy is about receiving loans and aid. The economic diplomacy of African states goes beyond just strict economic negotiations and eventually shape other national sectors - due to the continent's level of development - and areas of foreign policy (Manasserian, 2017; Okano-Heijmans, 2011). I will show later in this chapter that, sometimes, it is an affirmation of friendship for collaborative relations that permeates other spheres of foreign policy such as neighbour-relations and regional integration. Therefore, some of the existing analyses fall under what Lee & Hocking (2010, p. 1233) calls finance diplomacy, which is "concerned with attempts by governments to create stability in a regime which lacks the rules and laws of the international trade regime" usually facilitated by intergovernmental organisations such as the IMF and World Bank (Bartels, 2013; Olu, 2003).

Within the context of Africa, economic diplomacy takes a new shape, conceived as activism that captures how diplomatic actors traverse the linkages, activities, and institutions they work to create and manage their economic in(ter)dependence and dependence. Such activist objectives are not just sought in a vacuum but within the context of history and ideas. Therefore, China's relations with the developing world, for instance, cannot only be understood from the perspective of econometrics but also history and ideas. A retired career ambassador, who I interviewed in Accra but requested to stay anonymous, observed that the similar experiences of oppression and imperialism that China had undergone and the subsequent support it provided for African nationalist and liberation fighters makes African decision-makers receptive to Chinese approaches.²¹⁸ Although African states go into these negotiations from a position of weakness (Robertson & East, 2005), such relations have been interpreted as pursuance of economic independence from the West (Addis & Zuping, 2018; Campbell, 2008).

There is vast literature on Africa's economic relations. However, many scholars have argued that there is no room for ideology in Africa's economic diplomacy in Africa, because of Africa's relative weakness and the need to please donors through the processes of extraversion (Akokpari, 2005; Bayart, 2000;

²¹⁸ Anonymous

Fisher, 2013b; Graham, 2017; Zartman, 1966b). Such interpretations have also influenced the minimal agency given to Africa in such relations. Although economic diplomacy has proven to be one of the essential strands of Ghana's foreign policy, like other African states, it is negative because most African states lack relative economic power and function within the context of an international division of labour that has occasioned its marginalisation (Chang, 2002; Starosta, 2016). This greatly limits their choices, agency and, by extension, the role of ideas (Clark, 2001). Also, the domineering emphasis on rationalism in political economy and international relations has called into question whether the substantive content of peoples/governments' ideas matters in foreign policy that addresses national interest – a concept that has attracted various definitions (Amao, 2019; Rice, 2000, 2008).²¹⁹ Does this mean there is no ideology behind Ghana's economic diplomacy? Is Ghana's economic diplomacy at odds with the ideologies that governments espouse?

These are questions that must be answered in analysing economic diplomacy that is, in any case, one of the most ambitious and provocative parameters of African states' foreign policy. It essentially means that the approaches and realities of African foreign policies are changing, and as Timothy Shaw and Julius Okolo put it, "old assumptions about diplomacy and ideology are having to be reconsidered and revised because both internal and international political economy are in transition given the dramatic changes throughout the 1980s" (Shaw & Okolo, 1994a, p. 2). The ideological contextualisation framework for this study demonstrates that, even in such tight situations of dependency, there is still a possibility of ideological influence in more nuanced ways that only a reconceptualised and broader grasp of the concept can unravel. This is based on the belief that dependency does not necessarily obliterate ideology. Also, as I will show more in chapter six, this approach to ideology and economic diplomacy can help us understand agency in more nuanced ways – complementing the dynamic approach more recent studies have taken (Brown & Harman, 2013; Coffie & Tiky, 2021).

In this chapter, I argue that ideology is a significant variable in understanding Ghana's economic diplomacy. While many of the contextual structures and conditions of African states may be similar, ideology creates substantial differences in how they interpreted and acted on. Ideology manifests itself in Ghana's economic diplomacy in a similar way to the reactive attribute of nationalism, but it takes different shapes in all three administrations depending on an interplay of the governments' internalised and contextual ideological variables. This explains why, given the same or similar conditions, governments behaved differently. 'Reactive' is used here to mean a reaction against

²¹⁹ This thesis does not take on national interest as a key concept for definition and analysis

economic domination during colonialism and linked to the economic independence component that was critical in the ideology of every Ghanaian government.

Simply drawing an ideological nexus between economic diplomacy and the other foreign policy areas shows a movement from an area with less contextual structures and more freedom for governments to act in neighbour-relations to relatively stronger contextual structures and less freedom of action in economic diplomacy.

However, these contextual or 'practical' limitations do not presuppose the absence of ideology. Instead, they show ideology's dynamism and complexity. It also explains why, as demonstrated below, governments' adjustment to the ideas from these contextual structures are relevant, given that there is always a constant drive by governments to reconcile their ideas with ideas from contextual structures or what can be referred to as limitations. In the sections below, I discuss each of the three administrations separately, exploring and conceptualising the components of their ideologies, explaining the sources of those ideas and analysing their role in economic diplomacy.

5.2 The Nkrumah Regime

The period from independence in 1957 through to 1966 was one in which Ghana's economic diplomacy was designed to 'restore' Ghana and Africa to some measure of equality with the rest of the world. This idea emerged from how Nkrumah and members of the CPP conceptualised Ghana's past, present and future. Nkrumah expressed his disappointment in why "a Ghana which was in the eleventh century, at least equal in power in might to England, disappeared as it did?"²²⁰ This translated into the government's objective of "recreating the history of our nation as we translate into practical reality the dreams and visions of our forefathers"²²¹ or "to redeem its past glory and reinforce its strength for the realisation of its destiny".²²² The slave trade and colonialism were the dominant historical legacies members of the CPP government referred to as conditions that stymied the past glory they referenced. These historical legacies created conditions of decay, dependence, ethnic or internal fragmentation and a society alien to its roots that the CPP government sought to reverse.

While statements like these fit into classical reactionary thinking (Capelos & Katsanidou, 2018), I argue that the CPP government had a complex ambivalence regarding the past. They were torn between what to restore and what not to. For example, in terms of state-society relations, the CPP government was less inclined to restore the political power of the chiefs, an institution that played a vital role in

²²⁰ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 4th July, 1960, col. 6

²²¹ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 4th July, 1960, col. 7

²²² Kwame Nkrumah (1965, September 3) [Speech by Osagyefo the President to the National Assembly]. Collection of President Nkrumah's speeches. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

sustaining pre-colonial glory (Boafo-Arthur, 2001; Brukum, 1999). In *African Socialism Revisited and Consciencism: Philosophy and Ideology for Decolonisation*, Nkrumah cautioned against romanticising the African past as faultless and the need to keep a purged African culture blended with modernity and religion as a pathway to Africa's development. Kofi Baako, Leader of the House of Parliament in 1963, made a profound declaration on this in 1963. He argued that Ghana "cannot go back to the times before colonialism; it cannot pretend that colonialism was only a bad dream. Colonialism brought us in touch with technically advanced societies".²²³ What the government was eager to restore was some form of equality in relations between Africa and the rest of the world or to restore Ghana to that eleventh century nation which was "at least equal in power in might to England"²²⁴ and emerge to become "a bulwark of world peace"²²⁵ from decades of political and economic domination and interference of foreign powers.

The core components of the CPP's ideology for economic diplomacy were socialism (here as an internalised ideology), economic independence, Pan-Africanism/African consciousness and non-alignment (all as contextual components). The CPP's socialism was fluid both in name and conceptualisation. It moved from socialism to African socialism and then transitioned to scientific socialism and Nkrumaism. Socialism translated into daily life meant different things to key members of the CPP government and even to some opposition members. These interpretations were revealed during parliamentary debates. I highlight a few here from the parliamentary Hansards.

Joseph Braimah,²²⁶ a cabinet minister in Nkrumah's first government, socialism did not sacrifice strength for wealth. Instead, it would see to it that "its people put on weight due to better living by reason of increased production".²²⁷ Socialism was therefore defeated "if we sacrifice weight and better living to uneconomic industries".²²⁸ He added that the CPP's policy of socialism at "both home and abroad is live and let's live".²²⁹ Victoria Tagoe, who was a CPP MP, conceptualised it as a combination of work and happiness²³⁰ - a term for the CPP government programme that later

²²³ Kofi Baako (Leader of the House) OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col. 120

²²⁴ Kwame Nkrumah (1965, September 3) op cit.

²²⁵ Ibid

²²⁶ Joseph A. Briamah was the First MP and Cabinet minister from Northern Ghana but resigned in November 1953 following accusations of bribery and verified by a commission of enquiry which popular opinion in the CPP saw as attempts to besmirch the party. See: Denis Austin *Politics in Ghana 1946-1960* and Ama Barbara Biney *Kwame Nkrumah: An Intellectual Biography*

²²⁷ Joseph A. Braimah (CPP – Gonja East) OFFICIAL REPORT of 17th October 1963, col. 31

²²⁸ Ibid

²²⁹ Joseph A. Braimah (CPP – Gonja East): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th July 1960, col. 37

²³⁰ Convention People's Party (1962) Program of the convention people's party for work and happiness. Accra: Government Printing Department

embodied the government's seven-year development plan²³¹ (Miescher, 2014). The establishment of factories would bring work but happiness, she argued, "springs from a state of wellbeing" characterised by things such as fee-free education, free textbooks and uniforms, and free medical care.²³² The Minister for Local Government and Justice between 1961 and 1965,²³³ Kofi Ofori-Atta, contended that socialism could be better understood through a distinction between state and private enterprises.²³⁴ He added that "the paramount objective [of the state enterprise] is to supply the needs of the people... the entrepreneur also attempts to provide the needs of the people but with a difference, in order to make profit... the one gives, the other takes".²³⁵ For Nathaniel Welbeck, a Minister for Works and Housing between 1954 and 1958, socialism in the Ghanaian context meant a classless society where 'one should not eat and leave the others'.²³⁶ Socialism, according to Kwaku Amoa-Awuah,²³⁷ was meant to create a welfare state aimed at improving the standard of living²³⁸ or building what Benjamin Konu,²³⁹ a CPP MP who became a protestor and later a CPP member, referred to as a "safe haven of utopia".²⁴⁰ For Christian Dovlo and S. Iddrissu,²⁴¹ both CPP MPs, socialism was synonymous with an effective one-party state.²⁴² From the opposition bench, a leading MP, Jato Kaleo understood socialism to mean "he who does not work shall not eat".²⁴³

Although diverse, their explanations connect to some basic tenets – human values, communalism, and modernity – that formed the basis of socialism as defined later by Nkrumah. This is because most of the CPP members were ideological students of Nkrumah – they read his publications, and some

²³¹ New York Times (March 12, 1964, p. 13) Nkrumah Presents 7-Year Growth Plan. Accessed September 20, 2020 Retrieved from <https://www.nytimes.com/1964/03/12/archives/nkrumah-presents-7year-growth-plan.html>

²³² Victoria Tagoe (Third Member from the Northern and Upper Regions): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col. 81

²³³ Between 1958 and 1961, the Ministry of Local Government and Justice were together but separated in 1961 until 1965 when Justice Ministry was merged with Attorney General's office.

²³⁴ Kofi A. Ofori Atta (Minister of Justice) OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col. 85

²³⁵ Ibid

²³⁶ Nathaniel. A. Welbeck (CPP – Cape Coast) OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col. 88

²³⁷ Kwaku Amoa-Awuah served as a CPP MP from 1954 to the government's overthrow in 1966. He was later appointed as the Minister of Labour from 1965 to the end of the administration.

²³⁸ Kwaku. Amoa-Awuah (Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Social Welfare): OFFICIAL REPORT of 19th July 1960, cols. 72-73

²³⁹ Benjamin Konu was a CPP protestor during the 1956 elections; contested as an independent candidate and won against the CPP candidate; but he joined the CPP in parliament

²⁴⁰ Benjamin. A. Konu (CPP – South Tongu): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th July 1960, col. 18

²⁴¹ S. I. Iddrissu was a CPP MP for Dagomba North who became the Parliamentary Secretary for Information and Broadcasting after the 1956 elections

²⁴² Christian K. Dovlo (CPP – Keta): OFFICIAL REPORT of 3rd February 1966, col. 21; S. I. Iddrissu (Independent MP, Dagomba North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 15th March 1960, col 69

²⁴³ Jato Kaleo (UP – Wala-North): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col 77

enrolled at the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute.²⁴⁴ Nkrumah defined 'his' socialism as "a non-aligned version of second-world socialism; a social synthesis for the reconciliation of modern technology and human values; the defence of communalism in a modern setting" (Nkrumah, 1970 p, 201&207 cited in McCain, 1979).

'Indigeneity' is key to their understanding of socialism. A leading CPP MP, Charles E. Donkoh,²⁴⁵ argued that

our domestic policies are unique because our socialism is based upon communalism that is unique; it is different from any type of socialism obtained anywhere else. In our international relations, we have pointed out that we are not going to copy anything from any other country. We are going to experiment to find out for ourselves the best system based upon our communal way of life where nobody has property of his own but all the property belongs to the family.²⁴⁶

This 'non-aligned version of second world socialism' encapsulates Nkrumaism.²⁴⁷ The two main differences between Nkrumaism and 'second world socialism' is the African/Ghanaian component and the man Nkrumah. It was believed that Ghana had lived in socialism for centuries, but Nkrumah introduced the scientific aspect of it.²⁴⁸ Having a unique ideology, either by interpretation or by name, was a way of asserting Ghana's power and uniqueness in the Cold War era.

Even though indigeneity was predominant in how the government talked about ideology, I argue that the approaches and conceptualisations they used did not actually reflect the realities of Ghanaian society at the time. Several decades of colonialism had changed the nature of society, as the government acknowledged. Events leading to independence had raised expectations (Apter, 2008; Léautier, 2012), but I argue that it would have seemed that there was little difference between 'working for Nkrumah' and the colonial government if the people still missed some privileges like private ownership. This created mass apathy towards the government and gave the opposition some legitimacy. This partly explains why there was jubilation after the coup even though many regarded Nkrumah as the founder of Ghana (Ahlman, 2017; Hadjor, 1988; James, 1977; Rooney, 1988). In new

²⁴⁴ The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute (officially known as the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Economics and Political Science or Winneba ideological Institute) was an educational body in Winneba, founded in 1961 to promote socialism in Ghana as well as the decolonization of Africa.

²⁴⁵ Charles Donkoh was the CPP MP who was elected to fill the vacancy left by Dr K. A. Busia after he went into exile to avoid an impending arrest and detention based on the Preventive Detention Act (PDA). See Alex Frempong *Elections in Ghana 1951-2016*

²⁴⁶ Charles. E. Donkoh (Wenchi West): OFFICIAL REPORT of 17th October 1963, col. 39

²⁴⁷ Kofi Baako (Leader of the House): OFFICIAL REPORT of 6th July 1961, col. 48

²⁴⁸ N. A. Welbeck (Cape Coast): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col. 91; Kofi Baako (Leader of the House): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th October 1963, col. 118

states where there is less institutionalisation, there is the need for mass support for an ideology to survive and deliver.

The Nkrumah administration's idea of economic independence meant taking control of Ghana's economic fortunes. Under colonial rule, the economic systems of colonies were shaped to serve the demands of the metropole and resources were harnessed to serve colonial purposes. Trade links were largely restricted. The domestic economy was made foreign, thereby creating a dependent economy (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010; Chang, 2002; Huillery, 2014). Ghana's case was not much different. The *Report of the United Kingdom Trade and Industrial Mission* in 1959 revealed that 85% of all Ghana's import trade was done by European firms, mainly British; 10% was handled by Asians (Indians, Syrians and Lebanese); and 5% by Ghanaians (Nkrumah, 1963, p. 108). Ghana was a net exporter of raw materials, mainly cocoa and other mineral resources such as gold. This made the economy of Ghana dependent and susceptible to external shocks. The blame fell on the West, whose continuing economic relations with Ghana and Africa had, according to Nkrumah (1963), undermined not only Africa's economic viability and true independence but also disrupted the aspiration of an African political and economic union. The best solution, he recommended, was to cut off such relations with the West. Therefore, after attaining political independence, the next step was to achieve economic self-sufficiency and autonomy without which political independence was valueless.

For the CPP government, the best way to achieve this was through Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), economic diversification, and 'work and happiness'. What the government meant was a shift from a raw material producing economy to an industrialised one through economic diversification and expansion. It was, for Nkrumah, a relatively opportune time to pursue a mixed agricultural (fishery, forestry) and industrial economy from monotonous primary goods production using the proceeds from cocoa sales as security. By 1963, Ghana had begun exporting other commodities such as coffee, bananas, tobacco and palm oil (Nkrumah, 1963). To achieve large-scale industrial development, electricity was essential. The grand project to push the government's idea of economic independence was the Volta River Project (VRP).²⁴⁹ Attaining industrialisation and boosting Ghana's economic development was meant to have a ripple effect towards inspiring the idea of the African personality, which was one of the pillars that efforts towards African integration resonated around.²⁵⁰ For that same purpose, Ghana was going to use its newly found industrial prosperity to drive intra-African relations and encourage the idea of financial support from within.

²⁴⁹ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL RECORD of 21st February 1961, col. 125-138

²⁵⁰ Nkrumah highlighted this in his speech at the laying of the foundation stone for the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission on November 25, 1964. Accessed February 20, 2020, Retrieved from

Economic independence was not only the new mandate of the government but also for the people to work hard while being happy – a complement to the human value component of Nkrumah’s definition of socialism quoted above. During colonialism, workers were assumed to be ill-motivated and lazy because they were working for the colonial government.²⁵¹ However, the new mandate stressed the need for everyone to work harder and more diligently because they worked for themselves, their children, the future of Ghana, and not for the enrichment of the former colonial power (Nkrumah, 1963).

While these ideas originally sent signals of a government bent on jettisoning relations with the West, the practical application of the idea of economic independence was more complex. It produced a different type of relations I call economic interdependence. On the one hand was a partnership between Ghana and Western capital to finance not only the VRP and but also industries (Amankwah-Amoah & Osabutey, 2018). Nkrumah justified that “in the modern world, independence also means interdependence”²⁵² and “even Ghana with its real measure of stability and prosperity – needs this outside support and stimulus”²⁵³ which “contribute a web of common interests which we (both Ghana and Western partners) can freely acknowledge”.²⁵⁴ For Nkrumah, this partnership was also essential and needed “to help our people to learn the new industrial skills”.²⁵⁵ Meaning, this was a short-term relation and Ghanaians would be positioned, in the foreseeable future, to take over from expatriates.

The idea of Pan-Africanism or African consciousness, as discussed in chapter four, is the foundational notion on which African unity or unity of the African race is hinged. At its core, Pan-Africanism is based on the shared history and destiny for people of African descent within and outside Africa. In terms of economic diplomacy, the practical application of Pan-Africanism was the pursuance of a union of African economies. The CPP government highlighted its intention to “pursue plans for increased economic cooperation in Africa and give encouragement for the establishment of cooperative enterprises as one of the means of modernising Ghana's economic and social life of Ghana”.²⁵⁶ As I have shown in chapters three and four, and will further discuss below, the government pursued interdependency within the African continent to project an African personality and economic independence to the rest of the world.

<https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/Nkrumah-lays-foundation-for-atomic-reactor-in-1964-122255>

²⁵¹ Kofi Baako (Leader of the House): OFFICIAL REPORT of 18th May 1962, col. 39

²⁵² CPP Government policy statement 5th March, 1957 (page 2)

²⁵³ *ibid* p. 4

²⁵⁴ *ibid*

²⁵⁵ *ibid*

²⁵⁶ Kwame Nkrumah (President) OFFICIAL RECORD of 4th July 1960, col. 11

The last component is non-alignment. Though the primary focus of non-alignment was to present a third alternative to the world in the context of the Cold War and harness sustainable peace, it meant different things to different countries or leaders on the African continent. For the CPP administration, non-alignment meant the freedom to align with either the East or the West. Nkrumah argued that *In fact, perhaps “non-alignment” is a mis-statement of our attitude. We are firmly aligned with all the forces in the world that genuinely make peace for it.* In terms of economic diplomacy, what non-alignment meant to the CPP administration can be summarised in the African proverb: “when the bull elephants fight, the grass is trampled down”.²⁵⁷ Embedded in this proverb are two revealing implications. One, the government knew Africa’s position. Africa was economically at the bottom, and none of its military or strategic assets could make much difference to the balance of power at the time yet; participating in the Cold War had the tendency to draw African states into a stream of intractable conflicts. Two was the approach. For non-alignment, the CPP’s strategy was to establish broader economic relations with countries of the West and East so far as it satisfied Ghana’s economic interest which was shaped by the government’s ideology. Anglin (1958, p. 153) argued that the non-aligned idea was crucial in its instrumental value for the government since it gave Ghana the opportunity to experience “the delights of being wooed on all sides – by the Western powers the Soviet bloc and by the Afro-Asians”. As argued in chapter two, instrumentalisation can work efficiently as a pathway within the ideological contextualisation framework if there is an ideological context for it, either from the targeted audience (the East and West) or the creator (Ghana). I will show that it was a key part of the government’s efforts to pursue economic independence for Ghana and the rest of Africa.

In terms of contextual structures with the capacity to produce ideas for economic relations and development, the administration established its first relations with the Bretton Woods institutions in 1960 (Hutchful, 1985, 2002). However, as I will show in my discussion below on the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations, Ghana did not enrol on its programme until the later part of the administration. Therefore, I do not consider them as an institutionalised structure that the ideology of the Nkrumah administration had to adjust to.

I agree with Freedon (2006) and Stråth (2006) that contestations and oppositions are key to understanding ideology. Therefore, I highlight some of the important ideological disagreements. Two key members who disagreed with Nkrumah and eventually resigned or were dismissed from the government were Arthur Lewis²⁵⁸ and K. A. Gbedemah. Lewis, who became Nkrumah’s chief economic advisor, disagreed with Nkrumah’s idea of seeking economic independence through ambitious

²⁵⁷ Nkrumah 1960 Address on African Affairs; The elephants here are the Western and Eastern blocs, while the grass represents countries of the developing world.

²⁵⁸ Arthur Lewis was an economic policy advisor to Nkrumah in the immediate post-independence era

industrialisation projects that eventually became ‘white elephants’. When he criticised the imbalance of Nkrumah’s five-year development plan for having “too many schemes on which the Prime Minister is insisting for ‘political reasons’”, Nkrumah responded that “political decisions which I consider I must take. The advice you have given me, sound though it may be, is essentially from the economic point of view, and I have told you, on many occasions, that I cannot always follow this advice as I am a politician and must gamble on the future” (Kanbur, 2017; Tignor, 2006, p. 173). Gbedemah, a founding member of the CPP and cabinet minister for finance for seven years, disagreed with Nkrumah on some of the ideological components of the government. On non-alignment and economic independence, Gbedemah emphasised, in his letter to Nkrumah in 1962, that

Political Neutralism and Non-Alignment for small nations such as Ghana, are ideally desirable and should be encouraged, but to stretch the right to be outspoken as a neutral into licence for unwarranted condemnation of those helping you so profusely to build up your own ‘civilisation’ too, while simultaneously you keep on taking loans, credits, technical and other forms of assistance from them does not only prove your inherent ingratitude to all and sundry at home and abroad but also smacks Mr. President, of buccaneerism.²⁵⁹

Even though allegations of corruption and personal differences were blamed publicly for these disagreements, I argue that the diverse nature of the CPP government’s membership better explains these deep-seated ideological differences. The membership of the CPP comprised a plethora of social forces and individuals targeting the prime objective of independence. Nkrumah himself echoed that:

The circumstances under which the CPP was formed resulted in it being a compromise organisation composed of some genuine revolutionaries but containing many of those who are interested in independence only so as to better themselves and to take the place of the previous colonial traders and businessmen. (Nkrumah 1970: 71 cited in Ninsin, 1979, p. 85)

Ninsin (1979, p. 85) further described the CPP leadership as “an even more bizarre collection. It included romantic socialists (comprising primarily a section of the intelligentsia and trade unionists), petty-bourgeois elements (of the commercial elite), traditionalists and political ‘yo-yos’”. The CPP was a party of compromised units with one objective, independence, after which the differences in their post-independence goals for Ghana led to ideological disagreements and eventually the dismissal of senior cabinet ministers. Yet, from 1960 to the end of the CPP administration, not only had these key ‘dissident’ members of the party been sacked or left but also Ghana had moved from a de facto one-party dominance to a de jure one-party state (Biney, 2011; Fuller, 2014). This represented a more or less a unified foreign policy ideology to the world.

²⁵⁹ K. A Gbedemah’s open letter to Nkrumah on 29th September 1962

These ideas and their interpretation came from different sources relevant to understanding them, and I will discuss them in the next section.

5.2.1 Genealogy

The CPP's anti-Western ideas were reinforced by a Ghanaian society that was gradually developing ideas relating to anti-colonial thinking — certain implicit rules circumscribing wealth and exploitation — thanks to prior decades of nationalist efforts by different groups (Anglin, 1958; McCain, 1979). The African context at the time was a significant source of ideology. The 1950s and 60s was a period in African history that was characterised by high-level intellectualism. African leaders were equally occupied with crafting new lexicons and conceptualisations of ideology. Key ideologies such as *négritude*, African abolitionism, *ujamaa*, and *Ubuntu* are associated with this period (Hendrickson & Zaki, 2013). This situation is partly because ideology was how these leaders could conceptually organise the complex post-independence scene. It resulted in a series of gatherings by African leaders meeting to decide the post-colonial future of Africa. Also, this period coincided with the Cold War battle of ideologies which further influenced the new states.

Besides, Nkrumah was not just a leader of the CPP government but also, internationally, an influential ideological source. Some leading members of the CPP, in and out of parliament, rehashed the ideas of Nkrumah. Kofi Baako (CPP MP and cabinet minister) declared in parliament that Ghana's ideology is Nkrumaism instead of any of the 'big-isms'. He described Nkrumah as the "leader, teacher and inspirer" of the CPP.²⁶⁰ This buttresses how much ideological acumen Nkrumah provided for the party and government through his speeches and publications. It also demonstrates how, after independence and the exit of other opposition within the CPP, Nkrumah's thinking dominated the government's foreign policy.

5.2.2 Did ideology make a difference in the government's economic diplomacy?

More generally, ideology shaped the objectives of Ghana's economic diplomacy. The first objective was development. How the CPP government conceptualised development was embedded in its ideology. Beyond the provision of basic amenities and government social interventions,²⁶¹ development, according to the CPP government was conceptualised as a point in the process of state reconstruction where the state would become less dependent on foreign aid and able to industrialise based on Comparative Advantage Following (CAF). A developed Ghana was to have heavy industries like the Volta Aluminium Company (VALCO), grand hydroelectric power like the Akosombo and Bui

²⁶⁰ Kofi Baako: Motion to approve the nomination of Nkrumah as the president of the Republic of Ghana on 10th June 1965. Collection of Parliamentary Records. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

²⁶¹ Kwame Nkrumah (28th May 1957). Government Policy on Development by the Prime Minister. Collection of President Nkrumah's speeches. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

Dam, and a nuclear reactor. In 1964, the CPP government clearly defined what it meant by development. In the government's seven-year development plan, development meant a social transformation in which the government controlled key sectors of the economy, thereby eradicating colonial/neo-colonial stranglehold of the economy.²⁶² The second objective of Ghana's economic diplomacy was the attainment of great power status on the African continent to leverage this status in international negotiations. Although originally, the socialist ideas internalised by Nkrumah's government did not have great power tendencies, its combination with the anti-colonial and Pan-African components gave it that twist. Ghana had a unique opportunity as the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence. Therefore, I argue that it was part of the government's ideological approach to use this position to project an African personality interpreted from the anti-colonial, economic independence and Pan-African component of the government's ideology. Attaining great power status would highlight Ghana's prominence in Africa and the rest of the world; using Ghana's example would provide a blueprint for what the rest of the continent could achieve if independent. It conformed to the idea of economic independence which, I will later argue, was understood quite differently by both the opposition and the CPP government.

Linked to the role of shaping the objectives of Ghana's economic diplomacy, ideology influenced how the government defined the national economic interest that drove its economic diplomacy. The national economic interest was to shift Ghana's economy from a raw material producing economy to an industrialised one through economic diversification and expansion. In accordance with the government's socialist or Nkrumaist ideology, it was in the interest of the nation that "the growth rate of the public sector of the economy should exceed the growth rate of the private sector".²⁶³ And the government made efforts through state corporations, nationalised farms and institutions, among others, to pursue this interest.

Ideology also made Ghana prefer economic relations and support from the East, although the contextual ideological structure limited the degree to which it could break free from the West. As argued above, this contextual ideological structure of dependence on the West had been institutionalised through colonialism. However, the government's interpretation of economic independence and non-alignment was to wean Ghana off such structure or, at least, reduce its influence. This translated into how much effort and emphasis the CPP government gave to certain states or international entities in its economic diplomacy. While on face value, the CPP administration seemed to relate equally with both East and West with matching dividends, in reality, it placed more

²⁶² Kwame Nkrumah (1964) Speech to the National Assembly on the Launching of the Seven-Year Development Plan. Collection of President Nkrumah's speeches. PRAAD, Accra, Ghana

²⁶³ Ibid

emphasis on Ghana's relations with the East. Ghana got the VRP financed by the West and the atomic reactor financed by the East. However, the West appeared to do more. By 1966, the CPP government had accrued over £220 million from Western creditors while obtaining between £60-80 million from communist countries.²⁶⁴ These figures, which include financial aid for infrastructure projects and industries, show that economically the USSR could not match the US or West, making it a less viable economic partner for a new state that required huge capital investment. The most viable option for countries like Ghana that needed huge capital was the West.

However, the CPP government's penchant to forge closer ties with socialist states due to their ideology influenced the government's decision to promote economic cooperation with the East.²⁶⁵ Although the magnitude of efforts made to establish relations with the East did not match the economic dividends Ghana accrued, the Soviet share of Ghana's economy was consistently growing. From 1962 to 1964 and 1965, the Soviet share of Ghana's economy grew from 7% to 13.8% and 23.8%, respectively.²⁶⁶ Typical economic aid, outside of those for specific collaborative projects like the Volta River Project (VRP), from the communist bloc grew to £70 million while that from the Western countries stood at £50 million (Grundy & Farlow, 1969).²⁶⁷ Although compared to the West, this might be from a low base and not amount to much, the steady rise signalled an intent to consolidate the economic relations between the government and the East. On the African continent, the CPP government put much effort into building and promoting a common economic front for Africa, through financial assistance²⁶⁸ and economic cooperation.²⁶⁹

Ideology influenced how economic relations were perceived. As argued above, economic diplomacy has at least two sides: the political and the economic. Countries that share a common ideology explore both in their relations but countries with different ideologies restrict themselves to economic relations, in most cases characterised by conflicts and misunderstandings. This characterised Ghana-East/West economic diplomacy and ideology influenced it. For the CPP government, economic cooperation with the West was purely economic while economic cooperation with the East was both economic and political, and sometimes even stretched to cultural. Nkrumah and members of his

²⁶⁴ Economist (August 6, 1966, p. 551+) What Went Wrong. The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2014, Accessed December 20, 2019, Retrieved from https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/GP4100800843/ECON?u=rho_ttda&sid=ECON&id=0572d2a6.

²⁶⁵ Nkrumah's letter to His Excellency Mr. Alexei Kosygin, Prime Minister of the USSR on September 17, 1965

²⁶⁶ West Africa (December 17, 1966, p. 1459). No. 2585; See Jan Triska and David Finley (1968, p. 278), Soviet Foreign Policy New York: Macmillan Co.

²⁶⁷ *ibid*

²⁶⁸ Communiqué on the first session of the African states of Casablanca Charter held at Conakry from 17th to 21st July 1961.

²⁶⁹ Report of the Ghana delegation to the meeting of the committee of experts on posts and telecommunications, civil aviation and meteorology at Conakry from 10th July to 14th July 1961

government often referred to countries of the East as ‘brothers’. The government’s socialist, anti-colonial and Pan-African ideological components created a perception of fear and doubt regarding any form of economic relations it had with the West. Nkrumah, in particular, was very wary of how Western assistance might draw Ghana (Africa) into a new form of colonialism.

In addition, ideology moulded a national economic identity. How the CPP government wished Ghana to be seen by the rest of the world was shaped by the ideological components of the CPP government. The CPP government wanted Ghana to be seen as the economic success story on the continent – as a country that rose from the ashes of colonialism to prosperity. Furthermore, the CPP wanted Ghana to be seen as an economic hub and pursued an evangelical mission through material and financial support to other African countries. This aligned with its Pan-African objective and seeking to liberate other African countries economically.

Lastly, ideology was used as an instrumental tool to attract economic assistance. The non-alignment rhetoric and posture of the government made Nkrumah a powerful player in global economic relations. The non-aligned rhetoric by senior members/diplomats and Nkrumah himself drew the world's attention to Ghana and created an opportunity that Nkrumah tried to exploit for economic benefits. He projected an image of a powerful and influential leader, within the subregion, whose allegiance, when won, would inure to the benefit of either blocs. Within the contextual framework, this was the pursuit of the government’s ideological objectives through the instrumentalisation pathway. With instrumentalisation, governments take advantage of the ideological climate to pursue their ideological objectives.

Even though current key members of the CPP think otherwise, it is evident that Nkrumah played this card to secure funding or support from both the East and West to pursue his economic independence objectives mainly through Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI).²⁷⁰ This does not mean lack of genuineness. Rather, it demonstrates ideological heterogeneity at the world level, the limits to ideology for less powerful states like Ghana, and the way in which they [less powerful states] negotiate spaces and their dependency/agency to achieve foreign policy objectives. Nkrumah was charismatic and very persuasive. His persuasiveness was primarily hinged on his ideological beliefs, and there was a conscious effort to project that. In my interview with Mr. Amate, a retired diplomat who used to be part of Nkrumah’s speech writing team, he revealed that Nkrumah had the habit of rejecting any

²⁷⁰ In my interview with Kwabena Bomfeh, who at the time was the CPP General Secretary, and Samia Nkrumah (former Chairperson and MP for the CPP and daughter of Nkrumah) they contest this position because they think it connotes lack of genuineness of the government’s non-aligned stance.

speech that did not contain anti-colonial and non-aligned rhetoric even when the situation had little to do with it.²⁷¹ I find this statement plausible after going through many Nkrumah speeches.

However, in the context of the Cold War, both the West and East saw things differently and primarily from an ideological perspective, and it was their perceptions (based on ideology) that determined how successful or otherwise Nkrumah's persuasiveness was. The East saw Ghana as an ally for socialism. For the West, the fact that Nkrumah blamed it for Ghana's underdevelopment made it more inclined to support Ghana, not only an act of economic cooperation or securing their interest but also a way of recompense.²⁷² According to Sir Robert Jackson,²⁷³ the British government was committed to Ghana's development because of the conviction that its reputation was affected by the degree of success achieved by Ghana in governing itself.²⁷⁴ The US translated Nkrumah's non-alignment to mean a pragmatist interested in specific goals and they were ready to work with him.²⁷⁵ This supports the point that without an ideological context, instrumentalisation can rarely achieve its objectives. One key feature of the instrumentalisation pathway is that even if the ideology of two governments or parties are contradictory, there is a better chance of success if one party (the dominant one) has an ideological objective to achieve. In this case, the US had their own ideological objectives by preventing new allies for the USSR (Kalu, 2018; Schmidt, 2013). But they also had to overlook or try to change Nkrumah's socialism which did alarm them. This is a phenomenon very few studies on the Cold War have emphasised (Saul, 2005; Westad, 2000).

In the end, both governments are achieving their ideological objectives regardless of their primary ideological differences. Although the Nkrumah administration could not settle on a clear definition for their socialist ideology, it was clear on what it did not like. However, the administration was met with a context that demanded that not all its internalised ideological objectives could adequately be funded. In this classic case, the government had to conform to certain relations that went against the core of its ideological components, instrumentalising its ideational stance to accrue economic benefits for ideological ends. This demonstrates the complex nature of the roles ideologies play in economic diplomacy in the face of apparent limitations.

²⁷¹ C. O. C. Amate – Personal Interview (2019). Amate is a retired diplomat who worked at the African Affairs department of Ghana's foreign Affairs ministry and as one of the speech writers for the president during Nkrumah and Busia administrations

²⁷² This sentiment was demonstrated in a letter from Sir Robert Jackson to Nkrumah in 1957

²⁷³ Sir Robert Jackson was Australian naval officer, public servant and United Nations administrator. His most noted activity in Ghana was his role during the negotiations and construction of the Volta River Dam

²⁷⁴ Letter from Commander R. Jackson to Kwame Nkrumah, October 1957

²⁷⁵ CIA (January 17, 1964). The Leftward Trend in Ghana. Approved for Release 2006/10/11: CIA-RDP79-00927A004300080004-5

5.3 The Rawlings Administration

After over two decades of independence, the reactive nature of ideology for economic diplomacy took a different shape under the Rawlings administration. Here, I argue that the reactive nature of the PNDC/NDC's ideology for economic diplomacy took two main 'contradictory' forms. First, just like the CPP government, the PNDC/NDC pursued an idea of overthrowing a neo-colonial system in favour of equality in international economic relations. Within the contextual framework, the anti-colonial posture and feature of the internalised socialist-Marxist ideas of the Rawlings administration came from Ghana's long history of anti-colonialism, especially the Nkrumah era.

Second, the government's acceptance of an IMF-World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme was a reactive response to the context in which it functioned even though the rhetoric did not change much and its reception to the programme was more complex. This represents a contextual structure whose ideas the PNDC/NDC administration's ideology had to adjust to, although their dominant initial attempt was to resist. The Nkrumah administration initiated Ghana's relations with the Bretton Woods institutions but strengthened and institutionalised by the post-1966 administrations (Hutchful, 1985). Therefore, by the time of the Rawlings administration, they had become a critical stakeholder in Ghana's economic diplomacy, although I will discuss later that this involvement was received with mixed reactions. As I argued in chapter two, governments ideologies adjust the ideas of these contextual structures through different means. I show in this section that the administration's initial reaction to this structure was to conform and instrumentalise the programme to address their ideological objectives. But their later ideological move from being socialist-Marxist to a social democratic party signalled some form of adapting to these ideas for the Bretton Woods' structures in a way that brought them closer to the Kufuor administration than the Nkrumah administration.

However, an important thing to note here is that the PNDC/NDC was composed of different factions from different ideological backgrounds, including hard-line leftists like Chris Atim, Nyeya Yen and liberals including Obed Asamoah and even Kufuor, who served as the Secretary for Local Government for about six months. I argue that the adaption to the ideas from the IMF and World Bank coincided with the increasing control by the moderates over the party and government's policies, while the hard-liners and members who had internalised radical anti-colonial and Marxist ideas either left the government or were forced into exile (Opoku, 2008). Paying attention to these dynamics help us understand ideology and policies better. However, it is important to note that ideology is not everything domestically. The PNDC/NDC government, through its historical relations and key personalities, had the Volta Region as its stronghold (Frempong, 2019). Like the Rawlings administration, the Kufuor administration had ethno-regional appeals, making the Asante region its

greatest electoral base. Such appeals shaped the government's actions and inactions during different periods (Chazan, 1982; Sefa-Nyarko, 2021).

Stråth (2006, p. 39) argues that to understand ideologies, we need to think "much more in terms of opposition, discontinuities and contradictions, internally as well as externally, than in terms of cohesion and continuity". This argument is more profound to understand the PNDC/NDC administration's interpretation of the ideological components and how they shaped economic diplomacy. I will highlight some of these nuances below.

The core components of the PNDC/NDCs ideology on economic diplomacy were proletarian internationalism, social democracy and economic independence. The interpretation of these components and their resulting actions changed over time due to the demands of context and contextual ideological structures.

Proletarian internationalism meant that Ghana was part of a global struggle to replace capitalism with a more egalitarian system. I use this term to capture the administration bid to balance socialism and Marxism. In most of his international speeches, Rawlings emphasised the need to fight against "forces which continue in their efforts to disorient and hence control us... to control our destiny²⁷⁶... and establish clear action plans towards bringing about a new international economic order²⁷⁷." The government pursued international relations from the perspective of core-periphery/proletariat theory, idea from the World Systems/Dependency Theory that argues that the world has been structured to make the developing world a producer of raw materials for the industrial nations, thereby consolidating its dependency on the West (Chang, 2002; Starosta, 2016). Peter Okpora, a National Convention Party (NCP)²⁷⁸ MP, argued in parliament that the government's focus on "resisting all attempts to sell out our right to true self-government is an insult to imperialist institutions... therefore making them a target for those operating the core-periphery theory in the international economic and political order".²⁷⁹ It was important for members of the government to highlight this not only to create awareness but also to shape reactions.

Proletarian internationalism, as conceived by the PNDC/NDC government, differs from the international brigade of proletarian states in two ways: It did not seek an eventual Marxist stateless society. Its scope focused on Africa and what was referred to as 'progressive states', such as Cuba and

²⁷⁶ Address by Flt. Lt. J J Rawlings at the 6th Summit of the Non-Aligned countries in Havana, September 1979

²⁷⁷ Address by Flt. Lt. J J Rawlings at the 9th Summit of the Non-Aligned countries in Belgrade, September 1989

²⁷⁸ The National Convention Party (NCP), one of the four Nkrumaist that contested the 1992 elections, went into an alliance with the NDC ahead of the 1992 elections. Together, they won both the presidential and parliamentary elections convincingly although the opposition did not contest the parliamentary elections. See Alex Frempong (2017) *Elections in Ghana*.

²⁷⁹ Peter K. Okpora (NCP – Nkwanta): OFFICIAL REPORT of 19th November 1993, col. 649

some Latin American countries (whose relations were dominantly based on ancestral lineages to Ghana),²⁸⁰ rather than a purely international agenda. Yet its conceptualisation was closer to how the CPP government of Nkrumah conceived their Pan-African and anti-colonial ideas. Both governments emphasised the undermining actions of imperialist countries and the need to end the vulnerability of dependence by either cutting off or altering such relations. Unlike the CPP government's Pan-Africanism, this did not seek a total political or economic unification. Rather, it highlighted the vitality of safeguarding the principles of non-interference by Western countries and respect for each other's sovereignty while fostering economic cooperation among African states. The dynamics and priorities had changed. As I showed in chapter four, the PNDC/NDC favoured strengthening sub-regional groupings – an approach the CPP government opposed. To reiterate, Kwamena Ahwoi, in my interview, explained that the context had changed and that shaped their ideological response:

The other thing that we did which was slightly different from Nkrumah but it is because of the times. In Nkrumah's time we didn't have these regional groupings in Africa but today or when the PNDC came, we had them. We had the ECOWAS, we had the SADCC, the east African community, COMESA and the preference was for trying to gain regional integration first before we strive for continental unity.²⁸¹

On socialism, the PNDC/NDC administration also produced different manifestations. In name, the PNDC/NDC began with Marxist-socialist, moved on to revolutionary socialism and ended with social democracy (Abbey, 2018; Dickovick, 2008; Folson, 1993). All these terms are contextual: Marxists described their belief in class struggle domestically and internationally; revolutionary characterised their journey to power and their belief in causing a fundamental change in the Ghanaian society;²⁸² and democracy emerged mainly because of their receptiveness to multi-party electoral competition. For its practical application, Kofi Attor²⁸³ averred, in my interview with him, that one cardinal exhibition of socialism is to "tailor market forces to the benefits of the people in health, in education, etc",²⁸⁴ just as some CPP members like Ofori-Atta (Minister for Justice) thought of socialism during the Nkrumah administration. For some hard-line key members of the PNDC such as Akata Pore,²⁸⁵ socialism meant severing relations with the West. Kwamena Ahwoi reveals that these members were

²⁸⁰ Kwaku Danso-Boafo: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁸¹ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁸² Nana Ato Dadzie: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁸³ Kofi Attor is

²⁸⁴ Kofi Attor: Personal Interview, 2019

²⁸⁵ Akata Pore was one of the key members of the PNDC who attempted to overthrow Rawlings from betraying the values of the revolution by attempting to enrol on an IMF-SAP

willing to walk journeys²⁸⁶ in defence of socialism at a time when there were discussions of going to the IMF for economic recovery.

On January 1, 1981, Rawlings argued that socialism meant widening the scope of decision-makers and the decision-making processes to include those he called the guardians (police and soldiers), the workers, farmers, the rich and poor.²⁸⁷ However, the government's ban on multi-party politics was an affront to the representative government the PNDC claimed to establish. For Kwesi Botchwey²⁸⁸ and Kojo Tsikata,²⁸⁹ both leading members of the PNDC, it meant living a moderate life without the fanciness of driving expensive cars and wearing expensive shoes: they wore sandals made from car tyres (popularly called Afro Moses) in the streets of Accra.²⁹⁰ This was to exhibit the government's association and solidarity with the troubled masses and oppressed – a hearkening back to the history of social revolutionary as exemplified by Che Guevara.²⁹¹

In terms of social democracy, one of the ways in which members of the PNDC/NDC government conceptualised social democracy was to contrast it with the 'property-owning' democracy ideology of the NPP – an idea I will in detail explain later. The understanding is that, while social democracy "looks at the interest of the people and bring them up for the collective good", property-owning democracy "allows everything to thrive, the market forces play, prices find their level, individuals develop, and when they do, they will pay taxes, and that will be used to develop the nation".²⁹² This highlights the values that embodied their ideology. It is worthy of note that the idea of social democracy was essentially an ideology for the second phase of the Rawlings administration (1993-2001). Its core values of freedom, justice and solidarity are believed to have been gleaned from the core values of its predecessor, revolutionary/socialist-Marxist (PNDC), which were probity, accountability and social justice (Abbey, 2018). This was nominally justified because the NDC, in reality, was the democratic

²⁸⁶ Walk Journeys here is used as my description of what three of my interviewees described to me as the staunch anti-West/colonial position of the June Fourth Movement in the PNDC. They described people like Chris Atim, Nyeya Yen, Akata Pore among others as doctrinaire leftist who wanted and portrayed a communist lifestyle by wearing sandals made from vehicle tyres – which lasts longer, protects the feet from being pinched than expensive sandals do. It flows from this that when the leftist group retorted that 'we will walk' at the early months of the government when Ghana experienced fuel shortages but there was a viable option to go to the West for credit to procure fuel.

²⁸⁷ Daily Graphic – January 1, 1981

²⁸⁸ Kwesi Botchwey – leading member of the PNDC and served as a finance minister from 1982 to 1995

²⁸⁹ Kojo Tsikata – a leading member of the PNDC who was regarded as the closest and most trusted advisor to Rawlings. Kwamena Ahwoi reveals that he was to Rawlings what Blaise Compaoré was to Sankara

²⁹⁰ Economist (December 2, 2000, p. 89). Life, after Jerry. The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2014

²⁹¹ Ibid

²⁹² This comparison was made by Kofi Attor (NDC respondent) – a former MP and chairman of the parliamentary select committee on foreign affairs.

continuum of the PNDC as key members of the government – including Rawlings – remained at post after the PNDC changed to NDC in 1993.

In reality, I argue that the acceptance of the IMF and World Bank represented a monumental yet important turning point of ideology in the economic diplomacy for the PNDC/NDC government. The narrative and behaviour of the PNDC/NDC government presented itself as a government that took inspiration from the CPP government. All the three PNDC/NDC members I interviewed revealed how the PNDC/NDC made conscious efforts to produce a semblance of the CPP government's ideology since most of them had not only read Nkrumah's books but were also members of Nkrumaist groups such as the Young Pioneers (YP). However, this shift took the government closer to the Kufuor administration than to the Nkrumah administration, although I will argue later that it was not a complete shift since 'old' ideologies continued to play dynamic roles in the government's economic diplomacy. This seeming balance between the 'old' and new ideologies demonstrates how the PNDC/NDC's administration was an amalgamation of people from different ideological factions.

Even though economic independence had been talked up under the CPP administration, it was essentially a work in progress, and little was achieved after the overthrow of the CPP in 1966. The government of Ghana had been financing its development projects without 'foreign aid' until the mid-50s where Ghana needed financial assistance for projects due to the government's massive industrial drive²⁹³ and the cessation of aid from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund of Great Britain.²⁹⁴ By 1960, Ghana was receiving an average of US\$ 2.9 million in foreign aid per year.²⁹⁵ By the time of Nkrumah's overthrow, most of the factories started by the CPP government had become white elephants, and the diversification project had failed as Ghana continued to rely on cocoa as its main export (Hutchful, 1985). This figure rose to US\$ 80.8 million between 1970 and 1979.²⁹⁶ This, altogether, made economic independence an objective that characterised every government after Nkrumah even though none of their efforts matched the grand strategies mapped out by Nkrumah. In my interview, Kwamena Ahwoi observed and admitted that "yes economic independence, all our leaders have talked about it but he [Nkrumah] is the one who acted it. Yes, as for economic independence, we only go and talk about it at conferences, but we have done very very little".²⁹⁷

²⁹³ Government of Ghana (December 2017, p. 125) *An Agenda for Jobs: Creating Prosperity and Equal Opportunity for All 2018-2021; A Medium-Term National Development Policy Framework* published by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC)

²⁹⁴ Prior to independence, Ghana's dominant aid source was from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund of Great Britain. But after independence, Ghana began to receive aid from different sources including West Germany, Holland, and East European countries.

²⁹⁵ Government of Ghana (December 2017, p. 125) *op. cit.*

²⁹⁶ *Ibid*

²⁹⁷ Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

With the increasing role of the Bretton Woods institutions in the Ghanaian economy since the overthrow of the CPP government in 1966, economic independence came to also mean freedom from the IMF and World Bank programmes. From the first two ideological components, it is clear that the PNDC/NDC had an anti-Western ideological posture, and IMF-World Bank conditionality was seen as an affront to independent governance. This was an essential component of the PNDC/NDC ideology because most of the government's narrative was framed around it. The PNDC/NDC government, after almost 25 years of independence, was still paranoid about Ghana's independence. In response to a question on the idea behind the dynamics of Ghana's economic relations Obed Asamoah²⁹⁸ (foreign affairs minister for the PNDC/NDC) responded that "it was to safeguard our independence".²⁹⁹ However, he was part of the moderates willing to try SAP, unlike the hardliners who saw such a programme as neo-colonial and imperial. This was the most crucial ideological disagreement within the government, and I discuss it further below.

There were internal disagreements over conceptualisation and practical approaches regarding these ideological components for economic diplomacy. It is worthy of note that the PNDC, just like the CPP government, was an amalgamation of different groups or persons with diverse ideologies. It included a radical leftist group that formed the core of the June Fourth Movement (JFM) and the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG); and liberals – Obed Asamoah and J. A Kufuor, K. B Asante³⁰⁰ and Mahama Iddrisu³⁰¹ – who later came to be known as the 'Gang of 4'. According to Kwamena Ahwoi, this 'Gang of four' was added to the government to bring some balance to the regime "because people were worried about seeing young kids ruling the country".³⁰² However, this became a source of disagreement as Kufuor resigned after some months of serving as the Secretary for Local Government. Even though the reasons for his resignation are diverse, it can be said that Kufuor's strong commitment to the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition stood in the way of the effective execution of his responsibilities, especially with a government it shares little ideological semblance with.

The more bitter ideological disagreement came from within the core of the PNDC. Generally, my interviews revealed that three options were debated: to defy all odds and continue with a homegrown

²⁹⁸ Obed Asamoah was the longest serving foreign minister and Attorney General of Ghana under Jerry Rawlings from 1981 to 1997

²⁹⁹ Obed Asamoah Personal Interview (via text) 2019

³⁰⁰ K. B. Asante worked as the Principal Secretary at the African Affairs Secretariat (1960–66). Between 1982 and 1986, Asante served as the Secretary for Trade and Tourism under the PNDC administration. He also served as Secretary for Education and Culture between 1986 and 1990

³⁰¹ Mahama Iddrisu served as the Secretary of Transport and Communications and the Secretary of Defence under the PNDC administration

³⁰² Kwamena Ahwoi: Personal Interview, 2019

economic reform/adjustment policy supported by foreign credits but under domestic management; to pursue an anti-imperialist policy with support from the Soviet Union and other countries of the East; to fully subscribe to an IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Different groups within the PNDC supported different options. The JFM and KNRG were vehemently opposed to the third option but were more comfortable with the first and second. An agreement with the IMF, which was the view initially held by the economic bureaucracy, later gained support from some moderate leftists like Kwesi Botchwey and Kwamena Ahwoi and influenced the government to enrol onto the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Within the ideological contextualisation framework, what happened here was an example of the conformity and instrumentalisation pathway as later discussions will show that the government had relatively little belief and weak commitment to the programme's success.

The success of the pro-IMF group was largely due to three factors: the leftists were small and lacked any mass base because there were no open mass debates about the options; the leftists could not offer any short-medium term economic strategy; and besides Libya, which granted Ghana oil concessions after Nigeria suspended shipment of oil to Ghana, not much aid came from the East. Ideologically, Bretton Woods politics had developed into a historically contextual idea among decision-making elites since the late 1960s to the point that even governments that did not sincerely believe in the idea ended up pursuing it as a backup plan through either the conformity or instrumentalisation pathway. As will be discussed below, this explains why, at different times, the Rawlings administration attempted to achieve its socialist or what some might call 'populist' objectives with a capitalist inclined programme.

The leftist groups in the PNDC were not pleased with the party's U-turn on the IMF. Some of them, including Chris Atim and Nyeya Yen went into exile, criticising Rawlings as a 'fraud' for destroying the revolution they all fought for.³⁰³ Others like Lance Corporal Halidu Giwa and Daniel Akata Pore expressed their grievance through attempted coup d'états in 1983 and 1982.³⁰⁴ Just as during the Nkrumah regime, most critics went into exile, and by 1984 the government pursued a unified, yet compromised, ideology in its economic diplomacy.

5.3.1 Genealogy

The ideology of the PNDC/NDC emerged from 3 main sources. First was its Nkrumaist foundation or interpretation of Nkrumaism. Even though leading members of the CPP disagree, the international

³⁰³ Yen Nyeya (6th May 2014) I am Nobody's Small Boy. Accessed March 15, 2019, Retrieved from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/539424/i-am-nobodys-small-boy.html>

³⁰⁴ Economist (December 4, 1982, p. 67) Crumbling. The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2014; Economist (June 9, 1984, p. 50) Enemy on the loose. The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2014; Economist (March 10, 1990, p. 86) The Provisional Revolution. The Economist Historical Archive, 1843-2014

outlook of the PNDC/NDC bore some resemblances with that of Nkrumah. In part, this is due to the fact that some members of the PNDC government were also members of the Kwame Nkrumah Revolutionary Guards (KNRG) – a group that saw itself as the pure and true Nkrumaist group in an era where several groups were claiming to be the true Nkrumaist. Unlike Nkrumah, Rawlings had not formed a concrete worldview on foreign policy before becoming a leader, therefore, the people around him, or the members of the council were very influential in shaping the ideas for foreign policy. The nine-member council included civilians Chris Bukari Atim and Joachim Amartey Kwei as well as soldiers Sergeant Daniel Aolga Akata-Pore, Warrant Officer Joseph Adjei-Buadi, Brigadier Joseph Nunoo-Mensah and Reverend Dr. Kwabena Damuah. Beyond these core members who formed the collective presidency of the PNDC, there was a Committee of Secretaries which comprised secretaries (later known as ministers). The organisation of the PNDC was such that there were internal technical deliberations and debates on policies at the level of the Committee of Secretaries, which then made recommendations to the PNDC. Therefore, both groups were very influential in policy-making. According to Kwamena Ahwoi, the Committee of Secretaries was more dynamic. It included younger university graduates well-versed in theory and anti-Western ideologies and ready to implement them in government. It even had a Marxist left academia group led by Kwesi Botwe, Akilakpa Sawyer and Tsatsu Tsikata. Most of these policy advisors were the so-called ‘socialist firebrands’ who had been educated under and by the Nkrumah regime.³⁰⁵ Their influence shaped the actions and inactions of the government, although the administration was unsettled in the initial years of economic diplomacy by their experimental nature. In addition, the founding leaders of the PNDC deliberately framed aspects of its ideological components close to that of Nkrumah.

Although this has been argued by Nugent (2010) Whitfield (2009) as the PNDC/NDC’s way of exploiting the political marketing advantage of Nkrumah’s popularity for support and subsequent electoral benefit, it goes deeper than that. For a government that overthrew an Nkrumaist-oriented Limann administration, it did more than just marketing, including incorporating former Nkrumaist groups, to prove its Nkrumaist leanings. As I showed in chapter three, ideology went beyond shaping the PNDC/NDC’s bid for this domestic popularity to shaping foreign policy: to an extent where enemies were created as a result of their commitment to aspects of the so-called Nkrumah’s ‘populist’ ideas.

In my interview with some members of the PNDC/NDC administration,³⁰⁶ they revealed initial attempts to adopt CPP as their name prior to the 1992 elections. Also, the fact that the PNDC/NDC had a complement of the Nkrumaist groups (KNRG) demonstrates a genuine effort, of at least a faction

³⁰⁵ A Retired Career Diplomat (Anonymous) Personal Interview (2019)

³⁰⁶ These members are Kwamena Ahwoi, Nana Atto Dadzie and Kofi Attor

of the administration, to commit to aspects of the Nkrumah's ideology. However, as a thesis built on a contextual framework of ideology, I acknowledge the difference between the immediate post-independent Nkrumah era and the PNDC/NDC era. The internal dynamic shifts of the Nkrumah administration's ideology demonstrates that it would not have been immune to shifts if it stayed till the 80s. It is also worth noting that there were some marked differences between the Nkrumah administration's ideology and what the PNDC/NDC decided to take on. These dynamics in neighbour relations and regional integration has been discussed in the two previous chapters, but that of economic diplomacy form part of the discussions in this chapter.

The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) of June-September 1979, which partly reconvened in 1981 as the PNDC, was another source of PNDC/NDC's ideology. The NDC's conceptualisation of social democracy partly emanated from the values of probity and accountability that characterised the actions of the AFRC in 1979 (Abbey, 2018). At the time, the administration's concentration was on the domestic scene as it accused the previous General Akuffo-led administration of corruption and economic mismanagement (Hansen, 1991; Hettne, 1980; Jeffries, 1980). It, therefore, embarked on, what came to be known as, 'a house cleaning exercise'.³⁰⁷ This 'house cleaning exercise' was meant to rid the country of elite cronyism, stranglehold on the Ghanaian economy and their marginalisation of the ordinary Ghanaian (Brenya et al., 2015; Pieterse, 1982). Although this shows that much of the military junta's attention was domestic, they sent a strong anti-Western signal to the rest of the world (Agyeman-Duah, 1987). This anti-Western signal quite resonated with the public.

After over two decades since independence, I argue that the general ideas of Ghanaian society and context combined the dominant anti-colonial and imperialist positions with domestic accountability. Experiences with six different administrations before the PNDC/NDC exposed people to the vagaries of economic policy trends, mixed results and, some argue, little improvement in their living standards (Ahiakpor, 1991; Aryeetey & Fenny, 2017; Hutchful, 2002). The adverse effects of IMF/World Bank programmes had been detrimental to the working-class and farmers although farmers sometimes benefitted through price hikes in farm produce (Due & Gladwin, 1991; Smith, 1988). It partly explains why the PNDC revolution had relatively vast support and acceptance and why key PNDC members like Chris Atim and Yen Nyeya described Rawlings as a 'fraud' and 'traitor' for later enrolling on an IMF-SAP programme.

³⁰⁷ The house cleaning exercise was also accompanied by public executions of military officers including three former heads of state (Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, Lieutenant General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo and Lieutenant General Akwasi Amankwaa Afrifa. See Oquaye, Mike. (1980). *Politics in Ghana, 1972-1979*. Tornado Publications; Oquaye, M. (2004). *Politics in Ghana, 1982-1992: Rawlings, revolution, and populist democracy*. Tornado Publications.

However, because of the long historical relations, the idea of Bretton Woods intervention has developed into a contextually institutionalised idea within Ghana. Since Ghana joined Bretton Woods under the Nkrumah administration, every government has either invited or visited them for economic recovery (Hughes, 2005; Hutchful, 1985, 2002). As argued earlier, even governments like the Acheampong and the Rawlings administrations, whose internalised interpretation of anti-colonialism, Nkrumaism, and socialist/Marxist ideology was dominantly anti-Western, kept the idea of Bretton Woods intervention as a backup. In such cases, they later conformed and instrumentalised these ideas to serve the objectives of their sincerely internalised ideas – more so when the Ghanaian public was growing antagonistic to the repercussions that come with Bretton Woods policies.

Therefore while I agree with Ahiakpor (1991, p. 584) that the shift had, at its core, Rawlings' consistent "search for means to alleviate the plight of the poor in Ghana" a focus on just Rawlings misses a lot of PNDC/NDC dynamics and the contextual limits or malleability of ideologies – especially when he confirms that Rawlings saw himself as a facilitator who presided over debates on social and economic policy between the different ideological factions of the government (Ahiakpor, 1991, p. 588). Instead, I argue that it was a combination of conformity and instrumentalisation of Ghana's longstanding relations with the Bretton Woods. Although I argue the Ghanaian society, especially the working class was growing weary of the World Bank and IMF, the PNDC/NDC thought providing conducive and relatable results that reduce the burden people would gradually make them [Ghanaian working class] quite oblivious of the policy. As will be demonstrated below, it influenced why the government tried to implement a neo-liberal policy in a socialist way.

The African and broader non-Western contexts were also instrumental in shaping the ideas of the PNDC/NDC administration. For instance, the administration saw leaders like Gaddafi and Castro as ideological mentors. Rawlings, in particular, made many trips to Libya within the two-year break between the end of the AFRC regime in 1979 and the beginning of the PNDC regime in 1981. Rawlings described Gaddafi as "an example to be emulated" and as someone, he (Rawlings) "will stand together with against all enemies (imperialists)".³⁰⁸ Two major international situations influenced the government's ideology. First, the Cold War was ending, and the US was gradually gaining/reinforcing its unipolar status and consequently signalling the beginning of the third wave of democracy. Second, the international economic context in Africa was saddled with economic decline, thereby calling for the intervention of the Bretton Woods institutions. These developments shaped the PNDC government's reaction and defined the boundaries of their ideology for economic diplomacy.

³⁰⁸ A quote from Rawlings letter to Gaddafi on February 13, 1982 presented by PNDC member Chris Atim who led Ghana's visiting team to Libya.

5.3.2 Did ideology make a difference in the government's economic diplomacy?

For the PNDC/NDC regime, ideology manifested itself in 4 ways.

First, ideology influenced the direction or where to go for help and reception to policies, afterwards. The first point of call for the PNDC/NDC government's economic diplomacy was to head to the East. Rawlings sent high-powered delegations abroad to assess the viability of possible options for Ghana's economic recovery. The leaders of the delegations also used the opportunity to express the ideological position of the revolution. Kojo Tsikata, who led the delegation to the Soviet Union, declared that "socialist countries were the true friends of Africa" (Agyeman-Duah, 1987, p. 636). Chris Atim also led a delegation to Libya and, in a statement, praised the role of both revolutions in confronting Western imperialism (Agyeman-Duah, 1987). It is worthy of note that this was after the PNDC government had reopened diplomatic missions with Libya, just ten days after the revolution. The Limann administration had suspended relations with Libya due to accusations of Gaddafi's involvement in Ghana's domestic affairs. Rawlings himself visited Cuba, Libya, Nicaragua and China before visiting any Western country (ibid). Even though the government received some economic dividends from the East, the near futility of the Eastern agenda drove PNDC's new U-turn to the IMF – a move that nearly collapsed the government due to the internal uprisings (Oquaye, 2004).

Looking at the administration's internal ideological dynamics, this move will not be surprising as the liberals in the party supported it. The dominant socialist-Marxist ideology of the PNDC government cannot explain this shift; neither can the component of economic independence since the idea of discrediting the IMF and World Bank as a neo-colonial institution is at its core. Therefore, it can be explained as a pragmatic response to address domestic economic needs and consolidate the administration's hold on power – a close illustration of extraversion.

However, ideology influenced how receptive the government was to the programme. Regardless of the constant negotiations and renegotiations with the IMF, it tried to implement a neo-liberal policy in a socialist way. Even though members of the PNDC/NDC administration, I interviewed, admitted that there was nothing ideological about the SAP, the government's reception of it was partly ideological. They continued to criticise the programme and argued for a socialist implementation of liberal policies.

Instances of resistance to some key IMF policy conditionalities demonstrated this approach. One case was from 1995-1996 where, under considerable pressure from the IMF and World Bank, the cedi was devalued by 50% with a new exchange rate \$1 to 90 Cedis. The aim was to avoid the effects of overvaluing of the currency on economic performance. Besides, the daily minimum wage was increased by 28.6%, moving it from 70 to 90 Cedis (Ahiakpor, 1991; Amo-Agyemang, 2017; Kusi, 1998).

These policy changes were met with harsh opposition from workers' groups who protested the irreconcilability of devaluation and increased minimum wage. The protests were not healthy for a populist government that prided itself as rising to address the needs of the 'ordinary Ghanaian'. Therefore, the PNDC government responded by increasing the wage and salaries bill, which rose from 14 billion Cedis in 1985 to 30 billion Cedis exceeding the IMF target (Mosley et al., 1991, p. 184 cited in Amo-Agyemang, 2017).

There were other instances of resistance to IMF policies that occurred in the area of maintaining fiscal discipline during election years – 1992, 1996 and 2000. However, those actions had little to do with ideology and were purely a case of high expenditure from a government taking advantage of incumbency. The government's inability to reconcile its socialist and anti-Western ideology with the neo-liberal policies of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) partly accounts for the eventual failure of the programme. I will show in chapter six that this fits into a classic case of extraversion where a government suffering from the crisis of legitimacy resorts to foreign resources to consolidate power. As many have established to be the common feature of Africa's economic diplomacy, it also demonstrates a case where the administration lacked substantial agency in dealing with powerful contextual structures (Akokpari, 2001, 2005; Moosa & Moosa. While acknowledging these diverse perspectives, I argue that this was not just a government taken over by events or pursuing extraversion; it was also government whose ideology shaped reaction and execution of the programme. A lot of policy studies have emphasised how policy execution is as important as initiation. Therefore, cases like these challenge us to look at ideology and policy-making more critically, especially its dynamism in tight spaces.

There is a vast literature on how the Rawlings administration related with the IMF and World Bank, and implemented its flagship Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (Agyeman-Duah, 1987; Aryeetey & Fenny, 2017; Bofo-Arthur, 1993, 1999b; Hutchful, 2002). The dominant emphasis has been on the failure of ideology and how a socialist/Marxist government jettisoned its ideology to accept liberal policies inspired by the Washington consensus that tended to perpetuate the imperialism they (PNDC) set forth to fight. On this point, it is worthy of note that the PNDC was an eclectic mix of people or groups from different backgrounds and ideological inclinations. Although they may not like the West or Bretton Woods institutions, and it was part of why the Limann administration was overthrown, the 'moderates' among them did not hate it so much not to consider its propositions. An argument I made in chapter two is that governments with such a mix of groups tend to either split for ideological disagreements or adopt complementary ideas, sometimes as a way of bridging their differences. Notwithstanding, the observations in the literature are plausible. The Washington consensus, its accompanying policy conditions and perceptions of Western imperialism

(Gore, 2000; Jarso, 2018; Moosa & Moosa, 2019) were antithetical to the administration's initial ideological stance.

However, looking at ideology differently captures the dynamic aspects of this relationship than just a government being taken over by events. One part of it, as highlighted above, is the tight spaces the government had to operate in trying to implement a liberal policy in a socialist manner. As discussed above, Ahiakpor (1991) also highlights aspects of Rawlings's ideological objectives as a justification for pursuing the SAP. Another key insight a different look at ideology offers to understanding this policy U-turn is the instrumentalisation pathway. In chapter two, I argue that instrumentalisation rarely works without an ideological context. In this case, the West and Bretton Woods institutions had their fundamental objectives amidst several perceptive ones (Moosa & Moosa, 2019). We cannot ignore the Rawlings administration's social objectives (Abbey, 2018; Adedeji, 2001) and their attempts at achieving them by enrolling on a programme that barely represents their dominant ideology. This puts Ahiakpor's work in proper perspective within an ideological framework because its current state makes it challenging to understand the resistance approaches: why, how they were done and in what ways do they reflect aspects of the administration's ideology regardless of how small its influence may be?

Second and closely related to the first point is that ideology influenced efforts and emphasis. The NDC was very interested in establishing economic relations with what they called progressive states. Between 1982 and 1987, Ghana received loans amounting \$19 million while executing the flagship IMF/World Bank Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). Also, Ghana signed agreements with the USSR that brought back the specialist exchange programmes formed under the Nkrumah administration. Soviet specialists were invited to Ghana to conduct research, provide technical support for initiatives such as the Bui hydroelectric project, establish technical and vocational schools, and a gold refinery in Tarkwa. The collapse of the Soviet Union harmed relations with Ghana since Ghana's expectations for technical cooperation, trade and economic support were not met. By the 1990s, Ghana's imports from Eastern European countries had fallen from 10% in the 1970s to 1%. Yet in October 1991, a protocol on cooperation was signed between the Russian confectionery plant "Krasny Oktyabr" and the private Ghanaian firm in Sekondi-Takoradi (Sanusi & Adu-Gyamfi, 2017). Just as with the Nkrumah administrations, the healthy relations between Ghana and the USSR under the Rawlings administration was also expressed through high-delegation visits.³⁰⁹ There was a continued strong relationship with 'progressive' countries, although such relations did not yield any

³⁰⁹ Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) delegations visited Ghana in 1985, 1986, in 1987-twice, 1988, 1989, and the delegation of PNDC visited the USSR in 1988). In April 1991, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A. Piotrovsky, visited Ghana.

direct economic benefits to Ghana. D. K. Osei, a former private secretary to Kufuor, revealed that Ghana provided financial support to Cuba at some point during the PNDC/NDC regime.³¹⁰ Although I have not corroborated the story, it suggests how ideology continued to be important in shaping economic relations with different states.

Third, ideology shaped how relations were perceived. Like Nkrumah, the PNDC/NDC had perceived Ghana's economic relations with Western and Eastern partners differently. The PNDC/NDC saw the West as an imperialist or neo-colonial force that had intentions of continuing control of Ghana and Africa at large. This was one of the narratives that characterised the emergence of the PNDC. However, enrolment on a Western IMF SAP did not stop members of the government from ongoing rhetorical criticism of the West. The main reason for this was that even though the administration needed IMF funds to survive, the political and ideological conditions of the SAP contradicted the ideas of the PNDC/NDC. At best, economic relations with the West were perceived as purely economic while economic relations with the East/socialist countries was as a mixture of economics, culture and inspiration.

Fourth, ideology influenced Ghana's position in global affairs. The proletarian internationalist component of PNDC/NDC government affected how Ghana's position was perceived. Ghana was part of a lower economic class fighting against oppression and neo-colonialism at the international level. On the continent, Ghana was not aiming at attaining great power status; rather, it was interested in addressing its domestic economic challenges. This is relevant because such conceptions and understandings shaped the government's approach to economic diplomacy.

One very noticeable feature of economic diplomacy under the Rawlings administration is how the government struggled to maintain ideological purity in an unfavourable context. This shows how mutually constituting and historically reinforcing contextual ideological structures can be. A government whose internalised ideology came through the adoption pathway, just like the CPP, led to acrimonious internal divisions. However, contrary to the popular ascription that the Rawlings administration signified a time ideology collapsed in Ghana's economic diplomacy, the discussion above shows that ideology manifested itself in ways that narrow conceptions of ideology cannot capture.

5.4 The Kufuor Administration

Under the Kufuor administration, I will show, among other things, how Ghana's perception of the West moved from neo-colonial to development partners due to ideological differences between the

³¹⁰ D. K. Osei: Personal Interview, 2019

administrations. This also influenced Ghana's relations with the Bretton Woods. I will also show how ideology shaped who these administrations blamed for Ghana's underdevelopment – moving from accusing foreign powers, under Nkrumah, to blaming domestic maladministration under Kufuor. This is what I call externalisation and internalisation of Ghana's challenges.

However, just like the Rawlings and Nkrumah administrations, the Kufuor administration can be described as reactive in how it approached Ghana's economic diplomacy. As argued in chapter two, reactive nature is a key part of nationalism as governments are bound to respond to different (unanticipated) situations. Kufuor himself admitted to being surprised at the state of Ghana's economy when he took over. In many of his speeches, after winning the December 2000 election, Kufuor emphasised that his administration came to "meet an empty chest. No money".³¹¹ The opposition at the time, NDC held a rather contrary view and argued that "if the NPP Government inherited empty coffers, where did the NPP Government get money from to cover all that expenditure?"³¹² The General Secretary of NDC, Johnson Asiedu Nketia, further added in a separate interview that "it would be unfortunate if a President of a republic would perceive a nation's coffers to be a big purse or safe where resources are dumped and into which each time succeeding governments would dip their hands to undertake development projects".³¹³

Regardless of the debates, the Kufuor administration was met with an economy with which it could not do much. The inflation rate as of December 2000 was 40.50%. Ghana's total national reserves, including gold, had reduced from US\$ 537 in 1999 to US\$ 308 million in the year 2000, which was just 8.21% and 4.93% of the total external debts, respectively. GDP per capita income was US\$ 264, which is a negative development from US\$ 419 in 1999. Likewise, annual growth in per capita income dropped from 2% to 1.2% in 1999 and 2000, respectively (World Bank, 2015).

However, unlike the two other administrations, the Kufuor administration's reaction was demonstrated by how the government attempted to address the imminent conditions it faced. It had two components. The first was a quasi-socialist idea of addressing the perennial challenge of poverty through pro-poor and socialist-oriented policies such as National Youth Employment and National Health Insurance policies. As I will explain further below, context became a defining factor in shaping the government's ideology. Second, just like the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration, the Kufuor

³¹¹ The Ghana Report (2020). Two things I would Change if I were President Again – Kufuor. Accessed January 10, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.adomonline.com/two-things-i-would-change-if-i-were-president-again-kufuor/>

³¹² My Joy Online (January 29, 2007). Prof. Mills Damns Prez Kufuor. Accessed January 10, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.myjoyonline.com/prof-mills-damns-prez-kufuor/>

³¹³ Daily Graphic (January 22, 2007). Coffers Were Not Empty - Asiedu Nketiah. Accessed January 10, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/122246/coffers-were-not-empty-asiedu-nketiah.html>

government reacted to the bond of aid dependence and the decline of Ghana's economy. This was typical of the constant interaction between ideologies and contextual variables and what Kufuor characterised as "Capitalism with Conscience".³¹⁴ The point of departure from the other two administrations was that the Kufuor administration did not just blame colonialism. It accused post-colonial governments, especially the Nkrumah, Acheampong and later Rawlings administrations of 'maladministration'. It held the peculiar view that Ghana was wealthier by independence, but the constant attempt to alienate the West and take on a socialist agenda led Ghana into a state of continuous economic decay. While both the Nkrumah and the Rawlings administrations saw Britain as a threat, the Kufuor administration saw it as a strategic partner, a country "we (Ghana) should link with Britain in a very special way so as to use the relationship to maximise our economic efforts and benefits".³¹⁵

Looking at it differently, this could be regarded as pragmatism since the Cold War had ended and the East could not provide as many viable economic opportunities as the West. But history justifies how ideological this position is. This was not a perspective alien to the Kufuor government, but one that fits the party's ideology traced from the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition – its leaders had consistently criticised Nkrumah's position on world affairs. The differences between the three administrations in this regard lie in how they conceptualised Ghana's past. While the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations saw colonialism as a problem to deal with in a post-colonial era, the Kufuor administration saw colonial links as strategic opportunities to exploit. This position formed the foundations of the government's ideologies for economic diplomacy.

The core components of the NPP administration's ideology for economic diplomacy were classical liberalism, economic independence, and, what I call, integrative economic diplomacy.

For a country that came out of colonisation and characterised as communal, having an ideology that prioritises the individual and seen as Western comes with a lot of critique, including of selfishness, corruption, nepotism, neo-patrimonialism and fostering neo-colonialism. Parts of these are what the Nkrumah government tried to project and address with their version of socialism or Nkrumaism. Just like how the Nkrumah administration criticised the UGCC, NLM and UP, the Kufuor administration's decision to hold on to classical liberalism or 'property-owning democracy'³¹⁶ as its internalised ideology has come with a lot of critiques. In my interview with Kofi Attor, a former Chairman of Foreign Affairs Committee during the NDC administration, he characterised it a "backward ideology because

³¹⁴ CitiTube (June 27, 2020) Video. Former President Kufuor expresses high hopes for NPP victory in 2020 polls. YouTube. Accessed March 15, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vHc6h-H7Gso>

³¹⁵ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

³¹⁶ See NPP Manifesto (2020) Leadership of Service: Protecting Our Progress, Transforming Ghana for All

[of] the history of property-owning democracy, because that's how come democracy started in the Greek city-states long ago. Those days the word of the king is the final word, but in the Greek city-states, they allowed some form of participation". In the parliamentary Hansard on March 2 2001, an NDC MP explained it as an ideology that requires that "you must have a property before you can take part in our democracy".³¹⁷ Socialists, including Kwesi Pratt³¹⁸ and Tony Aidoo³¹⁹ maintain that it is a 'feudal' ideology that restricts democratic rights to few landowners. In an online article by Nyeya Yen, a key member of the PNDC who went into exile for strongly contesting the administration's decision to enrol on SAP, he argues that

the President [Kufuor] talks about the 'golden age of business' and creating property owning democracy. All what this means is that they will use the state to amass wealth. To do that others must loose... by squeezing the mass of the people and impoverishing them into submission they believe they are creating the necessary conditions for their continuous stay in power and the property classes that they want to create and entrench.³²⁰

Although these criticisms may sound odd in other countries, they get the clout in Ghana and many other African countries due to the context. It partly explains why only a few governments in the early post-independent period overtly adopted classical liberalism as their ideology even if they act as though they are (Hendrickson & Zaki, 2013; Thompson, 2016). Even more recently, capitalism, in practice, in many African countries has come to be known as state-led capitalism (Alami & Dixon, 2020; Taylor, 2014). This is a testament to the broader unpopularity of [pure] capitalism in Africa, although the Kufuor administration did not shy away from it. However, its version of classical liberalism is not as pure as the purists define it (Freeden & Fernández-Sebastián, 2019). The ideological contextualisation framework posits that it is intertwined with contextual ideological components.

Leading NPP members always launch a series of defences to justify why these interpretations are wrong. Nana Akomea (an NPP MP and minister for information) argues that "the ownership of property, as a reward for genuine effort is the bedrock of a genuine democracy".³²¹ For Buor-Karikari, an NPP MP, such freedom of ownership is a consequence of the belief that "the rule of law should be

³¹⁷ Y. D. Mensah (NDC – Atebubu) OFFICIAL REPORT of 2nd March 2001, col. 1171

³¹⁸ Kwesi Pratt is a renowned Ghanaian socialist, member of the CPP and co-founder of the Socialist Forum, Ghana

³¹⁹ Dr Tony Aidoo served as a member of the PNDC/NDC as Deputy minister for defence. Between 1992 and he was the Director of Research and Monitoring and National Executive Member for the NDC.

³²⁰ Nyeya Yen (March 8, 2003) The Deterioration of the Economic, Social and Political Situation. Accessed May 20, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/111864/the-deterioration-of-the-economic-social-and-political-situ.html>

³²¹ Nana Akomea (NPP – Okaikoi) OFFICIAL REPORT of 2nd March 2001, col. 1175

the guiding principle in all our dealings”.³²² Kufuor describes the practical manifestations of NPP ideology, or what he calls tradition, by what they are not. He argues that

We (NPP) are not revolutionary; we are not radicals. We appreciate the centrality of the human being. We are democrats. Even when we feel strongly about things, we want to convince stakeholders why the world should go the way we think we should go and if we manage to convince them, then in agreement with them we move together.³²³

Just like Kufuor, Kingsley Nyarko³²⁴ defines ‘property-owning democracy’ by telling us what it is not. He argues that “property-owning democracy is not the insatiable desire for property by politicians or public office holders to satisfy their egoistic desires as people like Mr. Pratt always insinuate”.³²⁵ Rather it is allegedly built on the philosophy of John Rawls.

Gaby Otchere Darko³²⁶ defines property-owning democracy from the perspective of John Rawls but in a Ghanaian context. Contrary to the perceived elitist agenda, he supports Rawls’ (2001, p. 139) argument that ‘property-owning democracy’ can create institutions that “prevent a small part of society from controlling the economy, and indirectly political life as well”. It does this not by redistributing income to the less privileged, which inadvertently stifles creativity, competition, creates laziness and dependency,

but rather by establishing a society of opportunities, through the facilitation of the widespread ownership of assets and human capital (i.e. creating opportunities for education, training and skills for a pro-generational expansion of access to wealth and a systematic bottom-up approach of gradual, progressive, suitable degree of equalisation of class differences).³²⁷

While NPP members are quick to reference John Rawls, they argue that J. B. Danquah was the first to articulate the idea of a property-owning democracy in 1960. Although I do not engage in the debate

³²² Buor-Karikari (NPP – Amansie West) OFFICIAL REPORT of 2nd March 2001, col. 1372

³²³ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

³²⁴ Kingsley Nyarko is a psychologist and a former executive director of the Danquah Institute from 2017 to 2018. The Danquah Institute is a centre that regards itself as the guardian of Danquah’s belief. It is also regarded as the ideological hub of the NPP

³²⁵ NPP Youth UK (November 18, 2010). Property Owning Democracy – The Ideological Road Map to Economic Self-Reliance. Accessed September 10, 2021. Retrieved from <https://nppyouthuk.wordpress.com/2010/11/18/property-owning-democracy-%E2%80%93-the-ideological-road-map-to-economic-self-reliance/>

³²⁶ Gabby Otchere Darko is a former executive director of the Danquah Institute, 2008 – 2013.

³²⁷ Gabby Otchere Darko (November 12, 2010) Property Owning Democracy – The Ideological Road Map to Economic Self-Reliance. Speech delivered at the 2010 University of Ghana (City Campus) TESCON meeting. Accessed September 15, 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/features/Akufo-Addo-s-Property-Owning-Democracy-345635>

on who mooted the idea, in 1962, Danquah wrote from detention³²⁸ explaining what he shared in common with the remaining members of the UP. He stated that:

I mention next the seven [leading] members of the United Party of Ghana with whom I share a common policy liberates the energies of the people for the growth of a property-owning democracy in this land, with right to life, freedom and justice as principles to which the government and laws should be dedicated in order, specifically, to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen.³²⁹

This statement has been used as a preamble in almost all the NPP election manifestos and, I argue, their constant reference to Rawls, to some extent, gives their ideology some sort of universal legitimacy, which is very important to the party.

There is a link between what Danquah and Rawls are saying. They both have respect for the values of liberty and equality in their understanding of the principles of justice. For Kufuor, this translates into “respect for the individual... universality of man... you may be Chinese, American, white, black it didn’t matter. Once you are human, you should be accorded the respect and dignity of the individual till you mess yourself up” .³³⁰

I argue that the term, classical liberalism, is not being kept just for ideological reasons but also for its historical significance. The NPP traces its roots to the formation of UGCC³³¹ on August 4, 1947, at Saltpond. According to Nana Akuffo Addo³³², the date was chosen for its significance since it was the 50th anniversary of the Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) formed in 1897.³³³ After 1951, the dynamics of domestic politics led to a metamorphosis of different political parties from the same UGCC tradition that eventually led to the much-touted Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition (Bob-Milliar, 2019; Frempong, 2019). Just as the UGCC was a deliberate continuum of the ARPS, the NPP was formed to continue the legacy of the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition of the United Party (UP). Throughout these periods, the ideology of classical liberalism has been carried on from one generation to the next. On the launch of the UGCC party, J. B. Danquah began his address by reminding everyone that

³²⁸ He had been imprisoned under the Preventive Detention Act (PDA), 1958. The law allowed for incarceration for up to five years without charge or trial if your activities are regarded as a threat to national interest/security

³²⁹ Gabby Otchere Darko (November 12, 2010)

³³⁰ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

³³¹ The UGCC was formed by George Alfred 'Paa' Grant, J. B. Danquah, Francis Awoonor-Williams, R. S. Blay, George More, R. S. Wood, J. W. de Graft Johnson, Ebenezer Ako Adjei William Ofori-Atta, Edward Akufo-Addo, and Emmanuel Obetsebi-Lamptey.

³³² Nana Akuffo Addo is a founding member of the NPP, served as the Attorney General and foreign affairs minister under the Kufuor administration

³³³ The Aborigines Rights Protection Society (ARPS) was an anti-colonial association formed to to protest the Crown Lands Bill of 1896 and the Lands Bill of 1897

We have come from all the corners of this country, come to Saltpond for a specific purpose: for a decision. We have come to take a decision whether our country and people are any longer to tolerate a system of government under which those who are in control of government are not under the control of those who are governed... We must have, here and now, if we are to be governed, a new kind of freedom, a Gold Coast freedom, a Gold Coast liberty.³³⁴

This was not just a declaration against colonialism. It rejected any form of internal autocracy. Akufo-Addo argues that it “promoted and protected multi-party democracy, rule of law, individual liberty, human rights, free enterprise and democratic accountability”.³³⁵ The fact that the 1992 constitution of Ghana embodies most of these values represents a practical manifestation of what the NPP’s forefathers fought Nkrumah over. It is, therefore, a history that the NPP is willing to defend. Changing the title would mean severing a very rich historical link the party takes great pride in.

What the idea of classical liberalism or property-owning ideology means, in terms of economic diplomacy is more complex but simple for Nana Afari³³⁶ (a respondent and director of protocol for the NPP) who I interviewed as a representative of the NPP. For him, this idea in practice “is like just go and take the money where you can get the grant”.³³⁷ This is borne out of his frustration that Ghana’s economic diplomacy lacks a clear agenda and direction. However, it means that economic diplomacy is structured in a liberal manner that makes the government receptive to cooperation from different sources aimed at economic and trade liberalisation. Domestically, it encourages privatisation, but does not subscribe to a total international economic liberalisation. What this meant for economic diplomacy under the NPP administration was the pursuance of what I call integrative economic diplomacy. It involves 4 main activities: creating an enabling environment to attract foreign investments, promoting international trade, conforming to the Bretton Woods approach and enhancing diaspora economic relations.

The idea of economic independence did not end after Nkrumah or Rawlings but took on a different shape. As we have seen, under the CPP administration, the idea of economic independence was to build a self-sufficient economy mainly through Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) and economic diversification. The PNDC/NDC’s approach was to wean Ghana off economic association with the West or Bretton Woods institutions which, they argued, had not helped but continued to make Ghana’s economy subservient to Western dictates. This was a similar approach to that pursued by the CPP government. Still, unlike the CPP administration, the PNDC/NDC regime did not have a concrete grand

³³⁴ Nana Akufo-Addo (May 23, 2011) The NPP Story and our Vision for 2012. A speech delivered at a seminar for parliamentary candidates for the 2012 elections

³³⁵ Ibid

³³⁶ Nana Afari is the Director of Protocol, NPP

³³⁷ Nana Afari: Personal Interview, 2019

economic and infrastructural plan beyond basic fiscal policies. Therefore, these periods also witnessed economic downturns as industries collapsed, and Ghana relied on cocoa as its main export. The annual aid average, which was US\$80.8 million between 1970 and 1979, rose to US\$ 304.85 million between 1980 and 1989. As a result, the PNDC/NDC had to hesitantly subscribe to an IMF-World Bank adjustment programme which they had hitherto criticised. However, this did little for economic independence. By 2001, Ghana's aid levels had increased and peaked at US\$72.2 per capita. Also, Ghana's total national reserves, including gold, had reduced from US\$ 537 in 1999 to US\$ 308 million in the year 2000, which were just 8.21% and 4.93% of the total external debts, respectively (World Bank, 2015). Therefore, economic independence under the NPP administration was to reduce Ghana's dependency on foreign aid and ultimately end it. In his first state of the nation address in 2001, Kufuor argued that this was aimed at "restoring the dignity of the African people"³³⁸ and strengthening Ghana's position in the world within the much-touted 'golden age of diplomacy/business' (Arthur, 2015). It will be demonstrated below that the seeming change in direction and approach by the Kufuor administration led to relatively better economic dividends.

These ideological components can be interpreted within the broader internalised liberal ideology of the Kufuor administration. They were exemplified by the administration's reduced anti-colonial rhetoric and warm reception of Western relations and approaches. Though not corroborated, Nyeya Yen revealed that the New Patriotic Party (NPP) "made it clear from the onset that they were against the NDC government because of its failure to pursue the IMF policies very well".³³⁹

We can better appreciate this position of the NPP by looking at what its forerunners (especially Kofi Busia who was Kufuor's mentor) did as a key member of the National Liberation Council (NLC) in fostering Ghana's relations with the West and Bretton Woods institutions. Grundy & Farlow, (1969, p. 168) observes that both Busia and Akwasi Afrifa (Member and later leader of the NLC military junta and chairman of the presidential commission between 1969 and 1970) "share a dislike for Nkrumah, but beyond that their writings manifest a definite pro-Western, anti-communist attitude". The Western world also loved them, and the NLC and later PP administration shared a mutual admiration. Joseph Ankrah who was the leader and second President of Ghana, for instance, was compared to America's founding fathers by President Johnson at a state dinner in Washington.³⁴⁰ In his book *Africa in Search of Democracy*, Busia argued that Africa can find true democracy by emulating the Western route, and economic freedom and progress by seeking Western aid. As a Prime Minister, later

³³⁸ J. A. Kufuor State of the nation address in 2001

³³⁹ Nyeya Yen (March 8, 2003) *The Deterioration of the Economic, Social and Political Situation*. Accessed May 20, 2021. Retrieved from <https://www.modernghana.com/news/111864/the-deterioration-of-the-economic-social-and-political-situ.html>

³⁴⁰ Ghana News, (October, 1967) V, No. 10, p. 1

between 1969 and 1971, Busia further pursued Bretton-Woods-inspired liberal economic reforms, regardless of reservations by his Finance and Planning Minister, J. H. Mensah (Goldsworthy, 1973; Killick, 2010; Roland, 1976).

Although I will discuss this later, this meant that unlike with the Rawlings administration, the IMF-World Bank Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) programme was not accepted through the conformity or instrumentalisation pathways. Rather it came through the adaptive pathway as the ideas embodied in that the programme coincided with the party's internalised liberal ideas. Therefore, contrary to simply interpreting Africa's relations with powerful institutions as a dereliction of agency, I show in chapter six why cases like this present a different perspective. It also shows that we can understand agency beyond resistance and influence to acceptance, if we include ideologies in our analysis – understanding their contextual dynamics, genealogy and how they influence policy.

5.4.1 Genealogy

The ideology of the NPP emerged from 3 main sources. The first was the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition. I have discussed above that the party associates itself with its long historical tradition, descendent of six parties – UGCC, GCP, NLM, UP, PP, PFP, and UNC. One major thing that bound these diverse parties together was their dislike of Nkrumah's ideology. The NPP government inherited the commitment to free enterprise, fundamental human rights and the vigorous pursuit of private initiative from its predecessors (Agyeman-Duah, n.d.; Ayee, 2011). It supported these ideas with a 1962 philosophical quote of J. B. Danquah, who is regarded as the founding father of the NPP:

[The party's] policy is to liberate the energies of the people for the growth of a property-owning democracy in this land, with right to life, freedom and justice, as the principles to which the Government and laws of the land should be dedicated in order specifically to enrich life, property and liberty of each and every citizen (New Patriotic Party, 2000).

Out of this statement, the party chose the idea of 'property-owning' democracy as its flagship ideology.

The second source is context. Even though the NPP's ideology has long historical roots, context is an important source for conceptualising the ideological components. The Kufuor government worked under a dynamic context within which its ideas were framed. Domestically, the government represented the first democratic transition in Ghana. Ghanaian society was gradually outliving its revolutionary past and moved towards more liberal ideas while living under multi-party democracy for eight years (under the Rawlings era) – the longest ever since independence.

On the international front, there was an enthusiastic reception for this new government that emanated from a democratic transition. It was also a time that was much touted as the 'golden age of diplomacy/business', and the Kufuor government was among its pioneers alongside other states, including South Africa, Nigeria, Algeria, Senegal, Mozambique, and Tanzania (Agyeman-Duah, 2003; Landsberg, 2011). This period, between 1998 and 2009, was characterised by a dominant neo-liberal approach of leaders of these countries trying to build a continental order and 'profitable' partnership with the rest of the world. Kofi Annan championed the era of African renaissance as the first UN General Secretary from sub-Saharan Africa. African leaders decided to move regional integration further and through novel approaches. The results were programmes such as the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) under the auspices of the New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) and the strengthening of sub-regional organisations. This context created a fertile ground for the flourishing of liberal ideas into which the liberal NPP government arrived. However, the NPP could not maintain ideological purity due to a fragile economic context that essentially drove certain aspects of its economic diplomacy. Due to the rising poverty levels, the government was forced to change aspects of its economic diplomacy into seeking assistance to execute pro-poor and socialist policies such as the National Youth Employment and National Health Insurance policies.

The third source was the Kufuor and Busia factor. According to Kufuor, Busia was not just a Prime Minister he worked with as a deputy foreign minister, but a mentor. In my interview with Kufuor, he narrated his relationship with Busia with pride how. According to him, this relationship grew from Busia being a 'distant' politician, a referee for his admission to Oxford, to a mentor and someone who gave him his first political appointment as a Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs.³⁴¹ During his tenure as a deputy minister, Kufuor admitted to learning a lot of diplomatic craft and building connections - which will later become useful to him as a president. This tutelage from Busia and exposure as a minister was crucial in shaping his thinking and approach to policy-making and party organisation. In my interview, Kufuor justifies Busia's approach and foreign policy decisions, including the most controversial 'dialogue with apartheid South Africa' by describing Busia as "someone who never acted without thinking properly".³⁴² Within the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition, Kufuor is aligned to Busia. Therefore, understanding the thinking behind the NPP government's economic diplomacy and foreign policy, in general, requires a reflection on Busia's foreign policy. This is not to say that other members of the government did not serve as ideological sources for the government. They did, but their ideas

³⁴¹ J. A. Kufuor: Personal Interview, 2019

³⁴² Ibid

found space within the Danquah-Busia-Dombo tradition. Also, as a former deputy minister for foreign affairs, Kufuor had relatively more control and experience in international relations than Rawlings.

5.4.2 Did ideology make a difference in the government's economic diplomacy?

Ideology made a difference in 4 main aspects of Ghana's economic diplomacy.

First, ideology shaped how the objectives of Ghana's economic diplomacy were outlined. Just like the CPP government, the NPP government had economic development as the primary objective of its economic diplomacy. However, the meaning of what development was had shifted over the different contexts in which the administrations worked. Development for the NPP meant three main things – private sector industrialisation; reducing/eliminating the budget deficit and, surprisingly for a neo-liberal party, effective social intervention policies to alleviate extreme poverty. This point buttresses how context is essential to understanding the ideologies of governments. The economic system and the vicissitudes of the IMF-World Bank SAP had created more poverty by the end of 2000 (Aryeetey & Fenny, 2017; Hutchful, 2002). The Kufuor administration's immediate plan was to introduce a Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS I & II) to facilitate economic and rural development (Bawumiah, 2012; Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, 2006). Kufuor highlighted the importance of context to ideology by arguing that:

We (NPP government) are strong believers of an individual to help her or himself while building a prosperous state; but we recognise that not everybody has the capability. It is the responsibility of the state, government and the community to take care of those who cannot stand on their own two feet.³⁴³

This was the idea behind the government's social intervention programmes more generally. Under Kufuor's administration, the state did not want to handle heavy industrialisation or import substitution industrialisation anymore; neither did it want to compete with private forces on the market. The government's objective was to create political, social, and economic conditions for private enterprises to thrive, a sharp departure from the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations. It facilitated the upsurge in the mobile telephone industry by selling 70% shares of Ghana Telecom to Vodafone; enacted the public procurement law and Banking Act (2004), Payment Systems Act, Venture Capital Act and Foreign Exchange Act, among other strategies to make the private sector the bedrock of economic development and for achieving its much-touted 'Golden age of Business'³⁴⁴ or development (Arthur,

³⁴³ Ibid

³⁴⁴ In his first sessional address to parliament, Kufuor declared that his government will lead Ghana to the golden age of business which means tackling issues such as mismanagement of the economy, unemployment, depreciation of the currency, high dependency on foreign aid, national debt crisis, corruption and high cost of living.

2015). These were neo-liberal policies that did not shield Ghana from the dilemma and danger of foreign investors and neo-colonialism but aimed at opening the economy for investment.

Second, ideology played a role in shaping how the NPP government conceived Ghana's economic position globally and on the continent. How development was defined, as outlined above, shaped Ghana's outlook as the hub of the (sub)regional neo-liberal economic order. Rather than seeking great power status, Ghana's position became a facilitator or much-touted 'gateway to Africa' (Bolaji, 2015; Reed, 2006; White, 2007). To reiterate the point made earlier in this chapter, the government promoted economic relations through the framework of integrated economic diplomacy which combined efforts to attract foreign investment, promote international trade and diaspora economic relations with satisfying the conditions of the Bretton Woods. Most parts of the government's economic relations, within and outside the continent, were linked. For instance, Ghana's pioneering role in constructing the West African Gas Pipeline (WAGP) brought Ghana, Benin, Togo and Nigeria into close economic cooperation. Further, the government facilitated the revitalisation of the Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation (PJCC) in the area of trade and economic cooperation between Ghana and neighbouring countries. The establishment of missions in Australia, Morocco, Equatorial Guinea, Spain and Kenya made it clear that Ghana's missions abroad were avenues for trade and investment promotion in Ghana.

Third, ideology influenced direction and policy reaction. As a classical liberal government, the first major economic diplomacy was HIPC. Even though the much-touted neo-liberal idea of HIPC fitted into the broader ideas of the government, it was a bitter pill to take. Members of the NPP government, including Osafo-Marfo (finance minister), J. H. Mensah (leader of parliament) and Kufuor himself, saw it as a painful price to pay for the decades of economic mismanagement: the NPP described it as an action symptomatic of "a sick person going to the clinic".³⁴⁵ This was primarily because subscribing to HIPC hurt the other components of the government's economic diplomacy even though it was seen as an important step towards economic recovery. For instance, Japan decided to suspend all new loans to Ghana, which raised tensions and gave credence to the government's critics (Osei & Quartey, 2001). The NDC described it as "recolonising ourselves".³⁴⁶ The belief in the liberal principles underpinning the HIPC programme influenced the government to enrol at a time where the previous government (PNDC/NDC) had declined and was warning the NPP of dire consequences on the economy.

³⁴⁵ A description by J. H. Mensah, an NPP MP, leader of parliament and former finance minister under the progress party. OFFICIAL REPORT of 2nd March 2001, col. 1431

³⁴⁶ This was a description by Alhaji Sumani Abubakari, an NDC MP for Choggu/Tishigu, during the discussions on HIPC. OFFICIAL REPORT of 2nd March 2001, col. 1180

The ideology of the party also influenced how the programme was accepted and executed. Unlike the difficulties the PNDC/NDC had faced in reconciling its ideas to the SAP, the NPP government was more receptive and rolled out the programme in a way that presented it as part of Ghana's economic policies. Yaw Osafo-Maafa, the Finance Minister of the NPP government, described the HIPC initiative "as part of the NPP Government's economic strategy of prudent economic management".³⁴⁷ This action partly explains why the NPP government reached the completion point in record time.

One major factor explaining the relatively calm environment within which the NPP government executed an IMF programme that previous administrations had struggled with was its effective communication and reorienting the Ghanaian society to be receptive to austerity measures – something previous administrations rarely did due to their ideological differences. In Kufuor's first address in parliament, he appealed to the conscience of Ghanaians about the declining nature the economic legacy they have inherited.³⁴⁸ He further asked everyone 'tighten their belts' in wait for impending austerity measures aimed at economic recovery.³⁴⁹ I argue that this was partly due to the administration's belief in the potential success of the programme. Even though the NDC disagreed and raised a series of counter-arguments both in parliament and media, the 'tighten our belts' mantra helped orient the people towards accommodating the adverse impacts of IMF policies. Also, projects funded by HIPC, including schools, public toilets and clinics were uniformly labelled and usually situated along town roads. Therefore, people saw the benefits of HIPC, unlike previous IMF programmes. These moves were possible because the government ideologically accepted and owned HIPC.

Fourth, ideology shaped how relationships were perceived. As a government with internalised liberal ideology, the economics of economic diplomacy were more important for the government than the politics of it. The NPP saw the British government as an economic partner rather than a neo-colonial or imperial power. This widened its choice of partners: the NPP government promoted economic relations with countries belonging to both East and West without paranoia. Under the NPP government, the relationship between Ghana and Cuba, on the one hand, and Ghana and the USA on the other, could be differentiated only by dividends accrued or how much capacity and opportunities they offered; not whether the government of Ghana liked them or not. It explains why the economic diplomacy of the NPP was much more diverse and yielded more financial dividends than any government since independence. Key among these dividends were the \$547 million from the

³⁴⁷ Press Statement on HIPC completion point by the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning, Mr Yaw Osafo-Maafa

³⁴⁸ Motions (State of the Nation Message): OFFICIAL REPORT of 2nd March, 2001, col. 1174

³⁴⁹ Ibid

Millennium Challenge Corporation; the \$624 million Bui hydroelectric project with only \$60 million coming from Ghana while the rest is shared between China and the US; an \$80 million grant for the Accra-Cape Coast highway; and an enormous boost to the Africa Growth Opportunity Act (AGOA) initiative by the US. Economic policy could be understood as the NPP government's version of non-alignment.

It is worthy of note that I do not explicitly analyse Ghana's relations with China or India. However, the Kufuor administration presents one of the rare cases where stronger economic relations were built with India, China and the West, although they represent some glaring ideological differences and similarities that influence their approaches and even aid types. Harris & Vittorini (2018, p. 375) notes that India is different from the West by not being prescriptive or interfering; and from China in "methods and specialisms, the influx of Chinese workers and the comparison of Ghanaian views of outsiders". India is, however, similar to China and some non-Western countries in its non-interference, commercialisation of aid and recipients' freedom of choice, although it shares some neo-liberal features with the West (ibid). While this shows fluidity and ideological nuances in Indian and Chinese foreign policy and the overarching ideas behind South-South cooperation, it characterises the supply side of this two-way relationship.

What I focus on is the Kufuor administration's approach to balancing these diverse sources and partners of economic diplomacy without creating animosity. Although this balancing act has been a recurring feature of Ghana's economic diplomacy, especially in how the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations instrumentalised ideas for different objectives, the analysis in this chapter shows that there has always been tensions that sometimes undermine the relations. The Kufuor administration approached this differently, yielding significant dividends. For instance, the administration secured a funding of \$45 million (initially \$36.9 million and controversially reported to have shot up to \$135 million), with 50% grant element in 2006, to construct a presidential palace (Gallagher et al., 2021). The government also secured another \$562 million loan for the \$624 million Bui hydroelectric project (Obour et al., 2016). It is the argument of this chapter that the ideology of the Kufuor administration played a critical role in this. While the government's bid to build these economic relations with countries or governments of different ideological inclinations demonstrates its liberal approach towards economic relations – thus demonstrating the commitment to deal with countries whose support can address Ghana's domestic challenges –, it showed a government whose ideology for economic diplomacy favoured a separation of economics from political or cultural.

On the African continent, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia's foreign policies, among others, have demonstrated a dynamic mix of economic relations with a variety of countries or governments that

subscribe to different ideological leanings. In Rwanda's case, for instance, there has been a shift (or combination) of economic diplomacy from their old traditional allies like France and Belgium to the UK and USA (Beloff, 2020). Beyond joining the Commonwealth in 2009, without having any historical ties with the United Kingdom, Rwanda has also signed a five-year immigration deal with the UK providing them with £120 million.³⁵⁰ Yet the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) has shown its anti-Western inclinations in different ways regarding the system of governance and respect for human rights. This broadening of foreign policy is driven by how Rwandan policy-making elites perceive economic interests and limits it to commercial diplomacy and peacekeeping objectives (Beloff, 2020). This is similar to Fisher (2013) and Hauser (1999) discussions of Uganda's foreign policy. It signals a wave of the dominant ideology in African economic diplomacy which stipulates a distinction between economics and politics, just like what the Kufuor administration did, but the Nkrumah and Rawlings administration found it difficult to do.

Generally, the Kufuor administration comes across as the only government that began with a relatively sincere commitment to an internalised ideology, unlike the adoption pathway by both Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations. One way to verify this, as argued, is to look at the party's history. The NPP government seemed settled with an internalised liberal ideology. This explains why there was no significant internal ideological tension as there had been with the earlier administrations. While it can be argued that the post-cold war context was conducive for liberal economic approaches and relations with the West, the history of the NPP tradition shows their consistent belief in Western structures.

5.5 Conclusion

Economic diplomacy is justifiably known as a foreign policy area where African states have little room for manoeuvre, signalling an area with no or only a very minimal role for ideology. Economic diplomacy has been seen as one of the key areas for extraversion. However, a contextual framework with a broader conception of ideology shows us something different: ideology is not everything, but it manifests in ways, sometimes subtle, that a narrow conception cannot unravel. Although economic independence is the underlying ideological component for economic diplomacy, its interpretation and policy influence is linked with the other ideological components.

This chapter demonstrated that the dominance of contextual structures became a significant source of either ideological change or tension for Ghanaian governments, especially the Rawlings administration. Unlike neighbour relations and regional integration, dualisation is not an integral

³⁵⁰ Amar Mehta (April 22, 2022) How the UK's Rwanda plan mirrors immigration policies in Australia, Israel and Denmark. Retrieved from <https://news.sky.com/story/how-the-uks-rwanda-plan-mirrors-immigration-policies-in-australia-israel-and-denmark-12594456> Accessed April 24 2022

pathway in economic diplomacy due to the existence of relatively stronger contextual structures, thereby making governments conform, adapt or instrumentalise more. However, the similarity of ideas between the Kufuor administration and the dominant contextual structures, like the Bretton Woods, meant that the pathways were silent during the administration's tenure because both the government and structures were relatively more ideologically synchronous. This dominance by contextual structures is reinforced by Ghana's historical relations with the BWIs since the 1960s., However, I have argued that it does not presume the non-existence of ideology, as ideology influences how government react to the dominance or how the ideas are taken on board (pathways). Such dynamics shape economic diplomacy. We saw this particularly with the Rawlings administration that was originally anti-Western but forced into conformity. However, there were ways in which the Rawlings administration continued to enact its sincere internalised ideological positions while conforming to and instrumentalising the contextual ideas originating from Bretton Woods. On the other hand, the Kufuor government demonstrates the argument that although it was met with a similar context, there was an ideological convergence between the government and Bretton Woods Institutions. The difference between the two governments is demonstrated in how they variedly received the policy and the ensuing dividends. Following this, I argue ideology shapes the reception to policies.

Theoretically, this means that ideology in its reconceptualised form unveils nuances that we may overlook because many existing theories focus on the 'big picture'. This has the potential to contribute to what some studies on Africa's international relations have critiqued as the limitation of existing IR theories, particularly in highlighting how insights from Africa's international relations, though overlooked, can broaden our understanding of international relations more generally (Odoom & Andrews, 2017; Tieku, 2012). In the next chapter, I take on part of this debate that focuses on extraversion and African agency and demonstrate how a broader conception of ideology can augment existing analysis.

CHAPTER 6 - The Utility of Ideology in Understanding Africa's International Relations

6.1 Introduction

From chapters one to five, the objective of this thesis has been to demonstrate the empirical role of ideology in shaping foreign policy. Scholars have not given as much attention to ideologies like factors that influence Africa's international relations because ideologies have been assumed to be given and less dynamic, relatively insignificant and uninteresting to study. This phenomenon owes much to the narrow conceptions of ideology that present it as highly systematic, idealistic and fanatical rather than rational and consistent (Maynard, 2019). However, the ideological contextualisation framework put forward in this thesis and the empirical analyses in chapters three, four and five show how dynamic ideology is and how useful it can be, were we to take a more constructivist and contextual approach to ideological analysis of policy-making.

Ideology is also one way of bringing to fore the political actions and purposes of African actors. In this chapter, I take my framework a notch higher into the broader literature on Africa's IR and ask the question: how can ideology help us to understand what Brown (2012, p. 1890) characterises as "African activism in international affairs and the persistence of wider, 'structural' constraints" within and outside the region? Structure is used here not in its philosophical or abstract sense but to mean contextual structures, just as in ICF, typifying the 'dominant' international institutions and intergovernmental organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and WTO that create international norms and sometimes oversee state activities.

There is a growing plurality in how international relations is studied, and Africa has not been left out of this trend (Odoom & Andrews, 2017). However, this means that different answers have been generated to some perennial questions about motives, actors, issues, position or stature, causes and consequences regarding Africa's international relations. For Africa, answers to these questions have translated into two main interrelated debates. The first debate is mainly centred on the motives behind African elites' engagements with foreign partners. It revolves around efforts to answer the question of "how African actors shape their foreign relations and how they deal with external actors, particularly when considering their structural dependency vis-à-vis Western states" (Tull, 2011, p. 8). For the most part, extraversion theorists have taken the lead in answering this question. They propose that what shapes the behaviour of African elites is the consolidation of their domestic power, regardless of the original aims of the engagement by their foreign partners (Bayart, 2000; Ricard, 2017). The second debate emanates from attempts to answer the question of Africa's position in both the theorisation of international relations and the nature of international relations' practice (Harman & Brown, 2013; Odoom & Andrews, 2017).

Agency and extraversion are the focus here because of their parallel bids to analyse Africa's international relations from a 'bottom-up' perspective, just as the ideological framework used in this thesis seeks to emphasise a breakaway from the contextually relevant, "yet determinist, structural accounts of Africa's international relations" (Brown & Harman, 2013, p. 2). And although the agency debate pioneered by Brown & Harman (2013) seems to be relatively well-established, extraversion has not lost traction in recent discussions (Ricard, 2017). Both the agency and extraversion debates seek to understand the room for manoeuvre for African political actors in international relations and what they use it for. Together, they discuss how much influence or power is exerted by African leaders and how much freedom of action African political actors have. They also explore the kinds of agency available and what is being done with them. These analyses focus on the specific agents, their context, and their purposes in bids to demonstrate how African agency is different from other forms of agency due to the nature of structural constraints. Their initial insights so far show that African agency is issue-specific, mixed and very fluid.

While these findings set us on a course to building a framework for analysing African agency in contemporary international relations, it provides an opportunity for reflection of different cases. It does this by introducing us to further foundational questions regarding thinking about African agency and elites'/actors' role more conceptually: in what ways can we understand these different shades of agency that also transcend the limitations of extraversion to understanding Africa's international relations.

My argument in this chapter is that ideology provides an alternative, but complementary, perspective to these debates. I argued in chapter one that ideology has received little attention from African-centred IR scholars in the past, partly due to pejorative connotations in literature. However, when ideology is reconceptualised as a living concept, and taken seriously, it can provide useful additions to these debates. After discussing ideology in the next section, I explore the extraversion and agency debates in the subsequent sections by showing how ideology can help enrich our understanding of Africa's international relations.

6.2 Ideology: A Reflection on the Theoretical Chapters

In chapter two, where I outlined the theoretical framework for this thesis, I made three modest conceptual contributions to the concept of ideology. First, I conceptualised ideology not as a dogma but as *a set of interrelated assumptions, whether intended or unintended, by an individual or group that provides a framework over a period of time not only for constructing and understanding their political/socio-economic context but also form the foundations for their actions and inactions while serving as an interpretive tool to understand the dynamics of such actions/inactions.* With this

definition, the contextual uniqueness and historical relevance of every case under study is brought into play. Second, I reviewed the thought-action debate of ideology in a way that takes ideology from the realm of only thinking to its material realisation. Third, I introduced the concept of ideological contextualisation to provide a clearer understanding of how analysis of ideologies should be approached. In the process of policy-making, large abstract political ideas must be translated into actual decisions, policy documents, plans, and programmes of action. To do this, ideological concepts need to be made to 'fit' a particular place, time, and cultural context. With these prior three fundamental clarifications, in this chapter, I propose ideology as an analytical tool and argue that ideology should not be left in the margins of policy analysis but should be analysed to reveal its pitfalls and areas of dominance.

To situate this in the relevant literature, I have argued in chapter one that generally Africa has not been the preoccupation of the mainstream literature on ideology. Western literature has been active in tracing the historical impact of ideology – going back into the earlier centuries when Antoine Destutt de Tracy introduced the term (Cassels, 2003; Halliday, 2005; Warnaar, 2013). Ideology has, at times, been understandably neglected amidst a general preoccupation with the realist perspective.

In 1966, William Zartman himself, a leading contributor to the study of African politics, framed a compelling scenario for understanding ideology by contrasting it with the national interest. After referring to 'ideological leaders' and 'national interest leaders' as 'solidarity-makers' and 'problems-solvers' respectively, he further wrote that:

... reaction to insecurity can be analysed as being adaptive or maladaptive; that is, the state can accept the general environment and attempt to find its place within it, or it can reject the environment and try to change it. One response seeks security within the present state system by overcoming internal weakness and increasing state power; the other sees only insecurity as long as the present order continues. The first attitude uses national interest as its criterion for action; the second is ideological. Both seek an answer to the insecurity of the state (Zartman, 1966b, p. 30).

Although the use of the terms adaptive and maladaptive, to some extent, connotes a difference between good and bad, it exemplifies Zartman's distinction between ideology and national interest based on the "attitude toward the environment within which the state finds itself" (ibid). Ideology here is primarily seen as strict dogma, unfamiliar to adaptability. He further argues that "ideology and national interest are two extremes of a range of foreign-policy criteria" (Zartman, 1966b, p. 48). He conceptualises ideology in a way that makes it anti-national interest. However, what we know is that national interest is a slippery and vague concept (Nye, 1999). Even though I have not directly addressed the national interest debate, I still hold as a priori the assumption that ideology is an

influential determining factor for national interest. Yet what Zartman's analysis shows is that there is some ideology in how African governments behave internationally. The focus here is to show how such underpinnings continue to be much more important in shaping international relations than is often perceived.

In the study of African politics and foreign relations, ideology has barely been deemed sufficiently important to merit dedicated, sustained research. This might be attributed to the apparently inconsistent, less coherently articulated ideas and sometimes unambitious behaviour of African governments' engagements in international relations (Bamikole, 2012; Elischer, 2012; Martin, 2012; Mazrui, 1977). Analysis of ideologies' influence on Africa's foreign engagements, since independence, has been in practice limited and mostly upstaged by the major trajectories of post-colonial activities such as post-colonial (second) independence, reactions and strategies for the Cold War, the era of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) and the burgeoning new phase of China in Africa. But these engagements are more dynamic than they appear, and ideology is a very useful tool for gaining deeper understandings of them. For instance, even in the apparently realist and unideological acceptance of the SAP, we can still find traces of ideology in the varieties of reception African governments gave to the programme.

One could argue that Ghana is a unique case – the first sub-Saharan African country to join the IMF, having an anti-Western military government but still ushered into a Western-oriented programme, thereby giving the financiers a reason to make Ghana work and make it an exemplar for the rest of the continent (Boafo-Arthur, 1999a; Frimpong, 1997; Hughes, 2005). However, there are other African countries where both military and civilian governments have tried to either localise these external programmes because they fit into their ideologies, as in Botswana (Leith, 2005); craft innovative ways to use the programme to achieve their ideologically inspired goals as Nyerere did in Tanzania between 1973 and 1983 (Hodd, 1987); or reject it as Sankara did in Burkina Faso (Murrey, 2019).

The ideology-national interest dichotomy has translated into different phases since independence, but the core argument throughout much of the literature is that ideology does not matter very much in African politics or international relations, except for leaders who are considered 'ideologues' (Elischer, 2012; Erdmann, 2004; Erdmann & Basedau, 2008; Thompson, 1969). The argument is predicated on the assumption that African governments and political parties have relegated the politics of issues to the background in a context of economic stress, rising political vagrancy based on selfish and parochial interests, the high mortality and turnover of party leadership, the lack of an industrial revolution, weak links between African parties and auxiliary organisations such as trade unions, and African parties' weak degree of institutionalisation (Elischer, 2012; Omotola, 2009;

Sprinzak, 1973). There has also been a lack of room for policy-choice due to the constraints of dependency. In essence, the African political terrain is so fluid and inconsistent that it is “nigh impossible to classify or treat it with any amount of consistency” that ideology deserves (Mafeje, 1971, p. 253).

In chapters one and two, I argued that while these factors exist in their variants in many African states, they do not necessarily obliterate ideology. In fact, in the decolonisation struggle where ideology was one of the critical variables, many of these factors existed in their most extreme forms. Clapham (1970) argues that ideologies during that period were used by African nationalist leaders to understand the complex nature of their context and frame programmes for addressing their challenges.

The problem here, I have argued, is not the existence of these factors. Instead, it lies in the pejorative understandings and interpretations of ideology. An additional problem lies in methodologies where what African leaders say is used as the only parameter for analysing ideologies without considering the resulting policies and the contexts in which these statements are made. As will be discussed later in this chapter, the effect is to describe African governments or policy-makers as ‘non-ideological’, whose policies are shaped only by need and extraversion. Another effect is to describe bad policies or every policy that does not translate into direct developmental benefits as ideological, and good policies as pragmatic. As has been discussed in the economic diplomacy chapter, it is useful to restate the argument that even governments in need can still have ideologies they use to shape the interpretation of their present condition and map out where to go. Another effect is that such analyses seek ideological purity when, in practice, such an ideal is almost impossible. But non-purity does not signify a lack of ideology. It is akin to pronouncing the death of ideology when what is happening is ideological malleability. As rightly argued by Freedon (1996), the lack of this ideological purity or strict logical coherence is the fundamental difference between ideology and philosophy – the latter prioritises purity and logical coherence while the muddying effects of contexts make it near impossible for such rigour.

As argued in chapter two, this characterisation leads to typifications of ideology which are pejorative and shapes their ensuing analyses. Marxists like Louis Althusser maintain that ideology implies ‘false consciousness’ and enables exploitation (Folson, 1993; Hatzopoulos, 2008; Mannheim, 1954). From a rather different, but equally pejorative take, Hannah Arendt sees ideology as innately associated with power acquisition, through its dominantly mythical component, oppressive, exploitative and dehumanising possibilities (Arendt, 1953). Other scholars regard ideology as a unitary entity that is internally logically consistent. Christopher Clapham, for instance, argues that the ideas espoused by

African leaders cannot pass as ideologies but as responses to situations due to the lack of strict logical coherence and consistency (Clapham, 1970). These characterisations shift ideology closer to being restrictive – restraining meaning, structure and scope. But this is not the case according to scholars who pursue broader conceptions of ideology (Freeden, 1996); (Bamikole, 2012; Finlayson, 2012). It is time, however, to go beyond this typification and think about ideology differently.

Nonetheless, the subject of ideology has produced real-world controversies to date, even if it has been an under-researched area and characterised by intermittent downplaying references. It has not been out of conversations. Some African leaders and governments do not shy away from indicating the part of the left-right ideological spectrum they belong to as motivations or justifications for their actions. This shows the salience of ideology not only as an analytical but also a rhetorical tool. Ali Mazrui argues that every study of ideology in Africa should pay much attention to the extent to which it is an eclectic mix of established grand ideologies (Mazrui, 1977). Sebastian Elischer also observes that most of these studies have largely been a “resemblance of personal predictions rather than empirically grounded research” (Elischer, 2012, p. 644). The greatest problem for analysts here, as Zartman highlights, is “the need to keep academic neutrality toward value systems and criteria used by the subjects of (his) study” (Zartman, 1966b, p. 25). Part of my attempt in this chapter is to respond to these calls.

The ideological contextualisation framework proposed by this study combines the internalised ideologies of governments within their historical contexts to produce different ideological frames. It pays more attention to how these contextual ideological variables are fused into the internalised ideologies – pathways – because they shape how ideologies manifest. This shift from a narrow conception of ideologies to a broader one opens up the analytical range to capture issues that might have been overlooked or seen as non-ideological.

6.3 Ideology and the Debate on Extraversion in Africa’s International Relations

From colonialism to post-independence, dependency and modernisation theories have been dominant in capturing arguments about Africa’s international relations and development, although both theories have been much disputed (Rodney, 1972; Rostow, 1959). One flaw in both theories is how African agency is downplayed and remains a reason why ideology has been overlooked as both assumed little freedom of manoeuvre for African governments. In hindsight, these theories gained popularity at a time where although there was an ideological war, ideological considerations and objectives of African states and government were downplayed (Chang, 2002; Nasong’o, 2019). These theorists were at the very least trying to be as pragmatic as possible, which means that the ‘soft’ intricacies of Africa’s international relations were missed due to their preoccupation with ‘material

realities' – an area where Africa was regarded to be subservient (Akokpari, 2005; Antwi-Boasiako, 2014; Bach, 2013; Lawson, 2007).

However, in the late 1980s, Jean-François Bayart introduced the concept of extraversion in his bid to demonstrate African agency in international relations, critiquing arguments by the dependency and modernisation theories that were built on the idea of marginalisation (Bayart, 1993, 2000). He argued that African elites or governments are not only active players in global affairs, but are involved in a way that perpetuates Africa's dependency for their parochial interest. The core of his argument rests on the point that there is some space for agency, but that it is exercised in pursuit of material interests. Bayart's is an attempt to answer the question: what is being done with the agency? In tracing Africa's history in international relations, he makes the point that, contrary to dependency theories, African leaders and governments have had the capacity to manipulate existing dependent relations for personal benefits, including financial gains, regime consolidation and territorial integrity. He reveals that prior to colonialism, Africans had been involved in trade relations (including the slave trade) with the rest of the world, and it were such trade relations that partly paved the way for colonisation. Essentially, the forces of colonisation were not purely external because colonised elites were active participants in the colonisation process. Therefore, just as the pre-colonial African states' elites exploited their unequal relations with external powers for resources to manage their domestic population and challenges, so did the post-colonial African elites take advantage of such relations for domestic power consolidation. This argument is based on the assumption that extraversion arises from the weakness of African states.

This weakness was caused by the lack of internal cohesion, which caused both acrimonious factional or ethnic/identity strife and weak consolidation of power. It also meant states did not need to exploit domestic production to obtain sufficient resources to hold on to power. In some cases, trying to exploit domestic resources might even have been a threat to power, in states where resources had been taken over by local brokers instead of the central government. Also, mobilising domestic resources through levying taxes, for example, came with higher political costs, such as local demands for accountability that did not accrue from external dependence. This shifted the argument and explanations regarding Africa's developmental trajectories and international relations a little away from dependency and structure.

Since Bayart propounded this theory, recent studies have continued to utilise it in understanding African politics. These studies have sustained the debate in areas such as slavery (Lindsay, 2014), conflict resolution (Tull, 2011) and China-Africa relations and the vicissitudes of globalisation (Large, 2008; Mohan & Lampert, 2013; Ricard, 2017). It also includes studies that set out to study agency, not

in a particularly strict sense, but to reveal the extraversion strategies of some African governments – a common denominator is studies that analyse economic and security relations between African countries and Western donors (Clapham, 1996; Whitfield & Fraser, 2010). These studies help in understanding elite motives, and their departure from the dependency theories brings fresh insight to understanding African politics.

Extraversion is also useful in explaining the dynamics of development, corruption, conflict, and how elites adopt extraversion strategies such as coercion, trickery and appropriation for their own power consolidation (Médard, 2002). Ultimately, it answers the question of how African leaders deal with foreign actors by theorising the reasons for Africa's dependence on the West.

There are some other things on which extraversion scholars are yet to agree, including what shapes how different governments dispense their extraversion dividends, what influences which area they pitch for in their extraversion agenda, and why across different countries on the continent, the extraversion agenda is so multifaceted. Also, they have not agreed on the nature of Africa's dependency. Dennis Tull observes that:

While dependency may reduce their range of actions, it does not eliminate it entirely. This becomes apparent when the interests of African elites diverge from those of their Western supporters. In such cases, African actors frequently raise a subtle, but entirely effective, resistance to Western policies and even instrumentalise them (Tull, 2011, p. 9).

If this is the case, then the ultimate question should be, what shapes these behaviours, including resistance. My argument is that ideology partly shapes this, and what extraversion theories count as motives are basically variable expressions of ideological underpinnings of African governments' expressions of agency.

My conceptualisation of ideology brings out four main critiques of extraversion theory that also complement our understanding of Africa's international relations. Here, I draw on empirical cases from Ghana who, although unique, have experiences in international relations that can speak to the larger experiences Africa and material of extraversion.

First, extraversion theories' overemphasis of instrumentalism is one of the ways in which they downplay ideology because they do not think it matters in a context perceived to be more of a realist cost-benefit analysis. However, ideologies do not begin and end as thinking. They manifest in different ways in which various governments adopt them as problem-solving tools in accordance with the thought-action cycle. A more refined conceptualisation of ideology embodies its instrumental function, different from what extraversion posits. To restate, instrumentalism from an extraversionist

perspective is more focused on consolidating the government's power, without any concrete ideational plan, by whatever means. Inserting an ideological perspective doesn't make instrumentalism go away, but views the pursuit of resources or objectives within the government's broader plans based on its ideological positions. However, it comes with some trade-offs. Therefore, as discussed in chapter three, what the Nkrumah administration did by combining different sources of funding from the West for its Nkrumaist/Socialist inspired Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI), regardless of its anti-Western/colonial stance, presents a classic case of such instrumental role of ideology. The ideological contextualisation framework shows that instrumentalisation works well under certain conditions: when the targeted audience have internalised and sincerely committed the ideas, ideological objective to be achieved, conformity to an ideological structure or instrumentalisation becomes a means to an ideological end (Maynard, 2019). In all three conditions, Ideologies have a role to play in providing context for such an instrumentalisation agenda to thrive.

Second, while extraversion theories signal that African elites find dependency desirable for power consolidation, their argument ignores the ideological foundations behind independence struggles. Historical events have at least made it clear that dependence or colonialism was not desirable, and some African elites had to fight it at the risk of their lives (Boahen, 1964, 1985; Shillington, 1995). In the course of fighting for independence, African leaders adopted ideologies which became evident not only in rhetoric but also their approaches. During this period and even after the end of formal colonialism, there was a significant movement of ideologies between Africans on the continent and their descendants abroad (Hendrickson & Zaki, 2013). These ideologies, including abolitionism, cultural nationalism, Negritude, Pan-Africanism, and the many varieties of African socialism were not only responses to international events but also foundations through which African elites proposed diverse developmental agenda. Ideology played a key role in how differently they understood their condition, mobilised and instrumentalised their fight against colonialism. Therefore, it would be misleading to assume that African elites were convinced and comfortable in their dependency for the sake of consolidating their power.

Third, extraversion does not talk about how African leaders manage domestic resources and production in international relations. It only focuses on foreign resources under the assumption that using local resources might generate tensions or expectations that African governments cannot meet. Regardless of these assumed challenges, African elites have not abandoned the management of domestic resources in their international relations. In doing so, they have had to engage in foreign relations with other states and multinational corporations that set the tone for their country's foreign policies. As discussed in chapter five of this thesis, the ways in which the three administrations managed Ghana's domestic resources and production says a lot about their ideational perspectives.

Ideology partly influences how they did it, which partner they preferred handling, which resources and for what purposes. For instance, contrary to what extraversion theory would argue about building an atomic energy to maximise power within the subregion, an ideologically-aware insight into Nkrumah's intentions reveals his attempts to demonstrate a new approach, using it for peaceful scientific innovation to project an African personality. A relatively recent study on Ghana's management of the newly initiated oil and gas sector buttresses this point, although the author's intention was not to reveal any ideational positions. What Phillips (2018, p. 111) reveals is that even the ruling National Democratic Congress (NDC), the different factions "represented different ideas over the appropriate role of the state in oil governance and the best way to maximise the value of petroleum". Such ideational underpinnings shape negotiations and the nature of the resultant deal.

Fourth, at first glance African governments' handling of reforms imposed by IFIs in the 1980s looks exemplary of extraversion strategies (Ricard, 2017; Tull, 2011), there is another part of that story that has been overlooked. That part of the story is about how ideologies shaped government responses to these programmes, including the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). A lot of the economic reforms involved a Western-styled economic liberalisation of hitherto closed economies. However, what happened in many African states was the selling or privatisation of state-owned enterprises to political allies. An extraversion explanation is that African governments did this to continue to "maintain patronage networks and consolidate their own power, but circumvented the objectives that the financial institutions had had in mind" (Tull, 2011, p. 9). Regardless of how realistic this interpretation is, it only tells one side of the story. It ignores the fact that before these reforms, African governments had plans for their countries partly based on their ideological interpretation of their context.

Interpreting it from the perspective of ideology reveals that there was more to the hesitant acceptance of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) by the PNDC than extraversion – and ideology illuminates such undertones. Although the acceptance of the SAP did not reflect the dominant ideology of the government, especially its leader Rawlings, its show of resistance, influence and other actions were partly ideological and reflected a near disbelief in the whole SAP process. Nugent (1995), Hutchful (2002) and Akonor (2013) list some of these resistance policies in areas such as taxes, currency devaluation and government expenditure that showed that the PNDC government was not necessarily playing the extraversion game of self-aggrandisement. Instead, there were genuine ideological dichotomies in policies among both politicians and technocrats on which fiscal approach to adopt, for what purpose and how it would make the government look, among others. They were not hesitant in revealing some of these convictions to the IMF and World Bank or the rest of the world as critiques of the programme (Amo-Agyemang, 2017). As mentioned in chapter three, some key

members of the government revealed in my interviews that, for a socialist inclined government, there were some clear-cut policies, including who and what to tax, which did not reflect their ideology. These became difficult to undertake and they had to find creative ways to execute them. This is not just because they wanted to check an ideological box but due to their disbelief that the approach would work or achieve its intended goal – a position informed by their ideology. In some cases, they were able to either cause the World Bank and IMF to change its conditionality or to push for a middle point or compromised position (Kusi, 1998). The empirical evidence discussed in chapter three suggests that although on the surface this looks like a Janus-faced approach to getting resources from international organisation for domestic power consolidation, this was a complicated situation in which the government had to push its ideological position as far as it could within the constraints it were under and given its internal ideological differences. Like a lot of military regimes in Africa, the PNDC contained an eclectic mix of ideologies. Parsimoniously, there were two sides: on the one hand was the moderate socialists who referred to themselves as pragmatist or non-ideological including Obed Asamoah. The second group, the hard-line Marxist-socialists, like Chris Atim, did not want to adapt to any Western inclined IMF-World Bank adjustment programme.

It also reveals the behaviour of ideologies when under pressure or faced with a contradictory stark reality. Ideology indicates possibilities for action instead of restrictions, and with such a reality check, it can take on new forms, not necessarily leading to its demise. Ideologically, many African governments faced the prospect of abandoning their version of socialism for a full-scale capitalist state. But they settled for what came to be known as state-led capitalism which meant ideological malleability instead of the end of it. African governments showed resistance by redefining aspects of the economic reforms to produce results that conformed, in part, to their ideologies. The irreconcilable ideological differences between the Bretton Woods institutions and African governments contributed to the failure of the programmes in many countries. As argued in chapter five, when governments' ideologies align with those of the programmes, there can be a high level of commitment to succeed.

A comparison between how the Rawlings and Kufuor administrations pursued their relations with World Bank and IMF programmes demonstrate this ideological manifestation. The Rawlings administration was in a constant clash with the World Bank and IMF while some members criticised the programme publicly. What this means is that although the Bretton Woods institutions tried to project Ghana as one of its best country cases, the administration declined full ownership of the programme and ascribed failures or excesses to the Bretton Woods institutions. I argue that this unwillingness of ownership partly caused the failure of the programme because there was very little genuine commitment. Ideologically, it confirmed the anti-colonial socialist/Marxist narrative

concerning the deficiencies of neo-liberal policies. They needed to get the most out of a programme that was dead at birth. The Kufuor administration also embarked on a IMF-World Bank programme, within a different context, but the difference in their approach was critical to its success. First, the administration enrolled on a HIPC programme that was hitherto rejected by Rawlings administration partly based on ideological justifications and because of the unpleasant experience with the SAP. It is highly unlikely that under the same circumstances, the Rawlings administration would have enrolled on HIPC. Some members of the administration touted it as washing Ghana's dirty linen out in public and a programme unsafe for the Ghanaian economy in 2001.³⁵¹

Amidst these criticisms and projected failure, the Kufuor administration, from its classical-liberal background, believed in the programme and took ownership of it, unlike the Rawlings administration. However, this approach was not devoid of internal dissent within the Kufuor administration. J. H. Mensah raised some objections while other key members of the administrations, including the Finance Minister (Yaw Osafo-Mafo) and Kufuor himself, were optimistic about the programme and pursued it in record time. The Kufuor administration claimed this as a huge achievement, while the Rawlings administration had papered over its SAP achievements and history.

Generally, extraversion concentrates on the economic utility and power consolidation of Africa's international relations, which essentially makes them realist-oriented. It enforces structuralist economic approaches in understanding African politics, although it critiques those theories such as dependency, Marxism and modernisation theory. This is a challenge because it only accounts for economic rationality and utility, something ideology not only captures but goes beyond into the socio-political, providing further and equally important aspects to understanding Africa's international relations.

6.4 Ideology and Africa Agency in International Relations

The debate on extraversion means two things for the discussion on agency. On the one hand, it argues that African elites enjoy a considerable level of agency exhibited mainly in how they can redirect foreign resources for different ends while appeasing their foreign partners and consolidating their power. On the other hand, the maintenance of agency in this way has translated into a self-induced dependency of African countries initially caused by African elites' penchant to satisfy their parochial interest in power consolidation. Extraversion almost takes away the agency it tries to give African elites by overlooking the diversity of contexts and interpretations.

³⁵¹ Larry-Alans Dogbey (June 27, 2004) HIPC Not Poverty. Accessed January 15, 2020. Retrieved from <https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/HIPC-Not-Poverty-60524>

However, scholars have approached the subject of African agency variedly and shown the different ways in which agency is manifested and used. For instance, Andreason (2013) and Zondi (2013) explore African agency as a question about how much influence or power is being exerted and how much freedom of action African political actors have available to them. The interests of these studies lie in enquiries into where and how African agents are impacting international politics; what factors are accounting for that; and what constrains or drives such influences. Brown (2012), Harman & Brown (2013) and Tieku (2012) take a more activist approach – their intention is to show the rest of the academic and practising world how Africa is marginalised and the insights they miss by keeping African experiences on the fringes of IR theorising. Their approach is motivated by enquiries into how to better understand IR theory and how to theorise African experiences and stories since existing theories barely explain them. They add that the inclusion and theorising of these stories will further enrich understanding of international relations. Particularly Odoom & Andrews (2017, p. 46) focuses on revealing stories that have the potential to “innovate, revise, reconstruct and possibly replace some of the conventional ‘stories’ that have been told in IR”. In these studies, Africa is seen solely as an agent of knowledge as it embodies cases and examples that modify our understanding of broader international relations theories. Beswick (2013), Chipaike & Knowledge (2018), Fisher (2013a), Landsberg (2011) and Mohan & Lampert (2013) are more concerned with the practical realities of how African agency is enacted in Africa’s international relations. While they argue that African actors are able to “exert assertive agency in their various encounters with external partners” (Chipaike & Knowledge, 2018, p. 1) they introduced a caveat for such agency – in that the level of agency exerted is determined by a variety of factors including “the type of governmental regime in place, possession and control of strategic commodities by the regime in place and the willingness of the governmental regime to work with civil society in its engagements with external partners” (ibid). One way this sets African agency apart from agency in other parts of the world is the way in which structural constraints act on that agency. But for Brown & Harman (2013, p. 3), “such constraints do not eclipse agency altogether; it just means that the tools and sites of such agency may differ and offer something new for our understanding”. It is my argument that ideology highlights the ways in which agency is manifest in different contexts.

An analytical focus on the relationship between ideology and agency does not presume that there is a significantly greater agency lurking somewhere. Instead, as suggested above, ideology illuminates such areas which are either overlooked or thought of as dependence when they are rather different manifestations of African agency. Generally, African agency has been thought of as a show of either influence or resistance, which invariably overlooks a variety of strategies, preferences and the range of outcomes they produce. Dieter Neubert and Christine Scherer have argued that tying agency ‘to

emancipatory concepts and visions or as a norm for successful social action' has limited its openness as a concept (Neubert and Scherer, 2014 cited in Murray-Evans, 2015). Murray-Evans makes quite an elaborate description of this. She argues that:

If the focus of the African agency literature falls only on those African actions that are expressed in the form of successful influence, contestation or resistance, we may miss the wide range of African actions that serve to perpetuate existing structures or that are simply geared towards coping and survival within a highly unequal global system (Murray-Evans, 2015, p. 1847).

Some agency lies in the acceptance and conformity to the structure, and it is partly through an understanding of the ideological underpinnings of African agents that we can unravel these nuances. In chapter four, I highlighted an AU event in 2007 when many expected the Kufuor administration to take an anti-establishment stance by supporting the bid for an immediate political unity of African states beyond what the AU offers. This seemed particularly likely, coming from a country known to have pioneered such unification after independence. The Nkrumaists do not mince words on this.³⁵² Kwabena Bomfeh³⁵³ contends that "Ghana was supposed to seal the mooted idea... Ghana under president J A Kufuor said it had no position on a subject that Ghana had consistently from independence defined where we stood". However, as discussed in Chapter four, the dominant idea of regionalism that the AU sought to pursue, facilitated by the UNECA, was something the Kufuor administration and its antecedents had ideologically supported even before the appearance of Nkrumah on Ghana's domestic political scene. From chapter four, I contend that what the AU structure exists to pursue is something the Kufuor administration and its historical antecedents have always argued for and want to strengthen instead of a grand political unification. It explains why the nature of the administration's efforts towards regional integration, discussed in chapter four, was primarily institutional. Therefore, while Nkrumaists or regionalists (those who argue that African agency can be found or magnified only through a united region) might call it a dereliction of agency, it is an expression of agency to conform to the existing AU structure instead of resisting or causing a radical change. This case is not limited to Kufuor and Ghana alone, but the arguments at the conference were almost a re-enactment of the Casablanca-Monrovia divide from the late 1950s to the early 60s.

Another example of this is Ghana's reaction to the IMF/World programmes between the two administrations, as discussed above and in chapter three. While the acceptance of an IMF-World Bank programme, ostensibly an erosion of agency under the Rawlings administration, cannot be interpreted

³⁵² Sentiments expressed by both Samia Nkrumah and James Kwabena Bomfeh

³⁵³ James Kwabena Bomfeh (aka Kabila) as of the time I interviewed him was the General Secretary of the Conventions People's Party (CPP).

as such when the Kufuor administration enrolled on HIPC. This is because while the dominant ideology of the Rawlings administration contradicted the neo-liberal roadmap of the SAP, the dominant ideology of the Kufuor administration perceived HIPC as a viable way to secure a stable economy. As discussed in Chapter five, the stark differences in the outcome of the two programmes justify this position.

Jay Wallace formulated a requirement for agency as “if agent A has reason r to perform action x, and A is properly aware that r obtains, then A must be motivated to do x, on pain of irrationality” (Wallace, 1999, p. 218). The point here is that one way in which we can explore agency is to have knowledge of an agent’s existing desires and ideas. Thus, agency can manifest when an agent internalises deliberations to achieve an existing desire even if they did not initiate deliberations. In essence, African agents do not necessarily have to resist or influence structures to show their agency, even though such acts also depict agency.

To better reflect these dynamics, I adopt a hybrid definition of agency as “the ability or capacity of an actor to act consciously and, in so doing, to attempt to realise his or her intentions within the context of uncertain or indeterminate social structures” (Hay, 2002, p. 94; Murray-Evans, 2015, p. 1848). This definition brings out two theoretical underpinnings in this thesis: first, it reflects the constructivist approach to agency that stresses the importance of reflexivity (Beswick & Hammerstad, 2013; Murray-Evans, 2015; Van Binsbergen et al., 2004). Second, it reflects the ideological contextualisation approach of this thesis that suggests the usefulness of contexts to understanding the thought-action synergy of ideology. This approach to understanding African agency provides an alternative while complementing the insights we gain from the resistance and influence approaches. It proposes that regardless of Africa’s putatively weaker position in highly asymmetrical global power structures, these structures do not entirely determine the interpretations and responses of ‘purposive African agents’ (Murray-Evans, 2015, p. 1848).

Agency can be depicted in a multiplicity of ways without making prior assumptions about the form and impact. For instance, agency is not only agency when the policy or relations yield positive results. Sometimes agency can be expressed in a damaging policy. Although I do not discuss the 1960 Congo crisis in detail, Scott Thompson has and the deduction that can be made from his analysis is that what was meant to be an expression of Ghana’s willingness to help another African country ended up as a failure and detrimental to Nkrumah’s African policy, his image and ultimately survival. Ghana’s involvement in Congo was a full expression of agency for the CPP government as the Hansard between June and September 1960 shows that the government was not happy with the UN’s approach or ‘deliberate hesitation’ and was willing to embark on a sole mission to save Congo and Patrice

Lumumba. Rev. Dzirasa, the resident minister in Guinea, summarised how the government felt about its intervention. He argued that

...we shall be failing in our duty if we alone enjoy the privileges of our freedom without extending the enjoyment of that freedom to our brothers; and we shall be failing in our duty if we remain silent spectators of events in the Congo. Therefore, the sacrifice we are called upon to make is not a sacrifice which is intended to bring some glory to Ghana; it is the registration on the record of history that Africans once free are capable of safeguarding their interest, their sovereignty and their territorial integrity; that an independent African state is capable of mustering all the resources at its command to go and save its neighbour.³⁵⁴

This approach to African agency enhances the agency debate by encouraging us to ask questions relating to how specific actors interpret their contexts, what ideational implications we can draw from those interpretations, how they influenced strategies for action, outcomes those strategies produced, and how the outcomes reflect the ideational positions.

It also considers agency in intra-Africa or regional relations. In other words, rather than making prior assumptions about actors and their interests or what they seek to change, I recommend a nuanced approach that is grounded in the contextual diversity of strategies and responses of African agents to regional politics and structural constraints of the international system. This is to attempt to make a relatively new turf of intra-African or regional agency, where agency is not only unravelled when African actors are relating with the rest of the world but also when they relate with one another on the continent.

As a proof of concept, I use this approach to briefly respond to three main areas which have been the focus of the agency-centred African literature so far. First is the regional approach to African agency. This approach emphasises that African agency resides in a concerted continental effort through regional organisations to frame programmes to tackle social, economic, political, corporate and socio-economic governance deficiencies (Achieng', 2014; De Carvalho et al., 2019; Tiekou, 2012, 2013, 2021; Ukaegbu, 2015). This position assumes that African actors or agents share a relatively unitary set of preferences and objectives. It further claims that such regional cooperation may enhance African agency in international relations by projecting the voice of African actors and making them more influential in global institutions like the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions. The failure of the regional organisations is akin to the erosion of African agency.

³⁵⁴ Rev. S. A. Dzirasa: OFFICIAL REPORT of 9th August, 1960, col. 705

This collectivist assumption erodes the agency of individual actors and fails to acknowledge the existence of different interests shaped by ideologies. At first glance, the formation of the OAU in 1963 appears to constitute a case of a unified African influence (on the continent and abroad) and resistance to neo-colonial influence. However, a closer inspection of just the speeches at its inauguration conference reveals that the diversity of interpretations, preferences and strategies were central to its formation.³⁵⁵ It confirms the Monrovia-Casablanca divide and how different countries wanted different things based on their ideological stance (Good, 1964). The OAU became a compromised solution to a complex problem. The OAU, as it was formed in 1963, had agency as expressed and achieved by leaders such as Felix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, leading member of the more conservative Monrovia group. But for Nkrumah and some other members of the Casablanca group, it was a potential agency derailed. For them, it was not a sufficient "all-African approach to the problems of the Africa continent"³⁵⁶ which they argued would be worsened by further Balkanisation if the regional efforts did not translate to a unified government for the whole continent.

Even more recent leaders on the continent have expressed varieties of agency in a way that has affected regional policies. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), adopted in March 2003, was meant to demonstrate and project African agency by tackling social, economic, political, corporate and socio-economic governance deficiencies (Achieng', 2014). It was fundamentally based on inter-African relations where African countries would review and learn from each other based on best practice. Although this programme benefitted from both regional and international support for its tendency to showcase African agency, not much agency has been adduced yet. Only Ghana and Uganda were able to successfully project this image, at the early stage of the programme, by visiting and learning from each other (Achieng', 2014; Bing-Pappoe, 2007). This is because, for most of the other African countries, agency may not reside in the learning from or being judged by other African countries. In a probably extreme case, resisting the scrutiny that comes with APRM may be a way of expressing agency. The neglect of this nuanced agency(ies) undermines the understanding of regional policy-making and execution.

Chapter four demonstrated that the Pan-African ideology, which underlies this collectivist view of African agency, is more dynamic than often thought. Although all three administrations in Ghana held the view that there should be more cooperation on the continent, there was a wide disparity between them on the nature of such cooperation, how it should be done and to what end. The existence of the

³⁵⁵ Speeches & Statements Organization of African made at the first Organisation of African Unity (O.A.U) Summit – May 1963. Accessed July 20, 2021. Retrieved from <https://au.int/en/speeches/19630508/speeches-and-statements-made-first-organisation-african-unity-oau-summit-1963>

³⁵⁶ Kwame Nkrumah: OFFICIAL REPORT of 16th December, 1965, col. 150

two fundamental ideas – African personality and Ghanaian personality – between the Nkrumah administration and the opposition (United Party) reflected how political elites thought about a continental union. Such collectivist assumptions overlook the complexity of African agency by obscuring the ideological perspectives to it. I contend that in the collectivist idea of African agency, some countries will even lose their agency due to the dominant nature of countries like Nigeria and South Africa. But an analysis of agency at the broader level, without ideology, will miss this nuance.

The second frame, which is used to analyse African agency is in bilateral relations. A lot of existing literature and commentary on African agency and bilateral relations has focused on the limited agency of individual African countries in negotiating with powerful states – paying more attention to how other states are exploiting Africa instead of the benefits Africa accrues (Bodomo, 2009; Jian, 2019).³⁵⁷ However, an emerging literature examines the agency of African actors in such bilateral relations. The most common claim within this literature is that although the powerful states exercise their leverage in bilateral relations with African states, African states are not altogether passive and inconsequential actors (Beswick, 2010; Brautigam, 2015; Fisher, 2012, 2013b; Phillips, 2018). A lot of these studies have actively focused on invoking agency in China-Africa relations which was hitherto overshadowed by a focus on the pragmatism and flexibility of China. Here exists the tendency for observers to assume that if policies do not seem to serve the developmental needs of the masses, then they (African elites) are powerless and lack agency.

Such assumptions miss the complexity in the exercise of agency by African leaders. They also de-historicise African agency, which is not a new phenomenon but has manifested historically in some other bilateral relations. For instance, the Nkrumah and Rawlings administrations' expression of agency in how they related with the East and progressive states (including Cuba, Libya and Burkina Faso) respectively, did not make much sense if agency is interpreted in material or developmental gains. Both Nkrumah and Rawlings chose to pursue relations with these countries that did not produce material gains, but did create enemies in the West who were the most viable economic partners at the time. At some point, agency would mean giving financial assistance, just as Nkrumah did for Mali and Guinea for purposive qualitative gains instead of material/quantitative gains.

There are some exercises of African agency in bilateral relations that are subsumed under broader IR narratives which downplay the role of African agents. At first glance, the Ghana Atomic Energy Commission (GAEC) and Volta River Project (VRP) would appear to constitute Cold War gifts, which the East and the West, respectively, gave in a bid to secure their dominance within the subregion. But

³⁵⁷ U.S. politicians get China in Africa all wrong by Deborah Bräutigam. *Washington Post*. Accessed October 3, 2020, Retrieved from <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/04/12/china-africa/>

a historical tracking of the VRP shows that it presented a blueprint for the fulfilment of how the government preferred to execute its socialist ideas. A closer look at the speech Nkrumah gave at the laying of the foundation stone for GAEC reveals a concrete outline of the government's vision for the centre's role in Ghana and Africa. Within the government's broader socialist ideology, these projects are linked to the key component of economic independence, which had Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) as its pathway. For the continent, it was linked to the projection of an African personality that showcased an Africa that could generate power for its citizens and industries, and play a key role in technological and scientific advancements for global peace instead of atomic bombs for war. Negotiations for these projects, especially the amalgamation of different donor countries to serve the industrialisation purpose, reflect African agency in nuanced ways, regardless of how much Cold War geopolitics one reads into it.

The position of the literature on African agency and multilateral arrangements is similar to the regional agency literature (De Carvalho et al., 2019; Tieku, 2013). The fundamental assumption is that agency resides in the consensual action of the cumulative number of African states. Therefore, Africa will have more say and impact on multilaterals if they come together for a unitary action. Here also the assumption is that agency rests on influence and resistance while overlooking the multiple manifestations of agency by different states and the variety of outcomes they produce. For instance, a lot of literature has stressed the imbalance of agency between China and African countries within the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) framework (Staden et al., 2018). But we have to reflect on the argument made earlier about the diversity of interests among these African states and how some of them are exercising their agency in direct relations with China.

More broadly, the debate on agency has focused more on identifying how far and in what ways African political actors are working and shaping the international system. I focus on a rather foundational question about how we can understand and detect agency. I argue for a place for ideology as it creates a context within which governments or political actors frame some of their actions and inactions, whether consciously or unconsciously.

6.5 Conclusion

Although African-centred IR scholarship has contributed significantly in actively pushing Africa into a position where it is taken more seriously, it only presents us with a limited picture of Africa's engagements with the rest of the world. Part of this limitation manifests in the debates about Africa's position, role, room for manoeuvring and purposes. The debates on extraversion and agency form the core analytical focus of this chapter because of their parallel bids to analyse Africa's international relations from a 'bottom-up' perspective and to emphasise a breakaway from the contextually

relevant, “yet determinist, structural accounts of Africa’s international relations” (Brown & Harman, 2013, p. 2). This form part of this thesis’s primary objective to demonstrate how certain overlooked aspects of policy analysis, in this case ideology, can further illuminate the dynamics of Africa’s international relations from history and in the contemporary era.

In this chapter, I have argued that the missing place of ideology in these two debates is crucial because ideology provides alternative perspectives to enrich these debates. With ideology, we are able to add to, rather than replace, the understandings of these debates in a way that presents African governments as entities that act partly on ideological understandings, regardless of how different or non-conforming they might be to existing grand ideologies. I acknowledge that the relative weakness of African states makes them seem less ideological due to the constraints within which they have to bargain to achieve their socio-political and economic objectives. However, analyses that begin with such constraints and a pejorative approach to ideology, as a yardstick for the peripheral nature of ideas, always struggle to articulate any real engagement with the dynamics of African governments operating within these tight corners under different contexts. Although the data for this thesis was mainly from Ghana, and I have already made a case for contextuality, there can be broad applicability on the continent because of similarities in contextual structures and dominant ideological components. However, I do not rule out different ideological approaches. This approach is a signal of intellectual intent. It is an intent to move beyond structural constraints and purely material gains in understanding the actions, preferences, strategies and purposes in order to explore the interpretative contextuality of the actions and inactions of governments. It is also to treat ideas and interest as mutually reinforcing – ideas shape and interest informs ideas in unending cyclical loop. This can be better appraised by understanding not only the configurations of governments but also the diversity of options with their associated interests, ideas, and the historical trajectories of such interests and ideas. As such, we do not treat ideology as one of the variables competing with the others for attention. Instead, we see ideology as a fundamental variable that can give meaning to other factors. We, therefore, will be on a constant lookout for consistency and malleability and adduce factors for such. This is not to say that ideologies explain everything, but it is to highlight the relationship between the interpretive value of ideology and contexts, and to emphasise that such relationships have a significant effect on Africa’s international relations.

Ultimately what this chapter does is to set the tone to bring ideology from the margins into mainstream African literature, and to provoke further analysis of African politics and understanding of state behaviour from such perspectives. Taking ideology seriously would position African-centred IR scholars in a better position to gain a broader and more in-depth awareness of the dynamics of

Africa's international relations. I argue that this will begin by conceiving ideology as a living concept and its influence more dynamic than it is often thought of.

CHAPTER 7 - Revisiting the Main Issues, Implications and Concluding Thoughts

7.1 Introduction

I began this thesis with the observation that the relation between ideology and Africa's international relations is more profound than is typically theorised and analysed by the African-centred literature and constructivist IR theorists. In the analysis of Africa's international relations, ideologies have been overlooked amidst preoccupation with realist or pragmatic inclinations, rhetoric and actions of policy-makers not conforming to dominant ideologies, or external influences appearing to override the ideological objectives of African governments. Constructivist IR theory implies and depends on assumptions of a fundamental difference between the social world and the natural world; hence, the reality is not mind-independent but subjectively created (Halperin & Heath, 2017; Wendt, 1995). This means that, when studying ideology, we can argue that ideas are socially constructed. By studying the dynamics of such processes over a period of time, we can unravel how they are institutionalised, internalised and influence behaviour or government policies. From this, I have shown in the preceding chapters that a non-pejorative and broader conception ideology that focuses on components, contexts and construction or interaction can help us better understand how ideologies shape Ghana's foreign policy. Pursuing an understanding of ideology from this contextual perspective is an approach that I have been inspired to take Michael Freeden's studies of ideology and political theory, where he emphasises on ideological morphology, contestations and decontestations, and more importantly, the fusion of thought and action (Freeden, 2021c). Although, at times in this thesis, I criticised Freeden's focus on the semiotic in the thought-action synergy, I situate this thesis in acknowledging the ubiquity of ideology and how that significantly shapes politics. I, therefore, agree with Freeden that that ideologies are "necessary, normal, and they facilitate (and reflect) political action" (Freeden, 2006, p. 19).

My ambition in this work has been threefold. First, to investigate how ideology can be reconceptualised to make it a useful analytic tool in Africa's international relations. This is based on my observation that ideology has been overlooked not because ideas do not exist or are irrelevant but because existing approaches and methods cannot adequately capture the nuances of ideas in an unconventional context. Second, to explore how this reconceptualised ideological approach can explain Ghana's foreign policy, focusing on neighbour relations, regional integration and economic diplomacy under the Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor administrations. The third is to examine how such reconceptualisation enhances our understanding of how African elites negotiate their agency and dependency, focusing on the extraversion and agency debates.

My task in this concluding chapter is first to summarise the thesis, outlining the main findings and arguments in each chapter. Second, discuss some challenges and clarifications needed to understand this thesis and future research on ideology in Africa. Third, I provide a brief discussion of this thesis's contribution to scholarship and the implications of such contributions. In the final section of this chapter and the whole thesis, I give my final thoughts, which sum up the outlines of this thesis.

7.2 Summary of Chapters and Key Findings

Chapter one was devoted to positioning the research question within the broader African IR context and justifying why Ghana's case, although unique in some ways, represents the broader African condition in different ways. The chapter examined how the ideology-foreign policy relationship has been analysed, demonstrating how such pejorative analyses undermine unravelling ideologies' dynamic role in [unconventional] African politics. I problematised this as a literature gap that leaves much unexplained in Africa and Ghana's international relations. I discussed the various definitions of ideology, foreign policy and offered my definition to clarify my position and demonstrate my intention to look at the relations between the two differently. I further discussed and justified the methodology and methods used for this thesis. The discussions in chapter one set out this thesis's intention to take ideology more seriously than in existing literature. This chapter provided a significant historical and contextual foundation for framing the Ideological Contextualisation Framework in chapter two.

In chapter two, I began by arguing that although several reasons, including dependency, weak degree of institutionalisation and the lack of an industrial revolution (Elscher, 2012; Omotola, 2009; Sprinzak, 1973), have been given for why ideology may be a relatively irrelevant factor in explaining Africa's international relations, these factors and ideologies are not mutually exclusive. I further argued that the problem of ideology in Africa lies not in the existence of these factors. Instead, it lies in much of the literature's pejorative understandings and interpretations of ideology. An additional problem lies in methodologies where what African leaders say is the only parameter for analyses, especially with big ideologies, without considering the resulting policies and the contexts in which these statements are made. Although I criticised constructivism for its liberal identity and top-down bias, it offers the best frame regarding IR theory and research paradigm for reconceptualising ideology because it studies how norms and ideas are socially constructed. At the core of this chapter was to frame and pursue an alternative framework for deployment in an unconventional context. I called this alternative approach the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) based mainly on a reading of Freedman and other analysts like Maynard and Hunt. The fundamental assumption of this approach is that ideologies should consider the immediate environment and historically evolving experiences that can shape interpretations and actions.

There are two key strands to note in this framework. First is the internalised strand that captures established ideologies or big-isms like socialism, Marxism and Liberalism. Internalised ideas are necessary because they form the fundamental frame of thinking about the world when one takes ideologies seriously. It is common for many African governments to associate with one of the big ideologies that are close to their political beliefs, although they may vary depending on the demands of their context. Second is the contextual strand that captures the variables within each context capable of developing into an ideational structure that internalised ideas adjust to. In the context are ideological components and contextual structures. Ideological components are historically evolving conditions that internalised ideologies, regardless of wherever they came from, either take on board or respond to it. I found that good neighbourliness, African consciousness/Pan-Africanism, economic independence and anti-colonialism are key ideological components that the ideologies of Ghanaian governments take on. Although these are common ideological components to all Ghanaian governments, there is no objective interpretation. They get their meaning and approaches from governments' internalised ideologies. However, this is not the only thing happening in the context. Contextual structures are those institutions, domestic or international, historical or not, that tend to create certain ideas that governments respond to differently. In my study of Ghana's foreign policy, these institutions include the IMF and World Bank, the UN, AU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional bodies.

Constructivists have long emphasised norm diffusion by international organisations (Carlsnaes, 2013; Finnemore, 1996; Ray & Kaarbo, 2008; Risse & Sikkink, 1999). However, this emphasis has always been a top-down analysis with little emphasis on the interaction between governments and these institutions on the level of ideas. Essentially, very little attention has been paid to how this happens and how governments' ideologies respond to the ideas from such contextual structures. The contextual framework used in the paper argues that not every government learns if they accept a policy, and those that learn do it in more dynamic ways. Different governments adjust to these ideological norms differently. While some governments conform to it only for a short period out of pressure, others genuinely adapt for the long term. Some can instrumentalise the ideas to achieve the government's ideological purposes or dualise when the government shuffles between conforming to structural ideas and their own ideas. These ideological adjustment pathways are not mutually exclusive. Instead, governments can shuffle with the pathways for a single institution or idea. Put together, I called this the varieties of Ghanaian nationalism. Because the lexicon nationalism and how it has been used, provides a broader framework for ideology-foreign policy relationship in the Ghanaian context. The contextual components are the nationalist part, while the internalised and

contextual structures present the varieties. With this framework crafted, I moved on to the next empirical chapters and demonstrated how it works practically.

The task for chapter three was to investigate how ideologies shaped Ghana's neighbour-relations under the Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor administrations. I began the chapter by critically reviewing the literature on neighbour relations and demonstrating how their preoccupation has been less on foreign policy-making processes but more on the effects of issues around conflicts, tensions, and cross border trade. The point was that although these issues characterised neighbour-relations, there are fundamental factors that shape neighbour relations. A deeper look at the ideology-foreign policy relationship in neighbour relations is essential to understanding these fundamentals. I argue the remnants of colonialism, especially the nature of border demarcation mixed with ethnicity and tensions even before independence, meant that African states became threats and opportunities to each other. For the most part, many African states have been in the business of proving to neighbouring countries that they are an opportunity (friends) rather than a threat (enemies). However, these efforts are wide-ranging; they have been perceived differently and attracted different responses from governments. At the core, this chapter showed how the ideologies of Ghanaian governments influenced these efforts and responses.

I showed, broadly, that under the three administrations, Ghana moved from being tensed and antagonistic during the Nkrumah administration to being cordial and more collaborative under Kufuor's administration. I argued that these escalations and de-escalations were partly caused by ideological interpretations, disagreements and consensus over internalised and contextual ideological components. More specifically, I argued that ideologies have three main roles in Ghana's neighbour relations. First is the role of ideology in shaping what the neighbourhood is or where the neighbourhood is situated. Here, I distinguished between geographic neighbours - a neighbourhood based on geographic borders or proximity - and conceptual neighbourhood, which is a conceptual construction based on ideological considerations. Second, ideologies shaped the administrations' identification of friends and enemies as a basis for alliances and foreign policy in general. The observation here is that similarity in ideology for foreign policy was key in the government choice of friends and perception of enemies. Third, ideologies shaped how they defined neighbourly behaviour. I argued that although good neighbourliness has been Ghana's primary neighbourhood policy, it meant different things to the three administrations. And these differences were occasioned by their ideological differences. The findings in this chapter showed that of all the three foreign policy areas analysed in this thesis, internalised ideas and their interpretation of ideological components have a dominant influence on neighbour relations than regional integration and economic diplomacy. This means the lack of any contextual structures stronger enough to generate ideological norms that the

internalised ideas of governments will adjust to. It also accounts for the historically unstable nature of Ghana's neighbour relations as a change in government meant a change in neighbour policy.

In chapter four, I take the ideological contextualisation approach into Ghana's efforts towards regional integration. Here, I presented Pan-Africanism as the core of ideologies shaping Ghana's efforts towards regional integration, just like many studies have established. However, unlike many studies, I argued that Pan-Africanism alone could not explain Ghana's efforts towards regional integration. However, we can understand Pan-Africanism and regional integration by studying its relations with the internalised ideas and other ideological components and structures like the UN. Within the contextualisation framework, I positioned Pan-Africanism as a contextual component that does not only work with other components like anti-colonialism, economic independence, and good neighbourliness. It also gets part of its meaning from the government's internalised ideology. This explains why different governments pursued various approaches and levels of effort.

Unlike the analysis of neighbour relations (chapter three) and economic diplomacy (chapter five), I began this chapter's analysis with a brief discussion of the history of Pan-Africanism and regional integration. For a thesis on context and historically evolving ideological variables, it was useful to trace Ghana's history of Pan-Africanism and regional integration to provide a context not only for the first post-colonial Nkrumah administration but also for the Kufuor administration, which, I argued, has held on to the Pan-African interpretations pioneered by their by forerunners who opposed Nkrumah.

Beyond these arguments, this chapter makes two main observations about the broad shifts in ideology and Ghana's efforts towards regional integration between the Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor administrations. First is the shift from the radical to moderate approach to regional integration between Nkrumah and Kufuor administration. This was a shift from seeing regional integration as an immediate objective to an ultimate desire. The second shift was a move from politically driven regional integration to a more economic focus. Although Nkrumah had economic intentions, due to the all-encompassing nature of the integration he proposed, the administration emphasised political unification first before the rest. However, by the beginning of the Kufuor administration in 2001, this had shifted to more economic and functional integration. The chapter showed that the dominant political bit the Kufuor administration pursued was democratic values and good governance in independent African states. These shifts are embedded in the ideological dynamics of the three administrations, not only Pan-Africanism.

It shows that there is more happening than a standard interpretation of Pan-Africanism. This, I argued, was due to the interactions between the internalised ideology (like liberalism) of governments, the contextual components (like Economic independence) and ideas from contextual structures (such as

AU, ECOWAS). By the Rawlings administration, contextual structures like the AU and ECOWAS were becoming stronger enough to produce ideas that governments' ideologies had to adjust to or say something about. This makes their contextual dynamics much different from what existed during the Nkrumah era.

Although I revealed the different roles for ideologies during different administrations, there are those roles that characterised Ghanaian nationalism and cut across all the administrations. They revolve around how Pan-Africanism is reflected in the use of security and peacekeeping arrangements to pursue some form of integration, and the assumption of a leadership role on the continent.

Chapter five analysed and demonstrated how ideologies shape Ghana's economic diplomacy under the three administrations. One important thing I did in this chapter is to review the internalised ideologies of each government, internal contestations, genealogies and how it shapes the interpretation of ideological components and responses to contextual structures. This is because there is a lot of literature and conversation on Ghana and Africa's economic diplomacy. It is one of the main avenues African states use to address domestic economic and developmental challenges. Due to how critical it is, economic diplomacy has been a critical part of African IR debates, including extraversion and agency. Therefore, for a thesis intended to explore the role of ideology, it was imperative to make these ideological clarifications for each administration before I moved into the analysis of the roles of ideologies. In this chapter, I admitted to the tight spaces African countries have to negotiate due to their dependency and relatively less economic power. Ghana is not an exception. As I argued in chapter two, although these conditions may affect the level of agency, they do not mean the absence of ideology. Therefore, for a study that set out to take ideology more seriously, these factors meant that the nature and role of ideology in economic diplomacy is more nuanced.

This chapter observed certain broad parallels and shifts across the three foreign policy areas and administrations. I demonstrate that Ghana's economic diplomacy was a varied reactive response to Ghana's developmental challenges and conditions across the three administrations. These responses were shaped by a combination of each administration's internalised ideology, interpretation of anti-colonialism and economic independence and ideas from contextual structures. Across the three foreign policy areas, economic diplomacy is where internalised ideas had to adjust to ideas from powerful contextual structures such as the Bretton Woods Institutions. These adjustments also had implications for agency, where on the surface, the more you adjust, the more agency you lose. However, these adjustments and its implication for agency varied across the different administrations. The Rawlings administration showed that even when agency seemed to have been lost on the surface, the government worked through some form of resistance, influence and different approaches to

policy execution. For the Kufuor administration, due to its classical liberal internalised idea, enrolling on an IMF-World Bank inspired neoliberal HIPC programme was not necessarily a dereliction of agency like can be said of the Rawlings administration. Instead, the government enrolled on a programme the administration believed in its viability, and the chapter demonstrates this by building some convergence and comparisons.

This chapter also established the difference between economic and financial diplomacy, explained by Lee & Hocking (2010), as a key part of Africa's economic diplomacy. While the latter is concerned with financial stability like some IMF and World Bank programmes do, the former makes economic relations broader, links it to other aspects of foreign policy and has deeper meanings to the actors beyond financial dividends. With this background and distinction in mind, chapter five revealed differences in economic identity, objectives, perceptions, and interests across all three administrations – parameters shaped by each government's ideologies. More specifically, certain roles of ideology cut across all three administrations. Ideologies shaped the objectives of Ghana's economic diplomacy, influenced how economic relations were perceived and influenced reaction to policies from other countries or foreign institutions.

In the sixth and final chapter, I developed my argument by drawing on the dynamics of the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) and insights from its deployment in the Ghanaian case to analyse its broader application in Africa's international relations by contributing to the extraversion and agency debates. I argued that, although there is a growing plurality in how international relations and, specifically, Africa is being studied, many of these studies have overlooked ideology or ideas and their relevance to understanding the dynamics of African international relations.

The focus on extraversion and agency debates was because both demonstrate a bid to look at Africa's international relations differently – from a bottom-up approach – and situate Africa as a key player in global affairs instead of being a passive recipient. Focusing on ideologies generally is a way of thinking about policies from the countries' perspective and assuming the interplay of many dynamic perspectives. Therefore, it was surprising that ideology has not received much attention in those debates. The chapter demonstrated that bringing ideologies into these two debates provides an alternative, but complementary, perspective beyond resistance and influence.

The chapter demonstrated that although extraversion theories' overemphasis of instrumentalism is one of the ways in which they downplay ideology, a more refined conceptualisation of ideology embodies its instrumental function, different from what extraversion posits. On agency, the chapter demonstrated that an analytical focus on the relationship between ideology and agency does not presume that there is a significantly greater agency lurking somewhere. Instead, ideology illuminates

such areas, which are either overlooked or thought of as dependence when they are rather different manifestations of African agency. Generally, I argued in the chapter that this approach to African agency enhances the debate by encouraging us to ask questions relating to how specific actors interpret their contexts, what ideational implications we can draw from those interpretations, how they influenced strategies for action, outcomes of those strategies, and how the outcomes reflect the ideational positions. I conclude the chapter by suggesting that taking ideology seriously would place African-centred IR scholars in a better position to gain a broader and more in-depth awareness of the dynamics of Africa's international relations. This will begin by conceiving ideology as a living concept and its influence more dynamic than often thought.

7.3 Challenges and Clarifications

Beyond the conventional challenges associated with qualitative fieldwork and data analysis, researching ideologies in an unconventional context comes with challenges that require the researcher to be more reflexive. The first challenge is the potential to meet and interview policy-makers and other respondents who have a pejorative view of ideology – something that this study set out to contest. Talking about ideology pejoratively can conceal certain areas, just like beginning an ideology-policy analysis from such a position. To present their administrations differently, some of my respondents preferred to use the word tradition or values instead of ideology because the word ideology has been used to characterise what they called “strongmen”, “revolutionists”, “original thinkers”, or leaders “who sort of meddle or grab power or any piece of land from any of our neighbours”. However, further questioning into components instead of big-isms releases them from the pejorative preoccupations into what they argue as the practicalities of the African condition. It is from these that I gleaned the ideological components and formed the core of what I called nationalism; the subsequent diversity of explanations I got from other archival readings and interviews, influenced by how they tried to relate with a global association of like-minded people, is what I called the varieties. Together, they form the basis of what I refer to as the varieties of Ghanaian nationalism.

On the other hand, those who talked about ideologies from a totalitarian perspective. In simple terms, think everything is ideology. While the pejorative view of ideology can mask certain nuances, narrower definitions are equally harmful in how they ignore context, opposition, contestations and decontestations, discontinuities and contradictions, internally and externally. In my conceptualisation of ideology, I put the two together as undermining the utility of ideology. What made the difference, in my case, was going with a framework that was flexible but anticipated some of these dynamics.

For an approach that relies on context specificity, one issue that needs clarifying is the general applicability of findings, especially across the African continent. The intention for proposing the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) was to frame an alternative approach to analysing how ideologies shape policy-making in an unconventional African context. Its key contribution lies in how it conceptualises the interaction between internalised ideas and contextual components and structures. In this thesis, I deployed this approach to studying Ghana's foreign policy and found more nuanced manifestations of ideology than analysed in the existing literature. Though contextual, I hope that this framework can be applied for comparative studies in different African countries due to the following reasons.

The choice of Ghana was motivated by the bid to select a case that is balanced and represents some of the prevailing conditions across many African countries. Selecting Ghana does not only allow the thesis to analyse foreign policy over a long period, as Ghana is the first sub-Saharan country to gain independence. The contextual components and structures identified in the Ghanaian context reflect the condition in several African countries. Many existing studies have highlighted these components but not their ideological value (Ayittey, 2010; Langan, 2020; Magu, 2021; Thompson, 2016; Youde, 2007). Therefore, these components can still be relevant to analysis in other African contexts.

Although the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) relied on the Ghanaian context, what has been demonstrated is that its key parts are flexible and can be adapted in different countries or for comparative analysis. The framework provides frames of interaction under which different variables can function to shape foreign policy. The part that deals with internalised ideas revolve around governments' general use of big-isms. It is not limited to the Socialism-Marxism-Liberalism that has dominated the Ghanaian ideology space. It even made a case for indigenisation which is the original framing of new ideologies.

Regarding the contextual part, I have indicated above that although the components and structures revealed in this thesis, to some extent, represents the African condition and have a potential for broad application, the framework still accommodates additional components and structures. The only caveat is that these components should have some historically evolving features capable of being interpreted by internalised ideologies or internalised ideologies adjusting to them. Generally put within a different context, the broad frame of this approach will not change, but the internal components can be adapted to suit the elites or political dynamics of the context.

7.4 Contributions and Implications of Research: Contextualising Ideologies, Varieties of Ghanaian Nationalism, and International Relations

My findings provide some valuable insights and contributions in the context of empirical and theoretical research on Ghana's foreign policy and Africa's international relations, in general. For the purpose of the overall research question, the findings of this thesis contribute to the contemporary debate on the burgeoning literature on ideology beyond the narrow and pejorative characterisations that restrict its utility. Similar approaches have been deployed across different academic fields (Maynard, 2019) and other continents (Freeden, 2021b; Hunt, 2009). However, the intersection between this new development and international relations is underexplored, especially in the African context. While I reflect on the dynamics of ideology and Africa's international relations, I find that its unconventional nature, the structural constraints and opportunities fit in with the new attempts, pioneered by Freeden, to study ideology in a way that establishes a synergy between thought and action. This was interesting because it is a similar complex interaction between ideologies, that is to say, internal connections between what Freeden referred to as core and peripheral concepts, that characterises the African context albeit in a different permutation. In answering this question, this thesis provided a relatively comprehensive, balanced and comparative overview of Ghana foreign policy. It has provided theoretical insights into Ghana's foreign policy.

The core of this thesis contribution revealed how paying attention to ideology allows a more nuanced investigation into Ghana and Africa's international relations amidst the negotiation of agency and dependency. This study conceived ideology as a living variable, necessary and has dynamic utility instead of the narrow and pejorative views. Taking such a view in this thesis destabilises and critiques the dominant approaches that have been used in Africa's international relations as they undermine the utility of ideology. This, I think, fits in Freeden's proposal to focus more on construction and contexts and interactions.

In this thesis, the framing of the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) contributes to the debate in the ideology literature and how it helps in our understanding of Ghana's and Africa's international relations. The two-part framework covering internalised and contextual ideas presents a clearer explanation of the relationship between ideology and international relations. Although this approach has been adopted in other fields like conflict and terrorism (Maynard, 2019), it remains an underexplored approach to theorising ideology and international relations. The difference between what I frame in this thesis and other fields is my introduction of contextual ideological components and their historically evolving interpretations, occasioned by their interaction with the internalised ideas and the ideas from contextual structures. The fine balance between these three exemplifies construction, context and interaction, which are the mainstays of the new approaches to framing the

thought-action synergy of ideology. This framework presents an alternative approach to analysing ideology and Africa's international relations.

At many points in this study, I have presented evidence suggesting that the ideologies of governments in power characterise Ghana's foreign policy through a complex mix: the interaction between internalised and contextual ideas, which, altogether, I called the varieties of Ghanaian nationalism. This evidence further suggests that ideology performs different roles under each foreign policy area – neighbour-relations, regional integration, and economic diplomacy. These findings suggest that the [deliberate or indeliberate] position taken by many African-centred scholars and scholars on Ghana's foreign policy that overlooks ideology not only amounts to a mischaracterisation of ideology but also reduces the level of seriousness we give to foreign policy in Africa. To reiterate Alex Thompson's statement, "if the study of ideology helps political scientists to understand the politics of the West, then the same should also be true for post-colonial Africa" (Thompson, 2016, p. 32). Therefore, any research attempting to understand Ghanaian and African politics needs to explore the ideologies in a less predetermined way but more contextual. This is what the whole of this thesis sought to do.

While constructivism provided the most viable IR theory to this thesis, the findings fill some of the shortcomings of constructivism, as discussed in chapter two. These include the constructivists' dominant focus on identity and norms, liberal bias, top-down approach, and less dynamic in its much-touted learning theorising in international relations. I address these gaps by focusing more on ideology; not only on liberal ideas but also on the internalised part of the ICF captures other big ideologies; analyse international relations from a bottom-up perspective; and analyse the dynamism in how state learn, captured under ideas from contextual structures within the ICF. In addition, Felix Berenskoetter inspires this thesis's contribution to constructivism with a focus on the link between ideology, friendship and enemy, particularly from an African context where such links produce a variety of state actions that are relevant to understanding neighbour relations (Berenskoetter, 2007).

Although this thesis is about ideology and foreign policy, it has implications for Ghanaian and African politics. Key among them is the exposé that Ghana's political landscape has been dominated by two ideologies which, regardless of changes, governments since independence have either aligned or continued to demonstrate their significance. This is the ideological dichotomy between the Nkrumaist and the Danquah-Busia-Dombo ideologies. The findings contradict the popular commentary and studies that argue that Ghanaian politics has nothing to do with ideology or ideology is used for its electoral market value (Whitfield, 2009). While acknowledging that ideologies can be used for such purposes, the findings of this study show that ideology is more dynamic and complex in an unconventional setting than this. Generally, what leads to these conclusions is the preoccupation to

separate Ghanaian parties or governments ideologically based on certain predetermined spectrums. But the Ideological Contextualisation Framework (ICF) and findings have shown that common contextual components and structures exist whose differences are occasioned by the interpretation given to them by the internalised ideas. This way, we can establish some points of ideological convergence and difference in the over sixty years of Ghana's political history.

This thesis links with the broader literature on extraversion and African agency, offering insights into how parts of extraversion can be a mischaracterisation of African politics and how African agency goes beyond the show of influence and resistance. To be clear, this is a signal of intent as I will suggest that future studies take ideology seriously in this regard. Hence this thesis has sought all along to question and critique why ideology has been taken for granted amidst preoccupation with dependency, economic stress, extraversion, high mortality and turnover of party leadership, and African parties' weak degree of institutionalisation. The analysis revealed how these observations are plausible but are not viable justifications for overlooking ideology. It is not my intention, in this thesis, to neglect the reality of Africa and Ghana's relatively weaker position in global affairs. However, using these conditions as a basis to overlook ideology or assume their non-existence is something that broader and non-pejorative approaches to ideology have contested. Therefore, to argue that regardless of Africa's putatively weaker position in global affairs is not mutually exclusive to ideology; that this context in itself creates conditions and structures capable of forming ideological foundations for actions and inactions that need to be interrogated by those who engage with African politics to open up to the reconceptualisation of ideology is in line with the spirit of looking at ideology differently. This thesis is a modest but relevant contribution to that critical interrogation.

7.5 Conclusion and Reflections

The perspective articulated in this thesis is far from offering ideology as an answer to all questions about Africa's international relations. In this thesis, I am primarily concerned with the quest to critically analyse the role of ideologies in Africa's international relations from a specific illustrative case study. In doing so, I revisited Ghana's foreign policy regarding neighbour-relations, regional integration and economic diplomacy across the Nkrumah, Rawlings and Kufuor administrations. This has involved emphasising how the pejorative characterisations and narrow definitions of ideology have undermined analysis of ideology and Africa's international relations. My view is that these characterisations are restrictive and also based on factors whose existence does not mean the non-existence of ideology. My deduction from this situation was the need for an alternative way of looking at ideology, which I proposed a contextual framework based on my reading of scholars like Michael Freedman. The argument raised in this thesis is not to retell or historicise Ghana's foreign policy.

However, I have given attention to certain historical issues, across the three administrations, in the hope to contextualise, problematise Ghana's international relations and reflect on the broader epochs of Africa's international relations since independence.

I argue that Ghana's foreign policy, since independence, is a reflection of varieties of Ghanaian nationalism which has been dominated by the dichotomy between Nkrumaist and the Danquah-Busia-Dombo lineage – an ideological divide that began even before independence. From this point, I suggest that although each administration associates with one of the big ideologies, there are ideological components that cut across. These are good neighbourliness, African consciousness or Pan-Africanism, economic independence and anti-colonialism. Along with this are ideas from contextual structures, such as the UN, AU, ECOWAS, IMF and World Bank, that internalised ideas of governments can adjust to in different ways. This claim does not mean ideology is everything. It is to show that what happens, in terms of ideology in an unconventional context, is more complex than has been analysed. Paying attention to contextualisation is the first step to understanding this complexity.

Objections can be raised about how this thesis focuses too heavily on Ghana and excludes other countries, which could have offered further insights through comparative studies. I believe my reasons for focusing on Ghana – because Ghana is unique, yet it bears semblance in many issues with other African countries and offers longevity in foreign policy-making – has been justified. Nevertheless, the frequent references to the broader African conditions across this thesis and the focus on extraversion and agency debates in chapter six raise the question of ideology's role in contemporary African politics. How best can we study ideologies in Africa? Is ideology important in other African countries like this study has shown in Ghana, using a contextualised approach and framework? How does ideology shape other aspects of foreign policy beyond the areas considered by this study? And more fundamentally, what other ideological components are relevant to contextualising ideology in Africa? These are some questions for future research.

Appendices

List of Abbreviations

APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	African Union
BRIC	Brazil, Russia, India and China
BWI	Bretton Woods Institutions
CPP	Convention People's Party
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ERP	Economic Recovery Programme
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
ICF	Ideological Contextualisation Framework
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IR	International Relations
MP	Member of Parliament
NCBWA	National Congress of British West Africa
NDC	National Democratic Congress
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NLM	National Liberation Movement
NPP	New Patriotic Party
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PJCC	Permanent Joint Commission for Cooperation
PNDC	Provisional National Defence Council
PNP	Peoples National Party
PP	Progress Party
SAP	Structural Adjustment Programme
UGCC	United Gold Coast Convention
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UP	United Party
WTO	World Trade Organisation

List of Interviewees

NAME		PARTY AFFILIATION	PROFILE
1	Afua Yakohene	Independent	Research Fellow - Legon Centre of International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana. Expert on Regional Integration
2	Baffour Agyeman-Duah	Independent	Professor of Politics and International Relations: Chief Executive Officer at the John A. Kufuor Foundation. Former Senior Governance Advisor to UN in Tanzania and Senior Special Advisor at the United Nations Mission in Liberia.
3	Clement Otu Cudeto, <i>widely known as C.O.C Amate</i>	Independent	MP during Ghana's First Republic; Speech Writer to Nkrumah. Career Diplomat and former Ghana representative at the OAU, now AU
4	Daniel Kufuor Osei <i>widely known as Ambassador D. K. Osei</i>	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Retired career Diplomat; Personal Secretary to President Kufuor; Member of the Diplomatic Action Committee under President Kufuor
5	Ebenezer Moses Debrah	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	Retired career Diplomat and a Pioneer of Ghana's Foreign Service. Ghana's first representative to the OAU
6	Edward Asomani	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Executive Director, Danquah Institute
7	Kwadwo Afari	New Patriotic Party (NPP)	Director of Protocol, NPP
8	Francis Tsegah	Independent	Retired career Diplomat and Senior Research Fellow at Centre for Democratic Development - Ghana
9	John Agyekum Kufuor	New Patriotic Party	Former President of Ghana 2001-2009

10	Kofi Attor	Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Member of the PNDC: NDC National Vice Chairman and Director of International Relations. Former member, ranking member and chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
11	Kwabena Baah-Duodu	Independent	Diplomat-in-Residence at LECIAD, University of Ghana. Retired career Diplomat: Ambassador to Switzerland and Austria and Permanent Representative to the European Offices of the UN and other Int. Orgs from 2006 to 2009; Senior Advisor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) from 2009 to 2011
12	Kwabena Bonfeh (Kabila)	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	General Secretary, CPP
13	Kwaku Danso-Boafo	Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Professor of Political Science; Member of the PNDC; Author of the controversial <i>Biography of Dr Kofi Abrefa Busia</i> (1996), and also <i>JJ Rawlings and the democratic transition in Ghana</i> , (2017). Ambassador to Cuba with simultaneous accreditation to Jamaica, Trinidad, Nicaragua and Panama – 1997 to 2000. Cabinet Minister in charge of Health under NDC. Special Advisor to the Eminent Person of the United Nations and former president of Ghana, Jerry Rawlings. From September 27, 2009 to 2012 he was High Commissioner in London
14	Kwame Asamoah Tenkorang	Independent	Retired career Diplomat: Served as first secretary and counsellor of Ghana's permanent mission to the UN office in Geneva from 1987 to 1991. Personal assistant to the

			Minister for Foreign Affairs; Obed Asamoah; Chargé d'Affaires at the Embassy of Ghana in Tokyo, Japan; Chief of Protocol at the Ministry; Ambassador to Libya, Kenya, Malta, Singapore, and Community of Sahel-Saharan States.
15	Kwame Boafo-Arthur	Independent	Professor of Politics and International Relations and expert on Ghana's foreign policy
16	Kwamena Ahwoi	Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Member of the PNDC: Minister for Local Government and Rural Development from 1990 to 2001 He also briefly served as Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1997 and was acting minister of Foreign Affairs during much of the 1990s. Former Director of Research
17	Mohammed Mumuni	Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Former NDC MP; Minister of Employment and Social Welfare under President Rawlings. 2004 Running Mate for John Evans Atta Mills; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Regional Integration, 2009-2013.
18	Nana Ato Dadzie	Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Member of the PNDC/NDC: former Chief of Staff to Rawlings, Special Assistant to former President Rawlings, Presidential advisor and PNDC Secretary in charge of the PNDC Secretariat
19	Obed Asamoah	Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) and National Democratic Congress (NDC)	Member of the PNDC/NDC: Ghana's longest serving Minister for Foreign Affairs under the Rawlings administration. He also became Attorney General and Minister for Justice from 1993 to 2001; and an MP during Ghana's 2 nd Republic between 1969-1972
20	Samia Nkrumah	Convention Peoples Party (CPP)	Daughter of Kwame Nkrumah; Former Chairperson and MP of the

			CPP; President of the Kwame Nkrumah Pan African Centre
21	Yao Gebe	Independent	Senior Research Fellow - Legon Centre of International Affairs and Diplomacy (LECIAD), University of Ghana.
22	Anonymous	Independent	Retired career Diplomat. Served in various African and South American countries

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