Governing the multicultural city: Europe’s ‘great urban expectations’ facing austerity and resurgent nativism
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Abstract
This article analyses European discourses on ‘optimal’ urban inclusion policies, as they are embodied in EU-sponsored city networking initiatives. Drawing from the scholarship on multiculturalism and urban austerity, it builds an inclusion agendas matrix that identifies four ideal-typical agendas for ethnic and racial inclusion: multicultural, diversity inclusion, community cohesion, and neoliberalised diversity. It identifies a shift from group-based to individual-based concerns (mainstreaming) and from a politicised to a depoliticised approach to inclusion (depoliticising). It argues that (a) this double shift should be understood as the result of the mutually-reinforcing pressures of nativism and austerity, and (b) inconsistencies in network discourses and policy advice suggest a pragmatic-adaptive logic that challenges simplistic understandings of cities as either (only) sites of resistance or (only) sites of full-blown accommodation of nativist and austerity imperatives.

Keywords
Multiculturalism; nativism; austerity; diversity; urban austerity; Europe; city networks.

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Introduction

Studies of integration have usually focused on the national level, but in recent years European policymakers and scholars increasingly turned their attention to cities (e.g. Ambrosini and Boccagni, 2015; Caponio and Borkert, 2010; Penninx, 2015). Cities are often expected to be laboratories for innovative approaches to governing diverse societies, providing inspiration for and/or resistance to national and European approaches. This is in line with long-standing expectations of cities as sites of encounter, creativity, and the fostering of more socially just interactions (Amin, 2002; Chandler, 2010; Schiller, 2016). City governments are expected to deal pragmatically with issues of everyday diversity (Jørgensen, 2012), ultimately resulting in more inclusive policies than those of national governments (Joppke, 2017; Penninx et al., 2004). Critical appraisals of this urban dreamscape also emerged. In particular, scholars argued that cities’ supposed pragmatism is not necessarily inclusive, as cities can restrict rights provided for by national governments (Mahnig, 2004) and – like them – can respond to the logic of majoritarianism, favouring the interests of (ethnic and racial) majorities over those of minorities (Kraus, 2013; Parvin, 2009; Purcell, 2006). The city as site of progressive politics is also called into question by the centrality of capital and its unequal accumulation in the historical process of urbanization (Harvey, 1985). Nevertheless, localism (especially its urban variant) still seems to hold the promise of a more equitable and harmonious society and – in the current context of national-level regressive politics – great expectations continue to be pinned to the city.¹

These expectations are the backdrop for this article’s exploration of changes in European urban inclusion agendas. I analyse these agendas, as displayed in a number of city networking initiatives, in a context that directly challenges the role of cities as pioneers of inclusion. At national level, multiculturalism has been repeatedly declared dead (Lentin and Titley, 2011), nativist appeals are on the increase (Mudde, 2017), and cities’ multiculturalism is often presented as threatening and/or unsustainable. Simultaneously, cities have been significantly affected by post-2008 austerity, as national governments have often devolved responsibilities to local governments while reducing their budgets (Donald et al., 2014). The double pressure of nativism and austerity are intimately interlinked (Billiet et al., 2014) and put cities in a complex position: they are expected to deal with their diversity with reduced budgets and in a context of growing hostility to spending scarce resources on ‘non-natives’.

¹ For a recent example of optimistic localism, see Katz and Novak (2018). See also the emergent interest in new and radical municipalism (Russell, 2019).
While several scholars have picked up on one aspect of this double bind, little has been said on how the two intersect. This article aims to fill this gap, integrating insights from (anti-)multiculturalism and urban austerity scholarships, to understand how ideas about ‘optimal’ inclusion policies have shifted. I proceed in two steps. First, I combine the key dimensions emerging from the two scholarships to build an inclusion agendas matrix. Second, I apply the matrix to the analysis of documents issued by three EU-sponsored city networking initiatives: Cities for Local Integration Policies, Eurocities’ Integrating Cities, and Intercultural Cities. Analysed over time, these documents show a policy trajectory that—in response to both nativism and austerity—moves from group-based to individual-based concerns and from a politicised to a depoliticised approach to inclusion. However, this broader trajectory is mediated by a pragmatic-adaptive logic that accounts for the ‘messier’ reality of urban policymaking and can include seeds of resistance against nativist and neoliberalising pressures.

**Four inclusion agendas**

The ‘multicultural city’ and the ‘austere city’ are typically theorised separately, with little interaction between the two. This compartmentalisation, however, obscures the simple fact that they are *the same city* and urban policies (including on inclusion) are a product of both. In this section I revisit the main policy-relevant dimensions in these two largely separate debates and use them to build a matrix of (ideal-typical) inclusion agendas. The multiculturalism debate has mostly been concerned with the appropriateness of group-based v. individual-based policies. As discussed below, these are grounded on different ‘ontologies of difference’ and inspire distinct approaches to inclusion. Urban austerity scholarship is embedded in the wider debate on cities’ neoliberalisation and typically does not address diversity. Yet it identifies an important shift that is lost in the multiculturalism debate, that is, a tendency for the political (contested) governing of the city to be replaced by apolitical (privatized, technicized) models of urban governance. Combined together, these dimensions form a matrix (Figure 1) that can help us distinguish different inclusion agendas and understand the vectors that drive shifts between them.

**The multiculturalism dimension**

Much recent work on urban diversity addresses how cities respond to new arrivals (particularly refugees), often through the prisms of crisis management and/or local solidarities (e.g. Søholt and Aasland, 2019). The focus here, however, will be on urban multiculturalism rather than responses to the refugee ‘crisis’. Thinking of the city through the (admittedly imperfect) prism of multiculturalism allows us to overcome the limited temporality of emergency, to study ethnic and racial difference as a

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2 Fincher et al (2014) and Ambrosini and Boccagni’s (2015) are notable exceptions.
3 ‘Refugee crisis’ and ‘migration crisis’ are politically loaded terms that have more to do with the political framing of the issue than with the actual facts of refugee and migrant arrivals; for this reason here and elsewhere in this article I put ‘crisis’ in inverted commas.
permanent feature of urban life. In this sense, multiculturalism is an objective reality: the starting point to ask questions about how cities can address issues (of inequality, segregation, discrimination, inclusion, integration) that derive from the fact of urban difference. Modood (2016) defined multiculturalism as ‘the idea that equality in the context of difference cannot be achieved by individual rights or equality understood as sameness, and has to be extended to include the positive inclusion of marginalised groups marked by race and their own sense of ethnocultural identity’. Multiculturalism, therefore, is also a set of policies that recognises the right of such different groups to be included in governing society. It is in this second meaning that multiculturalism has most often been contested and – increasingly – rejected.

Multiculturalism was never uncontested (Chin, 2017), but a concerted multicultural retreat gained steam from the mid-2000s (Joppke, 2004). It culminated with widely reported speeches by German Chancellor Merkel (in 2010), UK Prime Minister Cameron and French President Sarkozy (in 2011) who all decried multiculturalism’s failure and reasserted the need to foster social cohesion by requiring migrants to assimilate into the culture of their country of residence. Germany and France had in fact not developed any significant multicultural policy, and UK policies had not been coherently multicultural, but understandings of multiculturalism as a ‘failed experiment’ caught European popular and media imagination (Lentin and Titley, 2011). Critiques also came from academic circles, with multiculturalism’s groupist implications (Brubaker, 2002) being the main issue. Multiculturalism became a bad word, associated with self-segregated and potentially dangerous non-native communities. Increasingly, across Europe (and beyond), anti-multiculturalist ‘conventional wisdom’ opened the way to anti-immigrant, nativist and openly xenophobic public debates, political campaigns and policies, with calls to re-establish (ethno-national) sovereignty against the perils of multiculturalism (Lesinska, 2014).

While these developments happened mostly at national level, they strongly affected cities, which had been where actually-existing multicultural practices had developed (Fincher et al., 2014). ‘Re-nativising’ discourses were accompanied by visions of cities – and their more multicultural neighbourhoods – as problematic, ‘foreign’ and dysfunctional (Costa and Ewert, 2014: 148), and the urban dream of harmonious multicultural living was recast as a ‘multicultural hell’ (Keith, 2005). This prompted the rejection of group-based policies in favour of universalistic, individual-based policies that aim to ensure the integration of people of minority and/or migrant background while rectifying the social dis-integration that multicultural policies have supposedly ushered.

This brief review reveals a first key dimension to distinguish policy approaches to inclusion. This has to do with what is taken as the ideal object of policy – groups or individuals, based on two distinct ontologies of difference. The first sees society as made up of groups that because of their ethnic, racial, religious backgrounds are more or less likely to suffer exclusion and marginalization. It calls for policies that aim to include and/or integrate excluded groups. The second sees society in terms of ‘diversity’ or ‘super-diversity’ as made up of individuals who have different, complex identities but ideally
participate equally in the common good. It calls for policies that enable excluded individuals to be full members of society.\(^4\)

The austerity dimension

While the anti-multiculturalist backlash raged on, the 2008 financial crisis took place and the ‘age of austerity’ began. This affected local authorities particularly, as they saw reduced transfers from national governments and a shrinking tax base at the same time as more responsibilities were rescaled to their level. Moreover, the crisis exacerbated existing patterns of urban poverty concentration, with a double increase in social exclusion in cities compared to other areas.\(^5\) This is compounded by the fact that migrants and minorities – who were hit particularly hard by crisis and austerity – are concentrated in cities (Costa and Ewert, 2014).\(^6\) Notwithstanding clear linkages, scholarly compartmentalisation has meant that explanations of policy shifts happening in this context remain partial; either excessively focused on identity issues in multiculturalism scholarship, or surprisingly forgetful of ethno-cultural difference in urban austerity scholarship (Schiller and Çağlar, 2011).

Urban austerity scholarship claims that cities do not simply ‘suffer’ global and national economic forces but participate actively in embedding them locally (Gonzalez and Oosterlynck, 2014; Wilson, 2012). Already before 2008, urban development models were embracing city-to-city competition and shifting from local government to local governance, with more public services delivered through privatisation and public-private partnerships, and the progressive strengthening of city executives vis-à-vis deliberation and democratic debate (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Leitner et al., 2006; Peck and Tickell, 1994; Tickell and Peck, 2002). While these ‘neoliberalising’ trends were most decisive in the US and UK, they occurred all across Europe (Denters and Rose, 2005). Post-2008, long-standing debates on urban neoliberalisation acquired particular urgency. Pre-existing trends accelerated and spread. This was particularly the case for the tendency to decentralise responsibility on social policies and fragment it both vertically among different levels of governance and horizontally among governments and an array of non-governmental, private, and semi-private agents (Kazepov, 2010). This rescaling, coupled with cuts to local budgets,\(^7\) put city governments under significant pressure to adapt to austerity cuts by reimagining their modes of governance (Chorianopoulos and Tselepi, 2017; Davies and Blanco, 2017; Donald et al., 2014; Peck, 2012; Schöning and Schipper, 2016). In particular, austerity encouraged ‘roll-back’ and ‘roll-out neoliberalism’ in cities, that is, ‘withdrawal of the state’ and ‘market-oriented government interventions, a focus on community and responsible citizen participation’ (Fincher et al., 2014: 4). In this sense, austerity is not simply a matter of the quantity of

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\(^4\) The concepts of diversity and super-diversity are not per se individualistic, but in their empirical use they come with the ‘latent risk of producing an individualised representation of social inequalities’ (Berg and Sigona, 2013: 353; cf. also Vertovec, 2012).

\(^5\) See document 24 (pages 5, 15) in Appendix.

\(^6\) See also document 22 in Appendix.

\(^7\) What some have called ‘passing the buck without the bucks’ (Muldoon-Smith and Greenhalgh, 2015).
resources, but also – and most crucially – a new governance paradigm, that reshapes the respective roles in governing society of state, private sector, and civil society, in ways that favour ‘problem-solving’ approaches over political debate (Blokker, 2014).

This brief review illuminates another dimension along which urban approaches to inclusion differ, to do with the preferred policy solutions. These can be political, thus seeing a central role for the (multi-level) state in addressing systemic issues such as exclusion and discrimination. Or apolitical, thus seeing a central role for civil society and the private sector in promoting changes at the level of personal behaviour.

The inclusion agendas matrix

The two dimensions identified above can be brought together to form a matrix (Figure 1) in which each quadrant represents an ideal-typical policy agenda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy solution:</th>
<th>Object of policy:</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Groups</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political (level of the system)</td>
<td>(I) Multicultural policies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apolitical (level of personal behaviour)</td>
<td>(III) Community cohesion policies</td>
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Figure 1. Inclusion agendas matrix

Compared to other similar typologies (e.g. Alexander, 2003), the aim of this matrix is not assessing whether local policies are more or less inclusive (or exclusive, or assimilationist) but understanding differences among policies that are all framed as inclusive. This avoids bunching up together ‘inclusive’ policies that follow rather different logics. This is especially important as policies in Quadrants II, III and IV have variously been presented as responses to the shortcomings of multicultural policies (Quadrant I) and as such are often discussed together. However, as the description of each quadrant below makes clear, they posit both the problem and the solution in fundamentally different terms. Making the distinction is necessary to understand policy shifts that have taken place under the broader banner of inclusive cities.

Quadrant I gathers policies that see their object as ethnic, racial, religious groups and identify solutions that are inherently political, in the sense that they foresee a central role for the state to redress systemic disadvantages. These *multicultural policies* are ‘difference-affirming’, based on the recognition of the distinctive needs and barriers that certain groups face (Meer and Modood, 2009: 474). They include, for example, the inclusion of group representatives in decision making (e.g. through advisory councils or special representatives); support for and subsidising of group-based associations; cultural mediation and accommodation of difference in local government service provision; group-
based dress-code exemptions; recognition of and initiatives against institutional racism; proactive anti-discrimination of the affirmative action kind.8

Policies in Quadrant II also advance political solutions based on an understanding of disadvantage as systemic, but are located on the other side of the multiculturalism debate as they identify their policy object as individuals rather than groups. These diversity inclusion policies operate in what they see as (super-)diverse contexts that are not easily reduced to inter-group power dynamics. They aim to promote equal opportunities regardless of group belonging, without addressing specific groups directly. Passive non-discrimination policies are key to this agenda, requiring that all other characteristics being equal a person from a majority background should not be favoured (for example, for employment) over a person from a minority background.9 This quadrant also includes policies that tackle issues that affect certain groups disproportionally (e.g. unemployment) but do so with universalist rather than group-targeted tools (Collett and Petrovic, 2014; Scholten et al., 2017).

Quadrant III policies, like those in Quadrant I, conceptualise the policy problem in terms of groups but propose solutions that are apolitical in the sense that they target individual behaviour and operate mostly through ‘civil society’. These community cohesion policies aim to respond to what they see as the problem of inter-group division by garnering the unifying power of conviviality. Thus, they operate within a group-based ontology of difference but aim to overcome it by promoting intercultural encounters and social harmony, or – as critically put by Meer and Modood (2009: 486) – ‘a multiculturalism without groups’. Following Cantle’s idea of interculturalism, these policies aim at ‘creating shared spaces … developing a wider community narrative, projecting diversity as a positive and trying to change attitudes as well as behaviours’ (Antonsich, 2016: 477). The goal is to promote civic life and inter-communal contact especially at the micro-levels of the neighbourhood and the street. This takes the form of ‘coming together’ projects and events that encourage interpersonal interaction among members of different groups, often implemented through the work of voluntary associations (Cheong et al., 2007; Dobbernack, 2010).

Finally, Quadrant IV policies also favour depoliticised interventions aimed at shifting individual behaviours, but belong on the diversity side of the multiculturalism debate not as aspiration (like Quadrant III) but as their starting point. These neoliberalised diversity policies focus on the integration of single individuals rather than groups and operate through sustaining individual self-improvement and economic activation. This agenda has also been called the ‘capabilities-based’ strand of interculturalism (Zapata-Barrero, 2013) as it is mostly delivered through policies promoting employability, life-long education, and entrepreneurship. These policies are typically embedded in a wider discourse of diversity as a competitive advantage for cities’ image and economy (Kraus, 2012).

8 On this kind of policies see Banting and Kymlicka (2006).
9 These are distinct from proactive anti-discrimination policies (in Quadrant I) which aim to tackle systemic, group-based disadvantage with regard to those very ‘other characteristics’ (cf. Alexander, 2003).
These four agendas are ideal types in the sense that they represent homogenous policy clusters, which respond to univocal understandings of the matter at issue (i.e. a single ontology of difference) and coherent assumptions on the level at which solutions ought to be sought. In real life, however, policymaking is a much messier affair and rarely follows ideal types. This matrix should therefore not be intended as a representation of empirical reality, with cities consistently following one of the four agendas. Rather, it is an attempt to map what otherwise would be a confusing policy field. As such it is to be used as a tool to better understand how different (also inconsistent) combinations of policies come to be and what rationales can explain policy shifts over time. While critiques to such shifts will be mentioned, the matrix has no normative intention, as the appropriateness of policies that fall in one or another quadrant depends on the specific context and policy area.

**Methodology**

The inclusion agendas matrix will be used here to understand how European ideas of ‘optimal’ inclusion policies have changed and how they have been affected by nativist and austerity pressures. To do this, I analyse three EU-based networking initiatives and how their official understandings of the optimal inclusion agenda evolved over time, as evidenced by their policy recommendations, best practice selection, and contextual explanations. The European Union has no specific urban policy competency, and only limited competency in matters of diversity. Nevertheless, over time EU institutions have shown more interest in cities and developed strategic urban common goals. The idea that cities should play a key role in combating social exclusion has a long history, as EU institutions identified poverty and social isolation as affecting cities with particular intensity (Atkinson, 2000). Over the years, this generated several EU-sponsored urban initiatives, including on immigration and integration. This was particularly the case from 2004, when the EU’s Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the Common Basic Principles for migrant integration. These are guidelines for member states on how to approach issues of difference, but from the very beginning reserved a key role to cities by stating that ‘integration is a process that takes place primarily at the local level’.

As part of this urban focus, a series of city-to-city networking initiatives were created, sponsored by European institutions. *Cities for Local Integration Policies* (CLIP) was a joint initiative of the Council of Europe and the European Commission between 2006 and 2012. It included about 30 cities and several research institutions and aimed at promoting a stronger link between city policymakers and urban researchers on issues of housing, diversity and equality practices, intercultural dialogue, and ethnic entrepreneurship. *Integrating Cities* (IC-Eurocities) was also launched in 2006 as a joint initiative of the Eurocities network and the European Commission.[^12] It now includes over 140 cities and

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[^10]: For a summary of EU urban initiatives see document 23 in Appendix.
[^11]: See document 1 in Appendix.
[^12]: Although IC-Eurocities is not strictly speaking a network, it operates along similar lines.
developed the Integrating Cities Charter, which spelled out participating cities’ commitments to promoting diversity, equal opportunities, and migrant integration. *Intercultural Cities* (ICC) was launched in 2008 as a joint initiative of the Council of Europe (the leading partner) and the European Commission, which remained part of the initiative until 2013, providing it with over half of its budget. The network started with 11 pilot cities, now counts 126 participating cities, and developed the ICC Index – a benchmarking tool to track cities’ progress with intercultural integration.

Beyond their differences, these three initiatives all operate(d) with a similar set of tools: facilitating city-to-city networking, reviewing and disseminating best practices, and assessing cities’ progress against common benchmarks. They are not the only networking initiatives on these issues. For example, many European cities are also part of the UNESCO-sponsored European Coalition of Cities Against Racism and, more recently, in the context of the refugee ‘crisis’, of more informal and ad-hoc networks of ‘sanctuary’ or ‘refuge cities’ (Oomen et al., 2018). A thorough history of the development and working practice of city networking initiatives is beyond the scope of this article. What is of interest here are the discourses developed by EU-sponsored initiatives on optimal urban inclusion policies, as part of an ‘influential public policy discourse in Europe, in which policy networks are being widely presented as a solution to social, economic, and political governance problems’ (Leitner, 2004: 243). As such, the three networks can provide a glimpse on how European ‘great urban expectations’ have been articulated and have changed over time.

In the rest of this article, I analyse all the key official documents issued by the three initiatives, using the integration agendas matrix as a conceptual tool to understand and explain policy and discursive shifts. A few other relevant reports have been included, which were not issued as part of the networks’ work but are part of the broader EU policy ecosystem the networks inhabit and are sometimes referred to in network documents. A total of 39 documents were analysed spanning the period from the adoption of the Common Basic Principles in 2004 (1) to 2018 (see Appendix for a full list). I analyse both (a) policy recommendations and best practice examples, and (b) how the contexts cities operate within, the needs cities ought to respond to, and the choice of preferred policy approaches are framed and explained. For each document, I manually coded each instance of policy recommendation and/or best practice as belonging to one of the four quadrants in the matrix. I also separately coded each instance of explanatory and evaluative observation, as deploying discursive logics pertaining to one of the four agendas and/or justifying shifts between them. Distinguishing between discourse and policy is crucial as the two do not necessarily shift in tandem and one cannot be deduced from the other.

Two caveats are in order here. First, networks’ documents cannot be taken as representing the policy approach of all European cities or even all network members. Cities’ participation to these

13 See document 33, p. 6 in Appendix.
15 Henceforth documents in the Appendix will be referred to by their number in the list and, when relevant, page number.
initiatives is voluntary, so only cities that openly commit (at least on paper) to fostering inclusion take part. As they give examples of best practices, the documents do give a glimpse of participating cities’ actual policies. However, examples are selected and interpreted by the experts compiling the reports and/or volunteered by participating cities, so they can hardly be taken as a full picture of any city’s policies. Second, the documents do not show the process through which their understandings of optimal inclusion agendas were arrived at. The balance of power between different member cities in determining the reports’ thrust – which is likely to emerge from participating cities’ sizes and level of commitment to the networks – is not transparently reflected in the reports. Moreover, they are compiled by experts and officials that participate in the networking exercises, and thus they do not simply reflect the sum of member cities’ agendas, but, rather, networks’ experts and officials’ interpretations of what member cities are doing, should do, and can do. The likely interplay between researchers’ and policymakers’ potentially conflicting agendas is also not shown.

Yet, even with these caveats, taken diachronically, networks’ selection and framing of best practice examples, policy recommendations, and explanations for preferred approaches tell a story about prevailing expectations and discourses and how these have developed in the context of nativism and austerity. The aim is not to make a blanket argument that all European cities are converging towards the same approach identified in the networks’ reports, but that the ‘climate’ (and thus the policy space) cities inhabit is changing in specific ways that affect the range of (policy and discursive) possibilities that is open to them.

Mainstreaming and depoliticising

All three networks presented their agendas as an alternative to multiculturalism (and, increasingly, a response to nativism) as well as a way to sustain inclusion in a period of economic crisis. This double rationale justified a shift of the ‘optimal’ integration agenda from left to right (mainstreaming) and from top to bottom (depoliticising) in the matrix (Figure 2).

The ‘failure of multiculturalism’ underpinned the networks’ very genesis and, as evidenced by its recurrence in the documents, remained a strong discursive frame throughout. By rescaling the centre of diversity governance to the local level, and by accepting some of the critiques to multiculturalism,
the networks strived to reframe the case for diversity in ways that might recreate a consensus around it. Networking initiatives were presented as a direct response to the anti-multiculturalism backlash of the 2000s, and their agendas were framed as a response to the (actual or perceived) failures of Quadrant I policies. For example, CLIP’s conceptual framework stated that ‘In Europe, both cultural debate and social circumstances are lending support to positions and policies critical of multiculturalism’, and repeated the common anti-multiculturalist argument that the ‘formation of ethnic minority identities among migrants is leading to and reinforcing ethnic stratification and ethnocultural conflict’ (2:5; also 12:159). ICC tried to sidestep mounting anti-multiculturalist sentiments starting from its choice of name. Opting for ‘interculturalism’ was a direct response to the critique that multicultural policies had supported ethnic-based self-segregation (9:59-62). In the words of a report that laid the groundwork for ICC, ‘The creative challenge is to move from the multicultural city of fragmented differences to the co-created intercultural city that makes the most of diversity’ (3:5), questioning the ‘orthodoxy’ of multiculturalism (3:8; also 9:251, 10:9, 11:22-26, 29:6). While it has been generally more cautious with rejecting multiculturalism, IC-Eurocities framed its agenda in terms of social cohesion (5) and pointed to best practices that ‘avoid the fragmentation of societies along ethnic lines’ (8:22; also 28:9).

Policy-wise this resulted in recommendations and best-practice examples aimed at mainstreaming, i.e. ‘establish[ing] a whole-society approach to diversity rather than an approach to specific migrant groups in complex actor networks’ (Breugel and Scholten, 2017: 512). Embedding non-discrimination measures in all city departments and policy areas is key to this, as advocated by the Common Basic Principles (1) and mentioned in practically all subsequent documents. Group stigmatisation can also be overcome by folding inclusion measures into universal policies, and so networks often pointed to general (rather than group-targeted) interventions, especially with regard to housing (2; 4; 9:127; but grounded on group-based needs assessments in 15:13), education (2; 11:52; 18:9; 19:10) and the promotion of entrepreneurship (13:3; 16:98). Although CLIP recognised the need for some group-based initiatives as sometimes ‘necessary’, it still advocated for ‘as many general policies and programmes as possible’ (16:94). As summarised by an IC-Eurocities report in 2013, this shift means that ‘[a] decade ago, “integration” was the ruling model. Today we see city policies moving towards a broader cross-cutting approach to social inclusion, participation and equal opportunities’ (21:4).

Distancing inclusion policies from the ‘failures of multiculturalism’ was not the only driver of this shift. The lenses of urban austerity suggest a second, economic rationale for the ‘discursive emphasis on mainstreaming’ (Ambrosini and Boccagni, 2015: 47). From this perspective, mainstreaming is part of wider processes, whereby – as stated in a report by a leading EU think tank on urban policy, the EUKN – ‘The withdrawal of the welfare state goes hand-in-hand with decentralisation

16 The hope of ‘rescuing’ multiculturalism at the local level was echoed in academic circles (Uitermark et al., 2005).
and the search for new governance regimes and the localisation of social policy’ (30:43). Thus, beyond being a way to overcome group divisions, mainstreaming can also be a governance tool that rationalises service provision and produces efficiencies (cf. Breugel and Scholten, 2017). Indeed, ICC presented cities’ mainstreaming turn as – among other benefits – ‘[taking] away budgetary pressure’ (33:54). This might also explain why – although documents justify mainstreaming mostly in terms of overcoming social dis-integration – the need for cities to ‘[move] away from immigrant-specific services towards a service provision to all citizens’ (38:29; also 31:4) was highlighted more forcefully in the years following the financial crisis.

The left-to-right mainstreaming vector is accompanied by a top-to-bottom depoliticising vector. This too emerges in the documents through a double rationale, to do with both nativist and austerity pressures. First of all, the documents identify a hardening of the anti-multicultural backlash into full-on nativism. In introducing their agendas, documents refer to ‘shifting political priorities’ whereby ‘[the] received wisdom that integration is failing puts in jeopardy efforts to create more inclusive societies’ (17), ‘changing political discourse on migrant integration’ (21:8), ‘counterproductive national policies’ (33:55), and ‘anti-migrant backlash in the context of the global economic crisis’ (31:10). This context makes presenting a positive – and depoliticised – case for inclusion that shows the (economic and social) benefits for all (rather than for minorities only) central to successful and sustainable inclusion policies. In practice, this takes the form of foregrounding ‘social cohesion’ as the key goal (e.g. 5; 12:1; 26:6), and justifying cities’ investment in inclusion in administrative-pragmatic terms. In CLIP’s formulation of this justification, it is in cities’ interest to ensure that integration processes are handled successfully as part of their efforts for good governance, as cities ‘pay the price for integration processes that do not work’ (7:1; also 4:iii; cf. 15:3).

The social cohesion focus came with an emphasis (strongest in ICC) for best practices – like festivals, neighbourhood gatherings, cultural and sporting events – that ‘promote greater intercultural understanding and exchange’ (2:8), mixing of people of different backgrounds (8:19; 9:120,166), and ‘shared experiences’ (38:26). Although structural problems of exclusion were not denied, civil-society-led conviviality was often presented as a (depoliticised) solution. The concurrent framing of inclusion as making ‘business sense’ increased in prominence over time. While ‘making the most of diversity’ (3) was ICC’s slogan from the beginning, CLIP also – if more coldly – endorsed the idea of ‘market advantage’ (6:7), and – especially after 2008 – IC-Eurocities encouraged cities to ‘capitalise on their diverse population’ (15:3; also 21:5).

Occasionally documents explicitly laid down the pragmatic rationale for foregrounding the ‘business case’. According to an ICC document, ‘money isn’t everything but […] unless intercultural diversity can’t add to the bottom line of companies, cities and nations, an awful lot of people aren’t going to give it much credence’ (9:219). Similarly, IC-Eurocities distinguished between the ‘normative perspective’ for which ‘all citizens should be equally reflected in public services and political institutions’ and the ‘business case perspective’ – the document’s focus – that justifies inclusion in
terms of diversity benefits and ‘untapped’ resources (19:7). Following this logic, in recent years, IC-Eurocities started prioritising labour market inclusion (31:5; 32) and in 2018 launched City-GROW – a programme for cities to ‘[tap] into the unique expertise of immigrant entrepreneurs’ (34:4), avoid ‘brain waste’ and capitalise on migrants as resources and innovators (35:5), and ‘maximise the economic gains of migration’ (36:5).

Austerity is another driver of this depoliticising shift. Network documents are increasingly preoccupied with ‘shrinking resources’ (17), ‘tight financial constraints’ (20:9), ‘budget cuts and reduced financial support’ (21:8; also 31). These are reshaping cities’ governance, making it imperative to ‘make best use of resources’ (20:9) and find ‘cost-effective’ approaches to inclusion (36:9). This is also evident in Council of Europe and EUKN framework documents (22, 23, 24, 30), which from 2013 onwards always foregrounded the economic crisis as the necessary context within which cities operate. A remarkable illustration of austerity’s effects on urban policies is a best practice highlighted by ICC, whereby a London borough invited residents to participate in deciding how to distribute budget cuts, in an interesting reversal of participatory budgeting (29:4). Perhaps even more telling was a 2013 speech (titled ‘A reinforced role for European cities!’) by the European Commissioner for Regional Policy upon the renaming of the Directorate-General (DG) for Regional Policy into DG Regional and Urban Policy. Reiterating Europe’s ‘great urban expectations’, he announced that ‘Cities show concentrations of our greatest problems […] But they are also laboratories for solutions’, but he also signalled that increased responsibilities would not come with increased budgets, as ‘[cities] need a new approach and new governance, not just more money’.18

From an urban austerity perspective, therefore, incentives to depoliticise (favouring Quadrants III and IV) are in line with roll-back and roll-out neoliberalising trends (Fincher et al., 2014: 4). In ‘rolling back’, cities’ role is reframed as facilitating inter-cultural encounters, delivered by civil society organisations and/or self-organised informally at street and neighbourhood levels (e.g. 10:20; 12). In ‘rolling out’, cities are encouraged to plan for inclusive growth in ways that take full advantage of the ‘diversity dividend’ (9), not least through public-private partnerships (e.g. 36, 38:13-14). This also affects the language used by the networks, which adopt the depoliticised vocabulary of management – for instance by applying ‘SMART (specific, measurable, achievable, resourced and timed) targets’ (8:19) to inclusion – and invites cities to imitate private sector practices of benchmarking, customer satisfaction, and diversity management (3:10; 8:24; 9:11; 11:26-28).19 Moreover, following a neoliberalised narrative of personal responsibility (Bayırbağ et al., 2017: 2027), the networks’ strategic focus is increasingly on labour market activation (31; 32; 35; 38), with the bulk of best practices geared towards individual self-improvement and capability building – through mentoring schemes, 

17 See also Eurocities’ Declaration on Work: http://nws.eurocities.eu/MediaShell/media/EUROCITIES%20declaration%20on%20work.pdf
19 See Berg and Sigona (2013: 352) on how diversity has ‘gone corporate’.

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employability programmes, training and vocational education (e.g. 15:16; 18:13; 29:6). This is in keeping with the EU2020 agenda’s ‘trickle down’ approach to inclusion (Cianetti, 2018), which sees economic growth and labour market activation as the primary route to inclusion (23).

**Pragmatic adaptation and resistance**

The sum of the *mainstreaming* and *depoliticising* vectors suggests a policy convergence towards Quadrant IV, broadly in line with austerity urbanism theses. Evidence of both vectors is common to all three networks, albeit with differences in emphasis and coherence: *mainstreaming* and *depoliticising* were already at the core of ICC founding documents, while IC-Eurocities (and to a lesser extent CLIP) adopted them over time. However, this picture is complicated by the persistence of aspects of multicultural policies and multicultural thinking.

Throughout the period, network documents recommended involving marginalised groups in policy-making (e.g. 2:14, 8:19, 10:38, 12:163, 15:13, 18:11, 27:10, 28:9, 37:7), supporting and financing group-based organisations (e.g. 2:15, 8:29, 10:32, 19:11, 38:23) and adapting service provision to diverse needs (e.g. 6:126, 8:21, 11:52, 12:168, 15:13-18, 19:16, 26:12, 33:43, 38:21-22). Documents tended to justify these policies in terms of diversity advantage and social cohesion rather than strictly-speaking multiculturalism, presumably to legitimise them (and the concurrent use of resources) in line with changing governmental priorities. For example, IC-Eurocities indicated that the commitment to migrant participation ‘arises out of the imperative that involving citizens will advance social cohesion and improve quality of life’ (27:4). Nevertheless, the persistence of approaches from the multicultural toolbox is noticeable.

These policy ‘inconsistencies’ were sometimes accompanied by alternative framings that directly challenge *mainstreaming* and *depoliticising* discourses. CLIP, perhaps because of its more academic-led nature, was the more radical and consistent in presenting such framings: it critiqued the ‘diversity management approach’ because the right to inclusion must hold even when it cannot be proven to be economically advantageous (6:8), and encouraged cities to go beyond folkloristic events (12:159). Incongruous framings also surfaced in IC-Eurocities – especially in its recognition of structural barriers to migrant participation (8:31, 14, 28:8) and of indirect discrimination (18:7), both requiring political, group-based interventions.

These inconsistencies could partially be ‘sticky’ remnants from past approaches (Joppke, 2017: 1163), especially as some of the same city officials who were previously tasked with implementing ‘multicultural’ policies are now working towards ‘diversity’ and ‘social cohesion’ goals (Schiller, 2017). However, there also seems to be a degree of intentionality, as networks are not blind to (or uncritical of) nativism and austerity, and increasingly make explicit reference to these ‘two related trends’ (31:10; also 17; 21:9; 25:4; 34:12-13). Although they have not abandoned their ‘great urban

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20 On these ‘social cohesion’ priorities see Dobbernack (2010).
expectations’, a creeping urban pessimism seems to infuse more recent network documents. Even ICC – which went the furthest in embracing optimistic visions of the ‘diversity dividend’ – recently took a more sombre outlook. While in early publications (e.g. 9) the future appears bright and embracing diversity a way for cities to be part of it, ICC’s 2015 report strikes a different tone, lamenting that ‘financial constraints and counterproductive or lack of national policies’ challenge the programme’s sustainability in many cities (33:58).

Network responses are a combination of resistance and adaptation. Defiantly, IC-Eurocities asserted that cities are tackling the challenge of inclusion head-on notwithstanding austerity, and ‘even if the media would have us believe otherwise, our efforts are paying off’ (25:4). Similarly, ICC vouched to be ‘also a political community of cities which believe that diversity is their future and refuse the politics of fear’ (29:8). At the same time, pressures for adaptation through mainstreaming and depoliticising are strong. This points to the emergence of a pragmatic-adaptive logic, whereby city networks attempt to refashion diversity as attractive in state contexts that portray it as dangerous. Within this logic, elements of anti-multiculturalist and depoliticised ‘reinventing governance’ discourses are embraced, but are reproduced less than orthodoxly, leaving space for a re-tooling of ‘old’ multicultural policies and even for (inconsistent) resistance.

Conclusions
The shifts in urban inclusion policies in the past ten years, from a supposed ‘multicultural consensus’ to a refocusing on ‘community cohesion’ and ‘diversity advantage’, is typically understood through the lenses of the ‘anti-multicultural backlash’ (Lentin, 2014). Network documents confirm that the renativisation of national politics was indeed a key driver of policy shifts, but in combination with urban austerity. Trends towards mainstreaming (usually captured in multiculturalism scholarship) and depoliticising (better highlighted in urban austerity scholarship) are a result of both, in a mutually reinforcing relationship. In city practice, this does not mean that all cities are converging towards the same (Quadrant IV) policies; local peculiarities, path dependency, and local actors’ agency mean that each city will implement a unique constellation of policies from the four quadrants. However, networks developments suggest a pragmatic-adaptive path for European cities, whereby – in the face of shrinking policy and discursive options – cities are incentivised to change and/or reframe existing policy approaches, in a combination of accommodation of and resistance to anti-multiculturalist and austerity imperatives. Seen this way, the picture presented by the network documents contradicts simplistic visions of cities as either having capitulated to nativist and austerity logics or being unequivocal sites of resistance against them.

These findings suggest at least two future directions for research. First, the policy matrix could be deployed to understand how the trends seen in city networks translate into urban policies on the ground. Comparatively, this will elucidate how different policy combinations emerge under similar pressures, refining our understanding of the on-the-ground expressions of the networks’ pragmatic-
adaptive logic. Second, as the migration ‘crisis’ pushes newcomers centre-stage, we are as yet to understand how this affects pre-existing approaches towards settled communities. The inclusion agendas matrix could help us understand how the frames of emergency and (lately) human rights (Oomen and Baumgartel, 2018) that cities call on to deal with newcomers might be interacting with mainstreaming and depoliticising vectors to reshape cities’ policy and discursive options for governing difference.

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