Trade and Diplomacy in the fifteenth-century Balkans: Carlo II Tocco and the Despotate of Arta (1429-1448)

Robin Alexander Shields

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Declaration of Authorship:

I, Robin Alexander Shields, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed:

Date:
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Abbreviations:

Archives:

ACA – Archivo de la Corona de Aragón

ASN, APTM – Archivio di Stato di Napoli, Archivio Privato di Tocco di Montemiletto

ASV – Archivio di Stato di Venezia

DAD – Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku

TNA – The National Archives

Primary Sources:


CFHB – Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae

CSHB – Corpus Scriptorum Historiae Byzantina

CT – *Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di Anonimo*, ed. G. Schirò, CFHB 10 (Rome, 1975)

DRR – J. Gelcich and L. Thallóczy, *Diplomatarium Relationum Republicae Ragusanae Cum Regno Hungariae* (Budapest, 1887)


**Secondary Sources:**

AOASH - Acta Orientalia Academiæ Scientiarum Hungaricæ

BF – Byzantinische Forschungen

BZ – Byzantinische Zeitschrift

DA – Dubrovnik Annals

JRD – The Journal of Race Development


Miller, LiL – W. Miller, *The Latins in the Levant* (London, 1908)

SANU, PI – Srpska Akademija Nauka i Umethosti, Posebna Izdanja

SKANU – Srpska Kranjevska Akademija Nauka i Umethosti

SV – Studi Veneziana

Zečević, TGR – N. Zečević, *The Tocco of the Greek Realm – Nobility, Power and Migration in Latin Greece (14th-15th centuries)* (Belgrade, 2014)

**Conventions:**

Throughout this thesis I have utilised several conventions. The names of the members of the Tocco family have been given in Italian rather than Latin, e.g. Carlo, Guglielmo, and Ercole, rather than Karolus, Guiellmus, and Hercules. For Greek names I have generally tried to transliterate them into Greek, e.g. Dinos Kavalaropos. In the cases of the Byzantine Emperors John VIII and Constantine XI I have kept their names in the more familiar English. For place names I have utilised my own personal conventions. I have generally tended to favour traditional place names, e.g. Ioannina = Giannena, Leukas = Lefkada, the Morea = the Peloponnese. For the ease of the reader, academic works written in Serbo-Croatian have all been given in Ljudevit Gaj’s Latin alphabet rather than also utilising the Cyrillic alphabet. Those works in Greek are written in the Greek alphabet.
Introduction:

It is tempting to see the Christian states of the late medieval Balkans solely in terms of political fragmentation and consequent military and economic weakness that ultimately led them to fall like dominoes to an inexorable Ottoman advance. Such a broad and overarching narrative fails to take into account the wide variety of conditions in different regions at particular times. This thesis will focus on one particular regime, that of Carlo II Tocco, who reigned as Despot of Arta in Epiros from July 1429 until 30 September 1448.¹ Though his reign began in conflict against his illegitimate cousins for control of the family lands, he ruled over a prosperous and stable lordship that played an important economic and diplomatic role in the fifteenth-century Balkans. Based in the city of Arta, the former capital of the Komnenos-Doukas Despotate, Carlo’s lordship included rich agricultural land in the Akarmanian floodplains. It enjoyed easy access to the wider Balkans, the Gulf of Ambrakia and the Ionian Sea through the Arachthos River, making it a natural trading hub, while Carlo’s possession of the Ionian islands of Ithaca, Kephalonia, Leukas, and Zakynthos gave him a foothold in the Adriatic. From his capital, he built up a wide network of diplomatic contacts. He was a vassal of the Ottoman Sultan Murad II (1421-1451) which, far from being a position of subordination, confirmed him as the major lord in the region. He developed a close economic relationship

¹ Bodnar has suggested that Carlo I Tocco, Carlo II’s uncle and predecessor, died on 4 July 1429 which would imply that this was the date Carlo II succeeded him to the head of the Tocco lordship. E. W. Bodnar, Cyriacus of Ancona and Athens (Brussels, 1960), p. 28, footnote. George Sphrantzes also dates this event to July 1429, though does not give a particular day. George Sphrantzes, Cronaca, ed. R. Maisano, CFHB 29 (Rome, 1990), 66, translation in George Sphrantzes, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire – A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes 1401-1477, trans. M. Philippides (Amherst MA, 1980), 44. As the exact date given by Bodnar is unsubstantiated, this thesis shall merely state that Carlo II’s reign began in the July of 1429.
with both the Republic of Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and with the Republic of Venice, of which he held citizenship and honorary membership of the Venetian Maggior Consiglio. He also had close ties through his family origins with the kingdom of Naples. This thesis will use the lordship of Carlo II Tocco to illustrate the economic and political situation in the Balkans between 1413 and 1449.

It will also take this example to build on previous scholarship on the topic of the Latin lordships that had grown up in the former territories of the Byzantine Empire, such as those of the Florentine Acciaiuoli in Athens, the Genoese Gattilusio on Lesbos, and the Genoese Zaccaria in the Morea (Peloponnese). The lordship of Carlo II Tocco should not be viewed on its own, rather it was part of a wider phenomenon of small statelets, whose origins can be traced back even further to the fall of Constantinople in 1204, to the Fourth Crusade, and the establishment of the Latin Empire. Far from being finished by the early fifteenth century, they were able to take advantage of the civil strife and weakness of the Ottomans after their defeat at the battle of Ankara in 1402. Yet, in spite of being a key part of the history of the Late Medieval Balkans and Aegean and by no means a transient phenomenon, these Latin lordships have largely been omitted from the grand narrative histories of the region.

The Tocco Lordship and Balkan Nationalism:

The major reason why the Tocco Lordship has been neglected by historians is that as a regime established by a Neapolitan family it does not fit well with the nationalist preoccupations of many of those who have written on Balkan history. An example of this nationalist history can
be seen from *A History of the Macedonian People* written in the 1970s by academics from the Socialist Republic of Macedonia, then a constituent republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.² It traces the entire history of Macedonia, from the Neolithic era to the War of National Liberation in the 1940s, and implicitly suggests a level of continuity throughout Macedonian History. The book contains several highly questionable claims. According to the authors the population of Ancient Macedonia were of Illyrian and Thracian origin rather than of Greek.³ This claim is heavily disputed by Nicolaos Martis (1915-2013), a former Greek Parliamentarian and Minister for Northern Greece (1974-1981), who stridently and equally controversially claimed that Ancient Macedonia was, on the contrary, culturally part of Ancient Greece.⁴ Another suspect assertion made by the Yugoslav authors suggests that the ‘ancient authors’, whom it does not specify, distinguished between ‘Upper Macedonia’, which included the then borders of the SR Macedonia, and ‘Lower Macedonia’ within the lands of Greek Macedonia.⁵ Such a claim appears to be dismissed by the ancient author Strabo (64/63 BC- 24 AD) who not only states that ‘Makedonia is [a part] of Hellas’, but also makes no reference to an ‘Upper’ or ‘Lower’ Macedonia instead separating Macedonia from the lands to the north called Paonia.⁶ Though some of the land within the borders of the SR Macedonia was within Ancient Macedonia the majority was within Paonia.⁷ The retitling of Paonia as

⁷ Strabo, 308, 322. This is supported by both Anson and Martis, see: E. M. Anson, ‘Why study Ancient Macedonia and What this Companion is About’, *A Companion to Ancient Macedonia*, ed. J Roisman and I. Worthington (Chichester, 2010), 3-20, at 12-13 ; Martis, 13, 41.
‘Upper Macedonia’ by these Macedonian academics was an attempt to suggest that the Socialist Republic of Macedonia had as strong a claim to the name Macedonia as the northern provinces of the Hellenic Republic, something heavily disputed by Athens. This remains a key aspect of the nationalist debate ever since the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Needless to say, the Tocco presence close to the region is not mentioned in either book, due to there being no ‘Italian’ or ‘Neapolitan’ population in the former Yugoslavia to appropriate the history and successes of the Tocco family for their own nationalist agenda.

As with Macedonia and the rest of the Balkans, the history of Epiros has its own intense nationalist discourses that differ between the two major ethnic groups of the region, the Albanians and the Greeks. One of the key aspects of this nationalist debate is which of these two ethnic groups can call themselves the ‘native’ people of Epiros. One of the first attempts, in English, to pronounce this question was produced by an organisation known as the Pan-Epirotic Union of America. There has not been significant analysis of this organisation though it was part of a greater movement of Greek national organisations formed between 1912 and 1923. Peter Topping describes these organisations as being ‘mostly of tendentious character’,

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9 The Serbian ethnologist and geographer Jovan Cvijić (1865-1927) also suggests that the ‘Epiro-Albanian coast’ and the Pindos were also inhabited by a third group, the Aruman or Vlachs. This group was significantly smaller than the others in 1918 and has largely been forgotten from this debate. J. Cvijić, ‘The Geographical Distribution of the Balkan Peoples’, Geographical Review, vol. 5 (1918), 345-361.
which were created to promote relations between Greece and the United States and to support Greece at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Their writings tell us that they were based at 7 Water Street in Boston, Massachusetts, but they had a much larger impact throughout the United States. For example, the organisation is recorded as a donor to the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s library in 1919, although the exact nature of this donation is unclear.

The key figure of the Pan-Epirotic Union appears to have been a certain Nicholas J. Cassavetes. Not much is known of him except that he served as a private in the twelfth division of the United States Army, and held the positions of Honorary Secretary, General Secretary, and Director of the Pan-Epirotic Union. Cassavetes published several books and articles between 1918 and 1919, most of which illustrate the views of his organisation and their particular interpretation of Hellenic Nationalism, such as his exposition of how the future of northern Epiros should be considered by the 1919 peace conference in Paris. According to the author, it seeks to illuminate the situation in Epiros to an American readership, and to prove that Northern Epiros was Greek rather than Albanian. In doing so Cassavetes wrote a grand history of Epiros from Homer to 1914 which implies that Epiros had always been Hellenic. As a result his history barely covers the period between the conquest of Epiros by the Roman

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12 Also called Cassavety in several publications.


14 Cassavetes, Question of Northern Epirus, 9-36.
patrician Paulus Aemilius in the Third Macedonian War (171-168 BC) and the Ottoman conquest of the region in the fifteenth century, on the grounds that the study was ‘not concerned with the occupation of other races’, though he does mention the ‘Albanian invasion of Epirus’ and its ‘magnitude’ and ‘duration.’ Cassavetes also denounces what he describes as ‘the Albanian propagandists’, and their dubious interpretation of the history of Epiros, in particular two groups, the Vatra and the Skyperia, both of which were based in Massachusetts. In order to slander them further he ties these groups to America’s opponents of the First World War, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire respectively. Another of the Pan-Epirotic Union’s publications, was directly addressed to the Chairman of the Paris Peace Conference. The publication argues that the districts of Korytsa and Kolonia should be transferred from Albania to Greece, using an array of eye witness accounts and statistics in order to persuade the members of the peace conference. It was also a response to a declaration made by the Pan-Albanian Federation in America, an Albanian nationalist organisation in the United States and probably one they opposed. Cassavetes also published two further articles in the Journal of Race Development between 1918 and 1919. The journal mainly focuses on foreign policy and many articles were written by members of the Balkan diaspora in the United States largely concerning the claims of their ‘nations’. One of Cassavetes articles focuses on Epiros. As with the rest of his work, however, it is polemic in tone, advancing a

15 Cassavetes, Question of Northern Epirus, 14.
16 Cassavetes, Question of Northern Epirus, 5-8.
17 The Pan-Epirotic Union of America, Statement of the Natives of Korytsa and Kolonia (Boston, 1919).
18 Hereafter JRD.
critical response to Professor Radoslav Andrea Tsanoff’s article outlining Bulgaria’s demands and position post-war.²⁰

The *Journal of Race Development* also contains a similar article, but from the Albanian perspective, by Constantin A. Chekrezi (1892-1959).²¹ Unlike Cassavetes, Chekrezi was a much more public figure and there is more information available on him. He was born in 1892 in the Albanian village of Ziçisht, near Korça, and studied in Salonika and Athens before emigrating to the United States during the First World War.²² He was heavily tied to the Vatra movement, in Boston, and edited their newspaper *Dielli* along with several other supporting publications, notably the journals *Illyria* and *Adriatic Review*.²³ Chekrezi’s key work was undoubtedly *Albania Past and Present* which was published around the same time as the works of Cassavetes.²⁴ As expected it also contains a similar nationalist narrative of history, alongside a summary of current events and the geography of Albania. It begins with one of the key aspects of Albanian nationalism, the origins of the Albanian people. According to Chekrezi’s narrative the Albanians are the modern descendants of the ancient Illyrians, Macedonians, and Epirotes.²⁵ As a result he argues that they are the ‘descendants of the aboriginal settlers of the Balkan Peninsula’ and therefore they ‘have the best claims on it’.²⁶ This claim was also put forward by the adventurer, artist and writer Edith Durham (1863-

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²³ Elise, 79.
1944) in the account of her travels across Albania in 1908. A key aspect of this claim to Illyrian identity concerns the Albanian language, which according to Chekrezi is the last surviving language of Thraco-Illyrian. However, as Noel Malcolm has illustrated, much of the ‘linguistic evidence’ for this claim is flawed and of little substantiation, particularly since there are no written records of Illyrian. Chekrezi’s history traces the entire history of the Albanians from the Kingdoms of Illyria (1225-167 BC) and Molossia (1270-168 BC) until the events of, and the role played by Albania in, the First World War. Unlike Cassavetes however, Chekrezi gives greater focus to the medieval era in particularly that of the reign of Gjergj Kastrioti or Skanderbeg, Lord of the Principality of Kastrioti (1443-1468). This was undoubtedly because some of the first historical records for the Albanians came in the eleventh century, notably during Robert Guiscard’s campaign in the Balkans (1081-1085). Due to Chekrezi’s insistence that the Albanians were the descendants of the Illyrians, the impact of this period is significantly underplayed and it is tied into both the ‘earlier’ history and the later Albanian lordships of Skanderbeg and Gjin Bua Spata (1358-1399). As with Cassavetes work, Chekrezi’s history suggests continuity of Albanian settlement in Epiros. Again, there is no room in this narrative for ‘outsiders’ like the Tocco family.

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One might hope to find a middle ground in the work of modern academics who have attempted to understand the real history behind this debate. However, their findings have at times merely contributed to the nationalist discourse. Konstantinos Giakoumis has claimed that both the Albanian and Greek populations of Epiros have been present since before the thirteenth and fourteenth century migrations that previous Greek scholarship claimed had begun the Albanian presence in the region. This is evidenced through an analysis of historical and linguistic sources and the use of the city of Gjirokastër as a case study. The Albanians, he argues, have had a distinct and separate identity in the region since the early Middle Ages. However Giakoumis accepts the findings of the Albanian linguist Eqrem Çabej who inferred, through the analysis of toponyms, that the Albanians were the descendants of the Illyrians. He argues that Çabej’s research ‘stands out as one of the more serious works, quite distant from nationalist enthusiasm’, despite its support for one of the cornerstones of Albanian nationalism. Not everyone has been convinced though. As Noel Malcolm has suggested:

Trying to extract a language from such evidence is rather like trying to work out the true nature of the English language on the basis of ‘Edinburgh’, ‘Lancaster’, ‘Whitby’, ‘Grosvenor’, ‘Gladstone’, ‘Victoria’ and ‘Disraeli’. Place-names are often the remnants of an earlier language; personal pronouns may reflect cultural influences […] we have no reason to suppose that the Balkans were any less of a linguistic hotchpotch than they have been for most of the rest of their history.

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33 Giakoumis, 173-174.
34 Malcolm, Kosovo, 32.
Malcolm’s criticism of the Albanian-Illyrian connection is damning, though he himself had previously fallen into this trap in an earlier analysis on the history of Bosnia. Giakoumis’s support for such a suggestion is certainly suspicious, perhaps due to his position at the European University of Tirana. Antonio Maria Pusceddu, on the other hand, argues that that any division between Epirote Greeks and Epirote Albanians was largely created after the end of Ottoman rule in the region in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The religious divide between Muslim and Orthodox, which had largely remained suppressed during Ottoman rule, was further emphasised by both nationalisms. This is supported by Kemal Karpat who argues the root of all nationalist division in the Balkans can be traced to the treaty of Berlin in 1878, and places blame explicitly on the major European powers. Thus the Tocco lordship does not feature in this secondary literature either.

Popular perceptions also help to create an atmosphere in which ‘outsiders’ have no place in Balkan history. Regardless of when it might have begun, the now-entrenched separate identity of these two groups still manifests itself in an acute rivalry over space, with the perceived border between Greece and Albania acting as a key bone of contention. Albanian nationalists envision a border starting in Arta and the Greek Nationalists argue that the Shkumbin River should mark the frontier. The Anthropologist Gilles de Rapper has illustrated this divide through an interview with an Albanian man, known as ‘Mr A’. Arrested

by Greek police in 1994 for overstaying his visa, ‘Mr A’ was shown a map of Epiros by a police officer who asked him to show him the location of the border. The aim apparently was to ascertain his position on the issue.39 This is followed by the story of another Albanian man ‘Mr B’ who while on a bus journey from Athens to Ioannina requested that the bus stopped in Arta. Upon stopping ‘Mr B’ picked up a stone and kissed it. When asked by the bus driver what exactly he was doing, ‘Mr B’ responded that he had vowed to kiss Albanian soil upon his return.40 To ‘Mr B’ the city of Arta was part of Albania. Another key aspect of the debate, from the Greek side, has to been to de-legitimise Albania and the Albanian people in general in order to weaken their claims in Epiros. This tendency has been analysed by Laurie Kain Hart, who cites the international friendly football match between Greece and Albania which took place in Patras on the 5 September 1990 as an example of this.41 The game ended in a standard 1-0 win for Greece, however during the match the Greek supporters chanted ‘You don’t have a country [homeland]/You don’t have a people/What are you doing here/On this playing field?’42 This further illustrates the influence of popular nationalism in the debate concerning the status of Epiros.

39 De Rapper, 52-53.
40 De Rapper, 55.
42 Kain Hart, 197.
This conflict was further exacerbated in the local elections of October 2003 in the Albanian towns of Himara and Dhermi, as Entela Stamati has analysed.\textsuperscript{43} Neither of these regions are part of the official Greek minority of Albania, despite their significant Greek population.\textsuperscript{44} As a result the government of the Hellenic Republic was heavily involved in the region, offering residency and citizenship and providing financial assistance to those in the region, much to the displeasure of the Albanian authorities.\textsuperscript{45} In the election the Albanian authorities rigged the vote to prevent the candidate from the pro-Greek ‘Party of Human Rights’ from winning. This caused protests from the Greek population of the region, who burned Albanian flags and accused the authorities of being ‘invaders’, ‘equal to al-Qaeda’, and worse.\textsuperscript{46} As a result of this, and of pressure from international observers, the Albanian authorities had to reverse the results which showed that the pro-Greek candidate had in fact won the election.\textsuperscript{47} This whole event caused further damage between the two communities, along with the governments of Greece and Albania, and further illustrated the fragmented communities of the region which do not fit to the agreed national boundaries.

These kind of perceptions at a popular level do feed in to academic constructions of the late medieval Balkans. Consciously or unconsciously, historians tend to focus on the ethnic groups which appear to correspond with the nation states that exist in the region today. As we have already illustrated Giakoumis’ support for Çabej’s claims regarding the Albanian-

\textsuperscript{43} E. Stamati, ‘The apple of discord between Albania and Greece: the recent electoral campaign on the south Albanian riviera’, \textit{Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe}, vol. 7 (2004), 139-141.
\textsuperscript{44} Stamati, 139.
\textsuperscript{45} Stamati, 140-141.
\textsuperscript{46} Stamati, 141.
\textsuperscript{47} Stamati, 140.
Illyrian link is flawed and ties him to a key aspect of Albanian nationalism. John Fine Jr. has also suggested that the Epirote countryside during the time of the Tocco lordship was largely overrun by Albanians, over which the Tocco had no control. It is both hard to prove this claim and to dispute it since the Tocco lordship was largely based around the urban areas of the region. Nevertheless, recent research has at least cast doubt on it. Myrtali Acheimastou-Potamianou demonstrated that the monastery of St Paraskevi in the village of Monodendri, some 25 km from Ioannina, was sponsored by the Therianos family who were active at Carlo I’s court in Ioannina. This certainly suggests some interaction between the urban elite and the Epirote countryside. Likewise, Brendan Osswald’s research into the ethnic composition of the region, shows that the Epirote countryside was not exclusively Albanian, a suggestion unlikely to appeal to Albanian nationalists and their claims to the region. This preoccupation with certain identifiable national groups, which correspond to modern nation states, accounts largely for the absence of the Tocco.

Another way in which non-Balkan scholars, like John Fine Jr., unconsciously reach a nationalistic conclusion, is through their continued perception of history through the purview of modern nation-states. Even in the early twenty-first century it is still tempting to view the world, and as a result its history, through this purview of states with well-defined borders, strong centralised governments, and a common identity of those within the state. The small

48 Giakoumis, 173-174.
49 J. V. A. Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor MI, 1994), 356-357.
Latin lordships of the late medieval Balkans often did not possess any of these features and this is a possible reason for the relative lack of attention paid to them. They were not ‘nations’, ‘states’ or even ‘colonial possessions’ and should not be viewed as any of these. Jonathan Riley-Smith (1938-2016) subscribed to the view that Latin Greece was a ‘society of settlers’ created by the ‘conquerors’ of the Byzantine Empire, from which the later ‘petty states’ such as the Tocco developed.\(^2\) Such a view is also supported by Christopher Tyerman who states that the Latin lordships of thirteenth century Greece, which he refers to as ‘New France’ were a much clearer example of a colonial society than those possessions held by the Crusader States in the Middle East.\(^3\) Rather than acting as ‘colonies’ of Western Europe the possessions of those in the Balkans were the private property of the lords themselves and operated as such.

Another important aspect of these lordships that may have deterred scholars from studying them was their fragmented nature, which further adds to their complexity. Since the events of the Fourth Crusade and the subsequent establishment of the Latin states, the region had begun to politically fragment and the lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans were formed from this world.\(^4\) Lordships such as that of the Tocco further exacerbated this perception as their ‘control’ was based in the major settlements or fortresses of the region and their influence in the countryside is largely unknown, though historians such as Fine have suspected that it was at best nominal.\(^5\) As a result drawing an accurate political map of these lordships would be difficult since they controlled individual cities rather than entire regions.

\(^5\) Fine, 356-357.
or territories. However, attempts were made in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to produce historical maps of the region, notably by the historian Edward Augustus Freeman (1823-1892). Freeman includes in his *Atlas of the Historical Geography of Europe* a map of south-eastern Europe in 1444, which attempted to include Carlo II’s lordship. Freeman paints Carlo’s domains with a blue border, which according to the map legend denotes ‘Latin Powers’. He regarded the lordship as including Akarnania, the far south and coast of Epiros, and the Ionian Islands, writing ‘Tocco’ across all of these domains. Because of this it is therefore unclear whether or not Freeman believed all of this territory belonged to the Tocco or whether it included other Latin Lordships, possibly those of the illegitimate sons of Carlo I Tocco. Freeman’s map roughly covers all of the cities and islands that were under Carlo II’s control during his reign and in that sense is accurate. However as previously stated the Tocco’s political influence over the countryside is largely unevidenced, and therefore suggesting that they held control over large swathes of the sparsely populated Epirote countryside is misleading. The maps in this thesis will therefore only illustrate the settlements of the region under the control of the Tocco rather than attempt to draw a political map of Carlo II’s lordship.

As a result of this complexity previous analyses of the Balkans have dismissed the Latin lordships as insignificant, transitory and even somehow rather reprehensible. A key example of this comes from the mid-nineteenth century Scottish historian and devoted philhellene, George Finlay (1799-1875). In Finlay’s eyes the Balkans before the Ottoman

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56 E. A. Freeman, *Atlas to the Historical Geography of Europe*, ed. J. B. Bury (London, 1903), XLIII.
57 For further analysis of Finlay see: J. M. Hussey, ‘George Finlay in Perspective: A Centenary Reappraisal’, *The Annual of the British School at Athens*, vol. 70 (1975), 135-144; W. Miller, ‘George Finlay as a Journalist’, *The English*
conquest was a time of ‘incessant civil wars and odious oppression’ in which the smaller lords, which he describes as ‘tyrants’, merely ‘divided, impoverished, and depopulated the country.’

Such sentiments were also supported by Edward S. Forster (1903-1953) in his analysis of Modern Greece, in which he argues that the ‘misrule and incessant quarrels’ of the Frankish lords ‘had reduced the Greek inhabitants to a state of miserable servitude’. Finlay briefly analyses the Tocco and views them in a similar light, describing Leonardo III Tocco as a ‘little sovereign’ which further suggests the insignificance of the family in the grand narrative of Finlay’s work.

This narrative is also, to an extent, supported by the late Elizabeth Zachariadou (1931-2018) who described the Tocco as a ‘petty dynasty’.

Finlay’s contempt for these small lordships, in particular those of the Latins, is best illustrated by his view that a large part of the population of the fifteenth century Balkans felt relieved as a result of the Ottoman conquest.

This notion that division and fragmentation amongst the Balkans powers was the key reason behind the Ottoman conquest is also supported by Fernand Braudel (1902-1985).

However as this thesis will argue the fragmented lordships of the Balkans were by no means easy to conquer, particularly since the Ottomans were not in a position of strength and unity that this narrative often suggests.

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59 E. S. Forster, A Short History of Modern Greece 1821-1940 (London, 1941), 1. The dates given for Forster are for those in which he was an active writer of Greek history.
60 Finlay, 74-75.
62 Finlay, 1.
So, to summarise, the Tocco, and the other Latin lords, have largely been dismissed in the grand narratives of the Balkans. From a nationalist perspective they are seen as ‘non-indigenous’ and therefore not part of the greater national struggles of Epiros. From the perspective of the Ottoman conquest they are seen as fragmented, petty and weak, making their eventual expulsion from the Balkans in 1479 seem inevitable. From a fifteenth-century perspective, the Tocco look rather different. They were an integral part of the political and economic scene and as much part of the fabric of the Balkans as any of the ‘indigenous’ lordships: the Albanians, the Bosnians, the Bulgarians, the Croats, the Dalmatians, the Greeks, the Serbs and the Vlachs. This thesis will therefore locate the Latin lordships within the political and economic history of the fifteenth century Balkans.

Scholarship on the Latin Lordships:

In spite of the ethnic agendas and adverse value judgements, some historians have attempted to analyse the small lordships of the late medieval Balkans. One of the first to attempt this was Karl Hopf (1832-1873) in the mid to late nineteenth century, notably in his encyclopaedia article on the history of Greece, which spanned from 395 to 1566, and his *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, a work that will be used extensively in this thesis. Not only does this latter book present the texts of several key sources of the period, notably the Venetian chronicler Stefano Magno, but it was also one of the first to produce genealogical tables of the various lords of

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the region including the Tocco.\textsuperscript{65} Hopf undoubtedly deserves to be viewed as one of the first historians of the Latin lordships and all later analyses have built upon his work. There were however some notable gaps in Hopf’s knowledge, which later historians have identified. According to Peter Lock, the genealogical tables produced by Hopf contain numerous errors, although he believes that they can still be very useful, if used with caution.\textsuperscript{66} Donald Nicol also mentions that Hopf did not have access to the Tocco Chronicle, which was then hidden in the Vatican archives, although he did have access to the now-destroyed registers of the Angevin Kingdom of Naples.\textsuperscript{67} These problems combined with his misdating of the treaty of friendship between the Venetian authorities and Ayyubid Egypt in 1202, have resulted in him acquiring a reputation for inaccuracy from historians of the crusades.\textsuperscript{68} Yet although any scepticism surrounding Hopf’s work has largely been automatically accepted by historians, he is still of importance to any study of the Latin Lordships.

Another historian to pioneer the study of the Latin lordships of the Balkans was the journalist and historian William Miller (1864-1945).\textsuperscript{69} His book \textit{The Latins in the Levant}, published in 1908, was one of the first studies of the topic in English.\textsuperscript{70} It is rightly described by Paul Hetherington as ‘Miller’s most substantial achievement’ and is undoubtedly still one of the most important works on the Latin lordships of the Balkans.


\textsuperscript{69} For further information on Miller, see: P. Hetherington, ‘William Miller: Medieval historian and modern journalist’, \textit{British School at Athens Studies}, vol. 7 (2009), 153-161. Hetherington also produced a bibliography of Miller’s work, see: Hetherington, 161.

\textsuperscript{70} W. Miller, \textit{The Latins in the Levant} (London, 1908). Henceforth, Miller, LiL.
of the main secondary works on the topic.\textsuperscript{71} Miller’s analysis looked at the Latin Lordships in the Balkans and the Aegean as a whole, covering a significant period of time from the establishment of Latin empire in 1204 until the overthrow of Iacopo IV Crispo, Duke of the Archipelago, by the Ottomans in 1566. The Tocco receive some analysis in this work, though they are merely a small aspect of the greater analysis. Along with this key study, Miller also produced several smaller works which looked at specific aspects and examples of lordship in the Balkans, many of which were reprinted in his Essays on the Latin Orient.\textsuperscript{72} Miller also produced one of the first studies in English on the Empire of Trebizond, a lordship with many similarities to those of the Balkans.\textsuperscript{73} Miller’s research is still undoubtedly of great value and, as with Hopf, later studies of the Latin lordships have had to build upon his work.

In the 1990s Peter Lock further added to the research on the Latin Lordships in his book, The Franks in the Aegean 1204-1500.\textsuperscript{74} According to Lock, the aim of this book was to ‘remove the aura of romanticism’ from the Frankish settlers of the region and to build on the previous work by William Miller.\textsuperscript{75} Lock’s analysis follows a similar model to that of Miller,

\textsuperscript{71} Hetherington, 160.
\textsuperscript{73} W. Miller, Trebizond – The Last Greek Empire of the Byzantine Era 1204-1461 (Chicago, 1969).
\textsuperscript{74} P. Lock, The Franks in the Aegean 1204-1500 (Harlow & New York, 1995).
\textsuperscript{75} Lock, 34.
with an analysis that takes a long-term approach to the Latin lordships. However, Lock’s analysis was much more thematic, particularly in the second half of the book, covering particular aspects of Latin lordships such as religion, economics and the nature of their societies.\footnote{Lock 193-309.} He also critically analysed the key primary sources and the major secondary works on the topic.\footnote{Lock, 16-34.} Lock only briefly touched on the Tocco family, using them as an occasional case study of his analysis of the lordships in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These grand analyses of the Latin Lordships, by Hopf, Miller and Lock, have helped to better understand these movements as a whole, from their inception in thirteenth century until they were swept up in the Ottoman conquests of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.

Another historian who has analysed the role of the Latins in the region is Kate Fleet. Rather than specifically focussing on the Latin lordships, Fleet’s research studied the economic relationship between the Genoese and the Ottomans, and analysed this through the various commodities traded between the two, e.g. slaves, wine, alum, etc.\footnote{K. Fleet, European and Islamic Trade in the Early Ottoman state – The Merchants of Genoa and Turkey (Cambridge & New York, 2006).} One of the key commodities covered in this book, and a separate article, was the trade in cereals between Turchia, Fleet’s preferred name for the Ottoman domains in Western Anatolia, and the Balkans, and the Genoese.\footnote{Fleet, European and Islamic trade, 59-73 ; K. Fleet, ‘Ottoman Grain Exports from Western Anatolia at the End of the Fourteenth Century’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 40 (1997), 283-293.} Though her analysis focuses on Genoese involvement in the Aegean and Balkans, Fleet illustrates the importance of those based in the region, in Pera or the island of Chios, to the city state’s economic relationship with the Ottomans.\footnote{Fleet, European and Islamic trade, 12.} Fleet further
analysed this relationship through several journal articles which clarify certain diplomatic and legal aspects in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.\textsuperscript{81} She also published the text and an English translation of the Treaty of 1387 between the Genoese and the Ottoman Sultan Murad I (1362-1389) which demonstrates the multi-faceted nature of the relationship between the two.\textsuperscript{82} Fleet compares this relationship to that of the Latins and the Mamluks, which was much more confrontational and violent, and this difference suggests that the Ottoman relationship with the Latins was dictated by the insecurity of the Ottomans as a Muslim minority in an overwhelming Christian Balkans.\textsuperscript{83} Fleet’s analysis of the relationship between the Genoese and the Ottomans helps to better understand diplomacy and economics in the fourteenth and fifteenth century Aegean, and the role played by the Latin lords in this. This thesis will apply a similar analysis to the economic and political relationship between Carlo II Tocco and the Republic of Ragusa.

Alongside these grand, long-term, thematic studies of the Latin lordships there have been several analyses of the individual Latin regimes. In particular those of Julian Chrysostomides, Christopher Wright, and Mike Carr who looked at the lordships of the Acciaiuoli, the Gattilusio, and the Zaccaria families respectively. Julian Chrysostomides analysed the Acciaiuoli family, who ruled over the duchy of Athens in the fourteenth and


fifteenth centuries, through several journal articles rather than one major study. These articles were able to illustrate several key aspects of Acciaiuoli lordship, notably the conflict between the de-jure claims of political control and de-facto situation on the ground, and the human aspect of lordship. She achieved the latter by analysing the legal documents and letters of the time particularly those concerning Nerio I Acciaiuoli (1388-1394) the Duke of Athens, his daughter Francesca Acciaiuoli, and her husband Carlo I Tocco. These legal cases illustrate the nature of the Latin lordships. Their disputes were those of individuals claiming money and property, not of states or nations contesting territories or borders. She also produced two articles which looked at the role of women in the Latin lordships and the privileges granted to the Venetians under the Palaiologos dynasty which illustrate further aspects of lordship in the Balkans. Chrysostomides also edited and published a collection of many of the documents used in her work. The majority of these documents were from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia and concern the history of the Morea in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Through her micro-historical work, Chrysostomides was able to illustrate key aspects of Latin lordship in this era, in particular the nature of lordship and their possessions as private property.

Another similar analysis of Latin lordship can be found in Christopher Wright’s book on the Gattilusio regimes from 1355 to 1462. The Gattilusio were based in the Aegean Sea rather than the Balkans, with their powerbase at Mytilene on Lesbos, but they were as much part of the Latin lordships. In his book, Wright explains the decentralised nature of the Gattilusio lordship. For example, their mainland possession of Ainos in Thrace was essentially its own separate entity within the Gattilusio lordship, though its foreign affairs were still controlled by Mytilene. This is another important aspect of the Latin lordships and helps better to understand their loose political structure. As this thesis will illustrate, the lordship of Carlo I, and to a lesser extent that of Carlo II, were also decentralised in order to better control their dispersed and fragmented domains. In his analysis, Wright also explains the importance of the Aegean Sea in the interconnectivity and economic power of the Gattilusio, a view which is supported by David Jacoby. Wright has also produced several journal articles which look at the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes, in particular their diplomatic and economic relations. Wright’s analysis of the Gattilusio allows us to better understand the economic influence and political structure of the Latin lordships, and there are many similarities between the Gattilusio and the Tocco.

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89 Wright, *The Gattilusio Lordships*, 118.
93 My MA Dissertation on the Tocco, titled ‘The Tocco Lordships in the Late Medieval Balkans: A unique phenomenon?’, explored this by comparing the lordships of the Gattilusio and the Tocco.
Another important analysis of the Latins of the Aegean has been published by Mike Carr. Carr studied the Zaccaria family, who ruled over the island of Chios, as part of a wider analysis of crusading, piracy, and trade in the Aegean during the fourteenth century. In his analysis he illustrates the role played by the Zaccaria in crusades against the Turks of Aydin, and the close relationship they developed with the Hospitallers of Rhodes through their involvement. Carr’s research also illuminates the fluid nature of the Latin lordships and the merchants from within their domains. These merchants were not only engaged in trade with the Islamic world but were also involved in crusading and piracy against the Turks. Wright also alluded to this in his study of the Gattilusio, suggesting that piracy was merely ‘trade’s violent counterpart’ and heavily influenced by the lordships from which these merchant-pirates operated. This fluid nature, in terms of foreign policy and influence, is very important in understanding the Latin lordships of the Balkans and Carr further established this by using the Hospitallers of Rhodes as a case study. Carr’s research not only illustrates the fluid nature of Latin lordship in this period, but also places the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers in their rightful place within the events of the fourteenth century Eastern Mediterranean. This analysis of the lordship of Carlo II Tocco will contribute further to this

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96 M. Carr, ‘Trade or Crusade? The Zaccaria of Chios and Crusades against the Turks’, *Contact and Conflict in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, 1204-1453 – Crusade, Religion and Trade between Latins, Greeks and Turks*, ed. N. G. Chrissis and M. Carr (Farnham & Burlington VT, 2014) 115-134.
field of study, building on themes explored in the previous analyses of the Latin lordships particularly those of Chrysotomides, Wright and Carr.

**Studies of the Tocco:**

There have been a few previous studies of the Tocco, most notably those by Donald Nicol, Thekla Sansaridou-Hendrickx, and Nada Zečević. Writing in 1984, Nicol was one of the first historians to look at the Tocco family and their conquests in Epiros.99 Nicol’s interests concerned Epiros as a whole, having previously written on the Despotate of Epiros from 1204-1261 in the 1950s.100 According to the preface of his later analysis, the book was a continuation of his previous studies on the region up until the Ottoman conquest of the fifteenth century.101 As Nicol’s interests concerned Epiros as a whole he only analysed the Tocco as they took control over settlements in the region, in particular after Carlo I had taken control over Ioannina in 1411 upon the death of his uncle Esau Buondelmonti.102 As a result Nicol gave significant analysis to Carlo I though he largely neglected Carlo II and Leonardo III. A key reason behind this was his understanding of the Tocco ‘Civil War’, in which he argued that this event was the ‘beginning of the end’ for the Tocco Lordship and the harbinger of the Ottoman conquest of Epiros.103 As chapter two of this thesis will argue, Nicol’s interpretation of the conflict is questionable and resulted in an unduly pessimistic view of Carlo II and his successful reign as the Despot of Arta.

102 Nicol, Epiros II, 179-195.
103 Nicol, Epiros II, 205.
Another historian to work on the Tocco is Thekla Sansaridou-Hendrickx. Her research largely focuses on a textual analysis of the Tocco Chronicle, an anonymous work written in vernacular Greek that follows the events of the Tocco conquest of Epiros during the reign of Carlo I Tocco. Her thesis focused on the world view of the chronicle, arguing that the anonymous author reflects a Humanistic approach to history which was characteristic of the Italian Renaissance in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Sansaridou-Hendrickx later published several articles based on her research, particularly the Chronicle’s conception of death which was based upon one of her thesis’ chapters. She also continued working on similar projects through analyses of Laments for the fall of Byzantine cities, and the Chronicle of Ioannina in order to better understand the history of Epiros. Sansaridou-Hendrickx also collaborated with her husband, Benjamin Hendrickx, in several journal articles which analysed the military of the Latin lordships of the Balkans, including that of the Tocco, and the exact political nature of the Tocco Despotate. Despite her strong textual analysis

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Sansaridou-Hendrickx does make several inaccurate claims regarding the Tocco. Not only does she incorrectly describe them as being of Florentine rather than Neapolitan origin, but she claims that Carlo II changed the ‘capital’ of his domains from Arta to Ioannina, a claim in conflict with the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ and of Carlo II’s reign. Since her analysis of the Tocco is largely seen through the events recorded in the Tocco Chronicle, which does not continue beyond 1422, it is possible that this accounts for her misconceptions. In order to better understand Carlo II’s lordship, this thesis will supplement the Tocco Chronicle with archival sources and other chronicles as will be explained later. Despite these misgivings, Sansaridou-Hendrickx’s textual analysis of the Tocco Chronicle, and other similar sources, is a very important contribution to our understanding of a key source for the Tocco lordship, and the world in which they operated.

The only previous major study devoted specifically to the Tocco family is that by Nada Zečević, published in 2014.¹⁰⁸ Zečević looks at the Tocco through a long-term lens, studying the family history from their rise to prominence in Angevin Naples as part of the Guelph faction during their conflict against the Ghibellines.¹⁰⁹ As a result she views the Tocco as ‘Angevins’ who were heavily influenced by this period in their history. Not only were their courts based on Neapolitan institutions and practices, with titles such as Mastrorationalis, Procurator, Tresurerius and Vicarius, but Zečević also argues that Carlo I’s title of δεσποτής,

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¹⁰⁹ Zečević, TGR, 9-45.
bestowed upon him by the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos (1391-1425) in 1415, was based on the Angevin title of Despotus Romaniae held by the princes of Taranto.\textsuperscript{110} That might have been the case but other influences need to be taken into account as well. In many aspects, the Tocco lordship was similar to the other Latin lordships of the former Byzantine territories, such as the Acciaiuoli, Gattilusio and Zaccaria, most of whom were not influenced by the politics of Angevin Naples. Moreover, like Nicol, Zečević only dedicates a single chapter in her analysis to Carlo II and the majority of her research on the Tocco has focused on both Carlo I and Leonardo III.\textsuperscript{111} There have also been two smaller analyses of the Tocco by Charalambos Gasparis and Savvas Kyriakidis who analysed specific aspects of the reign of Carlo I relating to his diplomatic relations and military capability.\textsuperscript{112}

\textsuperscript{110} Zečević, TGR, 91-107.


It has been established then that there have been previous analyses of the Tocco, and the Latin Lordships in general, but it is fair to say that they have largely overlooked Carlo II Tocco and the scanty analysis that he has received has largely been negative. That is probably due to him being sandwiched between the ‘successful’ founder of the Tocco lordship, Carlo I, and Leonardo III, the last of the Tocco rulers in the Balkans. Both of these rulers can be classified into key phases of Latin lordship in the fifteenth century Balkans. Carlo I’s rule epitomises the successful expansion of the Latin lordships after the events of the Battle of Ankara, as a result of Ottoman division. Leonardo III’s reign, on the other hand, symbolises the ultimate expulsion of the Latin lords as the Ottomans consolidated their conquest of the Balkans. Unlike the other Tocco lords, Carlo II does not fit into an obvious phase. He was neither expansionist nor did he succumb to Ottoman expansion. During his reign the city of Ioannina, the centre of Carlo I’s lordship, was lost to the Ottomans as a result of the upheavals of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. This was, however, the only Tocco possession lost during Carlo II’s reign and his lordship was not swept away in a greater conquest of Epiros. Instead Carlo was able to consolidate the remaining Tocco possessions and presided over a prosperous lordship based around the city of Arta. This thesis shall therefore seek to better understand the Latin Lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans through an examination of the reign of Carlo II Tocco, building upon the previous works on the Tocco family and the other Latin lordships.

Primary Sources:

This thesis will use many different sources in order to better understand the lordship of Carlo II. The key source for any study of the Tocco family in the Balkans is undoubtedly the anonymous demotic Greek work which will be known throughout this thesis as the Tocco
Chronicle. It was probably commissioned by Carlo I Tocco and written by an unknown Greek citizen of Ioannina. It gives an account of Carlo’s rise to power and the expansion of the Tocco domains, spanning from the death of Leonardo I Tocco in 1375 until approximately 1422. This is significant because the chronicle omits the major loss of the Tocco possessions in the Morea to the future Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos who reigned as Despot at Mistra from 1428 to 1449. As a result, it portrays an overly positive account of Carlo I’s reign and therefore the reign of Carlo II has been viewed as a failure in comparison by previous studies of the Tocco which relied on this chronicle. This thesis will utilise the 1975 edition of the chronicle published by Giuseppe Schirò in the Corpus Fontium Historiae Byzantinae.113 Before bringing out this edition, Schirò published several other studies of the chronicle which analysed certain aspects of the chronicle both in terms of its content and production.114 As previously stated Thekla Sansaridou-Hendrickx’s research also focused on this chronicle and she produced several articles on its interpretations. As a historical text the Tocco Chronicle has faults. Its dating is often incorrect and many of the events mentioned are not in chronological order. Despite these flaws, the chronicle provides a fascinating insight into the situation on the ground in Eprios during the conquests of Carlo I in the early fifteenth century and illuminates key aspects of the Tocco Lordship. One of these concerns the relationships Carlo I had with the various powers of the region, notably the Byzantines and the Ottoman generals in the region. Chapter Eight of the Tocco Chronicle refers to the granting of the titles

113 Cronaca dei Tocco di Cefalonia di Anonimo, ed. G. Schirò, CFHB 10 (Rome, 1975). Hereafter CT. The last entry of the chronicle concerns a battle between Ercole Tocco, the eldest of Carlo I’s illegitimate sons, and a captain from Androusa (the Morea) called Lascaris. Schirò dates this event as having taken place in 1422. CT, 508-509.
of δεσποτής and μέγας κοντόσταυλος to Carlo I and his brother Leonardo II respectively, by the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos in 1415. They were also granted the honorary title of Κατακουζηνάτος, essentially honorary membership of the Emperor’s family clan. Not only was this seen as a defining moment in the reign of Carlo I, but it also illustrates the ‘soft-power’ that the Byzantine Empire still held in the early fifteenth century and the key ceremonial role of the Emperor. Another key aspect illustrated in the Tocco Chronicle is the relationship between the Tocco and the Ottomans and the power held by the Ottomans in the region during the early fifteenth century. Throughout his reign Carlo I aligned himself with the Ottoman rulers in the region, notably organising a marriage between Emir Musa Çelebi and one of his illegitimate daughters, whose name has been lost to history. When Mehmed I became Sultan in 1413, after defeating Musa and reuniting the Ottoman lands under one ruler, Musa’s widow was then married to Hamza Beg the brother of Mehmed I’s Grand Visir, thus transferring the relationship Carlo I had enjoyed with Musa to the new Sultan. Along with developing close relations with the Sultan, Carlo I also had relations with several uc begleri. The uc begleri were the Ottoman ‘Marcher Lords’ of the Balkans who were in a position of independence which allowed them hold possessions on a hereditary basis. Halil İnalcık suggests that they held a similar position within the Ottoman domains as Osman I had within

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115 CT, 378-382.
116 CT, 380-382.
117 CT, 360-362.
118 CT 366, 456-458. 460-462. According to Schirò, Hamza was the brother of Bayezid Paşa, the eighth Ottoman Grand Vizier (1413-1421). CT, 581. Doukas suggests Bayezid Paşa was of Albanian origin and had been enslaved as a child, likely through the Divşerme policy. Doukas, Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341-1462), ed. V. Grecu (Bucharest, 1958), 165, translation in, Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans. H. J. Magoulias (Detroit MI, 1975), 128. It is therefore likely that Hamza was also of Albanian origin. For further information on Bayezid Paşa, see: D. J. Kastritis, The Sons of Bayezid – Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-13 (Leiden & Boston MA, 2007), 34, 63, 75-76, 165, 189-194, 199, 215, 217 ; T. Stavrides, The Sultan of Vezirs – The Life and Times of the Ottoman Grand Vezir Mahmud Pasha Angelović (1453-1474) (Leiden & Boston, 2001), 55.
the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum. Colin Imber suggests that they were of such high standing that the Ottoman dynasty were merely first among equals, and not sole rulers of their Sultanate which they became towards the end of the fifteenth century. Carlo I interacted with two particular uc begleri, Evrenos beg and Yusuf beg. On two separate occasions, both of which are recorded in the family chronicle, he was able to utilise his skills in diplomacy and his relationships with these lords to his advantage and this further illustrates the importance of diplomacy in the early successes of the Tocco.

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119 H., İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), 104-105.
120 C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650* (Basingstoke & New York), 12.
122 During the dispute over the inheritance of Corinth after the death of his father-in-law, Carlo invited Evrenos into the Morea to attack the forces of Theodore I Palaiologos (1355-1407), the then Despot of the Morea. Evrenos defeated Theodore’s army and captured the Byzantine fortresses of Akova and Leontarion. CT, 250-254; Nicol, Epiros II, 303; D. A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1932-1953), vol. 1, p. 155; Zečević, TGR, 65. Yusuf attacked the settlement of Vonitsa at the request of Paul Spata. After failing to take the city, with many of his men being captured, he came to terms with Carlo I and left Epiros. This left the Spata without support and allowed the Tocco to accelerate their conquests in the region. CT, 250-256; Kyriakidis, 173; Nicol, Epiros II, 171.
When it comes to the Tocco lordship during the rule of Carlo II, the writings of Cyriac of Ancona (1391-1452) are an extremely useful source of information.\textsuperscript{123} Cyriac was a diplomat, merchant and renowned antiquarian whose letters and diary entries record both the historical architecture and the political history of the Balkans and Asia Minor. Cyriac visited Carlo II’s domains twice, once towards the beginning of his reign in 1435-1436 and at the end of his reign in 1448. Both of these voyages illustrate the interconnectivity of the city of Arta as a result of its placement on the Arachthos river, which was navigable by ship, and allowed it to have access to the Gulf of Ambrakia and the Ionian Sea.\textsuperscript{124} Cyriac’s first trip to Carlo’s domains was part of a wider voyage between December 1435 and May 1436 during which Cyriac also visited Attica, the Morea and the Negroponte.\textsuperscript{125} Cyriac first arrived in the city of Arta on 29 December 1435 and his diary entry records that he was impressed by the walls of the city and their many classical inscriptions.\textsuperscript{126} Georgio Ragnarolio, Carlo II’s secretary, is mentioned by Cyriac as he visited the town of ‘Astacora’ with Georgio’s son.\textsuperscript{127} Cyriac also visited the domains of several of the other Tocco lords in 1436, notably Carlo II’s cousins Torno and Menuno.\textsuperscript{128} These accounts are some of the clearest evidence of when the hostilities of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ came to an end since there is a lack of dateable sources regarding the conflict. Cyriac’s later visit to Carlo’s domains in September and October of 1448 also illustrates aspects of Carlo’s regime. The diary entry in question concerns a hunting trip from 8-13 September


\textsuperscript{124} Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium}, 64-65 ; Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Later Travels}, 342.

\textsuperscript{125} Bodnar has produced a map of Cyriac’s journeys over this period. Bodnar, 30.

\textsuperscript{126} Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium}, 64-65.

\textsuperscript{127} Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium}, 66-67. Bodnar has suggested that this ‘Astacora’ is the town of Rogus (Rogoi), this is unclear since in his later travels Cyriac visited the town of Rogoi calling it Rhogous. Bodnar, 29 ; Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Later Travels}, 348-354.

\textsuperscript{128} Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium}, 68-72.
1448. Through this account we learn about those in the Carlo’s employ, notably Iacopo Rosso (called Iacopo Ruphu), the governor of Nicopolis, and Ser Antonellus Barges, the ἀρχιτρικλίνα or ‘president of the banquet’. One of the final key pieces of information provided by Cyriac is the date of Carlo II’s death on 30 September 1448. Not only was Cyriac present in Carlo’s domains when he passed away but he also recorded the prayers he made in Carlo’s honour at the church in Rogoi (Rhogous). Cyriac’s early travels are also chronicled in his biography by Francesco Scalamonti, a fellow diplomat, traveller, knight and close friend. Scalamonti tells us of Cyriac’s life and travels up until 1434, including his visit to Adrianople and Gallipoli in 1429-1430 in which he purchased a young Epirote slave girl, who appears to have been enslaved as a result of the campaign of Sinan Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, during the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. Cyriac was not only an eyewitness, visiting Carlo’s realm twice, but he also developed a close relationship with Carlo along with

129 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 342-346.
130 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 342, 346.
131 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 348.
132 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 348-354.
134 Scalamonti, 70. Sinan Paşa, also known as Karaca Paşa, was the Beylerbeyi of Rumeli and one of the main commanders of the Ottoman military forces, described by Chalkokondyles as the General of Europe ‘Εὐρώπης στρατηγὸς’. Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 390-392. Donald Nicol also describes Sinan as the ‘captain of captains’ and ‘lord of all the west’. Nicol, Epiros II, 202. It is unclear as to how long Sinan was active within the Ottoman domains, though he appears to have died during conflict. Several Ottoman sources suggest that Sinan was killed at the Battle of Varna in 1444. Anonymous, ‘A Note of the Flyleaf of a Manuscript of the Kanz Al-Daqa‘iq of Al-Nasafi: an Ottoman Participant Recalls the Battle of Varna’, in C. Imber, The Crusade of Varna, 1443-45 (Aldershot & Burlington VT, 2006), 186-187, at 187; Anonymous, ‘The Holy Wars of Sultan Murad Son of Mehmed Khan’, in C. Imber, The Crusade of Varna, 1443-45 (Aldershot & Burlington VT, 2006), 41-106, at 97-98. This is also supported by Martin Chasin, see: M. Chasin, ‘Chapter VIII: The Crusade of Varna, in H. W. Hazard and N. P. Zacour, ‘Volume VI: The Impact of the Crusades on Europe’, A History of the Crusades, ed. K. M. Setton, 6 vols. (Madison WI & London, 1989), 309. However, Chalkokondyles suggests that he died at the siege of Belgrade in 1456. Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, 232-234.
the Tocco lords of Menuno and Torno, and officials within Carlo’s lordship, making him a vital source of information.

The major chronicles of the late Byzantine world will also be utilised in this thesis as they provide an insight into Carlo II’s reign. Traditionally the overarching theme of these chronicles concerns the fall of the Byzantine Empire and the rise of the Ottomans, with groups such as the Tocco family and their fortunes in the Balkans brought into this greater narrative by the various chroniclers.135 Christopher Hobbs, in his analysis of Doukas, has suggested that the classification of these ‘Historians of the Fall’ is convenient though it does have the potential to distort our interpretation of these historians.136 It is equally problematic to view these historians through the purviews of language and national identity. Describing these historians as being either ‘Byzantine’ or ‘Greek’ misrepresents the geographical locations of these writers and their political allegiances during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The language of these chronicles also needs to be considered. Though the majority of these chronicles were written in Greek the chronicle of Theodore Spandounes was written in Italian, due to his location in Venice. Therefore, grouping these historians based on their linguistic and political allegiance distorts our understanding of the situation in the Balkans during the late middle ages.

Of all of these chroniclers only one truly merits being referred to as ‘Byzantine’, and that is George Sphrantzes (1401-1478). Sphrantzes was born in Constantinople on 30 August 1401 during its siege by the Ottoman emperor Bayezid I Yıldırım (1389-1402). During his adult life Sphrantzes was an important Byzantine courtier and served as the aide to Constantine Palaiologos, the Despot of the Morea and future Byzantine Emperor. Due to this Sphrantzes directly interacted with the Tocco family as Constantine’s representative, most notably during his conquest of Carlo I’s possessions in the Morea during 1427-1428. Sphrantzes was also dispatched by Constantine to mediate in the Tocco ‘Civil War’ but was unable to fulfill his role as he was captured by Catalan pirates. Sphrantzes therefore gives an important eyewitness insight into the Tocco lordship, through a Byzantine perspective, and further illuminates the political situation in the early fifteenth century Balkans.

Though Sphrantzes was the only one of these chroniclers tied directly to Byzantium he was not the only one in service to a lordship of the region. This was the case for Doukas (1400-1462) who was in the service of the Gattilusio family. Through this role Doukas was a regular visitor to the Ottoman Porte, in both Adrianople and later Constantinople, as a representative of the family and an eyewitness to several important events in his chronicle. In his analysis of Doukas, Christopher Hobbs argues that he is often misunderstood since he

141 Doukas, Ducas Istoria Turco-Bizantina (1341–1462), ed. V. Grecu (Bucharest, 1958), translation in Doukas, Decline and Fall of Byzantium to the Ottoman Turks, trans. H. J. Magoulias (Detroit MI, 1975).
142 Miller, ‘The Historians Doukas and Phrantzes’, 63.
has often been placed by scholars within the classical tradition when his writings were of the biblical tradition.\textsuperscript{143} This further illustrates the problems of attempting to classify these chronicles. Due to his ties to the Gattilusio, the scope of his chronicle largely focuses on the Aegean, and therefore does not mention Epiros or the Tocco. Despite this it provides a further insight into the political situation and, through his connections with the Gattilusio, the nature of Latin lordship.

Another source that shall be taken into account in this analysis is that of Michael Kritovoulos (1410-1470).\textsuperscript{144} Described by Cyriac of Ancona as ‘the most learned of the Imbriotes’, Kritovoulos wrote a laudatory history of the Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (1451-1481).\textsuperscript{145} He largely focuses on the early part of Mehmed’s second term as Sultan from his ascension to the throne in 1451 to the plague that hit Constantinople in 1467.\textsuperscript{146} Kritovoulos has traditionally been seen as being less critical of the Ottomans than the other chronicles of this period, largely as a result of his time as governor of Imbros on behalf of the Sultan. However, by placing Kritovoulos within this ‘Historians of the Fall’ we misinterpret him.\textsuperscript{147} Kritovoulos was writing a history of the success of Mehmed II and should therefore not be viewed as a ‘Historian of the Fall’. As with Doukas, Kritovoulos focuses on the Aegean world

\textsuperscript{143} Hobbs, 9-10.
\textsuperscript{145} Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 96.
\textsuperscript{146} Kritovoulos, ed. Reinsch, 15-17, 204-207, trans. Riggs, 12-14, 219-222.
and does not mention the situation in Epiros. Despite this his chronicle remains an important source for the political situation in the Aegean post-1451.

The Histories of Laonikos Chalkokondyles (1427-1480) provide another important source for the fall of the Byzantine Empire and the rise of the Ottomans. Laonikos, also called Nikolaos, was from the Duchy of Athens, then under the control of the Acciaiuoli family, and he was born into one of the major Athenian families. Unlike some of his contemporaries, he gave due credit to the Ottomans in their eventual conquest of the region rather than solely putting it down to luck or divine retribution. Despite only briefly mentioning the Tocco, Chalkokondyles provides one of the most detailed and useful accounts of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. Through his account of the conflict we understand the divisions created after the death of Carlo I along with the events of the ‘civil war’ both before and after the surrender of Ioannina in October 1430. The Histories of Chalkokondyles will therefore play an important role in this analysis of Carlo II’s lordship.

149 For further analysis of Chalkokondyles life and Athenian Identity, see: A. Kaldellis, A New Herodotos – Laonikos Chalkokondyles on the Ottoman Empire, the Fall of Byzantium, and the Emergence of the West (Washington DC, 2014), 1-17.
151 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 390-394.
The last of the chronicles used in this analysis is that of Theodore Spandounes (d. post-1538). Unlike many of these other chroniclers, Spandounes was writing in sixteenth century Venice as he was the son of Byzantine refugees who fled there in the wake of the Ottoman conquest. As a result his history is written in Italian, rather than Greek, which distinguishes it from the other chronicles as previously mentioned. His chronicle largely focuses on the other aspects of the fifteenth century Balkans, in particular the rise of the Ottomans, but does reference the Tocco lordship. As with Chalkokondyles, Spandounes provides another important source for the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ and gives an insight into the terms of vassalisation granted to Carlo II by Murad II.

Archival Records:

Alongside the published literary sources described so far, unpublished archival records of the period will be used. These records are largely government records from the two major merchant republics of the Adriatic, those of Ragusa and Venice. Since they were some of the closest economic and political partners of Carlo II, their records provide an important insight into his reign. The Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, currently housed in the sixteenth century Sponza Palace in the Old-Town of Dubrovnik, contains many documents concerning the history of the city from the eleventh until the twentieth centuries. Carter has classified the records from the period of the Republic of Ragusa (1277-1808) into four separate groups:

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153 For further analysis of Theodore Spandounes, see: Spandounes, trans. Nicol, vii-xvii.


155 Hereafter DAD.
governmental records, financial records, judicial records, and civil contracts.\textsuperscript{156} This thesis will predominantly utilise the governmental and judicial records alongside the civil contracts from the fifteenth century. The governmental records used throughout this analysis will be the minutes from the major councils of the Republic of Ragusa, notably the Consilium Maius, Consilium Minus and the Consilium Rogatorium. It will also make use of the Lettere di Levante which contains the texts of several letters from the Ragusan authorities sent to the Hungarian court. The judicial records of the Lamenta de Foris and the Sententiae Cancellariae and the civil contracts found in the Debita Notariae, Diversa Cancellariae and Diversa Notariae will also be exploited in chapters four and five, as they are important to understanding the role played by Ragusan merchants in the cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa during the reign of Carlo II Tocco. Some of the archival records, in particular those in the Lettere di Levante, were published by the Hungarian historians József Gelcich and Lajos Thallóczy in the late-nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{157} Summaries of the documents concerning Ragusa’s relationship with the various powers of the Levant were produced by Bariša Krekić in 1961.\textsuperscript{158}

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{156}{F. W. Carter, Dubrovnik (Ragusa) – A Classic City-State (London & New York, 1972), 591-596.}
\footnote{157}{J. Gelcich and L. Thallóczy, Diplomatarium Relationum Republicae Ragusanae Cum Regno Hungariae (Budapest, 1887). Hereafter DRR.}
\footnote{158}{B. Krekić, ed., Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Âge (Paris & The Hague, 1961). Hereafter KrD.}
\end{footnotes}
This thesis will also make use of the records from the Archivio di Stato di Venezia. The archive is currently attached to the fourteenth century Franciscan Basilica di Santa Maria Gloriosa dei Frari, in San Polo, Venice. The majority of the Venetian records that refer to Carlo II Tocco and his realm are the various deliberations of the Senate. Notable amongst them are the Senatus Deliberationes Mare, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, and the Senatus Deliberationes Secretae. These records inform us of the views of the Venetian authorities to the events of the fifteenth century Balkans and their responses. Due to the location of the Tocco domains, which bordered the trade routes between Venice and its possessions in the Aegean, the Venetian authorities had a keen interest in maintaining their influence in the region and they attempted to bring the Tocco family into their sphere. In order to achieve this greater strategy, the Venetian authorities granted citizenship to all of the
Tocco lords in the Balkans from Leonardo I (1357-1375) to Leonardo III (1448-1479). During the reign of Carlo II, Doge Francesco Foscari (1423-1457) attempted to further this connection by granting Carlo II honorary membership of the *Maggior Consiglio* in March 1433, as recorded in the *Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi*.\(^{159}\) Despite these attempts the Venetians were unsuccessful at bringing the Tocco into their fold, and had poor relations with both Carlo I and Carlo II. There has been significant analysis of Carlo I’s relationship with the Venetian authorities, in particular of his renunciation of his Venetian citizenship and his formation of an alliance with Genoa in 1389-1395.\(^ {160}\) Little to no study has been carried out on Carlo II’s relationship with Venice which was equally frosty.\(^ {161}\) A major reason for this poor relationship was the involvement of the Tocco in piracy and, as the documents illustrate, Venetian shipping was one of the major targets for pirates based within Carlo’s domains. The Venetian authorities responded to these transgressions with harsh punishments, as seen from their confiscation and sequestration of Carlo II’s property on the island of Corfu in 1446-1447 after receiving testimony from a Venetian merchant, Georgio Loredan.\(^ {162}\) This episode not only illustrates a major aspect in the relations between Carlo II and the Venetian authorities, but it also illuminates the role piracy played in the economy of Carlo II’s lordship. Due to the important role played by the Venetian archival sources in previous studies of the region many of the documents in the Archivio di Stato di Venezia have been published. Most of the documents used in this thesis were published by Giuseppe Valentini, known as Zef Valentini in Albanian, (1900-1979) in the *Acta Albaniæ Veneta* during the 1960s and 1970s.\(^ {163}\) Valentini

\(^{159}\) ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, II, f. 17 ; AAV, vol. 15, no. 3550, pp. 5-6.


was an Italian scholar and Jesuit priest who emigrated to Albania as a missionary and became fascinated in its history, eventually becoming Professor of Albanian Studies at the University of Palermo.¹⁶⁴ Valentini appears through his research to have embraced aspects of Albanian nationalism and this is probably a reason behind the documents concerning Arta appearing in these volumes. Freddy Thiriet also produced summaries of the documents in the 1950s, particularly the deliberations of the Venetian Senate concerning the political situation in the Balkans.¹⁶⁵ Though Carlo II’s relationship with the Venetians was not as strong as that which he held with the Ragusans, it was still one of the central diplomatic contacts of his reign and these archival sources will thus play a key role in better understanding the lordship of Carlo II Tocco.

¹⁶⁴ Elise, 463-464.
Figure II – The Archivio di Stato di Venezia, attached to the Basilica di Santa Maria Gloriosa dei Frari in San Polo, Venice. Photograph taken by R. A. Shields in April 2018.

This thesis shall also make use of several other archives, though their records play a minor role compared to those of the Ragusan and Venetian sources. One of these archives is the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón in Barcelona.\textsuperscript{166} In particular it will make use of the \textit{Registros del Rey} of Alfonso V of Aragon, also known as Alfonso the Magnanimous (1416-1458). Alfonso became King of Naples in 1442 and developed close relations with the lordships of the Balkans during his reign, bringing many of them under his suzerainty. The Tocco, who originated from Naples, were one of these and broke their Ottoman vassalage in 1444, probably coinciding with the Crusade of Varna, with the support of the Neapolitans. In particular Carlo II received aid from the Ventimiglia family who provided military support and he solidified this relationship by marrying Ramondina Ventimiglia towards the end of his reign. This support is recorded in a document from the \textit{Registros del Rey} which illustrates Giovanni Ventimiglia’s presence in the Balkans in September 1445, when he was recalled by Alfonso.\textsuperscript{167} Due to the destruction of the Archivio di Stato di Napoli in the 1943 these are some of the only records available regarding the influence of the Neapolitans in the Balkans during the fifteenth century. Another archive used in this analysis is the Archivio Privato di Tocco di Montemiletto, which is currently housed in the Archivio di Stato di Napoli.\textsuperscript{168} This archive contains many key documents regarding the history of the Tocco family, from the fourteenth century onwards. The key document used in this thesis is \textit{Pergamene} XLVII which is a copy

\textsuperscript{166} Hereafter ACA.
\textsuperscript{167} ACA, Registros del Rey, 2798, f. 109.
\textsuperscript{168} Hereafter ASN, APTM.
of Carlo II’s honorary membership of the Maggior Consiglio as granted by Doge Francesco Foscari in March 1433.\textsuperscript{169} This is the only document in the archive that concerns the reign of Carlo II Tocco. Summaries of this archive were compiled by Allocati in the 1970s.\textsuperscript{170} Finally this thesis has also used material from the National Archives based in Kew, Surrey.\textsuperscript{171} In particular it will make use of the ‘Port: London Particulars of account of Richard Quatermayns and Thomas Walshyngham, collectors of tunnage and poundage’ or E 122/203/3 which dates from the reign of Henry VI (1422-1461, 1470-1471). This customs account contains a reference to a Greek merchant from Carlo’s domains, Dinos Kavalaropos, who played a role in the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusans.

\textsuperscript{169} ASN, APTM, Pergamene, XLVII.


\textsuperscript{171} Hereafter TNA.
Chapter One – The Tocco Family, Epiros, and the Wider Balkans

(1375-1448):

This chapter will survey the situation in the Balkans up to the accession of Carlo II Tocco (1429-1448) and will also place his reign in the context of the foundation of the Tocco lordship and the regime of Carlo I Tocco (1375-1429). Before that, though, it will look at the five main powers of the region with which Carlo II had to deal and interact: The Ottoman sultanate, the Kingdom of Hungary, the Republic of Ragusa, the Republic of Venice and the Kingdom of Naples.

The Ottomans:

The historiography of the late medieval Balkans has always been dominated by the rise of the Ottomans and their conquest of the region and it is often portrayed as an inexorable juggernaut. Edwin Pears (1835-1919), writing in the early twentieth century, viewed the Ottoman invasion of the Balkans as being part of a greater struggle in which the Tatars and Ottomans were part of a greater movement of the Asian hordes moving into Eastern Europe.¹ The Ottoman victory has been compared to that of the Mughals in India and of the Safavids in Iran. Both have been credited with using their nomadic tribal soldiers and gunpowder weapons in order to create a stable polity with a centralised bureaucracy, a strong military and the ability to collect taxes and maintain the rule of law.² Paul Wittek (1894-1978) regarded

¹ E. Pears, The Destruction of the Greek Empire and the Story of the Capture of Constantinople by the Turks (London & New York, 1908), 132.
the Balkan success as further evidence of the Ottoman adoption of the position of leaders of an Islamic jihad. Halil İnalcık (1916-2016) saw the process as the triumph of intelligent methods of conquest that were harnessed to defeat Christian powers to provide manpower for further victories. For Speros Vryonis Jr., Christian disunity was key with the Ottomans becoming adept at manipulating feuds and succession disputes.

All these historians could be accused of teleology. The conquest of the region was not necessarily inevitable as the Ottomans did not enjoy the unchallenged power that they seem to assume. Much of the Ottoman conquests of the Balkans in the fourteenth century are still very mysterious. Colin Imber suggests that this period is very much a ‘black hole’ and best left alone by modern historians as it may put them in the same position as sixteenth and seventeenth century Ottoman chroniclers who were guilty of projecting the views and concerns of their own period upon the history. A key example of this lack of clarity can be seen from the conquest of Adrianople, the location of the Sultan’s Porte until the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, of which there are four possible dates: 1361, 1362, 1367, and 1371. Irène Beldiceanu-Steinherr (1928-present) suggested that the city was first conquered in 1369

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by a force of Turks unaffiliated to the Ottoman Dynasty, and then it was later captured from them by the Ottoman State in 1376/77. Beldiceanu-Steinherr further illustrated the complexity of these conquests by suggesting that the occupation of Gallipoli in 1366 by Amadeo of Savoy (1343-1383), and the subsequent retention of this territory by the Byzantines until 1376, meant that the Ottoman lords and generals based within the Balkans were largely free from the authority of Murad I (1362-1389) and the Ottoman state in Anatolia. These conquests may therefore have been by those unaffiliated to the Ottoman state, or the work of the *uc begleri* (Ottoman ‘Marcher Lords’) who exercised a great deal of independence within the Ottoman domains. The extent to which these conquests were ‘Ottoman’ is therefore in question.

The conquests of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were often small-in-scale and targeted with precision. Heath Lowry argues that from the beginning the Ottoman conquests of the Balkans were heavily strategic. He illustrates this through analysis of the capture of the tower of Pythion on the Evros River by the *uc begi* Evrenos Beg. Due to its location between the settlements of Adrianople and Didymoteichon it provided a useful base from which to

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10 H., İnalcık, *The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600* (London, 1973), 104-105; C. Imber, *The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650* (Basingstoke & New York), 12.
11 The Evros river is now known as either the Meriç or Maritsa river.
attack both these cities and cut them off from one another, allowing for further expansion in the river valley and the wider region.\textsuperscript{12} The conquest of similar settlements and fortresses across the Balkans allowed the Ottomans to make inroads into new regions, allowing greater economic and political influence. A further example of this can be seen from the conquest of Valona and Gjirokaster in 1417, which gave the Ottomans access to the Ionian and Adriatic Seas and put them in a position to threaten the Venetian colonies in the region.\textsuperscript{13} Such conquests would continue well into the fifteenth century and, as this thesis shall illustrate, explain why the Tocco lordship lost its settlements incrementally to the Ottomans. In tangent with these strategically effective conquests, the Ottomans also attempted to bring the nobility of the region under their suzerainty. Though the Ottomans were not the first Turkic peoples to arrive in the Balkans, with groups such as the Szekler tracing their origin in the region back to Attila the Hun, they still remained a minority in the region.\textsuperscript{14} As such the role of the local nobility was necessary in shaping the administration of the early Ottoman polity, particularly as historians remain unsure as to the level of Turkish and Turkmen migration to the Balkans during this period.\textsuperscript{15} Through analysis of the \textit{Tahrir Defters}, cadastral surveys of the 15\textsuperscript{th} century Balkans, Lowry illustrates that a third of the Timariots, or fief holders, of the Ottoman domains were either local Christians or their offspring.\textsuperscript{16} This integration undoubtedly helped to maintain order in the region. The Ottomans would also introduce their own customs and


\textsuperscript{16} Lowry, \textit{The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans}, 7.
institutions such as İmâret (Soup Kitchens), Zâviyyes/Tekkes (Dervish Convents), and bath houses.\textsuperscript{17} Another method for bringing the rulers of the region under Ottoman influence was through terms of vassalage. Chapters two and six of this thesis shall give further analysis to the terms of Ottoman vassalage, though this practise allowed the Ottomans to exert influence over regions of the Balkans through a vassal. These vassals were required to pay tribute (the harac), provide military forces towards further Ottoman conquest, and attendance at the Ottoman Porte. Throughout this period the Ottomans were able to bring many rulers under their suzerainty including those in Epiros, such as Esau Buondelmonti (1385-1411) the ruler of Ioannina in 1386.\textsuperscript{18} The use of Balkan nobility would also remain of great importance to later conquests. It was often more profitable for the Ottomans to capture the strategically significant settlements of a region and demand the local nobility swear allegiance to their new suzerain, than to attempt to conquer the whole region outright. However, these vassals, such as Carlo II Tocco, could be unreliable and were often able to pursue their own economic and political relations outside of their suzerain’s influence.

Another major factor which may explain these limited conquests and use of vassalage was the phenomenon of succession crises which plagued the nascent Ottoman state in the early fifteenth century. The root cause of this, as Alderson states, was that the Ottomans had no clear laws of succession.\textsuperscript{19} Historically Turkish rulers had followed the same method of succession as was common in the Dar-al-Islam in which power passed to the eldest male member of the ruling family, which the anthropologist Jack Goody described as a ‘zigzag

\textsuperscript{17} Lowry, The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans, 65-106, 243-256, 260.  
\textsuperscript{18} C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 (Basingstoke & New York, 2009), 11.  
\textsuperscript{19} A. D. Alderson, The Structure of the Ottoman Dynasty (Oxford, 1956), 5, footnote 5.
pattern’ since it passed through brothers and nephews.\textsuperscript{20} However the Ottomans appear to have followed a different system, in which succession passed unbroken through the male line, largely from father to son, without resorting to a relative more distant than a brother, nephew, or first cousin.\textsuperscript{21} This was further complicated as notions of primogeniture and legitimacy did not apply, and any son of a reigning sultan, whether born to a wife or a concubine, could succeed his father, a custom found also among the Mongol marcher lords and other Turkoman and Turkish Lordships, such as the Aqquyunlu.\textsuperscript{22} This created a ‘free-for-all’ method of succession, which enabled the strongest sons to inherit while the less powerful were usually killed according to the laws of fratricide.\textsuperscript{23} Several Sultans attempted to influence their succession by placing the presumptive heir in the governorship closest to the capital, to allow them to succeed their father.\textsuperscript{24} Such organisation often allowed the Ottoman domains to avoid civil conflict, however the flaws in such succession were illuminated in the aftermath of the Battle of Ankara in July 1402. In this encounter the forces of the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid I Yıldırım (1389-1402) were defeated by Timur (1370-1405) and the sultan was captured and imprisoned.\textsuperscript{25} With Bayezid gone, his numerous sons fell to fighting each other for the succession during the Ottoman Interregnum of 1402-1413.\textsuperscript{26} As Colin Imber argues, that the lack of an agreed succession upon Bayezid’s death made civil war between his sons.

\textsuperscript{21} A. Alderson, 4.
\textsuperscript{22} Goody, 18-21; Alderson, 4-5. For further analysis of Aqquyunlu succession, see: J. E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu – Clan, Confederation, Empire (Salt Lake City UT, 1999), 19-20.
\textsuperscript{23} Alderson, 5.
\textsuperscript{24} Alderson, 8; Goody, 19-20.
\textsuperscript{25} Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo, Narrative of the Embassy of Ruy Gonzalez de Clavijo to the Court of Timour at Samarcand A.D. 1403-6, trans. C. R. Markham (London, 1859), 4.
\textsuperscript{26} For further analysis of the Interregnum, see: D. J. Kastritsis, The Sons of Bayezid – Empire Building and Representation in the Ottoman Civil War of 1402-13 (Leiden & Boston, 2007).
inevitable. The Interregnum resulted in the fragmentation which could have led to the total annihilation and disintegration of the Ottoman regime, in the way that those of the Carolingians and Mongols had and Timurids soon would. One by one the rival claimants rose and fell until 1413 when Mehmed I Çelebi (1413-1421) ascended to the Ottoman throne after he defeated and killed his rival Musa (1411-1413).

Despite ending the Interregnum and becoming the sole ruler of the Ottoman domains, Mehmed’s rule was by no means secure. In 1415 one of the heirs of Timur, Shahrukh (1405-1447), released one of his elder brothers Mustafa Çelebi (1380-1422) to revive the succession struggle, which happened to coincide with a major rebellion led by the Islamic scholar Şeyh Bedreddin (1359-1420). Both were eventually dealt with by Mehmed I. Bedreddin was captured and hanged, while Mustafa was chased off to Thessalonica where he was granted asylum by the Byzantine emperor, who promised not to release him during Mehmed’s lifetime. On his death in 1421, Mehmed was succeeded by his eldest surviving son, Murad II (1421-1444, 1446-1451) but that did not put an end to the problems. The new sultan was immediately faced with a challenge in the shape of his uncle Mustafa who was released from

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27 C. Imber, The Ottoman Empire, 1300-1650 (Basingstoke & New York, 2009), 16.
captivity by the Byzantine Emperors Manuel II and John VIII in the hope of further destabilising the Ottoman regime and sow further strife amongst their domains. Alderson believed that Mustafa’s claim to the Sultanate suggests an attempted revival of traditional Islamic succession. Murad disposed of his uncle quite quickly and laid siege to Constantinople in revenge in the summer of 1422. In response, the Byzantine played the succession card a second time, backing Murad’s younger brother Mustafa (Μουσταφόπουλος) in a bid for control of Bursa and Asia Minor. Murad had to break off the siege to track down and kill this latest threat. Another brother, still a babe in arms, had to be strangled in his cot.

Murad II reigned as the Ottoman sultan throughout the entirety of Carlo II’s reign, bar his resignation from the throne between the winter of 1444 and May 1446. Unlike his grandfather, Bayezid I Yıldırım (1389-1402), Murad did not share an interest in conquest or furthering the Ottoman domains, even though he dealt robustly with any threats. He was much more interested in art, architecture, literature, scientific debate, sodomy, and wine. He

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33 Alderson, 9.
35 Doukas, ed. Greco, 237, translation in Doukas, trans, Magoulias, 165.
was largely untroubled by succession issues partly because his eldest and favourite son, Alaeddin Ali Çelebi (1425 – 1443) died in 1443, leaving his second son Mehmed II (1444-1446, 1451-1481) as the obvious successor.\textsuperscript{38} Even so, the problem did not go away. The Byzantines acquired further pawns in the form of members of the Ottoman royal house, such as Orhan (d. 1453), a great-grandson of Bayezid, who could be released at any moment to stir dissension and rebellion. Equally Murad’s abdication and later reinstatement to the throne further illustrate the problems of the lack of Ottoman succession laws, and the influence Ottoman officials could therefore have over the empire.\textsuperscript{39} As Dimitris Kastritsis argues, the Ottomans would continue to they struggle with dynastic succession until the seventeenth century and even beyond.\textsuperscript{40}

Another important factor to consider when analysing the conquests of the Ottomans of this era in their military strength. Despite their eventual conquest of much of the Balkans, the Ottoman military forces were not unchecked and did suffer defeats against the Balkan lords. Perhaps most famous of these was Gjergj Kastrioti, or Scanderbeg, whom the future Pope Pius II (1458-1464), Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, described as having ‘defeated and destroyed many large Turkish squadrons’ and keeping the region ‘faithful to the Christian gospel’.\textsuperscript{41} The Tocco also had some success when fighting the Ottomans, as was seen on two separate occasions. In 1405/06 the \textit{uc begleri} Yusuf Beg, besieged the settlement of Vonitsa at the request Paul Spata, the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, 120.
\item \textsuperscript{39} Alderson, 5-6, 9.
\item \textsuperscript{40} Kastritsis, \textit{The Sons of Bayezid}, 4. Alderson even mentions the case in 1924 when the Ottoman dynasty was exiled from Turkish Republic in which it remained unclear as to who would rule if the family were invited back or later allowed to hold title of Caliph. The last Ottoman Caliph Abdulmecid II (1922-1924) faced opposition from his cousin and predecessor Mehmed VI (1918-1922), as both arguably had the right to return as either Sultan or Caliph. This would not be resolved until 1926 when Mehmed VI passed away. This further illustrates the problematic nature of succession in the house of Osman. Alderson, 16.
\item \textsuperscript{41} Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Europe (c. 1400-1458), trans. R. Brow, ed. N. Bisaha (Washington D.C., 2013), 114.
\end{itemize}
Albanian lord of Angelokastron and Naupaktos, but was heavily defeated by the Tocco forces and made peace with Carlo I Tocco. In 1413 Ercole Tocco, the eldest of Carlo I’s illegitimate sons, defeated an Ottoman force of four-hundred with only sixty of his own troops which illustrates that their forces were not always as advanced and successful as has been argued. Franz Babinger characterised Muard II’s reign was the beginning of a relentless conquest of the Balkan peninsula. However as the following chapter shall illustrate, Murad’s involvement in Eprios was not part of a general expansionist policy but a targeted intervention with a limited goal. Babinger’s interpretation of the Ottoman conquests under the reign of Murad II suggest that the Ottoman military was unchecked and misrepresents the nature of these conquests.

The Hungarians:

The Kingdom of Hungary, and its dual monarchy with Croatia (1102-1526), was described by Elizabeth Zachariadou as ‘the great power of the Balkans’. During the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth centuries it remained important to the political and economic life of central Europe and the Balkans. During the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century Hungary

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43 CT, 396 – 400.
44 Babinger states that upon Murad II’s ascension to the throne in July 1421 Ottoman power was ‘pushing relentlessly westward from the interior of the Balkan Peninsula’. Babinger, 3.
45 Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
47 For further analysis of the Hungarian economy, and the Florentine influence over it, see: K. Prajda, ‘Florentines’ Trade in the Kingdom of Hungary in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Centuries: Trade Routes, Networks, and Commodities’, The Hungarian Historical Review, vol. 6 (2017), 40-62.
was ruled by Sigismund of Luxembourg (1387-1437), who also held the titles of King of Germany (1411-137), King of Bohemia (1419-37), and Holy Roman Emperor (1433-1437). Sigismund was described by Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini as ‘a prince of remarkable wisdom and magnanimity […] but thoroughly unlucky in war.’\(^{48}\) Despite ruling over a significant amount of territory across central Europe, Sigismund was never able to utilise the entirety of his power against the Ottomans. Since his coronation in 1387, Hungary was beset by internal divisions between the competing claims to the throne, and he would not resolve this until 1404.\(^{49}\) Hungarian authority also came under threat in Dalmatia from the Venetians. The Dalmatian cities had come under Hungarian control during the reign of Louis the Great (1342-1382).\(^{50}\) Though in the mid-late fourteenth century the two had co-operated against the Ottomans, the economic and strategic value of these settlements to maintaining Venetian control over the Adriatic meant that conflict between the two was possible.\(^{51}\) In 1411 conflict between the Hungarians and Venetians broke out and would last for two years, until a peace treaty was signed in Rome.\(^{52}\) Despite signing a five year armistice the hostility between the two remained and problems flared up again in 1418-1419.\(^{53}\) Slowly over this period most of the Dalmatian coast returned under Venetian rule, with the major exception of the Republic

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\(^{48}\) Piccolomini, 53.


\(^{52}\) Engel, The Realm of St Stephen, 239.

\(^{53}\) Zachariadou, ‘Ottoman Diplomacy and the Danube Frontier’, 681.
of Ragusa. The greatest beneficiary of this conflict was undoubtedly the Ottomans. Zachariadou argues that despite the fragile unity of the Ottomans domains post-Interregnum Mehmed I was able to pursue a peaceful policy towards the Balkan lords, as the Hungarians and Venetians were unable to unite against him. Though perhaps not as damaging to Sigismund as the Hussite Wars, the divisions between Hungary and Venice allowed the Ottomans to recover and stabilise after the events of the Interregnum.

One of the defining factors of the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth century Balkans was the ever-present conflict between the Hungarians and the Ottomans for control of the region. Colin Imber argues that such conflict was inevitable as a result of the expansion of the Ottoman domains during the reign of Bayezid I, particularly after the First Battle of Kosovo when the Serbian lords were brought under Ottoman suzerainty. As the two powers came to border each other, regular raiding by both sides became common and generally resulted in ‘exhausting wars and meagre results’. This period saw several crusades launched against the Ottomans, the first of which was Nikopolis in 1396. In order to rally support Sigismund dispatched representatives across Christendom, notably to England France and Burgundy, and in 1395 he received official papal support. After assembling a force of Hungarians,

57 Engel, The Realm of St Stephen, 203.
Frenchmen, and Wallachs, Sigismund crossed the Danube into Bulgaria and besieged the settlement of Nikopolis.\(^{60}\) Bayezid I counterattacked and defeated the crusader force, the blame for this according to Chalkokondyles was the French contingent who ‘being impetuous and ignorant in most matters’ attacked before the rest of the army and were defeated.\(^{61}\) The outcome of the Battle of Nikopolis defined the relationship between the Hungarians and Ottomans, until the destruction of the Kingdom at the Battle of Mohács in 1526 as it proved to Hungary that they were unable to wage an offensive war against the Ottomans.\(^{62}\) They therefore adopted a defensive policy which relied upon the Balkan lords to the south for the defence of Hungary.

Due to this new force on its southern border the neighbouring lordship of Bosnia, Serbia and Wallachia became increasingly important to the defensive policy instituted by the Hungarian Kings. As Pál Engel states, it was necessary to either control or at least influence these lordship in order to employ them as a *cordon sanitaire* to protect Hungary from probable Ottoman raids and invasions.\(^{63}\) During the fourteenth century Louis the Great (1342-1382) had been able to assert Hungarian dominance over the region, however after the disastrous failure of the Crusade of Nicopolis in 1396 these lords were forced to accept Ottoman Suzerainty, ending the exclusive influence Hungary had held over them.\(^{64}\) The defeat at Ankara, and subsequent Interregnum, opened up the possibility to return them to Hungary’s

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\(^{60}\) Engel, *The Realm of St Stephen*, 203.


\(^{62}\) Engel, *The Realm of St Stephen*, 204.


sphere of influence. Sigismund was able to encourage Stefan Lazarević (1389-1427), the Despot of Serbia, and Mircea cel Bătrân (1386-1394/1397-1418), the Voivode of Wallachia, to return as his vassals. In an attempt to solidify the relationship both they were granted lands within Hungary, with Mircea receiving the Duchy of Făgăraș in Southern Transylvania along with the Castle of Bologa in the 1390’s, whereas Stefan received the regions of Mačva and Belgrade in 1411.\textsuperscript{65} Their attempts to influence Bosnia appear to have been much less successful, and it appears the cultural and religious differences along with a long-standing dislike for the Hungarian crown were responsible.\textsuperscript{66} Despite this Sigismund supported King Stephen Ostoja (1398-1404 and 1409-1418) in his attempt to regain the Bosnian throne, and attempted to pacify the troublesome Grand Duke of Bosnia, Hrvoje Vukčić Hrvantinić (1380-1416), in exchange for deploying Hungarian troops in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{67} A further method of securing the loyalty of these Balkan lords was to offer them membership of the Order of the Dragon. The order was founded in 1408 by Sigismund in order to defend the Hungarian royal house and the Catholic Church from threats.\textsuperscript{68} Devotion to the Catholic church appears to have been a secondary motivation as both Hrvoje and Stefan Lazarević, members of the Bosnian Church and Orthodox faith respectively, were members.\textsuperscript{69} Despite these generous grants these rulers would remain only partially within the Hungarian sphere of influence. In 1413, Lazarević agreed to accept the suzerainty to both Ottomans and Hungarians, in an attempt to avoid

\textsuperscript{66} Engel, \textit{The Realm of St Stephen}, 232-233.
\textsuperscript{67} Hrvoje was granted the lands of Pozega and the seigneur of Segsed. Engel, \textit{The Realm of St Stephen}, 234.
\textsuperscript{68} J. V. A. Fine, Jr., \textit{The Late Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest} (Ann Arbor MI, 1994), 465.
\textsuperscript{69} Engel, \textit{The Realm of St Stephen}, 223; Fine, 465.
conflict with either of his neighbours.\textsuperscript{70} Despite largely being on good terms Mircea of Wallachia, followed his own foreign agenda and even asked Władysław III of Poland (1434-1444) for support incase Sigismund decided to attack his domains.\textsuperscript{71} These cases further illustrate how fluid many of the allegiances held by the Balkan Lords were, often serving multiple suzerains. As chapter six of this thesis shall illustrate, such multiple competing relationships gave greater political power and diplomatic influence to the small Balkan lordships.

The Hungarians were involved in two further crusades against the Ottomans during the 1440’s: Varna (1444) and Kosovo (1448). After the crusade of Nikopolis, the Hungarians attempted to court the Beyliks of Karaman in an attempt to unify anti-Ottoman opposition.\textsuperscript{72} During the Crusade of Varna the Karamanids would help the crusaders by attacking the Ottoman possessions in Anatolia.\textsuperscript{73} At the same time, as this thesis shall show, that several of the Balkan lords, including Carlo II Tocco, broke their Ottoman vassalage.\textsuperscript{74} Despite this the crusade of Varna ended in defeat for the crusader army and King Władysław of Hungary and Poland (1440-1444) was slain.\textsuperscript{75} Nikolay Antov argues that the failure of the crusade of Varna

\textsuperscript{70} Fine, 522; J. D. Tracy, \textit{Balkan Wars – Habsburg Croatia, Ottoman Bosnia, and Venetian Dalmatia, 1499-1617} (Lanham MD & London, 2016), 31.

\textsuperscript{71} Engel, \textit{The Realm of St Stephen}, 233.


\textsuperscript{73} Imber, \textit{The Crusade of Varna}, 1.

\textsuperscript{74} Nicol, Eptros II, 207. At the same time the city of Srebrenica was seized from the Ottomans by the Bosnian King Stjepan Tomaš. E. O. Filipović, ‘Exurge igitur miles Christi, et in barbarous viriliter pugna … The Anti-Ottoman activities of Bosnian King Stjepan Tomaš (1443-1461)’, \textit{Holy War in Late Medieval and Early Modern East-Central Europe}, ed. J. Smołucha, J. Jefferson, and A. Wadas (Krakow, 2017), 201-242, at 213.

\textsuperscript{75} Piccolomini, 87.
ultimately sealed the fate of both the Balkans and Byzantium.\textsuperscript{76} Merely nineteen days after Carlo II Tocco died a Hungarian army under the command of János Hunyadi (1446-1453), the Regent-Governor of Hungary, fought the Ottomans at the Second Battle of Kosovo. As Mark Whelan argues, the Second Battle of Kosovo, and its related sources, have received less analysis than some of the other major events of the fifteenth century, in part because it is sandwiched between the Crusade of Varna and the Fall of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{77} This battle ended in another defeat for the Hungarians, and according to Jonathan Riley-Smith this led to the decimation of Hungarian military power.\textsuperscript{78} Perhaps the most significant outcome of these crusades did not concern the Hungarians but the Ottomans. According to Antov, the outcome of these crusades was that the Ottomans were able to furnish a sense of purpose and allowed them to construct a world-historical role and inspire, justify, and legitimise the strengthening and consolidation of their authority.\textsuperscript{79}

**The Venetians:**

The city-state of Venice had been a maritime empire ever since its doge agreed the terms of the *Partitio terrarum imperii Romaniae* with the participants of the Fourth Crusade in 1204, leading to the acquisition of Crete, Negroponte and other valuable islands and ports.\textsuperscript{80} By the


\textsuperscript{80} The full text of the treaty can be found in: A. Carile, ‘Partitio Terrarium Imperii Romanae’, SV, vol. 7 (1965), 125-305, at 217-222.
beginning of the fifteenth century the Venetians held much of the Adriatic coast, including ports such as Zara (Zadar) and islands extending as far south as Kythira. These islands and settlements could provide necessary economic resources and were of great strategic value, both protecting the city and its merchants.\textsuperscript{81} The most important of these holdings was undoubtedly the Island of Corfu.\textsuperscript{82} Not only could this island provide a source of food for the Venetians but it occupied a strategically important location.\textsuperscript{83} Along with the other Ionian Islands it sat upon the major trade route between the Venetian possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean and the city itself, the first in a chain of links of the annual voyages of the Venetian merchants galleys to Alexandria, Constantinople, London and Bruges, hence the Venetians affectionately terming it their ‘door’.\textsuperscript{84} As with most of Epiros and the other Ionian Islands, Corfu was granted to Venice in the \textit{Partitio Terrarium Imperii Romaniae}, but it would not be until 1386 that they would acquire the island by purchasing it for 30,000 ducats from a claimant to the kingdom of Naples.\textsuperscript{85}

It was of vital economic necessity for Venice to retain control over these Adriatic holdings to make sure that passing Venetian shipping was free from tariffs and piracy. Moreover, despite controlling Corfu, the Venetians further desired to control the other Ionian


\textsuperscript{83} For evidence of grain on Corfu, see: DAD, Diversa Notariae XXI, f. 121; KrD, no. 903, p. 314.


\textsuperscript{85} \textit{Partitio Terrarium Imperii Romaniae}, 219-220. Their control over the island would be confirmed by ceremony in 1394. Gertwagen, \textit{Corfu}, 201.

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Islands of Ithaca, Kephalonia, Leukas, and Zakynthos. When these islands came under the control of the Tocco family in the late fourteenth century, it helped to create a tense relationship and to reduce Venetian influence in the region. It would not be until 1483 that the Venetians would finally acquire more of the Ionian Islands, notably Kephalonia and Zakynthos, on the death of Antonio Tocco, possibly due to Venetian involvement.\textsuperscript{86} As in the case of the Ottomans, however, Venetian power should not be overestimated. The republic’s presence in the Adriatic was characterised by Peter Lock into four separate phases: 1) pre-1204, 2) 1204-1261, 3) 1261-1388, and 4) 1377-1718.\textsuperscript{87} The distinctive feature of this fourth and final phase was that the Venetians were apparently the only power in the region able to mount opposition to the Ottomans, as illustrated by their initiative in the various naval leagues during this period.\textsuperscript{88} Lock’s interpretation along with previous studies of Venetian power within the Adriatic and the Balkans have suggested that Venice had extensive control and influence in the region, at least by the standards of the time.\textsuperscript{89} These interpretations, in combination with the various justifications and myths used by the Venetians to legitimise their control over the Adriatic Sea, have helped to further inflate our perception of Venetian political power in the region.\textsuperscript{90} Though Venice undoubtedly held an important economic role in the Balkans and the Adriatic and Ionian Seas, this did not always translate into political

\textsuperscript{86} Miller, LiL, 487; Nicol, Epiros II, 213.
\textsuperscript{87} P. Lock, The Franks in the Aegean 1204-1500 (Harlow & New York, 1995), 135-160.
\textsuperscript{88} Lock, 159-160.
\textsuperscript{90} For further analysis of these historical justifications see: F. de Vivo, ‘Historical Justifications of Venetian Power in the Adriatic’, Journal of the History of Ideas, vol. 64 (2003), 159-176.
power within the region.\footnote{For further analysis of Venice’s role in Bosnia, see: M. Šunjić, \textit{Bosna i Venecija (odnosi u XIV. i XV. st.)} (Sarajevo, 1996). The Venetian Ducat appears to have been the preferred currency of Carlo II’s lordship, as seen from the ‘Barges Agreement’ in which the price for the cereals is fixed in Venetian Ducats and Solidi. DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274 ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.} The fractious relationship between the Tocco and the Venetian authorities illustrates this lack of Venetian influence in the region.

**Republic of Ragusa:**

Although Venice had acquired much of the Adriatic coast by 1400, the city state of Ragusa remained robustly independent. It had become the main port on the Eastern side of the Adriatic Sea and one of the three major economic powers of the region, alongside Venice and the city of Ancona, and so their economic rival.\footnote{For analysis of the development of Ragusa before it came under Hungarian suzerainty in 1358 see: F. W. Carter, ‘The Early Development of a Pre-Industrial City’, \textit{The Slavonic and East European Review}, vol. 47 (1969), 355-368.} Although the height of Ragusan success was to come in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, termed by Mirkovich as the ‘glorious period’, the foundations of this success had already begun to develop by the mid-fifteenth century.\footnote{Mirkovich states that the ‘glorious period’ lasted from 1510-1667. N. Mirkovich, ‘The Republic of Ragusa in the Age of Discoveries’, \textit{Bulletin of the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences in America}, vol. 1 (1943), 440-447, at 447.} As with these other city republics, the prosperity of Ragusa was entirely based on trade.\footnote{F. W. Carter, \textit{Dubrovnik (Ragusa) – A classic city state} (London & New York, 1972), 135.} Most of this trade was based around the Adriatic Sea and the Balkan hinterland and, according to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, this helped to turn Ragusa into the most prominent city in the region.\footnote{Chalkokondyles, vol. 2, 436.} One of the key roles played by Ragusan merchants in this period was their...
ability to act as a conduit for trade between Italy and the inland Balkans, notably Bulgaria and Serbia. Though this originally began as a result of Venetian attempts to limit the city’s maritime power, during their occupation of the city (1205-1358), once this trade proved profitable it became the bedrock of the economic policy of the Ragusan Republic. This success according to Obolensky and Krekić, was due to the dual identity of the city and its people, part-Latin, part-Slav. However both Carter and Stuard are sceptical of this claim, arguing that culturally the city had a much stronger Italian influence, best seen through the linguistic culture of the Ragusan elite who used an Italian dialect. Stuard calls this dialect ‘Old Ragusan’, and it came increasingly to differ from the vernacular used in the city.

Regardless of the culture of its patricians, Ragusa clearly had a unique influence over trade in the Adriatic and Balkans, to such an extent that, according to the anthropologist David Rheubottom, the flow of trade into Ragusa was so great that there was no need for the authorities to tax its own citizen’s income.

While Ottoman and Venetian power and influence in the region seems to have been exaggerated at times by secondary work, the power of Ragusa has been downplayed. The fifteenth century heralded the beginning of Ottoman influence over Ragusa and the slow decline of Hungarian suzerainty. As he did with the Tocco Lordship, Murad II had been

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100 Officially Ragusa would not cease to recognise Hungarian sovereignty over their city until after the Battle of Mohács in 1526. Carter, A Classic City State, 198-199.
able to exploit the divisions amongst the various rulers of the region to further Ottoman interests, particularly in neighbouring Bosnia. Carter and Miller have claimed that in the 1430s Southern Bosnia came under Turkish suzerainty and in 1436 Sarajevo, then called Vrhbosna, was captured by Murad II and became the Ottoman headquarters in the region. However, Fine and Mladenovic have argued that this assertion is incorrect and that these towns did not officially come under Ottoman control until a later conflict between 1448 and 1451, suggesting that, as with Epiros, the actual extent of Ottoman control appears to have been overstressed by previous historiography. At best they had nominal control over the region as a result of their influence in the dynastic struggles between the illegitimate sons of Tvrtko I (1377-1391), Ostoja (1398-1404 and 1409-1418) and Tvrtko II (1404-1409 and 1421-1443). When Tvrtko II finally regained control of the Bosnian throne in 1421 it was as the result of the support of the Ottomans, though when his loyalty towards them waned they supported a rival, Radivoj (1432-1435), and used this threat to turn Tvrtko into a tributary vassal of the Sultan. Another example of this came through the Ottoman influence over the Grand Dukes of Bosnia, Sandalj Hranić (1392-1435) and Stjepan Vukčić Kosača (1435-1466), both of whom played an important role regarding the relationship between Ragusa and the Ottomans, as their domains bordered those of the city.

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103 This influence was not unique to the Ottomans, with both Hungary and Ragusa backing various candidates for the throne in the early-mid fifteenth century. Fine, 463-471.
105 A large aspect of this related to control over Konavli, to the south of Ragusa. Sandalj sold the eastern part of Konavli to the city in 1419 to raise money during the succession conflict, they also purchased the western half of Konavli and the town Cavtat from another Bosnian noble, Radoslav Pavlović, in 1426/1427. Stjepan reconquered Konavli in 1451 with the permission of Mehmet II. Fine, 470-471, 486, 580 ; Mladenovic, 221.
There can be no doubt that the Ottomans were becoming a greater power in the region. The Ragusan authorities, therefore, had to adapt to these circumstances and found themselves interacting increasingly with the Ottomans. As a trading city, Ragusa’s neighbours provided the main market and it was important to maintain these links in order to preserve its prosperity. As a result of the Council of Basel in December 1433, with help from King Sigismund of Hungary, Ragusa’s unique position was recognised by the Papacy and they were granted the right to trade with the Ottoman Empire. This meant that the expansion of Ottoman power in Bosnia did little economic damage to Ragusa and the disruption to the city’s finances was minimal. According to Sugar, this also proved to be of use to the Ottomans as it provided the only real outlet in the Adriatic for the goods from their inland Balkan provinces. However there was tension between Ragusa and the Ottomans throughout this period. It resulted from Ragusa’s attempts to avoid paying the Harač, a tax levied on the Christian vassals of the Ottomans, and its reluctance to accept dhimmi status. In September 1440 an Ottoman emissary arrived in the city demanding the payment of the Harač, claiming that historically the city had paid tribute to Mehmed I. As Harris states this was a falsification by the Ottomans and the response of the Ragusan authorities to the demand made that clear. As a result of their refusal, all the Ragusan merchants in the Ottoman domains

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108 Harris, *Dubrovnik*, 81-82; Sugar, 174-179.
110 Harris, *Dubrovnik*, 83.
and those of their vassals, in particular Serbia and the domains of Stjepan Vukčić, were imprisoned, forcing the Ragusan authorities to come to terms with the Sultan in February 1442.\textsuperscript{111} The treaty produced stated that Ragusa would pay an annual tribute of silver worth a thousand ducats in exchange for the confirmation of privileges, including the freedom of trade and traffic for Ragusan merchants in the Ottoman domains, and the imposition of a two per cent customs duty.\textsuperscript{112} Nevertheless de Groot argues that the Ragusan-Ottoman relationship between 1430 and 1458 was still a bilateral agreement between two independent states, one a major power and one a minor, rather than that of a haraçağüzär, a tax or tribute paying vassalage agreement, relationship as seen post 1458.\textsuperscript{113} The Republic of Ragusa’s use of clever and subtle diplomacy alongside economic influence and power allowed it to maintain its independence from the Ottomans as described by the Italian scholar Francesco Maria Appendini (1768-1837).\textsuperscript{114} The history of Ragusa illustrates the ability of the smaller states of the region to remain successful in spite of the economic and military power of others. It would become the closest ally of the Tocco lordship during Carlo II’s reign.

Angevin Naples:

The Tocco family and their lordship stem from the Kingdom of Naples while it was under Angevin rule.\textsuperscript{115} In 1265, at the urging of the Papacy, Charles, count of Anjou had invaded the

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\item Carter, \textit{A Classic City State}, 200 ; De Groot, 581.
\item De Groot, 581.
\item F. M. Appendini, \textit{Notizie Istorico-critiche sulle antichità, Storia e Letteratura de’Ragusei} (Dubrovnik, 1802), 157. An English translation of this passage can be found in: R. Harris, \textit{Dubrovnik – A History} (London, 2006), 18.
\item Zečević illustrates this in her long-term analysis of the family. Zečević, TGR, 11-45.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Kingdom of Sicily. After defeating and killing the Hohenstaufen King Manfred (1258-1266) and executing the young Conradin (1254-1266), the Angevins replaced the Hohenstaufens as the rulers of the Island of Sicily and Southern Italy, with Charles as king (1266-1285). However, this would not last, due to the rebellion of the Sicilian Vespers and the subsequent war (1282-1302). By the treaty of Caltabellotta, Sicily and Naples were divided between Frederick II of Aragon (1296-1337) and the Angevin Charles II (1285-1309). The Aragonese took Sicily and the Angevins would rule over Naples and southern Italy for well over a century but their control over the region remained turbulent.

When they took over the kingdom of Naples in 1266, the Angevins inherited the old dream of the Norman rulers of the area to extend their rule across the Adriatic in the former Byzantine Balkans. The previous Hohenstaufen regime had held Corfu and from the beginning of 1267, Charles I was in control of the island. In February 1272, he extended his rule to the mainland when he took over the port of Dyrrhachium and had himself proclaimed king of Albania. Another route into the Balkans was Charles I’s alliance with William Villehardouin (1246-1278), the Prince of Achaia. Due to the success of the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos (1259-1282), William turned to the Neapolitans for support against this threat. The alliance was confirmed through a marriage alliance between Charles’

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117 Runciman, 115-116, 277 ; Zečević, TGR, 12-13.
118 For further analysis of the Norman campaigns in the Balkans, see: G. Theotokis, The Norman Campaigns in the Balkans 1081-1108 (Woodbridge, 2016).
120 Fine, 168 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 11-20.
son Philip (1255/1256-1277) and William’s daughter Isabelle.\textsuperscript{121} Charles I provided strong military support, described by Fine as ‘Byzantium’s Nemesis’, and brought the principality into the Angevin sphere of influence.\textsuperscript{122} Despite Philip never succeeding as prince of Achaia, the Angevin rulers retained their claim to the Principality of Achaia, one which they never forgot.\textsuperscript{123} It would be further pushed by Philip I prince of Taranto (1278-1332), who first brought the Tocco family to the region and would also retain the titular title of the Latin Emperor.\textsuperscript{124} It was during the reign of his successor Robert II of Taranto (1332-1364) that the Tocco would receive the Ionian Islands which had first been brought into the Neapolitan sphere during Charles I’s reign.\textsuperscript{125}

The beginning of the end of Angevin influence in the Balkans can be traced to the reign of Queen Joanna II (1414-1435). When she fell out with Pope Martin V, she found herself facing a papally-backed rival for the throne in the person of Louis III Anjou (1403-1434). Bereft of allies, in July 1421 Joanna pronounced that Alfonso V Trastámara, King of Aragon and Sicily, should become her adopted heir and champion.\textsuperscript{126} She later repented of her action and, after quarrelling with Alfonso, she disinherited him in 1423. Louis III of Anjou assumed the role of successor until his death a year before Joanna. Upon her death, Louis’ brother René (1435-1442) became King of Naples, but Alfonso of Aragon had no intention of relinquishing the claim he had received from Joanna II. A succession crisis enveloped the Kingdom, which

\textsuperscript{121} Fine, 168.
\textsuperscript{122} Fine, 234.
\textsuperscript{123} Nicol, Epiros II, 33.
\textsuperscript{124} Fine, 234, 236-237, 239-241, 248, 254, 258, 262.
\textsuperscript{125} Zečević, TGR, 14-16.
brought other Italian powers into the conflict notably the Genoese and the Milanese. After seven long years of fighting Alfonso would eventually succeed and confirm his rule over Naples, capturing the city on 2 June 1442, and bringing Angevin rule to an end.127 The Tocco clients of the Angevin regime were now robbed of their former protectors.

**Alfonso the Magnanimous and his Balkan Strategy:**

Alfonso V Trastámara, known better by the sobriquet ‘the Magnanimous’, held many titles, including: King of Aragon (1416-1458), King of Sicily (1416-1458), and King of Naples (1442-1458). Despite ruling over domains which spanned across the Mediterranean, according to Alan Ryder he transformed in his mid-career from a Spaniard to an Italian.128 As King of Naples, he played an active role in the politics of Italy and the wider Mediterranean and would utilise his position to become a major geopolitical force. An important feature of his reign was his Balkan strategy. As previously stated, Alfonso was not the first ruler of Naples to have such a strategy, with the Angevin King Robert the Wise (1309-1343) recently adopting a similar path. Thus, Alfonso was following in the footsteps of many of his Angevin and Norman predecessors.129 There was a difference though, for Alfonso’s interest in the lands across the Adriatic did not arise solely from rulership of Sicily and later Naples. As king of Aragon, he considered himself to have a claim to the old Catalan duchy of Athens.130 Obviously the major obstacle towards fulfilling these ambitions was the Ottoman sultanate,

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127 Runciman suggests that Alfonso took control of the Kingdom in 1435. Runciman, 278-279.
so Alfonso presented himself as the Christian champion against the infidel foe. His motivations appear to match very neatly those of the protagonist of the fifteenth century romantic novel ‘Tirant lo Blanc’ in which Tirant is asked by the aging Emperor of the Greeks to defend his realm against the oncoming Muslim invaders. He undoubtedly saw himself as one of the major forces to counteract the Ottoman advances in the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. According to Peter Garretson, Aragon’s conflict with the Turks was motivated by the context of the Reconquista, and due a lack of border with Granada turned its crusading energies towards the Eastern Mediterranean. Alfonso was also called to participate in the crusade of Varna, as is recorded in a letter to Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini (1398-1444) in September 1444, but appears to have pursued another strategy. Alfonso sought to bring many of the vassals of the Balkans under his influence, particularly those on the Eastern Adriatic. The three most important of his vassals were undoubtedly the Albanian leader Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg, Stepjan Vukčić Kosača, grand duke of Bosnia (1435-1466), and Carlo II Tocco. Alfonso not only provided them with soldiers to defend their realm, but also attempted to bring these lords under his sphere of influence. As Donald Nicol suggests.

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this made Carlo II, as well as the other Balkan lords, a ‘beneficiary of Alfonso’s imperialist scheme’.\textsuperscript{135}

**The Economics of the Balkans:**

It is equally important to understand the economic situation within the Adriatic and Balkans during the time of the Tocco lordship. This study shall first turn to the impact of the Ottoman conquest upon the economics of the region. The Ottoman conquests could prove disruptive such as in the case of Bosnia where, as Filipović illustrates, it appears to have led to significant depopulation.\textsuperscript{136} However, Lowry argues that despite the Ottoman conquests often resulting in the disruption of trade and commerce, they were followed with economic development and did not spell the end for the economic urban life of the region.\textsuperscript{137} A key example he utilises is that of Serres (Siroz) in Macedonia, which developed during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries into an important market town and centre for the production of silk and leather.\textsuperscript{138} The Ottomans often developed the urban centres of their domains as it allowed them to consolidate and extend the power of the Ottoman state and maximise sources of revenue, in what could be described as an economic policy.\textsuperscript{139} After the Battle of Ankara, the Balkans

\begin{itemize}
\item Nicol, Epiros II, 208. Neapolitan influence over both Skanderbeg and Carlo II are mentioned by Piccolomini. Piccolomini, 111, 114. For further analysis of the relationship between Skanderbeg and Alfonso, see: Fine, 558 ; A. Ryder, *Alfonso the Magnanimous – King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily*, 1396-1458 (Oxford, 1990), 294, 301-305, 408, 412, 414-415, 417 ; Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples*, 267, 274, 314. Kosača was also made a member of the Virgin’s Order by Alfonso, further aligning him into the Neapolitan sphere of influence. Fine, 483, 577.
\item Lowry, *The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans*, 207, 259. Zachariadou also supports this assertion as it also occurred in the Aegean Sea during the fourteenth century. Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade*, 125.
\item Lowry, *The Shaping of the Ottoman Balkans*, 152-168.
\end{itemize}
became the backbone of the Ottoman Empire and developed as Anatolia had before it. As they further expanded into the region, their economic impact increased. By the 1430’s, once they had made further inroads into Albania and Epiros after the conquest of Thessalonica, Ragusa became increasingly dependent upon the Ottomans for matters of trade and regional policy. Despite the geographical isolation of many coastal cities in Albania, Dalmatia, and Epiros, due to the Dinarica Alps and Pindos Mountains, they were still able to access the Balkan interior. The Via Egnati, the old Roman road linking Dyracchium to Constantinople retained an important economic role into the Late Middle Ages allowing goods to flow from the central Balkans into the Adriatic. The economics of both the Adriatic and Balkans were heavily intertwined, and the influence of the cities of Ancona, Ragusa, and Venice were important to trade within the region. However as Goldthwaite has illustrated the Florentines were also heavily involved in the region, often working through the Anconans, Ragusans and Florentines, or the Latin Lordships such as the Duchy of Athens and Despotate of Arta. Venice undoubtedly remained the economic power of the region and its currency was utilised by the other lordships of the Balkans. According to Halil İnalcık, by the

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140 H. İnalcık, ‘The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600’, An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300-1914, ed. H. İnalcık and D. Quataert (Cambridge, 1994), 9-410, at 256. For further analysis of the development of Bursa by the Ottomans in the fourteenth century, see: H. İnalcık, ‘Bursa and the Commerce of the Levant’, Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient, vol. 3 (1960), 131-147; İnalcık, The Ottoman Empire, 121-126.

141 İnalcık, ‘The Ottoman State’, 257-258.


145 This was certainly the case for the the Barges agreement with the Ragusan authorities where the price for the cereals was fixed in Venetian ducats and solidi. DA, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
fifteenth century the Ottomans were able to bring about the economic unification of the Balkans.  

Another key aspect of the economics of the region was the trade in cereals. The Balkans were part of the wider Eastern Mediterranean trade system which extended from Cyprus to Sicily and included most of the urban centres of the Balkans. The three major sources of grain in the Eastern Mediterranean, according to Fleet were: Thrace, the Black Sea, and the Ottoman possessions in Anatolia. For city states, such as Ragusa and Venice, who were unable to grow enough cereals within their own domains this trade was of vital importance to the survival of their city and its wider possessions. For those lordships who could produce their own cereals, this trade could prove to be a valuable source of income and allowed for greater economic and political influence as seen from the Gattilusio and Tocco lordships. A key example of this can be seen from the strategy employed by Bayezid I against the Venetians in the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries. Wheat from Anatolia

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146 İnalçık, ‘The Ottoman State’, 258-259.


150 The Gattilusio were also involved in this grain trade, with shipments leaving their possessions of Ainos and Phokaia towards Crete and beyond. C. Wright, The Gattilusio Lordships and the Aegean World 1355-1462 (Leiden & Boston MA, 2014), 209.
was vital to the survival of not only Venice but the entire Po river valley.\textsuperscript{151} As a result the Ottomans could demand concessions from the Venetians and either increase the price or stop the shipment of cereals.\textsuperscript{152} During the reign of Bayezid I, shipments of grain from the old Emirates of Aydin and Menteshe were discontinued which inflated the price.\textsuperscript{153} Those who could provide cereal held significant power in the region and were able to utilise it for their own economic and political influence.

Another key aspect of the economy of the Balkans was undoubtedly mining. The Balkans contained substantial metal deposits, notably of gold, iron, lead, mercury and silver. Mining in the Balkans appears to have increased during the thirteenth century onwards, particularly in Bosnia, Serbia, and Transylvania.\textsuperscript{154} The local rulers often recruited technical experts to supervise the development of these mines, usually turning to the Saxons from Hungary.\textsuperscript{155} The Republic of Ragusa played an important role in the development and trade of these metals. Their role in the transportation of these metals is mentioned as one of the factors behind the success of Ragusa, by the fifteenth century Ragusan merchant Benedetto

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\item \textsuperscript{151} H., İnalçık, \textit{The Ottoman Empire, the Classical Age, 1300-1600} (London, 1973), 134.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Zachariadou illustrates that the price of grain from Anatolia actually dropped after the Battle of Ankara, despite the devastation of the region by Timur’s army which illustrates how high Bayezid had chosen to set the price. Zachariadou, \textit{Trade and Crusade}, p. 164, footnote 685.
\item \textsuperscript{155} J. V. A. Fine, Jr., \textit{The Early Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Sixth to the Late Twelfth Century} (Ann Arbor MI, 1991), 5; J. V. A. Fine, Jr., \textit{The Late Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest} (Ann Arbor MI, 1994), 283; T. Stoianovich, \textit{Balkan Worlds – The First and Last Europe} (Oxford & New York, 1994), 89.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Due to its location, and possible dual identity, the city was able to act as a conduit between the Italian city states and the inland Balkans and dominated the Adriatic trade. Such a relationship was beneficial to both sides as the Balkan rulers received increased wealth and power, and the Ragusans could monopolise the export of these materials. The increased wealth in Serbia also allowed an increase in the sale of western imports which further benefited the Ragusan merchants. The Ragusans also began to establish and maintain colonies all over the region, most importantly in the town of Srebrenica which had developed into an important mining town. Ragusan influence over this trade was so great that they often served as the contractors, financiers, customs officials, and owners of the mines and the Ragusan currency eventually became the medium of exchange. Though merchants from other city states and lordships would become involved in the trade the Ragusan merchants would remain the dominant force in the Balkan hinterland. Despite there being some decline in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, mining undoubtedly played a significant role within economics of the Balkans and helped the city of Ragusa develop into the regional economic power it was.

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157 Krekić, *Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th centuries*, 23-24, 31; Obolensky, 41, 324.
158 Krekić, *Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th centuries*, 20-22.
159 Krekić, *Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th centuries*, 21.
160 Rheubottom, 20.
161 Rheubottom, 20-21.
162 For further analysis of the Venetians in this trade, see: B. Bojović, ‘Entre Venise et l’Empire ottoman, les métaux précieux des Balkans (XVe-XVIe siècle)’, *Annale. Historie, Sciences Socieales*, vol. 60 (2005), 1277-1297.
163 Stoianovich, *Balkan Worlds*, 89.
The Tocco Family:

The Tocco family are said to have originated from castellum di Tocco, near the city of Benevento in the Kingdom of Naples.\(^{164}\) They came though the turbulent years that plagued southern Italy, largely by staying close to the Guelf faction during the Angevin-Hohenstaufen conflict over the Kingdom of Naples.\(^{165}\) The first of the Tocco to arrive in the Balkans was Carlo II’s great grandfather Guglielmo Tocco (d. 1335), who served as Captain General of Corfu in the 1330s, on behalf of Philip I, Prince of Taranto.\(^{166}\) Although Guglielmo was the first of the family to arrive in the Balkans, it is to his son, Leonardo I Tocco (1357-1375), that the origins of the Tocco lordship can be traced. In 1357 Robert II of Taranto granted Leonardo I the lands of the County Palatine of Kephalonia, Ithaka, and Zakynthos.\(^{167}\) During Leonardo I’s reign, he extended the Tocco possessions by acquiring the island of Leukas and, arguably most importantly, the city of Vonitsa on the Akarnanian mainland.\(^{168}\) Sometime in 1375, Leonardo I Tocco died leaving his infant son Carlo I Tocco (1375-1429) as his heir to the lordship.\(^{169}\) As Carlo was still a minor, his early reign was dominated by the role of his mother and regent Magdalena Buondelmonti who, according to Chrysostomides, was one of the three most outstanding women of the fourteenth and fifteenth century Balkans.\(^{170}\) During her regency she maintained her son’s domains from Albanian invasions and travelled to Naples to have her son’s lands confirmed by the Angevin Queen Joanna I (1343-1382).\(^{171}\) Magdalena was also

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165 Nicol, Epiros II, 138; Zečević, TGR, 21-22.
167 Miller, LiI, 292; Nicol, Epiros II, 138; Zečević, TGR, 33.
168 Miller, LiI, 292; Nicol, Epiros II, 138; Zečević, TGR, 33.
169 CT, 220.
171 CT, 220-228.
regent during one of the most significant moments in Carlo I’s reign, the renunciation of his Venetian citizenship and his adoption of Genoese citizenship instead.\textsuperscript{172} This event also occurred around Magdalena’s imposition of a tariff (\textit{pedagium}) on any ships using the channel of Santa Mavra, between the island of Leukas and the Akarnanian mainland.\textsuperscript{173} Though this dispute was eventually resolved, with Carlo I regaining his Venetian citizenship in April 1392, it caused friction between the Tocco lordship and the Venetian authorities which continued throughout Carlo I and Carlo II’s reigns.\textsuperscript{174}

Upon his reaching maturity Carlo I Tocco appears to have sought to conquer territory in Greece and the Balkans, expanding from the original basis laid by his father and forging the lordship over which Carlo II and Leonardo III would rule. The expansion of the Tocco domains came quickly. The first acquisition was the fortress of Acrocorinth in 1394, through the inheritance of Carlo I’s wife Francesca Acciaiuoli.\textsuperscript{175} A further gain in the Morea followed in 1407 when Carlo I’s brother, Leonardo II Tocco, captured the town of Glarentza from the prince of Achaea, Centurione II Zaccaria.\textsuperscript{176} Though they were unable to hold the city for long on that occasion, the Tocco regained control of Glarentza in 1421 by purchasing it from an

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{173} ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, XXXVIII, ff. 27-27r ; XLI, f. 199r ; ThR, vol. 1, nos. 645, 782, pp. 157, 188.
\item \textsuperscript{174} ASV, Secretae Consilium Rogatorum, E, f. 80r ; ThR, vol. 1, no. 829, pp. 197-198
\item \textsuperscript{175} J. Chrysostomides, ‘Corinth 1394-1397: some new facts’, \textit{Byzantina}, vol. 7 (1975), 83-110.
\item \textsuperscript{176} CT, 258-268.
\end{itemize}
Italian adventurer called Liveri.\textsuperscript{177} It would later be lost in conflict with the Despotate of the Morea.

The first military expansion into Epiros by the Tocco forces came in 1399 when they attacked the Bay of Zaverda (Zaberda).\textsuperscript{178} This was followed with the capture of the Tower of Katochi, on the Acheloos River, and the Akarnanian settlements of Barnako and Kandeles.\textsuperscript{179} At some point between 1404 to 1406 the city of Dragamesto, now called Astakos, was also acquired followed by the city of Riniasa to the north which belonged to a local lord called Ipi kerni.\textsuperscript{180} The final settlement in Akarnania that came under the influence of the Tocco was that of Angelokastron in July 1408.\textsuperscript{181} The remaining conquests included the two major cities of the region, Ioannina and Arta which came under their control in 1411 and 1416 respectively.\textsuperscript{182} It is unclear when several of the settlements held by the Tocco during the reign of Carlo II, such as Kordobitsa and Efteleia both of which are mentioned in the ‘Barges Agreement’, came under the control of the Tocco but were probably tied to the conquests of the region.\textsuperscript{183} The expansion of the Tocco lordship relied upon several figures. According to the Athenian chronicler Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Carlo was able to conquer Epiros with the support of his three companions Rosso, Guido and Meliaresi who, according to the editor

\textsuperscript{177} CT, 480-488.
\textsuperscript{178} CT, 232 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 169.
\textsuperscript{179} CT, 234-236 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 170.
\textsuperscript{180} CT, 242, 282 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 170, 172-173.
\textsuperscript{181} Nicol, Epiros II, 172.
\textsuperscript{182} For the conquest of Ioannina, see: Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, p. 350 ; CT, 306-338, 378-380 ; J. Shea, The Late Byzantine City: Social, Economic and Institutional Profile (University of Birmingham PhD Thesis, 2010), 120. For the conquest of Arta see: CT, 434-444 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 187; Shea, 161. William Miller incorrectly dates this event to 1417, suggesting that this was when Carlo I started utilising his control over the city in his correspondents. Miller, LiL, 373.
\textsuperscript{183} DA Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309 ; Nicol. Epiros II, 228, footnote 61.
Anthony Kaldellis, probably refer to Iacopo Rosso, Andrea de’ Guidi de Strione, and Marino Meliaresi. All three of these companions would also play a major role in the lordships of Carlo II and Leonardo III Tocco. Carlo I also heavily relied upon members of his kin, notably his wife, brother, and his illegitimate children. Three of his illegitimate sons, Ercole, Torno, and Menuno would provide both administrative and military roles for their father. Not only did they serve as governors over his possessions and generals of his military forces, but he further utilised them through marriages which played a key role in his diplomatic relations. He also used his illegitimate daughters in this role, marrying one to Musa Çelebi, a son of Bayezid and claimant to the Ottoman throne during the Interregnum.

The two most important members of Carlo I’s kin were undoubtedly his wife, Francesca Acciaiuoli, and his brother, Leonardo II Tocco. Francesca Acciaiuoli is considered to be one of the most powerful women in the region and described by William Miller as ‘one of the ablest and most masterful women of the Latin Levant’. The Acciaiuioli were one of the great Florentine banking families and ruled over the Duchy of Athens in the fourteenth and fifteenth century. This marriage alliance proved to be advantageous, and upon the death of her father Nerio I Acciaiuoli, the Duke of Athens (1388-1394), Francesca inherited a portion of his wealth along with the fortress of Acrocorinth. Though they were ultimately

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185 CT, 360-362.
186 Miller, LiL, 371. This sentiment is also supported by Chrysostomides, see: Chrysostomides, ‘Italian Women in Greece’, 119-120.
187 Nicol, Epiros II, 169 ; Miller, LiL, 260.
unsuccessful at holding Acrocorinth, this signalled the first expansion of the Tocco lordship into the Morea. Francesca also held an important administrative role in her husband’s lordship, and ruled over the castles of Santa Mavra and Saint George, on the islands of Leukas and Kephalonia respectively.189

Another key figure in the Tocco lordship was Leonardo II Tocco (1375-1418/19) the brother of Carlo I and perhaps more importantly, at least from the purview of this thesis, the father of Carlo II. The exact date of Leonardo’s birth is unclear but according to the Tocco chronicle he was a baby at the time of his father’s death in 1375.190 Until his own death in 1418/1419, Leonardo II was a constant presence throughout the Tocco domains and undoubtedly his brother’s most trusted lieutenant.191 Leonardo led the Tocco forces in raids against Arta and Glarentza and ruled over the islands of Kephalonia and Zakynthos on behalf of his brother.192 One of Leonardo’s most defining moments came in 1415. At the same time that his brother was granted the title of δεσπότης by Manuel II, Leonardo also received the title of μέγας κοντόσταυλος.193 This Palaiologan title was a successor to the older Byzantine

190 CT, 220.
193 CT, 380.
title κόμης τοῦ στάβλου and retained a high level of prestige but was largely honorary in nature.\textsuperscript{194} According to the chronicle Leonardo II was very worthy of this award as he had fought on behalf of the Byzantine forces in the Morea, besieging the castles of Eliavurkos and Mantenas.\textsuperscript{195} This further illustrates the fluid nature of lordship that existed in the fifteenth century Balkans, as this thesis shall later illustrate, with Leonardo II clearly holding multiple political relations. Leonardo II clearly valued his title and used it in a Ragusan legal record when he attempted to sell a ship to five brothers from Ragusa in September 1416.\textsuperscript{196} Leonardo II was clearly one of the key figures in the Tocco lordship and played an important role in their expansion from the Ionian Islands to Akarnania, Epiros, and the Morea.

The Tocco in Epiros:

The expansion of the Tocco domains was a defining feature of Carlo I’s reign. During this time the Tocco gained possessions in the Morea and most importantly in Akarnania and Epiros. They were able to do this through their use of superior mercenaries of Albanian, Greek, Latin and Serb origin and their talented military commanders, particularly Carlo’s brother Leonardo II and his illegitimate sons: Ercole and Torno.\textsuperscript{197} Another factor in their expansion was undoubtedly their familial links and inheritance, particularly in the cases of Acrocorinth and Ioannina. That further illustrates the nature of lordship in the Balkans, with

\textsuperscript{195} CT, 380.
\textsuperscript{196} ‘magni commestabilis imperii romanorum’ DA, Diversa Notariae, XII, f. 139 ; KrD, no. 626, p. 266.
its fragmented personal possessions an aspect ignored by nationalist histories with their emphasis on the creation of centralised states.

Some of the first expansions of the Tocco came through Carlo I’s marriage to Francesca Acciaiuoli. Upon Nerio I Acciaiuoli’s death in 1394 Francesca inherited a portion of her father’s wealth along with some of his former possessions as the Duke of Athens, notably the fortress of Acrocorinth.\textsuperscript{198} Despite being rebuffed by the executors of Nerio’s will Carlo I arrived in Corinth in November 1394 with the intention of taking the city as part of his wife’s inheritance.\textsuperscript{199} Though the Tocco control over the fortress would not last, their acquisition illustrates the importance of inheritance in the expansion of the Tocco. Inheritance was not always beneficial however, as Francesca and Carlo also inherited Nerio’s debts, most notably 35,821 Venetian ducats that he had borrowed from a Venetian merchant called Giovanni Cremolisi. When Francesca refused to repay these debts, Cremolisi took the pair of them to a Venetian court and the following court case caused quite a stir.\textsuperscript{200} The outcome of the trial is unclear, due to a lack of documentation post 1402, though Chrysostomides has suggested that the expenses of the litigation may well have outweighed the debts and caused Cremolisi to drop his claims against Carlo and Francesca.\textsuperscript{201} This trial further illustrates the nature of Balkan lordship in this period as being a private enterprise rather than the affairs of a state.

\textsuperscript{198} J. Chrysostomides, ‘Corinth 1394-1397: some new facts’, \textit{Βυζαντινά}, vol. 7 (1975), 83-110.
\textsuperscript{199} Chrysostomides, ‘Corinth’, 87.
\textsuperscript{201} Chrysostomides, ‘Merchants versus nobles’, 124-125
There were further incursions in the Morea by the Tocco in the fifteenth century, particularly against the city of Glarentza which was captured by Leonardo II Tocco in 1407 from Centurione II Zaccaria (1404-1432), the Prince of Achaea.\textsuperscript{202} Though the city would later be lost to Zaccaria, the Tocco regained control of the Glarentza by purchasing it from an Italian adventurer called Liveri in 1421.\textsuperscript{203} The Tocco would then hold this city until 1428, when all the Tocco possessions in the Morea were lost. As this chapter shall later illustrate, the loss of the Morea in 1428 was of much greater significance than many previous studies of the Tocco have illustrated.

The first account of the Tocco expansion into the Balkan mainland during Carlo I’s reign appears in the Tocco Chronicle.\textsuperscript{204} The Tocco forces attacked the Bay of Zaverda in Akarnania and the lands surrounding Vonitsa, which at the time belonged to the major Albanian ruler of the region Gjin Bua Spata (1358-1399). Spata’s lordship covered much of Epiros and Akarnania including the settlements of Angelokastron, Arta and Naupaktos.\textsuperscript{205} The commander of the Tocco forces was a Galasso Peccatoro who also appears several times in the chronicle fighting against Sguros Bua Spata (1399-1403), the brother and successor of Gjin Bua Spata.\textsuperscript{206} Giuseppe Schirò dates this event to 1399 which may mean that it coincided with the death of Gjin Bua Spata, which follows Peccatoro’s attack in the Tocco Chronicle.\textsuperscript{207} Since the dating in the Tocco chronicle is inconsistent it is unclear whether these events are

\textsuperscript{202} CT, 258-268.
\textsuperscript{203} CT, 480-488.
\textsuperscript{204} CT, 232.
\textsuperscript{205} CT, 222-224.
\textsuperscript{206} CT, 294-298.
\textsuperscript{207} CT, 232, 233.
connected, but Spata’s death undoubtedly coincided with the expansion of the Tocco into Epiros. The attack on Zaverda and the surrounding countryside was the first incursion by Carlo I’s forces into Epiros and the beginning of the conquest of the region. The next to fall, according to the family chronicle, was the Tower of Katochi which sat on the banks of the Acheloos River. Dragomesto, now known as Astakos, along the southern coast of Akarnania fell in either 1404 or 1406, followed by Riniasa to the north which was acquired from a local lord called Ipikerni. The strategic importance of these settlements, though particularly Dragomesto, is illustrated by the author, scholar, and soldier Sir Patrick Leigh Fermor (1915-2011) who states:

The little port of Astakos lies in a wide inlet of Acarnania, the south-westernmost province of Roumeli. Ithaca, Cephalonia, Levkas and Zante blur the western skyline, and to the south the other side of the entrance to the Gulf of Corinth, the north-west corner of the Peloponnese shoulders its way into the Ionian.

This illustrates that many of these possessions acquired by the Tocco were by the coast, or along the major rivers of the region, which further illustrates the importance of naval travel in connecting the Tocco domains. Akarnania would prove to be an important acquisition for the Tocco and allowed for further conquests in the region.

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208 CT, 234-236. The tower of Katochi is still standing today.
209 CT, 242. Schirò is unclear as to which of these two dates is correct. CT, 282.
The centre of Carlo I’s lordship appears to have been the city of Ioannina. Unlike the other Tocco possessions of the region Ioannina was inland and geographically isolated, not connected to the sea or any of the major rivers of the region. According to Nicol, the geography of Arta was much more suitable for conquest than that of Ioannina, and it is likely that Carlo I did not expect to ever rule over this city of northern Epiros.\footnote{Nicol, Epiros II, 175.} As with Acrocorinth, Ioannina was acquired by inheritance rather than conflict. Before the city came under the control of the Tocco, it was ruled by Carlo I’s uncle Esau Buondelmonti (1385-1411). Upon Esau’s death in 1411 the local elites or ἄρχοντες utilised their institutions of a ‘senate’ and ‘boule’ to choose Carlo I as Esau’s successor.\footnote{Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, p. 350 ; CT, 306-338, 378-380 ; Shea, 120.} This also resulted in the exile of Esau’s wife Jevdokija Balšić and his son Giorgio Buondelmonti.\footnote{For further analysis of Giorgio Buondelmonti, see: T. Ganchou, ‘Giourgis Izaoul de Ioannina, fils du despote Esau Buondelmonti, ou les tribulations balkaniques d’un prince d’Épire dépossédé’, Medioevo Greco, vol. 8 (2008), 149-200} This event illustrates the power of the ἄρχοντες of Ioannina as they were able to choose their rulers and wielded significant power in their own city, even encouraging Carlo I to push Manuel II for the title of δεσποτής.\footnote{CT, 378-380. For further analysis of medieval Ioannina, see: B. Osswald, ‘Citizenship in Medieval Ioannina’, Citizenship in historical perspective, ed. S. G. Ellis, G. Hálfdanarson and A. K. Isaacs (Pisa, 2006), 87-105 ; Shea, 90-153.} The acquisition of Ioannina by the Tocco illustrates two important aspects. Firstly, that the Tocco not only captured cities as a result of military campaigns, and secondly that the citizens of these cities could hold significant power.

The final major settlement of the region that came under the rule of the Tocco was that of Arta. Arta was ruled by the Albanian Spata family whose lordship occupied most of
southern Epiros. As the Tocco expanded into Ioannina they began to threaten the Spata Despotate, and conflict broke out between the two. In 1414 Muriki Spata (1400-1414), the head of the Spata Despotate, died and this signalled the beginning of the end for the Spata family.

The city was then ruled by Muriki’s brother Yaqub Spata (1414-1416), who was later attacked on two fronts by the Tocco brothers. Though he was able to hold out for some time, Yaqub was eventually tricked, surrounded and executed by the constable of Vovliana on 1 October 1416. Upon his death the Tocco were able to enter the city with Carlo I arriving three days after Yaqub’s execution, with Leonardo II slightly behind him. The meeting of Carlo I and Leonardo II in Arta was also considered an important moment and is recorded in the family chronicle. The daughters of Muriki Spata were also married to Ercole and a member of Carlo I’s wider kin, in order to legitimise their rule over the city and to pacify this rival family.

Arta undoubtedly had political significance, as the former capital of the Komnenos-Doukas Despotate (1205-1337) and it is likely that was a key reason behind the Tocco conquest of the city. Nicol believes that due to its geographical placement, on the Arachthos River, its conquest was probably part of the Tocco strategy for the region.

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216 Nicol, Epiros II, 139-156, 179-187.
217 CT. 370 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 182.
218 CT, 376, 384-396, 400-430 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 185-187.
219 CT, 430 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 186.
220 CT, 434-444 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 187. William Miller incorrectly dates this event to 1417, suggesting that this was when Carlo I started utilising his control over the city in his correspondents. Miller, LiL, 373.
221 CT, 442. Zečević ‘Brotherly Love and Brotherly Service’, 143.
223 Zečević, TGR, 112-113.
224 Nicol, Epiros II, 175.
Carlo I’s conquests were recognised more widely in 1415 when he received the title of δεσπότης from the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II. According to the family chronicle the citizens of Ioannina encouraged Carlo I to acquire this title so that he could legitimise his control over the city. Carlo I visited Manuel II at the Hexamillion, the six-mile wall which spanned across the Isthmus of Corinth, and received the title of δεσπότης. At this ceremony Carlo I and his brother Leonardo also received the titles of Κατακουζηνάτοι, honorary membership of the Kantakuzenus clan. The significance of these titles, as this thesis shall later illustrate, has been heavily debated and it is unclear as to whether this title brought the Tocco into the Byzantine sphere of influence and therefore whether the Tocco lordship was Byzantine in nature. Regardless the granting of these titles is considered to be the high-point in Carlo I’s reign and illustrates his significant position in the region.

**Carlo I Tocco the ‘successful Tocco lord’?**

Due his successful conquests of Akarnania and Epiros along with receiving the title of δεσπότης from Manuel II, Carlo I has largely been viewed as the most successful of the Tocco lords. This has in turn affected the perception of Carlo II Tocco, who is seen as a failure in contrast to his predecessor. However, the assertion that Carlo I was successful, omits one of his most serious defeats that occurred towards the end of his reign. Between 1427 and 1428...

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225 CT, 378-382.
226 CT, 378-380; Shea, 90-153.
227 CT, 378-382.
228 CT, 380-382.
the Tocco came into conflict with the Despotate of the Morea, a semi-independent part of the Byzantine Empire.\textsuperscript{230} At this time the Despotate was ruled by the future Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos (1405-1453). During this conflict the Tocco possessions in the Morea were conquered by Constantine’s forces and the Tocco navy, under the command of Torno, was destroyed by the Byzantine naval forces.\textsuperscript{231} These defeats were clearly devastating for the Tocco, though their impact has been underplayed by previous analyses of the Tocco. This is likely for two reasons, firstly the terms agreed by the two at the end of the conflict resulted in a marriage between Carlo I’s niece Theodora and Constantine, which tied the Tocco to the Byzantine Imperial family and kept open the possibility for future interventions in the Morea.\textsuperscript{232} Secondly, most studies of the Tocco have relied upon the family chronicle and the last entry comes in 1422, before the defeat in the Morea.\textsuperscript{233} This defeat was of great significance, with the loss of the Tocco possessions in a wealthy region of the Balkans and the destruction of their navy. As this thesis shall later illustrate Carlo II’s reign has often been dismissed by the loss of Ioannina in 1430, which Donal Nicol cites as being the beginning of the end for the Tocco lordship in the Balkans.\textsuperscript{234} However Nicol fails to view the loss of Ioannina in the context of this earlier defeat, which proved to be of much greater significance.


\textsuperscript{232} Zečević, TGR, 98.

\textsuperscript{233} CT, 508.

\textsuperscript{234} Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
to the future of the Tocco domains. In order to accurately understand the success of Carlo II Tocco’s lordship it is therefore of great importance to reassess the reign of his predecessor, Carlo I Tocco who ‘made so much stir but left so little mark on the history of Epiros.’

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235 Nicol, Epiros II, 195.
Chapter Two – Carlo II and the Tocco ‘Civil War’:

Carlo I Tocco died in the summer of 1429, and his former domains became the subject of a disputed succession.\(^1\) Carlo died with no legitimate children and therefore his lordship, his title of δεσπότης, and his role as head of the family passed to his nephew Carlo II Tocco, which according to Zečević followed proper Neapolitan inheritance practice.\(^2\) However, Carlo II’s ascension to power proved contentious since he was still a minor, and this was much to the displeasure of the illegitimate sons of Carlo I: Ercole, Torno and Menuo, all of whom were older and more experienced than their cousin.\(^3\) A clash between the youthful, but official, heir and his elder and more experienced, yet illegitimate, cousins for control of the Tocco possessions was inevitable and culminated in the Tocco ‘Civil War’ of the early 1430s. Previous studies of the Tocco have devoted little attention to the civil war and those historians who have studied it, such as Donald M. Nicol, have jumped to a conclusion regarding it as the beginning of the end of the Tocco lordship. Nicol argued that this event shattered the ‘artificial unity’ created by Carlo I and was ultimately responsible for the loss of their mainland possessions and for forcing them back on to the Ionian Islands until they were

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\(^1\) Bodnar has suggested that Carlo I Tocco died on 4 July 1429. E. W. Bodnar, Cyriacus of Ancona and Athens (Brussels, 1960), 28, footnote. George Sphrantzes confirms that Carlo I died in this month and year, see: George Sphrantzes, Cronaca, ed. R. Maisano, CFHB 29 (Rome, 1990), 66, translation in George Sphrantzes, The Fall of the Byzantine Empire – A Chronicle by George Sphrantzes 1401-1477, trans. M. Philippides (Amherst MA, 1980), 44. As the exact date given by Bodnar is unsubstantiated, this thesis shall merely state that Carlo II’s reign began in the July of 1429 due to there being no exact date for its beginning.

\(^2\) Zečević, TGR, 112.

\(^3\) A reference to Carlo II’s minority can be found in a Venetian document from 3 March 1430 in which he is described as ‘magnificus dominus Carolus Iunior ducha Cefalonie’. ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Secretae, XI, ff. 85-85r; ThR, vol 2, no. 2186, pp. 271-272.
finally expelled from the Balkans in 1479. This is supported by Dimitris Kastritsis who argues that the Ottomans were able to conquer large swathes of territory in the Balkans by exploiting the various divisions and civil wars amongst the various powers of the region such as in the case of the Tocco. For Nicolas Cheetham, the death of Carlo I was the moment that ‘the empire of the Tocchi crumbled away’.

However, these apocalyptic views of the civil war are questionable. Though the city of Ioannina was lost to the Ottomans in October 1430, Carlo II remained in control of large swathes of territory in Epiros. In fact, many of these possessions were held beyond the death of Carlo II in September 1448, notably the city of Vonitsa, in the Gulf of Arta, which was under the control of the family until they were finally expelled from the region in 1479. Even the loss of Ioannina was probably less serious than the disastrous battle of the Echinades in 1427 and the loss of the territories in the Morea to the Byzantines in 1428 in the time of the supposedly successful Carlo I. This chapter will argue that the impact of the ‘civil war’ has been overstated by previous studies, which have viewed it through a teleological lens as part of a sequence of events leading to the eventual expulsion of the Tocco from the Balkans.

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4 Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
7 Stefano Magno, ‘VIII. Estratti degli Annali Veneti di Stefano Magno’ ed. K. Hopf, Chroniques Gréco-Romanes – Inédites ou peu connues publiées avec notes et tables généalogiques (Berlin, 1873), 179-209, at 208. By 1460 most of the Tocco domains on the mainland had fallen, notably the major settlements of Angelokastron and Barnako, see Stefano Magno, ed. Hopf, 201, also on the fall of Angelokastron are three short chronicles in P. Schreiner, Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken, 3 vols. CFHB 12 (Vienna, 1975), vol. 1, nos. 58/12, 69/17, 77/4.
civil war in reality helped to establish the successful lordship of Carlo II Tocco rather than set in motion its eventual downfall.

Division of the Tocco Domains:

Another key misconception of the civil war was that the seeds of the conflict were sown long before the death of Carlo I. It has been suggested by both Nicol and Zečević that Carlo I’s will divided up the Tocco domains amongst his heirs into individual lordships. The key problem with this assertion is that no copies of Carlo I’s will have survived, and there is, therefore, no way to verify whether it was responsible for the eventual divisions amongst the Tocco. The supposed terms of the will, along with the borders of the ‘new’ lordships created as a result, are outlined in the chronicles of Laonikos Chalkokondyles and Theodore Spandounes. Unfortunately these accounts are some of the main sources of information for the events of the conflict, though as the situation in the Tocco domains are not the subject of these chronicles their information is relatively limited.

These chronicles have also misinterpreted the nature of Carlo I’s lordship which has affected their assessment of the events of the ‘civil war’. The lordship was heavily decentralised partly because it was almost entirely based in the urban centres of the region. According to John Fine this was because much of rural Epiros, during the fifteenth century,

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8 Nicol, Epiros II, 198-199 ; Zečević, TGR, 112.
was under the control of various Albanian tribes over which the Tocco had no authority. As a result Carlo I relied on his kin, notably his brother and illegitimate sons, to administer the settlements within his domains. These various appointments are recorded in the family chronicle and help to illuminate the structure of Carlo I’s lordship. When these appointments are compared to the situation post-civil war as recorded in the letters of Cyriac of Ancona, during his visit to the various participants of the conflict in 1435-1436, it appears that there was no alteration to the possessions of the illegitimate sons. This thesis shall suggest that Carlo I’s will barely altered any of the territory held by the various participants, as seen from the situation before and after the conflict.

Rather than being a reaction to the supposedly unfair terms of Carlo I’s will, the conflict was instead an attempt by the illegitimate sons to succeed their father as head of the Tocco Lordship. Such an attempt would have been in contrast to Neapolitan succession law which Zečević suggests was practiced by the Tocco. Instead the illegitimate sons attempted to break this legal practice by using force as their means of succession. Such a method was utilised by both the Mongols marcher lords and later by the Ottomans who had no notions of

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10 J. V. A. Fine, Jr., *The Late Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor MI, 1994), 356-357.
12 Zečević, TGR, 112.
legitimacy and primogeniture as was present in Neapolitan tradition. In his analysis of the Aqquyunlu, a Turkoman tribe that ruled over parts of Eastern Anatolia, John Woods suggests that such a system came about because of the nature of corporate lordship, in which the family or clan’s control over the territories is conceived as being ownership by the group rather than by the individuals. Such a system was not unique to the Mongol and Islamic world, it was also used by the Merovingians in France and by the Kievan Rus. The decentralised Tocco lordship, which relied upon their kin to administer their lands, may also fit such a description. The nature of Ottoman succession appears to have been understood by the illegitimate sons who had experience dealing with the Ottomans, in particular Torno who had served as his father’s representative at the Porte in Adrianople during the reign of Mehmed I. Theodore Spandounes suggests that the major reason behind the illegitimate sons appealing to the Ottomans to intervene in the conflict on their behalf, was because they did not recognise the difference between legitimate and illegitimate sons. It is likely that the illegitimate sons also turned to the Ottomans due to their military power, though it still appears that they had embraced the Ottoman method of succession in order to acquire control over their father’s lordship and maintain their privileged positions. Ultimately their attempt to succeed their father was unsuccessful and instead led to fragmentation of the Tocco domains, as was happening throughout the wider Balkans. In order to understand the civil war this analysis

14 J. E. Woods, The Aqquyunlu – Clan, Confederation, Empire (Salt Lake City UT, 1999), 19-20.
16 CT, 366.
17 Spandounes, ed. Sathas, 150; translation in Spandounes, ed. Nicol, 27.
18 For further analysis, see: S. W. Reinert, ‘Fragmentation (1204-1453)’, The Expansion of Orthodox Europe: Byzantium, the Balkans and Russia, ed. J. Shepard (Aldershot, 2007), 307-326.
shall set out the various participants, describe their role in the conflict, and illustrate the possessions they held both before and after the conflict.

As already stated, because Carlo I had no legitimate heir his title of Despot and role as leader of the family passed to his nephew Carlo II. The family chronicle illustrates that Carlo II was primed to succeed his uncle as the leader of the Tocco, regularly comparing him to his father Leonardo II. Carlo I was apparently able to see aspects of his brother in his nephew, attributing Leonardo II’s impeccable reputation to his son.\(^{19}\) Furthermore the family chronicle suggests that Carlo I and Francesca took their nephew to live with them and ‘declared him their son and heir because they did not have a legitimate child and held him in high esteem as if he was their natural child.’\(^{20}\) This assertion is supported by Baldassar Maria Remondini, the eighteenth century bishop of Zakynthos (1730-1777), who claimed to have seen documents which showed Carlo II calling his aunt and uncle respectively ‘mother’ and ‘father’.\(^{21}\) Whether they officially adopted Carlo II when he came to court is unclear, though whether this is merely a figure of speech is a moot point. Carlo II’s succession certainly appears to have been pre-ordained to some extent but he was still in his minority upon the death of his uncle.\(^{22}\) This was not a unique situation for the Tocco as Carlo I had succeeded his father Leonardo I in 1375 during his own minority.\(^{23}\) However circumstances had changed and it was no longer

\(^{19}\) CT, 478.

\(^{20}\) CT, 478.


\(^{22}\) ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Secretae, XI, ff. 85-85r ; ThR, vol 2, no. 2186, pp. 271-272.

\(^{23}\) CT, 220-222. It should also be noted that Carlo I was certainly a toddler at the time of his succession whereas Carlo II was probably a teenager since according to Chalkokondyles he was able to lead an army against his cousins towards the end of the civil war. Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
seen as being feasible for the Tocco to have a minor at the head of the lordship. Upon his uncle’s death Carlo II inherited the major possessions within the Tocco lordship. According to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Carlo II took over the major cities of Ioannina and Arta along with lands in Ambrakia and Aitolia, whereas his illegitimate cousins were in control of lands in Akarnania to the west of the Acheloōs River. Chalkokondyles does not specify the exact possessions held by the illegitimate sons, though this thesis will seek to establish these through an analysis of the settlements they held both before and after the succession crisis.

One of the central problems in analysing the illegitimate sons of Carlo I Tocco is that there are significant disagreements over the number of sons and their roles within the lordship. Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the three key genealogical tables of the Tocco by Hopf, Nicol and Zečević. The family chronicle states that Carlo I had four illegitimate sons: Ercole, Torno, Menuno and Triano, though this analysis shall also explore several other possible sons. The first of the illegitimate sons, according to the family chronicle, was Ercole. Little is known of his origins and the exact date he came to maturity is unclear: neither of these points are expanded upon in the chronicle. Ercole served his father as a successful military commander and the Tocco Chronicle contains many references to his achievements in battle. In 1413 forces under Ercole’s command defeated a much larger Ottoman force at the Ophidares River and in 1421 he led the Tocco forces against the

24 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 392.
25 Hopf, Chroniques, 530 – 531 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 256 ; Zečević, TGR, 211.
26 CT, 364-366.
27 CT, 364.
Despotate of the Morea, alongside Centurione II Zaccaria. 28 The chronicle also informs us that Ercole held the city of Angelokastron, and the surrounding lands to the west the Acheloös River, within his father’s lordship. 29 We are unsure as to Ercole’s possessions post-conflict but it is likely that he retained control of these lands upon his father’s death in the summer of 1429. 30 As he is thought to have been the eldest of the illegitimate sons, Ercole might be considered likely to have been the instigator and leader of the rebels. This is questionable however. Chalkokondyles suggests that it was Menuno, rather than Ercole, who led the rebellion as he had a better claim to the lordship, the nature of which is not explained by Chalkokondyles, and was more intelligent than the others. 31 Karl Hopf also accepted this interpretation and placed Menuno as the eldest of the illegitimate sons in his genealogical table. 32 However there is strong alternative evidence to suggest that Ercole was the instigator and head of the rebels. On 17 June 1430 the Venetian Senate responded to a letter from the Baile of Corfu which states that Ercole rather than Menuno had ordered the attack against Ioannina. 33 As the Venetians had a significant interest in the situation of the Tocco domains, as will be discussed later, their information on events within Epiros and the Ionian Islands is likely to be highly reliable. Ercole is portrayed in the family chronicle as an accomplished leader with strong martial ability, two traits he shared with his father. It is debatable as to whether this portrayal is designed to illustrate Ercole as a potential successor, or to glorify

28 CT, 396 – 400, 504 – 508. The Ophidares river is known today as the Evinos. The Chronicle suggests that Ercole’s troops numbered sixty, whereas his Ottoman opponents had nearly four-hundred soldiers, though Schiro’s Italian translation of the Greek text incorrectly suggests that it was three-hundred strong, CT, 399. See also S. Kyriakidis, ‘The Wars and the Army of the Duke of Cephalonia Carlo I Tocco (c. 1375-1429)’, Journal of Medieval Military History, vol. 11 (2013), 167-182, at 168.

29 CT, 396.

30 CT, 396.

31 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 392.

32 Hopf, Chroniques, 530 – 531.

Carlo I’s decision to include his illegitimate son as a key member of the lordship. Either way Ercole was certainly a ‘strong-man’ candidate, perhaps not that surprising since his name is the Italianised form of Hercules. The Tocco lordship had been built on Carlo I’s ambition, wealth and military strength and Ercole’s attempt to seize control of the lordship was a continuation of this legacy.

The second of the illegitimate sons was Torno. According to the family chronicle Torno was given control over the settlement of Agios Donatos, and its dependencies, in northern Epiros which had previously belonged to an Albanian lord called Masarakei until the Tocco acquired these possessions through conquest.34 As with Ercole, it is likely that Torno retained control of Agios Donatos and its associated possessions upon his father’s death. According to Cyriac of Ancona, Torno also controlled the settlement of ‘Orionatium’ and held his daughter’s wedding there in 1436.35 The exact identity of this city is unclear, though Nicol has suggested that it was the city of Riniasa.36 Along with his elder brother, Torno was renowned for his military exploits, several of which are recorded in the Tocco Chronicle. While travelling from Ioannina to Arta to rendezvous with his father’s forces, on their approach to Arta in 1415/1416, Torno and his army were ambushed by Albanian forces. According to the account in the family chronicle, Torno was a skilled commander in spear warfare, without equal, and when the Albanians attacked he fought like Achilles.37 Torno was able to escape this ambush, which ended in a defeat for the Tocco setting back their attempts

34 CT, 392.
35 Cyriac of Ancona, Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium, ed. L. Mehus (Florence, 1742), 68-70.
36 Cyriac of Ancona, Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium, 68-70 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 206
37 CT, 394-396
to conquer Arta, though the family chronicle paints this event in a positive light as with the family’s other defeats.\textsuperscript{38} Torno was also in command of the Tocco fleet at the disastrous Battle of the Echinades, further illustrating that he was an important commander in the Tocco lordship.\textsuperscript{39} Finally he also fulfilled non-military roles for his father, notably serving as the family representative at the Ottoman Porte, when Carlo I agreed to submit and to pay a toll to Mehmed I in 1413.\textsuperscript{40} As with his fellow brothers, Torno played an important role in the administration and expansion of the Tocco lordship.

The domains inherited by the third of Carlo’s illegitimate sons, Menuno, are unclear.\textsuperscript{41} According to the family chronicle Menuno received the fortress of Aetos in Akarnania, as his own personal fiefdom, through his marriage to the daughter of the Albanian ruler of Arta, Muriki Bua Spata (1399-1414/1415).\textsuperscript{42} Menuno also appears to have held other possessions, though the exact identity of these are unclear. In 1436-37, Cyriac of Ancona visited a settlement in the Morea called ‘χερπινας’, in which Menuno was now based.\textsuperscript{43} In his genealogical table of the Tocco family Hopf interpreted ‘χερπινας’ as being the lands of ‘Charpigny’ which Menuno received in 1429, probably upon the death of his father.\textsuperscript{44}

\textsuperscript{38} See the Tocco defeat at Kranea, CT, 348-350.
\textsuperscript{40} CT, 366.
\textsuperscript{41} There are disagreements regarding the exact order of the illegitimate sons, since no records of their births exist. In their genealogical tables Hopf places Menuno first, Ercole second and Menuno third whereas Nicol and Zečević follow the same order as the chronicle. Hopf, Chroniques, 530 – 531 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 256 ; Zečević, TGR, 211. The order given in this analysis shall follow that of the family chronicle. CT, 364-366.
\textsuperscript{42} CT, 450-452.
\textsuperscript{43} Cyriac of Ancona, Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium, 71-72.
\textsuperscript{44} Hopf, Chroniques, 530 – 531.
lands of ‘Charpigny’ could possibly refer to the Barony of Vostitsa since in 1209 it was granted to Hugh I of Charpigny in 1209.\(^{45}\) However, Donald Nicol suggested that it may have instead been the village of Kerpini, to the north of Kalavryta, in the Northern Morea.\(^{46}\) Either way, it appears that Menuno held lands in the northern Morea, which contradicts the assumption that all the Tocco possessions in the region were lost in May 1428 when Carlo I signed a peace treaty with the Despot of the Morea, the future Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI Palaiologos.\(^{47}\) Menuno’s inheritance of these lands would suggest that Carlo I did not cede all his lands in the Morea to Constantine, or that Menuno later obtained these lands from the Despot or married into them. Little else is known of Menuno though he is described as being ‘a man of parts with military experience’ in Francesco Scalamonti’s account of Cyriac of Ancona’s early life, suggesting that Menuno played a similar role in his father’s lordship to that of his two elder brothers.\(^{48}\)

Ercole, Torno and Menuno appear to have been the three most prominent of the illegitimate sons and the key instigators of the succession crisis upon the death of their father. However, Carlo I may have had yet more illegitimate sons. According to the family chronicle Carlo I had other illegitimate children besides the four mentioned by name, though they may


\(^{46}\) Nicol, Epiros II, 207.


have died prematurely or before the production of the chronicle.\textsuperscript{49} The fourth and final son mentioned by name in the family chronicle is Triano. Little is known about Triano, with the only reference to his existence coming in the Tocco Chronicle in which he is described as being well educated and raised among the Turks.\textsuperscript{50} It is unclear as to what this refers to, though it may suggest that Triano was used as a ‘diplomatic hostage’ in one of the agreements Carlo I made with the Ottomans, either with Mehmed I as part of his vassalage agreement or with the Ottoman generals Evrenos beg and Yusuf beg.\textsuperscript{51} Due to this Turkish education and influence Triano may have also been the mysterious ‘Karlızade’ who became the Sanjak-bey of Ioannina during the reign of Leonardo III Tocco.\textsuperscript{52} Unfortunately there are no further references to Triano in any of the other chronicles and archival records so these claims cannot be substantiated. Due to this lack of supporting evidence Hopf, who did not have access to the Tocco Chronicle, did not include Triano in his genealogical table of the Tocco family. Instead, he argued that there was another son, who he suggests may have been called Antonio.\textsuperscript{53} This ‘Antonio’ may well have been Triano, though he could equally have been another illegitimate son and due to this lack of clarity Antonio will not be considered within this study. As Triano is mentioned by name in the family chronicle it is likely that he was the fourth of the illegitimate sons, however due to the lack of evidence concerning Tirano’s involvement in the succession crisis he will not be considered as one of the participants.

\textsuperscript{49} CT, 364.
\textsuperscript{50} CT, 366.
\textsuperscript{51} CT, 252-254, 256, 360-362, 366.
\textsuperscript{53} Hopf, \textit{Chroniques}, 530 – 531.
There may even have been yet another illegitimate son, Orlando. As with the previously mentioned Antonio, Orlando is included in Hopf’s genealogical table of the Tocco family with the title seigneur de Rhéniassa.54 However, Giuseppe Schirò was sceptical of the existence of Orlando Tocco and suspected that Hopf had falsified his existence as he cannot be found in the family chronicle.55 Due to Hopf’s reputation for inaccuracy, as seen from his misdating of the treaty of friendship between the Venetians and Ayyubid Egypt in 1202, any scepticism surrounding his work has largely been accepted by historians.56 However Schirò’s scepticism may be misplaced. A Venetian document from the 20 August 1463, refers to a Rolando de tocho olim domino Renesse, who may well be Orlando.57 If he was one of Carlo I’s illegitimate sons then it appears that he received the city of Riniasa, either before or upon his father’s death. As previously stated, Donald Nicol believed Riniasa was also the settlement of ‘Orionatium’ as mentioned in Cyriac of Ancona’s account of the marriage of one of Torno’s daughters.58 This would suggest that it may have been Torno, rather than Orlando, who held control over the lordship of Riniasa. The Rolando in the Venetian document of 1463 could therefore have been Torno’s son, rather than another illegitimate son of Carlo I. Not only is the exact identity of Orlando/Rolando Tocco unclear but there is also a lack of evidence to suggest that he was one of the illegitimate sons who rebelled against Carlo II. As with Triano, he will not be considered a participant of the succession crisis.

54 Hopf, Chroniques, 530 – 531.
55 CT, 27 footnote 4, 66 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 185 footnote 16.
58 Cyriac of Ancona, Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium, 68-70 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 206.
The final member of the Tocco family who played a role in the conflict was Francesca Acciaiuoli, the wife of Carlo I. Francesca held a key position in the Tocco lordship, and was described by William Miller as ‘one of the ablest and most masterful women of the Latin Levent’.\(^59\) This sentiment is supported by Julian Chrysostomides who places Francesca alongside Magdalena Buondelmonti and Annesa de’ Saraceni as the three foremost Latin women in the Levant.\(^60\) As with the illegitimate sons, Francesca appears to have played an important role within the lordship and held lands. According to Miller, Francesca held the castles of Santa Mavra and Saint George, on the islands of Leukas and Kephalonia respectively.\(^61\) This is corroborated in Jean Froissart’s account of the return journey made by the John I Count of Nevers (1394-1404) along with several other lords who were captured during the battle of Nicopolis (1396). Between Modon and Corfu they visited the island of Kephalonia, which Froissart suggested was entirely under the sovereignty of women, who dominated the government and the economy of the island.\(^62\) Upon the death of her husband, Francesca received the island of Leukas and the settlement of Vonitsa on the Epirote mainland. These were important possessions to the Tocco lordship and desired by the Venetians who considered intervening during the conflict to protect their shipping, and attempted to persuade Francesca to bequeath these lands to them upon her death.\(^63\) On 14 July 1430 her representatives made it clear to the Venetian Senate that Francesca viewed Carlo II as her legitimate heir and that her lands would pass to him upon her death.\(^64\) This appears

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59 Miller, LiL, 371.


61 Miller, LiL 371.


64 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Secretae, XI, ff. 119-120 ; AAV, vol. 14, no. 3377, pp. 82-85.
to coincide with the height of the succession conflict, and clearly illustrates that Francesca was
supporting her nephew as the legitimate head of the Tocco despite the possible threat of losing
her lands to the Turks. Francesca was the only other member of the Tocco family who
supported Carlo II during the civil war and played an active role in the conflict. In particular
through her encouragement of the pirates based within her lands, who were responsible for
the capture of George Sphrantzes in March 1430 and stalled Constantine Palaiologos’ attempt
to mediate the conflict.65

The fall of Ioannina and the role of the Ottomans:

Many of the events of the Tocco ‘civil war’ remain unknown or at best vague largely due to a
lack of sources for the conflict. The only event of the conflict that can be reliably dated is the
capture of Ioannina by the Ottomans on 9 October 1430.66 As a result the seizure of Ioannina
is viewed as the seminal event of the conflict and its impact has been overemphasised in
previous studies. The seizure of Ioannina and the subsequent terms of vassalage imposed
upon Carlo II Tocco have been interpreted as being significantly damaging to the Tocco from
which they were unable to recover.67 However, both the impact of the loss of Ioannina and
the severity of the terms imposed upon Carlo II have been exaggerated. Ioannina was the
only major loss for Carlo II during the conflict and the only major gain made by the Ottomans

65 Sphrantzes, ed. Maisano, 68, trans. Philippides, 45 ; ASV, Senatus Delibertationes Mixtae, LVIII, f. 1, 1r ; AAV,
66 Schreiner, Kleinchroniken, vol. 1, nos. 58/5, 60/14, 62/5, 69/11, 71/6, 76/2, 77/1, 92/3, 101/5, 102/10. One fragment
incorrectly dates the capture of Ioannina to the 9 October 1431, see: ‘De Rebus Epri Fragmentum III’, Historia
politica et patriarchica Constantinopolos – Epirotica, ed. I. Bekker, CSHB (New York, 1849), 246. A similar source
gives both dates, ‘De Rebus Epiroticum Fragmentum V’, Epirotica, 254. This analysis shall define the capitulation of
Ioannina as having taken place in 1430.
67 Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
in the region, who would make no further additions until 1449, a year after Carlo II’s death. Equally the terms of vassalage imposed upon Carlo II were not significantly different from previous terms imposed upon his uncle and, rather than constricting Carlo, they confirmed his position as the major lord in the region.

The capture of Ioannina in October 1430 needs to be understood in the context of the Ottoman military escapades during Murad II’s reign in the 1420s and 1430s. Franz Babinger believed that Murad II’s ascension to the throne in July 1421 heralded a push ‘relentlessly westward from the interior of the Balkan Peninsula’. This view of Murad II’s conquests is misleading and further perpetuates the view that the Ottoman conquest was somehow inevitable. The myth of Ottoman military superiority in the early fifteenth century can be called into question especially as demonstrated by Ercole’s victory at the Ophidares River in 1413. These early conquests of Murad II were by no means an all-out attempt to conquer large swathes of territory in the Balkans, rather they were targeted attacks and raids to enforce his position in the region and to punish those who disobeyed him. In September 1421 the Byzantines released Murad II’s uncle, and rival claimant to the Ottoman throne, Mustafa Çelebi. After defeating Mustafa and solidifying his control over the Ottoman possessions, Murad turned on Byzantium for their insurrection besieging Constantinople from June until September 1422. His attempt to conquer the city ultimately failed and so he turned his attention to the rest of the Balkans, destroying the Hexamilion on the Isthmus of Corinth and

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Babinger states that upon Murad II’s ascension to the throne in July 1421 Ottoman power was ‘pushing relentlessly westward from the interior of the Balkan Peninsula’. F. Babinger, Mehmed the Conqueror and his time, trans. R. Manheim (Princeton NJ, 1978), 3.

CT, 396 – 400.
he began an eight-year siege of the city of Thessalonica. Unlike the siege of Constantinople Murad refused to desist, even after Manuel II offered the city to the Venetians in 1423. Thessalonica fell in March 1430 and was brutally sacked by the Ottomans with many of its inhabitants sold into slavery. The event was so shocking that it was described by Chalkokondyles as the ‘biggest calamity suffered by the Greeks, second to none that had happened before’. A year later Murad sent one of his generals, Turahan, to yet again demolish the Hexamilion on the Isthmus of Corinth, which was in the process of being rebuilt by the Byzantines. The surrender of Ioannina in October 1430 was connected to this campaign and should be viewed in context of it.

Between late 1429 and early 1430 the illegitimate sons visited Murad II at his Porte in Adrianople to ask for Ottoman support against Carlo II. The chronicles also suggest that the illegitimate sons had also turned to the Venetians and the Despotate of the Morea for aid. Constantine Palaiologos, the Despot of the Morea and brother-in-law of Carlo II, agreed to arbitrate the dispute and dispatched his trusted advisor George Sphrantzes. However, Sphrantzes was captured by pirates, under the influence of Francesca Acciaiuoli, on 26 March

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70 Babinger, 9-10; Harris, 92-95.
71 Harris, 122-126; Sphrantzes, ed. Maisano, 68, trans. Philippides, 45.
72 The capture of Thessalonica in 1430 is recorded in the Chronicle of George Branković. Chronica serbica Despotae Georgii Branković, ed. R. Novaković, SANU, PI 339 (Belgrade, 1960), 52.
74 Sphrantzes, ed. Maisano, 72, trans. Philippides, 46.
75 The exact date of this meeting is unknown.
Whether this was a deliberate move by Francesca is unclear, however it appears to have broken down Constantine’s attempts to mediate the conflict. Due to a lack of dating for the meeting between the illegitimate sons and Murad II it is unclear as to whether the capture of Sphrantzes caused the illegitimate sons to turn to the Ottomans. As previously stated, Spandounes suggests that the illegitimate sons also turned to Murad as Turkish customs did not distinguish between sons in terms of legitimacy, which suggests that the other powers may have disapproved of their claims. Murad agreed to intervene in their conflict, grasping the opportunity to further the Ottoman presence in Epiros and to acquire territory. Therefore, after the capture of Thessalonica, he despatched Sinan Paşa, the beylerbeyi of Rumeli, to besiege and capture the city of Ioannina.

The Ragusan and Venetian archival sources inform us that by May/June 1430 the Ottoman forces were besieging Ioannina. Holding the city proved to be problematic for Carlo II. The Tocco forces were generally small in scale, with their forces largely comprising of well-trained mercenaries and rarely numbering more than a hundred. It should also be

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77 Sphrantzes, ed. Maisano, 68, trans. Philippides, 45. The Venetian archival sources illustrates that Catalan pirates were in the service of Francesca: ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, LVIII, f. 1, f. 1v; ThR, vol. 2, no. 2214, p. 278; AAV, vol. 14, no. 3405, pp. 108-109. Sphrantzes appears to have suffered poor treatment while under the enslavement of these pirates and visited Leonardo III Tocco in November 1467 in order to ask for yearly compensation as he was visiting the Tocco domains in the service of his father. Sphrantzes, ed. Maisano, 182, trans. Philippides, 89-90.

78 Equally, if this meeting occurred in 1429 then an agreement to submit to Sphrantzes arbitration may signal a sign of regret from the illegitimate sons for involving Murad and a genuine desire to settle this dispute through diplomatic means. Either way the sources are unclear as to the time of this meeting.

79 Spandounes, 150.

80 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 390-392. Sinan is called Karaja by Chalkokondyles.


borne in mind that several of the commanders of the Tocco forces, such as Ercole and Torno, were now in open rebellion against him. Another factor that contributed to the city’s eventual surrender was the influence of the ἀρχοντες of the city who were largely independent and held significant political power and privileges. According to Shea one of the key reasons behind this was that the city held a permanent council or ‘senate’ for the ἀρχοντες and a ‘boule’ for the people. As a result of this political power the citizens of Ioannina were able to influence their rulers. For example, the citizens of Ioannina were in a position to be able to choose Carlo I as the successor to Esau Buondelmonti and encourage him to acquire the title of δεσποτής from Manuel II Palaiologos. The Ioanniniotai were therefore in a position to choose their leaders and to overpower the lords who ruled over them. Despite these military and political problems Carlo was still able to hold the city for five or six months. The city of Ioannina surrendered to Sinan Paşa on 9 October 1430. The terms of surrender offered to the citizens of Ioannina are recorded in the ‘Capitulations of Ioannina’ and were as follows:

This is the decree and greeting of Sinan Pasha … May you know that the great lord (the sultan) has sent us to take over the territory and the castles of Ducas … And it is because of this that I write and tell you to submit willingly and not be deceived in any way and heed the words of the Franks, because they do not in any way wish to help

know that Carlo I captured and secured Ioannina in 1411 with 100 soldiers, it is likely that he retained control of the city with similar or smaller forces. CT, 328.


84 Shea, 120.


86 ‘De Rebus Epiri Fragmentum V’, Epirotica, 254 ; Schreiner, Kleinchroniken, vol. 1, nos. 58/5, 60/14, 62/5, 69/11, 71/6, 76/2, 77/1, 92/3, 101/5, 102/10.
you, except they would destroy you as they destroyed the inhabitants of Thessaloniki.  
And because of these things I swear to you … that you shall have no fear, either from  
enslavement, or from the taking of your children, or from the destruction of the  
churches, nor shall we build any mosques, but the bells of your churches shall ring as  
has been the custom.87

These generous terms were accepted promptly by the citizens of the city, probably because of  
the brutal sack of Thessalonica several months previously, and the Ottomans took the city  
without any conflict.88 It is important to note that this appears to be the only major loss for  
Carlo II during the conflict and the only gain made by the Ottomans in the region, who made  
no further gains until after Carlo II’s death.

Curiously, the most significant outcome of the surrender of Ioannina to Sinan Paşa  
was that it actually bolstered Carlo II in his position of power. Carlo was confirmed as an  
Ottoman vassal, the terms of which are described by both Chalkokondyles and Spandounes.89

Under these terms Carlo accepted the loss of Ioannina but would rule over the remaining  
Tocco possessions as a vassal of the Sultan. He would also pay tribute, on an annual basis, to  
the Sultan and attend the Porte in Adrianople.90 These terms were not particularly harsh and

(1908), 40-78, at 62-4. Translation in S. Vryonis, Jr., ‘Isidore Glabas and the Turkish devshirme’, Speculum, 31 (1956),  
433-443, at 440.
88 Spreos Vryonis Jr. also suggests that the fear of losing their children to the Devshirme policy was a factor in the  
surrender of Ioannina, as the terms exempted the city from this practice. S. Vryons Jr., ‘Seljuk Gulams and the  
90 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 392 ; Spandounes, ed. Sathas, 150, trans. Nicol, 27-28 ; Anonymous, Byzantium, Europe  
and the Early Ottoman Sultans 1373-1513 – An Anonymous Greek Chronicle of the Seventeenth Century (Codex Barberinus  
they were by no means unique. In 1413 Carlo I had agreed to pay a similar form of tribute to Mehmed I in exchange for recognition of his possessions, which further suggests that Murad was merely reimposing vassaldom upon the Tocco rather than enforcing a new relationship between the two. According to Spandounes a further clause was imposed on Carlo by Murad: the exchange of hostages. Carlo submitted his son, Leonardo III, and received the Sultan’s son, Mehmed II, in exchange. This is odd, given that Mehmed was only born in 1432, a claim supported by Franz Babinger who illustrates that Mehmed was sent to Amasya in the spring of 1434, at two years old, to spend his early life. Similarly Carlo II was still a minor and would not marry his wife and the mother of Leonardo III for at least another ten years let alone father a son. Spandounes claim can therefore be questioned. Now that Carlo II’s status as an Ottoman vassal was confirmed Murad II swapped sides in the civil war.

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91 It appears that similar terms were imposed upon the illegitimate sons. In his account of Cyriac of Ancona’s early travels, Francesco Scalamonti mentions a meeting between Cyriac and Menuno in Gallipoli. Menuno had arrived in Gallipoli having attended the Porte in Adrianople and the two discussed ‘eastern affairs’ further illustrating his knowledge of Ottoman politics. Scalamonti, 76. The exact date of this meeting is unclear though it appears to have occurred after the capture of Ioannina as Cyriac purchased a slave girl, named Clara, from Epiros. Mitchell, Bodnar and Foss believed that Clara was a victim of this conflict. Scalamonti, 70, 324 – note 76.


94 Babinger, 11-13.

95 Hopf suggests that Carlo II married Ramondina di Ventimiglia in 1444. Hopf, Chroniques, 530 – 531. This is supported by an Aragonese document from September 1445 which recalls Giovanni di Ventimiglia, Carlo’s brother-in-law, from Greece where he was assisting Carlo to lead the Aragonese army. ACA, Registros del Rey, 2698, 109r ; A. Ryder, The Kingdom of Naples under Alfonso the Magnanimous – The Making of a Modern State (Oxford, 1976), 272.

96 Spandounes also appears to confuse Carlo II with Leonardo III believing that Carlo II lost all his possessions on the Epirote mainland to Murad, ruling only Santa Maura, Zakynthos, Ithaca and Kephalonia. Spandounes, ed. Sathas, 150, trans. Nicol, 27.
to the larger and more powerful ruler whose loyalty had been obtained. According to Chalkokondyles, Murad supplied Carlo with soldiers to support an army he had assembled consisting of Italian mercenaries to fight against the forces of Ercole and Menuno. Chalkokondyles suggests that this Ottoman contingent made very little difference in the conflict. Nevertheless, the support of the Ottoman authorities must have shifted the balance of power in Carlo’s favour and helped to bring about the end of the civil war.

Murad II’s involvement in the Tocco succession crisis had allowed the Ottomans to take over one of the major cities in Epiros and bring the most powerful ruler of the region under their vassalage. Despite this Carlo II’s lordship remained largely free from the interference of his suzerain. The Ottomans were in no position to further enforce their control over Epiros and so Carlo had the freedom to establish his own diplomatic relations with the various foreign powers. Several previous analyses have viewed the capture of Ioannina by Sinan Paşa as the total conquest of Epiros by the Ottomans. Rather than being part of a well-orchestrated plan to conquer Epiros, it was merely an opportunistic attempt to capture a single city in the region on the momentum of their successful siege of Thessalonica. The Ottomans would follow a similar tactic in 1449, taking advantage of weakness amongst the Tocco

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97 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
98 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
99 This also applied to the illegitimate sons. According to Scalamonti, Cyriac of Ancona and Menuno not only talked about the launch of a new crusade against the Ottomans but they reconnoitred the major cities held by the Ottomans in Asia on their way back from Gallipoli. Cyriac even went so far as to ask Pope Eugenius IV (1431-1447) for Menuno to be paid as a result of his help. Scalamonti, 76, 80, 86.
100 Babinger, 10; Fine, 544.
domains after the death of Carlo II, and capture the city of Arta.\textsuperscript{101} Yet again this was only the conquest of a single city rather than a sustained military campaign to conquer all of the Tocco domains and the Ottomans still had to rely on the weakness and division amongst the Tocco in order to annex territory, taking advantage of the death of Carlo II and the minority of Leonardo III. The Ottomans made further sporadic incursions into Epiros until the Tocco were finally expelled from the region in 1479.\textsuperscript{102} The relative instability and weakness within the Ottomans also contributed to their slow conquest of the region and meant that their eventual conquest of the Balkans was by no means inevitable.

Resolution of the conflict:

As with many events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ there is little datable evidence to suggest when the conflict ended. We know from the accounts of Cyriac of Ancona in that there was peace between the various participants during his travels in 1435-1436.\textsuperscript{103} However the events preceding Cyriac’s travels are unclear and the lack of archival sources to illuminate this makes an accurate chronology of the conflict difficult, even though there is a plethora of information regarding the siege of Ioannina in the Ragusan and Venetian archival documents.\textsuperscript{104} This may

\textsuperscript{101} One chronicle gives the full date for the fall of Arta as 24 March 1449, ‘Fragmentum V’, \textit{Epirotica}. 254. Several others only note the year of the conquest. Schreiner, \textit{Kleinchroniken}, vol. 1, nos. 58/8 ; Stefano Magno, ed. Hopf, \textit{Chroniques}, 196.


\textsuperscript{103} Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium}, 68-72.

suggest that the sources of information these republics relied upon, notably merchants, may have dried up as a result of the conflict suggesting a certain level of economic instability within the Tocco domains.\textsuperscript{105} The chronicles of Chalkokondyles and Spandounes are therefore the only major sources for the events of the conflict and suggest that the Tocco domains were relatively stable with very few lands changing hands.\textsuperscript{106} This corroborates our information regarding the situations both before and after the civil war and enables us to use the chronicles in order to fill in the gaps.\textsuperscript{107} It can be assumed that by the spring 1433 Carlo II was in a position of strength and there was stability within his domains. In March, he was granted honorary membership of the \textit{Maggior Consiglio} by the Venetian authorities.\textsuperscript{108} Had Ercole, Torno, and Menuno been in a position to overthrow their cousin then it is likely that the Venetian authorities would have bestowed this honorary title upon them rather than Carlo. During this time Carlo II dispatched an ambassador to the Republic of Ragusa, who arrived on 18 April 1433, further suggesting that his domains were stable and that the conflict was either over or coming to an end.\textsuperscript{109} By January 1435 the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa resumed further suggesting a return to economic stability in the region.\textsuperscript{110} The lack of dateable evidence for the events of the conflict has undoubtedly contributed towards an absence of analysis on the conflict and a misunderstanding of its impact.


\textsuperscript{107} CT, 392, 396, 450-452; Cyriac of Ancona, \textit{Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium}, 68-72.

\textsuperscript{108} ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, LVIII, f. 184r; Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, II, f. 17; ThR, vol. 3, no. 2313, p. 29; AAV, vol. 15, nos. 3549, 3550, pp. 4-6.

\textsuperscript{109} DAD, Consilium Minus VI, f. 37; KrD, no. 806, p. 298.

\textsuperscript{110} DAD, Consilium Minus, VI, ff. 209, 221r; Diversa Notariae, XIX, f. 217r; Lettere di Levante, XI, ff. 215-215r; KrD, nos. 826, 827, 828, 829, p. 301-302.
Due to the nature of the conflict Carlo II was able to win by default. This was because the onus was on the illegitimate sons to remove Carlo from his position of power and replace him as head of the family. By contrast, Carlo only had to survive and remain in power to avoid losing. According to Chalkokondyles, Ercole and Menuno were able to conquer large swathes of territory, which are not specified, from Carlo II but were ultimately unable to overthrow their cousin. Carlo on the other hand was unable to repel his cousins as the mercenary army he had assembled, along with troops from Murad II, were ineffective. Therefore in this position of stalemate, Carlo II and the illegitimate cousins had to make peace to confirm their positions. These terms, also recorded by Chalkokondyles, suggest that Carlo agreed to cede all the land the illegitimate sons had taken from him on the condition that they no longer caused him any turmoil. The new boundaries created as a result of this peace are unclear but probably follow those described in Cyriac of Ancona’s account of his travels in 1435/1436. It is still unclear as to whether the illegitimate sons and their possessions were ever re-integrated into the Tocco lordship, with Carlo II as the de jure leader, or whether they remained independent as part of the fragmented fifteenth-century Balkans.

111 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
112 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
113 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
114 Cyriac of Ancona, Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium, 68-72.
115 A possible example that may show that the lands of the illegitimate sons reverted to Carlo II’s control upon their death can be found in the chronicle of Stefano Magno. According to this chronicle the settlement of Angelokastron (Anzolo Castro) was under the control of Leonardo III when it finally fell to the Ottomans in 1460. Stefano Magno, ed. Hopf, Chroniques, 201. We know from the family chronicle that the city of Angelokastron had been under Ercole’s control, suggesting that upon his death this returned to Carlo II or his son. CT, 396.
Regardless of whether the illegitimate sons were ever reintegrated into the Tocco lordship, aside from Cyriac of Ancona’s visit they have largely been lost to history. A possible mention of the bar-sinister offspring of Carlo I Tocco may come in the Barberini Chronicle, which mentioned a Moreot called ‘Tocco’ who fought against the Ottomans during their invasion of the region in the 1460s. This ‘Tocco’ may possibly refer to Menuno, who as previously established held lands in the Morea, or to his possible son Giovannetto as placed in Hopf’s genealogical table of the Tocco. Equally he may have been a creation of the anonymous author of the seventeenth century manuscript. Either way the family name had clearly permeated through the population of the Morea until the seventeenth century, suggesting that the family may have had a lasting influence on the region. Another possible reference is mentioned by Babinger, who states that one of the illegitimate sons, now known as Karlizade, became Sanjak-bey of Ioannina during the reign of Leonardo III Tocco. According to Babinger, Leonardo III refused to grant Karlizade the respect and tribute due to him. Mehmed II took this as an insult against himself and so the Tocco were finally expelled from the Balkans. As previously stated, this may refer to Triano as he is said to have been educated and raised amongst the Turks, though it could equally have been one of the other illegitimate sons. Unfortunately Babinger does not cite this claim and it is not supported by any of the major chronicles of the time. If true however, it would suggest that the illegitimate sons played a greater role in the fortunes of the Tocco lordship besides their involvement in the Tocco ‘civil war’.

117 According to Hopf, Giovannetto was born 1436. Hopf, *Chroniques*, 530 – 531.
118 Babinger, 383; Boykov, 247-267.
119 Babinger, 383.
120 CT, 366.
Despite Donald Nicol’s assertions, the succession crisis that began Carlo II Tocco’s reign was not ultimately responsible for the end of the Tocco lordship.\textsuperscript{121} Though the city of Ioannina surrendered to the forces of Sinan Paşa in October 1430, this proved to be the only loss for Carlo II during the conflict. The Tocco would continue to retain possessions on the Epirote mainland for a further fifty years, only losing territory sporadically to the Ottomans after Carlo II’s death in 1448.\textsuperscript{122} Though the events of the succession crisis were a setback for Carlo II, there was no major shift in power. The terms imposed upon Carlo II by Murad II were merely imposing continuity rather than forging a new power structure in the region. Furthermore, the disruption of the conflict appears to have largely been confined to the early 1430s and had no long-term effect upon the Tocco lordship. By 1433 Carlo II was in a position of strength: retaining his title of δεσποτής, and holding honorary membership of the Venetian Maggior Consiglio. Carlo would continue to rule over a strong and prosperous lordship during his near two-decade reign. By viewing the conflict through a teleological lens Nicol interpreted the events of the ‘civil war’ as ‘the beginning of the end’ for the family and ultimately responsible for their eventual expulsion from the region in 1479.\textsuperscript{123} The fall of the Tocco lordship was by no means predestined and its seeds had not been sown in the events of the early 1430s. The Tocco ‘civil war’ helped to establish the successful lordship of Carlo II Tocco rather than set in motion its eventual downfall.

\textsuperscript{121} Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
\textsuperscript{122} Stefano Magno, ed. Hopf, Chroniques, 208.
\textsuperscript{123} Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
Chapter Three – The Despotate of Arta under Carlo II Tocco:

Having discussed the ‘civil war’ and its relatively limited impact, this thesis will now turn to the practicalities of governing the Tocco despotate during Carlo II’s reign. This will include the geographical features that defined the lordship, the people who constituted its ruling elite and the offices that were developed and bestowed to ensure that the vital administrative tasks were carried out.

Geography of Carlo II’s Lordship:

Thence, our road followed the reedy and bird-haunted shore of the Ambracian Gulf to the many-legged bridge of Arta. Here among the giant Frankish debris and the Byzantine churches of the Despots of Epirus and the croaking frogs, we halted for a day or two’s reading and exploration.¹

In his travels across northern Greece, Sir Patrick Leigh Fermor eloquently described the geography of Northern Greece and in particular those of the former Tocco domains. In order to better understand Carlo II’s lordship it is of great importance to understand its physical geography.² As already discussed, producing an accurate political map of Carlo II’s Despotate, or any of the lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans, would be problematic. These lordships were small and largely fragmented, with no well-defined borders or strong

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centralised governments. Furthermore according to Fine, the Tocco appear to have had little control over the Epirote countryside, for they generally resided in the major settlements and fortresses of the region. These mainland possessions were therefore in a sense ‘islands’ often only connected together via the rivers of Epiros and the Ionian Sea, and this proved to be of great importance to maintain cohesion across the scattered Tocco possessions.

Another of the key geographical features of the Tocco lordship, and Epiros in general, were undoubtedly the Agrapha and Pindos Mountains. These mountains run through the ‘spine’ of the present day Hellenic Republic and separate Aetolia-Akarnania and Epiros from Thessally and Western Macedonia with only a narrow pass at Metsovo which allows access to Ioannina and Epiros. In the fifteenth century context, they provided a natural barrier between the Ottoman possessions and the Tocco lordship, which was largely impassable during the winter. There were a few villages in the Pindos which according to Sir Patrick Leigh Fermor were largely occupied by Vlachs, and it seems equally unlikely that the Tocco lordship had much control over this region.

As Myrto Veikou states:

The wild mountainous character of the terrain and the difficulty to access to its parallel valleys also separate this region from the adjacent areas; this is why ever since

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3 J. V. A. Fine, Jr., The Late Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest (Ann Arbor MI, 1994), 356-357.


5 Fermor, 64-66.

6 Even in the 1960s the settlements in the Pindos remained inaccessible during the winter months until highways were built to serve that region, see: Doxiadis Associates, ‘Feasibility Studies for Highways in Greece’, Ekistics, vol. 16 (1963), 37.

7 Fermor, 64-66, 191.
antiquity Epirus has tended to be introvert and self sufficient with a low standard of living.8

The physical geography of Carlo II’s lordship was therefore of great importance to its survival, protecting his lordship from the Ottomans which allowed him to pursue his own economic and diplomatic relations.

Figure III – Map of the Tocco domains. Produced by N. Fattori, January 2019.

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8 Veikou, 22.
Due to the loss of Ioannina during the events of the Tocco ‘civil war’ Carlo II restructured the centre of his lordship around the city of Arta. The city had formerly served as the ancient capital of the Komnenos-Doukas Despotate (1205-1337) and, according to Nada Zečević, Carlo II’s relocation to the city helped to legitimise his control over the region, reviving the ruling practices of the old despotate.\(^9\) As this analysis shall illustrate Carlo II certainly utilised his control over the city in his title. The city of Arta also had many geographical advantages, many of which Ioannina did not possess. The plains surrounding Arta were the most densely populated in all of Epiros, and remain so to the present day.\(^10\) The city also sat along the Arachthos River, which flows into the gulf of Ambrakia and beyond into the Ionian Sea. This meant that the Arta was perfectly interconnected, with access to the \textit{intra-culfium} trade through the Adriatic and Ionian seas, and was able to develop into a centre of trade. A market (\textit{μπόριο} or \textit{burgus}) had developed on the outskirts of the city which, as this thesis shall later expand upon, specialised in cereals.\(^11\) This interconnectivity appears to have been utilised by Carlo II, who according to Cyriac of Ancona had a palace along the river.\(^12\) As many of the Tocco possessions were fragmented across Epiros and the Ionian Islands, access to the water was of great importance to retaining a level of interconnectivity. Arta was

\(^9\) Zečević, TGR, 112-113.
\(^10\) Jonathan Shea attempts to prove how much more densely populated the plain of Arta was by utilising census data from the 1930s, in which the plain had a population density of nearly three times the Epirote average. J. Shea, \textit{The Late Byzantine City: Social, Economic and Institutional Profile} (University of Birmingham PhD Thesis, 2010), 154-155.
\(^11\) CT, 246, 388, 408 ; DA, Lamenta de Foris, XVI, f. 251 ; KrD, no. 1011, p. 332. In a sketch of thirteenth century Genoa, Edith Ennen illustrates that the city’s \textit{burgus} developed on the outside of the \textit{castrum} and \textit{civitas}, though remained within the fortifications. E. Ennen, \textit{The Medieval Town}, trans. N. Fryde, Europe in the Middle Ages Selected Studies 15 (Amsterdam & Oxford, 1979), 116. For a map of Arta in the late middle ages, see: J. Shea, \textit{The Late Byzantine City: Social, Economic and Institutional Profile} (University of Birmingham PhD Thesis, 2010), 163.
therefore not only a major economic centre within Epiros, but was equally politically important due to its connectivity with the rest of the Tocco domains and its association with the Komenos-Doukas Despotate. All these features undoubtedly made the city an ideal centre for Carlo II’s lordship.

Carlo II’s lordship also controlled most of the settlements around the Gulf of Ambrakia. Control over this large stretch of water would be of great importance to maintaining trade within the region, particularly those ships heading to Arta. At the mouth of the gulf sat the settlement of Preveza, built by the ancient city of Nicopolis. Control over this settlement would have been of great importance to maintaining control over the gulf and linking Arta to the Ionian Islands. It is unclear as to when Preveza came under the control of the Tocco, with no mentions of its conquest appearing in the family chronicle. We know that by 1448 the city of Preveza was governed by Iacopo Rosso, one of Carlo II’s key lieutenants, which further suggests its importance to the lordship. The other important settlement held by the Tocco in the gulf of Ambrakia was Vonitsa. Vonitsa was the first settlement on the Epirote mainland that came under the possession of the Tocco in 1362, and would remain under their control until their final expulsion from the region in 1479. As with Preveza its location near the mouth of the gulf made it strategically important. The final two settlements

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13 Sometimes called the Gulf of Arta or the Gulf of Actium. For further analysis of the settlements of the region, before the twelfth century, see: M. Veikou, Byzantine Epirus: A Topography of Transformation – Settlements of the seventh-twelfth centuries in Southern Epirus and Aetoloacarnania Greece (Leiden & Boston MA, 2012).
14 Cyriac of Ancona calls Preveza ‘Nicopolis’ in his diary entry from 8-13 September 1448. Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 342.
15 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 342.
16 CT, 222; Stefano Magno, ‘VIII. Estratti degli Annali Veneti di Stefano Magno’ ed. K. Hopf, Chroniques Gréco-Romanes – Inédites ou peu connues publiées avec notes et tables généalogiques (Berlin, 1873), 179-209, at 208.
in the Gulf of Ambrakia under Carlo II’s control were Kordobitsa and Efteleia. Both of these settlements are mentioned in the ‘Barges Agreement’ as locations from which cereals would be exported from Carlo II’s domain to the Republic of Ragusa.17 As a result these two towns probably held a greater economic role than Vonitsa and Preveza, but retained a strategic role as ports in the gulf. Carlo II’s possessions in the Gulf of Ambrakia were undoubtedly economically and strategically important to his lordship.

Lastly there were the vital possessions held during the reign of Carlo II: the Ionian Islands. They held a special place in the Tocco lordship, as they had been the first of their possessions in the region. As with his predecessor and successor, Carlo II retained control over the islands of Kephalonia, Ithaca, Leukas, and Zakynthos. These islands sat on the major trade lanes between Venice and the Eastern Mediterranean and so provided many economic benefits for the Tocco. The most important geographical feature of these islands was the channel of Santa Mavra, the stretch of water between the Akarnanian mainland and the island of Leukas. Control over this short stretch of water was of great economic and political significance and any attempt to tax the shipping passing through this channel could prove disastrous for the Venetian economy. This was a key motivation behind Venetian desires to acquire the islands for themselves, as this thesis shall elaborate upon. In order to avoid this situation the Venetian authorities offered citizenship to the Tocco lords and tried to bring them into their sphere of influence, with varying degrees of success.18 The many bays and islands of the region also provided an ideal locations for pirates to operate in, which would

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17 DA Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309 ; Nicol. Epiros II, 228, footnote 61.
18 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, I, f. 145r ; II, f. 17 ; AAV, vol. 15, no. 3550, pp. 5-6.
play an important economic role within the Tocco lordship.\textsuperscript{19} Carlo II’s control over these islands were therefore of great importance to the success of his lordship, and this was reflected in his title \emph{comes palatinus Cephaloniae, Ithacea, et Jacinti}.\textsuperscript{20} The Ionian Islands were the last of the Tocco possessions to fall to the Ottomans in 1479.\textsuperscript{21} They would briefly return into the Tocco hands when one of Carlo II’s sons, Antonio, captured Kephalonia and Zakynthos in 1482, though these would fall under Venetian rule upon his death in 1483.\textsuperscript{22}

**Governing the Lordship:**

The Tocco lordship was not a state in the modern sense but more of a family possession and it was run as such. That was certainly the case during the reign of Carlo II’s predecessor. Carlo I relied upon his kin to administer his domains and to lead his military forces. Such a system was not unique to the Tocco and can also be traced in the Gattilusio lordships in the Aegean and indeed in the last phase of the Byzantine Empire, in which the relatives of the Emperor were responsible for the administration of the appanages such as in the Morea which, by the fifteenth century, was largely separate from Constantinople.\textsuperscript{23} Undoubtedly the

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22 Miller, LiL, 487; Nicol, Epiros II, 213.

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most important member of Carlo I’s lordship was his younger brother Leonardo II Tocco. Before his death in either 1418 or 1419, Leonardo ruled as Count of Zakynthos and later Count of Kefalonia on behalf of his brother and commanded the Tocco forces in raids against Arta and Glarentza. Carlo I also heavily relied on three of his illegitimate sons: Ercole, Torno, and Menuno. As this thesis has previously illustrated, illegitimate sons ruled over their own possessions, commanded the Tocco forces, and acted as his ambassadors particularly to the Ottoman Porte. These were not the only kin that Carlo I brought into his government, as he employed his wider family including those who were based in Italy. There were, however, also non-relatives, notably other southern Italians and several local archontes, such as the Strategopoulos family of Ioannina. Of note were three of Carlo I’s close companions: Iacopo Rosso, Andrea Guidi de Strione and Mano Meliaresi, who helped Carlo I during his conquests.

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24 For further analysis on their relationship, see: N. Zečević, ‘Brotherly Love and Brotherly Service: On the relationship between Carlo and Leonardo Tocco’, Love, Marriage and Family Ties in the Later Middle Ages, ed. I. Davis, M. Müller, and S. Rees Jones (Turnhout, 2003), 143-156.


26 As the previous chapter has already stated there is only one reference to the fourth of the illegitimate sons Triano in the family chronicle. CT, 366.


These three would remain important figures during the reigns of Carlo II and Leonardo III and provided an important element of continuity for the Tocco during their time in the Balkans.

Donald Nicol and Nada Zečević have characterised the accession of Carlo II in 1429 as inaugurating a major change within the structure of the Tocco lordship, namely the abandonment of the kin-based system. That claim is debatable as we shall see at a later stage. Nevertheless, for the time being it is not unreasonable to surmise that Carlo II may well have reconsidered how much faith he could put in his own kinsmen, giving that his half-brothers had conspired to rob him of his inheritance. Those particular individuals could never be trusted again. Not surprisingly, he turned instead to his uncle's former companions, notably Iacopo Rosso, Andrea Guidi de Strione and Mano Meliaresi. Rosso was without doubt the most important of these. According to Laonikos Chalkokondyles, Rosso was one three companions, alongside Andrea Guidi de Strione and Mano Meliaresi, who helped Carlo I during his conquests in Epiros and the Morea. Along with Galeazzo de Santa Colomba these three would also go on to act as the governors of the Tocco realm upon Carlo II’s death in

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31 Nicol, Epiros II, 200, 204-205 ; Zečević, TGR, 113.

32 Also called, Jacobus Rosus, Jacobus Russo, Jacobus Rubeus and Iacopo Ruphu. Rosso also appears to have gone by the name Jacobus Schroffe. In August/September of 1441 Rosso and a Dinos Cavalaropou were granted ‘safe-conduct’ by the Ragusan authorities. In one record he is known as ‘Jacobus Schroffe’ and is recorded in another ‘Jacobus Rubeus’ suggesting they were both the same person. DA, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 19r ; Consilium Maius, VI, f. 132r ; KrD, no. 963, p. 324. Zečević disagrees believing that Iacopo Rosso and ‘Jacobus Schroffe Rubeus’ are different people as seen from her table of ‘Prominent Italians in the Tocco service under Carlo II’. Zečević, TGR, 182

33 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 344-346. See also: Kaldellis, vol 1, footnote 108, 344-346, 522-523. Both Rosso and Meliaresi’s role as companions of Carlo I are supported in the Tocco Chronicle. For Rosso see: CT, 350, 494-500. For Meliaresi see: CT, 288-289.
1448, as Leonardo III was still a minor, further suggesting their important role within the lordship. Iacopo Rosso appears to have been one of the major figures of Carlo II’s lordship and held several key positions, notably Captain of Leukas and Governor of Preveza. Control of these settlements would have been of great importance to the economic success of the lordship, which further illustrates his importance to Carlo II. Rosso also appears to have played a diplomatic role on behalf of his suzerain in particular with the Republic of Ragusa. Rosso was involved in the cereal trade, the arms trade, and even received a privilege of ‘safe-conduct’ from the Ragusan authorities in 1441. Iacopo Rosso was undoubtedly one of Carlo II’s key Lieutenants and played an important role in his lordship. This maintained a level of continuity between Carlo’s lordship and that of his uncle.

Carlo also seems to have looked beyond his own lordship for loyal servants: to the Neopolitan kingdom where his family had originated and was in the process of being absorbed into the kingdom of Aragon. Undoubtedly, the most important of these new arrivals was Ser Antonellus Barges who seems to have been of Catalan origin. His most important contribution to Carlo II’s lordship was undoubtedly his role in organising the ‘Barges Agreement’ in July 1436, where he is referred to as a familiaris and procurator of Carlo

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36 For Rosso’s involvement in the ‘Barges Agreement’, see: DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r (in Margin) ; KrD, no. 886, pp. 311-312. For his involvement in acquiring bombards in June 1448, see: DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, X, f. 201 ; KrD, no. 1136, p. 355. For his privilege of ‘safe-conduct’ see: DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 19r ; Consilium Maius, VI, f. 132r ; KrD, no. 963, p. 324.
38 Barges also appears to have gone by the name Antonellus Catellanus, further illustrating his connection to Alfonso the Magnanimous. DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LI, ff. 113-113r ; KrD, no. 921, p. 317 ; Zečević, TGR, 182.
II. According to Cyriac of Ancona, Barges also held the title of ἀρχιτρικλίνα, or President of the Banquet. Another notable Neopolitan figure in Carlo II’s court was Niccolò de Ansalona, described by Cyriac of Ancona as ‘a distinguished Sicilian knight at the court of the Acarnanians in Arta.’ We know from the Ragusan archival sources that Ansalona was heavily involved in the slave trade, and was one of the main participants in the Jagni Rosso case that lasted from October 1447 and January 1448. It appears that Ansalona developed contacts with the Ragusan authorities during this period, as Cyriac of Ancona recorded a letter written by a Ragusan patrician Pasquale de Sorgo to Niccolò de Ansalona. Another of those involved in the Jagnia Rosso case was a Ser Johannes Spartier, a Catalan merchant based in Ragusa, who represented Ansalona in the Ragusan courts. A further official of Carlo II’s lordship is recorded in the ‘Barges Agreement’ called Ser Raynaldus Leone, who held the title of notarius publicum. Another important Catalan figure who appeared in Carlo II’s domains during this period was Bernardus Villamaria of Barcelona, who is recorded in a Ragusan source as being a pirate within the Gulf of Arta. Villamaria was more than a pirate, as this thesis shall later establish, and this is yet another signal to the Aragonese influence that began to appear in the Balkans during Carlo II’s reign. During Carlo II’s reign these new figures of

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39 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
40 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 346.
41 ‘N. Ansalonem Siculum equitem clarum.’ Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 348.
45 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 273r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
Catalan and Neapolitan origin began to play a much more important role, taking over many of the responsibilities of the lordship.

Not all of Carlo II’s circle had Neopolitan or Catalan origins. Another important figure in Carlo II’s lordship was that of Francesco Pitti, a scion of one of the most prestigious Florentine banking families.\textsuperscript{48} The Florentines were heavily involved in politics and trade within the Adriatic, and the Tocco had previously developed close relationships with the Acciaiuoli family, another of the great Florentine families, through the marriage between Carlo I Tocco and Francesca Acciaiuoli.\textsuperscript{49} Pitti appears to have played a key economic role for the Tocco, facilitating trade between the lordship of Carlo II and the Republic of Ragusa as this thesis will illustrate. Despite playing an important role in the economic success of Carlo II’s lordship Pitti was a controversial character and on two separate occasions had his goods sequestered by a Ragusan court and was accused by a Ragusan merchant Vitus Vlatković of assault.\textsuperscript{50} Despite these Pitti was protected by Carlo II’s officials, including Ser Antonellus Barges, suggesting that his role in the Tocco lordship was of great importance. Pitti was not the only Florentine to arrive in the Tocco domains during Carlo II’s reign, as shall later be shown, but he played a major role in its economic success.

Even though Carlo II turned away from some of his relatives, he did make use of others. The clearest example of this was undoubtedly Carlo’s relationship with his aunt

\textsuperscript{49} For further analysis of the Florentine involvement in trade in the Adriatic, see: R. A. Goldthwaite, \textit{The Economy of Renaissance Florence} (Baltimore MD, 2009), 175-193.
\textsuperscript{50} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 158r; Lamenta de Foris, XVI, f. 251; KrD, nos. 852, 1011, p. 305-306, 332.
Francesca Acciaiuoli, who played an important role during the early years of his reign, particularly during the Tocco ‘Civil War’. As previously stated, Francesca was undoubtedly one of the most able and important women of the fourteenth and fifteenth century Balkans.\textsuperscript{51} As with her illegitimate step-sons Francesca also played an important role in the administration of her husband’s lordship, ruling over the castles of Santa Mavra on Leukas and Saint George of Kephalonia.\textsuperscript{52} Upon the death of her husband she received the island of Leukas and the town of Vonitsa as part of her inheritance, and ruled over both of these during the beginning of Carlo II’s reign. During the succession crisis which plagued the Tocco domains Francesca remained loyal to Carlo II. She appears to have played an active role during the conflict through her utilisation of the pirates based within her lands.\textsuperscript{53} In particular the pirates within her domains captured George Sphrantzes in March 1430, who had been sent by Constantine Palaiologos to mediate the conflict.\textsuperscript{54} The nature of this event is unclear, but since Francesca was Carlo II’s ally in the ‘civil war’ this may suggest that she was attempting to avert Constantine’s attempt to mediate the conflict. This loyalty is further confirmed through her dealings with the Venetians in 1430 which illustrate her support for her nephew as the legitimate heir to the Tocco lordship, and specifically to her domains.\textsuperscript{55} There are no further records of Francesca Tocco, and according to Dionysios Stathakopoulos she probably

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item J. Chrysostomides, ‘Italian Women in Greece in the late Fourteenth and early Fifteenth Centuries’, \textit{Rivista di Studi Bizantini e Slavi} 9 (Miscellanea A, Pertusi), vol. 2 (1982), 119-132, at 119-120 ; Miller, LiL, 371.
\item For further reference to pirates based with Francesca’s lands, see: ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, LVIII, f. 1, 1r ; AAV, vol. 14, no. 3405, pp. 108-109 ; ThR, vol. 2, no. 2214, p. 278.
\item Sphrantzes, ed. Maisano, 68, trans. Philippides, 45.
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died in 1432.\textsuperscript{56} Despite only being around for a few years of Carlo II’s reign, Francesca played an important role in the Tocco lordship particularly through her support in the succession crisis that began her nephew’s reign. Her continued support and involvement in his lordship suggests that Carlo II did not entirely abandon the kin-based system preferred by his uncle.

Carlo II also turned to other members of his aunt’s kin, the Acciaiuoli family. During his reign the Florentine influence in the region increased significantly with members of some of the major Florentine families, including the Acciaiuoli, Machiavelli, Medici, and Pitti, travelling to the Balkans particularly to the Florentine Duchy of Athens.\textsuperscript{57} Due to the close connection between the Acciaiuoli and Tocco, through the marriage of Carlo I and Francesca, several Florentines connected to the Acciaiuoli arrived in the Tocco domains during Carlo II’s reign. The two most notable of which were Angelo di Jacopo di Acciauoli and Niccolò Machiavelli.\textsuperscript{58} Angelo di Jacopo di Accaiuoli was a member of the Acciaiuoli family and a cousin of three of the Dukes of Athens: Antonio I (1394-1395, 1402-1435), Nerio II (1435-1439) and Antonio II (1439-1441). He had been a keen supporter of Cosimo de’Medici and was expelled from the city in 1433, when Cosimo was forced into exile by Rinaldo degli Albizzi and Palla Strozzi, and spent time in the Tocco domains during this time.\textsuperscript{59} Another member of the Acciaiuoli family, Antonio, is recorded in Hopf’s genealogical table of the Acciaiuoli as


\textsuperscript{57} Miller, LiL, 400.

\textsuperscript{58} Zečević places both of these in her table of Italians in the service of Carlo II Tocco. Zečević, TGR, 182.

the Bishop of Kephalonia (1427-1445). According to Zečević, Machiavelli was part of the Florentine aristocracy who had arrived at the court of Carlo I along with Nerio di Donato Acciaiuoli in 1423-1424, who had been sent to the Tocco lordship to learn Greek. Both Miller and Zečević suggest that this illustrates the presence of humanistic activities in the Tocco lordship, and attracted those who considered it the cradle of their classical heroes. This was undoubtedly the case for Cyriac of Ancona who according to Bodnar, viewed Arta as one of his ‘favourite ports of call’ and studied the antiquities found in and around the city. The Florentine influence in the Tocco lordship, particularly that of the Acciaiuoli family, suggests that Carlo II turned to the kin of his aunt. Though they do not appear to have played as great a role in the administration of the lordship as Carlo I’s former companions, notably Iacopo Rosso, they remained important members of his court after his ascension. The role of the Acciaiuoli in Carlo II’s lordship further suggests that there was not a major change to the structure of the Tocco lordship, as many of those involved during Carlo I’s reign remained into Carlo II’s reign.

Carlo II’s Marriages:

Carlo II’s early life is largely mysterious with very little information available. We are still unaware of many basic details, including his date of birth and the identity of his mother, the

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60 Hopf, *Chroniques Gréco-Romanes*, 476; Zečević, TGR, 93.
61 Zečević, TGR, 96, 98, 182.
62 Zečević, TGR, 95-96.
63 Miller, LiL, 400-401; Zečević, TGR, 96.
wife of Leonardo II Tocco. The only real information available concerns his life after the death of his father, according to which he was brought to live with his uncle and aunt and groomed to be the heir to the Tocco domains. Another aspect of Carlo II’s life about which we are unsure concerns his marriages. Though all the studies on the Tocco agree that Carlo II married Ramondina di Ventimiglia relatively late in his reign, he may have had a previous wife. According to Donald Nicol, he had earlier married the daughter of Nerata, the widow of Muriki Spata, and received the settlement of Riniasa as his own domain. This may be supported by a reference in the Tocco Chronicle in which a ‘Leonardo’ married the daughter of Nerata and received Riniasa to rule over. Schirò, in his prosopographical lexicon, suggests that this ‘Leonardo III’ was in fact Carlo II which certainly supports Nicol’s interpretation. Such a marriage was clearly designed to help bring an end to the rift between the Tocco and Spata families which finally ended when Ya’qūb Spata was captured and executed in October 1416 and the city of Arta finally came under Carlo I’s control.

The assertion that this ‘Leonardo’ was in fact Carlo II cannot be accepted as proven beyond doubt, however. The two other genealogical tables of the Tocco, by Karl Hopf and

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65 Two of the three genealogical tables of the Tocco make suggestions as to who this figure may have been. According to Zečević, Leonardo II married a woman called Lappa whose name was mentioned in a codex of the Anafonetria church on Zakynthos, which mentions the pair as the founders of the church in 1401. However as Zečević suggests this inscription no longer exists and cannot be verified. Zečević, TGR, 176-177, 211. Karl Hopf on the other hand suggests that Leonardo II’s wife may have been a member of the Zaccaria family. Hopf, Chroniques Gréco-Romanes, 530-531.
66 CT, 478; Baldassar Maria Remondini, ‘Estratto dalla storia inedita, antica e moderna della città e isola di Zante’, ed. K. Hopf, Chroniques Gréco-Romanes – Inédites ou peu connues publiées avec notes et tables généalogiques (Berlin, 1873), 341-345, at 343.
67 Nicol Epiros II, 190.
68 CT, 412.
69 CT, 594.
70 CT, 430, 440-442.
Nada Zečević, disagree with Nicol and Schirò’s interpretations and omit this marriage.\textsuperscript{71} Another possible piece of evidence which may cast doubt on Nicol’s interpretation concerns the chronology of this event. The marriage between this ‘Leonardo’ and Nerata’s daughter is undated by Schirò, though based solely on where it comes in the family chronicle it was possibly sometime between 1415 and 1416.\textsuperscript{72} If the chronology of the chronicle is correct then it would suggest that this ‘Leonardo’ is unlikely to have been Carlo II. As Carlo II began his reign in July 1429 as a minor, and was described in a Venetian document from March 1430 as ‘magnificus dominus Carolus Iunior ducha Cefalonie’, it is significantly unlikely that he would have married in the 1410s, particularly as he had only just been born.\textsuperscript{73} However, as previously stated, the chronology of the Tocco chronicle is often incorrect and events are occasionally mentioned out of order so it may not fall within this time bracket. It also is unlikely that this ‘Leonardo’ is Leonardo II as he is referred to by his title of μέγας κοντόσταβλος, which he received in 1415, from this point onwards in the chronicle, rather than simply by his first name.

Another possible identity for this ‘Leonardo’ is suggested by Nada Zečević in her analysis of the wider kin of the Tocco. She believes that the ‘Leonardo’ who married Nerata’s

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\textsuperscript{71} Hopf, Chroniques Gréco-Romanes, 530-331 ; Zečević, TGR, 211.

\textsuperscript{72} The events which Schirò dates in the chronicle either side of the marriage are Ya’qūb Spata’s expulsion from Arta in 1415/1416 and his capture and execution on 1 October 1416. CT, 384, 430.

\textsuperscript{73} We know that Carlo II began his reign as a minor and according to Chalkokondyles he would later lead a force of mercenaries and soldiers provided by Murad II to against Ercole and Menuno. Laonikos Chalkokondyles, The Histories, trans. A. Kandellis, 2 vols. (Cambridge MA & London, 2014), vol. 1, 394. This suggests that he may have been towards the end of his minority when he ascended to the head of the Tocco lordship in July 1429. I suspect that he may have been in his mid-late teens, either fourteen or fifteen, at the time of his succession and this would therefore place his birthdate around 1414/1415. For the Venetian document mentioned above, see: ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Secretae, XI, ff. 85-85r ; ThR, vol 2, no. 2186, pp. 271-272.
daughter was a member of the Neapolitan branch of the Tocco descended from Pietro Tocco, the eldest brother of Leonardo I Tocco. According to the family chronicle Leonardo was brought to Carlo I’s court as a child and raised to be a knight (καβαλλικευτής) and Carlo I’s heir. This suggests that Carlo II had not yet been born at this point and Carlo I was looking to groom a legitimate heir to his domains. This Leonardo Tocco was therefore briefly of great importance to the Tocco lordship and his marriage would have had the power to end the rift between the Tocco and Spata and brought further legitimacy to the Tocco, particularly in the city of Arta. However Zečević does suggest that there are problems with this marriage, particularly since a near identical passage follows this account in which Ercole married the daughter of Sguros Bua Spata. This raises more questions than answers concerning the marriage between this Leonardo and Nerata’s daughter, and further illustrates some of the inaccuracies of the Tocco Chronicle. Due to the inconsistent support for this claim and its confliction with other chronological aspects of his life and reign, it is unlikely that Carlo II married Nerata’s daughter. Carlo II’s marriage to Ramondina di Ventimiglia certainly proved to be much more significant, in diplomatic and political terms, and will receive greater study in this analysis.

75 CT, 410–412 ; Zečević, ‘The Italian Kin of the Tocco Despot’, 244.
76 Zečević, ‘The Italian Kin of the Tocco Despot’, 245.
77 CT, 414 ; Zečević, ‘The Italian Kin of the Tocco Despot’, 245.
The Occupations and Titles:

Another area of continuity between Carlo II’s rule and that of his uncle was their use of titles. The titles used by all of the Tocco lords came from a mixture of Byzantine and Neapolitan origins which illustrate two of the major influences upon their lordship. As with many of the other Latin lords of the region, the Tocco utilised Byzantine titles to further legitimise their rule in the region. Both the Tocco and Zaccaria utilised the Byzantine title of δεσποτής, though the use of this particular Byzantine title by the Latin lords was not universal. The Gattilusio preferred to style themselves as αὐθέντης. According to the Tocco chronicle the citizens of Ioannina asked Carlo I to appeal for the title of δεσποτής in order to legitimise his control over the city. Despite retaining little political power in the fifteenth century, the Byzantine Emperor retained a level of prestige and soft-power throughout the region and this was undoubtedly the reason behind many of the Latin lordships turning to the Byzantines for legitimacy. Along with the desire to acquire this legitimacy the Tocco also utilised the titles of their forebears in the Kingdom of Naples. The titles used by the Tocco therefore highlight the multiple influences of the Latin lordships of the Balkans.

79 CT, 338, 378-380
Turning first to the titles used by Carlo II himself, many of the Ragusan and Venetian documents distinguish him from his uncle by calling him ‘Karolo Secundo’. His own preferred title was δεσποτής. This title had been granted to his predecessor in 1415 by the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos. Upon his death, Carlo II inherited his uncle’s title and continued to use it throughout his reign. There is significant disagreement between Thekla Sansaridou-Hendrickx and Nada Zečević as to the nature of this title. Zečević, in her long-term analysis of the Tocco family, argues that the Tocco utilised the Angeloi/Angevin title of Despotus Romaniae. This suggests that Manuel II’s grant was merely a confirmation of the previous title held by the Angevin princes of Taranto rather than the creation of a brand new title. However Sansaridou-Hendrickx views the Tocco lordship from a different perspective. She suggests that though it was primitive in nature the Tocco lordship was built upon Byzantine traditions rather than those of a ‘western state’, though it was a direct successor to Byzantium and lacked the unity of the Serbs or Bulgarians. When Manuel II granted Carlo I the title of δεσπότης he also granted Leonardo II the title of μέγας κοντόσταυλος. This Palaiologan title was a successor to the old Byzantine title κόμης τοῦ στάβλου and Guillard views this grant to Leonardo as being part of this tradition. Equally both brothers were granted the titles of Κατακουζηνάτοι, essentially honorary membership of the Kantakuzenos clan, the clan of the Byzantine imperial family. Paul Magdalino has

81 CT, 378-382.
82 Zečević, TGR, 91-107.
83 Zečević, TGR, 91-92.
85 CT, 380.
87 CT, 380-382.
suggested that the interpretation of this grant by the author of the Tocco chronicle, and the citizens of Ioannina, is probably not a true reflection of this grant but illustrates the importance of such patronage due to how it was received in Epiros. This suggests that the title of δεσπότης granted to Carlo I, and used by Carlo II, was of Byzantine rather than Angevin origin as Zečević suggests.

Carlo illustrated his control over the city of Arta by including the city alongside the title of δεσπότης. The exact reason behind this is unclear. Nada Zečević suggests that Carlo II was not only implying a connection to the Komnenos-Doukas Despotate but also appealing to Alfonso the Magnanimous who had begun appropriating the legacy of the Neapolitan Angevins. Donald Nicol on the other hand believes he was merely realistically portraying his circumstances as Carlo I was the last true Despot of the whole of Epiros. This is largely supported in the documents of the Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, in which Carlo I is referred to as the ‘Despot of the Romans’, though in one document he is referred to as the ‘Despot of Ioannina’ and in another as the ‘Despot of Arta’. Carlo II also illustrated his control over the Ionian Islands, particularly Kephalonia and Leukas, within his titles. His two titles of Duke of Leukas and Count Palatine of Kephalonia were utilised in his dealings with the Ragusan and Venetian authorities. In some of their records Carlo is also referred to as the Duke of

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89 Zečević, TGR, 112-113, 116-117 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 198.
91 As the other possessions in the County Palatine, Ithaca and Zakynthos are often included alongside Kephalonia in the title. ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, II, f. 17 ; ThR, vol. 3, no. 2313, p. 29 ; AAV, vol. 15, no. 3550, pp.
Kephalonia, which may either be an abbreviation or a mistake on the scribe’s part. Carlo II’s other titles are also occasionally abbreviated with the term ‘et cetera’ in Ragusan documents, suggesting that his control over Arta was more important to the Ragusan authorities due to their economic relationship. Carlo II therefore held three major titles during his reign, which illustrated his control over the Ionian Islands and a major city on the Epirote mainland. These largely mirror the titles held by Carlo I which further illustrates continuity between the two rulers.

The titles used by the prominent members of Carlo II’s court similarly come from a mixture of Byzantine and Neapolitan origins. Due to the important role played by these familiares in the administration of his lordship they were bestowed with titles to illustrate their importance. As one of the most powerful members, Iacopo Rosso held several titles. Rosso held governance over the city of Preveza, which sat at the mouth of the Gulf of Ambrakia, utilising the titles of gubernator or nobili praefecto. This is similar to the term of διακράτηση used to denote Menuno Tocco’s control over Aetos. Iacopo also held the titles of Captain and Vicarius of Leukas as recorded in several Venetian documents. Another of Carlo II’s key lieutenants, Ser Antonellus Barges also held several titles in the Tocco lordship. According to

5-6 ; DA, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309. Carlo’s title of Count Palatine is also illustrated in Stefano Magno’s chronicle. Stefano Magno, ed. Hopf, Chroniques, 208 ; W. Miller, ‘Ithake under the Franks’, The English Historical Review, vol. 21 (1906), 513-517, at 515.
93 In one letter from the Ragusan authorities, Carlo II is referred to as ‘domino Karolo Secundo Arte dispotate et cetera’. DA, Lettere di Levante, XII, f. 163 ; IHC, vol. 2, p. 365 ; KrD, no. 939, p. 320.
94 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 342.
95 CT, 450-452.
the agreement organised by Barges and the Ragusan authorities in July 1436, regarding the trade in cereal, he served in the role of *procurator* which undoubtedly gave him the legitimacy to organise such a agreement.\textsuperscript{97} Barges also held the title of ἀρχιτρικλίνα, or President of the Banquet, which was recorded by Cyriac of Ancona on a hunting trip in September 1448.\textsuperscript{98} The fact that Barges and Rosso held several roles and titles within Carlo II’s lordship further illustrates their importance to him. They were not, however, the only people to hold titles in his realm. Another two of Carlo II’s officials are also mentioned by Cyriac of Ancona in his visit to Arta in 1436-1437. A Georgios Ragnarolo Pisauriensis served as Carlo II’s secretary during his early reign and a Bernardus Marcello was a courier for Carlo II.\textsuperscript{99} A final official Ser Raynaldus Leone is recorded in the ‘Barges Agreement’ serving as a *notarius publicum* during Carlo II’s reign, who had produced a document illustrating the exclusive rights granted to Barges to procure cereals for sale in Ragusa.\textsuperscript{100} This further illustrates the continued utilisation of the Neapolitan notary system which had been in function during the reigns of his predecessors.\textsuperscript{101} The retention of the tiles further illustrates the continuity between the reigns of Carlo I and Carlo II and further suggests that the impact of the Tocco ‘civil war’ has been exaggerated by previous studies.

\textsuperscript{97} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{98} Cyriac of Ancona, *Later Travels*, 346.
\textsuperscript{100} DA, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 273r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{101} Zečević, TGR, 93.
Chapter Four – Carlo II and the Republic of Ragusa: An economic policy?

Another aspect to consider when reassessing the lordship of Carlo II Tocco is its economic role within the Adriatic Sea and the Balkans during the fifteenth century.\(^1\) Carlo, like many of the elites of the region was actively involved in trade as it could provide a valuable source of income.\(^2\) This was certainly the case for the aristocracy in the remnants of the Byzantine Empire, for which trade often provided their sole source of income.\(^3\) Due to the city of Arta’s location on the Arachthos River, which leads to the Gulf of Ambrakia and the Ionian and Adriatic Seas, the Tocco lordship was fully intertwined with the *intra-culfium* trade routes between Venice and the Eastern Mediterranean.\(^4\) Another city that sat upon this lucrative and economically significant route was Ragusa, also called Dubrovnik, which became economically intertwined with Carlo II’s lordship and as a result the two developed a close relationship. Though connections between Arta and Ragusa predated Carlo II, during his


reign they developed a much closer economic and political relationship. According to Zečević the strength of this relationship was as a result of Ragusa’s proximity to his realm and its influence on trade in the region. However the correspondence between the two suggests that this was a stronger relationship than simply one of convenience.

Richard Unger argues that it was not until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that states developed economic policies based upon a desire for growth, however the foundation of such policies can be traced back to the growth in trade during the high middle ages. This certainly appears to be true of the Ottomans in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. Halil İnalcık argued that the Ottoman state had a deliberate policy to develop the urban centres of its realm, notably Bursa, Adrianople, and Constantinople, into commercial and industrial centres. Another key example of this was the Macedonian town of Serres (Siroz) which developed as a centre for the production of textiles, predominatly leather or silk, and as the location of an imperial mint. Heath Lowry suggests that Serres was ‘immediately

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6 Zečević, TGR, 115.
recognisable’ as an Ottoman settlement and part of a growing Ottoman heartland which had developed after the conquest of the region within the old Byzantine urban centres.10 İnalck suggests the motivations behind developing these urban centres was undoubtedly to consolidate and extend the power of the ruler and to maximise sources of revenue, by forcing the prosperity of the productive classes.11 This created a situation in which the Ottoman state performed basic economic functions within their domains, and it had influence over all financial and political interests.12 As a result officials were adopted or created to take responsibility for the development of sources of revenue, notably the tax farmers.13 The economic agenda of the Ottomans was also heavily linked to their diplomatic relations, and by the fifteenth century they were able to economically unify the Balkans under their leadership, including bringing the Republic of Ragusa into this sphere.14 All these factors suggests the Ottomans had some form of simple economic policy.

It is less clear as to whether Carlo II Tocco had an economic policy. As there are no Tocco equivalents to the Tahir Defters, fifteenth century Ottoman cadastral surveys, it is unclear as to whether there was much development of the Tocco possesions.15 As the last chapter illustrated the Tocco lordship still largely relied on familial ties, particularly his Acciaiuoli kin

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14 İnalck, ‘The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600’, 258-259. İnalck illustrates the economic integration between Ragusa and the Ottomans through the parity in value between the Ottoman Akça and the Ragusan Grosso against the Venetian Ducat during the period 1391-1410. İnalck, ‘The Ottoman State: Economy and Society, 1300-1600’, 269, footnote 11.
15 Many of the Tahir Defters have been published. The first of which was by İnalck, see: H. İnalck, Hicri 835 Tarihli Sütret-i Defter-i Sancak-i Arvanid (Ankara, 1954). Beldiceanu published thirty-five of these registers. N. Beldiceanu, Le timar dans l’État ottoman (début XIVe – début XVle siècle) (Wiesbaden, 1980).
and his uncle’s former companions, and there does not appear to have been any development of administrators or officials to maximise sources of revenue. Despite this the Tocco lordship was heavily involved in trade, which provided a key source of income during the reign of Carlo II, and Ragusa would become their key economic partner in this endeavour. It appears that Carlo II actively sought to develop an economic relationship between the two; regularly dispatching his representatives to the city throughout his reign. Due to the repeated work of Carlo’s representatives, this relationship covered multiple facets, and these will be explored in the next two chapters of this thesis. The following chapter shall focus on the cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa and the role of the authorities of both cities in re-establishing these links. Other aspects of this relationship will also be considered, notably the granting of privileges, the arms trade, slavery and piracy, and the provision of information. These economic activities were reliant on the close involvement of the officials from both polities, and the archival sources show that Carlo II’s representatives played a key role in these. The role of his officials further alludes to Carlo II’s lordship desiring to align itself with the Republic of Ragusa both politically and economically. Though it appears that Carlo II’s lordship did not have an economic policy, as the Ottomans appear to have had, he certainly had an economic agenda to tie his lordship to the Republic of Ragusa.

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16 These conclusions are supported by Hendrickx and Sansaridou-Hendrickx, who argue that that the Tocco were unable to build up a state in either the Western or Byzantine traditions, and relied on traditional methods of governance. B. Hendrickx and T. Sansaridou-Hendrickx, ‘The “Despotate” of the Tocco as “State” (14th-15th Century)’, Acta Patristica et Byzantina, vol. 19 (2008), 135-152.
The Ragusan Government:

In order to better understand the relationship between Carlo II’s lordship and Ragusa, it is necessary to study the various aspects of the Ragusan government and the role they played in foreign policy. The government of the Republic of Ragusa was praised by Chalkokondyles, for being well governed and for producing prudent and sensible men. The seventeenth-century English Pamphleteer John Streater used its government to illustrate the virtues of ‘Commonwealth government’. According to Rheubottom the government of Ragusa followed a similar model to that of Florence and Venice, and was heavily influenced by the Iuris-dicti of Azo and the political systems outlined in Aristotle’s Politics, which were considered the key political philosophies of the late Middle Ages. Both Oleh Havrylyshyn and Nora Srzentić argue that the political institutions were a key reason behind its continued success as an economic power in the Eastern Mediterranean. The administration of the Republic of Ragusa was divided into roughly three branches of government, the Consilium Maius, the Consilium Minus and the Consilium Rogatorum. Philippus de Diversis de Quartigianis, a doctor of the arts and orator from Lucca, who taught grammar in Ragusa during the 1430s produced an account of the city’s government during his time there.

Another source that further informs us of the government of Ragusa is the Statute of Dubrovnik, the legal code of the city. Though it was first produced in 1272, while the city was under Venetian rule, it was updated and republished in 1432 and therefore has significant information about the Ragusan government during Carlo II’s reign. The Statute informs us of the process by which the councillors and judges where elected to the Consilium Maius and Consilium Minus, the oaths they swore, and some of the legal restraints imposed on the members of these institutions. These sources along with the interactions between the various government institutions and the representatives of Carlo II, records of which are now in the Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku, help to further illuminate the lordship of Carlo II.

The most important branch of the government of Ragusa was undoubtedly the Consilium Maius or great council. Phillipus de Diversis succinctly describes the power of the Consilium Maius as ‘Hujus breviter est omnis Reipublicae potestas’. By the fifteenth century the council comprised all the adult males of the thirty-three patrician families of the city, as its membership had become exclusive in 1332. Despite being the de-facto centre of power in the Republic, the Consilium Maius generally concerned itself with the elections for all the other offices of the state, notably members of the other councils and the Rector.

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22 The Statute of Dubrovnik of 1272, trans. V. Rimac, ed. V. Bače and N. Lonza (Dubrovnik, 2012). Henceforth, SoD.
23 SoD, Book I, Sections III-IV, pp. 74-76; Book II, Sections IV-V, pp. 102-104; Book VI, Section XVIII, p. 236.
24 De Diversis, 58.
25 Rheubottom, 30. The thirty-three patrician families of the fifteenth century are listed by Phillipus de Diversis in his analysis of the city: ‘Videlicet Babalea, Basseglea, Benessea, Binzolea, Bonea, Bondea, Bucignolea, Buchia, Caboghea, Caluhia, Crucea, Gradea, Gondolea, Gozzea, Ghetaldea, Giorgsea, Luccarea, Luchea, Martinussia, Menzea, Miascogna, Palmotea, Procula, Prodanela, Pozzea, Raynea, Restea, Sarachea, Sorghea, Tudisea, Volzea, Zamagnea et Zervia.’ De Diversis, 58. For further analysis of the patrician families of Ragusa both before and after 1332, see: I. Manken, Dubrovački Patricijat u XIV boku, 2 vols. SANU, PI 340 (Belgrade, 1960).
26 A list of the various offices in the Republic of Ragusa has been compiled by Rheubottom. Rheubottom, 44-46. Rheubottom previously published this table in a collection of studies, see: D. Rheubottom, ‘Tidy structures and
was largely conducted by other branches of the Ragusan government, however the *Consilium Maius* still had the power to make the most crucial diplomatic and economic decisions, often delegating responsibility over these to a special section of their membership. This role is confirmed through their interactions with Carlo II’s representatives, which concern trade agreements and confirming the decisions made by the other branches of the government.

The Rector served as the head of state of the Republic of Ragusa. It was largely a ceremonial position and the holders influence was largely reduced as they were only in office for a month, and could not be re-elected to the position for two years. Both Harris and Stuard suggest that this was because the patricians of the *Consilium Maius* were wary of a strong executive after Venetian rule came to an end in 1358, ironically this sentiment was itself very Venetian. Despite these limitations of its power, the position was still highly valued by the Ragusan nobles and the Rector retained influence over foreign policy. The Rector attended to matters of foreign policy and government with the support of his minor council, or *Consilium Minus*. As such a large body as the *Consilium Maius* could not meet frequently a smaller council was created to attend to matters of state. According to Carter it also acted as

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messy practice: Ideologies of order and the practicalities of office-holding in Ragusa’, *Orders and Hierarchies in Late Medieval and Renaissance Europe*, ed. J. Denton (Basingstoke & London, 1999), 126-146, at 131-133. This thesis shall only refer to the version in Rheubottom’s monograph throughout. For further analysis of the elections to these offices, see: N. Lonza, ‘Election Procedure in the Republic of Dubrovnik’, DA, vol. 8 (2004), 7-41.

27 Rheubottom, 31.
28 De Diversis, 58 ; Harris, *Dubrovnik*, 130, 133 ; Rheubottom, 34.
30 Harris, *Dubrovnik*, 133.
31 Rheubottom, 34-35.
32 Krekić, *Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th Centuries*, 39.
Court of Chancery and more importantly as the Rector’s Privy Council. The *Consilium Minus* was made up of eleven members, six councillors and five justices, and served in office for a year. This allowed for the ‘executive branch’ of the Ragusan government to maintain a level of stability despite the frequent turnover of Rectors. As a result of their focus on foreign policy, their records provide a significant number of sources regarding Carlo II’s relationship with Ragusa.

The third, and final branch of the Ragusan government was that of the Senate or *Consilium Rogatorum*. Both Carter and Krekić believe that the *Consilium Rogatorum* was most influential of the three councils, due to its key role in the internal politics of Ragusa. Not only did it have significant influence over foreign policy, but it also acted as the Court of Appeal. According to Philippus de Diversis the *Consilium Rogatorum* was made up of thirty-three members who sat with the eleven members of the *Consilium Minus* in order to come to decisions. Membership of the *Consilium Rogatorum* also included the eleven previous members of the *Consilium Minus*, twelve former Rectors who were expected to sit as members for eleven months after their term expired, five judges and the rest were elected by the *Consilium Maius*. This illustrates the clout of the council within the Republic of Ragusa. Due

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34 De Diversis, 58.
35 Rheubottom, 35-36.
38 De Diversis, 58.
39 Rheubottom, 35.
to its role in the Republic of Ragusa, the records of the *Consilium Rogatorum* regarding Carlo II’s relationship focus on defence and legal matters.

**Mercantile Privileges:**

One of the key aspects of the relationship which illustrates that Carlo II had an agenda to economically tie his domains to the Ragusans, concerns the granting of privileges to merchants by both polities. The granting of privileges was not merely of economic significance, allowing greater access and benefits than those merchants of other lordships, but they were also a technique of diplomacy to help further relations. Privileges could take many different forms but usually offered merchants from a particular polity specific exemptions or rights not afforded to others. According to Chrysostomides, the Venetian privileges in Palaiologan Byzantium allowed Venetian merchants to avoid restriction on importing and exporting goods and to avoid much of the taxation, such as the *commercium*, for commercial transactions.  

Occasionally these privileges also came in the shape of gifts, either to dignitaries or their rulers, and proved to be an effective tool of diplomacy. The archival sources illustrate that privileges played a key role in the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities, as many different privileges were granted by both polities throughout Carlo II’s reign. The granting of privileges illustrate that Carlo II had a conscious economic agenda to tie his domains to the Republic of Ragusa.

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As with the many other merchant republics of the later Middle Ages, the Ragusans established ‘colonies’ in territories where they had been granted the rights to trade. Unlike Venice with its Domini da Mar, acquired as a result of the Fourth Crusade, these were closer to consulates or embassies rather than territories that formed part of a greater empire.\(^{41}\) A key example of this can be seen from the Fondaco dei Turchi of seventeenth-century Venice which acted as a hospice, market for merchandise, and a centre for merchants from within the Ottoman domains.\(^{42}\) As with the Venetian Fondaci, Ragusa’s colonies were essentially outposts of the city. They were governed by Ragusan law, they used Ragusan currency in their transactions, and allowed merchants access to intelligence gathered by the Ragusan authorities in order to aid their commerce.\(^{43}\) Some of these colonies were widely spread across the Eastern Mediterranean and Ragusa was one of the five European powers in the fifteenth century to have a permanent trading house in Alexandria, which contributed to the European spice trade.\(^{44}\) However the majority of them were based in the Balkans as Bosnia was the key trading centre for Ragusa due to its proximity and high quantity of raw materials.\(^{45}\) As the conflict in Bosnia intensified, and Ottoman control increased, Ragusa’s overland trade was disrupted and they increasingly moved to sea based trade which helped to further connect

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43 Rheubottom, 22.
44 Rheubottom, 19. Blažina Tomic and Blažina claim that at its height in the sixteenth century Ragusa had almost sixty consulates in the Mediterranean. Z. Blažina Tomic and V. Blažina, *Expelling the Plague – The Health Office and Implementation of Quarantine in Dubrovnik, 1377-1533* (Montreal & Kingston ON), 34. A map of these consulates can be found in: I. Mitić, *Dubrovačka država u međunarodnoj od 1358. do 1815* (Zagreb, 2004), 112.
45 Carter, *A Classic City State*, 144; Sugar, 173. Benedetto Cotrugli illustrates the close links between Bosnia and Ragusa in his account on the Art of Trade in which he mentions the key role of Ragusans in the trade of raw materials from Bosnia, and aspects of Bosnian culture such as their natural instinct for speaking, and that ‘they honour the rich […] and dismiss the poor’. Benedetto Cotrugli, *The Book of the Art of Trade*, trans. J. F. Phillimore, ed. C. Carraro and G. Favero (Cham, 2017), 29, 57, 122.
Arta and Ragusa through the Adriatic and Ionian seas.\textsuperscript{46} It is unclear as to whether the Ragusans ever established a colony in Arta during Carlo II’s reign, though by the sixteenth century a Ragusan consulate was based on the Island of Zakynthos.\textsuperscript{47} Regardless of whether a Ragusan colony was present in the Tocco domains during Carlo II’s reign, they were still able to have a unique influence over trade in the region through the establishment of a trading company in 1436 which was granted exclusive rights to trade in the Tocco domains.\textsuperscript{48}

Trading companies were another tool available to merchants, and merchant republics, in order to gain economic influence over a region. By the thirteenth century Italian commercial companies were present in Ragusa, most notably those of the four major Florentine companies, and this along with their time under Venetian control helped to develop the system that Ragusan merchants would use in the fifteenth century.\textsuperscript{49} The Ragusans used many different commercial techniques when interacting with the various lords in the Balkans, in particular utilising trade companies or partnerships most notably the


\textsuperscript{47} Mitić, 112. A Ragusan fondacho is mentioned in the Barges Agreement, though its location is unclear. DA Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.

\textsuperscript{48} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 158-159 ; KrD, no. 852, pp. 305-306.

collegantia.\textsuperscript{50} Also known as societas maris, the collegantia was an economic partnership in which all the individual members contributed capital, but only one or a few contributed to the labour.\textsuperscript{51} Often the participants would be of similar standing, since those entrusted with the labour were also investors in the partnership, with their substance and standing playing an important role in the agreement.\textsuperscript{52} Such an arrangement was common in merchant republics and mentioned in the Ragusan law code, with legal protections for all those involved.\textsuperscript{53} Such a collegantia agreement was utilised by a group of Ragusan merchants to trade within Carlo II’s domains.\textsuperscript{54}

The trade company in question was founded in Ragusa by four merchants, three of whom were based in the city: Polus Thomaxo of Camerino, Nicolaus Nuzoli of Castro Durante and Anellus Cichapesse of Naples, and one who was based within Carlo II’s domains: Francesco Pitti of Florence.\textsuperscript{55} Nuzoli, Cinchapesse, and Pitti had previously organised a societas agreement in December 1435, along with three other Ragusan merchants, in order to purchase cereals from Arta, though this agreement was voluntarily cancelled by all the members on 24 April 1436.\textsuperscript{56} The new company was registered with the Ragusan authorities

\textsuperscript{50} Krekić, A City Between East and West, 51. A similar technique was used by the Venetians, see: M. Weber, The History of Commercial Partnerships in the Middle Ages, trans. L. Kaelber (New York & Oxford, 2003), 73.


\textsuperscript{52} Postan, 69-70.

\textsuperscript{53} SoD, Book III, Sections XIII, XLVI ; Book VII, Section LI, pp. 142, 156-158, 282. Lopez and Raymond also provide translations of several collegantia agreements made in Venice and Genoa during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Lopez and Raymond, 176-179.

\textsuperscript{54} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 158-159 ; Diversa Cancellariae, LII, ff. 113-113r ; KrD, nos. 852, 921, pp. 305-306, 317.

\textsuperscript{55} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 158-159 ; KrD, no. 852, pp. 305-306.

\textsuperscript{56} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 122-122r ; KrD, no. 848, p. 304-305. The willing cancelation of this agreement can be found in the margin of folio 122.
on 30 January 1436 and would begin trading on 1 April 1436 until the end of March 1437. The merchants had been able to purchase the exclusive rights to trade within Carlo II’s domains for this year and were to use Arta as a base from which to conduct their operation. Economic access to their domains was another important commodity available to the Latin lords of the Balkans, and by granting access to these merchants Carlo was not only providing a unique service but also benefitting his treasury. Such a privilege was not solely economic, and Carlo undoubtedly granted access as he wanted to further relations between the two parties. The document suggests that the merchants also acquired the rights to trade in Ioannina, despite the city no longer being under the control of the Tocco. It is unclear whether they obtained the rights through the new Ottoman Sanjak-Bey or whether they asked Carlo II to petition on their behalf as an Ottoman vassal. If the latter, that, would certainly suggest that he retained some influence in the region despite the loss of Ioannina in 1430.57 Regardless this further alludes to Carlo II having an economic policy. According to the agreement Francesco Pitti was to provide the labour in this expedition and as he was based in Arta, he would oversee the operation from the city. Therefore, Pitti was entrusted with a significant proportion of the funds and the others would, over the term of the agreement, dispatch the rest of the capital in the form of currency or goods. This role performed by Pitti confirms that the nature of the agreement was that of a collegantia.58 Any profit or debts acquired as a result of the venture would be split amongst the four merchants. We know from the margins of this document that

57 DAD, Diversa Notarie, XX, f. 158 ; KrD, no. 852, pp/ 305-306
58 Throughout the document both the terms collegatia and compagnia are used to describe the agreement. DAD, Diversa Notarie, XX, ff. 158-159 ; KrD, no. 852, pp. 305-306. Compagna refers to another form of trade agreement in which all the participants provide both the capital and labour. Poston, 70. Since the agreement only appears to involve one participant providing labour, Francesco Pitti, I have deduced that this is a collegatia agreement.
by 12 April 1436 the merchants had invested 1,145.5 ducats into the company and that the returns were 1,999.5 ducats which suggests that the expedition was initially profitable.\(^{59}\)

However, further documents inform us that the success of this trade company did not last. On the 28 March 1438, the three other merchants asked in a Ragusan court for the goods of Francesco Pitti to be sequestered since he was now in their debt.\(^{60}\) According to their testimony, Francesco’s goods were in the possession of Antonellus Catellanus, a *familiaris* of Carlo II Tocco.\(^{61}\) As Pitti was based within the city of Arta, he had developed close relationships with some of the major figures in Carlo II’s administration and was now firmly under their protection. Pitti’s protection was probably motivated by his important economic role within Carlo II’s lordship, and due to the status of the Pitti family as one of Florence’s most prestigious families and important players in Florentine banking.\(^{62}\) Though Antonellus stated that he was not in possession of these goods he refused to affirm this under oath and as a result the court sequestered two-hundred ducats worth of goods from him.\(^{63}\) Though the trade company may have ultimately been unsuccessful, it illustrates several key aspects of the relations between the two entities. The selling of economic access to his polity, as in the case of the *collegatia* agreement of January 1436, provided Carlo II with a further source of income. Equally the selling of access to Ragusan merchants rather than those from Venice, despite Carlo II holding Venetian citizenship and honorary membership of the *Maggior Consiglio*,

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\(^{59}\) DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 158r ; KrD, no. 852, pp. 305-306.

\(^{60}\) DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LII, ff. 133-133r ; KrD, no. 921, pp. 317.

\(^{61}\) This Antonellus Catellanus may be Ser Antonellus Barges or the Antonello mentioned by Cyriac of Ancona in 1448. Cyriac of Ancona, *Later Travels*, ed. E. W. Bodnar (Cambridge MA & London, 2003), 346.


\(^{63}\) DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LII, ff. 133-133r ; KrD, no. 921, p. 317.
further illustrates the importance of Ragusa in his foreign relations, and the poor relations between the Tocco and the Venetians. Though the relationship between the two had largely been re-established in 1435 through the cereal trade, the agreement of this trade company was an important moment in the relations between the two and was followed by many further agreements and communications.

Alongside granting privileges to Ragusan merchants, Carlo II would also lobby on behalf of merchants from his domains who traded with or were based in Ragusa. The clearest example of this refers to a Greek merchant, ser Dinos Kavalaropos, a *familiaris* of Carlo II. Most of what we know concerning Kavalaropos, originates from a letter to Carlo II from the Ragusan authorities written on 9 August 1439. The letter responds to a complaint made by Carlo on 28 June that Kavalaropos had been ‘assaulted and plundered’ by Ragusans while he was in the city. The response, from the Rector and *Consilium Minus*, states that they regret the incident since Kavalaropos was one of Carlo’s subjects. However, the Ragusan authorities suggested that Kavalaropos had also been involved in a similar incident on 26 May 1437, in which he had fought with Ragusans and was accused of having stolen a purse, for which he would be punished if this were proved. It is unclear as to why this was included in this letter, and Bariša Krekić suggests that this is a misinterpretation by the Ragusan authorities of the events. The lack of effort or progress by the Ragusan authorities on this assault may have been due to a quirk in their legal system. According to the Statute of Dubrovnik:

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66 KrD, no. 939, p. 320.
Should a Ragusan assault and batter a foreigner, or should he injure him in any other manner, may the whole fine which the Ragusan shall pay belong to the Commune and nothing to the foreigner. [...] We establish the same should any foreigner assault and batter a Ragusan or injure him in any other manner whatever.\textsuperscript{67}

Due to this law the Ragusan authorities were constrained in providing any financial compensation for Kavalaropos, and this may explain their attempts to shift the blame of the assault onto him.

Despite being unable to provide Dinos Kavalaropos with financial compensation the Ragusan authorities did not want this incident to affect their relations, and two years later in 1441 they attempted to rectify the situation by granting Kavalaropos and Iacopo Rosso ‘safe-conduct’ for an entire year.\textsuperscript{68} The institution of ‘safe-conduct’, by the late Middle Ages, largely applied to merchants and referred to the safeguarding of the merchants and their goods rather than exemption from any tolls.\textsuperscript{69} Therefore this provided Kavalaropos and Rosso with assurances regarding the safety of their goods within Ragusan territory for that particular year. The proposal was first introduced by the Consilium Minus on 31 August and confirmed by the Consilium Maius on 2 September.\textsuperscript{70} As Rosso was one of the key members of Carlo II’s lordship it appears that this action was probably equally motivated by a desire to strengthen

\textsuperscript{67} ‘Raguseus so foresterium percusserit vel verberaverit, aut ei aliquam aliam iniuriam fecerit, de banno quod propter hoc Raguseus ipse solverit, nichil habeat foresterius, sed totum deveniat ad comune. […] Hoc idem statuimus, si foresterius percusserit aut verberaverit Ragusem vel ei aliquam aliam iniuriam fecerit.’ Translation by V. Rimac. SoD, Book VI, Section XXX, p. 240.

\textsuperscript{68} The two Ragusan records of this privilege give two different names for Iacopo Rosso. In the Consilium Minus record Rosso is referred to as Jacobus Schroffe, whereas in the Consilium Maius record he is called Jacobus Rubeus. DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 19r; Consilium Maius, VI, f. 132r; KrD, no. 963, p. 324.


\textsuperscript{70} DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 19r; Consilium Maius, VI, f. 132r; KrD, no. 963, p. 324.
the relationship between Ragusa and Arta rather than solely to recompense the affected merchant. There are no further references to Kavalaropos in the Ragusan sources suggesting that he did not take advantage of this privilege.\textsuperscript{71} This episode further illustrates the importance of privileges in developing and maintaining the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities.

The final set of privileges concern the privileges granted to Carlo II’s representatives by the Ragusan authorities, mainly gifts and allowances to avoid customs duties and laws concerning imports. Such privileges had also been granted to representatives of Carlo I Tocco. In November 1428 the Consilium Minus granted the speciarius (pharmacist or spice trader) Johannes Richi the right to import two boxes of butaragis or fish eggs, which had been sent to him from Carlo I, into Ragusa without paying any customs.\textsuperscript{72} A similar privilege was granted to an unnamed ambassador of Carlo II in April 1433, when the Consilium Minus permitted this ambassador to leave the wine he was in possession of with the guards at the city port, where it was sealed and held until he resumed his voyage.\textsuperscript{73} Wine was a heavily regulated commodity in the Republic of Ragusa and subject to strict rules concerning its import, with a fine of twenty five hyperperi being imposed for importing foreign wine.\textsuperscript{74} This privilege was therefore very generous, as it not only allowed him to avoid paying these duties and keep

\textsuperscript{71} The only other possible mention of Kavalaropos can be found in the Customs Account for the Port of London in The National Archives. In 1445 a Demetrius de Larta visited London, and Jonathan Harris believed that this Demetrius is Kavalaropos. TNA, E 122/203/3, f. 19r; J. Harris, \textit{Greek Emigres in the West} (Camberley, 1995), 88.

\textsuperscript{72} DAD, Consilium Minus, IV, f. 199r; KrD, no. 763, p. 289. Though Speciarius litterally translates as ‘spice trade’ the role was much more similar to that of an apothecary or pharmacist. T. Buklijas and L. Čoralić, ‘Speciarii and aromatarii of Croatian origin in the 15\textsuperscript{th} and 16\textsuperscript{th} century Venice: Examples of testaments from the Venetian Historical Archives’, \textit{Acta Pharmaceutica}, vol. 50 (2000), 339-345; Blažina Tomić and Blažina, 29.

\textsuperscript{73} DAD, Consilium Minus, VI, f. 37; KrD, no. 806, p. 298.

\textsuperscript{74} SoD, Book VI, Sections XXXV-XXXVII, p. 244; Book VIII, Section LXXX, p. 345.
hold of his wine, but particularly as it predates most of the key aspects of the relationship. On 16 March 1436 the Consilium Minus granted another unnamed ambassador a gift of sugar and confectionary of a value of ten hyperperi. The granting of this luxury good, of significant value, was yet another generous concession from the Ragusan authorities to Carlo II’s representatives. The nature of these gifts and exemptions were undoubtedly an attempt to influence the Tocco ambassadors in order to improve relations in which they appear to have been successful. The granting of privileges was one of the major aspects of the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities and lasted throughout the entirety of his reign. Not only did these privileges help to redevelop economic links between Arta and Ragusa, they also helped contribute towards the close political relationship that developed during Carlo II’s reign. This further suggests that they were part of a greater agenda to tie Carlo II’s domains to the Republic of Ragusa.

The Arms Trade:

Another major aspect of the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities concerns the sale of arms. By the fifteenth century Ragusa had become an important centre for the production of ships and gunpowder weapons, partially for its own defence and partially for export. Both of these industries were of interest to Carlo II who regularly sent representatives to the Ragusan government in order to acquire ships and bombards for the defence of his lordship. Though he had some success at purchasing both, there were also

several setbacks and it was ultimately not as successful as may have been expected. Alongside the obvious financial reward, the selling of arms has always had key political motivations at the centre of any decision. Though as Ágoston has illustrated the medieval arms trade was much more fluid than one may assume, due to our own perceptions of the modern arms trade during the Cold War, and in the case of the Balkans not simply divided between the Christian and Islamic worlds.\textsuperscript{77} Many Christian founders were in the service of the Ottomans in the fifteenth century, the most famous example being the Hungarian/Wallachian technician, Master Orban, who developed a sizeable cannon for Mehmed II to use in the siege of Constantinople.\textsuperscript{78} The trade in arms between Ragusa and Arta should therefore not be seen through the purview of two Christian polities for defence against the Ottomans. There are hints in some of the records that the close relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities was a key factor in the arms trade between the two, which further suggests Carlo II’s deliberate policy to tie the two together.\textsuperscript{79}

The rise in shipbuilding in Ragusa can largely be traced to the Hungarian conquest of Dalmatia in 1358 and the expulsion of the Venetians, which forced Ragusa to develop its own naval capacity. As a result of this the authorities in the city decided to develop new shipyards in the city harbour and to the north at Mali Ston, which meant it had the most significant


\textsuperscript{79} DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 37 ; KrD, no. 857, pp. 306-307.
arsenals on the Dalmatian coast.\textsuperscript{80} Ragusa was also ideally placed for a significant shipbuilding industry, since it had access to plenty of timber from Mount Srđ, the islands of Lastovo and Mljet, as well as from Bosnia, iron from the inland Balkans, canvas for sails from western Italy and pitch and cordage from Dalmatia. Along with tough controls over its shipbuilders, such as barring them from leaving their territory to work for anyone else except the Ottomans, they were able to produce a competitive and productive shipbuilding industry.\textsuperscript{81} Ragusa not only needed this industry to produce ships for the defence of its own realm, against foreign powers and to protect its shipping from pirates, but its navy was also used in larger conflicts as a result of the city being a client state of the Kingdom of Hungary.\textsuperscript{82} The industry would undoubtedly have provided an important source of revenue for the city as well. Though there has been significant analysis of the armies of the Tocco, particularly under Carlo I Tocco, there has been no analysis of their navy.\textsuperscript{83} With their domains scattered across Epiros, the Ionian Islands and the Morea, a navy would have been of great significance to the defence of the Tocco lordship. It is also probable that the Tocco navy was in a poor state as a result of the disastrous Battle of the Echinades in 1427, when many of the Tocco ships were

\textsuperscript{80} Carter, \textit{A Classic City State}, 309 ; Rheubottom, 23. According to Blažina Tomić and Blažina, the shipyard in the city had enough berth for four men-of-war and the shipyard at Mali Ston had enough berths for a further three large ships. Blažina Tomić and Blažina, 37.

\textsuperscript{81} Carter, \textit{A Classic City State}, 308.

\textsuperscript{82} Blažina Tomić and Blažina, 37. Stuard suggests that Ragusa’s obligation during a time of war was to provide two armed vessels to protect trade in the Adriatic Sea. Stuard, \textit{A State of Deference}, 35. Due to their involvement in the war against the Ottomans in 1443-1444, Ragusa agreed to provide one galley to the expedition in 1442 though in 1444 they agreed to provide two at their own expense. B. Krekić, ‘Dubrovnik’s Participation in the War against the Ottomans in 1443 and 1444’, \textit{Zbornik radova Vizantološkog instituta}, vol. 2 (1953), 145-158, trans. \textit{Variorum Reprints} (London, 1980), 1-17, at 2, 5.

captured by the navy of the Despot of the Morea. Therefore Carlo dispatched representatives to the city to acquire new ships for the defence of his realm.

The first evidence of Carlo’s attempt to acquire a ship from the Ragusans was on 28 February 1436 when a proposal was brought to the Consilium Rogatorum to sell or give the despot a Brigantine. It appears from the record that the establishment of a Ragusan trade company within his domains earlier that month, along with the long standing friendship between Ragusa and the Tocco Lordship, were taken into consideration by the Consilium Rogatorum as part of their deliberations. Though the proposal was not put forward to a vote, and the decision postponed, a few days later on 1 March, they accepted it and granted Carlo a Brigantine, of sixteen benches of oars, at his own expense. The decision was confirmed a few days later, on 3 March, by the Consilium Maius, who authorised the Consilium Minus to execute the proposal. The Consilium Minus thereby set up a commission on 5 March to assess the Brigantine and repair it for Carlo II. However not all of Carlo’s attempts to obtain a ship from the Ragusans were so successful. Merely a month after he was granted a Brigantine, he attempted to acquire a Galeotta, a larger ship of twenty benches of oars, by appealing to the

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85 DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 37 ; KrD, no. 857, pp. 306-307. A Brigantine was a small ship of between twelve to nineteen banks of oars with a sail, in use between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries. H. Kahane, R. Kahane and A. Tietze, The Lingua Franca in the Levant – Turkish Nautical Terms of Italian and Greek Origin (Urbana, 1958), 105-106.
86 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 158-159 ; KrD, no. 852, pp. 305-306.
87 DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 38 ; KrD, no. 859, p. 307.
89 DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 30 ; KrD, no. 859, p. 307.
Ragusan authorities. However this request was refused by the Consilium Rogatorum on 25 April 1436, though they suggested that the Rector and Consilium Minus write to Carlo II with ‘pretty words and ways’ in order to apologise for this decision. Nearly a month later the Consilium Rogatorum then authorised the Rector and the Consilium Minus to apologise once more to Carlo’s representatives because they had refused to grant him a Galeotta. This was probably as a result of their own need to defend themselves, and so they did not wish to part with their more powerful ships, and possibly because of fear of retribution from the Ottomans as suggested by Zečević.

Another important industry in the city of Ragusa was the production of cannon. A foundry was built within the city walls in the latter half of the fifteenth century, near the Minčeta tower, but it is clear from the archival sources that the production of cannon in Dubrovnik pre-dated the building of this foundry. The first records of firearms in Ragusa come from the mid-fourteenth century and the production of cannon in the city appears to have begun soon afterwards. According to Ágoston, by the late fourteenth century Ragusa had become the major centre of firearms production in the entire Balkan peninsular. The new technology left an enduring mark on the city. In 1435 the original Rector’s palace was

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90 A Galeotta was a larger warship of roughly nineteen to twenty-four banks of oars. Kahane, Kahane and Tietze, 241-243.
92 DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 55r ; KrD, no. 867, p. 308.
93 Zečević, TGR, 116.
95 Peković and Topić, 266-267.
destroyed in a gunpowder explosion, no doubt a consequence of the palace’s proximity to the Great Arsenal.\textsuperscript{97} Despite the limitations of the gunpowder weapons in the fifteenth century they were still an important part of many of the armies, most notably playing a significant part in the Ottoman forces at the successful siege of Constantinople in 1453 and the less successful siege of Belgrade in 1456.\textsuperscript{98} It appears from the sources that Carlo’s representatives purchased smaller bombards, rather than the larger siege engines used by the Ottomans. A possible example of one of these smaller Ragusan bombards, a Masculo or Maškuo, is currently on display in the Rector’s Palace in Dubrovnik and probably similar to those purchased by Carlo II’s representatives for the defence of his lordship.\textsuperscript{99}

\textsuperscript{97} Rheubottom, 26. Similar damage was done to the palace in August 1463, though according to Caplow the munitions were stored inside the palace rather than in a building adjacent. H. M. Caplow, ‘Michelozzo at Ragusa: New Documents and Revaluations’, \textit{Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians}, vol. 31 (1972), 108-119, at 113, 118 ; DAD, Diversa Notariae, XLVII, f.97.


\textsuperscript{99} Correct as of my visit to Dubrovnik in June 2016.
Figure IV – Masculo (Maškuo), Fifteenth Century Bombard. Rector’s Palace, Dubrovnik.

Photograph taken by R. A. Shields in June 2016.

The archival sources also inform us that Carlo II dispatched representatives to Ragusa to purchase bombards to aid in the defence of his realm. They had already been used by his military forces for some time. Acquiring new bombards was therefore of great importance to the defence of Carlo II’s lordship. Whereas most of the accounts regarding the attempts to acquire ships came in the 1430s, records of Carlo’s attempts to acquire bombards came later in his reign in the 1440s. The first account referring to bombards came in May 1443 when Carlo sent one of his representatives, Benedictus of Arta, to Ragusa in order to have a bombard

100 References to Carlo I using bombards can be found in the family chronicle, see: CT, 354-356, 356-358, 390-394, 424-426, 426-428, 496-500. For further analysis on the use of bombards by the Tocco see: Kyriakidis, 170.
repaired within the city. Benedictus was granted permission by the *Consilium Rogatorum* on 4 May and, later that month, on the 30 May the *Consilium Minus* instructed the *Officulares Armamenti* to provide Benedictus with some ammunition to test the bombard.\(^{101}\) The next and final reference to an attempt to acquire a bombard came nearly five years later in June 1448 when the *Consilium Rogatorum* accepted the requests of Carlo’s ambassador, Iacopo Rosso, to either have built or buy six bombards from the city, along with some silverware (*argenterias*) and a bell (*campana*).\(^{102}\) This is the last account regarding Carlo II in the Ragusan documents, and probably his last interaction with the city, since he died later that year on 30 September.\(^{103}\)

The arms trade was clearly an important and unique aspect of the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities. Though arguably not as great a part of the relationship as the cereal trade and the granting of privileges, the arms trade between the two was yet again another aspect that tied the two together. Though Zečević argues that these purchases were so small in size that they were at best symbolic gestures rather than of any sufficiency towards the defence of Carlo II’s realm, they still illustrate a level of generosity from the Ragusan authorities.\(^{104}\) This generosity was undoubtedly tied to the close relationship that had developed between the two during Carlo’s reign and further illustrates that his agenda to tie the two together was undoubtedly successful.

\(^{101}\) DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VIII (this is incorrectly cited by Krekić as volume VII), f. 214; KrD, no. 1006, p. 331; Consilium Minus, IX, f. 179r; IHC, vol. 2, p. 393; KrD, no. 1010, p. 332.

\(^{102}\) DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, X, f. 201; KrD, no. 1136, p. 355.

\(^{103}\) For the date of Carlo II’s death, see: Cyriac of Ancona, *Later Travels*, 348.

\(^{104}\) Zečević, TGR, 116.
Slavery and Piracy:

Another two aspects of the relationship between the two were the slave trade and piracy. Both of these were heavily tied to the economics of the Arta and Ragusa and strongly influenced by the diplomatic ties that had developed throughout Carlo II’s reign. Neither of these were significant aspects of the relationship but they both further illustrate the closeness of the relationship during Carlo II’s reign. There seems to have been a level of co-operation between the Ragusans and Carlo II’s officials regarding the trade in slaves from across the Balkans and Eastern Mediterranean. Piracy was another economic activity present Carlo’s lordship, with shipping in the Gulf of Ambrakia and the Ionian Sea falling victim to the pirates based within his domains. Despite this Ragusan shipping appears to have been largely safe from these pirates, which was probably as a result of the close relationship had had developed between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities. Due to the correlation between diplomatic relations and piracy this may be another example that illustrates the political and economic relationship that developed between the two governments during Carlo II’s reign.

As Kate Fleet has illustrated in her analysis of the relationship between the Genoese and Ottomans, slavery remained a key part of the economy of the Eastern Mediterranean. The majority of slaves came from the Black Sea and this largely flowed towards Egypt, with some trade heading to the west. According to Susan Mosher Stuard, slavery in the Adriatic

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and Balkans, unlike most of the rest of the former territories of the Roman Empire, had never disappeared or died out and was still present into the late middle ages. This is supported by the account of Francesco Scalamonti, who informs us that Cyriac of Ancona purchased an Epirote slave girl, called Clara, while visiting Gallipoli in 1430. Ragusa, as a key economic power in the region, was heavily involved in the medieval slave trade and practiced slavery within its domains, as seen from several clauses in the Statue of 1272. Despite this some historians, such as Arthur Evans, have argued that the legislation passed by the Consilium Maius in 1416, which imposed a fine and prison sentence for those selling slaves, can be seen as the first law banning slavery. However Krekić argues that this law, along with two others in 1418 and 1466, did not ban slavery in fifteenth century Ragusa and were merely reacting to situations of the time in an attempt to limit some of the damage caused by the practice.

An example that illustrates Ragusa’s cooperation with Arta regarding the trade in slaves can be seen through their dealings with two members of Carlo II’s lordship, notably Ser Benettus Magrinus and Ser Niccolò de Ansalona. On 8 May 1445 a Ragusan patrician Ser Marino de Bona and Ser Benettus Magrinus negotiated an agreement recorded in the Diversa

109 For the clauses, see: SoD, Book I, Section 14, p. 82 ; Book IV, Section 1, p. 172 ; Book VII, Section 20, p. 268 ; Book VIII, Section 60, p. 330.
110 A. J. Evans, Through Bosnia and the Herzegovina on Foot during the Insurrection, August and September 1875 – with an historical review of Bosnia and a glimpse at the Croats, Slavonians, and the ancient Republic of Ragusa (London, 1877), 410-411.
Notariae. Bona agreed to sell Magrinus twelve to fifteen slaves, which would be purchased from Constantinople. Magrinus would then sell on these slaves and any profit made would be divided between the two. A following record made on 10 May 1445 confirms that Magrinus was a resident in Arta and that upon his death his property would be entrusted to Niccolò de Anasalona and Ser Johannes Expartieri, both of whom were residents of Arta and of Catalan and Neapolitan origin. This is one of the clearest examples of the trade in slaves by both Ragusans and members of Carlo II’s lordship.

Another interesting case that illustrates the practice of slavery from within Carlo’s domains is that of Jagni Rosso. The saga lasted from October 1447 until January 1448 and is recorded in the Diversa Cancellariae. It concerns the claims of Ser Niccolò de Ansalona, an important member of Carlo’s court, and a Russian called Jagni who was accused of being a runaway slave. The first reference to Jagni came on 25 October 1447 when he was brought before a court in Ragusa, presided over by the Rector Ser Nicola de Goçe, where he was accused by Ser Johannes Spartier of being the slave of his lord Niccolò de Ansalona. Jagni asserted that he was a free man (sui juris) and a Christian and therefore that he should be released. One of the witnesses in the trial, a sailor called Ruscus Vlacussić (Rusko Vlahušić) stated that while he was in Arta his master, Radassin Vrgath, was taken by Niccolò de Ansalona to a place called Zancha where Jagni was being held in a pit. They then attempted to take Jagni to Leukas, but they were shipwrecked nearby and he was able to escape. Ruscus

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112 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XXIX, ff. 89r-90 ; KrD, no. 1086, pp. 344-345.
113 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XXIX, ff. 91r-92 ; KrD, no. 1087, p. 345.
114 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LX, ff. 247r-248r ; KrD, no. 1133, pp. 354-355.
115 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LX, f. 247r ; KrD, no. 1133, pp. 354-355.
then states that the people of Leukas recognised Jagni and claimed that he had been a freeman only twenty days previously and were surprised to see him as a slave. This account was confirmed by Vrgath though he was unable to confirm the opinions of the people of Leukas regarding Jagni’s status as a freeman.\footnote{116} It was therefore demanded by the Rector and the judges that Niccolò prove that Jagni was his slave by the end of January 1448, and that Jagni also prove he was free by the same date. On the 8 January 1448 Carlo II penned a letter with his seal, with documents confirming that Jagni was one of Niccolò’s slaves. This was produced to the court on the 26 January and the Ragusan authorities declared Jagni was a slave, since he was unable to provide evidence to support his claim. He was released to Ser Johannes Spartier at the end of the month.\footnote{117} These cases not only inform us that the practice of slavery extended to Carlo’s domains but that Ragusan merchants were involved in the trade between the two.

Another economic activity present in Carlo II’s lordship was that of piracy. Piracy is rightly described by Christopher Wright as ‘trade’s violent counterpart’ and was an equally important aspect of the economics of the region.\footnote{118} In the case of the small Latin lordships of the Balkans, piracy often played an equal role to trade and there appears to have been some connection between the lordships and the pirates based within them. Piracy was equally a very fluid activity, as the roles of a merchant and a pirate were easily interchangeable depending on the circumstances in the fifteenth century Mediterranean.\footnote{119} As with merchants,
pirates in the Eastern Mediterranean during the fifteenth century were made up of many
different groups and ethnicities such as Catalans, Frenchmen, Greeks, Spaniards, Turks and
even North Africans.\textsuperscript{120} Despite the diversity of those involved in the practice the pirates
appear to have been influenced by the foreign policy of the lords from the lands where they
were based. In the case of the Tocco there appears to have been little damage done to Ragusan
shipping due to their close relations.\textsuperscript{121} As will be shown later the main target of pirates from
within the Tocco domains appear to have been Venetian shipping, possibly due to their poor
relations.\textsuperscript{122} Though providing possible economic benefits to the lordships from which they
were based, it could also prove to be problematic and could affect their diplomatic relations.
According to Kritovoulos, piracy committed from within the Gattilusio domains against the
Ottoman domains in the Chersonese, Macedonia and Thrace was an important factor in their
eventual expulsion from the Aegean in 1462.\textsuperscript{123} Equally, Carr argues that the piracy committed
by both Turks and Catalans in the Aegean was one of the key factors that induced Pope John
XXII to call the Crusade of Smyrna in 1343.\textsuperscript{124} Balancing the economic benefits of piracy
against the political consequences was often a key consideration for those lordships which
allowed the pirates to remain in their domains.

\textsuperscript{120} N. Coureas and A. G. Orphanides, ‘Piracy in Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean during the Later Lusignan
\textsuperscript{121} Wright illustrates that the pirates based within the Gattilusio domains did little damage to Byzantine or Genoese
shipping in the region as the Gattilusio held close relations with these powers. Wright, \textit{The Gattilusio Lordships}, 236-237.
\textsuperscript{122} ASV, Senatus Deliberations, Mar, II, ff. 146, 174r-175; III, f. 30 ; ThR, vol. 3, nos. 2716, 2730, 2754, pp. 131, 134,
\textsuperscript{124} M. Carr, \textit{Merchant Crusaders in the Aegean 1291-1352} (Woodbridge, 2015), 57.
The geography of Carlo II’s lordship meant it was an ideal location for piracy. Not only was it situated along the wealthy *inter-culfum* trade routes, but the Ionian, like the Adriatic, was ideal territory for pirates to operate due to its many bays and islands. The threat of piracy, particularly in the Gulf of Akarnania was well known to the Ragusan authorities who provided Ragusan merchants with armaments when visiting Arta in 1435-1436. Though the threat of piracy to Ragusan shipping in the Gulf of Akarnania lessened as the relations between the two improved, the pirates within the Tocco domains were clearly a significant threat. There is only one substantial record of Ragusan shipping suffering as a result of piracy within the Tocco domains, as recorded in the *Lamenta de Foris*. On 8 May 1436 a Catalan pirate Bernardus Villamaria of Barcelona had boarded a vessel in the gulf of Arta, upon which a Paulus de Camerino, a pharmacist and agent of Johannes Richi, was travelling and stole some goods several pieces of cloth produced in both Florence and Ragusa.

Bernardus was no ordinary pirate, he was the Captain General of Royal Galleys of Aragon, and his presence in the region was undoubtedly because of the desire of Alfonso the

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126 DAD, Consilium Minus VI, f. 221r ; VII, f. 76r ; IHC, vol. 2, p. 332 ; KrD, nos. 829, 877, pp. 302, 310.

127 There is another possible mention to piracy from the Tocco domains. According to Bariša Krekić’s summaries a Ragusan ship was attacked by a Catalan Corsair on 1 March 1431 in the Gulf of Akarnania. The same corsair is said to have captured twenty-eight ships from both Ragusa and Venice. Unfortunately due to Krekić’s unhelpful reference for this document both myself and Professor Vesna Rimac of the Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku were unable to find the document of which he is summarising. KrD, no. 791, p. 294, citing Acta Sancta Maria Maioris, fasc. Fifteenth century.

128 This record was made as a complaint to the Rector Ser Petro de Sorgo, on 31 August 1436. DAD, Lamenta de Foris, ff.183r-184 ; KrD, no. 882, p. 311. Another good stolen by Bernadus is also mentioned in the document, ‘*unam peritam rosarum de grana de Florentia*’. This likely refers to the rare scarlet dye used in the production of textiles, which was obtained through a grain-like insect from the Mediterranean called *coccus ilicis*. I. Origo, *The Merchant of Prato – Daily Life in a Medieval Italian City* (London & New York, 1992), 69, 85.
Magnanimous to further his influence in Southern Italy, the Adriatic, and the Balkans as will be discussed later.\textsuperscript{129} The stolen goods, which are valued at 240 ducats, appear to have made their way into the possession of Iacopo Rosso.\textsuperscript{130} This document is particularly significant as it is the only archival source which goes so far as to name a pirate based within the Gulf of Arta during Carlo II’s reign. This record also ties Iacopo Rosso, one of the major figures in Carlo’s lordship, to the pirates within the Tocco domains as the receiver of these stolen materials. There are very few other records of Ragusan shipping falling victim to piracy within the Tocco domains. The close relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities was possibly responsible for this and supports Wright’s view that the pirates were under the influence of the lordships they based themselves in.\textsuperscript{131}

**Provision of Information:**

The final aspect of this relationship covered in this chapter concerns the provision of information by Carlo II and his representatives. Due to its unique position, between the spheres of influence of both the Ottoman Sultanate and the Kingdom Hungary, Ragusa became a hotbed of diplomatic intrigue.\textsuperscript{132} In combination with its role in trade this made it an important centre for information during the fifteenth century, some of which arrived from Carlo II’s lordship. Information was important for Ragusa which acquired intelligence on

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\textsuperscript{130} DAD, Lamenta de Foris, f. 183r; KrD, no. 882, p. 311.

\textsuperscript{131} Wright, *The Gattilusio Lordships*, 236-237.

\textsuperscript{132} Babinger, 19.
both neighbouring powers and their trading partners for purposes of defence and economic success. To the Latin Lordships of the Balkans information could provide a valuable service which could be used as both a commodity to provide another source of income and a tool of diplomatic influence. The merchants of this period were responsible for much of the dispersal of information, as both Dennis and Fleet have illustrated in their analyses of this subject. In the dealings between the Tocco lordship and Ragusa, however, the provision of information appears to have largely been conducted by Carlo II’s representatives rather than by merchants. Since Ragusa was still under Hungarian suzerainty much of the evidence of the provision of information by the Tocco comes from records of interactions between the Ragusan authorities and the Hungarian court. Two letters, are particularly informative: the first to King Sigismund of Hungary (1387-1437) in February 1436, and the other to Regent-Governor János Hunyadi (1446-1453) in September 1447. Both of these letters appear to suggest that Carlo II’s representatives were providing information to the Ragusan authorities, though their exact motivations behind this is unclear. Though the provision of information was a relatively small and largely insignificant aspect of the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities, it is suggestive as to the relations between the two.

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133 Blažina Tomić and Blažina, 140. A key example of this concerns the Bogojević expedition which will be analysed in greater detail in the following chapter. The Ragusan authorities tasked a Ragusan merchant, Rastiša Bogojević, in January 1435 to engage in economic espionage (meteretive a spiar), investigating the price and availability of cereals in Arta. Further analysis of this expedition will be given in the next chapter. DAD, Lettere di Levante, XI, ff. 215-215r ; KrD, no, 828, p. 301.


The first of these letters, written on behalf of the Rector and Consilium Minus, was sent to King Sigismund of Hungary on the 29 February 1436. In the letter, the Ragusan authorities inform Sigismund of certain events taking place within both Italy and the Ottoman domains. The information concerning the Ottoman domains is said to have come from a representative of the Despot of Arta, in particular from his Secretarius. According to these reports a ‘Tamberlain’ the ‘lord of the Tartars’ had assembled an army of 150,000 soldiers in Anatolia near the settlement of Candelor (Alanya). The Letter also states that the Ottoman Sultan, Murad II, was preparing for battle against this threat. The nature of this information is unclear, since the identity of the ‘Tamberlain’ in the letter is ambiguous as is the exact event that this information refers to. It is therefore important to analyse the possible figures behind this event and the possible motives of Carlo’s representatives in order to better understand this letter.

It is unclear who this ‘Tamberlain’ refers to since the great Timur (1370-1405) had been dead for over thirty years. It may well be Shahrukh Mirza (1405-1447) or one of the other Timurid lords, possibly the Baysunqur or Abd-al-Latif mentioned in Chalkokondyles.

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136 DAD, Lettere di Levante, XII, f. 15r; DRR, no. 243, p. 396; KrD, no. 858, p. 307.
137 The Italian events mentioned in the letter largely concern the attempts of Alfonso the Magnanimous to seize the lands of Apulia in his overall plan to acquire the Kingdom of Naples. DAD, Lettere di Levante XII, f. 15; DRR, no. 243, p. 395, KrD, no. 858, p. 307.
138 DAD, Lettere di Levante, XII, ff. 15-15r; DRR, no. 243, pp. 395-396; KrD, no. 858, p. 307. As previously stated, Carlo II’s Secretarius at this time was a Georgios Ragnarolo Pisauriensis. It is likely that he was the one responsible for providing this information. Cyriac of Ancona, Kyriaci Anconitani Itinerarium, ed. L. Mehus (Florence, 1742) 66-67, 71-72; Zečević, TGR, 182.
Sharukh Mirza was the youngest of Timur’s sons and the eventual successor in the succession crisis after the death of Timur.\(^{140}\) Traditionally historians have viewed Shahrukh as a more peaceful and conservative ruler than Timur, who spent his time dealing with the fractious situation within his domains rather than attempting to expand his domains.\(^{141}\) This is supported by Chalkokondyles who described him as:

> A man who was generally reasonable and who, for the most part, made treaties with his neighbours and maintained peace.\(^{142}\)

If this viewpoint is to be believed it would seem unlikely that Shahrukh is the ‘Tamberlain’ in the letter to Sigisimund. However, Beatrice Forbes Manz argues that such a conclusion would be guilty of teleology as it blames Shahrukh for the decline of the Timurid Empire, when it had already begun under Timur.\(^{143}\) During his early reign Shahrukh was aggressive, personally leading campaigns in Azerbaijan, although these were not motivated as much by expansionist ambitions as by simply maintaining control over his empire.\(^{144}\) Ultimately due to a lack of evidence suggesting a campaign by Shahrukh against the Ottomans in early 1436, it is unlikely that he is the ‘Tamberlain’ in this letter to Sigismund.

Another possible identity for this ‘Tamberlain’ could be the Bey of Karaman, Taceddin İbrahim Beg (1424-1464).\(^{145}\) The Karamanids were a Turkish emirate based in Asia Minor and,

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\(^{141}\) Manz, ‘Temür and the Problem of a Conqueror’s Legacy’, 31

\(^{142}\) Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 272

\(^{143}\) Manz, ‘Temür and the Problem of a Conqueror’s Legacy’, 31-34.

\(^{144}\) Manz, ‘Temür and the Problem of a Conqueror’s Legacy’, 34.

perhaps most importantly, they were rivals of the Ottomans. Throughout the reigns of Murad II and Mehmed II, the Karamanids were a regular thorn in their side often rebelling and causing problems for the Ottomans in Asia Minor as they attempted to further their control in the Balkans. This could prove trouble for the Ottomans, since an alliance between the Karamanids and a European power could be disastrous, and there were many attempts by the Byzantines, Venetians and Hungarians to secure Karamanid support against the Ottomans. Another final piece of evidence that may support Karamanid involvement in this campaign comes from the eventual conquest of Alanya by the Ottomans. The city finally came under the control of the Ottoman General Gedik Ahmed Paşa in the early 1470s as a result of his campaign against the Karamanids. Since the city can be tied to this conflict it is likely that it was under Karamanid control in the fifteenth century, and the force in the letter may therefore be the Karamanids rebelling against the Ottomans. Despite this it still remains unclear as to who the ‘Tamberlain’ in this letter is exactly and therefore makes this information, and the motivations behind it, even more mysterious.

146 Examples of this rebellious nature, during the reigns of Murad II and Mehmet II can be found in Chalkokondyles. Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 402-406, 416-418, 420; vol. 2, 2-4, 62, 76-78, 162, 366. One such example of a Karamanid uprising can be found in the Cyriac of Ancona, who dates it to 12 June 1444. Murad responded by crossing the Hellespont with an army. Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 36-38.

147 Nisbet Bain, 235-236; Ágoston, Karamania, 267-272.


149 Other possible suggestions for the identity of this ‘Tamberlain’ could be the Pisidians, also known as the Varsak, and the Turgudlu Turcomans. According to Chalkokondyles they were both nomadic Turkish clans who bordered the Karamanids. It is therefore possible that they could be the threat conveyed in the letter to Sigismund. Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 402-404.
The exact reasons behind Carlo’s representatives informing the Ragusan authorities of this information are uncertain, but it presumably had either economic or political motives. The dating of this letter provides a much stronger suggestion behind its motivations, as it coincides with the fostering of closer relations between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities in the first half of 1436. Perhaps most clearly, it appears to have been heavily tied to Carlo II’s attempts to acquire a brigantine in February 1436. As previously stated, Carlo II’s representatives petitioned the Consilium Rogatorum to acquire a Brigantine on 28 February, though the decision was postponed by the council. The following day the letter to Sigismund was penned by the Rector and Consilium Minus, with the information provided from Carlo’s representatives, and on 1 March the Consilium Rogatorum agreed to grant Carlo II the brigantine. The dating of these events suggest they were related, and it is likely that the representatives tasked with acquiring the brigantine were also responsible for providing the information to the Ragusan authorities. The information appears to have been used as a diplomatic ‘gift’ by the Tocco representatives to encourage the Ragusan authorities to provide their lord with a Brigantine. The availability of this knowledge to the Latin lordships could therefore provide diplomatic advantages and be used to improve their economic and diplomatic relations.

Another possible motivation behind this can be viewed through the actions of one of the other Tocco lords involved in this trade. According to Francesco Scalamonti, during the

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150 This letter also coincides with the registration of the collegantia agreement in late January 1436, and the early stages of the cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa which shall be analysed in the following chapter. DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 158-159; KrD, no. 852, pp. 305-306.


152 DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 38; KrD, no. 859, p. 307.
early 1430s Carlo’s illegitimate cousin Menuno Tocco and Cyriac of Ancona went on a
reconnaissance mission into Murad II’s possessions in Asia Minor, with the motivation of
using this information to launch another crusade against the Ottomans.\textsuperscript{153} This information
was then eventually relayed to Pope Eugenius IV by Cyriac, for which Menuno received
payment for his role in the expedition.\textsuperscript{154} This is perhaps the clearest example of the provision
of information by the Latin Lordships of the Balkans to the larger European powers,
motivated by the economic and political benefits.\textsuperscript{155} Scalamonti also states that Menuno
regularly attended Murad II’s Porte, as one of his vassals, and as a result would have known
about the political situation within the Ottoman domains.\textsuperscript{156} Since Carlo II was also a vassal
of Murad it can be assumed he would have been as well informed of the dealings of the
Ottoman Porte as his illegitimate cousin. Carlo II may also have played a diplomatic role on
behalf of his suzerain. On the 27 April 1437 the Rogatorum authorised the Rector and
Consilium Minus to respond to a Turkish representative who arrived in Ragusa, along with
several letters written by both Carlo II and the Turks to pardon the sons of the now dead, Stani
Illić.\textsuperscript{157} This record is not particularly clear, but it seems to suggest a cooperation between
Carlo II and the Ottomans, and may illustrate Carlo acting as an active vassal. It is likely that
the information received, regarding the supposed Timurid threat, came from the Porte in
Adrianople. Though there may also have been financial motivations, or even a desire to share

\textsuperscript{153} Francesco Scalamonti, ‘The life of Cyriac of Ancona’, in Cyriac of Ancona, Life and Early Travels, ed. C. Mitchell,
\textsuperscript{154} Francesco Scalamonti, 80, 86.
\textsuperscript{155} Such behaviour was not unique to the Tocco. As Filipović has illustrated King Stjepan Tomiš of Bosnia (1443-
1461) was also involved in similar anti-Ottoman activities, including the provision of information. E. O. Filipović,
‘Exurge igitur, miles Christi, et in barbarous viriliter pugna … The Anti-Ottoman Activities of Bosnian King Stjepan
Tomiš (1443-1461)’, Holy War in Late Medieval and Early Modern East-Central Europe, ed. J. Smołucha, J. Jefferson,
and A. Wadas (Krakow, 2017), 201-242.
\textsuperscript{156} Francesco Scalamonti, 76.
\textsuperscript{157} DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 132r ; KrD, no. 906, p. 315.
information in the hope that the Hungarians would mobilise against the Ottomans, it is likely
that this was part of the wider plan to further relations between Arta and Ragusa. The
provision of information needs to be viewed through this context in order to realise that it was
part of a greater attempt to improve relations between the Tocco lordship and the Republic of
Ragusa.

The direct involvement in the provision of information is not as clear in the second of
these letters, but it does further illustrate the situation in Epiros in the fifteenth century. The
letter in question was written by the Ragusan authorities to János Hunyadi, the Regent-
Governor of Hungary, on 1 September 1447. The letter states that according to reports in
Corfu, a ‘Saugeich Teucer’ was receiving monetary assistance from the Despots in Albania
and Epiros. Despite this the Ragusan authorities were unsure as to why Teucer is receiving
funds. Krekić himself is unclear as to whether this letter directly refers to Carlo II, though the
document does mention the city of Arta and the regions of Carlo’s lordship. Another piece
of information which may support Tocco involvement is that the information is said to have
come from the island of Corfu and the Venetian sources confirm that Carlo II held property
on the island in the late 1440s. It is therefore possible, but by no means conclusive, that this
information was also provided by Carlo’s representatives and therefore the document may
also refer to Carlo II along with many of the other lordships of Epiros and Albania.

158 DAD, Lettere di Levante, XIII, f. 241; DRR, no. 280, pp. 466-467; KrD, no. 1131, p. 354.
159 In his index Krekić assigns this document under the Despot of Arta and Janina and of the Romans, though he
places a question mark next to this particularly entry. These documents exclusively refer to Carlo I Tocco and
Carlo II Tocco so he suspects the document may refer to Carlo II. KrD, 418.
160 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mare, II, ff. 146, 174r-175; III, f. 30; ThR, vol. 3, nos. 2716, 2730, 2754, pp/ 131, 134,
The identity of Saugeuich Teucer is equally interesting and alludes to the fractious nature of lordship in the fifteenth century Balkans. The name Saugeuich is most probably of Slavonic origin, whereas Teucer may possibly mean ‘Teucri’ or Trojans a term used during the Renaissance in Italy to describe the Turks. Saugeuich may therefore have been a local Slavonic warlord, who was either a vassal of the Ottomans or a convert to Islam. It is likely that he was similar to the other uc begleri Evrenos Beg and Yusuf Beg, both of whom had interacted with Carlo I Tocco. Teucer may also be the ‘Salgianeck Turcas’ who is mentioned in a letter from Pasquale Sorgo to Niccolò de Ansalona, dated 11 September 1448, and recorded by Cyriac of Ancona. Sorgo was a Ragusan noble under the service of George Branković (1427-1456), the Despot of Serbia, as they crossed the Danube en route to Kosovo as part of János Hunyadi’s army in 1448. The reference to Turcas appears in the letter when Sorgo mentions the various troops provided by the Albanians, Hungarians, Polish and Transylvanian rulers for the expedition. He suggests that ‘Salgianeck Turcas is prepared with his army in the best order.’ Since Sorgo had access to this information, and the fact it is

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161 The Slavonic origin of the name Saugeuich or Saugević was suggested to me by Dr Emir Filipović at the Third Biennal Conference of MECERN at the University of Zagreb in April 2018. For further analysis of the term Teucri to refer to the Turks in the Renaissance, see: T. Spencer, ‘Turks and Trojans in the Renaissance’, The Modern Language Review, vol. 47 (1952), 330-333.

162 CT, 252, 254, 256.


164 The Sorgo Family were one of the major patrician families of the city and held considerable power. They are mentioned as one of the thirty-three patrician families by Philippus de Diversis. De Diversis, 58. In August 1436 a Petro de Sorgo was serving as the Rector of Ragusa. DAD, Lamenta de Foris, XI, f. 183r ; KrD, 311. Pasqual is mentioned in Manken’s analysis of the Patrician families, as being in the service of George Branković as an official in his treasury ‘čeonik despotov’. Manken, vol. 1, 210, 392, 419, 465, 466 ; vol. 2, table LXVII/2.

165 Whelan, 140.
mentioned alongside the forces fighting as part of Hunyadi’s expedition, may therefore suggest that Turcas’s army was fighting with the crusaders against the Ottomans at the Second battle of Kosovo (1448). He may not have wanted the Ottomans to further their control in the regions from which he was able to exact tribute and therefore may have supported the crusading army against Murad II. Whelan himself is unsure about the identity of ‘Salgianech Turcas’ suggesting he was probably a Turkish commander.¹⁶⁶ Though there is no further evidence to explain who exactly Saugeuich Teucer (or Salgianech Turcas) was, both the letters to János Hunyadi and Niccolò de Ansalona help to further illustrate the fractional lordships in the Balkans and the complexities surrounding it.

Though the provision of information is an interesting aspect of the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities, the unreliability of the information provided by Carlo II’s representatives and the lack of further archival sources to support this action means it was not nearly as significant as other aspects covered in this chapter. Despite this the provision of information illustrates another tool available to the Latin Lordships which could provide a further source of income, or as in the case of Carlo II Tocco, allowed them to have greater influence than their relatively small economic and military power would. The provision of information should be viewed in context of the other aspects of the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan officials and were possibly part of wider plans to tie his lordship economically and politically closer to the city of Ragusa.

¹⁶⁶ Whelan, 144, footnote 107.
Conclusions:

As this chapter has illustrated the relationship between Carlo II and Ragusa was one of the most significant in Carlo’s reign. Though Carlo II held Venetian citizenship and honorary membership of its Maggior Consiglio, Ragusa held a much more privileged position in his foreign policy than Venice. This privileged position was undoubtedly due to the Carlo II’s desire to develop an economic and political relationship between Arta and Ragusa across many different facets. Carlo actively sought to develop this relationship between the two over many facets, suggesting this was part of an economic strategy. Not only would such a relationship provide an important source of income for Carlo II but also developed into a closer political relationship, with Ragusa becoming his closest ally during his near two-decade reign. The reason behind Carlo seeking to develop this relationship may have been due to the city’s proximity to Carlo’s domains, as Zečević has suggested, and as a result this made it the preferred economic partner. This may explain why Carlo turned to the Ragusans, rather than the Venetians, despite his political connections to Venice. As this analysis shall later illustrate, there may have been other political factors behind choosing Ragusa as an economic and political ally than Venice. As the following chapter shall illustrate the economic ties between Carlo II’s lordship and the Republic of Ragusa were strengthened through the trade in cereals which provided a key source of income for the Tocco and a source of food for the population of Ragusa. This would prove to be a major aspect of Carlo II’s economic agenda.

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167 Zečević, TGR, 115.
Chapter Five – The cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa during the reign of Carlo II Tocco:

As the previous chapter has illustrated, a close economic and political relationship developed between the Tocco lordship and the Republic of Ragusa during Carlo II’s reign. Yet another aspect of this relationship concerns the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa. The trade in cereals was part of a wider trade system that spanned across the Eastern Mediterranean from Cyprus to Sicily, including many settlements across the Balkans and Asia Minor which provided the consumers and producers.¹ Many powers in the region, such as the Ottomans and Venetians, were heavily involved in the cereal trade both requiring the system to feed their populations and, as with the Tocco, this could provide an important source of income.²


Likewise due to the small size of Ragusa’s territory and its relatively unproductive lands, it relied on the wider cereal trade to feed its population. Arta’s geographical location on the Arachthos River, on the other hand, placed the city not only on rich agricultural plains but also allowed access to the Gulf of Ambrakia and therefore the Ionian and Adriatic seas. This meant that Carlo II’s domains were not only able to grow cereals but were in a very good position to easily export them, meaning that they could provide another key source of income for its lordship. The trade in cereals illustrates the important role of the Latin lordships in the economics of the fifteenth century Balkans and the wider Mediterranean.

Though the economic links between Arta and Ragusa predated the Tocco, by the fifteenth century Arta had become an important centre for the export of cereals to Ragusa, which began under Carlo I and became more significant during Carlo II’s reign. There is a lack of documentation for the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa during the early years of Carlo II’s reign suggesting a break in the economic relationship, probably due to the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. The trade would not revive until 1435 and then continued throughout the entirety of Carlo’s reign. The revival of the cereal trade during this period was ultimately due to the roles played by the officials from both Carlo’s lordship and Ragusa. Not only does this illustrate Carlo II’s economic agenda to tie his domains to Ragusa but

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4 Nicol, Epiros II, 229.  
suggests that the Ragusan authorities also desired this outcome as they hoped to utilise Carlo II’s domains as a source of grain for their city. Their officials responsible for the procurement of cereal for Ragusa, the *Massarii Bladorum*, played a key role in re-establishing trade between the two; organising treaties for the export of cereal and dispatching merchants to acquire the necessary goods to feed the commune’s populace. There has been little analysis of this organisation in previous studies of the Republic of Ragusa and this analysis shall illustrate that the *Massarii Bladorum* were responsible for restarting and maintaining the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa during Carlo II’s reign, and tying the two economically together. This suggests that the action of Carlo II and his representatives were not solely responsible for the development of the economic and political relationship between the two, but that the Ragusan officials also helped to contribute towards it through their desire to utilise Epiros and Akanarnia as a reliable and affordable source of grain.

**Other commodities:**

Though this analysis will largely focus on the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa, it was by no means the only commodity traded between the two cities. Cyriac of Ancona’s account of his visit to Carlo II’s domains in the Autumn of 1448 records that Carlo ruled over a bountiful and prosperous region.⁶ The forests of Akarnania were full of game, notably deer and wild boar, as illustrated by Carlo and Cyriac’s hunting trip in the outskirts of the city of Preveza (Nicopolis).⁷ The seas and rivers around Carlo’s domains, particularly the Gulf of Ambrakia, were equally abundant with fish. This is demonstrated by Cyriac during a hunting

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trip, in which Antonellus Barges and some of Carlo II’s companions and servants went fishing and caught a hundred fat fish (pingues c et varigenos pisces laquearunt) off the coast of Caraconesia.  According to Myrto Veikou the pastoral bounty of Epirus, of which she includes hunting and fishing, meant that the region always had sufficient food. This meant the region was in a position to export cereal as it was able to feed itself by other means. Another product of the Gulf of Ambrakia referred to in Cyriac’s account was coral. While travelling from across the Gulf of Ambrakia on the hunting trip, Cyriac mentions that some of the sailors aboard the ships had come from west of Marseilles in order to collect the coral from the gulf and the Ionian Sea around the island of Leukas. Coral, in particular the precious or red variety, was a luxury item often used in the production of jewellery in the late middle ages.

Another important export from Carlo’s domains was Rumney, a sweet wine produced in the Ionian Islands which became popular in England in the Fifteenth century, despite being considered inferior to the Malmsey produced in the Peloponnese. Wine was an important commodity in the late medieval era as it was a highly taxed good, often with a special customs duty, and heavily monopolised over the trade, as was the case with imports from Greece to

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8 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 346.
10 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 344.
11 For further analysis of this, see: M. Kupstas, ‘Prologue: Late Medieval Jewelry’, Art Institute of Chicago Museum Studies, vol. 25 (2000), 30-34, at 30, 34.
Anatolia. There are no records in the Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku of any shipments of Rumney arriving from Carlo II’s domains, and it is unclear whether the wine brought to the city by one of Carlo’s ambassadors in April 1433 was Rumney or another type of wine. The Ragusan documents however illustrate that several other goods from Carlo’s domains were exported to the city of Ragusa. One account from 7 February 1436 tells of a merchant from Koločep (Calamota), called Vitcus Ostoić, who purchased significant quantities of wax and sponge (songia) from Arta and brought them to Ragusa. During the middle ages, sponges were largely used for medical and contraceptive purposes and were therefore another source of income for fisherman of the Ionian Islands. Another document in the Diversa Cancellariae from 9 November 1441, tells of a failed agreement between a Franciscus de Camerino and a Zupriamus de Lucanis in which Franciscus provided ducats and goods in order to take to Arta to purchase animal skins and chestnuts. Animal skins were an important commodity as they could be turned into parchment, and became a major export for the Island of Crete as demand in Italy grew. Despite this operation being ultimately unsuccessful, this document further alludes to the bountiful forests of Akarnania. Though Carlo II’s domains produced many different products, many of which were purchased by Ragusan merchants, the most important of these was undoubtedly cereal, as illustrated by the large volume of documents referring to the trade in cereal between the two.

14 DAD, Consilium Minus, VI, f. 37 ; KrD, no. 806, p. 298.
15 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 164 ; KrD, no. 854, p. 306.
16 For further analysis of the historical uses of sponges and the methods for sponge fishing, see: R. Prozato and R. Manconi, ‘Mediterranean commercial sponges: over 5000 years of natural history and cultural heritage’, Marine Ecology, vol. 29 (2008), 146-166, at 146-149.
17 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LV, ff. 216r-217 ; KrD, no. 968, p. 325.
18 Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade, 166-167.
The economic relationship Carlo II’s domains had with the Republic of Ragusa was not entirely that of an exporter. As the previous chapter has illustrated Ragusa was a centre for manufacturing, notably for ship and gunpowder but also jewellery, salt and textiles.\textsuperscript{19} The Ragusan textile industry had sprung up in the late fourteenth century, and mainly produced woollen cloth.\textsuperscript{20} Several Ragusan documents imply that Arta may have been a destination for the export of these textiles, though certainly not a major one. The location of the ship carrying Paulus de Camerino, and the textiles he held, in the Gulf of Arta, when it was boarded and ransacked by the pirate Bernardus Villamaria of Barcelona, may suggest that they were travelling to or from the city of Arta.\textsuperscript{21} Another account from the 4 June 1446 tells of two Ragusan merchants, a Paulus Allegrić and a Martinus de Richo who formed a company, which would last for six months.\textsuperscript{22} Both provided coinage in the form of ducats, but also textiles namely woollen cloth and sheets. It appears they would take these textiles, along with the coinage, to the cities of Valona and Arta to sell and to purchase more goods. The profit from the venture would be divided between the two merchants. Another record concerning Martin de Richo, in September of that year, also involved taking Ragusan textiles to Arta in order to sell, using the funds to purchase other goods which would be sold in Valona and Ragusa.\textsuperscript{23} Despite these documents illustrating that textiles were traded between Ragusa and Arta during Carlo II’s reign, the Ragusan textile industry would not develop into a major

\textsuperscript{19} Carter, \textit{A Classic City State}, 293-324.
\textsuperscript{20} For further analysis of the Ragusan woollen industry, see: Carter, \textit{A Classic City State}, 294-308.
\textsuperscript{21} DAD, Lamenta de Foris, ff.183r-184 ; KrD, no. 882, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{22} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XXI, f. 77r ; KrD, no. 1104, pp. 347-348.
\textsuperscript{23} DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LX, ff. 21r-22 ; KrD, no. 1108, p. 348.
export for the city until after 1450. The trade in textiles was therefore not nearly as important an aspect of the economic relationship between Arta and Ragusa as the trade in cereals.

**The Cereals of the Balkans:**

Before turning specifically to the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa it is important to understand the various different cereals produced in the Balkans during the late middle ages. The key cereal during this time, both in Balkans and throughout Europe, was undoubtedly wheat. By the Iron Age, wheat had become the major cereal consumed in Greece, alongside Barley, and this continued into the medieval era. By the fifteenth century, wheat was undoubtedly one the key food stuffs of the Republic of Ragusa, and regularly appears in their documents under the terms *bladum, frumentum* and *granum*. Until the middle of the fourteenth century when the conquests of the Tartars, Timurids and Ottomans slowly constricted the farmland available to the Byzantine Empire, wheat had been one of the major exports from Byzantine Thrace. As a result Epiros and the Morea became much more significant origins for the export of wheat, though Angeliki Laiou-Thomadakis assumes that some of the wheat from Arta in the fifteenth century would have come from more fertile lands in Thessaly and Macedonia. Since there are no archival sources from Arta during the reign

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27 Kate Fleet has illustrated that the exact meanings of these terms are often unclear, interchangeable, and may refer to other cereals besides wheat. Millet, another key cereal, is often referred to as *millium* in the Ragusan documents and so these terms will be interpreted as wheat in this analysis. Fleet, *European and Islamic trade*, 59-62.
29 Laiou-Thomadakis, 185.
of the Tocco to corroborate this assertion it is unclear whether it can be proven. Even if the sources are unclear as to whether the wheat shipments from Carlo’s domains were grown in his territory or imports, from other parts of the Balkans, there can be no doubt that Arta was a key export hub of wheat to Ragusa during his reign.

Another of the key cereals of this time was millet. Millet is one of the oldest cultivated cereals and one of the key cereals grown by the Ancient Greeks alongside einkorn and emmer.\(^ {30} \) It is unclear as to which of the various genera of millet were grown in the Balkans during the middle ages, however the major crops of millet grown in the Balkans during the twentieth century was that of ‘cattail’ or ‘pearl’ millet.\(^ {31} \) A similar cereal to millet is sorghum which is nevertheless classed as a separate grain. However Europeans have often viewed it as a form of millet and the references to millet in the documents may also include sorghum.\(^ {32} \) According to Anderson and Martin, by the middle ages millet was largely considered to be a cereal of the poor.\(^ {33} \) Compared to other cereals it has a relatively poor yield and has insufficient properties to produce leavened bread.\(^ {34} \) As a result it was much less popular in Western Europe but remained important in Eastern Europe particularly in Bohemia, Poland and Hungary.\(^ {35} \) Millet remained one of the key foodstuffs of the Balkans until the eighteenth century when it was replaced by corn (maize) due to its higher yield.\(^ {36} \) To this day millet is

\(^ {32} \) Anderson and Martin, 268.
\(^ {33} \) Anderson and Martin, 266.
\(^ {34} \) Anderson and Martin, 266.
\(^ {35} \) J. W. Sedlar, East Central Europe in the Middle Ages, 1000-1500 (Washington DC, 1994), 85-86.
still used in Balkans for porridge and flatbread as well as in brewing.\textsuperscript{37} Millet also appears to have had an important influence on one of the major patrician families of Ragusa, the Sorgo, who according to Havrylyshyn and Srzentić derived their name from transporting sorghum to the city during a famine in 1292.\textsuperscript{38} The provision of cereals, such as millet and wheat, was of great importance to the continued survival of the commune and so the Republic of Ragusa developed the necessary institutions to administer it such as the \textit{Massarii Blorum}.

\textbf{The Massarii Blorum:}

The authorities in the Republic of Ragusa heavily regulated the trade in cereals, requiring strong governmental institutions and legal statues to help feed the commune.\textsuperscript{39} The \textit{Massarii Blorum (Massari de la Biave)}, literally translated as the ‘officials of wheat’, is recorded in Phillipus de Diversis’ analysis of Ragusa’s architecture and government, which provides an insight into both its role and structure.\textsuperscript{40} The officials who made up the body were ultimately

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[\textsuperscript{38}] O. Havrylyshyn and N. Srzentić, \textit{Institutions Always “Mattered” – Explaining prosperity in Mediaeval Ragusa (Dubrovnik)}, Palgrave Studies in Economic History (Basingstoke & New York, 2015), 59.
\item[\textsuperscript{39}] SoD, Book VI, Section XXXI ; Book VII, Section XXXVII, pp. 241, 276. Originally merchants providing grain to the city were expected to provide share to the city’s archbishop, though this law was repealed in 1292 by Andrea Dandolo, the Count of Ragusa. For the original law, see: SoD, Book I, Section XVII, p. 84. For its repeal, see: SoD, Book VIII, Section LII, p. 318.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
responsible for providing the city with regular supplies of grain in order to feed its populace. It was made up of three appointees who had the authority to make treaties concerning the shipments of grain.\textsuperscript{41} It also appears from the oath taken upon accession to the office, as recorded in the Statute of 1272, that they were expected to grant licences to merchants which allowed them to bring cereals into the city. They could impose a fine of a \textit{hyperpera} or confiscate the cargoes of offending merchants. They were also responsible for the apportion of the correct amounts of grain to the city and its territories.\textsuperscript{42} According to Stuard this followed a similar ticket system to that of the Roman \textit{anona}, and allowed the officials to use the grain distribution as a form of population control.\textsuperscript{43} The funds apportioned to the \textit{Massarii Bladorum} came from both the commune and the investments of private citizens, with dowry’s often being financed from there, as it was considered a good and stable investment.\textsuperscript{44} Due to these large funds, the officials were able to sell the grain at a loss in times of famine in order to alleviate the situation.\textsuperscript{45} In his analysis of Fifteenth Century Ragusa, Rheubottom categorises the various offices and councils of the government based on hierarchy.\textsuperscript{46} According to his analysis the \textit{Massarii Bladorum} ranks roughly in the middle of these offices and was typically granted to members of the \textit{Consilium Maius} after eighteen years of service.\textsuperscript{47} Stuard disagrees, arguing that it was one of the most important posts elected by the great council.\textsuperscript{48} We know from one of the archival records that two patricians, Ser Steffano de

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{41} De Diversis, 82.
\textsuperscript{42} SoD, Book II, Section XIX, p. 118.
\textsuperscript{44} Stuard, \textit{A State of Deference}, 71, 157
\textsuperscript{45} Stuard, \textit{A State of Deference}, 157-158.
\textsuperscript{46} D. Rheubottom, \textit{Age, Marriage, and Politics in Fifteenth-Century Ragusa} (Oxford, 2000), 44-46.
\textsuperscript{47} Rheubottom ranks the \textit{Massarii Bladorum} 26\textsuperscript{th} out of the 56 offices of the Republic of Ragusa. Rheubottom, 45.
\textsuperscript{48} Stuard, \textit{A State of Deference}, 157.
\end{footnotes}
Zamagno and Sigismundo de Giorgio were members of *Massarii Bladorum* in January 1435.\(^{49}\) According to Krekić, the officials were able to inform ship-owners of the need for cereals a whole year in advance and offered prizes to Ragusans and freedom from customs to foreign merchants who provided the city with cereals in times of emergency.\(^{50}\) Many of the key decisions made concerning the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa were made by the members of the *Massarii Bladorum*, and they were undoubtedly responsible for stimulating trade between the two after the events of the ‘Tocco Civil War’.\(^{51}\)

**Weights, Measures and Currency:**

Before focussing on the specifics of the cereal trade it is important to analyse the various weights, measures and currencies used in the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa. The use of weights, measures and currency were necessary for trade and needed to be heavily regulated. Ptolemy of Lucca, a fourteenth century member of the Dominican order, believed that maintaining the standards of weights and measures was of great importance to sustaining order in a republic or kingdom.\(^{52}\) The Republic of Ragusa had three officials, the *Camerlenghi* or *Fontigieri*, who were responsible for maintaining the standards of weights and measures

\(^{49}\) DAD, Diversa Notariae, XIX, f. 217r; KrD, no. 827, p. 301. Ser Steffano de Zamagno appears to have later served as a member of the Consilium Rogatorum in 1437, as seen from the membership records for that year. DA, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 114.

\(^{50}\) B. Krekić, *Dubrovnik in the 14th and 15th Centuries – A city between East and West* (Norman OK, 1972), 107. For further analysis and a case study of the workings of the *Massarii Bladorum* during a crisis see: S. D’Atri, ‘*Per conservare la città tributaria et divota*: Ragusa (Dubrovnik) and the 1590-91 crisis’, DA, vol. 14 (2010), 71-98.

\(^{51}\) DAD, Consilium Minus, VI, f. 209; KrD, no. 826, p. 301.

within the commune. They were also supported by the laws of the city which stipulated that if someone was found in the city with false measurements of weights they would be deprived of their measurements or weights and fined a hyperpera. The use of measurements was therefore of great importance to maintaining trade between Ragusa and its various trading partners.

The key measurement used for the transportation of cereals by the Ragusans was the star or starium (pl. stara). It is probably related to the Venetian measurement for the transportation of cereals, the staro (pl. stari). Diversis even mentions the starium in his analysis of the Massarii Bladorum, suggesting that the officials could bring seventy thousand stara of grain into the city if need be. The exact weight of a starium is unclear though it is estimated by both Blažina Tomić and Blažina, and Carter to be somewhere between 64.5 to 71.5kg. The starium was further dived into six coppeli with each copellus having a weight of 10.7 to 11.9kg. Malcolm suggests that each person required roughly 250kg of cereals to eat per year, approximately four starium and the oath taken by members of the Massarii Bladorum

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53 Rheubottom, 38, 44, 149. According to the Statute of 1272 the Camerlenghi or Fontigieri were founded by Count Nicolò Falier on the 16 January 1336 due to the rampant unjustness of many of the weights and measures of the city. SoD, Book VIII, Section LXXVI, p. 342. For the oath taken upon their ascension to office, see: SoD, Book II, Section XI, p. 110.

54 SoD, Book II, Section XI, p. 110. For further laws concerning weights and measures, see: SoD, Book VII, Section XXXIX, p. 276 ; Book VIII, Sections LXXVI-LXXVII, p. 342.

55 For further analysis of the currency, weights and measures of the Republic of Ragusa, see: M. Rešetar, Dubrovačka Numizmatika, 2 vols., SKANU 48, 59 (Belgrade-Zenum, 1924-1925).

56 The staro was the major measurement used by the Venetians and weighed approximately 62kg. N. Malcolm, Agents of Empire – Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-Century Mediterranean World (St Ives, 2016), 44.

57 De Diversis, 82.


59 Blažina Tomić and Blažina, xix ; Carter, A Classic City State, 581-582.
suggests that one copellus of wheat would be enough for three people per week. The other key measurement regarding the cereal trade between the two was that used within Carlo’s domains, the tagaro (pl. tagari/tagaria). The major source of evidence behind the use of tagari comes from the ‘Barges Agreement’ of July 1436. The exact measurement of a tagaro is unclear, there is a Modern Greek word ταγάρι (pl. ταγάρια) which refers to either a bag or a sack. This may suggest that a tagaro of millet is a sack of millet and not a unit of measurement, though this is still unclear. Despite the exact nature of a tagaro being unclear the ‘Barges Agreement’ specifies the conversion of measurements from those used in Ragusa. A hundred tagari in Arta was decided to be the equivalent of a hundred-and-ninety Stara de Ragusi suggesting that a tagaro probably weighed somewhere between 123 to 135kg. Since most of the sources regarding the trade between the two are from Ragusan archival records they tend to use the starium and copellus.

The two major currencies used in the cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa were those of Venice and Ragusa. Due to its economic power in the region Venetian currency retained a level of importance and appears to have been the preferred currency of Carlo II’s lordship as seen from their use in the ‘Barges Agreement’. Over its long history the Venetians used many different coins, though by the fourteenth and fifteenth century the most important of these was undoubtedly the ducat, along with the grosso (pl. grossi) and the solidus (pl. solidi). By the fourteenth and fifteenth century the ducat was beginning overtake the grosso as the

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60 Malcolm, Agents of Empire, 44 ; SoD, Book II, Section XIX, p. 118.
61 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274 ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
62 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274 ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
major currency of the most serene republic. The *solidus*, also called the *soldino* or *sildo*, remained the major silver coin used throughout the period. During the fifteenth century the *ducat* was equal to 24 *grosi* and approximately 110-110 *solidi*. Despite holding key economic value in the region, the majority of the documents of the cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa use Ragusan rather than Venetian currency.

The three major coins of Ragusa during the Fifteenth Century, the *grosso*, the *medianinum* and the *follarum*, are recorded by Phillipus de Diversis. The *grosso*, sometimes known as the *dinar* (pl. *dinari*), was the major currency of the Republic. The second, the *medianium* probably refers to the *mezzanin d’argento* also known as the *medzalin* or *poludinar*. It was worth half of that of a *grosso* and in circulation from 1370 till 1626. The final coin mentioned by Phillipus de Diversis is the *follarum*. The *follarum* (pl. *follari*), also known as the *minca* or *mjet*, was a copper coin used from 1294 to 1612, and according to Carter the smallest coin ever in circulation within the Republic. There were thirty *follari* to a *grosso* and fifteen to a *medianium*. The other form of currency used during the fifteenth century was the *hyperpera* (pl. *hyperperi*), which acted as the ‘ghost money’ or money of account of the Republic.

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64 Lane and Mueller, vol. 1, 314-326.
65 Lane and Mueller, vol. 1, 337-338.
67 De Diversis, 131-133. Milan Rešetar has produced a table of all of the currencies of the Republic of Ragusa, see Rešetar, vol. 1, pp. 67-69.
of Ragusa.\footnote{For further analysis of the use of ‘ghost money’ during the medieval era see: C. M. Cipolla, \textit{Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World – Fifth to Seventeenth Century} (Princeton NJ, 1956), 38-51 ; Wood, 76-78.} The \textit{hyperpera} had a value of twelve \textit{grosi}.\footnote{P. Spufford, \textit{Handbook of Medieval Exchange} (Woodbridge & Wolfeboro NH, 1986), 291 ; Rheubottom, 34.} By the fifteenth century three \textit{hyperperi} were equal to the value of a Venetian ducat.\footnote{Blăzina Tomic and Blăzina, xix ; Rheubottom, 34 ; Stuard, \textit{A State of Deference}, 92, endnote 37.}

\textbf{Ragusan Merchants:}

The role played by Ragusan merchants was undoubtedly one the key factors behind the economic link between Arta and Ragusa during the reign of Carlo II Tocco. Under the instruction and supervision of the Ragusan authorities, particularly the \textit{Massarii Bladorum}, Arta became an important destination for Ragusan merchants for the purchase of cereals along with other goods including salt. Not only were these merchants involved in the logistics of providing Ragusa with the cereals it needed to feed itself, but they also played other key roles in the relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities. As previously stated the role played by merchants in the dispersion of information was important, and in one case the \textit{Massarii Bladorum} used one Ragusan merchant, Rastiša Bogojević, as a source of information regarding the availability and price of cereals within Carlo’s domains.\footnote{G. T. Dennis, ‘Three reports from Crete on the situation in Romania, 1401-1402’, 5V, vol. 12 (1970), 243-265.} The role played by Ragusan merchants in acquiring cereals was key to the economic link between Arta and Ragusa during the reign of Carlo II Tocco, and this was largely motivated by the officials of the \textit{Massarii Bladorum}. 

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\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{For further analysis of the use of ‘ghost money’ during the medieval era see: C. M. Cipolla, \textit{Money, Prices, and Civilization in the Mediterranean World – Fifth to Seventeenth Century} (Princeton NJ, 1956), 38-51 ; Wood, 76-78.}
  \item \footnote{P. Spufford, \textit{Handbook of Medieval Exchange} (Woodbridge & Wolfeboro NH, 1986), 291 ; Rheubottom, 34.}
  \item \footnote{Blăzina Tomic and Blăzina, xix ; Rheubottom, 34 ; Stuard, \textit{A State of Deference}, 92, endnote 37.}
  \item \footnote{G. T. Dennis, ‘Three reports from Crete on the situation in Romania, 1401-1402’, 5V, vol. 12 (1970), 243-265.}
\end{itemize}
The Massarii Bladorum were ultimately responsible for re-establishing trade between the Tocco domains and Ragusa after the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. On the 23 January 1435 they decided to dispatch a ship to Arkanania and Epiros in order to purchase 1,500 *stara* worth of cereal. If they were unable to do this they were expected to acquire salt instead. This task appears to have fallen to a Ragusan captain, Rastiša Bogojević (Rastissa Bogoevich), as supported by several accounts written in January and February 1435. On the 28 January 1435, Bogojević agreed to provide his ship, and eleven sailors, to Ser Steffano de Zamagno and Sigismundo de Giorgio, the incumbent members of the Massarii Bladorum. He was tasked with the responsibility of heading to the Gulf of Arta in order to purchase the wheat. If he was unable to acquire a full shipment of wheat from the Gulf of Arta then he was to go to the Gulf of Patras. Wheat acquired in the Gulf of Arta would be purchased at four and a half *grossi* per *starium* and any acquired in the Gulf of Patras at 5 *grossi* per *starium*. Further instructions given to Bogojević are recorded in the Lettere di Levante on 31 January. The instructions tell Bogojević to engage in economic espionage (*meteretive a spiar*), investigating the availability and price of wheat in the Arta. He was told, that if he was satisfied with the cereals in Arta, to purchase 1,400 *stara* of wheat, a departure from the orders issued on the 23 January. As with the previous entries Bogojević is ordered to acquire cereal from the Gulf of Patras or salt if there is insufficient grain within Carlo’s domains. On the same day the Consilium Minus granted Bogojević ‘safe-conduct’ and instructed the Officiale...
(Armamento Officiali), the ‘paymaster of workmen in the armoury’, to provide him with four cuirasses (cureacias, curacias), presumably for defence against piracy.\textsuperscript{81} He would have to return these once he arrived back in the city. According to Krekić the merchant republics in the region regularly provided arms to merchants. For example in October 1392 the Ragusan authorities granted a merchant travelling to Venice ten cuirasses and three helmets for defence against pirates.\textsuperscript{82} In August 1436 they also provided armaments to five ships under the command of a Vlahota Petrović who was to travel to Arta to also acquire wheat.\textsuperscript{83} According to Noel Malcolm grain ships were often a target of piracy, particularly during times of famine.\textsuperscript{84} This ultimately further supports the serious nature of this mission, and alludes to the possible threat of piracy from within Carlo’s domains.\textsuperscript{85} On 1 February that year Bogojević received a thousand ducats, from the Massarii Bladorum, for the purchase of cereals in Arta.\textsuperscript{86} Though there are no records of the outcome of Bogojević’s mission, the continued trade between Arta and Ragusa post-1435 is probably as a result of its success. The Bogojević expedition illustrates the influence of the Massarii Bladorum over the trade in cereals and their importance in the re-establishment of trade between Ragusa and Carlo’s domains after the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’.

\textsuperscript{81} DAD, Consilium Minus VI, f. 221r ; KrD, no. 829, p. 302.
\textsuperscript{83} DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 76r ; IHC, vol. 2, p. 332 ; KrD, no. 877, p. 310.
\textsuperscript{84} Malcolm, Agents of Empire, 48-49. A further example of piracy against grain ships can be seen from the capture of Bartolomeo Benedetto’s ship off the coast of Sicily in 1411 by pirate based from within the Tocco domains. ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, XLIX ff. 57r-58 ; ThR, vol. 2, no. 1437, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{85} The 1432 version of the Statute of Dubrovnik also contains several laws which refer to the mandatory arming of ships, further suggesting the threat of piracy in the Adriatic Sea and the role of the authorities in defending Ragusan shipping. SoD, Book VIII, Sections LXXVIII-LXXIX, p. 344.
\textsuperscript{86} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XIX, f. 217r ; KrD, no. 827, p. 301.
Bogojević was not the only Ragusan merchant involved in trade between Arta and Ragusa in 1435. There were several other expeditions taken that year to Arta, the first coming in February. Six merchants under the patronage of a Nicola de Luca of Koločep (Calamota) set sail for the Gulf of Arta on 1 February. They were tasked with collecting goods from Arta, Vonitsa, Leukas and Corfu which would be brought back to Ragusa for sale. This further alludes to the stability and wealth of Carlo’s domains since three of the four settlements mentioned in the account were under the control of Carlo II. Nicola de Luca was also later recruited, along with a Dobrillo Vokojević, by the Massarii Bladorum to dispatch ships to Arta in August 1435 to acquire wheat, the details of which are recorded in the Lettere di Levante and the Consilium Minus. This suggests that Bogojević’s reconnaissance mission had born fruit since Arta was now seen as a reliable source of cereals for the commune, though the orders insist that if wheat is unavailable from Carlo’s domains to go to the Gulf of Patras. A further ship was dispatched in December 1435, by a Michael de Luca of Koločep (Calamota) and a Luca Gurgrević (Krekić suggests Djurdjević). The ship was to head to Arta ad partes Romanie basse and acquire five-hundred stara of wheat. The price per starium was fixed at four and a quarter grossi per starium. These accounts illustrate that by 1435 Arta had become an important destination for Ragusan merchants looking to purchase cereals, and would continue as thus throughout the reign of Carlo II Tocco.

87 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, XLVIII, f. 312r; KrD, no. 830, p. 302.
There are relatively few records of Ragusan merchants visiting Arta in 1436 for the expressed purpose of purchasing cereals for the commune, with the only one coming in July which refers to a ship carrying cereals stopping in Pelješac to buy thirty *quinqua grande* of wine for its crew. This may ultimately be due to the extraordinary scale of the ‘Barges Agreement’, as shall be analysed later on in this chapter, and therefore it was less of a priority for the *Massarii Bladorum* to dispatch merchants to acquire cereal. By 1437 the records of Ragusan merchants heading to Arta to acquire grain return when a ship was chartered by a Steffanus de Sorgo on 8 March to go to Arta or Glarentza to acquire nine-hundred *stara* of wheat. Any wheat acquired from Glarentza was to be priced at five *grosso* per *starium*, whereas Arta is valued at four *grosso* per *starium*, perhaps implying that the wheat from Glarentza was preferable. Another account from 21 March 1437 also appears to imply this, when a Radossavus Ratković financed a boat with five sailors to go to Valona, Corfu and Arta to acquire wheat alongside other goods. The price per *starium* for wheat differed massively, forty-five *hyperperi* for Valona, sixty for Corfu, and a mere four *grosso* 10 *follari* for Arta. As the following chart illustrates this was a significant difference in price:

90 DAD, Lettere di Levante, XII, f. 231 ; KrD, no. 875, p. 310. *A quinqua grande* was the larger measurement used for wine in the fourteenth century onwards. According to Carter *a quinqua grande* was approximately twenty-one litres in today’s measurements, which suggests that the crew were rather thirsty. Carter, *A Classic City State*, 582-583.

91 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XXI, f. 111r ; KrD, no. 902, p. 314.

92 DAD, Diversa Notariae XXI, f. 121 ; KrD, no. 903, p. 314.
Figure V – Chart illustrating the difference in price per *starium* of wheat between Valona, Corfu and Arta in DAD, Diversa Notariae, XXI, f. 121.

This illustrates that the price per *starium* of wheat in Arta was significantly cheaper than the prices available to the Ragusan merchants in the Ottoman and Venetian possessions. This may have been because the neither of these powers wished to jeopardise their own grain supply. According to Noel Malcolm the Venetians during the mid-sixteenth century required 108 tons worth of cereal per year to feed the population, of which under half came from their *Domini di Terraferma.* The high prices offered to Ragusan merchants in Corfu may therefore have been to maintain Venetian control of the grain within their own territories. This therefore meant that the independent lordships which produced surplus cereal, such as that of the Tocco, could play an important economic role in the region. By offering significantly cheaper prices to Ragusan merchants than his local competitors, Carlo II was further tying his domains economically to the Ragusans. The price offered to Radossavus Ratković was largely consistent with the average price offered per *starium* of cereal. As Figure V illustrates the

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93 Malcolm, *Agents of Empire*, 44.
average price for cereals in Arta varied roughly between four to five *grosso per starium*, with the high and low exceptions coming in April 1443 when Benedictus of Arta was offered a price of six and a half *grossi per starium*, and in November 1446 when a Michel de Bona was offered a price of three *grosso per starium*. These economical prices offered to Ragusan merchants further suggest that Carlo II attempted to develop a close economical relationship with the Republic of Ragusa.

![Chart illustrating the average price per starium of cereal from Arta during the reign of Carlo II Tocco.](chart)

The final reference of Ragusan merchants’ involvement in transporting cereals from Arta to Ragusa in the 1430s comes in July 1439 when a Ser Gabriel Nicolai de Prato chartered a ship to Arta to acquire wheat. Upon purchasing the wheat in Arta, Prato’s ship would then return to either Ragusa or travel on to Venice to sell the cereal. The prices, for both Ragusa

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94 DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 170 ; Diversa Notariae, XXX, ff. 130r-131 ; KrD, nos. 1004, 1121, pp. 331, 352.
95 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LIII, f. 194 ; KrD, no. 937, p. 320.
and Venice, had already been agreed in advance, with a *starium* of wheat fixed at twenty *ducat* if sold in Venice and four and a half *grossi* if sold in Ragusa. This account illustrates that Ragusan merchants were not solely involved in the trade in cereals for the benefit of the commune, but occasionally for their own financial reasons. It also illustrates that the cereals grown within Carlo II’s domains were exported to other destinations across the Adriatic rather than just to Ragusa.96 Ragusa was undoubtedly a major import centre for Arta’s cereals, but the city was not necessarily its final destination.

The influence of Ragusan merchants in Arta continued into the 1440s. In 1440 three Ragusan merchants, Laurentius Nuzoli, Paulus de Camerino and Anellus Cinchapesse had agreed to organise a trip to Arta, though it appears to have ultimately become a dispute.97 Anellus Cinchapesse had already been involved in expeditions to Arta, some of which will be explained in detail later. In 1438 he had already chartered a ship to Arta belonging to a Philippus Brampić/Grampić, and had been involved in previous agreements which involved trade with Arta.98 Therefore it is unsurprising that he was involved in a further agreement to Arta, especially with those he had done business with before. Ultimately this agreement failed, though the parties came to an agreement on 25 June.99 In 1446 a Michel de Bona, a Ragusan patrician, chartered a ship to Arta to collect four-hundred *stara* worth of goods.100

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96 This is supported by a further document from August 1441 in which Francesco Pitti and a Timeras Coochlobović agreed to purchase cereals from Arta and ship them to Recanti in the Marche of Ancona. DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LV, f. 141r ; KrD, no. 961, p. 323.
97 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LIV, ff. 238r-239 ; KrD, no. 954, pp. 322-323.
99 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LIV, f. 240 ; KrD, no. 954, pp. 322-323.
100 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XXX, ff. 130r-131 ; KrD, no. 1121, p. 352.
The price was set at three grossi per starium, the lowest value for any cereals from Arta during the reign of Carlo II Tocco. This also illustrates the role played by Ragusan patricians in trade between Arta and Ragusa, outside of an official capacity as members of the Massarrii Bladorum. The final record of Ragusan merchants involved in trade with Arta, during Carlo II’s reign came in May 1447. A Ragusan merchant Allegretus Francović and a Ragusan Patrician, Michaele de Babalio formed a societas agreement with Babalio providing two-hundred and ninety-two ducats and Francović only seventy-seven. Francović was then tasked with using the money to trade in Ragusa, Arta and elsewhere (a Ragusio ad Artam et alibi) the profit from which would be divided between the two. This further illustrates that Arta was considered to be of economic importance to Ragusan merchants, outside of being a provider of cereals. The role played by Ragusan merchants, under the stewardship of the Massarrii Bladorum, was undoubtedly important in re-establishing the economic relationship between Carlo’s lordship and the Republic of Ragusa. This suggests that the Ragusan authorities had a clear policy to utilise Carlo II’s domains as a cheap reliable source of cereal, and as a result tie the two together economically.

Artaioi Merchants:

The trade in cereals was equally sustained by merchants and officials from within the Tocco domains. Previous analyses have undervalued the role played by merchants from within the Tocco domains in the trade in cereals between the two. Nicol has wrongly asserted that there was little evidence of overseas trade conducted by Epirotes themselves and Krekić has stated

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101 DAD, Debita Notariae, XXIII, f. 47; KrD, no. 1126, p. 353.
that foreign merchants played a relatively small role in the trade in cereals to Ragusa.\footnote{Nicol, Epiros II, 231; Krekić, Dubrovnik in the 14$^{th}$ and 15$^{th}$ Centuries, 107.}

However when one analyses the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa during the reign of Carlo II, these assertions appear to have misjudged the role played by those within the Tocco domains. As with the Massarii Bladorum in Ragusa, several key members of Carlo’s membership were also responsible for developing the trade in cereals between the two after the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. Not only were they involved in the trade themselves, often chartering ships and providing the necessary grain, but they also helped to facilitate trade by Ragusan merchants. This further illustrates Carlo II’s policy to tie his domains economically to the Republic of Ragusa, as his lordship sought to become a major supplier of cereals to the Ragusans during his reign.

One of the key Artaioi merchants involved in the trade in cereals was a Dimos Grecus.\footnote{Also called: Dimos Mirali, Dino Armiralio and Dimichi Grai, in the Ragusan archival sources.} The first possible record regarding him is dated 10 July 1436, when the Massarii Bladorum agreed to examine a shipment of millet that had been brought in by a Greek merchant.\footnote{DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 69r; KrD, no. 870, p. 309.} Krekić believes that this Greek merchant was Dimos Grecus as supported by later references concerning a shipment of millet.\footnote{KrD, no. 870, p. 309.} On the 12 July Dimos Grecus was authorised to deposit six hundred *stara* of millet into the city’s grain stores, at the same time he was lent three-hundred *hyperperi* with the millet he deposited acting as the guarantee (*mileum sit obligatum*).\footnote{DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 70r; KrD, no. 870, p. 309. Krekić has incorrectly cited this document as 71r. It appears he has confused this with a similar document, which may possibly refer to Dinos, but the record and Krekić are unclear on this matter. KrD, no. 871, p. 309.} He had to repay this by November that year, by selling further
shipments of millet to the Ragusans. According to the margin of this document, Dimos received the loan from the *Massarii Bladorum* on the 18 July.\textsuperscript{107} There are several other possible mentions of Dimos Grecus in the Ragusan records, which are supported by Krekić. According to the ‘Barges Agreement’ a Dimos Mirali of Arta, probably Dimos Grecus, was to serve as guarantor of the agreement and that the millet he deposited in the Ragusan stores will act as security for the delivery.\textsuperscript{108} This probably refers to the six hundred *stara* of millet deposited by Grecus on 12 July.\textsuperscript{109} The fact that the millet provided by Dimos was to be used as a guarantee for this agreement suggests that he had close relationship with the authorities within Carlo’s domains. The next reference to Dimos comes on the 23 August 1436 when he was again lent a hundred hyperperi by the *Massarii Bladorum* to be repaid in October.\textsuperscript{110} It appears that yet again the flour and wheat (*farina et frum*) he had deposited in the Ragusan stores was to serve as a pledge against this loan. This appears to be a separate shipment to the previous guarantees which were backed with millet rather than wheat. On the 25 August Dimos received the loan from the *Massarii Bladorum*.\textsuperscript{111} The last mention of Dimos is a reference in the records of the *Consilium Minus* on 4 April 1437, which refers to his death in Ragusa.\textsuperscript{112} The account states that the custodians of his property (*Conservatoribus*) were to hand over his property, goods and currency to those who came to Ragusa with letters from Carlo II confirming their claims. This further alludes to the close relationship Dimos had with the authorities of Carlo’s lordship since they were responsible for confirming the authenticity of his inheritors. Dimos Grecus was not the only Greek merchant from within Carlo’s

\textsuperscript{107} DAD, *Consilium Minus*, VII, f. 70r ; KrD, no. 870, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{108} DAD, *Diversa Notariae*, XX, f. 274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{109} DAD, *Consilium Minus*, VII, f. 70r ; KrD, no. 870, p. 309.
domains involved in the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa. On the 5 August 1438 a Georgios Teucer Cani of Arta was granted the right by the Consilium Minus to sell the wheat that he had brought to the city.\textsuperscript{113} He was required to pay the dogana or customs duty on the wheat he sold, though allowed not to pay it for any wheat he was unable to sell. As previously suggested the term ‘Teucer’ may suggest that Georgios was either of Turkish origin or a convert to Islam, but this is unclear.\textsuperscript{114} Though the trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa was largely conducted by Ragusan merchants the role played by Artaioi merchants in the trade should not be dismissed.

The trade in cereals also appears to have been conducted by the members of the Latin elite within Carlo’s domains. The role played by Ser Antonellus Barges and Francesco Pitti will be analysed later in this chapter, but they were not the only key member of Carlo’s lordship involved in the cereal trade. Another was Ser Nicolas Satres, another Catalan who arrived in Carlo’s domains in the 1430s. In May 1439 an Antonnus Brullus, another Catalan, and Ser Sigismundo de Georgio, a Ragusan Patrician, acting on Satres’ behalf charted a ship to Arta to load it with wheat.\textsuperscript{115} The ship would then return to either Ragusa or go on to Venice, with two separate prices agreed per starium, eighteen Venetian solidi for Venice and four and a half grossi for Ragusa. In August of the same year there appears to have been a similar agreement with Ser Sigismundo de Georgio who dispatched a ship to Arta to receive wheat from Satres, with the price yet again fixed at four and a half grossi per starium.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{113} DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 242 ; KrD, no. 926, p. 318.
\textsuperscript{116} DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LIII, ff. 213r-214 ; KrD, no. 940, p. 320.
Another of the key families of the Tocco lordship involved in trade were the Rosso family. Both Iacopo Rosso and his son Galasius Rosso appear to have been involved in the trade in cereals as seen from a record in the Diversa Cancellariae from 15 October 1443.\textsuperscript{117} Galasius chartered a ship to Leukas which would collect five-hundred \textit{stara} of cargo (\textit{carigare}) which would be provided by Iacopo. Though it is unclear what the cargo refers to, since the measurement is given in \textit{stara} it probably refers to cereals. This is further supported by the fact that if they were unable to obtain the necessary amount of goods then they would go on to the Gulf of Arta an area, as previously explained, rich in the production of cereals. This would then be transported back to Ragusa for sale, with the price agreed at four \textit{grosi} per \textit{starium}. Iacopo was also involved in the ‘Barges Agreement’ of 1436 which will be expanded upon later in this analysis. Another probable Latin involved in the trade in cereals was that of Benedictus de Larta. As previously stated, Benedictus did serve as Carlo’s representative in Ragusa, being granted permission from the Ragusan authorities to repair and then test a bombard in May 1443.\textsuperscript{118} The Ragusan documents also imply that Benedictus was involved in the cereal trade. According to an account from the \textit{Consilium Minus} on 24 April 1443 the \textit{Massarii Bladorum} agreed to loan Benedictus five hundred ducats which had to be repaid by the end of June of that year.\textsuperscript{119} In exchange he would deposit grain into the Ragusan stores which would be sold for six and a half grosso per \textit{copellus}. This suggests it may have been similar to the arrangement offered to Dimos Grecus in the 1430s.\textsuperscript{120} These accounts further demonstrate the role played by those within Carlo’s lordship in the trade in cereals between

\textsuperscript{117}{DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LVIII, f. 84r ; KrD, no. 1021, pp. 333-334.}
\textsuperscript{118}{DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VII, f. 214 ; Consilium Minus, IX, f. 179r ; IHC, vol. 2, p. 393 ; KrD, nos. 1006, 1010, pp. 331-332.}
\textsuperscript{119}{DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 170 ; KrD, no. 1004, p. 331.}
\textsuperscript{120}{DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 70r, 81 ; KrD, nos. 870, 879, pp. 309-310.}
Arta and Ragusa. Two important members of Carlo’s lordship, Ser Antonellus Barges and Francesco Pitti, played a greater role in the cereal trade than any other of Carlo’s subjects and their roles will be analysed in detail in the next portion of this chapter.

The ‘Barges Agreement’:

One of the clearest examples of the cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa comes from a agreement between the two from 17 July 1436, the full text of which is recorded in the twentieth volume of the *Diversa Notariae*.\(^{121}\) The agreement was organised on the Tocco side by Ser Antonellus Barges, a *procurator* and *familiaris* of Carlo II, for whom I have named this agreement. The agreement informs us of many of the specific details around the cereal trade between the two. Not only does the agreement inform us of the individuals from both polities involved in the agreement but also the ports from which the cereals would be exported, the measurements for the cereals in both Arta and Ragusa and the conversion rate between the two, the roles played by both sides, and the set price for the cereals. This undoubtedly makes it one of the most thorough accounts of the economic relationship between Carlo II and the Republic of Ragusa. It is also important to note that, as later records inform us, the agreement was ultimately unsuccessful, largely due to supply issues and incompetence on behalf of Carlo’s officials. Despite its failings the ambitious agreement helps to illustrate the desire of Carlo II to develop a strong economic partnership between Arta and Ragusa during his reign.

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\(^{121}\) DAD, *Diversa Notariae*, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309. Zečević incorrectly identifies this as a cheese and millet agreement. Zečević, TGR, 115.
The first probable record regarding the ‘Barges Agreement’ came on the 13 July 1436, when the Consilium Minus granted permission to conclude a contract between a representative of Carlo II and the Massarii Bladroum regarding wheat and millet.\textsuperscript{122} The agreement was organised by Ser Antonellus Barges, a familiaris of Carlo II, and Ser Raynaldus Leone, a notarius publicum, on the Tocco side and two Ragusan patricians and members of the Massarii Bladorum, Ser Michael de Croxi and Ser Andreas de Babalio.\textsuperscript{123} It appears from the record that Barges had been granted on 20 June 1436 exclusive rights to procure cereals for sale to Ragusa, as produced by Leone.\textsuperscript{124} The agreement states that Barges would sell Ragusa two-thousand tagaria of wheat and a thousand tagari of millet. As previously stated the document spells out the conversion rate between the measurements used in both polities, with a hundred tagari in Arta decided to be the equivalent of a hundred-and-ninety Stara de Ragusi. Barges was therefore agreeing to provide 3,800 stara of wheat and 1,900 stara of millet, an extraordinary measurement compared to any of the other shipments of cereals from Carlo’s domains to Ragusa.

\textsuperscript{122} DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, ff. 69r, 70r ; KrD, 309.
\textsuperscript{123} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 273r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
\textsuperscript{124} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 273r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
Figure VII – Chart showing the volume of selected shipments of cereals to Ragusa from Carlo II’s domains.

The overly-ambitious figures promised by Barges were ultimately responsible for the failure of this agreement. The price for the cereals was fixed at one Venetian ducat and twelve solidi per tagaro of wheat and half that for millet. The agreement states that Barges is to deliver the wheat and millet to the ports of Arta, Cerdovixa, Vodiça and Efteleia where it will be shipped to Ragusa on Ragusan ships at the city’s expense.¹²⁵ Nicol suggests that Cerdovixa is the settlement of Kordobitsa and Vodiça refers to Vonitsa, though the identity of the settlement of Efteleia is still unclear.¹²⁶ Similarly to the others it probably refers to another settlement based around the Gulf of Ambrakia. All the cereal was to be received by the Ragusans between 1 August and 15 October 1436. The document also tells us that Barges attempted to make a similar yet separate agreement for five-hundred tagari (950 stara) of wheat and five-hundred tagari (950 stara) of millet under roughly the same terms, though it would require

¹²⁵ DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 273r; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
¹²⁶ Nicol, Epiros II, 228, footnote 61.
agreement from Carlo II to move forward.\textsuperscript{127} As previously stated, Dimos Grecus, was to serve as guarantor of this agreement, on the Tocco side, and that the millet he deposited in the Ragusan stores would act as a guarantee for the delivery.\textsuperscript{128} This agreement is undoubtedly one of the high points in the economic relationship between Carlo’s lordship and the Ragusan authorities and illuminates many aspects to the trade in cereal between the two. However, despite this the over ambitious nature of it would ultimately led to failure as later records imply.

The first problem to arise from the ‘Barges Agreement’ came on the same day it was recorded in the \textit{Diversa Notariae}, in which there appears to have been a disagreement over the price by the officials in the \textit{Consilium Maius} responsible for trade agreements.\textsuperscript{129} This not only suggests there were problems with the agreement, but that the scale of the trade was so significant that it fell to the Consilium Maius to organise it something it only did, according to Rheubottom, when the treaties were considered to be crucial.\textsuperscript{130} A few months later in October 1436 the \textit{Consilium Minus} allowed the Massarii Bladorum to pay the ambassador of Carlo II for 750 \textit{stara} of millet, which they had not yet received, as long as they had a sufficient guarantee from Carlo II.\textsuperscript{131} They also allowed the \textit{Massarii Bladorum} to send a hundred ducats to Arta to purchase additional millet if it was required. This is corroborated in the scholia of the Barges Agreement, which was written on the 8 October 1436, and name the ambassador of Carlo II as Iacopo Rosso.\textsuperscript{132} Rosso had received the payment for this delivery, 2,777 Venetian

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item\textsuperscript{127} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 274 ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
\item\textsuperscript{128} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
\item\textsuperscript{129} DAD, Consilium Maius, V, f. 85 ; IHC, vol. 2, p. 333 ; KrD, no. 874, p. 309-310.
\item\textsuperscript{130} Rheubottom, 31.
\item\textsuperscript{131} DAD, Consilium Minus, VII, f. 91r ; KrD, no. 885, p. 311.
\item\textsuperscript{132} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r (in Margin) ; KrD, no. 886, pp. 311-312.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
ducats eighty solidi. However, some of the cereals had not yet been transported, the 750 *stara* of millet.\textsuperscript{133} The delivery of the remaining cereals was to be guaranteed by two merchants, a Petrus Pantella and Anellus Cinchapesse. This suggests that the agreement eventually went through but that there were still logistical problems. The ‘Barges Agreement’ was ultimately an over-ambitious attempt by the authorities of Carlo’s to supply of grain to the Republic of Ragusa, in order to further the close economic and political ties that were developing between the two. However, there would never be a repeat of such an ambitious agreement, probably due to the logistical problems and incompetency on behalf of Carlo’s officials. The cereal trade between Arta and Ragusa did ultimately continue however, but on a much smaller scale and without as great an involvement from the officials of Carlo’s lordship.

**The role of Francesco Pitti:**

Another member of Carlo’s lordship responsible for developing this trade in cereals was Francesco Pitti, a Florentine merchant who appears to have been based within Carlo’s domains.\textsuperscript{134} Pitti was involved in the cereal trade playing the role of a facilitator for Ragusan merchants as he was based in the city of Arta. In several agreements made by Ragusan merchants Pitti acted as their representative within the city and appears to have been responsible for the acquisition of goods, in particular cereals, which would then be shipped to Ragusa.\textsuperscript{135} Pitti therefore held an important role in the trade between the two cities, however the documents also allude to a more sinister aspect to his character. In several accounts he ran into problems with Ragusan merchants. In one case he was even accused of

\textsuperscript{133} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r (in Margin); KrD, no. 886, pp. 311-312.

\textsuperscript{134} Also known as Pitthi or Piti.

\textsuperscript{135} DAD, Diversa Notariae XX, ff. 122-122r, 158-159, 280; KrD, nos. 848, 852, 876, pp. 304-306, 310.
assaulting one of them. Despite this Pitti was undoubtedly an important part in the trade in cereals and Carlo II clearly relied upon his financial connections with Ragusan merchants in order to further facilitate trade between the Tocco domains and the city of Ragusa.

Before Pitti was involved in the *collegantia* agreement previously discussed in this thesis, he had entered into a previous agreement with Niccolus Nuzoli and Anellus Cinchapese. In December 1435 a company, a *societas*, was created to purchase cereals from Arta by five Ragusan merchants: Nicolaus Nuzoli, Anellus Cinchapese, Ljubiša Ivanović *aurifex*, Junije Gradezević and Luko Radosalić.\(^{136}\) The company was divided into thirds, with Nuzoli and Cinchapese taking one, Ivanović and Gradezević another, and Radosalić the final. Pitti was to serve as the company representative in Arta and the procurer of the wheat from within the city.\(^{137}\) Each of the partners agreed to invest two-hundred ducats in order to purchase 1200 *staria* of grain with any profit to be divided amongst the three shares.\(^{138}\) According to a note in the margin, the *societas* was cancelled by the members on 24 April 1436.\(^{139}\) Pitti was also involved in a similar agreement the following year, this time organised by Andreas Johannes de Polignano and Ser Jacobus Zuzolus de Barulo.\(^{140}\) They were to charter a ship to Arta, Kordobitsa and Labodiza to load wheat and millet from Paulus de Camerino and Francesco Pitti in order to bring it to Ragusa, the price fixed at four grosso per *starium*. This suggests that Pitti provided a similar role in this agreement as he did in the agreement with the *societas*. Pitti was also a merchant in his own right and financed his own trade

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136 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 122-122r ; KrD, no. 848, p. 304-305.
137 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 122 ; KrD, no. 848, p. 304-305.
138 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 122r ; KrD, no. 848, p. 304-305.
139 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 122 ; KrD, no. 848, p. 304-305.
140 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, f. 280 ; KrD, no. 876, p. 310.
expeditions. On the 2 August 1441 he chartered a ship belonging to a Timeras Cooclobović, providing him with eighty gold ducats, to load wheat in Arta and transport it to the port of Recanati in the Marche of Ancona (Rachanati in Marca).\textsuperscript{141} This also illustrates that Ragusa was not the only destination for cereals grown in Arta, alluding to its greater role within trade in the Adriatic.

Despite his largely positive role in facilitating trade between Arta and Ragusa, Francesco Pitti did at times come into conflict with several Ragusa merchants. As previously stated the \textit{collegantia} agreement between Pitti, Paulus de Thomaxo, Nicolaus Nuzoli and Anellus Cinchapespe ultimately ended in failure and in March 1438 Pitti, who was under the protection of Carlo II, had two-hundred ducats worth of his goods sequestered by a Ragusan judge.\textsuperscript{142} However this was not the only example in which Pitti came into disputes with Ragusan merchants. In July 1442 he was involved in a dispute with a merchant from Kotor (Cathano) Johannes de Pautino. According to the records Pautino and Pitti had come to an agreement but this had eventually broken down. Three Ragusan judges were appointed to arbitrate the case: Johannes Marcii, Nalchus de Dobrić and Marmus de Mislien, and they found in favour of Pitti on the 13 July.\textsuperscript{143} Perhaps the most serious allegation made against Pitti was by a Ragusan merchant Vitc\textsuperscript{u}s Vlatković in July 1443. According to the record in the \textit{Lamenta de Foris}, Vlatković lodged a complaint to the Rector, Ser Martolo de Binčola, against Pitti, his nephew Tomaso and two of his servants.\textsuperscript{144}

\textsuperscript{141} DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LV, f. 141r ; KrD, no. 961, p. 323.
\textsuperscript{142} DAD, Diversa Cancellariae LII, f. 113-113r ; KrD, no. 921, p. 317.
\textsuperscript{143} DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LVI, f. 152 ; KrD, no. 983, p. 327.
\textsuperscript{144} DAD, Lamenta de Foris, XVI, f. 251 ; KrD, no. 1011, p. 332.
assaulted and chased from the *burgus* in Arta by the accused while he was looking for means of storage for grain he had acquired there. It is unclear as to why Vlatković was assaulted by Pitti and his accomplices and no other records help to illuminate the reasons behind this attack. Unlike in the case of Ser Dinos Kavalaropos, there appears to have been no attempt to recompense Vlatković by Carlo II, his authorities, or those from Ragusa. 145 This was due to Pitti’s economic importance to the Tocco lordship and the Ragusan authorities, in their desire to maintain close relations with Carlo II, the Ragusans appear to have been unwilling to act. 146 This instance not only illustrates the role Arta had in the cereal trade and sinister aspects of Pitti’s character, but also his economic influence in the Tocco lordship. Carlo II relied upon Pitti to help develop economic links between the two and this was undoubtedly the reason behind their overlooking his misdemeanours.

**Conclusions:**

The trade in cereals between Arta and Ragusa was undoubtedly an important aspect of the multi-faceted relationship that developed between the Republic of Ragusa and the Tocco lordship during Carlo II’s reign. The trade between the two not only helped to provide the Ragusan authorities with a reliable and cheap source of grain for the commune, but also provided an important source of income for Carlo II’s lordship. Merchants from both Carlo II’s lordship and Ragusa were involved in the logistics of this trade, often under the influence and supervision of the authorities of both domains. The *Massarii Bladorum*, a much

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145 DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 19r ; Consilium Maius, VI, f. 132r ; Lettere di Levante, XII, f. 163 ; IHC, vol. 2, p. 365 ; KrD, nos. 939, 963, pp. 320, 324.
146 The Ragusan authorities may have been influenced by the events regarding the *collegantia* agreement of 1436 of which Pitti was involved. DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 158-159 ; Diversa Cancellariae, LII, ff. 113-113r ; KrD, nos. 852, 921, pp. 305-306, 317.
undervalued part of the Ragusan administration, were responsible for revitalising the economic link between Arta and Ragusa after the Tocco ‘Civil War’ as they sought a consistent source of grain in order to feed the commune. Through the Bogojević expedition of 1435 they were able to ascertain that Carlo’s domains were a viable source of cereals and so continued to dispatch merchants to Arta throughout the 1430s and 1440s.147 Though the Ragusan officials were originally responsible for rejuvenating the economic links between the two in 1435, Carlo II’s officials also played a key role in the relationship. The role of Francesco Pitti was of great importance in the facilitation of the cereal trade and helped to further economic ties with Ragusan merchants. The role of Ser Antonellus Barges, and the agreement he organised, illustrates Carlo II’s desire to turn his domains into a major supplier of grain for the Ragusans.148 The role of the Carlo II Tocco’s officials and the *Massarii Bladorum* of the Republic of Ragusa were ultimately responsible for the trade in cereals between the two during Carlo II’s reign. The involvement of Carlo II’s officials in the cereal trade yet again suggests that he was attempting to develop close economic ties with the Republic of Ragusa. However, the trade in cereals also illustrates that the Republic of Ragusa were also attempting to develop the relationship and bring the Tocco lordship into their economic sphere of influence in order to utilise Epiros and Akanarnia as a reliable source of grain for their city. The desire by both polities to expand the economic and political link between the two proved to be one of the major reasons behind the success of Carlo II’s lordship.

147 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XIX, f. 217r; Lettere di Levante, XI, ff. 215-215r; Consilium Minus, VI, f. 221r; KrD, nos. 827, 828, 829, pp. 301-302.
148 DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274; KrD, no. 873, p. 309.
Chapter Six – Carlo II Tocco and the ‘Major Powers’

The final chapter of this thesis will discuss the diplomatic relationships Carlo II Tocco held with the ‘major powers’ of the region, the Ottomans, the Aragonese and the Venetians.¹ All three of these powers attempted to assert their influence over the Tocco lordship during Carlo II’s reign with varying levels of success. Carlo was a vassal of both Murad II (1421-1444, and 1446-1451), the Ottoman Sultan, and Alfonso the Magnanimous (1416-1458), the King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily. He also held Venetian citizenship and was granted honorary membership of the Maggior Consiglio in 1433 by Doge Francesco Foscari (1423-1457). Despite all these links to foreign powers, Carlo II was able to remain largely independent from their authority. Though he benefitted from the support of all three, and at times actively sought it, due to their rivalry and competing claims, none of them was able to bring Carlo II fully into their sphere of influence. The despot was largely able to play these three powers off against each other, and utilise them for his own ends. Such diplomacy was not unique to Carlo II. Oleh Havrylyshyn and Nora Srzentić put these kinds of tactics down as one of the four reasons behind the success of the Republic of Ragusa.² It is clear illustration of how small powers could survive and even thrive in the fifteenth-century Balkans.

¹ The Kingdom of Hungary could equally be viewed as one of the major powers of the region, due to its economic and political influence over the region. Carlo II’s interaction with the Hungarians largely came through his relationship with the Republic of Ragusa, in particular through the provision of information. DAD, Lettere di Levante, XII, ff. 15-15r; XIII, f. 241; DRR, nos. 243, 280, pp. 395-396, 466-467; KrD, nos. 858, 1131, pp. 307, 354.
Carlo II and the Ottomans:

This thesis has already touched on the role of the Ottomans in the Tocco ‘Civil War’ however this section will focus on the intricacies of Ottoman suzerainty and their impact on the lordship of Carlo II Tocco. As previously stated the terms of vassalage imposed upon Carlo II were merely an enforcement of the previous terms imposed upon Carlo I Tocco by Mehmed I in 1413.\(^3\) Ottoman vassalage largely revolved around the payment of tribute, and as result their Christian vassals were largely allowed to pursue their own economic and diplomatic relations. This meant that the Ottomans could never really control their vassals and so had little influence over Carlo II’s lordship. Carlo appears to have played several roles for his Ottoman suzerain, notably attending the Porte in Adrianople and acting as a diplomatic representative with the Republic of Ragusa. Towards the end of his reign Carlo II broke his vassalage under the Ottomans, turning to Alfonso the Magnanimous for aid in this endeavour. The Ottomans were unable to bring Carlo II back under their influence for the last few years of his reign, further illustrating their lack of control over the region. The factors behind this were ultimately: the geography of his domains, the weaknesses of the Ottomans, the impact of the crusade of Varna, and, as Donald Nicol argues, the fact the Ottomans ‘had bigger things in mind than the annexation of Arta and Aitolia’.\(^4\)

Before turning to Carlo II’s relationship with the Ottomans it is important to understand the nature of Ottoman vassalage in the Balkan Peninsular and the methods by which they established these vassals. The conquest of the Balkans has often been put down

\(^3\) CT, 366.  
\(^4\) Nicol, Epiros II, 207.
to the advanced Ottoman military strength and their ability to create a stable and well-organized state after their conquests. However the myth of Ottoman stability post-Interregnum is highly questionable, particularly as a result of the threat of succession crises which often plagued the dynasty upon the death of a Sultan. Equally their supposed military superiority can be called into question especially as demonstrated by their failure during the siege of Vonitsa in 1411, and Ercole Tocco’s victory at the Ophidares River in 1413. Due to both these factors the conquests of the Ottomans were by no means the ‘relentless push westwards’ as described by Franz Babinger, with Murad II’s military conquests largely confined to a smaller scale. His conquest of Thessalonica in 1430 and the destructions of the Hexamillion by Turahan in 1423 and 1431 were not all out attempts to conquer the remnants of the Byzantine Empire but punishment for their release of Mustafa Çelebi in September 1421. As previously stated the capture of Ioannina in October 1430 was merely an opportunistic attempt to gain territory from the division in the Tocco domains and to enforce the terms of vassalage on the Tocco lords, rather than a sustained conquest of the lands west

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7 CT, 256, 396 – 400.


of the Pindos Mountains as Aeneas Silvus Piccolomini suggested. Throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth century the Ottomans would seek to convert the lords of the region into their vassals rather than attempt to conquer large swathes of territory.

The nature of Ottoman vassalage during this period followed a simple pattern, which according to Hristov Matanov had begun after the battle Battle of Černomen on 26 September 1371. According to Peter Sugar the Ottomans viewed all those who agreed to pay tribute to them as their vassals. Beyond receiving this payment, known as the *harač*, the influence the Ottomans held over their vassal’s varied from case to case. Many Ottoman vassals were also expected to provide military support for their vassal, and occasionally going to campaign with the Sultan, though this was not always the case. Due to the loose nature of Ottoman vassalage several Ottomans vassals notably the Republic of Ragusa and Ferdinand I von Habsburg (1526-1564), who paid the Ottomans for peace in 1533, were vassals

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10. The conquests of Murad II are further embellished by Aeneas Silvus Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II (1458-1464), who argues that Aetolia and Epiros were added to the Ottoman domains through conquest. Aeneas Silvus Piccolomini, *Europe (c. 1400-1458)*, trans. R. Brown, ed. N. Bisaha (Washington D.C., 2013), 77-78.


14. Matanov, 84. Both Gjon Kastrioti (1407-1437) and Stefan Lazarević (1389-1427) were present at the Battle of Ankara on 20 July 1402 supporting Bayezid I *Yıldırım* against Timur. J. V. A. Fine, Jr., *The Late Medieval Balkans – A Critical Survey from the Late Twelfth Century to the Ottoman Conquest* (Ann Arbor MI, 1994), 422, 499.
in name only.15 The vassals of the Ottomans were therefore often free to pursue their own diplomatic and economic relations, free from the interference of the Porte. The nature of Ottoman vassalage therefore meant that they often had little influence over their vassals, and particularly in the case of Carlo II Tocco.

As this thesis has previously illustrated the terms imposed upon Carlo II Tocco by Murad II after the events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ were an attempt to enforce the terms that had existed previously between Mehmed I and Carlo I Tocco, rather than a redefinition of the relationship.16 The terms imposed upon Carlo II required him to accept the loss of Ioannina, to pay an annual tribute to Murad II, and to attend the Porte in Adrianople.17 In exchange Carlo II was allowed to retain control over his remaining possessions, and according to Chalkokondyles he received soldiers from the Ottomans in order to fight against Ercole and Menuno.18 These terms were almost identical to those imposed upon the Tocco in 1413, in which Carlo I agreed to pay annual tribute to Mehmed I in exchange for recognition of his realm.19 It also appears from Francesco Scalamonti’s account that similar terms were imposed

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15 Sugar, 111.
16 For the terms imposed by Mehmed I on Carlo I in 1413, see: CT, 366.
18 Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394. As previously stated the effectiveness of this Ottoman contingent, alongside the Italian mercenaries Carlo II had assembled, appears to have been negligent. However this shift in support from the Ottomans appears to have been a factor behind the eventual end of the conflict.
19 CT, 366.
upon Menuno Tocco, and probably the other illegitimate sons.\textsuperscript{20} The Gattilusio were also subjected to similar terms during this period, which illustrates that Carlo II’s arrangement with Murad II followed standard vassalage agreements.\textsuperscript{21} It does however appear from the vassal agreements of both Carlo I and Carlo II that the Tocco were not expected to provide military support for their Ottoman suzerain. This may have been due to the nature of the Tocco military forces which were predominantly mercenaries, similar to the \textit{condotierii} forces found across Italy, and they were unlikely to have many auxiliary forces to provide Murad II.\textsuperscript{22} According to Chalkokondyles, Murad II supplied Carlo with soldiers to fight against the forces of the illegitimate sons rather than demanded the Tocco provide him with soldiers.\textsuperscript{23} It therefore seems that the Tocco were not expected to provide the Ottomans with military forces. The events of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ merely led to a continuation of the agreement held between Carlo II’s predecessor and the Ottomans.


\textsuperscript{23} Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
The records of the Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku show that, as well as paying tribute, Carlo II may have played a diplomatic role on behalf of his Ottoman suzerain. Despite his involvement in the provision of information from the Porte in Adrianople, the Ottomans may have utilised Carlo II's close relationship with the Ragusan authorities for their own diplomatic dealings with the city. The first of these occasions came on the 27 April 1437 when the Consilium Rogatorum authorised the Rector and the Consilium Minus to respond, both in person or via letter, to a Turkis representative who had arrived in Ragusa. According to the record this Turk arrived in the city along with several letters written by both Carlo II and the Turks to pardon the sons of the now dead, Stani Illić. The exact reason behind this Turks arriving in Ragusa is expanded upon in a later record of 27 November 1437. According to this record, along with a Miho Murinić they had gone to Ragusa to raise a complaint against Barnaba and Ivan Ogrijić and Stane Ilić who had acquired debts in Ioannina. Letters from Carlo II and the Lord of Ioannina, probably the newly established Sanjackbey of the city, also arrived in support of this trial. After many months of deliberation upon these complaints the Consilium Rogatorum ordered Barnaba and Ivan Ogrijić to pay one of the Turks the three hundred ducats for which they were indebted. The record also suggests that Barnaba and Ivan Ogrijić were holding Miho Murinić's son and goods, and were ordered to release both of these, which illustrates why Murinić was involved in this complaint.

25 DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 132r; KrD, no. 906, p. 315.
26 ‘pro respondendum Teucro et litteris dispotis Arte et Teucri.’ DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 132r; KrD, no. 906, p. 315.
27 DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 153; KrD, no. 912, p. 316.
28 The Lords of Arta and Ioannina are referred to as ‘valiosi’ in the document. DAD, Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 153; KrD, no. 912, p. 316.
Another Ragusan document that illustrates Carlo II’s role as an Ottoman vassal is a letter written on the 2 October 1441.29 This letter was written to the Ragusan ambassadors to the Sultan with instructions to demand exemption for their merchants in the Sultans domains, along with Albania, Bosnia, Serbia and Wallachia.30 The letter also requests that the Sultan write to the Signor de Larta e alta Valiosi in order to free the Ragusan merchants and their merchandise.31 As previously stated this event coincides with the Ottoman attempts to force Ragusa to pay the Harač between 1440 and 1442, which explains why these merchants and their goods were seized.32 However this document is confusing as a few months before this the Ragusan authorities had granted Dinos Ka...aropos and Iacopo Rosso ‘safe-conduct’ for a year.33 There is a lack of documents during this period concerning the cereal trade, and only one further record for 1441 in which a Franciscus de Camerino and a Zupriamus de Lucanis were in dispute over a failed attempt to purchase skins and chestnuts in Arta.34 This may suggest that Carlo’s vassalage under the Ottomans briefly affected his close relationship with the Republic of Ragusa, though due to the multi-faceted nature of this relationship it was able to recover.

30 DAD, Lettere di Levante, XIII, f. 46r ; KrD, no. 965, p. 324.
33 DAD, Consilium Minus, IX, f. 19r ; Consilium Maius, VI, f. 132r ; KrD, no. 963, p. 324.
34 DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LV, ff. 216r-217 ; KrD, no. 968, p. 325.
Carlo II remained an Ottoman vassal throughout most of his reign, however that changed in the 1440s. The exact date on which Carlo II broke his vassalage is unclear. Donald Nicol suspects that Carlo’s rebellion against the Ottomans was tied to the early success of the Crusade of Varna and to the revolts by Constantine Palaiologos and Skanderbeg, which would date it to 1443-1444. Such a date is supported by the timing of the military support Carlo II received from his new relatives in the Ventimiglia family, of which further analysis shall be given in this chapter. According to Aeneas Silvus Piccolomini the Turks attacked Akarnania but this was repelled by a force of horsemen under the command of Giovanni di Ventimiglia. This suggests that the Turkish attack on Akarnania was not of substantial size due to the ease of Ventimiglia’s force to repel them. Donald Nicol suggested Carlo was later defeated by the Ottomans and forced to submit his son Leonardo III as a hostage. However, Nicol’s interpretation is based on Theodore Spandounes’ account of the aftermath of the Tocco ‘Civil War’, and there are no further documents to support this claim. Carlo’s realm was also largely aided by its geography with the Pindos Mountains shielding it from the majority of the Ottoman possessions. This meant it remained safe from the Ottomans for the final four years of his reign. We know from Cyriac of Ancona’s visit to Carlo II’s domains in 1448 that his domains were in a state of peace, so much so that the two were able to go on a hunting trip between 8-13 September. It would not be until after Carlo II’s death on the 30 September

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35 Nicol, Epiros II, 207. This date would also tie Carlo’s rejection of Ottoman vassalage with the seizure of Srebrenica from the Ottomans by the Bosnian King Stjepan Tomaš in 1444. Filipović, ‘The Anti-Ottoman Activities of Bosnian King Stjepan Tomaš’, 213.
37 Piccolomini, 111.
38 Nicol, Epiros II, 208.
1448 that the Ottomans would eventually attack the Tocco lordship, capturing the city of Arta on 24 March 1449.\footnote{For the dating of Carlo II’s death, see: Cyriac of Ancona, _Later Travels_, 348. Only one chronicle gives the full date for the fall of Arta, see; ‘De Rebus Eprii Fragmentum V’, _Historia politica et patriarchica Constantinopoleos – Epirotica_, ed. I. Bekker, CSHB (New York, 1849), 254. Several others only note the year of the conquest. P. Schreiner, _Die Byzantinischen Kleinchroniken_, 3 vols. CFHB 12 (Vienna, 1975), vol. 1, nos. 58/8 ; Stefano Magno, ‘VIII. Estratti degli Annali Veneti di Stefano Magno’ ed. K. Hopf, _Chroniques Gréco-Romanes – Inédites ou peu connues publiées avec notes et tables généalogiques_ (Berlin, 1873), 179-209, at 196.}

Despite being a vassal of Murad II for most of his reign, the Ottomans had little influence over Carlo II’s lordship. The terms imposed upon Carlo II, along with most Ottoman vassals, were often lenient and largely revolved around the payment of tribute.\footnote{Sugar, 111.} As a result their vassals were often free to pursue their own diplomatic and economic agendas, without Ottoman interference. This would eventually work against the Ottomans, as many of these vassals would seek to undermine their suzerain through the provision of information and, as occurred during Carlo II’s reign, eventual rebellion.\footnote{DAD, Lettere di Levante, XII, ff. 15-15r ; XIII, f. 241 ; DRR, nos. 243, 280, pp. 395-396, 466-467 ; KrD, nos. 858, 1131, pp. 307, 354.}

In the case of Epiros, the Ottomans were never in a position to further enforce their control, partially due to the geography which shielded the Tocco domains from most of the Ottoman forces and also due to the Ottoman’s own weaknesses. Akarnania and Epiros were equally of little importance to the strategy of the Ottomans in the region and this helped to protect the Tocco domains from any threat of invasion until 1449 when Arta was captured by the Ottomans, which further illustrates the strategic nature of their conquests.\footnote{Nicol, Epiros II, 207 ; ‘De Rebus Eprii Fragmentum V’, _Epirotica_, 254. Schreiner, _Kleinchroniken_, vol. 1, nos. 58/8 ; Stefano Magno, 196.} Carlo II’s relationship with his Ottoman
suzerain ultimately illustrates the lack of influence they held over their Christian vassals of
the Balkans during in the fifteenth century.

**Carlo II and the Venetians:**

The relationship between the Tocco lordship and the Venetian authorities was often fractious
and marred by mistrust between the two. The root of this animosity was undoubtedly
Venice’s territorial ambitions in the region, in particular their desire to acquire the Ionian
Islands to protect their shipping from piracy in the region. Due to their strategic position
along the Venetian trade lanes with the Eastern Mediterranean it was of both economic and
political importance to either obtain the islands for themselves or to placate those who ruled
over them. The Venetian authorities attempted to bring the Tocco into their sphere of
influence by offering citizenship to all members of the family from 1361, when Leonardo I first
received this privilege.\(^45\) However these privileges were unable to dispel the mistrust that
existed between the two due to the Venetian territorial desires. During the reigns of both
Carlo I and Carlo II the Tocco turned to others for their allies and economic partners, notably
Venice’s rivals the Genoese and the Ragusans, which further illustrates their fractious
relationship with the Venetians. Carlo II’s relationship with the Venetian authorities typifies
the inability of the Venetians to effectively incorporate the Tocco lordship into their sphere of
influence. Despite reaffirming his Venetian citizenship and granting him honorary
membership of the *Maggior Consiglio* in March 1433, the Venetian authorities were unable to
influence Carlo II. During his reign Carlo not only aligned his lordship to their economic

\(^{45}\) ASV, *Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi*, I, f. 145r; *I Libri Commemoriali della republica di Venezia - regesti*, ed. R.
Predelli, 8 vols (Venice, 1876-1914), vol. 2, book VI, no. 295, p. 329
competitors in the Adriatic, the Republic of Ragusa, but allowed pirates based within his domains to raid Venetian shipping. Due to their lack of influence over his lordship the Venetians were unable to prevent these attacks and were limited to seizing his assets in Venetian territory. Due to the mistrust that lay at the core of the relationship, the occasional acts of cordiality by both the Venetian authorities and Carlo II had little impact on their relationship and ultimately kept the Tocco lordship free from Venetian interference.

The key factor behind the strained relations between the Tocco and the Venetians concerned Venice’s territorial ambitions in the region, particularly their desire to control the Ionian Islands. The islands had originally been granted to the Venetians, along with most of Epiros including the cities of Arta and Ioannina, in the Partitio Terrarium Imperii Romanae though had been unable to take control over most of this territory allowing in the vacuum for Michael I Komnenos-Doukas to found the Despotate of Epiros.46 Despite failing to bring these possessions under their control the Venetians still appear to have desired control over the region, or at least influence in order to protect their shipping which passed through the Ionian Sea. Venice’s territorial ambitions largely concerned the Ionian Islands of Leukas, Kefalonia, Ithaca and Zakynthos which were in a strategically important location along the major trade route between their city and possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Equally the Venetians utilised the islands they controlled in the Adriatic and Aegean seas for the defence of their city and its possessions which undoubtedly motivated their attempts to acquire the Tocco

islands.\textsuperscript{47} This economic and strategic value were undoubtedly the key motivations behind the Venetians to acquire the Ionian Islands.

One of the key economic reasons behind the Venetian desire to acquire the islands was due to an important geographical feature, the channel of Santa Mavra. Situated between the island of Leukas and the Greek mainland, this channel sat along the major trade route through the Adriatic and Ionian Seas between Venice and its possessions in the Eastern Mediterranean. It was therefore in the interest of the Venetian authorities to either control this channel, through the eventual conquest of Leukas, or to make sure that those who controlled the channel were sympathetic to Venetian interests. This was probably the reason behind the Venetian authorities granting citizenship to Leonardo I Tocco, and his heirs, in the hope that it would bring them into the Venetian sphere of influence and protect their shipping.\textsuperscript{48} The Venetians also attempted to strengthen their bond with the Tocco by offering military support, in the form of a Galeotta, to Carlo I in July 1413 during his conflict with the Prince of Achaia, Centurione II Zaccaria.\textsuperscript{49} According to the record, this Galeotta, under the control of the Captain of the Gulf, would defend the Ionian Islands from piracy during the conflict. Centurione was supported in this conflict by the Gattilusio, and the union of these Genoese lords against the Tocco may have further motivated the Venetians to help Carlo I during this


\textsuperscript{48} ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, I, f. 145r.

\textsuperscript{49} ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Secretae, V, ff. 147r ; ThR, vol. 2, nos. 1498, 1500, p. 116.
conflict. The Venetian involvement in this conflict was undoubtedly due to a desire to protect their shipping during this conflict, but there were other considerations including maintaining the Tocco control over the region after Carlo I had renounced his brief Genoese citizenship.

While the channel of Santa Mavra was controlled by the Tocco family this vital trade lane largely remained open to Venetian ships. However, there were times when this was not always the case. On two occasions both Magdalena Buondelmonti, Carlo I’s mother and regent, and Carlo I himself had imposed tariffs (pedagium) on ships using the channel. This angered the Venetian authorities who declared tariffs on their ships to be illegal and even questioned the rights of the Tocco to their control over the island of Leukas. The Tocco control over the channel was a major reason behind the Venetian protests at Carlo I’s Genoese citizenship (1389-1393) as they now feared that it was threat to their shipping as he had aligned himself with one of their major competitors in the Mediterranean.

With this occasional but serious threat to their shipping and their trade, it is not surprising that the Venetians desired control over all the Ionian Islands for themselves. By obtaining the islands the Republic would be able to control the important shipping lanes

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51 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, XXXVIII, ff. 27-27r ; XLI, f. 199r ; ThR, vol. 1, nos. 645, 782, pp. 157, 188.
through the Ionian Sea and not be reliant on the good will of the Tocco family for their own prosperity. On numerous occasions the Venetian authorities discussed possibilities for taking over the islands. During the Tocco ‘Civil War’, they hinted to their commanders on Corfu that if the conflict deteriorated, and went against Carlo II, then it might be preferable for the Venetian forces to ‘protect’ the Ionian Islands. ‘Protect’ in this case probably meant ‘occupy’. They also tried to persuade Francesca Tocco to bequeath her lands, notably the island of Leukas, to them upon her death. She ultimately refused, confirming that upon her death her lands would revert to Carlo II, as her legitimate heir, and in any case the Venetian Senate refused to accept the plan voting it down by fifty votes to forty. Despite this setback Venetian territorial ambitions over the Ionian Islands continued into the reign of Leonardo III Tocco and even beyond the expulsion of the Tocco from the region in 1479. In 1482 Antonio Tocco, one of Carlo II’s sons, recaptured the islands of Kefalonia and Zakynthos from the Ottomans. However, his control over them did not last long and he was killed the following year. Both Miller and Nicol suggest there might have been Venetian involvement in Antonio’s death, and that it was therefore no surprise when the islands came under Venetian rule shortly thereafter.

Another of the major aspects which contributed towards the tense relations between Carlo II and the Venetians were the pirate based within the Tocco domains. As this thesis has previously stated, piracy was another economic activity present in the small Latin lordships

56 Miller, LiL, 487 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 213.
of the Balkans. Due to its proximity to the Adriatic and Ionian seas, these were ideal locations for pirates to operate within and could provide a key source of victims, and it appears that they made full use of the opportunity.\textsuperscript{57} However, a distinctive strand of policy can be detected in the piracy committed by those based in the lordships of the Balkans. The ships of those who were allies and economic partners of the lordship were often spared, suggesting a level of collusion between the pirates and lords, and the potentially severe consequences that could result from piracy.\textsuperscript{58} The expulsion of the Gattilusio from the Aegean in 1462 was a case in point.\textsuperscript{59} The balancing of any economic benefits of piracy against its wider diplomatic pressures and serious consequences was of great importance to the Latin lordships. Piracy was undoubtedly a factor in the souring of relations between Carlo II and the Venetian authorities. The Venetians were unable to prevent piracy against their own ships in the region and could only punish Carlo II by seizing his private property within their domains, notably the island of Corfu. Despite further souring relations the piracy against Venetian shipping was undoubtedly tied to the mistrust that already existed between the two due to Venice’s territorial ambitions.

A key example that illustrates the close relationship between the Tocco and pirates comes from the capture of George Sphrantzes by pirates in March 1430. Sphrantzes was dispatched by Constantine Palaiologos, the Despot of the Morea, to mediate the various


\textsuperscript{58} Wright, \textit{The Gattilusio Lordships}, 236-237.

participants of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ but was unable to fulfil this role as he was captured by Catalan pirates off the coast of Leukas and ransomed. Sphrantzes later visited Leonardo III in November 1467 and appealed for compensation due for the poor treatment that he had suffered at the pirates’ hands. There is further evidence in the Venetian records to suggest that Catalan pirates were in the service of Francesca Acciaiuoli. According to one report from September 1430 a Venetian merchant, Filippo da Canal, was captured and imprisoned by a Catalan vessel which was apparently in the pay of Francesca. It is likely that these were the same Catalans who captured Sphrantzes earlier in the year and suggests that Francesca may have been involved in the capture of Sphrantzes. These records not only further illustrate that pirates were based within the Tocco domains but that these pirates were at times under the influence and pay of the rulers of the region.

Piracy against Venetian shipping was not limited to the reign of Carlo II. Several accusations had been made against Carlo I regarding the case of a Venetian merchant called Bartolomeo Benedetto. In 1411 Benedetto’s ship, laden with wheat, was captured by pirates off the coast of Sicily, and the Venetian authorities suspected that Carlo I was responsible. Carlo dispatched an ambassador to Venice in March 1412 to plead his case, though this appears to have been unsuccessful as the government of Corfu later sent their own ambassador to the Tocco domains in September 1413 to negotiate a reimbursement for

63 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, XLIX ff. 57r-58; ThR, vol. 2, no. 1437, p. 103.
Benedetto. This case would continue to plague Carlo I throughout the 1410s and helped to further strain the already strained relationship. In July 1414 Carlo I’s ambassador, Egidio de Leonessa, arrived in Venice asking for aid against Centurione II Zaccaria in the shape of a galley and for the Venetians to transfer the city of Naupaktos to the Tocco. The Venetian authorities not only dismissed both of these pleas but reminded Egidio de Leonessa of the Benedetto case and demanded that Carlo I provide compensation. Benedetto’s case was also brought up on several occasions by the Venetian authorities in 1415 and 1417 though with little success, with Carlo’s representatives repeatedly pleading his innocence at all the accusations. As they were unable to come to any conclusions of the matter there are no further references to the case post-1417. Despite coming to nothing the case plagued Carlo for six years and undoubtedly caused friction between the two sides, as illustrated by the refusal of the Venetian authorities to aid Carlo in July 1414.

Piracy would remain present in the Tocco lordship during Carlo II’s reign, and the pirates within his domains appear to have largely targeted Venetian ships. Venetian shipping may have provided wealthier targets for the pirates based within the Tocco domains than the other shipping in the region, it was perhaps motivated by the poor diplomatic relations between Carlo II and the Venetian authorities. This thesis has already illustrated that the close relationship between Carlo II and the Ragusan authorities may have kept their shipping safe.

64 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, XLIX, f. 97r ; L, f. 38 ; ThR, nos. 1447, 1506, pp. 105, 116.
65 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, L, ff. 128-128r ; ThR, no. 1536, p. 125.
66 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, L, ff. 128-128r ; ThR, no. 1536, p. 125.
67 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, L, f. 195r ; LII, f. 65 ; LII, f. 28 ; ThR, nos. 1566, 1590, 1657, pp. 132, 138, 155.
68 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mixtae, L, ff. 128-128r ; ThR, no. 1536, p. 125.
from the pirates based within the Tocco domains.\textsuperscript{69} Equally it also appears that the tense relationship between the Venetians and the Tocco contributed to the piracy against Venetian shipping. The accusations of piracy made against Carlo II by the Venetians came in the 1440s. The first came on 20 May 1446, when a Venetian merchant based in Epiros, Georgio Loredan, made claims against Carlo II.\textsuperscript{70} As a result the government of Corfu under the mandate of the \textit{Collegio} sequestered Carlo’s property on Corfu, which came to a value of five-hundred ducats. However this action did not appear to deter piracy from within the Tocco domains and as result later that year on 14 September 1446 the Senate granted the Baile of Corfu the power to seize all Carlo’s assets on the island in the hope it would force him to negotiate compensation for Loredan.\textsuperscript{71} The next, and final, record concerning this episode was written on 7 August 1447.\textsuperscript{72} It appears from this record that the Venetians dispatched ambassadors to Carlo’s domains on two separate occasions. These missions though merely resulted in ‘polite words’ between the two and Carlo refused to compensate the Venetian merchants affected as a result of piracy. Therefore, the Senate decided to liquidate Carlo’s property on Corfu that had been sequestered by the authorities there in order to recompense the affected merchants. These accusations and the actions of the Venetians clearly soured the relations between the two. These cases of piracy also illustrate the relative weakness of the Venetians as they had little power with which to influence Carlo II. Their only real power was to seize and liquidate the private property Carlo held within Venetian territory, in this case on the island of Corfu, in

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{DAD}, Lamenta de Foris, ff.183r-184 ; \textit{KrD}, no. 882, p. 311. This supports Wright’s view of piracy being influenced by the lordships from which they were based. Wright, \textit{The Gattilusio Lordships}, 236-237.

\textsuperscript{70} \textit{ASV}, Senatus Deliberationes Mare, II, f. 146 ; \textit{ThR}, vol. 3, no. 2716, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{71} \textit{ASV}, Senatus Deliberationes Mare, II, ff. 174r-175 ; \textit{AAV}, vol. 19, no. 5266, pp. 218-220 ; \textit{ThR}, vol. 3, no. 2730, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{72} \textit{ASV}, Senatus Deliberationes Mare, III, f. 30 ; \textit{AAV}, vol. 19, no. 5323, pp. 272-273 ; \textit{ThR}, vol. 3, no. 2754, p. 140.
order to recompense the merchants affected. This further illustrates the relative power of the Latin lordships, and the weakness of the major powers, in the region.

As previously stated in this thesis, the appointment of Carlo II to the Venetian Maggior Consiglio in March 1433 can largely been seen as the event which confirms the end of the Tocco ‘Civil War’. This event was undoubtedly the ‘high point’ in the relations between Carlo and the Venetian authorities as they reconfirmed his citizenship and they appear to have tried to finally bring the Tocco lordship into their sphere of influence. Despite this ultimately being unsuccessful it is still important to analyse the documents concerning this to understand exactly what both sides wanted from this relationship. It is also important to analyse the role of the Venetians in the Tocco ‘Civil War’. Not only are their archival sources some of the most important sources of information of events about the civil war and the dating of the siege of Ioannina, but they also appear to confirm the territorial ambitions that the Venetians held concerning the Ionian Islands. This was undoubtedly the reason why Carlo’s appointment to the Maggior Consiglio ultimately did not bring him into the Venetian sphere of influence.

The actions of the Venetian authorities during the Tocco ‘Civil War’ not only help to provide important sources for the events of the conflict, but also further show the foreign policy of the Republic and its desire to acquire the rest of the Ionian Islands. As previously stated the Venetians had an important stake in the stability of the Tocco domains in order to maintain their trade in the region. As the Tocco ‘Civil War’ began the Venetian authorities were clearly worried by the instability in Epiros, as can be seen from the deliberations of the
Senate. On the 3 March 1430 the Senate sent instructions to the Captain General of the Sea, Silvestro Morosini regarding actions he should take in response to the situation in Thessalonica and the conflict in the Tocco domains. Significantly he was urged to attempt to secure the islands of Zakynthos and Kephalonia and to give them to the Baile of Corfu to administer on behalf of the Republic.\(^\text{73}\) Since Thessalonica was a Venetian outpost and under siege by the Ottomans, which finally succumbed later that month, it is likely that this took priority over the Ionian Islands under Tocco rule. On 17 June 1430 the Senate responded to letters from the Baile of Corfu, concerning the situation in the Tocco domains, with orders to the Gulf Captain Trolio Malipiero. The orders tell him, as a representative of the republic, to deploy two galleys to Corfu and prepare to ‘protect’ the islands of Kephalonia, Leukas and Zakynthos if Carlo and his lordship were in serious danger. If Carlo was not in serious danger, Malipiero was ordered to do nothing except encourage the young despot.\(^\text{74}\) Because of the previous actions of the Venetians and their clear desire to acquire the Ionian Islands for themselves, we can probably assume ‘protect’ means to secure and occupy the islands for the Republic for their own interest. Therefore, the Venetians, though supportive of Carlo during the conflict, equally saw an opportunity to further their territorial ambitions in the region if the situation deteriorated. This is yet another example of the territorial ambitions of the Venetians, which would prove to be a key factor behind the poor relations between the two.

Carlo II’s membership of the Maggior Consiglio was granted just when the Tocco ‘Civil War’ was coming to an end. As previously stated in this thesis, the granting of this privilege

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is arguably the clearest datable evidence for the end of the Tocco ‘Civil War’ and the superior position Carlo II held in the region by March 1433. Nicol argues that this relationship came about because Carlo was isolated as a result of the ‘Tocco Civil War’ and lacked the spirit of either his father or aunt to forge his own path, instead turning to Venice for help. Venice on the other hand, though sympathetic to Carlo’s situation, merely re-affirmed his citizenship and granted him honorary membership of the Maggior Consiglio to ‘boost his confidence’. However Nicol’s interpretation both exaggerates the situation faced by Carlo II during the Tocco ‘Civil War’ and devalues the Venetian aspirations in the region. As previously analysed, Venice’s desire to have control or at least influence over the Tocco domains is clear and, in this situation, they undoubtedly saw an opportunity to confirm Carlo’s lordship within their sphere of influence.

The Venetian Senate met with the ambassador of Carlo II Tocco on 14 March 1433. According to the record, the capture of Ioannina and seizure of other parts of his Lordship by the Turks during the Tocco ‘Civil War’ played a major part in Carlo’s representatives coming to Venice looking for aid. The Venetian authorities responded to the ambassadors stating that due to the historical rights of the Tocco family as Venetian citizens, first granted to Leonardo I, the Venetians would reaffirm this connection with Carlo II and grant him honorary membership of the Maggior Consiglio. The proposal was accepted with an

75 Nicol, The Despotate of Epiros 1267-1479, 205.
77 As previously stated in this thesis the Ottomans appear to have only captured the city of Ioannina during the ‘Tocco Civil War’. The capture of these other parts of his lordship may refers to the territory seized by Ercole and Torno during the conflict. Chalkokondyles, vol. 1, 394.
78 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, I, f. 145r.
overwhelming majority of 105 votes to 11, with 6 abstentions. \(^{79}\) Carlo was granted the honorary title by Doge Francesco Foscari on the next day, as recorded in the Privilegi. \(^{80}\) A copy of this document can be found in the Archivio Privato di Tocco di Montemiletto, in the Archivio di Stato di Napoli which is dated 16 March 1433. \(^{81}\)

The motivation behind this appointment was clearly an attempt by the Venetian authorities to bring Carlo II, and his lordship, into their sphere of influence in order to protect their trade routes. According to Theodore Spandounes, this privilege had much greater consequences, with Carlo becoming a vassal of Venice and handing over control of all legal matters within his lordship to the Republic. \(^{82}\) It should be borne in mind though that Spandounes’ forbears were Byzantine refugees who had been accepted by the Venetians, and he himself was probably born in Venice. \(^{83}\) His ‘special allegiance’ to the city may therefore explain his over-emphasis on Venetian power in the region. \(^{84}\) None of the Venetian documents appear to support such an assertion and it appears that the privilege granted to Carlo was largely honorary rather than politically significant. Membership of the Maggior Consiglio remained a great honour, and only forty foreigners were elected to this position between 1404 and 1454, a third of whom were Condottieri who had fought for the Venetian...

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\(^{80}\) ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Privilegi, II, f. 17 (37?) ; AAV, vol. 15, no. 3550, pp. 5-6.

\(^{81}\) ASN, APTM, Pergamene XLVII ; APT, no. 49, p. 28. According to Allocati this document is itself a copy which he dates to the 27 February 1662. APT, p. 28, footnote 1.


\(^{83}\) In his translation of Spandounes Donald Nicol gives a summary of Spandounes life and works. Spandounes, trans. Nicol, vii-xxv.

\(^{84}\) Spandounes, trans. Nicol, vii-ix.
State. There was undoubtedly a certain amount of prestige accrued as a result of this and it undoubtedly helped to demonstrate the strength of Carlo’s position in 1433. A similar grant was also made by Doge Pasquale Malipiero in January 1458 to Leonardo III Tocco, in which he re-affirmed the privileges granted to Carlo II in 1433, in yet another attempt to bring the Tocco lordship into their sphere of influence.

The granting of membership to the Maggior Consiglio was undoubtedly the high-point in the relations between Carlo II and the Venetian authorities, though it ultimately failed to bring Carlo II’s lordship into their sphere of influence. Granting these privileges was undoubtedly an attempt by the Venetians to gain influence over the Tocco lordship, in order to protect their trade in the region. The piracy against Venetian shipping in the 1440s from within the Tocco domains illustrates that they were unsuccessful in achieving this aim, and that they were unable to enforce their control over Carlo II other than by seizing and liquidating his property on the island of Corfu. The lack of influence was undoubtedly as a result of the Venetian territorial aims in the Ionian Sea, which led to animosity between the two during the reigns of both Carlo I and Carlo II Tocco. These poor relations contributed to the piracy against Venetian shipping which in turn further soured the already fractious relations.

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86 ASN, APTM, Pergamene LV; APT, no. 49, p. 28.
Carlo II and Alfonso the Magnanimous:

The final section of this chapter will analyse the relationship between Carlo II and the Kingdom of Naples under the rule of Alfonso the Magnanimous (1442-1458). As the Tocco originated from the Kingdom of Naples, and continued to maintain these links throughout their time in the Balkans, they remained in contact with their ‘homeland’ and its politics.\(^{87}\) Alfonso began to take power over Naples in the 1430s and during his reign in the 1440s and 1450s the Tocco developed close relations with the new sovereign. Though Leonardo III Tocco’s relationship with Alfonso was much closer and more significant, of which there has been greater analysis, the roots of this relationship can be traced back to Carlo II’s reign. Despite playing an important role in his later reign Alfonso had little influence over Carlo II’s lordship. As Alfonso only finally became undisputed King of Naples in 1442, he was only able to fully pursue his wider Balkan strategy in the last six years of Carlo II’s reign. Alfonso had greater influence over the lordships of Leonardo III, Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderberg, and Stjepan Vukčić Kosača of Bosnia, though the roots of these relationships lay in his dealings with Carlo II.

There has been greater analysis of the relationship between Alfonso the Magnanimous and Leonardo III Tocco, in part because there are more sources available. Unlike with Carlo II, a document of the vassal agreement between Leonardo III and Alfonso exists in the Archivio

\(^{87}\) For further analysis of the origins of the Tocco in the Kingdom of Naples, see: Zečević, TGR, 11-30. For further analysis of some members of the Neapolitan branch of the Tocco family and their use by Carlo I Tocco, see: N. Zečević. ‘The Italian kin of the Tocco Despot: Some notes about the relatives of Carlo I Tocco’, Recueil des travaux de l’Institut d’études byzantines, vol. 39 (2002), 237–247.
Privato di Tocco di Montemiletto, which illustrates the terms of this relationship.\textsuperscript{88} The document suggests that Leonardo would continue the work of his father to defend his realm against the Ottomans, further alluding to Alfonso's organisation of an anti-Ottoman network during both Carlo II and Leonardo III's reigns.\textsuperscript{89} It was also undoubtedly tied to his desire to appropriate the legacy of the Angevins and to further his claims in the region.\textsuperscript{90} The relationship between Leonardo III and the House of Trastámara would continue beyond Alfonso’s death in 1458. According to the Aragonese chronicler Jeronimo Zurita (1512-1580), Leonardo strengthened his connections by marrying Alfonso’s granddaughter Francesca de Aragón y Marzano in 1477.\textsuperscript{91} However as Zečević has highlighted the exact identity of Francesca de Aragón y Marzano and her relationship to Alfonso V is both confusing and unclear.\textsuperscript{92} Zurita also suggests that after his expulsion from the Balkans in 1479, Leonardo maintained his close relationship with the Trastámara, and even visited King Ferdinand II of Aragon (1479-1516) in Zaragoza in 1488 to ask for further financial support.\textsuperscript{93} Despite Alfonso clearly having a greater impact on the Tocco lordship during the reign of Leonardo III, the origins of this close relationship can be traced to the reign of Carlo II Tocco.

The beginning of the relationship between Carlo II and Alfonso the Magnanimous is unclear. On the 14 July 1437 a galley belonging to Carlo II Tocco was witnessed within close proximity of the Ottoman coast.

\textsuperscript{88} This document has been published and analysed by Zečević, see: N. Zečević, ‘Confirmation grant of King Alfonso V of Aragon to Leonardo III Tocco (July 16 1452): An authentic charter with a fake justification?’, Papers of the Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Eastern Sarajevo, vol. 14 (2012), 9-21.

\textsuperscript{89} Zečević, ‘Confirmation grant of King Alfonso V of Aragon to Leonardo III Tocco’, 10, 16.

\textsuperscript{90} J. Miret y Sans, La Política Oriental de Alfonso V de Aragón – Exposición del libro de Francesco Cerone (Barcelona, 1904), 20, 29, 34.

\textsuperscript{91} Jeronimo Zurita, Anales de la Corona de Aragón, ed. A. Canellas López (Zaragoza, 1978-1998), vol. 8, 277.

\textsuperscript{92} Zečević, TGR, 185.

\textsuperscript{93} Zurita, vol. 8, 540.
proximity to a ship carrying Alfonso himself along the Adriatic coast. Nicol suggests that the root of this relationship can be traced back to this event as it would seem that some kind of meeting must have taken place.\textsuperscript{94} The ties between the two may predate this meeting as those present in Carlo II’s lordship with ties to Alfonso, such as Ser Antonellus Barges, were there before July 1436.\textsuperscript{95} Bernardus Villamaria of Barcelona, the Captain General of the Royal Galleys of Aragon, was present in the Gulf of Arta in May 1436, further suggesting the connection may have predated this event.\textsuperscript{96} There is however little corroborating evidence to suggest that the relationship between the two began in the 1430s, and there is much clearer evidence to suggest that the relationship developed in the 1440s. As previously stated sometime around 1443-1444 Carlo II broke his Ottoman vassalage. This event is particularly difficult to date, though Nicol has suggested that this event was most probably tied to the events of the Crusade of Varna and the rebellions of Constantine Palaiologos and Skanderbeg.\textsuperscript{97} Another piece of evidence which supports this claim can be seen from the military support Carlo II received from the Ventimiglia family during this period.

Carlo’s ties to the Ventimiglia family are some of the clearest examples of the relationship between the Kingdom of Naples and the Tocco lordship. According to Zečević the Ventimiglia family originated from Liguria and had become significant players in the Kingdom of Sicily, and even the Empire of Nicaea under the Laskarids.\textsuperscript{98} It appears that

\textsuperscript{94} IHC, vol. 2, p. 37 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 208, footnote 27 ; Zečević, TGR, 117.
\textsuperscript{95} DAD, Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r ; KrD, no. 873, p. 309. Barges’ connection to Alfonso is revealed in a document in 1438 in which he is referred to as ‘Antonellus Catellanus’. DAD, Diversa Cancellariae, LII, ff. 113-113r ; KrD, no. 921, p. 317 ; Zečević, TGR, 182.
\textsuperscript{96} The record of this event is dated 31 August 1436. DAD, Lamenta de Foris, ff.183r-184 ; KrD, no. 882, p. 311.
\textsuperscript{97} Nicol, Epiros II, 207.
\textsuperscript{98} Zečević, TGR, 121, endnote 160.
during Carlo II’s reign, the head of the Ventimiglia family was Giovanni di Ventimiglia, the Marquis of Gerace, described by Alan Ryder as the ‘premier magnate of Sicily’. Giovanni was not only an important lord in the Kingdom of Naples but also a competent general with an extensive military career. During Alfonso’s conquest of Naples, Giovanni played an active role on the Aragonese side. While serving as governor of the city of Capua, he turned over the city to Alfonso, and later conquered the town of Accera on behalf of his new suzerain. Carlo II appears to have received military support from Giovanni when he broke his Ottoman vassalage, sometime between 1443 and 1444. It appears that the Ottomans responded to this by dispatching a force to invade Akarnania. According to Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini, Giovanni di Ventimiglia crossed the Adriatic and Ionian Seas with an army to aid Carlo II. Several Venetian documents also illustrate that Giovanni provided support in the form of naval forces. During this excursion in the Balkans, Giovanni also received the title of Viceroy in Athens and Neopatria with what appears to have been a mission despatched expressly to return these lost duchies to Alfonso. In September 1445 Giovanni di Ventimiglia was recalled by Alfonso to lead one of his armies in the March of Ancona against Francesco I Sforza (1401-1466). As previously stated, Donald Nicol believed that upon Giovanni’s return Carlo was defeated by the Ottomans, though this appears to be a

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101 Piccolomini, 289-290, 294.
102 ACA, Registros del Rey, 2698, f. 109.
103 He does mention any specific settlement that was besieged by the Ottoman forces. Piccolomini, 111 ; C. Marinescu, *La Politique Orientale D’Alfonse V D’Aragon, Roi de Naples (1416-1458)* (Barcelona, 1994), 99-100.
104 ASV, Senatus Deliberationes Mare, I, ff. 147-150 ; Senatus Deliberationes Secretae, XVI, ff. 112r-113 ; AAV, vol. 18, no. 4792, pp. 9-12 ; IHC, vol. 3, p. 183.
106 ACA, Registros del Rey, 2698, f. 109 ; Piccolomini, 281-282 ; Ryder, *The Kingdom of Naples*, 272.
misreading of Spandounes with no further sources to support this claim. It appears from Cyriac of Ancona’s account in September 1448 that Carlo II’s realm was at peace and he was free from Ottoman interference suggesting that the military aid from Giovanni, along with the geographical barrier of the Pindos Mountains, was of great help to Carlo.

The aid Carlo II received from Giovanni di Ventimiglia was undoubtedly tied to his marriage to Ramondina di Ventimiglia, which helped to further bring the two families together. As this thesis has previously illustrated Nicol believed this was Carlo II’s second marriage, the first being to a daughter of Muriki Spata. Zečević disagrees, however, believing that in the case of the putative first marriage Nicol confused Carlo II with a grandson of Pietro Tocco. There is no definitive date for the marriage between Carlo and Ramondina but it is not unreasonable to link it with the military support given by Giovanni di Ventimiglia between 1443-1445. The exact relation between Ramondina di Ventimiglia and Giovanni di Ventimiglia is unclear. Alan Ryder in his two analyses of Alfonso the Magnanimous, suggests in one that Giovanni was Ramondina’s brother and in the other that he was her father. Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini says that Ramondina was Giovanni’s daughter, and this is also followed by Iorga, Nicol, Zečević. It is therefore likely that Giovanni di Ventimiglia was Carlo II’s father-in-law. The Tocco and Ventimiglia families were already tied through marriage, as one of Leonardo II’s sisters, Giovanna, had married the previous lord of Gerace,

108 Cyriac of Ancona, Later Travels, 342-346.
109 Nicol Epiros II, 190 ; Zečević, TGR, 211.
110 Ryder, King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily, 303 ; Ryder, The Kingdom of Naples, 274.
111 IHC, vol. 3, p. 183, footnote 2 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 207 ; Piccolomini, 111 ; Zečević, TGR, 117, 183.
Enrico di Ventimiglia. This marriage was therefore between first cousins, and strengthened the bonds between the families and provided Carlo II with a powerful ally to protect his lordship.

The aid from the Ventimiglia family had clearly helped the Tocco, but it was likely that this was not the only factor at play. Alfonso the Magnanimous’s desire to unite the lordships of the Eastern Adriatic as part of his Balkan strategy was a factor in maintaining Carlo’s independence and kept his lordship safe. Alan Ryder suggests that this was undoubtedly the motivation behind the Venetimiglia military support. Alfonso’s involvement in the Balkans, particularly in Albania and Epiros, helped to reduce the influence of the Ottomans and Venetians in the region and further contributed towards the freedom of the Tocco lordship. Alfonso not only had a desire to develop an anti-Ottoman alliance, which particularly grew after the fall of Constantinople in 1453, but also to develop a rivalry with the Venetians for control in the Adriatic. Despite reducing the influence of the Ottomans and Venetians in the region, Alfonso was unable to have much influence over Carlo II’s lordship. As it would not be until the last six years of Carlo’s reign that Alfonso would solidify his control over the Kingdom of Naples, and could fully pursue his Balkans strategy. As a result Alfonso had a much greater influence over Leonardo III’s reign than that of his father. Despite this, Carlo’s new relationship with the Ventimiglia allowed his lordship to survive after he broke his

112 Nicol, Epiros II, 207. Giovanna is included in all three of the Tocco Genealogical Tables: K. Hopf, Chroniques Gréco-Romanes – Inédites ou peu connues publiées avec notes et tables généalogiques (Berlin, 1873), 530-531 ; Nicol, Epiros II, 256 ; Zečević, TGR, 211.
113 Nicol, Epiros II, 207 ; Zečević, TGR, 121, endnote 160.
114 Ryder, King of Aragon, Naples and Sicily, 303.
115 For analysis of Alfonso’s view on crusading, see: Ryder, The Kingdom of Naples, 39-40. For analysis of the Aragonese Venetian rivalry over control in Epiros, see: Marinescu, 170-171.
Ottoman vassalage in the 1440s. Through his marriage to Ramondina di Ventimiglia he received military aid from his father-in-law which allowed him to remain free from Ottoman interference during the last years of his reign. This relationship was yet another example of the lack of influence that the major powers had over Carlo II’s lordship, and further illustrates the power of these small yet geographically significant lordships.

Conclusions:

The various relationships Carlo II Tocco held with the three ‘major’ powers of the region illustrate the diplomatic and political power of the small lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans. Despite all three of these medieval ‘super-powers’ attempting to bring his lordship into their sphere of influence, Carlo II’s domains remained largely independent. Due to their competing rivalries and claims in the region Carlo was able to play these powers off against each other, utilising the Venetians to reduce the Ottoman influence, and the Aragonese to reduce the Ottoman and Venetian influence. With this lack of interference Carlo II could pursue his own economic and political relationship with the Republic of Ragusa, which was undoubtedly his closest ally during his near two-decade reign. Carlo II’s relationship with the Neapolitans, Ottomans, and Venetians illustrates a further success of the lordships of the Balkans. Despite being small and fragmented they held significant diplomatic and political power in the region and often utilised the competing claims of the major powers to their own benefit. Though history has often been seen through the lens of the great powers the relationship between the Tocco and the ‘major powers’ illustrates the influence the small lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans had over the politics of the region.
Conclusions:

The history of the Latins in the eastern Mediterranean region in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries is one of petty states, some under absentee dynasties, bound together by religion and little else, and facing a growing threat from the Ottoman Turks. A feature of their history is the decline of the old knightly culture in the face of independent mercenary companies and Italian money. Active at every stage one finds Italians, whose commercial concerns gave them an interest in the maintenance and even the government of the settlements and whose shipping provided the means of communication, and Hospitallers of St John, who were the region’s trouble shooters.¹

This narrative, as put forward by the late Jonathan Riley Smith, has long characterised the Latin lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans. Dismissed for their fractious nature, small size, and their inability to fit into certain identifiable nationalities, they have largely been forgotten from the grand narratives of the history of the Balkans. Despite being dismissed from these nationalist histories the Latin lordships of the Balkans, such as that of Carlo II Tocco, played an important role in the economics and politics of the region. Their omission from the grand narratives has misrepresented their impact on the history of the region.

Even within the studies of the Latin lordships, and specifically those on the Tocco by Donald Nicol, Thekla Sansaridou-Hendrickx, and Nada Zečević, Carlo II Tocco has received relatively little analysis and the little analysis that he has received has largely been negative.

His successes have been credited to the ‘successful’ founder of the Tocco lordship Carlo I and the failures of his successor Leonardo III, including their eventual expulsion from the region in 1479, have been attributed to his reign through a teleological lens. Escaping the twin generalisations of the Latin lordships: their expansion after the Battle of Ankara of 1402 and their eventual expulsion from the region by the Ottoman conquest, the ‘status-quo’ nature of the reign of Carlo II Tocco does not sit well with the wider studies of the family and the region they operated in.

Carlo II was by no means a failure, nor ultimately responsible for the ‘beginning of the end’ of the Tocco lordship as suggested by Donald Nicol.\(^2\) Though the city of Ioannina was lost during the succession crisis which began his reign, the overall impact of this conflict has been exaggerated. Carlo II also avoided losing any further territory during his reign, even upon the breaking of his Ottoman vassalage in the 1440s. Carlo II’s rule over the Tocco domains was a success. He reorganised the Tocco lordship around the city of Arta, and effectively tied his lordship to the Republic of Ragusa which proved to be of economic importance. He was also able to effectively play of the ‘major powers’ of the region in order to maintain the independence of his lordship.

The Latin lordships of the fifteenth century Balkans were not ‘foreign’, ‘insignificant’, ‘transitory’, and somehow ‘reprehensible’ as they have been so dismissed in previous histories. Their impact on the region lasted for over two hundred years and they were active

\(^2\) Nicol, Epiros II, 198, 205.
players in economics and politics. Carlo II Tocco and his lordship were as much a part of the
history of the region as Gjergj Kastrioti Skanderbeg, Stefan Lazarević, or John VIII Palaiologos
(1425-1448) and the preoccupation with certain identifiable national groups, and their
correspondence to modern nation states, has largely accounted for their omission from the
histories of the Balkans. The Latin Lordships were the economic and political history of the
Balkans and need to be placed at the centre of any historical analysis of this region.
Appendices:
Appendix I – The Adriatic and Ionian Seas during the reign of Carlo II Tocco

Tocco:

Map of the Adriatic and Ionian Seas during the reign of Carlo II Tocco. Produced by N. Fattori, January 2019.
Appendix II – Selected documents from the *Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku*:

The following transcriptions are from selected documents from in the *Državni Arhiv u Dubrovniku*. I have generally favoured the shorter governmental records of the three major councils of Dubrovnik: the Consilium Maius, Consilium Minus, and Consilium Rogatorum. Several legal records from the Lamenta de Foris have been included, as well as the Barges Agreement from the Diversa Notariae. When it comes to referencing these documents, I have generally chosen to follow the conventions used by Bariša Krekić, in his widely available summaries of these documents, for the ease of the reader.¹ The volume of each document, within its own record series, is given in Roman numerals. If the folio number is followed by an ‘r’ it denotes the record is on the reverse side. I have utilised the following conventions in my transcriptions:

[in marg.] = in margine. This text appears in the margin.

<ABC> = The word is superscript.

ABC = legible letters deleted by the scribe

+ - Cross

Consilium Maius:  

Consilium Maius, V, ff. 62-62r:

3 March 1436 – The Consilium Maius confirm the decision of the Consilium Rogatorum to grant Carlo II a brigantine of sixteen benches of oars. They instruct the Rector and Consilium Minus to execute their decision.

[in marg. pro d. dispoto de lartam]

Die iii martii 1436 ballivi Lxxxiii

Prima pars est de concedendo illustri domino Carolo dispoto de larta pro suis denariis brigentinum nostrum a sexdecim banchis quem factum fuit in arsenatu nostro fulcitum remis et cordis suis.

Secunda pars est de non concedendo.

[in marg. pro d. dispoto de larta]

Prima pars est de consentiendum unum ex nostris brigentinis sexdecim remorum <banchorum> fulcitum remis et cordis suis illustri domino dispoto de larta. Pro lvii, contra xxvi.

Secunda pars est de non consentiendum.

Prima pars est de concedendo dictum Brigentinum nostrum fulcitum ut supra pro dominiis suis dicto domino dispoto Carolo. Pro xlvi, contra xxxvii.

Secunda pars est de donando de brigentinum ut supra fulcitum.
f. 62r:

Die ultra suprascripto iii Marcii 1436 ballivi Lxxxii.

[in marg. Libertas vendendi Bregentinum a xvi banchis dispoto]

Prima pars est de dando libertatem domino Rectori et suo parvo consilio cum consilio Rogatorum venditiones faciendi ex domino nostro Bregentino a sedicim banchis fulcito appanis <remis et coredis suis sine armis> oratori prefati domini Karoli dispoti Arte pro <ut> sibi domino Rectori et suis consiliis sicut videbitur. Pro xlii, contra xli.

Secunda pars est de non dando dictam libertatem

Consilium Maius, V, f. 85:

17 July 1436 – The Consilium Maius confirm that the money granted for the sale of wheat and millet from Carlo II’s domains to Ragusa (in the Barges Agreement) cannot be withheld under any circumstances.

[in marg. Pro domino dispot Arte pro denario]

Die xvii Jullii 1436 ballivi lxv.

Prima pars est de dando fidam tutam et securam denariis praeteriti grani et milii. quod domino nostro vendit dominus Karolus dispotus Arte. que sibi impediri non possint per aliquem haec aliqua ratione vel causa. Captus pro omnes.

Secunda pars est de non dando.
2 September 1441 – The Consilium Maius accept the proposal of the Consilium Minus to grant Iacopo Rosso and Dinos Kavalaropos ‘safe-conduct’ for them and their goods and property for one year.

Die Secondo Septembris 1441 balivii lx.

[in marg. salvusconductus]

Prima pars est de dando fidam et salvumconductum domino Iacobo Rubeo Capitano Arte et Ser Dimcho Cavaloropo de Arta et rebus mercantiis et armixiis cuiuslibet eorum quanto ipsi et quilibet eorum tute et libere venire possint ad hanc nostrum Civitatem Ragusii ac etiam conducere seu mittere ad hanc ipsam nostram Civitatem Ragusii quascumque eorum et cuiuslibet eorum mercantias res et victualia cuiusque generis cum quibuscumque navigiis et barchis tam subditorum Magnifici domini Dispoti Arte quam aliarum quarumcumque personarum possintque durante tempore praesentis salviconductus ibidem tute stare morare et pernoctare et ab hinc discedere ad libitum cuiuslibet eorum eorumque ac cuiuslibet eorum mercantias res et victualia ibidem tute et seorse tenere tutari et salvare et vendere ac deipsis facere liberam cuiuslibet eorum voluntatem absque eo quod per dominium nostrum ulla molestia novitas represalia nec impedimentum aliquo modo fieri seu inferri possit ipsius Ser Jacobo et Ser Dimcho nec alicui eorum nec eorum vel alicuius eorum mercantiis rebus et armixiis. Necnon aliquibus navigiis et barchis et patronis et marinariis ipsorum navigiorum et barcharum cum quibus conducte essent alique corum seu alterius mercantie res seu victualia durante tempore praesentis salviconducti qui quidem duret et durare debeat uno anno proxime futuro. Pro omnes.

Secunda pars est de non dando.
Consilium Minus, VI, f. 37:

18 April 1433 – The Consilium Minus instruct the ambassador of Carlo II Tocco to leave the wine he carries with him with the guards of the port of the Ragusa where it is sealed until he resumes his voyage.

Die xviii Aprilis 1433.

[in marg. pro vino gratia]

Captum fuit de ambassiator dispothi Caroli vinum quoddam habet in nostro portu possit et debeat illud ponere in manibus custodum catene portus nostri sub eius bulla et postea dum volet sequi viagium nostrum suum illud rehabere possit.

Consilium Minus, VI, f. 221r:

31 January 1435 – The Consilium Minus decide to grant Rastiša Bogojević who is charged to visit Arta and Patras on the commune’s behalf, safe-conduct. They also instruct the Officiles Armamenti to provide Bogojević with four cuirasses. He is expected to return the safe-conduct and the cuirasses upon the conclusion of his expedition.

Die XXXI Ianuarii. 1435.

[in marg. pro salvo conducto domini Regis Aragonum et curacias dandis Rastisse patrocinio]

Captum fuit de dando Rastisse Bogevich patrono navis qui pro serviciis nostri communis vadit cum eius navi in aquis Arte et Patrasii unum exsalvis conductibus quos habuimus a
domino <rege> Aragonum. quem ex nunc confessus fuit habuisse idem Rastissa. Et quod similiter officiales armamenti sibi dare debeant curacias quatuor. Quem salvumconductum etquas curacies idem Rastissa restituere teneatur et debeat mercimonia sua.²

Consilium Minus, VII, f. 34r:

16 March 1436 – The Consilium Minus grant the ambassador of Carlo II Tocco a gift of sugar and confectionary (confectionibus zuchari) of a value of ten hyperpera.

Die XVI Martii 1436.

[in marg. pro dono oratoris domini dispoti Arte]

Captum fuit de donando in zucharo et confectionibus zuchari ambassiatori domini dispoti Karoli Arte et Zephalonie usque ad valutam hyperperorum decem.

Consilium Minus, VII, 91r:

6 October 1436 – The Consilium Minus allow the Massarri Bladorum to pay Carlo II’s officials for the 750 staria of millet they have not yet received, providing they receive a guarantee according to the agreement that was previously organised (The Barges Agreement).

Die V Octobris 1436.

[in marg. libertas Massariorum Bladorum pro milleo solvendo et ut infra emendo]

² The document ends here.
Captum fuit de Massarii nostri Bladorum solvere possint de denariis sui officii ambassiatori domini disposti Arte staria 750 milei nam dum a dicto domino disposto [sic] recepta sed debita accipiendo idoneam fide iussionem pro ipso milleo dando iuxta formam habite conventionis cum ipso domino dispoto.

Item quod possint mittere empta Arte vel id circa i milleorum ad valutam ducatorum centum pro navis Junii Gerdecevich que illud vadit causa levandi milleorum de quo supra fit mencio quo navis ipsa veniat onusta sue portate et non de vacuo solvatur.

Consilium Minus, VII, f. 242:

5 August 1438 – Georgius Teucer Cani of Arta is granted permission to sell the wheat he is carrying to the city of Ragusa and must pay the customs duty on the wheat he does sell. He is free to take away any of the wheat he does not sell without paying further customs duties.

Die V Augusti 1438.

[in marg. pro Giorgio de Larta]

Captum fuit quod Georgius Teucer Cani de Larta, possit carum suum frumenti quod conduxit mercerie ponere et vendere in Ragusam pro libito voluntate soluendo dogana debitam pro quanto vendiderit et id quod non vendiderit possit libere extrahere de Ragusam et alio conducere prout voluntate absque alicuius dogane solutus.
Consilium Minus, IX, f 170:

24 April 1443 – The Consilium Minus give permission to the Massarii Bladorum to lend Benedictus of Arta five hundred ducats. This was to be repaid at the end of June by selling grain at the Ragusan Fondaco. The price was set to six and a half grossi per starium.

Die xxiii Aprilis 1443.

[in marg. Libertas Massariis Bladorum per ducatos 500 mutuum Benedicto de Larta.]

Captum fuit de dando libertatem Massarii nostris Bladorum communis qui possint mutuare Benedicto de Larta de denariis communis ducatos quingentos auri. Ita tantum et cum hoc quode dictus Benedictus teneatur et debeat exonerare et vendere in fontico nostro circa staria mille quingentis inferius frumenti quod conduxit ad rationem grossi sex cum dimidio copellum. Quod mutuum restituere teneatur idem Benedictus ad tardius usque pro termino mensis Iulii Junni proxime futuri. Et si ante vendiderit dictum granum teneatur et debeat retentos per eum ducatos cc. exbursare dictis massariis restium videlicet alios ducatos trecentos in ratione de imposteta. Et teneatur pro predictis omnibus observandis et adimplendis dictus Benedictus prestare bonarum et sufficientum plegiarum approbandum more solito in minori consilio.

Consilium Minus, IX, f. 179r:

30 May 1443 – The Consilium Minus instruct the Officiales Armanenti to provide Benedictus of Arta with ammunition in order to test a bombard he made within the city.

[in marg. pro Benedicto de Larta]
Captum fuit de dando de officiales armament dare debeant Benedicto de Larta nuntio domini
dispot Larte libras decem salogii nostri comunis in dono pro probando unam bombardam
dicti domini quam fieri fecit hic Ragusam.
Consilium Rogatorum:  

Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 37:

28 February 1436 – The Consilium Rogatorum propose to authorise the Rector and the Small Council to sell or give Carlo II Tocco a Brigantine to maintain the friendship between the two particularly since his lands have been made open to the Ragusans. This was not put forward and a decision was postponed.

Die xxviii Februarii 1436 ballivi xxxi.

[in marg. pro domini Karoli dispoti Arte ambaxiata et requisitione Brigentinii]

[in marg. non portatus]

Prima pars est de eundo ad maius consilium. Pro libertate danda domino Rectori et suo minori consilio, cum consilio rogatorum possendo aut donare aut vendere prout sibi melius videbuntur domino Karolo secundo dispoto Arte, unum ex nostris brigentinis videlicet aut nominatum mariotam aut alium qui maior paulo est. Dicto mariota fulcitum prout ipsis domino Rectori et consiliis predictis videbitur et hoc maxime gratiam continendum et praestandum benivolentiam et intrinsecum honorem quibus cum precessoribus suis dominiis iunctum fuit et copulatum regimen nostrum et dian ut melius et favorabilius nobis et nostris pateant eius terras et partes unde sumus accepturi quod lucrum in dimidium.
Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 38:

5 March 1436 – The Consilium Rogatorum agree to grant Carlo II Tocco the right to purchase a brigantine at his own expense.

Die V Marci 1436 ballivi XXXII.

[in marg. libertas vendendi bregentinum domino dispoto Carolo]

Prima pars est quod damus libertatem datam per maius consilium domino Rectori et suo consilio cum consilio rogatorum in vendendo bregentinum nostrum <ab banchis> fulcitum remis et coredis suis per oratori domini disposti Caroli precio quo sibi melius videbitur eandem libertatem habeat dominus Rector cum suo minori consilio solus.

Pro xxi, contra xi.

Secunda pars est de providendo et de liberando in praesenti consilio [9 pro ipsa venditorem]

[in marg. libertas respondendi superscripto oratori domini disposti Arte]

Prima pars est de dando libertatem domino Rectori et suo minori consilio respondendi oratori superscripto domini disposti Caroli obligationibus per ipsum factis pro parte domini sui et pro concessione bregentini nostri quo quivis eo ad modum egebamus, sibi complacere volumus ex antiqua suorum et nova ipsius domini sui amicitia pulcro modo et ornatis verbis prout sibì domino Rectori et suo consilio videbitur. Pro omnes.

Secunda pars est de ordinatio ipsam in praesenti consilio
Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 48:

25 April 1436 – The Consilium Rogatorum instruct the Rector and the Consilium Minus to write to Carlo II to reject his request for a galleota of ten benches of oars. They will do this with pretty words and ways.

Die xxv Aprillis 1436 ballivi xxxi.

[in marg. pro excusatione facimus dispoto Arte pro galleota]

Prima pars est. de dando libertatem domino Rectori et suo minori consilio excusando nos per litteras nostras domino Karolo Secundo dispoto Arte pro galleota nostra banchorum xx quam rogavit et hoc pulcris verbis et modo. Captus pro xxi, contra x.

Secunda pars est. de induciarum.

Consilium Rogatorum, VI, f. 55r:

26 May 1436 – The Consilium Rogatorum authorise the Rector and Consilium Minus to apologise to the representative of Carlo II Tocco regarding the refusal to provide him with a galleota.

[in marg. Libertas respondendi oratori domini dispoti Arte]

Prima pars est de dando libertatem domino Rectori et suo minori respondendi oratori domini dispensati Arte excusando nos a petizione galeote postulate per eum et aliter prout sibi melius videbitur. Pro omnes.

Secunda pars est. de ordinando praedicta in praesenti consilio.
4 October 1436 – The Consilium Rogatorum suggests that the Rector and Consilium Minus should respond to the ambassador of Carlo II Tocco in a beautiful and honest manner.

[in marg. Libertas respondendo ambassiatori dispoti Karoli Arte]

Prima pars est de dando libertatem domino Rectori et suo parvo consilio pulcro et honesto modo ac verbis amicabilibus respondendi ambassiatae domini Caroli Secundi domini Arte prout sibi melius et amicabilius videbitur respondendi invocatio suam relatam ambassiatam.

Pro omnes.

Secunda pars est de non dando ipsam libertatem.

27 April 1437 – The Consilium Rogatorum authorises the Rector and the Consilium Minus to respond in letters and in person to the Turk who has arrived in Ragusa, and to the letters of Carlo II and ‘the Turk’ for the pardoning of the sons of the dead Stani Illich and other citizens of ours.

Bailivi XLI.

[in marg. pro respondendum Teucro et litteris dispotis Arte et Teucri]

Prima pars est. de dando libertatem domino Rectori et suo minori consilio, respondendo tam per litteras quam oratorie Teucro huc provento et litteris domini dispotis Arte et Teucri, pro excusando Stani Illiich occisi filiorum et aliorum nostrorum civium, prout sibi melius videbitur. Captus pro omnes.

Secunda pars est. de non damno.
Consilium Rogatorum, VIII, f. 214:

4 May 1443 – The Consilium Rogatorum allow Benedictus of Arta to repair a bombard within the city of Ragusa.

[in marg. pro dono Carolo dispoto Larte]

Prima pars est de concedendo Benedicto factori domini Caroli dispoti Arte, de unam eius bombardam per usque nuper Ragusam delatam refecit et aptari facere possit in Ragusam pro libito voluntatis. Pro omnes.

Secunda pars est de nostro concedendo.

Consilium Rogatorum, X, f. 201:

3 June 1448 – The Consilium Rogatorum accept the requests of Iacopo Rosso, the ambassador of Carlo II Tocco, to buy or have built within the city at his own expense: some silverware, a bell, and six bombards.

Die IIII Junii 1448.

Prima pars est de acceptando peticionem domini Jacobi Rossi milities ambaxiatorise magni domini despoti Larte, videlicet de possit emere vel fieri facere argenterias et campanam unam in civitate nostra pro libito voluntatis. Pro omnes.

Secunda pars est de nostro acceptam ser de excusando.

Prima pars est de concedendo do domino Jacobo Rosso de possit fieri facere suis expensis et pro suis denariis sex bombardas in civitate nostra. Pro XVI, contra XV.
Secunda pars est de excusando nos.
Diversa Notariae:

Diversa Notariae, XX, ff. 273r-274r:

18 July 1436 – Agreement between Ser Antonellus Barges and Ser Michael de Croxi and Ser Andreas de Babalio, members of the Ragusan Massarii Bladorum, for the sale of wheat and millet from the Tocco domains to the Republic of Ragusa. Barges agrees to sell the Ragusans two thousand tagari of wheat, at a price of 1 ducat and 12 solidi per tagaro, and a thousand tagari of millet, at half the price. The cereal will be presented to Ragusans in Arta, Kordobitsa, Vonitsa, and Efteleia. The conversion for a tagari to a staria is given as a hundred tagari to 190 stara. The Ragusans must receive the cereal between August 1 and October 15 of 1436. Barges also agrees to provide an extra five hundred tagari of wheat and 500 tagari of millet under the same conditions. Dimos Grecus (Dimus Mirali) will serve as the guarantor of the agreement.


[in marg. Vendicio grani et milii facta per dominum dispotum Arte communi Ragusii]

+ Vir prudens Ser Antonellus Barges familiaris et procurator illustris et excelsi principis domini Karoli Secundi dei gratia Arte dispotatus et cetera ducis. Leucate et Cefalonie comitis pallatini et cetera. ad infrascriptam vendicionem grani et milii faciendam nomine praefati illustris dominii magnifice Comunitati Ragusii constitutus ut de ipsa procuratione constat instrumento scripto Arte in carta bombicine per Ser Raynaldum de Leone notarium publicum, in anno domini mccccxxxvi. Indictionis 14. die vigesima mensis Junii et sigillo mediocri praefati Illustris domini sigillato ad maiorem cautelam. A notario catastici viso et lecto, parte una nomine dicti domini dispohti. Et Ser Michael de Croxi et Ser Andreas de Babalio nobiles
cives Ragusii Masserii Bladorum comunitatis dicte civitatis. Vigore libertatis eius date a
Regimine et minori consilio ipsius civitatis de qua libertate apparet in libro ipsius minoris
consilii die xiii Jullii praesentis. nomine et vice domini communis Ragusii, parte altera. Dictis
nominibus concordes fuerunt et convenerunt pro certa vendicione grani et milii quam idem
Ser Antonellus familiaris et procurator predictus facit nomine dicti domini Karoli disposti
dictis masseriis bladorum nomine Communis Ragusii recipientibus et ementibus. Prout idem
Ser Antonellus in scriptis in uno folio in vulgari sermone detulit notario catastici cuius scripti
conventionum et partorum ipsius vendicionis quod ipse partes dictis nominibus transcribi
voluerunt in notariam permanenter catastici ad cautelam ipsius venditionis et partium
praedictorum et pro maiori robore et firmitate omnium et singulorum in ipso scripto
contentorum, tenor sequitur per hec formalia verba, videlicet: Magnifici Signori. Io Antonello
Barges comisserio del mio Signor Karolo Secundo, dispoto de Larta et cetera. Facio vendita
alla Magnifica Signoria de Ragusi, de tagaria duomillia di formento. Et tagari mille de millio
a mesura de Larta. Cioe formenti et meglii novi del anno 1436 boni e mercanteschi cioe lo
tagaro de formento a ducato uno e solde xii venetiano. E tagari duo de meglio tanto quanto
uno tagaro de formento. La qual biava mi Antonello come fatore e comisserio del mio signor
dispot Karolo prometto alla magnifica signoria de Ragusi adare dentro dil colfo del Arta in
quattro porti, cioe a Larta alla Cerdovixa alla Vondiça e alla Efteleia ela assegnarlo alli vostri
fatori o patroni de fuste le dette biave alle spese del domino signor

Carolo, posto sulle barche over sulli batelli. E mi Antonello commune comisserio del domino
signor prometto alla magnifica signoria de Ragusa deli detti porti fina Ragusa che le dicte
biave vegnano arisigo del domino signor Carolo. Con questa condicion che la magnifica
signoria vostra abia apagar li noli deli navili chi portaran le dicte biave amodo che questo
ducato [denari] uno doro, e soldi xii dargento resta netto allo domino mio signor, raxonando lo
ducato doro a soldi 108, apagamento de ducati oro venetiani. Intendandose che cento tagari
de Larta siano tenuti arespondore cento novanta stara de Ragusi, e la magnifica signoria
vostra sia tenuta recever le dicte biave dal primo de dagosto fina fina giorni 15 de ottobrio
proximo futuro. E condutte le dicte biave a Ragusa. La magnifica signoria vostra sia tenuta
de far lo pagamento dela quantita auterti recevudo dele biave e dare et consignare lo
pagamento aquelle persone allequal lamagnifca signoria vostra sera avisada per lo mio
signore Carolo et per esser chiari del acordo de la predetta vendita alla signoria de Ragusi per
lo signor volemo che mandate manchi boni e choverti a chargar le dicte biave e non
altramente. Ancora, io Antonello come comisserio del magnifico mio signor despot Karolo
prometto tagari 500 de frumento e tagari 500 de millio, de respeto, a volunta deluno signor
Carolo. Ali patti e modus et persii sopra detti, et per lo sopradetto respetto fine chela signoria
de Ragusi sera avisata per lo domino signor Carolo sel vora acetar o non cioe per tutto Agosto
proximo futuro la vendita delo predicto respetto. E si lo domino signor accettara la vendita del
dicto respetto che tanti giornis sia prolongato lo termene del dicto respetto. Et la detta signoria
de Ragusi non levando le dicte biave infra spacio del sopradetto tempo che sia tenuta de
pagare per zascuno tagaro cusi de formento et commune de millio che non avesse levado,
soldi 20 dargento per tagaro al signor Karolo. Et sel domino signor Karolo non desse le dicte
biave infra spacio del domino termene che paga soldi 20 dargento per tagaro di quello non
avera dato al dicte termin aia signoria de Ragusi. Ancora sono dacordo ambe duo parte che
ogni navilio che vegnera acargar le dicte biave, gionti alli sopradetti porti siano tegnudo
aspetar giorni xviii allo caregamento. E alle barche sia termene giorni xii, e se le dicte, barche e navili non fossino caregade

f. 274r:

infra spacio delo praedicto termene e che per lo domino Signor Karolo vegnessivo voide che lo domino signor Carolo sia tegnudo a pagar li loro noli. Et se de piu del domino primo stessimo ad esser caregate lo domino signor per ogni di staravo de piu sia tenuto pagar ala barca. Ducato uno doro, et allo navilio, a ducati duo doro. E aquesto sopradetto achordo et vendita in tendandose salvo iusto inpedimento per ambe duo parte. Ancora io Antonello domando dala signoria de Ragusa, che la damna quantita de denari che serano retratti perle predicte biave che pro milla persona li detti denari non possino esser sequestrade ne in pazade ne retegunde per nulla caxon ne raxon salvo che se debiano dar al signor Karolo dispot over alsuo messo per le sue scritture con le sue bolle. Promittentes vicissim partes predictas nominibus antedicis, videlicet: dominus Ser Antonellus familiaris et procurator praefati domini Karoli dispotis nomine et vice ipsius domini Karoli et super omnia bona ipsius Illustris domini Karoli, et dicti massarii comunis Ragusii nomine et vice et super omnia bona ipsius comunitatis Ragusii supradictam vendicionem grani et milii, et pacta et conventiones ipsius vendicionis suprascripti et suprascripta et omnia et singula in ea vendicione contrata et conventa perpetuo firma rata et grata hic tenere ac attendere, observare et adimplere illis dictis nominibus omnibus et singulis, dilatus terminus foris legis status reformati consueti exempti et iuris auxiliis et legum uniumque cum quibus possit constituitur vel aliquod statorum fieri vel iri et a praeasenti vendicione convence et contentis in eis Tucri. Hec autem, Iudex Ser Johannus de Volzo et Nicola de Stella tituli. Pro quo superscripto Ser Antonello
familiaris et procurator superscripto domini Karoli dispotis et pro ipso modo domino Karolo
in quantum prima navigia quod mittentur ad caricandum ex grano et millio superscripte
vendiciones per dominium Ragusii redirent vacua ita que eis bladum emptum per denari
domini dispotis et alios eius nomine non daretur ad caricandum in totum vel in parte de
causaliter dando et solventur provabilis ipsorum navigiorum que sic vacua redirent nabilum
corun / usque ad ducatum auri contum extitit plegius Dimos Mirali de Arta constituentes
stara principales supra stara et bona sua et pro cautela praesentis sue plegians, obligans et
volens quod stare debeat retractum milii sui quod habet in fondacho Ragusae. Ita tantum que
pervento et applicato huc uno solo navigio carico ex grano vel milio stare vendicione ipso iure
istud sit liber et francus actam plegia. RM.

Scholia (f. 273r):

[Scholia: 8 October 1436 – Iacopo Rosso, the procurator of Carlo II Tocco and man responsible for the
payment for this agreement has received 2,777 ducats and 80 solidi for the two thousand tagari of wheat
and thousand tagari of millet. 750 staria of millet are yet to be delivered, a Petrus Pantella and Aniellus
Zecapesse are designated guarantors of this delivery.]

Die viii Octobris 1436.

Spectabilis vir dominus Jacobus Russo procurator illustris et excelsi principis domini Karoli
secondi dispotus Arte et cetera. ad petitionem et receptionem solventi a regimine et domino
Ragusii nomine ipsum dispotis de grano et millio nomine ipsum domini dispotis ut hic appareat
vendito domino [et] regimine Ragusii, ut de ipsius procura apparat publicis et patentibus
litteris ipsius domini disputis subsertis in propria manu et cum sigillo solito sigillatis rogatus
et scriptus per Ser Raynaldum de Leone notarium publicum factis et scriptis in Santa Maura.
Anno domini 1436 indictionis XV die octavum mensis scriptis. A nobis visis et lectis, dicti procuratoris nomine confessus et manifestus fuit et casualiter habuisset et recepisset a Ser Johanne de Luca sociis que suis masseriis bladorum communis dantes et solventes de denarium civitatis Ragusii vigore libertatis eis date ut apparat in libro minoris consili, ducatos auri duos mille septimeos septuagintam septem et soldos venetos octuaginta quatuororum pro completa et integra solucione tagariorum duorum milium frumenti et tagariorum mille milii ut in hac contrascripta venditione contra venditorum et lucrorum per ipsum dominum Ragusii, salvo tagarii quod adhuc restant dari ex dicto millio vendito et pro quo tagarii ipse procurator et integrum soluce ex nunc accepit stara septuaginta quinquaginta milii ad mensuram Ragusii, pro quibus stariis 750 milii sic restantes. Petrus Pantella et Antonellus Zecapesse ad melius termini super et omnia sua extiterunt plegii constituentes scripti principales de dando ipsum milium quod restat ut supra. Ad terminum et cum partis et nominis, formis, conditionibus, preciis et stricturis contentis in superscripto pacto vendicione predicte alias factas quia plegii approbati et assumpti fuerunt in minori consilio. Idendo oratore indictione tertii qui in vendicione.
Lamenta de Foris:

**Lamenta de Foris, XI, f. 183r:**

31 August 1436 – The pharmacist Paulus de Camarino complains that Bernard Villamaria of Barcelona boarded his vessel in the Gulf of Arta and removed goods to the value of 240 gold ducats.

Die ultimo Augusti 1436.

Paulus de Camerino speciarius tanquam factor Johannis Richi speciarii coram domino Rectore Ser Petro de Sorgo conqueritur supra dominum Bernardum de Villamaria de Barzelona militem piratham quare quod die 8 maii proximi furati in buccha culfi delarta cum una fusta de xii banchis invasit ipsum Paulum et barcham super qua erat ipse Paulus et cuius barche erat patronus Marcus de Zupane et sibi abstulit petias tres pannorum cum dimidia de Florentia. Item unam petiam rosarum de grana de Florentia et petias quatuor cum dimidia pannorum de Ragusam quas omnes fecit redimi adeo piratha per manus Jacobi Rossi nobilis de domini disporti de Larta. pro ducati auri ccxl

Jacobus Rubeus de Jacinto

**Lamenta de Foris, XVI, f. 251:**

5 July 1443 – A Ragusan merchant Vitcus Vlatković lodged a complaint against Francesco Pitti with the Rector of Ragusa, Ser Martolo de Binçola. According to Vlatković he was assaulted in Arta by Pitti, his nephew Tomaso, and two of his servants, and pursued back to his house in the city.

Die V Julii 1443
Vitcus Vlatcovich coram domino Rectore ser Martolo de Binçola fecit lamentum supra Franciscum Piti dicens et eius nepotem Tomam, et duos suos famulos dicens quod cum ipse Vitcus misset esset in Larta et vellet invenire curus pro conducendo frumentum quod emerat ipse Franciscus una cum suo nepote Toma et cum duobus aliis suis famulis insultaverunt ipsum Vitcum Vlatkovich in burgo de Larta cum spatis. Et verberaverunt ipsum Vitcum dando sibi et percutiendo ipsum quater cum saxis. Et fugaverunt ipsum Vitcum usque ad domum eius habitationis.

Johannes Pasquali de Insula de Medio Patronus barce Vasigl Dabisivovich
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