The *Sylloge Tacticorum* and the Development of Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century

Georgios Chatzelis

Royal Holloway, University of London

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

Supervised by: Prof. Jonathan Harris

2017

Declaration of Authorship

I, Georgios Chatzelis, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed:

Date:

Abstract

This thesis is a study of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*, a tenth-century Byzantine military manual. It aims to examine it as a case-study, so as to connect military manuals with the broader context of the society which produced it. The *Sylloge Tacticorum* is studied in connection with Byzantine warfare, literature, and historiography, as well as with the social and administrative context of the tenth century. The stage is set by an examination of how the Byzantines fought in the East in the period c. 900-950. Then follows a study of the sources of the *Sylloge Tacticorum* which is given comparatively with wider issues of education and Classical *mimesis*. The thesis continues with an examination of the dating of the manual which is connected with the broader socio-political and military context of Byzantium's wars with the Arabs in the first half of the tenth century. The study next attempts to explain the false attribution of the text to emperor Leo VI, and to identify whether there were any later revisions and by whom. Next follows an examination of the literary and military innovations of the treatise. The literary innovations are discussed in connection with recent advances and inter-textual studies on Byzantine imitation and adaptation. The military innovations are examined in connection with older manuals, in an attempt to highlight the gradual evolution and the development of Byzantine warfare. After that, the thesis considers how practical the *Sylloge Tacticorum* and other military manuals were and whether their advice was actively followed. The study takes into consideration the role of history and the past in Byzantium, and looks at the testimony of historical narratives critically and comparatively with the advice of the manuals. Finally, the thesis focuses on the later reception of the *Sylloge Tacticorum* and its influence on other manuals and on warfare.

Contents

Acknowledgements

Doing a PhD can be a long journey. Through the course of almost four years many things change and most of all yourself. In this period of time, there have been many people who have significantly helped me to change for the better, and to them I owe a great a debt of thanks.

Academically speaking, allow me first to express my gratitude to the late Prof. Frank Trombley, who, by supervising my MA dissertation, had laid the foundation of this thesis. My greatest debt, however, is to my doctoral supervisor, Prof. Jonathan Harris. As a supervisor, I owe him many thanks for his support and guidance on all levels: for being there for me in times of crisis, for teaching me that context is of vital importance, for pushing me to improve by going beyond what I felt comfortable, and finally for all his suggestions and corrections which greatly contributed to the drafting of this thesis as it is today. Needless to say of course that I am solely responsible for any shortcomings and mistakes. I must also thank Jonathan Harris for his participation in a related project, the translation of the *Sylloge Tacticorum.* I am indebted to him as a collaborator, for without his support, trust, guidance and advice, I would have been unable to undertake the task. In addition, my gratitude goes to Prof. John Haldon and Dr. Catherine Holmes whose careful reading of the thesis yielded many invaluable comments, improvements, suggestions, corrections and ideas for future research. I would also like to thank Dr. Charalambos Dendrinos for devoting precious time into guiding and initiating me to his area of expertise, as well as Prof. Peregrine Horden and Dr. David Gwynn for their comments and suggestions. In addition, allow me to express my gratitude to Dr. Andreas Goutzioukostas, Prof. Frank Trombley, Prof. Jonathan Harris, Dr. Charalambos Dendrinos and Dr. Dragana Dimitrijević who have supported me in this period by agreeing to support my applications with their reference letters. Last but not least, in the multitude of different approaches, sources, arguments and perspectives one is not alone. There is a number of scholars whose work I have found inspiring and extremely helpful and, therefore, I am indebted to the contributions of John Haldon, Catherine Holmes, Ingela Nilsson, Antony Kaldellis, Leonora Neville, Eric McGeer, George Dennis and Alphonse Dain.

I would also like to express my gratitude to all donors and institutions who supported me financially through the course of my studies. My biggest debt is to the Hellenic Institute of Royal Holloway, University of London which partly funded my PhD thesis with four studentships. Three of them were established by the Orthodox Cultural Association of Athens and donated by Mrs Angeliki Frangos, and the other by the Ministry of Education and Culture of the Republic of Cyprus (three *Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomaios I Postgraduate Studentships* and one *George of Cyprus Bursaries Fund).* My

thanks also go to Royal Holloway, University of London and Santander Bank for supporting me with a travel grant, as well as to the Templar Heritage Trust for providing me with a bursary. Finally, I would like to thank the Association Internationale des Études Byzantines and the Serbian National Committee for exempting me from participation fees for my communication at the International Congress of Byzantine Studies, Belgrade 2016.

Last but not least, on a personal level, my deepest gratitude goes to my parents and especially to my father, Aristeides, and to my sister, Lemonia. For without their sacrifices, moral and financial support none of these would have been possible. Through the course of a PhD one has to sacrifice, among other things, time, as well as physical and mental presence. Therefore, I am grateful to all those who understood what it was like, and to all those who helped me, in their own way, through an honest confession, an invitation, a call, a joke, a smile, a tear etc.; so, among others, many thanks to Eliza, Mr. Kostas, Georgios T, Christos, Antonis, Leonidas, Lambros, Chara, Panos, Georgios P, Michalis, Chrysa, Andria and Christina, Kostas and Christina, Andreas, Marianna, Maria, Toby, Nicollo and Chris.

Introduction

I. What is the *Sylloge Tacticorum*?

The *Sylloge Tacticorum,* or *Συλλογή Τακτικών* (hereafter *ST*), which translates to *Compilation of Tactics,* is a tenth-century Byzantine military manual attributed to emperor Leo VI (886-912), bearing the date 903-904 A.D in its title. However, since this attribution is generally not accepted by modern scholarship, a more specific dating remains open to question. The *ST* belongs to the literary genre of military manuals which stretches back to antiquity. The first military manual appeared in the fourth century BC; it was the work of Aeneas the Tactician who wrote a treatise on how to withstand a siege. Such works continued to be produced throughout antiquity, and by the late sixth or early seventh century the most influential Byzantine military treatise appeared under the name *Strategikon*, attributed to the emperor Maurice (582-602) (hereafter *MS*). The next extant military manual, the *Peri Strategias* (hereafter *PS*), written by Syrianos Magister, seems to date to sometime in the ninth century.

The tenth century was an important milestone for the genre of military treatises. The general context of high literary production under the so-called Macedonian Renaissance, in combination with the Arab threat, facilitated the production of several military manuals. One of these was the *ST,* which was strongly influenced by its predecessor, the *Taktika* of the emperor Leo VI (hereafter *LT*). In turn, the *ST* heavily influenced its successor, the *Praecepta Militaria* (hereafter *PM*) which is attributed to the emperor Nikephoros II Phokas (963-969).

The *ST* consists of 102 extant chapters which can be divided in three main categories. The first category covers chapters 1 to 56, where a wide variety of military matters is discussed, including generalship, sieges, battle and marching formations, division of booty, raids, ambushes, encampment, posting of officers, spies and truces. The second category includes chapters 57 to 75 which contain information regarding war by other means, discussing matters such as protecting against poisonous food or drinks, poisonous arrows, using flammable mixtures or easily neutralizing enemy horses. The third and final category covers chapters 76 to 102 all of which contain stratagems and anecdotes of military commanders in ancient times.

II. Manuscript Tradition

The *ST* is currently reported to be preserved in three manuscripts. The oldest available manuscript is the *Laurentianus Plut*. 75.6 (hereafter L), whereas the other two are more recent copies: The *Bernensis* 97, which is a direct copy of L, is dated to the sixteenth century and the *Parisinus* 2446, which is a direct copy of the *Bernensis*, to the seventeenth.[1] L most probably dates to the fourteenth or early fifteenth century, and it is a codex measuring 190 by 270 mm, consisting of 278 folios in total.[2]

The earliest recorded history of L can be traced in 1491, when the codex is found in the list of books which Janus Laskaris bought from Corfu. Janus also visited the Avramis library while in Corfu, but L does not seem to have been part of this library, since it is not featured in Janus' book list which specifically listed items coming for the Avramis library.[3] Janus, who was a prominent Greek scholar of his time, was patronized by the Medici, perhaps with the aid of Demetrius Chalkokondyles, sometime after the death of Bessarion (1472). In the context of his activities in Florence as a Greek scholar, Janus undertook two visits to Greece in search of Greek manuscripts. In his voyage between 1491 and 1492 Laskaris visited Corfu, where he purchased our codex, among other works.[4] The manuscript, however, did not directly go to the patron of Janus, Lorenzo de' Medici, as it does not feature as a holding of the Medici library in 1495. Nevertheless, we can trace its existence in the possession of the Medici in 1508, as the manuscript appears in the inventory of Vigili, listed as number 381, and in folio 108v of the so-called list of Hannover, which is a list of works and authors featuring the books that Laskaris introduced to Florence from his travels.[5] The L is still in the Medicea Laurenziana library in Florence today.

The codex contains various works of different kinds. More specifically folios 1-71 contain medical treatises, some of which are dedicated to Constantine Porphyrogennetos.[6] Folios 116-124 preserve a series of military laws and military hymns, which both have been edited and studied by modern

[1]Köchly 1854; Vári 1927: 241-2; Dain 1938: 9-10; 1940b: 36; Dain and Foucault 1967: 338; Andrist 2007: 126-37; Wallraff et al 2012: xl.

[2] Bandini 1770: 151; Köchly 1854; Vári 1927: 242; Vieillefond 1932: xlvi-xlix; Dain 1938: 9-10; 1940b: 38-9; Dain and Foucault 1967: 388; Fryde 1996: 425, 612; McCabe 2007: 33, n.101.

[3] Müller 1884: 379-407; Jackson 2003: 137.

[4] Knös 1945: 25-9, 33-7; Tsagas 1993: 13-9; Speake 1993: 325-30; Harris 1995: 101, 123-4; Irigoin 1997: 485-91.

[5] Vogel 1854: 156-7; Fryde 1983: 160-1, 203; 1996: 651; Jackson 1998: 91-3, 101; 2003: 137-9; Markesinis 2000: 302-6; McCabe 2007: 34.

[6] For more information on medical treatises connected to Constantine Porphyrogennetos see: Cohn 1900: 154-8; Dain 1953: 70; Hunger 1978: ii.305-6; Lemerle 1971: 296; Sonderkamp 1984: 29-41.

scholars.[7] After that, folios 124-247 contain the *Hippiatrika*, a veterinary treatise, which is most probably linked to Constantine VII (945-959).[8] The remaining folios (247-275) are filled with various treatises, mostly small in size, some of which are dedicated to medicine or geography.[9]

The *ST* occupies folios 72r-116r. A *pinax,* namely a table of contents, with the title of each chapter covers folios 72r-73v. However, the *pinax* continues over to folios 73v-74v, to cover, not only the contents of our treatise, but also the contents of the other two works that follow the *ST* in the codex, i.e. the *Poinalios Stratiotikos Nomos* and the *Akolouthia.* This implies that the *pinax* was not initially part of the *ST,* but it was added at a later date. Alphonse Dain argued that it was not added by the copyists of L*,* as some light corrections strongly imply a more ancient origin. Most probably the *pinax* was added sometime after the creation of the *ST*, when the latter was included in a corpus dedicated to military matters that contained all three works, and thus served as a general table of contents for the whole codex.[10] The next folios (74v-103v) preserve chapters 1 to 75. The last part occupies folios 103v-116r, at the beginning of which, a new title appears,[11] and directly after it follow the chapters 76 to 102.[12]

According to the author of our treatise, the *ST* was originally accompanied by two diagrams which unfortunately are not preserved in any of our surviving manuscripts. Both were dedicated to infantry formations.[13] The first diagram seems to have depicted a battle-array consisting exclusively of infantry, while the second probably illustrated a battle-formation in which the infantry was drawn up in a square and the cavalry was stationed inside it. A small and rough sketch of this square formation is preserved into the right lower margin of L, folio 95r. This sketch, however, bears little resemblance to other surviving diagrams of military treatises, and it seems, therefore, that it was not a copy of the original one, but rather a later design. This sketch, could have been the work of the copyists, or of an older owner of the text, and could have served to facilitate a better understanding of the guidelines of the text.[14]

---

[7] For the military laws of Rufus see: Korzenszky1931; *JGR*, ii.ix-x, 80-9, and for the military hymns: Pertusi 1948: 145-68.

[8] The *Hippiatrika* has been studied in detail by McCabe 2007. For other works on the *Hippiatrika* and Constantine VII see: Cohn 1900: 158-60; Hunger 1978: ii.306; Lemerle 1971: 296-7.

[9] Bandini 1770: 150-1; Dain and Foucault 1967: 338; Fryde 1996: 424, 612.

[10] Dain 1939: 11-12, n.1.

[11] *Strategic Recommendations from the Deeds and Stratagems of Ancient Men, Romans, Greeks and Others, In Twenty-Eight Chapters.*

[12] Bandini 1770: 147-9; Dain and Foucault 1967: 338.

[13] *ST,* 45.20, 47.8.

[14] See, for example, the appendix of diagrams in the edition of *MS* and the *Syntaxis Armatorum Quadrata.*

The *ST* was copied by two different copyists. Daniele Bianconi has recently argued that one of them was Krateros, a scribe who belonged to the milieu of the fourteenth-century scholar Nikephoros Gregoras. The environment of Gregoras seems to have played an active role in the drafting of L in general, since yet another of his scribes, known as Anonymous G., seems to have collaborated in the writing of the codex.[15] The first hand copied from the beginning of the *ST* and up to the end of chapter 67, while the second hand continued his work up to the end.[16]

Although the second title of the treatise states that it will cover the deeds of ancient men in 28 chapters, only 27 chapters appear in the treatise.[17] Furthermore, L does not preserve chapters 68 to 73 and half of chapter 74. The first scribe comments on this loss in the margins of the manuscript, reporting that the chapters were already missing from the manuscript he used. The copyist attempted to fill in some of the missing chapters using a lost source, but although the *pinax* preserved the original titles, the missing chapters were filled in the wrong order. To make matters worse, one of the chapters, which was filled in by the scribe, does not correspond with any of the original material of the *ST,* as its text is irrelevant to the chapter headings that are found in the *pinax*.[18]

Dain explained this inconsistency by trying to identify the method of the copyist. He suggested that the copyist first attempted to complete chapter 74 since it was already partly preserved. In order to accomplish this, our copyist used a lost source, which Dain named *Corpus Perditum.* According to Dain, the copyist managed to fill in chapter 74 by drawing on chapter 38 of the *Corpus Perditum,* but as this was the first chapter which he attempted to fill, the copyist numbered it 68, probably because this was the first missing chapter of the *ST.* Consequently, he added it in the margins of folio 103r, which was the first margin available. His next step was to fill the next missing chapter he could find successively, by reading the lost source in reverse order, from the end to the beginning. However, despite the fact that chapters 71 to 73 of the *ST* correspond with chapters that the *Corpus Perditum* probably preserved, our scribe either failed to notice their existence, or perhaps had a version which was mutilated.[19]

In any case, the next chapter of the *ST* which the copyist managed to locate in the *Corpus Perditum* was chapter 70. According to Dain this corresponds with chapter 31 of the lost source. The scribe added this chapter in the left margin of folio 102v, namely the one right before folio 103r, as he was

[15] Bianconi 2008: 372, n.104; 2011: 125, n.40; 2012: 311. For the Anonymous G. see: Pérez-Martín 2008: 431-58.
[16] Bandini 1770: 148-9; Dain 1939: 12; Dain and Foucault 1967: 338; Mecella 2009: 107.
[17] Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxi.
[18] Vieillefond 1932: lii-liv; Dain 1938: 113-5; 1939: 12-4; Dain and Foucault 1967: 353; Mecella 2009: 107-8.
[19] Dain 1939: 28-31.

aware that in the order of the *pinax*, this chapter came first. Nevertheless, he numbered it as chapter 69, as it was the second in line which he added. As he continued the reading of *Corpus Perditum* in the same reverse order, he came across chapters 29 to 27, some of which, correspond with missing chapters of the *ST.* Consequently, our scribe turned to the next available folios 103v-104r and filled the missing chapter 69, with chapter 29 of the *Corpus Perditum*. Once again, as this was his third addition he numbered it as chapter 70. Nevertheless, as the next missing chapters were preserved one after the other in the *Corpus Perditum,* the scribe accidentally copied chapter 28 of the lost source, despite the fact that its text is irrelevant to the original contents of the *ST*. Be that as it may, he numbered this as chapter 71, since it was his fourth addition. The next chapter of the *Corpus Perditum* in line was chapter 27, which corresponds with the surviving chapter 65 of the *ST,* so our copyist correctly skipped it. Finally, he filled chapter 68 of the *ST* with the next chapter of the lost source in line, chapter 26, and since this was his fifth addition, he numbered it as chapter 72.[20]

III. Editions and Translations of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

In 1770, Angelo-Maria Bandini was the first scholar to re-discover the existence of the *ST* in L, as he was preparing his catalogue of the manuscripts of the Medicea Laurenziana library.[21] The first edition of the text, however, was only published 84 years later by Hermann Köchly.[22] His work appeared in 1854; it consisted of two volumes which contained, among other works, chapters 31-33, 38-39, 41-43 and 53-55 of the *ST,* that were edited using the *Bernensis* 97 rather than L.[23] In 1863, Jacques-Paul Migne included Köchly's text in the *Patrologia Graeca,* where a facing Latin translation was also added.[24]

In 1887, 24 years later, Johannes Melber, who had a strong interest in the work of Polyaenus, edited the relevant chapters 76-102 of the *ST,* based on L.[25] In 1917, Rudolph Vári included in his edition of *LT* some previously unedited chapters of the *ST*, as a sort of a critical apparatus, in order to compare and contrast the information given.[26] The last partial edition appeared in 1932, when Jean-René

[20] Dain 1939: 28-31.
[21] Bandini 1770: 148-9.
[22] Köchly 1854; Dain 1938: 9.
[23] Köchly 1854; Vári 1927: 241; Dain: 1938: 9.
[24] *Patrologia Graeca*, 1095-120.
[25] Melber 1887; Dain 1938: 9.
[26] Vári 1917-1922.

Vieillefond, who was interested in the tradition of the *Cesti* of Julius Africanus, edited chapters 57-75, along with a useful study regarding the sources and the dating of the *ST*.[27]

The first complete edition of the *ST* was published in 1938 by Dain, who based his edition on L. Dain's edition included all of the chapters of the manual, as well as the chapters that were added by the copyists in the margins of the manuscript. The edition of Dain remains the only complete one. In 1939, Dain included a French translation of the five chapters which were filled in by the copyist of L.[28] In 1994, Everett Wheeler published the first partial English translation of the *ST*, which included chapters 76-102. Wheeler based his translation on Melber's text and not that of Dain, but an appendix with the different readings was included in his book. A new English translation of the complete text by Jonathan Harris and Georgios Chatzelis is due to be published in 2017.

IV. Previous Analysis of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

When, in 1770, Bandini included the *ST* in his catalogue, he described some of its contents and commented that although the title of the treatise is attributed to Leo VI, its contents have many differences compared to *LT*.[29] The next century saw a number of scholars dedicating some of their focus to the *ST,* the first of whom was Friedrich Haase. In 1847, Haase commented on the importance of the *ST* stating that the treatise is at least of equal value and deserves at least the same attention as *LT*. Haase argued that the *ST* pre-dated *LT,* but he saw it as an unedited treatise of Leo VI.[30] The phrase *Inedita Tactica Leonis* was thus introduced, and accompanied the *ST*, for at least a century to come.

Seven years later, Köchly was a little more cautious on the dating issue. He argued that it is not certain whether *LT* pre-dated the *ST*, or vice versa, but he did not question the attribution and authorship of both works to Leo VI.[31] Köchly also attempted to identify the sources of the *ST*. In the introduction of his partial edition he commented that part of the treatise derived from Aelian, *MS*, the *PS*, and *LT*. In addition, he was the first scholar to point out that L is the oldest available manuscript of the *ST* and that the *Bernensis* 97 is only a direct copy of it.[32]

[27] Vieillefond 1932.
[28] Dain 1939: 34-6.
[29] Bandini 1770: 148–9.
[30] Haase 1847: 17.
[31] Köchly and Rüstow 1855: 11.
[32] Köchly 1854: 4.

The picture remained unchanged throughout the nineteenth century. Therefore, in 1863 Migne included a reprint of Köchly's edition of the *ST* in the *Patrologia,* under the name of Leo VI. Likewise, in his history of Byzantine literature, published in 1887, Karl Krumbacher treated the *ST* as an addition to *LT*.[33] It was from the beginning of the twentieth century that the study of the *ST* intensified. At that time, the most influential studies on the treatise were published which managed to direct scholars to the right direction.

In 1927, Vári produced the first study solely dedicated to the *ST*. In his article, he discussed various aspects of the text. He agreed that L was the principal manuscript, and explained that the *Parisinus* 2446 was a direct copy of the *Bernensis* 97. Apart from these, however, Vári was the first to argue that, in spite of the title of the treatise, Leo VI was not the real author of the *ST*. He underlined that there is a difference in style and sources between *LT* and the *ST*, and looked to internal evidence to find an alternative explanation. Vári stated that the phrases 'our Majesty' and 'our generals' were proof that the manual was indeed written by an emperor, and that the identical military hierarchy in both manuals, as well as the mutual appearance of the statement that the hand-siphons were recently invented, indicated that the *ST* was written in the time of Leo VI.[34] Vári, therefore, proposed that the manual was originally written by Alexander, the brother of Leo VI, who probably completed his work before *LT*. After Leo VI became increasingly suspicious of his brother, however, he arrogated the treaty for himself, and once *LT* was completed, he reduced the *ST* to a mere reference work.[35]

Despite the fact that Vári's theory was never accepted by modern scholarship, the importance of his contribution cannot be overlooked. He was the first scholar to break the connection between the *ST* and Leo VI after at least a hundred years. Although the attribution of the *ST* to Alexander lacked cogency, Vári's article was the first and last detailed study dedicated to tackling the problem of dating and attribution of the *ST*. All subsequent views on dating and attribution were presented without detailed argument and analysis, as they were mostly expressed in passing.

In 1932, Vieillefond provided two fundamental insights on the issue of the sources of the *ST* which were to become the basis of modern scholarship. Firstly, he recognized that chapters 57 to 75 originally derived from a lost source, which he named *Corpus X.* Vieillefond identified that the extant source which preserves the most similar phrasing to that of chapters 57 to 75 is, in fact, the *Apparatus Bellicus,*

[33] Krumbacher 1897: 637

[34] τῆς βασιλείας ἡμων; οἱ ἡμέτεροι στρατηγοί

[35] Vári 1927: 241-3, 265-70.

and not the *Cesti* of Julian Africanus, as Vári had previously argued.[36] With this evidence in mind, Vieillefond concluded that the *ST* dated in the late tenth century or in the beginning of the eleventh.[37]

Vieillefond's argument regarding the lost sources of the *ST* was further advanced by Dain in 1938-1939. After Dain had made a comparative study of the *Apparatus Bellicus*, *ST* and *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos (hereafter *TNO*), he concluded that it was not only chapters 57 to 75 which derived from this lost source, but the whole second half of the treatise. He, therefore, proposed that chapters 56 to 102 derived from what he preferred to call *Corpus Perditum*.[38] Accordingly, Dain assumed that another lost source was used for the first half of the manual, a source which he called *Tactica Perdita.* He supported this theory by explaining that although in chapters 21.4 and 22.5, the author of the *ST* writes 'as I have already said', his cross-references are, in fact, inaccurate as no relevant information had been provided above.[39] Dain consequently concluded that the inaccurate cross-references, as well as the phrase 'our Majesty', which only appears in the first half of the treatise, were accidentally copied in the *ST* from the *Tactica Perdita*. Whatever the case, Dain identified most of the traceable sources that our author had used. He noted that the extant texts which have a similar phrasing to that of the *ST* are Aelian, Julian of Ascalon, Onasander, *MS*, *LT,* the *PS,* the *Apparatus Bellicus*, the *Hypothesis* and the *Ekloga*.[40]

Given that Dain saw the author of the *ST* as a careless copyist, he wondered whether the *ST* really was a manual produced for current needs. Although he recognized that some parts of the treatise were original, he expressed the view that the manual should be considered either partly or entirely bookish, a literary work, a work of the library.[41] Finally, Dain argued that the manual dated from the middle of the tenth century without, however, going into more detail.[42] Around thirty years later, he confessed that a dating at the time of Leon VI was more probable, once again without further specifying.[43] Although Dain changed his mind on the dating, it was his initial theory that influenced modern scholarship the most. The majority of the scholars who referred to the *ST*, commented that its date remained uncertain, but most probably dates around 950.

[36] Vieillefond 1932: lii-liv, c.f. Vári 1927: 265-6.
[37] Vieillefond 1932: xlvi–xlvii.
[38] Dain 1938: 8; 1939: 14-31, 70-1; Dain and Foucault 1967: 353.
[39] ὥς μοι λέλεκται; ὡς ἤδη ἐρρέθη μοι.
[40] Dain 1938: 8; Dain and Foucault 1967: 350-1.
[41] Dain and Foucault 1967: 351.
[42] Dain 1938: 8.
[43] Dain-Foucault 1967: 357.

In 1978, Herbert Hunger dedicated some pages of his survey of Byzantine literature to the *ST*. Hunger more or less repeated the findings of Dain. He emphasized that the author of the *ST* did not exhibit the skills of a successful editor, and explained that some parts of his work should be attributed to a direct copy from lost sources even if they are in the first person. Hunger further commented that the poor editing skills of our author was the reason why some of the material is treated both in the first and in the second half of the treatise.[44]

Between 1991 and 1995, Eric McGeer was one of the last scholars who studied the *ST* in some detail. McGeer accepted Dain's initial dating theory and went it a step further. He argued that the fact that L includes medical and veterinary treatises dedicated to Constantine VII should imply that the *ST* was also compiled during his reign. In addition, McGeer noticed that the earliest testimony for the appearance of the Byzantine heavy cavalry, the *kataphraktoi*, is the battle of al-Hadath (954). With that in mind, he proposed that since the *ST* refers to the *kataphraktoi,* who also appear in the *PM*, it should have dated around this period, and more specifically around 950. McGeer's contribution, however, was not only confined to the issue of dating. He also noted that the *PM* used the *ST* as source, and underlined some important innovations and evolutions as they appear in the two manuals, the most important of which are the hollow square formation, the tactics of the *menavlatoi*, the three-lined cavalry formation and the tactics of the *kataphraktoi* and the *prokoursatores*.[45]

In his monograph on Nikephoros II Phokas, published in 1993, Taxiarchis Kolias took a different approach on the dating issue. He refuted the idea that the *ST* dates at the reign of Constantine VII, and argued instead that the material of the treatise better fits the context of the first half of the tenth century. According to Kolias, the fact that the *ST* is the first manual which refers to the *kataphraktoi* cannot be convincingly used to support a dating around 950. He argued that the information of the text is in accordance with the first half of the tenth century and that the *kataphraktoi* might have appeared at that time. Unfortunately, Kolias did not elaborate further on the matter. He only noted that if the *ST* dates around 950, we must not consider it as a source which provides absolutely contemporary information.[46]

A year later, in 1994, Everett Wheeler discussed the *ST* as part of his work on Polyaenus. In his introduction, he argued that our author had manipulated the tradition of Polyaenus, since chapters 77 to 102, preserved a different version of stratagems compared to our most relevant extant source, the

[44] Hunger 1978: ii.333.
[45] *ODB*: iii.1980; McGeer 1995.
[46] Kolias 1993: 24-26 and n.10.

Hypothesis.[47] More specifically, he stressed that the author of the *ST* included new stratagems and information, while others are listed in different order and with different phrasing. Wheeler took Dain's argument, that the *ST* is a purely literary work, a step further, arguing that the fake attribution to Leo VI and the inaccuracy of cross-references indicate that the whole treatise is a forgery.[48]

In 2003, Marcel Meulder also turned his attention to the part of the *ST* which preserves the stratagems of classical commanders. Meulder tried to identify the identity of king Merops, who is one of the generals that appears in the *ST*, but not in the *Hypothesis*. Meulder discussed the possible sources that these unique passages could derive from, not excluding the possibility of reliance on Persian material as well. He wondered whether Merops was merely a nickname, used to substitute the name of generals who had been forgotten or lost, but from a comparative study of different passages Meulder concluded that Merops could have been the Sassanian ruler Shapur I (240-270).[49]

Six years later, in 2009, Edward Luttwak dedicated a page of his book to the *ST*. Luttwak mostly summarized the views of McGeer and Dain, and agreed with McGeer that the treatise should not only be regarded as a literary work.[50]

The same year, Laura Mecella published an essay on the sources of the *ST,* which is the first work, after that of Dain, to provide some original argument on this issue. Although Mecella supported Dain's view on the existence of the *Corpus Perditum* with additional evidence, she rejected the existence of the *Tactica Perdita*. Mecella explained that Dain's simplified theory that the author of the *ST* used the *Tactica Perdita* for the first half of the treatise and the *Corpus Perditum* for the second is problematic. She showed that this division cannot be accepted, since traces of the *Apparatus Bellicus* and the *PS*, which were both supposedly parts of *Corpus Perditum*, also appear in the first half of the *ST*. Mecella proposed, instead, that the author of the *ST* had only used one major lost source, the *Corpus Perditum*, and that most of the material of the first half of the work was drawn from other individual sources. Mecella closed her essay by commenting that a more detailed study of the sources is necessary to draw more firm conclusions.[51]

A year later, in 2010, Dennis Sullivan included the *ST* in his study of Byzantine military treatises. While he summarized the views of Dain and McGeer, he also noted that the *ST* is the first manual to

[47] A Byzantine treatise consisting of experts of Polyaenus, see: Dain 1937: 73-86; Dain and Foucault 1967: 337; Schindler 1973: 205-16; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xx-xiii; Wheeler 2013: 53.
[48] Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxi-xxii.
[49] Joseph Genesios, 4.34; Meulder 2003: 445-66
[50] Luttwak 2009: 312.
[51] Mecella 2009: 100-1, 107-13.

record new technical vocabulary, such as the word *kompothelykion* to denote loops and buttons for the attachment of sleeves, and the word *mosynas* to describe siege towers. Sullivan also commented on the fact that the author of the *ST* claims to provide the reader with contemporary material, a promise which is fulfilled in chapters 38-39 and 46-47.[52]

The most recent work to discuss the *ST* is that of John Haldon. In 2014, as part of his study of *LT*, Haldon provided a small summary of the views of Vári, Dain, McGeer and Mecella. Apart from that, he also addressed the basic issues of the *ST* that remain unresolved. Haldon started to question matters of dating and tradition, wondering whether the text was indeed written in the time of Leo VI, but was later revised with the addition of material that seems to date in the 950's, like the *menavlatoi* and *kataphraktoi*. Finally, Haldon also provided some original discussion on the similarities of some tactics from *LT*, to the *ST* and the *PM*.[53]

V. The Purpose of this Thesis

Despite the above studies, the *ST* remains a treatise that is vastly understudied. Crucial aspects of the text remain unanswered, some of which are: the dating and attribution of the text, the relation of the *ST* to other military manuals, the extent to which the manual was relevant to contemporary challenges of Byzantine warfare, and its connection with the broader literary, political and social context.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a fresh insight into the *ST* and to cover this gap. The aim is not only to engage with views of previous scholarship and to provide original argument, but also to connect the *ST*, and military manuals in general, with broader themes and aspects of Byzantine studies. There have been many noteworthy works on Byzantine imitation and innovation, as well as on inter-textual analysis. Other significant advances have been made in identifying lost sources and trends in historiography, as well as in the purpose of compilation literature in Byzantium. It is, therefore, important to build on these and to connect the *ST* with them, so as not only to produce a study that will be confined to the development of Byzantine warfare, but a thesis which can be used as a case study to address much broader issues of the pen and the sword, i.e. Byzantine warfare in connection with court education, Byzantine literature and historiography.

[52] Sullivan 2010: 155.
[53] Haldon 2014: 66-8, 337-8, 359, 360.

In this light, chapter one will focus on the context of Byzantine warfare in the period 900-950, in order to demonstrate the challenges and changes of Byzantine strategy in the time that the *ST* was compiled. This will serve as a background chapter which will set the stage to understand the treatise and its contents better.

Chapter two will examine the issue of Byzantine Classical imitation and its relation to court education. After this is explained, the study will specifically discuss the sources that the author of the *ST* had used. The chapter will list possible sources, but the main aim is to build upon Mecella's study and to determine whether the *Tactica Perdita* ever existed. This will allow us to estimate whether it is safe to regard the text of the *ST* as trustworthy evidence to determine the author and dating of the text, or whether it should be seen as an unsafe testimony which was the result of slavish copying from lost sources.

The next chapter, chapter three, will discuss the dating of the manual. After analyzing the problems of the dating theories of Vári, Vieillefond, Dain, Kolias, McGeer, and Haldon, the study will aim to tackle the issue from a fresh perspective. To achieve this, the internal evidence of the *ST* will be studied comparatively with other sources which shed light to the political, administrative and military milieu of the empire and its neighbors, in the first and second half of the tenth century.

Chapter four will attempt to explain authorship and attribution. It will take into consideration the views of Vári, McGeer, and Haldon and discuss their problems. The issue will be approached with a fresh look at the internal evidence of the text, and in accordance with the findings of the new dating theory. The goal will be to identify the identity of the original author and the existence of possible ghost authors or redactors.

After the basic issues of sources, dating and attribution are sufficiently discussed, the study will turn into evaluating how up-to-date and original the information of the *ST* was. Chapter five will therefore begin with a broader overview of scholarly views on innovation and adaptation in Byzantine society and literature and it will demonstrate how these arguments have evolved over time. Taking into account the most recent scholarship on the subject, the chapter will then focus on identifying innovations and originality in the *ST*. The material of the treatise will be studied comparatively with its sources to highlight any adaptations or shifts in attitude, but also in comparison with tenth-century Byzantine strategic and tactical needs as well as with perceptions of warfare, religion, and morality. Finally, the original material of the *ST* will be studied comparatively with that of anterior and posterior manuals in an attempt to highlight the gradual evolution that took place over the decades and to determine the place that the *ST* holds in the development of Byzantine warfare.

Chapter six will study the purpose of the *ST* and will try to determine its practical use. First there will be a presentation of various views concerning the practicality of Byzantine military manuals and compilation literature in general. Secondly, an analysis of the various problems of these theories will be provided, along with a study of how the Byzantines saw and used their past. In addition, we will examine the role of historiography and literature in providing examples to imitate. After all these matters are explained, the discussion will focus on determining how practical certain aspects of the *ST* were, by studying its contents in relation to the testimony of Byzantine, Arab and Western historical narratives as well as administrative documents and other manuals. The study will aim to look at the sources critically and determine whether they can be taken at face value.

The final chapter, chapter seven, will identify the impact that the *ST* had on posterior manuals and how its tactics were adapted and evolved. It will also provide some information regarding its influence on Byzantines and Westerners in the eleventh century and beyond.

Chapter One

The Context of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*: Byzantine Warfare c.900-950

The *ST* belongs to a particular moment in Byzantine military history: the point when after years of endemic warfare with the Arabs along a fixed frontier in Asia Minor, the balance began to shift in favour of the Byzantines. Likewise, in the Balkans, the Byzantines had been at war on and off with the Bulgars for several centuries. While they came close to complete defeat at the hands of Khan Symeon in the first twenty years of the tenth century, the final decades of the century saw them going over to the offensive culminating in the conquest of Bulgaria in 1018.

The status quo on the Arab-Byzantine frontier

On the eve of the tenth century, the Byzantine army and the type of warfare that it waged had more or less crystallized. The evolutions and responses that the rapid Arab conquests had necessitated had become established and consolidated, and warfare had taken on a standard form. From 720 to the third decade of the tenth century, the eastern frontier was more or less unchanged. Both Byzantines and Arabs turned to defence, fortification and consolidation, while military campaigns took the form of raids which did not aim at annexations, only at temporary occupations and plunder.[54]

Against this background, the Byzantine army evolved in order to respond better to the Arab threat. A series of reforms had started to take place slowly and gradually from the seventh century.[55] By the tenth century, the provinces of the empire were organised into *themata* and each was governed by a *strategos* who had supreme political and military authority in his area. Among the responsibilities of the latter was to supervise the upkeep, recruitment and training of the *stratiotai,* who formed the army of the *themata*. The *stratiotai* were part-time cavalry-soldiers, but also local land-owners, who held military land. Consequently, they were burdened with military service which was to be fulfilled either by themselves, by the participation of another soldier on their behalf, or by paying a sum to the state to hire a mercenary in their place. The *stratiotai* were responsible for buying and maintaining their

[54] Asa Eger 2014: 4-5; Cheynet 2001: 57; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 79-83.
[55] See for example: Stouraitis 2009: 47-54; Lilie 1976: 287-338 and Haldon 1990b: 208-53.

own arms and armour, as well as horses. The *themata* also provided infantry, but information regarding thematic infantry soldiers is very scarce.[56]

As a political counterweight to the *stratiotai* and the *strategoi*, but also for their supplement and enhancement, the Byzantine Empire had at its disposal professional full-time soldiers, the *tagmata*, who were based in or around Constantinople and were under the direct control of central authority, independent of provincial elites and local strong families. The *tagmata* were created during the reign of Constantine V (741-775), and by the middle of the tenth century there were four of them: The *Scholai*, the *Exkoubitores*, the *Vigla* and the *Hikanatoi.* They constituted the elite of the army and were provided with very satisfactory payments, rewards and donatives. Moreover, their armament, horses and maintenance were the responsibility of the state.[57] However, the nature of warfare was such that the *tagmata* were mainly used for offensive campaigns and deep raids. They were seldom deployed for defence: only when there was extreme pressure by invading armies. Therefore, the frequent task of defending against enemy raiders was mainly undertaken by part-time local soldiers of the *themata*.[58]

As warfare took an established form, the challenges that the Byzantine army faced, from the eighth century up to the beginning of the tenth, were the same. The Arabs conducted raids into Byzantine territory yearly, sometimes even three times in one year. A tenth-century Arabic source, Qudāma ibn Ja'far, describes the established pattern of the yearly raids:

> The most challenging raid of the skilled frontier-raids is the so–called spring time raid, which begins around ten of May after the people have pastured their animals and when their horses are in good condition. This lasts thirty days through the remainder of May and ten days into June. In the land of the Romans, they find pastures for their livestock like a second spring. Then they return home and settle for twenty-five days, being the remainder of June and five days into July until [the beasts are] rested and fattened. Then the people join in the summer raid, starting from ten of July and lasting sixty days. As for winter raids, everyone I know says that if these are necessary, they should not penetrate too far, but only to the extent of about twenty days round-trip, just long enough that the raider can load sufficient provisions on horseback. They should be done by the end of February and they should head out in the early days of March, for at that time

[56] The literature for the *stratiotai*, the *themata* and military service is vast, some comprehensive works include: Ahrweiler 1960: 1-24; Oikonomides 1972: 340-63; 1988: 62-86; Toynbee 1973: 224-52; Haldon 1979; 1993: 1-67; Whittow 1996: 170-4.
[57] Haldon 1984; Kühn 1991; Kolias 1994.
[58] Cheynet 2001: 60; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 79-86, 101-6.

> they will find the enemy – themselves and their animals – weaker and their livestock greater. Then they return and vie with one another to put their animals to green pasture.[59]

These campaigns, even when they reached deep into Anatolia, were part of a war of attrition and aimed at extracting booty, destroying the enemy's potential, capturing prisoners and livestock. Sometimes, they also had a punitive character, as they were launched in order to compensate for an annexation or a significant Arab defeat. When fortresses and cities were conquered, they were looted, destroyed and abandoned; the Arabs showed no intention of annexing more Byzantine territory. The conclusion of such raids was usually a short-term truce and an exchange of prisoners.[60]

The Byzantine response to these challenges was shaped during the eighth century and remained almost identical up to the end of the first decade of the tenth. The Byzantine army had largely lost the initiative; it could not repel the Arab raids by facing them in a pitched battle near the borders; consequently, a guerrilla defensive strategy was used instead. The Byzantines tried to exploit their limited resources and geography to their maximum advantage. As a result, the once linear system of defence changed to deep zone defence. The Arabs were to be stopped, if possible, at the narrow passes of the Taurus or anti-Taurus mountains or at the defiles of Caucasus, but the Byzantines were hardly ever able to repel them as they entered. Therefore, the Byzantines avoided contact, instead they followed the enemy closely, traced their routes and attempted to be constantly aware of their manoeuvres, so as to be able to avoid or ambush them at the right time, usually when they returned from the raid. The armies of the *themata* would sometimes burn the available fodder found in their province if they knew that the enemy would overrun it, in order to put extra pressure to the enemy cavalry. As the Arabs entered Byzantine territory they were to find numerous fortresses with garrisons along the main strategic routes. These could provide a hindrance especially in mountain passes and could either significantly delay the enemy, or become a potential threat if they were by-passed. In the ninth century, some narrow passes became independent administratively. These were known as *kleisourai* and they facilitated a quicker response either to block a passage or to warn about impending raids. As a final counter-measure, the Byzantines would launch counter-raids, aiming at destroying the Arabs' resources and potential, at retaliation, or at providing a distraction.[61]

---

[59] Trans. Asa Eger 2014: 280-1.

[60] Kennedy 2001: 105-7; Haldon 1999: 39-41, 755-6; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 113-6; Bonner 1996: 69-107; Asa Eger 2014: 5; Canard 1951: 716-7; Bikhazi 1981: 429.

[61] Stouraitis 2009: 54-169; Lilie 1976: 339-60; Tougher 1997: 77-9; Cheynet 2001: 59; Whittow 1996: 175-81; Asa Eger 2014: 255; Holmes 2002: 87; Decker 2013: 137-43. See also Haldon 2013: 380-6 for a study of fortresses, information, guerrilla strategy and physical context in the Middle Byzantine Period with some archaeological evidence.

Scholars have recognized three different zones of defence spread across Asia Minor: the first was the outer zone, which extended across the Taurus Mountains and it is often interpreted as a devastated no man's land that was constantly subject to destruction and hostilities. Behind the outer zone lay the middle zone which provided a second line of defence in the centre of Asia Minor and was full of fortified towns and fortresses. The final zone was in the West and North West area where enemy raids seldom penetrated. Consequently, this was used mainly for agriculture, trade and financial growth in order to compensate for the extensive territorial losses of Egypt and Syria.[62]

The fact that warfare became endemic and standardised, in connection with the increase of literary production from the ninth century onwards, facilitated the appearance of a number of military manuals such as the *PS*, *LT,* and the *DV*. The latter is solely dedicated to frontier warfare and is the most comprehensive source on Arabic and Byzantine guerrilla tactics employed.[63] Nevertheless, all three share a common characteristic, they all present a Byzantine guerrilla strategy and mentality, and an army suitable to undertake such a role, i.e. an army which is more or less unspecialised and does not undertake specific tactical roles.

The problem with this strategy was that although it was effective in dealing with enemy raids, it entailed a considerable investment in terms of manpower and resources. The fact that many sites were raided and devastated before the enemy was confronted, and sometimes without success, seems to be a major reason why Byzantium remained relatively poor. The results of this strategy seem to suggest that life in the Arab-Byzantine frontier was very grim. However, recent archaeological evidence seems to point towards a more dynamic and complex situation. Asa Eger has argued that although raids and warfare were dominant in the frontier, that area was by no means a no man's land. There is evidence that the roads were maintained, that there was growth, continuity and a local economy, that trade connections and activity existed among Arabs and Byzantines and finally that a number of fortresses and towns either on the plain or in the mountains were repaired, re-inhabited or built from scratch.[64]

While the basic features of Byzantine warfare remained unchanged from the eighth to the early tenth century, a number of significant developments occurred first during the reign of Leo VI (886-912), but more manifestly from 920 onwards. More specifically, among the numerous raiding campaigns which had little long-term effect, a number of strategic annexations of territory started to take place, some of which allowed certain *kleisourai* to be upgraded to *themata*. In addition, the Byzantines abandoned

[62] Lilie 1976: 339-60; Haldon 1999: 62.
[63] Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 139-287; Theotokis 2012: 5-15.
[64] Asa Eger 2014: 6, 250, 262; 2011: 1-13. For these aspects of the frontier see also Ahrweiler 1971: 209-30; Obolensky 1971: 303-13; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 87-100.

their passive stance against the Arabs and, as soon as they had secured their Western front, they took the initiative in the struggle and assumed a more offensive role. Campaigns into enemy territory became significantly more frequent, and the Byzantine army penetrated deeper than it had ever done in the previous period of three centuries. Finally, the Byzantine army started to change to meet these new challenges. New specialised units appeared and new formations were invented. Consequently, these years mark the first steps in the abandonment of a strategy of raiding and defence, in favour of aggression and annexation. It is exactly in this military context that the *ST* was compiled and its contents present an evolved army ready to employ the traditional guerrilla strategies, as well as support and undertake regular offensive campaigns, sieges and pitched battles.[65] It is worth highlighting these developments as we go through the main events from 900-950 putting them into context and finally drawing some conclusions.

First developments: the reign of Leo VI

The reign of Leo VI is usually described as one which included numerous defeats, and Leo himself as somebody who had no clear plan for the eastern front, or who was indifferent to and ignorant of military threats. However, some scholars have reviewed his reign in a more positive light, arguing that Leo VI did his best to respond to the situation of his time and that his defeats, although extensive, had little or no long-term effect.[66]

The Byzantines were largely unable to take the offensive at this time. The khan of the Bulgarians, Symeon I (893-927), was the biggest threat and a constant trouble for Byzantium from 894 to 902. In one of his campaigns in 896, Symeon reached the walls of Constantinople itself. Leo VI was in such desperate situation that he was compelled to arm Arab prisoners of war to assist in the defence of the city. The hostilities ended with an ignoble treaty for Byzantium, and despite what was agreed, the Byzantines had to protest to the Bulgarians about the occupation of thirty Byzantine fortresses.[67]

In the East, the Arabs pressed the Byzantines hard. In addition to the usual raids by land, the Arab fleet now became a menace in the sea. From 898 to 904 the Arabs won a number of naval battles and looted a number of coastal towns and cities such Lemnos (902/3) and Thessaloniki (904). The Arabs had no interest in permanently occupying these sites; they merely pillaged and destroyed them for the

[65] See chapter five below for more information.
[66] See for example: Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.115-25; Canard 1951: 722-3; Tougher 1997: 163-6, 193.
[67] TC, 359-62; Tougher 1997: 173-83; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.126-32.

collection of booty and prisoners. Until 910 the Byzantines were unable to deal with this threat and to prepare a counter-attack with long-term results. They only confined themselves to launching a number of counter-raids as retaliation, attacking Cyprus, north Syria, and other places.[68]

The first serious Byzantine campaign took place in 911. This expedition was different in that it was not launched in order to raid Arab territory, but with a view to re-conquer Crete. Had the expedition proved successful, the Byzantines would have annexed lost territory and would have taken a major step in pacifying the Aegean since Crete had turned into a significant pirate base.[69] Nevertheless, the long-term effects which military means did not manage to produce were achieved through diplomacy. Leo VI succeeded in winning over Manuel, an eminent Armenian chieftain, and thus managed to annex Kamacha and Keltzini, the addition of which allowed the surrounding area to be raised into the *thema* of Mesopotamia.[70] This small annexation was the first step to a series of developments which had a long-term effect for the Byzantines and which led to further expansion and interference in the East.

First developments: the years 912-927

In 912 Leo VI died and the throne passed to his brother Alexander who only ruled for a year. After Alexander's death, a regency was formed to take care of matters, since Constantine VII was only a child at that time. Byzantium was still in a difficult situation as it was compelled to face the Bulgarian and Arab threat simultaneously.

From 913 to 920 Symeon continuously attacked Byzantium. His strategy involved raiding the cities of Macedonia and Thrace, most notably Adrianople and the environs of Constantinople. Since he was unable to take the capital itself, Symeon confined himself to receiving payments and gifts from the Byzantines in exchange for his withdrawal. In response to this threat the Byzantines signed a peace treaty with the Arabs lasting from 917 to 922 so as to focus their manpower and resources in the West. This did not produce the expected results, however, the Byzantines were twice defeated by Symeon in the battles of Achelous and Katasyrtae (917) and the Bulgarians continued to menace the Byzantines

[68] TC, 366-9; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.132-77; Tougher 1997: 183-93.
[69] Tougher 1997: 191-3; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.196-216; Canard 1951: 723.
[70] *DAI*, 50.117-132; Runciman 1929: 121; Tougher 1997: 40.

until 924, well into the reign of Romanos I (920-944) who had in the meantime taken the throne for himself.[71]

The Eastern front was constantly a problem for the Byzantines. Raids were organised and launched mostly from the very important cities of Tarsus and Melitene. Such raids were either seasonal or specifically conducted in response to Byzantine activities. One of these raids was undertaken by al-Ḥusayn Ḥamdān (913). It was the first raid of the Hamdānids into Byzantine territory and a harbinger of the victories that Sayf al-Dawla was to enjoy over the Byzantines in the next decades. Although at this time Ḥusayn was merely the governor of the boarder garrisons of Mesopotamia, he had already shown his desire to acquire more authority in the whole district by interfering with the allocation of tax revenues which was beyond his authority.[72]

Although the Byzantines suffered at the hands of both Arabs and Bulgarians, and while it was clear to them that major results could not be achieved in the Eastern front without neutralizing the Bulgarian threat in the West, this period saw a number of developments which had some positive long-term effects for Byzantium.[73] The first was the Byzantine interference in Armenian affairs. The control of Armenia was crucial to both major powers in the area. The Byzantines preferred to hold the Armenians to their sphere of influence because they could use them as a buffer against the Arabs, while at the same time controlling the major routes that passed through their territory. Hence, the Arabs would be unable to cause a serious threat in the Southern part of the frontier, and the Armenians could prove an indispensable ally for a Byzantine offensive. The Arabs did not want another hostile force on their borders and the control of passes was an important element in Arab-Byzantine warfare. From 885 the Arabs had managed to secure their influence in Armenia by crowning prince Ashot king of kings. However, his heir was more sympathetic to the Byzantines and from 908/9 he was at war with the Arabs. Taking advantage of the revolt of al-Ḥusayn Ḥamdān who turned his back on Baghdad and revolted against the caliph al-Muqtadir, the Byzantines from 915 to 919 supported Ashot II and the Armenians gained independence from the Arabs. Secondly, not only did the Byzantines secure their influence in Armenia until 928, but also they seem to have annexed some territory by 916, enough to allow the elevation of Lykandos from a *kleisoura* to a *thema*.[74]

---

[71] TC, 385-91, 400-5; Symeon Magister, 135.23; c.f. Skylitzes 204-5 with Grigoriou-Ioannidou 1983: 123-48. See also Runciman 1929: 50-7, 84-90.
[72] Runciman 1929: 124-5; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.229-30, 238; Bikhazi 1981: 299-300.
[73] Haldon 1999: 40-1.
[74] *DAI,* 50.135-66; Constantine VII, *De Thematibus*, 12; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.225, 232-4; Runciman 1929: 126-33; Oikonomides 1972: 350; Toynbee 1973: 146, 257-8; Pertusi 1952: 144-6; Bikhazi 1981: 308-9.

The third important development was a series of events that facilitated the gradual turn of the tide in favour of the Byzantines in the Eastern front. In 922 John Radinos managed to deliver a significant blow to Arab piracy in the Aegean since he defeated Leo of Tripoli who was responsible for the sack of the Thessaloniki back in 904. In addition, from 923 onwards the Abbasid Caliphate entered into a long period of gradual decline. On one level, the nomad tribe of the Quarmatians of Bahrain started to attack the Caliphate, conducting incursions which could not be effectively challenged for at least five years. On another level, the Abbasids were already weakened by civil wars and by internal affairs: Bagdad was in a terrible financial situation and had every difficulty in paying and sustaining its army.[75]

Nevertheless, the major development that enabled the Byzantines to achieve their counter-attack in the East was the neutralization of the Bulgarian threat in the West. In 924 Symeon prepared another expedition against Byzantium and negotiated an alliance with the Fatimids, who were to assist in the siege of Constantinople with their fleet. Romanos I became aware of these plans and managed to win over the Fatimid caliph al-Mahdi, signing a peace treaty with him.[76] In spite of this setback Symeon invaded anyway and, pillaging as he went, encamped in front of Constantinople. Unable to conquer the city, Symeon asked for a peace treaty and when one was concluded, he retired to Bulgaria. Symeon did not bother the Byzantines with another incursion, and in 927 he died. After the death of Symeon, Bulgaria was exhausted from fighting since its neighbours found the perfect opportunity to invade. His successor, Peter, had no other option but to ask for a long-term peace from the Byzantines which was given after he agreed to marry Romanos' granddaughter, Maria, in October 927.[77]

The watershed of 927 and the years up to 944

The death of Symeon and the marriage of Peter and Maria, marks a significant turning point which greatly facilitated the evolution of Byzantine warfare. Byzantium had more or less secured its Western front, the Bulgarians were not a threat anymore and Constantinople was able to focus its entire man-power on fighting the Arabs and on dominating the Eastern front with long-term results.[78] Byzantium now steadily undertook the offensive in the East and chose to expand its influence and territory by its own initiative. The Byzantines knew of the Caliphate's troubles and weaknesses, therefore a new spirit

[75] TC, 405; Runciman 1929: 135-6; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.249; Bikhazi 1981: 359. For the Quarmatians see Cappel 1994: 114-8; von Sievers 1979: 230-3; Kennedy 2004: 285-90.
[76] Runciman 1929: 136; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.251-5; Canard 1951: 726.
[77] TC, 405-15; Runciman 1929: 90-8.
[78] For studies on the Balkan frontier see: Madgearu 2013; Stephenson 2000: 18-53.

of confidence arose after the conclusion of the Bulgarian wars.[79] An oration written in 927 records this optimistic spirit: 'So all things made new and sparkling, and hymn and glorify the cause of this. Only the sons of Hagar mourn and shall mourn, who are bereft of heart at the mere echo of our concord'. In addition, Ibn al-Athīr records that, in 925, Romanos demanded tribute from the Arab cities of the frontier stating that 'I know exactly the weakness of your governors'.[80] The Byzantine actions after 925 seem to confirm this mentality.

In the light of this spirit, the Byzantines seemed to have had a general plan in mind after the Bulgarian wars.[81] That is not necessarily to say that there was a grand strategy or a higher motive behind every move, but that their goals were more or less clearly dictated by a sense of realpolitik, common sense, knowledge of their capabilities, and a long-acquaintance with the enemy and his strategy. Furthermore, almost all the initiatives came from Constantinople itself, and were executed by the domestic of the *scholae*, John Kourkouas. There was continuity too since, in many respects, Constantine VII continued the policy of Romanos I Lekapenos. Finally, it is obvious that after 925 there were repeated attempts to annex or to extend the influence of the empire to certain key cities which were the very bases from which Arab raids were launched, like Melitene and Theodosioupolis, or to strategic fortresses like Marash, Samosata and al-Hadath, all of which aimed at neutralizing the enemy threat and at acquiring a foothold in strategic areas.[82]

These new circumstances, and the more focused attempts that Byzantium undertook to achieve its primary goals on the Eastern frontier, whether these led to annexations, treaties, sieges or defeating Arab armies, meant that the Byzantine offensive attempts were multiplied. A new army was needed to fulfil these roles, an army in which the *tagmata* would play a major role and which would be able to undertake specialised roles. A strong, disciplined, specialized infantry and cavalry were essential for these tasks and the need to support and protect each other during the march, battles and sieges was crucial. Gradually, it became more and more essential to stand and fight in a disciplined formation, something which was not the major priority of the thematic armies. Consequently, scholars have argued that it was exactly at this time that the Byzantine army evolved and took the form of the army presented in tenth-century military manuals, able to fight in the hollow square formation, where the infantry served as a mobile operation base for the cavalry and able to field specialized troops such as

[79] Canard 1951: 718-9; Shepard 2001: 19-20; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.261-2; Runciman 1929: 135.
[80] Dujčev 1978: 281; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.ii.148; Runciman 1929: 137.
[81] Haldon 1999: 42-6; Canard 1951: 716-22.
[82] Shepard 2001: 20, 34-40; 2012: 505-37.

heavy, light and medium infantry, *menavlatoi, kataphraktoi*, lancers and horse-archers.[83] In contrast to earlier military manuals, such as *LT*, the *ST* is the first treatise to record such evolutions and specialization of formations and troops.[84]

However, the Byzantine offensive did not achieve its goals overnight. Although the Bulgarians were no longer a threat, a number of new challenges appeared that troubled the Byzantines. In 941, the Byzantines were faced with the invasion of the Rus which compelled them to abandon the East for some time and to march back to Bithynia to repel them.[85] But the biggest challenge for the Byzantines were the Arabs. Apart from the usual seasonal raids, now mainly coming from Tarsus (926-931), the Byzantines had to face incursions which were organised, led and conducted by new powers. In the period 927-932 Mu'nis, the leader of the Abbasid army was responsible for extra incursions against Byzantium.[86] In addition, since the caliphate was in a weak financial and military situation, its caliph, al-Muqtadir, responded to the Byzantine thrust in the East by making Mesopotamia an autonomous district, similar to Tarsus. In 930/1, the caliph decided to grant an almost autonomous north Mesopotamia to the Ḥamdānids.[87] This year would mark the active involvement of the Ḥamdānids in frontier warfare which was to disrupt Byzantine operations until the 960s. Three major figures of the family, Saïd ibn Ḥamdān, leader of the Ḥamdānids and governor of Mesopotamia from 931-934, Nasir al-Dawla, leader of the family and governor of Mesopotamia from 934, and his brother, Sayf al-Dawla, who for now acted as a deputy of Nasir, inflicted significant blows to the Byzantines. In the period 931 to 940 they conducted raids into Byzantine territory, they repelled Byzantine expeditions against Melitene, Samosata, Arsamosata and Armenia, and they brought part of the latter to their control, occupying key fortresses and towns which supervised the main routes from Armenia to Mesopotamia and from Arsan to Taron.[88]

Luckily for the Byzantines, however, both the Abbasids and the Ḥamdānids were weakened by internal strife and crises. The Byzantines took advantage of the fact that the Arab world was divided which in combination with the elimination of the Bulgarian threat in the West, allowed the Byzantines to take the initiative and to launch a counter-attack against the major Arab frontier cities.

---

[83] TC, 459-60; Shepard 2001: 37-8; McGeer 1988: 135-45; 1992: 228; 1995: 262, 272-5, 283-5; Haldon 1999: 217-20; Whittow 1996: 323-4; Decker 2013: 152-6.
[84] See chapter five below.
[85] TC, 423-6; Runciman 1929: 111-3.
[86] Runciman 1929: 138-41; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.258-60, 263-8; Bikhazi 1981: 414-5; Canard 1951: 734.
[87] Bikhazi 1981: 414.
[88] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i. 277, 282-90; Whittow 1996: 318; Runciman 1929: 143-4; Bikhazi 1981: 429, 578-85; Canard 1951; 736-7, 741-7.

The first main goal of the Byzantines was Melitene and repeated attempts were made to capture it. It was a major frontier city and one of the three bases from which raids were organised and launched. It was under the authority of an independent emir who recognized the overlordship of Baghdad. However, Melitene was not only dangerous because the main policy of its emirs was to raid Byzantium, it was also strategically placed close to the Anti-Taurus Mountains, allowing the Arabs to control the plains and neutralize the natural defences of Anatolia.[89] The first Byzantine attempt against Melitene was undertaken in 926. John Kourkouas and Melias managed to break into the city for a short time, but they were repulsed and then confined themselves to pillaging its environs for sixteen days. The city turned to the Caliph, al-Muqtadir, to request assistance, but none came, since the latter was occupied with internal affairs and with the extensive raids of the Quarmatians. Melitene came to terms with the Byzantine army and a non-belligerent agreement was concluded. The emir was to keep his position, but promised to maintain peace and not to raid against Byzantium.[90]

The fact that Byzantium saw annexation as a last resort and that it preferred to demilitarise enemy cities meant that the latter would come to terms with the empire easily, but this quick end of hostilities did not always guarantee long-term results. Melitene changed sides two times (916, 930) and was unsuccessfully besieged another two (928, 929) before it was finally captured in 934. At that time the Abbasids were occupied with a revolt which succeeded in overthrowing the caliph, al-Qāhir (932-934). In this context Kourkouas marched to Melitene for the last time, leading a considerable army of *themata*, *tagmata* and Armenians. After the city surrendered, it was annexed and turned into a *kouratoria*. The fall and annexation of such a major city came as a surprise to the Muslim world and it was more than clear now that the Byzantines had come to stay.[91]

The imperial army made attempts against the other major frontier city, Theodosioupolis, which was also a base for the organisation of raids. In 931 the city was taken by John Kourkouas, but once more it was not annexed, instead a tribute and a non-belligerence treaty was imposed on it. As was the case with Melitene, the city changed sides again and in 939 the Byzantines launched an unsuccessful expedition to conquer it. Theodosioupolis, however, would only be annexed in the reign of Constantine VII.[92]

---

[89] Cheynet 2001: 59-60; Whittow 1996: 310; Haldon 1999: 725-32; Runciman 1929: 142; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 109-12. The other two bases were Theodosioupolis (see below) and Tarsus. For the importance of Tarsus see: Bosworth 1992: 270-86.

[90] TC, 415-6; Runciman 1929: 137; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.258-9; Bikhazi 1981: 366-7; Canard 1951: 732.

[91] TC, 416-7; Runciman 1929: 137, 139, 141-2; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.264, 267-70; Canard 1951: 733-6; Bikhazi 1981: 413-6 428-9; Whittow 1996: 318.

[92] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i. 284-5; Bikhazi 1981: 583-5; Canard 1951: 744-5; Whittow 1996: 310,

Although Theodosioupolis was not annexed, Byzantium managed to expand towards Armenia and Mesopotamia by capturing a number of key fortresses and towns. Around 937-938 the Byzantines acquired some territory from the emirate of Tarsus, which was extensive enough to allow the elevation of Seleucia from a *kleisoura* to a *thema*, while in 939 they annexed Arsamosata.[93] As was characteristic of Byzantine expansion at this stage though, most cities and fortresses were not annexed. They were either given to Byzantium's allies or they were sacked, forced to demilitarize and to sign a treaty of non-belligerence. The Byzantines took advantage of civil strife, of the antagonism between the Ḥamdānids, the Fatimids and the Abbasids, as well as of the incursions of the Quarmatians and of the Qushayr and Numayr tribes. They temporarily occupied Samosata and/or Chimchat (927, 931, 936), Khelat and Bitlis (928), Perki (931), Marash and Halad (938), while the town of Mastatum and the area north of Araxes were given to the Iberians (930/1).[94]

The final years of Romanos' I reign saw the Arabs even less able to resist the Byzantine advance. The Abbasid caliph al-Muttaqī had to face the mutiny of Turkish troops (941) which now threatened his throne and compelled him to abandon Baghdad. The Ḥamdānids were called to help, and in 942 Nasir al-Dawla managed to enter Baghdad. After their successful intervention in Baghdad the Ḥamdānids re-established themselves in their territory. Nasir was named governor of Mesopotamia and north Syria, while Sayf managed to occupy Aleppo and became its emir (944).[95]

The occupation of the Abbasids and the Ḥamdānids in Iraq, North Syria and Mesopotamia gave a golden opportunity to the Byzantines to push forward and raid from 942 to 944 with no serious opposition, save for Sayf al-Dawla's intervention when he defeated the Byzantines and raided the *thema* of Lykandos (944). The Byzantines now raided and attacked into the heart of Mesopotamia, directly challenging Ḥamdānid rule. Hamus, Arzan, Dara, Martyropolis, Ra´s Ayn, Nisibis, Marash and Bragas were all captured and looted. The Byzantines did not annex these cities, but instead they most probably imposed some kind of peace-treaty before they abandoned them. Last but not least, John Kourkouas marched to Edessa which came to terms with him; its emir handed over to the Byzantines

[93] Constantine VII, *De Thematibus*, 13; Runciman 1929: 146-7; Oikonomides 1972: 150; Toynbee 1973: 258; Pertusi 1952: 147-8; Asa Eger 2011: 140; Whittow 1996: 318; Canard 1951; 745.
[94] *DAI*, 45.50-175; Asa Eger 2011: 114, 147; Canard 1951: 733-7; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i. 260-1, 264, 266, 277; Bikhazi 1981: 580-1; Runciman 1929: 138-41
[95] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i. 290-1, 304-6; Bikhazi 1981: 474-505, 522-5, 607-10; Kennedy 2004: 273.

a famous relic, the *mandylion,* and promised to stop hostilities (944). The Byzantine army had not appeared so far East for three centuries.[96]

Constantine VII and the years 945-950

Constantine VII came to the throne in a very favourable context. Not only did the Byzantines have the upper hand and the initiative in the Eastern front, but also the Ḥamdānids had no interest in frontier warfare from 945 to 948. Sayf al-Dawla was chiefly occupied in achieving consolidation in Syria and most importantly taking Damascus from the Ikhshīds of Egypt. After his unsuccessful attempts to take Damascus, Sayf turned all his attention in subjugating Barzūyah, a fortress between Tripoli and Antioch, which was ruled by a Kurdish governor Abū Taghlib al-Kurdī. At the same time, Nasir al-Dawla was caught in the struggle to invade Iraq. The occupation of the Ḥamdānids elsewhere gave the chance to Constantine VII to consolidate his authority and to follow the policy of his predecessor. Since Arab resistance was very limited, the Byzantines attacked Marash and al-Hadath which were conquered, demilitarized and a non-belligerence treaty was imposed on them.[97]

The years 949-950 mark a terminus for the Byzantine-Arab wars. The unsuccessful campaign against Crete in 949 brought a change in Byzantine frontier policy. From this year onwards, Constantine VII focused his entire resources in the East and tried to compensate for his failed expedition. For a decade the Byzantines pushed further and further into the frontier every year and were now more eager to raid into the heart of the Ḥamdānid emirate. Key cities and fortresses like Marash, al-Hadath, Martyropolis, Diyār Bakr and Aleppo were stormed and sacked, while others which had been taken several times in the past, were now annexed, such as Theodosioupolis in 949 and Samosata in 958.[98] This Byzantine thrust after 950 also brought administrative changes: the *strategos* started to lose his supreme authority as the *themata* were no longer important in countering the raids, since these gradually started to fade or to become weaker. The *tagmata* were now moved towards the frontier and the *themata* were subordinate to the *katepanates* under a *doux* or a *katepano*.[99] All these set the stage for the final push of Nikephoros II and John Tzimiskes which was to follow in the 960s and 970s.

[96] TC, 426-8, 432; Runciman 1929: 144-7; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i. 295-6, 304-6; Bikhazi 1981: 586, 609-10; Whittow 1996: 321; Canard 1951: 748-53; Kennedy 2004: 273. For the *mandylion* see Guscin 2009.
[97] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i. 316-8; Bikhazi 1981: 548-58, 611-23, 657-9; Canard 1951: 761.
[98] Shepard 2001: 34; Whittow 1996: 322; Bikhazi 1981: 787, 843-4, 854-67; Canard 1951: 762.
[99] Ahrweiler 1960: 46-63; Cheynet 2001: 59-69; Holmes 2002: 88; Oikonomides 1971: 285-302; Kühn 1991: 60-6, 158-69.

But 949 did not mark a change only for Byzantium. Sayf al-Dawla, who was convinced after his recent failures that it would not be an easy thing to extend his influence in Syria at the expense of the other Arab governors, turned his attention on the frontier and engaged in large-scale punitive raids in the borders and heart of the empire. Furthermore, he was compelled to take the defence of the frontier more seriously, as the Byzantines pushed further and further into his territory. As a result, he managed to become infamous among the Byzantines inflicting some devastating defeats on them. Sayf's objective was to reverse the situation whereby the capture of Melitene and the surrounding area had made the Byzantines masters of the passes. The demilitarization of key fortresses, like al-Hadath, made matters worse as it exposed vulnerable sections in the South and gave the Byzantines more initiative. Sayf would try to focus on controlling al-Hadath and do his best to compel the governors to revoke their treaties with the Byzantines, while at the same time he regularly raided Byzantine territory as retaliation.[100]

Reflexions and conclusion

By taking the events above into consideration, it is important to reflect first on what enabled this steady Byzantine expansion after the 920s and what the character of this expansion was. As regards the first matter, it cannot be overlooked that the neutralization of the Bulgarian threat allowed the Byzantines to concentrate their manpower and resources in the Eastern frontier. The fact that the Byzantine army started to evolve and change must have also played a part in favour of the Byzantines. However, the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate played an even greater role. It is vital to note that almost all major Byzantine successes coincided with periods of instability, revolt and internal strife.

By 925, the Abbasids had entered a crisis from which it was impossible to extricate themselves. The caliphate had immense trouble finding revenues for its troops, while at the same time new political and demographic elements appeared on the scene.[101] The Quarmatians formed the largest nomadic migration since the seventh century and, at first, the caliphate had no other option but to deal with their extensive raids and pillaging. These nomads played a major role in the historical scene of Syria and Mesopotamia during this period and up to the eleventh century.[102] Apart from the Quarmatians, the Abbasids had to deal with certain alien groups which at times served the caliphate and at times revolted against it: The Daylamite and Turkish soldiers, as well as the Buyids, put an immense pressure on

[100] Bikhazi 1981: 609-11, 732-5; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 108-9; Kennedy 2004: 273.
[101] Whittow 1996: 329; Bikhazi 1981: 450; von Sievers 1979: 212-44; Kennedy 2004: 186-90; Canard 1951: 719.
[102] Cappel 1994: 114, 117, 129; Asa Eger 2014: 265.

central authority and kept its army occupied at the expense of the war against the Byzantines. In addition, the semi-independent emirs and governors of certain emirates and cities were always a potential threat. They were usually involved into wars between one another for the expansion of their influence, and others like the Ḥamdānids were actively involved with the affairs of Baghdad while trying to pursue their own interests. Allowing a district to be independent had some financial and administrative benefits for the Abbasids: the independent district would be responsible for the collection of taxes and the upkeep of garrisons, defence of the frontier and engaging in raids. But this also meant that its governors could turn their back on central authority or enter in individual negotiations with the Byzantines.[103]

The Ḥamdānids, who were responsible for many Byzantine defeats and the defence of Mesopotamia and north Syria, were of course not in such a precarious situation, but their estates and power were limited. They too had to face the hostilities of Bedouin tribes and were sometimes forced to pay tribute. Furthermore, Nasir was not too actively involved into the frontier and was always occupied in pursuing his interests in Iraq and Bagdad. The role of frontier warfare fell to Sayf, who was also reluctant to play the role, and was only seriously involved with it after all his attempts on Damascus and Syria had failed.[104]

As regards the character of this expansion, although we are indeed talking about a Byzantine offensive, it is important to underline that its motive was essentially defensive. The Byzantines sought to occupy territory only if it was absolutely necessary or when there was no other option.[105] While their main concern was to improve their strategic position by extending their influence on the control of passes and by halting the enemy raids, this was seldom done with annexations. Even one of the main targets, Melitene, repeatedly entered into peace treaties and pledges of neutrality before it was finally annexed.

It is obvious from the above that the Byzantines preferred not to annex territory that was difficult to control or was too vulnerable, instead they preferred to acquire only key fortresses and towns, while the rest were either given to allies, like the Iberians, or were demilitarized, forced to pay tribute and cease hostilities.[106] The *DAI* records how annexations mostly served a defensive purpose at first 'if these three cities, Khelat, Arzan and Perki, are in the possession of the emperor, a Persian army cannot come out against Romania, because they are between Romania and Armenia, and serve as a barrier

[103] Bikhazi 1981: 450; Whittow 1996: 329-32.
[104] Shepard 2001: 35; Kennedy 2004: 269-71, 274; Bikhazi 1981: 705-10, 777; Whittow 1996: 333-4.
[105] Shepard 2001: 20, 22-5; Cheynet 2001: 59.
[106] Shepard 2001: 26-30, 36-9.

and military halts for armies'.[107] Therefore, the primary character of Byzantine expansion was to extend the influence of the empire and gain access to key areas and cities, first by demilitarizing them and making them tributary, and if this was not possible, through annexations. This gives a more demilitarized character to the Byzantine frontier than we usually thing of it.[108]

In this light, most of the campaigns which did not result in annexations played the above roles, while at the same time helped to show the flag deep into Arabic territory which could be of great importance in achieving diplomatic results, by making the weakness of Baghdad obvious and by convincing governors and emirs to surrender and enter into non-belligerence agreements.[109]

Although Byzantine expansion was much more marked during the reigns of Nikephoros II Phokas and John Tzimiskes due to major annexations, the roots of their achievements are to be found in this period.[110] The gradual developments described above, mark the military context which inspired the compilation of the *ST*. The latter presents an army and strategy able to operate in such a context, namely, to fulfil both guerrilla and tactical offensive warfare. Consequently, it comes to no surprise that the innovations of the *ST* were adapted and further evolved in military manuals like the *PM* and the *TNO*, which were both authored by eminent generals who were active in the later years of Byzantine expansion, namely in the second half of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century.

[107] *DAI,* 44.125 (trans. Jenkins, p. 205).
[108] Shepard 2002: 67-82; Holmes 2002: 97-103; 2008: 149, 151-3; Cheynet 2001: 58.
[109] Shepard 2001: 21.
[110] For the difference in strategy between these two emperors see: Garrood 2013: 20-34.

Chapter two

The Sources of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

At first sight the issue of the sources of the *ST* is uncomplicated and straight forward. The author took much of his material from earlier manuals, both ancient and Byzantine. A number of scholars have identified some of these works and listed the extant classical or earlier Byzantine manuals that the author of the *ST* has used material from. The main classical works which has been identified are the *Strategikos* of Onasander (fl. 50 AD), a treatise which mainly focuses on the characteristics and duties of the ideal general, and the *On the tactical arrays of the Greeks* of Aelianus Tacticus (fl. 120 AD), a military manual which analyses the equipment and formations of Hellenistic armies. A greater dependence has been identified on earlier Byzantine handbooks including the famous *MS,* the *PS*, which latest scholarship dates to the ninth century,[111] and *LT*. Less known Byzantine works used by the author of the *ST* include the *Apparatus Bellicus,* a work most probably dating to the ninth century, which draws heavily on the *PS* and the *Cesti* of Julian Africanus (160-240 AD), and which, among others, includes various recipes for fighting the enemy with poison, as well as for producing antidotes.[112] Another traceable source used by our author is the *Hypothesis*, a Byzantine abbreviation of the *Stratagemata* of Polyaenus who lived in the 2nd century AD. The *Hypothesis* dates some time before 850 and presents 356 stratagems of commanders of antiquity in a thematic order.[113]

The recent established view, however, is that the author of the *ST* did not have access to most of these works directly, but that he copied all of his treatise from two extensive lost sources, and in a rather slavish manner. This approach is partly responsible for a certain distrust towards the information of the *ST*, and has led some scholars to regard the work as a forgery, or as a purely theoretical treatise which did not reflect contemporary Byzantine practice. If the imitation of sources was indeed so slavish, it probably means that the internal evidence of the text cannot be taken at face value and that are of little help to determine the identity of our author or the dating of the *ST.* It is, therefore, worthwhile to look into the matter from a fresh perspective and determine whether our author did indeed copy inattentively from two lost sources, and by extension whether we can trust the internal

[111] For the dating of the *PS,* see: Dennis 1985: 2-4; Zuckerman 1990: 216; Cosentino 2000: 262-80; Rance 2007: 719-37.
[112] For the *Apparatus Bellicus,* see: Vieillefond 1932: xxxvi-xliii; 1970: 194, n.6; Zuckerman 1994: 359-89; Mecella 2009: 87-98; Wallraff et al 2012: xlviii-lii.
[113]Dain 1937: 73-86; Dain and Foucault 1967: 337; Schindler 1973: 205-16; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xx-xiii. For stratagems in Byzantium, see also: Wheeler 1988.

evidence of the text. The issue of imitating older sources, however, is something found not only in the *ST*, but in almost every genre of Byzantine literature. In order to understand this concept of imitation better, it will be useful to put it into a broader context and reflect on its connection not only with Byzantine literature in general, but also with the education of the elite.

The context of imitation in Byzantine literature

As Vári noted in the first half of the twentieth century, 'with every Byzantine war author we must primarily inquire into the sources used, because there is hardly any Byzantine military manual that does not rely on older works, or that does not seek to extract ideas from older warfare treatises without compunction'.[114] This concept of *mimesis* (imitation) was a common and well known characteristic of Byzantine literature, and since military manuals were to an extent literary works, it also applied to them.

This *mimesis* was long noticed by scholars who identified it as an act of copying from classical and/or earlier Byzantine works, which involved using similar vocabulary or sometimes directly copying from the source, usually without mentioning the original author. Furthermore, imitation was also recognized in the adoption of the same motifs, aesthetic and style. Since plagiarism and copyright law was not an issue, the author of a Byzantine literary work actually showed how well versed he was with the 'bibliography' of his time and, therefore, demonstrated and validated his value and erudition by imitating older works.[115] But imitation of older authorities was not only the norm in Byzantium, it was a concept of the medieval word in general, and it is also found in the West until the middle of the eighteenth century.[116]

The concept of imitation may seem peculiar today, but the lucky few Byzantines who were educated were exposed and encouraged to such behaviour from an early age. From the time they were young students, they worked with rhetorical textbooks, the *progymnasmata,* which instructed them to imitate older forms. A good example comes from the textbook of Theon who argues that:

> Despite what some say or have thought, to paraphrase is not without utility. The argument of opponents is that once something has been well said it cannot be done a second time, but those who say this are far from hitting on what is right. Thought is not moved by any one thing in only

[114] Vári 1927: 265 (my trans. from the German).
[115] Hunger 1969-1970: 22, 29-30; Nilsson 2006: 51-52; Nilsson and Scott 2007: 319-32.
[116] Nilsson 2010: 196-8; Cutler 1995: 209-10.

> one way so as to express the idea (...) but it is stirred in a number of different ways and sometimes we are making a declaration, sometimes asking a question, sometimes making an inquiry (...) and sometimes expressing out thought in some other way. There is nothing to prevent what is imagined from being expressed equally well in all these ways (...). While Homer says 'Such is the mind of men who live on earth, as the father of men and gods grants it for the day', Archilochus rephrasing the lines says 'Such Glaucus, son of Leptines, is the mind of mortal men as Zeus brings it for the day'.[117]

Consequently, from the time of their education and from the example of other literary works, the readers of Byzantine literature would have been crystallized in such a tradition and would have rather enjoyed recognizing the reference to ancient or older authorities.[118] Beneficiaries of such an education formed a distinctive group which was usually employed in Byzantine bureaucracy or found a place in the emperor's court or the church. In fact, according to Psellos, it was enough if somebody recounted two to three words for the educated elite to recognize the reference to a classical author and admire the man for his learning.[119]

Imitation of older works and adhesion to the tradition was largely the norm due to education, but those who must also have been influential in shaping and maintaining this attitude were the patrons and readers of such literary works, and more specifically in our case of military manuals. The target group of these works and the relationship between the patron and the ghost author were very important. The advantageous position of the patron or commissioner, who most of the times seems to have been an emperor would have been crucial.[120] The emperors would have accepted imitation as the appropriate way to compile a manual and therefore would have encouraged the incorporation of older authors, classical or Byzantine, not only because they themselves had usually received an elite education, but also because they would have been seen as protectors and continuators of the classical tradition and wisdom.

Most of the time, the same applied to those who seem to have been the readers of such works, namely the military aristocracy. This relatively small group of people was sometimes educated to a certain extent and shared the same traditional standards which dictated that the classical tradition gave authority to any literary work. After all, these men were sometimes copyists, owners, authors, or

[117] Theon, 62.10-33 (trans. Kennedy, p. 6).
[118] Hunger 1969-1970: 22, 24, 27-30; Lemerle 1971: 301-7; Kennedy 2003: ix-xiv; Odorico 2006: 213-15; Kaldellis 2007: 42-189; Webb 2009: 39-47; Nilsson 2010: 198.
[119] Psellos, *Chronographia,* 6.61; Harris 2014: 22-3; Mango 1980: 147; Lemerle 1971: 255-7.
[120] For a discussion of these aspects, see: Odorico 2006: 214-31; Nilsson 2010: 200.

readers of literary works.[121] The military aristocracy was certainly familiar with military manuals including ancient ones. Kekaumenos records that he had received education from the *progymnasmata*, while he and Nikephoros Ouranos were evidently versed with the works of the ancient tacticians and also advised their readers to consult them.[122] In addition, John Doukas and Alexios I are recorded as having read the works of Aelian and Apollodorus.[123]

But apart from the influence of patrons and readership, Byzantine authors had two basic things to gain from classical imitation. The first was the authority that the ancient tradition had, and the second the refined language and style of ancient texts. Authors of Byzantine military manuals were very much interested in the first aspect, since classical authority gave them the credibility which was needed to justify their content and instructions.[124] The style and language, however, seems to have only partially interested them. This is rational if we consider that manuals were not solely works of literature, they were also practical handbooks. Of course, every military manual was different, and sometimes more or less literary. But, although some authors employed a *topos* in their preface to take pride in the fact that they had used simple and understandable language, most of the manuals have a mixed language. They incorporate both elements of Attic and/or literary phrases, but most of their material is written in contemporary military terminology, or a military slang that had Germanic, Turkish, Latin, Arabic and Iranian elements.[125] The *ST* is a characteristic example of that. On the one hand, its author used Attic Greek forms, similar to these found in Thucydides, which do not appear in his sources, for instance, ξυμμαχικὸν instead of συμμαχικὸν, ἀντιτάττονται instead of ἀντιτασσονται, παραφυλάττειν instead of παραφυλάσσειν.[126] In other passages, he uses literary phrases, such as 'with fire and sword', which is commonly found in ecclesiastical texts, already from the fourth century by John Chrysostom, as well as in ecclesiastical commentaries, *synaxaria* or lives of saints, up to the tenth century and beyond.[127] His terminology is no different, he uses common and rare Greek terms

[121] Lemerle 1971: 255-7, suggests that around 300 pupils received an elite education in the tenth century. For education and literacy of the military aristocracy see: Haldon 1999: 270-4; McGeer 1995: 138, 191-4; Browning 1978: 39-40, 42-4; Andriollo 2014: 131-8. Among the books that Eustathios Boilas owned in 1059 was the Poems of George of Pisidia and probably the history of Agathias or Procopius' *Persian Wars,* see Vryonis 1957: 269-70.

[122] Kekaumenos, 2; *TNO* 65.140-7; McGeer 1991: 138; Roueché 2002: 111-38; 2003: 23-37.

[123] Psellos, *Chronographia,* 7.180; Anna Komnene, 15.3.6.

[124] See chapter six below.

[125] See for example: Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* 3; Haldon 1990: 70-4; Kolias 1993b: 39-44.

[126] *ST,* 1.6; 1.27; 4.3. There are also cases when the Attic appears in our author sources, see for example φυλάττειν in *ST*, 13.1, which also appears in Onasander 38.7.

[127] πυρὶ καὶ ξίφει, *ST,* 11.1,2, 23.6. See for instance: John Chrysostom, *Sanctum Pascha,* 47.9; *Omnes Sanctos,* 304.20; Gregorius, *Commentarius*, 6.12; John Damascenus, *Vita Barlaam,* 26.12; Euthymius, *Theodore Stratelates,* 8.17; *SEC, September,* 22.3.17.

like the word μόσυνας to describe wooden towers. This word is described as archaic already in the writings of Strabo who presents its etymology; it is used by Aeneas the Tactician in the fourth century BC and again by Anna Komnene in the *Alexiad*.[128] On the other hand, next to the classical terminology, we find contemporary Byzantine terminology which is sometimes of Latin or barbaric origin like the words *klibanion*, *viglas*, *allagia, artzikidion, menavlion, kabadion* etc.[129]

Consequently, we can understand why imitation remained such an important aspect of military manuals and by extension of the *ST*. Despite the fact that the latter is usually criticized for the plethora of ancient references, it was by no means an exception to the rule, but in fact part of a well-established literary tradition. Now that the context is set, it will be useful to look into the established views concerning the sources of the *ST* so far.

Previous views on the sources of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

Already from the very first partial edition of the text by Köchly and up to the study of Vári, it had been noticed that the *ST* had numerous parallels with classical and earlier Byzantine works.[130] However, the study of sources of the *ST* is somewhat more complicated than in most cases, and it was not until the study of Vieillefond that this issue was shifted in the established direction. Vieillefond recognized that in chapters 57 to 75, including those added by the scribe of L, the actual source was a lost work and not any surviving one.[131]

This argument was further developed by Dain, who concluded that the author of the *ST* derived his material from two major lost sources. Dain argued that the first half of the treatise, namely chapters 1 to 55, drew on a lost source which he named *Tactica Perdita*, and the second half, chapters 56 to 102, on another lost work, which he named *Corpus Perditum*.[132] Dain dated the latter lost source to the end of the ninth century or to the beginning of the tenth.[133]

Although we have to speculate to a certain extent when we talk about lost sources, Dain supported the existence of the *Corpus Perditum* with parallel evidence from a comparative study of the *Apparatus*

[128] Strabo, 12.3.18; Aeneas the Tactician, 33.3; Anna Komnene, 4.1.2.2; 4.4.6.2; 4.5.1.2; see also: Sullivan 2010: 155.
[129] See for example: *ST,* 6.13, 35.1-5, 38.3-8, 40.7, 44.4, 55.1, 54.9, 55.4. For the *allagia* in the tenth century see: Pertusi 1956: 92-5; Guilland 1967: 524-5; Haldon 1984: 275. For some of these terms, see: Sullivan 2010: 155.
[130] Köchly 1854; Vári 1927: 243, 265-6.
[131] Vieillefond 1932: lii-liv.
[132] Dain 1938: 8-9; Dain and Foucault 1967: 357-8, 350-1, 353.
[133] Dain 1939: 70-1; Dain and Foucault 1967: 353.

Bellicus, the *ST*, and the *TNO*, and his arguments are generally convincing.[134] As we have seen in the introduction, Dain argued that the scribes of L used the *Corpus Perditum* in their attempt to fill up the missing chapters of our treatise. For had they used another version of the *ST*, the missing chapters would have been filled correctly and in perfect order. Vieillefond and especially Mecella further supported Dain's theory, but they expressed certain dissent concerning the version of the *Apparatus Bellicus* that the author of the *Corpus Perditum* had used.[135]

Despite the fact that the *Corpus Perditum* is now lost, we can trace the sources of the second part of the *ST* in extant works which are the next available mediations. Therefore, as Dain has shown the surviving source for chapter 56 is the so-called *Cynegeticus* of Urbicius,[136] while the traceable source for chapters 57 to 75 can be found in the *Apparatus Bellicus.* According to Dain, the source of chapter 76 was the *De Secretis Epistolis*,[137] while all the remaining chapters can be traced to the *Hypothesis*.[138]

But while Dain's theory makes sense for the second half of the *ST*, the picture starts to get distorted as soon as we try to examine the *Tactica Perdita* and the first half of the treatise. Dain's argument that the author of the *ST* has used two different lost sources with a clear division in chapter 55 to 56 has already started to be challenged by Mecella. She argued that traces of the *Apparatus Bellicus*, which according to Dain was part of the lost *Corpus Perditum*, can also be found in the first half of the *ST,* namely in chapter 53.4, which itself indicates that Dain's division is problematic.[139] Furthermore, the appearance of the *PS* as a traceable source in the first part of the *ST* is also problematic, since Dain had argued that a version of the *PS* was also among the sources that constituted the *Corpus Perditum.*[140] In this light, Mecella proposed that the existence of the *Tactica Perdita* seems unlikely and that most probably the author of the *ST* had used only one lost source for the entire treatise, i.e. the *Corpus Perditum*. Instead, she conceived the material of the first 55 chapters as mainly deriving from extant individual sources.

---

[134] Dain 1939: 14-31, 40-5; Dain and Foucault 1967: 353.
[135] Vieillefond 1970: 194-8; Mecella 2009: 107-13.
[136] Found in *MS*, 12D. Rance 2007b: 197, n.9, argued that the attribution to Urbicius was based on a misunderstanding, c.f. Dain and Foucault 1967: 341-2, 352-3, 372.
[137] This is another lost source though, perhaps the treatise that Philon proposed to write, see: Dain 1939: 53-4; Dain and Foucault 1967: 323, 339; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxii.
[138] Dain 1938: 8-9.
[139] Mecella 2009: 100.
[140] Dain 1939: 58-59; Mecella 2009: 100.

A new look at the problem of the sources

Although Mecella challenged Dain's view, she admitted that further study is necessary in order to draw more firm conclusions on the matter.[141] Indeed a closer look at the sources of the first half of the manual seems to verify Mecella's approach. The evidence can be grouped in four main categories: extra evidence that a clear division between the *Tactica Perdita* and the *Corpus Perditum* does not exist, evidence that our author did not copy slavishly, inconclusive evidence for the existence of the *Tactica Perdita*, and evidence for extra dependence upon individual extant sources that Dain failed to recognize.

To begin with, we have already seen how Dain's theory was challenged by Mecella and that we can no longer argue that our author used the *Corpus Perditum* for the second part of the *ST* and the *Tactica Perdita* for the first. To the problem that sources such as the *Apparatus Bellicus* and the *PS,* which supposedly belonged to the *Corpus Perditum*, appear in the first half of our treatise we may also add another source, the *Hypothesis,* which was also part of the *Corpus Perditum*. The problem appears in a chapter that belongs to the first half of the *ST*, chapter 53.9. Dain has recognized Polybius, 21.28, as a source for this passage, but if we compare the narrative of Polybius to the narrative of *Hypothesis*, 56.7, it is evident that the latter is significantly more similar. Therefore, as the *Hypothesis* constituted part of the *Corpus Perditum*, we possess extra evidence that argues against Dain's clear division.

The second group of evidence can be more challenging, as it concerns an evaluation of evidence concerning the very existence of the *Tactica Perdita* itself. Contrary to what applies to the *Corpus Perditum,* there is no evidence from a parallel study of different treatises to ensure the existence of the *Tactica Perdita*. As the sources in the first part of the *ST* are used more or less indiscriminately, relevant material in very similar order and with very similar phrasing cannot be found in other treatises before or after the *ST*.

However, some indirect evidence for the existence of the *Tactica Perdita* may be recognized in the inaccuracy of cross-references which are found in our manual. In the *ST* there are seven cases where our author falsely cites parts of his own work, since either no relevant information is found in the chapter cited, or phrases like 'as I have already said' are used though without the existence of relevant information having been discussed above.[142] Dain, who managed to locate some of these instances,

[141] Mecella 2009: 100-1.

[142] ὥς μοι λέλεκται; ὡς ἤδη ἐρρέθη μοι. These seven passages are found in: *ST,* 21.4, 22.5, 39.3, 45.25, 45.26, 46.5, 49.8.

suspected that these were product of a direct copy. He, therefore, argued that our author had accidentally copied them while he was drawing material from the *Tactica Perdita*.[143]

This approach seems sensible at first, but it is by no means conclusive. In order to effectively evaluate whether the *Tactica Perdita* ever existed we need to focus on two things: to find out whether our author had, indeed, copied slavishly from his sources, and to find a reasonable explanation for these inaccurate cross-references. As far as the first issue is concerned, there seem to be some mixed evidence. First of all, Dain seems to contradict himself, since when he was studying the sources which constituted the *Corpus Perditum,* he argued that our author had a freer method of using his sources which involved rephrasing, and the addition of extra information or comments. The same thing is also observed by Mecella who came to the same conclusion.[144] But is it possible for an author to employ such a slavish method in the first part of the work and a more independent approach on the second? We might be able to explain Dain's inconsistency, if we assume that he accepted two different authors who perhaps used different methods, but that is not the case, as Dain had clearly expressed the view that the treatise has been written by a single person.[145]

It comes to no surprise that Dain had such an approach. The scholarship of his time was not very developed in understanding and appreciating Byzantine imitation. Most scholars regarded Byzantine *mimesis* as a slavish procedure, as a phenomenon which was stuck to ancient models with little concern on updating the tradition and transmitting the reality of its time.[146] Consequently, Dain readily attributed to our author all inconsistencies of the first half of the treatise as careless editing, and considered all adaptations and paraphrases as belonging to pen of the author of the lost source.

A good example to demonstrate this can be found in chapter 55.4 of the *ST,* which is similar to the information found in *MS*, 10.4.34-40 and *LT*, 15.62. In the *ST* we read that 'The best time for the construction of such forts should be the months of *Panemos, Loos* and *Gorpiaios*, which the Romans call July, August and September, since the pasturage is dry and easily burned at that time', while the other manuals report that 'these undertakings are effectively employed (...) about July, August or September when the grass is dry and burns easily'.[147] Older scholarship would have readily assumed that the passage of the *ST* derived from a lost intermediate source. At best it might have argued that it came from a different or an unknown version of *MS* and *LT*, but it would seldom celebrate the idea

[143] Dain 1938: 8; Dain and Foucault 1967: 351.
[144] Dain 1937: 44, 55, 57-9, 81; 1939: 69; 1967: 357; 1946: 130-1; Mecella 2009: 101.
[145] Dain 1938: 8.
[146] Hunger 1969-1970: 15-7; Mango 1975: 16-8; *ODB*: ii.989. See also: chapter five below.
[147] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming); trans. Dennis, p. 379.

that the fact that the months appear with their classical names, is a personal preference of the author of the *ST* who wanted to impress his readers with his familiarity of the classical tradition.[148] This after all, as we have seen above, is in accordance with the overall style of our author and with his use of Attic Greek and classical terminology.

Consequently, when one notices differences in the phrasing and style of two extant works, there are more explanations to consider than simply to accept that all of them must be attributed to a direct copy from a lost source. Some of these adaptations may have to do to with an innovative style or a personal preference of the author of an extant work. After all, for these changes to have existed, someone at some point needed to have deviated from the original text. But to appreciate this procedure we need to reflect on the inter-textual relations between sources and Byzantine works and better understand the role that the past played in Byzantine society.[149] Fortunately, despite the older apologetic views on imitation in Byzantine literature, recent scholarship has not confined itself in merely identifying the sources used by Byzantine authors. Instead it focuses on better understanding this feature of *mimesis,* providing insights about the relation of Byzantium with its tradition. Scholars have shifted their attention on the inter-textual relations between a Byzantine work and its sources. For instance, Ingela Nilsson has argued in favour of a *mimesis* that was perceived as 'consciousness of historical change' or an 'invitation of beginnings', as Byzantine authors not only imitated, but also criticised, paraphrased, or revised their sources.[150]

Therefore, we can clarify matters by further applying this method and studying how our author has used his sources. When we look more closely in the matter, we realise that, most of the time, the author of the *ST* applied the same method of free adaptation, with changes of sequence, omissions and additions in both parts of his work. For example, he updated the tradition of Onasander and Julian Africanus and made it relevant to his own time and context, while the same also applies for the stratagems of Polyaenus. Last but not least, he also updated the advice of older Byzantine manuals and, based on them, he created his own original advice on equipment, tactics and strategy.[151]

Nevertheless, one should be cautious. There are times when the author of the *ST* speaks in the first person, but this is not a reference to himself, rather a direct interpretation from his source. For instance,

[148] See also Bryennios, 4.5.2-5 with Neville 2012: 40, where Bryennios apologizes to his readers for being unfamiliar with the classical name of a river.
[149] See chapter six below.
[150] Nilsson 2010: 199; Cutler 1995: 208-14; Lemerle 1971: 301-7. See Codoñer 2014b: 61-90 for a study of the strategy of this rewriting processes.
[151] See for example, *ST*, 16.3, with Onasander 37.3; *ST*, 59.3, with *Apparatus Bellicus,* 2.6. These are discussed in chapter five below.

in chapter 75.1, where a recipe for poisonous arrows is described, we read 'when I was looking for it and I was not able to find it, one of the most esteemed doctors gave me another drug of equal strength'.[152] This passage has in fact been copied in the first person as the testimony of the *Apparatus Bellicus* suggests.[153] To this we can add another five cases, found in the first half of the treatise, where our author speaks in the first person, but he copies Onasander. For example, when we read 'I cannot praise as much as blame the generals who destroy their own defences', or 'I think that this [tactic] which is risky or too daring and dangerous [is] not a product of good judgment and tactical knowledge, but of luck', as well as, 'I would allow [some] soldiers to run risks out of desire for distinction', we in fact have a copy of Onasander's view.[154] These, however, are minor cases which neither influence the content in any way, nor contradict previous material. Therefore, not only did the content remain unaffected, but also the author underlined his erudition and directly connect himself with the credibility of his source.[155]

The only exception can be spotted in chapter 53.8, where our author has copied from *LT* (19.64). The *ST* reports that 'The so-called *strepta*, namely those which mechanically shoot the liquid fire (…) and the so-called hand-siphons, the very thing which Our Majesty presently invented, get the better of wooden towers'. This is significant because it strengthens the connection of our author with Leo VI since the latter wrote in his *Taktika* that 'These are also called hand siphons and have been fabricated recently by Our Majesty'.[156] The importance and meaning of this passage, however, is open to interpretation and depends on the dating and the authorship of the text.[157]

Whatever the reason for this exception, Dain's claims for a slavish copy from the *Tactica Perdita* in the first half of the *ST* seem unfounded, since our author appears to have been rather free and adaptive with the treatment of his sources throughout the work. Therefore, if the inaccurate cross-references cannot be the result of a slavish copy from a lost source, another possible explanation must be found. A more careful look at these cross-references denotes that all the information that our author cites do actually exists in the manual, just not in the right order. If the author of the *ST* had indeed copied from a lost source carelessly that would hardly have been the case.

[152] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).
[153] *Apparatus Bellicus*, 37; Dain 1938: 8.
[154] These five instances can be found in *ST,* 1.30, 1.36; 6; 10.1; 10.3 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[155] See the introductory remarks in this chapter together with those of chapter six below.
[156] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming); trans. Dennis, p. 529.
[157] See the chapter three and four below.

More specifically, the first incoherence can be located in chapter 21.4, where our author states that 'the outpost which is close to the enemy will consist of (…) at least ten men (...) when it is separated from the camp at a distance of approximately three or four miles in proportion to the location of the site and the preparations of the enemy, as I have said'. Despite the fact that relevant information does not appear before this passage, it does appear in the next paragraph, while we can additionally locate some passages throughout the treatise, where the author has stated that a distance above three miles is not considered safe, and extra precautions are needed if it is exceeded.[158] Likewise, in the second inconsistency, located in chapter 22.5, our author reports that 'As I already said, it [is] advantageous to throw iron caltrops (...) all around the trench'.[159] Although this is the first time that iron caltrops are mentioned in our treatise, our author discusses them in detail later in chapter 38.12.

The next three false cross-references are slightly different since they refer to incorrect chapters. The first one can be found in chapter 39.3 where our author states 'In their saddles they should all have maces (...) and (...) two or three saddle-bags containing hardtack or flour, as we have said with more detail, in chapter twenty'. Once again, although chapter 20 has nothing relevant to offer, more information regarding provisions in the saddle-bags is found in chapter 44.8 where our author explains that they should be enough for two or three days. Similarly, in chapter 46.5 we read that 'the *tetrarchs* [will fill] the tenth and last row, on this account they are also called file-closers. We have discussed them in more detail in chapter seventeen'. Despite that nothing of the sort is found in chapter 17, the positioning and naming of the *tetrarchs* is covered in chapter 35.9. The third similar inconsistency can be seen in chapter 49.8 where our author instructs the reader not to cross the defiles without first seizing them with the infantry, then he adds: 'as we have said in chapter thirty-three'.[160] Although relevant information is not provided in chapter 33, it does appear in chapter 23. It could be that, since the two chapters have a similar numbering, some of the copyists were careless and accidentally wrote the wrong chapter down. However, the fact that the numbering is written in full, in the surviving manuscript at least, and that we have also encountered a number of other inconsistencies, makes it less likely so.

The final two false cross-references are slightly different from the above. The first one occurs in chapter 45.26, where we read that 'If the infantry formation amounts to 6,000 [men], the same array will follow, as has been said.' While once again nothing similar has been said above, this case could very well be a mistake of the copyist regarding the numbers. More specifically, in paragraph 22 of the

[158] *ST*, 21.5; 40.3; 43.10; 44.4; 46.23.
[159] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).
[160] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).

same chapter our author wrote: 'If the army amounts to 10,100 [men] the same array will follow, even if the army should consist of more than 24,000 [men] and up to 10,100'. It is obvious that it is unnecessary for the number 10,100 to appear a second time here, so it does not seem wrong to replace the second 10,100, with the number 6,000. As regard the final case, which is found in chapter 45.25, our author informs us that: 'To reckon this infantry formation to a total of 10,000 < and 100 > [men], 64 [men] are also included, namely they who are detached for the needs of the three major shield-bearing *tagmata*, as stated above'.[161] Likewise, in spite of the lack of relevant information above, this incoherence can be attributed to an omission by our author, as this information should indeed have appeared in paragraph 45.7. In any case, as it can be seen in chapters 45 to 47, it is a well-established pattern of our author to give this information every time he completes the treatment of each variation of the army formations, and has nothing to do with an irrelevant piece carelessly copied from a lost source.

Consequently, the fact that all the information does actually exist in the text, but not in the right order, may be better explained by the fact that some of the material had been, at some point, revised or re-ordered. Although the study of this revision can prove complicated or with too little evidence to draw secure conclusions about it, what is important for us now is that there was most probably no such thing as the *Tactica Perdita* and that our author did not really copy carelessly.[162] Therefore, after much consideration, it seems rational to accept Mecella's approach that the author of the *ST* must have used individual works for most of the first half of the treatise.

Some of these individual sources have been more or less recognized by Dain and Mecella. As far as classical sources are concerned, for the first part of the work (chapters 1 to 55) Dain was correct to identify the influence of Onasander and Aelian. Nonetheless, the influence of Aelian does not seem to have been direct since in chapters 30 to 34 our author seems to have also depended on *LT* and on Arrian's, *Ars Tactica*.[163] Dain has also recognized Julian of Ascalon as a source for chapter 3, but this attribution is problematic. Some scholars do not accept that the metrological list which appears in some versions of Julian of Ascalon is original, but regard it as a later interpolation to the tradition of the text.[164] Therefore, they have proposed that chapter 3 of the *ST* is a mixture of our own author's additions, what is found in Heron's, *Geometrica*, 4, and the metrological table found in the *Peri*

[161] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).
[162] The revision is discussed in chapter four below.
[163] Dain 1946: 130-3.
[164] Julian of Ascalon was an architect who most probably lived in the sixth century, see Hakim 2001: 4-25; Saliou 1996: 9-29, 79-132.

Metron, a small treatise interpolated into the tradition of Aelian, the dating of which is unclear, other than that it dates before the eleventh century.[165]

With regard to older Byzantine sources, Dain argued that the legal text of the *Ekloga* was the source for chapter 50.4, but it is more reasonable to replace it with the *Procheiros Nomos*, whose text and dating are closer to the *ST*.[166] Other Byzantine sources which Dain identified are military manuals, namely *MS*, the *PS,* and *LT*. However, Dain underestimated the dependence of our author to these sources which in fact cover a great percentage of the *ST*. For example, the *PS* could be the source of chapters 48.5, 53.6 and 22.6. Chapter 2 seems to derive from *LT*, 11.9 and 20.209. Similarly, chapter 55.4 of the *ST* is similar to *MS,* 10.4.34-40 and *LT,* 15.62, while chapter 1.15 of our manual seems to come from *MS*, 8.2.77, 9.1.5-11 and *LT*, 29.124. Likewise, chapter 54.3-4 derives from *LT,* 15.27.[167]

Nevertheless, a number of sources escaped the attention of previous scholars altogether. Therefore, to the list of sources used by the author of the *ST* we may add the legal text of the *Poinalios Stratiotikos Nomos* as a source for chapter 50.6.[168] A small reliance can also be recognized on Basil I's *Hortatory Chapters*, from which the author of the *ST* used a small passage and two small phrases to supplement Onasander's material.[169] Apart from the above, the author of the *ST* seems to have relied on texts called *Anthologia* or *Florilegia* which included sayings of famous figures of both classical and Christian antiquity. These texts were very popular in Byzantium and were usually used by the students of the *progymnasmata* to supply them with material for their exercises and by authors of admonitory works who found plenty of moralising sayings there.[170] The author of the *ST* depended on such works to supplement Onasander and the profile of his ideal general.[171] Therefore, although we find sayings which originally belonged to Greek philosophers and orators, such as Aristippus of Cyrene or Isocrates, the author of the *ST* seems to have copied them from works such as John Stobaeus'

[165] Dain 1938: 9 and Geiger 1992: 31-43 suggest that it belongs to Julian of Ascalon; c.f. Diller 1950: 22-5 and Saliou 1996: 21-7.
[166] *Procheiros Nomos*, 40; Dain 1938: 8-9; 1946: 130-3; Dain and Foucault 1967: 357; Haldon 2014: 67; Mecella 2009: 100.
[167] *PS,* 39.39-43, 13.61-71, 29.25-30. Some other examples include: *ST,* 20.5, derives from *MS*, 7.16B.20-37 and *LT*, 12,87-8, 14.30, 17.82-3. *LT,* 15.4,23 could be the source of *ST*, 54.1, some parallels are also found in *MS*, 9.3.75-81, 10.1.11-8. The information of chapter 55.2 could derive from *MS*, 10.4.41-63 and *LT,* 15.63-4. Chapter 52.1-2 of the *ST*, seems to have used *MS*, 10.2.1-14 and *LT,* 17.59-61 as sources. *LT,* 16.2-5, could be the source for *ST,* 50.1-3. For a more detailed record of parallel passages see Chatzelis and Harris 2017.
[168] *Poinalios Nomos*, 48.2.
[169] *ST*, 1.7, 1.10; Basil I, *Hortatory Chapters,* 1.11, 1.65.
[170] For a comprehensive study of Byzantine *anthologia*, see Searby 2007: 1-112. For the use of such texts in rhetoric and hortatory works see, among others, Roueché 2003: 23-37; Markopoulos 1998: 469-79; Gerlach 2008: 599-600.
[171] For more information, see chapter five below.

Anthologia and from more recent *florilegia* of his time like the late ninth-century *Corpus Parisinum*.[172] For now one cannot exclude the possibility that the author of the *ST* might have known Isocrates directly since one of his quotes cannot be traced in existing *anthologia.* As more of the latter are edited and added to the TLG, however, it is very probable that this saying will also be identified as deriving from such texts.[173]

Whatever the case, the fact that the sources for the majority of the first part of the *ST* can be identified in extant works makes the existence of another extensive unknown lost source, like the *Tactica Perdita*, even less plausible. Most probably, the author of the *ST* had these individual sources at his disposal in more or less the same version we know them today, or perhaps in a slightly different or abbreviated one. Despite the fact that the author of the *ST* used these sources, he adapted and used their information at will, while at times he supplemented them with personal comments.[174]

From all these sources, *LT* seem to play a more prominent role in the *ST.* Our author has relied heavily on it*,* both in terms of structure and in terms of material, some of which, however, he further advanced and revised. It seems that the manual of Leo VI was used as sort of a general guide for his own work. In spite of the differences in style and form, for example, our author does not treat his work as a *Procheiros Nomos,* neither does he divide his work in constitutions, the *ST* preserves some similarities with the structure of *LT*. Thus, it has already been noted by Vári that the first chapter of our manual is fairly similar to *LT*'s second constitution.[175] Leo VI discusses the qualities of the general, in his first chapter and throughout the second, and that is also what our author does, but only in the first chapter, which is one of the biggest chapters of his treatise. *LT* includes a discussion of Hellenistic armament and array and very similar material is also found in the *ST*.[176] Furthermore, the author of the *ST* included passages that refer to the well-being of the *stratiotai,* which are copied, with slight revisions, from similar ones found in *LT*.[177] Likewise, the same seems to apply for the final part of the *ST,* chapters 76 to 102 are dedicated to stratagems of classical commanders, while constitution twenty of *LT,* includes, among other material, stratagems and anecdotes from classical sources such as the

[172] See, for example, Stobaeus, 3.17.17; *Corpus Parisinum,* 3.453 as a source for *ST*, 1.7. Stobaeus, 4.10.29 as source for *ST*, 1.11. Stobaeus, 3.1.18; *Corpus Parisinum,* 6.66 as a source for *ST*, 1.14.
[173] Isocrates, *To Nicocles,* 24 as a source for *ST*, 1.28.
[174] For more information, see chapter five below.
[175] Vári 1927: 269.
[176] *LT* 6.27-33; 4.58-63, 14.86-8.
[177] *ST,* 2, 36; *LT* 4.1; 11.9, 20.209.

Hypothesis, Plutarch or Polybius, though not exclusively, as much of what is presented also derives from *MS*.[178]

Conclusion

The issue of the sources of the *ST* is indeed a complicated one, and it is partly responsible for the low reputation of our manual. Although the imitation of ancient and Byzantine sources was the norm, the author of the *ST* is identified by some scholars as a particularly slavish example: one who copied his material directly from two lost sources with little regard for consistency or for presenting the reality of his time. This assertion however, not only contradicts the remarks of the author himself in the introduction,[179] but it is also contradicted by the very theory of some of these scholars who argue that the same person treated the sources of his work freely in the second half of his work and slavishly in the first.

While the existence of the second lost source, the *Corpus Perditum,* seems to be more or less secure that does not apply to the first one, the *Tactica Perdita*. The existence of the latter seems unfounded once we study the inconsistent cross-references more closely and recognize the same free treatment of sources for the first as well as for second part of the work. Instead our author seems to have used only one major lost source, the *Corpus Perditum*. For the other parts of the work, he could have used a small lost source, or another version of known sources, but the majority of his work seems to derive from individual known and recognized sources, most of which are paraphrased.

Therefore, the author of the *ST* seems to have belonged to the norm as regards his practices. He seems to be as credible as any other author of military manuals. If this is the case, it would be safe to turn to internal evidence to recognize the dating and the author of the text. It also seems safe to argue that material and comments which are not found in parallel extant sources could well have been added by our author and can be taken into consideration in order to assist in clarifying the issues discussed above.

[178] Haldon 2014: 45-7, 418.
[179] *ST*, 1.1.

Chapter three

The Dating of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

The *ST* is a very unusual case in that it gives very precise information on its date of composition and on attribution. The title of the treatise reads 'Λέοντος δεσπότου Ῥωμαίων αὐτοκράτορος ἔτους ,ϛυιβ′ [903-904]'.[180] Yet despite this unique evidence, the issues of authorship and dating can prove very problematic when studied together, so that there is no scholarly consensus on either. It is, therefore, necessary to study the issue of dating separately for now, so as to remain uninfluenced by a potential false attribution.[181] Instead, since we have established that our author was not a slavish copyist of lost sources and that internal information in the text can be trusted as much as in other sources, we will specifically focus on such information. This evidence will then be studied critically and comparatively with the military, administrative, and political milieu of the empire. But in order to better understand the challenges of our undertaking, it will be useful to reflect on previous views on the dating of the *ST*.

Problems with previous dating theories

The theories which accept the dating and attribution of the title of the *ST* can be grouped into two categories: these which suggest that the *ST* was written before *LT,* and these which suggest that it was written afterwards.[182] As far as the first category is concerned, it appears to be the most difficult to substantiate. The mere fact that the author of the *ST* has used *LT* as one of his sources is enough to undermine it severely. The only remaining indication which could imply that Leo VI completed his handbook after the *ST* is the reference of *LT* to another manual, which some connect with the *ST*. This argument is, however, by no means conclusive. *LT* simply cites to a 'corresponding single volume of

[180] This is the title of the table of contents. The chapter heading of the first chapter is similar and reads: 'Ἐκ τῶν τακτικῶν Λέοντος δεσπότου Ῥωμαίων αὐτοκράτορος προοίμιον ἐν ᾧ και ποταπόν δεῖ τον στρατηγόν εἶναι και πόσα εἰσί τά τοῦτον χαρακτηρίζοντα ἔτους ,ϛυιβ''.

[181] The issue of authorship and attribution will be discussed in the next chapter.

[182] See the Introduction above for a detailed overview of previous dating theories.

the Tactics', which could have been an unknown work, or the treatise of Leo Katakylas, who, as we know, wrote a manual at the request of Leo VI. [183]

Those who argue in favour of a post *LT* dating stand on more solid ground, although their arguments are not without problems. To begin with, accepting that the manual was written in the reign of Leo VI would justify the identical military hierarchy that exists in both manuals, as well as the simultaneous reference to hand-siphons as a recent invention. Nevertheless, certain very important issues remain unaddressed. Firstly, if both manuals were written at the time of Leo VI, how could they present such different material? For while there are many similarities between *LT* and the *ST*, the latter preserves a number of military innovations and an army which seems to have gradually evolved from that of *LT*.[184] This new material and tactics cannot be explained by a dating too close to *LT*, especially since the latter most probably dates to c. 904-912.[185] Haldon attempted to tackle this issue by arguing that the *ST* was initially written in the reign of Leo VI, but was later revised (c. 950) to include these new tactics and innovations like the *kataphraktoi* and the *menavlatoi.* But this theory raises new issues, namely if the innovations of the *ST* were added later, why would Leo VI bother writing two separate treatises with such similar material in such a short period of time?

These important problems compel us to reject all the above views, to turn away from the reign of Leo VI and to consider the theory which dates the *ST* towards the middle of the tenth century. Paradoxically, while this theory appears in most books of general reference and remains the most popular, there has never been a detailed study to provide extensive argument in support of it.[186] This theory is, indeed, very attractive at first, but it has two main drawbacks. The first is that some of its aspects are based on McGeer's incorrect assumptions, while other features are by no means conclusive since they seem to be characteristic not only of 950, but of earlier decades as well.

While Dain gave no explanation as to why a dating around 950 was more appropriate, his view was supported by McGeer who argued that the fact that the *ST* is preserved in L along with medical and veterinary treatises attributed to Constantine VII should mean that the *ST* was also compiled at that time. This argument, however, is suspect on codicological grounds. We have already seen in the introduction that the *pinax* of the *ST* also lists the contents of the *Poinalios Stratiotikos Nomos* and the

[183] *LT*, 2.33 (trans. Dennis, p.37); Constantine VII, *Three Treatises,* C.24-39; Haldon 1990: 45-53; 2014: 134.
[184] See chapter five below for more information.
[185] Haldon 2014: 55-68.
[186] See for example *ODB*: iii. 1980; Haldon 1999: 220-2; Parani 2003: 101.

Akolouthia, which strongly implies that at an earlier stage the *ST* was part of a codex with only these two works.

As regards the non-conclusive aspects of this theory, they have most probably become popular because the second half of the tenth century has been studied disproportionately more than the first half. Therefore, most of the time, scholars readily attribute things to the second half of the century, sometimes ignoring that certain developments had taken place earlier than 950 and sometimes overlooking certain biases or methodological problems. To begin with, modern scholarship tends to focus more on Byzantine expansion after 950 and to credit the reign of Constantine VII too much for it. It is true that Theophanes Continuatus describes the Byzantine army at that time as bravely standing its ground and fighting against the Arabs without hiding, retreating or hesitating, but that is certainly a hyperbole.[187] For no other source records any significant change in the way the Byzantines fought. Moreover, we have already seen how Byzantium, after 925, was gradually taking the initiative and shifting to a more offensive struggle against the Arabs, and other scholars have analysed how the policy of Constantine VII was, more or less, similar to that of Romanos I, save for more extensive annexations.[188] Nevertheless, this praise for Constantine VII is something one would expect to find in Theophanes Continuatus since it was this emperor who commissioned and sponsored the writing of the history.

In this light, the supporters of the 950 theory tend to automatically connect certain developments such as the appearance of the *kataphraktoi* with the reign of Constantine VII, and as we have seen they also cite al-Mutanabbī's description of Byzantine heavy cavalry in the battle of al-Hadath as proof of that. This, however, can end up being a circular argument, and Kolias was right to point out that since the *ST* is the earliest witness of these innovations, it could well mean that they had appeared earlier than 950. Moreover, al-Mutanabbī' could have referred to the Byzantine *kataphraktoi* merely to highlight the victory of his patron, Sayf al-Dawla, rather than to record something unusual. It is, after all, a characteristic of Byzantine sources before 950 to present battles and campaigns without much detail; hardly any information about units and tactics is given before the *Vita Basilii*, the history of Leo the Deacon, and the appearance of promotional literature which described the deeds of generals in detail.[189] Therefore, the silence of the sources cannot be explicitly interpreted as proof that such developments did not take place earlier.

[187] TC, 459-60.
[188] See for instance Shepard 2001: 19-40.
[189] See Kolias 1993: 11-36; Markopoulos 2009: 697-715 and for more details chapter six below.

Apart from warfare, however, similar misconceptions and disproportions of focus are also found in the cultural history of the tenth century. The title of the manual itself, 'Compilation of Tactics' may automatically link to the reign of Constantine VII, due to the trend of compilations and excerpts of his time.[190]This connection, however, is by no means conclusive; it is well noted that this trend had already started in the ninth century, featuring, among others, legal corpuses and military manuals, such as the *Hypothesis* and the *Apparatus Bellicus*. The compilation of such treatises continued into the eleventh century with the *TNO* which also contains extensive material from classical and older Byzantine authors that is arranged thematically.[191]

Theories, like Vieillefond's that the date the *ST* to the late tenth or the eleventh century are usually not accepted by scholars. This is understandably enough, since Vieillefond wrote at a time when the relationship between the *ST*, the *PM* and the *TNO* was very unclear. This also applies to the *Apparatus Bellicus* that was almost unstudied in his time and which he dated to the tenth century instead of the now widely accepted ninth century. It was especially the false dating of the latter that compelled Vieillefond to date the *ST* to the late tenth or eleventh century, since the *ST* used the *Apparatus Bellicus* as an indirect source. But now that we have explored the problems of older scholarly views, we ought to turn to the text itself in order to determine whether we can find internal evidence which can help us date the *ST* with more confidence.

A fresh look at the internal evidence of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

Before we proceed to a new study of the internal evidence of the *ST*, it will be helpful to use Gilbert Dagron's criteria as our guideline. Dagron argued that the modernity of a military manual can be determined by focusing on three main factors: the military innovations and technology that are recorded, the attention and description given to the enemy and its tactics, and the relationship of the army with the administrative and socio-political context.[192] We will now explore these three criteria by first looking into evidence that is related to technology and innovations.

[190] For a discussion of that trend and whether it can be termed as encyclopaedism see: Odorico 1990: 1-21; Flusin 2002: 556; Roberto 2009: 73-84; Holmes 2010: 56-60; Schreiner 2011: 3-8, 11-7, 23-5.
[191] Németh 2010: 20-31; Dain 1953: 64-8, 71, 75, 79-80; Lemerle 1971: 242-4; Trombley 1997: 261-74; Roberto 2009: 71-3; Holmes 2010: 56. Other military handbooks, like *LT,* have similar characteristics: the main material is organised in relevant chapters and the last part of the work contains "Various Sayings" usually deriving from older sources, and sometimes repeating what has already been said in the first part.
[192] Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 142.

In his introduction the author of the *ST* promises to focus on and discuss contemporary armament and tactics. This not a mere *topos* in our case, since the *ST* is the earliest witness to a number of innovations which include new battle formations, new types of units and new usage of siege-engines. While some of the innovations, like the *kataphraktoi* and the *menavlatoi,* do not conclusively clarify the problem of dating, the technology of siege-warfare can prove more helpful. The *ST* is the first manual to record the use of Greek fire and hand-siphons for siege purposes rather than just for naval warfare, as is the case with *LT*.[193] But while our author has made the effort to update the tradition, he is silent about another major invention, the *laisai*.

The *laisai* were light type of tortoises, wooden shelters, for covering troops during a siege.[194] Scholars have noticed that they are first attested as having been employed by the Bulgarians against the Byzantines during the reign of Leo VI.[195] Some decades later, however, the Byzantines, started to use them and the treatise of Heron of Byzantium, the *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* is the first to record their use, commenting, in fact, that they were recently invented.[196] Could it be that the *ST* was written before the Byzantines started to use the *laisai*, or was it perhaps an unimportant development that the author did not feel the need to record?

It is certainly odd that the author of the *ST* did not mention the *laisai*, especially if we take into consideration that he had listed a number of other innovations which were not as significant. The importance of the *laisai* is highlighted by the fact that it is mentioned in every tactical manual dating after Heron, save for the *PM* which anyway does not have a chapter devoted to sieges, and the *DV* whose chapter on sieges (21) does not refer specifically to any siege-engine.[197] Therefore, it seems possible that the *laisai* were not employed by the Byzantines at the time the *ST* was compiled, and that this manual was written before the *Parangelmata Poliorketika*.

If we accept this reasoning, then the dating of Heron is key to determining the dating of the *ST*. The material of the *Parangelmata* fits the context of the Byzantine offensive in the time of Romanos I and

[193] See chapter five below.

[194] While the employment of wooden hunt/fence-like barriers, goes back to the Roman times, known as *vinea,* their widespread used and the term *laisai/lesai* appears in the tenth century, see: McGeer 1991: 136; Sullivan 2000: 175-6.

[195] *DAI,* 51.114-120; McGeer 1991: 136.

[196] Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* 2.1-4.

[197] In the *De Obsidione Toleranda,* 50.6, its dating is not certain, but it was written after 924. However, it does not refer to the *laisai* as a recently invented, which may imply that it was completed after the *Parangelmata.* Dain 1940: 136, proposed a dating around the middle of the tenth century. For further discussion about its dating see: Dain and Foucault 1967: 359, 349-50; van den Berg 1947: 3; Sullivan 2003: 139-41. In the *Mémorandum,* 6, Dain proposed a dating at the second half of the tenth century, 1940: 136; 1967: 366-7; Sullivan 2003: 140. In the *DRM,* 27.7, see Dennis 1985: 241-3 and Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 171-5 for the dating. In the *TNO,* 65.86-100.

Constantine VII, as the words capture 'the cities of Agar' implies.[198] The earliest dating assigned to the *Parangelmata* is 934, but there is absolutely no evidence to support such a precise date.[199] Another theory dates the treatise to the sole reign of Constantine VII, and there is indeed good evidence to support that.[200] If we accept the second view, which is anyway more secure, it would mean that the *ST* was probably written c. 920-950. What remains to be seen is to determine where the other innovations in our manual are in line with such a dating.

Evidence from another source seems to imply that one of the innovations of the *ST* could date to the reign of Romanos I. In the ninth century, the *peltastai* or the javelin-men were counted among the light infantry, together with the archers.[201] Accordingly, in the early tenth century we are informed from *LT* that the infantry of his time was only divided into heavy and light since the *peltastai* were still considered as light infantry.[202] In the *ST,* however, that is not the case: the infantry is divided into three categories, heavy, medium and light. The medium infantry is called *peltastai*, and is equipped almost as the heavy, save for the use of smaller shields, javelins, helmets which do not cover the face, and for the absence of leg and arm guards. This medium infantry was drawn up and operated together with the heavy, the two together were called shield-bearing infantry. This development appears in all the later manuals of the tenth century where the medium infantry is once again described in the same way, but is designated with the term *akontistai*.[203]

The above innovation can prove helpful for the dating of the *ST*, if we link it with the information provided by Constantine VII in the *De Thematibus*. Constantine informs us that:

---

[198] Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* 58.6-10 (trans. Sullivan, p. 113); Dain 1933: 16-7; Sullivan 2000: 3-4.

[199] Martin 1854: 275-7.

[200] Schneider 1908: 84-5, proposed that the *Parangelmata* was connected with Constantine VII. Dain 1933: 16-7, at first doubted this theory, but later accepted this connection, stating that his various nominal references to his sources point towards this direction, see: Dain 1953: 77-78. Sullivan 2000: 4, 15-21, 248, noticed that the word *θεολέστων,* used in this treatise (ch.58.9), is employed in the works of Constantine VII, such as in the *DC* and his military orations. He also pointed how relevant the manual is to a mid-tenth-century context. To those arguments we can add the author's manifesto on the avoidance of the Attic language and the use of simple flat writing with clarity (ch.3).

[201] In *Synagoge*, π.282, we read: πελτασταί = τοξόται, ἢ τοὺς ξυστοὺς κατέχοντες, while in the *Lexicon* of Photios π.408.12-13, we read the same with the addition that the πέλτη δὲ εἶδος ἀσπίδος οὐκ ἐχούσης ἴτυν · οὐδ' ἐπίχαλκον, οὐδὲ βοός· ἀλλ' αἰγὸς δέρματι περιτεταμένη.

[202] *LT*, 6.20.

[203] *ST,* 38.6-7; *DV.* 3.3, 20.73; *DRM*. 1.10-20, 35, 5.12-8, 6.1-5, 58-60; *PM,* 1.51-62, 82-7, 95-7; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 192, n.42; McGeer 1995: 208-9. See also chapter five below.

> The so-called *tourmarchs* were appointed in the service of the *strategoi*. This rank signifies he who commands 500 archers, 300 *peltastai* and 100 heavy infantry. For this is how it is found in the book of John Philadelphos, the so-called Lydos. [204]

We read, therefore, that there was a triple division of the army of the Anatolikon *thema*. The *peltastai* were not included in the light infantry, together with the archers, as is the case in *LT*. On the contrary, the *peltastai* appear as a distinct type of infantry, between the archers and the heavy infantry, while Constantine VII uses the term *peltastai*, which is the same term that denotes the medium infantry in the *ST.* This passage is not without difficulties though. Constantine VII connects this information with John Lydos, who was active in the sixth century and who wrote the book *On the Magistracies of the Roman Constitution*. This information, however, is incompatible with the sixth century. Firstly, a relevant citation cannot be found in John Lydos' book, and secondly, the term *tourmarches* was not in use during his time. On the other hand, this passage fits well into the known tenth-century context of *themata* and their manpower, which has led certain scholars to interpret it as a reflection of contemporary practice.[205]

But this is where we come to the second problem, for the dating of the first half of the *De Thematibus* is, to some extent, questionable. Some scholars believe that it was written in the reign of Romanos I, because it contains praise to him, but others have noted that the reference to the transfer of the relics of St. Gregory from Cappadocia to Constantinople must place the work after 946, which is the date that the transfer took place.[206] But while this argument is very secure, this theory does not sufficiently explain the favourable comments for Romanos I. The reasoning that Constantine VII wanted to be politically correct because the text was intended for a wider readership is not very convincing, since Constantine VII did not seem to have had such problems when he abused the name of Alexander in *LT* and in a funeral poem dedicated to Leo VI.[207] If Constantine VII was not willing to do that for a relative, I do not see the reason for doing it for Romanos I.

That being said, it may be that the first half of the *De Thematibus* was indeed drafted when Romanos I was still alive. The work must have been revised in the later years of Constantine VII, but it seems that it remained unfinished, and therefore the praise was not edited.[208] In this light, it could be that

[204] Constantine VII, *De Thematibus,* 1.1.73-7.
[205] Pertusi 1952: 117; Ahrweiler 1960: 3; Cheynet 1995: 321; Treadgold 1992: 89-110; Haldon 2000: 305-29; 2014: 135-7.
[206] Ostrogorsky 1953: 38; Huxley 1980: 31-2; Lemerle 1971: 279-80; c.f. Ahrweiler 1981: 1-5.
[207] See chapter four below.
[208] Németh 2010: 51-2.

Constantine VII is providing us with information which is contemporary to the reign of Romanos I and this could also imply that the introduction of the *peltastai* as a distinct medium infantry unit took place during the reign of Romanos I.

The fact that the *ST* records the appearance of new battle formations and specialized units, such as the *peltastai*, the *menavlatoi* and the *kataphraktoi*, seems to be in line with the new challenges that the Byzantine army faced in the reign of Romanos I, as it begun to take the initiative against the Arabs. We have already seen that John Kourkouas participated, for almost twenty years, in offensive campaigns, which involved besieging fortresses and cities, as well as taking part in pitched battles.[209] While guerrilla tactics still remained important, this kind of warfare was different from the small defensive or retaliation operations which usually took place in the frontier. It required specialised infantry able to protect and assist the cavalry during marches, battles and sieges, specialized cavalry to take the offensive, solid battle formations and a close cooperation of troops.[210] Therefore, all these developments in warfare could well have first taken place during the period 920-950, and then served as bases for further expansions and developments that lasted from the middle of the tenth century and up to the beginning of the eleventh.[211]

The above view is sufficiently summarised by Mark Whittow's words 'None of these appeared overnight [...] new armies and tactics had been developing since at least since 930'.[212] These examples demonstrate that the military milieu during the period 920-950 was very fruitful for these innovations to have taken place and consequently for the drafting of the *ST*. It is, however, necessary to take the second criterion of Dagron into consideration and explore whether the *ST* presents the enemy in a way that it is compatible with this milieu.[213]

The *ST* does not contain extensive information about any specific enemy, but some useful conclusions can be drawn with the help of other sources. When all these are put together it seems that the *ST* provides evidence which best fits into the context of Arab-Byzantine struggles of the first half of the tenth century. A first example can be seen in the absence of any mention of the *Arabitai* who were nomadic Arab light cavalry troops. Their first incursions began in 902 but their earliest establishment did not take place until 936 near Aleppo. These nomads started to play a key role in the

[209] See chapter one above. For an example of a pitched battle see: Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.121-2.
[210] See chapter five below.
[211] Runciman 1929: 137-50; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.257-300; Canard 1951: 731-51; Guilland 1950: 30; McGeer 1995: 262; Haldon 1999: 218-22.
[212] Whittow 1996: 323-4.
[213] For Dagron's criteria see p. 54 above.

regions of Syria and Mesopotamia around 950, but their fullest impact was felt by the Byzantine armies after the death of Sayf al-Dawla (967).[214] Both *LT* and the *ST* are silent as to the threat posed by these men. In contrast, manuals which were written in the second half of the century, like the *PM* and the *TNO,* make explicit reference to the *Arabitai* and their tactics. These manuals also instruct the general to screen the flanks of the *kataphraktoi* wedge with the *prokoursatores*, so as to ensure that the charge will be carried out without hindrance from the enemy light cavalry, a tactic which is not present in the *ST*.[215]

Another example, which seems to paint a picture of the Arabs as they were in the first half of the tenth century, comes indirectly from the *ST*'s information regarding the *menavlatoi*. The mere appearance of the *menavlatoi,* who were specialised infantry employed to repel the enemy heavy cavalry, seems to imply that there must have been a change in the Arab armies which made their use necessary. It was after the reforms of caliph al-Mu'tasim (833-842) that these developments started to take place, when specialised Turkish cavalry troops started to enter the service of the Abbasids. However, their impact was not that significant at first, it was not until the tenth century, and more specifically during the reign of Mu'tadid (892-902), that the system of *ghulams* was developed and appeared as a distinct elite force with separate command.

The *ghulams*, after 936, fought in distinctive units and their numbers were a few hundred strong, while similar developments also took place in the autonomous Mesopotamia, where the main enemies of the Byzantines, the Ḥamdānids started to employ them in the 930s as bodyguards in low numbers.[216] For example, during the reign of Romanos I, a force of fifty *ghulams* is reported, while at the battle of al-Hadath (954) five hundred of them were said to have spear-headed the Arab assault.[217] Therefore, from the tenth century onwards a steady increase in the number of heavy cavalry seems to have taken place in the Arab armies, while this type of cavalry started to play an important role on the battlefield.[218]

The numbers and tactics of the *menavlatoi* in the *ST* seem to correspond to this stage of developments when the numbers of enemy *ghulams* were still low. The maximum number of the *menavlatoi* was 300 in the *ST*, and they were expected to bear the heavy cavalry's onslaught on their own, distancing

[214] Von Sievers 1979: 230-4; Cappel 1994: 114-5, 129, n.4.
[215] *ST,* 46.9; *PM,* 2.104, 128, 129, 4.126-37, 180, 187; *TNO*, 57.125-8, 167-59, 61.155-9, 256-7; McGeer 1995: 68, 305; Cappel 1994: 114 n.2, 117.
[216] Bikhazi 1981: 256-7, 372; Kennedy 2004: 204, 269; Gordon 2001: 127, 139. For more information on al-Mu'tasim's reforms see Ayalon 1994: 23-31; Gordon 2001: 119-40.
[217] McGeer 1995: 237; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.352-3, 362, ii.i.361-2 Canard 1971: 779-81, 794.
[218] Bosworth 1965-1966: 153-154; Nicolle 1980: 10; 1983: 47-52; McGeer 1995: 237.

themselves 40 *orgyai* from the infantry square formation.[219] This, however, is not the case in the second half of the century. In the *PM* the numbers of the *menavlatoi* are four times higher, while the same manual instructs the reader not to allow them to fight the enemy *ghulams* alone, but with the support of other infantry units.[220]

Similarly, the appearance of the *kataphraktoi* can be seen as a response to the deployment of the Turkish elite cavalry of the Abbasids. This mutual influence is supported by the similar equipment which the Byzantine *kataphraktoi* had with the Turkish or Arab elite heavy cavalry. Al-Mas'udi records that some Khazars and Arabs were heavily armed horse-archers also bearing lances and shields, while the *ST* instructs that the *kataphraktoi* should have shields, bows, and lances as their primary weapons.[221] On the other hand, the *kataphraktoi* could have also appeared as an attempt to respond to developments in the enemy infantry. Some of these can be seen during the reign of al-Muqtadir (908-932) when the *Maṣāffi*, an elite infantry force, saw its numbers doubled and its pay dramatically increased during the period 917-929. Eventually their status was raised so much that resulted in a civil war between the groups of infantry and cavalry.[222] The increase in payments would have most probably allowed the *Maṣāffi* to be equipped with the best equipment available, so the heavier the enemy infantry, the heavier the allied cavalry needed to break their formation. It is possible, however, that the decline of the caliphate and troubles in Baghdad may have not allowed the *Maṣāffi* to participate in frontier wars during the time of Romanos I, as has been argued that it was mostly local or regional troops that the Byzantines often faced.[223]

Be that as it may, part of the *Maṣāffi* was composed of Daylamite troops who not only served as palace-guards, but also as mercenaries employed in Syria and Mesopotamia. The Daylami, an enemy long known to the Byzantines, were specialized infantry who fought in thick formations, able to withstand cavalry onslaughts. Their numbers and importance, however, steadily increased in the tenth century. For example, the Abbasids regularly employed them after 929, while the same also applies to regional governors like the Ḥamdānids.[224] By taking the above information into account, we can argue that the evidence of the *ST* regarding the enemy, either direct or indirect, seems to be compatible with

[219] *ST,* 47.16.
[220] McGeer 1995: 273-5. See also chapter seven below.
[221] Mas'udi, 22; *ST*, 39.1-6.
[222] Miskawaihi, 227; Kennedy 2001: 161
[223] Whittow 1996: 329.
[224] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.349; Bosworth 1965-1966: 148-51; McGeer 1995: 234-5; Bikhazi 1981: 421; Kennedy 2004: 269-71.

the reign of Romanos I, not only because it corresponds to contemporary characteristics of the enemy, but also because it justifies Byzantine developments as a response to them.

This moves us to the third criterion of Dagron, and to whether the army of the *ST* is in accordance with the administrative and political milieu before 950. Our first evidence for a dating in the first half of the century comes from the study of the *taxiarchos.* The word occurs three times in the *ST* where we read that 'it must be known that the *taxis* is also part of the formation, just like the *tagma*, and so the *tagmatarches* is also called *taxiarchos*'.[225] The *taxiarchos*, therefore, appears as an unofficial rank, used to describe an officer who commands a unit of drawn up men regardless of whether this is an infantry or a cavalry unit. It is thus similar to the *tagma-tagmatarches*.[226] Consequently, this *taxiarchos* must not be confused with the official rank of *taxiarchos* which appears in the second half of the tenth century and is specifically in command of an infantry unit, usually one thousand strong, which is called *taxiarchia* and appears in the *PM* and *DRM*.[227]

Another evidence for a dating in the period 920-950 can be found when we look at the ranks of *droungarios* and *komes.* We have seen that Vári considered the military hierarchy in *LT* and the *ST* to be identical, but on a closer inspection all is not the same.[228] The author of the *ST* did not slavishly copy his information from *LT,* but he updated its information to make it relevant to his time. First of all, he reports that the cavalry units, which he calls *allagia*, consisted of a different number of men, while he also records that the *komes* could have commanded as few as 50 men, both of which are not found in *LT*.[229] Consequently, this seems to suggest that a small evolution had taken place in the meantime which would have been chronologically impossible to have been crystallized in the reign of Leo VI, given that *LT* was compiled quite late. This small evolution, however, certainly fits the context of the period 920-950 which can justify both a similar hierarchy with *LT* and a time frame that could allow such small changes to be developed and recorded.

Another factor that requires our attention is the relationship between the rank of *droungarios* and *komes.* In the *ST* the *droungarios* is reported to have commanded from 3000 to at least 1000 men and the *komes* at least 50 and up to 400. These numbers also agree with the Arab geographer, Ibn Khurdādhbih, who reports that the *droungarioi* of the *thema* of Thrakesion commanded 1000 men

[225] *ST,* 22.8, 35.10, 50.6 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[226] *ST,* 43.5, 46.25, 43.2, 46.22. For a similar case see: *PS*, 15.65-6.
[227] *PM,* 1.75, 81, 5.21; *DRM,* 1.11-6; Oikonomides 1972: 273, 335-6; Kühn 1991: 273-8; McGeer 1988: 135-45; 1995: 265-72; Haldon 1999: 218.
[228] Vári 1927: 267.
[229] *ST,* 35.2-5; c.f. *LT*, 4.47, 18.146.

each and the *komites* 200. The same figures appear in Kudama for the 930s which are, however, most probably copied from Khurdādhbih.[230] What is more of interest to us now, is not so much the exact number of men that a *droungarios* or a *komes* commanded since those varied from *thema* to *thema* and from theory to practice, but the fact that the *komes* is clearly subordinate to the *droungarios* and generally commanded fewer men than him.[231]

Haldon has argued that already from the reign of Basil I (867-886) the clear distinction between the two ranks had gradually started to disappear. The *DC* records that in the ceremonial hair-cutting of Basil's son, Leo, the 'θεματικοὶ ἄρχοντες τῶν δρουγγαροκομήτων' were among the officials who were present.[232] However, this seems to be the only reference which records the merging of the two ranks in the ninth century, and it is possible that either the author of the *DC* merged them together so as to generalize and record the presence of both, or that he applied the situation of his time to Basil's. This becomes more evident from the *Kletorologion* of Philotheos (c. 899) where the *droungarioi* are stated to be first in the list of presence followed by the *komites*, a fact which confirms their higher hierarchy.[233] Nevertheless, as Haldon commented, the fact that they are referred as 'δρουγγάριοι τῶν βάνδων, κόμητες ὁμοιως' seems to point towards the decline of their importance.[234]

The *DC* presents the *droungarios* and the *komes* as distinct ranks up to the reign of Romanos I,[235] but that is not the case for sole reign of Constantine VII. The lists for the 949 expedition of Crete features the joint rank of the *droungarokomites*, and the same also applies to the manual on imperial military expeditions.[236] These facts allow us to speculate that, while this decline in the rank of *droungarios* had started by the middle of the ninth century, it became crystalized in the reign of

[230] Treadgold 1992: 88-90; Haldon 1999: 108; 2000: 322.
[231] See the detailed study of Haldon 2000: 305-30; C.f. Treadgold 1992: 84-110.
[232] *DC*, 622.10; Haldon 2000: 324-5. For this ritual see Tougher 1997: 46-8.
[233] *Kletorologion,* 109.23-4, 157.9-11.
[234] Haldon 2000: 325.
[235] For the expedition of Crete in 911, the 5000 Mardaites included 44 *droungarioi* and 44 *komites.* The fact that they were both 44 implies a low commanding number of men for the *droungarioi.* The latter, however, received 12 *nomismata*, whereas the *komites* only 6. The Armenians of Sebasteia numbering 960 men for the same expedition included 10 *droungarioi* and 8 *komites,* once more the *droungarioi* were paid more, namely 6 *nomismata* each, while the *komites* 5. See: *DC*, 656.10-5; Haldon 2000: 325; C.f. Treadgold 1992: 118-9.
[236] The force of the *thema* of Thrakesion had 64 *droungarokomites* in 949. The situation of Charpezikion seems to be quite different, the lowest rank reported is the *droungarioi,* which probably implies that the *droungarioi* became equivalent to the *komites*, see: *DC*, 663.6, 667.7-11; Haldon 2000: 326-7; c.f. Treadgold 1992: 127-30. In the treatise on imperial expeditions the hierarchy is reported as 'All the strategoi should issue orders to their *tourmarchai*, and the latter to their *droungarokomites*, so that each and every *bandon* has its smith and likewise its bootmakers', see: Constantine VII, *Three Treatises,* C.653-5 (trans. Haldon, p. 136-7); Haldon 1990: 256-8; Kühn 1991: 51-2.

Constantine VII.[237] Therefore, the fact that there is a clear distinction between *droungarios* and *komes* in the *ST* better fits the administrative context of the reign of Romanos I.

Similar conclusion can be drawn from other internal evidence of the *ST.* For example, our manual explicitly mentions two *tagmata* in the east, the royal *allagia* of Thrakesion and Charsianon.[238] The royal *allagion* of Thrakesion can correspond with the *peratika tagmata* which were stationed in Asia Minor, but not too far from the capital.[239] Troops from Thrakesion are reported to have fought against the Rus in 941, perhaps they can be identified as the *tagmata* of Thrakesion.[240] The royal *allagion* of Charsianon remains a mystery. Our first clear mention of *tagmata* in the Charsianon dates to the eleventh century, therefore, the *ST* is the earliest source referring to them in the tenth.[241] These troops could have been recruited to the *tagmata* especially for the needs of a particular campaign, much like the Armenians of Platanion in the *DC*, or as *peratika tagmata* stationed there against the Arabs.[242] The fact that they were from Charsianon might not be a coincidence, as they could have been recruited from this *thema*, which was home to the powerful family of Argyroi.[243] The Argyroi were allied to Romanos I, as the latter married his daughter Agatha to the son of Leo Argyros. In addition, both Leo and his brother, Pothos Argyros, were *domestikoi* of the *scholai* before John Kourkouas, when Romanos I was in power.[244]

The recruitment of men from a loyal *thema* to the *tagmata* could be explained in the tenth-century context of powerful families, as securing a strong imperial force to use as a counterweight both against other strong families of this *thema,* like the Phokades, and generally against rebellions aimed at the

[237] Haldon 2000: 328.
[238] *ST,* 35.5. For the term in the tenth century see: Pertusi 1956: 92-5; Guilland 1967: 524-5; Haldon 1984: 275.
[239] For *tagmata* stationed outside the capital see: Ahrweiler 1960: 25-33, 55-9; Guilland 1967: 428-30; Oikonomides 1972: 329-35; Toynbee 1973: 286; Haldon 1984: 234; 1999: 84; 2000: 332; Kühn 1991: 69; McGeer 1995: 201.
[240] The chronicles report that Bardas Phokas fought the Rus with some picked men, but that Kourkouas was in charge of the main army that arrived later. The *Life of Saint Basil the Younger* states that Bardas was in charge of troops from Macedonia, and Spongarios from Thrakesion. Since Spongarios replaces the name of Theophanes who was in charge of the fleet, and Kourkouas had already with him the largest part of the Eastern army, it is possible that Bardas actually commanded some remaining detachments of the *tagmata*. See: Symeon Magister, 136.71-5; TC*,* 423-5; Skylitzes, 229; *Basil Younger,* 3.23-7. For Skylitzes' reference to *tagmata* in this passage see Holmes 2005: 146, who does not regard it as trustworthy.
[241] Ahrweiler 1960: 34-5; Kühn 1991: 265.
[242] *DC*, 652.6-7, 657.20-658.8, 666; Haldon 1984: 219-20; Haldon 2000: 333. Caesarea in Charsianon was an important cite, being one of the imperial *aplekta* and probably also producing arms, see: Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, A.11-2; Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 85-7; Huxley 1975: 90-3; Haldon 1984: 318-9; 1990: 63 and n.53; Cooper and Decker 2012: 242.
[243] Recruiting thematic elites in the *tagmata* see: *DC*, 657.20-658.8; Haldon 1984: 219-20; Kühn 1991: 251-52; Grigoriou-Ioannidou 1993: 35-41. For the Argyroi family see: Vannier 1975: 15-7; Cooper and Decker 2012: 234-6, 250.
[244] Guilland 1950: 28-29; Cheynet and Vannier 2003: 60-62; Kühn 1991: 79-80.

throne.[245] For example, Skylitzes informs us, that John Kourkouas confronted the rebellion of Bardas Boilas, *strategos* of Chaldia, Tatzates and Adrian Chaldos, when he happened to be at Charsianon. Kourkouas could have used the *tagmata* there to suppress the rebellion since he was *domestikos* of the *scholai* at that time.[246] Moreover, the recruitment of allied powerful families to the *tagmata* gave them the chance to enhance their position by acquiring booty, lands, and fame, by participating to the frequent operations of the nearby front, not to mention better payment.[247]

The *ST* also mentions the western *tagmata*, which can be identified with the *tagmata* of Thrace and Macedonia.[248] It is also possible, however, that some or all of the *allagia* mentioned in our manual were detachments of *tagmata* listed as having participated in a recent major campaign. Perhaps they were detachments of the imperial army who participated in the most important operation of that time, the capture of Melitene, since the chroniclers clearly inform us that both *themata* and *tagmata* participated in that campaign.[249]

Conclusion

When we take all the above factors into consideration, it seems that the date which appears on the title of treatise cannot be trusted. The *ST* cannot be dated to the reign of Leo VI because it has used his *Taktika* as a source, and despite the many similarities, it presents a number of developments which cannot be contemporary with Leo VI. A dating in the reign of Leo VI remains problematic even if we suppose that the innovative material of the *ST* was added later because in this case it hard to see the purpose for the production of the manual in the first place.

The other popular view, that the *ST* should be dated around 950, seems to ignore internal evidence of the manual itself which presents an army with technological and administrative elements dating to

[245] For example, the strong family of the Phokades was pushed to the background by Romanos, but returned to the command of high-offices during the sole reign of Constantine VII, see: TC, 436; Skylitzes, 288; Runciman 1929: 64-6; Cheynet 1986: 296-301; 1991: 210-2; Cooper and Decker 2012: 233-9, 250. For the powerful provincial families and imperial authority see: Lilie 1993: 66-7, 71-3; Howard-Johnston 1995: 78-89; Haldon 1999: 238-9, 273-4; 2008: 165-9, 172-6; Cheynet 2006: 31-2, 37-8; Stephenson 2010: 22-4. For the political aspect of the *tagmata* in enforcing the central imperial policy see Haldon 1984: 231-5; Kühn 1991: 48-9. Numerous rebellions took place in the reign of Romanos I, some of the important participants involved were Leo Phokas and the *strategos* of Chaldia Bardas Boilas: Symeon Magister, 136.4, 26; Skylitzes, 210, 217; TC, 395-6, 404.

[246] Skylitzes, 217. Lounghis 1997: 101, argues that we can interpret from this reference that Kourkouas used Caesarea as a temporary base for his troops.

[247] Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 98-9; Haldon 2009: 185-96; Magdalino 2009: 228; Cooper and Decker 2012: 251-2.

[248] *DC*, 652.4, 660.19, 666.

[249] Symeon Magister, 136.53; TC, 416.

the first half of the century and an enemy which seems in line with this dating. A dating to the eleventh century also seems unlikely; it overlooks the gradual evolution found in the *LT*, *ST* and *PM* and the administrative structure of the army which seems to be pre 950.

It seems, therefore, that the most suitable dating for the *ST* is the reign of Romanos I Lekapenos (920-944). This is supported by all three factors proposed by Dagron to determine the modernity of a treatise. In terms of technology and innovations, the appearance of the *peltastai* as medium infantry could have taken place at the same time, while the *laisai*, which appear in all later manuals, is an innovation not recorded in the *ST,* despite the fact that the author presents us with an updated version of the Byzantine army. As regards information concerning the enemy, the *ST* contrary to later manuals, does not refer to the threat of nomad Arabs which gradually started to menace the Byzantines from 950 onwards, while the tactics of the *menavlatoi* imply a low number of enemy heavy cavalry which agrees with developments that took place in the Arab armies at the first half of the century. Administrative information about the army in the *ST* also supports a dating at this period since there is a gradual development from *LT,* but the ranks of *droungarios* and *komes* are still distinct, and not joint as is the case in the sole reign of Constantine VII.

In addition, the reign of Romanos I seems very suitable not only because the Byzantine offensive brought new challenges which are in line with the innovations presented in the *ST*, but also because these innovations can be explained as responses to contemporary Arab developments. In addition, the reign of Romanos I is the most attractive for the compilation of the *ST* because it was long enough to allow for these developments to take place, crystallise and be recorded, and yet was not too far from the context of the reign of Leo VI, from which they gradually evolved. Last but not least, this was a period when very experienced generals like John Kourkouas and Melias flourished and held posts for an extensive amount of time, and one of the few times that the emperor himself was a man with military experience who had held the rank of *droungarios* of the fleet before he became emperor.

Although the internal evidence of the *ST* agrees with this new dating, it is also essential to examine this dating theory in connection with the authorship and the attribution of the manual. The discussion which follows in the next chapter reinforces in fact a dating at the time of Romanos I.

Chapter Four

The Authorship, Attribution and Redaction of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

In the previous chapter we discussed that the internal evidence of the *ST* fits the technological, military and administrative context of the first half of the tenth century, and more specifically that of the reign of Romanos I. To make the best of this reasoning and to better understand the manual itself, it is essential to study the dating in relationship with authorship and attribution. Therefore, we will attempt to investigate who was behind the compilation of the *ST,* and to explain why it was falsely attributed to Leo VI. Hopefully, this study will not only clarify some very controversial issues of the *ST*, it will also reinforce the new dating theory, shed some light on possible previous versions of the text, as well as put all of them into context. In order to achieve this, we will begin by looking into previous views on the matter. Then we will use internal evidence to examine the identity or rank of the author; and whether he was an emperor as the title wants us to believe. Thirdly, we will try to identify who this person might be and whether the identification agrees with the chronological context of our new dating theory. Last but not least, we will attempt to explain the false attribution and determine whether this is a deliberate product of later intervention in the text and to estimate the degree and character of this intervention.

Previous views on authorship

For most of previous scholarship the problem of authorship was not really an issue since the attribution of the title was taken at face value. The majority of scholars did not turn to internal evidence to identify the identity of the author and readily accepted that he was Leo VI. Another group of scholars overlooked this issue altogether and while they proposed a dating beyond the time of Leo VI, they did not explain whether the manual simply dated in the reign of Constantine VII or was specifically commissioned by him. Consequently, the findings of the few scholars who did study the issue of the identity of the author can be summarized into two different theories.

The first theory to doubt the attribution of the text was supported by Vári who argued that the *ST* was written by a single person who was emperor, since he presents himself as such through the phrase

'our Majesty'.[250] The phrase 'our Majesty' may indeed link our treatise with an imperial milieu since it is frequently used in texts, which were commissioned by emperors, to indirectly refer to their dignity as emperors. Some tenth-century examples include the novels and *Taktika* of Leo VI, the *DAI* and the *DC* of Constantine VII, as well as imperial correspondence in general.[251] There are cases, however, in which the above phrase is used to broadly refer to the dignity of the emperor and it is not connected with any particular figure. The most relevant example comes from the *Taktika* of Ouranos, who was a general and governor of Antioch. In the *TNO* we read 'They [the prokoursatores] must have one head commander either a *strategos* or someone else whom Our Majesty appoints'.[252] Therefore, Ouranos uses the phrase without being an emperor, and without making a specific reference to Basil II, he just describes a responsibility that all Byzantine emperors had.

The other theory which looked critically into the issue of authorship was expressed by Dain and Wheeler, who see the issue of authorship as something which cannot be clarified by internal evidence. Dain believed that the *ST* was written by a single author, but he envisaged him as somebody who copied extensively from lost sources. He refuted Vári's hypothesis on the grounds that the phrase 'our Majesty' only appears in the first half of the treatise, which Dain explained as a careless copying from a lost source, which he named *Tactica Perdita.*[253] Wheeler argued that the whole work is a 'forgery', most probably meaning that some redactor put different extracts from extant and lost sources together, exploiting Leo's name. [254]

Vári's theory was generally rejected as one which too readily accepted internal evidence without a critical eye, since it was expressed at a time when the issue of the sources of the *ST* was not properly studied. This criticism is not entirely fair though. Our earlier observations regarding less dependence on lost sources and a copying which was not really careless allow for a more careful consideration as well as for an advancement of his argument through a fresh look into the internal evidence of the text.[255]

---

[250] The Greek reads τῆς βασιλείας ἡμων. The phrase is found several times in the manual: *ST,* 27.1, 35.2, 5, 36.2, 50.4, 6, 53.8, and 54.1. See Vári 1927: 266-7.

[251] See for example: Leo, *Novels*, 40.71, 106.22; *LT*, 15.33, 2.21, 30, 4.1, 45, 11.9, 12.37; *DAI*, 45.68, 75; *DC*, 484, 528, 565; Daphnopates, 5.43, 4.60; LD, 115.

[252] *TNO*, 61.16 (trans. McGeer, p. 119).

[253] For a detailed discussion of lost sources see chapter two.

[254] Dain 1938: 8; Dain and Foucault 1967: 350-1; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxi-xxii; Haldon 2014: 67-8.

[255] See chapter two above.

Internal evidence for the identity of the author of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

To begin with, the fact that the treatise is attributed to an emperor may not be wholly misleading. For the content of the *ST* seems to be in line with an imperial attribution, and the phrase 'our Majesty' is by no means the only evidence which implies such an authorship or commission. When the author of the *ST* addresses the general, he does so in the imperative mood or through the use of the phrase 'the general must', which means that he outranks him, commanding him to act in a certain way.[256] These phrases occur numerous times in the text and they cannot solely be attributed to dependence on older models, because they also appear in parts of the work which are original and innovative. It is, therefore, very unlikely that they were a product of copy of the mood and style of sources, either direct or indirect.[257] The use of such authoritative phrases and mood is common in manuals written or commissioned by emperors such as *MS, LT*, the *PM* and the *DV*.[258]

Apart from the imperative mood, the authoritative status of the author becomes more obvious in chapter 54.1, where we read that 'The general (…) must first secure the camp in every possible way, which in chapter twenty-two Our Majesty ordered to be established standing off from the city at a distance of approximately two miles'.[259] This passage cannot be traced to any extant source and the author clearly states that he considers the information provided in his manual as an order. This order is either given by the author who is the emperor and addresses himself indirectly, or by a ghost author who writes in the name of the emperor. In addition, it is worth noting that the person who compiled the *ST* must have had access to the imperial library since he had used works which were not intended for wide readership. That at least is what his copying of the *Hortatory Chapters* of Basil I seems to suggest.

The above evidence strongly implies that there was an imperial involvement in the project of the *ST.* The only flaw in the argument is Dain's observation that such phrases and mood only appear in the first half of the treatise. However, even if we were to accept his hypothesis that the author of the *ST* slavishly copied the first half of the treatise from the *Tactica Perdita* and the second half from the *Corpus Perditum*, there is additional proof from the second half of the work which is in accordance with the authoritative style of the first half. In chapter 59.3 the author of the *ST* states that 'we compiled this book judging that these [stratagems] and others of the kind should be recorded (...) so that our

[256] Δεῖ/χρὴ τον στρατηγόν.
[257] *ST*, 46.13, 47.20, 48.7.
[258] See for example *MS*, 2.17, 2.20; *PM*, 1.1, 1.10, 1.94; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 164-5; Sullivan 2010: 153.
[259] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).

generals may be able to guard against them'.[260] The words 'our generals′ once again imply that the author is to be distinguished from common generals and that he commands or 'owns' them.[261]

There is, consequently, evidence throughout text, both in the first and the second half of the work, that seems to agree that the author of the manual was somebody who possessed very high authority. He was either an emperor himself, or somebody who wrote on behalf of an emperor. As it always the case with these works, it is difficult to say whether the manual was personally written by an emperor or by a team of ghost authors under his auspices.

It is common for military manuals commissioned or written by an emperor to use both the first personal singular and the first person plural, without necessarily denoting two different subjects. If one tries to speculate on such a distinction it is usually very difficult, if not impossible, to recognize the difference.[262] The *ST* is not an exception; the 'we' and 'I' are used interchangeably in the text, sometimes mimicking its sources, sometimes not.[263] The only difference can be found in chapter 59.3 where the change from 'we' to 'I' might perhaps have some significance. The passage cannot be traced to any extant source and it reads 'We compiled this book judging that these [stratagems] and others of the kind should be recorded not in order to be used by us against the enemy (for I believe that they are unworthy even to be mentioned in a Christian context)'.[264] Here the 'we' seems to be differentiated from the 'I', as the 'we' seems to play the role of a team who helped the 'I' in the compilation and collection of the material, but eventually it is the 'I', the emperor-supervisor, who expresses his personal view and dominates. Whatever the case, it is not unlikely that the author had a group of people from his court that he supervised and who probably did most of the work. What is more important now is to attempt to identify who this emperor was.

[260] Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τα τοιαῦτα ἕτερα, (…) κρίνοντες δεῖν, τῶ παρόντι συγγράμματι συντετάχαμεν (…) ἵνα (…) οἱ ἡμέτεροι στρατηγοί, ταύτας φυλάττεσθαι ἔχοιεν. Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).
[261] Vári 1927: 266–7.
[262] Sullivan 2010: 153; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 164-5.
[263] See for example *ST*, 8.2 and c.f. *ST*, 20.1 with *MS*, 2.17.
[264] Ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τα τοιαῦτα ἕτερα, οὐχ ὡς ἐνεργεῖσθαι παρ' ἡμῶν κατὰ τῶν πολεμίων δεῖν κρίνοντες, τῶ παρόντι συγγράμματι συντετάχαμεν (ἀνάξια γὰρ ἐμοί γε ταῦτα δοκεῖ χριστιανικῆς καταστάσεως καὶ μόνον λεγόμενα). Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).

Identifying the emperor who commissioned the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

Trying to identify the emperor responsible for the *ST* can be a very tricky task. Since the title of the *ST* cannot be trusted, one has to turn to other known texts commissioned by emperors in the tenth century to identify their trends and style. For the time being we will not take into consideration our findings regarding dating, as the fact that the contents of the *ST* best fit into the reign of Romanos I does not necessarily mean that the manual was indeed produced under his auspices. It could have been the case that it was produced by another emperor who failed to update its material into his own time, resulting into the compilation of a slightly outdated manual. Consequently, our *terminus post quem* will be the year 963 which is when Nikephoros II Phokas became emperor, since we know that he had used the *ST* as a source for the drafting of his *PM*.[265]

All modern scholars who have studied the *ST* unanimously agree that its style and sources are very different from that of *LT*, so Leo VI cannot have been its author or commissioner.[266] A comparative reading of *LT* and the *ST* is indeed enough to establish that despite some relevance in material and structure, the author of the *ST* had his own unique style and his work looks nothing like that of Leo.

The difference in style was the main reason that led Vári to argue that the author of the *ST* was Alexander, the brother of Leo VI.[267] This theory, however, was never accepted by scholars and it does not solve a number of other important issues, namely that Alexander was a contemporary of Leo VI and such a difference and evolution in tactics between the two manuals cannot be explained. Another theory argues that the *ST* was compiled c. 950. This would imply that Constantine VII was responsible for its commission. At first sight this attribution is very attractive; Constantine had definitely shown an interest in the compilation of new treatises or in the copying of older ones, either classical or Byzantine. For instance, he was responsible for the *DAI*, the *DC*, the three treatises on imperial military expeditions, and he also seems to have been behind the production of the *Laurentianus Plut*. 55.4, a manuscript which contains a number of military treatises, such as the works of Aelian, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, the *MS*, the *Hypothesis*, the *PS,* and *LT*.[268]

Those who accept this attribution have turned to codicological grounds, but we have already seen that this theory is not valid because the *ST* first belonged to a codex with the military laws of the *Poinalios Stratiotikos Nomos* and a military hymn called the *Akolouthia,* which both seem to have

[265] McGeer 1995: 184-8; Haldon 2014: 67-8.
[266] Vári 1927: 266; Dain 1938: 6–8; Dain and Foucault 1967: 357; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxi; Haldon 2014: 67.
[267] Vári 1927: 268-70.
[268] Irigoin 1959: 178-81; Dain and Foucault 1967: 382-5.

been contemporary with the reign of Leo VI, and had nothing to do with Constantine VII. Since the manuscript tradition does not support this connection, we are compelled to turn to a comparative reading of works which are connected with Constantine VII in order to determine whether their style or their general characteristics match those of the *ST*. This, however, can be very problematic because works such as the *DC*, the *DAI*, the *Vita Basilii*, the *De Thematibus* and the *Geoponika* are themselves very different and belong to different genres or sub-genres. What is more, the extent to which Constantine VII was actually involved in the writing procedure, or what exactly his supervision and his relationship with his team and ghost authors involved, is also unclear.[269]

It is probably because of these problems that some common characteristics which appear both in the *ST* and in works connected with Constantine VII cannot provide us with conclusive evidence. For these similarities appear to be more generic and cannot be attributed solely to Constantine VII. One such common characteristic is references to Solomon. The *ST* records that if the general 'does not boast the wisdom and judgment of Solomon (...) he will not be able to accomplish anything beneficial'.[270] Solomon also plays an important role in the works of Constantine VII.[271] For example, in the three treatises of imperial military expeditions, Constantine introduces himself as Solomon to his son Romanos II, while in the *DC* his throne is called the throne of Solomon.[272] But this symbolism cannot explicitly link to Constantine VII as it was a more general phenomenon in the Byzantine world. Other members of the Macedonian dynasty, such as Leo VI, were also compared to Solomon, and, to make matters worse, the name of Solomon also features in an oration which celebrates Romanos I's peace treaty with the Bulgarians, in 927, as well as in Romanos I's imperial correspondence with Symeon I.[273]

Another characteristic of the known works of Constantine VII is etymological comments which are given usually with the words 'in the Roman language'.[274] Sometimes the author of the *ST* does provide

[269] This subject is controversial and complicated. Different styles are noted in different works, and sometimes in different chapters of the same work. Some studies that treat this topic are: Moravcsik 1938: 514-20; Lemerle 1971: 276-7; Haldon 1990: 70-5; Ševčenko 1992: 182-94; Tanner 1997: 128-30; Anagnostakis 1999: 97-123; Featherstone 2012: 123-35; Mango 2011: 3-13. Koutava-Delivoria 2002: 365-80, has argued that the contribution of Constantine VII in the *Geoponika* is perhaps underestimated.

[270] *ST,* 1.24 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

[271] Haldon 1990: 178-9; Huxley 1980: 37-40.

[272] Constantine VII, *Three Treatises,* C.8-10; *DC*, 510.20, 566.13.

[273] Daphnopats, 61; Dujčev 1978: 237, 265, 281, 290-1, 294; Jenkins 1966: 297-8; Stavridou-Zafraka 1976: 368, 376, 389; Magdalino 1987: 58; 2013: 196-7; Dagron 1984: 268-9; Tougher 1994: 171-9; 1997: 126-8; Shepard 2003: 341-44; Anagnostakis 2008: 45-60.

[274] Κατὰ Ῥωμαίων διάλεκτον / τῇ Ῥωμαίων διαλέκτῳ. See for example: Constantine VII, *De Thematibus,* 1.11.1-8, 1.6.1-4; *Geoponika,* 1.5.3; *DAI,* 29.216-7, 271-2; *DC,* 413.4-9; Koutava-Delivoria 1991: 281-332; 2002: 372.

us with alternative terms using a similar phrasing. For example, we read that 'at this time the *skopoi* as the Greeks call them, or the so-called *viglai* in the Roman language, should also be dispatched' or that 'the depth or thickness of each *tagma*, which is also called *kontoubernion* in the Roman language, comprises of sixteen ranks'.[275] Once again, however, these are found in Byzantine treatises in general, and in a very similar fashion as it is the case in *LT,* where we read that 'those before us, the more recent tactical writers, called [the exhorters] by the Latin term *cantatores*' and that 'the army will proceed more safely along the road (...) if you reconnoitre the paths that lie ahead of you by sending out a few men who are called *minsoratores* and *antikersores* in the Roman tongue'.[276]

Another passage which seems to provide similar evidence for Constantine VII's authorship is the aforementioned comment of our author in chapter 59.3. After presenting material which originally derives from Julius Africanus on how to deal with the enemy using disease and poison, the author comments that these are 'unworthy even to be said in a Christian context' explaining that these details were added to the *ST* as a precaution for Byzantine generals. Comments of the same kind can be spotted in the *De Thematibus* and the *Geoponika* after passages from works of antiquity are cited, for instance,

> So much for what the ancient sources say. I think that some of these methods are quite improper and to be avoided; I advise readers not to trust them completely. I copied them so as not to be thought to have omitted anything said by the ancient sources.[277]

> The so-called Aegean Sea is also considered a *thema*. According to those who make commentaries on Homer, it obtained its name from Aegeus the son of Poseidon. But Greek history is not serviceable now, for it is full of fallacies.[278]

These comments, however, are a general characteristic of Byzantine authors and of the way they used and admired the classical tradition without fully accepting it, since it reflected a pagan culture.[279] To demonstrate that with another tenth-century example, after Leo the Deacon described Aristotle's theory of how earthquakes occur, he then commented that 'the foolish babbling of the Greeks has

---

[275] *ST*, 44.4 and 45.11: Συνεκμπέμπειν δὲ ἄρα τηνικάδε δεῖ καὶ τοὺς σκοποὺς μὲν καθ' Ἕλληνας, ῥωμαϊστὶ δὲ βίγλας ὀνομαζομένους. Τὸ μὲν οὖν βάθος ἢ πάχος ἐνταῦθα ἑκάστου τάγματος, ὅ δὴ καὶ κουντουβέρνιον ῥωμαϊστὶ λέγεται, ἐξ ὀρδίνων συνέστι δεκέξ. [Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]. See also 40.7, 55.1, 55.4.

[276] *LT,* 4.7 and 20.174: οὕς οἱ πρὸ ἡμῶν, νεώτεροι δὲ τῶν ἄλλων, τακτικοὶ Ῥωμαϊστὶ καντάτωρες ἐκάλουν; διὰ τῶν καλουμένων τῇ ῥωμαΐᾳ γλώσσῃ μινσωτατώρων καὶ ἀντικησώρων (trans. Dennis, p. 51, 597).

[277] *Geoponika*, 1.14.11 (trans. Dalby, p. 68); Koutava-Delivoria 2002: 368-9.

[278] Constantine VII, *De Thematibus*, 1.17.1-4.

[279] Kaldellis 2007: 13-188.

explained these things the way they want it; but I would go along with the holy David and say that it through the agency of God that such quakes happen to us'.[280]

The final putative link to Constantine VII can be seen in the use of the phrase of 'Ἰστέον ὅτι', which is found numerous times in works which he was involved with, notably the three treatises on imperial military expeditions, the *DAI* and the *DC*.[281] In the *ST* we most probably find its abbreviated form when various chapter headings begin with the word 'ὅτι'; for instance, 'Ὅτι τὰ ὑπεσχημένα τοῖς προδόταις ἀπαράθραυστα χρὴ τηρεῖν' or 'Ὅτι δεῖ κρύπτειν ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ τὰς ἰδίας συμφοράς'.[282] Despite the fact that some scholars regard this phrase as a characteristic of a Constantinian involvement, this is by no means conclusive.[283] The phrase also appears in works that have nothing to do with him. Among them are a small treatise on siege warfare called *Mémorandum* and the manual of harmonics of Nicomachus the Pythagorean (c. 100 AD).[284]

In themselves these features do not seem to provide enough evidence, either to accept, or to discard Constantine VII as the commissioner of the *ST*. However, more conclusive evidence can be found in the way in which the Macedonian dynasty highlighted its legitimacy. Denoting, imperial legitimacy and dynastic continuity through literary works was a characteristic of the Macedonian dynasty already from the late ninth century, and this was also practised by Constantine VII.[285] For example, Leo VI refers twice to his father, Basil I, in *LT*, and similarly, Constantine VII does so in the *De Thematibus, DAI,* and *DC*.[286] Accordingly, Constantine also mentioned his father, Leo VI, quite frequently in his works.[287]

In contrast, such references are completely absent from the *ST*. There is no reference to Leo VI and Basil I. What is even more puzzling though, is that the author of the *ST* seems to have deliberately decided not to include any reference to previous Macedonian emperors, even though he most probably came across them in his sources. For instance, although *LT* describes how Basil I successfully conducted and supervised a river crossing with his army, the author of the *ST* did not include this

[280] LD, 68 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 118).
[281] For example: Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, C420; *DAI,* 15.1, 21.3; *DC,* 520.12, 522.15; *Geoponika,* 14.7.28. Bury 1906: 538-9; 1907: 223-4; Haldon 1990: 42-3; Sullivan 2003: 145; Moffatt and Tall 2012: xxxii.
[282] *ST,* 13, 93; Sullivan 2003: 145.
[283] Bury 1906: 538-9; 1907: 223-6, 428, 438; Haldon 1990: 42-3; Németh 2010: 266-8; Moffatt and Tall 2012: xxxii.
[284] *Mémorandum*, 1-4, 6-30, 32; Nicomachus, 1, 3, 4-5; *Suda*, π.323.13, 1941.17; Symeon Magister, 50.11, Leo, *Novels,* 7.8, 8.11, 10.38; Dain 1940: 136; 1967: 366-7; Sullivan 2003: 140-5.
[285] Holmes 2010: 64-8; Magdalino 2013: 194-5, 201-9; Markopoulos 1994: 160-7.
[286] *LT*, 9.14, 18.95; *DAI,* 30.128, 50.225; *DC*, 485.20; Constantine VII, *De thematibus,* 1.10.11, 11.21, 2.11.34.
[287] See for instance: Constantine VII, *De Thematibus,* 1.9. *DAI,* 32.78, 40.8; 50.101 43.19, *DC*, 410-1, 514.19, 702.

anecdote regardless of the fact that chapter 49.5 discusses exactly the same material and otherwise has many parallels with the relevant paragraphs found in *LT*.[288] This practice was by no means unprecedented; Nikephoros Ouranos, who is generally considered less creative with the treatment of his sources, did not include the name of Basil I in his treatise, even though he copied the respective passage from *LT*.[289] Given that there was most probably no such thing as the *Tactica Perdita*, and that *LT* was most probably a direct source for the author of the *ST*, it seems rather odd for Constantine VII to have avoided such a reference to the founder of his dynasty, and even more so, when we bear in mind that Constantine played an important part in the compilation of the *Vita Basilii*, the laudatory biography of Basil I.[290]

The above facts strongly imply that there was no dynastic connection between the emperor who commissioned the *ST* and Basil I, something which would exclude all the members of the Macedonian dynasty such as Constantine VII and Romanos II from being candidates for the authorship of the *ST*. Consequently, the strongest candidate to fit the profile of such an emperor is Romanos I. We have already discussed how the internal information of the *ST* fits well into the military and administrative milieu of his reign. But in addition to this, an attribution to him is the best way to explain the lack of reference to Basil I, which was actually more of a necessity. Romanos I was a usurper, although he initially promised to give the throne back to Constantine VII when he was of age, he marginalised him for decades and finally gave precedence in the succession to his own son, Christopher. In this light, Romanos I would have been more than keen to avoid any dynastic memoranda, linking back to Basil I, Leo VI and Constantine VII.[291] In addition, Romanos' commission may explain the quite independent style of the *ST,* which, as a whole, is not reminiscent of any other known manual. Now that the issue of authorship has been clarified, it is time to turn into the issue of attribution and attempt to determine why the title of the treatise features the name of Leo VI instead of that of Romanos I.

[288] See *ST* with *LT*, 9.12-8 and *MS,* 1.9.

[289] Dain 1937: 46, 55.

[290] For the debate on the degree of Constantine's involvement in the work see the studies of: Moravcsik 1938: 519-20; Lemerle 1971: 274-5; Toynbee 1973: 582-6; Huxley 1980: 30-1; Ševčenko 1992: 184-6; Anagnostakis 1999: 101-9; Kazhdan 2006: 137-44; Mango 2011: 3-13.

[291] TC*,* 414; Skylitzes, 213, 216; Symeon Magister, 136.38, 50; Runciman 1929: 66-7; Toynbee: 1973:9-10. For numismatic evidence see Grierson 1973: 526-40

The attribution of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

Undoubtedly the false attribution of the *ST* has created much confusion and it is perhaps one of the main reasons why this manual has been viewed in a negative light, as a slavish compilation, or even as a forgery. We could perhaps assume that the attribution is a later mistake. It could belong to the long tradition of *pseudo*. The attribution might have been an unsuccessful attempt of a scribe to identify the work which he was working on, which was perhaps copied from a manuscript that had a missing title. It could be that a scribe was confused by the similar material between the two treatises and thought he was indeed copying *LT*.[292] If the attribution was a mistake, however, it would suffice to have the name of Leo VI, as in the *Taktika*, not such a precise date along with it. It is very unfortunate that we do not have another group of manuscripts to make matters clearer; all we know for sure is that the *ST* in L was already attributed to Leo VI sometime in the fourteenth century. But now that the problem of authorship and sources has been discussed in detail, we can speculate about this attribution and put it in the context of tenth-century dynastic rivalry.

To begin with, it is almost certain that the title and attribution of the *ST* was a later addition. That does not only come from our previous discussion on the dating and authorship of the work, but also from the very title itself. The tile of the *ST* refers to Leo VI as 'αὐτοκράτωρ' and bears the date 6412 [903/904]. It has been noticed by scholars that before 904 the standard title that Leo VI and other emperors preferred and employed in documents was that of 'βασιλεύς'. It is only from an inscription dating in 904 and thereafter that we find Leo VI recorded as an αὐτοκράτωρ, probably in attempt to distinguish himself from his brother and junior emperor Alexander.[293] This could, therefore, make the *ST* the earliest witness to this change, not to mention that 903/4 would make the compilation of the *ST* earlier than, or contemporary with *LT,* something which is very improbable at best.

The fact that the title was added later and with such an unusual precise date seems to suggest that somebody deliberately wanted to associate the *ST* with *LT*. The *ST* seems to have been written in a time when the struggle for succession between Constantine VII, the legitimate heir of Leo VI, and the usurper Romanos I was still not concluded. Constantine VII was forced to suffer every humiliation in silence and therefore had every reason to hate Romanos I. The usurper had pushed him to the background for twenty-two years and expelled his mother and teacher from the palace. He had also allied with Nicolas Mystikos, the patriarch who had condemned Leo's wedding with his fourth wife

[292] Dain 1937: 53.

[293] Spierser 1973: 162; Schminck 1986: 92-4; Haldon 2014: 59-60; C.f. van Bochove 1996: 44-5 for one of the exceptions in Leo's first novel, where both titles appear.

Zoe, the mother of Constantine.[294] Consequently it is very likely that Constantine VII or his circle changed the attribution of the manual to practise political propaganda. It is indeed a very possible explanation that the attribution of the *ST* is nothing but a *damnatio memoriae* of the name of Romanos I.[295]

Such an action is by no means unprecedented in the case of Constantine VII. Constantine had taken similar measures against this uncle, Alexander. When Alexander took the throne in 912 he wanted to make sure that he would be unopposed, and so, he first attempted to eliminate Constantine as a potential threat by ordering his castration, something which in the end did not take place.[296] After Alexander's death, however, Constantine VII decided to inflict a *damnatio memoriae* of the name of Alexander. In constitution twenty of *LT* an acrostic is formed, which originally recorded the names of both Leo VI and Alexander. Constantine intervened to the text and by making some slight changes in the first words of specific paragraphs he corrupted the acrostic only where the name of Alexander originally appeared.[297] Similarly, Constantine VII also intervened in a funeral poem dedicated to Leo VI, in which he revised the part that originally referred to Alexander as 'ὁ τῆς πορφύρας ἥλιος'.[298]

If Constantine VII was so hostile to the memory of a member of his own dynasty, there was no reason to treat Romanos' memory any better. Indeed, the shift of Constantine's attitude towards Romanos is well reflected in his works. In the first half of the *De Thematibus,* which was probably written while Romanos I was still on the throne,[299] we read that 'Romanos the ruler, the good and valiant emperor, rendered it [Seleucia] into a *thema,* and added width, length and greatness to Roman authority'.[300] However, the favourable tone disappeared after Constantine VII became the sole emperor in 945. Consequently, in the *DAI* and the *DC* the treatment of Romanos I is all but flattering:

> The lord Romanos, the emperor, was a common, illiterate fellow, and not from among those who have been bred up in the palace, and have followed the Roman national customs from the beginning; nor was he of imperial and noble stock (...) he was too arrogant and despotic (...) but

[294] Symeon Magister, 136.9-13; TC*,* 397-8; Runciman 1929: 61, 65; Toynbee 1973: 9-14.
[295] For some remarks on the Byzantine method of *damnatio memoriae* see: Vatchkova 2011: 164-6.
[296] Symeon Magister, 133.4; *DAI,* 50.196-200; Karlin-Hayter 1969: 585-96; Ševčenko 1969-1970: 222-6; Grosdidier de Matons 1973: 241-2.
[297] Grosdidier de Matons 1973: 232-40; Haldon 2014: 418-9; c.f. Schminck 1986: 97, n. 271.
[298] Ševčenko 1969-1970: 202, 205-10; Grosdidier de Matons 1973: 241-2; Tsamakda 2002: 25-8.
[299] Ostrogorsky 1953: 38; Huxley 1980: 31-32; for a presentation of the different arguments on dating see Lemerle 1971: 279-80.
[300] Constantine VII, *De Thematibus*, 1.13, 2.6.

> out of a temper arrogant and self-willed and untaught in virtue and refusing to follow what was right and good.[301]
>
> Note that his ceremonial for the Broumalia was changed and it reached the point of ceasing to exist in the reign of the ruler Romanos since, on the pretext of piety and thinking that it was not right for the Romans to observe the Broumalion (...) he ordered that these ceremonies cease. He did not bear in mind those great and famous emperors of the past (...) but whatever he thought right was deemed law and canon and righteousness and piety.[302]

Romanos I, was not only criticised in the works of Constantine VII, but also in that of others which seem to have been commissioned by men of his circle. The *Life of St. Basil the Younger* was written sometime in, or after the sole reign of Constantine VII.[303] Two of the proposed patrons of this text are men which enjoyed much favour in the court of Constantine.[304] The first, Basil Lekapenos the Nothos, was an illegitimate son of Romanos I. He was probably castrated at an early age by Romanos I and, therefore, chose to cooperate with Constantine VII. He supported Constantine's accession to the throne and earned a much esteemed position in his court holding the title of *parakoimomenos*. Together with John Tzimiskes, he was also entrusted with a Byzantine army to fight against the Arabs in 958, and was a great patron of the arts and commissioner of manuscripts.[305] The second were the Gongylioi brothers, who are described very favourably in the text and were said to be regularly visited by St. Basil the Younger himself. One of them, Constantine Gongylios held the title of *patrikios* and was put in charge of the expedition against the Arabs of Crete in 949.[306]

Whoever the commissioner of the *Life of St. Basil the Younger* was, he also had Romanos I described unfavourably. The latter is reported as 'an avaricious womanizer and a corruptor of the citizen's daughters', despite the fact he only had one known bastard son, Basil Lekapenos, who was born after the death of his wife.[307] The negative image of Romanos in the text should not be underestimated, since there is good evidence to support that the *Life of St. Basil the Younger* did not only aim at a narrow audience of followers or monks, but at the broader public. Gregory, the author of the text, lived

---

[301] *DAI*, 13.149-57 (trans. Jenkins, p. 73-5). See also Holmes 2010: 65, n.58.
[302] *DC*, 606 (trans. Moffatt and Tall, p. 606)
[303] Sullivan et al: 2014: 7-11.
[304] Sullivan et al: 2014: 11; Magdalino 1999: 108-11; cf. Angelidi 2013: 25-6.
[305] Ross 1958: 271-5; Brokkaar 1972: 199-217; Angelidi 2013: 11-26; Mazzucchi 1978: 267-31; c.f. Skylitzes, 288 who reports that it was Constantine VII who castrated Basil Lekapenos.
[306] Skylitzes, 245-6; LD, 7.
[307] *Basil Younger*, 1.29.15-21 (trans. Sullivan et al. 2014); Grégoire and Orgels 1954: 153-4; Kazhdan 2006: 186-7 and Sullivan et al 2014: 29 argue that the text is clearly biased against the Lekapenoi. Cf. Angelidi 1980: 170-1 who does not accept that there is such clear hostility. For Romanos and his morality see: Runciman 1929: 244.

in the capital and had close relations with elite families in Constantinople. Furthermore, the story itself takes place in Constantinople, addresses famous people, and provides universal messages of piety and apocalyptic visions which would have been appreciated by a wider audience, especially the urban population. Finally, the large number of manuscripts which preserve the work seem to agree with the idea that the text was a popular reading.[308]

The hostility, however, was not only confined to Romanos I, but it was also extended to his closest associates who were also, of course, rivals of Constantine VII and the Macedonian dynasty. John Kourkouas was unsurprisingly also affected by similar hostility to his name. Being one of the most loyal supporters of Romanos I, he suppressed two plots against the throne and remained in his post as the leader of the Byzantine army for almost the whole reign of Romanos. John had every qualification to be a very strong political opponent; he was very well educated, came from a rich family and was also a very successful commander who had acquired enormous fame from his successful campaigns against the Arabs. His contemporaries compared him to Trajan and Belisarius, while a work now lost was dedicated to him and to his military campaigns.[309]

John Kourkouas and his family seems to have been treated considerably harshly after his dismissal and the fall of Romanos I. As soon as Stephen and Constantine Lekapenos were exiled from the palace and Constantine VII became sole emperor, the properties of the family were plundered.[310] Other figures who served Romanos I in influential positions, seem to have been treated more leniently. For example, Pantherios, who succeeded John Kourkouas in his post, does not seem to have received such harsh treatment, even though he was most probably a member of the Skleroi family who also cooperated with Romanos I.[311]

This discrepancy might be because the Kourkouai had a long-lasting rivalry with the Macedonian dynasty which dates back to the coup of John's grandfather's against Basil I. The coup seems to have been very well organized and dangerous since 66 *archontes* and members of the senate also participated in it. However, this was not how Constantine VII wanted the events to be remembered. In the *Vita Basilii* he deliberately compressed and downgraded the coup merely referring to it as 'one

[308] Da Costa-Louillet 1954: 492-5; Angelidi 1980: στ, 86-91, 170-3; Kazhdan 2006: 186; Flusin 2001: 41-54; Sullivan et al 2014: 19-24.
[309] Symeon Magister, 136.10, 26, 76; TC, 397, 404, 426-7; Skylitzes, 211-2, 217, 230; Guilland 1950: 29-31; Andriollo 2012: 58-65; Howard-Johnston 1995: 87-8. For this lost work and the new trends in tenth-century Byzantine historiography see Markopoulos 2006: 397-405; 2009: 697-715
[310] TC, 441.
[311] Cheynet 1986b: 146-7; Grégoire and Orgels 1954: 154.

going by the name of Kourkouas, overcame by the lust of tyranny [..] gathered a band of like-minded plotters and waited for the opportune occasion'.[312]

However, the patron of the *Life of St. Basil the Younger* took the hostility to the next level. With reference to the Russian attack of 941 against Byzantium, the text records that those who defeated the Rus were Bardas Phokas, Pantherios and Spongarios.[313] This is of course contradicted by all our other surviving sources who state that the figures responsible for defeating the enemy were John Kourkouas, Theophanes and Bardas Phokas.[314] It is evident that the patron of the work applied a *damnatio memoriae* of the name of John Kourkouas and Theophanes, leaving intact only the name of Bardas Phokas, who came from a family hostile to the Lekapenoi, who supported Constantine VII, and who served as *domestikos* of the *scholai* during his sole reign.[315]

The same pattern is also observed for other close associates of Romanos I. For instance, Theophanes, a *patrikios* and *parakoimomenos* of Romanos I, who originally commanded the Byzantine fleet in 941 and who revolted against Constantine VII in a failed attempt to restore the Lekapenoi to the throne, saw his name replaced with that of Theodore Spongarios in the *Life of St. Basil the Younger*'s account of the Russian attack. Theodore Spongarios is either identified as the military saint Theodore, or as a military official and *strategos* of the *thema* of Thrakesion.[316] The *Life of St. Basil the Younger* is also biased against Nicolas Mystikos, a close associate of Romanos I who was reluctant to approve the fourth marriage of Leo VI the one which resulted in the birth of Constantine VII. Nicolas is recorded as having invited Constantine Doukas to share the crown with Constantine VII, but later as having betrayed him, and as refusing him entrance to the palace, which eventually resulted in his death. Therefore, the author of the text describes Nicolas as having failed in his post and as worthy of condemnation by God for his actions.[317]

---

[312] Symeon Magister, 132.26; Leo Grammarian, 261; *VB,* 45 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 161); Guilland 1950: 30; Andriollo 2012: 58-9; Vlysidou 1985: 53-8.

[313] *Basil Younger,* 3.23-27; Grégoire 1938: 292-3; Angelidi 1980: 161; Sullivan et al 2014: 29-30

[314] Symeon Magister, 136.71-5; TC*,* 423-5; Skylitzes, 229.

[315] Grégoire 1938: 293-9; Grégoire and Orgels 1954: 154; Mango 1982: 306; Sullivan et al 2014: 29-30; c.f. Angelidi 1980: 155-6, who argues that perhaps the name of Pantherios appears because he was in command the time St. Basil the Younger died, which coincides with the time that our author had perhaps started to draft his work. For St. Theodore, and his hagiographical tradition see: Haldon 2016: 1-19.

[316] TC*,* 422-3, 430-1, 440; Skylitzes, 238-9. Grégoire 1938: 299; Angelidi 1980: 161 and Grégoire and Orgels 1954: 153, argue that the role of Theophanes concluding the peace with the Hungarians is deliberately silenced in the *Life of St. Basil the Younger.*

[317] *Basil Younger*, 1.14-20. Gregory also shows a negative attitude towards the patriarch, and son of Romanos I Theophylaktos, openly criticizing him (although Theophylaktos kept his post during the sole reign of Constantine VII). On the other hand, he is well disposed towards the Doukas family. He refers to Constantine Doukas as a martyr and states that he did not revolt, but came to the capital after being invited by Nikolas to share the crown with Porphyrogennetos. The

Under such circumstances, it is very probable that the attribution of the *ST* to Leo VI is, in fact, a *damnatio memoriae* aimed at Romanos I. Constantine VII was at first in a very weak position when he reached the throne in 945. Faced by rebellions, and given his military and administrative inexperience, he turned to the exercise of political propaganda through literature, in which he found a very effective way of highlighting his legitimacy and authority in matters of the state. This he did not only by erasing and staining the names of his political opponents as was the case for Alexander and Romanos I in *LT* and *DAI*, but also by linking his name and that of his predecessors with the creation or preservation of handbooks related with the state and the army.[318] It is, therefore, most likely that Constantine VII and perhaps Basil Lekapenos, changed the attribution of the *ST* to cover up the name of their political opponent in order to deprive him of such an authority, preferring to replace it with that of Leo VI. Both men were anyway hostile to Romanos I and his associates. Moreover, they had both shown an interest in military treatises, new and old, as the manuscripts *Laurentianus Plut*. 55.4 and *Ambrosianus B*. 119 Sup. demonstrate, and they both practised political propaganda and *damnatio memoriae* through literary works. Constantine VII, did so through the *DAI*, *DC,* the acrostic of *LT* and the funerary poem of Leo VI. Basil Lekapenos worked through the *Life of St. Basil the Younger* and perhaps also through the history of Theophanes Continuatus as he has been credited for writing part of book VI and for its anti-Romanos I remarks.[319]

The dominance of the Macedonian dynasty in the years to come meant that this sleight of hand could go unchallenged. The Lekapenoi did not play a prominent role in Byzantine history after they were dethroned, and their only member who was active the next decades, Basil Lekapenos, was a sworn enemy of Romanos' dynasty. Similarly, after the Kourkouai failed to dethrone Basil I, they seem to have never acquired any important office while a member of the Macedonian dynasty was on the throne. They were in disfavour until Romanos I came to power, and despite the fact that Theophanes Continuatus records that Constantine VII was willing to restore John Kourkouas' property and that he also entrusted him with the task of conducting one of the customary exchanges of prisoners between

Doukas family disappears after Nikolaos Doukas from the sources which seem to point that it was pushed to the background and did not possess any high-ranking offices during the reign of Romanos. The only clear hostility at the time of Romanos I is reported from a certain Basil who revolted in 932 claiming to be Constantine Doukas which shows that the family was still popular and a potential threat. The family reappear during the reign of Basil II. Grégoire 1938: 297; Grégoire and Orgels 1954: 148-50, 153-4; Da Costa-Louillet 1954: 495-6; Polemis 1968: 21-6; Angelidi 1980: 90, 117, 133-4, 137-9, 165; Rydén 1983: 572.

[318] Holmes 2010: 64-8; Magdalino 2013: 194-5. 201-9.

[319] Irigoin 1959: 178-81; Dain and Foucault 1967: 382-5; Mazzucchi 1978: 267-316; Featherstone 2011: 115-23; 2012: 134; 2014: 353-72.

the Byzantines and the Arabs, it is no coincidence that the Kourkouai would only hold important posts again in the reign of Nikephoros II Phokas.[320]

The fact that Constantine VII and/or Basil Lekapenos seem to have been responsible for changing the attribution of the *ST* raises the question whether they were also responsible for intervening in other parts of the text as well. This becomes more pressing when we take into account that the inconsistent cross-references of the *ST* strongly imply that the material of the manual was revised by some later redactor.

The redactors and the revision of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

It goes without saying that the relatively late date of L, and the fact that only one recension survives, present a huge obstacle in identifying the original or other versions of the *ST*. Consequently, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to prove for certain when or to what extent our manual was revised. However, based on what is known for Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos as redactors, we might be able to provide some speculations about the degree of their intervention in the *ST* by comparing the method they followed in other works.

As we have seen above, the inaccurate cross-references in the *ST* point towards a later revision of the material rather than a slavish copying from lost sources, because all the information do, in fact, exist in the text, but in the wrong order. It is impossible to reconstruct how the original material might have looked like. The table of contents can be of little help here since it was added later and preserves the order of the chapters after the revision took place. The *pinax*, however, implies that this revision occurred at some point between the compilation of the original version of the *ST* and before, or at the time, that somebody included the manual as the first work of a codex which also contained the *Poinalios Stratiotikos Nomos* and the *Akolouthia*. Judging from the inaccurate cross-references and where the correct material is indeed found in the text, we may speculate that originally, chapter 35 was chapter 17, chapter 44 was chapter 20, chapter 23 must have been chapter 33, and probably chapter 38 was before the current chapter 22. This seems to tell us very little of how the original treatise might have looked like though, except for the fact that some of the material was somehow re-ordered and that the redactor did not return to correct these inconsistencies.

[320] TC, 441-3; Vlysidou 1985: 56; Andriollo 2012: 66-75.

This careless re-ordering of material of an existing military treatise was something also probably practised by Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos who intervened in previous versions of *LT*. The version of *LT* found in the *Laurentianus Plut*. 55.4 has three constitutions extracted from the main body of the work, while the *Ambrosianus B* 119 Sup. has one constitution extracted. Although the remaining constitutions in both manuscripts were re-numbered, internal cross-references and the prologue of the treatise which refers to the contents of all twenty constitutions were not been revised to reflect these changes.[321] The constitutions of *LT* which were extracted by Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos in both manuscripts were given new independent headings. Apart from this, however, and some light changes to the text, especially in constitution 20, where the acrostic was corrupted, the redactors do not seem to have intervened greatly with the contents of the work. Most of the treatise seems to be as Leo VI intended it.[322]

This method of re-ordering the material, of giving new chapter headings and of lightly intervening in the main text may be helpful in recognizing similar patterns in the redaction of the *ST*. We have already seen that the redactors were most probably responsible for changing the attribution of the *ST* for political reasons, and in this light it is probable that they also made some light revisions to the text to the same end. This could mean that in chapter 53.8, where we read that siege-towers should be countered with liquid-fire shot through hand-siphons, the part that states 'the very thing which our Majesty presently invented' could have been a later revision, since *LT* 19.64 credits Leo VI for this invention. A comment such as this seems to be against the method of our author, who, as we have seen, seems to have directly copied something only in insignificant cases, in which the meaning or current state of affairs seem to be uninfluenced by such an imitation. Furthermore, Romanos I would have been keen to avoid any reference to the Macedonian dynasty and there is no other to be found in the text. On the contrary, this comment served the end of the redactors since it indirectly enhanced the attribution of the text to Leo VI.

As far as intervention in chapter headings is concerned, the re-ordering of the material must have created the need for fewer or more chapters and thus for new headings. We have already seen that some chapter headings in the *ST* demonstrate a characteristic which often appears in works that Constantine VII was involved with. Out of the 102 chapter headings of the manual, thirty-five begin with ''Ότι' and another nine include it as part of the heading. What is more interesting, however, is that this phrase never appears in the main text, only in the chapter headings. The only exception being,

[321] Haldon 2014: 55-66; Dennis 2014: ix-xi; Németh 2010: 30, 95-101; Tougher 1997: 168-9; Dain and Foucault 1967: 355-7; Mazzucchi 1978: 280-5.
[322] Haldon 2014: 56; Grosdidier de Matons 1973: 229-31.

chapter 3.4, where we read that 'Ὅτι ἡ σχοῖνος ἑλληνικόν ἐστι μέτρον ταὐτὸ τῷ παρασάγγῃ'. It seems possible, therefore, that this was not the preferred style of the original author. It may well be that these parts which have 'ὅτι' in them namely, chapter 3, or at least part of it, as well as the aforementioned headings, were a product of Constantine's or Basil's involvement, for Basil also preferred the use of ὅτι, as his version of the *Hypothesis* seem to demonstrate.[323]

Similarly, the fact that an independent title appears in the *ST* after chapter 75 could mean that this section could have had a separate existence and that it was later added to the *ST* by the redactors. This second title reads 'Στρατηγικαὶ παρανέσεις ἐκ πράξεων καὶ στρατηγημάτων παλαιῶν Ῥωμαίων τε και Ἑλλήνων καὶ λοιπῶν ἐν κεφαλαίοις κή' and introduces us to the last part of the manual that preserves anecdotes from commanders of antiquity which originally derive from Polyaenus. The author seems to ignore this section in his introduction because while he states that he will first 'recall the armament and formations of former ages' and then he will 'place greater emphasis on those which are contemporary', he only partly does so.[324] Indeed the treatment of Ancient Greek armament and deployment comes before the contemporary Byzantine one, but chapters 76 to 102, which are filled with ancient stratagems appear after the contemporary material.

The fact that these stratagems are an abbreviation of Polyaenus, could also mean, although not conclusively, that they were added by Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos. In his treatise on imperial military expeditions, Constantine VII suggests that the book of Polyaenus was among the best to accompany the emperor during a campaign, while we have already seen that the *Hypothesis* was among the works included into the *Laurentianus Plut*. 55.4.[325] Basil Lekapenos also included a version of the *Hypothesis*, although different, in the *Ambrosianus B* 119 *Sup*. better known as *Stratagemata Ambrosiana*. Their aim could have been to make the content of the treatise more effective by providing the general with classical exemplars deriving from an author they highly thought of. In fact, some of the exempla are very relevant to themes discussed in the first 55 chapters. For instance, chapter 100 refers to anecdotes regarding moderate punishments of soldiers, a topic which is discussed in chapter 17. Chapter 88 provides ancient examples of generals who personally acted in times of need, much as chapter 5 had already instructed the general to do so.

[323] See for example: *ST*, 82.1; *Stratagemata* 6.

[324] *ST*, 1.1: ἀναγκαῖον οἶμαι […] διαλαβεῖν τῶν τε κατὰ τοὺς ἄνω χρόνους καὶ ὁπλισμῶν ἐπιμνησθέντας καὶ παρατάξεων εἶτα μέντοι περὶ τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

[325] Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, C.196-199.

Apart from these, however, there seems to be another passage of the *ST* that does not belong to its author. In Dain's edition, after chapter 46 comes a *scholion* which is found in the beginning of the left lower margin of folio 94v and ends at the bottom margin of the same folio. The comment attempts to supplement the main material by drawing information from an ancient unspecified work which referred to the correct appointment of commanders for the right and left wing of the formation and explained which flank should take precedence during the crossing of defiles.[326] The fact that Dain included this comment in his edition seems to imply that he regarded it as an integral part of the treatise, but unfortunately he did not comment on its existence.

We cannot be sure when exactly the *scholion* was added to the text's tradition. It seems very unlikely to have belonged to the pen of the author though, since there is an obvious difference in style. In the comment, the commentator uses the phrase κίνησιν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων σωμάτων, and the word divided in σώμασιν to denote marching and drawing up in units respectively. However, throughout the manual our author uses the words τάγμα or τάξις to describe the various units; he never uses the word σώμα in such a context.

A possible candidate for the authorship of the *scholion* are the copyists of L. All the other notes found in the margins of the *ST* are very short though, save for this one, and those which comment on and fill the missing chapters 68-74. The vast majority of marginal notes act as markers, noting the subject treated in each paragraph of the main text, and none attempts to comment on the text, supplementing it with knowledge from other works.[327] Consequently, the size, type and style of this *scholion* does not seem to fit the pattern of how the copyists of L interacted with the text. It could be that the comment originally belonged to some other scribe or owner of a previous manuscript which directly or indirectly served as a prototype for L, but it is also possible that it belonged to the redactors.

The phrasing and type of the *scholion* brings to mind another tenth-century example, the marginal comments which appear in the *DC*. Some scholars have argued that in this comments we are more

[326] The comment reads: Ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν τακτικῶν δεῖ εἰδέναι ὡς ἀεὶ τὸ ἀριστερὸν πλείονα τὴν ἐκλογήν ἔχει τοῦ δεξιοῦ. Διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ ἡγεμὼν διαφορώτερος ὀφείλει εἶναι τοῦ ἑτέρου · ἐν στενοῖς δὲ καὶ δυσβάτοις τόποις ὁ τοῦ ἀριστεροῦ προηγεῖται, εἶτα ὁ τοῦ μέσου, καὶ τρίτος ὁ τοῦ δεξιοῦ. Προτιμᾶται δὲ διὰ τὰς ἐπελάσεις τοῦ δεξιοῦ τῶν πολεμίων τὰς κατ'αὐτοῦ. Εὐκινητότερα δὲ τὰ δεξιὰ τῶν ἀριστερῶν · προηγοῦνται δὲ ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς τόποις κατὰ κίνησιν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων σωμάτων, ὅτε διὰ στενῆς εἰσόδου διελθεῖν αὐτά πρόκειται ἀνάγκη · προτεθὲν δὲ ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἀριστερὸν μέρος πλάγιον διέρχεται πρὸ τοῦ δεξιοῦ μέρους, τὸ δὲ δεξιόν, ὡς εὐκινητότερον, καὶ συντόμως εἰς την προτέραν ἀποκαθίσταται τάξιν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἐν τάγμασιν ἔστιν ἰδεῖν παρακολουθοῦν.

[327] See for instance the marginal notes on folios 81r, 82, 85v, 86, 89, 91v, 92, 93, 94.

likely to see a more personal involvement of Constantine VII himself, especially in those which use the phrase 'χρή εἰδέναι'.[328] It may also have been, however, that Basil Lekapenos was somehow also responsible for them, since he most probably played an active part in the drafting and revision of the *DC*.[329] Whatever the case, the similar phrase 'δεῖ εἰδέναι' is found in the first sentence of the *scholion* of the *ST,* which is not only very close to 'χρή εἰδέναι', but also known to have been used interchangeably; for δεῖ usually replaced χρή when works were copied.[330] Furthermore, the commentator of the *ST* used the phrase Ἐκ τῶν παλαιῶν τακτικῶν to open his *scholion,* using information found in older tactical treatises to comment on the text. A similar practice, as well as phrasing can be spotted in one of the comments of the *DC,* which opens with the similar phrase 'Ἐξ ἑτέρου παλαιοῦ τακτικού', and also uses information from older treatises to comment on the main text.[331]

Consequently, it seems that the methods of revision undertaken by Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos in other tenth-century works have some similarities with the redaction of the *ST*. The redactors most probably changed the original attribution of the *ST,* which, judging from internal evidence, was written by an emperor who did not have a dynastic connection with the Macedonian dynasty, i.e. Romanos I. In addition, the redactors were probably responsible for light additions in the texts, which were designed further to connect the work with Leo VI, as well as, for the re-ordering of material and for inserting new titles. It is also possible that they added the last section of the *ST,* which preserves ancient stratagems, or it could be that these were originally scattered in the text and they decided to group them in a special section with its own title. Whatever the case the redaction of the *ST* has the same unfinished character as other works which were revised by Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos: its introduction does not seem to have been updated to correspond to the changes and there is a number of inconsistent cross-references in the text which were never edited after the re-organization of material. Last but not least, although title of the last section states that the stratagems will cover twenty-eight chapters, one of them is missing.

[328] Bury 1906: 538-9; 1907: 223-6, 428, 438; Haldon 1990: 42-3; Moffatt and Tall 2012: xxxii.
[329] Ševčenko 1992: 185-92; Featherstone 2004: 114-21; Brokkaar 1972: 218-9.
[330] *DC*, 197, 686; Codoňer 2014b: 61-92.
[331] Moffatt and Tall 2012: 161, n.3.

Chapter Five

Innovation in the *Sylloge Tacticorum* and its Place in Byzantine Warfare

As Hunger noticed, every high literary work in Byzantium which aimed at an educated reader imitated older models, both ancient and Byzantine.[332] This of course generally applies to military manuals, and therefore to the *ST* as well, but did that *mimesis* simply reproduce word for word or did it allow for innovations? This question however concerns a wider debate about whether originality or innovation were present in Byzantine literature. It was a characteristic trend of older Byzantine scholarship to treat Byzantine literature as a genre without any innovation, a literature which was stuck to ancient models and did not generally present the reality of its time.[333] Two characteristic examples are the views of Hunger and Cyril Mango. Hunger argued that 'the Byzantine Middle Ages cared very little for original genius' or with regard to military treatises and specialized literature that 'the Byzantines remained clung to ancient models'.[334] Mango stated that 'Byzantine literary works tend to be divorced from the realities of their own time, while remaining anchored in an ideal past' and that 'Byzantine literature is both a dim and a distorting mirror'.[335]

However, since then, a number of scholars, who focused their research on innovation in Byzantium and the relationship between the empire and the past, have managed to challenge this view. Alexander Kazhdan proved that innovation was present in almost every aspect of Byzantine life, like art, music and literature, while Anthony Cutler has demonstrated that despite the fact that originality was not an end itself in Byzantine society, it was by no means absent from it.[336] As regards literature itself, a number of scholars have concluded that despite the evident *mimesis*, innovation can be spotted in many literary genres, such as Historiography.[337]

---

[332] Hunger 1969-1970: 15-38; Moravcsik 1966: 366-77.
[333] Reinsch 2010b: 56-7; 2010: 23-6; Nilsson 2010: 195-8; Kazhdan 1995: 8-9.
[334] Hunger 1969-1970: 15; Hunger 1978: ii.324-5.
[335] Mango 1975: 16-8.
[336] Kazhdan 1995: 1-12; Cutler 1995: 203-14; For literary innovations in the eleventh and twelfth century see: Kazhdan and Epstein 1985: 83-6, 133-41.
[337] See Reinsch 2010b: 56-61, for an overview of tradition and innovation in Byzantine literature. See Scott 1981: 61-74, Runciman 1995: 59-66 and Spanos 2014: 44-5 for innovation in historiography. For a particular tenth-century example see: Kaldellis 2013: 35-52, on the literary innovations found in the lost source which recounts the campaign of Tzimiskes in 971.

This innovation can also be demonstrated in the study of inter-textual relationships between Byzantine Literature and its sources. There it is proven that Byzantine *mimesis* was not slavish and that innovation can be also spotted in terms of how the Byzantines paraphrased their sources in order to fit things into their own context and to become original through the concept of *anakainises* and *ananeoses*, resulting in creating, as Ingela Nilsson puts it, 'the same story, but another'.[338] It would suffice to provide some examples from tenth-century Historiography and Hagiography, to support the case. To begin with, although the concept of φθόνος appears in the ancient sources of the *Vita Basilii* and the History of Leo the Deacon, both authors use the word with a Byzantine meaning of 'the devil/envious fate', which differs from that of their sources. Therefore, both Byzantine writers adapted the word to their needs and did not include it merely to imitate their predecessors.[339] As far as Hagiography is concerned, although Niketas Magistros, the author of the *Vita* of St. Theoktiste of Lesbos, used the *Vita* of St. Mary of Egypt as a model, he largely revised and altered the narrative, creating new stories and manipulating the tradition.[340]

The kind of innovation that derives from revising and paraphrasing older models can also be spotted in the *ST.* As we have seen in chapter 2, the author of the *ST* was creative with the treatment of his sources and he usually adapted and paraphrased his models regardless of whether these were classical or earlier Byzantine ones. We will attempt to study and identify these innovations, as well as determine the place that the *ST* holds in relation to other tenth-century treatises in terms of evolution. The innovations in the *ST* can be grouped into five groups: the adaptation of Onasander; the adaptation of Polyaenus and Julius Africanus; the presentation of an updated mentality on warfare; new tactics and battle formations; and finally developments as regards technology and equipment.

Adapting and updating Onasander

One of the most notable adaptations undertaken by the author of the *ST* was to insert a number of comments and passages which are in accordance with a distinctly Christian character.[341] These passages appear as an addition to Onasander and serve to make his arguments more relevant to a

[338] Cutler 1995: 208-9; Nilsson 2010: 195, 207-8. Some case studies include originality in the comments of Photios and the *TNO,* see: Croke 2006: 59-70 and McGeer 1991:129-38. For other examples see the works of Reinsch 2010: 23-32 and Miller 1976: 385-95.
[339] Hinterberger 2010: 187-203.
[340] Nilsson 2010: 203-5.
[341] This was acknowledged in passing by Dain 1937: 44, but was never studied in detail.

Byzantine context. Most of these passages concern certain traits and actions that the ideal Byzantine general should have or use.

One such example is found in chapter 16 which advises the general to be careful in times of truce and not to drop his guard against the enemy. Onasander had originally argued that the general should 'suspect a breach of faith on the part of the enemy due to their hostility'.[342] In chapter 16.3, however, the author of the *ST* revised this statement, stating that 'from the side of the enemy dishonesty should be suspected because of barbarian morality'.[343] Consequently, distrust is connected with moral issues, which most probably derive from the fact that the main enemy of the Byzantines, the Arabs, were Muslims. The theme that the Muslims were not be trusted for long also appears in the contemporary imperial correspondence, written by Theodore Daphnopates on behalf of Romanos I.

Daphnopates was in a very esteemed position in the court of Romanos, serving as *protasekretes* and also bearing the title of *patrikios*.[344] In his letter, which was addressed to Symeon I and was probably composed around 925-927, Daphnopates tries to convince the Christian khan of the Bulgarians to make peace with Romanos, writing 'since you are a lover of the perfect and true religion, why not agree to peaceful and perpetual terms?' Daphnopates urges Symeon 'not to appear worse than barbarians [Arabs] in our disposition, who even though they make truce and exchange prisoners, they do not accept complete peace, since they lack faith in the perfect religion'.[345] The concept that the Arabs could not make a long-lasting peace with the Byzantines due to religious issues is also brought up by Arab sources. Around 957/8 some Byzantine emissaries visited the court of the Fatimid caliph al-Muʿizz requesting a perpetual truce. Qadi al-Nuʿman, who held a very prestigious position in the court of al-Muʿizz, reports that the Fatimid ruler responded that a perpetual truce is not in line with the Muslim religion and canon law which preaches holy war against the infidels and only allows a truce for a fixed amount of time.[346]

---

[342] Onasander, 37.3: 'τὸ μὴ πιστὸν διὰ τὸ ἀπεχθές' (trans. Oldfather and Oldfather, p. 495).

[343] 'τὸ μὴ πιστὸν διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἤθους βαρβαρικόν' [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

[344] Several works are attributed to him including a homily to Romanos I for the peace treaty of 927, and the imperial correspondence in the reign of Romanos I. For Daphnopates see: TC, 470; Jenkins 1966: 301-2; Stavridou-Zafraka 1976: 351-5; Dujčev 1978: 250-1; Darrouzès and Westerink 1978: 1-26; Flusin 2001: 48-50; Kazhdan 2006: 152-7; Chernoglazov 2013: 623-31.

[345] Daphnopates, 85: 'τελείας καὶ ὀρθοτόμου πίστεως ὤν ἐραστης, διὰ τί μὴ προς εἰρηνικάς καὶ ἀδιαλύτους συμβιβάσεις συνέρχῃ;'; 'μὴ χείρονες βαρβάρων τῇ διαθέσει φανῶμεν, οἵτινες κἄν ὁπωσοῦν μεθ' ἡμῶν εἰρηνεύοντες καὶ ἀλλαγήν αἰχμαλώτων ποιοῦντες, ὡς μὴ τελείας ὄντες πίστεως, οὐδὲ τελείαν εἰρηνην ἀσπάζονται'. For the use of the word barbarian in the Byzantine context see: *ODB*: i.252-3; Lechner 1955: 74-124, and 69-106, in connection with religion. For Arabs as barbarians see also: Christides 1969: 319-24.

[346] Stern 1950: 245-6; Lev 1995: 191-2.

The addition of distinctly Christian elements to complement Onasander's thoughts can also be spotted in chapter 1.7, which is, in fact, declarative of how paradoxical and interesting the relationship of Byzantium with the classical past was. In this passage the author of the *ST* discusses the traits of the ideal general, one of which is prudence. At first, he copies Onasander almost verbatim stating that the general should be 'prudent, so that he might not abandon his devotion to the most important [things], by being drawn to physical pleasures'.[347] Our author, however, supplemented Onasander with a passage from Basil I's *Hortatory Chapters* which states that God grants victory to those who are able to resist the pleasures of life, explaining that these men first win over their moral/invisible enemies, and therefore they also prevail against the visible ones.[348] While this addition served to highlight the typical Byzantine concept which connected Christian morality and piety with the ability to win in battle,[349] it is nonetheless substantiated not by some reference to Christian fathers, but with a rather suitable saying of a classical Greek philosopher, Aristippus of Cyrene, who wrote that 'He who prevails over pleasure, is not the one who refrains from it, but he who is not carried away by it despite the fact that he desires it. Just as, for instance, with the ship and the horse: [it is] not the man who does not desire them, but he wants to travel somewhere'.[350]

Last but not least, we can identify additions of Christian morality which do not complement the traits already found in Onasander, but which are added anew to the portrait of the perfect Byzantine general. It comes to no surprise that one these is piety, but a more interesting one is the addition of justice.[351] The author of the *Sylloge* supplements the latter with comments on the last judgement stating that 'whoever governs lawfully, but is tolerant of those who act unjustly will be judged by God with the same measure as those who are unjust'.[352] Apart from the updated Christian morality, however, the addition of justice can also be linked with the administrative duties of the *strategos* in the tenth century. The general was responsible for military rewards and punishments, but the *strategos* also had supreme jurisdictional authority over his *thema* and was active in judging cases until the mid-tenth century.[353] Moreover, the fair judgment on the part of the *strategos* was even more essential in a tenth-century

[347] *ST,* 1.7: 'Σώφρονα δε, ἵνα μὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀνθελκόμενος ἡδοναῖς τὴν περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἀπολείπῃ φροντίδα' [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; Onasander 1.2: 'σώφρονα δε, ἵνα μὴ ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἀνθελκόμενος ἡδοναῖς ἀπολείπῃ τὴν ὑπερ τῶν μεγίστων φροντίδα'.

[348] Basil I, *Hortatory Chapters,* 1.11.

[349] See for instance, Dennis 1993: 113-7; Strässle 2004: 121-4; McGuckin 2011-2: 29-44. For the aspects of God granting victory through iconography see: Nelson 2011-2012: 162-92.

[350] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming); Stobaeus, 3.17.17. See also: Kaldellis 2007: 13-188, for a discussion of Byzantium and the reception of its classical past.

[351] *ST,* 1.4.

[352] *ST*, 1.5 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

[353] Kolias 2007: 320-5; Haldon 1999: 84, 148; 2014: 130; Ahrweiler 1960: 37-45.

context because of the need to enforce the novels of Leo VI, Romanos I and Constantine VII to protect the military lands of the *stratiotai* against the *dynatoi*. The author of the *ST* makes specific reference to this problem twice, slightly adapting the text of *LT* which was nevertheless still relevant. More specifically, the *ST* states that the general should particularly protect farming and military matters and also stresses that the *stratiotai* should be free of impositions and extra payments.[354]

Adapting and updating Polyaenus and Julius Africanus

Except for adapting Onasander to include comments on Christian mentality, the author of the *ST* or a lost source he could have used, has further manipulated the ancient authorities. The *ST* features various cases in which some aspects of classical stratagems are changed.[355] Some of these changes seem to have been undertaken in order to make stratagems more relevant to a Byzantine context.

To begin with, the author of the *ST* copied the advice of Julius Africanus in chapter 59 describing how to overcome the enemy through poisonous food. Although the version of the *ST* does not add anything new to the tradition, a certain originality is identified in chapter 59.3 where such practices are labelled as 'unworthy even to be said in a Christian context'.[356] The author of the *ST* continues to explain that this information was included not to be used by the Byzantines, but simply to keep the general informed of the practices that may be used by the enemy. It could be that the author of the *ST* reflected contemporary attitudes. The use of poisonous food and water against the enemy features as a standard practice in *MS*, but in *LT* such action is no longer advisable to be undertaken by Byzantines. *LT*, copying *MS*, only states that the general should guard against such practices and suggests that the Byzantines used poisonous arrows mainly, if not merely, against horses and not riders.[357] Historical narratives seem to support this approach since no relevant evidence is found.

Secondly, some stratagems became more relevant through the addition of a number of anachronistic references to Byzantine technology. In chapter 65, although the *ST* reproduces Julian Africanus' original advice to fall upon the enemy cavalry with burning torches in order to make it flee, it goes

[354] *ST*, 2, 36; *LT*, 4.1, 11.9, 20.209. For such passages, see Kolias 2007: 323-5; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 260-74.
[355] The protagonist is changed: *ST*, 80.5 with *Hypothesis*, 9.3 and Polyaenus, 5.33.3; *ST*, 83.1 with *Hypothesis*, 7.3 and Polyaenus, 5.33.6; *ST*, 85.2 with *Hypothesis*, 44.1 and Polyaenus, 3.9.57; *ST*, 86.5 with *Hypothesis*, 14.22 and Polyaenus 7.35. The stratagem is changed: *ST*, 79.2 with *Hypothesis*, 3.5 and Polyaenus, 4.3.32. For more examples and commentary see Chatzelis and Harris 2017; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxii-xxiii; Dain 1931: 323-33.
[356] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).
[357] *MS,* 8.2.99; *LT*, 17.54, 18.129; Kolias 1989: 475-6; Haldon 2014: 323. While the use of poison is very limited in *LT* and absent in the *PM,* it does appear in the *De Obsidione*, 82-3 in a way reminiscent of *MS.*

further to add that this can also be achieved by spraying the horses' nostrils with spurge-juice through a hand-siphon. This machine was only invented in the reign of Leo VI, centuries after Julian's death.[358] Similarly, in chapter 99.5 we find reference of added protection for the horse's hoofs, a technological invention which was probably in use by the Byzantines around the ninth century.[359] The latter is not only important because of the anachronistic reference, but also because it appears in a totally new stratagem which seems to be absent from the tradition of Polyaenus.

It seems, in fact, that the author of the *ST,* or some lost source he had consulted, went as far as to create a tradition out of thin air in order to present his advice as belonging to the classical past.[360] He presents us with new figures and stratagems, some of which have a more or less realistic historical background like that of Choerillus, but also with others which are at best obscure and previously unheard of such as Merops, Onias, Tyrrenius and Abradatas.[361] However, the fabrication of the tradition with a view to strengthening the authority of the content is by no means something unprecedented in Byzantine literature, since we have some examples of this from religious texts.[362]

Last but not least, there were cases in which stratagems became more suitable with almost imperceptible adaptations. For example, in chapter 86.5 we read of the stratagem of Brennus, who, according to the *ST*, presented the shortest and weakest Roman prisoners to his army in order for it to gain courage for the upcoming battle with the Romans. In the *Hypothesis*, the Byzantine epitome of Polyaenus, Brennus is recorded as having done the same thing, but we read nothing about the identity of the prisoners, nor about the enemy's. Going further back to the original text of Polyaenus, the prisoners are Greek rather than Roman and Brennus is a Gallic king fighting against the Greeks. Consequently, in the *ST* the tradition of Brennus has been manipulated from Brennus who invaded Macedonia and Greece in 279 BC to Brennus who attacked Rome in 390 BCE. This could have served to make the stratagem more relevant to the Roman past and closer to the Byzantine experience, since the latter considered themselves as the only true continuators of the Roman Empire.[363]

[358] *ST*, 65; *Apparatus Bellicus*, 36.
[359] *ST,* 99.5; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxiii; Rance 2007: 729-33.
[360] See chapter six below.
[361] See for example, *ST*, 77.1; 76.11, 13; 97.2; 64; 77.1-2; 95.5; 102.3; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxii-xxiii; Meulder 2003: 445-66; Chatzelis and Harris 2017.
[362] Berger 2013: 247-58.
[363] *ST*, 86.5; *Hypothesis,* 14.22; Polyaenus, 7.35.1.

Updated attitudes to warfare

The *ST* was compiled at a time when the Byzantines started to get the upper hand against the Arabs. The tenth century was the time that the big families of Asia Minor came to prominence and started to enrich themselves through land acquisition and booty from the frontier wars. It was also the century that promotional literature of prominent generals started to appear, like that of John Kourkouas Bardas Skleros and Nikephoros II Phokas.[364] This type of literature presented its subjects in an ideal way, sometimes playing it by the book and practicing the well-known Byzantine indirect approach to war, but sometimes acting like warriors who considered pitched-battles and duels honourable, who highly valued hand-to-hand fighting and bravery, and who saw wounds as a medal of honour and retreat as disgraceful, unless it was conducted in the most desperate situation. Although these works are now lost, their traces can be found in extant historiography from Theophanes Continuatus and the *Chronicle* of Symeon Logothete onwards. Therefore, the readers of such works, and especially the military aristocracy, were exposed to such heroic ideals along with the more prudent Byzantine tradition of indirect warfare.

As has been noted, these heroic ideals were neither new, nor specifically Byzantine. When the conditions were ripe for them to become popular they were expressed in accordance with the authoritative classical past.[365] Authors once more turned into classical works which had long provided the Byzantines with this dual perception of warfare, one could either be an Odysseus, using cunning and stratagems to overcome the enemy, or an Achilles, fighting in the open with bravery and prowess in arms.[366]

The impact of these ideals was not confined to historiography to entrench and idealize. On the contrary, they seem to have influenced the military aristocracy more deeply, since they also appear in some military manuals. The *ST* is, in fact, the oldest among the manuals to preserve some of them so clearly. The first heroic ideal to concern us is bravery and death in battle, which was a very popular aspect of promotional historiography. For example, drawing on promotional sources from the tenth century, Skylitzes records in the late eleventh that in 979 Bardas Phokas 'was of the opinion that it was better to die gloriously than to live ignobly'.[367] It is in *LT* that we first read that the general should be 'bold in the face of dangers' and that 'it is more beneficial to take a stand in battle (…) than to flee',

[364] See chapter six below.
[365] Kaldellis 2007: 74; Neville 2012: 2-27.
[366] On heroic ideals see: Holmes 2005: 240-98; Kazhdan 2006: 273-94; Stouraitis 2009: 114-9; Neville 2012: 89-103, 121-38; Sinclair 2012: 319-79; Andriollo 2014: 126-38. For single combat see Kyriakidis 2016: 114-36
[367] Skylitzes, 337 (trans. Wortley, p. 319); Holmes 2005: 269-72.

but the *ST* further advances this case.[368] In the latter, bravery appears as one of the traits of the ideal general and it constitutes an addition to the characteristics originally found in Onasander. What is more, originally drawing on Isocrates, the author of the *ST* continues to explain that bravery is a much esteemed trait, 'for death is common to all mankind, but to die gloriously is a characteristic of the great'.[369] Kekaumenos makes a very similar case, urging in his manual not to 'fear death, if you are going to meet it on behalf of your country and the emperor; rather fear a shameful and blameworthy life'.[370]

The second heroic ideal was fighting openly which was sometimes considered more honourable to fighting with stratagems. Promotional historiography usually underlined this mentality by giving examples of contradicting actions. For instance, Nikephoros Bryennios highlights how his grandfather fought openly and honourably in pitched-battles while in comparison Alexios Komnenos emerges as an ignoble general trying 'to steal victory' by fighting with ruses.[371] Fighting in the late tenth century, Skylitzes reports that at first both Bardas Phokas and Bardas Skleros 'hesitated, and shirked open battle and attempted to steal victory', but describes their duel very honourably and full of praise.[372] Theophanes Continuatus records that Theophobos advised emperor Theophilos (829-842) to make a night attack, but this did not take place as the emperor was convinced by the majority that Theophobos was trying to deprive him of his glory and they urged him to fight at dawn instead.[373] The latter, brings in mind how Alexander the Great reacted before the battle of Gaugamela, in 331 BC, when Parmenion advised him to launch a night-attack against the Persians, responding that 'it was dishonourable to steal the victory'.[374]

The *ST* is the first and only manual which preserves the above ideal so clearly. In chapter 48.7 we read that 'it must be known that night battles were invented for times of weakness or shortage in the army. For if the army is fighting-fit, it [is] insulting and totally unworthy to win in such a way'.[375] It seems as if we are presented with the credentials a night attack should have fulfilled in order to have been considered honourable. While this remark is not totally alien, since manuals generally advised

[368] *LT,* 14.19; 20.190 (trans. Dennis, p. 301, 605).
[369] *ST,* 1.11 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; Isocrates, *To Demonicus,* 43.
[370] Kekaumenos 2 [trans. Roueché (online publication)].
[371] Bryennios, 4.5; Neville 2012: 100-3, 126-8.
[372] Skylitzes, 319-26; Sinclair 2012: 320-7; Holmes 2005: 289-98; Stouraitis 2009: 114-9.
[373] TC (b), 3.22; Skylitzes, 67.
[374] Arrian, 3.10 (trans. Brunt, p. i. 253).
[375] *ST,* 48.7: Εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ πρὸ παντὸς ὡς ἐν ἀδυναμίᾳ καὶ ὀλιγότητι στατοῦ αἱ νυχτομαχίαι ἐπενοήθησαν· ἀξιομάχου γὰρ ὄντος στατεύματος καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἐντεῦθεν ἐφύβριστον καὶ οὐδενος ἄξιον [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

the general to engage in pitched-battles if his army was well prepared and stronger than the enemy's, there is, however, some contradiction with the advice found in *LT* and *PM* and it is questionable whether generals really took it into consideration when they conducted night attacks.[376]

Tactics and battle-formations

Although we have spotted a number of innovations in the *ST,* so far these are literary and theoretical. They were added as an addition to or as a manipulation of the classical and Byzantine tradition in order to update it to a more contemporary context. But despite their literary side, military manuals had also their practical side. They seem to have been connected to a specific time which had certain needs to tackle and evolutions to respond to. They seem to have been created, at least to some extent, to be used by officers and generals, to provide them with guidelines on how to best use their limited resources, technology, ruse and geography to their favour. It is, therefore, necessary to look for another kind of innovation, a more practical one, and to search for originality and evolution in the realm of tactics and battle-formations.[377]

As we have seen above, the *ST* was compiled in a very specific context in which the traditional guerrilla practices were still predominant but started to co-exist with the new needs and challenges required by the Byzantine counter-attack and by the new role the army gradually started to play. This period is close enough to the reign of Leo VI to explain the closeness of the information in the *ST* to that in *LT*, but far enough removed to allow for gradual evolution to take place.[378] Despite this evolution, guerrilla tactics remained dominant aspects of Byzantine warfare at least until the reign of Nikephoros II Phokas.[379] In order to provide the reader with an efficient guidance on these matters, the author of the *ST* included all the relevant information he could find on the topic from Onasander, *MS*, the *PS,* and *LT*.

But although the *ST* is based on these authorities, we can recognize some special emphasis given on certain key aspects. For instance, in chapter 49.10-2, despite the parallel information found in *MS* and *LT,* our author provides us with two marching formations, designed to ensure a safe crossing of medium and narrow defiles.[380] Furthermore, in chapter 23.4, the problem of withdrawing after a raid

[376] See chapter six below.
[377] Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 139-44; McGeer 1995: 191-5; Strässle 2006: 51-7.
[378] See chapter one and three above.
[379] Haldon 1999: 149-65, 176-81; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 215-57, 275-87.
[380] *MS,* 9.3.87-91, 12.20B.12-52; *LT* 9.37, 58.

is examined in detail, and the regular practice of the enemy to capture the *kleisourai* and to attack while the army was withdrawing is also emphasized. Although the author of the *ST* repeats the information found in *MS* and *LT* on how to defend against an invading enemy when there is a shortage of troops, which was a very important aspect during the yearly Arab raids in the *themata,* he further instructs the reader to attack while the enemy is setting up camp or while he is occupied with the pasturage of horses. He also warns that the latter stratagem is also undertaken by the enemy.[381]

However, one can better recognize the contribution of the *ST* to the Byzantine military theory and the gradual evolution of the latter, by studying the appearance of new units and tactics. It is no surprise that these first appear in the *ST* since offensive warfare made the use of specialised troops essential. The infantry needed to operate effectively in formation, to serve as a barrier against enemy infantry and cavalry and to protect the army during marches, battles and sieges. In addition, a new specialised cavalry force was also essential to fulfil various roles, from pillaging to leading a disciplined charge in a pitched battle.[382] These new conditions were what shaped tenth-century infantry and cavalry tactics as we know them, and they all began with the *ST*.

We have already seen that the *ST* is the first manual to list the medium infantry as a distinct type of infantry. This is a gradual evolution from *LT*, where the javelin-men were considered and operated as light-infantry.[383] The new type of medium infantry is called *peltastai* in the *ST.* The term used is obviously antiquarian and it automatically brings to mind the role of the classical *peltastai* from the Hellenistic period. They were a medium type of infantry, less heavily armed than the traditional hoplites, but at the same time more heavily armed than the light infantry, able to employ both melee and missile roles on the battlefield, as they were equipped with swords, lances and javelins.[384] But was this just a theoretical anachronism, or did it actually correspond to the needs of contemporary Byzantine warfare of the time?[385]

In the *ST* the *peltastai* are described as bearing smaller shields than the heavy infantry, and being equipped with a *paramerion*, javelins, a spear, a helmet which did not cover the face, and either a *lorikion*, a *klibanion* or a *kabadion*. They appear to be somewhat lighter than the heavy infantry, as they had smaller shields and did not bear arm and leg guards.[386] This type of medium infantry, who

[381] *ST*, 52, 22.11; 40.7.
[382] Haldon 1999: 217-20; McGeer 1988: 135-45.
[383] See chapter three above.
[384] See for instance, Sekunda 2008: 339-343.
[385] For the use of antiquarian terms to justify innovation see: chapter six below.
[386] *ST,* 38.6-7.

qualified as a sort of heavier javelin-men is also found in the later manuals of the tenth century, though not with the antiquarian term *peltastai,* but rather referred to *akontistai.* This separation of infantry in three categories, rather than two, also appears in the *DV*, in the *DRM,* and in the *PM*, all of which, treat the *peltastai/akontistai,* as a distinct type of medium infantry who was usually drawn up together with the heavy or supported the light.[387]

Another new unit, first found in the *ST,* is the corps of the *menavlatoi*. They were specialised infantry whose duty was to repel the attacks of the enemy heavy cavalry.[388] The *menavlatoi* were named after their weapon the *menavlion.* Although the *menavlatoi* are first attested in the *ST* as a distinct unit, the *menavlion/menavlon* as a weapon appears already in *LT*.[389] There is some scholarly debate concerning the length and the use of the *menavlion,* which as Haldon has shown, mainly results from the fact that before the *ST,* the word *menavlion* was used to describe a javelin and not a sturdy thrusting spear.[390] We can note that the *ST* appears to be the intermediate stop in the evolution of tactics since it is the first manual to preserve the innovation of the *menavlatoi* and the change in the meaning of the *menavlion*, but the tactics and the numbers of the *menavlatoi* become further advanced and sophisticated in the *PM.*[391]

Nevertheless, the infantry was not the only one that was updated and specialised in the *ST.* As specialised infantry units like the *menavlatoi* appeared, and the new role of the medium infantry emerged, similar evolution were also required in the cavalry. The *ST* is the first military manual to report the Byzantine *kataphraktoi.* Despite the fact that the Roman army started to employ units called *cataphractarii/clibanarii* already in the reign of Hadrian (117-138), they are last recorded in the sixth century, when there is a reference to a unit called *Leonis Clibanariis* in Egypt in 546.[392] The next available evidence of the term *kataphraktoi* to denote a specialized troop of heavily cavalry and not heavy armour or more heavily armed troops in general, occurs in the *ST*, some 400 years later.[393]

---

[387] *DV,* 3.3, 20.73; *DRM,* 1.10-20, 35, 5.12-8, 6.1-5,58-60; *PM,* 1.51-62, 82-87, 95-97; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 192, n.42; McGeer 1995: 208-9.

[388] *ST*, 47.16; McGeer 1988: 135-45; 1995: 209-11; Haldon 1999: 218.

[389] *LT* 6.27, 9.71, 11.22, 19.14-16, 69.

[390] Haldon 1975: 33; 2014: 202. For the debate about the *menavlion* see: McGeer 1986: 53-8; Kolias 1988: 194-5; Anastasiadis 1994: 1-10; Dawson 2007: 7-8; Grotowski 2010: 320-3.

[391] For more details, see chapter seven below.

[392] Scholarship on the Roman heavy cavalry is vast. See, among others, Maspero 1912: 105f; Eadie 1967: 161-73; Gamber 1968: 7-44; Diethart and Dintsis 1984: 67-84; Speidel 1984: 151-6; Dixon and Southern 1992; Mielczarek 1993; Negin 1998: 67-75.

[393] The term *kataphraktos* appears in the *PS,* and *LT,* but only to denote the more heavily armed, see: *PS,* 35.19-20; *LT* 6.25-27, 15.9, 18.143,147, 19.14,73; *ODB*: iii.1114.

The disappearance of the term *kataphraktoi* from the sources for about four centuries has aroused much debate concerning the tactics and the use of heavy cavalry in the Byzantine army. From the sixth to the early tenth century the Byzantine cavalry went through great changes and warfare was dominated by the influence of the steppe-nomads, the fluidity of the battlefield and de-specialization in equipment.[394] The sources of this period, manuals, poems and historical narratives feature a de-specialised cavalry mainly operating as horse-archers or as archer-lancer cavalry.[395] The elite cavalrymen, together with their mounts remained armoured, but the term *kataphraktoi* was not used to describe them.[396]

In the light of this evidence scholars have expressed two different opinions. The majority of them argued that the *kataphraktoi* were disbanded from the Byzantine army since the defensive warfare of the period did not facilitate the use of such troops, only to appear again around the middle of the tenth century.[397] On the other hand, Kolias and Michal Wojnoski argued that the *kataphraktoi* were never disbanded. As regards Kolias, he stated that the appearance of the term *kataphraktoi* could be incidental, and that words like 'καβαλλάριος' could have had exactly the same meaning. He also explained that there are certain factors, such as authorship, trends and genre, which influence the information we receive in the sources.[398] Wojnoski explained the absence of the term in a slightly different way. While he accepted that heavy cavalry was always used in the Byzantine army, he connected the revival of the term with the literary style of Macedonian renaissance. Furthermore, he argued that the terms *cataphracti/clibanari/kataphraktoi* were only used to describe armoured riders and horses of elite status. Therefore, he stated that in the sixth to ninth century this type of cavalry was the norm in the army and not of elite status, thus the term *kataphraktoi* was not used.[399]

Nonetheless, while his theory explains the absence of the term quite effectively, it does have some weaknesses. For instance, some of the *cataphracti* of the late antiquity were of *limitanei* status. Therefore, while the elite character of the *cataphracti/clibanari* is generally well documented in the sources, the status of the *limitanei,* in particular, shows that this was not without exceptions.[400] Additionally, there are also strong doubts whether the archer-lancer cavalry was actually the normal

[394] Haldon 1999: 219-20; Rance 2005: 552; 2008: 355-7; Trombley 2007: 347.
[395] Procopius, 1.1.12-4, 5.27.4-5, 4.10.8-11, 6.1.29-34; Agathias, 1.2.5-8. 2.14.3; Theophylact Simocatta, 6.2.3, 8.2.10; Corippus, 6.638.
[396] *PS,* 17; *MS,* 1.2.35-9, 1.2.6-10; Jones 1964: 665-7; Haldon 1984: 102; 2002: 68; Bivar 1972: 277-8.
[397] See for instance: Ahrweiler 1960: 16; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 245; Haldon 1999: 199-220; McGeer 1995: 184-8; 273-4; 303-10; Trombley 2007: 347.
[398] Kolias 1993: 21-36.
[399] Wojnoski 2005: 7-20; 2012: 195-220.
[400] Jones 1964: 626, 661-3, 653 and n.106; Fear 2008: 450-1.

fighting force as Wojnoski accepts.[401] Last but not least, most of the time Wojnoski assumes that the appearance of the word *kataphraktos* is directly connected with a specific type of Byzantine heavy cavalry. He, therefore, overlooks the fact that the word *kataphraktos* was also used to describe a piece of armour or heavy armed troops in general, both infantry and cavalry, and so its presence is not always proof of continuation in equipment or tactics.[402]

A probable solution to the problem could be as follows. The Byzantines never stopped employing heavy cavalry, there is after all mention of them in historical narratives and manuals. The term *kataphraktos* before the tenth century merely denoted a heavily armed soldier in general, and it was never connected with any specialised role. It is only from the *ST* onwards that, in addition to the traditional general meaning, the term *kataphraktos* also denoted a specialised heavy cavalry which employed distinct and specific tactics. The emergence of the term *kataphraktos* to denote a specialist heavy cavalry, whose role was to employ shock tactics by directly charging against enemy formations, is in accordance with the new specialised infantry units that appear in the *ST* and with the operational needs of the tenth century.[403]

In the *ST* the *kataphraktoi* are presented in their very first stage of evolution. Judging from relevant information found in *LT*, it seems that their revival as specialised heavy cavalry troops was a gradual evolution. The *ST* happens to be the first manual to preserve the wedge formation of the *kataphraktoi*. Although the wedge formation was known from antiquity, its composition of *kataphraktoi,* lancers and horse archers, as well as the pattern of adding four men in every rank is a contemporary Byzantine invention first found in the *ST*.[404] The wedge formation of the *kataphraktoi* was placed in the middle of the vanguard to spearhead the attack, but that is not entirely unprecedented. In *LT* we read that 500 elite cavalry were to be placed in the middle of the vanguard. These 500 elite horsemen could have served as an inspiration for the wedge of the *ST*. For the latter did not only deploy the *kataphraktoi* in the same position, but also one of its variations of the wedge formation numbers 504 men.[405]

The appearance of a number of specialised new units also required a fresh approach on deployment and tactics which would allow the Byzantines to make their use effective. As far as the infantry is concerned, the author of the *ST* seems to have been aware of such a need since he argued that a

[401] Kaegi 1964: 98-9; Haldon 1999: 195, 216; Rance 2008: 356-8.
[402] Some examples include: *PS,* 35.20; *LT*. 6.163-172, 15.52-54, 18.775, 816, 19.86, 404; Psellos, *Chronographia*, 6.87; Anna Komnene, 5.6.4.4, 15.6.4.14, 15.6.17.3; Attaleiates, 2.62-63.24.
[403] See chapter three above.
[404] *ST*, 46.6-8; McGeer 1995: 286-9; Haldon 1999: 220.
[405] *LT,* 18.26; *ST,* 46.26; Haldon 2014: 337.

discussion about the deployment of infantry units was essential since the latter usually fought irregularly.[406] It could be, therefore, that the guerrilla tactics of the soldiers of the *themata*, which dominated Byzantine warfare, made the infantry unable to live up to the task of effectively fulfilling the new required roles. To remedy this, the author of the *ST* provided his readers with a number of new infantry formations.

The most important of these new formations is the appearance of a new standard battle array, the hollow square formation. The author of the *ST* begins by making a case about its uniqueness, stating that this formation is 'undoubtedly dissimilar to the fashion of the aforementioned infantry and cavalry formations'.[407] This formation, however, had some known parallels from antiquity and it also appears in earlier Byzantine manuals such as *MS* and *LT*, but only as a marching or emergency formation, never as a standard one, as is the case in the *ST*.[408]

In contrast to the brief treatment of this array in past manuals, the author of the *ST* goes in great detail to describe it. The infantry was drawn up in a square, each unit leaving intervals between one another. The number of intervals depended on certain factors, such as the number of the cavalry or the numbers of the enemy. Inside the square the cavalry was drawn up together with the baggage train. The cavalry assumed the offensive role, exiting through the gaps to attack the enemy, while the infantry served as a mobile operation centre, providing defence, support, and a rallying point if the cavalry was thrown back.[409]

After Leo VI had explained that a hollow-square formation can be used if the army is defeated and threatened by a cavalry army, he stated that the Arabs employ battle formations which are

> both square and oblong and so are very secure and not easily broken up by the attacks of their opponents. They employ this formation while marching and in forming up for battle. They also imitate the Romans in many respects. It is as though they have been trained by experience in the other models of battle formations, so the very things they suffered from the Romans they are now busily putting into practise against them.[410]

From this statement Leo seems to suggest that that the Arabs were already using the square formation in battle, as well as others, which they took from the Byzantines. In this light, we may argue that Leo

---

[406] *ST*, 45.10.
[407] *ST,* 47.1 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; McGeer 1995: 262.
[408] *MS,* 7B.11.42-52; *LT,* 14.20; McGeer 1995: 259-60; Haldon 1999: 219.
[409] *ST*, 47; McGeer 1988: 135-45; 1995: 257-80; Haldon 1999: 217-20.
[410] *LT* 18.113-4 (trans. Dennis p. 479).

VI presents a point in which the Arabs were partially using the square formation in battle, but the Byzantines had not yet started to employ it as their standard battle order, something which happens in the *ST*.[411] The hollow square in the latter seems to be in its very first stage of evolution as a standard battle order, for not only does the author of the *ST* go into great detail to describe it, but also its deployment does not seem to be crystallised. It is the only manual that deploys all the units of the square by ranks which makes the flanks look rather vulnerable. This and other such issues were improved on in later manuals since the *PM* draws up the sides of the square by file rather than by rank, and introduces additional beneficial changes.[412]

Apart from the hollow square, the *ST* describes another formation which exclusively comprised of infantry. We find four variations of this infantry formation ranging from 24,100 men to 3,116.[413] Although this formation is new, its core seems to have been evolved from an infantry deployment described in *LT*.[414] While there seems to be an evolution from *LT* to the *ST*, there is no further mention of such a formation in later manuals and its practicality is questionable.[415]

In the *ST*, however, the new tactics and formations are not confined to the infantry, for similar developments are noticeable in the cavalry. The *ST* is the first manual to preserve a new cavalry formation. This is presented in various versions according to the available number of troops, but the most serviceable versions deploy the troops in three main lines. Once again this innovation seems to have been based on a gradual evolution of what is found in *LT*, as the basic plan remained more or less the same, with certain additions.

To begin with, both *LT* and the *ST* draw up the *prokoursatores*, together with one *tagma* of *defensores,* as scouts ahead of the main force, and some small units as a separate rear-guard.[416] As is the case in *LT,* the *ST* instructs the general to divide his vanguard into three main units, the only deference being, as seen above, that the middle unit in the *ST* took the form of the wedge of the *kataphraktoi*. Both manuals also agree that flank-guards and out-flankers should be posted at the flanks of the vanguard as well as another two concealed units, one in each flank, which were to be posted further away from the flank-guards and out-flankers. As regards the second line, both manuals suggest that it should consist of four main *tagmata* which were to keep larger intervals than the units in the

[411] Haldon 2014: 360.
[412] See chapter seven below.
[413] *ST,* 45.
[414] *LT*, 4.64-76.
[415] See chapter six below.
[416] *LT,* 12.20-5; *ST,* 46.

vanguard. The larger intervals were to be guarded by other smaller *tagmata*. However, the author of the *ST* adds a new third battle line which is not found in *LT.* He goes on to explain that this line should be identical to the vanguard, if there are enough *kataphraktoi,* otherwise its middle unit should consist of regular cavalry instead. This new third line is named *saka* by our author, which is the word that Muslim authors use to describe the rear-guard. It has been argued that most probably this implies a Byzantine imitation and adaptation of tactics to contemporary Arab developments.[417] Whatever the case, once more, the *ST* acts as a middle point of development since later tenth-century manuals, such as the *PM,* adopt this cavalry formation with very few alternations.[418]

Technology and equipment

The *ST* does not only provide original material regarding tactics and formations, it also features some innovation and evolution in terms of technology and equipment. The character of this innovation is the same as above. It is a gradual evolution in which the *ST* appears as the middle point of development between *LT* and other later manuals such as the *PM.*

The first novelty concerns siege-warfare and the appearance of the *strepta.* It is open to debate whether the *strepta* was a different device from the hand-siphons, whether it was the same device, or whether it was a different part of the same device.[419] Whatever the case, the *ST* seems to treat the *strepta* as a different device from the hand-siphons. Although the *strepta* also appears in the siege manual of Heron of Byzantium and in the *De Obsidione Toleranda,* accepting the new dating of the *ST* would mean that the latter is the first manual to mention this device.[420] This seems to be supported by the fact that the author of the *ST* felt the need to describe the function of the *strepta* to his readers. He explains that the *strepta* is the device 'which mechanically shoots the liquid fire'.[421] Even if the *strepta* was identical to the hand-siphons, the *ST* is still the first manual to encourage the use of such devices for sieges, since in *LT* the hand-siphons are only referred to in the context of naval warfare.[422]

Except for the technology of siege warfare, similar innovations can be identified as regards the equipment of the Byzantine infantry. On one level the equipment of heavy infantry in *LT* and in the

[417] *ST*, 46.17, 19; Dain 1951: 94-6; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 59, n.4; McGeer 1995: 283-4; Sullivan 2010: 155.
[418] See chapter seven below
[419] For an overview see Haldon 2006: 290-7 and Sullivan 2000: 231.
[420] Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 49.20-25; *De Obsidione*, 64.113. There is a surviving representation of this device in the Vaticanus gr. 1605, folio 36, see: Sullivan 2000: fig.22.
[421] *ST,* 53.8 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[422] *LT*, 19.64.

ST have many similarities. For instance, the men are instructed to wear *lorikia,* arm and leg-guards, to have plumes at their helmets and shoulders, as well as to carry circular shields, double-edged swords and lances. On the other hand, the *ST* recommends square and triangular shields in addition to circular ones. Not only are triangular and square shields treated as a standard type for the first time, but also detailed measurements are given for all. The axes, that Leo VI instructed the heavy infantry to have, are not found in the *ST*, which features *parameria* instead. What is more, the *ST* presents the general with a number of alternatives regarding the heavy infantry armour. In addition to the *lorikia*, the use of *klibania* and *kabadia,* is recommended. The latter were made of cotton and raw silk, and the *ST* is the first manual to record their existence. Finally, we can also note that although full-face helmets are found in *LT*, Leo VI does not specify their use for the heavy infantry, whereas the author of the *ST* does.[423] As far as the armament of the light infantry is concerned, it does not present any innovations compared to *LT*, apart from the fact that the *ST* provides a precise measurement of the size of slings.[424]

Similar gradual innovation can also be spotted in the equipment of the heavy cavalry. Once more, the *ST* appears as the middle point of evolution between *LT* and the *PM.* The heavy cavalry in the *ST* is very similarly armed to the elite cavalry in *LT*; both manuals instruct that the heavy cavalry should be equipped with bows, *klibania* or ankle-long coats of mail, lances and shields. In the *ST*, however, the *kataphraktoi* are clearly instructed to bear fully covering helmets and also surcoats, named *epilorikia* or *epanoklibana.* In addition, while in *LT* the use of the mace was confined to a small portion of the infantry or to be carried by the latter as a secondary weapon in their wagons, in the *ST* it is first attested as a weapon of the heavy cavalry, though only as a secondary one. The equipment of heavy cavalry appears more crystallised in the *PM* which leaves out the bows, the long mail coats and the lances. Instead, the *kataphraktoi* are armed with fully covering helmets, *klibania*, *epilorikia,* shields and maces.[425]

Conclusion

The *ST* is a manual where innovation can be seen in many aspects. There is the introduction of new troops, both infantry and cavalry, as well as evolution in their formations, tactics and equipment. These

[423] *LT,* 5.3; 6.21; *ST,* 38.1-5; Kolias 1989: 103-9; Dawson 2007: 2-5; Sullivan 2010: 155. For tenth-century Byzantine equipment see also: Dawson 2002: 81-90; 1998: 38-50; 2001-2: 89-95; Grotowski 2010; Haldon 1975: 11-46; 2002: 65-79; 2014; Tsurtsumia 2011b: 65-99.
[424] *LT,* 6.22; *ST,* 38.8-11.
[425] *LT* 6.1-7, 6.23, 7.41; *ST,* 39.1-6; *PM* 3.26-46; Grotowski 2010: 367.

innovations paint the picture of a Byzantine army which was gradually evolved from *LT* and which was in the middle point of evolution between the *LT* and the *PM*. The appearance of specialised troops such as the *menavlatoi* or the *kataphraktoi*, the hollow square and wedge formation, the use of new terms and equipment such as the *kabadion* or the *epilorikion*, as well as the broader use of the mace, were all important aspects of tenth-century warfare, first recorded in the *ST*.

On these grounds it would be fair to claim that the *ST* is one of the most innovative military manuals the Byzantine world produced. Its innovations paint the picture of an army which had some similarities with *LT*, but at the same time was totally different. It was an army which could fulfil its traditional guerrilla roles, but also an army which was gradually evolved and ready to correspond to the current offensive needs in the oriental front between the reigns of Romanos I Lekapenos and Nikephoros II Phokas. These tactics were further evolved in the *PM,* but it is reasonable to state that the *ST* is the manual that introduces us to tenth-century Byzantine warfare as we know it. After the *ST*, the Byzantine tactics were just not the same again; they had evolved into something new.

Chapter Six

The *Sylloge Tacticorum* and its Practical Use

The *ST* belongs to the literary genre which is usually described as military manuals or treatises. As with almost any other treatise of that kind, the *ST* contains a great deal of information which can be traced to older sources, some of which date back to antiquity. Therefore, with such a degree of antiquarianism in its contents it is only natural to ask what the purpose of the *ST* was. It could have been for practical use on the battlefield; or just a good book to read by the fire, a literary work which mostly aimed at preserving the older tradition.[426] Before this issue can be resolved in the case of the *ST*, the wider scholarly debate needs to be considered. While the individual treatises within the genre differ widely in some respects, these wider debates provide an important entry to an assessment of the purpose of the *ST*.[427]

General Scholarly Debate

Scholars who deny the practical use of military manuals tend to focus on two main issues, antiquarianism and political propaganda. As far as the second is concerned, most recently, Catherine Holmes has concluded that one of the primary purposes of tenth-century compilation literature, and by extension of military manuals, was to highlight legitimacy or to persuade the readers that their patron or author was the most suitable person to gain authority or offices.[428]

We have already seen that such markers of legitimacy can be spotted in *LT*. Leo VI refers there to his father and predecessor, Basil I, as a prudent and effective general who successfully and safely crossed a river with his army by implementing the instructions that Leo gives in his manual. Basil I is also described as a benefactor of the Bulgarians who were 'crude' and 'barbarous' before they were baptized by him.[429] Furthermore, Holmes suggests that Constantine VII might have shown such an interest in writing or collecting military manuals, so as to compensate for the fact that he had no military experience, thus trying to present himself as somebody who had active authority over the army. The above argument could also be applied to Leo VI, who, unlike his father, was also an

[426] For general remarks on the issue, see: Kolias 1997: 153-64; Cheynet 2014: 55-6 and Theotokis 2014: 106-118. For the practical use of *Apparatus Bellicus* see Zuckerman 1994: 385-9.
[427] Sullivan 2010: 160.
[428] Holmes 2010: 61-77.
[429] *LT,* 9.14, 18.95.

'armchair' general.[430] In addition, other military manuals make an explicit effort to stress the deeds of specific individuals. Such propaganda is visible in the *DV*. This treatise seems to have been compiled under the orders of Nikephoros II Phokas by one of his officers who was closely associated with him.[431] In this manual we find direct or indirect references to successful operations of generals who belonged to the Phokas family, such as Leo, Bardas and Nikephoros Phokas, brother, father and grandfather of Nikephoros II respectively, while the deeds of other generals are passed over in silence.[432] This has led certain scholars to argue that the primary purpose of the *DV* was political propaganda or even political criticism.[433] Finally, a dedication poem placed before the preface of Basil Lekapenos' *Naumachica* has also been interpreted as a case of political progression. The preface records the victories of Basil against the Arabs, stating that he will also enjoy similarly victories in the sea.[434] This was interpreted by Holmes as mainly aiming to persuade Romanos II that Basil was a more suitable candidate than Joseph Bringas for political promotion before the Cretan expedition.[435]

This 'legitimacy and political progression' approach however, does not exclude the possibility that a manual could have been practical. Even if the author's ultimate motive was merely to promote himself, he could have done that, and perhaps better, by producing a practical manual. While Holmes' approach fits well into the tenth-century context, and there could be various motives behind a work, the evidence found in the military manuals themselves does not always clearly show that progression was the main factor behind their compilation. To begin with, the dedicatory poem in Basil's *Naumachica* could have merely been an attempt on the part of the author, who has been identified as a young and minor figure in the circle of Basil Lekapenos, to express his good will and praise to his patron.[436] This becomes more probable if we accept the view of Pryor and Jeffreys, who, in contrast to previous scholars, have suggested that the manual had little or no practical use, interpreting it more as a linguistic exercise or a scholarly game of antiquarianism.[437] Therefore, one might wonder why Basil Lekapenos chose to promote himself against his political opponent by being the patron of a manual which had no or little practical use.

[430] Holmes 2010: 66; Magdalino 2013: 189, 195; Tougher 1997: 166-8.
[431] Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 160-5; Dennis 1985: 139.
[432] *DV,* preface; Dennis 1985: 149; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 33-7; Holmes 2010: 74.
[433] Holmes 2010: 74-5; Cheynet 1986: 312.
[434] Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 522.
[435] Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 183-4; Holmes 2010: 71-2; Angelidi 2013: 16-7.
[436] Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 185.
[437] Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 4-5, 183-6.

As regards the *DV* and *LT*, where reference to a certain family member or to a predecessor is found, these does not seem to be central or extensive. Basil I is mentioned only twice in *LT,* while the general Nikephoros Phokas, grandfather of the future Nikephoros II, is mentioned three times.[438] The fact that Nikephoros, who had no dynastic connection with Leo, is mentioned more frequently than Basil I, seems to imply that the main focus of Leo VI was practical, namely to provide his reader with recent examples of loyal generals who acted according to the advice of *LT.* While the reference to Basil I most probably also served to underline the legitimacy of Leo VI, this does not seem to be among the dominant reasons for the creation of *LT*. As far as the *DV* is concerned, political propaganda can be mostly seen in the preface, rather than in the main body of the work. Whether it also expressed political criticism, is something whose relevance depends on its dating.[439]

Consequently, while legitimacy or praise of a certain family are present in the two manuals, they do not appear to have been the major factors behind their compilation. Legitimacy and praise seem to be present in the customary context in which the author would praise his patron, imply his legitimacy or make specific reference to loyal family members. By the same standards we cannot explicitly argue that the *De Thematibus*, which refers kindly to Romanos I, was written having as a main purpose the praise of Romanos I, since we know that Constantine VII was deeply hostile to him. Similarly, the references to Basil I and Leo VI and the negative ones to Romanos I, cannot explicitly mean that the main purpose of the *DAI* and the *DC* was to praise or to condemn these figures. It cannot be overlooked, of course, that propaganda was important and practised through literary works when the opportunity presented itself.[440] Textual evidence however, seems to suggest that this propaganda was sort of a 'happy accident' which mostly highlighted a situation that already existed, rather than aiming to create a new equilibrium or being a major factor behind the drafting of manuals.

This line of reasoning is also supported by the fact that some manuals contain no references to previous emperors or families. For instance, the *De Obsidione Toleranda*, the *Syntaxis Armatorum Quadrata,* the *DRM*, or the *Memorandum,* not only lack references to specific contemporary individuals, but they seem to have been written by ghost-authors; a fact which seems to remove political progression, influence or propaganda as a major factor of their composition. The *ST* itself fits well into that pattern. In addition, even though a number of military treatises are not anonymous, political propaganda or highlighting personal deeds to achieve political progression are usually not obvious. For example, Maurice, the author of the *Strategikon*, does not underline any of his

[438] *LT,* 11.21; 15.32; 17.65.
[439] Holmes 2010: 75; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 163-4, 171-5; Dennis 1985: 140.
[440] Magdalino 2013: 189-209; Holmes 2010.

achievements as a general, neither does he praise or criticize contemporary individuals in his manual.[441] Similarly, in the *PM,* or at least in the version that is extant today,[442] Nikephoros Phokas, an experienced and successful general himself, did not feel necessary to include any of his family or personal deeds, even though some of the latter, especially the battle outside of Tarsus according to the account of Leo the Deacon, seem highly relevant.[443] What is more, any other form of political propaganda against, or in favour of other individuals, is equally absent. An exception might be Syrianos Magister, the author of the *PS,* who has been identified by some as a person who might have had first hand military engineer experience, and who clearly states that he can improve Apollodorus and the ancient siege-treatises.[444] His reference to Belisarius, however, does not seem to serve any political end, if we accept the latest studies that the treatise was written in the ninth century.[445]

Going into the eleventh century the picture does not seem to alter. Holmes has suggested that one of the primary reasons for the compilation of the *TNO* was to advance the author politically in the context of peer rivalry between Byzantine generals under Basil II.[446] This may well be true, but it does not come across from the text of the *TNO* itself. The part of the treatise that has already been edited at least, does not include any hints of political support towards any particular figure, and there is also a lack of reference concerning the deeds of Ouranos himself, even though scholars have proposed that the work was written after Ouranos had achieved his greatest military deeds.[447] If progression was the main aim of Ouranos, he could have better achieved his goal through such references. For example, when he discusses the crossing of rivers in his manual, he could have mentioned his personal experience, when, in 997, he crossed Sperchios River and suddenly attacked the camp of Samuel.[448]

Apart from political propaganda, the other reason which led many scholars to argue against any practical use of military manuals is antiquarianism. The fact that a great deal of their material derives from classical and/or older Byzantine works, has led scholars to regard them as untrustworthy. Manuals are seen as having been mostly written for non-practical reasons and are usually described as 'works whose primary aim was to preserve the ancient knowledge', 'more literary than technical',

[441] Dennis 1981: 16-8; 1984: xv-xvii; Dain and Foucault 1967: 344-6; Rance 1994: 36-42.
[442] Dain 1937: 47-51; Dain and Foucault 1967: 370-1; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 154; Kolias 1993: 23-4.
[443] McGeer 1995: 313-5.
[444] *PS*, 13.69-71; 19.40-65; Dennis 1985: 3; Sullivan 2010: 151-2; Dain and Foucault 1967: 343; Hunger 1978: ii.327-8; Rance 1994: 58-60; 2007: 706; Zuckerman 1990: 215; Cosentino 2000: 277-80.
[445] Rance 2007: 719-37; Cosentino 2000: 262-80.
[446] Holmes 2010: 61-2, 72-3.
[447] McGeer 1991: 129-31, Dain 1937: 136; Trombley 1997: 269.
[448] Skylitzes, 341-2; Dain 1937: 144; Dain and Foucault 1967: 373; Hunger 1978: ii.323, 336-7; McGeer 1991: 130-1.

'theoretical rather than practical', and 'traditional rather than innovative'.[449] Although these comments are usually moderated when studying specific military treatises, that is not always the case. For instance, we have seen that the *ST* is sometimes regarded as a purely literary manual, copied with very little adaptation from its sources, and as a source which has little relevance to tenth-century Byzantine warfare.[450]

However, this approach overlooks the important role that the past played in Byzantium. When we argue that the presence of antiquarian material is enough to qualify a military manual as non-practical, we tend to judge Byzantium through a contemporary way of thinking. We have already seen that the presence of older works in military treatises can be adequately explained in the context of high Byzantine literature and education, and the relationship between patron and author.[451] It is, therefore, necessary to take into account how the Byzantines used the past to educate themselves, and to wonder whether the past enjoyed more credibility than the present.

Firstly, it should be recalled that while Byzantine society was averse to radical or sudden change, it was nonetheless, quite receptive of gradual innovation.[452] We already know that pure originality was seen as something negative in Byzantium and that the word *kainotomia* was used to negatively describe a breach with the tradition. Certain ancient or older practices were, therefore, justified by the mere fact that they belonged to the past.[453] Thus, anyone who created something new had to justify their innovation by putting it in a context of older material, which would highlight a gradual rather than a radical change and which would connect the innovation with the authority of the tradition. In some genres of Byzantine literature older established insight seemed to be more credible than contemporary observation and there were cases in which the authority of the past was so strong that a tradition had to be fabricated in order for one to advance his case.[454]

Influenced as they were by this approach, the Byzantines saw both ancient military manuals and history as a credible source of educating themselves about contemporary matters.[455] For example, the

[449] Hunger 1978: ii.323-4 (my trans. from the German); Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 139-41 (my trans. from the French); McGeer 1995: 171; Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 1-6, 445-53; Holmes 2010: 61-80.
[450] Dain and Foucault 1967: 350-1; Hunger 1978: ii.333; Krentz and Wheeler 1994: xxi-xxiii.
[451] See chapter two above.
[452] See chapter five above.
[453] Cutler 1995: 203-5; *ODB:* ii.997-8; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 41 and n. 7; c.f. Spanos 2010: 51-9.
[454] Berger 2013: 247-58; Mango 1975: 6-17; Shepard 1995: 108; Sinclair 2012: 202-3; Strässle 2006: 55-6. See also Kaldellis 2015b: 22-35.
[455] Nemeth 2013: 232-58, demonstrates how the *Excerpta* of Constantine VII included works on stratagems and warfare from older authors and how these were popular with the Byzantine aristocracy. Kaegi 1990, argues in favour of the

author of the *ST* twice states in his manual that 'the sufferings of the ancients should be a lesson to the contemporaries'.[456] John Doukas and Alexios I are recorded as having read the works of Aelian and Apollodorus.[457] Constantine VII especially stresses that the stratagems of Polyaenus and other historical works must be part of the baggage train during a campaign, while Theophylact Simocatta states that Philippicus, 'who was very fond of learning, drew his military knowledge from the experts of the past', and thus imitated Scipio.[458] Furthermore, Julian (361-363) reports that he educated himself and his officers with older writings so as to use them as exemplars and to avoid repeating the same mistakes.[459] Ammianus Marcellinus seems to confirm this mentality, as he states that Julian, being acquainted with historical deeds, was inspired to attack Pirisobora, much like Scipio did in the case of Carthage.[460] Leo VI encourages his readers to look for information and ideas regarding siege matters in historical works.[461] The use of ancient exemplars and the need for the Byzantines to emulate ancient prominent figures seems to be well underlined by the author of the *ST*. More specifically he states that a general will never achieve something noteworthy 'if he does not boast the wisdom and judgment of Solomon, the strength of Samson and Hercules, the tactical experience and ability of Cyrus and Alexander and the fortune of Caesar'.[462] The case is no different in Kekaumenos who underlines his advice with figures of the past such as Pyrrhus, Scipio, Hannibal or Belisarios.[463]

By taking the above factors into account, we can further understand and explain the purpose that antiquarian material played in military treatises: it was considered to be an exemplar more credible than contemporary observation. This explains why authors such as Maurice, Nikephoros II and Ouranos, who had first hand military experience and could have highlighted their personal deeds, chose not to do it, but preferred the credibility of sticking to their older sources, copying or paraphrasing them. Therefore, it seems that whenever an older author had already referred to something that a contemporary military writer wanted to discuss, the latter preferred the credibility of the older model with minor changes or additions. In this way the author not only showed that he was familiar with the older works, but also gained credibility. He justified his innovations by presenting

---

educational use of history for Byzantine officers. Alexopoulos 2008-2012: 47-71, argues that Alexius I used ancient stratagems to fight his battles and Neville 2012: 29-45, explains the use of ancient figures as exemplars in historiography.

[456] *ST,* 1.10, 14.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)], with Basil I, *Hortatory Chapters,* 1.65.

[457] Psellos, *Chronographia,* 7.180; Anna Komnene, 15.3.6.

[458] Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, C.196-9; Theophylact Simocatta, 1.14.2 (trans. Whitby and Whitby, p. 40).

[459] Julian, 3.124a-d; Libanius, 18.53,72,233.

[460] Ammianus Marcellinus, 24.2.14-7; Lendon 2005: 293-309. See also Kaegi 1981; 1964b who further speculates about the works known to Julian.

[461] *LT,* 15.29.

[462] *ST*, 1.24 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

[463] Kekaumenos, 2.

them as a slight addition to established practices, or explicitly referred to the past to explain why certain practices were no longer used in his time.

Of course every author and work was different. Some manuals seem more practical than others and some authors appear to be less or more conservative. Be that as it may, there are numerous authors of military manuals who seem to support this approach since their personal comments seem to imply an 'undeclared war' between the credibility of the past and the need to include innovative material. For instance, Urbicius reports in his *Epitideuma* that he was asked to present a formation that will ensure the safety of the army, but hopes that he 'will be excused' since his battle array is his own invention and not connected to the ancient tradition. Towards the end of his work he makes reference to the same issue again, hoping that his formation will not 'be despised just because it has been invented for the first time and has not yet demonstrated its usefulness in practice'.[464]

Maurice reports in his *Strategikon* that he will draw on both ancient authorities and his 'limited experience'. It could be argued that Maurice employs a *topos* here. He deliberately tries to humble the value of contemporary experience as opposed to the well-established ancient authorities. This seems to be further supported by the fact that he continues to state quite apologetically that he 'has no pretence of breaking new ground or of trying to improve upon the ancients' for he recognizes them as necessary.[465] In addition, Leo VI felt the need to explain that first he tried to find information for naval warfare in the older tacticians and when he failed to do so, he consulted contemporary commanders.[466] Similarly, Constantine VII explains that he did a lot of research to find sources which deal with the matters of an imperial expedition. But he was only able to find the work of Katakylas, which was not to his liking; therefore, he altered it, probably with the help of individuals who had some personal experience.[467] Constantine VII fabricated authority for his material stating that ninth-century practices were undertaken by Constantine the Great (324-337) and Julius Caesar (d. 44 BC).[468] The author of the *Geoponika* states that he does not regard all the evidence from the authors of antiquity he has cited earlier as credible and true, but he explains that he added their views so that he may not be regarded as having omitted the words of the ancients.[469]

[464] Urbicius, 2; 15 (trans. Burges and Greatrex, p. 60, 67).
[465] *MS*, introduction, 14-21 (trans. Dennis, p. 8). See also: Rance 1994: 85.
[466] *LT,* 19.1.
[467] Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, C.20-39.
[468] Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, B; Haldon 1990: 45.
[469] *Geoponika*, 1.14.11.

Moreover, the author of the *ST* reports that it is necessary for those who write about tactics to cover both ancient and contemporary practices, so as for his reader to become well versed in the deeds of both ancient and contemporary generals because that is how a military manual becomes effective.[470] It seems that the author of the *ST* placed references to antiquarian material carefully in order to justify some of his major innovations. For example, before he deals with the new hollow square formation, he explicitly refers to its originality. Right after the discussion of the square formation, however, it seems as if the author felt the need to link the new with the old and so he explains that Aelian and Polybius had proposed to increase or decrease the number of intervals according to the situation.[471]

Likewise, perhaps to justify the introduction of new troops such as the *peltastai* and the *kataphraktoi*, the author of the *ST* first decided to present the armament of their Hellenistic counterparts, which is given in Byzantine terminology.[472] Then, the contemporary situation is presented and it comes as no surprise that their Byzantine counterparts are also referred as *peltastai* and *kataphraktoi,* perhaps to further imply that there was no rigid break with the tradition.[473] In addition, even Nikephoros II Phokas, an author who was quite original and treated his sources more freely, felt the need to explain why he differentiated himself from the Hellenistic phalanx. More specifically, Nikephoros explains that so deep a formation was out of use in his day, since in contrast to ancient practices, the Arabs have reduced their depth, thus rendering the Hellenistic formation obsolete.[474]

However, other authors were not so conservative; instead they emphasized that personal experience and creativity should also play a part in warfare and strategy. For instance, Ouranos used numerous ancient works and the only surviving title of his treatise in the *Constantinopolitanus Gr*. 36 cites no less than eighteen ancient authorities. Nevertheless, he differentiates himself from ancient siege practices, explaining that in contrast to classical authors who preferred siege engines, his experience has shown that undermining the foundations is the most effective way to capture a fortification and he continues to note that he will only refer to methods which are currently in use.[475] Additionally, while the author of the *DV* cites older military manuals, he reports that he will also write according to his

[470] *ST,* 1.1.
[471] *ST,* 47.1, 20. See also chapter seven below.
[472] *ST,* 30, 31; See McGeer 1995: 182 who states that the Macedonian phalanx was the standard exemplar for the infantry in the tenth century.
[473] *ST,* 38, 39. Maurice and Arrian tried to justify their innovations in the same way, see: Rance 1994: 111, 119.
[474] *PM,* 1.63-74; McGeer 1995: 182, 187; Sinclair 2012: 202.
[475] *TNO,* 65.139-47, 169-72; Dain 1937: 13; Dain and Foucault 1967: 371; McGeer 1991: 137-38; c.f. Holmes 2010: 77 who refers to another similar example from the *De Obsidione*, where the author proposes the use of siege engines as the most effective way.

own experience.[476] To further underline his approach, he clearly states that 'All this we are setting forth as experience teaches. It is up to you to apply it to circumstances at the urgent needs of the time. For tradition alone does not do it, but it must be reinforced by the assistance of God, and only then the outcome of the battle shall be assured'.[477] Kekaumenos seems to support this approach, on the one hand he advised his readers to read ancient manuals, but on the other he went further to report that:

> Devise what you need yourself as well, not only what you have learned and heard of from the ancients, but think up other new things, which are within the capacity of human nature to invent. Don't say; 'It wasn't handed down to us by the ancients'. I tell you that human nature possesses innate cunning and wisdom; just as those very ancients invented their devices, you make your own discovery yourself and win a victory. For certainly they were men just like you.[478]

Last but not least, we should not be too keen to associate antiquarian material directly with outdated practices. We ought to take into account that the basic practises of warfare remained largely unchanged before the invention of gunpowder. This is not to say that nothing has changed, but the very bases of leadership, siege-warfare and battle formations were not altered. Be that as it may, Onasander's work was still very relevant to any tenth-century Byzantine general.[479] Moreover, the Byzantines could find a great deal of useful information from older tacticians or historians and it is no surprise that tenth-century siege manuals specifically cite and use them as their sources, sometimes revising and updating them.[480] Finally, while armament, formations and the roles of infantry and cavalry had changed, the commander could still look for ideas in the ancient formations of Aelian. It is no coincidence that Kekaumenos, who was a veteran, urged his readers to do so and, after all, Aelian also appears in a number of Byzantine manuals such as the *PS*, *LT*, the *ST,* and the *TNO,* which draw selectively on him either directly or indirectly.[481]

Having discussed the views and problems usually proposed against the practical use of military manuals in Byzantium, it will be worthwhile to go deeper into the other side of the argument. There is more direct evidence in favour of the practical use of at least certain manuals. This evidence can be grouped in four main categories, and examples from the *ST* can be seen in all four.

---

[476] See for example, *DV,* preface, 19.5; 21.1; Sullivan 2010: 157-8.
[477] *DV,* 16.8 (trans. Dennis, p. 203).
[478] Kekaumenos, 2 [trans. Roueché (online publication)].
[479] Kaegi 1983: 20-21.
[480] *De Obsidione*, 76-77; Sullivan 2000: 4-15; 2003: 144-5.
[481] See for example, Aelian, 25.1-2,9, 31.1,3, 36.1-2, 38.1, 39.1; *PS,* 22-23,31; Rance 1994: 76-7; 2007: 703-4; Zuckerman 1990: 217-9; Haldon 2014: 40; Dain 1938: 9; 1937: 87-9.

The first concerns how the authors of military manuals saw their works. Judging from their comments, they regarded their treatises as practical handbooks rather than purely literary works. Despite that the author of the *ST* records that his book would be effective if it covered both ancient and contemporary practices, he reports that he will put emphasis on what is contemporary.[482] Maurice begins his work by stating that he will focus on practicality and that his book is 'an elementary handbook for generalship'.[483] The same message appears indirectly in *LT.* Leo VI had written his book in a form of imperial legislation, always addressing it to the generals, which seems to imply that he saw it as a way of legislating for warfare, and, therefore, probably expected his advice to be followed as an order . What is more, in the epilogue of the work we read that the book was compiled in response to the Arab threat, but this might have been absent from the original version and could have only been added in the version known from *Laurentianus Plut*. 55.4.[484] The author of the *Poliorketika Parangelmata*, states that his purpose is to present the ancient siege engines, but also to update and make them relevant to his time, since according to him, his target audience is the military commanders and it is they who will benefit from his work.[485] A hint towards practical use is also given in the *DV.* Although the author cited information from his personal experience and that of other contemporary commanders, he felt the need to apologise that his tactics 'might not find much application in the Eastern regions at the present time', due to the fact that the Byzantines were mainly on the offensive.[486]

Nikephoros Ouranos implies the practicality of his work in a different way. He states that 'it is inappropriate for some [devices] to be described to prevent their becoming known to the enemy'.[487] It seems, therefore, that Ouranos regarded Byzantine manuals as practical handbooks which were to be carried in the battlefield, and as a result implies that some of them were deliberately generic for fear of being stolen by the enemy. Ouranos' concern does not seem to be completely unfounded. Constantine VII reports that military manuals were intended to be part of the imperial baggage-train, and could therefore end up in the hands of the enemy if the latter was looted.[488]

---

[482] *ST,* 1.1.

[483] *MS*, intro.10-4, 22-31 (trans. Dennis, p. 8-9); Dennis 1981: 13-6; Hunger 1978: ii.329-30; Kolias 1993: 39-44. For the use of simple language and the military 'slang' in the *MS* see: Rance 2004: 265-326; 2004b: 96-130; Gyftopoulou 2013: 84-6.

[484] *LT*, epologue.71; Grosdidier de Matons 1973: 229-31; Tougher 1997: 169-71; Haldon 2014: 22-5.

[485] Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 1-4, 58; Sullivan 2000: 15-21; c.f. Holmes 2001: 480, who states that the author fails to keep a simple style and argues that the manual was more a court debate on how to use the past for the current needs rather than something used by generals. See also Sullivan 2010: 155.

[486] *DV,* preface.1 (trans. Dennis, p. 147).

[487] Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 599.

[488] Constantine VII, *Three Treatises*, C.196-9.

We are aware of some cases in which the Arabs had at their disposal material deriving from treatises of antiquity or even from Byzantium. The oldest was compiled by al-Harthamī, written for the Arab caliph al-Ma'mūn (813-833), but unfortunately it is only known to us in an abridged form which is preserved in much later manuscripts. The original work appears to have been called 'Al-Ḥiyāl' (Stratagems) and seems to include passages which originally derived from Aelian, Arrian and Onasander. Some of its contents seems to have been very similar to those of Byzantine military manuals, covering aspects such as the qualities of a good general, espionage, ambushes and night attacks, formations, sieges, camps and marches, but it might be that its material rather reflected classical practices than contemporary Abbasid ones.[489] S. al-Sarraf reports that an anonymous treatise on military organization and stratagems was written in the late ninth or early tenth century, the author of which claims to have been inspired by an ancient Greek passage he found himself, while another fourteenth century Arab writer, al-Aqsarā'ī drew heavily upon Aelian.[490] The final case concerns *LT* which was, partly or wholly, at the disposal of the fourteenth-century Arab war-writer Ibn Mankali, who paraphrased and used parts of it in his own manual. It is unclear, however, whether he translated the work himself or used an existing translation.[491] Regardless of the process, in the eyes of Ibn Mankali, who both originated from a military family and was also a high-ranking military officer himself, the treatise of Leo VI was a manual 'written for the use of the Byzantines in their warfare against Muslims' and 'contains great military benefits'.[492] He also comments that it is 'useful for anyone who is engaged in fighting the enemy on land or at sea', which seems to imply that he regarded it as a practical handbook.[493]

The second group of arguments in favour of the practical use of manuals is connected with scholarly views which argue that these treatises were written in order to tackle new dangers and respond to current threats or needs.[494] The basic argument of these scholars is dependent on original material that is found in certain manuals, which provides us with an updated version of tactics and/or equipment. This is especially true for the manuals of the tenth century, where a gradual evolution can be observed from *LT* to the *ST*, to the *PM* and the *DRM* and finally to the *TNO*.[495] From a slightly different

[489] For the manual see: Kennedy 2001: 111-4; Haldon 2014: 43-44; Shatzmiller 1992: 253-7.
[490] Sarraf 2004: 178-9, 195, 198.
[491] Christides 1984: 137-43; 1995: 83-96; Serikoff 1992: 57-61. The texts of the Arab translations have been edited and translated by Ahmad Shboul in Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 645-66.
[492] Christides 1984: 139; Serikoff 1992: 58.
[493] Pryor and Jeffreys 2006: 656-7, 660.
[494] See for example: Strässle 2006: 51, 55-8; Kaegi 1983; Rance 1994: 142-7; Dennis 1997: 178; Haldon 1999: 149-50, 172; Sullivan 2003b: 520-1; Luttwak 2009: 235-408; Sinclair 2012: 201.
[495] See chapter five and chapter seven for more detail.

perspective Meredith Riedel argued that *LT* should be seen as a manual of practical value because its original material touched upon both current practical and intellectual problems. She demonstrated that the moral of the army played a central role in the work of Leo VI who attempted to revive it using Christian theology. Thus, similarly to the ninth-century intellectual context of anti-Muslim polemic, Leo underlined the superiority of Christianity and created a Byzantine philosophy of warfare.[496] These arguments do only concern military manuals, they also extent to other treatises as well. For instance, the *DC* is no longer regarded as a manual of outdated practices, but as playing a central role to the restoration or renovation of ceremonial practices in the time of the Macedonian dynasty.[497]

In the previous chapter, we have discussed the military innovations that are found in the *ST* and how these fit to the new military context of its time, as well as how its author seems to have been aware of the new challenges and roles the army had to fulfil.[498] Other examples include the original material of *MS* which, according to some, highlights the adaptation of the Byzantine army to fight against mobile nomads, Slavs and Persians.[499] Others have gone further than that and by comparing the original material of *MS* to the historical narratives, they have concluded that certain generals, such as Herakleios, were familiar with its instructions and practically applied them.[500] While the dependence of Leo VI on *MS* is undisputed, a number of scholars have highlighted the originality of *LT*, most importantly the chapter which is devoted to fighting the Arabs, as well as shifts in attitudes and perceptions of war with reference to Byzantines and Arabs.[501] McGeer has highlighted some of the innovative material of the *ST, PM* and *TNO*, distinguishing between tradition and originality, with some examples of practical use.[502] In addition, Sullivan has underlined the innovative material in the *Poliorketika Parangelmata* and the *De Obsidione Toleranda*, and provided some parallel examples of practical use from historical narratives.[503] Last but not least, a number of scholars have interpreted the *DV* as a manual with a great degree of originality and in practical accordance with the situation on the Arab-Byzantine borders.[504]

[496] Riedel 2010.
[497] Featherstone 2013: 139-44.
[498] See chapter five above.
[499] Dennis 1984: vii-xv; Dain and Foucault 1967: 344-5; Hunger 1978: ii.329-30; Rance 2005: 429-31, 435-6, 450, 455, 460-1, 464, 468-9; Syvänne 2004: 16-9.
[500] Kaegi 1992: 57-61, 100-11, 123-28, 251-6; 2003: 117, 129-30, 161-3, 168; Trombley 2002: 241-52, 258-9; Karantabias 2005-6: 28-41; Whitby 1988: 130-2, 138-83, 276-304.
[501] Kolias 1984: 129-35; Dagron 1983: 219-43; Haldon 2014: 33-8; Riedel 2010.
[502] McGeer 1991: 129-38; 1995: 174-360.
[503] Sullivan 2000: 5-21; 2003: 139-45.
[504] Haldon and Kennedy 1980: 97, 105; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 215-87; Dennis 1985: 137-41; Haldon 2014: 100-1; Theotokis 2012: 5-15; Decker 2013: 132-40.

The third argument that wants manuals to have played a practical role has to do with how the Byzantine court functioned. In the Byzantine world there was no military academy as such. Therefore, military knowledge could only be acquired by limited and specific means. The most obvious way would be to spend some time in the army, to be promoted to an officer and acquire first-hand experience. Another possible way would have been for someone to be part of a military family and thus acquire experience either from being instructed by a senior or even campaign with him to observe. According to TC, that is how Basil I chose to instruct Constantine, his intended heir, by bringing him along on expeditions, 'to (...) be his teacher in tactics'.[505] The third way, which was the quickest and least risky, was to learn about military matters by reading. The writings which somebody could have consulted may have well varied. We have already seen that some military commanders read ancient histories in order to educate themselves about war, but historical texts did not always provide with detailed coverage on all aspects of warfare.

Another possible source of learning could have been to read 'promotional literature' of the military aristocracy, such as biographies of famous generals and families like the Kourkouai or Phokades. Although these sources are no longer extant, it can be speculated that they probably included a great deal of military information. However, this seems to have been a genre that did not start to be established until the middle of the tenth century, so it does not seem to have affected matters much by the time the *ST* was compiled.[506] An additional solution, although undoubtedly quite an exclusive one, would have been for somebody to consult official army reports or correspondence. These military bulletins were sent from the field to Constantinople to inform about the course of events and results of battles. Nevertheless, even if somebody was in the position to have access to this material, it seems that records were not systematically kept, and thus probably these reports played little or no educational role.[507]

Finally, one could consult military manuals, and there are a number of primary sources which record their use in war or for educational purposes.[508] We have already seen that Constantine VII instructed that military manuals should be part of the imperial baggage and that Caesar John Doukas and Alexios I were recorded to be familiar with the writings of Aelian. According to Psellos, Basil II acted much as Kekaumenos and the *DV* proposes, drawing up his army by 'having read of some [formations] in

[505] *VB*, 46 ((trans. Ševčenko, p. 165); Skylitzes, 141
[506] Sinclair 2012: 267-72; Holmes 2005: 202-16; Markopoulos 2009: 702.
[507] Sinclair 2012: 171-4, 197-208. See also: Kolia-Dermitzaki 1997: 213-38; Mullett 1997: 41-3; 1981: 82, 88-9; Dennis 1988: 161; Ševčenko 1992: 189-93; Shepard 1995: 115; 2003b: 109-13.
[508] McGeer 1995: 191-5; Sinclair 2012: 201.

the manuals and others by devising himself during the operations of war, the result of his own intuition'. Likewise, Psellos reports that Romanos IV (1068-1071) was envious of him because he 'was thoroughly conversant with the science of military tactics, that had made a complete study of everything pertaining to military formations, the building of war-machines, the capture of cities, and all the other things that a general has to consider'.[509] The author of the *Vita Basilii* seems to further imply the dominant role of military manuals, in educating potential commanders. He states that 'were it possible for everyone to learn military science or art without study and considerable practice, authors of works on tactics who devote so much labour to this topic would be merely ranting senselessly'.[510] In addition, Nikephoros Bryennios records that Basil II, who was responsible for the education of Isaac and John Komnenos, appointed tutors so that among others the boys will 'study military treatises, so as to learn how to draw up a formation, array the files, how to pitch camp correctly and set up a palisaded encampment, and all the other things that the tactical manuals teach'.[511]

One may argue that such comments were promotional, aiming to present figures in an ideal light, but the mere fact that authors chose to promote figures in such a way implies that this was the way things were supposed to be done.[512] Nevertheless, the practical need for military manuals in Byzantine society is better highlighted by the fact that the main qualification to become a *strategos* or a military commander was to possess the full trust of the emperor. In the tenth-century context of powerful military families, the emperor wanted to make sure that no *thema* would revolt against him and that the person in charge of an expeditionary force would not attack Constantinople. Therefore, military experience and knowledge seemed to have been of secondary importance compared to loyalty. Under those circumstances the role of such manuals could prove invaluable. We possess a number of examples of how military operations resulted in disaster due to military blunders, which almost all military manuals warn against.

A popular example is that of Constantine Gongylios, a eunuch who enjoyed the trust of Constantine VII, holding the title of *patrikios*. Put in charge of the campaign to re-conquer Crete in 949, Gongylios failed to post sentries at night and secure his camp with the result that the Byzantine force was slaughtered by an Arab night-attack. Both Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon describe him as somebody who had no experience of warfare.[513] Even if we argue that it was not entirely the fault of Gongylios,

[509] Psellos, *Chronographia*, 7.137 (trans. Sewter, p. 353), see also 1.33.
[510] *VB,* 36 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 135).
[511] Bryennios, 1.1.
[512] The *VB* is largely promotional and Psellos usually records Basil II ideally and Romanos IV badly, see: Krallis 2012: 81-100 and the discussion below.
[513] Skylitzes, 245-6; LD, 7.

or that Leo was biased against eunuchs,[514] the account of Skylitzes seems to verify that some commanders lacked military experience.[515] For instance, Krateros, *strategos* of the Kibyrrhaiote theme, committed a similar blunder in Crete during the reign of Michael II (820-829), and the case was no different in the reign of Basil I.[516] Basil was convinced to replace the more experienced commander in the East with Stypeiotes. Stypeiotes once again failed to post sentries and secure the Byzantine camp, thus the Byzantine army was annihilated by a night attack, something which is also corroborated by Arab sources.[517] Stypeiotes is described as somebody who had no clear plan in mind, and who lacked prudency and experience.[518]

Except for educational practices there is also a final argument in favour of the practical use of military manuals. A number of historical narratives seem to provide similar information to the military treatises, or describe Byzantine commanders acting in similar ways. This evidence has led a number of scholars to conclude that indeed certain generals were aware of them and applied their instructions on the battlefield. Such examples include emperor Herakleios and *MS,* Leo the Deacon and the *PM,* as well as siege descriptions from historical narratives up to the *Alexiad* and the manuals of *ST*, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, and the *De Obsidione*.[519] However, the parallel information between the historical narratives and the military manuals is of course something a historian cannot readily accept as proof that the advice of the manuals was applied on the battlefield. This is especially true when somebody attempts to identify the practical use of the *ST* due to the fact that the major Byzantine sources for the tenth century were either written in the second half of the century or in the eleventh or even in the twelfth century. This creates a difficulty that not only concerns the way in which Byzantine historical narratives chose to describe warfare,[520] but also the fact that many of our historical narratives seem to have drawn on non-extant sources.

Some of these lost sources are identified by scholars as deriving from biographies or encomia of successful generals or battle reports, written in the context of peer rivalry between powerful families.[521] For instance, we have evidence for the existence of a book that covered the military deeds of John

[514] Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 30; Makrypoulias 2000: 355-6.
[515] Other examples can be found in Skylitzes, 7, 32.
[516] Skylitzes, 45-6; TC (b), 2.25; Genesios, 2.12.
[517] Tabarī, 2103; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.102-3.
[518] Skylitzes, 141-2; *VB,* 51.
[519] See the discussion above, and also below for other parallel passages. For the *Alexia*d, see: Sullivan 2010b: 51-6.
[520] See for example: Riedel 2012: 578-83; Sinclair 2012; Kaldellis 2012: 206; Neville 2012: 29-45; Lilie 2014: 157-210.
[521] Holmes 2005: 202-39, 278-89; Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 13-4; Kaldellis 2013: 45-8; McGrath 1995: 152-64; Howard-Johnston 1983: 239-46; 2000: 302-3; McCormick 1986: 192-4; Sinclair 2012: 150-1, 153-7.

Kourkouas and for others which were dedicated to Nikephoros II.[522] This military promotional literature can be problematic for two main reasons. Firstly, it seems to have included praise to the figures it was dedicated to, and secondly its target group seems to have been the military aristocracy, namely men with military interests and experience who could have enjoyed reading about idealized generals who acted similarly to the treatises.[523] As regards battle reports, although they could have been a more credible source, there is one point of concern. Namely, that one might choose to distort actual events to his advantage, especially when we know that these reports were sometimes read publicly or even sent to foreign rulers.[524]

When we take into consideration the above factors together with the militaristic context of elite Byzantine society from the tenth century onwards, we are faced with one major concern. Namely, are the parallel events between the manuals and the historical narratives proof for the practicality of the military treatises or have they been included to the narratives as part of lost sources whose purpose was to present figures as ideal generals who played 'by the book'?[525] For example, Holmes has argued that when it comes to describing Bardas Skleros in action, the parallel information between the narratives of Skylitzes and Psellos on the one hand, and the *PM* and *TNO* on the other, should not be taken at face value, but as deriving from a pro-Skleros source which aimed at presenting him as a general who acted by the book.[526] Similarly, certain scholars have wondered whether this is the case with Leo the Deacon's narrative of Nikephoros II Phokas, Leo Phokas and John Tzimiskes where fortified camps, night-attacks and frontier warfare all reflect the advice of the *PM* and the *DV.* These too may have drawn on similar promotional literature and can be questioned as evidence for the practicality of the manuals.[527]

It would be better neither to reject nor to accept the practicality of the manuals on the basis of the parallel evidence between historical narratives and the treatises. It would be too easy for the practicality

[522] TC*,* 427-8; Skylitzes, 230; Psellos, *Historia*, 98; Markopoulos 2006; c.f. Treadgold 2013: 198 who argues that Manuel's work was not a biography of Kourkouas, but a wider history in which Kourkouas was featured.
[523] For lost promotional literature in Theophanes Continuatus, Leo the Deacon, Skylitzes and *Vita Basilii,* see among others: Sinclair 2012: 267-316; Markopoulos 2003: 186-8, 193-6; 2006; 2009: 697-710; Morris 1988: 85-6; Ljubarskij 1993: 252-253; Roueché 1988: 127-8; McGrath 1995: 152-64; Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii.352-7, 358-64, 399-400, 480-5; iii.248-9; van Hoof 2002: 163-83 Holmes 2005: 268-98; Kazhdan 2006: 167, 273-4, 279-80; Kiapidou 2010; Kaldellis 2013: 45-8; Treadgold 2013: 226-70, 329-39; Andriollo 2014: 119-31.
[524] Sinclair 2012: 158-89, 390-7; Magdalino 1993: 314; Shepard 2005: 178-80; McCormick 1986: 42-4, 190-6; Walker 1977: 301-5, 319-27; Kaldellis 2014: 235-40; Howard-Johnston 2010: 422-23; 1994: 70-1. Whitby 1988: 97; Kaegi 2003: 131-32, 156.
[525] For an overview see Sinclair 2012: 302-18.
[526] Holmes 2005: 284-87; c.f. McGeer 1998: 294-99.
[527] Sinclair 2012: 306-8, 361-5; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 165-70; Cheynet 1986: 293-6, 299-301.

of the manuals to be overestimated or to be underestimated. After all these sources are not extant and their exact contents or distortions can only be guessed at. The mere fact however, that these lost sources seem to have chosen to portray the generals as playing it by the book, even if their evidence is entirely false, implies that the instructions of the manuals were not something marginal and entirely theoretical, but rather how the general was expected to act, at least ideally. This shows that they had been an integral part of the way military aristocracy thought and understood warfare.

Therefore, the degree of practicality of the *ST* can be estimated by comparing its instructions with the historical narratives of this era, while also considering the effect of these lost promotional sources. This can be achieved by approaching our sources more critically and comparing them not only with other type of Byzantine sources but also with Arabic material. We will study the degree of practicality of the *ST* focusing on aspects and traits of generalship, rewarding and punishing soldiers, gathering intelligence, camps and night attacks, siege-warfare, numbers units and formations, as well as guerrilla warfare.

Practical information 1: Aspects and traits of generalship

It is no surprise that the *ST* is addressed directly to the general and that he is to a great extent the centre of its focus. The manual does not only advise the general on tactics and formations, but also guides him on how to cultivate his character and stance on warfare. All these shape the image of the ideal general and the vast majority of these passages derive from Onasander. Although the work of Onasander was very old, it was still, to a very large extent, relevant, and with minor additions and adaptations became ever more so. Onasander's influence becomes more evident when we take into account that apart from the *ST* extensive passages of his work can be found in other military manuals as well, such as *LT* and the *TNO*.[528] What makes the practicality of these passages difficult to estimate, is that most of them are connected with moral characteristics or aspects of bravery, which Byzantine historians would manipulate according to the situation to make a moral point to their readers.[529]

The *ST* features a number of traits, all deriving from Onasander, which the general should have as part of his character. These traits occur in the historical narratives and are highlighted in such a way so as to appear as a major factor for the outcome of a battle. Thus, narratives which draw on promotional literature or describe successful commanders seem deliberately to associate their subjects

[528] Strässle 2006: 52; Haldon 1999: 37.
[529] Lilie 2014: 168-76.

with these characteristics, while when some disaster has occurred, it is blamed on the moral character of a general and the lack of such traits.

For example, the *ST* reports that the general should be 'prudent, so that he might not abandon his devotion to the most important [things], by being drawn to physical pleasures' and that 'extravagant indulgences (...) do not allow for keeping vigilant in the most important matters'.[530] In this light, Nikephoros II is described by Leo the Deacon as someone who had 'a temperate disposition and was not tempted by pleasures' and Psellos portrays Basil II as somebody who endured 'the rigours of winter and the heat of summer' and 'kept his natural desires under stern control'.[531] In juxtaposition Leo the Deacon blames the defeat of Nikephoros Pastilas in Crete when he was ambushed by the Arabs, on the fact that he and his troops were absorbed by the riches of the countryside and 'indulged in indolence and luxury'. The story continues with the prudent Nikephoros II Phokas giving a fictional rhetorical speech on how victory will be assured if everybody refrains from physical pleasures.[532]

Similarly, the *ST* states that the general should be 'firm so as not to be puffed up in times of victory', 'open to counsel' and 'not so stubborn, so that it is impossible for something better to be thought, considered and said by somebody else'.[533] These traits are once more used to create a negative image and a moral cloak for defeats. For instance, during his expedition to Sicily in 964/5, Manuel was influenced by his early victories. He pursued a retreating enemy and ended up getting his army trapped in difficult terrain. He is therefore described by Leo the Deacon as 'hot-headed and self-willed' and by Skylitzes as somebody who ignored good advice.[534] It is interesting though, that this imagery is not limited to the Byzantines. Miskawayh and Ibn al-Athīr, attribute the defeat of Sayf al-Dawla, in 950, to his stubbornness and his failure to accept that the Tarsians possessed a better espionage system than him. Sayf ignored the intelligence of the Tarsians who reported to him that the passage he intended to retreat through was already occupied. However, Bikhazi has argued that this accusation is not entirely fair as there was distrust between Sayf and the Tarsians at that time.[535]

Another characteristic of the ideal general which appears in the histories is used to underline the exemplary good character of a figure through his supposed deeds.[536] Following an advice originally found in Onasander, the author of the *ST* reports that 'when an essential piece of state business presses,

[530] *ST*, 1.7-9 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[531] Psellos, *Chronographia*, 1.32 (trans. Sewter, p. 46).
[532] LD, 9-10 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 62-4); Hoffmann 2007: 113-5
[533] *ST*, 1.10, 1.20, 1.23 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[534] LD, 66-7 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p.115-7); Skylitzes, 267.
[535] Bikhazi 1981: 846.
[536] Lilie 2014: 168-76.

in which the army has to serve the general with manual labour, the general himself should be the first to begin the work'.[537] This is used by authors of promotional historiography and thus Leo the Deacon describes how Nikephoros II, after urging his troops to build a fortress close to Antioch to assist in its submission, took 'a rock on his shoulder (...), and climbed up the hill, ordering all the army to do the same'.[538] The author of the *Vita Basilii* states that Basil I 'eagerly joined his soldiers at their work and put heavy loads upon his shoulders and carried these loads to the bridge' when he wanted to cross the Euphrates to pillage.[539] The historicity of this events is highly doubtful. It is not a coincidence that this anecdote only appears in promotional narratives. Leo the Deacon and the author of the *Vita Basilii* either copied that from a lost promotional source or perhaps shaped their narratives directly from Onasander to underline that their subject acted similarly to an ideal general.[540] Once again, this image is not restricted to Byzantium, as it also occurs in an Arab promotional source. The poet and close associate of Sayf al-Dawla, al-Mutanabbī, reports that during the reconstruction of the walls of al-Hadath in 954, Sayf assisted his men in the work by building with his own hands.[541] The appearance of relevant material in the Arab sources raises questions of whether this was something universal, or the Arabs perhaps had copies of Onasander or Byzantine treatises in their disposal.

In spite of the fact that, so far, most aspects of generalship which are found in historical narratives are regarded fictional and symbolic, there are others which may shed some light on whether some of these aspects were indeed followed in the battlefield. To begin with, the *ST* advices the general to keep his judgement for a course of action secret until it is time to apply it. It also dismisses those 'who share secret plans (...) with all the soldiers' as 'senseless and with imperfect intelligence', explaining that if plans are widely disseminated, they end up being reported to the enemy by deserters.[542] It is no surprise that this trait appears in the historical narratives. Psellos reports this advice almost verbatim as given by Bardas Skleros to Basil II during their meeting in c. 991, quoting Skleros to have said 'share with few your most intimate plans'.[543] Holmes has argued that this passage could have been included for promotional and encomiastic purposes, such as to justify Skleros' career or facilitate the rehabilitation of the family.[544] Nevertheless, the fact that this trait was expected to be followed by the commander in

[537] *ST*, 5 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; Onasander, 42.2; *MS*, 8.1.1.
[538] LD, 75 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 125).
[539] *VB,* 40.7-15 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 145). The event is also described in *LT*, 9.14.
[540] See for instance: Jenkins 1954: 20-30; van Hoof 2002: 163-83; Mango 2011: 4, 10-1; Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii.331-8, 352-6; Kazhdan 2006: 137-44; Treadgold 2013: 165-76; Markopoulos 2009: 697-706. For the campaigns of Basil, I against the Arabs see: Tobias 2007.
[541] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.331-2; Canard 1951: 779.
[542] *ST*, 1.21-2, 6 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; Onasander, 3.1, 9.24.
[543] Psellos, *Chronographia,* 1.28 (trans. Sewter p. 43).
[544] Holmes 2005: 282-4.

battle is supported not only by reasons of practicality, but also from Arab sources.[545] In what appears to be a military dispatch, written in 903 by Muḥammad Sulaymān for his victory over the Qarmatians, we read that as soon as the commander learned about the exact location of the enemy, he 'kept this information concealed from the officers and everybody else and did not reveal it'.[546] Although we have seen that military dispatches have their weaknesses as sources, it seems safe to assume that the mere need to refer to his concealment of information may suggest that this was indeed an accurate reconstruction of the way that a commander was expected to act.

The final trait of generalship we may be able to shed some light on is whether commanders engaged in hand to hand combat. The author of the *ST*, once more drawing heavily on Onasander, reports that 'the general should fight prudently rather than daringly, or he should altogether refrain from coming to blows with the enemy'. He then continues to highlight that the same should be applied during a raid, possibly in an attempt to make the passage more relevant to contemporary practice, since the yearly raids were an important aspect of Arab-Byzantine warfare.[547] Other Byzantine manuals, such as *MS* and *LT* record the same advice since they instruct the general to draw up in the middle of the second line and discourage him from fighting with his own contingent.[548] This is reasonable enough, as McGeer and George Dennis have demonstrated how the death of a general in a medieval context could prove disastrous for the fate of battle. In the same line of reasoning Nikephoros II proposes in the *PM* to aim the charge of the *kataphraktoi* directly against the enemy general, which is likely to make the enemy flee.[549]

To what extent this advice was followed in practice during the tenth century is difficult to assess, due to the scant and contradictory nature of the sources. This seems to be a clear case where the historical narratives seem to have been influenced differently according to the sources they used. Narratives which draw on promotional lost sources tend to present their subjects taking part in heroic deeds or single combat, while at the same time also portraying them acting as prudent and careful generals who followed the advice of manuals. This contradiction can be explained by the culture of the military aristocracy. Their idea of the brave soldier was influenced by the dual imagery of Achilles

[545] See the discussion on acquiring information below.
[546] Tabarī, 2239 (trans. Rosenthal, p. xxxviii. 136).
[547] *ST*, 4.1,3 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; Onasander, 33.
[548] *MS,* 7.B1.8-10; *L.T*. 14.3, 14.99; *ST*. 46.17; McGeer 1995: 285.
[549] *PM*, 4.121-53; McGeer 1995: 307-8; Dennis 1997: 174-5; Haldon 1999: 228-31.

and Ulysses in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, or by the brave deeds of Roman warriors, as well as single combat and cunning warfare of the *Old Testament*.[550]

The narrative of Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes are characteristic of this problem. When they refer to central figures of their work, like Bardas Skleros, Nikephoros II Phokas and John I Tzimiskes, we find references such as 'he always used to fight (...) in the van of the army, ready to meet any danger that came his way, and ward it off valiantly' and 'he was not afraid of attacking single-handed an entire enemy contingent and (...) would return again (...) to his own close formation. What is more, detailed descriptions of hand-to-hand fighting are sometimes provided.[551] Although this fulfilled the purpose of presenting a figure in an ideal and heroic way, the majority of passages from chronicles narrating events up to the middle of the tenth century do not provide much evidence of generals being involved in direct fighting, while some of the battle narratives of Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes contradict the image they had already set for certain protagonists.

Byzantine sources appear equal contradictory for less well-known figures too. A famous tenth-century example is the commander of Adrianople, Leo. During the siege of 921 by the Bulgarians, Theophanes Continuatus reports that he was called 'Moroleon', i.e. foolish Leo, because of his daring behaviour. Nevertheless, Theophanes comments that it would be more proper to call him 'Thymoleon', i.e. brave Leo.[552] Other historians do not seem to share his view; Symeon Magister refers to him as Moroleon, although he does record that he accomplished worthy deeds against the Bulgarians, and Skylitzes describes him very rash and calls him 'Moroleon'.[553] The testimony of Arab sources seems to agree in part with the less heroic image of the general. When we have a description of an expected battle, the Byzantine general is not involved into the fighting.[554] A good example is the battle between John Kourkouas and Sayf al-Dawla in 938. Sayf managed to emerge victorious against the Byzantines but had to penetrate deep into the Byzantine troops before he could reach Kourkouas.[555]

---

[550] Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 13-4; Morris 1994: 209; McGrath 1995: 156-9; Holmes 2005: 240-98; Sinclair 2012: 319-85; Kaldellis 2013: 35-52; Neville 2012: 2-27, 121-38, 194-203; Markopoulos 2009: 697-714; Andriollo 2014: 126-38; Lilie 2014: 188-90; Kazhdan 2006: 273-8.

[551] LD, 29-30, 96-7, 110-1 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 82, 146); Skylitzes 290-1. See Holmes 2005: 272-6, for the differences in the accounts of Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes.

[552] TC, 404-5.

[553] Symeon Magister, 136.27; Skylitzes 218; Holmes 2005: 150-1; Sinclair 2012: 355.

[554] However, in 953, the Byzantine commander Bardas Phokas was wounded in the face, which might imply he had a more active role in battle, see: Skylitzes, 241; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.323-6, 362; ii.348-51; Canard 1951: 774-6; Bikhazi 1981: 747-8.

[555] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.121-2.

To sum up, the appearance of similar qualities in the narrative sources and the manuals most probably served as means to idealize or disapprove of figures, or even explain defeats in terms of lack of morality, probably because the lack of these ideal qualities can also be regarded as a sin in the Christian and even Muslim religion and morality.[556] The profile of a general is something which appears to have largely been influenced by promotional literature or biases in the historical narratives. Some qualities, such as avoiding battle and not sharing information, seem to have had some practicality, but there is little doubt that the *ST* provides an updated version of how the ideal general should be, a version which seems to be in accordance with the concept of Christian morality and the ethos of the military aristocracy in the tenth century and beyond.[557]

Practical Information 2: Punishments and Rewards

The author of the *ST* dedicated two chapters to the discussion of military punishments. His material draws heavily on *MS*, while similar passages are also found in *LT*.[558] In the version of the *ST* we read that 'the general must moderate the offences of the rank and file and he should not aim his punishments at the masses so that common discontent may not unite them in revolt. At any rate, he should only inflict sentence and punishments on those who were the ringleaders of indiscipline'.[559] The need for somebody to punish justly and with moderation is well highlighted in the thoughts of Attaleiates who records how Romanos IV's excessive punishment to a soldier made a very bad impression. Skylitzes reports that Leo V (813-820) would punish everyone with extreme severity in order to instil fear, and thus 'earned the hatred of all his subjects'.[560] Although the comments against Leo V might be quite exaggerated due to the iconophile perspective of the sources, the advice of the *ST* seems rational and sound.

There is a number of passages in our sources which report that some generals treated the rank and file with leniency while inflicting severe punishment on individuals. These narratives usually appear in a number of different chronicles and present events with what seems to be a neutral tone. To begin with, Michael II (820-829) managed to deal with the revolt of Thomas the Slav by giving amnesty to the masses that supported the rebel. As a result, the rank and file apprehended Thomas who was

[556] Sinclair 2012: 361-5.
[557] For some considerations of the ideal general in the treatises see Strässle 2006: 371-6 and chapter five above.
[558] *MS*, 7.6,15, 8.1.2, 3, 15; *LT,* 13.6, 19.20, 20.18.
[559] *ST*, 17.1-2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[560] Attaleiates, 20.153; Skylitzes, 17 (trans. Wortley, p. 19); Genesios, 1.15; TC (b), 1.14.

severely punished by amputation of all his limbs. The amnesty, along with the punishment of the leading figure alone, led the rebel garrison of Bizyes to act accordingly, seizing Thomas' son Anastasios and surrendering him to Michael.[561] John Kourkouas undertook a similar course of action during the revolts against Romanos I. All the chronicles agree that Kourkouas managed to suppress the revolt of Bardas Boilas and Adrian Chaldos and after his success 'he only blinded the most important of the men he arrested, and confiscated their property, but the poor and insignificant he let go scot-free'.[562] Kourkouas' actions facilitated in achieving unity and ensuring that no new ringleaders would take over.

The following two examples of Leo the Deacon and Psellos might be a little suspicious, as their narratives usually presented Nikephoros II and Basil II as playing it by the book. Leo the Deacon records an event when in 965, during a march to Tarsus, one of the soldiers of Nikephoros II dropped his shield, something which the emperor noticed. Nikephoros ordered the officer in charge to punish the soldier by cutting his nose and parading him through the camp. When the officer disobeyed his orders, Nikephoros ordered the same punishment to be applied at the officer explaining that such a punishment was inflicted in order to discourage similar behaviour by others.[563] Psellos reports that Basil II 'promptly discharged' and 'punished like common criminals' certain individuals who rashly charged the enemy, disobeying his order to hold the line.[564]

Despite the caution that one must show when reading the above two accounts, the lenient treatment of the rank and file in critical times is something which occurs in both Byzantine and Arab sources. The *ST* makes specific reference to this situation stating that 'if the enemy is already approaching and a pitched battle is expected, it is appropriate for the general at that time to be very remiss about punishing the soldiers who commit offences, (...) mitigating, as far as possible, those who are under suspicion, as well as having a disposition towards leniency'.[565] Byzantine sources record a similar situation in the reign of Theophilos. The emperor was in battle against the Arabs, when the majority of his army was routed and thus abandoned him in the field with only a small unit of men. When Theophilos managed to escape he 'limited himself to scolding the army which had abandoned him, he did nothing else unpleasant'.[566] This narrative agrees with Arab sources which also stress the lenient

[561] TC (b), 2.19; Genesios, 2.8; Skylitzes 40.
[562] Skylitzes, 217 (trans. Wortley, p. 211); Symeon Magister, 136.26; TC, 404.
[563] LD, 57-8. For the legal punishment of throwing the equipment during the battle see: Ashburner 1926: 93; McGeer 1995: 335-8.
[564] Psellos, *Chronographia,* 1.33 (trans. Sewter, p. 47).
[565] *ST*, 15.1 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[566] Skylitzes, 68 (trans. Wortley, p. 69); TC (b), 3.22.

approach of Theophilos towards his soldiers in the midst of war. Al-Tabarī reports that prior to the siege of Amorion, part of the Byzantine army did not manage to unite with the emperor when a battle took place. Theophilos learned that this force was routed by the Arabs and that the Byzantine commander in charge had abandoned his troops. Afterwards Theophilos arrested him and had him decapitated, but since the campaign was far from over he ordered the Byzantine garrisons of surrounding fortresses to punish the soldiers only with lashing and then to point to them the location of the new rally point.[567]

While some sort of punishment was usually reserved for offences and indiscipline, the *ST* encourages the general to reward those who distinguished themselves in battle. Most of the material of the *ST* is slightly revised from *LT*.[568] More specifically, we read that 'it is fit for the general to give benefits to those who acted bravely during the battle, promoting some to a higher rank, or giving money, or land grants to others'.[569] There seems to be little doubt that such measures had some practical appliance and there is, in fact, a number of similar references in different kinds of sources.

On the one hand, most references to rewards given in the tenth century are more or less fixed in the historical narratives, leaving the historian to wonder whether they are mere cliché. For example, Theophilos 'awarded gifts and various honours to' Theophobos and his Persian troops who helped him escape from the battlefield.[570] In 965, after the siege of Mopsuestia, Nikephoros Phokas 'handed out donatives to the host as was fitting',[571] and after the end of his campaign in 971 John I Tzimiskes offered gifts to his victorious army, 'as was fitting'.[572]

But on the other hand, we have evidence which is more specific and supplements our knowledge. A military oration written, most probably, in 950 by Constantine VII specifically records promotions as rewards after battle.[573] Constantine VII states that 'the commanders of the *tagmata* and the other units who fight courageously will be rewarded in proportion to their deeds, some to become *tourmarchs*, others *kleisourarchs* or *topoteretai'*. He then goes on to report that even the common soldiers 'who

[567] Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.301; Tabarī, 1243.
[568] *LT*, 16.1-5.
[569] *ST*, 50.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)] and also 1.26 where the original source is Onasander, 34.1-2.
[570] Skylitzes, 68 (trans. Wortley, p. 69); TC(b), 3.22; Grégoire 1934: 183-204; C.f. Genesios, 3.9; Treadgold 1979: 180-2 who argues that Manuel saved the emperor. For the different accounts see Codoñer 2014: 132-5.
[571] LD, 53 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 103); c.f. Skylitzes 269 who confirms the reward of the army, but states that they were given a specified amount of the booty. Leo the Deacon dates the fall of the city in 964, but Skylitzes, 268 and Yahya, i.796, place it in 965. For full analysis see: Apostolopoulou 1982: 157-67.
[572] LD, 159 ((trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 201). For donatives and cash rewards see: Haldon 1984: 307-18.
[573] According to Mazzucchi 1978: 296-8 and McGeer 2003: 116, c.f. Ahrweiler 1967: 402 who proposed the date of 952-953.

display the traits of valour, will receive the due reward'.[574] It appears that these promotions were neither only promises nor mere rhetoric. Apart from their reference in military manuals they also appear in historical narratives. For example, after the great victory of Leo Phokas against Sayf al-Dawla in 960, Romanos II gave promotions and distinctions to those who fought bravely under Leo Phokas,[575] while just after the battle of Dorostolon (971), John I Tzimiskes granted promotion awards to his men which 'made them even more zealous for battle'.[576] Similarly, the distribution of land grants to distinguished soldiers appears to have been a measure that was indeed followed. Evidence for this is found in legal texts whose purpose was practical and administrative. Nikephoros II Phokas reports in one of his novels that abandoned lands were given to soldiers who performed valiantly in battle.[577]

Distinguished soldiers, however, did not only receive material awards. Sometimes there were given honorary rewards instead, like an invitation to eat with the army commander and the high-ranking officers. The *ST* records that the general 'should show favour to the distinguished men with banquets and breakfasts, some [given] by himself and others by their commanding officers'.[578] While a number of passages from historical narratives seem to agree with this practice, estimating the practicality of this measure falls to the same problem of evaluating the narrative of promotional sources.

Historical narratives which drew on promotional sources appear to be very problematic. Their passages include generic clichés, like that of Leo the Deacon, who states that John Tzimiskes 'rewarded his soldiers (...), with banquets' and 'entertained them with sumptuous banquets' after his triumph.[579] Psellos records how Bardas Skleros ate and drank together with his soldiers, which resulted in enhancing the soldiers' loyalty to him. Holmes has interpreted this as an exaggeration drawn from a pro-Skleros source that depicted him as an ideal commander.[580]

Although Holmes is correct to raise caution for this passage, one should not be too willing to accept that the advice of the manuals had no practical value whatsoever. The *Vita Basilii* records that the domestic of the *scholai* Antigonos invited prominent military and political figures in his banquet.

---

[574] Constantine VII, *Military Oration*, 85-93 (trans. McGeer, p. 120).
[575] Skylitzes, 250.
[576] LD, 141 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 186). The statement 'made them even more zealous for battle' is suspiciously close to the advice of the *ST,* 50.2 and *LT*, 16.3, about how the spirits of the rewarded men will become more eager after their reward, and could perhaps have been part of a lost promotional source, written by somebody who was aware of relevant passages from the manuals.
[577] *JGR*, i.247-8; McGeer 2000: 86-9.
[578] *ST*, 50.3 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]. See also Constantine VII, *Three Treatises,* B.92-4, where the emperor is reported to dine with two or three table guests.
[579] LD, 141, 159 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 186, 201).
[580] Psellos, *Chronographia,* 1.25; Holmes 2005: 285-91, 294-7.

Despite the fact that the *Vita Basilii* is, to an extent, a promotional text, and similar methodological problems may arise, the reference to this banquet is only causal and neutral, and it is not directly linked with military activities or rewards, something which seems to make it somewhat credible.[581] Other passages casually refer to military banquets as an established practice, even though they appear in anecdotes which belong to legend. For instance, we read that a gypsy predicted the accession of Michael II to the throne, which led his military commander to invite him to a banquet 'to the exclusion of all others, even of those who were of superior birth and rank'.[582] Perhaps more relevant is the event recorded in the chronicles during the conflict with the Bulgarians in 922. Romanos I, after the destruction of the palace of Theodora, gathered the various commanders of the army in a banquet 'urging them valiantly to go forth against the foe'. While one may argue that Romanos I is here portrayed as an energetic ruler who does everything to urge his men to battle, the narrative cannot be regarded as particularly promotional since the direct result of the banquet was to inspire a surprise attack which was eventually a failure.[583]

It seems, therefore, that the *ST* gave more or less well-established means of rewarding those who distinguished themselves in battle. But although these were reserved for the few, the booty was distributed to all soldiers. Our manual records that:

> The distribution of spoils should be made equally among those who engage in fighting: likewise, among those who are on guard behind them or among those who guard the baggage train. They should be given both to the lower [ranks] and to the higher, because this is the law for the whole army. The general should not receive a portion from our majesty's grant more than the old tenth or the present sixth.[584]

The complete practical application of this passage is difficult to assess. The historical narratives which usually refer to such matters are sometimes promotional and usually give generic information without referring to specific figures. We read, for instance, that after his victory, Leo Phokas 'distributed most of it [the booty] to the army' or that in 961, after the capture of Chandax, Nikephoros II Phokas 'handed over everything to the soldiers as plunder'. The rest was 'displayed at the triumph (...). Then he deposited the wealth of the barbarians in the public treasury'.[585] More helpful, perhaps, is the fact that the author of the *ST* is presenting this information as deriving from some kind of legislation, since he

[581] *VB,* 12.
[582] Skylitzes, 26 (trans. Wortley, p. 29); TC (b), 2.5.
[583] TC, 403; Symeon Magister, 136.23; Skylitzes, 216-7 (trans. Wortley, p. 210).
[584] *ST,* 50.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[585] LD, 23, 27, 32, 53 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 75, 79, 84); Skylitzes, 254, TC, 306.

uses the phrase 'στρατῳ νόμος'. This demonstrates that this practice was supposed to be followed, as it had some legal force. Indeed, the passage derives from the *Procheiros Nomos* that dates around 870-879 or 907,[586] but this raises a number of other issues. It is unclear whether the sixth remained an unchanged figure in our period. *LT* for instance, states that it was the fifth which was to be reserved for the public funds.[587]

The contemporary value of the rest of the passage is likewise hard to determine. The author of the *ST* copied from the *Procheiros Nomos* that 'the increase in salary should suffice', but he added 'and the plentiful grants which are given to them on each [occasion] by our God-crowned majesty'.[588] To what extent this reflects the situation of our period is hard to tell. The only available hint seems to be provided by comparing the information provided by Ibn Khurdādhbih, the *DC* and Liudprand of Cremona concerning the payment of officers. Judging by their accounts, Treadgold has shown that the payments seem to have been reduced at some point in the reign of Leo VI, and then restored back to normal.[589] Be that as it may, Byzantine chronicles may supplement this view since they record a number of generous expenditures and donatives made by Romanos I and Constantine VII.[590]

In conclusion, the advice of the *ST* concerning punishments and rewards seem to fit the challenges and context of tenth-century Byzantine warfare. While it is impossible to argue that it was always followed verbatim, there is evidence which points towards its application. Lenient punishments are recorded in both Byzantine and Arab sources. Rewards and distribution of booty are not only validated by historical narratives which one might argue were influenced from biased accounts, but also from other types of sources, most importantly legal ones, whose purpose was mainly practical or at least intended to be. However, certain details such as the amount of spoils that went to the public treasury, or whether the payments of officers were indeed higher before the middle of the tenth century seem to be less clear.

---

[586] *Procheiros Nomos*, 40; Schminck 1986: 98-101; C.f. van Bochove 1996: 29-56.
[587] *LT,* 20.192; Kyriakidis 2009: 168; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 231-4; Kolias 1995: 131-2.
[588] Trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming).
[589] Treadgold 1992: 91-2.
[590] TC, 417-8, 429-30, 446-52; Symeon Magister, 136.57-59; Skylitzes, 225, 231. These expenditures seem to imply a sufficient economic stability during the reign of Romanos I which could have been used for army expenditures. The above evidence can be seen together with the conversion of Melitene to a *kouratoria* (934,) which provided additional money to the treasury of Romanos. TC, 443, speaks of Romanos' excessive demands from the poor of some *themata* which if true could mean that extra money was given to the army. This reference, however, could merely have been a rhetorical scheme to underline the injustice that supposedly existed in the times of Romanos I so as to portray Constantine VII as a better leader.

Practical Information 3: Gathering Intelligence

In a world where conflict was endemic and guerrilla tactics and raids played an important role, sometimes taking place even three times per year, warfare was dominated by manoeuvres, ambushes and ruses. In this context the gathering of information could prove both challenging and vital for a successful campaign.[591]

The *ST* advises the general to obtain information about his surroundings and the routes that the enemy is intending to take before and after the battle.[592] A good example of how negligence towards this matter could prove fatal is given by Arab sources which narrate the events that took place in 953. After Sayf al-Dawla had finished ravaging the area of Melitene, he tried to retreat following the *kleisourai* South-East of the city. Constantine Phokas, the son of the *domestic* of the *scholai* Bardas Phokas, managed to follow Sayf closely and blocked his way by capturing the mountain passes with his infantry. As a result, Sayf was compelled to retreat and to find another way to cross. The Byzantines took advantage of his absence and ravaged the region of northern Syria and Antioch. However, Sayf was well informed about this turn of events and by forcing his way across the Euphrates, he surprised the Byzantines by returning and attacking them. The latter, who were not informed about Sayf's whereabouts, were taken by surprise from his manoeuvre. This resulted in a complete defeat, the Byzantine army suffered heavy losses, among them, the *patrikios* Leo, son of Maleinos, while other *patrikioi* and Constantine Phokas were taken captives. The domestic of the *scholai* himself, was injured to the face and all the Arab prisoners and booty was recovered by Sayf.[593] However, the tables turned in 962, as Sayf was the one who failed to discover which route Nikephoros II Phokas followed, which resulted in a sudden engagement outside Aleppo where Sayf was utterly defeated.[594]

To avoid such predicament, a way to gather intelligence was required, the most obvious one being espionage. The *ST* states that the general should not act before he is well informed about the matters that concern the enemy. It continues to report that his can be achieved 'by always sending spies throughout their camp and by placing them in ambuscades, as well as by reconnoitring the nearby places for lying in wait, in case the enemy might be hiding in them, and by taking care of everything

[591] See Haldon 2013: 373-86 for a study of information gathering and guerrilla warfare.
[592] *ST,* 8.2; 44.4; 51.1. The sources of these passages can be traced to *MS*, 8.1.32, 10.2.23-29, 7.13B; *LT*, 14.25.
[593] Skylitzes, 241; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.323-6; ii.348-51; Canard 1951: 774-6; Bikhazi 1981: 747-8.
[594] Canard 1951: 812; Bikhazi 1981: 856-61.

that regards the safety of his army'.[595] Similar information is of course recorded in earlier manuals such as *MS* and *LT*.[596]

The narrative which appears to be closer to the advice of the manuals is in the history of Leo the Deacon. For instance, Leo records how Nikephoros II Phokas sent Nikephoros Pastilas to scout the surroundings immediately after he disembarked on Crete and how Leo Phokas spied on the camp of the Hungarians to find out their numbers.[597] Furthermore, he also states that Bardas Skleros, prior to dealing with the Rus, 'summoned John Alakas and sent him out as a scout to observe the Scythians, estimate the size of the host, and see where they have camped and what they were doing'. The same man 'immediately sent spies disguised as beggars to the camp of Bardas Phokas'.[598] Finally, John Tzimiskes ordered his generals to send spies to the enemy camp and then to inform him about their plans.[599] The above passages might seem enough to argue that the advice of the *ST* was followed almost verbatim in the tenth century, but this is not the case. The historian is compelled to look at this evidence with some caution, since certain scholars has argued in favour of lost promotional sources in the narrative of Leo the Deacon. It may, therefore, come to no surprise that those passages in Leo the Deacon which have parallel information with military manuals either drew material from promotional sources, or narrate the deeds of people Leo personally favoured, such as the Phokas family, John Tzimiskes and Bardas Skleros.[600]

To remedy the weaknesses of Leo the Deacon's text, one can turn to the account of Theophanes Continuatus which also records the conquest of Crete. Theophanes Continuatus' narrative, which treats the deeds of Nikephoros II Phokas in a more moderate manner than that of Leo the Deacon, also agrees that Nikephoros had employed spies in the first stage of the conquest.[601] Theophanes Continuatus seems to be equally problematic though, since he had most probably modelled his narrative on Procopius' *Vandal War,* in which Belisarius is also recorded to have used spies early in the conquest.[602]

Be that as it may, even if the above sources do not allow us to draw safe conclusions for the practicality of the advice of the *ST*, the use of spies in the tenth century cannot be excluded so readily.

---

[595] *ST*, 7.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]. See also 44.3.
[596] *MS,* 7A.13-20, 7.3.
[597] LD, 9, 19.
[598] LD, 109, 120 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 159, 168).
[599] LD, 108.
[600] Ljubarskij 1993: 252-3; Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 14; Morris 1988: 85-6; McGrath 1995: 153-6,162 Kaldellis 2013: 42; Sinclair 2012: 50-7, 361-5; Holmes 2005: 273-6, 278-89; Kazhdan 2006: 283; Riedel 2012: 580-3.
[601] TC, 475-6. For the use of espionage by the Byzantines see: Koutrakou 1995: 135-44.
[602] Kaldellis 2015: 302-11.

There is, in fact, additional evidence which derives from both Byzantine and Arab sources. To begin with, Byzantine chronicles also record the use of spies earlier in the century during the reign of Romanos I, when the Byzantines spied on the movements of the Bulgarians.[603] But apart from the account of manuals and historical narratives, the practical use of spies is also attested in administrative documents. In the *DC,* the *archon* of Cyprus is reported to have been responsible for sending spies to Tarsus and Syria, prior to the Cretan expedition of 911.[604] The Arab sources further prove the use of spies, recording for instance that Byzantine spies were caught prior to the poorly documented Byzantine expedition against Egypt in 926.[605]

It seems, consequently, that despite promotional sources and *mimesis*, the advice of manuals on espionage had some practical value in the tenth-century battlefield. Information on how these spies functioned or on how they were chosen is also found in the manuals. Some relevant passages are found in earlier treatises such as in *MS*, *LT* and the *PS*, but most of these are incorporated in the *ST*.[606] In the latter, we read that spies 'must be prudent and bold, know the customs and the language of the enemy and also have a precise knowledge of the roads and topography'.[607] The knowledge of the Arabic language appears to have been an indispensable skill, allowing spies to mingle unmolested with the enemy. Scholars have demonstrated that such men were indeed available to the Byzantines, if needed, and this appears in both Byzantine and Arab sources.[608] For instance, Leo the Deacon states that John Tzimiskes ordered bilingual spies to be sent to the enemy, and al-Tabarī records that during the siege of Amorion (838), the Byzantines tried to send a letter to the emperor, giving it to a man who could speak both Arabic and Greek, hoping that he could pass through the enemy lines without trouble.[609]

As far as the strategy of spies is concerned, the *ST* states that 'when we want to send them to conduct espionage, we take each one privately, and suitably instruct them one by one about those things which they should know, so that they may communicate with one another under the pretence of buying or selling when they are in hostile territory, and thus reveal what is happening'.[610] The information that spies acted under the pretext of trade, or approached each other in the markets is also referred, in more detail, in the *DV*.[611] While there is no similar reference in Byzantine historical narratives, Arab sources

[603] Symeon Magister, 136.17.
[604] *DC*, 657.19. For further evidence on intelligence and its capabilities in the tenth century see: Shepard 1995: 109-16.
[605] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.189, ii.259.
[606] *PS,* 42; *MS,* 8.2.26, 9.5.51-55; *LT,* 20.84.
[607] *ST*, 25.1 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[608] See for example, Beihammer 2012: 387-400; Haldon 1999: 224; Decker 2013: 144-8.
[609] LD, 108; Tabarī, 1246; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.302.
[610] *ST,* 25.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[611] *DV*, 7.2.

seem to agree that such methods were indeed employed by Byzantine spies. Ibn Ḥauqal, who was a contemporary to the events he describes, reports that during Romanos I's reign the Byzantines sent some merchants by ship. The merchants started to gather information about the regions and the state of affairs in the frontier, and under the pretext of conducting business, they met with a number of important Arab figures, and then reported back to the Byzantines.[612]

Although spies were an important source of information, they were certainly not the only one. Intelligence could also be gathered by other means, one of which was through defectors or traitors. The *ST* warns the general that he must be suspicious of defectors 'even if some (...) come (...) proposing an attack or promising to lead the way through roads unknown to most men, (...) or to unexpectedly fall upon the enemy', while it also notes that defectors should not be readily trusted because they might give false information which had been planned beforehand.[613] The need to practise caution at the words of Arab defectors seems to have been a contemporary practical issue which is also confirmed by Arab sources. For instance, we know that, in 932, the Byzantines missed a great opportunity to re-capture Melitene since they intended to launch an expedition, only to be discouraged by an Arab defector, called Bunnay b. Nafīs. The circumstances were very favourable for the Byzantines: the cities of the Arab frontier had revolted against the Caliph in protest against his neglect of their protection. There was a significant disruption of foodstuff and supplies, not to mention that a civil war was underway in which one of the leading figures of the army, Mu'nis, was trying to install a new Caliph on the throne. It seems that Bunnay b. Nafīs, who was also an associate of Mu'nis, was asked by the latter to discourage a Byzantine attack, so that Mu'nis could focus on achieving his internal-policy goals.[614]

Other contacts with defectors were more fruitful for the Byzantines. Skylitzes reports that Niketas Chalkoutzes, who probably accompanied Sayf al-Dawla to his expedition in 950 as a hostage, kept Leo Phokas constantly informed about the routes and plans of the Arabs, and so contributed to the Byzantine victory that year.[615] However, neither Leo the Deacon nor Theophanes Continuatus mention the contribution of Chalkoutzes.[616] Similarly, al-Tabarī records that Theophilos attacked and captured Zapetra in 838, after he was urged to intervene by al-Bābek. Al-Bābek welcomed a Byzantine invasion

[612] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.415-6.
[613] *ST,* 27.2, 44.7 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]. This passages seems to derive from *MS*, 8.1.36, 9.3.21-31; *LT*, 17.32,92 20.38.
[614] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.268; Canard 1951: 735; Bikhazi 1981: 422-5.
[615] Skylitzes, 242; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.341-5; Koutrakou 1995: 142.
[616] Leo the Deacon is also silent about the capture of Cyprus by Niketas in 965. For the capture of Cyprus see Sinclair 2012: 56; Lemerle 1972: 153-4; Savvides 1993: 371-8.

since he had rebelled against the Caliph earlier in the year, and being hard pressed at that time, he looked forward to any distraction of the Caliph's' troops.[617]

Except for defectors, captives and prisoners of war were also used for gathering intelligence. In fact, the *ST* suggests that prisoners of war 'who have been captured by assaults are to be more easily believed, since it appears that they give unprepared responses to our questioning and that they do not lie as much'.[618] Byzantine narratives seem to confirm that captives were a very effective means of acquiring information. Leo the Deacon states that, during the Cretan expedition, Nikephoros II Phokas was informed from war prisoners that the Arabs were gathering forces to attack him unexpectedly, hoping to take him by surprise.[619]

Nevertheless, even if Leo the Deacon perhaps tried to depict Nikephoros II Phokas in an ideal light and deliberately presented him as 'playing it by the book', the Arab sources agree that interrogating prisoners of war to acquire intelligence was a standard and indispensable practice. Al-Tabarī informs us that, in 838, the Arabs wanted to learn about the whereabouts of the Byzantine army and thus they decided to take captives in order to interrogate them. The captives informed the Arabs of the location of the Byzantine army, and of the fact that the nearby fortresses where aware of their plans and position.[620] During the same campaign the Arabs started to face a serious lack of provisions and decided to kill all Byzantine captives. According to al-Tabarī, one of them asked not to be killed and proposed in return to reveal the location of Byzantine fugitives who were carrying supplies with them. The Arab general, al-Mutasim, agreed to follow the way proposed by the old man and to grant him his freedom, should his words prove truthful. This account is similar to the advice of the *ST* on how to act on such cases. More specifically, the *ST* states that if the traitors propose to lead the army through unknown passages:

> The general must keep them under observation after enchaining them close to him. He must safeguard himself with the most horrible oaths that if they tell the truth and do everything for the safety and victory of his army, he will release them from their bonds and that he will provide them with worthy gifts, but if they lie and prove guilty of desiring to put our army into the hands of the

[617] Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.137-41, 293-4; Tabarī, 1235-6.
[618] *ST*, 44.7 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[619] LD, 14. See Koutrakou 1995: 123-32, for more unusual means of gathering intelligence.
[620] Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.296-7; Tabarī, 1238-9. For a discussion about Mutasim's march through Cappadocia during the expedition of Amorion see: Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.149-76; Bury 1909: 120-9.

enemy, they will be immediately butchered with swords, limb by limb, by those who are guarding them.[621]

Al-Tabarī goes on to report that the Arabs started to suspect that the elderly Byzantine prisoner was leading them in circles, at which point they thought of killing him. The old man, with the help of another two captives, finally managed to find the Byzantine fugitives he promised, and he and the other two captives were set free.[622] A similar account is given by Ibn al-Athīr, who states that during the Byzantine-Arab conflicts in Sicily (859) the Arabs took a number of prisoners, among whom was a Byzantine official. The Arab commander al-Abbās ordered that all the prisoners be slain, but the official asked for his life to be spared and in return promised to give information on how to capture Castrogiovanni. The Arab commander accepted and ordered a detachment to follow the lead of the prisoner who during the night showed them a secret doorway close to sewers.[623]

Nevertheless, important information could also be provided from refugees. The *ST* warns of the fact that refugees might inform the enemy and advises that 'if the general is setting out to have a city delivered by betrayal at a specific time, he should first capture and deal with those whom he encounters on his way, so that none of them may inform those who are inside about the assault by running on ahead, and so that our army's assault might be completely unexpected to them'.[624] The passage originally derives from Onasander, but it is also found in other Byzantine treatises such as *LT*.[625] It is more than rational to argue that this practice was still quite relevant, especially in the context of yearly raids which frequently aimed at storming a number of minor or major fortresses. The practicality of this advice is underlined by both Byzantine and Arab sources. For example, John Kaminiates reports that in 904 the Byzantines were informed in advance by refugees that the Arabs were intending to sack Thessaloniki.[626] What is more, Yahya of Antioch reports that, in 955, the domestic of the *scholai* Bardas Phokas besieged al-Hadath and blocked all the surrounding paths in order to prevent the locals from informing Sayf al-Dawla of the siege. Although Bardas was successful in that, it was the absence of all news that made Sayf suspicious and finally prompted him to march towards al-Hadath, which he successfully relieved.[627]

---

[621] *ST*, 27.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[622] Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.298-300; Tabarī, 1241-2.
[623] Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.220, 366-7.
[624] *ST*, 11.5 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[625] Onasander, 39.4; *LT,* 15.37; Sullivan 1997: 193.
[626] Kaminiates, 29. Some scholars have questioned the narrative of Kaminiates, see for example, Kazhdan 1978: 301-14; Treadgold 2013: 121-3, but others have defended his credibility, see for example, Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii.270-3.
[627] Yahya, i.74; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.97, 125, 337-40; ii.335; Canard 1951: 781; Bikhazi 1981: 778-9.

Of course gathering of intelligence could not go unchallenged by the enemy and there is some evidence that a means of counter-intelligence was employed. We have already seen that this counter-intelligence could take the form of misinformation which was employed by fake deserters who deliberately provided the enemy with false intelligence, but this was not the only way. Counter-intelligence could also involve rumours, false news and propaganda which were deliberately spread by the enemy. The author of the *ST* warns the general against such rumours and how hazardous they could prove to be. More specifically, he states that 'the unpleasant rumours, which are spread by the enemy or even by us, must be closely scrutinized and not ignored, because these rumours are often true. Entire armies suddenly fall into the greatest dangers, when the general is neglectful towards them and he does not take the proper precautions'.[628] Although the passage originally derives from *MS,* endemic warfare with the Arabs seems to have made such behaviour more relevant than ever.[629]

A number of Byzantine and Arab sources suggest that false rumours have been regularly circulated by the Arabs in the tenth century. To begin with, Constantine VII makes explicit reference to this practice in his military oration:

> In truth the Hamdanid has no power. Do not believe in his skills and wiles, he is afraid, he is devious and without a reliable force (...), he is trying to put fear in your minds with ruses and deceptions. One moment he proclaims that another force is on its way to him and that allies have been despatched from elsewhere, or that from another quarter a vast sum of money has been sent to him, while at other times he has exaggerated rumours spread about for the consternation of his listeners.[630]

Despite the reassuring mood of Constantine VII, the act of misinformation is portrayed as a realistic threat, and other Byzantine sources agree that this danger was beyond mere rhetoric. Byzantine chronicles inform us that during the reign of Michael III (842-867), Theoktistos was successful in fighting the Arabs of Crete, until they managed to persuade him that supposedly there had been a coup and a new emperor was reigning in Constantinople. Consequently, Theoktistos left Crete to return to Constantinople, leaving back a portion of his army, which being left without sufficient leadership, was destroyed by the Arabs.[631] According to the testimony of Arab sources, around 955 some Byzantine spies seem to have been fed false information which resulted in the demoralization of their army.[632] In

[628] *ST*, 7.1 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[629] *MS*, 8.1.10; *LT*, 20.13.
[630] Constantine VII, *Military Oration*, 48-51 (trans. McGeer, p. 119).
[631] Symeon Magister, 131.2-4; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.195-6.
[632] Canard 1951: 782.

addition, false rumours seem to have also been employed in the internal Arab conflicts. For example, it is possible that Sayf had deliberately spread false intelligence to al-Ikhshīd, in 944, in order to make him appear as the aggressor and therefore as the one responsible for the breaking of their political alliance.[633]

To sum up, although most of the passages of the *ST* which discuss the gathering of intelligence have little or nothing innovative, they remained more than relevant in the context of tenth-century warfare. A number of historical sources record many similarities with the manuals. Some of these sources are problematic though, as they seem to include *mimesis* and/or promotional material, and cannot be taken at face value. We are fortunate, however, to possess alternative accounts either from Byzantine military orations or historical narratives, but also from Arab historical texts, which seem to underline the practicality and application of such practices.

Practical Information 4: Camps and Night-Attacks

Almost all Byzantine military manuals dedicate a passage or two on how to pitch a camp securely while on campaign. The *ST* is no exception to the rule, and its advice largely draws upon Onasander, *MS*, *PS* and *LT*.[634] The author of the *ST* reports that for the security of the camp

> The general should surround the remaining site with an artificial trench (...). The gathered soil from the trench should not be thrown outside but inside, that is to say towards the side of the encampment. Whenever the ground is harsh and cannot easily be dug, he should secure the camp in every direction either with a wall made of bricks, or stones, or tree trunks, or with fences, or with a large number of wagons, above all due to the enemy surprise attacks and especially ones at night.[635]

The security of the camp was supposedly a standard characteristic of a prudent general, or at least that is what the historical narratives want us to believe. The problem lies in that most passages which describe Byzantine generals applying the advice of the manuals word for word, have either employed *mimesis* or drawn material from promotional sources. For example, Leo the Deacon describes how John Tzimiskes secured his camp with a ditch and used the gathered soil as a wall, in which he constructed a palisade with spears, stating that 'it was customary for the Romans to set up their camp

[633] Bikhazi 1981: 612-3. For earlier examples see: Rance 1994: 202-7. Disinformation was regularly employed by Byzantine diplomacy, for an analysis with a focus on diplomatic relations with the West see: Shepard 1985: 275-92.
[634] *ST,* 22; Onasander, 8,9; *MS*, 4.3.53-56, 5.1, 7.13; 12.22; *LT*, 11.3, 8, 13-8, 30-3; *PS,* 29.25-30.
[635] *ST*, 22.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

in this way in enemy territory'.[636] Tzimiskes' actions are evidently similar to the advice of manuals, to the extent that one wonders whether Leo the Deacon is presenting Tzimiskes in an ideal light, or whether he applies ancient Roman practices to his time, to show that Tzimiskes followed the Roman ideal.[637] Similarly, Leo states in another passage that, in his campaign against Tarsus, Nikephoros II Phokas, 'pitched a camp and surrounded it with a palisade', while outside of Chandax, 'he fortified it strongly all around with a stockade and a ditch'.[638]

The fact that Leo the Deacon seems to have been heavily influenced by promotional sources becomes even more evident because not only does he always describe the two generals as securing their camps, but he also records that they picked ideal locations for them, in accordance with the information of the manuals. For example, the *ST* instructs that the most suitable locations are those which 'have drinking water nearby' or 'where there will be a canyon or an inaccessible river or some other rough ground at the rear of those who encamp'.[639] Leo the Deacon records that John Tzimiskes rested his soldiers 'on a secure hill that had a river flowing past on both sides' the night before the siege of Preslav, and that Basil II 'pitched camp in a thicket and allowed the army to rest'.[640]

When the historian turns to the alternative testimony of John Skylitzes, he faces difficulties of similar nature. First of all, promotional sources are also discernible in Skylitzes' narrative. Secondly, Skylitzes sometimes covers military events with certain haste or standardized phrases, which could make his account less credible. For instance, as Holmes has shown, he always uses the phrase 'στρατόπεδον πήξας' in his narrative which would suggest that the camps were always secured and established.[641] On the bright side, we know that Skylitzes coverage of Nikephoros II Phokas' and Tzimiskes' reign is notably more moderated than that of Leo the Deacon,[642] but that does not seem to be of much help in our case. More specifically, Skylitzes agrees with Leo the Deacon, without using one of his standardized phrases, that Nikephoros II had 'set up a strong palisade surrounded by a deep ditch fortified with stakes and staves' in front of Chandax on Crete.[643] This could either mean that

[636] LD, 142-3 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 187). The manuals record the use of the spear-wall in our period, see: *TNO*, 62.31-5 and something similar in *PS,* 27; McGeer 1995: 348-54.
[637] Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 11; Sinclair 2012: 57-60; Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii.492-501; Treadgold 2013: 241-4.
[638] LD, 16-7, 58-9 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 68, 106).
[639] *ST*, 22.3 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[640] LD, 133, 171-2 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 179, 214). On the other hand, there is also the more neutral account of TC (b), 2.18; Skylitzes, 38 who record the choice of a camp which was in suitable location because of the flowing rivers around it during the reign of Michael II.
[641] Holmes 2005: 150-1.
[642] Holmes 2005: 94-5; Morris 1988: 85-8; Sinclair 2012: 61-3; Kiapidou 2010: 353-9.
[643] Skylitzes, 249 (trans. Wortley, p. 240). Skylitzes, 300 also agrees that Tzimiskes had 'established a well-fortified camp' before Dorostolon, but this belongs to his generalized phrases.

Nikephoros II had, in fact, secured his camp, or that perhaps Skylitzes drew on some similar source to Leon the Deacon. The issue remains unresolved even if one turns to the testimony of Theophanes Continuatus, for although he also agrees that Nikephoros II 'χάρακα καὶ τάφρον βαθεῖαν κατασκεύασεν' his account is most probably modelled on that of Procopius' *Vandal Wars*, in which Belisarius is presented to have done the same.[644]

In spite of these difficulties, however, one should not readily argue that the advice of the manuals was never followed in action. There is evidence from both Byzantine and Arab sources which supports that the measures for the security of the camp were considered a standard procedure and that they were not only supposed to be followed by Byzantines, but also by Arabs. In a passage that does not seem to draw on promotional sources or to imitate others, Theophanes Continuatus, implies that securing the camp was, at least theoretically, a standard practice in the Byzantine army. More specifically, we read that in 833 the Tarsians 'found out that (...) neither had he [Stypeiotes] <dug> a trench and <built> a rampart in front of the encampment, nor had he accomplished any other of those things which thoughtful and sensible generals prepare in advance'.[645] In the same spirit, Yahya of Antioch, records how Byzantine generals secured their camp with a palisade and a ditch and explicitly states that this was a standard procedure. We also read that, in 958, Basil Lekapenos campaigned against Sayf al-Dawla, constructing a ditch around his camp everywhere he went.[646] What is more, al-Tabarī not only describes an Arab camp being secured in the same manner as a Byzantine one, but also records how an officer supervised the watches in order to prevent surprise attacks. The latter brings to mind the advice of the *ST* which instructed the general to post and supervise guards at a considerable distance from the camp in order to be able to apprehend spies or to react to night-attacks promptly.[647]

To reinforce the security of the camp, the *ST* and other manuals instruct the general to place caltrops in the ditch.[648] The *Alexiad* records that, in 1082, Alexios used caltrops in order to secure his position from the charge of the Norman heavy cavalry.[649] One may argue that this information should not be taken at face value, since Anna Komnene might have idealised Alexios' actions and modified them to match the advice of the manuals. The caution for this passage is, however, moderated to an extent by

[644] TC, 476; Kaldellis 2015: 302-11.
[645] *VB,* 51 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 185-7).
[646] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.368; Yahya, ii.497, 525, which is also confirmed by Attaleiates, 17.109. For speculations concerning the use of Greek sources by Yahya see Forsyth 1977: 182-98, who concluded that Yahya relied on Greek sources more heavily for the first part of the tenth century, but claims that the only extant source which can be identified with some security is probably Symeon Logothetes.
[647] Tabarī, 2030; *ST*, 21, 22.
[648] *ST*, 22.5; *MS,* 4.3.53-56; *PS,* 29.25-28; *LT*, 11.8. For the camp in *MS* see Gyftopoulou 2013: 77-80.
[649] Anna Komnene, 5.4.5.

a Norman source, William of Apulia. William agrees with Anna that Alexios used caltrops to secure his camp from the Norman cavalry, but another issue may arise here.[650] Scholars have shown that most probably William of Apulia used some common lost source with Anna for his work.[651] One can only guess the contents and style of this work of course, but the possibility that this source contained promotional material cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, the practical use of caltrops seems to be backed by a number of textual and archaeological sources. Mamuka Tsurtsumia has shown the extent to which this practice was applied by the Romans up to the fifth century AD and by the Arabs in the seventh and ninth.[652]

Although the manuals seem to have fulfilled a practical need and included measures for the security of the camp, and these measures seem to have been a standard practice in the Byzantine army, this was not always the case. Byzantine narratives often record defeats which were inflicted by enemy night-attacks against unfortified or disorganized camps. The description of the events is usually followed by comments underlying the inexperience or negligence of the commander in charge. We have already seen how Gongyles, Krateros and Stypeiotes are characterized in this way, but misfortunes such as this did not always occur to inexperienced generals. According to the testimony of Theophanes Continuatus and Symeon Magister, in 917 the domestic of the *scholai* Leo Phokas was fighting against the Bulgarians, but was defeated after the latter surprised him with a night-attack, something which is, nevertheless, not accompanied with negative remarks against him.[653]

Byzantine narratives usually cover the enemy night-attacks with no detail; they confine themselves to say that they happened unexpectedly and that many Romans were killed. A significant exception is the defeat of Stypeiotes in 833 by the Arabs. Both Byzantine and Arab chronicles speak of a night-attack which destroyed the Byzantine army, but the *Vita Basilii* records how 'men and horses were thrown together in confusion and fell upon each other'.[654] This seems to recall the advice of the *ST* which states that in an organized camp the infantry tents should be set in the perimeter and then after a suitable interval the tents of the cavalry, so as for the cavalry to have more time to prepare for battle, but also for the horses not to cause confusion or to run amok in such situations.[655]

---

[650] William of Apulia, 4.11-13.
[651] For the debate on William of Apulia, his sources, and the relationship of his work with Anna see: Mathieu 1961: 38-46; Loud 1991: 48-55; Brown 2011: 162-73; Frankopan 2013: 80-99.
[652] Tsurtsumia 2011: 415-21.
[653] Symeon Magister, 135.23; TC, 390; c.f. Skylitzes 204-5, who reports that Leo Phokas was victorious. For a discussion of the battle and the different narratives in the sources see Grigoriou-Ioannidou 1983: 123-48.
[654] *VB,* 51 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 187).
[655] *ST*, 22.7-8, 12, 49.9.

Apart from direct attacks on camps, the Byzantines also suffered defeats while they were on camp duties, such as gathering forage and supplies which denotes a certain negligence towards posting guards and sentries.[656] The *ST* makes explicit reference to this danger stating that:

> Above all, however, the general must always keep an eye with devotion on this: that neither he, nor any of the picked officers with the stronger *tagmata* under their command should dismount from their horses, before the camp is safely completed and the watches set (...). For the greatest misfortunes befall the army precisely during such times, namely when it is occupied with establishing the camp or with the release of the horses for grazing or when it is dismounted and almost unfit for battle.[657]

It looks as if the author of the *ST* made such an explicit reference to tackle a real practical issue. This of course cannot be determined too readily from historical narratives, since some of them must be approached with caution. To begin with, Leo the Deacon records that during the Cretan expedition and after the initial successful skirmish, Nikephoros Pastilas was defeated by the Arabs of Crete due to his indulgence in luxury and his failure to post sentries and keep vigilant.[658] Leo the Deacon is our sole witness to this event. Theophanes Continuatus only agrees with Leo in that the place where the Byzantines camped was abundant in trees and food, and his account is open to question since it imitates Procopius' *Vandal Wars,* in which a very similar reference is found.[659] What is more, the fact that Pastilas' defeat is followed by a made up speech, given by Nikephoros II Phokas to his men, which urges them to vigilance and abstinence, makes it rational to wonder whether Leo the Deacon invented the defeat of Pastilas to highlight Nikephoros II Phokas as an ideal general who could inspire his men.[660]

Leo the Deacon's sympathies and promotional material make it very difficult to trust his account. In his narrative even time is ideal. A Russian sudden attack on the Byzantine camp, happened as 'evening was drawing on', which is exactly the time that the manuals instruct such attacks are more likely to happen. It comes to no surprise that the Byzantines managed to counter this threat successfully since Tzimiskes was in charge of the army, and thus, playing it by the book, he had kept the camp fortified and his men vigilant.[661] In another passage, Leo the Deacon records that, in 986, the Byzantines were

[656] Haldon 1999: 210-2.
[657] *ST*, 22.11 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[658] LD, 9-10.
[659] TC, 476-7; Kaldellis 2015: 306-7.
[660] Hoffmann 2007: 113-5.
[661] LD, 143-4; c.f. Skylitzes, 300 (trans. Wortley, p. 286).

defeated by the Bulgarians because 'the army fell into indolence and sluggishness as a result of the incompetence of the commanders. Thus the Mysians ambushed them first, when they left the camp for forage and fodder'. This is one of the cases, however, in which his account appears to be more trustworthy since Leo the Deacon was present and an eye-witness to these particular events.[662]

Despite the difficulties of Leo's account, a number of alternative sources, with a notably more neutral tone, record similar events and seem to agree that the advice of the manuals attempted to tackle a real issue of the Byzantine army. Skylitzes describes how, in 965, a Byzantine detachment under the command of Monasteriotes was sent to gather forage and was ambushed outside of Tarsus at night because Monasteriotes had failed to posted guards.[663] Similarly, in 707, Justinian II was defeated by the Bulgarians during the collection of hay since the cavalry camped without guard.[664] Arab sources also record similar night-attacks against the Byzantines, one of which was undertaken, in 959, by Sayf al-Dawla who was successful in defeating the Byzantines and reclaiming all the captured prisoners.[665]

Nevertheless, from time to time the tables turned and it was the Byzantines that took advantage of enemy's negligence. The *ST* dedicates a chapter on the issue of mounting night-attacks against camps. Most of the information of course comes from older manuals, but we can find a certain amount of original material.[666] We have already seen that the author of the *ST* included a new passage in which he described the honourable credentials of a night-attack, explaining that the latter is only worthy when the army is small, ill-prepared, or not fighting-fit.[667]

It seems doubtful that the honourability of a night-attack actually concerned a Byzantine general before he mounted one. First of all, the advice of the *ST* is in contradiction with other military manuals such *LT* and the *PM*. More specifically the two treatises state that:

> It is very dangerous, as we have frequently said, for anyone to run the risk of a pitched battle, even when it seems perfectly clear that <our forces> far outnumber enemy. The result of fortune is unseen.[668]

[662] LD, 171-2 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 213). Skylitzes does not record this event but the account of Leo the Deacon is thought more credible here, see: Holmes 2005: 226-8.
[663] Skylitzes 269, and for a similar case, 302.
[664] Theophanes Confessor, AM6200.
[665] Yahya, i.79.
[666] *ST*, 48; *MS,* 8.1.25, 9.2; *LT,* 17.14-19; *PS,* 39.39-43.
[667] See chapter five above.
[668] *LT,* 18.121 (trans. Dennis, p. 483).

> If the enemy force far outnumbers our own both in cavalry and infantry, avoid a general engagement or close combats and strive to injure the enemy with stratagems and ambushes. The time to seek general engagements with the enemy is when, with the help of God, the enemy has fled once, twice, or three times and are crippled and fearful, while on the other hand our host is obviously confident and their thoughts of valour have been awakened. Avoid not only an enemy force of superior strength but also one of equal strength, until the might and power of God restore and fortify the oppressed hearts and souls of our host and their resolve His mighty hand and power. (...) When She [the Virgin Mary] secure Her people's victory for the third time, from that moment on they need not flinch or recoil in fear.[669]

Secondly, historical narratives hardly ever describe a Byzantine night-attack with negative remarks. The example of Nikephoros II Phokas is characteristic here. Despite the exaggerations of the sources, scholars argue that Nikephoros II had an able expeditionary force at his disposal, perhaps no less than 35,000 men if we judge by the previous Cretan expeditions.[670] But in spite of his able force, Nikephoros II mounted a successful night-attack against the Arabs of Crete in 960, which not only lacks any negative remark, but on the contrary, is described as a triumph by Leo the Deacon.[671] Historians seem to take these honourable credentials into consideration only when they are trying to push their agenda and deliberately highlight how ideal the deeds and the qualities of their figures were. For instance, Leo the Deacon makes explicit reference to the fact Leo Phokas mounted a night-attack against the Magyars in 960/1, because they 'enjoyed vastly superior numbers of troops, whereas he was leading a small and ill-prepared band of soldiers'.[672] This reference is of course very suspicious when we take the authors' pro-Phokas bias into account.[673] Similarly, Theophanes Continuatus preserves an anecdote, according to which, Theophobos proposed to emperor Theophilos 'a night attack on the enemy by the infantry, with the cavalry being brought in as and when needed'.[674] Theophilos chose not to follow this advice, because he was convinced that supposedly the motive of Theophobos was to diminish the glory of the emperor by making him attack during the night. The whole event, however, has nothing to do with practical honourable credentials of a night-attack. There is the alternative testimony of Genesios, who does record Theophobos' proposal, but makes no reference to honour and glory. He merely states that

[669] *PM*, 4.191-212 (trans. McGeer, p. 41).
[670] *DC*, 651-2, 664-78; Tsougarakis 1988: 61-4.
[671] LD, 14.
[672] LD, 19-20 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 72). For a detailed discussion of this battle and of the conflicts between the Byzantines and Magyars see: Grigoriou-Ioannidou 1999: 65-135.
[673] Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 14; Morris 1988: 85-6; Sinclair 2012: 50-6; Kazhdan 2006: 283. Leo Phokas was the subject of many promotional accounts. For his skill in surprise attacks. See: Dennis 1985: 139-40; Cheynet 1986: 302-5.
[674] Skylitzes, 67 (trans. Wortley, p. 69); TC (b), 3.22.

the advice was not followed because Theophilos was already growing suspicious of Theophobos.[675] The whole anecdote seems to have been a literary creation serving to pick sides in the rivalry that existed between two generals, Theophobos and Manuel in lost and extant sources. It, therefore, underlines how untrustworthy Theophobos was and portrays Manuel as the more loyal and worthy general.[676]

The unworthiness of night-attacks aside, the *ST* examines in detail how one should be conducted. To begin with, we learn that 'the best time for a night-attack is two or at most three hours before dawn and when the night is full of starts or the moon is full'.[677] Then the author of the *ST* informs us that 'the tacticians divide the whole army into only three divisions (…). They set two of them on both sides of the enemy camp, with many bugles, trumpets and copper drums, because in this manner the approaching army gives the impression to the enemy that it [is] many times larger'. He goes on to explain that the third division advances against the enemy camp directly, and that the camp should be attacked from three sides and not encircled, so that the enemy has a route to escape and not fight bravely due to desperation.[678]

The question of whether this advice was indeed followed on the battlefield is a very challenging one. The biggest problem in this case is that most references to night-attacks are given without much detail. For example, in 959 Pothos Argyros is simply recorded to have attacked the Magyars during the night, to have massacred them, and to have reclaimed booty and prisoners, but we know little about how he achieved this.[679] On the other hand, when more detailed accounts are available, they usually draw on promotional sources and describe the deeds of emperors or loyal generals, to such an ideal light, that they seem to have copied their accounts word for word from the manuals. To begin with, the *Vita Basilii* records that the *strategoi* of the Charsianon and Armeniakon *themata* conducted their night-attack against Chrysocheir, the ideal time, just before dawn, while Leo the Deacon has Nikephoros II Phokas conduct his at another ideal occasion, when there was a full moon.[680]

Apart from time and occasion, the procedure of night-attacks also perfectly matches the description of the manuals. The *Vita Basilii* describes how the Byzantines picked one part of their force to assault the camp and the others took place on the slopes around the camp to so that they 'would let out

[675] Genesios, 3.8.
[676] Codoñer 2014: 132-5; Kaldellis 1998: 45-7.
[677] *ST*, 48.6.
[678] *ST*, 48.1-2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[679] TC, 462-3.
[680] *VB,* 42; LD, 14.

terrifying clamours with deafening war whoops and trumpet blasts (...), so as to make it appear that vast numbers were involved', and Leo the Deacon reports that Nikephoros II attacked after 'ordering the trumpets to sound and the drums to roll', just before the assault.[681] The same author also has Leo Phokas attack the enemy camp by dividing his army into three sections. Given the lack of any further detail, Leo's words here could either denote the standardized phrase used by historians to describe a drawn up formation, or on adherence to the advice of the manuals not to surround the enemy camp completely.[682] The only thing that is in contrast with the advice of the *ST* is that Nikephoros II is recorded to have completely surrounded the enemy camp, something which could have served to highlight the effectiveness and gallantry of Nikephoros' troops.[683]

The author of the *ST* gives an additional way of attacking enemy camps. He reports that 'if there is a river flowing between both camps, especially if it [is] impassable to the cavalry, commanders have quickly obtained victory when they suddenly appeared against the enemy, after a bridge was built there and the army safely crossed over it'.[684] The practical evaluation of this practice has very similar difficulties. Skylitzes reports that Nikephoros Ouranos employed the exact same strategy against the Bulgarians in 997. According to Skylitzes' account, Ouranos pitched his camp opposite the Bulgarians' with the river Sperchios between them. Since the river was overflowing and an approach seemed impossible, Samuel neglected his guard. When Ouranos found a suitable spot to cross the river he managed to reach the enemy camp at night and to slay the Bulgarians who were still sleeping.[685] Given, however, that Skylitzes could have used lost promotional sources which idealized the deeds of Ouranos, the lack of any reference of this event in another source compels us to be cautious about whether this reflects a practical use of the aforementioned advice or whether it is a promotional tool.

To sum up, it is very difficult to evaluate with certainty whether the advice of manuals concerning camps and night-attacks was indeed followed on the battlefield. As far as the security of Byzantine camps is concerned, we are on firmer ground. Promotional accounts like that of Leo the Deacon and John Skylitzes argue that these measures were followed by successful Byzantine commanders and there are good chances that these narratives are idealised. We are fortunate enough, however, to possess alternative accounts from more neutral Byzantine sources and even Arab ones which seem to agree that securing the camp was supposed to be a standard practice in the Byzantine army. In similar terms,

[681] LD, 14 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 67); *VB,* 42 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 153). Genesios, 4.36, has a similar narrative with the *VB,* because he seems to have used the latter as a source, see for example, Treadgold 2013: 186-8.
[682] LD, 18-9.
[683] *ST*, 48.2; LD, 14.
[684] *ST,* 1.18 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[685] Skylitzes, 341-2.

it seems quite logical to argue that there were indeed times that commanders were neglectful towards securing their camps or posting sentries and consequently suffered similarly to what the manuals describe. The variety of materials from a wide range of Byzantine and Arab authors seem to confirm that the warnings of the manuals served a very practical purpose and were perhaps included in response to failures. On the other hand, the only thing that can be said with certainty about Byzantine night-attacks is that they were indeed conducted from time to time. The safe evaluation of whether the procedure of night-attacks in the manuals was indeed followed in action seems to be impossible. Our most detailed sources are mostly promotional which seem to describe an ideal conduct of operations which followed the advice of manuals almost word for word. Therefore, in the absence of other parallel accounts, one cannot take the evidence of these sources at face-value.

Practical Information 5: Defensive Siege Warfare

Sieges were a very important aspect of Byzantine warfare especially during the tenth century. In this period, the Byzantines were involved in numerous sieges against fortified cities and fortresses such as Melitene, Marash, al-Hadath, but they were also called upon to defend their own strongholds against seasonal Arabic raids and counter-attacks. Therefore, siege warfare included both defensive and offensive practices which are covered separately in the *ST*.[686]

As far as defensive siege warfare is concerned, the *ST* provides the general with detailed advice which covers almost every aspect of a siege. The author of the *ST* instructs the general to take some necessary measures before the arrival of the enemy. Firstly, the general is advised to stockpile food supplies in order to be able to withstand a lengthy siege. Supplies were most probably gathered from the surrounding countryside which had the additional benefit of preventing the enemy from supporting himself from local sources, whilst he was besieging. As the *ST* puts it 'so that the enemy, may not (...) feed on fruits from the trees, if they have a shortage of food'.[687] The practicality of these instructions seem to be confirmed by Arab sources which report that during the reign of Michael II, the Arab forces

[686] Much of the advice of the *ST* concerning siege warfare derives from: *MS,* 10.3; *LT,* 15; *PS,* 13. For a general discussion of siege warfare in Byzantium see: McGeer 1995b; Sullivan 1997; 2003, 2010b; Haldon 1999: 134-8, 181-9; Decker 2013: 158-61; Petersen 2013: 115-43.

[687] *ST,* 53.1, 53.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; *De Obsidione,* 57.71, 59.84. For food supplies and whether this advice was followed see also Sullivan 2003b: 511-2.

were faced with famine when they besieged Syracuse, because the Byzantines had already gathered all the supplies from the countryside to the city.[688]

If local food supplies were not enough to support a lengthy siege, the *ST* advises the general to 'send the sick, elderly, and women and children, to a safe and fortified location in advance of the enemy assault'.[689] Whether this passage was indeed followed in action can be checked on two levels. The first level is whether the above group of people actually abandoned the city before a siege. Byzantine and Arab historical narratives seem to argue that this was, more or less, a standard practice. More specifically, we are informed that Thomas the Slav was pressed by famine during the siege of Adrianople, so he 'expelled all the people who were unfit for service'.[690] In 716, the Byzantines 'removed the surplus families' out of Amorion since they were expecting a siege from the Arabs, while, in 714, emperor Anastasius II (713-715) expelled the families who could not store supplies for three years from Constantinople.[691] Last but not least, Yahya records a similar course of action undertaken by the Arabs in Aleppo in response to the campaign of Romanos III (1028-1034).[692]

The second aspect that requires checking is whether adult male civilians were recruited to assist in the defence of their city. The manuals seem to imply that his was the case, since adult male civilians are excluded from those expected to abandon the city. Technically, this was in contrast with imperial legislation which prohibited civilians to carry, buy or sell weapons. The relatively small manpower of the Byzantine army, however, and the continuous hostilities, strongly distinguished theory from practice. *LT* clearly instructs the general to encourage the use and the possession of at least one bow for every household, in order to aid in the defence of the region. Additionally, civilians defending cities, from the capital to the borders, are attested throughout the course of Byzantine history. A clear tenth-century example can be seen in the siege of Thessaloniki by the Arabs in 904, where the civil population joined the garrison to the defence of the city.[693]

Equally vital to securing food supplies, would have been the maintenance of water supplies. The *ST* instructs the general that 'if there is not an abundance of water or reservoirs in the city, drinking water may be enclosed in some kind of container or cisterns because (…) water must be measured and secured as much as possible so that it may not be easily snatched away by the more powerful'.[694] Lack

[688] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.79.
[689] *ST*, 53.1 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[690] Skylitzes, 39 (trans. Wortley, p. 42); TC (b) 2.19.
[691] Theophanes Confessor, AM6206, 6208 (trans. Mango and Scott, p. 540).
[692] Yahya, ii.497.
[693] *LT,* 20.81; Kaminiates, 21-3; Kolias 1989: 467-76; Makrypoulias 2012: 109-20.
[694] *ST*, 53.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

of water during a siege could prove to be the sole reason to compel a city to surrender. Arab sources are demonstrative of that since they record that during the siege of Geraca in 951, it was that which compelled the Byzantines to negotiate a treaty with the Arabs. The city of Geraca was asked to pay a sum of money and to give some of its men as hostages.[695]

After food and water had been secured, the *ST* advises the general to undertake another preliminary measure, to 'cut down the trees which are near to the city walls and remove every kind of obstacle, so that the enemy may not hide in them'.[696] The practical application of this measure seems less clear, due to the lack of similar information from historical narratives. The most similar account is found in Leo the Deacon, but it is set in a slightly different context. Leo records that in 965 the area around Tarsus and the Byzantine camp 'was filled with flowers and all sorts of trees'. Consequently, in order to secure his camp, Nikephoros II ordered his army 'to clear-cut and mow down thoroughly the fields (…) so that (...) it would be impossible for any of the barbarians to set up an ambush in thickly grown areas'.[697] One might question this information, since Leo the Deacon could have used promotional material to present Nikephoros II as doing everything by the book, but in this case, his account seems to agree with the testimony of Arab sources which record the extension to which the countryside was destroyed and report that 50,000 trees were uprooted.[698]

Nevertheless, securing and clearing the perimeter was not enough to ensure that unfortunate surprises would not take place, for there were numerous occasions that the greatest threat came from the inside rather than the outside. The *ST* devotes a passage to tackling such issues and it reports that one of the first concerns of the general, before the siege begins, should be to 'pay serious attention to suspicious people'.[699] The suspicious people our author refers to could have been spies, allies, traitors or men who had the same religion as the besieger.

Historical narratives underline the importance of this measure since they record various acts of treason. For example, Skylitzes reports that just before the siege of Dristra, Sviatoslav tried to avoid treason and mutiny and that among his first course of action was to 'put the Bulgars he had captured alive (...) in iron fetters and other kinds of restraints for fear they might mutiny'.[700] Furthermore, Byzantine chronicles report that in 838 Amorion was betrayed by Boiditzes who was corrupted by

[695] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.158-60, ii.366-7.
[696] *ST*, 53.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[697] LD, 58 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 106).
[698] Bikhazi 1981: 854-5.
[699] *ST*. 53.1 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[700] Skylitzes, 300 (trans. Wortley, p. 286).

gifts, while Arab sources record that he was an ex-Muslim prisoner who had embraced Christianity and married a Christian.[701] Kekaumenos reports that in 918 Symeon struggled to capture a fortress in Greece, so after gathering intelligence about the state of the gates, he ordered five men to enter the city on the pretext of going for work, armed with axes. The men entered the city, overcame the gate-watch and opened the gates to the rest of the Bulgarian army.[702] A similar attempt is reported by Arab sources; in 928, Melias attempted to take Melitene by infiltrating seven hundred Byzantines and Armenians into the city before the siege. They were to act as if they were looking for employment and when the Byzantines arrived, they were instructed to betray the city. However, the officials of Melitene suspected the plot and decided to kill all unknown men who had entered the city recently.[703] Another such case occurred during the siege of Amid, in 951. A Christian inhabitant of the city proposed to the Byzantines to build an underground tunnel that would allow them to by-pass the walls and enter the city. Shortly before the Byzantines were close to the walls the treason was revealed and the Arabs killed the Christian traitor.[704] Moreover, in 969, Skylitzes reports that Bourtzes managed to corrupt an Arab from the garrison of Antioch, and with his help constructed ladders that were able to reach one of the western towers of the city. Under the cover of the night the Byzantines mounted the ladders on the walls, captured the tower and thus opened the gates for the rest of the army to enter the city. The accounts of Leo the Deacon and Yahya of Antioch are different however, the latter reporting that there was turmoil and division among the personnel inside the city.[705]

The final preliminary measure that the manuals advise should be taken before the siege was to deploy and distribute the garrison. The *ST* records that the garrison should be assigned to various spots on the wall, but also encourages the general to keep a force next to him so as to reinforce the more hard-pressed sectors.[706] Byzantine and Arab historical narratives refer to this measure as, more or less, a standard one. Al-Tabarī states that the defence of Amorion was divided between officers who according to their contingents were responsible for a specific number of towers. Kaminiates informs us that the general who was responsible for the defence of Thessaloniki against the Arabs in 904 had already posted some men on the walls, while, at the same time he was patrolling around with his bodyguards assigning them on the most vulnerable posts on the wall, as needed.[707] The *ST* underlines

[701] Skylitzes, 78; TC (b), 3.34. Arab sources speak of two acts of treason see: Tabarī, 1245-6, 1251-2; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.301-3.
[702] Kekaumenos, 2; Haldon 1999: 186-7.
[703] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.264; Canard 1951: 733.
[704] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.346; Sullivan 1997: 191.
[705] Skylitzes, 272-3; LD, 81-2; Yahya, i.99-100, 108.
[706] *ST*, 53.2.
[707] Tabarī, 1250; Kaminiates, 27; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.306. For other examples see: Sullivan 2003b: 517-8.

the need to rotate the guards not only to avoid fatigue, but also to eliminate the chances of treason.[708] This advice seems to take into consideration very practical issues or even past mishaps. The narrative of al-Tabarī demonstrates that negligence towards this advice was the fatal blow that led to the capture of Amorion. Al-Tabarī describes how a Byzantine officer was very hard-pressed since he happened to be responsible for the sector where part of the wall had been breached. After he managed to ward off the Arabs by fighting continuously, he asked to be reallocated to another sector, but the commander refused to relieve him, even though other contingents were fresh. Consequently, he betrayed his sector to the Arabs and defected to them.[709]

After all preliminary measures were taken, all the besieged could do was to defend the city against enemy assaults and siege-engines as efficiently as possible.[710] One of the most common ways to make a breach to the walls was to use stone-throwing engines. Most probably the standard type the Arabs used at that time was the traction trebuchet.[711] Al-Tabarī records how the Arabs focused the attack of most of their stone-throwers in the most vulnerable section of Amorion,[712] while Kaminiates records a similar attempt against Thessaloniki stating that:

> Others applied themselves to stone-throwing engines and sent giant hailstones of rock hurtling through the air. Death threatened us in many shapes, and since it was coming from all directions, it lent a further dimension of terror to the experience (…) whose relentless fire made it impossible for anyone to venture forth with impunity on to the wall.[713]

To counter this threat, the *ST* advices that 'against stones released from stone-throwers and trebuchets, the general should hang heavy mats or newly stripped-off buffalo hides from the battlements on the outer side of the wall in order to cover them easily, or timbers attached together like a textile'.[714] The application of these guidelines is not very often reported in our sources. The closest examples we have come from al-Tabarī who states that when part of the wall collapsed during the siege of Amorion, the Byzantines repaired it by using timber and reinforcing it with packsaddles on top, which acted like a shield, and from Anna Komnene who reports that the Turks under Tzachas hung mattresses, leather hides and clothes from the wall to soften the blows of the bombardment.[715]

---

[708] *ST*, 53.1-2.
[709] Tabarī, 1251-2; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.305-6.
[710] For the advice of other manuals and parallel narratives see also: Sullivan 2003b: 514-7.
[711] Kennedy 2001: 184-5.
[712] Tabarī, 1245, 1248; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.302-4
[713] Kaminiates, 29 (trans. Frendo and Fotiou, p. 51-3).
[714] *ST*, 53.5 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[715] Tabarī, 1245; Anna Komnene, 7.8; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.302

Another popular siege-engine which was employed to shatter the walls was the battering-ram. To limit the effectiveness of this device the *ST* instructs the general to use 'very thick pikes and sacks full of chaff or sand' to soften the blows. While the use of pikes in this context is recorded in many manuals, historical narratives, do not seem to offer any parallel accounts of such a use.[716] Byzantine narratives seem to be equally silent about the use of sacks filled with sand or chaff, but Albert of Aachen suggests that they could have been used in practice since he reports that the garrison of Jerusalem employed them against the Crusaders' rams in 1099.[717]

It goes without saying that men who tried to approach the enemy walls were vulnerable to missile fire, which, being released from the ramparts above, came down to them with higher velocity. In order to counter this problem, the besiegers usually built mobile shelters which used as covers as they were trying to approach the wall with a siege-ram or to undermine the walls. Such devices were usually called tortoises and we explicitly know from *DAI* that their lighter version was already used by the Arabs during the reign of Leo VI. Arab sources additionally record that tortoises were also employed against Amorion.[718]

To deal with the threat of tortoises, the *ST* proposes two different ways. The first way was to 'build beams which have very sharp iron points at their ends because when they are stuck into the tortoises, they easily overturn them'.[719] It is difficult to evaluate whether this advice was commonly followed on the battlefield. The only evidence for the employment of this measure seems to come from Skylitzes who reports that during the siege of Manzikert in 1054 the Turks constructed light-types of tortoises, the *lesai,* and started to approach the walls of the city. The commander of the city Basil Apokapes supplied the garrison with large beams which were sharpened at one end. When the time was appropriate, the Byzantines threw them off the battlements and thus overturned the enemy tortoises.[720]

The second way to counter the enemy tortoises was to cast on them fire, or boiling pitch and lead. It is reasonable to argue that this method was very popular. Such use of flammable substances was already known from antiquity, and it certainly remained in use well after the tenth century. Certain scholars have argued that sometimes liquid fire was stored and thrown in pots against the enemy.[721] The use of similar means is reported by John Kaminiates who informs us that some of the defenders

[716] *ST*, 53.5 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; *MS*, 10.3.9-13; *PS,* 13.71-81,115-20; *De Obsidione,* 69.
[717] Albert of Aachen, 6.9.
[718] *DAI,* 51.114-120; McGeer 1991: 135-8; Sullivan 2000: 175; Kennedy 2001: 134.
[719] *ST*, 53.6 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[720] Skylitzes, 463.
[721] See for instance: Korres 1995: 118-22; Haldon 1999: 189; 2000: 278-80.

of Thessaloniki tried to counter the Arab assault with artificial fire, by preparing similar earthenware vessels which included 'pitch, firebrands quicklime and other flammable substances'.[722] Most importantly, the use of pitch in warfare is further confirmed by administrative documents, since it features in the list of the *DC* among the provisions taken for the Cretan expedition of 949.[723] Furthermore, Arab sources also agree that the Byzantines employed such practices since al-Tabarī states that during the siege of Amorion the tortoises of the Arabs were burned by the Byzantines, while Western chronicles mention the use of boiling pitch in the East during the First Crusade.[724]

Except for tortoises, the enemy usually employed siege-towers to reach the ramparts and the walls of a city. The author of the *ST* explains to the general that 'the so-called *strepta*, (…) which mechanically shoot the liquid fire, (…) and the so-called hand-siphons (…) get the better of wooden towers brought towards the walls with rolling cylinders'.[725] Both Byzantine and Arab sources record that the Byzantines used liquid fire, either to burn the enemy siege-engines, or generally to gain an advantage during a siege. For instance, Michael Attaleiates, records that Basil Apokapes attacked and burned an enemy siege-engine by throwing a pot which contained liquid fire, while Ibn al-Athīr, informs us that devices which shot liquid fire were used by John Kourkouas during the siege of Dvin in 927, stating that 'their fire could cover twelve people, and was so violent and so adherent that no one could resist it'.[726]

Nevertheless, perhaps the cheapest and most efficient way to breach the fortifications of a city was to dig and undermine the foundations of its walls. The *ST* provides the general with two different ways in which to tackle this threat. The first way was to dig a deep trench in front of the city 'because in this way, the enemy who is digging the tunnels will be clearly spotted'.[727] Most of the time historical narratives do not give specific information about whether a city had a trench at its disposal. The advice of the manuals, however, is confirmed by Arab sources. Al-Tabarī, for example, refers to the deep trench in front of Amorion and the difficulties that it caused to the besiegers.[728]

The second way to counter the enemy mines was to fix metal objects into the ground so that the defenders could place their ears on the metal objects and hear whether somebody was digging

[722] Kaminiates, 33 (trans. Frendo and Fotiou, p. 59).
[723] *DC*, 673.3-4.
[724] Tabarī, 1248; Albert of Aachen, 7.24; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.302-6; Kennedy 2001: 134.
[725] *ST*, 53.8 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[726] Attaleiates, 8.46-47; c.f. Skylitzes, 463, who gives an alternative testimony. See also: Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.150, ii.262-3.
[727] *ST*, 53.9 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[728] Tabarī, 1247; Skylitzes, 302; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.302-6.

underground. After the location of the enemy mine had been confirmed, the defenders were instructed to dig a counter-mine which would allow them to meet the attackers and neutralize their threat by suffocating them with gusts of smoke produced by burning felt and feathers. The smoke was to be directed to the enemy through a pair of bellows, similar to the type used by blacksmiths.[729] The *ST*, however, is not the first manual to record such advice. The oldest reference to such course of action derives from Polybius' description of the siege of Ambracia by the Romans which took place in 189 B.C.[730] Similar information also survives in other military manuals: The *PS* advises the defender to place his ear into the ground, so as to investigate if digging is taking place underneath, but also to counter-dig and confront the enemies underground by using smoke or by flooding the tunnel with water. In addition, parallel information is found in Heron of Byzantium and in the *De Obsidione*.[731]

Given that this is a passage which originally derives from a classical source, it is reasonable to wonder whether it was applied on the Byzantine battlefield or whether it served as a theoretical and educational exemplar of the past. The Byzantine historical narrative which is closest to this particular advice is the narrative of the *Alexiad*. Anna Komnene states that during the siege of Dyrrachium in 1081, the Normans dug a tunnel in order to undermine the walls. The Byzantines responded by a digging a counter tunnel in which the men posted themselves to find out the exact location that the enemy was aiming at. When they managed to locate their direction through the sounds of digging, they opened small peep-holes into the ground and when they acquired visual conduct with the enemy, through them, they placed reed pipes and cast fire to the enemies' faces.[732] It is difficult to determine whether Anna was trying to portray the Byzantines in an ideal light here. If this was her purpose, however, she could have given us an account by far more identical to the advice of the manuals. What is more, some scholars believe that Anna had access to eye-witness accounts and this could have been one, although we must not forget that eye-witness accounts are also subject to distortion.[733] Nonetheless, other Byzantine sources seem to imply that such practices were not totally alien. Theophanes Confessor reports that in one of their raids, which took place in 775/6, the Arabs used smoke to compel the fugitives of Cappadocia to come out of a cave.[734]

---

[729] *ST*, 53.9.
[730] Polybius, 21.28.
[731] *Hypothesis,* 56.7; *PS,* 13.34-43; Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 11; *De Obsidione,* 76.185-95.
[732] Anna Komnene, 13.3; Sullivan 2010: 52.
[733] For Anna, her credibility and her sources, see: Neville 2016: 47-59, 75-88; Sinclair 2014: 143-85; Macrides 2000: 63-82; Magdalino 2000: 15-44; Buckley 2014; Frankopan 2012: 38-88; 2014: 38-52. For special focus on siege description, see: Sullivan 2010b: 51-6.
[734] Theophanes Confessor, AM6268.

Apart from digging, the enemy could use ladders to capture the walls of a city or of a fortress. The *ST* instructs the general to counter this threat by using pitch and flammable substances which we have already discussed above. The author of the *ST* continues to report that mill-stones or heavy timbers could also be thrown at the attackers.[735] While Byzantine historical narratives do not explicitly refer to mill-stones or to heavy timbers, they record a similar course of action. The *Vita Basilii* reports that the defenders of Euripos repelled the Tarsian raiders by 'throwing stones down by hand' among other missiles, and Leo the Deacon states that in the siege of Chandax the Arabs threw 'enormous stones' from the walls.[736] The closest Byzantine account we have, however, is that of John Kaminiates. Kaminiates reports that, during the siege of Thessaloniki, a detachment of the Saracens took a ladder and started to scale the wall, using their shields to cover their heads. The Byzantines responded and 'a volley of stones as thick as hail was unleashed against them'.[737]

Despite the similarities between the manuals and the historical narratives, one may raise a certain caution as to whether this practice was indeed followed. The narratives of both the *Vita Basilii* and Leo the Deacon may have been fabricated to reflect written practices, while Kaminiates, even though he was supposedly an eye-witness, he uses a literary *topos* ('thick as hail') in his account. This could mean that he only gave a generalised account of what happened, which seems to agree with the fact that and he does not provide us with any detail about the size of the stones, although the fact that the enemy shields proved inefficient, might imply the stones were quite heavy. Nevertheless, the practicality of this practice seems to be confirmed by non-Byzantine sources as well. Al-Tabarī generally reports that the Arabs were afraid of the stones thrown down by the Byzantines, while Ralph of Caen states that the defenders of Latakia threw heavy stones from the towers against the Normans in 1101.[738]

As a last resort to ward off enemy siege-engines, the *ST* instructs the defender to strike unexpectedly against the siege-engines through postern gates. The author of the *ST* specifically states that this should only be done 'if there is a very great need', and generally advises the defenders not to 'fight outside of the walls, even if they happen to be greater in numbers and braver'.[739] Clearly the author of the *ST* regarded sallies as a risky tactic and his concerns are partly confirmed by historical narratives. Arab sources report that the sallies of the garrison of Castrogiovanni were unsuccessful in 835, and that

[735] *ST*, 53.7.
[736] *VB,* 59 ((trans. Ševčenko, p. 213); Skylitzes 151; LD, 16 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 68); Sullivan 2000: 161.
[737] Kaminiates, 26 (trans. Frendo and Fotiou, p. 47).
[738] Tabarī, 1248; Ralph of Caen, 160.
[739] *ST*, 53.3, 53.10 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

Tayromenion was captured after a failed sally of his garrison.[740] On the other hand, Byzantine chronicles report that Moroleon, the commander of Adrianople, was successful in encountering the Bulgarians with sallies, but some of them characterise Moroleon as rash and stupid.[741]

Whatever the risk of the operation, a number of historical narratives record that commanders made sallies to neutralise enemy siege-engines. Leo the Deacon states that during the siege of Dorostolon, in 971, the Rus made a sally to attack the Byzantine siege-engines, as 'they were unable to withstand the whizzing missiles the latter [i.e. the Byzantines] hurled'.[742] Although the action is undertaken by a barbarian, the narrative of Leo is as close to the manuals as one can get. He strongly implies that the sally was undertaken as a last resort and this may raise suspicion as to whether Leo deliberately modelled his battle descriptions on the manuals. Other Byzantine sources are equally problematic. Michael Attaleiates, for instance, records how Basil Apokapes made a sally and burned an enemy siege-engine, after he was unable to counter it in any other way.[743] Once more, the narrative is very close to the advice of manuals, but no other source apart from Attaleiates records that Apokapes actually engaged in such action. Our caution, however, for the practicality of this measure is moderated by Arab sources which seem to imply that such course of action was mainstream. For example, we know that by the time Sayf al-Dawla marched to the relief of al-Hadath, in 955, its garrison had seized the opportunity and had suddenly charged out of the walls, managing to capture some of the Byzantine siege engines.[744]

To conclude, the advice of the *ST* on defensive siege-warfare appears to be, to a large extent, practical and relevant. It is true that the narratives which are closest to the advice of the manuals are mostly promotional, but we are lucky enough to possess alternative evidence from other Byzantines narratives and administrative documents, as well as Arab and Western sources. This seems to imply that even if promotional historiography idealised and deliberately modelled battle descriptions in accordance with the advice of the manuals, the practicality of the manuals is still confirmed by alternative sources which seem to show that such practises were more or less mainstream.[745] On the other hand, information

[740] Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.359-60, ii.i.146

[741] TC, 404-5; Symeon Magister, 136.27; Skylitzes 218. See also: Haldon 1999: 184-5.

[742] LD, 148 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 192).

[743] Attaleiates, 8.46-7; c.f. Skylitzes, 463, who gives an alternative testimony. The credibility of Attaleiates as an eye-witness account has most recently been challenged by Vratimos 2012: 829-40, see also: Krallis 2012: 126-56.

[744] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.97, 125, 337-40, ii.355. For additional examples see: Sullivan 2003b: 518.

[745] See also: Sullivan 2003b: 520-1, who also argues in favour of the practical use of manuals regarding defensive siege warfare.

which appears only in one source remains problematic, while certain other practices like the use of pikes against battering-rams seem to find no parallel in the historical narratives.

Practical Information 6: Offensive Siege Warfare

The *ST* offers a variety of advice concerning offensive warfare which can be divided into two categories: advice on how to win a siege with minimum fighting, and taking a city by storm. As far as the first category is concerned, the *ST* focuses on how to conquer a city by means of persuasion and famine. To persuade the besieged, the author of the *ST* draws on Onasander and instructs the general to send ambassadors to the city explaining that he is intending to ravage the countryside and inflict loss of food and income, and then to proceed to do so, so that the city will be compelled to come to terms out of fear. Furthermore, he also advises the general to be humane to the cities that surrender to him, so that other cities may follow their example, expecting a similar treatment.[746]

It is hard to determine whether this advice was actually followed. The sources usually do not speak of negotiations or their details, they usually only describe how the generals ravaged the countryside of a city without giving more information.[747] Nevertheless, we possess some evidence which shows that the policy of threat and humane treatment was the main strategy employed by the Byzantines in the tenth century. To begin with, a repetitively small number of few cities or fortresses were captured by storm, most of them decided to subject themselves to the Byzantines by coming to terms with them.[748] The fact that this approach was mainstream, or even encouraged by the capital, seems to be further supported by propaganda found in the novels of Romanos I, where the latter takes pride in the fact that 'towns and cities have, with the help of God, come into our hands from the enemy, some as a result of war, while others have passed over to us by the example [of conquered towns] or through fear of capture'.[749] The testimony of Arab sources supplements our knowledge of how this policy was applied. In 934 John Kourkouas first violently ravaged the countryside of Melitene, whereupon the citizens decided to come to terms with him and finally opened their gates. The population was treated relatively leniently as John declared that any Muslim who was willing to convert to Christianity would recover his family and his property, whereas those who chose to remain Muslims would be driven out of the

[746] *ST*, 11.1; 12; Sullivan 1997: 186.
[747] For example, see: Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.260; Canard 1951: 774-5.
[748] For example, see: LD, 60; Skylitzes, 231-2; *VB,* 38; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.111; Bikhazi 1981: 783-4; Canard 1951: 748-51, 761.
[749] *JGR,* i.213-4 (trans. McGeer, p. 60); McGeer 2000: 49-53.

city and moved to another region, but they too, would remain unharmed and free.[750] A similar treatment is also recorded for the case of Tarsus which was captured by Nikephoros Phokas in 965.[751]

Apart from persuasion and lenient treatment, cities were very often compelled to surrender due to lack of food.[752] The author of the *ST* once more draws on Onasander to advise the general on how to proceed. More specifically we read that 'If the general (…) intends to capture the city by famine, he should assign himself the task of always hindering any interaction with the outside, while he should capture those who go out for the collection of necessary provisions by mounting ambushes'.[753] While these measures seem very practical and standard, it is rational to wonder whether they reflect an outdated practice and whether were indeed followed by tenth-century Byzantine generals.

The answer to this question can prove tricky though, and one should first understand the weaknesses of our sources in order to evaluate them properly. Our most detailed references come, once more, from sources which contain promotional material. Leo the Deacon records that Nikephoros II Phokas applied this measure at least three times. In Chandax, where he surrounded the city and tried to cut off its food supply; in Tarsus where 'he encircled the town with diligent guards' and also tried to 'deliver the city into the grip famine'; and in Antioch where he adhered his men to camp outside and to force the city to surrender by stealing its provisions with daily raids.[754] While Leo the Deacon's narrative is very close the advice of the *ST,* it cannot be taken at face value. Leo could have intended to idealize Nikephoros II and his advice on the blockade of Antioch is included in a fictional speech full of rhetorical elements.[755]

The alternative testimony of Skylitzes can be equally problematic. On the positive side, although Skylitzes gives another reading on the events regarding Antioch, he agrees with Leo the Deacon that Nikephoros II blockaded the city and disrupted food supplies.[756] But when Skylitzes mentions that Tzimiskes tried to capture Dorostolon 'by blockade and famine' and he set up a blockade with guards, his account is contradicted by that of Leo the Deacon who reports that the city was taken with a first assault.[757] What is more, we must also be cautious of Skylitzes' narrative, not only because is he a

[750] TC, 415-6; Skylitzes, 224-5; Symeon Magister 136.53; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.268-9. The same is recorded for Samosata, see: Canard 1951: 742.
[751] Bosworth 1992: 279; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.269, n. 1
[752] Haldon 1999: 183-4.
[753] *ST*, 11.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[754] LD, 16-7, 60, 124(trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 108); Haldon 1999: 185.
[755] Sinclair 2012: 361-2; Morris 1988: 85-6; Kazhdan 2006: 283; Riedel 2012: 580-3; Hoffmann 2007: 127-30.
[756] Skylitzes, 271-2.
[757] Skylitzes, 302-3 (trans. Wortley, p. 288); LD 135-6.

more remote source from these events, but because he also tends to standardise his battle descriptions, and as Holmes has pointed out, it is characteristic of him to report that a city had surrendered because of lack of supplies.[758]

Despite these difficulties, however, even if the generals were presented in an ideal light or even if battle descriptions were standardised, this does not necessarily mean that the advice of the *ST* had no practical value on the tenth-century battlefield. Alternative sources with a more neutral tone seem to imply that the blockade of a city was a standard procedure. For example, all Byzantine chronicles agree that Symeon blockaded Adrianople in 923 and managed to force a surrender because the defenders ran short of food, while Arab sources record that Melitene surrendered to Kourkouas because it was pressed by hunger.[759]

In case persuasion and famine were either not applicable or not severe enough to make a city surrender, the Byzantine general could employ a variety of siege-engines to achieve his goal. The author of the *ST* devotes a whole chapter on how to storm a city or a fortress with siege-engines and on which tactics to employ. Most of the information provided by the *ST* derives from *MS* and *LT*, but there is good evidence to support that it was still relevant.[760] To begin with, the author of *ST* reports that the army should be 'divided into *allagia* (…) so that it does not easily become exhausted from the siege by fighting all at once. Having the greatest part of the army with him, the general ought to launch assaults continuously in relays, by night as well as by day'. Then, he goes on to explain that the continuous assaults will make the enemy weary and more likely to surrender.[761] The practicality of this measure is recorded both by Byzantine and Arab sources which record that this tactic was employed by the Arabs during the siege of Amorion. The historical narratives describe how the Arabs attacked in relays, day and night, believing that this would force the Byzantine garrison to surrender. In the first stage of the siege, however, the Byzantines responded well and managed to withstand by guarding the towers in rotation.[762]

The most dangerous of these assaults were those which were undertaken during the night. The author of the *ST* comments that the most appropriate time to attack is 'especially during the night, when the assaults seems a great deal more intimidating to the besieged'.[763] The same spirit of anxiety and fear

[758] Holmes 2005: 150.
[759] TC, 404-5; Symeon Magister, 136.27; Skylitzes 218; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.268; Runciman 1929: 88-9.
[760] *ST*, 54; *MS*, 9.3.75-81, 10.1.11-8, 31-51; *LT*, 15.4-5, 21, 27.
[761] *ST*, 54.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; Sullivan 1997: 188.
[762] Tabarī, 1251; Vasiliev 1935-1968: i.306; Skylitzes 77-8; TC (b), 3.34; Genesios 3.11.
[763] *ST*, 54.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].

of a night-attack is shared by John Kaminiates, who was supposedly an eye-witness to the siege of Thessaloniki. In John's words the Arabs

> fought there until late into the night and then (...) rested (...). Though perhaps they were exercising their minds how best to attack us (...) and were intent on preparing a further series of treacherous and deceitful moves. No sooner, therefore had we paused a moment from the heat of battle than we were thrown into a further state of anxiety over the level of vigilance maintained by the troops manning the fortifications that ringed the city and the suspicious movements of the barbarians, movements which might be the prelude to a successful ambush carried out under cover of darkness that would allow them to penetrate our defences undetected and thus encompass our destruction (...). Accordingly, we stayed awake all that night (...).[764]

A western source, Liudprand of Cremona, highlights the same danger by providing a detailed account of the measures taken to guard Constantinople against similar hostile actions during the night at the time of Leo VI. According to Liudprand, patrols were stationed in short intervals all around the city with the duty to arrest, to interrogate, and to deliver for public trial anyone who they encountered during their watch.[765]

Assaults at the walls were facilitated with the use of siege-engines which were indispensable for the capture of any fortification. Among the most efficient and devastating siege-engines were the stone-throwing machines. The author of the *ST* refers to these engines and encourages the use of πετροβόλων ὀργανων and ἑλεπόλεων.[766] The latter term also had a more generic meaning; in the middle Byzantine period it can denote anything from a siege-tower, as it was its original meaning in antiquity, to a ram and a stone-thrower.[767] Here it is clear from the context that our author refers to a certain type of stone-thrower which is interpreted by scholars as a trebuchet. Dennis has proposed that the difference between the two machines is perhaps that the latter could throw stones further and with greater impact.[768] The use of trebuchets was continuous in the tenth century and it is confirmed by many references in historical narratives.[769]

---

[764] Kaminiates, 28 (trans. Frendo and Fotiou, p. 51).
[765] Liudprand of Cremona, 1.10-1; Haldon 1999: 38.
[766] *ST*, 53.5, 54.5.
[767] Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 53.37; LD, 25; Sullivan 2000: 239. For a study of military terminology and technology regarding siege warfare: Makrypoulias 2013: 31-44.
[768] Dennis 1998: 107; Haldon 1999: 188-98; Chevedden 2000: 74-84. For the other types of stone-throwing siege engines see Haldon 2000: 273-5
[769] For example, see: LD, 25, 52; TC, 385, 415-6; McGeer 1995: 123-9; Sullivan 1997: 179-80, 191; Dennis 1998: 99-115; Haldon 1999: 188-98.

Another siege-engine proposed by the *ST* is the wooden siege-tower which was a portable siege-tower for reaching the enemy walls, already in use from antiquity. Wooden siege-towers were a quite popular machine in siege warfare, and so they are mentioned and recommended in both specialised and more generic military manuals such as the *Parangelmata Poliorketika* or *LT*.[770] Historical narratives, however, usually seldom explicitly record their use by the Byzantines, but alternative sources confirm that they were employed. First of all, the administrative lists in the *DC* include a wooden-tower among the equipment prepared for the Cretan expedition of 949, and Arab sources agree that they were used as Ibn al-Athīr reports that John Kourkouas used siege-towers during the siege of Dvin (927).[771]

Apart from wooden siege-towers, the *ST* also refers to battering-rams which was another famous siege-engine from antiquity. The battering-ram is mentioned in a number of manuals, such as the *Parangelmata Poliorketika* and *LT*, usually without many comments which implies that it was already well known and continuously used throughout Byzantine history.[772] Likewise, the author of the *ST* does not give much information about battering-rams, he only records that 'rams should strike at the walls' and thus assumes their existence.[773] Historical narratives usually do not refer to siege-engines in detail, with the exception of Leo the Deacon. In his description of the siege of Chandax (961) by Nikephoros II Phokas, Leo the Deacon gives a more detailed description of the ram stating that 'this is the device the Romans call a battering ram, because the piece of iron that is joined to the beam and batters the town walls is shaped like a ram's head'.[774] One should, however, be cautious about the testimony of Leo the Deacon since we know that he usually imitated older authors, especially Agathias. This fact leaves the historian wondering whether this is indeed a contemporary description of a ram, or whether Leo the Deacon has modelled his account using phrases from antiquity.[775] Be that as it may, the use of rams is corroborated from an alternative type of source as the administrative lists of the *DC* include ten rams among the equipment prepared for the Cretan expedition of 949.[776]

[770] *LT,* 15.27; Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 2.6; Sullivan 2000: 160.
[771] *DC*, 670.10-1; Sullivan 1997: 191; Haldon 1999: 188; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.150. See also Anna Komnene, 13.3.
[772] *LT,* 15.27; Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 2.6; 39.33-40.1. Sullivan 2000: 160; 1997: 179-18; 183, 190-1; Haldon 1999: 187.
[773] *ST*, 54.3 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[774] LD, 25 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 77).
[775] See: Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 9, 11, 13-5; Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii.492-501; Sinclair 2012: 57-9; Treadgold 2013: 241, 243-4.
[776] *DC*, 671.4-5; Sullivan 1997: 191.

The next siege-engine that the *ST* refers to is the tortoise. Our author explains that the tortoise provides cover for those who undermine the foundations of the walls.[777] Other manuals which specialized in siege warfare, like that of Heron of Byzantium, describe in detail many types of tortoises, among which, was a tortoise especially used for undermining the foundations of the walls, called χελώνη ὀρυκτρίς.[778] Scholars have argued that undermining the walls was the standard tactic the Byzantines employed to capture cities or fortresses in the tenth century, and Nikephoros Ouranos agrees that this course of action was by far the most effective.[779]

To ensure that the Byzantines employed this strategy, however, we have to study the testimony of manuals in comparison with the information from historical narratives and with other alternative sources. The most contemporary and detailed account that we possess for this tactic is the testimony of Leo the Deacon. Leo records how the Byzantines, in the siege of Chandax, presumably under the cover of a siege-ram, 'carrying stone cutting tools began to dig there quietly chipping away and cutting through the rock at the point where the foundation of the wall was set', while a very similar course of action is given for the fall of Mopsuestia.[780] Once again our most detailed account has certain difficulties. To begin with, one may wonder to what extent these testimonies are an account of what really happened, for the fact that two different siege accounts are covered with such similarity is itself suspicious, and may imply that the narrative was somehow modelled by Leo the Deacon. This becomes even more an issue, since it has been shown that these accounts were modelled on the narrative of Agathias, as there is a strong resemblance with what happened at the siege of Cumae in 552.[781] Nevertheless, even if these passages are a purely literary creation, the practical use of tortoises and undermining techniques is still confirmed by another type of source. Once again, we are lucky to possess the testimony of the *DC* where we find record of tortoises together with sledge-hammers and pickaxes most probably for undermining purposes, listed among the siege-equipment gathered against Crete in 949.[782]

The final siege-engine that the *ST* lists is the wheeled-ladder.[783] The wheeled-ladder also appears in *LT* where it is described as composite wheeled-ladder, as well as in the *Parangelmata Poliorketika*

[777] *ST*, 54.3; Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 2.1-5; Sullivan 2000: 159.
[778] Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika*, 2.1-5, 13-5; Sullivan 2000: 159, 182-7.
[779] *TNO*, 65.139-47; McGeer 1995: 125-8; Sullivan 1997: 196-7; Haldon 1999: 186-7.
[780] LD, 25, 52-3 (Talbot and Sullivan, p. 77-8); see also Haldon 1999: 186-7.
[781] LD, 26; Agathias, 1.10; Talbot and Sullivan 2005: 78, n.41; Sinclair 2013: 59; Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii.492-501; Treadgold 2013: 241, 243-4.
[782] *DC*, 670.11,16. They also appear in 659.1, for the expedition during the reign of Leo VI, but they presented in the context of ship equipment, see: Haldon 2000: 270.
[783] *ST*, 54.4.

with more detail.[784] This invention cannot be traced in any existing source from antiquity, and so it may reflect a Byzantine innovation.[785] Generally speaking, the historical narratives of our period only report the use of ladders during sieges, without specifying their type.[786] However, we have a clear mention of wheeled ladders in the seventh century, as they are reported during the siege of Thessaloniki by the Avars and Slavs. A tenth-century account comes from the poem of Theodosius the Deacon who mentions 'composite ladders' which might be close to the type of wheeled ladders that are found in the manuals.[787]

It goes without saying that siege-engines required expertise, resources, and time to be produced. It was, therefore, essential to protect them from enemy missiles and attacks so that all those resources and time should not be wasted. The *ST* responds to this problem by advising the general that siege-engines 'should be enclosed all around with newly stripped-off buffalo hides. The tortoises should be smeared all over with clay on top and sponges completely soaked with vinegar should be placed on their exterior. For if vinegar is used, it prevents the combustion of fire, especially of the so-called liquid [fire]'.[788] Specialised manuals on siege warfare like that of Heron of Byzantium and more generic ones like *LT* include similar instructions.[789]

These measures appeared to have been quite mainstream and Byzantine historical narratives record that they were widely employed in the East. Attaleiates, for instance, records that the Turks covered their stone-throwing machine with fabrics which could deflect missiles, but proved to be vulnerable to fire.[790] John Kaminiates most probably refers to some similar protection when he records that the Arabs 'ἑπτά παρέστησαν πετροβόλους πάντοθεν περιπεφραγμένους'.[791] Western accounts seem to agree that such defensive measures were common. Albert of Aachen reports that the Crusaders were advised by local Christians to use vinegar in order to counter the attempts of the garrison of Jerusalem to get the better of them through the use of fire. In addition, sponges were included as parts of siege-engines in the 949 campaign against Crete.[792] Negligence towards these matters could prove disastrous for siege operations. Most probably the Byzantines failed to cover their siege-engines during the siege of Serdica in 986 and Leo the Deacon reports that 'after the siege machines and the other contrivances

[784] *LT,* 15.27; Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* 46.
[785] Dain 1933: 16 n.2; Sullivan 1997: 191; 2000: 161.
[786] For instance, see: LD, 82, 135-6; Skylitzes, 296-7.
[787] *Miracula Demetrii,* 203.25; Theodosius the Deacon, 327; Sullivan 1997: 191.
[788] *ST*, 54.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[789] *LT,* 15.27; Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* 15.
[790] Attaleiates, 8.46-47; c.f. Skylitzes, 463, who gives an alternative testimony.
[791] Kaminiates, 29; *ST*, 54.4.
[792] Albert of Aachen, 6.18; *DC,* 673.

accomplished nothing, because of the inexperience of the men who brought them up against the walls, they were set on fire by the enemy'.[793]

Although siege engines were indispensable to destroy or to overcome the walls, the siege was by no means over after part of the walls had been demolished or captured. Usually the first breach was followed by stubborn and desperate resistance. The author of the *ST* makes explicit reference on how to tackle this issue. He instructs the general to 'announce in the language of the enemy (…) that none of the citizens who are unarmed are to be slain (…). For if the enemy hears such an announcement, everyone (…) will shamefully choose slavery, and so, when the city becomes empty of armed men, it will be captured without danger'.[794] The author of the *ST* seems to have had a purely utilitarian purpose in mind since he explicitly states that the goal was to capture the city without danger.

The same point of view seems to be confirmed by Byzantine and Arab historical narratives which reveal or imply the dangers that the besieger could face when he entered a city. Arab sources report how the Byzantines managed to get close to the gates of Melitene, but were then repulsed by stubborn resistance and the same applies for the siege of Dvin, where the Byzantines were repulsed after they had breached the walls.[795] It is safe to assume that once the walls were breached or captured, the garrison would resist more daringly out of desperation for the safety of their lives and of their families. Eye-witness accounts, like that of John Kaminiates, seem to agree with that. In John's words, once the Saracens approached the walls, the garrison of Thessaloniki 'came to think nothing of death, since it was both inevitable and staring them (…) in the face.' Thus they, 'threw themselves unreservedly into the struggle, making the moment of maximum danger an occasion for displaying their courage (…) every man did his utmost'.[796] John also records that fighting through the narrow streets of a city could prove a challenging and dangerous task for the attackers. More specifically, he explains that after the Arabs had captured the battlements of the city, they:

> waited for the crowd to surge forward, trying to discover whether they had made off in feigned or in genuine flight. For they suspected that the inhabitants might have laid some hidden ambush for them in the streets, in order to waylay them once they had split up into separate groups.

[793] LD, 171 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 214).
[794] *ST*, 54.6 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[795] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.149-51.
[796] Kaminiates, 34 (trans. Frendo and Fotiou, p. 61).

> Consequently, they were reluctant to enter the city, and set about their task without first taking precautions.[797]

Despite the fact that the *ST*, Arab accounts, and Byzantine eye-witness sources all agree that it was practical and sometimes essential to avoid further fighting after the walls had been captured or demolished, some Byzantine sources present a different narrative. Leo the Deacon, for instance, attempts to present Nikephoros II Phokas in a more ideal light. He records that, in 961, after the walls of Chandax had been breached, the Arabs:

> turned to flight, withdrawing through the narrow streets, as the Romans pursued and slaughtered them mercilessly. The survivors, and those whom the warfare had not succeeded in mowing down, threw down their arms and turned to supplication. When the general observed this, he (…) restrained the soldiers' onslaught, persuading them not to kill the men who had thrown down their arms, nor to attack cruelly and inhumanely men without armour or weapons, saying it was a sign of inhumanity to cut down and slay like an enemy men who had given themselves up in surrender.[798]

Nikephoros II thus emerges as both a successful and merciful general. He follows the advice of the manuals not to harm unarmed people and to avoid further fighting, but Leo the Deacon wants us to believe that this was neither utilitarian nor necessary, merely the choice of a pious man.[799]

In conclusion, the *ST* seems to provide us with more or less practical advice regarding offensive siege-warfare. It is true that the most detailed accounts we possess cannot be taken at face value due to promotional material, but we are lucky to have alternative testimonies from eye-witness accounts, Western and Arab sources, as well as administrative documents, which agree that the manuals touched upon practical issues, and that their advice was usually employed.

Practical Information 7: Numbers, Units and Battle Formations

Any attempt to evaluate the numbers of troops given in the *ST* comes up against the problem of how to estimate the numbers of the Byzantine army accurately in the first place. This issue is controversial and has already been discussed in great detail and at great length by other scholars. There is therefore

[797] Ibid.
[798] LD, 26-7 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 78-9).
[799] For the attempt of Leo the Deacon to underline Nikephoros' military understanding as well as mercy see Riedel 2012: 582-3.

no need to repeat their findings here.[800] In order to estimate how realistic the numbers in the *ST* are, there is no need specifically to debate the total numbers of the Byzantine army, but rather to look at how large an expeditionary army could be, comparing the information of the *ST* with other sources. Since historical narratives offer controversial and sometimes exaggerated numbers, it would be better to take into consideration other type of accounts as well, such as the *DC*, which contains administrative lists, and the testimony of Arab sources.

To begin with, the *ST* provides the reader with a number of variations of battle formations, each for a different number of men, consisting exclusively either of infantry or cavalry, or of both. The highest number that the *ST* gives is a combined army of 26,184 men, 19,414 of whom were infantry and 6,770 cavalry.[801] To find out whether the Byzantines could mobilise such a force in the tenth century, one should first turn to the administrative lists of the *DC* which seem to have fulfilled a utilitarian purpose and appear to be uninfluenced by biases or exaggerations. The *DC* seems to agree that the highest figures of the *ST* were a realistic representation of the tenth-century Byzantine manpower. It informs us that, theoretically, in the Cretan expedition of 911, approximately 37,000 men were mobilised, around 6,000 of whom were cavalry, while for the expedition of 949, around 12,600 men are recorded, around 6,000 of whom were cavalry.[802] What is more, this evidence is backed by Arab sources which provide similar estimates of Byzantine forces, a good example being al-Athīr who reports that the expeditionary force of John Kourkouas against Melitene in 934 comprised of 30,000 men, and Leo the Deacon who states that 28,000 men campaigned with John Tzimiskes.[803]

If the highest figures of the *ST* were practical indeed, and Byzantium could afford to muster an infantry and cavalry army of 26,184 men, there seems no reason to doubt that the smaller variations of 12,528, 9,220 and 4116 men could have reflected contemporary practice. On the contrary, these numbers do not seem to have been proposed at random, the fact that they appear again and again in manuals of war seems to suggest that they were more or less mainstream. For instance, the *DRM*, considered 12,000 men as an adequate operation force. *LT* speaks of an infantry and cavalry army of 12,000, 10,000, 5000 and 4000 men, while a ninth-century Arab manual states that 12,000 to 4,000 men was a serviceable number for military operations.[804]

---

[800] Treadgold 1992: 78-145; 1995; Haldon 2000: 201-352; Cheynet 1995: 319-35; Whittow 1996: 181-93.
[801] *ST,* 47.2,18.
[802] *DC*, 651-2, 664-7. For interpretations of the numbers see: Haldon 2000: 236-334; Treadgold 1995; 1992: 78-145; Makrypoulias 2000: 352-4.
[803] LD, 132-3; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.154. For historical narratives and exaggerated numbers see: Haldon 1999: 101-6; 2014: 102-6.
[804] *LT*, 18.136-49; *DRM*, 1.11, 4, 8; Haldon 2014: 103-5.

Although the numbers and variations of the *ST* for a combined cavalry and infantry army seem to be realistic and practical, there are certain problems with its figures for a purely cavalry or infantry force. As regards the cavalry, the largest figure we are presented with, is a purely cavalry army of 18,570 men. Compared to other manuals, this figure is quite large, probably the closest example we have is the testimony of *LT* which speaks of a cavalry army of 12,000, but does comment that the basic one consists of only 4,000 men.[805] Unfortunately, it seems that we do not have secure and precise information from alternative sources which argues that such a number of cavalrymen was regularly deployed. Perhaps the 18,570 reflected a figure which was in accordance with theoretical registries of Byzantine *stratiotai* which seem to have been outdated and not to have reflected the actual number of able cavalrymen who could have participated in an expedition.[806]

Nevertheless, the same does not seem to apply to the second variation. After the cavalry army of 18,570 men, the author of the *ST* presents a second cavalry formation which consists of 6,770 men.[807] This number seems to be in line with the advice of other manuals. Nikephoros II Phokas speaks of a cavalry force of about 6,000 men in the *PM*, and in the *DV* he argues that the Byzantine general 'who has five or six thousand warlike horsemen and the assistance of God will not need anything more'.[808] The account of the *DC* seems to agree that this was indeed practically followed, since we have already seen that it records twice a cavalry force of around 6,000 men. On similar grounds, the other two smaller variations found in the *ST*, of 3,000 and 1,000 men respectively, also seem to have had an operational value. The *DV* states that a *thema* could have had 3,000 cavalrymen, while scholars estimate that a large *thema*, as that of the Thrakesion, in the tenth century, could have mustered 3,000 cavalrymen. Smaller *themata*, like that of Peloponnesus, seem to have had the means of providing the expenses for 1,000 cavalrymen, and it seems that such a number was also operational as the *DC* records that Romanos I sent a cavalry detachment of 1453 men to Italy in 935.[809]

Although the purely cavalry armies in the *ST* appear to be practical and operational in most cases, this does not seem to apply for the infantry armies, where the lack of sources do not allow us to reach the same conclusions. To begin with, the largest infantry army found in the *ST* comprised of 24,100

[805] *LT,* 18.136-49.
[806] For instance, a late ninth-century Arabic source counts the total of the Byzantine cavalry in 40,000 men, see Haldon 2014: 96, 105. For a detailed discussion about theoretical registries and active soldiers see: Haldon 2000: 316-34. See also: LD, 132-3 who speaks of 13,000 cavalry.
[807] *ST*, 46.26.
[808] *PM*, 4; *DV*, 17 (trans. Dennis, p. 205); McGeer 1995: 280.
[809] *DC*, 661. *DV*, 16.4 records a thematic army of three thousand men. See also: Haldon 2000: 326; Vlysidou et al 1998: 215-6; Oikonomides 1996: 105-25; Zuckerman 2014: 193-233.

men.[810] In our discussion above, we have seen that the *DC* records compound expeditionary armies of 37,000 and 12,600 men and if we subtract the cavalry from these numbers, we get two infantry armies of 31,000 and 6,600 men. If we perhaps assume that the cost of maintaining a marine or a ship crew would have been more or less the same as that of a medium and of a light infantry man (in the *DC* the men are recruited from nautical *themata*), it seems that the number of infantrymen the *ST* reports is realistic. But the *ST* records that these 24,100 men were exclusively infantry and supposed to act on their own accord independently of cavalry. It seems that we do not have any reference from historical narratives to determine whether this was actually the case and the lack of sources about the Byzantine infantry in general makes the issue all the more uncertain.

Be that as it may, in the absence of parallel accounts from other sources, one can only compare the advice of the *ST* with other manuals. The closest narrative to that of the *ST* appears in *LT*. Leo VI describes a force of 24,000 infantrymen, who are in similar array than the one given in the *ST*, but who, nevertheless, operated with cavalry and not on their own. The testimony of later manuals preserves nothing similar to the advice of the *ST*. For instance, the *PM* speaks of an infantry army of 12,000 men who, once again, operate with the help of cavalry and are drawn up in a hollow square formation.[811] Whatever the case, this formation may not have been intended so much for regular combat. The author of the *ST* reports that this array can also be employed by a compound army in which the cavalry could dismount and draw up in order to cross defiles of medium width.[812]

But numbers aside, we also possess very little evidence to determine whether these infantry or cavalry formations were ever employed by generals on the battlefield. For example, although the *ST* records that the standard battle-array for the infantry was the hollow square formation, which according to circumstances could also be rectangular, either horizontal or vertical, it is quite difficult to find a detailed, clear and secure reference to confirm this advice.[813] Historical narratives are usually of little to no help since they rarely comment on how the army was arrayed, and even if they do, they do so in such little detail or with such a standard phrasing that most of the times we can get nothing out of it. A characteristic example is that of Leo the Deacon who records that Nikephoros II Phokas arranged his army in an oblong formation during the siege of Chandax, but gives no further detail on whether this was a simple classical-style formation or whether it was a hollow one.[814] Surprisingly enough,

[810] *ST*, 45.2.
[811] *PM*, 1*; LT*, 4.64-76; McGeer 1988: 135-45; 1995: 257-80.
[812] *ST,* 49.5.
[813] *ST*, 47.3.
[814] LD, 24.

military manuals are no better since when they refer to the Arabs, they only record that their 'battle formations are both square and oblong and so are very secure' and that 'they also imitate the Romans in many respects', without giving any more detail.[815]

The only exception to this rule is the narrative of the *Alexiad*. Anna Komnene speaks of a formation that was supposedly invented by Alexios himself. The formation was a hallow square in which the booty, rescued prisoners, women and children were placed on the inside. Anna describes Alexios' hollow square as 'a moving city' which protected everybody and was so perfect and solid as if 'it was directly attributable to God' and the angles. She comments that 'the ranks' were 'organised in such a way that the Turks would have to shoot from their right at the side protected by the shield, whereas our soldiers would shoot from the left, that is at the side that is unprotected'. Anna continues to report that 'the serried ranks of close-locked and marching men gave the impression of immovable mountains' and that the men marched and acted as one body 'to the sound of the flute', marching slowly 'at an ant's pace'.[816]

Although this is the most detailed description of a hollowed square formation being used in action, it certainly has its weaknesses. First of all, Anna is trying to present it as a novelty to enhance the image and prestige of Alexios, but we do know that such formations existed long before Alexios. On this matter she seems to contradict herself to a certain extent, because she says that Alexios drew this formation on paper because he was familiar with Aelian's tactics. It seems possible, however, that either Anna or Alexios knew of the interpolated version of Aelian which also included the *Syntaxis Armatorum Quadrata* that preserves the diagram of a hollow square formation. Therefore, either Alexios used this diagram, or he was perhaps inspired by it, or Anna knew it and modelled her account accordingly.[817]

Given that there is no other account to confirm whether Alexios employed such tactics, it would be dangerous to take the testimony of the *Alexiad* at face value. Anna presents it in such an ideal light, that it is impossible to accept her narrative. She records that the square halted every time a woman was giving birth, or someone needed medical help, or somebody died and a burial was required, and that the emperor was present at all these and personally cared for them. It seems very probable that Anna

[815] *LT,* 18.113-5 (trans. Dennis, p. 479-81). Some scholars have interpreted them as hollow, see for instance, Haldon 2014: 360.
[816] Anna Komnene, 15.3-7 (trans. Sewter and Frankopan, p. 440, 450-1).
[817] Birkenmeier 2002: 5.

manipulated the events to present Alexios as somebody who could protect his people, who could easily win the battle and provide care and refuge to every single soul.[818]

Despite the idealised account of Anna, one should not too readily discard the possibility that such formations were indeed used in battle. It is certainly not impossible that an experienced general like Alexios knew of and used such a formation. Western sources speak of a square fighting-march formation which was employed by the Crusaders at the battle of Ascalon (1099). This was a square which was formed by nine units in total, three in the front, three in the back, and three in the middle. Although this square was simplified and not hollow, it employed all men by ranks, just as the one in the *ST*. Scholars have argued that this tactic was unprecedented in medieval warfare and that it was inspired by Byzantine tactics.[819] If this is indeed the case, then the square of the *ST* seems to be the closest candidate to have inspired the Crusaders' formation.

Nevertheless, the practical application of cavalry formations presents similar difficulties. Most historical narratives provide little to no detail on the matter, and those which are more detailed usually derive from promotional sources. The most characteristic example is that of the wedge formation of the *kataphraktoi.* We have already seen that the wedge was posted in the middle of the first line and that the *kataphraktoi* were supported by lancers and horse-archers. The only historical narrative, however, which describes the use and the array of the *kataphraktoi,* is Leo the Deacon. Leo informs us that Nikephoros II Phokas attacked the Arabs outside of Tarsus by 'deploying the ironclad horsemen in the van, and ordering the archers and slingers to shoot at the enemy from behind'. He goes on to comment on the gleam of the heavy cavalry's armour and on the discipline of the assault, and finally reports that the Tarsians were 'forced back by the thrusts of spears and by the missiles of the [archers] shooting from behind'. Leo the Deacon describes a similar course of action undertaken by John I Tzimiskes, who 'deployed the Romans in the van and placed ironclad horsemen on both wings, and assigned the archers and slingers to the rear and ordered them to keep up steady fire'.[820]

Some scholars have noticed that the narrative of Leo the Deacon is very close to the advice of the *PM*, and therefore argued that Nikephoros Phokas and John Tzimiskes used military manuals to fight their wars.[821] But despite the parallel information, the account of Leo the Deacon must be approached with caution, and cannot so readily be taken at face value. The first issue is that Leo the Deacon is very favourable to Nikephoros II Phokas and John Tzimiskes and he could have deliberately presented them

[818] Buckley 2006: 106; 2014: 264-7.
[819] Raymond of Aguilers, 133-5; France 1994: 361-3; Smail 1995: 122-4; Theotokis 2013: 57-71; Bennett 2001: 1-18.
[820] LD, 59, 140 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 107-8).
[821] McGeer 1995: 313-6.

as acting in accordance with the advice of the manuals. This is a very fair point, what better way to idealise Nikephoros II than drafting a battle narrative in which Nikephoros is present and defeats the enemy with the same advice that he gives in his manual, the *PM*. The problem is that, although Leo the Deacon completed his history after the *PM* was written, his battle descriptions follow more closely the advice of the *ST* and not that of the *PM*, as previously thought.[822] In the *PM*, the *kataphraktoi* use the mace as their primary weapon and the wedge of the *kataphraktoi* is always posted in the vanguard, not in the flanks. It is only in the *ST* that we find the *kataphraktoi* using the spear as their primary weapon and the wedge being drawn up either in the centre of the vanguard or in the two flanks.[823]

One may argue that Leo the Deacon did not have access to such detailed information on warfare and perhaps he was not even interested in it. It could be that Leo descripted the *kataphraktoi* fighting with spears and in the flanks, because that is how the cavalry used to fight in antiquity, and this *mimesis* could have served to enhance the style of Leo's history. On the other hand, it is also possible that one of his oral sources, who seems to have been an eye-witness and a high ranking officer, saw the advice of the *ST* employed on the battlefield and then reported the events to Leo the Deacon, undoubtedly in a sympathetic light.[824]

Whatever the case, given that these narratives do not appear in other accounts, one can never be sure as to what extent they were idealised. However, whenever we possess some alternative account, the advice of the *ST* concerning the *kataphraktoi* seems to be confirmed. Arab sources agree that the equipment of the *kataphraktoi* was far from a mere literary imitation. An eye-witness to the Arab-Byzantine conflicts of our period, al-Mutanabbī, provides us with an account of the Byzantine *kataphraktoi* which is almost identical to the *ST*. He too records that they were completely enclosed in iron, bearing iron garments and helmets, while their horses seemed to have no legs, most probably due to horse armour.[825] What is more, the armament of the *kataphraktoi* in the *ST* (heavy armour with bows and lances and shields), seems to have been the standard way to equip heavy cavalry and probably reflected either mutual influence or a response to enemy developments, since according to al-Mas'udi (896-956) the Khazars were 'heavy armed mounted archers with bows lances and shields like all the rest of the Arabs'.[826]

[822] See for example, Treadgold 2013: 236-46.
[823] *ST,* 39.1-6; 46.4,6-7
[824] Treadgold 2013: 240.
[825] *ST*, 39.1-6; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.333.
[826] Mas'udi, 11 (trans. Lunde and Stone, p. 22).

Apart from the *kataphraktoi,* the information we possess to determine whether other aspects of the cavalry formation were followed in action, is rather scarce and with similar problems. To begin with, the *ST* instructs the general, as do most tenth-century manuals, to use a unit of scouts (*prokoursatores*) to reconnoitre. These men were to attack the enemy with arrows and if they were unable to overcome him, they retreated behind the vanguard which undertook the attack.[827] Once again, most historical narratives provide very little detail of how these men acted and those which give us a little more detail are usually promotional. For example, the *Vita Basilii*, records that Basil I, 'set aside a body of picked men whom he sent forward as scouts and reconnoitres; he himself then followed with his main force'. Skylitzes recounts how John Tzimiskes 'detached a company of picked men (...) with orders to advance ahead of the army, look out for the main body of the enemy and to keep the emperor informed. If they drew near they were to test the strength of the enemy by skirmishing them.' Although Skylitzes' account is very similar to the advice of the manuals, it is backed by Leo the Deacon, who also records that Tzimiskes used scouts.[828]

Similar difficulties occur for the other units of the cavalry formation. What we usually get from historical narratives is the almost standard phrase that the commander divided his troops into three divisions, left, right, and centre. When more detail is given, however, it seems that the advice of the manuals was not followed too closely, only partially depending on the situation. A good example is the battle of Kalobrye (1078) between Alexios and Nikephoros Bryennios. The homonymous grandson of Nikephoros Bryennios and Anna Komnene agree that both commanders divided their armies into three main units, but instead of posting both flank-guards and out-flankers as the manuals advise, having numerical superiority, Bryennios only posted out-flankers, and Alexios only flank-guards. It is difficult to assess how credible these accounts are, Anna usually follows Bryennios' text, but not word for word, and anyway both had good reasons to portray their subjects as playing it by the book. Anna just emphasized the cunning side of Alexios, and Bryennios the courage and good order of his relative, but at the end of the day while both commanders followed the manuals to an extent this does not seem have been verbatim, which makes the accounts more realistic.[829]

This battle is also interesting because both Bryennios and Anna record that Alexios used concealed troops which he placed at the outermost left flank of his formation. We have already seen that this advice is found both in *LT* and in the *ST*.[830] The latter records that these men could have a crucial effect

[827] *ST*, 46.2-3, 9.
[828] *VB,* 46 (trans. Ševčenko, p. 165); Skylitzes, 298-9 (trans. Wortley, p. 284-5); LD, 139-40; McGeer 1995: 300-1.
[829] *ST,* 46.10-1; Bryennios, 4.4-7; Anna Komnene, 1.5; Tobias 1979: 200-1; Neville 2012: 92-131; Buckley 2014: 107-67.
[830] See chapter five above.

in the enemy's moral, and the narrative of Bryennios and Anna seems to support that, since both historians record that Alexios' concealed troops almost turned Bryennios' right wing to flight.[831] But even if this account is deliberately modelled to reflect the advice of the manuals and/or Alexios' cunning, the practicality of this tactic is also confirmed by Arab sources. In 903, Muḥammad Sulaymān recorded in his military dispatch how the Qarmatians had concealed two units, one in their left and one in their right wing, which they used to ambush the enemy. Contrary to Alexios who only concealed a unit on his left wing, the Qarmatians are recorded to have acted exactly as the *ST* instructs, concealing two units on both sides. This may suggest that this tactic was widely used and was perhaps also introduced by the Byzantines as a counter measure.[832]

In conclusion, it is quite problematic to determine how practical the battle-formations of the *ST* are. As far as numbers are concerned, most of them seem to be quite realistic as they are confirmed both by the *DC* and by moderate estimates in the historical narratives. Some of the numbers, however, like that of the purely infantry formations remain problematic, given that the information we possess is very scarce. As far as the actual formations are concerned, we are once again limited by our sources. Most of them are of no help while others, although they provide more detail, cannot be accepted at face value, because they are promotional. In cases where only such narratives exist, one should be cautious not to accept or discard their testimony too readily, that is before appreciating their complexity, as it is the case for example with Leo the Deacon and the *kataphraktoi.* It seems safe, however, to accept that certain aspects of the advice of manuals on formations were indeed employed in action, especially when they also appear in Western and Arab accounts, like the concealed units, or the square formation.

Practical Information 8: Guerrilla Warfare

Despite the fact that the Byzantines had already started to take the offensive against the Arabs before the middle of the tenth century, guerrilla warfare remained important almost throughout the century and was very effectively employed by small armies of the *themata* in order to defend their territory against Muslim raids or expeditions. We have already seen that the *ST* covers such matters with some detail. The relevant information of the *ST* can be grouped into two general categories: firstly, advice

[831] *ST*, 46.12-3; Bryennios, 4.8; Anna Komnene, 1.5.
[832] Tabarī, 2240; *ST*, 46.12-3.

on how to protect against enemy guerrilla tactics when an invasion or raid was undertaken, and secondly, advice on how to employ guerrilla tactics to counter enemy raids or invasions.

As regards the first category, the *ST* instructs the general to be cautious when raiding in hostile territory and to pay close attention to narrow passes because 'the enemy has only to pre-empt the defiles and to rekindle hostilities during our withdrawal, when our army [is] burdened by the spoils. In addition, it [is] likely that the enemy will emerge victorious since they fight fresh and on ground to their advantage against those who are weary'.[833] This advice seems to have touched upon a very practical issue, since the Byzantines are recorded to have suffered from this tactic on many occasions. For example, Leo the Deacon, who was an eye-witness to this event, reports that in 986, after the siege of Serdica, the Byzantines were ambushed by the Bulgarians in a defile. The army was annihilated and the enemy captured the imperial baggage-train, something which is confirmed by Armenian sources.[834] The testimony of Arab sources provides additional evidence. They report, for instance, that after the Byzantines captured and abandoned Samosata in 927, they were attacked and defeated by the Arabs who managed to take back a large number of spoils, while in 944 after Bardas Phokas was withdrawing from a successful raid against Marash, Sayf al-Dawla managed to completely defeat the Byzantines in a defile and to reclaim the spoils.[835]

Given that the enemy was in an advantageous position once he had captured the defiles, the *ST* advices the general not to 'join battle in the defiles' and not to 'force his way through, because this is, in fact, the most dangerous course of action'. Instead it instructs the general to retreat from the defiles and by ravaging the nearby regions, to lure the enemy out in more favourable terrain.[836] This practice is not usually recorded in historical narratives, but the narrative of Skylitzes is one of the few exceptions. According to the *Synopsis Historion*, in 1014 the Bulgarians blocked the defiles and trapped Basil II and his forces. Basil II did what the manuals advise not to do, and attempted to force his way through the blockade, which resulted into a large number of casualties for the Byzantines. Nikephoros Xiphias, one of Basil II's generals, offered to find another way through the defiles and then surprise the enemy by attacking simultaneously with the emperor, which was how the battle was won.[837]

---

[833] *ST,* 23.4 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[834] LD, 171-3; Stephen of Taron, 186-7. For the different account of Skylitzes, 330-1 and its purpose see Holmes 2005: 224-8.
[835] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.260-1, 305-6, ii.i.149-50; Canard 1951: 758.
[836] *ST*, 23.6 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[837] Skylitzes, 348-9.

Skylitzes' narrative, however, could be problematic here. It is not impossible that he had used some promotional literature favourable to the military aristocracy which was very sympathetic to Nikephoros Xiphias.[838] Even if this is the case, it does not mean that the advice of the *ST* was not practical. The testimony of Arab sources seems to imply that this was a rational measure that was generally employed on the battlefield. We know that when the Byzantines blocked the defiles to hinder Sayf al-Dawla's retreat, he responded by looking for alternative passages, making a wide detour and ravaging the enemy land on his way.[839] This narrative seems to be more credible and neutral due to the fact that Sayf's manoeuvres either had little effect, or did not result into an immediate victory, as was the case with Xiphias.

The best way to avoid such misfortunes, however, was to ensure that the enemy did not capture the defiles. The *ST* instructs the general to occupy with his infantry the narrow-passes and defiles from which he will enter and exit enemy territory, so as to prevent the enemy from blocking and ambushing the Byzantine force.[840] This practice is sometimes recorded in historical narratives, but some of these accounts are problematic. To begin with, we learn from the *Vita Basilii* that after the Byzantines had attacked Adata, they posted various detachments to capture the defiles because they expected some kind of attack during their retreat. While this narrative is very close to that of the manuals, it goes without saying that the purpose of the *Vita Basilii* was promotional, which makes this passage difficult to accept at face value. Similarly, while Arab sources record that in 951 Sayf al-Dawla guarded all the passages behind him in order to ensure the safe retreat of his army from the raid, this narrative appears after his significant defeat from the Byzantines in 950, and could have, therefore, served as an offset to show that Sayf learned from his misfortunes.[841] Nevertheless, even if these accounts are deliberately angled to idealise their figures, our knowledge is supplemented by more neutral Arab accounts which imply that these measures were, indeed, sometimes employed. In 953, we read that Sayf al-Dawla attempted to capture the defiles with an infantry force only to find that they had already been occupied by the Byzantines.[842]

Whenever the Byzantines found themselves on the defensive, however, they employed similar guerrilla tactics to counter enemy raids and invasions. Following earlier Byzantine manuals, the *ST*

[838] Holmes 2005: 198-9.
[839] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.308-9, ii.349-50; Bikhazi 1981: 747. See also Howard-Johnston 1983: 242-5 for the movements of Sayf in 956, which perhaps come from an official Ḥamdānid bulletin and may also have been idealized. However, he proposes that the victory of Sayf in this case may have needed 'little or no embellishment'.
[840] *ST*, 23.2-3. Similar advice is of course found in *MS*, 9.4.10-20 and the *PS,* 18.31-8.
[841] *VB,* 49; Skylitzes, 143; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.174-5, ii.346; Bikhazi 1981: 723-4.
[842] Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.126-7, ii.349; Canard 1951: 774-6.

advises that 'the general must not fight those who occupy our land openly and in a pitched battle but during the invasion he must not oppose them at all. However, he must always lurk in strategic locations' and that 'if the enemy is retreating and by this time has reached his own borders (...) then it may be advantageous to attack furiously, (...) because everybody is weary from the march and likewise encumbered'.[843] This advice finds the perfect application in how Leo Phokas dealt with the raids of Sayf al-Dawla in 950 and 960. Skylitzes reports how in 950 Leo Phokas was informed of Sayf's movements and ambushed him in a defile as he was retreating. Sayf al-Dawla 'was surrounded by forces lying in ambush. Men posted for this purpose rose up from their concealed positions, rolling great stones down on them and shooting all kinds of missiles at them'.[844] Leo the Deacon goes into far greater detail for the events of 960. We read that Leo Phokas, 'decided not to expose the army to certain danger, nor to face the barbarian host in the open' instead he decided to 'occupy the most strategic positions on the precipices, to lie there in ambush and guard the escape routes, and then confront the barbarians at the most dangerous and perilous sections of the path'.[845]

The testimony of this historical narratives, however, is so close to the manuals, it is only rational to wonder whether they should be taken at face value. Both Skylitzes and Leo the Deacon could well have drawn upon promotional material which was favourable to the Phokades.[846] Leo the Deacon's narrative is full of praise for Leo Phokas, he is referred to as 'a courageous and vigorous man, of exceptionally good judgement, and the cleverest of anyone we know at devising the proper course of action at times of crisis'. Leo the Deacon goes as far as to say that 'some divine force, I believe, used to fight alongside him in battles'.[847] What is more, Leo the Deacon has Leo Phokas give a fictional speech to his army which was so perfect that made all the soldiers want to follow him to the death.[848] Leo Phokas' achievements are also praised in the preface of the *DV* which according to certain scholars contains clear pro-Phokas material and propaganda.[849]

Be that as it may, one could too readily dismiss Byzantine accounts as completely fictional and the advice of the *Sylloge* as impractical. But in this case, we are lucky enough to possess the alternative testimony of Arab accounts, and we can, in fact, determine to what extent the Byzantines altered their accounts to idealise their figures. For the Byzantine victory of 950, Arab accounts report that Sayf al-

[843] *ST*, 52.1-2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; *MS*, 10.2.1-7; *LT*, 17.59.
[844] Skylitzes, 242 (trans. Wortley, p. 233-4).
[845] LD, 19-23 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 71-3).
[846] Cheynet 1986: 293-4, 304-5; Sinclair 2012: 306-7; Markopoulos 2006;
[847] LD, 19-23 (trans. Talbot and Sullivan, p. 71-3).
[848] Hoffmann 2007: 116-20.
[849] Holmes 2010: 74-5; Cheynet 1986: 312; Dagron and Mihăescu 1986: 33-7.

Dawla returned from his raid in the *thema* of Charsianon, only to find that the *kleisourai* were already captured by Leo Phokas and that the passage was blocked with tree trunks. The Byzantines attacked with missiles and Leo Phokas attacked the rear-guard of Sayf al-Dawla who managed to fight his way through with considerable losses. Sayf tried to cross via an alternative route, marching through rough terrain. His troops were already exhausted from the previous engagement, from the march and from carrying the spoils. Towards the end of their journey, close to the *kleisoura* that led to the South-East of Marash, the Byzantines attacked again and utterly destroyed his army.[850] As regards the second victory in 960, we learn that on his retreat, Sayf al-Dawla was blocked in a defile by Leo Phokas who ambushed him and destroyed his army.[851]

Byzantine accounts, therefore, even when they were promotional, do not seem to have fabricated events out of thin air. Their subjects were certainly praised and described in a more ideal light, but the alternative account of Arab sources agrees with the testimony of Byzantine narratives in terms of the main strategy employed. The fact that the engagements were fought near the borders of the enemy may have something to do with the advice of the *ST* which urges the general to attack the enemy in this location 'because they will be more negligent since they clearly have more opportunities to save themselves'[852] Indeed Arab sources inform us that some of the enemy abandoned Sayf before the engagement, most probably to run towards their own territory and to ensure safety.[853]

Whatever the case, Arab sources further confirm the testimony of the manuals since they record similar other events of less significance. For example, we know that when, in 939, Sayf al-Dawla invaded and ravaged the theme of Koloneia, John Kourkouas only attacked him as he was retreating. In 956, John Tzimiskes protected his own *thema* as its *strategos* by avoiding a pitched battle with Sayf al-Dawla and instead captured the defiles to block his exit and ambushed him as he was withdrawing into Arab territory.[854] In addition, this strategy was no novelty of the tenth century. Byzantine, Arab and Armenian sources agree that this was more or less the tradition Byzantine approach to warfare at least from the eight century onwards.[855]

While this strategy was very effective and well tested, Byzantine guerrilla tactics did not only involve ambushes in the *kleisourai*. An alternative way to deal with invaders was to surprise them outside of

[850] Yahya, i.70-1; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.95-6, 309-12, ii.344-5; Canard 1951: 766-8; Bikhazi 1981: 716-21.
[851] Yahya, i.83-4; Bikhazi 1981: 846
[852] *ST*, 52.2 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[853] Vasiliev 1935-68, ii.i.313, ii.344-5.
[854] Yahya, i.74-5; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.i.97, ii.340; Canard 1951: 790; Runciman 1929 143-4; Vasiliev 1935-1968: ii.289-90.
[855] See for example, Stouraitis 2009: 45-168; McMahon 2016: 22-33.

the defiles and while they were on regular Byzantine territory. Such attacks were usually undertaken when the enemy was unprepared for battle and occupied with some other task. For example, the *ST* instructs the general that 'the very best time for attacking (…) is when the army is occupied with fixing the camp and whenever everybody releases the horses for pasturage'.[856] It seems that this tactic was indeed employed on the battlefield. All the chronicles agree that when the Rus invaded Byzantium, in 941, Bardas Phokas attacked them 'when he encountered a considerable body [of Rus] set to forage'. His example was followed by John Kourkouas, who, when he arrived with reinforcements, 'found the Russians dispersed wandering hither and thither and dealt them a bitter blow'.[857] Besides, this strategy was not only employed by the Byzantines, it was more or less commonplace. We have already seen that Byzantine narratives record how such attacks were undertaken against the Byzantines as well, while Liudprand of Cremona records that the Hungarians employed the same practice in the West.[858]

Finally, the *ST,* mostly drawing on older manuals, instructs the general to prepare ambushes not only in the borders, but also when then enemy is deep into the Byzantine territory.[859] More specifically, it advices the general to conceal two units and to use another one to lure the enemy towards the ambush with a feign retreat.[860] Perhaps the most famous parallel account of this tactic is found in the narrative of Skylitzes. We read that in 970, Bardas Skleros prepared an ambush against the Rus and sent John Alakasseus to lure the enemy with his detachment by feigning retreat.[861] Some scholars have pointed out that this passage represents a perfect example of implementation of advice from the manuals demonstrating how a general should deal with superior numbers and employ ambuscades.[862] But others, have raised caution and argued that Skylitzes must have used a lost promotional pro-Skleros source for this account.[863] The process of historical writing and the agenda of every author becomes clearer when we read Leo the Deacon's testimony. Once more, as it was the case with Leo Phokas above, both Leo the Deacon and Skylitzes agree that the main strategy the Byzantines used was an ambuscade. They disagree, however, on who was responsible for coming up with the plan and who led the operation.[864]

---

[856] *ST*, 52.3 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)].
[857] TC*,* 424-5; Symeon Magister, 136.73-4; Skylitzes 229-30 (trans. Wortley, p. 221).
[858] Liudprand of Cremona 2.15.
[859] *PS,* 40; *LT*, 14.49.
[860] *ST*, 24.3-5.
[861] Skylitzes 289-90.
[862] McGeer 1995: 298-9.
[863] Holmes 2005: 284-6.
[864] LD, 108-10; Holmes 2005: 273-6. For a discussion as to whether Skylitzes had used Leo the Deacon as a source see: Karpozilos 2002-2009: ii. 477-8; Kiapidou 2010: 104-10; Treadgold 2013: 239-40.

To conclude, we are fortunate to possess a variety of information concerning guerrilla warfare which seems to validate the practicality of the instructions provided by the *ST*. This is better demonstrated by the fact that guerrilla warfare was the basic strategy of Byzantium for almost three centuries and indeed remained important during the tenth, despite the fact that the Byzantines had, by then, taken the offensive. In addition, the practicality of the *ST* on this topic is further underlined by the fact that historical narratives provide with a great deal of parallel information and the more suspicious passages seem to be supplemented and validated by more neutral accounts or by Arab and Armenian sources.

Conclusion

The question whether the military manuals and, by extension, the *ST* had any practical use on the battlefield is one that more or less impinges upon modern perceptions of what a practical manual looks like. In this light it comes to no surprise that certain scholars have viewed the *ST* either as purely literary work which had little connection with contemporary warfare or as a forgery. Therefore, we should take into consideration that these manuals were written for a literary audience which was very deeply influenced by tradition, and, most of the times, viewed the past as a credible source to find exemplars or to be educated by it. Be that as it may, the presentation of the material in a proper way, i.e. a way which was in line with traditional standards and connected to the past, would have been of vital importance, almost equally important as the contents of the work itself. Consequently, the work would look as if it was a gradual evolution of tradition, rather than a rigid breakup with traditional practices.

Nobody can deny that there might be multiple purposes for the production of a manual. One might be the preservation of knowledge, another might be for an individual to promote himself against other peers, or for an emperor who was an armchair general to exercise propaganda referring to his predecessors or demonstrating that he had a more active role in the army. However, we cannot deny that practicality was among these reasons. Despite the fact that a great deal of information came from older or classical works, we have demonstrated that the majority of them remained relevant to the tenth century or were, to an extent, updated. We have also seen that the gradual evolution of tactics from manual to manual cannot be perceived as a coincidence, and more importantly, that there is good evidence from other sources to support that a large percentage of this advice was indeed followed on the battlefield, or that the generals faced similar challenges. Last but not least it would be futile to try to understand the practical value of military manuals without first trying to understand the role that

tradition, history and the past played into the mentality of the Byzantine emperor, of the patrons and authors, as well as of the military aristocracy.

Chapter Seven

The *Sylloge Tacticorum* after the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

We have already seen that the *ST* used a number of works as its sources; but that which seems to have influenced the *ST* the most is *LT*. Our author used *LT* as a base from which he gradually evolved and developed Byzantine tactics to correspond to contemporary needs. Therefore, the *ST* is the first manual to introduce us to what we regard as tenth-century warfare, and it is the middle point between *LT* and the *PM*. The latter will become more obvious here, since we are going to discuss the extent to which the *ST* influenced later manuals and warfare. In addition, it will look into the relationship of the *ST* with these later manuals and how its tactics were further evolved and crystallised in them.

To begin with, the manual which seems to have been influenced the most by the *ST* is the *PM* of Nikephoros II Phokas.[865] Nikephoros II, in fact, seems to have used the *ST* in the same way that the author of the latter used *LT*. Nikephoros used the *ST* as a basis to further evolve and crystallize Byzantine tactics and armament, and the approximately thirty years which separate the *ST* from the *PM* are sufficient to explain both the similarities and the differences between the two manuals.

In terms of armament, the *PM* kept the advice of the *ST* with very few changes. As regards the cavalry, the equipment of the Byzantine lancers is given in more detail in the *PM*, but it is very much in accordance with the *ST* which instructed to keep them less armoured than the *kataphraktoi* and with unarmoured horses. Likewise, judging by the equipment proposed by Nikephoros II for the horse-archers in the wedge formation, the equipment of the light cavalry remained largely unchanged. The equipment of the *kataphraktoi*, however, had undergone some more important changes in the *PM*. Contrary to the *ST*, the mace became their primary weapon in the *PM*, and the use of the lance was only restricted to a small number of *kataphraktoi* in the flanks of the wedge formation. On the same grounds, the bows, which were part of their armament in the *ST*, do not appear in the *PM*, and the latter only recommended the use of *klibania* as armour, excluding the other types, such as the mail coats, that the *ST* also recorded.[866]

The armament of the infantry is more or less along the same lines. First of all, the *PM* preserves the same three infantry units as the *ST*: the heavy infantry, the medium infantry and the light infantry. The

[865] McGeer 1995: 184-8; Sullivan 2010: 156-7.
[866] *ST*, 39; *PM*, 3-4; McGeer 1995: 212-7; Dawson 2002: 81-90.

only difference being that in the *PM* infantry units are organized in *taxiarchiai* and their leader, the *taxiarchos,* is now a distinct and official rank.[867] The men are equipped in much the same way as their counterparts in the *ST,* save for the fact that Nikephoros II usually excludes lamellar and mail armour and proposes instead the cheaper types, made of felt or coarse silk and cotton.[868] Specialized infantry troops like the *menavlatoi* appear with very much the same equipment and in fact the specific passage of the *PM* bears a strong resemblance to that of *ST*.[869]

Apart from armament, however, the most interesting changes can be spotted in the evolution of tactics from the *ST* to the *PM*. Although it is evident that the tactics of the *ST* served as a template for Nikephoros II*,* his manual reflects their sophistication, crystallization and improvement which took place in the course of almost thirty years. This evolution of tactics can be found in both cavalry and infantry.

As far as the cavalry is concerned, at first sight there seems to be very little change. Nikephoros II clearly based his instructions on the second cavalry formation found in the *ST*: both manuals record the use of irregular scouts, the *prokoursatores,* which marched ahead of the main army and which were accompanied by a small *tagma* of defenders. In both cases the vanguard consisted of two units of regular cavalry in the flanks, and the wedge of the *kataphraktoi* in the middle, while flank-guards and out-flankers were placed even further away in the flanks. The only difference between the two manuals so far is that the *ST* instructed that two concealed units be placed even further away from the flank-guards and out-flankers, while the *PM* omits them altogether. The second line was divided into four main units, with the general placed in the middle interval, the only difference being that the *ST* instructed another three small units to be placed in the larger intervals of this line in order to guard them. Other than that the rest of the cavalry formation remained the same. Both manuals record a third line which was to be identical to the vanguard, if there were enough *kataphraktoi* at hand, and a rear-guard of three small units followed behind.[870]

A closer look, however, is enough to spot a range of more significant changes and to indicate the optimization of cavalry tactics. These improvements are related to the use of heavy cavalry and seems to have been implemented in order to ensure its success. To begin with, in both manuals, the wedge formation included *kataphraktoi*, horse-archers and lancers. The *PM* is once more evidently influenced

[867] *PM,* 1-2.1, 1.51-62,82-7,95-7; Oikonomides 1972: 273, 335-6; Kühn 1991: 273-8; McGeer 1995: 202-11.
[868] *PM,* 1-2.1; Kolias 1988: 54-8, 85-7; McGeer 1995: 204-6; Dawson 2002: 81-90; Grotowski 2010: 166-70.
[869] *ST*, 38.3; *P.M.* 1.119-24; McGeer 1988: 137.
[870] *ST,* 46.1-28; *PM,* 4.1-75; McGeer 1995: 280-9.

by the *ST*. Nikephoros II based his wedge in the second and third variation of the wedge of the *ST* and so both manuals record a wedge formation of either 504 or 384 men.[871]

While the basic pattern of the wedge remained unchanged, namely consisting of twelve ranks, the men in the first rank being the fewest and every rank having additionally two men in the right and two in the left, the placement of the troops was different. In the *ST* the *kataphraktoi* covered the first, second, third, fourth, ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth ranks, while the other four (fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth) were filled with horse-archers and lancers. It is safe to assume that as in the *PM*, the horse-archers were drawn up in the middle ranks, in order to be protected by the lancers.[872] Although this formation was double-faced and quite secure from encirclements, the flanks of the wedge in the middle ranks seem rather exposed. The *ST* does not clearly specify the armament of the lancers, it states though that their armament should be similar to the *kataphraktoi*, but less heavy, and that their horses should be unarmoured in order to retreat and charge rapidly.[873] This fact must have made the wedge quite vulnerable as the horses of the middle ranks could have been more easily killed by enemy troops who wished to disturb the charge of the *kataphraktoi*.

This seems to have been a really challenging issue which the Arab cavalry probably took advantage of, since in the *PM* we can spot two counter-measures to deal with this problem. Firstly, the wedge of the *PM* had *kataphraktoi* in all ranks. Therefore, in the middle of the wedge, there were horse-archers enclosed and protected by *kataphraktoi.*[874] Although this formation was not double-faced, as the last rank was comprised of both *kataphraktoi* and horse-archers, its flanks were protected by the fact that all the cavalrymen in the flanks were *kataphraktoi,* thus were heavily equipped and with armoured horses. Secondly, the *ST* instructed the wedge to charge right after the *prokoursatores* had released their arrows against the enemy, and after they had retreated through the intervals of the first line. In the *PM,* however, some of the *prokoursatores* were employed to accompany and screen the flanks of the wedge while it was charging in order to 'keep the enemy away from their flanks so that they do not divert or disrupt the *kataphraktoi* and break up the charge'. Additionally, Nikephoros II provided additional instructions in case there was a great number of enemy attempting to strike against the flanks of the wedge, which unfortunately are lost today. [875]

[871] *ST,* 46.26, 29; McGeer 1995: 287-8.
[872] *ST*, 46.6-8.
[873] *ST,* 39.7.
[874] *PM,* 3.53-65; McGeer 1995: 286.
[875] *ST,* 46.9; *PM,* 4.126-33 (trans. McGeer, p. 47); McGeer 1995: 303-5.

Another optimization in the use of heavy cavalry is the abstinence from conducting pursuits. The author of the *ST* fails to notice such an important matter and seems to imply that the *kataphraktoi* were to advance towards the retreating enemy, accompanied by the other two units of regular cavalry.[876] Examples from antiquity underline the danger of this practice. In 272, the Roman emperor Aurelian lured the Palmyran *cataphracts* into pursuing the much lighter Roman cavalry, only to wheel about and attack them when they were exhausted from the pursuit. Likewise, during his Western campaign (356-358), Julian the Apostate avoided pursuing the enemy with his *cataphractarii,* even though he had easily overrun them.[877] The *PM*, on the other hand, specifically instructed the general not to undertake the pursuit with the *kataphraktoi*, but instead advised to have them follow slowly as the other two accompanying units of regular cavalry conducted the pursue.[878]

Last but not least, Nikephoros II seems to have recognized that the *kataphraktoi* were mostly unable to charge more than once. Sources from antiquity seem to support that as Nazarius informs us that in the battle of Turin (312) the *clibanarii* were defeated after their initial charge had failed because they could not easily turn about to regroup.[879] Therefore, the *PM* provided additional advice on how to get the best out of the *kataphraktoi* and instructed the general to aim the charge specifically at the enemy commander with a steady pace and in complete silence to ensure success.[880] On the other hand, while the author of the *ST* recognized that the *kataphraktoi* could get weary from fighting, he did not give specific instructions for limiting their use against a specific target. Instead he generally advised that enemy formation be broken with an irresistible charge, but without giving any details on the procedure of the charge.

The absence of such important details from the *ST* may imply that heavy cavalry tactics were still at a preliminary stage. Indeed, two very important factors which greatly contributed to the success or failure of such specialized heavy cavalry, namely cohesion and fatigue, seem to be neglected in the *ST*. It could be that some of the experiences of the past had been forgotten due to the fact that the practice of employing specialized heavy cavalry had fallen out of use for almost four centuries. Be that as it may, the Byzantines seem to have quickly learned from their mistakes. After three decades the *PM* advanced and optimised the tactics of the *kataphraktoi* in order to ensure their maximum performance and to enhance their contribution in the successful operations against the Arabs.

---

[876] *ST,* 46.9, 16.
[877] Zosimus, 1.50; Festus, 24; Ammianus, 16.2.5-6.
[878] *PM,* 4.150-3.
[879] Nazarius, 22-24.
[880] *PM,* 4.121-4; McGeer 1995: 289.

In addition to the optimisation of cavalry tactics, the *PM* also records the development of infantry tactics. Nikephoros II took measures in order to ensure the success of the specialised infantry. In the *ST* the tactics of the *menavlatoi* seem to reflect a small number of enemy heavy cavalry and a rather small threat. Their numbers were relatively small, 300 at best, and they were instructed to fight almost independently, drawing up at a distance of 30 to 40 fathoms away from the infantry square.[881] In the *PM* the *menavlatoi* no longer acted alone, but were part of the infantry *taxiarchia*, attached to the infantry square. Each *taxiarchia* had 100 *menavlatoi*, which made them 1,200 in total, a number four times bigger than that of the *ST*.[882]

In addition, the *PM* features an optimised version of the hollow square formation. Compared to the *ST,* Nikephoros II provided clear and practical advice on the array of the square and on counter-measures for special occasions, which shows a good understanding and crystallization of practices.[883] In this case, however, Nikephoros II did not directly advance the advice of the *ST*, but he partly copied from another source, the *Syntaxis Armatorum Quadrata,* which had already improved the hollow square formation. Older scholarship regarded the advice of the *ST* and *Syntaxis* as similar and overlooked the different stages of evolution of the infantry square.[884] In this light it will be helpful to discuss the relationship of the *ST* and the *Syntaxis* in more detail.

The *Syntaxis Armatorum Quadrata* is a tactical blueprint which preserves a diagram depicting a hollow square infantry formation with the cavalry inside. The *Syntaxis* was at some stage interpolated in the manuscript tradition of Aelian, and, therefore, appears under his name. The diagram is accompanied by a small text which explains the formation. The text reports that there should be three infantry units in each side, twelve in total, each drawn up with an interval between each another. The intervals must have sufficient length so as to allow fifteen cavalrymen abreast to pass through. The text goes on to explain that in case of emergencies the intervals can be reduced from twelve to eight, and judging by the diagram this was achieved by merging the infantry units in the corners.[885]

The exact dating of the *Syntaxis* remains uncertain. Dain had dated this interpolation somewhere around the reign of Nikephoros II Phokas, i.e. after the *ST*, but not necessarily posterior to the *PM*.[886] On the other hand, McGeer argued that the *Syntaxis* predated the *ST*, and since he dated the latter c.

[881] *ST*, 47.16.
[882] *PM*, 1.80-4, 94-106; McGeer 1988: 136-45; 1995: 273-5.
[883] McGeer 1995: 262.
[884] McGeer 1995: 257-66; 1992: 223-8.
[885] *ST,* 47.20; Dain 1946: 156-8; 1967: 367; McGeer 1992: 220-2.
[886] Dain 1946: 159-60.

950, he suggested that the *Syntaxis* was compiled in first half of the tenth century, around the time of John Kourkouas.[887] McGeer's view seems very convincing at first. The author of *ST* seems to have known this text for he seems to cite it in his discussion of the hollow square formation, stating that 'if the enemy force is larger, then it is safer, according to Polybius and Aelian, for this compound formation to have only eight intervals and the corners of the square to be attached together'.[888] In addition as we have already seen in chapter two, another text interpolated in the tradition of Aelian, the *Peri Metron*, seems to have been used as a source by the author of the *ST*. But when we put this thesis under closer scrutiny some very important issues arise.

First of all, McGeer argued that the *Syntaxis* influenced the *ST* because he believed that they featured very similar tactics. This is not the case, however, for the hollow square of the *ST* seems to be in its first stage of evolution. Although the author of the *ST* tried to be flexible and adapt the shape and size of the square according to manpower and geography, he presents it in a rather theoretical and mathematical model, which is reminiscent of ancient theoretical tacticians, like Asclepiodotus and Aelian.[889] What is more, the units at the flanks of the square are not drawn up by files, as one would expect, but by ranks, which evidently makes the formation exposed from the flanks. It is hard to imagine that it would have effectively sustained an attack from the sides. It seems as if the square was not yet crystallized, but gradually evolved from a marching formation. On the other hand, the hollow square of the *Syntaxis* is clearly optimised. The text seems rather practical and the units on the flanks are drawn up by files, effectively protecting the flanks of the square, to the same degree as the units on the front and the back side did. Its model is much more common to the one in the *PM*, and I think that it is reasonable to argue that the *Syntaxis* was compiled sometime after the reign of Romanos I and that it was used by Nikephoros II as a source.

As regards the reference of the *ST* to Polybius and Aelian, it can be explained in another way. The reference to Polybius cannot be traced to any extant work, but it could have referred to a lost military treatise written by him.[890] The reference to Aelian is a little more complicated and there are three possible explanations for it. The first is that the reference is fake and the author of the *ST* manipulated the tradition in order to fabricate authority for the relatively new practices he was describing.[891] The second is that the author of the *ST* did cite an interpolation of Aelian, but an older lost version of it.

[887] McGeer 1992: 228.
[888] *ST,* 47.20 [trans. Chatzelis and Harris (forthcoming)]; McGeer 1992: 226-7.
[889] *ST*, 47.24, 27; Aelian, 8-9, 15-16, 20; Rance 1994: 77.
[890] Vári 1927: 266.
[891] For a similar fabrication in religious texts see Berger 2013: 247-58. For a manipulation of Xenophon's *Anabasis* to discretely convey criticism and a moral message to Leo VI, see: Kaldellis 2015b: 22-34.

This is supported, as we have seen in chapter two, by the fact that the metrological table in the *ST* is different from the extant *Peri Metron*, which was also part of the same interpolation as the *Syntaxis*. This could, therefore, mean that our author drew his material from a lost version which could have included a slightly different metrological table and some other square array, perhaps an emergency or marching formation that suggested the reduction of intervals. The third explanation is that the reference to Aelian was added later by the redactors of the *ST*, sometime after the *Syntaxis* had been compiled.

Even if the infantry square of the *ST* had its weaknesses, its legacy seems to have survived for at least a century and a half. We have already seen how the Byzantines could have employed such formations in the late eleventh century, as Anna Komnene speaks of a hollow square infantry formation employed by Alexios I. In addition, the influence of the *ST* could well have gone beyond Byzantium, the square fighting-march formation of the Crusaders, seems to have been inspired by Byzantine tactics. Since it deployed the men by ranks, the *ST* seems to be the closest Byzantine example one could find. The Crusaders could have acquired this knowledge from their previous experience as mercenaries of Byzantium or from military advice that Alexios gave to them.[892]

The last work to concern us is the *TNO*. Writing in reign of Basil II (975-1025), Ouranos largely copied from the *PM*, whose tactics, however, he further revised and developed.[893] The structure of the *TNO* is very similar to the *ST*. Both treat the ideal general and more conventional warfare in their initial chapters, and then move on to war by other means based on Julian Africanus and the stratagems of classical commanders. Unfortunately, the manual has not yet been edited to its entirety, but according to studies so far, there is no consensus as to whether Ouranos used the *ST*. Some have argued that part of the common material was copied directly, while others that it derived from some version of *LT* and the non-extant *Corpus Perditum*.[894]

Whatever the case, the tactics of the *ST* seem to have had a quite significant impact on later manuals. The *Syntaxis* and the *PM* seem to have used the *ST* as a basis from which they optimised the hollow square formation, the cavalry formation and the tactics of specialised units such as the *kataphraktoi* and the *menavlatoi*. Around the eleventh century the *TNO* took the lead to further advance Byzantine tactics, which despite improvements, remained essentially very similar to the *ST*. It seems in fact that some of the older tactics of the *ST* were still considered practical, since they were successfully employed by the Crusaders.

[892] See chapter six above.
[893] McGeer 1991: 132-4; Sullivan 2010: 159-60; Trombley 1997: 271-3.
[894] McGeer 1991: 132 and n.27; c.f. Vieillefond 1932: lii; Dain 1937: 47-87; Foucault 1973: 281-3; Mecella 2009: 105-6.

Conclusion

The tenth century was a century of change and relative prosperity. The procedures and challenges that were introduced during the 'Dark Ages', from the Arab conquests to the ninth century, were finally crystallised and standardised. All gradual developments of Byzantine society started to accelerate. The steady revival of literacy and letters of the ninth century was further developed and facilitated in the tenth. The Byzantines, despite their defeats, had found a way to deal with the Arab threat which was now only seasonal. After Byzantium dealt with the Bulgarians in the West, a new spirit of confidence emerged, and the initiative and offensive was undertaken in the East. The Byzantine army invaded and raided Arab lands more frequently and ever deeper. To meet the challenge effectively, the army was required to change, from one that mainly focused on defensive guerrilla warfare, to an army that could also field specialised troops and draw up in specialised formations, able to engage in sieges and pitched-battles. The above challenges, together with the so-called 'Macedonian renaissance' facilitated the production of various new military manuals which aimed at preparing the army for guerrilla warfare, sieges and pitched battles. It is in this particular context that the *ST* was produced and one could say that its contents are very much in line with contemporary needs. This view, however, is not shared by everyone.

Most of the studies solely dedicated to the *ST* were produced relatively early in the twentieth century. This was a time when Byzantine warfare was still very much undiscovered and very little researched. It was also a period which approached *mimesis* quite apologetically and negatively. Scholarship contented itself with simply identifying which earlier works, classical or Byzantine, an author had used, and argued that Byzantine literature was so stuck in the classical tradition that it cared very little about updating it and addressing contemporary realities and needs. Therefore, when a dependence upon a classical model was recognised, it was too readily seen as mere antiquarianism, a literary exercise that played no further role, and little effort was undertaken to understand it. This background, together with the fact that the *ST* had a false attribution, created a tone of distrust and untrustworthiness for the manual. Dain saw the *ST* as a compilation of material which had little relevance for tenth-century Byzantium, and its author as a careless editor who copied almost all of his material from two lost sources. His views were shared by more recent scholars, such as Wheeler, who argued that the whole work was a forgery.

Since then, however, Byzantine studies have come a long way. Scholars have started to understand and appreciate *mimesis* better, and instead of merely identifying classical or older references, they now

devote their attention in recognizing how the tradition was adapted to better meet Byzantine needs and contexts. While these advances have been made for quite some time now, they have been applied very little to military manuals. A fresh approach to the issue of the sources and *mimesis* demonstrates that the author of the *ST* was just a regular example of an established tradition. He seems to have copied part of his work from one lost source, the *Corpus Perditum,* and the other from individual, more or less, known sources. These works were mainly classical and older Byzantine military manuals, as well as legal treatises, which most of the time were adapted and paraphrased. The author of the *ST*, therefore, was not a careless copyist. The testimony of the *ST* is as trustworthy as that of other tenth-century manuals such as *LT* or the *PM*. Although sometimes it is necessary to assume that some lost work existed, there is a risk of overdoing it. Assuming that a lost source existed every time a passage was adapted, can silence important aspects of style and authorship within extant narratives.

With the above in mind, one can safely turn to the internal evidence of the *ST* in order to determine its dating. Although most scholars suggest a dating around 950, a detailed study to support such a theory has yet to be produced. The testimony of the *ST* speaks of any army ready to fulfil the traditional defensive guerrilla role, as well as an offensive one: an army which could employ specialised troops and sophisticated formations. In this light, the reign of Romanos I is by far the most likely period of composition, not only because it is when the Byzantines started to take the initiative, but also because the army of the *ST,* technologically, administratively and operationally fits into this period. The tactics, ranks and technology paint the picture of an army which had gradually evolved from the reign of Leo VI, but not so much as to be dated to the reign of Constantine VII. Last but not least, it is not only that these developments occurred and fit the context of the reign of Romanos I, but also that they are compatible with Arab developments of the first half of the tenth century, and that they can be seen and explained as a response to these enemy developments.

The authorship of Romanos I is also supported by the fact that the *ST* does not refer to members of the Macedonian dynasty, even though its sources seem to have included such references. It was a characteristic of the Macedonian dynasty to practise imperial propaganda through literature and both Leo VI and Constantine VII refer to their predecessors in their works. For Romanos I, however, it would have been a necessity to avoid any memoranda that linked to the Macedonian dynasty and to Constantine VII who was the legitimate heir to the throne. The false attribution of the *ST* could well have been a *damnatio memoriae*, inflicted by Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos. This is not, after all, something unpreceded. Constantine VII used similar action against Alexander, after the latter had died. Similarly, when Romanos I was still on the throne Constantine VII spoke highly of him, but after he was dethroned, Constantine VII stained his reputation at any given chance. Other men in the circle

of Constantine VII, either the Gongylioi brothers or Basil Lekapenos, were also hostile to the name of Romanos I, as well as to his closest associates, inflicting a *damnatio memoriae* on his *domestikos* of the *scholai,* John Kourkouas, and on his *parakoimomenos*, Theophanes.

Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos seem not only to have changed the attribution of the *ST,* but to have further interfered with the text. The method of the revision of the *ST* has many similarities with the way Constantine VII and Basil Lekapenos revised other extant treatises. Given that there is no alternative version of the *ST* available, only a few conjectures can be made as to the level of their interference. Judging from their usual method, they seem to have re-ordered the material in a certain way, adding new chapters and new chapter headings. They might have also added, or gathered together in one section, all the stratagems in the last part of the manual, as well as written the *scholion* that appears after chapter 46. As it was usually the case with the works they revised, the inconsistencies in the introduction and in the cross-references were not corrected to reflect the changes, and one chapter from the stratagems is also missing.

The inconsistent cross-references, as well as the uncertain dating and attribution greatly contributed to the image of the *ST* as an untrustworthy source. But since the original compiler of the *ST* was not responsible for them, and the testimony of the *ST* is as credible as any other tenth-century Byzantine manual, it is time to reassess and re-evaluate its contents. The contribution of the *ST* to our understanding of the tenth century can be significant. It is a manual which provides insights into how the Byzantines interacted with the past, and how they updated classical sources to fit them into their own contemporary context. An inter-textual analysis contributes to our understanding of how the Byzantines perceived war and their enemies and how Christianity made some classical passages obsolete. What is more, the *ST* is a source which perfectly reflects the ideology and values of military aristocracy as these had begun to take shape in the tenth century.

But apart from the ideological, cultural and literary sphere, the greatest contribution of the *ST* is its military innovations. The army of the *ST* is an army that had gradually evolved from *LT*. It is an army highly specialised and divided into light, medium and heavy infantry and cavalry, with updated equipment and technology. The troops were drawn up in new formations which were a more sophisticated version of the practices found in *LT.* All the aspects which introduce us to tenth-century strategy, tactics, and equipment as we know them, were first recorded in the *ST.*

The fact that an author has updated the tradition and has included original material in his manual, however, does not necessarily mean that this material was practical and applicable on the battlefield. Many scholars believe that military manuals were mostly literary works which had little to no practical

value. These scholars have argued that the main aim of their authors was to preserve the tradition by copying it, or to promote themselves among other peers. But practicality can in fact co-exist with these two factors. It would be futile to try to understand the purpose of the manuals without first looking into the role that tradition and history played in shaping the thinking and world-view of the Byzantine elite.

There is, without doubt, more than one motive for the compilation of any work. An author could have certainly produced a work to promote himself among his peers, but what better way for someone to advertise himself as the best candidate for power by producing the most up to date work on military matters. The correct way to do so, however, would have been within the traditional standards of Byzantine literature. It is not enough to discard the practicality of manuals just because they draw on classical and older Byzantine material. The past played a very authoritative role in Byzantium, sometimes, in fact, it enjoyed more credibility than current observation or practice. Every innovation had to be connected with the older tradition, so as to be seen as a gradual evolution from it and not as a rigid break. Therefore, the correct way to proceed would have been to paraphrase classical and older sources whenever something had already been covered by them, and when necessary to update them with some original material. What is more, classical or older material does not necessarily mean outdated material. Most of the time the advice of Onasander or *MS* were still relevant in the tenth century, and even more so with a little update. The anecdotes of Polyaenus could have been of use to anyone in theory; not only did they provide exemplars from the classical past, they also supplemented and connected material from the first half of the treatise with the deeds of prominent figures from antiquity.

While it is easy to underestimate the practical use of manuals, it is also very easy to overestimate it. A parallel passage between a military manual and a historical narrative is not enough to confirm that the advice of manuals was followed on the battlefield. A great deal of our historical narratives include promotional sources which could well have presented some generals in an ideal light, while battle narratives may have been fictional. It is possible that they preserved a core of truth, but they could also have been deliberately adapted to include practices which were similar to the manuals. It is, therefore, necessary not to take the testimony of a source at face value before we understand its sources and motives. The only way to confirm to what extent the advice of manuals was followed is to compare Byzantine historical narratives with other types of sources, such as administrative or legal records, as well as with Arab, Western or Armenian material, when possible.

Generally speaking, most of the material of the *ST* seems to be in line with tenth-century context and practice. In this line of reasoning most of its contents seems practical. It is indeed a different issue if a manual had relevant and rational advice to offer, and a different issue if people actually employed its practices on the battlefield. To what extent prominent generals actually followed the advice of manuals is something which has to do with how fictional promotional narratives are. When we do have parallel accounts, it seems that most of the information of the *ST* was considered common practice and that promotional sources did not fabricate events out of thin air. They most certainly enhanced the image of their subjects with allusions, anecdotes and praise, but the basic strategies followed do not seem to have been invented.

After all, the advice of the *ST* was not discarded as theoretical and this is evident by the afterlife of the manual. Very experienced generals who wrote military manuals in the tenth and eleventh century, like Nikephoros II Phokas and Nikephoros Ouranos, used the information of the *ST* as a basis. It is true that they further advanced and sophisticated Byzantine tactics, but the revision was not drastic. At their core, Byzantine tactics in the eleventh century, as reflected in the *TNO,* remained largely the same as those in the *ST*. The advice of the *ST* seems not only to have been appreciated by the Byzantines, but by Westerners as well. The Crusaders fought their way through to Ascalon by employing similar tactics as the *ST* describes.

Bibliography

Editions of the *Sylloge Tacticorum*

1854: H. Köchly (ed.), *Index lectionum in literarum universitate Turicensi habendarum,* 2 vols, Zurich 1854.

1863: J.P. Migne (ed.), *Patrologia Graeca,* vol. 107, Paris 1863.

1887: J. Melber (ed.), *Polyaeni Strategematon libri octo,* Leipzig 1887.

1917-1922: R. Vári (ed.), *Leonis imperatoris Tactica,* 2 vols, Bucharest 1917-1922.

1932: J.R. Vieillefond (ed.), *Jules Africain, fragments des Cestes provenant de la collection des tacticiens grecs,* Paris 1932.

1938: A. Dain (ed.), *Sylloge tacticorum, quae olim "Inedita Leonis tactica" dicebatur,* Paris 1938.

Primary Sources

Aelian, C. Matthew (ed. and trans.), *The Tactics of Aelian, or On the Military Arrangements of the Greeks,* Barnsley 2012.

Aeneas the Tactician, A.M. Bon and A. Dain (ed.), *Énée le tacticien. Poliorcétique,* Paris 1967.

Agathias, R. Keydell (ed.), *Agathiae Myrinaei Historiarum libri quinque*, Berlin 1967; Eng. trans. J.D. Frendo, *Agathias the Histories*, Berlin 1975.

Albert of Aachen, S.B. Edgington (ed. and trans.), *Albert of Aachen Historia ierosolimitana, History of the Journey to Jerusalem,* Oxford 2007.

Ammianus Marcellinus, J.C. Rolfe (ed. and trans.), *Ammiani Marcellini Rerum Gestarum,* 3 vols, London and Cambridge MA 1935-1939.

Apparatus Bellicus, In: I. Lamis (ed.), *Ioannis Meursi Operum, Volumen Septimum,* Florence 1746: 905-84.

Arrian, P.A. Brunt (ed. and trans.), *Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander,* 2 vols, Cambridge MA 1976-1983.

Attaleiates Michael, A. Kaldellis and D. Krallis (ed. and trans.), *Michael Attaleiates: The History,* Cambridge MA and London 2012.

Basil I, K. Païdas (ed. and trans.), *Βασίλειος Α΄ Μακεδών: Δύο παραινετικά κείμενα προς τον Λέοντα ΣΤ',* Athens 2009.

Basil Younger, D.F. Sullivan, et al (ed. and trans.), *The life of St. Basil the Younger: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Moscow Version,* Washington DC 2014.

Bryennios Nikephoros, P. Gautier (ed. and trans.), *Nicéphore Bryennios Histoire,* Brussels 1975.

Chrysostom, John, *In Omnes Sanctos,* In: C.I. Dyobouniotes (ed.), 'Ὁ ὑπ' ἀριθμ. 108 κῶδιξ τῆς Ἱ. Συνόδου τῆς Ἐκκλησιας τῆς Ἑλλάδος', *Ἐκκλησιαστικός Φάρος* 9 (1912): 303-5.

Chrysostom, John, *In Sanctum Pascha,* F. Floëri and P. Nautin (eds.), *Homélies pascales,* vol. 3, Paris 1957.

Constantine VII, *De Administrando Imperio,* G. Moravcsik (ed.), trans. R.J.H. Jenkins, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio,* Washington DC 1967.

Constantine VII, *De Cerimoniis,* J.J. Reiske (ed.), *Constantini Porphyrogeniti imperatoris de cerimoniis aulae Byzantine libri duo,* Bonn 1829; Eng. trans. A. Moffatt and M. Tall, *Constantine Porphyrogennetos: The Book of Ceremonies,* Canberra 2012.

Constantine VII, *De Thematibus*, A. Pertusi (ed.), *Costantino Porfirogenito, De thematibus,* Vatican City 1952.

Constantine VII, *Military Oration,* H.G. Ahrweiler (ed.), 'Un discours inédit de Constantin VII Porphyrogénète', *TM* 2 (1967): 393-404; Eng. trans. E. McGeer, 'Two military orations of Constantine VII'. In: J.W. Nesbitt (ed.), *Byzantine Authors: Literary Activities and Preoccupations, Texts and Translations dedicated to the Memory of Nicolas Oikonomides,* Leiden and Boston 2003: 117-20.

Constantine VII, Theophanes Continuatus, In: I. Bekker (ed.), *Theophanes Continuatus, Ioannes Cameniata, Symeon Magister, Georgius Monachus,* Bonn 1838: 3-481.

Constantine VII, Theophanes Continuatus, J.M. Featherstone and J.S. Codoñer (ed. and trans.), *Chronographiae quae Theophanis Continuati nomine fertur libri i-iv,* Boston and Berlin 2015.

Constantine VII, *Three Treatises,* J.F. Haldon (ed. and trans.), *Constantine Porphyrogenitus: Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions,* Vienna 1990.

Constantine VII, *Vita Basilii,* I. Ševčenko (ed. and trans.), *Chronographiae quae Theophanis Continuati nomine fertur liber quo Vita Basilii imperatoris amplectitur*, Berlin 2011.

Corippus, Flavius Cresconius, I. Diggle and F.R.D. Goodyear (eds.), *Flavii Cresconii Corippi, Iohannidos Libri VIII,* Cambridge 1970; Eng. trans. W. Shea, *The Iohannis or De Bellis Libycis of Flavius Cresconius Corippus*, New York 1998.

Corpus Parisinum, D.M. Searby (ed. and trans.), *The Corpus Parisinum, A Critical Edition of the Greek Text with Commentary and English Translation: A Medieval Anthology of Greek Texts from the Pre-Socratics to the Church Fathers 600 B.C. – 700 A.D.),* 2 vols, New York 2007.

Damascenus, John, *Vita Barlaam et Joasaph,* H. Mattingly and G.R. Woodward (eds. and trans.), *St. John Damascene, Barlaam and Joasaph,* Cambridge MA 1914.

Daphnopates, Theodore, J. Darrouzès and L.G. Westerink (eds. and trans.), *Théodore Daphnopatès correspondance,* Paris 1978.

De Obsidione Toleranda, H. van den Berg (ed.), *Anonymus De obsidione toleranda: edition critica,* Leiden 1947; Reprint, Eng. Trans. and annot. D.F. Sullivan, 'A Byzantine Instructional Manual on Siege Defense: The *De obsidione Toleranda.* Introduction, English Translation and Annotations'. In: J.W. Nesbitt (ed.), *Byzantine Authors: Literary Activities and Preoccupations, Texts and Translations dedicated to the Memory of Nicolas Oikonomides,* Leiden and Boston 2003: 139-266.

De Re Militari, In: G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *Three Byzantine Military Treatises,* Washington DC 1985: 246-327.

Ekloga, L. Burgmann (ed. and trans.), *Ecloga: Das Gesetzbuch Leonis III. und Konstantinos V,* Frankfurt 1983.

Euthymius Protasecretis, *Encomium in sanctum Theodorum Stratelatem,* In: F. Halkin, 'L'éloge de saint Théodore de Stratélate', *Analecta Bollandiana* 99 (1981): 223-37.

Festus, M.L. Fele, (ed. and trans.), *Il Breviarium di Rufio Festo*, Hildesheim 2009.

Genesios Joseph, A. Lesmüller-Werner and J. Thurn (eds.), *Iosephi Genesii regum libri quattuor,* Berlin 1978; Eng. trans. A. Kaldellis, *Genesios on the Reigns of the Emperors,* Canberra 1998.

Geoponika, E. Lelli (ed. and trans.), *L'agricoltura antica, I Geoponica di Cassiano Basso,* Soveria Mannelli 2010; Eng. trans. A. Dalby, *Geoponika, Farm Work,* Totnes 2011.

Gregorius, *Commentarius in Ecclesiasten*, G.H. Ettlinger and J. Noret (eds.), *Pseudo-Gregorii Agrigentini seu Pseudo-Gregorii Nysseni commentaries in Ecclesiasten,* Turnhout 2007.

P. Grierson, *Catalogue of the Byzantine Coins in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection and in the Whittemore Collection,* vol.3.2, Washington DC 1973.

Heron, *Geometrica,* In: J.L. Heiberg (ed.), *Heronis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt omnia,* vol. 4, Leipzig 1903: 172-448.

Heron of Byzantium, *Parangelmata Poliorketika,* In: D.F. Sullivan (ed. and trans.), *Siegecraft, Two Tenth-Century Instructional Manuals by "Heron of Byzantium",* Washington DC 2000: 26-113.

Hypothesis, In: J. Melber (ed.), *Polyaeni Strategematon libri octo,* Leipzig 1887: 427-500; Eng. trans. P. Krentz and E.L. Wheeler, *Polyaenus Stratagems of War,* 2 vols, Chicago 1994: ii. 852-1003.

Isocrates, *To Nicocles,* In: G. Norlin (ed. and trans.), *Isocrates,* 3 vols, Cambridge MA. 1928: i. 37-72.

Isocrates, *To Demonicus,* In: G. Norlin (ed. and trans.), *Isocrates,* 3 vols, Cambridge MA. 1928: i. 1-36.

Julian of Ascalon, C. Saliou (ed. and trans.), *Le traité d'urbanisme de Julien d'Ascalon (VI^e siècle),* Parris 1996.

Julian the Apostate, W.C.F. Wright (ed. and trans.), *Julian*, 2 vols, London and Cambridge MA 1913-1923.

Jus Graecoromanum, I. Zepos and P. Zepos (eds.), 8 vols, Athens 1931.

Kaminiates, John, G. Böhlig (ed.), *Ioannis Caminiatae de expugnatione Thessalonicae,* Berlin 1973; Eng. trans. D. Frendo and A. Fotiou, *John Kaminiates, The Capture of Thessaloniki,* Perth 2000.

Kekaumenos, C. Roueché (ed. and trans.), *Kekaumenos, Advice and Anecdotes, Edition, English Translation and Commentary,* online edition 2013: ancientwisdoms.ac.uk/folioscope/greekLit%3Atlg3017.Syno298.sawsGrc01

Kletorologion, In: N. Oikonomides (ed. and trans.), *Les listes de préséance byzantines des IXe et Xe siècles,* Paris 1972: 65-235.

Komnene, Anna, A. Kambylis and D.R. Reinsch (eds.), *Annae Comnenae Alexias,* Berlin and New York 2001; Eng. trans. E.R.A. Sewter and P. Frankopan, *Anna Komnene Alexiad,* London 2009.

Leo Deacon, C.B. Hase (ed.), *Leonis Diaconi Caloensis historiae libri decem,* Bonn 1828; Eng. trans. A.M. Talbot and D.F. Sullivan, *The History of Leo the Deacon, Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century,* Washington DC 2005.

Leo Grammarian, I. Bekker (ed.), *Leonis Grammatici Chronographia,* Bonn 1842.

Leo VI, *Novels,* A. Dain and P. Noialles (eds.), *Les novelles de Léon VI le Sage,* Paris 1944.

Leo VI, *Taktika,* G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *The Taktika of Leo VI,* revised edition, Washington DC 2014.

Libanius, R. Foerster (ed.), *Libanii opera,* 11 Vols, Leipzig 1903-22.

Liudprand of Cremona, *Antapodosis,* In: P. Chiesa (ed.), *Liudprandi Cremonensis Antapodosis, Homelia Paschalis, Historia Ottonis, Relatio de Legatione Constantinopolitana,* Turnhout 1998: 3-

150; Eng. trans. In: P. Squatriti, *The Complete Works of Liudprand of Cremona,* Washington DC 2007: 41-102.

Mas'udi, P. Lunde and C. Stone (trans.), *Al Mas'udi, From the Meadows of Gold,* London 2007.

Maurice, *Strategikon,* G. T. Dennis (ed.), trans. E. Gamillscheg, *Das Strategikon des Maurikios,* Vienna 1981; Eng. trans. G.T. Dennis, *Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy,* Philadelphia 1984.

E. McGeer (trans.), *The Land Legislation of the Macedonian Emperors,* Toronto 2000.

Mémorandum, A. Dain (ed. and trans.), 'Mémorandum inédit sur la défense des places', *Revue des Études Grecques* 53 (1940): 123-36.

Miracula Demetrii, P. Lemerle (ed.), *Les plus anciens recueils des miracles de saint Démétrius et la pénétration des Slaves dans les Balkans,* Paris 1979.

Miskawaihi, H.F. Amedroz and D.S. Margoliouth (eds. and trans.), *The Eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate,* vol. 4, Oxford 1921.

Nazarius, E. Baehrens (ed.), *XII Panegyrici Latini,* Leipzig 1874; Eng. trans. C.E.V. Nixon and B.S. Rogers, *In Praise of Later Roman Emperors, The Panegyrici Latini,* Los Angeles and Oxford 1994.

Nicomachus the Pythagorean, *Harmonicum enchiridion,* K. Jan (ed.), *Musici scriptores Graeci,* Leipzig 1895: 236-65. Eng. trans. F.R. Levin, *The Manual of Harmonics of Nicomachus the Pythagorean,* Grand Rapids MI 1994.

Nikephoros II, *De Velitatione,* G. Dagron and H. Mihăescu (eds. and trans.), *Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l'empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963-969),* Paris 1986; Eng. trans. 'Skirmishing'. In: G.T. Dennis, *Three Byzantine Military Treatises,* Washington DC 1985: 145-239.

Nikephoros II, *Praecepta Militaria,* In: E. McGeer (ed. and trans.), *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century.* Washington DC 1995: 12-59.

Nikephoros Ouranos, *Taktika,* In: E. McGeer (ed. and trans.), *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century.* Washington, D.C. 1995: 88-163.

Onasander, In: W.A. Oldfather and C.H. Oldfather (ed. and trans.), *Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander,* Cambridge MA and London 1928: 368-527.

Patrologia Graeca, J.P. Migne (ed.), vol. 35, Paris 1863.

Peri Metron, In: A. Dain (ed.), *Histoire du texte d'Élien le tactician des origines à la fin du moyen age,* Parris 1946: 158-9.

Photios, *Lexicon*, R. Porson (ed.), *Φωτίου τοῦ πατριάρχου λέξεων συναγωγή,* 2 vols, Cambridge 1822.

Poinalios Nomos, In: *JGR*: ii. 80-9.

Polyaenus, In: J. Melber and E. Woelfflin (ed.), *Polyaeni strategematon libri viii*, Leipzig 1887: 2-425; Eng. trans. In: P. Krentz and E.L. Wheeler, *Polyaenus Stratagems of War,* 2 vols, Chicago 1994: i. 1-1003.

Polybius, *The Histories,* W.R. Paton (ed. and trans.), 6 vols, Cambridge MA and London 1922-1927.

Procheiros Nomos, In: *JGR:* ii. 114-228.

Procopius, H.B. Dewing (ed. and trans.), *Procopius of Caesarea, History of the Wars,* 5 vols, Cambridge MA and London 1914-1928.

Psellos Michael, *Chronographia,* D.R. Reinsch (ed.), *Michaelis Pselli Chronographia,* Berlin and Boston 2014; Eng. trans. E.R.A. Sewter, *Fourteen Byzantine rulers: the 'Chronographia' of Michael Psellos,* Harmondsworth 1979.

Psellos Michael, *Historia,* W.J. Aerts (ed. & trans.), *Michaeli Pselli Historia Syntomos,* Berlin 1990.

Ralph of Caen, B.S. Bachrach and D.S. Bachrach (trans.), *The Gesta Tancredi of Ralph of Caen: A History of the Normans of the First Crusade,* Aldershot and Burlington VT 2005.

Raymond of Aguilers, H. Hill and L.L. Hill (trans.), *Raymond d'Aguilers, Historia Francorum qui ceperunt Iherusalem,* Philadelphia 1968.

Skylitzes John, I. Thurn (ed.), *Ioannis Scylitzae Synopsis Historiarum,* Berlin and New York 1973; Eng. trans. J. Wortley, *John Skylitzes, A Synopsis of Byzantine History, 811-1057,* Cambridge and New York 2010.

Stephen of Taron, H. Gelzer and A. Burckhardt (trans.), *Des Stephanos von Taron armenische Geschichte,* Leipzig 1909.

Stobaeus John, O. Hense and C. Wachmuth (ed.), *Ioannes Stobaei Anthologium,* 5 vols, Berlin 1884-1912.

Strabo, A. Meineke, (ed.), *Strabonis geographica,* 3 vols, Leipzig 1873-1877.

Stratagemata, In: J.A. de Foucault (ed.), *Stratagemata,* Paris 1949: 17-66.

Suda, A. Adler (ed.), *Suidae lexicon*, 4 vols, Leipzig 1928-1935.

Sylloge Tacticorum, A. Dain (ed.), *Sylloge Tacticorum quae olim "Inedita Leonis tactica" dicebatur,* Paris 1938; Eng. trans. G. Chatzelis and J. Harris, *A Tenth-Century Byzantine Military Manual: The Sylloge Tacticorum,* Abingdon and New York (forthcoming).

Symeon Magister, S. Wahlgren (ed.), *Symeonis Magistri et Logothetae Chronicon*, Berlin 2006.

Synagoge, I.C. Cunningham (ed.), *Sammlung griechischer und lateinischer Grammatiker,* Berlin and New York 2008.

Synaxarium Mensis Septembris, In: H. Delehaye (ed.), *Acta Sanctorum* 62, Brussels 1902: 1-94.

Syntaxis Armatorum Quadrata, In: E. McGeer (ed. and trans.), 'The Syntaxis armatorum quadrata: A Tenth-Century Tactical Blueprint'. *REB* 50 (1992): 219-29.

Syrianos Magister, *Peri Strategias,* In: G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *Three Byzantine Military Treatises:* Washington DC 1985: 11-135.

Tabarī, F. Rosenthal (trans.), *The History of al-Ṭabarī,* 40 vols, New York, 1989-2007.

Theodosius the Deacon, H. Criscuolo (ed.), *Theodosii diaconi de Creta capta,* Leipzig 1979.

Theon Aelius, *Progymnasmata,* M. Patillon (ed. and trans.), *Aelius Théon Progymnasmata,* Paris 1997; Eng. trans. In: G.A. Kennedy, *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric,* Atlanta GA 2003: 1-72.

Theophanes Confessor, C. de Boor (ed.), *Theophanis chronographia,* Leipzig 1883; Eng. trans. C. Mango and R. Scott, *The Chronicle of Theophanes Confessor,* Oxford 1997.

Theophylact Simocatta, C. de Boor (ed.), *Theophylacti Simocattae Historiae,* Leipzig 1887; Eng. trans. L.M. Whitby and M. Whitby, *The History of Theophylact Simocatta,* Oxford 1986.

Urbicius, R. Burgess (ed.), ‘Urbicius’ *Epitideuma:* An Edition, Translation and Commentary’, Eng trans. R. Burgess and G. Greatrex, *BZ* 98 (2005): 35-74.

William of Apulia, M. Mathieu (ed. and trans.), *La Geste de Robert Guiscard,* Palermo 1961; Eng. trans. G.A. Loud, *The Deeds of Robert Guiscard,* Leeds 2002.

Yahya, I. Kratchkovsky and A. Vasiliev (ed. and trans.), ‘Histoire de Yahya ibn-Said d’ Antioche continuateur de Said ibn-Bitriq’, *Patrologia Orientalis* 18 (1925): 700-833; I. Kratchkovsky (ed.), trans. F. Micheau and G. Tropeau, *Patrologia Orientalis* 47 (1997): 385-539.

Zosimus, I. F. Paschoud (ed. and trans.), *Zosime Histoire Nouvelle,* 4 vols, Paris 1971-1989.

Secondary Sources

Ahrweiler, H.G. 1960. 'Recherches sur l'administration de l'empire byzantine aux IX-Xième siècles'. *BCH* 84: 1-111.

Ahrweiler, H.G. 1967. 'Un discours inédit de Constantin VII Porphyrogénète'. *TM* 2: 394-404.

Ahrweiler, H.G. 1971. 'La frontière et les frontières de Byzance en Orient'. In: M. Berza and E. Stănescu (eds.), *Actes du XIVe Congrès international des études byzantines,* vol.1, Bucharest: 209-30.

Ahrweiler, H.G. 1981. 'Sur la date du De Thematibus de Constantin VII Porphyrogénète'. *TM* 8: 1-5.

Alexopoulos, T. 2008-2012. 'Using ancient military handbooks to fight medieval battles: Two stratagems used by Alexios I Comnenos against the Normans and Pechenegs'. *Εωα και Εσπερία* 8: 47-71.

Anagnostakis, I. 1999. 'Ούκ εἴσιν ἐμά τα γράμματα. Ιστορία και ιστορίες στον Πορφυρογέννητο.' *Βυζαντινά Σύμμεικτα* 13: 97-140.

Anagnostakis, I. 2008. 'Η Σολομώντεια αμφιθυμία των πρώτων Μακεδόνων αυτοκρατόρων και οι αποκαλυπτικές καταβολές της.' In: A. Lambropoulou and K. Tsiknakis (eds.), *Η εβραϊκή παρουσία στον ελλαδικό χώρο (4ος-19ος αι.)*, Athens: 39-60.

Anastasiadis, M.P. 1994. 'On handling the menavlion'. *BMGS* 18: 1-10.

Andriollo, L. 2012. 'Les Kourkouas'. *Studies in Byzantine Sigillography* 11: 57-88.

Andriollo, L. 2014. 'Aristocracy and literary production in the 10th century'. In: A. Pizzone (ed.), *The Author in Middle Byzantine Literature: Modes, Functions and Identities.* Berlin: 119-38.

Andrist, P. 2007. *Les manuscrits grecs conservés à la Bibliothèque de la Bourgeoisie de Berne – Burgerbibliothek Bern: Catalogue et histoire de la collection,* Zurich.

Angelidi, C. 1980. *Ο βίος του οσίου Βασιλείου του Νέου,* PhD thesis, University of Ioannina.

Angelidi, C. 2013. 'Basil Lecapène. "Deux ou trois choses que je sais de lui"'. In: C. Gastgeber et al (eds.), *Pour l'amour de Byzance: Hommage à Paolo Odorico,* Frankfurt: 11-26.

Apostolopoulou, S. 1982. 'Η άλωση της Μοψουεστίας (965) και της Ταρσού (965) από βυζαντινές και αραβικές πηγές'. *Graeco-Arabica* 1: 157-67.

Asa Eger, A. 2011. *The Spaces between the Teeth: A Gazetteer of Towns on the Islamic-Byzantine Frontier,* Istanbul.

Asa Eger, A. 2014. *The Islamic-Byzantine Frontier: Interaction and Exchange among Muslim and Christian Communities,* London and New York.

Ayalon, D. 1994. 'The military reforms of caliph al-Muʿtaṣim, their background and consequences'. In: *Islam and the Abode of War,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 1-39.

Ashburner, W. 1926. 'The Byzantine Mutiny Act'. *The Journal of Hellenic Studies* 46: 80-109.

Bandini, A.M. 1770. *Catalogus codicum manuscriptorum bibliothecae Mediceae Laurentianae,* vol. 3, Florence.

Bennet, M. 2001. 'The crusaders' fighting march revisited'. *War in History* 8: 1-18.

Berger, A. 2013. 'Believe it or not: Authority in religious texts'. In: P. Armstrong (ed.), *Authority in Byzantium,* Farnham and Burlington VT: 247-58.

Beihammer, A. 2012. 'Strategies of diplomacy and ambassadors in Byzantine-Muslim relations on the tenth and eleventh centuries'. In: A. Becker and N. Drocourt (eds.), *Ambassadeurs et ambassades au cœur des relations diplomatiques: Rome – Occident medieval – Byzance (VIII^e s. Avant J.-C. - XII^e s. Après J.-C.),* Metz: 371-400.

Bianconi, D. 2008. 'La controversia palamitica: Figure, libri, testi e mani'. *Segno e Testo* 6: 337-76.

Bianconi, D. 2011. 'Un altro Plutarco di Planude'. *Segno e Testo* 9: 113-26.

Bianconi, D. 2012. '"Duplici scribendi forma". Commentare Bernard de Montfaucon'. *Medioevo e Rinascimento* 23: 299-317.

Bikhazi R. 1981. *The Hamdanid Dynasty of Mesopotamia and North Syria,* PhD Thesis, University of Michigan.

Birkenmeier, J.W. 2002. *The Development of the Komnenian Army,* Leiden and Boston.

Bivar, A.D.H. 1972. 'Cavalry equipment and tactics on the Euphrates frontier'. *DOP* 26: 271-91.

Bonner, M. 1996. *Aristocratic Violence and Holy War: Studies in the Jihad and the Arab-Byzantine Frontier,* New Haven CT.

Bosworth, C.E. 1965-1966. ‘Military organisation under the Buyids of Persia and Iraq’. *Oriens* 18/19: 143-67.

Bosworth, C.E. 1992. ‘The city of Tarsus and the Arab-Byzantine frontiers in early and middle Abbāsid times’. *Oriens* 33: 268-86.

Brokkaar, W.G. 1972. ‘Basil Lecapenus: Byzantium in the tenth century’. In: W.F. Bakker et al (eds.), *Studia Byzantina et Neohellenica Neerlandica,* Leiden: 199-234.

Brown, P. 2011. ‘The Gesta Roberti Wiscardi: A “Byzantine” history?’. *Journal of Medieval History* 37: 162-79.

Browning, R. 1978. ‘Literacy in the Byzantine world’. *BMGS* 4: 39-54.

Buckley, P. 2006. ‘War and Peace in the Alexiad’. In: J. Burke (ed.), *Byzantine Narrative,* Melbourne: 92-109.

Buckley, P. 2014. *The Alexiad of Anna Komnene: Artistic Strategy in the Making of a Myth,* Cambridge.

Bury, J.B. 1906. ‘The treatise De administrando imperio’. *BZ* 15: 517-77.

Bury, J.B. 1907. ‘The ceremonial books of Constantine Porphyrogennetos’. *English Historical Review* 86/87: 209-27 and 417-39.

Bury, J.B. 1909. ‘Mutasim’s march through Cappadocia in A. D. 838’. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 29: 120-9.

Canard, M. 1951. *Hamdanides: Histoire de la dynastie des Hamdanides de Jazîra et de Syrie,* Algiers.

Cappel, A.J. 1994. ‘The Byzantine response to the Arabs (10th-11th Centuries)’. *BF* 20: 113-32.

Chatzelis, G. and Harris, J. 2017. ‘Introduction and notes’, In: *A Tenth-Century Byzantine Military Manual: The Sylloge Tacticorum,* Abingdon and New York (forthcoming).

Chernoglazov, D. 2013. ‘Beobachtungen zu den Briefen des Theodoros Daphnopates. Neue Tendenzen in der byzantinischen Literatur des zehnten Jahrhunderts’. *BZ* 106: 623-44.

Chevedden, P.E. 2000. ‘The invention of the counterweight trebuchet: A study in cultural diffusion’. *DOP* 54: 71-116.

Cheynet, J.C. 1986. ‘Les Phocas’. In: G. Dagron and H. Mihăescu, *Le traité sur la guérrilla (De velitatione) de l’empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963-969),* Paris: 199-315.

Cheynet, J.C. 1986b. ‘Notes arabo-byzantines’. In: V. Kremmydas, C. Maltezou, and N.M. Panagiotakis (eds.), *Αφιέρωμα στον Νίκο Σβορώνο,* vol.1, Rethymno: 145-52.

Cheynet, J.C. 1991. ‘Fortune et puissance de l’aristocratie (Xe-XIIe siècle)’. In: V. Kravari, J. Lefort, and C. Morrisson (eds.), *Hommes et richesses dans l’empire byzantine II,* Paris: 199-214.

Cheynet, J.C. 1995. ‘Les effectifs de l’armée byzantine aux Xe-XIIe siècles’. *Cahiers de civilization médiévale* 38: 319-35.

Cheynet, J.C. 2001. ‘La conception militaire de la frontière orientale (IX^{e}–XIII^{e} siècle)’. In: A. Eastmond (ed.), *Eastern Approaches to Byzantium: Papers from the Thirty-third Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, March 1999,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 57-69.

Cheynet, J.C. 2006. ‘The Byzantine aristocracy’. In: J.C. Cheynet (ed.), *The Byzantine Aristocracy and its Military Function,* trans. J. Lefort, Farnham and Burlington VT: 1-43.

Cheynet, J.C. 2014. ‘La pensée stratégique byzantine’. In: J. Baechler and J.V. Holeindre (eds.), *Penseurs de la stratégie,* Paris: 45-58.

Cheynet, J.C. and Vannier, J.F. 2003. ‘Les Argyroi’. *ZRVI* 40: 57-90.

Christides, V. 1969. ‘Arabs as “Barbaroi” before the rise of Islam’. *Balkan Studies* 10: 317-24.

Christides, V. 1984. ‘Naval warfare in the eastern Mediterranean (6th-14th centuries): An Arabic translation of Leo VI’s *Naumachica*’. *Graeco-Arabica* 3: 137-43.

Christides, V. 1995. ‘Ibn al – Manqalī (Manglī) and Leo VI: New evidence on Arab-Byzantine ship construction and naval warfare’. *BS* 56: 83-96.

Codoñer, J.S. 2014. *The Emperor Theophilos and the East, 829-842: Court and Frontier in Byzantium during the Last Phase of Iconoclasm,* Farnham and Burlington VT.

Codoñer, J.S. 2014b. ‘Towards a vocabulary for rewriting in Byzantium’. In: J.S. Codoñer and I. Peréz-Martín (eds.), *Textual Transmission in Byzantium: Between Textual Criticism and Quellenforschung,* Turnhout: 61-90.

Cohn, I. 1900. ‘Bemerkugen zu den Konstantinischen Sammelwerken’. *BZ* 9: 155-60.

Cooper, J.E. and Decker, M.J. 2012. *Life and Society in Byzantine Cappadocia,* Basingstoke and New York.

Cosentino, S. 2000. ‘The Syrianos’s ‘‘Strategikon’’: A 9th century source?’. *Bizantinistica* 2: 243-80.

Croke, B. 2006. ‘Tradition and originality in Photius’ historical reading’. In: J. Burke et al (eds.), *Byzantine Narrative: Papers in Honour of Roger Scott,* Melbourne: 59-70.

Cutler, A. 1995. ‘Originality as a cultural phenomenon’. In: A.R. Littlewood (ed.), *Originality in Byzantine Literature, Art and Music: A Collection of Essays,* Oxford: 203-16.

Da Costa-Louillet, G. 1954. ‘Saints de Constantinople aux VIIIe, IXe, Xe siècles’. *Byzantion* 24: 453-511.

Dagron, G. 1983. ‘Byzance et le modèle islamique au Xe siècle. À propos de Constitutions tactiques de l’empereur Léon VI. *Comptes rendus des séances de l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*: 219-43.

Dagron, G. 1984. *Constantinople imaginaire. Études sur le recueil des “Patria”*, Paris.

Dagron, G. and Mihăescu, H. 1986. ‘Commentary’. In: *Le traité sur la guérrilla (De velitatione) de l’empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963-969),* Paris: 139-287.

Dain, A. 1931. ‘Les cinq adaptations byzantines des *Stratagèmes* de Polyen’. *Revue des Études Anciennes* 33: 321-45.

Dain, A. 1933. *La tradition du texte d’ Héron de Byzance,* Paris.

Dain, A. 1937. *La ‘Tactique’ de Nicéphore Ouranos,* Paris.

Dain, A. 1938. ‘Introduction’. In: *Sylloge tacticorum, quae olim "Inedita Leonis tactica" dicebatur,* Paris: 7-10.

Dain, A. 1939. *Le Corpus Perditum,* Paris.

Dain, A. 1940. ‘Introduction’. In: ‘Mémorandum inédit sur la défense des places’. *Revue des Études Grecques* 53: 123-36.

Dain, A. 1940b. *La collection florentine des tacticiens grecs,* Paris.

Dain, A. 1946. *Histoire du texte d'Élien le tacticien des origines à la fin du moyen âge,* Paris.

Dain, A. 1953. 'L'encyclopédisme de Constantin Porphyrogénète'. *Lettres d'humanité* 12: 64-81.

Dain, A. and Foucault, J.A. 1967. 'Les strategists byzantins'. *TM* 2: 317-92.

Darrouzès, J. and Westerink, L.G. 1978. 'Introduction'. In: *Théodore Daphnopatès correspondance,* Paris: 1-27.

Dawson, T. 1999. 'Kremasmata, kabadion, klibanion: Some aspects of Middle Byzantine Equipment Reconsidered'. *BMGS* 22: 38-50.

Dawson, T. 2001-2. 'Klivanion revisited: An evolutionary typology and catalogue of Middle Byzantine lamellar styles'. *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 12/13: 89-95.

Dawson, T. 2002. 'Suntagma Hoplon: The equipment of regular Byzantine troops, c.950 to c.1204'. In: D. Nicolle (ed.), *A Companion to Medieval Arms and Armour,* London: 81-90.

Dawson, T. 2007. 'Fit for the task: Equipment sizes and the transmission of military lore, sixth to tenth centuries'. *BMGS* 31: 1-12.

Decker, M.J. 2013. *The Byzantine Art of War,* Yardley PA.

Dennis, G.T. 1981. 'Introduction'. In: *Das Strategikon des Maurikios,* Vienna: 13-42.

Dennis, G.T. 1984. 'Introduction'. In: *Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy,* Philadelphia: vii-xxi.

Dennis, G.T. 1985. 'Introduction'. In: *Three Byzantine Military Treatises,* Washington DC: 1-7, 137-41, 241-44.

Dennis, G.T. 1988. 'The Byzantines as revealed in their letters'. In: J. Duffy and J. Peradotto (eds.), *Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies Presented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75,* Buffalo NY: 155-65.

Dennis, G.T. 1993. 'Religious services in the Byzantine army'. In: E. Carr et al (eds.), *Eulogēma: Studies in honor of Robert Taft, S.J,* Rome: 107-17.

Dennis, G.T. 1997. 'The Byzantines in battle'. In: K. Tsiknakis (ed.), *Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος – 12ος αι.),* Athens: 165-78.

Dennis, G.T. 1998. ‘Byzantine heavy artillery: The Helepolis’. *GRBS* 39: 99-115.

Dennis, G.T. 2014. ‘Introduction’. *The Taktika of Leo VI,* Washington, D.C: ix-xiv.

Diethart, J.M. and Dintsis, P. 1984. ‘Die Leontoklibanarier: Versuch einer archäologisch-papyrologisch Zusammenschau’. *BYZANTIOΣ: Festschrift für H. Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag,* Vienna.

Diller, A. 1950. ‘Julian of Ascalon on Strabo and the Stade’. *Classical Philology* 45: 22-25.

Dixon, K.R. and Southern, P. 1992: *The Roman Cavalry, From the First to the Third Century AD,* London.

Dujčev, I. 1978. ‘On the treaty of 927 with the Bulgarians’. *DOP* 32: 217-95.

Eadie J.W. 1967. ‘The development of Roman mailed cavalry’. *Journal of Roman Studies* 57: 161-73.

Fear, A. 2008. ‘War and society’. In: P. Sabin, H.V. Wees and M. Whitby (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Volume II: Rome from the Late Republic to the Late Empire.* Cambridge: 424-58.

Featherstone, M. 2004. ‘Further remarks on the De Cerimoniis’. *BZ* 91: 113-21.

Featherstone, M. 2011. ‘Theophanes Continuatus VI and *De Cerimoniis* I, 96’. *BZ* 104: 106-19.

Featherstone, M. 2012. ‘Theophanes Continuatus: A history for the palace’. In: P. Odorico (ed.), *La face cachée de la littérature byzantine: Le texte en tant que message immédiat.* Paris: 123-35.

Featherstone, M. 2013. ‘*De Cerimoniis*: The revival of antiquity in the Great Palace and the Macedonian Renaissance’. In: N. Necipoğlu, A. Ödekan and E. Akyürek (eds.), *The Byzantine Court: Source of Power and Culture (2nd International Sevgi Gonül Byzantine Studies Symposium, Istanbul 21-23 June 2010),* Istanbul: 137-44.

Featherstone, M. 2014. ‘Basileios Nothos as compiler: The *De Cerimoniis* and Theophanes Continuatus’. In: J.S. Codoñer and I.P. Martín (eds.), *Textual Transmission in Byzantium: Between Textual Criticism and Quellenforschung,* Turnhout: 353-72.

Flusin, B. 2001. ‘L’empereur hagiographe. Remarques sur le rôle des premiers empereurs macédoniens dans le culte des saints’. In: P. Guran (ed.), *L’empereur hagiographe: Culte des saints et monarchie byzantine et post-byzantine, Actes des colloques internationaux “L’empereur*

hagiographe" (13-14 mars 2000) et "Reliques et miracles" (1-2 novembre 2000) tenus au New Europe College, Bucharest: 29-54.

Flusin, B. 2002. 'Les Excerpta constantiniens: logique d'une anti-histoire'. In: S. Pittia (ed.), *Fragments d'historiens grecs: autour de Denys d'Halicarnasse*, Rome: 537-59.

Forsyth, J.H. 1977. *The Byzantine-Arab chronicle (938-1034) of Yaḥyā b. Sa`īd al-Anṭākī,* PhD Thesis, University of Michigan.

Foucault, J.A. 1973. 'Douze chapitres inédits de la "Tactique" de Nicéphore Ouranos'. *TM* 5: 281-312.

France, J. 1994. *Victory in the East: A Military History of the First Crusade.* Cambridge.

Frankopan, P. 2012. *The First Crusade: The Call from the East.* Cambridge MA.

Frankopan, P. 2013. 'Turning Latin into Greek: Anna Komnene and the *Gesta Roberti Wiscardi*'. *Journal of Medieval History* 39: 80-99.

Frankopan, P. 2014. 'Understanding the Greek sources for the First Crusade.' In: M. Bull and D. Kempf (eds), *Writing the Early Crusades: Text, Transmission and Memory,* Woodbridge: 38-52.

Fryde, E.B. 1983. *Humanism and Renaissance Historiography,* London.

Fryde, E.B. 1996. *Greek Manuscripts in the Private Library of the Medici, 1469-1510,* vol. 2, Aberystwyth.

Gamber, O. 1968. 'Kataphrakten, Clibanarier, Normannenreiter'. *Jahrbuch der Kunsthistorischen Sammlungen in Wien* 64: 7-44.

Garrood, W. 2013. 'The illusion of continuity: Nikephoros Phokas, John Tzimiskes and the eastern border'. *BMGS* 37: 20-34.

Geiger, J. 1992. 'Julian of Ascalon'. *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 112: 31-43.

Gerlach, J. 2008. *Gnomica Democritea: Studien zur gnomologischen Überlieferung der Ethik Demokrits und zum Corpus Parisinum mit einer Edition der Democritea des Corpus Parisinum,* Wiesbaden.

Gordon, M. 2001. 'The commanders of the Samarran Turkish military: The shaping of a third/ninth-century imperial elite'. In: C.F. Robinson (ed.), *A Medieval Islamic City Reconsidered: An Interdisciplinary Approach to Samarra,* Oxford: 119-40.

Grégoire, H. 1934. 'Manuel et Théophobe ou le concurrence de deux monastères'. *Byzantion* 9: 183-204.

Grégoire, H. 1938. 'Saint Théodore le Stratélate et les Russes d'Igor'. *Byzantion* 13: 291-300.

Grégoire, H. and Orgels, P. 1954. 'L'invasion hongroise dans la "Vie de saint Basile le jeune"'. *Byzantion* 24: 147-54.

Grigoriou-Ioannidou, M. 1983. 'Η βυζαντινοβουλγαρική σύγκρουση στους Κατασύρτες (917)'. *Επιστημονική Επετηρίδα Φιλοσοφικής Σχολής ΑΠΘ* 21: 123-48.

Grigoriou-Ioannidou, M. 1993. 'Θέματα et Τάγματα, Un problème de l' institution des thèmes pendant les Xe et XIe siècles'. *BF* 19: 35-41.

Grigoriou-Ioannidou, M. 1999. 'Οι Ούγγροι και οι επιδρομές τους στον δυτικό-ευρωπαϊκό και στον βυζαντινό χώρο (τέλη 9ου-10ος αι.)'. *Βυζαντινά* 20: 65-135.

Grosdidier de Matons, J. 1973. 'Les constitutions tactiques et la damnatio memoriae de l'empereur Alexandre'. *TM* 5: 229-42.

Grotowski, P.L. 2010. *Arms and Armour of the Warrior Saints, Tradition and Innovation in Byzantine Iconography (843-1261),* trans. R. Brzezinski, Leiden and Boston.

Guilland, R. 1950. 'Études sur l'histoire administrative de Byzance: Le Domestique des Scholes'. *REB* 8: 5-63.

Guilland, R. 1967. *Recherches sur les institutions byzantines,* vol. 1, Berlin and Amsterdam.

Guscin, M. 2009. *The Image of Edessa.* Leiden and Boston.

Gyftopoulou, S. 2013. 'Historical information gathered from *Mauricii Strategikon*'. *Βυζαντινά Σύμμεικτα* 23: 59-89.

Haase, F. 1847. *De militarium scriptorum Graecorum et Latinorum omnium editione instituenda narratio,* Berlin.

Hakim, S.B. 2001. ‘Julian of Ascalon’s treatise of construction and design rules from sixth-century Palestine’. *Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians* 60: 4-25.

Haldon, J.F. 1975. ‘Some aspects of Byzantine military technology from the sixth to the tenth centuries’. *BMGS* 1: 11-46.

Haldon, J.F. 1979. *Recruitment and Conscription in the Byzantine Army c. 550–950: A study of the Stratiotika Ktemata,* Vienna.

Haldon, J.F. 1984. *Byzantine Praetorians: An Administrative, Institutional and Social Survey of the Opsikion and Tagmata, c.580-900.* Bonn.

Haldon, J.F. 1990. ‘Introduction’ – ‘Commentary’. In: *Constantine Porphyrogenitus: Three Treatises on Imperial Military Expeditions,* Vienna: 35-78, 155-293.

Haldon, J.F. 1990b. *Byzantium in the Seventh Century: The Transformation of a Culture,* revised edn. Cambridge.

Haldon, J.F. 1993. ‘Military service, military lands, and the status of soldiers: Current problems and interpretations’. *DOP* 47: 1-67.

Haldon, J.F. 1999. *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565–1204,* London.

Haldon, J.F. 2000. ‘Theory and practice in the 10th century military administration’. *TM* 13: 201-352.

Haldon, J.F. 2002. ‘Some aspects of Early Byzantine arms and armour’. In: D. Nicolle (ed.), *A Companion to Medieval Arms and Armour,* London: 65-79.

Haldon, J.F. 2006. “Greek Fire’ revisited: recent and current research”. In: E. Jeffreys (ed.), *Byzantine Style, Religion and Civilization: In Honour of Sir Steven Runciman,* Cambridge: 290-325.

Haldon, J.F. 2008. ‘Provincial elites, central authorities in the Byzantine state’. In: B. Forsén and G. Salmeri (eds.), *The Province Strikes Back, Imperial Dynamics in the Eastern Mediterranean,* Helsinki: 157-85.

Haldon, J.F. 2009. ‘Social elites, wealth and power’. In: J.F. Haldon (ed.), *A Social History of Byzantium,* Chichester and Malden MA: 168-211.

Haldon, J.F. 2013. ‘Information and war: Some comments on defensive strategy and information in the Middle Byzantine period (ca. A.D. 660-1025)’. In: A. Sarantis and N. Christie (eds.), *War and Warfare in Late Antiquity,* vol. 2, Leiden and Boston: 373-93.

Haldon, J.F. 2014. *A Critical Commentary on the Taktika of Leo VI,* Washington DC.

Haldon, J.F. 2016. ‘Introduction’. In: *A Tale of Two Saints: The Martyrdoms and Miracles of Saints Theodore ‘the Recruit’ and ‘the General’,* Liverpool: 1-19.

Haldon, J.F. and Kennedy, H. 1980. ‘The Arab-Byzantine frontier in the eighth and ninth centuries: Military organisation and society in the borderlands’. *ZRVI* 19: 79-116.

Harris, J. 1995. *Greek emigres in the West 1400-1520,* Camberley.

Harris, J. 2014. *Byzantium and the Crusades*, 2nd edition, London and New York.

Hinterberger, M. 2010. ‘Envy and nemesis in the *Vita Basilii* and *Leo the Deacon:* Literary mimesis or something more?’. In: R. Macrides (ed.), *History as Literature in Byzantium: Papers from the Fortieth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Birmingham, March 2007,* Farnham and Burlington VT: 187-206.

Hoffmann, L. 2007. ‘Geschichtsschreibung oder Rhetorik? Zum *logos parakletikos* bei Leon Diakonos’. In: M. Grünbart (ed.), *Rhetorische Kultur in Spätantike und Mittelalter / Rhetorical Culture in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages,* Berlin: 105-39.

Holmes, C. 2001. ‘Book Review: *Siegecraft: Two tenth-century instructional manuals by “Heron of Byzantium”’. War in History* 8: 479-81.

Holmes, C. 2002. ‘Byzantium’s eastern frontier in the tenth and eleventh centuries’. In: D. Abulafia and N. Berend (eds.), *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 83-104.

Holmes, C. 2005. *Basil II and the Governance of Empire,* Oxford.

Holmes, C. 2008. ‘Treaties between Byzantium and the Islamic world’. In: P. de Souza and J. France (eds.), *War and Peace in Ancient and Medieval History,* Cambridge: 141-57.

Holmes, C. 2010. ‘Byzantine political culture and compilation literature in the tenth and eleventh centuries: Some preliminary inquiries’. *DOP* 64: 55-80.

Howard-Johnston, J.D. 1983. ‘Byzantine Anzitene’. In: S. Mitchell (ed.), *Armies and Frontiers in Roman and Byzantine Anatolia, Proceedings of a Colloquium Held at University College, Swansea, in April 1981,* Oxford: 239-90.

Howard-Johnston, J.D. 1994. ‘The official history of Heraclius’ Persian campaigns’. In: E. Dąbrowa (ed.), *The Roman and Byzantine Army in the East: Proceedings of a colloquium held at the Jagiellonian University, Kraków in September 1992,* Kraków: 57-87.

Howard-Johnston, J.D. 1995. ‘Crown lands and the defence of imperial authority in the tenth and eleventh centuries’. *BF* 21: 75-100.

Howard-Johnston, J.D. 2000. ‘The *De Administrando Imperio:* A re-examination of the text and a re-evaluation of its evidence about the Rus’. In: M. Kazanski, A. Nercessian and C. Zuckerman (eds.), *Les centres proto-urbains russes entre Scandinavie, Byzance et Orient,* Paris: 301-36.

Howard-Johnston, J.D. 2010. *Witnesses to a World Crisis: Historians and Histories of the Middle East in the Seventh Century,* Oxford.

Hunger, H. 1969-1970. ‘On the imitation (ΜΙΜΗΣΙΣ) of Antiquity in Byzantine literature’. *DOP* 23/24: 15-38.

Hunger, H. 1978. *Die hochsprachliche profane Literatur der Byzantiner,* 2 vols, Munich.

Huxley, G.L. 1975. ‘A List of ἄπληκτα’. *GRBS* 16: 87-93.

Huxley, G.L. 1980. ‘The scholarship of Constantine Porphyrogenitus.’ *Proceeding of the Royal Irish Academy. Section C: Archaeology, Celtic Studies, History, Linguistics, Literature* 80C: 29-40.

Irigoin, J. 1959. ‘Pour une étude des centres de copie byzantins.’ *Scriptorium* 13: 177-209.

Irigoin, J. 1997. ‘Lascaris Rhyndacenus (Janus) (1445-1535)’. In: C. Nativel (ed.), *Centuriae Latinae, Cent une figures humanistes de la Renaissance aux Lumières offertes à Jacques Chomarat,* Geneva: 485-91.

Jackson, D.F. 1998. ‘A new look at an old book list’. *Studi italiani di filologia classica* 16: 83-108.

Jackson, D.F. 2003. ‘Janus Lascaris on the island of Corfu in A.D. 1491’. *Scriptorium* 57: 137-9.

Jenkins, R.J.H. 1954. ‘The classical background of the *Scriptores Post Theophanem’. DOP* 8: 13-30.

Jenkins, R.J.H. 1966. ‘The peace with Bulgaria (927) celebrated by Theodore Daphnopates’. In: R. Jenkins (repr.), *Studies on Byzantine History of the 9th and 10th Centuries,* London: 287-303.

Jones A.H.M. 1964. *The Later Roman Empire 284-602: A Social, Economic, and Administrative Survey,* Oxford.

Kaegi, W. E. J. 1964. ‘The contribution of archery to the Turkish conquest of Anatolia’. *Speculum* 39: 96-108.

Kaegi, W.E.J. 1964b. ‘The Emperor Julian’s assessment of the significance and function of history’, *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 108: 29-38.

Kaegi, W.E.J. 1981. ‘Constantine’s and Julian’s strategies of strategic surprise against the Persians’. *Athenaeum* 69: 209-13.

Kaegi, W.E.J. 1983. *Some Thoughts on Byzantine Military Strategy,* Brookline MA.

Kaegi, W.E.J. 1990. ‘Procopius the military historian’. *BF* 15: 53-85.

Kaegi, W.E.J. 1992. *Byzantium and the Early Islamic Conquests,* Cambridge.

Kaegi, W.E.J. 2003. *Heraclius, Emperor of Byzantium,* Cambridge.

Kaldellis, A. 1998. ‘Introduction and commentary'. In: *Genesios, On the Reigns of the Emperors,* Canberra: 45-7.

Kaldellis, A. 2007. *Hellenism in Byzantium: The Transformations of Greek Identity and the Reception of the Classical Tradition,* Cambridge.

Kaldellis, A. 2012. 'Byzantine historical writing, 500-920’. In: S. Foot and C.F. Robinson (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing Volume 2: 400-1400,* Oxford: 201-17.

Kaldellis, A. 2013. ‘The original source for Tzimiskes’ Balkan campaign (971 AD) and the Emperor’s classicizing propaganda’. *BMGS* 31: 35-52.

Kaldellis, A. 2014. ‘Did Ioannes I Tzimiskes campaign in the east in 974?’. *Byzantion* 84: 235-40.

Kaldellis, A. 2015. ‘The Byzantine conquest of Crete (961 AD), Procopius’ *Vandal War,* and the continuator of the *Chronicle* of Symeon’. *BMGS* 39: 302-11.

Kaldellis, A. 2015b. *Byzantine Readings of Ancient Historians,* Abingdon and New York.

Karantabias, M.A. 2005-6. 'The crucial development of heavy cavalry under Herakleios and his usage of Steppe Nomad tactics', *Hirundo* 4: 28-41.

Karlin-Hayter, P. 1969. 'The Emperor Alexander's bad name'. *Speculum* 44: 586-96.

Karpozilos, A. 2002-2009. *Βυζαντινοί ιστορικοί και χρονογράφοι,* vols. 2-3, Athens.

Kazhdan, A.P. 1978. 'Some questions addressed to the scholars who believe in the authenticity of Kaminiates' "Capture of Thessalonica". *BZ* 71: 301-14.

Kazhdan, A.P. 1995. 'Innovation in Byzantium'. In: A.R. Littlewood (ed.), *Originality in Byzantine Literature, Art and Music: A Collection of Essays,* Oxford: 1-14.

Kazhdan, A.P. 2006. *A History of Byzantine Literature (850-1000)*, ed. C. Angelidi, Athens.

Kazhdan, A.P. and Epstein, A.W. 1985. *Change in Byzantine Culture in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries,* Berkeley CA, Los Angeles and London.

Kennedy, G.A. 2003. *Progymnasmata: Greek Textbooks of Prose Composition and Rhetoric,* Atlanta GA.

Kennedy, H. 2001. *The Armies of the Caliphs, Military and Society in the Early Islamic State,* London and New York.

Kennedy, H. 2004. *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates,* 2nd edn, Harlow.

Kiapidou, E.S. 2010. *Η Σύνοψη Ιστοριών του Ιωάννη Σκυλίτζη και οι πηγές της (811-1057),* Athens.

Knös, B. 1945. *Un ambassadeur de l'Hellénisme Janus Lascaris et la tradition Greco-Byzantine dans l'humanisme français,* Stockholm and Paris.

Köchly, H. 1854. 'Introduction'. In: *Index lectionum in literarum universitate Turicensi habendarum,* 2 vols, Zurich.

Köchly, H. and Rüstow, W. 1855. *Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller,* Leipzig.

Kolia-Dermitzaki, A. 1997. 'Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο στις ομιλίες και τις επιστολές του 10ου και 11ου αιώνα. Μια ιδεολογική προσέγγιση'. In: K. Tsinakis (ed.), *Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος-12ος αι.),* Athens: 213-38.

Kolias, T.G. 1984. 'The Taktika of Leo VI and the Arabs', *Graeco-Arabica* 3: 129-35.

Kolias, T.G. 1984b. ‘Eßgewohnheiten und Verpflegung im byzantinischen Heer’. In: W. Hörandner et al (eds.), *Byzantios: Festschrift für Herbert Hunger zum 70. Geburtstag,* Vienna: 193-202.

Kolias, T.G. 1988. *Byzantinische Waffen, Ein Beitrag zur byzantinischen Waffenkunde von den Anfängen bis zur lateinischen Eroberung,* Vienna.

Kolias, T.G. 1989. ‘Τα όπλα στην βυζαντινή κοινωνία’. In: C. Angelidi (ed.), *Η καθημερινή ζωή στο Βυζάντιο. Τομές και συνέχειες στην ελληνιστική και ρωμαϊκή παράδοση, πρακτικά του Ά διεθνούς συμποσίου,* Athens: 463-76.

Kolias, T.G. 1993. *Νικηφόρος [Β’] Φωκάς (963-969): Ο στρατηγός αυτοκράτωρ και το μεταρρυθμιστικό του έργο*, Athens.

Kolias, T.G. 1993b. ‘Tradition und Erneuerung im Frühbyzantinischen Reich am Beispiel der militärischen Sprache und Terminologie’. In: F. Vallet and M. Kazanski (eds.), *L’armée romaine et les barbares du III^e^ au VII^e^ siècle,* Rouen: 39-44.

Kolias, T.G. 1994. *Η θέση του στρατιωτικού στην βυζαντινή κοινωνία,* Athens.

Kolias, T.G. 1995. ‘Kriegsgefangene, Sklavenhandel und die Privilegien der Soldaten. Die Aussage der Novelle von Ioannes Tzimiskes’. *BS* 56: 129-35.

Kolias, T.G. 1997. ‘Η πολεμική τακτική των Βυζαντινών: Θεωρία και πράξη’. In: K. Tsinakis (ed.), *Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος-12^ος^ αι.),* Athens: 153-64.

Kolias, T.G. 2007. ‘Zur Gerichtsbarkeit im byzantinischen Heer’. In: K. Belke et al (eds.), *Byzantina Mediterranea: Festschrift für J. Koder zum 65 Geburtstag,* Vienna, Cologne and Weimar: 319-25.

Korres, Th. 1995. *‘Υγρόν Πυρ’. Ένα όπλο της βυζαντινής ναυτικής τακτικής,* Thessaloniki.

Korzenszky, E. 1931. ‘Introduction’. In: *Leges poenales militares e codice Laurentiano LXXV6*, Budapest: 155-63.

Koutava-Delivoria, B. 1991. *Ο γεωγραφικός κόσμος Κωνσταντίνου του Πορφυρογεννήτου,* vol. 1, Athens.

Koutava-Delivoria, B. 2002. ‘La contribution de Constantin porphyrogénète à la composition des Geoponica’. *Byzantion* 72: 365-80.

Koutrakou, N. 1995. ‘Diplomacy and espionage: Their role in Byzantine foreign relations, 8th-10th Centuries’. *Graeco-Arabica* 6: 125-44.

Krentz, P. and Wheeler, E.L. 1994. ‘Introduction’. In: *Polyaenus, Stratagems of War,* Chicago: vi-xxiv.

Krallis, D. 2012. *Michael Attaleiates and the Politics of Decline in Eleventh-Century Byzantium,* Tempe AZ.

Krumbacher, K. 1897. *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des Oströmischen Reiches (527-1453),* Munich.

Kühn, H.J. 1991. *Die byzantinische Armee im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert, Studien zur Organisation der Tagmata,* Vienna.

Kyriakidis, S. 2009. ‘The division of booty in Late Byzantium (1204-1453)’. *JÖB* 59: 163-75.

Kyriakidis, S. 2016. ‘Accounts of single combat in Byzantine historiography in the 10th to 14th centuries’. *Acta Classica* 59: 114-36.

Lechner, K. 1955. *Hellenen und Barbaren im Weltbild der Byzantiner, die alten Bezeichnungen als Ausdruck eines neuen Kulturbewußtseins,* Munich.

Lendon, J.E. 2005. *Soldiers and Ghosts: A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity,* New Haven CT and London.

Lemerle, P. 1971. *Le premier humanisme byzantin: Notes et remarques sur enseignement et culture à Byzance des origines au Xe siècle,* Paris.

Lemerle, P. 1972. ‘Séance de clôture’. *Πρακτικά του Πρώτου Διεθνούς Κυπρολογικού Συνεδρίου,* vol. 2, Nicosia: 151-6.

Lev, Y. 1995. ‘The Fatimids and Byzantium, 10th-12th centuries’. *Graeco-Arabica* 6: 190-208.

Lilie, R.-J. 1976. *Die byzantinische Reaktion auf die Ausbreitung der Araber: Studien zur Strukturwandlung des byzantinischen Staates im 7. Und 8. Jhd,* Munich.

Lilie, R.-J. 1993. ‘Die Zentralbürokratie die Provinzen zwischen dem 10. und dem 12. Jahrhundert. Anspruch und Realität’. *BF* 19: 65-75.

Lilie, R.-J. 2014. ‘Reality and invention: Reflections on Byzantine historiography.’ *DOP* 68: 157-210.

Ljubarskij, J. 1993. 'Nikephoros Phokas in Byzantine historical writings: Trace of the secular biography in Byzantium'. *BS* 54: 245-53.

Loud, G.A. 1991. 'Anna Komnena and her sources for the Normans of southern Italy'. In: I. Wood and G.A. Loud (eds.), *Church and Chronicle in the Middle Ages, Essays Presented to John Taylor,* London: 41-57.

Lounghis, T.K. 1997. 'Επιθεώρηση ενόπλων δυνάμεων πριν από εκστρατεία'. In: K. Tsiknakis (ed.), *Το εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος – 12ος αι.),* Athens: 93-110.

Luttwak, E.N. 2009. *The Grand Strategy of the Byzantine Empire,* Cambridge MA and London.

Macrides, R. 2000. 'The pen and the sword: Who wrote the *Alexiad*?'. In: T. Gouma-Peterson (ed.), *Anna Komnene and her Times,* New York and London: 63-82.

Madgearu, A. 2013. *Byzantine Military Organization on the Danube, 10th-12th Centuries,* Leiden and Boston.

Magdalino, P. 1987. 'Observations on the Nea Ekklesia of Basil I.' *JÖB* 37: 51-64.

Magdalino, P. 1993. *The Empire of Manuel I Komnenos 1143-1180,* Cambridge.

Magdalino, P. 1999. 'What we heard in the lives of the saints we have seen with our own eyes': The holy man as literary text in tenth-century Constantinople'. In: J. Howard-Johnston, and P.A. Hayward (eds.), *The Cult of Saints in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages,* Oxford: 83-112.

Magdalino, P. 2000. 'The pen of the aunt: Echoes of the mid-twelfth century in the *Alexiad*'. In: T. Gouma-Peterson (ed.), *Anna Komnene and her Times,* New York and London: 15-44.

Magdalino, P. 2009. 'Court society and aristocracy'. In: J.F. Haldon (ed.), *A Social History of Byzantium,* Chichester and Malden MA: 212-32.

Magdalino, P. 2013. 'Knowledge in authority and authorised history: The imperial intellectual programme of Leo VI and Constantine VII'. In: P. Armstrong (ed.), *Authority in Byzantium,* Farnham and Burlington VT: 187-209.

Makrypoulias, C.G. 2000. 'Byzantine expeditions against the Emirate of Crete c. 825-949'. *Graeco-Arabica* 7-8: 347-62.

Makrypoulias, C.G. 2012. 'Civilians as combatants in Byzantium: Ideological versus practical considerations'. In: J. Koder and I. Stouraitis (eds.), *Byzantine War Ideology between Roman Imperial Concept and Christian Religion: Akten des Internationalen Symposiums (Wien, 19.-21. Mai 2011),* Vienna: 109-20.

Makrypoulias, C.G. 2013. 'Η μελέτη της βυζαντινής πολεμικής τεχνολογίας: Προβλήματα μεθοδολογίας'. In: E. Mergupe-Sabaidu el al (eds.), *Επιστήμη και τεχνολογία. Ιστορικές και ιστοριογραφικές μελέτες,* Athens: 31-44.

Mango, C. 1975. *Byzantine Literature as a Distorting Mirror: An Inaugural Lecture delivered before the University of Oxford on 21 May 1974,* Oxford.

Mango, C. 1980. *Byzantium: The Empire of New Rome,* London.

Mango, C. 1982. 'The Life of Saint Andrew the Fool reconsidered'. *RSBS* 2: 297-313.

Mango, C. 2011. 'Introduction'. In: I. Ševčenko (ed.), *Chronographiae quae Theophanis Continuati nomine fertur liber quo Vita Basilii imperatoris amplectitur,* Berlin: 3-13.

Markesinis, B. 2000. 'Janos Lascaris, la bibliothèque d'Avramis à Corfou et le Paris. gr. 854'. *Scriptorium* 54*:* 302-6.

Markopoulos, A. 1994. 'Constantine the Great in Macedonian historiography: models and approaches'. In: P. Magdalino (ed.), *New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th Centuries,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 159-70.

Markopoulos, A. 1998. 'Autour des Chapitres Parénétiques de Basile Ier.' In: M. Balard et al. (eds.), *Εὐψυχία: Mélanges offerts à Hélène Ahrweiler.* Paris: 469-79.

Markopoulos, A. 2003. 'Byzantine history writing at the end of the first millennium'. In: P. Magdalino (ed.), *Byzantium in the Year 1000,* Leiden and Boston: 183-97.

Markopoulos, A. 2006. 'Η ιστοριογραφία των δυνατών κατά τη μεσοβυζαντινή περίοδο. Ο Ιωάννης Κουρκούας στην ιστορική συγγραφή του πρωτοσπαθάριου και κριτή Μανουήλ.' In: G.K. Promponas and P. Valavanis (eds.), *Ευεργεσίη: Τόμος χαριστήριος στον Παναγιώτη Ι. Κοντό*, vol. 1, Athens: 397-405.

Markopoulos, A. 2009. 'From narrative historiography to historical biography: New trends in Byzantine historical writing in the 10th-11th Centuries'. *BZ* 102: 697-715.

Martin, T.H. 1854. *Recherches sur la vie et les ouvrages d'Héron d' Alexandrie, disciple de Ctésibus, et sur tous les ouvrages mathématiques grecs, conservés ou perdus, publiés ou inédits, qui ont été attribués à un auteur nommé Héron,* Paris.

Maspero, J. 1912. *L'organisation militaire de l' Egypte byzantine,* Paris.

Mathieu, M. 1961. 'Introduction'. In: *La Geste de Robert Guiscard,* Palermo: 3-96.

Mazzucchi, C.M. 1978. 'Dagli anni di Basilo Parakimomenos'. *Aevum* 52: 267-316.

McCabe, A. 2007. *A Byzantine Encyclopaedia of Horse Medicine, The sources, Compilation and Transmission of the Hippiatrica,* New York.

McCormick, M. 1986. *Eternal Victory: Triumphal Rulership in Late Antiquity, Byzantium, and the Early Medieval West,* Cambridge.

McGeer, E. 1986. 'Menaulion-menaulatoi'. *Δίπτυχα* 4: 53-57.

McGeer, E. 1988. 'Infantry versus cavalry: The Byzantine response' *REB* 46: 135-45.

McGeer, E. 1991. 'Tradition and reality in the "Taktika" of Nikephoros Ouranos'. *DOP* 45: 129-40.

McGeer, E. 1992. 'The Syntaxis armatorum quadrata: A tenth-century tactical blueprint'. *REB* 50: 219-29.

McGeer, E. 1995. 'Commentary'. In: *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century*, Washington DC: 171-360.

McGeer, E. 1995b. 'Byzantine siege warfare in theory and practice'. In: I.A. Corfis and M. Wolfe (eds.), *The Medieval City under Siege,* Woodbridge: 123-9.

McGeer, E. 2000. 'Commentary'. In: *The Land Legislation of the Macedonian Emperors,* Toronto.

McGeer, E. 2003. 'Two military orations of Constantine VII'. In: J.W. Nesbitt (ed.), *Byzantine Authors: Literary Activities and Preoccupations, Texts and Translations dedicated to the Memory of Nicolas Oikonomides,* Leiden and Boston: 111-35.

McGrath, S. 1995. 'The battles of Dorostolon (971): Rhetoric and reality'. In: T.S. Miller and J. Nesbitt (eds.), *Peace and War in Byzantium: Essays in Honor of George T. Dennis,* Washington DC: 152-64.

McGuckin, J.A. 2011-2. ‘A conflicted heritage: The Byzantine religious establishment of a war ethic’. *DOP* 65-66: 29-44.

McMahon, L. 2016. ‘De Velitatione Bellica and Byzantine guerrilla warfare’. *Annual of Medieval Studies at CEU* 22: 22-33.

Mecella, L. 2009. ‘Die Überlieferung der Kestoi des Julius Africanus in den byzantinischen Textsammlungen zur Militärtechnik’. In: M. Wallraff and L. Macella (eds.), *Die Kestoi des Julius Africanus und ihre Überlieferung,* Berlin: 85-144.

Meulder, M. 2003. ‘Qui est le roi Mérops cité dans la Συλλογη Τακτικων?’. *Byzantion* 73: 445-66.

Mielczarek, M. 1993. *Cataphracti and Clibanarii: Studies on the Heavy Armoured Cavalry of the Ancient World,* Lodz.

Miller, T.S. 1976. ‘The plague in John VI Cantacuzenus and Thucydides’. *GRBS* 17: 385-95.

Moffatt, A. and Tall, M. 2012. ‘Introduction’. In: *Constantine Porphyrogennetos: The Book of Ceremonies,* Canberra: xxiii-xxxviii.

Moravcsik, G. 1938. ‘Τα συγγράμματα Κωνσταντίνου του Πορφυρογεννήτου από γλωσσικής απόψεως’. *SBN* 5: 514-20.

Moravcsik, G. 1966. ‘Klassizismus in der byzantinischen Geschichtsschreibung’. In: P. Wirth (ed.), *Polychronion: Festschrift für F. Dögler zum 75. Geburstag,* Heidelberg: 366-77.

Morris, R. 1988. ‘The two faces of Nicephoros Phokas’. *BMGS* 12: 83-115.

Morris, R. 1994. ‘Succession and usurpation: Politics and rhetoric in the late tenth century’. In: P. Magdalino (ed.), *New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th Centuries,* Farnham and Burlington VT: 199-214.

Müller, K.K. 1884. ‘Neue Mittheilungen über Janos Laskaris & die Mediceische Bibliothek’. *Centralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* 1: 333-412.

Mullett, M. 1981. ‘The classical tradition in the Byzantine letter’. In: M. Mullet and R. Scott (eds.), *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition, University of Birmingham Thirteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies 1979,* Birmingham: 75-93.

Mullett, M. 1997. *Theophylact of Ochrid: Reading the Letters of a Byzantine Archbishop,* Birmingham.

Negin, A.E. 1998. 'Sarmatian cataphracts as prototypes for Roman equites cataphractarii'. *Journal of Roman Military Equipment Studies* 9: 65-75.

Nelson, R.S. 2011-2012. 'And so, with the help of God: The Byzantine art of war in the tenth century'. *DOP* 65/66: 169-92.

Németh, A. 2010. *Imperial Systematization of the Past: Emperor Constantine VII and his Historical Excerpts,* PhD thesis, Central European University, Budapest.

Németh, A. 2013. 'The imperial systematization of the past in Constantinople'. In: J. König and G. Woolf (eds.), *Encyclopaedism from Antiquity to the Renaissance,* Cambridge: 232-58.

Neville, L. 2012. *Heroes and Romans in Twelfth-Century Byzantium: The Material History of Nikephoros Bryennios,* Cambridge.

Neville, L. 2016. *Anna Komnene: The Life and Work of a Medieval Historian,* Oxford.

Nicolle, D. 1980. 'The impact of the European couched lance on Muslim military tradition'. *The Journal of the Arms and Armour Society* 10: 6-40.

Nicolle, D. 1983. 'The Cappella Palatina ceiling and the Muslim military inheritance of Norman Sicily'. *Gladius* 16: 45-145.

Nilsson, I. 2006. 'To narrate the events of the past: On Byzantine historians, and historians on Byzantium'. In: J. Burke et al (eds.), *Byzantine Narrative. Papers in Honour of Roger Scott,* Melbourne: 47-58.

Nilsson, I. 2010. 'The same story, but another: A reappraisal of literary imitation in Byzantium'. In: E. Schiffer and A. Rhoby (eds.), *Imitatio – Aemulatio – Variatio,* Vienna: 195-208.

Nilsson, I. and Scott, R. 2007. 'Towards a new history of Byzantine literature: The case of historiography'. *Classica et Mediaevalia* 58: 319-32.

Obolensky, D. 1971. 'Byzantine frontier zones and cultural Exchanges'. In: M. Berza and E. Stănescu (eds.), *Actes du XIV^e Congrès international des études byzantines,* vol.1, Bucharest: 303-13.

Odorico, P. 1990. ‘La cultura della Συλλογή. 1) il cosidetto enciclopedismo bizantino. 2) le travole del sapere di Giovanni Damasceno.’ *BZ* 83: 1-21.

Odorico, P. 2006. ‘Displaying la littérature Byzantine’. In: E. Jeffreys et al (eds.), *Proceedings of the 21st International Congress of Byzantine Studies: London, 21-26 August 2006,* vol.1, Aldershot and Burlington VT: 213-34.

Oikonomides, N. 1971. ‘L’organisation de la frontière orientale de Byzance aux Xe – XIe siècles et le *Taktikon de l’Escorial’.* In: M. Berza and E. Stănescu (eds.), *Actes du XIVe Congrès international des études byzantines,* vol.1, Bucharest: 285-302.

Oikonomides, N. 1972. ‘Commentary’. In: *Les listes de préséance byzantines des IXe et X siècles,* Paris: 281-363.

Oikonomides, N. 1988. ‘Middle Byzantine provincial recruits: Salary and equipment’. In: J. Duffy and J. Peradotto (eds.), *Gonimos: Neoplatonic and Byzantine Studies Presented to Leendert G. Westerink at 75,* Buffalo NY: 121-36.

Oikonomides, N. 1996. ‘The social structure of the Byzantine countryside in the first half of the Xth century’. *Βυζαντινά Σύμμεικτα* 10: 105-25.

Ostrogorsky, G. 1953. ‘Sur la date de la composition du Livre des Thèmes et sur l’époque de la constitution des premiers thèmes d’Asie Mineure’. *Byzantion* 23: 31-66.

Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 1991, Kazhdan, A. et al (eds.), 3 vols, New York and Oxford.

Parani, G.M. 2003. *Reconstructing the Reality of Images (11th-15th Centuries).* Leiden and Boston.

Peréz-Martín, I. 2008. ‘El estilo Hodegos y su proyección en las escrituras constantinopolitanas’. *Segno e Testo* 6: 398-458.

Pertusi, A. 1948. ‘Una acolouthia militare inedita del X secolo’. *Aevum* 22 (2/4): 145-68.

Pertusi, A. 1952. ‘Commentary’. In: *Costantino Porfirogenito De thematibus,* Vatican City: 103-183.

Pertusi, A. 1956. ‘Il preteso thema Bizantino di “Ṭālāja” (O Ṭājāla o Ṭāfālā) e la regione suburbana di Costantinopoli’. *BZ* 49: 85-95.

Petersen, L.I.R. 2013. *Siege Warfare and Military Organization in the Successor States (400-800 AD): Byzantium, the West and Islam.* Leiden and Boston.

Polemis, D. 1968. *The Doukai, A contribution to Byzantine Prosopography,* London, Toronto and New York.

Pryor, J.H. and Jeffreys, E.M. 2006. *The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ: The Byzantine Navy ca 500-1204,* Leiden and Boston.

Rance, P. 1994. *Tactics and Tactica in the Sixth Century: Tradition and Originality,* PhD thesis, University of St. Andrews.

Rance, P. 2004. 'The *Fulcum,* the Late Roman and Byzantine *testudo:* The germanization of Roman infantry tactics?'. *GRBS* 44: 265-326.

Rance, P. 2004b. 'Drungus, δρουγγος, and δρουγγιστί: A gallicism and continuity in Late Roman cavalry tactics'. *Phoenix* 58: 99-130.

Rance, P. 2005. 'Narses and the battle of Taginae (Busta Gallorum) 552: Procopius and sixth-century warfare'. *Historia* 54: 424-72.

Rance, P. 2007. 'The date of the military compendium of Syrianus Magister (Formerly the sixth-century Anonymus Byzantinus)'. *BZ* 100: 701-37.

Rance, P. 2007b. 'The Etymologicum Magnum and the fragment of Urbicius'. *GRBS* 47: 193-224.

Rance, P. 2008. 'Battle'. In P. Sabin, H.V. Wees and M. Whitby (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Volume II: Rome from the Late Republic to the Late Empire.* Cambridge: 342-78.

Reinsch, D.R. 2010. 'Der Autor ist tot – es lebe der Leser: Zur Neubewertung der Imitatio in der byzantinischen Geschichtsschreibung'. In: E. Schiffer and A. Rhoby (eds.), *Byzantium, Imitatio – Aemulatio –Váriatio,* Vienna: 23-32.

Reinsch, D.R. 2010b. 'Byzantinische Literatur – Tradition und Innovation'. In: V. Hirmer (ed.), *Byzanz: Pracht und Alltag; Kunst- und Ausstellungshalle der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bonn, 26. Februar bis 13. Juni 2010,* Munich: 56-61.

Riedel, M.L.D. 2010. *Fighting the Good Fight: The Taktika of Leo VI and its influence on Byzantine Cultural Identity.* PhD thesis, Exeter College, Oxford University.

Riedel, M.L.D. 2012. 'Historical writing and warfare'. In: S. Foot and C.F. Robinson (eds.), *The Oxford History of Historical Writing Volume 2: 400-1400,* Oxford: 576-603.

Roberto, U. 2009. 'Byzantine collections of Late Antique authors: Some remarks on the *Excerpta historica Constantiniana'.* In: M. Wallraff and L. Mecella (eds.), *Die Kestoi des Julius Africanus und ihre Überlieferung,* Berlin: 71-84.

Ross, M. 1958. 'Basil the proedros patron of the arts'. *Archaeology* 11: 271-5.

Roueché, C. 1988. 'Byzantine writers and readers: Storytelling in the eleventh century'. In: R. Beaton (ed.), *The Greek Novel AD 1-1985,* New York: 123-33.

Roueché, C. 2002. 'The literary background of Kekaumenos.' In: C. Holmes and J. Waring (eds.), *Literacy, Education and Manuscript Transmission in Byzantium and Beyond,* Leiden and Boston: 111-38.

Roueché, C. 2003. 'The rhetoric of Kekaumenos.' In: E. Jeffreys (ed.), *Rhetoric in Byzantium: Papers from the Thirty-fifth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Exeter College, University of Oxford, March 2011,* Farnham and Burlington VT: 23-37.

Runciman, S. 1929. *The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and his Reign,* Cambridge.

Runciman, S. 1995. 'Historiography'. In: A.R. Littlewood (ed.), *Originality in Byzantine Literature, Art and Music: A Collection of Essays,* Oxford: 59-66.

Rydén, L. 1983. 'The "Life" of St. Basil the Younger and the date of the "Life" of St. Andreas Salos'. *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 7: 568-86.

Saliou, C. 1996. 'Introduction and commentary'. In: *Le traité d'urbanisme de Julien d'Ascalon (VI^e^ siècle),* Paris: 9-29, 79-132.

Sarraf, S. 2004. 'Mamluk *Furūsīyah* literature and its antecedents'. *Mamlūk Studies Review* 8: 141-200.

Savvides, A.G.C. 1993. 'Προσωπογραφικό σημείωμα για τον απελευθερωτή της μεγαλονήσου (965 μ.Χ.)'. *Επετηρίδα του Κέντρου Μελετών της Ιεράς Μονής Κύπρου Κύκκου* 2: 371-8.

Schindler, F. 1973. *Die Überlieferung der Strategemata des Polyainos*, Vienna.

Schminck, A. 1986. *Studien zu mittelbyzantinischen Rechtsbüchern,* Frankfurt.

Schneider, R. 1908. *Griechische Poliorketiker,* vol. 2, Berlin.

Schreiner, P. 2011. 'Die enzyklopädische Idee in Byzanz'. In: P. Van Deun and C. Macé (eds.), *Encyclopedic Trends in Byzantium? Proceedings of the International Conference held in Leuven, 6-8 May 2009,* Leuven, Paris and Walpole MA: 3-25.

Scott, R. 1981. 'The classical tradition in Byzantine historiography'. In: M. Mullet and R. Scott (eds.), *Byzantium and the Classical Tradition, University of Birmingham Thirteenth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies 1979,* Birmingham: 61-74.

Searby, D.M. 2007. 'Introduction'. In: *The Corpus Parisinum, A Critical Edition of the Greek Text with Commentary and English Translation: A Medieval Anthology of Greek Texts from the Pre-Socratics to the Church Fathers 600 B.C. – 700 A.D.),* 2 vols. Lewiston NY: i. 1-112.

Sekunda, N. 2008. 'Land forces'. In: P. Sabin, H.V. Wees, and M. Whitby (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare Volume I: Greece, The Hellenistic World and the Rise of Rome*, Cambridge: 325-57.

Serikoff, N.I. 1992. 'Leo VI Arabus? A fragment of Arabic translation from the "Tactica" by Leo VI the Wise (886-912) in the Mamluk military manual by Iban Mankali (d. 1382)'. *Macedonian Studies* 9: 57-61.

Ševčenko, I. 1969-70. 'Poems on the death of Leo VI and Constantine VII in the Madrid manuscript of Scylitzes'. *DOP* 23-24: 187-228.

Ševčenko, I. 1992. 'Re-reading Constantine Porphyrogenitus'. In: J. Shepard and S. Franklin (eds.), *Byzantine Diplomacy*, *Papers from the Twenty-fourth Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, Cambridge, March 1990,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 167-96.

Shatzmiller, M. 1992. 'The crusades and Islamic warfare: A re-evaluation'. *Der Islam* 69: 247-88.

Shepard, J. 1985. 'Information, disinformation and delay in Byzantine diplomacy'. *BF* 10: 233-93.

Shepard, J. 1995. 'Imperial information and ignorance: A discrepancy'. *BS* 56: 107-16.

Shepard, J. 2001. 'Constantine VII, Caucasian openings and the road to Aleppo'. In: A. Eastmond (ed.), *Eastern Approached to Byzantium: Papers from the Thirty-third Spring Symposium of Byzantine Studies, University of Warwick, Coventry, March 1999,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 19-40.

Shepard, J. 2002. ‘Emperors and expansionism: From Rome to Middle Byzantium’. In: A. Abulafia and N. Berend (eds.), *Medieval Frontiers: Concepts and Practices*, Aldershot and Burlington VT: 55-82.

Shepard, J. 2003. ‘The ruler as instructor, pastor and wise: Leo VI of Byzantium and Symeon of Bulgaria’. In: T. Reuter (ed.), *Alfred the Great, Papers from the Eleventh-Centenary Conferences,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 339-58.

Shepard, J. 2003b. ‘The uses of ‘history’ in Byzantine diplomacy: Observations and comparisons’. In: C. Dendrinos et al (eds.), *Porphyrogenita: Essays on the History and Literature of Byzantium and the Latin East in Honour of Julian Chrysostomides,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 91-115.

Shepard, J. 2005. ‘Past and future in Middle Byzantine diplomacy: Some preliminary observations’. In: M. Balard, É. Malamut and J.M. Spieser (eds.), *Byzance et le monde extérieur: Contacts, relations, échanges,* Paris: 171-91.

Shepard, J. 2012. ‘Holy land, lost lands, *Realpolitik*: Imperial Byzantine thinking about Syria and Palestine in the later 10th and 11th Centuries’. *Al-Qanṭara* 33: 505-45.

Sinclair, K.J. 2012. *War Writing in Middle Byzantine Historiography: Sources, Influences and Trends,* PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham.

Sinclair, K.J. 2014. ‘Anna Komnene and her sources for military affairs in the *Alexiad*’. *Estudios bizantinos* 2: 143-85.

Smail, R.C. 1995. *Crusading Warfare (1097-1193),* 2nd edition, Cambridge.

Sonderkamp, J.A.M. 1984. ‘Theophanes Nonnus: Medicine in the circle of Constantine Porphyrogenitus’. *DOP* 38: 29-41.

Spanos, A. 2010. ‘“To every innovation, anathema” (?): Some preliminary thoughts on the study of Byzantine innovation’. In: H. Knudsen et al (eds.), *Mysterion, strategike og kainotomia: Et festskrift til ære for Johny Holbek,* Oslo: 51-9.

Spanos, A. 2014. ‘Was innovation unwanted in Byzantium?’. In: I. Nilsson and P. Stephenson (eds.), *Wanted: Byzantium. The Desire for a Lost Empire,* Uppsala: 43-56.

Speake, G. 1993. ‘Janus Lascaris’ visit to Mount Athos in 1491’. *GRBS* 34: 325-30.

Speidel, M.P. 1984. 'Cataphractarii clibanarii and the rise of the Later Roman mailed cavalry.' *Epigraphica Anatolica* 4: 151-6.

Spieser, J.M. 1973. 'Inventaires en vue d'un recueil des inscriptions historiques de Byzance'. *TM* 5: 145-80.

Stavridou-Zafraka, A. 1976. 'Ο ανώνυμος λόγος "Επί τη των Βουλγάρων Συμβάσει"'. *Βυζαντινά* 8: 344-406.

Stephenson, P. 2000. *Byzantium's Balkan Frontier: A Political Study of the Northern Balkans, 900-1204,* Cambridge.

Stephenson, P. 2010. 'The rise of the Middle Byzantine aristocracy and the decline of the imperial state'. In: P. Stephenson (ed.), *The Byzantine World*, London and New York: 22-33.

Stern, S.M. 1950. 'An embassy of the Byzantine Emperor to the Fatimid Caliph Al-Mu'izz'. *Byzantion* 20: 239-58.

Strässle, P.M. 2004. 'Krieg und Frieden in Byzanz'. *Byzantion* 74: 110-29.

Strässle, P.M. 2006. *Krieg und Kriegführung in Byzanz: Die Kriege Kaiser Basileios' II. gegen die Bulgaren (976-1019),* Cologne.

Stouraitis, I. 2009. *Krieg und Frieden in der politischen und ideologischen Wahrnehmung in Byzanz (7.-11. Jahrhundert),* Vienna.

Sullivan, D.F. 1997. 'Tenth century Byzantine offensive siege warfare: Instructional prescriptions and historical practice'. In: K. Tsiknakis (ed.), *Το Εμπόλεμο Βυζάντιο (9ος-12ος αι.),* Athens: 179-200.

Sullivan, D.F. 2000. 'Introduction and commentary'. In: *Siegecraft, Two Tenth-Century Instructional Manuals by "Heron of Byzantium",* Washington DC: 1-23, 153-248.

Sullivan, D.F. 2003. 'Introduction'. In: 'A Byzantine instructional manual on siege defense: The *De Obsidione Toleranda.* Introduction, English translation and annotations'. In: J.W. Nesbitt (ed.), *Byzantine Authors: Literary Activities and Preoccupations, Texts and Translations dedicated to the Memory of Nicolas Oikonomides,* Leiden and Boston: 139-266.

Sullivan, D.F. 2003b. 'Byzantium besieged: prescription and practice'. In: A. Abramea, A. Laiou and E. Chrysos (eds.), *Βυζαντινό κράτος και κοινωνία. Μνήμη Νίκου Οικονομίδη,* Athens: 509-21.

Sullivan, D.F. 2010. 'Byzantine military manuals: Prescriptions, practice and pedagogy'. In: P. Stephenson (ed.), *The Byzantine World,* London and New York: 149-61.

Sullivan, D.F. 2010b. 'The authorship of Anna Komnene's *Alexiad:* The siege descriptions compared with the military instructional manuals and other historians'. In: A. Ödekan et al (eds.), *First International Byzantine Studies Symposium: Change in the Byzantine World in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries,* Istanbul: 51-6.

Sullivan, D.F. et al. 2014. 'Introduction'. In: *The life of St. Basil the Younger: Critical Edition and Annotated Translation of the Moscow Version,* Washington DC: 1-61.

Syvänne, I. 2004. *The Age of Hippotoxotai: Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491-636),* Tampere.

Talbot, A.M. and Sullivan, D.F. 2005. 'Introduction'. In: *The History of Leo the Deacon, Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century,* Washington DC: 1-52.

Tanner, R.G. 1997. 'The historical method of Constantine Porphyrogenitus'. *BF* 24: 125-40.

Theotokis, G. 2012. 'Border fury: The Muslim campaigning tactics in Asia Minor through the writings of the Byzantine military treatise *Περί παραδρομής του κυρού Νικηφόρου του βασιλέως*'. *ATINERS Conference Paper Series,* No: HIS2012-0308: 5-15.

Theotokis, G. 2013. 'The square fighting march of the crusaders at the battle of Ascalon (1099)'. *Journal of Medieval Military History* 11: 57-71.

Theotokis, G. 2014. 'From ancient Greece to Byzantium: Strategic innovation or continuity of military thinking?'. In: B. Kukjalko, O. Lāms and I. Rūmniece (eds.), *Antiquitas Viva 4: Studia Classica*, Riga: 106-18.

Tobias, N. 1979. 'The tactics and strategy of Alexius Comnenus at Calavrytae (1078)'. *Études byzantines* 6: 193-211.

Tobias, N. 2007. *Basil I Founder of the Macedonian Dynasty: A Study of the Political and Military History of the Byzantine Empire in the Ninth Century,* Lampeter.

Tougher, S. 1994. 'The wisdom of Leo VI'. In: P. Magdalino (ed.), *New Constantines: The Rhythm of Imperial Renewal in Byzantium, 4th-13th Centuries,* Aldershot and Burlington VT: 171-80.

Tougher, S. 1997. *The Reign of Leo VI (886-912) Politics and People,* Leiden and Boston.

Toynbee, A.J. 1973. *Constantine Porphyrogenitus and his Work,* New York and Toronto.

Treadgold, W.T. 1979. 'The chronological accuracy of the *Chronicle* of Symeon the Logothete for the years 813-845'. *DOP* 33: 157-97.

Treadgold, W.T. 1992. 'The army in the works of Constantine Porphyrogenitus'. *RSBN* 29: 78-145.

Treadgold, W.T. 1995. *Byzantium and Its Army 284-1081,* Stanford CA.

Treadgold, W.T. 2013. *The Middle Byzantine Historians,* New York.

Trombley, F.R. 1997. 'The *Taktika* of Nikephoros Ouranos and military encyclopaedism'. In: P. Binkley (ed.), *Pre-modern Encyclopaedic Texts, Proceedings of the Second COMERS Congress, Groningen, 1-4 July 1996,* Leiden, New York and Cologne: 261-74.

Trombley, F.R. 2002. 'Military cadres and the battle during the reign of Heraclius'. In: G.J. Reinink and B.H. Stolte (eds.), *The Reign of Heraclius (610-641): Crisis and Confrontation,* Leuven, Paris, and Dudley MA: 241-59.

Trombley, F.R. 2007. 'The operational methods of the Late Roman army in the Persian war of 572-591'. In: A.S. Lewin and P. Pellegrini (ed.), *The Late Roman Army in the Near East from Diocletian to the Arab Conquest. Proceeding of a colloquium held at Potenza, Acerenza and Matera, Italy (May 2005),* Oxford: 321-56.

Tsagas, N.M. 1993. *Ιανός Λάσκαρις (1445-1535), Πρεσβευτής των Ελληνικών γραμμάτων στην Δυτική Ευρώπη,* Athens.

Tsamakda, V. 2002. *The Illustrated Chronicle of Ioannes Skylitzes in Madrid,* Leiden and Boston.

Tsougarakis, D. 1988. *Byzantine Crete, From the 5th Century to the Venetian Conquest,* Athens.

Tsurtsumia, M. 2011. 'ΤΡΙΒΟΛΟΣ: A Byzantine landmine'. *Byzantion* 82: 415-21.

Tsurtsumia M. 2011b. 'The evolution of splint armour in Georgia and Byzantium: Lamellar and scale armour in the 10th-12th centuries'. *Βυζαντινά Σύμμεικτα* 21: 65-99.

Vatchkova, V. 2011. 'La méthode byzantine de la *damnatio memoriae'*. In: A. Milanova, V. Vachkova, and T. Stephanov (eds.), *Memory and Oblivion in Byzantium,* Sofia.

Van Bochove, T.E. 1996. *To Date and Not to Date: On the Date and Status of Byzantine Law Books,* Groningen.

Van den Berg, H. 1947. 'Introduction'. In: *Anonymus De obsidione Toleranda,* Leiden: 3-39.

Van Hoof, L. 2002. 'Among Christian emperors: The *Vita Basilii* by Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus'. *The Journal of Eastern Christian Studies* 54: 163-83.

Vannier, J.F. 1975. *Familles byzantines, les Argyroi: IXe-XIIe siècles,* Paris.

Vári, R. 1927. 'Die sogenannten Inedita Tactica Leonis'. *BZ* 27: 241-70.

Vasiliev, A.A. 1935-1968. *Byzance et les Arabes,* 3 vols, Brussels.

Vieillefond, J.R. 1932. 'Introduction'. In: *Jules Africain, fragments des Cestes provenant de la collection des tacticiens grecs,* Paris: vii-lviii.

Vieillefond, J.R. 1970. 'Introduction'. In: *Les Cestes de Julius Africanus: Étude sur l'ensemble des fragments avec édition, traduction et commentaries,* Florence and Paris: 5-70.

Vlysidou, B.N. 1985. 'Ἡ συνωμοσία τοῦ Κουρκούα στο "Βίο Βασιλείου"'. *Βυζαντινά Σύμμεικτα* 6: 53-8.

Vlysidou, B.N. et al 1998. *Η Μικρά Ασία των θεμάτων: έρευνες πάνω στην γεωγραφική φυσιογνωμία και προσωπογραφία των Βυζαντινών θεμάτων της Μικράς Ασίας* (7ος – 11ος αι.), Athens.

Vogel, E.G. 1854. 'Litterarische Ausbeute von Janus Lascaris, Reisen im Peloponnes um's Jahr 1490'. *Serapeum* 15: 154-60.

Von Sievers, P. 1979. 'Military, merchants and nomads: The social evolution of the Syrian cities and countryside during the classical period, 780-969/164-358'. *Der Islam* 56: 212-44.

Vratimos, A. 2012. 'Was Michael Attaleiates present at the battle of Mantzikert?'. *BZ* 105: 829-40.

Vryonis, S.J. 1957. 'The will of a provincial magnate, Eustathius Boilas (1059).' *DOP* 11: 263-77.

Wallraff, M. et al 2012. 'Introduction'. In: *Iulius Africanus Cesti, The Extant Fragments,* (trans. W. Adler), Berlin: xi-xcii.

Walker, P.E. 1977. 'The "crusade" of John Tzimisces in the light of new Arabic evidence'. *Byzantion* 47: 301-27.

Webb, R. 2009. *Ekphrasis, Imagination and Persuasion in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practise,* Farnham and Burlington VT.

Wheeler, E.L. 1988. *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery,* Leiden.

Wheeler, E.L. 2013. 'Polyaenus: *Scriptor Militaris*'. In: K. Brodersen (ed.), *Polyainos. Neue Studien/ Polyaenus. New Studies,* Berlin: 7-54.

Whitby, M. 1988. *The Emperor Maurice and his Historian: Theophylact Simocatta on Persian and Balkan Warfare,* Oxford.

Whittow, M. 1996. *The Making of Orthodox Byzantium 600-1025,* Berkeley CA and Los Angeles.

Wojnowski, M. 2005. 'Κατάφρακτοι – Ciężkozbrojna jazda Cesarstwa Bizantyjskiego jako kontynuacja antycznych Cataphracti I Clibanarii'. *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego* 21: 8-22.

Wojnowski, M. 2012. 'Periodic revival or continuation of the ancient military tradition? Another look at the question of the kataphraktoi in the Byzantine army'. *Studia Ceranea* 2: 195-220.

Zuckerman, C. 1990. 'The military compendium of Syrianus Magister'. *JÖB* 40: 209-24.

Zuckerman, C. 1994. 'Chapitres peu connus de l'Apparatus Bellicus'. *TM* 12: 359-89.

Zuckerman, C. 2014. 'Squabbling *protospatharioi* and other administrative issues from the first half of the tenth century'. *REB* 72: 193-233.

Abbreviations

BCH: Bulletin de correspondance Hellénique, Paris 1877-

BF: *Byzantinische Forschungen*, Amsterdam 1966-

BMGS: Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies, Oxford and Birmingham 1975-

BS: Byzantinoslavica, Prague 1929-

BZ: Byzantinische Zeitschrift, Leipzig, Munich and Cologne 1892-

DAI: Constantine VII, *De Administrando Imperio,* G. Moravcsik (ed.), trans. R.J.H. Jenkins, *Constantine Porphyrogenitus, De administrando imperio,* Washington DC 1967.

DC: Constantine VII, *De Cerimoniis,* J.J. Reiske (ed.), *Costantini Porphyrogeniti imperatoris de cerimoniis aulae Byzantine libri duo,* Bonn 1829; Eng. Trans. A. Moffatt and M. Tall, *Constantine Porphyrogennetos: The Book of Ceremonies,* Canberra 2012.

DOP: Dumbarton Oaks Papers, Washington DC 1941-

DRM: De Re Militari, In: G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *Three Byzantine Military Treatises,* Washington DC 1985: 246-327.

DV: Nikephoros II, *De Velitatione,* G. Dagron and H. Mihăescu (eds. and trans.), *Le traité sur la guérilla (De velitatione) de l'empereur Nicéphore Phocas (963-969),* Paris 1986.

GRBS: Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, Durham 1958-

JGR: I. Zepos and P. Zepos (eds.), *Jus Graecoromanum,* Vol.1-2, Athens 1931.

JÖB: *Jahrbuch der österreichischen Byzantinistik*, Vienna 1969-

L: Manuscript *Laurentianus Plut*. 75-6, Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Florence.

LD: Leo Deacon, C.B. Hase (ed.), *Leonis Diaconi Caloensis historiae libri decem,* Bonn 1828; Eng. trans. A.M. Talbot and D.F. Sullivan, *The History of Leo the Deacon, Byzantine Military Expansion in the Tenth Century,* Washington DC 2005.

LT: Leo VI, *Taktika,* G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *The Taktika of Leo VI,* revised edition, Washington DC 2014.

MS: Maurice, *Strategikon,* G. T. Dennis (ed.), trans. E. Gamillscheg, *Das Strategikon des Maurikios:* Vienna 1981; Eng. trans. G.T. Dennis, *Maurice's Strategikon. Handbook of Byzantine Military Strategy:* Philadelphia 1984.

ODB: Kazhdan, A. et al (eds.) 1991. *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, 3 vols, New York and Oxford.

PM: Nikephoros II, *Praecepta Militaria,* In: E. McGeer (ed. and trans.), *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century.* Washington DC 1995: 12-59.

PS: Syrianos Magister, *Peri Strategias,* In: G.T. Dennis (ed. and trans.), *Three Byzantine Military Treatises:* Washington DC 1985: 11-135.

REB: Revue des Études Byzantines, Paris 1944-

RSBN: Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici, Rome 1964-

SBN: Studi bizantini e neoellenici, Rome 1924-1946.

SCE: *Synaxarium Ecclesiae Constantinopoleos,* H. Delehaye (ed.), *Acta Sanctorum* 62, Brussels 1902.

ST: *Sylloge Tacticorum*, A. Dain (ed.), *Sylloge Tacticorum quae olim "Inedita Leonis tactica" dicebatur,* Paris 1938.

TC: Constantine VII, Theophanes Continuatus, In: I. Bekker (ed.), *Theophanes Continuatus, Ioannes Cameniata, Symeon Magister, Georgius Monachus,* Bonn 1838: 3-481.

TC (b): Constantine VII, Theophanes Continuatus, J.M. Featherstone and J.S. Codoñer (ed. and trans), *Chronographiae quae Theophanis Continuati nomine fertur libri i-iv,* Boston and Berlin 2015.

TM: Travaux et Mémoires, Paris 1965-

TNO: Nikephoros Ouranos, *Taktika,* In: E. McGeer (ed. and trans.), *Sowing the Dragon's Teeth: Byzantine Warfare in the Tenth Century.* Washington DC 1995: 88-163.

VB: Constantine VII, *Vita Basilii,* I. Ševčenko (ed. and trans.), *Chronographiae quae Theophanis Continuati nomine fertur liber quo Vita Basilii imperatoris amplectitur*, Berlin 2011.

ZRVI: Zbornik Radova Vizantoloshkog Instituta, Belgrade 1952-