Holocaust Memory for the Millennium

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I Larissa Allwork, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: L.F. Allwork    Date: 15/09/2011
Abstract

*Holocaust Memory for the Millennium* fills a significant gap in existing Anglophone case studies on the political, institutional and social construction of the collective memory of the Holocaust since 1945 by critically analyzing the causes, consequences and ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional context for understanding the Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (26th January-28th January 2000). This conference was a global event, with ambassadors from 46 nations present and attempted to mark a defining moment in the inter-cultural construction of the political and institutional memory of the Holocaust in the United States of America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Israel. This analysis is based on primary documentation from the London (1997) and Washington (1998) restitution conferences; Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research primary sources; speeches and presentations made at the Stockholm International Forum 2000; oral history interviews with a cross-section of British delegates to the conference; contemporary press reports, as well as pre-existing scholarly literature on the history, social remembrance and political and philosophical implications of the perpetration of the Holocaust and genocides. It is through the mediation of these interdisciplinary sources that, *Holocaust Memory for the Millennium* explores the inter-relationships between the global and the national, offering a specifically British political, cultural and historical perspective on the organization, implementation, impact as well as ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional context for the Stockholm International Forum 2000. For this was a conference of global significance, which simultaneously promoted the remembrance of the Holocaust as a specific historical event, as well as drawing attention to the ‘universal’ lessons of the Jewish catastrophe for a contemporary world still wracked by the anguished political, legal, philosophical and above all, human questions posed by the continuing recurrence of genocide at the dawn of the twenty-first century.
# Contents

**Acknowledgements** 5

**Abbreviations** 7

**Preface: Terms and Definitions** 8

**Introduction: Holocaust Memory for the Millennium** 12

Chapter 1: “Money ought not to be the last memory of the Holocaust”: The Historical Context for the Stockholm International Forum (2000). 44


**Conclusion** 311

**Bibliography** 327
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**Abbreviations**

Some of the most commonly cited abbreviations used throughout this thesis are:

- **AROE**  *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Raphael Lemkin, 1944)
- **AWG**  ITF Academic Working Group
- **EU**  European Union
- **EWG**  ITF Education Working Group
- **HMD**  Holocaust Memorial Day, usually preceded by a country, eg. UK HMD.
- **HMGA**  *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age* (Levy and Sznaider, 2002)
- **HMM**  *Holocaust Memory for the Millennium*
- **ICC**  International Criminal Court
- **IMT**  International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg
- **ITF**  Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research
- **IWM**  Imperial War Museum, London, UK.
- **LCNG**  London Conference on Nazi Gold
- **LJCC**  London Jewish Cultural Centre
- **MMWG**  ITF Memorials and Museums Working Group
- **NATO**  North Atlantic Treaty Organization
- **OSCE**  Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe
- **OT**  *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (Hannah Arendt, 1951)
- **QGG**  *The Question of German Guilt* (Karl Jaspers, 1947)
- **RH**  *Rethinking the Holocaust* (Yehuda Bauer, 2001)
- **UNDHR**  United Nations Declaration on Human Rights
- **UNGC**  United Nations Genocide Convention
- **USHMM**  United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
- **WCHA**  Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets
- **WJRO**  World Jewish Restitution Organization
Terms and Definitions

In this historical analysis of the causes, consequences and intellectual context for understanding the Stockholm International Forum 2000 (SIF 2000), the term ‘Holocaust’ refers to the Nazi regime and its collaborators mass murder of almost six million Jews in the ghettos, concentration camps and extermination sites of Nazi occupied Europe and the Soviet Union during the Second World War.¹ As Gerd Korman has noted it was not until 1957-1959 that the Third Reich’s extreme physical, spiritual and cultural assault on the Jews was widely referred to as the ‘Holocaust’,² a word from an ancient Greek translation of Hebrew Scripture meaning a sacred, burnt offering to God.³ Prior to this time, Jewish communities across the globe had used a number of different terms to refer to the ‘Holocaust’ or Nazi Germany and its collaborators mass murder of six million Jews. For example, in American Jewish communities between 1945 and 1962, Hasia R. Diner has observed a diversity of names including, ‘the Six Million’, ‘the Great Catastrophe’, ‘the Concentration Camps’ and the ‘Hitler Holocaust’.⁴ Furthermore, in Yiddish, the Nazi mass murder of Jewry was often called the ‘Hurban’ (‘the Destruction’) or ‘Hitler Zeiten’ (‘Hitler Times’) whilst in Hebrew it was named ‘Sheshet Hamillionim’ (‘the Six Million’) or the Biblical term

‘Shoah’ was used.\(^5\)

Whilst the word ‘Holocaust’ will be used to specifically describe the Jewish catastrophe perpetrated by the Germans and their collaborators, this thesis will also place the Third Reich’s murderous racial anti-Semitism within the context of the Nazi regime’s broader racial ideology and atrocity crimes. These atrocity crimes included the systematic mass murder of handicapped individuals’ designated racial ‘life unworthy of life’ during the Aktion T4 ‘Euthanasia’ campaign.\(^6\) The mass racial killing of what Ian Hancock has named the Porrajmos of Europe’s Roma and Sinti populations in among other killing sites Auschwitz-Birkenau and Chelmno.\(^7\) Furthermore, the Third Reich’s atrocity crimes also included the mass executions and deaths through brutal conditions of Soviet Prisoners of War; the aggressive ‘Germanization’ of native populations in Nazi occupied territories such as Poland, the Baltic States and the Ukraine,\(^8\) as well as the incarceration in concentration camps and even death through neglect and mistreatment of political dissidents (Communists, social democrats, trade unionists), Jehovah’s Witnesses and homosexuals.\(^9\) Finally, there was also the suffering of foreign workers from the Nazi occupied territories in the East who were pressed into service as forced and slave labor for the Third Reich’s industrial and military requirements.\(^\text{10}\)

\(^5\) Diner, *We Remember with Reverence and with Love*, p. 22. In the Hebrew Bible, the word ‘Shoah’ referred to the consequences of a natural disaster such as a flood or an earthquake. However, by the mid-1940s and not un-controversially it had come to mean ‘annihilation’, ‘destruction’ or ‘catastrophe’ in Israeli public discussions of Nazi anti-Semitic atrocities. See Stuart Liebman, ‘Introduction’, in Claude Lanzmann’s Shoah: Key Essays, ed. Stuart Liebman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 7.


\(^\text{10}\) Ulrich Herbert, *Hitler’s Foreign Worker Enforced Foreign Labor in Germany under the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Although a controversial issue and subject to recalculation as more evidence emerges from the archives, Michael Berenbaum, has cited the following
However, this is by no means an exhaustive list of those who suffered Nazi persecution. Recent research by scholars at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (USHMM) in archives from the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia have also suggested that the Nazi collaborationist and fascist Ustasa regime was responsible for the murder of between 330,000 and 390,000 Serbs, approximately 26,000 Roma and 32,000 Jews, a figure that does not include those Jews who were deported to the extermination camps in Nazi occupied Poland. Furthermore, the Ustasa also persecuted and murdered political dissenters of Croatian descent as well as Bosniaks (Bosnian-Muslims) for religious and political reasons.¹¹

The second term to be used extensively in this thesis is ‘Genocide’. Ratified in 1951, the United Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC) defines ‘genocide’ as the intent to destroy national, racial, ethnic or religious groups in whole or in part through killing and other forms of physical or mental assault. The UNGC also defines ‘genocide’ as the prevention of births within a group as well as the infliction of living conditions on a collective that are designed to bring about that group’s destruction.¹² In line with this, the Third Reich and its collaborators can be called perpetrators of ‘genocide’ in their efforts to destroy collectives in whole or in part, such as, but not necessarily limited to, figures in relation to the Third Reich’s estimated number of victims in The World Must Know: The History of the Holocaust as Told in the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2007): Approximately 200,000-250,000 German, Soviet and Polish individuals were murdered in the T4 campaign (p. 61); an estimated 90,000-220,000 of Europe’s Roma and Sinti were brutally killed (p. 126); approximately 2-3 million Soviet prisoners of war perished (p. 125); up to 5000 German male homosexuals were imprisoned and maltreated in the German concentration camps, whilst approximately 7 million foreign workers from the eastern occupied territories were made to perform forced or slave labor for the Third Reich. However, the number of Roma and Sinti victims cited by Berenbaum has been contested by Porrajmos scholar Ian Hancock, who has proposed that between half and 1.5 million Roma and Sinti were murdered. Furthermore, Hancock has stated that he believes this to be a conservative estimate. See Hancock, ‘Romanies and the Holocaust: A Re-evaluation and Overview’, p. 392.


the Jews, the Roma and the Poles. Furthermore, whilst the UNGC is problematic in its exclusion of political groups, in its omission of the categories of ‘cultural’ genocide and ‘developmental’ genocide as well as in its failure to prevent the perpetration of genocides since 1951,13 this thesis will use the UNGC’s definition of ‘genocide’ on the grounds that although flawed, this categorization of ‘genocide’ continues to be recognized as a cornerstone of international law on the punishment and prevention of the destruction of collectives in whole or in part.

The final set of terms to be used throughout this thesis relate to post-conflict issues of compensation for survivors of mass atrocities. Within this context, cultural studies scholar, Elazar Barkan has observed that the term ‘apology’ denotes a declaration of misconduct by the agencies responsible as well as an admission of duty by these agencies to make amends to the victims.14 Furthermore, in strict legal terms, ‘restitution’ refers to attempts to return confiscated or looted property, whilst ‘reparations’ denotes a type of material compensation for losses which cannot be restored, such as human lives and a group’s culture and identity.15 However, like Barkan, this thesis will not always use the term ‘restitution’ in the strict legal sense but rather as an indicator of collective political, institutional and cultural efforts to apologize, restitute and provide reparations to the victims of mass atrocities. For whilst these mechanisms of restitution can never redeem past injustices, if efficiently and fairly implemented they can help survivors rebuild their lives after catastrophe.16

13 See Chapter 5 of this thesis for more detail on the UNGC.
15 Ibid., p. xix.
16 Ibid., p. xix.
Introduction

Holocaust Memory for the Millennium

Anglophone case studies on the political, institutional and social construction of collective memories of the Holocaust since 1945 currently lack a critical examination of the causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for interpreting the Stockholm International Forum on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (26th January-28th January 2000). This is a significant omission because the SIF 2000 was a worldwide event, with ambassadors from 46 nations present and its organizers wanted the conference to symbolize a watershed moment in the inter-cultural construction of the political and institutional memory of the Holocaust, particularly although not only in the United States of America, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Israel. The SIF 2000 was also important because alongside its specific agenda of promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education globally, the Stockholm Declaration (2000) or the manifesto of the conference, also acknowledged broader Nazi atrocity crimes and encouraged the political representatives, academics, educationalists, Holocaust commemoration experts and survivors present to support more ‘universalistic’ objectives in the international arena, such as working to prevent contemporary forms of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”¹

The convening of the SIF 2000 thus marked a significant moment by Western leaders in trying to ensure that nations across the world confronted their Nazi era pasts; as well as

rhetorically invoking the memory of the Holocaust as a so called ‘universal’ imperative to prevent the transgression of human, group or minority rights in the present. However, key questions remain. Who was responsible for organizing the SIF 2000 and why did it happen when it did? How was the SIF 2000 and initiatives that it promotes received by different national societies? To what extent did the SIF 2000 on the Holocaust actually succeed in drawing attention to broader Nazi crimes as well as other past and present genocides and mass atrocities? Furthermore, how far did the legacies of the SIF 2000 encourage the contemporary prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”?² And in what ways did the SIF 2000 promote research, remembrance and education about the Nazi past through the ongoing policies of the Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF)? Finally, in the aftermath of the conference what has been the intellectual and institutional context for interpreting the broader historical and cultural significance of the SIF 2000? To orientate the reader this introduction will give a brief overview of what happened at the SIF 2000 as well as why its causes and consequences merit such intense analysis. This introduction will then relate the themes of this thesis to the current literature on collective memory studies of the Holocaust and the recent ‘transnational turn’. The last sections of this introduction will include a summary of the chapters comprising this thesis, as well as a description of the research methodology and primary and secondary sources which have been used in Holocaust Memory for the Millennium (HMM).

For Göran Persson, the Swedish Prime Minister responsible for convening the SIF 2000, the millenial timing of the conference after the founding of the Living History project (1997), the establishment of the ITF (1998) and in reaction to the European Union’s focus on Maastricht and the politics of monetary union during the 1990s were crucial factors shaping the SIF 2000’s project of Holocaust research, remembrance and education within the nexus of Western liberal values:

There was also the temptation of the millennium. After all, by its nature, the issue is universal and – alas – timeless. In view of our success in Sweden and the response from the Task Force group, it felt natural to organize a conference as well, right at the start of the new millennium. I remember Prime Minister Jospin saying, both to me personally and also in his conference speech, that it was remarkable how we had devoted the whole of the 1990s to international conferences about economics, and now it was the new millennium and the first big conference was about ideology, humanism and values.3

The main components of the SIF 2000 consisted of opening and plenary sessions in which high profile national politicians were expected to pledge their support to Holocaust research, remembrance and education as well as their commitment to fight against contemporary manifestations of anti-Semitism, racism, ethnic cleansing and genocide. Illustrating the global prestige and perceived political pertinence of the SIF 2000 among Western nations, some of the high profile heads of state and government representatives at the SIF 2000 included the already mentioned Prime Minister of France, Jospin, the Federal Chancellor of Germany Gerhardt Schröder, the President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski, the President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel, the Prime Minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook as well as a video message addressed to the conference from President of the United States of America, Bill Clinton. To these political representatives Persson reaffirmed the

centrality of the remembrance of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000, whilst simultaneously acknowledging the importance of commemorating broader Nazi atrocities:

The Holocaust was no accident of history. The systematic murder of the Jews did not happen by chance. Nor the genocide of the Roma. Nor the mass murder of disabled persons and the persecution and murder of homosexuals and dissidents.\(^4\)

Furthermore, illustrating the SIF 2000’s primary objective of proactively promoting the intergenerational transmission of the public memory of the Holocaust within the framework of Western liberal values, whilst concurrently showing an awareness of broader Nazi atrocity crimes, Persson also articulated his hope for the legacies of the SIF 2000 that, “Learning the lessons of the past is a task without end. There will always be a new generation to win over to knowledge, democracy and humanity.”\(^5\)

In line with these objectives, which sought to not just politically utilize Holocaust memory but also responsibly deal with issues relating to Holocaust research, remembrance and education, the second part of the SIF 2000 mirrored the central focus on the Jewish Catastrophe and was based around three panels of experts and survivor witnesses. The first panel addressed the future of Holocaust education (Ben Helfgott, Samuel Pisar, Hédi Fried, Dalia Ofer, William L. Shulman and Stuart E. Eizenstat); the second dealt with the challenges faced by Holocaust remembrance (Franciszek Piper, Anita Shapira, Serge Klarsfeld), whilst the third, reflected on the process of historically researching the Holocaust in archives and the classroom (David Bankier, Ulrich Herbert, Michael Marrus).\(^6\) These panels were followed by a number of workshops led by academics (for example, John K. Roth, James E. Young and Deborah Dwork) and

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\(^5\) Ibid.

remembrance experts (Teresa Swiebocka, senior curator of the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum; Jan Munk, the Director of Terézin Museum and Myra Osrin, Director of the Cape Town Holocaust Centre). Furthermore, in a similar way to the composition of the panel sessions, a number of workshops also included presentations by Holocaust survivors such as Ben Helfgott, Kitty Hart Moxon and Hédi Fried.\(^7\)

The subjects covered in these workshops included sessions on Holocaust education (teaching and pedagogy, the use of testimony and the challenges posed by the Internet and Holocaust denial); Holocaust remembrance (the role of historical sites, museums, art and other media) as well as workshops on Holocaust Research (pedagogy at the university level; researching and teaching genocide in comparative contexts).\(^8\) That comparative genocide was discussed in a session with Robert Melson, Kristian Gerner and Christian P. Scherrer illustrates both the SIF 2000’s more ‘universalistic’ objectives as well as the conference’s political relevance in the wake of genocides in Sri Lanka (September 1989 - January 1990), Bosnia (May 1992 - November 1995), Burundi (October 1993 - May 1994), Serbia (December 1998 - July 1999), Rwanda (April 1994 - July 1994) and the Congo (1998 onwards).\(^9\) Indeed, the renewed focus on the Holocaust and the prevention of genocides at the SIF 2000 seemed particularly pertinent given the return of genocide to the European continent in the 1990s. For example, Serbian ethno-nationalists had brutally murdered approximately 225,000 Bosnian Muslims between May 1992 and November 1995, whilst NATO military intervention had been provoked in March 1999 by the Serbian perpetrated mass murder of 10,000

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\(^8\) Ibid.

Muslim Kosovar Albanians between December 1998 and July 1999.  

Another key component within the Stockholm agenda was to draw attention to the work of the recently established ITF and its mission that after a decade of political focus on Holocaust restitution issues (for example, at the London Conference on Nazi Gold, 1997 and the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets, 1998) it was now necessary to promote ongoing Holocaust research, remembrance and education initiatives and combat Holocaust denial. As part of this session a number of presentations were given by representatives such as Hans Westra (Anne Frank House, the Netherlands) as well as Suzanne Bardgett (Imperial War Museum, London) on Holocaust research, remembrance and education projects which were already being carried out in the ITF’s member states. Furthermore, during this session the Clinton administration’s special envoy on Holocaust era issues, Stuart E. Eizenstat also briefed the Task Force. He stated that the importance of the SIF 2000 resided in the fact that, “Financial restitution, while critical, cannot be the last word on the Holocaust...[this]... conference assures education, remembrance and research will be.” He also noted that the SIF 2000 and the ITF should encourage open access to Holocaust era archives, promote inter-generational knowledge about the Jewish catastrophe, combat neo-Nazism and Holocaust denial as well as contributing to international efforts to record and make publically available the names of both Jewish

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10 Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust?’, p. 60.
and non-Jewish victims of the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{14}

Furthermore, whilst acknowledging the international community’s failures in relation to Rwanda (1994) where over just one hundred days the Hutu Power regime had murdered between half a million and 800,000 predominantly Tutsi civilians with blunt instruments and machetes;\textsuperscript{15} Eizenstat built on the sober, proactive mood of the conference in arguing that against the backdrop of the establishment of a UN Rwandan Tribunal in Tanzania, the operation of an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia as well as recent NATO military intervention in Kosovo:

I am absolutely convinced that continued Holocaust education and awareness will continue to raise our sensitivity and consciousness to mass slaughter and genocide, and impel us to prevent them or to try and stop them as early as possible.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally, Eizenstat noted that a key outcome of the SIF 2000 was the furthering of the Task Force’s current ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic as well as its encouragement of potential future ‘Liaison projects’ with Lithuania, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Argentina.\textsuperscript{17} These ‘Liaison Projects’ were planned to take place between Holocaust NGOs in America, Israel and Western Europe and Holocaust organizations which were often located in the post-Communist states of Central, Eastern, South-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states. These international ‘Liaison Projects’ would be designed to support national and local efforts in terms of Holocaust research, remembrance and education as well as tackling ideological distortions of Holocaust memory as a result of Soviet narratives of Nazi atrocity, continuing indigenous anti-

\textsuperscript{14} Eizenstat, ‘Stockholm International Forum 2000: Task Force Briefing’.
\textsuperscript{15} Harff, ‘No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder since 1955’, p. 57 and p. 60; Levene, \textit{Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1}, pp. 73-76.
\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid}. 18
Semitism as well as competing national narratives of suffering under Nazism and Communism.

Within this context, the purpose of the SIF 2000 and the long-term aims for the ITF were articulated in the eight-point Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust (2000). Despite its significance as the manifesto of the SIF 2000, the Stockholm Declaration had quickly been put together in 1999 by the committee whom Dr. Stephen Smith (co-founder of the Holocaust Centre, Beth Shalom, UK and the Aegis Trust for Genocide Prevention), cites as the academic advisors to the conference:

…it the Stockholm Declaration… like a lot of statements was not particularly well prepared, I remember there was myself, Yehuda [Bauer], Jonathan Cohen from the American Embassy, were drafting it, David [Cesarani] was involved. There was the four of us drafting it behind the scenes, and to be honest we didn’t think that the Declaration would be accepted. So, we thought about it and thought about definitional issues and thought about the general thrust of what was required. I can also tell you there was virtually no political or ideological steer on that at all. It emerged out of again a pragmatic question of what should... what would we like as a general base for universal remembrance of the Holocaust. How should we define that to make sure it’s specific enough to represent the mass murder of European Jewry but also to make it universal enough to make it absolutely clear that this is about moral and ethical standards within our current society. And we were pretty well left to our own devices with that. ¹⁸

The final published copy of the Stockholm Declaration was centrally focused on the Holocaust (Shoah) or the mass murder of European Jewry, whilst simultaneously demonstrating an acknowledgment of the broader victims of Nazi atrocities as well as articulating the ‘universal’ ethical imperative to politically work to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, xenophobia and anti-Semitism in the present:

We, High Representatives of Governments at the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, declare that:

1. The Holocaust (Shoah) fundamentally challenged the foundations of civilization. The unprecedented character of the Holocaust will always hold universal meaning. After half a century, it remains an event close enough in time that survivors can still bear witness to the horrors that engulfed the Jewish people. The terrible suffering of the many millions of other

¹⁸ ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’ (Unpublished Transcript, 05 June 2009).
victims of the Nazis has left an indelible scar across Europe as well.

2. The magnitude of the Holocaust, planned and carried out by the Nazis, must be forever seared in our collective memory. The selfless sacrifices of those who defied the Nazis, and sometimes gave their own lives to protect or rescue the Holocaust’s victims, must also be inscribed in our hearts. The depths of that horror, and the heights of their heroism, can be touchstones in our understanding of the human capacity for evil and for good.

3. With humanity still scarred by genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia, the international community shares a solemn responsibility to fight those evils. Together we must uphold the terrible truth of the Holocaust against those who deny it. We must strengthen the moral commitment of our peoples, and the political commitment of our governments, to ensure that future generations can understand the causes of the Holocaust and reflect upon its consequences.

4. We pledge to strengthen our efforts to promote education, remembrance and research about the Holocaust, both in those of our countries that have already done much and those that choose to join this effort.

5. We share a commitment to encourage the study of the Holocaust in all its dimensions. We will promote education about the Holocaust in our schools and universities, in our communities and encourage it in other institutions.

6. We share a commitment to commemorate the victims of the Holocaust and to honor those who stood against it. We will encourage appropriate forms of Holocaust remembrance, including an annual day of Holocaust Remembrance in our countries.

7. We share a commitment to throw light on the still obscured shadows of the Holocaust. We will take all necessary steps to facilitate the opening of archives in order to ensure that all documents bearing on the Holocaust are available to researchers.

8. It is appropriate that this, the first major international conference of the new millennium, declares its commitment to plant the seeds of a better future amidst the soil of a bitter past. We empathize with the victims’ suffering and draw inspiration from their struggle. Our commitment must be to remember the victims who perished, respect the survivors still with us, and reaffirm humanity’s common aspiration for mutual understanding and justice.

Mirroring the precedent set by the consensually accepted although non-binding Washington Principles on Nazi era looted art (1998), the Stockholm Declaration was “Adopted rather than signed” by the forty-six nations in attendance at the SIF 2000. This meant that the normative manifesto announced at Stockholm possessed the flexibility of “a voluntary declaration”, which needing no ratification by state legal bodies quickly became “the statement of intent” of the ITF. Despite the potential for tensions between the rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, broader Nazi atrocities and the more ‘universal’ aspirations of the Stockholm Declaration as well as the risk of

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20 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.

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severe cleavages in the document’s implementation as a result of its flexibility, many commentators have perceived the Stockholm Declaration as a significant rallying point in encouraging Holocaust research, remembrance and education in different national contexts. For example, Paul Levine, author of the Swedish publication *Tell Ye Your Children* (1997), summarized the possible consequences of the SIF 2000 and the Stockholm Declaration in a CNN World Report broadcast on 13th February 2000:

If it works, it will be like a stone on the water, it will create – have a ripple effect that the decision makers, the bureaucrats, the educational authorities, will go home to their countries and be convinced that, yes, this subject is important. It needs to be supported in terms of education, in terms of research, in terms of remembrance.21

From a different perspective, and specifically placing the convening of the SIF 2000 within the European context, Jens Kroh, a German scholar has gone as far as to describe the significance of the Stockholm Declaration in the following words:

The Stockholm Declaration can thus be conceived as the starting point for a new political interest to interpret the past and even regularize remembrance. It is a very important step towards the formation of a European politics of history and for the international boom to commemorate negative pasts. And coming to terms with such a negative past has almost turned into an informal criterion for accession to the European Union.22

This thesis will excavate the causes of the SIF 2000 and the impact of the Stockholm Declaration in more depth. As part of this analysis it will look at how the Stockholm Declaration’s objectives of promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education was implemented in different international and national contexts; the degree to which it did indeed function as an “informal criterion for accession to the European Union”;23 as well as the extent to which the Stockholm Declaration also encouraged state agencies to acknowledge broader Nazi atrocities and fight, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism,

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23 Ibid.
anti-Semitism and xenophobia” in the first decade of the new millennium. Finally, this thesis will also address a key intellectual and institutional context for understanding the historical lineage and broader political and cultural significance of the SIF 2000 and the ‘universalist’ rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration. Namely, the ideas that underpin ‘cosmopolitanism’ as a set of intellectual values and concepts which advocate human and minority rights, and which formed the seedbed for the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by social scientists, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider.

However, this analysis of the historical causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for interpreting the SIF 2000 does not operate in an academic vacuum. Rather it works in dialogue with a pre-existing literature on the Holocaust, collective memory studies and issues relating to the transnational. Within this context, defining the differences between ‘history’ and ‘memory’ is crucial. Namely, that whereas the academic practice of ‘history’ is concerned with trying to perform a detailed, critical and ‘objective’ reconstruction of past human events through archival and testimonial research; ‘memory’ is about how individuals as members of social groups such as the family, the cultural community, the religious congregation or the nation, perceive the past, often in order to fulfill collective social, political, religious or cultural needs and objectives in the present. Bearing these definitions in mind, the next section will show how **HMM** attempt’s to contribute something new to this pre-existing literature on the Holocaust, collective memory and the transnational.

Collective Memory Studies of the Holocaust and the ‘Transnational Turn’

This thesis is also a companion piece to existing case studies on the ‘history’ of how national societies have attempted to politically and institutionally construct the public ‘memory’ of the Holocaust since 1945. These case studies have been written by among others, Steven Cooke, Tony Kushner and Andy Pearce on Britain; Hasia R. Diner on America, Dirk Moses on West Germany, Tom Segev on Israel, and Thomas C. Fox on the history of the remembrance of the Holocaust in the U.S.S.R. and in the post-Communist states. These studies on the history of how societies have constructed the remembrance of the Holocaust often directly or implicitly draw on the ideas of the early twentieth century Durkheim inspired sociologist Maurice Halbwachs (1877-1945) who argued that social frameworks of ‘collective memory’, are constructed by groupings such as the family, organized religion, class based affiliations and nation states. Furthermore, for Halbwachs these often ‘overlapping’ frameworks of collective memory are important because they play a key role in determining how socialized individuals remember or perceive the past.

This case study of the SIF 2000 will both build upon and depart from the ideas of

27 Hasia R. Diner, We Remember with Reverence and with Love.
Halbwachs and many current national case studies on the historical construction of the social memory of the Holocaust, by focusing on how political and institutional developments at the international inter-state level have specifically impacted upon the institutional construction of the memory of the Holocaust at the national and local levels, as well as analyzing how different national social groups have perceived, responded or remained oblivious to international interventions in national and local forms of Holocaust memory work. In short this thesis is concerned with analyzing what Claudio Fogu and Wulf Kansteiner have called the ‘institutional construction’ (through museum exhibitions, educational curricula and state memorial days) and diverse ‘public reception’ (in the print media, television and online press) of public forms of Holocaust memory work within nation-states who have ascribed to the Stockholm Declaration.32

Whilst advocating the ideal that national societies should take responsibility for the remembrance of past atrocities, this case study of the inter-cultural institutional construction of Holocaust memory at the turn of the millennium, will mark an intervention in the current literature on the collective memory of the Holocaust in a number of key ways. Firstly, while acknowledging the canonical importance and influence of many psychoanalytically infused collective memory studies such as Alexander and Margaret Mitscherlisch’s The Inability to Mourn (1967) and Henry Rousso’s, The Vichy Syndrome (1991),33 as well as maintaining that these psychoanalytic approaches can be particularly useful in analyzing the individual’s

response to trauma; this case study of Holocaust memory work in the international arena will rarely use psychoanalytically inspired grand narratives in order to explain the institutional construction of the collective memory of the Holocaust in different nation states since 1945.

This is because these psychoanalytic narratives of the collective memory of the Holocaust have tended to suggest that the social memory of the Jewish Catastrophe was ‘repressed’ by nation states and Jewish communities in the immediate post-war period before undergoing an ‘uncanny’ process of the ‘return of the repressed’ since the 1960s. However, HMM rejects this approach because the use of psychoanalytic grand narratives of ‘repression’ and ‘the return of the repressed’ within the global reach of this thesis might risk subordinating the diversity and complexity of regional, national, international and Diasporic dynamics in Holocaust commemoration since 1945 to meta-narratives of collective ‘pathology’, which a new historiography is suggesting bears little relation to the historical development of international inter-state restitution processes and Jewish communal responses to the Holocaust, particularly in the West since the Second World War.

As a result, in opposition to such diverse scholars as Peter Novick, Norman Finkelstein, Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider whose historical periodization broadly structurally reproduces although does not reference psychoanalytic ‘repression’/ ‘return of the repressed’ narratives, HMM is influenced by the current wave of memory studies

which does not perceive the period between 1945 and 1962 as largely marking an overwhelming ‘silence’ in relation to discussions of the lessons and legacies of the Jewish catastrophe and the Nazi past in America, Germany or Israel. This historiography is particularly pertinent in relation to chapter one’s historical contextualization of admittedly inadequate Cold War precedents for the restitution campaigns of the 1990s, as well as chapter five’s analysis of post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional developments which can be seen as forming a key context for understanding the broader historical and political significance of the SIF 2000. Moreover, if the memory of the Holocaust was broadly ‘repressed’ in the Soviet bloc from the late 1940s until the 1980s, this arguably had less to do with a ‘collective unconscious’ and more to do with Soviet policies and the eventual liberalizing influence of Perestroika. As a result, this thesis will support Iwona Irwin-Zarecka’s opinion in relation to collective memory dynamics that, “…we are best advised to keep


This view is supported by recent research in relation to the remembrance of the Jewish Catastrophe in Poland, admittedly, just one of the nations under Soviet dominance. For example, prior to the firm Communist crackdown in the late 1940s, scholars such as Gabriel N. Finder, Judith R. Cohen and Natalia Aleksuin have suggested that there were various individual and communal efforts by Polish Jews to research and/or commemorate the Jewish Catastrophe immediately after the war. See: Gabriel N. Finder and Judith R. Cohen, ‘Memento Mori: Photographs from the Grave’, in Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume Twenty: Making Holocaust Memory, ed. Gabriel N. Finder, Natalia Aleksuin, Antony Polonsky and Jan Schwarz (Oxford; Portland, Oregan: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2008), pp. 55-73; Natalia Aleksuin, ‘The Central Jewish Historical Commission on Poland, 1944-47’, in Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume Twenty: Making Holocaust Memory, ed. Finder, Aleksuin, Polonsky and Schwarz, pp. 74-97. Furthermore, after the Soviet crackdown these efforts by Polish Jews to commemorate the Holocaust were continued in the late 1940s and 1950s by various Polish Jewish émigrés living in different countries across the globe. See: Jan Schwarz, ‘A Library of Hope and Destruction: The Yiddish Book Series Dos poylishe yidntum (Polish Jewry), 1946-1966’, in Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume Twenty: Making Holocaust Memory, ed. Finder, Aleksuin, Polonsky and Schwarz, pp. 173-196; Boaz Cohen, ‘Rachel Auerbach, Yad Vashem and Israeli Holocaust Memory’, in Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume Twenty: Making Holocaust Memory, ed. Finder, Aleksuin, Polonsky and Schwarz, pp. 197-221.
psychological or psychoanalytic categories at bay and to focus rather on the social, political, and cultural factors at work.”

Secondly, in looking at how an international event such as the SIF 2000 has impacted upon the construction of Holocaust research, remembrance and education initiatives at the national and local levels this thesis also builds on a burgeoning literature which seeks to understand the construction of institutional forms of Holocaust commemoration within the nexus of contemporary international relationships or what Arjun Appaduri might describe as global inter-cultural ‘flows’. Most recently this has taken the form of Jens Kroh’s analysis of the ITF as a ‘transnational network public’ operating as a ‘policy network’ between nation states affiliated with the ITF. This thesis will take Kroh’s transnational research forward by using oral history interviews with British delegates to the SIF 2000 and the ITF, in order to offer a distinctly British perspective on the lessons and legacies of the events of 2000. In so doing, HMM will also be building upon Kushner and Pearce’s analyses of Holocaust memory in the UK, by more strongly foregrounding the role of global dynamics and inter-cultural ‘flows’ in contributing to developments such as the IWM’s ‘Holocaust Exhibition’, the establishment of UK Holocaust Memorial Day (UK HMD), as well as offering the first Anglophone analysis of Britain’s ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania.

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Equally, in terms of the transnational turn in memory studies this analysis is also aware of Andreas Huyssen’s recent conceptualization of ‘screen memory’. This is the Freudian inspired idea that local and national traumas are sometimes communicated through international discourses associated with the commemoration of the Holocaust, whilst at other times they can be potentially elided by claims emphasizing the non-comparability of the Holocaust with other mass atrocities. For example, in Huyssen’s essay on Argentinean ‘collective memory’ of the desaparecidos or the approximately 30,000 citizens who were subjected to state terror under the Argentinean military dictatorship (1976-1983), Huyssen points to the use of titles such as Nunca Mas (‘Never Again’), as well as the Daniel Libeskind ‘Jewish Museum’ inspired design for the Monument to the Victims of State Terror in Buenos Aires, in order to suggest how phrases and visual codes conventionally associated with the commemoration of the Holocaust have been re-appropriated by other discourses which structure the contemporary remembrance of atrocity crimes and human rights violations. In this way, Huyssen demonstrates how the return of the symbolic in architecture since the 1960s, has been used to simultaneously register collective memory tropes of social trauma and mourning, whilst negotiating the particularity of experience that communities endow to site-specific topographies of political repression, brutality and mass atrocity.

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43 Ibid., p. 97.
44 Ibid., p. 99.
Although this thesis will explore the extent to which the Stockholm Declaration’s discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ encouraged or limited the SIF 2000 and the ITF’s engagement with broader Nazi atrocity crimes and more recent instances of genocide, unlike Huyssen, this thesis will shy away from using psychoanalytically loaded binary terms such as the extent to which the representation of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000, ‘screened in’ or ‘screened out’ the awareness of other genocides and mass atrocities. However, Huyssen is not alone in perceiving contemporary symbols of Holocaust commemoration as sometimes operating or alternatively being re-appropriated as signs of transnational human rights agendas. For example, Jeffrey C. Alexander has utilized the deeply problematic rhetoric of ‘pollution’ in relation to the role of Holocaust remembrance in American public life, by describing the emergence of the representation of the Holocaust as a supra-territorial symbol of ‘moral universalism’. For Alexander, the symbolism of the Holocaust acts as a kind of ‘pollution’ impelling the United States to tackle its own shameful histories of what began as English settler colonial violence and became U.S government sanctioned atrocities against Native American Indians, acts of slavery and segregation against African Americans as well as American perpetrated human rights abuses during wartime conflicts.47 Furthermore, building on this idea of the Holocaust as a symbol of ‘moral universalism’ at the turn of the twenty-first century but applying this to a specifically European context, Helmut Dubiel has described the SIF 2000 as an attempt to utilize the symbolism of the Holocaust as a “European foundation myth” which in

“sublimating the Holocaust to an abstract concept releases the moral potential of its remembrance”.

Sharing certain similarities with Dubiel but from an altogether more political perspective, late historian, social democrat and controversial critic of Israel, Tony Judt (1948 - 2010) offered a far more politically orientated analysis and critique of the transnational significance and contemporary symbolism of the Holocaust in Europe.

First published in 2005, Judt argued in *Post-War: A History of Europe since 1945* that after many years of inadequate redress by European governments, recent historical shifts have meant that, “Holocaust recognition is our contemporary European entry ticket.”

Although Judt maintained that European nations recent confrontation with negative pasts remains, “…one of the unsung achievements and sources of European unity in recent decades”;

he also argued that the political use of the memory of the Holocaust and its seeming ‘ubiquity’, especially in contemporary Western European societies is also potentially problematic because of, “…the danger of backlash”; as well as risking a new form of historical distortion based on, “…putting anti-Semitism at the centre of European history”; when for Judt it is only, “In retrospect, [that] ‘Auschwitz is the most important thing to know about World War II. But that is not how it seemed at the time.”

Lastly, Judt also drew attention to what he saw as the fundamental ‘asymmetries’ at the heart of European memory politics between Western and Eastern Europe, owing to the fact that in the post-Soviet states, the public memory

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51 Ibid., p. 830.
52 Ibid., p. 820.
53 Ibid., p. 821.
54 Ibid., p. 821.
of Communist atrocity crimes is often perceived to compete for public recognition with the remembrance of the Holocaust. For Judt this means that, “Europe might be united, but European memory [has] remained deeply asymmetrical.”

Whilst Judt does not directly reference the SIF 2000 or the ITF, many of his observations are pertinent to the causes and consequences of the conference as well as the subsequent challenges faced by the ITF in the first decade of its existence, which will be explored in *HMM*. This is because as sections on the founding and development of the ITF in chapters two and three will show, although the first leaders of the ITF were the Swedish, British and American governments as opposed to the leaders of specific European institutions, many prospective and new members of the ITF particularly after 2000, saw ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ and membership of the organization as a step towards gaining affiliation to Western bodies such as the EU and NATO.

Equally, in his histories of the Holocaust, co-author of the Stockholm Declaration (2000), Yehuda Bauer does centre anti-Semitism as the root cause of the Holocaust and perceives the Holocaust as an ‘unprecedented’ event residing at the core of both European and World history. Lastly, some of the projects that the ITF sponsors do meet resistance and backlash from ultra-nationalists in various European states, some of whom in Eastern and Central Europe as well as the Baltic States particularly resent what is perceived as the ‘secondary’ status accorded to the crimes of Communism, a phenomenon of ‘competitive victimhood’ that will be explored in more detail in chapter four’s analysis of the political background for the British/Lithuanian ITF ‘Liaison Project’.

56 Kroh quoted during *Symposium: 10 years with the Stockholm Declaration*.
57 See the section on Bauer in chapter two of this thesis.
However, the analysis found in *HMM* will also nuance and supplement Judt’s interpretation of the centrality of the memory of the Holocaust to European identity after the Cold War in two key ways. Firstly, it will be shown in chapters one and two on the historical background for the establishment of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000, that far from naively stimulating nationalist backlash, the ITF and the SIF 2000 were self-consciously organized to try and proactively battle forms of ultranationalist backlash through the support of indigenous forms of Holocaust research, remembrance and education, particularly in post-Soviet states, where the public presence of the Holocaust was sometimes far from ubiquitous. Thus, the early founders of the ITF and the SIF 2000 had a self-perception of themselves as part of the ongoing liberal educational ‘solution’ to the problems posed by distortive post-Soviet historiographies and ultra-nationalist hostility to Holocaust remembrance, as opposed to part of the inadvertent stimulation of indigenous forms of nationalist ‘backlash’ that Judt has ascribed to certain types of politically motivated Holocaust remembrance.

Secondly, if Holocaust recognition has become central to European membership in political terms, then it is highly ironic that European institutional support of Holocaust restitution and remembrance during the 1990s and early noughties, by transnational bodies such as the EU, has often been ambivalent and contradictory. This phenomenon will be explored in more depth as part of chapter five’s critique of the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000.58

*HMM*

In substantiating these research findings, this thesis will be divided into five chapters and will use official documents, oral history interviews, relevant press reports as well as

pre-existing scholarly literature on the history, social remembrance and institutional and intellectual context for the SIF 2000. Chapter one will focus on the immediate historical, political and cultural causes of the establishment of the Living History Project (1997), the ITF (1998) and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000 by the Swedish government. It will show that whilst the inadequacies of Maastricht and the return of genocide to the European continent were important factors, the specific choice of the Jewish catastrophe as the central subject of the work of the ITF and the SIF 2000 was also the result of a number of particular challenges and opportunities posed to Holocaust research, remembrance and education during the 1990s. These included the conviction expressed by commentators such as Eizenstat that alongside other victim groups and in the wake of restitution campaigns in relation to the Third Reich, “…money ought not to be the last memory of the Holocaust”;59 whilst liberal concerns had also been raised by the Europe-wide threat posed to Holocaust remembrance by resurgent forms of populist and far-right wing politics, ethno-nationalism and Holocaust denial. Finally, chapter one will also tentatively suggest that while building on important Cold War precursors, the groundwork for the ITF and the SIF 2000 was also facilitated by an intensifying sense of intercultural cooperation in the institutional construction of some important Holocaust commemoration and education initiatives since the dismantling of Communism in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Building on the reasons for the founding of the ITF explained in chapter one and against the backdrop of events such as the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets (1998) and NATO military intervention in Kosovo (1999), chapter two will delineate

Bauer’s notion of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as well as the institutional policy discussions and decision-making within the ITF which directly influenced the convening of the SIF 2000 and the launch of the ITF’s ‘Liaison Projects’. As this thesis is also concerned with the relationship between developments in the institutions of Holocaust memory work at the international level and their impact on the national and local levels, this chapter will also summarize how the SIF 2000 was perceived in the American, British and Israeli media; how the conference was used as a platform by some speakers to raise awareness of broader Nazi atrocities, other genocides and human rights abuses; as well as noting the event’s omissions. Finally, in a further effort to provide a specific example of the relationship between the transnational, the national and the regional, this chapter will also look at how one particular element which corresponded with the Stockholm project, namely the launch of UK HMD was received in the British press and what questions and controversies it stimulated in the British public at large.

Concerned with analyzing the legacies of the events described in chapter two, chapter three will focus on critically evaluating the direct consequences of the SIF 2000 and efforts by its organizers at implementing the objectives of the Stockholm Declaration in promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education globally as well as acknowledging the broader victims of Nazi atrocity crimes and encouraging political efforts to prevent, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”\footnote{Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, in Beyond the ‘Never Again’, ed. Fried, pp. 136-137.} With these objectives in mind, this chapter is split into two main sections. The first part concerns assessing the international impact of subsequent Stockholm International Forums on ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004), whilst the second part is focused on providing an overview of the work of the ITF during the first decade of its existence as well as illustrating the practical implications of Bauer’s discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’. This evaluation will demonstrate that whilst the subsequent SIFs and the ITF had their notable and important successes, in terms of the SIF 2000’s more ‘universalistic’ aspirations to promote the prevention of genocide, a number of limitations were apparent particularly in relation to Darfur and the Congo.

Whilst chapter three is particularly keen to focus on these more ‘universalistic’ issues, chapter four is concerned with providing a specific intercultural case study of the ITF’s efforts to promote Holocaust research, remembrance and education through ITF ‘Liaison Projects’, a type of policy that is introduced and discussed in detail in chapter two. Whilst there have been many ITF ‘Liaison Projects’, each meriting scholarly attention and all with specific outcomes, this analysis of the causes and consequences of the British/Lithuanian ITF ‘Liaison Project’ (2000-2003) will analyze the political and cultural struggles facing Holocaust research, remembrance and education in Lithuania; the elements comprising the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’; the impact of this initiative as well as tentatively looking at the extent to which the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration in this context was perceived in Judt’s mode of thinking and Kroh’s words as an, “informal criterion for accession to the European Union.”\textsuperscript{61}

If chapter three focuses on the consequences of the SIF 2000 in terms of the work of the ITF and the subsequent Stockholm conferences and chapter four looks at the intercultural legacies of the conference in terms of the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, this analysis of the causes and consequences of the British/Lithuanian ITF ‘Liaison Project’ (2000-2003) will analyze the political and cultural struggles facing Holocaust research, remembrance and education in Lithuania; the elements comprising the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’; the impact of this initiative as well as tentatively looking at the extent to which the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration in this context was perceived in Judt’s mode of thinking and Kroh’s words as an, “informal criterion for accession to the European Union.”\textsuperscript{61}

\textsuperscript{61} Kroh quoted during Symposium: 10 years with the Stockholm Declaration.
Project’, then chapter five explores the key context of ‘cosmopolitanism’, or intellectuals and institutions which advocate human and minority rights, for understanding the broader historical and political significance of the SIF 2000 and the ‘universalist’ rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust to work towards the prevention of present day and future forms of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”

In line with this, the first part of chapter five will look at the theoretical ideas and organizational developments underlying ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional responses to the legacies of Nazi atrocity crimes since 1945, and as part of this examination, will pose the challenging question as to whether Bauer’s concept of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, which will have already been discussed in detail in chapters two and three, can also be comprehended within this framework of ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual traditions which are associated with thinkers such as Karl Jaspers, Raphael Lemkin, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas. Then the second part of this chapter will use the pre-existing primary and secondary literature on ‘cosmopolitanism’ in order to analyze in detail one of the most prominent interpretations of the political and historical significance of the SIF 2000, namely, the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ reading of the events of 2000 offered by the social scientists Levy and Sznaider. Lastly, and against the backdrop of HMM’s history of the causes and consequences of the SIF 2000, the third part of this chapter will take a critical look at the historical and political problems that are presented by Levy and Sznaider’s understanding of the symbolism of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000 in their ‘New

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Cosmopolitan’ treatise, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*.63

**Sources and Methodology**

Aside from the pre-existing critical literature on ‘cosmopolitanism’ as well as the writings of ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers such as Jaspers, Lemkin, Arendt and Habermas as well as ‘New Cosmopolitans’ Beck, Levy and Sznaider, a number of published and unpublished, primary and secondary sources have been used in the research process for this history of the causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for understanding the SIF 2000. The first key published primary source used throughout this thesis is the documentation of the speeches and presentations made at the four Stockholm conferences (2000, 2001, 2002 and 2004). This documentation is available from an online archive administered by the Swedish government.64 However, it can also be accessed from a CD-Rom sourcebook of essays and interviews entitled, *Beyond the Never Agains*, which is edited by Eva Fried and published by the Swedish government. This book is available in some libraries internationally and can also be requested from Sweden’s Living History Forum.65

In chapters one and two, other important published primary documents include the proceedings of the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets (WCHA, 1998), a source which can be accessed online or purchased from the U.S State Department

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63 Levy and Sznaider, *The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age*.
64 Stockholm International Forum Conference Series website ([http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Affinity/SIF/index.html](http://www.dccam.org/Projects/Affinity/SIF/index.html)).
archives, as well as a book containing the full documentation of the London Conference on Nazi Gold (LCNG, 1997). In relation to these events, Stuart E. Eizenstat’s memoir, Imperfect Justice is also used to provide a personal perspective on the restitution campaigns of the 1990s, although this is from the position of the interests of the Clinton administration. In order to counter-balance and contextualize this personal agenda, literature by restitution scholars such as Elazar Barkan, Michael Marrus and Michael Bazyler is also used as well as critical articles from journals, newspapers and magazines such as Commentary, The Forward and The Jerusalem Report.

In terms of chapters two, three and four another key published source, particularly in terms of providing a reliable guide to the chronological development of the ITF and the organization’s major achievements in the first decade of its existence is Bitte Wallinn and Michael Newman’s edited history The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book (2009). This source is also particularly useful in cross-referencing the veracity of basic information such as dates and major organizational events which are also chronicled in more detail complete with internal institutional debates in online ITF meeting minutes for the years, 1998-2007. Alongside official speeches, education

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reports and press releases, these unpublished meeting minutes were available for public viewing and download on the ITF’s official website in the summer of 2008.  However, unlike the speeches, education reports and press releases, these minutes were removed whilst the ITF website was being updated in 2009 and are now no longer available to the public. As a result, these minutes have been used cautiously to illustrate the internal organizational debates and diversity of opinions within the various national delegations which comprised the ITF during the first few years of its existence. Furthermore, it should be noted that any critique offered in this thesis is done in the spirit of constructively contributing to the ongoing work of the ITF.

Other key unpublished sources include a summary of the 7th May 1998 founding meeting of the ITF as well as a British report on an ITF advisory visit to Lithuania’s Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum in 2003. Furthermore, in terms of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, use has been made of a folder of letters, e-mails and reports archived at London’s IWM under the title *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: International Task Force for Holocaust Commemoration, September 1998 – July 2002.* However, whilst these primary unpublished sources are crucial in illuminating how institution’s attempt to construct the memory of the Holocaust, these sources also have their drawbacks. For as Rodney Lowe has noted official government and institutional records such as public speeches, reports and organizational minutes cannot function as the last word on analyzing policy making because they sometimes

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72 ‘*Stockholm Meeting on the Holocaust...tell ye your children...Summary from the meeting of 7 May 1998 in Stockholm*’ (Stockholm: The Living History Forum, 1998). This meeting summary was made available by Dr. Paul Levine; Suzanne Bardgett, ‘Report for the Lithuanian Liaison Group of the International Task Force for Holocaust Education, Commemoration and Research on the Jewish Museum, Vilnius’. A copy of this report was made available by Suzanne Bardgett at the IWM.

omit vital details, change form in relation to institutional developments and are written with a deliberate private or public agenda in mind.  

It is to counter-balance these limitations that these sources will be contextualized, analyzed and cross-referenced in relation to the pre-existing critical literature on the social remembrance of the Holocaust in various national contexts. Furthermore, although speeches, reports and meeting minutes tell the historian about institutional dynamics, agendas, and actions, they rarely illuminate the public reception of efforts to institutionally construct Holocaust memory nor do they excavate in any depth the thoughts and motivations of the makers of Holocaust memory at the institutional level. As a result, in an effort to gain insights into how events such as the SIF 2000 and the announcement of UK HMD were received by the media and the public in different nations, use has been made of a sample of Anglophone newspaper columns and ‘letters’ pages, online press reports, magazine articles and television transcripts from America (CNN, Commentary, The Forward, The New York Times and The Washington Post), Israel (Haaretz, The Jerusalem Post and The Jerusalem Report) and the United Kingdom (The BBC, The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Jewish Chronicle, New Statesman, The Sun and The Times).

Some of these news providers such as The BBC, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Jerusalem Report and CNN have been selected because they are representatives of high profile sources of world reportage for both a national and international audience; others such as America’s The Forward and Britain’s The Jewish Chronicle cater for more specifically Jewish audiences. Finally, the publications and

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articles selected also represent a diverse political spectrum of views and opinions. For example, in relation to the announcement of UK HMD, British newspaper responses will be shown to vary from the centre-left (*The Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Sun*) to the centre-right (*The Daily Mail, The Times, The Daily Telegraph*) and the space in-between (*The Independent*),\(^{75}\) as well as traversing the divide between more serious broadsheets (*The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian, The Independent, The Times*) to more populist tabloids (*The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Sun*). Admittedly, whilst this sample of publications only encompasses responses to the conference available in English and covers only a limited number of countries affected by the SIF 2000, as well as ultimately reflecting the attitudes of the most prominent opinion-makers and self-selecting members of the public; they nonetheless remain a useful starting point in providing an awareness of how developments in Holocaust memory work at the international level are mediated to and received by various national societies. For as historian John Tosh has noted, albeit in terms which too easily suggest a unified *Zeitgeist* as opposed to the divisions, contradictions and pluralities that animate public debates in contemporary democracies; whilst tabloids and newspapers might ultimately reproduce, “…*what was considered to be fit for public consumption*”,\(^{76}\) they are also useful for historians in that they provide, “…*valuable insights into the mentality of the age*.”\(^{77}\)

Furthermore, it is to provide a more detailed and personal insight into the responses of those present at the SIF 2000 that oral history interviews have been conducted with a cross-section of primarily British delegates to the conference, each selected as a

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\(^{75}\) Founded in 1964 and first published as a tabloid in 1969, *The Sun* traditionally supported the Conservative Party. However, between March 1997 and 2009, *The Sun* supported New Labour.  
representative of a particular sector of Holocaust research, remembrance or education. For example, Suzanne Bardgett is the curator of the Holocaust and ‘Crimes against Humanity’ exhibits at the IWM, London. Professor David Cesarani is a leading Holocaust Studies academic in the United Kingdom and the United States. Dr. Ben Helfgott is a spokesman for the British Jewish community as well as a survivor of the Nazi concentration camps at Buchenwald, Schlieben and Theresienstadt. Professor Paul Levine is the co-author of *Tell Ye Your Children*, and an expert in Swedish responses to the Holocaust at Uppsala University, Sweden. Finally, Dr. Stephen Smith is a leading Holocaust educationalist and co-founder of the Holocaust Centre, Beth Shalom and the Aegis Trust for Genocide Prevention. All of these interviewees have also been involved in the ITF’s project at some stage of its development, and when interviewed in 2009, Smith and Helfgott continued to be regular attendees at ITF meetings.

Each of these interviews was subject to the planning, recording, transcribing and informed consent model of interviewing discussed at the course ‘Interviewing for Researchers’ (Senate House, London, 5th June 2008) and led by Michael Kandiah, Director of the Oral History Program at the University of London’s Institute of Historical Research. Many of these interviewing techniques are also outlined in an alternative format in Valerie Raleigh Yow’s, *Recording Oral History: A Practical Guide for Social Scientists*. One of the techniques learnt on this course included the importance of preparing pre-interview questions, which were then tailored to the

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78 ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’ (Unpublished Transcript, 05 May 2009); ‘Interview with Professor David Cesarani’ (Unpublished Transcript, 30 March 2009); ‘Interview with Dr. Ben Helfgott’ (Unpublished Transcript, 24 July 2009); ‘Interview with Dr. Paul Levine’ (Unpublished Transcript, 15 November 2009); ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
80 Michael Kandiah, ‘Interviewing for Researchers’. One day course delivered at Senate House, London on 5th June 2008.
interviewee in question as well as to the spontaneous demands of the interviewing moment. Moreover, in order to ensure ethical practice, interviewees were presented with an informed consent form and could stipulate their conditions of participating in the project. For example, Bardgett requests that she see how her oral history material is used prior to its official publication in academic journal articles and commercial books.

Clearly, the strength of oral history interviews in giving a personal account of historical events which can now only be reconstructed in documents is also a source of their weakness in that they also articulate the fluctuations in memory and specific agenda and self-justification of each interviewee. In this respect the sample of interviewees in this study is biased towards the British perspective on the events of 2000, although given more research time there are still other British representatives who could be interviewed such as former Education Director at the Spiro Institute, Trudy Gold and survivor of Auschwitz, Kitty Hart Moxon. For these reasons this thesis does not claim to be the final word on the causes, consequences and intellectual and institutional context for understanding the SIF 2000. Rather it is a British intervention in an international dialogue in which there are still plural histories to be written and a diversity of voices to be recorded and heard.
Chapter 1

“Money ought not to be the last memory of the Holocaust”

The Historical Context for the SIF 2000

Whilst bearing in mind the importance of the reaction against Maastricht and the return of genocide to the European continent as important circumstances shaping the institutional convening of the SIF 2000, this chapter will delineate three factors which help to historically explain why the subject of Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research was the central focus of the SIF 2000. The first factor relates to the cumulative impact of the Holocaust and Nazi era restitution campaigns of the 1990s and the belief articulated by Eizenstat, “that money ought not to be the last memory of the Holocaust, or of the slave and forced labor issues, but a sense of coming to terms with responsibility.”\(^1\) The second examines fears raised among liberal and social democratic politicians, such as the Swedish Prime Minister, Göran Persson at the extent of popular ignorance about the Holocaust as well as the rise of the far right and Holocaust denial in the 1990s and the relationship of these developments to the founding of the Living History campaign in 1997, the Swedish precursor to the ITF. Finally, the third section tentatively proposes that whilst forms of international co-operation in Holocaust memory work forwarded by the ITF at the SIF 2000 may have been radically new in terms of the sheer scale of government involvement, in other respects these developments were vitally facilitated by intercultural patterns in Holocaust education and memorialization in the decades directly preceding the SIF 2000.

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\(^1\) Eizenstat quoted in Sher, ‘Landmarks, More Than Deutschmarks’, p. 36.
Restitution in the 1990s

This section will outline the key developments and debates surrounding Holocaust restitution in the 1990s and the way in which these contributed to the political environment that facilitated the convening of the SIF 2000. The restitution campaigns of the 1990s, which also included negotiations for the compensation of foreign workers who were pressed into service as forced and slave labor in Germany and the Nazi occupied territories, made nations aware that they had an obligation to take responsibility for historical injustices committed during the Second World War as well as a duty to mitigate the effects of national backlash against restitution campaigns by educating their respective publics about the Third Reich and its collaborators atrocity crimes. Within this context, some of those involved in the restitution process such as Eizenstat and commentators such as Yisrael Gutman increasingly began to feel that the last word about the Holocaust and Nazi atrocities should not be about money but rather the respectful and appropriate memorialization of the victims of the Third Reich and its collaborators. This awareness facilitated international political support for Persson’s launch of the ITF in 1998 and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000.

The movement for Holocaust restitution in the 1990s did not occur in a political and economic vacuum, but rather at a time when as cultural studies scholar, Barkan has noted, “beginning at the end of World War II, and quickening since the end of the Cold War, questions of morality and justice are receiving growing attention as political questions. As such, the need for restitution to past victims has become a major part of

\[2\] During settlement negotiations, ‘slave labor’ tended to refer to predominantly Jewish victims who had been forced to work in the Nazi concentration camps, often with the perpetrator’s intention of bringing about their death. ‘Forced labor’ denoted a larger number of mainly Slavic workers who had been made to work in German industries and agriculture, sometimes in abject and at other times in more reasonable conditions. (Marrus, Some Measure of Justice, p. 21.)
national politics and international diplomacy."³ Post-Second World War political dynamics such as the growth of civil rights movements and decolonization meant that far from being an isolated instance of reparative justice, the political and grass-roots pressure for Holocaust restitution in the 1990s needs to be perceived within a broader global context of social movements for post-facto justice for victims of state sanctioned atrocity including war crimes, genocide and colonialism. For example, in relation to the Second World War, these developments have included the U.S congress’s passing of the Civil Liberties Act (1988) which facilitated the compensation of Japanese Americans that had been interned by the U.S government in the wake of Pearl Harbor,⁴ as well as renewed pressure on Japan to make amends for its war-time atrocities, including the treatment of ‘Comfort Women’, or those East Asian (primarily Korean) and sometimes European women who were coerced into organized brothels for the Japanese military between 1931 and 1945.⁵

Equally, scholars such as Marrus and Barkan have also noted the importance as a historical precedent for restitution in the 1990s that as part of West Germany’s reintegration into NATO under the chancellorship of Konrad Adenauer, the country ratified a reparations deal with Israel via the Jewish umbrella organization, the Conference of Jewish Material Claims against Germany (Claims Conference) in 1953.⁶ Demonstrating the legal, diplomatic and ‘top-down’ nature of reparations negotiations in the 1950s,⁷ reaching this agreement was nonetheless, not without its public controversies, least of all in Israel. The right-wing led by Menachem Begin accused the

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³ Marrus, Some Measure of Justice, pp. 70-73; Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, p. xvi.
⁷ Marrus, Some Measure of Justice, p. 74.
Mapai government headed by David Ben Gurion of dealing in German ‘blood money’, whilst opponents of Begin described his mass street demonstrations as ‘fascist’.\(^8\) This dispute reached a crescendo during an Israeli Knesset session in January 1952, when street protests became so violent that the safety of Knesset representatives was jeopardized.\(^9\)

However, the result of the eventual settlement in 1953 was that over a period of approximately fifty years the German government paid over 100 billion Deutschmarks to Jewish and some non-Jewish victims of the Third Reich.\(^10\) Equally, owing to pressure emanating from the U.S government and American Jewish groups, Austria issued seven restitution laws to deal with property seized from Jews between 1946 and 1949,\(^11\) whilst a Swiss law of 1962 ordered that the country’s banks audit their dormant accounts and restitute assets to owners and heirs within the next decade. Indeed, Marrus has observed that the historical significance of these Cold War settlements, particularly the 1953 German case, should not be underestimated:

> …whatever the shortcomings of these agreements, and there were plenty, these were hardly seen at the time, and nor should they be seen now, as involving mere token payments, based on an evasion of responsibility. Rather, the sums involved were huge, unprecedented, based on innovative legal principles, and often considered by the Americans who viewed the West Germans as their Cold War protégés, as pressing against the limits of what their new ally would be able to pay.\(^12\)

However, as Marrus notes despite these important achievements, this reparative justice and restitution for victims of Nazism in Western Europe during the Cold War was also largely inadequate. This was because these settlements often did not cover payments for many other victims of Nazi atrocities including forced and slave laborers, Roma and

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\(^12\) Marrus, *Some Measure of Justice*, p. 73.
Sinti, homosexuals, the disabled and Jehovah’s Witnesses, whilst Austrian legislation was characterized by loopholes, unsympathetic administrators and short time frames for the processing of claims. Finally, although Swiss banks had found 10 million Swiss Francs in approximately 1000 inactive Jewish bank accounts in the decade between 1964 and 1973, approximately 7000 claims had been processed and rejected. This was partly because Swiss banking rules were often saturated with bureaucratic intransigence. As a consequence, relatives of Holocaust victims were often required to fulfill emotionally wrenching and impossible criteria such as producing documentation like death certificates if they wanted to access the accounts of their relatives. For example, when Romanian survivor and post-war U.S. citizen, Greta Beer was searching for the Swiss bank account of her father, Siegfried Deligdisch, one Swiss bank requested precise, “details of her father’s death, whether by violence or natural causes, even asking if he died with a gun to his head.” As a result, in America, Western Europe and Israel, it would only be with the increasing presence of the American class action legal process; the accelerated globalization of mergers and acquisitions within the banking economy; as well as post-Cold War political shifts which encouraged revitalized confrontations with the Nazi past, that these issues would once again be addressed in the decade directly preceding the SIF 2000.

Furthermore, if there were serious issues surrounding the effectiveness of reparation and restitution in the West following the settlements of the 1950s and 1960s, compensation and restitution for Jewish victims of Nazi crimes in the Soviet bloc was even more acutely hampered by the Cold War political and institutional context. By the late 1940s,

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13 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 207.
14 Ibid., pp. 281-282.
15 Ibid., p. 48.
17 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 47.
leaders in the Soviet Union had decided that social cohesion in the U.S.S.R and its empire would be better aided by an inclusive narrative of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as opposed to the specific suffering of Jews under Nazism, a tragedy which raised the contentious issue of local collaboration with the Third Reich in states such as Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine and Belorussia.\(^{18}\) The result of this Communist ideological landscape in the Eastern bloc was that Soviet Jews rarely received public recognition or compensation for their losses engendered during the Second World War.

For example, in East Germany, scholars such as Thomas C. Fox, Jeffrey Herf and Bill Niven have shown that Communists initially refused the necessity of Jewish compensation altogether, whilst a dual set of categories was established which discriminated against Jewish material claims.\(^{19}\) Communists were ‘Fighters Against Fascism’ whereas Jews were classified as ‘Victims of Fascism’. Even Jewish members of the resistance were not always given the status of ‘Fighter’.\(^{20}\) Furthermore, an East German scholar, Helmut Eschwege has uncovered evidence of East German Jews in the 1950s who attempted to recover property that had been seized by the Nazis. They were informed that because they were categorized as ‘passive’ and non-political as opposed to ‘antifascists’, they were disqualified from individual reimbursement. In these instances, property stolen by the Nazis was either taken over by the East German Soviet


\(^{20}\) Fox, Stated Memory, p. 81.
state or distributed to non-Jewish residents. The result of this was that many East German Jews attempted to escape to West Germany which held the possibility of material payments for losses suffered.\(^{21}\) Although East German Jews as ‘Victims of Fascism’ were entitled to higher pensions, early retirement, housing and educational benefits, and by the 1980s, East Germany supported the renovation of synagogues and the upkeep of Jewish cemeteries, these minuscule gains were considered insufficient for the assets that Jewish communities had forcibly relinquished to the Nazi and Communist regimes.\(^{22}\)

Despite complaints from some American Jewish individuals and organizations about Soviet policies towards its Jewish populations during the Cold War,\(^{23}\) it was not until the 1990s and whilst working as a member of the United States Mission to the European Union under the auspices of the Clinton administration (1993-2001), that Eizenstat was given the mandate, “…to encourage the return of property confiscated from religious communities by the Nazis and then nationalized by Eastern European Communist governments.”\(^{24}\) Eizenstat’s remit coincided with the broader restitution battles being played out as post-Soviet states attempted to deal with the immediate legacies of Communism which included the distribution of property that had been nationalized under the Soviet system.\(^{25}\) Most radically, this took the form of a voucher system in Czechoslovakia whereby citizens could utilize coupons to bid for the tenure of certain government companies. Other countries such as Poland used a lottery method to

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21 Helmut Eschwege quoted in Fox, *Stated Memory*, p. 81.
22 Fox, *Stated Memory*, p. 79.
distribute government businesses,\textsuperscript{26} whilst “Hungary offered victims vouchers pegged to the old value of the properties, which could then be used to buy any state property that was put up for auction.”\textsuperscript{27} Mixing restitution with privatization these policies often strengthened the middle-classes and sought to facilitate the move towards Western capitalist social and economic systems. Furthermore, the Roman Catholic Church received compensation, particularly extensive property restitution in Poland where the church had become synonymous with Solidarity, anti-Communist resistance and Polish national identity in the immediate post-Cold War period.\textsuperscript{28}

As evidenced by these examples, post-Communist governments initially focused their attention on restitution that strengthened both national cohesion and the transition to capitalism.\textsuperscript{29} However, in these states there was also the question of restitution to minority groups who had suffered serious human rights violations and forcibly lost communal and individual property during the carnage of the Second World War and the ensuing nationalization of property by Communist regimes. These groups included Jews, Roma, minority Hungarian populations in Slovakia and Romania as well as most contentiously the losses of the Sudeten Germans expelled from Czechoslovakia and Poland at the end of World War II.\textsuperscript{30} To address the specific question of Jewish losses in Central and Eastern Europe, Jewish organizations built on the precedent established with West Germany in the 1950s. Desiring state and public recognition of Jewish

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{27} Barkan, \textit{The Guilt of Nations}, p. 128.
\item \textsuperscript{28} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 123.
\item \textsuperscript{29} Beata Pasek, ‘Polish Citizenship the Main Criterion for Property Restitution’, \textit{Associated Press}, 23 March 1999.
\end{itemize}
suffering, the primary aims of Jewish reparation and restitution in the post-Soviet states became firstly, material assistance for Holocaust survivors, secondly, to revive decimated Jewish neighborhoods through the return of communal assets and finally, to provide assistance for individuals who were trying to reclaim personal properties that had been forcibly requisitioned under Nazi and/or Soviet domination.31

These restitution negotiations in Central and Eastern Europe involved President of the World Jewish Congress (WJC) and Canadian billionaire, Edgar Bronfman, who became a pivotal player in a series of diplomatic negotiations which claimed to represent both the Israeli government and Eastern European Jews living in America. Within this context, the non-governmental World Jewish Restitution Organization (WJRO) was set-up in 1992 to investigate national laws, restitution cases and co-ordinate arbitration on the behalf of governments and the relevant members of the Jewish communities involved.32 Bronfman was assisted in his negotiations by WJRO co-chairman and Jewish Agency leader, Avraham Burg, WJRO Deputy Chairman, Holocaust survivor and former Israeli Consul General of New York, Naphtali Lavie as well as Bronfman’s top aide, the Orthodox rabbi and political science university lecturer, Israel Singer.33

By 1997, the WJRO was conducting restitution meetings with nineteen European nations.34 Eizenstat was also involved in mediating many of the deals that were eventually reached with Central and Eastern European countries such as Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic. One of the first reparation and restitution agreements was reached with Hungary in the summer of 1996, a country whose ex-Communist

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32 Marrus, *Some Measure of Justice*, p. 142.
34 Halevi, ‘The Accounting’.
government had renounced anti-Semitism in 1994, and which housed the most Jews between France and the Ukraine (80,000 – 100,000 Jewish citizens). The hub of this restitution plan comprised support for survivors and welfare for the Hungarian Jewish community as well as a government pledge to set up a foundation that would distribute compensation vouchers, artworks and real estate. Moreover, by 1997, Hungary had also founded a $21 million pension endowment for the country’s 30,000 survivors. Further settlements were also negotiated in Poland and the Czech Republic. For example, restitution of communal Jewish property in the Czech Republic began in 1990 whilst legislation facilitating the restitution of Jewish religious property in Poland was ratified in 1997, although the restitution of Jewish and non-Jewish private property in Poland remains a contested issue.

Like Germany in the 1950s, efforts at Jewish compensation were widely perceived by the international community as part of the post-Soviet states push for NATO and EU membership. However, these restitution agreements in post-Soviet Europe have neither been unproblematic nor without accompanying controversies. Divisions between the interests of the WJRO and local Jewish communities dogged negotiations in Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland. For example, in 1997 the WJRO protested against, “…a proposed Polish law that would return communal property confiscated by the Nazis and then the Communists to Poland’s tiny remnant Jewish community.”

37 Halevi, ‘The Accounting’.
39 For an analysis of the limitations of this perception, see chapter five.
40 Halevi, ‘The Accounting’.
The WJRO perceived the proposed bill as an attempt by the Polish government to pacify its small national Jewish community with minimum restitution. Claiming to represent the international interests of Diaspora Polish Jewry, the WJRO instead stated that almost 7000 expropriated communal buildings should be returned. Epitomizing these conflicted relations between Polish Jewry and the WJRO, Stanislaw Krajewski,\textsuperscript{41} a Polish Jewish intellectual and leader of Warsaw’s Jewish Forum at the time of the restitution controversies objected:

\begin{quote}
It’s convenient to say that there’s no Jewish community here. The more true that is, the easier it is for the WJRO to represent us. But there is a community and it gets stronger every year.\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

The heated debates between the WJRO and the local Jewish community in Poland were repeated with national variations in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe. These disagreements often hinged on the fact that the WJRO claimed to speak in the name of Diaspora survivors and perceived its’ role as the legitimate heir in distributing restitution settlements, whilst some members of indigenous Jewish communities in Central and Eastern Europe protested that they would rather negotiate directly with their national governments. Many also feared that the enormous restitution demands of the WJRO risked provoking right-wing ethno-nationalist backlash and popular resentment.

\textsuperscript{41}Krajewski was made a member of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Warsaw in 1997 and has played a number of important roles in Polish Jewish life. During the 1980s he was a member of the Solidarity movement and since the fall of Communism he has not only co-founded the Council of Christians and Jews (1991), but he has also been a member of the Executive Committee of the International Council of Christians and Jews (1992-1998); a consultant to the American Jewish Committee (from 1993) as well as a member of the International Auschwitz Council. He has also been an affiliate to the board of the Union of Jewish Religious Communities in Poland (1997-2006); a member of the team preparing the Museum of the History of Polish Jews in Warsaw and finally, an affiliate of the Centre for the Study of Jewish-Christian Relations at Cambridge. He is the author of \textit{Poland and the Jews: The Reflections of a Polish Polish Jew} (Krakow: Austeria, 2005), and he has also written, ‘Auschwitz at the Threshold of the New Millennium’, in \textit{Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide, Volume 3: Memory}, ed. John K. Roth, Elisabeth Maxwell and Margot Levy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). For further biographical details see: ‘The Centre for the Study of Jewish Christian Relations website (http://www.woolf.cam.ac.uk/cjcr/). Accessed: 25/07/2011. There is also information on Krajewski in Gabriel N. Finder, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{Polin: Studies in Polish Jewry Volume Twenty: Making Holocaust Memory}, ed. Finder, Aleksuinn, Polonsky and Schwarz, p. 3 and p. 38.

\textsuperscript{42}Stanislaw Krajewski quoted in Halevi, ‘The Accounting’.
in the post-Soviet states. An example of the materialization of these fears would be the fact that in the run-up to the 1997 restitution legislation, Polish state apologies for anti-Semitic pogroms in the wake of the Second World War met with ethno-nationalist backlash from the President of the American Polish Congress, Edward Moskal, who criticized the Polish government of, “excessive submissiveness to Jewish demands.”

The result of this tense situation was that although the WJRO had been contractually empowered to negotiate on the behalf of Central and Eastern European Jewry in various nations, this representation was far from uncontested. Lavie accused Polish Jews of twice trying to withdraw from their agreement with the WJRO whilst the Hungarian Jewish community consented to co-operate with the WJRO but forbade the body from speaking on its behalf. Peter Feldmayer, President of the Hungarian Jewish Community even went as far as saying that, “Each country is different, but the WJRO looks at all countries as being one problem. Naphtali Lavie treats us like a dictator.”

However, perhaps the deepest divisions were evident in the Czech Republic where Jewish community leaders refused to sign an agreement with the WJRO. Czech community leaders and the WJRO fundamentally disagreed over the amount of confiscated Jewish property to seek restitution for. Czech Jews sought 202 buildings whilst the WJRO put the figure at a bare minimum of 1000. Tomas Kraus, director of the Czech Jewish Community argued that the WJRO estimate was inaccurate because it included properties that had been sold prior to World War II, whilst Lavie argued that the Czech number was too low because it did not figure into the calculation the real estate on which razed Jewish properties had once been present. These tensions over

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43 Halevi, ‘The Accounting’.
45 Halevi, ‘The Accounting’.
46 Ibid.
the restitution of communal property reached boiling point when Lavie started negotiations with the Czech government without liaising with local Jewish leaders first.

Compounding these divisions between the WJRO and Czech Jewry, restitution of Jewish property in the Czech Republic has also suffered from both the indifference of Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus (1992-1997) as well as political fears within the nation that successful Jewish restitution might inadvertently encourage the territorial claims of the Sudeten Germans, even though Jewish advocates have emphasized the distinctiveness as opposed to the comparability of post-Holocaust issues and the Sudeten case. For these reasons a more comprehensive government bill outlining the restitution of Jewish property was defeated in 1994. As a result, although the Czech Jewish community was supported in its claims by Czech Republic President Václav Havel (1993-2003), and although it benefitted from two restituted synagogues and a cemetery at the heart of Prague’s frequently visited Jewish Quarter, the vast majority of Czech restituted Jewish properties have little commercial worth whilst funding for the small Jewish community of 4000 is largely sustained by one cash rich property in Prague.

However, despite or perhaps because of the shortcomings and controversies of many of these settlements, it can be tentatively proposed that the renewed emphasis on restitution issues and Jewish cultural heritage in the former Soviet bloc, was an important factor in making the SIF 2000 and the ITF’s focus on Holocaust research, remembrance and education relevant to Western, Central and Eastern European states at

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the turn of the millennium. This is because the high profile of the restitution campaigns helped to renew public interest in Jewish Civilization and the Holocaust in the post-Communist bloc; whilst backlash against Jewish restitution among some groups in former Soviet countries could be interpreted as implying the necessity of Holocaust education, remembrance and research programmes in the region. Finally, against the backdrop of concerns expressed at how post-Soviet democracies would cope with the economic burdens of restitution,\(^5\) there was perhaps also the sense that Western nations should not just make demands but also contribute to the process of dealing with the post-Communist legacies of the Nazi past, a notion that was perhaps most fully realized in the idea of ITF ‘Liaison Projects.’

Furthermore, Eizenstat’s efforts to promote Western norms of property law and democracy in the former Soviet bloc also coincided with a series of extremely controversial American class action law suits and attendant compensation deals in Western Europe which he also helped to arbitrate in the mid-late 1990s. Marrus has perceived these deals as being significant for the central role played by individuals, claimant groups and class action lawyers in registering dissatisfaction with Western government led processes of reparation and restitution which had emerged during the Cold War era.\(^5\) However, although a significant innovation, the role of these class action lawyers also proved incredibly contentious with public outrage being expressed at exploitative behavior, high legal fees, publicity stunts as well as the vexed questions posed by the role of Jewish lawyers who defended banks and corporations during the


Holocaust law suits.\textsuperscript{53} Despite these controversies, important final settlements included the Swiss banks agreement to pay $1.25 billion to Jews, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roma and Sinti, Homosexuals and the disabled after a class action lawsuit was resolved at the Brooklyn Courthouse, New York on August 12\textsuperscript{th} 1998.\textsuperscript{54}

Other issues dealt with included German industry’s use of forced and slave labor during the war; Austria’s failure to restitute Jewish looted property and pay for its use of forced and slave labour and finally issues concerning the French spoliation of Jews under the Vichy regime.\textsuperscript{55} Emerging from the dynamics of these settlements was also the establishment in 1998 of the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims (ICHEIC). Founded by state insurance commissioners, survivor organizations, Jewish groups, the Israeli government and funded by various European insurance companies (Switzerland’s Zurich and Winterhur; Italy’s Generali, Germany’s Allianz and France’s Axa), ICHEIC was commissioned, “...to resolve and pay claims by survivors and heirs of Nazi victims who contend companies refused to pay their families’ life insurance policies.”\textsuperscript{56}

Indeed, during the SIF 2000 itself, news about the reparation campaigns in Western


\textsuperscript{54} Marrus, \textit{Some Measure of Justice}, p. 111.

\textsuperscript{55} Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}.

\textsuperscript{56} Nacha Cattan, ‘Restitution Leader Disbarred by Court After Investigation of Job Misconduct’, \textit{The Forward}, 5 September 2003. Despite initial hopes, during the noughties, ICHEIC was frequently critiqued for being slow, inefficient in processing claims, and wasteful, allegedly spending approximately $40 million on operating costs. Moreover, in June 2002, the Commission was hit hard by scandal, when Neil Sher, Chief of Staff at ICHEIC and former director of the Office of Special Investigations (1983-1994) resigned from his position, allegedly because he had been misappropriating funds for air travel. (Nathaniel Popper, ‘Agency Slow to Handle Holocaust Claims’, \textit{The Forward}, 10 December 2004; Netty C. Gross, ‘The Greatest Theft in History’. \textit{The Jerusalem Report}, 5 April 2004.)
Europe were evident in the British press. For example, on 26th January 2000 it was publically announced that the German cabinet had accepted a draft bill which laid the groundwork for a $5 billion compensation fund for victims of slave labor policies during World War II.57 Just over half of the former victims to be covered by the bill were Jewish whilst the rest of potential claimants tended to be Polish or Russian non-Jews.58 However, the campaigns and class action law suits of the 1990s were more than just a contextual factor for the convening of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust education, remembrance and research. This was for three main reasons. Firstly, as part of the process of reaching settlements, national historical commissions were established which preceded the SIF 2000’s invocation that nation’s should research their Holocaust era pasts. For example, almost two dozen historical commissions were established by different national governments in response to campaigns for compensation, including the Bergier Committee (1997) which was commissioned for five years to examine Swiss history during the Second World War.59 Furthermore, American legal historian and expert on Holocaust reparation and restitution in the 1990s, Michael Bazyler has noted that the positive step taken by countries and corporations to establish historical commissions and, “finally ‘come clean’ would not be occurring without the spotlight being shined on their activities through the lawsuits in the United States.”60

Secondly, as part of the controversies that reparation and restitution campaigns generated in both Western and Eastern Europe, critical questions were raised as to the appropriate legacy of the Holocaust and Nazi era crimes. For example, an article by

58 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 206.
59 Marrus, Some Measure of Justice, p. 131.
Yossi Klein Halevi in *The Jerusalem Report* of March 1997 documented some of the most polarized opinions.\(^6^1\) Holocaust survivor and editor of Macmillan’s *The Encyclopedia of the Holocaust*, Gutman expressed concerns that:

> In principle restitution is just. But I’m very worried that this demand will create the impression that our historical account with Europe is associated with one issue. We’re talking about the destruction of a civilization.\(^6^2\)

Equally, French Jewish leader, Theo Klein focused on one national perspective and articulated his anxiety that restitution campaigns might result in anti-Semitic backlash:

> For 2000 years, the Jews were identified with money in the popular imagination. If we turn the memory of the Holocaust into a demand for reparations with interest that could haunt not only the (French) community but the whole Jewish people.\(^6^3\)

Finally, Efraim Zuroff of the Simon Wiesenthal Center’s Israel Office objected that:

> No people can present the world with an unlimited number of moral demands. Our efforts would be far better invested in issues related to bringing war criminals to justice. Putting our efforts into reclaiming material assets will only reinforce anti-Semitic stereotypes.\(^6^4\)

These concerns raised by the reparation and restitution campaigns particularly in relation to anti-Semitism and promoting knowledge and awareness about the destruction of Jewish civilization during the Second World War, undoubtedly infused Eizenstat’s conviction which was articulated at the SIF 2000 that, “Financial restitution, while critical, cannot be the last word on the Holocaust...[this]... conference assures education, remembrance and research will be.”\(^6^5\)

Finally, issues of reparation and restitution directly influenced the policies of the ITF.

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\(^{6^1}\) Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’.

\(^{6^2}\) Yisrael Gutman in Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’.

\(^{6^3}\) Theo Klein in Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’.

\(^{6^4}\) Efraim Zuroff in Halevi, ‘Reducing the Holocaust to a Search for Assets’.

and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000 because of the precedents in promoting archival research and education about the Holocaust set in motion by two international conferences, organized to deal with issues of gold, art and property in the late 1990s. These international conferences were the London Conference on Nazi Gold (LCNG, 2\textsuperscript{nd} - 4\textsuperscript{th} December 1997) and the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets (WCHA, 30\textsuperscript{th} November – 3\textsuperscript{rd} December 1998). Supported by the representative of Britain’s New Labour government, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook and at the initiative of Lord Greville Janner, the LCNG was convened at Lancaster House with forty governments in attendance. The purpose of the conference was to decide what would happen to the remaining five and a half metric tonnes of looted Nazi gold which had been requisitioned by the allies from the Germans at the end of the Second World War.\footnote{Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 
\textit{Nazi Gold: The London Conference, 2-4 December 1997} (London: The Stationary Office, 1998). For a report on controversies at the conference see: Jenni Frazer, ‘Major differences sour atmosphere at London Nazi Gold Conference’, \textit{The Jewish Chronicle}, 5 December 1997.} In the post-war period, countries from whom the gold was stolen managed to recover approximately 65\% of their looted gold through a process which was administered by the Tripartite Gold Commission (TGC) under the trusteeship of the British, French and American governments.\footnote{Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}, p. 12.} As individual claimants had received nothing from the account, it was the agenda of the British and Americans at the conference to convince countries eligible to donate their share to a victim’s fund.\footnote{Robin Cook, ‘Opening Speech by the Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon Robin Cook, MP’, in \textit{Nazi Gold: The London Conference}, p. 6-7.} Furthermore, and significant in relation to the future themes of the SIF 2000, it was also the goal of the LCNG to encourage all countries and institutions including the Russian Federation, the Vatican and the Reichsbank to allow unfettered access to their wartime archives.\footnote{Stuart Eizenstat, ‘Opening Plenary Statement by Stuart Eizenstat, U.S Under-Secretary of State’, in \textit{Nazi Gold: The London Conference}, p. 10.} The result of the LCNG was the formulation of the International Persecutee Relief Fund for Survivors as well as the encouragement of nations to open their archives.
to researchers and establish historical commissions.\textsuperscript{70} Building on the process initiated at the LCNG and organized by the U.S Department of State and the USHMM, the WCHA was attended by the representatives of forty-four governments and thirteen NGOs including: the American Gathering of Jewish Holocaust Survivors; the American Jewish Committee and the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee; the Anti-Defamation League; B’nai B’rith International; the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany; the European Council of Jewish Communities and the European Jewish Congress; the WJRO and Yad Vashem.\textsuperscript{71} Representatives from the Holy See and the International Romani Union were also involved as were observers from Sotheby’s, Christie’s and the Pink Triangle Coalition.\textsuperscript{72}

The principle focus of the WCHA was the continuing problems surrounding cultural property, in particular the ownership, sale and display in museums of art looted by the Nazis during the Second World War. It has been estimated that up to 600,000 paintings were stolen by the Third Reich and up to 100,000 still remain missing.\textsuperscript{73} This situation was further complicated by the fact that in response to the Nazis mass plunder and destruction of Russian cultural artifacts during Operation Barbarossa, the Soviets looted and hoarded vast quantities of German art as the war turned in the allies favor and the Soviets advanced westwards. Most of these artifacts remained in Soviet hands

\textsuperscript{70} Robin Cook, ‘Closing Statement by the Foreign Secretary, the Rt Hon Robin Cook, MP’, in Nazi Gold: The London Conference, p. 789.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., pp. 949-970.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid., pp. 969-970.
\textsuperscript{73} Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 187.
throughout the Cold War. As a result, it was imperative at the WCHA that Russia be at least willing to discuss divesting itself of this ‘trophy art’. However, although some liberal reformist Russians such as authors of *Beautiful Loot* (1995), Konstantin Akinsha and Grigori Kozlov have advocated the public display and restitution to Germany of some of these expropriated cultural artifacts, for the vast majority of Russians these objects remain potent symbols of both national heroism and due recompense for Soviet suffering at the hands of the Nazis during the Second World War. As a result, the dispute over the restitution of Soviet looted art to Germany is particularly intense and emotional.

However, although these issues were the central focus of the WCHA, the conference also arguably influenced the SIF 2000 in two key ways. Firstly, a primary outcome of the WCHA was the Washington Principles, a non-binding document that was nevertheless adopted by a consensus among delegates present, including Russia. Encouraging “…countries to act within the context of their own laws”, the Principles implied that governments, museums, auction houses and galleries should attempt to trace looted art by researching the provenance of the items in their holdings; encourage nations to develop set procedures to resolve competing art claims as well as deal with heirless works of Nazi looted art. Although addressing different issues, the non-binding format of the Washington Principles can be perceived as being mirrored in the subsequent construction of the Stockholm Declaration. Secondly, the WCHA can be

74 Eizenstat, *Imperfect Justice*, p. 188.
75 Ibid., pp. 190-191 and pp. 198-199.
79 Ibid., pp. 971-972.
perceived as marking a significant moment in the history of the ITF through the elucidation at the conference of a number of concrete short and long term projects in Holocaust education, remembrance and research. These projects will be described and explored in more detail in chapter two, which analyzes the early years of the ITF and the subsequent organization of the SIF 2000.

However, it should also be noted that the allocation of funds to support programmes of Holocaust education, remembrance and research which was advocated by some speakers at events such as the WCHA was not without its critics. For example, the French Matteoli Report on Jewish confiscated assets (2000) proposed that unclaimed Jewish restitution funds should contribute to the maintenance of a National Memory Foundation. This provoked outrage from Jean-Jacques Franckel, whose parents had been deported to Auschwitz. For Franckel, who sued the French state, “The money should go to survivors, not for monuments or to cover the deficits of Jewish community organizations. We are the victims of a second looting.”

Despite the strong opinions of survivors like Franckel, the presence of the ITF and questions regarding Holocaust pedagogy and memorialization at the WCHA in December 1998 suggests that Eizenstat’s and Gutman’s concerns that the last word about the Holocaust at the beginning of the new millennium should not be about money had been taken on board. The next section will deal with a second set of important circumstances for the establishment of the ITF in May 1998 and the successful convening of the SIF 2000. These factors concern the relationship of the founding of the ITF to the launch of Sweden’s Living History campaign in 1997; the Western and

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Eastern European experience of anti-Semitic backlash against the Holocaust restitution movements of the 1990s as well as the troubling rise of the far right and Holocaust denial in the post-Cold War context of a reunified continent.

**The Establishment of Sweden's Living History campaign (1997) and Liberal Fears Concerning the Growth of the Popular and Far Right in the 1990s**

The idea for the ITF and the SIF 2000 on Holocaust research, remembrance and education grew out of Sweden’s *Living History* campaign which was instigated by Social Democratic Prime Minister, Göran Persson in 1997. Sweden had been a neutral country during the Second World War. However, the Swiss bank scandals and a report by the American government entitled, *U.S and Allied Efforts to Recover and Restore Gold and Other Assets Stolen or Hidden by Germany during World War II* (1997) had demonstrated that even neutral nations were expected to confront their Nazi past. In this report Sweden had been criticized for protecting German shipping, allowing the Wehrmacht to cross its borders, and selling iron ore and ball bearings to the Third Reich.  

Against this backdrop of pressure to confront the Nazi past, Persson was also perturbed by a survey by the Centre for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations in co-operation with the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention which suggested that many Swedish schoolchildren were not even sure that the Holocaust had occurred. It was also felt that this lack of knowledge made young people more vulnerable to the propaganda of far right-wing extremists like David Janzon, groups such as the Swedish National Alliance (Sveriges Nationella Förbund) as

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well as Holocaust deniers such as the Swedish based Muslim anti-Zionist and founder of Radio Islam, Ahmed Rami. These fears over the erasure of Holocaust memory were further compounded by the proliferation of Holocaust denial and what Roger Griffin calls ‘cyber-fascism’ on the Internet as well as by the gradual passing away of an aging population of Holocaust survivors.

Attempting to rectify this situation and following a parliamentary debate in June 1997 in which Persson personally pledged to take action on these issues, the Swedish government launched an information campaign about the Holocaust entitled Living History. This campaign was directed by the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office and was conducted at both the national and local levels. Living History sought to initiate a social discussion about the Holocaust within the context of issues such as democracy, tolerance and equality and the campaign became in Persson’s words, “…a broad popular movement in the classic Swedish mould.” Swedish schools were offered training programmes and educational materials, whilst a research centre for the Holocaust and genocide was established at Uppsala University. Furthermore, as part of the Living History project the Swedish government commissioned Stéphan Bruchfeld and American scholar living in Sweden, Paul A. Levine to write a short history of the Holocaust as an “academic anchor” for the Living History campaign. Levine commented of his experience writing Tell Ye Your Children: A Book about the Holocaust in Europe, 1933-1945:

87 ‘Stockholm Meeting on the Holocaust...tell ye your children...Summary from the meeting of 7 May 1998 in Stockholm’ (Stockholm: The Living History Forum, 1998), p. 3.
88 ‘Interview with Dr. Paul Levine’.
Stéphan and I worked like complete idiots. And literally did this book from scratch to finish in seven working weeks...We had help of course, but the last three weeks we were working about twenty hours because it had to be ready for the ceremony at Berwaldhallen, a concert hall in Stockholm because the King and Queen were booked. And we got it ready. And I think they printed off, 500 copies for 27th January [1998].

Comprising eighty-five pages and approximately fifty photographs, the intention of the Swedish government was that adults would read what became known as ‘the book’ with their children and educate them about the Holocaust. Initially, former German State Minister for Culture and Media at the time of the SIF 2000 and current publisher of Die Zeit, Michael Naumann criticized ‘the book’ for not mentioning, “…Kiruna, a city in northern Sweden” that had played an “…important role in maintaining the war industry and Nazi Germany’s ability to wage war.” However, in general, the publication of Tell Ye Your Children met with widespread critical acclaim. Yehuda Bauer is reported by Levine to have described it as ‘the best history of the Holocaust available under one hundred pages’, whilst on its launch in January 1998, a survivor of the Lodz ghetto was overwhelmed by ‘the book’. Against this backdrop of recommendation, by May 1998, approximately 400,000 parents had filled in a form to request a free copy of Tell Ye Your Children from the Swedish government, whilst a further 200,000 copies had been requested by private individuals and made available to libraries, schools and pensioners organizations. Provision was also made to translate Tell Ye Your Children into the seven major immigrant languages in Sweden (English, Spanish, Finnish, Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Serbo-Croatian) as well as producing accompanying versions for the disabled. The success of the Living History campaign and Tell Ye Your Children became a critical factor in motivating Persson to pursue the idea of an

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89 ‘Interview with Dr. Paul Levine’.
90 Michael Naumann quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 79.
91 ‘Interview with Dr. Paul Levine’.
92 ‘Stockholm Meeting on the Holocaust...tell ye your children...Summary from the meeting of 7 May 1998 in Stockholm’, p. 3.
93 Ibid., p. 7.

Against the backdrop of the success of *Tell Ye Your Children*, the subsequent establishment of the ITF with the Americans and British in May 1998 as well as the elucidation of goals for the ITF at the WCHA, fears over the role of the political extreme right in Swedish public life were further compounded by the Swedish police’s allegations that far right-wing groups were responsible for the death of a labour union leader and two police officers in 1999;\(^94\) whilst the SIF 2000 itself unfolded at the same time as the prosecution of three Swedish Neo-Nazis for distributing and selling far right-wing propaganda.\(^95\) That said the resurgence of extreme right-wing groups as well as softer right-wing populist parties marked by euro-skepticism and anti-immigration policies was not just a Swedish concern. This feeling of pan-European liberal anxiety over the increasing presence of populist right-wing political parties and far right-wing political organizations in the 1990s was perhaps a further factor in why the founding of the ITF and the organization of the SIF 2000 garnered such widespread European support in January 2000.

This resurgence in right-wing activity included the fact that Silvio Berlusconi’s ‘Freedom Alliance’ won the Italian elections in March 1994,\(^96\) the French *Front National* made major gains in the elections of June 1995,\(^97\) whilst far from consensual contrition for the violations of Swiss neutrality in relation to the Third Reich during the

\(^{97}\) Ibid., p. 190.
Second World War, the Swiss ‘public sphere’ during the 1990s was deeply divided over the questions of reparations and restitution and there was even a resurgence of anti-Semitism in Switzerland. Regula Ludi has chronicled how Swiss Cold War ‘special case’ rhetoric of militarized ‘neutrality’, national independence and heroism had elided from public view the nation’s economic collaboration with Nazism, its political concessions to the Third Reich as well as its humanitarian failures in regards to Jewish refugees. Some members of the Swiss polis resented the breaking of this Cold War consensus and right-wing politicians such as Christoph Blocher exploited this potent resentment over reparations and restitution in order to make his People’s Party the second most powerful political collective in the Swiss parliament. Reinforcing his position in 1997, he commented, “Switzerland had no reason to apologize for doing business with Nazi Germany in order to survive as a neutral country.” Whilst the presence of Blocher in Swiss politics was undoubtedly a concern, 1995 Swiss ‘anti-racism’ legislation had facilitated the conviction of Holocaust deniers Jürgen Graf (1998) and Gaston-Armand Amaudruz (2000 and 2003).

Furthermore, against the backdrop of negotiations to deal with Austria’s failure to restitute Jewish looted property and pay for its use of forced and slave labor, Jörg Haider’s populist right-wing Freedom Party was elected the second strongest party in the Austrian parliament of October 1999. This was a particularly disturbing electoral development in Western Europe given Haider’s personal and political background. Haider was born in 1950 and his parents had been active National Socialists, whilst the

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99 Christoph Blocher quoted in Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 99.
100 Atkins, Holocaust Denial as an International Movement, pp. 132-135. Whilst waiting for the results of an appeal, Graf escaped Switzerland and the completion of his prison sentence. According to Atkins, Graf eventually ended up as a translator in Moscow.
101 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 284.
family’s 38,000 acre estate in Carinthia, ‘the Valley of the Bears’ had been appropriated by one of Haider’s relatives, a local Nazi official from the widow of an Italian Jewish timber businessman for a fraction of the property’s worth in 1940.\textsuperscript{102} Politically Haider was notorious for his anti-Semitic statements and attendance at a meeting of former SS officers at Ulrichsberg in Carinthia in 1995 where he commented, “The Waffen SS was a part of the Wehrmacht and hence it deserves all the honor and respect of the army in public life”.\textsuperscript{103} Given the importance of the Haider controversy in the media reception of the SIF 2000, which will be explored in chapter two, this section will briefly delineate Haider’s position within the politics of Austrian collective memory of the Nazi past.

Haider’s right-wing attitudes towards the Nazi past were clearly a product of his family background. However it is also arguable that they had been reinforced by the Cold War mythologization of the memory of the Holocaust in Austria. Aided by growing American indifference to DeNazification as the Cold War intensified, Austrian governments had often used the rhetoric of the Moscow Declaration of 30\textsuperscript{th} October 1943 which stated that Austria was the “first free country to fall to Hitler’s aggression” in order to over-exaggerate the role of Austrian resistance to the Nazi regime and de-emphasize the extent of Austrian collaboration with the Nazis. This collaboration had included the fact that an estimated 7000 Austrian-Jewish businesses were ‘Aryanized’ between March and June 1938, approximately 60,000 Austrian Jews were murdered in Nazi extermination and concentration camps, whilst, Austrians had comprised up to 14\% of the SS and as many as 40\% of the perpetrators in Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{104}  

\textsuperscript{104} Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}, pp. 280-281.
1956, the Freedom Party which succeeded the League of Independents became a rallying ground for the articulation of the agenda of these ex-Nazis. The Freedom Party was politically positioned between the socialist left and the clerical conservatives and its supporters had the potential to swing the results of national elections. As a result of this, both socialist and conservative camps attempted to appease Freedom Party interests, culminating in socialist chancellor Bruno Kreisky’s appointment of four ex-Nazis to his cabinet in 1970.\textsuperscript{105}

However, scandals that had erupted in the 1960s surrounding the anti-Semitic and pan-Germanic statements of Vienna University of World Trade Professor, Tara Borodajkewycz and the controversy surrounding Helmut Qualtinger’s television play, \textit{Der Herr Karl} (1961) had begun the process of challenging this post-war Austrian national mythology. That said it was not until the Kurt Waldheim affair in 1986, when the former general secretary of the UN and OVP Federal presidency candidate was publically confronted with his own service record in the German Wehrmacht that liberal Austrians began to accept a ‘co-responsibility’ thesis for the nation’s complicity in Nazi crimes.\textsuperscript{106} Within this context, Haider’s right-wing attitudes towards the Nazi past represented a deeply perturbing desire to disavow the horrors and responsibilities of history in order to preserve the dignity of Austrian nationhood. In his bid for political influence Haider also systematically exploited the political capital arising from social anxieties concerning the breakdown of the Cold War state-orientated Austrian economic system in the 1980s in favor of a more competitive neo-liberal model of global commerce. He also utilized concerns raised about national sovereignty issuing from

\textsuperscript{105} Wistrich, ‘Haider and His Critics’.
Austria’s late entry into the EU in 1996 and, like other members of the West European populist right, played on social anxieties about domestic employment levels in terms of the eastwards expansion of the EU and accompanying levels of immigration.\textsuperscript{107}

That said, illustrating the even broader relevance of Persson’s project, the rise of the populist and far right in the 1990s was not an issue confined to Western Europe but was also a problem in Eastern Europe,\textsuperscript{108} where Tismaneanu has described a condition of ‘cultural despair’ since 1989. ‘Cultural Despair’ refers to the political and economic dislocations arising from the fall of Communism which resulted in resurgent ethno-nationalism and accompanying skepticism towards the EU, liberal democracy and the memory of the Holocaust among far right groups in countries such as Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and the Baltic States.\textsuperscript{109} For example, ultranationalists in Romania in the 1990s such as Iosif Constantin Dragan, owner of the right-wing weekly newspaper, Europa as well as the writer Cornelieu Vadim Tudor, who established the far right political party and weekly publication, Greater Romania were responsible for denying the Holocaust in order to rehabilitate the reputation of Second World War Romanian dictator and collaborator in the Nazi perpetration of the Holocaust, General Ion Antonescu.\textsuperscript{110} This situation was mirrored in Slovakia where leader of the Slovak National Unity Party and economist, Stanislav Pánis denied the Holocaust in order to restore the reputation of Nazi collaborator and Slovakian leader, Josef Tiso.\textsuperscript{111}

Furthermore, antipathy towards remembrance of the Holocaust in the post-Soviet states

\textsuperscript{107} Musner, ‘Memory and Globalization’, pp. 77-91.
\textsuperscript{110} Atkins, Holocaust Denial as an International Movement, p. 140.
\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., pp. 140-141.
has often been exacerbated by the politics of competitive victimhood between members of ethno-nationalist groupings who feel that their suffering equaled, if not surpassed that of the Jews under both Nazism and Communism.\textsuperscript{112} For example, in the Polish national context, these issues over competing Polish and Jewish victimhood were crystallised in the debate over the presence of the Catholic Carmelite convent at Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{113} This conflict had been most heated during the 1970s and 1980s but re-surfaced forcefully in the year preceding the SIF 2000 over the ‘War of the Crosses’ that played itself out in the gravel pit of the same Convent (March 1998 - May 1999).\textsuperscript{114} Responding to rumours that the eight metre high ‘papal cross’ would be removed from the grounds of Auschwitz, former deputy of the Confederation of Independent Poland and ex-Solidarity activist, Kazimierz Switon agitated Poles to plant 152 crosses in the gravel pit in order to memorialise the Nazi perpetrated execution of 152 Poles in 1941 and to ‘protect and defend the papal cross’ as a national symbol.\textsuperscript{115} Many of the leading figures in the Polish ‘War of the Crosses’ (1998-1999), including leader Switon, reflected extreme and marginal viewpoints that were expressed in Far Right weekly, \textit{Nasz Polska} or in the national Catholic daily, \textit{Nasz Dziennik}, a publication associated with Radio Maryja, a right-wing Catholic media organization preaching anti-liberalism, anti-Semitism and anti-Communism.\textsuperscript{116}

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\textsuperscript{112} This will be explored in more depth in relation to Lithuania, in chapter four.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 309.
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Provoking schism within the Polish Catholic church and consternation from both the Israeli government and a group of U.S. congressional representatives, the Polish army did not remove all the crosses until May 1999, by which time there were 322 crosses planted in the gravel pit. Within the controversial context of Polish Catholicism and the history of Polish anti-Semitism what the ‘War of the Crosses’ demonstrates is the ongoing and, “...contested meaning of Auschwitz and the problematic presence of a Christian symbol at that site...”117 Furthermore, Geneviéve Zubrzycki has also suggested that the ‘War of the Crosses’ can be perceived as demonstrating the fact that in relation to the memorialization of the Holocaust, “…more nationalistic Poles specifically resent dictates from the West as to the proper focus of work on postwar memory and identity.”118 It is within this context of ethno-nationalist reaction and in opposition to the representation of liberal consensus implicit in documents such as the Stockholm Declaration (2000) that more skeptical commentators such as Konstanty Gebert,119 the infamous Polish-Jewish underground journalist Dawid Warszawski during Communism and current contributor to the Gazeta Wyborcza, have predicted that Polish and Jewish memory of the Second World War will never be reconciled, but will instead always be subject to ongoing contestation and debate.120

Analyzing the rise of the radical right in Western and Eastern Europe in the 1990s, Diethelm Prowe noted, “The social antagonism which fuels the hateful language and

violence of the present radical right is that of an emerging European multicultural society”, whilst the Holocaust has, “…become the central object of hateful rejection and denial for the right today.” In many respects, it was this situation that Persson’s Living History campaign sought to address, whilst combating Holocaust denial was also an important factor motivating the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000. Indeed, the shadow of high profile Holocaust denial was even present in the run-up to the conference. This was a result of the libel trial that British right-wing historian David Irving was bringing against American historian Deborah Lipstadt and Penguin Books over his representation in her 1995 book, Denying the Holocaust. However, despite the undisputable merits of Persson’s project, as Gebert and Zubrzycki have suggested and as will be explored in chapters three and four, battling Holocaust denial, ethno-nationalism and extreme right-wing backlash in various nation-states would remain one of toughest challenges posed to the ITF in the first decade of its’ existence.

**Precedents in Inter-Cultural Collaboration in Holocaust Memory Work**

Inter-cultural co-operation in the construction of the memory of the Holocaust stimulated by the SIF 2000 and the establishment of the ITF also needs to be perceived within a much longer historical trajectory of international developments in Holocaust

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remembrance that if not always initiated, were intensified as a result of the fall of Communism between 1989 and 1991. This short case study of global Holocaust NGOs and institutional relations between the USHMM, the State Museum Auschwitz-Birkenau and the IWM, London will demonstrate the increasing importance of inter-cultural collaboration in the production of institutional Holocaust representations in the period directly preceding the convening of the SIF 2000 and the theorization of the ITF’s notion of ‘Liaison Projects’ in the late 1990s. This is not to say that these inter-cultural collaborations directly caused the SIF 2000. Rather these examples of inter-cultural teamwork demonstrate that there were several paradigms of international co-operation in Holocaust memory work already in place that the WCHA and the SIF 2000 utilized as examples in their own specialist led panels. Furthermore, the ITF would draw on the expert personnel in these museums and NGOs for support in its own cross cultural collaborations enacted in national arenas after 2000.

Some of the groundwork for the global ethos evident in the SIF 2000 and the ITF’s inter-cultural collaborations had been laid by specific institutions such as the USHMM during the 1980s and 1990s. The USHMM was commissioned by the Carter administration in 1978 as a result of fears raised by a Neo-Nazi march in Skokie, Illinois; as a pacifier to an American Jewish public who were enraged by the government’s sale of military planes to Saudi Arabia and as an emblem of the Carter administration’s attempt to make human rights integral to American foreign policy.123 The importance of Eastern Europe as both an imaginative space in the museum planner’s horizon and as a somewhat grotesque cabinet of curiosities for artifact collection is illustrated by two examples. Firstly, in the summer of 1979, USHMM

commission members embarked on a research trip to Eastern Europe and Israel on which many participants were appalled by Soviet distortions of the memory of the Holocaust. For example, Elie Wiesel, survivor of Auschwitz and Chairman of the United States Holocaust Memorial Council until his resignation in 1986, was furious that the commemorative monument at Babi Yar in Ukraine did not mention the word ‘Jew’. Subsequently, this tour became almost paradigmatic for any high level official recruited to join the effort to construct the USHMM in the 1980s and early 1990s. This was because the visit to sites such as the Warsaw Ghetto, Treblinka and Auschwitz-Birkenau was perceived to underscore the enormous tragedy of the Holocaust as well as demonstrating the Soviet ideological distortions that the USHMM sought to correct.

Secondly, the USHMM recognized opportunities for ‘artifact collection’ presented by the post-1989 dismantling of Communism. As a result, by 1992 and the opening of the USHMM in 1993, Chairman of the International Relations Committee Miles Lerman, “…had signed official agreements with every Eastern European country except Albania, not only paving the way for artifact collection, but allowing the museum to copy massive amounts of archival material heretofore inaccessible to scholars.”

Against the backdrop of these changes wrought by the end of the Cold War, in the autumn of 1989, Polish Prime Minister, representative of Solidarity’s left-wing and member of the Catholic intelligentsia, Tadeusz Mazowiecki recognized that given the Soviet distortions of the representation of history at Auschwitz-Birkenau the public memory of that site needed to be reformed at the camp grounds and museum. These

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124 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, p. 28.
125 Ibid., p. 33.
126 Ibid., p. 35.
127 Ibid., p. 147.
distortions included the relegation of Jewish suffering to its primary exposition in the Jewish Pavilion, despite the fact that the majority of people murdered at Auschwitz-Birkenau had been Jews.\textsuperscript{129} This was illustrated during the 1990s, when analyst of the number of victims at Auschwitz-Birkenau, Francisek Piper revised the Communist estimate of victims at the camp from four million to considerably less than two million and more likely in the region of 1.3-1.5 million.\textsuperscript{130} Alongside these calculations, Piper also proposed that there were two key phases at the camp complex, the first period, 1940-1942, where most of the prisoners killed, primarily at Auschwitz 1 were Polish, and the second stage from the middle of 1942 onwards, when the majority of those murdered were Jews at Birkenau.\textsuperscript{131}

As a result, one of the problems with the Auschwitz-Birkenau memorial and museum at the end of the Cold War, was that rather than recognizing these distinct historical phases and victim numbers, the Sovietization of Poland after 1945 had led to the subordination of the narrative of systematic anti-Semitic racial extermination at Birkenau to a Polish Communist ideologically driven interpretation which stressed the suffering and killing of national and left-wing political prisoners such as Poles, Communist resisters and socialists at the Auschwitz complex.\textsuperscript{132} Indeed, Jonathan Huener, a scholar of the history of the camp during the Communist period has noted how this form of

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\textsuperscript{129} Young, \textit{The Texture of Memory}, p. 152.

\textsuperscript{130} Francisek Piper, ‘Estimating the Number of Deportees to and Victims of the Auschwitz-Birkenau Camp’, \textit{Yad Vashem Studies}, No. 21 (1991), pp. 49-103. Furthermore, in 1996 Piper went as far to suggest that 1.1 million people are likely to have died at Auschwitz-Birkenau, of which 960,000 were Jews, 70-75,000 were Poles, 21,000 were Roma and Sinti, 15,000 were Soviet combatants whilst 10-15,000 were victims from other countries (Francisek Piper, ‘The Number of Victims in KL Auschwitz’, in \textit{Auschwitz Nazi Death Camp}, ed. Francisek Piper and Teresa Swiebocka (Oswiecim: Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum, 1996), pp. 182-195; Wollaston, ‘Auschwitz and the Politics of Commemoration’, p. 9.)


\textsuperscript{132} Young, \textit{The Texture of Memory}, p. 150.
remembrance was inaugurated at the camp’s first museum, opened in June 1947. For Huener, the historical narrative presented at this museum fundamentally drew on the legacy of ‘Poland’s martyrological culture’, whilst simultaneously incorporating Polish Communist doctrine as well as marginalizing, although not denying, the history of the persecution and extermination of the Jews at Auschwitz-Birkenau.

Furthermore, the need to reform the representation of the history of Auschwitz-Birkenau at the camp grounds and museum was also partly stimulated by increasing international pressure in the post-Cold War era. Before the demise of Communism, just 5 million of the 22 million visitors to Auschwitz-Birkenau, which had been granted the status of an UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1979, came from outside Poland. However, as Michael Steinlauf observed (1997), after the fall of the Berlin Wall, over half the people coming to the site have been from beyond Poland’s borders including Germans, Israelis and Jews from all over the world. One of the key consequences stimulated by these issues over the representation of history at Auschwitz-Birkenau for inter-cultural dynamics in Holocaust memory work was the convening of an important international conference entitled ‘The Future of Auschwitz’ in May 1990 at the Oxford Centre for Hebrew and Jewish Studies at Yarnton Manor. Organized in collaboration with the Polish Ministry of Culture, the result of these discussions between twenty-seven concentration camp survivors, academics, religious leaders and editors from nine countries across the globe was ‘The Yarnton Declaration of Jewish Intellectuals on the

Future of Auschwitz.\textsuperscript{137} This document recommended that the Polish government should consult with Holocaust research centres and survivor’s groups, whilst the museum at Auschwitz-Birkenau should be reformed to clearly demonstrate the most recent estimates of the numbers of prisoners murdered there; the specific victim status of the Jews who, “...\textit{aside, from the tribes of Sinti and Rom... were the only people condemned to death for the “crime” of having been born}”,\textsuperscript{138} as well as the fact:

3. that huge numbers of non-Jews, especially Poles, died at Auschwitz, and that the camp played a key role in the Nazi campaign to destroy Polish nationhood;

4. that both Jews and non-Jews murdered there were drawn from all walks of life and all political persuasions, from dozens of cultural, religious and national traditions;

5. that the atrocities committed were perpetrated by the German National Socialist regime and its collaborators.\textsuperscript{139}

In response to these recommendations the Polish government removed the inscription citing 4 million victims from the International Memorial at Auschwitz-Birkenau. However, owing to constant postponements it was not until 1992 that a new commemoration message was inscribed in nineteen languages at the International Memorial. Such is the public weight of this new message, that Professor Jonathan Webber, a British based Jewish Studies specialist, co-author of the new inscription and one of the founding members of the International Auschwitz Council, described it as a present day, “vernacular sacred text”\textsuperscript{140}, which reads as follows:

\textsuperscript{137} Young, \textit{The Texture of Memory}, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{138} Summary of the Yarnton Declaration signed by convenor Jonathan Webber and quoted from Young, \textit{The Texture of Memory}, p. 152.
\textsuperscript{139} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 152.
Let this place remain for eternity as a cry of despair and a warning to humanity. About one and a half million men, women, children, and infants, mainly Jews from different countries of Europe were murdered here. The World was silent. Auschwitz-Birkenau, 1940-1945.  

The international debate over the future of the Auschwitz State Museum was given further impetus in 1993 by Webber and was sustained with funding from TEMPUS, the European Union’s higher education modernization programme which primarily supports university co-operation projects with the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, Mediterranean states and countries in Central Asia. The results of these numerous national and international discussions over Auschwitz were a number of efforts at reforming the layout of the museum which included, “the recaptioning of photographic displays with information about Jewish victims, the translation of captions into Hebrew alongside European languages, and the retraining of some of the guides.”  

The role of the growing importance of inter-cultural co-operation in Holocaust memorialization prior to the SIF 2000 is also apparent in the planning of the UK’s permanent Holocaust exhibition at London’s IWM, an institution which is funded by the Department of Culture, Media and Sport and which also functions as the country’s national museum of twentieth century conflict. The Holocaust Exhibition was commissioned in 1995 and opened in June 2000, following important domestic developments such as the addition of the Holocaust to the British National Curriculum (1991) and two temporary exhibitions at the IWM on the Holocaust, ‘Belsen, 1945’ (1991) and a photographic exegesis on the Warsaw Ghetto (1993). The construction of the exhibition was also given a major boost by private funding and a £12.6 million

141 Incription at the International Memorial quoted in Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead, p. 136.  
142 Steinlauf, Bondage to the Dead, p. 136.  
Heritage Lottery Fund grant which was given in December 1996 on the grounds that the exhibition would be the IWM’s contribution to millennium year. According to British Holocaust memory studies scholar Steven Cooke as well as Curator of the Holocaust Exhibition, Bardgett, the decision to commission the IWM’s Holocaust Exhibition was also partly and not un-controversially influenced by developments in the USA, although the construction of the display remained primarily an IWM and UK based process:

The USHMM’s example was a really important factor in the decision to set up the Holocaust exhibition here because our Chairman and our then Director, Alan Borg went to see it, in I think about 1994, and were very impressed by it. And I think could see how something like that could work in the UK.

Equally, although the content of the permanent exhibition was principally guided by a British advisory board of experts, USHMM staff also played a key role in influencing what Bardgett has described as the Holocaust exhibition’s “purist approach” – historically analytical in content with heavy reliance on artifacts and audio-visual components but eschewing theatrical reconstructions. In line with this Annie Dodds and her October Films co-producer/director James Barker were enlisted to produce

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145 Cooke, “‘Your Story Too’”, pp. 593-594. Cooke has analyzed the discourses surrounding the London based exhibition in the years preceding its opening in June 2000 and has noted how the USHMM was a key reference point for public debates during the planning of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition. For example, public statements by the IWM suggested that the USHMM, if too large for a British project provided an “instructive’ model”. In response, Ben Helfgott, survivor of Buchenwald and Chair of the Yad Vashem (UK) Committee supported the IWM as a site for a Holocaust exhibition but, “...did not want to emulate American models”; whilst a 1994 Jewish Chronicle editorial rejected a USHMM style institution on the grounds that communal funds were limited; British Jewish identity ought to be more focused on the future as opposed to the tragedies of history as well as articulating fears that a Holocaust centered exhibition might result in alienating non-Jewish members of the British public. Cooke’s analysis also suggests that the USHMM was such a key reference point during these debates because of the global impact of the American museum in the early 1990s as well as the fact that like the U.S the UK was perceived as a ‘bystander’ nation.

146 ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.

147 Ibid.
films and edit existing footage to operate within the narrative of the exhibition.\footnote{148} These moving images included allied newsreels from the 1940s, Nazi propaganda films, amateur home movies as well as a series of specially recorded interviews with survivors.\footnote{149} USHMM Permanent Exhibition developer, documentary producer and member of the IWM Exhibition Advisory Group, Martin Smith as well as Raye Farr, Director of Film and Video at the U.S Holocaust Research Institute were also crucial in giving Dodds and Barker feedback about their work.\footnote{150} Furthermore, in May 2009, Bardgett recalled:

\begin{quote}
I remember the Head of the Acquisitions section of the USHMM just gave me all his contacts in Europe, sort of printed out, which saved me a huge amount of time because we’re talking pre-Internet age when we embarked on this programme.\footnote{151}
\end{quote}

Whilst recognizing the fact that any comment on this matter can only be purely speculative and that after 2000 the majority of the ITF’s funding would be concentrated in archival and educational as opposed to museum based projects, it is still worth posing the question as to whether the USHMM’s involvement during the construction of the IWM Holocaust exhibition could be perceived as a prototypical ‘Liaison Project’ experienced in a Western European as opposed to Eastern European region. To state this is not to detract from the fact that the production of the Holocaust exhibition was financed by the lottery and private donors as well as fundamentally based in an IWM curatorial team, with a primarily British based advisory group and also with consultation from other UK organizations such as Beth Shalom. Rather it is simply to highlight the role of the USHMM as a much appreciated advisory voice, and that this

\begin{footnotes}
\item[150] Bardgett, ‘Film and the Making of the Imperial War Museum’s Holocaust Exhibition’, p. 23.
\item[151] ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.
\end{footnotes}
type of international co-operation in Holocaust memory work was perceived as beneficial within the context of two states who were key founders and promoters of the ITF and its subsequent ‘Liaison Projects’ after 2000.

However, it was not just the USHMM who aided with the design of the IWM exhibition, the curatorial team spoke to Yad Vashem about their plans, whilst Teresa Swiebocka of the Auschwitz State Museum, “came over to look at the Auschwitz model and to make comments on where the particular trees would have been, the watchtowers, on what had been reconstructed.” Although the Auschwitz model at the IWM was produced specifically for the London based Holocaust exhibition, the idea of using a model of the camp as a display strategy had a number of historical precedents. For example, a white plaster representation of the slaughter of Jews in a gas chamber and crematoria at Auschwitz Birkenau was originally completed in 1948 by an ex-Polish underground fighter Mieczyslaw Stobierski who had based his design on the testimony of an SS guard who had administered the crematorium. This model was placed for public display in the Auschwitz barracks. Stobierski’s model was later reproduced for Yad Vashem, whilst the USHMM also asked Stobierski to make another copy for the American museum which was completed in December 1992. Stobierski’s model illustrates an important Polish iconographical contribution to international Holocaust memory work, whilst the IWM’s admittedly unique and bespoke Auschwitz model is also a further example of this institution initiating dialogues with types of display strategies already effectively utilized by institutions such as the Auschwitz State Museum, Yad Vashem and the USHMM.

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152 ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.
153 Ibid.
154 Linenthal, Preserving Memory, p. 205.
Moreover, the position of the Polish Ministry in organizing ‘the Future of Auschwitz’
conference, the role of Stobierski at Yad Vashem and the USHMM as well as the task
of Swiebocka at the IWM also highlights the fact that whilst developments such as the
SIF 2000 and the ITF would be initially spearheaded by Sweden, America and Britain,
Eastern European Holocaust organizations were not simply a passive arena for either
what has been deemed the power play of the ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust or the
institutional lending, copying or purchasing of archival materials by Western Holocaust
organizations after Communism. Rather Eastern European organizations participated as
active agents whose grassroots support and memorialization initiatives were and are
essential to the success of ongoing Holocaust memory work in the Western World and
Eastern Europe after Communism. As a result, the conclusion of the USHMM’s
permanent exhibition, which emphasizes the post-war emigration of survivors to Israel
and America and uses a casting of Cracow’s Remu synagogue’s memorial wall to stress
the post-war status of Europe as, “A Jewish Graveyard”, needs to be re-nuanced in light
of developments since the fall of Communism. For whilst chapter four will demonstrate
that serious challenges are still posed to Holocaust memorialization in some post-Soviet
states, ongoing efforts to commemorate the memory of the six million also need to be
perceived within the context of ‘Hidden Jews’ ‘coming out’ of the Communist closet in
Poland, the thriving Jewish Quarter in Prague and recent restorations of Jewish cultural
life such as the Dohány Street Synagogue in Budapest.155

From this perspective, it is also important to note that whilst the ITF was unique in
terms of the sheer extent of government involvement in memorialization initiatives, in
other ways it utilized and built upon the precedent of global NGOs which were already

155 Stanislaw Krajewski, ‘The Impact of the Shoah on the Thinking of Contemporary Polish Jewry’,
Contested Memories: Poles and Jews during the Holocaust and its Aftermath, ed. Joshua D. Zimmerman
promoting the study of the Holocaust in America, Europe and Israel. For example, directly succeeding the establishment of the ITF in May 1998, two of these organizations were responsible for mounting presentations in a section addressing issues of Holocaust education, remembrance and research at the WCHA. These organizations included the Anti-Defamation League’s Braun Historical Institute for combating anti-Semitism and racial hatred, which carries out research, remembrance and education about the Holocaust within a schema that perceives, “…the history of anti-Semitism as culminating in the Shoah.”\(^{156}\)

Founded in 1976, another international NGO is the United States based Facing History and Ourselves National Foundation which seeks, “to promote democratic citizenship through the curriculum.”\(^{157}\) Facing History operates with a full-time representative in Switzerland, which co-ordinates educational materials and teacher training in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. At the WCHA, a representative of the organization, Margot Stern Strom, stated that translations of the Facing History resource book had been made into Hungarian, whilst the Slovak Republic had contacted the organization about developing school textbooks and the Romanian Ministry of Education had proposed the integration of Facing History into the education system.\(^{158}\)

Within this context of European politics and the issue of the eastern expansion of the EU, it is also important to observe the founding of the European Council for Cultural Co-Operation in the mid-1990s which looked at issues of historical education within the


EU and mooted the idea as to the extent to which the Holocaust could be pedagogically interpreted within the framework of contemporary ethics.\textsuperscript{159} As a result, the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000 can be perceived as utilizing and expanding upon foundations of inter-cultural collaborations in Holocaust memory work that had been established by various public and private sector organizations in the period both preceding and succeeding 1989.

\textbf{Conclusion}

This chapter has outlined the historical context for the founding of the ITF in May 1998 and the convening of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust research, remembrance and education in January 2000. It has argued that a chief impetus for the founding of the ITF and the organization of the SIF 2000 came out of the historical process stimulated by the restitution campaigns of the 1990s, and the desire by key figures in that struggle, such as Eizenstat, to ensure that the last word on the Holocaust and the Third Reich at the beginning of the new millennium should not be about money but rather nations taking moral responsibility for their complicity in the Nazi past through acts of public research, education and memorialization. It also suggests that national developments in Sweden such as the founding of the \textit{Living History} campaign (1997) were indispensable in leading to the conceptualization of the ITF and the SIF 2000, whilst pan-European concerns at the rise of the popular and far right-wing in the 1990s as well as various forms of Holocaust denial made the mission of the ITF and the SIF 2000 feel relevant to a newly reunified continent at the turn of the century.

However, this chapter has also proposed that far from being entirely new, developments such as the ITF and the SIF 2000 utilized the expertise and institutional foundations of inter-cultural co-operation in Holocaust memory work which had been cultivated by various private and state sector organizations in the decades preceding 2000. Taking forward the history of the institutions introduced in this section, chapter two will focus on the decision-making at the WCHA and within the ITF which led to the formulation of the idea of ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ as well as directly resulting in the organization and public reception of the SIF 2000.
Chapter 2

The ITF and the Organization and Media Reception of the SIF 2000

Sandwiched between the London and Washington conferences, the Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (ITF) was established on 7th May 1998 at the suggestion of the Swedish government and in co-operation with the British and Americans.\(^1\) Consisting of the representatives of governments, the ITF was to be academically advised by Yad Vashem historian Yehuda Bauer whilst the organization’s remit was to promote international archival openness, education and memorialization of the Holocaust through co-operation with relevant NGOs. The summary of the inaugural meeting of the ITF held in the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office on 7th May 1998 states that the organization was founded because remaining indifferent to Holocaust memory, “could threaten our common future” and that in order to implement contemporary institutional memory of the Holocaust “… in a complex world, people and countries need to share experiences.”\(^2\) At this meeting it was proposed that international co-operation should focus on those aspects of the Holocaust that have, “been touched upon” or “neglected”. It also stated that collaborationist projects should specifically target parents and young people and should be orientated towards, “long-term changes and effects of attitudes.”\(^3\)

It was also mooted that the ITF should support efforts to record the histories of

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2. Ibid., p. 981.
3. Ibid., p. 981.
Holocaust survivors and look into ways of using the Internet for education whilst finding ways to battle international electronic networks of Holocaust denial. It was also stressed that, "Knowledge about the Holocaust should be woven into existing structures, for example, the educational system, research, and training of teachers and journalists." This chapter will use documents from the WCHA, interviews with British delegates to the SIF 2000, ITF minutes, press reports and scholarly articles, in order to interrogate institutional developments within the ITF which shaped the objectives and organization of the SIF 2000 as well as the launch of the ITF’s first ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic. It will then document the subsequent press reporting of the SIF 2000 in the British and American media before turning to an analysis of the analogous reception of the announcement of UK HMD, in order to gain an awareness of how developments in the remembrance of the Holocaust at the international and national political levels are communicated to and received by national societies.

It is difficult to establish why the Swedish government contacted the British and Americans as the first ITF partners. It is perhaps because as British participant in the ITF, Stephen Smith observed, Persson was most probably, “…approaching Clinton and Blair who I think he saw as his natural political allies....” For example, although Sweden continued to refuse full NATO membership and the country retained its status of military non-alignment, it had also become a NATO Partner for Peace in 1994, which had resulted in Swedish participation in NATO peace-keeping forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996). Beyond these foreign policy alliances, the American Democratic Clinton government had also been committed to Holocaust restitution initiatives

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5 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
throughout the 1990s in order to support survivors as well as promote convivial German and East European relations; civil society and the rule of law in the post-Soviet states as well as broader human rights issues.\(^6\) Finally, Tony Blair’s speech welcoming Bill Clinton to address the British Cabinet on 29\(^{th}\) May 1997 after his landslide New Labour election victory demonstrated the strength of the centre-left Atlantic alliance, his commitment to European issues as well as his conviction that Britain could act as a diplomatic ‘bridge’ between Europe and America. Addressing Clinton, Blair stated, “I think you, like me, have always believed that Britain does not have to choose between its strong relationship in Europe and its strong relationship with the United States of America.”\(^7\) Moreover, in relation to Persson’s project specifically, not only had New Labour convened the LCNG, but the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights into national law as well as Blair’s ‘Third Way’ multicultural domestic and foreign policy rhetoric chimed with Persson’s historically specific and yet ethically ‘universalistic’ vision of Holocaust remembrance which encompassed the aims of placing, “recognition of the urgent necessity of combating racism, anti-Semitism, ethnic hatred and ignorance of the past on the daily agenda of the international community.”\(^8\)

A further instance of the proximity of New Labour policies to Swedish multicultural rhetoric was Robin Cook’s ethical Foreign Policy announced in his Foreign Office Mission Statement of 1997. Admittedly, by 2000 Cook faced criticism that his Mission Statement had been both diluted by pragmatism and subject to scathing assessment by John Maples, the Shadow Home Secretary who had alleged Cook’s hypocrisy in failing

to critique the human rights record of China, speak out on Chechnya or halt the sale of Hawk jet spares to Zimbabwe. However, Cook stood firm in January 2000, stating that British foreign policy would be underlined by four key ‘ethical’ or arguably ‘cosmopolitan’ aims, “*more bridges and fewer barriers; the global interest becoming the national interest: universal values: and the greater Britain’s standing in Europe, the greater in the world.*”

Thus, from the outset the so called ‘universal’ values that the political founders of the ITF and instigators of the SIF 2000 wanted to promote were very much based on a synergy or coalition of European and American liberal multicultural ideals that were prevalent among the British, Swedish and American political leadership in the years directly preceding the millennium.

However, the role of Sweden in approaching Clinton and Blair and establishing the ITF in May 1998 was not without its critics. Persson observed that, “*Many of the major Swedish newspapers thought it was presumptuous of me to have ideas about what world leaders like Blair and Clinton might think*”, whilst Efraim Zuroff of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s Jerusalem Office complained at the ITF inaugural meeting (7th May 1998) that Swedish educational efforts were undercut by judicial failures in regards to the post-war entry of Nazi war criminals into Sweden. As a result, Zuroff called, “*for the investigation and establishment of a legal mechanism to deal with Nazi war criminals living in this country.*”

Furthermore, it was not insignificant that the historian Yehuda Bauer had been nominated to be Academic Advisor of the ITF in May 1998, after he had been involved

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in advising the Swedish government on the Living History campaign. Given the importance of Bauer to the future development of the ITF as well as his role in co-authoring the Stockholm Declaration, this section will now unpack the history of his writings in more depth. Bauer left Europe owing to the rise of Nazism. Born in 1926 in Prague, Bauer’s Zionist father tried to raise money to move his family to Palestine and finally succeeded on March 15\textsuperscript{th} 1939, the same day as the German occupation of Bohemia and Moravia. Bauer finished high school in Haifa and signed up for the Palmach or the Jewish underground which later became the basis of the Israeli army, before embarking on a career in academia in which he has held pre-eminent positions at Hebrew University and Yad Vashem. Between the 1960s and 1970s, Bauer’s research centered on survivor testimonies as well as on historical analyses of the role played by key American Jewish associations during the Holocaust. By contrast, since the 1980s, Bauer’s research has increasingly focused on the issue of the rescue of Jews as well as on the relationships formed between Jews and Nazis during the Second World War.

However, Bauer’s historical work has also been significant in the controversies it has generated. Contrasting with the Stockholm Declaration (2000), in The Holocaust in Historical Perspective (1978), Bauer rejected descriptions of the Holocaust which placed the event within narrative tropes of ‘universalism’. This is because Bauer claimed that viewing the Holocaust within the wide horizon of human responsibility too often produces, “vague, universalistic generalizations like “the results of prejudice”, “man’s inhumanity to man”, and similar meaningless drivel.” Arguing that the Holocaust needs to be explained historically, Bauer also proposed that the Holocaust is

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\textsuperscript{12} Yehuda Bauer quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 93.
both ‘unique’ and “…a central experience of our civilization.”  

It is also worth quoting the following paragraph from Bauer at length because it simultaneously reflects Bauer’s scorn of ‘universalistic’ rhetoric at the end of the 1970s as well as delineating what would become his controversial and contradictory notion of Holocaust ‘uniqueness’:

To view the Holocaust as just another case of man’s inhumanity to man, to equate it with every and any injustice committed on this earth – and God knows, the number is endless – to say that the Holocaust is the total of all crimes committed by Nazism in Europe, to do any or all of this is an inexcusable abomination based on a mystification of the event. On the other hand, to view it as totally unique is to take it out of history and out of the context of our everyday lives, and that means opening up the gates for a possible repetition.

We should properly use the term ‘Holocaust’ to describe the policy of total physical annihilation of a nation or a people. To date, this has only happened once, to the Jews under Nazism.

This last sentence resonated with Bauer’s further categorization of the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust that, “…the Nazi policy towards the Jews was motivated by a pseudoreligious and anti-Christian ideology that was based on a very deep anti-Semitic European tradition, and it was total and logical.” Furthermore, part of Bauer’s stance in *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective* also included two beliefs, echoed in the later rhetoric of the ITF, that, firstly, contemporary Holocaust denial and political right-wing extremism must be battled and secondly, that it was important to find an effective way to teach the factual history of the Holocaust to future generations. However, Bauer’s very specific conceptualization of the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust became subject to increasing criticism by the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Bauer’s framing of the history of the Holocaust within the schema of ‘uniqueness’ clashed with the research of scholars such as Sybil Milton and Henry Friedlander who

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15 Bauer, *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective*, p. 3
16 Ibid., pp. 37-38.
17 Ibid., pp. 36-37.
18 Ibid., p. 43 and p. 45.
argued that Bauer’s definition of the term ‘Holocaust’ should be altered to accommodate the fact that, “The Nazi regime applied a consistent and inclusive policy of extermination - based on heredity - only against three groups of human beings: the handicapped, Jews and Gypsies.”

The virulence of the ‘uniqueness’ debate was intensified by the fact that post-war failures of justice and compensation abounded not only in relation to Jewish victims of Nazism, but also in regards to these two other groups who Milton and Friedlander have defined as being subject to the Nazis, “consistent and inclusive policy of extermination.”

These conflicts over what Bauer called the ‘uniqueness’ of the Jewish Catastrophe and the meaning of the word ‘Holocaust’ were also reflected in heated debates during the planning and construction of the USHMM in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, in the early 1980s, Bauer alongside survivors such as Elie Wiesel and Henryk Grynberg saw efforts particularly by some Eastern European members of the museum’s council to expand the number of victim groups included under the term ‘Holocaust’ as an

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20 Bauer and Milton, ‘Gypsies and the Holocaust’, p. 516. For example, Ernst Klee has demonstrated the failures of post-war justice in regards to three doctors who were responsible for murdering those who the Nazis designated as ‘life unworthy of life’. The trials of doctors Heinrich Bunke, Klaus Endruweit and Aquilin Ullrich began at Frankfurt District Court on 3rd October 1966 and lasted several months. It was revealed that Bunke had been an accessory in the murder of a minimum of 4950 handicapped individuals, Endruweit an accessory in the murder of 2250 whilst Ullrich had been an accessory in the killing of 1815 handicapped persons, as well as being individually responsible for the deaths of 210 of these victims. However, all three doctors were acquitted on the grounds that following the orders of the Third Reich they did not understand that their actions were illegal and ethically perverse. Although the West German Federal Supreme Court rejected this judgment in 1970, all three doctors continued their medical careers, “Bunke until 1979, Ullrich until 1984, Endruweit until 1986.”

(Errst Klee, “‘Turning on the Tap was no big deal’ – The Gassing Doctors during the Nazi Period and Afterwards’, Dachau Review 2 (1990), p. 58 and 63). Equally, of the post-war failures of justice and restitution towards the Gypsies, Porrajmos scholar Ian Hancock has noted that, “As a result of having therefore to carry wealth on one’s person, in the form of gold necklaces, rings, bracelets, coins serving as buttons on clothing, etc., no documentation exists in the form of bank records for property stolen by the Nazis from the Romani people...No Romani witness was called at the Nuremberg trials, and little has been paid to Romani survivors of the Holocaust by way of war crimes reparation.” (Ian Hancock, ‘International Romani Union – Statement by the Hon. Ian F. Hancock’, in Nazi Gold: The London Conference, 2-4 December 1997, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London: The Stationary Office, 1998), pp. 307-308).
unacceptable effort to ‘de-Judaize’ the term and in so doing, abnegate the recognition of the specific experiences of Jews as victims of the Third Reich.\textsuperscript{21} Furthermore, for Bauer and Monroe Freedman these efforts also smacked of latent anti-Semitism, with Freedman going as far to say that some Eastern European representatives, “... insistence on referring to six million Jews as an indistinguishable part of eleven million civilians...”, was if not a form of Christian conversion, then certainly a “posthumous assimilation.”\textsuperscript{22}

For different reasons, a multitude of voices argued against Bauer and other ‘uniqueness’ advocates in desiring a more inclusive understanding of the term ‘Holocaust’ at the USHMM. For example, during the museum’s planning in the mid- late 1980s, Roma representatives like Ian Hancock and William Duna complained that they felt ignored and marginalized by the process, whilst USHMM Council historian, Milton argued that the Roma and disabled experience should be integrated much more fully and forcefully into the museum’s narrative.\textsuperscript{23} Although these debates remained live both until and after the opening of the USHMM in 1993, in the wake of Wiesel’s resignation from the Chairmanship of the Holocaust Council on 4th December 1986, the dominant notion of the ‘Holocaust’ that held sway during the planning of the exhibition was advanced by Project Director Michael Berenbaum. This sought to provide a careful balance between understanding the fundamental American context framing the construction of the exhibition as well as emphasizing that the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry resides at the core of the ‘Holocaust’ whilst also recognizing the broader victims of the Third Reich’s atrocity crimes within the exhibition’s narrative. Linenthal has summarized this approach as follows, “…a careful inclusion of non-Jewish victims, a balance between

\textsuperscript{21} Linenthal, \textit{Preserving Memory}, pp. 53-54.
\textsuperscript{22} Milton Freedman quoted in Linenthal, \textit{Preserving Memory}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{23} Linenthal, \textit{Preserving Memory}, pp. 244-247.
Jewish life before the Holocaust, the extermination, and the return to life after; and emphasis on Americans, characterized as bystanders and liberators.”

Despite this attempt at balancing several interest groups at the USHMM, the public debates about what Bauer called the ‘uniqueness’ of the Jewish Catastrophe and the meaning and use of the word ‘Holocaust’ continued following the opening of the museum in 1993. For example, some members of the American Jewish community expressed concerns over the alleged ‘Americanization’ of the Holocaust at the USHMM. These complaints responded to what Berenbaum had referred to as the museum’s framing of the history of the Holocaust within a schema promoting American liberal democratic values (a type of liberal framing of the Holocaust which was arguably, just one precursor for the so called ‘universal’ values that would be fused with European influences and Bauer’s ‘unprecedentedness’ rhetoric in the Stockholm Declaration 2000). Moreover, for Anson Rabinbach these objections, which were articulated by U.S Jewish conservatives such as Edward Norden expressed American Jewish political fears that the USHMM’s willingness to promote liberal ‘universalist’ values over the pure focus on the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust might contribute to, “...the further erosion not of Holocaust memory, but of Jewish identity.”

By contrast, American Jewish scholar Peter Novick expressed a different set of concerns when he argued that the exceptional or ‘unique’ status accorded to the

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24 Linenthal, *Preserving Memory*, p. 139.

25 In an interview with journalist and critic of the USHMM, Philip Gourevitch, Michael Berenbaum has described this process in the following terms, “In America we re-cast the story of the Holocaust to teach fundamental American values... For example - when America is at its best – pluralism, democracy, restraint on government, the inalienable rights of individuals, the inability of government to enter into freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of religion and so forth...” (Michael Berenbaum quoted in Philip Gourevitch, ‘Behold Now Behemoth: The Holocaust Memorial Museum – One More American Theme Park’, *Harper’s Magazine* (July 1993), p. 56.

USHMM on the Washington Mall risked ‘screening out’ American accountability for the suffering endured by African Americans under the system of slavery. Furthermore, the controversy over Jewish ‘uniqueness’ claims was also further intensified when scholar David E. Stannard attacked Bauer, Steven T. Katz and Deborah Lipstadt on the grounds that ‘uniqueness’ rhetoric is complicit in ‘denying’ the severity and status of the genocide of the Native Americans, a group who finally had their own museum opened on the Washington Mall in 2004. Lastly, and even more controversially American-Jewish left-wing critic Norman Finkelstein argued in his highly problematic conspiratorial narrative ‘The Holocaust Industry’ that the use of the discourse of ‘uniqueness’ is synonymous with the political and economic interests of American Jewish organizations and right-wing pro-Israeli lobby groups.

29 Norman Finkelstein, The Holocaust Industry: Reflections on the Exploitation of Jewish Suffering (London: Verso, 2000). Whilst the Holocaust historian, Raul Hilberg caused consternation among his colleagues for his pro-Finkelstein stance, the majority of commentators including Omer Bartov, Andrew Ross and Paul Bogdanor found Finkelstein’s assertions in The Holocaust Industry hugely contentious. For whilst Finkelstein’s polemic against the ‘Holocaust Industry’ has its roots in the controversial restitution campaigns and divisive Holocaust ‘uniqueness’ debates of the mid-1990s, his argument is ultimately deeply problematic. This is largely because as Dan Stone has noted, Finkelstein’s thesis risks deploying negative Jewish ‘conspiracy theory’ stereotypes that could and have been irresponsibly re-appropriated in order to provide political fodder for right-wing anti-Semites and/or European ethno-nationalists who seek to elide national responsibility for the Nazi past. For example, in the Polish Neighbors debate, right-wing Catholic commentators such as Bishop Józef Michalik, Bishop Stanislaw Stefanek and Reverend Edward Orlowski of Jedwabne Parish have used the phrase ‘the Holocaust business’ (‘the Holocaust gescheh’f) in their nationalist inspired critiques of Jan T. Gross’s history of Polish collaboration in the Jedwabne massacre of Polish Jews in the summer of 1941. Furthermore, the assumptions underpinning The Holocaust Industry thesis are deeply questionable for reasons other than just the deployment of conspiratorial Jewish stereotypes. Gabriel Schoenfeld, Editor of the neo-Conservative Commentary magazine described The Holocaust Industry as “...not only false but lunatic”, and took issue with Finkelstein’s notion that the Holocaust restitution and memory campaigns of the 1990s were an attempt to strengthen the political clout of Israel. Instead Schoenfeld argued in his own controversial article that Israel’s security was more likely to have been diminished by alienating traditional supporters in Germany, Switzerland and Holland through the WJRO’s, “... arm-twisting, the threats of boycott, the bad press.” (Marrus, Some Measure of Justice, p. 140; Dan Stone, ‘Review of The Holocaust and Collective Memory: The American Experience’, European Journal of Social Theory, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2002), pp. 165-168; Antony Polonsky and Joanna B. Michlic (eds), The Neighbors Respond: The Controversy Over the Jedwabne Massacre in Poland (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 36; Schoenfeld, ‘Holocaust Reparations: Gabriel Schoenfeld and Critics’; Gabriel Schoenfeld, ‘Holocaust Reparations – A Growing Scandal’, Commentary, September 2000.)
Against the backdrop of these controversies, by the time of the establishment of the ITF in 1998, Bauer had shifted his terminology from the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust to the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust. Bauer now defines the Holocaust or the Nazi perpetrated mass murder of European Jewry as ‘unprecedented’ because the Nazi regime and its collaborators radical anti-Semitic and non-pragmatic ideology sought to murder all Jews across the Nazi occupation zone during the Second World War. For Bauer, the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust resides in, “...the ideological, global, and total character of the genocide of the Jews.”\(^{30}\) This also means that for Bauer the Holocaust is simultaneously the paradigmatic and exceptional instance of genocide against which all other instances of group killing and persecution can be compared to see if they conform to Bauer’s categories of the ‘partial’ destruction of racial, national and ethnic groups (‘genocide’) or ‘total’ destruction (‘Holocaust’).\(^{31}\) In contrast to his earlier complete disregard for ‘universalist’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ rhetoric in *The Holocaust in Historical Perspective*, the ‘unprecedentedness’ thesis also embraced the ‘universalistic’ concept that:

> Because it seems to me, the realization is sinking in that the Holocaust says something terribly important about humanity. It is on the one hand, a genocide that must be compared to other genocides; that universal dimension of comparability should concern everyone from Kamchatka to Tasmania and from Patagonia to the Hudson Bay.\(^{32}\)

As will be explored in more detail in chapter five, Bauer’s shift towards ‘unprecedentedness’ was evident in the ‘universalistic’ rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration and was later most forcefully articulated in his 2001 book, *Re-thinking the Holocaust* (*RH*). Despite Bauer’s statement in *RH* that, “...one should never say that one form of mass murder is ‘less terrible’, or even ‘better’, than another”,\(^{33}\) the

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invocation of the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust still divides opinion. Whilst some scholars essentially take forward the type of critique of Bauer advocated by Milton and Friedlander; others have perceived Bauer as advancing an overly-exclusionary definition of ‘genocide’, whereas Stuart D. Stein has interpreted Bauer as, “differentiating between the Holocaust and other genocides” in order to imply “…a superior genocide, and genocides.”

Putting forward an alternative perspective, Stephen Smith, British ITF representative, co-founder of the Nottingham based Holocaust memorial centre, Beth Shalom as well as co-initiator of Rwanda’s Kigali Memorial Centre, has noted the more positive potentials in Bauer’s thought:

What Bauer is able to do which many historians find difficult is to change his position and say, “I’ve changed my position”. Now I’ve watched Yehuda’s development in his thinking over the last fifteen years and I’ve had the opportunity to do that personally through his writing and his thinking because I’m quite close to him personally, and I think what I’ve seen is a really honest historian there. Because what he says is, “I’m prepared to re-assess the facts as I find them”. So there isn’t a single thesis, there, actually. There is a dynamic process which as an individual and as a professional he is dealing with. And I think that if you try to deal with his writing in any other way and say, “Yehuda Bauer as an individual has developed his thinking”, you’ll mis-read it. I don’t think he’s contentious at all. Not really. Another thing about him is, which I think is quite different to a lot of historians...he is very politically tuned in. He understands the difference between documenting the past and addressing that within a current, contemporary context and making it relevant. And...therefore, actually, while he is quite clear about the as you described it, the ‘unprecedented’ nature of the Holocaust he does not see and I don’t see this as being at variance with looking at genocide as a universal phenomenon, and a comparable phenomenon including comparison with the Holocaust.

If Bauer is interpreted in a way which rejects the potential for the hierarchization of victimhood that is one possibility within his definitions of Holocaust (‘total destruction’) and genocide (‘partial destruction’), and instead encourages respectful remembrance of what has conventionally become the specificity of the name, ‘Holocaust’ to commemorate the Jewish tragedy of the six million; Justice and commemoration for all racial, social, sexual, national, political and religious victims of

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34 For example, Bauer’s definition of ‘genocide’ is based on the UNGC, but excludes religious groups on the grounds that, “One can change one’s religion or one’s political color. One cannot change one’s ethnicity or nationality or ‘race’-only the persecutor can do that…” (Bauer, RH, p. 11.)
36 Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith.
Nazi atrocities;\textsuperscript{37} a self-critical Israeli national consciousness as well as the ongoing legal recognition and memorialization of past genocides and the prevention of future genocides,\textsuperscript{38} then RH begins to live up to its claim that it marks a self-reflexive attempt by an Israeli citizen to encourage Jewish people to psychoanalytically, “...work through the mourning, the loss” and encourage “Jewish society to open up to the world.”\textsuperscript{39}

\textbf{The ITF, the WCHA and the subsequent organization of the SIF 2000}

Having been established in May 1998 and having gained an Academic Advisor in the figure of Bauer, according to the archival documents of the WCHA, the ITF’s second meeting of 25th September 1998 marked the moment when the rotating chairmanship of the Task Force was passed from Sweden to the United States.\textsuperscript{40} This meeting held at the USHMM also saw the acceptance of Israel and Germany as ITF members and resulted in the elucidation of a number of concrete short and long term projects for the organization which coalesced with the ITF’s broad goals of Holocaust remembrance and, “fighting intolerance, racism, and other challenges to basic human values.”\textsuperscript{41} These prospective projects included: suggestions for how international and national versions of the Swedish book, \textit{Tell Ye Your Children} could be created; a Task Force declaration on Holocaust education to be compiled by the U.S; the compilation of a directory of Holocaust education organizations to be worked on by Sweden and the

\textsuperscript{37} For a more detailed list of the victims of Nazi atrocities, see the ‘Preface’ of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{38} For the definition of ‘genocide’ used in this thesis as well as a critique of the limitations of the UNGC, see the ‘Preface’ of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{39} Bauer, \textit{RH}, p. xii-xiii.
United States; a Task Force mandate on access to archives and a guide to archival material to be proposed by the U.S and the UK; as well as a set of guidelines on Holocaust education and a proposal for an International Day of Holocaust Remembrance to be drafted by the UK.\textsuperscript{42} Progress on these projects was to be made by the WCHA, so that an ITF working report could be presented to delegates and future inter-cultural collaboration in Holocaust education encouraged.\textsuperscript{43}

In line with decisions made in September 1998, a number of ITF Declarations and policy documents were showcased to those present at the WCHA. These Declarations and documents set the precedent for what would be the chief themes at the SIF 2000 as well as highlighting the primary objectives of the ITF in its formative years. These primary objectives of the ITF were developed in relationship to the inadequacies of the restitution conferences of the 1990s, which as has been demonstrated in chapter one, found their expression in complaints articulated in different ways by representatives such as Eizenstat, Gutman and Auschwitz survivor, Wiesel that the tragedy of the Holocaust cannot simply be financially recompensed but must also be recalled as a sign of, “conscience, morality, and memory.”\textsuperscript{44} Mirroring this concern, the first Task Force Declaration at Washington focused on ‘Promoting Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research’. The wording of this Declaration is additionally significant in that it also alludes to the importance of radical right-wing reaction and Holocaust denial in the 1990s as factors motivating the founding of the ITF and the subsequent convening of the SIF 2000:

\begin{itemize}
\item[43] Ibid., p. 984.
\item[44] Elie Wiesel quoted in Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 196.
\end{itemize}
As the international community continues to focus on the Holocaust era assets at the 1998 Washington Conference and beyond, the priority and urgency for international attention must also encompass Holocaust education, remembrance and research. Efforts and resources in this direction should be expanded to reinforce the historic meaning and enduring lessons of the Holocaust (‘Shoah’) and to combat its denial.45

The second declaration emphasized the importance of archival openness and made the ambitious claim that all Nazi era documents should be accessible by 31st December 1999 because:

The governments comprising the International Task Force on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research agree on the importance of encouraging all archives, both public and private, to make their holdings more widely accessible. This will facilitate further research and encourage greater understanding of the Holocaust and its historical context.46

Other ITF policy documents forwarded at Washington included a presentation by Stéphane Bruchfeld (Prime Minister’s Office, Sweden); Wesley A. Fisher (USHMM) and Nicolas Gauvin (USHMM) on the recently established and ongoing compilation of an ‘International Directory of Organizations in Holocaust, Education, Remembrance and Research’. This directory listed basic information on an estimated 900 Holocaust organizations across the world. Bruchfeld also collaborated with Levine in order to propose that Tell Ye Your Children could be internationalized through national adaptations each of which would add, “…several pages treating their own specific histories.”47

Anthony Layden, Head of the Western European Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the UK outlined preliminary guidelines for Holocaust Education as well as the role of governments and NGOs within that nexus. He stated

46 Ibid., p. 987.
that Holocaust education is important in order to ensure that young people have a well rounded knowledge of twentieth century history as well as a respectful relationship with Holocaust survivors. He also thought that Holocaust education possessed the capability to be socially enlightening in encouraging genocide prevention and racial tolerance within societies.\footnote{Layden, Appendix H: Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research; Elements of guidelines for Holocaust education, in Proceedings of the Washington Conference on Holocaust Era Assets, ed. Bidenagel, pp. 991-996.}

Layden highlighted that whilst all governments should promote memorialization initiatives such as museums, the exact role played by national governments in Holocaust education would be dependent on whether a country’s education system was centralized or localized; subject to a national curriculum or more flexible in orientation.\footnote{Ibid., p. 993.}

Finally, Smith presented a ‘Proposal for International Commemoration of the Holocaust’ which evaluated the concept of Holocaust Memorial Days (HMDs) and stated that they were an appropriate form of commemoration because they possessed the capacity to promote remembrance of the victims of the Holocaust; ‘awareness’ for the potential for future genocides in the world; a symbol of ‘solidarity’ against anti-Semitism and racism as well as an opportunity for ‘education’ about the Holocaust. However, citing the diversity of HMDs already in place, such as the liberation of Auschwitz (27\textsuperscript{th} January in Germany and Sweden); Anne Frank’s birthday (12\textsuperscript{th} June in the Netherlands) or Yom HaSho’ah in Jewish communities in America and around the globe, Smith noted that:

\begin{quote}
Task force participants do not consider it necessary or desirable that all countries that decide to institute a Holocaust Remembrance Day should hold it on the same date. A number of different dates are already regarded as significant in different countries…Countries may wish to consider them, or other dates with more significance for them, should they decide to adopt a
\end{quote}
These Declarations and policy proposals at the WCHA illustrate the fact that far from promoting uniformity in Holocaust remembrance, the mission of the ITF was about setting down certain normative baselines for research, remembrance and education, which were designed to either support regional initiatives already in place, or alternatively encourage the innovation of new programs that would be national variations of the kind of international norms outlined in Washington. These policy proposals or normative baselines would be more systematically laid down at the SIF 2000 in the guise of the Stockholm Declaration, a document which also utilized Bauer’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as well as advocating key American and European politicians shared liberal ‘universalist’ values at the end of the 1990s.

At a further ITF meeting during the WCHA it was decided that France, Poland and the Netherlands would also be invited to become members of the ITF. This meeting also contained embryonic discussions of the concept of ‘Liaison Projects’ or ‘Field Missions’. However, within the context of this analysis of the SIF 2000, it was perhaps most pertinent for the announcement by Sweden of plans for a Stockholm Conference on Holocaust Education, to run in 1999 or 2000. It was also decided that an ITF Endowment fund administered by Sweden would be instigated at the Stockholm Conference. This would give the ITF, the ability to fund projects on research, remembrance and teaching that it deemed worthy of support.

These initial meetings of the ITF in late 1998 and early 1999 took place against public

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debates about NATO intervention in the escalating crisis of Serbian perpetrated mass murder of Muslim Albanians in Kosovo. Having sanctioned NATO air strikes against Weapons of Mass Destruction capabilities in Iraq (1998), in the summer of the same year, Blair was one of the first Western leaders to advocate military action against Milosevic’s armies who were fighting against the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and perpetrating a vicious campaign of ethnic cleansing against the province’s Muslim Albanian civilians.\footnote{Lawrence Freedman, ‘Defence’, in \textit{Blair’s Britain, 1997-2000}, ed. Anthony Seldon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 622-623.} Blair justified the case for NATO humanitarian military intervention in his Chicago speech (April 1999), arguing that Western nations should militarily intervene in the affairs of states who were perpetrating repression, ethnic cleansing and genocide, as long as the case for intervention met the criteria of ‘Five tests’: \textit{“a strong case, exhausted diplomacy, realistic military options, a readiness to accept long-term commitment and a link to national interests.”}\footnote{Ibid., p. 624.}

NATO’s air campaign began on 26\textsuperscript{th} March 1999 and lasted seventy-eight days. Initially, NATO’s military strategy was dogged by disagreements between the British and Americans over issues such as the deployment of ground troops,\footnote{Blair was strongly in favour of the deployment of ground forces, whereas Clinton was reluctant to fly in ground troops. (Freedman, ‘Defence’, p. 625.)} whilst the air campaign itself had a number of unforeseen consequences and presented severe moral and ethical dilemmas for NATO’s leadership. For example, at first air strikes did little to disrupt Serbia’s genocidal military campaign and huge numbers of Kosovar refugees fled to Albania and Macedonia. Equally, NATO’s air campaign was most effective at eroding Serb power when elements of the political and economic system were targeted such as power supplies, bridges, railway tracks and factories. However, these strategic
gains came mainly at the cost of Serbian civilians.\textsuperscript{54} That said, in spite of the tough ethical dilemmas raised, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo is widely perceived as one of the success stories of the first Blair administration, whilst the Swedish government also contributed peace-keeping forces to the campaign.\textsuperscript{55} This is because as adviser to the House of Commons Defence Committee, Michael Clarke observed, NATO intervention in Kosovo set in motion, “…\textit{a dynamic that saw the fall of Milosevic in Serbia, his delivery to the International Criminal Tribunal in the Hague, and [brought] Kosovo to the brink of independence}.”\textsuperscript{56}

Despite the perceived success of the campaign, NATO’s intervention in Kosovo provoked controversy with critics like Daniele Archibugi expressing anxiety at the precedent set by state alliances acting unilaterally outside the purview of international law, for whilst the campaign had been supported by the EU, it had lacked UN prerogative.\textsuperscript{57} In response to these concerns, ‘cosmopolitan’ German intellectual Jürgen Habermas expressed the view that the Kosovo conflict must be perceived as an ‘emergency situation’ rather than a precedent where, “\textit{the dilemma of having to act as though there were already a fully institutionalized global civil society…does not force us to accept the maxim that victims are to be left at the mercy of thugs}.”\textsuperscript{58} Given the controversies provoked by NATO’s military intervention in Kosovo, it is significant that in the British and American press, literary and visual metaphors arising out of the public memory of the Holocaust played a crucial role in how NATO’s air campaign was mediated and justified to the British and American public in the absence of UN sanction

\textsuperscript{54} Freedman, ‘Defence’, p. 623.
\textsuperscript{58} Jürgen Habermas quoted in Fine, \textit{Cosmopolitanism}, p. 88.
for military intervention.\textsuperscript{59}

For example, Tony Kushner has demonstrated that metaphors relating to the memory of the Holocaust were used by the Clinton and Blair administrations to justify and rally popular support for NATO military intervention in Kosovo. The fact that the grandparents of American Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright had perished during the Holocaust meant that the Kosovo war was sometimes referred to as ‘Madeleine’s War’. Continuing these Second World War and Holocaust metaphors, UK Minister for International Development, Clare Short, agreed with Clinton that Albright’s support for the war demonstrated that we have ‘learned the lessons of Munich.’ Equally, language and rhetoric associated with the Nazi persecution of European Jewry was used to frame reports and images of Muslim Kosovar Albanians in British newspapers such as \textit{The Daily Mirror}, \textit{The Guardian} and \textit{The Daily Mail}.\textsuperscript{60}

However, this use of Holocaust metaphors to publicize news about contemporary genocides has not proved un-controversial. For example, prior to the Kosovo crisis, U.S Communications scholar, Barbie Zelizer suggested that the Western media’s tendency to use literary metaphors and photographic imagery of the Holocaust as a reservoir of archetypical visual and verbal tropes in order to convey news about post-1945 genocides in places such as Cambodia and Bosnia risks creating a pernicious, “\textit{atrocity aesthetic}”.\textsuperscript{61} For Zelizer, this “\textit{atrocity aesthetic}” is problematic because far from sensitizing the public to violence and the importance of dealing with those responsible

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{footnotes}
\item[59] Fine, \textit{Cosmopolitanism}, p. 78.
\item[61] Barbie Zelizer, \textit{Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory through the Camera’s Eye} (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1998), p. 204.
\end{footnotes}
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for the perpetration of mass atrocities, it is more likely to provide reductive frameworks of comprehension which simply allow viewers to, “...position new horrors rather than understand them...”\textsuperscript{62} and in so doing, “... classify, categorize, and in many cases forget what we are seeing.”\textsuperscript{63} Beyond Zelizer’s critique of the problem of, “Remembering to forget”,\textsuperscript{64} the significance of this phenomenon of journalistically framing Kosovo via the use of literary and visual tropes associated with the Holocaust will be explored in more detail and in a different context in chapter five’s section on the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’.

Thus, as NATO commemorated the 50\textsuperscript{th} anniversary of its establishment (April 1999) against the backdrop of the anxieties provoked by Kosovo, three ITF meetings were held in 1999, two in London under the British chairmanship (8 - 9\textsuperscript{th} March 1999 and 25\textsuperscript{th} June 1999) and a third in Jerusalem under the Israeli chair (13 - 14\textsuperscript{th} October 1999). According to ITF minutes,\textsuperscript{65} the first meeting in London primarily focused on the continuation and completion of projects from previous meetings. Within this context, the USHMM took up the German delegations suggestion at a meeting in 1998 that an ongoing calendar of Holocaust events be compiled and constantly updated. The best ways to disseminate Holocaust education guidelines was discussed, whilst Smith continued to argue that owing to the diversity of national historical particularities across Europe, “...it was difficult to find a single date equally meaningful and appropriate to all.”\textsuperscript{66} although the European Parliament and the Council of Europe could be

\textsuperscript{62} Zelizer, Remembering to Forget, p. 204.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., p. 204.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., p. 202.
approached to see if they would be willing to promote such a Holocaust commemoration day.

Other issues addressed were the Yad Vashem Holocaust Educator’s conference, the prospective administration of the Task Force fund and the necessity that it not, “...compete for sources of finance with other Holocaust related institutions,” as well as the organization of the impending Stockholm conference. From a retrospective knowledge of the institutional development of the ITF, it is also notable that by the March 1999 meeting, member states were beginning to assume functions that would remain their primary area of competence throughout the next few years. For example, the USHMM would often be responsible for technological issues involved with the development of databases or the ITF website; Yad Vashem, alongside the USHMM would be vital in providing teacher training sessions for ‘Liaison Projects’; the British delegation would be at the forefront of HMD discussions; whilst Sweden would organize a series of Stockholm conferences and end up administering the ITF fund.

According to ITF minutes accessed online in 2008, a key discussion at the first London meeting was the prospective role that ‘Field Missions’ or what would later become known as ‘Liaison Projects’ would play in both the SIF 2000 and the future role of the ITF. Although this information about the theorization of ‘Liaison Projects’ is difficult to corroborate with other documentary sources at present, it is worth reviewing this information, however tentatively because the idea of the ‘Liaison Project’ would


become so central to new member states gaining membership to the ITF after the SIF 2000. Also, the discussions about ‘Liaison Projects’ demonstrate how sensitive the ITF was to potential criticism about being branded as an organization that simply imposed western norms and values without any sensitivity to the specificities of national and regional context in the post-Soviet states. Building on a ‘Field Missions’ paper written by Yad Vashem, but arguing that bilateral and multilateral projects should go beyond the process of teacher training, a Senior Advisor to the U.S Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs proposed that, “Field Missions should be a primary vehicle for Task Force outreach to other countries.”68 He further added that there “was a need to slow down and work towards the Stockholm Conference as a showcase for the pilot project. What’s done in 1999 can be viewed as an experiment.”69

The Senior Advisor also argued that under good conditions, missions should comprise three member countries working in partnership with a liaison state. The formation of ITF diplomatic liaison partners should reflect pre-existing political and cultural links with the country of co-operation. He also emphasized that an essential prerequisite to a successful international collaboration was a prior awareness of the conditions of Holocaust education in the liaison state and stressed that these missions should be long term projects. In this way, missions would be specifically tailored to the country in question yet implemented in a flexible way in order to ensure their sustainability. Finally, the Senior Advisor underlined the fact that, “Missions should only visit countries that have invited them to do so. To date the Czech Republic has expressed an

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69 Ibid., p. 30.
interest as have (informally) the Argentines.”  

He was concerned that short-term projects might backfire because they could be perceived as western impositions, an opinion encapsulated in his comment that, “Teachers can be resentful of westerners parachuting in, conducting one workshop and then leaving.”

These issues were further discussed at the June 1999 meeting in London where a ‘Liaison Projects’ concept paper proposed by the delegation from the Netherlands met with consensus and prospective ‘Liaison Projects’ with the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Russia and Argentina were mooted. The presence of the South American option is significant as it suggests that even at this early stage, the ITF’s objectives were far wider than the recovery of the European memory of the Holocaust. It was also highlighted at this meeting that the criteria for potential ‘Liaison Projects’ could include:

…comprehensive national education programs (like Sweden’s Living History Project), teacher training curriculum development, establishment of national remembrance days and related activities, establishing museum/remembrance institutions, hosting conferences, developing educational guidelines, using survivor lectures, recording survivor histories, concentration camp visits, developing or accessing educational material. Liaison with expert institutions, educator exchanges, and using travelling exhibitions.

After discussions, it was decided that on condition of mutual agreement with the host nation, the Czech Republic would become the first site of a ‘Liaison Project’, and as

71 Ibid., p. 30.
72 Wallin and Newman (eds), The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book, p. 22.
part of this initiative, “...experts from the Task Force country institutions would conduct intensive training in the Czech Republic for teachers who could then train other Czech teachers in the Czech language, for a multiplier effect.” A country that joined NATO in 1999 and aspired to EU membership, it is arguable, that the willingness of the Czech government to co-operate with the ITF was further reaffirmed by Deputy Prime Minister, Pavel Rychetsy’s announcement in January 2000 that the Czech government would return property seized from the Jews during the Nazi era.

In line with these plans, specific details of the Czech ‘Liaison Project’ were confirmed at an ITF meeting during the SIF on 27th January 2000. It was decided that the Netherlands, America and Israel would be the Czech Republic’s ‘Liaison Partners’ and a number of initiatives became immediate targets for implementation. Organized by the Czech Ministry of Education, the Jewish museum in Prague, the Romani Museum in Brno and the Terezín memorial, experts from the Task Force would assist in a series of four training seminars between March and May 2000 for four hundred Czech educators in Terezín and Prague. A limited selection of these Czech educators would then be involved in training schemes in the USA, Israel or the Netherlands or alternatively, could be called on to participate in a specialized week long seminar on the Holocaust, run with ITF support in the Czech Republic in 2001. Other strands of the proposed ‘Liaison Project’ included training programmes for civic educators, the reform of history textbooks as well as the establishment of Internet links between Czech teachers

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*Czechs to return Nazi loot*, *The Daily Telegraph*, 26 January 2000, p. 16.
This ‘Liaison Project’ built on the fact that as scholar Michal Frankl has observed the memory of the Holocaust in the Czech Republic had been distorted by the experience of Nazi and Soviet occupation. The construction of the ‘Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia’ by the Nazis and the Third Reich’s suppression of the Czech population was succeeded by the idolization of the Communist elements of the Czech resistance by the post-war Soviet regime. These Soviet governments also included anti-Zionist elements which were intensified by the Kremlin’s decision to cease diplomatic contacts with Israel in the wake of the state’s success in the ‘Six Day War’ (1967). Within this political context, the extent of Jewish suffering, the role of Nazi-Czech collaboration as well as the issue of domestic anti-Semitism during the Second World War was largely suppressed. For example, in May 1947 the Czechoslovakian government resolved to maintain Terezín as a memorial primarily to the suffering of political prisoners detained in the Small Fortress during the Second World War, whilst sidelining the hardships endured by the Jewish inhabitants of the ghetto.78

Furthermore, the crackdown on reformers, intellectuals and dissenters in the wake of the Prague Spring (1968) by Czech communist leader Gustav Husak included the closing down and effacement of the walls of the Prague Pinkas synagogue where the names of 78,000 Jewish victims of the Nazi occupation had been individually hand printed on the

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walls by the local Jewish community between 1954 and 1959.\footnote{Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}, p. 31.} Husak sanctioned this desecration on the grounds that the Pinkas Synagogue was perceived by the Communists as an emblem of ‘Zionist propaganda’. Furthermore, investigation of the Nazi era ‘autonomous’ government and Czech Police units role in constructing internment camps for Roma and Sinti at Lety u Pisku and Hodonín u Kunštátu was also stymied during the Soviet period.\footnote{Michal Frankl, ‘Holocaust Education in the Czech Republic, 1989-2002’, \textit{Intercultural Education}, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2003), pp. 177-188.} This situation in relation to Jewish and Roma victims only really began to change in the twilight years of Communism and after 1989 when an Education Department (1993) and international meeting centre (1997) were established at Terezín, and successful efforts were made by the Czech Jewish community to restore the Pinkas Synagogue (1992-1995).\footnote{European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, \textit{Discover the Past for the Future}, p. 114; Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}, p. 32.}

Supporting statements made in ITF minutes, Frankl’s research also notes that, \textit{“The Czech Republic was first a liaison partner and later became a full member of the Task Force”} and cites the Fenomén Holocaust Project (The Holocaust Phenomenon Project) as a particularly important Czech initiative in this regard.\footnote{Frankl, ‘Holocaust Education in the Czech Republic’, p. 185.} Founded by the Office of the President of the Czech Republic backed by Václav Havel, the Fenomén Holocaust Project originally focused its attention on the genocide of the Roma and Sinti but later expanded its remit to include all victims of Nazi crimes. The project ran an international conference called Fenomén Holocaust between 6\textsuperscript{th} and 8\textsuperscript{th} October 1999, which included a speech by Havel and attendance by Bauer as well as other ITF delegates.\footnote{Wallin and Newman (ed.), \textit{The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book}, p. 22.} The Fenomén Holocaust Project was quickly integrated as a further
component of the ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic.\textsuperscript{84} The adoption of this project by the ITF demonstrates the way in which the organization sought to build on indigenous Holocaust remembrance initiatives that were already operational in national public arenas.

The June 1999 meeting was also significant for Poland’s report on its Holocaust commemoration activities, and the USHMM’s offer to design a Task Force logo. The idea of, “...the possible complementary nature of Task Force efforts with other international organizations (Council of Europe, OSCE, UN Human Rights Commission)” was observed.\textsuperscript{85} Within this context, the ITF considered approaching international bodies such as the European Parliament and the Council of Europe as potential collaboration partners, although it is significant that these organizations were not fundamental to the ITF’s establishment. Members of the UK delegation as represented by Smith and David Cesarani continued their work on HMDs, whilst a decision was made that despite approving Italy’s application to join the Task Force, there should be a halt on further expansion until after the Stockholm Conference.\textsuperscript{86} As British historian Andy Pearce has documented, the month of June was also especially significant for Smith and Cesarani because after a number of Task Force discussions, the idea for a British HMD received national media exposure in June 1999 after it was discussed in the context of Prime Minister’s Question’s and packaged as a Parliamentary Bill. Following on from this discussion, the plan and objectives for a British day of Holocaust memory assumed a unified outline in a Consultation Paper of

\textsuperscript{84} Frankl, ‘Holocaust Education in the Czech Republic’, p. 184.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., pp. 35-36.
October 1999.\textsuperscript{87} However, it should be stressed that although HMD in the UK was implemented through British governmental channels and whilst the campaigning of the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET) played a central role in getting the legislation adopted, as Smith noted in an interview in 2009, British HMD was also “…a recommendation of the Task Force.”\textsuperscript{88}

Whilst these meetings unfolded and HMD was being formalized in Britain, the Swedish government was busy organizing the SIF 2000 after the first invitation to the conference was presented to participants at the June 1999 ITF meeting.\textsuperscript{89} Despite the high profile of Holocaust issues in the global media in the late 1990s, organizers maintain that they were astonished at the amount of political interest that the event inspired in those invited to attend. Persson has commented that, “…the response surprised us when the acceptances and confirmations began to arrive”,\textsuperscript{90} whilst Smith, a British participant in the preparations has observed:

The invitations were sent out and there was certainly no anticipation that twenty-two heads of state would come. We thought two, three...We thought one or two minor countries might send senior representatives but the letters were sent to Heads of State and on the main part, Heads of State attended, which was totally, absolutely, unexpected. And the scale of it was totally unexpected. We genuinely thought that there would not be that much interest. We certainly thought that there would not be that much interest from Central and East European countries and we didn’t even expect them to come. And I know that for a fact. So it caught the organizing committee by surprise. There was certainly no...I mean the team was only three people; there was no sense from the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office’s side that they would actually have to put any resources into it. It was expected to be a small affair.\textsuperscript{91}

Mirroring the fact that it was agreed on 1\textsuperscript{st} July 1999, that Israel would succeed the UK as Task Force chair, followed by Sweden at the end of 1999 and Germany and the

\textsuperscript{88} ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
\textsuperscript{90} Göran Persson quoted in \textit{Beyond the ‘Never Again’}, ed. Fried, p. 126.
\textsuperscript{91} ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
Netherlands in 2000, the next meeting of the ITF occurred just three months before the SIF 2000 in Jerusalem in October 1999. Minutes from this meeting suggest that it was convened against the backdrop of a two-day Yad Vashem International Conference on Holocaust Education which the ITF had affiliated itself with as a ‘moral supporter’.\footnote{Summary of the Meeting of the Working Group of the Task Force, 8-9 March 1999, in London’, \textit{Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research Report To the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, Work in Progress, December 1998-January 2000}, p. 29.} This important precursor to the SIF 2000 was considered different from the impending Swedish event because as two Israeli delegates pointed out, the Yad Vashem conference had been, “…\textit{designed for educators and the Stockholm meeting} for political, religious and civic leaders.”\footnote{Summary of the Meeting of the Working Group of the Task Force, 3 December 1998, in Washington D.C’, in \textit{Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research Report To the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, Work in Progress, December 1998-January 2000}, p. 28.} Against this backdrop, it was announced that the early stages of implementing the Czech ‘Liaison Project’ had been successful and that the declaration of an annual UK HMD would be announced at the same time as the convening of the SIF 2000. The next section will delineate the media reception of the SIF 2000 in the British and American contexts although reference will also be made to Swedish and Israeli commentaries. Finally, this chapter will conclude with a description of the press responses to the announcement of UK HMD, an initiative shaped by British campaigners and members of the ITF and communicated to British society through the media discourses of one particular national ‘public sphere’.

\textbf{The Media Reception of the SIF 2000}

The sheer spectacle of the SIF 2000 dazzled many of the delegates present at the event. For example, Eizenstat commented of the impact of the SIF 2000 that:
After more than half a century, it was extraordinary to convene so many political leaders to commit their countries to promote Holocaust education, remembrance – like national days of commemoration – and research. 94

Equally, Levine recalled in an interview in November 2009 that:

I’ll never forget standing on the stairs and putting my arm around Lars-Erik [Wingren] and saying, “Can you believe this?” as the hundreds of delegates streamed in… But we were overwhelmed and I was personally overwhelmed. 95

Finally, for psychologist and survivor of Auschwitz-Birkenau and Bergen-Belsen, Hédi Fried:

As a survivor, I was personally very happy to see my adoptive country, Sweden, hosting that huge event with all those world leaders coming to talk about the importance of education about the Holocaust. 96

Positive responses to the SIF 2000 were also evident in a number of recollections about the conference by British eyewitnesses to the event which were recorded in 2009. The British delegation was organized through the auspices of the office on post-Holocaust issues in the European Union Department (Bilateral) of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office. 97 The British delegation included both Cesarani and Smith as well as figures such as Jeremy Cresswell (Head of the European Union Department – Bilateral), Ben Helfgott (1945 Aid Society and Board of Deputies of British Jews), Trudy Gold (Spiro Institute), Suzanne Bardgett (IWM), Janice Lopatkin (HET) and Gillian Walnes (Anne Frank Educational Trust). Leading figure within the British Jewish community, Ben Helfgott, who personally experienced the wartime horrors of Buchenwald, Schlieben and Theresienstadt felt that the Forum was, “…very uplifting…at an event like this you always come out more Enlightened and enthusiastic.

94 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 348.
95 ‘Interview with Dr. Paul Levine’.
96 Hédi Fried quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Again’, ed. Fried, p. 53.
I mean this was something very special."98

Equally, predating the opening of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition in June 2000, Bardgett, the then Project Director of the aforementioned exhibit at the London establishment commented of her experience at Stockholm that:

It had a very major impact on me. I had never been at an event where there were so many statements, pledges, to remember the Holocaust from so many senior people. It had a very profound effect on me. I remember actually being quite overcome by...I couldn’t sleep actually, the night after the main events because it was sort of, so extraordinary.99

Bardgett was so struck by the conference that on the 1st February 2000 she wrote to the British Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook thanking him for his speech and his mention of the IWM Holocaust exhibition. She stated to Cook that, “The Forum seemed a real watershed in history of understanding this subject, and it was very encouraging to hear such firm commitment from each country both to education and to the remembrance of this terrible event.”100 Wanting the IWM’s patrons to know about discussions at the SIF 2000, Bardgett also sent a note about the conference with Cook’s speech attached to the IWM’s Founding Patrons and Advisory Group in the weeks following the Forum.101 The IWM curator was not alone in her positive sentiments about the conference. Despite prior inter-cultural developments in Holocaust education and memorialization over the previous decades, Smith recalled commenting to his colleagues at the end of the first day that the SIF 2000 still marked a significant watershed in terms of the global density of the institutions of Holocaust history and remembrance:

98 ‘Interview with Ben Helfgott’.
99 ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.
We can’t say anymore that the Holocaust has been forgotten, the question is what kind of memory have we got?” I think that then began a new process in terms of internationalising memory and it happened in that hall, that day, there’s no doubt about that.102

Even a somewhat more circumspect Cesarani recalled that despite the freezing cold climate and prolonged periods of diplomatic tedium, it was nevertheless an ‘extraordinary’ event in more ways than one:

I remember it being extremely cold. And everywhere I stood to give interviews with radio or television involved me standing in a very cold puddle of water. It was also very boring for long stretches. All of these conferences involved plenary sessions in which politicians and diplomats would make very long and very inconsequential speeches and you would have to sit through them and pretend to be awake. The Stockholm Conference was of a different order to the one in London and Washington because there were far more countries represented at a senior level. So the plenary sessions were extraordinary because you had one Prime Minister, one President after another getting up and making speeches. It was also extraordinary because Prime Minister Persson, who was then Prime Minister of Sweden, was clearly dedicated to making people aware of the persecution and mass murder of the Jews.103

Press reportage of the SIF 2000 in British and American newspapers was primarily placed within the context of the coincidental news of the Haider controversy in Austria.104 Owing to the strength of the Freedom Party, Chancellor Wolfgang Schuessel of the Austrian People’s Party decided to propose a governing coalition with Haider on 25th January 2000. Accidentally overlapping with the eve of the SIF 2000, the presence of Haider within the upper strata of European power politics became a controversial issue which made the SIF 2000 seem relevant to journalists. On the 27th January 2000, The New York Times proclaimed news of the Stockholm conference in a report headlined, ‘Rightists Gain in Austria Strikes Some of its Neighbours as a Loss’ whilst on the same day The Washington Post reported on the Forum within the context of, ‘Austria Alliance Alarms Europe: Far Right Party likely to be Partner in Governing

102 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
103 ‘Interview with Professor David Cesarani’.
In a similar vein, in Britain on the 27th January 2000, the left-wing *The Guardian* headed an article which included quotes from politicians present at Stockholm, ‘Austria gets Pariah Warning Over Haider’,

whilst the more conservative broadsheet, *The Times* reported that, ‘Leaders gather at Holocaust Forum’, an initiative which, “...comes at a time when the far Right is enjoying a renaissance in Europe and amid shock in Sweden at the growth of neo-Nazism.”

The main news in these press reports was the U.S and Europe-wide condemnation of Haider by a number of politicians who were present at the SIF 2000. Despite acting chancellor of Austria and leader of the Social Democrats Viktor Klima’s efforts at a Reception at Stockholm City Hall to reassure assembled delegates as to the intentions of his country by stating that, “...there must be no doubt about the continuation of the critical confrontation with the Nazi past.”, the censure of the Austrian government coming from assembled politicians was unambiguous. Persson was quoted in *The Washington Post* as stating, “The European Union is also a union consisting of values that respect tolerance. The program that is developing in Austria is not in line with those values.”

Germany, France and Italy also expressed concern about Haider’s rise to pre-eminence, however, it was the Israeli government who was most enraged and threatened to cease diplomatic relations with Vienna. *The Guardian* quoted Prime Minister Ehud Barak as commenting from the SIF 2000 that, “For every Jew in the

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world it is a highly disturbing signal...It touches every one of us”, whilst Michael Melchior, the Israeli minister responsible for battling anti-Semitism was reported in *The Times* as stating that, “This man and his teachings are insults to decency and democracy. They are an insult to the essence of the message of what we are gathered here to talk about.” Although not presenting a speech at Stockholm, First Lady Hilary Clinton and candidate for the American Senate also joined in the condemnation of Haider, arguably in order to support the foreign policies of her husband as well as to show her liberal credentials and undercut her political opponent Rudolph Giuliani, Mayor of New York, who had allegedly shared the stage with Haider at a Martin Luther King commemoration in January 2000. Writing to Edgar Bronfman, President of the WJC, Mrs Clinton stated, “Haider’s record of intolerance, extremism and anti-Semitism should be a concern to all of us.”

In terms of the political dynamics of institutional Holocaust memory and reparative justice, one of the key results of the Freedom Party controversy was that the United States government operated a ‘restricted contacts’ policy in which no contact was allowed with Haider or any Freedom Party members of the Austrian government whilst the class-action law suits relating to slave and forced labour were being resolved. The affair was also significant because as spearheaded by the socialist government of Lionel Jospin in France, the EU placed sanctions on Austria. This meant that whilst Austria continued to partake in EU meetings, Schuessel became isolated among EU leaders and bilateral relations with Austria were limited among the other EU heads of

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112 ‘Hilary warns against Haider’s rise to power’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 29 January 2000, p. 15.
state. The results of this international condemnation were that by February 2000, Haider had resigned as leader of the Freedom Party and refused to participate in the new government. However, victory against the Austrian populist radical right was far from total. Half of the Austrian governing cabinet comprised members of the Freedom Party whilst Haider retained his position as Governor of Carinthia. Furthermore, commentators such as Robert S. Wistrich, Neuberger Chair in Modern Jewish History at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem warned of the potential consequences of the Haider affair:

If he presents a threat, and he does, it is one that should be met not by rejecting the choice of the Austrian people but by giving them ample opportunity to reconsider. By contrast, the EU’s diplomatic embargo seems calculated to turn Austria into pariah state, a policy that may give some temporary satisfaction to the cosmopolitan defenders of a united Europe but it is likely to backfire in the end.

The fact that the convening of the SIF 2000 was often journalistically framed in terms of this battle against a resurgent European far right is further compounded by two press reports issued in February 2000. The headline of a BBC report of 18th February 2000 describes the SIF 2000 as a ‘World Alert for the Rise of the Far Right’ whilst in a report for CNN, Stieg Larsson, left-wing journalist, writer of the Millenium crime trilogy, and founder of the Swedish anti-racist and youth orientated Expo Foundation, expressed the opinion that:

I think the Stockholm conference is the most important event in the matter of anti-fascism in many, many years simply because anti-Semitism is once again the absolute cornerstone of all neo-Nazi and racist activities in Europe.

With the exception of the context of the Haider controversy, press reportage of the SIF

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116 Ibid.
2000 in British and American newspapers generally gained only a brief mention as in *The Daily Telegraph’s* description of the conference in the ‘World Bulletin’ under the heading ‘Jews honour Wallenberg.’ However, it should also be noted that on 27th January 2000 news of the SIF 2000 made the front page of *The Times* and the inside pages of *The Daily Telegraph* for domestic political reasons in Britain. Relating to the controversy over New Labour’s proposal to repeal Section 28, or the law which prohibited the promotion of homosexuality by UK local authorities and was seen by abolitionists as inhibiting teachers from supporting gay teenagers and tackling sex education effectively in schools, SIF 2000 attendee and leader of British Orthodox Jews, Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, in a classic moment of faith inspired ‘liberal ambivalence’ towards homosexual difference opposed the repeal of Section 28 on the grounds that:

> I can never forget as a Jew that homosexuals were sent to Auschwitz just as Jews were. If our society has become more tolerant then that is a good thing. However, the current proposal is based on a fundamental confusion between tolerance and moral judgement. There is a real danger that the abolition of Section 28 will lead to the promotion of a homosexual lifestyle as morally equivalent to marriage.

Sacks comments incited a reader, Jonathan Fraser to write a letter to *The Jewish Chronicle*:

> I remember being bullied at school for being Jewish (and therefore being different) at the time of the Yom Kippur War. Treating gays and lesbians as ‘different’ is the surest way of encouraging hatred. And Section 28 encourages this. When, next January, we reaffirm that the Holocaust should never happen again, we would do well to remember the other victims as well as those from our own families and friends.

120 Ruth Gledhill, Roland Watson and Andrew Pierce, ‘Chief Rabbi turns fire on Section 28’, *The Times* 27 January 2000, p. 1; Oliver Poole, ‘Chief Rabbi joins the fight against scrapping gay law’, *The Daily Telegraph*, 27 January 2000, p. 16.
121 Jonathan Sacks quoted in Poole, ‘Chief Rabbi joins the fight against scrapping gay law’, p. 16.
122 Jonathan Fraser, ‘Chief Rabbi and Section 28’, *The Jewish Chronicle*, 4 February 2000. Although the Nazi persecution of homosexuals was a marginal and rarely discussed issue at the January 2000 conference, Georg Sved of The Swedish Federation for Lesbian and Gay Rights was a delegate to the SIF 2000. For a list of delegates to the Stockholm International Forum 2000, see the SIF Conference Series CD-Rom.
In addition to this commentary, *The Jewish Chronicle’s* coverage of the SIF 2000 was to be primarily found in an article under the headline, ‘Britain to attend Latvia talks on suspected war criminal’ by Ronald Loefler, Hal Weitzman and Bernard Josephs. This article reported that:

Latvia won praise at an International Forum on the Holocaust...by inviting representatives of six nations to Riga to discuss the case of Konrad Kalejs, the alleged Nazi war criminal who left Britain for America earlier this month.\(^{123}\)

Loefler, Weitzmann and Josephs also commented on Foreign Secretary Cook’s presence at the SIF 2000, the conference’s coincidence with the announcement of UK HMD as well as Persson’s pledges to set up a Holocaust museum in Sweden and donate $5 million to the Swedish Association of Jewish Communities. They also noted that the WJC’s Bronfman, “...was holding a parallel conference at the Stockholm Great Synagogue” which Persson attended in order to present, “Nina Lagergren, Raoul Wallenberg’s sister, with the WJC human rights award.”\(^{124}\)

However, the achievements of the SIF 2000 did not win universal praise. Absent from attending the Forum itself, for Zuroff writing in *The Jerusalem Report* (28\(^{th}\) February 2000), the conference was a catalogue of ‘Missed Opportunities in Stockholm’. Zuroff reiterated his critique of the Swedish government for failing to deal with war crimes issues, especially in the wake of the January 2000 release of Bosse Schoen’s documentary which alleged that a minimum of 260 Swedes had been Waffen-SS members during the Second World War.\(^{125}\) Within this context, Zuroff criticized the organizers of the SIF 2000 for not inviting Simon Wiesenthal and disapprovingly


\(^{124}\) Ibid.

observed of the treatment of the Swedish war crimes issue that:

Prime Minister Persson called for an investigation, but no operative decision on this has been made and the subject was studiously avoided by the visiting dignitaries who preferred to praise their host. Nor was it discussed in any of the numerous panels and lectures.\footnote{Zuroff, ‘Missed Opportunities in Stockholm’.
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However, in spite of this, Zuroff stated that the most important of the SIF 2000’s shortcomings was:

…the cynical manner in which it was exploited by some Eastern European leaders to deliver sanitized presentations of their history and the role played by their countrymen in the implementation of the Final Solution.\footnote{Ibid. 127}

In regards to this criticism and in contrast to the reported praise heaped on Latvia in The Jewish Chronicle’s report, Zuroff criticized the speech of Latvian President, Vaira Vike-Freiberga for minimizing the extent of local collaboration in the Holocaust and for blaming “...Nazi racist propaganda exclusively for the participation of Latvians in the murder of the Jews, which is grossly inaccurate.”\footnote{Ibid. 128} Equally, given the extent of local Lithuanian collaboration in the Nazi mass murder of 212,000 of Lithuania’s 220,000 Jews during the Second World War,\footnote{Ibid. 129} Zuroff also found fault with Prime Minister Andrius Kubilius’s claims that the Lithuanian Jewish collective had been one of the ‘happiest’ in Europe because Lithuania was “…a country with no anti-Semitism in its recorded history.”\footnote{Ibid. 130} Zuroff’s observations were supported by scholar Göran Adamson who also censured the Bulgarian government’s speech for over-stating the lack of anti-Semitism in the Bulgarian parliament during the Second World War as well as over-exaggerating the overall “…benevolent character of the Bulgarian people.”\footnote{Andrius Kubilius, ‘Stockholm International Forum (2000): Message by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Lithuania’, SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Again’, ed. Fried. 131 Göran Adamson, ‘Selective Perceptions: The Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust’, Patterns of Prejudice (Volume 34, Number 3), p. 65. It should also be noted that Stephen Smith observed
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Adamson also observed the ‘vagueness’ of the commitments to human rights in presentations by Persson, Italian Prime Minister D’Alema as well as the brevity of Havel’s speech, which nonetheless condemned racism and anti-Semitism, pledged his country to the needs of Holocaust survivors and supported the memorialization of the Jews and Roma through the ‘Holocaust Phenomenon’ project.\[132\] Within this context, Adamson felt that it was ironic that:

The only states who avoided this ever threatening vagueness were actually those who, in various degrees made nationalistic speeches, that is those who used the SIF as a platform for ideas, in a manner contrary to the stated purpose of the conference.\[133\]

Although the SIF 2000 did not gain extensive coverage in the UK print media or in American newspapers such as The New York Times and the Washington Post, it did receive substantial exposure through television, radio and the Internet. For example, a report on CNN’s website (27th January 2000) proclaimed that there would be a live webcast of the opening ceremony,\[134\] whilst in February, a CNN World Report was aired entitled ‘Stockholm International Forum Remembers Crimes of Nazism’.\[135\] Equally, BBC reports on the SIF 2000 were written against the backdrop of other Holocaust era headlines such as ‘Latvia killers rehabilitated’ (26th January 2000); ‘Blair unveils Holocaust Memorial Plan’ (26th January 2000); ‘Nazi slave cash bill adopted’ (26th January 2000); ‘The Long Fight for Holocaust Compensation’ (26th January 2000) and of the SIF 2000 that, “I also wanted attending countries who had collaborated with Nazi Germany in their brutal destruction of Jews and others to say more about having been allies with Nazi Germany, or at least to address the question of collaborators and bystanders within their countries. Some were honest about that. Others were less honest.” (Smith quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 69.)


\[133\] Adamson, ‘Selective Perceptions’, p. 66.


‘Berlin’s Battle to build memorial’ (27th January 2000).

However, perhaps two BBC reports on the conference are most significant both in terms of the high profile of the actors involved as well as in the way that they intimate future challenges for the Stockholm Project and the ITF in terms of the public perception of global dynamics in Holocaust memory work. For example, the first report situates the convening of the SIF 2000 within the question, ‘Is there a Holocaust Industry’; whilst the second is by diplomatic correspondent Barnaby Mason and fronted a headline which proclaimed ‘Uncomfortable Questions in Stockholm’ and which observed, “Walking around the conference centre, you feel a curious disconnection between the comfortable people sipping coffee and the horrors whose memory they are here to perpetuate.”

Mason’s article then focuses on the Opening Speech of Auschwitz survivor, Nobel Prize Winner and Honorary Chairman of the Conference, Elie Wiesel. In his speech Wiesel had called on Persson to make the conference an annual event on “conscience and humanity” and had posed a number of difficult questions to the delegates gathered

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137 Andre Vornic, BBC News, ‘Is there a “Holocaust Industry”?’, 26 January 2000 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/619610.stm) Accessed: 16/08/2009. This report contained interview captions from Tim Cole and Norman Finkelstein, two very different scholars whom Vornic’s article nonetheless associates with “a new school of academic thought”, which, “questions the accepted vision of the Holocaust and the universality of its moral teachings.” For example, Cole’s 1999 book Selling the Holocaust, proposed that the construction and commodification of Holocaust memory in films such as Anne Frank’s Diary (1959) and Schindler’s List (1993) are responsible for representing mythical ‘sugar coated’ redemptive narratives of atrocity that need to be questioned because these commercial distortions of the past possess the potential to stimulate as oppose to combat Holocaust denial. For a summary of why Finkelstein’s “Holocaust Industry” is so problematic, see footnote 29 of this chapter.

culminating in his statement that if the allies had not followed the policy of appeasement, the Holocaust, “…could have been avoided.” In many respects, it is unsurprising that the BBC picked up on Wiesel’s high profile speech because at least one delegate believed that Wiesel had potentially, “insulted the international community,” and in general had formulated an address that was off tone within the context of the Forum’s political objectives. Wiesel was also in the world press later in the week when he made an official address to the German Reichstag on 27th January or HMD in Germany. Wiesel’s speech was part of a ceremony announcing the building of a ‘Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe’ in Berlin. In his address, Wiesel reinforced the idea of the Holocaust as what Dirk Moses might call an enduring stigma on German national history and identity, stating to the politicians gathered that, “No people ever inflicted such suffering as your people on mine in such a short period. Until the end of time, Auschwitz is part of your history and mine.”

However, other issues were raised at the SIF 2000 which received little or no coverage in the press. In this regard, much like debates surrounding the creation of the USHMM, except played out against the more ‘universalistic’ rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ rather than ‘uniqueness’, the SIF 2000 was also used as a platform by some speakers in order to raise awareness of not just issues arising from the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry but also other Nazi atrocities and instances of genocide and/or human rights abuses since 1945. For whilst Turkey continued to maintain its

140 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
141 Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past.
silence on the Armenian genocide during World War One,\textsuperscript{143} and there was no representative of a disability NGO, in spite of the need to memorialize the Nazi T4 mass murder programme as well as to highlight the ongoing human rights abuses of disabled children in some Romanian orphanages.\textsuperscript{144} Texas University Professor Ian Hancock spoke on the behalf of Europe’s Roma and Sinti during the second plenary session and criticized the delegates to the SIF 2000 on the grounds that:

…the primary target today in Europe of right-wing aggression and racist attacks are the Roma, my people, the Romani people, the so-called ‘Gypsies’. We were also second only to the Jews in the Holocaust, in terms of being victimized, singled out, the targets of attempted extermination. And yet that connection has not been made. It seems to me puzzling, given the reason for this conference, which is to remember what happened then, and to take it as a lesson and apply it to what is happening now. Nobody on the first day talked about what happened to - what is happening to - Roma today in Europe. It has come up in one or two of the sessions when we have raised the issue ourselves, but it has not been a spontaneous issue at all.\textsuperscript{145}

Furthermore, in his address, Hancock was particularly critical of the claims made in the Czech delegation’s speech on the grounds that, “… in the past year those very same governments have refused entry to Roma, particularly from the Czech Republic, seeking asylum on grounds of human rights violations.”\textsuperscript{146} Equally, whilst Prime Minister of the Bosnian republican government since 1993 and Co-Chairman of the Council of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Haris Siladzic acknowledged the importance of remembering the Holocaust he also drew particular attention to the Serbian genocide of Bosnian Muslims (1992-1995), as well as the plight of innocent, non-terrorist Muslim civilians and refugees caught up in the conflict in Chechnya:

\textsuperscript{144} For list of delegates and organizations to the SIF 2000 see SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried.
\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
The Allies did not bomb the railway tracks leading to Auschwitz, because they feared that it would arouse the wrath of the Nazis; six million people died. In our case, an arms embargo led to ‘only’ a quarter of a million deaths - an embargo that penalized only the victims for the aggressors already had more arms than they could handle. How many will die in Chechnya remains to be seen; it will depend on who counts the dead. The majority of our quarter of a million victims in Bosnia and Herzegovina were Bosniaks, Bosnian Muslims.\textsuperscript{147}

Despite Russia’s presence at the SIF 2000, and although the Danish Prime Minister, Poul Nyrup Rasmussen called for a peaceful resolution to the Chechen conflict and, “\textit{...access for humanitarian aid}”,\textsuperscript{148} few politicians at the SIF 2000 commented on Russia’s brutal autumn 1999 attempt to militarily reclaim its former province against the backdrop of the violent terrorist provocations of Chechen separatist war-lords and fighters, many of whom were Islamic extremists.\textsuperscript{149} This was in spite of the fact that soon after the crisis flared, international human rights organizations began to raise concerns about the conduct of ‘cleansing’ operations by Russian federal forces;\textsuperscript{150} whilst an article on the plight of non-militant and non-Islamic extremist Chechen refugees by Vanora Bennett in \textit{The Times} (27\textsuperscript{th} January 2000) cited the concerns of Muscovite human rights worker Svetlana Gannush that, “\textit{There is a strange revanchist attitude fuelling this war, a distorted Russian nationalism...A huge number of people believe Russia is fighting not Chechnya but Chechens.}”\textsuperscript{151}

\textbf{The Media Reception of the Announcement of British HMD}

On 26\textsuperscript{th} January at the SIF 2000, British Foreign Secretary Cook told international

\textsuperscript{149} Vanora Bennett, ‘Say it out loud, this is genocide’, \textit{The Times}, 27 January 2000.
\textsuperscript{151} Bennett, ‘Say it out loud, this is genocide’, p. 39.
delegates present that, “…today Tony Blair has announced that the 27th January will every year be commemorated in Britain as Holocaust Memorial Day not just in memory of the victims of the Holocaust alone but also in memory of all victims of genocide.”

Preceding Cook’s speech by a few hours, Blair had announced an annual UK HMD amidst the media fanfare of an official trip to the Anne Frank Trust exhibition in London. Blair stated that, “The Holocaust and the lessons it teaches us for our own time, must never be forgotten.”, as well as emphasizing that, “As the Holocaust survivors age and become fewer in number, it becomes more and more our duty to take up the mantle and tell each generation what happened and what could happen again.” Blair placed the decision for a HMD within the context of New Labour’s objectives to encourage, “a just, tolerant and multi-racial Britain” as well as the government’s desire to, “build a new patriotism that is open to all.”

Echoing the policy line of the Prime Minister, whilst stressing the more ‘universalistic’ aims of British HMD, Home Secretary, Jack Straw added:

> Appalling and inhuman acts of genocide changed the course of history in the twentieth century. Millions of people perished or had their lives hideously damaged. This is an opportunity for us to recognize and act upon the lessons from the past.

> Our aim, in the 21st Century, must be to work towards a tolerant and diverse society which is based upon notions of universal dignity and equal rights and responsibilities for all citizens. The Holocaust Memorial Day is a symbol of this.

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General press reports on Blair’s announcement in *The Guardian* and *The Times* noted that the first UK HMD would be held on the 27th January 2001 and that a working group on HMD was considering the various ways in which the Holocaust could be commemorated. These suggestions included a secular ceremony attended by senior figures from the Royal Family and British politics. Other events mooted included Holocaust survivors giving speeches in schools as well as the charitable selling of commemorative stamps, badges and memorial candles. BBC news reported that the Prime Minister’s sentiments were echoed publicly by a number of British delegates to the SIF 2000 including Chief Rabbi Sacks who reportedly said that, “I welcome this announcement and applaud the government on what is a brave and significant idea”; 157 Smith described the news as, “A remarkably bold initiative”; 158 whilst Eldred Tabachnik QC and President of the Board of Deputies of British Jews mirrored the ITF’s liberal ‘universalistic’ rhetoric in stating that, “It is essential that we remember the genocides of the last century and learn their lessons for the future.” 159

However, not all commentators shared Sacks, Smith and Tabachnik’s enthusiasm for British HMD. In *The Guardian*, Anne Karpf, daughter of Holocaust survivors and author of *The War After* (1996) bemoaned, “the Spielberg agenda of using the Holocaust to teach liberal values.” 160 Karpf also expressed fears that a ritualized day of Holocaust Remembrance would be little more than a series of ‘empty tributes’ that would reinforce public forgetting in a society that in her childhood experience had

159 Eldred Tabachnik QC quoted in BBC News, ‘Blair Unveils Holocaust Memorial Plan’.
ignored the memory of the Holocaust. Political writer and Observer columnist Will Hutton worried that UK HMD might end up suggesting, “…that the crazed mix of eugenics, anti-semitism and barbarism were and are unique to Germans and Germany, rather than something common to all European culture and something which we all must face.” In a different vein, Simon Finch, producer of the Channel Four documentary Hitler and Stalin, critiqued UK HMD from the perspective of the continuing inadequacy of the public remembrance of Stalin’s crimes:

Think of the absurdity of the phrase, “the gulag industry” and you see the problem. No iconic images exist to symbolize the millions who died in Stalin’s camps. There is no archive. There has been no public process of reckoning, and precious little discussion of guilt. There is no chance of a memorial day for victims of Stalinism.

However, perhaps the most acerbic criticism came from left-of-centre columnist, Nick Cohen in the New Statesmen. Writing in November 2000, Cohen proposed that British HMD was inappropriate because the country had not been occupied by the Nazis during the Second World War as well as politically hypocritical. Cohen argued that this hypocrisy arose from the government’s implementation of the Immigration and Asylum Act (1999), its arms deals with countries which continued to violate human rights, as well as the failure of the proposed HMD to deal with specific issues such as the Armenian genocide as well as the persecution of the Kurds by the Iraqi government.

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162 Will Hutton, The Observer, 21 January 2000. See also Cesarani, ‘Does the Singularity of the Holocaust make it Incomparable and Inoperative for Commemorating, Studying and Preventing Genocide?’, p. 44.
164 The Immigration and Asylum Act (1999) increased the legal mechanisms to stop and discourage asylum-seekers from entering the U.K. These included greater penalties on transport companies who facilitated illegal immigration as well as the introduction of a controversial system which substituted the asylum seekers right to UK welfare benefits with a more restrictive voucher scheme. (Sarah Spencer, ‘Immigration’, in Blair’s Britain, 1997-2007, ed. Anthony Seldon, pp. 342-344.)
Discussions about HMD in the British ‘public sphere’ were also reflected in letters to the editor published in the broadsheets between 27th and 29th January 2000. These letters tended to illustrate the lack of popular awareness about inter-state organizations such as the ITF in national public life as well as demonstrating how the announcement of HMD provoked mixed responses relating to the role of memorialization in constructing multicultural values within British society. Supporting the announcement Professor Geraldine Van Bueren stated in *The Times* that, “Holocaust Day should be regarded as an opportunity for all of us to commemorate where daily acts of intolerance and their silent acquiescence may eventually lead”\(^\text{166}\); whilst Mr John Wagner believed that HMD should be represented by a yellow star of David badge which would turn that symbol, “of repression into one of defiance against any country or power that commits the crime of genocide.”\(^\text{167}\)

By contrast, the more politically conservative *Daily Telegraph* bemoaned in an ‘Opinion’s Column’, Blair’s “Playing with history.” Despite acknowledging the failures of British policy towards the Jews during the Second World War, including immigration policy to Palestine and whether the allies should have protested the case of the Jews louder or even attempted to bomb Auschwitz, the writer maintains that a HMD in the UK, “…is the wrong way for Britain to commemorate a uniquely German crime” and that, “Blurring the distinction between those who ran the death camps and those who liberated them may serve European unity, but not historical truth.”\(^\text{168}\) Agreeing with this article in a ‘Letter to the editor’ on 29th January 2000, Mr Philip Malins from

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Solihull in the West Midlands stated that commemoration of Holocaust victims should be incorporated into Remembrance Sunday because, “This would be a much more positive, constructive national day, embracing people of all ages and races, a fitting memorial to those who fought and died in the greatest of all wars.”169 Displaying a degree of ambivalence towards the remembrance of the suffering of the Jews during the Second World War as well as that endured by other victims of genocide, these articles in The Daily Telegraph also suggest a desire by the centre-right to represent World War II in a triumphal national narrative which is at odds with what can be interpreted as the liberal ‘universalistic’ and nationally self-critical representation of the remembrance of the Nazi past that was reinforced by the rhetorical claims of the SIF 2000.

In The Guardian, two letters from Gil Elliot and Jane Clements of the Council of Christians and Jews whole-heartedly supported UK HMD. However, echoing the complaints of writers such as Karpf and Hutton, letters of left-wing dissent were also published concerning the danger that UK HMD might ignore the national memory of Britain’s own Imperial transgressions as well as justify contentious domestic and foreign policies in the present. Given Britain’s colonial past, Professor Robin Wilson protested, “Would it not be more appropriate for the day to be called national Holocaust and slavery day?”170 Equally, Mr Paul Elsen from London interjected that, “No person would deny the Jews proper commemoration for the Holocaust. What opponents object to is its use as a symbol of Jewish victimhood and thus as justification for Israeli aggression and oppression”;171 whilst Mr Noel Longhurst from Sheffield protested against perceived parliamentary and social hypocrisy, “Am I alone in thinking

that the announcement of Holocaust day sits somewhat uneasily next to the row about letting in ‘too many’ refugees many of whom have been persecuted in their homelands.”

The heated opinions expressed in The Guardian suggest that the idea of UK HMD did not just provoke disdain from the popular right but also ambivalence, and sometimes outright opposition for very different political and social reasons from commentators left of New Labour, who perceived the government as being hypocritical in both its domestic multiculturalism and ‘ethical’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ foreign policy rhetoric. In this mode of left-wing ambivalence towards British HMD, the commemoration day was perceived as a liberal and ‘universalistic’ representation of specific Jewish victimhood that in centering the Jewish tragedy was neither self-critical nor diverse enough to encompass the numerous narratives of suffering contained within the multicultural British ‘public sphere’. This was a position shared by Britain’s Armenian community who were battling to get the Turkish government to acknowledge the massacre of 1.5 million Armenians during the First World War. As a result, they interpreted Straw’s references to the need to remember genocides as political hypocrisy and polemically proclaimed that UK HMD, “…was an insult to other victims of genocide.”

Mirroring the way in which news about UK HMD was mediated through a specifically British context, The Guardian, The Times and The Daily Telegraph made virtually no mention of the role of the ITF or the convening of the SIF 2000 in bringing about the conceptualization of UK HMD, although The Guardian did report that, “There are also

plans to offer every household in Britain a free book on the Holocaust, following a similar initiative in Sweden.”

Equally, in the Jewish Chronicle’s report on the announcement of UK HMD, reference was made to the convening of the SIF 2000, the British financial contribution to the ITF as well as the fact that President Arpad Gonz of Hungary had, “…announced that his country would inaugurate an annual Holocaust remembrance day on April 16, the anniversary of the start of the deportation of Hungarian Jewry in 1944.”

Very little mention of the announcement of UK HMD was made in the tabloid print media (The Daily Mail, The Daily Mirror, The Sun) with the exception of a very small article in The Sun under the caption, “Brits to mark Holocaust.”

**Conclusion**

The political and intellectual personnel of the ITF including but not limited to Academic Advisor and Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ advocate, Yehuda Bauer played a key role in the organization of the SIF 2000 and the writing of the Stockholm Declaration. For many attendees, such as Eizenstat, Levine, Bardgett and Smith, the event was ‘extraordinary’ and marked a significant attempt to ensure that the remembrance of the Holocaust as well as the acknowledgement of, “The terrible suffering of the many millions of other victims of the Nazis” would not just be about the necessary although ‘imperfect justice’ of reparations, but also in the words of Wiesel, “…the

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continuing ethical value and weight of memory.”

However, speeches by some delegates to the SIF 2000, the media reception of the conference in the British, American and Israeli press as well as the public response to analogous announcements such as the launch of UK HMD, suggests that the project of remembrance outlined at the SIF 2000 also provoked criticism from various dissenting voices.

Issues raised included the ongoing need to prosecute Nazi war criminals and Sweden’s failures in this regard; the demand for greater justice and remembrance for Europe’s Roma and Sinti populations; debates in relation to national identity provoked by the announcement of UK HMD; ambivalence in Eastern European countries towards taking national responsibility for collaboration in the Holocaust and finally, pressure over the extent to which remembrance of the Nazi past should directly contribute to international action to memorialize other historical atrocities as well as to prevent future genocides and human rights abuses in line with the Stockholm Declaration’s commitment to condemn, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”

As will be seen in chapter 3, which looks at the consequences of the SIF 2000 in terms of the successive SIFs and the ITF, as well as chapter four, which delineates the impact of the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’; many of these issues would continue to shape, confront or be debated in subsequent SIFs as well as in the ITF during the first decade of its existence.

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Chapter 3

The Legacies of the SIF 2000:
The Subsequent Stockholm Conferences and
The First Decade of the ITF

Once the politicians had exited the conference stage and the scholarly experts had
discarded their prompt notes where could the impact of the SIF 2000 be traced beyond
the newspaper articles, television reports and Internet bulletins? Some of the immediate
consequences of the SIF 2000 included increased pressure on Germany to resolve slave
labor compensation issues as well as the arrival in Latvia of prosecutors from six
nations, including the U.S and the UK, in order to mount criminal cases against alleged
Second World War perpetrators in the Baltic States.¹ Equally, Polish scholar Jolanta
Ambrosewicz-Jacobs has noted the fact that Poland’s participation at the SIF 2000 also,
“...helped the authors of the first curriculum pertaining to the Holocaust, Robert
Szuchta and Piotr Trojanski, obtain financial support from the Ministry of Education in
April 2000.”² Moreover, in response to the heated public discussions that greeted the
Polish publication of Neighbors in the spring of 2000,³ Polish President, Aleksander
Kwasniewski made an important address on 10th July 2001 marking the sixtieth
anniversary of the Jedwabne tragedy. In response to Jan T. Gross’s analysis of the July

¹ William Horsley, BBC News, ‘Call for access to Holocaust archives’, 28 January 2000,
² Jolanta Ambrosewicz-Jacobs, ‘So Many Questions: The Development of Holocaust Education in Post-
Finder, Aleksuin, Polonsky and Schwarz, p. 283; Robert Szuchta, ‘From Silence to Recognition: The
³ Jan T. Gross, Neighbors: The Destruction of the Jews in the Community of Jedwabne (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 2001); Polonski and Michlic (eds), The Neighbors Respond.
1941 Polish massacre of approximately 1,600 Jews in the small town of Jedwabne, Kwasniewski stated:

I apologize in the name of those Poles whose conscience is moved by that crime. In the name of those who believe that we cannot be proud of the magnificence of Polish history without at the same time feeling pain and shame for the wrongs that Poles have done to others.\(^4\)

Whilst Kwasniewski’s address cannot be viewed as a direct consequence of the SIF 2000 but rather as a result of the *Neighbors* controversy, it is notable that his speech mirrored ideas about nations taking responsibility for their Nazi pasts which were enunciated at the SIF 2000.\(^5\)

Furthermore, in the months following the SIF 2000, the ITF also rolled out further stages of its ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic. In 2000, the Terezín Memorial, the Jewish Museum in Prague and the Ministry of Education organized a number of training seminars for Czech teachers. Between 2000 and 2002, several hundred instructors attended this three-day course at the Terezín Memorial Museum. Participants were given lectures on the genocides of the Jews and the Roma and Sinti during the Second World War as well as instruction on Jewish history, anti-Semitism, racism and pedagogical approaches to the teaching of the Holocaust and Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’. Members of the ITF assessed these courses at Terezín and recommended that improvements needed to be made in terms of module content and methods used. This advice was adopted and used to improve the syllabus for future

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\(^5\) However, despite Kwasniewski’s Jedwabne address issues relating to Poland and the Holocaust would continue to be controversial throughout the noughties, particularly in relation to the restitution of private property. See Popper, ‘Restitution Battle Shifts to Stalled Polish Front’, *The Forward*, 6 August 2004.
recipients of instruction. It should also be noted that a few months after Stockholm, two other major international conferences on the Holocaust were organized and these included some of the same participants. The first event was convened in London and Oxford in July 2000 and was a major week long academic conference entitled *Remembering for the Future.* This event was the latest in a series of academic conferences motivated by the leadership of Holocaust and Christian-Jewish relations scholar, Elisabeth Maxwell and convened under the same name in Oxford (1988) and at Berlin’s Humboldt University in 1994. Although *Remembering for the Future* (2000), was not directly linked to the SIF 2000, Bauer delivered a plenary address on ‘genocide’ which can be perceived as further reinforcing the themes of Stockholm in that he reminded his audience that, “...our very aim, as students of the Holocaust and Genocide, is eminently political, globally so.”

The second international conference continued the work of the LCNG (1997) and WCHA (1998) and was convened in Vilnius, Lithuania in October 2000. The particular

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6 Michal Frankl, ‘Holocaust Education in the Czech Republic, 1989-2002’, *Intercultural Education*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 2003), p. 185. By 2009, the Czech Republic had a tiered system for training Holocaust pedagogues. The first stage is a three-day course on ‘How to teach the Holocaust’, the second level a four-day international study group on ‘The Holocaust in Education’, the third tier a series of seminars organized in cooperation with the Auschwitz and Ravensbrück memorials, and the final stage a ten day course at Yad Vashem. By 2009, over 1500 Czech teachers had participated in at least some parts of this training programme (‘Czech Republic’ in *The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book*, ed. Wallinn and Newman, p. 35.)


9 One of the primary results of *Remembering for the Future 2000* was a three volume collection of academic essays edited by Roth, Maxwell and Levy and published under the title: *Remembering for the Future: The Holocaust in an Age of Genocide*. Volume One covered ‘History’; Volume Two discussed ‘Ethics and Religion’ and Volume Three dealt with ‘Memory’. Furthermore, Roth and Maxwell were both attendees at the SIF 2000. For a list of delegates and organizations at the SIF 2000, see SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in *Beyond the ‘Never Again’*, ed. Fried.

focus of this meeting was issues of heirless art and cultural property. At this conference Israel’s consul general in New York, Colette Avital put forward the highly controversial claim that Israel was the rightful heir to unclaimed Jewish art. Understandably unable to reach a consensus, delegates decided that more study of the issue was required.\textsuperscript{11}

Finally, an unexpected corollary of the SIF 2000 was the 2007 release of mezzo-soprano, Anne Sofie von Otter’s vocal interpretation of music by Jewish composers interned in Theresienstadt.\textsuperscript{12} She originally became involved in the project when she performed some of the songs at the SIF 2000.\textsuperscript{13} However, in the long term there were two key institutions through which efforts were made to enact the legacy of the SIF 2000 and the sentiments of the Stockholm Declaration (2000).\textsuperscript{14} The first related to the subsequent convening by the Swedish government of SIFs on ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004); whilst the second corresponds to the ITF’s efforts to put the Stockholm Declaration (2000) into practice via the promotion of Holocaust remembrance, research and education throughout the world. This chapter will give an historical overview of these two important institutional outcomes of the SIF 2000 as well as providing an assessment of the successes and challenges faced in implementing the Stockholm Declaration (2000), a document which in principle encouraged the international community to fight against, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”;\textsuperscript{15} as well as demanding that nations confront their Nazi and Holocaust era pasts.

\textsuperscript{11} Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}, pp. 203-204.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., pp. 136-137.
One of the most significant consequences of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research was that Swedish Prime Minister Persson took on Wiesel’s request to make the Forum an annual event, and fused this with the liberal ‘universalistic’ aims of the SIF 2000 in order to promote democracy, tolerance and genocide prevention. This work was continued in subsequent SIFs on ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004). This section will briefly summarize the key discussions, achievements and challenges posed to each of these conferences, primarily using sources from Fried’s edited anthology of SIF speeches and interviews, Beyond the ‘Never Agains’. However, in order to provide a more balanced analysis, this commentary will also utilize oral history interviews carried out with SIF attendees, newspaper articles as well as critical reviews of Fried’s anthology. It will be seen that whilst these conferences were significant in encouraging dialogues between politicians, academics, NGO representatives and genocide survivors on a range of important human rights issues, the SIF conferences were also challenged by ongoing political failures to adequately address the pressing issues posed for the international community by the perpetration of contemporary genocides in places such as Darfur and the Congo.

The SIF 2001 (29th - 30th January 2001) was attended by delegates from fifty-one countries as well as representatives of NGOs, universities, and transnational institutions such as the UN, the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU. This conference focused its discussions on issues related to modern forms of far right-wing fanaticism, racism, xenophobia, Islamophobia, homophobia and anti-Semitism such as ‘white power’ music
and online Holocaust denial.\textsuperscript{16} The chief outcome of the SIF 2001 was the Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum on Combating Intolerance. This non-binding document sought to encourage national, local and transnational agencies, “\textit{... to combat all manifestations of intolerance in our societies}” by improving, “\textit{... existing systems for collecting and analyzing information}”; supporting “\textit{... the creation of a research process linking academics and policy-makers}”; further developing “\textit{...and where absent consider establishing, legislative measures, including anti-discrimination legislation}”; encouraging, “\textit{...media in our societies to develop training programmes for journalists, editors and producers}”; and supporting, “\textit{international co-operation in the establishment of a voluntary Internet Code of Conduct Against Intolerance.”}\textsuperscript{17}

Whilst Irwin Cotler, Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada (2003-) perceived the SIF 2001 as, “\textit{...an important contribution to thinking about and acting upon the combating of racism, xenophobia and discrimination}”,\textsuperscript{18} other attendees perceived the SIF 2001 as one of the weakest gatherings in terms of its subsequent impact on world affairs. Psychologist and survivor of Auschwitz and Bergen-Belsen, Hédi Fried was disappointed that no particular conference on combating Neo-Nazism was held after the SIF 2001 or the SIF 2002,\textsuperscript{19} whilst in relation to the SIF 2001, British Holocaust NGO representative, Stephen Smith felt that, “\textit{...the political follow-up after the second conference on racism and tolerance was nonsense, because it could really have been utilized to help deal with some of the Durban issues.”}\textsuperscript{20} Here Smith was referring to the disastrous UN Durban World Conference Against Racism which was

\textsuperscript{16} Fried (ed.), \textit{Beyond the ‘Never Agains’}, p. 139.
\textsuperscript{18} Irwin Cotler quoted in \textit{Beyond the ‘Never Agains’}, ed. Fried, p. 41.
\textsuperscript{19} Hédi Fried quoted in \textit{Beyond the ‘Never Agains’}, ed. Fried, p. 56.
held in South Africa in 2001 against the backdrop of the Second Palestinian Intifada and reignited anger against Israel in the Middle East. Far from challenging anti-Semitism, the Durban Conference was widely reported as a “festival of anti-Jewish hate” which resulted in the walk-out of the American and Israeli governments after continued efforts by some delegates to brand Israel as ‘uniquely racist’. 21 There were also reports that anti-Semitic literature and cartoons were circulated at Durban, whilst similar controversies at a parallel meeting of approximately 3000 NGOs led to condemnations and walk-outs of the NGO Forum by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. 22

The third SIF was convened between 23rd and 24th April 2002 and it tackled the issues of ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’. Representatives from forty countries, the UN, the EU as well as international experts were present at this conference which focused on how different post-conflict societies, “…move forward and live with painful memories of injustices… [and]…with the legacy of past atrocities and authoritarian rule.” 23 Although Esther Mujawayo-Keiner, survivor of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and founder of the Rwandan widows support group, Avega was initially concerned at the implications of the word ‘reconciliation’ in the conference title, 24 many participants involved in the SIF 2002 found its seminars on ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ in relation to Rwanda, South Africa, Bosnia, Cambodia, and the German-Polish context particularly stimulating and useful. For example, for Kay Rala Xanana Gusmao, who

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23 Fried (ed.), Beyond the ‘Never Again’, p. 143.
24 “When I heard the title of the first conference that I attended, ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’, I was a bit concerned. I avoid using that word all the time. I don’t believe in reconciliation. It is a word that makes it seem too easy, too much like magic. I think people have to live in ‘cohabitation pacifique’.” (Mujawayo-Keiner quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Again’, ed. Fried, p.19).
had just been elected the first President of Timor-Leste, the SIF 2002 was, “...an unforgettable occasion”, whilst for Cotler, the SIF 2002 was, “...very important for the people who were there, for example, from Rwanda, to have discussion of various justice models, like the Gacaca... as well as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.” Equally, Youk Chhang, survivor of the Cambodian genocide (1975-1979) and Director of the Cambodian Documentation Centre was impressed at the dialogues that the SIF 2002 fostered:

…I was surprised, especially when I saw the list of participants, including both Palestinians and Israelis. I thought ‘Wow, how did they manage to get them to talk together like that? So for me, it was an amazing conference.27

Finally, Smith, who had been involved in creating memorial museums in post-apartheid communities such as the Cape Town Holocaust Centre and post-genocide societies such as the Kigali Memorial Centre, Rwanda, both praised and noted the inadequacies of the SIF 2002:

The third conference on truth, justice and reconciliation, I thought was very useful because we had real practitioners in those rooms talking about the very real difficulties and challenges involved in forgiveness and reconciliation. But I have to say that I don’t think the senior diplomats and attendees captured the significance of that conference, because I don’t think they understand enough the importance of reconciliation for stable communities and societies. I think the organizers (including me) should have addressed this more clearly.28

Although the SIF 2002 did not result in a conference declaration, it had other significant consequences. One of these was the fact that Sweden provided some financial support to the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Equally, despite Sweden’s own checkered record on the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, its Foreign Affairs Ministry put pressure on states in the former Yugoslavia, such as Serbia, Montenegro

26 Cotler quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, pp. 41-42.
29 Zuroff, ‘Missed Opportunities in Stockholm’.
and Bosnia and Herzegovina to co-operate with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and “…conduct war crimes trials that meet international standards” as a prerequisite for accession to the EU.  

Another key consequence of the SIF 2002 was that in a similar way to the SIF 2000 on ‘Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research’, the Stockholm conference on ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ was particularly significant in encouraging new bonds or strengthening existing global networks of co-operation between governments and/or NGOs.

For example, Youk Chhang, felt that the SIF 2002, “…made a lot of difference to my work.” He formed links with the government of Timor-Leste and modified the way he interviewed and documented the actions of former Khmer Rouge perpetrators.

Finally, in co-operation with the ICTJ, he established an international Affinity Group of documentation centers throughout the world, in countries such as the former Yugoslavia, South Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, Guatemala and Burma:

From this affinity group with people from different parts of the world, I get many constructive ideas. We come together and share issues about technology, ways of disseminating and documenting information. Each of us can bring something different based on the differences of culture and politics in our own country.

Furthermore, highlighting the 2002 Stockholm conference’s links to the original objectives of the SIF 2000, in his presentation to the 2002 Forum, entitled, ‘From the Shoah to Rwanda’, Smith drew on the examples of the post-1945 development of the memory of the Holocaust in Europe and post-1994 efforts to commemorate the Rwandan genocide in order to suggest, “how the memorialization process facilitates or...
otherwise reconciliation.”

Smith chronicled how the survivors of the Holocaust and their representatives had to find ways, “to secure justice, care for survivors and assist the community in coming to terms with its loss,” and how this is still an ongoing process, two generations or more since the Jewish catastrophe. He hoped that some of the lessons learned from this process might contribute to understanding and finding solutions to the difficulties and struggles facing the justice and commemoration process in Rwanda. Smith observed that victims of the Rwandan genocide, including orphans, widows and HIV/AIDS rape victims need long term support from both their national government and the international community, particularly in an environment where genocide victims often live in close proximity to former perpetrators. Smith believed that national and international support for education and commemoration strategies could contribute to the re-building of Rwandan society by combating denial and bringing “about public recognition of the victims’ lives.”

Smith’s paper at the SIF 2002 related to his Aegis Trust project to construct the Kigali Memorial Centre in Rwanda, which was opened in April 2004. This centre includes three exhibits, one documenting the 1994 genocide; one dedicated to children’s experiences and one based on genocide as a world-wide issue. 250,000 victims of the Rwandan genocide are also buried in the environs of the Kigali Memorial Centre. According to the centre’s website, in the first week of its opening, 1500 survivors visited per day and 60,000 people came to the Kigali Memorial Centre in the first three

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35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
months of its existence, including 7000 from the international community. In an extract from an interview with Smith that was conducted at Beth Shalom in June 2009, he described the construction of the Kigali Memorial Centre in the following terms:

So effectively... we were invited to try and create a Genocide Memorial Museum and to assist with the preservation issues and so on, which we did. And spent, I guess a couple of years doing that, raised the money and built the museum, designed it, installed it and did everything from here. So, using some of the skills and the knowledge that we’d got in creating memorial museums but doing so in a different context. What we didn’t do was just take Holocaust education, remembrance and research and just download it into Rwanda. It was very much again based on focus groups, stakeholder communications in the city and around the country in Rwanda, listening to what survivors had to say, listening to what civil society had say and developing a culture of remembrance there that was appropriate for the society. Which included putting human remains on display, which was not my favoured method but it was one which the survivors were absolutely adamant was going to happen.

Following the SIF 2002, there was no SIF held in 2003, although the year was significant for another off-shoot of Sweden’s Living History project, an initiative which had originally contributed to the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000, as demonstrated in chapter one. For although the work of the Living History project had been active since 1997, the result of a Swedish parliamentary decision in December 2001 was that in June 2003 the Swedish government formerly established The Living History Forum. The objectives of this newly established institution were, “…to engage in issues relating to tolerance, democracy and human rights taking the Holocaust as a starting point.” As a result, the specific roles designated to The Living History Forum included promoting awareness, facilitating research and educating teachers and young people about the Holocaust, human rights, tolerance and democracy; promoting the observance of Sweden’s Holocaust Memorial Day on 27th January as well as acting as the organizational office behind the Swedish ITF delegation.

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39 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
40 Fried (ed.) Beyond the ‘Never Again’, p. 160.
41 Ibid., p. 160.
42 Ibid., p. 160.
However, *The Living History Forum* also had an impact on the memorialization of the Holocaust at both the national and the global levels. This was not just via its involvement with the ITF, but rather through the legacies of *The Living History Project’s* commissioning of Levine and Bruchfeld’s short history of the Holocaust, *Tell Ye Your Children* (1997). By 2005, 1,170,000 copies of *Tell Ye Your Children* had been requested and distributed in the Swedish language and ‘the Book’ was also available in languages read by sizeable immigrant groups in Sweden: English, Spanish, Finnish, Arabic, Turkish, Persian and Serbo-Croatian. With the exception of the Bible and one particular Swedish cook-book, *Tell Ye Your Children* has been printed in greater numbers than virtually any other text in Swedish publishing history. According to Levine, versions of ‘The Book’ have also been published in, “Russia, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Denmark, Germany, France, Latvia, Japan, Portugal and in most of these instances they were done by the Ministries of Education, in these countries, doing translations.” Reflecting on the extraordinary national and global popularity of what became known as ‘The Book’ Levine believes that its accessibility lies in the fact that as writers, he and Bruchfeld were:

…both pragmatic and sober. We were not at all nationalistic…there was a police show that I grew up with in the 1960s called *Dragnet*, a detective show, a cop show, in which the main character called Detective Sergeant Joe Friday, what he would always do, what he would always say to those he was questioning was, “Just the facts man, just the facts”. And this is what we did in *Tell Ye Your Children*. Which I think explains a lot of its success.

The last SIF was convened between 26th and 28th January 2004 and it was called ‘Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities’. Although attended by controversy owing to Israeli ambassador Zvi Mazel’s outraged response to a controversial art exhibit

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44 ‘Interview with Dr. Paul Levine’.
in Stockholm, *Snow White and the Madness of Truth*;\(^{46}\) as well as met with a small scale protest by the left-wing Anti-War coalition;\(^{47}\) the SIF 2004 was the first significant inter-governmental gathering on the issue of genocide since the adoption of the UN Genocide Convention in 1948.\(^{48}\) The SIF 2004 was attended by representatives of fifty-five governments, fourteen transnational agencies as well as genocide survivors such as Mujawayo-Keiner and experts from the field of genocide studies such as Helen Fein, Frank Chalk, Barbara Harff, Ted Gurr, Samantha Power and Carol Rittner.\(^{49}\)

Following an opening speech by Persson which called on the international community to reject rhetorical clichés and, “…go beyond the ‘Never A gains’”,\(^{50}\) UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan delivered the keynote address of the conference. Whilst Annan re-affirmed the importance of international efforts to prevent genocide, he also admitted to gross UN failures in relation to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, “*In both cases the gravest mistakes were made by member states, particularly in the way that decisions were taken by the Security Council. But all of us failed.*”\(^{51}\) Annan made no direct mention of the recent American and European political schisms over the Iraq War (2003),\(^{52}\) although perhaps this was because of the fact that in January 2004 the UN itself was becoming embroiled in revelations over the ‘oil for food’ scandal in Iraq.\(^{53}\)

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\(^{50}\) Persson, ‘Stockholm International Forum (2004): Opening Address by the Prime Minister of Sweden’.


\(^{53}\) In response to the humanitarian crisis created by the sanctions regime during the 1990s, the UN with the support of the Clinton administration had permitted Iraq to market some oil reserves for essential food
Furthermore, addressing the concerns of SIF 2004 organizers and Anti-War protestors who wanted the minority rights of groups such as the Chechens, the Turkish Kurds, the Palestinians and the Colombian trade unionists to be discussed;\(^{54}\) Bauer also delivered a speech in which he outlined the specific objectives of the conference organizers as well as the idea that other diplomatic arenas would be necessary to address and work towards peaceable resolutions to certain present-day conflicts and minority rights issues:

The next task is to make clear that the organizers of the Forum would plead with the participants not to discuss past and current violent conflicts. They are asking you to leave the discussion of Iraq, Kashmir, the Middle East, and other issues to the appropriate arenas, not here, where no resolutions can be passed and no agreements can be reached. Our Forum is directed to the future. We want to help in creating the tools and mechanisms that may prevent, or at least diminish, genocidal dangers in the future.\(^{55}\)

Despite the desire of SIF 2004 organizers to orientate discussions towards the future, the plenary session speeches by political leaders were often most significant in their reflections on the past. For example, the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame was addressing the Forum a few months before the tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide;\(^ {56}\) the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia, Andranik Margarian praised Sweden for recognizing the Armenian genocide and called on other members of the international community to follow suit;\(^ {57}\) and in contrast to criticisms voiced by Efraim

\(^{54}\) Barkat, ‘Swedish MP calls Holocaust greatest failure’.  
\(^{57}\) A delegation from Armenia did not attend the SIF 2000, but one was present at the 2001, 2002 and 2004 conferences. At the SIF 2004, Andranik Margarian stated to the assembled representatives, “Here I would like to draw your attention to the statement on the Armenian Genocide – one that is very much congruous to my thoughts – dated March 29, 2000, by the parliament of Sweden – the country that has organized this conference: ‘An official statement and recognition of the Genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire is important and necessary.’” (Margarian, ‘Stockholm International Forum (2004): Address by the Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia’, SIF Conference Series CD-Rom in Beyond the ‘Never Again’; ed. Fried.)

154
Zuroff about the speeches of Latvian and Lithuanian delegates at the SIF 2000, on the eve of these nations’ accession to NATO and the EU in 2004, both the President of the Republic of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga and the Prime Minister of Lithuania, Algirdas Brazaukas tackled issues relating to the Nazi past more fully in their speeches. For example, Vike-Freiberga drew attention to Latvian suffering under the Nazi and Soviet regimes but also specifically pointed out that, “The racial ideology and extreme xenophobia of the Nazi German Reich culminated in the mass murders of the Holocaust, leading to the near annihilation of the Jewish and Roma communities in many countries, including my own.” Admittedly, Vike-Freiberga’s speech remained problematic in that it did not address the issue of Latvian collaboration in the Holocaust, even though she also drew attention to the fact that, “Latvia supported the resolution on anti-Semitism proposed by Ireland at the UN General Assembly in 2003.” By contrast, Brazaukas directly tackled the issue of Lithuanian complicity in the Jewish catastrophe:

We will always remember what happened in Lithuania back in 1941. It took only half a year of massacre to systematically destroy the six-centuries-old civilization of the Lithuanian Jewry. This was a catastrophe which rippled across an immense part of Europe and was almost indifferently witnessed by locals. In some cases they even collaborated with the Nazis.

Following the format of previous SIFs, a number of panels, seminars and workshops were held, this time on the themes of ‘Threats: Anticipating genocidal violence’; ‘Responsibilities: Individual, National and Multilateral’; ‘Prevention: Policy Instruments and Responsibilities’; ‘Creating Awareness: Education, Media, Memory.’

58 Zuroff, ‘Missed Opportunities in Stockholm’.
60 Ibid.
SIF 2004 attendees found these seminars notable for a number of reasons. Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group found David Scheffer’s definition of ‘atrocity crimes’ potentially very useful in terms of encouraging international non-legal action and political debates about genocide, mass murder and human rights abuses.\textsuperscript{63} From a different perspective, Human Rights lawyer, Payam Akhaven was particularly moved by Mujawayo-Keiner’s presentation on her experiences as a survivor of the Rwandan genocide.\textsuperscript{64} He also said that he found the Stockholm process particularly useful because:

At the Stockholm Forum, I had the chance to interact with some government officials – some Foreign Ministry officials, parliamentarians or advisors which gave me a feel for how they think about the issues. As a human rights advocate it is essential for me to know how to engage these people. What sort of language do they understand? How do they formulate self-interest? How could one try to change their way of constructing foreign policy or security objectives? These are all important issues and questions for me because in order to be effective, we have to move beyond mere condemnations and righteous indignation and infiltrate the centers of power with new ideas and perspectives.\textsuperscript{65}

The SIF 2004 had a number of outcomes. The first was a ‘Declaration of the Stockholm International Forum: Preventing Genocide: Threats and Responsibilities’. This document was supposed to encourage the international community to “identify as early as possible and to monitor and report genocidal threats”; shoulder our “responsibility to protect groups identified as potential victims of genocide, mass murder or ethnic cleansing”; bring perpetrators of genocide to justice; support research into genocide prevention; educate “the youth and the wider public against genocide dangers of all kinds” and encourage co-operation between transnational, national, regional and state institutions and NGOs in working to prevent genocide, mass murder, ethnic cleansing and the spread of ideologies which advocate group hatred and the destruction of human

\textsuperscript{63} Gareth Evans quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{64} Payam Akhaven quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., p. 28.
This document has been viewed as important because it utilizes the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ which had first been delineated in a 2001 report by the Canadian sponsored International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, and which would become a commonplace of international legal parlance after the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ was adopted by the UN World Summit in September 2005.67

Furthermore, conference delegates such as Smith, Bauer and Cotler also perceived the SIF 2004 as particularly significant because it contributed to the creation of the post of UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide,68 which was first filled by Argentinean human rights lawyer and President of the International Center for Transitional Justice, Juan Méndez in July 2004.69 The role of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide is to report to the UN Secretary-General and through him to the UN Security Council on recorded instances of national, racial, religious or ethnic human rights violations that have the potential to escalate into genocide. It is also the role of the UN Special Advisor to suggest realistic measures for the prevention of genocide in different national contexts where the threat of violence has been detected.70

However, despite being recognized as one of the most important conferences in the

67 The UN Outcome Document on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) stresses that “Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” However, when “...national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations”, then it is the responsibility of the international community through the United Nations to take diplomatic, humanitarian and/or collective action to “...protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” (UN Outcome Document on R2P quoted in Diana Amnéus, A Right to Humanitarian Intervention? (Stockholm: The Living History Forum, 2005), p. 16.)
68 For example, see the following quote from Annan’s key-note speech at the SIF 2004: “We should also consider establishing a Special Rapporteur on the prevention of genocide, who would be supported by the High Commissioner for Human Rights but would report directly to the Security Council...” (Annan, ‘Stockholm International Forum (2004): Key-note speech by the Secretary General of the UN’).
70 Annan quoted in Beyond the ‘Never Again’s’, ed. Fried, p. 113.
Stockholm series, the SIF 2004 was not only criticized by anti-war protestors but also
by a number of intellectual commentators and conference attendees. For example,
Holocaust Studies Professor, G. Jan Colijn observed that it is unlikely that, “...the
creation of a special adviser on genocide prevention at the UN can overcome the
structural problem of power asymmetry in the international arena.”\(^{71}\)
Furthermore, in a critical review of ‘Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, the main source of SIF documents and
interviews, University of Maryland International and Security Studies scholar, Milton
Leitenberg candidly noted that the organizers of the SIF 2004’s ambivalence towards
addressing contemporary violent conflicts was deeply problematic because:

...it is possible that not a single one of the speeches by national representatives pointed out that
the next ‘Again’ had already taken place, in the Congo between 1998 and 2003, with a cost of
perhaps 3.5 million lives. (This reviewer attended the entire conference) In spite of this there
was absolutely no international response during that period. Furthermore, yet another Genocide
had already begun and was well underway as the conference was taking place: in the Darfur
province of Sudan, and perpetrated by the Government of the Sudan. It is questionable whether
any of the speeches by diplomatic figures pointed this out either.\(^{72}\)

Leitenberg’s analysis was further supported by a dialogue with Samantha Power in
*Beyond the ‘Never Agains’,* in which both Power and her interviewer critiqued the
international community and the SIF 2004 for failing to speak out about the perpetration
of mass atrocities in countries such as Darfur, the Congo and Chechnya.\(^{73}\) Indeed,
进一步 criticisms of the SIF 2004 were evident in other conversations with conference
participants in *Beyond the ‘Never Agains’. In a similar way to Colijn, Evans was
concerned about the structural limitations placed on the role of UN Special Advisor on
the Prevention of Genocide. He noted that whilst Méndez had a very good reputation,

\(^{71}\) G. Jan Colijn, ‘Book Briefs: Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 28,


\(^{73}\) Power in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed. Fried, p. 33. It should also be noted that Bauer comments,
“I’ll never forget an American diplomat who will remain nameless, who, when I confronted him with
detailed information about Darfur said, ‘How do we convince the Sudanese government to act
differently?’ I replied, ‘You cannot convince a genocidal government. You have to stop it, if not by
military force, then by diplomatic or economic pressure.’” (Bauer in Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, ed.
Fried, p. 97.)
“…does he have sufficient staff? Does he have any financial support?”

Equally, Mujawayo-Keiner was disappointed that issues such as restitution, which directly relate to efforts by genocide survivors to re-build their lives after catastrophe were not addressed more fully in the seminars and workshops. Finally, Power, who has already been cited above and is author of the 2003 Pulitzer Prize winning book, *A Problem from Hell*, re-iterated her fears that ultimately, “…countries talk big and act small” on the issue of genocide. She also sent out a provocative message to Europeans, which shattered any illusions of grandeur that international events such as the SIF 2004 may have generated:

The real question – on Darfur and on atrocity prevention in general – is: Where are the Europeans? Where is the public pressure in various European countries? Why don’t they mobilize? …American students have helped to pressure the most ideological administration in American history to refer the case to the International Criminal Court. Why is there no similar political pressure in Europe?

Indeed despite the promises made at the SIF 2004, the international community’s response to the genocide in Darfur continued to be inadequate to the scale of the crisis. For whilst, some action was taken, for example, the United States Congress classified the violence in Darfur as a genocide in June 2004; the UN World Summit adopted the notion of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ in September 2005 and UN Resolution 1593 referred Sudanese President Omar Al Bashir to the ICC; the fact remained that as in previous genocides numerous state interests combined with the power of veto held by the UN Security Council (America, France, Britain, Russia, China) continued to block effective action being taken. In this instance, the Sudanese government’s hostility to UN intervention; the United States focus on the ‘War on Terror’, the fact that the

74 Evans quoted in *Beyond the ‘Never Agains’*, ed. Fried, p. 61.
76 Power quoted in *Beyond the ‘Never Agains’*, ed. Fried, p. 34.
Sudanese government co-operates with the U.S to fight indigenous terrorism as well as skepticism cast on the humanitarian motives of Western military interventions as a result of the invasion of Iraq (2003).\textsuperscript{79} Other significant factors precluding an effective response included China’s concern to defend its economic interests in Sudan which are based on the oil and arms trade; the EU’s relative disengagement from the issue as a consequence of the policy of ‘African solutions to African problems’; as well as the international community’s primary focus on finding a resolution to the Sudan’s North-South civil conflict.\textsuperscript{80} As a result, far from going Beyond the ‘Never Agains’, the limitations of the SIF 2004 were all to evident: By 2006, the genocide in Darfur had cost the lives of approximately 400,000 non-Arab Darfuris and the annihilation of an estimated 1000 villages.\textsuperscript{81}

**The Legacies of the SIF 2000 Part 2: The First Decade of the ITF**

The second major institutionalization of the objectives of the SIF 2000 was evident in the continuing work of the ITF which employs the Stockholm Declaration (2000) as its guiding manifesto.\textsuperscript{82} This section will use the ITF’s official history edited by Wallin and Newman, alongside newspaper articles, academic papers, interviews’ with ITF members as well as the organization’s meeting minutes in order to provide an overview of the impact of the ITF in implementing the Stockholm Declaration in the first decade since the SIF 2000.\textsuperscript{83} During this time period, the ITF has quickly moved from being, “…a short-lived group of governments supporting educational and other efforts

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\textsuperscript{79} Amnéus, *A Right to Humanitarian Intervention?*, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., p. 5.
\textsuperscript{81} Leitenberg, ‘Beyond the ‘Never Agains’’, p. 163.
\textsuperscript{83} Online ITF Minutes Archive ([http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/meetings/top.htm](http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/meetings/top.htm)). Accessed: 05/08/2008 - 11/08/2008.
relating to the Shoah of the Jewish people”;84 to a long-term, international outfit with a still highly specific and yet in other respects more ‘universal’ remit of research, remembrance and education. However, as will be seen, the extent of the ITF’s ‘universality’ in promoting the Stockholm Declaration’s commitment to fight, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”;85 was hotly debated within the organization during the first decade of its existence.

The ITF’s decision making plenary consists of government representatives, university academics as well as NGO members and it is chaired by a different member state each year. Also integral to the ITF’s structure and institutional discourses is the fact that Bauer served as the ITF’s first Academic Advisor, and was given the status of Honorary Chairman of the organization in November 2005.86 Bauer was succeeded as Academic Advisor, by Professor Dina Porat, the Head of Tel Aviv University’s Stephen Roth Institute for the Study of Contemporary Anti-Semitism and Racism in January 2007.87

In the ITF’s recent, ‘Ten Year Anniversary Book’, Bauer and Porat described the primary objectives of the Task Force in the following terms:

…the Stockholm Declaration, is the foundation of the ITF. It explains the Holocaust and by adding the Hebrew term ‘Shoah’ in brackets after the word ‘Holocaust’, makes clear that the main concern of the ITF is to teach about, remember and research the genocide of the Jewish people in World War Two. It then goes on to say that Nazi Germany also perpetrated a number of other major crimes, thus contextualizing the Holocaust. This opens up the opportunity for the ITF to also deal with the genocide of the Roma, which took place at the same or similar locations, and was committed largely by the same perpetrators.88


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Over the first decade of its existence, the ITF has expanded at a rapid rate and by 2008 its plenary comprised twenty-six member states. This meant that following a period of time as ‘Liaison Partners’ to already established ITF member states, Austria and the Czech Republic joined the organization in 2001 and Hungary in 2002. Argentina, Luxembourg, Norway and Lithuania joined in 2003 as well as Latvia, Denmark, Switzerland and Romania in 2004; Greece, Croatia, the Slovak Republic and Belgium in 2005; Estonia in 2007 and Spain in 2008.\textsuperscript{89} As a result, the ITF’s membership includes long term members of NATO and the EU as well as those states that were part of more recent NATO and EU enlargements.\textsuperscript{90} Over the last decade, the ITF has also increased its links to transnational institutions. For example, in October 2001, a Council of Europe delegate attended an ITF plenary session, in December 2004, an OSCE/ODIHR representative took part in an ITF meeting and in May 2006, UN staff members were present as ITF plenary observers.\textsuperscript{91}

As the ITF has become larger and more institutionalized, its activities have also become increasingly firmly centered on five working groups: the Academic Working Group, the Education Working Group, the Memorials and Museums Working Group (initially the Memorials Working Group); the Communications Working Group (initially the Information Working Group) as well as the Task Force Fund Working Group.\textsuperscript{92} These units are primarily responsible for putting the ITF’s objectives into practice, initiatives which survivor of the Nazi camps and spokesman of the British Jewish community, Ben

\textsuperscript{89} Wallin and Newman (eds), \textit{The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book}, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 10-11.
Helfgott, has perceived as some of the, “...the most important work that is being done” in connection with Holocaust research, remembrance and education in the global arena.  

The Academic Working Group (AWG) was established in July 2000 and chairs of the AWG have included Bauer and Juliane Wetzel (2000-2002), the Luxembourg academic, Paul Dostert (2006-2008) as well as the controversial U.S. Holocaust historian, Steven T. Katz (2008). Katz advocates the ‘uniqueness’ of the Shoah and provoked censure from Genocide Studies scholars such as Native American specialist David E. Stannard and Roma expert, Ian Hancock, when in his 1994 book, The Holocaust in Historical Perspective, he restrictively defined the perpetration of genocide to:

…the actualization of the intent, however successfully carried out, to murder in its totality any national, ethnic, racial, religious, political, social, gender or economic group, as these groups are defined by the perpetrator, by whatever means.

The main problem with Katz’s definition of genocide is that it fits his historical analysis of the Holocaust, whilst bringing into question the ontological status of other genocides which Katz analyzes to be less ‘total’ in terms of perpetrator intention. As a result, Katz’s exclusionary definition of ‘genocide’ represents one of the most problematic viewpoints to be found amidst the plurality of opinions within the ITF.

However, notwithstanding the opinions of its 2008 chair, the institutional role of the AWG is to promote archival openness and scholarly research and also makes decisions
on academic project applications for ITF funding such as the publication and translation of scholarly books, the production of documentary films, the convening of university courses on the Holocaust as well as funding for the cataloguing of archives. The AWG prefers inter-cultural projects and will tend to give priority to funding requests from Central and Eastern Europe because research grants are limited in these states even though there is a need for archival research in these locations. The AWG has also launched other projects including a May 2004 joint initiative with the Education Working Group entitled, ‘Special Working Group on Resistances to Learning and Teaching about the Holocaust’ as well as AWG involvement in the organization of the April 2006 Vienna conference, ‘Memory of the Holocaust: Culture of Remembrance’. Finally, the AWG has plans to sponsor an annual ITF academic research forum beginning with a gathering in Norway in June 2009.

That said it is arguable that the AWG has been primarily successful when acting alongside other major institutions such as the USHMM in putting pressure on various organizations, such as the International Tracing Service (ITS) at Bad Arolsen to make their Holocaust era archives fully accessible. Affiliated to the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ITS archive comprises approximately sixteen miles of files detailing Nazi crimes and their victims. Following a 1955 international treaty between the United States, Germany, Britain, Israel, Poland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, France, Greece and Luxembourg, the archive prohibited scholars owing to privacy fears and was stringently restricted to use by the family member’s of Holocaust victims, many of whom still struggled to gain full access to files relating to their respective

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97 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
cases. Following pressure by groups such as the USHMM, various survivors’ organizations and the ITF, in May 2006, the eleven nations agreed that they would each ratify an amendment to the 1955 treaty that would grant scholars access to the archive. A year later, seven nations had passed the amendment (United States, Israel, Germany, Poland, Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands), with the others intending to ratify and with a further agreement that digital copies of the ITS archive would be made available to institutions such as the USHMM and Yad Vashem. In relation to the important role of the Task Force in pressurizing the ITS to open its holdings, Cesarani commented in March 2009:

...Paul Shapiro who was involved with the American delegation to the Task Force through the museum became instrumental in opening access to the documents of the International Tracing Service at Bad Arolsen. And he is unequivocal that without the ITF, without the backing of the American government which rallied other governments to press the German authorities who were the dominant force in the international committee maintaining Bad Arolsen, that without that international pressure, then the archives at Bad Arolsen would not have been made accessible to the public, outside the circle of the descendants of survivors etc, or academics. And certainly wouldn’t have been micro-filmed, or digitised, or distributed to appropriate repositories around the world. And nor would the facilities of Bad Arolsen themselves have been properly maintained with an assured future, all of which is now in train. So the work of the International Task Force and the international co-ordination has been extremely important in the area of archival resources.

After making headway with the ITS, the Task Force is now putting pressure on the Vatican as well as some North African countries to open their holdings to researchers. The second ITF Working Group is focused on Memorials and Museums

100 Eddy, Herschaft and Scisłowska, ‘Opening of archive likely to spur new generation of Holocaust scholarship’.
101 Landler, ‘Documents from vast Nazi archive to be made available to scholars’.
103 Wallin and Newman (eds), The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book, p. 16.
and the idea for a ‘Memorials’ working group was first mooted in September 2000. Later titled the ‘Memorials and Museums Working Group’ (MMWG), its chairs have included Stephen Smith (UK, 2002), Thomas Lutz (Germany, 2003), Teresa Swiebocka (Poland, 2004), Heidemarie Uhl (Austria, 2005), Dirk Mulder (the Netherlands, 2006), David Marwell (USA, 2007) as well as Magdalena Smidova (Sweden, 2008). Operating alongside and sometimes in collaboration with the other ITF ‘Working Groups’, the objectives of the MMWG are to establish web resources on existing Holocaust museums, memorials and remembrance days; encourage on-site training programmes; promote inter-cultural dialogues and personnel exchanges between Holocaust remembrance institutions as well as to work alongside government representatives in order to ensure the marking and preservation of mass atrocity sites, and finally, to help with the organization of Holocaust remembrance days.

The MMWG also assesses proposals for remuneration from the Task Force fund and is particularly concerned to, “…deliver lasting memorials in countries facing severe financial constraints.”104 For example, site specific memorialization projects that the ITF’s MMWG has addressed include the Terezín memorial after flooding caused substantial damage in August 2002. Consequences of the floods included the fact that most of the permanent exhibitions were temporarily closed, some historical documents including lists of Czech Jews deported to Terezín were damaged, the wall of the Prague synagogue with the names of 80,000 Jews taken to Auschwitz was seriously spoiled as well as the water level reaching 3.5 meters in the Nazi era crematorium.105 According

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to ITF meeting minutes for 17th October 2002, an ITF grant of $20,000 to help with restoration costs at the Terezín memorial, “…was adopted unanimously in principle.” Although repair work remained to be completed, by December 2007, exhibitions had been re-opened, the prayer room from the ghetto era restored, the wooded objects in the cells mended as well as most of the spoiled documents and collection items repaired.

Another memorial site that is repeatedly mentioned in ITF minutes is the remains of the Jasenovac concentration camp in Croatia which was operated by the Nazi collaborationist and fascist Ustasa regime during the Second World War. The most reliable estimates of those who perished in Jasenovac suggest that approximately 45,000-52,000 of the Ustasa’s primary victims, the Serbs were killed in the camp; 8000-20,000 Croatian and Bosnian Jews, 8000-15,000 Roma and Sinti, 5000-12,000 Croatian political/religious opponents as well as many Muslims, for whom there are no reliable figures at present. The collective memory of these atrocities became increasingly subject to distortion during the 1980s, when rising ethno-nationalism intensified the rift between Croatian and Serb communities within Croatia. These tensions were further exacerbated by the election of Franjo Tudjman, the leader of the ultra-nationalist Croatian Democratic Union Party (HDZ) in April 1990, as well as by the outbreak of

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106 Ibid., p. 9. Unfortunately, there are no references in ITF minutes confirming payment of the $20,000.
110 Efraim Zuroff has noted of Tudjman’s anti-Semitism and deliberate distortion of the Holocaust that, “In Croatia, President Franjo Tudjman wrote in his book ‘The Wastelands of Historical Reality’ that the
violent conflict with Croat-Serbs supported by Serbian forces during the former Yugoslavia’s ethno-nationalist wars in the 1990s.\textsuperscript{111} This conflict impacted on the public remembrance of Jasenovac with some Serb historians purposely inflating the victim numbers of the Ustasa regime and some Croatian ultra-nationalist historians deliberately underestimating the death count.\textsuperscript{112}

The context for references to Jasenovac in ITF meeting minutes is the fact that on 27\textsuperscript{th} October 2000, the USHMM with support of the U.S Department of State and with the permission of the governments of Croatia and the Republika Srpska, assumed temporary custody for a year until 26\textsuperscript{th} November 2001 of historical artifacts from Jasenovac concentration camp as well as tens of thousands of written documents and approximately 2000 photos, 70 oral histories and eight reels of 16mm and 35mm films.\textsuperscript{113} The USHMM received these archives because when fighting broke out near the remains of the concentration camp during the 1990s, the former deputy director of the memorial area had decided to move the collection to the Republic of Srpska’s Banja Luka archive.\textsuperscript{114} The storage facilities were inappropriate and the collection began to decay, until in the summer of 2000, the U.S. embassies in Sarajevo and Zagreb informed the USHMM of the existence of the archive. Following assessments by USHMM specialists it was decided that if the collection was to be preserved, it needed to be catalogued and organized immediately in the United States before being returned.

\textsuperscript{111} Lindsey, ‘Remembering Vukovar, Forgetting Vukovar’, p. 150.
\textsuperscript{112} Levene, \textit{Genocide in the Age of the Nation-State Volume One}, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{113} USHMM, ‘United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Press Releases: Croatian WWII Concentration Camp Records made available for the First Time by United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}
to the Jasenovac memorial.\textsuperscript{115} Another result of this process was the USHMM’s construction of a Jasenovac Memorial website.\textsuperscript{116}

According to the 27\textsuperscript{th} October 2000 agreement, it was decided that once preservation work had been completed on the archive, the USHMM and the Jasenovac Memorial Council would continue to work together to maintain the collection and Croatia would become a ‘Liaison Partner’ of the ITF.\textsuperscript{117} Part of this co-operation related to the construction of a permanent exhibition and education centre at Jasenovac and resulted in two workshops organized by the Croatian Ministry of Science, Education and Sports in conjunction with the ITF:

\begin{quote}
...in which the concept of the museum exhibition was presented and agreed upon at an international level, including how victims and crimes should be represented, and how educational programs tied to Ustasha crimes in Jasenovac should be conducted.\textsuperscript{118}
\end{quote}

Further evidence of this working partnership can be seen in ITF minutes. For example, during the discussion in Strasbourg on 17\textsuperscript{th} October 2002, which preceded Croatia’s acceptance as an ITF member state, reference was made to the collaboration between the Jasenovac Memorial and the USHMM, whilst a French delegate reflected on Croatia’s recent efforts at Holocaust memorialization, noting that although it was problematic that, “…the Jasenovac Memorial attracts very few visitors”,\textsuperscript{119} it remained, “… the duty of the Task Force to encourage the programs undertaken, notably those...

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{115} USHMM, ‘United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Press Releases: Croatian WWII Concentration Camp Records made available for the First Time by United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’.
\bibitem{117} USHMM, ‘United States Holocaust Memorial Museum Press Releases: Croatian WWII Concentration Camp Records made available for the First Time by United States Holocaust Memorial Museum’.
\bibitem{119} ‘Application for membership by Croatia’, in \textit{Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Room 13, Thursday 17 October 2002, 9.30 a.m. – 5 p.m}, p. 3.
\end{thebibliography}
Despite these reservations the USHMM’s and ITF’s collaboration with the Jasenovac Memorial was perceived as a success, at least by those NGOs who were involved. For example, at an ITF meeting in Krakow in November 2005, delegates from Israel and the United States, “…expressed their satisfaction about the work already underway in Croatia, in particular in cooperation with the Jasenovac Memorial”, whilst a year earlier at an ITF meeting in Trieste on 16th December 2004, a representative of the Auschwitz State Museum and member of the ITF’s Memorials Working Group reported that:

Given the positive results of the project managed in co-operation with the Jasenovac Memorial Area in Croatia, the MWG suggested that other international advisory groups of ITF experts be established in order to support and advise memorial sites and museums in their new initiatives.

Aside from contributing to the preservation of memorial sites, some of the MMWG’s other achievements during the noughties have been in the increasingly important area of Internet resources. These have included the construction of the website, ‘Cultures of Remembrance – a Network’ in conjunction with the Topography of Terror as well as the Internet site, ‘Memorial Museums’. The website ‘Cultures of Remembrance’ gives an overview of different nations and their attempts to memorialize the Holocaust, whilst ‘Memorial Museums’ provides a global database of the major museums, memorials and

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120 Application for membership by Croatia’, in Minutes of the Plenary Session of the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, Room 13, Thursday 17 October 2002, 9.30 a.m. – 5 p.m., p. 4.
monuments dedicated to the remembrance of the victims of Nazi persecution.\textsuperscript{124} Another important achievement of the MMWG has been the support that its sub-committee on Holocaust Remembrance Days has given to the establishment of annual commemoration ceremonies in different national ‘public spheres’.\textsuperscript{125}

For example, an OSCE/ODIHR January 2008 report in conjunction with the ITF, ‘Holocaust Memorial Days in the OSCE Region – An Overview of Good Governmental Practices’, suggested that before the Stockholm Declaration (2000) eight of the thirty-six countries surveyed had some form of annual commemoration day (the Netherlands, the United States, Latvia, France, Lithuania, Germany, Austria, Sweden),\textsuperscript{126} but after 2000 the number of states with remembrance days rapidly increased to twenty-nine by 2006.\textsuperscript{127} The OSCE/ODIHR report indicates both the national particularity and diversity of remembrance days both prior to and after the SIF 2000, with some days commemorating the Jewish catastrophe specifically and others embracing wider victims of Nazi atrocities and even genocides more broadly. Owing to the Council of Europe’s 2002 decision to set up a ‘Day of Remembrance’ in member states as well as the UN General Assembly’s November 2005 Resolution 60/7 which established 27\textsuperscript{th} January as ‘International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust’, the rapid growth in ritualized days of remembrance cannot be perceived as the sole result of the ITF and the implementation of the Stockholm Declaration (2000). However, the


\textsuperscript{125} Wallin and Newman (eds), The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book, p. 21.


\textsuperscript{127} The twenty one additional states which gained commemoration days after the SIF 2000 according to the 2008 OSCE/ODIHR report are: Hungary, Italy, Norway, the UK, Slovakia, Denmark, Croatia, Estonia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Poland, Romania, Spain, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Russian Federation and Serbia.
increase in national commemoration days after 2000, many of which are held on 27th January, does attest to the normative political and cultural relevance of the ITF’s objectives, particularly, but not exclusively within NATO and the EU’s sphere of influence. In the future, the MMWG hopes to build on its international networks of expertise and act as an interface between academic research into Holocaust memory cultures and the practical reality of its implementation in museums, memorials and remembrance days in various countries.\footnote{128}

The third component of the ITF, the Education Working Group (EWG) was formed in February 2001 and its chairs have included Shulamit Imber and Richelle Budd Caplan (Israel, 2001), William Shulman (U.S, 2002), Paul Levine (Sweden, 2003), Paul Salmons (UK, 2004), Karen Polak (the Netherlands, 2005), Claude Singer (France, 2006), Wolf Kaiser (Germany, 2007), Yvonne Schuchmann (Hungary, 2008) and Monique Eckmann (Switzerland, 2009).\footnote{129} During the first years of its operation, the EWG collated a number of Holocaust Education Reports from ITF member countries,\footnote{130} as well as formulating a number of multi-lingual guidelines which are available online and can be used in teacher training seminars across the globe on why and how to teach about the Holocaust.\footnote{131}

Focusing on Sweden, Lange sent out postal questionnaires to 10,000 teachers who worked in years 4-9.\textsuperscript{132} From just 5081 responses, Lange concluded that the vast majority of teachers felt that students were interested in the subject and that it is important to educate young people about the Holocaust because it is a way of drawing attention to issues such as racism, intolerance and genocide in the contemporary world.\textsuperscript{133} However, Lange also found that teachers needed more training in how to teach Nazi crimes and were particularly weak in their knowledge of the Roma genocide and the history of eugenics in Sweden.\textsuperscript{134} Co-initiated by the ITF, it is hoped that other, “…member countries plan to conduct similar national surveys on teachers’ experiences of teaching about the Holocaust.”\textsuperscript{135}

The EWG is also further divided up into a number of teams which look at specific issues such as ‘the sub-committee on the Holocaust and other genocides’, the ‘sub-committee on special challenges in Holocaust Education’ as well as ‘the sub-committee on the Roma genocide’.\textsuperscript{136} One of the results of these sub-committees were a number of press releases issued by the ITF on the importance of promoting awareness about the genocide of the Roma and Sinti which was perpetrated by the Nazi regime and its collaborators during the Second World War. These press releases were important because the remembrance of this genocide still sometimes struggles to gain political recognition, particularly in the countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe. This battle for the recognition of the Roma genocide as well as national sensitivities to the involvement of international institutions in promoting the remembrance of this genocide

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{132} Anders Lange, \textit{A Survey of Teachers’ Experiences and Perceptions in Relation to Teaching about the Holocaust} (Stockholm: The Living History Forum, 2008), p. 90.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid., p. 95.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Ibid., p. 95.
\item \textsuperscript{135} Eskil Franck, ‘Foreward’, \textit{A Survey of Teachers’ Experiences and Perceptions in Relation to Teaching about the Holocaust}, by Lange, p. 7.
\item \textsuperscript{136} Wallin and Newman (eds), \textit{The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book}, p. 18.
\end{itemize}
is illustrated in the following observation by speaker at the SIF 2000, supporter of the Czech Fenomén Holocaust Project and former President of the Czech Republic (1993-2003), Václav Havel. Commenting on political rival and founder of the Czech right wing ODS party, President Václav Klaus’s negative response to a 2005 European Parliament resolution supporting Roma memorialization efforts at the former Czech concentration camp of Lety u Pisku, Havel noted:

The Roma, rightly see this place as a memorial site, and they find it intolerable that a mega pig farm is standing on the spot today. For years there has been a discussion in our country about whether or not the government should pay the owner of the pig farm to move his animal concentration camp down the road so that in the appropriate place, a burial mound, or some other reminder of the fact that there was a human concentration camp here once, might be built. Naturally, the mega pig farm still occupies the spot. The European Parliament passed a resolution on the Roma and the solving of their problems that makes reference to the Czech pig farm and recommends that it be relocated.

And that is what offended Václav Klaus: such gross interference into our purely Czech affairs! We’ll look after our own little Czech pigsty ourselves, and we’re not remotely interested in any assistance from outsiders! And in any case – that Czech concentration camp wasn’t really much of a concentration camp; it was only a place to put those who didn’t want to work!

When one hears this, one is overcome with a secret longing that democratic, educated, and cultured Europe will meddle as much as possible in our Czech affairs. It is demonstrably in our own interests.137

ITF press releases issued on the subject of the memorialization of the Nazi genocide of the Roma and Sinti, particularly in the Czech Republic included the fact that on 13th June 2007, the Czech ITF Chair commended, “…the Education Working Group (EWG) and especially the Brno Museum of Romani Culture for working on this topic”,138 and asked the ITF that more teacher training, text-books and academic research be carried out, “…in particular in Central and South-Eastern Europe where discrimination against the Roma still exist.”139 The results of this commitment included ITF seminars for experts in Brno, Czech Republic in 2007 (in collaboration with the Museum of

139 Ibid.
Romani Culture) and Linz, Austria in 2008 (in co-operation with the Austrian Ministry of Education) as well as a teacher training seminar convened in conjunction with the Hungarian Ministry of Education and the Council of Europe in Budapest in 2008.\textsuperscript{140}

Furthermore, on 7\textsuperscript{th} December 2009, the ITF issued a ‘Statement concerning Hate Crimes and Discrimination targeting Roma in Europe’, which drew attention to contemporary European anti-Roma hate crimes and reaffirmed the remit of the ITF to build on the EWG’s efforts and promote awareness of the Porrajmos as well as to combat discrimination towards Roma and Sinti in the present.\textsuperscript{141} It was important for the ITF to issue this statement because during the noughties, anti-Roma attacks including beatings, shootings, stabbings and fire-bombings had been reported in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic and Hungary;\textsuperscript{142} whilst the heightened emigration of Roma from former Soviet bloc countries to Western Europe, facilitated by the expanded EU contributed to an increasingly intensive crackdown against Roma and Sinti in Western Europe.\textsuperscript{143} These measures have included forced evictions of Roma and Sinti in Italy since 2000 as well as the sending of groups of Roma back to Romania by Germany in June 2009 and Denmark and Sweden in the summer of 2010.\textsuperscript{144}

However, most controversial has been French President, Nicholas Sarkozy’s sanctioning of the deportations of more than 1000 Roma to Bulgaria and Romania and

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[\textsuperscript{141}] Ibid.
\item[\textsuperscript{142}] Mark Tran, ‘Prejudice and evictions widespread in Europe not just France activists warn’, The Guardian, 17 September 2010.
\item[\textsuperscript{144}] Tran, ‘Prejudice and evictions widespread in Europe not just France activists warn’.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
the dismantling of over 100 Roma camps between August and September 2010. Sarkozy’s actions attracted media attention across Europe because of a leaked French Interior Ministry document which suggested that the Roma were being targeted as a group on ethnic foundations. This drew the ire of EU Justice Commissioner, Viviane Reding, who accused the French government of breaking EU law and compared, “...the French treatment of the Roma with that of the Jews during the Second World War.” Reding later retracted this metaphor whilst maintaining her condemnation of the French government’s actions. These examples of the precarious situation faced by Europe’s Roma and Sinti communities illustrates the limitations of current ITF educational policies in terms of Europe-wide political influence and mass popular impact, as well as the need for geographically broader ITF educational initiatives in this area in the future.

Furthermore, one of the most important roles of the EWG is to assess applications for ITF funding in the sphere of Holocaust education, which includes teacher training conferences and student led projects. Assessing applications for funding is quite a substantial task for the EWG as of an estimated 400 project proposals received by the ITF between 2001 and 2008, over half were assessed by the EWG. This situation is further reflected in ITF statistics which suggest that 45% of the 221 projects supported by the ITF fund between 2001 and 2008 comprised training programmes, whilst a further 14% of the fund had been disbursed on producing books and educational materials. By contrast, just 8% of the fund had been spent on exhibitions, 6% on

147 Ibid.
149 Ibid., p. 77.
150 Ibid., p. 77.
academic conferences, 7% on websites and databases, 7% on ‘others’, 6% on
documentary films, 3% on writing competitions, 2% on research and 2% on the working
groups themselves.\footnote{Wallin and Newman (eds), \textit{The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book}, p. 77.} The ITF fund is made up of annual contributions by its member
states and countries from Eastern Europe are the most likely to benefit from Task Force
sponsorship.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 24.} In the early days of the ITF these contributions were in dollars, but
institutional changes meant that by 2008, member countries tended to contribute
approximately 30,000 Euros yearly to the ITF fund.\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, p. 76.} Whilst some members of the
ITF have raised concerns about the organization’s spend on administrative costs such as
plenary meetings, Smith also maintains that a central problem for the ITF is that, “…the
Task Force… is totally, absolutely, ridiculously underfunded.”\footnote{‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
\textit{Ibid.}, p. 24.}

Both the achievements and struggles of the ITF fund aside, it is also notable that the
organization has not been free from internal controversies. Concerns have been
expressed about the consequences of the ITF’s rapid expansion in terms of both the
implementation of its projects as well as the power dynamics within the organization’s
institutional structure, whilst the ITF’s discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ has
continued to beg questions both within and outside the ITF about the organization’s
perception of both broader Nazi atrocities and other genocides in relation to the Jewish
Catastrophe.\footnote{For discussions of these issues, see the sections on Bauer in Chapters two and five of this thesis.} For example, whilst the EWG has made a clear effort to remember the
Jewish Catastrophe specifically, whilst embracing wider questions about genocides and
the particular memorialization of Roma victims, it is also notable that similar sub-
committees on other specific victims of Nazi atrocities, such as T4 fatalities were not
established at the same time as the Roma sub-committee. However, the EWG’s idea that the main focus of ITF activities is the Jewish Catastrophe, whilst sensitively and carefully working towards establishing specific sub-committees on the educational questions posed by other Nazi victim groups could serve as a model for future Task Force developments.

Furthermore, in terms of the organization’s rapid expansion, whilst acknowledging that the Task Force has achieved some important work in the post-Communist Eastern and Central European satellite states, former member of the British ITF delegation, Cesarani also expressed the following concerns:

...I became very skeptical of the work of the ITF because it kept growing bigger and bigger and admitting members who signed up to a kind of pro-forma, the Stockholm Declaration and a few other bits and bobs, and threw in twenty thousand dollars or Euros into a pot, but which actually didn’t commit them to very much in practice. And when it came to countries like Austria when Jörg Haider and his party were in government and Romania when they were re-naming streets after Antonescu, I just felt that this was farcical.156

Indeed, as has been shown in chapter one, whilst political anxieties about resurgent populist and far right-wing ethno-nationalism had been one of the key causes of the establishment of the ITF in May 1998, it is arguable that a decade later, the populist radical right and far right remained key challenges to the work of the ITF, a phenomena that will be explored in more detail in chapter four. For instance, the Polish Law and Justice Party led by Lech and Jaroslaw Kaczynski formed a coalition government with extreme right-wing parties in 2005,157 whilst a member of Law and Justice, Michal Kaminski had raised objections to the Polish state apology for the Jedwabne massacre.158 Moreover, disconcerting trends were not limited to Eastern Europe. For

156 ‘Interview with Professor David Cesarani’.
example, during his 2008 election campaign, Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi utilized popular resentment against Roma and Sinti communities;\(^{159}\) whilst during their period in opposition to the Labour government, the normally moderate British Conservative Party created waves of controversy when they split from the centre-right EPP-ED group in the European Parliament in order to form the European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) in 2009.\(^{160}\) Some of the British Conservatives new allies in Europe included Kaminski from the Polish Law and Justice Party,\(^{161}\) as well as MEPs from Latvia’s Fatherland and Freedom Party, “...some of whose members attend a ceremony to commemorate members of the Latvian legion of the Waffen-SS.”\(^{162}\)

However, it was not just anxieties about project implementation that were at stake; rapid Task Force expansion was also a major factor motivating discussions about ITF institutional reform in November 2007. Structural tensions included the fact that the fast growth of the ITF had meant that the decision-making process during Plenary Session meetings had become, “...lengthy and cumbersome”,\(^{163}\) whilst there were also concerns that decision-making inequalities needed to be addressed within some parts of the organization. This was most notable in terms of the operation of the Strategic Implementation Working Group (SIWG), which had been established in May 2003 in an attempt to enhance preparations for ITF Plenary meetings and discuss potential future directions for the organization.\(^{164}\) However, as a November 2007 ITF report

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\(^{159}\) Tran, ‘Prejudice and evictions widespread in Europe not just France activists warn’.
\(^{161}\) Nicholas Watt, ‘MEP defects to Liberal Democrats after Tory links with extremists’.
\(^{164}\) Wallin and Newman (eds), \textit{The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book}, p. 23.
noted: Membership of the SIWG is limited to Member countries who have held the ITF’s presidency in the past. The composition of the SIWG, led, over time, to a perception that the ITF was divided into an ‘inner circle’ of old member countries which were able to use the SIWG meetings to set the stage for future ITF policies and an ‘outer circle’ of relative newcomers barred from participation in the work of SIWG. Although this was clearly not the intention of the ‘founding fathers’ of the ITF, the sense of an ‘in group’ and ‘out group’ detracts from the legitimacy and efficacy of the SIWG. Since it is obvious that all Member countries of the ITF should be able to participate on an equal footing in the process of preparing and taking decisions within the ITF, it is imperative to address these concerns and ensure that the ITF’s decision-making processes are more representative.\footnote{Annex 7: Report on the Meeting of the Special Working Group on the New Challenges to the ITF, held in Amsterdam, on 1 and 2 November 2007, in Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, Plenary Meeting, Prague, December 2-5, 2007, Final Report, p. 31.}

In response to some of these structural issues, in November 2007 it was proposed that SIWG be replaced by a ‘Plenary Preparation Committee’ (PPC).\footnote{Ibid., p. 34.} This committee would arrange plenary session meetings and Bauer and Porat wanted the body to have a structure which would, “…abolish the difference in status between observers and members that existed in the SIWG.”\footnote{Annex 8: The Compromise Proposal to Report by Prof. Yehuda Bauer and Prof. Dina Porat’, in Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, Plenary Meeting, Prague, December 2-5, 2007, Final Report, p. 40.} To further aid with the administrative running of the ITF, a permanent secretariat was established in Berlin on 11\textsuperscript{th} March 2008.\footnote{Wallin and Newman (eds), The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book, p. 24.}

ITF plenary session meeting minutes (2002-2007) also suggest that the more ‘universalistic’ sentiments of the Stockholm Declaration to combat, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia” were a site of recurring controversy, contestation and conflict within the organization in its early years. For example, in a discussion on ‘The role of the Holocaust in education on Human Rights’ at an ITF meeting in Paris on 26\textsuperscript{th} June 2002, the full diversity of views on this issue were aired. On the one hand, Bauer proposed that according to the Stockholm Declaration, “Holocaust education must necessarily address the issue of human rights” and Stephen...
Smith unequivocally stated that the ITF cannot, “…be perceived as an institution dealing with anything other than intolerance and racism.” By contrast, a French delegate expressed concerns that; “…the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the conflict in the Middle East were making more difficult the work of bodies addressing the Holocaust. It was necessary...to avoid tackling topical issues head on.” This sentiment was taken even further by a member of the Israeli delegation who re-stated the currently controversial Holocaust ‘uniqueness’ thesis:

…the focus should be on the initial mandate of the ITF, this being Holocaust education. Account should be taken of the failure of the Durban conference, as well as the worrying rise of anti-Semitism, and excessive involvement in current events should be avoided. The objective must be to use Holocaust education to send out a strong message to young people. The Holocaust must therefore be treated as a unique event in all countries, the aim being one of prevention.

These debates over the extent of the ITF’s remit in relation to drawing attention to contemporary instances of human rights abuses continued throughout the noughties, but became increasingly focused on the issue of genocide. For example, following the SIF 2004 and Smith’s opening of the Kigali Memorial Centre, at the 16th December 2004 ITF plenary session meeting in Trieste, the UK delegation suggested that, “The ITF could begin studying ways to expand its expertise and experience for the benefit of other post-genocidal issues such as those being faced in Bosnia, Cambodia and Rwanda.” This proposal was built on at the next ITF meeting in Warsaw on 30th June 2005. In a debate entitled, the ‘Involvement of the Task Force in other genocide issues’, the UK

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delegation proposed, “…how to use the resources and expertise developed by the Task Force to contribute to offering better information on genocide and giving related policy making advice.” An anonymous British representative added that, “…to facilitate the involvement of the Task Force in other genocide issues”, was not to detract from the ITF’s central focus on the Holocaust, but simply to follow the remit of the Stockholm Declaration (2000) which, “…emphasized the necessity and moral duty to reflect on current situations of genocide.” The same British representative also stressed, “…the current situation of the genocide in Darfur, Sudan, about which the Task Force should be in a position of at least publically expressing concerns.”

The British group’s proposal met with agreement from some members of the Swedish, Norwegian, Danish and German delegations, whilst the Academic Advisor concurred with many of the sentiments expressed by the British representative:

The Academic Advisor pointed out that such an approach is crucial for the work of the Task Force and that an important aspect of educating about the genocide of the Jews, the most extreme and unprecedented genocide, was also to discuss the context of genocide including what happened before and after World War II, with the Holocaust being a central point of focus. The Task Force is intended to deal with lessons to be drawn from the Holocaust and therefore must reflect on current issues on the basis of the knowledge gained from the Holocaust. Thus, it only makes sense that an international body involved with this issue does not remain silent while genocide and large scale massacres are being perpetrated. The Academic Advisor suggested, that, as a first step, the Chair of the Task force draft a declaration about Darfur to be discussed by national delegations.

However, not all members of the Task Force were supportive of all parts of the British delegation’s policy proposal. For example, whilst supporting the writing of an ITF


175 Ibid., p. 6.

176 Academic Advisor quoted in Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Plenary Session, Warsaw, June 30, 2005 Report, p. 6. During this meeting Porat was presented as a candidate for the post of Academic Advisor (p. 3), as a result it is likely that this quote can be attributed to Bauer.
declaration on Darfur, an Israeli representative also wanted the organization to, “...stay clearly focused on the Holocaust and opposed the suggestion by the United Kingdom of compiling a paper describing the role that the Task Force could play with regard to other genocide issues.”

Equally, a member of the French delegation:

…underlined the fact that educational activities on the Holocaust must necessarily be examined in relation to other genocides. However, he also stressed the specificity of anti-Semitism with regard to other forms of racism and also the specificity of the Holocaust with regards to other genocides. He explained that these were the basic elements of the French approach on that matter and reaffirmed that political debate among Task Force members should focus on the Holocaust and that the Education Working Group should deal with the relation between the Holocaust and other genocides as a pedagogical matter.

The immediate results of this debate were that the Polish ITF Chair was instructed to draft a declaration on Darfur, and the Academic, Education and Memorials Working Groups were told to discuss, “...the issue of teaching about the Holocaust and its connections with teaching and remembering other genocides.”

The consequence of these discussions was a letter dated 21st November 2005 addressed to Juan Méndez, Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide at the UN. Acting on behalf of the ITF as a whole, the then Task Force Chair, Professor Daria Nalecz called on the international community to, “...increase its efforts to halt the ongoing atrocities in Darfur.” However, for Smith, a long-time member of the British ITF delegation, the Task Force’s statement on the situation in Darfur should have been issued considerably earlier:

We came to a real crunch over Darfur, actually because it became virtually impossible to get a statement out of the Task Force on Darfur. One was achieved after about 100,000 extra deaths, and I just don’t think that’s appropriate. It brought me into conflict with the Task Force, I have

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to say, because I felt that for governments to willingly join an organization on the basis that they wanted to ensure that ‘Never Again’ meant ‘Never Again’ and then not being able to find an adequate form of words over Darfur, just demonstrated that we were very unlikely to learn very much from the Holocaust in a political context. And I would add to that we have not learnt from the Holocaust in a political context.\footnote{181}

Although the issue of the Holocaust and its relationship to other genocides remains a deeply contested one within the ITF, a sense of consensus was reached with the publication of the ‘Holocaust Task Force Policy Plan for the next Five Years’ (December 2006), which emphasized that whilst the primary aims of the ITF remained the promotion of Holocaust education, remembrance and research as well as the battle against anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial, the plan also stressed that the purpose of the ITF was to develop ways, “…by which research, remembrance and education of the Holocaust, the paradigmatic genocide, can be used to prevent and address contemporary threats of genocide.”\footnote{182} As a result, in contradistinction to those critiques which see the rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as simply ‘screening out’ the acknowledgement of other genocides and past atrocities,\footnote{183} a study of the institutional conflicts and debates within the ITF suggests a much more complex although nonetheless still highly problematic picture.

The final part of the ITF’s remit is to battle contemporary forms of anti-Semitism as has been evidenced by Task Force support for events such as the OSCE co-sponsored conference ‘Lessons Learned: Holocaust remembrance and combating anti-Semitism’...
held in Vienna on 10th November 2008 to commemorate the 70th anniversary of ‘Kristallnacht’.\textsuperscript{184} Although the ITF’s rhetoric of combating anti-Semitism can sometimes re-iterate problematic stereotypes,\textsuperscript{185} the organization has also spoken out on some important issues. For example, in January 2006, the ITF condemned the pronouncements of Iranian President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejab on the grounds that calling, “the Holocaust a myth, and in effect calling for a genocidal policy towards another member state of the UN, namely Israel, were an unacceptable departure.”\textsuperscript{186} In spite of these condemnations from the West, Ahmadinejab continued his anti-Zionist inspired attacks on the veracity of Holocaust history, a campaign which reached one of its most intense points with a cruel and perverse satire on the SIF 2000 itself.

On 11th December 2006, Tehran’s foreign ministry hosted a two-day event, ‘Review of the Holocaust: Global Vision’, which sought, “to counter an alleged lack of free speech in the West about the Holocaust, which Iranian officials argue is used to justify Israel’s

\textsuperscript{184} Wallin and Newman (eds), \textit{The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book}, p. 7.

\textsuperscript{185} For example, in a paper available on the ITF’s website entitled, ‘The Educational Challenges of European Anti-Semitism’, Bauer noted that in terms of contemporary anti-Semitism, “...we are dealing with three forms of the disease: one, the right-wing anti-Semitism of Neo-Nazis, skin-heads, etc; two, the anti-Semitism of a minority of radicalized, marginalized, frustrated, unemployed and non-integrated, largely second generation Moslem youth, who follow radical Islamist teachers; three, the anti-Semitism of the so-called ‘chattering classes’, mainly some of the liberal-leftist intelligentsia and media.” (A copy of this is available in the ‘speeches’ section of the ITF website under the title, ‘Yehuda Bauer speaks about the role of the educator at recent OSCE conference on Anti-Semitism, 9 June 2005’: \texttt{http://www.holocausttaskforce.org/about-the-itf/speeches.html}). Accessed: 28/05/2010. Sociologist, Robert Fine has critiqued this tendency towards stereotyping in the ‘New Anti-Semitism theory’ on the grounds that, “Its defects are the other side of its strengths. They lie in partly not resisting the temptation to stigmatize the anti-Semite as the anti-Semite stigmatizes the Jew, by tarring certain collectivities such as ‘critics of Israel’ or ‘the left’ or ‘Muslims’ or even ‘Europeans’ with the brush of anti-Semitism without addressing the irreducible pluralism that exists within these categories. They also lie in the temptation to view anti-Semitism as a unique phenomenon and in isolation from or even in contradiction to other forms of racism.” (Robert Fine, ‘Fighting with Phantoms: a contribution to the debate on anti-Semitism in Europe’, \textit{Patterns of Prejudice}, Vol. 43, No. 5, (November 2009), p. 476.).

oppression of Palestinians." However, far from being a meeting on democracy and human rights, many commentators saw this conference as actively harming the Palestinian cause, because attendees included such extremists as the infamous Holocaust denier, Robert Faurisson, Michele Renouf, who is based in the UK and has links to David Irving as well as David Duke, an ex-Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan. Given these provocations, it is perhaps unsurprising that on 8th December 2006 just a few days before the ‘Review of the Holocaust’ conference opened, the ITF issued a second ‘Declaration about the Iranian President’s Statements on the Holocaust’.

**Conclusion**

One of the key outcomes of the SIF 2000 on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research was the continuance of SIFs in 2001, 2002 and 2004. These gatherings were significant because they encouraged dialogues and the formation of networks of action between politicians, academics, NGO representatives and survivors on a range of important issues relating to ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001); ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004). A further key consequence of the SIFs was that following the ‘Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust’ (2000), non-binding Stockholm Declarations were also formulated in relation to ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004). These declarations are significant in that they document and re-affirm the collective responsibilities of the

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189 Tait, ‘Holocaust deniers gather in Iran for ‘scientific’ conference’.
international community and can be used proactively by human rights campaigners. However, it cannot be ignored that genocides, in places such as the Congo and Darfur have been perpetrated immediately before, during and since the convening of the SIF 2004. As a result, the danger is that the Stockholm Declarations become hollow pledges which idealistically promise Western international commitment but fail to deliver, illustrating instead the strength of nation states vis-à-vis the Western international order, and in the process of disenchantment create little but further intellectual and public cynicism about Western international security agencies, politicians and their promises, for as Bauer has described the situation, “… we haven’t been able to move governments to act on their noble-sounding words, or to move from noble-sounding words to concrete action to prevent genocide.”

Alongside the convening of the subsequent SIFs, the second major consequence of the SIF 2000 was the continuing work of the ITF and its efforts to implement the chief tenets of the Stockholm Declaration (2000), particularly in relation to Holocaust research, remembrance and education. However, assessing the impact of the ITF and the projects that it supports is far from a simple task given the geographical range of the initiatives that the ITF sponsors, the complexities of public reception in different national ‘public spheres’ as well as the relatively short time frame in which the ITF has been operational. Despite this, it is clear that the organization has had some notable successes, particularly, working in collaboration with the USHMM in relation to the ITS and Jasenovac archives, whilst the ITF’s public statements on Ahmadinejab as well as those Task Force press releases which highlight the continuing discrimination faced by the Roma and Sinti illustrate the ITF’s willingness to take a stand on important

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191 Bauer quoted in Beyond the ’Never Again’s’, ed. Fried, p. 97.
contemporary issues. However, much more problematic is the potential for the hierarchization, and in the worst cases, exclusion of genocides implicit in some but not all interpretations and uses of the ITF’s dominant discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, whilst the time lag that it took for the ITF to issue a statement on the genocide in Darfur is highly problematic. Finally, the far right and the populist radical right in various nation states continue to pose challenges to the implementation of the Stockholm Declaration.

Against the backdrop of these concerns, it is difficult to assess both the success of the ITF’s specific projects as well as the ramifications of the post-Communist asymmetries of political and cultural power implicit in ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ or what Donald Bloxham has described as, “‘enlightened’ western states…ensuring the basic tenets of Holocaust historiography are recognized by former eastern bloc states.”\footnote{Donald Bloxham, ‘Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Days: Reshaping the Past in the Service of the Present’, Immigrants and Minorities, Vol. 21, No. 1 and 2 (March-July 2002), pp. 52-53.} For whilst the ITF’s mission to challenge the most distortive and pernicious elements of Communist and ultra-nationalist Holocaust historiographies is incredibly important,\footnote{Ibid., p. 53.} the policies that the Task Force supports can nonetheless be deeply controversial and provoke ethno-nationalist backlash in certain political contexts. For example, following U.S critiques of Estonia’s failures to prosecute former Nazi war criminals, an opinion poll commissioned by the nation’s popular newspaper, Eesti Paevaleht revealed that 93% of Estonians opposed the 2002 creation of a ‘Day of the Holocaust’ commemorating the Jewish catastrophe, genocides and other ‘Crimes against Humanity’.\footnote{Adam B. Ellick, ‘How Shared Are ‘Shared Values’?’, The Jerusalem Report, 12 July 2004; Zuroff, ‘Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the wake of Holocaust Related Issues’, p. 5.} In an effort to further analyze the consequences of the SIF 2000, as well as to provide an in-depth case study of the impact of an ITF ‘Liaison Project’, the next
chapter will turn to an analysis of the implementation and political and cultural implications of the British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania (2000-2003).
Chapter 4

Post-Millennial Holocaust Memory Work

Implementing the Stockholm Declaration (2000):

The ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’

As chapter two has suggested, post-millennial efforts to implement the Stockholm Declaration (2000) in Britain primarily focused on the launch of UK HMD. However, as reaffirmed at the SIF 2000, it was also the responsibility of the British ITF delegation to provide assistance to ‘Liaison Partners’ or prospective member states of the Task Force who needed to improve their public efforts at Holocaust research, remembrance and education before they would be permitted to join the organization. As a result, British ITF representatives were involved in Task Force ‘Liaison Projects’ with Lithuania and Estonia (alongside representatives of Sweden, Israel and Latvia) as well as having informal relations with countries such as Ukraine, Belarus and China during the noughties.  

Continuing this analysis of the causes and consequences of the SIF 2000, which has laid particular emphasis on the UK perspective, and in order to gain a greater knowledge of how the ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ described in chapter two work in practice; what conditions are essential to their success; as well as how the ‘Liaison Project’ as a relationship of political and cultural power can be understood within the nexus of the challenges faced by post-Communist, ‘Westernizing’ countries in the Baltic States, this chapter will evaluate the successes and challenges posed to the implementation of the British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania (2000-2003).

Before analyzing the process which led to the formation of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ as well as the results of that partnership, it should be noted that the UK’s relationship to the Holocaust was far from flawless. According to Kushner, a scholar of the collective memory of the Holocaust in the UK, the British government downplayed the victimization of the Jews during the mass mobilization efforts of the Second World War, whilst post-war the ‘liberal imagination’ of the British immigration authorities often continued to perceive Jews, “…as undesirable newcomers…inassimilable, both religiously and racially, left-wing trouble makers and poor workers.” Furthermore, the perseverance of this stereotype was one of the reasons why the British government was more willing to accommodate immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, who were often perceived as more ethnically and culturally assimilable, sometimes in spite of their war record.4

During the chaos of the end of the war in Europe, many Lithuanians, but also Latvian, Ukrainian and Estonian Nazi collaborators attempted to flee to the West to escape the re-imposition of Soviet rule and retribution for their anti-Communist resistance. However, rather than being deported, many of these former war criminals managed to settle in America and Britain. This was because Western courts such as the Nuremberg tribunals failed to adequately deal with the perpetrators of Jewish genocide in the Baltic States, and as a result Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Latvian and Estonian collaborators were inadequately screened and accepted into Britain under migrant labor programmes such

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5 Ibid., p. 41.
as the UK’s European Voluntary Worker schemes. Furthermore, the anti-Soviet credentials of these Baltic and Eastern European nationals’ became a valuable commodity to the American and British governments in the climate of espionage that accompanied the intensification of the Cold War. As Cesarani has noted in his book on the subject, *Justice Delayed*:

The disclosures by Kim Philby, Anthony Cavendish and CIA operatives have revealed that MI5 and MI6 recruited anti-Soviet agents from amongst the pool of DPs, including Axis collaborators and known war criminals.

In spite of this situation, some Holocaust survivors did manage to settle in Britain after the war. For example, in 1945, the Committee for the Care of Children from the Concentration Camps brought 732 child survivors from Europe to Britain including Ben Helfgott and Hugo Gryn, whilst a large number of survivors settled in the UK as a result of the Distressed Relations Scheme in which successful applicants had produced proof that they had close relatives in Britain as well as no surviving family members abroad. However, current research suggests that the overall picture of social and political efforts to promote the remembrance of the Jewish catastrophe in Cold War Britain was bleak. Although this assessment may be subject to the potential challenge of the new historiography which is re-evaluating the 1950s and 1960s, Kushner summarizes the situation as follows:

From the end of the war until at least the 1980s British society as a whole was, for the most part, at best indifferent and at worst antipathetic to recognizing that the Jews had, in fact, been subject to specific treatment by the Nazis. The net result was that Holocaust commemoration and education in Britain was left to a small group of largely Jewish activists, including some survivors.

Kushner contends that in the 1980s and 1990s, this situation began to change when

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7 Cesarani, *Justice Delayed*, p. 4.
10 See the ‘Introduction’ to this thesis.
domestic developments such as the continued campaigns for Holocaust education by organizations such as the ‘45 Aid Group and the Holocaust Educational Trust (HET, 1988) overlapped with the growth of political discourses such as multiculturalism in the UK,\textsuperscript{12} as well as international developments such as the commissioning of the USHMM in 1978,\textsuperscript{13} the growth of pressure in America, Australia, Israel and Canada to address war crimes issues in the 1980s,\textsuperscript{14} as well as the reinvigorated post-1989 international movement for Holocaust restitution.\textsuperscript{15} All of these factors had a ‘knock-on’ effect in encouraging the British political establishment to engage with post-Holocaust era issues of justice, restitution, remembrance, research and education. The result of these developments combined with considerable campaigning by collectivities such as the Board of Deputies of British Jews, the All-Parliamentary War Crimes group and the HET was the establishment of the Hyde Park Holocaust Memorial in 1983,\textsuperscript{16} the passing of the War Crimes Act and the inclusion of the Holocaust in the British National Curriculum in 1991, the opening of the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre, Nottinghamshire and the commissioning of the IWM’s Holocaust exhibition, both 1995 as well as the convening of the LCNG (2\textsuperscript{nd}-4\textsuperscript{th} December 1997).\textsuperscript{17} Finally, alongside Sweden and the U.S, Britain became a co-founding member of the ITF in May 1998, attended the SIF 2000 and held its first HMD on Saturday 27\textsuperscript{th} January 2001, based on the ‘universalistic’ theme, ‘Remembering Genocides, Lessons for the Future’.\textsuperscript{18}

As a member of the ITF, the British delegation was not only expected to consolidate Holocaust research, remembrance and education at home, it was also expected to play

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{12} Kushner, ‘Too Little, Too Late?’, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{13} Linenthal, Preserving Memory, pp. 16-17.
\textsuperscript{14} Cesarani, Justice Delayed, pp. 192-194.
\textsuperscript{15} Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice.
\end{flushleft}
the part of a ‘lead country’ to prospective member states of the ITF, many of which were located in the former Soviet bloc countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States. Whilst chapter two has documented how discussions about the function of ‘Liaison Projects’, were first mooted at a March 1999 ITF meeting in London, a decade later Wallinn and Newman’s official history of the ITF, described the purpose of ‘Liaison Projects’ in the following terms:

The partner countries contribute money to the project in addition to subsidies granted by the Task Force. Ideally, such projects are ensured lasting support and extension by partner governments and the Task Force sometimes provides a portion of the financing. Evaluation is provided by an international expert group within the Task Force. The policy is therefore one of solidarity and action in order to ensure a solid foundation for an initial series of public actions which will then be more widely developed.

Examples of ‘Liaison Projects’ in the first decade of the ITF’s existence include Germany as ‘lead country’ to Slovakia; Israel as ‘lead country’ to Hungary; Sweden as ‘lead country’ to Latvia; the United States as ‘lead country’ to Croatia and Argentina; France and Israel as ‘lead countries’ to Romania, Greece and Spain; Britain, Sweden, Israel and Latvia as ‘lead countries’ to Estonia as well as Britain as ‘lead country’ to Lithuania (2000-2003). In order to understand why Lithuania became Britain’s ‘Liaison Partner’ and why it was necessary for Lithuania to form a ‘Liaison Project’ before it became a full member of the ITF in 2002, it is essential to have an understanding of the history of the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second World War; an awareness of how the Holocaust was treated in Lithuanian public life during the Communist era as well as the role of the Holocaust in public debates in post-Soviet Lithuania, or the period of state independence which immediately preceded the

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20 Wallin and Newman (eds), The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book, p. 76.
21 Ibid., p. 76.
formation of the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ in January 2000.

**Lithuania and the Holocaust prior to the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’**

The mass murder of Lithuanian Jews during the Second World War remains a difficult event for the Lithuanian nation to confront because of the enormity of the genocide that was perpetrated, the role of local collaborators in the killing of Lithuanian Jews as well as the complicating factor of the brutal legacy of Russian dominance and Soviet occupation, which has distorted and complicated the country’s public remembrance of the Holocaust in a multitude of ways. Lithuania’s relationship to Russia as an imperial occupier and the movement for national independence has its’ roots deep in the nineteenth century and an awareness of this adds a further layer in understanding why Soviet dominance was so resented in the twentieth century. One of the consequences of the Third Partition of Poland in 1795 was that Tsarist Russia ended up incorporating Lithuania into her Empire, however following the cataclysms of the First World War (1914-1918) and the Bolshevik Revolution (1917) Lithuanian nationalists were able to declare state independence on 16th February 1918.22 This successful declaration of independence was only qualified by the fact that Vilnius, a city shrouded in Lithuanian nationalist mythology, but largely populated by Poles and Jews in the early half of the twentieth century, was annexed to Poland in October 1920.23

However, the achievements of Lithuanian independence were to be short-lived. The

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foreign policy alliance between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union in the late 1930s led to the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (23rd August 1939), which divided central and eastern Europe into Nazi and Soviet spheres of future invasion and influence. Whilst the First Secret Protocol of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (28th August 1939), allocated Lithuania to Nazi Germany, the Second Secret Protocol (28th September 1939) reversed this decision and gave Lithuania to the Soviets. A few months later on 15th June 1940, the U.S.S.R invaded Lithuania, incorporated the country into the Soviet Union (3rd August 1940), made Vilnius the capital of the Lithuanian SSR and carried out brutal mass deportations of 20,000-30,000 Lithuanians, Jews and Poles to Kazakhstan and Siberia between June 1940 and July 1941. Victims of the deportations included members of the Lithuanian political elite such as Prime Minister Merkys and Foreign Minister Urbsys.

It was against this backdrop of the Second World War and Soviet invasion and partition that the Nazi/Soviet alliance dissolved, and the Nazi German invasion of Lithuania on 22nd June 1941 occurred. The German invasion led to a wave of Lithuanian partisan uprisings against the Soviet army, as well as furious local pogroms against Lithuanian Jews. For whilst some Lithuanian Jews served in the Soviet state apparatus and army, the Nazis and their collaborators’ violence was directed against all Lithuanian Jewish civilians whatever their political affiliation, religious congregation or experience during the Soviet occupation. Jews were universally identified in Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda as well as in the consciousness of many Lithuanian Nazi collaborators with

24 Lane, *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*, p. x.
25 Ibid., p. x.
27 Ibid., p.83.
28 Lane, *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*, p. x.
Communist interests. An extract from the war-time diary of Jewish oncolologist, Dr. Viktor Kutorga is indicative of both the extreme violence of the Nazis and their Lithuanian collaborators as well as their widespread tendency to identify the political and doctrinal diversity of Lithuanian Jewry with Communist concerns. In Kaunas on 28th June 1941, Kutorga observed:

On Vitauskas Avenue, in the open yard of the Letukis garage at 4.00pm, the Lithuanian ‘partisans’ and the Germans gathered around forty Jews and, after spraying them with water from fire hoses, beat the unfortunates to death with clubs. This scene took place in the presence of many German officers and a large crowd of people made up of men, women and children who avidly observed the terrifying picture. No one tried to intervene; the victims (Communists, they were sure) died in front of everyone after two hours of suffering.

The prevalence of this pernicious stereotype served as an alibi for the ferocious mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry by Nazi Einsatzkommandos and their Lithuanian collaborators. Sub-units of Nazi Einsatzkommando 2 operated in the Schauliai region and northern Lithuania; Einsatzkommando 3 conducted killing operations in Kaunas and western and central Lithuania and finally, Einsatzkommando 9, organized murder squads in the Vilnius region. These massacres of Vilnius Jews in the sandpits of the Paneriai (Ponary) Forest by Einsatzkommando 9 are also a shocking example of the extent of Lithuanian collaboration in what would later become known as the Holocaust. For example, by July 1941, Einsatzkommando 9 had recruited thousands of Lithuanian volunteers into its organization and between July and August 1941, hundreds of Vilnius Jews were shot at Paneriai by a Lithuanian volunteer unit called the Special Platoon (Ypatingas Burys). The homicidal work of Einsatzkommando 9 continued with 3700

29 Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, p. 84.
30 Dr. Viktor Kutorga, ‘The truth about the terror against the Jews in Lithuania during the German occupation of 1941: An appeal to the Nations of the World’, in *The Unknown Black Book: The Holocaust in the German Occupied Soviet Territories*, ed. Joshua Rubenstein and Ilya Altman (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2008), p. 281. Kutorga’s account was most probably written at the end of 1941, although there is no information concerning whether it was published during the Second World War.
32 Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, p. 84.
Jews being shot at Paneriai in September 1941; a further 6000 being executed after the formation of the Vilnius ghettos on 6th September 1941 as well as 12,000 more Jews being murdered in the Paneriai death pits between October and November 1941.\textsuperscript{33} As a result, by December 1941, the Nazis and their Lithuanian collaborators had murdered an estimated 21,700 Vilnius Jews.\textsuperscript{34}

By the beginning of 1942, the Nazis and their local collaborators had killed between 160,000 and 163,000 members of Lithuanian Jewry.\textsuperscript{35} Whilst some Jews who were perceived as essential workers managed to survive in the ghettos of Vilnius, Kaunas and Siauliai, the process of mass killing, exploitation, expropriation and plunder was far from over. In early 1942, a subdivision of Special Staff Rosenberg was established in Vilnius and valuable Jewish antique books and religious artifacts were shipped to the Reich, whilst a similar process was also implemented in Kaunas.\textsuperscript{36} In September 1943, the Kaunas and Siauliai ghettos were converted into SS administered concentration camps, whilst despite the controversial efforts of Jewish Council leader, Jacob Gens, the Vilnius ghetto was liquidated between 23rd and 24th September 1943.\textsuperscript{37} Recently in a documentary interview, Gita Geseleva, a survivor of the destruction of the Vilnius ghetto described the brutality that she encountered:

The Germans came into our house and searched. They took everything out and threw things on the floor…They themselves covered the entrance to the basement. I heard somebody say; “come, come here”, and then I heard the shots. This was my parents. I started crying but the others held me back. The Germans went from one house to another. Searching, searching and killing. And then they set the ghetto on fire.\textsuperscript{38}

\textsuperscript{33} Snyder, *The Reconstruction of Nations*, p. 86.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid., p. 86.
\textsuperscript{35} Arad, *The Holocaust in the Soviet Union*, p. 147.
\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., p. 415.
\textsuperscript{37} Ibid., p. 318.
\textsuperscript{38} Gita Geseleva quoted in the documentary, *Surviving History*, written by Shivaun Woolfson and directed by Jesse and Daniel Quinones (UK/Lithuania: Living Imprint, 2009).
Following the liquidation of the Vilnius ghetto, 4000-4500 women and children were deported to Sobibor where they were murdered; 1600-2000 men were sent to Estonia; 1400-1700 younger women were expected to perform duties in the Latvian Kaisserwald concentration camp; whilst many older members of the ghetto population were taken and brutally shot at Paneriai. Over the course of the war, approximately 70,000 Jews were murdered at Paneriai, a massacre site which also witnessed the Nazi sanctioned killings of a further 30,000 people including Polish, Lithuanian, Czechoslovakian, Latvian, Hungarian, Romanian, Russian and French dissidents.

However, even in the days immediately preceding the onslaught of the Soviet army in July and August 1944, the Nazis continued targeting Lithuanian Jewry. At Paneriai, they massacred 2000 who had been taken from the Kailis military vehicle workshop as well as deporting 5000-6000 Jews from the Kaunas concentration camp to Stutthof in East Prussia (July 1944), where some of the prisoners were murdered and other inmates were sent onto a number of different concentration camps across Germany. Of those Jews who survived the Holocaust in Lithuania, 7000-8000 were deportees to German concentration camps who were subsequently liberated by the allies in 1945; approximately 1000 were aided by ‘Righteous Gentiles’ in hiding or attempted to pass as ‘Aryan’ citizens; whilst an estimated 1000 survived as a result of fighting with Soviet and Jewish partisans in the forests. It was this latter group that would prove the most controversial in post-Communist Lithuania, being valorized for their heroic resistance in Israel and condemned for siding with the Soviets by Lithuanian ultra-

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42 Ibid., pp. 521-522.
43 Ibid., p. 521 and pp. 432-433.
44 Ibid., p. 521 and pp. 506-507.
nationalists. However, what both of these interpretations elide, is the fact that whilst the majority of Jewish partisans comprised a motley crew of escaped Zionist, Bundist and Communist ghetto underground youth movement members, many Jews hiding in the forests, including some women, children and the elderly were not primarily involved in the conflict for the sake of ideology, but were there because it was the best way of surviving the genocide that was unfolding around them.

At the outset of the Second World War, Lithuania had a Jewish population of approximately 205,000-210,000 however, by the end of the conflict Lithuanian Jewish survivors of the Holocaust numbered just 9000-10,000 and Vilnius, or what was once known as the ‘Jerusalem of the North’ had been looted, plundered and reduced to rubble. Against this backdrop of destruction, the future of the Lithuanian state also hung in the balance of reconfigured post-war international relations. Eventually, the Yalta Peace Conference (4th-11th February 1945) re-confirmed Soviet control of the territories of Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, however, the result of this decision was Lithuanian partisan resistance to Communist power in Lithuania between 1944 and 1952. In response the Soviets cracked-down against aggressive forms of ‘bourgeois nationalism’, ‘enemies of the people’ as well as ‘kulaks’ who were seen as opposing the collectivization drive in agriculture. The consequence of this was that approximately 350,000 Lithuanians were forcibly deported to work in Soviet special camps in places such as Kazakhstan, Tadzhikistan, the Altay and the Arctic.

47 Ibid., p. 525.
48 Lane, *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*, p. x.
49 Ibid., p. 62.
Obtaining justice and remembrance of the Jewish catastrophe in Soviet Lithuania would be fraught with difficulties. Not only did Western states such as America and Britain turn a ‘blind eye’ to Lithuanian Nazi collaborators, but Soviet policy towards different ethnic groups in Lithuania between the end of the Second World War and Perestroika also discouraged a reckoning with Lithuania’s role in the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry. For example, whilst Yiddish responses to the Jewish catastrophe flourished in the Soviet Union after the war, it was not long before institutions which promoted Yiddish language, history and culture were seen as forwarding a pernicious form of ‘bourgeois nationalism’.  

This meant that they were at odds with the Stalinist Russification drive against what were perceived to be forms of ideologically retrograde and dissident nationalisms within the U.S.S.R. and its satellite states. Furthermore, against the backdrop of the intensification of the Cold War, Yiddish was also perceived as doubly dangerous because some of its key proponents in Communist organization’s such as the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee had links to Jewish institutions in the West, or in Soviet terms they had a status which suggested that they were ‘rootless cosmopolitans’.

Equally, although the Soviet Union had initially supported the establishment of Israel in 1948 and Czechoslovakia had supplied arms during the first Israeli War of Independence (1948-1949), the intensification of the Cold War combined with the increasing association of Israel with American interests, as well as the rapturous reception given by some Soviet Jews to a visit by Israeli ambassador Golda Meir.

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formed the backdrop for a paranoid Stalinist attack against ‘Zionists’ who were maliciously stereotyped as a perceived ‘fifth column’ of ‘fascist capitalist’ conspirators within the Communist empire.\textsuperscript{55} The results of this Communist crackdown against forms of Jewish ‘cosmopolitanism’ and ‘Zionism’ were anti-Semitic purges in the party-state hierarchy as well as the repression of political, social and cultural expression in Yiddish.\textsuperscript{56} By 1950 the Soviets had closed all Jewish public institutions in Lithuania, including the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum (which had been re-established in 1944),\textsuperscript{57} whilst the Vilnius Great Synagogue dating back to the late sixteenth century and subject to bombing during the Second World War had also been demolished.\textsuperscript{58} This Soviet persecution of Lithuanian Jewry meant that by 1959 a Communist census estimated that just 24,672 Jews were left living in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{59}

Post-war forms of Soviet anti-nationals policy dovetailed with the U.S.S.R.’s belief that social cohesion in the Soviet empire would be better aided by an inclusive narrative of the Soviet struggle against German ‘fascist-capitalism’. The result of this was the widespread Soviet failure to recognize the specific crime of the mass murder of European Jewry under Nazism in the late 1940s and 1950s; a tragedy which also raised the divisive issue of local collaboration with the Third Reich in occupied states such as, Lithuania, Latvia, Ukraine and Belorussia.\textsuperscript{60} For example, in 1949, the Yiddish

\textsuperscript{55} The Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum of Lithuania Information Leaflet (Vilnius: The Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum, 2010).
\textsuperscript{57} The Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum of Lithuania Information Leaflet.
\textsuperscript{58} Michael Kimmage, ‘In the Ruins of Vilna’, Commentary, January 2009.
inscription on a memorial specifically dedicated by Lithuanian Jews to their fellow Litvaks who had perished at Paneriai was altered to a Lithuanian and Russian message which commemorated the mass murder of Soviet Citizens. However, Stalin’s death in 1953 and Khrushchev’s policy of ‘de-Stalinization’ facilitated the publication of some books in the 1960s which began to address the history of the Jewish catastrophe in Lithuania, albeit within the problematic context of Communist ideology. For example, journalist Stasys Bistrickas published an account of the Paneriai forest massacres called, *And those who were shot bear witness* (1960). Equally, documents from the Vilnius and Kaunas trials of Nazi war criminals (1962) were made available, whilst in 1967, Sofia Binkiene released a book entitled, *War Without Weapons*, which dealt with stories of Jewish rescue.

Furthermore, the writings of Lithuanian Jewish survivors were also published in this period, such as *I Must Tell*, the memoir of Mashe Rolnikaite, a teenage survivor of the Vilnius ghetto and Stutthof concentration camp. Rolnikaite’s memoir was published in Yiddish in 1963 before being translated into Russian and published in Moscow as the Soviet equivalent of Anne Frank in 1965. However the Soviet selection of survivor memoirs to be published was ultimately problematic for the future development of the memory of the Holocaust because the published accounts failed to represent a wide variety of Jewish experiences. Rather in Communist ideological fashion, published memoirs were either predominantly authored by or alternatively primarily represented Jews who had either served with the Red Army, the Soviet partisans, or the Communist

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62 Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.

63 ‘Holocaust Chronicler’s Story Must be Told’.
ghetto resistance during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{64} Illustrating the troubling elements of this Soviet selectivity, when ROLNIKAITE first submitted her memoir for publication, she was told that it needed to be altered because it was not written from the right class perspective. That is, it failed to adequately address the role of the Soviet partisans and it was also too positive about the Jewish Councils.\textsuperscript{65} In light of this, Lithuanian writer, Vytautas Toleikis, has noted how ROLNIKAITE’s description of the Vilnius ghetto resistance emphasized the heroism of the Communist members whilst ignoring the contributions made by Zionist and Bundist affiliates.\textsuperscript{66}

The 1970s and 1980s also witnessed some significant shifts in the remembrance of the Holocaust in Lithuania. During the 1970s, Lithuanian émigré scholar and poet at Yale University, Tomas Venclova began to write about the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second War.\textsuperscript{67} Equally, within Lithuania itself, Thomas C. Fox, a scholar of Soviet collective memory has observed that, “…\textit{in the 1970s and 1980s, an emphasis by Lithuanian Jews and non-Jews on the Jewish catastrophe often served as a protest, coded or not, against Soviet policies of repression and misinformation.}”\textsuperscript{68} Despite this, further waves of Lithuanian Jewry left for Israel in 1971, 1972 as well as during the late 1980s.\textsuperscript{69}

Against the backdrop of Gorbachev’s \textit{Perestroika} (‘Re-structuring’) and \textit{Glasnost} (‘publicity’ or ‘openness’), from the summer of 1988, the Sajudis national Lithuanian revival movement held popular public rallies and in March 1989, Sajudis

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{64} Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
\item \textsuperscript{65} ‘Holocaust Chronicler’s Story Must be Told’.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
\item \textsuperscript{68} Fox, ‘The Holocaust under Communism’, p. 424.
\item \textsuperscript{69} Schoffman, ‘The Best Revenge’; Kimmage, ‘In the Ruins of Vilna’.
\end{itemize}
representatives were elected to seats in the newly established Congress of People’s Deputies.\textsuperscript{70} Rebelling against the consequences of the Soviet invasion of June 1940, the movement for independence gained increasing momentum in Lithuania, one of the least ethnically Russian as well as one of the most politically vocal of the Baltic Republics.\textsuperscript{71} The desire for national independence was epitomized by the massive ‘Baltic Way’ protest that Sajudis and the Latvian and Estonian People’s Fronts organized between Tallinn and Vilnius on 23\textsuperscript{rd} August 1989.\textsuperscript{72} These popular political developments eventually led to the overthrow of Lithuania’s Soviet tutelage and resulted in the re-establishment of Lithuanian national independence on 11\textsuperscript{th} March 1990.\textsuperscript{73} Although Soviet security forces attempted to reverse this situation, seizing the TV tower in Vilnius in January 1991, a move which resulted in the deaths of fifteen people,\textsuperscript{74} the leaders of independent Lithuania persevered and in October 1992 inaugurated a democratic constitution with liberal minorities and citizenship legislation.\textsuperscript{75}

However, in a similar way to neighboring post-Communist Poland, one of the consequences of Lithuanian independence, democracy and the re-orientation of politics from East to West was a renewed impetus from some social groups at home as well as certain state alliances abroad to deal with Lithuania’s relationship to the Second World War, the consequences of the Soviet and German occupations and in particular, the perpetration of the Holocaust. This confrontation with the past came at a time when owing to the legacy of Nazi extermination and subsequent Soviet persecution, Lithuania’s native Jewish population was massively depleted. In 1989, the Lithuanian

\textsuperscript{70} Lane, Lithuania: Stepping Westward, p. xi; Lovell, The Soviet Union, p. 56.
\textsuperscript{71} Lovell, The Soviet Union, p. 113.
\textsuperscript{72} Lane, Lithuania: Stepping Westward, p. xi.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid., p. 132.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., p. xi.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid., p. xi and p. 131.
Jewish community had numbered just 12,314, but approximately half of this figure left for Israel between 1989 and 1994.\textsuperscript{76} The cumulative effect of these emigrations was that by 1999, the Lithuanian Jewish population totaled just 5500 (with 3500-4000 living in Vilnius) whilst approximately 60% of this figure were over the age of sixty.\textsuperscript{77}

Despite this demographic situation, political, social and cultural shifts meant that by the end of the 1980s as well as under democratic Lithuanian governments of the 1990s, a number of positive developments were facilitated in relation to Holocaust research, remembrance and education. For example, a campaign by Jewish intellectuals at the Lithuanian Cultural Foundation meant that the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum of Lithuania was re-established in October 1989. In part of this museum, called ‘The Green House’ is the \textit{Catastrophe} exhibition, a display curated by Lithuanian Holocaust survivors such as Rachel Kostanian, which recounts the history of Jewish life in Lithuania prior to the Second World War, the subsequent persecution and systematic mass murder of Lithuanian Jews by the Nazis and their Lithuanian collaborators as well as providing a space for Jewish mourning, resistance and revival in contemporary Lithuania. Kostanian has said that her work at the museum honours her family members who perished at Paneriai.\textsuperscript{78} Furthermore, reflecting on an exhibition of Jewish artefacts and books in Vilnius in the period immediately preceding national independence,\textsuperscript{79} Kostanian also stressed the importance of preserving and keeping alive Jewish communal culture in Lithuania, particularly after years of Nazi and Soviet repression:

\textsuperscript{76} Schoffman, ‘The Best Revenge’.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} It is possible that Kostanian is referring to an exhibition of Lithuanian Jewish art organized by Zingeris and displayed in Kaunas in June 1988 before being shown in Vilnius (Toleikis, ‘Repress, reassess, remember’).
Of course, the books mainly touched me, books, pictures and art. It was something outstanding it was such an event in my life, the culture behind it. The regret, the pain that we couldn’t have had it, that I couldn’t have had it for my son...That they made us nameless, homeless...because a culture is home...A culture is home, it’s roots...a name, a family name, things that we could be proud of.80

Kostanian’s testimony attests to the fact that for many Holocaust survivors the right to express their Jewish identity and commemorate the Holocaust was incredibly important in post-independence Lithuania. This was a feeling shared by escapee of the Vilnius ghetto, former partisan, and librarian at the Vilnius Yiddish Institute, Fania Brantsovsky, who aids survivors, teaches Yiddish and organizes tours of Jewish Vilnius as well as guided trails of the partisan forest bases.81 Equally, World War II conscript into the Soviet army, Joseph Levinson returned to his home shtetl of Veisiejai in 1945, to find his father, cousins and many of his neighbours massacred. After national independence and in honor of the dead, Levinson relentlessly toured Lithuania, discovering mass graves and establishing memorials which were dedicated to those who perished during the Nazi onslaught.82

However, for many Lithuanian survivors, some of whom face illness and financial hardship, the memories of the past still evoke troubling feelings of what Italian-Jewish Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi might call ‘survivor guilt’ or ‘shame’.83 For example, in Surviving History (2009), a documentary about the contemporary plight of Lithuanian Holocaust survivors, blind Orthodox Jew, Berl Glazer commented that, “On the one hand it’s good that I survived, but so many others perished”, whilst Chasia Spanerflig, who made the ‘choiceless choice’ to leave her son, her niece and her husband’s parents in the Vilnius ghetto, and instead join her husband with the forest

80 Rachel Kostanian quoted in the documentary, Surviving History.
81 Fania Brantsovsky in the documentary, Surviving History.
82 Joseph Levinson in the documentary, Surviving History.
84 Berl Glazer in the documentary, Surviving History.
partisans, agonized that this decision, “stays with me and tortures me all my life.”

Other sites which commemorate the Holocaust in Lithuania include Jewish community member, Adomas Jacovskis’s memorial stone and Epstein’s 1991 monument to the 70,000 Jews who were slaughtered at Paneriai, as well as the Kaunas Ninth Fort’s memorial to Jewish victims, established in 1991, which commemorates over 30,000 Jews who were murdered there during the Second World War. International awareness about the Holocaust in Lithuania was also heightened by the 1993 opening of the USHMM, where one of the most prominent and moving exhibits is the ‘Tower of Faces’, a display which vertically bisects the core of the museum. This display was pieced together from the photographic collection of Lithuanian Holocaust survivor and scholar, Yaffa Eliach, and it is a vast display of portraits of the pre-war inhabitants of the Lithuanian shtetl of Eishishok, the majority of whom were subsequently murdered during the Holocaust.

Against this backdrop of local and international interest in commemorating the Holocaust in Lithuania, the nation’s political establishment made some efforts to promote awareness of the Holocaust throughout the 1990s. For example, on 8th May 1990, a government decree was passed entitled, ‘Regarding the Genocide of the Jewish

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85 Chasía Spanerflig in the documentary, *Surviving History.*
87 Other victim groups at Paneriai have also erected their own specific commemorative monuments since the end of Communism. For example, in 1989, Poles commissioned their own commemorative cross and in 1992 Lithuanians created their own monument.
Nation in Lithuania during the Nazi Occupation’, whilst other state efforts included the 1994 inauguration of a yearly National Holocaust Remembrance Day on 23rd September, the day that the Vilnius ghetto was liquidated in 1943. Also significant was the fact that on 7th September 1998, the Lithuanian-American émigré and supporter of Western integration, President Valdus Adamkus established, ‘The International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania’. 

This Commission was significant in opening up the study of the perpetration of Nazi and Soviet crimes in Lithuania to the wider international academic community after decades of Lithuanian intellectual life being dominated by the constraints of Communist ideology. Members of the International Commission included the Chairman, Emanuelis Zingeris (a member of the Lithuanian Seimas), the co-Chairman, Professor Liudas Truska (History department, Vilnius Pedagogical University), Yitzhak Arad (Yad Vashem), Andrew Baker (American Jewish Committee), Sir Martin Gilbert (Honorary Fellow, Merton College, Oxford University) as well as Professor Saulius Suziedelis (History department, Millersville, University of Pennsylvania). The Commission has supported research in relation to the history of the Holocaust in Lithuania by local scholars. For example, Vygandas Vareikis (Klaipeda University) and Truska have analyzed pre-war Lithuanian anti-Semitism, whilst Arunas Bubnys (Genocide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithuania) has written on the role of Lithuanian

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collaborators in the Holocaust. Furthermore, the Commission has also encouraged research by international academics, such as Christoph Dieckmann (PhD Freiberg; Lecturer History department, Keele University, UK) and Suziedelis’s investigations into the persecution and mass killing of Lithuanian Jews between the summer and autumn of 1941.

However, despite these public and academic achievements, many critics have also argued that these government efforts were also full of significant flaws and omissions, particularly given Lithuania’s continuing failures to prosecute former Nazi war criminals and Lithuanian collaborators in the perpetration of the Holocaust. For example, in 2005, Efraim Zuroff, director of the Simon Wiesenthal Centre’s Israel office criticized the wording of the Lithuanian government’s 8th May 1990 decree on the grounds that:

…the Lithuanian parliament sought to differentiate between the ostensibly blameless ‘Lithuanian people’ and the murderers who were ‘Lithuanian citizens’, a distinction which is not supported by the historical record.

Equally, Zuroff was cynical of the choice of 23rd September, the date marking the liquidation of the Vilnius ghetto, as Lithuania’s HMD:

…it is not linked to the extensive mass murders carried out throughout the country by Lithuanian vigilantes and Security Police during the initial half year of Nazi occupation. This - most probably intentional – decision to divert the focus helps to minimize Lithuanian participation in the crimes of the Holocaust, a tendency clearly reflected in government policy since the regaining of independence.

94 Ibid., p. 54. For example, Dieckmann has suggested that the German decision to murder the majority of Jews in the Baltic States prior to the end of 1941 was catalyzed by the crisis in food supplies encountered by Army Group North. See: Christoph Dieckmann, ‘The War and the Killing of Lithuanian Jews’, in National Socialist Extermination Policies: Contemporary German Perspectives and Controversies, ed. Ulrich Herbert (New York: Berghahn Books, 2000), pp. 240-267.
96 Ibid., p. 5.
Furthermore, one of the most vocal critics of the Lithuanian International Commission has been Vilnius University Judaic Studies Professor and founder of the Vilnius Yiddish Institute, Dovid Katz. Admittedly, Katz is a problematic commentator in that he forwards a definition of ‘genocide’ which fits the Holocaust, whilst excluding less ‘total’ mass atrocities against groups in terms of perpetrator intention.\(^97\) Equally, in response to reactionary claims of a global ‘Holocaust Industry’, Katz has sometimes employed unhelpful and inflammatory rhetoric which is likely to exacerbate as opposed to stimulate constructive dialogue about Lithuania’s ‘memory wars’. For example, Katz alleges that the Lithuanian state is sponsoring a ‘Genocide Industry’ in relation to the representation of Soviet atrocities.\(^98\)

However, despite these troubling elements, Katz has forwarded a pertinent concern in relation to the Lithuanian International Commission. Namely, he has argued that the twinning of the Soviet and Nazi era pasts within the remit of the International Commission is problematic because it can be subversively interpreted and abused by ultra-nationalist pressure groups who seek to minimize the responsibility of Lithuanian collaborators in co-perpetrating the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second World War.\(^99\) For whilst in principle, it is perfectly acceptable to compare and contrast the Nazi and Soviet dictatorships, some post-Communist, ultra-nationalists use and abuse the history of the Soviet and Nazi occupations in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in order to write anti-Semitic and apologetic ultra-nationalist historiographies.

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\(^97\) For example, Katz defines ‘genocide’ in the following terms, “Genocide is the mass murder of as many people as possible on the basis of born national, ethnic, racial or religious identity as such; with the intent to eliminate the targeted group entirely and internationally; without allowing the victims any option to change views, beliefs or allegiances to save themselves; and with large-scale accomplished fulfilment of the goal. Genocide leaves in its wake an extinct or nearly extinct group within the territory under the control of the perpetrators.” See Katz, ‘On Three Definitions: Genocide; Holocaust Denial; Holocaust Obfuscation’, p. 269.


\(^99\) Ibid., p. 263.
which attempt to justify indigenous collaboration in the mass murder of European Jewry during the Second World War. Within the Lithuanian context, these discourses often simplistically and inaccurately equate all members of Lithuanian Jewry as acting in alliance with Lithuanian Jewish Communists and the Soviet Union during the 1940s. All members of Lithuanian Jewry are then blamed for the Soviet occupation of 1940-1941, and what the Lithuanian state has categorized as the subsequent genocide of the Lithuanian people (through Soviet deportations and the political repression of national life). Revenge for these actions forms the excuse for Lithuanian collaboration with German forces in perpetrating the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second World War. Katz has called this the Holocaust ‘Obfuscation’ movement, and an exponent of this type of nasty and apologetic ultra-nationalist historiography, Jonas Mikelinskas has claimed that the Lithuanian Jews were ultimately responsible for the mass murder of their own people.

Against the backdrop of these anxieties in relation to the limitations of state sponsored efforts, international organizations have also contributed to the remembrance of the Holocaust and the revival of Jewish communal life in post-independence Lithuania. For example, between 1995 and 2003, B’nai B’rith in conjunction with the History Faculty of the Vilnius Pedagogical University organized a series of annual seminars for teachers on the subject of Holocaust education, whilst according to a July 1999 article in The Jerusalem Report, the Joint Distribution Committee focused:

> …on rebuilding Lithuanian Jewish life by helping elderly Jews with food packages and medical care, supporting community centers and schools, and fostering a culture of local Jewish

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102 Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
103 ‘Holocaust Education in Task Force Member Countries: Holocaust Education in Lithuania’. 
Despite these initiatives by the Lithuanian Jewish community as well as by international organizations such as B’nai B’rith and the Joint Distribution Committee, efforts at promoting Holocaust education, remembrance and research in Lithuania were also beset by intractable controversies and difficulties in the first decade after the state had declared independence. For example, in 1996 there was the dispute over the ownership of 300 pre-Holocaust era Torah scrolls valued at approximately $4 million. This dispute was only resolved in January 2002 when the National Library of Vilnius conferred the scrolls to an Israeli delegation led by Michael Melchior, with the intent of distributing the scrolls to Jewish organizations throughout the world.

However, the main focus of Holocaust era controversies in the 1990s was the resurgence in ultra-nationalist interpretations of the Second World War and the war crimes issue. After the fall of Communism, the independent Lithuanian government had granted amnesty to approximately one thousand Lithuanian Nazi collaborators who had been imprisoned by the Soviet Union. As many of these Nazi collaborators had also served in the Lithuanian partisan resistance against the Soviet Union, in some quarters of Lithuanian society they were hailed as national heroes. However, this amnesty was at odds with wider developments within the Western international community. For, whilst countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom had turned a ‘blind eye’ to many Eastern European and Baltic Nazi collaborators during the Cold War, the 1980s had heralded a changed international climate on the issue.

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105 Ellick, ‘How Shared Are ‘Shared Values’?’. 
106 Ibid.
This meant that as part of Lithuania’s integration into the West, countries such as the United states, Britain and Israel as well as organizations such as the Simon Wiesenthal Centre expected Lithuania to make efforts to ‘come to terms’ with its past by forcing former Nazi collaborators and war criminals to face justice.\textsuperscript{109} The perturbing side effect of this international campaign was that the ultra-nationalist reaction against it also brought residual anti-Semitism to the surface of Lithuanian public life.\textsuperscript{110}

Responding to demands that Lithuania face its Nazi past, between 1994 and 1995, President Algirdas Brazauskas made a number of diplomatic moves in the foreign policy arena. In April 1994, he gave a speech to the Council of Europe which condemned the Holocaust in Lithuania, regretted the role of Lithuanian collaborators and pledged that war criminals would be found and prosecuted.\textsuperscript{111} He also stated that Lithuanian ‘Righteous Gentiles’ should be recognized for their courage.\textsuperscript{112} Brazauskas’s speech at the Council of Europe was followed by a diplomatic visit to Israel in March 1995, in which he echoed the sentiments articulated by Prime Minister Adolfas Slezevicius a year earlier.\textsuperscript{113} Whilst in Israel, Brazauskas publically apologized for crimes committed by Lithuanians against Jews during the Second World War and reaffirmed his pledge to bring Lithuanian Nazi collaborators to justice.\textsuperscript{114} Part of this process had been set in motion with the Lithuanian High Court’s renewed emphasis on screening suspected Nazi war criminals, who had managed to hide their past and be rehabilitated into Lithuania and were still receiving full state benefits and pensions. Of

\textsuperscript{110} Zuroff, ‘Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the wake of Holocaust Related Issues’, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{111} Lane, \textit{Lithuania: Stepping Westward}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{112} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{113} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 156.
the 50,000 cases assessed by 1994, approximately 1000 were stripped of their rehabilitation status.\textsuperscript{115}

However, Brazauskas’s apology also created waves of controversy at home. For whilst his actions were supported by more liberal Lithuanian patriots as well as by many Lithuanian Jews, there was also huge hostility in some quarters of the Lithuanian popular press as well as from the ‘usual suspects’: far right neo-Nazi groups such as the Lithuanian National Socialist Unity Organization and extreme ultra-nationalist newspapers such as \textit{Respublikos Varpai} (‘Bells of the Republic’). The main claims being made by opponents of the apology was that the President was perceived to be humiliating the Lithuanian nation and furthering an international image of Lithuanians as ‘war criminals’.\textsuperscript{116} These feelings were further intensified by the issue of bringing charges against Aleksandras Lileikis on 6\textsuperscript{th} February 1998.\textsuperscript{117} Lileikis returned to Lithuania from the United States in June 1996 and was an alleged Nazi collaborator as a result of his role as head of the Security Department of the Lithuanian Police in the Vilnius region during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{118} As part of the investigation into his war crimes, he voluntarily addressed the court for ten minutes (5\textsuperscript{th} November 1998) and answered questions by video link (23\textsuperscript{rd} June 2000).\textsuperscript{119} However, in the event, charges were dropped because of an apparent lack of hard evidence and the ill health of the defendant, although according to the Wiesenthal Centre, there was also a lack of urgency by the Lithuanian authorities.\textsuperscript{120} On 26\textsuperscript{th} September 2000, Lileikis passed

\textsuperscript{115} Lane, \textit{Lithuania: Stepping Westward}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., p. 156.
\textsuperscript{117} Zuroff, ‘Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the wake of Holocaust Related Issues’, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{118} Lane, \textit{Lithuania: Stepping Westward}, p. 157.
\textsuperscript{119} Zuroff, ‘Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the wake of Holocaust Related Issues’, p. 6.
\textsuperscript{120} Lane, \textit{Lithuania: Stepping Westward}, p. 157.
Even after the Leleikis controversy, the war crimes issue remained a deeply problematic one throughout the latter half of the 1990s, affecting both Lithuania’s relationship to its own Jewish population as well as its diplomatic relations with the West, particularly America and Israel. For example, efforts to commemorate the 200th anniversary of the death of the Jewish spiritual leader and scholar, The Vilna Gaon in September 1997 became embroiled in the war crimes debate when a movement led by a Tel Aviv based group of Lithuanian Jews, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre as well as other international Jewish organizations opposed the event on the grounds that it was, “…a cynical attempt by Lithuania to divert attention away from its policy of rehabilitating its criminals, even as it tries to attract Jewish tourist dollars.” However, these international calls for action continued to be met with resistance at home, culminating in inflammatory ultra-nationalist claims that Jews should be put on trial for collaborating with the Soviet Union. It was against this backdrop of resurgent ultra-nationalism and deep hostility in some quarters of Lithuanian society towards the remembrance of the Holocaust that the UK attempted to launch its ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania.


Discussions about the possibility of a British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania were first initiated in the immediate months prior to the convening of the SIF 2000. This is evidenced in a letter dated 19th January 2000 from Jeremy Cresswell at the UK’s

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123 Lane, *Lithuania: Stepping Westward*, p. 156.
In this letter, Cresswell described the tentative beginnings of the British/ Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’:

In line with discussions taken at the last Task Force meeting in Jerusalem, I visited Vilnius on 17/18th January in response to expressions of interest from the Lithuanian government in developing a Liaison Project. I was accompanied by Stephen Smith (Beth Shalom) who has himself been active in Lithuania for several years. Among those we met were Deputy Foreign Minister Usackas, the new Ambassador-at-large Eidintas, Prime Minister’s advisor Matulonius and Emanuelis Zingeris, MP.

All our interlocutors stressed the importance of Lithuania developing greater awareness about the Holocaust. They reiterated the importance of Lithuania, particularly Vilnius, in Jewish history up to World War II. They were very conscious of the fact that the issue of the Holocaust remains very sensitive in Lithuanian public life, including the media, and that there was still confusion in many people’s minds between the evils of the Holocaust and of Stalinism, with nationalist elements insisting on the latter.

This description is particularly notable for stressing the extent to which Lithuanian representatives were proactive partners in instigating the ‘Liaison Project’ with the UK. For example, the document mentions the presence in meetings of Zingeris, a Lithuanian Jewish activist who has promoted the recognition of human and minority rights in Lithuania and the Council of Europe. Zingeris has also argued that Nazi collaborators should be brought to justice in Lithuania because the country will only be taken seriously on the international stage when the nation has dealt, “with this chapter from its war-time past.” However, Zingeris’s principled stand on Nazi war crimes issues also meant that he was marginalized and even considered ‘un-Lithuanian’ in ultra-nationalist circles. Furthermore, Cresswell’s description of the Lithuanians’ response is also significant for frankly addressing the controversial role of the remembrance of the Holocaust in Lithuanian public life as well as the way in which the

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125 Ibid.
126 Lane, Lithuania: Stepping Westward, p. 140 and pp. 157-158.
127 Emanuelis Zingeris quoted in Lane, Lithuania: Stepping Westward, p. 158.
social recollection of this tragedy frequently competes for recognition with the social
memory of Soviet crimes. Other issues discussed during Cresswell’s and Smith’s visit
to Vilnius included potential projects for ITF support as well as the Lithuanian decision
to host with the support of the Council of Europe, the ‘Vilnius International Forum on
Holocaust Era Assets’ in October 2000.\(^{128}\)

During these meetings in Vilnius, Cresswell and Smith did not promise to develop a
‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania rather they said that further discussions would be
carried out at the next ITF meeting (25\(^{th}\) January 2000), just prior to the convening of
the SIF 2000. However, the conclusion of Cresswell’s letter, suggests that he and Smith
were extremely positive about the opportunity of developing a British/ Lithuanian ITF
‘Liaison Project’:

Stephen and I have concluded that while (or perhaps precisely because!) this issue is so sensitive
and important in Lithuania, we should make efforts to develop a Liaison Project. To do this we
would need to help the Lithuanians to establish their own priorities. At present, there are a lot of
ideas around, from various NGOs and parts of the government, but no plan.\(^{129}\)

In line with Cresswell’s letter, at the ITF meeting in Stockholm on 25\(^{th}\) January 2000,
progress on the first ‘Liaison Project’ with the Czech Republic was discussed and the
fact that Lithuania but also Latvia, Romania, Bulgaria and Argentina had expressed
hopes of forming ‘Liaison Projects’ with ‘lead countries’ was mooted. During this
meeting:

It was suggested that each liaison project would have to be tailor-made in accordance with both
the needs of the recipient country and the capacity of the Task Force to assist.\(^{130}\)

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\(^{129}\) Ibid.

\(^{130}\) ‘Summary of the Meeting of the Working Group of the Task Force, 25 January 2000, in Stockholm’,
in Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research
Report To the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, Work in Progress, December 1998-
January 2000, p. 37.
Furthermore, the ITF meeting in Stockholm firmed up the respective roles of government and NGO representatives in prospective ‘Liaison Projects’:

It was agreed that the government representatives in the Task Force would play more of a diplomatic – political role, but that institutions and NGOs in the Task Force countries possessed the real capacity and expertise to provide the assistance required.\footnote{131}{‘Summary of the Meeting of the Working Group of the Task Force, 25 January 2000, in Stockholm’, in \textit{Task Force for International Co-Operation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research Report To the Stockholm International Forum on the Holocaust, Work in Progress, December 1998-January 2000}, p. 37.}

Following further discussions within the ITF, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was launched during millennial year and in close proximity to the formation by the Lithuanian President in April 2000 of ‘The Working Group for the Preparation and Coordination of the National Holocaust Education Programme’.\footnote{132}{‘Holocaust Education in Task Force Member Countries: Holocaust Education in Lithuania’.}

Unpublished ITF documents suggest that the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ comprised a number of different initiatives with the intention of supporting Holocaust research, remembrance and education in Lithuania. For example, a letter from Cresswell dated 20\textsuperscript{th} December 2000 to Task Force representatives in Rome, Warsaw and the Hague suggested that a central focus of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ would be supporting a conference for Polish and Lithuanian teachers to be held in Cracow at a cost of approximately $26,148, which Cresswell hoped would be defrayed by the Task Force Fund.\footnote{133}{Jeremy Cresswell, ‘Letter from Jeremy Cresswell to Dr. Albert Spiegel, Berlin; Anna Sgherri, Rome; Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, Warsaw; Cees Van’t Veen, The Hague, 20 December 2000’, in \textit{Foreign and Commonwealth Office: International Task Force for Holocaust Commemoration, September 1998 – July 2002}.}

This proposed project built on a well established initiative by the London Jewish Cultural Centre (LJCC), an independent organization providing Jewish themed educational courses, cultural events and leisure activities to the British public.\footnote{134}{London Jewish Cultural Centre (http://www.ljcc.org.uk).} As part of its international outreach programme, the LJCC had also been facilitating teacher training courses in Warsaw and Cracow in association with the Anne Frank House, Yad
Vashem and Polish academics, since the mid-1990s.\textsuperscript{135}

In terms of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, the LJCC recommended that, “…we incorporate carefully selected Lithuanian teachers into the existing programme, with an additional day to deal with the complex issues of Lithuania and the Holocaust.”\textsuperscript{136} It was hoped that by bringing approximately 60 Polish teachers and 30 Lithuanian instructors together a system of ‘twinning’ might emerge or in the words of the LJCC’s draft proposal, an opportunity, “…for teachers from both countries to exchange methods and suggestions”,\textsuperscript{137} as well as contributing to the formation of “a strong support system for teachers in the field.”\textsuperscript{138} It is also notable that the LJCC commented on the positive potential that teachers from the Vilnius region might be able to speak Polish, although, “…simultaneous translation can be provided.”\textsuperscript{139} Following ITF discussions in March 2001 as well as ongoing Task Force involvement in Czech teacher training programmes as discussed in chapters two and three, the LJCC’s Polish/Lithuanian teacher training project became the first program to specifically receive support from the ITF endowment fund.\textsuperscript{140}

Additionally, the work of the LJCC in the field of Holocaust pedagogy quickly diversified internationally. For example, collaborating with the ITF and representatives of Austria and the Netherlands, by February 2002, the LJCC was convening teacher

\textsuperscript{135} Cresswell, ‘Letter from Jeremy Cresswell to Dr. Albert Spiegel, Berlin; Anna Sgherri, Rome; Agnieszka Magdziak-Miszewska, Warsaw; Cees Van’t Veen, The Hague, 20 December 2000’.


\textsuperscript{137} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{140} Wallin and Newman (eds), The Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research: Ten Year Anniversary Book, p. 23.
training conferences in partnership with Lithuanian pedagogues in Lviv, Ukraine, whilst by August 2003, the LJCC was also holding teacher training seminars in Belarus. Reflecting on these initiatives as well as the LJCC’s increasing role in Holocaust education in China, London based businessman and restaurateur as well as ITF representative and Director of the LJCC’s Holocaust and Anti-Racism Education Department, Jerry Gotel, was reported in the *Jewish Chronicle* as commenting that:

> My brief was to develop Holocaust education in Eastern Europe. But at the same time as this was getting off the ground, in 2001, I was asked to lead a Holocaust education conference in Hong Kong. It turned into a tremendous success, and the following year I was invited by the academic Xu Xiu, whom I had met in Hong Kong, to a conference he was running about the Jews of China – the history of Harbin, Shanghai and Kaifeng.

Furthermore, in relation to British and Lithuanian teacher training co-operation projects, Beth Shalom also organized seminars with the Lithuanian Teacher Training Centre, whilst in 2001 the UK Holocaust centre produced a two hour film for educational purposes on Lithuanian-Jewish history, the Holocaust and contemporary Lithuanian inter-ethnic relations entitled, *Sunset in Lithuania*. Alongside these teacher training initiatives and in line with Task Force ‘Liaison Project’ policy which had been mooted within the organization during the late 1990s, other elements comprising the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ included the consolidation and extension of existing collaborative projects between individuals and institutions within the two states.

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142 Ibid.
145 Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
For example, British historian Martin Gilbert was a patron of the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum Friends association, and as part of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ his book, *Never Again: A History of the Holocaust* was translated and plans were made to distribute copies, “…to all major libraries in Lithuania.” According to Cresswell, this initiative was to be completed independently of Task Force funding. Furthermore, with the encouragement of Lord Greville Janner, the British HET funded the Baltic Mass Graves Project, an enterprise which built on the work of survivors such as Joseph Levinson, and sought to signpost Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian mass murder sites and index them electronically. Although it is not known whether this initiative was officially incorporated into the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, by 2003, over 200 mass graves had been found and marked, whilst in October 2003, the Lithuanian and Latvian Presidents attended an official unveiling ceremony for the signs created by the Baltic Mass Graves Project.

The planning and carrying out of these initiatives combined with the fact that on 30th May 2002, the Lithuanian Delegation presented the National Holocaust Education Programme to ITF representatives, meant that Lithuania was perceived to have made enough progress in Holocaust education, remembrance and research to become a full member of the ITF at the 26th June 2002 Plenary Meeting in Paris. According to minutes of this Plenary Session, a British representative is recorded as commenting:

…”that over the two years of cooperation between the United Kingdom and Lithuania, the latter

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150 ‘Holocaust Education in Task Force Member Countries: Holocaust Education in Lithuania’.
153 ‘Holocaust Education in Task Force Member Countries: Holocaust Education in Lithuania’.
had become a major actor in the domain of Holocaust education. Liaison projects had been conducted on the basis of programmes of high quality in terms of Holocaust education and remembrance. Lithuania has achieved a remarkable position because of the extensive experience accumulated and the innovative nature of the projects implemented.\textsuperscript{154}

Speaking after the British delegate, one of the members of the Lithuanian ITF delegation commented on the importance to Lithuania of Task Force membership.\textsuperscript{155} The delegate emphasized, “…the need to ensure that the tragic past of Lithuania is not forgotten”,\textsuperscript{156} as well as significantly remarking that the nation’s, “… inclusion in the ITF comes at a time when Lithuania is opening up to the outside world. In 2004, it is to become a member of both NATO and the EU.”\textsuperscript{157} The Lithuanian delegate also pointed to the endeavors of the Lithuanian working group, which by 26\textsuperscript{th} June 2002 had discussed twelve projects that were now in the implementation phase, whilst, “Eight new projects will be presented at a later time.”\textsuperscript{158} Noting the presence of approximately fifty recent publications on the Holocaust in Lithuania as well as the discussion of the Holocaust in Lithuanian schools, newspapers and military establishments, the Lithuanian delegate even went as far to proclaim, admittedly somewhat prematurely given continued ultra-nationalist dissent that, “The Wall of silence in the country has now disappeared.”\textsuperscript{159} Finally, the Lithuanian delegate thanked the British for their support, and also drew attention to initiatives that were bound up in the ongoing and future activities of Lithuanian cooperation with the ITF generally, as well as the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ specifically:

…further new projects may be set in train, notably in Vilnius, where museums and exhibitions are to be organized, with the possibility of ITF input. Similarly, it is necessary to strengthen cooperation between Lithuania and Poland. Greater importance must be attached to common

\textsuperscript{154} British delegate quoted in ‘Admission of the Lithuanian Delegation’, in Minutes of the Plenary Session of the International Task Force for Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, Paris, Centre de Conférences Internationales, Room 3, Wednesday 26 June 2002 - 9.30 a.m. – 5 p.m.

\textsuperscript{155} Lithuanian delegate quoted in ‘Admission of the Lithuanian Delegation’.

\textsuperscript{156} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{157} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid.
Following Lithuania’s accession to the ITF, the Lithuanian government, the Task Force, the British as well as a host of other countries and organizations attempted to support Holocaust education, remembrance and research through the continuing activities of the International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania. For example, the result of a September 2002 International Commission conference entitled, ‘Holocaust in Lithuania in the Focus of Modern History, Education and Justice’, was that it was decided that a ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’ would be implemented.\footnote{Subsequently, on 25\textsuperscript{th} September 2002, the International Commission completed co-operation contracts with Yad Vashem, Smith’s Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre as well as the New Jersey Commission on Holocaust Education.\footnote{Furthermore, other organizations which periodically co-operate with the International Commission include the USHMM, Facing History, B’nai B’rith and the National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism.\footnote{As part of the ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’, the International Commission and its partners sought to improve and consolidate the ‘Holocaust and Tolerance Education Network’ (comprising 56 Tolerance Education Centers which are integrated into museums, schools and NGOs).\footnote{These centers}}}}

\footnote{Lithuanian delegate quoted in ‘Admission of the Lithuanian Delegation’.
\footnote{Ibid.
promote the teaching of the Holocaust; organize historical conferences and remembrance ceremonies as well as enlisting volunteers to maintain mass graves and cemeteries in Lithuania. The ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’ was also designed to provide teacher training seminars as well as to facilitate resources for the teaching of the Holocaust, especially in Lithuanian secondary schools.  

The Task Force is also involved in the implementation of the International Commission’s programme through ITF funding for some of the International Commission’s teacher training courses and educational initiatives, as well as via organizations such as Yad Vashem and Beth Shalom, which are involved in both the work of the International Commission and the ITF. Lastly, the Executive Director of the International Commission is also a member of the Lithuanian Task Force delegation.

However, the actions of the Commission and its international partners in establishing the ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’, also met with considerable criticism from some Holocaust educators within Lithuania. These commentators were concerned that the Lithuanian government was not sufficiently engaged with the remembrance of the Holocaust as an ethical issue, but was rather pragmatically playing ‘lip-service’ to American, Israeli and European demands in order to improve the image of Lithuania in the West. In a different vein, Holocaust educationalist, Snieguole Matoniene caused uproar when she suggested that some

168 Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.

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teachers only participate in Holocaust pedagogy training for careerist reasons.\textsuperscript{169} Finally, some dedicated Lithuanian Holocaust education activists felt snubbed by the launch of the ‘National Programme’ and its implication that Lithuanian Holocaust research, remembrance and education activities were only in their fledgling stages.\textsuperscript{170} As a result, some of these critics were cynical of the need for the network of Tolerance Centers as well as the international teacher training programmes provided by the Commission’s partners.\textsuperscript{171}

Beyond the launch of the International Commission’s controversial ‘National Programme on Holocaust and Tolerance Education’, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ continued with Bardgett and Smith spending a day in June 2003 meeting Kostanian and Zingeris in order to discuss the key challenges facing the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum as well as conducting a similar set of meetings with staff members from the Ninth Fort Museum in Kaunas. Reflecting on these discussions, Bardgett commented in an interview in May 2009:

\begin{quote}
I went with Stephen Smith from Beth Shalom to the Jewish Museum in Vilnius and also to the Ninth Fort. And we basically gave those two museums, I suppose a couple of days of intensive discussions and ultimately advice for them to take or leave as they chose, on how better to position themselves within the cultural sector because having been under Communism for quite a long time they were very expert in the fields of scholarly efforts in putting on exhibitions but in terms of fund-raising, marketing, those rather more business like museum activities there was quite a lot that they could learn from us about them.\textsuperscript{172}
\end{quote}

Contrasting with the survivor led approach to exhibition making that had dominated ‘The Green House’, Bardgett’s observation that one of the primary challenges facing the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum was making the transition to museum management in a liberal market economy was also reflected in a report that the IWM curator compiled

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\textsuperscript{169} Toieikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
\textsuperscript{170} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{171} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172} ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.
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on the findings of her and Smith’s visit to Vilnius. This report noted that some of the key challenges facing the museum were a “lack of financial resources”, a “lack of space” as well as the fact that the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum was, “relatively low in the pecking order of Lithuanian museums, and deserving a higher profile in the spectrum of Lithuanian cultural and tourist attractions.”\(^{173}\)

To begin to remedy some of these problems Bardgett’s report suggested that the museum should try to find, “…new space for storage and exhibition activity”,\(^ {174}\) as well as attempt to pay more of its staff rather than rely on volunteers, partly because many of these volunteers were aging Holocaust survivors who were, “…increasingly facing medical bills which they cannot afford.”\(^ {175}\) Bardgett also recommended that the museum should consolidate its existing sources of institutional support and revenue, such as donations from the Howard Margol Association, partnerships with the Anne Frank House (Amsterdam), as well as the presence of the Gedenksdient, young Austrian volunteers who work at the museum instead of performing national service.\(^ {176}\) However, she also suggested a number of ways in which the museum could practice a more “market-orientated approach to museum management.”\(^ {177}\)

This approach would aim to position the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum more noticeably within the Lithuanian Tourist Authority and the Lithuanian Ministry of Culture as well as more visibly on the international tourist trail through marketing and partnership strategies with other Holocaust museums and heritage websites. It would


\(^{174}\) Ibid., p. 1.

\(^{175}\) Ibid., p. 3.

\(^{176}\) Ibid., p. 4.

\(^{177}\) Ibid., p. 1.
also entail the promotion of the museum in Jewish Heritage brochures, in-flight magazines as well as at trade fairs and film festivals.\textsuperscript{178} The British report also suggested that the museum should aim to appoint a Marketing and Development Officer who could plan and implement, \textit{“a coordinated marketing strategy,”}\textsuperscript{179} including an overhaul of the museum’s website, whilst attempts could also be made to maximize revenue by looking at all potential avenues of funding including grants, legacies, sponsorship, trading, efficiency measures, corporate hospitality and copyright fees.\textsuperscript{180}

Finally, the report expressed concerns about staff development training and the ‘succession’ issue within the management of the museum, especially as, \textit{“Mrs Kostanian will eventually retire… and it will be important to ensure that her successor has the personal qualities and knowledge to ensure that there is no loss of zeal – particularly from the Museum’s volunteers.”}\textsuperscript{181}

Whilst some of these suggestions might raise commercialization concerns, these issues are ultimately outweighed by the fact that if the future survival of the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum is to be safeguarded, it is essential that the institution is efficient, economically viable and able to invest in its Judaica and Holocaust era collections.\textsuperscript{182}

Furthermore, the museum’s economic self-management is particularly important because of the continuing hostility to the remembrance of the Holocaust in some quarters of Lithuanian society, as well as for the reason that museum funding from the Lithuanian state is extremely limited. For example, Bardgett’s report notes from the vantage point of 2003:

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\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 1.
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\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., p. 7.
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\textsuperscript{181} Ibid., p. 7.
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\textsuperscript{182} Ibid., p. 3.
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The Museum receives a grant from the Ministry of Culture, but this is relatively low, the Museum being graded at the same level as houses occupied by famous writers etc, rather than as a repository of material on the history of one of the most significant minority groups in Lithuania’s history.\textsuperscript{183}

The British ‘Liaison Project’ report on Bardgett’s and Smith’s visit to the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum concluded with an offer by the British NGO representatives to return to Lithuania to discuss proposals if so desired,\textsuperscript{184} as well as forwarding the suggestion that a:

“… ‘study week ’could be offered to the staff of the Jewish Museum Vilnius through a tailor-made week-long fact-finding visit to the Imperial War Museum whose various departments would readily share what has evolved here as best practice.”\textsuperscript{185}

Although there is no evidence that this ‘study week’ materialized, whilst increasingly the IWM’s Paul Salmons took over from Bardgett as the institution’s chief representative at ITF meetings,\textsuperscript{186} reflecting on the process of co-operation with the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum during the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, Bardgett commented in May 2009 that, “… there was plenty of dialogue and in fact, I stayed in touch with Rachel Kostanian and Julia Menchinenyi, not so much recently but certainly for a year or so afterwards.”\textsuperscript{187}

Following Bardgett’s and Smith’s consultation exercises at the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum and the Kaunas Ninth Fort, British and Lithuanian collaboration in Holocaust memory work was further symbolized by the fact that UK HMD representatives were present at the 23\textsuperscript{rd} September 2003 Holocaust Memorial Day in Lithuania.\textsuperscript{188} However, with Lithuania successfully a member of the ITF and an increasing amount of national

\textsuperscript{184} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., p. 8.
\textsuperscript{186} ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’; ‘Interview with Professor David Cesarani’.
\textsuperscript{187} ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.
\textsuperscript{188} ‘Holocaust Education in Task Force Member Countries: Holocaust Education in Lithuania’.
and international cooperation seemingly focused on the implementation of Holocaust education, remembrance and research initiatives, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was wrapped up at an ITF meeting in Washington D.C on 3rd December 2003, although it was also noted that informal relations on Holocaust era issues would continue to exist between the two states.\(^\text{189}\)

So how can the multiple actions that comprised the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ be comprehended and interpreted? At the most basic level, the launch of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ issued from the fact that it was the responsibility of the British ITF delegation to implement Task Force policy in promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education abroad as well as battling anti-Semitism and far right extremism. Furthermore, whilst being more contingent in practice, it can also be tentatively proposed, that the formation of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was also encouraged by three key developments which coalesced at the turn of the millennium. These can be described as Britain and Lithuania’s changing relationship to the social remembrance of their Nazi pasts, the growing profile of British Holocaust educationalists and curators on the global stage as well as New Labour’s European foreign policy prior to the divisive impact of the Iraq War (2003), which complimented Lithuanian aspirations towards EU and NATO membership in the early noughties.\(^\text{190}\)

Firstly, a ‘British/Lithuanian’ Liaison Project could be perceived as mutually desirable to both states because of the intensified international emphasis on issues of Holocaust


\(^{190}\) Ellick, ‘How Shared Are ‘Shared Values’?’. 

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justice, restitution, education, remembrance and research during the 1980s and 1990s. Whilst these developments sometimes competed with each other for state re-dress, the cumulative effect was that nation’s, particularly within the western international community were expected to confront their complicities and wrong-doings in relation to the Nazi past.\(^\text{191}\) In Britain this included allowing former Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Latvian and Estonian Nazi collaborators into the country during the Cold War.\(^\text{192}\) A British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ thus internationally symbolized not only a gesture towards Lithuanian atonement for the crimes of the Nazi past, but also functioned as a veiled British acknowledgement of the UK’s complicity in allowing former Baltic war criminals to ‘get away with murder’ during the Cold War.\(^\text{193}\) It can thus be tentatively proposed that the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, was not just about Lithuania dealing with its past, it was also about British responsibilities to begin to make amends for the mistakes of the Cold War era, in this case through contributing to Holocaust education, research and remembrance initiatives in Lithuania. However, despite the best efforts of those involved in the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, some critics such as Donald Bloxham would infer, that initiatives such as ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ are ‘too little, too late’ and at their worst smack of Western hubris and political hypocrisy.\(^\text{194}\)

Secondly, the role of the British as ITF ‘lead partner’ to Lithuania can be perceived as vitally facilitated by the professional confidence and experiences of international cooperation that many of the British educationalists and museum personnel involved brought to the table in 2000. For example, the LJCC had been running Holocaust


\(^{193}\) Ibid., pp. 42-65.

\(^{194}\) Bloxham, ‘Britain’s Holocaust Memorial Days: Reshaping the Past in the Service of the Present’, pp. 52-53.
teacher training programmes in Poland since the mid-1990s; whilst not only had Smith recently established the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre in Nottinghamshire (1995), he had also been working with the Cape Town Holocaust Centre in South Africa. 

Equally, as demonstrated in chapter one, during the planning process for the IWM Holocaust Exhibition, Bardgett had experienced the benefits of inter-cultural collaboration with institutions such as the USHMM and the Auschwitz State Museum.

These positive experiences of international exchange may have helped to create an environment in which the concept of the ‘Liaison Project’ was seen as particularly viable and a potentially beneficial enterprise for Lithuanian Holocaust educationalists and curators, as well as for British specialists who would also gain something from the knowledge and expertise offered by their ‘Liaison Project’ partners such as Kostanian and Zingeris. Furthermore, British involvement in international collaborations concerning the remembrance of the Holocaust as well as instances of genocide more broadly continued both during and after the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’. For example, the LJCC continued its Holocaust teacher training programmes in Ukraine, Belarus and China; whilst independently of the ITF, Bardgett became involved in efforts to establish a Srebrenica Memorial Room at The Srebrenica Potocari and Memorial Centre in Bosnia Herzegovina; and Smith opened the Kigali Memorial Centre in Rwanda (April 2004).

196 Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
197 ‘Interview with Suzanne Bardgett’.
200 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’. For more on the Kigali Memorial Centre, see chapter three of this thesis.
Thirdly, it is arguable that a British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was also particularly desirable to UK and Lithuanian government ITF representatives because it complimented both Lithuanian and British foreign policy objectives which sought to reap the perceived economic, cultural and defensive benefits of twenty-first century EU expansion. As part of Lithuania’s consolidation of liberal democracy and a free market economy, the vast majority of its moderate politicians wanted the country to join Western institutions such as NATO and the EU which demanded that their member states meet certain political, economic, social, and cultural requirements. For example, whilst sidelining Holocaust era restitution issues,\(^{201}\) the EU made evidence of a commitment to democracy, human rights and the protection of ethnic minorities’ part of its Copenhagen Criteria (1993) for membership.\(^ {202}\)

Furthermore, coalescing with Lithuanian objectives, British New Labour leader Blair sought to promote EU enlargement, encourage the consolidation of the European single market, as well as support increased transparency and democracy in transnational organizations, although he also remained equivocal on joining the European single currency and was determined to hold onto Britain’s national veto in the EU.\(^ {203}\) Within this context, the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ formed just one small part of a whole nexus of political and cultural actions designed to send ‘Westernizing’ signals that would contribute to smoothing Lithuania’s entry into the EU and NATO. Whilst Lithuania’s accession to these two transnational organizations was achieved in the spring of 2004, this political imperative combined with continuing Lithuanian inertia in

\(^{201}\) Eizenstat, \textit{Imperfect Justice}, p. 27; Ruth Deech quoted in Spritzer, ‘News Analysis: Last Chance for Holocaust Restitution?’, \textit{The Forward}, 30 June 2009. For more on the complexities of these issues in relation to the EU, see chapter five of this thesis.

\(^{202}\) Vachudova, \textit{Europe Undivided}, p. 121.

relation to Jewish restitution and Nazi war crimes issues, resulted in concerns among Holocaust remembrance activists as to the exact extent of the state’s commitment in dealing with Nazi era matters.204

Furthermore, it is also arguable, although not resolutely provable from the documents surveyed, that from the perspective of British Foreign Office representative’s, the ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania could also be interpreted as a form of Anglo ‘soft power’ which corresponded with the objectives of British foreign policy in the late 1990s and early noughties. Blair believed that in order to protect British national interests, the UK should be willing to promote and defend its values of ‘liberty, democracy, tolerance and justice’ abroad,205 through the means of both ‘hard’ power (military and diplomatic deployment) and ‘soft’ power (promoting the spread of liberal democratic norms through access to information, economic incentives and cultural discourses).206 At the administrative level in Whitehall, one of the outcomes of this global and European vision is what has, perhaps prematurely, been called a ‘quiet revolution’, whereby ministers and officials were encouraged to form stronger bilateral relations and policy networks with their colleagues in fellow and prospective EU member states.207

As such, whilst the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ was primarily the product of intergovernmental co-operation under the auspices of the Task Force, it also overlapped with a heightened interest in the British government to forge international bilateral relations and promote Western liberal, democratic norms abroad through cultural,

204 Ellick, ‘How Shared Are ‘Shared Values’?’; Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
social and economic ‘soft power’ as well as through much more controversial military interventions (Kosovo, 1999; Sierra Leone, 2000; Iraq, 2003). However, as will be seen in the next section, what the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ ultimately demonstrated was the limits of British ‘soft power’ in promoting ‘liberty, democracy, tolerance and justice’ abroad. For despite the principled engagement of British and Lithuanian Holocaust education and remembrance activists, the reactionary views of Lithuanian ultra-nationalist pressure groups would continue to pose a key challenge to implementing the Stockholm Declaration in Lithuania.

The impact of the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’

Whilst the previous section has given an overview of the activities that comprised the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ as well as the political and cultural contexts which accompanied its implementation, the final part of this chapter will assess the impact of the ITF British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’. Reflecting on the overall role of the ITF, as opposed to the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ specifically, Kostanian observed in March 2010 that ITF support had been integral to the realization of Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum projects such as the production and distribution of the film, Helene Czapski-Holzman: Story of Rescue (2006); the publication of, The Ghettos of Oshmyany (2008); the production of the Tolerance Centre’s exhibition, Rescued Lithuanian Jewish Child Tells About Shoah (2008) as well as contributing to the ongoing renovation of the Green House’s Catastrophe exhibition (2009). Equally, a Jewish Heritage map is now available from the Vilnius tourist board, although whether the production of this pamphlet was linked to Smith and Bardgett’s recommendations is

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208 Clarke, ‘Foreign Policy’, pp. 593-614.
209 ‘E-mail from Rachel Kostanian to Larissa Allwork, 19 March 2010’.
However, whilst Kostanian’s observations illustrate the positive outcomes of the ITF’s involvement in Lithuania, other elements have been much more challenging. For example, in an interview with Smith in June 2009, the founder of the Beth Shalom Holocaust Centre acknowledged the enthusiasm of the Lithuanian’s involved, but also voiced dissatisfaction at the limitations of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’:

Problem is, I mean during the liaison process with the Lithuanians, they were very enthusiastic and we covered a lot of ground and we had our run ins and we had our problems and so on, but on the whole, they really wanted to be a member of the Task Force and wanted to demonstrate their willingness to be so, through their political and educational and cultural commitment to Holocaust issues. What tends to happen is that once membership is gained then there tends to be some slippage, in practice. Lithuania is a good example actually, I’m sure the delegation would point to all of its structures and so on, but the reality is, it’s not happening actually.

Smith compared the Lithuanian case with the implementation of UK HMD since January 2001, where despite a number of public controversies, Smith argues that the British government had exercised good practice in empowering home grown Holocaust experts and NGOs to deliver the commemoration day through the

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211 Stephen Smith quoted in ‘Admission of the Lithuanian Delegation’, in Minutes of the Plenary Session of the International Task Force for Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research, Centre de Conférences Internationales, Room 3, Wednesday 26 June 2002 - 9.30 a.m. – 5 p.m.
212 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
213 Ibid.
establishment of the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust (2005) and continued government funding. However, in contrast to the implementation of UK HMD, Smith felt that a central reason for ‘slippage’ in the implementation of Lithuanian projects was the fact that newly created state and inter-state bodies did not adequately ‘plug into’ and utilize existing good practice in Lithuanian Holocaust research, remembrance and education NGOs.

An organization that Smith mentions in this regard is the Lithuanian NGO, House of Memory which was established in 2000 by Linus Vildziunas, and which worked to encourage nation-wide school projects and competitions excavating Lithuania’s Jewish heritage such as, ‘The Jews – My Grandparents and Great Grandparents Neighbours’. Furthermore, House of Memory also operated in collaboration with the Lithuanian Ministry of Science and Education in order to publish books on the Holocaust, establish school history clubs, set up museum and information centres as well as facilitating educational trips to former Nazi camps such as Stutthof, Klooga and Auschwitz. Of the House of Memory, Smith notes in an extract that is worth quoting at length from the same June 2009 interview:

"Well, I worked on a number of different areas, but to give you an example, of how perhaps dysfunctional some of the areas can be, prior to the Task Force I was working with an organization called the House of Memory which were also linked to the School Improvement Centre. They were an off-shoot of the Soros Foundation, they went independent and were a very enthusiastic, dedicated group of people who were doing regular teacher training on Holocaust issues, were introducing Holocaust Education as a part of school improvement. They were..."

215 The first UK HMD on 27th January 2001 had been organized under the auspices of the Home Office with the assistance of Holocaust scholars such as Cesarani and remembrance specialists like Smith. However, by 2005, the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust had taken over responsibility for running the day and the Queen had agreed to be a patron of the charity. (‘Queen heads Holocaust memorial’, The Times, 6 September 2005). Furthermore, according to Hansard documents accessed in May 2007, the Communities and Local Government department gave the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust £500,000 per year to roll out the remembrance event as well as to facilitate year long educational strategies on the relevance of the Holocaust to modern Britain (‘Seen in Hansard’, The Times, 1 May 2007).

216 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.


218 Toleikis, ‘Repress, Reassess, Remember: Jewish Heritage in Lithuania’.
doing all sorts...management and curriculum, but were regularly introducing Holocaust Education as a part of that. And...they eventually became disenchanted by the political process which was somewhat excluding NGOs because they were so busy trying to prove that politically they had got it right, they weren’t incorporating the experts who were already working in the field, rather they were excluding them. The result of it was they lost some traction because they disenfranchised some of the people who were actually doing the job. By creating too many committees and too many structures, not giving access to funds, making stipulations about what could and couldn’t be done, when actually the good practice was being squeezed out as a result of it...Departments within the system saw the opportunity to do good work, I mean the idea was good behind creating a Holocaust Education and Tolerance programme, but when you’ve got people out there that are already doing Holocaust Education and Tolerance, which is to say is, “How do we as government bring them in?”, rather than, “How do we do our own thing and then lose the good practice that’s out there?” And I think the result of it is probably...I would say there is probably less Holocaust Education going on in sort of NGOs now than there was ten years ago.219

These institutional inadequacies in relation to the implementation of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ also help to explain former Task Force member, Cesarani’s pessimistic appraisal of the UK’s role in the ITF in April 2009 that, “Britain was, what’s called a contributor nation, it was supplying expertise”,220 and “If anything...the ITF was a drain on resources in Britain.”221

Furthermore, this situation of what Smith calls ‘slippage’ in relation to the implementation of Holocaust education, remembrance and research in Lithuania is also perturbing given the continuing inertia and even direct public hostility by the ultra-nationalist right to confrontations with Holocaust era issues in the immediate run-up to as well as in the wake of Lithuania’s accession to the EU and NATO in 2004. For example, Lithuania has failed to pass communal or private property restitution laws,222 whilst despite the efforts of the Wiesenthal Centre’s ‘Operation Last Chance’,223 where financial rewards were given to those offering information about former Nazi war

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220 Interview with Professor David Cesarani’.
221 Ibid.
criminals, only Kazys Gimzauskas, a former Lithuanian Security Police Commander during the War and returnee from the United States in 1993 has been convicted (14th January 2001). However, Gimzauskas was also deemed unfit for punishment and as a result served no jail sentence for his war-time transgressions.\textsuperscript{224}

Even more controversial has been the fact that in response to calls from the Lithuanian ultra-nationalist press, the Lithuanian government has opened up investigations of alleged war crimes committed by Soviet Jewish partisans. Whilst investigations of Soviet atrocity crimes are important especially given the fact that the Putin regime erected memorials to Josef Stalin in a sop to Russian nationalism at the turn of the century,\textsuperscript{225} what is concerning about the Lithuanian probe is the fact that rather than looking into the alleged war crimes committed by all of the Soviet partisans, the investigation has appeared to disproportionately focus on former Jewish partisans who also just happen to be engaged in excavating the history of Lithuanian collaboration in the Holocaust. For example, in 2006, Yitzhak Arad, former chairman of Yad Vashem and a prominent member of The International Commission, was accused of war crimes by the Lithuanian ultra-nationalist press.\textsuperscript{226}

The evidence that was presented for this claim were passages from Arad’s memoir, \textit{The Partisan}, describing how his brigade was instructed to mount a raid against Girdenai villagers in 1944.\textsuperscript{227} Arad describes how the villagers had been given arms by the Germans and had killed partisans who had come there to requisition supplies. During

\textsuperscript{224} Zuroff, ‘Eastern Europe: Anti-Semitism in the wake of Holocaust Related Issues’, p. 5 and p. 6.
\textsuperscript{226} Gersten and Perelman, ‘Tensions Mount Over Lithuanian Probe’.
the Soviet raid, at least one villager was killed and houses were raised. However, Arad has denied any involvement in the killing and has perceived the case to be revenge by ultra-nationalists for his role in presenting expert evidence during the trial of a former Lithuanian collaborator in the United States. Soon after the press allegations, the Lithuanian Prosecutor, Rimvydas Valentukevicius, mounted an investigation, against the backdrop of international outrage expressed by Israel, the Simon Wiesenthal Centre and American Jewish leaders. Whilst Lithuania’s Deputy Foreign Minister claimed that Arad was only being called as a ‘witness’ rather than as a ‘suspect’, the controversy has ultimately undermined the work of the International Commission. This is because angered by the Commission’s failure to condemn the prosecution case, Arad has withdrawn from the research body as has British scholar, Martin Gilbert, whilst Zingeris believes that the allegations against Arad by Lithuanian ultra-nationalists were part of efforts to subvert and sabotage the work of the International Commission:

Someone has tried to dismantle this carefully-built bridge between Lithuania, Israel, America and world-historical opinion. And it’s a real tragedy…a highly counter-productive move against Lithuanian liberal values, against all our shared values with NATO and EU countries.

Following further allegations in the ultra-nationalist press, two other Jewish partisans facing investigation in 2008 included biologist and historian, Rachel Margolis, who re-discovered the lost diary of a Polish Christian who witnessed the mass murder of Jews at Paneriai, as well as Fania Brantsovsky, a librarian at the Vilnius Yiddish Institute, who was questioned about Kaniūkai, where thirty-eight towns-people were killed by a Soviet anti-Nazi unit comprising 120-150 people in 1944. Brantsovsky maintains

\[^{228}\text{Whewell, BBC News, ‘Reopening Lithuania’s old wounds’}.\]
\[^{229}\text{Ibid}].\]
\[^{230}\text{Katz, ‘On Three Definitions: Genocide; Holocaust Denial; Holocaust Obfuscation’, p. 264}.\]
\[^{231}\text{Zingeris quoted in Whewell, BBC News, ‘Reopening Lithuania’s old wounds’}.\]
\[^{232}\text{Katz, ‘On Three Definitions: Genocide; Holocaust Denial; Holocaust Obfuscation’, p. 264}.\]
\[^{233}\text{Gersten and Perelman, ‘Tensions Mount Over Lithuanian Probe’}.\]
that she was not present during the raid and she is no longer a suspect.\textsuperscript{234}

These actions have also combined with failures to halt the construction of luxury apartments on Vilnius’s historic Snipiskes Jewish cemetery,\textsuperscript{235} as well as the presence of a Neo-Nazi march through Vilnius on 11\textsuperscript{th} March 2008, in which chants of ‘Jews out’, ‘Russians out’ were heard and Nazi salutes were witnessed.\textsuperscript{236} These events led Rabbi Andrew Baker, member of the International Commission and Director of International Jewish Affairs for the American Jewish Committee, to strongly object to the EU designating Vilnius 2009 ‘European Capital of Culture’. Writing in \textit{The Forward}, he fumed:

Twisting Holocaust memory, desecrating cemeteries, ignoring anti-Semitism and refusing to return communal property – surely this is not the best cultural capital Europe can offer. The EU should reconsider the honor accorded Vilnius.\textsuperscript{237}

Furthermore, a visit to three Vilnius exhibitions in July 2010 would seem to confirm the dominant narratives about the past which Lithuania appears to be encouraging in relation to constructing its contemporary sense of national identity. Bulwarked by modern design and clear investment in its collection display, \textit{The Museum of Genocide Victims} just off of the main Gedimino Avenue functions as a chilling reminder of the brutality of the former KGB prison as well as acting as a national shrine to anti-Soviet resisters and Communist deportees.\textsuperscript{238} However, the exhibition is also deeply problematic in that whilst representing Lithuanian victimhood under the Soviet and Nazi regimes respectively, it also fails to deal with the issues presented by those

\textsuperscript{234} Whewell, BBC News, ‘Reopening Lithuania’s old wounds’.
\textsuperscript{235} The Soviets had also built a ‘Sports Palace’ on this site during the 1950s.
\textsuperscript{236} Baker, ‘Europe’s Shameful Honouring of Vilnius’. For television footage of the Neo-Nazi march see the documentary, \textit{Surviving History}.
\textsuperscript{237} Baker, ‘Europe’s Shameful Honouring of Vilnius’.
\textsuperscript{238} Virginija Rudiene and Vilma Juozeviciute, \textit{The Museum of Genocide Victims} (Vilnius: Genocide and Resistance Research Centre, 2010).
Lithuanian partisans who were also collaborators in the mass murder of Lithuanian Jewry during the Second World War.\textsuperscript{239} By contrast, the Tolerance Centres ITF supported and hi-tech exhibition, \textit{Rescued Lithuanian Jewish Child}, predominantly tells the story of the bravery of Lithuanian ‘Righteous Gentiles’.\textsuperscript{240} Whilst these are undoubtedly important tales to tell, it is left to the Green House’s \textit{Catastrophe} exhibition to most directly confront issues relating to Nazi and Lithuanian collaboration in the mass murder of European Jewry.\textsuperscript{241}

However, whilst passionately cared for since Lithuanian independence by its curators, many of whom are Holocaust survivors and although part of the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, in contrast to the two other displays which tell a more comforting narrative of Lithuania’s national past, and which are invested with modern museum techniques and English translation, the renovation of the \textit{Catastrophe} exhibition by July 2010 was only half complete, with one section of the display in Lithuanian, Yiddish and English, and other sections eschewing English translation altogether. Given that English is a leading language of international discourse, the incomplete translation of the \textit{Catastrophe} exhibition suggests that this is a story that Lithuania is still struggling to tell the world at the end of the first decade of the new millennium.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Kostanian’s observations on the significance of the ITF to the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum’s projects attests to the importance of international commitment in promoting

\textsuperscript{239} Rudiene and Juozeviciute, \textit{The Museum of Genocide Victims}, pp. 30-35.
\textsuperscript{240} \textit{The Tolerance Centre Information Leaflet} (Vilnius: The Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum, 2010).
\textsuperscript{241} \textit{The Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum of Lithuania Information Leaflet}. 
the remembrance of the Holocaust in Lithuania. However, Smith’s appraisal also illustrates the limits of ‘Liaison Projects’, especially when they do not adequately utilize existing good practice in locally based Holocaust NGOs. Furthermore, examples such as the alleged efforts to sabotage the International Commission by Lithuanian ultra-nationalist pressure groups as well as the presence of anti-Semitic historiographies and neo-Nazi marches all illustrate the ongoing challenges posed to the ITF’s efforts to implement the Stockholm Declaration in Lithuania. Continuing this analysis of the causes and consequences of the SIF 2000, the next chapter will turn to a very different aspect of the SIF 2000, namely, how the liberal ‘universalist’ aims of the conference can be perceived within the intellectual and institutional context of ‘cosmopolitanism’, a school of thought which also contributed to how a contemporary group of thinkers, the ‘New Cosmopolitans’, interpreted the political and historical significance of the SIF 2000.
Chapter 5

The Intellectual and Institutional Context for Understanding the SIF 2000: The ‘Cosmopolitan’ Potentials of the SIF 2000 and the Limits of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’

‘Cosmopolitanism’ is a term that has recurred in various forms throughout HMM. Sometimes it has appeared alongside and almost interchangeably in descriptions of the Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust’s ‘universalist’ values of encouraging the prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”¹ At other times, as in Chapter two, the term ‘cosmopolitanism’ has specifically referred to British New Labour politician, Robin Cook’s aspirations towards an ‘ethical’ foreign policy at the turn of the millennium. By contrast, in Chapter four a negative form of ‘cosmopolitanism’ was encountered as the Soviets, like the Nazis used this word as a term of abuse to stigmatize their Jewish subjects. However, despite this plurality of both positive and negative uses, this chapter is going to unpack a specific form of ‘cosmopolitanism’, namely intellectual and institutional ‘cosmopolitanism’ in more depth. This is because the ideas associated with ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an intellectual or institutional set of values advocating human and minority rights, provides a key context for understanding the historical lineage and broader political and cultural significance of the Stockholm Declaration’s ‘universalist’ rhetoric to invoke the remembrance of the Holocaust and acknowledge broader Nazi atrocity crimes in order to promote the prevention of contemporary forms of prejudice and mass killing.

In line with attempting to understand this ‘cosmopolitan’ context for comprehending the SIF 2000, the first part of this chapter will attempt to historically delineate the intellectual ideas and institutional developments underlying the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and as part of this analysis, will pose the provocative question as to whether Bauer’s complex and contradictory concept of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, which has also been encountered in chapters two and three, can additionally be understood within the nexus of ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual traditions (eg. Karl Jaspers, Raphael Lemkin, Hannah Arendt and Jürgen Habermas). The second part of this chapter will analyze in detail the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ scholarly interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by the social scientists Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider in the Ulrich Beck edited, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (2001), which was published in English translation as, The Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (HMGA, 2006). Finally, the third part of this chapter will reveal the historical and political problems posed by Levy and Sznaider’s interpretation of the SIF 2000 in HMGA. For although many attendees at the SIF 2000 on the Holocaust such as Levine and Bardgett noted the event’s overwhelming or ‘extraordinary’ qualities, it is arguable, that the conference was not quite so overwhelming and ‘extraordinary’ that it can be un-problematically hailed as a symbol of a ‘New Cosmopolitan’ transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’ in which the European remembrance of the Holocaust unconditionally functions as a, “... model for national self-critique, [which] serves to promote human rights as a legitimating principle in the global community, and plainly offers a negative example of dealing with alterity.”

For as has been seen in chapters two, three and four of HMM, if the SIF 2000 did aspire

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2 Daniel Levy and Natan Sznaider, Erinnerung im globalen Zeitalter: Der Holocaust (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2001). Levy and Sznaider, HMGA.
3 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, p. 201.
to frame the remembrance of the Holocaust through liberal ‘universalist’ values that seemed to build a delicate bridge between American and European liberal ideals, promoting self-critical confrontations with national histories in relation to Nazism as well as articulating aspirations to encourage the prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia”; then the actual results of the SIF 2000 and the ITF in implementing these objectives were also very much restricted, mediated and counter-balanced by the existing interests, tensions, contradictions and divisions that continue to haunt Holocaust memory politics and contemporary relations between regional, national and international organizations.

The Representation of Nazism and the Jewish Catastrophe in the Genre of ‘Cosmopolitanism’ before Levy and Sznaider’s Interpretation of the SIF 2000

The genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ has a long historical lineage that pre-dates 1989, the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and Levy and Sznaider’s reading of the SIF 2000. The idea was first intimated by the Ancient Greeks in the form of Natural Law theory, and was continued by legal thinkers such as Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, but it was most famously formulated by the philosopher, Immanuel Kant in a twelve year period, after the American Revolution (1776) and around the time of the French Revolution (1789), specifically in his Enlightenment treatise, ‘Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical

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5 A genre is a textual horizon of, “…of understanding, interpretation and reading” (Robert Eaglestone, The Holocaust and the Postmodern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 6).
6 ‘Natural Law’ referred to the ideal of justice bestowed on man by nature. It was argued that man’s laws should try to mimic this perfect sense of justice. The concept of Natural Law is the basis of all law and is anterior to Positive Law which is enforced by the state. (Elizabeth A. Martin, Oxford Dictionary of Law, p. 326).
For Kant, a rational political order is based on ‘universal’ justice within a state and this is achieved through the application of law and the encouragement of an open society predicated on free and reasoned debate. It is the duty of all citizens within a state to submit to a rationally conceived code of law, but in return citizens enjoy the rights of freedom (the right of individuals to act as long as those actions do not infringe the law and the inviolable rights of others); equality (all men should be equal before the law); and independence (economically independent men should have the right to vote, although reflecting the predominant attitudes of the eighteenth century Kant excluded women from this political duty). However, for Kant these ‘universal’ rights could become endangered by the violent conditions brought about by inter-state warfare and the threat posed by states with opposing value systems. To address the international political question of how to begin to bring about ‘perpetual peace’ and the preservation of ‘universal’ rights, Kant intimated that the ‘cosmopolitan’ condition rests on three pillars: ‘cosmopolitan’ rights, international law and the formation of a federation of states opposed to war. For Kant the chief goal of political ‘cosmopolitanism’ was to try and establish ‘perpetual peace’ between states and to ensure the ‘universalism’ of the ‘Rights of Man’ as predicated on the view that, “a violation of rights in one part of the world is felt everywhere.”

Theorist of ‘cosmopolitanism’, Robert Fine argues that this aspiration to fundamental human ‘universalism’ can also be traced in Hegel’s statement that, “a human being counts as such because he is a human being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic,
Protestant, German, Italian, etc.” Fine also believes that a ‘cosmopolitan’ attitude can be detected in Karl Marx’s view that capitalism would lead to the disintegration of nation-states and a new schema of human emancipation as well as in Emile Durkheim’s optimistic call for ‘world patriotism’.14

These ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘universalistic’ aspirations can also be perceived as shaping Karl Jaspers (1883-1969), Raphael Lemkin (1900-1959), Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), Jürgen Habermas’s (1926- ) and it will be explored in this chapter, co-author of the Stockholm Declaration, Yehuda Bauer’s (1926-) millennial reflections on the Jewish catastrophe and atrocity crimes perpetrated by the Third Reich and its collaborators. This regime’s destructiveness particularly in war-time seemed to embody both the atrophy of Enlightenment legal systems and aspirations towards ‘perpetual peace’ as well as the challenge of re-thinking the Kantian tradition of ‘universal’ rights and working towards the creation of a sustainable ‘cosmopolitan’ international political and legal order in the post-war world. Furthermore, this desire for the movement towards a new international rights regime in the immediate post-war period, particularly in relation to human as opposed to minority or group rights, also coalesced with the public war-time anti-Nazi rhetoric of Allied leaders and politicians such as Franklin Roosevelt (‘State of the Union Address’, 1941) and Anthony Eden, who had stated in 1942 that Nazi anti-Jewish violence was a breach of ‘the most elementary human rights’.15

Finally, this trend for a renewed international liberalism in the immediate post-war period also became more widely reflected in campaigns for civil and human rights led by activists such as Eleanor Roosevelt as well as in books on the issue of human rights

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13 Georg Hegel quoted in Fine, Cosmopolitanism, p. ix.
14 Fine, Cosmopolitanism, p. ix.

Against this international political backdrop, the writings of German philosopher and psychologist Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) were crucial in contributing to post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ discourses which directly sought to re-think the Kantian ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition, support the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as advocate the reformulation of German national identity in the mirror of the human in the wake of catastrophe. Jaspers had directly experienced life under the Third Reich. He was married to a Jewish woman, Gertrude, and had felt personally affronted when his intellectual compatriot in German existentialism, Martin Heidegger had declared his enthusiasm for the newly empowered Nazi government in his 1933 Rectoral address.\footnote{Raphael Gross, ‘Relegating Nazism to the Past: Expressions of German Guilt in 1945 and Beyond’, \textit{German History}, Vol. 25, No.2, p. 232; Anson Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah: Karl Jaspers’ \textit{The Question of German Guilt}’, in, \textit{In the Shadow of Catastrophe: German Intellectuals between Apocalypse and Enlightenment}, by Anson Rabinbach (Berkeley; Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 129-130.}

During the period of Nazi dictatorship, Jaspers avoided political themes in his writing and instead concentrated on the spiritual aspects of his philosophy until he was dismissed from his academic post at Heidelberg University in 1937. For his past pupil, Hannah Arendt, “\textit{what Jaspers represented then, when he was entirely alone, was not Germany but what was left of humanitas in Germany. It was as if he alone in his inviolability could illuminate that space which reason creates and preserves between men.}”\footnote{Hannah Arendt quoted in Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah’, p.130. For an analysis of what Arendt saw as significant about Jaspers’ character, see: Ned Curthoys, ‘Hannah Arendt: A Question of Character’, \textit{New Formations}, No. 71 (Spring 2011), pp. 75-77.}
Jaspers internal emigration during the late 1930s and the Second World War meant that in 1945, the Allies included the philosopher on the White List, or the list of public figures that were perceived to be untarnished by the Nazi regime and capable of aiding in the re-construction of West German democracy.\textsuperscript{19} As a result, in contrast to Heidegger’s ongoing silence in post-war West Germany, Jaspers embraced the role of the public intellectual dealing with the legacy of the Nazi past.\textsuperscript{20} In line with this, he delivered a series of lectures at Heidelberg University (Autumn/Winter of 1945/1946),\textsuperscript{21} which became the basis of his key post-war re-thinking of German national identity in terms of the ‘human’, \textit{Die Schuldfrage} (1946) or in English translation, \textit{The Question of German Guilt} (\textit{QGG}, 1947). In this text Jaspers wrestled with the question of how Germany could begin to deal with the political, legal and moral consequences of the Nazi regime.\textsuperscript{22} Perceiving Nazism as an extreme nationalistic perversion of the German tradition and the atrophy of the ideal of the political citizen, Jaspers believed that it was necessary for all Germans to communicate with each other and confront their relationship with the Third Reich. Jaspers identified four types of guilt: criminal (subject to legal prosecution), political (the citizen’s responsibility to the polis and the community’s obligation to make amends through reparations), moral (individual responsibility for wrongful actions invoking personal shame) and metaphysical, the last of which put forward the ‘universal’ ideal that:

\begin{quote}
There exists a solidarity among men as human beings that makes each co-responsible for every wrong and every injustice in the world, especially for crimes committed in his presence or with his knowledge. If I fail to do whatever I can to prevent them, I too am guilty.\textsuperscript{23}
\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{20} Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah’, p. 131.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Gross, ‘Relegating Nazism to the Past’, p. 232.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Jaspers, \textit{QGG}, p. 104.
\item \textsuperscript{23} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 32.
\end{itemize}
Jaspers focus on the significance of communication to the moral ‘purification’ of the German people in *QGG* mirrored the thinker’s important concept of *Existenz*, that is the notion that moral existence is achievable through the process of communication with others.\(^{24}\) Indeed, for Jaspers honest and frank discussion and reflection on the Nazi past among Germans, “…is the only way that we can save our souls from a pariah existence.”\(^{25}\) For Anson Rabinbach, this conviction meant that Jaspers was a key figure in the construction of, “the new narrative of the ‘European German’, of a neutral, anti-militarist and above all ethical Germany.”\(^{26}\) However, despite the retrospective importance ascribed to *QGG* as one of the foundational texts of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or post-war self-critical German national identity which stressed that, “…we are part of mankind – are human before we are German”,\(^{27}\) Jaspers treatise was initially criticized by members of the public as well as intellectuals of various political stripes when it was first published in the mid-1940s.

According to Daniel F. Penham’s classified report for the American Counter-Intelligence Corps, Jaspers’ lectures at Heidelberg University which preceded the publication of *QGG*, were greeted with laughter and disruption by many students who were ex-Wehrmacht soldiers;\(^{28}\) Nazi jurist Carl Schmitt perhaps unsurprisingly condemned Jaspers for inaugurating West Germany’s guilt culture, whilst German right-wing nationalists castigated Jaspers for ‘national betrayal’.\(^{29}\) Critics from the left were also scathing with Theodor W. Adorno, branding Jaspers’ discourse a ‘jargon of authenticity’ which paradoxically risked creating an environment which ruled out an

\(^{24}\) Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah’, p. 140.
\(^{25}\) Jaspers, *QGG*, p. 16.
\(^{26}\) Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah’, p. 132.
\(^{29}\) Carl Schmitt in Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah’, p. 130.
honest and expressive confrontation with Nazism by German people; whilst commentators in Communist East Germany criticized the philosopher for being a pro-NATO apologist. Finally, in a letter to his wife Arendt, the Communist intellectual, Heinreich Blücher harshly chastised Jaspers for indulging in the language of German ‘purification’ as opposed to focusing on the plight of those who had been ‘robbed of their dignity’ by the regime. Equally, Zionist commentator Kurt Blumenfeld was concerned by Jaspers’ failure to admit the popularity of German anti-Semitism and the active widespread willingness with which many Germans participated in anti-Jewish actions.

In line with Jaspers’ political and philosophical positions at the end of the Second World War, the controversial public intellectual also embraced government by the allies in West Germany and argued that the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg (IMT, 1945-1946) was significant in marking tentative, legalistic steps towards the realization of Kant’s ‘cosmopolitan’ vision for mankind. Jaspers argued that Nuremberg was significant because it demonstrated that a criminal nation-state and the citizens who serve it are no longer immune from prosecution if individuals within that state can be proved to have committed ‘Crimes against Humanity’ such as brutal violence against civilians, mass population expulsions and mass murder. Jaspers also noted that the codification of ‘Crimes against Humanity’ meant that the excuse of ‘only obeying orders’ and the cult that might have developed around mass murderers was

31 East German critics in Rabinbach, ‘The German as Pariah’, p. 130.
stymied by their reduction in status to mere criminals. However, Jaspers also noted some serious shortcomings. For example, the IMT was a multinational body as opposed to an international tribunal. This was the result of the settlement between the prosecuting and judging states (America, U.S.S.R, Britain and France), and meant that crimes committed by the allies were excluded from consideration. The result of this was that for Jaspers, Nuremberg was not ‘cosmopolitan’ enough in that it continued to bow to national sovereignty and the might of inter-state power relations.

Certainly from today’s perspective, the IMT at Nuremberg was significant in that it led to the prosecution and/or cross-examination of the major war criminals of Nazi Germany, such as Hermann Goering, Joachim von Ribbentrop, Albert Speer, Alfred Rosenberg, Wilhelm Keitel, Ernst Kaltenbrunner and Rudolf Höss. It also generated significant documents for post-war historians of Nazism, and as Jaspers recognized, it also broadened the remit of international law and contributed to important legal innovations such as the charge, ‘Crimes against Humanity’. Furthermore, the IMT can also be perceived as both expressly and circuitously influencing subsequent ‘cosmopolitan’ developments in the formulation of ‘universal’ rights and/or international law such as the ‘Nuremberg code’ of medical and scientific ethics (1947), the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights (UNDHR, 1948), the United Nations Genocide Convention (UNGC, 1948) as well as acting as an important historical precedent for the establishment of an International Criminal Court (ICC, 2002).

Finally, in addition to the significance of Nuremberg for the future development of

36 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, p. 4.
37 Fine, Cosmopolitanism, p. 100.
38 Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, p. 1.
39 Ibid., p. 2.
40 Ibid., p. 1.
international law and human rights, Marrus has also made the not uncontested observation that the IMT was also important in forwarding the first documentation of the Jewish catastrophe to a non-Jewish audience.\textsuperscript{41} This was evident in Justice Robert Jackson’s ‘Opening Statement’ which dedicated a section to atrocities committed against Jews during the Second World War as well as in the over eight hundred documents and thirty witnesses presented to the court in support of these claims over the next twelve months of the IMT’s convening.\textsuperscript{42}

However, as Donald Bloxham has noted, whilst the IMT was significant in shaping a ‘judicial’ awareness of the importance of the legacy of Nazi atrocities including the Jewish catastrophe for post-war developments in international jurisprudence, the legacies of the IMT also proved more problematic in terms of the ‘collective memory’ of the crimes of Nazism in various national ‘public spheres’.\textsuperscript{43} For example, the mass murder of the Roma and Sinti was rarely referenced,\textsuperscript{44} whilst the IMT’s engagement with the specificity of the mass murder of European Jewry was far from comprehensive. For example, reflecting on 1945 in his memoirs, Jackson’s assistant at the IMT, Telford Taylor admitted that he “remained ignorant of the mass extermination camps in Poland and the full scope of the Holocaust did not dawn on me until several months later.”\textsuperscript{45}

For Bloxham, the result of this inadequate coverage of the Jewish catastrophe was the elision of the responsibilities of what Christopher Browning has called the ‘Ordinary Men’ and the promotion of the perception that the Third Reich’s brutalities were the

\textsuperscript{43} Bloxham, \textit{Genocide on Trial}, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{44} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 89.
primary result of the long-term, willed actions of a fanatical and depraved Nazi elite.\textsuperscript{46} Furthermore, the documentary style of Nuremberg combined with the realpolitik of Cold War international relations initially failed to provoke the kind of long-term self-critical moral, legal and criminal reckoning with the past that a ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker such as Jaspers had proposed.\textsuperscript{47} For example, between 1945 and 1950, the British prosecuted 1000 members of the Axis who were primarily Germans, whilst the U.S tried over 1,800.\textsuperscript{48} However, “...by 1957-8 British and American prisons were empty, and those several hundreds blessed with premature liberation included the surviving Einsatzgruppen leaders convicted in 1948.”\textsuperscript{49}

Despite these inadequacies of the lessons and legacies of the IMT, a key development in international law in the late 1940s and early 1950s was the ratification of the UNGC (1951), a piece of legislation whose emphasis on group or minority rights can be perceived as a relative rarity in a new Cold War international system dominated by the UN doctrine of individual human rights and scornful of the League of Nation’s failed inter-war efforts to preserve minority rights in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{50} The UNGC was also irrevocably shaped by the Cold War political context as well as by the intellectual interests and personal grief of its chief author: the Polish Jewish legal expert, Raphael Lemkin. Dirk Moses has shown how Lemkin’s interest in preserving forms of “national cosmopolitanism” was rooted in a pre-Second World War fascination with Eastern European ‘groupism’ (Bronislaw Malinowski) and Western traditions of international


\textsuperscript{47} Bloxham, ‘From Streicher to Sawoniuk’, p. 402.

\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., p. 398.

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., p. 398.

law which objected to aggressive wars that exploit and harm civilians (Bartolomé de Las Casas, Francesco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Emeric de Vattel, Christian Wolff, Charles Solomon and Gaston Jéze).\textsuperscript{51}

Furthermore, Moses has also demonstrated how Lemkin’s later conception of ‘genocide’ was also embedded in his outrage at Turkish massacres of Armenians during the First World War; the mass killings of Assyrian Christians in Iraq as well as being influenced by his role as a comparative law lecturer at the Free University, Poland and his work for various international law commissions in the late 1920s and early 1930s.\textsuperscript{52} This is because at a 1933 meeting in Madrid, Lemkin proposed that what he called crimes of ‘barbarity’ (attacks against individuals because of their membership of a collectivity) and ‘vandalism’ (attacks against the art and cultural heritage of a collectivity) ought to be perceived as transnational dangers to the global social order. As a result, Lemkin classified them as delicta juris gentium (‘offences against the laws of nations’) which ought to be prosecuted under the notion of ‘universal’ jurisdiction.\textsuperscript{53} However, given the focus on the issue of terrorism at Madrid, Lemkin’s report was not even mooted, and international interest in his preoccupations would only begin to increase after the devastation of the Second World War.\textsuperscript{54}

Moreover, following World War II, Lemkin’s interest in preserving forms of “national cosmopolitanism” and enacting a “cosmopolitan vision of world civilization” was given

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture and the Concept of Genocide’, pp. 22-30. Moses does not comment on whether Lemkin was directly influenced by Kant’s ideas on ‘perpetual peace’, however, thinkers of the Natural Law tradition such as Grotius and Pufendorf influenced the formation of Kant’s ‘cosmopolitanism’.
\item Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture and the Concept of Genocide’, pp. 30-31.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 31.
\item \textit{Ibid.}, p. 31.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
This was because Lemkin discovered that his parents had been murdered in Treblinka and that most of his forty-nine member family had been killed during the Holocaust, with the exception of his brother, Elias, his sister-in-law, Lisa, and his brother’s two children. Lemkin had escaped the Nazi onslaught by emigrating from Europe to the United States in 1941 where he worked as a consultant for the Board of Economic Warfare and lectured to the U.S army in Virginia on military government. Before arriving in America, Lemkin had served in the Polish army, escaped to Lithuania, lectured in law at Stockholm University and travelled through the Soviet Union on his journey to the United States.

During this period, Lemkin had collected examples of Axis occupation laws and decrees as well as continuing his research into other historical examples of the mass killing of groups such as the Aghet or the Ottoman Empire’s CUP state sanctioned massacres of Armenians (1915-1916). The result of this enormous investigative undertaking was his book, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposal for Redress (AROE)*, which was published in Washington in the latter half of 1944. Illustrating the Third Reich’s radical violation of the ideal of ‘universal’ rights as well as the regime’s subversion of existing codes of national and international law, Lemkin analyzed the occupation decrees that the Nazis and their collaborators imposed on subordinated nations in Western Europe, such as France, the Netherlands and Denmark as well as on subjugated national populations living in Axis controlled

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55 Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture and the Concept of Genocide’, p. 31.
60 Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture and the Concept of Genocide’, p. 32.
territories to the East of Germany such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, the Baltic States and Yugoslavia. As part of his book, Lemkin also provided an English reference guide to the meaning of Axis occupation decrees. Furthermore, whilst making an effort to comprehensively analyze the particular conditions of subjugation endured by all national peoples under Axis rule, in a specific chapter on ‘The Legal Status of the Jews’, Lemkin observed of the Nazi regime and its collaborators mass murder of European Jewry:

The treatment of the Jews in the occupied territories is one of the most flagrant violations of international law, not only of specific articles of the Hague regulations, but also the principles of the laws of nations as they have emerged from established usage among civilized nations, from the laws of humanity, and from the dictates of public conscience – principles which the occupant is equally bound to respect.

For Moses, Lemkin’s representation of the Jewish Catastrophe in AROE is significant in showing that, “The Jewish experience is both distinctive in its extremity and part of a broader pattern.” Indeed, Lemkin’s biographer or perhaps hagiographer of his ‘struggle for the genocide convention’, John Cooper has observed that one of Lemkin’s primary insights, “was to understand through studying these occupation regulations that the Germans intended to reorganize Europe on racial lines and that would involve the mass murder and suppression of other cultures.” Lemkin’s understanding of the significance of this brutal process of the, “…destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group” and “…the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor”, for the future development of ‘universal’ group rights within international law was articulated most forcefully in the chapter in AROE in which he

62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., p. 77.
64 Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide’, p. 39.
65 Ibid., p. 19.
66 Cooper, Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention, p. 56.
67 Lemkin, AROE, p. 79.
defined ‘Genocide – a new term for the destruction of nations’.\textsuperscript{68} Combining elements of what he had previously called ‘barbarism’ and ‘vandalism’, Lemkin described the meaning of ‘genocide’ in the opening paragraph of this chapter as follows:

The destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group...Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accompanied by mass killing of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a co-ordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups with the ultimate aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be the disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of a national group.\textsuperscript{69}

Lemkin then went on to describe the political, social, economic, physical, religious and moral efforts at the destruction of ethnic and national groups perpetrated by the Third Reich, as well as noting the biological underpinnings of Nazi processes of genocide in different areas of the occupied territories:

The plan of genocide had to be adapted to political considerations in different countries. It could not be implemented in full force in all the conquered states, and hence the plan varies as to subject, modalities, and degree of intensity in each country. Some groups - such as the Jews - are to be destroyed completely. A distinction is made between peoples considered to be related by blood to the German people (such as Dutchmen, Norwegians, Flemings, Luxembourgers), and peoples not thus related by blood (such as Poles, Slovenes, Serbs). The populations of the first group are deemed worthy of being Germanized. With respect to the Poles particularly, Hitler expressed the view that it is their soil alone which can and should be profitably \textit{Germanized.}\textsuperscript{70}

For Lemkin, the perpetration of genocide presented, “... \textit{one of the most complete and glaring illustrations of the violation of international law and the laws of humanity},”\textsuperscript{71} and in the post-war period he led a determined global campaign to have the crime of genocide incorporated into international law. Although the judges and prosecutors at the IMT refused to accept Lemkin’s proposal that the Nazi leadership be indicted for the crime of genocide, his work was occasionally rhetorically employed as well as

\textsuperscript{68} Lemkin, \textit{AROE}, 79-95.
\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 79.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 81-82.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 94.
discussed ‘behind the scenes’ at Nuremberg, whilst the term genocide was used by the Polish Supreme National Tribunal to sentence the former commandant of Auschwitz, Rudolf Höss to death in April 1947. Finally, following further political lobbying and public campaigning, on 9th December 1948, parts of Lemkin’s definition of ‘genocide’ were incorporated into the ‘UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’. Needing the support of twenty member states, it was finally ratified in 1951. However, although a major achievement in legally recognizing the ‘universal’ rights of national, racial, ethnic and religious groups, like the UNDHR (1948) before it, which Mark Mazower has argued proved so appealing to the great powers because of its non-binding status which ultimately preserved state sovereignty, the ratification of the UNGC and the UN Security Council’s ultimate power of veto over its application revealed both the nation-state dominated political shortcomings of the post-war ‘universal’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ rights regime as well as the historically conditioned construction of international law.

For example, the UNGC defined ‘genocide’ as the intent to destroy national, racial, ethnic or religious groups in whole or in part through killing and other forms of physical or mental assault. Genocide was also defined as the prevention of births within a group as well as the infliction of living conditions on a collective that were designed to bring about that group’s destruction. However, owing to the Cold War context and the construction of the UN Security Council (United States, Britain, France, China and Russia), the UNGC made the major omission of failing to include the category of political groups in its list of potential targets for mass extermination. This meant that

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72 Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide’, p. 36; Cooper, *Raphael Lemkin and the Struggle for the Genocide Convention*, pp. 74-75.
73 Diner, *We Remember with Reverence and Love*, p. 306.
75 Levene, *Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1*, p. 45.
whilst contemporary scholars of genocide such as Mark Levene have defined Stalin’s purge of the ‘kulak’ class (1929-1933) as a genocidal act perpetrated across the whole of the U.S.S.R., although most severely in the Ukraine, Kazakhstan and the North Caucasus, prosecution for the perpetration of this mass atrocity could not be invoked under the UNGC.\textsuperscript{76} Equally, to the disadvantage of indigenous tribal societies, the UNGC also failed to include forms of ‘developmental’ genocide, as well as omitting what Lemkin defined as ‘cultural genocide’ or ‘vandalism’, namely the “prohibition of the use of the national language, destruction of books, documents, monuments and objects of historical, artistic or religious value.”\textsuperscript{77} This was because powerful members of the Security Council such as the United States and France as well as representatives from Brazil, Sweden, South Africa and New Zealand felt that national minorities might start utilizing the UNGC in order to oppose what had become relatively normalized processes of assimilation to colonial or majority rule through violence.\textsuperscript{78}

If the UNGC was eventually subject to political compromise and failures of implementation, Lemkin’s ‘cosmopolitan’ idealism in relation to forms of national and ethnic group life was in some respects shared by other ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers in the post-war period. For example, although Hannah Arendt tended to focus more on the issue of human rights as well as interpreting the term ‘genocide’ to refer to the Holocaust alone, Dan Stone has also noted that certain similarities existed between Lemkin and Arendt’s defense of the ‘plural’:

Although she did not refer to Lemkin, Arendt’s definition of genocide as ‘an attack upon human diversity as such’, or on ‘human status’ and her resistance to ‘all totalizing definitions’ and all ‘homogenizing politics’, is strikingly similar to Lemkin’s claim that ‘the human cosmos’ was

\textsuperscript{76} Levene, \textit{Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1}, p. 80.

\textsuperscript{77} Lemkin in Levene, \textit{Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1}, p. 45; Moses, ‘Raphael Lemkin, Culture, and the Concept of Genocide’, p. 38.

\textsuperscript{78} Levene, \textit{Genocide in the Age of the Nation State Volume 1}, p. 45.
violated by the destruction of its constituent nations.\footnote{Dan Stone, ‘Defending the Plural: Hannah Arendt and Genocide Studies’, \textit{New Formations}, No. 71 (Spring 2011), p. 52.}

It was against this backdrop of fears for the protection of human ‘plurality’, that Arendt wrote \textit{The Origins of Totalitarianism} (\textit{OT}, 1951), a response to the recent horrors of the Nazi past as well as an expression of personal and public anxieties elicited by the potential for Cold War nuclear conflict. Equally, it is testimony to the genre defying political, philosophical and historical complexity of this text, that whilst Arendt’s “\textit{boomerang effect}” hypothesis is currently informing a new wave of historical literature focused on the links between colonialism and genocide,\footnote{Richard H. King and Dan Stone, ‘Introduction’, in \textit{Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History: Imperialism, Nation, Race and Genocide}, ed. Richard H. King and Dan Stone (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 2-3; Enzo Traverso, \textit{The Origins of Nazi Violence} (New York: The New York Press, 2003); Jürgen Zimmerer, ‘The First Genocide of the Twentieth Century: The German War of Destruction in South-West Africa (1904-1908) and the Global History of Genocide’, in \textit{Lessons and Legacies VIII: From Generation to Generation}, ed. Doris Bergen (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 2008), pp. 34-65.} \textit{OT} can also be interpreted as a canonical text within the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ and a classic intellectual response to the brutalities of Nazism, including the experience of the Jewish catastrophe.\footnote{Fine, \textit{Cosmopolitanism}.} Arendt was a German assimilated Jew who had studied with Heidegger and Jaspers at the University of Heidelberg and Marburg. Her own personal life had been profoundly affected by the Third Reich. For example, she had been personally close to Heidegger and had been deeply shaken by the ‘un-worldly’ intellectual’s lack of ‘character’ and capacity to be seduced by Nazism.\footnote{Simon Swift, \textit{Hannah Arendt} (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 9-10; Curthoys, ‘Hannah Arendt: A Question of Character’, pp. 60-61.} As a result, in the same year as Heidegger made his ‘Rector’s address’ (1933), Arendt was arrested by Nazi authorities for collecting information on German anti-Semitism for the German Zionist Organization. Arendt then emigrated from Germany to France where she worked for a Parisian refugee agency which was facilitating Jewish migration to Palestine. She was
then briefly imprisoned in Gurs concentration camp before escaping to the U.S in 1941, where she resided until her death in 1975.\footnote{Swift, \textit{Hannah Arendt}, p. 11.}

Robert Eaglestone has argued that in \textit{OT}, Arendt drew on the phenomenological tradition of ‘deep history’, whilst reacting against Heidegger’s lack of political understanding,\footnote{Robert Eaglestone, ‘The ‘Subterranean Stream of Western History’: Arendt and Levinas after Heidegger’, in \textit{Hannah Arendt and the Uses of History}, pp. 207-208.} and attempted to analyze what she describes as, “\textit{...the subterranean stream of history}” which has, “\textit{...come to the surface and usurped the dignity of our tradition.}”\footnote{Arendt, \textit{OT}, p. ix.} This ‘subterranean stream’ is the brutal underbelly of Western political Enlightenment, which oscillated between being historically visible and a hidden wellspring of potential violence, which contributed to but was not inevitable in shaping, “\textit{...the elemental structure of totalitarian movements and domination itself.}”\footnote{Hannah Arendt, ‘A Reply to Eric Voegelin’, in \textit{The Portable Hannah Arendt}, ed. Peter Baehr (London: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 158.} Arendt suggested, sometimes in language which has been legitimately critiqued for reproducing problematic Western stereotypes about both the Jewish and non-European ‘other’,\footnote{King and Stone, ‘Introduction’, pp. 9-11; Stone, ‘Defending the Plural: Hannah Arendt and Genocide Studies’, p. 47.} that the roots of totalitarian domination can be perceived to reach right back to the practice of slavery, the dictatorial terror that accompanied Robespierre’s hi-jacking of the French Revolution, as well as residing in various forms of imperialism, the Western capitalistic exploitation of the colonies and the twentieth-century breakdown of the nineteenth-century balance of power between nation-states.\footnote{Arendt, \textit{OT}, p. 440.}

For Arendt, the unchecked violence of colonialism and imperialism, which operated beyond the constraints of Western nation-state sanctioned legal norms, resulted in the
massacres of native populations in Australia, Africa and the Americas, as well as facilitating the founding of concentration camps in India and Africa during the Boer War.\textsuperscript{89} She also pointed to post-1918 processes of national self-determination as paradoxically catalyzing the breakdown in the nation-state system because during this period, “…the supremacy of the will of the nation over all legal and ‘abstract’ institutions was universally recognized.”\textsuperscript{90} As a consequence, the exclusionary logic of prevailing political ethno-nationalism resulted in growing numbers of refugees, deportees as well as the civil disenfranchisement and violent persecution of stateless peoples such as Armenians and Jews.\textsuperscript{91} For Arendt, the terrible treatment of these peoples between the First World War and the end of the Second World War demonstrated the fundamental lacunae in national laws and European abstract ideals such as the ‘Rights of Man’. Namely, that unless a person was considered to be a national citizen of a state, their fundamental rights as a human being were not automatically protected within the international arena.\textsuperscript{92}

Given this context, it is perhaps unsurprising that Arendt perceived the destructive dynamics of imperialism, the rise of ethno-nationalism, and the breakdown of the nation-state system as exacerbating the international rise of anti-Semitism.\textsuperscript{93} Arendt argued in not unproblematic representational terms that this was because the traditional political and financial function of Jews within the social infrastructure of modern nation-states as, “\textit{an inter-European non-national element}” capable of inter-state diplomacy became redundant under the increasing influence of imperialism and ethno-nationalism, whilst ‘the mob’s’ resentment at perceived Jewish international financial

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{89} Arendt, \textit{OT}, p. 440.
  \item \textsuperscript{90} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 3.
  \item \textsuperscript{91} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 275.
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Arendt, \textit{OT}, p. 291; Stone, ‘Defending the Plural: Hannah Arendt and Genocide Studies’, p. 53.
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Arendt, \textit{OT}, pp. 9-10.
\end{itemize}
power and their assimilated non-national status in the European Diaspora increased. These blinkered perceptions which reduced the heterogeneity of European Jewish religious, social, cultural, political and economic life to pernicious Jewish ‘world conspiracy’ stereotypes formed the ideological backdrop for the rise of international and national anti-Semitic associations which were further exacerbated by the growth of European ‘Continental Imperialism’ (Pan-Germanism/Pan-Slavism), or the notion that Central and Eastern European states needed to create land-based empires in order to compete with their maritime equivalents. Against this backdrop, these anti-Semitic movements became, “the catalytic agent for first the Nazi movement, then a World War and finally, the establishment of death factories.”

For Arendt, terror, slavery and colonial violence shared characteristics with the brutality of totalitarian concentration camps because they, “…develop and crystallize on the nihilistic principle that “everything is permitted”....” However, paradoxically totalitarianism also marked a radical break with both the Western tradition and its exploitation of the overseas colonies, and instead drawing on continental imperialism in particular, totalitarianism was a completely ‘novel form of government’ based on the exercise of terror and the control of the masses through dogmatic and misleading ideologies which purported to enact the ‘Laws of History’ (in the Nazi case, the move towards a racially organized society and in the Soviet example, the drive towards a classless utopia). Furthermore, the Soviet gulags and the Nazi concentration and extermination camps typify highly specific and different strains of the ‘total

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96 Arendt, *OT*, p. viii.  
domination’ of totalitarianism, for not only is “everything permitted” within the sphere of action of the oppressor but in opposition to all utilitarian economic interests and outside the restraints of all nation state sanctioned legal norms and ‘universal’ ideals of the ‘Rights of Man’, 99 “everything is possible.” 100 Differentiating between the Nazi and Soviet systems, Arendt described the, “Soviet Union’s labor camps, where neglect is combined with chaotic forced labor”, 101 and the Nazi camps, “…where the whole of life was thoroughly and systematically organized with a view to the greatest possible torment”, 102 and where prisoners were:

…divided into those whose ‘extermination’ was immediately on the agenda, as in the case of the Jews, or could be expected in the predictable future, as in the case of the Poles, Russians, Ukrainians, and into those who were not yet covered by instructions about such an over-all ‘final solution’. 103

Whilst highlighting the particularities of the Nazi and Soviet systems, Arendt also noted that both the Soviet labor camps and the Nazi administered concentration and extermination camps were archetypically totalitarian in that they treated “… human masses…as if they no longer existed”, 104 and destructively registered the, “superfluity of man.” 105 For Arendt, these common features meant that totalitarian systems embody the potential for ‘radical evil’. That is, various forms of this extreme type of dictatorship which is epitomized by the ‘total domination’ of the masses, unrestrained conquest across the globe, and an infinite potential for the administration of terror in

99 For Arendt, the appearance of, “the concentration camp society” showed that, “…the Rights of Man, which had never been philosophically established but merely formulated, which had never been politically secured but merely proclaimed, have, in their traditional form, lost all validity.” (Arendt, OT, p. 447).
100 Arendt, OT, p. 440.
101 Ibid., p. 445.
102 Ibid., p. 445.
103 Ibid., p. 443.
104 Ibid., p. 445.
105 Ibid., p. 457.
concentration camps, have the capacity to destroy the dignity of ‘the human’, or lead to the, “murder of the moral person”, the “annihilation of the juridical person” and “the destruction of individuality.” Current historians such as Dan Stone have expressed concerns in relation to the representation of the Jewish catastrophe in Arendt’s work on totalitarianism that the rhetoric of the annihilation of the ‘human’ risks attributing, “to the Holocaust a somewhat mystical sense of grandeur, precisely the feeling that the Nazis wished to generate...” Whilst it is important to note this perturbing interpretative potential within Arendt’s representational structures, there was little ‘mystical’ about Arendt’s political objectives. For ultimately, Arendt’s representation of the Jewish catastrophe within the matrix of anti-Semitism, imperialism, totalitarianism and the destruction of the ‘human’ was tied to the political and legal project of ensuring the ‘universal’ human “right to have rights.” Namely, the right to a home protected from hostile governance, the right to the membership of a political community and the right to exercise political citizenship as part of that community. In short, for Arendt, recent history had shown that:

Anti-Semitism, not merely the hatred of Jews; Imperialism, not merely conquest; Totalitarianism not merely dictatorship; one after the other, one more brutally than the other have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee, which can be found only in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity, while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.

Here Arendt is similar to Jaspers in perceiving the brutalities of the Second World War as necessitating a contemporary rethinking of Kantian ‘cosmopolitanism’ in a form sobered and ‘made wise’ by the weight of the devastation of 1945 as well as the fears

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107 Arendt, OT, p. 455.
109 Arendt, OT, p. 290.
110 Ibid., p. ix.
engendered by the threat of global annihilation unleashed by the technological innovations of the atomic Cold War age.\textsuperscript{111} This is a point which Arendt further elaborated in an essay published in 1957 entitled ‘Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World’.\textsuperscript{112} In this text, she noted the importance of Kant’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ for Jaspers’ philosophy,\textsuperscript{113} and stated that one of the, “…central idea[s] of Jaspers’ philosophy” is ‘limitless communication’ or, “…the faith in the comprehensibility of all truths and the good will to reveal and to listen as the primary condition for all human being-together.’\textsuperscript{114} For Arendt, a ‘cosmopolitan’ understanding of the globe cannot reside in the ‘totalitarian’ potentials inherent in a “…a world government with a centralized power”,\textsuperscript{115} but instead can be discerned in an international law, limited and administered by, “…newly defined territorial entities”,\textsuperscript{116} which co-exists alongside nation states and is underpinned by Jaspers notion of ‘limitless communication’:

The bond between men is, subjectively the ‘will to limitless communication’ and, objectively, the fact of universal comprehensibility. The unity of mankind and its solidarity cannot consist in a universal agreement upon one religion or one philosophy, or one form of government, but in faith and the manifold points to a Oneness which diversity conceals and reveals at one and the same time.\textsuperscript{117}

However, ‘cosmopolitan’ social and political theory is far from a homogenous set of viewpoints and as a result it is important to note where Jaspers and Arendt differ in their responses to the legacy of Nazism. For example, Arendt’s response to Nuremberg was more ambivalent than Jaspers. She was concerned that the term ‘Crimes against Humanity’ might not promote a self-reflexive attitude about Nazism but would rather

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., pp. 539-549.
\textsuperscript{113} “One could easily prove’ that Jaspers whole philosophical work from its beginnings in the ‘Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919) to the forthcoming world-history philosophy was conceived with a ‘cosmopolitan intention’.” (Arendt, ‘Karl Jaspers: Citizen of the World’, p. 541).
\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., p. 539.
\textsuperscript{116} Arendt, OT, p. ix.
stigmatize Germans and reinforce old prejudices. This situation would neither encourage Germans to reflect on their Nazi past, nor promote members of other nations to understand the vital warning issued by Nazism. Namely, that the totalitarian temptation was not limited to Germany and, “… it requires no particular national character in order to supply this new type of functionary.” Moreover, Arendt also differed from Jaspers in stressing that despite the political necessity of prosecuting ‘Crimes against Humanity’ both at Nuremberg as well as at subsequent trials, the ‘radical evil’ of Nazi crimes also detonated the conceptual limits of any legal or penal code. Finally, the ‘radical evil’ of totalitarianism meant that for Arendt:

… attempts to build up a European elite with a program of intra-European understanding based on the common experience of the concentration camps have foundered in much the same manner as the attempts following the First World War to draw political conclusions from the international experience of the front generation. In both cases it turned out that the experiences themselves can communicate no more than nihilistic banalities.

Jaspers and Arendt also differed in their attitudes towards Judaism as well as in their

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122 Arendt, OT, pp. 441-442. It is possible although not provable that in this quote Arendt may have been referring to international networks such as the Congress of Cultural Freedom (CCF). The CCF was established at a West Berlin conference in 1950. The CCF operated throughout the 1950s and into the 1970s and functioned as an anti-communist network of European and American intellectuals united in an offensive for a democratic Europe, free from the politics of totalitarianism. Public figures involved in the CCF’s events and journals included ex-French resistance fighter and survivor of Buchenwald, David Rousset; German left-wing survivor of Ravensbrück concentration camp and the Siberian gulags, Margarete Buber-Neumann and the Buchenwald political prisoner and author of, The Theory and Practice of Hell (1950), Eugene Kogon. Preceding the SIFs by several decades, the CCF was responsible for organizing a number of international conferences most notably ‘The Future of Freedom’ forum which was convened in Milan in September 1955 and included a paper by Arendt entitled, ‘The Rise and Development of Totalitarianism and Authoritarian Forms of Government in the Twentieth Century’. It is also notable within the context of this analysis that Jaspers was appointed as one of the six honorary presidents of the CCF, although it should be remembered that as CCF activist Edward Shils observed in 1990, the role of these honorary presidents was primarily ‘decorative’. (Giles Scott-Smith, ‘The Congress of Cultural Freedom, the End of Ideology and the 1955 Milan Conference: ‘Defining the Parameters of Discourse’, Journal of Contemporary History, Volume 37, Number 3 (July 2002), pp. 437-455; Edward Shils and Peter Coleman, ‘Remembering the Congress of Cultural Freedom’, Society, Volume 46, Number 5 (October 2009), pp. 437-444.)
responses to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948. Jaspers was interested in Judaism given the influence of his wife Gertrude and his former student Arendt as well as because of the devastating legacy of Nazi anti-Semitism. Jaspers felt that Jewish monotheism was an essential contribution to Western culture; that the Jewish people had the right to politically assimilate themselves into nations across the globe and that part of their significance as a people lay in their specific religious identity and non-national status. However, whilst fearing the negative possibilities of Jewish assimilation into aggressive forms of modern nationalism as a result of the founding of the state of Israel, Jaspers also perceived the establishment of this new state to hold fresh potentials for the development of Jewish religion and culture and felt that any attempt to, “…destroy Israel would mean the end of human kind.”

Whilst mirroring her mentor’s opinions in some respects, Arendt also disagreed with Jaspers in many significant areas. For example, having grown up as an assimilated German Jew and having worked with Zionist organizations during the war, Arendt’s sense of her own Jewish identity primarily rested on a historical and political understanding of the construction and development of Jewish communities through the ages and their complex relationship to the gentile world, as opposed to the fascination with Jewish religious culture that Jaspers espoused. Furthermore, it was as part of her engagement with the history of Jewish experience in Europe that Arendt questioned the possibility of full Jewish political and social assimilation in the Diaspora. As a result, she believed in the importance of the establishment of a Jewish homeland but her

‘Jewish Writings’ of the 1940s have also suggested that she perceived Zionism as a problematic, “vassal of British Imperialism” and a “betrayal of the Jewish masses of Eastern Europe.”¹²⁷ Instead, Arendt argued for Jewish representation in a European federation and common parliament, which might include, “…a settlement in Palestine…but only if attached to some such European Commonwealth.”¹²⁸ The result of her opinions were that whilst Arendt praised the Kibbutzim, she also remained critical of how the founding of the Israeli state occurred; the treatment of the Arabs; forms of extreme Israeli nationalism as well as the role of orthodox religious parties in Israel’s political life.¹²⁹ Furthermore, Arendt also continued to question the political motives and policies of some members of Israel’s subsequent governments.¹³⁰ However, in a similar way to Jaspers, and as articulated in a letter that Arendt wrote to her companion Mary McCarthy, in the wake of the 1967 war against Egypt and its allies, Arendt also felt that, “any real catastrophe in Israel would affect me more deeply than anything else.”¹³¹

Both Jaspers’ and Arendt’s views in relation to Israel as well as their ‘cosmopolitan’ values in regards to international law became apparent in their private correspondence about the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem for ‘Crimes against the Jewish people’ and ‘Crimes against Humanity’ (11th April -15th December 1961). Prior to the start of prosecution proceedings, Jaspers was critical of the idea of the Eichmann trial on ‘cosmopolitan’ grounds. He argued that the Israeli government’s kidnapping of Eichmann from Argentina lacked legal justification, whilst he also objected to a national

¹²⁸ Piterberg, ‘Zion’s Rebel Daughter’, p. 5.
¹³¹ Hannah Arendt (17 October 1969) quoted in Zertal, Israel’s Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood, p. 162.
court as opposed to an international tribunal prosecuting the former SS Obersturmbannführer who had bureaucratically organized the deportation of Europe’s Jews to ghettos and extermination camps in Nazi occupied Eastern Europe. Jaspers’ objections to the Eichmann trial in an Israeli court rested on the fact that the Jewish state did not exist when the crimes were committed; the state of Israel did not automatically represent all members of the Jewish people; and finally, that the judgment meted out by a national court might be perceived as vengeance rather than justice, and as a result, might stimulate political backlash against Israel. Instead, in a letter written to Arendt in December 1960, Jaspers suggested that in an ideal world, the Eichmann case would serve as a spur for the creation of an ICC:

> Israel does an exemplary job of historical investigation and documentation and then closes with a demand addressed to humanity, which is represented formally today by the UN: Here are the facts. It is a task for humanity, not for an individual national state to pass judgment in such a weighty case. We have the perpetrator of these crimes in our custody and place him at your disposal. What he did concerns all of you, not just us. Create the means by which humanity can mete out justice (possible consequences I am thinking of are, for instance, appeals to this highest supranational authority from people whose human rights have been violated by their own countries).

Arendt disagreed with Jaspers and accepted the need and validity of prosecuting and sentencing Eichmann in Israel because an ICC did not yet exist and as many Holocaust survivors lived in Israel, the ‘passive nationality principle’ could be applied, or the legal concept that, “…the country or state to which the victims belong has jurisdiction.” However, it should also be noted that in the same letter to Jaspers, Arendt added, “Don’t misunderstand me: I would be all in favor of an international criminal court
Furthermore, Arendt’s chief objections to the Eichmann trial were expressed most notoriously in her controversial trial reports for *The New Yorker*, which were published in book form as *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (*EJ*, 1963). Arendt’s reports were scandalous in Israel and Jewish communities across the globe because some critics such as the philosopher Gershom Scholem argued that by focusing on the term ‘banality of evil’ instead of ‘radical evil’, Arendt had not shown enough ‘love for the Jewish people’ and had trivialized the death camps; whilst Scholem alongside commentators such as Martin Buber were also upset by Arendt’s harsh critique and judgement of Jewish community leaders. This was because Arendt argued that rather than operating within the Nazi system, the Jewish Councils should have done nothing, because in her view this would have disrupted the machinery of destruction and potentially reduced the number of victims. Furthermore, she performed the writing of this point extremely provocatively and ‘tactlessly’ in the following statement from *EJ*, “The whole truth was that if the Jewish people had really been unorganized and leaderless, there would have been chaos and plenty of misery but the total number of victims would hardly have been between four and a half and six million people.” During the ensuing controversy which Arendt experienced as,

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“...the smear campaign against me”,\textsuperscript{141} and in which she was perceived by her critics as ‘revictimizing the victims’, Jaspers and his wife Gertrude remained supportive, with Jaspers telling Arendt that as an overall piece of work he found \textit{EJ} both, “\textit{profound and full of despair}”,\textsuperscript{142} and that he also sensed a more ‘universal’ tone in the book, “\textit{a desire for veracity and for the contemplation of man, but you do not speak explicitly about that}.”\textsuperscript{143}

Despite the controversy, Arendt won praise not only from Jaspers but also from psychologist Stanley Milgram, whilst notwithstanding the complaints from critics such as Scholem, Arendt’s invocation of ‘the banality of evil’ actually reflected her opinion that Eichmann, the careerist bourgeois under prosecution was not an anti-Semitic psychopath but was rather, “\textit{terribly and terrifyingly normal}”,\textsuperscript{144} and an example of a, “\textit{...new type of criminal}”,\textsuperscript{145} who emerges under the ‘radical evil’ of totalitarianism, a person who although ultimately responsible for their actions, “\textit{...commits his crimes under circumstances that make it nigh on impossible for him to know or feel that what he is doing is wrong}.”\textsuperscript{146} Moreover, one of Arendt’s chief objections to the Eichmann trial rested on the fact that she perceived the Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and the Attorney General, Gideon Hausner as utilizing the horror stories of Holocaust survivors in the political interests of Jewish nationalism, rather than focusing on the task of prosecuting Eichmann for the specific crimes that he had committed.\textsuperscript{147} Lastly, and in a more ‘cosmopolitan’ vein she also critiqued the prosecutors of Eichmann for

\textsuperscript{144} Arendt, \textit{EJ}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{145} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 276.
\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 5.
focusing on national interests and failing to demonstrate an awareness of the ‘universal’ implications of the trial for ‘world humanity’. For example, Arendt argued, that the Eichmann trial dealt with, “…the supreme crime…the physical extermination of the Jewish people…a crime against humanity perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people.” 148 Whilst this expression contained the problematic potential to place victims of Nazi atrocities in a hierarchy of suffering, she also stressed that the process of:

…extermination against whole ethnic groups – the Jews, or the Poles, or the Gypsies – might be more than a crime against the Jewish, Polish or the Gypsy people, that the international order, and mankind in its entirety, might have been grievously hurt and endangered. 149

If Arendt’s expressions of what she calls the threats posed to, “international order and mankind in its entirety” also shares affinities with Jaspers ‘cosmopolitan’ rhetoric she was not the only post-war thinker to draw on the influence of the German existentialist.

In a similar way to Jaspers, Jürgen Habermas’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ was profoundly affected by his personal experience as a German living as part of the Nazi regime. Habermas grew up in the town of Gummersbach where despite his serious cleft palate he was allowed to join the Hitler Youth and operated as a field nurse towards the end of the war. 150 Morally shocked by allied footage of the concentration camps, 151 Habermas was subsequently educated at the universities of Gottingen and Bonn and worked with Adorno at the Institute for Social Research in Frankfurt (1956-1959). 152

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148 Arendt, EJ, p. 269.
149 Ibid., pp. 275-276.
150 Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past, pp. 107-108.
151 Ibid., p. 108.
152 Ibid., p. 115 and p. 124. In his 1959 Freudian tract, ‘What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?’, the left-wing Frankfurt School critic Adorno perceived Nazism to be the result of a “pathological nationalism” and considered, “…the continued existence of National Socialism within democracy potentially more threatening than the continued existence of fascist tendencies against democracy.” Although Adorno warns against the domestication of the horror of Nazism as well as the potential for anti-fascist pedagogy to simply appeal to those who support the cause and provoke backlash among hostile members of the public, he maintained that if instructors are adequately trained, “…political education, seriously conducted and not just as a tiresome duty, produces better results than one had thought possible.” Although some of Adorno’s attitudes overlap with Jaspers, he does not fit the mould of a liberal ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker given his critique of Jaspers philosophy as a ‘jargon of authenticity’
Habermas shared Adorno’s skepticism towards technological progress,\(^{153}\) whilst rejecting his tutor’s overall pessimism and instead maintaining that the integrity of modernity resides in the self-critical functions of the ‘moral-legal’, ‘scientific-technical’ as well as ‘aesthetic-expressive’ value spheres acting in dialogue with secular humanitarian values and the democratic dynamism of the ‘public sphere’.\(^{154}\) The ‘public sphere’ is what Habermas defines as that shared arena of critical debate within a state that nurtures the self-reflexive individual and which is sustained by parliamentary institutions, discussion venues, international and national law as well as the global and local print media. However, the integrity of the ‘public sphere’ is perpetually placed under threat by the ‘scientization of politics’ and the increasing commercialisation of the mass media.\(^{155}\) Although Habermas’s discussion of democratic republicanism and the ‘public’ owes something to Schmitt’s legal theory, whilst rejecting that author’s anti-Semitic attitudes,\(^{156}\) in other respects, it is Jaspers’ ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal of the importance of ‘limitless communication’ that is refracted in Habermas’s view that communication lies at the heart of modern ethics. As a result, in Habermas’s thought, a state’s ‘public sphere’ becomes a key site for the interrogation, renewal or rejection of national, local and global traditions.\(^{157}\)

Habermas recognized that in the absence of what Jaspers would call personal guilt, the questions posed by the legacy of the Third Reich were different for both his generation and his attitude in relation to the fight against fascism that, “If one wants to oppose an objective danger objectively, then a mere idea won’t do, not even that of freedom and humanity, which in its abstract form – as we’ve recently learned – doesn’t mean that much to people.” (Theodor W. Adorno, ‘What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?’, in Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective, ed. Geoffrey H. Hartman, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1986, pp. 114-129.)

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and subsequent post-war generations. Bearing this in mind scholars of German historical memory such as Wulf Kansteiner and Dirk Moses have identified Habermas as a member of what has been termed the ‘Hitler Youth Generation’ or the ‘generation of 1945’, an age group who were children during the early years of the Third Reich, adolescents in the Second World War as well as young actors in the post-war reconstruction of West Germany at a time when many former Nazis still held prominent positions in the nation’s industries, universities and commercial enterprises. Although less talked about than the more radical generation of 1968, Moses has observed that left-liberal journalists and intellectuals from the ‘forty-fivers’ were significant in supporting the democratic reconstruction of West Germany as well as subjecting national intellectual life to penetrating critique in response to the devastation of Nazism.158

Kansteiner has observed that by the 1980s, the West German historiographical establishment was headed by members of this ‘Hitler Youth’ generation and had settled on a broad consensus which rejected the ‘totalitarianism’ thesis and perceived the Holocaust to be a singular event in history and the result of a German ‘special path’ of political development, social modernisation and anti-Semitism.159 However, by the mid-late 1980s this consensus was aggressively challenged by the international Ronald Reagan/Helmut Kohl political controversy at Bitburg cemetery (1985) as well as by the publication of two neo-conservative histories of the Third Reich by Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber.

Whilst Arendt’s OT had stressed both the specificity and comparability of the Nazi and

158 Moses, German Intellectuals and the Nazi Past, p. 9.
Soviet regimes as well as confronting, “…the unspeakable gratuitous cruelty in the German concentration and extermination camps”, Nolte and Hillgruber’s histories were perceived by many critics to ‘normalize’ the horror of Nazi crimes, specifically the Jewish catastrophe through a comparative perspective with the Soviet Union. For example, in the 1990s, Dominick LaCapra perceived ‘denial’ of the trauma of the Holocaust in Hillgruber’s portrayal of Eastern Front Nazi soldiers as ‘victims’, as well as in Nolte’s controversial argument that the Holocaust was an extreme version of Soviet terror and that the Nazis defended Western civilisation by opposing the Bolshevik threat. These events stimulated the Historikerstreit (‘Historians’ Dispute’) or the series of intellectual debates which raged in German newspaper articles and academic journals between 1986 and 1988 about the role of the remembrance of the atrocity crimes of Nazism in German public life.

Habermas was active in the ‘Historians’ Dispute’ and like Jaspers before him was ‘cosmopolitan’ in arguing for a rigorously self-critical German confrontation with the lessons and legacies of the Nazi past. In an essay contributed to the Historikerstreit entitled ‘Concerning the Public Use of History’, Habermas stressed that after the moral catastrophe of Auschwitz, the continuing perseverance of Nazi era political, intellectual, local and family traditions within the contemporary horizon of German identity politics necessitated an ongoing process of both individual and national self-reflection and

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160 Arendt, OT, p. xxiii.
161 Hartman (ed.), Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective.
163 Ibid., p. 49. Far from being an issue confined to Germany, the comparison of the Nazi and Soviet regimes is sometimes used in problematic contemporary discourses which attempt to evade national responsibility for collaboration in the crimes of the Nazi past in countries such as the Baltic States. This has been discussed in Chapter 4.
communication within the German ‘public sphere’.  

For Habermas, the objective of this process is the production of a self-critical individual and self-reflexive German collective identity that is stripped of what Adorno would refer to as the violent excesses of ‘pathological nationalism’:

After Auschwitz, we can only create national self-consciousness from the better traditions of our history, traditions which we must appropriate critically not blindly. We can only continue to shape a national context of existence, which once allowed a unique injury to the substance of human commonality, in the light of such traditions which stand up to the suspicious gaze made wise by the moral catastrophe.

The importance that Habermas ascribes to the self-critical confrontation with the German national past in relation to the Jewish catastrophe is perhaps most evident in his defence of Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s, *Hitler’s Willing Executioners* (1996), a book which argued that the mass murder of European Jewry was the result of a specifically German ‘eliminationist form of anti-Semitism’ that had culminated in the realization of the Holocaust. Although Karyn Ball has noted that Goldhagen’s book has been widely critiqued by historians for the ‘impropriety’ of its representations of mass atrocity, as well as for decoupling the Third Reich’s mass murder of European Jewry from its relationship to local collaboration in the occupied territories, the broader Nazi war effort and the brutal violence targeted against Soviet civilians and other social, ethnic, religious, sexual and racial groups, Habermas persisted in forwarding an alternative perspective. Brushing aside the complaints of historians, Habermas commented of Goldhagen’s confrontation with anti-Semitism that, “This critical

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165 Ibid., p.45.
attitude towards one’s own particularity is precisely what Goldhagen’s study demands - and what worries some conservative critics.”

Furthermore, the legacies of Kant’s Enlightenment ‘cosmopolitan’ thinking as well as the experience of Europeans during the Second World War also played a key role in legitimating Habermas’s arguments in *The Postnational Constellation* (1998). In this treatise Habermas argued that individual nation-states cannot combat the negative impacts of globalization on their own or within the matrix of traditional foreign relations and as a result it is necessary for transnational bodies such as the EU to reform, democratize and in the process build a type of ‘constitutional patriotism’ at the supra-territorial level. The challenge posed by ‘constitutional patriotism’ is how to integrate contemporary democratic and multicultural nation-states on a lawful and rational foundation at the transnational level whilst simultaneously recognizing the essential democratic functions served by nation states, granting equal rights to all citizens regardless of colour, creed, race, gender, religion, ethnicity and language as well as working to neutralize social modalities of radical ethnic nationalism.

Whilst Habermas constructed 1945 and the horrors of Auschwitz as marking a watershed in the collective self-understanding of the German nation-state, within a European as opposed to strictly German schema, the experience of the Second World War also holds a key place in legitimating the critique of ethno-nationalisms inherent in the concept of ‘constitutional patriotism’. For Habermas, the Enlightened universalism of the French Revolution and its lawful, reasoned achievements of democracy and

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“...the universalist spirit of political Enlightenment” remain guiding principles for ‘constitutional patriotism’, whilst “...the defeat of fascism” marks the most significant ‘normative’ watershed of the twentieth century. This is epitomized by Habermas’s statement that, “...the Allied victory and the German defeat of 1945 permanently discredited an array of myths, which ever since the end of the nineteenth century had been mobilized against the heritage of 1789.”

However, Habermas’s notion of ‘constitutional patriotism’ and the representation of the Second World War within that concept have also been questioned from a number of different perspectives. For example, the prospects for ‘constitutional patriotism’ in the European context has been seen as over-idealistic given continuing democratic deficits in EU governance, whilst Habermas has also been criticized for idealizing the political form of the constitution and questioned as to whether its normative basis can ever be adequately distanced from its legitimizing roots in modern state nationalism.

Furthermore, Habermas can be perceived as being premature in citing 1945 as marking a ‘normative’ watershed in European politics. For whilst the appeal of fascist movements in their pre-1945 mould might have been relegated to the margins of European societies, a populist vein of democratic far right radicalism persists and its representatives continue in their efforts to influence contemporary European politics. This point has been highlighted in previous chapters of HMM, specifically although not only in relation to Haider in Austria in the 1990s and Lithuanian ultra-nationalists in the early years of the twenty-first century.

171 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Learning From Catastrophe? A Look back at the Short Twentieth Century’, in The Postnational Constellation, by Habermas, p. 46.
172 Ibid., p. 46.
Despite these sobering assessments of Habermas’s ‘cosmopolitanism’, it is arguable that the Third Reich and its collaborators’ humanitarian transgressions and genocidal violence, including specific reflections on the Jewish Catastrophe played such an important role in the thought of post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ philosophical, political, legal and social science theorists because not only were thinkers such as Jaspers, Arendt, Lemkin and Habermas profoundly personally affected by the Third Reich, but the brutality of the Nazi concentration and extermination camps, mass shootings and organized terror can be interpreted as paradoxically demonstrating both the Nazi regime’s anti-liberal subversion of the positive aspirations of ‘cosmopolitanism’ towards ‘universal’ rights, international justice, engaged democratic citizenry and prosperous progressive peace as well as the ‘dark side’ of Enlightenment thinking in the forms of the legacy of colonialism, the legal categorical exclusions of the Rights of Man (1789), the potential violence that undergirds the administration and manipulation of the law as well as what Zygmunt Bauman would perceive as the potential indifference toward the ‘other’ facilitated by the mechanisms of bureaucratic modernity.174

Furthermore, it is arguable that the convening of the SIF 2000 and the rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration (2000) continues elements of this ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition of responses to the Nazi past. This cannot only be seen in the Stockholm Declaration’s desire to remember the Holocaust in order to promote the prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia,”175 but is also arguably apparent in some of the narrative tropes that have been consciously or unconsciously used in co-author of the Stockholm Declaration, Yehuda Bauer’s, Rethinking the Holocaust (RH, 2001). Admittedly, some may see this as a provocative and contentious

claim to make particularly given Bauer’s previous association with the Holocaust ‘uniqueness’ thesis, a claim which chapter two has shown is more often associated by its harshest critics with aggressive forms of Jewish communal and/or national identity politics than modes of idealistic ‘cosmopolitan’ pluralism.\textsuperscript{176}

However, if Bauer’s shift from ‘uniqueness’ to the more ‘universalistic’ if not completely un-problematic rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ is to be analyzed seriously, then it is important to note that in a similar way to previous ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers, Bauer was deeply personally affected by the Holocaust, whilst in relation to the prevention of future genocides Bauer states that, “we have a moral obligation, in the spirit of Kantian moral philosophy, to try.”\textsuperscript{177} Furthermore, Bauer can be interpreted as conforming to certain ‘cosmopolitan’ generic conventions. For instance, he points to the ambivalent significance of 1789. Thus, in a similar way to Habermas, he views Nazism as the opposition of, “the major achievements of the European culture that preceded them, especially the legacy of the French Revolution and the Emancipation.”\textsuperscript{178} However, like Arendt he also perceives the deeply pernicious facets of the legacy of 1789. This is because for Bauer elements of the Enlightenment influenced Nazism’s anti-Semitic ideology, “François Marie Voltaire, after all, was the one who rejected Christianity and saw in it a destructive force introduced into Europe by Judaism and the Jews, whom he despised.”\textsuperscript{179}

Finally, mirroring the rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration which he helped to construct, Bauer also forcefully articulates the viewpoint that the genocide of the Jews

\textsuperscript{176} See the section on Bauer in Chapter two of this thesis.
\textsuperscript{177} Bauer, RH, p. xi.
\textsuperscript{178} Ibid., p. 53.
\textsuperscript{179} Ibid., p. 43.
during the Second World War, was not only an irreducibly ‘unprecedented’ human event but also contained ‘universal’ elements which need to be discussed and understood, if we are to work towards what can be perceived as the ‘cosmopolitan’ goals of international peace, the rule of law and effective genocide prevention in the present. Indeed, for Bauer:

...the Holocaust has become a world issue. It has had an enduring impact on contemporary civilization and continues to shape, at least indirectly, the fate of nations. For its impact to effect mutual understanding, widespread peace, and active, full-scale opposition to genocidal events, we all have to re-think what happened then.180

However, there are also major differences between what can be perceived as Bauer’s historical ‘cosmopolitanism’ and the diverse philosophical, legal and political ‘cosmopolitanisms’ of Jaspers, Lemkin, Arendt and Habermas. For example, whereas Jaspers and Habermas’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ wrestles with the political, moral and ethical implications of the legacy of the German perpetrators, Bauer’s approach is rooted in the conviction that, “...it is best to look at the Holocaust from a Jewish perspective.”181

Equally, whereas Arendt is critical of the potential “nihilistic banalities” produced by inter-state political initiatives based on the memory of the camps,182 Bauer believes, “We need the politicians for the education effort to succeed.”183

Furthermore, whereas Arendt’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ can be seen as highly critical of how Israel was founded, and can be perceived as a crucial precursor to the work of the ‘post-Zionist' historians, Bauer has remained critical of how this contemporary wave of

181 Ibid., p. vii.
182 Arendt, OT, pp. 441-442.
183 Bauer, RH, p. xiii.
scholarship has analyzed the establishment of the Jewish state.\textsuperscript{184} That said, whilst Bauer remains strongly biased towards the Israeli national perspective, it should also be noted that in a more ‘cosmopolitan’ vein he is openly critical of extreme forms of contemporary Israeli religious nationalism.\textsuperscript{185} For example, in February 2003, Bauer admirably critiqued the ethnic cleansing inciting hate speech of extremist Israeli settlers and stated to a group of Danish educators visiting Yad Vashem, “\textit{What we have here between the Israelis and the Palestinians is an armed conflict – if one side becomes stronger there is a chance of genocide.}”\textsuperscript{186} However, according to the report in \textit{Haaretz}, Bauer also drew attention to polls which showed the militant anti-Semitic attitudes of a proportion of the Palestinian population and went on to add, “\textit{Fortunately, both sides are very strong and good at killing each other so you realize you can’t get rid of each other and must come to some sort of a political solution.}”\textsuperscript{187}

It is also arguable that there are differences in the way in which what can be perceived as Bauer’s ‘cosmopolitanism’ approaches the subject of the Holocaust because of his status as a professional historian that is, as a scholar who is concerned with the causes and consequences of human events and their social, political, cultural, religious or economic developments over time. For example, although sharing Arendt’s belief that not just German but all collaborators in Nazi mass murder policies should be analyzed, he also rejects Arendt’s controversial appraisal of the Jewish Councils in the 1960s which stated that the members of the Judenrat should have done nothing, because this would have disrupted the machinery of destruction and potentially reduced the number

\textsuperscript{184} Bauer, \textit{RH}, p. 244 and p. 257. Illustrating this debate, the post-Zionist historians have also been critical of Bauer’s work. For example, see Tom Segev, ‘Tragic, this story of helplessness’, \textit{Haaretz}, 22 February 2002.


\textsuperscript{187} \textit{Ibid.}
of Jewish victims. From the perspective of a historian who has analyzed specific efforts at Jewish survival during the Holocaust, Bauer perceives Arendt’s judgement to be, “inappropriate, because no Judenrat behaved in quite the same way as any other Judenrat.”\(^{189}\) Equally, whilst Bauer shares Habermas’s admiration for Goldhagen’s unapologetic centring of anti-Semitism as the primary cause of the Holocaust, he also historically critiques Goldhagen’s failure to integrate, “developments in German society in the nineteenth century,”\(^{190}\) “…the social and economic traumas that afflicted German society in the wake of World War I” as well as broader forms of European anti-Semitism into his historical explanation.\(^{191}\)

That said, perhaps where Bauer can be perceived as most notably either consciously or unconsciously negotiating, departing or troubling the ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition is in his definitions of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ and ‘genocide’. Against the backdrop of the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’, Bauer’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ can be interpreted as operating within established traditions which have sought to register the enormity of the Jewish catastrophe. For whilst at Nuremberg, Jackson considered all Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’ to be ‘unprecedented’,\(^{192}\) this chapter has also shown how ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers as early as Lemkin and Arendt also definitively recognized the extremity of the Jewish catastrophe whilst also seeing it as part of broader patterns of atrocities committed under Third Reich occupation regimes (AROE) or totalitarian systems of domination (OT). Furthermore, in many respects, Bauer’s specific invocation of the ‘unprecedentedness’ of the Holocaust also builds on direct


\(^{189}\) Bauer, *RH*, p. 129.


‘cosmopolitan’ precedents. For example, in *EJ* Arendt noted that, “*Eichmann was accused of, an unprecedented crime…*”\(^{193}\) and that amidst broader Nazi atrocities, the Holocaust was the, “…*the supreme crime…*” perpetrated against humanity.\(^{194}\)

Whilst the rhetoric of ‘unprecedentedness’ suggests a degree of continuity, what can be categorized as much more distinctive is Bauer’s splitting of Lemkin’s term ‘genocide’ which was later institutionalized in the modified form of the UNGC, into his definitions of ‘total’ destruction (‘Holocaust’) and ‘partial’ destruction (‘genocide’).\(^{195}\) As has been explored in chapters two and three, what is troubling about this splitting as well as Bauer’s restriction of the victims of genocide to racial, ethnic and national groups,\(^{196}\) is that it potentially excludes certain collectives, it increases the possibility for the Western orientated hierarchization of genocides as well as exacerbating the possibilities for competitive victimhood between those who have suffered and survived genocide. However, demonstrating Bauer’s ambivalence if he is to be perceived as a ‘cosmopolitan’ thinker these negative potentialities also co-exist alongside the more positive possibilities in Bauer’s thought to remember the Holocaust, commemorate other Nazi atrocities and proactively work towards taking action on genocide issues. For example, standing by his convictions in 2006, Bauer filed a request to Israel’s High Court of Justice to allow him to forward a position paper on Darfur, in an effort to help the cause of, “…31 Sudanese refugees held under IDF administrative detention and being threatened with expulsion.”\(^{197}\)

Having demonstrated how the SIF 2000 and the intellectual lineage of the Stockholm

\(^{195}\) Bauer, *RH*, p. 10.
Declaration can be categorized as ‘cosmopolitan’ in both positive as well as in more problematic ways, this chapter will now critically delineate the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000. This ‘New Cosmopolitan’ reading of the SIF 2000 is not concerned with understanding how Bauer and the Stockholm Declaration’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ can be historically compared, contrasted and categorized in relation to a ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual and institutional tradition. Rather it seeks to re-appropriate the events of 2000 in order to support its own teleological narrative of history as ‘progress’ towards what its adherents perceive as the transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’. Furthermore, as part of this ‘progressive’ narrative towards the remembrance of the Holocaust in the ‘global age’ of ‘Second Modernity’, the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ problematically ignores the extent to which ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers in the 1940s and 1950s such as Lemkin and Arendt recognized the absolute specificity of the Jewish Catastrophe even within comparative contexts of analysis such as ‘genocide’ and ‘totalitarianism’.

Moving beyond this brief sketch of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and in order to comprehensively understand the intellectual context in which the SIF 2000 was interpreted in the early twenty-first century, the next section will explain in depth what makes the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ different from older forms of ‘cosmopolitanism’ as well as explicating the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by Levy and Sznaider. Finally, it will be argued that these authors ‘emplotment’ of the SIF 2000 within a ‘New Cosmopolitan’ narrative of ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ is deeply problematic because not only does it risk downplaying the extent to which the Jewish catastrophe was specifically addressed by ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers such as Lemkin and Arendt in the immediate post-war period, but it also risks over-simplifying
the historical record of developments in the commemoration of the Jewish catastrophe since 1945. Finally, it will also be argued that a central problem with Levy and Sznaider’s historical analysis of the SIF 2000 within the ‘progressive’ framework of ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ is that it also discourages a sober and realistic assessment of the continuing challenges posed to the implementation of the Stockholm Declaration’s imperatives to remember the Holocaust, recognize other Nazi atrocities and prevent forms of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia,” in the present.198

**Levy, Sznaider and the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000**

The ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ can be defined as the international and interdisciplinary post-1989 intellectual and political movement that re-thinks and contemporizes the Kantian ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition and puts global governance, international law, peaceful inter-state relations and human rights at the centre of its world-view.199 Also central to the work of scholars such as Ulrich Beck, Daniel Levy, Natan Sznaider, David Held and Daniele Archibugi is the critique of methodological nationalism in the social sciences. These thinkers also share the conviction that humanity exists in an era of mutual global inter-dependence and attempt to construct normative and at times prescriptive concepts of global justice, world citizenship and ‘cosmopolitan’ democracy.200 The formation of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ was influenced by a wave of transnational human rights developments that occurred since the twilight of Communism in the late 1980s. For example, the United Nations Convention Against

200 Ibid., p. 2.
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment (1987); War Crimes
Tribunals in the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994); as well as the
establishment of the ICC (2002).\textsuperscript{201}

Member of the German generation of 1968 and current Professor of Sociology at the
University of Munich and the London School of Economics, Ulrich Beck is one of the
key representatives of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’. Beck postulates that 1989 marked
the watershed moment between ‘First’ and ‘Second’ modernity in which national-global
‘cosmopolitan’ parties, social movements and self-reflexive knowledge systems are
needed to deal with the environmental, economic and military challenges posed by a
globally inter-dependent twenty-first century ‘World Risk Society’.\textsuperscript{202}

Responding to the transnational problems posed by the post-Cold War era, Beck has argued that, “…in
a world of global crises and dangers produced by civilization, the old differentiations
between internal and external, national and international, us and them, lose their
validity and a new cosmopolitan realism becomes essential to survival.”\textsuperscript{203}

The intervention of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ is not only significant within the
development of the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’ but has also provided a key framework
for the interpretation of the political and historical importance of the SIF 2000. The
most widely known ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the symbolic significance of
both the Holocaust and the role of the SIF 2000 within that matrix is New York based
sociologist Daniel Levy and Tel Aviv based academic Natan Sznaider’s book, \textit{The


Holocaust and Memory in the Global Age (HMGA, 2006) as well as their article, ‘Memory Unbound: The Holocaust and the Formation of Cosmopolitan Memory’ (2002). Perceiving the Holocaust as an attack on a stereotyped ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal of Diaspora Jewishness which accidently and disconcertingly corresponds with the negative representation of ‘World Jewry’ found in European far right propaganda, Levy and Sznaider’s book fits squarely within the conceptual horizon of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and has been cited by Beck as demonstrating that, “…radical, self-critical European commemoration of the Holocaust does not destroy, but rather constitutes the identity of Europe.”

Levy and Sznaider adopt Beck’s chronological framework of ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ or the transformation from a ‘First Modernity’ rooted in industrial modernization and the nation state by the processes of, “…globalization, individualization, gender revolution, underemployment and global risks (such as ecological crisis and the crash of global financial markets)” to a ‘Second Modernity’ based on trans-national mutual inter-dependence. They have argued that since 1989 and the end of the Cold War, the memory of the Holocaust has become a ‘cosmopolitan’ symbol that functions as a transnational moral imperative to prevent racism, intolerance and genocide in the self-reflexive age of ‘Second Modernity’. For Levy and Sznaider, what is significant about this zeitgeist of ‘Second Modernity’ is the fact that the contemporary memory of the Holocaust has ‘universalistic’ implications for the West’s ethical imperative towards its suffering ‘other’. In their work, the specific remembrance of the Jewish catastrophe during the Second World War has universal implications for present and future members of ‘world humanity’:

206 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, p. 10.
In a newly European ‘cosmopolitan’ memory, the Holocaust future (and not the past) is now considered in absolutely universal terms: it can happen to anyone, at anytime, and everyone is responsible.  

In their article, ‘Memory Unbound’, Levy and Sznaider focus on three national cultures of remembrance, America, Germany and Israel, and argue that the formation of ‘cosmopolitan memory’ of the Holocaust is the result of three stages of historical development. As has been previously addressed and will be demonstrated in more depth in the last section of this chapter, Levy and Sznaider argue in historically problematic terms that the First Stage encompassed the ‘silencing’ of the Holocaust in the public memory of the West in the immediate post-war period. This is because the authors propose that whilst the Jewish catastrophe was discussed in private, it was rarely named the ‘Holocaust’ nor recognized as a specific event in the official state remembrance cultures of West Germany, Israel and the United States. For example, Levy and Sznaider argue in their book that the ‘silencing’ of the Holocaust in West Germany was largely because of the pragmatic needs of democratization after the war. Equally, although the authors note that the post-war Israeli state recognized the Jewish catastrophe as something separate from wider Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’, pointing to significant public debates as well as legislation such as the April 1951 parliamentary resolution establishing a remembrance day on 27th of Nissan or Yom Hashoah as well as the 1953 ruling which founded Yad Vashem, the authors maintain that by and large ‘silence’ surrounded the Holocaust in 1950s Israel. For Levy and Sznaider, “…no unifying terminology even existed at that point” and in overall terms, “…almost nothing was initiated by the state in the first decades after the war to

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208 Ibid., pp. 93-95.
209 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, pp. 80-81.
210 Ibid., p. 88 and p. 90.
Equally, following Peter Novick, Levy and Sznaider also argue problematically that although American Jews were willing to aid survivors, they were less concerned with remembrance and more focused on cultural assimilation and re-building their lives after the war. They are also influenced by Novick in that they forward the notion that part of the reason for the seeming lack of discussion of the Jewish catastrophe in post-war America was the fact that the legacies of Hiroshima seemed to better encapsulate public fears and anxieties in the Cold War nuclear age. Contrasting with this chapter’s analysis, Levy and Sznaider also propose that recognition of the Holocaust as a specific event in American public life was stymied by descriptions which the authors perceive as ‘universalising’ the particular history of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry in analytical terms such as ‘totalitarianism’. However, the authors also argue that it was this type of ‘universalistic’ rhetoric that laid the foundations for what they perceive as the Western liberal consensus politics of future orientated ‘cosmopolitan memory’ of the Holocaust. In line with this, _HMGA_ represents intellectuals such as Jaspers, Arendt and Lemkin as exceptional ‘cosmopolitan’ avant-garde figures during the Cold War in the 1940s and 1950s.

The second stage of historical development that Levy and Sznaider point to in their article is ‘the Iconographical Formation of the Holocaust’, or the period between the 1960s and the 1980s when national memory cultures of remembrance are perceived to emerge alongside mass media representations, such as the American television series,

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211 Levy and Sznaider, _HMGA_, p. 90.
212 Novick, _The Holocaust and Collective Memory: The American Experience_.
213 Levy and Sznaider, _HMGA_, p. 94.
214 _Ibid_., pp. 92-93.
In their book, the authors summarize these key national developments in Holocaust memory cultures of what they call ‘First Modernity’ as follows:

In Germany, the Holocaust provided a means for the left to examine its own history from a distanced, critical perspective and, above all to discredit the national perspective. In Israel the Holocaust became a symbol for insecurity and the need to maintain a strong militarized state. In the United States, it provided the basis for a newly emerging ethnic politics.217

After the nation-state orientated ‘Iconographic’ era of Holocaust memory cultures, Levy and Sznaider perceive ‘the post-Cold war’ period to be the most significant in terms of the formation of ‘cosmopolitan memories’ of the Holocaust, or memories of the Jewish catastrophe which promote a transnational human rights agenda, restitution processes and national self-reflection in different local contexts. For the authors the ‘institutional’ and ‘normative’ construction of collective ‘cosmopolitan’ memories are discernable in media reports documenting Serbian ethnic cleansing in Kosovo in the 1990s, as well as in the convening of the European, inter-governmental, Stockholm Forum on the memory of the Holocaust held in January 2000.218 Within this schema, the authors perceive the SIF 2000 to be significant as a, “good example for the deterritorialization and the institutionalization of cosmopolitan memories.”219

For Levy and Sznaider, the SIF 2000 marked a key moment in, “the institutionalization of a European memory”,220 in which “The privileged nation of yesteryear was subsumed under a powerful symbolism of victim-centered cosmopolitan memory.”221 The authors also note that the SIF 2000 contributed to the recognition of genocide as

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217 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, p. 95.
219 Ibid., p. 100.
220 Ibid., p. 100.
221 Ibid., p. 100.
one of the key risks to be addressed by the institutions comprising a self-reflexive age of ‘Second Modernity’, whilst the type of ‘future orientated’ Holocaust memory inaugurated at the SIF 2000 functions for Levy and Sznaider as, “...a prime legitimating force for future military and non-military interventions to prevent future genocides...”222 As a result, in HMGA, the authors conclude that in the contemporary Western world:

> The Holocaust sets the parameters for deterritorialized memoryscapes in Second Modernity, provides a model for national self-critique, serves to promote human rights as a legitimating principle in the global community, and plainly offers a negative example of dealing with alterity.223

A further important component of Levy and Sznaider’s argument is that since 1989 self-reflexive national memory cultures combined with emerging supra-territorial human rights legal discourses have facilitated the dialectical ‘common patterning’ or what Roland Robertson refers to as the ‘glocalization’ of Holocaust remembrance. Levy and Sznaider describe this process of ‘common patterning’ in the following terms:

> …They begin to develop in accord with common rhythms and periodizations. But in each case, the common elements combine with pre-existing elements to form something new. The new, global narrative has to be reconciled with the old, national narratives; and the result is always distinctive.224

For Levy and Sznaider, the construction of Holocaust memory is no longer predominantly carried out by nation states or historians, but is instead becoming a ‘universalized’ message of tolerance and ‘cosmopolitan empathy’ owing much to the American model.225 They allege that this message is accepted, negotiated or rejected in different local contexts and is carried across national boundaries by the global distributive power of the mass media, popular texts such as Schindler’s List (1993) as

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223 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, p. 201.
224 Levy and Sznaider, ‘Memory Unbound’, p. 89.
225 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, p. 183.
well as by supra-territorial alliances of governments resulting from initiatives such as the SIF 2000. As a result, in *HMGA*, Levy and Sznaider, interpret the Stockholm Declaration as marking the institutionalization of a future orientated, “…deteriorialized, cosmopolitan memory…”226 that works because the Holocaust, “…conforms so unequivocally to categories of good and evil.”227 However, this overtly Manichean and mass media friendly reading of the Holocaust within Levy and Sznaider’s work begs the question of how the discourses of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ could cope with documentary evidence and testimonial descriptions of the horror and historical heterogeneity of what Auschwitz survivor, Primo Levi has termed the reality of day to day survival in the moral ‘grey zone’ of the concentration camp system.228

In terms of the history of the SIF 2000, Levy and Sznaider are correct to point to the significance of the construction of norms of remembrance at the transnational level and the potential impact of these norms in various national ‘public spheres’ after 2000 as a result of practical efforts to implement the Stockholm Declaration by the ITF and its affiliated governments and NGOs. Equally, as has been demonstrated in chapter two, the authors are correct to note the significance of Holocaust metaphors in justifying NATO military intervention in Kosovo as well as the importance of the American contribution to the international project of Holocaust remembrance in the run up to the SIF 2000. Furthermore, in terms of the expectations created by the genre of ‘cosmopolitanism’, it is possible to perceive the rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration (2000) in encouraging the prevention of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia” as well as the subsequent convening of SIFs on ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing

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226 Levy and Sznaider, *HMGA*, p. 185.
227 Ibid., p. 186.
228 Levi, *The Drowned and the Saved*, p. 27.
Genocide’ (2004) as generically ‘cosmopolitan’ in construction. That is, through the convening of these conferences international dialogues were forged, whilst the adherence of state governments to international law and the protection of ‘universal’ rights was encouraged through the formulation of the Stockholm Declarations (2000, 2001, 2004), a collection of non-binding multilateral contracts. Indeed, in a similar way to other ‘cosmopolitan’ documents before them (for example, the UNDHR), the non-binding nature of the Stockholm Declarations (2000, 2001, 2004) meant that they remained non-contentious at the government level, both in terms of their volunteerism and preservation of state sovereignty, but also possessed the more radical possibility of serving as potential lobbying tools in campaigns by non-governmental activists.

However, whilst elements of the SIF 2000 can be categorized as ‘cosmopolitan’ in other respects Levy and Sznaider’s conclusions in HMGA are deeply flawed and this is not just because of the reasons already mentioned or the fact that their writings can be perceived as demonstrating some of the most cited objections to ‘New Cosmopolitan’ approaches in the social sciences. For example, some thinkers have berated the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ for identifying with Western value systems of modernization and representations of the ‘human’ which are perceived to risk producing new exclusions through the elision of the specificity of difference in terms of the diversity of national, ethnic, gendered and sexual experiences across the globe. For example, postcolonialists might perceive Levy and Sznaider’s ‘universalizing’ of the Holocaust or the Jewish catastrophe as a central symbol of what they call ‘New Cosmopolitan’ ‘Second Modernity’ as problematic in terms of its potential to elide the particularism of the experiences of ‘non-European’ victims of genocide. Furthermore, and in contrast to

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Arendt’s and Jaspers’ caution in regards to the ‘totalitarian’ potentials inherent within some formulations of the ‘cosmopolitan’ ideal of international jurisdiction,²³¹ ‘New Cosmopolitan’ theories have also been viewed by some critics as potentially undemocratic in their failure to ensure the popular legitimacy of global governance.²³² Finally, and crucially in relation to questions posed by the continuing perpetration of genocide in the contemporary world, the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ has also been sharply criticized as naïve and unrealistic for fetishizing the ‘universal’ human and group rights agenda, when this agenda continues to be violated by various state actors throughout the globe.²³³

**Historical Problems with the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ Interpretation of the SIF 2000**

Moving beyond these general criticisms of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’, this section will argue that there are three main problems with Levy and Sznaider’s periodization of the historical development of Holocaust memory work since 1945 as well as their interpretation of the SIF 2000 which encompasses their conviction that the post-Cold War era marks a key historical turning point in the construction of ‘cosmopolitan memories’ of the Holocaust, a transition from ‘First’ to ‘Second’ Modernity which, “…provide[s] a new epistemological vantage point, one that questions the ‘methodological nationalism’ that still prevails in much of the social sciences.”²³⁴ Firstly, new historical research is demonstrating that there was much more extensive Jewish communal remembrance of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry in the late

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²³⁴ Levy and Sznaider, ‘Memory Unbound’, p. 103.
1940s and 1950s than Levy, Sznaider and Novick’s accounts would suggest, including examples of global inter-linked remembrance cultures which were sometimes but not always connected to what can be perceived as early ‘cosmopolitan’ state sanctioned efforts to provide financial restitution to Jewish victims of Nazi atrocity crimes. Moreover, further research is needed to assess whether any of these early forms of communal and/or transnational networks of collective remembrance of the Jewish Catastrophe can be seen as prototypically ‘cosmopolitan’ in not just financial but also ideological terms.

Secondly, the role of transnational institutions such as NATO and the EU in the restitution movements of the 1990s as well as in the ITF and the SIF 2000 marked not the smooth transition to a ‘Second Modernity’ dominated by global governmental norms in relation to Holocaust memory as an ethical imperative for the promotion of ‘New Cosmopolitan’ values such as international justice, human rights and genocide prevention, but was rather complex and contradictory. Thirdly, Levy and Sznaider’s representation of the ‘progressive’ arrival of a transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’ risks underplaying the ongoing structural inadequacies of international bodies such as the UN in the face of the continuing threat that Barbara Harff argues is posed by potential perpetrators of genocide in war torn, ethnically divided, politically unstable, ideologically elite driven, economically fragile and isolated nation states.235

Levy and Sznaider argue that the memory of the Holocaust was largely suppressed in the immediate post-war period whilst nation-state dominated memories of the Holocaust were constructed in the era of ‘First Modernity’ between the 1960s and 1980s. They

also argue that since 1989 collective memories of the Jewish catastrophe have emerged which promote a transnational human rights agenda and national self-reflection in different local contexts in the period of what ‘New Cosmopolitans’ call ‘Second Modernity’. However, this interpretation of the historical development of memory cultures of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry is flawed, largely because it reduces the diversity of human attempts at communal remembrance to the stranglehold of a retrospectively imposed and deeply somber discursive pun. That is, because what is now ‘normatively’ called ‘the Holocaust’ globally, was not commonly named or institutionalized as ‘the Holocaust’ by state agencies in the immediate post-war period, the collective memory of the Jewish catastrophe was therefore rendered largely ‘silent’ in America, Israel and Germany between 1945-1962.

Recent research by scholars such as Hasia R. Diner, Roni Stauber and Boaz Cohen is challenging many elements of this pervasive historiographical assumption that underpins the work of scholars such as Levy, Sznaider and Novick, particularly in relation to America and Israel. For example, Stauber has shown how issues in relation to the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry kept erupting in Israeli public life during the 1950s, whilst Cohen has chronicled the struggles of Polish Jewish survivor Rachel Auerbach to collect survivor testimonies for Yad Vashem during the 1950s.236 Equally, Diner has demonstrated how Jewish communities in various states across America used an assortment of terms to memorialize what has now become normatively known as the Holocaust in books, radio broadcasts, institutional programs, liturgies, cemetery markers and Warsaw Ghetto memorial days’ between 1945 and 1962.237

237 Diner, *We Remember with Reverence and Love*, pp. 18-85.
Furthermore, re-thinking the chronology of the social remembrance of the Jewish catastrophe in this way suggests a number of important points for how to understand the development of transnational dynamics in collective memory work. Indeed, far from being unique to ‘Second Modernity’, or developing after nation-state dominated memories, transnational dynamics in the remembrance of the Nazi regime and its collaborators’ mass murder of six million Jews have been apparent since the end of the Second World War and have arisen and continue to develop in relation to national, regional and familial collective memories of the Holocaust. Moreover, as early as 1953 these efforts have sometimes but not always been directly linked to what can be perceived as important prototypical ‘cosmopolitan’ efforts at the government level to provide restitution and reparation to victims of state sanctioned atrocities. For example, although not necessarily making these memorial projects ‘cosmopolitan’ in content, the 1953 agreement that Israel and the Conference of Jewish Material Claims Against Germany (comprising 22 Jewish organizations from America, France, Canada, Great Britain, South Africa, Australia and Argentina) reached with the Federal Republic of Germany in regards to reparations was significant for commemoration reasons because the Claims Conference put aside some of these funds to sponsor memorial projects to the Jewish catastrophe in Israel and America.

Significant in this regard was the fact that Yad Vashem was established in Israel in 1953 and approximately half of its budget in the 1950s was contributed by the Claims Conference. This affected some important decisions made in the fledgling institution.

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238 For a detailed analysis of important dynamics in Holocaust restitution between the 1940s and the 1990s, see Marrus, *Some Measure of Justice*, pp. 62-75.

239 Levy and Sznaider say little about the significance of the founding of Yad Vashem at around the same time as the 1953 reparations deal. Their only comment on this is, “Interestingly, Yad Vashem was erected at precisely the same time that negotiations with Germany over restitution were taking place.” (Levy and Sznaider, *HMGA*, p. 89.)
The initial influence of the Zionist Left had impacted on the early conceptualization of Yad Vashem, with plans for a Hall of Memory and a separate Hall of Heroism dedicated specifically to the ghetto fighters and Jewish resistance. However, demonstrating the organizational and financial clout of the Claims Conference, two halls were vetoed in 1955 on the grounds that the Claims Conference wanted the majority of their investment to be spent on research, whilst representative Mark Yuvilar objected that, “As a European Jew I protest to a plan that would differentiate between heroes and martyrs. The whole concept is un-Jewish and incorrect.” Furthermore, it should also be noted that the Claims Conference did not only support Yad Vashem. It also contributed funds to YIVO (Yidischer Visinschaftlekher Institut or The Jewish Scientific Institute) which had originated in Vilna, Lithuania, and had decamped to New York in 1940. Staffed by many survivors, YIVO played a key role in archiving primary documents relating to the Jewish catastrophe as well as in producing exhibitions and memorial projects dedicated to educating the public about the recently decimated Yiddish and Eastern European Jewish communities. Monies from the Claims Conference in the mid-1950s also contributed to the completion of a number of YIVO research studies as well as facilitating a working partnership with Yad Vashem.

However, international dynamics in Holocaust memory work were not restricted to the workings of the Claims Conference in the 1950s. American Jewish individuals, the Anti-Defamation League as well as the American Jewish Committee all financially contributed to Polish Jew Isaac Schneersohn’s Parisian project to construct, The Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine and Tomb of the Unknown Jewish Martyr.

242 Diner, We Remember with Reverence and Love, p. 93.
243 Ibid., p. 96.
which was consecrated in 1952 and opened to the public in 1956.\textsuperscript{244} American Jews also donated money to the Jewish National Fund’s initiative to plant six million trees in a Martyr’s Forest in the Jerusalem Hills.\textsuperscript{245} Noting the lack of signposts for visitors to Dachau concentration camp, the Jewish Labor Committee also put pressure on the U.S. Department of Defense’s, Robert McNamara, to fix the problem. Equally, mass reproduced images of the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial (1948) quickly made Nathan Rappoport’s public sculpture a global icon of Jewish resistance.\textsuperscript{246} As such, whilst international dynamics in Holocaust remembrance institutions may have intensified and become greater in scale and government involvement since 1989, this development does not necessarily mark a radical historical break but instead builds on international patterns of admittedly incomplete government processes of compensation for Holocaust survivors during the Cold War era as well as immediate post-1945 inter-cultural co-operative attempts by Jewish communities across the globe to commemorate the six million.\textsuperscript{247}

Finally, an interesting area for more detailed investigation would be to conduct further research into the extent to which rather than being limited to a post-war ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual avant-garde or the representatives of Holocaust memory work in what Levy and Sznaider call ‘Second Modernity’, whether ‘cosmopolitan’ or ‘liberal universalistic’ sentiments issuing from the remembrance of the six million can be detected in much earlier events than the press reportage of Kosovo (1999). Areas for further analysis in this regard might include the fact that far from being a lone avant-garde ‘cosmopolitan’ light in the battle for the UNGC, Lemkin was supported by American Jewish

\textsuperscript{244} Diner, \textit{We Remember with Reverence and Love}, p. 30.
\textsuperscript{245} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 42.
\textsuperscript{246} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 32.
\textsuperscript{247} \textit{Ibid.}, pp. 18-85.
individuals and institutions. Indeed, Diner has already started to note how in the period 1945-1962, some American Jews invoked the memory of the Nazi mass murder of the six million in both highly specific and ‘universal’ terms to lead liberal campaigns against the Soviet Union, in favor of civil rights, in opposition to harsh immigration laws and in support of the ratification of the UNGC. Mirroring this sentiment figures such as Jacob Blaustein of the American Jewish Committee and David Ullman of the National Community Relations Advisory Council drew on the memory of the Nazi mass murder of European Jewry specifically, as well as references to other victims of genocide and Nazi ‘Crimes against Humanity’ in order to push for the U.S Congress to ratify the 1948 UNGC (a task that was finally achieved in 1987).

The second major problem with Levy and Sznaider’s delineation of historical time is that by representing the contemporary construction of ‘Second Modernity’ as the dialectical resolution of a ‘New Cosmopolitan’ world-historical turning point, Levy and Sznaider risk intimating too positive a picture of transnational agencies and simplifying the complex and contradictory role of Western supra-territorial alliances such as NATO and the EU in bringing about post-1989 developments in Holocaust restitution and memory work. Transnational institutions often played either a contested role (NATO) or marginal part (EU) in the restitution campaigns and early years of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000. For example, during the restitution negotiations of the 1990s, the WJRO threatened that without adequate restitution it would attempt to block Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic’s integration into NATO in 1999 and this stance was also broadly supported by the U.S government. However the WJRO’s invocation of a NATO ban on enlargement was strongly objected to by the American

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248 Diner, *We Remember with Reverence and Love*, p. 266.
249 Ibid., p. 308.
Jewish Committee as well as by many local Eastern European Jewish communities.\textsuperscript{251} Furthermore, although the EU had made a commitment to democracy, human rights and the protection of minorities’ a part of its Copenhagen Criteria (1993) for membership,\textsuperscript{252} it has been contended that the organization played only a limited role in the Holocaust era restitution campaigns of the 1990s. For example, Eizenstat observed:

\begin{quote}
Aside from a 1995 European parliament resolution generally encouraging property restitution, we received no support from the European Union, which could have used the leverage of its own admission process to encourage prospective member states in the former communist world to adopt modern property laws and to return property confiscated during the Nazi and communist eras.\textsuperscript{253}
\end{quote}

Moreover, the role of transnational inter-state institutions such as the EU, UN and the Council of Europe within the founding of the ITF and the convening of the SIF 2000 was in fact, quite minimal. This is perhaps most firmly illustrated by the fact that the role of these supra-territorial institutions as associates in the work of the ITF only really accelerated after the SIF 2000 and subsequent conferences on ‘Combating Intolerance’ (2001), ‘Truth, Justice and Reconciliation’ (2002) and ‘Preventing Genocide’ (2004). For example, in 2002 Education Ministers at the Council of Europe decided to support a ‘Day of Holocaust Remembrance and the prevention of Crimes against Humanity’ in schools, whilst the United Nations established 27\textsuperscript{th} January as ‘Holocaust Memorial Day’ through UN Resolution 60/7 passed on 1\textsuperscript{st} November 2005.\textsuperscript{254} Equally, French Holocaust survivor, Henryk Pikielny, who was contesting the Polish government’s refusal to return his father’s Lodz factory, broke with all historical precedent by taking his case to the European Court of Human Rights in 2005 rather than presenting his case

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\textsuperscript{251} Barkan, The Guilt of Nations, p. 148.  \\
\textsuperscript{252} Vachudova, Europe Undivided, p. 121.  \\
\textsuperscript{253} Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice, p. 27.  \\
\end{flushright}
to the American legal system. Finally, the swift expansion of ITF members from just three founding states in 1998 to 25 member states in 2007 has broadly mirrored the political dynamics of democratization associated with EU and NATO enlargements.

However, despite these developments, the EU’s diffidence towards Holocaust restitution efforts persisted throughout the noughties. For example, compounding the Bush administration’s looser grip on restitution issues, the EU also, “...lifted a requirement for restitution that would have blocked Poland’s 2004 admission to the 27-country union.” Furthermore, as shown in chapter four, the EU persisted in making Vilnius 2009 European Capital of Culture in spite of Andrew Baker’s allegations of Lithuania’s “twisting” of Holocaust memory as well as the country’s refusal to deal with communal property restitution issues, whilst as late as June 2009, British member of the House of Lords, Ruth Deech, who was seeking compensation for property taken from her Jewish grandparents in Poland during the Nazi era, complained:

Rather than declarations…the European Union should create a fund immediately to deal with claims…In Britain we are subject to so many European Union directives…Why can’t there be one on this?

Finally, it should also be noted that in spite of some transnational efforts by agencies such as the UN to encourage the remembrance of the Holocaust as a touchstone for the promotion of human and group rights since 2005, the coupling of these objectives in contemporary forms of Holocaust memory work is far from clear-cut. For example, a survey carried out by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights on the role

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257 Spritzer, ‘News Analysis: Last Chance for Holocaust Restitution?’.
258 Baker, ‘Europe’s Shameful Honouring of Vilnius’.
259 Ruth Deech quoted in Spritzer, ‘News Analysis: Last Chance for Holocaust Restitution?’
played by Holocaust museums and memorial sites such as Auschwitz-Birkenau, Terezín and the House of the Wannsee Conference in promoting human rights’ education discovered that, “Only one of the surveyed sites regards raising awareness about human rights as its most important objective, all other institutions focus on the transmission of historical knowledge.” Furthermore, despite what can be categorized as the ‘cosmopolitan’ elements of the Stockholm Declaration, the role of the ITF in promoting the remembrance of the Holocaust in relation to human rights was hotly debated within the organization during the noughties, whilst an ITF statement condemning the genocide in Darfur was issued, but only after a great deal of internal deliberation. Within this context, Levy and Sznaider’s conviction that twenty-first century ‘New Cosmopolitan’ memory of the Holocaust promotes issues such as human rights as well as their statement that, “The consolidating of the European Union and other transnational organizations also works to promote international forums of justice” remains both contested and an ongoing work in progress.

The third problem with the division between ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ is that despite Levy and Sznaider’s proclamations of self-reflexivity, the almost messianic dialectical arrival of ‘Second Modernity’ ultimately risks masking the terrifying realities of both historical and contemporary inter-state and nation-state sanctioned political violence. This failing is illustrated most starkly when the ‘New Cosmopolitan’ assumptions of Levy and Sznaider are placed in dialogue with analyst of the causes of genocide and critic of the political and economic structures of Western modernity, Mark Levene. For Levene, not only are competitive inter-state relations towards

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260 European Union Agency for Fundamental Human Rights, Discover the Past for the Future, p. 10. The one site that prioritised Human Rights Education was Hartheim Castle, Austria which focuses on the Nazi Euthanasia programme.
261 See Chapter 3 of this thesis.
262 Levy and Sznaider, HMGA, p. 207.
modernization one of the underlying structural causes of genocide in ‘failed’ states but the prevention of genocide is also stymied by contemporary inter-state relations, most notably the ongoing failure to reform the power of veto held by the five member states of the UN Security Council (America, France, Britain, Russia, China). For Levene, the national interests of the Security Council have meant that:

…the Western system leaders may act in the future to prevent or halt genocidal threats where they are sure of being able to do so with minimal military, political or economic consequence to themselves – in other words against very weak states – but not against, for instance, Russia, China, Turkey – all states with significant potential for genocide – where Western self-interest would dictate a strictly hands off policy.  

Levene’s analysis of the role of inter-state relations in facilitating genocide as well as the ongoing failure of international bodies such as the UN to prevent genocide reveals the deficiencies within the idealism of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and its binary construction of nation state dominated ‘First Modernity’ and transnational ‘Second Modernity’. For one of the dangers inherent in the idealization of the ‘transnational’ and the relegation of the ‘national’ within the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ is that it ultimately contains the capacity to produce cynicism when contemporary human rights abuses, national hostility to refugees and acts of genocide continue unabated in what Levy and Sznaider have constructed as the post-1989 period of ‘Second Modernity’.  

These shortcomings, specifically in relation to the perpetration of genocide are epitomized by post-1989 UN failures in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995), as well as by the fact that genocide has been perpetrated in Darfur province by Janjaweed militias with the sanction of the Sudanese government since 2003, and in flagrant disregard of UN directives, as well as the SIF 2004’s well intentioned efforts at ‘preventing genocide’.  

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263 Levene, ‘Why is the Twentieth Century the Century of Genocide?’, p. 335.
264 Fine, Cosmopolitanism, p. 138.
265 Leitenberg, ‘Beyond the ‘Never Again’’, p. 163.
Conclusion

It can be contended that whilst certain elements of the SIF 2000, including Bauer’s not un-problematic rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, can be perceived within the nexus of ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual traditions, the idealistic assumptions of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’ and Levy and Sznaider’s mode of understanding the SIF 2000 within the periodization of ‘First’ and ‘Second Modernity’ needs to be questioned. Arguably, this is necessary for two main reasons. Firstly, because the proposed progressive movement from ‘First’ to ‘Second Modernity’ presents a problematic periodization of historical developments in Holocaust memory work and as a result risks obfuscating the extent to which the SIF 2000 built on international and possibly even ‘cosmopolitan’ precedents in the remembrance of the Jewish Catastrophe during the Cold War era. And secondly, because in order for Holocaust and Nazi era memory work to retain its historical integrity but also proactively encourage human rights and genocide prevention in the present, it is also necessary to have an honest confrontation with the complexities and ambivalences of contemporary power relations between international organizations and nation-states, rather than envisaging a theoretical but too often premature ideal of transnational relations and uncontested human rights promoting Holocaust memory work in what ‘New Cosmopolitans’ have called the post-1989 era of ‘Second Modernity’.

However, by critiquing the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’, this chapter does not seek to refute the formative impact that knowledge of Nazi atrocities including the Jewish catastrophe had on post-1945 ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers and activists nor does it negate the importance of all contemporary ‘cosmopolitan’ thinking in the social sciences. For as
Fine has proposed what is needed in the place of the research agenda of the ‘New Cosmopolitanism’, is a ‘cosmopolitanism’ sobered by its own ‘worldliness’. That is a ‘cosmopolitanism’ which is not based on 1989 as heralding a new transnational era of ‘Second Modernity’, but is instead focused on a radically self-critical, historically un-blinded and politically vigorous engagement with contemporary questions relating to national and transnational governance, ‘universal’ rights and international law.\footnote{Fine, Cosmopolitanism, p. 141.} For it is only through such an unstinting awareness of the ongoing potential for the perpetration of acts of brutality within the current global system of nation-states, international jurisprudence and transnational governance that any attempts at contemporary human rights activism and genocide prevention in line with the positive ‘cosmopolitan’ potentials of the Stockholm Declaration (2000) can be discovered, discussed and acted upon.
Conclusion

Through an analysis of published and un-published primary sources, the critical interrogation of the pre-existing secondary literature as well as the recording of oral history interviews with a selection of primarily British delegates to the SIF 2000, HMM has provided an original analysis of the causes, consequences and ‘cosmopolitan’ intellectual context for understanding the SIF 2000 on the Holocaust. By specifically focusing on the conference at Stockholm, broader themes have been unpacked relating to the political, social and cultural dynamics of Holocaust memory politics within the international arena at the dawn of the twenty-first century. These themes have included the relationships of power between Western Europe and ‘New’ Europe and how Holocaust era issues fit into NATO and EU enlargement processes; as well as the relationship between the focus on the Jewish Catastrophe, broader Nazi atrocity crimes and ‘universalist’ political objectives in Bauer’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, a rhetoric which was significant because it formed a central element of the discursive construction of the manifesto of the SIF 2000, the Stockholm Declaration on the Holocaust.

As part of HMM’s analysis, chapter one delineated the immediate causes of the SIF 2000 in the 1990s and in so doing suggested that whilst the inadequacies of Maastricht and the return of genocide to Europe were important factors, the specific choice of the Nazi past and the Jewish catastrophe in particular, as the central subject of the work of the ITF and the SIF 2000 was also the result of a number of particular challenges and opportunities posed to Holocaust research, remembrance and education in the post-Communist context of the 1990s. These included the ideal expressed by some
restitution advocates that whilst compensation could provide a degree of ‘Imperfect Justice’, one of the legacies of the Holocaust and the Third Reich should be nations taking responsibility for their complicity in the Nazi past through acts of public research, education and memorialization. Chapter one also proposed that the founding of Sweden’s Living History campaign (1997) and the publication of Tell Ye Your Children…; the proven success of recent examples of inter-cultural co-operation in Holocaust memory work as well as pan-European liberal anxieties at the rise of the populist and far right and forms of Holocaust denial were also indispensable dynamics in contributing to the establishment of the ITF and the subsequent organization of the SIF 2000. Furthermore, through chapter one’s inter-cultural analysis of the links between the USHMM, the IWM and the Auschwitz-Birkenau State Museum in the 1990s, this chapter implies that this is a potentially productive methodology in attempting to understand how international ‘flows’ impact on the construction of national sites of memory work.

Taking into consideration the reasons for the establishment of the ITF explained in chapter one and against the backdrop of events such as the WCHA (1998) and NATO military intervention in Kosovo (1999), chapter two outlined the institutional policy discussions and decision-making within the ITF which directly preceded the convening of the SIF 2000 and the writing of the Stockholm Declaration. These decisions included the nomination of Bauer as Academic Advisor (May 1998), as well as the adoption of his complex and multi-faceted rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as the dominant discourse of the Stockholm Declaration. Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’

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1 Eizenstat, Imperfect Justice.
suggests that in its ‘totality’ the particular event of the Nazi era Jewish Catastrophe is exceptional as well as ‘universal’ in possessing elements of comparability with other genocides and saying, “...something terribly important about humanity.” However, this discourse has also proven contentious because of the potential for the hierarchization of Nazi atrocities and genocides implicit in some but not all interpretations and uses of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, as well as potentially exclusionary in its restriction of the term ‘genocide’ to ethnic, national and racial groups.

Another key ITF policy formulated at this time was that of ‘Liaison Projects’. Discussions about ‘Liaison Projects’ within the ITF in 1999 demonstrate just how sensitive the organization was to potential criticism about being perceived as an institution which simply imposed Western norms and values without any sensitivity to the particularities of different national and regional environments. As a result, the original idea for these ‘Liaison Projects’ was that the ITF should only work with states who approached it; that projects should be long term and adaptable in implementation; that they should support and reinforce pre-existing diplomatic associations as well as being specifically tailored to the territory in question. For example, it is arguable that an instance of this kind of ‘tailoring’ was the integration of the Czech Republic’s Fenomén Holocaust initiative within the work of the ITF’s first ever ‘Liaison Project’.

However, whilst to some observers the notion of these ‘Liaison Projects’ might have hubristic connotations of grand Western-led projects of integration in Holocaust

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3 Bauer, RH, p. 67.
4 Ibid., p. 12.
research, remembrance and education across Europe and the globe, it should also be remembered that although the ITF had some major international players in its midst, it was still a relatively young organization on the eve of the millennium and uncertain as to the extent to which it should expand. For example, although later Task Force expansions would broadly mirror the contours of NATO and EU membership and enlargement processes, in 1999 the ITF was only just starting to cultivate relations with organizations such as the European Parliament and the Council of Europe, whilst during preparations for the SIF 2000, Smith retrospectively recounted how Swedish organizers were surprised at the number of political delegations who accepted invitations to attend.6 Indeed, a common theme running through interviews with specialists who attended the SIF 2000 was that the high level of political and intellectual involvement was ‘extraordinary’ and/or ‘overwhelming’. This intense level of political participation which felt radically new, was mirrored in the fact that the forty-six nations in attendance adopted the Stockholm Declaration (2000), a document which used the multifaceted and not unproblematic discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ as part of its promotion of research, remembrance and education about the Nazi era Jewish Catastrophe, the acknowledgement of broader victims of the Third Reich’s atrocity crimes as well as encouraging the ‘universalist’ ethical imperative to politically work to prevent present day forms of ethnic cleansing, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and genocide.

In addition, this thesis has not only been concerned with how international developments impacted upon the ‘institutional’ construction of Holocaust commemoration strategies and efforts to prevent, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism,

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6 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’. 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia,” but has also been interested in how these initiatives have been received and perceived in different international, national and regional contexts. As part of this process, chapter two demonstrated how the SIF 2000 was used as a platform by speakers such as Hancock and Siladzic to raise awareness of broader Nazi atrocities as well as other genocides and human rights abuses. Furthermore, this thesis has also suggested that whilst the SIF 2000 generated considerable global television and radio coverage, news of this ‘extraordinary’ conference in Anglo and American newspapers was often only reported within the context of other international or national stories such as the Haider controversy in Austria or the debate over Section 28 in Britain. This demonstrates the extent to which communicating important developments in Holocaust memory work at the international level through the press was a challenge for events such as the SIF 2000. However, in a move towards remedying some of the potential ‘democratic deficits’ of event organizing and decision-making at the global level, the Internet has made it possible for SIF conference speeches and presentations to be made available online. Indeed, in terms of the subsequent work of the ITF, the rapid growth in influence of the Worldwide Web shaped many of the organization’s post SIF 2000 initiatives, from encouraging the creation of memorials and museum databases and producing online Holocaust education guidelines, to the ITF’s increasing interest in the use of online exhibitions to promote education about the Holocaust.

Contrasting with the inadequacies of Anglo-American newspapers reportage of the SIF

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8 *HMM*, pp. 170-173.
2000, in February of the same year, *The Jerusalem Report* tackled the events in Stockholm specifically, with Zuroff expressing his disappointment that the Swedish government did not adequately address war crimes issues, whilst he also critiqued the speeches of politicians from the Baltic States for failing to address instances of local collaboration in Holocaust era mass murders.\(^\text{10}\) Alongside this national resistance to acknowledging the full horrors of the Nazi past, this thesis has also noted that some of the SIF 2000’s other limitations included the fact that in the official speeches little was said about Chechnya, whilst Turkey continued to stonewall the Armenian genocide. Furthermore, despite Persson’s opening address at the conference, as well as the Stockholm Declaration’s acknowledgement of the broader victims of Nazi atrocities, Hancock critiqued the event in relation to the Roma, whilst there was no representative of a disability NGO at the conference, despite the continuing need to memorialize the Nazi T4 mass murder programme.\(^\text{11}\) Indeed, chapter three of *HMM* has suggested that alongside the ITF’s central focus on the Jewish Catastrophe and post-SIF 2000 work on the Roma genocide, and whilst bearing in mind other victim groups, T4 remembrance is an important area that the organization could establish special educational sub-committees on in the future.\(^\text{12}\)

Additionally, it should also be noted that in line with the British perspective on the SIF 2000 advanced by this thesis as well as in an additional effort to provide a specific example of the relationship between the transnational, the national and the regional, chapter two also delineated how one particular element which corresponded with the Stockholm project, namely the launch of UK HMD (26\(^\text{th}\) January 2000) was received in the British press and what questions and controversies it stimulated in the broader

\(^{10}\) Zuroff, ‘Missed Opportunities at Stockholm’.

\(^{11}\) *HMM*, p. 131.

British public. Indeed, in relation to the public ‘reception’ of the SIF 2000, what the British debate over the launch of UK HMD most pertinently illustrated is how developments at the international level, sometimes struggled to be directly communicated to the public at the national level. For example, with the exception of a couple of reports in *The Guardian* and *The Jewish Chronicle*, little was said in the press commentaries and letters pages about the international context in which the establishment of UK HMD had occurred. Instead, media commentators and members of the public articulated a degree of ambivalence about UK HMD, with the centre-right often expressing fears that Holocaust commemoration would disrupt victorious national narratives of World War II, whilst pressure groups such as the Armenians as well as critics left of New Labour articulated concerns that the liberal ‘universalistic’ representation of the Holocaust in UK HMD was not self-reflexive enough about Britain’s Imperial past and foreign policies in the present, nor varied enough in its emphasis on the Jewish Catastrophe to encompass the plural narratives of suffering embedded in British society.

Against the backdrop of the SIF 2000’s extraordinary spectacle as well as the questions the conference raised both purposely and inadvertently in relation to societies taking responsibility for their Nazi era pasts and human rights records in the present, the final three chapters of this thesis were concerned with analyzing the longer term consequences of the SIF 2000 including what institutional efforts have been made to implement the Stockholm Declaration’s objectives of promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education globally as well as acknowledging broader Nazi atrocities and political efforts to prevent present day, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-
Semitism and xenophobia.”13 Equally, these chapters were also concerned with how these efforts to apply the Stockholm Declaration have been perceived in various international and national contexts; the consequences of the post-Communist asymmetries of political and cultural influence couched in ITF ‘Liaison Projects’; the way in which these initiatives relate to processes of NATO and EU accession; and finally, the wider ‘cosmopolitan’ institutional and intellectual context for understanding the Stockholm Declaration’s ‘universalistic’ rhetoric to invoke the remembrance of the Holocaust and acknowledge broader Nazi atrocity crimes in order to encourage the prevention of contemporary forms of prejudice and mass killing.

In line with these objectives, chapter three evaluated the work of subsequent Stockholm conferences and the ITF in implementing the Stockholm Declaration’s objectives of promoting Holocaust research, remembrance and education as well as encouraging political efforts to prevent, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”14 It demonstrated that whilst the subsequent Stockholm conference series was important in stimulating networks of action and producing a series of international declarations (2000, 2001 and 2004) which can now be proactively utilized by human rights activists, the credibility of these conferences was also contradicted by a number of omissions. For example, international relations experts, Leitenberg and Power noted that speeches by politicians at the SIF 2004 hardly mentioned the recent genocides in the Congo and Darfur.15

14 Ibid., pp. 136-137.
Furthermore, chapter three also demonstrated that whilst the ITF was important in terms of its campaign alongside the USHMM to open the Bad Arolsen archives; its issuance of public statements on Holocaust denial in Iran and European anti-Roma prejudice; as well as in supporting numerous Holocaust research, remembrance and education projects across its twenty-three member states, particularly in the post-Soviet zone; there were also a number of more problematic elements, such as the ongoing hierarchizing and exclusionary potentials within some but not all uses of the ITF’s official discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, as well as the challenges posed to Holocaust research, remembrance and education by far right and ultra-nationalist backlash in some member states. Furthermore, within the context of the ITF, observers such as Smith have noted that there was a highly problematic time lag before the organization issued a letter addressed to the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide (21 November 2005), which called on the international community to, “…increase its efforts to halt the ongoing atrocities in Darfur.” As a result, what chapter three highlights is the ongoing political challenges posed to genocide prevention in the international arena, as well as expressing the hope that in the future, the ITF will use its position of public influence to speak out promptly on these issues.

Whilst chapter three suggested that the impact of subsequent SIFs and the ITF since 2000 has been complex and full of both successes and challenges, particularly in relation to genocide issues, chapter four was concerned with providing an intercultural case study of one of the ITF’s specific efforts to promote Holocaust research, remembrance and education through its ‘Liaison Projects’, a type of policy that was

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16 ‘Interview with Dr. Stephen Smith’.
demarcated in detail in chapter two. Following the SIF 2000 and in association with the Lithuanian government, the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office launched its ITF ‘Liaison Project’ with Lithuania. This initiative was recognized as potentially controversial by its proponents because whilst Holocaust remembrance is central to the identity of many members of Lithuania’s small Jewish survivor population as well as becoming associated by a moderate liberal political elite with accession into organization’s such as the EU and NATO; the fact remains that Lithuanian national remembrance of Communist oppression is often seen as a more pressing public priority, whilst in terms of the legacies of the Third Reich, many Lithuanian ultra-nationalists remain hostile to accepting the role of Lithuanian Nazi collaborators in co-perpetrating the Holocaust alongside German occupation forces during the Second World War.

Against this backdrop, chapter four demonstrated how the British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ utilized pre-existing links with Lithuania, whilst British academics as well as leaders from organizations such as Beth Shalom, the IWM and the LJCC facilitated teacher training seminars, book distributions and museum advisory sessions with various Lithuanian Holocaust education, remembrance and research organizations. Reflecting on the work of the ITF in Lithuania, survivor and curator, Kostanian has viewed many of its programmes as an important source of support for small organizations such as the Vilna Gaon State Jewish Museum.\(^{18}\) Indeed, Smith’s specific evaluation of the successes and limitations of the British ITF ‘Liaison Project’ suggests that these types of initiative are at their most effective when they directly link up with local, dedicated Holocaust commemoration specialists; whilst the example of Lithuania also implies that contemporary backlash against Holocaust commemoration by ultra-

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\(^{18}\) ‘E-mail from Rachel Kostanian to Larissa Allwork, 19 March 2010’.
nationalist pressure groups remains one of the major challenges posed to the successful institutional implementation and public reception of Holocaust research, remembrance and education programs. As a result, further analyses of the outcomes of other ITF ‘Liaison Projects’ are needed, to see if common patterns emerge. If so, this data could be utilized to improve the effectiveness of international collaborations in the future, possibly by ensuring that Western NGOs always work closely with pre-existing and dedicated partner Holocaust and Nazi era research, remembrance and education organizations in the region under consideration.

Turning away from the specific questions posed by ITF ‘Liaison Projects’, chapter five explored the key context of ‘cosmopolitanism’, or intellectuals and institutions which advocate human and minority rights, for understanding the broader historical and political significance of the SIF 2000 and the ‘universalistic’ rhetoric of the Stockholm Declaration (2000) to invoke the remembrance of the Holocaust and acknowledge broader Nazi atrocity crimes in order to encourage the prevention of contemporary manifestations of, “genocide, ethnic cleansing, racism, anti-Semitism and xenophobia.”\(^\text{19}\) Chapter five explored these themes in three separate but inter-linked sections. The first section offered a close analysis of ‘cosmopolitan’ thinkers such as Jaspers, Lemkin, Arendt and Habermas, and provocatively suggested that in contrast to the critiques leveled at Bauer’s earlier notion of Holocaust ‘uniqueness’, which are discussed at length in chapter two, his discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ which is explicated in the Stockholm Declaration and Rethinking the Holocaust can be located within the genre of Kantian ‘cosmopolitan’ responses to the Nazi past, a position that is reinforced by reports in Haaretz during the noughties which have

documented Bauer’s defense of Sudanese refugees as well as his critiques of religious extremist Israeli settlers in the West Bank.\(^{20}\)

That said, if Bauer is to be read in this way, it must also be acknowledged that he renders the ‘cosmopolitan’ tradition problematic, particularly as a result of the hierarchizing and exclusionary potentials inherent within his splitting of Lemkin’s term ‘genocide’ into his definitions ‘Holocaust’ (‘total’ destruction) and ‘genocide’ (‘partial’ destruction) as well as his restriction of the term ‘genocide’ to ethnic, national and racial groups.\(^{21}\) However, within the broader findings of this conclusion to \textit{HMM}, it is arguable that what is particularly significant about understanding both the ‘cosmopolitan’ potentials and problems within Bauer’s discourse is that it disrupts crude narratives by scholars such as Norman Finkelstein, who have suggested that Israeli political interests and American Jewish organizations have advocated the ‘uniqueness’ of the Holocaust since the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict and have exploited European restitution cases at the turn of the millennium for the national, political, institutional and commercial benefit of the American-Israeli alliance.\(^{22}\) For although, Bauer does cooperate with American and European politicians; tends to be biased towards the Israeli perspective and is not as critical of Israel’s history as Arendt or the post-Zionist historians; whilst his not un-problematic discourse of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’ certainly privileges the Jewish Catastrophe; it is also notable that his passionate promotion of Holocaust research, remembrance and education; his support for the ideals of law, order and democracy; his critiques in \textit{Haaretz} of the ‘hate speech’ of radical

\(^{20}\) \textit{HMM}, pp. 284-287.
\(^{22}\) Finkelstein, \textit{The Holocaust Industry}. 

322
religious Israeli settlers, as well as his defense of Sudanese refugees, all suggests a much more nuanced intellectual and Western political agenda to the kind described by critics such as Finkelstein in *The Holocaust Industry*.

By contrast, the second part of chapter five looked at a different element of the context of ‘cosmopolitanism’ for understanding the wider significance of the SIF 2000 on the Holocaust. This encompassed the Ulrich Beck inspired ‘New Cosmopolitan’ interpretation of the SIF 2000 offered by Levy and Sznaider, which saw the representation of the Holocaust at the SIF 2000 as a symbol promoting international law, ‘universal’ human rights and genocide prevention in what these authors perceive to be the post-1989 transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’. However, whilst this chapter acknowledges that there is certainly a degree of validity in Levy and Sznaider’s representation of the historical and political significance of the SIF 2000 and the role of Holocaust memory in promoting human and minority rights at the turn of the millennium, in the third part of this chapter, *HMM* additionally argues that there are also serious weaknesses within Levy and Sznaider’s interpretation. This is for three main reasons. Firstly, because the new historiography on the remembrance of the Jewish Catastrophe in the 1950s renders problematic Levy and Sznaider’s chronology of the development of the remembrance of the Holocaust in the West from 1945-2000. Secondly, because despite what can be seen as the more ‘cosmopolitan’ elements of Holocaust memory work, the response of both transnational institutions in promoting Holocaust remembrance and Holocaust remembrance organizations in promoting human rights, has been both ambivalent and contradictory. For example, despite what

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24 Levy and Sznaider, *HMGA*.

25 *HMM*, pp. 298-309.
can be perceived as the ‘cosmopolitan’ elements of Bauer’s and the Stockholm Declaration’s rhetoric of Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’, the role of the ITF in promoting the remembrance of the Holocaust in relation to human rights was an issue which was fiercely debated within the organization during the noughties. And thirdly, because far from living in a transnational age of ‘Second Modernity’ where international organizations respond effectively to nation-state perpetrated acts of genocide, more often than not, the continuing perpetration of state sanctioned acts of atrocity reveals the inherent contradictions and limitations of the international order vis-à-vis the global system of nation states.

Thus, in contrast to Levy and Sznaider’s more idealistic vision of the SIF 2000, this case study of the historical causes and consequences of the events at Stockholm has indicated a considerably more complex picture. It has shown important restitution processes which nonetheless could only offer, _Some Measure of Justice_; it has demonstrated the ‘cosmopolitan’ potentials as well as competing intellectual and institutional debates over Bauer and the Stockholm Declaration’s complex and multifaceted term, Holocaust ‘unprecedentedness’; and it has also articulated continuing concerns over the role of political actors and institutions in promptly speaking out and effectively acting to prevent genocide. Furthermore, through analyzing efforts at applying the Stockholm Declaration via the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’, _HMM_ has also started to explore some of the complexities of political and cultural power surrounding Holocaust research, remembrance and education in post-Soviet national contexts of European integration. For example, whilst it appears to be true that in line with Tony Judt’s argument about the political importance of the remembrance of

26 _HMM_, pp. 181-185.
27 Marrus, _Some Measure of Justice_.

324
the Holocaust to European identity at the turn of the millennium, and as Jens Kroh has noted, membership of the ITF became increasingly perceived by many ‘Liaison States’ as an “informal criterion for accession to the European Union”\textsuperscript{28}; the example of Lithuania also demonstrates the EU’s ambivalence towards restitution issues as well as the obstacles posed by ultra-nationalists to initiatives in Holocaust research, remembrance and education. Accordingly, the outcomes of the ITF’s British/Lithuanian ‘Liaison Project’ have illustrated both the ongoing fragility of the remembrance of the Holocaust within continental integration processes as well as the continuing political, social and cultural challenges posed to national confrontations with the Nazi past and Holocaust era issues.

Finally, although this thesis has highlighted the importance of American and Israeli contributions to European initiatives to commemorate the Holocaust, \textit{HMM} has also delineated a complex picture that rejects the crude and conspiratorial allegations of ‘The Holocaust Industry’\textsuperscript{29} as well as qualified claims that events such as the opening of the USHMM (1993), the release of Steven Spielberg’s \textit{Schindler’s List} (1993) and the organization of the SIF 2000 heralded an unqualified global boom in Holocaust memory work.\textsuperscript{30} Instead, \textit{HMM} has suggested that despite the Holocaust’s high political, intellectual and media profile in certain national contexts at the turn of the millennium, specific and serious factual initiatives in Holocaust research, remembrance and education have often remained contested and unequal in their distribution across the world. As a result, despite the important, determined and ongoing efforts to redress these research, remembrance and education imbalances by organization’s such as the

\textsuperscript{28} Judt, \textit{Post-War: A History of Europe since 1945}, p. 803; Kroh quoted during Symposium: 10 years with the Stockholm Declaration, 26 January 2010.

\textsuperscript{29} Finkelstein, \textit{The Holocaust Industry}.

\textsuperscript{30} Levy and Sznider, \textit{HMGA}.
ITF, whose mission has been re-affirmed by the Terezín Declaration (30th June 2009); the intensity of the challenges faced have meant that this situation has often remained particularly acute in some of the former Soviet bloc countries, such as the Baltic States, where despite international efforts and government pledges, ensuring the establishment and institutional sustainability of Holocaust research, remembrance and education remains both a source of public controversy and an ongoing struggle for local survivors, academics and Holocaust education NGOs.

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