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episode of unmediated intuition, but in being a conflict-free grasp of the whole structure of reality. While this reading is extremely attractive, I remain unclear as to whether the author maintains that the form of the Good is identical with the intelligible structure of reality, or merely whether understanding the former is necessary and/or sufficient for understanding the latter. Whatever the answer to that question, this is a very substantial piece of work.

In contrast, the Aristotle section has more thematic unity, in that each of the four papers deals with a central topic of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, specifically the doctrine of the mean (Christoph Rapp), the relation of Aristotle’s ethics to political science (Gisela Striker), the virtue of *epieikeia*, including a judicious discussion of the role of generalisation in Aristotle’s ethics (Christoph Horn), and the benefits of virtue (Jan Szaif). The last-mentioned essay includes excellent discussions of altruism and of the difficulty of reconciling Aristotle’s claim that the virtuous person chooses good actions for their own sake with the argument of 1171b1–26 that political activity is less valuable than *theôria* because the former is undertaken only for ends external to it, and is therefore ‘unleisured’. All these contributions display close knowledge of the texts and a high degree of analytic acuity. As it happens, all four authors are German, three currently teaching at German universities; the study of Aristotle’s ethics is clearly in a very healthy state in Germany.

Professor Frede’s work on Hellenistic philosophy is appropriately honoured by the two articles on Epicureanism, by David Konstan on the passions and Susanne Bobzien on moral responsibility. Both are lucid and learned works, which maintain the high standard of the volume.

The articles are complemented by an honorific preface, a useful thematic introduction, index locorum, general index, general bibliography and bibliography of Professor Frede’s writings. It is an excellent piece of editing; I noticed no misprints. (In addition, it has a delightful emblematic picture on the dust-jacket.) It is a sign of the times that though the honorand, the Editor and five of the eleven contributors are German, the entire book, including the editorial matter, is in English, and is published in the UK. This suggests that the humanities are moving towards the situation which already obtains in the natural sciences, where work intended for an international readership is published exclusively in English, other languages being for domestic use only. That development may be inevitable (and is certainly convenient for native Anglophones), but the cultural uniformity which it threatens is not altogether to be welcomed.

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**GREEK EMOTION**


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Konstan has been lecturing and publishing regularly and increasingly on ancient Greek emotions for at least the last fifteen years. This book is a natural culmination in
which, with considerable success and panache, he develops that work into a coherent whole. The book begins with an extensive introduction outlining the major modern controversies in emotion studies. One of the most important is whether emotions should be considered universal or culturally specific. K. argues that, while in general there is much overlap between individual emotion terms in ancient Greek and modern English, because emotions are based on a way of looking at the world, ultimately the parameters of an emotion must be unique to a culture. He makes an instructive comparison with colour words: the Greeks would have had the same visible spectrum as we do, but they described those colours differently; for instance, we might variously translate *glaukos* as ‘blue-green’, ‘pale blue’, or ‘gray’. Similarly, Aristotle splits our anger into two Greek emotions (*orgê* for response to a slight, *to nemesan* for response to an injustice), but collapses our shame and guilt into a single concept. K.’s approach is fundamentally philological: he insists throughout that, instead of assuming ancient Greek emotions map easily on to their modern English equivalents, one must examine carefully the boundaries of the Greek terminology used.

A parallel controversy is the dispute between what K. terms ‘neo-Darwinists’ and ‘cognitivists’ on the nature of emotions. Following the work of Darwin in the late nineteenth century, ‘neo-Darwinists’ focus on the reflex responses (e.g. facial expression, flushing) that express an emotion. The ‘cognitivist’ approach dates from the 1970s, with scholars overturning the post-Cartesian opposition between reason and emotion, arguing instead that emotions are best understood as judgements based on cognitive evaluations. K. argues that these schools of thought are not irreconcilable, as an emotion is made up of both stimulus and response, while each school concentrates on only one. However, he firmly aligns his own work with the ‘cognitivists’, though arguing with Aristotle that judgements are ‘strongly conditioned by the social environment’ (p. 22), and that, at least in the archaic and classical periods, ancient Greek emotions are best understood as ‘responses … to actions, or situations resulting from actions, that entail consequences for one’s own or others’ relative social standing’ (p. 40).

This emphasis on the socially reactive aspect of emotions pervades and informs the remaining eleven chapters, respectively on: anger; satisfaction; shame; envy and indignation; fear; gratitude; love; hatred; pity; jealousy; and grief. The book is mainly concerned with the emotions Aristotle gives socio-psychological analyses for in the *Rhetoric* (though for expository reasons they are discussed in a different order). The greater part of each chapter contains a detailed, and consistent, analysis of the phenomena Aristotle deals with, and the vocabulary used to describe them. K. is highly sensitive to nuances of different words used to express subtly different concepts. The chapters typically go on to compare K.’s interpretation of Aristotle’s emotions with their depiction in a wide range of Greek literature, especially in Homer, tragedy, oratory and Hellenistic philosophy. There is insufficient space in this review to discuss all eleven chapters, but a subset will be representative.

K. argues against the usual translation of ‘kindness’ for the emotion discussed in *Rhet.* 2.7, on the grounds that for Aristotle an emotion can only be a reaction to a cognitive stimulus, not a general disposition. He demonstrates persuasively that the emotion treated is not *kharis* (best translated ‘favour’ or ‘benefaction’, rather than ‘kindness’), but *kharin ekhein*, or ‘gratitude’ for a favour rendered; *kharizesthai* and *akharistein* at the end of Aristotle’s chapter are respectively translated ‘doing favours’ and ‘acting ungratefully’.
K.’s proposition that ‘satisfaction’ is a more appropriate translation of prao̱tēs than the traditional ‘calming down’, is less persuasive. He argues that Aristotle’s system leaves scope for ‘a pleasurable response to a gesture that enhances one’s status or self-esteem’ (p. 89), as an opposite to anger being a painful response to a slight; whether or not there is such scope, it is not clear that prao̱tēs is that emotion: ‘satisfaction’ works well for some parts of Rhet. 2.3, but ‘calming down’ better for others. In any event (as K. notes elsewhere), the opposite of a pain is not consistently a pleasure in Aristotle: pity is a response to someone’s undeserved bad fortune, and indignation a response to their undeserved good fortune; these emotions are described as opposites, but both are painful. Aristotle’s ‘system’ does not seem quite as neat as K. might like.

K. devotes one chapter to Aristotle’s two emotions to nemesan (‘indignation’) and phthonos (‘envy’). He argues that the interpretation of the archaic nemesis as an indignant response to a rupture of social norms, fell in the classical period within the (wider) purview of phthonos. As K. demonstrates, nemesis is barely used in the classical period outside Aristotle, who resurrected it to describe justified indignation. However, the usual oratorical word for this is orgē; only occasionally is it called phthonos. This is a rare instance in which Aristotle shows himself significantly out of sympathy with contemporary literary usage.

K.’s case that the modern English and ancient Greek repertoires of emotions are not wholly in sync, is most effectively demonstrated by his chapter on jealousy, an emotion Aristotle does not treat. It becomes clear that this is because the emotion, as we understand it, did not even exist in ancient Greece. Greeks could express an emotion representing a desire for exclusivity within a sexual relationship, an emotion that could be termed zelotypia from the fourth century B.C.E.; but K. painstakingly demonstrates that the Greeks (whether Hera, Medea or Eratosthenes’ murderer) did not feel pain at the alienation of someone’s affection. K. speculates that such an emotion was not possible until women had equal status to men, and equal right to a chronic emotional attachment; accordingly an emotion similar to our jealousy does not appear in ancient literature until the odes of Horace. This is K.’s strongest, and most thought-provoking, challenge to our tendency to think of our own emotional repertoire as natural and universal.

This book is a pleasure to read. K. is never less than informed and incisive, and never afraid to be iconoclastic. He is clearly highly familiar with both the wide variety of ancient and medieval commentary on the emotions, and the modern, multi-disciplinary explosion of scholarship in the field, especially in the last 30 years, and this emerges most clearly in the copious endnotes (referring to scholarship in at least seven languages), and extensive bibliography. This reviewer missed a chapter on zēlos (a curious omission), and wondered whether chapters on jealousy and grief were included mainly because the author had something valuable to say (it is unclear why these should be singled out from all the emotions Aristotle does not treat). But these are minor quibbles about a major intellectual achievement. This book is a ‘must read’ for any classicist (and indeed non-classicist) interested in the emotions, and no serious scholar in the field will want to be without a copy.

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