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The volume focuses on three main themes, that is, three different but often complementary ways of conceiving memory and remembering, and tries to analyse how these representative patterns recur in the history of philosophy. The first pattern – formalised in Plato’s *Theaetetus*, reprised by Aristotle and (although polemically) by the Stoics, and finally newly evoked in the modern theories of the engramma – compares the soul to a wax block and memorisation to an imprint in the wax, that is an impression. The second looks at memory as an act of writing (and of drawing, too), which historically has opened the field both to the assertion of the ‘propositional’ nature of memory (Plato’s *Philebus*, Aristotle, Plotinus) and to the idea that memory functions as a store of images. The third theme is that concerning the intentionality or passivity of memory and also the relationship between soul and body, since arguing for intentionality has often been the first step (in Plotinus, for example, and also in Descartes and Spinoza) towards representing the soul as partially or totally autonomous and as something distinct or differentiated from the body.

To sum up, this book is to be welcomed as a valuable source for classicists and philosophers as well as for all those interested in the history of ideas, both for the accuracy of its textual analyses, and for the openness and originality of its interpretative approach.

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K. is a moral philosopher with a long-standing interest in Aristotle; his recent books on pride and jealousy (2002), and on justice-based emotions (2006), have a strong Aristotelian flavor. This book, according to the Introduction (Chapter 1), aims to contribute to the field of ‘values education’, especially the ‘character education’ and ‘social and emotional learning’ trends that are strong particularly in the USA. K. argues that, while many in the field pay lip service to Aristotelian inspiration, there is much muddled thinking about Aristotle’s actual views on child rearing, moral education and the place of emotions in the educational programme. K. takes at face value moral educators’ desire for genuine Aristotelian grounding, and aims to show what Aristotle can (and cannot) contribute, in general strongly recommending him as a guide.

The following ten chapters examine specific issues: (2) the moral education of children; (3) whether one can develop *phronêsis* merely through habituation; (4) whether any emotions should be eradicated; (5) whether, and how, one should teach children to feel justified anger; (6) to what extent proponents of Emotional Intelligence can cite Aristotle in support; (7) whether emulation (of role models, or desirable character traits) is pedagogically a useful emotion; (8) whether parents and children can be true character friends; (9) whether generosity/charity is an Aristotelian virtue; (10) the extent to which agreeableness, manners and morality overlap; and (11) whether teaching is a *praxis*.

K. starts each chapter with an ‘Assumption’ that purports to be an amalgam of typical muddled thinking. For instance (Chapter 2): “Aristotle does not really provide a coherent conception of childhood. He offers no systematic theory of moral development, and his idea of moral virtue is based solely on self-control: teaching children to flex their will-power muscles” (p. 15). To someone like the present reader not familiar with the above-mentioned pedagogical movements, it is hard to know to what extent these ‘Assumptions’ are straw men. However, even if they are an authorial conceit, they do usefully indicate the ground each chapter aims to cover. K. typically proceeds by drawing out relevant themes from (mostly) the *Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, before moving on to give modern scholars’ views, and arguing against these and for his own conception, finally concluding each chapter ‘Assumption X is wrong’. Some chapters contain considerably more Aristotle than others: 2–5 and 7–8 will be of most interest to classicists.

Several chapters, however, seem almost to abandon Aristotle for extended critiques of modern scholars (e.g. Goleman, pp. 83–97, Kupfer, pp. 116–22). K.’s method of critique is frequently to group scholars into schools, label them, and then dismiss their arguments by means of the label. For instance, having stated (p. 157) that there are ‘three neo-Aristotelian sub-perspectives’ in ‘educational circles’ – the *ethos* perspective, the *logos* perspective (both dismissed in a paragraph), and the *phronêsis-praxis* perspective (PPP) – he concludes, ‘The advocates of the PPP try to
Establish an anti-realist, non-foundationalist, perspectivist account of education and educational theory with reference to a philosopher whose epistemology and methodology are unabashedly realist, foundationalist (naturalist) and cosmopolitan (p. 162).

In the Introduction K. states: ‘I do not pretend to be a classics expert, let alone an Aristotelian scholar, and my goals are not exegetical: I have unearthed no new readings of Greek texts or hit upon novel interpretations that are destined to shake the classics world. I rely on existing translations …’ (p. 5). K. here neatly encapsulates (presumably to neutralise) several obvious criticisms of the book, reflecting aspects that do limit its usefulness to classical scholars. Classicists are also hampered by the Index, which is mostly a list of modern scholars’ names. ‘Education’ is not listed; ‘emotions’ is wrongly inset, so easy to miss; and ‘Aristotle’ is followed by ‘1–280’, which is neither helpful nor accurate. The book will be of most use (in the Classics world) to undergraduates, or scholars approaching the subject for the first time and wanting an overview of relevant issues.

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P.’s book is a new edition of the treatise Ἰππί συντάξεως preserved in the Coisl. 345, a tenth-century parchment manuscript well known to scholars familiar with ancient and Byzantine lexicography. The treatise, which was first edited by I. Bekker in Anecdota Graeca I (Berlin, 1814), pp. 117–80, is an alphabetical lexicon about verbs requiring a genitive, dative or accusative construction; each item is equipped with more or less substantial quotations from classical and Christian authors. Many of them, including several fragments from lost books of Cassius Dio’s Roman History, are otherwise unattested, and the lexicon is thus a useful tool for the transmission of some Greek authors. The volume contains: (1) the Introduction (pp. xiii–lxxxix); (2) the edition (pp. 1–110); (3) various indexes (pp. 111–23); (4) an Appendix (pp. 125–51), where P. prints for the first time the most relevant items of two other lexica, Syntacticum Parisinum and Syntacticum Vindobonense, which are closely related to our text.

The Introduction aims to cover essential topics in three chapters: Chapter 1 focusses on work, author, sources, and place and date of composition. The discussion is sound and well arranged. Even if Constantinople is not to be ruled out, P. is inclined to set the making of the lexicon at Gaza between 600 and 625 (before the Arabic conquest). She rightly stresses the importance of the quotations from Gazaean rhetors such as Choricius and Procopius. In particular, the lexicon is the sole authority for quotations from otherwise unknown profane works of Procopius; this might well imply a close acquaintance with such texts. Chapter 2 is a painstaking inquiry into the quotations from Demosthenes, Isocrates and Thucydides in comparison with the direct tradition. In this section P. lists MSS and modern editions, but sometimes references are regrettably out of date and not always reliable: for example, on p. lv Pal. Heid. gr. 252 is wrongly dated to the tenth–eleventh centuries, instead of the end of the ninth century (M.J. Luzzatto, Tzetzes lettore di Tucidide [Bari, 1999], p. 11). Furthermore, it would have been helpful to focus on the importance of this lexicon for the indirect tradition of other authors such as Lysias: seven out of nine Lysian quotations derive from lost speeches and are not attested elsewhere. One can infer that the lexicographer relied on a Lysian corpus more complete than ours. Chapter 3 is devoted to studying the relationship between our lexicon and other syntactic treatises, namely (i) a lexicon largely attested in many manuscripts and christened by P. ‘lexicon Ἀγορασμῶν’ (from its first lemma); (ii) the syntactic section in the Στίχοι τῆς γραμματικῆς attributed to Nicetas of Heraclea (eleventh–twelfth century); for the latter, however, it would have been useful to quote another similar excerpt by way of comparison, which is still unpublished and probably by the same author (B. Roosen, Byzantion 69 [1999], 119–44: 128).

P.’s text improves on Bekker’s in many respects; it is supplied with two updated and generous apparatuses (loqui similes and variant readings/modern conjectures). Problems arise with editorial practice: P. makes much use of erases and angled brackets, especially in the classical quotations.