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Memory, Enchantment, Dream:  
The Later Chamber Works of  
George Enescu

September 2019

*Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements  
for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy*

## Declaration of Authorship

I hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

## *Acknowledgments*

The initial inspiration for this thesis emerged almost ten years ago, while I was a Master's student at Royal Holloway, University of London. Before then, I was not at all familiar with Enescu's music, and it is primarily thanks to Jim Samson (who included a lecture on Enescu as part of his Music History module) that I encountered this rich and fascinating repertoire. Having embarked on the project several years later, Jim was then kind enough to lend me scores and other materials, and facilitate some initial introductions with Romanian scholars.

From my very first attempts at crafting a PhD proposal, Julian Johnson has been a source of wisdom and encouragement. As my supervisor, I am grateful to him for his guidance, thought-provoking comments and discussions, his meticulousness regarding my own writing and the structuring of my arguments, and for his kind support. The parts of this thesis of which I am most proud owe much to his insightful feedback, and his constant encouragement to engage directly with musical materials.

In Romania, I am grateful to the scholars working at or in conjunction with the George Enescu National Museum in Bucharest, including Liliana Birnat, Cristina Andrei, and Valentina Sandu-Dediu. I am especially thankful to Florinela Popa for her generous provision of scores and books, as well as facilitating access to unpublished letters and reviews during my visit to Romania in 2017. My visit was made possible in the first place by Mihai Cosma, who accepted my paper proposal to present at the George Enescu International Musicology Symposium.

I have benefited hugely from being part of a sociable and intellectually stimulating community of fellow postgraduate students and colleagues in the Music Department at Royal Holloway, many of whom I now happily call my friends. I have had the pleasure of assisting on several undergraduate courses, the experience of which has often helped to shape my own thinking about music. Most importantly, this period of research was only made possible through the IMR-Reid Scholarship which I was awarded in 2015, and I am particularly grateful to both Geoff Baker and Julie Brown for facilitating this grant (and to Geoff for being such a supportive Director during my time as Administrator for the Institute of Musical Research; thanks, too, to Paul Harper-Scott and to Stephen Downes who took over following Geoff's departure). Beyond Royal Holloway, I am also grateful to King's College London, whose libraries have always been among my favourite places to work, and whose long opening hours have often proved convenient for my occasionally erratic work schedule.

Finally, a thank you to my friends and family, who in more ways than they probably realise have helped to keep me grounded and to maintain an important sense of perspective over these last few years. I am especially grateful to Jen, for her reassurance and her patience, and her love and support, particularly during this last year.

*Tring, Herts.  
September 2019*

## *Abstract*

This thesis seeks to engage (philosophically, analytically, historically) with George Enescu's later chamber works, dating mainly from the period 1935–1944. Although Enescu's works are finally beginning to reach a wider audience outside of his native Romania, within the UK his music still suffers from a relative neglect – both in the concert hall and in Anglophone scholarship. I argue that the quiet radicalism of Enescu's compositional output poses important questions for the field of musicology, and easily merits a position at the forefront of twentieth-century art music.

Difficult to pin down in terms of any conventional stylistic narrative, Enescu's musical language (particularly in the forms that it took following the completion of his opera *Oedipe*) seems somehow trapped between Romanticism and Modernism, boasting an intricate complexity that is also highly corporeally expressive. A closer investigation of Enescu's later chamber works yields a fully developed musical engagement with several important aesthetic categories which aid a better understanding of his frequently elusive processes. Memory and time, enchantment, and dream are each key themes through which we might further reassess Enescu's contribution to musical modernism. In exploring these categories, I draw on a range of largely contemporaneous thinkers (both French and Romanian, thereby reflecting what I understand to be Enescu's cultural geographical positioning) whose own writings reveal a similar preoccupation with modern conceptions of time and memory; 'ecstatic' or poeticised experiences within the everyday; and the increased role of the unconscious and the imaginary within the life of the modern subject.

More specifically, I look at the ways in which Enescu's music might encapsulate and reconstruct various mnemonic modes (both within a broader structural and temporal context, and more locally in terms of the experiential effects of remembering); how it employs 'strategies of enchantment' (including drawing on a childlike way of 'seeing' the world) as a means of counteracting the common understanding of modernity as heralding a 'decline in mystery'; and the ways in which it might evoke a 'dream-logic' and thereby conform with the aesthetic notion that music might itself represent a mode of dreamlike translation. Throughout the thesis, I endeavour to draw these strands together through a broader consideration of questions relating to musical modernism, embodiment, and a phenomenology of listening.

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## INTRODUCTION

### *Situating Enescu*

A PERFORMANCE in the spring of 2016 of George Enescu's only opera, *Oedipe*, at the Royal Opera House, Covent Garden (the first staged production to reach the UK in the eighty years since the work's premiere in Paris) felt like a watershed moment in the reception history of a composer whose music is increasingly lauded yet still lacks the wider recognition it deserves.<sup>1</sup> This relative neglect is noted not only in the performance of Enescu's works (which include symphonies, orchestral suites, tone poems, a variety of chamber works, piano music, and some songs) but likewise within the Anglophone scholarship on the composer. In the twenty-plus years since Leon Botstein argued (in earnest hope) that 'the time has come for Enescu, not only in Romania, but throughout the world', startlingly few Anglo-American musicologists have sought to engage with this repertoire.<sup>2</sup> This seems like an opportunity missed, not simply because this music is worthy of a wider critical audience, but because Enescu's oeuvre poses significant questions for the field of contemporary musicology – questions to which it offers its own distinctive answers. A main aim of my thesis is to highlight the quiet radicalism of Enescu's music ('quiet', in that it relates to a certain kind of modernist practice that is quite different to, and drowned out by, the more overt radicalism of Arnold Schoenberg or Igor Stravinsky), by focusing on a small group of mature and later chamber works.

The practical reasons for Enescu's neglect stem largely from his disinclination towards self-promotion, as well as the rather luckless circumstances surrounding the publishing and reprinting of much of his oeuvre.<sup>3</sup> The dissemination and availability of his scores remains

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<sup>1</sup> Richard Whitehouse's review for Classical Source details the opera's significance while remarking on its performance success. [http://www.classicalsource.com/db\\_control/db\\_concert\\_review.php?id=13673](http://www.classicalsource.com/db_control/db_concert_review.php?id=13673) (May 23, 2016).

<sup>2</sup> Leon Botstein, 'Rediscovering George Enescu', *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (1997), 144. The main Anglophone scholars to have written about Enescu's music in recent years are Jim Samson and Benedict Taylor. See especially Samson's chapter 'Placing Genius', in *Music in the Balkans* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2013), 391–414 (which is derived from previously published articles, including 'Placing Genius: The Case of George Enescu', *Trondheim Studies on East European Cultures and Societies*, Vol. 17 (PEECS, 2006), 2–31); and Taylor's 'Landscape–Rhythm–Memory: Contexts for Mapping the Music of George Enescu', *Music & Letters*, Vol. 98, No. 3 (2017), 394–437. Within his native Romania, Enescu's reputation is of course unquestioned: he is regarded among performers and scholars as the country's most important composer, while a biennial international music festival bearing his name (and serving as a platform for the performance of many of his works) has in recent years attracted some of the world's foremost artists and ensembles.

<sup>3</sup> Jim Samson has gone so far as to claim that had Enescu signed with Universal, rather than Salabert in Paris (an arrangement which has proved 'little short of disastrous'), then the situation concerning his reception would be

relatively limited as a result. While a chauvinist kind of marginalisation of composers regarded as peripheral or merely provincial may not so long ago have been deemed a significant factor in Enescu's neglect, the continuing historiographical problem of situating the composer's music in terms of its stylistic orientation seems a more pertinent issue. As with several composers whose stylistic identity was moulded prior to the radical avant-gardism of the 1910s, Enescu's music seems somehow trapped between the categories of Romanticism and Modernism (forcing us once more to question the usefulness and narrowness of these terms).<sup>4</sup> This is not to say that Enescu's style did not evolve, but it does say much about the circumscribed narrativisation of twentieth-century music history and the continued resistance of Enescu's music to stylistic categorisation that the composer Robin Holloway should describe his oeuvre in terms of a 'gradual rarefication, over some five decades...into something utterly strange'.<sup>5</sup> This music is obviously not of the same aesthetic persuasion as that espoused by the radical modernism of Schoenberg and Stravinsky, but neither does it fit easily into the category of twentieth-century musical oeuvres which have been marginalised for being tonally conservative or 'backward-looking'. Certainly, the past constitutes an important theme in Enescu's music: his works often evince a highly nostalgic atmosphere, and he occasionally seeks to recapture the mood and flavour of his homeland, particularly as he experienced it in childhood. But there is also a prescient aspect to his 'looking back', evidenced in early works like the First and Second Piano Suites, Opp. 3 and 10 (1897 and 1903), whose neoclassicism predates the emergence of the movement as such.<sup>6</sup> Equally, to describe Enescu's music merely in terms of a tonal conservatism would be to ignore the pervading modal leanings and rich melodism of his musical language.

What comes to the fore in these later works is music that is remarkable in its expressive potency, completely individual and uncompromising in its language (though also demonstrating an extraordinary amalgamation of various musical influences), highly

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rather different. Samson (2013), 407. Unfortunately, the Romanian state publishers have not been in a position to reprint much of Enescu's oeuvre for some decades.

<sup>4</sup> This has in recent decades become a major preoccupation for scholars of early twentieth-century music, yielding several composer studies which seek simultaneously to recontextualise the repertoire in question while nuancing an understanding of musical modernism. My current research does to some extent align itself with these studies. See especially: J. P. E. Harper-Scott, *The Quilting Points of Musical Modernism: Revolution, Reaction, and William Walton* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and *Edward Elgar: Modernist* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Daniel Grimley, *Carl Nielsen and the Idea of Modernism* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2010); and (looking further back) James Hepokoski, *Sibelius: Symphony No. 5* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>5</sup> Robin Holloway, *On Music: Essays and Diversions, 1963–2003* (Brinkworth: Claridge Press, 2003), 343.

<sup>6</sup> For a historical survey of neoclassicism, as well as an investigation into the term's utility, see Scott Messing, *Neoclassicism in Music: From the Genesis of the Concept through the Schoenberg/Stravinsky Polemic* (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI Research Press, 1988).

sensuously charged, bewildering in its intricacy and perceptually elusive construction – and very hard to pin down. This music can be challenging, certainly, but its difficulty is of a different order to that encountered elsewhere in modern composition. Noel Malcolm (whose life and works study of Enescu remains an indispensable resource for Anglophone scholars) observes that the composer was ‘angelically untouched by any sense of the “crisis” of modern music; his works are free of all the devices of irony, pastiche and alienation by which other composers proclaimed their view that direct, unselfconscious expression in music was no longer possible’.<sup>7</sup> What we encounter in Enescu’s mature and later works is a musical language that is at once beguiling, yet which also has the capacity to disorientate or perplex the listener. It retains an overriding improvisatory quality, yet the manner of its construction is utterly meticulous. The music mixes a spontaneous and fundamentally corporeal expressivity (it has the capacity to express or strongly evoke the presence of a moving, feeling body) with an almost passive kind of surety and inevitability. It is through such paradoxes that Enescu’s music continues to evade stylistic categorisation, allowing Holloway to conclude that the composer’s reputation ‘when fully measured, will...reroute the clichéd highways of received modern-music history’.<sup>8</sup>

How does one account for an oeuvre which remains stubbornly (and refreshingly) individual? I take some inspiration here from recent composer studies by writers including Daniel Grimley, Michael Puri, Matthew Riley and Benedict Taylor, each of whom identifies aesthetic categories (such as landscape, memory, decadence, or nostalgia) which can be considered either latent qualities or more explicit representational modes of the music in question, and which effectively cut across the conventional narratives of a received style history.<sup>9</sup> A closer investigation of Enescu’s later chamber works similarly reveals a fully developed musical engagement with certain aesthetic categories, or criteria, which to a variable

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<sup>7</sup> Noel Malcolm, *George Enescu: His Life and Music* (London: Toccata Press, 1990), 14.

<sup>8</sup> Holloway (2003), 342. This view is shared among Anglophone and Romanian scholars alike. Benedict Taylor, for instance, argues that Enescu ‘was and still is too many things for music history to cope with’, while the composer and musicologist Pascal Bentoiu has written that ‘this music must be listened to again and again. I have the renewed feeling that the composer whom I am facing is *not* of the twentieth century, but of a future one’. See Taylor (2017), 396; and Pascal Bentoiu, *Masterworks of George Enescu: A Detailed Analysis*, trans. Lory Wallfisch (Plymouth: Scarecrow Press, 2010; originally published in 1984 as *Capodopere enesciene*), 453.

<sup>9</sup> See Daniel Grimley, *Grieg: Music, Landscape and Norwegian Identity* (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2006); Michael J. Puri, *Ravel the Decadent: Memory, Sublimation, and Desire* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Matthew Riley, *Edward Elgar and the Nostalgic Imagination* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Taylor’s article ‘Landscape–Rhythm–Memory: Contexts for Mapping the Music of George Enescu’ (cited above – see note 2). Taylor’s identification of memory and time as pertinent aesthetic categories of Enescu’s music overlaps with my own explorations, and can also be regarded as a continuation of his interest in time and memory as an expressive category in the music of several other composers. See his *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), and *The Melody of Time: Music and Temporality in the Romantic Era* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). I draw on both these sources in my discussion of temporality and cyclicism in Chapter Two.

extent had always been central to Enescu's aesthetic orientation, and which further aid a better understanding of his frequently elusive processes. Memory and time, enchantment, and dream are each key themes, I suggest, through which we might reassess Enescu's contribution to the field of twentieth-century art music, and at the same time further our understanding of how these experiential categories are constructed musically. Consequently, alongside a consideration of how we might theorise these categories from an aesthetic and cultural standpoint, I am also interested in exploring how Enescu frames these experiences from a phenomenological perspective, and what this music might reveal (or give rise to) within the context of an 'artful' listening (how listeners engage with an artwork's temporal unfolding) or a broader phenomenology of listening. In other words, I am interested in how Enescu's processes encourage and subsequently shape a close listening experience, and what this may reveal in turn about the way we as listeners engage with music in terms of its capacity to reproduce various ways of remembering, for instance, or evoke dreamlike states, or to enchant and mystify. To aid this aspect of my investigation, I draw on the philosophical thought of several (largely) contemporaneous thinkers (including Henri Bergson, Gaston Bachelard, Vladimir Jankélévitch, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Lucian Blaga), whose own writings reveal a similar, often phenomenologically-driven preoccupation with modern conceptions of time and memory; ecstatic or enchanting experiences within the everyday; and the increased role ascribed to the unconscious and the imaginary within the life of the modern subject.<sup>10</sup>

In broader terms, I would like to argue that Enescu's later works offer new and fascinating perspectives on the relationship between music on the one side, and memory, temporality, enchantment and dream on the other. Within the field of musicology, time and memory are undoubtedly the more rigorously explored of these four related categories; dream and enchantment, less so (although the conception of music as a kind of dream has an important and far-reaching aesthetic history, and is immediately relevant to Enescu's aesthetic outlook).

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<sup>10</sup> Although Jankélévitch was writing predominantly in the period after Enescu's own lifetime, his work can be situated alongside that of Bachelard's and Merleau-Ponty's in as far as all three can feasibly be regarded (in quite different ways, admittedly) as post-Bergsonian philosophers (the overriding influence of Edmund Husserl on Merleau-Ponty must also be noted, along with that of Martin Heidegger on French philosophical thought more generally in the period after the Second World War – which simultaneously contributed to Bergson's falling out of fashion). Bergson's remarkable influence in the early decades of the twentieth century and the impact he had on French intellectual and cultural life in general cannot be over-emphasised. A significant part of both Jankélévitch's and Bachelard's work engages directly with Bergson's thought (although it does so from quite different critical viewpoints – as I will explore in Chapter Two), while Merleau-Ponty explicitly acknowledged the influence it had on the shaping of his own philosophical arguments. My inclusion of the Romanian philosopher and poet Lucian Blaga is significant for the fact that he too was strongly influenced by Bergson; more broadly, this is indicative of the high degree of cultural and intellectual exchange between France and Romania within Enescu's lifetime (see below).

Within Enescu scholarship specifically (which has largely been carried out by Romanian researchers), none of these categories has attracted much attention, although there are isolated exceptions.<sup>11</sup> Each of my four chapters addresses these categories in turn, situating them within a broader scholarly context (which includes drawing on research that lies beyond the immediate scope of musicology) while also providing close readings of a number of Enescu's musical works.<sup>12</sup> Before delving into more detailed discussions of Enescu's music and aesthetics, however, I intend in the remainder of this Introduction to outline a wider social, cultural and geo-historical context for Enescu's aesthetic orientation, and to explore what these aesthetic categories may reveal to us in a broader sense about the music's time and place.

Enescu's music could in various ways be regarded as a (predominantly) Franco-Romanian synthesis of ideas and traditions. Throughout his life, Enescu maintained a deep and proud connection to his homeland: he aligned himself with Romanian collective ideals and spiritual values; in his pieces, he drew on a variety of indigenous musical traditions; and he worked tirelessly to further Romania's (and particularly Bucharest's) musical and artistic reputation. His itinerant lifestyle was evidently born with some despondency, particularly since it offered him little respite to do the thing he most loved: compose. The melancholic sense of yearning that Enescu felt towards Romania (which in his imagination existed as an idealised, rural landscape; a spiritual as well as a literal homeland) might easily be regarded as a typical symptom of displacement, and it certainly helped to shape his aesthetic orientation.<sup>13</sup> When not based in Romania, a significant proportion of Enescu's life was spent in Paris. He attended the Paris Conservatoire in 1895–1899 (where he was taught by Jules Massenet, Gabriel Fauré and André Gédalge, among others, and where his contemporaries included Charles Koechlin, Florent Schmitt, Maurice Ravel, Jean Roger-Ducasse and Alfred Cortot); he lived, performed

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<sup>11</sup> Taylor's recent article on Enescu (cited above – see notes 9 and 2) leads the way in considerations of how Enescu's music might articulate various modalities of 'pastness', and the way it relates to modern conceptions of time. Constantin Secară has also written about the complexity of Enescu's temporal processes, specifically in the context of some of his finales: see his 'Finalurile enesciene, de la "încununarea operei" la modelarea percepției timpului muzical', in *Studii și cercetări de istoria artei: Teatru, Muzică, Cinematografie*, Vol. 3 (Bucharest: 2009), 75–85. Given how frequently Enescu described music as a form of dreamlike expression (a topic which I explore in greater depth in Chapter Four), it is surprising not more has been written about this category in relation to his oeuvre. The exception is Despina Petecel-Theodoru, *George Enescu: Reverie și Mit* (Bucharest: Editura Muzicală, 2014), especially the essays in the opening section titled 'George Enescu sub semnul reveriei' ('George Enescu under the sign of reverie').

<sup>12</sup> Given how closely related these categories are in terms of the way we might experience them (for instance: our dream experiences are simultaneously reliant on mnemonic operations; both remembering and dreaming can be construed as modes of enchantment) some overlap between chapters is inevitable.

<sup>13</sup> On the role of displacement in artists' lives, see for instance the collection of essays in *Music and Displacement: Diasporas, Mobilities, and Dislocations in Europe and Beyond*, ed. Erik Levi and Florian Scheduling (Plymouth, UK: The Scarecrow Press, 2010).

and taught in Paris throughout much of his professional career (his publishers and agents were likewise based there); and, following the Communist takeover of Romania in 1946, he spent the remainder of his life living in self-imposed exile in Paris. And yet, the significance of what one might describe as Enescu's French cultural inheritance has largely been ignored, or else eclipsed by (entirely justified) considerations of how his oeuvre relates to the Western art music tradition in a broader sense.<sup>14</sup>

Positioning Enescu against a backdrop of Franco-Romanian cultural exchange allows for a more nuanced geo-historical reading of his work, as well as a deconstruction of the stereotypical 'East'–'West' delineation of Europe: a division which unhelpfully reinforces (in geopolitical terms) the marginalisation of composers from East Central and South East Europe who are already stylistically regarded as 'peripheral' to a largely Austro-German canonic 'centre'.<sup>15</sup> Jim Samson provides his own insightful deconstruction of this cultural division between East and West by focusing on how Romania's orientation within Europe was influenced by a history of Balkan affiliations.<sup>16</sup> Accordingly, due to Romania's own ambivalence regarding its geographical positioning (either inside or outside the Balkan region), it has often found itself looking East and West simultaneously.<sup>17</sup> This ambivalence has been conditioned by the often marginalising, even disparaging attitudes underpinning the way the Balkans have been imagined historically (which also has much to do with the Ottoman expansion into South East Europe). Indeed, it is largely because of negative perceptions of the region (especially on the part of the West) that Romanians have, as Adrian Cioroianu observes, often sought to 'escape' the Balkans (never more so than in the period following independence, which was officially

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<sup>14</sup> Situating Enescu's music in relation to Impressionism is about the extent to which Romanian scholars have drawn explicit links between Enescu and his French cultural milieu. See for instance Gabriela Oceanu, 'Impressionism and Enescu's Work', in *Enesciana II–III*, ed. Mircea Voicana (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1981), 167–172. There may well be political reasons for this neglect of Enescu's French heritage. Certainly, Romanian scholars in the 1960s through to the 1980s would have felt compelled to promote the composer's work as manifestly Romanian in both spirit and aesthetic.

<sup>15</sup> On the problematic issue of centres, peripheries and the 'placing' of musical modernisms in a cultural geographical context, see for instance Max Paddison, 'Centres and Margins: Shifting Grounds in the Conceptualization of Modernism', in *Rethinking Musical Modernism*, ed. Dejan Despic and Melita Milin (Belgrade: Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 2008), 65–81. This edited volume also contains several other insightful essays responding to (among other things) questions concerning the reception of modernism among composers in 'peripheral' countries.

<sup>16</sup> Samson (2013), 397–398.

<sup>17</sup> The twentieth-century Romanian philosopher and essayist Emil Cioran (who spent the last half-century of his life in Paris, writing exclusively in French) captures the sense of this ambivalence when he writes: 'And yet, if the Balkans were no more than horror, why is it, when we leave them and make for this part of the world, why is it we feel a kind of fall – an admirable one, it is true – into the abyss?' Cioran, *History and Utopia*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Seaver, 1987; originally published as *Histoire et utopie* in Paris: Gallimard, 1960), 34.

recognised in 1878 – three years before Enescu was born).<sup>18</sup> Maria Todorova’s contribution to Balkanist discourse presents a more nuanced perspective, and focuses on what she describes as the region’s ‘transitional’ character, or its ‘in-betweenness’. She claims that while Orientalism points to a ‘rethinking of what had for centuries been believed to be an unbridgeable chasm separating East from West’, the Balkans, conversely, ‘have always evoked the image of a bridge or a crossroads’.<sup>19</sup> For Samson, it is precisely this quality of transition (which ‘distinguishes Balkanism from Orientalism’) that is articulated by Enescu’s music. Specifically, Enescu ‘delved deeply into the transition between a diversified indigenous culture, strongly marked by its Byzantine and Ottoman inheritance, and a European symphonic culture’. He is a Romanian composer not merely because he turned to indigenous materials, Samson claims, but because of the way his music reflects the transitional character that is inherent (or which Todorova and others regard as inherent) to Balkanism more generally.<sup>20</sup>

Given Samson’s primary focus is music in the Balkans, he inevitably stops short of interrogating the Western models and idealised archetypes around which Romania based its metaphorical escape. Lucian Boia has written that ‘when we speak of the Western model, what is to be understood is first and foremost the French model, which comes far ahead of the other Western reference points’. Accordingly, once it had committed itself to Westernisation, the Romanian elite ‘threw itself into the arms of France, the great Latin sister in the West’.<sup>21</sup> Romania’s embrace of the French model can be traced back to around 1830 (before then, Romanians had had limited contact with France), and developed initially out of anti-Russian sentiments. By the end of the century, Romanian *francophilie* was bordering on a national

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<sup>18</sup> Adrian Cioroianu, ‘The Impossible Escape: Romanians and the Balkans’, in *Balkan as Metaphor: Between Globalization and Fragmentation*, ed. Dušan I. Bjelić and Obrad Savić (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 209–233. A good indicator of the antipathy that was felt towards the Turks and their presence in the Balkans can be found in Dumitru Drăghicescu’s psychological history of Romania, written in 1907. Here, he claims that ‘Every Turkish custom borrowed, every Turkish fashion imitated introduced into our ethnic soul the seeds of corruption and idleness, which causes peoples to degrade and degenerate’. See Drăghicescu, *Din psihologia poporului român*. 1907 (Bucharest: Editura Albatros, 1995), 262; cited in translation in Lucian Boia, *History and Myth in Romanian Consciousness*, trans. James Christian Brown (Budapest and New York: Central European University Press, 2001; first published in Romanian as *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*, Bucharest: Humanitas, 1997), 159.

<sup>19</sup> Maria Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 18, 15. Elsewhere in her Introduction, Todorova writes that ‘unlike Orientalism, which is a discourse about an imputed opposition, balkanism is a discourse about an imputed ambiguity’; Todorova’s argument is that ‘while Orientalism is dealing with a difference between (imputed) types, Balkanism treats differences within one type’ (17, 19).

<sup>20</sup> See Samson (2013), 398; 412. Samson notes furthermore that it is ‘not just that an investment in transition was uniquely attuned to Balkan history and geography, but that it may indeed have been the *only* viable project for this region at this time’ (412).

<sup>21</sup> Boia (2001), 160. Alongside this ‘French myth’, as Boia describes it, there was also a German ‘counter-myth’ whose influence cannot be discounted. It was the ‘option of a minority, but an influential minority’ (163), Boia explains (particularly after the drawing up of the 1866 Constitution), although ‘the gulf created by the [First World] war – in which Romania, seeking national unity, found itself in the opposite camp to Germany and suffered an oppressive German occupation – made it difficult for relations to continue as before’ (164).

obsession, and went far beyond a broader wished-for separation from the East (which Boia describes in terms of a systematic distancing from the Greeks, the Turks, and the Russians). The emulation of French culture and politics (and even spiritual identity) can also be seen to coincide with a renewed interest on the part of Romanians in their Latin heritage, the most obvious surviving evidence of which concerns the Romance origins of the Romanian language.<sup>22</sup> A shared linguistic heritage became the platform on which Romania could cement its ties to the West, and to France in particular (the development of this ‘Europeanist’ narrative would likewise eventually help to provide a unifying strand among the Romanian principalities). As Monica Spiridon observes, ‘membership in the club of Romance languages was the irrefutable proof of a Western European identity and allegiance. Eventually, for most Romanians, Romance came to mean French. Economically, politically, but first and foremost culturally, France was regarded as the most dignified heir of the late Roman Empire’.<sup>23</sup>

For generations of Romanian artists, intellectuals and exiles, Paris (already seen universally as a hub of artistic and high-cultural activity, as well as entertainment)<sup>24</sup> came to epitomise Romance culture and Romania’s Latin heritage. While Bucharest increasingly gained a self-styled reputation as a ‘Little Paris’ in the East, the French capital itself gradually emerged as a ‘Bucharest-on-the-Seine’ (in Spiridon’s words)<sup>25</sup> – a second home for Romanian intellectuals looking to complete their education, or (for the post-1848 Romanian revolutionaries, or the post-World War II generation) a place of exile (at different stages of Enescu’s life, the city would symbolise both these things).<sup>26</sup> The fact that Enescu looked to France (and to Paris) is

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<sup>22</sup> Boia notes that the linguistic ties between Romania and France in fact formed the basis of a ‘second Latinization’ of the Romanian language, with French as the primary reference. The Slav and Oriental components were marginalised, and a ‘massive’ range of French neologisms was adopted instead – to the extent that in modern spoken Romanian, one word in every five is of French origin. See Boia (2001), 161–162.

<sup>23</sup> Monica Spiridon, “‘Bucharest-on-the-Seine’: The Anatomy of a National Obsession”, in *Paris–Bucharest, Bucharest–Paris: Francophone Writers from Romania*, ed. Anne Quinney (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2012), 23.

<sup>24</sup> Nicholas Hewitt writes that ‘from 1900 onwards, Paris, with little exaggeration, could merit its reputation as “capital of the arts”’. But it is important to note too how separated Paris was from the rest of French society; the capital, Hewitt observes, ‘dominated’ the country (economically, culturally). This was still true in the years after the Second World War (notwithstanding the importance of such regional events as the Marseilles Exhibition of 1922), when the rest of the nation – beyond the prospering capital – was dubbed the ‘French desert’. See Hewitt’s chapter, ‘Modern France: history, culture and identity, 1900–1945’, in *The Cambridge Companion to Modern French Culture*, ed. Nicholas Hewitt (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; online publication, 2006), 21–22.

<sup>25</sup> Spiridon (2012), 23, 26.

<sup>26</sup> A brief outline of some of the artistic and intellectual figures who made their way to Paris seems worthwhile. The modernist sculptor Constantin Brâncuși famously made his career in Paris after moving to the city in 1903, and subsequently spent much of his life in France. The playwright Eugène Ionesco, along with the writer Emil Cioran and historian Mircea Eliade, all moved to Paris as self-exiles following the end of the Second World War (much like Enescu did). While Eliade eventually relocated to Chicago (returning to Paris for five months every year), Ionesco and Cioran became totally assimilated within French culture. All three chose to produce their work in French. The avant-garde poet and performance artist Tristan Tzara moved to Paris after the First World War,

therefore not unusual, and his project can easily be situated in terms of a broader cultural inclination towards France on the part of Romanians.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, one might argue that his project was typically Romanian precisely because it engaged, in various ways (aesthetically, ideologically), with the French model. For Enescu as for other Romanian artists, Paris resembled a ‘space of cultural identification’<sup>28</sup> – a shifting, heterogeneous space, which through its imaginative construction invited expressions of nostalgic or rebellious sentiments, and which retained an important symbolic appeal over the course of Romania’s modernisation.

Amid the debates concerning Romania’s place in Europe which took place in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, a counter-story to the Europeanist narrative was also much in evidence. The so-called ‘Great Debate’ of the interwar years resumed the arguments initially put forward in the second half of the nineteenth century, and pitted the Europeanists – who sought to model the country on the modern urbanised nations in the West – against the ‘traditionalists’ (otherwise referred to as ‘indigenists’, ‘Romanianists’, or ‘autochthonists’), who emphasised Romania’s peasant, agrarian and Orthodox traditions, and promoted a more ‘inward-looking’ narrative. The poet and philosopher Lucian Blaga was one of the key figures of the traditionalist group. With his friend Nichifor Crainic he helped to establish the literary journal *Gândirea*, which was devoted to investigating aspects of Romanian national character and identity. The historian Keith Hitchins observes that the ‘Gândirists, as they came to be known, were attracted to speculative thought, mystical and religious experiences, and the primitive spirituality of folklore, and they were anxious to communicate their own ideas in a wholly modern idiom’.<sup>29</sup> Blaga’s understanding of national identity is communicated primarily through his theory of ‘style’, which he advanced in his *Orizont și stil* (‘Horizon and style’) of 1935. He applied his theory to the Romanians in his *Spațiul mioritic* (‘Mioritic space’), published the following year

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having already helped to found the Dada movement; he too would continue to write exclusively in French following his departure from Romania, as did several other Romanian-born or Romanian-French literary figures (such as Anna de Noailles, Marthe Bibesco, or members of the so-called ‘surrealist group of Bucharest’). The Bibesco family itself was one of the most prominent families in French society, and became remarkably influential in drawing together Romanian and French culture. Princess Elena Bibescu (known also as Hélène Bibesco) was a protectress of Enescu’s, and one of the outstanding pianists of the nineteenth century. Her son Antoine enjoyed a lasting friendship with Marcel Proust, and it would have been at the Bibesco salon that Proust first heard Enescu perform, in 1910.

<sup>27</sup> As Anne Quinney rightly notes, this relationship was ‘far from one-sided’, with numerous Romanian artists and intellectuals having a considerable influence on French cultural life: ‘What would Dada be without Tristan Tzara? French theatre without Ionesco? Or, contemporary poetry without [Isidore] Isou? The nature of Franco-Romanian relations is one of exchange, borrowings, and crossovers, rather than a relationship based on a hierarchy characterizing the colonial and postcolonial experience underwriting other Francophone literatures’. See the editor’s Introduction in Quinney (2012), 11, 13.

<sup>28</sup> Spiridon (2012), 23.

<sup>29</sup> Keith Hitchins, *A Concise History of Romania* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 163.

(the title is derived from the popular Romanian folk ballad *Miorița*, about a shepherd boy and his ewe lamb).<sup>30</sup> Here, he claimed that Romanian identity is tied (collectively, unconsciously) to the Romanian landscape and to rural life more generally, and that these aspects comprise the ‘inalienable stylistic matrix of our ethnic spirit’.<sup>31</sup> The mioritic space can be regarded as a spiritual or mythical space; a conceptual attempt at outlining the mythical (and topographical) origins of the nation’s poetic imagination.

Hitchins claims that Blaga’s quest ultimately ‘penetrated more deeply than just the discovery of national character. He sought in the ancestral world of the village the forgotten secrets of the age of innocence before the sin of knowledge had alienated man from nature and his true self’.<sup>32</sup> Re-connecting to rural or agrarian life was, for Blaga, evidently a means of re-enchanting the world – a counteraction of man’s displacement from nature. This is likewise an important theme of Enescu’s music, particularly in works like the Third Orchestral Suite (known as the ‘Village’ Suite), in D major, Op. 27, and the *Impressions d’enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28 (which I explore in greater detail in Chapter Three). The narrative of displacement is obviously one which extends to Enescu’s own displacement from his homeland, and it is notable that he often conflates his enchanting evocations of nature with memories of his native land (which is often depicted in ways that resemble Blaga’s ‘ancestral world of the village’).<sup>33</sup> Richard Collins observes that the *Miorița* ballad is easily co-opted by displaced or exiled artists due to its implicit message of a transcendent return to nature.<sup>34</sup> Indeed, the themes of displacement and yearning which evidently lie at the heart of Romanian folklorism (or the Romanian poetic imagination, as Blaga would put it) find poignant echoes in many of Enescu’s works and in his aesthetic outlook.

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<sup>30</sup> In the ballad, a shepherd boy is warned by his ewe lamb, Miorita, that his fellow shepherds plan to kill him and steal his flock. The boy accepts his fate, and makes no attempt to resist – but he does ask Miorita not to reveal the true manner of his death to his mother, and to tell her instead that he has married a heavenly princess. Miorita duly complies, and spends her days wandering the land, telling the fictitious story of a celestial wedding. An English translation of the ballad can be found in *Cinci balade populare (Five Folk Ballads)*, trans. W. D. Snodgrass (Bucharest: Editura Cartea Românească, 1993).

<sup>31</sup> Lucian Blaga, *Spațiul mioritic*. 1936 (Bucharest: Humanitas, 1994), 165. Cited in translation in Boia (2001), 146.

<sup>32</sup> Hitchins (2014), 163–164.

<sup>33</sup> There are parallels to be drawn here between Enescu’s vision of the rural Moldavian village and what Daniel Grimley describes as the ‘idealised embodiment of an essentialised Englishness’ with reference to Edward Elgar’s music (which he compares in turn to Carl Nielsen’s conception of Danish culture). Significantly, each of these composers is therefore implicated (in different ways) in ‘localist patterns of thought’, but in such a way that ‘what at first seems peripheral or marginalised...in fact emerges as central or core’. See Grimley (2010), 18.

<sup>34</sup> In some versions of the story the celestial wedding is staged as a kind of utopian partnering of the human and natural worlds. See Richard Collins, ‘Andrei Codrescu’s Mioritic Space’, *MELUS*, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1998), 83–101. Benedict Taylor similarly notes that while the story is primarily one of wandering and loss, an inherent sense of displacement can ultimately be ‘[sublimated] through poetic creation’ – which obviously resonates with Enescu’s own situation. Taylor (2017), 430–431.

Most obviously, Enescu engages with a particular mode of yearning that the Romanians call *dor*. For the traditionalists especially, *dor* constituted an important spiritual category: a dreamlike state of the soul, which carries additional connotations of melancholy and nostalgia. Blaga provides his own definition in *Spațiul mioritic*, where he writes that ‘existence for the Romanian is “*dor*”, aspiration across horizons, existence which in its entirety flows towards “something”’ (his interpretation is undoubtedly influenced by Henri Bergson’s famous notion of the *élan vital*, or vital impulse: an intuited urge or drive – a ‘flow towards something’ – by which all life comes into created being and evolves).<sup>35</sup> Enescu’s aesthetic engagement with *dor* is noted by the fact that melancholy and nostalgic longing are clearly important expressive themes of his music (his use of the expressive markings *malinconico* and *nostalgico* is accordingly prolific). A more explicit engagement is evidenced by his incorporation of the great nineteenth-century Romanian poet Mihai Eminescu’s ‘Mai am un singur dor’ (‘One wish alone have I’) as part of the finale of his Fifth Symphony. Although the symphony remained unfinished, Pascal Bentoiu has written that Eminescu’s text (in which the poet wishes only to die in peace, ‘in some calm land beside the sea’, and which would have been set for solo tenor and wordless female chorus) ‘is not in the least an insertion of subsequent addition; it dominates and defines the work poetically, right from the first bar’.<sup>36</sup> Enescu also gave several spoken and written indications of what he understood by *dor*, including in a brief article on Romanian music which he contributed to a special edition of *La Revue Musicale* in 1931: ‘the Romanian peasant carries music within him. In the solitude of the mountains and fields, it is his companion; it calms the terrible dread that assails him; it helps him to express his “*dor*”, an inexpressible nostalgia that devours his soul’.<sup>37</sup>

Alongside Enescu’s incorporation (and stylistic emulation) of indigenous sources and materials, his aesthetic engagement with *dor* is one of the most obvious examples of his (frequently essentialised) attachment to traditional Romanian values and collective ideals. Since he also actively engaged with various aspects of French musical and aesthetic thought,

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<sup>35</sup> Blaga’s first published article, titled ‘Notes on Intuition in Bergson’ (1914), reveals the influence that the French philosopher had on the shaping of Blaga’s thought. In a later work (the autobiographical *The Chronicle and the Song of Ages*) he describes Bergson as ‘the most significant philosopher of the time’. Blaga, *Hronicul și cântecul vârstelor (Opere, Vol. 6)*, ed. Dorli Blaga (Bucharest: Editura Minerva, 1979), 130.

<sup>36</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 530; Bentoiu himself has been responsible for creating a complete version of the Fifth Symphony. Mihai Eminescu (1850–1889) is universally regarded as Romania’s greatest poet. He was a traditionalist and member of the Junimea literary society, and his work is often marked by a fascination with the natural world and the Romanian folk ballad. For an overview of the ways in which Enescu incorporated Eminescu’s writings (in the unfinished Fifth Symphony and elsewhere), see Ion Potopin, ‘Thematic Interferences between Enescu and Eminescu’, in Voicana (1981), 179–186.

<sup>37</sup> George Enescu (as Georges Enesco), ‘De la musique roumaine’, *La Revue musicale* (July – August 1931), 158.

Enescu could be seen as having allied himself with both Europeanist and traditionalist narratives, while simultaneously creating art that transcended a mere borrowing of Eastern and Western elements. Indeed, Samson writes that we would be doing Enescu an injustice ‘if we tried to represent this project exclusively in terms of intersecting cultural spheres’. Instead, we might return to the idea of transition, and to Samson’s observation that ‘in order to give transitional states their due, we need to view them not just as sites of theoretical transformation which contain elements of two systems, but as invitations to locate a third system’.<sup>38</sup> If Enescu’s music is to be regarded as articulating the quality of transition, then the independence it gains from its in-betweenness helps us to account not only for its uniqueness (as a system-in-itself), but also for the way it moves beyond its geographical condition (it is not contained by it, but it nevertheless contains elements of it).

Put in slightly different terms: to the extent that Enescu’s musical language could be seen, for instance, to re-enact and unify processes of memory across the vast temporal space represented by his oeuvre (through a habitual kind of self-quotation, which I explore in Chapter One), he seems also to reflect an attempt on the part of both Europeanist and traditionalist narratives to create a unified collective identity, or homogenising of the Romanian ‘space’.<sup>39</sup> The interpretative space denoted by Enescu’s music also suggests a variegated or pluralistic landscape (giving rise to a variety of meanings), characterised by the interpenetration of cultural values, temporalities, and aesthetic ideologies. It both incorporates and is independent from the spatializing narratives articulated as part of Romania’s cultural and geo-political self-identification within Europe (the ‘Parisian space’; the ‘Mioritic space’), as well as the conceptual moieties of ‘French’ / ‘Romanian’ or ‘East’ / ‘West’. To labour the metaphor, it is

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<sup>38</sup> Samson (2013), 398.

<sup>39</sup> The homogenising of the Romanian ‘space’ was of course a very pertinent issue in geopolitical terms. While Moldavia (Enescu’s home principality) and Wallachia had been unified in 1878, Transylvania only became part of the Greater Kingdom of Romania in 1919–20, in the wake of the First World War (other post-war acquisitions included Bessarabia to the east, Banat and Crişana to the west, and Maramureş and Bucovina to the north). Keith Hitchins notes that by the end of 1920, Romania had added 156,000 square kilometres (now 296,000 square kilometres) and 8,500,000 inhabitants (now 16,250,000) to its pre-war kingdom (Hitchins (2014), 158). Questions of geographical space and boundaries were evidently foremost, then, in Romania’s political aims, debates and concerns in the decades surrounding the turn of the twentieth century. One notes a tendency among Romanian scholars of examining the homogeneity of Enescu’s oeuvre, which might similarly be interpreted in terms of a desire to unify and mark off the Romanian space. See for instance Mircea Voicana, ‘The Unity and Continuity of Enescu’s Work’, *Enesciana II–III*, ed. Voicana (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1981), 161–166. Parallels may likewise be drawn here with the homogenisation of the French ‘space’, primarily through attempts on the part of the ruling elite to define Frenchness on a national scale – through education, language, conscription, and a notable resistance to American globalisation (importantly, some of these nationalising aims were themselves resisted by regional groups). See Hewitt (2003), 3–6. As I discuss at the outset of Chapter Two, homogeneity was in fact regarded as an important aesthetic category among French artists in the early decades of the twentieth century.

also within this space that I suggest locating the aesthetic categories which I believe are pertinent to Enescu's music. Enescu uses complex processes of remembering in order to remake or re-situate (essentially, give 'boundaries' to) a lost past, or lost homeland, both of which are idealised or sublimated as a result. Consequently, this creative space is potentially one of enchantment; it offers the possibility for re-enchanting the world.<sup>40</sup> Lastly, this space can also be dreamt or imagined, thereby blurring the distinction between fiction and reality (or the internal and external world) within the lived experience of the modern subject.

The space in which I am choosing to situate Enescu is invariably a modern one. Indeed, his positioning in cultural geographical terms (poised between the urban cosmopolitanism of cities like Paris or – on a much smaller scale – Bucharest, and the rural utopia of a mythologised homeland) is in many ways emblematic of the modern experience, which has literal and metaphysical displacement at its core. Likewise, each of my aesthetic and experiential categories takes on especial relevance within the context of modernity. In fact, each category could be seen to grow out of the modern experience, and is in some way determined by it (conversely, these aesthetic categories also reveal how art itself might shape our understanding of modernity). In my opening chapter, I argue that Enescu's later chamber works together constitute one of the most innovative and sophisticated examples of a memory-based musical conception as might be found within the Western art music tradition (although he is not, of course, the only composer to play with processes of remembering – one thinks inevitably of such composers as Franz Schubert, Gustav Mahler, or Morton Feldman).<sup>41</sup> Enescu's contrapuntal writing, for instance (which had always been foundational to his compositional language), not only permeates the musical texture entirely, but does so with a subtlety that teases and challenges listeners' perceptual faculties, the music's processes seemingly only revealing themselves 'from within' through repeated listening; memory – and especially its perceptual component – emerges as an important category primarily for this reason. At the same time, Enescu's mnemonic processes (primarily concerning the retrieval of past materials over

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<sup>40</sup> Mircea Eliade reveals a similar preoccupation with carving out or delineating an enchanted or mystical space within the everyday – what he calls 'sacred space'. This sacred space 'ontologically founds the world', Eliade writes, 'because it reveals the fixed point, the central axis for all future orientation'. Ultimately, Eliade believes that secularised individuals still retain an unconscious connection to the memory of this sacred space – which resonates with the way Enescu retains a symbolic and aesthetic connection to his homeland, or the past. See Mircea Eliade, *The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Harcourt, Inc., 1959; originally published as *Le sacré et le profane*. Paris: Gallimard, 1956), 21.

<sup>41</sup> I include references to the literature on Schubert and memory in Chapter One. On Mahler and memory, see for instance Thomas Peattie, 'In Search of Lost Time: Memory and Mahler's Broken Pastoral', in *Mahler and His World*, ed. Karen Painter (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2002), 185–198; and on Feldman, see Catherine Laws, 'Feldman – Beckett – Johns: Patterning, Memory and Subjectivity', in *The Modernist Legacy: Essays on New Music*, ed. Björn Heile (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 135–158.

the course of a musical work's temporal unfolding) encapsulate some of the paradigmatic shifts which underpin our understanding and theorisation of modern memory. The work of Pierre Nora is significant for the way it charts memory's social and historical transformation from a collective and socially governed phenomenon to an experience that is by contrast highly subjective and psychologised. With the degradation of collective memory (which Nora attributes to the decline of the peasantry and traditional rural life, especially around the middle decades of the twentieth century), it effectively became the responsibility of the individual to remember his or her own past, most pertinently as a means of reconstituting a vital sense of self within a temporally dislocating modern world. In Nora's words: 'the atomization of a general memory into a private one has given the obligation to remember a power of internal coercion...when memory is no longer everywhere, it will not be anywhere unless one takes the responsibility to recapture it through individual means'.<sup>42</sup> Unlike its pre-modern counterpart, memory recast in terms of an individual obligation to remember is framed by a self-conscious acknowledgment of the past's essential irretrievability (the extent to which this was felt by individuals during the long nineteenth century amounts to what Richard Terdiman has described as a 'memory crisis' afflicting modernity).<sup>43</sup> Remembering in that sense becomes a perspectival act, with the past viewed from an angle, or at a distance (for moderns 'the past is a foreign country', writes David Lowenthal).<sup>44</sup> As such, the psychologised memory of the modern subject was often characterised by a nostalgic mode of yearning, as individuals sought to reconstruct their identities by piecing together a historically discontinuous and ever-receding impression of the past. Marcel Proust's novel *In Search of Lost Time* (1913–27) famously presents a sustained exploration of this quintessentially modern conception of remembering, and constitutes a semi-autobiographical attempt at reliving the past (or reconstructing it) in such a way that it might prove meaningful for the narrator's understanding of the present.<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>42</sup> Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire', *Representations*, No. 26, Special Issue: Memory and Counter-Memory (Spring, 1989), 16.

<sup>43</sup> Richard Terdiman, *Present Past: Modernity and the Memory Crisis* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993).

<sup>44</sup> David Lowenthal, *The Past is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>45</sup> The extant literature on Proust, from a variety of perspectives, is of course extensive. A useful starting point for Proust's conceptualisation of memory can be found in Roger Shattuck's *Proust's Binoculars: A Study of Memory, Time and Recognition in A la recherche du temps perdu* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). Proust's appropriation and understanding of music (in structural as well as metaphysical terms) is well researched; see for instance the classic studies by Georges Piroué, *Proust et la musique du devenir* (Paris: Denoël, 1960) and Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Proust as Musician*, trans. Derrick Puffett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). For considerations of Proust's novel in relation to the work of specific composers, see Michael J. Puri, 'Memory, Pastiche, and Aestheticism in Ravel and Proust', in *Ravel Studies*, ed. Deborah Mawer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 122–152, or Julian Johnson, 'Rehearing Lost Time: Proust and Mahler', *Romance Studies*, Vol. 32, Issue 2: Unsettling Scores: Proust and Music (2014), 88–98.

Looking ‘back’ rather than ‘forward’ (which is often the distinguishing comparison made between Schubert’s and Beethoven’s musical temporalities)<sup>46</sup> is similarly a foundational aspect of much of Enescu’s music. It is telling, moreover, that Enescu saw his entire oeuvre as being fundamentally anchored to the past: ‘although my musical language may resemble that of my contemporaries, it does in fact differ radically from theirs. At a profound level it bears the mark of the past from which it has grown; it does not share their attitude of repudiation’.<sup>47</sup> On the face of it, Enescu seems eager to distance himself from the kind of modernist art in which, as he saw it, a clean break from past influence had become a notable aesthetic imperative (it is presumably for this reason that he never experimented with serial techniques). Instead, he seeks to trace a continuity between his work and that of his predecessors, both in terms of his own stylistic evolution as well as his professed indebtedness to former traditions and methods (his schooling in counterpoint would seem an obvious example in this case). From a technical perspective, Enescu exhibits a strong tendency for creating a continuity between the past and the present, at times even seeking to collapse the ontological distinction between both temporal categories. He seems to resist the notion that the past is truly lost, and his evident preoccupation with creating a continuity or co-immanence between the past and present similarly overlaps with a more traditional, pre-modern kind of memory – of the sort that Nora himself nostalgically laments the disappearance of, but which Enescu may still have found to be an integral part of rural peasant life in parts of Romania (*dor* itself could be regarded as a marker of this collective or ‘lived’ memory: a shared expressive mode which encourages an awareness of self through a community, and which offers a cohesive means for living in the present – even if its nostalgic undertones are invariably an expression of modernity). It is worth noting that compared with the rate at which traditional village and peasant life became subsumed by urbanisation in France, in Romania this same process took longer (even in the twenty-first century, parts of the Romanian countryside remain apparently untouched by modernisation, which has become a sociological problem in itself).<sup>48</sup> As such, the capacity of agrarian communities to retain their

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<sup>46</sup> See for instance Carl Dahlhaus, ‘Sonata Form in Schubert’, in *Schubert: Critical and Analytical Studies*, ed. Walter Frisch (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press), 8.

<sup>47</sup> Zeno Vancea, ‘George Enescu, muzician umanist’, *Studii de muzicologie*, Vol. 4 (1968), 26. Cited in translation in Malcolm (1990), 261.

<sup>48</sup> Until the outbreak of the Second World War, France was in fact a predominantly agricultural society (about half the population in 1945 was still engaged in agriculture). Not only that, but by Western standards its industry, as Hewitt notes, was not only ‘subordinate to agriculture, it was also...relatively primitive’. See Hewitt (2003), 2. The industrial situation in France was still far more developed than in Romania, however. Alina Mungiu-Pippidi notes that ‘in 1930, Romania’s per capita income was comparable to France’s in 1789 (...); in the early decades of the twentieth century, the sophistication and productivity of Romanian farming were at the level of French farming in the seventeenth century’. Even in 2010, Romania was home to seven million peasants (in a population of around 20 million) who could ‘barely reach subsistence levels’, posing a ‘development problem’ for both

living traditions and something like a collective mode of remembering (as well as what Terdiman and others have described as a ‘transparency of meaning’)<sup>49</sup> was arguably more pronounced in Enescu’s homeland than was the case in France, particularly around the middle decades of the twentieth century. At the same time, Enescu’s description of his music as past-orientated is also suggestive of the same personal obligation to remember that Nora identifies as a condition of modern memory. Enescu makes it his responsibility to remember the past – a symptom of his displacement, certainly, but perhaps also influenced by his own perception of the decline of rural life and peasant communities within his adopted homeland. This is evidenced by some of the more ‘autobiographical’ works in his oeuvre, particularly the *Impressions d’enfance* suite in which he presents scenes from his childhood in rural Moldavia.

As I explore in Chapter Two, Enescu’s treatment of the past shifts incessantly between something that is distant and ‘other’, and something that is lived spontaneously or ‘inhabited’ within the present. The variable means by which Enescu effectively creates continuities and discontinuities between the past and the present is of course inseparable from his understanding of musical time more generally. The theoretical conception of lived time was itself a contested topic in the decades around the turn of the twentieth century. While modern recollection was understood in terms of the perceived rupture between past and present, thinkers like Henri Bergson instead insisted that our experience of lived time ought in fact to be understood in terms of a continuity between past and present. Moreover, the experience of continuous time (whereby the past ‘melts’ into the present) was not subordinate to the pervading view of time as linear or goal-directed. Such theoretical concerns find their echo in the cultural production of the period. In the early half of the nineteenth century, Western art music began re-engaging with cyclic conceptions of temporality, drawing on the polychronic, or ‘sacred’ notions of time that also underpinned Western consciousness before industrialisation, and which typifies the temporal encoding of much African, Balinese, or Javanese musics (famously, Debussy was

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Romania and the European Union. An important contrast can be made here between the idealisation of peasant communities (on the part of Blaga, and others), and the stark reality of impoverishment. By comparison, in the thirty years after the Second World War, France’s peasant population fell for the first time to below ten percent (which for Nora signalled the final breaking of collective memory). See Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, *A Tale of Two Villages: Coerced Modernization in the East European Countryside* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2010), 2, 189; see also Bill Schwarz, ‘Memory, Temporality, Modernity: *Les lieux de mémoire*’, in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 41–58.

<sup>49</sup> Terdiman writes that ‘In traditional societies...objects and people could be said [to] carry their pasts and their meanings openly’, and that ‘the influence of this mode of conceiving the precapitalist past remains strong’. He cites the work of writer John Berger, who likewise draws attention to this ‘transparency of meaning’ in village settings in his novel *Pig Earth*: ‘In a village the difference between what is known about a person and what is unknown is slight...Peasants do not *play roles* as urban characters do...because the space between what is unknown about a person and what is generally known...is too small’. Terdiman (1993), 6.

influenced by the latter upon hearing the gamelan at the 1889 Paris Exhibition). In some ways, we can see how the cyclicism and inherent continuity of what Raymond Monelle has called ‘lyric’ temporality (implying non-linearity, or ‘stasis’ – an important feature of Enescu’s works) afforded a conceptual rejoining of ‘sacred time’ within the broader context of a modern Western ‘bichrony’ (which Monelle claims encountered its expressive peak in musical works of the Classical era).<sup>50</sup> What Enescu brings to this temporal shift is especially intriguing, in so far as his music (which draws heavily on cyclicism and non-linear temporal states, but which is still evidently concerned with directionality) might be seen to articulate a counterpoint of cultural temporalities (or different cultures’ understanding of time), expressed in the contexts of an industrialised, modern nation state on the one hand, and a nation to which industrial development came comparatively later on the other. Indeed, to the extent that Romania in the first decades of the twentieth century was more reliant than France on an agricultural economy, it was thereby (arguably) possessed of a cultural temporality in which the cyclic time of agrarian life was still of comparatively greater significance (something which Enescu could well be seen to evoke in his musical landscapes). It is in this sense that the ‘temporal space’ of Enescu’s music could be regarded as comprising a variety of cultural temporalities, each in counterpoint with one another: polychronicity; future orientation; western bichrony. Similarly, the way his works reveal a perpetual kind of self-differentiation within their temporal unfolding (especially in terms of their continual melodic evolution) prompts us to consider further how Enescu’s music reconciles (or transitions between) contrasting cultural temporalities, creating a stylistic ‘becoming’ out of the discontinuity of displacement.

Theorising memory is partly a question of how the past is retrieved or revived, but it is also about how we (primarily as listeners) engage with its contents. (Re-)enchantment is an important category in this respect, and allows us to consider what promises (or ‘auratic returns’) the past holds for our lived experience of the present.<sup>51</sup> Listening to the mature and later

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<sup>50</sup> As Monelle describes, industrial work necessitated the invention of a homogeneous, secular (‘monochronic’) time, and so the mechanical clock was developed between 1380 and 1450. Monelle makes a further clarifying distinction between polychronic and monochronic time, arguing that Western consciousness, while ‘convinced that its cognition of clock time is all there is to know about time’, is fundamentally mistaken about the roots of its cultural time. This is Monelle’s starting point for outlining the origins of a modern Western ‘bichrony’, which, he claims, comprises lyric and progressive temporalities (implying stasis and directionality respectively) in various stages of reconciliation and interaction. Raymond Monelle, *The Sense of Music: Semiotic Essays* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2000), 93.

<sup>51</sup> Kerwin Lee Klein claims that part of the reason why memory retains its ‘shine’ is because it ‘projects an immediacy we feel has been lost from history’. More specifically: ‘memory promises auratic returns [because] its traditional association with religious contexts and meanings is so much older and heavier than the comparatively recent effort of the early professional historians to define memorial practice as a vestigial prehistory’. See Kerwin Lee Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse’, *Representations*, No. 69, Special Issue: Grounds for Remembering (University of California Press, 2000), 129–130.

chamber works, it is evident that Enescu is interested in the enchanting, mystifying capacity of music, and that memory has a significant role to play in this respect. As I explore in Chapter Three, the strategies that Enescu employs in his construction of enchanted states or in the creation of enchanting effects goes well beyond the clichéd view of music as a mode of enchantment in and of itself.<sup>52</sup> Partly, this aesthetic stance can be seen to derive from Enescu's adherence to the spiritualism of Romanian folklore, which became a key element of the traditionalist narrative (and which likewise underpins Enescu's fascination with nature and evocations of rural life). Enescu's own self-professed 'mysticism' also seems relevant here in explaining why his music seems actively to resist the conventional narrative of modernity as disenchantment (in a series of interviews for French radio with the journalist Bernard Gavoty, Enescu describes himself as a 'countryman (*campagnard*) and mystic (*mystique*)').<sup>53</sup> Consequently, while enchantment (and the question of its continued role in daily life) can readily be theorised in terms of the impact of modernity more generally, in Enescu's case we can see how this category is also mediated by more localised cultural, spiritual, ethical and sociological influences, which in turn are crystallised within the musical material itself (for instance: Enescu's wondrous contemplation of the rural and natural world in the *Impressions d'enfance* suite is demonstrated by his numerous onomatopoeic renderings of animal 'voices').

Both memory and enchantment can be seen as important constitutive elements of dreaming, which is the category I explore in Chapter Four. It was not until the late nineteenth century that

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<sup>52</sup> The extent to which music theorists are still inclined to think about music in this way is something Steven Rings has considered in a recent article, asking: 'in the wreckage of world events, what are the ethical stakes of theorists remaining in such beguiled proximity to musical sound?' Rings draws on the work of political theorist Jane Bennett (as do I), who defends enchantment on ethical grounds despite conceding the fact that, in the academy, 'pervasive skepticism is the authoritative marker of a social conscience'. She argues on the contrary that 'if enchantment can foster an intellectually laudable generosity of spirit, then the cultivation of an eye for the wonderful becomes something like an academic duty'. See Rings, 'Music's Stubborn Enchantments (and Music Theory's)', *Journal of the Society for Music Theory*, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2018), 1.3, 3.09, 3.10; and Jane Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 9–10.

<sup>53</sup> Enescu explains that since both his paternal grandfather and a great uncle on his mother's side were Orthodox priests, and since he himself was raised in the countryside (his father was an agriculturalist and estate administrator), for him 'the land and religion were consequently the two divinities of my childhood' ('la terre et la religion ont été ainsi les deux divinités de mon enfance'). He notes too that over the course of his life he had remained largely faithful to these 'divinities' ('J'y suis resté fidèle – en transposant'). See George Enescu and Bernard Gavoty, *Entretiens avec Georges Enesco*, episode 1 (first broadcast on French Radio on 25.01.1952; accessible online via [www.franceculture.fr/emissions/les-nuits-de-france-culture](http://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/les-nuits-de-france-culture)). Enescu's conversations with Gavoty (numbering 20 episodes in total) were recorded in 1951–52, and contain an invaluable account of the composer's life, music, and career. Gavoty later published an edited version of the interviews as *Les Souvenirs de Georges Enesco* (Paris: Flammarion, 1955), although comparing the print version with the original recordings does reveal numerous stylistic alterations, as well as the insertion of words and phrases attributed to Enescu which were either merely implied, or originally spoken by Gavoty himself. I have used the most recent reprinting of a dual language (French and Romanian) edition of *Souvenirs*. For the above quotes, see Gavoty, *Les Souvenirs de Georges Enesco / Amintirile lui George Enescu* (Bucharest: Curtea Veche, 2016), 56. All translations are my own unless noted otherwise.

a link between memory and the unconscious dream experience began to be theorised, however, which in a broader sense is indicative of the modern cultural fascination with dreaming and the unconscious mind. Dream theorisation, as Natalya Lusty and Helen Groth have observed, ‘coincided with a collective desire to apprehend the experience and culture of modernity’, which was itself increasingly mapped ‘through the contradictory forces of alienation and overstimulation, detachment and immersion’.<sup>54</sup> Indeed, dreaming was often analogised (notably by poets like Charles Baudelaire) with the experience of being in a modern city and part of (or detached from) the urban crowd. In the words of Laure Katsaros: ‘just as they do in crowds, the self and the nonself come into contact in the world of dreams. Dreams are both our own and not our own; they are both familiar and unfamiliar, both clichés and uniquely, joyously, or painfully particular’.<sup>55</sup> Perhaps most importantly, even while the variety of theoretical and cultural perspectives on dreaming increased dramatically in this period (one notes especially the influences of Sigmund Freud and Symbolist thought), the burgeoning fascination with dreaming in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries also stimulated ‘greater appreciation of the dream’s role in furnishing evidence of the uncertainty of a self-evident reality and a fully knowable coherent self’.<sup>56</sup> Within this context, music becomes a vital cultural medium, and what was once regarded as its lack – its incapacity for visual representation – instead becomes its major potency. For the Symbolists most obviously (who put the unconscious and the construction of alternate realities at the heart of an understanding of the world), music was exalted as the ideal art form for expressing the ineffable, for revealing the hidden depths of one’s inner self, and for making ‘the invisible visible’.<sup>57</sup> It is worth noting that unlike Debussy, for instance, who engaged with the writings of several Symbolist poets (including Baudelaire and Stéphane Mallarmé), Enescu rarely looked to Symbolist writers.<sup>58</sup> However, his various pronouncements about music and life being a kind of dream certainly

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<sup>54</sup> Helen Groth and Natalya Lusty, *Dreams and Modernity: A Cultural History* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1.

<sup>55</sup> Laure Katsaros, *New York–Paris: Whitman, Baudelaire, and the Hybrid City* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012), 77.

<sup>56</sup> Groth and Lusty (2013), 2.

<sup>57</sup> The French Symbolist painter Odilon Redon famously stated that ‘all my originality...consists in giving human life to unlikely creatures...while, as much as possible, putting the logic of the visible at the service of the invisible’. See Redon, ‘Artist’s Confidences’, in *To Myself: Notes on Life, Art and Artists*, trans. Mira Jacob and Jeanne L. Wassermann (New York: George Braziller, 1986; originally published as *À soi-même, journal (1867–1915)*, Paris: H. Floury, 1922), 23.

<sup>58</sup> One notable exception is his early setting of Albert Samain’s ‘Silence!...’ (1905), which the Symbolist poet included as part of his 1893 collection *Au jardin de l’infante* (which of course calls to mind Enescu’s own *Impressions d’enfance* suite, or the garden scene in Ravel’s *L’Enfant et les Sortilèges*). Samain himself was heavily influenced by Baudelaire and Paul Verlaine.

resonate with Symbolist thought, and perhaps more pertinently with the Wagnerism of the *fin de siècle* (which itself was influential to the Symbolist movement).

Over the course of my fourth chapter I explore how both dream and reverie (as a kind of waking ‘dream-thinking’) might serve as useful discursive metaphors for Enescu’s allusive, fragmentary processes. Indeed, his musical language can be understood to evoke a dreamlike logic to the extent that it incorporates processes of defamiliarisation, discontinuous blurring, melodic fragmentation, sudden shifts or fluid transitions, temporal and formal displacement, or non-linear development. At the same time, Enescu’s evident desire for his pieces, or at least sections of his works to be interpreted as ‘dreamlike’ – through a recourse to nocturnal settings; certain expressive markings (*sognando*, most obviously); his aesthetic pronouncements; and, indeed, his ‘mystifying’ processes – suggests a deep engagement with the broader cultural preoccupation with dreaming as a medium for understanding the nature of modern consciousness and the self in relation to the world. Again, Enescu’s cultural geographical positioning is relevant here, particularly concerning his itinerancy, which inevitably helped to foster a narrative of displacement – a quintessential marker of the modern condition. At the same time, the way Enescu seems to orientate himself aesthetically with the inwardly focused autochthonist narrative reveals a simultaneous conception of the dream that is closer, in fact, to how the early Romantics understood the notion – as part of a spiritual realm; a state of the soul; a longed-for alternate reality.

Ultimately, Enescu’s music and aesthetics offer yet another fascinating perspective on how art in general and musical works in particular narrate the experience of modernity. Even while it exposes and negotiates aspects of the modern condition, however, Enescu’s music (as noted at the outset) shows little of the crisis of modernity – it is not in the least bit alienating. On the contrary, even at its most complex, the music still retains an alluring quality, with the potent capacity of drawing the listener in. A fundamental reason for this has much to do with how Enescu privileges the body through his highly sensuous musical language (if, as Baudelaire and others saw it, modernity is characterised by our detachment from the world, then the lived body is capable of re-affirming our centrality within it). Indeed, the ways Enescu encourages a kind of embodied listening and how we might situate the lived (or phenomenological) body in relation to his music are central considerations in my investigation of Enescu’s processes, and underpin my exploration of his aesthetics through the experiential categories I have just outlined. For while it is more common to think about topics like memory, time, enchantment and dream specifically in relation to a psychologised or inwardly orientated modern subject (as

I have effectively described above), each of these experiential categories simultaneously invokes a corporeal presence. Thus, in the following chapters, I consider types of pre-cognitive, body-orientated remembering; the somatic effects of enchantment; and how the body's perceptual presence in dreams ties us to the waking world, as well as how each of these corporeal processes is evoked or framed musically.

My examination of Enescu's music in terms of its corporeality coincides with a recent surge of interest in the 'musical body'. As part of their introduction to an edited volume of essays on music, analysis, and the body, published in 2018, Nicholas Reyland and Rebecca Thumpston note that 'the body and embodiment have emerged as central concerns in twenty-first-century arts, humanities, and cultural studies research – including some areas of musicology'. However, the editors also concede that notwithstanding some 'important early advances' – concerning philosophical and feminist approaches to the musical body, for instance, or in the development of theories of gesture, affect, or embodied cognition – still, 'the body remains less than fully scrutinised by musicological inquiry'.<sup>59</sup> In his exploration of Carl Nielsen's musical works, Daniel Grimley has suggested that attempts to account for the music's corporeal referentiality remain 'stubbornly metaphorical' – which is presumably one reason why the body has been comparatively overlooked in musicological scholarship. Grimley goes on to claim that 'this metaphorical discourse itself reflects another aspect of the process of modernity, namely the apparent autonomy of the subject and hence of the modernist work of art'. This autonomy is 'ultimately deceptive', in that it leads potentially to a kind of circumscribed process of narrativisation. Grimley observes how 'the subject's appearance of autonomy, the crucial fracturing of artist and society that provides the foundation for many familiar readings of musical modernism, in turn becomes another aspect of modernism's narrative character'.<sup>60</sup> We need not grant it exclusivity of course, for it is through such self-referential narrativisation that such aspects as the role of the musical body risk becoming marginalised within modernist discourse. Julian Johnson similarly suggests that 'the failure to hear certain aspects of twentieth-century music produces a misunderstanding of the broader movement of modernism; or, to put it the other way round, our theoretical misconceptions make us deaf to key aspects of the music'.<sup>61</sup> Enescu's music offers a compelling opportunity to address this lacuna – to tell a different 'story' – and it is in large part because of their overt corporeality that I am choosing

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<sup>59</sup> *Music, Analysis, and the Body: Experiments, Explorations, and Embodiments*, ed. Nicholas Reyland and Rebecca Thumpston (Leuven: Peeters Publishers and Booksellers, 2018), 1–2.

<sup>60</sup> Grimley (2010), 9–10.

<sup>61</sup> Julian Johnson, 'Return of the Repressed', in *Transformations of Musical Modernism*, ed. Erling E. Gulbrandsen and Julian Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 46–47.

to explore the mature and later chamber works specifically in this thesis (these include the Third Piano Sonata in D major, Op. 24, No. 3 (1935); the Second Cello Sonata in D major, Op. 26, No. 2 (1935); the *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28 (1940); the Piano Quintet in A minor, Op. 29 (1940); and the Second Piano Quartet in D minor, Op. 30 (1944) – see the Appendix for an indication of where these works are situated in the context of Enescu's output in the period of 1926–1955).<sup>62</sup> Ultimately, I wish to argue that Enescu's music and his aesthetics prompt a nuanced reassessment of the multiplicity that is musical modernism. His case is an important and unjustly overlooked addition both to this multiplicity and to the field of musicology, and situating his accomplishment at the forefront of twentieth-century art music seems long overdue.

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<sup>62</sup> By focusing predominantly (but not exclusively) on these works, my interest is therefore in those pieces which were written in the period dating from around the time Enescu completed the monumental compositional landmark that was his only opera, *Oedipe* – which was drafted in piano reduction in 1922, orchestrated in the years after, and finally completed in 1931 – up to the end of the Second World War. Consequently, my interest is not so much in the works written towards the very end of Enescu's life – a period of eight or nine years in which illness prevented him from writing a great deal, and during which he spent much time revising earlier works (such as his First String Quartet, and the Piano Quintet). These very late works reveal a final aesthetic reorientation: both the Second String Quartet, Op. 22, No. 2 (1952) and the Chamber Symphony, Op. 33 (1954) are more austere and classicised compared with the mature and 'later' chamber works, while the symphonic poem *Vox Maris*, Op. 31 (1954) is truly unique in Enescu's oeuvre. Taken together, these last three works are in fact ideal for discussing issues of 'late style' (one notes with interest Enescu's decision to change an original marking of *Adagio Funebre* for one of the movements in the Chamber Symphony back to *Adagio*), although this is beyond the scope of the current project.

## CHAPTER I

### *Memory*

‘Your memory and your senses will be but the nourishment of your creative impulse’  
(Arthur Rimbaud, *Illuminations*)<sup>1</sup>

‘I have more memories than if I had lived a thousand years’  
(Charles Baudelaire, *Les Fleurs du mal*)<sup>2</sup>

#### CONTEXTS

IT IS COMMON for theorists and musicians to hear and understand music as if it were possessed of agency: the music ‘does this’, or, ‘it goes in this direction’. Music, more than any other art form, creates the impression of being somehow aware of its own temporal and mnemonic processes. Indeed, we are encouraged to listen to musical works as if they had the capacity to map their own history, remember past events, or gaze toward the future. Ascribing such agency to music (or endowing it with a ‘recollective consciousness’)<sup>3</sup> is tempting since the experience of listening to musical works itself reflects a fundamental aspect of remembering – as both something that we do, and that happens to us. On the one hand, music is understood to be a structured object – structured by a composer and a performer who themselves have the capacity to remember and reflect. The music is, in this sense, a product or an expression of the way we as humans make sense of our temporal relation to the world. It is our own mnemonic, perceptual and affective faculties that determine or lend weight to the music’s broader temporal and recollective processes (which are evidenced most obviously by its tendency for repetition). At the same time, music occasions and shapes our experience and understanding of time, most importantly because it confronts us as something ‘that happens to us’, as a structuring of time and memory presented to us, not of our own making. We are prompted to engage in a meaningful fiction, whereby both listener and music have the capacity to embody recollective subjectivities, such that our experience of listening to music might even afford a kind of intersubjective remembering.

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<sup>1</sup> Arthur Rimbaud, ‘Jeunesse’ from *Les Illuminations* (Paris: Publications de La Vogue, 1886). ‘Ta mémoire et tes sens ne seront que la nourriture de ton impulsion créatrice’.

<sup>2</sup> Charles Baudelaire, ‘Spleen’ from *Les Fleurs du mal* (Paris: Poulet-Malassis et de Broise, 1857). ‘J’ai plus de souvenirs que si j’avais mille ans’.

<sup>3</sup> Scott Burnham similarly describes Franz Schubert’s later instrumental music as the ‘distinctive realisation of [a] recollective mode of consciousness’, as part of his summative contribution to a series of articles which appeared in an issue of *The Musical Quarterly* dedicated to Schubert and musical memory. See Burnham, ‘Schubert and the Sound of Memory’, *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 84, Issue 4 (2000), 655–663 (655).

I would like to suggest in this chapter that such complexly intertwined processes of musical remembering are essential to a closer understanding of several of Enescu's later chamber works. Taken together, these pieces point to one of the most remarkably sophisticated examples of a memory-based musical conception as might be found in Western modernity, easily matching Franz Schubert's achievement in this respect.<sup>4</sup> Enescu's mnemonic processes (particularly concerning the recollection of thematic material) and his evocations of the past (or 'pastness') oscillate between explicit representations on the one hand, and veiled allusions on the other – as if the music remembers but the listener, who may not necessarily perceive the recollection, does not.<sup>5</sup> Peter Edwards hears this same quality in the music of György Ligeti (who, though Hungarian, was born in Romania), observing that 'any attempt to explain the pastness in Ligeti's music in abstract terms detracts from its most alluring quality: the manner by which the music acknowledges its own self-production in response to the past and the contradictions that this incurs'. Consequently, 'each work challenges perception and interpretation in new ways'.<sup>6</sup> Enescu's music often achieves a similarly disorientating effect by virtue of its rich polyphonic interweaving – its 'kaleidoscopic density', in the words of Pascal Bentoiu.<sup>7</sup> However, in spite of its occasional complexity and its challenges to perception, the music retains an uncanny ability to lure listeners into its intricate contrapuntal processes. It is no less beguiling during those extended moments where Enescu curtails any sense of polyphonic complexity and the mnemonic mode with which he engages instead resembles a static and transitory vision. Across this broad textural spectrum, the past can come across as distant and ephemeral (as if it were ontologically separate from the present), or it can seem co-immanent with present experience. Enescu's music therefore charts a wide range of mnemonic modes and processes, from self-conscious acts of remembrance to mnemonic operations that seem spontaneous and immediate. Each of these types of remembering can in turn be situated in terms of the shifting conceptions and theorisations of modern memory which I outlined in the

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<sup>4</sup> Schubert's songs and his instrumental works have certainly attracted the most attention as far as the study of musical memory is concerned (as the journal issue cited in note 3 suggests). Benedict Taylor prefaces his own article 'Schubert and the Construction of Memory: The String Quartet in A minor, D. 804 ("Rosamunde")', *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, Vol. 139, No. 1 (2014), 41–88, with the observation: 'It is a truism of recent musicology that Schubert was the master of musical memory'.

<sup>5</sup> I understand the 'listening subject' in a broad sense to include performers, composers, and analysts. Leon Botstein identifies the composer as an 'ideal listener', whose recollective processes are directed rather more at 'the conversation with oneself' than at some imagined listener who experiences the work in performance. Botstein, 'Memory and Nostalgia as Music-Historical Categories', *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 84, Issue 4 (2000), 532–533.

<sup>6</sup> Peter Edwards, 'Remembrance and prognosis in the music of György Ligeti', in *Transformations of Musical Modernism*, ed. Erling E. Guldbrandsen and Julian Johnson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 190.

<sup>7</sup> Pascal Bentoiu, *Masterworks of George Enescu: A Detailed Analysis*, trans. Lory Wallfisch (Scarecrow Press, 2010), 418. Bentoiu is referring here to the Piano Quintet, Op. 29.

Introduction. Essentially, I suggest that Enescu's understanding of memory and the past is highly malleable: the past is, in one sense, irretrievable (a symptom of the 'memory crisis' which befell modern life), but at the same time, Enescu's mnemonic processes reflect a deep engagement with how the past may still be lived spontaneously in the present.

Musicologists have identified several ways in which the music of certain composers could be said to frame or construct the experience of memory (although as Kristina Muxfeldt has rightly observed, music in general has in fact largely been ignored in broader cross-disciplinary studies and discussions on memory).<sup>8</sup> Despite the multifarious ways in which memory might be seen to function – musically or otherwise – within this broad interpretative field some discernible trends have emerged (although what follows is by no means an exhaustive overview). Many writers have been attracted to the ways in which the recollection of past material in various works (dating predominantly from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries) can be seen to shape a broader experience of musical time, specifically in relation to a generic formal framework. Muxfeldt elegantly describes this approach in terms of how 'a mimesis of mental functioning interacts with commonplace conventions of the local musical discourse'.<sup>9</sup> Thematic recall emerges as an important topic in this respect, especially in such contexts as cyclic form (I explore Enescu's own engagement with thematic cyclicism in Chapter Two).<sup>10</sup> From a more abstract perspective, musical memory has likewise been explored in terms of a given work's ability to shape what one might describe as a temporality of pastness – the way in which music might be said to 'sound' like memory, regardless of whether or not something is literally being recalled.<sup>11</sup> A feeling of nostalgia frequently accompanies such modes of remembering (in particular, 'reminiscing' is often characterised by nostalgia, as I explore below) and is likewise an important aspect of Enescu's own compositional aesthetic, as

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<sup>8</sup> Kristina Muxfeldt, *Vanishing Sensibilities: Schubert, Beethoven, Schumann* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 123. See also the chapter containing this quotation: 'Music Recollected in Tranquillity: Postures of Memory in Beethoven', 118–147.

<sup>9</sup> Muxfeldt (2012), 124.

<sup>10</sup> Alongside Muxfeldt's chapter in the study cited above (note 8), see Benedict Taylor's *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* (2011), and *The Melody of Time: Music and Temporality in the Romantic Era* (2016), especially Chapter 5: 'La sonate cyclique and the Structures of Time' (which informs my own analytical investigation in Chapter Two). In *Ravel the Decadent: Memory, Sublimation, and Desire* (2011) Michael Puri examines how Ravel's thematic procedures substantiate what he describes as a 'larger process of remembering', primarily in the context of cyclic writing (see especially Chapters 1 and 5, titled 'Thematic Cyclicism and the Ravelian Finale' and 'Epilogram in the *Valses nobles et sentimentales*', respectively). In the chapter on 'Memory' in his book *Edward Elgar and the Nostalgic Imagination* (2007), Matthew Riley addresses what he calls 'thematic reminiscence', or the non-functional return of earlier material in Elgar's music, which can be likened to the cyclic processes explored by both Taylor and Puri.

<sup>11</sup> See, for instance, John Daverio, "'One More Beautiful Memory of Schubert": Schumann's Critique of the Impromptus, D. 935', *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2000), 604–618.

evidenced by his frequent use of the expressive marking *nostalgico*.<sup>12</sup> For other writers, memory is evidenced by the recollection or invocation of past styles, traditions, or methods. Musical borrowing of this kind is often reliant on a discernibly cultural mode of remembering, which is also based on a shared understanding of how past models and traditions are constructed, as well as what they entail or symbolise.<sup>13</sup> Enescu himself, for instance (like many of his French contemporaries), was attracted to stories of Greek antiquity (in *Oedipe*);<sup>14</sup> inspired by medieval and Renaissance poetry (in the *Sept Chansons de Clément Marot*, Op. 15);<sup>15</sup> and experimented with Renaissance and Baroque dance forms (in the Second Piano Suite in D major, Op. 10)<sup>16</sup> – practices which can all be subsumed under the larger umbrella of Neoclassicism, but which could not have been deemed meaningful without the operations of a broader, collective mode of remembering.

Despite these significant gains in the study of musical memory, much less attention has been directed at investigating how music might frame the act of remembering from a phenomenological perspective, for instance.<sup>17</sup> Of course, there are certain kinds of analysis which include or incorporate what is phenomenologically available in order to ‘measure’ the degree of relatedness between musical materials, and to get to grips thereby with questions of significance. The point is that with Enescu, what is phenomenologically available is quite permeable; his processes often lack the intentionality of specific analytical categories of ‘recall’ or ‘transformation’. Enescu plays instead with the degrees to which recurrence is foregrounded,

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<sup>12</sup> For instance, towards the end of the opening movement of the Second Piano Quartet, Op. 30, and again at Figure 19; or on three occasions in the second movement of the Third Piano Sonata, Op. 24, No. 3.

<sup>13</sup> Walter Frisch approaches this issue from the perspective of a contemporaneous listening experience in “‘You Must Remember This’: Memory and Structure in Schubert’s String Quartet in G Major, D. 887”, *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 84, No. 4 (2000), 582–603.

<sup>14</sup> Philhellenism in France took a particularly strong hold in the 1920s and 1930s, as evidenced by the period’s numerous theatrical and musical settings of Greek tragedy. Alongside *Oedipe*, one might also point to Darius Milhaud’s successive settings of each of the three parts of Aeschylus’s *Oresteia* triptych (based on Paul Claudel’s translations and performed in full for the first time in 1935); Arthur Honegger’s setting of Jean Cocteau’s theatrical version of *Antigone* (premiered in 1927); Erik Satie’s ‘symphonic drama’ *Socrate* (first published in 1919); as well as Igor Stravinsky’s opera-oratorio *Oedipus rex* (1927). Richard Strauss’s *Elektra* (1909) is among the best-known settings of Greek tragedy composed outside of France.

<sup>15</sup> Clément Marot’s resurgent popularity in France (alongside such other medieval and Renaissance poets as François Villon and Charles d’Orléans) around the turn of the twentieth century is attested by numerous settings of his poems, not only by Enescu, but also by Ravel (*Deux Épigrammes de Clément Marot*, 1900); Jean Françaix (*Trois Épigrammes*, 1938, one of which is by Marot; the five settings in *Adolescence Clémentine*, 1941); Honegger (*Trois Psaumes*, 1940–41, the last of which is an adaptation of Psalm 138 by Marot); and Jean Rivier (*Trois poèmes de Ronsard et un de Clément Marot*, 1944).

<sup>16</sup> The inclusion of a Toccata and Sarabande (alongside Bourée and Pavane movements) in Enescu’s suite of 1903 bears striking similarities with the formal outline of Claude Debussy’s *Pour le piano* suite. The latter comprises a Prélude, Sarabande and Toccata, and was completed two years earlier, in 1901 (although the Sarabande movement was initially composed in 1894).

<sup>17</sup> Scott Burnham’s ‘Schubert and the Sound of Memory’ (see note 3), which considers the kind of attentive state afforded by the act of remembering, is one notable exception.

or the extent to which explicit links can be made between musical materials within the listening experience. A closer understanding of the relationship between memory and perception (within a broader phenomenology of listening) seems crucial for the study of musical memory in Enescu, whose processes might be described as disorientating precisely because they so frequently tease listeners' mnemonic and perceptual faculties. These processes are a reminder, moreover, that not all remembering is defined by distinct re-presentations of the past: recognition itself is a permeable mnemonic mode. Such perceptual equivocacy prompts an investigation into what is perhaps the most neglected topic as far as musical memory is concerned, namely the role of the body, and its importance in pre-cognitive modes of remembering.<sup>18</sup> This again seems a fundamental component of Enescu's own mnemonic processes, not least because his musical language is so often noted for its remarkably sensuous content. While body-orientated memory has been addressed in passing by some writers, its theoretical basis is usually limited to a consideration of 'habit memory', in the sense that Henri Bergson conceived of it.<sup>19</sup> Within Bergson's dualistic conception of remembering, habit memory seems to cede importance to 'independent recollection', however, thereby mirroring a general preference for thinking about memory from a mainly mental perspective. By contrast, and in a boldly assertive claim, Edward Casey (on whose work I draw throughout this chapter) has stated that 'there is no memory without body memory', and I suggest that to conceive of memory in Enescu necessarily invites a simultaneous consideration of the habitual, affective and kinaesthetic modes of remembering that his music affords.<sup>20</sup> The ways in which the music might shape a corporeal or sense-based mode of remembering is central, in other words, to my understanding of the mnemonic presentation in Enescu's works. This approach also goes a

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<sup>18</sup> While the body and embodiment are increasingly becoming important topics for musicology, very few inroads have been made in the investigation of body-orientated memory. A notable exception is Michael Puri, who explores (albeit very briefly) how Ravel's improvisatory keyboard textures trigger the involuntary remembering (through physical sensation) of earlier materials. I make similar observations regarding Enescu's own 'kinaesthetic' processes later in this chapter. See Puri (2011), 145–146.

<sup>19</sup> See the section on 'The Two Forms of Memory' in Chapter II of Bergson's *Matter and Memory*, trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (Mansfield, CT: Martino Publishing, 2011; originally published in French as *Matière et mémoire* in 1896), 86–105.

<sup>20</sup> Edward S. Casey, *Remembering: A Phenomenological Study* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2000), 172. Casey's study charts a comprehensive overview of the many varieties of remembering, and while in its theoretical scope it can be situated alongside studies such as Israel Rosenfield's *The Invention of Memory: A New View of the Brain* (New York: Basic Books, 1988) or George Johnson's *In the Palaces of Memory: How We Build the World Inside Our Heads* (New York: Vintage, 1991), its focus is less on the neuropsychological aspects of remembering, and more on how different kinds of remembering are experienced from a phenomenological perspective. By drawing on Casey's work it is not my intention to marginalise the importance of historical theorists – quite the opposite. Indeed, Casey himself seems to rely quite heavily on the thinking of Bergson, William James, and Edmund Husserl, for instance. Taken together, these theorists offer a host of similar (though slightly differing) models for an understanding of memory.

significant way to elucidating how Pierre Nora's concept of 'real' or lived memory continued to make its presence felt in the modern world: 'true memory', as Nora calls it, 'has taken refuge in gestures and habits, in skills passed down by unspoken traditions, in the body's inherent self-knowledge, in unstudied reflexes and ingrained memories'.<sup>21</sup>

This chapter therefore addresses some of the lacunae in current studies of musical memory, for which Enescu's later chamber works provide some remarkably sophisticated models. It would be remiss, however, to embark on a study of memory in Enescu without mentioning the composer's own remarkable cerebral capacity in this respect. Indeed, it is highly tempting to regard the perceptual and interpretive challenges inherent in the music as having originated through the prodigious workings of Enescu's own musical memory.<sup>22</sup> Noel Malcolm, for instance, observes that Enescu's extraordinary gifts 'must have helped to mould his compositional style into the complex inner organicism of construction which became more and more essential to it as his writing developed'.<sup>23</sup> This natural facility inevitably became an indispensable aid with regard to Enescu's irregular composing routine, which was frequently interrupted by his busy touring schedule. Under these circumstances, whole works would take shape in Enescu's head before he found the time to draft them (often with astonishing rapidity) on manuscript.<sup>24</sup> Malcolm notes further that 'with all the material of a work completely present to his mind at any moment, it is not surprising that Enescu became fascinated by the task of

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<sup>21</sup> Nora (1989), 13.

<sup>22</sup> There are numerous attestations as to Enescu's astonishing mnemonic faculty. Yehudi Menuhin recalls, for instance, how a single run-through of the newly completed Violin Sonata Maurice Ravel had just brought him was enough for Enescu to be able to place the manuscript to one side and play the entire work again, with Ravel at the piano, but this time from memory (to the astonishment of the young Menuhin, whose violin lesson Ravel had interrupted). See Yehudi Menuhin, *Unfinished Journey* (Futura, 1978), 100–101. Enescu himself was characteristically self-deprecating about his abilities, claiming in one of his conversations with Gavoty that his mnemonic prowess was merely 'a mechanical gift' ('un don mécanique'). Pressed on whether he'd be able to rewrite a significant portion of the Classical and Romantic repertory if he were left on a desert island with nothing but a quill and some lined paper, Enescu replied offhandedly that it would 'certainly be quite possible' ('c'est ma fois bien possible'), before remarking instead on the musical memory of his former fugue and counterpoint teacher at the Paris Conservatoire, André Gédalge. See Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 5 (first broadcast on 22.02.1952).

<sup>23</sup> Malcolm (1990), 13.

<sup>24</sup> The composition of *Oedipe* is a remarkable case in point, with Enescu drafting the entire opera – in a reduced piano version – in just two months, in July and August of 1921 (the final act took just six days to draft; Act III – with a performance duration of forty-five minutes – took a mere twenty-four hours). The speed at which Enescu worked is indeed astounding, although it is worth noting, too, that he had been 'living with' the opera since at least 1910, when he made his first sketches (he also attended a performance of Sophocles' *Oedipus Tyrannus* at the Comédie Française in 1909, which may have served as initial inspiration). These sketches were lost, however, along with a further series of wartime sketches, in 1917 (eventually rediscovered in 1924), so that any reference to these musical ideas (which in any case lacked the unifying thread of a libretto) during the initial drafting in 1921 would have been through memory. See Malcolm (1990), 144.

creating a complicated and delicate web of thematic interconnections in each piece'.<sup>25</sup> And, as Bentoiu observes, one main consequence of this as far as the listener is concerned is that 'mastering the memory of the musical discourse...in Enescu demands – as a rule – a much greater effort'.<sup>26</sup> A latent consideration throughout this (and the next) chapter, therefore, is how Enescu's music might suggest a kind of gestalt conception, or frame a uniquely complex mnemonic mode, as well as what implications this might have from the point of view of a listening experience. This seems a far more interesting question compared with merely considering the music as a literal product of memory: there is a highly expressive dimension to Enescu's writing for which memory alone does not account, but which in turn is suggestive of various rich and subtle modes of remembering. My exploration of these mnemonic modes charts a general move from issues surrounding perception and the mental aspects of remembering to a consideration of affective memory, followed by an examination of some of Enescu's processes of habituation and examples of body-orientated memory. The two works on which I will focus are the Third Piano Sonata in D major, Op. 24, No. 3 (1935), and the Second Piano Quartet in D minor, Op. 30 (1944), with additional examples occasionally drawn from other works.

#### MEMORY IN THE MIND

The opening of the second movement (*Andantino cantabile*) of Enescu's Third Piano Sonata presents a monodic recollection and gradual thematic expansion of the first movement's second subject (Ex. 1.1).

**Example 1.1:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, bars 1–7 (*continued next page*).

The musical score for Example 1.1 is for the opening of the second movement of Enescu's Third Piano Sonata. It is written for Piano (Pno.) and is in D major. The tempo is marked 'Andantino cantabile' with a metronome marking of quarter note = 72. The music is in 6/8 time, with a key signature of two sharps (F# and C#). The score shows the first seven bars, with a change in time signature from 6/8 to 4/8 at the end of bar 7. Dynamics include 'mp' (mezzo-piano) and 'mf' (mezzo-forte), with performance instructions 'dolce, pensieroso, un poco ad lib.' and 'poco'.

<sup>25</sup> Malcolm (1990), 13–14. Musically speaking, the scope of Enescu's musical memory is perhaps exemplified in the Second Symphony in A major, Op. 17, which both Malcolm and Bentoiu regard as a paradigmatic example of the composer's complex thematic method (this was the only work Enescu wrote away from the piano). Echoing Bentoiu's description of the work, Taylor writes that there is 'something almost monstrous about the polyphonic intricacy of [the symphony's] final movement', so that its overall effect 'verges on the overwhelming'. See Taylor (2017), 428.

<sup>26</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 453.

The *dolce rustico* and *piacevole* markings which accompanied the theme in its initial guise (in line with the opening movement's pastoral topic) are replaced in the *Andantino cantabile* with a more introspective marking of *dolce, pensieroso*.<sup>27</sup> The ruminative mood is matched by the theme's slower tempo and numerous carefree embellishments (mordents and grace notes). The gentle melding of ornament and theme, the soft dynamic and high register (the theme is a fifth higher compared with its initial appearance in the previous movement), as well as the instruction to play *un poco ad lib.* suggest an indistinctness or intangibility, emphasised further by the dissolution of a discernible metrical pulse and the occasionally lengthened notes which cause overlap within the melodic line. The loosening of grammar here is in fact radically different to how we might usually expect musical lines to be coordinated – around key metrical accents, or through points of rhythmic consonance. Enescu avoids any such structural or metrical grounding, by tying his melodic lines over the barline, and by employing grace notes and ornamental figures to undermine any sense of congruence between melody and metre. What is being recalled consequently seems ethereal and distant – as if the memory itself were located on the fringes of our consciousness. The lyrical voice framing this act of memory is still emergent, and only gradually becomes more fully formed through reiteration and harmonic grounding. The process of remembering, therefore, is composed in this instance as a re-inhabiting and subsequent expansion of musical space – or, an ethereal restatement of a

<sup>27</sup> The second subject first appears on page 5, stave 2, bar 1 – or 5/II/1 – of the Salabert edition of the score. In the absence of bar numbers or figures in the Salabert edition of the Third Piano Sonata, hereafter I refer to specific points in the score by page / stave / bar number.

previously evocative moment which is then subjected to an idealised or sublimated expansion.<sup>28</sup> More accurately, this constitutes a reworking of musical materials according to a logic that is quite different to the usual temporal sequence of linear development. Even when further melodic ‘layers’ are added the music never seems weighed down by chordal movement: it is entirely melodically conceived, with ornamental figures and frequent metrical shifts continuing to thwart our expectation of some melodic regularity, even as the texture thickens. The dynamic level rarely exceeds *mezzo piano*, and there is accordingly a highly intimate and subjective dimension to the way this recollection is framed, which has the capacity to absorb a listener’s attention – much in the way a memory can, as Scott Burnham observes: ‘when we attend to a memory, we forget what we are doing and look inward, straining to secure the memory, to center and then savor it’.<sup>29</sup>

Perhaps the most striking quality of this opening section, however, has to do with the absence of what one might describe as an authorial or structural ‘will’ – the linear, logical sequence of ideas that we normally associate with clear musical structures or narratives (or indeed with how musical time unfolds). In this sense, Enescu’s writing encapsulates that fundamental aspect of remembering which I noted at the outset – that it happens to us. As Casey puts it, ‘memories are not narrated by anything like an authoritative voice; if anything, they tend to *narrate themselves*; for we possess them so intimately, so much from within our own life-histories, that there is no need for a separate source of articulation to recount them to us’.<sup>30</sup> The ‘passive’ mindset through which we experience memories of this kind (namely, personal memories) – which is so unlike the authoritative narrative mode found in Beethoven or Mahler – is something I return to both in this chapter and in greater detail in my discussion of dreaming in Chapter Four.

The second subject’s re-presentation at the start of the second movement could also be categorised as an example of recollective or ‘secondary’ memory (as William James first described it)<sup>31</sup> specifically because it recalls a past event that has since been forgotten – this is notwithstanding the occasional reminders of the second subject throughout the first movement, which in any case are often brief or fragmentary. As Casey observes, secondary memory makes

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<sup>28</sup> Michael Puri has observed how sublimation formed part of the French fascination with memory during the *fin de siècle*, noting that the manner in which decadent figures like Proust and Ravel treated a desired object was by ‘setting it at a distance and idealizing it – in other words, sublimating it’. See Puri (2011), 15.

<sup>29</sup> Burnham (2000), 661.

<sup>30</sup> Casey (2000), 45.

<sup>31</sup> The distinction between primary and secondary memory is introduced by James in the chapter on memory (Chapter XVI) in his *The Principles of Psychology* (Henry Holt & Co., 1890; reprinted New York: Dover Publications, 1950), Vol. I, 643–659.

apparent the gulf between the past and the present: recollection is a present act which takes place from ‘a temporal vantage point that does not belong to [the remembered] scenes themselves’.<sup>32</sup> Thus, while drawing us into the past, recollection simultaneously retains a temporality that binds us to the present and exposes the past’s ‘otherness’. By contrast, primary memory, as James describes it, ‘makes us aware of...the just past’. He continues:

The objects we feel in this directly intuited past differ from properly recollected objects. An object which is recollected, in the proper sense of that term, is one which has been absent from consciousness altogether, and now revives anew. It is brought back, recalled, fished up, so to speak, from a reservoir in which, with countless other objects, it lay buried and lost from view. But an object of primary memory is not thus brought back; it never was lost... it comes to us as belonging to the rearward portion of the present space of time.<sup>33</sup>

A particularly effective example of how Enescu’s music frames the experience of primary remembering can be found at the opening of the second movement of the Second Piano Quartet, Op. 30 (Ex. 1.2a). The movement begins with a coalesced restatement in the piano of the echoing ‘bells’ and ‘chimes’ that concluded the first movement (Ex. 1.2b) – made up of the *quasi campane* gesture which appeared in the piano three bars after Figure 23, and the similarly bell-like reverberations of stacked fifths ( $A_4/E_6/B_6$ ) which find their way from the strings at Figure 23 to the piano eight bars later (with the addition of an  $F\#_5$ ).

Interspersed with gently oscillating octave As in the right hand of the piano (the gesture is something of a stylistic fingerprint in Enescu – a habit of mind and body), these diaphanous, bell-like echoes create an atmosphere of remarkable stillness and introspection. By the end of the first movement we are left solely with a *ppp*  $E_6/B_6/F\#_5$  cluster in the piano and a muted  $A_4$  in the violin – a modally suspended echo which is left to decay to nothing. Then, following the pause between movements, the piece effectively picks up where it left off: the motivic material which links the two movements is not so much recalled as ‘retained’; it is not forgotten, but ‘prolonged’, to borrow from Edmund Husserl.<sup>34</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Casey (2000), 24.

<sup>33</sup> James (1950), 646.

<sup>34</sup> ‘Retention’ and ‘prolongation’ are terms which Husserl employs in his own extensive exploration of James’s ‘primary’ memory. See Husserl’s *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, trans. James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964; originally published in 1928 after being presented as a series of lectures in 1905).



(8) *rit. al un poco più lento*

*più pp* *pp* *molto* *bsf*

*più pp* *pp* *molto* *bsf*

*2 pp* *molto* *bsf*

*f* *rit. al un poco più lento* *mf*

*più pp* *mp* *espress. nostalgico un poco cant.* *poco*

*2 p* *(sopra)*

*p* *bp* *s.v.*

*p* *bp* *s.v.*

*p* *bp* *s.v.*

*tranq.* *8va*

*prfz* *mf* *2* *pf* *molto* *p* *mp* *pp* *bp lontano ma marc.*

The image displays a musical score for a string quartet, consisting of two systems of staves. The first system includes a Violin I staff, a Violin II staff, a Viola staff, and a Cello/Double Bass staff. The second system includes a Soprano staff, a Bass staff, and a Piano accompaniment staff. The score features various musical notations such as dynamics (ppp, pp, p, smorz.), articulation (pizz., arpeggio lento), and performance directions (rall., lunga, mettez la sourdine). The tempo markings are 52 and 56. The key signature is one sharp (F#).

Since no forgetting takes place in this instance, one might justifiably question whether anything is in fact ‘remembered’ at the start of the Quartet’s second movement (certainly, for Husserl, memory and retention were distinguishable concepts, and this kind of thinking is similarly evident in James, who relegates primary memory to a manifestation of ‘habit’ while referring to secondary memory as ‘memory proper’ – much in the way Bergson privileges ‘independent recollection’).<sup>35</sup> The example demonstrates that not all remembering is strictly recollective, or ‘re-presentational’ (body-orientated memory, for instance, is non-recollective). At the same time, however, there is a recollective *quality* to the way Enescu frames this instance of motivic recurrence, brought about by the pause separating both movements. This silent gap effectively stretches the temporal distance spanning the immediate present and the ‘just past’. The fadeout at the end of the first movement (note the markings of *perdendosi* and *niente* in the final bar) contributes to this feeling that the present is itself receding, its ‘rearward portion’ (as James described it) threatening even to breach the mind’s horizon of retention. While the motivic content of the opening movement’s concluding section is never quite lost to forgetfulness, the start of the middle movement does feel quite different and new – decidedly present-tense, yet coloured with the memory of the past. It certainly seems, in any case, as if the music were speaking from within that highly intimate and contemplative realm which the

<sup>35</sup> James (1950), 647–648. James even states: ‘I much prefer to reserve the word memory for the conscious phenomenon’.

end of the previous movement pointed towards. If we follow Casey's understanding of recollection as a combination of retrieval (of the forgotten past) and revival (of the *experience* of the past),<sup>36</sup> then it is almost as if Enescu is meeting us halfway – by reviving a past that was never in fact lost.

The mingling (or superimposition) of primary and secondary memory is a common feature of how Enescu's music frames various acts of remembering, as of course is the case in our daily experience of memory. Memory's unceasing and manifold operations, and the various ways we attend to it or encounter it in daily life suggests a constant interaction or permeability between recollective and non-recollective modes of remembering.<sup>37</sup> A closer look at the origins of the bell-like motivic material which brings the Second Piano Quartet's opening movement to a close (and which subsequently begins the second movement) will help to demonstrate this permeability. Notably, the *quasi campane* gesture at Figure 23 is derived from the tail of the work's opening melodic statement, which also comprises its primary thematic material. This 'tail motif' becomes an increasingly significant thematic fragment over the course of the work, particularly following its recollection (properly speaking) towards the end of the opening movement. Its importance is hinted at early on, as it forms the melodic basis of the two bars after Figure 1 (Ex. 1.3), which move suddenly from the modal key of D natural minor to the flattened supertonic, E-flat minor. This harmonic reorientation seeks to revive the slackening in bars 5–6, brought about by the tonal indeterminacy and rhythmic listlessness of the tail motif. The music goes nowhere, however, and bars 7–8 end with a melancholic slump back to D minor (via a non-functionally resolving augmented sixth), made emphatic by the violin's descending *portamento* from F<sub>4</sub> to A<sub>3</sub>. The same thing happens again just two bars later, with a sudden swerve towards an implied A-flat minor, and subsequent slide back to the home key (which in fact appears as a modally ambiguous stacked fifth comprising D/A/E).<sup>38</sup>

Both these harmonic shifts (to E-flat minor and A-flat minor) can be heard as parenthetical insertions within the broader tonality of D natural minor, with a variant of the tail motif comprising the melodic interest in each new (yet fleeting) chromatic zone. The way this motivic fragment is treated here in fact points to a more genuine instance of primary remembering: the

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<sup>36</sup> Casey (2000), 51–52.

<sup>37</sup> Casey lists several main types of remembering (such as 'remembering-to', 'remembering-how', or 'remembering-that') which 'subtend' and 'cut across' the generic forms of primary and secondary memory. See Casey (2000), 52–64; 52.

<sup>38</sup> In both instances the D minor tonality is in fact closer to a modal mix of D and A minor, with A minor outlined over a D/A drone in the left hand of the piano.



The first system of the musical score consists of two systems of staves. The upper system contains a vocal line (treble clef) and a piano accompaniment (bass clef). The vocal line begins with a *pp s.v.* marking and includes the instruction *non troppo*. The piano accompaniment features a *pp* marking and includes a *poco* dynamic marking. The system is divided into four measures, with labels C.2, C.1, C.3, and C.2 below the piano staff. The lower system continues the piano accompaniment with dynamic markings *p*, *pochissimo*, *poco*, *bp*, and *pp*. It includes a *bp s.v.* marking and a *poco* dynamic marking. The system concludes with a *pp* marking.

The second system of the musical score consists of two systems of staves. The upper system contains a vocal line (treble clef) and a piano accompaniment (bass clef). The vocal line begins with a *senza rigore* marking and includes the instruction *a tempo* with a tempo marking of  $\text{♩} = 69$ . The piano accompaniment features a *poco* dynamic marking and includes a *bp* marking with the instruction *arco*. The system is divided into two measures. The lower system continues the piano accompaniment with dynamic markings *poco*, *bp s.v.*, *senza rigore*, and *a tempo* with a tempo marking of  $\text{♩} = 69$ . It includes a *2* marking and a *p* marking. The system concludes with a *bp* marking.

The tail motif's recollection (properly speaking) towards the end of the quartet's opening movement points to another aspect of this particular mode of remembering, namely the likelihood of transformation. This is, as Casey observes, exactly what we might expect of such a 'disparate activity', since 'secondary remembering does not draw upon essentially unchanged and still-conscious experiences, but upon no longer conscious experiences that have been held

in long-term storage'.<sup>40</sup> Enescu frames this transformation as a sudden reimagining of familiar material. Following a slightly stretched, three-bar reprise of the E-flat minor insertion which first appeared in bars 7–8, there is sudden registral and timbral shift at Figure 22 (Ex. 1.4 below), where the melodic variant of the tail motif which appeared in the right hand of the piano in bar 9 is now transposed up two octaves. The effect is totally disarming, especially since for much of the movement the primary thematic area has been associated with a murkier lower register (see, for instance, the theme's reprise after Figure 9, where it rumbles ominously in the depths of the piano). The motif's reimagining at Figure 22 is striking in its novelty, and catches the listener off guard. This is decidedly an instance of how remembering can happen *to us*: the suddenness of the transformation comes about involuntarily and we are forced, as listeners, to take note (accordingly, there is little of what Casey calls 'self-presence' in this mnemonic presentation, although the transformation does also herald a highly subjective and quite extraordinary change in atmosphere, especially after Figure 23, as we have already seen).<sup>41</sup>

**Example 1.4:** *Second Piano Quartet*, Op. 30, 1<sup>st</sup> movement, Figure 22.

<sup>40</sup> Casey (2000), 51. Casey draws here on Bergson's notion of the 'persistence' of the past, which I discuss in some further detail below. It was through his claim that the past could never really be forgotten, moreover, that Bergson asserted the ontological reality of the past.

<sup>41</sup> Casey (2000), 69–70.

The pleasurable shock of experiencing the past anew was foundational to Proust's concept of involuntary memory, which informs many of the narrator's musings on memory in *In Search of Lost Time*. As Michael Puri observes, unlike voluntary memory, involuntary remembering is 'unbidden by the conscious will and conjured up by sensation rather than the intellect'; moreover, being 'discontinuous with the present, involuntary memories are like electric shocks, entering through the body and startling the rememberer out of the oblivion brought on by the dulling effect of the mundane and the quotidian'.<sup>42</sup> I will return to the importance of sensation in Proust's understanding of involuntary memory in the latter part of this chapter, but for now I wish just to draw attention to how the startling effects of this unpredictable kind of remembering lend added significance to the tail motif's transformation, as detailed above. Perhaps the most important consequence of this striking reimagining is not merely the fact that the motif is remembered (as part of a broader reprise of thematic material), but that this particular segment of the opening theme is reaffirmed in its importance: its role quite literally becomes elevated. Not only does the memory of the past therefore take fresh hold over our recollective consciousness (unexpectedly so), the past also assumes a renewed significance in the present as a result. These unbidden returns of material importantly seem to undermine the sense of a sovereign and directing consciousness (which once again links to my final chapter on dream).

In the wake of the tail motif's sudden registral transformation at Figure 22, there is a discernible shift in mood, and our apprehension of the recollection effectively prompts a change in orientation. This is manifested in two ways. Firstly, the transitional nature of the musical material inspires a feeling of anticipation: although it is only confirmed in retrospect, the atmospheric shift at the end of the first movement guides the listener directly into the soundworld of the work's intimate middle movement; the transformation essentially heralds a new and different realm. At the same time, being a recollection of consciously forgotten material, this whole process of remembering is also characterised by a nostalgic yearning, and a sense of loss. This is predicated on an awareness of the distance separating both the present and the anticipated future from an ever-receding past. As Peter Fritzsche explains, a nostalgic mode of remembering 'yearns for what it cannot possess, and defines itself by its inability to approach its subject'.<sup>43</sup> Thus while the past can be invested with a renewed presence, it cannot

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<sup>42</sup> Puri (2011), 16.

<sup>43</sup> Peter Fritzsche, *Stranded in the Present: Modern Time and the Melancholy of History* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), 65. In a similar vein, Susan Stewart has observed that it is in the 'gap between resemblance and identity that nostalgic desire arises'. See Stewart's *On Longing: Narratives of the Miniature, the Gigantic, the Souvenir, the Collection* (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 1993), 145.

literally be brought back. From a similar standpoint, Enescu therefore cultivates (in musical terms) an awareness of the past's irretrievability by suffusing this concluding passage with a sense of nostalgic longing. This is made explicit, in fact, by the *espressivo nostalgico* marking which appears six bars after Figure 23, and which accompanies a chromatically 'pained' variant of the oscillating octave gesture originally encountered at Figure 9. From a listening perspective, the harmonic clash between the octave As in the right hand and a rogue B-flat in the left hand (within an implied F-sharp minor tonality) prompts a sudden and momentary darkening of the already suspenseful mood. The poignancy of this moment obviously has an immediate bearing on what happens in the following bar, in which we encounter a bittersweet recollection of the movement's second subject (which was initially introduced in the piano in the lead up to Figure 8, and characterised by a descending chromatic scale). The way the music frames a sense of longing here is therefore made emphatic by the chromatic poignancy immediately preceding the recollection.

A feeling of nostalgia also accompanies the tail motif's final iteration, which appears in a slightly melodically truncated yet rhythmically stretched form four bars before the end of the movement (see Ex. 1.2b). This languid recurrence is layered with added significance for the fact that the motif employs the same pitches as were heard in the fifth bar (Ex. 1.3). Compared with this earlier iteration, the change in mood and the temporal distance suggested by the closing bars of the movement are accentuated by the idealised revival not only of the motif's former (lower) register and accompanying timbral quality (which now comes across as unique in the surrounding context), but effectively its kinaesthetic and synaesthetic properties, too. There is, in other words, an apparent awareness on Enescu's part of where the motif once belonged, or where it originated on the keyboard, and correspondingly of the simultaneous sound and unique feel associated with those particular notes (the embodied aspects of the musical material hence exert a presence over and above the kind of recall or transformation that analysis usually discusses or maps purely in terms of motivic or 'visual' identities; this reflects the way that memory itself is often discussed in terms of non-embodied or purely representational content). The *lontano ma marcato* marking which appears alongside the motif's final iteration suggests that while the motif's origins are now part of a distant past, there ought nonetheless to be a tangible, 'marked' pleasure in feeling and striking each note as it is remembered (for both the performer and mimetic listener). In contrast to the pained nostalgia from just a few bars earlier, this memory seems a pleasurable one, then, with a sense of wistful freedom conveyed not only by the drawing out of the motif's rhythmic values, but also by the

gratifying sense of resolution that is experienced as the tail motif comes to rest on a chord of D major (when previously it had been left to linger via chromatic displacements).

The pleasure derived from this act of remembering is not solely corporeal: it stems equally from the memory's 'reminiscent' quality (to borrow from Casey's mnemonic terminology). A mode of remembering of which nostalgia is often an affective by-product, reminiscing assumes a level of intimacy with the past which surpasses that experienced in any other kind of remembering. In contrast to nostalgic remembering, which situates the past purposefully at a distance, reminiscing is characterised by a desire to 're-enter' and become one with the remembered past (it is consequently a voluntary rather than an involuntary act). As Casey describes, reminiscing means '*insinuating ourselves* back into the past'; it ought moreover to be regarded as 'an essentially privileged and especially powerful way...of getting back inside our own past more intimately, of reliving it from within'.<sup>44</sup> Significantly, by 'revivifying' the past in this way, we may also 'revitalise' the present, thereby transforming the circumstances of our remembering into feelings of contentment and idealisation.<sup>45</sup> Enescu's treatment of the tail motif is suggestive of these subjectively gratifying aspects of reminiscing: in the closing bars of the Second Piano Quartet's opening movement, we encounter and dwell on a familiar fragment (familiar to us as listeners, and not simply as analysts – and framed compositionally as such) whose kinaesthetic and synaesthetic resemblance to an earlier event allows us to 're-enter' the past even more intimately and pleasurably, thereby revitalising the present.

As far as what exactly is remembered in the act of reminiscing, it is notable (as Casey observes) that we never reminisce 'something' – we reminisce 'about it'.<sup>46</sup> As such, reminiscing need not follow any sort of predictable narrative: it is not concerned with chronology, nor even with rehabilitating a past event in its entirety (often, remembering a fragment of the past, or focusing on and reliving a certain emotion or atmosphere can suffice). A significant proportion of Enescu's slower, more meditative movements contain phrases or longer passages which evoke this phenomenological process. The propensity for vague or fragmentary reminiscence in these movements is aided, one observes, by Enescu's tendency of eschewing exact repetition in favour of passing resemblance (a perceptual issue which I consider in greater detail below). Similarly, Enescu's obvious predilection for introspective landscapes would seem to provide a highly conducive ambient frame for this contemplative mode of remembering. A particularly

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<sup>44</sup> Casey (2000), 109.

<sup>45</sup> As Casey puts it: 'I do the reminiscing not for the sake of the past as past but for the sake of myself: that is, for the pleasure of the good that it will effect in the present'. Ibid., 110.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., 105.

effective and more extended example can be found in the third movement (*Andantino cantabile, senza lentezza*) of the Second Cello Sonata, Op. 26, No. 2 (which Enescu completed while staying in Vienna, in 1935). In the coda section (beginning at Figure 40; see Ex. 1.5) we encounter a drawn-out variant, in the cello, of the movement's opening thematic material. An octave higher in register, the reminiscence more specifically consists of a varied reprise of the movement's (monodic) opening five bars (shown in Ex. 1.6), with the addition of a sustained  $C_5$  (which, together with its subsequent fall to the  $A_4$  via a B-flat, draws on a thematic variant first introduced in bar 10). Sustained high notes are in fact a characteristic feature of this thematic reminiscence, with the final A of the remembered phrase being held continuously (with just one interruption) for a total of 23 quaver beats – much of the last page of music. The effect this produces is of a remarkably drawn-out and timeless landscape, which is emphasised by the piano's ethereal 'stippling' (a painting technique employing random small brush marks)<sup>47</sup> and an overall sense of complete metric freedom.

**Example 1.5:** *Second Cello Sonata*, Op. 26, No. 2, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, Figure 40 (continued next page).

<sup>47</sup> I use this term as much to describe how the notes look on the page as to convey the musical effect that Enescu achieves by notating seemingly random spots of sonorous colour.

Example 1.6: *Second Cello Sonata*, Op. 26, No. 2, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, opening bars.

It is from just such a sense of timelessness – of the present moment extended through an unending remembering of the past – that Proust claimed individuals could derive pleasure from remembering. Moreover, when Marcel, Proust’s narrator, states that ‘the only true paradise is a paradise that we have lost’,<sup>48</sup> his sense of enjoyment from remembering the past (as he goes on to explain) has more to do with finding himself somewhere *in between* the past and the present: ‘the truth was that the being within me who was enjoying this impression was enjoying it because of something shared between a day in the past and the present moment, something extra-temporal, and this being appeared only when, through one of these moments of identity between the present and the past, it was able to find itself in the only milieu in which it could live and enjoy the essence of things, that is to say *outside of time*’.<sup>49</sup> Enescu’s evocations of the act of reminiscing can be seen to achieve something very similar: a kind of ambiguity or in-

<sup>48</sup> Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*, VI: *Finding Time Again*, trans. Ian Patterson, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 179.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* The italics are mine.

betweenness arising from the interweaving of past and present, which importantly does not rely on some reconstruction or rehabilitation of the past, and has more to do with how we resituate ourselves within the past as part of a present-orientated act of remembering. The sheer extent to which Enescu stretches the cello's thematic material in the coda of the Sonata's third movement (and the pleasure we derive from this as listeners) demonstrates this well. And although it concerns a more condensed fragment, by stretching the rhythm of the tail motif at the end of the Second Piano Quartet's opening movement (Ex. 1.2b), Enescu's pleasurable (though brief) reminiscence similarly seems to take place both in and outside of time, dwelling above all on the sensation of those particular notes as they are remembered: beyond time, we come closer to the motif's *embodied* essence. To the extent that nostalgia might be considered an adjunct of reminiscing,<sup>50</sup> Svetlana Boym's poetic description of nostalgic longing as a mode of being in which 'we long to prolong our time, to make it free' would also seem very relevant here, resonating both with Enescu's treatment of the tail motif and the coda passage in the Cello Sonata. Her assertion, moreover, that nostalgia is in a broader sense a 'rebellion against the modern idea of time, the time of history and progress' is likewise apposite, and helps to frame (from a historical perspective) Enescu's marked preoccupation with timeless landscapes.<sup>51</sup> Indeed, the way he achieves this remarkable sense of unweighted timelessness in his constructed reminiscences, which is surely related to the lack of an authoritative and goal-directed narrative strategy (which I described earlier in terms of a 'passivity'), is certainly what allows Enescu to stand out from other composers (like Franz Liszt, or César Franck) who use similar processes of thematic recall.

A final point to make about reminiscing concerns what Casey describes as its 'deeply dialogical' character: reminiscing, he observes, is a process of 'relating to others what we possess so securely from within'.<sup>52</sup> In day to day reminiscing, this shared (or 'communitarian') aspect is evidenced by the fact that we often relive already shared experiences with those around us – this in turn invites re-sharing or 'co-reminiscing'.<sup>53</sup> Crucially, as far as subjective, musical reminiscing is concerned, it is entirely possible to reminisce with ourselves: we can do so continuously by layering aspects of the past non-consecutively in a kind of free-flowing

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<sup>50</sup> Michael Puri offers an elegant description of nostalgia as 'a particular mode of memory that can be thought to enhance the pleasure of reminiscence by mixing it with the pain of loss'. See Puri (2011), 18.

<sup>51</sup> Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), xix; xv. The latter quote is prefaced with the observation that nostalgia is 'a yearning for a different time – the time of our childhood, the slower rhythms of our dreams'. These two categories – childhood and dreaming – are of central importance in my third and fourth chapters.

<sup>52</sup> Casey (2000), 104; 113.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 115.

monologue which we present to ourselves. And that is the main thrust of Casey's phenomenological account of this kind of remembering: when we reminisce, we do so *towards* others, even when that 'other' is me. In that sense, reminiscing becomes something like a performance, a staging of memory. Musically, this dialogical aspect of reminiscing is difficult to pin down, except in as far as we might ascribe distinct agential subjectivities to both music and active listener, each reminiscing with the other over the course of the music's unfolding. To the extent that we might perceive an apparent capacity on the part of musical works to re-enact mental processes of remembering, the experience of listening itself often seems to spur acts of reminiscence. At the same time, it is possible to identify this communitarian aspect of reminiscing in the musical discourse itself, most obviously in the way instruments relate to one another. In the coda from the Cello Sonata, the sense of reminiscing is indeed heightened by the role the piano plays. With its subtle motivic echoes of the movement's main theme (which appear in a fragmented form and are most effective when the cello plays its long high notes), the piano writing engages in an intimate dialogue with the cello, offering its own perspective and commentary in a reminiscential and idealised re-sharing of past material.

Over the course of the preceding discussion I have explored some of the many and varied ways that Enescu stages acts of remembering and, in doing so, how we as listeners are often encouraged, or prompted, to reorientate ourselves in relation to past events and encounters that we have experienced over the course of the music's unfolding. I distinguish this listening perspective from the analytical method of tracing motivic continuities and recurrences, since (as I mentioned nearer the outset of this chapter) Enescu's allusive processes often lack the intentionality of specific analytical categories such as 'thematic recall' or 'transformation'. Indeed, his compositional strategy of foregrounding or concealing recurrent materials (to various degrees) makes it highly tempting to describe this music as being 'about' listening – reflecting the modern artistic preoccupation with how artworks emerge in our lived perception of them (I return briefly to this idea in Chapter Three). In the mature chamber works, the constant merging or mingling of mnemonic modes results in themes acquiring multiple 'layers' of pastness, evoking varying degrees of temporal distance or mental involvement. The listener's conscious perception (or lack thereof) of these depths of pastness is inherent in the complex and continually evolving thematic processes with which Enescu engages, and it is through such processes, moreover, that his music can occasionally be described as disorientating. It is more broadly to the theme of perception and its role in memory that I now turn.

Perceiving memory based on its specific content (by which I mean, in this instance, its thematic or motivic content) introduces the possibility that through processes of transformation or fragmentation, for instance, we attend to remembered materials with varying degrees of intensity. Some memories, in other words, are experienced or felt more forcibly than others – their ‘modes of givenness’ (a term Casey uses to describe how we receive memories) are variable.<sup>54</sup> Thus while some memories come across as porous or fleeting, others have a decidedly greater clarity or concreteness; similarly, some memories emerge gradually, appearing as it were on the fringes of our consciousness, while others are startling in their immediacy. Aside from the degree or manner of their potential transformation, our remembering of materials and events in everyday life is also affected by circumstances in the present – the time or place of our remembering (which may also determine which memories are attached or retrieved there). In terms of the mood we adopt when remembering, this can range from intimate reminiscence to more collectively orientated commemoration; however, it is probably accurate to state that in modern life remembering is most often thought about as a private and introspective activity. It is certainly a highly introspective mood that accompanies the mnemonic presentations of Enescu’s slower movements, and especially his middle movements: here, inwardness and intimacy abound, and are evidently regarded as vital for creating the sort of atmosphere in which private and often sustained modes of remembering (like reminiscing) might take place. Indeed, these ‘middles’ often represent the intimate heart of Enescu’s works: their ‘ways of telling’ are highly expressive, deeply personal, and even secretive, in the sense that they do not reveal their processes all at once.<sup>55</sup> In Proustian terms, they could be described as the truest ‘refraction’ of Enescu’s artistic sensibility. By contrast, Enescu’s faster movements (his finales, for the most part) often contain fleeting or ephemeral glimpses of past events – if only because the speed at which the music seems to progress gives a more pronounced effect of the present ‘falling away’, as events are lost to forgetfulness. These tantalising glimpses of the past are often experienced amid unrelenting motivic and thematic transformations, culminating in an accumulation and synthesis of thematic materials, so that

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<sup>54</sup> Casey lists four ways in which memories are given: with varying degrees of clarity, density, textuality, and directness. Casey (2000), 78–81.

<sup>55</sup> Michael Beckerman has examined the role that ‘middles’ have to play in musical works (as well as in artworks more generally), observing that they are often sites of overt expressivity which are associated with compositional freedom, ‘slowness’ and ‘shadowy recollections’. They are also ‘more a signal of the composer’s taste and individuality than the more conventional outer parts’, which suggests that it is in middle movements especially that we might expect to find evidence of the composer’s deepest and most subjective form of expression. See Beckerman, ‘The Strange Landscape of Middles’, in *The Oxford Handbook of the New Cultural History of Music*, ed. Jane F. Fulcher (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 163–181.

the music seems constantly to gather up the ‘just-past’ into itself (I explore this notion in further detail in the following chapter). Less a case of introspective contemplation, these faster final movements seem underpinned more strongly still by a moral imperative to keep the past alive in the present.<sup>56</sup>

While the perceptually disorientating quality of Enescu’s music might, on the face of it, seem a more obvious consequence of his transformative and apotheotic finales, it would be wrong to assume that his slow movements do not achieve something similar in effect. Indeed, it is in these movements that Enescu often reveals a far greater melodic and polyphonic complexity, which results in a highly captivating and occasionally bewildering interweaving of musical lines, gestures and expressive ideas. The middle movement (*Andantino cantabile*) of the Third Piano Sonata demonstrates this well. Indeed, merely to look at a page from the score is to get an indication of the surprising level of detail and ‘busy-ness’ of this music, which seems at odds with such a tranquil and serene movement. Numerous instances of contrapuntal imitation and heterophonic shadowing, and a wide variety of elaborative gestures – spread chords, spread pairs of notes (often at the octave), rhythmic displacements, grace notes, trills, arabesque-like motion – together create a kind of perceptual fulsomeness, a glut of auditory information. Indeed, listening to this movement it quickly becomes evident that most of the perceptual interest comes about because of the polyphonic writing on the one hand, and Enescu’s use of ornament (and decorative writing more generally) on the other. Polyphonic invention is central to Enescu’s compositional aesthetic, as he makes clear to Bernard Gavoty during one of their interviews: ‘the essential principle of my musical language is polyphony. I’m not a person for pretty successions of chords. I have a horror of everything which stagnates. For me, music is composed of phrases that wish to communicate something, an action, or mobile gestures that strike out along determined paths’.<sup>57</sup> In the *Andantino*, this is evidenced predominantly by the way lengthy melodic lines are developed, fragmented and superimposed – most obviously in the fugato section beginning at bar 25, and subsequently when the same thematic material is

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<sup>56</sup> In his article on ‘middles’ (see note above) Beckerman cites an intriguing passage from the writer Milan Kundera’s novel *Slowness*, which contains the pithy observation: ‘there is a secret bond between slowness and memory, speed and forgetting’. While it is tempting to employ such a neat delineation (neat only in as far as memory and forgetting can be considered exclusively, of course) with regard to Enescu’s slow and fast movements, more intriguing still is the way Enescu challenges this kind of assumption about memory’s function in contrasting temporalities. Despite the increased likelihood of ‘forgetting’ taking place in the faster finales, it is in these movements that Enescu most often attempts his vast thematic syntheses, remembering many of the work’s preceding themes; conversely, due to their perceptual complexity, Enescu’s slow movements often seem to encourage forgetting specifically so as to facilitate instances of poignant remembering. See Milan Kundera, *Slowness* (New York: Harper Collins, 1996), 38–39; and Beckerman (2011), 169.

<sup>57</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 9 (first broadcast 21.03.1952).

extended through ascending chromatic transpositions. This constant melodic evolution simultaneously allows for subsequent themes to emerge, or else combine; indeed, so much of Enescu's music reveals a self-generating aspect as far as the thematic writing is concerned. Consequently, while the overall tempo and indeed the harmonic rhythm may be rather relaxed, Enescu's fluid and highly inventive polyphony generates a feeling of mobility (this is exacerbated by a marked preference for broken chords and arpeggiation rather than homophony – and often when chords do appear they are spread, so it is rare that Enescu has more than two notes sounding simultaneously). Perhaps most notably, the *Andantino* manages to combine a kind of melodic restlessness and polyphonic complexity while retaining an overriding mood of limpid simplicity. This aesthetic is captured perfectly in the movement's opening monodic statement, as we saw earlier (Ex. 1.1): despite its deceptively simple and fluid unfolding, the theme still has the capacity to disorientate listeners due to its melodic subtlety, its use of ornament, and the feeling of uncertainty and unpredictability that this elicits.

Enescu's ornamental and decorative writing only adds to this feeling of perceptual disorientation, and it is worth considering, briefly, this marked predisposition for the ornament in some further detail, particularly in the context of the musical traditions Enescu inherited or to which he was exposed. Most obviously, his knowledge of Romanian folk music serves as a highly important contextual frame. And, although it is discussed far less often, it is highly likely that Enescu would also have been influenced by a contemporary privileging of the ornament on the part of French artists and composers – an elevation in status that dated back to around the turn of the twentieth century (when Enescu first arrived in Paris). Enescu often admitted to being influenced by Romanian folk traditions: he wrote on more than one occasion about how much he derived from the music of the *lăutari* (professional folk musicians), and lists among his earliest memories listening to local gypsy bands and Moldavian folk musicians.<sup>58</sup> As has often been noted, one genre on which he frequently drew is the 'doina' – a kind of slow improvisatory melody, steeped in melancholy, for which Béla Bartók reserved the description 'parlando rubato', and which Noel Malcolm describes as 'richly ornamented...to a point where it becomes impossible to separate the ornaments from the nature of the melody itself'.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 2 (first broadcast 01.02.1952). In 1921, Enescu wrote (in rather effusive terms) that 'we should be thankful to the gypsies [the *lăutari*] for having preserved our music, this treasure which we are only now appreciating; they alone have brought it to light, passed it on and handed it down from father to son, with that reverential care which they feel for what is the most precious thing in the world: melody'. Enescu, 'Despre muzica românească', *Muzica. Revista pentru cultura muzicală*, Vol. 3, Nos. 5–6 (May–June 1921), 115. Cited in translation by the author in Malcolm (1990), 25.

<sup>59</sup> Malcolm (1990), 24. Malcolm interprets Bartók's description as meaning 'in a free, speaking rhythm'. A more detailed exploration of the doina can be found in Tiberiu Alexandru, *Romanian Folk Music* (Bucharest: Musical

Certainly, the opening melody from the Third Piano Sonata's *Andantino* bears all the hallmarks of a doina, as does much of the melodic writing throughout the rest of the movement.<sup>60</sup>

The ornament's elevation in status among French artists during the *fin de siècle* (and in the decades following) similarly provides a useful contextual backdrop for Enescu's tendency for highly decorative writing. In 1901, Debussy famously (though also somewhat enigmatically) declared in a concert review that 'the principle of "ornament" is the foundation of all kinds of art'.<sup>61</sup> As Gurminder Kaur Bhogal has demonstrated, it was through the music of composers like Debussy and Ravel that the ornament (and especially the arabesque) was transformed, in the early twentieth century, from a mere accessory to 'a central component of the musical structure and primary agent of expression' – one whose function was extended even beyond the merely 'exotic' contexts explored by the likes of Georges Bizet or Camille Saint-Saëns.<sup>62</sup> The ornament's privileging was therefore also indicative of a broader artistic desire to subvert the hierarchical distinction between 'surface' and 'depth' in music – a subversion which Vladimir Jankélévitch situates at the heart of his aesthetic philosophy when he claims that 'music prefers the curved line to the straight line... [it] prefers superfluous circular motions, notes for nothing'.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, and as Bhogal goes on to explain, by allowing surface (ornamental) features of the music to attain an unprecedented level of structural involvement, an increasing proportion of the French repertoire of this period became defined by a sense of 'textural upheaval', and it was ultimately the sense of ambiguity that this upheaval precipitated to which many modern composers were attracted.<sup>64</sup>

The parallels that might be drawn here with Enescu's music are plainly evident. And yet there is a marked difference between the decorative writing found in Enescu to that found in

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Publishing House, 1980), 49–55. The contemporary composer Michael Finnissy, whose own melodic writing is often noted for its rich ornamentation, has likewise been drawn to Romanian folk music precisely for its decorative style. See Ian Pace's 'The Panorama of Michael Finnissy (II)', *Tempo*, New Series, No. 201 (1997), 7–16, in which Pace observes how 'the locus of Finnissy's Eastern European interests seems to have converged on Romania', and that the 'narrow tessitura and extensive ornamentation of Romanian folk music' inform many of Finnissy's folk-influenced works (9).

<sup>60</sup> Further examples of Enescu's use of the doina can be found in the First Piano Sonata, Op. 24, No. 1; the first half of the Piano Quintet, Op. 29; the first two movements of the Third Violin Sonata, Op. 25; the shepherd's flute melody from Act 1 of *Oedipe*; or, most obviously, the *Doina* for Baritone, Viola and Cello, from 1905.

<sup>61</sup> Claude Debussy, 'Musique: Vendredi Saint', *La Revue Blanche* (May 1<sup>st</sup>, 1901), 67. Cited in translation in Gurminder Kaur Bhogal, *Details of Consequence: Ornament, Music, and Art in Paris* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 26.

<sup>62</sup> Bhogal (2013), 9.

<sup>63</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*, trans. Carolyn Abbate (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), 67.

<sup>64</sup> Bhogal (2013), 10. One must note also the highly gendered undercurrents that characterised uses of the ornament, as well as the gendered criticism of decorative writing around this time. See *Women Artists and the Decorative Arts 1880–1935: The Gender of Ornament*, ed. Bridget Elliott and Janice Helland (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002).

Debussy or Ravel. Certainly, in movements like the *Andantino* or the opening movement of the Third Violin Sonata (which are among the more liberally embellished of Enescu's ornamental essays), there is no sign of the irregular rhythmic groupings or repeating melodic and rhythmic patterns that frequently make their way into Debussy's and Ravel's works. The perceptual disorientation that stems from Ravel's 'Noctuelles' (1905) or some of Debussy's *Préludes* ('Les fées sont d'exquises danseuses' (1913), for example) is altogether of a different (and more technically virtuosic) order compared with Enescu's highly fluid and unpredictable – and primarily melodic – conception of ornamental writing.

The immediate consequence of such a highly allusive, elaborate, and mobile polyphonic language is that Enescu's thematic and motivic material acquires an uncanny ability to drift in and out of focus, with fleeting suggestions appearing alongside explicit representations. This shifting level of familiarity depends largely on the extent of a theme's fragmentation or textural interweaving: it can be disguised or defamiliarised, or else it may be exposed and brought to the music's surface (or, surface and depth could be regarded as shifting and interchangeable). The result of being confronted with such a degree of thematic and polyphonic manipulation and embellishment is that we, as listeners, inevitably cling to any materials or gestures that might seem more recognisable; even a mere interval can be enough to redirect our attention. It is a direct consequence of the music's polyphonic and elaborative richness (or the extent of its ornamental 'saturation'), in other words, that a remembered theme's mode of givenness (a veiled glimpse; a sudden shock; a gradual re-emergence) might be determined, affecting the extent to which we may even perceive (or recognise) the memory in the first place.

Within this multi-layered texture of simultaneous concealment and revelation, the treatment of two motivic ideas (in the Third Piano Sonata's middle movement) can be regarded as emblematic of Enescu's processes (lending further support to my earlier suggestion that this could be described as music 'about' listening). Significantly, both are ornamental ideas which successfully aspire to a level of structural involvement, and which have the capacity to affect and direct our cognitive apprehension of the movement's unfolding. The first example concerns the 4–3 trill figure (marked *tranquillo*) which appears at the tail end (bar 5) of the *Andantino*'s opening monodic statement (see Ex. 1.7). A few bars later (bar 10, in the same example), this same cadential elaboration (again marked *tranquillo*) is given harmonic underpinning as part of a plagal resolution in B major. The pleasurable feeling of tonal closure brought about by this 'cadential motif' produces a sudden and gratifying calming effect, which is felt all the more keenly given the movement's general resistance to tonicisation and its proclivity for modally

inflected writing. It is precisely this aspect of the motif – its emotional or affective content – that is idealised (or sublimated) through subsequent recurrences, none of which is entirely predictable as the motif often gets tacked on to the end of other thematic statements. Accordingly, each utterance further elaborates and stretches the cadential figure through added trills, mordents and octave displacements (at bars 18, 22, 58 and 78). With every hearing, the listener becomes delayed by the motif’s presence, drawn in by the chance to cling to a pleasurable memory (this is especially true of the motif’s final iteration at bar 78). Indeed, the process echoes Mary Carruthers’s claim that ‘a primary use of ornament...is to slow us down, make us concentrate, set up moments of meditation – and so help us to think and remember’.<sup>65</sup> Ultimately, these moments of tonal and polyphonic resolution have a reorientating quality, lifting us out of the surrounding complexity and inviting us to linger just that little bit longer each time through the remembering of a transformed and idealised ornamental gesture.

**Example 1.7:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, ‘cadential motif’ appearances.

<sup>65</sup> Mary Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400–1200* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 131.

The second example is slightly more nuanced, and involves the recollection of a motif whose initial sounding may not even have been registered as memorable in the first place. Consequently, it is highly likely upon initial hearing that the memory of the motif is not recognised, or merely partly recognised. It concerns a pair of grace notes which embellish a major triad (on C#), first heard at 16/II/1, which are then subjected to close imitation at the octave between right and left hands (bars 17–18 in Ex. 1.8). Unlike the cadential motif, this grace note figure does not bring any sense of closure or resolution; its appearance is fleeting, and it only really draws attention to itself through some imitation (which may or may not be enough to make it memorable). The gesture is then heard one more time, in the same thematic context, at bar 27, before disappearing for several pages (largely as a result of further thematic development). After a period of dormancy, it then returns in bar 88, in its original thematic context, but this time a semitone lower. Thereafter, and on no fewer than nine occasions in the movement's last twelve bars, the same grace note gesture repeatedly embellishes an A minor triad at various octaves (the final three bars of Ex. 1.8 – bars 94–97 in the score – demonstrate the extent of this ornamental saturation). The sheer extent of this ornamental gesture's repetition in these concluding bars (along with its frequent harmonic juxtaposition with chords of B major or triads built on B-flat) allows this apparently inconsequential grace note figure to acquire genuine motivic status. And, in another example of inter-movement primary remembering, the

motif is ‘carried over’ into the finale, in which an echo of the embellished A minor triad quickly becomes the basis of a dynamic ostinato pattern which drives the whole movement onward.

**Example 1.8:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, ‘grace note motif’ appearances.

The image displays three systems of musical notation for a piano sonata. The first system (measures 17-27) features a treble and bass staff with a *dim.* marking and triplet figures. The second system (measures 88-93) includes a *poco* marking and triplet patterns. The third system (measures 94-100) is more complex, with markings for *calando*, *a tempo*, *mp*, *p*, *ten.*, *cant.*, *p dolciss.*, *lontano*, and *ppp*. A bracketed section is labeled *esitando*. The final system (measures 101-103) includes *a tempo*, *p*, and *bp s.v.* markings.

From a listening perspective, the origins of the ‘grace note motif’ are undoubtedly more difficult to place compared with the ‘cadential motif’. As the seemingly inchoate form of a more substantive idea, one which we cannot yet fully recognise, the grace note motif’s initial sounding easily eludes our faculties of perception – or rather, we perceive the gesture but are unlikely to reflect on it, so it is soon forgotten. Why and how this happens is often dependant on the manner of a motif’s ‘embedding’, or implanting.<sup>66</sup> What is being played with here is one’s cognitive ability to make discoveries regarding the shared characteristics of melodic and timbral ideas that are separated through time. Benjamin Boretz has called these perceptual discoveries ‘acts of creative attribution’, based on the formation of ‘retroactive illusions’,<sup>67</sup> so that the qualitative means by which gestures are embedded is what makes them memorable in the first place. In a broader sense, what Boretz alludes to here is the listener’s capacity to recognise the past as it is encountered in the present – effectively, to connect past images (or encounters) with present perceptions. As Casey observes, recognition – in a more pronounced way than with other modes of remembering – is in fact remarkably ‘present orientated’; the fact that it occurs in the ‘immediate context’ of perception contributes to this. By way of example: when I recognise a friend in the street, this activity is not contingent on specific recollections of past encounters with that friend; instead, the presence of the past is ‘presupposed’ in the act of recognising.<sup>68</sup> Consequently, the presupposition of the past’s presence means the past ‘need not be elicited as anything distinct from the present experience of recognising: and thus not as something to be recollected as such’.<sup>69</sup> This is apparent in the way the cadential motif is experienced: as an instantaneous mingling of perception and memory,<sup>70</sup> and (increasingly, as the movement unfolds) as a pleasurable prolonging of that recognitory act into an extended present.

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<sup>66</sup> Barney Childs uses the term ‘embedding’ as part of an insightful discussion on perception and gestural retrieval in musical listening. See Childs, ‘Time and Music: A Composer’s View’, *Perspectives of New Music*, Vol. 15, No. 2 (1977), 194–219.

<sup>67</sup> Benjamin Boretz, ‘What Lingers On (, When the Song is Ended)’, *Perspectives of New Music*, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1977), 108.

<sup>68</sup> Casey (2000), 123–125.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 123. This is not to say that recognition does not also play an important part in recollection – it certainly does. As Casey also notes: ‘since recognising of some sort can take place in virtually every context and with regard to any kind of object (including oneself), its typological variety is considerable’; ultimately, ‘it is difficult to tell what is not recognitory in human experience’ (137).

<sup>70</sup> The mingling of perception and memory is central to Bergson’s conception of lived time, as he reveals in *Matter and Memory*: ‘perception and recollection...always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance’. Fundamentally, this interpenetration occurs because we retrieve the past in our perception of the present; or rather, is it because memory requires conscious perception to give back to the past a sense of the present, thereby *enabling us to act on it*. It is with a view to its usefulness in the present, then, that Bergson claims the past is able to survive, or persist through memory. See Bergson (2011), 72; 70.

By contrast, the way the grace note motif is experienced suggests a process of partial recognition, resulting from what Casey describes as an ‘incomplete merging’ of memory and perception (which corresponds with Bergson’s understanding of ‘failed recognition’).<sup>71</sup> Casey outlines several ways in which this might happen, including: ‘dim’ recognition, which never reaches a state of full, or even partial certainty; ‘dawning’ recognition, whereby an incomplete recognition moves towards a state of full recognition; and recognising something as ‘having happened before’, but not being able to pinpoint when (what remains is merely the ‘conviction’ that something has been encountered previously in the past).<sup>72</sup> Each of these three ‘levels’ of partial recognition resonates with Enescu’s treatment and our experience of the grace note motif over the course of the *Andantino*. The resulting effect of this is a feeling of hesitancy or disorientation, which only dissipates through subsequent hearings of the movement. In that sense, and perhaps most significantly, Enescu seems to facilitate or encourage instances of failed recognition, but which – crucially – can eventually be overcome (through repetition, or increased familiarisation). His processes therefore suggest that a lost or forgotten past is in fact never truly lost. This Bergsonian notion regarding the persistence of the past (or the ‘survival of past images’) serves as the jumping-off point for Paul Ricoeur’s writings on recognition and forgetting. As Keith Ansell Pearson notes, contrary to the more pervasive understanding of forgetting as ‘destruction’ or the ‘effacement of traces’, Ricoeur instead conceives of forgetting as ‘a reserve or a resource’; in Ricoeur’s own words, ‘forgetting then designates the *unperceived* character of the perseverance of memories, their removal from the vigilance of consciousness’.<sup>73</sup>

It is precisely this ‘unperceived’ character of Enescu’s mnemonic presentations to which I have been alluding in the preceding discussion, and which will similarly inform my examination of Enescu’s thematic processes in the Piano Quintet, Op. 29, in the following chapter. By constructing a musical landscape that seems to facilitate or otherwise re-enact mental processes of forgetting and remembering, Enescu is able to play with the degree to which the past is rendered co-immanent with the present (which is the culminating point of the act of recognising). More broadly, it seems quite evident that Enescu is less concerned with

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<sup>71</sup> Casey (2000), 128. As described in the note above, the past, in Bergson’s understanding, persists on the basis of its utility; failure to recognise a previous perception does not therefore come about as a result of the destruction of memory, but because a cognitive breakdown between perception and memory has taken place, which consequently prevents us from ‘actualising’ the past.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 130–137.

<sup>73</sup> Keith Ansell Pearson, ‘Bergson on Memory’, in *Memory: Histories, Theories, Debates*, ed. Susannah Radstone and Bill Schwarz (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 75. See also Paul Ricoeur, *Memory, History, Forgetting*, trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2004), 440.

what exactly is being remembered or recognised in these instances, and rather more with evoking the sense of disorientation and ambiguity that underpin this entire process of staggered apprehension. This is much in keeping with the overriding aesthetic of concealment and revelation – or of sense and signification – by which so many of his middle movements are characterised. At the same time, the perceptually disorientating nature of Enescu’s musical language simultaneously introduces the possibility of encountering modes of remembering that take place as it were ‘beyond’ the confines of the mind. I have already alluded to some of the ways this might happen by introducing terms such as habitual remembering, or kinaesthetic and synaesthetic remembering. In the following section I address these ideas in greater detail.

#### FEELING MEMORY

If, following Bergson, or especially the philosophical writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, one acknowledges the body’s centrality in our perception of the world,<sup>74</sup> then for theorists like Casey it follows that ‘body memory’ (or embodied remembering) must constitute the ‘natural centre of any sensitive account of remembering’.<sup>75</sup> Most of the mnemonic modes I have explored above can be reconceived (or ‘fleshed out’) in these terms. Primary memory, for instance, can be seen to rely on the continuation of a predominantly sensory or affective mode which then shadows the present: the bell-like reverberations of the ‘tail motif’ at the end of the Second Piano Quartet’s opening movement (Ex. 1.2b) are *felt* reverberations; likewise, the motif’s prolongation into the following movement necessarily implies the simultaneous prolongation of a prevailing affective mood – one which, in that instance, is charged with nostalgic longing. Reminiscing is similarly characterised by a wish to re-enter and relive a certain mood, or ambience, or emotion, while the general effect of recognition, Casey argues, is ‘to enhance the familiarisation of the circumambient world: to make us feel more completely at home in it’.<sup>76</sup> Each of these mnemonic modes, to a lesser or greater extent, involves some embodied or pre-representational engagement with the world or other individuals; embodied remembering can thus be seen to precede recollective remembering. This is undoubtedly one

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<sup>74</sup> While taking his cue from Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty certainly went further in asserting the body’s primacy in our ‘being in the world’. In his *Phenomenology of Perception* he writes: ‘the body is our general means of having a world’; elsewhere in the same work he argues that ‘if it is true that I am conscious of my body through the world and if my body is the unperceived term at the centre of the world toward which every object turns its face, then it is true for the same reason that my body is the pivot of the world’. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Donald A. Landes (New York, NY: Routledge, 2012; originally published as *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1945), 147, 84.

<sup>75</sup> Casey (2000), 148.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 138.

of the most important lessons derived from a reading of Proust, for whom the body serves as a vital spur to remembering: ‘the sudden gift of memory is not always so simple’, Proust’s protagonist, Marcel, muses, before asserting that ‘movement alone restores thought’.<sup>77</sup> In Proust’s understanding (which builds on Bergson’s thought), the body not only has the capacity to re-enact the past and thereby give rise (spontaneously, involuntarily) to its representation through memory, it also serves as a kind of deep repository of past experiences which can be recalled at any time (through movement, or sensation). The unpredictability and spontaneity of this kind of remembering has the effect of taking us directly ‘into’ past experiences: the body ‘in-corporates’ the past in such a way as to make it seem co-immanent with the present (music’s capacity to emulate this kind of embodied remembering goes a long way to explaining why it plays such an important role in Proust’s novel). These notions, I suggest, can be investigated in greater depth in the context of three broad categories of embodied remembering: affective memory; habitual memory; and kinaesthetic and synaesthetic memory. Each of these categories assumes a pivotal role in Enescu’s understanding of musical memory, and are revealing of the way he and (many, but not all) his contemporaries conceived of memory as an embodied phenomenon. I will explore each category in turn.

### *Affective memory*

In his *Masterworks of George Enescu*, Pascal Bentoiu frequently refers to an aspect of Enescu’s writing that has rarely been scrutinised within musicological studies more generally, namely the composer’s ‘affective memory’.<sup>78</sup> Bentoiu defines this mode of remembering as a ‘memory of lines, of harmonies, of rhythms, of intervals, not abstract, with purely architectonic function, but with a great affective charge’.<sup>79</sup> He observes an ‘affective continuity’ between certain themes or across sections of Enescu’s works, and notably describes what I have been referring to as the Second Piano Quartet’s ‘tail motif’ as ‘truly an “affective echo” of the entire quartet’.<sup>80</sup> Perhaps most intriguingly, Bentoiu observes that compared with the recollection of a work’s ‘rhythmic-melodic elements’, affective remembering is contrastingly ‘rather diffuse,

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<sup>77</sup> Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, V: The Prisoner*, trans. Carol Clark, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 109.

<sup>78</sup> While the relation between music and affect has become an increasingly fertile area of investigation over the last decade or so, attempts at a simultaneous theorisation of how memory operates within this dichotomy is rarely encountered. For a recent consideration of the relationship between music and affect, see the collection of essays in *Sound, Music, Affect: Theorizing Sonic Experience*, ed. Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).

<sup>79</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 519.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, 438.

in the sense that, on the whole, it is more suspected than known. It is present at once, together with a reminder of a single melodic turn, a single characteristic rhythm; it is *felt* as a whole in memory's storehouse'.<sup>81</sup> The description implies a simultaneously precognitive and corporeal dimension to the act of remembering: Bentoiu surmises that affective presence in remembered materials is 'felt' as opposed to being explicitly represented; it is more 'suspected' than consciously 'known'.

Equating 'feeling' with affect (or with emotion, for that matter) invariably presents some ontological problems. For although affect has much to do with feelings and emotions (which are themselves ontologically distinct categories), it is not entirely synonymous with those terms – something which Bentoiu in any case implies. For Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth, affect is 'the name we give to those...visceral forces beneath, alongside, or generally *other than* conscious knowing, vital forces insisting beyond emotion'.<sup>82</sup> Affect is essentially precognitive, relating somehow to bodily stimulation, while emotions could more accurately be thought of as the translation (or categorisation) of a diffuse affective experience into cognitive thought (and to be clear: my interest here is not in Baroque theorisations of affect, or in the doctrine of affections).<sup>83</sup> Being pre-representational, affect can be productively thought of in terms of potential: 'as a gradient of bodily capacity'; specifically, 'a body's capacity to affect and be affected'.<sup>84</sup> In their attempts to define affect, Marie Thompson and Ian Biddle reach much the same conclusion, stating that while affect 'remains stubbornly ungeneralizable, referring to a myriad of approaches', the question is 'never really what affect means but what it does'.<sup>85</sup> Affect gives rise to emotions, feelings, or moods; it is transformative; it acts upon us and it moves us to act upon others. It soon becomes clear, in that sense, how affect and memory might interrelate (indeed, both Bergson and Freud conceived of memory as being intimately bound up with affect).<sup>86</sup> More than that: to conceive of memory in close relation to affect is to broaden both

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<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 30–31.

<sup>82</sup> As Gregg and Seigworth go on to state, these same forces 'can serve to drive us toward movement, toward thought and extension, that can likewise suspend us (as if in neutral) across a barely registering accretion of force-relations, or that can even leave us overwhelmed by the world's apparent intractability'. See Gregory J. Seigworth and Melissa Gregg, 'An Inventory of Shimmers', in *The Affect Theory Reader*, ed. Gregg and Seigworth (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), 1.

<sup>83</sup> Gregg and Seigworth concede the important point that, practically speaking, 'affect and cognition are never fully separable – if for no other reason than that thought is itself a body, embodied'. Such thinking naturally undermines the Cartesian split between mind and body, and it is this very blurring of thought, representation, and embodiment that has underpinned much of the recent work in affect theory. Gregg and Seigworth (2010), 2–3.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 2.

<sup>85</sup> See the editors' introduction, 'Somewhere between the signifying and the sublime', in Thompson and Biddle (2013), 6.

<sup>86</sup> For a brief overview of the Freudian perspective on memory and affect, as well as the positioning of these terms in psychoanalysis, see Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias, 'Affect and Embodiment', in Radstone and

our understanding of the experience of memory (as non-representational *and* representational) and the nature of subjective experience more generally. In the words of Felicity Callard and Constantina Papoulias, if we ‘attend to affect and to how it courses through the body, we might edge closer to illuminating the elusiveness and vitality of the embodied present’.<sup>87</sup>

The elusiveness of Enescu’s mnemonic processes would certainly seem to open up the conceptual space for a consideration of affect, although this does also prompt the question of how exactly one ‘attends to affect’ within musical experience. What makes the music more (or less) ‘affecting’? Or, how might we account for the affective *potential* of Enescu’s music? In broad terms, music’s affectivity would seem to stem from its own non-representational nature: music (like affect) lacks the capacity to literally represent the world (certainly, it lacks the greater capacity of visual arts to do so), but it can prompt a subjective expansion that incorporates a precognitive, affective, and fundamentally embodied mode of being. Our experience of music in general could consequently be described in terms of an ‘affective resonance’.<sup>88</sup> Enescu’s music has the capacity to foreground this already inherent quality of the musical experience, in the way that it so evidently spurs an embodied kind of listening. Its elusive and occasionally disorientating processes; the manner in which it frequently invites (or activates, or intensifies) a deep level of subjective engagement – most obviously at moments of climax or overt expressivity, but also in those passages or movements (such as the Third Piano Sonata’s middle movement) which evoke a kind of sensuous passivity, lyric freedom, or a lack of authorial will; and the extent to which, through its variety of mnemonic processes, it seems to reflect conscious modes of being, simultaneously inviting instances of shared or intersubjective remembering – all these aspects of Enescu’s musical language, all these richly enigmatic qualities draw us into an affectively resonant state of sensuous ‘in-between-ness’ –

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Schwarz (2010), 249–252. For Bergson, despite the way he privileges memory ‘images’, memory’s entwinement with affect was ultimately what allowed him to argue for memory’s autonomy, and by extension to state a case for what he regarded as the ontological reality of the past. As Keith Ansell Pearson observes, for Bergson the past represents a ‘specific region of being’ which we enter into (or ‘replace ourselves’, as Bergson himself puts it); memory, in that case, is not merely ‘the mechanical reproduction of the past but [of] *sense*’. Ansell Pearson (2010), 76, 71; Bergson (2011), 171.

<sup>87</sup> Callard and Papoulias (2010), 247. In a footnote, the authors also suggest an intriguing comparison between affect and what Kerwin Lee Klein regards as memory’s capacity ‘to re-enchant our relation with the world and pour presence back into the past’, claiming similarly that ‘affect too is about presence (the lived, ‘fleshed’ experience) and ultimately about re-enchantment’. I return to this notion as part of a more detailed discussion on enchantment in Chapter Three. See 247 (498): note 6; see also Klein, ‘On the Emergence of Memory in Historical Discourse’, *Representations*, No. 69 (University of California Press, 2000), 145.

<sup>88</sup> The concept of ‘affective resonance’ was originally introduced by the psychologist Silvan Tomkins, in *Affect, Imagery, Consciousness* (New York: Springer, 1962). My use of it here, within a specifically musical context, admittedly constitutes a slight departure from Tomkins’ understanding of the concept.

a state of ‘perceptual becoming’<sup>89</sup> – and consequently into an ever-shifting and transformative landscape of emotional and felt intensity.

In as far as we might conceive of affect and memory as indissoluble categories, then, the implication here is that the memory of past materials will always be bound up with the affective mood (or atmosphere, or even emotions) originally associated with those materials. The remembered past retains an affective halo about it, in other words, even while specific details are lost to forgetfulness, or otherwise to transformation. This is particularly true of the thematic and motivic transformations we encounter in Enescu’s finales. Often, the nature of these transformations involves the introduction of dance rhythms, jauntiness, or syncopation, while the movements themselves are generally more propulsive, evincing a goal-directed dynamism that is usually absent from Enescu’s opening movements (and especially his middle movements). Still, it is often strikingly the case (and proof as to the body’s mnemonic capacity – specifically, its capacity to be affected through memory) that in recognising familiar material we simultaneously remember (or re-incorporate) the way it affected us, or moved us in the past. This remains the case even when a memory’s specific content is not immediately recognisable or ‘locatable’ (again, the result of transformation or fragmentation). The feeling of ‘in-between-ness’ to which I alluded above is experienced here by the way a memory’s affective content can itself be enough for conferring a sense of the past even while its thematic detail remains perceptually ‘distant’ (we sense the ‘elusiveness and vitality of the embodied present’ – in terms of its mood or atmosphere – prior to, or at least alongside its perceptual representation). This is demonstrated most effectively by Enescu’s processes of thematic fragmentation, so that a mere interval, extracted from its thematic context, can still retain the ‘affective charge’ (as Bentoiu describes it) of the whole. While this is certainly true of thematic development in general (including among other composers, like Brahms or Franck), the extent to which Enescu seems prepared or willing to modify his materials demonstrates a remarkable faith in their affective potential (or memorability); his music’s distinctiveness lies in its capacity to throw us back onto affective rather than necessarily reflective remembering. And in so far as the music might be seen to grow out of a constant process of thematic fragmentation and melodic evolution, it possesses an unrivalled capacity for perpetuating its own affective essence and power.

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<sup>89</sup> Gregg and Seigworth (2010), 3. In a broader sense, the authors are using language here that is couched firmly in the phenomenological tradition of Bergson, Gilles Deleuze, Vladimir Jankélévitch, *et al.* I draw on these authors’ writings in my own discussion of ‘becoming’ in Chapter Two.

A good example which helps to demonstrate some of these points can be found near the very start of the Third Piano Sonata's last movement (*Allegro con spirito*). As mentioned earlier, this begins with an echo of the middle movement's grace note motif embellishing a broken chord of A minor, which quickly gives rise to a repeating ostinato in the right hand (Ex. 1.9). After just six bars, however, there is an interruption: the music seems to frame a kinaesthetic recollection of the harmonic opposition that was played out between the right and left hands at the end of the previous movement (at the same pitch range), so that the A minor ostinato is suddenly brought to a jarring halt by a chord of B major in the left hand. The memory of this harmonic clash brings with it the thematic content, tonality and affective mood of the *Andantino* (and indeed of the faster opening movement's second subject, of which the main *Andantino* theme is a sublimated memory). The pace slackens slightly (as if the new *Allegro* tempo was being held in abeyance) allowing room for an expressive freedom that is lacking in the ostinato, while the ornaments convey the memory of the middle movement's wistful and melancholic freedom (affirmed by the *sciolto* marking). We are offered a fleeting yet intense vision of the past – a brief reminder of what is being left behind. After three bars, it is over, and the ostinato returns – although the memory of the *Andantino* vision still lingers in the form of the sustained *lontano* chord (combining the pitches of A and B) in the left hand. Ultimately, it feels as if it will take more than a mere quickening of tempo and rhythm to wrench the listener out of the affective domain of the *Andantino* – indeed, the fleeting reminder serves as evidence of this.

**Example 1.9:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, opening bars (*continued next page*).

**Allegro con spirito** (♩=132)

*g<sup>va</sup>*-----

Pno.

L      J

5 (8) (♩ = ♩) *pp* *ppp* *p* *sciolto* *poco* *3* *3* *(sopra)*

9 *più* *3* *3* *8va* *lontano p un poco legato* *b♭ sub.*

One of the prevailing affective moods of Enescu’s music, and certainly the signature affect of many of his slower movements, is a kind of melancholy yearning. Much like the theorisation of affect itself, melancholy tends to resist generalisation and is often characterised as a mode of unfulfillment.<sup>90</sup> Thus, in his 1917 essay ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, Freud conceives of melancholy as the unfulfillment of mourning, ‘as the failure of the process by which a lost object is let go and the self, the ego, is allowed to survive, rebuild, and flourish’. Importantly (and in contrast to mourning), Freud understands melancholy as an inability to perceive what has in fact been lost – the lost object is ‘withdrawn from consciousness’, and an abstracted sense of loss becomes endemic to the ego’s own subjective identification.<sup>91</sup> To think of Enescu’s music in terms of an affective melancholia, then, is to suggest a technical process by which the listener experiences a sense of loss without being able to identify what it is that is

<sup>90</sup> Melancholy is often described as an affective or complex emotional state, essentially irreducible to a single emotion but connotative of several others (sadness; despair; longing; but also pleasure). Aristotle originally conceived of melancholy (*melas kholé* – ‘black bile’) in clinical terms, lending it a capacity to affect the body in a genuinely visceral sense (Robert Burton’s classic *The Anatomy of Melancholy* of 1621 continues this trend, although it does also present a more philosophical reading of melancholia). Others have considered the importance of melancholy as an aesthetic emotion – as an emotion arising through aesthetic encounters, but also (due to its complex and reflective nature) as an aesthetic experience in and of itself. For a useful theoretical introduction to melancholy see Emily Brady and Arto Haapala’s ‘Melancholy as an Aesthetic Emotion’, *Contemporary Aesthetics*, Vol. 1 (2003), <https://contempaesthetics.org/newvolume/pages/article.php?articleID=214>; and Jennifer Radden’s edited collection *The Nature of Melancholy: From Aristotle to Kristeva* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).

<sup>91</sup> Michael P. Steinberg, ‘Music and Melancholy’, *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 40, No. 2 (2014), 292. See also Sigmund Freud, ‘Mourning and Melancholia’, in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1974), 14: 237–258.

lost. And indeed, Enescu's tendency of recalling fragments of the past offers a compelling analogy for this pre-articulate sense of loss, in technical terms: remembering (especially in a representational sense) will always comprise a 'lack' of some kind, in the sense that while some aspects of the past are revived, others (though we cannot know which) are 'withdrawn from consciousness' and lost to forgetting. As such, melancholy may well signify yearning, but that yearning lacks a specific object; unlike nostalgia (which, in its modern guise, directs its longing specifically toward a lost past), melancholy can be thought of as poignantly ahistorical.<sup>92</sup> As Michael Steinberg notes: 'unlike the mourner, the melancholiac cannot historicize his condition; he says he has always been this way'.<sup>93</sup>

Melancholy can be readily situated within a more localised affective metaphysics as articulated by the Romanian idea of *dor*: a dreamlike and melancholic 'state of the soul' (or perhaps more concretely, a kind of vocal register) which Enescu recognised as a quality of Romanian folk music. 'The general characteristic which stands out in the music of our country', Enescu claims, is 'sadness even in the midst of happiness. (...) This yearning ("*dor*"), indistinct but profoundly moving is, I think, a definite feature of Romanian melodies' (asked by Gavoty to elaborate on these essential features of Romanian music, Enescu replied: 'dreaming, and a tendency, even in fast movements, towards melancholy, towards minor keys').<sup>94</sup> While Enescu's use of the *doina* (discussed earlier) serves as a more explicit generic reference for this mode of yearning, it is also an idea that he instinctively ties to the landscape, stating: 'this feeling [of sadness in the midst of happiness] is inspired by our valleys and our hills, the special colour of our sky'.<sup>95</sup> Lucian Blaga has similarly attempted to account for *dor*'s geographical provenance by tying the *doina* to his philosophical conception of how the Romanian poetic

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<sup>92</sup> Quite notably, the way Enescu distinguishes between *malinconico* and *nostalgico* markings suggests that he does not regard melancholy and nostalgia as merely synonymous terms. He marks a motivic anticipation of the Second Piano Quartet's second thematic group (a descending chromatic figure which appears in the viola) as *malinconico*, for instance, yet subsequent appearances and variations of the same material are nearly always marked *nostalgico* (this remains the case even in the next movement). While nostalgia therefore orientates itself around a lost and desired object, melancholy for Enescu simply constitutes the motif's core affective quality. Elsewhere in the later chamber works, *malinconico* markings can be found in the third movement of the Second Cello Sonata, Op. 26, No. 2; in the opening tempo marking (*Moderato malinconico*) of the Third Violin Sonata, Op. 25; in the 'Vieux mendiant' scene of the *Impressions d'enfance* suite, Op. 28; throughout the first half of the Piano Quintet, Op. 29; and in the opening movement of the Second Piano Quartet, Op. 30. More often than not, the markings accompany chromatically descending melodic contours which are understood to signify a topic of lamenting.

<sup>93</sup> Steinberg (2014), 293.

<sup>94</sup> George Enescu, interview with A. Șerban, 8<sup>th</sup> September 1912, in *George Enescu: Monografie*, ed. Mircea Voicana (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1971), 400. Cited in translation by the author in Malcolm (1990), 22; Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 2. 'Le rêve, et, même dans les mouvements rapides, un retour vers la mélancolie, le mineur'.

<sup>95</sup> See Voicana (1971), 400. 'Sentimentul acesta este inspirat de văile și dealurile noastre, de culoare deosebită a cerului nostru.'

imagination is derived from the landscape: the mioritic ‘horizon’, as he describes it, ‘emerges from the inner line of the doina, resonating and projecting out the atmosphere and spirit of our ballads’.<sup>96</sup> This resonates strongly with Walter Benjamin’s intriguing claim that ‘melancholia spatializes’, and in its effort to ‘reverse or suspend time’ it ‘produces “landscapes” as its signature effect’<sup>97</sup> – something which Enescu evokes by the way he often frames his sinuous and brooding melodies against a backdrop of harmonic ‘stasis’, or silence.<sup>98</sup> In general terms, then, *dor* and the Romanian folk idiom provide a useful cultural geographical frame for thinking about the specific ‘flavour’ of Enescu’s melancholic aesthetic disposition. This Romanian ‘brand’ of melancholy is something to which Ligeti has also been drawn, and likewise identified as a feature of Romanian folk melodies.<sup>99</sup> More broadly, both composers’ use of folk material could easily be interpreted as a melancholic reaching for what has been lost – a distant homeland; a forgotten past – and reinfusing the world with specific materials that are emblematic of that loss.

Steinberg’s interpretation of melancholy as a feeling of ‘hope without arrival’ (he looks here to the music of Gustav Mahler)<sup>100</sup> offers another useful way of thinking about the musical framing of melancholy in Enescu. These were the exact terms in which I described the initial presentation of the ‘tail motif’ in bars 5–9 of the Second Piano Quartet’s opening movement (Ex. 1.3): a fleeting sense of hopeful anticipation brought about by harmonic reorientation, soon followed by a sense of melodic and rhythmic listlessness, and a ‘non-arrival’ which was encapsulated so poignantly by the violin’s portamento ‘sigh’ in the eighth bar. It is here, in the Quartet’s opening bars, that the tail motif (the work’s ‘affective echo’, as Bentoiu called it) is first imbued with its affective melancholia – a mood or quality that is remembered again and again with subsequent iterations of the motif throughout the rest of the piece. Indeed, part of the reason why Enescu identifies a tendency towards melancholy ‘even in fast movements’ is because of the way it persists as an affective quality of the materials presented initially in the slower movements, which are then remembered in a different temporal context (as we saw with

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<sup>96</sup> Blaga (1994), 165. Cited in translation in Taylor (2017), 430.

<sup>97</sup> Steinberg (2014), 295.

<sup>98</sup> For more detailed discussions of how Enescu’s music constructs a sense of landscape, see Taylor (2017), especially 397–413; and Harald Haslmayr, ‘Erinnerung und Landschaft im Werke George Enescu’, in *Resonanzen: Vom Erinnern in der Musik*, ed. Andreas Dorschel (Vienna, 2007), 185–196.

<sup>99</sup> Ligeti’s Sonata for Solo Viola of 1994 opens with a movement titled ‘Hora lungă’, a type of non-ceremonial Romanian song which is essentially a subset of the doina. In the Sonata’s preface, Ligeti writes that this opening number ‘evokes the spirit of Romanian folk music which, together with Hungarian folk music and that of the Gipsies, made a strong impression on me during my childhood. (...) *Hora lungă* literally means “slow dance” but in the Romanian tradition this is not a dance but slow folk melodies...nostalgic and melancholy, richly ornamented’. György Ligeti, Preface to *Sonata for Viola Solo*, trans. Lindsay Gerbracht (Mainz: Schott, 2001).

<sup>100</sup> Steinberg (2014), 308–309.

the opening of the Third Piano Sonata's finale, above; Ex. 1.9). In the next chapter I consider how the potent memory of affective states conjured up in Enescu's slow movements (which so frequently engage with temporal 'stasis') might in fact undermine attempts at creating a progressive, goal-directed finale.

### *Habit memory*

Another form of pre-representational embodied remembering with which Enescu's music engages and of which it is strongly suggestive is habit memory. As I mentioned at the outset of this chapter, there were several early-twentieth-century theorists, including Bergson, who only ever regarded habitual remembering as second in importance to independent recollection, due to its incapacity to properly represent the past. As Bergson writes in *Matter and Memory*:

[Habit memory] has retained from the past only the intelligently coordinated movements which represent the accumulated efforts of the past; and it recovers those past efforts, not in the memory-images which recall them, but in the definite order and systematic character with which the actual movements take place. In truth, it no longer *represents* our past to us, it *acts* it; and if it still deserves the name of memory, it is not because it conserves bygone images, but because it prolongs their useful effect into the present moment.<sup>101</sup>

The way Bergson refers to memory-*images* underscores his understanding of memory as an overtly representational process. Accordingly, while he does establish the importance of habit memory in daily life, for him it nevertheless does not amount to what he considers true remembering (in a mentally perceptual, intellectual sense). On the contrary, however, Enescu's occasionally perceptually disorientating and elusive processes imply that understanding memory in terms of the body becomes a highly pertinent endeavour. While forms of representational (or recollective) memory are certainly of great experiential significance for Enescu, allowing him to treat the past as an ontologically separate and highly longed-for temporality, his musical processes also suggest that he attaches considerable importance to exploring mnemonic modes that convey an 'active immanence of the past in the body'.<sup>102</sup> For Enescu, this type of embodied remembering is as crucial to his conception of the past as something ontologically 'distant'.

As Casey observes, 'the early stages in the creation of anything habitual...are definitive for establishing the form that will be continually re-enacted'. If habituation implies a certain

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<sup>101</sup> Bergson (2011), 93.

<sup>102</sup> Casey (2000), 149.

‘consistency in action’, then actions themselves can become spontaneously reinstated as habit (there is in that respect a sort of mental passivity in habitual remembering – paradoxically, a passivity involving active, or action-based reenactment – which resonates with my earlier descriptions of Enescu’s free-flowing melodic writing).<sup>103</sup> Primary remembering is exemplary in its capacity to function as a mode of habituation. This is very much the case with Enescu’s treatment of the tail motif at the very start of the Second Piano Quartet (Ex. 1.3). As I explored earlier, the motif becomes more memorable by the way it seems to linger (in variant form) following its initial appearance in bar 5. Specifically, it is the habituation of this gesture in a bodily (essentially kinaesthetic) sense that allows it to become memorable, or familiar (for the performer, but also for mimetic listening participants). Moreover, its habituation grants it the capacity to outlast its initial appearance. Remembering of this kind is therefore notable for the way it acquires a sense of futurity: the potential for future remembering following habituation allows the future to cast its shadow on the present.

Habituation that takes place through recurrence or repetition is observable on an even smaller scale in Enescu’s music. Indeed, it is often the case that the introduction of a new gesture or motivic idea involves an almost immediate (or occasionally overlapping) ‘echo’. The Third Piano Sonata’s grace note motif is introduced exactly like this (see Ex. 1.8), with the left hand immediately imitating the right in such a way that implies a kind of distributed habituation which spreads across different parts of the body.<sup>104</sup> Heterophonic shadowing of this sort is notably a recognisable gestural habit of the melodic folk tradition to which Enescu was exposed from a young age. To the extent that habitual memories ‘reflect their origins’, it is significant in this instance how much habitual remembering might relate to a culturally formative basis. As Casey observes, ‘habitual body memories intersect with cultural traditions and are sometimes deeply influenced by such traditions in a complex dialectical interplay’.<sup>105</sup> Habits are never merely isolated actions, then, and in as far as they are constitutive of a body’s being in the world, they have the capacity to reflect and incorporate that world.

In a related sense, habitual memories are notable for their capacity to reorientate us within an *unfamiliar* world – to help us become familiar with it. More specifically, as Casey notes, such memories ‘liberate us from the necessity of constant reorientation. In their very regularity, they allow us to undertake actions lacking regularity’; and in that sense, ‘they establish a base

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<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 150.

<sup>104</sup> The same process (which in itself aspires to being a habitual tendency of Enescu’s) can be observed with the *malinconico* anticipation of the second thematic area in the opening movement of the Second Piano Quartet (see note 92), with the piano closely imitating the descending chromatic fragment presented in the viola.

<sup>105</sup> Casey (2000), fn. 17 on 151 (335).

of assurance and ease upon which more complicated, or more spontaneous, activities can freely arise'.<sup>106</sup> Enescu's 'oscillating octaves' gesture, to which I have already alluded, fulfils precisely this capacity for (re-)orientation, carving out the space for more spontaneous activity.<sup>107</sup> The gesture is habitual to the point of being pervasive: it appears (often on numerous occasions) in virtually every one of the late chamber works, both in fast and slower movements, and in other pieces besides (we have already encountered it towards the very end of the Second Piano Quartet's opening movement, and near the start of the Third Piano Sonata's middle movement – see Exx. 1.2b and 1.1). As a basic repeating figure (usually lasting only a couple of bars), its simplicity is its primary expressive draw. Moreover, since it is so easily 'identifiable' in terms of pitch content, we find ourselves, as listeners, focusing predominantly on the pattern of the movement itself. Indeed, the gesture's most perceptible feature is arguably the very quality (in a purely somatic sense) of its hesitantly contained mobility. Within the broader context of the music's unfolding, it constitutes a moment of respite, or of perceptual 'gathering': a somatic hook that helps to ground us (physically, by triggering a kind of embodied listening) within a mentally (or perceptually) disorientating landscape.

The construction of Enescu's thematic language can likewise be conceived as the result (in part) of habitual remembering – specifically the embodied memory of certain melodic contours. This is apparent not only in the way that some themes relate to each other within individual works, but also across works, as part of an allusive network of inter-opus memories. This may seem an unrealistic claim as far as the listener perspective is concerned, and more the result of a compositional strategy. I suggest, however, that the proposition made by Enescu's oeuvre is that long-range associations can indeed be sensed through repeated listening (tracing the exact provenance of various melodic associations invariably becomes the task of the analyst). This is presumably made possible because it is often just one melodic idea that is distributed across several works; this in turn aids our capacity as listeners to (gradually) come to recognise that idea through its inter-opus habituation. This has very much been the case in my own experience of listening to Enescu: of recognising familiar material, but being unable to place where I had first heard it (until after several hours spent looking through scores). The tendency of Enescu's

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<sup>106</sup> *Ibid.*, 151–152.

<sup>107</sup> Perhaps the best example of this process can be found at the opening of the Third Violin Sonata's middle movement, although the oscillating octave gesture does not in fact make an appearance here. Instead, the movement begins with an even simpler pattern – a repeated B<sub>5</sub> in the piano (written out as quintuplet semiquavers), which eventually (after ten bars) gives way to a repeated D<sub>3</sub> in the left hand, and thereafter to an oscillating fourth which appears in both the piano and the violin. Against the piano's repeating B, the violin presents a delicate doina-like melody using artificial harmonics – a tentative inscription against a simplistic backdrop of repeating patterns.

music to provoke a kind of remembering where the object of memory is unlocatable recalls my earlier discussion of melancholy, of course; this seems another way in which Enescu's oeuvre might induce a pre-cognitive or affective yearning for a lost past, or a past 'withdrawn from consciousness'. While it is not really my interest to trace all the various thematic allusions that might be encountered throughout Enescu's oeuvre, some indicative examples (involving the works discussed in this chapter) will suffice.<sup>108</sup> Both examples below (Exx. 1.10a and 1.10b) present several themes or thematic fragments which relate to one another through shared motivic ideas or a pervasive melodic contour.

**Example 1.10a:**

- i. Second Piano Quartet, Op.30, 1<sup>st</sup> movement: opening theme in piano (bars 1–5)
- ii. Second Cello Sonata, Op. 26, No. 2, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement: variant of opening movement's primary theme in cello (Figure 37-1 – Figure 37+2)
- iii. Third Piano Sonata, Op. 24, No. 3, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement: Fragment from secondary theme in piano right hand (bars 16–19)
- iv. Piano Quintet, Op. 29, 1<sup>st</sup> movement: Motivic fragment from opening theme (Figure 2+9 – Figure 3)

**i. [Allegretto moderato]**



**ii. [Andantino cantabile, senza lentezza]**



**iii. [Andantino cantabile]**



**iv. [Con moto molto moderato]**



<sup>108</sup> Bentoiu's analytical study of Enescu's major works is a useful starting point for considering the extent of the composer's thematic and motivic similarities (Bentoiu, 2010). Perhaps the exemplary work in this respect is the Piano Quintet, Op. 29, which Bentoiu claims resembles 'a kind of atlas of the author's entire creation and acquires – due to this circumstance – an autobiographic aspect that no other composition offers to such a degree' (419). Throughout the chapter on the Piano Quintet, thematic links are made with both the First and Third Orchestral Suites, Opp. 9 and 27; the Chamber Symphony, Op. 33; *Oedipe*, Op. 23; the Dixtuor for winds, Op. 14; as well as passing affinities with several other works.

### Example 1.10b

- i. Second Cello Sonata, Op. 26, No. 2, 4<sup>th</sup> movement: Opening theme in cello (bars 4–12)
- ii. *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28: 'Chanson pour bercer' theme (Figure 15: 6–9)
- iii. Orchestral Suite No. 3 ('Villageoise'), Op. 27: I. Opening theme (bars 2–3)

#### i. [Allegro sciolto]



#### ii. [Con moto moderato]



#### iii. [Allegro moderato]



In Ex. 1.10a, example ii. is obviously closely related to the first half of i. Example iv., on the other hand, relates directly to the second half of i., starting from the melodic highpoint of the B flat. Each of these melodic descents traces a similar contour (this becomes especially apparent if we imagine an E instead of the middle C in the fourth bar of i.), and each initial descent is followed by a leap of a fourth (this becomes a fifth in the sequential repetition of iv.'s first two bars). Though more elaborate, the melodic descent in the latter part of iii. is likewise reminiscent of the descent in i.: both span a range of a minor seventh (B flat – C; B – C sharp), and both outline a natural minor (or Aeolian) scale – as indeed does (most of) iv. The stepwise ascent at the start of iii. is again similar to that heard in i.: both examples outline a minor scale, and both move upwards through a fifth (if we take D sharp as the first scale degree in iii.); both then seem to linger briefly on the fifth degree before reaching an extra semitone to the melodic highpoint of the phrase. Turning to Ex. 1.10b, the closest point of resemblance between examples i. and ii. is undoubtedly between the second bar of ii. and the last two bars of i. (from the E down to the final A; this pattern initially appears in bars 2–3 of i., but with the chromatic substitution of an E flat). The second bar of iii. is likewise closely related to this motivic contour, which evidently makes a feature of a descending major third. There is a further similarity between bar

6 of i. and the opening bar of ii., while each of the three examples makes similar use of decorative appoggiaturas.

In each of these two examples, the themes or thematic fragments are bound together not only by the melodic gestures they share, but more specifically by the way they seem to elaborate a certain habitual tendency of Enescu's melodic writing: semitone oscillation around the highpoint of a phrase in Ex. 1.10a, for instance; a falling major third, often preceded by a semitone – and in that case predominantly appearing as part of a  $\hat{5}-\hat{4}-\hat{3}-\hat{1}$  'filling out' of a fifth – in Ex. 1.10b;<sup>109</sup> or an oscillating tone / minor third pattern, again in Ex. 1.10a. Each thematic incorporation (or elaboration) of these rather basic ideas itself plays an important generative role within a given piece (this will become apparent in my exploration of the Piano Quintet in the following chapter). But these germinal melodic ideas (and others like them) also appear throughout Enescu's oeuvre as habitual elements of his melodic language: they imply a gestural presence that is 'felt' by the listener, rather than 're-presented' in a more cerebral sense. Indeed, unlike with other composers, for whom self-quotation is in any case quite normal practice (one readily thinks of Schumann, for instance), my concern here is specifically with how Enescu's habituated ideas further encourage a kind of embodied listening, or an embodied engagement with musical materials. The recurrence of habituated material across Enescu's works is never framed as a gesturally significant quotation; the sense of familiarity we may (or may not) derive from our experience of this material relies less on cerebral recall and more on a pre-representational kind of remembering. Again, and in a broader sense, it is tempting to consider these habitual tendencies in terms of the intersection between habit memory and tradition – specifically the melodic folk tradition Enescu derived from the Romanian *lăutari*.<sup>110</sup> The absorption of these melodic habits (particularly in terms of their actual melodic contour) on Enescu's part was not merely the result of vicarious listening: they were formed as much through the embodied act of playing, of 'in-corporating'. These stylistic trademarks were a vital and

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<sup>109</sup> As Bentoiu argues, and as can be seen in both Examples 1.10a and 1.10b, Enescu has an inclination for using perfect fifths as part of a broader melodic framework. This tendency for filling out 'modal fifths' has been explored by Clemansa Firca, specifically in the context of the Piano Quintet, Op. 29. See Clemansa Firca and Ștefan Niculescu, 'Sinteze și perspective: Anii celui de-al doilea război mondial (1939–1944)', in Voicana (1971), 2: 925–1016 (968–981); and Bentoiu (2010), 431. As far as descending thirds are concerned, it is perhaps worth noting that the 'cadential motif' and 'grace note motif' both embellish a descending third, with the cadential motif incorporating a preceding semitone as part of its 4–3 elaboration.

<sup>110</sup> Studies exploring the relationship between Enescu's music and Romanian folk music include: Ștefan Niculescu, 'Aspecte ale folclorului în opera lui George Enescu', in *Reflecții despre muzică* (Bucharest: Editura Muzicală, 1980), 90–104; and Speranța Rădulescu, 'Caractère spécifique roumain dans le langage harmonique de la III<sup>e</sup> Sonate pour piano et violon de Georges Enesco', in *Enesciana II–III*, ed. Mircea Voicana (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1981), 75–84.

formative part of Enescu's expressive and technical development: not only as a violinist, but also as a pianist and (by several accounts) an able cellist.

Proust's elaboration of the 'unifying musical idea' provides another fruitful way of contextualising Enescu's melodic habits. In the novel, discerning a sense of unity between individual works by the same composer (the fictional Vinteuil) is central to the protagonist Marcel's journey towards creative fulfilment, and the realisation of his own literary vocation. Marcel discerns an ineffable unity between two of Vinteuil's works, the violin sonata and the septet. Importantly, he only begins to make sense of this unifying link upon hearing the latter work, several years after having come to know the former. It is in the sonata that Marcel's older friend Charles Swann (who represents something of an allegorical forebear in terms of the trajectory of Marcel's own life) originally discerned the presence of the *petite phrase* – an inspirational yet elusive musical idea (a 'mysterious entity', as Swann describes it) which plays constantly on his mind, but the creative significance of which he never fully comes to realise or fulfil. Crucially, unlike Marcel, Swann never encounters Vinteuil's later work (the septet), and it is precisely by discerning the inexpressible singularity of the musical 'voice' linking both pieces (the voice *behind* the 'little phrase') that Marcel becomes inspired (Swann, on the other hand, never fulfils his plans of becoming a writer, and for some time Marcel feels he will end up sharing his older friend's fate).

In the following (often quoted) passage, Marcel interrogates the provenance of Vinteuil's stylistic unity:

...it was just when he was doing his utmost to be novel, that one could recognise, beneath the apparent differences, the deep similarities and the planned resemblances that underlay a work, when Vinteuil would pick up a given phrase several times, diversify it, playfully change its rhythm, bring it back again in the original form; this kind of deliberate echo, the product of intelligence, inevitably superficial, could never be so striking as the *hidden, involuntary resemblances* which sprang to the surface, under different colours, between the two distinct masterpieces; for then Vinteuil, striving powerfully to produce something new, searched into himself, and with all the force of a creative effort touched his own essence, at a depth where, whatever question one asks, the soul replies with the same accent – its own. A particular accent, this accent of Vinteuil's...a single, personal voice that those great singers, the original musicians, always return [to] in spite of themselves, a voice which is the living proof of the irreducible individuality of each soul.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>111</sup> Proust, *The Prisoner* (2002), 234–235. The italics are mine.

Marcel's most significant observation here concerns what he regards as the apparently 'involuntary' resemblances between the two works. To him, these 'hidden' similarities are of far greater value compared with Vinteuil's conscious recycling of material, since they stem from an irreducible essence that is quintessentially Vinteuil's. Marcel goes on to question the nature of the composer's 'particular accent', or individual song:

This song, so different from everyone else's, so similar in all his own works, where had Vinteuil learnt it? Each great artist seems to be the citizen of an unknown homeland which even he has forgotten (...) It is not that musicians can remember this lost homeland, but each of them remains unconsciously in tune with it; he is overcome with joy when he sings the songs of his country...[when] he gives voice to that particular song whose repetitive character – for whatever the ostensible subject it remains identical – proves the continuity in the musician of the constituent elements of his soul.<sup>112</sup>

Carlo Caballero has examined the importance that Proust ascribes to Vinteuil's instinctive unity in terms of a contemporaneous privileging of stylistic homogeneity.<sup>113</sup> This aesthetic category was evidently of as much importance to Proust as it was to composers like Gabriel Fauré (who taught Enescu at the Paris Conservatoire, and to whom Enescu dedicated his Second Piano Quartet) or Debussy (whose pronouncements on homogeneity I will address in the following chapter). It is obviously tempting, then, to situate Enescu's allusive melodic language in the same aesthetic context. However, while Caballero is quick to comment on the 'instinctive' or 'unconscious' elements of homogeneity,<sup>114</sup> what remains unclear – perhaps unsurprisingly – is how a composer might in practical terms look to achieve this unconscious homogeneity, or how this quality might be assessed. I suggest a useful way of resolving the methodological quandary that Caballero sees in Proust's opposition of 'involuntary' and 'planned' resemblances between works is to reconceive homogeneity as something deriving of habit: the habituation of culturally embedded melodic and expressive tendencies, and the subsequent habitual (and instinctive) remembering of those tendencies. Indeed, to conceive of a corporeal (or 'incorporated') dimension to Vinteuil's (or Enescu's own) 'unknown homeland' would seem very much to approach the terms in which Maurice Merleau-Ponty came to conceptualise Proust's 'little phrase'.<sup>115</sup> As Jessica Wiskus observes, Proust's account of the 'little phrase' forms the

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid., 235–236.

<sup>113</sup> Carlo Caballero, *Fauré and French Musical Aesthetics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 126–169.

<sup>114</sup> Ibid., 155.

<sup>115</sup> Proust's conception of the artist's 'unknown homeland' resonates with Enescu's own habituated homogeneity, but also (and perhaps more obviously) seems to overlap with the Romanian composer's relationship concerning his actual homeland. To conceive of Enescu's culturally formed habits as a 'dimensional depth' (to borrow from

inspirational basis for Merleau-Ponty's elucidation of the 'idea...that comes to be known thanks only to its unfolding within the sensible realm...that comes through the flesh and that is of the flesh'.<sup>116</sup> The 'musical idea' (which Merleau-Ponty treats as a 'general conception' of ideas) is essentially pre-representational: being grounded in the flesh, it may be 'invisible' in a mentally representational sense, but it is not 'an absolute invisible, which would have nothing to do with the visible. Rather it is the invisible *of* this world, that which inhabits this world, sustains it, and renders it visible'.<sup>117</sup> Enescu's melodic and motivic habits could be thought of in a similar way: as precognitive ('invisible') ideas which nevertheless sustain and substantiate the works of which they are a part – as if from 'behind'. As Wiskus observes, the musical idea therefore amounts to so much more than the content of its notes: with the idea existing in the 'divergence' between works, it has the capacity to bind the present with the past; as such, 'it exceeds its audible presentation'.<sup>118</sup> Enescu's own thoughts regarding his compositional process, as described in an interview in 1945, reveal a startlingly similar awareness of how a felt (or embodied, or invisible) 'general idea' comes to resemble the excess of its own 'being' (here, as a 'nebulous astronomic spiral'), thereafter shaping and sustaining the thematic (the 'specified', or visible) content of the musical works of which it is a part:

In the beginning there might have been, perhaps, a sensory or affective stimulation; but in order to become 'inspiration' a whole interior and nevertheless spatial complex is necessary, to gather from a tumultuous start, a sort of nebulous astronomic spiral. (...) Only after the nebulous spiral becomes specified, do the thematic elements occur, in relation to the general idea. They form the material with which the architectonic structure of the symphony is fixated and built. Obviously, this material must be adequate for the style of the work, that is the elements must agree with the general idea.<sup>119</sup>

It is notable, in the context of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy, that Enescu should also identify some sense of harmony or agreement between the 'material elements' of the work and the

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Merleau-Ponty) of stylistic homogeneity would seem to bring both geographical and conceptual homelands into close alignment. I return to this notion as part of a broader discussion on how French and Romanian aesthetic contexts overlap in Enescu's music in Chapter Four.

<sup>116</sup> Jessica Wiskus, *The Rhythm of Thought: Art, Literature, and Music after Merleau-Ponty* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), 92.

<sup>117</sup> Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1968; originally published as *Le visible et l'invisible*, ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1964)), 151.

<sup>118</sup> Wiskus (2013), 95.

<sup>119</sup> George Enescu, 'O personalitate a gândirii și a artei: antologia de text și gânduri ale lui George Enescu' ('A personality of thought and art: an anthology of George Enescu's text and thought'), ed. Elena Zottoviceanu, Nicolae Missir, Mircea Voicana, in Academia Republicii Populare Romîne, Institutul de Istoria Artei, *George Enescu* (Bucharest: Editura Muzicală, 1964); cited in translation in Bentoiu (2010), 516.

‘general idea’: a chiasmic intertwining, as Merleau-Ponty might put it, of the work’s visible and invisible components.<sup>120</sup> I return to this conceptual dichotomy towards the end of the following section.

### *Kinaesthetic and synaesthetic memory*

Among the several real-life models Proust once listed for the ‘little phrase’ (in a letter to his friend Jacques de Lacretelle) he included César Franck’s Violin Sonata – ‘especially as played by Enescu’.<sup>121</sup> This is intriguing, for if the ‘little phrase’ has its origins in the body (the ‘flesh’, for Merleau-Ponty), one might easily speculate over how far Proust’s conception of it – the way he imagined it to sound, or made him feel – was inspired or influenced by Enescu’s playing. Habit is at work here too, of course, to the extent that Enescu’s expressivity and individuality (as a performer) is born of habituated gestures. More specifically, we might think about Enescu’s performance of the Franck sonata in terms of movement: his expressive movements constituting a visual and embodied manifestation of the ‘sensible realm’ to which Proust’s musical idea is aligned, and from whence it flows: ‘music’s movement discloses the existence of the originary unrepresentable, the fact of which comes to presence retroactively’. The performer feels and brings to life this movement that is already inherent in the musical idea; for Merleau-Ponty (as Wiskus explains), the performer serves as the ‘conduit for the encroachment, the coiling up, the intertwining that opens the dimension of depth as the source (...) of being’.<sup>122</sup>

It is indeed tempting to imagine Proust sat in a friend’s salon, listening to Enescu play Franck’s music, effectively living out his eponymous protagonist’s experience of hearing Vinteuil’s septet.<sup>123</sup> My main interest here is in exploring how the sense of musical movement that Proust perceived in Enescu’s playing finds its way into or becomes an inherent component of Enescu’s own works. These themes to which I keep returning – a sense of corporeality; an immediacy of embodied expression – are undoubtedly central to Enescu’s compositional

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<sup>120</sup> Merleau-Ponty, ‘The Intertwining–The Chiasm’, in *The Visible and the Invisible* (1968), 130–155.

<sup>121</sup> Marcel Proust, letter to Jacques de Lacretelle, 1918, in *Correspondance de Marcel Proust*, ed. Philip Kolb, 21 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1970–1993), 17: 193–194. ‘...J’ai pensé à la *Sonate* de Franck, surtout jouée par Enesco’. Proust had heard Enescu perform the Franck sonata in 1910, later describing the performance in a letter to Antoine Bibesco. See Proust, letter to Bibesco, 19 April 1913, in *Correspondance*, 12: 148.

<sup>122</sup> Wiskus (2013), 100–101.

<sup>123</sup> This analogy may be strengthened by the fact that Proust also refers (in the same letter to Jacques de Lacretelle) to another work by Franck, the String Quartet, and its appearance in one of the novel’s later volumes. His knowledge of both works (and others besides) suggests his experience of hearing Enescu’s rendition of the sonata may similarly have been influenced by his awareness of the thematic connections it shares with Franck’s other works. Further evidence of these connections is discussed in the introduction, ‘Beyond the little phrase’ in Jean-Jacques Nattiez, *Proust as Musician*, trans. Derrick Puffett (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 1–11.

aesthetics. It is indeed striking how so many of his later chamber works seem to ‘embody’ a musical idea (rather than simply ‘representing’ it – technically, intellectually). One of the ways this comes to the fore is through what I have been referring to as kinaesthetic memory: a remembered awareness of the body’s positioning and its movements through space. More broadly, kinaesthesia (or proprioception) can be thought of as conveying a sense of movement, orientation, position, or location. The kinaesthetic quality of Enescu’s music has the capacity, moreover, to encourage a kind of embodied listening, whereby the listener’s movements resonate with those engendered by the music.<sup>124</sup>

I have alluded to kinaesthetic memory a few times throughout this chapter already. The tail motif’s final appearance at the end of the Second Piano Quartet’s opening movement (discussed above – see Ex. 1.2b) frames a perfect example of how remembering can be spurred or accompanied by an awareness (on the part of the listener or performer) of the body’s own positioning.<sup>125</sup> Indeed, it is often the case with Enescu’s apparently spontaneous glimpses of past material that the pitches or tessitura remain constant, as if the memory of that material is itself generated by a kinaesthetic resemblance. Enescu’s habitual ‘oscillating octaves’ gesture likewise has a strong kinaesthetic element to it, and its memorability is derived as much from its somatic quality. It is easy to be drawn into the physicality of the gesture: when it appears in the piano, for instance, it has the capacity to embody the shape of the performer’s hand over the keys, gently oscillating back and forth. In that sense, the physical resistance of the instrument itself also plays a significant part in what the gesture, from a listening perspective, is assumed to feel like. This is also the case in the kinaesthetic remembering of ornamental patterns or figures. Importantly, ornaments are themselves markedly corporeal in nature, prompting (and drawing significance from) bodily responses in the listener.<sup>126</sup> Their spontaneity and expressive freedom can readily be construed in terms of an abstract yet potent mobility: ornamental gestures are evidently not ‘thought through’ in the same way a theme is when it is constructed.

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<sup>124</sup> It was precisely in these terms that an increasing number of early twentieth-century theorists began to think about the listening experience, as well as the body’s involvement within artistic experiences in general. For instance, in his *L’Art et le Geste* of 1910, the philosopher and music critic Jean d’Udine theorised the extent to which the body’s physiological responses to art (especially in physical genres such as dance) were entwined with the mind’s emotional responses (in such areas as music and the visual arts). Roger Smith has also shown how the advent of free dance at the turn of the twentieth century (which amounted essentially to a foregrounding of the expressivity of the ‘natural human body’ – compare Émile Jacques-Dalcroze’s notion of eurhythmics) contributed to a ‘background understanding of reality in terms of knowledge thought to come from the touch (and movement) sense’. Smith, ‘Kinaesthesia and Touching Reality’, *19: Interdisciplinary Studies in the Long Nineteenth Century*, 19 (<http://19.bbk.ac.uk>, 2014), 25.

<sup>125</sup> Michael Puri detects a similar process of remembering in Ravel’s piano music. See Puri (2011), 145–147.

<sup>126</sup> The ‘embodiment of ornament’, as Gurinder Bhogal notes, ‘was critical to its success as a gesture of semantic significance and source of expressive meaning’. Bhogal (2013), 31.

Instead, they present a stylised imitation of movement itself. A feeling of joy or pleasure often accompanies the remembering of the somatic freedom that such ornamental gestures engender – as was the case with the Third Piano Sonata’s ‘cadential motif’ (Ex. 1.7), which became stretched with each pleasurable re-hearing.

Something similar can be observed during the Sonata’s first movement, which involves the recollection of the opening theme’s defining motivic idea: a descending major-scale flourish framed by a perfect fifth (Ex. 1.11, below). The motif returns occasionally throughout the movement, in formal repetitions of the opening theme and more spontaneously. Importantly, the gesture is easily perceived in terms of its physicality – one imagines the pianist’s hand bouncing off the keys after the last quaver beat of the opening bar, and the rapid movement of the fingers through the descending triplets. This rapid descent becomes a marked feature of a varied recapitulation encountered later in the movement (see the second iteration in the example below). Here, the kinaesthetic memory of the descending finger-run (from the fifth finger to the thumb, again from A to D) forms the basis of a playful variant: the left hand becomes involved; the gesture’s note values are altered (making it quicker); the pitches are reversed; and it is explored at different octaves. In recalling the gesture, the body’s kinaesthesia (the awareness it has of its own movements) seems to prompt a further, apparently spontaneous exploration of the motif’s intervallic construction: moving through different ‘heights’ means the pianist’s arms need to move, and this increased physicality is characterised by a feeling of alacrity and excitement. This sense of rapid play is equally apparent in another variant heard towards the very end of the movement. Here, the motif is reduced to its kinaesthetic essence in a series of delicately punctuated flourishes in the right hand (Ex. 1.11: third iteration).

**Ex. 1.11:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 1<sup>st</sup> movement, iterations of opening ‘filled fifth’ motif: opening; 10/IV/2–3; and 14/IV–V (*continued next page*).



The image shows two systems of musical notation for a piano piece. The top system is marked "Tempo I con brio" and "pp legieriss. scherz." with a tempo of 8va. It features a treble and bass clef with a key signature of two sharps (F# and C#) and a 6/8 time signature. The music includes triplets and sixteenth-note runs. The bottom system is marked "armonioso" and "veloce leggiero" with a tempo of 112. It also features a treble and bass clef with the same key signature and time signature. The music includes arpeggiated chords and sixteenth-note runs. Both systems have a "3va" marking above the treble clef.

Synaesthesia is most often thought of as a merging of sensory impressions (sound with colour; touch with sound), or the stimulation of one sense by another. It can often be seen to accompany instances of kinaesthetic remembering in our experience of Enescu’s music, in that it enfolds a multi-sensory experience of movement, touch, and hearing. It was in this sense that I described the tail motif’s final appearance at the end of the Second Piano Quartet’s opening movement: the haptic (touch-based) perception and felt movement of that gesture experienced together with its melodic (as well as affective and atmospheric) content could be described as a form of synaesthetic remembering. More than that, the merging of those sensory elements in the perception of a motivic gesture as it was once experienced suggests a wholesale *revival* of the past in the present: not merely something that is represented mentally, but relived.

As various commentators have observed, synaesthetic experiences are central to Proust’s conception of how the past is relived in the present through involuntary memory.<sup>127</sup> There are numerous instances in *In Search of Lost Time* where an apparently arbitrary sensation (a flavour, a smell, a melody) suddenly re-awakens a deep-seated, emotional memory of the past – the past in its lived essence. Probably the most well-known among these instances is the episode in which Marcel tastes a ‘petite madeleine’ dipped in tea, which induces an intense memory of his childhood in Combray. After experiencing the extraordinary sense of joy elicited by this spontaneous enactment of a forgotten event, Marcel reflects:

<sup>127</sup> One recent approach that simultaneously considers the aesthetic, neurological, and psychological implications of the synaesthetic experience in Proust’s conception of involuntary memory can be found in Cretien van Campen, *The Proust Effect: The Senses as Doorways to Lost Memories* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

The sight of the little madeleine had not reminded me of anything before I tasted it; perhaps because I had often seen them since, without eating them, on the shelves of the pastry shops, and their image had therefore left those days of Combray and attached itself to others more recent; perhaps because of these recollections abandoned so long outside my memory, nothing survived, everything had come apart; the forms and the form, too, of the little shell made of cake, so fatly sensual within its severe and pious pleating – had been destroyed, or, still half asleep, had lost the force of expansion that would have allowed them to rejoin my consciousness. But, when nothing subsists of an old past, after the death of people, after the destruction of things, alone, frailer but more enduring, more immaterial, more persistent, more faithful, smell and taste still remain for a long time, like souls, remembering, waiting, hoping, upon the ruins of all the rest, bearing without giving way, on their almost impalpable droplet, the immense edifice of memory.<sup>128</sup>

Proust makes clear through his narrator that this apparently ‘unconscious’ recollection could only have come about through the sensations of taste and smell. Indeed, when his conscious attempts to cling to the memory result in failure, Marcel is forced to recognise the relative inadequacy of voluntary recollection. By contrast, sensation contains within it the ‘immense edifice of memory’: the capacity to restore the lived, sensate past; the ‘essence of things’.

As mentioned earlier, the attendant sense of joy or exhilaration that Proust describes in these instances of involuntary remembering derives more accurately from a feeling of finding oneself in between the past and the present – somehow ‘outside of time’. We might in that case resituate the synaesthetic experience itself as something that fills the gap between the past and the present. Or rather: as something that transcends the gap between a ‘visible’ present and an ‘invisible’ past; synaesthetic remembering makes a presence of absence. Again, Wiskus’s reading of Proust through Merleau-Ponty is helpful to us here. If the invisible is in fact ‘*of this world*’, then we can say accordingly that the invisible past lies ‘not beyond the boundary of the present but in one sole gesture with the present, as the obverse or unseen side of the present, and therefore as a dimension of the depth of the present.’<sup>129</sup> For Merleau-Ponty (and for Proust), it is precisely this dimensional relation that makes transcendence possible: ‘the invisible is *there* without being an *object*, it is pure transcendence’.<sup>130</sup>

There is a startlingly literal manifestation of this idea at the very end of the Third Piano Sonata’s opening movement. Three bars after the kinaesthetic flourishes discussed in Ex. 1.11 (above), Enescu produces a variant of the movement’s opening motivic gesture which seems to eradicate its defining kinaesthetic quality almost entirely (Ex. 1.12). The motif’s notes (the five

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<sup>128</sup> Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, I: Swann’s Way*, trans. Lydia Davis, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 47.

<sup>129</sup> Wiskus (2013), 116.

<sup>130</sup> Merleau-Ponty (1968), 229. From a working note titled ‘Problematic of the visible and the invisible’.

itches from D to A) are still ‘present’ in the right hand, but they are effectively ‘invisible’; the pianist is given the instruction instead to ‘place the fingers silently on the keys’ (implying that the keys ought to be depressed but not sounded). And yet the ‘invisible is *there*’: most obviously in the sense that the notes are literally visible on the page, though hollowed out; but also, the rapid flourish in the left hand has the effect of exposing the silent cluster’s barely audible overtones.<sup>131</sup> The music makes a feature of its own inaudibility – it exposes it, and in doing so transcends it. The music reveals or moves out towards something ‘beyond’ our experience of it up to this point. As Wiskus notes, in synaesthetic remembering ‘what shines forth is an evocation through sensible appearance of what could never serve as an object of vision in the ordinary sense’.<sup>132</sup> Accordingly, what is brought forth is the motif’s essence, the thing that binds it as much to its kinaesthetic past as to the present (as well as to an invisible future).

**Example 1.12:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 1<sup>st</sup> movement, closing bars.

\* Posez silencieusement les doigts sur les touches.

Elsewhere in Enescu’s music, the synaesthetic enfolding of the past and present seems to highlight the heightened emotion deriving from this transcendent experience. I will have the opportunity to discuss this in much greater depth in Chapter Three (as part of my analysis of the ecstatic sunrise scene from Enescu’s *Impressions d’enfance* suite), so for now one final example will suffice, taken from the penultimate page of the Third Piano Sonata’s middle movement (21/I–IV). Bentoiu describes this brief passage (Ex. 1.13) as an ‘astral vision’ of the movement’s earlier recapitulation of the opening theme (which, as mentioned above, is derived from the Sonata’s second subject).<sup>133</sup> It appears immediately after the return of some familiar motivic material (including a final iteration of the cadential motif and the movement’s third theme – both at their original pitches). Seemingly spurred by this kinaesthetic memory, the

<sup>131</sup> The closing bars of Schumann’s *Papillons*, Op. 2, is a direct forerunner of this gesture, with a thick A<sup>7</sup> chord gradually thinning out one note at a time (with the lowest note in the chord dropping out each time). Ligeti’s third étude for solo piano (*Touches bloquées*) experiments with the same idea of silently depressing the piano keys.

<sup>132</sup> Wiskus (2013), 118.

<sup>133</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 336.

ensuing ‘vision’ of the absent and longed for past (note the *nostalgico* marking in the third bar) is framed musically as a ‘transcending’ of tessitura – there is an unprecedented sense of ‘height’ to this recollection.

Example 1.13: *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, page 21, I/3 – IV/1.

The musical score is presented in two systems. The first system, labeled 'Pno.', shows the piano part in treble and bass clefs. It begins with a *rit.* marking, followed by *poco*, *a poco*, and another *poco*. Dynamics include *dim.* and *p*. The piece features several triplets and a quintuplet. A *dolciss.* marking is present in the right hand. The second system, marked 'a tempo, un poco lento' with a tempo of 52 (♩ = 52), includes a *8va* marking. It features dynamics from *pp* to *pf* and *mp*. Performance instructions include *pensieroso, nostalgico*, *cant.*, and *un poco legato*. The section concludes with *senza rigore* and *un poco legato*. The third system continues the *un poco legato* instruction and includes dynamics *p*, *mf*, and *mp*. The fourth system features dynamics *pp*, *p*, and *bp*, with a *0* marking at the end.

The effect is a feeling of ethereality, which is accompanied by the fragility evoked by Enescu's treatment of the melodic line. This is brought about by the distributed nature of the theme itself (which appears as an imitative canon between both hands), and by the physical non-coincidence of the individual notes as they are played in each hand (as implied by the arpeggiation markings in the third, fourth and fifth bars). It is only in retrospect that the listener becomes aware of the poignant singularity of this moment: shortly after, the grace note figure returns, signalling an affective reorientation and a shift in temporality.

Each of the kinds of bodily memory discussed in the latter part of this chapter (affective, habitual, and kinaesthetic and synaesthetic) propose a way of remembering that is encountered as it were 'beyond' the confines of the mind, which I have also described in terms of the 'unperceived' character of Enescu's mnemonic presentations. In general, much of this chapter has focused on the role of perception in memory, as well as how Enescu's music might constitute a challenge to listeners' perceptual faculties. At the same time, Enescu's processes (and the various mnemonic modes that I have outlined) reveal an aesthetic concern with the extent to which the past is rendered as distant or co-immanent with the present. All this plays an important role in the larger-scale apprehension of Enescu's works, of course, and it is specifically how memory might influence the temporal and formal design of some of these works that I address in Chapter Two.

## CHAPTER II

### *Temporality*

‘Music, as the language of Becoming, will also be the language of memories  
(...) memory renders all expression evasive’  
(Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable*)<sup>1</sup>

#### CONTEXTS

WHILE THE LAST chapter considered some of the various ways in which remembering is experienced from a phenomenological perspective, this chapter considers more closely the role that memory plays within the context of music’s temporal unfolding. More precisely, I am interested in how memory creates continuities or discontinuities across time, and how these discrete temporal modalities are experienced in Enescu’s music. This prompts further considerations, including how memory plays with or undermines the coherence of ostensibly linear structures, and how the allusive or captivating experience of remembering might give rise to innovative formal schemes (cyclic form being an important example). I use Enescu’s Piano Quintet, Op. 29, as a case study for these issues, before discussing (from a more philosophical perspective) the categories of duration, instantaneity, and becoming. I begin, however, by considering the contemporaneous aesthetic concern with discontinuity and continuity, and the ways these temporal modalities are negotiated in Enescu’s works.

Notably, around the time Enescu was composing, Western art music was marked by a revolution concerning compositional structure and the elements that were traditionally meant to account for it. Functional harmony had long been associated with a priori coherence or continuity, yet its dissolution near the start of the century, as Jonathan Kramer has remarked, essentially made continuity a merely optional strategy in the creation of musical works.<sup>2</sup> While growing numbers of composers explored the possibilities of minimising continuity (increasingly, through expressions of extreme discontinuity, but also through various forms of anti-teleological writing), many others of the post-tonal generation, including Enescu, were evidently still concerned with composing music that retained a fundamental sense of continuity while fully engaging with the expressive potential of musical discontinuity.

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<sup>1</sup> Vladimir Jankélévitch, *Music and the Ineffable* (2003), 152.

<sup>2</sup> Jonathan D. Kramer, ‘Moment Form in Twentieth Century Music’, *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 64, No. 2 (1978), 177–78.

Claude Debussy epitomises this aesthetic concern in a letter to Gabriel Pierné in March 1914, just after Pierné had conducted Debussy's 1913 ballet, *Jeux*, for the first time. As Jann Pasler has observed, Debussy was not entirely convinced that the performance successfully captured what he understood to be an underlying coherence across the ballet's series of metrically juxtaposed blocks: 'It seemed to me that the different episodes lacked homogeneity. The link which connects them is subtle, yet it exists, does it not? You know it as well as I'.<sup>3</sup> The quotation highlights an important way in which composers thought they might be judged by their public: evidently, in 1914, there was still a value to be placed on coherence, which would only gradually diminish as the century wore on.<sup>4</sup> By referring to the subtlety of his connecting 'link', Debussy also points to an inherent difficulty regarding the perception of underlying homogeneity. Twentieth-century composers who struggled against the 'crumbling of continuity' were faced with a dilemma: namely, how to create music whose perceptible continuity (amidst varying manifestations of discontinuity) could succeed in lending strength to a given piece.<sup>5</sup>

As we have seen, a significant preoccupation of Enescu's music is with sensuous evocations and re-imaginings of the past. To that end, memory occupies an important role in Enescu's exploration of the dialectical relationship between formal continuity and discontinuity. How Enescu reincorporates past material, or evokes a sense of the past (not least through the various modes of remembering explored in the previous chapter) has a profound influence on the temporal and formal structuring of individual works, and our perception of them as they unfold in time. While the technical and expressive means by which this is achieved obviously varies throughout Enescu's oeuvre, the later chamber works stand out for the often-complex ways in which thematic and motivic material is reimagined, transformed or superimposed. As I have already suggested, these later works demonstrate remarkable emotional depth, while the intricacy of their melodic construction can be both disorientating and utterly beguiling. Particularly interesting is how these works shape our experience of time, by the way they appeal to and play with our faculties of perception and memory. Both on a large scale (across movements, for instance) and locally, the extent to which memory can create an experientially continuous strand between past and present is mediated by memory's simultaneous capacity to

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<sup>3</sup> Claude Debussy to Gabriel Pierné, 5<sup>th</sup> March 1914, printed in the catalogue to the exhibition *Claude Debussy*, Paris: Bibliothèque National (1962). 'Il m'a semblé que les divers épisodes manquaient d'homogénéité. Le lien qui les relie est subtil, mais il existe pourtant? Tu le sais aussi bien que moi.' Cited in Jann Pasler, 'Debussy, *Jeux*: Playing with Time and Form', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (1982), 69, although the translation is mine.

<sup>4</sup> As observed in Chapter One, homogeneity (especially as perceived across the entirety of a composer's oeuvre) was advanced as an important aesthetic category in French musical thought of the early twentieth century. See Caballero's *Fauré and French Musical Aesthetics*, 126–169.

<sup>5</sup> Kramer (1978), 178.

create a sense of rupture, especially through jarring clashes in mood or affect, and in the contrast of what Raymond Monelle has called lyric and progressive temporalities (implying stasis and directionality, respectively).<sup>6</sup>

The opening ten bars or so of the Third Piano Sonata's final movement demonstrate this simultaneous capacity for continuity and rupture quite effectively. As I explored in the previous chapter (see Ex. 1.9, reproduced as Ex. 2.1 below), the finale begins with an A minor broken-chord ostinato derived from the *Andantino*'s grace note motif (especially as it appears towards the end of the movement; see Ex. 1.8). The persistence of this motivic gesture (even as it is transformed into something more propulsive and dynamic) lends an important sense of continuity to the transition between both movements (and is one of several examples of inter-movement primary remembering that can be found in Enescu's music). This feeling of continuity is compounded by the fact that the ostinato figure also reincorporates a fragment of the *Andantino*'s secondary theme: namely, the apex of the melodic line, where the theme effectively turns back on itself (note the longer crotchets E–F–E–D in bars 5–6 of the example below; see also Ex. 1.10a. iii. in the previous chapter which shows how this theme is related to several other thematic fragments in Enescu's oeuvre). After only six bars, this ostinato is suddenly interrupted by a recollection of the previous movement's main theme, and along with it, its tonality (B major), affective mood, and lyric temporality. The suddenness with which we are momentarily (yet forcefully) transported back into the dreamlike world of the *Andantino* is both curious and wholly unexpected. While this is certainly a moment of interruptive discontinuity, the remembering of recently past material at the same time creates a sense of thematic continuity between both movements; Enescu does not allow the past to recede into forgetfulness so easily. The sudden recollection is also emblematic of the various ways in which Enescu's introspective movements have a tendency of 'haunting' a work's finale, potentially even undermining the possibility of a genuinely goal-orientated, temporally progressive conclusion (I return to this topic as part of my discussion of the Piano Quintet's finale later in this chapter).

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<sup>6</sup> Monelle augments (along semiotic lines) Jonathan Kramer's bichronic theory of 'linear' and 'non-linear' time through his observation that 'the two temporalities of the musical signified are respectively holistic and progressive. Music invites us to step out of time into its own timeless state; or it gives us an experience of movement, passage, orientation'. It is important to note that the temporality of the 'musical signified' is distinct from what Monelle calls the 'temporality of the signifier', which is a semiotic reframing of the observation that the time music might mean or evoke is not the same as the time it takes: 'while music is structured in time, musical temporality is also the time music *means*'. Monelle (2000), 81–86. See also Jonathan Kramer, *The Time of Music: New Meanings, New Temporalities, New Listening Strategies* (New York: Schirmer, 1988), 20.

**Example 2.1:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, opening bars.

**Allegro con spirito** (♩=132)

*8<sup>va</sup>*-----

Pno.

5 (8) (♩=♩) *pp* *p* *sciolto* *poco*

9 *più* *3* *3* *8<sup>va</sup>* *lontano p un poco legato* *fp sub.*

The contrast exhibited here between lyric and progressive time is framed as a contrast between a seemingly suspended, timeless state (as evoked by the *Andantino*'s conclusion), and one of forward movement, experienced in the Sonata's opening bars primarily through rapid (though relatively unchanging) passagework. Most of Enescu's later chamber works rely on a similar temporal juxtaposition between movements, most commonly to mark the transition from a slower, contemplative movement into a dynamic finale: this is true of the Third Violin Sonata, the Second Cello Sonata, the Third Piano Sonata and the Second Piano Quartet (as well as the Chamber Symphony). The extent to which this kind of structural discontinuity might inform Enescu's aesthetics is revealed by his comments on Stravinsky's *Rite of Spring*, which he claimed was 'marred, from the point of view of the emotional progression of the work, by the

fact that the two parts are too closely similar in character'.<sup>7</sup> To be sure, unlike the sudden juxtaposed recollection just discussed (which is also emblematic of Proust's involuntary remembering), the actual move from one temporal pole to another across the Third Piano Sonata's second and third movements is not the result of a stark delineation, but is instead born of a sense of attenuation and renewal. Gently oscillating octaves, a *pianissimo* dynamic marking, and the long final fermata which bring the *Andantino* to a close (Ex. 2.2) are a remarkable example of how music can sound at the very limits of (im)materiality; what Vladimir Jankélévitch might describe as a 'game played with almost-nothing'.<sup>8</sup> Note especially the performance direction stating the next movement should only begin after 'about ten seconds of silence' ('*enchânez après environ 10 secondes de silence*'). For Enescu, music would seem to reside as much in the void between these two movements as it does within them.<sup>9</sup>

**Example 2.2:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, closing bars.

The echo of the embellished A minor triad at the start of the *Allegro* along with the fragmented reintegration of the *Andantino*'s secondary theme further contributes to the sense that the boundary between these movements is permeable; the shared motivic content either side of the structural divide suggests a kind of suspended continuity. This blurring is compounded by the fact that we do not immediately register the grace note motif's transformation into something more propulsive: Enescu disguises the metamorphosis to make it seem as if the ostinato were emerging within an admittedly short span of time (as opposed to already fully formed from the outset). Indeed, the movement's opening bar does little to suggest a discernible shift in

<sup>7</sup> Cited in translation by the author in Malcolm (1990), 112. See also *George Enescu*, ed. George Oprescu and Mihail Jora (Bucharest: 1964), 68.

<sup>8</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 142. See also the subchapter 'Le Presque-rien. L'air et le vent' in Jankélévitch, *Debussy et le mystère de l'instant* (Paris: Plon, 1976), 225–232.

<sup>9</sup> A similar performance direction can be found at the end of the Chamber Symphony's opening movement, where Enescu stipulates: '*environ 20 secondes d'arrêt avant l'attaca du N° II*'.

temporality or motivic variation, and contains an almost exact echo of the grace note gesture as it appears at certain points in the bars before the end of the *Andantino* (again, see Ex. 1.8). Only in the movement's second bar do we discern some transformation taking place, as the gesture is stripped of its grace notes and reduced to a regular quaver pattern (the quicker tempo would almost certainly be acknowledged by this point, too). Importantly, this is not a metamorphosis that we discern or make sense of in retrospect. Likewise, the way Enescu handles this temporal shift has little to do with long-range structural listening. Instead, he encourages a mode of musical engagement which foregrounds change as it takes place within our present field of perception; we witness the grace note motif 'becoming' an ostinato through our present perception of the music's unfolding. Thus, while both movements are contrasting in temporality (quite radically so), the move between temporal poles in this instance is far more nuanced than a binary delineation between 'stasis' and 'propulsion' (essentially a description of musical process on a larger scale) would otherwise suggest.

Enescu's chamber works are replete with permeable discontinuities of this sort, distinct from the collage-like or cinematic juxtapositions one might find in Debussy's *Jeux*, for instance, or most notably in a work like Stravinsky's *Symphonies of Wind Instruments* (1920).<sup>10</sup> It is notable too that even those instances of genuinely interruptive recollection (as encountered in the seventh bar of the Third Piano Sonata's finale) have the capacity of facilitating a temporal continuity between past and present. Enescu's oscillating octaves gesture, which I discussed in relation to habitual and kinaesthetic remembering in the last chapter, is another fluid means by which he occasionally facilitates a 'present-orientated' shift from one temporal pole to another, or a kind of continuity through discontinuity. An arresting variant of the gesture can be found in the Third Piano Sonata's opening movement, where it introduces the second subject area (marked *dolce rustico*; see Ex. 2.3). The upward flourish across five octaves (G#<sub>1</sub>–G#<sub>6</sub>) in the fourth bar seems to suspend the movement's intermittently progressive temporality and sense of teleology (the whole movement is characterised by a playful, Haydnesque pastoral). The first subject thereby gives way to the more interiorised rusticity that characterises the lyric second theme, the subjective depths of which will only be plumbed in the second movement, which is based on the same thematic material.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Jonathan Kramer conducts an extended analysis of Stravinsky's *Symphonies of Wind Instruments* in his *The Time of Music* (1988), 221–285. See also the influential study by Edward T. Cone, 'Stravinsky: The Progress of a Method', *Perspectives of New Music*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1962), 18–26. On Debussy's *Jeux*, see Pasler's study cited above (note 3).

<sup>11</sup> The temporal contrast is potentially that much greater if we 'hear' the *dolce rustico* theme in terms of the subjectively immersive dreamworld it forecasts in the *Andantino* – but this relies on repeated listening.

**Example 2.3:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, opening movement, second subject.

Even though the tempo remains the same, the gesture has the effect of slowing the propulsive thrust of the music. The change in energy takes place quickly but not instantaneously – it lasts as long as the gesture itself, so that the focus here is very much on how the articulation of change itself might look and feel as it takes place through or across time. This is evidenced by the way the music seems to outrun itself, shooting up several octaves of the piano and effectively curtailing any sense of forward movement. The music’s teleological progress takes a detour, a sideways swerve that is manifested literally by the way the pianist’s hands suddenly work their way up to the higher registers of the keyboard.

At other times (and more commonly, in fact), the oscillating octaves gesture is used simply to mark a momentary pause in the music’s unfolding; it signifies a ‘perceptual gathering’ within a potentially disorientating landscape. This is the mode in which we encountered the gesture in the last chapter, and a further example can be found below (Ex. 2.4), taken from near the beginning of the second scene (‘Vieux mendiant’) of the *Impressions d’enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28 (1940). The intermittent octave leaps in the violin and (initially) the piano, thereafter reduced to syncopated repetitions of an E<sub>4</sub> amidst arabesque-like punctuations in the right hand (not dissimilar to the violin’s improvisatory flurries in the opening of the Third Violin Sonata) together create a feeling of ‘static mobility’, brought about by metric blurring and the elimination of thematic ‘hooks’ (even the *malinconico* arabesque figures seem little more than embellishments of the pitch E). What is left is a basic form of elaborated repetition which results

in a curtailing of forward motion, so that any sense of what might follow seems held in abeyance. The gesture is a perfect example of how purposeless movement might nonetheless draw attention to the continuity of the present moment and its open-endedness towards the future. Even though the focus here is not so much on change as the relative lack of it (a reduced rate of change), this is another example of how Enescu uses present-orientated perceptual functions to disrupt a sense of goal-directed linearity. More generally, Enescu's processes reveal how musical time can likewise elicit a sense of timelessness.

**Example 2.4:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28: 'Vieux mendiant', Figure 3–2 – Figure 3+2.

Local contrasts or deviations are also a feature of many of Enescu's extended melodic passages, and are expressed as rapid or momentary shifts in idea (and not necessarily temporality). Often this is achieved through chromatic detours: the Second Piano Quartet's opening theme, with its chromatically evasive slides and deviations (which simultaneously reinforce the 'memorability' of the tail motif; see Ex. 1.3 in the previous chapter) is a perfect example of this. Similar harmonic evasions characterise the unfolding of the Piano Quintet's meandering and expansive opening theme, while elsewhere these kinds of evasive detours are achieved through changes in instrumental colour, textural density, or control of mobility. In this way too, then, Enescu's music often evinces an elusiveness, a kind of reticence concerning self-revelation, in the way that an idea might resist articulation through its attempted recollection (this is how Jankélévitch understands memory, when he writes that it 'renders all expression evasive').<sup>12</sup> Moreover, as a vehicle for the spontaneous remembering of earlier material (through the constant manipulation and transformation of motivic fragments and thematic ideas),

<sup>12</sup> See note 1.

Enescu's melodies often incorporate a sense of temporal discontinuity or fluctuation even within their continual unfolding (I return to this notion later in the chapter). In listening to these later works, then, it becomes apparent, on the one hand, that Enescu uses melody (contrapuntally, heterophonically, but above all allusively) to establish a substratum against which many of the above instances of discontinuity can play against, and in which they become enmeshed. Melody could, in that case, be regarded as the predominant means by which Enescu manages to create an underlying continuity within a harmonically, texturally and temporally discontinuous or evasive musical landscape. At the same time, however, the way Enescu relies on melody to express shifts in idea or to facilitate the sudden (and frequent) remembering of earlier material can paradoxically suggest a discontinuous kind of melodic continuity.<sup>13</sup> I explore how this dialectic underpins Enescu's understanding of musical (and lived) time in the next part of this chapter, by tracing the processes of thematic development and evolution in the Piano Quintet, Op. 29.

#### THEMATIC THREADS: THE PIANO QUINTET, OP. 29

The Piano Quintet in A minor, Op. 29, belongs to the small group of chamber works written at the time of the Second World War, the duration of which, as with the First World War, Enescu spent in his native Romania. These works include the Second Piano Quartet and the *Impressions d'enfance* suite of 1940. *Impressions* – which recalls aspects of Enescu's childhood through a continuous series of motivically linked yet affectively contrasting vignettes – was the first major composition of these war years, and suggests how the memory of a *lived* past took fresh hold over Enescu. It is within the context of Enescu's renewed connection to his homeland (a topic which I consider in greater depth in Chapter Four) and the meditative self-reflection that it provoked that we must also situate the Piano Quintet and Second Piano Quartet, which contain some of the composer's most intimately expressive music. The Quintet is the more luxuriantly Romantic of the two, and at around thirty-five minutes, it is also the longest of the chamber

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<sup>13</sup> Enescu's use of melody broadly speaking is a topic to which numerous Romanian scholars have been drawn, yielding several studies dedicated to questions of monody, polyphony, counterpoint, and heterophony. See for instance: Clemansa-Liliana Firca and Gheorghe Firca, 'Caractéristiques et fonctions de l'unisson chez Georges Enesco', in *Enesciana II–III: Georges Enesco, musicien complexe*, ed. Mircea Voicana (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1981), 57–62; Constanța Cristescu, 'The Monody in Enescian Polystratifications', in *Proceedings of the George Enescu International Musicology Symposium, Bucharest 2011*, ed. Mihai Cosma (Bucharest: Editura Muzicală, 2011), 33–38; and Ștefan Niculescu, 'Aspecte ale creației enesciene în lumina Simfoniei de cameră', *Studii muzicologice*, Vol. 8 (Bucharest: Uniunea Compozitorilor din R. P. R., 1958). A frequent observation made in these studies – as Benedict Taylor has also noted – concerns how, for Enescu, 'the melodic principle...expands to fill the place of the diminished role played in the twentieth century by tonal harmony'. In this way Enescu effectively overcomes the major issues brought about by the dissolution of functional harmony. See Taylor (2017), 437, note 120.

works which I explore. The Quintet was never performed in Enescu's lifetime, and remained unpublished until 1964. The manuscript indicates that the first two movements were completed on September 24<sup>th</sup>, 1940, at Enescu's villa in Sinaia. The latter two movements, however, are undated, and the score is incomplete, but only insofar as some details (such as pedal and expression markings) are missing from the last third of the piece (from Figure 45 onwards), while metronome markings are missing throughout.

Like the other chamber works of this late period, the Piano Quintet engages in a complex and constantly evolving process of thematic and motivic recurrence, fragmentation, and synthesis. The degree of thematic cross-pollination and reintegration between movements (both by allusive and more explicit means) is such that it is tempting to view the work as a particularly nuanced example of cyclic form – a technique to which Enescu would inevitably have been exposed during his time at the Paris Conservatoire, studying the music of César Franck and other composers of the French School (particularly Camille Saint-Saëns and Vincent d'Indy). Franck's name especially has become synonymous with cyclicism, in part due to d'Indy's efforts to promote the idea that Franck alone developed the technique from late Beethoven.<sup>14</sup> Of course, this conveniently overlooks the numerous examples of cyclic writing (explored in some depth by Benedict Taylor, among others) which predated even the earliest of Franck's cyclic essays.<sup>15</sup> Nonetheless, with Franck's cyclic masterpieces of the 1880s (his last and greatest works), and pieces such as Saint-Saëns' First Violin Sonata, Op. 75 (1885) and Third Symphony (1886), or d'Indy's own Second Symphony (1902–1903), the *principe cyclique*, as Walter Frisch has observed, was carried 'to new extremes'.<sup>16</sup> In a broader sense, then, the French cyclic sonata of the late nineteenth century must be regarded in terms of an ever-deepening fascination with how memory's complex structures might shape or potentially lend temporal coherence to (or else creatively undermine) ostensibly 'linear' artworks. Drawing on Proust's evident debt to some of these cyclic works (as suggested by his own descriptions of the fictional composer Vinteuil's complex musical processes), Taylor observes that 'this repertoire was heard as

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<sup>14</sup> See Vincent d'Indy, *Cours de Composition Musicale*, ed. Auguste Sérieyx, 3 vols. (Paris: A. Durand, 1903–50), Vol. 2/i (1909), 'La Sonate Cyclique', 375–433.

<sup>15</sup> See the chapter titled 'La Sonate Cyclique and the Structures of Time' in Benedict Taylor's *The Melody of Time: Music and Temporality in the Romantic Era* (2016), 211–256; especially 216–217 and 230–231. Similarly, in the insightful opening chapter ('The idea of cyclic form') to his *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory: The Romantic Conception of Cyclic Form* (2011), Taylor notes that 'the idea of cyclic form is...essentially a Romantic one', with composers like Mendelssohn, Robert Schumann, and Hector Berlioz (who introduced the concept of the *idée fixe*) each experimenting with the technique prior to or around the time that Franck composed his first cyclic work, the Piano Trio in F# minor, Op. 1, No. 1, of 1840.

<sup>16</sup> Walter Frisch, 'The Snake Bites Its Tail: Cyclic Processes in Brahms's Third String Quartet, Op. 67', *The Journal of Musicology*, Vol. 22, No. 1 (University of California Press, 2005), 156.

expressing the richness and multiplicity of human temporality in an unsurpassed way'. The aesthetic articulation of cyclicism effectively afforded composers, musicians and listeners a deeper understanding of 'what it is to exist in time'.<sup>17</sup>

It is hardly surprising, in that respect, that Enescu was drawn to the idea of cyclicism, or that he should use the phrase 'oeuvre *cyclique*' to describe one of his earlier works, the Octet for Strings, Op. 7, written in 1900.<sup>18</sup> At the same time, the cyclic conception of this work also points us towards another String Octet – that of Mendelssohn's – which Taylor has called 'one of the first and most significant compositions in cyclic form'.<sup>19</sup> Enescu must have known the work, it being virtually the only well-known piece for string octet written up to that point (although Louis Spohr did also write four octets – or double quartets – between 1823 and 1847, his first predating Mendelssohn's by only two years). Enescu's Op. 7 Octet seems, therefore, to look both to the formal example set by Mendelssohn, and simultaneously roots the Romanian composer firmly within the French aesthetic tradition of the late nineteenth century. The piece itself (together, arguably, with the Second Violin Sonata, Op. 6, written the year before) proposes a kind of manifesto for the formal aesthetic that would come to influence a significant proportion of Enescu's works, including the Piano Quintet.<sup>20</sup>

Cyclic form can be defined, broadly, as the long-range reintegration of earlier thematic material over the course of a piece (across movements, for instance), and most commonly towards the end of the work. This is exactly what happens in the Quintet, where the 'remembering' of several earlier themes heralds a kind of thematic apotheosis in the Coda. The

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<sup>17</sup> Taylor (2016), 215; 256.

<sup>18</sup> In the opening paragraph of the Composer's Preface (presented in French and in English translation) to Enoch's new edition of the String Octet, Op. 7 (1950), Enescu writes the following: 'This Octet, *cyclic* in form [*Cet Octuor, oeuvre cyclique*], presents the following characteristics: it is divided into four distinct movements in the classic manner, each movement linked to the other to form a *single symphonic* movement, where the periods on, an enlarged scale, follow one another according to the rules of construction for the first movement of a symphony'. In his typology of cyclic forms (in *Mendelssohn, Time and Memory*), Taylor categorises Enescu's Octet as a type of 'combined- or single-movement cyclic form', specifically one which exhibits a 'multi-functional four-in-one design'. Similar examples include Liszt's Piano Sonata in B minor (1854), Saint-Saëns' Cello Concerto No. 1 in A minor, Op. 33 (1872), and the last three of Richard Strauss's tone poems (see Taylor (2011), 16); one might also add Enescu's Second String Quartet, Op. 22, No. 2 (completed half a century after the Octet) to this category. Elsewhere, Taylor also describes the Octet as characteristic of a two-dimensional sonata design; see his 'Landscape – Rhythm – Memory: Contexts for Mapping the Music of George Enescu' (2017), 418.

<sup>19</sup> Taylor (2011), 54.

<sup>20</sup> The extent to which Enescu engaged with cyclic forms or the cyclic accumulation of themes cannot be understated. Though by no means an exhaustive list, other works (besides the Octet and the Piano Quintet) which experiment with this technique include all the symphonies (Nos. 1–3; the incomplete Nos. 4 and 5; as well as the Chamber Symphony, Op. 33); both String Quartets, Op. 22; the Second Violin Sonata, Op. 6; both Piano Quartets, Opp. 16 and 30; and even structurally 'loose' works like the *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28 (which sees a return of many of the work's main themes in the final scene). Enescu's use of leitmotifs in *Oedipe* has likewise been described by Pascal Bentoiu as adhering to an overarching cyclic principle (Bentoiu (2010), 221–224). This inclination for cyclicism may well be indicative of how French artists broadly speaking used cyclic writing as a means of transmuting the influence of 'Wagnérisme'.

piece also includes themes (or recognisable fragments of themes) which drift in and out across movements, together with a remarkable level of thematic transformation and evolution across the entirety of the work. Taylor defines each of these ‘types’ as ‘*recalling*’ and ‘*transformative*’ cyclicism respectively, and although he admits that these categories will always overlap to some extent at least (since the boundaries ‘between what constitutes close allusion and literal reprise’, are easily blurred),<sup>21</sup> I suggest it is preferable to think of Enescu’s cyclicism more generally as a highly contingent and malleable kind of cyclic ‘re-surfacing’ – a gradated (re-)emergence of thematic and motivic materials to the musical surface (which, crucially, often overlies a contrapuntally dense musical texture). Enescu’s generative processes suggest, moreover, that these thematic materials never really go away – they are somehow latent beneath the surface; the same material underpins the recurrent forms and variants that intermittently break the surface of the music, teasing our perceptual faculties in the process. As such, I am less concerned with exactly when past material is brought back in a global, functional sense (or how its cyclic reappearance might serve to undercut or work against some larger generic structure), and more interested in how the effects of remembering (as felt by us as listeners) might shape our experience of the music at a given point in time, which likewise aids our understanding of how the music unfolds in time. It is the effects of perceiving something as familiar that I wish to unpack, in other words, rather than merely describing or pointing out where an idea originates – where it is ‘from’ in the music. As such, I am especially interested in how cyclic re-surfacing is framed as a phenomenological or perceptual experience that potentially either facilitates a sense of temporal continuity or precipitates temporal rupture, both locally and on a larger scale.

A basic structural and thematic outline of the Piano Quintet will in any case be helpful in getting us acquainted with the work (see Table 2.1 below).<sup>22</sup> As the table shows, the piece is divided into four movements. However, as the first and second, and the third and fourth movements run seamlessly into one another it is likewise tempting to conceive of the work in terms of two larger movements, or blocks.<sup>23</sup> A largely pensive and lyrical first half gives way to a contrastingly livelier, and more extrovert second half (although this second block is also tempered with more introspective sections, as indicated by the *Più tranquillo* tempo markings). The opening movement (*Con moto molto moderato*) is the least complicated as far as a generic

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<sup>21</sup> Taylor (2011), 11.

<sup>22</sup> My tabular analysis adapts and builds on Pascal Bertoïu’s discussion of the Piano Quintet in his *Masterworks of George Enescu*, 416–433.

<sup>23</sup> A cursory glance at the Piano Quintet’s discography suggests that most performers, including the Solomon Ensemble (Naxos, 2003) and Schubert Ensemble (Chandos, 2013), regard the work as being divided into two larger movements (split across four tracks).

structural unfolding is concerned, and conforms closely enough to a sonata form model. Compared with the outer movements (I and IV), the middle movements are evidently more reliant on recurrence as a formal principle: internal repetitions, often within larger repeating structures, seem to privilege a poetic (as opposed to a discernibly generic) formal conception. This is most true of the third movement, the first half of which comprises the material indicated in the table by the wavy line, while the second half provides a truncated repeat of the same material with the resumption of the initial tempo. Pascal Bentoiu describes it as a ‘double journeying on an asymmetrical trajectory’ with each journey presenting three ‘distinct surfaces’, which are labelled A, B, and C in the table.<sup>24</sup> The B section, both times around, is the most fluid in conception, with cyclic reappearances of Theme 3, and the introduction of new, largely unrelated thematic material (a waltz-like Theme Z). Given the temporal and thematic contrast between the *Vivace* and *Più tranquillo* sections, and the fact that the transitional material enfolding Theme 7 remains the same, it may be tempting to consider the ABA and A<sub>1</sub>B<sub>1</sub> sections as broader A sections to a more lyrical B section (or second subject area), resulting in AB|A<sub>1</sub>B<sub>1</sub>. However, that reading might risk glossing over the numerous contrasting aspects between A and B sections (in their original designation), which could just as temptingly be viewed as a scherzo and trio.

The second movement, which Bentoiu describes as appearing ‘like a vast lyric poem’, and whose formal scheme ‘does not present a customary plan’,<sup>25</sup> exposes similar problems regarding formal integration (in a generic sense; the constant circling and manipulation of familiar themes creates its own kind of coherence). This is largely brought about by the four character vignettes (following the initial ABA section), which recall the same or related themes, yet present those ideas through formal juxtaposition (of the ‘blurred’ or ‘permeable’ kind which I discussed above). Note how the ‘*Disintegration*’ vignette features a fragmentary re-surfacing of Theme 1, while the coda consists of variations on the same motivic idea. The finale, for Bentoiu, represents a ‘vast synthesis of the work’s entire thematic material’, and ‘has a very clear sonata form’.<sup>26</sup> Both the bridge section (which is built over an extended C# pedal) and the development in this last movement serve as initial platforms for the re-surfacing of several motivic and thematic ideas (mainly from the third movement – although note, too, the ‘in-breaking’ of Theme 3 in the Recapitulation, which I will discuss in more detail below). However, it is in the finale’s gigantic coda where the real synthesis takes place. This culminating section is roughly

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<sup>24</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 429.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 425.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 429.

equal in size to the rest of the finale, and witnesses the re-emergence not only of many of the work's themes, but also their corresponding ambience and temporality: the coda's bridge-like opening, with its re-surfacing of Theme 3 and motif  $\gamma$  (see also Ex. 2.5a below) simultaneously evokes the lyric soundworld of the *Andante*, for instance. Other particularly noteworthy examples of cyclic re-surfacing include: the reappearance of the third movement's transition material just before Figure 65, which immediately gives way to a fragmentary re-surfacing of the head-motif of Theme 1; the wonderfully expansive cyclic recall of Theme 3 at Figure 67; a rhapsodically drawn-out variant of cell  $\chi$  (again, see Ex. 2.5a) in the build-up to Figure 70; or the many fleeting reminders of the ascending filled-fifth motif that is central to Themes 6 and 8 in both the strings and the piano.

**Table 2.1:** Table outlining formal and thematic structure of the *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29.

Movement	Section	Main thematic material	
I. (I.) Con moto molto moderato –	Exposition	Themes 1 & 2; anticipation of Theme 3	
	<i>transition</i>		
	Development (brief)	Themes 1 & 2 (plus variants)	
	Recapitulation	Themes 1 & 2	
(II.) Andante sostenuto e cantabile	<i>transition</i>	Theme 3	
	A	Theme 3	
	B (A <sub>1</sub> ?)	Theme 4	
	A	Theme 3	
	<i>Fugato</i> (A <sub>2</sub> ?)	Theme 4	
	<i>Lyrical</i> (A <sub>3</sub> ?)	Themes 3 & 4	
	<i>Dramatic restatement</i> (A)	Theme 3	
	<i>Disintegration</i>	Theme 1 (motif $\delta$ ), Theme 3	
	Coda	Variations on motif $\delta$	
II. (III.) Vivace, ma non troppo –	A	: Theme 5 :  : Theme 5a :	
	B	a	Theme 6
		b ( <i>Waltz</i> )	( <i>Theme Z</i> )
	a <sub>1</sub>	Themes 3, 4 & 6	
	A (truncated)	Theme 5 (very brief reminder)	
Più tranquillo –	<i>transition</i>		
	C	Theme 7	
A tempo I –	<i>transition</i>		
	A <sub>1</sub>	Th. 5    Th. 5a    (no repeats)	
	B <sub>1</sub>	c ( <i>quasi fugato</i> )	
		b ( <i>Waltz</i> )	( <i>Theme Z</i> )
a <sub>2</sub>	Theme 3 (brief reminder)		
Più tranquillo –	<i>transition</i>		
	C <sub>1</sub>	Theme 7	
(IV.) L'istesso tempo	<i>transition</i>		
	Bridge / Intro.	Motif $\beta$ vars., cell $\chi$ , Theme 6	
	Exposition	Themes 8 (Theme 6 var.) & 9	
	Development	Themes 5, 6, 8 & 9	
	Recapitulation	Themes 8 & 9, and 3 (briefly)	
Coda	<i>Synthesis</i>		

My suggestion (above) that melody could be regarded as the substratum to many of Enescu's more complex thematic and polyphonic processes is no less true in the case of the Piano Quintet. The work's formal ambiguity is in part derived from the extraordinary sense of fluidity and unpredictability in the melodic writing (and by extension, from the density of the polyphonic writing), which, architecturally, becomes increasingly fundamental to so much of Enescu's later music. Often, thematic material is varied before it is even recognised as thematic; there is very little literal repetition throughout the piece; and most significantly, the material seems entirely self-generated. Indeed, most of the thematic interest of the first movement (and consequently most of the rest of the work) grows out of the initial theme. Bentoiu and others have rightly identified that this comprises five important motifs, illustrated as part of the example below.

**Example 2.5a:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29: I. Opening theme motifs.

The image displays five musical motifs from the opening theme of the Piano Quintet, Op. 29, I. Each motif is presented on a single staff of music in treble clef with a key signature of one sharp (F#).  
 - Motif  $\alpha$  is shown in two parts: the first part consists of a half note G4, a quarter note A4, a quarter note B4, and a quarter note C5; the second part consists of a quarter note D5, a quarter note E5, a quarter note F#5, and a quarter note G5.  
 - Motif  $\beta$  consists of a quarter note G4, a quarter note A4, a quarter note B4, and a quarter note C5.  
 - Motif  $\gamma$  consists of a quarter note G4, a quarter note A4, and a quarter note B4.  
 - Motif  $\chi$  consists of a quarter note G4, a quarter note A4, a quarter note B4, and a quarter note C5.  
 - Motif  $\delta$  is shown in two parts: the first part consists of a quarter note G4, a quarter note A4, a quarter note B4, and a quarter note C5; the second part consists of a quarter note D5, a quarter note E5, a quarter note F#5, and a quarter note G5.

Tracing how each of the work's subsequent themes relates to the opening theme, and to each other, suggests that Enescu's process of derivation becomes more complex, more nuanced, and fundamentally more allusive as more themes appear (Ex. 2.5b). Note how a variant of motif  $\alpha$  is already tacked on to the end of the sequential repeat of motif  $\delta$  in Theme 1 (see the last three notes of the fifth motif in Ex. 2.5a), or how the rocking major 2<sup>nd</sup> tail of Theme 3 (labelled  $\varphi$ )

is adopted by Theme 4 (this same motivic gesture is used to gently tail off the second movement). By the time we encounter Theme 9, it is possible to point to several potential thematic influences, although it is difficult to state which themes exactly, due to their shared motivic affinities.

**Example 2.5b:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29: Main themes with motivic affinities (*continued next page*).

**Theme 2**

**Theme 3**

**Theme 4**

**Theme 5**

**Theme 6**

**Theme 7**

### Theme 8

### Theme 9

By generating newer variants out of preceding variants, Enescu's thematic process has less to do with the mere variation of an idea that recedes further into the past, and rather more to do with the constant reshaping and reinvigorating of the present-just-past (or recent past), as a condition not just of our perceived present, but likewise of the anticipated future (this has a significant impact on the extent to which Enescu is able to facilitate a satisfactory sense of goal-directed closure, as I will discuss in the next part of this chapter). For instance, the way Theme 8 evolves out of Theme 6 (which itself is a development on Theme 5 – which is essentially a more dynamic variant of Theme 3), makes it seem, initially, more like a variation of earlier material, only gradually becoming thematically assertive. This process of gradual emergence, or thematic crystallisation, is similarly suggested by Theme 3's anticipation (or 'embedding') just five pages into the piece (before we even encounter Theme 2; see the second violin and viola parts at Figure 4, bars 6–8). At first hearing, we perceive this 'anticipation', which contains Theme 3's rhythmically augmented variant of motif  $\beta$  and melodic variant of motif  $\alpha$  (spanning a perfect fifth as opposed to an augmented fifth), as little more than an expansion of the material comprising Theme 1 (compare the second motif in Ex. 2.5a with Theme 3 in Ex. 2.5b). Further sequential repetitions of motif  $\beta$  alongside the motif  $\alpha$  variant later in the movement suggest the gradual hardening, or coalescing of an idea, so that by the time we hear the theme in the slower tempo and generally lower tessitura of the *Andante sostenuto e cantabile*, it already seems familiar to us (although as I discussed in the last chapter, this process of embedding and subsequent remembering relies very much on the extent to which the melodic material is made memorable in the first place, and on the listener's capacity to connect past

images with present perceptions – effectively, to recognise past materials in their transformed state). Enescu borrows aspects of Theme 1, reimagines them, and looks ahead to when those transformations might become meaningful (especially in a different affective or temporal context). In that sense, his thematic processes are emblematic of Bergson’s notion of a persisting, or enduring past (which he describes as the ‘survival of past images’). The extent, moreover, to which we recognise (or fail to recognise) past materials through their various thematic and polyphonic transmutations contributes to the temporally disorientating quality which underpins Enescu’s processes.

In a similar way, Theme 4 only becomes discernible gradually, through the congealing of two motivic variants,  $\alpha$  and  $\varphi$ . The way Enescu controls the theme’s appearance is again significant for the sense of continuity it brings about. In its initial, still inchoate form (at Figure 18 in the score, and appearing as I have notated it in Ex. 2.5b, in the first violin and viola), ‘Theme 4’ is perceived as merely transitional: it is too closely related to extant motivic material to be considered thematically substantial, or gesturally significant. A condensed variant of the motif  $\alpha$  component of the theme, together with another variant of motif  $\varphi$  makes up the fugato theme that begins in the viola at Figure 20 (the start of the *Fugato* vignette, as indicated in Table 2.1). The incessant circularity of this section is as much a process of familiarisation as it is a way of creating temporal ‘stasis’, which contrasts so emphatically with the lyrically expansive vignettes which follow, and which contain further fleeting reminders of Theme 4’s melodic contour. When we encounter Theme 4 in the second half of the *Lyrical* vignette (at Figure 24), the rhapsodic characterisation seems like affirmation of the theme’s crystallisation; ‘dawning’ recognition finally gives way to an assertive restatement.

What allows us to perceive, or recognise both Themes 3 and 4 is the way we experience them through time. We could easily identify where Theme 4 first appears retrospectively (or by locating it in the score), but this would not take into consideration the significant role that time plays in our understanding of what makes this theme meaningful. Its qualitative emergence over time is also what helps to create a coherent strand across a set of affectively discontinuous vignettes. However, the sense of continuity underpinning the emergence of Themes 3 and 4 is not merely the result of a spontaneous or arbitrary melodic transformation which is then reabsorbed in the present; nor is this strictly a case of primary remembering, since these thematic ‘embeddings’ take place at the periphery of our perceptual field and only gradually come into focus. There is a vital and dynamic temporal dimension through which these staggered thematic inceptions occur, in other words: they are perceived (to the extent that they

are perceived) as taking place *through* time (with anticipatory processes linking past and future), but also – and necessarily – through various fleeting or dawning moments of recognition (which of course continue to play a part in later sections of the work, as we re-encounter various thematic variants). Remembering here is characterised as both continuous and discontinuous; it can be perceived as a drawn-out experiential phenomenon and it can manifest itself suddenly. One can also observe that our perception of these and other themes' gradual coalescence points likewise to the relational aspect of memory. Indeed, memory is fallible insofar as what we recall is always changeable, and therefore in some sense reimagined (recollection, we might recall, is always liable to transformation); the music is likewise suggestive of this mental process.

The allusive means by which Enescu constructs his thematic language is witnessed further by the way he extends and develops his themes' melodic lines. The manner of this melodic development is reliant on a kind of thematic 'outgrowth': familiar contours are 'remembered' or evoked through variation within the continuing melodic line, seemingly revitalising the memory of the past within the unfolding present. Themes 7 and 9 proceed by recycling several thematic elements, often simultaneously (Examples 2.6a and 2.6b). Arguably, we sooner perceive these elements as part of the variational outgrowth of the melodic line as opposed to a genuinely interruptive kind of cyclic re-surfacing (the technique responds more readily, in other words, to Taylor's notion of 'transformative' cyclicism). However, this does not necessarily account for the potentially disruptive effect of recognising past material (even partially), which can delay the listener even as the melodic line continues its unfolding (motif  $\chi$  certainly has this effect in both the examples below).

Consequently, while a distinction can be made between Enescu's method of continuous thematic evolution and the marked intrusion of earlier themes in a more genuinely interruptive sense (which calls to mind Taylor's own distinction between recalling and transformative cyclicism), it seems also that Enescu's processes might just as often occupy a conceptual space between these two categories. Even within the continual unfolding of a melodic line, Enescu plays with the degree to which re-cycled material might stop us briefly in our tracks, or simply appear as an inevitable consequence of the melody's variational outgrowth. In other words, sometimes these melodic reminders seem more interruptive, at other times less so. Enescu is less like Beethoven or even Franck in that respect, in the sense that for these other composers the idea of return almost always has more of a deliberate signifying intent (Tchaikovsky does this in exaggerated fashion, creating an explicit signifying gesture out of the 'Fate' motif's

various recurrences in the Fourth Symphony, for instance); Enescu's altogether more permeable and allusive re-surfacings seem to sidestep this kind of deliberate intentionality.

**Example 2.6a:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement. Theme 7 outgrowth in first violin (Figure 39–5 – Figure 39+6).

**Example 2.6b:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29, 4<sup>th</sup> movement. Theme 9 outgrowth in first violin (Figure 54–2 – Figure 54+9).

The momentary intrusion, or inbreaking of a variant of Theme 3 in the Finale's recapitulation is very much an example in the Beethovenian mould of interruptive returns, however (Ex. 2.7). Moreover, this brief re-surfacing has the power to immediately draw our attention, much like the way a sudden, involuntary memory might. The recollection (in the first violin, in the bar before Figure 58) brings with it not only a reminder of Theme 3's affective mood (which simultaneously pre-empts the imminent recapitulation of the introspective Theme 9, which resumes at Figure 58), but also its earlier temporality, so that the juxtaposition of progressive and lyric time results in a sort of temporal clash: the lyric temporality of the remembered past is brought into conflict with the progressively orientated present, through memory. This clash points to an understanding of memory consistent with the view (first realised by the Romantics) that the past could not simply be reunited with the present by a process of remembering; instead, remembering encapsulated a realisation of the distance that had to be traversed to recall an earlier, now absent state of being.<sup>27</sup> Such modes of remembering find parallels, moreover, with

<sup>27</sup> George Sand described remembering as the realisation of 'all the distance that has to be crossed in order to discern...the dark, remote, and mysterious being of memory'. Similarly, the space between the past and present resembles 'a sort of dead duration, a kind of negative time composed of destruction and absence, an existence finished'. See Monelle (2000), 115.

Enescu's cultural geographical situation: temporal distance readily translates in terms of narratives of displacement and marginality (in the sense that a lost past is often equated with a kind of uprooting or deracination – the loss of a home, or the struggle to belong somewhere). This fundamental division between past and present (where the past is treated as ontologically separate from the present) accounts for the sense of rupture that memory can bring about. Indeed, the strength, or clarity of Theme 3's recollection (its 'mode of givenness', as Casey would put it) arguably rests less on the vaguely familiar melodic contour, and more on its affective and temporal quality – its conflictive elements, in other words, which are further underpinned by the abrupt harmonic shift to the minor. In a moment, it is over, and we press onwards with Theme 9, with the memory of the intrusion undoubtedly still lingering and shadowing our present.

**Example 2.7:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, Theme 3 re-surfacing, Figure 58–2 – Figure 58+2.

The musical score for Example 2.7 is presented in five systems. The first system contains the staves for Violin I (Vln. I), Violin II (Vln. II), Viola (Vla.), and Violoncello (Vc.). The second system contains the Piano (Pno.) part. The third system contains the Violin I part. The fourth system contains the Violin II, Viola, and Violoncello parts. The fifth system contains the Piano part. The score is in G major (two sharps) and 6/4 time. It features various dynamics including *sempre ff*, *pf*, *bf con ardore*, *mf*, and *p*. Performance instructions include *8va* and *V*. The score includes a boxed number '58' in the bottom left of the fifth system. The Piano part features complex rhythmic patterns with triplets and quintuplets.

While we may well consider the Quintet as an example of cyclic form purely on the basis of the thematic synthesis that takes place in the fourth movement coda, this does not really take into account the highly-nuanced means by which earlier thematic and motivic material is brought in and out of focus (not just in the expansive final-movement coda, but throughout the work). As I have already implied, a general failing of cyclic form as a designation would seem to be its incapacity to distinguish between variously allusive degrees of thematic incorporation, and the effect these allusive processes might have on the listener's perceptual faculties (thematic meaning, or the degree to which a melodic gesture is perceived or *felt* as thematically meaningful, is by degrees elusive, emergent, or plainly evident; this is to say nothing of the various mnemonic modes – reminiscing, recollecting, and so on – through which cyclic reappearances may occur). More importantly perhaps as far my current investigation is concerned is the way that memory and perception together might contribute to a temporal experience of the music's cyclic processes which is marked simultaneously by continuities and discontinuities. This is remarked upon least often when it comes to considerations of cyclicism in music, yet it seems to be an aspect of cyclic writing and musical remembering more generally to which Enescu is very much drawn. This is particularly evident in the way he constructs his finales: here, the memory of earlier material is used to create a long-range synthesis of thematic ideas (thereby creating a sense of continuity between past and present), but the very means by which Enescu frames his cyclic re-surfacings also creates the potential for temporal disruption or discontinuity.

#### THE SENSE OF AN ENDING<sup>28</sup>

The emergence of the Piano Quintet's second theme (in the opening movement) provides another example of how Enescu constructs permeable discontinuities between sections or movements (as I explored at the outset of this chapter). Moreover, the theme itself (which begins at the upbeat to Figure 6 in the score; see Ex. 2.8) gives melodic expression to another of those seemingly timeless landscapes which are a quintessential marker of Enescu's compositional style. The transition into this new thematic region is marked by a slowing of tempo and harmonic rhythm, but ultimately it is characterised by a feeling of open-endedness. The piano's gradually dwindling, chromatically elaborated peroration in the bars leading up to Figure 6 eventually

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<sup>28</sup> The title here refers to the literary scholar Frank Kermode's well-known *The Sense of an Ending: Studies in the Theory of Fiction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967). It has also been used by Julian Barnes for his novel *The Sense of an Ending* (London: Vintage, 2012) – a meditative study on remembering and forgetting; and it likewise appears as a sub-heading in Michael Puri's own chapter on cyclicism in Ravel. See Puri (2011), 33.

settles – it would seem almost arbitrarily – on an open fifth of D/A, but the rise to the B (in the right hand, just before the fermata) seems to ask a question. We are immediately curious as to what will follow. After the pause, the delicate, muted *piano* line in the violins, accompanied by gently decorative tremolos and flourishes in the piano furnish a moment of exquisite beauty.

**Example 2.8:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29, 1<sup>st</sup> movement, second subject (Theme 2) emergence, Figure 6–4 – Figure 6+4 (continued next page).

The musical score is presented in two systems. The first system includes staves for Violin I (Vln. I), Violin II (Vln. II), Viola (Vla.), Violoncello (Vc.), and Piano (Pno.). The second system includes staves for Violin I, Violin II, Viola, Violoncello, and Piano. The score features various dynamics, articulations, and performance instructions such as "più tranquillo", "f dolce", "dim.", "mf dim.", "mettez vite la sourdine", "mettez la sourdine", "bf cant. flessibile dim.", "mf", "rit.", "a tempo I", "grazioso", "delicatamente", "p", "mp", "pp", "harm.", and "6".

The music is made memorable by the way it was prepared, and by the way it resumed its own unfolding within a harmonically static landscape. Indeed, when the second subject (or Theme 2) begins at Figure 6 our attentive consciousness seems occupied entirely with the present moment; our focus seems occupied with an extended ‘now’, a qualitative state of presence that does not look beyond itself. The passage is an ideal example of what Bergson described as the durational quality of lived time, which I will explore in greater depth in part four of this chapter. In technical terms, this extended present is created by syntactic and semantic features of the music – or more accurately, by syntactic features which acquire semantic load.<sup>29</sup> Syntactically, we can point to the loosening and blurring of metre, and the meandering simplicity and circularity of the melody, played in octaves in the violin and viola. The piano’s purely decorative oscillations and sweeps are asemantic, in that they do not necessarily signify temporal meaning (although such gestures can, and do in Enescu, acquire a signifying capacity by means of association and conventionalisation, as we will see). The lack of thematic or semantic interest in the piano (which is already observed in the aimless peroration leading up to the fermata) does focus our attention on the melody, however. This acquires semantic weight by its circularity and resulting sense of continuity, which helps eliminate any sense of directionality or goal-directed narrative.

<sup>29</sup> For Raymond Monelle, ‘every temporal feature of [music’s] syntax is available to signify some temporal meaning. We are apt to find often in music...that syntactic features acquire semantic load, by indexicality’. Monelle also stresses, however, that ‘musical syntax does not necessarily carry semantic weight’, and that ‘the failure to distinguish syntactic and semantic temporality has led to much confusion in the temporal theory of music’. This is the grounds for his criticism of Jonathan Kramer, and others, who fail to identify that ‘ordinary components of musical time’ such as tempo, metre, rhythm, phrasing, and closure, are ‘chiefly syntactic features, not necessarily linked to any semantic level’. Monelle (2000), 83–84. See also note 6.

The timeless, lyric states that Enescu conjures (most often in his middle and / or opening movements) in other words create the sense that there is no culmination point in sight; we are content to lose ourselves in an extended present (or, as Proust puts it, somewhere ‘in between’ the past and present). The music in these sections might therefore be described as anti-teleological, although this term needs clarifying. Leonard Meyer describes anti-teleological music as ‘directionless, unkinetic art’, which ‘arouses no expectation, except presumably that it will stop’, while Jonathan Kramer labels such music ‘non-linear’, in the sense that it suspends forward momentum.<sup>30</sup> Enescu’s music might indeed at times seem directionless, both in the lyric temporalities it explores or by the fact that it so frequently encourages a kind of ‘listening-in-the-moment’, as opposed to long-range processual listening.<sup>31</sup> But it is rarely, if ever, ‘unkinetic’. No music could ever be truly static (notwithstanding some of the attempts made in the field of electronic music in the second half of the twentieth century), but even in passages of drastically contained movement, such as those moments of attenuation, or in the recurring ‘oscillating octaves’ gesture, there is at least some sense of corporeal mobility. The piano’s aimless meandering in Example 2.8 contributes to the sense of lyric timelessness evoked by this passage, but it is hardly immobile: the gentle, vamp-like oscillations, sweeps, spread chords, and rhythmically heterogeneous ornamental patterns are all registered as habitual or eminently ‘pianistic’ gestures; while they may come across as directionless in a teleological sense, they undoubtedly communicate a kinaesthetic or tactile mode of bodily motion and physical involvement.

While never entirely immobile, Enescu’s timeless lyric states (or indeed his cyclic re-surfacing of lyric themes) do contribute to a sense of non-linearity that has numerous implications for the structural coherence of his works, especially those that employ generic forms traditionally associated with goal-directedness, climax, or resolution of tensions. This seems a most pressing issue in the case of Enescu’s finales, which (as I noted earlier) often represent a radical shift in mood compared with the movements immediately preceding them. From a listening perspective, it is notable that this reorientation rarely manages to break the

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<sup>30</sup> Leonard Meyer, *Music, the Arts, and Ideas: Patterns and Predictions in Twentieth-Century Culture* (University of Chicago Press, 1967), 72; Kramer (1988), 20. See also note 6.

<sup>31</sup> That it does so would seem to strengthen the arguments of such theorists as Jerrold Levinson, who has claimed that our apprehension of musical form when listening to music is derived from ‘moment-to-moment’ experiences, rather than through some conceptualisation of a structural whole. I would suggest that as much as Enescu’s processes might uphold such a view, the various richly allusive means by which past material is brought back in this music can simultaneously prompt the listener to create conceptual links across larger temporal spans (and even, as I suggested in Chapter One, between works). See Levinson, *Music in the Moment* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).

spell (at least initially) of what was just experienced (despite Enescu's attempts at facilitating a permeable kind of transition). It is also often the case that these final movements are either interspersed with lyric sections that effectively curtail any sense of progressive motion, or they reincorporate themes which were first heard within the temporal lyricism of earlier movements (the Piano Quintet's cyclic re-surfacing of materials effectively does both). The remembering of these themes, or more accurately the pre-cognitive memory of how these themes affected us in the past, can in turn inflect the way we experience subsequent dynamic variants. This is particularly evident in works like the Second Piano Quartet or the Third Piano Sonata, each of whose finales present thematic variants that apparently struggle to escape the memory of an introspective and intensely expressive past. The Third Piano Sonata's finale makes a feature of this dilemma, as we have already seen (Ex. 2.1), by opening with an ostinato which contains a fragmentary re-surfacing of the middle movement's secondary theme. As a concession to memory's capacity for resituating us affectively within the past, Enescu then poignantly interrupts the ostinato's dynamic unfolding with an explicit and unexpected recollection of the *Andantino*'s primary theme. This kind of relapse into the previous movement's immersive lyricism occurs throughout the Sonata's finale, and it takes the re-surfacing of the opening movement's propulsive main theme (initially in the minor, at 31/I/4) to galvanise a sense of end-orientated motion. It is worth noting, too, that since the middle movement's main theme is itself a transformed recollection of material from the Sonata's opening movement (specifically, the second subject area), Enescu can likewise draw on the memory of this more vigorous thematic incarnation as part of his re-surfacing of the *Andantino*'s lyric themes in the finale. This is precisely what happens towards the end of the recapitulation (Ex. 2.9), where a highly impassioned and increasingly frenetic rendering of the *Andantino* theme (in octaves, interspersed by chromatic runs) eventually collapses into the coda.

**Example 2.9:** *Third Piano Sonata*, Op. 24, No. 3, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, Theme 2 re-surfacing prior to Coda  
(continued next page).

The image shows a musical score for piano, likely from a 20th-century work. It features two staves: a treble clef staff and a bass clef staff. The key signature has two sharps (F# and C#). The time signature changes from 3/2 to 3/4. Above the staves, there are tempo markings: a dotted quarter note equals 108 (♩ = 108) and a quarter note equals 138 (♩ = 138). The score includes various musical notations such as triplets (marked '3'), slurs, and dynamic markings: *sff frenetico*, *p non troppo legato*, and *cresc.*. There is also a marking 'sub.' with a slur over a triplet. The music appears to be a chromatic descent in the final bar.

The music at this point simply disintegrates into a registrally displaced chromatic descent (see the final bar of the example); on the page, it looks as if the notes themselves have become scattered, or blown apart.

By contrast, the Second Piano Quartet cannot draw on the memory of earlier, more propulsive material in the same way, for the obvious reason that the opening and middle movements are too similar in character. So while Enescu handles the temporal reorientation at the start of the Quartet’s finale in characteristically nuanced fashion (by reshaping the melodic material into a series of short, questioning phrases, which ascend in pitch over the course of a gradual *accelerando* – see Ex. 2.10), the familiarity of the thematic material here is nevertheless such that it is very difficult to disengage ourselves from the memory of its former lyricism and intense expressivity (the fleeting – yet jarring – reminder of Theme 3 in the recapitulation of the Piano Quintet’s finale, discussed above, serves a very similar function). My thoughts very much echo those of Bentoiu’s in that respect, when he writes that ‘after the affective depth progressively attained in the first two movements (not very dissimilar, since one prepares the other), the counteracting, essentially volitional activity of the last movement does not quite succeed, in spite of the oversize dimensions of the respective movement, in restoring a satisfactory spiritual equilibrium. (...) Listening to the Piano Quartet has left me each time – after the stormy finale – with a feeling that the real essence of the work had been exhausted in the infinite nostalgia of the slow movements’.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>32</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 434. Bentoiu has similar misgivings about the Second Cello Sonata, claiming: ‘I still cannot cope well, in spite of many readings and hearings, with a certain stylistic unevenness I experience at the moment of transition from the slow movement to [the] “Finale à la Roumaine” (362).

Example 2.10: *Second Piano Quartet*, Op. 30, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, piano part opening bars.

**Con moto moderato** (♩=120)      **accelerando poco a poco** -----

Pno. *p*      *cresc. poco a poco*      *sempre cresc.*

----- **al** ----- **Allegro agitato** (♩=152)

38      *p sub.*      *molto cresc.*

*f*

To escape the associations of a work's slower movements even while persisting with recognisable (albeit varied) thematic material is the challenge that Enescu sets himself in his finales. Elsewhere in his analyses, Bentoiu repeatedly remarks upon 'Enescu's extraordinary power...of investing with sense any series of intervals, as imagined at a certain time'.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, the insistence that any melodic contour can be invested with an affective sense that is

<sup>33</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 426.

fundamentally changeable is evidently what underpins Enescu's thematic processes, despite the difficulties this presents from the perspective of a theme's enduring affective continuity. The temporal contrast that he sets up between movements is as much an indication of the degree of change that must be negotiated for his materials to become transformed (or be rid of their affective associations) over time. This correspondingly is what helps to enable some directed sense of closure, which Enescu facilitates in two main ways. Firstly, the long-range cyclic re-surfacing of (often a variety of) materials precipitates a kind of thematic apotheosis which can readily be understood in terms of an organic climax. Indeed, Enescu often seems to rely on a superfluity of thematic re-surfacings to combat the non-linearity brought about by these recyclings in the first place. Secondly, Enescu not only varies but exhausts his thematic materials, stripping them as much as possible of their affective resonance in order to force closure. These finales need to 'earn' their sense of home, and the process is invariably hard-fought (although this does depend on the degree of contrast between the finale and preceding movements, and the extent to which these finales oscillate between contrasting temporalities). The Piano Quintet exemplifies this. Indeed, the frequency (or density) of cyclic re-surfacing that is encountered in the Quintet's finale, and especially in the coda, is at times quite staggering. I have already drawn attention to a few extended instances of cyclic recall; a closer look at one of these examples helps to demonstrate the occasionally bewildering complexity of these apotheotic re-surfacings. The passage in the coda from around Figure 64 (which is preceded by a re-surfacing of Theme 7 mingled with Theme 3) to a few bars after Figure 65 (see Ex. 2.11) demonstrates this well: in the first two bars of the example the strings' expansive melodic phrase (largely in octaves) is gesturally similar to some of the more broadly rendered variants of Theme 3 encountered in the second movement (such as at Figure 19); in the piano, meanwhile, we encounter chordal variants of motif  $\beta$ , which, when outlining a minor scale, closely resemble Theme 6, and when appearing as a major scale, recall Theme 8 (bars 2–5); the characteristic dotted rhythm of cell  $\chi$  is prominent in the strings in bar 3, giving way to a diatonic variant of motif  $\alpha$ ; this variant spawns a rhythmically stretched re-surfacing of the tail (motif  $\varphi$ ) of Theme 3 (bars 6–7); in bars 8–10 the first violin offers motivic snippets of material initially encountered in the introductory section of the finale (the quaver movement in bars 8–9 and the semiquaver pattern in bar 10 correspond directly to the material in the eighth and ninth bars of Figure 51 – which are essentially a variational outgrowth of Theme 6), while the piano once again presents variations on motif  $\beta$ ; lastly, the bar before Figure 65 (particularly the triplet rhythm alongside the scotch snap figure) recalls the transitional material encountered each time

directly before the appearance of Theme 7 in the third movement (after Figures 38 and 47; see also Table 2.1), but this time giving way to a rhapsodic re-surfacing of Theme 4 (Figure 65.ff).

**Example 2.11:** *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29, 4<sup>th</sup> movement, thematic apotheosis, Figure 64 – Figure 65.

The musical score is divided into two main sections, Figure 64 and Figure 65. Figure 64 (measures 64-80) is marked 'a tempo, un poco largamente' and 'pesante'. It features a 'poco allarg.' section. The dynamics range from *sff* to *ff*. Figure 65 (measures 81-90) is marked 'a tempo I' and 'con calore'. It features a 'poco allarg.' section. The dynamics range from *mf cresc.* to *ff*. The piano part has a prominent triplet rhythm.

Such intricately woven thematic and motivic re-surfacings throughout the Piano Quintet's coda allow Enescu to play with the disorientating quality that remembering in general can provoke (indeed in passages like this one, the point is not that each motivic re-surfacing is perceptible by the listener – identifying these returns of material is in this instance more genuinely an analytical exercise – but that the listener is left feeling overwhelmed or disorientated by the experience). This 'constructed bewilderment' is intensified by an overriding sense of temporal ambiguity, with the music shifting fluidly between or combining lyric re-surfacings with more progressively orientated sections to create an occasionally quite perplexing yet remarkably allusive thematic tapestry. This is less concealment, as we saw in earlier parts of the Quintet (and in other works besides), and more a case of sheer plenitude of remembered ideas: a kind of 'total presence', as Jankélévitch would claim, in which near and far, past and future, are called upon simultaneously in the present moment.<sup>34</sup> Notable too is the amount of string writing which appears in unison or in octaves. The focus on melodic content here helps to highlight the extent to which Enescu's cyclic processes are underpinned by a conceptual strategy which aligns long-range melodic continuity with a simultaneous propensity for melodic transformation (as discussed earlier). Indeed, in this final movement it is often as if the music unfolds according to the apparently spontaneous melodic remembering of earlier themes and motifs; the degree of unpredictability within the melodic line as well as the sheer profusion of re-emergent ideas gives the section a stream-of-consciousness feel (which in a sense is not unlike the 'passive' mode that I identified earlier as a feature of Enescu's more contemplative movements, but obviously this takes place in a very different temporal context). While this superfluity of motivic and thematic recycling may well contribute to an apothecic climax, beyond this Enescu still faces the dilemma of how best to provide closure to an extended section (or, indeed, an entire work) which, through its highly ambitious synthesis of past and present, is always effectively looking backwards. Admittedly, this risks a slightly simplistic reading, for it is not merely that Enescu's finales are 'stuck' in the past, or that the past is merely treated as some temporal obverse of the present; his processes, which evoke a constant shifting of temporality and affect, are invariably more complex and intertwined than this. Rather, the constant remembering of past materials in the present (remembering is an activity we do *now*) effectively creates an open-endedness towards the future. When remembering, we reside in a state of potentiality or possibility (we might recall once more Proust's description of remembering as somehow finding himself between past and present, or out of time; this 'in-

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<sup>34</sup> See Chapter 3 ('La Présence Totale'), in Jankélévitch (1976), particularly 143–177.

between-ness' opens on to a contiguous but similarly unbounded future). Much of Enescu's music evokes this dynamic state: a state of flux in which the spontaneous remembering of a seemingly unbounded past (involuntary remembering is remarkable precisely because it strongly suggests that any aspect of our forgotten past can ultimately be recalled) opens on to a future of correspondingly infinite possibility. Looking at it another way, we could state that the durational aspect of remembering (we remember *now*, and through a subsequent string of 'nows') means that the past spills into our future. As Casey puts it, 'thanks to its thick autonomy, remembering here *reminders* itself' (in similar terms, Proust writes elsewhere that the past 'project[s] in front of me that shadow of itself which we call our future').<sup>35</sup> It is in this sense that the future is made possible, moreover: 'we make the future possible precisely by envisaging it in terms of the past we bear in the viscosity of the present, allowing its remanence to arise in an act of foreshadowing what might be. In contrast with the purely possible that is projected in imagining, however, "what might be" is here a function of what has been and thus of the thickness of the past as it comes to bear on the present and on the future'.<sup>36</sup> Ultimately, an openness to the future is likewise what helps to keep the past alive (it is precisely in these terms, in fact, that Jankélévitch theorises a more positive definition of nostalgia: as a kind of openness to the limitless freedom brought about by the possibility of future remembering).<sup>37</sup> As Casey concludes: 'memory moves us as surely into the realm of what shall be as it moves us back to what has been; by extracting what is indeterminately lasting from the latter, it allows the former to come to us'.<sup>38</sup>

One could say that it is precisely this 'indeterminately lasting' aspect of what we have already experienced in the music that makes Enescu's cyclic re-surfacings (and, indeed, his constantly evolving thematic transformations) seem as if they point towards an open-ended rather than end-orientated future. Similarly, if cyclicism in music came about as an attempt on the part of modern artists to evoke or emphasise the non-linearity of lived time, or effectively to re-

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<sup>35</sup> Casey (2000), 277; Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, Vol. 2: In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*, trans. James Grieve (Penguin, 2002), 395.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 278. Casey supports his observations by citing a passage from Jacques Lacan, which is worth reproducing: 'what is realized in my history is not the past definite of what was, since it is no more, nor even the present perfect of what has been in what I am, but the future anterior of what I shall have been for what I am in the process of becoming'. See Lacan, trans. A. Sheridan, *Écrits* (New York: Norton, 1977), 86.

<sup>37</sup> It is quite striking, too, that Jankélévitch should equate what he describes as 'open nostalgia' ('nostalgie ouverte') with an openness toward the 'distant homeland' ('la patrie lointaine') – given the obvious parallels this has with Enescu's own cultural geographical situation. Jankélévitch was himself the son of Russian Jewish émigrés to France, and in that respect his situation is perhaps comparable to Enescu's, thereby lending an intriguingly textured backdrop to their overlapping conceptions of musical and lived time. See Jankélévitch, *L'Irréversible et la nostalgie* (Paris: Flammarion, 1974), especially 360–367.

<sup>38</sup> Casey (2000), 279.

construct a model of consciousness which can just as easily look backwards as it can forward (and often simultaneously, unpredictably, or involuntarily), then creating a persuasive linear end-point becomes a major compositional issue. Enescu's solution, which involves the eventual exhaustion of his melodic and thematic material, clearly stems from a desire to create a satisfactory sense of closure; evidently, he regards this as a musical and aesthetic imperative. Certainly, Enescu would never have thought of concluding a cyclic work in the way that Ravel concludes his Sonata for Violin and Cello (1920–1922), for instance, which Michael Puri describes in the following terms: 'although the rondo theme seizes the last word in the final two measures of the [sonata], it comes so late that it seems to be more of an ironic concession to conventions of musical closure than an actual resolution of tensions'.<sup>39</sup> In the Piano Quintet's finale, the total plenitude of ideas and temporal contrasts is ultimately deemed unsustainable, and the sense of an ending must be brought about instead by an apotheotic exhaustion of materials (a process not dissimilar to the Schoenbergian 'liquidation' of thematic contents). This relies in part on Enescu's capacity for forcing a change in the signficatory potential of his themes, as already mentioned. A particularly striking example of this can be found in the bars after Figure 62 (Ex. 2.12, below), where a re-surfacing of Theme 9 (mingled with cell  $\chi$ ) appears in a spiky, almost petulant variant, in sharp contrast to its former lyricism (of which we are reminded, in fact, just a couple of pages earlier, after Figure 60).

It is through transformations such as these that Enescu's materials and indeed his forms eventually become spent, or exhausted from within. With content so often dictating and generating form in the Quintet, we find that once that content is exhausted, form on its own cannot sustain the work (a common enough problem when it comes to the use of generic structures like sonata form in the twentieth century). Following an ecstatic A major reaffirmation of a fragmented variant of Theme 8 (centred around the descending major third that comprises the theme's head) at Figure 70, the Piano Quintet ends through increasing fragmentation and a bell-like hollowing-out of motif  $\beta$  in the piano (Example 2.13). Closure is brought about by thematic depletion and a gradual slowing of tactus, until effectively nothing remains to be said. We are left with noise, and the piece concludes with an almost violent hammering in the depths of the piano.

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<sup>39</sup> Puri (2011), 36. As Puri also notes, this is merely one strategy within a 'broad and differentiated practice' (33) of thematic cyclicism in Ravel's works, and we may point to the finale of the Sonata for Violin and Piano (1923–1927) as being closer to Enescu's own exhaustive processes.

Example 2.12: *Piano Quintet*, Op. 29, 4<sup>th</sup> movement, Theme 9 variant, Figure 62–1 – Figure 62+6.

The first system of the musical score includes five staves: Vln. I, Vln. II, Vla., Vc., and Pno. The key signature is three sharps (F#, C#, G#) and the time signature is 6/4. The Vln. I, Vln. II, Vla., and Vc. parts begin with a half note followed by a slur over a triplet of eighth notes. The Pno. part begins with a triplet of eighth notes. The measure number 62 is indicated in a box above the Pno. staff. Performance markings include *al tallone* and *ruvido* above the string parts, and *secco* above the piano part.

The second system of the musical score continues the five staves from the first system. The Vln. I, Vln. II, Vla., and Vc. parts continue with their triplet patterns. The Pno. part continues with its triplet patterns. Performance markings include *secco* and *ff marcatis.* above the string parts, and *secco* and *ff marcatis.* above the piano part. The dynamic marking *bp* (bristly piano) is also present above the string parts.

Example 2.13: Piano Quintet, Op. 29, 4<sup>th</sup> movement, final bars (continued next page).

[a Tempo]

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Pno.

71 *sost. ff*

3

Detailed description: This system of the musical score features five staves. The top four staves are for the string instruments: Violin I, Violin II, Viola, and Violoncello. The bottom staff is for the Piano. The key signature is three sharps (F#, C#, G#) and the time signature is 3/4. The tempo marking is '[a Tempo]'. The first three staves (Vln. I, Vln. II, Vla.) have a 'V' marking above the first measure. The Piano part has a '3' marking over a triplet in the first measure. The measure number '71' is enclosed in a box, followed by the dynamic marking '*sost. ff*'. The system concludes with a fermata over the final notes of the strings and a triplet of eighth notes in the piano part.

Vln. I

Vln. II

Vla.

Vc.

Pno.

71 *poco*

3

Detailed description: This system continues the musical score with five staves. The top four staves are for the string instruments: Violin I, Violin II, Viola, and Violoncello. The bottom staff is for the Piano. The key signature remains three sharps (F#, C#, G#) and the time signature is 3/4. The dynamic marking '*poco*' is placed above the first measure of the string parts. The Piano part has a '3' marking over a triplet in the first measure. The measure number '71' is enclosed in a box, followed by the dynamic marking '*poco*'. The system concludes with a fermata over the final notes of the strings and a triplet of eighth notes in the piano part.

The image displays a musical score for a piano quartet, consisting of four staves: Violin I, Violin II, Viola, and Cello/Double Bass. The score is divided into two main sections. The upper section is marked "a tempo più largamente" and features dynamic markings of *ff* and *fff*. The lower section is marked "allarg." and "ten." (ritardando), with dynamic markings of *fff*. The bottom of the page shows a triplet of eighth notes in the Cello/Double Bass part, with a circled 8 below it.

The Second Piano Quartet concludes in similar fashion, but is even more remarkable for the way it incorporates Enescu’s gesture of ‘static’ oscillating octaves. These appear intermittently throughout the work, and with increased frequency in the finale, each time arresting the sense of forward movement as the music gains in chromatic impetuosity. In the coda, the oscillating octave vamp begins over a tonic pedal five bars before Figure 90, and continues for a whole

fifty-four bars, up to the penultimate bar of the piece. It incorporates one final, slowly unwinding restatement of the Quartet’s opening theme, along with occasional chromatic inflections in the piano and sustained strings. Gradually, however, melody and harmonic dissonances are stripped away, until we are left with nothing but the piano’s oscillating Ds, and held Ds in the strings, as shown in the example below (Ex. 2.14). The octave vamp’s repetitious nature effectively allows it to acquire semantic weight – a process which is aided by the gesture’s increased reiteration throughout the work up to this point. Through conventionalisation, it becomes understood as a temporal gesture signifying lyric, or ‘non-progressive semantic’ time (as Monelle also calls it). The Piano Quartet has increasingly less to say (thematically, discursively), and the attendant sense of muteness is ‘amplified’ by the way the piece is seemingly brought to a temporal halt. The basic rhetorical device of a long-range *crescendo* is the only means left of forcing closure and, as in the Piano Quintet, the Quartet resorts to violence in the sounding of its final cadence.<sup>40</sup>

**Example 2.14:** *Second Piano Quartet*, Op. 30, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, final bars (continued next page).

<sup>40</sup> This seems a common strategy in several of Enescu’s works, as I also discuss in Chapter Three, and it is worth pointing out one more example, beyond the chamber pieces. The Fourth Symphony, which was drafted around the time Enescu wrote his Third Piano Sonata, but which was never completed, is among his most dense and complex scores. Its culminating bars offer a palpable sense of the relief that comes from struggle, and following a final tonic chord, the symphony simply (yet boldly) ends with a sustained unison E, which grows louder after an initial subito piano. The unison functions as an antidote to the complex levels of melodic superimposition witnessed throughout the rest of the work, but gesturally it also seems to wring out the very last of what the symphony can ‘say’. We are left with the most basic of utterances, a kind of muteness relative to the symphony’s polyvocality.

The image displays two systems of musical notation for a piano quartet. The first system consists of three staves (treble, alto, and bass clefs) with dynamic markings *pf*, *f*, *bf*, *ff*, and *bsf*  $<$ . A tempo marking  $\text{♩} = 144$  is present. The second system includes a grand staff (treble and bass clefs) with dynamic markings *pf*, *f*, *bf*, and *ff*, and a boxed measure number 92. Below the grand staff, there are markings for *8<sup>va</sup>* and *8<sup>vb</sup>*. The third system features a grand staff with dynamic markings *più ff*, *sff*, and *fff*, and a tempo marking *a tempo I* ( $\text{♩} = 160$ ). The fourth system continues the grand staff with dynamic markings *più ff*, *fff*, and *fff*, and a tempo marking *a tempo I* ( $\text{♩} = 160$ ). The score concludes with a performance instruction: *ten.* and the date *Sinaia, ce 4 mai 1944*.

Given, however, that we never really escape the affective and temporal connotations of the oscillating octaves gesture, one could state that the Quartet is arguably less successful than the Quintet in providing a satisfactory sense of closure. This has as much to do with the work's

overall structure: whereas the Piano Quartet's finale is preceded by two lyric movements that are similar in character (as Bentoiu also notes), the Piano Quintet employs a larger bipartite structure in which the third movement effectively acts as buffer between the lyric first half and the progressively orientated finale (the sheer size of the coda itself is also a factor when it comes to striking an effective structural balance). To think of either work (and others besides) in terms of success or failure is perhaps missing the point, however. Surely the broader and more relevant issue has to do with the way these finales simultaneously encourage a kind of processual or goal-directed listening while also undermining it. As such, the music engages with and presents a typically modern conception of time as fundamentally non-linear, even while utilising generic forms that are ostensibly linear in their temporal trajectory.<sup>41</sup> It is tempting, in that case, to think of these works as somehow staging a crisis, and in some sense that is true. Aesthetically it never really comes across this way, however: there is certainly very little in the way of anxiety or alienation in these works, for instance, and many of Enescu's finales are noted rather more for their ebullience and sheer resolve (this is especially true of the Piano Quintet, the Second Piano Quartet, the Third Piano Sonata and the Third Violin Sonata). Furthermore, Enescu's processes reveal a different kind of cohering strategy than might otherwise be achieved through an ostensibly linear, teleological trajectory. While cyclicism has commonly been regarded as a means of creating 'synthetic unity' (in d'Indy's words)<sup>42</sup> within a work, Enescu's cyclic re-surfacings and modes of remembering go further still, prompting a dialectical consideration of continuity and discontinuity which I suggest is central to an understanding of how memory operates within lived time. An examination of Henri Bergson's conception of 'duration' and Gaston Bachelard's contrasting notion of 'instantaneity' (alongside an exploration of the concept of 'Becoming') will help to elucidate this dialectic, and reveal the extent to which continuity and discontinuity were contested within theorisations of lived time in the first half of the twentieth century. Ultimately, I aim to show how Enescu's structuring of musical time evokes a post-Bergsonian conception of temporality.

#### DURATION, INSTANTANEITY, BECOMING

In this chapter and in the last, I have observed how in the listener's experience of Enescu's music the extent to which we might recognise melodically familiar material is in one respect

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<sup>41</sup> In his article 'Composing Time: Zeno's Arrow, Hindemith's *Erinnerung*, and Satie's *Instantanéisme*' (*Journal of Musicology*, Vol. 24, Issue 4 (2007), 522–580), David Trippett similarly investigates how differing concepts of non-linear time were explored in certain pieces in the early twentieth century (including Paul Hindemith's *Hin und Zurück* of 1927, and Erik Satie's scoring of René Clair's film *Entr'acte* of 1924).

<sup>42</sup> D'Indy (1909), 376.

purely auditory: on initial listening, it is difficult to hear or perceive a particular thematic variant if submerged within the texture, for instance. But the means by which we perceive (or make meaningful sense of) a thematic variant also seems to draw specifically on the memory of earlier material, so that we retrieve the past simultaneously in our perception of the present. Conceiving of musical time in these terms (which is to say, in rather broad or abstract terms – although Enescu’s allusive motivic processes certainly seem to foreground this experiential phenomenon) recalls Bergson’s claim that ‘perception and recollection...always interpenetrate each other, are always exchanging something of their substance’; similarly, ‘if there be memory, that is, the survival of past images, these images must constantly mingle with our perception of the present, and may even take its place’.<sup>43</sup> In Bergson’s conception of time, memory of the past joins with present perception to give back to the past a sense of the present. Moreover, because the present is always turning into the past, we further require memory in order to prolong it, into what Bergson calls *durée*, or duration. Duration is the central aspect of what is known as Bergsonian intuition, which Bergson himself describes as ‘the form which the succession of our conscious states assumes when our ego lets itself *live*, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states’.<sup>44</sup> The juxtaposition of conscious states, of past and present, is symptomatic, Bergson claims, of a modern understanding of time in terms of space (it is in fact as a counter to earlier philosophical interpretations of the human experience, which drew predominantly on spatial, as opposed to temporal concepts, that Bergson introduces his concept of pure duration). Accordingly, in our real experience of time, change does not take place through juxtaposition, but through the qualitative (and continual) melting of one state into another. It is in these terms that Bergson likewise conceives of music. As Raymond Monelle describes, for Bergson there are ‘no spatial or “side-by-side” events in music. Musical continuity always “melts” into an intuitive unity, or it is not perceived as music’.<sup>45</sup> Indeed, it is striking just how often Bergson analogises temporal continuity by the way we hear, or perceive, melody; pure duration, he asserts, ‘forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting...into one another’.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> Bergson (2011), 70–72 (see also note 70 in Chapter One). Bergson later makes an important distinction between memory as it is perceived in the present, and what he calls ‘pure memory’, where the past appears before us in its entire, undifferentiated multiplicity. Because we cannot perceive it and therefore act on it, the past in this instance is likened to an unconscious dream state (see *Matter and Memory*, 181–202). I return to this notion in Chapter Four.

<sup>44</sup> Henri Bergson, *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*, trans. F. L. Pogson (Allen & Unwin 1910; originally published in French 1889), 100.

<sup>45</sup> Monelle (2000), 87.

<sup>46</sup> Bergson (1910), 100.

Bergson's comparison of time and space has been much criticised, but his real importance, Monelle suggests, lies in his separation of perceived time (our lived experience of time) from measured time (often referred to as 'clock' time). Moreover, 'his intuition that music is heard simultaneously as a gestalt, rather than successively as points on a line, has been widely accepted'.<sup>47</sup> Bergson's intuition regarding the continuous nature of lived time is equally in evidence in the Piano Quintet, as I have already implied: our perception of thematic variants as they appear (and reappear) is constantly linked with the memory (through a variety of mnemonic modes, as I explored in the last chapter) of past variants, so that the past seems prolonged, through duration, into the present.<sup>48</sup> And in the same way that Michael Klein has identified a qualitative melting of one theme into another (specifically through modal shifts) in Debussy's *L'Isle Joyeuse*, we might also point to a qualitative difference in *kind* (as opposed to degree) between the thematic variants in the Quintet as evidence of an intuitive unity.<sup>49</sup> Enescu's permeable juxtapositions, his thematic outgrowths, as well as his constant undermining of a tonal centre (especially by modal means) would further support such a reading.<sup>50</sup>

For some thinkers, however, Bergson's intuitive time-sense does little to account for the experientially variable and contrastingly allusive means by which past and present can be melded together. How do we make sense of the sudden or heightened intensity through which a recollection (thematic or otherwise) is perceived, for instance, or the ways in which remembering can make the familiar seem new once more – aspects which are clearly so crucial to the sensuous means by which Enescu shapes his musical language? This proves to be an essential shortcoming of Bergson's philosophy for Gaston Bachelard, for whom Bergson's 'doctrine of memory remains...a doctrine of the utility of memory'.<sup>51</sup> Duration may contain flashes of insight, but its concern is not with the experiential and imaginative detail of that

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<sup>47</sup> Monelle (2000), 87–88. In fact, this viewpoint may have held true only until recent decades: see note 31, above.

<sup>48</sup> Daniel Grimley likewise draws on this aspect of Bergson's work in his discussion of Frederick Delius's *The Song of the High Hills* (1915), observing that, for Bergson, all human experience is predicated upon a simultaneous 'moving into the past and pushing forward into the future'. Thus, within the durational understanding of experience, 'the mind operates through a constant drift between immediate perception, the memory of past events and experiences that instantaneously shapes such perceptual response, and the expectation of further change or action'. See Grimley, *Delius and the Sound of Place* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 247–248.

<sup>49</sup> See Michael Klein's 'Debussy's *L'Isle Joyeuse* as Territorial Assemblage', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2007), 28–52.

<sup>50</sup> The comparison with Debussy is potentially rather apposite, since we know Bergson identified certain durational aspects in Debussy's writing. However, he did object to the more 'cinematic' juxtapositions of musical material in Debussy – as did Enescu. More broadly, we might justifiably speculate as to how far Bergson's philosophy – which so often uses music as a conceptual means of explaining *durée* – was influenced by the aesthetic conceptions of time explored by French composers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

<sup>51</sup> Gaston Bachelard, *The Poetics of Reverie: Childhood, Language, and the Cosmos*, trans. Daniel Russell (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971; originally published as *La Poétique de la Rêverie* by Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 115–116.

insight. This, Bachelard contends, can only be rediscovered through a conception of time that is founded on the creative instant. The reality of time is in the present, and it is in the present instant alone that our conscious being experiences reality – the rest, against which it is juxtaposed, Bachelard implies, is artificial. The importance of reinforcing the isolation of the instant serves to emphasise the rupture of being that it constitutes, and it is ‘in the experience of a certain rupture of being that the idea of discontinuity imposes itself’.<sup>52</sup>

For Bachelard, time is inherently discontinuous, punctuated by creative instants, the retrospective grouping of which can form the *impression* of continuity. This discontinuous time-sense can be corroborated by the fact that ‘the memory of duration is among the least enduring memories. One remembers having been, but one does not remember having lasted’.<sup>53</sup> Indeed, how one recalls aspects of the past has very little to do with pinpointing a memory along some chronological trajectory, or locating it within some span of past time. In musical terms, when listening to the Quintet, we seem to recall ‘having been’ through the renewal of recognisable states of being, which impose themselves to varying degrees of intensity through our perceptual and corporeal experience of the music (those states, or qualities, can, of course, have temporal resonances: music, in its unfolding, has the capacity to signify time, so that we might feasibly recognise a quality of timelessness, or of propulsion, as carried by a particular theme – as we saw with the intrusion of Theme 3 in the finale’s recapitulation).

Bachelard declares in decidedly polemical terms that ‘memory, that guardian of time, guards the instant alone. It preserves nothing, absolutely nothing, of our complicated and artificial sense of duration’.<sup>54</sup> It is memory’s poetic content as expressed and understood through acts of instantaneity (rather than through an intuited durational time-sense) that concerns us most, Bachelard claims. And this is perhaps the most important point when it comes to distinguishing between Bergson’s and Bachelard’s conceptions of lived time, which despite the rather stark delineation that I have just outlined are not, in fact, so fundamentally opposed as is commonly thought (for instance, in *The Dialectic of Duration*, Bachelard writes: ‘of Bergsonism we accept everything but continuity’).<sup>55</sup> Whereas Bergson’s conception of lived time rejects representational thought (the real experience of time is *intuited*), Bachelard views existence as a constant dialectic between lived time – which David Trippett describes as ‘a chronometry of

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<sup>52</sup> Gaston Bachelard, *Intuition of the Instant*, trans. Eileen Rizo-Patron (Northwestern University Press, 2013; French original published 1932), 7.

<sup>53</sup> Bachelard (2013), 19.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, 20.

<sup>55</sup> Bachelard, *The Dialectic of Duration*, trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000; originally published in French by Presses Universitaires de France as *La Dialectique de la durée*, 1950), 28–29.

actions and matter’ – and *thought* time – ‘a memory of psychic instants and intuitions’.<sup>56</sup> It is precisely through his conception of time as shaped (in part) by imaginative thought that Bachelard claims duration is not intuited but invented; ‘*psychic continuity is not given but made*’.<sup>57</sup> He does not reject ‘the sensation of duration’, as Jessica Wiskus explains, ‘but rather the notion that such duration can be intuited directly’.<sup>58</sup>

Notwithstanding this significant ontological distinction, what links Bergson’s and Bachelard’s conceptions of time is the fact that they can each be characterised as philosophies of ‘difference’. As David Webb observes, both are fundamentally concerned with how ‘any thinking of time should be able to account for the occurrence of what is new’.<sup>59</sup> And while this may seem more emphatically the case in Bachelard’s philosophical perspective, it is no less true of Bergsonian intuition.<sup>60</sup> Moreover, a consideration of time as difference further allows us to identify structural homologies with Enescu’s own processes. Bachelard’s ‘differential ontology’ is founded on the argument that to remember is not ‘to live again...but to imagine a return’.<sup>61</sup> Such imaginative and attentive thought lends novelty to the recurrence of the familiar: attention, Bachelard tells us, is a series of beginnings; ‘it is constituted by those mental rebirths that occur in consciousness when it heeds time’s instants’.<sup>62</sup> We might feasibly speak of an aesthetic of resumption in Enescu’s music, whether that concerns the ‘novel resumption’ that constitutes the introduction of a thematic variant (where we are struck by the seeming novelty of something already past), or the clear fascination his music has with beginnings, which are invariably played out on the threshold of silence (we saw at the outset of this chapter how Enescu’s music has a propensity for ‘sounding out’ the silent void that bounds it). Wiskus notes furthermore that

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<sup>56</sup> Trippett (2007), fn. 26 on 533.

<sup>57</sup> Bachelard (2000), 19. Emphasis in the original.

<sup>58</sup> Jessica Wiskus, ‘Thought Time and Musical Time: Thinking Bachelard Through Messiaen’, in *Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2006), 179. Wiskus goes on to state that in Bachelard’s understanding, temporality does not sustain the “Immediate, deep continuity” of Bergsonian duration because, as such, duration would harbour no need for poetic imagining of the possible; the possible would already be given’ (183–184).

<sup>59</sup> David Webb, ‘The Complexity of the Instant: Bachelard, Levinas, Lucretius’, in *Time and the Instant: Essays in the Physics and Philosophy of Time*, ed. Robin Durie (Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000), 192.

<sup>60</sup> Keith Ansell Pearson notes that ‘Contrary to widespread misconception which has persisted from Bachelard onwards, Bergson’s thinking of ‘creative evolution’ places a notion of ‘radical contingency’ at the centre of its concerns and conceives duration precisely in terms of an interruption and discontinuity: duration involves “incommensurability between what goes before and what follows”’. Ansell Pearson avers that ‘it is only by thinking time as duration that the features of rupture and discontinuity can be rendered intelligible’, which parallels the kind of simultaneity of continuity and discontinuity in Enescu’s music to which I have alluded throughout this chapter. See Keith Ansell Pearson’s chapter, ‘Duration and Evolution: Bergson contra Dennett and Bachelard’ in Robin Durie (2000), 149. See also Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, trans. A. Miller (Lanham: University Press of America, 1983), 29.

<sup>61</sup> Wiskus (2006), 184.

<sup>62</sup> Bachelard (2013), 20.

within this imagined or constructed process of remembering ‘always a difference – a lacuna – is brought forth’. This difference can in fact be thought of as an ‘excess’: this excess ‘represents “more than” either the primary past or the poetic recollection alone even though, as a difference between the two, it maintains no independent existence as such’.<sup>63</sup> Music is particularly well suited to giving expressive voice to this excess, and Enescu’s processes exemplify this capacity. His technique of constant thematic evolution and manipulation, and his apothotic re-surfacings (which yield a veritable superfluity of thematic materials) can easily be thought of as markers of excess. As we saw earlier, this excess is ultimately unsustainable, and Enescu’s materials effectively become exhausted through their own incessant and excessive remembering.

The differential aspects that are latent in Bergson’s *durée* can be drawn out further through a consideration of ‘becoming’, which simultaneously moves us beyond Bergson’s own theorisations of lived time. Perhaps the most influential philosopher of the twentieth century to think upon the idea of becoming is Gilles Deleuze,<sup>64</sup> and it seems noteworthy that Deleuze himself regarded Bergson as perhaps the most important theorist of difference (along with Jankélévitch, Deleuze was one of the first to resituate Bergson’s thinking in a more sympathetic context, and draws attention to the specific importance of what Bergson understood by intuition).<sup>65</sup> Elizabeth Grosz compares duration and becoming in the following terms: ‘duration is difference, the inevitable force of differentiation and elaboration, which is also another name for becoming. Becoming is the operation of self-differentiation, the elaboration of a difference within a thing, a quality or a system that emerges or actualizes only in duration’.<sup>66</sup> The categories can be regarded as synonymous, then – although Deleuze more accurately defines duration as a ‘type’ of becoming. Importantly, both he and Bergson reject the notion that change can be defined through representational thought. As Samantha Bankston observes, for Bergson and Deleuze change is ‘perpetual, and nothing can elude its force...Change is continuous and does not move in discontinuous leaps; it is not created externally but is internal to that which is undergoing change’.<sup>67</sup> It is precisely in this sense that both Bergson and Deleuze reject the Hegelian notion of becoming as a conceptual (or representational) formation *tout court*. For

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<sup>63</sup> Wiskus (2006), 184–185.

<sup>64</sup> Other significant ‘philosophers of becoming’ include Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Vladimir Jankélévitch, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida and – from the previous century – Friedrich Nietzsche and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.

<sup>65</sup> Michael Klein provides a useful account of Deleuze’s understanding of Bergsonian intuition, along with problems of its interpretation (the term’s unfortunate connotations led Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell to accuse Bergson of anti-intellectualism). See Klein (2007), 41–42, and Deleuze, *Bergsonism*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (New York: Zone Books, 1988).

<sup>66</sup> Elizabeth Grosz, ‘Bergson, Deleuze and the Becoming of Unbecoming’, *Parallax*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2005), 4.

<sup>67</sup> Samantha Bankston, *Deleuze and Becoming* (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 18.

Hegel, becoming is conceived as the uniting of a concept and its negation; it represents the passage between being and non-being; it traces the process of ‘coming-into-being’.<sup>68</sup> For Bergson and Deleuze, on the other hand, becoming has little to do with the end-orientated transition from one state to another. Becoming, in their understanding, is pure change: there is no negation within its differential unfolding. Deleuze consequently follows Bergson ‘in removing the notion of becoming from an alleged formation in the conceptual realm and places it in the midst of the sensible’.<sup>69</sup> This recalls Enescu’s own ‘non-representational’ or body-orientated modes of remembering (discussed in Chapter One), of course. Similarly, his timeless landscapes and permeable discontinuities evoke an understanding of change within time’s unfolding that is focused on the nature of change itself, as opposed to an end-orientated or teleological conception of change. Much the same can be said of Enescu’s thematic processes, which as we have already seen contribute to an open-ended (as opposed to goal-orientated) structural trajectory. These processes can readily be characterised in terms of a ‘fundamental openness of time to futurity’ (as Grosz describes it), which is precisely what underpins Bergson’s and Deleuze’s notion of becoming. Enescu’s technique of thematic and motivic ‘embedding’ is emblematic of this ‘openness’ – an openness to the future; to difference; and to the possibility of the new (which is also, paradoxically, the familiar).

#### MUSIC AND/AS SILENCE

Bergson’s anti-Hegelian understanding of becoming, which rejects the possibility of negation or non-being within an object’s or system’s self-differentiation, serves as Vladimir Jankélévitch’s cue for introducing the paradoxical notion that silence (conventionally interpreted as the negation of sound) might also be subsumed under the differential operations of becoming and be understood as ‘sound’. In other words, silence (as Jankélévitch sees it) need not be theorised as the mere obverse of sound. Instead, music can be ‘silent’ in the sense that it gives expressive voice to that which cannot be said: it fills the allusive gap between language

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<sup>68</sup> It is specifically a Hegelian conception of becoming that underpins Janet Schmalfeldt’s important recent study *In the Process of Becoming: Analytical and Philosophical Perspectives on Form in Early Nineteenth-Century Music* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Schmalfeldt understands becoming as ‘the special case whereby the formal function initially suggested by a musical idea, phrase, or section invites retrospective reinterpretation within the larger formal context’ – one formal function effectively ‘becomes’ another (9). Given the reliance here on representational or reflective thought, there is unsurprisingly no room in Schmalfeldt’s study for a theoretical consideration of Bergson or Deleuze; indeed, to include them would seem somewhat anachronistic in the context of her chosen repertoire (Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn, Chopin). For that same reason, my consideration of becoming in relation to Enescu’s processes necessarily draws on a contemporaneous Bergsonian-Deleuzian understanding of the term (rather than a Hegelian conception), and explores the ways in which these processes evoke the perpetual continuity of change itself.

<sup>69</sup> Bankston (2017), 21.

(or conscious reflection) and the raw perception of things themselves. As the ‘language of Becoming’, music is difference itself, or an audible re-filling of the lacunae that difference (or indeed remembering) brings forth. This is a powerful and inviting metaphor through which to consider Enescu’s music, especially as it so often plays with silence – both in terms of an absence of sound, but also as in terms of what I described in the last chapter as the ‘imperceptibility’ of some of his sensuous processes. As I observed nearer the start of this chapter, Enescu often introduces a kind of creative silence in the transition between certain movements (see Exx. 2.1 and 2.2). He invites us (as listeners) to fill the silence that this suspended void affords us, so that silent absence might instead become the inaudible re-sounding of music’s presence. Jean-François Lyotard offers a similar proposition: ‘our ears are deaf to what sound can *do*. We must give back to the act of listening the power to open itself to the inaudible’.<sup>70</sup> I suggest that such analogies between music and the finitude of silence resonate strongly with Enescu’s aesthetic and stylistic concerns, and that his later chamber works especially seem a useful model for thinking further about musical silence, temporal continuity, ineffability, and the perceived gap between music and language.

Jankélévitch’s poetic notion of ‘audible absence’ (or inaudible presence) can initially be compared with another, more recent conception of musical silence. Edward Pearsall treats silence as an extended metaphor for ‘non-discursiveness’, a term he uses to describe musical events that imply a lack of form, structure, or teleology. Accordingly, ‘patterns in non-discursive music do not immediately transmit the sense that they are part of a global structure whose dimensions exceed the boundaries of the “present now of consciousness”’.<sup>71</sup> ‘Silence’ resists structural analysis, although as Pearsall clarifies, that does not point to an absence of structure in the absolute sense. Rather, structural aspects ‘remain elusive and hidden’, and non-discursive events can be distinguished as those whose ‘aesthetic impact is more perspicuous than their formal or syntactic role’.<sup>72</sup> This is largely manifested by qualitative, surface attributes of the music.

Pearsall’s understanding of non-discursiveness, or ‘silence’, clearly parallels the temporal qualities of stasis, lyric timelessness, or non-linearity that are apparent in Enescu’s works. While those aspects are focused specifically on temporality and its syntactic or semantic

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<sup>70</sup> Jean-François Lyotard, ‘The Inaudible: Music and Postmodernity’, in *Miscellaneous Texts I: Aesthetics and Theory of Art*, ed. Herman Parret, Vol. 4/I (Leuven: Leuven University Press), 211.

<sup>71</sup> Edward Pearsall, ‘Anti-Teleological Art: Articulating Meaning through Silence’, in *Approaches to Meaning in Music*, ed. Byron Almén and Edward Pearsall (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 42. Pearsall cites Edmund Husserl’s notion of a ‘present now of consciousness’.

<sup>72</sup> Pearsall (2006), 43–44.

articulation, non-discursive silence implies the suspension of utterance altogether. Pearsall stresses, however, that ‘silence of this kind is *performative*, enacted through sound rather than by the curtailment of sound’. Moreover, ‘with performative silence...it is almost entirely up to the listener to supply meaning’.<sup>73</sup> Pearsall is understandably wary about how one might differentiate between discursive and non-discursive events, but he does assert that non-discursive types can be distinguished primarily by their aesthetic impact and qualitative attributes, as opposed to their structural or syntactic aspects. By comparison, for Jankélévitch silence is not simply a denotation for music that lacks discursive intent. Rather, silence can come to represent music in its durational entirety: music moves ‘from silence to silence, across silence’.<sup>74</sup> Pearsall goes on to observe that through the obscuring of syntax and event relations, ‘sound itself becomes the centre of attention’; moreover, the ‘heightened importance of sound qua sound is essential to the experience of silence in music’.<sup>75</sup> Similarly, Jankélévitch’s suggestion that ‘silence is no longer the obverse of a positive’ suggests that silence itself ought to be thought of as a kind of sonority; or rather, that sonority for sonority’s sake becomes an expression of silence.<sup>76</sup> By asserting the heightened importance of sonority in the conception of music, Jankélévitch reflects an aesthetic preoccupation of composers from about Debussy onwards to make ‘sound qua sound’ a fundamental component of music, both structurally and experientially. In his chamber music especially, Enescu likewise often eschews generic formal constructs in favour of non-discursive or ‘silently sonorous’ events. Works like the Second Piano Quartet, the Piano Quintet, or the Third Piano Sonata often provide a silent haven for the intimate reimagining of past thematic and gestural material. They also evoke a quite extraordinary sensuousness that lends strength to the idea of music as a wholly pre-conceptual mode of expression. The rendering of musical silence could in that sense imply a translation of unconsciousness, or a transformative seeking out of the mind’s depths: silence is ‘thought being fermented’, and ‘the sleep that feeds wisdom’.<sup>77</sup> This ‘in-between-ness’ by which musical silence is characterised (and by which we make sense of it as listeners) is amplified in Enescu, whose processes of concealment and plenitude, and of self-differentiation and becoming, tease our perceptual faculties.

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<sup>73</sup> Pearsall (2006), 43. Andrew Bowie has written in a similar vein that silence is ‘not something that one judges to be present or that one brings about, but rather something that we can become aware of or open to’. See Bowie, *Music, Philosophy, and Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 70.

<sup>74</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 133.

<sup>75</sup> Pearsall (2006), 45.

<sup>76</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 154.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, 136. Jankélévitch cites Francis Bacon with these descriptions. I address the notion of music as unconscious translation in Chapter Four.

By blurring and even inverting the distinction between audible and inaudible sound (music is as an allusive realm characterised by ‘a thousand differentiating nuances, ranged between the audible and the inaudible’)<sup>78</sup> Jankélévitch proposes an experiential homogeneity that maps neatly onto his underlying Bergsonian conception of temporal continuity, or becoming. In keeping with Bergson (under whom he studied, and about whom he wrote a book),<sup>79</sup> Jankélévitch points to the fundamentally durational aspect of contemplative silence, which ‘brings into being the latent counterpoint between past and future voices, a counterpoint that jams the noisy tumult of the present’.<sup>80</sup> (Elsewhere in *Music and the Ineffable* he writes similarly: ‘but silence has differential properties: and as a result, this particular nothingness is not *nothing at all* – in other words, it is not...the negation of all being; it is not a nonbeing that totally annihilates or contradicts total being’.)<sup>81</sup> However, while Jankélévitch describes a composer like Fauré as ‘a musician of Becoming, and of a Bergsonian temporality’, he cannot say the same for Debussy.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, it would seem that Debussy’s music, in which Jankélévitch instinctively recognises the value of the instant, instead prompts an attempted reconciliation of Bergson’s and Bachelard’s philosophies.<sup>83</sup> There is an interesting negotiation here between what Jankélévitch instinctively draws out from the music (namely, evidence of durational continuity *and* discontinuous instantaneity), and his own philosophical credo (which owes so much to Bergson) – a negotiation which can, moreover, be mapped in part on to my own exploration of memory, and the ways it creates continuities and discontinuities across time.

Contrastingly, in *Music and the Ineffable*, Jankélévitch writes that ‘a human being’s duration precedes and survives the “moments musicales”’; that these ‘enchanted moments, even if they resonate in memory and are thus prolonged, tend to annul themselves eventually within the mediocrities of Becoming’.<sup>84</sup> Jankélévitch agrees with Bachelard that the creative act is

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<sup>78</sup> Jankélévitch (1976), 235.

<sup>79</sup> See Jankélévitch, *Henri Bergson*, trans. Nils F. Schott (Durham, NC and London: Duke University Press, 2015). Jankélévitch’s initial monograph was published in 1931, with a revised edition following in 1959.

<sup>80</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 151.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

<sup>82</sup> Jankélévitch, *De la musique au silence: I. Fauré et l’inexprimable* (Paris: Plon, 1974), 266. (‘Gabriel Fauré, musicien du devenir et de la temporalité bergsonienne’).

<sup>83</sup> Jankélévitch’s 1976 monograph on Debussy, *Debussy et le mystère de l’instant*, is a revision and expansion of an earlier book, published as *Debussy et le mystère* (Neuchâtel: Baconnière, 1949); the title change alone seems to confess to the renewed importance that Jankélévitch afforded Bachelard’s conception of instantaneity in his later writings. Among numerous references to the instant and to Bachelard specifically, one passage deserves to be quoted at length: ‘Without doubt, Gaston Bachelard rediscovered in Debussy the “structure” of a pulsatile time, rhythmicised through intermittent apparitions. Bachelard’s “quantic” discontinuity undoubtedly speaks to a nominalist compunction, to an exigency of immediacy: for an attentive, unprejudiced ear, the sounds of nature weave discontinuity over a backdrop of silence’. See Jankélévitch (1976), 216–17.

<sup>84</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 123.

discontinuous, but for him, as for Bergson, every act ultimately inscribes itself within the continuity of duration. Treating music as a discontinuous *act* ultimately allows Jankélévitch to claim that beyond the bounds of its instantaneity, music ceases to exist. When he claims, in that case, that ‘meaning will emanate from a work evolving through and in time’,<sup>85</sup> he is saying that it is specifically in the ‘doing’ (in its ‘nascent *action*’) that music becomes meaningful. Music is ‘silent’, therefore, precisely because it renders us mute when confronted with the task of explicating its meaning in hermeneutic, or linguistic terms.

Julian Johnson notes that when Jankélévitch advocates music’s ineffability, vagueness, or mysteriousness, it is because he is ‘keen to accord music with characteristics that would make it an antidote to language’. Conceiving of music on its own terms, Johnson is surely right to insist that it is, in fact, ‘absolutely particular – *this* sound, played in *this* place at *this* time by *this* person, and heard by *me* – in comparison with which, every word...is of course abstract and therefore general’.<sup>86</sup> What sets Enescu apart even among other modern composers is the extremely meticulous means by which his music is constructed, even when it is at its most sensuous and ‘mysterious’. The sheer number of expressive markings and performance directions (there are numerous occasions when Enescu provides a *cantabile* marking over two, or even just one note), and the rigorous detail by which he constructs his polyphonic and melodic language betrays a compositional mind-set that is utterly obsessed with music’s sounding particularity.

And yet, Jankélévitch’s contention that language cannot give anything back to music’s intelligible specificity quite clearly contradicts his own, attention-directing linguistic style – what Steven Rings calls the *deictic* character of Jankélévitch’s writing.<sup>87</sup> Particularly when he analogises music with sounds from nature, but also when speaking of such apparently oblique concepts as the ‘almost-nothing’, Jankélévitch points us towards musical disclosures, and offers a way of listening that is highly perceptually open to the specificity of music’s sounding materiality. His writing has the capacity, in other words, to both mystify and to elucidate, or edify. In a revealing phrase, Rings admits that experiencing Fauré’s music, as it were through

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<sup>85</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 29.

<sup>86</sup> Julian Johnson, *Out of Time: Music and the Making of Modernity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2015), 308–309.

<sup>87</sup> Steven Rings, ‘Talking and Listening with Jankélévitch’, in the colloquy ‘Vladimir Jankélévitch’s Philosophy of Music (Michael Gallope and Brian Kane, convenors), *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Vol. 65, No. 1 (Spring 2012), 218–223. See also Rings’s article ‘*Mystères limpides: Time and Transformation in Debussy’s Des pas sur la neige*’, *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2008), 207–208.

Jankélévitch, prompted in him a moment of ‘epiphanic intensity’.<sup>88</sup> The experience of musical time in this context, as mediated by Jankélévitch’s deictic language, seems remarkably close to Bachelard’s conception of instantaneity.<sup>89</sup> The ontological difference in kind between music and language, as Bergson understands it, would therefore seem to be undermined by Jankélévitch’s own linguistic ability of directing us towards aspectual breakthroughs in the temporal experience of music. Contrary to Jankélévitch’s philosophical credo (but perhaps *not* his musical instinct), musical silence invites a conceptual filling out, or some discursive means of constituting meaning (certainly, this is how I choose to understand musical silence in relation to Enescu’s works).

In his account of performative silence, Edward Pearsall reaches the conclusion that musical meaning must emerge through the dialectical interaction of non-discursive and discursive events, suggesting that there is an underlying and constant renegotiation of music’s inherent intelligibility (or its ‘perceptibility’, as I have described it in relation to Enescu), which presumably varies with each listener’s experience. And, despite Jankélévitch’s frequent dictums concerning music’s unknowability, his musical sensibility would already seem dialectically attuned to a similar idea of music as both a linguistically intelligible *and* a mysteriously ‘unsayable’ mode of expression (an inconsistent dialectics to be sure, which Michael Gallope describes as ‘unwoven’).<sup>90</sup> The following passage unites these apparently conflicting strands quite tellingly:

It is silence that allows us to hear *another voice*, a voice speaking *another language*, a voice that comes *from elsewhere*. This unknown tongue spoken by an unknown voice, this *vox ignota*, hides behind silence just as silence itself lurks behind the superficial noise of daily existence. Knowledge deepened by dialectics enables an individual who listens attentively to burrow through thick

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<sup>88</sup> Rings (2012), 222. ‘When the [intervallic] seconds first became perspicuous to me, I experienced a moment of epiphanic intensity, in which the physical presence of the seconds suddenly took on a sort of sonic palpability. This was accompanied by the physiological effects typical at such moments—among them, mild goose bumps’.

<sup>89</sup> It is worth noting how Jankélévitch’s and Bachelard’s ontological conceptions of time can be seen to emerge out of a prevailing historical and ethical unease, while philosophical reflection about the nature of time more generally became more pressing (from a moral standpoint) in the aftermath of both world wars. According to Eileen Rizo-Patron, ‘the insight that strikes Bachelard in [his reading of Roupnel’s *Siloë*] (...) is that of the brutal instant experienced when we are faced with the unexpected death of a loved one, or the sudden daunting realisation of personal responsibility for the recurring errors and habits that rule over our thwarted lives or collective worldviews such as those that led to the two world wars in Bachelard’s lifetime’. Eileen Rizo-Patron, ‘Translator’s Preface’, in Bachelard (2013), xii. Vladimir Jankélévitch’s thinking was shaped in an even more profound sense by an unswerving opposition to German philosophical influence (and a concurrent disinclination towards German music), stemming from a refusal to forgive Germany following the extermination of Jews during the Holocaust. In 1971, Jankélévitch published an essay entitled ‘Pardonner?’ (in *L’Imprescriptible* (Éditions le Pavillon, 1971), translated as ‘Should we Pardon Them?’ by Ann Hobart, in *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1996), 552–572), which questioned whether to forgive the actions of Hitler’s regime.

<sup>90</sup> See Chapter 3: ‘Jankélévitch’s Inconsistency’ in Michael Gallope, *Deep Refrains: Music, Philosophy, and the Ineffable* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017), 165–203.

layers of noise to discover transparent strata of silence. And then, he or she will delve into the infinite within the depths of silence, to discover therein the most secret of all musics.<sup>91</sup>

Silence is ultimately construed as the gateway to an unspeakable mode of transcendence, or ‘truth’. For Jankélévitch, ‘the truth appears in music’s vanishing into silence’, which is to say that the point at which truth reveals itself is also the point at which it is no longer perceptible (the parallels one might draw with Enescu’s processes, as I have described them, ought by now to be evident). We approach music’s truth asymptotically: as Gallope observes, music’s truth is kept ‘at a permanent distance, opening us to the realm of the multiple’ – note the plural *musics*.<sup>92</sup> It is in this sense that Jankélévitch conceives of music’s fundamental mysteriousness, or ineffability – essentially, as perpetual openness, or becoming; an expanded mode of how we ‘are’ in the world. In a sense, of course, he is not wrong: music does indeed have the potent capacity to seem mysterious and unknowable; it manages thereby to shape and reshape our thinking of the self and the world in such a way as to both enchant and enthrall. This is the topic to which I now turn in Chapter Three, which focuses specifically on the constructed means by which Enescu gives rise to an apparently unspeakable yet world-enlarging ‘enchantment’, and how this might be experienced corporeally, emotionally, and metaphysically.

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<sup>91</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 151.

<sup>92</sup> Gallope (2017), 199.

## CHAPTER III

### *Enchantment*

‘There is another world, but it is in this one’  
(Paul Éluard, *Donner à voir*)<sup>1</sup>

#### CONTEXTS

IN THE SECOND part of his *Sonnets to Orpheus* (1923), Rainer Maria Rilke describes how music, apparently by its very nature, still has the capacity to enchant a world disenchanted by the advancements of technology.<sup>2</sup> While the opening two quartets of the tenth sonnet tell of the machine’s ubiquity and dominance in modern social life, in the closing triplets Rilke offers a solution to this desecration of the human spirit:

But existence is still enchanted; is at a hundred or more  
Points in its origin still. A playing of pure forces  
That no one touches who does not marvel and kneel before.

Words still fail before the unsayable sources...  
And music, ever new, puts pulsating stones in place  
To build her god-like house in unusable space.<sup>3</sup>

Rilke’s rich and spiritually inclined verses yield several important points: enchantment is an opening up to a multiplicity of origins, to new worlds in a state of pure Becoming; these ‘pure forces’ (*reinen Kräften*) are characterised by a sense of play, and freedom; and to experience or ‘touch’ these enchanted forces, one needs to accept their marvelousness. For Rilke, music provides just such a means of enchantment, for it offers privileged access to ‘ever new’ (*immer neu*) and wondrous worlds. Music constructs a ‘god-like’ (*vergöttlichtes*) or enchanted dwelling-place, which is also ‘unusable’ (*unbrauchbaren*) – both in that it resists commodification by technological means (Rilke died before the century’s most significant developments in commercial recording), and in the sense that it is somehow ungraspable, or

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<sup>1</sup> Paul Éluard, ‘Donner à voir’ (1939), in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), Vol. 1, 986 (‘il y a un autre monde, mais il est dans celui-ci’). Variants and translations of this line have also been attributed to the poets Rainer Maria Rilke and W. B. Yeats.

<sup>2</sup> Max Weber famously claimed that the demystification of the world as wrought by processes of rationalisation resulted in a disenchanted life, which bore the ‘imprint of meaninglessness’. Weber, ‘Science as a Vocation’ (1917), in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (Abingdon: Routledge, 1991), 140. For a close study of Rilke’s poetry in the context of Weber’s writing, see José M. González García, ‘Max Weber, Goethe and Rilke: The Magic of Language and Music in a Disenchanted World’, in *Max Weber Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (2011), 267–288.

<sup>3</sup> Rainer Maria Rilke, *Sonnets to Orpheus. Duino Elegies*, trans. Jessi Lemont (New York: Fine Editions Press, 1945), 38 (Sonnet 10, Second Part). Cited in González García (2011), 272.

untameable. There is something ‘unsayable’ (*Unsäglichen*) about the place where music ‘is’ (before which words ‘still fail’), so that Rilke’s notion of enchantment – and the way he thought about music – seems bound up with something linguistically inexpressible, and spatially unquantifiable (of course, Rilke was hardly alone in this view, and can be seen to contribute to a broader movement which simultaneously granted music pre-eminence within the arts).<sup>4</sup>

Significantly, Rilke contends that existence is ‘still’ enchanted, implying that modernity has the capacity to enchant while simultaneously disenchanting the world, and that enchantment might have a continued role to play in modernity. In her book, *The Enchantment of Modern Life*, the political theorist Jane Bennett offers just such a view of enchantment, as a ‘counterstory [that] seeks to induce an experience of the contemporary world...as also enchanted – not a tale of re-enchantment but one that calls attention to magical sites already here’.<sup>5</sup> Bennett clarifies that these magical sites are not to be understood in a supernatural or Christian cosmological sense, but rather as examples of the numerous unusual or captivating experiences that affect us in everyday life (and have always affected us). This is in contrast to the claim, articulated by Joshua Landy and Michael Saler, for instance, that the modern world does, in fact, require *re*-enchantment, which necessitates the invention of new strategies by which the secularised and intellectualised world could once again be made mysterious, wondrous, redemptive, purposeful, epiphanic, and a locus for the infinite.<sup>6</sup> Recognising the widespread and far-reaching efforts on the part of modern intellectuals and creators to do just that is, Landy and Saler claim, ‘to reach a new, and more nuanced, understanding of the nature of modernity’.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> Walter Pater had already claimed, in 1877, for instance, that ‘all art constantly aspires towards the condition of music’. Still earlier in the century, artists like Robert Schumann argued that music represented the quintessential Romantic art. This elevation in status (compared with music’s lowly position in the eighteenth century) stemmed from the fact that music, through its perceived ineffability and autonomy, was understood as the ideal medium for conveying hidden truths, expressing states of the soul, and evoking fictional or alternative worlds. This view found its most explicit philosophical expression in the work of Arthur Schopenhauer, who maintained that music alone among the arts could serve as the unmediated expression of a metaphysical will. See Walter Pater, ‘The School of Giorgione’, in *Selected Works*, ed. Richard Aldington (London: William Heinemann, 1948), 271; and Schopenhauer’s *The World as Will and Representation*, Volume I, trans. E. F. J. Payne, eds. Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman, and Christopher Janaway (Cambridge University Press, 2011). For an overview of the way music came to influence such art forms as literature and painting (as well as philosophy), see Robert P. Morgan, ‘Secret Languages: The Roots of Musical Modernism’, in *Critical Inquiry*, Vol. 10, No. 3 (1984), 442–461.

<sup>5</sup> Bennett, *The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics* (2001), 14.

<sup>6</sup> Specifically, Landy and Saler claim that if the modern world is to be re-enchanting, it must accordingly be reimbued with secularised versions of these categories. See the editors’ Introduction in *The Re-Enchantment of the World: Secular Magic in a Rational Age*, ed. Joshua Landy and Michael Saler (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 2.

<sup>7</sup> Landy and Saler (2009), 3.

The ‘re’ in re-enchantment suggests a historical dimension, moreover (it ‘carries a powerful hint of estrangement or distancing’, as Nicholas Paige puts it), and a definition of the term may also imply a nostalgic component. In re-enchanting the world, artists and creators might be thought of as longingly re-cultivating lost forms of enchantment for a secular age; in that sense, “re” marks the specifically modern relationship between art and the world’.<sup>8</sup> It is possible to give an alternative reading of Rilke in this way, especially if we observe that his sonnet belongs to a collection of poems directed at the legendary figure of Orpheus, who notably inhabits an ancient world still enchanted by music. The loss of this enchanted world is central to a quintessentially modern condition of longing for a nostalgically idealised past, which (importantly) was understood to be ontologically distinct from the present. Svetlana Boym elegantly defines this modern strain of nostalgia as a mourning for the ‘impossibility of mythical return, for the loss of an enchanted world with clear borders and values’.<sup>9</sup> Part of what makes Rilke’s enchanted world ‘unsayable’, then, might well be its apparent irretrievability. Through music, however, Rilke envisages a means of reclaiming and resituating this lost world amid the demystified hierarchies of modern social life. We might, in that sense, regard the poet as orientating himself nostalgically towards a lost Arcadian idyll, and offering Orpheus’s lyric voice as a means of re-enchanting, or ‘re-singing’ (from the French, *chanter*) the present.<sup>10</sup>

It is perhaps unsurprising, in the context of what Rilke regards as music’s fundamental ‘unsayability’, that the poet stops short of interrogating the specific means by which music enchants – through the ways it constructs states of enchantment, or why musical materials might have enchanting effects. Instead, he seems content to claim that music enchants simply by virtue of its inherent mysteriousness and ineffability – a view that can also be equated with the nineteenth-century tendency of locating the sublime within musical expression. While it is still commonplace to think of music in these terms, Julian Johnson has warned that ‘music is poorly understood if it is taken to be, “by its very nature”, a form of enchantment’.<sup>11</sup> Music is more

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<sup>8</sup> Nicholas Paige, ‘Permanent Re-Enchantments: On Some Literary Uses of the Supernatural from Early Empiricism to Modern Aesthetics’, in Landy and Saler (2009), 159 and 161.

<sup>9</sup> Svetlana Boym, *The Future of Nostalgia* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), 23. In similar terms, Peter Fritzsche contends ‘there is no nostalgia without the sense of irreversibility, which denies the wholeness of the past to the present’. See Fritzsche, ‘How Nostalgia Narrates Modernity’, in *The Work of Memory: New Directions in the Study of German Society and Culture*, ed. Alan Confino and Peter Fritzsche (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 65.

<sup>10</sup> Writing about Monteverdi’s opera *L’Orfeo* (first published in 1609), Daniel Chua makes the similar claim that ‘opera sings in an unsung world as nostalgia for an ancient age enchanted by music’. It is primarily for this reason, Chua argues, that so many of the earliest operas were Arcadian pastorals. Daniel K. L. Chua, ‘Vincenzo Galilei, Modernity and the Division of Nature’, in *Music Theory and Natural Order from the Renaissance to the Early Twentieth Century*, ed. Suzannah Clark and Alexander Rehding (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 25. For a critique of Chua’s idea of music as re-enchantment, see Johnson (2015), 189–200.

<sup>11</sup> Johnson (2015), 200.

complex than this, and it is also clear that enchantment itself is a rather more protean category than the reductive binary of enchanted / disenchanted would suggest.

Distinguishing between enchantment and re-enchantment seems an important task in the context of Enescu's music, which both looks back to reimagine aspects of the past (explicitly so in works such as the *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, and the Third Orchestral Suite, which draw on the composer's childhood memories), and simultaneously employs strategies of enchantment that have a continuing presence within modern life. Drawing on Bennett's work, I am particularly interested in the sonorous and somatic effects of enchantment, as viewed from a phenomenological perspective. A 'rationalised' exploration of enchantment also queries its contemporary usage, especially since such traditional definitions as 'charming', 'spellbinding', or 'mystifying' do not resonate in quite the same sense today as perhaps they once did.

As I suggested towards the end of the last chapter, one twentieth-century writer who persists in using these terms, however, is Vladimir Jankélévitch. In doing so, he seems actively to resist what Landy and Saler describe as lying at the root of many intellectuals' understanding of disenchantment, which is a 'gradual decline in mystery'.<sup>12</sup> Notably, while Jankélévitch does (famously) advocate for music's inherent mystery and ineffability (Fauré is dubbed '*inexprimable*', while Debussy's music is laden with various kinds of '*mystère*'), he also engages closely (unlike Rilke) with the material quality of musical sounds, and their captivating or 'charming' potential.<sup>13</sup> Notwithstanding his credo regarding music's unknowability, Jankélévitch is right to argue that music can come across as mysterious, or even inexplicable. Much of Enescu's music, but especially those later pieces (or sections of pieces) that incline toward intimate chamber writing, can readily be described as mysterious or entrancing: the first two movements of the Third Violin Sonata, Op. 25, the Second Piano Quartet, Op. 30, and the Piano Quintet, Op. 29; the middle movement of the Third Piano Sonata, Op. 24, No. 3; the first and third movements of the Second Cello Sonata, Op. 26, No. 2; and the second movement of the Second String Quartet, Op. 22, No. 2, for instance, are all examples of Enescu's propensity for writing deeply sensuous, highly captivating, and mystifying music (and in that sense he seems to share Jankélévitch's resistance to the idea that modernity should signal a 'decline in mystery').<sup>14</sup> These and other pieces, however, can also be used to demonstrate music's capacity

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<sup>12</sup> Landy and Saler (2009), 7.

<sup>13</sup> Jankélévitch (1974; 1976).

<sup>14</sup> Enescu does not use the expressive marking of *misterioso* nearly as often as *malinconico* or *nostalgico* (or *lontano*, which is another favourite), but it does appear in the second movements of both the Third Piano Sonata and the Second String Quartet.

to enchant in a more specific and rationalised sense. I intend, in other words, to ‘close the gap’ of the ineffable and mysterious, while simultaneously asserting the mystifying and enchanting capacity of Enescu’s music. Perhaps the exemplary work in this respect is the *Impressions d’enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano of 1940, in which the composer reimagines scenes from his childhood home in rural Moldavia, through a continuous series of motivically linked yet affectively contrasting vignettes: the local fiddler; a babbling brook; a lullaby; a storm in the night; and other similar recollections. In each of these scenes, Enescu employs musical strategies that help to create a sense of enchantment: as Bennett notes, such strategies may in broader terms include giving ‘greater expression to the sense of play’, or ‘[honing] sensory receptivity to the marvellous specificity of things’.<sup>15</sup> Exploring these strategies and their musical framing allows for a more nuanced understanding of the role that enchantment occupies within musical modernity.

#### THE CHARMS OF CHILDHOOD

As mentioned in the last chapter, *Impressions* was Enescu’s first major composition of the Second World War, the duration of which he spent in Romania. It was arguably due to this renewed closeness with his homeland that allowed the memories of a lived past to take fresh hold over the composer. This is reflected by the immanence and directness of his ‘impressions’, which include remarkably nuanced evocations of nature (a babbling brook, wind in the chimney), onomatopoeic renderings of animal ‘voices’ (birdsong, crickets, a cuckoo-clock), as well as focused attention on the sensual and emotional aspects of these recollections. Nocturnalism and dreaming (topics which I consider in greater depth in Chapter Four) are likewise important themes in *Impressions*, suggesting a contemplative solitude that is perhaps more poignant for being of a kind that evaded Enescu in his adult years. These scenes reflect a fascination with the world, in all its mysterious minutiae, as seen through a child’s eye; the *Impressions* are ‘filled with evocative fantasy’, as one reviewer wrote in 1955.<sup>16</sup> Each of the suite’s ten scenes have their own programmatic title (Enescu provided further programmatic descriptions of each scene in his interview with Gavoty)<sup>17</sup>, while the chronology of the scenes charts a broadly circadian trajectory, taking us from day to night, and back to day with the final scene, ‘Lever de soleil’ (‘Sunrise’).

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<sup>15</sup> Bennett (2001), 13.

<sup>16</sup> Gustave Samazeuilh, ‘Adieu à Georges Enesco’, *Le Conservatoire: Musique, Théâtre, Cinéma*, No. 44 (June, 1955), 10. ‘...pleines d’évocatrice fantaisie’.

<sup>17</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1. See also Gavoty (2016), 56–60.

The predominant experiential mode through which Enescu constructs his enchanted scenes in *Impressions* is, invariably, childhood, and more specifically, a childlike fascination with the world. According to Jane Bennett, enchantment as a mood involves a state of surprise, ‘a pleasurable feeling of being charmed by the novel and as yet unprocessed encounter’, which one associates with ‘a fleeting return to childlike excitement about life’.<sup>18</sup> Enescu’s ‘impressions’ could be thought in exactly these terms, as only *partly* processed encounters that through their novelty give rise to a feeling of enchantment. A similar sense of novelty and childlike wonder is communicated in the suite’s opening scene (‘Ménétrier’), the opening bars of which are shown in the example below (Ex. 3.1).

**Example 3.1:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, ‘Ménétrier’, opening bars.

The musical score for the opening bars of 'Ménétrier' is presented in three staves. The first staff, for the Violin (Vln.), is marked 'Allegro deciso, non mosso' with a tempo of quarter note = 96. It begins with a forte (f) dynamic and a 'giocososo' character. The second staff, for the Piano (Pno.), is marked 'mf' and 'un poco più dolce'. The third staff, for the Violin (Vln.), is marked 'di nuovo giocoso' and 'f'. The score includes various musical notations such as accents, slurs, and fingerings.

The exuberance of this opening causes us, as listeners, to marvel at the local fiddler’s virtuosity, while the solo violin’s dotted rhythms and offbeat accents especially lend a striking purposiveness to the fiddler’s music. Frequent motivic repetitions, and the commonality of certain rhythms and melodic contours serve as rhetorical devices, so that the fiddler’s folksong amounts to a self-consciously performative act, akin, almost, to a speech, which through its stridency and authorial boldness is designed to hold its audience in thrall (a notion which Enescu, as a virtuoso performer, no doubt empathised with). There is a striking originality to this opening number, certainly within the stylistic conventions of Western art music – it is rare that a piece for solo violin and piano should begin with an extended number for the violin alone

<sup>18</sup> Bennett (2001), 12.

– but also, and more poignantly, in the sense that the music gives expressive voice and aesthetic form to one of Enescu’s earliest memories, and therefore to his own (or the memory of his own) primordial or originary conception of the world. The music seems, in that respect, to speak of a ‘first time’. Certainly, the immediacy of the solo violin’s purposeful entry evokes a sudden awakening unto the world; the child’s perspective, as Enescu understands it, offers little room for reflective thought (it is ‘partly’ processed specifically for that reason), and is caught up instead in the perceptual immediacy and wondrous novelty of the things surrounding him. It is this conception of the world as ‘new’ which evidently fascinated writers, artists and theorists in the early decades of the twentieth century, as Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei observes: ‘The originality or primitive nature of child experience, so idealised by the romantics, is cherished not necessarily for being original or more important than mature states of mind, but rather for revivifying a stage in which the world, being first constituted as world, is open to constant negotiation’.<sup>19</sup> I return to this notion of the child’s ‘world-transforming’ or, indeed, ‘enchanted’ way of seeing, as well as how this might relate to artistic creation, below.

In a variety of ways, children, as well as theorisations and explorations of childhood, began to occupy an important place in the public and intellectual consciousness of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this stemmed in part from the experience of modernity itself, in which rapid technological and economic advancement gave rise to the perception of a new kind of progressive temporality, an inevitable consequence of which was a diminished capacity for retaining and living with the past. Amid this awareness of temporal rupture, the notion of a similarly lost (and ‘magical’) childhood contributed (in Peter Fritzsche’s words) to a feeling of ‘permanent itinerancy’, so that individuals felt strangely unmoored from themselves, and their own half-forgotten past identities.<sup>20</sup> The American essayist and naturalist Henry David Thoreau demonstrates the effects of this permanent itinerancy in a journal entry from 1841: ‘we seem but to linger in manhood to tell the dreams of our childhood, and they vanish out of memory ere we learn the language’.<sup>21</sup> Thoreau bemoans the fact that, as an adult, he has forgotten the childhood language of enchantment, and of being able to dream the world as a child might: full of wonder, irrationalised admiration, and a charmed *jouissance*. The nostalgic evocation of a treasured but lost childhood (encountered most frequently in the nineteenth century within the highly subjective genres of modern

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<sup>19</sup> Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, *The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art and Literature* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007), 42.

<sup>20</sup> Fritzsche (2004), 180.

<sup>21</sup> Henry David Thoreau, *The Heart of Thoreau’s Journals*, ed. Odell Shephard (New York: Dover Publications, 1961), transcription of entry on February 19<sup>th</sup>, 1841.

autobiography and the private memoir) accordingly became a vital means of re-rooting the self, as well as an expressive mode of longing.<sup>22</sup> While Proust's *In Search of Lost Time* remains one of the best-known examples of this kind of writing, Proust was himself strongly influenced by Gérard de Nerval, whose short story, *Sylvie* (1853), draws on the author's own youthful experiences and recounts (in the form of a dreamlike reminiscence) the protagonist's love for three women, all of whom he loses. Separated by over half a century, the two novels' exploration of themes including love, loss, and remembrance, indicates the sustained contemporary fascination (in France, at least) with displaced recollections of the past, including adolescence and childhood. It was also against this literary backdrop that Sigmund Freud began to publish his work (at the start of the twentieth century) on the links between adult behaviour and child experience, in an attempt effectively to reconcile the perceived split between childhood and adulthood in emotional, behavioural and psychological terms.

While Enescu's *Impressions d'enfance* can easily be situated amid a contemporary nostalgia for lost childhood and an autobiographical questing for origins,<sup>23</sup> the suite is, at the same time, quite distinct from those musical depictions of modern childhood that proliferated in France in the period of the Third Republic. The rise of the modern child (and, by extension, the emergence of a new social order) is traceable in the latter years of the nineteenth century, during which children benefited from a variety of social reforms, and an increasingly elevated status within the household.<sup>24</sup> Emily Kilpatrick has observed how this child-centredness (with its attendant categories of child laziness and the spoiled child) gave rise to a characteristically Parisian type of musical *enfantine*. Works like Georges Bizet's *Jeux d'enfants* (1871); Gabriel Fauré's *Dolly Suite* (1896); Claude Debussy's *Children's Corner* (1908) and *La Boîte à joujoux* (1913); Maurice Ravel's *Ma mère l'Oye* (1910) and *L'Enfant et les sortilèges* (1925); and André

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<sup>22</sup> Among the vast proliferation of such sources, some key French texts may include François-René de Chateaubriand's *Mémoires d'Outre-Tombe* ('*Memoirs from Beyond the Grave*'; 1849–1850); George Sand's *Histoire de ma vie* ('*Story of my Life*'; 1854); Gustave Flaubert's *Mémoires d'un fou* ('*Memoirs of a Madman*'; written in 1838, published 1901); and Victor Hugo's *Mémoires* (1899). Jean-Jacques Rousseau's *Les Confessions* ('*The Confessions*'; completed 1769, and published 1782) is an early forerunner to these texts.

<sup>23</sup> There is no shortage of nineteenth- and twentieth-century musical works which deal with the topic of searching for origins. To take one example: Sigmund Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* (1900), in which the author first discusses what would later become the theory of the Oedipus complex, yielded several musical and theatrical works centred around the legend of Oedipus – including Ruggero Leoncavallo's opera *Edipo re* (1920), Igor Stravinsky's *Oedipus Rex* (1927), and Enescu's own opera, *Oedipe* (1936). The contemporary fascination with Oedipus stemmed largely from a parallel obsession with the psychologisation of one's origins and a questing for self-knowledge.

<sup>24</sup> See, for instance, Linda Clark, 'France', in Joseph M. Hawes and N. Ray Hiner, eds., *Children in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (Westport, Ct.: Greenwood, 1991), 277–304; and Colin Heywood, *Childhood in Nineteenth-Century France: Work, Health and Education among the 'Classes Populaires'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Caplet's *Un tas de petites choses* (1925) are all prominent examples of how composers 'turned from the idealised Romantic childhood of Schumann's *Kinderszenen* towards the overflowing nurseries and exuberant family life of their busy, vital Parisian society'.<sup>25</sup> By contrast, Enescu's evocation of rural childhood seems wholly removed from this world of toys, dolls, and the modern family unit (and, in this sense, perhaps closer to Schumann's Romantic ideal).<sup>26</sup> His vision is concerned primarily with life outside of the home, experienced in nature, through solitary contemplation of the world, and in music (Ravel's *L'Enfant* is perhaps Enescu's closest point of comparison, as I will discuss below). Through his vocally absent protagonist, Enescu constructs a world that strongly engages with a childlike way of seeing and marvelling, drawing heavily on sensory experience and a boundless imaginative freedom, which can in turn give rise to enchantment.

Gosetti-Ferencei expands on the nature of this unique experiential mode, describing how theorists and artists (like Gaston Bachelard, Proust and Rilke) came to view childhood not only as a 'state of freedom from fixed conceptuality and habit that characterises adult consciousness', but also as 'a persistent source, when revived in adulthood, for the revitalisation of quotidian life'.<sup>27</sup> That this mode of child experience might be revitalised at all within adult daily life is central to Bachelard's conception of reverie (which is to be distinguished from dreaming, although the latter category does also feature in the nocturnal part of Enescu's suite).<sup>28</sup> For Bachelard, since memory alone is not sufficient for reliving childhood, the daydreamer revivifies child experience through reveries which are spurred by poetic images. In this way, Bachelard claims that poetry and art can invite a return to child experience. Reverie is therefore an eminently creative means by which Bachelard proposes individuals can relive their past: 'in our reverie which imagines while remembering, our past takes on substance again'.<sup>29</sup> Imagination and memory combine, through reverie, in order to recapture a *sense* of the original experience; moreover, with the modern perception that the irretrievable past now existed solely in memories and the imagination, these same mental structures came to be seen (by Bachelard, and others) as helping to constitute reality itself. There is, in other words, a

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<sup>25</sup> Emily Kilpatrick, *The Operas of Maurice Ravel* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 198.

<sup>26</sup> The twelfth piece in Schumann's *Kinderszenen*, Op. 15, 'Kind im Einschlummern', for instance, is remarkable for the ways it exceeds its 'childlike' aspect; similarly, Enescu seems less concerned with capturing a childish or infantile quality, and more with evoking an enchanted, childlike (in the sense of being uninhibited) vision of the world.

<sup>27</sup> Gosetti-Ferencei (2007), 59–60.

<sup>28</sup> Both reverie and dreaming (and their construction in a musical and phenomenological sense – as well as how they may be differentiated) are key topics in my next chapter. Here, my understanding of reverie is limited to the role that Bachelard ascribes it in revivifying child experience.

<sup>29</sup> Bachelard (1971), 119.

constructed aspect to this mnemonic-imaginative mode: the process which Bachelard outlines (and with which Enescu could be seen to engage in the composition of his *Impressions*) is not merely an intellectualised representation of childhood, neither is it some faithful transcription of memory, but a creative act of construction with its own materials and forms. The process of revivifying childhood through reverie is reliant, as Bachelard further claims, on recalling (or ‘remaking’) those circumstances pertaining to the child’s experience of life. As such, it is in childhood solitude that Bachelard identifies the original foundation for poetic reverie: ‘in his solitudes, from the moment he is master of his reveries, the child knows the happiness of dreaming which will later be the happiness of the poets’. To relearn the language of enchantment (as Thoreau so wished to do) is to once again become like the dreaming child, then: ‘to enter into the fabulous times, it is necessary to be serious like a dreaming child’; and similarly, ‘by dreaming on childhood, we return to the lair of Reveries, to the reveries which have opened up the world to us’.<sup>30</sup>

To become like the dreaming child is to invoke a unique mode of understanding that relies less on the ‘conceptual recognition of objects and perspectives’ (as Gosetti-Ferencei puts it), and rather more on what early twentieth-century French culture perceived as a condition ‘enlightened’ by irrationality.<sup>31</sup> Viewing the world as if for the first time – ‘pre-rationally’ – suggests that within this condition the gap between reflective thought and brute perception (to which I referred in the previous chapter) is effectively foreshortened. Childlike perception considers the world in its instantiation (it is freed from the habits which dull and hinder adult vision; it implies a naivety, or suspension of judgment) in large part because the distinction between ‘self and the world’ in childhood is more ‘porous and negotiable’ than in adulthood. Gosetti-Ferencei cites Merleau-Ponty’s observation that the child ‘is apt to recognise himself in everything’: he finds himself more intimately connected with the things around him.<sup>32</sup> This self-identification with objects (which Merleau-Ponty also describes as an ‘openness to the world’)<sup>33</sup> allows, ultimately, for their transformation into something enchanting, and

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<sup>30</sup> Bachelard (1971), 99, 118, 102.

<sup>31</sup> Gosetti-Ferencei (2007), 50. Elsewhere in the same chapter, Gosetti-Ferencei observes that in the earlier stages of child consciousness, ‘objects are not yet fixed in their substantive identities and time and space are not yet conceived as a continuity containing absolutely distinct perspectives’ (81). On the wider artistic revaluation of childhood as an irrational condition, see Timothy F. Coombes, ‘The Nursery as Circus: Dancing the Childlike to Fauré’s *Dolly Suite*, 1913’, *Journal of the Royal Musical Association*, Vol. 142/2 (2017), 277–325.

<sup>32</sup> Gosetti-Ferencei (2007), 48, 50.

<sup>33</sup> See Wiskus (2013), 17.

precipitates an intense experience that is located outside of the ‘ordinary feeling of the self’s familiarity with the world’.<sup>34</sup>

A good example of how Enescu uses musical materials to frame this kind of enchanting transfiguration can be found in the third scene of *Impressions d’enfance*, titled ‘Ruisselet au fond du jardin’. Here, Enescu seeks to recreate what he remembers as the glistening, reflective quality of the stream at the end of his garden, and does so initially through patterns of imitation and repetition.<sup>35</sup> The scene’s opening bars present an imitative dialogue between both instruments as arpeggiated chromatic flourishes are exchanged between the piano and the violin (Ex. 3.2, below). This dialogue is itself mirrored, with the second bar echoing the first almost exactly. Continuing imitative exchanges (mimicking general contour and gestures as opposed to exact notes) come across rather more as distorted reflections, and the increasingly chromatic motion (in both parts) conveys a sinuous fluidity as melodic lines and motivic shapes are passed between the violin and piano. Chromaticism is in fact central to Enescu’s reimagining of the babbling stream: chromatically-led shifts in harmony take place suddenly every few bars; the melodic movement (especially in the piano writing) is entirely chromatically derived; and polyrhythmic chromatic arpeggiations in the piano eventually give way (after Figure 10) to ascending and descending chromatic runs (occasionally this motion appears in thirds or fifths, or even at a major seventh). With its energetic flourishes and carefree swerves, the scene’s form could be viewed as paratactic, as if the music were constantly reorientating itself, seeking a new or different direction. To speak of any formal framework or structure would be misleading, however, and Enescu’s fluid design instead recalls Vladimir Jankélévitch’s poetic claim that ‘water in motion drowns form’.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Gosetti-Ferencei (2007), 1. This is more accurately how Gosetti-Ferencei defines ‘ecstasis’, which can be regarded as a synonym for enchantment. My preference here is for the latter term, although I do return to a closer consideration of ecstasis towards the end of this chapter.

<sup>35</sup> Enescu describes the scene briefly to Gavoty: ‘ah, I can still see it, this shimmering little stream at the end of our garden at home!’ (‘ah, je le vois encore! Ce petit ruisselet miroitant au fond du jardin de notre maison!’). See Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1. Among the various impressionistic ‘water-scenes’ from which Enescu may have drawn inspiration, it’s likely that the initial model for the ‘Ruisselet’ scene came from Karol Szymanowski’s ‘The Fountain of Arethusa’, also for violin and piano. ‘Arethusa’ is the first of three poems comprising Szymanowski’s *Mythes* cycle (Op. 30), which, as Jim Samson has observed, was a work Enescu knew well and admired, and which had been in his repertoire since 1927. The work is notable for its variety of timbral effects and extended techniques for the violin, although compared with Szymanowski’s largely melody-accompaniment derived texture, Enescu gives more equal weighting to the instrumental voices. See Jim Samson, ‘What Makes a Hero? Enescu, Szymanowski, and the Classical Plot’, in *Proceedings of the George Enescu International Musicology Symposium*, ed. Mihai Cosma (Bucharest: Editura Muzicală, 2011), 213.

<sup>36</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 94.

**Example 3.2:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Ruisselet au fond du jardin', opening bars, from four bars before Figure 7 (*continued next page*).

The musical score is presented in two systems. The first system includes the Violin (Vln.) and Piano (Pno.) parts. The Violin part begins with a *rallentando* and *non vibr.* marking, followed by a *lunga* note. The tempo then changes to *Andante tranquillo e flessibile* with a metronome marking of  $\text{♩} = 52$ . The Violin part features a *pp* dynamic, a *poco* marking, and a *lunga* note. The Piano part starts with *ppp* and *lunga* markings. The second system continues the Violin and Piano parts, with the Violin part marked *p* and *bp*, and the Piano part marked *dolcissimo, con una sonorità acquatica*. The score includes various musical notations such as *lunga*, *pp*, *poco*, *p*, *bp*, *dolcissimo, diafono*, *dolcissimo, con una sonorità acquatica*, *ppp*, *5*, *6*, *3*, *7*, *harm.*, *C.1*, and *C.2*. The score is written in 3/4 time and features complex rhythmic patterns and dynamics.

The image shows a musical score for violin and piano. The violin part (top staff) begins with a sixteenth-note run (marked '6'), followed by a triplet (marked '3') and a 'V' marking. The piano part (bottom staff) features a triplet (marked '3') and a 'delicatamente' marking. The score is marked '(senza rigore)' and 'lusingando'. There are five bar lines indicated by small brackets below the piano staff.

Gradually, the unsettled curiosity brought about by the music's polyrhythmic and chromatic business succumbs to a more luxuriant and delectable contentment. Part of this change in mood has to do with the establishing of a more stable tonality: an implied E major appears like some sought-after and idyllic harmony after a chromatically deviating and rhythmically restless initial section.<sup>37</sup> Likewise, both violin and piano parts become more rhythmically regular, the piano glossing (by means of diminished and half-diminished arpeggiated flourishes) the violin's drawn-out articulation of an E major broken-chord and a gently rocking pattern between E<sub>3</sub> and D<sup>b</sup>/<sub>3</sub># (Ex. 3.3). In the fourth bar before the end of the scene (bars four to five of the example below), an ascending E-major-scale run (in fifths) in the piano gives way to a drawn-out portamento in the violin, from G<sub>3</sub># to A<sub>3</sub>, and back down again to the G<sub>3</sub>#. This is the first time a musical device of this sort has been encountered in this scene, and it is, in part, its uniqueness that makes it so captivating. The slide's singularity causes us to become 'delayed' in its presence, as Philip Fisher might put it.<sup>38</sup> This is highlighted musically with a sudden shift to a slower metronome marking, and a subsequent suspension of metre: the sustained G<sub>3</sub># in the violin is punctuated by *lontano* clusters in the upper ranges of the piano, until everything fades to silence. This is an enchanting moment, not just because it has the power fleetingly (yet completely) to transfix and absorb a listener's attention, but it does so because it is easily interpreted as a poetic exaggeration of water's liquidity – a fluid and extravagant re-filling of the gap between rationally tempered intervals. The exaggerated motion between the third scale

<sup>37</sup> E major further represents a harmonic idealisation of the Aeolian scale descent from E<sub>4</sub> to E<sub>3</sub> (appearing in the left hand of the piano) in the first four bars of the scene.

<sup>38</sup> Philip Fisher, *Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 131. See also the citation in Bennett (2001), 11.

**Example 3.3:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Ruisselet au fond du jardin', concluding bars, Figure 12–3 – Figure 12+4.

The musical score consists of four systems. The first system shows the Violin (Vln.) and Piano (Pno.) parts. The Violin part has dynamics *poco mf* and *mp*. The Piano part has dynamics *poco mp*, *dim.*, and *p*. The second system includes tempo markings *Molto tranq. (♩=42)* and *rit. poco a poco*, with *più rit.* and *dolce estinto s.v.*. The third system features *a Tempo I (♩=52)* and *molto rit. molto lento (♩=72)*. The fourth system includes *12 a Tempo I in tempo (♩=52)* and *molto rit. molto lento (♩=72)*. Performance instructions include *Tutto l'arco V*, *mettez vite la sourdine*, and *en résonance, sans frapper l'accord*.

degree and locally dissonant fourth is experienced somatically as a kind of tightening and subsequent uncoiling – a pleasurable release. The way Enescu foregrounds the sensuous intensity of this enlarged and suspended moment prompts us to consider enchantment, in this instance, as the transformation of something linear (a process) into something like *durée*, where the corporeality of being comes to the fore. This enchanted moment effectively brings us ‘closer’ (in a physical, visceral sense) to the watery world of Enescu’s vision, and as such our experience of the music likewise reflects a childlike self-identification with the world. As the culmination of a process which takes place over a larger span of time, the temporal dimension

of Enescu's rendering (and our perception of the stream's transformation) also evokes what Merleau-Ponty discerned in Paul Cézanne's painted landscapes as 'a world in which being is not given but rather emerges over time'.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, as I mentioned in the last chapter, Enescu's processes (not just in this scene, but also as witnessed in his motivic 'embeddings' or 'permeable discontinuities', for instance) evidently reflect a preoccupation in modern art of attending to how things themselves are perceived, or how they 'emerge in living vision'.<sup>40</sup> With Enescu we are similarly made to consider how musical materials emerge and are transformed within a span of lived time, and how processes of perception are evoked through a constructed phenomenology of listening.

The most obvious topical marker for childhood in the suite is the Lullaby ('Chanson pour bercer') of the fifth scene. Enescu's own description of the scene involves a nurse reciting her predictions to the child as it falls asleep: 'you will be big, you will be strong...'.<sup>41</sup> The lullaby's *cantabile semplice* theme appears in unison in the violin and piano (in bold contrast to the 'Ruisselet' scene), and consists of two extended phrases, each built around the circular repetition of familiar melodic contours and rhythmic patterns (Ex. 3.4).<sup>42</sup> The whole sequence is then repeated, with the piano providing a gradually more imitative and elaborate accompaniment. By design, the lullaby is supposed to induce slumber, and the theme's gently undulating and repetitive simplicity does indeed prompt a sense of restful inactivity, or quiescence. The Scottish writer Nan Shepherd describes this type of dormancy in particularly evocative terms: 'as one slips over into sleep, the mind grows limpid; the body melts; perception alone remains. One neither thinks, nor desires, nor remembers, but dwells in pure intimacy with the tangible world'.<sup>43</sup> In the lullaby, there is nothing beyond the melody itself that provokes our perceptual faculties – at least initially. What remains of perceptual interest is the movement of the melody itself, particularly its irregular stresses (compounded by frequent changes in metre) and familiar contours – each brought to the fore by a significantly pared down texture, and accompanying sense of ideality. The 'pure intimacy' that Enescu evokes here recalls the kind of plenitude of being that Bergson claimed was central to his conception of durational time, and which the latter often equated with how one hears or perceives a melody: pure duration 'forms

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<sup>39</sup> Wiskus (2013), 19. See also Merleau-Ponty, *The World of Perception*, trans. Oliver Davis (London: Routledge Classics, 2008; originally published as *Causeries*, 1948, ed. Stéphanie Ménasé (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 2002)), 41.

<sup>40</sup> Gosetti-Ferencei (2007), 6.

<sup>41</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1 ('tu seras grand, tu seras fort...'). See also Gavoty (2016), 60.

<sup>42</sup> Pascal Bentoïu has observed that the Lullaby is rhythmically reminiscent of a 'colind' (Christmas carol), 'but with a freedom characteristic of a lyric song'. See Bentoïu (2010), 411.

<sup>43</sup> Nan Shepherd, *The Living Mountain* (Edinburgh: Canongate Books, 2011), 90.

both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting...into one another'.<sup>44</sup> Pure presence of this sort is partly what makes the lullaby enchanting, although that same plenitude also articulates a contradiction. The lullaby is transfixing (and in that sense immobilising, or arresting), but its melody is also transportive, in that it lulls us into different states of attentiveness, or consciousness. Complete absorption in the melody's movement is akin to being simultaneously gripped and carried along by it, echoing Bennett's claim that 'to be both caught up and carried away – enchantment is marked by this odd combination of somatic effects'.<sup>45</sup>

**Example 3.4:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Chanson pour bercer', opening.

The musical score for 'Chanson pour bercer' is presented in three systems. The first system shows the beginning in 4/4 time, with the tempo marking 'Con moto moderato (♩ = 66)'. The violin part starts with a melodic line marked 'mp cant. semplice', and the piano part provides a simple accompaniment marked 'p s.v. semplice'. The second system continues the piece, showing dynamic markings such as '>p', 'mp', and '>p < mp' in the violin part, and 'bp' and 'p s.v.' in the piano part. The third system concludes the piece with the instruction '(Senza rigore ----- a Tempo)' and a final measure marked with a box containing the number '16'.

<sup>44</sup> Bergson (1910), 100.

<sup>45</sup> Bennett (2001), 11.

These effects could be thought of in terms of the captivating power of sound itself (or, the self-sufficiency of the sonorous space). Indeed, sonority (and sonorous repetition especially) is at the heart of what makes the lullaby scene a site of enchantment. For Bennett, and others, a theorisation of enchantment can be finessed by considering the word's etymological roots. Thus, to 'en-chant' means 'to surround with song or incantation; hence, to cast a spell with sounds, to make fall under the sway of a magical refrain, to carry away on a sonorous stream'.<sup>46</sup> Repeated word sounds have a noticeably spell-binding or hypnotic quality about them: they can quickly become meaningless or nonsensical ('pure' sound), or else they can reveal new sounds, and new perspectives of meaning. This process of repetition masks a gradual shift, in other words, from what might be understood as the signifying aspect of language to its musicality; from signification to the self-sufficiency of sonority. Herein lies the creative potential of language: as Jessica Wiskus observes, 'in language there is always more than a mapping of thought to expression: there is something latent, something unaccounted for, that springs to life in the performance of language'.<sup>47</sup> The poet Stéphane Mallarmé described this latency as the songfulness of speech, recognising the capacity of poetic language (as a kind of musical speech) to give expressive voice to the unspeakable – the allusive 'not-said' of creative thought.<sup>48</sup> By drawing on an instinctual sense of play, children are well-versed in the sensuous and pleasurable repetition of words and sounds; their inherent creativity is demonstrated through their realisation of the enchanting melodism of language – something Enescu seeks to emulate through his purely sonorous rendering of the lullaby. It is worth noting, too, that the chant-like repetition of words or phrases was once viewed in sacred terms as a passage towards enlightenment, via the stripping away of worldly distraction or sinful thought. Enescu's own description of the lullaby scene suggests a similar attempt to draw on the mesmerising effects of chant-like repetition, with the nurse's litany of predictions taking on an incantatory quality, encapsulated by the lullaby's wordless and enchanting repetitions.

The transformative effects of chant-like repetition likewise inform the philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's conception of the refrain, which 'turns back on itself, opens onto itself, revealing until then unheard-of potentialities'.<sup>49</sup> Being drawn into the lullaby's quiescent

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<sup>46</sup> Bennett (2001), 12.

<sup>47</sup> Wiskus (2013), 8–9.

<sup>48</sup> In an essay titled 'Crisis of Verse' Mallarmé writes: 'as opposed to a denominative and representative function...speech, which is primarily dream and song, recovers, in the Poet's hands, of necessity in an art devoted to fictions, its virtuality'. Mallarmé, 'Crisis of Verse', in *Divigations*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007; originally published as 'Crise de vers', Paris: 1897), 211. See also Wiskus (2013), 8–9.

<sup>49</sup> Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus*, trans. Brian Massumi (University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 349. Cited in Bennett (2001), 12.

circularity likewise opens up new, perceptually revealing ways of hearing its thematic substance. Enescu plays on this idea at the start of the theme's second iteration, introducing a rocking quaver accompaniment in the left hand of the piano part, while the right hand shadows the theme in the violin through close imitation at the octave (Ex. 3.5).

**Example 3.5:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Chanson pour bercer', middle section, Figure 17 onwards.

The imitative commentary creates an effect of (literal) displacement, as well as a further layer of audible ‘mirroring’, which itself is emblematic of an innate kind of wonder. The melodic imitation (and further subsequent elaboration in the piano accompaniment) not only provides a different way of hearing a familiar theme by poeticising aspects of its grammar; it also provokes a sharpening of sensory activity. In effect, Enescu maps an increasing sensory restlessness onto our experience of the restful lullaby theme. The somatic pulling apart this produces serves as a further indicator of the kind of bodily disruption that characterises moments of enchantment. (One particularly effective moment is at Figure 18, where a little fanfare-like figure in the piano

seems to accelerate and then settle into the relaxed pace of the lullaby melody as it recommences in the violin).

#### DWELLING IN LONGING

In referring to the lullaby scene as a ‘site’ of enchantment, I am suggesting also that it could be viewed as a contained space which, moreover, takes the form of an enchanted dwelling. As such, the somatic ambiguity to which I refer above also articulates a more broadly conceived metaphysical restlessness, of the kind that underpins a yearning to belong and to find comfort in a dwelling place – an idea which, as Julian Johnson observes, is central to the experience of modernity: ‘not being at home here and now, the modern subject...is restless to be elsewhere or elsewhere’.<sup>50</sup> Enescu’s own itinerancy (and that of other modern, touring performer-composers, such as the young Mahler, Sibelius, or Bartók) is of course emblematic of this need to find a dwelling, both in the literal sense of longing to dwell in a specific place, but also in the more abstract sense of identifying a lost homeland that needs to be remade through music. Notwithstanding the lullaby’s own implicitly restless (and desirous) elaboration of a quiescent state of dwelling, the modern subject’s metaphysical plight is exemplified primarily in the contrast between the lullaby as a whole (placed right at the heart of the suite), and all the surrounding scenes, each of which is in some way influenced by the lullaby’s motivic (and sonorous) content. Enescu’s middle movements frequently serve a similar purpose (as we have already seen), appearing as islands of restfulness and calm, and marked as special or private. It is here – in music (specifically, music *within* music, in the case of the lullaby) – that Enescu constructs his place of dwelling. A similar idea is pursued by Martin Heidegger, whose later philosophical writings elicit a sustained and quite varied preoccupation with dwelling. Around the same time that Enescu was working on his *Impressions d’enfance*, Heidegger delivered a lecture course at the University of Freiburg, entitled ‘Hölderlin’s Hymn, *Der Ister*’,<sup>51</sup> in which he characterised dwelling as a kind of ‘rest’. In the later essays, Heidegger identifies a feeling of ‘safety’ as the essence of dwelling; ultimately, dwelling means ‘to be at peace...to be

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<sup>50</sup> Johnson (2015), 185.

<sup>51</sup> The lecture course was given in 1942. See Martin Heidegger, *Hölderlin’s Hymn ‘The Ister’*, trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). Friedrich Hölderlin’s poetry was fundamental to the evolution of Heidegger’s understanding of dwelling from the period of *Being and Time* (1927), up to the late essays, ‘Building Dwelling Thinking’ and ‘...Poetically, Man Dwells...’ (both 1951). Whereas Heidegger’s earlier work is more concerned with homelessness, the later essays focus specifically on the idea of dwelling through language, which I address in greater detail later in this chapter.

protected from harm and threat, safeguarded...that is, cared for and protected'.<sup>52</sup> Through its internal repetitions, the lullaby melody conveys a similar feeling of peace, intimacy, and protection (much like the repetition of a mantra can help stave off fear, or build confidence). For Deleuze and Guattari, one of the effects produced by the musical refrain is exactly this sense of a protected 'shelter', which sets up a border between an organised, 'limited space', and the external 'forces of chaos'. Importantly, this home 'does not pre-exist', but needs to be organised spatially through acts of 'selection, elimination, and extraction'.<sup>53</sup> Most notably, and as Bennett reminds us, for Deleuze and Guattari the 'experience of "having a place" is not simply spatial but is also sonorous': sound itself (and especially repeated sound) has a foundational role in the organising and delimiting of sheltered space.<sup>54</sup>

The assertion that 'home' does not simply pre-exist, and that it requires (presumably continuous) acts of organisation, selection, and extraction, resonates strongly with the technical manner by which Enescu anticipates the lullaby's melodic material. This takes place through a process of motivic protention (in the Husserlian sense), which Enescu uses as a way of 'organising' the sonorous home, by extracting its melodic components from the surrounding 'chaos'. As I explored in Chapter One, Enescu embeds motivic segments and contours within the texture before the start of the lullaby, and consequently before they are perceived as thematically significant. For instance, the piano part of the preceding scene ('L'oiseau en cage et le coucou au mur') is replete with motivic variants of the lullaby's opening seven-note figure; that same motivic figure is also 'quoted' at Figures 1 and 2, near the start of the 'Vieux Mendiant' scene (I discuss both scenes below). As is often the case elsewhere in Enescu's oeuvre, the motivic construction in the *Impressions* suite is self-generating to the point that it is possible to trace the origins of several of the lullaby's more characteristic melodic contours right back to the opening scene (the  $\hat{5}-\hat{4}-\hat{3}-\hat{1}$  melodic figure is a notable example; see Ex. 3.1). The process of motivic embedding, we might recall, is primarily one of familiarisation: of making melodic segments memorable, so that by the time the lullaby melody is heard, it already seems familiar – it already sounds like home.

Notably, however, once the comforting sense of home is secured, the refrain simultaneously begins to look beyond its own delimited space: 'one opens the circle not on the side where the old forces of chaos press against it but in another region, one created by the circle itself...in

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<sup>52</sup> Quoted in Julian Young, 'What Is Dwelling? The Homelessness of Modernity and the Worlding of the World', in Mark A. Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, eds., *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus*, Vol. 1 (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2000), 189.

<sup>53</sup> Deleuze and Guattari (1987), 311.

<sup>54</sup> Bennett (2001), 140.

order to join with the forces of the future'. It is this final effect of the refrain which Deleuze and Guattari famously describe as when 'one ventures from home on the thread of a tune'.<sup>55</sup> This is exactly what Enescu does in the second iteration of the lullaby theme, when the piano begins its imitative flights, probing the cracks of its sonorous walls through ulterior drifts, twists, vibrations, and movements (see Ex. 3.5, above). These minor disruptions – the superimposition of new types or modes of experience – contribute to the lullaby's enchanting quality. (Eventually, the child's refrain will make overtures toward the non-human world, and vibrate with the insect refrain of the next scene – 'Grillon').

In stark contrast to the 'at-homeness' of the 'Chanson pour bercer', the 'Vieux mendiant' ('Old beggar') scene presents a musical exploration of homelessness. And whereas a sense of dwelling in the lullaby is created through the sonorous re-collecting of melodic material, the suite's second scene is marked instead by an apparent failure of memory. The opening fourteen bars of the piano part seem to re-enact a process of trying to remember, by introducing a series of statements which expand upon the scene's initial motivic idea of a falling semitone (Ex. 3.6, below). The statements gradually coalesce (at Figure 2) into a motivic anticipation of the lullaby theme's opening melodic contour (A-B-D-C-B-G-F#; compare Ex. 3.4). However, like every statement so far, the phrase simply seems to give up with the effort of attempting to recall some as yet unrecognisable idea of home. The melodic line slumps dismally down a semitone, and fades away. This sighing, or sagging figure comprises the most fundamental aspect of the intervallic writing in this scene (frequently accompanied by expressive markings such as *patetico*, *lamentoso*, *mesto*, *malinconico*), and is exemplified both by the violin's *raucamente* ('hoarse') vocality and the *mancando* ('dying away') slide from a sustained A<sub>4</sub> down a whole octave, and then further still by two more semitones, in the fourth bar before the scene's end. It is a pathetic conclusion to a scene steeped in melancholy, marked by its inability to construct (and retain) a memorable refrain, or shelter (one is reminded again of Freud's reading of melancholy: as the inability to perceive or recall what has been lost; here, it is a sense of home).

Homelessness can of course be thought of in conceptually broader terms, beyond the definition of literally lacking a home. The violin's dying breath hints at a metaphysical kind of homelessness, the essence of which Julian Young suggests Heidegger first incorporated in his early conception of 'Dasein' ('being-as-human'). Accordingly, the pervading mood of *Being and Time* (1927) – along with Heidegger's conception of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' – is homelessness, or alienation. The source of this homelessness, Young goes on to explain, is an

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<sup>55</sup> Deleuze and Guattari (1987), 311.

**Example 3.6:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Vieux mendiant', opening section.

anxiety, or ‘ontological insecurity’ in the face of death, or the ‘abyss’.<sup>56</sup> In his later writings, Heidegger becomes increasingly concerned with the duality of homelessness and dwelling, so that the former only characterises what Young helpfully distinguishes as ‘ordinary dwelling’

<sup>56</sup> Young (2000), 188–189.

(which differs from ‘essential dwelling’).<sup>57</sup> Dwelling in the ordinary sense refers to how we experience ourselves in the world, or how we might (or might not) feel at home; in modernity, the feeling is almost always one of alienation. Conversely, essential dwelling does not rely on feeling or experience at all. In a move that highlights the fundamental transposition of his thinking, late Heidegger maintains that human beings dwell essentially because this is ontologically the case, regardless of whether one feels at home or not in the ordinary sense. Essential dwelling can be thought of as a transcendent mode, which repositions Heidegger’s former conception of the abyss within a broader plenitude of being that he calls ‘ek-sistence’.<sup>58</sup>

I will return to this idea in my discussion of the suite’s final scene below; for now, I wish to focus on the duality of homelessness and dwelling that Heidegger clearly imagined to be the modern subject’s existential plight. For many modern composers (Enescu included), this plight was most obviously manifested in the modern-day realities of exile or itinerancy (as mentioned above), but it also expressed itself implicitly in individuals’ day-to-day experience of being in the world. Music (and art generally) has always offered itself as a space for poetic and psychological dwelling (or for the poetic remaking of a ‘lost’ homeland), but perhaps more pertinently, it offers a means for exploring and thinking through such apparently conflicting ideas as homelessness and dwelling dialectically. While *Impressions* does point to some more explicit renderings of homelessness (the old beggar; the caged bird; the itinerant fiddler), much like his contemporaries, Enescu was also concerned with the subtler ways in which homelessness runs as a dialectical counterpart to dwelling, especially when considering the relationship between humans and nature. In this context, I am interested primarily in the degree of permissible or realisable contact between the human and non-human world, and the types of fascination and creative responses this engenders (two operas from the 1920s offer prime examples of how this interaction was rendered musically and dramatically: Leoš Janáček’s *The Cunning Little Vixen* (1923), and Ravel’s *L’Enfant et les sortilèges* (1925), which I discuss in further detail below). The extent to which one might come to know nature, or experience it, especially in a bodily sense, similarly frames my thinking about how an earthly living-space might impinge upon or attempt to incorporate aspects of nature. As Andrea Nightingale suggests, this hinges on the idea that the modern subject’s apprehension of the natural world, in experiential (non-scientific) terms, is always partial or broken off, and collapsing into fascination.<sup>59</sup> This ‘broken knowledge’, as Francis Bacon described it, provokes a feeling of

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<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 194.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 193.

<sup>59</sup> Andrea Nightingale, ‘Broken Knowledge’, in Landy and Saler, eds. (2009), 16.

simultaneous belonging and unbelonging in the face of something known yet unknown – a blurred duality which for Nightingale ‘masks a unique mode of wonder’.<sup>60</sup>

The wondrous contemplation of nature as a familiar yet alien Other underpins Enescu’s conception of not only the *Impressions d’enfance*, but also several other pieces. Among the later works, both the Third Orchestral Suite (‘*Villageoise*’), Op. 27 (1938), and the unfinished *Voix de la Nature* (a symphonic suite comprising the completed *Vox Maris*, Op. 31 (1954), and the fragment ‘Nuages d’automne sur les forêts’) stand out, the former conjuring similarly onomatopoeic and rustic evocations of rural life to those found in *Impressions*. Pastoral evocations more broadly are noticeably frequent throughout Enescu’s oeuvre, from his first published work (the *Poème Roumain*, Op. 1) through to his last (the Chamber Symphony, Op. 33). This recourse to pastoral topics could easily be read as a historically minded attempt to re-enchant the present, thereby counteracting (or perhaps dramatising) the composer’s own sense of *dépayement*, by reinvoking the kind of harmonious unity with nature that was perceived as lost under modernity. However, though his primary concern may be with framing a childlike way of seeing the world, Enescu is not quite so naive as to confuse what Theodor Adorno described, after Hegel, as ‘second nature’ (‘*zweite Natur*’) with primary nature (or the natural world, which second nature – or society – exploits and dominates). Indeed, though he may at times invoke a mythic idea of nature, there is nonetheless an awareness on Enescu’s part (of a different kind, however, to the self-reflective irony one finds – and which Adorno identifies – in Mahler) that the closer one gets to nature, the more distant it seems. And while nature may never be purely nature in our apprehension of it, it is precisely at the point where our efforts to comprehend it collapse in failure that enchantment resides; for Deleuze, as Bennett notes, ‘enchantment resides in the spaces where nature and culture overlap’.<sup>61</sup>

Much of this comes across in Enescu’s onomatopoeic renderings of animal ‘voices’ and of the natural world – portrayals which invariably combine empiricism with poetic reflection. Perhaps the best example of this to be found anywhere in Enescu’s oeuvre is the ‘Shepherd’ scene (‘*Pâtre*’) in the third movement of the *Villageoise* Suite, Op. 27. The scene begins (seven bars after Figure 41) with an unaccompanied, plangent oboe solo, marked *nostalgico*. After sixteen bars or so it is interrupted by an extraordinary rendering of bleating sheep: chromatic clusters in the muted trumpets and trombones, together with harmonium (see Ex. 3.7, below).

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid., 36.

<sup>61</sup> Bennett (2001), 48.

**Example 3.7:** *Orchestral Suite No. 3* ('Villageoise'), Op. 27, 3<sup>rd</sup> movement, 'Shepherd' scene, Figure 42 – 3 – Figure 42+7.

**Figure 42 – 3**

*molto tranq.* 42 *pochiss. più animato*

*f* *grave* *mp dolce* *bp* *p* *bp* *bp*

*Ob.*

*1.* *2.* *3.* *4.*

*C Tpt.*

*1.* *2.* *3.*

*Tbn.*

*Harmon.*

*8* *mp* *mp sost.* *mp sost.* *mp sost.* *mp sost.* *mp sost.* *mp sost.*

*avec sourd.* *avec sourd.* *avec sourd.* *avec sourd.* *avec sourd.* *avec sourd.*

*dans les coulisses*

**Figure 42+7**

*poco rall. più rall.* *a tempo tranq.*

*bf con suono* *> mp*

*Ob.*

*1.* *2.* *3.* *4.*

*C Tpt.*

*1.* *2.* *3.*

*Tbn.*

*Harmon.*

*poco* *mf* *molto* *p s.v.* *bp* *mf* *molto* *p s.v.* *mf* *molto* *p s.v.* *bp*

*dans les coulisses*

The unsettling, almost haunting quality conveyed by these bizarre noises is accentuated by the fact that they take place offstage (*'dans les coulisses'*) and out of sight; nature's fundamental otherness and unknowability is framed here in terms of a literal invisibility (with enchantment residing in the space between what is audibly perceptible and visually imperceptible). This rendering is even more remarkable if we consider that the scene, which continues with more piping from the shepherd, can go on for around two and half minutes before any onstage playing resumes (onstage horns join the offstage brass and harmonium at the second bleating, which also features *sforzando* tremolos in the trumpets and trombones).<sup>62</sup>

Onomatopoeic renderings of nature have a strong precedent in the French musical tradition, reaching back through Debussy, Camille Saint-Saëns, and Berlioz most obviously, although the use of more general onomatopoeic effects can in fact be traced all the way back to the programmatic chansons of the Renaissance composer Clément Janequin (whose settings of verses by the Renaissance poet Clément Marot Enescu may well have encountered when composing his own *Sept Chansons de Clément Marot*, Op. 15, of 1908). Outside of France, Janáček's use of onomatopoeia in *The Cunning Little Vixen* is remarkable for the ways it interrogates the distinction between nature and society, most prominently through Janáček's simultaneous humanising and othering of his animal protagonists. But the piece which corresponds most closely with Enescu's *Impressions d'enfance* is probably Ravel's second opera, *L'Enfant et les sortilèges*. The similarities between both works could be ascribed to the fact that Enescu and Ravel were long-time friends: they studied together at the Paris Conservatoire and, despite some obvious differences in musical taste and aesthetic, they evidently shared a mutual respect and admiration for each other's work;<sup>63</sup> indeed, Ravel occasionally presented Enescu with drafts for approval, or for them to play through together.<sup>64</sup> It seems likely, then, that Enescu would have known or heard Ravel's opera, which tells the story of a naughty child's subjective 'awakening', while a host of inanimate objects (items of

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<sup>62</sup> I return to this scene and the ways it seems to blur the distinction between reality and the imaginary in Chapter Four.

<sup>63</sup> Ravel's student, Manuel Rosenthal, recalls his teacher's 'great admiration' for Enescu, as well as his claim that among the students making up André Gédalge's counterpoint class at the Paris Conservatoire – which included Ravel, Florent Schmitt, Henri Rabaud, and Jean Roger-Ducasse – Enescu was, in Ravel's words, 'the most gifted of us all' (*'le plus calé de nous tous'*). Manuel Rosenthal, *Ravel: Souvenirs de Manuel Rosenthal*, compiled by Marcel Marnat (Paris: Hazan, 1955), 56. In one of his interviews with Gavoty, Enescu states: 'who doesn't love the delicious harmonies of Ravel?'; he continues, however: 'but, I dreamt of music that was grander, vaster, simpler, more exuberant. I am an unrepentant lyric' (*'un lyrique impénitent'*). Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 9.

<sup>64</sup> It is known that Ravel approached Enescu for the first readings and premiere of his Violin Sonata of 1927. See Stephen Zank, *Irony and Sound: The Music of Maurice Ravel* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2009), 132; see also Yehudi Menuhin's account in note 22 of Chapter One.

furniture and crockery, storybook characters), and a variety of animals and plants – including frogs, insects, trees, a bat, and a squirrel – become magically anthropomorphised before him. The enchanted garden of the opera's second part is especially remarkable for its variety of timbral effects, with animals and trees speaking freely to the child. And although Ravel's style is certainly more self-knowing and ironic (at times comically so) than Enescu's more sincere rendering, like the *Impressions* suite, *L'Enfant et les sortilèges* constructs its drama out of a childlike fascination with and contemplation of nature, especially in relation to home life. Indeed, it is through a mutually beneficent interaction with nature that the child (dramatically present in Ravel, but vocally absent in Enescu) gains a more mature understanding of his own place in the (human) world.

Whereas Romantic attitudes towards nature were underscored by a sense of distance (epitomised by the notion of the sublime, which situated nature beyond the reach of comprehension), the artistic perception of nature as 'far-off' gradually became inverted in the later decades of the nineteenth century, mirroring advancements in the empirical understanding of the natural world. Consequently, by the time of the twentieth century, composers like Ravel and Enescu had become increasingly concerned with how music might allow for unprecedentedly 'objectivist' (or 'inexpressive', as Vladimir Jankélévitch also writes) representations of nature, drawing attention as much as possible to the microscopic details inherent to things-in-themselves<sup>65</sup> (this tendency also parallels what I am referring to as a childlike perceptual mode – a closer and more intimate self-identification with objects and the surrounding world). A relatively early example of this aesthetic of 'closeness' in Enescu can be heard in his use of bell sonorities in several works, but especially the 'Carillon Nocturne' from the Third Piano Suite (*Pièces impromptues*), Op. 18 (1916). In a remarkably striking opening, dissonant chord clusters, containing major sevenths and augmented octaves, reverberate in the piano's higher registers with a metallic brilliance (Ex. 3.8). Enescu further seems to dissect the overtone-laden quality of pealing bells by using different-sized noteheads: the root of each chord is larger than the dissonant 'harmonics' spaced out above it, which also implies that the root melody be brought out against the overlying harmony (emphasised further by the *marcato* indications). The objectivist aesthetic Enescu employs here finds a highly comparable (and almost exactly contemporaneous) example in the bell sounds of Louis Vuillemin's piano suite of 1918, *Soirs armoricains*, Op. 21, which Jankélévitch describes in the following terms: in this piece, 'it is bells themselves that ring...and not, as with the Romantics, an idealist, subjective

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<sup>65</sup> See Jankélévitch (2003), 32–39.

transposition of the poetry of bell sounds'.<sup>66</sup> The same might easily be said of Enescu's 'Carillon Nocturne', and indeed of the many works featuring bell sounds by Debussy or Ravel.<sup>67</sup> It is notable, in any case, that each of these composers gives voice to the bells in such a way as to imply an effacement of the human subject (or perhaps more accurately, a merging of the human subject with the objects it perceives). This, as Jankélévitch asserts, is the most striking consequence of this kind of objectivism, and the reason why such music can purport to being non-musical.<sup>68</sup>

**Example 3.8:** *Third Piano Suite ('Pièces impromptues')*, Op. 18: VII. 'Carillon Nocturne', opening bars.

**L'istesso tempo (moderato, non troppo lento)**

*8<sup>va</sup>*

(8)

sempre *Ped.*

(poco accel. ---- calando ----)

A similarly objectivist aesthetic can be identified in Enescu's onomatopoeic renderings of animal 'voices' in *Impressions d'enfance*. As suggested above, these microscopically precise and faithful notations might well bring us 'closer' to nature, but that very desire for proximity simultaneously highlights nature's essential strangeness. The song of the caged bird in the fourth scene ('L'Oiseau en cage et le coucou au mur') is a good case in point: muted, high in

<sup>66</sup> Ibid., 33.

<sup>67</sup> See Debussy's 'Cloches à travers les feuilles' from *Images*, or 'La Cathédrale engloutie' from the first book of *Préludes*; and Ravel's 'Entre Cloches' from *Sites auriculaires*, or 'La vallée des cloches' from *Miroirs*. Liszt seems an important early forbear here: see for instance his 'Les cloches de Genève: Nocturne' from *Années de pèlerinage*, or his famously fiendish étude, 'La campanella'.

<sup>68</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 34–35.

its register, and quiet, the violin's chirruping (notated as staccatos and tremolos, leaps and slides) comes across as a startlingly vivid and tantalisingly realistic mimicry (Ex. 3.9).<sup>69</sup> The rhythmic precision and highly detailed articulation also suggest a minute attentiveness to nature's exactitude, as does Enescu's extensive use of portamento between pairs of notes, which lends an indeterminacy to the violin's non-musical song. Sound itself, at the most microscopic level, becomes approximated, drawing us closer to the marvellously specific voice of nature – a 'space of virtuosic detail', to use Francesca Brittan's apt phrase – and away from the rationally mediated world of notated music.<sup>70</sup> With the complete dissolution of any sense of metre or narrative (at least until the piano re-enters), these compulsively fascinating, infinitesimal details of the birdsong are further thrown into sharp relief. It is as much through the resulting sense of immediacy (as well as the child's wont to 'recognise himself in everything') that the caged bird's song comes across as objectively 'real' – not only to our ears, but likewise to the ears of the vocally absent but ever-present child through whom we experience it all.

**Example 3.9:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'L'Oiseau en cage et le coucou au mur', opening bars (*continued next page*).

The musical score for Example 3.9 is presented in two systems. The first system shows the beginning of the piece. The tempo is marked 'Andantino' with a quarter note equal to 50 beats per minute. The key signature has one flat (B-flat). The time signature is 4/4. The violin part begins with a 'nostalgico' marking and includes dynamics like 'p un poco staccato, non spiccato' and 'poco'. The piano part is mostly silent in the first system. The second system shows the piano re-entering with 'esitando' and various dynamics like 'p', 'bp', and 'p non troppo'. The score includes triplets and portamento markings.

<sup>69</sup> Enescu's exploration of birdsong in *Impressions* roughly coincides with Olivier Messiaen's first attempts at incorporating birdsong within his own compositions, starting with the *Quatuor pour la fin du temps* of 1941 (thereafter, Messiaen would use birdsong as the foundational material for his *Reveil des oiseaux* (1953), *Oiseaux exotiques* (1956), *Catalogue d'oiseaux* (1958), and *Chronochromie* (1960)).

<sup>70</sup> Francesca Brittan, 'On Microscopic Hearing: Fairy Magic, Natural Science, and the *Scherzo fantastique*', in the *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Vol. 64, No. 3 (University of California Press, 2011), 533.

Something similar happens in the sixth scene ('Grillon'), in which a chirping cricket's inexpressive 'voice' is faithfully recreated in the violin's extremely energetic and rapid staccato oscillations (Ex. 3.10). Both the *gettando l'arco* and *saltando* markings (demanding a throwing action, and a bouncing motion respectively) suggest an abrasive physicality evocative of a cricket's stridulation. There is a feeling of unpredictability or waywardness accompanying these techniques, stemming from the relative lack of control as the bow hits the string and ricochets off. This is not musically expressive writing, in other words: instead, Enescu extracts a non-musical song out of the friction between two planes, as they collide and grate.<sup>71</sup>

**Example 3.10:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Grillon', violin part.

What we experience here is not merely a sonorous imitation, but an attempt to mimic an animal's physical habits through purportedly inexpressive, essentially mobile gestures – akin to what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as 'becoming-animal'.<sup>72</sup> This process is contingent on a

<sup>71</sup> Enescu's own interpretation of this brief scene, which he includes as part of his description of *Impressions* (complete with musical examples) in one of his interviews with Gavoty, is well worth listening to: the sheer level of 'unmusicality' that he demonstrates as being integral to this gesture goes well beyond the rather more elegant renderings that one encounters in more recent recordings. Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1.

<sup>72</sup> See Chapter 10, '1730: Becoming-Intense, Becoming-Animal, Becoming-Imperceptible...' in Deleuze and Guattari (1987), 232–309, and especially 237–257. See also Chapter 4, 'Body, Meat, and Spirit, Becoming-Animal' in Gilles Deleuze, *Francis Bacon: The Logic of Sensation*, trans. Daniel W. Smith (Continuum, 2003),

desire to fulfil or overcome the lure of the Other (or new, or different) through some exhilarating and magical transformation. That desire probably finds its most unashamed manifestation in children's games of make-believe, and in the carefree wish to become something else (like an animal, or an aeroplane, or a giant) by pretending. More accurately, the pretence is derived from what it might feel like to be that something, or someone else. As such, the desire for metamorphosis is also mingled with a pleasurable sense of freedom – the freedom to do, or be, as well as to think, or move otherwise. The capacity of cross-species encounters to provoke fascination and to enchant comes as a result of this promised sense of freedom (be it imaginative, subjective, somatic), particularly as expressed in the context of 'becoming'. Indeed, the enchantment to be found in hybrid forms such as becoming-animal (or merely becoming-*different*) stems in part from the continual sense of flux, or free play, conveyed by states of becoming (one is reminded of Rilke's lines quoted at the outset of this chapter: 'But existence is still enchanted; is at a hundred or more / Points in its origin still. A playing of pure forces...'). Inherent to Deleuze's account (and recalling my discussion in the last chapter) is what Cliff Stagoll describes as 'the *pure movement* evident in changes between particular events...[becoming] is the very *dynamism* of change' (my emphasis).<sup>73</sup> Bennett also surmises that motion is at the heart of what makes such inter-species 'crossings' enchant: 'to live among or as a crossing is to have motion called to mind, and this reminding is also a somatic event...hybrids enchant for the same reason that moving one's body in space can carry one away'.<sup>74</sup> And it is essentially through motion and gesture that Enescu experiences his becoming-animal. Deleuze's understanding of becoming as durational (in the Bergsonian sense) further allows the possibility of extending and revelling in a continually reciprocal migration of differences: a rich counterpoint of marvellous identities, that both stops us in our tracks and whisks us away.

The 'Grillon' scene calls to mind similar renderings of the insect world found not only in Ravel's *L'Enfant et les sortilèges*, for instance, but also in Janáček's *The Cunning Little Vixen*; Béla Bartók's 'The Night's Music' (from the *Out of Doors* suite for solo piano, composed in 1926); or, going back to the previous century, the Scherzo movement (entitled 'The Queen Mab, the queen of dreams') of Berlioz's *Roméo et Juliette* symphony (1839). What ties these experimental forays into 'insect music' together is a creative desire to unearth the strangeness

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20–26. As discussed in Chapter Two, 'Becoming' (along with 'difference') constitutes an important part of Deleuze's corpus.

<sup>73</sup> Cliff Stagoll, 'Becoming', in *The Deleuze Dictionary*, ed. Adrian Parr (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 26.

<sup>74</sup> Bennett (2001), 21.

and otherworldliness of nature, most obviously as a counterpoise to the mundanity of an industrialised and disenchanted world. This perception of (scaled-down) nature as otherworldly and enchanting was manifested in the nineteenth century by the conflation of insect music with fairy music, amid a contemporary enthusiasm for elfin depictions within art in general. Thus, in France, the ‘microscopic natural’, as Brittan describes it, was mingled with the supernatural, prompting a host of contemporary theorisations on what Théophile Gautier termed the ‘surnaturel vrai’ and ‘fantastique moderne’.<sup>75</sup> In their exploration of supposedly magical insect worlds, and sprites and fairy kingdoms, Romantic composers drew on music’s special and long-understood capacity for successfully ‘representing’ such fictional landscapes. The belief was sustained well into the next century, and it is notable that the scientific rationalisation of the insect world did little to neutralise its magical, or otherworldly status. On the contrary, advancements in microscopy and photography, which made the once hidden world visible, arguably helped confirm this outlook: through the belief, in the nineteenth century, that ‘properly wielded, science itself would but confirm the existence of fantasy’,<sup>76</sup> and more recently, in the conviction that the exposed secrets of the miniscule natural world are, in themselves, a source of vertiginous wonder. Although the means of representation might have become more objectively ‘scientific’, the tendency among composers for staging or evoking the natural world has remained strong by virtue of a continuing belief in nature’s capacity to enchant. Music itself is thereby reinvested with a special potency for enchanting the present.

Not only has technological progress done little to diminish our fascination with nature, it has, perhaps, only magnified our sense of estrangement from it. Similarly, musical representations of nature may well aspire to a microscopic kind of realism, but this only serves to emphasise the inherent distance between nature and the modern subject, for whom apprehension of the former could only ever be partial. This gap between nature and culture is ultimately borne out by the conceptual mixture of empiricism and reflective thought that is inherent in artistic representations of the natural world. Take Enescu’s onomatopoeic transcriptions of the wind and storm (‘Vent dans la cheminée’ and ‘Tempête au dehors, dans la nuit’) in scenes VIII and IX of *Impressions d’enfance*: the dissonant clusters, chromatic swirls, occasionally violent wrenches and remarkable timbral effects aspire to being non-musical noise, effectively testing the resistance of what might be construed as ‘music’. These sounds represent, in Jankélévitch’s words, a ‘border zone beyond which art simply reabsorbs itself into

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<sup>75</sup> Brittan (2011), 539; 531–532.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 532.

reality'.<sup>77</sup> At the same time, however, these indistinct textures are tempered by a kind of poeticism and a creative logic, determined and governed, moreover, by the rationalised capabilities of the instruments being played.<sup>78</sup> The sense of wonder elicited by the music's onomatopoeic 'closeness' to these elemental forces is derived as much from the at times dazzling virtuosity that Enescu calls for, further emphasising the culturally processed means by which these objectively realistic, 'non-musical', or 'natural' soundscapes are constructed, or poeticised.

Such considerations of music's poetically delimited capacity for objective representation further prompts an examination of how these 'things-in-themselves' might be perceived in time. For Jankélévitch, the possibility of 'finding and touching the immediate' is always, in fact, mediated by the present moment's intangibility: 'the present is made past-like by the milligram of nostalgia, by the infinitesimal and somehow minimal regret, that makes all perception into a memory-of-the-present, a present imperceptibly gone by, a present almost past'.<sup>79</sup> There is always already a sense of pastness within the present, in Jankélévitch's view, since perception of the present moment is always poeticised – always essentially reimagined, and thereby made past-like. Returning to the caged bird in scene four, it may well seem significant, then, that Enescu should mark the violin's 'non-musical' song *nostalgico*. Programmatically speaking, this (and a later marking of *mesto* – 'sad') likely refers to the imprisoned (and anthropomorphised) bird's yearning for a remembered freedom. At the same time, however, by suffusing its song with a modality of pastness, Enescu makes explicit the distinction between nature's immediate, objective reality, and its human, culturally mediated mode of expression.<sup>80</sup> Heard in this context, the interruption of the birdsong by the mechanical notes of the cuckoo clock suggests an ironic questioning of the 'real' bird's verisimilitude.<sup>81</sup> The latter might aspire to being a faithfully conceived transcription of real birdsong, but in the end, it is no more real (in the sense of music's limited capacity for representation) than the song of the 'Coucou au mur'. Going deeper, the anthropomorphic bird's nostalgic song communicates self-consciously

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<sup>77</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 37.

<sup>78</sup> Julian Johnson has observed how such processes as the rationalised construction of instruments or the systematisation of modern tuning emerged as products of disenchantment. The history of music is consequently as much bound up with the rationalizing forces that led to the disenchantment of modernity as it is with a concurrent 'nostalgia for re-enchantment'. See Johnson (2003), 196–200.

<sup>79</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 33; 39.

<sup>80</sup> Anton Webern's 'Gesang einer gefangenen Amsel' ('Song of a captive blackbird'), from the *6 Lieder nach Gedichten von Georg Trakl*, Op. 14 (1917–1922), offers a slightly different take on a similar idea, namely the opposition between overly-rationalised and more faithful, or 'freer' depictions of nature.

<sup>81</sup> The interrupting cuckoo clock also constitutes possibly the only moment of genuine irony to be found anywhere in Enescu.

the composer's awareness that the perception of nature will always be in some sense poeticised; Enescu's artistic representation is but the elaboration of a poetic instinct – or, as Bachelard puts it, a reverie which 'has all the oscillations of childhood reveries between the real and the unreal, between real life and imaginary life'.<sup>82</sup> In the wider context of the work, one realises, of course, that for Enescu, the startling immediacy (or 'reality') of the caged bird's song will always be inhabited by imagination and memory, because the suite itself is envisaged as the re-staging of scenes contained in, and by memory.

My discussion of Enescu's depictions of the natural world sets up a distinction between a carnal, or bodily means of coming to know nature, and a reflective, poetic means of apprehension. The implication is that carnal knowledge allows for a 'closeness' that is ultimately impeded, or negated by intellectual curiosity; in its poeticism of the thing-in-itself, perceptual cognition comes after bodily knowledge. In her exploration of Thoreau, and his own musings on how body and mind interact with nature, Andrea Nightingale claims similarly that 'while our bodies ally us with nonhuman beings', the 'very activity of human cognition and self-consciousness pulls us away from nature, and precludes us from being fully at home on earth'.<sup>83</sup> It is the mental awareness of our own bodily finitude, in that case, that separates us from a purely carnal, temporally immediate experience of the natural world. By way of further elucidation, Nightingale cites a beautiful passage from Robert Harrison's meditative study on forests, which is worth reproducing here in full:

We humans do not speak the language of nature's self-inclusion, but one of extraneous excess. Our *logos* is the outside of things – a boundary of finitude at which we are lost but which, in return, enables us to utter words at all. The words 'tree' and 'rock' are utterable because *logos*, in its longing, projects us beyond the containment of trees, rocks, wind and forests. In excess of the earth, we dwell in longing as in a house turned inside out.<sup>84</sup>

In our ability to name the things of nature, we place ourselves at a remove, and even beyond those things. Dwelling in longing might on the one hand be considered in terms of a yearning to know nature in purely carnal terms, but evidently it goes deeper than that, as our mind projects us beyond the immanent, immediate states of bodily and temporal presence contained by nature's things-in-themselves. Drawing conceptual similarities with Heidegger's 'ek-sistence', Nightingale observes that by dwelling 'in excess of the earth', our being is

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<sup>82</sup> Bachelard (1971), 123.

<sup>83</sup> Nightingale (2009), 32.

<sup>84</sup> Robert Pogue Harrison, *Forests: The Shadow of Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 229–30. Cited in Nightingale (2009), 32.

consequently one of extravagance – or, as Thoreau himself puts it, extra-vagant, which deliberately emphasises the Latin roots of ‘wandering’ (*vagare*) ‘beyond’ (*extra*).<sup>85</sup>

Dwelling in longing, or dwelling ‘extra-vagantly’, is evidently a central theme of Enescu’s *Impressions d’enfance*, but nowhere is it made more explicit than in the suite’s final scene, titled ‘Lever de soleil’ (‘Sunrise’). In its conception and overall effect, the scene bears striking similarities with Harrison’s poignant image of a ‘house turned inside out’. Having survived the tempestuous night, Enescu’s child protagonist is greeted by the dawn, and by a marvellous infiltration of the outside world, which is mixed with memories of the lullaby and other musical ideas (‘internal’ memories); Ex. 3.11 below illustrates how the scene begins. Familiar birdsong interjections are prevalent, and appear in nearly every bar between Figures 32–36; we are reminded of the cricket at Figure 35 in the left hand of the piano; varied and fragmentary reminders of the fiddler’s music and the lullaby theme in particular appear intermittently throughout (for instance: in the violin in the second bar after Figure 34 and at Figure 35; in the right hand of the piano half a bar before Figure 35; in all three bars after Figure 36; in the violin again two bars before Figure 38; and so on). In fact, nearly every aspect of the melodic writing (in the violin especially) is in some way derivative of previous thematic material, and therefore richly allusive. The piano part, meanwhile, is replete with rhapsodic arpeggiation, glissandos, and trilled chords. Enescu describes the scene to Gavoty: ‘it’s day! Shafts of light penetrate all through the room. The birds sing. All the themes return, this time in the major. The child breathes, he is happy’.<sup>86</sup> Amid the piano’s increasingly lavish depiction of a dawn chorus, and the rapturous soaring of the violin, the child seems to reach out beyond the limits of his physical dwelling, and re-situate himself as part of the world outside, effectively inverting the boundaries of his own home. In its virtuosity, the music is likewise extravagantly rendered, and I am interested especially in the rhapsodic and, ultimately, ‘ek-static’ (literally, ‘standing outside oneself’) means by which Enescu conceives of his outward-facing dwelling. I am also interested in how the scene’s transfigurative quality is further manifested in the sonorous evocation of light, which clearly plays an important part not only in Enescu’s conception of the ‘Sunrise’ scene, but also in the suite as a whole – for instance, in the moonlight of the seventh scene (‘Lune à travers les vitres’), and in the delightful reflections of the babbling brook in the third scene.

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<sup>85</sup> Nightingale (2009), 32; 29.

<sup>86</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1; Gavoty (2016), 60.

Example 3.11: *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Lever de soleil', opening.

**Un poco Andante**  
(♩ = 42)

Vln. *mf* (sans sourd.) C.4 *harm.*

Pno. **Un poco Andante**  
(♩ = 42) *dolciss. etereo cant.* *mp* *pp*

*8<sup>va</sup>* *mp* *p* *pigolando non troppo* *poco* *bp*

**LEVER DE SOLEIL**

Vln. *mf* *dolce, chiaro* *f* *harm.* *espress.* C.3

Pno. *mf stacc.* *mp* *poco* *p* *armonioso*

*mf delicatamente, con purita* C.4 C.3

*un poco marc. ma sempre dolciss.*

*sempre p*

Within the experience of instrumental music, categories such as ecstasy, transcendence or rhapsody have often been perceived and thought about specifically in relation to virtuosity. Historically, this concept has invited an array of definitions and meanings, united perhaps by a shared contemplation of virtuosity's inseparability from what could be described as the musical work's 'event-status'.<sup>87</sup> In its simplest and most conventional understanding, virtuosity could be interpreted as the demonstration of exceptional technical ability, combined with an impassioned kind of expressivity. As such, instrumental virtuosity has most often been identified as a quintessentially Romantic ideal (exemplified in the performances of Niccolò Paganini and by the 'Lisztomania' of the 1840s), although the impulse for composing pieces containing blazing displays of technical bravura has of course continued, across a variety of genres, into the twenty-first century. Among Enescu's contemporaries, for instance, Sergei Prokofiev's concertos (especially the five for piano which he himself performed) and several of Ravel's solo piano pieces (*Gaspard de la nuit*, in particular) stand out, as well as Sergei Rachmaninov's paean to virtuosity itself, the *Rhapsody on a Theme of Paganini*, alongside numerous other piano works. The inclination towards virtuosity apparent in Enescu's works, particularly those for solo violin, stems in part from his own virtuoso capabilities, and is further influenced by contemporary definitions and interpretations of virtuosity and virtuosic expression. Thus, while Enescu's understanding of virtuosity might in some ways conform to the example set by Liszt (whose music and performances so forcibly came to dominate mid- to late nineteenth-century interpretations of virtuosity, and which further inform the bulk of the historical and cultural investigations into virtuosity carried out in recent decades)<sup>88</sup>, it also deviates from the Lisztian and Romantic conception in some important respects. Unlike Liszt, Enescu was always at pains to keep his virtuoso profile markedly separate from his compositional work (he told Gavoty in one of their conversations, 'for me, the violin was only a way of making myself [musically] independent').<sup>89</sup> His uneasiness with being identified as a virtuoso may in some ways echo the increasing hostility with which early nineteenth-century critics came to regard virtuosity, pointing especially to what they saw as a subtraction of

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<sup>87</sup> For a consideration of how virtuosity marks out a 'relational field' between music's object-status and event-status, see the Introduction to Jim Samson's *Virtuosity and the Musical Work: The Transcendental Studies of Liszt* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

<sup>88</sup> Alongside Samson (2003), see also: James Deaville, 'Virtuosity and the Virtuoso', in *Aesthetics of Music: Musicological Perspectives*, ed. Stephen Downes (New York: Routledge, 2014), 276–296; Susan Bernstein, *Virtuosity of the Nineteenth Century: Performing Music and Language in Heine, Liszt and Baudelaire* (Stanford University Press, 1998); and Lawrence Kramer, 'Franz Liszt and the Virtuoso Public Sphere: Sight and Sound in the Rise of Mass Entertainment', in *Musical Meaning: Toward a Critical History* (University of California Press, 2002), 68–99.

<sup>89</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 10 (first broadcast 28.03.1952). See also Gavoty (2016), 174.

aesthetic quality in favour of technical and mechanical excess.<sup>90</sup> Neither are Enescu's compositions ever merely vehicles for his virtuosity, and in his refusal to conflate his professional roles of violinist and composer, he does seem to privilege what might be described as the music's 'work-character', within the historically uneasy and often complex dialectic between virtuosity and the autonomous musical work.<sup>91</sup>

At the same time, Enescu's aesthetics and music do both implicate some quintessentially Romantic interpretations of virtuosic expression, which evidently continued to inform conceptions of virtuosity in the early twentieth century. The search for innovation, for instance, and an air of unpredictability are qualities with which Paganini was strongly associated, and which likewise inform Enescu's virtuosic writing (and that of his contemporaries): the timbral effects in the wind and storm scenes in *Impressions* are obvious examples; elsewhere, the violin's brilliant wolf-whistle-like swoops in the finale of the Third Violin Sonata, Op. 25, stand out. Although technical difficulties are apparent in the performance of many of Enescu's instrumental pieces, the later works certainly tend to avoid any hint of mechanical passagework or ostentatious bravura. In that respect, Enescu's virtuosity could be seen to evoke what Schumann identified (in Frédéric Chopin, primarily) as a 'poetic' kind of virtuosity, derived less from a desire to flatter or indulge the audience, and more through the translation of an 'inner spirit'.<sup>92</sup> Enescu discerns a similar kind of virtuosity in the playing of his near-contemporary, the violinist Jacques Thibaud. In one of their interviews, Enescu describes to Gavoty how Thibaud 'was the first ever violinist to reveal to the public a certain sonorous quality, a particular contact between skin and taut string [*'un contact particulier de l'épiderme avec la corde tendue'*]. There was in his playing an indescribable voluptuousness'. Asked by Gavoty whether Thibaud could be compared to the Spanish virtuoso Pablo de Sarasate, Enescu replied that Sarasate only ever offered a 'glacial perfection; (...) he was a "mechanical nightingale" [*'rossignol mécanique'*], whereas Thibaud...was a "real-life nightingale" [*'rossignol authentique'*]'.<sup>93</sup> This 'sung' quality which Enescu so valued in Thibaud's playing is something he himself is eager to communicate in the 'Lever de Soleil' scene, as evidenced by the sheer number of *cantabile* markings (predominantly for the violin) that litter the score –

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<sup>90</sup> For an in-depth investigation charting the increasingly negative critical reception of instrumental virtuosity in the first half of the nineteenth century, see Žarko Cvejić, *The Virtuoso as Subject: The Reception of Instrumental Virtuosity, c. 1815–c.1850* (Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

<sup>91</sup> See Samson (2003), 66–76. For a useful recapitulation of the arguments and conceptual issues surrounding the musical work, see *The Musical Work: Reality or Invention?* ed. Michael Talbot (Liverpool University Press, 2000).

<sup>92</sup> See Alexander Stefaniak, *Schumann's Virtuosity: Criticism, Composition, and Performance in Nineteenth-Century Germany* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), especially Chapters 2 and 3.

<sup>93</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 10; Gavoty (2016), 180.

eleven appearances in just over six pages of music. Similarly, the ‘certain sonorous quality’ that Enescu identifies is emulated (again, in this final scene) through markings such as *sonoro, con suono* (‘with sound’, or ‘sonorously’) and *con espansione e una grande sonorità*. It is notable, of course, that Enescu should equate this ‘sonorous quality’ with a certain artistic touch or corporeal (linguistically ‘indescribable’) aspect of Thibaud’s expression (‘skin on taught string’). The violin’s capacity for vocal expressivity is therefore contemplated both in corporeal and emotionally evocative terms as a sincere manifestation of *feeling*. Similarly, for Schumann, the translation of one’s inner spirit through music could only be understood through feelings; as Hubert Moßburger puts it, in Schumann the musically poetic makes ‘the unspoken sensible’ (the transcendent interplay between body and imaginative spirit implied by this ‘unspoken sensibility’ resonates in significant ways with what I have described as Enescu’s pre-articulate, body-orientated mnemonic processes).<sup>94</sup>

These aspects of Enescu’s virtuosic thought might be considered further in the context of a rhapsodic expressive mode. The poetic rhapsody, of course, both historically and etymologically, implies a specifically musical or sung quality (*Rhapsōidia* was the name the Greeks gave to the practice of reciting epic poetry; from *rhaptein*, meaning to sew or stitch together, and *aidein*, meaning to sing – from which we also have the word ‘ode’ (*ōidē*), and ‘voice’ (*audē*)). In the ‘Lever de soleil’, as was similarly the case in the lullaby, Enescu again seems to foreground the self-sufficiency of the sonorous space, which exerts a presence above that of the music’s formal or grammatical ‘patterning’ (quite aptly, Pascal Bentoïu describes the final four pages of the work as a ‘sonorous explosion’).<sup>95</sup> For while rhapsodising may suggest a ‘sung’ quality on the one hand, it also implies a way of speaking, writing, or thinking that does not follow semantic norms (a bit like reverie or dream, in fact, which I explore in the next chapter). The rhapsody carries connotations of improvised spontaneity; it proceeds by moving sideways, it drifts, it follows unpredictable paths (Jankélévitch similarly insists on this ‘other’ kind of logic when he writes that ‘music prefers the curved line to the straight line’, which in a broader sense is also how Enescu constructs his water scene in ‘Ruisselet au fond du jardin’).<sup>96</sup>

The rhapsodic mode through which Enescu constructs his ‘Lever de soleil’ scene is also characterised by an increasing sense of excess and extravagance, which amounts to a further

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<sup>94</sup> Hubert Moßburger, ‘Robert Schumann’s Poetic Paraphrases: Analytical Implications’, in *Ohne Worte: Vocality and Instrumentality in 19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, ed. William Brooks (Collected Writings of the Orpheus Institute: Leuven University Press, 2014), 201. See also Stefaniak (2016), 72–73.

<sup>95</sup> Bentoïu (2010), 413.

<sup>96</sup> See note 63 in Chapter One.

defamiliarising of what we might call the ‘figures’ of musical speech, or musical grammar. It is through such processes of defamiliarisation that we may locate the potential for enchantment (as I suggested above), and it is precisely in terms of its capacity to enchant through defamiliarisation that Jankélévitch describes rhapsodic virtuosity as giving voice to ‘the precarious thing’ and to the ‘paradoxical depth of appearance’ (a similar metaphor of surface and depth might also be used to interpret the quote by the poet Paul Éluard with which I prefaced this chapter: ‘There is another world, but it is in this one’).<sup>97</sup> Already this process of rhapsodic defamiliarisation (which throughout this chapter I have likened to an uninhibited, childlike vision – a way of seeing beneath or beyond surface appearances) is evident at the start of the ‘Lever de soleil’ scene (Ex. 3.11, above). The birdsong re-surfacings in the piano, captured through crystalline cheeps and tweets, are manifestly of a different kind compared with the objectively ‘real’ rendering heard in the caged bird scene, for instance. The gestures are similar – quickly repeated *staccato* high notes, and *tremolando* broken chords, or alternating pairs of chords – but the context has been transformed. Enescu’s marking near the scene’s beginning of *pigolando non troppo* (‘chirping but not too much’) suggests a desire to evoke a more poeticised or abstracted ‘impression’ of birdsong, which nonetheless is closely managed in terms of notational detail (this too is emblematic of a kind of virtuosity, albeit of a more restrained variety: a virtuosic attention to detail; or the virtuosic refinement of material).<sup>98</sup>

As the scene unfolds, ethereality and decoration give way to melodic and gestural writing that is bolder, looser, and more effusive. The piano’s *misurato* (‘measured’) oscillations give way to a host of markings urging a rhapsodic and impassioned mode of expressivity: *con anima*, *con fuoco*, (*molto*) *espressivo*, *con calore*, *appassionato*, *ardente*. On three occasions, the piano part collapses impulsively into sweeping black-note glissandi (at Figures 35, 37 and 38, and as illustrated in Ex. 3.12). Similarly, the violin’s melodic content is characterised increasingly by extreme heights and dizzying leaps – literal dis-locations that convey not only an exciting sense of risk, but also a rapid and nervous changeability of expressive intent: a body reaching the physical limits of its expressive capabilities. The impetuosity implied by the *con slancio* marking accompanying one of the violin’s virtuosic embellishments on the penultimate page (see the first bar of Example 3.13) is likewise suggestive of a desire to express or move ‘otherwise’, and without repercussion (effectively bypassing reflective thought in favour of a more physicalised expression).

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<sup>97</sup> See the Introduction to Jankélévitch’s *Liszt et la rhapsodie: essai sur la virtuosité* (Paris: Plon, 1979).

<sup>98</sup> Jankélévitch also identifies this kind of virtuosic thinking in the music of Ravel. See Jankélévitch, *Ravel*, trans. Margaret Crosland (New York: Grove Press, 1959; originally published in Paris by Éditions du Seuil, 1956).

Example 3.12: *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Lever soleil', Figure 37.

Vln. [Un poco agitato ma in Tempo] (♩ = 48) *vibr.* *poco più sost.* (♩ = 116) *con suono*  
 Pno. [Un poco agitato ma in Tempo] (♩ = 48) *mp cresc. molto* *f* *poco più sost.*  
*rapido gliss. sur les touches noires* *sub.* *ff* *poco f espr.* C.3.

Example 3.13: *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Lever soleil', Figure 41–1 – Figure 41+1 (continued next page).

Vln. *con slancio* (♩ = 48) *sf* *poco allarg.* *molto*  
 Pno. (♩ = 48) *sf* *bsf* *poco allarg.* *bsf*

Maestoso largamente  
(♩ = 116)

fff con allegrezza

tutto l'arco

C.4

41

Maestoso largamente  
(♩ = 116)

fff con allegrezza

quasi trillo

7

5

8<sup>va</sup>

L O J L J L J L J

This expressive capriciousness can also be observed in the frequently shifting tempo and metronome markings, and in the broad range of dynamics Enescu employs. Again, the specificity is notable here, with the use of less common markings such as *poco forte*, *ben sforzando*, *poco rinforzando*, and *ben piano*, alongside a profusion of *subitos* and *crescendos*. The music's spontaneous changeability, together with the way it draws so constantly on the memory of earlier events and materials, while also using physicalised gestures to foreground an intense corporeality suggests a creative desire to evoke an experiential plenitude, or what the philosopher William James described as the 'much-at-onceness', or fulsomeness of the world.<sup>99</sup> For James, the much-at-once implied an immeasurable potentiality of experience, and an ultimately unknowable world of ever-enlarging possibility. The effect, as Bruce Wilshire observes, of 'finding ourselves intensely alert to and caught up in the much-at-once' is such that 'we can become ecstatic, transported out of our dulled and dulling habitual behaviours, moved into a state of heightened feeling, into exaltation, into rapture, into an intensified awareness of being subsumed into the All'.<sup>100</sup> Much the same effect can be observed in the way Enescu constructs his ardent and highly impassioned finale to the *Impressions* suite; indeed, it feels as if the lyric voice of the violin is gradually overwhelmed by its own desire to express the surrounding sonorous plenitude.

In its desire to express this 'immeasurable potentiality of experience', the 'Lever de soleil' scene likewise suggests a sense of Dionysian vehemence. Neither is the scene lacking in a

<sup>99</sup> See William James, *Some Problems of Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979).

<sup>100</sup> Bruce W. Wilshire, *The Much-at-Once: Music, Science, Ecstasy, the Body* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016), 2.

suggestion even of violence, which simultaneously recalls the storm of the preceding scene. Indeed, violence would seem a natural consequence of such virtuosic and corporeal excess, and there are several moments in the finale which incline towards excessive rashness and impetuosity. For instance, in the second bar after Figure 38, we encounter a five-note broken-chord gesture (made up largely of descending minor thirds) in the right hand of the piano – a spiky five-fingered attack of the keyboard, whose pointed nature is further emphasised by a marking of *mordace* ('biting'). Enescu employs this same marking alongside similarly forceful *aspro* ('bitter' or 'harsh') and *furioso* gestures in both instruments towards the end of the storm scene, where the piano's stormy (*fluttuoso*) rumblings precipitate one last burst of violent energy (Ex. 3.14, below). This explosion is made more emphatic by the sudden breakdown of the piano's rapid triplet motion, exemplified by the violin's convulsive interjection, which momentarily wrenches us out of the music's forward momentum. Evidently, the articulation of violence for Enescu is understood in terms of an emphatically discontinuous gesture, or a kind of rupture: an intense assault on what may be described as a 'quotidian' state of being (we might think of this as an extreme example of musical defamiliarisation). It is an overwhelmingly carnal effect, but in its intensity, it is also suggestive of an ecstatic mode 'beyond' what the body is able to articulate physically. Such carnal excess also implies a 'letting go' – akin to a Lisztian transcendence of subject over matter.

**Example 3.14:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Tempête au dehors, dans la nuit', Figure 31, bars 3–4.

The musical score for Example 3.14 consists of two staves: Violin (Vln.) and Piano (Pno.). The tempo is marked as quarter note = 52. The key signature has one sharp (F#) and the time signature is 9/8. The violin part begins with a rest, followed by a convulsive interjection marked *aspro, mordace* and *ff < sff furioso*. The piano part features a rapid triplet motion in the right hand, marked *ff* and *sff*, which breaks down into a *molto* section. The score includes various musical notations such as slurs, accents, and dynamic markings.

Instances such as these are, notably, present-tense occurrences, and devoid of memory. There are violent moments in Enescu, however, which combine with the memory of earlier gestures or motifs to create a powerful assault on the mnemonic and perceptual faculties. Near the end of the ‘Lever de soleil’ scene (in the bars immediately after Figure 41), for instance, the violin suddenly plunges from its rapturous heights to perform two heavily accented variants (initially chromatic, then diatonic) of the suite’s familiar  $\hat{5}-\hat{4}-\hat{3}$  contour (see the end of Ex. 3.13, above). Enescu’s direction for these variants to be played *tutto l’arco* – utilising the whole length of the bow – calls for more body behind the gesture, which lends a brute physicality to the melodic recollection. At the same time, the gesture and its sequential repetition also recall a very similar moment towards the end of the storm scene (in the two bars after Figure 31), where the violin’s lower-register displacements are marked *violento*. The remembered gesture’s affective quality is likewise revived here.

The ‘sensibility’ of Enescu’s vehement re-imaginings indicates a broader concern regarding art’s ability to affect the body. Violence, in this case, can be thought of as an intense manifestation of Enescu’s desire to ‘move’ listeners’ bodies – discernible also in the somatic effects produced by enchanting encounters, and by Enescu’s virtuosic writing in general. With Deleuze, we might more accurately describe Enescu’s rendering of violence as an expressive portrayal of violent ‘sensations’.<sup>101</sup> Indeed, it is primarily through sensation, rather than representation, that Enescu conveys the experience of violence in his music. Deleuze makes a similar claim for Francis Bacon, stating that the ‘violence of sensation’ (for Deleuze, all sensations are ultimately communicated violently) is opposed to the ‘violence of the represented’ (which implies the portrayal of horror, or a violent narrative). Most importantly, the violence of sensation is ‘inseparable from its direct action on the nervous system’.<sup>102</sup> As such, sensation has less to do with feelings, which are already ‘represented’ (or in essence perceived, or conceptualised) by the mind, and can be thought of instead as a more instinctive kind of affective experience. As Paul Valéry conceived of it, sensation is ‘that which is transmitted directly, and avoids the detour and boredom of conveying a story’.<sup>103</sup>

Enescu’s violent sensations do indeed have the capacity to transmit ‘directly’, effectively forcing the listener into the physical or affective conditions of the artwork’s sensate unfolding through time. Putting it another way, violence is framed here as a breaking up of language (what

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<sup>101</sup> Deleuze (2003). See especially the section on ‘Figuration and violence’ in Chapter 6, ‘Painting and Sensation’, 34–43.

<sup>102</sup> *Ibid.*, 39.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, 37.

Pierre Boulez called the ‘pulverisation’ of language)<sup>104</sup> or of the linguistic mode in the listener to allow something more immediate – something more ‘sensational’ – to break through.

Enescu’s vehement, disruptive gestures also convey a certain stubbornness, highly representative of the lengths to which he typically goes in exhausting a musical idea. This is particularly true of the harsh, occasionally violent means by which he often concludes works, as noted in Chapter Two. Much like in the Second Piano Quartet or the Piano Quintet, in the final bars of the *Impressions* suite, all harmonic and melodic interest is reduced to something like the work’s brute essence, and Enescu seemingly forces the piece to a close through sheer will rather than by formally conventional means (Ex. 3.15). The sustained octaves in the violin, together with the piano’s ever-louder and incessant rumbles and hammered notes, reflect an attempt to tonicise D on purely sonorous and physical grounds, rather than by cadential affirmation. This process is undermined, of course, by the persistent presence of the pitch E, which throughout the piece has staked its own claim for tonic supremacy. The suite’s culminating bars therefore capture within a single dissonant interval the modal ambivalence at the heart of this, and so many other of Enescu’s works (a similar effect can also be heard at the very end of the Third Violin Sonata).

**Example 3.15:** *Impressions d’enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, ‘Lever soleil’, concluding bars (continued next page).

<sup>104</sup> See Boulez’s comparison of Debussy and Webern, cited in Jonathan Goldman, *The Musical Language of Pierre Boulez: Writings and Compositions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 47. Boulez also includes the direction ‘pulvériser le son’ (‘pulverise the sound’) in his Second Piano Sonata of 1947–48.

The image displays two systems of musical notation. The upper system features a vocal line with a fermata and piano markings *bf* and *marcatiss.*. The lower system is a piano accompaniment consisting of two staves. It includes dynamic markings *ff*, *più ff*, and *sff*. Tempo markings include *allarg.* and *a T°.* with a tempo indication of  $\text{♩} = 40$ . The piano part features triplet patterns in the bass line.

Notwithstanding these moments of vehemence (or violence, even), the overall mood of the ‘Lever de soleil’ scene is undoubtedly one of unbridled joy and rapture – a transcendence of the familiar and the everyday (or an openness to what Jankélévitch describes as the ‘paradoxical depth of appearance’). This, as I mentioned earlier, is how Heidegger characterises dwelling ‘essentially’, which he refers to as ‘ek-sistence’. Indeed, it is tempting to interpret the ‘Lever de soleil’ as an overcoming of the ‘blindness’ towards (essential) dwelling which characterises the modern experience of being-in-the-world, and as a dawning realisation of the true, ‘ek-static’ nature of being, which is also an overcoming of homelessness (both existential and, in Enescu’s case, as a response to his literal *dépaysement*). Such an overcoming, Heidegger also claims, will precipitate the ‘re-enchantment’ of the world.<sup>105</sup> As is well known, the thing that Heidegger believes allows us to dwell (or to experience our ‘ek-sistence’) is poetry. He writes: ‘the phrase “poetically man dwells” [which Heidegger extracts from a late poem (‘In Lovely

<sup>105</sup> Julian Young, *German Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: Weber to Heidegger* (New York: Routledge, 2018), 238, 245, 243.

Blueness’) by Friedrich Hölderlin] says: poetry first causes dwelling to be dwelling. Poetry is really what lets us dwell’.<sup>106</sup> He describes poetic creation as a ‘kind of building’, implying that our dwelling is not only made but also constantly re-made through language: ‘man is capable of dwelling only if he has already built, is building, and remains disposed to build, in another way’.<sup>107</sup> The implication is that dwelling is not merely a given, or a reversion, but something that requires a creative act of construction – akin to the constructive aspect that Bachelard sees as being inherent to reverie, and which Enescu employs in the revivification of his childhood home.

The claims that Heidegger makes for poetry can obviously be seen to resonate with those made by Bachelard, Mallarmé, Jankélévitch, and others besides.<sup>108</sup> What is striking about his descriptions of poetic dwelling is the way he imagines it as a kind of illumination, or enlightenment: ‘the poet calls all the brightness of the sights of the sky and every sound of its courses and breezes into the singing word and there makes them shine and ring’.<sup>109</sup> Heidegger offers a helpful context through which to interpret Enescu’s ‘Lever de soleil’, as a similarly ecstatic ‘lighting up’ of the world (the child awakes to ‘shafts of light [which] penetrate all through the room’). While the materiality of this dazzling vision is rendered primarily by sonorous and sensible means (further emphasised by expressive markings such as *chiaro* and *luminoso*), the transcendent aspect of the scene’s ‘shining’ brings us back to a consideration of how synaesthesia may serve as a marker of transcendence or transfiguration. As Wiskus observes, the experience of synaesthesia can be thought of as transcendent precisely because of the way it seems to ‘[open] an entirely new dimension’.<sup>110</sup> Being fundamentally transformative, synaesthesia does not merely constitute the merging of sensory impressions (in this instance, sight and sound); rather, it implies the sensed appearance of something beyond our everyday experience of the world. The ‘Lever de soleil’ scene can be thought of in just such a way. It is framed as a ‘dazzling’ transformation in the sense that it confounds the child’s vision – he experiences something of a sensory and cognitive overload (as does the listener), so that ‘what shines forth is an evocation through sensible appearance of what could never serve as an object

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<sup>106</sup> Martin Heidegger, “...Poetically Man Dwells...”, in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 2001; originally published 1971), 213. Heidegger prefaces this assertion by stating that ‘the poetic is not merely an ornament and bonus added to dwelling’.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, 215.

<sup>108</sup> In an echo of Mallarmé’s description of poetry as a form of musical speech which gives expressive voice to the allusive ‘not-said’ (see note 48), Heidegger claims that poetic thinking enables us to ‘grasp...what is ungraspable’. See Young (2018), 248.

<sup>109</sup> Heidegger (2001), 223. Again, note how Heidegger’s reference to the ‘singing word’ echoes Mallarmé’s description of poetry as musical speech (see note 108 above).

<sup>110</sup> Wiskus (2013), 115.

of vision in the ordinary sense'; the child senses 'the appearance of transcendence'.<sup>111</sup> The duality underpinning this dazzling synaesthetic vision stems from a transformative merging of the sensed external world and the subject's inner world, giving rise to an emotionally heightened foregrounding (or, indeed, overcoming) of the apparently insurmountable gap between non-human and human worlds (or between carnal knowledge and reflective thought) by which much of the rest of the suite is characterised. On the one hand, then, the world's 'lighting up' is framed as taking place from 'without': the child awakes to the sounds of the natural world which originate as it were outside his home (his 'ordinary' dwelling-place). This is framed musically and phenomenologically as an act of involuntary remembering which happens *to us*: in his reincorporation (or re-surfacing) of the work's earlier themes and motifs, Enescu draws on the capacity of memory to affect us unpredictably, so that the world seems to reveal itself (viscerally, materially) to both the child and the listener once more. This is a revelation 'through sensible appearance': ungraspable in a cognitive sense, Enescu's vision of the external world becomes graspable in sensible terms; this is a sensate evocation which is characterised by an extravagant and impassioned corporeal expressivity.

At the same time, the scene's transformative potential relies on the subject's capacity to recognise earlier materials as part of a predominantly internalised process – a kind of mental piecing-together of one's surroundings. As such, the child's inner world – which comprises his memories of past events – is presupposed in the present-orientated act of recognition. As listeners, we too engage in spontaneous 'acts of creative attribution' (as Boretz describes it), thereby linking our memory of past events with present perceptions.<sup>112</sup> It is this articulation of the past through the present, and the manifestation of the external world through the subject's inner life and sensibility (or the interior of the child's room, as the scene depicts it) which precipitates a transformative merging and gives rise to a new realm of experience. As Merleau-Ponty might put it: 'the inside and the outside intertwine, and this intertwining – as the sensing of an invisible that comes through the visible – gives rise to the emotion, to the wonderment' – or to the enchantment of the world.<sup>113</sup> We might similarly consider the implications of an ek-static mode of being in these terms: as a 'standing outside oneself', but where one is to some

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<sup>111</sup> Wiskus (2013), 118–119. In a similar vein, Heidegger writes of the 'invisible' or 'unknown': 'The poet calls, in the sights of the sky, that which in its very self-disclosure causes the appearance of that which conceals itself, and indeed *as* that which conceals itself'. Heidegger (2001), 223.

<sup>112</sup> See Chapter One, note 67.

<sup>113</sup> Wiskus (2013), 119. Much of the preceding discussion on synaesthesia draws on Wiskus's reading of Proust's involuntary 'resurrection' of Venice (as ever, through the lens of Merleau-Ponty's work), which is encountered in the final volume of *In Search of Lost Time* (118–119).

extent aware of the self one is standing outside of (inside and outside give something of themselves to each other). Enescu keeps this boundary in play through his constant re-surfacing of materials, which to a variable extent keep us anchored, through memory, to the work's earlier scenes, even as we become rapt, or ecstatic, by the rhapsodic excess of the suite's culminating pages.

Finally, it is important to remember that in the 'Lever de soleil' this transcendent intertwining is precipitated (made possible, even) by what I have described as a 'childlike' way of seeing the world: the inside and outside intertwine because the distinction between 'self and the world' in childhood is ultimately more 'porous and negotiable' than in adulthood.<sup>114</sup> As I discussed earlier, this vivid perceptual mode through which evocations of childhood (such as those encountered in Enescu's *Impressions d'enfance*, or Ravel's *L'Enfant et les sortilèges*) are constructed is indicative of a broader aesthetic concern with perceptual processes, and how things are perceived to emerge in lived time; childhood vision likewise precipitates a rarefied and transcendent kind of artistic vision. My next chapter shifts the context slightly: I move away from considering a childlike perceptual mode to addressing how the world is perceived and experienced in dreams, where the distinction between subject and object (and between reality and unreality) is often similarly blurred. Likewise, the increased importance of 'dream life' and how this was theorised in the earlier half of the twentieth century can be seen to have a significant influence on how artistic creation was imagined to take place. Enescu's own dreamlike constructions ultimately help to tie together some of the major discussion points relating to my ongoing themes of perception, memory, temporality, and enchantment.

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<sup>114</sup> See notes 31 and 32.

## CHAPTER IV

### *Dream*

‘If a little dreaming is dangerous, the cure for it is not  
to dream less, but to dream more, to dream all the time’  
(Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time*)<sup>1</sup>

#### CONTEXTS

IN ENESCU’S music and in his general outlook on life, dreaming – broadly understood as a process of sense-making with its own allusive logic and forms, which is also representative of an abstracted mode of artistic expression – occupies a central and formative role. The importance of dreaming has already been hinted at in the previous chapters, and both memory and enchantment could be regarded as constitutive elements of dreaming. It has often been noted, for instance, that sleeping dreams have their foundation in ‘real’ (waking) life primarily because of their frequent recourse to both recent and distant memories (as well as to those which have been lost to waking recollection).<sup>2</sup> Similarly, the way dreams blur the boundary between reality and the purely imaginary, thereby opening the way to strange and unfamiliar permutations of the everyday, lends them an enchanting quality (even if, through the involuntary nature of dreaming, these strange and irrational distortions are accepted uncritically, and consequently are registered differently to how they would be in waking life).

In this chapter I am interested both in dreaming as an unconscious mode of perception or sense-making (the extent to which we ‘perceive’ objects in sleeping dreams is something I explore later), and in reverie as a kind of waking ‘dream-thinking’. Aside from investigating how these two categories might be distinguished (or indeed how they overlap), as well as how

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<sup>1</sup> Marcel Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, II: Within a Budding Grove*, trans. C. K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, revised D. J. Enright (London: Vintage, 2005), 488. I have followed the example of some scholars of modifying the Moncrieff and Kilmartin translation, which uses ‘if a little *day-dreaming* is dangerous...’, on the basis of the French original: ‘si un peu de rêve est dangereux, ce qui en guérit, ce n’est pas moins de rêve, mais plus de rêve, mais tout le rêve’. While on the whole I have sought to reference from the more recent Penguin editions of *In Search of Lost Time*, in this instance the Moncrieff and Kilmartin translation provides a more apposite rendering compared to that of James Grieve, who interprets ‘rêve’ as ‘wistfulness’ (Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, II: In the Shadow of Young Girls in Flower*, trans. James Grieve, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 422).

<sup>2</sup> The psychiatrist Morton F. Reiser observes, for instance, that ‘memories often are intimately woven into the fabric of dreams’. See Reiser, *Memory in Mind and Brain: What Dream Imagery Reveals* (Yale University Press, 1994), 31. One of the most enduringly fascinating qualities of dreams is the way in which, through them, we are able to retrieve apparently lost or buried memories, even if we don’t recognise them as such in our waking life; the connection between dreamt recollection and real-life occurrence may not be made for several years, if ever. Freud provides several examples of how these ‘hypermnesic’ dreams are experienced in the opening chapter of his seminal study, *The Interpretation of Dreams*. See James Strachey’s translated edition of Sigmund Freud, *The Interpretation of Dreams* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 44–54.

they might contrast more generally with a purposive, waking kind of logic, my concern is with how dream and reverie (together with Enescu's own conception of the dream) are linked explicitly with ideas surrounding artistic creation, as well as the ways in which these categories might serve as useful hermeneutic tools for exploring the processes and structures of Enescu's musical language. Dream and reverie can in other words be regarded as useful discursive metaphors for interpreting the allusive and fragmentary processes which are a hallmark of Enescu's musical works (especially his slower movements).<sup>3</sup> As I have remarked throughout the previous chapters, Enescu's processes in the later chamber works often seem opposed to an active, directed, or common-sense notion of waking thought, instead pursuing a non-linear, drifting, passive and unpredictable kind of logic which is commonly associated with dream or reverie. Indeed, the psychiatrist Allan Hobson (known primarily for his work on rapid eye movement sleep) notes that a characteristic feature of dreaming is its 'illogical content and organization, in which the unities of time, place, and person do not apply, and natural laws are disobeyed'.<sup>4</sup>

That Enescu thought of his pieces as having the capacity to sound dreamlike, or wanted to suggest to performers and listeners that they do likewise is evidenced in part by his use of expressive markings. The term *sognando* (literally, 'dreaming'), for instance, appears in the Second Piano Quartet, Op. 30; the Second String Quartet, Op. 22, No. 2; the Chamber Symphony, Op. 33; and in the seventh scene ('Lune à travers les vitres') of the *Impressions d'enfance* suite – which also boasts the intriguing marking of *quasi addormentato* ('almost' or 'half asleep'). One also encounters markings of *rêveur* in both the Pavane from the Second Piano Suite, Op. 10, and in Enescu's setting of the Symbolist poet Albert Samain's 'Silence!...' (composed two years apart, in 1903 and 1905).

At the same time, Enescu's musical and aesthetic thought and his ideas concerning artistic creation suggest that he assumed a more direct connection between composition and dreaming (one might consequently regard this as the source of the dreaming metaphor as a useful framing mechanism for Enescu's processes). For him, music exists primarily as the translation of some

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<sup>3</sup> Similar approaches, which investigate the dreamlike logic of musical works by certain composers (and especially Chopin, it seems), can be found in Michael Klein, 'Chopin Dreams: The Mazurka in C# Minor, Op. 30, No. 4', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Chopin's Subjects (2012), 238–260, and 'A Narrative of Dreams: Chopin's *Polonaise-Fantasia*', *Musica Theorica* (2017), 1–18; in James Parakilas, 'Disrupting the Genre: Unforeseen Personifications in Chopin', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 35, No. 3, Chopin's Subjects (2012), 165–181; in Brian Black, 'Remembering a Dream: The Tragedy of Romantic Memory in the Modulatory Processes of Schubert's Sonata Forms', *Intersections*, Vol. 25, Nos. 1–2 (2005), 202–228; and in Peter Pesic, 'Schubert's Dream', *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (1999), 136–144.

<sup>4</sup> J. Allan Hobson, *The Dreaming Brain* (Basic Books, 1988), 4.

interior mode of being, or state of the soul – a fact Enescu affirms in his series of conversations with Gavoty, by claiming that ‘music is the only means of reproducing the cries of the soul [*les cris de l’âme*]’; and similarly, that ‘it is impossible for me to translate my impressions other than through music’.<sup>5</sup> Dreaming is evidently the means by which this process of translation is made possible: ‘when I compose, there is never the slightest interruption to my inner dream [*rêve intérieur*]’.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, it becomes clear, throughout these conversations, that Enescu conceives of music, and, indeed, of life itself, as a kind of dream: ‘I am, above all, a dreamer [*rêveur*]’, he tells Gavoty; ‘I live in a dream [*je vis en songe*]’.<sup>7</sup>

Enescu’s views concerning an oneiric creative mode, or music as a form of dreamlike translation are by no means unique, and resonate very much with the aesthetic values that were enshrined not only within the cultural landscape of early twentieth-century France (and more specifically, among the groups of artists and thinkers congregated in and around Paris), but which reach back into the nineteenth century, most obviously through composers such as Wagner, Berlioz, or Chopin.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, Wagner’s Schopenhauerian conception of artistic creativity (rendered most discernibly in his opera *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg*, completed in 1867) is especially relevant in this context. In the words of Kevin Karnes, ‘Of particular import is [Wagner’s] conviction that the source of artistic creativity resides in the depths of the unconscious mind, accessible to us in dreams; that what the creative artist must therefore depict in his or her work is not the world outside (however transformed by fantasy, as the Romantics were apt to present it) but the world within ourselves; and that it is precisely within ourselves that essential truths, or the essence of human existence, is to be found’.<sup>9</sup> Enescu himself (an unashamed Wagner obsessive), along with many of his contemporaries (musicians, writers, and painters alike) conceived of artistic creativity in similar terms: as the dreamlike or ‘unconscious’

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<sup>5</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 17 (first broadcast 30.05.1952).

<sup>6</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 18 (first broadcast 06.06.1952). Similarly, when asked by Gavoty (in the same episode) whether his touring schedule ever got in the way of his compositional ‘meditations’, Enescu’s response is unequivocal: ‘never! I carry within me a permanent dream [*rêve*], something which trembles within me night and day’.

<sup>7</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 12 (first broadcast 18.04.1952).

<sup>8</sup> Dreaming is an important idea in Berlioz’s music, and is central to the programmatic arc of his *Symphonie fantastique*, Op. 14 (1830); the symphony’s opening and final movements are titled ‘Rêveries, passions’ and ‘Songe d’une nuit du Sabbat’ (commonly, ‘Dream of a Witches’ Sabbath’), respectively. (For Berlioz, reverie is understood to take place during waking, while the dream of the final movement is framed as taking place during sleeping – or more accurately, as part of an opium-induced nightmare). For an investigation into how Chopin and his contemporaries conceived of dreaming and artistic creation, and of the ways in which Chopin likewise imagined his waking life and dreams to merge, see Halina Goldberg, ‘Chopin’s Oneiric Soundscapes and the Role of Dreams in Romantic Culture’, in *Chopin and His World*, ed. Jonathan D. Bellman and Halina Goldberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2017), 15–43.

<sup>9</sup> Kevin C. Karnes, ‘Wagner, Klimt, and the Metaphysics of Creativity in *fin-de-siècle* Vienna’, *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Vol. 62, No. 3 (2009), 650.

translation (especially through music, which occupied a most elevated position among the arts) of one's deepest emotions, or memories, or simply one's personality. Carlo Caballero has explored at length how the translation of an artist's emotional sensibility was in turn often judged as a marker of sincerity (which he defines as 'the translation of the artist's inner life into music by force of innate creative necessities') or as an expression of originality (seen as the inimitable 'manifestation of the unique moral and sensory temperament of the artist who possesses it', and of the 'artist's irreducible singularity as a human being').<sup>10</sup> These two closely related aesthetic categories, Caballero observes, played a pivotal role in the creation and critical reception of French music at the beginning of the twentieth century (although, as the reception of Enescu's own music demonstrates, both sincerity and originality were still being invoked as admirable aesthetic qualities as late as the 1950s). Writers and philosophers such as Proust and Bergson engaged frequently with these ideas, which similarly found a sustained focus in the critical reviews and essays of composers like Charles Koechlin and Paul Dukas, as well as in the correspondence of a host of other musicians and thinkers.<sup>11</sup> A representative example of how sincerity was discussed can be found in an article by Koechlin on artistic sensibility, in which he states (and Caballero quotes in translation): 'beautiful works are those that...best translate the beautiful sensibility of their creator, or, if you prefer, those that give the whole measure of his personal character'.<sup>12</sup> Koechlin essentially equates personality and emotional sensibility with the resultant quality of a musical work. For his own part, Enescu seemed aware of both the apparent necessity of evoking a discernible aesthetic sincerity and of the essential fragility of this aesthetic category. In one of his conversations with Gavoty, he muses: 'I feel in me the need to express my inner sensations, and music allows me to penetrate the very meaning of my emotions...but to convince the listener of the sincerity of my emotions – that's the major

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<sup>10</sup> Carlo Caballero, *Fauré and French Musical Aesthetics* (Cambridge University Press, 2001), 12, 5.

<sup>11</sup> See for instance Charles Koechlin's 'Les tendances de la musique moderne française' (1921), in *Encyclopédie de la musique*, ed. Albert Lavignac and Lionel de La Laurencie (Paris: Delagrave, 1925), part 2, vol. 1, or the article 'Du rôle de la sensibilité dans la musique', in *La revue musicale* 10 (1 Jan 1929), 200–221; and Paul Dukas's essay 'La musique et l'originalité', in which he warns against the stylistic imitation of even the greatest composers if 'true musical originality' ('véritable originalité musicale') is to be achieved (Dukas focuses predominantly on Wagner in this context, and his undeniable influence on French music of the period). See Dukas, *Les écrits de Paul Dukas sur la musique* (Paris: Société d'Éditions Françaises et Internationales, 1948), 287–293.

<sup>12</sup> Caballero (2001), 13; see also Koechlin (1929), 205. In an essay paying homage to Fauré shortly after his death, Paul Dukas writes in a similar vein: 'those who had the joy of sharing Fauré's intimacy know how faithfully his art reflected his being – to the extent that his music at times would seem to them the harmonious transfiguration of his own exquisite charm (...) [W]hatever sources his music springs from, it translates above all his own self according to the varied moods of the most admirable sensibility'. See Paul Dukas, 'Adieu à Gabriel Fauré', *La revue musicale* 6 (1 December 1924), 98. Reprinted in Dukas (1948), 682–684. Cited in translation by the author in Caballero (2001), 13.

issue'.<sup>13</sup> It is worth noting too that in the Preface to the edited, print version of *Entretiens* (published in 1955 as *Les Souvenirs de Georges Enesco*), Gavoty himself praised Enescu as being 'one of the most original of our contemporary composers; one of the most sincere; one of the most magnificently inspired'.<sup>14</sup>

While the related category of dreaming does not feature prominently in Caballero's exploration of French musical aesthetics,<sup>15</sup> it was undoubtedly of central importance to the musical and aesthetic thought of Enescu's generation (and of a number of older artists), and was often invoked specifically in various essays and critical writings on music. This is mirrored by the critical reception of Enescu's own compositions, and of his playing. A biographical and analytical review of the composer's early works (effectively an overview of his aesthetics and influences) which appeared in the journal *L'Echo Musical* in 1905, when the composer was still only twenty-three years old, makes several claims that will have resonated with Enescu's Parisian milieu: 'his music is a mirror which reflects the soul... In this mirror, dreamlike grace inclines its undulating body'. Similarly, Enescu's music is described as impressionist, 'in the sense that it completely exposes...the sensibility of its creator'. And, in yet more poetic terms, the Octet, Op. 7, and the Second Violin Sonata, Op. 6, are both described as having emerged from 'a dream which nothing disturbs; a dream whose soul is tranquil water, which perceives the irrationality [*folie*] of the sun and the wind without comprehending it; a dream which reflects only the sky'.<sup>16</sup>

Gavoty also seems highly invested in the notion of a dreamlike creative expression, and frequently embellishes any mention of dreaming by Enescu in his published version of the *Entretiens* – occasionally going so far, in fact, as to invent quotes on the composer's behalf.<sup>17</sup> Gavoty's shared concern over the artist's state of dreamlike detachment is also made apparent by the inclusion of a quoted passage from Alfred de Musset's 1833 play, *Les Caprices de Marianne*, in the book's preface:

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<sup>13</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 18. 'Je sens en moi le besoin d'exprimer mes sensations intérieures, et la musique me permet de pénétrer le sens même de mes émotions...mais convaincre l'auditeur de la sincérité de mes émotions – voilà la grande affaire.'

<sup>14</sup> Gavoty (2016), 36.

<sup>15</sup> Caballero has, in fact, considered the issue of dreaming and its construction in Fauré's music elsewhere; see his 'Strange Gondolas: Oneiric Turns in Fauré's Barcarolles', unpublished keynote address, first read at *Focus on Piano Literature 2012: Gabriel Fauré*, 2 June 2012, University of North Carolina, Greensboro. One of the central concerns in this paper is Caballero's interest in daydreaming as '*indugio*' – a kind of 'tarrying', or stasis, which he regards as a characteristic quality of the dream experience, as well as an investigation into the links between dreaming and 'watery' representations, as conveyed by the barcarolle genre.

<sup>16</sup> Charlette Adrienne, 'Georges Enesco', *L'Echo Musical* (Paris: 15<sup>th</sup> August, 1905), 2–3.

<sup>17</sup> Gavoty never goes so far as to effectively misrepresent Enescu's replies, however, and there is certainly enough evidence in the recordings to confirm that Enescu engaged actively with the contemporary preoccupation with dreaming, both as an aesthetic quality and an expressive mode. See also note 53 in the Introduction.

C'était un homme d'un autre temps; il connaissait les plaisirs et leur préférait la solitude; il savait combien les illusions sont trompeuses et il préférait ses illusions à la réalité.

[He was a man from a different time; he knew pleasures but preferred solitude to them; he knew how much illusions deceive and yet he preferred his illusions to reality].<sup>18</sup>

While Enescu's (and his contemporaries') understanding of dreaming does, on the one hand, imply just such an escape from reality, the way Enescu describes composing as a 'waking dream' (*songe éveillé*) simultaneously suggests a conflation of the kind of rational lucidity associated with real, waking life, and the unconscious, imaginary world of sleep.<sup>19</sup> This blurring of conscious states resonates strongly with the ever more important and dynamic role accorded to the unconscious mind in early twentieth-century thought (particularly in the work of figures such as Freud or Bergson), and forms an important aspect of the shift in artistic conceptions regarding dreamlike expression. Indeed, it is precisely along these lines that we might think further about how the conceptualisation of dreaming in the early twentieth century moved on from how the topic was understood by the early Romantics (while acknowledging, too, that Gavoty's Musset reference rather underlines how the topic derives from its centrality in Romanticism). For the Romantics, dreams were often equated with a spiritual, noumenal realm; they were a marker of the mystical, or transcendental. Halina Goldberg, in a chapter exploring the oneiric in Chopin, has shown how dreams were understood as allowing one to 'venture beyond the boundaries delimited by the senses'. Such venturing implies a traversing of distance, which for Novalis became the defining poetic trope of Romanticism; accordingly, he too conceived of the dream as 'a transcendental domain that exists outside of time and space...a higher world'.<sup>20</sup> This almost divine otherworldliness pertaining to the dream experience also underpinned notions of artistic creation: as Goldberg explains, for poets like William Blake or Byron, 'dreams and prophecy inhabited the same space; the poet's imagination thus echoed divine creativity'.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Gavoty (2016), 8. The composer Henri Sauguet adapted Musset's play for his opera of the same name; the opera was premiered in 1954, and broadcast on French Radio shortly after, which is possibly how Gavoty initially came upon the Musset quotation, or else was reminded of it.

<sup>19</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 20 (first broadcast 04.07.1952). 'Je songe éveillé pendant que je compose, j'écoute sans comprendre' ['I dream while awake (dream lucidly) when I compose, I listen without understanding']. See also Gavoty (2016), 192 and 358.

<sup>20</sup> Goldberg (2017), 24, 27. In *Das allgemeine Brouillon* (1798–99) Novalis writes: 'in the distance, everything becomes *poetry – poem*. (...) Distant mountains, distant people, distant events, etc., everything becomes romantic'. Cited in Berthold Hoeckner, 'Schumann and Romantic Distance', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Vol. 50, No. 1 (1997), 55.

<sup>21</sup> Goldberg (2017), 24.

By contrast, for the moderns of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, dreaming was increasingly understood as an experiential mode through which one might make sense of *this* world, as opposed to revealing some otherworldly, mystical realm (the shift in orientation arguably comes with Wagner, and becomes cemented in Schoenberg). As noted in the Introduction, dreaming was increasingly theorised as being in some ways analogous with the experience of modernity, while the unconscious became regarded as an important source of knowledge about the self and the world. Thus, when Enescu melds the lucidity of waking thought with the unconscious in his *songe éveillé*, he reflects a modern preoccupation with dreaming as somehow underpinning and shaping our experience of waking life (I examine this notion in greater detail below). Less a means of venturing ‘*beyond* the boundaries delimited by the senses’ (my emphasis), for Enescu and his contemporaries it is more often the case that the perceptual or sensed reality (albeit abstracted or defamiliarised) of the experience of dreaming instead becomes foregrounded (to say nothing of its symbolic content).<sup>22</sup> Debussy set the tone for this more immanent, essentially corporeal conception of the dream experience, when he wrote in 1892 that ‘music is a dream from which the veils have been drawn! It’s not even the expression of a feeling – it *is* the feeling itself’.<sup>23</sup> For Proust, music (and art in general) was tasked with conveying nothing less. Matthew Spellberg notes, for instance, that art was Proust’s ‘main conduit for the sharing of dreams’.<sup>24</sup> The artist’s obligation, moreover, is toward dreaming – ‘not to dream less but to dream more, to dream all the time’, as the painter Elstir asserts in the second volume of *In Search of Lost Time*.<sup>25</sup> I return to this more phenomenologically grounded aspect of the dream experience, alongside more detailed analysis of the technical means of its musical and artistic expression, in later sections of this chapter.

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<sup>22</sup> Among Enescu’s contemporaries, Schoenberg in particular stands out for the ways in which he incorporates psychoanalytical aspects of dream theorisation into works like his 1909 monodrama *Erwartung*, Op. 17. For a closer examination of the connections between Schoenberg and Freud, see Alexander Carpenter, ‘Schoenberg’s Vienna, Freud’s Vienna: Re-Examining the Connections between the Monodrama *Erwartung* and the Early History of Psychoanalysis’, in *The Musical Quarterly*, Vol. 93, No. 1 (2010), 144–181.

<sup>23</sup> Claude Debussy, letter to André Poniowski, February 1892. See *Debussy Letters*, ed. François Lesure and Richard Nichols, trans. Richard Nichols (London: Faber and Faber, 1987), 41. From a more empirical standpoint, Bergson notes (in a lecture on ‘Dreams’ which was published in *Mind-Energy*) that a structural aspect of dreaming includes the occasionally unpredictable way in which memories become attached to physical sensations, or feelings: ‘the mind continues to function in sleep; it exercises itself...on sensations and memories; and in the sleeping as in the waking state it combines the sensation with the memory which the sensation evokes. (...) It is...not by the abolition of reasoning, any more than by the closing of the senses, that we must characterize dreaming’. Bergson, *Mind-Energy: Lectures and Essays*, trans. H. Wildon Carr (London: Greenwood Press, 1920), 122–123.

<sup>24</sup> Matthew Spellberg, ‘Proust in the Dreamtime’, *The Yale Review*, Vol. 104, Issue 2 (April 2016), 78.

<sup>25</sup> Proust, *II* (2005), 488. See also note 1.

The French artistic and cultural preoccupation with dreaming and artistic sensibility is not the only context through which we might examine the importance of dreaming to Enescu's musical thought. As we have seen, the Romanian idea of *dor* was likewise understood to imply a dreamlike, nostalgic yearning (of a more Romantic kind, certainly)<sup>26</sup>, and offered an expressive mode whose aesthetic qualities Enescu evidently sought to emulate in his own music (the extent to which he does so in the eyes of Romanian musicians is evidenced by Pascal Benteoiu's description of Enescu as 'the poet of yearning and dreaming').<sup>27</sup> Indeed, Enescu's conception of music as a kind of dream could be regarded as an expansion of the inherently dreamlike qualities he discerned in Romanian folk music specifically (we might recall his description of Romanian music as being characterised by 'dreaming, and a tendency, even in fast movements, towards melancholy, towards minor keys').<sup>28</sup> Furthermore, he describes Romania itself as a 'nostalgic and dreamy country'.<sup>29</sup>

Enescu's understanding of music both as a voicing of *dor* and of his own *rêve intérieur* lends a remarkably textured and dynamic aspect to the scholarly interpretation of his music and aesthetic thought as a form of dream expression. While the French view of dreaming is concerned rather more with individual artistry and expressive sincerity, the dreamlike yearning encapsulated by *dor* is symbolic of a shared expressive mode, a native (and collective) state of the soul. At the same time, the Romanian and French conceptions of the dream experience can of course be seen to complement one another, and it is interesting to note how Enescu himself occasionally melds these culturally defined notions. I explore this conceptual overlap in further detail in the final part of this chapter. For now, however, I wish to return to my opening premise, and examine more closely the ways in which dreaming (and a discernible dream-logic, as constructed in Enescu's music) might relate to both memory and enchantment, as well as how this interrelation was theorised by Enescu's contemporaries.

#### DREAM CONSCIOUSNESS

The seventh scene of the *Impressions d'enfance* suite ('Lune à travers les vitres', or 'Moonlight through the windows') is illuminating for the way Enescu suffuses his dreamlike construction with musical memories of the waking world. Foremost among these memories is

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<sup>26</sup> Halina Goldberg describes how in the contemporaneous reception of Chopin's music by his compatriots, 'dreaming and memory are intertwined with nostalgia for Poland', which obviously resonates with how Enescu imagined his own homeland. See Goldberg (2017), 16.

<sup>27</sup> Benteoiu (2010), 98.

<sup>28</sup> See note 94 in Chapter One.

<sup>29</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1. 'Un pays nostalgique et rêveur'.

the lullaby theme (encountered in scene five), whose gentle undulations and simple melody represented a sublimation of the preceding scenes' motivic content, allowing it to emerge in crystalline relief (as I discussed in Chapter Three). After the conclusion of the 'Chanson pour bercer', we move into the 'Grillon' scene, and the lullaby theme begins to fragment. It may be brief (it is the shortest scene in the suite), but the 'Grillon' scene achieves two things: it allows for the gradual disintegration of the lullaby theme, and for its melodic segments to permeate through the piano's improvisatory textures; and it marks a transition from the natural, outside world, to a more internalised landscape. Thus, by the time the last chirrups of the cricket in scene six have faded away, an important shift has taken place: the listener has been transported (effectively, through a process of defamiliarisation) from the predictable regularity of the lullaby into a strange and highly allusive dreamworld (note the *sognando* and *quasi addormentato* markings in Ex. 4.1, below). Indeed, perhaps the most immediately perceptible (yet simultaneously disorientating) feature of the 'Moonlight' scene's opening is the sheer extent to which chromatically and rhythmically distorted memories of the lullaby theme permeate the texture. Even the smallest melodic fragments have the capacity to divert the listener's attention, so that nearly every falling major third, for instance, or variant of the familiar  $\hat{5}-\hat{4}-\hat{3}$  melodic pattern seems to carry some potentially meaningful memory of the lullaby (Freud makes the apt observation that dreams 'yield *fragments* of reproductions', and only rarely reproduce entire experiences).<sup>30</sup> The scene ultimately lacks the clarity of a waking, rationalised experience, since any sense of a linear temporal progression or narrative strategy (through the use of regular phrases, for instance) is completely effaced. Instead, we are confronted with a different kind of logic – one that is underpinned by incoherence, instability, and unpredictability, and which seems instead to privilege sensation and sonority (a logic that draws on 'the idea of an a-linguistic order to musical sounds', as Julian Johnson puts it).<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Freud (2010), 53. In a later chapter, Freud notes that 'our dream-thoughts are dominated by the same material that has occupied us during the day and we only bother to dream of things which have given us cause for reflection in the daytime' (197–198); Enescu's dream scene likewise draws heavily on the memory of experiences which took place earlier in the day. From a slightly different perspective, the way this scene seems to focus so exclusively and deliberately on material from the lullaby suggests that it might also be interpreted in terms of an obsessive compulsion – what Freud called 'obsessional neurosis'; however, a psychoanalytical or psychodynamic reading is not my main concern here.

<sup>31</sup> Johnson (2015), 302.

**Example 4.1:** *Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, 'Lune à travers les vitres', Figure 20–2 – Figure 20+2.

The musical score for 'Lune à travers les vitres' is presented in two systems. The first system shows the Violin (Vln.) and Piano (Pno.) parts. The Violin part begins with a melodic line marked 'sognando, con grazia' and 'dolciss. lusingando'. The Piano part features a complex texture with overlapping lines and chords, marked 'pp' and 'poco p'. A box labeled '20' is placed above the piano part at measure 20. The second system shows a continuation of the piano part, marked 'bp' and 'pp'. The score includes performance instructions such as 'molto tranq. (♩=40)', 'sognando, con grazia', 'dolciss. lusingando', 'quasi addormentato', 'poco p', and 'pp s.v.'.

The music's unpredictability implies, moreover, that there is an involuntary aspect to this mode of dreamlike remembering, reflecting the fact that the dream experience is itself an involuntary phenomenon (crucially, the involuntary dream is unlike involuntary remembering in that it does not carry the same 'shock value' as the latter). Recognisable fragments and contours seem to drift before us, unbidden, before dissipating. Again, there is nothing sudden or shocking about the way these re-surfacings are framed: Enescu saturates the texture with memories of the lullaby to such an extent that its presence is not in the least bit unusual or surprising; much like in a dream, we accept the music's thematic contents uncritically, even passively. Much of this has to do with the manner of the piano writing, which appears loose and untethered (although, as always, Enescu's meticulous attention to notational detail in fact reveals an extremely rigorous compositional aesthetic). It is easy to imagine the pianist's fingers feeling their way over the keys, almost arbitrarily. Spread chords (or just pairs of notes, predominantly at the octave) shimmer within the interweaving texture; chromatic lines are passed freely from one hand to the other; parallel chromatic contours are offset through rhythmic displacement; close imitation and heterophony (often involving just pairs of notes)

give the impression of one hand shadowing or taking its cue from the other. There is little to latch on to as far as rhythmic or metric regularity is concerned, with the music merely hesitating and starting up again, in a constant ebb and flow, thus evoking the blurry transitions of a dream sequence. A modally inflected and constantly shifting tonal centre contributes further to a sense of disorientation and ambiguity. With the dissolution of these musical-linguistic parameters, Enescu seems instead to privilege the somatic (and, indeed, sonorous) quality of the music, as demonstrated by the piano's carefree 'noodling' – a casual improvisatory mode which brings the music's corporeal logic (defined in part by a strong sense of habituation) to the fore. Consequently, the listener's attention is directed more towards surface phenomena – sudden harmonic swerves; momentary changes in texture; the habituation of simple oscillating-octave or broken-chord gestures; and the fleeting recognition of melodic detail (in the violin as much as in the piano).

The attentive mode that Enescu evokes here, and which I am attempting to describe, seems very much reliant on a pre-conceptual or 'a-linguistic' kind of sense-making, which obviously parallels the irrationality and spontaneity of the unconscious dream experience (and, moreover, modern music's own creative resistance to a linguistic logic).<sup>32</sup> The way Enescu's writing gives such an immediate sense of its own corporeal production accentuates this pre-cognitive aspect of the dream, which nevertheless is linked to waking life by the way it draws spontaneously on waking memories. Once again, even though dreaming and involuntary remembering can be likened on the grounds that they happen 'to us', often as a result of some sensory stimulus, Enescu does not frame the dream experience as one in which the past can suddenly and powerfully intrude on the present, as it does in involuntary memory. This is an important way in which dream-logic can be said to differ from a rationalised, waking logic, and Enescu maintains this distinction to a certain extent. His conflation of these two categories (waking and dream) in his *songe éveillé*, however, suggests the possibility of an unpredictable and allusive dream-logic operating in tension with a more linear or linguistic mode of musical thinking. Indeed, the way Enescu's music so often seems to exacerbate or foreground this tension (through its fragmentary thematic processes, or its oscillation between lyric, timeless landscapes and more progressive temporalities) is one of its most defining aesthetic traits.

The corporeal aspect of Enescu's dream writing prompts a brief consideration of the sensuous, even sensual connotations of the dream experience as constructed in 'Lune à travers

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<sup>32</sup> For Julian Johnson, 'modernity is shaped by the trajectory of a linguistic logic and simultaneously a resistance to that logic'; thus, in its capacity to 'rework [such relations] in aesthetic form', the music of modernity 'plays out, in parallel, the tensions between its own abstract order and concrete particularity'. *Ibid.*, 302.

les vitres’.<sup>33</sup> In the whole scene, the dynamic level rises above *piano* only very briefly, but it does so in order to highlight a passage of slightly more luxuriant and expansive writing in the violin, roughly between Figures 22 and 23 in the score. This is significant since the motivic idea which appears two bars after Figure 22 (first introduced in the violin directly at Figure 20 – see Ex. 4.1 – and characterised by octave displacement) eventually assumes a very prominent role in the suite’s highly virtuosic and rhapsodic final scene; variants of this melodic gesture appear in the violin in Examples 3.12 and 3.13. The motif’s introduction at this stage of the suite’s unfolding implies, on the one hand, that Enescu understands the dream experience as a means of exploring and giving voice to sensuous and sensual material; for a moment, the violin seems to break out of its dreamlike haze, and hints at the voluptuous kind of rhetoric which we eventually encounter in the ‘Lever de soleil’. But it is notable too that the desirous quality suggested by the sudden dynamic contrasts in both instruments at this point in the ‘Moonlight’ scene is then remembered upon waking, so that, much in the same way as the day’s events are recalled in dreaming, the material content of the dream itself is then remembered (even sublimated) in the daytime. There is a discernible slippage between Enescu’s waking and sleeping states, in other words, as the remembered content of the one spills into the other, creating a strange temporal continuity amid discontinuous states of consciousness.

Further evidence of this can be found toward the end of the ‘Lune à travers les vitres’, where we encounter another melodic recollection but from a much earlier scene in the suite. Following a more explicit (though melodically contorted) reprise of the lullaby theme at Figure 23, there is a brief resettling into A minor at Figure 25, which is approached using the now familiar syncopated cadential pattern from the ‘Chanson pour bercer’ (see Ex. 4.2). Thereafter, the tempo gradually slows and the melodic detail in the violin is reduced. Harmonically, too, we seem to drift into a different, altogether more distant realm (certainly in relation to the familiar and homely A minor tonality which we encounter so fleetingly at Figure 25, and which we became accustomed to hearing in the ‘Chanson pour bercer’). The piano resumes its rhythmic and chromatic ambiguity from earlier, initially combining movement by parallel fifths in the right hand with a tonally incongruous E-flat minor 7<sup>th</sup> broken chord in the left hand (in the second bar after Fig. 25), followed by two bars built around the acoustic scale on C

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<sup>33</sup> In Freudian terms, it is surely significant that in this instance, the dream experience – a means of foregrounding repressed urges, albeit through various distortions – should be orientated so much around material from the lullaby, which of course carries wider connotations of the intimate relationship between mother and child. Freud explores how repressed desires manifest themselves within dreams as part of what he calls ‘wish-fulfilment’, in both the third and seventh chapters of *The Interpretation of Dreams* (2010).

(characterised by an augmented fourth and a flattened seventh)<sup>34</sup>; the lack of a tonal centre once again contributes to the sense of ambiguity by which dream states are often characterised. At the same time, the violin settles on a simple elaboration of a vaguely familiar yet also slightly unnerving contour – a sliding, descending tritone (from F#<sub>4</sub> to C<sub>4</sub>), last heard near the end of the ‘Vieux Mendiant’ scene (where it contributed to a deep sense of melancholic resignation). The violin’s behaviour at this point would seem to reinforce the palpable sense of instability and ambiguity which Enescu understood to be at the heart of any dream state – the gesture is especially poignant since the violin’s tritone elaboration contrasts so effectively with the way much of the rest of the suite (which is framed as taking place during ‘waking’) is based around the filling out of a perfect fifth (witnessed by the prevalence of the  $\hat{5}-\hat{4}-\hat{3}-\hat{1}$  contour); the tension between dreaming and waking – as well as the proximity of one state to the other, as Enescu saw it – is spelled out here through the prominent use of closely related melodic intervals.

**Example 4.2:** *Impressions d’enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28, ‘Lune à travers les vitres’, Figure 25 – Figure 26 (continued next page).

<sup>34</sup> The oscillation between E-natural and E-flat in these bars also suggests the influence of the so-called Romanian Minor (or altered Dorian) scale, which, like the acoustic scale, also incorporates a tritone and a minor seventh, but with a flattened third.

*p* *mp* *sost.* C.4

(8)

*pp armonioso* *bp* *sost.*

a Tempo ancora più lento (♩=80)

rallentando e calando

C.4 *mp* *penseroso* 2-o 3

a Tempo ancora più lento (♩=80)

rallentando e calando

*p lontano* *pp* *dolciss.* *poco* *8va*

*bp* C.3

26

*pp* *bp s.v.* *pp estinto* *ppp perd.*

The music gradually slows and quietens, diminishing in contrapuntal complexity and dissolving any sense of metric regularity. The writing evokes a state of reduced mental (and physical) activity, suggesting that this is the point where, as Enescu describes it, the absent child protagonist ‘falls asleep’.<sup>35</sup> Interestingly, the recollection of an ‘older’ memory at this point suggests that Enescu equates the move into a deeper state of ‘*un-consciousness*’ with temporal distance, and a sense of dying away. This is made explicit by the *lontano* markings which litter the score (appearing three times in just seven bars, and implying a kind of distancing between subject (performer, listener) and melodic material); while the movement’s gradual fade-out is underpinned by markings of *pochissimo smorzando*, *estinto* and, finally, *perdendosi*. At the same time, the vague recollection of the ‘Vieux mendiant’ fragment also implies that Enescu understood the special capacity of dreams to overlay older and more recent memories, without concern for chronology. Perhaps most intriguingly, this last section also contains markings (which appear together at Figure 25, alongside a chromatic sigh figure in the violin) of *sognando* and *malinconico*, pointing to the simultaneously dreamlike and melancholic qualities of *dor* which Enescu both identified and sought to recapture in his music.

It is evident from the preceding description that both memory and sensation are key aspects in Enescu’s conception of dreaming (I address the role of the latter in greater detail later in the chapter). It is clear, too, that Enescu understood the dream experience not merely as a state of unconscious passivity, but also (somewhat paradoxically) as a site of mental activity, where both recent and more distant memories are not only recalled, but also transformed and reimagined. Freud recognised this active role of the brain in sleep, similarly identifying its capacity for recollection and imaginative transformation.<sup>36</sup> Despite being generally opposed to Freud’s dream theorisations, Allan Hobson notes in a similar vein that one of the many paradoxes uncovered by modern sleep science is that ‘while sleep persists, our brains are more active in dreams than in some states of waking’.<sup>37</sup> For this reason dreams can seem convincingly real, drawing effortlessly (involuntarily) on past experiences, and utterly strange at the same time – a combination which Hobson calls the ‘autocreative’ aspect of dreaming (as Hobson also notes, it was exactly this autocreative and essentially imaginative, inventive quality of the dream experience that so fascinated European artists in the 1920s and 1930s, and especially the

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<sup>35</sup> Enescu’s description of the scene to Gavoty: ‘et, l’enfant s’endort’. Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 1.

<sup>36</sup> Freud also believed that we could learn much more about how memory works in general by observing its behaviour in dreams. See Freud (2010), 53.

<sup>37</sup> Hobson (1988), 17.

Surrealists).<sup>38</sup> It is important to note in this context that the dreamlike state which Enescu recreates musically is not exclusively one of deep sleep, but of the passage from waking to sleeping – a hypnagogic state, which modern sleep theorists claim is often characterised by lucid dreaming. It is specifically this lucid or mentally active (although simultaneously disorientating) part of the dream experience that Enescu is interested in reconstructing, as demonstrated by the apparent slippage between waking and sleeping to which I alluded earlier. His *songe éveillé* is characterised not only by the unconscious recollection of both recent and more distant memories, but likewise by the imaginative transformation and fragmentation of those memories. Even the scene's last few bars, which come closer to evoking a deeper sleep-state, are characterised by a degree of mental 'activity'; the violin's embellishments of the falling tritone figure may seem simplistic compared with what came earlier, but they are still creatively and imaginatively rendered – even 'thoughtfully', in one instance (*pensieroso*).

Much like with his oneiric 'approach' to composing, then (or his conception of music as dreamlike translation), Enescu's understanding of the dream experience is shaped by what he regards as its simultaneous capacity to blur the categories of real and unreal which supposedly divide waking and sleeping life. Of course, nothing in music is strictly 'real', but Enescu invariably exploits music's special potency to transform that which is understood to be real or unreal, in poetic terms (as Johnson states, music's 'apparent disconnection with "real" things is precisely the means by which it has smuggled itself to the heart of things; its unworldliness is the mark of its freedom to take up the structural tensions, processes, and forms of modernity and refashion them').<sup>39</sup> The way Enescu privileges the remembering of past material, thereby connecting the dream experience explicitly to waking events, is a significant aspect of what he regards as the dream's 'lived reality'. Henri Bergson's writings on this topic are useful here, although given the extent to which memory features in his critical and philosophical thought, it is perhaps surprising that he did not spend much more time conducting a sustained examination of the role of memory within dreaming. There are, nonetheless, a few significant references to dreaming in his writings and lectures, including a brief chapter, which resonate with Enescu's conception of the dream-life. Most notably, in *Mind-Energy* (published in 1919), Bergson encourages us to move beyond the view of dreams as 'phantoms superadded to the solid perceptions and conceptions of our waking life', which are often considered 'useless' from a

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<sup>38</sup> Hobson (1988), 17–18. Even though the Surrealists were influenced by several of Freud's psychoanalytical findings, they also seemed to distance themselves from him in the public sphere. For an overview of the relationship between Freud and the Surrealists, and of the ways Surrealism might be read in response to the Freudian uncanny, see Hal Foster, *Compulsive Beauty* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995).

<sup>39</sup> Johnson (2015), 312.

practical point of view. Setting aside such preconceptions, Bergson claims that the dream state will instead be seen ‘as the substratum of our normal state’. He continues:

The dream is not something fantastic hovering above and additional to the reality of being awake; on the contrary, that reality of the waking state is gained by limitation, by concentration and by tension of a diffuse psychical life, which is the dream-life. In a sense, the perception and memory we exercise in the dream-state are more natural than those in the waking state: there does consciousness disport itself, perceiving just to perceive, remembering just to remember, with no care for life, that is, for the action to be accomplished. But the waking state consists in eliminating, in choosing, in concentrating unceasingly the totality of the diffuse dream-life at the point where a practical problem is presented. To be awake means to will. Cease to will, detach yourself from life, disinterest yourself, and by that mere abstention you pass from the awake-self to the dream-self – less *tense* but more *extended*.<sup>40</sup>

By describing the dream-state as a substratum of waking life, from which actions can be extracted or chosen according to the will of the waking self, Bergson develops a theme he first introduced some years earlier in *Matter and Memory* (published in 1896). Here, Bergson claimed that ‘if almost the whole of our past is hidden from us because it is inhibited by the necessities of present action, it will find strength to cross the threshold of consciousness in all cases where we renounce the interests of effective action to replace ourselves, so to speak, in the life of dreams’. It is the dream-life, in other words, that allows an individual to access the entirety of their lived past, or their ‘inner reality’ (*réalité intérieure*), as Bergson also described it. He hypothesised accordingly that ‘a human being who should *dream* his life instead of living it would no doubt thus keep before his eyes at each moment the infinite multitude of the details of his past history’.<sup>41</sup> This notion continues to underpin Bergson’s conception of the dream as presented in *Mind-Energy*, where he refers to the dream-life not as ‘something fantastic’ that is ‘additional to the reality of being awake’, but as a ‘diffuse psychical’ state which, by implication, has a reality of its own (the difference in thinking here, compared with early Romantic conceptualisations of the dream experience as an otherworldly realm, is indeed striking). In the chapter on dreaming (which is taken from a lecture titled ‘Le rêve’, which Bergson delivered before the Institut Psychologique in March 1901), he affirms that ‘behind the memories which crowd in upon our present occupation and are revealed by means of it, there are others, thousands on thousands of others, below and beneath the scene illuminated by consciousness. Yes, I believe our past life is there, preserved even to the minutest details;

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<sup>40</sup> Henri Bergson, *Mind-Energy* (1919), in Keith Ansell Pearson and John Ó Maoilearca, eds., *Key Writings: Henri Bergson* (London: Bloomsbury, 2002), 175.

<sup>41</sup> Bergson (2011), 199–201.

nothing is forgotten; all we have perceived, thought, willed, from the very first awakening of our consciousness, persists indefinitely'.<sup>42</sup> Naturally this resonates with Enescu's own understanding of the dream experience, and is evidenced musically in the way his self-generating thematic language suggests the possibility of a persisting or perduring past (as I described in Chapter One).

Bergson's conviction that within the dream-state, consciousness (a highly significant choice of word in this context) 'perceives just to perceive', and 'remembers just to remember' ('without care for...the action to be accomplished'), resonates strongly with Enescu's description of composing not just as a waking dream, but also as a state in which he 'listens without understanding'.<sup>43</sup> He becomes 'disinterested', in other words, recalling Bergson's conditions for passing from the awake-self to the dream-self. Significantly, by describing this state as 'less *tense* but more *extended*', Bergson also makes explicit the link between the detached dream-life and his concept of *durée*, where the past is continuously reincorporated within the present and lived time is experienced as an extended 'now'. In Bergson's conception, then, the dream-state is accordingly one in which the constant interpenetration of the events of one's lived past is made possible within a seemingly timeless (and highly malleable) present. I have already remarked on the capacity of Enescu's music to construct similar temporal states as part of my analysis of the Piano Quintet (in Chapter Two). This is no less true of those sections of pieces which he marks explicitly as dreamlike, including the 'Lune à travers les vitres' scene from *Impressions d'enfance*. Its durational quality is suggested by the music's non-goal-directed, lyric temporality, as well as by the temporally immersive overlaying of recent and older memories, and by the way Enescu creates a blurred sense of continuity between waking and sleeping states.

It is, moreover, through the very willingness to dream, or to become disinterested, that Bergson claims we are able to form memories at all: 'to call up the past in the form of an image, we must be able to withdraw ourselves from the action of the moment, we must have the power to value the useless, we must have the will to dream'.<sup>44</sup> The act of remembering is equated with

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<sup>42</sup> Bergson (1920), 116. This belief was not new. The German psychiatrist Friedrich Scholz observed in 1893 that the way dream memory behaves indicates that 'nothing which we have once mentally possessed can be entirely lost', while another study by the French psychologist Joseph Delboeuf (*Le sommeil et les rêves*, 1885) similarly claims that 'even the most insignificant impression leaves an unalterable trace, which is indefinitely capable of revival'. Both studies are cited in Freud (2010), 53.

<sup>43</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 20 (first broadcast 04.07.1952). See note 19.

<sup>44</sup> Bergson (2011), 94. In the lecture on 'Dreams' in *Mind-Energy*, Bergson similarly claims that it is through becoming 'disinterested in the present situation, in the pressing action' that the mind's 'repressed memories...begin to stir'. See Bergson (1920), 116–117.

dreaming in such a way as to imply (albeit paradoxically: ‘we must will ourselves to cease willing’) that dreaming, or an experience akin to dreaming, might in fact be possible in waking life, merely by force of a willed detachment. (It might be more accurate to say that Bergson’s conception of the dream creates a far more fluid dichotomy between the categories of waking and sleeping, so it becomes rather more difficult to situate the dream experience according to a conventional dualism). At the same time, however, the difficulty of rationalising, or of narrating – essentially, of verbalising – the dream experience suggests that, even though it may be proximal to waking life, it is inevitably of a different ontological order to rational, conscious thought, as I hope my discussion of the ‘Lune à travers les vitres’ scene has shown (it is also in this sense that Bergson conceives of the ontological reality of the past – by which, in his understanding, dreams are made). So, while perception and reasoning may function in a relatively similar way in the dream state as in the waking state, Bergson of course recognises that ‘we cannot analyse the dream while we are dreaming’;<sup>45</sup> neither can we translate the ‘inner reality’ of the dream in any rational or verbal sense (Bergson must concede this point, if only by his own definition of dreaming as *durée* – by which he means a purely temporal concept which resists explication through categories of spatial representation, including by linguistic means).<sup>46</sup> Bergson’s solution to this theoretical dilemma, as we have seen, was to explain duration through analogies with musical expression (and melody especially). He grants music ‘the prerogative of contact with a verbally unrepresentable interiority’,<sup>47</sup> and in doing so, he aligns himself squarely with Enescu and the latter’s own conception of music as the ideal means of translating his inner dream (by ‘a-linguistic’ means). Dreaming is thus conceived of more generally as a kind of mediator between memory, which is emblematic of the artist’s inner life and past history, and aesthetic expression.

What I have so far been referring to in general terms as dreaming, or as the dream-life ought, at this stage, to be more properly distinguished from the related concept of reverie, which I introduced in the previous chapter. In Gaston Bachelard’s conception (as articulated in his *La Poétique de la rêverie*, of 1960), reverie is presented as a dynamic form of imaginative consciousness; a reflective, contemplative state which has the capacity to inspire spontaneous (artistic) creativity. Bachelard is quick to distinguish between passive forms of day-dreaming,

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<sup>45</sup> Bergson (1920), 123.

<sup>46</sup> Bergson was thus caught, as Caballero observes, in a ‘daunting paradox conceived within his own system’. What he desperately needed was to find a way of conveying in words the essence of a notion ‘whose vital and distinctive mobility always freezes up under the cold scrutiny of spatial analysis’. Caballero (2001), 39.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 40.

and what he describes as a *poetic reverie*: ‘a reverie which poetry puts on the right track’.<sup>48</sup> As we saw in the last chapter, it is through poetic reverie, and specifically reveries toward childhood, that Bachelard suggests we can relive our past (‘in our reverie which imagines while remembering, our past takes on substance again’).<sup>49</sup> Reverie is conceptualised as a ‘mnemonics of the imagination’, a reimagining of the past through memory, which in turn gives rise to innumerable potential futures, never in fact realised: ‘reverie toward our past...seems to bring back to life lives which have never taken place, lives which have been imagined’.<sup>50</sup> It is in this sense that Bachelard also conceives of reverie as a cosmic opening onto the world, in all its potentiality and in its originality.

In many respects, Bachelard’s conception of reverie actually comes remarkably close to Enescu’s (and indeed Bergson’s) understanding of the dream experience, including its role in artistic creation (or, one might claim in a broader sense that the development in thinking around the unconscious dream in the early twentieth century begins to impinge in significant ways on contemporaneous understandings of the waking reverie). Both are clearly reliant on a dialectical interplay between memory and imagination; both evoke detached states of being which are simultaneously characterised by some degree of conscious mental activity and connection to waking thought (Bachelard refers to reverie as an ‘awakened oneirism’);<sup>51</sup> and both seem to blur the distinction between the real and the purely imaginary.<sup>52</sup> Given this similarity, it is hardly surprising to find that among some of Enescu’s contemporaries, *rêverie* was used in such a way as to imply a synonymy with *rêve*, or *songe*. An often-quoted letter from Gabriel Fauré to his wife, Marie, in which the composer dwells on the issue of dreamlike translation and aesthetic expression, serves as an indicative example:

It is only in the Andante of the *Second Quartet* that I remember having translated, almost involuntarily, the very distant memory of ringing bells...in the evening, at Montgauzy... Over this drone [*bourdonnement*] arose a vague reverie [*vague rêverie*], which like all vague reveries, would be untranslatable in literary form [*littérairement*]. Only, is it not often the case that some external fact lulls us into thoughts which are so imprecise that in reality they are not

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<sup>48</sup> Bachelard (1971), 6.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 119.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 112.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.*, 158; also 159.

<sup>52</sup> Bachelard writes that it is by recalling the ‘cosmic solitude’ of childhood, through reverie, that we re-experience a residual mode of being which ‘binds the real with the imaginary’; it is in this sense that the mature mind might still ‘[live] the images of reality in total imagination’. Later he writes that by reimagining our past ‘we go into a very nearby elsewhere where reality and reverie are indistinguishable’. Bachelard (1971), 108; 121.

thoughts, but which are nevertheless something we can delight in? The desire for non-existent things, perhaps; and that is indeed the domain of music.<sup>53</sup>

Fauré's understanding of 'rêverie' in this instance seems to overlap with a contemporaneous understanding of 'rêve'. It is notable for a start that the dreamlike quality (the 'vague reverie') that Fauré attaches to the ringing bells is shaped fundamentally by his memory of them – a 'very distant' recollection that would almost seem unreal in its 'non-existence' (and whose origins, one infers from Fauré's account, would seem to stem from a deeper unconscious; this 'reverie' comes to him unpredictably, as a sleeping dream does, rather than as something which he directs and engages with actively). Moreover, it is through music (not through words) that the 'translation' of this vague and inarticulable reverie is made possible (thereby prefiguring Enescu's own statements regarding the musical translation of what he called his *rêve intérieur*). Indeed, it seems that the distant memory and its oneiric quality are what prompt an imaginative response on Fauré's part in the first place (the 'almost involuntary' nature of this response has obvious Proustian overtones).

A similar appropriation of 'rêverie' can be found in a review of Enescu's playing: specifically, from a solo concert performance of music by Bach, which he gave in Strasbourg in 1947.<sup>54</sup> Again, a great deal of importance is placed on the dreamlike translation of all that the artist has 'to say'. Much like how Enescu himself characterised his *rêve intérieur*, his ability to express these things sincerely is understood as the direct result of his 'solitary meditation' and silent detachment. This sense of solitude is ultimately what prompts Enescu's 'deep reverie':

Enesco is alone on the stage, alone with so much to say, stooping as if burdened by an exhausting task, immobile, cut off from everything other than his violin... his face is pained with the effort of expressing himself, and with the fear of failing to do so; he is plunged within the deep reverie [*profonde rêverie*] of one of those solitary meditations which Bach entrusts to the violin alone. The man too is alone, with his violin, encased by a kind of inner silence.<sup>55</sup>

While there may have been some conceptual overlap between contemporaneous understandings of dream and reverie, in *La Poétique de la rêverie* Bachelard makes a strong

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<sup>53</sup> Gabriel Fauré to Marie Fauré, 11 September 1906, in Gabriel Fauré, *Lettres Intimes (1885–1924)*, ed. Philippe Fauré-Frémiet (Paris: 1951), 132. For perceptive analyses of the passage in question (which refers in fact to the Adagio non troppo of the Second Piano Quartet, Op.45), see both Caballero (2001), 41–45, and Basil Smallman, *The Piano Quartet and Quintet* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 81. Enescu's dedication of his own Second Piano Quartet to Fauré seems all the more apt given it too employs a prominent bell motif.

<sup>54</sup> Gavoty reads this review to Enescu during one of their conversations, although he does not provide a source for it, in either the recording or the print version of the *Entretiens*.

<sup>55</sup> Enescu and Gavoty, *Entretiens*, episode 11 (first broadcast 04.04.1952); also in Gavoty (2016), 186–188.

distinction between the two. Perhaps the most obvious difference is that reverie was understood to take place specifically in waking consciousness, whereas, as Bachelard saw it, in the depths of our nocturnal dreams, we descend instead into a state of non-life: ‘we brush intimately against nothingness, our nothingness...At the limit, absolute dreams plunge us into the universe of the Nothing’.<sup>56</sup> In this ‘slumber without memory’ (a significant departure from both Freud’s and Bergson’s shared assertion that memories form the material content of sleep dreams) Bachelard sees a disastrous obliteration of the subject, and an end-point to the detached state of ‘less-than-being’ (*moins-être*) by which he characterises reverie.<sup>57</sup> Devoid of conscious presence, Bachelard concludes that ‘the nocturnal dream is an ontological mystery’.<sup>58</sup>

Of course, subjective obliteration is not predominantly how Enescu conceives of the dream experience.<sup>59</sup> Thus, notwithstanding Bachelard’s own distinction (which can effectively be traced back to a traditional separation of dream and reverie, as witnessed in Berlioz’s *Symphonie Fantastique*, for instance),<sup>60</sup> the fact remains that Enescu’s conception of the dream (shared by many of his contemporaries) intersects in significant ways with Bachelard’s later theorisation of reverie.<sup>61</sup> Arguably the most important point of contact between these two related concepts has to do with the way they are understood to influence or mediate aesthetic expression. The notion, as advanced by Enescu and others, that a dreamlike state of detachment might invite or otherwise facilitate artistic creation is paralleled by the role Bachelard ascribes to poetic reverie. I have already explored how, in Bachelard’s mind, dreaming of childhood can act as a spur for the artist’s own imaginative consciousness. In a similar way, Bachelard proposes that the contemplation of matter itself, through reverie, can also inspire spontaneous artistic creation. Water is understood to be a particularly evocative element in this respect: ‘the lake, the pond,

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<sup>56</sup> Bachelard (1971), 146.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 146; 150.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, 149.

<sup>59</sup> It is possible to hear the end of the ‘Lune à travers les vitres’ scene along these lines, and the music’s gradual slowing and dying away does suggest a descent into eventual nothingness (this never arrives of course, and instead the child’s slumber is interrupted by the start of the ‘wind in the chimney’ scene). The closest Enescu comes to articulating a sense of nothingness is precisely through the kinds of silences I explored in Chapter Two, which seem to usher the music towards the very border of perceptibility, causing it to teeter between presence and absence, or the material and immaterial.

<sup>60</sup> See note 8. Further nineteenth-century explorations of reverie can be found, for instance, in songs by Camille Saint-Saëns (‘Rêverie’, 1851) and Reynaldo Hahn (‘Rêverie’, 1870); Debussy’s piano piece ‘Rêverie’ (1890); or Pierre Auguste Renoir’s *Portrait of Jeanne Samary (La Reverie)* (1877).

<sup>61</sup> My point here is not so much that the understanding of reverie changed around this time (although Bachelard’s expansion of the concept in terms of a *poetics* of reverie is obviously significant), but that the conceptualisation of the unconscious or sleeping dream evolved in such a way that it became linked not only to waking life (as reverie undoubtedly is), but also to one’s understanding of the self in relation to the quotidian world. Furthermore, I understand both dream and reverie to be emblematic of the kind of ‘dream logic’ that I have distinguished from a more rationalised, linear mode of waking thought.

the still water very naturally awaken our cosmic imagination through the beauty of a reflected world. When he is near such things, a dreamer receives a very simple lesson for imagining the world, for doubling the real world with an imagined world'.<sup>62</sup> Water's capacity for inspiring the imagination, or for teaching the dreamer to overlay the real world with the imaginary, is unambiguously the focal point of Bachelard's *Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter* (1942), in which he examines poetic creations inspired by reveries towards water (it is notable that in this earlier work, 'dream' and 'reverie' are often used interchangeably).<sup>63</sup> Thus lively water is considered to offer a 'lesson in vivacity', while placid waters blur the boundaries of a 'seen' reality by merging depths with reflected heights.<sup>64</sup>

Alongside the extensive list of poets on whom Bachelard draws in his exploration of water-inspired artistic creations (Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul Claudel, Victor Hugo and Edgar Allan Poe, to name just a few) one may of course add a number of contemporaneous composers for whom water provided a source of material inspiration. Debussy and Ravel are obvious examples, and Enescu himself engaged with the topic on several occasions.<sup>65</sup> For Enescu, it is not just that water offers a convincing analogy for the non-narrative structure and (self-)reflective aspect of the dream, but that (through this process of dreaming, or reverie) music itself becomes metaphorically analogous with water, specifically as a culturally mediated topic of nature. In other words, music (especially at this point in history, when its language becomes more corporeal – effectively adopting an expressive mode that conforms less with the formal patterns of classical syntax) represents a vital means of participating in the construction of various cultural ideas about water and the natural world more generally.<sup>66</sup> It is within this mediating capacity that Bachelard makes his claims regarding water's essential qualities, and that Enescu

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<sup>62</sup> Bachelard (1971), 198.

<sup>63</sup> Bachelard, *Water and Dreams: An Essay on the Imagination of Matter*, trans. Edith R. Farrell (Dallas: The Pegasus Foundation, 1983; originally published 1942).

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 32; 48.

<sup>65</sup> Debussy's water pieces include 'Reflets dans l'eau' and 'Poissons d'Or', from the *Images* for solo piano; 'Ondine' (from the Second Book of *Preludes*); and perhaps most famous of all, the symphonic suite *La Mer*. Well-known water pieces by Ravel include his own 'Ondine' setting, as well as his 'Une barque sur l'océan', from the *Miroirs* suite, and *Jeux d'eau* (all for solo piano). Other than the 'Ruisselet au fond du jardin' scene from *Impressions d'enfance*, Enescu's water pieces also include the 'Rivière sous la lune' scene from the Third *Orchestral Suite*, Op. 27 (which I also discuss in this chapter), and his own contribution to the genre of large-scale orchestral sea depictions: *Vox Maris*, Op. 31.

<sup>66</sup> A very useful technical and aesthetic overview of the water metaphor in music, and especially its recurrence in Debussy, can be found in Francesco Spampinato, *Debussy, poète des eaux: Métaphorisation et corporéité dans l'expérience musicale* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2011). By investigating the ways in which music became heard (or received) metaphorically as a material substance, Spampinato effectively provides a wider frame for considering how Bachelard equates water and dreaming with poetic acts of creation. Julian Johnson has explored how music absorbs and transforms conventional topics for the representation of nature, thereby participating in its construction, in relation to the music of Anton Webern. See Johnson, *Webern and the transformation of nature* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 3.

likewise constructs his watery landscapes. The latter's 'Ruisselet au fond du jardin' scene from *Impressions d'enfance* (which I began to explore in the previous chapter; see Exx. 3.2 and 3.3) responds well, in fact, to a further observation by Bachelard, who claims that due to their imagined dynamism and youthfulness, the 'laughs' and 'babblings' of gurgling streams are emblematic of 'the childhood language of Nature'.<sup>67</sup> Compared with the lullaby scene there is nothing childish or naive about Enescu's actual rendering. Through its enchanting slides, its meandering melodies and its mirror-like repetitions, the scene's construction reverberates strongly with the notion that water imagery might itself influence (also a water term) and deepen our experience of the world (note also the violin's series of trills around Figure 9 which evoke swirling eddies, and are redolent of the youthful dynamism to which Bachelard alludes).

Enescu's water-scene is evidently based on the contemplation of matter itself, to the point that water becomes the material form of his reverie – this is what Bachelard infers when describing water as 'an element of materializing imagination'.<sup>68</sup> Indeed, the importance of the materiality of sound to Enescu's musical reverie is evidenced by such expressive markings as *con una sonorità acquatica* and *fluido armonioso*, which are intended to convey the delicateness and softness of the water's sounding movement. Similarly, moments of overt textural density suggest a murkiness which Enescu emphasises by use of the expressive term *glauco*, and a sense of turbidity or opaqueness is further exacerbated by occasional heterophonic shadowing between both parts, suggesting a slippery distinction in instrumental vocality. While the use of heterophony is relatively common in Enescu, what really sets him apart stylistically (if we compare this scene with the 'water pieces' of composers like Debussy or Ravel) is the fluid dichotomy he sets up between heterophony and strict counterpoint. This is undoubtedly a stylistic marker of the later works more generally, and is regarded by Jim Samson as one of the manifestations of a broader dialectic, discernible in Enescu's music, between improvisation and composition.<sup>69</sup>

It is by 'dreaming' of the stream, then (and not merely recalling it), that Enescu relives the watery landscape of his childhood. By reimagining the past in this way, the stream becomes transformed into a site of enchantment – a rippling source of delight. Moreover, by granting free reign to the imaginary (and, by extension, the marvellous and sensational), reverie (or indeed dreaming) could be thought of as a complementary, even necessary mood of enchantment – a way of becoming receptive or open to it. Partly this is because 'dreaming' of the stream,

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<sup>67</sup> Bachelard (1983), 32.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 11.

<sup>69</sup> Samson (2006), 17.

contemplating its movement, or reimagining the specificity of its sounding form precipitates its idealisation, or its sublimation (as discussed in the previous chapter, the scene charts a move from detached contemplation to a sense of idyllic contentment). To idealise the stream (or any object) is to elevate it, to make it unique, to find some magic in it; indeed, virtually every scene in the *Impressions d'enfance* suite reveals an attempt to rediscover a sense of magic in the everyday.

#### ENCHANTED DREAMS

The process of dreamlike idealisation with which Enescu engages also relies on the introduction of a purely imaginary aspect that can transform an everyday object into something unfamiliar, strange, and new. This is precisely what underpins Enescu's (and Proust's, as we saw earlier) paradoxical conception of the dream as something that can replicate the perceptual clarity of a waking-life experience (or else overlap with it), and yet seem to operate by an utterly foreign and unfamiliar set of rules. One way in which artists have long sought to replicate this process of 'othering' the world, of making it seem unfamiliar, is through a related category of dreaming – namely the nocturnal. Like dreaming, nocturnalism is understood to have symbolic associations with subconscious thought, or desire, and has provided much artistic inspiration in that respect (not least for Romantic poets like Novalis or Joseph von Eichendorff).<sup>70</sup> It also lends what could be described as a visual frame for the (sleeping) dream experience, while its binary opposition to the daytime means it has often been explored and theorised through analogous dichotomies such as conscious and unconscious, or real and unreal. A world that is rendered unfamiliar by nocturnalism can also be understood to offer an experience of nature that is not spoiled or tarnished by human presence, and the secret thrill of witnessing nature coming alive at night-time is a topic that is explored by Enescu, Ravel, and Bartók, among others.<sup>71</sup> This experience is characterised by what could be described as a sensory 'intermediality': by closing down the dominance of the visual sense (commonly associated with a rationalistic philosophy

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<sup>70</sup> Repressed desire, secrecy, death and the erotic are all topics that are explored through the lens of the nocturnal, especially around the turn of the twentieth century (nocturnalism, sleep and dreaming were all important themes for Symbolism and Expressionism). Notable works from this period include Schoenberg's *Verklärte Nacht*, Alban Berg's *Vier Gesänge*, Op. 2, and Debussy's *Pelléas et Mélisande*, which Enescu saw in 1902 (he and Ravel attended the *répétition générale* together in Paris). The nocturnal also occupies a central place in German Romanticism: see, for instance, Novalis's *Hymnen an die Nacht* (1800), or Eichendorff's (1788–1857) many 'night' poems – *Mondnacht* ('Moonlit Night'); *Frühlingsnacht* ('Spring Night'); *Die Nacht* ('Night'); *Nachtzauber* ('Night Magic'); *Zwielicht* ('Twilight'); *Gute Nacht* ('Good Night') – most of which were set to music by composers including Schumann and Hugo Wolf.

<sup>71</sup> Ravel's enchanted garden in *L'Enfant et les sortilèges* and Bartók's 'The Night's Music' from the *Out of Doors* suite, both mentioned in the last chapter, are notable examples.

of mind), emphasis is placed instead on the aural (a marker of the irrational). This decentring of the subject was again a notable feature of Romantic poetry (exemplified in Eichendorff or in the work of Ludwig Tieck)<sup>72</sup> and is crucial, moreover, to music's claims to a special proximity to the irrational world of the unconscious. Such Romantic tropes evidently find a renewed iteration in Enescu's music and in that of his contemporaries.

Enescu's own night-scenes are most often embedded in programmatic works which depict a circadian cycle (moving from day to night, and back to day again).<sup>73</sup> *Impressions d'enfance* is one such work, with its night-scenes comprising most of the suite's second half (from the lullaby scene, which effectively acts as an invitation to dreaming, to the storm in scene IX). The template for *Impressions* is clearly derived from Enescu's first published work, the *Poème Roumain* for Orchestra and Wordless Chorus, Op. 1 (1897): the poem depicts an evening in the Romanian countryside, and similarly features a night-time storm scene which is then succeeded by a glorious evocation of sunrise. It concludes with a medley of Romanian folk dances. A similar programmatic arc also underpins the *Suite Villageoise* (Third Orchestral Suite), Op. 27, whose opening evocations of rural springtime and children at play are succeeded by an extended third scene comprising the 'Childhood home at sunset' ('La vieille maison de l'enfance, au soleil couchant'); the 'Shepherd' ('Pâtre'), explored in the last chapter; 'Migrating birds and crows' ('Oiseaux migrants et corbeaux'); and the 'Evening bell' ('Cloche vespérale'). A brief nocturnal scene follows ('Rivière sous la lune'), and a final scene of 'Rustic dances' ('Danses rustiques') brings the suite to a close.

In all these works, the onset of night seems at least as important as night-time itself (the third scene from the *Suite Villageoise* takes two to three times longer to perform compared with any of the other scenes, and is undoubtedly the heart of the piece). Failing light and a slowing of the

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<sup>72</sup> Norman Kasper notes that 'whereas eighteenth-century (landscape) paintings largely operate with colours to constitute their pictorial identity...romantic poetry discovers the colour sense and the sense of hearing'. As such, 'language's iconicity [in the poetry of Ludwig Tieck and Joseph von Eichendorff] is no longer found by referring to a painting's presentiveness...or by a merely symbolic use of colours. As the concept of *mood* takes centre stage, pictures as well as poems are led by a musicality that also structures their iconicity'. Norman Kasper, 'Loss of Presentiveness – and Poetical Explanations: Linguistic Iconicity in Poetry by Tieck and Eichendorff', in *Afterlives of Romantic Intermediality: The Intersection of Visual, Aural, and Verbal Frontiers*, ed. Leena Eilittä and Catherine Riccio-Berry (Lanham and London: Lexington Books, 2016), 5.

<sup>73</sup> Away from this group of programmatic works, Enescu also evokes the topic of nocturnalism in his 'Carillon nocturne' from the Third Piano Suite, Op. 18 (discussed in Chapter Three), as well as in his setting of Fernand Gregh's 'L'ombre est bleue', from the *Trois mélodies sur poèmes de Fernand Gregh*, Op. 19 (1916). In the opera *Oedipe*, the scene in which Oedipe confronts the Sphinx likewise takes place at night, thereby accentuating the connotations that the nocturnal also has with topics of danger and the unknown (Enescu's stage directions include the description 'Nuit bleue, étoilée. On ne distingue que d'immenses masses noires' ('Blue night [idiomatically, this also implies a 'night of terror'], starry. One can only make out vast expanses of darkness'). See Figure 139 in the Third Tableau of Act 2).

day's activities seem to prepare the way for a different kind of world, one that is gradually obscured and therefore internalised. These twilight scenes are an invitation to dream, a beckoning toward the mysterious, but they are also a poignant reminder of a communally lived time – a 'public time' that is marked by church bells and which, in Peter Davidson's words, evokes a 'sense of shared progress through the day'.<sup>74</sup> The sense of 'in-between-ness' that these scenes conjure is conveyed most effectively in the third movement of the *Suite Villageoise*, whose offstage and onstage instruments create a blurred distinction between presence and absence, real and unreal. The scenes also tend to be steeped in melancholy and evince an accompanying sense of belatedness. As Davidson observes, this comes about 'not only [through] late arrival at a place, with the light already going out, but of coming to a place after a lapse of time when circumstances have changed'.<sup>75</sup> The revisiting of such a place through memory (in Enescu's case, the childhood home or the Romanian countryside) is likewise an acknowledgment of a lapse in time, accompanied by the painful realisation that it is now too late to change anything; one is left merely to 're-find' or reimagine the past, rather than alter it (a quintessential aspect of the modern condition).<sup>76</sup> Meanwhile our own sense of belatedness, as listeners, is intensified through the realisation that Enescu has already viewed these scenes in retrospect.<sup>77</sup>

Night is already upon us in the Orchestral Suite's following scene, which depicts a river bathed in moonlight ('Rivière sous la lune'). As with the 'Ruisselet' scene, Enescu presents a dreamlike vision of a watery landscape (spurred by the contemplation of water itself), but this time the vision is situated deep within the realm of the nocturnal. Enescu's engagement with these related themes helps to make explicit the dream vision's capacity to enchant, while the nocturnal frame also lends a sense of unfamiliarity or strangeness to the scene. A brief exploration of timbre (particularly in the thinly scored 'chamber-like' sections at the start and

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<sup>74</sup> Peter Davidson, *The Last of the Light: About Twilight* (London: Reaktion Books, 2015), 13.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>76</sup> Joseph Leo Koerner writes in a similar vein about the paintings of Caspar David Friedrich (1774–1840), whose numerous evening scenes (*Der Abend; Two Men Contemplating the Moon; The Dreamer; Moonrise over the Sea* – to name just a few) are particularly effective in provoking a sense of belatedness – a topical association that obviously predates Friedrich's work, and whose potency as an aesthetic idea can be discerned well into the twentieth century. See Koerner's *Caspar David Friedrich and the Subject of Landscape* (London: Reaktion Books, 2009).

<sup>77</sup> The opening of the third scene of the *Villageoise* suite has a feeling of 'lateness' built into the melodic writing itself. The iambic (short–long) rhythms that characterise the scene's main theme, which is heard initially in the first violins and flutes, obscure the music's slow triple metre pulse by transferring stressed beats to different parts of the bar (it is tempting to try and hear the theme in a compound 6/8 time, but this is similarly undermined). The theme's falling fourth 'motif' (heard in bars three and five, an octave apart) seems particularly affected by this: it quickly becomes recognisable, but rarely seems to arrive at the start of the bar 'in time' (or its arrival seems to contradict our sense of where the barline is). This feeling of lateness stays with the motif, which soon becomes the scene's most prominent melodic idea; its iambic character continues to suggest that it has somehow arrived late in the bar – like an anacrusis that has been shifted.

end of the movement) will help to show how Enescu imbues his dreamlike scene with an eerie strangeness. Perhaps most startling is the vertiginous melodic line that appears in a B-flat soprano saxophone at the beginning of the movement (playing at the very top of its range), alongside trickling arpeggiations in the harp and sustained muted strings (which often play harmonics; see Ex. 4.3). The dreamlike logic that Enescu constructs here relies largely on the fluid and unpredictable shifts in harmonic orientation which take place every bar or so,<sup>78</sup> and which are masked by the overarching melodic line which is passed around, seamlessly, from the soprano saxophone to a solo oboe, and then the flutes and clarinets (the contrast between the remarkably drawn-out yet never ‘resolving’ melodic line and the harp’s continual semiquaver patterns likewise contributes to a feeling of dreamlike disorientation). The effect this produces is of a series of blurred discontinuities, much akin to the seamless shifts in perspective and subtle metamorphoses that are common to the dream experience. There is little in the way of linear logic here; instead, Enescu constructs a dreamlike vision that relies on subtle shifts in the music’s harmonic and timbral complexion (and thereby simultaneously analogising the water’s myriad hues).

While the harp’s inclusion within this opening texture is not unexpected,<sup>79</sup> the soprano saxophone is encountered far less often in art music of this period, and is nearly always used for timbral effect.<sup>80</sup> Enescu himself rarely makes use of the saxophone, of any kind. Quite revealingly, however, a saxophone does feature in two important (and bitterly ironic) moments in the opera, *Oedipe*: in Act III, when Oedipe confronts the Thebans after blinding himself and

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<sup>78</sup> The opening two bars of the movement are arranged around a hexachord of Eb – Gb – Bb / F – A – C; the third bar is based on a non-symmetrical octatonic set; the fourth bar is based on another hexachord (with the strings and harp each drawing on closely related pentatonic scales); the fifth bar eventually presents us with a tetrachord, having begun by outlining a minor 2<sup>nd</sup> of F and Gb; and the start of the sixth bar is based on another hexachord closely related to that encountered in the opening bars (Eb – Gb – Bb / F – Ab – Cb). The pitch collections are such that they obviously undermine any sense of a tonic ‘home’. The harmonic contrast that Enescu generates from bar to bar therefore comes across as somewhat weightless, or ungrounded – each bar is juxtaposed with the next, as opposed to against an underlying tonal scheme.

<sup>79</sup> John Daverio described the harp as an ‘emblem of distance and disembodiment’, and it is often thought of as a quintessentially Romantic instrument with the capacity to symbolise mystery, the otherworldly, death. See Daverio, ‘Schumann’s Ossianic Manner’, *19<sup>th</sup>-Century Music*, Vol. 21, No. 3 (1998), 259. Sarah Clemmens Waltz has explored the topical associations the harp has with night-time and moonlight in ‘In Defense of Moonlight’, *Beethoven Forum*, Vol. 14 No. 1 (2007), 1–43.

<sup>80</sup> Ravel makes use of the soprano saxophone in his *Boléro* (1928), as does Vincent d’Indy in his opera *Fervaal* (1895) – both works Enescu is likely to have heard. Charles Koechlin, who was a classmate of Enescu’s at the Paris Conservatoire, wrote several pieces for saxophone and piano, including his *15 Études*, Op. 188 (1942–1944).

**Example 4.3:** *Orchestral Suite No. 3 ('Villageoise'), Op. 27, 4<sup>th</sup> movement, opening bars (continued next page).*

**Moderato malinconico, ma senza lentezza**

**Soprano Sax. (Bb)**  
Solo  
*mf dolce, cantabile tranq.*

**Harp**  
*mp eguale legato*  
6 6 6 6 3  
si ♭

**Violins I**  
1 Solo  
avec sourdine  
*p*

**Viola**  
3  
av. sourd.  
*p*

**Sop. Sax.**  
*p*

**Cel.**  
*mp*

**Harp**  
6 6 6 6 3  
ut ♭  
*p*

**Vlns. I**  
1 Solo  
*bp*

**Vlns. II**  
1 2 3 4  
*bp* *pp* *pp*

**Vlas.**  
1 2  
*bp* *pp*

**Vc.**  
1 Solo  
*p* *bp*



thanks his mother for the children she has born him (Fig. 292+5ff); and the scene in Act II which foresees this moment, where Oedipe decides to leave home and follow his destiny, claiming that (the god) Phoibos has prepared ‘other loves’ (‘autres amours’) for him (Fig. 86+3ff). In each of these scenes the saxophone’s melodic chromaticism highlights the text’s perverse irony; indeed, the instrument’s very presence (with its prevailing jazz connotations) may be regarded as a ‘perversion’. But there is also a pained aspect to each of these appearances, evidenced by markings of *lamentoso* in the Act II ‘premonition’, and later of *doloroso*. It is easy to hear these qualities in the soprano saxophone’s languorous melodic line in the ‘Rivière sous la lune’ scene. A similarly reflective sadness is conveyed by the scene’s initial tempo marking of *Moderato malinconico* (and later, again, through further markings of *malinconico*), while the saxophone’s alien timbre also helps to conjure a mysterious yet enticing atmosphere – a subversion of normality (indeed, one is tempted to draw further parallels between Enescu’s use of the saxophone here and its extensive use in the jazz-influenced, dystopian *film noir* soundtracks that would reach Paris just a few years later, in the 1940s).

Much the same could be said of Enescu’s use of the celesta, which takes over from the harp with a shimmering chromatic ostinato towards the end of the movement. For Enescu, the celesta clearly possesses connotations of the otherworldly: its capacity to evoke a sense of eeriness is realised to great effect in the opera, in the scene where Oedipe confronts the Sphinx (which also takes place at night; see Act II, Sc. 3 – Fig. 158ff).<sup>81</sup> Near the very end of ‘Rivière sous la lune’ the woodwind drop out, and the remaining strings (playing harmonics) and celesta are joined by a tam-tam and suspended cymbal (see Ex. 4.4, below). The movement ends with a sustained A<sub>4</sub> harmonic in the cello and the reverberating percussion. While Enescu would go on to construct a similarly evocative percussion coda in another (much later) water piece – his symphonic poem *Vox Maris*, from 1954 – the more obvious and immediate model for this combination of instruments is surely Bartók’s *Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta* (1936). Noted for its unsettling, even frightening soundscapes, Bartók completed his piece the year before Enescu wrote the *Village Suite*’s fourth movement (in the score, the movement is dated 27 November 1937; Bartók’s work was premiered in January of that year).

The timbral innovations at the start and end of ‘Rivière sous la lune’ could be interpreted as an evocation of uncanniness, not dissimilar to that which characterised the eerily bleating brass in the ‘Shepherd’ section of the suite’s previous scene. There is, however, nothing really frightening about Enescu’s depiction of the moonlit river; its uncanniness has rather more to do

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<sup>81</sup> See note 73.

**Example 4.4:** *Orchestral Suite No. 3* ('Villageoise'), Op. 27, 4<sup>th</sup> movement, concluding bars.

The musical score for the concluding bars of the 4th movement of Enescu's *Orchestral Suite No. 3* is presented in a system of six staves. The time signature is 3/4. The score begins at measure 59, marked 'esitando a tempo I molto tranq.'.

- Cym. (Cymbal):** Features trills (tr) and dynamics ranging from *pp* to *p*.
- Perc. (Percussion):** Mirrors the cymbal part with trills and dynamics from *pp* to *bp*.
- Cel. (Celesta):** Plays a melodic line with dynamics from *mf* to *f*, including a triplet (3).
- Vln. I (Violin I):** Starts with *pppp* and the instruction 'enlevez les sourd.' (remove the mutes).
- Vla. (Viola):** Also starts with *pppp* and 'enlevez les sourd.'.
- Vc. (Violoncello):** Labeled '1 Solo', it plays a sustained note with dynamics from *mp* to *p*, including the instruction 'dolciss.' (very soft).

The final system (measures 60-63) includes further dynamics and instructions:

- Cym. and Perc.:** Dynamics range from *più p* to *ppp*. The percussion part includes 'laissez vibr.' (let vibrate) and 'perd.' (fade out) markings.
- Cel.:** Dynamics range from *pf* to *mp*, with 'dim.' (diminuendo) and 'perd.' markings.
- Vc.:** Dynamics range from *bp* to *ppp*, with 'perd.' and 'enlevez vite la sourd.' (remove the mutes quickly) markings.

with the music's capacity to disorientate the listener by creating a mysterious feeling of unease. Enescu's alien (or connotatively strange) timbres frame a process whereby a familiar scene from nature is effectively defamiliarised. This, as Richard Cohn has observed, is a key aspect of Freud's etymological unpicking of the dichotomy between *heimlich* and *unheimlich*. Importantly, in Freud's formulation of the uncanny, the latter term does not merely imply the eerie or unfamiliar, but an 'intensification' of the connotative meanings of *heimlich* as referring to something 'private, secret, clandestine'. As Cohn notes, in Freud's formulation 'the

clandestine is transformed into something so interior, so familiar, that it is hidden from the viewing eye and the enquiring mind'; the uncanny thereby resembles a 'coincidence of the alien and the hyper-familiar'.<sup>82</sup> Nocturnal dreams have the capacity to foreground this nuanced relationship: they serve as the arena for our most private (or 'hyper-familiar') thoughts, memories, and desires, which are all simultaneously subject to imaginative processes of transformation and distortion (a function of the 'dream-work', as Freud describes it). Music is well disposed to articulating these transformative processes, as Enescu's rendering demonstrates. His moonlit river comes across as intensely private: as listeners, there is a sense that we are on the outside looking in, presented with a scene whose secrets we can only partially grasp (as is often the case in our own dreams, in fact). The uncanniness of this secretive landscape is manifested primarily as uncertainty: specifically, the feeling of uncertainty which results from the ontological slippage that takes place between the categories of *heimlich* and *unheimlich*, and which Enescu frames musically through his use of discontinuous harmonic shifts and alien timbres.<sup>83</sup>

As Freud shows, the dichotomy of familiar and unfamiliar is readily reconceived in terms of the opposition between reality and the imaginary. Towards the end of his essay on the uncanny, he writes: 'an uncanny effect is often and easily produced when the distinction between imagination and reality is effaced, as when something that we have hitherto regarded as imaginary appears before us in reality'.<sup>84</sup> The dream experience is likewise noted for the peculiar way in which imaginary distortions are 'presented' to us, and accepted uncritically, as 'reality' (of course that does not necessarily make all dreams uncanny experiences). The extent to which music can poeticise or metaphorise this effacement derives in part from the way it plays with (or loosens) the distinction between the familiar and the unfamiliar, as we have seen; music fills the space afforded by the irrational void of nocturnalism. Enescu's setting of the 'Rivière sous

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<sup>82</sup> Richard Cohn, 'Uncanny Resemblances: Tonal Signification in the Freudian Age', *Journal of the American Musicological Society*, Vol. 57, No. 2 (University of California Press, 2004), 290. Cohn's focus is on the way composers have often employed 'hexatonic poles' (the name he gives to combinations of major and minor triads appearing within a hexachord whose individual pitches are separated by just a semitone, for instance: a chord of E major in root position alongside a chord of C minor in first inversion) as an evocation of the uncanny. A not dissimilar process is utilised by Enescu with his harmonic shifts which take place every bar at the opening of 'Rivière sous la lune' (see note 78).

<sup>83</sup> Freud's fascination with the work of E. T. A. Hoffmann (particularly in 'The "Uncanny"', where he examines Hoffmann's short story *Der Sandmann* ('The Sandman'), of 1816) reinforces, once again, that these dream topics (the nocturnal, the uncanny) have their origins in Romanticism, and that Enescu's recourse to such tropes in his own work suggests their renewed iteration. I reflect further on the difference between Romantic and early twentieth-century conceptualisations of the dream towards the end of this chapter.

<sup>84</sup> Sigmund Freud, 'The "Uncanny"', in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud*, trans. and ed. James Strachey, 24 vols. (London: Hogarth Press, 1953-1974), 14: 244. Cited in Cohn (2004), 289.

la lune' suggests, moreover, that this poeticisation has much to do with the way we are drawn, through the dreamlike blurring of musical syntax, into 'an originary relation...with a world that is already created' (as Matthew Spellberg says of Proust's dream-scenes).<sup>85</sup> In the same way that dreams (or perhaps more accurately, poeticised dreams) might stage encounters with the uncanny, they likewise have the capacity to enchant (in that the uncanny could be considered an unsettling mode of enchantment). They do so by bringing us into contact with a pre-cognitive 'vision' of the world (as discussed above, part of that pre-cognitive aspect is achieved, in fact, by bypassing the rational, visual sense, through use of the auditory or nocturnal) – a world in its nascence, which we encounter as if for the first time (and whose perceptual 'reality' is therefore unquestioned).

Bachelard writes in a similar vein that 'before becoming a conscious sight, every landscape is an oneiric experience',<sup>86</sup> which recalls the curious blurring between sleeping and waking that Proust famously depicts at the very beginning of *In Search of Lost Time*, in which Marcel's dream life spills over into his attempts at perceiving the waking world:

For a long time, I went to bed early. Sometimes, my candle scarcely out, my eyes would close so quickly that I did not have time to say to myself: 'I'm falling asleep.' And, half an hour later, the thought that it was time to try to sleep would wake me; I wanted to put down the book I thought I still had in my hands and blow out my light; I had not ceased while sleeping to form reflections on what I had just read, but these reflections had taken a rather peculiar turn; it seemed to me that I myself was what the book was talking about: a church, a quartet, the rivalry between François I and Charles V. This belief lived on for a few seconds after my waking; it did not shock my reason but lay heavy like scales on my eyes and kept them from realising that the candlestick was no longer lit.<sup>87</sup>

For Proust, the boundary between waking and sleeping is evidently permeable enough for his narrator to find himself slipping easily from one state into the other. The sense of blurred (dis)continuity between these overlapping states is made possible by their shared content, namely the images from Marcel's book. These take on the 'rather peculiar' quality of blending with the narrator's own subjectivity in the dream (he somehow *becomes* these abstract things)<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>85</sup> Spellberg (2016), 68.

<sup>86</sup> Bachelard (1983), 4.

<sup>87</sup> Proust, *In Search of Lost Time, I: The Way by Swann's*, trans. Lydia Davis, ed. Christopher Prendergast (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 7.

<sup>88</sup> One is reminded also of the painter Marc Chagall's (1887–1985) many nocturnal scenes, whose dreamlike quality is conveyed by a variety of strange metamorphoses, an inclination for surreal or symbolic content, and the ambiguous spatial distribution of his subjects (often floating against an ostensibly 'real' backdrop, or layered on top of each other). Taken together, these dreamlike scenes nonetheless present an ontological reality that is ultimately understood to be as valid as any waking notion of 'real life'.

and, fascinatingly, persist in this oddly modified shape on waking, thereby altering Marcel's perception of his surroundings (later he describes how, when drifting off, his relaxed mind 'would let go of the map of the place where I had fallen asleep and, when I woke in the middle of the night, since I did not know where I was, I did not even understand in the first moment who I was').<sup>89</sup> As I have suggested throughout this chapter, the persistence of the nocturnal (or sleeping) dream into waking life is indicative of the enlarged role that was granted to the dream experience (and the unconscious mind) from around the beginning of the twentieth century. Its capacity to overlap with waking, conscious thought is likewise, as Spellberg also argues, a defining feature of Proust's understanding of the dream-life, specifically in terms of its potential to alter our waking perception of the world (to conceive of the sleeping dream in these terms also begins to conflate it with a contemporaneous understanding of reverie, of course). By focusing on how the dream state seems to overlap seamlessly with waking life, Proust reveals his fascination with how a distinction between 'real' waking life and the 'imaginary' world of dreams might be effaced. Indeed, his primary interest is in recalling the sense of uncertainty, confusion, dislocation or disorientation that arises from that 'in-between' state of half-sleep or half-waking. Moreover, from the novel's outset, Proust seems to say that to perceive the world as if in a dream (or waking from it) carries as much ontological validity for him as waking life itself – and that sometimes one 'reality' is indistinguishable from the other.

The programmatic works discussed so far in this chapter readily exemplify this dreamlike effacing of the distinction between the real and the imaginary by explicitly invoking the trope of nocturnalism. Of course, Enescu's evocation of a dreamlike logic or oneiric atmosphere in his non-programmatic works has the capacity to achieve a similar metaphorical blurring, by blending the familiar and the unfamiliar, the concrete and the vague, or the present and absent. The middle movement of Enescu's Second Piano Quartet, Op. 30, draws on these poetic dichotomies in its evocation of a highly sensuous and simultaneously disorientating dream experience (see Ex. 4.5, below). Much of the movement's disorientating quality is derived from the lingering presence of its opening motif, namely the bell-like chimes (in the piano) of the 'tail motif' (and related open-fifth gesture) which, as I discussed in some detail in Chapter One, effectively bridges the gap between the end of the Piano Quartet's first movement and the start of the second in a powerful example of primary remembering. These gentle chimes drift in and out intermittently and unpredictably (for instance, three bars before and after Fig. 24, then seven bars after Fig. 24, two bars before Fig. 25, at Fig. 26, and so on), often using the same, idealised

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<sup>89</sup> Proust, *I* (2002), 9.

pitches to which we were introduced at the end of the first movement. Indeed, the register and timbre of the piano's bell-like echoes are familiar to the extent that even when the motif's specific content is transformed (such as at Fig. 27 or Fig. 28) the gesture is still recognised, if only as a timbral recollection; its affective essence (its mood) endures despite Enescu's processes of defamiliarisation and dislocation.

From near the start of the movement a poignant contrast is set up between the piano's interjecting chimes and the intensely lyrical material in the strings. This new material (pensive, with a wide dynamic range, and characterised by large, angular leaps) forms the melodic basis of the movement's primary theme, which appears in the cello at Figure 24 (note the *sognando* markings in the first bar of Ex. 4.5), and is subsequently taken up by the viola, and then the violin. The theme's sustained *cantabile* lines carve out a distinct melodic space around which the piano shimmers and reverberates. It is also characterised by a deep sense of yearning, brought about most obviously by the way the melody reaches upwards (by leaps of a major sixth or seventh, and nearly always by a *portamento* – again, as seen in Ex. 4.5) towards a sustained B<sub>4</sub>, which through its reiteration effectively becomes idealised as a kind of liminal tone (liminality being central to Enescu's conception of the dream experience as something occurring at the border between sleeping and waking). Within this atmosphere of dreamlike yearning and introspection, the piano's bell-like intrusions appear as if from a distant elsewhere, or 'elsewhen': they are fleeting, fragmentary, imprecise, and yet also highly engaging (evoking the way a dream draws us in despite its various digressions and distractions). These subtle intrusions also evoke a process of temporal and spatial layering (if we consider the consistent high register of the bell-chimes as occupying a distinct spatial realm that contrasts with the strings' melodic content) which is redolent of the dream's tendency to resist a narrative logic in favour of conflating different times and places.<sup>90</sup> Thus on the one hand we encounter the drifting intrusions of an ever more distant and hazy past (as conveyed by the piano's echoing chimes), and at the same time we are drawn into the 'extended present' of the strings' drawn-out melodic lines. The sense of metric instability and textural blurring that accompanies each varied iteration of the tail motif seems to compound this disorientating yet highly captivating simultaneity of the past and the present.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> This is emphasised by the fact that the piano also incorporates a memory of the opening movement's second thematic group, as evidenced by the descending chromatic contour in the second bar of Example 4.5.

<sup>91</sup> Freud's concept of 'displacement' within dream-formation offers another tempting model by which to interpret Enescu's pianistic overlaying of the movement's main thematic content. In *The Interpretation of Dreams*, Freud notes that 'In the course of the formation of a dream [the] essential elements, charged, as they are, with intense interest, may be treated as though they were of small value, and their place may be taken in the dream by other

Example 4.5: *Second Piano Quartet*, Op. 30, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, Figure 24 – Figure 25+1 (continued next page).

a tempo, con molto calma (♩=52)

The musical score is arranged in two systems. The first system includes staves for Violin (Vln.), Viola (Vla.), and Violoncello (Vc.), followed by the Piano (Pno.) part. The second system continues the Piano part and includes a section marked '8va' (octave) for the right hand. The key signature is three sharps (F#, C#, G#) and the time signature is 3/4. The tempo is 'a tempo, con molto calma' with a quarter note equal to 52 beats per minute. The score contains various dynamic markings: *pp* (pianissimo), *p* (piano), and *mp* (mezzo-piano). Performance instructions include 'cant., sognando' (cantabile, dreamy) and 'tranq. 6' (tranquillo, 6/8). Rhythmic features include triplets and sextuplets, with some notes marked with an 'x'.

elements'. If we regard the thematic material in the strings as constituting the dream's 'essential elements' (charged indeed with yearning intensity), then the occasional shift of attention brought about by the piano's fleeting incursions could be viewed as momentary and illusory 'replacements' of the dream's essential elements. Freud (2010), 323.

The image displays two systems of musical notation for a piano and cello. The first system shows the cello part with dynamics *p* (sempre C.1), *bp dolciss.*, *p*, and *tranq.* The piano part features triplets and a tempo marking of *3 tranq.* The second system includes a tempo change to 44 (quarter note = 44) and a measure number 25. The piano part continues with triplets and a 7th chord, with dynamics *tranq.* and *molto*.

Pascal Bentoiu writes insightfully that in this movement it is ‘as if the [tail motif’s] recollection would encounter its own nonreality’.<sup>92</sup> Indeed, whereas the tail motif’s sudden and gripping transformation at the end of the opening movement seemed to lend it a degree of tangibility, soon after the strings enter in the second movement that tangibility seems to evaporate. Alongside the cello’s affective longing the piano’s echoing chimes instead signify the tail motif’s own absence: an absence that is nonetheless made curiously present through

<sup>92</sup> Bentoiu (2010), 442.

memory, and oddly ‘real’ by our passive acceptance of Enescu’s dreamlike construction. The liminal state that Enescu conjures here is in fact remarkably similar in its conception to that encountered towards the end of the third movement of the *Suite Villageoise*. As we saw with the ‘Shepherd’ scene in Chapter Three, a marked feature of this movement is its use of offstage instruments; indeed, the unsettling, almost haunting quality that one readily associates with Enescu’s extraordinary rendering of the bleating sheep is accentuated by the fact that these uncanny noises are produced offstage, and out of sight. This physical dislocation accentuates the nonreality, or ‘imagined reality’ suggested by the music’s invisible origins. Carolyn Abbate has written about the inherent mysteriousness that is conveyed by such disembodied, or acousmatic sounds (the sounds one hears without seeing an originating cause), with reference to Debussy.<sup>93</sup> She cites Jankélévitch, for whom such an ontologically unimaginable sound as the faun’s flute in Mallarmé’s *L’après-midi d’un faune* is an indicator that ‘Musical reality is always somewhere else’.<sup>94</sup> As Abbate explains, the compositional response to the apparent fugacity of musical reality (and its construction) was to insist in turn on the paradoxical quality of simultaneous ‘absence and omnipresence’ in the rendering of unimaginable or fugitive sounds.<sup>95</sup> Enescu’s ‘Shepherd’ scene, as well as the subsequent ‘Migrating birds and crows’ and ‘Evening bell’ scenes, are not an attempt at the evocation of unimaginable sounds per se, but they do employ (literally) distant, invisible sounds, which convey the geographical indeterminacy of a landscape that exists in memory, in dreams, and which therefore resonates with Jankélévitch’s contention that the localisation of musical reality is fleeting and indeterminate: ‘the country of dreams...the homeland of non-existent things...the invisible city...all these designate the doubtful homeland...that is not here, and not there, but everywhere and nowhere’.<sup>96</sup> Both the third movement of the *Suite Villageoise* and the middle movement of the Second Piano Quartet exemplify this dreamlike and fundamentally enchanting quality of absence and omnipresence. After the onstage music resumes in the Orchestral Suite movement, the offstage ensemble soon dissipates, leaving only the distant tolling of the evening bell. As in the Piano Quartet, this (literal) bell seems to drift in and out of our conscious perception of the music’s unfolding, markedly present despite its absence, and unreal in its realism.

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<sup>93</sup> Carolyn Abbate, ‘Debussy’s Phantom Sounds’, *Cambridge Opera Journal*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1998), 67–96.

<sup>94</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 103.

<sup>95</sup> Abbate (1998), 68.

<sup>96</sup> Jankélévitch (2003), 103.

The haptic and kinaesthetic aspects of Enescu's dreamlike construction bring us to a more sustained consideration of the body in relation to dreaming. I have alluded several times to the corporeal nature of Enescu's musical language (from his use of ornament, to the habituation of somatic gestures), and this is no less true of those sections which he marks specifically as dreamlike: in the way that the music seems to frame a pre-cognitive mode of experience, it simultaneously heightens the sense of corporeality which is understood to underpin that experience. Nearer the start of this chapter I observed how Enescu's writing made a feature of its own corporeal production (as part of my discussion of the 'Lune à travers les vitres' scene from *Impressions d'enfance*; see Exx. 4.1 and 4.2). Similar instances where Enescu foregrounds an expressive kind of corporeality can be found in the middle movement of the Second Piano Quartet, as I have already implied. For instance, the way in which the main theme (as it appears in the cello in Ex. 4.5) keeps returning – often by an intervallic leap of a major sixth or seventh – to a high B<sub>4</sub> suggests a strongly kinaesthetic melodic conception. This is emphasised by Enescu's explicit direction that this liminal tone (as I described it earlier) of the cello's melodic line ought to be reached by a portamento on the same string ('Corde 1', or the A string). Indeed, virtually the entire theme is played on the A string, including when the melodic line suddenly drops by a major sixth to the A# below middle C. The sense of expressive yearning associated with this dreamlike melody is therefore linked explicitly to the physicality (or the feeling) embodied by the portamento.

There is a similar kinaesthetic (or haptic – relating to touch) quality evoked by the piano's recurring bell chimes, focused as they are on a specific region of the keyboard (and often on the same specific notes – such as the E<sub>6</sub> / B<sub>6</sub> open fifth). As I suggested earlier, the manner in which this gesture is embedded and subsequently consolidated through repetition spurs a kind of kinaesthetic conditioning: whenever these upper ranges of the piano are explored later in the second movement, we, as empathic listeners, are reminded (partly, too, by the sonorous quality of those notes) of the echoing bell gesture. Perhaps the most powerfully somatic gesture in this movement concerns a similarly bell-like reverberation (again in the piano), which is encountered for the first time in bar six (two bars before Fig. 24 and the introduction of the cello theme; see Ex. 4.6a). These are deeper and more forceful reverberations compared with the piano's more prevalent delicate tintinnabulations. Through various markings of *rinforzando*, *ben forte* and *poco forte*, which provide the dynamic emphasis for a sudden harmonic swerve to A natural minor, this syncopated triplet gesture is felt quite viscerally as a kind of thud and subsequent

shudder – the embodiment of an imagined reverberation. The gesture returns at the end of the cello’s rendition of the main theme (Fig. 25+5), and then only once more towards the very end of the movement (in the bar before Fig. 37): a reminder of the body’s centrality within Enescu’s rendering of the dream experience.<sup>97</sup> In a varied form the same gestural idea also underpins the movement’s melodic climax (at Fig. 35+3), during which all the strings are playing the main theme largely in octaves. The highpoint of the phrase (a literal highpoint of the movement, as demonstrated by the violin’s D<sub>7</sub> in Ex. 4.6b) gives way to a descending portamento, spanning a minor tenth, in each of the string instruments. The physicality evoked by the music here is quite astonishing, and it is certainly the most exaggerated treatment of the yearning portamento gesture (introduced earlier in the cello) to be found anywhere in the movement (the octave displacement is also strongly reminiscent of the rhapsodic writing in the violin in the ‘Lever de Soleil’ scene from *Impressions d’enfance*). The overt corporeality and, indeed, the emotional intensity of this melodic climax is augmented by the piano’s syncopated reverberations.

**Example 4.6a:** *Second Piano Quartet*, Op. 30, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, Figure 24–2.

<sup>97</sup> The gesture is remarkably reminiscent, in fact, of that strange and sudden feeling of falling which we occasionally experience when dreaming (or more accurately, as we literally fall into deep sleep).

**Example 4.6b:** *Second Piano Quartet*, Op. 30, 2<sup>nd</sup> movement, Figure 35+3.

Enescu's inclination for evoking a markedly corporeal mode of expression within his dreamscapes recalls Debussy's description of music as 'a dream from which the veils have been drawn! It's not even the expression of a feeling – it *is* the feeling itself'.<sup>98</sup> Equating dreaming with raw feelings parallels some of the earliest theorisations of *l'inconscient* – a term which, as Tony James observes, only entered French in the early 1870s – as something closely linked to physiological behaviour.<sup>99</sup> Stéphane Mallarmé's poem *L'Après-midi d'un faune* (1876), on which Debussy based his *Prélude* of 1894, aestheticises this elision of psychology and physiology by depicting the unconscious dreamworld as the fulfilment (and sublimation) of raw, physical impulses (as opposed to feelings in a merely emotional sense). For Edward Lockspeiser the poem represents an 'exploration of the processes by which physical impulse first originates in the imagination, is later defined in reality, and is eventually transformed into a work of art'.<sup>100</sup> Certainly, the notion of unconscious translation (through such categories as sincerity or originality) could readily be reconsidered in a way that incorporates bodily expression. In more

<sup>98</sup> See note 23.

<sup>99</sup> Tony James, *Dream, Creativity, and Madness in Nineteenth-Century France* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 218.

<sup>100</sup> Edward Lockspeiser, 'Debussy's Concept of the Dream', *Proceedings of the Royal Musical Association*, 89<sup>th</sup> Session (1962–1963), 52.

recent decades, theorists (including Elmer Day, Jr.) have in fact noted that while the sense modalities of the dream are predominantly visual, other modalities such as tactility, kinaesthesia and sound can also be experienced (and often these are linked to the physical conditions of the dreamer).<sup>101</sup> Dreams also have a tendency of foregrounding the affective content of certain memories (even when the specific content is distorted), by presenting the dreamer with highly sensuous visual images and an emotional intensity which can even threaten the dream's continuation.<sup>102</sup> In a similar way, Enescu's dreamscapes often evoke a sublimation of the affective content of memories: the comforting mood and sense of protection evoked by the lullaby melody in scene five of *Impressions d'enfance* is sublimated into something even more pleasurable and gratifying in the 'Lune à travers les vitres' scene, potentially masking repressed desires.

Thus, while Enescu's evocations of the dream experience may come across as detached or illusory (unlike how we experience most mnemonic modes – with the exception, perhaps, of reminiscence, which is not dissimilar from reverie), the corporeality of many of these constructions (both in terms of their physicality, but also the way they frame a pre-cognitive mode of experience) suggests to a large degree that the expressive body might anchor Enescu's conception of the dream. Such a view is paralleled by Merleau-Ponty's thoughts regarding the body's relation to both dreaming and waking life, and more generally with his theorisations concerning the role of the imaginary as foundational to being.<sup>103</sup> Central to his phenomenology of perception is the notion that the lived body constitutes the primary means by which we may perceive a world which fundamentally pre-exists our cognitive attempts to rationalise it, or reflect upon it; the lived body allows us to perceive the world in its primary reality. Or, in Merleau-Ponty's words, we 'must think of the human body (and not consciousness) as that which perceives nature which it also inhabits'.<sup>104</sup> Importantly, dreaming is considered part of the (pre-reflective) world in the same way that waking experiences are part of the world: the lived body constitutes a common ground (a 'chiasmic' ground) between both experiential modes. Consequently, much as waking perception is understood to take place within a pre-existing world, Merleau-Ponty argues (in a working note to *The Visible and the Invisible*) that

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<sup>101</sup> Elmer S. Day, Jr., 'Toward a Phenomenology of Dream Imagery and Metaphor', *Art Education*, Vol. 32, No. 7 (Nov., 1979), 16.

<sup>102</sup> Allan Hobson refers frequently to the dream's capacity for 'emotional intensification' (especially in nightmares, where feelings of anxiety or fear risk bringing the dream to an end, by prompting the sleeper to wake up) in *Dreaming: An Introduction to the Science of Sleep* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

<sup>103</sup> James Morley provides an insightful account of how dreaming features in Merleau-Ponty's writings in 'The Sleeping Subject: Merleau-Ponty on Dreaming', *Theory and Psychology*, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1999), 89–101.

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 90.

we must likewise ‘understand the dream starting from the body: as being in the world’.<sup>105</sup> It is through the living and perceiving body, then, that Merleau-Ponty grants ontological validity to all modes of experience, including dreaming. As James Morley notes, this is likewise a vital step in Merleau-Ponty’s collapsing of the hierarchical relation between reality and the imaginary, as evoked by the traditionally antithetical categories of waking and sleeping.<sup>106</sup>

The body’s meaningful presence in the dream experience and its role in pre-cognitive perception are both themes which find their theoretical precursor in Proust. Again, in the opening section of *In Search of Lost Time*, we encounter two passages which help to shape Merleau-Ponty’s thinking (the second of which he in fact cites, partially, in a footnote in *Phenomenology of Perception*).<sup>107</sup> In the first passage, Marcel describes an erotic dream which evidently starts ‘from the body’:

Sometimes, as Eve was born from one of Adam’s ribs, a woman was born during my sleep from a cramped position of my thigh. Formed of the pleasure I was on the point of enjoying, she, I imagined, was the one offering it to me. My body, which felt in hers my own warmth, tried to return to itself inside her, I woke up. The rest of humanity seemed very remote compared with this woman I had left scarcely a few moments before; my cheek was still warm from her kiss, my body aching from the weight of hers.<sup>108</sup>

Marcel then describes his unsuccessful attempts at remembering the woman of his dreams (particularly if she was someone he had known in waking life), which recalls the perceptual confusion he often experienced upon waking from a deep sleep (explored above). Indeed, Marcel soon goes on to describe how, in such situations, it was specifically through his body that he attempted to make sense of his surroundings, while his mind floundered:

When I woke thus, my mind restlessly attempting, without success, to discover where I was, everything revolved around me in the darkness, things, countries, years. My body, too benumbed to move, would try to locate, according to the form of its fatigue, the position of its limbs in order to deduce from this the direction of the wall, the location of the furniture, in order to reconstruct and name the dwelling in which it found itself. Its memory, the memory of its ribs, its knees, its shoulders, offered in succession several of the rooms where it had slept, while around it the invisible walls, changing place according to the shape of the imagined room, spun through the shadows. And even before my mind, which hesitated on the thresholds of times and shapes, had identified the house by reassembling the circumstances, it – my body – would recall the kind of bed in each one, the location of the doors, the angle at which the light came in

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<sup>105</sup> Merleau-Ponty (1968), 262; see also Morley (1999), 98.

<sup>106</sup> Morley (1999), 91.

<sup>107</sup> Merleau-Ponty (2012), 187, fn.11.

<sup>108</sup> Proust, *I* (2002), 8.

through the windows, the existence of a hallway, along with the thought I had had as I fell asleep and that I had recovered upon waking.<sup>109</sup>

For Proust, as much as for Merleau-Ponty (or for Enescu), the body's centrality to both waking and sleeping suggests not only that dreaming has an ontological validity in the world, but that it also retains a perceptual 'reality' which is experienced in relation to (as opposed to being severed from) waking perception.<sup>110</sup> As Matthew Spellberg observes, for Proust 'the *reality* of the dream is paramount. What does it look like? How does it feel? What is the nature of dream-experience? Meaning is to be found not in the domain of dream symbolism but in the realm of dream-feeling and dream-touch, dream-motion and dream-looking. Proust is concerned not with what to know but how to be, not what we learn, but how, in the oneiric mode, we *are*' (my explorations throughout this chapter of how Enescu constructs a particular dream-logic are carried out to a similar end).<sup>111</sup> In Proust's metaphysics, reality as expressed through language and symbols (Freud's predominant concern) has a different ontological emphasis compared with the reality of simply 'being' within the dream. The nature of that 'being' is, as Merleau-Ponty makes clear, proximate to waking reality in the sense that both experiential modes (dreaming and waking) are 'grounded in a *general being* that is common to all human experience'.<sup>112</sup>

The 'oneiric' is precisely the term which Merleau-Ponty employs to describe the meaningful presence articulated by the dream experience, or to assert the dimensional relation of dreaming to real, waking life. Importantly, the term is also used to describe the dreamlike character of waking life itself, as Merleau-Ponty explains: 'our waking relations with objects and others especially have an oneiric character as a matter of principle: others are present to us in the way that dreams are...and this is enough to question the cleavage between the real and the imaginary'.<sup>113</sup> In the same way that perceptual reality might impinge on the dream experience (prompting a complex or layered model of lived reality), Merleau-Ponty claims that the imaginary (traditionally understood to be the preserve of the non-rational, unconscious mind) might be foundational to conscious, waking thought, and therefore to being in general.

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<sup>109</sup> Ibid., 10.

<sup>110</sup> Morley's summary observations are helpful here: 'dreamed space, like perceived space, is not a geometrical or intellectually abstracted zone or sector, a space apart from the experiencing subject. The subject's pre-thematic bodily anchor binds the various modes of experience. Though Merleau-Ponty never equates dreaming with waking perception, he understands dreaming as proximate to, and inherently linked with, perception'. This remains the case even if we admit to the 'passivity' of sleep (and dreaming) experiences, since for Merleau-Ponty passive phenomena are still a "'modality of perceptual activity'". Morley (1999), 93–94.

<sup>111</sup> Spellberg (2016), 60.

<sup>112</sup> Morley (1999), 91.

<sup>113</sup> Merleau-Ponty, *Themes from the lectures at the Collège de France: 1952–1960*, trans. J. O'Neill (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1970; originally published 1968), 48.

Essentially, the experience of dreaming offers a deeper or more pluralistic model for what it means to be in the world (Elmer Day regards his own interest in dreaming as the search for a ‘deeper ontology’).<sup>114</sup> As Spellberg notes, in Proust’s novel the dream-life is framed ‘not just as a mode of being but as a tool for extending the scope of experience, for deep immersion in the past and in the wonders of the imagination’ (it ought not to come as a surprise that Proust identifies dreaming as an effective way of restoring Lost Time).<sup>115</sup> Mauro Carbone has similarly drawn on Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Proust in order to bring to light a more nuanced understanding of ‘experience’ itself, as pursued by both writers.<sup>116</sup> Carbone is interested especially in Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of the lived or embodied temporality that Proust’s confused waking state seems to imply – the lived time, in other words, of the pre-existing world to which the lived body grants us primary access. This lived time constitutes an ‘implication’ of the past (and of the future) in the present moment; it is also the temporal ground for the emergence of memory. Indeed, this is the time which Proust (as we saw in Chapter One) describes as enjoyable precisely because it is more accurately ‘one of these moments of identity between the past and the present...in which [his being] could live and enjoy the essence of things, that is to say outside of time’.<sup>117</sup> As Carbone explains, for Merleau-Ponty this lived time is essentially (and in an ontologically weighted sense) a pre-possessive dimension of ‘brute being’ (of ‘latent intentionality’), where, as in sleep, ‘subject and object are not yet constituted, where activity and passivity are undifferentiated, where space and time lose their distinction, [where] the present is enveloped...by a past which is the farthest away, a past defined...as “intemporal”’.<sup>118</sup>

Throughout this chapter (and in Chapters One and Two) I have alluded to how Enescu evokes this experiential mode that lies as it were ‘beyond’ subjective experience (in the time of sleep and dreaming, as well as remembering), and which ‘marks precisely the passivity of our activity’.<sup>119</sup> It is as much in this sense that I understand Enescu’s music to be *perceptually* disorientating. In the dream-scenes that I have discussed in this chapter, Enescu obviously draws on ‘waking’ content, actively developing it and transforming it, but in such a way as to place us (as listeners) on the ‘outside’: the things which we ‘experience’ in the dream life seem to happen

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<sup>114</sup> Day, Jr. (1979), 17.

<sup>115</sup> Spellberg (2016), 73.

<sup>116</sup> See the opening chapter ‘The Time of Half-Sleep: Merleau-Ponty between Husserl and Proust’ in Carbone’s *The Thinking of the Sensible: Merleau-Ponty’s A-Philosophy* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2004), 1–13.

<sup>117</sup> Proust, *VI* (2002), 179.

<sup>118</sup> Carbone (2004), 12.

<sup>119</sup> *Ibid.*

to us, in a similar way to how involuntary remembering happens to us ('the things have us, and...it is not we who have the things', as Merleau-Ponty puts it; 'it is being that speaks within us and not we who speak of being').<sup>120</sup> There is an unpredictability to Enescu's processes which I have attempted to equate with the expressive corporeality that is so clearly a foundational element of his musical language. The experience of listening to Enescu's dream-scenes (and indeed to other movements and pieces of his which are not explicitly about dreaming, but which emulate a dreamlike logic or temporality – like the middle movement of the Third Piano Sonata, discussed in Chapter One) seems to highlight our engagement as 'participant-observer'. In a broader sense, and as I explored in the Introduction, the manner of this engagement reflects the way in which dreams and dream consciousness were often theorised (from the nineteenth century until well into the twentieth) as analogous to the conscious yet highly contingent experience of modernity. Dreams therefore offer not only an expanded mode of experience (an 'openness to the world such as we discover it in ourselves', as Merleau-Ponty puts it),<sup>121</sup> but also an aesthetic means of interrogating the paradoxical state of detachment and immersion which characterised modern consciousness. (The manner of this interrogative drive is indicative, moreover, of the 'broader culture of self-observation and a fascination with oneiric experience', as Lusty and Groth describe it, that took root in the early decades of the twentieth century, especially in the wake of Freud's own seminal contribution to dream theory).<sup>122</sup> Enescu's literal detachment from his homeland and indeed his immersion in a Romanian conception of dreamlike expression serves as a final contextual frame for considering his articulation of the dream experience.

#### 'MYTH-ING' HOME

When Proust writes that 'every great artist seems to be the citizen of an unknown homeland' (with which he nonetheless remains 'unconsciously in tune') he refers specifically to what he

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<sup>120</sup> Merleau-Ponty (1968), 194.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid., 193.

<sup>122</sup> Groth and Lusty (2013), 8. It is along these lines that we might reflect further on how the conceptualisation of dreaming in this period moved on from Romantic understandings of the topic. The experimentalism of the Surrealists provides a useful contextual frame, especially if one considers how the movement adapted Freud's ideas as a means of exploring the expanded modes of experience to which I allude above. As Groth and Lusty put it, 'the [Surrealist] movement's early fascination with "psychic automatism" and dreams extended the domain of the unbounded imagination, revealing how the unconscious processes that inform the dream animate everyday life' (8). It is precisely this tendency of using dreams to interrogate the self and one's place in the world (especially as a means of enhancing one's possibilities of experience) that distinguishes the modern conceptualisation of dreaming from early Romantic evocations of some 'other-world' (to which notions of the divine or the prophetic dream were also tied).

regards as the artist's 'irreducible individuality', or 'accent'.<sup>123</sup> Of course, in Enescu's case, the individuality of his 'particular song' (through which he 'touches his own essence') is nuanced by (and prompts consideration of) an actual homeland. This too might be considered a 'dreamt' space – in the sense that it is replete with imaginary, even mythical potential; and because Enescu often found himself absent from home, dreaming of it. Though not quite 'unknown' in the sense that Proust describes his figurative 'country', Enescu did indeed spend large portions of his life distanced from Romania: during his years of schooling in Vienna and Paris; as a result of his busy touring schedule; and latterly during his self-imposed exile, lasting from soon after the end of the Second World War until his death (in Paris) in 1955. Enescu's displacement could easily be seen to animate his idealistic characterisation of Romania (and its folk music) as dreamy and nostalgic. Moreover, to the extent that this lends his native land an imaginary or intangible quality, it can be seen to resonate with Proust's conception of a geographically indeterminate and deeply internalised homeland (or indeed with Jankélévitch's references to the 'doubtful homeland', or 'country of dreams').<sup>124</sup> In this concluding section, I draw attention to the ways that Enescu's 'dreamt' homeland overlaps with some of the contemporaneous mythologising narratives of his compatriots, as well as considering the intersection of dream and myth more generally.

Most obviously, Enescu's dreamy characterisation of his homeland recalls the autochthonist (or 'traditionalist') narrative promoted in Romania in the early decades of the twentieth century. The primary aim of this mythologising narrative, as I explored in the Introduction, was to draw attention to the country's cultural and historical uniqueness, not least by identifying and reinforcing the (essentially Romantic) idea of a national 'spirit' or soul. The notion of *dor* became emblematic of this vernacular mode of expressivity and soulfulness, and as such it can be regarded as an important component of Romania's mythical biography (never mind that melancholic yearning is a universal expressive mode; here it is understood to have a quintessentially Romanian flavour). To the extent that *dor* is also characterised as a dreamlike mode of expression, Enescu's oneiric landscapes suggest an attempt to emulate not only a dreamlike quality of Romanian music as he perceived it aesthetically, but also a dreamlike yearning that was understood to symbolise a collective unconscious, or a mythical native spirit. Accordingly, by 'dreaming' of home (or, indeed, in his reveries towards home) Enescu effectively participates in a process of myth-making – a process which, significantly, seems to

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<sup>123</sup> Proust, *The Prisoner* (2002), 234. See also Chapter One, notes 111 and 112.

<sup>124</sup> See note 96.

resonate simultaneously with some of the cultural aesthetic imperatives of his Parisian milieu. Thus, while Enescu's ideas concerning dreamlike creativity or a dreamt life can, on the one hand, be seen to resonate with Proust's 'homeland' or Bergson's understanding of the dream as the 'substratum' of waking life, the same ideas call to mind Lucian Blaga's theories concerning a collective unconscious, or a shared state of the soul. This was exemplified by Blaga's concept of the Mioritic space, which, we might recall, constituted an attempt to forge a collective Romanian identity and outline the mythical origins of the nation's poetic imagination. Most importantly, Blaga's mythical space outlined a spiritual and aesthetic topography derived from characteristics which he discerned in the Romanian landscape itself, and from rural life more generally. Enescu's musical and spiritual connection to these mythical symbols of the nation is much in evidence: for instance, through his use of the *doina*; his spiritual and aesthetic engagement with *dor*; or his conception of Romanian folk music as an essentially melodic art. Of course, while melody in and of itself is no guarantor of an inherently Romanian national style, what matters here is that Enescu conceived of Romanian music as essentially melodic; his own privileging of melody could consequently be seen as an attempt to emulate the music (or the poetic 'style', as Blaga might put it) of his homeland.<sup>125</sup> From an etymological standpoint, one might also point to Enescu's tendency for faux-naïf melodic writing (the lullaby theme in *Impressions*; the opening to the Chamber Symphony, Op. 33; the first movement, 'Rural Springtime', from the *Suite Villageoise*; or the opening of the *Romanian Rhapsody No. 1* in A major, Op. 11, No. 1) as an attempt to cultivate a 'native' melodism – *naïf*, from the Latin *nativus*, meaning 'native' or 'natural'.

Enescu's village scenes can be regarded in a similar light, as they clearly echo a discernible trend among Romanian traditionalists (especially in the 1930s) of valorising the peasantry and village life. The fact that Blaga gave his inaugural address ('Eulogy to the Romanian Village') to the Romanian Academy in the same year that Enescu began writing his *Suite Villageoise* (1937) could be regarded as a striking coincidence, but more striking still are the parallels between Blaga's and Enescu's mythologised conceptions of village life. In his address, Blaga drew explicitly on his childhood experiences of the village (his naive recollections enfolding native values – the etymological parallels are writ large here), claiming that 'the childhood and the village completed each other', and moreover that there were 'mysterious aspects and secret

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<sup>125</sup> Opening monodic statements are a veritable calling-card of Enescu's compositional language. The opening to the Octet for strings, discussed in Chapter Two, springs to mind, as does his second *Romanian Rhapsody*, Op. 11, No. 2. Easily the most well-known and effective example of monodic writing in Enescu's oeuvre is the opening movement (the extraordinary *Prélude à l'unisson*) of the First Orchestral Suite, Op. 9. See also note 13 in Chapter Two.

horizons and structures of the village that can only be comprehended in childhood'.<sup>126</sup> Much like Enescu's musical renderings (in works like the *Suite Villageoise*, or *Impressions d'enfance*), Blaga's recollections present an enchanted vision of rural life, which suggests moreover that the kinds of myths that he and Enescu were interested in advancing were essentially nostalgic (and in Enescu's case, reinforced through displacement). As Svetlana Boym puts it, 'the nostalgic desires to obliterate history and turn it into private or collective mythology, to revisit time like space, refusing to surrender to the irreversibility of time that plagues the human condition' (it is notable that Merleau-Ponty likewise discusses myth in terms of a 'mythical space', as does Mircea Eliade).<sup>127</sup>

I suggest that in as far as dreaming (and its 'translation') became regarded as a mode of authentic individual expression (so highly prized within modernist aesthetics), Enescu's conception and evocation of a 'dreamt' homeland – with its folk idioms, its native melodism, its national myths, and indeed its self-consciously dreamlike mode of being – can be seen to encompass and reaffirm that native mode of expression, both in an individual and a collective sense.<sup>128</sup> It is worth noting, however, that Enescu's nativist impulse was not limited exclusively to the mythologising of an enclosed Romanian community: his setting of Breton texts in the tone poem *Vox Maris* implies a nostalgia for (diminishing) rural communities in general, as well as a nurturing attachment to native languages in a more literal sense (both could in fact be regarded as *lieux de mémoire*, in Pierre Nora's understanding of the concept). The invocation of a unique French rural community also seems to underline the extent to which Enescu's music and aesthetics melds both Romanian and French conceptions of dreaming, homeland, and 'native' expression, and is suggestive likewise of the degree to which these culturally defined notions overlap within a broader cultural geographical framework. Within this context, it comes as no surprise that Blaga was heavily influenced by Bergson's work, especially if one considers the huge cultural and intellectual capital that France exerted in Romania throughout the

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<sup>126</sup> Irina Livezeanu, 'Generational politics and the philosophy of culture: Lucian Blaga between tradition and modernism', *Austrian History Yearbook* (Cambridge University Press, 2002), 207+ (5).

<sup>127</sup> Boym (2001), xv; Merleau-Ponty (2012), 298; Eliade (1959) – see note 40 (on Eliade's 'sacred space') in the Introduction.

<sup>128</sup> Again, from a broader perspective, one notes that the connection between the privileged site of the artist's dream and a collective or mythical realm is enshrined in Wagner, and continues through the Wagnerism of the *fin de siècle* in a great variety of forms: Schoenberg's psychoanalytically inclined expressionism; Mallarmé's and Debussy's symbolism; Gustav Klimt's scandalous renderings of the unconscious, psychic life; Wassily Kandinsky's synaesthetic response to *Lohengrin* (1850), which he saw in Moscow in 1896; and so on. For an overview of how Wagner's legacy impinged on European art and culture, see for instance Erwin Koppen, 'Wagnerism as Concept and Phenomenon', in *Wagner Handbook*, ed. Ulrich Müller, Peter Wapnewski, and John Deathridge (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), Ch. 15.

nineteenth century and well into the twentieth (as noted in the Introduction, the historian Lucian Boia describes this influence in terms of the ‘French myth’).<sup>129</sup>

Ultimately, Enescu’s cultivation of a mythical space is closely aligned with his conception of the dream as an ontologically valid mode of being in the world. Of course, dreams and myths can be seen to interact in a variety of ways. For Merleau-Ponty, they occupy the same essential mode of experience which is ‘repressed by everyday perception or objective thought’.<sup>130</sup> Much like the dream experience, myths bring us into contact with an originary temporality (they ‘knit timelessness and time’, as Robert Bringhurst puts it)<sup>131</sup> or with the essence of things: ‘The myth fits the essence *into* the appearance; the mythical phenomenon is not a representation, but a genuine presence’.<sup>132</sup> There is in that sense a kind of truth to the myth (as there is in dreaming), even if it is found wanting in historical veracity. Mythical thinking is put forward as a remedy to our decentred-ness, and it is by dwelling in mythical space that Merleau-Ponty claims (in a poignant echo of Blaga’s concept of the Mioritic space) that we might reconnect to the real ‘landscape of our life’.<sup>133</sup>

Mythical space therefore has the capacity of expanding our scope of experience: ‘myth is a projection of existence and an expression of the human condition. But understanding the myth does not mean believing in it’.<sup>134</sup> In other words, myths offer an enchanted vision of the world, and we might say, too, that Enescu’s enchanted re-imaginings are symbolic of a mythical relation to the world. Furthermore, myths and dreams can both be understood and compared in terms of their relation to the modern world: as a means of reconnecting to one’s community or oneself through the restoration or evocation of a lost or ancestral past; as a way of expanding our relation to and understanding of lived experience; and as participant-observers within the self-conscious construction of some ‘eternal’ truth. From a broader perspective, we might also note, then, that while one version of modernism is certainly contained in (arguably more prevalent) discourses of alienation and estrangement, another is certainly comprised of the varied attempts to ‘re-find’ or remake what has been lost – in some idealised folkloric past, in childhood reverie, or in some mythic or unconscious order. Enescu’s strain of modernism seems very much to parallel and exemplify this latter version. His aesthetic stance has little to do with

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<sup>129</sup> Boia (2001), 160–162.

<sup>130</sup> Merleau-Ponty (2012), 304.

<sup>131</sup> Robert Bringhurst (interviewed by Matthew Spellberg), ‘Myth is a Theorem about the Nature of Reality’, *Guernica* (May 15, 2014). Accessible online: <https://www.guernicamag.com/myth-is-a-theorem-about-the-nature-of-reality>.

<sup>132</sup> Merleau-Ponty (2012), 303.

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 299.

<sup>134</sup> *Ibid.*, 306.

a reinforced isolation or obliteration of the subject, and rather more to do with establishing a space in which the displaced subject finds its self again, as a corporeal and essential presence. Ultimately, such explorations of myth and dream in relation to Enescu's aesthetics and his artworks allow us to steer between individual and collective expressions of an imagined homeland – a space which acts as a shelter (or dwelling-place) for memories, desires, the past. It is a space filled with the timeless song of Enescu's dreams.

## Appendix

List of works with opus number completed by Enescu in the period 1926–1955  
(works explored in detail appear in bold)

- 1926 Violin Sonata No. 3 in A minor, *Dans le caractère populaire roumain*, Op. 25  
1931 *Oedipe, tragédie lyrique* in 4 Acts, Op. 23  
1935 **Third Piano Sonata in D major, Op. 24, No. 3**  
**Second Cello Sonata in C major, Op. 26, No. 2**  
1938 Third Orchestral Suite in D major ('*Villageoise*'), Op. 27  
1940 ***Impressions d'enfance* Suite for Violin and Piano, Op. 28**  
**Piano Quintet in A minor, Op. 29**  
1944 **Second Piano Quartet in D minor, Op. 30**  
1948 *Ouverture de concert sur des thèmes dans le caractère populaire roumain* in  
A major, Op. 32  
1952 Second String Quartet in G major, Op. 22, No. 2  
1954 *Vox Maris* in G major, Symphonic Poem for Tenor, three-part Choir and  
Orchestra, Op. 31  
Chamber Symphony, for 12 instruments, Op. 33

*Scores of all the works marked in bold are available online at the IMSLP Petrucci Music Library (imslp.org), although users are strongly advised to be aware of the copyright restrictions in their own country.*

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