Secularisation, Weber and Islam

Francis Robinson

For the hundred years preceding the Muslim revival of the late twentieth century, the Islamic world seemed to be following a path of secularization similar to that on which the Western Christian world embarked some centuries before. Law derived from revelation had been increasingly removed from public life; religious knowledge had steadily lost ground in education; more and more Muslims had come forward who were Islamic by culture but made `rational' calculations about their lives in much the same way as Christians formed in the secular West might do. The development of this `rationaliality' and rationalization within Christianity, according to Max Weber, brought the secular world into being. This essay is concerned to explore how far Weber's theory of secularization, which is derived specifically from the experience of western Europe, can help us both to make sense of this process in Islamic society and, perhaps, to reach some understanding of what the measure of secularization might be in an Islamic environment.

Weber's process of secularization is a unique Western development, its roots deep in ancient Judaism, and its trunk in Protestantism and in the growth of capitalism. At the heart of the process lie the concepts of rationality and rationalization. We discern the growth of rationality in increasing human capacity to calculate and to control all aspects of life without appeals either to traditional norms or to charismatic enthusiasm. As
bureaucracies come to embrace all the activities of the economy and of the state, opportunities for individual initiative, and dependence on traditional loyalties, are reduced. Social relationships are rendered steadily more impersonal. As rational legal systems, in which lawyers make the law, come more widely to be adopted, the hold of sacred traditions and all forms of arbitrariness in law is loosened, and individuals contemplate their prospects with greater precision. Society grows more like a machine, the individual like a cog in that machine, and human actions come more and more to be rationally calculated. The individual gains a growing sense of control over life.iii There flow from this substantial consequences for religious understanding.

There is that famous 'disenchantment of the world'; Weber uses Schiller's term 'entzauberung', meaning literally 'the driving out of magic from things'. The human being no longer dwells in a great enchanted garden. To find direction, and to win security in this world and the next, the human being no longer needs either to revere or to coerce the spirits; there is no longer need to seek salvation through ritualistic, idolatrous or sacramental procedures.iv Human beings lose their sense of providence in life. 'Once upon a time', declares Owen Chadwick in surveying the secularization of the European mind, 'the wood was bewitched, and goblins and fair spirits dwelt in the trunks of trees and among the roots. But now the wood is administered by the Forestry Commission, and although romantic men may still hear a goblin running in the undergrowth and glimpse beauty behind a bush, they know when a subjective experience is subjective.'v
Closely associated with disenchantment there is a fragmentation of human understanding of the world. The development of science reveals how the world consists of natural and cultural processes; humans learn that a religious understanding of it is partial, indeed, subjective. The growth of a functionally differentiated society leads to the steady relegation of religion from public life; it is forced out of the realms of economic, political and even social conduct, and into the further recesses of private life in which its function is merely to interpret and to organize the relationship of the individual human being to the sacred. Thus, the unified vision, in which all human experience was understood through Christian revelation, is replaced by a fragmented vision in which no one set of values either embraces both public and private life, or is shared by citizens in their individual existences.\(^vi\)

This is Weber's path of secularization. From his sociology of the great religions he takes us down a path of disenchantment which culminates in the sociology of the intelligentsia, amongst whom, like as not, each human is a god unto his\(\text{\textquoteleft\textprime}\)herself.\(^vii\) We should note, nevertheless, that Weber's theory is regarded as offering only one possible perspective over secularization in the West. It does not explain, so Turner claims, the American case of immigration, religious revival and the secularization of theological content; nor does it account for the East European path of secularization from above.\(^viii\) Then, again, it does not satisfy those heirs of Comte and Durkheim who find religion deep-seated in humanity and in the consensus which makes up human society. They suspect those who talk of secularization of
presupposing some golden age in the past as compared with an over-secularized present; they feel they ignore a continuing interaction between Christian revelation and Western civilization, a continual working and reworking of the Christian message through the lives and minds, the societies and institutions of Western man.¹⁰

These reservations noted, let us see what Weber's theory can tell us about secularization in the Islamic world. Our evidence will be derived in the main from the Islamic world of South Asia, although we shall reach out, where appropriate, to seek parallels and comparisons elsewhere. Our approach will be founded on one adopted by Peter Berger. In exploring Weber's perspectives of disenchantment and fragmentation we shall use Berger's distinction between structural secularization, that is the evacuation of religion from society's institutions and its consequences, and subjective secularization, that is the evacuation of the religious from the consciousness of man and its consequences.¹¹

First, we consider structural secularization, the driving out of Islam from the frameworks of law, of knowledge, and of power in British India. In the case of law, we find that in the century which followed the 1770s the Islamic criminal and civil law was first encroached upon, and then replaced outright, by British codes of law. By the 1870s the Muslims of British India found that their Islamic law, the shari`a, accounted for no more than their personal law, that is the law relating to matters such as marriage, divorce and inheritance. Moreover, that law was no longer strictly Islamic in its rules of procedure but slowly
being reshaped, as Islamic doctrines of strict adherence to established authorities were set aside in favour of English doctrines of equity and binding precedent, by the procedures of that limited form of Weberian qadi-justice, the Anglo-Muhammadan law.\textsuperscript{xi} We can discern fragmentation in at least two senses. There was fragmentation between public and private worlds, between a public world ruled by law derived from the West, and a private world ruled by law derived from Islamic sources. There was also fragmentation between the world of the British courts, whether they applied the British codes of public law or the Anglo-Muhammadan personal law, and the world of the ulama, the traditionally learned men of Islam, who strove to offer as full guidance in the ways of the shari`a as they could. Beneath the framework of British justice the ulama sustained a limited system of Islamic legal guidance represented by institutions such as the Dar al-Ifta of the Deoband School and the Amir-i Shari`at organization of Phulwari Sharif, Bihar.\textsuperscript{xii}

In the case of learning, an entirely new system was erected, which owed nothing to Islam. The knowledge taught was knowledge which would enable men to work modern bureaucracy, it was not knowledge which would make God's revelation through Muhammad work more successfully in the world. The peaks of achievement in the new system were peaks of achievement in Western scholarship and science, which were usually reached in British universities, they were not peaks of achievement in tafsir (Quran commentary) or fiqh (jurisprudence) to be scaled in Cairo or an-Najaf. Education in Islamic knowledge was increasingly relegated to a minor position and increasingly became less relevant to the broad
purposes of society and state. Here, too, we can discern fragmentation. There were differences between government educational institutions, which taught Western knowledge in an anglicized environment, and Muslim institutions, like Aligarh College, which to some degree at least wished to hold Western knowledge within a Muslim cultural frame. There were greater differences between all such colleges, which produced swelling streams of trousered graduates able by and large to think in Western terms and to serve the purposes of Western civilization and the Islamic madrasas, which produced a dwindling stream, relatively at least, of turbaned graduates able to see the world only through the prism of revelation.xiii

In the case of power, the only association between Islam and power which remained after the British abolished Muslim judges, or qadis, in the 1860s was the Anglo-Muhammadan law. Nevertheless, there did develop an association between Muslims and power. At each stage, as the British slowly devolved power on Indians between 1909 and 1947, a separate Muslim political identity was further entrenched in the modern political framework they were fashioning for India. Muslims gained separate electorates; they gained guaranteed numbers of seats; and ultimately some won an Islamic state of Pakistan. We seem to witness in the first fifty years of twentieth-century British India that somewhat paradoxical process, which also took place in Victorian Britain, that while the disenchantment of learning and other institutions goes on apace the political importance of religious remains strong.xiv Of course, we can also find fragmentation in the wake of disenchantment. There was the
development of both a secular and a communal framework for politics within the colonial state. More significantly, there was the growth of a fundamental distinction between those Muslims for whom freedom meant removing the British and taking over the framework of the colonial state and its law, either in a secular India or in a Muslim Pakistan, and those Muslims for whom the only real form of freedom was the imposition of the shari`a, a true marriage between law derived from revelation and the machinery of the modern state.\textsuperscript{xv}

British India, therefore, reveals a moderate structural secularization; Islam was to various degrees disentangled from the frameworks of law, of learning and of power. Indeed, we might understand the situation best in terms of a kind of structural dualism. On the one hand, there was the developing fabric of the modern colonial state onto which, admittedly, some Muslim preferences had been imposed. On the other, there were the residual Islamic institutions of law and learning and the political vision which they fostered. By comparison, Turkey between the nineteenth-century reform period of the Tanzimat and the death of Ataturk had achieved a total disentangling of Islam from the frameworks of law, learning and power. But in Iran, up to the abdication of Riza Shah in 1941, or in Egypt, up to the Free Officers Revolution of 1952, we must talk more in terms of structural dualism along the lines of British India. Indeed, by the mid-twentieth century this was the pattern in most of the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{xvi}

We now turn to consider subjective secularization, the disentangling of the religious vision from the consciousness of
human beings. Here, too, we seem to be able to see the realization of a Weberian perspective. There seem to be processes of disenchantment in the emergence of a protestant or puritan Islam. This had its immediate origins in the great movement of revival and reform which swept through the Islamic world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Barbara Metcalf analyses one of its Indian manifestations in her study of the context and the emergence of the Deoband school in the second half of the nineteenth century. She notes the growth of Islamic practice based more firmly on the Quran, the Hadiths and the Shari`a. It is an Islam based on scripture; it is one which is rationalizing the sense of making religion self-conscious, systematic and based on abstract principles. Groups of Muslims come forward who, while they do not in the main reject saints and Islamic mysticism (sufism), increasingly see themselves as following religious practice which is different from that of the sufi shrines, indeed, they often define their Islam in contrast to the parochial forms of the shrines. Their's is a universal form in which Muslims all over India, indeed, all over the Muslim world, could share. It is one, moreover, whose growth and development is closely interwoven, as in the emergence of European protestantism, with the translation of scripture into the vernacular languages and the harnessing of the printing press to the spreading of religious knowledge.

Thus, there came to be established among the forms of Indian Islam a puritan form, which in its extreme manifestation of the Ahl-i Hadiths (People of the Traditions) was stripped to the bare essentials of Quran and Hadiths. These puritan Muslims began to
dispense with the great network of saints and ancestors through whom they once came close to God. They came to live less in a world penetrated through and through by sacred beings and forces. God was firmly transcendant and humans had no comfort, no guidance except God's revelation through Muhammad to help them live in this world so that they might be judged favourably in the next. These Muslims increasingly seemed to find the world a cold, bleak, disenchanted place. It is a process which in protestant Christianity many see to be preparing the way for secularization. Once the channels between humankind and God had been narrowed down to His Word, belief in God became dependent on the credibility of that Word. Once that credibility was undermined, the floodgates of secularization were open.\textsuperscript{xix}

We do not wish to suggest that the outcome for Islam will be the same, only that there are some similarities in the path travelled. For the moment, we would note that the emergence of a puritan Islam is not confined to India but is also to be found in other parts of the Islamic World. The closest parallel is probably the Muhammadiyah of Indonesia. A less close one is that of the Salafiyah of North Africa, whose assertion of the ideal of a reformed Islam as against that of a saintly Islam in the context of the urbanization of Algeria has been set out by Ernest Gellner in his somewhat misleadingly entitled essay, `The unknown Apollo of Biskra'. Some of the same drives and concerns, on the other hand, have also been expressed through the framework of a sufi order as in the case of the Nurcular of Turkey.\textsuperscript{xx}

If we can see disenchantment in the processes of subjective secularization, we can also see fragmentation and growing
conflict of world views. The very emergence of the new puritan Islam in the towns and qasbahs of nineteenth-century India led to bitter conflict with those for whom the world was still enchanted; it led to those endless battles over behaviour at saints' shrines which Deobandis and Barelvis have carried with them from India to Pakistan to the towns and cities of midlands and northern Britain.\textsuperscript{xxi} It also led to conflict, often no less, bitter, in letter, tract, newspaper and debate, among the reforming sects themselves. Then, there was further conflict between the various traditionalist groups and those called Islamic modernists. Islamic modernists grew from the same stock as the puritan traditionalists but strove somehow to hold elements of Western knowledge and understanding within an Islamic frame. Their line began with the great theological and historiographical efforts of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Aligarh movement. It moved through the crises of pan-Islamism from the late nineteenth century to the great Indian movement of 1919-24 to preserve the Turkish caliphate. Then it came to a peak, on the one hand in Abul Kalam Azad and the genesis of the idea of a composite Hindu-Muslim Indian nationalism as the political counterpart to a continuing Islamic universalism, and on the other hand in Muhammad Iqbal and the genesis of the idea of the Islamic state of Pakistan as the realistic answer to the political failure of Islamic universalism.\textsuperscript{xxii} Further development led to Fazlur Rahman, that most creative of Pakistani thinkers, who was once head of the Islamic Research Institute established under his country's constitution but whose challenging thought led him to die in exile on the shores of Lake Michigan.\textsuperscript{xxiii}
All these thinkers, whether traditionalist or modernist, understood the world within an Islamic frame. Their vision of world history was bound by Islam: the Quran was their starting point. But, there also came those who espoused visions which challenged Islam as an all-inclusive moral, social and political system, men whose understandings of the world were distinctly secular in a Western sense. There are those, like K.M. Ashraf and Sajjad Zaheer and other supporters of the Progressive Writers Movement of the 1930s and 1940s, who espoused a primarily socialist vision of progress. There are also those, both in India and in Pakistan, who have espoused a nationalist vision of past and future: there is Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's transient vision of five thousand years of Pakistani history; there is also Mushirul Hasan's vigorous advocacy on behalf of a secular nationalist future for India in general and India's Muslims in particular. For such men Islam is no longer the explanation of the beginning and end of things; it is just another form of culture.

This process of fragmentation and conflict, of the emergence of multiplying strands of conflicting thought among Muslims, which come eventually to include those that challenge Islam as total ideology, can be seen yet more distinctly in the world outside South Asia. Here the nationalism of Ataturk and Riza Shah Pahlavi stood both more confident and better developed. Here the socialism of Nasserite Egypt and Baathist Iraq was more fully thought through and realised. But here, of course, Islam was only threatened by Western domination from without, as opposed to the South Asian Muslim's fear of the pincer threat of Western
Thus, we find within the Islamic world much evidence of the growth of secularization along the lines that Weber traced in Christian Europe. Disenchantment and fragmentation takes place in structural terms; it also takes place in subjective terms. From almost any Western point of view the signs of secularization are plentiful. Yet, one reflection gives pause for thought about just how much weight we should attach to what we find. This secularization was a consequence of the projection of Western capital and power into the Islamic world from 1800 onwards. The steady disenchantment and fragmentation of the structures of law, learning and power was either the direct result of the impact of Western imperialism, as in British India, or as in Turkey and Iran the result of deliberate attempts to copy European ways and institutions to make the state strong enough to keep the foreigner out. These processes were in large part forced on Muslim societies from outside or imposed from above; they were only to some extent the result of new economic and social formations within these societies. We could, moreover, argue along similar lines in dealing with those Muslims who espouse secular ideologies which deny the all-inclusive vision of Islam. That they were able to espouse these ideologies seems mainly a function of the extent to which they were caught up within a web of Western economic influence, power and thought. They embraced a Western secularism rather than developing an Islamic one.

Some might counter this reflection by pointing to those processes of religious change in the recent Islamic past which bear comparison with similar processes in Christian history. We
think of that development of a Muslim puritanism out of the internal dynamics of Islamic civilization which developed a modernist aspect as it came into contact with the West. There are certainly aspects of rationalization here, aspects of Weberian disenchantment and fragmentation. But they do not seem as yet to threaten to undermine the Islamic world view from within. Indeed, these processes seem more aspects of religious change, a reduction in the sufi element in Islam and an increasing emphasis on the law. They seem as much spurs to find a new relationship between revelation and history as a notable manifestation of secularization within an Islamic environment. It may be that this is in large part because Muslims have contemplated the meaning of Western knowledge in the context of overwhelming Western power, which has made it particularly difficult critically to explore their own world and to risk turning it upside down. More time, perhaps, is needed. On the other hand, it may be that there are limits to what a theory of secularization derived from the experience of the Christian world can tell us about religious change in the Islamic world.

So we turn from exploring the potential of Weber's theory of secularization in the Islamic context to considering the problem of secularization in Islamic terms, in fact, to considering the problem as Weber might have done, in terms of the unique `developmental history' of Islam, that is, in terms of the development of Islam as a form of rationalization of world views. xxvi We start from the position that the orientation of Islam to the world is different from that of Christianity, and thus its
pattern of development will be so too. As Weber suggests, Islam is particularly concerned with this world. It is much more concerned with how men behave than with what they believe, in fact, all that they need believe is contained in the one sentence of the *shahada*, the confession of faith. In most of its fundamental rituals Islam concentrates on the creation and support of a community of believers on earth. There is to be communal prayer, communal fasting, alms-giving to support the community, pilgrimage to affirm the community. Indeed, a Muslim life is primarily significant as being lived as part of the community, that best community, as the Quran declares, raised up for men. A prime function of the community is to support the power which will enforce the *shari`a*. This is ideally, though not wholly in fact, the distilled essence of the Quran and the life of the Prophet which offers guidance for every aspect of human life. It is ideally, and certainly in fact, the constitution of the Muslim community, as Gibb describes it, which stands 'for all that the Constitution stands for the United States of America and more [check]' . It embodies both the patterns of behaviour which the Muslim should strive to realize in his own life and the patterns of behaviour which the state should try to impose upon him. Muslim society is Islamic to the extent that it follows the *shari`a*. Muslim states are Islamic to the extent that they support the *shari`a*. Here we have a possible criterion of secularization in Islamic societies and states; if they are Islamic to the extent to which the *shari`a* is followed and applied then they are secular to the extent that it is not followed and applied.
Let us see what we can learn if we use this criterion in the case of South Asia. We have already noted that by the 1870s the application of the shari’a in British India had been reduced to the personal law, and that in its distorted Anglo-Muhammadan form. Nevertheless, there were important developments in its shape and in its support up to the mid-twentieth century. Throughout the history of Islam in South Asia, as in that of other Muslim societies, the shari’a had tolerated the continuing existence of customary laws, the non-Islamic laws of new, and not so new, entrants to the Islamic milieu. But, by the time of the Shariat Application Act of 1937, almost all toleration of these customary laws came to an end. As far as their personal lives were concerned, Indian Muslims lived under the shari’a alone.

Then, in the past, the reach of the state, particularly into rural communities, had always been limited; so had been its capacity to apply the law. But the superior machinery of the colonial state, and later of the national states of India and Pakistan, was able to bring the shari’a much closer to the lives of each individual Muslim. By the mid-twentieth century Muslim personal law, that point where the Quran is most explicit, that point where Muslims feel, in Anderson’s telling phrase, that the shari’a partakes most intimately in the very warp and woof of their lives, had come to be more completely applied than ever before in South Asia. Similar developments can be traced in Malaysia and Indonesia, for instance, and even in Saudi Arabia.

If we now turn to examine how the shari’a might have been followed, it seems that, up to the eighteenth century, although
many knew they were Muslims, not so many knew how to behave as the holy law might direct. Islamic knowledge, knowledge of what Muslims should and should not do, was hard to come by. We know, as Bulliet, Geertz, Eaton and many others have demonstrated, that through much of the Islamic world the process of Islamization, the patterning of society after some version of the shari`a, has been painfully slow. Many centuries divide the first confession of faith from the wide mastery of the scriptural tradition. We also know that the early nineteenth century movements of revival and reform in Kerala, in Bengal, and in Northern India, all suggest how large the gap was between the practice of rural and even qasbah society and the preference of an alert, reforming Islam. But the nineteenth and twentieth centuries have seen unprecedented drives, fuelled by continuing movements of reform, by vast increases in the availability of Islamic knowledge, and by favourable economic and social changes, which have brought Muslims to live lives closer to the shari`a. Just as the application of the personal law by the state is more rigorous and more widespread than before, so equally is knowledge of the shari`a, and perhaps the following of it, in Indo-Muslim society at large. This, too, is not a development confined to South Asia. It is also expressed, for instance, in the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood throughout much of the Middle East, and, in spite of the determinedly secular face of the Turkish state, or perhaps because of it, in the extraordinary thirst for Islamic knowledge among the Turkish people in recent times. It is, in fact, a feature of the late-twentieth century revival of Islam that has touched every Muslim society.
We are left with contrasting perspectives. If we take that derived from Weber's theory of secularization, it does seem that Indo-Muslim society, indeed Muslim societies in general, has advanced some way down the path of disenchantment and fragmentation, the path of secularization. But, if we respect the integrity of the 'developmental history' of Islam as a rationalization of world views, we have a picture which is more complex. Certainly, the exercise of European power in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries drove the shari`a out of the public and into the private sphere of Muslim life. Certainly, it undermined the Islamic world view of Muslim elites. Yet, on the other hand, the modern state and the modern technology, which the European brought, helped to draw many Muslims closer to the shari`a than before. In recent times, moreover, the retreat of the European, and some failures of the state machinery left behind, have often been accompanied by a reassertion of Islamic world view and a reinstatement of the shari`a in public life. A continuing process of islamization, following Weber's understanding of developmental history, seems as notable a feature of recent Islamic developments, as one of secularization, following Weber's theory of secularization.

*****

Reviewing the argument of this essay some thirteen years after it was first written, and in the light of recent developments in the Muslim world, there is an additional reflection. We have noted above that in terms of the unique developmental history of Islam the faith was particularly concerned with this world. This is, of course, true if it is
approached in a sense that veers in an orientalist/essentialist direction. But, if we consider the effective practice of Islam in many societies over much of the past 1400 years, it has had powerful other-worldly dimensions. Most believers have attended saints' shrines and implored the saint to intercede for them with God.

The great event of Islamic history over the past two hundred years has been the attack by the movement of revival and reform on all ideas of saintly intercession for humankind with God and the new emphasis on the this-worldly dimension of the faith. The many movements of Islamic reassertion have been, and are, impelled by the consciousness of the need to act in this world to achieve salvation. There is evidence that these manifestations of `willed Islam' have come to develop new strands in Muslim consciousness that bear resemblance to similar outgrowths of European protestantism. There is a new sense of empowerment that comes with the knowledge that it is humanity that fashions the world. There is a new sense of personal autonomy and individual possibility that comes with the knowledge that individuals are able to make choices. There is a steady transfer of the symbols and centres of meaning in life from the signs of God and the friends of God to the mundane things of life - family, home, love, sex, food. There is the `inward turn' as the individual comes to examine and to reflect upon the self. In sum the individual becomes more and more focused on earthly activity and earthly fulfilment.

If we take Islam as widely practised through time as the basis of our understanding of the developmental history of Islam,
strands are emerging which would appear to point in similar directions to those of protestant Christianity. We recognise, of course, that the new individualism derives some of its impetus from the influence of the West as well as having firm roots in this-worldly Islam. This said, there is growing tension between demands for individual fulfilment and the requirements of obligation to community, a tension felt most acutely in many Muslim societies by women. It is worth considering whether this tension may not be at the cusp of a process of secularization in Muslim societies.

Footnotes

i. The first draft of this paper was given at the conference on Weber and Islam held under the auspices of the Werner-Reimers-Stiftung, Bad Homburg, in June 1984. I am particularly grateful for comments made then and later by Professors Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter. This version of the paper is in large part the same as that originally published in German, except for minor changes in the text to bring it up to date and some additions to the supporting notes.

ii. It is important to emphasize that Weber's theory of secularization sees the process as an historical one. It is not a model, or ideal type, like patrimonialism, feudalism, or charismatic domination, which is meant to be applicable in different places and at many times.


vii. This broad sweep is outlined by Guenther Roth in "Religion and Revolutionary Beliefs" in Guenther Roth and Wolfgang Schluchter, *Max Weber's Vision of History: Ethics and Methods* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 166.


xii. Tahir Mahmood, Muslim Personal Law: Role of the State in the Subcontinent (New Delhi: Vikas, 1977) 67-69; at the end of its first one hundred years the Dar al-Ifta of Deoband reckoned that it had issued 269,215 legal decisions - the work of this office and the nature of its decisions are discussed in Barbara Daly Metcalf, Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband, 1860-1900 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), 146-54.

xiii. Two excellent books enable us to enter these very different worlds under British rule: David S. Lelyveld, Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1978), and Metcalf, Islamic Revival.


xv. Aspects of these attitudes are dealt with by Francis Robinson


xx. For a local study of this development in Indonesia see, Mitsuo Nakamura, *The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: a study of the Muhammadiyah movement in a central Javanese town


xxiii. Fazlur Rahman was professor of Islamic thought in the department of Near Easter Languages and Civilization at the University of Chicago. The final statement of his thinking was *Islam and modernity: transformation of an intellectual tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).


xxv. One attempt to develop Bhutto's vision was Ahmed Abdulla, *The Historical Background of Pakistan and its People* (Karachi: Tanzeem Publishers, 1973); Hasan's advocacy appears most powerfully in Mushirul Hasan, *Legacy of a Divided Nation: India's Muslims since independence* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997).
xxvi. Guenther Roth has shown how fruitful it is to see Max Weber as a `developmental' historian working amongst other German developmental historians who competed hotly with each other. "Developmental History" in Max Weber's time and work', unpublished paper.


xxxiii. Metcalf emphasizes the difficulties which even ulama experienced in finding books in the days when they were reproduced by hand and consequently the great change made by the


xxxvii. This argument is developed in Francis Robinson, "Religious Change, the Self and Community in Muslim South Asia since 1800", *South Asia* (forthcoming).