People, Place, and Power in Tacitus' Germany

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Leen Van Broeck, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: 

Date: Wednesday 20 December 2017

Abstract

This thesis analyses Tacitus' account of Germany and the Germans through a re-reading of all passages in the Tacitean corpus set in Germany. The focus is on the nature of power exerted in spaces and by spaces. The aim is to uncover the spatial themes within Tacitus' work and offer new perspectives on his treatment of space and power. Throughout, I see landscape as a powerful influence on those who inhabit it. That landscape can be managed and altered, but is resistant to imperial power.

Chapter one discusses the limits of violent Roman repression in overcoming the landscapes and people of Germany during the Batavian revolt. **Chapter two** demonstrates that the revolt's ultimate demise can be located in Rome's undermining of the unity of purpose and identity of the alliance created by Civilis. **Chapter three** traces lexical and thematic similarities in the discourses of Roman mutineers on the Rhine in AD14 and the German rebels of AD69-70, suggesting Tacitus – through repetition – sees imperial power as inevitably producing certain forms of resistance that are replicated in a variety of instances and circumstances, whatever the identities involved. **Chapter four** evaluates Germanicus' campaigns in Germany as assertions of power and identity through extreme violence. I also show the difficulties of maintaining Roman identity in the German landscape of ruin, decay and terror through discussion of Caecina's and Agrippina's interventions to preserve Roman spatial integrity. **Chapter five** demonstrates the recurrence of landscape and power's prominence throughout the later books of the *Annals*, through a consideration of Florus and Sacrovir's revolt, the fluctuating fates of the Cheruscan king Italicus, and the migrations of the Frisii and the Ampsivarii. **Chapter six** argues that the *Germania* uses history and the landscape to show how Germany is ultimately inaccessible to Rome and hence unconquerable.

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Introduction

This thesis unpacks Tacitus' literary presentation of *res Germanae* by analysing the role played by the place (and space) 'Germany' in the events narrated. It examines the author's depiction of the lived experiences of Roman soldiers and provincial subjects in Germania. From these analyses, I will draw conclusions about Tacitus' historical and political thought with a focus on Empire and imperial power. There will be two primary conclusions. The first is that Tacitus consistently – across German affairs in the *Histories*, *Annals* and *Germania* – represents the landscapes of the (watery) Rhineland and (forested) Germany across the Rhine as difficult to navigate by Rome, powerful in their resistance to Rome, and essentially unconquerable by Rome. This has been noted in passing by several scholars, contradicted by some, and in the case of the *Germania*, analysed in depth by one, but this is the first study to cross-compare all *res Germanae* from the entire Tacitean corpus and gauge its general applicability. Its second conclusion is that Tacitus describes the lived experiences of all who were implicated in one way or another in the Roman Empire of the first century AD, with very different statuses and ethnic identities, in terms so thematically – and often lexically – similar to suggest that there was only a single lived experience on offer: of being unhappily and irremediably oppressed by imperial power. This includes Roman citizen-soldiers no less than tribute-paying provincials.

In focusing on Germany as a subject in its own right, the present work's methodology departs from the most prominent strand of thought in Tacitean scholarship of the past few decades which emphasises the mirroring function of his depiction of events and peoples abroad.[1] It shares with mirroring the concern to direct attention away from trying to retrieve or reconstruct 'what happened' but differs from mirroring in retaining the focus on the examined

[1]See O'Gorman (1993), 135: 'The *Germania*, as its full title *de origine et situ Germanorum* implies, is about Rome.' See also Timpe (2007) and Smith (2002, especially chapters three and four) on the *Germania* and Low (2013) on the first hexad of the *Annals*.

subject rather than seeing it as a lens through which to view something else. This is not to deny that mirroring is one valid approach to illuminating the complex nexus of ideas and purposes which informed Tacitus' writing. However, whatever our contemporary judgment of Tacitus' historical works as works of history, I do not doubt that *he* saw himself as engaged in the task of describing past events which actually happened as well as formulating historical truths, insights and patterns on the basis of those events, which on occasion transcended the specifics of their individual circumstances.[2]

A first aspect of this thesis' contribution to scholarship, therefore, is its focus on the depiction and role of the space 'Germany' in every German example from the texts. Even when an emotionally affective (sad, threatening, etc.) Germany is an appropriate setting for an emotionally significant event, as in Germanicus' visit to the battlefield of Teutoburg or the chaos of the Civil War of AD69, such representations are not, or not solely, vehicles or metaphors for talking about things *other* than Roman imperialism and power.[3] In chapter one I explore the complex interplay of natural features and human bodies in a game of power between two opposing military forces in Tacitus' representation of the Batavian revolt (*Hist.* 4.12-37, 4.54-79, and 5.5-26). The episode foregrounds the productive, symbiotic relationship between the German rebels and their watery environment and the relative weakness of Roman technology in the face of this powerful landscape.[4] I read this dichotomy in the narrative's depiction of imperialism and resistance through the lens of Jane Bennett's conception of vibrant matter, which 'presents individuals as simply incapable of bearing *full*

[2]In that sense, I share the caution expressed in the polemics of Evans (2007) and Lendon (2009) on reading historiography, including Tacitus, solely as literature. Though, in fairness, so does Low (2013, 18).

[3]Cf. Pagán (1999), 302: 'Our concern is not, however, to reconsider Tacitus' geography of the lower Rhine; it is to examine the way these two startling paragraphs [describing Germanicus' visit to the battlefield at Teutoburg] evoke the themes of transgression and transformation in the *Annales*.'; O'Gorman (1995), 117: 'the landscapes of Palestine and Germany are marshaled as physical manifestations of the moral/political/poetical discourse(s) of civil war.'

[4]Noted by O'Gorman (1995, 125) but again metaphorically: 'Civilis embodies Roman civil war. It is appropriate therefore that his tribe, the Batavi, are at home with the fluid landscape of discord.'

responsibility for their effects'.[5] The matrix of agency within which all human events unfold themselves, for which she borrows Deleuze and Guattari's term of *assemblage*, includes the agency of nonhuman material.[6] In Tacitus' account of the Batavian revolt, nonhuman agency emerges most clearly in the behaviour of the river Rhine which unexpectedly and severely affects Roman military operations on two occasions (*Hist.* 4.26 and 5.23). Given Tacitus' report of the Roman soldiers' fearful response to these, I further explore the Roman religious context in which such fear makes sense: the routine recognition of rivers as divine entities and the ceremony of *evocatio* by which Romans attempted to entice the gods of their enemies away from their people and over to Rome's side. I simultaneously propose, on the basis of Tacitus' dismissal of the soldiers' fear, a more secular reading of landscape agency in Tacitus. The Germany of the *Histories* is both an alien place, which has its effects on the psychology of the soldiers, and a challenging place in its geophysical attributes, which has its effects on the deployment of Roman military power and engineering.

The *assemblage*, in this more neutral, secular sense of a variety of other factors involved in Roman imperialism alongside human agency, recurs throughout the *Annals*, most explicitly in the Germanicus campaigns of *Annals* 1 and 2, discussed in chapter four, which are frequently frustrated by impenetrable forests, boggy marshes, and Roman disorientation.[7] To my knowledge, Maria Antonietta Giua's 1988 monograph *Contesti ambientali e azione umana nella storiografia di Tacito* is the only other work to have treated at length the importance of the Tacitean landscapes in our readings of his texts. In the third chapter of the book, discussing the Germanicus campaigns, she challenges

> 'la tradizionale visione di Tacito come storico interessato esclusivamente all'azione umana. In realtà quest'ultima riceve dall'ambiente geografico e naturale continui condizionamenti, così che la trama del resoconto storico diventa più ricca, non limitata alla psicologia di individui e di gruppi, ma aperta ad una dinamica più complessa.'[8]

[5]Bennett (2010), 37.
[6]Developed in Deleuze and Guattari (1980).
[7]Compare Low (2013), 56-65.
[8]Giua (1988), 86.

> ['the traditional vision of Tacitus as a historian interested exclusively in human action. In fact, the latter experiences continuous influencing by the geographical and natural environment, so that the texture of the historical account becomes richer, not limited to the psychology of individuals and groups, but open to a more complex dynamic.']

This thesis offers a closer reading of the text than Giua's, but always starting from the viewpoint articulated above, that once the landscape is taken into account alongside human action we gain a much better understanding of the events depicted and a clearer appreciation of the richness and complexity of the Tacitean text. At the same time, I will show that Tacitus frequently nuances, or part-undermines, the environmentally deterministic position which connects Germans at home in the landscape with success (and unfamiliar Romans with disaster). On several occasions increased knowledge of the alien landscape can tip the balance of the *assemblage* of agency, which directs events and outcomes, into Roman victory. This happens most clearly in the Germanicus campaigns, where, significantly, the knowledge which enables Roman success is borrowed from traitorous German natives (*Ann.* 2.12ff and 2.20ff): the successes thus preclude real Roman understanding and thereby permanence. Germanicus neither comes to understand nor conquers Germany. On the other hand, the successes of Corbulo's German travels and his expulsion of the rebel Gannascus (*Ann.* 11.18-9), discussed as part of chapter five, map neatly onto Germanicus' failures, suggesting reports from the earlier efforts inspired the later ones. Romans' own knowledge could optimise the *assemblage* in their favour too. Corbulo at least could learn from history.

Even so, Tacitus shows how Germany remained unconquered by Corbulo, as it did by Germanicus. Though the narrative leaves unclear whether Corbulo, travelling through Germany in the AD40s, found the decaying relics of Germanicus' military infrastructure, chapter four shows that Germanicus himself in the AD10s encountered too many dilapidated structures put up by *his* Roman predecessors (including his father Drusus) to inspire faith in the reader that his own interventions would long outlast him. My conclusions therefore diverge from Levene's on warfare in the *Annals.* He concludes that at *Ann.* 2.21,

when Germanicus has won the second of his battles against Arminius' troops, 'Germanicus' control of the physical landscape of Germany is now complete.' Concerning warfare in the rest of the work, he concludes that

> '[i]f the Empire [after Germanicus' death in the *Annals*] no longer involves grand wars and conquests, it is only partly the fault of the imperial system. It is no less the result of the success of Germanicus, who has made control of the Empire all too easy.'[9]

Tacitus' account of the decades after Germanicus' death in the rest of the *Annals* do not bear this out, even if we concede Levene's literary point – the main thrust of his paper – that battle scenes do become less varied and lively. Moreover, the *Histories*, whose narrated time is AD69-70, still show little sign of firm Roman control of even the Rhineland (either its people or its landscape) on the Gallic west bank of the Rhine, let alone of Germany across the river. The Tacitean text consistently implies, across both works, that the extension of the empire into Germany across the Rhine is impossible, on the basis that any military successes are represented as relatively rare, difficult to achieve and temporary.

As a counterbalance to these representations of failure to control the territory, the idea of textual conquest of Germany by Rome has been advanced by scholars as one function of Tacitus' ethnographic monograph *Germania.*[10] However, Zoe Tan recently demonstrated how un-illuminating the *Germania*'s illumination of Germany actually is: in its hodological progression through the territory, increasingly further away from the Rhine, Tacitus denies his reader the spatial referents necessary to support any understanding of the structure of this vast space.[11] In chapter six, I too advance arguments for resisting reading the *Germania* as an act of textual conquest; instead arguing that Tacitus, through his frequent mention of internal migrations, represents both actual and textual conquest as impossible. Not only can the Germans not be pinned down in reality, enabling conquest and then emplacement by Rome, but they cannot

[9]Levene (2009), 236–37.
[10]Esp. Rives (2012), 54. See also Low (2013), 32 n. 42.
[11]Tan (2014), an extensive (and independent) elaboration of a position also articulated by Rives (2011), 166–67.

even be pinned down on a map with any certainty. Timpe claimed that Tacitus was not particularly interested in a 'Vermittlung einer Raumvorstelling' in the *Germania*; I argue the very different point that the Tacitean text shows that such a 'transmission of a representation of a space' cannot be achieved.[12] This judgment is textually expressed by the frequent mentions of tribal migrations outside the chapter explicitly set aside by Tacitus to discuss them. The Germans of the *Germania* metaphorically overrun even the bounds of the text. The medium, in this case, reinforces the message. Germany's perpetual state of flux as a bar to both understanding and conquest is complemented by, and partly founded on, the absence of any historical development since Tacitus' report of the Germans' origin myths. In contrast, Romans had recorded and remembered their own historical development from their mythical foundations – I compare with both Livy's historical work *Ab Urbe Condita* and Virgil's foundation epic the *Aeneid* – and this historical practice helped to structure and bind together into a coherent unit both their territory and themselves as a people. The German space of the *Germania* has no such coherence, and nor does its people. The connection of the tribes he lists throughout the work to the Ur-tribes mentioned at its beginning is never traced, neither by Tacitus himself nor, in the *Germania*'s presentation of the *carmina antiqua* (*Ger.* 2.1) which he claims are their form of *annales*, by the Germans themselves.[13] Far from being intellectually conquered in the *Germania*, Germany and its people emerge as incomprehensible (to Rome) and therefore unconquerable (by Rome).

Moving from place and power to people and power, the other main interest of the present work lies in its focus on Tacitus' ventriloquisation of the thoughts and complaints of those experiencing the consequences of Roman imperial power in Germany. Scholars have analysed such ventriloquised discourses of complaint before, including some at which I look in the present work[14], and

[12]Timpe (2007), 425.

[13]This non-tracing would remain a problem even if one explained the absence of historical development on the dual grounds, advanced by Rives (2002, 165) to explain the absence of *Roman* history from the *Germania*, that ethnographical inquiry is by definition ahistorical and that Romans considered characters as fixed.

[14]For textual analyses of the Batavian revolt and some or all of the speeches from it that are discussed in the present work, see Lavan (2017), 28–29; Master (2016), *passim*;

those from other episodes in the Tacitean corpus.[15] Some of these analyses have drawn parallels between speeches in the manner I do within this thesis[16], anticipating some of my conclusions on the basis of smaller or different samples. Most notably, Liebeschuetz in his 1966 discussion of *libertas* in the *Agricola* wondered 'whether Tacitus deliberately set out to demonstrate the parallel between the rule of the Caesars over the Romans and of the Romans over their subjects, thus applying a common yardstick to both'[17], only to dismiss the notion in the next sentence. Aside from intention, however, which is impossible to divine two thousand years on, the present work's discourse analysis will redefine Liebeschuetz' notion of a parallelism from a form of mirroring (provincials are oppressed by Romans in a way which resembles how Romans are oppressed by the emperor) into a general condition of the principate regardless of location, citizenship, emperor, or status. Provincials and Romans alike are collectively oppressed by imperial power. The main textual support for this interpretation comes from Tacitus' presentation of the experiences and complaints of the mutinous Roman legions of *Annals* 1 (1.16-30 and *Ann.* 1.31-49) and the rebellious Batavi of *Histories* 4 in very similar terms, discussed in chapter three. Both events occurred at times when the deaths of the reigning Julio-Claudian emperors, Augustus in AD14 and Nero in AD68, had severed a highly personalised political relationship between ruler and ruled,

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Haynes (2003), 148–77 esp. 163ff; Lavan (2013), 142–47; Rutherford (2010, 318–28; Keitel (1993); Isaac (2004), 140–41, and a pertinent throwaway comment at Levene (2009), 226 ('Civilis is able to win not least by dividing the 'Romanised' Gauls from the 'Germanic' Civilis.'). For the German speeches from the *Annals* which I discuss, see primarily Auerbach (1953), 33-40; Rancière (1994), 24-41, 51; and Woodman (2006) for the mutinies (though also Alston (2017), Bhatt (2016) and Low (2016), unfortunately published too late to be considered in the present study); Lavan (2017), 30–32 and Low (2013), 56-64, 208-13 on Florus and Sacrovir; Low (2013), 56-64, 222-4 again on the Frisii's first uprising; and Haynes (2003), 170-1 and Städele (1985) on Boiocalus' exchange with Duvius Avitus.

[15]For Calgacus in the *Agricola*, most notably Städele (1985); Rutherford (2010), 315–19; Clarke (2001) and Liebeschuetz (1966); for Boudicca in the *Annals*, Lavan (2013), 147–53 and Adler (2011), 119–39.

[16]See Adler (2011), 130–34: 'Echoes of Boudica? Civilis condemns colonialism' and 134-6: 'More echoes of Boudica? Arminius on colonialism as slavery', or Liebeschuetz' drawing connections (1966, 137), albeit again only in passing, between the speeches in the *Agricola* and 'other freedom fighters in the *Annals* and *Histories*' (the debate of Arminius and Flavus at Ann. 2.9-10, Arminius' speech at 2.15 and those of Caratacus at *Ann.* 12.34 and 37 in one footnote, and *Hist.* 4.14, 4.17, and 4.32 in another).

[17]Liebeschuetz (1966), 138.

one which had in both cases kept discontent with the regime's treatment of them from spilling over into violence.

The immediate aftermath of these imperial deaths will be revealed as an 'empty' site which imperial regime and imperial subject both strive to occupy as quickly as possible, ideologically and practically. The most significant of these 'occupations' is the mutineers' creation of a democratic *tumultus* in response to the imperial redeployment of the Late Republican *iustitium* after Augustus' death, but the Batavians' violent rebellion in the absence of a formal *iustitium* must be seen as a comparable attempt to deal with the 'gap' left by imperial death. Batavians and Romans not only act but also at times talk identically in Tacitus' narrative, showing both groups as caring deeply about the nature and tangible expression of their relationship with Rome. The discourses they employ illustrate imperial Rome's excessive assertion of power over them, specifically over their bodies, in contrast to Republican custom and law (as idealistically envisaged). In word as well as deed in these narratives, the ghost of the Republic – with its safeguards against the violation of the non-slave (citizen) body and the rallying cry of *libertas* which embodies these safeguards[18], and of all that was lost with the emergence of the principate – is never far away.

Returning to Liebeschuetz's perceived parallel, then, I argue that the replication in the Tacitean text of these similarly framed circumstances, triggers, and protests across such a large distance in terms of ethnicity and status asserts the universality of this imperial dynamic and, consequently, of its disregard of people's individual and group statuses. It is not a structural relationship across three levels, with the relationship between the top level (emperor) and middle level (Roman citizens) being played out between the middle level (Romans) and the lower level (provincials), but a case of there only being two levels: the emperor and everyone else. I do not, therefore, follow Master's interpretation of

[18]See Low (2013), 24-7 for a useful overview of fifty years of scholarship on *libertas* and Tacitus up to its point of publication, though excluding the then-recent Arena (2012) whose line of reasoning has heavily influenced the argument in chapter three.

the Batavian revolt as the product of a badly calibrated transactional model between Rome and the provincial subjects on whom it relied to maintain its army and stability[19], because this suggests, first, that the problems were administrative rather than cultural and systemic[20] and, secondly, the possibility of easy recalibration. In Master's view, the Batavian revolt is unusual and unrepresentative of the power relations of the Roman system (the closest parallel he identifies is the incorporation of the Latins after the Social War). Instead, I read the Batavian revolt as one of multiple similar German episodes in Tacitus. These collectively assert a general and widespread condition of oppression caused by the nature and functioning of an imperial power that respects no status or limits and subordinates all to its working.[21]

Two other provincial revolts in the Rhineland and their associated discourses of complaint, both discussed in chapter five, represent the same dynamic of imperial oppression as the mutinies and the Batavian revolt, even if the word *libertas* is either less prominent (Florus and Sacrovir, *Ann.* 3.40-46) or absent (the Frisii's first uprising under Olennius, *Ann.* 4.72-74). Occurring at different times and in different parts of Germany, these provide further proof of the universality of the collective oppression of those under imperial Rome. In Tacitus' account of the rebellion of Florus and Sacrovir, there is even a repeat of the identity-blurring dynamic of the mutineers/Batavi comparison: Florus and his troops end up being killed in battle for airing their grievances (through speech and armed revolt) in the same way that those at Rome whom Tacitus says harboured similar desires for regime change risked being killed by Tiberius if they ever aired their grievances aloud (through speech). Instead of one connection (the mutinies) between a voiced Roman experience of imperial oppression and several provincial ones, we have two connections. The (implied) elites grumbling behind Tiberius' back at Rome are, moreover, of a different status than the lower-class citizen-soldiers of the mutinies, thus further

[19]Master (2016).
[20]This view is implicitly advanced for Agricola's management of the troubles of Britain by Liebeschuetz (1966, 136).
[21]The conclusion to this thesis offers a very quick preliminary survey of other areas in the Empire for which the Tacitean text asserts the same dynamic, especially Britain (*Ann.* 14.35); see p. 232.

reinforcing the disregard of imperial oppression for distinctions of status and class, even on the Roman side. In 'Slaves to Rome', Lavan traced a gradual shift, during the course of the first century AD, in the Roman discourse of oppositional identity politics from defining citizens against non-citizens to Italians versus everyone else[22], and finally, as a result of Caracalla's universal grant of citizenship in AD212, to emperor versus everyone else.[23] My reading of Tacitus proposes to place the change in AD14, on the basis that Tacitus ventriloquises similar discourses about arbitrary imperial power on behalf of different groups of Romans *as well as* different groups of Germans throughout the entire narrated period of the Tacitean corpus (AD14-AD70).

The significance of Tacitus' accounts of these smaller episodes of revolt is now clear. Criticism has been leveled at them (specifically the Batavian revolt and that of Florus and Sacrovir) and other examples from Roman historiography, for flattening real historical causes into a standard set of grievances and buzzwords (mostly centred around greed, cruelty and lust) which prevent the ancient historian from discerning what was really going on.[24] In response, this thesis argues that the stylisation of these complaints across different episodes in itself asserts a pattern which Tacitus shows at work across the empire at different times in different places. This in itself is a valuable historical insight. The approach which sees patterns as indicative of historical processes and therefore very enlightening indeed was usefully taken by Dyson in his two analyses of the causes of native revolts in the Roman Empire[25], though they differ from the present work in focus (he largely excludes discourse, on which I focus in detail) and scope (he cross-compares revolts across different parts of the empire and different authors, whereas I focus on Germany within Tacitus). His conclusion that economic and cultural change were the main triggers for revolt is partly upheld in my readings of the Tacitean text, especially of the rebellion of Florus and Sacrovir and the Tencteri's participation in the Batavian revolt, but these

[22]Lavan (2013), 59.
[23]Ibid., 111.
[24]Lavan (2017), 29; but see Woolf (2011), 35 for the opposite position that 'Tacitus' revolt narratives are not completely stereotyped'.
[25]Dyson (1971) and Dyson (1975).

factors too are recontextualised as the result of the inherently and irreparably oppressive nature of imperial power.[26]

Elsewhere, Tacitus reports a focus on identity by provincial subjects themselves which is out of step with this equalising influence of imperial corruption. The Batavian revolt, which is not 'won' by either side in the conventional sense of a decisive military victory, dissolves as a result of Petillius Cerialis' skilful manipulation of identity politics in the Rhineland, discussed in chapter two.[27] He encourages groups to see themselves as being in competition with each other for social or more tangible goods that depend on the stability of the Roman Empire for their continued provision. In his scaremongering to the Gauls that Germans are only ever interested in crossing the Rhine to steal Gallic lands, and his assertion to the Batavi that their leader Civilis is precisely such an opportunist transrhenane renegade, neither true Batavian nor Roman, he borrows ethnic labels and essentialising stereotypes to cloak his realpolitik. The imperial general Cerialis may know that all of them are in fact similarly enslaved to imperial Rome, but they have reason to care about the status differences between slaves. Ethnic identities are both meaningful and meaningless at the same time in the Rhineland of the first century AD; moreover, its imperial context means groups and individuals can choose to shift categories or be re-labelled by others on the basis of political choices. The Tacitean text does not devalue ideological attachments to certain identities, as my analysis of the Tencteri's exchange of speech with the Ubii-turned-Agrippinenses in this same chapter shows, but it does show that with the advent

[26]Agricola, despite being presented by Tacitus as comparatively humane and considerate in his conquest of Britain, is surely not a real exception to the imperial governors and procurators disparaged by Civilis (*quando legatum, gravi quidem comitatu et superbo, cum imperio venire? tradi se praefectis centurionibusque*, *Hist.* 4.14.13-5), Florus and Sacrovir (*saevitia ac superbia praesidentium*, *Ann.* 3.40), and Boudicca (*Romanorum cupidines*, *Ann.* 14.35). The comment that as governor of Aquitania he kept himself *procul a contentione adversus procuratores* or 'far from disputes with his procurator' (*Agr.* 9) sounds to me as if he himself refrained from the impositions described elsewhere but did not prevent others from committing them.

[27]Noted in passing by Levene (2009, 226) in his treatment of warfare in the *Annals* (!), but not substantiated any further. Ash (2009, 97) grounds the revolt's fragmentation in 'the arrival of multiple leaders with different aims' without reference to the identity frameworks used by these leaders and applied to them by Tacitus in the narrative or his ventriloquised Petillius Cerialis.

of Rome more pragmatic considerations (whether peace from Rome, status from Rome, or the threatening presence of several legions) informed such positioning.[28]

Chapter five considers three further episodes which do not neatly fit the patterns outlined above, though there are traces of similar preoccupations. Even in taking the story of Italicus in *Annals* 11 (*Ann.* 11.16-17) on its own terms, as an account of a Roman-fostered German going out to rule his kingdom, it is hard to ignore the extent to which the king's deposition and subsequent reinvestiture (to the detriment of his people) invite comparison with Rome's past history. It is most straightforwardly like Low's reading of the foreigners in *Annals* 1-6 as examples of the corruption of foreign *libertas* through contact with Rome, which had long ago lost its own.[29] Thus Italicus' story is both a mirror of Rome *and* a description of the consequences of Germans being pulled into the orbit of the Empire: the Cherusci did not have kings before, but once they get one (moreover, one raised in imperial Rome) he oppresses his people as the nature of one-man rule demands. Corbulo's establishment of a Republic on the northern periphery of the empire by relocating the Frisii (*Ann.* 11.19) and giving them a senate is similarly metaphor (mirror) and fact: that the Republic cannot be brought back into being, even so far from Rome, speaks to the extent to which the imperial regime had entrenched itself and could no longer be dislodged anywhere which had had contact with Rome. Finally, the Ampsivarii's migration into Roman lands and their expulsion by Duvius Avitus in *Annals* 13 (*Ann.* 13.53-57) looks back to the *Germania*'s concern with Germany's absence of fixity and structure, as well as to Germanicus' choice in *Annals* 1 and 2 to blaze a trail of destruction through an uncontrollable Germany and its population in preference to letting them exist outside Roman control.

[28]Woolf (2009), 208 talks about '[t]he incorporation of the Batavi within the empire on terms that preserved old identities at the same time as assigning new roles' as described by Roymans (2004); my thesis will approach the difficulties of such combinations of identity continuity and change on the basis of the Tacitean text instead of Roymans' archaeological remains.
[29]Low (2013), 26.

The two over-arching themes of this study, then, are the powerful role of the German landscape in Tacitus' account of Roman imperialist endeavours in Germany and the implication of its population in an empire-wide collective oppression which erases all other distinctions of identity and status. I now conclude the introduction with an overview of the individual chapters.

Chapter one discusses the limits of violent Roman repression in overcoming the landscapes and people of Germany during the Batavian revolt of *Histories* 4 and 5. After examining how Tacitus appears to establish an environmentally deterministic relationship which equates the Batavi with successful operations on water, and Roman Rhine navigation with disaster, I proceed to outline how his account subsequently nuances any rigid application of this schema. Landscape is shown to be a powerful agent in the struggle, but also to be capable of being neutralised by Roman technology so that Romans *can* make headway. Those spatial interventions then support and uphold structures of power. There are two main theoretical influences in this chapter. First, Jane Bennett's *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things* (2010) stresses the importance of paying attention to nonhuman agency in our interpretation of events and the assignation of responsibility or blame to humans. Her work sees events and outcomes as produced by an assemblage, or matrix, of agency, and is a useful lens through which to interpret Tacitus' depiction of the landscape as a serious player in the Batavian conflict. The second main theoretical framework borrowed is from Foucault's *Discipline and Punish* (1995). His reading of knowledge and classification as techniques of power underpins my interpretation of the corrupt Batavian *dilectus* which sparked the Batavian revolt as the human equivalent of Roman technology's spatial interventions to facilitate control – not co-option – of the Rhineland.

Chapter two traces the process of the Batavian revolt's breakdown in the Tacitean text. It will be shown that the narrative of *Histories* 4 and 5 grounds this demise solidly in the detachment of Civilis' supporters, Batavian and other, from each other and from him, rather than in any military causes. From the moment the Ubii pay lip service to their Tencteran cousins' demands to 'de-

Romanise' themselves, all subsequent speeches reported by Tacitus, Roman and non-Roman, contain discourses of separation which help to effect, whether intentionally or not, the breakup of Civilis' Gallo-German alliance. These discourses rely partly on the language and framework of identity politics and partly on considerations of power and economics to motivate withdrawal from the rebellion, showing how the advent of Rome into the Rhineland changed existing identities and (self-)identifications. My analyses of Cerialis' final communications to the Transrhenani and Batavi, both pragmatic and threatening, and the latter's change of heart, have benefited from Frantz Fanon's theorising on 'spontaneous' anti-colonial uprisings. Through my examination of the efficacy of Cerialis' speeches and general approach, the Roman general is then rehabilitated as precisely the right general for this part of the world, rather than the military failure he has often been judged to be in scholarship.

Chapter three draws connections between the German rebels of the Batavian revolt and the mutinous Roman legions of *Annals* 1 in AD14. Tacitus describes how both uprisings were prompted and facilitated by imperial deaths. To explain the role of *iustitium* in imperial death in the mutinies narrative, I engage with Giorgio Agamben's theorising on states of exception (such as the *iustitium*) in *State of Exception* (2005). Erich Auerbach's *Mimesis* (1953) and Jacques Rancière's *The Names of History: The Poetics of Knowledge* (1994) will inform my discussion of the occasions on which Tacitus allows discourse to the 'common' Roman legionaries who do not ordinarily speak in Latin historiography. I further build on Tony Woodman's 2006 tracing of the metaphor of madness in the mutinies narrative by explaining it as a historiographical tool to indicate Tacitus' disapproval of the mutinies' violence against the state (despite the ambiguous status of the *iustitium* as a factor in promoting this violence). Bakhtin's concept of the carnivalesque from *Rabelais and his World* (1984) is tested but ultimately discarded as a fitting way of interpreting the mutinies' 'mad' role reversal. Tacitus depicts neither madness nor carnival sanctioned by the authorities as a means of reconciling subjects to that authority for the rest of the time. Instead, he understands but disapproves of both rebellions, whose causes he firmly roots in both cases in the inherently

oppressive nature of the imperial regime which rules both groups. Autocratic power respects no identity or status distinctions in its treatment of those subjected to it.

Chapter four analyses the spatialisation in the Germanicus campaigns of *Annals* 1 and 2 in terms of conflicts between Roman and German spaces which often occupy the same physical territory. The resulting multilayeredness of the landscape raises issues of translation and comprehension for Romans moving through a Germany in which Roman ruins superimposed on the otherwise unknowable forests are the only available structuring elements to help them navigate and understand their surroundings. The combination of this tension between spaces, the negative connotations of many of these guideposts, and the absence of knowledge of the German underscape beneath them creates fear in the rank and file when such insights are absent or defective. In contrast to these fearful responses, I examine in turn the very different reactions of Germanicus himself, his wife Agrippina and his general Caecina as striving, with varying levels of success, to guard the integrity of Roman space and indeed permanently subordinate German space to it. Ultimately, I conclude, the Tacitean text shows Germany as a place where feats of conquests are both difficult and temporary. The final section discusses the raid on the Marsi as departing from this preoccupation with conflicts of space, instead foregrounding identity as its primary concern. The unthreatening Marsi's destruction at the hands of formerly mutinous Romans is essential to the restoration of the legions' Roman identity, the breakdown of which *Annals* 1 showed to be as much of a threat to the stability of the empire as an unknowable and unconquered Germany.

Chapter five discusses how several 'smaller' German revolts and events in the *Annals* (Florus and Sacrovir, the Frisii, Corbulo's German campaigns, and the story of Italicus and the Cherusci) further support the conclusions on Tacitus' historical and political thought on Empire and power which were reached in the previous four chapters. Thematic connections are made to other Tacitean passages but also to other authors and periods from Roman history. These intratextual and intertextual connections across space and time further support

the dynamics of how imperial power and resistance manifest and repeat. The nexus of connections also shows the Tacitean text does not deal in either essential categories of peoples and places or discourses asserting them (unless ventriloquised). Several of these episodes again foreground the spaces in which this power is deployed and resisted, and the *assemblage* returns as a framework for explaining Corbulo's (relative) successes in *Annals* 11 where Germanicus in *Annals* 1 and 2 was shown to have failed.

Chapter six shows that several textual strategies in the *Germania* conspire to represent the impossibility of imposing an imperial geography on Germany, both in the shape of secure physical conquest and intellectual containment. The three main strategies colluding to depict this are the pervasive attestations of migrations within the work – a thematic strand which has not received much attention in the scholarship[30] –, the work's erratic engagement with the past (Rome's, Germany's, and their intersection), and the suppression of accounts of Rome's partial success at imposing an imperialist geography on parts of Germany. To explain Germany's fluid state of a space without coherence, the *Germania* advances the Germans' absence of both historical development and historical practice, which I illustrate through a comparison with Roman historical practice concerning their own mythical origins. Some of these spatial themes in the *Germania* (fixity, emplacement, migration, the difficulty of pinning down what and where Germans are) prefigure later reworkings in the *Annals*. Thus the *Germania*, using different tools, conveys the same German inaccessibility and unconquerability as the Tacitean record of German military affairs in the historical works.

[30]Though many outline the work's dual structure and summarise the purport of both halves, the third of Tacitus' advertised aims at the beginning of part two, *quaeque nationes e Germania in Gallias commigraverint [expediam]* is often entirely omitted from the summary; see O'Gorman (1993), 136 and Thomas (2009), 60, despite reproducing the quotation of which this forms a part in full on p. 62. Sallmann (1987, 124) comments on the difficult 'classification of those tribes who, since Caesar's epoch, engaged in restless raids and wanderings in the Rhine-lands' but without reference to any classical texts.

1 Managing (in) Batavia

Introduction

The episodes which constitute the Batavian rebellion across books 4 (chapters 12-37 and 54-79) and 5 (chapters 14-26) of the *Histories* are characterised by a complex interplay of natural features and human bodies in a game of power between two opposing military forces. This chapter will analyse what power the narrative grants the Germanic landscapes over their occupants (for example, by frustrating Roman fighting tactics and aiding Germanic efforts), and in what ways power is in turn exercised over the land by its occupants – by these, I mean both its native inhabitants and the Roman military. Finally, I will discuss the different forms of landscape 'appropriation' presented by Tacitus in Rome's conquest and control of Batavia, and their role and efficacy in furthering Roman imperialism.[31]

The narrated time of the episode is AD69-70, after Nero's death and during Vespasian's struggle to emerge as the victor of the civil war (which happened in December AD69). The rebellion is instigated by the tribe of the Batavi (Roman allies but not – with a few exceptions – citizens, who lived by the Rhine estuary where it flows into the North Sea) as a result of a corruptly conducted military conscription of the tribe into the Roman army. Several other German and even Gallic tribes quickly join the revolt for varying reasons and the rebellion spreads until it covers a large stretch of territory along the west bank of the Rhine, including multiple Roman army camps. This territory itself is difficult to categorise neatly: in its military classification, it spanned the military districts of Germania Inferior and Superior on the Rhine's west bank and the strip of land on the east bank which had no official status beyond the appellation Germania but showed definite and permanent traces of Roman conquest. In its political

[31]All translations in this thesis are my own, unless otherwise specified. For the Latin, I have in each case used the Oxford Classical Text of the *Germania* (Ogilvie and Winterbottom 1975), *Histories* (Fisher 1911) and *Annals* (Fisher 1906). The sole exception is *Hist.* 4.12, where the Teubner by Delz, Heubner, and Önnerfors (1978) usefully emends *erat et domi delectus eques, praecipuo nandi studio, <quo> arma equosque retinens integris turmis Rhenum perrumpere*… to *perrumperet*.

and administrative classification, all the west bank activity occurred within the provinces of Gallia Belgica and Gallia Lugdunensis.[32] For convenience's sake I will refer to the territory affected by the revolt simply as the Rhineland or as Germany, having warned the reader of the complexities that prevent any neat description of this territory. The Roman view of the non-Roman peoples inhabiting both sides of the Rhine in the middle of the first century AD complicates the matter further: Tacitus does not use the ethnic terminology of Gaul and German with any level of consistency or clear underpinning criteria. Indeed, Krebs contrasts the care Caesar took to differentiate the two ἔθνη in order to justify the limits of his campaigns, creating essentially an artificial construct bounded by Roman political considerations, with Tacitus' depiction in the *Germania* of Gauls and Germans as rather similar as a result of their similar climates.[33] In the *Histories* too, we have no basis on which to judge Tacitus' use of the terms. Therefore I will name individual tribes when Tacitus gives us their name but will refer to 'the Germans' or 'the Gallo-German alliance' when he does not. For the purposes of my argument, however, the inconsistency does not matter: my focus is the setting in which the conflict between Rome and the wider alliance takes place regardless of its geographical classification or that of its inhabitants.

Environment shapes man: I

One way in which the power of the landscape finds expression in the Batavian rebellion is the dichotomy between water-savvy Batavi who are comfortable in their riverine environment on the one hand, and often literally floundering

[32]Land from these two Gallic provinces was given up to create the two Germaniae as formal provinces only during the reign of Domitian, more than a decade after the Batavian revolt; see Millar (1981), 111–12.
[33]Krebs (2011), 205–7. Nonetheless, the *Germania* maintains the distinction in some of its discussions of *origines*: at *Ger.* 28.2 Tacitus gives the Helvetii as one of several examples of Gauls who had moved into Germany in the distant past, without commenting explicitly on whether the move had transformed them into Germans, and at *Ger.* 28.4 he discusses several tribes who crossed over from Germany to inhabit the Gallic bank of the Rhine but are nonetheless counted as (still) German. Neither physical characteristics nor location can therefore be the foundations of Tacitus' distinction between Gaul and German. See also Rives (1999), 26–27, 'The discovery of the Germani' and Rives (2011), 166–7.

Romans on the other.[34] In the two sections which introduce and end the conflict, Tacitus associates Batavian success with the aquatic and contrasts it with their struggle to get a hold on land. These frame the central, urban section of the rebellion, set in Cologne.

The connection between the western fringes of the known world in antiquity and vast, awe-inspiring, sometimes distressing amounts of water, had been established in Greek geographical writings long before Tacitus.[35] His presentation of Germany in the two minor works with a historical bent which preceded his composition of the *Histories*[36], *Agricola* and *Germania*, conforms to these conventions. The emphasis in these works on the wet nature of the areas of Britain and Germany respectively ([37]) is carried through into the Batavian sections of the *Histories*, but this time not to produce a landscape that is obstructive and inaccessible to Rome[38], but to characterise the stage on which the Romans wage war as powerful and active.

At the very beginning of his narrative of the rebellion, Tacitus mentions the presence of Batavian auxiliaries on the Gallo-German borders who are exceptionally good at swimming in full military kit, including taking horses

[34]It is of real interest, therefore, that the only *other* episode 'in which Romans are depicted as fighting foreign invaders, rather than turning their military skills on fellow citizens' (Ash 2010b, 143), that of the raid against the Rhoxolani in Moesia, takes great pains to reverse this environmentally determinist narrative logic for the foreigners: they almost farcically bungle a battle in the snow on home turf which the Romans win with ease. Ash (150–55) argues the necessity of this victory in the context of the civil war at that stage. O'Gorman (1995) notes the Batavi's affinity with their fluid landscape (p. 125 and 127), but sees this as poetically appropriate to the civil war of which their revolt is an outcrop: for her, waterscapes are the 'landscape of discord'.
[35]Stewart (1995), 2–5 on Britain and Clarke (2001, 95–98), in particular, on Britain as well as northwest Europe more broadly.
[36]See Birley (2000), 239–40 and Levene (2008), vii–viii for the dating of the early works.
[37]See Clarke (2001) for the *Agricola*; (Tan 2014) for a discussion of the *Germania*'s treatment of water. Its boundaries are set by rivers and the Ocean (*Ger.* 1.1) and *Ger.* 5.1 explicitly compares it to Gaul and proclaims the German climate wetter: *Terra etsi aliquanto specie differt, in universum tamen aut silvis horrida aut* ***paludibus foeda****,* ***umidior qua Gallias****, ventosior qua Noricum ac Pannoniam adspicit*.
[38]See Tan (2014).

across rivers.[39] The claim's position in the introductory passage which promises to set out '*id bellum quibus causis ortum*' (*Hist.* 4.12.4) signals its importance to what follows.[40] In addition, they supply oarsmen to the Roman fleet in sufficient numbers to obstruct the fleet's operations with disastrous results (*Hist.* 4.16.14-9).

The third section (*Hist.* 5.14-26) of the narrative of the rebellion similarly contributes to setting up this affinity between the Batavi and their waterscapes and Rome's unsuitability to them. Battles on marshy ground repeatedly cause great difficulty for Rome (*Hist.* 5.15 and 5.18) while Civilis hails them as one of the alliance's strongholds in his speech before the final battle (*campos madentis et ipsis gnaros, paludes hostibus noxias,* 'that the soggy fields were well known to themselves, but the swamps harmful to the enemy', *Hist.* 5.17.9-10). Later, Civilis and the Batavi retreat to the island at the core of their territory on the assumption that Rome lacks the skills to make a similar crossing (*Hist.* 5.19.5-7), they destroy the obstruction on the Rhine built by Drusus and restore the free flow of the river (*Hist.* 5.19.7-11), and in the course of fighting a losing cavalry battle a little later, Civilis and his Germanic co-commanders Julius Verax, Julius Tutor and Julius Classicus all escape by water (Civilis and Verax swim, and Tutor and Classicus escape on small, nimble riverboats, *luntres*, *Hist.* 5.21.7-9). Meanwhile, the Roman fleet, caught unprepared but in any case supremely unconfident in the Batavian element, simply look on, prevented from action through fear (*formido obstitit*, *Hist.* 5.21.10-11).

But it is not all plain sailing for the Batavi. An important corollary to their facility with water is a much lower level of confidence and competency on land. At *Hist.* 4.23, their siege of the Roman camp at Bonn founders because they have no skill in besieging: they manage to construct a siege engine, but only with their Roman captives' borrowed knowledge, and even then it is but an *informe*

[39]*Hist.* 4.12.3 (in Delz, Heubner, and Önnerfors (1978); see n. 31): *erat et domi delectus eques, praecipuo nandi studio, <quo> arma equosque retinens integris turmis Rhenum perrumperet.* Noted by O'Gorman (1995, 125) but Tacitus implicates the Batavi much more closely in their wet surroundings than her single example.
[40]Interestingly, what is here a defining characteristic makes no appearance in the brief description accorded the Batavi in the *Germania* (*Ger.* 29).

opus and easily destroyed. Tacitus labels the engine *in modum pontis* (*Hist.* 4.23.16), suggesting that the water-savvy Batavi had attempted to transpose wetland techniques to battle on land, and hopelessly fail.[41] They are out of place.[42] This representation is context-specific and peculiar to Tacitus, not an instance of barbarian stereotyping. The best point of comparison for this part of the world and its habits is Caesar's *Gallic Wars*, and this grants the Gauls and Germans a traditionally successful method of besieging places (*BG* 2.6):

> *Gallorum eadem atque Belgarum oppugnatio est haec: ubi circumiecta multitudine hominum totis moenibus undique in murum lapides iaci coepti sunt murusque defensoribus nudatus est, testudine facta portas succedunt murumque subruunt. Quod tum facile fiebat. Nam cum tanta multitudo lapides ac tela coicerent, in muro consistendi potestas erat nulli.*[43]
>
> 'The siege methods of the Gauls and Belgae are the same, and as follows: when they have surrounded the entire circumference of the city defences with a mass of people, they begin to throw stones at the walls from all directions and the wall is cleared of defenders. Then they march up to the gates in tortoise formation and undermine the wall. Which at this point [in the siege of Bibracte] happened easily. For when such a crowd throw a mix of rocks and other projectiles, there was no way anyone could remain standing on the wall.'

Caesar's text was the point of transmission into Latin historiography of many *topoi* on Gallic and German barbaric behaviour from the Greek ethnographic tradition. The Tacitean type of incompetence is not one of them, neither here

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[41]In addition to the point about an absence of water equalling an absence of success, one might wonder whether in the Tacitean universe those bred so close to a land he describes as *Germaniam informem terris* (*Ger.* 2) are capable of engineering land-based structures which are anything other than *informa*? See O'Gorman (1993) for a discussion of Germany's shapelessness as a defining feature in the *Germania.*

[42]This gives rise to the question whether Rome attempted to break such links with the home country by removing units abroad. Brunt (1960), 501 argues that the Batavian cohorts when deployed abroad continually caused trouble, probably because they were 'averse to campaigning far from the Rhine'. But not only does severing the link with the home country not make them more loyal, therefore, the Tacitean narrative also suggests that outside a suitably watery environment they may have lost much of the skill which made them useful to Rome. Intriguingly, *Hist.* 2.93's *adiacente Tiberi Germanorum Gallorumque obnoxia morbis corpora fluminis aviditas et aestus impatientia labefecit* ('In the Tiber's vicinity, the Gauls' and Germans' intolerance of the local climate and their keenness on the river weakened their bodies, which are prone to disease') allows for the option that it is only the specific waterscapes and climate of Germany in which they flourish.

[43]Edition by Henderson (1917).

nor later on in the *Gallic Wars*.[44] Only a little later on in the second book, when the Gauls are faced with the defences of a Roman camp as opposed to those of a walled city, Caesar mentions their unfamiliarity with such features as mantlets, mounds and towers, and reports their decision to surrender rather than fight against these unfamiliar constructions (*BG* 2.12). This position resembles that of Tacitus' ignorant Batavi and their *opus informe*. In the next book, however, Caesar reports the Aquitanii as having the insight and competence to tunnel under siege mounds and towers (*BG* 3.21), and in book five he explicitly reports the Nervii constructing *turres*, *falces*, *fossa* and *testudines* on the Roman model outside Quintus Cicero's winter camp, having learnt of their efficacy through years of fighting and of their construction through some Roman prisoners of war (*BG* 5.42). These examples cumulatively prove that Caesar's Gauls and Germans are capable of adapting, or expanding, their range of responses to their environment when this is changed by the Romans. Tacitus' presentation of Civilis' Gallo-Germanic alliance's incompetence on land deviates starkly from this model[45], and the inability to move successfully into siege warfare reinforces the strength of their symbiotic relationship with their waterscapes. It widens the gap between Romans as technologists and Batavi as 'people of (a particular kind of) nature', conforming to earlier patterns of thinking that set the Romans apart as extraordinary engineers (we may recall Josephus' manifest awe at Titus' siege works outside Jerusalem in book 7 of the *Jewish War*).

Environment shapes man: II

That people are 'made' to a large extent by the environment in which they dwell is corroborated by a contrasting example from the urban section of the Batavian narrative. The passage shows the tribe of the Tencteri, fighting on Civilis' side, blaming the Ubii's 'caged' state inside the walled settlement of *Colonia Claudia*

[44]Krebs (see n. 3) describes Tacitus' engagement with the Caesarian tradition on the representation of Germans and Gauls as '*oppositio in imitando*'. The example here cited from the *Histories* is, perhaps, a different manifestation of this same strategy.
[45]Not to mention being oddly unhistorical: the group had been serving with the Roman army for generations, and elsewhere the Batavi's appreciation of the discipline gained through their service to Rome is made clear (*Hist.* 4.17.17-19 *nunc easdem omnium partis, addito si quid militaris disciplinae in castris Romanorum viguerit*).

Ara Agrippinensis for constricting their German, warlike character. They demand that the Ubii tear down these walls (*Hist.* 4.64.3-23):

> *redisse vos in corpus nomenque Germaniae communibus deis et praecipuo deorum Marti grates agimus, vobisque gratulamur quod tandem liberi inter liberos eritis; nam ad hunc diem flumina ac terram et caelum quodam modo ipsum clauserant Romani ut conloquia congressusque nostros arcerent, vel, quod contumeliosius est viris ad arma natis, inermes ac prope nudi sub custode et pretio coiremus. sed ut amicitia societasque nostra in aeternum rata sint, postulamus a vobis muros coloniae, munimenta servitii, detrahatis (etiam fera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviscuntur), Romanos omnis in finibus vestris trucidetis (haud facile libertas et domini miscentur): bona interfectorum in medium cedant, ne quis occulere quicquam aut segregare causam suam possit. liceat nobis vobisque utramque ripam colere, ut olim maioribus nostris: quo modo lucem diemque omnibus hominibus, ita omnis terras fortibus viris natura aperuit. instituta cultumque patrium resumite, abruptis voluptatibus, quibus Romani plus adversus subiectos quam armis valent. sincerus et integer et servitutis oblitus populus aut ex aequo agetis aut aliis imperitabitis.*

> 'We render thanks to the gods we have in common and to the chiefest of them, Mars, that you have returned to the German fold and name, and we congratulate you because you will finally be free people amongst the free; for up until this day the Romans had closed off the rivers, earth and in some ways the sky itself so that they could stop us from talking and meeting, or, something even more insulting to men born to take up arms, so that we could meet unarmed and practically naked only, under their guard and for a price. But so that our friendship and alliance may be considered everlasting, we demand from you that you tear down the walls of this colony, the hallmarks of your slavery (indeed even wild beasts, if you keep them closed up, forget their fighting spirit); that you murder all Romans within your territory (freedom and masters do not mix at all easily): the possessions of the murdered will go into a common pile, so that no one can hide anything or separate their own interests from the rest. It will be allowed for us as well as for you to inhabit either side of the Rhine, as once our ancestors did: in the same way that nature opens up the daylight to all men, she opened up all the lands of the earth to brave men. Take up the customs and habits of your fathers again, with all indulgences cast off (with which the Romans achieve more against their subjects than with arms). Clean and uncontaminated, as a people no longer remembering slavery, you will either deal with others on an equal footing or actively rule over them.'

From the desired changes requested by the Tencteri – to pull down the walls, outlaw owning private property and let go of Roman habits and Roman dress – we can gauge the extent to which the Ubii were perceived to have departed

from the Germanic norm and turned their faces to Rome. The property measure evokes the idea of, literally, *res publica*: it is in fact an extremely Roman action to take among a portfolio of anti-Roman ones, questioning the possibility of how much of a turn away from Rome's influence this change would achieve.[46] But the main thrust of the speech is spatial, blaming the Roman town's form and access policy for the negative effects on the Ubii: their changed environment has re-shaped them, not only through its positive contribution of walls but through the negative injunction of excluding the Germans from their existing relationship with the *flumina*, *terram*, *caelum* which, by implication in the speech and in conformity with ancient medical thought, make them who they are.[47] They believe this so strongly that even though the Ubii have already declared support for the German side (*redisse vos … deis grates agimus*), the Tencteri feel their return into the fold cannot be complete without redesigning their Roman space back into a German one, restoring their broken link to the rivers, earth and sky. This environmental change would thus both prove and sustain – perhaps even cause – the Ubii's restored allegiance to their German roots.

The settlement's walls in particular are picked on, as *munimenta servitii*. Part of the Tencteri's reason for doing so is that the walls are Roman, and Roman-*looking* buildings, in contrast to the Germanic tradition of open land surrounding habitation.[48] They are thus symbolic of Roman oppression. But they are also a practical tool to serve this oppression. As well as representing a cultural separation, the walls enforce a physical separation between the Ubii and their German kinsmen (*ut conloquia congressusque nostros arcerent)* with

[46]Clarke (2001) posited the fringes of the empire – in her case, Britain – as the only suitable theatre left in which 'old' Roman values could manifest themselves. The area peripheral to the Rhine here conforms to that pattern.
[47]The shaping influence on humans of their environment was an accepted fact in ancient thought. Pioneered in the medical 'Hippocratic' treatise *Airs, Waters, Places* and embraced in historiography for the first time by Herodotus in his *Histories*, the tradition of environmental determinism treated as obvious and unexceptionable the notion that people's physiologies as well as psychologies were shaped by the environment in which they are born and then raised. See Lo Presti (2012).
[48]Cf. *Ger.* 16.1: *nullas Germanorum populis urbes habitari satis notum est, ne pati quidem inter se iunctas sedes. Colunt discreti ac diversi, ut fons, ut campus, ut nemus placuit. Vicos locant non in nostrum morem conexis et cohaerentibus aedificiis: suam quisque domum spatio circumdat*,

any contact only possible with the permission of Rome and accompanied by practical impositions such as arms controls at the gates and taxes on trade (the rather vague *sub custode et pretio coiremus* is clarified by the Ubian response to this speech as *vectigal et onera commerciorum*, *Hist.* 4.65.13). These arrangements of walled confinement, checks on movement, and taxation represent Foucauldian biopower in action through confinement, surveillance, and control: the Tencteri rightly note that although contact under these circumstances is still possible, it is not by any means the situation of *liberi inter liberos* (*Hist.* 4.64.6) on which they have set their sights. The arrangements are Roman mechanisms to control and render less dangerous interactions between the unromanised Germans surrounding Cologne and the Romanised Ubii who inhabit the walled area.[49]

The restraints are a necessary precaution. Unlike in Alston's reading of the *Agricola*, in which all British space is revealed to be imperial space with no alternatives, the Tencteri's confrontation with the Ubii suggests the country surrounding Cologne has not (yet) been obliterated into the imperial desert which the Caledonian Calgacus equates with conquest in the *Agricola*.[50] Alston reads Calgacus' speech, critical of empire and seeing a possibility of resistance to it, as introducing a *heteroglossia* into the narrative: as the opposite of unitary language, this ambivalent position requires the reader to decide whose reading of the world is right: Calgacus' or Tacitus' or the Roman reader's, or even that of the so-called *imperiti* who willingly fall in with Agricola's strategy, believing their Roman-style refinements to be manifestations of a desirable kind of *humanitas* (*Agr.* 21). The *Agricola* ends with Roman victory and a war-torn Caledonian landscape, confirming that Calgacus' is wrong and Tacitus is right that in imperial time there can be only imperial space.[51] In the Cologne episode,

[49]Though we need not read Roman spatial interventions as repressive measures only. Cf. Woolf's summary (2002, 54) of Louise Revell's archaeological work in Spain: '[it examines how the] physical structures of Roman cities provided frames for repetitive actions that entrenched and normalised particular views of social order and shaped the emerging new cultural identities of those who inhabited these cities.'
[50]Even if walled Cologne itself is on its way to becoming Alston's flat-packed Roman city; cf. Alston (2018), 246.
[51]Alston (2018), 240-1.

however, the tension between imperialist obliteration of the space 'before' and the existence of alternatives is still unresolved. Moreover, the alternatives to imperial space in the Cologne episode are revealed by Tacitus to still be present *spatially*, not just psychologically as the detached refuge of those implicated in empire.[52] We may remember the uncontrolled space of the sacred grove, *nemus sacrum*, in which the initial Batavian resistance is secretly organised (*Hist.* 4.14.10) and the Tencteri's implication in their speech that across the river life is still run on German lines: *liceat nobis vobisque utramque ripam colere* (*Hist.* 4.64.16-17) is an attack on the Roman injunction against Germans settling on the west, 'Roman', bank of the Rhine, not an acknowledgment that those on the further, east bank had also succumbed to Roman living. The Cologne episode is a boundary dispute between two coexisting modes, imperial Roman artificial non-space and traditional Germanic space, but its ultimate pro-Roman outcome does not achieve (or require) the destruction of Germany across the Rhine.[53]

Cologne's contested physical space in the middle section of the Batavian rebellion thus complements the Tacitean portrayal of the skilled Batavi as shaped by their aquatic environment in the framing sections. It does so through presenting its inverse situation: the Roman urban environment has made the Ubii Roman and urban in nature, instead of Germanic and symbiotic with the forests and rivers that surround them. Place is revealed to have an enormous influence on physical bodies, skill sets and identities. But the relationship between people and place is mediated through human agency instead of being causal, direct and inescapable: the Batavi are not born water-savvy, nor are they

[52]Alston (2018), 251–56. Nor are the Tencteri who denounce the imperial present of Cologne's imperial space deprived of a history by Tacitus (cf. Alston (2018), 244-6 on Caledonians without history or local *mores*). Cologne's pre-Roman past (*redisse*; *ut olim maioribus nostris; resumite*) is recognised in the Tencteri's speech, and consequently the utopian future is still 'present', too (*ut amicitia societasque nostra in aeternum rata sint*; *imperabitis*); cf. Alston (2018), 248–49.

[53]The Batavian rebellion of course peters out and Rome is able to reassert control. But unlike in Britain, which ended up conquered in its entirety with Calgacus' uncomfortable truths about desertification still ringing quietly through the war-torn landscape, Roman control of Germany beyond the Rhine was, at this point in time, erratic. Later, part of the territory did move towards a state of more formal occupation from Trajan's reign onwards, with the construction of a *limes*, of which traces still survive in Baden-Württemberg. See Wilson (2006) for an overview of archaeological work in the area and its chronological import.

born as immoral beings. It is their choice to adapt and make optimal use of their surroundings that allows the environment to work its effects. In the same way, it is the Ubii's choice to retain their walls and decline to change the changed ways fostered by them. This is where the Tencteri's understanding is incomplete compared to that of Agricola: environment does have the power to change man, but people can refuse as well as choose to change their environment.

Environment shapes power and resistance

But sometimes the human actors in Tacitus find themselves in a third position, that of being powerless against the forces exerted by their environment. Tacitus grants the wetscapes of Germanic Batavia real power in the rebellion, to shape and limit the options for Rome's exertion of power as well as for the Batavi's resistance to Roman domination. It is to an analysis of this power that I now turn.

Tacitus' presentation of the role of the landscape goes beyond simply creating a symbiosis between the Batavi and their homeland at the expense of Roman success. At key moments in the early stages of the Batavian rebellion, the Romans suffer setbacks as a result of natural phenomena presented as more powerful than any human agency or forward planning can withstand. The Batavian environment fulfills the role of agent in influencing events which we customarily think of as directed by humans alone:

> *Sed discordis animos multa efferabant: inopia stipendii frumentique et simul dilectum tributaque Galliae aspernantes, Rhenus incognita illi caelo siccitate vix navium patiens, arti commeatus, dispositae per omnem ripam stationes quae Germanos vado arcerent, eademque de causa minus frugum et plures qui consumerent.*
>
> *Hist.* 4.26.1-6
>
> 'But there were many things to aggravate further minds which were already at odds: insufficient pay and grain, the Gallic provinces refusing both conscription and taxation, the Rhine barely supporting rivercraft on account of a drought (unusual in that region), provisions in short supply and guard posts set up along the entire bank which barred the Germans from fords; therefore they had less grain but more people to consume it.'

The Rhine, in this first example, is described by means of the active present participle *patiens* – giving it its proper due in translation makes the Rhine actively intolerant, 'impatient of', 'not suffering', 'not allowing', of river navigation. Heubner *ad loc.* notes that the phrase *navium patiens* is applied to rivers in both Livy (21.31.10, to the Druentia or modern Durance in France) and the Younger Pliny (Ep. 5.6.12, to the Tiber), and indeed the Oxford Latin Dictionary gives its meaning as 'capable of bearing' in the case of things (*OLD patiens* 1b), where in the case of persons it means 'able or willing to endure or undergo, submissive' (1a), citing these same two examples and more, though not this Tacitean example. However, the context in which the Rhine example occurs contains two other such ambiguities which together persuasively support an anthropomorphic reading (as well as the river being unwilling, the *Galliae* are scornful, and the sky's *siccitas* can mean thirst as well as drought).[54] The result of the river's unwillingness is the successful capture of a grain freighter by the Gallo-German alliance (*Hist.* 4.27.5-6), who were aided in their effort by the river's *vada*, in which the ship had got stuck. The episode has far-reaching consequences, as it is this shortage of grain caused by the Rhine's 'non-bearing' which ultimately allows the Batavi their first taste of land-based success: they successfully starve out the Romans inside the camp at Vetera at *Hist.* 4.59-60.

A similar example of riverine agency expressed grammatically and causing setbacks for Rome occurs at *Hist.* 5.23.14-9, though Tacitus makes less of it – no doubt because at this point he has made it clear in other ways that this area of Germany will succumb to Rome in the end[55]:

> *Cerialis insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus agros villasque Civilis intactas nota arte ducum sinebat, cum interim flexu autumni et crebris per aequinoctium imbribus superfusus amnis palustrem humilemque insulam in*

[54]Levene's 2008 revision of Fyfe keeps his original 1912 translation of *Rhenus …. vix navium patiens* as 'drought… made the river almost too low for navigation', but Church and Brodribb (1864) preserves anthropomorphic agency with 'the Rhine would hardly admit of navigation'.

[55]Identity politics, economic and political choices play a greater role in the revolt's ultimate failure; see chapter two of this thesis.

faciem stagni opplevit. Nec classis aut commeatus aderant, castraque in plano sita vi fluminis differebantur.

'After savagely laying to waste the island of the Batavi, Cerialis was using that famous general's trick of leaving alone the fields and estates belonging to Civilis; in the meantime through the change of season and the frequent showers of the autumn equinox the flooded river filled the swampy and low-lying island until it looked like a lake. Neither the fleet nor provisions were at hand, and the camp situated on the plain was smashed to pieces by the force of the river.'[56]

Indeed at this point the damage inflicted on the Romans by the river's unexpected behaviour so far counters Roman successes that Civilis claims (and Tacitus endorses the claim) that 'at this point the legions could have been overcome by the Germans, had they wanted it' (*Hist.* 5.24.1-2).

In the first example, Tacitus' narration offers room for a multi-layered interpretation of the river's agency; the second example, as we will see, is compatible with both readings but less explicitly associated with both by Tacitus. One level allows the power of the landscape to be read as divinely animated. He reports that the Roman soldiers witnessing the Rhine drought interpreted this occurrence in divine terms[57]:

apud imperitos prodigii loco accipiebatur ipsa aquarum penuria, tamquam nos amnes quoque et vetera imperii munimenta desererent: quod in pace fors seu natura, tunc fatum et ira dei vocabatur.

Hist. 4.26.6-9

'but by the ignorant this dearth of water was interpreted as an omen, as though the rivers along with the other ancient strongholds of empire were deserting us; what in peacetime would have been called coincidence or nature was then labelled fate and divine anger.'

[56]Church & Brodribb once again keep the passive with their translation of 'the river, swollen by the continual rains of the season, overflowed the island', whereas Levene conveys the general sense but again shifts the agency from river to atmospheric conditions, with 'the heavy equinoctial rains had set the river in flood, covering the low-lying marshy island until it looked like a lake'.

[57]I agree with Joseph (2012, 69) that 'the *deus* referred to specifically here is the river god of the Rhine'.

Though Tacitus as author distances himself straightaway from this particular explanation for what occurred, this can be no reason to disregard his account of this prevalent opinion at the time. I will here consider some aspects of Roman imperialism and Roman religion which reveal the sentiment as far from nonsensical within a Roman context, despite Tacitus' criticisms. Romans recognised that natural elements, including rivers, indisputably had the power to intervene quite drastically in the material world on which humans depend for their livelihood. It was only a small step from this recognition to treating them as deities, and from this evidence of intervention and their existing tradition of an anthropomorphised central pantheon to anthropomorphising these natural elements too.[58] Though not as frequently revered in inscriptions as springs or wells, there are still numerous examples of vows made to the river Rhine, and possibly even evidence for a sanctuary of Rhenus Pater.[59] Civilis' telling juxtaposition in his pre-battle *contio* of *Rhenum et Germaniae deos in aspectu* (*Hist.* 5.17.10-11) is attested almost verbatim in a 2nd century AD or later inscription by a legionary legate of *legio XXX Ulpia* stationed on the Rhine (ILS 9266) mentioning both ancestral gods and Rhine as part of a sequence also encompassing Jupiter, local gods of protection, and Ocean: *I. o. m.* | *dis patriis et* | *praesidibus huius* | *loci Oceanique* | *et Reno* | *Q. Marc. Gallia*|*nus leg. leg. XXX U. v.* | *pro salute sua* | *et suorum* | *v. s. l. m.*[60] It was dated to around AD220 by Alföldy[61], though his date is questioned and potentially put forward to some time in the 2nd century AD by Reuter.[62] An earlier date would drastically shorten the gap between Civilis' reported use of this particular configuration of deities including the Rhine and this real-life attestation of its use, and certainly between Tacitus' time of writing and the evidence. Tacitus' attribution of the phrase to Civilis in AD69-70 may be simply a retrojection of a contemporary phenomenon, but it is

[58]'The enormous influence of rivers on the lives of rural communities reminded men of the divine power to intervene in human affairs and the mutability of human fortune'; Campbell (2012), 129.
[59]Campbell (2012), 136, n. 117 (vows: AE 1969-70.434; 1993.1227; ILS 3913; CIL 13.5255, 7790, 7791, 8810, 8811 – for ILS 9266 = CIL 13.8810, see next note) and n. 285 (sanctuary).
[60]ILS 9266. The inscription was found at Vechten (Fectio) on the Rhine but we know the legion was stationed at Xanten (Vetera). It is mentioned by Campbell (2012, 138), but the connection with Tacitus' text is my own.
[61]Alföldy (1967), 54-5.
[62]Reuter (2012), 57.

also possible that it attests a practice of longer standing in which soldiers on the Rhine had long seen the Rhine as an anthropomorphised divine agent in their lives, just like Jupiter.

Such religious feeling and ideas of divine assistance had had a place in Roman imperialism from the early Republic onwards. Ando remarked that 'insofar as the peoples of the Mediterranean each had their own gods – or were understood to do so – the confrontation of peoples in war implicated each party's gods'.[63] He offers the case study of Republican *evocatio* as one way of guarding against the potential danger posed by the opponents' gods, and a closer look at this ceremony offers a key to understanding our examples of riverine agency as well as the Roman response they provoked with those called *imperiti* by Tacitus. *Evocatio* was a ritual in which Rome tried to entice the patron deity of whatever city they were trying to capture over to Rome, by means of promises of (presumably better) worship by Romans.[64] By this logic, a city abandoned by its gods could and would fall much more easily. There are numerous issues surrounding the historicity of the textual evidence attesting instances of *evocatio*[65], but no one disputes that Romans saw the line of reasoning that saw anthropomorphised gods changing alliance in this way as plausible. Plutarch reports without any caveats the tale that people claimed to hear sounds of a Bacchic procession, the cult Antony most closely associated with himself, leaving his stronghold of Alexandria in 30BC, interpreting this as a sign of the god deserting Antony's cause.[66] Tacitus reports a similar divine exodus from the Temple at Jerusalem at the advent of Titus.[67] Many centuries later, Macrobius reports the words allegedly read out during the *evocatio* ceremony held outside the walls of Carthage in 146BC, and much is made of the dreadful effects hoped for from the divine abandonment of Rome's opponents, suggesting that

[63]Ando (2008), 121.
[64]For more on *evocatio*, see Gustafsson (2000).
[65]Ando (2008), 128ff.
[66]Plutarch, *Antony* 75.3-4.
[67]*Apertae repente delubri fores et audita maior humana vox excedere deos; simul ingens motus excedentium*, *Hist.* 5.13.4-6.

engendering fear was as much of an objective as enticing away divine assistance.[68]

In light of this long-standing association between gods and imperialism, Rome's concern with the Rhine's behaviour becomes understandable on more than simply a practical level: whether an actual ceremony to placate the river god was held at any point or not, their religiously motivated fear at the Rhine's uncooperativeness suggests the soldiers operated under the belief that the river god had been persuaded to the side and service of Rome, away from its *tutela* of Germany (*nos amnes quoque… desererent*). The Rhine's unexpected drought, which damages Rome, can then be read as a change of allegiance. Not only has Rome lost the Rhine as divine ally, but it may be back to working for the enemy. The river's desertion is as worrying as a human ally's desertion in battle: *nos amnes quoque et vetera imperii munimenta desererent*, the Roman soldiers complain (*Hist.* 4.26.7-8), including rivers (or Rivers) in the defences of empire which also encompassed Rome's legions.[69]

In the central section of the Batavian revolt narrative, the German tribe of the Tencteri complain, amongst other things, of being barred from the *flumina* of Germany by Rome (*nam ad hunc diem flumina ac terram et caelum quodam modo ipsum clauserant Romani*, 'for up until this day the Romans had closed off the rivers, earth and in some ways the sky itself', *Hist.* 4.64.6-7). We can now read this as a precautionary separation of the river [god] from his traditional worshippers as well as an attempt to break the link between the German environment and its inhabitants which makes Germans German (this, as we say, was the central tenet of the Tencteri's identity-focused speech when they are trying to persuade the Romanised Ubii to break away from Rome). Having

[68]'*…veniamque a nobis peto ut vos populum civitatemque Carthaginiensem deseratis, loca templa sacra urbemque eorum relinquatis; absque his abdeatis eique populo civitati metum formidinem oblivionem iniciatis'*, Macrob. *Saturnalia* 3.7-8, quoted by Ando (2008, 131). In Tacitus' Judaean example (see note above), no general panic ensues ([*Quae*] *pauci in metum trahebant*, *Hist.* 5.13.6-7) but only because the Jews misinterpreted this omen as positive.

[69]Cf. Haynes (2003), 162, a similar reading of the river as a foe, but with reference to the passage's use of 'us' and 'them' to signal, in Haynes' theory, moments of Roman insecurity.

established the complex interaction between nature that is simultaneously divinity and inhabitants who are simultaneously worshippers, we can further infer from Tacitus' drought-related comment that '*dispositae per omnem ripam stationes quae Germanos vado arcerent*' (*Hist.* 4.26.4-5) that the Germans are at risk of resuming their own use of the river, thereby restoring the link with the environment that makes them powerful and thus threatening Roman order, but perhaps also restoring their religious relationship with the river as their tutelary deity, an equally disturbing prospect.

The technologies of Roman religion are shown not to be sufficient to bind the river god securely. The equation of religious pacification with pacifying the environment through building is also present in other Latin texts, roughly contemporary with Tacitus. Statius in *Silvae* 4.3 offers a particularly useful comparison, celebrating the completion of the *via Domitiana* through Campania. Starting with an outline (20-39) of the sorry state travellers in this part of the world found themselves in before the road was built – to make clear the roadmaker's benevolence in redressing that situation – he moves to a description (40-66) of the vast amount of hard and noisy work involved, to make clear the roadmaker's power. The poem then finds its culmination in two speeches by 'supernatural' entities, suitably placed to act as mouthpieces for proclaiming Domitian's literally supernatural achievement: first, the god Volturnus (67-94), now shackled by a bridge as part of the project, acknowledges the superior force of Domitian the emperor-engineer over his divinity (*ligasti*, 75), followed by the Sibyl's speech, which equates the builder of this godlike feat with a god (*hic est deus*, 128), calling him '*natura melior potentiorque*' (135). The speech as a whole combines the mundane elements of mastering landscapes through engineering within a religious framework. Though obviously intended to be flattering to Domitian, these were considered suitable terms in which to talk about the power of landscapes as well as the power of those who interfered with them successfully.[70] The realisation by the

[70]See Coleman (1988), 13-9 and 102-35; Newlands (2002), 301–9. The villa poems operate on similar terms, e.g. *Silvae* 2.2 on the villa of Pollius Felix, esp. 44-5 (*locine*

Roman soldiers in the Batavian revolt that their power to control the Rhine successfully is insufficient, fills them with fright.

So much for the conceptual frameworks which may be governing the rank and file's fearful response to the flood. As noted earlier, Tacitus takes care to distance himself from this view by calling those who espouse it *imperitos* (ignorant). By doing so, he did not intend to invalidate divine anger as a cause of events in the human world[71], nor the human skill of interpreting the gods' will. What he *is* doing at this point is impeaching the soldiers' qualifications for making such pronouncements, and disagreeing with their judgment in this particular case.[72] Yet his rationality cannot advance a complete model for the perplexing occurrence of the unusual drought which frustrates Rome's imperialist hold on this incomprehensible, slippery, dreadful Germany, and sits alongside the gods as one of several potential explanations which defy the understanding of the humans who suffer its consequences. As readers and scholars, we cannot fill in this gap in any detail, but we *can* say that on a general level the text proposes a conception of materiality which, even if not divinely animated, is active as opposed to passive. The causal universe in which the participants in the Batavian conflict operate is made up of interactions which include but are not limited to the human.

Such a way of looking at the world was elaborated recently by the political philosopher Jane Bennett in *Vibrant Matter* in which she defines the vitality of (all) nonhuman matter as 'the capacity of things – edibles, commodities, storms, metals – not only to impede or block the will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, propensities, or tendencies of their own'.[73] Accepting this, as I do, as a useful description of what is going on in Tacitus' representation of the Batavian landscape, amounts to ascribing to him

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ingenium an domini mirer prius?) and 52-3 (*his favit Natura locis, hic victa colenti cessit et ignotos docilis mansuevit in usus*).

[71]He explicitly advances it as a cause at *Hist.* 1.3.6-11, 2.38.13-14, and 3.72.1-6; see Joseph (2012), 69-70.

[72]See Davies (2004), 143–225 for an analysis of divine will and the *correct* interpretation of signs in Tacitus.

[73]Bennett (2010), viii.

the morally neutral recognition that humans are not all-powerful[74] – not even in the endeavour of imperialist conquest, which is traditionally assumed to revolve mainly around the coercion and subjugation of one set of humans by another (and indeed, Roman incompetence or unpreparedness gets allocated its proper share of responsibility).[75] Without spelling it out in so many words, Tacitus' account powerfully suggests that successful imperialism has to account for more than simply human resistance, and requires somehow overcoming or obviating environmental resistance on a thoroughly mundane level which is compatible with a religious colouring but which is, at heart, extremely secular. (It need not be any less frightening for all that.)

Important in terms of Tacitean imperialism at work in Germany is that all the agents in an *assemblage*, as Bennett – applying to the world at large Deleuze's and Guattari's term for describing social complexity[76] – describes the confederation of human and nonhuman agents which govern events, interact in a perpetual struggle. Only the human agents are capable of intentional action to influence the event's outcome, and even then it is not always possible to predict the effect of a human action on the whole. But it does mean it is sometimes possible to force the outcome of an event by influencing other agents within the *assemblage* in some way. Environmental agency can be constrained by mastering the elements (e.g. by damming rivers). Human power can be pooled and thus increased (e.g. through adding knowledge of the local territory from Batavian traitors to the superior fighting skills of the Romans, as at *Hist.* 5.18.7-8) or, alternatively, diminished by introducing new elements into the *status quo* which reduce the efficacy of one's opponents in a particular *assemblage* of agents (e.g. through restricting the Germans' access to the Rhine whose practical use and religious associations underpin their identity as well as their success, as in the Tencteri's complaint to their Ubian kin – although this then goes both ways, as with the Romans' panic at the Rhine drought). The

[74]'a theory of vibrant matter presents individuals as simply incapable of bearing *full* responsibility for their effects'; Bennett (2010), 37.
[75]e.g. *Hist.* 4.15.16-17, where unprepared soldiers and camp-followers, who should have known better, are surprised by Brinno's attack.
[76]First developed in Deleuze and Guattari (1980).

destruction or management of the environment changes the way in which these *assemblages* operate and thereby also the power dynamics within a region.

Tacitus thus follows the familiar path, long noted by others, in creating tensions in his account which he leaves unresolved, allowing the reader to form their own interpretation. Happily, however, the dual readings advanced here on the basis of the text can coexist unproblematically. Whether we choose to interpret the Rhine's resistance to Rome as divinely actuated or the more secular 'capacity of things to act as quasi agents with propensities of their own', the concept of *assemblage* accommodates both, separately as well as together, as significant factors involved in determining the progress of the Batavian revolt in Tacitus' account. Finally, we cannot read Tacitean judgment into the complexity of his representation of imperialism. He is not criticising Rome's approach as being somehow deficient, or suggesting that they could or should have run their campaigns, here or elsewhere, differently – the point is that there is a finite limit to what humans can effect in the face of certain kinds of environmental resistance, and the extreme nature of the examples of landscape agency discussed bring home that harshest of realities more forcefully than the previous section's demonstration of the pervasiveness of environmental factors in less spectacular ways such as a positive relationship of symbiosis. Reading the Batavian landscape as possessing a power of its own which can trump human power imbues Tacitus' narration with a sense of awe for the difficulties this wildly unfamiliar wet environment poses to Roman imperialism. The soldiers may be foolish, in Tacitus' view, for thinking a god is displeased with them when suffering at the mercy of the powerful river Rhine, but they are not foolish for being frightened.

Power and resistance shape the environment

In this final section I return to spatial interventions in slightly more detail. Just as reading the Rhine examples as instances of divine abandonment made the environment into a powerful agent escaping Roman imperial(ist) control on a symbolic, psychologically disconcerting level, Bennett's idea of events as *assemblages* of 'vibrant matter' stresses that Rome's imperialist project

depended on rendering passive and controllable a landscape which possesses 'active' powers of resistance. In the Batavian rebellion of the *Histories*, however, good Roman imperialism need not destroy foreign structures and replace them with a 'one size fits all' building programme as in Alston's reading of the *Agricola*. But, as we saw, it does need to neutralise them somehow, either by 'binding them' to Rome symbolically through religious ritual or by constraining them physically (which can be thought to subsume religious binding, though not vice versa).

Zoe Tan recently proposed a reading of the *Germania*'s Germany as so remote and impenetrable to either intellectual or physical conquest that even actual Roman triumphs or achievements in the area are elided from the narrative.[77] The *Histories*, in contrast, show that it *is* possible to make a mark on Germany despite the resistance of its environment. Tacitus shows that its geography can be altered by means of the application of force onto it, making it not a passive *force*, but an *object* in the hands of others. Ellen O'Gorman notably wrote about Tacitus' treatment of Germany as an object to be manipulated by characterising it as 'shapeless' throughout the work.[78] In this reading, Tacitus then 'shaped' the formless *Germania* through writing about it.[79] The *Histories*, again in contrast, represent instances of actual violent interference by Rome in the Batavian landscape.

Such landscaping is not only a means to an end (that of establishing firmer physical control of an area) but it is both the means *and* the end. For every act of Roman physical appropriation of frightening German space with a view to turning it into 'tame' Roman space, there is a corresponding Batavo-Germanic rejection of these acts, trying to reassert control over 'their' landscape. The transrhenane Tencteri demand that the Romanised Ubii tear down their city walls (*Hist.* 4.64.11-12). The same holds for the burning of all Roman camps on the Rhine by the alliance — with the exception of Mogontiacum and Vindonissa

[77]Tan (2014), 188–92 and 199.
[78]O'Gorman (1993), 137-41.
[79]Though chapter six of this thesis questions how much shape, clarity or fixity is in fact achieved by Tacitus's account.

— reported at *Hist.* 4.61.16-7. The fact that Roman army camps were constructed along the same basic lines all over the world and were not varied to reflect, incorporate or accommodate local circumstances would have aided a sense of familiarity for the Romans in Germany. But this was possible precisely because they would have stood out for the Batavi as 'alien' in their 'home' landscape; visually but also mentally, as indications of occupation by a foreign power. A suitably riverine example is the Elder Drusus' construction of a dam across the Rhine between 12 and 9BC, which facilitated Roman naval traffic on the Rhine for both supply and patrolling purposes by regulating its flow.[80] At *Hist.* 5.19.5-11, Tacitus records its destruction as follows:

> *[Civilis] in insulam concessit, gnarus deesse navis efficiendo ponti, neque exercitum Romanum aliter transmissurum: quin et diruit molem a Druso Germanico factam Rhenumque prono alveo in Galliam ruentem, disiectis quae morabantur, effudit. Sic velut abacto amne tenuis alveus insulam inter Germanosque continentium terrarum speciem fecerat.*
>
> 'Civilis pulled back to the island, knowing that there were not enough ships to make into a bridge, and that the Roman army could not be put across in any other way; then he also destroyed the dam made by Drusus Germanicus and poured out the Rhine so that it rushed towards Gaul by means of a deep channel, once the obstacles which slowed it down had been removed. In this way, with the river diverted as it were, a thin channel had created the impression of continuous solid ground between the island and the Germans.'

This implies that though the Batavian island was situated in the Rhine, the flow of the river was stronger, and thus the crossing more difficult, on the side of the island facing the Gallic, and thus Roman, bank of the Rhine. The Roman dam redirected much of this flow to the side of the island opposite the German shore, thus making the crossing to Germany more difficult and that to Gaul easier. In this sense, the interference brought closer the island to Rome in a practical sense – no doubt there was a symbolic implication too, that the Batavi's association with Rome *ought* to pull it towards Gaul more than towards their German cousins, and the dam aided this. By restoring the natural flow of the river, Civilis thus mentally cut loose the Batavian island once more from its

[80]Nienhuis (2008), 34.

mooring to the Gallo-Roman shore. As 'a thin channel had created the impression of continuous solid ground between the island and the Germans', the Batavian island is now virtually *attached* to Germany.[81] But there is a sense in which the narrative invites the reader to doubt the possibility of return for the Batavi, despite the setting free of the river: the plain attaching them visually to Germany is called a *speciem*, a reminder that there was still a channel, if narrower than before his intervention, separating the two banks. Civilis' power over the landscape is great, but in this case not great enough to achieve a reordering of his environment beyond restoring it to its original state. Eliminating the separation between Germany and the island of the Batavi is not within his technological capacity, nor does it remove the Batavi from Rome's military grasp: the war continues, and Rome starts to build a bridge (*Hist.* 5.20.13-5), and so Civilis' gesture remains a statement and a challenge only.

The anecdote highlights how both Romans and Civilis manipulate the landscape to express and occasionally achieve domination and allegiance. But Tacitus ultimately uses it to stress how the shaping power of humans on the landscape is in constant conflict with the landscape's power to resist such human interventions. The interaction of these two forces is circular and sometimes neither party is strong enough to force a break. There is, further, a sense in which it shows up the receptiveness of space to human intervention but the complete resistance of time to such manipulation in reverse: recalling the situation of the Ubii and even the Tencteri earlier on in the conflict, the Batavi's association with Rome is of too long a standing and has had too profound an effect on them for physical removal to produce the required reversion to their 'state of nature'.

When physical domination fails, Tacitus' representation of the struggle for control turns to words. Claims to physical possession of Batavia on the basis of its mental appropriation is the dominant theme of the final confrontation between Cerialis and Civilis before the Batavian rebellion fizzles out and Civilis surrenders. Both sides base their claim to possessing the very same riverbank

[81]Noted briefly by Pomeroy (2003, 269).

on historical grounds. They are radically separated, however, by the rhetorical treatment Tacitus gives them.

Cerialis combines elements traditional to the pre-battle *contio*, such as a mention of Rome's long-standing military glory (*veterem Romani nominis gloriam, antiquas recentisque victorias*, *Hist.* 5.16.7-8) and denunciation of the enemy (*perfidum ignavum victum hostem*, *Hist.* 5.16.8-9; *qui fugam animis, qui vulnera tergo ferant*, *Hist.* 5.16.12). Nonetheless, his speech has the ring of generality typical of imperialist powers failing to really 'see' the specific characteristics of the situation and people before him.[82] Importantly, however, his claims to superiority are not even based on Rome's performance in the Batavian rebellion. The only context-specific remarks are Cerialis' reminder of his troops' previous rout of the Germans (at *Hist.* 4.78) and the Roman claim of the riverbank and its local legionary camp (Vetera) as 'theirs' (*suam ripam, sua castra*, *Hist.* 5.16.17-18). But the first claim ignores the Romans' intervening defeat suffered at *Hist.* 5.15, and the second claim rather suffers from the fact that Vetera was torched by Civilis' troops at *Hist.* 4.60.[83] The rest of the speech moves away from the Rhine as well as from the past completely, aiming to strengthen Roman resolve here on the basis of the troops' achievements elsewhere: the successful subjection of Britain and their role in the accession of Galba (*Hist.* 5.16.13-14). By the end of the speech, Cerialis is looking to the future for motivation (the dedication of the second legion's new eagle), as he has run out of not only local references, but also useful elements from the past, to spur on his troops. The overall picture is unimpressive.

In contrast to the abstract concepts offered by Cerialis, Civilis' speech is made up of concrete elements. He bases the German side's parallel claim to military prowess firmly on the place in which they find themselves: *locum pugnae testem virtutis ciens*, 'invoking the battlefield itself as testifying to their bravery in

[82]A powerful characteristic of Orientalism as described by Edward Said (cf. Said 2003, originally published in 1978).
[83]Shumate (2006, 116), drawing on the list of tropes of modern colonial rhetoric compiled by Spurr (1993), cites 'the inverse relationship between the rootedness – the reality, one might say – of colonial power, and the insistence with which that reality is asserted; in other ways the tendency of the rhetoric to intensify under stress.'

battle' (*Hist.* 5.17.1-2). He supports this focus on the here and now first of all through the close conjunction of words which evoke the idea of autopsy or 'seeing for oneself', such as *testis* (witness), *vestigia* (traces, but literally 'footprints'), *oculos* (eyes) and *obversari* (to appear before one) in the first two sentences. Tacitus' Roman readers would have been familiar with autopsy as a historical technique, and moreover one with a claim to fostering the most authoritative knowledge of something.[84] Hand in hand with this focus on autopsy goes an accurate description of their present surroundings: *campos madentis et ipsis gnaros, paludes hostibus noxias*, 'soggy fields well known to them, but swamps harmful to the enemy'. Finally, an invocation of the Rhine alongside the German gods takes care of religious piety as well as reminding the German troops that the river is a quasi-divine ally as well as a practical advantage. The second feature of Civilis' *contio* which roots it firmly in its context, in contrast with that of Cerialis, is its references to the past, which are both specific and (broadly) relevant: *stare Germanos Batavosque super vestigia gloriae, cineres ossaque legionum calcantis* (*Hist.* 5.17.2-3) refers to the visible reminders of the Germans' slaugher of the evacuated soldiers from Vetera at *Hist.* 4.60[85], in connection with which Tacitus had indeed mentioned no burial. The reminder allows Civilis' troops' morale to peak before he proceeds to take the sting out their recent defeat at Trier (*ne terrerentur vario Trevirici proelii eventu*… narrated at *Hist.* 4.71), the recollection of which could potentially have depressed their fighting spirit before battle.

The pairing of the two speeches shows both sides employing the same technique of linking possession of their environment to history, but shows Civilis doing it better. Imperial Rome's effort to mentally appropriate Batavian space lags well behind its physical efforts. Underlying this claim is the

[84]See Marincola (1997), 61–86 for a discussion of autopsy. Herodotus 2.99 is the *locus classicus* for historiography: 'Up to this point I have confined what I have written to the results of my own direct observation and research, and the views I have formed from them; but from now on the basis of my story will be the accounts given to me by the Egyptians themselves – though here, too, I shall put in one or two things which I have seen with my own eyes.' (tr. De Sélincourt, rev. Marincola). Cf. discussion by Hartog (1988), 261–69.

[85]For which, at the time, Civilis rebuked them sternly (*Hist.* 4.60.14-5).

recognition that exerting force upon geography to change the landscape, such as by damming a river, is not only a mental and physical assertion of domination, but also a means of increasing it. Such intervention makes the environment more suited to receiving, upholding, and furthering particular structures of power.

But in addition to the Batavian destruction of such inroads as Rome *has* made on the Batavian landscape, I contend that Tacitus' representation of this corner of Gaul and Germany shows very little sign of *permanent* structures of power which would achieve pacification (or Romanisation, or civilisation, or demilitarisation) of this part of the world, as opposed to simply keeping it subdued by means of violent oppression. This failure can be understood in terms of Lefebvre's dictum that '(social) space is a (social) product' by saying it both *contained* and *assigned places to* first, the social relations of reproduction and secondly the relations of production, and that in pre-capitalist societies the interaction of these two sets of relations constituted social reproduction ('that is to say, the reproduction of society as it perpetuated itself generation after generation, conflict, feud, strife, crisis and war notwithstanding').[86] The walled settlement at Cologne is a good example. It is the urban stage on which much of the action of the central section of the revolt takes place (*Hist.* 4.54-79) and by this urban nature integral to the environmental argument about spatial organisation and resistance. Made by social intervention (of Rome in Ubian territory), it is then formative of society (of Romanised Ubii, who then prefer to carry on that way). How strong this link can be is proved in Tacitus by the Ubii's preference for carrying on that way rather than reverting to their original German state, as their transrhenane cousins the Tencteri think is possible and desirable.[87] But outside of the Ubian example of Cologne, the Batavian rebellion as narrated by Tacitus offers little evidence of social reproduction in the Roman mould: although the camps reproduce a Roman environment, which makes it difficult for the Romans to be defeated *in that environment*, further inroads into Batavian (social) space are clearly very difficult to make: they still have their

[86]Lefebvre (1991), 32.
[87]See chapter two for the Ubii's response.

forests to hide in (there is no imitation of Caesar, who occasionally simply cut them down, as at *BG* 3.29.1, or Caecina at *Ann.* 1.50[88]), and manage to undercut Roman control of their waterways, as we have seen.

Both of the elements required for social reproduction are absent. The social relations of reproduction are portrayed as taking place on strictly ethnic lines with the Ubii the only ones shown to have intermarried with Romans. And as long as the camps are islands of self-sufficient Romanity implanted into the 'alien' landscape, the relations of production are also conducted strictly on Roman lines. The conditions for (Roman) social reproduction as opposed to forcible subjugation are not fulfilled in Tacitus' Batavian narrative. Roman and Batavian worlds exist in parallel and in continual tension. Each side reproduces their own environment but expanding into each other's territory, reproducing one type of social space (made by one set of people) in another (made by a different set of people), is shown to be difficult on the basis of repression alone. Cologne's representation as the sole foothold of Roman civilisation amidst the Batavian landscape of dread in this regard is historically unrealistic, as is the representation of Roman activity on the Rhine as nothing more than a measure of military control: patrolling would have made and kept the Gallic river bank safe for settlers, including those living in settlements near the Roman camps.[89] Further, intermarriage would have taken place between soldiers and locals everywhere, not just in Cologne (*nobiscum per conubium sociatis quique mox provenerunt*, *Hist.* 4.65.10-11). But not even *mercatores* are mentioned in the course of the Batavian revolt, and *negotiatores* or merchants only once (*Hist.* 4.15.16). *Lixae* are the only category of non-soldiers associated with the Roman side (*Hist.* 4.15.16, 4.20.9, 4.22.17), and their role is regrettably unclear. If Vishnia is right, and they were 'a special paramilitary squad, connected to the army contractually, whose main task was not only to capture inhabitants in war areas, as described by Sallust and Polybius, but also to take care of the newly

[88]I discuss the reason for Caecina's success in the German forests in this particular episode at the end of chapter four.
[89]For more on this, see Allison (2013).

enslaved population for an agreed upon share in this form of booty'[90], this advances the economic argument for reading Rome's activity in Germany as conducive to the production of Roman, or at least hybrid, space and society no further. In the Tacitean sketch of Germany at the time of the Batavian revolt, the limits of violent imperialism for building an empire are revealed.

If we look back on the origins of the Batavian rebellion, in the *dilectus* rejected by the local population, it becomes clear that the same shortsightedness is at work in Tacitus' representation of the Roman strategy for dealing with the Batavian population. Foucault theorised on how the ordered representation of a subject is equivalent to establishing a measure of control over it.[91] Tacitus presents the Batavian *dilectus* as an attempt by Rome to count and manage adult Batavian bodies and therefore a means of establishing control over them. The first book of Vegetius' 4th century AD treatise *De Re Militari* describes the selection and training of recruits to the Roman army, and may differ from 1st century AD practices in some of the detail but probably not in the general sense. It gives a clear impression of the level of detail to which the bodies of recruits were inspected:

> *Sit ergo adulescens Martio operi deputandus uigilantibus oculis, erecta ceruice, lato pectore, umeris musculosis, ualentibus brachiis, digitis longioribus, uentre modicus, exilior clunibus, suris et pedibus non superflua carne distentis sed neruorum duritia collectis*
>
> *DRM*, 1.6.4-5[92]

> 'Let, then, the young man dedicated to military efforts have watchful eyes, a straight neck, a broad chest, muscular shoulders, strong arms, long fingers and have a moderate waistline, slim buttocks, with legs and feet which are not excessively fleshy but well-proportioned thanks to sturdy tendons.'

That there was a genuine (Vitellian) military need underlying the *dilectus* does not impede the symbolic value of its inspection of Batavian bodies as a

[90]Vishnia (2002), 270.
[91]Foucault (1991), 135–69, 'Docile bodies', with an emphasis on the exertion of power through the spatial distribution of bodies through timetables, reports, prescribed actions in specially designed spaces, etc.
[92]Latin edition by Önnerfors (1995).

statement of Roman power over the Batavi, and of the rape which accompanied the listing and inspection of bodies (*Hist.* 5.14.3-7)[93] as a demeaning gesture which gives the lie to the bond between the two peoples continuing to be labelled one of alliance (*neque enim societatem, ut olim*, Civilis says in his speech advising people not to present themselves for inspection). The *dilectus* is thus a measure which enables the Romans to control these people and is one of several imperial measures which enable the Romans to exert authority over land *and* people. But just as with their management of the outlandish Batavian lands, their strategy for human domination is shortsighted: in Tacitus' presentation of things, they may be subjecting the dreadful Batavi, but they are not making Romans.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown the pervasiveness of the environment in Tacitus' depiction of the rebellion through tracing its various permutations and how these affect the conduct of the conflict. As an influence on humans, it is a key factor in fostering the Batavi's special skills, which are of such use to Rome but are also the key to Germanic resistance to Rome when they decide to rebel. Its key importance is further demonstrated by the fact that its forcible suppression from outside is portrayed as causing the Ubii's shift, politically and ideologically, towards identifying with Rome and its best interests. As an influence on human power and resistance, its unpredictable, devastating force is a key factor in undermining the Roman soldiers' religiously backed faith in the moral rectitude and likely success of their imperialist endeavour in Batavia. It also frustrates Roman logistical efforts to establish enduring structures of surveillance and domination in the area. Finally, as not only a subject but also an object, it suffers spatial interventions into its fabric by the humans that are waging this war, with a view to mastering its territory as well as its inhabitants and setting up structures to perpetuate this mastery. Alongside these interventions, the territory is being laid claim to ideologically by both sides in the rhetorical

[93]*iussu Vitellii Batavorum iuventus ad dilectum vocabatur, quem suapte natura gravem onerabant ministri avaritia ac luxu, senes aut invalidos conquirendo, quos pretio dimitterent: rursus impubes et forma conspicui (et est plerisque procera pueritia) ad stuprum trahebantur.*

contest which precedes the final, inconclusive clash of arms in the text as we have it. Power by and over the environment and resistance by and to the environment are everywhere. Understanding how they are locked in a perpetual struggle within the framework of the *assemblage* goes a long way towards explaining the inconclusive nature of much of the fighting, and the conflict's non-military final resolution. The question of why Rome ultimately wins, or alternatively, why Civilis is outplayed in his initially strong appeal to 'pan-germanity' and his environmental advantage, finally prompting his surrender, is the focus of the next chapter.

2 Fragmentation in Batavia

Introduction

The previous chapter showed how Tacitus' Batavian environment shapes its human inhabitants and their opportunities for exerting power and resistance. It also showed how humans, in their turn, have some power to shape and resist their environment. Thus the Tacitean narrative appears to establish a complex but fundamental relationship between the environment and identity, one in which 'natural' elements point towards environmental determinism, but also one in which Roman landscape engineering can significantly transform a landscape and 'cultural' landscapes (notably cities) can influence identity. Consequently, affinity and familiarity with the landscape in the text are ultimately not useful predictors for military success (or, as this chapter will show, for identity): the Batavian rebellion still fails, with the Tacitean narrative breaking off a short way into a speech by Julius Civilis, abandoned by all his allies, offering his surrender to the Roman commander Petillius Cerialis.

This chapter, then, considers how we might account for the ultimate unsuccessful collapse of the Batavian revolt, given that there is no total, or even significant, military victory on either side. It will be shown that the narrative of *Histories* 4 and 5 grounds this demise solidly in the detachment of Civilis' supporters, Batavian and other, from each other and from him, rather than in any military causes. From the moment the Ubii pay lip service to their Tencteran cousins' demands to 'de-Romanise' themselves, all subsequent speeches reported by Tacitus, Roman and non-Roman, contain discourses of separation which help to effect, whether intentionally or not, the break up of Civilis' pan-German alliance.[94] These discourses rely partly on the language and

[94]Noted in an off-hand comment by Levene (2009, 226; see n. 14), but see Ash (2009, 97) for the view that different groups with different aims were responsible for the alliance's breakdown. Interestingly, Haynes (2003, 150) draws on similar terms of identity to mine in her assessment of the Batavian revolt's position within the *Histories*: 'As he does with the Jews, Tacitus often examines the Batavians in terms of their beliefs. At a time when Roman ideology fluctuates so drastically, everyone else's

framework of identity politics and partly on considerations of power and economics to motivate withdrawal from the rebellion (with the exception of the rebel leaders, who use these same considerations to decide on their military strategy).

On the side of power, the speeches individually and together often refer to past experience of Roman force in order to make the threat of future force believable; on the economic side, they contain reminders of the benefits enjoyed by the audience as a result of Rome's imperialist presence and combine these with the threat of removing such advantages. This rhetoric, further, may either encourage the audience to weigh up these benefits for themselves or include the speaker's assessment of this trade-off between the benefits of Roman rule and tribal self-determination. Often, the text makes clear that identity is linked to considerations of economics and politics/power, even if the speakers appear to treat the two sets of considerations separately. I argue that this makes the text at least partly an exploration of how the advent of imperial Rome in the Rhineland radically changed how tribes constituted their identities. In whatever way this happened before, the appearance of Rome on the scene made its provision of economic goods a crucial factor in delineating groups from each other, further aided by Rome's threat of meeting violent resistance to this evolution with brutal force. At the same time, the text shows that old labels still held some importance in and of themselves despite their increasingly economic underpinnings.[95] My argument will not be concerned with explaining why different speeches categorise people as Gallic or German, as upon closer examination the concepts seem to hold very little water. Instead, it notes the inconsistencies and redeployments, and explains them as a feature of this new imperial world in which labels of identity shift meaning as the groups who apply

represents the challenge to provide a logic of differentiation. The central concern of the *Histories* is the rhetoric of this differentiation and its evolution from chaos, at the death of Nero, to order, at the accession of Vespasian.' The latter part of the quote indicates where our foci diverge: she focuses on the Civil War, I on Roman imperialism.

[95]See n. 28.

them to themselves and others shift their political position for pragmatic reasons.[96]

The chapter's aims are to trace the process of the alliance's non-military breakdown in the Tacitean text, to identify the different mechanisms on which it relies, and to examine what the results could reasonably be said to indicate about the non-violent strategies which supported or facilitated Rome's imperialism. In the latter regard, my analyses of Cerialis' final communications to the Transrhenani and Batavi and the latter's change of heart have benefited from Frantz Fanon's theorising on the political and economic reasons why uprisings fail to become sustainable and successful revolutionary wars. Through my examination of the efficacy of his speeches and general approach, Petillius Cerialis is then rehabilitated as precisely the right general for this part of the world, rather than the military failure he has often been judged to be in scholarship, a presentation which Tacitus' text seems to encourage on a superficial level.

Finally, as in chapter one, I will name individual tribes when Tacitus gives us their name but will refer to 'the Germans' or 'the Gallo-German alliance' when he does not, in recognition of the fact that Tacitus does not use the ethnic terminology of Gaul and German with any level of consistency or clear underpinning criteria.[97]

Fragmentation

Tacitus is clear that the rebellion fails because Civilis eventually stands alone, having been abandoned by his supporters. The first to detach themselves from the alliance are the Ubii/Agrippinenses (*Hist.* 4.65), in response to the Tencteri's demands (*Hist.* 4.64). Their speech, though superficially acquiescent, already sets out a vision of empire – identity-wise *and* economic – that is incompatible

[96]The introduction to Master (2016) offers a good overview of modern scholarship on ethnic identity as 'socially constructed and instrumental' (p. 24).
[97]See pp. 24-5.

with the Tencteri's thoughts on Cologne's space and German identity.[98] After that the Treveri return to loyalty after a speech from Cerialis (*Hist.* 4.73-75), with which the Trevir rebel leader Tutor appears to engage in his subsequent speech to the other leaders of the revolt, including Civilis (*Hist.* 4.76). In book 5, the Transrhenani led by Veleda withdraw from the alliance and (implicitly) from Roman Gaul, again after receiving communications from Cerialis (*Hist.* 5.24). Finally the Batavi themselves decide they no longer want to be part of Civilis' project, and Tacitus provides his readers with a report of what they were thinking (*Hist.* 5.25). Each step of dissociation is thus associated with either direct speech, indirect speech or a Tacitean account of motivations and thoughts. Each of these discourses provides us with clues to understanding this dwindling support as based on considerations in which economic goods and power are entangled with identity politics.

Significant work has already been done on the speeches of *Histories* 4. Keitel stressed the mirroring of the Roman events and speeches of the civil war in those narrated for Batavia and along the Rhine: in both cases, the dichotomy between *libertas* and *servitus* is the crux.[99] Rutherford expanded upon Keitel's observations, mentioning 'factional antagonism, uncertain motives, fluctuating loyalties, excessive optimism frustrated by inadequate preparation or support and followed by disillusionment and resignation' as 'motifs' of both the revolt and the rest of the civil war narrative in the *Histories.*[100] From both I borrow the awareness, in what follows, that the speeches are interconnected.[101] From Rutherford I additionally borrow the framework of division, but as the subject of investigation on its own terms. Finally, I supplement Master's reading of the revolt's representations of identity as blowing up the reductionist binary of Roman/Other[102] with an investigation of identity fragmentation on the non-Roman side (which includes the close realignment of the supposedly Other with

[98]Benario (1988), 135 saw the Treveri's defeat and submission (*Hist.* 4.70ff) as 'one of the first steps in the turning of the devastating tide': I argue the Ubii's false acquiescence here is *the* first step.
[99]Keitel (1993).
[100]Rutherford (2010), 327.
[101]Keitel (1993), 51; Rutherford (2010), 327–28.
[102]Master (2016), 153–57.

Rome and its interests). Yet my mission differs from all of them in reading the revolt not as mirror of and for Rome[103], nor as a work that predominantly breaks down boundaries between Roman and Other – though it is both these things – but as a historical account, however dramatised and stylised, of the workings of Roman imperialism.

The Ubii and the Tencteri (revisited)

The welcoming of the Ubii back into the Roman fold was the first serious setback for Civilis' forces. In the previous chapter, I argued that the focus of the Tencteri's speech was their conviction that the Ubii had abandoned their German identity. Their new state as Agrippinenses was, in the Tencteri's view, both fostered by and expressed in the Roman spatial organisation of Cologne and the Roman habits its people had adopted. The speech thus called for the restoration of Cologne as a supposedly pure German space and the restoration of its population to containing only pure German bodies.[104] However, at three different points the speech refers to more pragmatic concerns amidst those of identity and cultural change:

> *nam ad hunc diem flumina ac terram et caelum quodam modo ipsum clauserant Romani ut conloquia congressusque nostros arcerent, vel, quod contumeliosius est viris ad arma natis, inermes ac prope nudi sub custode et pretio coiremus.*
>
> *Hist.* 4.54.6-10

> 'for up until this day the Romans had closed off the rivers, earth and in some ways the sky itself so that they could stop us from talking and meeting, or, something even more insulting to men born to arms, so that we could meet unarmed and practically naked only, under their guard and for a price.'

[103]Haynes (2003, 156–63) is also concerned with identity in the Batavian revolt, but from a Roman, literary, mirroring angle rather than focusing, as I do, on how the text articulates German-specific concerns and truth. See n. 94.

[104]See Isaac (2004), 140–41 for an analysis of the nature of their argument as based on purity. The *Germania*, whether historical or not, presents a very different picture of the spatial arrangements of the Germani in which their lack of identity is expressed in their lack of spatial coherence; cf. chapter six. Liebeschuetz (1966, 138) briefly mentions the passage as a Tacitean critique of romanisation [sic], but does not disentangle the mechanisms described.

bona interfectorum in medium cedant

Hist. 4.64.15

'the possessions of the murdered will go into a common pile'

sincerus et integer et servitutis oblitus populus aut ex aequo agetis aut aliis imperitabitis.

Hist. 4.64.21-3

'Clean and uncontaminated, as a people no longer remembering slavery, you will [then] either deal with others on an equal footing or actively rule over them.'

The first complaint combines power and economics in the compact phrase *sub custode et pretio*, making clear that the Tencteri's resentment originates at least as much from being impeded by Rome from free (in both senses) access to the bubble of wealth enjoyed by the Agrippinenses in Cologne. In the second quotation, their insistence on reserving the fruits of Roman Cologne's prosperity for common use also undermines the identity angle: unlike the Roman walls, which must be destroyed, these goods are not marked for destruction as tainted or un-German, despite their origins in the political and economic structures they wish to destroy.[105] Finally, their closing statement predicting *ex aequo agetis aut aliis imperabitis* envisages a future in which the Tencteri are, in the worst case, no longer controlled by others (in view of the preceding complaints, Rome is clearly implied) and, in the best case, in a position to control others. Though they offer this vision of radically reconfigured power relations to the Agrippinenses, it is a more effective expression of their discontent with their own economic and political position than it is an appealing offer to the Agrippinenses, as the latter's response and subsequent events make clear.

[105]This paradoxical attitude recurs in modern postcolonial discourse too. E.g. Castle in the introduction to the anthology *Postcolonial Discourses* (2001, xii) commenting on '(…) the extent to which resistance to empire is not always as radical as it seems, that it is predicated on a principled complicity, an ambivalence that is foundational' in the context of Ireland.

Tacitus ventriloquises the Agrippinsenses' response to the Tencteri's concerns and demands as follows:[106]

> *quae prima libertatis facultas data est, avidius quam cautius sumpsimus, ut vobis ceterisque Germanis, consanguineis nostris, iungeremur. muros civitatis, congregantibus se cum maxime Romanorum exercitibus, augere nobis quam diruere tutius est. si qui ex Italia aut provinciis alienigenae in finibus nostris fuerant, eos bellum absumpsit vel in suas quisque sedis refugerunt. deductis olim et nobiscum per conubium sociatis quique mox provenerunt haec patria est; nec vos adeo iniquos existimamus ut interfici a nobis parentes fratres liberos nostros velitis. vectigal et onera commerciorum resolvimus: sint transitus incustoditi sed diurni et inermes, donec nova et recentia iura vetustate in consuetudinem vertuntur. arbitrum habebimus Civilem et Veledam, apud quos pacta sancientur.*
>
> *Hist.* 4.65.4-17

> 'The first opportunity of freedom which came our way, we embraced with more eagerness than wisdom, so that we could be joined to you and the other Germans, our kinsfolk. But the walls around our community, now that the armies of the Romans are gathering in the greatest possible numbers, it would be safer to build up further than to throw down. If there had been any left within our borders who were born elsewhere, either from Italy or the provinces, either the war has already removed them or they have all sought refuge in their own nations. For those who settled here a long time ago and are now joined to us in marriage, and for those who were born since, this is their fatherland; nor do we judge you to be so unfair that you would want our parents, brothers and children to be murdered by us. The tax and other burdens of trade we have remitted: let there be unguarded contact, but only during the day and unarmed, until these novel rights are converted into tradition by long standing. We will have Civilis and Veleda as referees, in whose company these pacts will be sanctioned.'

At first glance, their response engages seriously with the Tencteri's speech. Their use of *consanguineus* to describe and address the Tencteri acknowledges the latter's appeal to a shared German identity, in spite of their cultural change. The Agrippinenses also follow the anti-Roman line set out by their cousins in implying that the Roman troops in the area are a potential threat to their safety.

[106]Rutherford stops short of allowing this direct exchange of speeches to be termed an *agōn* (Rutherford 2010, 322). Although it is the only pair of straightforward 'petition and response' speeches out of all those discussed, the traditional standard of meeting the opponent's arguments in agonistic debate is not really met.

However, the rest of their speech complicates this apparent agreement with the Tencteri's sketched out worldview.

First of all, the Ubii take issue with the notion of externally influenced identity change, and reply that their identity change is written into their very bodies, now mixed due to intermarriage with Romans. By anchoring this mixed identity in corporeal reality, they make clear that the ethnic separation desired by the Tencteri cannot be achieved, instead of simply declaring that they would not do it even if possible.[107] Instead, the Agrippinsenses spuriously advance the category of *alienigenae* as people who do not belong in Cologne and would therefore be legitimate targets for the Tencteri. The redefinition has several benefits, despite its intellectual dishonesty. First of all, it allows them to avoid murdering their own Romano-German families, whose bodies as we saw were problematic in the purity schema advanced by the Tencteri. Secondly, it allows them to show willing in front of the Tencteri, claiming they *would* kill any such people if there had been any left in the city, without antagonising Rome by actually having to be put to the test. They can steer a middle course between the immediate danger of the Tencteri's wrath if they protest too much and the more distant danger of Rome's displeasure if they did kill all Romans present in the city. Finally, it allows them to uphold the validity of the new identities that have sprung up as a result of Cologne's imperial context, thereby appearing to endorse the Tencteri's binary framework of German or Roman whilst in fact sidestepping it. The language of identity is prevalent in both speeches, call and response, but though the Agrippinenses use the same terms, the logic of purity on which the Tencteri's conception of identity is founded is explicitly rejected.

[107]Syme (1958, 453) talks about their *choice* to remain a 'single and indivisible community'. The Tacitean text does not question the physical basis to the Agrippinenses' self-professed identity, but modern theories of race are clear that embracing and upholding their hybridity in this way is indeed a choice, not a biological reality that is empirically traceable. (Although the opposing argument, that race is biologically determined, is still pervasive in the modern day, to the despair of the philosopher Kwame Anthony Appiah, as recently expressed in his 2016 BBC Reith Lectures.) See the introduction to Master (2016) for a brief overview of modern scholarship on ethnicity as 'socially constructed and instrumental'.

Their redefinition of the argument into one of insider versus outsider of the imperial space of Cologne brings us back to economics and power. Let us look at how their speech deals with the Tencteri's demands in these two areas. To the complaint of *sub custode et pretio coiremus*, they respond that *vectigal et onera commerciorum resolvimus: sint transitus incustoditi sed diurni et inermes*. The Tencteri's demand to cede all goods into a common supply is simply ignored. Finally, the Tencteri's confident prediction of dealing with the world on a more equal footing in the future, or even ruling over it, is matched by the Agrippinenses' imposition of various safeguards, clearly indicating their distrust of their 'cousins'. They call for a long transitional period before arriving at *truly* unrestricted interaction (*donec nova et recentia iura vetustate in consuetudinem vertuntur*) and for an external arbiter to monitor both parties' adherence to the agreements made. There is, therefore, only a very limited engagement with both the Tencteri's economic argument (the Agrippinenses may remit the Tencteri's taxes but there is no mention of them opting out of, or condemning, taxation and trade altogether) and their arguments and proposals concerning freedom and power. The Agrippinenses keep their walls, keep the requirement to visit unarmed, and even add extra measures (the transition period, daytime crossings only, the external arbiter). They really only offer the cancellation of the degrading inspection by the (Roman?) *custos* upon entry to the city. Having assessed their present situation and weighed up the alternative future put forward by the Tencteri, it is clear that the Agrippinenses are seeking the best way to preserve their Roman-friendly status quo whilst avoiding immediate retaliation from the Tencteri. Tacitus reports that the Tencteri received this speech favourably.[108] Identity is important in these speeches, but a close reading suggests that identifications for both groups are closely linked to economic and political positions. The Tencteri have no part in the new imperial

[108]*sic lenitis Tencteris* (*Hist.* 4.65.17) looks puzzling in view of my argument, but makes more sense in view of the Ubii's presence in Civilis' army at *Hist.* 4.77.1-2 (*Media acies Vbiis Lingonibusque data; dextro cornu cohortes Batavorum, sinistro Bructeri Tencterique*), backing up their verbally expressed rapprochement with actions. Given their later massacre of two groups of rebel Germans (commoners at *Hist.* 4.79-3-4 and soldiers at *Hist.* 4.79.10-11), their appearance here, like their speech, is best explained by needing to keep the Tencteri on side until an opportunity to rebel from the rebels presented itself.

structures which transformed the Ubii into Agrippinenses: they are therefore convincingly able to assert a transhistorical essentialist German identity. But the Agrippinenses in the text cannot and will not adopt this: they are not who they were before the advent of Rome.

The speeches' reductionist position, in which identity is linked closely to being inside or outside the nexus of Roman imperial space, is adopted in the narrative's framing of the speeches as well. In the brief chapter contextualising the Tencteri's embassy, Tacitus mentions that the rebel leaders were considering sacking Cologne *saevitia ingenii et cupidine praedae*, 'because of the savage nature of their character and through their greed for loot' (*Hist.* 4.63.3). The statement is partly identity-focused, offering a different transhistorical essentialisation of German identity than the Tencteri did, but relies at least partly on Cologne's wealth, which clearly differentiated it from its surrounds, for its force. In the same chapter, Tacitus goes on to state the economic grounds for targeting Cologne in even less ambiguous terms:

> *Transrhenanis gentibus invisa civitas opulentia auctuque; neque alium finem belli rebantur quam si promisca ea sedes omnibus Germanis foret aut disiecta Vbios quoque dispersisset*.
>
> *Hist.* 4.63.8-11

> 'The settlement was hateful to the transrhenane tribes because of its wealth and growth, and they thought there could be no other end to the war than it being open to all the Germans or, destroyed, displacing the Ubii too.'

This introductory chapter therefore twice primes the reader to look beyond the face value of the Tencteri's ideological-sounding rhetoric before they have even spoken. The introduction to the Ubii's response similarly stresses the utilitarian preoccupations of those who are about to speak, with no reference to considerations of identity whatsoever:

> *Agrippinenses sumpto consultandi spatio, quando neque subire condiciones metus futuri neque palam aspernari condicio praesens sinebat, in hunc modum respondent*…
>
> *Hist.* 4.65.1-3

> 'The Agrippinenses, after taking some time to consider, since fear of the future did not allow them to submit to these conditions nor their present circumstances allow them to reject them plainly, responded in the following way…'

The speeches prevent us from adopting wholesale the reductionist position that economics and power are all that matter, however. The Agrippinenses' speech mentions Cologne as the *patria* of its new mixed population, a Roman concept with serious ideological significance. The Tencteri's speech also reveals that the position of these supposedly stereotypically greedy and savage Germans is more sophisticated than this authorial framing suggests. Chapter one already discussed their astute – if nonetheless flawed[109] – observation of the connection between spatial arrangements and the ideologies they can foster and uphold. Even more importantly, Tacitus' ventriloquising of their denunciation of change reads like a highly emotive and moving piece of rhetoric instead of a cynical charade. Tacitus' treatment is at least partly sympathetic, and their plea stands alongside other moving critiques of Roman imperial power in the Tacitean corpus: Calgacus' famous speech in the *Agricola*, Civilis' first speech at *Hist.* 4.14, and the mutineers' complaints in *Annals* 1.[110] Not coincidentally, all these episodes, contextually so very different, also depict these groups' dissatisfying economic and political relationships to Rome. Their shared position of exclusion and oppression undercuts identity differences on grounds of ethnicity. The equalising influence of different ethnic groups' collective subjection to imperial power will recur throughout this thesis. Tacitus' preliminary contextualisation of the Germans who speak so movingly as stereotypical greedy Germans (such as he grants to Cerialis in his speech later on in *Histories* 4, as we will see), instead of exposing their home-hitting criticisms about economic exclusion as false, is a framing device which allows such criticisms of Empire to be voiced without ever seriously threatening the stability, or questioning the morality, of

[109]Because they appear to think that a simple reversion of spatial change would also turn the Agrippinenses back into Ubii.

[110]See chapter three. Liebeschuetz (1966, 137) connects the speeches of Calgacus and Civilis as similar in content and expression, but from the point of view of their judgment on the vices of civilisation rather than collective and similar oppression by Rome.

the structure itself.[111] Economics and power matter, but identity does too. Identity matters, but so do economics and power.

Petillius Cerialis to the Treveri

The next occasion on which we encounter the tactic of dissociation through identity politics is immediately after the Roman general Petillius Cerialis' first entry into the narrative and shortly after the Agrippinenses' elaborate hedging to the Tencteri. Cerialis speaks to the Treveri and Lingones, who are at that point still nominally part of Civilis' alliance but have been recently defeated by auxiliaries of the Roman Sextilius Felix (*Hist.* 4.70):

> *neque ego umquam facundiam exercui, et populi Romani virtutem armis adfirmavi: sed quoniam apud vos verba plurimum valent bonaque ac mala non sua natura, sed vocibus seditiosorum aestimantur, statui pauca disserere quae profligato bello utilius sit vobis audisse quam nobis dixisse. terram vestram ceterorumque Gallorum ingressi sunt duces imperatoresque Romani nulla cupidine, sed maioribus vestris invocantibus, quos discordiae usque ad exitium fatigabant, et acciti auxilio Germani sociis pariter atque hostibus servitutem imposuerant. quot proeliis adversus Cimbros Teutonosque, quantis exercituum nostrorum laboribus quove eventu Germanica bella tractaverimus, satis clarum. nec ideo Rhenum insedimus ut Italiam tueremur, sed ne quis alius Ariovistus regno Galliarum potiretur. an vos cariores Civili Batavisque et Transrhenanis gentibus creditis quam maioribus eorum patres avique vestri fuerunt? eadem semper causa Germanis transcendendi in Gallias, libido atque avaritia et mutandae sedis amor, ut relictis paludibus et solitudinibus suis fecundissimum hoc solum vosque ipsos possiderent: ceterum libertas et speciosa nomina praetexuntur; nec quisquam alienum servitium et dominationem sibi concupivit ut non eadem ista vocabula usurparet. Regna bellaque per Gallias semper fuere donec in nostrum ius concederetis. nos, quamquam totiens lacessiti, iure victoriae id solum vobis addidimus, quo pacem tueremur; nam neque quies gentium sine armis neque arma sine stipendiis neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt: cetera in communi sita sunt. ipsi plerumque legionibus nostris praesidetis, ipsi has aliasque provincias regitis; nihil separatum clausumve.*
>
> *Hist.*4.73.2-74.8

> 'I have never commanded eloquence, and have always strengthened the valour of the Roman people with my weapons; but since with you words seem to weigh heavily and good or bad events are not judged by their

[111]In this sense is no different to Tacitus' undermining of the truth-speaking Percennius in *Annals* 1 as *common* (*gregarius miles*); see chapter three, p. 90-91. I disagree with Liebeschuetz (ibid.) that the framing devices 'detract from the effect of the speech' for either Percennius (as he claims) or by analogy for the Tencteri.

> intrinsic worth but according to the comments of those out to cause trouble, I have decided to say a few words which, with the war almost finished, will be more useful for you to have heard than for me to have said. Roman generals and emperors came into your lands and those of the other Gauls not through greed, but with your ancestors begging us to, whom civil discord had exhausted almost to destruction; with Germans summoned as auxiliaries they had imposed slavery on their allies as well as their enemies. How often we have engaged in fights against the Cimbri and Teutones, with how much effort by our legions and with what outcome we have waged German wars, is clear enough. Nor did we occupy the Rhine so that we might protect Italy, but so that no other Ariovistus could wrangle the kingship of the Gallic territories. Do you think you are dearer to Civilis and the Batavi and the tribes from across the Rhine than your fathers and grandfathers were to their ancestors? The Germans have always had the same reason for crossing over into Gaul: lust and greed and the desire for a change of scene, so that with their desolate swamps left behind they could take possession not just of this extremely fertile soil but also of you yourselves. Of course freedom and other empty words are being dangled in front of you; no one has ever desired the slavery of others and tyranny for themselves who has not used these very words. There were always despots and wars throughout the Gauls until you submitted to our laws. We, although so often taunted, have imposed only this on you, by the right of our victory, and so that we can protect the peace. For peace among peoples cannot be had without a military presence, nor this military presence without soldiers' wages, nor soldiers' wages without tribute: all other arrangements are universal. You yourselves commonly command our legions and govern these and other provinces. Nothing is held aloof from you or closed off from you.'

The ethnic distinction drawn in this speech by Cerialis is a simple binary one, of Gaul versus German. Germans live on the east bank (*eadem semper causa Germanis transcendendi in Gallias*), include Civilis, his Batavi and a number of other tribes (*an vos cariores Civili Batavisque et Transrhenanis gentibus creditis*), live in swamps which they are always keen to leave behind for the fertile fields of Gaul, and want to enslave the Gauls (*ut relictis paludibus et solitudinibus suis fecundissimum hoc solum vosque ipsos possiderent*).[112] Gauls, in the speech, are the reverse of all of these things: they live on the west bank, include the Treveri and Lingones (*terram vestram ceterorumque Gallorum*), possess fertile fields and operate in a general context of Roman order and structures (such as the

[112]The swamps of Germany appear in the mutinies of AD14 as similarly undesirable, in the soldiers' complaints that Rome passes off these lands to them upon discharge in the guise of a benefit when they are quite the contrary; they also feature in *Annals* 13's story of the Frisii's migration into fertile Roman land.

taxes which fund their safety from such incursions, *nam neque quies gentium sine armis neque arma sine stipendiis neque stipendia sine tributis haberi queunt)* and the provision of Roman social goods (*pax,* the aforementioned *quies gentium*, and the opportunity to command legions and provinces).[113]

Though couched in terms of an ethnic binary, the distinction between the two categories is thus in fact based on economic and political considerations. Cerialis is not saying that the Treveri should abandon their alliance with the Batavi because they are Gauls and the Batavi Germans, but because the Batavi may look like allies but are really out to steal the Treveri's lands and become their political overlords. The engagement between the general's speech here and that of the Tencteri to the Agrippinenses reinforces still further the strength of these economic factors in determining political decision-making.[114] Ethnic difference is represented but it appears as almost a shorthand for environmental separation and consequent political and economic division: the ethnic division becomes a representation of poor (Germans) and rich (Gauls) and the incentive for the Gauls becomes holding onto that wealth. In his power-related claim about the specious dangling of *libertas* by those who actually wish to rule[115], the Tencteri's prediction to the Ubii that *aliis imperabitis* is recalled; in his assertion that *nihil separatum clausumve*, Cerialis appears to be rebutting the Tencteri's repeated professions that *clauserant Romani…* and *arcerent Romani…* from a variety of things, people and environments in order to exclude them economically and from exerting power of their own.[116]

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[113]When Cerialis classifies the Treveri and Lingones as Gauls ('your lands and those of the other Gauls'), he follows Caesar's original labeling of them as well as the latter's implicit separation of them from 'the Germans': at *BG* 1.37.3.1, the Treveri's first occurrence in the work, they complain about the German Suebi settling on the opposite bank of the Rhine to them. Cerialis' generalisation about the fixity of Gauls and the tendency of Germans to move is therefore supported by past evidence from Caesar. Cf. chapter six for the theme of fixity and migration in the *Germania*.

[114]Rutherford (2010, 315) mentions this convention of paired speeches not overheard by the other party nonetheless engaging with each other for pre-battle *contiones*: it seems reasonable to extend the principle to other kinds of speeches.

[115]See Haynes (2003, 163-71) for a discussion of this part of the speech which, though interesting, is not central to this thesis' argument.

[116]With further references to opening and closing in the Tencteri's proposed parallels that *etiam fera animalia, si clausa teneas, virtutis obliviscuntur* and *quo modo lucem diemque omnibus hominibus, ita omnis terras fortibus viris natura aperuit*.

The specifics of Cerialis' portrayal of the Batavi as Germans and the Treveri as Gauls also undermine the potency of the ethnic division which Cerialis appears to be instating, this time on its own (ethnic) terms. Tacitus noted the Batavi's German descent in their formal introduction to the narrative at *Hist.* 4.12.6-9, thus matching Cerialis' classification here. But their inhabiting of the island in the middle of the Rhine, between its Gallic and Germanic banks, makes them at least liminal (as noted by Rutherford).[117] Their simultaneous cultivation of the island and *extrema Gallicae ora vacua cultoribus* arguably even pushes them towards a Gallic classification on a Tacitean map; and at one point when first trying to persuade the Treveri to join the revolt Civilis does indeed identify himself and his tribe as Gallic (*en ego praefectus unius cohortis et Canninefates Batavique, exigua Galliarum portio*, *Hist.* 4.32.3). Tacitus tells us in the *Germania* that the Treveri, addressed here as Gauls by Cerialis, in fact also claimed such German descent. They are explicitly said to be concerned with distinguishing themselves from what they perceived as effeminate Gauls.[118] The separation of Batavi as German and Treveri as Gallic is thus spurious: both were Germans who had crossed into Gaul at some point. Joining together *Transrhenani gentes* with Civilis and his Batavi in the speech therefore makes sense, but the Treveri's exclusion from this framework does not.

The gap between reality and representation is explained by the narrative's need to persuasively malign Civilis, by a process which others him and then associates his particular kind of otherness with economic threat, so that the Treveri will dissociate themselves from the revolt. His German representation by Cerialis enables the general to equate Civilis with Ariovistus: in the essentialising identity framework set out earlier, underpinned by economics, both were Germans who crossed the Rhine in order to take possession of Gallic

[117]Rutherford (2010), 320.

[118]'The Treveri and Nervii work extremely hard to push their supposed German origins convincingly, as if through this renowned bloodlink they can be kept separate from their similarity to the feckless Gauls' (*Treveri et Nervii circa adfectationem Germanicae originis ultro ambitiosi sunt, tamquam per hanc gloriam sanguinis a similitudine et inertia Gallorum separentur*, *Ger.* 28).

soil.[119] The mention of Ariovistus and continued crossings through the generations since (evoked through *maioribus*, *patres avique*) supports Cerialis' subsequent essentialisation of the German character (*semper eadem causa Germanis transcendendi…*).[120] The continuity implied is then stretched into the future in the second part of the speech, in which the need for continued protection from such invading Germans (and Britons)[121] is signalled again:

> *…nisi forte Tutore et Classico regnantibus moderatius imperium speratis, aut minoribus quam nunc tributis parabuntur exercitus quibus Germani Britannique arceantur.*
>
> *Hist.*4.74.13-15
>
> '… unless perhaps you hope for a more moderate rule when Tutor and Classicus are in power, or that the legions by which the Germans and the Britons are kept out can be kept ever ready with less tribute than is the case now.'

With this nod to the future, located in the timeless generalisation of the German character on the basis of a single example, long ago but powerful, the rest of Cerialis' speech returns to economics and power, albeit from a new angle. It sketches out the alternatives to Roman rule, reiterating their awfulness compared to the present day:

> *nam pulsis, quod di prohibeant, Romanis quid aliud quam bella omnium inter se gentium existent? octingentorum annorum fortuna disciplinaque compages haec coaluit, quae convelli sine exitio convellentium non potest: sed vobis maximum discrimen, penes quos aurum et opes, praecipuae bellorum causae. proinde pacem et urbem, quam victi victoresque eodem iure obtinemus, amate colite: moneant vos utriusque fortunae documenta ne contumaciam cum pernicie quam obsequium cum securitate malitis.*
>
> *Hist.* 4.74.16-24

[119]Rankin (1987, 146) noted Tacitus' echo of Caesar's description of Ariovistus when describing Civilis as *ultra quam barbaris solitum ingenio sollers* (*Hist.* 4.13.6-7). The Caesarian reference is *non se tam barbarum neque tam imperitum rerum*, *BG* 1.44.9.2.
[120]A more modest variation on the *Germania*'s much more elaborate thesis of German movement – see chapter six.
[121]The alignment of the far more distant and geographically separated Britons with the Germans here serves to reinforce the spurious otherness of the much more nearby Germans across the very porous Rhine boundary.

> 'because if the Romans are driven out, gods forbid, what will be left other than all nations at war with one another? Eight hundred years of good fortune and discipline have nourished this edifice of empire, which cannot be torn apart without the undoing of those tearing it apart: but you are in the greatest danger, who have gold and resources, which are the chief causes of war. Hence you must love and cultivate peace and the city of Rome, which conquerors and conquered occupy by the same law; let the outcomes of either scenario counsel you so that you do not prefer arrogance with disaster over obedience with security.'

In this closing address, the speech lets go completely of identity politics within the anti-Roman camp as a means of breaking up the alliance. Instead, Cerialis allows for two groups of people only, on the basis of the starkest possible utilitarian criterion: self-preservation. If the Treveri wish to continue to live peacefully, they must choose to realign themselves with Rome (though the further egalitarian declaration that *[urbem] quam victi victoresque eodem iure obtinemus* is immediately belied by the word *obsequium*). The alternative is the destruction of the wealthy tribe (*penes quos aurum et opes*) at the hands of a self-imploding Germany perpetually at war without Rome's policing. His case is hyperbolically put, but in being so reinforces the extent to which he considers such considerations should influence his audience's political positioning. And they do: Tacitus rounds off the speech with an authorial *tali oratione graviora metuentis composuit erexitque*, 'with such a speech did he calm and encourage those fearing worse'. The *graviora* expected from the Romans remain unspecified, but the Tacitean account of Rome's imperialism in Germany makes clear enough that the most likely forms such repercussions took were economic (fines, taxation, removal of benefits) or violent (rape, genocide, destruction of settlements). The Treveri weighed up their options, as Cerialis suggested (*moneant vos…*), decided which was *graviora* and refrained from further action in the rest of the narrative.[122]

[122]Tutor references their state of occupation (*Tenebantur victore exercitu Treviri*, *Hist.* 4.75.1) a little later on, when he speculates that 'they will take up their arms again, as soon as their fear dissipates' (*resumpturos arma, ubi metus abscesserit*, *Hist.* 4.76.22-23). He is wrong, which suggests their fear, whether of not being able to win or of repercussions if they do win, does not dissipate.

Dissension among the Gallo-Germanic leadership

After the Treveri's defeat and their capitulation to Cerialis' occupying forces, Tacitus describes deliberations among the Gallo-German leadership as follows:

> *Apud Germanos diversis sententiis certabatur. Civilis opperiendas Transrhenanorum gentis, quarum terrore fractae populi Romani vires obtererentur: Gallos quid aliud quam praedam victoribus? et tamen, quod roboris sit, Belgas secum palam aut voto stare. Tutor cunctatione crescere rem Romanam adfirmabat, coeuntibus undique exercitibus: transvectam e Britannia legionem, accitas ex Hispania, adventare ex Italia; nec subitum militem, sed veterem expertumque belli. nam Germanos, qui ab ipsis sperentur, non iuberi, non regi, sed cuncta ex libidine agere…*
>
> *Hist.* 4.76.1-10

> 'On the German side, different opinions were being contested. Civilis thought they ought to wait for the tribes from across the Rhine, by fear for whom the already broken strength of the Roman people would be utterly crushed: what were the Gauls other than spoils for the victor? But that nonetheless the Belgae stood with him openly or had pledged themselves. Tutor was insistent that the Roman cause would be strengthened by delay, with legions being united from all directions: that a legion had been ferried across from Britain, multiples summoned from Spain, and that some were coming from Italy; that these were not raw recruits, but veterans and experienced in war. And that the Germans, of whom they had such hopes, could not be commanded or ruled, but that they did just as they pleased…'

The passage is introduced by an authorial comment advertising discord among the Germans, and the speeches bear it out. The two Gallo-German commanders feel differently about the course to be pursued, and their reported debate, like the other speeches, appears to frame their preferences in terms of the identities of the people involved in each option. However, as before, economic and political concerns are shown to underpin both their valuation of ethnic groups and their own positioning of themselves on the spectrum of identities offered.

The Batavus Civilis positions himself as cisrhenane German, including himself neither among the *Gallos* (despite his profession at *Hist.* 4.32.3) nor the Transrhenani (with whom Cerialis had classified him in his speech to the Treveri). The Trevir Tutor, in contrast, denigrates *Germani* and mentions no subdivision between cis- and transrhenane, thereby appearing to reject a German identity for himself altogether. But in the schema adopted in these

consultations by the rebel leaders, the only option left for someone who distances himself from the Germans, short of being Roman, is to be Gallic. This is exactly the classification which Cerialis adopted for Tutor's tribe, the Treveri, in his speech to them (see *Hist.* 4.73-4). Calling them Gallic put them on the side of good Roman subjects with fertile fields which are always under threat from the greedy and migrating Germans. Although the reported debate and Cerialis' speech are not set up in a conventionally agonistic manner, it is clear that they rely on the same identity framework. Moreover, Cerialis' dire predictions about Germans and *libertas* are shown to be at risk of coming true. For Civilis, positioning himself as (cisrhenane) German in this speech, the Gauls are *praeda*, literally 'loot', of which the human equivalent is enslavement. They are there to be disposed of by the victorious alliance (including both kinds of Germans), and the Transrhenani will therefore indeed cross the Rhine to rule over the Gauls and take their things. Tutor, positioning himself as Gallic, is concerned about precisely this: that 'the Germans' will escape the control of the rebel leaders and, presumably, act out this essentialist German nature by crossing and ruling over the rebels themselves.

Civilis and Tutor's replication of the identity framework put forward by Petillius Cerialis a few chapters earlier (already exposed in the preceding section of this chapter as spuriously unhistorical) suggests the following conclusions about the Tacitean representation of identity in the Rhineland at this time. Firstly, that within the narrative, there is already a deep split between the two leaders of the rebellion, with one buying into Cerialis' value judgments of Germans as a threat and the other articulating the German stereotype as his planned course of action. Secondly, the replication shows that Tutor as a Trevir is much more deeply steeped in Romanity than he realises. His replication of the general's Roman framework of division even whilst plotting violence against Rome is, on a more general level, deeply suggestive of how difficult it was for even resistance against Rome to escape the ideologies on which their subjection was built. Thirdly, it shows that rebel leaders were both happy and able to reposition themselves according to their immediate agendas. I mentioned earlier Civilis' self-identification as Gallic at *Hist.* 4.32. Even more aptly, this was

to a Treveran auxiliary cohort with their native commander Alpinius Montanus. To Montanus' plea to abandon his resistance, Civilis responded

> *vos autem Treviri ceteraeque servientium animae, quod praemium effusi totiens sanguinis expectatis nisi ingratam militiam, immortalia tributa, virgas, securis et dominorum ingenia? en ego praefectus unius cohortis et Canninefates Batavique, exigua Galliarum portio, vana illa castrorum spatia excidimus vel saepta ferro fameque premimus. denique ausos aut libertas sequetur aut victi idem erimus.*
>
> *Hist.* 4.32.13-20

> 'you, Treveri, and others living in slavery, what reward do you expect for having so often shed your blood, unless it is an unprofitable term of service, tribute without end, the rods and axes of Roman authority, and the tempers of those who rule you? But I, the prefect of a single cohort, and the Canninefates and Batavi, a tiny portion of Gaul, have either cut down their massive useless camps or are pressing them hard, hedged in by sword and starvation. Therefore either *libertas* will follow on the heels of those who dare to act or, conquered, we will be as we are now.'

Civilis' positioning in this speech as Gallic is determined by his need to get them, as Gauls, on side. With the Treveri's withdrawal from the alliance after Cerialis' speech, however, expediency now dictates that he distance himself from the Gauls and reposition himself as German in order to keep his German allies close. This is what Tacitus shows him doing in the debate at *Hist.* 4.76. Tutor, who does not wish to enlist the Germans in the alliance's forthcoming offensive, has no need to switch positions.

The ability of both Civilis and Tutor to reposition themselves effectively within the spectrum of identities at play within the Rhineland of the first century AD shows the malleability of these categories in the new world changed by Rome's advent, which introduced both force and economic benefits on a larger scale as factors influencing the choice of which identity one to adopt. Essentialist positions are frequently invoked, often successfully, when political agendas make it expedient to do so. But the narrative makes clear that they cannot be maintained, by reapplying different essentialist labels to the same people at different times. Amidst all this repositioning, it is impossible for the reader to pin down whether Civilis or Tutor *are* best considered Germans (as Tacitus

introduces the debate: *Hist.* 4.76.1 *apud Germanos…*), or rather Gauls as they both at times assert. It is equally impossible to find a reliable guide in the narrative to the characteristics on which these categories are based. With frequent past and present Rhine crossings and assertions of Germanity on both sides of the Rhine, location is no guide either. The supposedly ethnic groups all have malleable political and economic foundations, and in recognition of this the protagonists of the Batavian revolt can reposition themselves, and their Roman opponents can reposition them, as belonging to different ethnic groups when political or economic expediency impels them to. The narrative shows that this malleability often works in the rebels' favour (Civilis does achieve the Treveri's enlistment by his profession of Gallic identity) but that it can work in Rome's favour too. In this section, Tutor's decision to take the field without waiting for 'the Germans' leads to the alliance's first serious military defeat. In the next two sections, I will show how one further exploitation by Cerialis of this malleability persuades the remaining rebels to cease hostilities entirely.

Petillius Cerialis to the remaining rebels

The next group to be detached from Civilis are the Transrhenani themselves, after receiving communications from Cerialis:

> *nam Cerialis per occultos nuntios Batavis pacem, Civili veniam ostentans, Veledam propinquosque monebat fortunam belli, tot cladibus adversam, opportuno erga populum Romanum merito mutare: caesos Treviros, receptos Vbios, ereptam Batavis patriam; neque aliud Civilis amicitia partum quam vulnera fugas luctus. exulem eum et extorrem recipientibus oneri, et satis peccavisse quod totiens Rhenum transcenderint. si quid ultra moliantur, inde iniuriam et culpam, hinc ultionem et deos fore.*
>
> *Hist.* 5.24.4-12

> 'For Cerialis by secret messengers held out peace to the Batavi and a pardon to Civilis, and kept warning Veleda and her supporters that the outcome of the war, which was looking unfavourable because of so many defeats, could be changed by opportune kind service done to the Roman people: that the Treviri had been murdered, the Ubii welcomed back into the Roman fold, control of their fatherland snatched from the Batavi, and that nothing had been gained by the friendship of Civilis but wounds and flights and mourning. That he was a homeless exile to the burden of those hosting him, and that they had committed enough mistakes by so often crossing the Rhine. If anything further was being plotted, from their side

> they would incur injuries and blame and on the Roman side vengeance and the gods would block them.'

This passage isolates both Civilis and the Transrhenani, and again the grounds are economic and power-based. Tacitus summarises Cerialis' tactic in these communications as *miscebantur minis promissa,* 'promises were mixed with threats' (*Hist.* 5.25.1). Despite the plurals used, only variations on a single theme are offered on either side. *Batavis pacem*, *Civili veniam* and *Veledam monebat fortunam belli adversam mutare* all amount to the avoidance of further harm being inflicted by Rome, in different wordings. *Iniuriam*, *culpam*, *ultionem et deos*, conversely, all convey unspecified threats of further harm to be added to the slightly more specific injuries of *vulnera fugas luctus* of which the Transrhenani already had experience. He also alludes to the unfortunate examples of the murdered Treveri and displaced Batavi: at the point when these threats and promises are held out to the latter, Cerialis has just destroyed their fields and houses on the island (*Cerialis insulam Batavorum hostiliter populates agros villasque*, *Hist.* 5.23.14-5).[123]

This second speech by Cerialis differs from the others discussed in that the language which masks these economic considerations is more spatial than ethnic.[124] Cerialis' description of Civilis as *exulem eum et extorrem* is of great symbolic importance in isolating the rebel leader. Given that his speech to Veleda's Germans upholds a straightforward duality between two parties only, Rome and the Germans, calling Civilis a homeless exile raises the question of to what spot Cerialis has in fact relegated him. If he is neither German nor Roman,

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[123] A tactic paralleled in Duvius Avitus' dealings with the Tencteri who had been invited to join arms with the expelled Ampsivarii: *ipse legiones in agrum Tencterum induxit, excidium minitans, ni causam suam dissociarent. igitur absistentibus his pari metu exterriti Bructeri; et ceteris quoque aliena pericula deserentibus sola Ampsivariorum gens retro ad Vsipos et Tubantes concessit,* 'he himself led his legions into the Tencteri's fields, threatening them with annihilation unless they dissociated themselves. Consequently, with them abstaining, the Bructeri were terrified by a similar fear; and with others also removing themselves from dangers not their own, only the tribe of the Ampsivarii fell back to the territory of the Usipi and Tubantes.' *Ann.* 13.56.

[124] Perhaps in recognition of the Transrhenani's naming by virtue of their location, or because the object in view is not separation between groups but isolation of one man from the remaining groups – Transrhenani and Batavi – which are less easily dissociated on grounds of ethnicity.

and those are the only categories in the speech, there is literally no space for him: *extorris*, though frequently translated as exiled from one's home community, is a contracted adjective based on *ex terra* and so evokes the possibility of a much more radical expulsion. Civilis is placed outside the circle of Cerialis' (cisrhenane) ordered Roman world as well as outside (transrhenane) Germania as the rightful place of Veleda's people. Within such a spatial context, the designation *Transrhenani* itself becomes prescription as much as description: separated by the Rhine, Cerialis implies they have nothing to do with the cisrhenani, and they should withdraw from being implicated in their misfortune. If crossing the Rhine was a crime (*satis peccavisse quod totiens Rhenum transcenderint*), re-crossing it would become a signal example of virtue. However, given that Cerialis' earlier discourse set up the Germans as typically crossing the Rhine into Gaul, even such withdrawal from the Roman sphere of influence by crossing in the opposite direction paradoxically indicates not their separation from the Roman order but, to the contrary, the extent of Rome's influence on them. The Transrhenani's withdrawing to escape Roman power becomes a demonstration of Roman power.

The Batavi's final judgment

The final break in the chain of support appears when the Batavian nation itself chooses to dissociate itself from Civilis and his rebellion. As was the case with Tutor's speech to the leadership and Cerialis' to the Treveri, the Batavi's reported thoughts on the situation after the Transrhenani's withdrawal from the alliance seem to engage in a dialogue with another speech – that of Cerialis to Veleda and the Transrhenani – despite not having been present to hear it. Tacitus reports their thoughts as follows:

> *Miscebantur minis promissa [a Ceriale]; et concussa Transrhenanorum fide inter Batavos quoque sermones orti: non prorogandam ultra ruinam, nec posse ab una natione totius orbis servitium depelli. quid profectum caede et incendiis legionum nisi ut plures validioresque accirentur? si Vespasiano bellum navaverint, Vespasianum rerum potiri: sin populum Romanum armis vocent, quotam partem generis humani Batavos esse? respicerent Raetos Noricosque et ceterorum onera sociorum: sibi non tributa, sed virtutem et viros indici. proximum id libertati; et si dominorum electio sit, honestius principes Romanorum quam Germanorum feminas tolerari. haec vulgus,*

> *proceres atrociora: Civilis rabie semet in arma trusos; illum domesticis malis excidium gentis opposuisse. tunc infensos Batavis deos, cum obsiderentur legiones, interficerentur legati, bellum uni necessarium, ferale ipsis sumeretur. ventum ad extrema, ni resipiscere incipiant et noxii capitis poena paenitentiam fateantur.*
>
> *Hist.* 5.25

> 'Promises were mixed with threats; and once the loyalty of the Transrhenani had been shaken talk started amongst the Batavi as well: that they should not drag out their destruction, and that it was not possible for the enslavement of the whole world to be undone by a single tribe. What had been achieved by the massacre of legions and burning of their camps, unless that more and stronger ones had been summoned? [they further said] That if they had waged war for Vespasian, he was now in control; but that if they were challenging the entire Roman people to war, how small a part of the human race did the Batavi represent! Let them ponder the predicament of the Raeti and the Norici and the burdens of other allies: on themselves no tribute but only army service and men were imposed, and this was the closest thing to true freedom. And if there had to be a choice of overlords, that the foremost Romans in rank were more honourably to be tolerated than German women. These things the common people were saying; the nobles said worse: that Civilis in his madness had dragged them along into battle; that he put the destruction of his tribe up against his personal grievances. That then the gods became hostile to the Batavi, since legions were being destroyed, officers murdered, and a war taken up which was of significance to one man only, but full of grief for themselves. That they had reached breaking point, unless they began to come to their senses and publicly avowed their regret by executing the guilty party.'

The final separation achieved by Cerialis is intratribal, not intertribal. The Batavi collectively reject Civilis, but within this unanimous rejection there are two further opinions: one among the *vulgus*, one among the *proceres*. The first emphasises yet again a very practical reading of the situation's power dynamics: the goal of ending Roman control was not achievable, and the costs of attempting it were proving to be extreme. If they failed rather than surrendered, repercussions would follow which would worsen even their current position: more troops, and a relegation to the ranks of those who pay tribute, like the Raeti and Norici, instead of being exempt.

The Batavi's resistance to Rome is by no means an exact parallel for uprisings against modern colonialist powers, but certain of its dynamics recur in Fanon's

analysis of such modern uprisings. Specifically, in reverting to their Roman allegiance because of the suffering they have undergone they succumb to a weakness which Fanon specifically condemned as detrimental (unless guarded against by the political education of the masses) to the rank and file's ability to sustain an uprising on the basis of anger at injustice – which he calls 'spontaneity' – into a war with the potential for overthrowing the coloniser permanently: 'The hard lesson of facts, the bodies mown down by machine guns: these call forth a complete reinterpretation of events.'[125] For the Batavi in Tacitus' text, unlike in Fanon's Angolan example, this repeated harsh confrontation with the cost of their struggle does not make them re(de)fine their methods into more effective resistance such as guerilla warfare, but prompts them to abandon their resistance altogether. At the same time, Cerialis in his prompts to the Batavi and Transrhenani very much conforms to the part played by the coloniser at this dicey point in Fanon's pattern of uprising:

> 'The enemy is aware of ideological weaknesses, for he analyzes the forces of rebellion and studies more and more carefully the aggregate enemy which makes up a colonial people; he is also aware of the spiritual instability of certain layers of the population. The enemy discovers the existence, side by side with the disciplined and well-organized advance guard of rebellion, of a mass of men whose participation is constantly at the mercy of their being for too long accustomed to physiological wretchedness, humiliation, and irresponsibility.'[126]

In exactly the manner outlined, Cerialis in his final reported communications to the Transrhenani and Batavi capitalised on the latent fragmentation of purpose and experience within the nominally united alliance. His speeches exploit the weakness of the ideology of pan-Germanity by reminding the Transrhenani of their lack of business in Roman territory but the Batavi, conversely, of their inescapable implication in Roman space. Simultaneously he capitalises on his hearers' 'wretchedness and humiliation' in the timing and content of his communications with the Batavi, which the text shows were initiated after he had destroyed the rank and file's houses and fields, but not those of their leader (*Cerialis insulam Batavorum hostiliter populatus agros villasque Civilis intactas*

[125]Fanon (2001), 18; originally published in French in 1961.
[126]Fanon (2001), 19.

nota arte ducum sinebat, *Hist.* 5.23).[127] Cerialis' invitation, at this critical moment, to review their pre-revolt situation next to their present suffering and any future alternatives, goes a long way towards rehabilitating their appreciation of the status quo. Furthermore, although Tacitus does not report Cerialis as touching upon the matter of Veleda's rule explicitly in any of these communications, further ideological splintering speaks from the Batavi's reflection that being ruled by a woman in the post-victory world was comparatively worse than their current subjection to the Roman emperor. The nobles make similar calculations about the undesirability of their present situation and the likelihood of worse to come, not only at the hands of the Romans but also at the hands of the gods. Collectively, the thought processes are utilitarian in different ways but united in coming to the conclusion that being outside imperial control was worse than being inside. Their definitive return to Roman allegiance is reflected in the very Roman sentiments with which Tacitus ends the reported thoughts of both Batavian groups. The *vulgus* are concerned with the threat to social hierarchy posed by the female Veleda's rule.[128] The *proceres* are concerned with the threat to divine order (both the divine order itself and the Roman order approved by this divine order). Specifically, they frame Civilis' actions as a conflict between the Roman collectivity that preserves order and the individual which challenges that collectivity and its order, which recalls both Catiline and Sertorius.[129]

These reported thoughts therefore contain a multitude of arguments to justify returning to Rome, not all of which can be true simultaneously (the post-victory

[127]This increase of the pressure of suffering on the Batavi as a means to achieving renewed compliance is one way in which the Batavian revolt differs from Fanon's scheme, in which modern colonial powers, when rebellion starts to peter out, *improve* their colonial subjects' situation. Another difference is the Batavian revolt's resolution, which is a very far cry from Fanon's optimistic and extremely un-Roman prediction that '[the war] will be ended not because there are no more enemies left to kill, but quite simply, because the enemy, for various reasons, will come to realize that his interest lies in ending the struggle and in recognizing the sovereignty of the colonized people', Fanon (2001), 22.

[128]Suddenly we are back in the sphere of the *Germania*'s Roman assessment of Germany's tolerance of women in power: *Suionibus Sitonum gentes continuantur. Cetera similes uno differunt, quod femina dominatur; in tantum non modo a libertate sed etiam a servitute degenerant*, *Ger.* 45.6.

[129]Tacitus notes Civilis' self-identification with Sertorius very early on at *Hist.* 4.13.7.

world is presented as desirable but unachievable and simultaneously *un*desirable, in its rule by Veleda).[130] In fact, this multiplicity of 'solutions' corresponds to a lack of unanimity and clarity on what the rebellion actually stood for which, in Tacitus' text, had been present from the start. The *vulgus* and *proceres*' final reflections at *Hist.* 5.25 repeat the options outlined by Civilis in his initial speech to the Batavi at *Hist.* 4.14.23-4:

> *ne Romanis quidem ingratum id bellum, cuius ambiguam fortunam Vespasiano imputaturos: victoriae rationem non reddi.*
>
> '[he said further that] this war would not be unwelcome to the Romans, of which an ambiguous outcome could be credited to Vespasian and that no account would have to be given for a total victory.'

Tacitus explicitly attests the presence of both these categories in this audience.[131] Their final reflections show that they have not forgotten the speech. Only now, they have decided to end all ambivalence and ambiguity concerning Civilis' motivations and consequently the status of the revolt. The final speech of the rebellion is therefore in direct engagement with the first.[132]

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[130]The *volte-face* is striking, since Tacitus had reported the *defection* of Veleda's Germans from the Batavian alliance, not their inclusion in it, as a major contributing factor to the Batavi's decision to give up on Civilis: *concussa Transrhenanorum fide inter Batavos quoque sermones orti*, *Hist.* 5.25.1-2.

[131]*Civilis primores gentis et promptissimos vulgi specie epularum sacrum in nemus vocatos…*, *Hist.* 4.14.9.

[132]See Rutherford (2010, 320), who notes the engagement between these first and last speeches in terms of their focus on *libertas*/*servitus*, but not for the issue of ambiguous self-presentation which helps to make the Batavian revolt an elaborate instance of ring-composition. The order in which Civilis gains support is also the order in which his various supporters fall away: the rebellion grows from Civilis' personal initiative as a Romanised individual via the support of his own tribe to include other Gallo-German tribes more widely, and diminishes first with the falling away of this Gallo-German support, then the detachment of his own Batavi, leaving him once more on his own, stripped of his Germanic identity and trying to reconnect with Rome. The order in which Cerialis lists the alliance's individual failures in his speech to Veleda and the other Transrhenane Germans also maps onto this sequence of fragmentation: *caesos Treviros, receptos Vbios, ereptam Batavis patriam; neque aliud Civilis amicitia partum quam vulnera fugas luctus. Exulem eum et extorrem…* (*Hist.* 5.24.7-9). Similarly, the Transrhenani who crossed the Rhine are firmly redeposited on the further bank and the Batavi restored to their status as subordinate allies to Rome (though we do not know on what terms in reality, the narrative reports their assumption that they would continue as they were before the revolt).

Deciding that it was too ambitious all along to aim for complete independence for themselves as well as the world[133], the Batavian *vulgus* now retrospectively conclude that they were fighting for Vespasian all along, dispensing with any further need to fight. Again, the parallel with the later stages of spontaneous uprisings in Fanon's scheme is instructive. He warns that in these later stages '[t]he objectives of the struggle ought not to be chosen without discrimination, as they were in the first days of the struggle. If care is not taken, the people may begin to question the prolongation of the war at any moment that the enemy grants some concession.'[134] In *Histories* 5, the Batavi retrospectively pin down their muddled mishmash of objectives with great precision in order to facilitate exactly this cessation of hostilities and the resumption of their colonially subject position. This choice increases their distance from the German cause and moves them closer to an identification of their best interests with Rome. Their politics are once more Roman and the rebellion becomes a feature not of the German-Roman imperial divide, but of the divisions within the Roman Empire between haves and have-nots (*bellum civile* after all, not *bellum externum*). Identity remains part of the story, but the multiplicity and fluidity of identities constituted with reference to one's economic and political position in the Roman Empire undermines fixed and distinct ethnic categories and means the Batavi are able to reposition themselves as Roman convincingly. The *proceres* also see Roman power play at work in their interpretation of the conflict as essentially a clash between Civilis and other groups within the Roman political class: *Civilis rabie semet in arma trusos; illum domesticis malis excidium gentis opposuisse*, '[they said] that Civilis in his madness had dragged them along into battle; that he put the destruction of his tribe up against his personal grievances.' They decide it is not an issue that pertains to the Batavian collectivity as good Roman subjects, but only to this Roman individual of a very different political class.[135]

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[133]A detail not explicitly proposed by Civilis, but judging by this comment clearly inferred by his audience at the time.

[134]Fanon (2001), 22.

[135]It is interesting that their reframing of the conflict as Roman and Civilis as a disgruntled Roman of the political class is immediately followed by Civilis' accepting Cerialis' offer to parley (*Cerialis Civili veniam ostentans, Hist.* 5.24.4-5). He then commences to conduct the interview on terms that imply one Roman general speaking

Conclusion

To summarise, then, the Batavian revolt fails not on military grounds but fails through its inability to sustain unity over fragmentation. More specifically, sufficient constituent groups belonging to the Gallo-German alliance shift from the angry and violent rejection of their present situation to being persuaded, through rhetoric backed up with threats and smallish demonstrations of military power, that obedience to Rome is more in their interest than holding out for a German utopia.

Three aspects of the Tacitean representation of the revolt are particularly important in understanding the process of the revolt's breakdown. First of all, the recognition that the adoption or assignment of identities in the revolt is determined by considerations of economics, politics and power, in all of which Rome in the first century AD Rhineland had the power to give as well as to take away; to make life easier and to make life harder. The economic dimension to choosing one's identity is present most explicitly in Tacitus' authorial framing of the Tencteri's exchange of speeches with the Ubii-turned-Agrippinenses, but this and the other considerations run through the rest of the speeches in *Histories* 4 and 5 implicitly. The alliance's German leadership begins to implode halfway through into Gallic and German as a result of disagreement on how useful the transrhenane Germans could be in achieving both victory and the post-victory world. The Transrhenani are dissuaded from serious and prolonged involvement by the rhetoric of ethnic separation combined with the threat of Roman force. The Batavi, finally, abandon Civilis after an invitation to reposition themselves as Roman and keep their current position (privileged compared to that of other tribes) is extended at a point when the possibility of

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to another when, up until this moment, the narrative has only shown traces of a gradual reversion of Civilis from Romanised auxiliary commander to German native as the rebellion progresses, in both appearance and habits. To Rutherford's list of elements contributing to the transformation we can add the ritual feasting in the sacred forest (*Hist.* 4.14. *primores gentis et promptissimos vulgi specie epularum sacrum in nemus vocatos*) reflecting a German habit Tacitus mentioned at *Ger.* 22.3. The decision to grow his hair so as to cut it later in fulfillment of a vow is also mentioned by Tacitus in the *Germania* as a German rite of passage into adulthood (*Ger.* 31.1) and thus makes sense for Civilis as one 'reborn' as a German.

complete destruction seems very real, having just had their homes and fields destroyed by Cerialis' army.

A second notable feature of the rhetoric of persuasion used by and to different groups across *Histories* 4 and 5 is the fluidity of many of its central concepts. The labels of Gallic or German are often invoked but their application to and by individuals or groups shifts constantly. This shifting shows how meaningless these categories, if ever they did hold water in the first place[136], had become in the porous and liminal frontier zone of the Rhineland, and in light of Rome's appearance in the area as a coloniser with both an army (push) and a host of benefits to provide (pull). Ideological attachments to specific identities were not rendered meaningless by this player reshuffling the pieces on the board, but they diminished in importance next to these new, additional influences on shaping identity politics. The Ubii-turned-Agrippinenses are the most extreme example of this dynamic in the narrative, attesting the creation of an entirely new identity as a result of a political choice underpinned by economic benefits. At the same time as identities and labels shifting on the grounds of utilitarian considerations, the goalposts of the revolution are also shown by Tacitus to have oscillated in the course of its conduct: its purpose is alternatively presented as a Flavian victory and already achieved[137], a German victory possible to achieve but carrying the threat of even worse oppression (by women) than that by Rome, or a German victory *im*possible to achieve, too costly in the process of trying, and even more costly in the case of failure. Similarly, most of the tribes involved are portrayed as finding their pre-revolt situation unbearable at the beginning of the conflict, but deemed not so bad after their losses had made a cessation of hostilities the most prudent course.

This brings us to the third and final point, which is that Tacitus' rhetorical discourses either perform or induce a continual self-assessment, on economic

[136]See Krebs (2006), 113 for Caesar as, essentially, the creator of Germany and (2011), 205-7 for Tacitus' breaking down of Caesar's distinction in favour of a 'Borealist' depiction of northerners generally.
[137]Already declared by the Treveran auxiliary chief Alpinius Montanus at *Hist.* 4.32.6-7: *si Vespasianum iuvare adgressus foret [Civilis], satis factum coeptis*, 'if he had attacked to help Vespasian, enough had been done to achieve that'.

and political grounds, of groups' past, present and future positions. Petillius Cerialis' two speeches are most clearly constructed with this purpose in mind, and are shown to be effective too: the Treveri do not resume hostilities, the Transrhenani withdraw back across the Rhine, the Batavi argue themselves into abandoning Civilis. Cerialis' rhetorical strategy, combining seemingly dispassionate economic and political analysis with the threat of repercussions, is shown to be much more powerful in containing and defusing the Batavian revolt than Roman military victories. This casts a different light on what I characterised in the previous chapter as Rome's 'failure' to achieve an effective physical mastery over the Rhineland's space or people: there are clearly other, better means of achieving Roman control. These means would seem, on a superficial reading, to be the division of the peoples into ethnic groups. However, on my more detailed reading, access to the benefits of empire, security over property, and wealth, together with more negative pressures (fear of Roman military power) are the effective means of maintaining imperial control. Cerialis understands this and tailors his rhetoric accordingly. His manipulation of rhetoric and political values reveal him to be a more realistic general than has generally been admitted.[138] In this way, the programme of the reconquest of the Rhineland after the revolt becomes in Tacitus' retelling a paradigm of successful imperial suppression.

[138]E.g. Benario (1988), 238 and Levene (2008), 285 on the basis of such incidents as *Hist.* 4.77.2-12 and 5.22.

3 The Mutinies

Introduction

Moving on to the *Annals*, I begin this chapter with a reading of the double mutinies narrative in book 1 (*Ann.* 1.16-30; *Ann.* 1.31-49). Though only one of the two is set in the Rhineland (the other in Pannonia), it has been convincingly established that they were designed as twin narratives; we should not, without good reason, read the one without reference to the other.[139] Moreover, Tacitus' *Germania* makes sufficient reference to Pannonia to indicate both its geographical nearness and its similarity; in the *Germania,* at least, Pannonia is an eastward extension of Germany.[140]

This chapter will demonstrate that the episode of the mutinies replicates and interprets some of the major themes of the Batavian rebellion. Both events occurred at times when the deaths of the reigning Julio-Claudian emperors, Augustus in AD14 and Nero in AD68, had severed a highly personalised political relationship between ruler and ruled, one which had kept discontent with the regime's treatment of them from spilling over into violence in both cases. The immediate aftermath of these imperial deaths will be revealed as an 'empty' site which imperial regime and imperial subject both strive to occupy as quickly as possible, ideologically and practically. The most significant of these is the mutineers' creation of a democratic *tumultus* in response to the imperial redeployment of the Late Republican *iustitium* after Augustus' death, but the Batavians' violent rebellion in the absence of a formal *iustitium* must be seen as a comparable attempt to deal with the 'gap' left by imperial death.

Batavians and Romans not only act but also at times talk identically in Tacitus' narrative, revealing both as caring deeply about their relationship with Rome.

[139]See Bacha (1906), whose evidence establishing twinning was added to substantially by Woodman (2006).
[140]*Ger.* 1.1 and 43.1 assert physical and linguistic separation of the German lands and people from the Pannonian; *Ger.* 5.1 and 28.3, on the other hand, assert proximity and contact.

The discourses they employ all illustrate imperial Rome's excessive assertion of power over them in comparison to Republican custom and law. In word as well as deed in these narratives, the ghost of the Republic is never far away. The similarities are lexical and in the discourse and can be arranged under the thematic headings of causation, *libertas* and bodies, and *libertas* and language. Their separation in time and space (in the sense of geography but also ideological space) serves to reinforce the pervasive nature of corruption under the one-man rule of first the Julio-Claudians and arguably the model of the principate itself. It also serves as the most extensive demonstration in the Tacitean text of how this power cut through expected identity differences and relegated all imperial subjects to the same status.

Causation

The first significant similarity is Tacitus' assertion that both mutinies and Batavian revolt were causally linked to imperial death at Rome. In Pannonia, he describes the causes of the mutiny as *nullis novis causis nisi quod mutatus princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem praemiorum ostendebat*, 'for no new reasons unless it was because the change in *princeps* provided an opportunity for the recklessness of crowds and hopes of spoils from a civil war to emerge'. The German mutiny's causation is described in similar terms: *isdem causis* (*Ann.* 1.31). In the *Histories*, Civilis is said to have been at least partly inspired to revolt by opportunism in the troubled and uncertain circumstances of AD69 in the aftermath of Nero's death, first at *Hist.* 4.13.10-2 by Tacitus (*missis sane ad eum Primi Antonii litteris, quibus avertere accita Vitellio auxilia et tumultus Germanici specie retentare legiones iubebatur*, 'certainly Antonius Primus sent letters to him, in which he was ordered to turn away the auxiliary troops summoned by Vitellius and to hold up the legions under the pretence of a Germanic uprising', and then at *Hist.* 4.14.23-4 by himself (ne Romanis quidem ingratum id bellum, cuius ambiguam fortunam Vespasiano imputaturos: victoriae rationem non reddi, '[that] this war would not be unwelcome even to the Romans, of which an ambiguous outcome could be credited to Vespasian, and for a total victory no account would have to be given at all.'). His

correspondence with the generals Primus and Flaccus makes him an active player in the game of thrones, as a stable successor for Nero has yet to emerge.

For the mutineering Roman legions, the 'old causes' (*nullis novis causis*) for mutiny were as present while Augustus was alive as after he had died; and while he was alive there was no sign of mutiny in these legions but, to the contrary, much evidence pointing to the maintenance of ferocious discipline.[141] The epsisode shows there is something crucial about the falling away of a reigning monarch.[142] The next section will explore how Tacitus presents the role of Augustus' death in the mutinies on the double level of narrative and historiography, steering his reader to an interpretation of this event which is diametrically opposed to that of the mutinous soldiers in the narrative. It will show that the Batavians are faced with a similar problem after the death of Nero and before Vespasian's accession and will offer some thoughts on what the parallels achieve.

The King is dead, long live the King!

There are different elements to an understanding of the death of a king, the first being that it is the person, not the office, which matters. This is the view generally posited for ancient Rome by classical scholars.[143] It is present in Tacitus at the beginning of the *Annals*, when he points to the welcome peace

[141]*Ann.* 1.17 *hinc saevitiam centurionum; at hercule verbera*; 1.18 *verberum notas*; 1.20 *antiquam duramque militiam revocabat [Aufidienus Rufus praefectus castrorum]*; 1.23 the centurion whose nickname was *cedo alteram* ('fetch me another stick!'); 1.26 *poenas sine arbitro* in Pannonia and 1.31 *saevitiamque centurionum;* 1.35 *verberum notas* and *si qua alia ex necessitate aut adversus otium castrorum quaeruntur* on the Rhine.

[142]Tacitus describes the Thracian revolt too as occurring *audita mutatione princeps* (*Ann.* 2.64): the regime change is what prompted king Rhescuporis' encroachment on his nephew and fellow king Cotys' territory (established by Augustus' partitioning of the kingdom).

[143]See Ando (2000, 30–34) for a discussion of how Augustus developed a system of adoption to allow his individual charisma to be transferred between generations so they could all be seen as Augusti and this personal loyalty could become dynastic. But compare Phang (2008, 24) who posited that the legitimation of the imperial family as hereditary rulers required a rationalisation, instead of transfer, of Augustus' personal charisma; she also posits that the crises of the 1st century AD show that this rationalisation to some extent failed and on some level the importance of charisma persisted. For moralistic analysis of actions and events, including rebellions, in Roman historiography as the result of individuals' personalities, not failures of the 'system', see Woolf (2011), 36ff.

Augustus brought to a state riven by internal strife: *[…Augustum] qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit*, '[Augustus] who took into his care, under the name of *princeps*, everything that had been drained by civil discord' (*Ann.* 1.1). The comment highlights how the Augustan system was solely constituted through the person of Augustus and his personal achievements. Patel identified the workings of this Augustan system in Tacitus as 'constituted and preserved through systems of mutual gain': in return for his power, he provided *otium* (rest from worldly or political concerns)*, annona* (grain) and *dona* (gifts, often money) in an exchange which Tacitus, quoted above, says people welcomed and certainly tolerated.[144] This view relies on personal loyalty, and would see the mutinies as confirmation that Augustus himself rather than Augustus *qua* emperor was significant to the mutineering troops. This personal relationship mattered since it prevented the soldiers from complaining at the miserable service conditions listed by Percennius at *Ann.* 1.17. The Pannonian commander Iunius Blaesus saw this as a factor for the mutineers, as he says that *neque ipsos a divo Augusto tam nova petivisse*, 'they had not made such radical demands of the divine Augustus' (*Ann.* 1.19).[145] Consequently, in this first view, a new person, not-Augustus, would not command the loyalty which Augustus did, and which formed an obstacle to their taking action. The death of the monarch then represents the end of a personalised political relationship, a break in the regime. A new realignment of political relationships subsequently needs to occur; the state needs to work towards a new way of being. In Patel's terms, the issue is whether Tacitus' Tiberius will manage to continue the Augustan system. My reading of the mutinies suggests the soldiers are unsure of his ability or willingness to do so,[146] so they attempt to force regime change by replacing him with Germanicus, of whom they have a clear perception as possessing Republican leanings and

[144]Patel (2013), 10–11.
[145]It also applies to Rhescuporis, of whom Tacitus says that he '*[Augustum] quem auctorem utriusque regni, si sperneretur, vindicem metuebat* [*Rhescuporis]*, *Ann.* 2.64.
[146]Tacitus tells us there were those *quaenam post Augustum militiae condicio ambigentis* (*Ann.* 1.16) in the Pannonian camps. He also suggests that if anyone in the imperial family fired the Roman people's enthusiasm it had been Drusus, not Tiberius (*Ann.* 1.33). Lastly, these troops had served under Tiberius already (as he himself reminds them in the letter Drusus reads out, *Ann.* 1.25) and they knew what sort of general he was.

therefore offering the hope of a different way of doing things (*libertatem redditurus*, 'he would restore *libertas* to them', Ann. 1.33).[147] When this fails and they are forced to work within the parameters of the existing system, they no less vigorously attempt to ensure that the Tiberian system is different to the Augustan, most obviously in improved service conditions. Both attempts, either wholesale regime change or Tiberian rule on different terms to the Augustan system, indicate that the mutineers see the death of Augustus as a real break in the regime.

The presence in the narrative of the alternative view, that it did not constitute such a break, can be defended on two levels, narrative and historiographical. On the narrative level, Tacitus dates the Pannonian mutiny to *fine Augusti et initiis Tiberii auditis*, 'when Augustus' demise and the start of Tiberius' reign were heard of [simultaneously]', suggesting neither the fact of succession itself nor the identity of the successor were in doubt. As we have seen, however, the soldiers' actions subsequently belie this view that Tiberius' succession was seen as certain. The second level holds more promise, and is provided by Tacitus' use of two framing devices in the narrative to defend the continuity of the regime: his undermining of Percennius' act of speaking when he attacks it, and his pervasive use of the metaphor of madness throughout the accounts of the mutinies (and the Batavian rebellion). Both of these historiographical techniques frame the mutinies in moral terms and are intended to separate the reader's interpretation of them from that suggested by the bare facts as they are narrated.

Erich Auerbach and Jacques Rancière both picked up on the significance of the portrayal of Percennius in framing our interpretation of the Rhine mutinies' relationship to the death of Augustus. Rancière commented that '[Thus t]he narration seems to be ordered according to a radical disjunction. The revolt is explained twice: in its absence of reason and in the reasons that it gives itself.'[148]

[147]On *libertas* as meaning the republic, see Gallia (2012), 23–28 and chapter one of Gowing (2005), specifically p. 18.
[148]Rancière (1994), 26.

His 'absence of reason' derives from Auerbach's observation that Tacitus invalidates Percennius' speech in advance. Tacitus does this by stating at the outset his own view of the real causes of the mutiny in purely ethical terms[149]; that is, by referring to the base nature of the common mob which is by definition always in the wrong regardless of what they have to say. Auerbach proposed plausibly that Tacitus' invalidation of Percennius' act of speaking makes clear that preserving the order of society was of paramount importance, and there are no excuses for jeopardising this. When the common mob usurps the right of the elite to public, even political, discourse, social order is already threatened.[150] Although neither reason (in the sense of 'sanity') nor reasons (as 'explanations') are in fact absent from the soldiers' discourse, reason becomes 'absent' through Tacitus' condemnation of their act of speaking, hinting that what they go on to say should be disregarded.

The second framing device supporting the view of Tiberius' accession as regime continuity instead of a break is the pervasive metaphor of madness, identified by Tony Woodman as present throughout the 'double histories' of the Pannonian and Rhineland mutinies to describe the behaviour of the mutineers who agitate against Tiberius.[151] Woodman's listing of the parallels between the two episodes is not complemented by an analysis of the work this metaphor is doing in the text. His silence suggests that the madness, for him, is simply unreason. But this cannot be so: their discourse is logical, even persuasive. Patel challenged the unreason by offering a meaningful reading of the mutinies as 'democratic violence' which 'interrupts established roles and places and in so doing make visible certain wrongs imposed onto subordinates'.[152] Although this

[149]Auerbach (1953), 37.
[150]Ash (1999, 60) sees this same disapproval at work in Tacitus' treatment of the mutiny of Aponius Saturninus' troops from Moesia at *Hist.* 3.11: 'So, in the final analysis the Flavian troops may have had a case, but that does not make their spontaneous mutiny acceptable. No matter how ambiguous Saturninus is as a leader, the soldiers should still obey him, which is why Tacitus remarks with disdain, 'although once Roman soldiers had competed in courage and moderation, now the rivalry was in insolence (*procacitatis*) and insubordination'.
[151]Woodman (2006), 312 for madness. The reading of the mutinies as 'histoires dédoublées' or 'contes géminés' derives from Bacha (1906). See Woodman (2006), 204–5, section II(i).
[152]Patel (2013), 13.

makes the madness meaningful, this still leaves the metaphor itself unexplained: if there is reason, why choose to call it madness? Seeing Tacitus' use of insanity as morally descriptive, not causative or explanatory, gets the reader out of this fix; in this sense, it is like Rancière's 'absence of reason'. As a descriptive model it conveys Tacitus' moral judgment on two levels: one is on the wisdom, or lack of, of taking on the established authorities over their corruption, a sentiment amounting to needing to be mad to take on an opponent as powerful as Rome. The other level is his judgment on the morality of threatening the social order as a response to abuse by the state.[153] In choosing to frame the conflict which he introduced as *nullis novis causis nisi mutatu principe* in such ethical terms, Tacitus' focus can be read in a Thucydidean framework, with the death of the monarch as the *aition* (immediate cause) while refusing to label as 'actionable' what the reader must see as the *prophasis* (real reason) of the conflict, namely the *nullae novae causae* of the imperial soldiers' oppression, which in turn correspond to Rancière's 'the reasons it [the mutiny] gives itself'.[154]

This does, however, leave us with the problem that Tacitus could have made these points much more easily by not giving such a sympathetic voice to the repressed lower classes in the Roman army, despite the framing devices which undermine the validity of their actions. One of the aims of this chapter will be to explore why, and what their discourse achieves despite Tacitus' fundamental rejection of their actions.

Iustitium

In the camps, the death of Augustus by itself should have made little difference to the daily life of the soldiers: there would have been no fewer commanders present than before to enforce discipline. But Tacitus explicitly draws attention to a decision by the Pannonian authorities to mark the passing of Augustus by

[153]Even Woodman links madness to occasions of civil strife through his recollection of Thucydides' linking of *stasis* and plague (another form of illness), though he does not take the thought any further: Woodman (2006), 329.
[154]The dichotomy is set up at Thuc. *Hist.* 1.23.6. It is unconcerned with the moral rightness or wrongness of the situation as an explanatory tool, unlike Tacitus' ethical framework for interpreting the mutinies.

declaring a *iustitium*: *fine Augusti et initiis Tiberii auditis ob iustitium aut gaudium intermiserat solita munia*, 'when Augustus' demise and the start of Tiberius' reign were heard of [simultaneously], he suspended the usual duties either through mourning or through joy' (*Ann.* 1.16). In Germany the *iustitium* is implicit – *isdem aestivis in finibus Vbiorum habebantur per otium aut levia munia*, 'in the territory of the Ubii they were being kept in summer camps, passing their time with leisure activities or light duties', *Ann.* 1.31 – but may be inferred. Tacitus makes this *iustitium* as a suspension of normality a causal factor in the breakdown of order in the camp: *eo principio lascivire miles, discordare, pessimi cuiusque sermonibus praebere auris, denique luxum et otium cupere, disciplinam et laborem aspernari*, 'for this reason the soldiers first started to run wild, start arguing, and listening to the talk of every layabout, until finally they craved comforts and an easy life and despised discipline and hard work' (*Ann.* 1.16).

It is worth untangling the work *iustitium* does in the narrative, and for that we need to clarify its meaning. The Oxford Classical Dictionary gives its primary meaning as a legal term signifying 'a cessation of judicial and all other public business, in the event of national calamities, riots, etc.'. Suspensions of public business occurred on the many religious holidays in the Roman calendar, and would also often occur on days commemorating events both positive, such as the celebration of a military victory, and negative, such as a significant military defeat (for fear of contaminating the present day with its ill luck).[155] At the heart of this way of commemorating lies a desire to makes events concrete instead of abstract, and meaningful to the entire community. The courts and the forum, whose business ceased, were central to the reality as well as the ideological identity of the Roman Republic. A central authority with the power to decree such a suspension of business and be obeyed was powerful indeed. But Tacitus' use of *iustitium* also evokes memories of the *iustitia* of the Late Republic, which were declared as a result of the *senatus consultum ultimum* at times of *tumultus* or great commotion (defined by Agamben on the basis of ancient sources as

[155]See Grafton and Swerdlow (1988) for a good overview of the Roman tradition on 'ominous days' and its relation to earlier Mediterranean civilisations, though the article is largely concerned with tracing the provenance of the Roman material we have and the technicalities of dating events.

anything that caused *magna trepidatio* in Rome).[156] Acts committed during this time to suppress the perceived danger to the state took place in a state of *anomia* or absence of law (hence the term 'state of exception'), divorced from the legal system for as long as the *iustitium* lasted. Agamben cites the grammarians' definition of it as a suspension not of the administration of law but of law itself.[157] In the very act of decreeing it in the face of a threat the state also legitimised its own existence – you cannot define something as a threat without implying that which is threatened is something to be valued and protected. A second legitimisation follows from the first, namely the legitimisation of severe interference in, and control of, public and private life by the state executive in the interests of defending the state. This interference could take a range of shapes, from marking the public calendar or suspending everyday business to violence and even the technically illegal execution of citizens without trial.[158]

Tacitus plays with all these elements in an unexpected way, evoking the widening gap between Republican tradition and principate throughout. First there is the ideological import of Blaesus' *iustitium* for the soldiers. By applying to Augustus' passing the word traditionally used for events which affected the entire Republican community, sometimes even acute threats to its survival, Tacitus is making Iunius Blaesus' *iustitium* look like an attempt to reinforce continuity between Republic and principate and thus bolster the legitimacy of the Augustan family at the head of the state. In this he followed a trend set by Augustus, who 'beginning with the death of his nephew Marcellus, would proclaim a *iustitium* every time the family mausoleum was opened', for the very purpose of making 'the *bona* and the *mala* of a single family (…) the concern of the *res publica*'.[159] But by the time of the mutinies the Tacitean reader has already been warned that the Republic had given way to system described in terms of an individual, not a structure: the very first chapter of the *Annals*

[156]Agamben (2005), 42.
[157]Agamben (2005), 41.
[158]As in 121BC (death of Gaius Gracchus), 100BC (death of Saturninus), and 63BC (death of some of the Catilinarian conspirators), all actions committed as a result of the SCU's injunction.
[159]Agamben (2005), 68, citing Fraschetti (1990), 57.

summarises the move from *populi Romani prospera vel adversa* to *temporibus Augusti dicendis*. The individuality of this new regime in fact highlights the break with the collectivity of the Republic instead of demonstrating its continuity with it. More dangerously in the narrative of the mutinies, the *iustitium* calls up for the soldiers the question of Tiberius' continuation of this personal system. It allows them to see an opportunity to build up an entirely new and different relationship with the new ruler, preferably Germanicus, instead of resigning themselves to life as usual under Tiberius: break, not continuity. In this sense the *iustitium* failed to achieve the ideological purpose envisaged by first Augustus and then Blaesus.

In a second surprising move, Tacitus the historiographer makes the Roman soldiers' violence into the *tumultus*. Their actions represent the danger to the state which traditionally triggered the decreeing of a *iustitium* with its suspension of law to enable good citizens to resist the danger. They are the threat, not the remedy as we might have expected. Tacitus also presents this threat as coming into being as a result of the *iustitium*, reversing the usual order.[160] The Republican *iustitium* to allow the Republican state to defend itself against an anti-Republican threat in Tacitus becomes an imperial *iustitium* which *provokes* an anti-imperial (and perhaps more Republican) threat. On this reading the *tumultus*, more than the *iustitium*, acts as a legitimation of the imperial regime. Conveniently, however, the *iustitium*'s inherent *anomia* is then able to act as a legitimation of the savage retributions deemed necessary to preserve the throne by Blaesus, Germanicus and Drusus. This was desirable on two fronts: firstly, though Roman commanders traditionally and legally had the power of life and death over their soldiers[161], by the time of the principate truly severe punishments would have been rare due to a combination of factors, including the potential of excessive severity to arouse resistance in the soldiers (as proved by these mutinies), and a shift in morality to make extremes ethically

[160]This embeds it into Patel's view of the Tiberian books of the *Annals* representing peacetime politics and procedures as sources of conflict; Patel (2013), iii.
[161]Phang (2008), 115.

controversial.[162] Secondly, the spectre of the Republican *iustitium* and its 'legal suspension of legality' adds a hue of respectability to the violence committed against these soldier-citizens to safeguard the precarious legal and moral position of the first imperial successor. Blaesus is using *iustitium* and the violence legitimised by its *anomia* (an artificial imperial 'gap' in normality and legality) as a defence against the ideological 'gap' which opens up after each imperial death and carries with it the potential of violence against the new occupant of the throne.

On a second level, there is *iustitium*'s practical as opposed to ideological import. Its relaxation of everyday tight discipline tells us that Augustus was not the only constraining factor on violence to be removed. By interrupting the soldiers' professional lives Blaesus replicates the suspension of the civic courts and assemblies mentioned earlier. Phang illuminated the connection between the repression of soldiers' *ira* as a quality required in battle and the fear of the destructive *furor* it could turn into – especially when directed against fellow citizens – if it was not moderated by *modestia* (which she defined as 'respect or obedience to authority').[163] This *modestia* could not be legally imposed but was conditioned into existence through *disciplina* and formed part of the soldiers' *habitus*, a 'durable, ingrained disposition of thinking, feeling, and behaving that is characteristic of a given field' (Phang's rephrasing of Bourdieu).[164] One means of inculcation was combat training; another was *labor* in the form of fatigues and camp building, but these were ideally ongoing pursuits, not imposed for a training period only.[165] During the mutinies, *labor* is foregone (*intermiserat solita munia*, *Ann.* 1.16; *per otium aut levia munia*, *Ann.* 1.31) so the *habitus,* the main guarantor of good behaviour, relaxes and disorder follows. Where Sallust saw the loosening of the Roman *habitus* occasioned by the removal of *metus hostilis* (with its need to be in constant readiness) as the direct cause of subsequent moral decline, Tacitus substitutes *disciplina* for *metus hostilis*.[166]

[162]Ibid., 123–27, especially decimation.
[163]Ibid., 37, 75 (connection); 74 (definition).
[164]Ibid., 73 (modestia); 31 (definition). Bourdieu (1990), 53 for the original definition.
[165]Phang (2008), 32.
[166]Sallust, *BC* 10.

Thus by using a Sallustian moral schema to explain the exact role of his Thucydidean *aition*, he once again denies any legitimacy to the soldiers' complaints about their circumstances.

Another practical aspect of Blaesus' *iustitium* may be the lack of any attempt in the mutinies narratives by the camp commanders to administer an oath of loyalty to Tiberius (their oath to Augustus would have lapsed with his death). This cannot have been a historiographical oversight, given that Tacitus stresses Germanicus' immediate administration on Tiberius' behalf of such an oath to the Sequani and Belgae whom he happened to be visiting when he heard the news of the Rhine mutiny (*Ann.* 1.34). Furthermore, Birley plausibly explains the start date of the *Histories*, 1 January AD69, in terms of the Rhine legions' refusal to swear allegiance to Galba on that day.[167] Tacitus was therefore clearly aware of the symbolic but also immediately practical significance of oaths in containing the threat inherent in large numbers of citizens under arms.

Gaps

To sum up, the 'gap'[168] left by the death of the emperor and marked through *iustitium* in AD14 is not productive of new forms of power. Though intended to affirm regime continuity by marking the death of the monarch before his successor takes power, its relaxation of discipline literally gives the soldiers pause for thought and allows them to conclude that instead of continuity they see an opportunity to negotiate from scratch a highly personalised relationship with the new ruler. What emerges from the gap is ideological difference, and although Tacitus' narrative details the discourses which stake out these opposing positions, violence is needed to decide the issue.

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[167]Birley (2000), 239.

[168]The idea that the removal of *metus hostilis* created a 'gap' is also implied in Sallust by his use of the verb 'pateo', 'to open': *sed ubi labore atque iustitia res publica crevit, reges magni bello domiti, nationes ferae et populi ingentes vi subacti, Carthago, aemula imperi Romani, ab stirpe interiit, cuncta maria terraeque patebant*, 'but when the *res publica* had grown through its efforts and its justice, greats kings had been subdued in war, savage nations and huge tribes subjected through sheer force, Carthago, the Roman Empire's chief rival, was annihilated roots and all, all the seas and lands of the world lay open [to them]', Sall. *BC* 10.1.

Through his invocation of the *tumultus*/*iustitium* link Tacitus looks back to the Republic and invites the reader to compare then and now. The soldiers, whose *tumultus* threatens the imperial regime, are advocating a somehow Republican principate under Germanicus' leadership which they hope will eliminate corruption and abuse. The *iustitium* which was traditionally employed to safeguard the Republican state from danger is being used as an instrument to quench resistance to the imperial regime. One gets the impression that the regime would have violently beaten down resistance even without the *iustitium* but that it welcomes it as a cover providing some legality to its actions. In this sense, even though the *iustitium* itself ends, the powers it traditionally lent, over and above those of the law, were appropriated *in perpetuum* by the regime.[169] And so its *anomia* and its violence in AD14 follow Agamben's model of the evolution of states of exception in modern states into being the norm.[170] Tacitus looks forward too: the revolutionary *potential* of the legionaries in AD14 foreshadows the reality of AD69 when Tacitus says legionaries realised *fully* that they have the power to choose emperors: *finis Neronis (…) omnis legiones ducesque conciverat, evulgato imperii arcano posse principem alibi quam Romae fieri*, 'the death of Nero … stirred up all the legions and generals, once the secret of empire had been divulged, namely that an emperor could be made somewhere other than Rome' (*Hist.* 1.4.6-10).[171] In AD68 the 'gap' thus produced much more extreme violence, the intensity potentially explained by the lack of a Neronian heir. Yet after two years this strife too settled down to a continuation of the principate instead of producing a new kind of regime.

Some of the factors mentioned at play in the mutinies apply to the Batavian Julius Civilis in AD69: he too is faced with a 'gap' after the death of the monarch to whom he had sworn loyalty.[172] Given the long standing of their treaty with

[169]Measures taken to suppress the so-called conspiracy of Libo Drusus against Tiberius in AD16 (Tac. *Ann.* 2.27-31) suggest a similar disregard for the law without a formal *iustitium*, for example in the picketing of Libo's house by soldiers (*cingebatur interim milite domus*).
[170]Agamben (2005), Ch. 1 'The State of Exception as a Paradigm of Government' (1-31).
[171]Kotze (1996), 132 and Fulkerson (2006), 183 also noted the foreshadowing. For a detailed and recent discussion, see Low (2013), 41–55, reworked as Low (2016).
[172]Slofstra (2002), 31 suggests Nero was Civilis' patron.

Rome, it is unlikely that the death of Nero, in whose army Civilis had commanded auxiliary troops, released him from the obligation of loyalty to Rome. But, as for the soldiers, no mention is made by Tacitus of any oath retaken by Civilis to Galba, Otho or Vitellius. To the contrary, the rivals' quick succession argues against anything so formal having taken place, especially if we assume that legionaries would be 'secured' before auxiliaries. Further, what information Tacitus does give us suggests Civilis had no reasons to exert himself greatly on behalf of any of the pretenders with whom a new relationship would have to be negotiated: *Paulum Fonteius Capito falso rebellionis crimine interfecit; iniectae Civili catenae, missusque ad Neronem et a Galba absolutus sub Vitellio rursus discrimen adiit, flagitante supplicium eius exercitu*, 'Fonteius Capito killed Paulus on a false charge of rebellion; chains were put on Civilis, and he was sent to Nero. Released by Galba he again got into a tight corner under Vitellius, with the army demanding his execution' (*Hist.* 4.13.2-5). Nor was there a Neronian heir, equivalent to Tiberius in the mutinies narrative, to whom it could be argued or felt loyalty was owed whilst awaiting a formal oath. We saw that the *iustitium* did not reinforce the centrality of the emperor to the soldiers' lives but instead allowed them to realise how much power they held. The same holds for the 'gap' which opened up for Civilis and his followers, only it was less clear against whom this power to get what they wanted should be leveraged. Evidence at the time of the Batavian rebellion strongly reinforced just how many directions events could still take: two Neronian successors were dead in the space of a few months and two more candidates fighting it out. And unlike the soldiers, the Batavians had no reason to presume either the continued existence of the (by then much more formalised) imperial office or the identity of the final victor.

Although this discussion has made clear the different ways in which 'gaps' can exert their influence and shape events, the parallels between the gaps of AD14 and AD68 suggest that Tacitus saw imperial death as having revolutionary potential *even* under relatively stable circumstances such as when there is a designated or expected heir and within the confines of that most ordered of spaces, the Roman military camp. Where there is succession, there is a gap

which each time opens up the question of the nature of the principate as continuous or alternatively to be negotiated each time through violent conflict. The cautionary tale of Galba and Piso in the *Histories* demonstrates that attempting to avoid the appearance of this question through pre-emptive adoption during life was an insufficient defence. Once the question had been allowed to surface, Galba then failed to win over the soldiers to the side of continuity either by argument or by force. Birley followed Syme in seeing Nerva's situation as an almost exact reenactment of Galba's in this respect.[173] The adoption of Trajan did prevent further rivalry for the throne or perhaps even a *coup* by Trajan himself as the leading general of the day[174], but his first act after being adopted by Nerva was to visit the troops to secure their loyalty.[175] It may be this which allowed for his success in traversing, or preventing from opening up, the gap where Galba, notoriously unwilling to court the troops' favour, failed. This suggests, in line with what Tacitus shows in the mutinies, that successfully closing the gap between successive imperial rulers depended on violence, or at least the threat of it.

Discourse (I): *Libertas* and bodies

Servitium

As I mentioned earlier, Rancière noted the 'radical disjunction' governing the narrative of the mutinies, of which the first component, the absence of reason, resulted in a discussion of the 'gap' opened up by imperial death. The 'gap' produced by either *iustitium*'s cessation of business (for the mutineers) or a more informal structural vacuum (for the Batavians) is not creative, but through its removal of customary strictures allows room for reflection as well as for pre-existing tensions to erupt. The component to be addressed now is these pre-existing tensions, the *nullae novae causis*. These revolve around shared experiences of maltreatment by a corrupt regime, and are expressed in the

[173]Birley (2000), 239, n. 23.
[174]Suggested by Alston (2014), 145.
[175]Ibid.

narrative through similar discourses for Batavians and mutineers, polarised around *servitium*/*libertas*.[176]

Civilis' personal grudges against the Romans for past maltreatment are well-documented by Tacitus: *falso rebellionis crimine* at the hands of the Neronian commander Fonteius Capito, followed by *flagitante supplicium eius [Vitelli] exercitu*, *Hist.* 4.13.5. When he speaks to and for his countrymen he laments the corrupt conduct of a Roman levy, and then sums up their general treatment in terms of the polarities of slavery and freedom: *iniurias et raptus et cetera servitii mala enumerat: neque enim societatem, ut olim, sed tamquam mancipia haberi*, 'he listed for them the injustices, rapes and other misfortunes belonging to their state of serfdom, saying that they were not treated as allies, as they once had been, but as slaves' (*Hist.* 4.14.11-13). When their thoughts are reported after their rebellion has fizzled out, they describe their aim retrospectively as *nec posse ab una natione totius orbis servitium depelli*, 'it was not possible for the enslavement of the whole world to be undone by a single tribe' (*Hist.* 5.25.3-4).

The Roman legions also complain about their treatment: they need to spend a high proportion of what's left after the normal deductions for clothes and food on bribes of their senior officials to be excused extra duties[177], and they do not receive wounds and scars from the enemy, but from their own commanders:

> *[Percennius] … interrogabat cur paucis centurionibus paucioribus tribunis in modum servorum oboedirent. quando ausuros exposcere remedia, nisi novum et nutantem adhuc principem precibus vel armis adirent? satis per tot annos ignavia peccatum, quod tricena aut quadragena stipendia senes et plerique truncato ex vulneribus corpore tolerent. ne dimissis quidem finem esse militiae, sed apud vexillum tendentis alio vocabulo eosdem labores perferre. ac si quis tot casus vita superaverit, trahi adhuc diversas in terras ubi per nomen agrorum uligines paludum vel inculta montium accipiant. enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam: denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi. at hercule verbera et vulnera,*

[176]This polarity was asserted by Keitel (1993) as at the heart of the speeches, Roman and Other, in *Histories* 4, but I extend the notion well beyond this scope.
[177]Davies (1989), 189 for the deduction *ad victum* from soldiers' stipends.

duram hiemem, exercitas aestates, bellum atrox: aut sterilem pacem sempiterna.

Ann. 1.17; Pannonia

'[Percennius] … asked why they obeyed so few centurions and even fewer tribunes in such a slavish manner. When would they dare to demand redress, if they were not going to approach a new and still precariously placed emperor either with pleas or violence? [He also said] that they had missed enough opportunities through the years on account of their cravenness, and old men were dragging out thirty or forty years of service, with the bodies of many maimed through injuries. And that there was no end to service even for those who had been discharged, but instead whilst serving in the *vexillae* they performed the same duties under a different name. And if anyone should have survived such threats to their life, they were then dragged to the far ends of the earth where under the name of fields they took possession of the damp ends of swamps or the wildest bits of mountains. Indeed, military service itself was harsh and unrewarding: body and soul were deemed worth ten asses a day, and from this had to be subtracted clothes, weapons and tents; out of this, too, the cruelty of their commanding officers and respite from chores had to be bought off. But by god, they had lashings and injuries, harsh winters and eventful summers, and a grim war. Their unremunerative peace, on the other hand, seemed everlasting.'

nudant universi corpora, cicatrices ex vulneribus, verberum notas exprobrant; mox indiscretis vocibus pretia vacationum, angustias stipendii, duritiam operum ac propriis nominibus incusant vallum, fossas, pabuli materiae lignorum adgestus, et si qua alia ex necessitate aut adversus otium castrorum quaeruntur. atrocissimus veteranorum clamor oriebatur, qui tricena aut supra stipendia numerantes, mederetur fessis, neu mortem in isdem laboribus, sed finem tam exercitae militiae neque inopem requiem orabant.

Ann. 1.35; Germany

'All of them bared their bodies and showed the scars from injuries and the marks from lashes; then in a cacophony of voices they cursed the cost of remission from chores, the inadequacy of their pay, the harshness of their labour and in carefully chosen words also complained about the building of the camp wall, digging of trenches, foraging for food and timber, and any other tasks which derived either from necessity or from the desire to counteract leisure time within the camp. The loudest din came from the veterans, who had thirty or more years under their belts, and begged that relief should be provided to them in their tiredness, not in the form of death in service, but of an end to such an intense tour of duty and a well-provided retirement.'

This treatment supports Percennius' presentation of the soldiers' situation in Pannonia as that of slaves (*interrogabat cur paucis centurionibus paucioribus tribunis in modum servorum oboedirent?, Ann.* 1.17). At the heart of this identification of the soldiers with slaves lie two issues: that of punishment and that of the labour these soldiers were made to perform by their superiors. The legality of Roman commanders' all-encompassing authority was adduced earlier.[178] Evidence attesting to harsh discipline does not suggest this was illegal.[179] In that sense, the legionary's position was like the slave's. The soldiers' complaints, however, suggest that moderation was expected in meting out punishment, in recognition of their status as citizens, and that this moderation was absent from the German and Pannonian camps. The other aspect of their identification with slaves is the cultural distinction between servile labour, which was seen as degrading, and labour appropriate to soldiers.[180] When the mutineers complain about having to buy off their centurions to avoid particular kinds of work, it suggests they feel they are being made to do too much labour of the servile kind.

The Batavian situation is similar: we get no sense from the narrative that the *dilectus* itself is what sparks support for Civilis; the Batavians have, after all, a track record of decades of valued service in the Roman army.[181] Support emerges after the *corrupt* conduct of the levy, particularly the servile punishment of rape being inflicted on their free (and loyal, allied) bodies. When the Batavians at the end of their rebellion say that *nec posse ab una natione totius orbis servitium depelli*, 'it was not possible for the enslavement of the

[178]See n. 162.
[179]Ibid.
[180]Phang (2008), 234–39.
[181]They are involved in Germanicus' punitive expedition into Germany in AD14 in *Annals* 2, and Bellen (1981, 39) posits their involvement in missions under Octavian's leadership as early as 36BC: 'Fest steht auf jeden Fall, daβ unter den Truppen Oktavians, die 36 v. Chr. in Sizilien eingesetzt wurden, sich Germanen befanden und es ist nach den hier angestellten Überlegungen mehr als verlockend, in ihnen Bataver- und Ubierkontingente zu sehen, die von Agrippa bei seiner Rückkehr aus Gallien (37) Oktavian zugeführt worden waren'. The African Tacfarinas, who also rebels against Rome, similarly had a history of distinguished service in the Roman army: *is natione Numida, in castris Romanis auxiliaria stipendia meritus, mox desertor*, *Ann.* 2.52.

whole world to be undone by a single tribe' (*Hist.* 5.25.3-4) they are articulating their aim of achieving a state of non-*servitium*.

What unites mutineers and Batavians, therefore, is a sense of grievance at Rome's behaviour. They articulate that they are treated as slaves when their respective statuses as citizen and free do not justify such treatment, and it is the imperial elite's excessive power which enables them to reduce the citizen-soldier and the ally to the *de facto* status of slave. This also means that the oppressed cannot have recourse to legal change to alleviate their suffering, both because the elite is able to (and does) disregard the law, and because (quasi) legal safeguards are already in place. Tacitus tells us the official terms of the Batavian treaty with Rome were already lenient, and that the tribe recognised this leniency: to rationalise their return to Roman allegiance at the end of the rebellion, they advised themselves that *respicerent Raetos Noricosque et ceterorum onera sociorum: sibi non tributa, sed virtutem et viros indici. Proximum id libertati*, 'Let them ponder the predicament of the Raeti and the Norici and the burdens of other allies: on themselves no tribute but only army service and men were imposed, and this was the closest thing to true freedom', *Hist.* 5.25.8-10. For the soldiers too any improvement in their legal position remained in competition with the lived reality in which they encountered abuses of power, and the legal change itself was abolished again by the emperor soon after its achievement (*Ann.* 1.78). Their preferred solution to supplant Tiberius in favour of Germanicus as a Republican-style head of state (it is difficult to imagine precisely what they had in mind) also fails in the face of overwhelming repression by the regime. In Tacitus' Tiberian universe options beyond articulating dissatisfaction are few.

Libertas

The mutineers and Batavians' shared desire for a state or status in which they are not subject to the arbitrary whims of imperial Rome's representatives conforms remarkably closely to the notion of *libertas* as it was used in the political discourse of the Late Roman Republic. Valentina Arena defined this as 'a status of non-subjection to the arbitrary will of either a foreign power or a

domestic group or individual'.[182] This definition is both broad enough to allow us to recognise its applicability in the very different circumstances of Batavians and mutineering Romans and narrow enough to allow us to specify its precise meaning in each context. An important circumstantial difference between them and the political elite of the Late Republic must be highlighted, however: Arena contends, contrary to most of the scholarship on this topic, that Late Republican political discourse was not marked by different conceptions of *libertas.* Both supporters and opponents of measures such as land distribution or the application of the *senatus consultum ultimum* drew on a single, shared conception of this. The arguments they had were not about defining it but about the best means to preserve it. Even more importantly, all these actors were similarly circumstanced, unlike Batavians and Romans: they had political power and exerted it within the same, closed political system. In contrast, although the mutinous Roman soldiers were citizens, the lower classes to which they belonged would never gain office and be producers of political discourse in this system, neither under the Republic nor the principate (when political oratory continued to take place but with much lower stakes). Batavians were outsiders of a different kind, and at the time of their conflict with Rome were not even officially incorporated into Roman provinces.[183] Yet despite their position as outsiders whose conceptions of *libertas* differ based on their different positions within imperial society, Tacitus, in making them talk of wanting to be free from domination in terms evocative of Late Republican political discourse, makes them speak like insiders.

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[182]Arena (2012), 7.

[183]See Millar (1981), 111–2, 152, and 302 on the situation on/near the Rhine and the Batavian's role in events there, if not their actual status. It seems likely that the Batavians had some sort of formal treaty relationship with Rome, but beyond their exemption from tribute and obligation to provide an unknown quantity of men and arms with an unknown frequency – *Hist.* 5.25 – we have no particulars. This to me suggests that Tacitus did not think the particulars of the treaty impinged on the morality of the corruptly conducted *dilectus* he is narrating. Roymans (2004, 55–57) argues in favour of a treaty, partly on the basis of a Batavian presence in the Julio-Claudian bodyguard before the rebellion of AD68. Bellen (1981, 37–39) posits the relationship and treaty went back as far as Agrippa's governorship of Gaul in 37BC and were prompted by the need for troops against the renewed hostilities with Sextus Pompeius. The Romans' desperate need for reinforcements may explain the lenient terms of the treaty in that the Batavians did not have to provide tribute, only men and arms.

The locus where the question of *servitium* versus *libertas* found its most direct practical application in Roman society is the body, hence the significance of the mutineers' mutilation at the hands of their commanders and the rape perpetrated during the Batavian *dilectus*, both discussed earlier. But for the Roman soldiers, there is the extra dimension of their bodies being not only *free* but *citizen* bodies. Arena, again, stresses the origins of Late Republican *libertas* as deriving from the *Lex Sempronia de capite civis Romani* of 123BC, which forbade the execution of Roman citizens *iniussu populi*.[184] This law further reinforced the link already present in the Roman legal system which constituted the citizen to a large extent through his physical body: only citizen bodies were allowed to join the army, only citizens had the right of *provocatio*, that is the right to appeal against *coercitio* by a magistrate, which was any attempt to compel their bodies by force.[185] Soldiers in service lacked their civilian colleagues' right of *provocatio*, so the passage showing them appealing to Drusus and Germanicus against the violation of their bodies presents the soldiers as foregrounding their citizen identities. The scenes where they display their wounds to these leaders amount to a re-enactment of a civilian *provocatio* of the Republic by the citizen-soldiers of the Empire. The display of wounds was also a traditional way in which Romans asserted their *virtus*. Republican politicians could use their battle scars from *bellum externum* as badges of outstanding citizenship, as 'signs of legitimacy' in the competition for political status.[186] In contrast, the mutineers' wounds are not respectable, but demeaning: not inflicted by the enemy in the defence of the state, but inflicted by Romans on Romans in a perverted state-sanctioned *bellum civile*. They are therefore not badges of loyalty to the state; they are proof of injustices.

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[184]Arena (2012), 258; Rotondi (1962), 309–10 on the sources for this law; Williamson (2005), 384 on the historical context of the Gracchi; Steel and van der Blom (2013), 52–53 mention it as a measure specifically designed to safeguard *libertas*.

[185]The *leges Porciae* which preceded the *lex Sempronia* during the 2nd century BC forbade, for example, the flogging of citizens: OCD (4th ed.) '*provocatio*'.

[186]Phang (2008), 47. Dio 54.14.2-3 mentions former senator Licinius Regulus enumerating his campaigns and stripping bare his body to reveal his scars when he is struck from the senatorial record after Augustus' reform of the senate in 18BC.

Historiographically, the citizen-mutineers' display of servile wounds inflicted by their own side reveals the gap which has opened up between the Republican valuation of the citizen body and its imperial equivalent. But of course times *have* changed, and even the soldiers are aware of it: their display to Germanicus in particular constitutes a paradox, in that it is an appeal to the emperor (by proxy) for the redress of their un-Republican treatment. The paradox is appropriate to their situation in time, on the threshold of the institutionalisation of the principate as opposed to simply the reign of Augustus. The fact that the Batavians share their outrage at their bodily treatment, however, shows two things foremost. First, that the main distinction is that between *servitium*/*non-servitium* (and thus some conception of *libertas*) rather than between slave/citizen. And secondly, that Tacitus' text, in aligning Roman citizens as well as the Batavian auxiliaries on one side of this dichotomy, asserts further evidence of the erosion of certain status distinctions under the Empire, such as citizen/non-citizen, centre/periphery, foreign/Roman, free/slave, in favour of a Roman conception of society as polarised around the emperor on one side and his subjects on the other.[187]

But there is a further aspect to Arena's argument concerning *libertas* in Late Republican political discourse which is relevant to its use in Tacitus: whereas for a long time political opponents under the Late Republic drew on the same definition of *libertas* as a state of non-domination, from the mid-1st century BC onwards the concept underwent two changes: first, an 'alteration of the set of references to which it could be applied by virtue of its agreed criteria' (i.e. the idea that sometimes a disregard for the strict letter of the law was required to safeguard *libertas* became accepted), and secondly that the rule of law was no longer the essential foundation and guarantor of *libertas*. Instead, this function

[187]Lavan (2013), 111 mentions Caracalla's universal grant of citizenship to all free men in AD212 as the end point of this development towards obscuring all other distinctions, though only the non-imperial half of the dichotomy underwent any such change during those two centuries – the emperor had reigned supreme and alone on the other side since the Augustan age.

was usurped by the private *iudicium* of the man committed to the right and good.[188] Finally, she argues that

> '[b]y endorsing the exclusion of the objectivity of law as an entity above anyone's judgement which those who supported the senatus consultum ultimum advocated, the people opened a very dangerous breach in the intellectual world of the Republic, which contributed to the ideological premises for its fall (….) [this] resulted in the legitimation of a political behaviour which, by making Octavian's actions ideologically possible, ultimately acted as one of the engines of social and political change.'[189]

The possibility of the *iudicium* of the man committed to the right and good as underpinning the notion of *libertas* culminated in the ascendancy of Octavian and then became institutionalised in the person of the emperor.

Arena's dichotomy between the 'old' Republican conception of *libertas* as derived from the rule of law and the 'newer' conception of it as something which could be under the care of a single individual is reflected in Tacitus. For every occasion where the mutineers or the Batavians air the 'old' conception, there are Romans from higher up in the imperial entourage to speak up, on the basis of the new one, for the necessity and legitimation of the *princeps* whom the Republicans identified as the ultimate source of their domination. At *Ann.* 1.28 in Pannonia, Drusus' messengers go round denouncing the legitimacy (*Percennione et Vibuleno sacramentum dicturi sumus?*) as well as ability (*Percennius et Vibulenus stipendia militibus, agros emeritis largientur?*) of such as Percennius and Vibulenus to provide the soldiers with what they want from an emperor. On the Rhine, the imperial standpoint is voiced by Germanicus when he highlights how central Tiberius is to the situation of the soldiers:

> *primane et vicesima legiones, illa signis a Tiberio acceptis, tu tot proeliorum socia, tot praemiis aucta, egregiam duci vestro gratiam refertis? hunc ego nuntium patri laeta omnia aliis e provinciis audienti feram? ipsius tirones,*

[188]Arena (2012), 160–66. Compare Gowing (2005), 18–19.
[189]Arena (2012), 276. She points out Cicero was instrumental in the development of these changes, first through the SCU against Catiline in 63BC which he based on the first conceptual change; secondly through that against Antony in 43BC which he based on the *privatum consilium* of those committed to the continuation of the commonwealth.

> *ipsius veteranos non missione, non pecunia satiatos: hic tantum interfici centuriones, eici tribunos, includi legatos, infecta sanguine castra, flumina, meque precariam animam inter infensos trahere*.
>
> *Ann.* 1.42

> 'You first and twentieth legions, both with eagles received from Tiberius, allies of him in so many battles, made richer by him through so many bonuses, is this the kind of extraordinary thanks you give to your general? Shall I take this message to my father who hears only glad tidings from other provinces? that his recruits, his veterans, are not satisfied with retirement or money? That in this camp only murdered centurions will do, and tribunes expelled, legates locked up, camps and rivers tainted with blood, and me dragging out a precarious existence among troops hostile to me?'

The common good requires the *princeps*; denying him is both wrong and misguided in terms of procuring their aims. In Batavia, Cerialis again argues the necessity of the *princeps*, virtuous or not as he may be, for exactly this reason:

> *quo modo sterilitatem aut nimios imbris et cetera naturae mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate. vitia erunt, donec homines, sed neque haec continua et meliorum interventu pensantur: nisi forte Tutore et Classico regnantibus moderatius imperium speratis, aut minoribus quam nunc tributis parabuntur exercitus quibus Germani Britannique arceantur. nam pulsis, quod di prohibeant, Romanis quid aliud quam bella omnium inter se gentium existent?*
>
> *Hist.* 4.74.9-17

> 'In the same way you put up with droughts and pouring rains and other natural disasters, put up with the decadence and greed of those who rule you. There will be vices for as long as there are humans, but they are not never-ending and are balanced out by the emergence of better times; unless perhaps you hope for a more moderate rule when Tutor and Classicus are in power, or that the legions by which the Germans and the Britons are kept out can be kept ever ready with less tribute than is the case now. Because if the Romans are driven out, gods forbid, what will be left other than all nations at war with one another?'

Similar arguments are put forward in a similar manner in two speeches made by outraged Roman commanders to unruly Roman soldiers, one during the mutinies and the other during the Batavian rebellion:

> *quo usque filium imperatoris obsidebimus? quis certaminum finis? Percennione et Vibuleno sacramentum dicturi sumus? Percennius et Vibulenus stipendia militibus, agros emeritis largientur? denique pro*

Neronibus et Drusis imperium populi Romani capessent? quin potius, ut novissimi in culpam, ita primi ad paenitentiam sumus? tarda sunt quae in commune expostulantur: privatam gratiam statim mereare, statim recipias.

Ann. 1.28; Clemens (*centurio*)

'How far will you pursue your siege of the emperor's son? What will be the end to your battle? Are we to take our oaths to Percennius and Vibulenus now? Will Percennius and Vibulenis provide pay for soldiers and lands for veterans? Then will they take on the empire of the Roman people in the place of the Nerones and the Drusi? Isn't it better, just as we were the latest ones to fall into error, to be the first to come to repentance? Things which are demanded on behalf of a group are slow to come about; but forgiveness for yourselves as individuals you can earn on the spot, and will receive immediately.'

vobis satellitibus Civilem et Classicum Italiam invasuros. an, si ad moenia urbis Germani Gallique duxerint, arma patriae inferetis? horret animus tanti flagitii imagine. Tutorine Treviro agentur excubiae? signum belli Batavus dabit, et Germanorum catervas supplebitis? quis deinde sceleris exitus, cum Romanae legiones contra derexerint? transfugae e transfugis et proditores e proditoribus inter recens et vetus sacramentum invisi deis errabitis? te, Iuppiter optime maxime, quem per octingentos viginti annos tot triumphis coluimus, te, Quirine Romanae parens urbis, precor venerorque ut, si vobis non fuit cordi me duce haec castra incorrupta et intemerata servari, at certe pollui foedarique a Tutore et Classico ne sinatis, militibus Romanis aut innocentiam detis aut maturam et sine noxa paenitentiam.

Hist. 4.58.24-38; Dillius Vocula (*legatus*)

'… that with you as their cronies, Civilis and Classicus will invade Italy. Or, when the Germans and Gauls have led you up to the walls of Rome, will you carry arms against your fatherland? The mind recoils at the thought of such a crime. Will you keep watch at night for the benefit of Tutor the Trevir? Will the Batavian give the order to attack, and will you help to bulk out the fighting bands of Germans? What will the outcome of this crime be, when Roman legions have lined up against you? Will you oscillate, hateful to the gods, as deserters from other deserters, traitors of other traitors, between your recent and your old oath? I beseech you, Jupiter Optimus Maximus, whom we have honoured with so many triumphs over the course of eight hundred years, and you, Quirinus, parent of the city of Rome, and I pay honour to you so that, if you cannot find it in your hear to keep this camp uncorrupted and unviolated, with me as its leader, you will assuredly not allow it to be polluted and stained by Tutor and Classicus, and will grant to the Roman soldiers either innocence or a speedy reconsideration with no harm done.'[190]

[190]The sentiment of Vocula's closing statement here, talking to his own soldiers, resembles that of Cerialis to the Transrhenani at the end of the rebellion, which is

Rhetorically Percennius *et al.* and the Batavians *et al.* are both the focus of what Ash identified as a *congeries*: a 'piling up of synonymous words or concepts with the purpose of '*unius amplificatio*'', strengthening the impact of a single theme.[191] The theme, in this case, is that neither common soldiers nor Batavians are able to perform the roles the emperor (and his delegates with *imperium*) fulfill in looking out for the soldiery both during (*sacramentum*, *stipendia*, *excubiae*, *signum belli*) and after (*agros emeritis*) their service. Through this denial, the opposite case is made, which advocates loyalty to the *princeps* as the only provider of such goods. The ludicrousness of either soldiers or Germans being put in charge is given rhetorical form: in both cases an invasion of the Roman state by these soldiers[192] is held forth for contemplation, followed by a hypothetical enumeration of the consequences of such an act (appalling, it is implied), and closed off with a recommendation to repent and mend their ways.

Looking at these examples, it becomes clear that the argument of these advocates of the principate is once again structured on two different levels, the narrative and the historiographical. What Tacitus has both soldiers and Batavians say reveals them to care about *libertas* as freedom from domination only in a utilitarian way. Drusus' anonymous messengers, Germanicus, and Petillius Cerialis all legitimate the existence of the *princeps* to soldiers and Batavians on this basis: they would be worse off because those who are trying to get their support are not the emperor, and only the emperor can do the

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telling in itself: *… Veledam propinquosque monebat fortunam belli, tot cladibus adversam, opportuno erga populum Romanum merito mutare*, *Hist.* 5.24.5-7.

[191]Ash (2010a), 223–24. Cerialis' final speech to the remaining rebels relies on this same strategy of piling up synonyms on a single theme, cf. chapter two, p. 75.

[192]Clemens speaks of besieging *filium imperatoris*: the identification of the imperial family with the state is a particular and well-attested feature of the Tiberian principate, see Woodman (2006), 325. Although it was articulated most elaborately and directly in the *Senatus Consultum de Pisone patre* of AD20 (see Severy (2000)), Millar (1993) traced the development of the language which fostered this link to Ovid's Tiberian poetry. Tacitus is therefore only retrojecting a very little when he asserts the connection for AD14. Then again, Fraschetti (1990, 57) sees it as originating in the much earlier *iustitia* proclaimed after deaths in the *domus Augusta* beginning with Marcellus in 23BC.

emperor's job, which is to give them various economic and status benefits.[193] There is also an aspect of class-based snobbery to their rhetoric: the inability of Percennius/Vibulenus and the Gallo-Germans to usurp the duties of the emperor or to act politically to that effect is partly grounded in their identification in the narrative as lower class (both are described as *gregarius miles*).[194] Batavians and mutineers kick against the system not because it has an emperor at the top of the old Republican system, but because the emperor's corrupt minions exploit them in a way which they feel violates their status. They are not fighting for an ideology which sees *libertas* as the highest social good in and of itself (even the soldiers' preference for Germanicus as head of a Republican state is grounded in their expectations of better treatment from him).

The actors in this story themselves are thus not presented as political agitators. Political freedom would not have been a concern for those classed as barbarians, nor, arguably, for the Roman poor who were excluded from the practice of politics even if they belonged to the polity as citizens and cared about that status. Nonetheless, their view of *libertas* as the absence of corrupt *dominatio* of their bodies is evocative of political *libertas*, precisely because political freedom was partly constituted through the unassaulted body of the citizen (especially if he participated in politics). The senatorial elite which formed Tacitus' main audience would have likely been alert to this implicit

[193]The lack of planning for the aftermath of a revolution is a feature of several conspiracy narratives in Roman historiography, including the Catilinarian. Cicero's first speech against Catiline shares other features with the mutinies, confirming the connection in Tacitus' narrative between mutiny and political conspiracy as equally harmful to the state: first, the resonant borrowing by Clemens of Cicero's Catilinarian *quo usque?* construction to open his speech, as noted by Pagán (2005, 420). Further, the imagery of a siege to describe the danger to the established order (*desinant insidiari domi suae* ***consuli****, circumstare* ***tribunal praetoris urbani****, obsidere cum gladiis* ***curiam***, Cic. *Cat.* I.32). Cicero's use of words relating to religious sacrifice at the end of his prayer (*homines bonorum inimicos, hostis patriae, latrones Italiae scelerum foedere inter se ac* ***nefaria*** *societate coniunctos aeternis* ***suppliciis*** *vivos mortuosque* ***mactabis***, Cic. *Cat.* I.33) recalls the religiosity of Tacitus' vocabulary (*incorrupta, intemerata, pollui, foedari*) at the end of Vocula's prayer.

[194]See Fulkerson (2006), 173 for the connection between theatre and questionable morality with regard to Percennius' background as claqueur at the theatre. Malloch (2004), 202 similarly stresses the 'city origins and vices' of the Rhine mutineers.

alternative reading of imperial *dominatio* of bodies as political, especially since they had at several times throughout the 1st century AD experienced being humiliatingly sidelined by emperors in stark contrast to their former, much more important role.[195] Such nostalgic engagement with Republican political ideology need not surprise us: it is possible to voice regret for the loss of past political freedoms at the same time as acknowledging the necessity of the change which ended them. It is in fact possible to read Tacitus' litany of successive episodes of *dominatio* in his potted history of '*urbem Romam*' at *Ann.* 1.1 as seeing political *libertas* as more or less under continuous threat (or only existing as an ideal) since Rome's very beginning, and Augustan times, in contrast, as the most fully realised incarnation of it that had ever existed:

> *Urbem Romam a principio reges habuere; libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit. dictaturae ad tempus sumebantur; neque decemviralis potestas ultra biennium, neque tribunorum militum consulare ius diu valuit. non Cinnae, non Sullae longa dominatio; et Pompei Crassique potentia cito in Caesarem, Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit.*
>
> *Ann*. 1.1

> 'From its beginning, kings held the city of Rome; it was Lucius Brutus who instituted both *libertas* and the consulate. As occasion demanded, dictatorships were taken up, but the power of the *decemviri* did not last beyond two years, nor did the consular law of the military tribunes hold out a long time. Neither Cinna nor Sulla held sway for long, and the rule of Pompey and Crassus quickly made way for Caesar, the military dominance of Lepidus and Antonius submitted to Augustus, who took into his care, under the name of *princeps*, everything that had been drained by civil discord.'

Tacitus, despite his nostalgia, is reconciled to the trade-off of the Republic's steep ups and downs, including highly fluctuating levels of senatorial freedom and importance, for the flatter but more stable political landscape under the principate.

[195]Sometimes physically: see Tiberius' sending Drusus to Pannonia as imperial representative at the head of a senatorial delegation (*Ann.* 1.24); see p. 121.

To conclude, the soldiers and Batavians are united in voicing their displeasure at being treated in the manner of slaves. Their bodies are wholly at the disposition of the imperial representatives with whom they deal or under whom they serve, when their status as free people and for the mutineers as Roman citizens should have protected them from such abuses of power. They call the absence of such domination *libertas*. The word recalls the legal protection of citizen bodies from *coercitio* and execution without trial by magistrates under the Late Republic but also brings to mind an explicitly political conception of the word during this period to denote the absence of any one politically dominant individual or group. In this way Tacitus sets up a contrast in the narrative between Republican tradition and the realities of imperial power experienced by the soldiers which has implications for the world outside the narrative as well. This world was inhabited by the senatorial elite reading Tacitus whose political agency under the principate was as constrained as the soldiers' bodies.

Carnival

I have already briefly touched on the limited options available to the Tiberian citizen-soldier or provincial ally forcibly reduced to the status of slave. What the narrative shows they *can* achieve is to turn the tables, however briefly: to salvage their wounded pride by inflicting on others[196], before retribution sets in, what they have had to bear themselves. The window of opportunity is brief and precarious, judging by the floggings authorised by Blaesus at *Ann.* 1.21 and the murder of Percennius and Vibulenus sanctioned by Drusus at *Ann.* 1.29-30 in Pannonia. In Germany two further summary executions are ordered by *praefectus castrorum* Manius Ennius at *Ann.* 1.38, and murder at the hands of a soldiers' tribunal is permitted, if not commanded, by Germanicus at *Ann.* 1.44. Not only are the high brought low, the low are uplifted: Tacitus's presentation of Percennius as a *dux contionabundus* (*Ann.* 1.16-17) reveals him as usurping the place of a general and making a mockery of a legitimate general's speech by preaching dissension, not unity.[197] The Gallo-Germans too 'turn the tables': in a

[196]The named *praefectus castrorum* Aufidienus Rufus at *Ann.* 1.20 in Pannonia, and the unnamed *centuriones* on the Rhine at *Ann.* 1.32.

[197]The two terms do not occur as a syntagma: Percennius is said to be a *dux theatralium operarum*, not *militum* (1.16), and *contionabundus* does not occur til the next chapter

general sense, by beating the Romans in a number of skirmishes, but also more symbolically in two very specific cases. First, the Trevir Classicus at *Hist.* 4.59.6-7 enters a captured Roman camp dressed as a Roman general (*sumptis Romani imperii insignibus in castra venit*). A little later the Lingonian Julius Sabinus, at *Hist.* 4.67.1-5, usurps the name of 'Caesar' and then goes on to perform a whole host of theoretically unCaesar-like actions, such as besieging the Sequani, faithful allies of Rome. It is possible to view the Batavi's actions similarly to those of the Romans: knowing how lenient their official treaty relations with Rome already were and that no change could be achieved for the better in that regard, they inflict as much violence as possible on those who perpetrated violence upon them.

In this reversal of the normal order of things, the mutinies display important aspects of 'those periodic feasts (such as the Anthesteria and Saturnalia of the classical world and the charivari and Carnival of the medieval and modern world) that are characterised by unbridled license and the overturning of normal legal and social hierarchies'.[198] The main problem, however, with analogies to the 'modern' medieval carnival and further theoretical elaborations of it, such as Bakhtin's, is that seeing the mutinies wholesale as a carnival ignores that carnival was a social institution which had the approval, grudging or otherwise, and sometimes even the encouragement of the dominating classes. In Tacitus the *iustitium* is declared by those in authority, yes, but its violent consequences are described as wholly unexpected, undesired, and disapproved of; retributions are correspondingly savage. Bakhtin's theoretical elaboration of the societal reversal of carnival into what he called the 'carnivalesque' also seems inappropriate for Tacitus' scene. Even if we disregard the specific historical grounding of this concept[199] in the (unique, Bakhtin

(1.17). They are, however, placed suggestively close together. The rare *contionabundus* can be both positive and negative in its meaning of proposing something in a public assembly (*OLD* 'delivering a public speech or harangue') but *velut* denotes its negative use here. Auerbach (1953), 37, too, spotted the carnivalesque in this and refers to him as 'playing the general'. Pagán (2005), 422 notes the incongruity of a general preaching dissension.

[198]Agamben (2005), 71.

[199]Developed in *Rabelais and his World* (1984).

argues) circumstances of the Renaissance, the only feature of the carnivalesque which emerges in Tacitus' narrative is the body's display of degeneration used for anti-authoritarian purposes in the soldiers' display of their dishonorable scars. But even this relies on extending – overstretching – his definition of the degenerated body from natural bodily functions to the man-inflicted bodily disfigurements Tacitus reports. Nor is this body being 'celebrated' or associated with regeneration and renewal.[200] To the contrary, the reversals result in harsh retributions which further mutilate, and even kill, these bodies.

Whatever is in Tacitus of the carnival aligns more easily with the theory that sees violent, exuberant role-reversal as a metaphorical safety-valve, 'which in some overall functional way reinforces the bonds of authority by allowing for their temporary suspension'.[201] In this theory the failure of the state of reversal to become permanent makes the rebellions by no means pointless, as there is a vengeful gratification to be derived from 'acting out' these frustrations. Scott questioned the safety valve theory by wondering whether domination really is easier to return to afterwards.[202] For Tacitus' soldiers it definitely is: after the lunar eclipse in Pannonia and the threatened removal of Agrippina and her entourage to the Treviri, both sets of mutineers are completely reconciled to authority again (*tum redire paulatim amor obsequii*, *Ann.* 1.28) or even request a return to the *status quo*: *supplices ad haec et vera exprobrari fatentes orabant puniret noxios, ignosceret lapsis et duceret in hostem*, 'having become contrite at these words and confessing that they were being punished for true crimes, they begged that he should punish the guilty, forgive those who had been misguided and lead them out against the enemy', *Ann.* 1.44. The Batavi, too, come to their senses and the people, if not Civilis, appear to be forgiven.[203]

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[200]Dentith (1995), 70–76.
[201]Dentith (1995), 73. Although it is arguable whether Blaesus saw himself suspending the bonds of *authority* in declaring the *iustitium*, the soldiers act as if they are freed from these bonds.
[202]Scott (1990), 177.
[203]*Cerialis per occultos nuntios Batavis pacem, Civili veniam ostentans*, *Hist.* 5.24.4-5; though, sadly, Tacitus' account of the aftermath of the revolt is lost and they largely disappear from the historical record.

If bodies are the object of corrupt imperial *dominatio* which is resented, it is thus apt that any resistance against this *dominatio* should partly find expression through the body, alongside discourse. Victims and persecutors swap roles in a carnivalesque reversal of the normal order to gratify their feelings of outrage. But this can only occur to a very limited extent: given that the *dominatio* originates from the unlimited power of the *princeps*, violent resistance is still subject to that very same power and structurally unable to overcome it in the longer term. The narrative proves that by the ultimate failure of both the mutinies and the Batavian rebellion to overthrow the regime or achieve any lasting results.[204]

Discourse (II): *Libertas* and language

The resemblance between parts of the mutinies and the Batavian revolt goes a lot further than the way both sets of actors perceive their relationship with the Roman state as one of master and slave as manifested through the treatment of their bodies. They also repeatedly complain about a mismatch between what they perceive and what Rome says; between what Rome says and what it means:

> *Postremo promptis iam et aliis seditionis ministris velut contionabundus interrogabat cur paucis centurionibus paucioribus tribunis in modum servorum oboedirent. quando ausuros exposcere remedia, nisi novum et nutantem adhuc principem precibus vel armis adirent? satis per tot annos ignavia peccatum, quod tricena aut quadragena stipendia senes et plerique truncato ex vulneribus corpore tolerent. ne dimissis quidem finem esse militiae, sed apud vexillum tendentis alio vocabulo eosdem labores perferre. ac si quis tot casus vita superaverit, trahi adhuc diversas in terras ubi per nomen agrorum uligines paludum vel inculta montium accipiant. enimvero militiam ipsam gravem, infructuosam: denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi. at hercule verbera et vulnera, duram hiemem, exercitas aestates, bellum atrox: aut sterilem pacem sempiterna. nec aliud levamentum quam si certis sub legibus militia iniretur, ut singulos denarios mererent, sextus decumus stipendii annus finem adferret, ne ultra sub vexillis tenerentur, sed isdem in castris praemium pecunia solveretur. an*

[204]Though it is clear that Tacitus is not interested in ascribing a specific expected outcome to either mutineers or Batavi (cf. chapter two's discussion of how and why aims are shown to oscillate). It is the power structures analysed in the course of the mutinies and the rebellion which allow him to explore and criticise the nature of the principate and its effects on its subordinates.

praetorias cohortis, quae binos denarios acceperint, quae post sedecim annos penatibus suis reddantur, plus periculorum suscipere? non obtrectari a se urbanas excubias: sibi tamen apud horridas gentis e contuberniis hostem aspici.

Ann. 1.17, mutinies

'After this, with other assistants to his rebellion already at hand, he asked, as if addressing a gathered crowd, why they obeyed so few centurions and even fewer tribunes in such a slavish manner. When would they dare to demand redress, if they were not going to approach a new and still precariously placed emperor either with pleas or violence? [He also said] that they had missed enough opportunities through the years through their cravenness, and old men were dragging out thirty or forty years of service, with the bodies of many maimed through injuries. And that there was no end to service even for those who had been discharged, but instead whilst serving in the *vexillae* they performed the same duties under a different name. And if anyone should have survived such threats to their life, they were then dragged to the far ends of the earth where under the name of fields they took possession of the damp ends of swamps or the wildest bits of mountains. Indeed, military service itself was harsh and unrewarding: body and soul were deemed worth ten asses a day, and from this had to be subtracted clothes, weapons and tents; out of this, too, the cruelty of their commanding officers and respite from chores had to be bought off. But by god, they had lashings and injuries, harsh winters and eventful summers, and a grim war. Their unremunerative peace, on the other hand, seemed everlasting. Nor was there any other relief possible than to go into the military with fixed regulations in place to the extent that they could earn a denarius, and the sixteenth year of service would bring retirement, and so that no one would be held back in the *vexillae*, but the money would be paid in the camp itself. [Then he asked] whether the praetorian cohorts who receive two, and who are returned safe to their homes after sixteen years, took on more danger in the line of duty? He did not wish to disparage urban duties, but nonetheless it was by them, in rough foreign parts, that the enemy could be seen from their very tents.'

Igitur Civilis desciscendi certus, occultato interim altiore consilio, cetera ex eventu iudicaturus, novare res hoc modo coepit. iussu Vitellii Batavorum iuventus ad dilectum vocabatur, quem suapte natura gravem onerabant ministri avaritia ac luxu, senes aut invalidos conquirendo, quos pretio dimitterent: rursus impubes et forma conspicui (et est plerisque procera pueritia) ad stuprum trahebantur. hinc invidia, et compositae seditionis auctores perpulere ut dilectum abnuerent. Civilis primores gentis et promptissimos vulgi specie epularum sacrum in nemus vocatos, ubi nocte ac laetitia incaluisse videt, a laude gloriaque gentis orsus iniurias et raptus et cetera servitii mala enumerat: neque enim societatem, ut olim, sed tamquam mancipia haberi: quando legatum, gravi quidem comitatu et superbo, cum imperio venire? tradi se praefectis centurionibusque: quos ubi spoliis et sanguine expleverint, mutari, exquirique novos sinus et varia praedandi vocabula. instare dilectum quo liberi a parentibus, fratres a fratribus velut

supremum dividantur. numquam magis adflictam rem Romanam nec aliud in hibernis quam praedam et senes: attollerent tantum oculos et inania legionum nomina ne pavescerent. at sibi robur peditum equitumque, consanguineos Germanos, Gallias idem cupientis. ne Romanis quidem ingratum id bellum, cuius ambiguam fortunam Vespasiano imputaturos: victoriae rationem non reddi.

Hist. 4.14, Batavians

'Therefore Civilis decided to secede. While he was keeping hidden his real intention, and would judge all other things as they unfolded, he began a revolution in the following manner. By the order of Vitellius the Batavian youth had been called to a levy, which, already burdensome by its very nature, the officials made even harder to bear with their greed and lack of restraint, by seeking out the old and the weak, whom they would only let go for a price: then again they would drag off the young and those notable for their physique (and there is much tall youth there) to be raped. Hence the bad feeling, and the leaders of the prepared rebellion made it so that people refused to be conscripted. Civilis addressed the chiefs of the tribe and those commoners most ready to act, called together to a sacred grove under the pretext of a feast, and when he saw that they had grown restive through the late hour and with jollity, he listed, starting from a point of praise and the tribe's glory, the injustices, rape and other misfortunes belonging to their state of serfdom, saying that they were not treated as allies, as they once had, but as slaves: when would a legate come their way, with a massive and proud entourage, with actual power? They were being handed over to prefects and centurions, whom, when they had filled themselves with loot and blood, changed, and sought out new money traps and different words for their stealing. A levy was upon them by which children would be separated from parents, brothers from brothers as if forever. But the Roman state had never been more under pressure, nor was there anything in their winter camps but loot and old men: let them only lift their eyes and not tremble at the empty names of the legions. But with themselves were a stout cohort of foot soldiers and cavalrymen, German relatives, and Gauls wanting similar things. This war would not be unwelcome even to the Romans, a war of which an ambiguous outcome could be credited to Vespasian, and for a total victory no account would have to be given at all..'

In both, mention of a *seditio* is followed by a rousing speech enumerating the evils besetting Pannonian soldiers and Batavians respectively, and their concerns are surprisingly similar. Civilis' assertion that *tradi se praefectis centurionibusque: quos ubi spoliis et sanguine expleverint, mutari, exquirique novos sinus et varia praedandi vocabula* can be mapped seamlessly onto the Pannonian soldiers' concerns at *Ann.* 1.17. *Sanguine* stands for the *verbera* of which the legionaries complain; in both cases these are administered by

praefecti and *centuriones*.[205] The *spolia* taken from the Batavians by these corrupt officers are similar to the bribes extracted from the soldiers to spare them further maltreatment: *saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi*. On both sides there are attempts to cover up these injustices with fancy words: for the Pannonian legionaries their term of being kept *sub vexillatione* after they complete their term of legionary service is *alio vocabulo eosdem labores perferre*, and when they finally are allowed their retirement they are forced to take *per nomen agrorum uligines paludum vel inculta montium.* Further, the Batavian idea that their association with Rome was one of *societas* turned *tamquam mancipia* is reiterated by Civilis in different words: *miseram servitutem falso pacem vocarent [Romani]* (*Hist.* 4.17.10).[206] A distinct lack of faith in the correlation between words used by the Roman authorities and the reality faced by the soldiers characterises the discourse of the mutineers and is paralleled by the situation facing the Batavians. The import of this shared discourse is great: the corruption of the language used by official representatives of Rome is here shown to be universal in its application; not used exclusively against provincials but also against Romans to 'keep them in their place'.[207]

The cross-pollination between these episodes is too fertile to be explained in terms of the recycling of historiographical *topoi* for 'scenes of rebellion', and of the *topoi* listed by Fulkerson in her analysis of the German mutiny none recur in the Batavian rebellion.[208] The meaning of the similarities lies elsewhere.

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[205]For the Batavians, see the quote above, and for Pannonia cf. the revenge inflicted on harsh disciplinarians Aufidienus Rufus, *praefectus castrorum*, at *Ann.* 1.20 as well as on *centurio* 'cedo alteram' Lucilius at *Ann.* 1.23.

[206]The Batavian position is also articulated by the Caledonian Calgacus in the *Agricola*: *auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant*, *Agr.* 30.

[207]See Rudich (1993) as a 'study of a society suffering from a crisis of values and of people who were at the same time the victims and perpetrators of that crisis' (publisher description) through the medium of doublespeak; Alston and Spentzou (2011), Ch. 6 'Imperial Dreams. Being Roman in a World Empire' on crises of representation of those who speak 'Roman'; and Bartsch (1994) on the imperial script which determines reality, regardless of reality.

[208]Fulkerson (2006), 174–78 for the list.

Imperial language

Crucial to reading the mutinies as partly about the failure of language under the principate is the accession debate of Tiberius in the senate, which immediately precedes them (ending with *hic rerum urbanarum status erat, cum Pannonicas legiones seditio incessit*, 'this was the state of urban affairs, when a rebellion hit the Pannonian legions', *Ann.* 1.16). By placing this debate at the very beginning of the *Annals* and at the very significant moment of the first dynastic succession Tacitus makes clear that it is one of the keys to understanding Tiberius' principate. Another effect of this strategic placement is that a stark contrast is achieved between all the talking about the state's future taking place in one place, and all the action to determine that future taking place in another. The conversation is conducted as if there were still room for maneuver when there is not, and when it is clear from Tacitus' narrative that both senators and Tiberius know this, but cannot say it. This 'ability to impose [his] own fictions upon the world' was labeled as a mark of the tyrant by Bartsch, and his will and ability to punish those who misunderstand, willfully or not, the imperial script as particularly Tacitean features of such tyrannical manipulations of language and truth.[209] In the Tiberian accession debate the emperor ought to decide what is to be the truth of the political settlement – this, too, is a form of domination. Patel highlighted that Tiberius's failure to realise his power to 'decide' truth is exactly what confuses his senatorial listeners – the debate thus comes to be read as a personal failing of Tiberius as emperor. The potential duplicity of the emperor is crucial in a regime in which imperial power asserts meaning and is more meaningful than whether, at a personal level, the words Tiberius uses reflect his true feelings or meaning.[210] Tacitus' narrative shows, however, that they cannot publicly acknowledge this uncertainty, so that the emperor's perceived insincerity generates senatorial insincerity and any real meaning of the words spoken by Tiberius' or others must go unacknowledged or

[209]See Bartsch (1994), 16, following Rosenblatt, for the ability to impose one's fictions and p. 20 for listeners' errors in Tacitus.
[210]Patel (2013), 12. She sees Tiberius' protestations as not necessarily insincere, but I believe Tacitus' stress on his sending out his sons as representatives of the imperial family rather than as part of a senatorial delegation argues against a respect for the senate's Republican prerogatives. This does not rule out his feeling ambivalence about his own position, which is perfectly compatible with decisive action.

unrecognised. There is no room for truth in the official discourse or in the oppositional discourses of the senatorial dissidents.

The failure of language in the accession debate thus does not lie in talking about the wrong things. It is easy to see why the disposition of the state at a time of (potential) unprecedented dynastic succession would be of great concern to the senate. Their lack of experience of the senate's operation under the Republican system (*quotus quisque reliquus qui rem publicam vidisset?*, 'how many and who were left who had witnessed the Republic?, *Ann.* 1.3) does not invalidate their concern, as the memory of it persisted (though it may explain their inability to recognise or speak truth.) But they are no longer the right people to do the talking, even if they *were* able to recognise or speak truth. This is first of all because they have lost their traditional right to dominate political discourse to the emperor's supreme power. But the narrative also shows it is the soldiers, not the senate, who have the potential to affect arrangements at the top (although their potential at this point in time goes unrealised, as Germanicus refuses their offer to supplant Tiberius).[211]

Tiberius' actions make much clearer the message he is hedging by his confusing words: he sends his son Drusus to quell the mutiny in Pannonia at the head of a group of *primores civitatis* (*Ann.* 1.24), a set of advisors which must have included senators. Subsequently, after the German mutiny becomes known at Rome, Tacitus' report of Tiberius' deliberations includes no thought of sending senators (*Ann*. 1.47). Later still, Tacitus says Tiberius made journey preparations as if to go himself at the head of an entourage of *comites*. He contrasts Tiberius' voiced reluctance to take on autocratic rule with a description of his actions which suggests the senate was firmly sidelined in favour of members of the imperial family. Another example which illustrates how power lies outside the senate is the near-lynching of the senatorial

[211]Recognised by Pelling (2012), 293: '… of course the mutinies are 'historically unimportant' only in the crudest sense, for they introduce so many important themes to illuminate the crucial role an army can play in making or breaking a *princeps*. These themes are the more striking here for their stark juxtaposition with the polite nonsense of the accession debate…'.

delegation in the Rhine camps by the mutineers, for fear that the recently granted concessions will be revoked (*Ann.* 1.39). The senators had no such purpose but had been sent earlier to confer upon Germanicus the special powers which would designate him as heir.[212]

Tiberius' dicey relationship with language is typical for the Julio-Claudians in Tacitus and in the literary tradition more widely. Bartsch's study dealt with the Neronian sources' preoccupation with his ability to assert what was reality or not and to make the wrong-footed suffer for getting it wrong. The sources on Gaius also speak of his need to impose his fictions on the world and the senators' fear at not knowing the script and thus how to behave, especially with an emperor so changeable.[213] In keeping with this tradition, the *Annals* show throughout that playing fast and loose with reality and the language that describes it was endemic at Rome under the Julio-Claudians. The recurrence during the Batavian rebellion of the complaint that Rome's imperial delegates (this time Nero's) say one thing and mean another confirms this. In the *Agricola*, set under Domitian, Tacitus' Calgacus repeats the complaint once more.[214] The repetition at three such different points in time suggests that for Tacitus the erosion of language was not simply a Julio-Claudian phenomenon but became an inherent feature of the principate itself, born from the immense practical power of the imperial aristocracy to override law and tradition.

Centre and periphery

But these reiterations of the complaint that Rome separates language from reality occur not just across time but across space, too, in very different settings

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[212]Miller (1992) *ad loc*. on *Ann.* 1.14.3's *proconsulare imperium* as 'the association in the general power which indicates a possible successor'.
[213]E.g. Dio 59.4.5-6 and 59.6.7 for inconsistency and fear, and for fictions 59.17.9 (describing Gaius' night-time speechifying, aided by fires, after the bridge-building between Puteoli and Bauli) καὶ γὰρ τὴν νύκτα ἡμέραν, ὥσπερ που τὴν θάλασσαν γῆν, ποιῆσαι ἠθέλησεν, 'indeed, it was his wish to make the day right, as he had made the sea land' (tr. E. Cary, Loeb 1914-7) and Suet. *Gai*. 26 *alios cum clam interemisset, citare nihilo minus ut uiuos perseuerauit, paucos post dies uoluntaria morte perisse mentitus*, 'others, after he had privately put them to death, he continued to send for, as if they were still alive, and after a few days pretended that they had laid violent hands on themselves'..
[214]See n. 207.

(semi-Romanised Rhineland, wild Britain, and camps in Germany and Pannonia). The breakdown of language at the centre of the Empire is both known and replicated on the periphery. Nonetheless, we cannot equate centre and periphery with specific ethnicities, as we have seen already that corrupt language is not just directed against the native inhabitants of the periphery but also against Romans 'transplanted' there. Neither does any single ethnicity have the monopoly on perpetrating this abuse. One aspect of the breakdown of language at Rome is re-enacted by the legionaries themselves. This is the artificiality which we saw marking the debate in the senate at Tiberius' accession (and which is a precursor to the outright theatricality in the Neronian books).[215] Fulkerson labeled the artificiality characterising the mutinies on the Rhine 'competitive roleplaying' between an emotional soldiery and an emotional leader; but it is not Germanicus as the imperial scion sent out from Rome who somehow introduces this drama from the centre to the periphery: the soldiers start first. Before Germanicus has spoken even one word they are forcing him to witness at close quarters the physical toll taken on their bodies: *postquam vallum iniit dissoni questus audiri coepere. Et quidam prensa manu eius per speciem exosculandi inseruerunt digitos ut vacua dentibus ora contingeret*, 'after he entered the compound, rough complaints began to be heard. And some, having taken his hand with the appearance of being about to kiss it, inserted their fingers so that he touched mouths empty of teeth' (*Ann.* 1.34). The soldiers are not necessarily 'faking it' or 'putting it on', but the impression is they know that interactions with the imperial house are characterised by this element of 'acting' and if they wish to be heard, this is what they should do. Blurring the lines further, Tacitus shows how at the end of the Batavian episode the accusation of manipulating language to serve one's own ends is directed against Civilis by his own Batavian people: *haec vulgus, proceres atrociora: Civilis rabie semet in arma trusos; illum domesticis malis excidium gentis opposuisse*, 'These things the common people were saying; the nobles said worse: that Civilis in his madness had dragged them along into battle; that he put the destruction of his tribe up against his personal grievances', *Hist.* 5.25.12-14. Instead of falling in with the *libertas*/*servitium* discourse to explain his call to violence, the Batavian

[215]Bartsch (1994), 16–21.

nobles say he used this discourse as a pretext for the personal grievances which pushed him into risking the annihilation of the Batavian nation. Finally, Civilis and Cerialis accuse each other of masking a lust for power behind nice-sounding words:

> *tradi se praefectis centurionibusque: quos ubi spoliis et sanguine expleverint, mutari, exquirique novos sinus et varia praedandi vocabula*
>
> *Hist.* 4.14.15-17; Civilis
>
> 'They were being handed over to prefects and centurions, whom, when they had filled themselves with loot and blood, changed, and sought out new money traps and different words for their stealing.'

> *ceterum libertas et speciosa nomina praetexuntur; nec quisquam alienum servitium et dominationem sibi concupivit ut non eadem ista vocabula usurparet.*
>
> *Hist.* 4.73.21-3; Cerialis
>
> 'Of course freedom and other empty words are being dangled in front of you; no one has ever desired the slavery of others and tyranny for themselves who has not used these very words.'

The examples cumulatively show that the occurrences of linguistic corruption on the periphery do not bear any relation to the origins of the speaker, but that it is ubiquitous under the principate. It is no wonder that groups as disparate as Batavians and mutineers articulate the same complaint.

Libertas and language

The joint accusation by both groups of a disconnect between imperial language and truth implies an accompanying desire for freedom from imperial *dominatio* of language, complementary to that for freedom from imperial *dominatio* of their bodies. Both articulations are underpinned by the excess of power at the disposal of the *princeps* and express longing for the *libertas* of Late Republican political discourse. Haynes linked imperial language to Republican *libertas* when she posited that 'imperial discourse, nearly identical in structure and expression to that of the Republic but divorced from Republican connotations, provided an empty site where Roman fantasies of self-definition took strong

hold'.[216] Tacitus' use of *iustitium* in the mutinies show it to be exactly such a site of Roman self-definition as Haynes describes.[217] Empty only in the sense of being untrue to the spirit (not the letter) of its Late Republican form, it fills its suspension of the law with meaning and tradition to enable it to act against the *tumultus* in which there is no social order. In doing so, the new order defines itself as legitimate and, in its guise of guarantor of the social order, as continuous with the Republican regime. It is the soldiers' *tumultus* which is more appropriately described as empty. Firstly because of this lack of social order, but secondly because it rejects the *iustitium*'s 'filling' which aims to reimpose social order and stress continuity. And finally and most importantly, because the desire for Germanicus to head up a Republican state is a much more explicit 'fantasy of self-definition' than the *iustitium*'s self-definition as an extension of the Republic. The citizen-soldiers of AD14 may not have experienced the Republic, but some memory of its *libertas* was still a powerful constituent in their attempt at self-definition in the face of the principate's assertion of control over their language and their bodies. As for the Batavians, if language and truth are disconnected in the imperial discourse, then another way of reading the violence of their revolt is as a way of refusing to play word games. Although there is plenty of discourse flying around, very little of it amounts to dialogue with the opposite side or is even spoken *to* Rome, as if they know it would be pointless.

This consideration of the pointlessness of language under the principate brings us back to my earlier explanation of the metaphor of madness which runs throughout the narrative of the mutinies as morally descriptive. I will demonstrate how language evocative of mental illness also occurs in Tacitus' description of the Batavian rebellion, before proceeding to interpret its significance.

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[216]Haynes (2004), 33.

[217]I see Haynes' perception as applying to the wider discourses voiced by Tacitus and not just to those places in which it is marked lexically by e.g. the difference between *nomen* and *vocabulum*. For example, Percennius at *Ann.* 1.17 uses *nomen* and *vocabulum* interchangeably to describe fobbing off a bad deal as a good deal, and neither word features in the accession debate which I see as crucial to the issue of language.

Parallels are easily established. First, the verb *resipiscere* is used at *Hist.* 5.25.16 as part of a passage setting out, in indirect speech, the self-reflection undergone by the Batavians as they decide to give up on rebellion. The Oxford Latin Dictionary gives its meaning as 'to recover one's reason' (*OLD* 2, after 'to regain consciousness, come to (after fainting or sim.)') which therefore, by a single word at the very end of the lengthy episode, manages to characterise it as an event in which they had *lost* this reason, i.e. had gone mad. The infinitive occurs three times in the Loeb Classical Library online: in Pliny the Elder, it occurs in a section dealing with foreign medicine where it is used to describe the curing of the delirious by the Magi by sprinkling them with mole's blood[218]; the other two references are from Valerius Maximus and are used to denote the process of sobering up from alcoholic intoxication which, in both anecdotes, is stopping rational discourse or behaviour from taking place.[219] In addition madness, *rabies*, is precisely the word which the Batavian *proceres* choose to apply to Civilis' undertaking in which they were dragged along. Finally, when Cerialis holds out inducements to disengage his supporters from Civilis, the phrase *miscebantur minis promissa* is used, which resembles the mixing of medicine.[220]

The parallels continue in the treatment of the disease: just as in the case of the mutinies and the Batavian rebellion we saw that for every articulation of the old *libertas* there was a Roman to speak up for acceptance of its new, imperial conception, the madness of both episodes requires a Roman commander with the right knowledge of medicine to restore sanity. And here we come full circle, as the medicine is of course not a physical draught but applied through words. Although no longer marked by medical language, the manner in which Drusus' staff bring the mutinous Pannonians to their senses resembles the manner in which Cerialis brought the Batavians back to their allegiance: multiple

[218]Plin. *Nat. Hist.* 30.24.
[219]Val. Max. *Facta et dicta memorabilia* 6.12 ext. 1; 6.15 ext. 1.
[220]As it does in Celsus *De Med.* 3.16.14.4, 3.6.16.2, but really *passim.* Celsus probably wrote his treatise on medicine during the reign of the emperor Tiberius (Loeb Classical Library online edition of *De Medicina*, vii), so the terminology predates Tacitus.

messengers offering differentiated messages to different groups, effectively breaking up the unity of the resistance:

> *utendum inclinatione ea Caesar et quae casus obtulerat in sapientiam vertenda ratus circumiri tentoria iubet; accitur centurio Clemens et si alii bonis artibus grati in vulgus. hi vigiliis, stationibus, custodiis portarum se inserunt, spem offerunt, metum intendunt. 'quo usque filium imperatoris obsidebimus? quis certaminum finis? Percennione et Vibuleno sacramentum dicturi sumus? Percennius et Vibulenus stipendia militibus, agros emeritis largientur? denique pro Neronibus et Drusis imperium populi Romani capessent? quin potius, ut novissimi in culpam, ita primi ad paenitentiam sumus? tarda sunt quae in commune expostulantur: privatam gratiam statim mereare, statim recipias.' commotis per haec mentibus et inter se suspectis, tironem a veterano. legionem a legione dissociant.*
>
> *Ann.* 1.28; *centurio* Clemens

> 'Caesar thought that this change in mood ought to be exploited, and thinking that what fate had supplied should be turned to good use he ordered a circuit of the troops' tents. A centurion, Clemens, was summoned and anyone else popular with the crowd because of their skilled rhetoric. They wove themselves in and out of watchposts, guard posts, sentries at gates, and they held out hope but also promoted fear. 'How far will you pursue your siege of the emperor's son? What will be the end to your battle? Are we to take our oaths to Percennius and Vibulenus now? Will Percennius and Vibulenus provide pay for soldiers and lands for veterans? Then will they take on the empire of the Roman people in the place of the Nerones and the Drusi? Isn't it better, just as we were the latest ones to fall into error, to be the first to come to repentance? Things which are demanded on behalf of a group are slow to come about; but forgiveness for yourselves as individuals you can earn on the spot, and will receive immediately.' Through minds affected by these words and already suspicious of one another, they detached recruit from veteran, legion from legion.'

> *nam Cerialis per occultos nuntios Batavis pacem, Civili veniam ostentans, Veledam propinquosque monebat fortunam belli, tot cladibus adversam, opportuno erga populum Romanum merito mutare: caesos Treviros, receptos Vbios, ereptam Batavis patriam; neque aliud Civilis amicitia partum quam vulnera fugas luctus. exulem eum et extorrem recipientibus oneri, et satis peccavisse quod totiens Rhenum transcenderint. si quid ultra moliantur, inde iniuriam et culpam, hinc ultionem et deos fore. Miscebantur minis promissa; et concussa Transrhenanorum fide inter Batavos quoque sermones orti…*
>
> *Hist.* 5.24.3-25.2

> 'For Cerialis by secret messengers held out peace to the Batavi and a pardon to Civilis, and kept warning Veleda and her supporters that the outcome of the war, which was looking unfavourable through all the defeats, could be changed by opportune kind service done to the Roman people: that the Treviri had been murdered, the Ubii welcomed back into the Roman fold, control of their fatherland snatched from the Batavi, and that nothing had been gained by the friendship of Civilis but wounds and exiles and mourning. That he was a homeless exile to the burden of those hosting him, and that they had committed enough mistakes by so often crossing the Rhine. If anything further was being plotted, from their side they would incur injuries and blame and on the Roman side vengeance and the gods would block them. Promises were mixed with threats; and with the faith of the Transrhenani shaken, mutterings also arose among the Batavi… .
>
> *haec vulgus, proceres atrociora.*
>
> *Hist.* 5.25.12
>
> 'These things the commoners said; the nobles said even worse.'

We saw that Tacitus' re-use of the complaint of Roman linguistic corruption across the episodes of the mutinies and the Batavian rebellion, so widely separated in time and space, showed that the failure of language is endemic under the principate as a result of its excessive power. But it does so alongside showing equally harshly the failure, in both settings, of violent resistance against the system which perpetrates this abuse of power. Finally, by means of his framing devices of invalidating Percennius' speech setting out reasons for rebellion and additionally describing the mutinies as 'madness', Tacitus conveyed his absolute moral disapprobation of threatening social order. By extending the metaphor of madness to the Batavian episode, we come full circle: the duplication of motifs from the mutinies to the Batavian rebellion 55 years later serves the dual purpose of reinforcing the universality both of the principate's abuse of power in specific ways and of Tacitus' condemnation of violent reaction against this state by the oppressed, whatever their situation.

Conclusion

This chapter started with the analysis of imperial death as a causal factor in the mutinies and the Batavian rebellion. In both episodes imperial deaths cause the appearance of 'gaps' as transitional moments when the ideological significance of the principate is assessed by its subjects and exploited for the improvement

of their personal situation, through violence. Tacitus' narrative shows how the mutineers see the death of Augustus as the end of a highly personalised political relationship based on loyalty and mutual exchange of benefits, and consequently a break in the imperial regime. It also shows, however, that Tacitus did not think this was a valid way of interpreting the death of emperors: in his understanding of the nature of the regime, these events did not preclude its continuity. He made this clear through his use of two framing devices to separate his view of the mutinies from the justifications offered by the soldiers: first by presenting Percennius as lower class and thereby morally inferior and having no right to speak, and secondly by describing the mutineers' behaviour through the metaphor of madness: madness to take on a regime which always wins, and madness to jeopardise the stability and peace brought by the principate.

Tacitus uses the notion of *iustitium* in the mutinies narrative to make both points about continuity and separation. On the narrative level the *iustitium* is employed by the army commander Iunius Blaesus to continue Augustus' appropriation of the word for crises under the Republic to deaths in the imperial family. It was intended as a marker of continuity between Republic and principate, and between Augustus and Tiberius, but it enables the soldiers to ponder the position they are in and conclude it is in fact marking a break. Violence is facilitated further by the *iustitium*'s practical effect of suspending the soldiers' disciplinary routines which in Roman military ideology would have helped to contain and direct their aggression against the enemy. Its historiographical exploitation by Tacitus also revolves around this uncomfortable relationship with *iustitium*'s Republican incarnation. In the mutinies, the soldiers' violence is not presented as sanctioned by the *iustitium* in defence of the state but as the *tumultus* threatening the state which traditionally prompted a *iustitium*. The roles are reversed: the *iustitium* is symbolically representative of the new imperial regime's intention to take over without change, but provokes violence intended to overthrow that status quo and provoke a renegotiation. But because *iustitium* carries with it the state of *anomia* which allows violence in defence of the state, the regime can exact a

harsh retribution from those threatening it. Its Republican heritage thus lends an aura of legitimacy to the violence used by imperial representatives to safeguard one-man rule.

The regime's powers of oppression also play a large role in the case of soldiers' and Batavians' professed reasons for rebelling. They are united through voicing in the text similar discourses complaining that imperial delegates reduce all status distinctions (free/citizen/slave/ally) to the single status of slave. Under the principate all have become imperial slaves, and this is manifested through the inappropriate treatment of their bodies. This is even more important for the mutineers who are not only freeborn but citizens. The *libertas* they want is non-*servitium,* that is, not to be in the position of slaves with no recourse to being compelled by those more powerful.

What they want is thus phrased in terms of the Late Republican definition of political *libertas*. This was partly grounded in the rule of law and with a distinct application to the citizen body, which was protected from violence by the state by the right of *provocatio*. On this definition, their complaints characterise imperial rule as Late Republican *dominatio*. What they do not realise is that this reflects an outdated and idealised view of the Late Republic, which even before its end at Actium underwent a change from being underpinned by the rule of law to being based on the private *iudicium* of the individual.[221] This change opened the door to the ascendancy of Octavian and the development of the principate, so that even the principate could, on this later definition, be equated with a restoration of *libertas.* This is given expression in the narrative when it features Romans arguing for the necessity of the *princeps*. This mostly rests on a utilitarian and narrow basis for the soldiers and Batavians, but is evocative

[221]Sallust in the *Bellum Catilinae* dated this evolution to much earlier than Arena's suggestion: the collectivity of the Middle Republic, which was so just it almost had no need for its laws (*ius bonumque apud eos non legibus magis quam natura valebat*, 'law and morality with them was strong not so much because of the laws than because of their character', *BC* 9.1), split apart into ambitious individualism after the destruction of Carthage brought wealth as well as security to the state, resulting in the lawlessness of first civil war and then Sulla's proscriptions (*neque modum neque modestiam victores habere*, 'its victors had neither restraint nor discretion', *BC* 11.4).

enough to invite more politically aware senatorial (and modern) readers to overcome their nostalgia for Republican senatorial freedom by remembering the Civil War of the Late Republic which led to the concept's redefinition.

In the narrative, articulating a dissatisfaction with abuses of the principate's unlimited power seems to be one of a very limited set of options, given the regime's powers of repression. However, a brief turning of the tables is possible, and both episodes display moments of carnivalesque role reversal and revenge, which precede a return to mutineers' and Batavians' former positions of powerless subjection.

But there is a second form of *dominatio* in these episodes which affects even this view of articulating discontent as a viable option. This is the domination of language perpetrated by Rome on the soldiers and Batavians – the *princeps*' power to name a spade a shovel translates into their physical maltreatment being dressed up with fancy words. This disconnect between what's really going on and what is being expressed through language is typical for Tiberius in the *Annals*, and typical in Tacitus as well as the wider literary tradition on the entire Julio-Claudian dynasty.

To sum up, finally, the recurrence of these identical complaints at different points in time and different locations in space shows Tacitus thought the abuse of power was endemic in the Julio-Claudian and even the imperial system (as the complaint resurfaces in the *Agricola* where Calgacus makes it). This is entirely compatible with his view that there was no better alternative.

4 The Germanicus campaigns

Introduction

The German campaigns waged by Germanicus in AD15-17 (*Ann.* 1.55-71; *Ann.* 2.5-26) have been only selectively studied, with interest focusing mainly on the person of Germanicus and his relationship with Tiberius and less on the specifics of the campaigns and their setting. Agrippina's scene on the bridgehead has been used mostly to suggest that she was a transgressive female overstepping the bounds of her sex in isolation from the military crisis which spurred it, and the Teutoburg episode as yet another example of Germanicus' oft-noted tendency to excessive emotion.[222] The struggles of the troops led by Caecina have been overlooked by all but Woodman[223], but the length and elaboration of the account suggests more than a token inclusion for historical reasons. The same holds for the expedition against the Marsi prompted by the aftermath of the German mutiny.

This chapter analyses the spatialisation in these scenes in terms of conflicts between Roman and German spaces which often occupy the same physical territory. The resulting multilayeredness of the landscape raises issues of translation and comprehension for Romans moving through a Germany in which Roman ruins superimposed on the otherwise unknowable forests are the only available structuring elements to help them navigate and understand their surroundings. The combination of this tension between spaces, the negative connotations of many of these guideposts, and the absence of knowledge of the German underscape beneath them creates fear in the rank and file when such insights are absent or defective. In contrast to these fearful responses, I examine in turn the very different reactions of Germanicus himself, his wife Agrippina

[222]Pelling (2012), 281 refers to the 'hysteria' of the death scene at *Ann.* 2.69-73; Pelling (2012), 284 speaks of an 'excess of *comitas* or *ciuilitas* or theatricality'; Pagán (1999), 311–13 speaks of 'Germanicus' exorbitance' as a 'motif'.
[223]Woodman (1988), 168–76. However, I offer a different explanation for the episode's inclusion to his interpretation of it as 'a sub-plot which increases the suspense of the major engagements' (p. 174).

and his general Caecina as striving, with varying levels of success, to guard the integrity of Roman space and indeed permanently subordinate German space to it. The final section discusses the raid on the Marsi as departing from this preoccupation with conflicts of space, instead foregrounding identity as its primary concern. The unthreatening Marsi's destruction at the hands of formerly mutinous Romans is essential to the restoration of the legions' Roman identity, the breakdown of which *Annals* 1 showed to be as much of a threat to the stability of the empire as an unknowable and unconquered Germany.

Competing spaces

Chapter one finished with an assessment of Rome's inability to make permanent inroads into the resisting Batavian landscape, and the human destruction by the Batavi of many of the permanent markers – such as Drusus' *moles* and the camps along the Rhine – which Rome had managed to establish since the area was first pacified. Alongside the power of an alien landscape which cannot be completely controlled, the other main factor responsible for this failure is Rome's focus on control through measures of repression instead of co-option into the empire on a fair basis. The only lasting spatial change managed by Rome along the Rhine in Tacitus' *Histories* was the colony of Cologne. The tension between this imperial urban space and the numerous pockets of alternative German space which still surrounded it, on either side of the Rhine, is present throughout Tacitus' narration of the Batavian rebellion.

The German passages of *Annals* 1 and 2, as befits their earlier narrated time (by about 55 years), play even more evidently with the idea of multiple coexisting and competing spaces on the far side of the Rhine. A focus on the spatial in the text reveals that Germanicus' campaign is full of building. His troops carry packs (*onustum sarcinis armisque [militem]*, *Ann.* 1.63) and travel with *impedimenta* or baggage trains (*Ann.* 1.65), which include tools – the presence of such things *per quae egeritur humus aut exciditur caespes* being advertised by the narration of their loss (also *Ann.* 1.65). Their purpose is clear when Tacitus refers on three separate occasions to the formal practice of castrametation (*castra metari* at *Ann.* 1.65 and *Ann.* 2.8 and *castris faciendis* at *Ann.* 2.21; compared to only once

during the Batavian rebellion, *castra fecere* at *Hist.* 4.26.13, and even then in a passage where the manuscript tradition is as muddled as the narrative). Germanicus' columns are fully aware that they will meet little that will be of use to them along their way and have come prepared to carve what Roman spaces they need out of their German environment.

This act of carving out Roman space had several ideological meanings as well as practical functions. On the former level, it was a way of extending Roman values and discipline into foreign spaces; this is how Polybius saw it.[224] It was also one of the forms of *labor* which reinforced an army's *disciplina*[225]; this is how Tacitus depicts it when he describes Corbulo's management of his eastern troops at *Annals* 13.35[226], and to a lesser extent of his German troops at *Ann.* 11.18.[227] *Annals* 1 itself contains two examples of these functions, which illustrate what the Corbulo passages explicitly state: the expedition against the Marsi and the legions' loss of their tools at *Ann.* 1.65. The first example will not be discussed in detail until the end of this chapter, as its decidedly un-imperialistic impetus requires such separate treatment from the other Germanicus campaigns, but Tacitus explicitly motivates this otherwise

[224]Polyb. 6.19-42.
[225]See Phang (2008), 37-72 (chapter two 'Combat training and discipline').
[226]*Sed Corbuloni plus molis adversus ignaviam militum quam contra perfidiam hostium erat: quippe Syria transmotae legiones, pace longa segnes, munia castrorum aegerrime tolerabant. satis constitit fuisse in eo exercitu veteranos, qui non stationem, non vigilias inissent, vallum fossamque quasi nova et mira viserent, sine galeis, sine loricis, nitidi et quaestuosi, militia per oppida expleta. igitur dimissis, quibus senectus aut valitudo adversa erat, supplementum petivit. et habiti per Galatiam Cappadociamque dilectus, adiectaque ex Germania legio cum equitibus alariis et peditatu cohortium. retentusque omnis exercitus sub pellibus, quamvis hieme saeva adeo, ut obducta glacie nisi effossa humus tentoriis locum non praeberet. ambusti multorum artus vi frigoris, et quidam inter excubias exanimati sunt. adnotatusque miles, qui fascem lignorum gestabat, ita praeriguisse manus, ut oneri adhaerentes truncis brachiis deciderent. ipse cultu [l]evi, capite intecto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse, laudem strenuis, solacium invalidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere. dehinc, quia duritia caeli militiaeque multi abnuebant deserebantque, remedium severitate quaesitum est. nec enim, ut in aliis exercitibus, primum alterumque delictum venia prosequebatur, se qui signa reliquerat, statim capite poenas luebat. idque usu salubre et misericordia melius apparuit: quippe pauciores illa castra deseruere quam ea, in quibus ignoscebatur*.
[227]*ubi praesentia satis composita sunt, legiones operum et laboris ignavas, populationibus laetantis, veterem ad morem reduxit, ne quis agmine decederet nec pugnam nisi iussus iniret. stationes vigiliae, diurna nocturnaque munia in armis agitabantur; feruntque militem quia vallum non accinctus, atque alium quia pugione tantum accinctus foderet, morte punitos.*

unprovoked aggression with reference to the legions' desire to erase the shame of their abandonment of *disciplina* during the mutinies. Their combat is an alternative form to Corbulo's castrametation of the *labor* which goes into creating, restoring and maintaining *disciplina*. The second example from the more straightforwardly imperialist campaigns later in *Annals* 1 shows the importance of such *labor* through illustrating the breakdown of *disciplina* if it is *not* performed. The real import of Caecina's troops being reported as losing their tools lies not in the fact that this outcome reflects badly on the process that led to it (their customary tactics being patently unsuitable to the swampy battlefield by the Long Bridges).[228] Nor does it lie in the sympathy evoked by their resulting uncomfortable situation of having to dig a camp without proper tools, though it does both these things. Instead, it lies in their resulting inability to carve out a sufficiently Roman space to keep the soldiers insulated from their surrounding German, frightening, space. They get neither the benefit of the process of castrametation (the confidence and steadfastness that derive from *disciplina*) nor the benefit of its outcome, a safe Roman space. As section four analyses in detail, the consequence is a total breakdown of discipline and spatial integrity within the camp at the slightest provocation.

Yet alongside the need to carve out new spaces from their German surroundings, the legions in the text frequently encounter the visible remnants of an earlier age in which Augustan lieutenants *did* manage to make their mark on the landscape. At *Ann.* 1.56 L. Apronius is delegated to the fortification of existing roads and river fortifications (*L. Apronio ad munitiones viarum et fluminum relicto*) on the further bank of the Rhine. In the same chapter Tacitus mentions Germanicus building a *castellum super vestigia paterni praesidii in monte Tauno*, referencing the Elder Drusus' campaigns. At *Ann.* 1.61 the Teutoburg forest still displays signs of Varus' camp and fortifications (*prima Vari castra lato ambitu et dimensis principiis trium legionum manus ostentabant; dein semiruto vallo, humili fossa accisae iam reliquiae consedisse intellegebantur*).

[228]*illi sanguine suo et lubrico paludum lapsantes excussis rectoribus disicere obvios, proterere iacentis. plurimus circa aquilas labor, quae neque ferri adversum ingruentia tela neque figi limosa humo poterant. Caecina dum sustentat aciem, suffosso equo delapsus circumveniebatur, ni prima legio sese opposuisset*, *Ann.* 1.65.

There are, further, the 'Long Bridges' built by L. Domitius at least twenty years earlier[229], which Tacitus says should put Caecina's troops in a position to travel *notis itineribus* (*Ann.* 1.63).[230] During the second year of campaigning, we read that *castellum Lupiae flumini adpositum obsideri* (*Ann.* 2.7). Further on in the same chapter, the reference to the nearby *tumulum tamen nuper Varianis legionibus structum* locates us back in the area of the Teutoburger pass through its allusion to Germanicus' earlier ordering of the Varian battlefield.[231] Both the *veteram aram Druso sitam* and the *castellum Alisonem* on this site were Roman structures which predated Germanicus' presence.[232] In the same breath we read that *cuncta inter castellum Alisonem ac Rhenum novis limitibus aggeribusque permunita*. The force of *novis* lies in its suggestion that Germanicus found existing structures in this territory dating back to the earlier period of Roman expansion into Germany during which Aliso was built, which he now restored or supplemented.[233] Finally, at *Ann.* 2.8 Germanicus and his waterborne troops enter the *fossa Drusiana*, an enormous canal built by his father Drusus that led from inland Germany to the Zuiderzee and from there to the North Sea.

But many of these Roman markers from the past are (in) ruins. Of Drusus' fort on Mount Taunus, only *vestigia* remain. The camp at Teutoburg where Varus

[229]His obituary at *Ann.* 4.44 reveals him to be the consul of 16BC, who penetrated into Germany during a subsequent proconsular command in 2BC.
[230]It is unclear where these *itinera* are *nota* because they used this route on the way up (if so, Tacitus does not mention it) or because Germanicus and his staff had access to written records from earlier commanders, documenting their existence and route.
[231]Makins (2013), 103 notices that Germanicus here seems to be visiting old ground – the narrative does not clearly signal it, although it is true that the German episodes of *Annals* 1 end with attempts to reconvey the troops to the Rhine for the winter, a journey for which they would likely have taken the same, familiar route back as they did on the way up.
[232]It remains puzzling why this altar to Drusus at Teutoburg, if it was already in existence at the time of Germanicus' visit (as the narrative's stress on *veterem* seems to demand) had not been destroyed by Arminius around the time of the Varian disaster, instead of recently. The fortress at Aliso had been built by the Elder Drusus himself (OCD 4th ed. 'Aliso', Dio 54.33.4).
[233]Isaac (1988), 126–27 established convincingly, by analogy with *Ann.* 1.61, that the *limites* and *aggeres* here referred to must mean military roads and causeways over swamps rather than boundary walls and ramparts. Even if these were new structures imposed by Germanicus, as Isaac claims, the occurrence of the word *novis* seems to me to imply emphasis. Additionally, the text's delineation of territory is such to establish beyond doubt that previous campaigns would *also* have cut roads and built causeways, of which traces likely survived, even if in a decayed state.

made his last stand has fallen into ruin, as indicated by the *semiruto vallo*. The *albentia ossa* spread around on the battlefield attest to the natural processes of decay working their effect on the unburied bodies.[234] L. Domitius' Long Bridges (*Ann.* 1.63) were also clearly still discernible in the landscape twenty years later, but Tacitus mentions that they had decayed since they were first built (*ruptos vetustate pontes*), and the difficulty of repositioning them in hostile territory (*reponeret simulque propulsaret hostem*). Roads and bridges are ways of making territories navigable and, to state a truism, access is a prerequisite for being able to deploy other mechanisms of control – such as armies – effectively. As well as enabling control, they also express it. Roads are visible reminders of the roadmaker's mastery over the landscape and any obstacles it may have presented to the creation of the road (as celebrated in poem 4.3 of Statius' *Silvae*, esp. lines 40-66; see chapter one, p. 40ff). In Tacitus' account of the decayed Long Bridges, none of these three functions of access, control and landscape subjugation are any longer fulfilled[235]: Caecina's troops cannot access the route without rebuilding; whilst doing so they are besieged instead of besieging, and the German landscape has started to master the road instead of vice versa. From the description of their positioning (*inter paludes… cetera limosa, tenacia gravi caeno aut rivis incerta erant*) we can infer that the boggy ground is eating away at the wood's structural integrity. The impression is of an environment slowly reverting back to its natural state, eating away at any interventions from outside. The agency of the landscape is inescapable and visible in its impact on Roman interventions. The Roman landscape which past Romans had superimposed on Germany has, by the time of Germanicus' visit, dwindled to a fragmentary overlay only, a landscape of ruin. German space is eroding Roman space.

As in the Rhineland of the Batavian revolt, where the camps left untouched by the river's force were destroyed by human hands, the people who inhabit this

[234]I see no reason to claim them as a meaningless poetic transplant from the *campique ingentes ossibus albent* of Virgil, *A.*12.36, as Woodman does (Woodman 1979, 148–49).
[235]For Makins (2017, 230), control was never established in the first place: 'the ramshackle causeway commemorates an earlier failed attempt to bring the area under Roman control'.

consuming landscape work with that landscape in overturning Roman spatial interventions. Tacitus implies that the hostility of the decidedly unpacified inhabitants of the area poses an extra challenge for Caecina's troops who are aiming to re-establish the bridges: the struggle with the landscape is simultaneous with the struggle with the people and one has to see these two aspects of Caecina's task as intimately interlinked (*Caecinae dubitanti quonam modo ruptos vetustate pontes reponeret simulque propulsaret hostem, Ann.* 1.63). At Teutoburg (*Ann.* 1.61), Pagán interpreted Germanicus' actions as successfully transforming the disordered space of the battlefield, upon which nature had already made incursions, into an ordered cemetery safe from such intrusions. But the *tumulus* which resulted from this transformation is already found unmade by unspecified Germans at *Ann.* 2.7, with the added destruction of the much older altar to Drusus. It is in this joint action by humans and landscape to undo the transformation of German space into Roman space[236] that the representation of Germany the *Annals* most closely resembles the dynamic between people and place which Tacitus depicts in the *Histories*' account of the Batavian revolt.[237]

Germany as a Roman ruin

An indication of the importance of these sites of Roman history as structuring elements for Romans' navigation through Germany is provided by the much higher number of occasions where Germanicus and his troops pass or visit 'old ground' – those sites of previous Roman activity with preserved material remains which were listed earlier – compared to instances where they find themselves forging new paths and camps.[238] In a practical sense, the density of Roman structures, however decayed, in the areas traversed by Germanicus during these campaigns suggest that even the partial survival of Roman landscapes of conquest and occupation was held to make legionaries' progress

[236]Of course both these instances are also examples of German people undoing Roman *people* as well as Roman space.
[237]Pagán (1999), 303.
[238]Woolf (2009, 207) off-handedly introduced a paper on something completely different (ethnicity) with this contextualisation of Tacitus' Germany: '[Tacitus' Germany is] forever a place of treacherous landscapes. Dark forests hide enemies and the traces of Roman disasters.' This section substantiates and elaborates on this casual remark.

easier. The narrative never shows them opening up new pathways by choice: at *Ann.* 1.63 Arminius lures Germanicus into trackless territory (*avia*), and at *Ann.* 2.8 Germanicus, after a smooth journey up the Ems thanks to Drusus' canal[239], is forced to build bridges from scratch to bridge the gap between where he *thought* he had arrived and where he had *actually* arrived[240]: *classis Amisiae ore relicta laevo amne, erratumque in eo quod non subvexit aut transposuit militem dextras in terras iturum*, 'the fleet was left tethered to the left bank of the Ems, and in doing so an error was made because Germanicus had not sailed up to or disembarked his soldiers onto the lands on the right bank where they were going'. The Germans, in contrast, know where they are so well that they can use shortcuts through the forests, *compendiis vias*, unknown to the Romans, to beat Caecina to the Long Bridges (also *Ann.* 1.63). On both occasions where Germanicus deviates from familiar paths, the digressions cost him dearly in terms of time, efficiency and success. First, Arminius' baiting ends with the Romans only just avoiding being pushed into a swamp, and secondly, in rectifying Germanicus' error in locating himself in (German) space they lose several days (*plures dies efficiendis pontibus absumptis*) and can no longer execute a quick strike against Arminius.[241] Roman engineering can, and does on this occasion, overpower even previously untouched German landscape, but it is a difficult struggle even when Germanicus has the natural path of the river to inform his progress. In contrast, the ocean provides no such information, as the shipwreck at *Ann.* 2.23 proves, nor can it be bridged or otherwise bound by Roman technology.

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[239]*fossam cui Drusianae nomen ingressus… lacus inde et Oceanum usque ad Amisiam flumen secunda navigatione pervehitur*, 'entering the canal which bore Drusus name… he sailed from there into the lake and then the Ocean until he came to the river Ems via a favourable journey'.

[240]The manuscripts we have of the text are too muddled in this passage to allow us to reconstruct precisely what happens, but it is clear that the error is born from a lack of knowledge.

[241]This is not to say that *only* uncharted territory produces setbacks: at *Ann.* 2.23 Germanicus, retreating, follows the same river route down the Ems into the Ocean (*per flumen Amisiam Oceano invexit*) by which he came up (*Ann.* 2.8 *fossam cui Drusianae nomen… lacus inde et Oceanum usque ad Amisiam flumen*) but gets shipwrecked on the Ocean – the unpredictable German waterscapes at work again.

The existing Roman landscape is not only the means by which Germanicus and his troops prefer to navigate Germany but also the means by which they understand its nature. However, in doing so they are already at one remove from Germany. All that the decayed forts and roads can attest to is *Roman* Germany, because many other spaces as well as what is underneath Roman Germany remains impenetrable. Germany itself can only be construed through an inversion of what they see, known by what it is *not* (knowable, suitable to be transformed into Roman space without serious effort and constant maintenance), but not by what it is. At no point in the narrative other than the visit to Teutoburg at *Ann.* 1.61 do we encounter translators of the German landscape to help Germanicus read it. Even then, within this single scene, a contrast is implied between what needs translating and what does not. The Tacitean text allocates translators to two categories of things only: first, to the kind of human activity which does not leave traces in the landscape and therefore needs human interpreters (where and how particular Romans died, but also where and how the Germans desecrated the eagles which they then removed from the scene)[242]; and secondly, to spatial intrusions by the Germans into the Roman spatial order of the camp, such as the instruments of torture pointed out by the survivors: the *tribunal* (platform) from which Arminius spoke, the *patibula* (gibbets) and *scrobes* (pits) for the prisoners. Pagán noted how, in contrast, the physical remains of traditional Roman structures of the camp in their traditional places can speak for themselves[243]: *semiruto vallo, humili fossa accisae iam reliquiae consedisse intellegebantur: medio campi albentia ossa, ut fugerant, ut restiterant, disiecta vel aggerata*, 'from a dilapidated rampart and a shallow ditch, it could be understood where those legions still left to have entrenched themselves had fallen; the whitening bones in the middle of the field were strewn around or heaped up depending on whether they had

[242]*cladis eius superstites, pugnam aut vincula elapsi, referebant hic cecidisse legatos, illic raptas aquilas, primum ubi vulnus Varo adactum, ubi infelici dextera et suo ictu mortem invenerit*, 'survivors of that disaster, who escaped either from the battle or from the chains of the enemy, related how the legates had succumbed here, the eagles had been stolen there, the place in which the first wound was inflicted on Varus, and that where he found his death through the blow inflicted by his own unfortunate right hand'; but also *utque signis et aquilis per superbiam inluserit [Arminius]*, 'how Arminius disrespected the *signa* and the eagles'.
[243]Pagán (1999), 308.

resisted or stood fast'. The scene's division of different kinds of evidence implies that the survivors' capacity for translating their surroundings was limited to what they had personally experienced. It is not a general skill, and is therefore no good outside of the ruins of the camp at Teutoburg. As if to reinforce the point, immediately afterwards Germanicus is baited into following Arminius into the *avia* of the forests already discussed, a digression from familiar paths which almost ends in disaster. The Roman readers of the Roman battlescape of Teutoburg are no guide to reading the German landscape of pathless forests. The next section investigates how Tacitus depicts the process of understanding the German landscape which is underneath and all around the Roman superimpositions.

Translating un-Roman Germany

The first thing to note is that Tacitus' narrative does not show any of the Germans who are identified as pro-Roman taking on the role of translating the German landscape on behalf of Rome. Arminius' disinclination to put the bilingual capacities he gained during his service to Rome at their disposal is understandable. But the pro-Roman and Latin-speaking Segestes (*Ann.* 1.55) is not mentioned as being enlisted in this capacity either, and indeed disappears from the narrative quite early on at *Ann.* 1.59, to settle *vetere in provincia* (Gaul). Segestes' son, the priest-turned-rebel-turned-penitent Segimundus, had been sent to the Gallic bank of the Rhine even earlier (*Ann.* 1.57), and Segestes' brother Segimerus and his unnamed son are removed across the river to Cologne at *Ann.* 1.71. The use of native guides, co-opted into the Roman apparatus of conquest, was an established Roman route to understanding foreign territory[244], but the Germanicus campaigns contain no mention of the practice. Instead, all the key individuals foregrounded in the narrative as suitable to perform this role are either co-opted into the German landscape of resistance, like Arminius himself, disappearing into the forests, or removed to Roman landscapes outside transrhenane Germany. Given the parallel tendencies, in the narrative, of the German people and the German landscape to

[244]Austin and Rankov (1995), 67. The authors also cite the perils of deception and misinformation in such cases, which made it imperative to try to confirm the information by other means.

undo Roman spatial interventions in the territory and restore, or revert to, its 'natural' German state, the removal of persons with one foot in each of the cultures makes sense as a precaution against the possibility of their reverting to German loyalties.

On two occasions, however, German informants open up the landscape of Germany to Germanicus' understanding and therefore enable the intersecting power balance between people and place, Roman and German, to be rearranged in Rome's favour. As if to increase the force of the contrast, the passages (*Ann.* 2.12ff and *Ann.* 2.20ff) follow immediately after Germanicus' error in disembarking his troops (*Ann.* 2.8). *Ann.* 2.12 mentions a *perfuga* who communicates *delectum ab Arminio locum pugnae* to Germanicus, who then goes on to win the battle on the plain of Idistaviso, despite the disadvantages of its surroundings and of the Roman position within it, both described by Tacitus in great detail at the start of the battle.[245] The implication is that, forearmed with knowledge from the informant[246], Germanicus is able to exploit to maximum effect the Roman factors under his control (tactics and kit, both emphasised in the *contio* as superior to the Germans')[247] in order to successfully overcome the joint resistance of the German people and landscape. This victory over people and land is powerfully expressed in the final images of Roman bowmen

[245]*Ann.* 2.16 *is [campus] medius inter Visurgim et collis, ut ripae fluminis cedunt aut prominentia montium resistunt, inaequaliter sinuatur. pone tergum insurgebat silva, editis in altum ramis et pura humo inter arborum truncos*, 'this field, between the Weser and some hills so that the banks of the river either give way to it or the mountain cliffs narrow it, curves irregularly. At its rear a forest rises on a ridge, with branches reaching into the sky and clear ground in between the trunks of trees' (location); *campum et prima silvarum barbara acies tenuit: soli Cherusci iuga insedere ut proeliantibus Romanis desuper incurrerent*, 'the barbarian army held the field and the edges of the woods, only Cherusci occupied the ridges so that they could come down from above on the fighting Romans' (position).

[246]Idistaviso must be the place that is meant. It cannot be the Roman camp, as generals would guard against incursions into the camp as a matter of course.

[247]*Ann.* 2.14 *non campos modo militi Romano ad proelium bonos, sed si ratio adsit, silvas et saltus; nec enim inmensa barbarorum scuta, enormis hastas inter truncos arborum et enata humo virgulta perinde haberi quam pila et gladios et haerentia corpori tegmina*, 'not only fields were conducive to Roman military success, but if they kept their heads, also woods and hillsides; nor could the immense shields of the barbarians, and their enormous spears be wielded in the spaces between tree trunks and undergrowth springing up from the ground in the same way that Roman javelins, short swords and close fitting body armour could'.

shooting Germans out of trees or cutting down the trees themselves: *quidam turpi fuga in summa arborum nisi ramisque se occultantes admotis sagitariis per ludibrium figebantur, alios prorutae arbores adflixere* (*Ann.* 2.17). They perform the same slaughter on those trying to get away by swimming across the Weser. It is a stark reversal of patterns both expected (on the basis of the *Histories*' connection between Germans and their lands)[248] and established in the account of the campaigns so far.[249]

The sequence of events from informant to success is replicated at *Ann.* 2.20[250], where Germanicus' foreknowledge of both Arminius' plans and terrain are explicit (*consilia locos prompta occulta noverat*). The presence of an intermediary like the *transfuga* of *Ann.* 2.12 is implied. The Romans win this second battle as well, and this time for reasons which are exactly those which Germanicus' *contio* advanced as guarantors of success before the first battle: *nec minor Germanis animus, sed genere pugnae et armorum superabantur*, 'the Germans had no less lust for battle, but were outmatched because of the nature of the battle and the nature of their weaponry' (*Ann.* 2.21). Their spears and bodies are hampered by circumstances similarly cramped to those at Idistaviso (*ingens multitudo artis locis praelongas hastas non protenderet, non colligeret, neque adsultibus et velocitate corporum uteretur*). The presence on the Roman side of German traitors who *can* read the landscape, in short, has enabled Germanicus to take measures accordingly and tip the balance of success on this occasion.

These issues with reading and interpreting both the past and the landscape in Germany offer an interesting contrast with how Germanicus goes about reading history into the landscapes of the East. At Athens, he encounters non-visual evidence of a foreign history, in the oratory of Greece's greatest rhetors (*vetera suorum facta dictaque praeferentes [Athenienses]*, *Ann.* 2.53), which predates Rome and yet does not exclude Roman knowledge. Though Tacitus gibes that

[248]See chapter one.
[249]Section six of this chapter explains why the cutting down of trees at *Ann.* 1.50 should be viewed differently.
[250]It is also present at *Hist.* 5.18.7-13.

the Athenians dressed up their speech in this allusive and historically sanctioned manner 'in order to lend dignity to their flattery' (*quo plus dignationis adulatio haberet*; Pelling's observation and translation[251]), the gibe does not invalidate his implicit recognition that the pre-Roman Greek past is alive in Roman Athens, present in the minds not only of the Greeks but also of the Romans who are fully conversant with the cultural framework referred to. Germanicus' visit to Egypt is also motivated by his awareness of their glorious pre-Roman past and a desire to see beyond its Roman connotations (*cognoscendae antiquitatis, Ann.* 2.59.1). He succeeds in doing so by taking an interest in the hieroglyphs from the reign of Ramses II (*et manebant structis molibus litterae Aegyptiae, priorem opulentiam complexae*, *Ann.* 2.60) in addition to reading more classical allusions, such as to Menelaus and Hercules, into specific features of the landscape (*orsus oppido a Canopo. condidere id Spartani ob sepultum illic rectorem navis Canopum, quae tempestate Menelaus Graeciam repetens diversum ad mare terramque Libyam deiectus est. inde proximum amnis os dicatum Herculi*…). Piso in his turn offers yet a third way of approaching the history of landscapes visited by Romans. With regard to Athens, his phrase *non Athenienses tot cladibus extinctos … coluisset [Germanicus]* (*Ann.* 2.55) suggests that whatever or whoever Germanicus thinks he is visiting, it is not the Athens of old. The place itself is not denied its glorious history but its people are. Piso denies that this heritage belongs to the current inhabitants of the place, whom he sees instead as formed entirely through their association with Rome, and negatively so, as past allies of Rome's enemy Mithridates and opponents of Octavian in the civil war. In his view, the current inhabitants are essentially a different people, using the same name and moving around amongst the monuments left by their extinct predecessors.

What unites the differing interpretations, however, is the fact that Rome has a mental framework for accessing this past history: elite young Roman males learned Greek as a matter of course so the Athenians' references to their past orators did not pass Germanicus by. In Egypt, translators of its more opaque culture and language were readily available (*iussusque e senioribus sacerdotum*

[251]Pelling (2012), 301.

patrium sermonem interpretari, referebat…, *Ann.* 2.60), and what the priest reveals about this empire long gone is then readily assimilated by his audience through comparison to the present day Roman Empire and its neighbours: *legebantur et indicta gentibus tributa… haud minus magnifica quam nunc vi Parthorum aut potentia Romana iubentur*. Both of these cultures, therefore, are recognised and valued *as* cultures by Germanicus. They are alternative systems which are different – hence the interest – but similar enough to be understood, hence the absence of any sense of them as a threat to Rome and of any condemnation of them as valueless. Even more importantly, at the time of Germanicus' visit both Greece and Egypt had long been conquered and co-opted into the Roman Empire (since 146BC and 30BC, respectively).

In both cases, the known and the solidly conquered go together, in the same way that the threat posed by Germany is compounded by the combination of being unknown and not yet fully conquered. The German *templum* to Tanfana which Germanicus' troops destroy at *Ann.* 1.51[252] is not granted the benefit of *translatio Romana* (the practice of describing a foreign custom by means of a Roman equivalent) and incorporation into Roman religious practice, as happened frequently in the aftermath of Roman conquest, but is simply destroyed by Germanicus and his troops. Instead of translating Germany's history, culture, or religion, Germanicus and his troops rely solely on the Roman markers in the German landscape. Their only access to Germany is through the occasional acquired knowledge of the battle positions of the enemy. With this exception, their project is focused on deploying power in the landscape to bring victory to Rome and destruction to Germany, to restore Roman memories in the landscape, and to display Roman authority through camps and memorials. Nevertheless, in spite of Germanicus' successes and those of his father in this regard, the German landscape of *Annals* 1 and 2 remains hostile, difficult to read, and always capable of swallowing such Roman markers of power, and Germany is not made into a province. It is salutary to remember that both of the Roman successes discussed in this section formed part of an organised retreat *from* Germany, back to the Rhine and the safety of Roman Gaul on the other side.

[252]See section six of this chapter, 'Asserting Romanity through violence'.

Ruins, memory and fear: Caecina and Agrippina

The Roman travellers who journey through this powerful landscape of either unknown threat or constant ruin have powerful responses to it. The landscape, as we have seen, reabsorbs whatever Roman markers of guidance, control and understanding are put upon it. Those markers are patches on the landscape, or perhaps corridors of knowledge and control, that exist amidst an incomprehensible 'natural' Germany which is illegible and thus frightening to the Romans. Makins noted that at Teutoburg the soldiers' growing identification with their fallen comrades as the burial proceeds prompts sorrow, pity and reflections on mortality.[253] The latter cannot be dissociated from fear that similar things might happen to them, at the hands of either people or landscape. Tacitus mentions this fear as an effect dreaded by Tiberius as one consequence of the Teutoburg visit: *quod Tiberio haud probatum, seu cuncta Germanici in deterius trahenti, sive exercitum imagine caesorum insepultorum tardatum ad proelia et formidolosiorem hostium credebat*, 'which was not at all approved of by Tiberius, whether because he interpreted all Germanicus' actions in the worst possible light, or because he believed the army, at the sight of the unburied dead, would become reluctant to fight and more fearful of the enemy', *Ann.* 1.62. The comment is tendentious, especially as the reader, in the mutinies, has already been groomed to see Tiberius as perpetually finding fault with Germanicus, regardless of the merits or demerits of the imperial heir's actions. In fact, such fear engendered by the confrontation with battlefields had been recognised by Roman lawmakers centuries earlier, and steps taken to prevent it. Makins cites Appian's record of a Roman decree being passed during the Civil War in 90BC that soldiers should be buried as they fell instead of at Rome in full sight of the civilian population, as the latter might be deterred from army service at the pitiful (or gruesome?) sight.[254] Both Tacitus and Tiberius were probably aware of this official precedent for recognising and guarding against the debilitating effects of fear. Pelling recognised that the aftermath of the Teutoburg burial, which ironically fulfills exactly this decree's requirements of

[253]Makins (2017): sorrow (p. 220-1, 227), pity (p. 217, 226), mortality (p. 226).
[254]Makins (2013), 14 citing Appian, *BC* 1.(5.)43, who uses ὄψις or 'spectacle' leaving the reader to invest it with emotions of their choice.

soldier burying soldier on the site of the battlefield, bears out Tiberius' fears in that the soldiers *do* get jumpy.[255] The following section examines Tacitus' complex depiction of how their encounters with German space affect and distort the Roman soldiers' perception of Roman space on two occasions. The first is the strategically useless but fairly lengthy 'Caecina episode' of *Ann.* 1.63-8, for which I argue that Caecina's behaviour is more meaningful than an 'act of personal courage' and the overall purpose more than to 'increase the suspense of the major engagements'.[256] The second occasion is the scene describing Agrippina's stewardship of that part of the army on the west bank of the Rhine which Germanicus did not take on his campaign.

Caecina's 'story' reads as a litany of setbacks for the general and his troops from the moment they set off on their overland journey to return to the Rhine (*Caecina, qui suum militem ducebat, monitus, quamquam notis itineribus regrederetur*, *pontes longos quam maturrime superare*, *Ann.* 1.63). Very soon the decayed state of the Long Bridges (*ruptos vetustate pontes*) exposes them to a barbarian onslaught while they suffer the adverse effects of the Germans' manipulation of the local streams.[257] Tacitus introduced this chapter with the summary *cuncta pariter Romanis adversa* (*Ann.* 1.64), but things get worse still. Caecina's troops spend a disturbed night being kept awake by the enemy's ululations (*laeto cantu aut truci sonore*, *Ann.* 1.65) and he himself has a nightmare about Varus rising up from the Teutoburger swamps they have only just left, and trying to pull him down with him (*Quintilium Varum sanguine oblitum et paludibus emersum cernere et audire visus est velut vocantem, non tamen obsecutus et manum intendentis reppulisse*).[258] The next day they find

[255]Pelling (2012), 302: 'the Romans are indeed terrified by Arminius, and come within an ace of replaying the Varus disaster'; O'Gorman (2000), 54 cites only Caecina's dream as proof of fear, when the soldiers' panicked behaviour seems a much stronger example.
[256]Woodman (1988), 174.
[257]If not quite imitating, then certainly recalling, the hydraulic interventions of Civilis and his troops at *Hist.* 5.14.2 and 5.19.7-11, half noted by Goodyear *ad loc.* though only in the context of Tacitus getting ahead of himself in mentioning *undas* (*Ann.* 1.64.2) before the work of diverting the streams had actually been done.
[258]Though see Makins (2017, 228, n. 86) for Annemarie Ambühl's suggestion that the gesture could just as well be read as an invitation to Caecina to pull Varus out of the swamp, constituting further spatial restoration of the disaster.

themselves ranged against Varus' nemesis, Arminius himself, who encourages his own troops and taunts his opponents by explicit reference to the disaster whose traumatic aftermath they have only just experienced (*'en Varus eodemque iterum fato vinctae legiones!*', still *Ann.* 1.65). Come the battle, they are unable to fight properly due to the muddy nature of Arminius' chosen ground. They mostly survive the encounter, but at the cost of having lost or damaged most of their food and tools, which the muddy landscape has claimed (*amissa magna ex parte per quae egeritur humus aut exciditur caespes*), leaving them to pitch a very makeshift camp. Though we get no glimpses into the inner feelings of the soldiers, their overwrought state is illustrated by Tacitus at *Ann.* 1.66:

> *Forte equus abruptis vinculis vagus et clamore territus quosdam occurrentium obturbavit. tanta inde consternatio inrupisse Germanos credentium ut cuncti ruerent ad portas, quarum decumana maxime petebatur, aversa hosti et fugientibus tutior. Caecina comperto vanam esse formidinem, cum tamen neque auctoritate neque precibus, ne manu quidem obsistere aut retinere militem quiret, proiectus in limine portae miseratione demum, quia per corpus legati eundum erat, clausit viam: simul tribuni et centuriones falsum pavorem esse docuerunt.*
>
> *Ann.* 1.66
>
> 'By chance a horse, broken loose from its tethering and wandering around frightened by all the clamouring, disconcerted those running towards it. From this incident originated so much consternation with those who believed that the Germans had overrun the camp that all together rushed to the gates, of which the *decumana* was primarily sought out because it faced away from the enemy and was safer for those fleeing. When Caecina had discovered that their fears had been groundless, he was still unable to stop or hold back the soldiers with either his authority, his entreaties or even his hands. He finally threw himself down on the threshold of the gate and so closed off their escape route with pity, because they would have had to march over the body of their legate. At the same time the tribunes and centurions explained that their panic was spurious.'

The soldiers' fright must be interpreted in light of the fear which gripped them at Teutoburg: that of being slaughtered themselves and then being absorbed into the German environment. As the soldiers resisted the German landscape at Teutoburg by ordering the chaos of the battlefield into a burial ground, so Caecina's camp, however provisional, must be seen as a stronghold of order and Romanity amidst the encroaching outside. But somehow fear and panic infiltrate it, and they attempt to abandon both the ordered Roman space of the

camp and what *disciplina* remained to them after the previous night's improvised instead of routine castrametation.[259]

Caecina, whose ability to keep a cool head in all circumstances was celebrated by Tacitus at *Ann.* 1.64[260], is the first to read the situation correctly in the face of his soldiers' distorted perception of the spatial crisis at hand. As reason fails to stop their stampede, the general resorts to a symbolic gesture at the very point where inside and outside meet and where a reversal of perspective is always inherently present: Tacitus says he obstructs the *limen* of the door by placing his body between the soldiers and the outside (*proiectus in limine portae miseratione demum, quia per corpus legati eundum erat, clausit viam*). It is the sight of the aristocratic body interposing itself between the soldiers and danger, disorder and irrationality, which recalls them to safety, order and their senses. Only when this bar is interposed between the soldiers and the landscape of irrationality and fear is Caecina's speech (*si fugerent, pluris silvas, profundas magis paludes, saevitiam hostium*, *Ann.* 1.67) able to restore the traditional and appropriate boundaries.

The soldiers' behaviour in this scene is prefigured by that of the horse which introduces the chapter (*forte equus abruptis vinculis vagus et clamore territus quosdam occurrentium obturbavit…)*. The horse's incomprehension of the noise surrounding it causes its fear and its flight from the safe space where it had been tethered. The soldiers in their panic turn into such unthinking animals governed by environmentally induced fear, and are only with difficulty restored to rational humanity by a gesture which combines space (the physical body as spatial obstruction) and symbolism (the Roman aristocratic body as a reminder of who they are). Tacitus in these scenes juxtaposes thoughts of German nature as unsafe (*Ann.* 1.65) and the Roman camp as safe (*Ann.* 1.66). But he also shows

[259]See section one, 'Competing spaces'.
[260]*quadragesimum id stipendium Caecina parendi aut imperitandi habebat, secundarum ambiguarumque rerum sciens eoque interritus*, 'Caecina was in his fortieth year of either submitting to or exercising military authority, fully aware of how to keep his head in both success and crisis and fearless because of it'. So steadfast and approbatory is Tacitus' portrayal of Caecina that Benario (2003, 401–2) suggests the *clades Variana* might have been avoided had Caecina been in charge.

that the environment tends to appropriate and shape all that occurs on it, making it a landscape of future threat as well as past horror for the Romans. This capacity can taint even positive and well-ordered spaces such as the Roman camp and make the soldiers waver in their duty.

Once the soldiers are restored to their correct awareness, *Ann.* 1.68 contrasts their perception of the space surrounding them with that of the Germans. The first half of the chapter records Arminius' and Inguiomerus' followers' divided opinions on their respective proposed strategies. The former wants to lure Rome out of the safe environment of the camp into the hostile outside and let the environment do its work (*Arminio sinerent egredi egressosque rursum per umida et inpedita circumvenirent suadente*); the latter wishes for the Germans to leave this advantageous environment in order to invade the Roman space of the camp (*atrociora Inguiomero et laeta barbaris, ut vallum armis ambirent*). Inguiomerus' plan is the more popular, *laeta barbaris*, because the loot will be uncorrupted by mud and blood, and is accepted. The Roman soldiers, whose understanding of the spaces around them has been restored by Caecina, delight in the German choice to attack the Roman fortification (*tergis Germanorum circumfunduntur, exprobrantes non hic silvas nec paludes, sed aequis locis aequos deos*) and the consequences are, of course, disastrous for the Germans (*vulgus trucidatum est*). Arminius, Caecina and the Roman legionaries, despite their fear-induced wobble, are proved right in their spatial readings: the Roman camp is a place of safety in a surrounding landscape of ever-encroaching death, ruin and destruction. Only faith in both Roman space and the Roman discipline which shapes their identity as soldiers can preserve them. The four-chapter sequence of *Ann.* 1.65-58 thus has a thematic coherence that makes sense of the episode rather than being simply an oddly long drawn out retreat (which *Ann.* 1.63 makes clear it is). Following as it does on the heels of the confrontation with the Teutoburger battlefield, it illustrates the lingering effects on the soldiers of the destruction perpetrated by the German people and landscape which they perceived there.

In the light of Caecina's concern to maintain, physically if necessary, the correct boundaries between the different kinds of spaces and the dangers they represent, Agrippina's behaviour in preventing the destruction of the bridge over the Rhine at Vetera in the very next chapter (*Ann.* 1.69) takes on a new significance.

> *Pervaserat interim circumventi exercitus fama et infesto Germanorum agmine Gallias peti, ac ni Agrippina inpositum Rheno pontem solvi prohibuisset, erant qui id flagitium formidine auderent. sed femina ingens animi munia ducis per eos dies induit, militibusque, ut quis inops aut saucius, vestem et fomenta dilargita est. tradit C. Plinius Germanicorum bellorum scriptor, stetisse apud principium ponti laudes et grates reversis legionibus habentem.*
>
> 'Meanwhile a rumour had done the rounds, of the army blockaded and a hostile army of Germans on its way to Gaul. And if Agrippina had not forbidden that the bridge built across the Rhine be destroyed, there were those who would have dared to commit that crime. But this woman of immense spirit in those days took on the duties of a general, and to the soldiers she dispensed clothes and bandages as each was in need or wounded. Pliny, the author of the German Wars, wrote that she stood on the bridgehead expressing praise and thanks to the returning legions.'

The scene has often featured as evidence in investigations into determining Tacitus' attitude towards women or whether there is any pattern to the collective works' representation of women in general and some women in particular.[261] Out of others which focus on the figure of Agrippina Maior alone, three discuss the episode on the bridge in some depth. Both Santoro L'Hoir and Hayne read the episode as indicative of Agrippina's ambition and infringement of the traditional territory of elite Roman males.[262] McHugh, in contrast, reads Agrippina as indeed 'ventur[ing] into traditionally male activities' but argues this must not automatically be equated with deserving censure for it, as there were respectable Republican precedents for wives looking after their absent husbands' business.[263]

[261]Notably Baldwin (1972) and McDougall (1981).
[262]Santoro L'Hoir (1994), 12–13 n. 30, 17, and 18 n. 57; Hayne (2000), 37–39.
[263]McHugh (2012), 76.

Against this backdrop, I make the dual argument that, firstly, Germanicus' and Agrippina's imperial identities, as prince and princess, outweigh both the Republican precedents and the gender angle; and secondly, that the enormity of her achievement befits Tacitus' – in my view – unequivocal praise (*femina ingens animi*). Tacitus reports Tiberius' grumblings upon receiving news of Agrippina's achievement as follows: *id Tiberii animum altius penetravit… nihil relictum imperatoribus, ubi femina manipulos intervisat, signa adeat, largitionem temptet*, 'this made a deep impression on Tiberius' mind… there would be nothing left for generals, when a woman inspects the companies, is present at the banners, provides largesse' (still at *Ann.* 1.69). It is Tiberius in the text who takes the negative gendered angle, as well as the anti-Germanicus and by extension anti-Agrippina angle, as Tacitus has primed us to expect.[264] In as far as there is an authorial voice in Tacitus, it states very clearly that without Agrippina's intervention a disaster would have befallen a Roman army, pursued and cut off from safety in enemy territory. From a spatial point of view her actions on the bridge are therefore analogous to Caecina's clearly heroic gesture at *Ann.* 1.66, and therefore equally appropriate to the situation and equally praiseworthy. Agrippina (too) frustrates, by means of positioning her aristocratic (even imperial) body in the way, the unacceptable desire of fearful troops to separate themselves from what they perceive, on the basis of faulty information and fear, as an environment fraught with danger and death which might overwhelm them. Just as the disobedience and flight of 1.66 would have been dishonourable, the destruction of the bridge would have been a *flagitium* as referenced at 1.69; and just as the *pavorem* at the frightened horse in Caecina's camp is *falsum*, the tale of the barbarians at the gate in Agrippina's camp is a *fama* only; lastly, *formido* occurs in both cases as the primary driver of behaviour (*consternatio inrupisse Germanos credentium* and *pervaserat fama …. infesto Germanorum agmine Gallias peti*). She is a good wife, certainly, but is a member of the imperial family in her own right and in the Tacitean representation of the incident makes her decision to act without reference to her husband. She temporarily becomes an imperial *dux* interposing her

[264] *ipse Druso fratre Tiberii genitus, Augustae nepos, set anxius occultis in se patrui aviaeque odiis quorum causae acriores quia iniquae*, *Ann.* 1.33.

aristocratic body between Roman disaster and its aversion because that was what was needed, just as Caecina did.

The narrative says nothing to encourage us to believe that communication lines between the expeditionary forces across the Rhine and the permanent camps on the left bank of the Rhine were kept open, but an absence of news can be just as powerful a generator of wild tales as news itself. And though these troops, unlike their counterparts across the river, have not witnessed the damage inflicted on their Roman comrades' bodies at Teutoburg, their complaint at *Ann.* 1.17 that *sibi tamen apud horridas gentis e contuberniis hostem aspici* suggests they saw enough in the ordinary line of duty for past memories to fuel future imagined horrors.[265] In Germany, only Agrippina and Caecina stand between the irruption of disorder into Roman ordered space on the one hand, and the relinquishing of Roman control over German space, through the abandonment of the camp or the destruction of the Rhine bridge, on the other.

Bloody Germanicus

Germanicus' reception of the environment that surrounds him is noticeably different from that of his fearful soldiers. Others have already noted how in the course of his travels through the landscape of memory and ruin, he seems to be not so much afflicted with fear as propelled by the desire to avenge the Roman people's past wrongs suffered at the hands of the Germans. O'Gorman noted that the early promise of vengeance at *Ann.* 1.3 is carried out in the Germanicus campaigns.[266] Makins framed Germanicus' resolution or erasure of the disgrace at Teutoburg as fulfilling the two 'socially conditioned imperatives' of 'the need to honor the dead and the need to rewrite defeat as victory'.[267] Pagán sees an overall theme of a Germanicus who, in both retrospective vengeance

[265]Reported for the Pannonian mutinies, but we must remember Tacitus' insistence that *isdem causis Germanicae legiones turbatae* at *Ann.* 1.31.
[266]*bellum ea tempestate nullum nisi adversus Germanos supererat, abolendae magis infamiae ob amissum cum Quintilio Varo exercitum quam cupidine proferendi imperii aut dignum ob praemium* ('at that time, there was no war left anywhere apart from that against the Germans, waged more for reasons of wiping out the disgrace of the army lost with Quintilius Varus than from a desire to expand the empire or because the rewards justified it'; O'Gorman (2000), 153.
[267]Makins (2013), 102.

(Teutoburg at *Ann.* 1.61) and prospective conquest (*Ann.* 2.5-26), does not know where to stop: he incurs ritual pollution when his emotions push him to participate in the burial of the Varian victims and he keeps crossing rivers, which calls up the grand ambitions of a Caesar or an Alexander instead of a representative of the Augustan policy of containment.[268] In addition to these imperialist concerns, I identify another, more personal impetus behind Germanicus' trajectory through Germany, in which he vies with the memory of his father. Not only does he restore a memorial to Drusus Senior (*Ann.* 2.7) and follow in his footsteps through the *fossa Drusiana* (*Ann.* 2.8), he also appeals to his soldiers to help him emulate his father and uncle (*se patris patruique vestigia prementem isdem in terries victorem sisterent*, *Ann.* 2.14) and builds trophies (*Ann.* 18 and 22) asserting definitive conquest (*debellatis inter Rhenum Albimque nationibus*) of territories first pacified and marked with a trophy by his father.[269]

However, only scant attention has been paid to the sheer bloody nature of many of the actions taken in the course of the Germanicus-led campaigns. Pagán does not mention this narrative strand at all, despite the dubious morality of this violence potentially fitting quite well with her central thesis of a Germanicus who knows no bounds. Although arguably the violence associated with battle against Arminius (e.g. *Ann.* 1.69) can be justified within the framework of vengeance and *aemulatio*, the narrative is rife with acts much more morally questionable than 'honest' battle. At *Ann.* 1.68 there is indiscriminate slaughter of those who have essentially already been defeated: *Arminius integer, Inguiomerus post grave vulnus pugnam deseruere: vulgus trucidatum est, donec ira et dies permansit*. At *Ann.* 2.17 German refugees from the battlefield are shot down from the trees *per ludibrium*, and when a retaliatory battle takes place at 2.21 Germanicus, well on his way to a victory, openly acknowledges that he has shifted the goalposts from 'winning' to 'genocide': *nil opus captivis, solam*

[268]Pagán (1999), 312–13; cf. *Ann.* 1.11 *quae cuncta sua manu perscripserat Augustus addideratque consilium coercendi intra terminos imperii*.
[269]Flor. 2.30.23-4, Ptol. 2.10, Dio 55.1.2-3. Both O'Gorman (2000), 63 and Makins (2013), 104 comment on Germanicus' tendency to look to the past in the context of his later visit to Actium, but not in the context of his German campaigns.

internicionem gentis finem bello fore, [shouting] 'that they had no need for prisoners of war and that only the destruction of the entire tribe would mean an end to this war'. Acts of similar cruelty are perpetrated against people *not* involved in the *Varusschlacht*, with no *casus belli* mentioned by Tacitus. At *Ann.* 1.55 Germanicus orders a sudden raid (*repentino excursu*) against the Chatti, which at *Ann.* 1.56 is narrated as *Chattis adeo inprovisus advenit, ut quod imbecillum aetate ac sexu statim captum aut trucidatum sit* and *incenso Mattio (id genti caput) aperta populatus vertit ad Rhenum*; 'He came upon the Chatti so unexpectedly that anyone in a position of weakness through age or gender was immediately captured or killed'. This is followed not long after by *quantumque Amisiam et Lupiam amnis inter vastatum* (*Ann.* 1.60). At *Ann.* 2.13 the Roman response to a German emissary's offer of wives, much better pay than they currently earned or had hoped to achieve by their mutiny[270], and local lands, contains an unmistakable reference to rape in *tracturum coniuges* and *matrimonia ac pecunias hostium praedae destinare*.

The violent acts described occur outside the context and bounds of what is arguably sanctioned by both the *ius ad bellum* (attacking Arminius' troops) and *ius in bello* (taking prisoners of war on the battlefield, selling them). This was a moral and legal system to which Rome nominally did subscribe, judging by Germanicus' accusation at *Ann.* 2.14 that the Germans disregard such injunctions when things are going their way (*inter secunda non divini, non humani iuris memores [Germani]*).[271] To link these examples of transgression to the established psychological profile of Germanicus in scholarship as essentially excessive in all its facets would clearly be facile.[272] Extending Pagán's argument on transgression at Teutoburg to the violations just listed is no help either: it would reduce them to the level of literary symbolism, a political metaphor,

[270]Goodyear *ad loc*.
[271]Segestes' complaint at *Ann.* 1.58 (*quia parum praesidii in legibus erat*) when he recounts Varus' inaction in the face of Arminius' rise is puzzling in context (what laws did Segestes feel would have been of use to him in this case?) but makes more sense if it is read as descriptive of the kind of Roman lawlessness with which Germanicus waged the campaigns of AD15-7. In this regard, Goodyear *ad loc*. mentions that 'before the uprising Varus was attempting to persuade the Germans of the benefits of Roman laws (Vell. 2.118.1).'
[272]See n. 223.

when we must at least in part read them as accounts of inflicting *real* human suffering. If we assume that Tacitus' account is at least as much historical record of these German campaigns as it is a product of literature, in a modified version of Lendon's diatribe against overly narrow literary readings[273], these campaigns *were* characterised by extraordinary violence even by Roman standards and Tacitus wants us to know it. Invoking Pagán's argument of a new Caesar or Alexander to solve this puzzle would also ignore the fact that expansion of the empire is so manifestly not the object of these campaigns: no choices are offered to the local population, just death. Judging by Germanicus' actions, no Romanisation is intended, no pacifying of this territory to be included in a transrhenane Roman province of Germania after he moves forward the existing border. He neither tries to sway nor forces the people who live here to submit to Rome's will and live peacefully ever after as citizens in the making. Compared to the energy spent in the course of the Batavian revolt on winning over, or recalling to loyalty, a multitude of tribes by means of rhetoric (even if judiciously backed up with the threat of force) even by those highest in command, the absence of dialogue is startling.

Only Arminius' brother Flavus gets trotted out to take up the position of empire and defend the status of the native converted to Rome: *hic magnitudinem Romanam, opes Caesaris et victis gravis poenas, in deditionem venienti paratam clementiam; neque coniugem et filium eius hostiliter haberi*, 'he talked about the magnificence of Rome, the wealth of Caesar and the heavy penalties imposed on the conquered but the clemency extended to those who surrender themselves, and [mentioning also] that his wife and son were not being mistreated in their care' (*Ann.* 2.10). The short indirect speech, relying for its persuasion on reference to an alien and abstract concept, the prosperity of a distant figure and the absence of dire punishment for anyone who submits, falls flat in the face of Arminius' response. This is reported equally indirectly and equally briefly, but the concepts referenced are culturally relevant and specific: *ille fas patriae, libertatem avitam, penetralis Germaniae deos, matrem precum sociam; ne propinquorum et adfinium, denique gentis suae desertor et proditor quam*

[273]See Lendon (2009).

imperator esse mallet, 'the other talked about the ancestral law of their fatherland, their hereditary freedom, the gods of inland Germany, and their mother as a fellow supplicant that he, Flavus, should not prefer being a deserter and traitor of his nearest, dearest and tribe, over being their chief'.

The paired speeches are reminiscent of the opposing approaches taken by Cerialis and Civilis in their pre-battle *contiones* at *Histories* 5.16 and 5.17 (see chapter one, p. 46ff), producing a similar unfavourable comparison of the (prospective) oppressor's generalising gaze with the local knowledge of a (potential) subject heavily invested in his native soil. But Tacitus at least grants to Cerialis an apology for empire at *Histories* 4.74.6-7 which references several examples of what Roman imperialists saw as positive gains from subjection by the Roman Empire (*ipsi plerumque legionibus nostris praesidetis, ipsi has aliasque provincias regitis*). The reason why no Roman apologists occur in this scenario is therefore not because Romans thought no such positive case could be made for the empire, but because Germanicus has no interest in persuading anyone of this. In these campaigns, in which the end of war is equated with genocide and the burning down of settlements, Rome *truly* creates a *solitudo* and calls it *pax*, enacting Calgacus' prediction for the future of Britain at *Agr.* 30. Tacitus' narrative suggests that the Germans have understood this as well: at *Ann.* 2.19 it is acknowledged that, had they not been driven into resistance by the sight of Germanicus' trophy (*Ann.* 2.18), some of the tribes affected would have migrated across the Elbe, simply putting themselves out of physical reach of the Roman destructiveness.[274]

Germanicus' trophies around the Elbe make complete sense in such a context of destruction. The basic descriptions Tacitus provides of both (at *Ann.* 2.18 and *Ann.* 2.22) allow us to compare them to another Julio-Claudian trophy from the west, that of Augustus at La Turbie, dedicated 20 years before Germanicus' campaigns in 7/6BC.[275] This is what Tacitus tells us about Germanicus' trophies:

[274]*qui modo abire sedibus, trans Albim concedere parabant, pugnam volunt, arma rapiunt.*
[275]Cornwell (2013), 266.

> *miles in loco proelii Tiberium imperatorem salutavit struxitque aggerem et in modum tropaeorum arma subscriptis victarum gentium nominibus imposuit.*
>
> *Ann.* 2.18
>
> 'The soldiers hailed Tiberius as *imperator* on the site of the battle, raised a platform and piled up arms in the manner of a trophy, with the names of the conquered peoples listed underneath.'

> *Laudatis pro contione victoribus Caesar congeriem armorum struxit, superbo cum titulo: debellatis inter Rhenum Albimque nationibus exercitum Tiberii Caesaris ea monimenta Marti et Iovi et Augusto sacravisse.*
>
> *Ann.* 2.22
>
> 'After praising his victorious troops in a speech, Caesar constructed a pile of armour with this proud superscript: that, having conquered in battle the nations between the Rhine and the Elbe, the army of Tiberius Caesar dedicated these monuments to Mars, Jupiter and Augustus.'

Tacitus' description of their superscripts is brief, yet conforms to the pattern suggested by the epigraphic fragments from La Turbie, which in turn matches fairly well the description provided by the Elder Pliny.[276] Its restored phrasing of *gentes Alpinae devictae*, followed by a list, resembles closely what Tacitus suggests occurred on the first Germanicus trophy by *subscriptis victarum gentium nominibus*. Its designation of geographical extent by means of *gentes Alpinae omnes quae a mari supero ad inferum pertinebant* resembles Germanicus' indication of geographical spread *debellatis inter Rhenum Albimque nationibus* on the second trophy. Cornwell's claim for La Turbie that its stated purpose is to celebrate the complete subjugation of the enemy can, on this basis, be extended to the Germanicus trophies.

Both descriptions also match La Turbie in emphasising this subjugation without any mention of *pax*. We can only speculate on the reasons. In La Turbie's case, Cornwell contrasted it with the celebration of this ideology by the monumental *Ara Pacis*, commissioned in 13BC and dedicated in 9BC, only a few years after La Turbie. For her, '[t]his absence may suggest that *pax* was at this time and in this context a fundamentally Roman concept employed in a civic setting, in order to

[276]Recorded and discussed by Cornwell (2013), 264–65.

explain and express *imperium*. Whilst this concept of *pax* was extremely important at Rome at the time, it was clearly not necessary or relevant for the discourse of Roman imperialism *to* the conquered territories.'[277] This suggests that *pax* was an important part in Rome's self-definition as an imperialist power during the Augustan period but either deemed a notion unlikely to persuade the conquered of their good fortune, or such persuasion of the conquered was deemed to be unnecessary. The absence of *pax* on trophies despite its importance to the Augustan ideological programme, often through monumentalisation, supports the Tacitean picture of a Germany in AD15-7, only just post-Augustan, in which no Roman apology for empire is be extended. In contrast, in AD70 Tacitus portrays Petillius Cerialis as quite happy to do so. The point is that both time and space are different between these thematically related occasions in transrhenane Germany of AD17 and the Rhineland in AD70. To revise my earlier formulation, under Germanicus Rome creates a *solitudo* in Germany and does not even bother to call it *pax*.

But here the similarities between the Turbie monument and Germanicus' trophies and campaigns end. Cornwell notes that the statement on the former, that the *gentes devictae* were also *redactae*, recalls Velleius Paterculus' phrases for the formal creation of a Roman province, *redacta in formulam provinciae* (*Vell.* 2.38) and *redacta in formam provinciae* (*Vell.* 2.97.4 cf. 2.44.4).[278] The claim to formalisation is further bolstered by her discussion of the monument's placement within the newly built road scheme of the Alpine area.[279] It was placed in a suitable location to complement the visual and symbolic claims of Roman control expressed through the nearby *via Julia Augusta*, and this was not necessarily at the highest point of the area:

> 'In one sense the monuments [Pompey's Pyrenees trophy of 71BC as well as La Turbie] are subordinated to the course of the road, yet they further emphasise the concept of the road as a display of *imperium*, by monumentalising the area.'[280]

[277]Ibid., 276.
[278]Ibid., 271.
[279]Ibid., 266–69.
[280]Ibid., 269.

No such transformation of the *gentes* or monumentalisation of the landscape speaks from the Tacitean report of the Germanicus trophies, based as they are on an *agger* and *congeries armorum* respectively, nor from that of his campaigns, conducted as they were on decaying roads or in pathless forests.

The trophies thus further support the notion that Germanicus travels through Germany in the conviction that the land is unsuitable to Roman annexation. Its tendency to revert to a state of nature which slowly destroys everything in its path carries no potential for settlement on any model acceptable to Rome. Destruction becomes the only possible response to this type of resistance, the only kind of mastery. The issue is not Germanicus' competence, as Giua showed: as a general, he takes thought for the future, delegates to capable officers, does the best he can with the information he has, and learns from past mistakes, changing his strategy to avoid their repetition. Everything that goes wrong in the Tacitean narrative is outside his control.[281] The issue is with the landscape to which he applies that competence. It simply cannot be transformed in the way Rome needs it to.

Asserting Romanity through violence

As I mentioned in section one, the raid against the Marsi (*Ann.* 1.49-51) stands out among the other acts of violence of *Annals* 1 and 2 in its absence of provocation by either people or land and its incongruously domestic setting in the Marsi's village. Their introduction into the narrative is at the same time the performance of their destruction as a tribe: their women and children, the means to a future, are killed without mercy during the raid: *quinquaginta milium spatium ferro flammisque pervastat. Non sexus, non aetas miserationem attulit* (*Ann.* 1.51).[282] Having put the humans to the sword, the flames are reserved for the destruction of their domestic and public buildings: *profana simul et sacra et celeberrimum illis gentibus templum quod Tanfanae vocabant*. And yet the Marsi have not provoked these legions, nor has a 'natural' and threatening Germany that needs to be subdued yet made any appearance, as the

[281]Giua (1988), 91.
[282]The remainder of their fighting men regroup to attack Rome at *Ann.* 1.57 and a still smaller surviving fraction of those suffer a third defeat at *Ann.* 2.25.

mutinies took place within the ordered space of the Roman camp. Where Tacitus does introduce the German landscape into the Marsi episode, the Romans actually benefit from these encounters. The stars provide favourable light for the nighttime raid (*iuvit nox sideribus inlustris*)[283], contrasting markedly with the destructive influence of the equinoctial star of *Ann.* 1.70 on Vitellius and his two legions the following year (*mox inpulsu aquilonis, simul sidere aequinoctii, quo maxime tumescit Oceanus, rapi agique agmen*). Germanicus' camp is constructed properly, *frontem ac tergum vallo, latera concaedibus munitus*, with *concaedibus* perhaps designed to activate an echo later on when the reader arrives at Caecina's sad plight of *amissa magna ex parte per quae egeritur humus aut exciditus caespes* and the equally pathetic camp that results at *Ann.* 1.66. Caecina's cutting of the trees which obstruct his path (*obstantia silvarum amoliri iubetur*, *Ann.* 1.50) contrasts with the Romans' later disorientation in forests which remain *avia* instead of having roads cut through them.[284] The Romans here overpower the landscape instead of being overpowered by it.

The contrast with the later campaigns as regards people and landscape enable us to eliminate the provocation and resistance which underpinned these campaigns as possible explanations for the violence against the Marsi. This leaves the raid's particular genesis as the most likely explanation. Tacitus says:

> *truces etiam tum animos cupido involat eundi in hostem, piaculum furoris; nec aliter posse placari commilitonum manis quam si pectoribus impiis honesta vulnera accepissent. sequitur ardorem militum Caesar iunctoque ponte tramittit duodecim milia e legionibus…*
>
> *Ann.* 1.49

> 'A desire to meet the enemy in battle, in redemption of their former madness, suddenly took hold of their still unsettled minds; not in any other way could the spirits of their fellow soldiers be placated than by their accepting honourable wounds to their sinful breasts. Caesar fell in

[283]Giua (1988), 80 noted that 'l'operazione, favorita anche da una notte chiara di stelle, e quasi un gioco'.
[284]Caecina's actions are more reminiscent of Caes. *BG* 3.29.1 than of *Ann.* 2.17, where the legionaries do cut down trees but not in the context of navigation.

with his soldiers' ardour and after joining the two riverbanks by a bridge he put across twelve thousand of his legionaries…'

The emotive framing of the aftermath of the mutinies (*cupido*, *piaculum furoris*, *pectoribus impiis*, *honesta vulnera*) makes clear that the raid emanates from the emotional state of these Roman legions rather than from anything they encounter around them. Fresh from the extremely un-Roman internal strife of the mutinies (*civilium armorum facies*, *Ann.* 1.49), the narrative of the raid illustrates the process by which these perpetrators of, essentially, civil war restore their identity as Romans through a resumption of the *labor* which underpinned the Roman army's *disciplina*.[285] As we saw, such *labor* to restore *disciplina* could take different forms, of which Germanicus, whose attempt at punishment during the mutinies resulted only in further disorganisation and bloodshed (*permissa vulgo licentia atque ultio et satietas*. *mox ingressus castra Germanicus, non medicinam illud plurimis cum lacrimis sed cladem appellans*…, *Ann.* 1.49), chooses combat.[286]

In this sense, the mutiny-followed-by-a-raid as set up by Tacitus plays out the transformational dynamics of the Teutoburger episode from polluted space into ordered Roman space. Germanicus, prompted by the indiscriminate slaughter of Roman soldiers, responds as emotionally to it (*plurimis cum lacrimis*) as he does to Teutoburg (*praesentibus doloris socius*); uses the word *clades*, the traditional description of the Varian disaster (*non medicinam illud sed cladem appellans*), to describe it, and physically transforms the site on which the mutiny occurred in order to erase the traces of this shameful crime (though here by means of cremation, not burial: *cremari corpora iubet*). As is the case after Teutoburg, when Germanicus sets off in pursuit of Arminius, the confrontation with the battlefield then prompts a military response, in the shape of the raid against the Marsi. There are lexical echoes to support the contextual analogy in the phrase *cupido involat*, prefiguring the later *cupido invadit* at Teutoburg, and in Tacitus'

[285]See n. 226.

[286]Dio spells this out even more clearly, stating that 'Germanicus, being afraid even so that they [the mutineers] would fall to rioting again, invaded the enemy's country and tarried there, giving the troops plenty of work and food in abundance at the expense of aliens' (Dio 57.6.1, tr. Loeb 1924).

use of religious language (*piaculum furoris*) to describe this transformation, as he does for that at Teutoburg (*solvendi suprema*). But whereas the burial at Teutoburg was labelled a religious transgression by Tiberius (because Germanicus' priestly responsibilities prohibited contact with the dead), the raid against the Marsi is the opposite. The mutiny itself was their transgression, and this sortie is the restoration of the Romans to their proper concerns in Germany, which are to subdue its landscape and its people. The Tacitean text's representation of the Marsi and their habitat as the least threatening of all the Germans in the *Annals* has the effect of highlighting precisely how Germanicus' destructive raid is *not* a response to the German environment, but a site on which it is made clear that Roman identity and unity must be secured above all other concerns. And one way in which unstable Romans reassert and perform their identities is through exclusionary violence against the Other: *fidensque recentibus ac priorum oblitus miles in hibernis locatur*, Tacitus rounds off his account of the raid.[287] The Germany of the Marsi, with its women, children and named temple, is therefore neither unconquerable nor unknowable nor even threatening to the empire, unlike the territories further inland which are explored during the campaigns of AD15-7. But its destruction is the means by which an entirely Roman threat to the empire, its mutinous legions, is finally abolished.[288]

[287]At *Ann.* 2.13 even the *hypothetical* abandonment of their Roman identity (not this time through the civil war that is mutiny, but through the proposed exchange for a German one) invites violent retaliation on the possessors of the alternative identity offered as a means of asserting Roman identity and loyalty: *unus hostium, Latinae linguae sciens, acto ad vallum equo voce magna coniuges et agros et stipendii in dies, donec bellaretur, sestertios centenos, si quis transfugisset, Arminii nomine pollicetur. intendit ea contumelia legionum iras: veniret dies, daretur pugna; sumpturum militem Germanorum agros, tracturum coniuges*, 'one of the enemy, with knowledge of Latin, after being carried to the rampart on his horse loudly proclaimed, in the name of Arminius, a promise of wives, fields and a daily stipend of two hundred sesterces for as long as the war lasted for anyone who should have changed sides. This insult sharpened the anger of the legions: let the day comes, let battle be joined; the soldiers would *take* the Germans' fields and drag off their wives'.

[288]In this sense, the restoration of Roman identity through violence against the Marsi plays a similar role to Rome's war against the Jews in *Histories* 5 as noted by Ash (2009), 96–99.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter argues that Tacitus' depiction of Germany in *Annals* 1 and 2 as a landscape of multiple layers as well as competing spaces is crucial to understanding the course of events in these books. The first two sections of the chapter set out the way Tacitus sets the scene. I first examine how the campaigns of AD15-7 are full of castrametation as a Roman act which carves out Roman space from German space but which also keeps the travelling army bound into an ordered unit and keeps fear at bay. Alongside these fresh pockets of Romanity, Germany also exhibits Roman structures from past campaigns, creating a layer of Roman space superimposed on the German underscape. The text shows that many of these past structures are either decaying naturally or destroyed, presenting these processes as the natural tendencies of both Germany and its inhabitants when not prevented by Roman force. Section two then shows how much of the Roman movement through Germany happens via such old Roman routes which take in many of these old structures. In the narrative, the Romans never choose to open up news paths; when they do it often ends in disaster. This in turn limits their understanding of Germany, as they can understand the Roman top layer only. Of the rest of Germany, they know only that it is unknowable.

The two following sections of the chapter discuss this issue of knowledge and knowability in more depth. In line with the landscape's general tendency, section three frames Rome's removal across the Rhine of suitable pro-Roman Germans who could be potential translators and navigators of the landscape as a necessary precaution to avert the reversal of these Roman allies to their natural German state. Through the presence of traitors furnishing Germanicus with information that allows him to win two battles, Tacitus makes clear that borrowed knowledge of the land *can* make a difference to Roman success, enabling Germanicus to deploy his power and skill to better effect. Nonetheless, there is a contrast between this mediated understanding of Germany for destructive purposes with Germanicus' deeper and more sincere understanding of the equally mediated Egyptian antiquities later on in book 2. Unlike Germany's landscape, that of Egypt poses no threat to Roman power, as it is

both long conquered and its imperialist monuments and their implications are readily comprehensible to the Roman imperial heir. Section four examines how the absence of real knowledge and understanding about Germany produces fear in the rank and file on two occasions, threatening to break down the Roman structuring of space in their respective parts of Germany. On one of these occasions this threatened order is explicitly linked to the soldiers' loss of tools, which prevented them from pitching a proper camp as an act of *labor* which maintained Roman discipline and identity. On both occasions where this dynamic of spatial panic occurs, the integrity of the Roman space is preserved by the physical interposition of the Roman aristocratic bodies of Caecina and Agrippina in the spaces the soldiers seek to transgress, forcing the pause which recalls them to their proper awareness of their identity and duty. As in the previous sections, Rome can achieve things in German space but it is difficult, problematic, and always has the potential for failure.

The final two sections discuss the extreme violence of Germanicus' actions in the course of the campaigns of AD15-17 and during the raid on the Marsi in AD14. Despite these episodes' similarities in depicting a thirst for blood and destruction completely out of proportion to any provocation as legitimised by the *ius in bellum* or *ius in bello*, I argue that these passages must be understood very differently. Whereas the brutality of the Germanicus campaigns is born from the conviction that Germany and its people are unsuitable for co-option as potential Roman territory and subjects, and therefore has an outward focus, the murderousness of the raid against the Marsi is inward-looking, born from the former mutineers' need to reconfirm their identity as loyal Roman citizen-soldiers. The method they instinctively (*cupido involat…*) pursue, and which gets approved by Germanicus, is to reassert this group identity by assaulting another group. This just happens to be the Marsi, whose innocence is stressed by the lack of provocation or resistance from either people or landscape which so characterise the other campaign. With the exception of the raid on the Marsi, therefore, the German passages of *Annals* 1 and 2 are built on the same foundations throughout: Germany as a complex space, structured both horizontally (by means of competing spaces) and vertically (by means of

layered spaces), of which the constitution is perpetually contested, perpetually shifting, and perpetually eluding the Roman grasp, even though it is an arena in which Roman violent power can leave a mark in the landscape, a mark which, over time, the landscape might obliterate in turn. In this regard, its treatment follows the lines set out decades earlier by Tacitus in the *Germania*, as chapter six will show.

5 The rest of the *Annals*

Introduction

There are many other instances of *Germanae res* recorded by Tacitus in the *Annals*. The main ones discussed in this chapter are: the part of the Gallic rebellion of AD21 that was led by Florus in northern Gaul where the boundary with Germany started to blur (*Ann.* 3.40-46); the fluctuating fates of the Romano-Cheruscan king Italicus (*Ann.* 11.16-17); Corbulo's campaigns in the Rhineland (*Ann.* 11.18-20); the Frisii's rebellion of AD28 (*Ann.* 4.72-74), their settlement by Corbulo in AD47 (*Ann.* 11.19) and their departure for the Roman military frontier zone in AD58 (*Ann.* 13.55-56); and the immediate reoccupation by the Ampsivarii of the contested lands from which the Frisii had just been removed by Rome (*Ann.* 13.53-57). Passing reference will be made to Maroboduus' final efforts against Rome after the defeat of Arminius (*Ann.* 2.44-46, 2.62-63) and the Suebian Vannius' ejection from his kingdom followed by his request to be restored by Rome (*Ann.* 12.29-30).[289]

All these passages engage further with the relationship between imperial power and its subjects through foregrounding the spaces in which this power is deployed and resisted. Thematic connections are made to other Tacitean passages (the Batavian revolt and the Roman mutinies for Florus and Sacrovir; the campaigns of Germanicus for Corbulo; Tacitus' account of the Republic's collapse into the principate in the earliest chapters of the *Annals* in the Italicus episode) but also to other authors and periods from Roman history (Sallust's account of the Catilinarian conspiracy for Florus and Sacrovir, descriptions of Rome's earliest history by Livy and Sallust). These intratextual and intertextual connections across space and time further Tacitus' analysis of the dynamics of power and resistance in general, and particularly in the way these manifest and repeat. These political narratives pay close attention to the role of spaces in limiting and enabling both this power and the resistance it provoked. The nexus

[289]Pomponius Secundus' skirmish with the Chatti at *Ann.* 12.27-8 is unremarkable apart from his rescue of a few Varian survivors.

of connections also shows the Tacitean text does not deal in either essential categories of peoples and places or discourses asserting them (unless ventriloquised).

Florus and Sacrovir

The rebellion of Florus and Sacrovir is reported by Tacitus for the year AD21 at *Ann.* 3.40-47. Discussion of its northern element, led by Florus, warrants inclusion in this thesis first because he was a Trevir and secondly because from a firmly Gallic centre he aimed to extend his campaigns northwards (whereas his colleague Sacrovir went south).[290] He thereby involved the Belgae in the uprising and although both the Treveri and the Belgae were administratively classified as living in Gaul during the AD20s, they would rise in AD69 under Civilis' German banner.[291] Only in overly schematic historiographical or ethnographical narratives did Germany start cleanly across the Rhine.[292]

Discourse

The passage which principally concerns us is the introductory chapter of the Florus episode:

> *Eodem anno Galliarum civitates ob magnitudinem aeris alieni rebellionem coeptavere, cuius extimulator acerrimus inter Treviros Iulius Florus, apud Aeduos Iulius Sacrovir. nobilitas ambobus et maiorum bona facta eoque Romana civitas olim data, cum id rarum nec nisi virtuti pretium esset. ii secretis conloquiis, ferocissimo quoque adsumpto aut quibus ob egestatem ac metum ex flagitiis maxima peccandi necessitudo, componunt Florus Belgas, Sacrovir propiores Gallos concire. igitur per conciliabula et coetus seditiosa disserebant de continuatione tributorum, gravitate faenoris, saevitia ac superbia praesidentium, et discordare militem audito Germanici*

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[290]Woodman and Martin (1996, 327–28) note the parallel structure of the two different strands of the revolt and compare it to the similar scheme of the mutinies of *Annals* 1 as identified by Bacha (1906). This also makes it possible to separate the two.

[291]The Treveri played a significant role in the Batavian revolt through their leader Julius Classicus and the Belgae are mentioned as allies of Civilis at *Hist.* 4.76.

[292]Rives (2002), 166 defended Tacitus' use of the Rhine as a suspiciously neat border of Germania on the grounds of literary convention, though Rives (1999), 26–27 traces the beginning of this convention to Caesar, and noting that it continued to be disputed for a long time amongst (especially Greek) writers until Agrippa's map during Augustus' reign 'set the standard for later Roman geographical knowledge, and thereafter we find fundamental agreement (…)'. In the *Histories*, however, we still find a much more fluid identity spectrum: see chapter two. And even the *Germania* admits the existence of German tribes living on the Gallic bank (*Ger.* 2.3 and 27.2, 28.4 and 19.1).

> *exitio. egregium resumendae libertati tempus, si ipsi florentes quam inops Italia, quam inbellis urbana plebes, nihil validum in exercitibus nisi quod externum, cogitarent.*
>
> *Ann.* 3.40

> 'That same year the communities of the Gallic provinces began a revolt because of the size of their debts. The keenest rabble-rouser was Julius Florus among the Treveri; with the Aedui it was Julius Sacrovir. Both had noble blood and a family history of good service and for this reason Roman citizenship had been granted them long ago, when this occurrence was still rare and the reward for honourable conduct. In secret conclaves in which every possible hothead had been included, as well as those for whom this opportunity to break the law was necessary, either because of their poverty or because of fear that their past crimes would catch up with them, Florus undertook to fire up the Belgae and Sacrovir the closer Gauls. At treasonous meetings in public places they repeatedly speechified about the relentlessness of the tribute, the burden of interest, the cruelty and overbearing attitude of those governing them. They added that the legions' acting up after hearing about Germanicus' death offered an excellent opportunity for retaking their freedom, and that though they themselves were in good shape, let them consider how helpless Italy was, and how feeble the urban plebs, and that there was really nothing of strength in the army unless it was foreign strength.'

It is immediately obvious that the reasons for revolt advocated by Florus and Sacrovir in their speech to the disaffected are more varied and serious than Tacitus' introduction of *ob magnitudinem aeris alieni*.[293] They fall into two categories: the first relates to their own situation in the form of the economics (the tribute they have to pay, *de continuatione tributorum*) and the politics (proud and cruel imperial representatives, *[de] saevitia ac superbia praesidentium*) of subjection; the second relates to Rome's situation in the form of the economics and politics of domination: only with the help of the subjected provincials can Rome maintain its military superiority (*imbellis urbana plebes, nihil validum in exercitibus nisi quod externum*), and only when Roman politics are stable can the military be relied on to keep its grip on the provinces (*discordare militem audito Germanici exitio*). The short speech is recorded half as a concise summary of topics (*disserebant de…*) and half in *oratio obliqua*

[293]*Hist.* 4.26 also contains such a wide gap between a Tacitean authorial judgment on a situation and the explanations for it advanced by his ventriloquised characters in the text; see p. 34-9 where I discuss the Rhine drought during the Batavian revolt.

(*cogitarent egregium resumendae libertati tempus…*) but still manages to pack in conspicuous references to other German passages.

My first aim is therefore to establish that Florus and Sacrovir's discourse as reported by Tacitus bears significant resemblances (in content, phrasing or both) to the complaints and feelings reported by Tacitus for the mutineers of AD14, to a substantial proportion of the politically engaged population of the city of Rome in AD21, to the Frisian rebels of AD28, and to the Batavian-led rebels of AD69-70. Chapter three already drew a parallel between the mutineers' reported discontent in AD14 as a result of their financial and bodily exploitation by their commanders[294], and Civilis' complaints about the same on behalf of the Batavi.[295] To these complaints, whose subject matter falls into the first category of the economics of subjection, we can add Florus and Sacrovir's complaints, which combine financial exploitation (*de continuatione tributorum*) with bodily exploitation (*saevitia ac superbia praesidentium*). The rebellious Frisii in AD28 are described by Tacitus at *Ann*. 4.72 as having broken the peace *nostra magis avaritia quam obsequii impatientes*, 'more because of our rapacity than because they chafed under their obedience', an unfair change in their existing tax regime (financial exploitation) having led to their having to sell the bodies of their wives and children into slavery (bodily exploitation).[296]

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[294]*Ann.* 1.17 *denis in diem assibus animam et corpus aestimari: hinc vestem arma tentoria, hinc saevitiam centurionum et vacationes munerum redimi*. A deduction *ad victum* from their stipend was official practice in the Roman army (Davies 1989, 189), and Goodyear *ad loc.* mentions papyrological evidence for deductions towards *vestimenta*, though Koestermann *ad loc.* implies that food is absent from Tacitus' enumeration because that was provided by the state. Either way, the need to buy off gratuitous violence from one's superiors was certainly not legal.

[295]*Hist.* 4.14 *impubes et forma conspicui (et est plerisque procera pueritia) ad stuprum trahebantur* and *tradi se praefectis centurionibusque: quos ubi spoliis et sanguine expleverint, mutari, exquirique novos sinus et varia praedandi vocabula* (all the more galling because the Batavi were meant to be free of tribute, *tributorum expertis*, Hist. 4.17).

[296]*Ann.* 4.72 *tributum iis Drusus iusserat modicum pro angustia rerum, ut in usus militaris coria boum penderent, non intenta cuiusquam cura quae firmitudo, quae mensura, donec Olennius e primipilaribus regendis Frisiis impositus terga urorum delegit quorum ad formam acciperentur. id aliis quoque nationibus arduum apud Germanos difficilius tolerabatur, quis ingentium beluarum feraces saltus, modica domi armenta sunt.*

Certainly there are differences in these situations. The Frisii's tribute had been set by the Elder Drusus in the form of ox hides in recognition of their specific circumstances, the Batavi were exempt from tribute but contributed men to the army, and the everyday lived experience of Roman legionaries would have been very different from that of subjected provincials. The issue of debt (*aes alieni*) occurs in the Florus and Sacrovir episode only. Nonetheless, there are repeating patterns across these very different situations. Miles Lavan has recently read the recurrence of the 'familiar triad of greed, cruelty and lust' in the Frisian and the Batavian revolts as a result of Tacitus' inability, as a product of his time and his imperial context, to conduct sophisticated analyses with which modern historians of the ancient world can advance their knowledge about what *really* caused these revolts, and differentiate them.[297] It is impossible not to share his reservations that

> '[o]ur ability to identify and understand past revolts is necessarily constrained by our sources' operations of classification (what they consider a revolt) and selection (their threshold for taking notice of relevant events) and the conceptual apparatus they deploy to explain and describe episodes of revolt, which may not be particularly accurate and is unlikely to be disinterested'.[298]

However, what he sees as flaws in the texts - the agenda-based schematising to the point of obscuring what really happened – are positive assets for this thesis' project in attempting to bring to light the 'conceptual apparatus' which Tacitus brings to bear on his representations of what happens in Germany. In short, the recurrent similarities allow us to posit the positive rather than negative hypothesis that Tacitus discerned a repeating pattern of revolts against the imperial regime in the course of the first century AD, and that these revolts were triggered by similar kinds of circumstances. Rather than concluding simplistically that Rome should simply have taken better care to keep its officials in line and remedy administrative failures, the Tacitean text raises a more structural question concerning the nature of imperial power: what is it

[297]Lavan (2017), 20 follows Guha (1983) in acknowledging the inevitable implication of elitist discourse on revolts in the colonial power's distortions of representation, even when the writers are not unsympathic.
[298]Lavan (2017), 20.

about this set-up that kept producing these circumstances? Low, in discussing the connections between Florus and Sacrovir, the Thracians of *Annals* 4 and the Frisians of *Ann.* 4.72-74, locates a possible answer in Rome's fundamental 'inability to understand and manage foreigners', which she asserts is proportionally related to these tribes' possession of and commitment to *libertas*. This in turn is related to geographical distance from Rome: the Thracians more committed and further removed than Florus and Sacrovir's tribal followers; the Frisii still more than the Thracians.[299] This answer is valid for these revolts *qua* provincial uprisings, but cannot account for a pool of revolts which, as I argue, includes the Roman citizen-soldiers of the Rhine mutinies.

The Empire produced these circumstances regardless of the identity of the subjected group: the alignment of Roman legionaries with Frisians, Batavians and the Gallo-Germans of the west bank of the Rhine breaks through the Roman versus non-Roman dichotomy implied in Low's solution, as well as through Lavan's theory of a limiting imperial gaze. The mutineers' inclusion in the matrix makes these recurrent features into an indictment not of colonial power under the Empire, which sets Romans against provincials, but of imperial power, which sets the emperor and his delegated representatives (= the imperial regime) against 'everyone else'. The 'parallel between the rule of the Caesars over the Romans and of the Romans over their subjects' was noted by Liebeschuetz in a rather off-hand manner.[300] I here advance a stronger argument, that they were not analogous but in fact the same, and take it to its logical conclusion, that this erased the distinction between the Romans and their subjects. As mentioned in the introduction to the present work, Lavan, in an earlier piece concerned with the empire's representation of its relationship with its provincials, traced a gradual shift in the discourse of oppositional identity politics from citizen vs non-citizen to Italy vs everywhere else[301], and finally, as a result of Caracalla's universal grant of citizenship in AD212, to

[299]Low (2013), 64-65, 219–26.
[300]Liebeschuetz (1966), 138; see also the introduction to this thesis, p. 14ff
[301]Lavan (2013), 59.

emperor vs everyone else.[302] My reading of the Florus and Sacrovir episode further strengthens the argument, made in chapter three, that the change ought to be placed in AD14, on the basis that Tacitus ventriloquises similar discourses about arbitrary imperial power on behalf of Roman mutineers *as well as* Germans throughout the entire narrated period of the corpus (AD14-AD70).

A second feature which Florus and Sacrovir's reported discourse shares with some of these other passages has similar consequences for the positioning of all these rebels, regardless of identity, on the weaker side of the imperial power divide. The Trevir and the Auduan declare the timing for the revolt to be auspicious (*egregium resumendae libertati tempus*) firstly because Rome's soldiery is restive as a result of the death of their beloved former commander Germanicus (*discordare militem audito Germanici exitio*) and secondly because, on top of that, they are not very fearsome legions anyway. *Inbellis urbana plebs* refers to the urban levies of the last years of Augustus' reign and *nihil validum in exercitibus nisi quod externum* implies that they see the rest of the army as made up of those whose loyalty they can reasonably question on the grounds of only recent or still absent Roman citizenship.[303]

Both lines of reasoning parallel the mutineers' as well as Civilis' rhetoric on the timing of their uprisings. Firstly, the soldiers' response at the death of Germanicus, as reported by Florus and Sacrovir, recalls their behaviour seven years earlier at the death of Augustus.[304] In considering that episode in chapter three, I argued that the death of the imperial ruler opened the opportunity for these soldiers to renegotiate a political relationship which they felt was very

[302]Ibid., 111.
[303]The phrase combines the sentiment that the Roman army's main strength lies in the provincials which serve in it in such large numbers with the implication that all these foreign elements will turn against Rome at a moment's notice. Both recur as part of Civilis' inflammatory rhetoric: used at the very beginning in the general shape of *provinciarum sanguine provincias vinci* (*Hist.* 4.17.14), it is then backed up by examples (*aciem cogitarent: Batavo equite protritos Aeduos Arvernosque; fuisse inter Verginii auxilia Belgas, vereque reputantibus Galliam suismet viribus concidisse*, *Hist.* 4.17.14-17).
[304]*Ann.* 1.16 *nullis novis causis nisi quod mutatus princeps licentiam turbarum et ex civili bello spem praemiorum ostendebat* and Blaesus' *iustitium* occasioned by *fine Augusti et initiis Tiberii auditis*. The similarity of Florus and Sacrovir *discordare militem* to *Ann.* 1.16 *eo principio lascivire miles, discordare…* is noted by Martin and Woodman *ad loc.*

personal, between them and the ruler directly. In AD21, in contrast, Germanicus may have been in line for the throne, but Tiberius occupied it. No power vacuum was created by the former's death and so they possessed no bargaining power over a *nutantem adhuc principem* (as Percennius expresses it at *Ann.* 1.16). But the Florus and Sacrovir episode, through its re-use of *discordare militem*, makes clear that these legions' relationship with Germanicus as *dux* paralleled that relationship with Augustus whose loss they mourned seven years earlier. Their love of Germanicus was made clear in the mutinies narrative (esp. at *Ann.* 1.33) as well as during the campaigns of *Annals* 2 (especially during his incognito visit to the soldiers' fires at *Ann.* 2.13). Florus and Sacrovir's speech suggests that the uneasy process of adjustment to a new reality was hindering these legions' ability to quickly or efficiently take the field against the Gallo-German rebels. To the rebels, the value of imperial death then lies not in an opportunity to renegotiate their own political relationship with Rome, but in the distraction of the legions. Civilis, almost fifty years later, also wanted to capitalise on distraction caused by an imperial death and a subsequent power vacuum. His speech at *Hist.* 4.14 references three different factors which make the timing for rebellion opportune: the instability of the Roman state since the death of the last Julio-Claudian (*numquam magis adflictam rem Romanam*, *Hist.* 4.14.18-19), the depleted condition of the armies of the west as a result of troop movements by Vitellius and Vespasian (*nec aliud in hibernis quam praedam et senes: attollerent tantum oculos et inania legionum nomina ne pavescerent*, *Hist.* 4.14.19-21) and the potential offered by the internal strife to re-label their uprising, if unsuccessful, as pro-Flavian (*ne Romanis quidem ingratum id bellum, cuius ambiguam fortunam Vespasiano imputaturos: victoriae rationem non reddi*, *Hist.* 4.14.23-4).

The similarity of all these considerations show that all these different categories of rebels are tied to the stability of the Roman political centre as a determinant of their actions, regardless of their citizenship, ethnic identification or feelings about the Roman Empire. Within that repeating pattern, however, there is again local difference related to the nature of the relationship: the mutineers possess some political standing as citizens as well as real military might to back up their

political demands at a time when the ruler needs their support; the provincials neither have that relationship nor the clout to enforce concessions from an emperor firmly lodged on the throne. They simply have to go for broke at an opportune time, when their oppressor's enforcers are distracted, and hope for the best. However, at the root, considerations of Rome's political stability inform everyone's actions.

The only exception to this rule, where action is absent, reinforces the all-pervasive influence of the imperial regime on those subject to its power. Tacitus describes the mood at Rome when news of the Florus and Sacrovir revolt (admittedly exaggerated: *cuncta, ut mos famae, in maius credita*) reaches them (*Ann.* 3.44): *optumus quisque rei publicae cura maerebat: multi odio praesentium et cupidine mutationis suis quoque periculis laetabantur increpabantque Tiberium quod in tanto rerum motu libellis accusatorum insumeret operam*, 'every good citizen lamented the *respublica*'s sad condition, but many, out of hatred for the current regime and a desire for change, rejoiced even in their own danger and attacked Tiberius because despite such a great crisis he took up the business of the accusers' incriminations'. In their hatred for the current regime and their desire for change, the unnamed *multi* are identically placed to Florus and Sacrovir's followers. The parallel feelings of citizens in Rome and figures on the German periphery erase distinctions of geography and citizenship in a collective oppression and unhappiness.

The difference is that unlike the mutineers, Florus, Sacrovir, Frisii and Batavi, all on the periphery, the discontented at Rome take no action and are reduced to treasonous mutterings (I read *laetabantur* as public glee and approval rather than harbouring secret hopes that the rebellion will deliver their objective). Paradoxically, Tacitus suggests, through reference to the *libelli*, that any open expression of such desires for change carried the same risk as that incurred by the provincial insurgents who were trying to force change.[305] Rebellious action

[305]Martin and Woodman *ad loc.* remarked on the ambiguity of *suis periculis* as able to signify danger from Tiberius as well as from a successful rebellion, but either way these talkers-not-doers would suffer.

invites a military response from the regime, rebellious talk invites legal action, but both situations end with the loss of life at the hands of the regime. Just as the mutinies narrative had its counterpart at Rome in the accession debate, the Florus narrative in the Rhineland has its counterpart at Rome. Events at Rome indirectly but significantly affect the management of the Gallo-German revolt. And though the actions of Florus in Germany do not influence action at Rome, they do influence discussions at Rome. The replication of the rebels' sentiments in the sentiments of the disgruntled in the capital further undermine the idea of any consensus behind Tiberian rule and expose the realities of imperial power. Tiberius was not deposed as a result of either Florus and Sacrovir's revolt or the grumblings of the discontented like-minded at Rome. But in AD68 the Gallic revolt led by Julius Vindex, despite its quelling by Verginius Rufus, *did* prompt action at Rome instead of just talk, leading to the murder of Nero. As Syme noted long ago, Tacitus' narration of Florus and Sacrovir historically foreshadows this last and worst of the Gallic upheavals of the Julio-Claudian principate, and likely did so in Tacitus' lost account of it.[306] For Tacitus, this particular dynamic between provinces and imperial centre was therefore already present in the earliest days of the principate.

Space

In addition to the separation-and-yet-connection between the Empire's centre and periphery, the Florus narrative also reflects on the connection between people and place, with place viewed not as a function of location but of ideology. The rebellion's movement from urban space to countryside develops a dichotomy between urban space as a place to talk and be Roman and rural space as enabling action and distance from Romanity. This movement follows the spatial and emotional patterns established for the Catilinarians in Sallust's account of the conspiracy. In both cases the result evokes sympathy for the enemies of Roman authority that get driven out of Roman space whilst simultaneously condemning their actions against the state.

[306]Syme (1958), 458.

The rebellion's genesis takes place in private space: *ii secretis conloquiis componunt Florus Belgas, Sacrovir propiores Gallos concire*. These meetings parallel the secret conclave of the four Julii of the Batavian revolt in Trier (*in colonia Agrippinensi in domum privatam convenient*, *Hist.* 4.55.12-3) and the gatherings of the Catilinarian conspirators in domestic spaces at Rome (*BC* 17.2-3 and 27.3).[307] From there (*igitur*), Florus and Sacrovir move on to hold open meetings in the public spaces of their designated territories (Sacrovir southern Gaul, Florus northern Gaul) to preach rebellion *per conciliabula et coetus.*[308] After that, Florus moves to a local military camp housing an auxiliary Treveran *ala equitum*, in an attempt to win support:

> *Interim Florus insistere destinatis, pellicere alam equitum, quae conscripta e Treviris militia disciplinaque nostra habebatur, ut caesis negotiatoribus Romanis bellum inciperet; paucique equitum corrupti, plures in officio mansere.*
>
> *Ann.* 3.42

> 'In the mean time, Florus put in train what had been decided, namely to entice a cavalry wing, which had been conscripted from the Treveri but was housed under Roman conditions of discipline, into triggering war by murdering Roman traders; a few of the cavalrymen were corrupted, but more remained in post.'

The cavalrymen are presented in the text as natives biding in a Roman environment and under Roman conditions. Tacitus' Florus seems convinced that these had retained their native German loyalty underneath, but in thinking so he makes the same error made by the Tencteri when they tried to join forces with the Agrippinenses: the Roman-style buildings and habits which they see as merely external trappings have in fact changed the people who adopted

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[307] *BC* 17.2-3 *Ubi satis explorata sunt, quae voluit, in unum omnis convocat, quibus maxuma necessitudo et plurumum audaciae inerat. Eo convenere senatorii ordinis P. Lentulus…*; BC 27.3 *intempesta nocte coniurationis principes convocat per M. Porcium Laecam…*

[308] OLD '*conciliabulum*': *a place of assembly, meeting-place, esp. as the administrative centre of a district*. **b** a meeting, assembly. Woodman and Martin *ad loc.* suggest that because *coetus* definitely means meeting, *conciliabulum* here should be read as the meeting-place rather than the meeting itself. Koestermann *ad loc.* concurs, but additionally sees a contrast between *conciliabula* as open and public, and *coetus*, which he interprets as secret, private meetings.

them.[309] Civilis in the Batavian revolt also holds out the idea that all ethnic troops in the Roman army should still be counted as German.[310] The misconceived nature of Florus' plan and its central idea are emphasised by the juxtaposition of the ethnic marker *conscripta e Treviris* with the Roman ideological marker *disciplina nostra.*[311] Tacitus' use of *nostra* instead of *Romana* is likely significant, as Haynes' study of the possessive pronoun in the *Histories* concluded that:

> '*Nos* and its variants are not interchangeable with *Romani* in the Histories; they reflect ideological boundaries. They occur relatively infrequently, excepting those found in *oratio recta*, and the preponderance are in book 4, where the stakes for dividing "us" from "them" are highest. While Tacitus frequently uses variants of *Romani* in the narrative, where he wishes to signal an ideological distinction he uses the pronoun instead; (…)'[312]

Shaped into different people by their Roman environment and service, the majority of these Treveran cavalrymen in the *Annals* stay true to Rome.

Florus, it seems, needs to get away from urban, ordered spaces imbued with Roman ideology in order to be able to take the field against Rome. Hence his next move, into the countryside: *aliud vulgus obaeratorum aut clientium arma cepit; petebantque saltus quibus nomen Arduenna* (*Ann.* 3.42). The trope of German forests as largely inimical to Rome is frequently employed in Tacitus, whether dangerous and frightening in and of themselves[313], or because Germans use them to conspire (as Civilis does)[314] or entrap Romans.[315] Such a

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[309]See chapters one and two.
[310]*Hist.* 4.17.14-17: *ne Vindicis aciem cogitarent: Batavo equite protritos Aeduos Arvernosque; fuisse inter Verginii auxilia Belgas, vereque reputantibus Galliam suismet viribus concidisse.*
[311]See chapter three for the mutinies narrative's linking of a relaxation of *disciplina* within the camp with resistance to authority.
[312]Haynes (2003), 161.
[313]As in Caecina's speech to his panicked and fleeing soldiers at *Ann.* 1.67 (*quod si fugerent, pluris silvas, profundas magis paludes, saevitiam hostium superesse*) and as places which harbour non-Roman strangeness (*hinc veteranarum cohortium signa, inde depromptae silvis lucisque ferarum imagines, ut cuique genti inire proelium mos est, mixta belli civilis externique facie obstupefecerant obsessos*, *Hist.* 4.22.11-14).
[314]*Hist.* 4.14 *Civilis primores gentis et promptissimos vulgi specie epularum sacrum in nemus vocatos, ubi (…) iniurias et raptus et cetera servitii mala enumerat.*

location, outside the bounds of civilisation, is therefore suited only to its natives or to those who have turned their backs on the civilised world for other reasons. In these categories do we find Florus' final remaining supporters of *obaerati* and *clientes*, debtors and retainers, who are the only ones to accompany him to do battle. Martin and Woodman as well as Koestermann *ad loc.* note that these two categories of people recall the followers of Orgetorix at Caes *BG* 1.4.2, who help him to escape the course of justice when his own tribe arraigns him for ambitions outside the scope of the plans they had entrusted to him. The association is therefore one of lawlessness, describing Florus' final followers as 'lowlifes': only this kind of people or non-Romans would take to the forests.

There are broad parallels between Tacitus' account of Florus' revolt and the way Sallust reported, over a century earlier, on the causality, spatial dynamics and people involved in the Catilinarian conspiracy. Already prominent in scholarship are the prominence of debt and poverty as drivers for both revolts[316], resulting in a similar following of the disaffected who felt excluded from what Rome had to offer.[317] Though no Roman literature evinces sympathy for Catiline's decision to make war on the Roman state, no counter-narratives are offered by Sallust or Cicero either to deny the prevalence and seriousness of the levels of debt in the 60s BC which motivated the conspiracy. The conspirators' complaints have substance, and Catiline's speeches are highly emotionally wrought (for examples, see n. 319, as well as *BC* 58). This creates a

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[315]As at *Ann.* 1.63, *Arminius colligi suos et propinquare silvis monitos vertit repente: mox signum prorumpendi dedit iis quos per saltus occultaverat*, and indeed during the *clades Variana*.

[316]Noted by Martin and Woodman *ad loc*, though not Koestermann. Also by Lavan (2017), 31 and Low (2013), 213, though the latter connects the similarities to the mutinies and through them proleptically to the Civil War of AD69.

[317]The *superbia* of Catiline's perceived oppressors is implied in his speech to the assembled conspirators, and the expressed feeling of being 'shortchanged' is very much in the spirit of Florus and Civilis', and indeed the other revolters', complaints: *Nam postquam res publica in paucorum potentium ius atque dicionem concessit, semper illis reges, tetrarchae vectigales esse, populi, nationes stipendia pendere; ceteri omnes, strenui, boni, nobiles atque ignobiles, vulgus fuimus, sine gratia, sine auctoritate, iis obnoxii, quibus, si res publica valeret, formidini essemus. Itaque omnis gratia, potentia, honos, divitiae apud illos sunt aut ubi illi volunt; nobis reliquere pericula, repulsas, iudicia, egestatem. Quae quousque tandem patiemini, o fortissumi viri? Nonne emori per virtutem praestat quam vitam miseram atque inhonestam, ubi alienae superbiae ludibrio fueris, per dedecus amittere?* (*BC* 20.7-9).

moral ambivalence about rebels: depicted as oppressed citizens with just complaints, they are also condemned for their employment of violence against the state. The ambivalence remains throughout the narrative, all the way up to Catiline's heroic and admirable final stand (*strenui militis et boni imperatoris officia simul exequebatur*, *BC* 60.5) and tragic end in which he chooses death over renouncing his cause (*Catilina vero longe a suis inter hostium cadavera repertus est*, *BC* 61.4). In Florus and Sacrovir's emphasis on the Gallic communities' sad plight and Florus' similarly tragic but noble end (*sua manu cedidit*), the episode re-works the moral ambivalence of the Catilinarian story, adding further force to the sympathy expressed in Rome for these provincials' desire for regime change.

The Catilinarian conspiracy and Florus' management of the northern half of the revolt share the spatial evolution from conspiracy in urban domestic space (*BC* 17.2-3 and 27.3, see n. 309) to countryside battle (*BC* 56.4 *per montis iter*, 57.5 *montibus atque copiis hostium sese clausum*, and 59.2 *planities erat inter sinistros montis*). The spatial dynamics of the Florus revolt, which equate Roman urbanity with civilisation and countryside with relative barbarity and end with an *inconditam multitudinem* in the Ardennes forest, are prefigured in Sallust's description of the mountain army of debtors with which Catiline makes his last stand.[318] Non-Roman, 'other' space is the last resort for those who feel the Roman world has excluded them completely and so driven them out spatially as well as metaphorically.[319]

Roman history among the Cherusci

Autocratic power and resistance to it are also at the heart of the story of the Cheruscan king Italicus (*Ann.* 11.16-17). Instead of focusing on space, the episode brings to the fore the complexities of imperial identity in the figure of the Roman-fostered German Italicus, only to dismiss these as secondary to the

[318]*BC* 56.3 mentions the large proportion of rebels without military training or proper armour, 57.1 the desertion, at the news that the conspiracy at Rome had been discovered, of a large proportion even of those, and Catiline's *contio* before the final battle re-emphasises necessity as the motive of all that had been done.
[319]The note sent by Catiline's general Gaius Manlius to Marcius Rex, deputed to watch the conspirators' movements once they had left the city, speaks of *necessitudo*, *BC* 33.5.

illustration of how autocratic power is inherently corrupting. Italicus' introduction into the narrative stresses not only both sides of his heritage but also the very Roman-sounding circumstances which led up to his investiture.

Tacitus starts as follows:

> *Eodem anno Cheruscorum gens regem Roma petivit, amissis per interna bella nobilibus et uno reliquo stirpis regiae, qui apud urbem habebatur nomine Italicus. paternum huic genus e Flavo fratre Arminii, mater ex Actumero principe Chattorum erat; ipse forma decorus et armis equisque in patrium nostrumque morem exercitus.*
>
> *Ann.* 11.16

> 'In the same year, the tribe of the Cherusci asked Rome for a king, having lost to internal strife all but one of their nobles, who was of royal stock, and was being held in Rome, going by the name of Italicus. His paternal descent was from Flavus, brother of Arminius; his mother had been born to Actumerus, chief of the Chatti; he himself was handsome in appearance and trained in both his native and our way of fighting and riding.'

His background encompasses ties to the independent German nation of the Chatti, to Rome's recent nemesis Arminius, even more directly to one of Rome's staunchest Cheruscan supporters Flavus, and to the city of Rome itself.[320] Both his identity and position are complex: of native stock (*uno reliquo stirpis regiae*), but with a long-standing association with Rome and comfortable in both cultures (*armis equisque in patrium nostrumque morem exercitus*).[321] The narrative proceeds to explore the difficulties of this position in the specific context of the Cherusci as well as inviting more general reflections on patterns of power and resistance. Read through the narrowest lens of its immediate circumstances, the narrative makes clear that Italicus' hybridity puts him in a position to appeal to both sides of the internally torn Cherusci. Tacitus had

[320]Malloch (2013) *ad loc.* distinguishes between 'would-be monarchs of foreign peoples' who tended to be resident in Rome, and 'foreign monarchs taking refuge or being detained within the empire', who were settled elsewhere, giving the examples of Segestes in Gaul or Arminius' wife and son in Ravenna (both *Ann.* 1.58). Maroboduus, interestingly, is offered an *honoratam sedem in Italia* by Tiberius without further specification (*Ann.* 2.63), and Vannius simply a *tutum perfugium* by Claudius (*Ann.* 12.29).

[321]Malloch (2013) *ad loc.* suggests the name may indicate that he was born in Italy.

already described the tribe as divided in *Annals* 1 and 2, between the pro-Roman Flavus and anti-Roman Arminius. The persistence of those internal divisions twenty-five years later (AD47) is confirmed by Tacitus through the phrases *potentiam eius suspectantes qui factionibus floruerant* (*Ann.* 11.16) and *nec pauciores Italicum sequebantur* (*Ann.* 11.17). Italicus is presented as sufficiently Romanised to be an example to the pro-Roman amongst the Cherusci, but with sufficient native culture to satisfy the traditionalists. However, hybridity can be exploited and turned from an asset into a handicap by those with bad intentions and a good grasp of rhetoric. Issues successively raised as precluding the legitimacy of his rule over the Cherusci are his birthplace in Rome (*neminem isdem in terris ortum qui principem locum impleat [?]*), his father's Roman military service which saw the latter pitted against Arminius, and the perceived likelihood that Italicus therefore might also choose to fight against his own people (*si paterna Italico mens esset, non alium infensius arma contra patriam ac deos penatis quam parentem eius exercuisse*). Finally, there are the consequences of a foreign upbringing. *Infectum alimonio servitio cultu, omnibus externis* is either puzzlingly obscure or plainly inappropriate, given the text's insistence in the introduction on the care taken by Rome to educate Italicus in his native culture. The odd claim amounts to a denial of hybridity as a valid state and the equation of any Roman influence with a loss of Germanness; in this, the anonymous detractors follow a line of reasoning already set out by Arminius[322] and the Tencteri.[323] Since one prevalent characteristic of Germanness is *libertas*, both Arminius and the Tencteri equate the state of the new Romans Flavus and the Agrippinenses, who are not allowed to be hybrid, with *servitium*. The Cherusci also deny Italicus that right.

Against adversaries seeking to undermine his native credentials, Italicus advances two claims with important rhetorical antecedents in Roman imperialism and in Tacitus specifically. The first is that he was *invited* onto the

[322]*Flavus aucta stipendia, torque et coronam alique militaria dona memorat, inridente Arminio vilia servitii pretia*, *Ann.* 2.9.
[323]*muros coloniae, munimenta servitii* (*Hist.* 4.64.11-12) and *instituta cultumque patrium resumite, abruptis voluptatibus, quibus Romani plus adversus subiectos quam armis valent* (*Hist.* 4.64.19-21).

Cheruscan throne (*non enim inrupisse ad invitos sed accitum memorabat*), which Tacitus' factual introduction *eodem anno Cheruscorum gens regem Roma petivit* (*Ann.* 11.16) does not call into doubt. This claim resembles Rome's traditional defence of its Gallic and German campaigns: that Roman interference in these areas had been by invitation.[324] Petillius Cerialis invoked it in his speech to the Treveri and Lingones during the Batavian revolt at *Hist.* 4.73.7-9 (*terram vestram ceterorumque Gallorum ingressi sunt duces imperatoresque Romani nulla cupidine, sed maioribus vestris invocantibus*, 'Roman generals and emperors came into your lands and those of the other Gauls not through greed, but with your ancestors begging us to').[325] Italicus' defence also contains an echo of Tacitean rhetoric: he rails that *falso libertatis vocabulum obtendi ab iis qui privatim degeneres, in publicum exitiosi, nihil spei nisi per discordias habeant*, 'That the word *libertas* was being touted by those who were privately immoral, disastrous to the public good, and had no hopes other than what could be achieved through civil war'. Tacitus as narrator explained the success of Civilis' alliance at *Hist* 4.25.17 in terms of exactly such a spurious brandishing of the catchphrase *libertas*, claiming other tribes joined *spe libertatis et, si exuissent servitium, cupidine imperitandi* rather than for any more valid reasons. Shortly after this, Tacitus' Petillius Cerialis warned the defeated but still restive Treveri and Lingones against such self-interest in the guise of freedom-fighting in similar terms: *ceterum libertas et speciosa nomina praetexuntur; nec quisquam alienum servitium et dominationem sibi concupivit ut non eadem ista vocabula usurparet*, 'of course freedom and other empty words are being dangled in front of you; no one has ever desired the slavery of others and tyranny for themselves

[324]Fontanella (2008), 215–16 notes the trope's initial development from Cic. *ad Q. fr.* 1.1.34. Caesar had also deployed this line of reasoning in Gaul, using it to rebuke the Aedui under Liscus's leadership: *praesertim cum magna ex parte eorum precibus adductus bellum susceperit, multo etiam gravius quod sit destitutus queritur* (*BG* 1.16). It was still current in the mid-second century AD, when we find Aelius Aristides recycling it in his Roman Oration celebrating Roman government over the culturally superior Greeks; cf. Fontanella above.

[325]Fontanella (ibid.) noted Cerialis' use of the trope in this footnote without making explicit claims about its relation to Aristides' stance. A notable further similarity between the speeches, however, make it plausible that Aristides borrowed from Tacitus: Cerialis' remarks on nothing in government or command being closed off from provincials (*nihil separatum clausumve*, *Hist.* 4.74.7-8) recur in sections 63 and 65 of the Roman Oration.

who has not used these very words' (*Hist.* 4.73.21-3).[326] In short, the fresh German king, raised at Rome and crowned with Roman support, is employing against his own people a number of rhetorical strategies which elsewhere in the text are used to defuse threats to Roman authority. In answering his detractors thus, Italicus is proving their point.

Despite Italicus' introduction to the narrative as a hybrid, therefore, both the Cherusci's accusations and his response to them – despite claiming the opposite – position him as Roman. To this surprising unanimity, Tacitus adds Rome's view on Italicus as a third perspective which further cements him as a Roman rather than a hybrid or a German. When he was ready to leave Rome for Germany, Tacitus reports that

> *Caesar auctum pecunia, additis stipatoribus, hortatur gentile decus magno animo capessere: illum primum Romae ortum nec obsidem, sed civem ire externum ad imperium.*
>
> *Ann.* 11.16

> 'Caesar boosted his efforts with money, and attendants thrown in, and encouraged him to lay claim to his family's inheritance with good courage, because he was the first to be born at Rome and go forth to a foreign post not as a hostage but as a citizen.'

Through the use of *civis* and *imperium*, Tacitus makes clear that Claudius was sending Italicus away on a Roman errand: a Roman *civis* with a Roman expense account and Roman entourage going to exercise *imperium* over foreigners, as Romans do. Tacitus reports that he discharged his office fairly (*nullis discordiis imbutus pari in omnis studio ageret*) and exercised *comitas* and *temperantia*.[327] Both these qualities are associated particularly with Germanicus in the

[326]On Tacitus and *libertas*, see Liebeschuetz reading of the *Agricola* (1966); for the theme in the first hexad of the *Annals* as well as a general overview, see Low (2013), 24-8.

[327]Even if he combined these political qualities with the personal vices of *vinolentia* and *libidines*, described as *grata barbaris* in line with traditional depictions of drunken Germans.

Annals[328], but are notably absent from Tacitus' portrayal of the reclusive and suspicious 'bad emperor' Tiberius. When Italicus fails to pacify the tribe because his enemies considered his hybridity suspect, the narrative therefore shows they have good grounds to believe so.[329] Their fear that *adimi veterem Germaniae libertatem et Romanas opes insurgere* (*Ann.* 11.16) prompts them to take action. In this first conflict, Italicus wins a military victory (*magno inter barbaros proelio victor rex*, *Ann.* 11.17) but clearly not an ideological one, as a second conflict follows, in which he is deposed, though afterwards restored: *secunda fortuna ad superbiam prolapsus pulsusque ac rursus Langobardorum opibus refectus per laeta per adversa res Cheruscas adflictabat*, 'after this good fortune he lapsed gradually into arrogance and was expelled; restored again with the help of the Langobardi, he continued to vex the affairs of the Cherusci through good and bad times for a long time' (*Ann.* 11.17).[330] High-handedness (here labelled *superbia*) is therefore still a factor at the time of the second, more successful conflict. The story of Italicus thus twice associates *superbia* with revolt, and connects the suffering Cherusci with the rebellious Batavi, Treveri, Frisii and Roman mutineers. In doing so, it further transcends the boundaries of geography and citizenship when it comes to the effects of autocratic (whether imperial or regal) power.

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[328]Pelling (2012), 283-4 notes the emphasis on Germanicus' *comitas*. Kelly (2010), 231 characterises this as a virtue specifically associated with the Roman Republic, alongside *temperantia*. For Kelly, Germanicus is a model of 'moderate political behaviour' (p. 224, 231). This would fits with the mutineers' (misguided) view that Germanicus shared his father Drusus's suspected Republican leanings (*Ann.* 1.33).

[329]The narrative is rich and layered enough to bypass the facile explanation that Romans thought Germans simply incapable of refraining from squabbling and shaking things up. That trope is certainly at play within the Tacitean corpus (e.g. Petillius Cerialis: *terram vestram ceterorumque Gallorum ingressi sunt duces imperatoresque Romani nulla cupidine, maioribus vestris invocantibus, quos discordiae usque ad exitium fatigabant*, *Hist.* 4.73.7-10) and the initial sketch of the Cherusci's circumstances (*Ann.* 11.16) relies on a similar framework (*amissis per interna bella nobilibus et uno reliquo stirpis regiae… Italicus*), but then takes it in a different direction.

[330]In the Suebian Vannius' case Rome is explicitly unwilling to assist him in regaining his throne, only offering a safe space in which to await a change in situation (*nec Claudius, quamquam saepe oratus, arma certantibus barbaris interposuit, tutum Vannio perfugium promittens, si pelleretur*, *Ann.* 12.29). The *odium accolarum* precludes assistance from neighbours such as Italicus received from the Langobardi.

Through the use of the terminology of *regnum* and *superbia* in this particular story, however, it also makes a connection to Roman Republican revolutions. The first of these was the deposition of Rome's last king Tarquinius Superbus, also *ad superbiam prolapsus*, after which the *libertas*-loving people of early Rome made *regnum* give way to the *res publica*. This is the event with which Tacitus begins his *Annals*, despite their official title's delineation of the work's scope as *ab excessu divi Augusti* (manifestly not *ab urbe condita*): *Urbem Romam a principio reges habuere; libertatem et consulatum L. Brutus instituit* (*Ann.* 1.1). Though literal *superbia* is absent here too, the mention of *libertas* means something like *regnum* or *superbia* is clearly the implied antithesis. Readers would have been aware of the Livian story of Superbus' deposition[331], and Sallust does use *superbia* in the introduction to the *Bellum Catilinae* to describe this very same same transition from kingship to republic.[332] In prompting recollection of this earlier episode in Roman history, Italicus' story reminds the reader that imperial Rome has failed to perpetuate its early model of rising up in response to *superbia* in a way that Germany is still able to (though ultimately they fail too, as I mentioned on the previous page and will discuss further at the end of this section). Italicus' deposition bears out Civilis' claim in the *Histories* that obedience to kings is fine for the Orient but not for free Germans, untainted by Romanisation (*servirent Syria Asiaque et suetus regibus Oriens*, *multos adhuc in Gallia vivere ante tributa genitos*, *Hist.* 4.17.20-1). The Germans who rightfully depose their overly arrogant autocratic ruler thus behave as Civilis claims free Germans historically have and should again.

The second key transformational moment in Roman political history recalled by Italicus' story is the transition of Republic into principate, called to mind here precisely because of the process' similarity to Italicus' accession to the throne. Just as the Cherusci had lost most of their nobles through internal strife and then needed a king to set them right, so had and did Rome after Antony and Octavian's civil war was over. This event, too, is described by Tacitus in the first

[331]Livy 1.59-60.
[332]*Post, ubi regium imperium, quod initio conservandae libertatis atque augendae rei publicae fuerat, in superbiam dominationemque se convortit*, *BC* 6.7.

chapter of the *Annals*: … *Lepidi atque Antonii arma in Augustum cessere, qui cuncta discordiis civilibus fessa nomine principis sub imperium accepit,* '… the military dominance of Lepidus and Antonius submitted to Augustus, who took into his care, under the name of *princeps*, everything that had been drained by civil discord' (*Ann.* 1.1). In the case of both the Cherusci and the Late Roman Republic, Tacitus admits the need for a breathing space under a stable ruler over the instability and destruction caused by trying to preserve *libertas*. But whereas the Cherusci can still rally enough resistance to oust – at least temporarily – their leader when he oversteps the bounds, Rome under the principate takes no action despite increasing despotism.

Instead of taking up arms against the *superbia* of its own autocratic leader, the principate shifted its focus to putting other people in their place, in a continuous series of conquests (Britain) and campaigns (Germany, Britain, Armenia) despite Augustus and Tiberius' preference for policies of containment and German self-destruction. Virgil articulated the change well in his description of the Roman imperial mission as *debellare superbos*[333], meaning only those *outside* the empire. For the *superbia* of emperors, Tacitus' Cerialis prescribes acquiescence not just to the Treveri and Lingones, but also to the Roman reader, by means of his reformulation of Tacitus' assertion at the beginning of the *Annals* that alternatives were no longer possible. This time not because nobody remembers what the Republic looked like (as claimed for the post-Actium generation at *Ann.* 1.3), but because humans will corrupt even the most optimal of political configurations: *quo modo sterilitatem aut nimios imbris et cetera naturae mala, ita luxum vel avaritiam dominantium tolerate. vitia erunt, donec homines*, 'in the same way you put up with drought and excessive rainfall and other natural disasters, do so with the excesses and greed of those who rule you. There will be vices as long as there are humans' (*Hist.* 4.74.9-12).

Through the dual strategies of Italicus' engagement with the rhetoric of Petillius Cerialis in the *Histories* on the one hand, and the evocation of circumstantial parallels between the Germans' response of revolt to *superbia* and past Roman

[333]Virgil, *A.* 6.851.

responses to the same scenario, Tacitus again asserts a universal pattern of power and resistance. A corollary of this is the erasure of distinctions of identity. The Italicus episode initially seems to set German *libertas* sharply against Roman *servitus,* only to abruptly collapse the distinction between the two when Italicus is restored to the throne despite his bad behaviour and successful deposition.[334]

Corbulo in Germany

Optimising the imperialist assemblage

The other half of the *Germanae res* in book 11 shifts from being in dialogue with the Batavian revolt to engaging primarily with Tacitus' account of Germanicus' campaigns thirty years earlier.[335] The portrayals of general, events and landscape are all almost entirely opposite.[336]

Corbulo's relationship with the German landscape is defined by successful ingress and egress from Germany. He successfully brings warships and other craft inland via the Rhine and its tributaries: *triremis alveo Rheni, ceteras navium, ut quaeque habiles, per aestuaria et fossas adegit*, 'he brought up triremes through the deep channel of the Rhine and other types of ships, of a suitable kind, through shallows and canals', *Ann.* 11.18. An implied contrast with Germanicus at *Ann.* 2.8 is inescapable: *...usque ad Amisiam flumen secunda navigatione pervehitur. classis Amisiae ore relicta laevo amne, erratumque in eo quod non subvexit aut transposuit militem dextras in terras iturum*, '... until he

[334]Similarly, the tribe had, twenty-five years earlier, murdered Arminius for overstepping the terms of his leadership (*Arminius abscedentibus Romanis et pulso Maroboduo regnum adfectans libertatem popularium adversam habuit, petitusque armis cum varia fortuna certaret, dolo propinquorum cecidit, Ann.* 2.88), only to end up exhausting themselves through in-fighting and clamouring for a new ruler and thus resuming the same cycle. And the internal division which led to the deposition of king Maroboduus, *regis nomen invisum apud popularis* (*Ann.* 2.44), by the Suebi produced the situation in which Rome placed them under the guardianship of another king, Vannius of the Quadi (*Ann.* 2.63).

[335]The disturbance's partial cause in the death of the Roman governor (*morte Sanquinii alacres*, *Ann.* 11.18) does not really align it with the arguments concerning imperial death proposed in chapter three: the Chauci were not subjects of the Roman emperor and their actions here are clearly motivated by opportunism, not the desire to renegotiate a political relationship, cf. Florus and Sacrovir's revolt, p. 174-5.

[336]Malloch (2013) *ad loc.* sees the contrast as one between the dynamism of Corbulo and the bad management of his cause by Italicus.

came to the river Ems via a favourable journey. The fleet was left tethered to the left bank of the Ems, and in doing so an error was made because Germanicus had not sailed up to or disembarked his soldiers onto the lands on the right bank where they were going'. Corbulo's departure from Germany exceeds even this easy navigation of Germany's existing access routes. His cutting of a canal asserts Roman engineering's mastery over the landscape's natural state, whilst facilitating avoidance of Ocean (*qua incerta Oceani vitarentur*, *Ann.* 11.20) as one aspect of it they cannot control. Germanicus, we may recall, was picturesquely shipwrecked on the North Sea (*Ann.* 2.24).[337]

In Tacitus' account, this ease of moving around produces correspondingly more convincing military successes. After his smooth journey into inner Germany, Corbulo's fleet wins a battle against the barbarian fleet (*luntribusque hostium depressis*), whereas Germanicus' erroneous landing forces him to waste time building bridges, in the course of which process he loses some badly-disciplined troops to the river's torrent. Corbulo also succeeds in expelling the barbarian rebel leader Gannascus from his lair (*exturbato Gannasco*), whereas Germanicus failed to achieve any definitive victory over Arminius, partly because of his struggles to navigate the German forests. In terms of the troops' response to the landscape, the harsh discipline imposed by Corbulo (*veterem ad morem reduxit*, *Ann.* 11.18) increases the *virtus* of his troops (*Ann.* 11.19) in contrast to the 'unmanning' fear and mourning of Germanicus' soldiers at Teutoburg (*Ann.* 1.62) and the panicked flight of Caecina's troops from their camp when they mistakenly believe they are under German attack (*Ann.* 1.66). Germanicus' troops feared the landscape of memory and ruin more than they feared their commanding officers, but those commanded by Corbulo are fearful only of their his discipline (his actions are described as a *terror*, *Ann.* 11.19). The imperial general Germanicus and his imperial soldiers struggle; the Republican general Corbulo and soldiers, drilled Republican-style, hold their own.

The contrast between the two was noted in general terms by Ash, and the retrospective (negative) impact on the reader's view of Germanicus as a general

[337]*per omnis illos dies noctesque apud scopulos et prominentis oras*.

acknowledged.[338] However, the specificity of the comparative material makes it possible to put all this into the framework of the assemblage of factors. Seen through this lens, the narrative clearly suggests that Corbulo has a better understanding than Germanicus of how the assemblage of factors in Germany might impact his projects: what is manageable in the landscape, and what aspects of it are beyond the power of Roman change; the importance of firm troop discipline and high morale. He acts accordingly. For any other Roman general active in Tacitus' account of German affairs, the local people and the place itself conspire in creating resistance or destruction for Rome. For Corbulo people and place are optimised in as far as possible to help his mission succeed. In this framework, it would be easy to conclude that Corbulo is simply a better general than Germanicus. However, it seems more plausible that the almost itemised comparison set up by Tacitus is meant to illustrate precisely the value of Germanicus' campaigns (and failures) in shaping Corbulo's approach fifteen years later. Rome has puts its past experience to good use. It is as if Corbulo has fed Germanicus' experiences into his matrix of factors and changed his approach accordingly to procure a different outcome.

Establishing a Republic among the Frisii

Germanicus' campaigns could be no guide, however, for the second part of Corbulo's mission, the cowing of the rebellious Frisii:

> *et natio Frisiorum, post rebellionem clade L. Apronii coeptam infensa aut male fida, datis obsidibus consedit apud agros a Corbulone descriptos: idem senatum, magistratus, leges imposuit. ac ne iussa exuerent praesidium immunivit…*
>
> *Ann.* 11.19

> 'The tribe of the Frisii, still hostile and of doubtful loyalty after the rebellion begun with the defeat of L. Apronius, settled down after giving hostages in territory allocated to them by Corbulo: he imposed a senate, magistrates and laws on them. And to prevent them from disobeying his commands, he strengthened the local garrison...'

[338]Ash (2006), 360–61.

The passage, set in AD47, references the defeat of L. Apronius, in AD28, and must be understood in light of it. At *Annals* 4.72-4, Tacitus gave some context on the Frisii's relationship with Rome as well as the origins of this conflict with Apronius. Originally sympathetically assessed for tax (*pro angustia rerum*, 'in line with the scarcity of their resources', *Ann.* 4.72) by the Elder Drusus in 12BC, forty years later in AD28 a high-ranking *primipilarius* among the Frisii called Olennius increased their tax to a level which the tribe could not reasonably sustain.[339] Tacitus explicitly mentions the small size of Frisian cattle[340], and narrates how the tribe resorted to selling this cattle, their land, and finally themselves and their relatives in order to be able to pay the new tribute. Then they rebel, and defeat Apronius. The connection between excesses of the Roman imperial government and the violation of the free (even if not, in this case, citizen) body in this passage recalls the situations of the abused mutineers and raped Batavi particularly.

From a spatial angle, however, the condensed tale in *Annals* 4 is a very short version of Roman rapacity leading to a collapse of Roman control in a specific area of Germany. Tacitus' narrative mentions no attempts to address the Frisii's concern, only Apronius' military repression. This heavy-handedness explains the tribe's continued restiveness in AD47 when Corbulo arrives, which Tacitus describes as *post rebellionem clade L. Apronii coeptam infensa aut male fida*, 'still hostile and of doubtful loyalty after the rebellion begun with the defeat of L. Apronius'. The short passage in *Annals* 11 then narrates how Corbulo attempts to reassert Roman control over the Frisii by enforcing (*imposuit*) spatial (*consedit*) and political (*senatus magistratus leges*) changes under threat of violence (*immunivit*) rather than through exerting immediate and direct

[339]During this intervening period, Germanicus had not had any dealings with them, beyond his lieutenant Albinovanus Pedo taking his troops through their territory unmolested on his way elsewhere (*equitem Pedo praefectus finibus Frisiorum ducit*, *Ann.* 1.60). Their faithful status as Roman allies during that time explains why they were not amongst those tribes obliterated by Germanicus. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that this long-standing entanglement with Rome, despite their lapse in AD28, explains why Corbulo in AD47 does not subject them to a Germanicus-style genocide. These people are, for better or for worse, part of the Roman Empire.

[340]*id aliis quoque nationibus arduum apud Germanos difficilius tolerabatur, quis ingentium beluarum feraces saltus, modica domi armenta sunt*, *Ann.* 4.72.

violence, as Apronius did. The general is instituting a stable political system along Roman Republican lines in an area empty of previous associations and power structures (at least, Tacitus does not explicitly say so, but it seems the likeliest explanation for the spatial change which accompanies the societal change).

The passage paints a picture of an imperial general, in a Republican tradition[341], setting up a Republic on the periphery of the empire, and whom Tacitus records as having expressed longing, upon his recall by Claudius, for the freedom of action granted to generals of the Republic (*beatos quondam duces Romanos*, *Ann.* 11.20). It is indeed the *scope* and *extent* of his actions in Germany (proactive, *novam vim*, instead of reactive once Gannascus is killed and the Frisii settled) which compels Claudius to recall Corbulo (*Ann.* 11.19), as Tiberius had recalled Germanicus. But the *nature* of his actions among the Frisii is exceptional among imperial generals, even those who formed part of the dynasty. As we saw in the previous chapter, Germanicus' proactivity was focused on repression, to the point of genocide, and resulted in trophies modelled after Augustus' at La Turbie both in proclaiming this repression and in prominently bearing the name of Augustus' successor Tiberius (*Ann.* 2.18 and 2.22). Corbulo does not crush the Frisii with his army and commemorate the feat with a trophy, but tries to bring into being among them a rule of law (*leges*) and collective decision-making (*senatus*) which is outdated at the imperial centre in the politics of Rome, which monopolises power as it has monopolised military glory.[342]

The passage suggests that Corbulo thought the old Roman values, upheld almost exclusively by himself alone among imperial Roman generals, might still be present, or potentially achievable, on the periphery among free non-Romans. Other passages in Tacitus allow similar readings of barbarians as old Romans.

[341]*Ann.* 11.18 *veteram ad morem reduxit* refers to 'the old-fashioned ways'. It is also known of Corbulo that he had encouraged his posthumous presentation as such by modeling himself in his memoirs after one of the last great generals of the Republic, Lucullus; see Ash (2006), 356.
[342]Triumphs had long been restricted to members of the imperial family at this point; Sidebottom (2005), 319.

Katherine Clarke read Calgacus' Caledonians in the *Agricola* as such[343], and the Batavi of the *Histories* or the Cherusci of *Annals* 11 also portray barbarians choosing violent insurrection as the only appropriate response to tyranny, whether of Romans or their own countrymen. All these had made attempts to push back against unacceptable threats to whatever conception of *libertas* they felt they had left. The Frisii themselves had shown a decade earlier under Olennius that they would not indefinitely tolerate infractions of their *libertas*; in this regard at least, they appear suitable candidates to become Corbulo's new Roman Republicans. Equipping them still further to take on this role, Tacitus reported that even at the time of their rebellion in AD28 they had not been opposed to their involvement with the Roman Empire *per se*: *pacem exuere, nostra magis avaritia quam obsequii impatientes* (*Ann.* 4.72).

But just as the Caledonians were mistaken in thinking themselves too remote to be reeled into the destructive expansion of imperial space, and the supposedly *libertas*-loving Cherusci only managed to oust the Romanised Italicus once but not twice before being enslaved by his autocratic rule, Corbulo's Republican experiment with the Frisii fails. The tribe ups sticks in AD58 during the reign of Nero (*Ann.* 13.54), as soon as the constraint of military force is removed.[344] Their abandonment of Corbulo's miniature Republic highlights a mismatch. The Republic cannot be brought into being under the empire, not even with Germans since the imperial context of its genesis, as with Italicus' investiture, infects the Republic. The maintenance of the Frisian Republic depended on Corbulo's threat of violence – *ac ne iussa exuerent praesidium immunivit* – a practice which in itself looks suspiciously imperial. His military activity in Germany followed this same pattern of initial Republican success where (Germanicus') imperial management failed, but which then proves to be short-

[343]See Clarke (2001), 106-9, including the creation and simultaneous problematisation of this image by Tacitus.

[344]Corbulo himself had already been ordered back to the Gallic bank of the Rhine (*cis Rhenum*, *Ann.* 11.19) by Claudius at the end of AD47. By AD58, Tacitus makes clear, local generals preferred to get their triumphs through peaceful government in Germany rather than through military action *(pervulgatis triumphi insignibus maius ex eo decus sperabant si pacem continuavissent*, *Ann.* 13.53). This situation gave rise to a rumour that they were actively forbidden from engaging in battle with German tribes, and on the basis of this rumour (*eoque, Ann.* 13.54), the Frisii leave.

lived and unsustainable: Corbulo conquers Germany no more than Germanicus did.

Having oscillated between *libertas*-loving Germans in *Annals* 4 and then tentative Republicans in *Annals* 11, the migrating Frisii in their final appearance in *Annals* 13 look most like the Germans of the *Germania* as discussed in chapter six. Tacitus does not ventriloquise a native perspective on the attempted change of habitation. Their unexplained move instead resembles the world of the *Germania* in which topographical fixity does not apply. When the Frisii are first mentioned in the narrative (*Ann.* 4.72) they are introduced as a *transrhenanus populus* (residence across the Rhine being, by and large, a marker of Germanness[345]). Their migration away from the Corbulonian settlement thus shows that neither their subjection to Rome nor Corbulo's attempt to transform them into Republican Romans have affected their essentially German nature. The final part of their narrative deals with their subsequent occupation of *agrosque vacuos et militum usui sepositos* (*Ann.* 13.54), their appeal to Nero to be allowed to stay, and their forcible removal when they refuse to leave as instructed. The description of their brief sojourn is full of paradoxes that undermine the idea of past, present, or future fixity for the essentially German Frisii: first, *utque patrium solum exercebant,* 'they started to till the soil as if it were that of their forefathers' mocks the ease with which they effect such migrations; secondly, the governor Duvius Avitus' recommendation for them to return *veteres in locos* highlights the difficulty of sending the Frisii back to where they came from (would that be the lands they settled under Corbulo's direction, or the territory before that?); finally, Avitus' alternative recommendation to ask Caesar for a *novam sedem* is almost casual in its suggestion that one more move could easily be accommodated by the tribe. Framed as they are as perpetually fluid in their movements on the Empire's German periphery, the Frisii's massacre by Rome upon their refusal to leave the Roman military lands they had occupied[346] is then a variation on the identity

[345]Chapter six shows the *Germania* allows some exceptions to this rule.
[346]*Nero… Frisios decedere agris iussit. Illis aspernantibus auxiliaris eques repente immissus necessitate attulit, captis caesisve qui pervicacius restiterant*, *Ann.* 13.54.

theme foregrounded by Germanicus' massacre of the Marsi. In both cases, Roman identity and control are asserted through violence over a fundamentally different (German) subject which does not conform to the imperial map and the imperialist project.

The Ampsivarii's migration

If the *Germania* and the tale of the Frisii present a fluid Germany and ever-moving Germans as incomprehensible subjects to Rome, the migration of the Ampsivarii into the territory just vacated by the Frisii (*Ann.* 13.55-6) is about the German Boiocalus' failure to understand the Roman world order of emplacement and fixity. Though the sequence of events is identical to that undergone by the Frisii (occupation, order to leave, appeal, refusal, destruction), this time Tacitus ventriloquises – through Boiocalus – the German perspective which was lacking in the Frisian episode. The discussion allows Tacitus to not only reflect the complex layers of history and occupation in this overlapping frontier zone between a fluid Germany and Roman military space, but also to bring out the irrelevance of either logic or sentiment in the face of power.

After being told, as the Frisii were, to remove the tribe from the Roman military land they had occupied, their chief Boiocalus makes an impassioned speech to the Roman commander Duvius Avitus[347]:

> *vinctum se rebellione Cherusca iussu Arminii referens, mox Tiberio et Germanico ducibus stipendia meruisse, et quinquaginta annorum obsequio id quoque adiungere, quod gentem suam dicioni nostrae subiceret. quo tantam partem campi iacere, in quam pecora et armenta militum aliquando transmitterentur? servarent sane receptus gregibus inter hominum famem, modo ne vastitatem et solitudinem mallent quam amicos populos. Chamavorum quondam ea arva, mox Tubantum et post Vsiporum fuisse. sicuti caelum deis, ita terras generi mortalium datas; quaeque vacuae, eas publicas esse. solum inde suspiciens et cetera sidera vocans quasi coram interrogabat vellentne contueri inane solum: potius mare superfunderent adversus terrarum ereptores.*
>
> *Ann.* 13.55

[347] The Oxford Classical Text records Dubius rather than Duvius, but CIL 4.3340, which attestests his suffect consulship of AD56, has Duvius.

> ‘relating how he had been imprisoned during the Cheruscan rebellion on the orders of Arminius, had then accrued years of service under the generalship of Tiberius and Germanicus, and to fifty years of obedience to Rome he would like to add this, that he could place his people under our jurisdiction. To what purpose did such a parcel of land lie empty, into which cattle and beasts of burden would occasionally be transferred? By all means let them reserve room for the herds during times of hunger for human beings, only let them not prefer wasteland and emptiness over friendly tribes. These fields were once those of the Chamavi, then of the Tubantes and after that the Usipi. Just as the sky was given to the gods, so the earth was given to the race of mortals; lands which are empty are public property. Then, looking up to the sun and calling on the other stars he asked them as if face to face whether it was their will to look out upon unused soil. If so, they should pour out the sea over these lands, to thwart anyone who might otherwise take them!’

A major function of the episode and the speech is to jointly establish a *Germania*-like picture of a fluid Germany with no fixed boundaries and continual migration. The episode’s first sentence described the tribe as *pulsi a Chaucis*, ‘driven from their homes by the Chauci’. In this speech Boiocalus asserts that the contested lands they then occupy had a rich history of changing (German) occupation (*Chamavorum quondam ea arva, mox Tubantum et post Vsiporum fuisse*). The reader recollects that the Frisii had occupied these lands between the Usipi’s departure and the Ampsivarii’s arrival, and may have read the *Germania* with its stress on the fluidity of an ungraspable Germany. Boiocalus’ claim that change is normal in Germany, and therefore the Ampsivarii’s occupation of this territory fitting, is therefore bolstered by the Tacitean narrative outside the speech, even outside the work. This consistent representation makes Rome and its desire for fixing the territory under their rule forever the anomaly. Boiocalus’ speech naïvely aims to convince Rome to fall in with this conception of a German space which they want to treat as fixed.

Alongside disputing the ethics of Rome’s *possession* of the land, Boiocalus also disputes the ethics of Rome’s *use* of the land. He sees no function for emptiness – which he stresses repeatedly, successively calling it *vastitas*, *solitudo*, *vacuae [terrae]* and *inane solum* – especially in the face of his people’s urgent need for shelter and food (*ne vastitatem et solitudinem mallent quam amicos populos*). Here again he opposes his German perspective, which asserts a natural right to

put to use fallow land (*quaequae vacuae eas publicas esse*), to the Roman perspective, which considers this land 'in use' once it is claimed by Rome, even if it is not being worked. Boiocalus' speech does not acknowledge the value to Rome of a clear strip of territory in terms of security and surveillance, as well as the serious power projected by the ability to clear such territory and control access to it.[348] The emptiness of the land is as much a fortification, a spatial measure of power, as a dug encampment. The rebel Calgacus in the *Agricola* perceived this clearly when he equated the *solitudo* which Rome creates with *pax*.[349] Boiocalus' blindness to this fact is markedly selective given his own acknowledged implication in rolling out Roman military subjection elsewhere (*Tiberio, Germanico ducibus stipendia meruisse*).

He even draws on this past complicity in Roman imperialism as a justification for the tribe's settlement in these lands reserved for military (imperialistic) use. In reminding Rome of his past service in loyalty in the same speech in which he claims Roman territory, Boiocalus is essentially proposing an exchange to Avitus (of land for past service) instead of deferring fully to Rome's authority in deciding how to dispose of their territory. His mistake lies not in his assumption that such exchanges could be made, as they could and were[350], but in thinking that they could be enforced, or anticipated. This is a third way in which his speech demonstrates this German's failure to understand the Roman perspective.

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[348]Potter (1992), 273.

[349]*Agr.* 30.5: *Auferre trucidare rapere falsis nominibus imperium, atque ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.*

[350]Indeed, a personal bargain of that nature is offered him by Avitus (*ipsi Boiocalo ob memoriam amicitiae daturum agros*, *Ann.* 13.56). At *Ann.* 13.54 Verritus and Malorix are granted citizenship by Nero, and at *Ann.* 1.59 Segestes accepts settlement for himself *in vetere provincia*, and his relatives are offered *incolumitatem*. Such benefits could be extended to entire communities, e.g. Aphrodisias in the province of Asia for its resistance of Mithridates in 88BC and Caesar's murderers, or the Batavi's exemption from tax in favour of contributing soldiers and arms (*Hist.* 4.17.11 *tributorum expertis*; *Ger.* 29.1 *exempti oneribus et conlationibus et tantum in usum proeliorum sepositi, velut tela atque arma, bellis reservantur*) though see Haynes (2013), 112-6 for the view that such a 'special' arrangement was not always less burdensome than paying tribute.

Duvius Avitus in his response responds to none of these three arguments concerning the essence of Germany, the ethics of specific uses of the land, or the proper reward of provincials' service to Rome. Instead, he asserts only power:

> *patienda meliorum imperia; id dis quos implorarent placitum, ut arbitrium penes Romanos maneret quid darent quid adimerent, neque alios iudices quam se ipsos paterentur.*
>
> *Ann.* 13.56
>
> 'That government by one's betters must simply be tolerated; that it had pleased the gods whom they were beseeching that the final judgment would rest with the Romans as to what they could give or take away, and that they would not tolerate any other arbiters than themselves.'

Duvius Avitus' absence of engagement with any of the arguments advanced by his rhetorical opponent prevents the exchange of speech from becoming a rhetorical agōn.[351] In such a point-by-point exchange between equals, the best argument would win, and Boiocalus' side is articulated with compelling logic and powerful sentiment (indeed, even Avitus is emotionally affected: *Et commotus his Avitus*, *Ann.* 13.56). The Roman general's refusal to engage thus takes the issue out of the realm of ethics, logic or emotion and frames it simply as an issue of power. Like the senators at Rome treading carefully during Tiberius' accession debate whilst the younger Drusus is already on his way to Pannonia *in loco principis*, Boiocalus' exchange with Avitus serves to highlight the futility of words in situations where the power balance is unequal. The truth is that in this particular area, Rome can enforce compliance with its imperialist emplacement and containment and therefore will. The land's emptiness may even be the crucial factor in their ability to do so, judging by the practical and emotional difficulties posed by the German forests in other passages of the *Annals* and *Histories*, and the fluidity of its occupants in the populated Germany of the *Germania*. The German Boiocalus' failure to understand the Roman imperial view of this particular land dispute but also the realities of power more generally is as overwhelming here as Tacitus' incomprehension of Germany's fluidity in the *Germania*.

[351]Though both Boiocalus and Avitus make reference to the gods as arbiters, Haynes (2003, 170-1) notes that once again Boiocalus misunderstands the Roman position, which was that the gods had outsourced their *arbitrium* to the Romans.

Conclusion

Each of the 'smaller' German revolts and conflicts in the *Annals* discussed in this chapter contribute to our understanding of Tacitean historical and political thought. Depicting the deployment of imperial power in Germany as a process involving people, place and power, his narratives show how Rome's power can be occasionally and temporarily constrained and resisted on the west bank of the Rhine, but ultimately wins.

In section one, Florus and Sacrovir's discourse on Roman rapacity and subsequent revolt connected them to the Batavian rebels and Roman mutineers who suffer under the systematic oppression of imperial power. The spatial dynamics of the passage, through links to Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*, develop the theme of how spatial structures create, uphold and enable ideological positions. Such themes are also prominent in Tacitus' account of the Batavian revolt, discussed in chapters one and two. Collectively, they show that power can follow resistance even into these rural and disordered spaces, and overcome it. Florus commits suicide in the Ardennes forest.

Section two showed that the fluctuating and complicated fates of the Romano-Cheruscan king Italicus can be read as a consideration of the difficulties of a hybrid ruler in a German kingdom. But they even more strongly encourage a Roman reading of his accession, deposition and reinvestiture. By replaying Rome's own evolution from one-time defenders of *libertas* to ultimate imperial slaves unable to resist *regnum*, the limits of resistance more than the limits of power are revealed. The bad ruler Italicus wins the day and, in Tacitus' words, goes on to plague his tribe for many years to come. Rather than mirroring Rome for allegorical purposes, however, the episode's unfolding of the pattern of tyranny inviting pushback shows the universal nature of this dynamic, as well as the inevitable triumph of imperial (or regal) autocratic power.

Section three showed Corbulo mastering the same landscapes of Germany more successfully than Germanicus did in the *Annals*. With such pointed contrasts to these earlier episodes, it suggests that his predecessor's work enabled Corbulo

to deploy a more Germano-centric approach to conquest. Within the theoretical framework of the *assemblage* of factors which govern events – a concept which grants landscape its own agency – Corbulo has profited from Germanicus' experiences and is thus more easily able to eliminate or mitigate different factors. The brief interlude in which he settles the Frisii in new territory under a form of Republican government, on the other hand, suggests he is more of a Republican than an imperial general. The Frisii abandon their Republic, showing that this form of government cannot be brought back into being under the principate, not even among foreigners on the empire's periphery. Similarly, the Republican general Corbulo successfully completes individual projects in Germany, but no more manages to pacify the region than the imperial general Germanicus did.

Finally, section four showcased a different kind of misunderstanding, in the Romanised Boiocalus' blindness to the realities of imperial power when it comes to his own tribe, despite his past complicity with Rome in imposing such realities of power on other tribes.

None of these facets show flattering portraits of how empire works, but all show the same crushing mechanics in operation, in different contexts, in different periods, at different speeds. The smaller episodes provide us with further quantitative evidence to support the theory that Tacitus did not see the big upheavals of the Rhine mutinies or the Batavian revolt as unique in kind, only in size. In providing a multitude of examples showing that the same processes of power and resistance took place on either side of the Roman frontier – for the 'outsider' Cherusci and Ampsivarii as well as for the mutineers and the Frisii – this chapter also argues against reading Tacitus as asserting any kind of essentialising discourse concerning peoples and places. Neither citizenship (mutineers) nor distance (Cherusci, Frisii) are any protection against the endlessly replicated brutalities of Roman imperial power.

6 Germania

Introduction

The work which we commonly abbreviate as the *Germania*[352] is a rare monograph in a recognised tradition of ancient ethnography. Ethnography commonly found expression in digressions across all genres, from poetry to historiography, and did not constitute a genre in and of itself.[353] However, certain categories of description were commonly associated with this type of enquiry, such as geography, climate, agricultural produce, habitation and cultural habits of different peoples. All these are present in the Tacitean text.

Nevertheless, scholars have argued plausibly for several Tacitean deviations from the norm (or innovations) within the work, which indicate the author's desire to go beyond mere factual instruction on a fascinating foreign land. O'Gorman read the virtuous Germans in it as a mirror for Roman corrupt morality, and its construction and transmission of details as a Roman act of appropriation (only partially successful) of this territory. Timpe developed similar interpretations of the monograph as a record of both Roman foil and Roman moral failure. Thomas discussed how the deceptively innocent historical digressions within the work warn that the internal stability of the empire is closely tied to the success of German conquest. Most recently, Tan highlighted how the *Germania*'s geographical journey through Germany persistently closes

[352]Rives (1999), 99 points out that we cannot be entirely certain that the commonly accepted title *De origine et situ Germanorum* was the one given to it by Tacitus, though the MS tradition is fairly uniform in adopting it.

[353]See Almagor and Skinner (2015), 2–3 for a brief discussion of the difficulties of defining the term. Woolf (2015), 134–35 asserts forcefully that 'ethnography was not a discipline' and hence talks about ethnographical 'discourse' and 'enquiry', and argued against 'extreme culturally constructionist readings of ancient ethnography' in an earlier piece (Woolf 2009, 210–15); Timpe (2007), 421 talks about a 'formal tradition of ethnography in antiquity' but does not argue for an independent genre, noting the *Germania*'s unique status as a monograph devoted to the purpose amidst a sea of much more common ethnographical *excursus* in historiographical works. O'Gorman (1993), 136 follows him, talking of a 'survey of the country as a whole, following the tradition of ethnographical and geographical writing' but other recent works such as Thomas (2009), 61 and Rives (2012), 48 talk of ethnography as a formal genre.

it off to both intellectual comprehension and future imperialism, instead of laying it open to them as the ethnographical mode of enquiry and exposition is supposedly meant to do.

This brief overview illustrates the two dominant modes of interpretation within the scholarship: *Germania* as a commentary on Tacitus' contemporary Roman society and *Germania* as a commentary on late first century, but also earlier, Roman imperialism. Under the latter umbrella, the scholarship unites positions that see in the text a judgment on past activity and policy as well as a recommendation for Rome's future approach to the conquest – or not – of Germany under Trajan. Many viewpoints acknowledge the presence of both strands in the work simultaneously. That the author's primary interest must have lain elsewhere than with a straightforward elucidation of its ostensible subject is supported by the presence of demonstrable inaccuracies which must have been willfully included by Tacitus given his education and the glaring extent of some of the fallacies.[354] Finally, the booklet's diminutive size (forty-six chapters) compared to the twenty books of the Elder Pliny's *Bella Germaniae* also suggests as much, given that Tacitus freely acknowledges drawing on this much more extensive work in the *Annals*.[355]

The following chapter, in keeping with this thesis' focus on the relationship between people, the places they find themselves in, and power, will work largely within the framework of the second mode. I argue that several textual

[354]Tan (2014), 183–88 and 193 on the Helvetii and Boii's migration at the end of the second century BC, which would certainly have been known to Tacitus. Morgan (1983), 100 and 103 remarks in general terms on the omission of material definitely known in Tacitus' day, as does Timpe (2007, 427). Rives (2002), 173 has been the lone voice in the desert, seeing 'strong evidence that the *Germania* [also] reflects its contemporary context in sometimes striking ways'. Deliberate departure from known or accepted truths for the sake of proving a point occurred in other ethnographical work too: Sallmann (1987, 116–17) notes a similarly partisan discrepancy between Pliny's report on the Chauci as a *misera gens* (*NH* 16.2) and the contemporary tradition on the Chauci in other authors, including Tacitus' *Germania* 35.

[355]See *Ann.* 1.69 *tradit C. Plinius Germanicorum bellorum scriptor, stetisse apud principium ponti laudes et grates reversis legionibus habentem [Agrippinam]*. The relationship of Pliny's work to the *Germania* is less clear and more disputed: Dorey (1969), 13 discusses examples of the relationship but also its limits; Rives (2012), 49 dismisses the idea of any significant relationship.

strategies in the *Germania* conspire to represent the impossibility of imposing an imperial geography on Germany, both in the shape of secure physical conquest and of intellectual containment. The three main strategies colluding to depict this are the pervasive attestations of migrations within the work – a thematic strand which has not received much attention in the scholarship[356] –, the work's erratic engagement with the past (Rome's, Germany's, and their intersection), and the suppression of accounts of Rome's partial success at imposing an imperialist geography on parts of Germany.

Germans do not stay put

Conquering Germany would require the subjugation of its population and the mastery of its landscape, and then keeping the conquered people tethered to the conquered land in accordance with the conqueror's will. The Germans' constant moving about in the text contributes to the text's construction of Germany as a place where the process of imposing an imperial spatial order is impossible.

Although Tacitus only draws attention to migrations on one occasion and only in one direction (*Ger.* 27.2's … *quaeque nationes e Germania in Gallias commigraverint expediam*), the work in fact sets up four different categories of migrations. The first migrations occur as early as the second chapter. This begins with Tacitus asserting autochthony on behalf of the Germans, because Germany's geography prohibits easy access for anyone not already from there. But within this framework of autochthony migration did occur:

> *Ipsos Germanos indigenas crediderim minimeque aliarum gentium adventibus et hospitiis mixtos, quia nec terra olim, sed classibus advehebantur qui mutare sedes quaerebant, et inmensus ultra utque sic dixerim adversus Oceanus raris ab orbe nostro navibus aditur.*
>
> *Ger.* 2.1

[356]Though many outline the work's dual structure and summarise the purport of both halves, the third of Tacitus' advertised aims at the beginning of part two, *quaeque nationes e Germania in Gallias commigraverint [expediam]*, is often entirely omitted from the summary; see O'Gorman (1993), 136 and Thomas (2009), 60 despite reproducing the quotation of which this forms a part in full on p. 62. Sallmann (1987), 124 comments on the difficult 'classification of those tribes who, since Caesar's epoch, engaged in restless raids and wanderings in the Rhine-lands' but without reference to any classical texts.

> 'I tend to believe the Germans indigenous and barely affected in their ethnic make-up by either invasions or cordial relations with other peoples, because back in the day those who sought to change their habitation did not approach it over land but by means of ships, and the immeasurable and hostile, as I have said, Ocean beyond it is only rarely sailed by vessels from our shores.'

As the *Germania* proceeds, further examples of internal migration are added. After introducing the Boii as Gallic immigrants to Germany, Tacitus goes on to mention that the place where they settled and to which they gave their name, Boihaemum, is no longer occupied by them (*mutatis cultoribus*, *Ger.* 28.2). The name of the new tribe is not given[357], so we cannot speculate on where they came from. The new destination of the Boii is also lacking, but inscriptions from the second century AD attest to the their presence in the *Agri Decumates*.[358] The *Germania* classifies this territory as part of Germany (though it refuses to categorise as Germans the Gallic immigrants whom it acknowledges as living there in the first century AD)[359], making the Boii's migration a case of movement internal to Germany. A little later on, at *Ger.* 33.1, Tacitus describes yet another such internal German migration, of the Chamavi and Angrivarii into what was formerly the territory of the Bructeri (*Iuxta Tencteros Bructeri olim occurrebant; nunc Chamavos et Angrivarios immigrasse narratur*).

Ger. 2, which started with migration, also ends with migration; this time, however, from Germany into Gaul instead of internally. He describes the Tungri as *qui primi Rhenum transgressi Gallos expulerint*, '[they] who first crossed the Rhine and expelled the Gauls' (*Ger.* 2.3). Further examples in this second category are everyone from *Ger.* 28.4 to 29.2 (Treveri, Nervii, Vangiones, Triboci, Nemetes, Ubii, Batavi and Mattiaci) and the Cimbri's exodus from

[357]Noted by Tan (2014), 193 as further proof of Tacitus' desire to obscure Roman understanding of Germany instead of elucidating it.
[358]Hind (1984), 187.
[359]Given that the Boii are mentioned as Gauls who managed to make a life in Germany because of their fierceness (the section in which they appear begins with *Validiores olim Gallorum res fuisse summus auctorum divus Iulius tradit, eoque credibile est etiam Gallos in Germaniam transgressos*, *Ger.* 28.1), it is unlikely that Tacitus had them in mind when he denigrated the lazy Gallic occupants of the *Agri Decumates* a little later (*levissimus quisque Gallorum*, *Ger.* 29.3).

(probably) Jutland[360] all the way down to Provence which is alluded to at *Ger.* 37.1.

But *Ger.* 28, full of examples of German migration into Gaul, also establishes a third category, of those who had moved in the opposite direction, from Gaul into Germany:

> *… credibile est etiam Gallos in Germaniam transgressos: quantulum enim amnis obstabat quo minus, ut quaeque gens evaluerat, occuparet permutaretque sedes promiscuas adhuc et nulla regnorum potentia divisas? Igitur inter Hercyniam silvam Rhenumque et Moenum amnes Helvetii, ulteriora Boii, Gallica utraque gens, tenuere.*
>
> *Ger.* 28.1-2

> '… it is plausible, even, that Gauls crossed over into Germany; how insignificant, after all, is the river which stands in the way, allowing each tribe, as it grew, to occupy and leave again new lands which were still held in common at the time and had not yet been sequestered by any kingdoms? So the Helvetii hold the territory in between the Hercynian forest and the rivers Rhine and Main, and the Boii the further stretches; both are Gallic tribes.'

Immediately after this, the conjunction *sed* appears to raise a difficulty within this category of migrants from Gaul into Germany:

> *sed utrum Aravisci in Pannoniam ab Osis [Germanorum natione] an Osi ab Araviscis in Germaniam commigraverint… incertum est*
>
> *Ger.* 18.3

> 'But whether the Aravisci had migrated into Pannonia away from the Osi, a German tribe, or the Osi into Germania from the Aravisci… is uncertain'

[360] *Eundem Germaniae sinum proximi Oceano Cimbri tenant*, with *sinus* here meaning, as at *Ger.* 1.1, the land that shapes a gulf, analogous to the looping that shapes the fold in a garment, such a fold being the primary meaning of *sinus* (OLD *sinus* 1, hence a gulf too, OLD 11). For the identification with Jutland, see Benario (1999) and Rives (1999) *ad loc.*, though Lund 1988 *ad loc.* argues for a different (unknown) bay on the basis that Tacitus would not have known of Jutland's existence, which is not mentioned in classical literature until Ptolemy in the 2nd century.

But in wondering about the precise direction of the migration, Tacitus in fact establishes a fourth category, of those who had moved in or out of Germany to and from somewhere that was *not* Gaul. Whatever the answer, Pannonia and Germany are the only two parameters mentioned. Then Tacitus returns to a further example of the third category, Gallic migration into Germany, by unnamed peoples into the transrhenane and transdanubian *Agri Decumates* (*Ger.* 29.3):

> *Non numeraverim inter Germaniae populos, quamquam trans Rhenum Danuviumque consederint, eos qui Decumates agros exercent. levissimus quisque Gallorum et inopia audax dubiae possessionis solum occupavere; mox limite acto promotisque praesidiis sinus imperii et pars provinciae habentur*.
>
> 'I would not count among the peoples of Germany those who till the *Agri Decumates*, even though they have settled across the Rhine and Danube. All the laziest Gauls, and those most reckless through hunger, occupied land under a doubtful right of possession; then when the border was drawn and the fortifications brought forward they were accepted as included in the empire and a part of the province.'

Many of the migrations discussed above are shown by the text to have produced knock-on effects of further migration. The unnamed Gauls of *Ger.* 2.3, expelled by the Tungri (*Gallos expulerint*), were not killed. They may therefore have moved further south within Gaul. Lund in his commentary identified another likely such relocation in the text's description of the *Agri Decumates*' Gallic occupants. He reads *occupavere* as a quasi legal term derived from the actual legal term *occupaticius ager*, of which the definition implies that the land had been voluntarily abandoned by the previous occupants prior to the new occupation.[361] If Lund's inference is correct, then the previous occupants of the German *Agri Decumates* had already migrated elsewhere (presumably

[361] Lund (1985), 343–44. *Occupaticius ager* is defined by the second century AD grammarian Festus as

> *Occupaticius <ager> . . . <desertus>*
> *a cultoribus fre . . . <occupa->*
> *ri coeptus*

(181.41-3, PHI Latin Texts (online), 'Sexti Pompei Festi *De Verborum Significatu Quae Supersunt cum Pauli Epitome*', ed. W. M. Lindsay, 1913).

elsewhere in Germany) before the lazy Gauls mentioned in the *Germania* arrived.[362]

What is Germany, then?

The impression created is that the Germans in the *Germania* are constantly on the move. On only two occasions are reasons given for the migration: *seditio domestica* (*Ger.* 29.1) for the Batavi and *inopia* for the occupants of the *Agri Decumates* who came from Gaul (*Ger.* 29.3).[363] Leaving obscure the undoubtedly rational motivations for the great majority of tribal migrations constructs the internal makeup of Germany as a disorderly mess: constantly changing, but with no pattern behind the changes. The first way in which this messy internal makeup prevents the imposition of a Roman imperial geography upon the Germans is that it implies they would be difficult to find. If they cannot be trusted to stay in one place, targeted action becomes difficult. Defining conquest also becomes challenging when tribes are not easily linked to particular territories: what would it mean to claim that the pacification of any part or people of Germany had been completed? The Britons of Calgacus, in contrast, were easy to find and easy to conquer: not only had they all assembled in one place for their battle with Rome at Mons Graupius[364], but Tacitus'

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[362]On the basis of this Lund proposes the emendation *desertos* instead of the (in his view) corrupt *decumates*, on the grounds that it is nowhere else attested and, if an existing legal term, sits oddly within the work (presumably more oddly than the verb *occupare,* which was common parlance as well as used in the legal sphere). In his commentary, he makes the same case largely on the basis of analogies with other texts in which it is clearer that the territory of which possession is taken had been empty or abandoned, including *Hist.* 4.12.1 *Batavi … seditione domestica pulsi extrema Gallicae orae vacua cultoribus simulque insulam iuxta sitam occupavere.*

[363]In contrast, Tacitus makes Petillius Cerialis in the *Histories* motivate migration in this direction as always prompted by *inopia*, given the German landscape's infertility: *eadem semper causa Germanis transcendendi in Gallias, libido atque avaritia et mutandae sedis amor, ut relictis paludibus et solitudinibus suis fecundissimum hoc solum vosque ipsos possiderent*, *Hist.* 4.73.17-20. His characterisation of the landscape here fits some of the disparaging Tacitean *sententiae* about the German soil in the *Germania*, though this judgment is not consistently applied throughout the latter work: for example, despite *terra… satis ferax, frugiferarum arborum inpatiens* (*Ger.* 5.1), *agrestia poma* are mentioned at *Ger.* 23. In fact, that same passage explicitly acknowledges that the Germans' food may be simple, but explicitly denies that there is not enough of it: *sine blandimentis expellunt famem*. *Inopia* cannot even implicitly be read into the reasons for the *Germania*'s migrations.

[364] *tandemque docti commune periculum concordia propulsandum, legationibus et foederibus omnium civitatium vires exciverant*, *Agr.* 29.3-4.

ventriloquised Calgacus stressed the fact that Scotland was also the place where Britain ran out of land[365]: there was nowhere else for these peoples to go, whether for their own purposes or to avoid the Romans. This is not the case for the *Germania*'s Germany, which combines remoteness with vastness instead of with boundaries and limits. Conquest requires fixity and precision, which accounts for the great pains Caesar took to map out for his readers the geography of Gaul and the positioning of its tribes within that. The *Germania*'s occasional anachronistic mislocation of tribes, as for the Boii[366], illustrates the impossibility of assuming that tribes would continue to be where they were when intelligence was first received. The *Germania*'s frequent movement of tribes underpins the tale of the Frisii in the *Annals*, written much later. Their abandonment of Corbulo's Roman Republic in Frisia is left unmotivated by Tacitus, but in the framework of the *Germania* makes complete sense as a reversal to their essential German nature as wanderers from the moment at which the removal of the threat of Roman force (which keeps them emplaced) makes this possible.

A related difficulty inherent in these incessant migrations is the threat that the Germans may not be confined across the Rhine forever. The *Histories* indirectly acknowledge how much of a concern such potential crossings were to Rome, in reporting the care Rome took to first forbid and then carefully monitor the transrhenane Tencteri's interactions with their Ubian cousins on the western Rhine bank during the Batavian revolt.[367] These crossings did not need to have the potential to overthrow the Roman Empire in order to be inconvenient: invasions used up resources and time, and did ideological damage to perceptions of Rome and its power by threatening Rome's full control over its territory. Moreover, the possibility of Rhine crossings revealed the porousness of this supposedly rigid boundary between the Empire and Germany.

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[365]*nullae ultra terrae, Agr.* 30.1; *terrarum extremos recessus*, *Agr.* 30.3.
[366]See note 355.
[367]*nam ad hunc diem flumina ac terram et caelum quodam modo ipsum clauserant Romani ut conloquia congressusque nostros arcerent, vel, quod contumeliosius est viris ad arma natis, inermes ac prope nudi sub custode et pretio coiremus*, *Hist.* 4.64.6-10. See chapter one for a discussion of the spatial implications of this part of the speech.

One consequence of the *Germania*'s characterisation of Germany as a place of flux is to set two geographical systems against one another: the unplanned, unexplained and messy nature of the text's representation of these migrations offers a conception of Germania as disordered space in contrast to ordered Roman imperial space. Germany's representation of internal disorder thus calls into question the work's own mission as an ordered Roman overview of a space called Germany. Although the work's title *de origine et situ Germanorum* does not quite claim to discuss the space, only the people, its first word is *Germania* and its first chapter a geophysical description of the territory for which that word posits a unity. The work's subsequent exposition of a systemic disconnect between different kinds of *Germani* and their *situs* raises the question of what, precisely, unites or constitutes either the people or the space. In terms of the area's spatial dynamics, Tacitus cannot get beyond a description of fluidity of people and of space.

A different history, a different people, a different space

This disorder is present despite Tacitus' efforts in almost the entire first half of the work (up to *Ger.* 27.1) to posit a communal identity for a first level category of Germani with shared *mores* which contains all the second level subtribes with their idiosyncracies which are described in the second half of the work. But instead of bringing into being and then sustaining a unified space, the unity posited for the Germani by Tacitus lacks the historical dimension required to give it power through the ages, and has produced the amorphous space described above. This section will examine precisely how practices of German history as described by Tacitus are insufficient for producing the sort of national German identity to go hand in hand with a coherent national German space.

Tacitus clearly acknowledges that the Germani keep (certain) memories of the past alive: *Celebrant carminibus antiquis, quod unum apud illos memoriae et annalium genus est, Tuistonem deum terra editum*, 'they celebrate in song, which is their equivalent of memory and annals, the god Tuisto born from the earth', *Ger.* 2.2. But within this *translatio Romana* of these *carmina* as memory and

annales, it is clear that German memory and history fall far short of the Roman standard. Hardly any of the stuff of annalistic history (the battles, the treaties, the kings) is recorded by Tacitus for the Germans in this passage which explicitly deals with history, and the lack persists across the work. In the military sphere, only the Bructeri's destruction at the hands of an alliance of neighbours is mentioned (*Ger.* 33.1), and that was a very recent occurrence indeed.[368] As for kings and their lineage, only Maroboduus for the Marcomani and an otherwise unknown Tudrus for the Quadi are mentioned at *Ger.* 42.2, with no contextualisation of Tudrus. By not possessing a continuous record of such events and genealogies into the present, the Germans of the *Germania* are shown to lack a national history capable of creating an identity with the power to last through the ages. The *carmina* which serve the Germans as history are ahistorical by the standards of Roman historical practice, which in its earliest form derived from simple listings of past events in the form of Fasti or 'calendars' long before Ennius wrote the first historical 'work' called *Annales* in the early 2nd century BC.[369]

The only communal identity granted the Germans in the *Germania* derives from their reported shared descent from the three sons of their god Mannus (in turn the son of their Urvater Tuisto):

> *Celebrant carminibus antiquiis, quod unum apud illos memoriae et annalium genus est, Tuistonem deum terra editum*. *ei filium Mannum, originem gentis conditoremque, Manno tris filios adsignant, e quorum nominibus proximi Oceano Ingaevones, medii Hermiones, ceteri Istaevones vocentur*.
>
> *Ger.* 2.2

> 'They celebrate in ancient songs, which are their equivalent of memory and annals, the god Tuisto, born from the earth. He had a son Mannus, the

[368]Datable to AD97 on the basis of Pliny *Ep.* 2.7.2: *Nam Spurinna Bructerum regem vi et armis induxit in regnum, ostentatoque bello ferocissimam gentem, quod est pulcherrimum victoriae genus, terrore perdomuit*. Rives (1999) *ad loc.* interprets the genocide mentioned in the *Germania* as the catalyst for this Roman intervention and victory under Spurinna's leadership.

[369]OCD 4th ed. '*fasti*' suggests the official publication of such a listing in 304BC had probably been preceded by continuous elaboration since the 5th century BC.

> point of origin and founder of their race, and to Mannus they allocate three sons, after whose names those closest to the Ocean are called Ingaevones, the middle people Hermiones, and the rest Istaevones.'

The first important aspect of this legend is that even though a single origin is here proposed (Tuisto and through him Mannus), there is division almost from the start (Mannus' three sons). And though Tacitus assigns to each of the three parts a – very roughly indicated – specific territory (*proximi Oceano, medii, ceteri*), and is thus suggesting a level of fixity, the subsequent migrations make it clear that these original divisions and groups were not permanent and fragmented further. The absence of a record accounting for this fragmentation is one of Tacitus' main strategies in undermining his own construct of a first level group of Germani with a communal identity to unite its different subtribes.[370]

Another such strategy is his immediate introduction of disagreement on the specifics of even this first step after reporting the joint descent from Tuisto, Mannus and the sons of Mannus: *quidam, ut in licentia vetustatis, pluris deo ortos pluresque gentis appellationes, Marsos Gambrivios Suebos Vandilios, adfirmant, eaque vera et antiqua nomina*, 'some, as can happen in cases where long distance in time creates leeway, assert that more sons were born to the god and more names of tribes (the Marsi, Gambrivi, Suebi and Vandili), and that these are true and ancient names' (*Ger.* 2.2). In addition to the reported disagreement on what immediately before seemed certain, the discrepancy is not addressed, and there are no attempts to connect either of the stories with the Tungri, who make their entry into the narrative immediately afterwards, nor with the *Germania*'s subsequent focus on reporting the 'current' state of Germany and all its constituent tribes.[371] The result is a muddle, and the muddle is neither acknowledged, let alone resolved. Exactly that part of the 'story' which would constitute a German identity into the present day (of Tacitus) is missing: it may be that they had one, of course, and that Tacitus did not know it, or knew but did not report it. But Tacitus occasionally confesses to *aporia*, for example with

[370]Compare with Livy 5.33ff, which provides a genealogy for the Gauls of his own era which connects past and present and Gallic history and Roman history in exactly the way Tacitus in the *Germania* does not; see Woolf (2009), 214.
[371]Noted by Morgan (1983), 108–9.

regard to the existence of ancient Greek monuments on the border of Germany and Raetia[372], yet he does not do so in the case of Germany's prehistory. His silence on the matter creates an anti-history which leaves the disorder and movement within Germany as beyond reconstruction. The absence of a story covering the intervening period means that the relation between the 'modern' Germans and their mythical ancestors remains unclear.

The visits of Hercules (*Ger.* 3.1)[373] and Ulixes (*Ger.* 3.2)[374] which occur in the chapter following the story of Mannus do not constitute that missing link, but belong to the same prehistory. They are mythical, undatable, uncertain, impermanent and with no discernible effect either on the Germans or on Germany. Hercules is not granted his traditional role of founder of cities and father of children. Instead, some of these characteristics are imputed to Ulixes in the *Germania*.[375] But the suggestion that he may have played some part in the origins of the German people[376] is forestalled by Tacitus' introduction of *quidam opinantur* and his conclusion of *neque confirmare neque refellere in animo est*. Ulixes' physical effects on the space of Germany (the founding of the city, the altar found, the *tumuli* and *monumenta* supposedly still standing, *Ger.* 3.2) are called into doubt by the same two mechanisms. In any case, Asciburgium, described only in terms of its location (*in ripa Rheni situm hodieque incolitur*) had become, at the time Tacitus wrote the *Germania*, a Roman camp (mentioned at *Hist.* 4.33.4-5).[377] In as far as Asciburgium can be invoked to say anything about Germany or its history, therefore, it attests both the insubstantiality of the

[372]*quae neque confirmare argumentis neque refellere in animo est: ex ingenio suo quisque demat vel addat* fidem, 'which I do not propose to either confirm with proof or refute: let each either withhold or grant his acceptance as he sees fit', Ger. 3.2-3.
[373]*Fuisse apud eos et Herculem memorant*…
[374]*ceterum et Ulixem quidam opinantur longo illo et fabuloso errore in hunc Oceanum delatum adisse Germaniae terras…*
[375]O'Gorman (1993), 145-6.
[376]Rives (1999) *ad loc:* 'Tacitus' account here suggests that some earlier scholars may have argued that Ulysses not only visited Germania but also played some part in the origin of the Germanic people'; also noted at Morgan (1983), 105.
[377]Rives *ad loc.* notes for this passage that the Asciburgium founded by Ulixes was probably conflated wrongly on the Peutinger map with the Rhineland military camp of that name through reading into the latter 'a false etymology that derived the name from the Greek *askos*, 'skin bag', and *purgos*, 'tower, fortification', referring to Aeolus' bag of the winds (*Od.* 10.19 etc.)'.

events reported as part of Germany's mythical pre-history, and the entanglement of Germany's 'modern' history with Rome.

The representation of Germans as a fragmented people with a disconnected history occupying a fluid space contrasts heavily with the early story of Rome, which began with division and wandering but moved increasingly towards unity and fixity – the reverse of Germany's process in the *Germania*'s account of the sons of Mannus. The *Germania* is understandably silent on the topic of the prehistorical wanderings which led to the founding of Rome, but accounts of them are prevalent enough in other works of Roman historiography to suggest that such migration was a recognised and often utilised trope in Rome's early history, of which Tacitus would have been aware. Sallust's *Letter of Mithridates* has the ventriloquised eastern king describe the Romans as *convenas olim sine patria, parentibus* ('once tramps without a homeland or ancestors', Sall. *Hist.* 4 fr. 60.17), a description echoed in the *illa conluvie convenarum* (*Hist. Phil.* 38.7.1) of Justin's second century AD record of the same speech by Mithridates. The phrase is likely to have been Pompeius Trogus', whose work Justin epitomised and who was Livy's contemporary. It occurs twice in the early books of Livy (*illa pastorum convenarumque plebs, transfuga ex suis populis*, 2.1; *maiores nostri, convenae pastoresque*, 5.53). Within this established tradition, Sallust's connection between wandering and being *sine parentibus* is particularly interesting in its suggestion that the early Romans wandered around in exactly those circumstances Tacitus attributes to the Germans of the *Germania*: in possession of a past (obviously) and of ancestors (mentioned explicitly) but not of an ancestral history to assert a connection between the united past and the fragmented present.

Rome connected its wandering past to its present by accounting in detail not only for the pre-migration past but for the wanderings themselves. The Livian tradition on Rome's early pre-history had offered a violent version of the tale of the wanderer Aeneas, in which he beats the original inhabitants of Italy into submission, alongside a milder one, in which king Latinus is so impressed with Aeneas' tale and character that he makes a peaceful alliance with the Trojan

settlers (1.5-9). Important is that he follows up these disputed first events with a continuous chain of subsequent events, all the while tracing the genealogy of Aeneas into the future as Rome grew and incorporated other neighbouring communities. Livy's history is a story of moving from exile and wandering to fixity and the accretion of different tribes around a stable Roman core to create the Romans to whose exploits the rest of the work is dedicated, all the way up to the Livian present day. Roman history's evolution from homelessness to settledness may be violent and morally ambivalent[378], but it is fully documented, without gaps.

Virgil's approach to Roman history in the *Aeneid* solves the problem of bridging the gap between Rome's mythical pre-history and the present day in a different way. In the *Aeneid*, the Roman past stretches far into the future, preventing the fragmentation which might result from the unifying power of shared origins diluting as time goes by (a process which the Tacitean account of the Germani's shared origins but fragmented present suggests occurred in Germania). Though the work stops well short, chronologically, of connecting the mythical past to Virgil's contemporary Augustan Rome[379], ending as it does with Turnus' death at the hands of Aeneas, it avoids disconnecting past and present by the frequent divine assurance in the work of Rome's destiny as ruler of the Mediterranean (achieved in Virgil's 'present'): from the authorial introduction *multa quoque et bellō passūs, dum conderet urbem/inferretque deōs Latiō, genus unde Latīnum/Albānīque patrēs, atque altae moenia Rōmae* ('having suffered many tribulations and also in war, until he founds a city/and brings his gods into

[378]Neither Livy nor Virgil's accounts hide the violence, but they counterbalance it with absorption of neighbouring tribes – not all were killed or robbed into submission. Sallust's Mithridates (*Hist.* 4 fr. 60.17), as an enemy of Rome, understandably connects Rome's early wanderings solely with the theft of other people's property instead of a process of growth and incorporation: *[An ignoras] Neque quicquam a principio nisi raptum habere [Romanos], domum, coniuges, agros, imperium?* Justin's epitome of Trogus also stresses the violence of these early stages (*Hist. Phil.* 43.1.10-13 and 43.3.1-2).

[379]Even so, there are two passages where Virgil does provide specifics concerning the intervening 'history': both the procession of early, Republican and Augustan Romans witnessed by Aenaes in the underworld (*A.* 6.756-853) and the events and people on the shield of Aeneas (*A.* 8.625-728) feature the 'Great Romans' which connect the mythical then with the Virgilian now.

Latium, from where the Latin tribe will spring/and the Alban fathers, and the walls of high Rome', *A.* 1.5-7) to the very end, when Juno makes her recommendation to Jupiter that *sit Latium, sint Albani per saecula reges/sit Romana potens Itala virtute propago* ('let it be Latium, let there be Alban kings through the ages/let there be a Roman shoot strong with Italian virtue', *A.*12.826-7).[380] The future is already taken care of in these accounts of the past. Once this divine mission was canonised in the literature of the Augustan age, it rationalised and systematised the past in a way which could then sustain Roman identity into the future.

To summarise, Livy constitutes a communal identity for his early Romans through the fully traceable (!) genealogy of the earliest kings and the Roman state's equally fully documented merging with other tribes. Virgil constitutes it around Rome's divine mission, articulated to them in their earliest prehistory and supposedly borne in mind by them, as they grew, ever since. Virgil also, following Livy's most brutal version of the Aeneas legend, made him a founding father steeped in violence against the original inhabitants of Italy but followed this antagonism with reconciliation, starting the process of incorporating other tribes into the Roman fold. This 'history' therefore helped to create a common identity which could harbour large variations in local populations and local histories without damaging the Roman core. Though Tacitus posits a similar core identity for the Germani, he denies them a narrative which connects this to the subtribes he mentions. In both cases, Virgil and Livy, an originally diverse group reconstituted itself around a shared Roman identity and thereby reconstituted a shared Roman space. The construction of a narrative of time allowed the building of a narrative of space and identity. The truth of such claims does not matter – the Romans were likely unclear on when the tipping point occurred between their myths and their history[381] – but their value in

[380]There are several assertions of the general destiny in between, particularly in the crucial book 4 when Aeneas is tempted to tarry with Dido (Jupiter's errand to Mercury at *A.* 4.227-31, Mercury's paraphrase to Aeneas at *A.* 4.267 and 275-6, and Aeneas' explanation to Dido at *A.* 4.345-6 and 355).

[381]Luce (1998, xvi) notes that 'Livy is keenly aware of the unreliability of the material for this early period. In the preface to book 6 he says that almost all written records –

constituting a communal identity is clear, and this both the Romans in general and Tacitus in the *Germania* clearly realised. The early homelessness of Rome, temporary because they know their history and their future, is therefore very different to that of the Germans in the *Germania*.

The difference is, then, not one of mythic origins or the presence of a myth of origins to give unity to the people, but lies in the absence of the processes of historical formation that fill the many books of Livy. There is an absence of historical development which leaves the Germans in a state of mythic non-history, a permanent state of no change. This distortion then supports itself: what is there to describe, if there is no development? The Germani's amorphous mythic space, a space of flux and change to which we can compare the Homeric Mediterranean roamed by Odysseus, inevitably produces an inability to constitute space and to undergo the long historical processes of identity formation. In this sense, the Germani remain a non-people living in a non-space. The close relationship between classical geography and history in tracing communities in space and time finds its counter in Germany since the various Germanic tribes and hence Germany itself cannot be constituted in either space or time.

The ahistorical characterisation of Germany is aided by the chronological vagueness regarding the timing of most of its migrations. Only the Cimbri's exodus is datable on the basis of the text, its ablative absolute *Caecilio Metello ac Papirio Carbone consulibus* placing it in 113BC in the customary manner of establishing chronology in Roman annalistic history. In all other reported instances of migration that are granted a temporal indicator in the *Germania*, Tacitus uses *olim* ('back in the day', and in context perhaps even something like 'once upon a time'). It is applied to the first ever mention of migration in the context of autochthony at *Ger.* 2.1, to the crossing of the Gallic Boii and Helvetii into Germany at *Ger*. 28.1, to the crossing of the Ubii at *Ger.* 28.4, to the occupation and then exodus of the Bructeri from their territory at *Ger.* 33.1, and

'the only reliable guardian of the remembrance of past events' – were destroyed in the Gallic Sack of Rome in 390 BC.'

to the Boii's forced expulsion at *Ger.* 42.1 at the hands of the Marcomani. The Helvetii actually left the area in Germany in which the *Germania* places them (*inter Hercyniam silvam Rhenumque et Moenum amnes*, 28.2) in the late 2nd century BC.[382] The Ubii were settled on the west bank of the Rhine in 38BC, by Agrippa.[383] The Bructeri's destruction and settlement of their territory by Chamavi and Angrivarii took place in AD97, only shortly before the publication of the *Germania*.[384] The Marcomani's expulsion of the Boii may have occurred as part of their growth into one of Tausend's Großstämme ('super-tribes') in the course of the late first century BC.[385] Tacitus would have been aware of such movements, as demonstrated by the overlap between the Marcomani's reported activities here in the *Germania* and those he reports in the *Annals*, where he describes Arminius' war with Maroboduus in AD17 as *a Cheruscis contra augendae dominationi certaretur,* 'the Cherusci were fighting against their increasing hegemony' (*Ann.* 2.46). The reference is compatible with Marcomanic/Suebian territorial expansion through displacing other peoples. All other migrations (Tungri, Batavi, Osi, Aravisci) are not located in time at all. The absence of clear chronological markers, even in cases where Tacitus would have possessed such information, collapses his picture of Germany further into an impression of timelessness and its state of internal flux into a permanent feature of this part of the world.

Roman history: present but absent

The only intrusions of 'factual' history into the text are related to contact with Rome, but several strategies are applied to the presentation of this material which misrepresent, to Rome's detriment, the effects of Roman imperialism in the area.

[382]Tan (2014), 193.
[383]Tausend (2006), 395.
[384]See n. 370.
[385]Tausend (2006), 395-6 and 400-1, though he again ignores Tacitus' claim that the Marcomani expelled the Boii: 'Der überwiegende Teil der am Main ansässigen Sueben (d. h. Markomannen und Quaden) zogen jedoch unter der Führung des Marbod nach Böhmen, wo nach der Abwanderung der vormals dort sitzenden keltischen Boier wohl keine große Besiedelungsdichte vorhanden war.'

The first of these strategies relates to the elision of Roman involvement – and therefore power – entirely from certain German events in which they very much played a part. The prime examples in this category are the Batavi's accession to empire (*Ger.* 29.1) and the similar accession of the lazy Gauls who inhabit the Agri Decumates (*Ger.* 29.3). The text does not mention that the Batavi's ethnogenesis as a people, and the constitution of the *insula Batavorum* as 'theirs', were profoundly tied in with the consequences of Roman imperialism. Slofstra and Roymans argued convincingly that the tribe originated through a merger, encouraged by Rome, of this Chattian subgroup with the remnants of the Eburones, previously wiped out by Caesar.[386] Yet the *Germania* simply reads *Batavi… pars Romani imperii fierent*, 'they became part of the Roman Empire' (*Ger.* 29.1). The same effect is produced by *Ger.* 29.3's tale of the Gallic occupants of the *Agri Decumates*:

> *levissimus quisque Gallorum et inopia audax dubiae possessionis solum occupavere; mox limite acto promotisque praesidiis sinus imperii et pars provinciae habentur*.
>
> 'the laziest Gauls, and those most reckless through poverty, occupied ground under a doubtful right of possession; then when the border was drawn and the legions brought forward they were considered as belonging to the empire and a part of the province.'

Tacitus stresses the unsuitability of these people as both budding Roman citizens and taxable provincials. Yet the newly extended Roman province, in the *Germania*'s phrasing, arranges itself around them, incorporating their fragile claim on the land instead of dismissing it and displacing them. Like the Batavi in

[386]Slofstra (2002), 24; Roymans (2004), 23–26. This would make Tacitus' assertion in the *Histories* concerning the ethnogenesis of the Batavi (that they moved into *extrema Gallicae orae vacua cultoribus* – *Hist.* 4.14.7-8 – as well as the island) wrong. Roymans found inconclusive evidence to posit a discontinuity in the material culture of the area (which would be required to established the new lands' emptiness beyond doubt). Curiously, Schön (2006), 169 and Tausend (2006), 395 place the Ubii in the former territory of the Eburones, instead of the Batavi, but cite none of this archaeological work from the Netherlands, already available then, which disproves their case. Tausend (2006) gives other examples of Roman-influenced ethnogeneses or settlements, such as the Chatti's settlement in the transrhenane territory occupied by the Ubii before they crossed into Gaul under Agrippa (p. 395).

the *Germania*'s representation, they became a part of the Roman Empire by virtue of their location, unresisted.

The second strategy is to acknowledge Roman involvement in certain German events but to elide information which would reveal Rome's power as an imperialist state. The prime example here is the *Germania*'s mention of the Cimbri's first clash with Rome in 113BC during their long migration:

> *sescentesimum et quadragesimum annum urbs nostra agebat, cum primum Cimbrorum audita sunt arma, Caecilio Metello et Papirio Carbone consulibus. ex quo si ad alterum imperatoris Traiani consulatum computemus, ducenti ferme et decem anni colliguntur: tam diu Germania vincitur.*
>
> *Ger.* 37.1-2
>
> 'Our city had already existed for six hundred and forty years by the time it first heard the clashing of the Cimbri's arms, during the consulship of Caecilius Metellus and Papirius Carbo. Which, if we count from there until the second consulship of the emperor Trajan, means almost two hundred and ten years: for all this time has Germany been in the process of being conquered.'

The confrontation did result in a Roman defeat and the suicide of consul C. Papirius Carbo in 113BC. But Rome ultimately managed to 'fix' the Cimbri on the imperial map by exterminating them a decade later.[387] Tacitus does not mention this final outcome. The half-story of the Cimbri leaves the reader hanging at the point where Rome was proved incapable of guarding the integrity of its territory against irruptions into it from the ever-wandering Germans. Even the claim of two hundred and ten years of failing to conquer Germany misrepresents the truth, given that Tacitus conflates military encounters with German tribes with military encounters on German soil, and so arrives at a longer period of supposed failed conquest of Germany: the Cimbri were beaten in the south of France, not in Germany. Rome did not get to the Rhineland until Caesar's campaigns in the 50s BC, when he built two bridges, and serious transrhenane excursions did not occur until 38BC when Agrippa was governor of Gaul.

[387]In 103 and 101BC, under the generalship of C. Marius.

Only in the settlement of the Ubii are the Romans accorded their proper role as an imperialist power which can command others to stay or go, and has the power to keep them emplaced: *transgressi olim et experimento fidei super ipsam Rheni ripam conlocati ut arcerent, non ut custodirentur*, '[they] crossed over a long time ago and in recognition of their loyalty were settled on the very bank of the Rhine so that they could be a guardian, not in order to be guarded themselves' (*Ger.* 28.4). But their settlement is on the nearer side of the Rhine and therefore removed from the conventional geographical conception of Germany with which the *Germania* itself proclaims to work, which saw it as lying wholly on the further side of the Rhine. Thus not even this is a marker of Roman success. If anything, *ut arcerent* highlights again the persistent threat of further migrations from across the Rhine. Finally, the exceptional nature of this single feat of imperialist 'fixing' of otherwise perpetually wandering Germans makes Rome's overall achievements in Germania, as presented in the *Germania*, look unimpressive.

In short, all four occasions of German migrations involving Rome (Cimbri, Batavi, *Agri Decumates*, Ubii) are presented as trials of Roman strength against the consequences of Germany's internal turmoil, and what at first seems like Roman success is subtly undermined in each case to resemble accommodation of a difficult reality more than it resembles victory. When the migrations in the text which involve Rome are placed in their correct context, however, they in fact show a clear correlation between Roman expansion – in Gaul in the 1st century BC and on the borders of Germany in the 1st century AD – and Roman emplacement of migrating Germanic peoples like the Ubii and the Batavi in the frontier zone. Finally, some of the internal German migrations of the text – the Osi, the Aravisci, the original inhabitants of the *Agri Decumates* – follow the governing principle of the second half of the text[388] in occurring increasingly

[388]The order of the text equating increasing difference with increasing distance from whatever the author is positing as the 'centre' and 'norm' is one of the traditional features of ancient paradoxography, to which both *Germania* (see Tan (2014) and Woolf (2015)) and the *Agricola* adhere; though the latter less straightforwardly. See

further inland, increasingly further away from the Roman sphere of influence (actual and desired). They are also either left undated (Osi and Aravisci) or they occurred before Roman activity in those areas commenced (which for the *Agri Decumates* was not until the Flavian period). These, therefore, cannot be chalked up to a Roman failure of containment of the Germans, despite Tacitus shaping the text of the *Germania* to convey that impression.

The *Germania*'s presentation of such 'vignettes', brief and outcomes-based, contrast starkly with the processes of conquest narrated in Tacitus' later works. Chapter one examined how Tacitus *shows* Roman imperialism's difficulties during the Batavian Revolt with mastering the landscape and the people of Germany. Chapter four discusses how Tacitus *narrates* Germanicus' campaigns in Germany and his struggles to impose ordered Roman space along the way. Chapter five analyses how Tacitus *describes* Corbulo's enactment of Roman imperial geography in Germany via the displacement or emplacement of peoples and the management of spaces: he expels the Canninefatian rebel Gannascus from his lair (*exturbato Gannasco*, *Ann.* 11.18) and resettles the Frisii (*natio Frisiorum… consedit apud agros a Corbulone descriptos*, *Ann.* 11.19). Later on, during Nero's reign, Tacitus makes *agrosque vacuos et militum usui sepositos* in transrhenane Germany the focus of two different episodes; lands whose description Potter rightly interpreted as signifying active maintenance by the local commander Duvius Avitus and his army.[389] Furthermore, the text makes clear, through Avitus' recommendation to petition the emperor for leave to stay and Nero's refusal to allow it (*Ann.* 13.56), that Rome in the *Annals* saw itself as having the right to dispose over these lands and their use, and used that right. A large part of imperial Rome's conception of itself was its desire to arrange the world and its concurrent ability to do so. In the *Germania*, much of Rome's achievement in terms of emplacement is left unmentioned and, where Roman involvement in German ethnogenesis or the course of German migrations is mentioned, it is deliberately misrepresented as bordering on failure.

Clarke (2001), 95–99 for the ancient geographical framework and the *Agricola*'s seeming conformity, before proceeding to break that down.

[389]Potter (1992), 273–74.

The third and final textual strategy which demonstrates the impossibility of imposing an imperial geography on Germany is the subtle undermining of what *is* ostensibly mentioned as Roman achievement in this sphere. Several reports of successes are contradicted by the reader's awareness of the recent historical context which scholars have noted is absent from the *Germania*.[390] For example, the Batavi's military usefulness (*Ger.* 29.1) and *obsequium* to Rome, which they supposedly share with the Mattiaci (*Ger.* 29.2), would have rung hollow in light of readers' awareness of the Batavian revolt, which occurred almost thirty years before the work's publication and effectively ended the Batavi's special status. This, as Syme pointed out, the *Germania* does not mention.[391] Even hollower than the Batavi's great worth to Rome would have rung the suggestion that the Quadi and Marcomani relied on Rome to maintain their hegemony in the region (*vis et potentia regibus ex auctoritate Romana*, 'the kings derive their strength and authority from Rome's position', *Ger.* 42.2). Dio tells us that Domitian was in fact defeated by these tribes in the mid-80s AD when he intended to punish them for not helping him against Decebalus (67.7.1-2).

In a number of other cases, the spatial dynamics reported as part of statements of Roman superiority undermine the value of what is being said. How much does the Mattiaci's *obsequium* mean when it is stressed that, living on the right bank (described as *sua ripa*, 'their *own* bank'), they remain physically distinct from the Roman Empire on the left bank?[392] A similar ambiguity concerning the precise distribution of power is created in the description of the Hermunduri:

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[390]This need not entirely invalidate Dorey's argument (1969, 13) 'that [Tacitus] made full use of new information that had come to hand during the twenty years since the publication of Pliny's work. Such new sources would include reports of merchants engaged in the amber trade with the Baltic that developed after Nero's reign, and information about Germany collected and circulated at Rome in connection with Domitian's campaign against the Chatti and his subsequent triumph.'

[391]Syme (1958), 127.

[392]Though Rome made an undeniable spatial impact on the transrhenane modern area around Baden-Württemberg thanks to Drusus', Germanicus' and Corbulo's military campaigns, in the AD 90s when Tacitus was writing, the area was still very far from becoming a formal province of the Empire, hence Tacitus' is able to refer to the Mattiaci as having *sua ripa.* See Wilson (2006) for an overview of scholarship on the area.

> *…Hermundurorum civitas, fida Romanis: eoque solis Germanorum non in ripa commercium, sed penitus atque in splendidissima Raetiae provinciae colonia. passim et sine custode transeunt, et, cum ceteris gentibus arma modo castraque nostra ostendamus, his domos villasque patefecimus non concupiscentibus*.
>
> *Ger.* 41.1

> '… the community of the Hermunduri, faithful to the Romans; for this reason to them alone of all the Germans is trade allowed not on the river bank but far inland, in the most magnificent *coloniae* of the province of Raetia. They have free passage everywhere and without guards; and although to other nations we only show our weapons and our army camps, to the Hermunduri we open up our townhouses and villas, as they have no wish to possess them.'

Through presenting them as 'tame' enough to be allowed free movement within the Roman *provincia* of Raetia, Tacitus also cements the tribe's position as firmly outside of the boundaries of the Roman Empire. Rome has *not* exported – not managed to export? – its spatial arrangements to the community of the Hermunduri; instead, the German tribe has the freedom of the Roman towns. The interaction of people, place and power in this case is a far cry from the control imposed by Rome on the Tencteri's and Ubii's interaction in the *Histories*. Tacitus also presents the Hermunduri's relationship with Rome as one of trade, which implies a level of equality, instead of tribute, which would imply subservience. Rome is not entirely absent in this Tacitean narrative, even from innermost Germany, but its involvement is a far cry from the imperialist 'fixing' of the later books of the *Annals*.

Germania and narratology

But of course writing is also an act of power, as a form of what Foucault called the 'ordered representation of a subject'.[393] Imperial geographies are metaphorically enacted by soldiers on a real land and real people but also literally enacted into geography as a field of knowledge by modes of intellectual representation: understanding a subject amounts to an intellectual emplacement of it, as expressed in Anderson's 'totalizing classificatory grid' of

[393]Foucault (1991), 'Docile bodies', 135-169, with an emphasis on the exertion of power through the spatial distribution of bodies through timetables, reports, prescribed actions in specially designed spaces, etc.

the colonial state: 'the effect… was always to be able to say of anything that it was this, not that; it belonged here, not there'.[394] Said saw the West's discourse of Orientalism as exercising this same power over the Orient: '(…) dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, ruling over it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient'.[395] Rives read the *Germania* within such a framework, 'as in itself an enactment of Roman control over them [the Germans], intellectually if not physically. By rendering them the objects of Roman knowledge, [Tacitus] subjects them to a more effective Roman dominance than Domitian had ever been able to achieve. In this respect *Germania* also functions as a writer's demonstration that where the Roman sword had failed, the Roman pen could succeed'.[396] In my view, the frequent migrations in the *Germania* are one of several factors to prevent the text from being an ordered representation of Germany as a subject of knowledge which could facilitate and complement physical control. The difficulty of achieving even intellectual conquest amidst Germany's absent or constantly changing boundaries is illustrated neatly by Tacitus' frequent mention of such movements of entire peoples outside the sole context in which he indicates he will speak about them (*Ger.* 27.2), and only then in a very particular way (from Germany into Gaul): his Germans are metaphorically overrunning the text. The subject is represented, but not in the orderly manner required to contain it.[397]

Tan laid bare another spatial strategy preventing the imposition of a Roman imperial geography on Germany, either physically or intellectually. Tacitus' journey through Germania, though structured hodologically as befits an

[394]Anderson (2006), 184.
[395]Said (2003), 3, explicitly acknowledges his indebtedness to Foucault's work on discourse in *Discipline and Punish* (see n. 395) and *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) in developing his view of Orientalism.
[396]Rives (2012), 53-4.
[397]Certain strands of modern postcolonial fiction display stylistic features which similarly evade, undermine or protest against the established order by being outside of rational control: the magic which intrudes into the otherwise realistic and recognisable setting of magical realism novels, for instance. Cf. Castle (2001), xviii and Slemon (2001) in the same collection.

itinerary moving from place to place[398], eschews the place names and indications of distance which make itineraries useful.[399] As a seeming alternative, Tacitus offers us the names of tribes and relative spatial indicators such as *iuxta*, *ultra* etc. to show how their territories relate to one another, but again undercuts the usefulness of this relative spatial perception:

> 'Although the use of these terms is a completely normal way to establish spatial relations in Latin text, their success depends on the security of the objects used as reference points — the spatial *relata*. (…) Tacitus' account does not clearly establish the location of *relata*, or of the viewer. (…) Spatially relative language can be used with much more precision than is demonstrated here; the 'failure' of the text to communicate is not the result of a poverty of spatial language, but of Tacitus' refusal to provide a supporting structure which would render it functional.'[400]

Though not reliant on Germany's constant internal movement for its purpose, this tactic also renders Germany mentally incomprehensible and thereby physically unconquerable. All these representational strategies run counter to the optimism and knowledge that speak from the previous 140 years of Roman activity in Germany and documentation *of* Germany: as Tan notes, Caesar records a very specific measurement for the Hercynian forest as taking nine days to traverse.[401] A century later, the Elder Pliny published twenty books filled with knowledge about Germany. This was only twenty years before Tacitus published the *Germania*. Vagueness was clearly not the only possible Roman approach to Germany.

I end this chapter by a theoretical reflection on the *Germania*'s internal textual dynamics informed by Victoria Pagán's discussion of Roman conspiracy narratives.[402] The *Germania*, despite its varied foci and representational strategies, is also a text which purports to lift the veil of ignorance from an alien

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[398]See also Morgan (1983), 114.
[399]Tan (2014), 194–95. In this, Tacitus may have taken his lead from Caesar's Germany, which in Krebs' view is presented 'as an infinite extension without any interior patterns except for infinite forests'; Krebs (2006), 112; also 119-24.
[400]Tan (2014), 196. Rives (2011), 166-7 describes the relational approach as the norm in classical antiquity but does not mention obstruction.
[401]Tan (2014), 191 citing Caes. *BG* 6.25.
[402]See Pagán (2004), 5–10 especially.

and unknown place. It is in a comparison of methods and symbolic function that the peculiarity of Tacitus' account of *Germania* as a supposedly instructive text most clearly manifests itself. Pagán notes that in order to achieve their purpose of elucidation, historians writing conspiracy narratives make the effort to 'construct a continuous chain of causality of an event that is shrouded in secrecy and silence.'[403] What was previously hidden is now laid bare. In contrast, this chapter makes clear throughout that Tacitus' methodology relies heavily on misrepresentation, suppression and narrative obstruction to obscure continuity and chronology in Germany. The work does not connect German prehistory to the modern history Tacitus describes by means of such a chain of causality.[404] Tacitus' text illuminates the extent to which Germany is not a subject which can be illuminated. What was hidden is actually still (largely) hidden. The medium (the text's obstructive nature) expresses part of the message (Germany's obstructive nature) – whatever the actual words *literally* say about Germany and its peoples.

This brings us to a comparison of the main function of such texts of revelation, as a containment of risk. In a modified version of Foucault's statement about the relationship between ordered representation and control, we could say that by making the threatening unknown known, conspiracy narratives assert a form of power and enact a final endgame victory over it. According to Pagán, they operate as 'palliatives' intended to reassure readers, through their textual illumination of the secret, that the threat depicted will never return because everyone has now been informed of the facts as well as the need for vigilance against similar events. Tacitus' text, as we have seen, neither literally nor metaphorically contains the Germans' movements in Germany across the Rhine. Representing Germany and the Germans in this way justifies Rome's military presence on the west bank, to guard against irruptions, and simultaneously

[403]Pagán (2004), 5.
[404]Another feature of conspiracy narratives which the *Germania* shares is the 'irreconcilability of sources on several counts' even where a subject *is* accounted for; see Pagán (2004), 7 for the Catilinarian conspiracy. The *Germania*'s prehistory is called into doubt by Tacitus, as we saw, partly on the basis of conflicting sources.

shows that the order and emplacement which she had managed to impose west of the river cannot be replicated east of the river.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter argues that the persistent movement of Germany's people in Tacitus' *Germania* is a defining feature of the work and the land it represents. The essence of Germany in this work is fluidity, meaning that the logic of Roman imperial geography cannot be applied to it. These people cannot be pinned down either physically or intellectually.

Tacitus hints at an explanation for the disunity of Germany's tribes and the fluidity of their space in his account of their *origines.* It is both muddled – leaving a large gap unexplained between the original three tribes from the sons of Mannus and the multitude of German tribes which Tacitus describes – and presented as uncertain and contested. This contrasts with Roman history, which traced a genealogy of the state through an intervening period between Rome's mythical prehistory of exile and migration and the contemporary period. The Roman ability to 'make' imperial spaces, which I have traced in Livy and Virgil, contrasts with a Germania of flux and shifting peoples, boundaries and lands. The constitutive power of a historical narrative for a group identity is closely tied to the production of coherent space. The Germans, whose *carmina antiqua* are incomplete and contested as historical records, do not constitute a unified group and move through a non-determined space. Their ungraspable fluidity is further aided by the chronological vagueness with which Tacitus narrates several events from Germany's past, situating them only by means of the adverb *olim* when he could have dated them very precisely.

Tacitus could have made Roman history fill at least part of the German history gap from the moment where the frequent clash of the two spaces and peoples made this possible. Instead, he collapses even Rome's history with Germany (Germany's Roman history) into timelessness through emphasising and exaggerating – by means of some rhetorical slight of hand - the long duration of the period of attempted and supposedly failed conquest. Within this period, the

text does touch on Roman activity in Germany but devalues it in different ways. Many outright Roman successes in Germany are elided from the narrative entirely; certain achievements are presented so as to create the impression of having come about despite Rome's passive reactivity rather than because of its proactivity; and proof of its far-reaching informal influence into even the innermost parts of Germany is reframed as failure to conquer.

Some of the spatial themes in the *Germania* prefigure later reworkings in the *Annals*, such as the migrations by the Frisii and Ampsivarii which were discussed in the previous chapter. Pinning down how their location related to people's identity, as well as to their relationship with the Roman Empire, was clearly of interest to Tacitus. The *Germania* also displays a concern with fixity as a prerequisite for rolling out imperialism and establishing post-pacification society.[405] In the *Histories* and *Annals*, this concern evolves into an even narrower focus on imperial Rome's unlimited power as the ultimate arbiter of people's placement and distribution in German space as well as in other domains and hierarchies, such as legal status, class, taxation and the army.[406]

Finally, the *Germania* as text adds to the impression of German unmanageability by means of the migrating Germans within it disrespecting the bounds set for them by the text – this merely mirrors the absence of boundaries within Germany. Thus it becomes a perfect adjunct to the strategy of geographical obscuration instead of illumination which Tan already observed in the work. Though authorial intention is impossible to divine retrospectively, it is hard to

[405]With regard to the latter two points of connection to Tacitus' other works, I am therefore of the view that Rives' assertion (2012, 58) of a Tacitean 'interest in Rome's relations with its northern neighbors' across them all is too vague, and that of 'endorsement of Roman imperialism' too strong.

[406]Chapter one discusses Rome's desire to manage both the people and the land of Batavia in the *Histories*; chapter two deals with the changes wrought in the economic constitution of identities in the Rhineland by the advent of Roman imperialism; chapter three analysed the Rhine mutinies as proof that Roman legionaries under the principate displayed similar concerns to the Batavi about their position and powerlessness with regard to the Roman autocratic régime; chapter four depicts the German landscape's unsuitability to Roman pacification and order by means of Germanicus' soldiers' fear and his own destructiveness; and chapter five a mixture of most of the above.

see how the text could be read as facilitating, encouraging or even representing any kind of conquest of this strange and volatile land.

7 Conclusion

This thesis has made clear that two themes run consistently through the German passages of the Tacitean corpus. The first is the collective oppression of imperial subjects, regardless of their status, showing that imperial power under the principate worked in similar ways to produce similar results in different regions, among different ethnic or political groups, and among different status groups. Tacitus foregrounds such common patterns without losing the specificity of different events such as Roman mutinies or provincial revolts. The second theme is the steady depiction of the Rhineland and transrhenane Germany as places in which Rome can achieve feats of conquest only with difficulty and temporarily. Their alien (wet and forested) and ever-changing nature, and that of its peoples, preclude Roman physical and mental access and the transformation of the territory into a Roman province in which both space and people are controlled and transformed permanently.

The theme of imperial oppression is a background issue in the first two chapters, but is introduced and explored more fully in chapter three on the mutinies on the Rhine and in Pannonia, as the earliest *res Germanae* reported in the Tacitean corpus. Tacitus' account highlights how these mutinies originated in Rome's flawed political relationship with the mutineers, which became critical and no longer containable after the death of Augustus. This chapter then further showed that the Tacitean text frames the mutineers' complaints as the political equivalent, by citizens, of the provincial Batavi's discourses asserting their suffering at the hands of an overbearing exploitative imperial Roman government. Both these episodes are concerned with the relationship between Roman imperial power and its subjects[407], and the replication of complaints and situations from one to the other suggests a view of the principate in which everyone subject to the emperor and his delegates was relegated to a similar

[407]My reading therefore diverges from that of Lavan (2013), in which slavery is a metaphor applied to provincials by Romans.

inferior status of *de facto* slavery in which their physical integrity is subject to arbitrary but systematic violence for which there is no practical, legal redress.

The parallels developed between the Batavi and the mutineers show that the workings of imperial power and this subjugation of free individuals to its operation do not respect distinctions of citizenship or origins. There is not, in these accounts, one law for the Romans and another for the provincials. The result is to erode identity distinctions, certainly those in which modern understandings of Roman imperial history have conventionally been framed (Roman – provincial – barbarian). The dynamic establishes two very distant poles of identity and power, the imperial centre one the one hand (the emperor, his family, and their representatives in government and the military) and everyone else on the other, whether citizen or provincial.

To this shared depiction of the brutal power wielded by the one-man system as well as its blowing up of traditional Roman-versus-other distinctions, the communal German setting appears almost incidental. These German residents do not experience this relegation of status *because* they are in the Rhineland, but because the operations and inherent corruption of the imperial political (and economic) structure have effects in Germany. This opens up the possibility of gaging whether (or how far) this power dynamic extends to, firstly, other German passages from the Tacitean corpus, and secondly, depictions of other areas and groups of people across the Empire in this group of texts. In the former case, chapter five of this thesis demonstrates that both issues, the brutality of Roman imperial power and the effacing of distinctions between identity groups in favour of shared oppression, are at the heart of several shorter episodes set in Germany. *Annals* 3's account of Florus and Sacrovir's revolt of AD21 contains discourses on Roman rapacity as part of the revolt's beginnings, just as in the accounts of the mutinies and Batavian revolt. The story of the Roman official Olennius' maltreatment of the Frisii in *Annals* 4 connects the excesses of the Roman imperial government with the violation of the non-slave body, and recalls the maimed mutineers and raped Batavi in particular. The Ampsivarii in *Annals* 13, despite their chief Boiocalus' long service to Rome

and consequent expectation of reciprocal consideration, are treated no differently to these other tribes. These smaller German narratives in the Tacitean corpus, therefore, further support a reading of the text as indicating that to imperial Rome no differences of status or situation between imperial subjects were any longer relevant.

A discussion of other areas of the Empire and the groups of people within it would have fallen outside the scope of this thesis, but even a cursory reading of some of them suggests they uphold the pattern outlined above. The British queen Boudicca's story in *Annals* 14, for example, contains (as well as new and idiosyncratic ones) several of the familiar elements from this thesis: the violation of the non-slave body, a Roman procurator's rapacity, and consequent revolt. The beginning of the Thracian revolt at *Annals* 4.46 is explained by Tacitus in terms of a *dilectus* refused and complaints about burdens framed in terms of *servitium*. The Thracians' situation resembles that of the Batavi in several other respects which, whether historically accurate or not[408], reinforce further the parallels about provincials' lived experience within the Empire or its sphere of influence. The African Tacfarinas' rebellion against Rome is presented as a conflict between neighbours for plunder in its early stages, but just before his final defeat *libertas* makes an appearance here also (*Ann.* 4.24), alongside the idea of Rome as antithetical to whatever he is using the concept to mean (which is not clarified by Tacitus, and he offers very little ground on which to construct a hypothesis). Though further work can usefully be undertaken in this area, this preliminary survey suggests that Tacitean accounts of Roman encounters with non-Germans elsewhere will uphold the conclusions reached in the present study on the basis of the German passages. Imperial power is shown to work similarly and to be perceived similarly, even if the landscape in these passages is different (the desert of Africa, the mountains of Thrace).

[408]Both tribes are led in battle by their own leaders, reject a *dilectus* and act up at least partly because they fear that under Rome's rule their group will be mixed in with other nationalities and dragged to opposite ends of the earth; see Brunt (1960), 501.

Tacitus' narrative detects and represents certain patterns in the workings of Roman power across different specific circumstances. It is not easy to see whether the paradigms we can perceive in the account influence or distort the narrative. Two ways of reading this material are possible: we can believe that Tacitus applies a certain set of literary and intellectual tropes to his understanding of resistance to Rome or that Tacitus' understanding of the political structures was such that he perceived certain repetitive elements within the dynamics of Roman imperial history. More literary approaches that have become common in the analysis of Latin historiography would tend to the former interpretation. The analysis in this thesis would tend to the latter. One of the primary differences between Tacitean history and its modern descendants is that the political interpretations of these events are embedded within the specifics of the varying narratives. A repetition in narrative pattern between two different events need not be seen as a literary trope or an imaginative borrowing to fill a gap in the narrative, but as a manifestation of a perceived regularity in the historical process, even if Tacitus never theorises that process. Even though the *Annals* are written in annalistic form, Tacitus does not seem to regard history as 'one thing after another' but as a working out of particular social and political relationships. It is this pattern that we see in the repetition of trials in the Tiberian books, for instance, and it is through the repeated nature of events that the general conclusions of the reader are reached.

One might object that even in the Tacitean accounts, the revolts and uprisings that I have traced in this study are exceptional. Tacitus must have been aware of the long periods of peace in the German lands between these accounts of violence. We cannot doubt that Roman rule was enthusiastically embraced in many parts of the Empire[409], as it was by the Agrippinenses, formerly Ubii, in

[409]The subject of Ando (2000) and also touched upon in Woolf (2000). I do not share Master's optimistic reading (2016) of the Batavian revolt in Tacitus, analogous to the Social War, as the convulsion necessary to force a change in Roman behaviour towards this group which would then reconcile them to their heavy human (rather than financial) contribution to the Roman Empire; my skepticism derives in part from the limits of the argument. In my view, Tacitus' description of the problem is not transactional in nature; moreover, a better remunerated share in the Empire would do

Histories 4 (see chapter two). At the same time, it is perfectly possible that in many cases peace and the material benefits brought by Roman rule were valued despite a concomitant awareness of political and other forms of oppression and corruption.

I started this conclusion with the earliest German event narrated in the Tacitean corpus, and traced its thematic concerns in several other German episodes discussed in this thesis. At the other chronological end, the *Histories* contain the latest recorded *res Germanae*, in the form of the Batavian revolt.[410] As well as being concerned with imperial power in a manner which transcends the specifics of its German setting, as we have seen, the Tacitean account devotes attention to Germany as a place. Chapter one discusses the spatial representation of Germany by Tacitus in detail, analysing how Tacitus carefully shaped and continually brings to the fore the wetscapes in which the revolt took place. This enables him to explore different modes of interaction between peoples and places, and how they affect the power balance of imperialist aggression and resistance to it. This chapter is therefore in a general sense about how Tacitus depicts place as a central determinant of relationships between people and power. Specifically, his concern is with how the riverine and swampy nature of the Rhineland shaped these relationships to be symbiotic and productive in the native Germans' case – not least thanks to a semi-divine agency of the river Rhine which repeatedly damages Rome's progress – and hostile and obstructive for the occupying Romans.

In view of this dynamic, in which gains made in Germany by Rome are difficult and often temporary, chapter two discusses how this failure to fully master this wetland landscape was countered by Petillius Cerialis' rhetorical offence on the participants of the Batavian revolt in *Histories* 4 and 5. His tactic uses the guise of identity politics to split the Gallo-German alliance into competing groups which rely on pragmatic considerations to determine what action to take and

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nothing to remedy the systemic nature of the problem as outlined by Tacitus and traced in this thesis.

[410]The *Germania* makes opaque reference to some later events but these are not of Roman making, such as the Bructeri's genocide in AD97 by their neighbours (*Ger.* 33.1).

what identity to adopt. Though Tacitus does not describe in the *Histories* how identity was constituted in the Rhineland or how the territory was politically and economically organised before the advent of Rome, the speeches, especially when voicing resistance such as that of the Tencteri, attest how Rome's appearance in the Rhineland effected a change in both these mechanisms, resulting in the primacy of these other considerations over the ideological aspects of identity. Under Rome, groups – whether along the same lines as before or new ones – were in competition with each other for goods and status provided by Rome, and it is their individually negotiated position which sets them apart *qua* group, rendering previous ties such as pan-German relatedness less important. The competitive mechanism described amounts to a form of largely non-military Roman control over the Rhineland. In spite of military setbacks caused by Rome's difficult negotiation of the landscape, Rome retained an ability to separate groups as a means of achieving control, at least to the west of the Rhine. I say 'largely non-military' because, even though there are skirmishes, there were no large-scale battles or massive losses suffered by the rebels – not until the very end when Cerialis destroyed the Batavi's island with its homesteads, and at this point most of the work in dismantling the alliance has been done. For most of the tribes, it is the threat of violence at a point where they have just suffered defeat in a relatively small skirmish that impels the rebels to undergo the change of heart which sees them revaluate the economic benefits of the status quo. Through his skilful exploitation of all this to separate the constituent groups of the Gallo-German rebel alliance, the Roman general Petillius Cerialis, often discussed in scholarship and partly portrayed by Tacitus as incompetent, shows himself to be an efficient commander in managing and ending the revolt after all.

Germany as an obstructive landscape returns in the *Annals*, where the unpredictable force of nature of the *Histories* is reworked into an equally destructive but much slower agent of decay as a different way of showing up the importance between peoples and places in Rome's imperialist conquest of the Rhineland. The German passages of *Annals* 1 and 2 are built on the same foundations throughout: Germany as a complex space, structured both

horizontally (by means of competing Roman and German spaces) and vertically (by means of layered spaces), of which the constitution is perpetually contested, perpetually shifting, and perpetually eluding Roman grasp. Even though the text shows that Roman violent power *can* leave marks in the landscape, it also shows that these marks, over time, are obliterated by the landscape. There is no middle ground between violent repression which destroys both such resistant people and resistant places, as Germanicus does, and full co-option of Germans so that they collude in the transformation of themselves and their landscape into Roman subjects. Germanicus does not offer the Germans co-option, perhaps in recognition that in this Germany in this part of the Tacitean text such co-option cannot be achieved. His bloody expeditions and trophies do therefore not amount to a conquest of Germany that results in a province, and are even interspersed with failures on a scale as grand as that of the victories. Several decades later, Corbulo at first seems to do better than Germanicus. His victories would seem to herald the beginnings of a possible integration of Germany into Roman imperial structures, in particular with his establishing of German states such as the Frisii's quasi-Republic. But ultimately, his efforts too cannot improve on the Germanicus intervention, despite achieving more impressive victories and longer journeys into the German interior.

The contrast, familiar from the *Histories*, between Germans travelling easily and swiftly through their distinctive landscape (here, across the Rhine, more forested than riverine) and Romans who struggle to master it recurs in the Germanicus campaigns of the *Annals*, but foregrounds identity even more clearly. The alienness of the Germans, their landscape, and their culture is stressed through Germanicus' lack of interest in comprehending Germany. This contrasts markedly with his intellectual curiosity and historical awareness when encountering the remnants of Egypt's (bygone) empire, to which he can relate, and his trip to Greece. His soldiers respond with fear to their sustained confrontation with the alien German landscape and people. Both those encamped on the Roman west bank, fairly safe from German irruptions, and those campaigning on the east bank, in a more fragile position after the muddy defeat which cost them their tools, rush to the unfounded conclusion that

further confrontation with Germany is imminent, and threaten to abandon discipline, duty, and safety to escape it. At this point, Tacitus dramatically shows how only the interposition of the Roman aristocratic body, Caecina's and Agrippina's, between the soldiers and their desired escape is able to avert disaster for Rome. A similar breakdown of discipline, though even more explicitly explained as the result of abandoned *labor*, lay at the root of the mutinies (as chapter three showed) and provided the impetus for the first 'Germanicus campaign' in *Annals* 1, against the Marsi. This expedition's status as a deliberate reinstatement of *labor* to restore lost discipline means it deserves separate treatment from the other campaigns of *Annals* 1 and 2. It is not about a tightly welded unit of disciplined Romans going out to impose their rule (values, structures, …) on the Germans, but about recently undisciplined Romans going out to impose Roman rule back on themselves. The Marsi simply happen to be a convenient target. As if to illustrate the difference in purpose of this episode, Tacitus' account shows the usually challenging German landscape working in Rome's favour during the Mari expedition. Identity and landscape are central to it, as in the rest of *Annals* 1 and 2, but people, place, and power are configured very differently.

I finish this conclusion, as I finished this thesis, with a discussion of the *Germania*. Its position as final book-end instead of springboard seemingly goes against its status as one of Tacitus' earliest compositions. The *Germania* is not a historical work. In fact, its nature as (the results of) an ethnographical inquiry makes it more liable to essentialisation and schematisation of both the place and the people. Though my reading 'backwards' to the *Germania* from the identity and spatial patterns of the *Histories* and *Annals* does not argue for an early German template in the *Germania* to which Tacitus then adhered rigidly in the later works, it does find the seeds of many of these later concerns. In its most straightforward aspect, the *Germania* is dominated by ever-moving Germans who cannot be fixed on a map and so defy both physical and intellectual mastery by Rome. The perpetual shifting of its internal tribal constitution prevents and discourages conquest as much as the obscurity of its internal geography (long noted by other scholars) does. Both themes also occur

in Germanicus' frustrating pursuits of Arminius through trackless forests. The *Germania*'s preoccupation with emplacement (or fixity in space) as a prerequisite and characteristic of successful Roman imperialism recurs in Tacitus' account of Corbulo's first settlement of the Frisii as well as in their subsequent migration and eviction by Rome from their newly chosen lands (a cycle which is enacted a second time by the Ampsivarii). Germanicus' lack of interest in understanding Germany or its history in the *Annals*, yet his interest in the history of other 'civilised' Mediterranean cultures such as Egypt, are not motivated in the *Annals*. In chapter four, I offered my own hypothesis for the divergence on the basis of the *Annals*' depiction of Germany as difficult for Romans to negotiate and conquer, more threatening because of it, and therefore more easily neutralised through destruction than through understanding. This understanding is further enriched by reading the *Germania*'s depiction of Germans as people almost without history: without both the historical development undergone by Rome since its – equally mythical – earliest beginnings and the historical practice which commemorates it, thereby enabling an empire to grow which expanded territorially but retained a single stable identity. The *Germania*, as are the other works, is therefore ambivalent in tone about the Roman Empire: though the Germans are clearly portrayed as inferior to Romans in this and other aspects[411], the obstructive, fragmented and shifting space created by this incoherent people at the same time ensures it remains outside the reach of the Empire's corrupting dynamics. Finally, the 'ungraspability' of the ever-moving Germans in the *Germania* recalls, though is different from, the *Histories*' depiction of German identities as supremely malleable under the influence of Rome's economic and military pressure.

In what is perhaps an uninspiring conclusion, therefore, Tacitus' Germany unites a variety of different functions. As others have argued, Germany can be read as a mirror to Rome.[412] But my thesis has also shown that for Tacitus it was a theatre in which features of Roman imperialism and power were manifested.

[411]Though not all, as demonstrated by the admiration with which Tacitus' writes on the Germans' marital ethics (*Ger.* 18-9).
[412]E.g. Low (2013) on the *Annals*, Keitel (1993) on the *Histories* and O'Gorman (1993) and Timpe (2007) on the *Germania*.

It is a place of conquest, not firmly shaped and tamed into a province, yet not one in which the virtues of old Rome can be played with away from the corruption of the new imperial Rome of the principate: the imperial prince Germanicus fails to conquer or annex it, the Roman-fostered Italicus introduces a quasi principate to plague the Cherusci in Germany's interior, the Rhine legions repeatedly abandon Republican standards of discipline while their commanders treat them like slaves. It is a place for which Tacitus is driven to explore the mechanics of Roman imperialism: the attempted transformation of landscapes, the occasional co-option of communities such as the Agrippinenses but also the suppression of the free, such as the Batavi, in its corrupt regime. It is a place of difference and resistance where place resists Roman power, as in the Batavian revolt and Germanicus campaigns, and Roman comprehension, as in the *Germania*. For these reasons, it is ultimately unable to be brought within the Roman sphere, and as a result is subject to often extreme Roman violence. Destruction is the nearest Rome can get to any real form of control over Germany. Ultimately, therefore, Tacitus' treatment is not of Germany as an abstraction, but a detailed engagement with Germany, the workings of imperialism, and its place in Roman history.

Bibliography

All translations in this thesis are my own, unless otherwise specified. For the Latin, I have in each case used the Oxford Classical Texts of the *Germania* (Ogilvie and Winterbottom 1975), *Histories* (Fisher 1911) and *Annals* (Fisher 1906). The sole exception is *Hist.* 4.12, where the Teubner by (Delz, Heubner, and Önnerfors 1978) usefully emends *erat et domi delectus eques, praecipuo nandi studio, <quo> arma equosque retinens integris turmis Rhenum perrumpere*… to *perrumperent*. Editions of texts by other ancient authors are, unless stated otherwise, taken from the early 20th century Loebs on the Perseus.edu website.

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