IDENTITY IN TIME OF CRISIS: CHINESE MIGRATION DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY IN SURAT THANI

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Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Tawirat Songmuang, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed : Tawirat Songmuang
Date : 10 January 2019
Abstract

From the third to the seventh centuries, the area now known as Surat Thani was called the Panpan Kingdom, whose rulers sent tribute missions to China. From the seventh to the fourteenth centuries, Surat Thani was the regional centre of the Srivijaya Kingdom. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, it was a place where Chinese merchants uploaded their cargoes for transportation overland before returning to China. In the early twentieth century, Surat Thani became an important port where migrants from across China met, a diversity which made the characteristics of migrant communities and their associated networks rather complex. This research explores Chinese migration and the transformation of ethnic Chinese identities during the first half of the twentieth century in Surat Thani by observing the role of Chinese temples and their schools. Drawing on diverse primary materials, historical artefacts, oral history interviews, together with an engagement with the secondary literature on the subject, the research found that the industrial revolution and colonisation led to a huge migration of Chinese into Surat Thani from the late nineteenth century. The Chinese established their native-place associations through the construction of temples and schools to serve migrants who spoke common dialects based on their birth regions. They saw themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese and Hakka. After encountering the modern concept of the “nation-state” and the movement to use a Chinese national language based on Mandarin as the language of instruction in Chinese schools in the late 1920s, diverse ethnic Chinese consciousnesses were gradually transformed into a united national Chinese consciousness. During the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), many Chinese politically and culturally identified with their motherland. Therefore, they contributed to the Chinese war effort to help China fight against the Japanese. When Japanese troops landed in Surat Thani in 1941, the Chinese armed themselves to resist. During World War II, the Chinese were largely split into two groups: those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. In the post-war years, the Chinese were again essentially divided into two: pro-Chinese Nationalist Party and pro-Chinese Communist Party. In brief, the migrant communities in Surat Thani and also in greater Thailand had fluid and complicated characteristics that were susceptible to change over time.
Acknowledgements

During my PhD journey from the very beginning to the final stage of completion, my thanks must go first and foremost to Dr. Tsai Weipin, who supervised this thesis with her characteristic blend of boundless energy, enthusiasm, experience and kindness. This thesis would certainly never have begun, let alone been completed, without her considerable help, advice and encouragement. I am also deeply grateful that she dedicated her time to tutor me in aspects of Chinese language to the extent that my language skills have improved enormously. I have, therefore, had the great privilege of having the opportunity to work with her, and enough thanks cannot be given to fully express my heartfelt gratitude.

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### Abbreviations

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAT</td>
<td>The National Archives of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>The Ministry of Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOI</td>
<td>The Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>The Secretariat of the Cabinet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCH</td>
<td>The Supreme Command Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MFA</td>
<td>The Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNA</td>
<td>The National Archives of the United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FO</td>
<td>Foreign Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WO</td>
<td>War Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Colonial Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>The Chinese Chamber of Commerce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCP</td>
<td>The Chinese Communist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>The Communist Party of Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D.E.I.</td>
<td>The Dutch East Indian Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GMD</td>
<td>The Chinese Nationalist Party, or the <em>Guomindang</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FCRFSS</td>
<td>The Federation of China Relief Fund of the South Seas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>The People’s Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROC</td>
<td>The Republic of China</td>
</tr>
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<td>SSJW</td>
<td>The Second Sino-Japanese War</td>
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1. This map was adapted from Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bimalputra, *A History of the Thai-Chinese* (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 10.
Introduction

According to archaeological evidence and shipwreck excavations, relations between China and the area which is now known as Surat Thani, a province in Southern Thailand, date back almost two thousand years. From the third to the seventh centuries, Panpan Kingdom, whose rulers sent numerous tribute missions to China, was located in Surat Thani. From the seventh to the fourteenth centuries, the province of Surat Thani was the regional centre of the Srivijaya Kingdom. Surat Thani, together with its neighbouring provinces, was the first region that drew Chinese merchants, with their junks stopping at many ports and settlements because the merchants, who were travelling to India and further west, may have gone with the northeast monsoon only as far as these sites. Before returning to China with the southwest monsoon, they uploaded their cargoes for transshipment overland. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the province was an important port for trade with China and the main traded good with Fujian was rice. During the second half of the nineteenth century, the Chinese population rose rapidly (see Chapter One).

I. Chinese Migration to South East Asia

The period under study in this thesis is a particularly interesting one in the history of migration. Michael H. Fisher has noted that in the modern period, from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries, there were massive global people movements due to the end of slavery and the industrial revolution, which led to an increased demand

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2 Chinese earthenware during the Western Han dynasty, from the first to the second centuries, has been discovered in Surat Thani. See Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 17.


for labourers in new industries.\textsuperscript{6} He added that migration also stemmed from war. The First World War and the Second World War in the first half of the twentieth century displaced people across the world.\textsuperscript{7} During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were also huge movements of Chinese abroad. Fan Yuchun has written that the Chinese migration to South East Asia is the largest of all Chinese migrations.\textsuperscript{8} Su Lin Lewis has argued that twentieth-century Asia was characterised by movement, migration, and bustling cities.\textsuperscript{9} Nevertheless, throughout Chinese history, there has been ceaseless, large-scale migration in various forms.

From the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries, China was governed by the Qing dynasty. The early Qing occupation drove tens of millions of people to migrate. There were consecutive waves of flight resulting from the brutality of the Manchu conquest. This transition made the population diminish substantially in many areas due to the ferocity of the rebellions and wars between the Ming and Qing. However, the Qing, the new authority, tempted people to migrate to the depopulated areas with tax incentives and the provision of seeds and farming equipment. Some exiles migrated to Taiwan, headed by Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功, 1624-1662). To prevent their return and to fight the anti-Qing movement based in Taiwan, in 1661 the demarcation line was drawn along the coast from Guangdong to Zhejiang in southern China, and overseas navigation was prohibited. Forts were built and people were told to move inland.\textsuperscript{10} Claudine Salmon has written that the commercial networks between China and South East Asia stopped for many years. After the grandson of Zheng was sent to Beijing and Taiwan was integrated into China, the order was removed in 1683 and the ban on overseas navigation was lifted a year later. Seagoing merchants in South East Asia were quick to recommence their

\textsuperscript{7} Fisher, \textit{Migration}, 105-108.
\textsuperscript{10} Lary, \textit{Chinese Migrations}, 75-78.
relations with Guangdong. Diana Lary has argued that this brutal policy instilled in local people a burning resentment towards the Qing dynasty. These histories provide a valuable background to the understanding of Chinese revolutionaries such as Seow Hoodseng in Siam during the late Qing dynasty, as some of their ancestors fled to South East Asia after the integration of Taiwan in 1683 (see Chapter Three).

In the late Qing period, huge movements of people were caused by two disruptions: the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) and globalisation. The Taiping Rebellion caused people to migrate within and away from China. Within China, there were two waves of movements. The first wave was from those who escaped the rebellion to Shanghai and the latter from the Taipings to Southwest China after the Taipings were ferociously subdued by the Qing. As for globalisation, economics drove many Chinese to migrate as free or indentured labour. There was a massive need for labourers to construct railways, dams, and canals. For example, Chinese labourers were employed by contractors in the Chinatowns of San Francisco and Vancouver to build the western sections of the Transcontinental Railway, which was finished in 1869. Indeed the migration was so sizeable that Chinese migrants to North America began to experience racism. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act was passed by Congress to prohibit all Chinese, both skilled and unskilled, from working in mining and entering the US (the law was rescinded in 1943). In the US and Canada, Chinese communities were male “bachelor societies”. “Space of difference” and “islands of externalities” were appropriate terms used to describe Chinatowns which, built through the “mechanism of spatialization” which evolved in urban society, occupied the least desirable areas of a city’s spatial

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12 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 75-78.
13 “Siam” was an official name of the country until 24 June 1939 when it was changed to “Thailand”.
14 Lary, Chinese Migrations, 92.
15 Fisher, Migration, 83.
17 Fisher, Migration, 101.
structure.\textsuperscript{18} Wang Yuchun has studied how tremendous numbers of Chinese migrated abroad in the mid-nineteenth century after five ports were opened for foreign trade as a result of the end of the First Opium War in 1842 and ten new ports were opened following the Second Opium War in 1860.\textsuperscript{19} The work of Yuchun is most in tune with the analysis of this research, which examines the massive movements of the Chinese to Surat Thani in the mid-nineteenth century (see Chapter One).

In South East Asia, Chinese, mostly from Southern Fujian, or Minnan (閩南), migrated to trade and work in plantations until there were only women, children, and elders left in some of their villages in China.\textsuperscript{20} Of all of the overseas Chinese, there were five major native-places and dialect groups. The first to come in numbers were the Hokkien (福建) from southern Fujian, followed by the Cantonese (廣東) from the rural areas near Canton, and the Teochew (潮州) from Chaozhou and Shantou in Guangdong province. The Hainanese (海南) from Hainan had started trading in this region in the eighteenth century, and were established in some numbers by the early nineteenth century. The Hakka (客家), from disseminated hilly regions in northern Guangdong and southern Fujian, migrated through Teochew ports in the mid-nineteenth century.\textsuperscript{21} Chinese migrants who came from the same region were inclined to settle in the same destination. For example, the Hokkien was the majority of Chinese migrants in the Philippines, the Teochew in Bangkok, Toishan from Guangdong in California, and Shandong in Korea.\textsuperscript{22} The existence of one more dialect group - the Tanka (蜑家) - has not been mentioned in the existing scholarship. Although Wang Yuchun did write about the Tanka in Hainan, he failed to mention that the Tanka did in fact migrate to South East Asia.\textsuperscript{23} This thesis

\textsuperscript{19} Wang Yuchun, \textit{ประวัติการอพยพของชาวจีนไหหลํา海南移民史志} (History of the Hainanese migration) (Bangkok: Hainan Education and Cultural Foundation of Thailand, 2014), 233-234.
\textsuperscript{22} Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 20.
\textsuperscript{23} Yuchun, \textit{ประวัติการอพยพของชาวจีนไทยหลาน海南移民史志}, 114-115, 138-139, 190.
makes up for this lapse in the scholarship by recording this ethnic subgroup in Surat Thani.

In South East Asia, their settlements were socially divided and their economic activities were organised along occupational lines based on place of origin. In Thailand, in 1837 George Winsor Earl observed that the dialect groups strenuously opposed one another as if they belonged to rival nations. Su Lin Lewis has also argued that multi-ethnic port-cities such as Penang, Rangoon, and Bangkok were sites of tensions and conflicts between many ethnicities and religions. The influential colonial scholar J.S. Furnivall has argued that these communities were “plural societies” in which people self-segregated and interacted with one another only in the realm of commerce. For example, in Singapore people from different communities lived essentially separate lives, engaging only in the market area. They were distinct ethnic communities.

The findings of this thesis reflect the idea of what Furnivall called “plural societies” in the colonial era. The spatial geography of Surat Thani is a testament to this idea that there were ethnic enclaves of native Thai and Chinese communities. The majority of the Chinese stayed together in the market areas in most districts, while most of the native Thai lived in distant rural areas. In Bandon, for example, the commercial heart of the province was dominated by most Chinese. In other words, they founded a local ethnic space within a wider pluralist society. Within their space, there were also many other smaller spaces created in which each Chinese dialect group had its own temples, native-place associations, and cemeteries, and where its members interacted with one another. Prior to the late 1920s, for example, even Chinese schools were separated from one another based on the use of language of instruction (see Chapter One and Chapter Four).

26 Lewis, Cities in Motion, 2, 8.
Despite the insularity of the Chinese community, there were cases of inter-cultural exchange and interaction with the native Thai community. This thesis reveals that a small number of Chinese, namely those that had established small Chinese communities in rural areas, had to dwell together with locals. Therefore, they had many opportunities to interact with ethnic Thai people, who, as noted above, mostly lived in the countryside. The hybrid Sino-Thai nature of some temples in Surat Thani are representative of this assimilation process. In Tha Chang district, for example, a hybrid temple was created by a lukchin, a Chinese child who was the product of an intermarriage between a Thai and a Chinese, to serve a small number of Chinese and native Thais. In addition, the locally-made bells in some Chinese temples, exhibiting a hybrid style, reflected the gradual process of assimilation of some Chinese into the wider Thai society. These hybrid bells could be purchased by Sino-Thais (see Chapter One).

Surat Thani’s Chinese community also interacted with the Bangkok-centred Siamese nation-state and Siamese elites in Southern Siam. The closeness of the Chinese community leaders to Siamese royalty and elites reflected the interactions between them. Through the patronage of Phraya Nakhon Si Thammarat, the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat, Liao Chiangsoon, a Teochew migrant from Bangkok, had established himself in Bandon’s Chinatown and successfully controlled the birds’ nest industry in the country at the turn of the twentieth century. Liao also had a close relationship with King Vadjiravudh and supplied his birds’ nests to the palace in Bangkok. He was also appointed to the title of phraya by the king. Due to his connections with Siamese royalty and elites, he was granted exceptional privileges (see Chapter Three). The role of Liao also highlights the close connections between the Chinese community in Surat Thani and Bangkok.

Su Lin Lewis, in her book *Cities in Motion*, which studies the connections between port-cities in South East Asia, has written that a regional rail network knitted Bangkok, Penang, and Singapore together, facilitating intercity travel. Increasing connections produced new modes of belonging to new regional and transnational communities. Lewis has further described that Penang was a regional hub for English and
Chinese secondary education, which attracted students from all over the region. The study also looks at the connections between Penang and Surat Thani, a node in the rail network. It found that in the first half of the twentieth century Penang was closely connected to Surat Thani once the railway had been built. Many Chinese in Surat Thani not only shared trading connections with those Chinese in Penang, but also family ties and a hybrid culture (see Chapter Two and Chapter Three).

Several studies of Chinese communities in South East Asia have focused on the three major Chinese traditional religions: Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism. Evelyn Lip has proposed that Shenism and ancestor worship should be added to these groups, whilst Stephen Feuchtwang has written that popular religion in China comprises some elements of both Buddhism and the imperial cults, more of Daoism, but is singularly identifiable with none of them. He has further described that “religion” here is a category, not a singular thing, and it is also “popular in the sense of being local and true of the China of the Han, or Chinese-speaking people, where every place had or has its local cults and the festivals peculiar to them.” Religion influences the designs of local festivals and temples, which are ubiquitous in the lives of the Chinese.

In her survey, Teresita Ang See found that 83 percent of the Chinese in the Philippines identified themselves as Christians. She has insisted that religious syncretism is the norm because Chinese Catholics continue to practise Chinese popular religion. She has concluded that Chineseness is not defined by religion, as one is free to choose one’s religion and even practice syncretism. Others have emphasised that while this may be true, religion nevertheless occupies a crucial role in the construction of Chinese cultural identity. Myron Cohen, for example, has suggested that amongst the major features of Chinese culture are a particular family organisation, land-based economic structures, great value associated with education in Chinese Classics, ritual life based on Confucian ethics and filial piety, pride in the local place of origin, and popular religion. Cohen has

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27 Lewis, Cities in Motion, 1-6, 17-21.
claimed that part of being Chinese was a consciousness of participation in the political, cultural, and social arrangement of Chinese civilisation. The hierarchy of deities in popular religion reflects the imperial bureaucracy of dynastic rule. Arthur Wolf has written that the connection between gods and ancestors is a way of comprehending one’s social world and the cosmos. In other words, there is a hierarchy in the spirit world, known as the ‘imperial metaphor’ in Chinese popular religion.

Aristotle Dy has studied Chinese Buddhism in the Philippines, arguing that religion performs a substantial role in the preservation of ethnic identity for Chinese Buddhists in there. Under Spanish rule for more than 300 years, the Chinese secretly worshipped the bodhisattava Guanyin in their private homes. Later, Chinese temples were allowed to be built under American colonisation in the early twentieth century. Dy has described how many temples, such as Seng Guan Temple, built Buddhist schools in the vicinity of the temples but independent. There were Chinese language lessons focusing on Confucian teachings, and Buddhist religion classes. Chinese language and culture could be preserved through these schools. Additionally, once the schools were founded, intermarriage between Chinese and native Filipinos was rare. Dy has written that temples did not serve only a religious function, but were community centres for first and second-generation immigrants. People shared a common identity through rituals and many activities. They were the only places where the Chinese could feel secure and pray to their deities for divine assistance. In his research, Dy challenged the Teresita Ang See by concluding that the connection of religion with ethnic and cultural identity in the Buddhist community is more natural compared with the Christian because all the people, language, and festivals are Chinese. Hence, the sense of being Chinese is automatically asserted.

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Some, such as Bernard Formoso and Tan Chee-Beng, have seen temples as a window on the history of Chinese migration to South East Asia. They have examined the role of the charitable temple (善堂), describing how charitable temples in South East Asia and in Chaoshan in China are organised mostly around the worship of Song Dafeng. Each is a separate temple, enjoying local and transnational networks with other charitable temples. They simultaneously conduct both religious and charitable work. For example, as Chinese education has a great deal to do with Chinese identity, charitable temples in Singapore and Malaysia mostly donate money for Chinese education. Formoso and Chee-Beng have argued that their charitable actions tend to be received by local people as a verification of Chinese integration, and to reduce their prejudice in terms of the reputedly selfish Chinese. Mutual help amongst migrants has its roots in the charitable temples. Moreover, help provided to kinsmen, clan members, and people of the same origin is an essential determinant of economic success, social adaptation, and the preservation of identity.\textsuperscript{33} However, such scholarship, studying Chinese traditional religions in South East Asia, has failed to engage with hybrid temples that serve both Chinese migrants and local people (see Chapter One).

There has been a comparatively large amount of research conducted on Chinese migration to Thailand. The Chinese have been migrating to Thailand for centuries. During the reign of King Narai (1656-88), the king of Ayutthaya, the former capital of Thailand, there were only around 3,000 Chinese permanently settled in the country.\textsuperscript{34} In the late eighteenth century, after Ayutthaya was invaded and burnt down by the Burmese army in 1767, the Chinese population in Siam grew several fold due to the accession to the throne of King Taksin, the son of a Chinese migrant from Shantou in Guangdong. Chinese migration sharply increased during his reign (1767-1782) and maintained high levels throughout all of the early Chakri kings.\textsuperscript{35} Purcell argued that in the late nineteenth


\textsuperscript{34} Victor Purcell, \textit{The Chinese in Southeast Asia} (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 83.

\textsuperscript{35} The reigns of the first five Chakri kings are as follows: Rama I (1782-1809), Rama II (1809-1824), Rama III (1824-1851), Rama IV (1851-1868), and Rama V (1868-1910). Skinner, \textit{Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand}, 4-5.
and early twentieth centuries the increase in the number of Chinese was due to the expansion of Siam’s export trade, the chaotic state of China following the 1911 revolution and the barriers against Chinese migration in French Indochina.\textsuperscript{36} Ian Brown has described how Siam carried out reforms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that attracted Chinese migrants.\textsuperscript{37}

There was an increase in Chinese nationalism amongst the Chinese in South East Asia after China’s defeat by Japan in 1895. Overseas Chinese took part in the royalist reform party and the revolutionary movement, with Singapore at its centre. Newspapers serving as mouthpieces to both royalists and revolutionaries were published in the city. In Bangkok, a branch of the revolutionary movement was also established. A well-known leader of the revolutionists in Siam was Seow Hoodseng, who was appointed chairman of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1906. In that year he also founded bilingual newspapers to support the movement.\textsuperscript{38} Penpisut Intarapirom has studied the political role of Seow from 1907 to 1931, finding that his interests in both Chinese and Thai national politics reflected his “Sino-Siamese” identity.\textsuperscript{39} Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra have written that the involvement of leading Teochew families in Thailand was due to their networking with Seow.\textsuperscript{40} Eiji Murashima has studied the political role of certain Teochew families from Surat Thani.\textsuperscript{41} However, the historical analysis of the networks between leading families from Surat Thani and other families has been neglected.

\textsuperscript{36} Purcell, \textit{The Chinese in Southeast Asia}, 83-84.
\textsuperscript{39} Penpisut Intarapirom, เข้าสู่สังคม สิ่งมั่งคั่ง: ทัศนคติและท่าทางของจีนเชษฐาในสังคมไทย (Seowhood seng Sriboonruang: The Attitude and Political Role of Sino-Siamese in Thai Society) (Bangkok: Centre for the History of Thai Relations with Asian Countries, 2004), ฐ-ณ.
\textsuperscript{40} Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 328-332.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, the Thai people also developed a spirit of nationalism. They accused the Chinese of crowding them out of trade and industry, of degrading native Thais with their gambling, and of being the Jews of Siam. Thai people first fully realised how dependent they were on the Chinese when they were severely inconvenienced by a Chinese strike in 1910 due to the misunderstandings of taxes payable to the government.\textsuperscript{42} A serious campaign of suppression was launched after King Rama VI came to the throne. Rapid decline of secret societies led to the establishment of the CCC (Chinese Chamber of Commerce hereafter), which Skinner has described as the most essential Chinese organisation in Bangkok and one which managed to represent the Chinese community as a whole.\textsuperscript{43}

In the early twentieth century, the first Chinese schools in Bangkok were also founded along political lines. For example, the Huayi School was established by the Chinese Association, a front organisation for the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance founded by Seow in 1908, and the Zhonghua School was established by royalists between 1909 and 1911. Later, other schools were also founded, of which Xinmin School, established under the auspices of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance, was the most important. All five major dialect groups also supported Xinmin School, but the school used Teochew as the language of instruction. Therefore, it failed to meet the needs of other dialect groups and they founded their own schools: Jin Tek School by the Hakka in 1913, Ming-te School by the Cantonese in 1914, Pei-yuan School by the Hokkien in 1916, and Yu-min School by the Hainanese in 1921.\textsuperscript{44}

After the Nationalists successfully reunited China in 1928, the idea of Chinese national identity, which revolved around the concept of the Republican citizen, was transmitted to the Chinese community in Siam. According to Wang Guangwu, the introduction of modern Chinese schools was a factor for rapid change and the idea of the


national was quickly implanted into the consciousness of local-born Chinese students.\(^{45}\)

A Chinese national language based on Northern Mandarin was also introduced as the language of instruction in Chinese schools. Narong Phuangphit has studied the policy on Chinese education during the reign of King Prajadhipok (1925-1935), arguing that Chinese schools had become a problem since they perpetuated Chinese nationalism and refused to engender assimilation into Siamese society. Therefore, an education law was launched to control Chinese schools more effectively as part of the Thai-ification policy to force the Chinese to become Thai.\(^{46}\) However, Phuangphit failed to examine the response of the Chinese to the education policy, a part of Thai-ification programme.

Another wave of Chinese nationalism in the Chinese community in Thailand was sparked by the Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW hereafter) of 1937-1945. Chinese migrants around the world who identified strongly with their homeland were associated with displays of patriotism and support for China’s war effort against Japan.\(^{47}\) William Skinner has described the political action organisations that were established in 1937-1938 to help China’s cause and whose goals were to enforce an anti-Japanese boycott and collect and remit funds for the Chinese war effort. However, all these activities were illegal as the Thai government sought to reconcile themselves with growing Japanese power in the region. As a result, in 1939 many Chinese leaders were arrested for involvement in anti-Japanese activities.\(^{48}\) Skinner’s study failed to provide a full picture of the boycott leading up to 1937, an activity that caused severe damage to the Japanese economy. In addition, the Chinese used it to respond to Japanese agitation in China even before the start of the war in 1937 (see Chapter Three).


\(^{46}\) Narong Phuangphit, นารองพุ่งพิท (The policy on the education of the Chinese in Thailand during the reign of King Prajadhipok) (Bangkok: Bhannakij Publishing, 1975), 56-115.


Ernest Koh, in his book *Diaspora at War*, which studied Singapore’s Chinese who identified politically with China and contributed to China’s war effort during the SSJW, proposed that “diaspora” narrates an ideological relationship that can be constructed between centres and peripheries. Therefore, *China* diaspora is used rather than Chinese diaspora to capture better the connection between *overseas Chinese* and China because an idea of China existed around the 1930s. However, Koh fails to recognise that the surge of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the diaspora in South East Asia had been brewing for decades long prior to the 1930s. For example, the Chinese in Siam responded to the Japanese agitation in China by boycotting Japanese merchandise in events such as the Twenty-One Demands in 1915 and the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (see Chapter Three).

In 1938, Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram became the Prime Minister of Thailand. The subsequent year was the worst year for Thailand’s Chinese community. All Chinese schools were closed down by the Phibun government. Whilst Phichai Rattanapon claimed that every Chinese school in Thailand was closed down between 1938 and 1940. Research has revealed that Chinese schools, newspapers, and banks collaborated closely with secret societies operating against the Japanese.

On 8 December 1941, Japanese troops landed in Thailand and the Thai government decided to co-operate with the Japanese. Many leading Chinese leaders who were supporting Chinese anti-Japanese organisations were arrested. Only the CCC and native-place associations were allowed to remain open as usual. In 1943, the Chinese were persuaded to work on the Death Railway and the CCC organised recruitment for it. By the end of the Pacific War in 1945, there were many underground groups operating against the Japanese and many of them were co-operating with the Free Thai

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Movement. However, conflict between Chinese collaborators with the Japanese and patriotic Chinese has been neglected in the scholarship on this subject.

The end of the Second World War saw a resurgence in Chinese nationalism. Phuwadol Songprasert has noted how the Chinese in Bangkok and other big cities celebrated the victory over Japan. Moreover, the Chinese circulated rumours that Guomindang (GMD hereafter) troops were set to arrive to occupy Thailand. Some Chinese physically attacked Thai people in acts of revenge for perceived injustices which had occurred during the war and the Japanese occupation. The flag of the Republic of China was also hung to celebrate and challenge the Thai authorities. However, Songprasert’s analysis failed to fully explain how the tensions between Thais and Chinese were resolved.

Many scholars have researched the Chinese community in southern Thailand. Skinner has written that the Southern Peninsula was the first region that attracted Chinese and foreign merchants. Fleets of Chinese junks stopped at numerous ports and settlements on the east side of the peninsula. From around 1850 to 1870 there was an expansion of rice cultivation for export, making mainland South East Asia pre-eminent in the world rice trade. The financing, the transportation, milling, and export of the rice crop had increasingly fallen under the sway of Chinese merchants over the second half of the nineteenth century. At the same time, Chinese migrants from the tin districts of the peninsula moved to Central Siam and other ports. These and other economic developments had a significant effect on Chinese migration to the region.

The reformed system of provincial administration which took effect in 1894 changed the face of the peninsula. A provincial office of the Department of Mines was founded in Phuket, the capital of tin, appointing a mines commissioner with

responsibility for issuing concessions and inspecting leases. By 1915, there were six mines officials positioned in the southern provinces, namely Phuket, Nakhon Sithammarat, Kedah, Pattani, Phang Nga, and Ranong. A southern railway was also constructed down the east side of the peninsula, with the Siamese government hoping that the railway would encourage foreign investment in mining and help to develop agriculture and forestry in South Siam. The scholarship shows that the reforms and the railway were important, and this thesis adds to this scholarship by revealing that these two developments were key factors causing the Chinese to migrate to Surat Thani.

Their networks and connections with Siam’s royal family are also important for the success of the Chinese in Siam. Skinner has argued that Wu Yang’s family (吳陽) was famous because he was the first Chinese in Siam allowed to become a governor, paving the way for other Chinese migrants such as Kaw Suchiang (許泗章). Wu Yang, a Hokkien, came to Songkhla by junk in 1750 from Fujian. When King Taksin consolidated his power in the peninsula in 1769, Wu reported his estates and presented fifty cases of tobacco to the King. In 1775, Taksin made him governor of Songkhla. Nine Songkhla governors were from his family until the reformed system of provincial administration. Kaw Suchiang, another Hokkien, had migrated to Penang about 1810 to work as a coolie. He saved money to do business in South Siam. In Ranong, Kaw expanded coastal trading and established a tin mining company. Later, he was appointed to governor of Ranong. His son, Kaw Simbee, also served as the governor of Phuket in 1901. Simbee encouraged Chinese migration, primarily Hokkiens, from Penang, in British Malaya, to Phuket and gave them funds to start working in the tin mining. This study shows how such Chinese families were successful because they had networks and connections with the royal family (see Chapter Three). The research also explores the networks of the Hokkien tin miners between Penang and two southern provinces, Ranong and Phuket. This thesis found that the tin mining industry in Surat Thani attracted Hakka tin miners from Penang (see Chapter Three).

Supakarn Siripaisan’s research on the history of the Chinese community in Hat Yai, a district in Songkhla, noted how Hat Yai, a small village at the time, became an important port and a big city in Thailand after the railway arrived. During the construction of the railway, many Chinese migrated here. The major dialect groups, ordered by population size, were Hakka, Teochew, Cantonese, and Hainanese. The most remarkable Chinese in Hat Yai was Chia Kisi (謝樞泗), a successful Hakka railway contractor. However, Siripaisan’s study did not cover Surat Thani, which had also benefited from and had grown in size as a result of the railway.

Many scholars have studied the transnational networks and cross-border links between the Chinese community in Southern Thailand and Northern Malaya. Wong Yee Tuan has researched Penang’s big five Hokkien families and Southern Siam during the nineteenth century, revealing the existence of interaction in the Penang-Southern Siam linkage and the role of Penang’s Hokkien business networks in enabling the big five families to advance their business interests in Southern Siam. In his research Wong proposed that the family networks bound the five families together through strategic cross-family marriages and shared place of origin in China. To establish their business interests in Southern Siam, the five families intermarried with other prominent Hokkien families in the Southern Peninsula, especially the Kaw family who controlled the Penang-oriented commercial economy of the west coast of Southern Siam. For example, two daughters of the Cheah family were married to two sons of Kaw Suchiang, Kaw Simtek and Kaw Simkong, who served as governors of Langsuan in the 1870s and Ranong in 1877, respectively. Therefore, living in the fluid and plural environment of the region, the big five families utilised intermarriage within their own dialect group to expand their businesses.

60 Supakarn Siripaisan, จีนหาดใหญ่ (Hat Yai Chinese) (Songkhla: Thaksin University Book Centre, 2007), 1-103.
61 The big five families of Penang consisted of the Khoo (邱), the Cheah (謝), the Yeoh (楊), the Lim (林) and the Tan (陳). Wong Yee Tuan, “Penang’s Big Five Families and Southern Siam during the Nineteenth Century,” in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on the Plural Peninsula, eds. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), 201-213.
62 Wong, “Penang’s Big Five Families and Southern Siam during the Nineteenth Century,” 202-203.
business interests from Penang to the Southern Peninsula. Additionally, Wong argued that the five families not only intermarried and formed alliances with other Hokkien elites, but also Hakka elites who controlled tin mining businesses in Penang and Perak, Penang’s neighbouring state. Nevertheless, little is known about the network of the Hakka families who migrated from Penang and Perak and controlled the tin mining industry of Surat Thani. Further research is required to determine whether the families of Penang’s Hakka tin miners in Surat Thani were related to the big five.

In his research article, “Chinese-Malay-Thai Interactions and the Making of Kelantan Peranakan Chinese Ethnicity,” Teo Kok Seong has studied the assimilation process of the rural Chinese, whom are often labelled ‘Peranakan Chinese,’ into the local Malay and Thai population in Kelantan, which is a north-eastern state of Peninsular Malaysia and shared a border with Southern Thailand. Teo wrote that the earliest Peranakan Chinese of Kelantan came from Chinese-Siamese intermarriages. Historically, these Peranakan Chinese fled from Patani to Kelantan when it was attacked by Siam in the late seventeenth century. By the late eighteenth century, Chinese settlements in Kelantan were firmly established, with Chinese-Siamese intermarriages and adoption of Malay customs. Living in rural areas, the Peranakan Chinese, who were entirely Hokkien, had many opportunities for interactions with Malay and Siamese communities in Kelantan, and so they were more assimilated with local Malays and Siamese. Their language, food and costume represented this assimilation process. The version of Hokkien spoken by them was influenced by the Malay dialect and Thai language. In cuisine pork, the staple Chinese meat, was cooked with Malay and Thai ingredients. And in society women wore a sarong kebaya, Malay-style costume. This thesis thus shows

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63 Wong, “Penang’s Big Five Families and Southern Siam during the Nineteenth Century,” 203-204, 207-208.
64 Wong, “Penang’s Big Five Families and Southern Siam during the Nineteenth Century,” 208.
that the migration of the Chinese tin miners from Penang in the early twentieth century marked the beginning of the Peranakan community in Surat Thani.

Teo, in his research conclusion, wrote that even though the Kelantan Peranakan did not feel offended with by the label ‘Peranakan Chinese’, they referred to themselves as “Tng-lang” (唐人), or ‘people of the Tang dynasty’, a term exclusive to “Chinese”. They also called themselves “Thai-Chinese” and “Siamese-Hokkiens” in order to distinguish themselves from town Chinese. Indeed, they became aware of the “Peranakan” term only with the founding of Kelantan Chinese Peranakan Association, which was established in 1987 at a Thai temple. Similarly, in Surat Thani, people who were born of Hainanese fathers and Thai mothers called themselves “Deng-nang,” a Hainanese version of “Tng-lang” (see Chapter One). Moreover, before the late 1930s, women’s costumes distinguished the Peranakan family from the Dengnang’s, who had settled in the coastal areas and on the islands of Surat Thani. While the Peranakan Chinese women dressed in sarong kebaya, a Malay-style cloth, the daughters of the latter wore chong kraben, a Siamese-style cloth. However, Dengnang women started to wear a Malay-style batik sarong after Phibun had encouraged women to wear western skirts or sarongs and finally issued a law on dress in 1941 that forced people to stop wearing chong kraben. Therefore, clear identification of Peranakan women gradually became less apparent (see Chapter Four).

Michael J. Montesano has utilised Chinese-sponsored education in Trang as a tool to investigate developments in Chinese society on the west coast of Southern Thailand during the twentieth century, arguing that Chinese schools, which were supported by the Chinese community in Trang, reflected close connections between Southern Thailand and

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68 During my field research trip to Surat Thani in 2015, I found that many dengnangs in the coastal areas of Surat Thani, both men and women, have begun to refer to themselves as “Baba,” which simply means “Peranakan”. Perhaps, this was the result of Phibun’s cultural Thai-ification programme, which forced the dengnangs to incorporate aspects of Malay culture. Further research is needed in this area.
Malaya. Trang’s Chinese community long had close ties with Penang. The Hokkien and the Cantonese had throughout the course of many generations migrated to Trang from Penang. In the early 1920s, two Chinese primary schools were established by Trang’s Chinese. Montesano has claimed that their ability to establish these schools was derived from interaction with external capital. The involvement of Trang in the rubber trade strengthened connections with British Malaya due to the fact that the output of rubber in Trang, as well as other provinces along the Southern Peninsula, was exported to global markets through Malaya. In other words, the integration into the global rubber economy enabled the Chinese to support their Chinese schools adequately. Similar to Trang, rubber also connected Surat Thani’s Chinese with Malaya. Surat Thani, one of the rubber centres in Southern Siam, drew Chinese immigrants who were rubber planters from Northern Malaya. Furthermore, some supporters of Chinese schools in Surat Thani owned rubber plantations. Liao Jingsong, a founder of Tao Ing School in the Chinese-dominated Bandon, for example, had a rubber plantation (see Chapter Four).

Montesano also proposed that education bound Trang, as well as other provinces in the Thai South, to Penang, a great centre of South East Asia and a crucial node in the educational network. A large number of Chinese in Trang and across the Southern Peninsula sent their children there for Chinese and English education. Studying there not only offered high academic standards but also economic opportunity and the opportunity to establish fruitful business connections. A lot of leading Chinese from the region were the products of a Penang education. Many chairmen of Chinese associations in Trang enrolled at Chung Ling High School (鍾靈中學校), a hotbed of anti-Japanese sentiment and a source of fundraising against the Japanese prior to the Pacific War. In other words, it made Trang’s Chinese orient towards Penang. Many leading Chinese in Surat Thani

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also studied in Penang. For example, Shou Kiangjiao, whose family had financially supported a post-war Chinese school in Surat Thani, graduated from Chung Ling High School, where Shou also established a connection with other prominent Chinese from Trang and across southern Thailand. Zhan Kimha, who donated all of his guns and bullets to the fight against the Japanese during the invasion of Surat Thani in 1941, also received a Chinese education from Penang (see Chapter Three). Thus, it would not be incorrect to state that the Chinese communities in Surat Thani and Penang were connected via education.

With regards to notions of identity, Supang Chantavanich, in her research article “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai,” which studies the interaction between Thai and Chinese nationalism and its impact on the identity of the overseas Chinese in Thailand, has argued that the five major Chinese dialect groups had been very conscious of their ethnic Chinese identities in the late nineteenth century. She added that the Chinese in Siam referred to themselves as “Siamese-Chinese,” or Xian Hua (暹華), a dubious term criticised by King Vajiravudh (1910-1925) because it suggests that they were considered Siamese only once they had proclaimed their allegiance to Siam. Additionally, she claimed that leading Chinese luminaries proved their loyalty to Siam by adopting Siamese family names in an attempt to keep a dual identity. On the contrary, this thesis points out that the Chinese were still Chinese, but that they formed different identities to negotiate with the Siamese authorities in order to preserve their Chinese identity. For example, after the Thai-ification programme was rigorously enforced to control Chinese nationalism and the CCP’s activities, many managers, who were Chinese elites, signed their names in Thai with a royal title, attempting to show loyalty to the Siamese authorities in order to preserve their schools (see Chapter Two).

Chantavanich has also proposed that Chinese identities shifted from ethnic to national after Chinese schools in Siam began to use Mandarin as the language of

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instruction in 1930, in contrast to the majority of Chinese schools in South East Asia, which still used dialects as the language of instruction. In terms of the shifting identities of ethnic Chinese, her argument is analogous to this thesis. Nevertheless, in the late 1920s there was a movement to use Mandarin in Chinese schools not only in Siam but also elsewhere across South East Asia.

According to Chantavanich, when Phibun became Prime Minister in 1938, the two factors underpinning the need for a stronger sense of Thai nationalism were Chinese nationalism and communism. She further noted that Phibun’s purpose was to protect social cohesion and public order. However, this thesis has argued that Phibun launched the Thai-ification policies with the aim of overturning the economic domination of Thailand by the Chinese (see Chapter Four). Moreover, Phibun became staunchly anti-communist following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 and subsequently imposed a series of anti-communist laws to suppress the Chinese (see Chapter Five). Chantavanich has further described that during World War II, the Chinese gradually began to lose their Chinese identity after the Chinese Daily News (中原報), the only Chinese newspaper that was allowed to publish at the time, was taken over by the Japanese in 1941. In contrast, this thesis emphasises that the Chinese still preserved their Chinese identity to a great extent, even though they had changed their nationality to Thai. Essentially, with a shared anti-Japanese sentiment, the Chinese were still the Chinese (see Chapter Four).

Chantavanich has contended that, after the end of World War II, the Chinese could not continue to preserve their Chinese nationalist ideology. However, Chantavanich fails to realise the fact that there was actually a resurgence of Chinese nationalism when the war came to an end as the Chinese in Thailand celebrated the victory over Japan. Moreover, the Chinese Embassy was founded partly to protect the Chinese in Thailand and one consequence was that Chinese education thrived (see

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77 Chantavanich, “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai,” 249.
Chapter Five). Chantavanich also fails to provide an adequate picture of the ideological conflict between GMD and CCP sympathisers in the post-war years. In her research, she concluded that the defeat of the PRC in 1949 accelerated the identity shift of the Chinese towards Thailand. The majority of the Siamese-Chinese became Thai citizens; therefore, they should be termed “Chinese-Thais,” or “Sino-Thais.”

Richard Coughlin, in his book *Double Identity*, noted that Sino-Thai people were the offspring of intermarriage between Chinese and Thais. He further noted that such persons were also called *lukchin*, or “Chinese child”, by Thais, but in practice this term might be applied to all persons who had some Thai blood. Coughlin has observed the role of the CCC as an intermediary between the Chinese and the Thai authorities and that its highest officials were mostly leading Sino-Thai elites, who interceded for the Chinese who were experiencing problems with the Thai authorities. In other words, the Sino-Thai took positions as intermediaries. Moreover, Coughlin also proposed that most Sino-Thai identified themselves with either the Chinese or Thais and that both the Thais and the Chinese accepted them without prejudice. Although Coughlin’s idea of the Sino-Thai as intermediaries is true to a degree, he fails to emphasise the fact that these Sino-Thai elites utilised their Thai identity for the benefit of the Chinese community. In contrast, this thesis has revealed that in the first half of the twentieth century the majority of Sino-Thais were more Chinese-oriented than they were Thai. It should also be borne in mind that there was significant prejudice against Sino-Thais remained. For example, in the late 1920s, the Siamese authorities wanted to inspect Chinese textbooks but they distrusted the translators because they were *lukchin* (see Chapter Two). Also, during the Pacific War the Thai government also monitored closely Sino-Thais who worked in the government sectors (see Chapter Four). Coughlin acknowledges that, unlike the peranakan Chinese, Sino-Thais were indistinct socially and did not form a separate part

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of the population. This underlines the fact that during the first half of the twentieth century most Sino-Thai identified themselves as Chinese.

To comprehend mass movements of people, one recent theoretical approach is the theory of transnationalism, which comprises two important elements: transmigration and diaspora. Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton have proposed that transnationalism is the process through which immigrants create social fields connecting together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Those who build the social fields integral to this process are termed “transmigrants”. As for “diaspora”, the etymology of the term is Greek, and the word was used by the ancient Greeks to refer to migration and colonisation. “Diaspora” was used to describe the dispersed Jews after their temple in Jerusalem was destroyed by the Babylonian army in 586 BC. The dispersal of the Jews was later heightened by the conquest of the Holy Land by the Romans in 643 BC. The African diaspora refers to enslaved migrants across the Atlantic and Indian Oceans from the sixteenth through to the nineteenth centuries. Today, the Irish, Chinese, Indians, and others use the term to describe the emigrees from their homelands.

For Michael Fisher, the term “diaspora” has been replaced by “migration” in recent years. Laurence Ma sees the word as signifying loss of homeland, uprootedness, expulsion, oppression, moral degradation, a collective memory of the homeland, and a strong desire to return to it one day. In other words, it depicts a process of scattering in space and is replete with emotional connotations. Diaspora can refer to a group of people who have scattered from the same ancestral homeland and have established themselves in different locations. Ma has also argued that diaspora symbolises interconnected sets of places and spatial processes created by transmigration and

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81 Coughlin, *Double Identity*, 89-90.
83 For the original work of Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Blanc-Szanton, please see Lary, *Chinese Migrations*, 4.
transnational economic activity.\(^{87}\) However, Ma fails to explore the complex nature of space creation. For example, within a space there are many smaller spaces created and interacted in by migrants, and these spaces can be also shifting and fluid (see Chapter One).

The term “overseas Chinese” is not easy to define.\(^{88}\) Historically, the Chinese government began to use the term *huaqiao* (華僑), or overseas Chinese, in the nineteenth century to refer to Chinese citizens working or living abroad. This word has been largely used to define Chinese living abroad despite their citizenship, a definition followed by this thesis.\(^{89}\) Wang Gungwu has proposed that this term should be used to refer to Chinese citizens abroad only, while Ma has argued that it should be used to define all ethnic Chinese outside China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan regardless of citizenship.\(^{90}\) This term is identical to *haiwaihuaren* (海外華人), or Chinese living overseas, and Chinese descendent (華裔).\(^{91}\)

In addition to transnationalism, six other theories account for international migration: neoclassical economics, the new economics of migration, the segmented labour market, world systems, migrant networks, and cumulative causation. Neoclassical economic theory holds that migration is caused by such factors as spatial disparity in employment opportunities, local pay differences, expected income gaps for individuals or households, and changes in the structure of the economy which provoke economic disruptions. The second concept is the new economics of migration, which argues that international migration is caused by market failures where migrants come from. In third

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\(^{87}\) Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 5.

\(^{88}\) The term “overseas Chinese” is identical to “Chinese overseas”. Many scholars such as Ernest Koh, William Skinner, Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra prefer to use the first term, while some scholars such as Laurence J.C. Ma use the latter.

\(^{89}\) Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 39.

\(^{90}\) For the original comments of Wang Gungwu, please see Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 40.

\(^{91}\) The data on the global size of the overseas Chinese, collected by a government agency in Taiwan, has since at least the early 1960s not only counted Chinese nationals alone, despite the fact that the term *huaqiao* is used in the title of the data. See Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 40.
view, the segmented labour market, global migration is seen as resulting from demand in advanced industrial societies, where a two-sector economy prevails in which labour is categorised under two sectors: primary and secondary. Capable local labourers are employed in the primary sector, but incapable or low-skilled labourers are hired in the secondary. The fourth is the theory of world systems, which focuses on connections between core and peripheral economies, especially in “global” and “local” contexts. The fifth is migrant networks, seen as sets of interpersonal ties that link together migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination locations through ties of kinship, friendship, and shared community origin. The final theory, cumulative causation, records how migration experiences exert an impact on future migrations. It is used to analyse places where migration has happened again and again, particularly migrants from coastal provinces of South China, whose migration is based on the accumulative knowledge of past migrations.\(^9\)

Ma has criticised these six theoretical approaches on account of the fact that they neglect the place-based qualities and spatial processes of Chinese diasporic migration.\(^9\) Therefore, the most appropriate and most recent theory that can be used to account for the intricate nature of modern migrant geographies, social behaviours, economic activities, and changing cultural identities is transnationalism. As mentioned above, this approach focuses on the process that migrants create social fields connecting their home country and the host country. In the first half of the twentieth century, Chinese migrants to Surat Thani and elsewhere were often involved in two or more societies and through them still preserved strong relations with China. For example, they remitted money home and took part in Chinese national politics. Additionally, transnationalism is characterised by the movement of people, capital, goods, ideas and information across networked spaces between homeland and settled land where a diasporic person has settled.\(^9\) It is thus most fitting with this research’s aim to investigate the creation of space and the creation of identity within that space by Chinese migrants in Surat Thani.

\(^9\) Ma, “Space, Place, and Transnationalism in the Chinese Diaspora,” 7.
These six aspects can be included in the theory of transnationalism and can be deployed in this research. The first theory is useful for explaining why the Chinese in the nineteenth century, following economic disruptions, migrated to Surat Thani. Migrant networks can be used to account for the networks of relationships, especially in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when there was a huge influx of Teochew into Thailand owing to the accession to the throne of King Taksin. Cumulative causation can be applied to explain how Chinese migrations to Surat Thani, particularly those from China’s coastal provinces, applied their accumulative knowledge of the previous migrations.

II. Why Surat Thani?

As noted, Surat Thani has a lengthy history of contact with China. Victor Purcell has written about how a large proportion of the city of Bandon’s 20,000 inhabitants was Chinese by the second half of the nineteenth century. There were Hainanese, Hokkiens and Cantonese involved in the export of timber, rattans, skins, and other jungle products, transported mainly by a large fleet of Chinese junks. The Chinese, who tried to control the trade as much as possible, successfully boycotted Bangkok-based steamers. Surat Thani was at the centres of many important trade routes, and had long been a port for trading with China, Japan, Taiwan, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Bangkok, and other southern provinces in Thailand such as Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Phuket, and Songkhla. A study which focuses on Surat Thani, therefore, can illuminate aspects of the wider history of trading networks in this region.

In terms of its political importance, in 1899, under the reformed system of provincial administration, King Chulalongkorn (1853-1910) merged Bandon with Chaiya, a former city and a modern district in Surat Thani, making Bandon the provincial

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95 It has been written that pirate Chinese junks were still common along this coast in the 1870s. See H. Warington Smyth, *Five Years in Siam, from 1891 to 1896* (London: John Murray, 1898), 84. Cited in Victor Purcell, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 111.
centre. Connected with other regions by footpaths and by sea before 1909, in that year the
government began to construct the southern railway which was to connect Surat Thani
and other southern provinces with Bangkok. Due to these two factors (the reform and
the railway), Surat Thani became an important port, a development which attracted many
Chinese migrants from different parts of China to the province. In the early twentieth
century, Surat Thani came under the administration of Monthon Chumphon, which was
later incorporated into Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat in 1925 until the monthon system
was abolished in 1932 and the top-level administrative division was the province (see
Chapter One).

Despite the fact that Surat Thani has a long history of contact with China, the
history of Chinese migration to the area has not been studied extensively in prior research
on Chinese migration to Thailand. For example, the Chinese community in Surat Thani is
hardly mentioned at all in G. William Skinner’s classic text Chinese Society in Thailand:
An Analytical History. Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Biscalputra devote only a page and a
half of text in their A History of the That-Chinese to what they describe as the family
background of Liao Chiangsoon, a southern tycoon, and his son, Liao Jingsong, from
Surat Thani, totally ignoring the history of the wider Chinese community in Surat
Thani. Although Kanok Nganphairot writes a short article about the history of Chinese
schools in Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani, many details, such as the year of
the establishment of some schools, are incorrect. These details have been reproduced
as newspaper articles such as newspaper articles in the Mueangtai News, a monthly

96 Bunnag, The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915, 3-4.
97 In the late nineteenth century, Monthon was an administrative subdivision of Siam. Monthon Chumphon
consisted of Chumphon, Langsuan and Surat Thani.
98 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, ix, 2, 211.
99 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the That-Chinese, 273-274.
100 Kanok Nganphairut, “โรงเรียนจีนในบ้านดอน,” (Chinese Schools in Bandon) in ๗๕ ปีราชฤทธาภิบาล
พระราชา (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of the city) (Surat Thani:
Lertchai, 2010), 45-47.
The history of Chinese migration to Surat Thani is therefore scant at best, despite the fact that it was among the first regions of Thailand to attract Chinese migrations. It is clear, then, that using Surat Thani as a case study is both groundbreaking and important to this field of research. The methodologies employed in this thesis are rich and interdisciplinary. Combining archival materials with a wide range of other sources collected from temple visits, family histories and oral history interviews, this thesis provides invaluable insights into our understanding of the shared history of Thailand and China.

In terms of scholarly contributions, this study serves as a window into successive Chinese migrations to Surat Thani and explores the shifting identities of ethnic Chinese throughout the first half of the twentieth century. The migrant communities in Surat Thani and also in greater Thailand had fluid identities and complicated characteristics that were susceptible to change over time. From the late nineteenth century, the Chinese saw themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese, and Hakka. In the late 1920s, multiple ethnic Chinese consciousnesses were gradually transformed into a unified national Chinese consciousness. The Chinese contributed to the Chinese war effort against the Japanese after the SSJW broke out in 1937, and armed themselves to fight against the Japanese when Japanese troops landed in Surat Thani in 1941. During the Second World War, the Chinese found themselves split into two groups: those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. In the post-war years, the Chinese were again essentially divided into two: pro-GMD and pro-Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

This thesis also highlights the transnational networks which were established between the Chinese communities in Surat Thani and those in Northern Malaya, in particular those in Penang in the first half of the twentieth century. Many Chinese in Surat Thani not only enjoyed trading networks with those Chinese in Northern Malaya, but also family and educational networks. The tin mining industry of Ban Na San was chiefly owned and operated by Hakka tin miners who had migrated from Northern Malaya. The Peranakan community reflected relations between the Hakka peranakan in Surat Thani with Northern Malaya. Education linked Surat Thani Chinese to Northern
Malaya, with many Chinese parents sending their children to Penang to receive an education. In fact, many leading Chinese were the product of a Penang Chinese education. Before the Japanese invasion of the Southern Peninsula in 1941, some Chinese also took refuge in Penang.

It came as a great surprise during the research in this thesis that during the Second World War the Chinese who were working for the Japanese and those who had changed their Chinese nationality to Japanese in order to assume for themselves the power to indulge in illegal activities were called “Taiwan,” a term meaning “traitors” at that time because Taiwan was then under Japanese rule and some Taiwanese in Thailand identified politically with the Japanese.

In South East Asia, Surat Thani was one of the most important hubs in the Hainanese and CCP networks. The largest dialect group in Surat Thani was the Hainanese, and it should be pointed out that most of the CCP members in South East Asia were also Hainanese. Since the late 1920s, the CCP had been politically active in Surat Thani, where CCP activities were undertaken in Chinese schools, leading to the arrest and deportation of many Chinese teachers. In addition, this study has underlined the networks between the CCP members in Thailand and those in British Malaya. These transnational political organisations were closely interconnected.

This thesis not only brings the existence of the Peranakan community in Surat Thani to light but also the Tanka, an ethnic subgroup. Importantly, the Tanka had also migrated to the coastal parts where the Hainanese community has settled in Surat Thani. This study emphasises the fact that the Tanka also migrated to South East Asia from Hainan.

III. The Structure of the Thesis

This thesis explores Chinese migration and the transformation of ethnic Chinese identities in the first half of the twentieth century in Surat Thani by exploring the role of
Chinese temples and their schools. Surat Thani was a meeting place for migrants from many different parts of China, which made the characteristics of migrant communities and their associated networks quite complicated. The rich picture of the Chinese community in Surat Thani provides excellent opportunities for examination and raises four central areas of enquiry. The first issue is how Chinese identities, including notions of clan, nationality, and local identities, changed over time. Secondly, how did migrants struggle to balance their identities with others in new places and new environments, both politically and economically? Third, how did migrants establish and use their transnational networks in the new spaces? The final issue concerns the impact of the two distinct colonial periods, Western and Japanese colonialism, and the interactions between them.

Using the theoretical lens of transnationalism, especially the notion of spatial interaction, these areas of enquiry are explored through a focus on Chinese temples and their schools, which serve as a window into the Chinese migrations and the transformation of Chinese identities throughout the first half of the twentieth century. This thesis draws on diverse primary materials, historical artefacts, oral history interviews, together with the relevant existing secondary literature. The National Archives of the United Kingdom has a huge collection of records on Siam and China during the first half of the twentieth century. However, the collections during and after the Pacific War are of particular interest for the subject of Chinese migration to Thailand because large-scale immigration by Chinese into South East Asia in 1943 attracted the interest of the British government. The collection of the War Office also has various memorandums and reports about the Chinese in Thailand, Sino-Thai relations, and political divisions. The Foreign Office’s collection has also been invaluable. There are extracts from English newspapers such as Bangkok Post, Liberty, The Malaya Tribune, and Democracy, reporting on Sino-Thai relations and Chinese schools in the post-war years.
During a nine-month field research trip in Thailand, the bulk of primary materials from the National Archives of Thailand proved useful.\textsuperscript{101} Not only have many collections been investigated and selected from various ministries, but many photos in the archive have also been used. The collection of the Ministry of Education has provided letters, reports, and newspaper articles about Chinese schools in Surat Thani during the early twentieth century. Large amounts of archival documents have provided useful information about the development of Chinese nationalism and the education law of Siam. There are also many illuminating documents in this collection about Thai-nationalism and Thai-ification policies after Phibun came to power in 1938. The highlights of one of the sources in this archive are Chinese and Siamese newspaper articles, records, letters and reports on microfilms about anti-Japanese campaigns and initiatives, particularly the boycotts of Japanese products in the early twentieth century. The collection of the Secretariat of the Cabinet details the conflicts between the Chinese who joined the boycott and those who did not.

During 1941 to 1945, one of the collections of this period is the collection of the Ministry of Education, which presents a detailed account of the damage which occurred during and after the Japanese invasion of Thailand. Additionally, the details on the Thaiification programme during the war period can be found in this collection. Many documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs show the military, political, and economic co-operation between Thailand and Japan. There are also telegraphs about the attempt to exchange diplomatic relations between Bangkok and Nanking, led respectively by Phibun and Wang Jingwei, the head of the Nanjing government. Rich sources on Chinese underground activities against the Japanese are also in this collection. The collection of the Ministry of Interior provided an account of Chinese reaction to the Japanese occupation in the southern provinces, including Surat Thani. The hardships of the Chinese community in the region are described in the Secretariat of Cabinet’s collection. The useful collection of the Supreme Command Headquarters gave information about Chinese underground activities. The collections of the Ministry of

\textsuperscript{101} I made two journeys to Thailand, from 6 August to 11 October 2015, and from 5 September 2016 to 6 April 2017.
Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of Cabinet, and the Ministry of Education provided many illuminating documents about the position of Chinese schools, as well as Sino-Thai relations and tensions during the post-war years. A rich source of information on the conflagration that swept through the downtown of Bandon in 1953 is contained in the Secretariat of the Cabinet.

During the trip to Thailand, I travelled to Phuket, Songkhla, and Surat Thani in order to survey the Chinese community and collect data from Chinese temples, Thai temples, Chinese native-place associations, and graveyards. The data collected proved useful. For example, the mural painting at Matchimawat temple in Songkhla provided an insightful picture of the Chinese community in the Malay peninsula during the nineteenth century. In a cemetery in Phuket, many Peranakans exerted their identity on their tombstones. Artefact evidence can highlight the gaps in written documents. To convey their thoughts and feelings through buildings and temples, overseas Chinese recorded this style of writing on wooden plates, door frames, candlesticks, bells, drums, and altar tables. Two bells dating to the late sixteenth century, presently in Chaiya National Museum, symbolise early Chinese settlement in Surat Thani. Moreover, these artefacts cannot only be used to trace the history of each Chinese community, but also the transnational networks of the migrants. A huge amount of artefacts from eighteen temples and native-place associations established in the first half of the nineteenth and the second half of the twentieth centuries across Surat Thani have been thoroughly examined in this thesis.

Eyewitness testimonies help researchers to complete the picture when there are gaps in the archival evidence and when data is absent from archives. Oral history emerged as an acceptable form of primary source material when there was the revolt against the elitism that was seen as limiting intellectual historical inquiry in the 1960s. During the field research, a total of sixty-three interviews with eye-witnesses were

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102 I was surprised to find that there were also Peranakans in Surat Thani, as some scholars, such as Caroline S. Hau, tend to focus on the Peranakan community in Phuket. See Caroline S. Hau, *The Chinese Question: Ethnicity, Nation, and Region in and beyond the Philippines* (Singapore: Kyoto University Press, 2014), 251-252.

conducted. However, I was somewhat wary about any over-reliance on oral history. The nature of memory is that it is not a precise source, shaped as it is by such factors as the passage of time and experiences since the event. Yet oral history can provide useful insights if deployed carefully and corroborated with available archival materials. In this thesis, therefore, only twenty interviews were conducted (see Appendix Two).

The first chapter of this thesis explores the migration of ethnic Chinese, their settlement, networks, and the transformation of their identities from ethnic to national from the late nineteenth century to 1927. It found that the industrial revolution and colonialism caused massive migration of Chinese to Surat Thani. Once Chinese migrants decided to settle in a particular place, they established their native-place associations through the construction of temples to serve as centres of networks. Nevertheless, each temple was built to serve migrants, who spoke a common language based on the regions where they were from. They saw themselves as Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese, and Hakka. In the late 1920s, the introduction of the Chinese national language as the language of instruction in Chinese schools was the first sign of the transformation of Chinese identities from different ethnic groups to a single national one.

The second chapter examines the Chinese response to the Thai-ification programme, from 1928 to 1937. After the Chinese Nationalist government was founded in Nanjing in 1928, veneration of Sun Yat-sen became a hallmark of Chinese nationalism. Therefore, different ethnic Chinese consciousnesses gradually evolved into a united national Chinese consciousness. Chinese schools were not only founded to perpetuate Sun’s revolutionary cause, but also that of communism. Knowing that both of these political ideas would threaten the notion of an absolute monarchy, the Siamese government introduced the Private School Act of 1927 to control Chinese schools. The operation of Chinese schools was seriously affected by the law. Some managers demonstrated loyalty to the monarchy by signing their names in Thai with a royal title, hoping to preserve their positions. Yet by 1933 Keemong School was the single school left in Surat Thani. In 1936, the Private School Act was amended to allow the Chinese

language to be taught for only two hours per week. Many Chinese parents thus sent their children to study abroad.

The third chapter looks at the Chinese reaction to the Japanese invasion of both China and Thailand from 1937 to 1941. It opens with a brief history of the conflict between China and Japan and recounts the anti-Japanese feelings amongst the overseas Chinese. Before 1937, the overseas Chinese responded to Japanese agitation in China by boycotting Japanese products. Leading Chinese from Surat Thani also participated in various anti-Japanese movements in Siam. The connections of Liao Chiangsoon, the ninth chairman of the CCC, with leading Chinese in the country influenced his son, Liao Jingsong, to become involved in politics. Liao Jingsong and his friends were mentored by Seow Hoodseng, the leader of anti-Japanese movements in Siam. Liao, together with his friends, established the Teochew Association in 1938 as a vehicle to contribute to the Chinese war effort and undertake anti-Japanese activities. When the Japanese landed in Thailand in December 1941, Liao was arrested by the Japanese army whilst Chinese in Surat Thani armed themselves to fight against the Japanese when they landed in Bandon.

The fourth chapter deals with the splits within the Chinese community during Thailand’s military alliance with Japan, from 1941 to 1945. Under Japanese occupation, the Chinese were faced with the dilemma of deciding whether or not to cooperate in spite of their anti-Japanese sentiments. While Liao Jingsong refused to collaborate with the Japanese and was immediately put into prison, Tan Siewmeng and Wang Jingwei chose the opposite path, leading to accusations of treason by non-cooperating, patriotic Chinese.

The final chapter investigates the ideological conflict between GMD and CCP sympathisers, mirrored in the division of Chinese native-place associations and schools in Surat Thani from 1945 to 1949. After the GMD and the CCP went to war, Chinese native-place associations and schools were essentially divided into two: pro-GMD and pro-CCP. In the meantime, Phibun carried out a coup and became prime minister, and, exploiting the political upheaval in China, resumed the Thai-ification programme and closed many Chinese schools. Chinese secret associations that were collecting money to
finance the Chinese Civil War were also cracked down on by Phibun, who met with great success in his anti-Chinese policies, representing a victory for the Thai government over the Chinese community in Thailand.
Chapter One
Chinese Diaspora, Settlement, and Networks in Surat Thani
(from the Late 19th Century to 1927)

I. Introduction

Archaeological evidence and shipwreck excavations reveal that China’s relationship with the area which is now known as Surat Thani, located on the east side of the Malay peninsula and the gulf of Siam, dates back almost two thousand years. From the third to the seventh centuries, Panpan Kingdom, which was mentioned in Liangshu, or the History of Liang Dynasty, whose rulers sent many tribute missions to China, was believed to be located in the province of Surat Thani. Chaiya, now a small town in Surat Thani, was the regional centre of the Srivijaya Kingdom from the seventh to the fourteenth centuries. In the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries it was a place where Chinese merchants unloaded their cargoes for transportation overland before returning to China with the opening southwest monsoon. From the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries the city was an important port for trade with China. In 1827 there were around 2,000 Chinese persons there, and rice was the chief trade good with Fujian. The Chinese population, however, increased rapidly during the second half of the nineteenth century.

105 ‘Siam’ was the official name of the country until 24 June 1939 when it was changed to ‘Thailand’.
106 Chinese earthenware during the Western Han dynasty, from the first to the second centuries, has been found in the city. See Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 17.
In 1832, King Nangklao, reigning from 1824-1851, established a shipyard in Bandon (萬隆) for making royal barges and warships. Bandon, today’s city centre of Surat Thani, had quickly developed into another port city as many people migrated into this area and many shops were established. Therefore, King Mongkut, reigning from 1851-1868, moved the capital district from Tha Thong, today’s Kanchanadit, to Bandon.\footnote{\textit{In the meantime, Tha Thong was severely damaged from the Burmese invasion during the Burmese-Siamese War (1785-1786). Prathum Chumpengphan, \textit{ประวัติศาสตร์ราชธรรมกิจ แหล่งประวัติศาสตร์และโบราณสถานที่สำคัญในประเทศไทย} (History of Civilisation in Southern Thailand: important historical and archaeological sites in Thailand) (Bangkok: Chomromdek, 2002), 81-82.}}

Bandon was a small city port and market town; however, under the reformed system of provincial administration in the late nineteenth century, together with the construction of the railway in the early twentieth century, it became an important port, benefitting greatly from these two factors. During the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), the king combined Bandon with Chaiya in 1899 and the new province was named Chaiya, whose provincial centre was Bandon. The province was under the administration of Monthon Chumphon.\footnote{Monthon was an administrative subdivision of Siam in the late nineteenth century. Monthon Chumphon consisted of Chumphon, Langsuan and Chaiya.} Later, the city hall of Monthon Chumphon was moved from Chumphon to Bandon. In 1915 in the second reform during the reign of King Vajiravudh (1910-1925), the province of Chaiya was renamed Surat Thani and Monthon Chumphon was renamed Monthon Surat. In 1925, Monthon Surat was incorporated into Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat.\footnote{Ibid., 77-83.} Nevertheless, the monthon system was abolished after the Siamese Revolution of 1932 and the province became the top-level administrative division. Surat Thani was one of four key locations on the coast of South Siam, along with Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Prachuap Khiri Khan, where the Japanese chose to land in Thailand in 1941 to secure railway stations and airfields.\footnote{E. Bruce Reynolds, \textit{Thailand and Japan’s Southern Advance 1940-1945} (New York: Macmillan Press, 1994), 78.}
There were five major ethnic groups of importance among Chinese migrants to Siam: Hokkien (福建), Cantonese (廣東), Teochew (潮州), Hainanese (海南), and Hakka (客家).\(^{114}\) In Surat Thani in 1848 early Hainanese migrants established Wangao Temple (萬高廟) in Ko Pha-ngan (帕岸島), which was the first Chinese temple in Surat Thani. This chapter seeks to engage with the migration of ethnic Chinese, their settlement, and networks in Surat Thani from the late 19th century to 1927. Through observation of the role played by Chinese temples and schools, the chapter is constructed around four major conceptual points: the establishment of native-place associations as the centres of networks, both national and transnational; the improvement in the economy and transportation, especially the construction of the railway due to industrialisation; the immigration of Chinese women; and the establishment of Chinese schools in the early twentieth century. All of these had a considerable effect on Chinese migration and the resulting communities. Therefore, they provide considerable opportunities to examine how Chinese migrants built their networks; how industrialisation had an impact on migration; how the immigration of Chinese women had an effect on the Chinese community; and how Chinese schools were used to preserve Chinese ethnic identity. Prior to the twentieth century, women rarely migrated from China so Chinese men assimilated into the host society through intermarriage with local women. This fluidity is another interesting characteristic of Chinese migration and identity. The first chapter is divided into four sections: the origins of Chinese penetration into Southern Siam; networking through Chinese temples and native-place associations; the immigration of Chinese women; and Chinese schools and the preservation of Chinese ethnic identity.

II. The Origins of Chinese Penetration into Southern Siam

To better understand the Chinese diaspora and the transformation of identity, it is essential to appreciate the historical background of Chinese migration into Surat Thani and other parts of the peninsula, which shows that the early contact by the Chinese in the area had a great deal to do with trade and the economy. In the nineteenth century, industrialisation, along with colonialism, came to remodel migration patterns, adding to

\(^{114}\) ‘Ethnic group’ means subdivisions of the Chinese population speaking a common dialect based on regions where they are from.
large-scale movements of people around the world, as they were both quicker and in greater safety, these greater volumes in turn have had a significant impact on identity.

Figure 1.1: A Chinese junk, Chinese shopkeepers and coolies in traditional Chinese townhouses. Mural painted during the reign of King Mongkut (1804-1868) at Matchimawat temple, which had been patronised by Hokkien governors of Songkhla, a province on the east side of the peninsula.

Tin, spices and many forest products had traditionally been the major goods that attracted the attention of the Chinese in South Siam. South East Asian rulers wanted to sell these goods to the Chinese and in return desired luxury Chinese goods such as ceramics, tea and silk, which were considered to be status symbols, and other necessary products and metals such as iron and copper.115 Siamese territories on the Malay Peninsula were the first regions that attracted Chinese and other foreign merchants, with fleets of Chinese junks stopping at various ports and settlements on the eastern side.116 Abundant evidence has been found confirming that in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Chinese merchants travelling to India and further west may have gone with the northeast monsoon only as far as Chumphon, Surat Thani (Bandon) or Nakhon Si Thammarat (Ligor). At these sites, their cargoes were unloaded for transshipment

115 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 17.
overland, before returning to China with the southwest monsoon. It is hypothesised that earlier trade was engaged mostly by land or through foreign vessels manned by Persians, Arabs, Indians, Javanese, Malays and other merchants of coastal South East Asia, because China only developed its own high-seas merchant fleet during the Song dynasty (after the 10th and 11th centuries).

There is no evidence that the Chinese permanently settled in the area prior to the sixteenth century. However, two Chinese bells dating to the late sixteenth century, presently kept in the local museum in Chaiya, were found in a Siamese temple (see figs. 1.2 and 1.3). A tombstone of a Chinese lady, dated 1592, was also found in Pattani, one of the southernmost provinces in Thailand. These can be interpreted as early signs of Chinese settlement in the area before the twentieth century and also reveals their relationship with local temples. Early migrants might donate these bells for religious purposes as there was as yet no Chinese temple in the area to serve them. Moreover, it is also the first sign of the exertion of Chinese identity and the assimilation of the Chinese into the local space and society. This is a characteristic of a diaspora which is connected to all phenomena that develop transnational movements in which cultural introduction and plural societies’ formation are among them.

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117 Nunn, “Some Notes upon the Development of the Commerce of Siam”.
118 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 17.
119 Ibid., 27.
From the late eighteenth century to the early twentieth century, there were massive movements of people around the world due to the end of slavery and the industrial revolution, and both these factors led to the need for labourers in new industries. Moreover, transmigration would not have been possible without the transport revolution which caused a huge increase in migration.\textsuperscript{121} Colonisation was such an important factor affecting migration the ancient Greeks applied the term diaspora to refer to both migration and colonisation.\textsuperscript{122} Transnationalism itself is interpreted as a process in which immigrants create social fields connecting together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Those who construct these social fields are termed “transmigrants.” Transmigrants expand and preserve their diverse relations with which the familial, economic, social, organisational, and religious aspects are all included and often intertwined, and within social networks that link transmigrants to two or more societies together, they establish their own identities.\textsuperscript{123}

The nineteenth century was an era of colonisation and imperialism in South East Asia. During the reign of King Mongkut, Siam was in a critical stage in its history. China was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanjing (南京條約) as a result of losing the First Opium War (1839-1842). Burma was also defeated by Britain in the Second Anglo-Burmese War (1852-1853). Faced with the might of the British army, Mongkut agreed to sign the Bowring Treaty in 1855 after Bowring, the Governor of the British colony of Hong Kong, came to negotiate a treaty to open up Siam to Western trade. Under the agreement, the prohibition on rice export was lifted. Mongkut began to embrace Western innovations and initiate Siam’s modernisation.

The economic changes experienced by Siam during the decades of late European imperialism echoed those of the evolution of the economies of British Burma and French

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 4.
Indo-China in the period beginning from the mid-nineteenth century. Colonialism was a main contributing factor to the modernisation of Siam and had a great impact on Chinese migration. Within three decades, around 1850-1870, there was an expansion of rice cultivation for export in the delta areas of the Irrawaddy, Chaophraya, and Mekong rivers, making mainland South East Asia pre-eminent in the world rice trade. The cultivation of rice was carried out by the indigenous population while “the financing, transportation, milling and export of the crop increasingly became the preserve of the immigrant Asian communities which grew rapidly in size and economic influence throughout mainland South East Asia in the second half of the 19th century.” It was later followed by a growth in production for export of other primary goods including teak, tin and rubber, the latter two of which had hitherto been the major products in South Siam.

In this age of imperialism, Siam went through drastic reforms from the reign of King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) to that of Vajiravudh (1910-1925). In 1925, Siamese society had undergone a radical transformation from the first year of King Chulalongkorn’s reign in 1868. The most active reforms occurred in 1892, particularly an improvement in the internal communication network focused on the railways, which contributed to greater economic coherence in the immediate hinterland of the port. By 1900, the ports of Rangoon, Bangkok, and Saigon had evolved into major centres of commerce in the Far East. Numerous local craft and ocean-going vessels were not only loaded with commodities but also carried immigrants from India or China.

The economic situation in the country affected Chinese migration. The growing importance of rice exports made the Chinese migrate from the tin capital Phuket to other ports. Tin was a major product in South Siam, but in the early 1890s its production decreased owing to many factors. In this decade, peninsular Siam did not possess either the port facilities or internal communications that would allow an expansion in tin

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125 Ibid., 1-3.
126 Ibid., 3-4.
excavation and subsequent exporting.\textsuperscript{127} Another factor was a serious shortage of Chinese coolie labour in the tin districts. There had been a considerable influx of Chinese labour into Phuket in the 1860s and 1870s,\textsuperscript{128} but most of the coolie migrants recruited in China were leaving ship on arrival in either Singapore or Penang rather than going on to the Siamese port.\textsuperscript{129} The final factor was the increase in demand for manual labour in Central Siam from the late 1880s, diverting Chinese migrants away from the tin districts of the peninsula.\textsuperscript{130} There had been approximately 50,000 Chinese tin-miners in Phuket in the mid-1880s, but this figure had dropped to only 11,000 a decade later.\textsuperscript{131}

From 1894, the reformed system of provincial administration in the country had changed the face of the peninsula.\textsuperscript{132} A provincial office of the Department of Mines was founded in Phuket to which a mines commissioner was appointed with responsibility for issuing concessions and inspecting leases throughout the peninsular provinces.\textsuperscript{133} By 1915 there were six mines officials employed in the south.\textsuperscript{134} Local Chinese capitalists with major interests in tin were appointed to significant political positions in the region because the Bangkok administration had sought to “blunt the forward drive of British economic incursions” in the south.\textsuperscript{135} Strong local administration also controlled the riots and gang-warfare which often erupted among the Chinese coolie population in the tin districts.\textsuperscript{136}

Globally, the improvement in the transportation system, especially the construction of the railways, had an impact on migration patterns. Many Chinese were

\textsuperscript{127} Ibid., 95-96.
\textsuperscript{129} Brown, \textit{The Elite and the Economy in Siam}, 96.
\textsuperscript{131} Brown, \textit{The Elite and the Economy in Siam}, 96.
\textsuperscript{132} The centralised system of provincial administration was known as the \textit{Thesaphiban} system between 1892 and 1899, but its implementation and development occurred between 1899 and 1915.
\textsuperscript{133} Tej Bunnag, \textit{The Provincial Administration of Siam, 1892-1915} (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977), 97.
\textsuperscript{134} Phuket, Nakhon Sithammarat, Kedah, Pattani, Phang-nga and Ranong. See Bunnag, \textit{The Provincial Administration of Siam}, 223-224.
\textsuperscript{135} Brown, \textit{The Elite and the Economy in Siam}, 102.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 103.
hired to construct the peninsular railways as there was a great need for labourers to build railways, dams and canals. Chinese labourers, employed by labour contractors in the Chinatowns of San Francisco and Vancouver, were employed to build the western sections of the US Transcontinental Railway (finished in 1869). The eastern sections of the five-thousand-mile Trans-Siberian Railway across Russia, as well as the Panama Canal (1880-1914), were also built by Chinese labourers.137

After Siam and Britain reached an agreement over the transfer of the four northern Malay States to British authority in March 1909, the government decided to proceed with the construction of the peninsular railway, which was financed by a loan from the Federated Malay States.138 The railway was laid on the east side at the insistence of the Singapore business community, which wanted that port rather than Penang to benefit from the new line owing to the commercial potential of the tin deposits. However, afraid that the area would be flooded with concession hunters, in August 1909 Prince Damrong proposed that “for an appropriate period no further licenses or mining leases be issued for Monthon Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Pattani.”139 In 1911, the new minister accepted that the southern railway would encourage foreign investment in mining together with agriculture and forestry in the south, and so the prohibition was lifted in 1912. Before 1920, tin exports from the southern provinces were all sent to Penang. In 1918, Koh Tiew Lim, a Chinese businessman in Ranong, wrote a petition to King Vajiravudh to construct smelting facilities in Phuket but it was not until the mid-1960s that a modern tin smelter was established on the island.140

After the building of the peninsular railway, Hat Yai, a small village in Songkhla, became an important port and big city in Siam, with many Chinese having migrated there during the construction of the railway. The major ethnic groups in the city were Hakka, Teochew, Cantonese, and Hainanese respectively. The most remarkable Hakka Chinese

138 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 104.
139 Surat Thani was under the administration of Chumphon at that time.
140 Brown, The Elite and the Economy in Siam, 106.
141 Ibid., 108-109.
was Jia Geesee (謝樞泗) or Khun Niphatchinnakorn, the railway contractor, who decided to settle down there.\textsuperscript{142} Phunphin, a small city near Bandon, also the site of the railway station of Surat Thani, became an important locale that attracted large numbers of Chinese.

Trade and economy had a considerable effect on Chinese migration as they had traded within the area for a long time, based on evidence quite possibly establishing their network and choosing to settle permanently as early as the sixteenth century. These early transmigrants exerted their identity through local temples, which was the beginning of their assimilation into local society. However, industrialisation and colonialism greatly affected Chinese migration, causing massive movements of people to and within many ports in Siam. An influx of the Chinese in the period led to their permanent establishment as well as that of native-place associations as the centres of their networks, both national and transnational. The next section will discuss the role of Chinese temples in Chinese communities.

III. Networking through Chinese Temples and Native-place Associations

Early migrants who settled in Siam in the sixteenth century and assimilated into local society established their networks and exerted their identity within local temples based on the aforementioned evidence. Nevertheless, after the industrial revolution, together with colonialism, there was a huge influx of Chinese into Siam. Once they decided to settle in a particular place, Chinese migrants in the modern period established their native-place associations through the construction of temples to serve as centres of networks. In addition, materials in Chinese temples and native-place associations not only reflected the beliefs of the migrants, but the epigraphy on the bells and wooden plates also revealed the transnational networks. This section discusses the establishment of Chinese temples and native-place associations as centres of networks in Surat Thani during the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth century.

\textsuperscript{142} Supakarn Siripaisan, จีนหาดใหญ่ (Hat Yai Chinese) (Songkhla: Thaksin University Book Centre, 2007), 1-103.
Early Chinese communities must have at least one temple to serve them. These temples did not only serve a religious function but were also community centres for the first and second generations of immigrants. People shared a common identity through rituals and many other activities. Aristotle Dy carried out research on Chinese Buddhism in the Philippines and argues that religion performed a substantial role in the preservation of ethnic identity for the Chinese Buddhists of the Philippines. He also asserts that they were the only places where the Chinese could feel secure and pray to their deities for divine assistance. This situation was echoed in Surat Thani, where a temple was built as the centre of the Chinese community. In 1848, early Hainanese migrants built Wangao Temple, the first Chinese temple in Surat Thani, to be a centre of the Chinese community in Ko Pha-nga-nan.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1.1: Chronological list of Chinese temples in Surat Thani in the nineteenth century</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1868</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

144 The data was collected during my field research in Thailand from 6 August to 11 October 2015 and from 5 September 2016 to 6 April 2017.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Temple Name and Location</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Origin</th>
<th>Significant Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>Samui Temple (初梅廟, 蠔貝廟) / Hainanese Temple and Association of Nathon (那吞海南公所)</td>
<td>Bentougong</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Nathon (那吞), Ko Samui (蘇梅島)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1879</td>
<td>Maeyaichao Temple</td>
<td>Female crocodile</td>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>Tha Chang</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Wanluntianhoushengmu Temple (萬崙天后聖母廟)</td>
<td>Guansheng dijun</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Bandon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>Nakai Temple (藍概廟) / Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua Thanon (蘇梅島關帝神廟會館)</td>
<td>Guansheng dijun</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Hua Thanon, Ko Samui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1893</td>
<td>Banpot Temple and Association (夏屆會所)</td>
<td>Guansheng dijun</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Banpot (夏屆), Don Sak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Zhao Eeong Sae Temple (昭應祠廟)</td>
<td>108 brothers (一百有八人)</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Maenam, Ko Samui</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1898</td>
<td>Ko Rat Temple (鉄丁廟)</td>
<td>Bentouyeye</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Ko Rat (鉄丁埠), Don Sak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to Table 1.1, there were eleven Chinese temples established in coastal areas and islands across Bandon bay in Surat Thani from 1848 through to the second half of the nineteenth century. Ten of these temples belonged to the Hainanese whereas one was of an unknown origin. Owing to the number of temples, Surat Thani was one of the most important strongholds of the Hainanese diaspora. The number also represented the wealth and members of a clan.

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145 The temple claimed that it was built in the second year of the reign of Tongzhi Emperor (1863), but there is no evidence. There is a bell, but its inscription is blurred by the new colour.
There are internal and external factors influencing the reasons why Surat Thani was the base for transnational Hainanese networks. Looking at the internal factors, Siam experienced an economic evolution during the decades of late European imperialism (see above, Section II). Around the 1850s, there was the expansion of rice cultivation for export. The financing, transportation, milling and export of the crop were all done by the Chinese while local people carried out the cultivation of rice.

In addition, the geography of the city bears a distinct resemblance to Hainan. Based on field research, many Hainanese in the coastal areas and islands worked as fishermen. The price of coconuts was also controlled by the Hainanese. Following Skinner’s concept of the “ethnic division of labour”, “occupational specialization” by Chinese ethnic groups occurred, in which different geographical locations in the native places of origin account for the distinct positions of each ethnic group. It also helps to explain the reasons why the Hainanese settled down in Surat Thani.

By looking at the external factors, there were massive movements of Hainanese abroad in the mid-nineteenth century. After the end of the First Opium War, the Treaty of Nanjing was signed in 1842, opening up five ports for foreign trade. Additionally, the Treaty of Tianjin (天津條約) was signed in 1858 following the end of the Second Opium War (1856-1860), opening up ten new ports, including one in Hainan. These events caused a huge influx of Hainanese into Surat Thani and other parts of South East Asia.

In addition, Chinese temples were constructed not only for religious purposes, but also for the establishment of their native-place associations to serve as centres of transnational networks to help each other. They were also accommodations for newly arrived migrants. The Hainanese established their native-place association, Kengjiu Huiguan (瓊州會館), throughout Surat Thani and South East Asia. In Singapore, the

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Kengjiu association was established in 1854. In 1870, the Hainanese in Penang, British Malaya, founded an association. The wooden plate depicted in Fig. 1.4, located at the Hainanese temple in Pak Kradae, a coastal village in Surat Thani, reads “Kengjiu Association,” testifying that the temple in the second half of the nineteenth century was used as an ethnic association.

Interestingly, Tanka people (Dankae, or Boat people) (蜑家 or 蜑民) also migrated to the coastal parts of the Hainanese community in Ko Pha-ngan and Ko Samui. They, however, lived on junks. The Tankas are an ethnic subgroup and Cantonese-speaking people in Hainan that migrated from Guangdong and Guangxi during the Tang dynasty and were historically called Jiaoren (鲛人), or mermaid. Both in Hainan and Surat Thani, they were considered to be outcasts by the Hainanese, and therefore known as Huannang (番人), barbarians.

The Tanka in Surat Thani fished for a living and stayed on junks, although today many of them live onshore and refer to themselves as being Cantonese. There were often conflicts amongst the Hainanese and Tankas as the Hainanese often looked down

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149 Ibid., 234.
150 Ibid., 114-115.
151 Ruemun. Interview, 18 March 2017. Ruemun, aged more than 80, had been living on a junk with her family members. She started to live onshore in Ko Pha-ngan when she was 13 after the junk was damaged. She refers herself as being Cantonese.
on them, whilst children who were born of Hainanese fathers and Siamese mothers were called Dengnakia (唐人仔), or Chinese children. The word Dankae can be also used to refer to children who were born of Hainanese and Tanka parents as some Hainanese men married Tanka women. 152

Materials in Chinese temples not only show the religious needs of Chinese migrants in the communities, but associated objects of belief such as deities, bells and wooden plates also reveal economic and commercial networks linking the country of origin with the country of settlement. Moreover, they also portray the identity of the migrants as well as the historical development of the Chinese communities.

While the sixteenth century migrants exerted their identity in the local space by donating two bells to the Siamese temple, subsequent migrants created their own space in the country of settlement though the establishment of Chinese temples as the centres where they could fully exert their identity through religious objects. Since long ago, educated high officials and noble lords had inscribed articles to convey their thoughts and feelings through their buildings and temples. This style of writing was also introduced by overseas Chinese and recorded in wooden plates, door flames, candlesticks, bells and drum, and altar tables, among other objects. 153

The bells in the temples also reveal the history of the development of a Chinese community. Figure 1.5 shows a bell cast in 1885 which was offered to the Wangdi deity, Wuzu deity, Bentougong and Bentouma. The year on the bell might be related to the year of Hainanese migration to Bandon. Nevertheless, the patron saint of the temple nowadays is Mazu, or the Sea goddess. It is believed her power is extended to protect all professions including fishermen, farmers, merchants, artisans, and even government officials. Zheng He (鄭和), who was a court eunuch, diplomat, explorer and fleet admiral, also believed in

152 Khuay Ngiyuat, also known as Prayat Saekhuay, a guardian of Guanshengdijun Temple at Ko Pha-engan district. Interview, 19 March 2017.
Mazu when he travelled to South East Asia during the Ming dynasty.\textsuperscript{154} Therefore, the deity in the temples also portrays the various professions of migrants in a community. It is possible that the belief in those deities was changed to Mazu to protect all walks of life when the Chinese community became larger in the early twentieth century.

![Figure 1.5: A bell in a Hainanese temple in Bandon cast in 1885](image)

Almost all temples had spirit mediums acting as moral guides and protectors. At Guan Yu Temple of Hua Thanon, Ko Samui, spirit mediums acted as doctors in advising believers to use plants to make herbs to cure their illnesses. When the gods wanted to communicate with people in a community, a bell was used to call members of the Hainanese community to meet. Sometimes they sprinkled holy water on people to cure illness or fishermen before they went to sea. The power of Guan Yu, or the God of War, spread through the community the belief that in 1941 rocks in the sea in front of the temple had transformed into soldiers to scare Japanese troops away when their warships first passed the community.\textsuperscript{155}

In front of the temple building there are two bells. The first bell has become blurred by new colours, and another was cast in 1899 and offered to the God of War. Some characters on the bell read as follows: “沐恩信” (Blessing to merchants who believe), and this inscription is often followed by the names of the donators. Some bells

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid., 4.  
\textsuperscript{155} Pu Gui, or Gui Saepu. Interview, 2 October 2015. Pu is a guardian of Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua Thanon at Ko Samui district.
are transcribed to bless “信民”, people who believe. The word, “沐” (mu) also depicts a picture of the acting of sprinkling holy water. Therefore, every time a bell was rung, it not only symbolised that donators or believers would get a blessing from the god but also represented the power of the god and importance of the temple that served as the centre of the community.

Although the role of the mediums as doctors in advising people to buy Chinese medicine or make herbs has disappeared today, possibly because of the establishment and improvement of modern hospitals, people still pray to the god when suffering from a fatal illness. In some temples, fortune sticks indicating the names of diseases and Chinese medicines have been provided for believers, as in Figure 1.6.

Yongtao Du and Jeff Kyong-McClain propose that in the core area, where the Han Chinese resided, the connection between the local, regional, and national identities has served as a long-term conundrum that had an effect on power relations and perceptions of belonging and identity. Although the centralised bureaucracy gained control over the hundreds of local prefectures and counties through the institutionally-enhanced fiscal and administrative powers of the throne, together with the establishment

of a centralised recruitment (examination) system that infiltrated deeply into local societies, the local was never defined only by the hierarchy of the imperial administration. Since the Southern Song the literati elites were extremely oriented to the local in their cares and family strategies.\textsuperscript{157} In other words, they “married locally, lived locally and in many ways thought and acted locally.”\textsuperscript{158}

In the late nineteenth century, the production of thousands of local gazetteers and local anthologies represented a particularly strong articulation of local identity and highly developed local communities. This was a consequence of dual developments in imperial polity and elite disposition.\textsuperscript{159} The articulation of local identity in the Chinese diasporic communities in Surat Thani was also reflected in many bells and wooden plates, particularly from the nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. After the Song dynasty, the county and prefecture had the power to carry their own budget and quota of taxation and own quota of candidates in examinations. County and prefecture identities visibly expressed by the literati were by some means “a ‘felt identity’ that grew out of the imperial state’s ‘marked identity’ of the local.”\textsuperscript{160}

\textbf{Figure 1.7: A wooden plate in a Hainanese temple at Pak Kradae}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{157} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 6-7.
\item \textsuperscript{160} Ibid., 7.
\end{itemize}
The above figure shows a phrase asking for the patron saint in the temple. The donator is Wu Duolun (吳多論), the owner of Hexing company, who was from Hainan. In most of the bells and wooden plates the ancestral home of the donator was always transcribed, which can be understood to mean that the donator cared a great deal about his ancestral home. In the case of a signature in a temple in Singapore, the donator also wrote his status or official ranking when he donated a wooden plate, as follows: “天福宮「光緒二十年甲年嘉平中澐，賜進士出身四品銜刑部直隸司主政閩縣曾福謙敬獻」.” The donator, one Ceng Fuqian, worked in the Ministry of Justice in Fujian, and this shows his respect to his motherland and his form of government.\(^{161}\)

The big migrant communities created their own space and established a pluralist society in the local space in which they had their own temples to serve them whereas in the less sizeable communities a small number of migrants had to stay together with local people and thus created hybrid temples to serve both migrants and local people. Many temples also reflected the assimilation of the Chinese into local communities owing to the fact that many builders of the temples were born of a Chinese father and Siamese mother.

![Figure 1.8: Mysterious Chinese wooden plates in Maeyaichao temple at Tha Chang, Surat Thani](image)

In Tha Chang, a small district in Surat Thani, there are two mysterious Chinese wooden plates in the Maeyaichao shrine. The statue of Maeyaichao deity is more Thai

\(^{161}\) Xun, “東南亞媽祖銘刻萃編,” 4.
than Chinese and, as such, whether the shrine is considered to be Thai or Chinese remains a question. Chinese geomancy was possibly used to determine the orientation of the temple because the location has good *feng shui*. In Singapore and Malaysia, *feng shui*, which is imperative for a temple, means that its front façade should face open to the land and have a good view of the sea. It is called, “座山望海”, meaning “sitting on the hills and looking at the water or sea”. Based on an interview with two of the descendants of the shrine founder, the shrine was built by Champa, a *lukchin*, meaning Chinese children who were born of Siamese mother and Chinese father, with the Chinese family surname of Li. Champa found a white stone floating in the sea and later it was revered as a goddess. When the people in the community, both Thai and Chinese, were sick, they prayed for her to cure their illness.

Based on an interview with two of the descendants of the shrine founder, the shrine was built by Champa, a *lukchin*, meaning Chinese children who were born of Siamese mother and Chinese father, with the Chinese family surname of Li. Champa found a white stone floating in the sea and later it was revered as a goddess. When the people in the community, both Thai and Chinese, were sick, they prayed for her to cure their illness.

Champa was said to have acted as a person who found Chinese migrants to build the railway. His profession was crocodile hunting and, before the twentieth century, the river in front of the shrine was full of crocodiles. In the past it was also used by people in the community to take bath, so her power was said to prevent believers from being attacked by crocodiles. Many crocodile skulls have been found around the statue that are

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162 This will be discussed intensively in Chapter two.
164 On Srirak. Interview, 10 September 2015. On is a guardian of Maeyaichao Temple at Tha Chang. She was a daughter-in-law of Champa.
said to be her followers. This reflects a hierarchy of deities in spirit world, known as ‘the imperial metaphor’ in Chinese popular religion.\textsuperscript{165} The hierarchy in the spirit world is a metaphor for social organisation of family and government. This explains why gods are portrayed in the robes of officials and the military guards who attend them, as seen in Figure 1.9, an example from a Chinese temple in Bandon.

Inspecting carefully the two wooden plates in Maeyaichao shrine, the oldest one reads as follows: “惠及海防「光緒已卯年孟春月吉旦, 沐 恩信民, 弟子 李登漢 敬奉」” (“Grace reaches maritime activity”; it was cast on the auspicious day of the fifth year of the reign of Guangxu Emperor (1879). Blessing to believers. It was donated by Li Denghan, the follower).\textsuperscript{166} The reason why there is no transcription of his ancestral home might possibly be because of the fact that he was \textit{lukchin}, born in Siam.

Today, the shrine is claimed to be Thai and its myth and story are different from this version. Moreover, the committee members are all Thai. In the past it was the place where Chinese migrants and their descendants used to come to pray every Chinese New Year. There has also been a procession of the deity every year to Thai villages and the Chinese market since the early twentieth century. The Chinese migrants were said to number no more than 20-30 people in the twentieth century, and included Hainanese, Hakka, and Teochew.\textsuperscript{167}

Claudine Salmon researched on the transnational networks of Chinese bells in South East Asia, and during her fieldwork she counted a total of 166 bells from the nineteenth to the first half of the twentieth century, among which are 73 in Indonesia, 67 in Malaysia, and 26 in Thailand, excluding Surat Thani. She states that the scarcity of “Chinese” bells might have come from the fact that the Sino-Thais were not hesitant in purchasing bronze bells cast locally, so some of them are hybrids. The acquisition of

\textsuperscript{165} Stephan Feuchtwang, \textit{Popular Religion in China, the Imperial Metaphor} (Surrey: Curzon Press, 2001), vi-viii.

\textsuperscript{166} 李登漢 is supposed to be the Chinese name of Champa.

\textsuperscript{167} Go Kaew, a successful Hakka merchant from Tha Chang district. Interview, 28 June 2015. ‘Go’ is a Hainanese word meaning ‘brother’, which is widely used by the Chinese and their descendants in eastern coast provinces in the South, although he was born of a Siamese mother and Hakka father.
locally-made bells might have something to do with the long process of assimilation of the Chinese into the local society.168

However, her data, collected from Thailand, seems to be incomplete as she failed to survey many Chinese temples in many major Chinese communities, including those in Surat Thani. According to the observations in Surat Thani only, there were ten bells imported from China while only one was cast locally. Of this number, nine bells were imported during the nineteenth century while only one was imported from China and another one was purchased locally during the first half of the twentieth century. Thus, the Chinese of Surat Thani during the nineteenth century were not buying the bells cast locally yet. Nevertheless, it should be noted that there was a significant demand for bells, especially those new arrivals, as they had to build and develop new temples to be centres of the Chinese communities throughout South East Asia. Moreover, it also reveals the transnational networks of Chinese bells between Surat Thani and China.169

Figure 1.10: A “hybrid” bell found in the Hainanese temple at Bandon

169 For a chronological list of Chinese bells in Surat Thani from 1848 through to the first half of the twentieth century, see Appendix 1.
A solely Chinese bell imported from China in the first half of the twentieth century might signify that the Chinese had already firmly established themselves in Surat Thani. Therefore, they began to buy a locally cast bell. A local bell, seen in Figure 1.10, exhibits a highly ‘hybrid’ style in that the handle is adorned with a *naga*, which is rather Siamese, but the waist bears an inscription date based on the Chinese calendar. In addition, it should be noted that all of the bells imported from China belonged to the Hainanese temples, so the number of the bells also represented the power and status of the Hainanese in the area prior to the twentieth century.

The brand name of the foundry on the bells could also be traced to the transnational networks of the migrants. Of all the bells in the temples, only one, from Qingtonggangbentou Temple, bears the brand name of Foshan foundry in Guangdong, an area naturally rich in iron ore and so many foundries were established there. However, the inscriptions on some bells are rather blurred so it is not possible to ascertain whether a foundry name is transcribed.

Concerning commercial activities, in the South Seas seagoing merchants, who for the most part were native to Fujian, acted as go-betweens. A number of them had to make a stop-over at Foshan to buy ironware to take with them to the South Seas and at the same time they could place orders for bells. In the 1680s many of the established merchants at Canton in Guangzhou were said to be from Fujian province and many Hokkiens moved there and ran their junk trade from Guangdong. Guilds or ethnic associations in Surat Thani might also have acted as intermediaries in the shipping of the bells found in Hainanese temples. The people of North Fujian and the Hainanese, who also participated in shipping activities in South East Asia, had a *huiguân* (會館), or ethnic association, in Foshan. Therefore, it is possible that most of the bells were either bought from Foshan or Hainan.

170 Ibid., 76.
171 Ibid.
In the late nineteenth century, Siam underwent a series of radical reforms, as mentioned above. The growing importance of rice exports affected Chinese migration such that the Chinese migrated from the tin districts on the west side of the peninsula to other ports. The construction of the peninsular railway in the early twentieth century had an impact on migration patterns. Similar to Hat Yai in Songkhla, many sites of the railway stations in Surat Thani became significant locales that attracted a large number of Chinese from many different ethnic groups. In the first half of the twentieth century, all five major ethnic groups were present in the province, especially in the downtown area of Bandon, the main district.

Table 1.2: Chronological list of Chinese temples and native-place associations in Surat Thani during the first half of the twentieth century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Patron saint</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>Bentougong Temple of Surat Thani (素叻本頭公廰)</td>
<td>Bentougong</td>
<td>Teochew</td>
<td>Thakham, Phunphin</td>
<td>Wooden plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>Shuiweishengniang Temple (水尾聖娘廟)</td>
<td>Shuiweishengniang</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Tubthon (宅港通), Kanchanadit</td>
<td>Wooden plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>Hokkien Temple or Shunfugong (順福宮)</td>
<td>Lifuwangyegong (厲府王爺公)</td>
<td>Hokkien</td>
<td>Bandon</td>
<td>Wooden plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1931</td>
<td>Thakham Temple and Association (呈坎公所)</td>
<td>Tianhoushengmu (天后聖母)</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Thakham (呈坎), Phunphin</td>
<td>Government document\textsuperscript{172}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>Kwongsiew Association (廣肇高公所)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Cantonese</td>
<td>Bandon</td>
<td>Wooden plate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Teochew Temple or Today’s Bentougumiao (本頭古廟)</td>
<td>Bentougong</td>
<td>Teochew</td>
<td>Bandon</td>
<td>Government document\textsuperscript{173}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{172} See Yokkian School in section VI.
\textsuperscript{173} See Chapter 5.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Temple</th>
<th>Hainanese</th>
<th>Pakkio, Tha Chana</th>
<th>Inscription on a jellyfish pond</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Bentouma</td>
<td>Bentouma</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Pakkio, Tha Chana</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From the Table 1.2, it can be seen that there were seven temples and associations established in the first half of the twentieth century. Three of these belonged to the Hainanese, while the Teochew had two temples. The Hokkien had one temple to serve them. The Cantonese established an association. However, the Hakka had settled down in Surat Thani during this period, although they officially established their temple and native-place association after 1950. The buildings of ethnic associations and meeting halls were built in the temple precincts in the late 20th century, as seen in the following illustrations.

![Figure 1.11: Hokkien temple after the renovation in 1953](image1)

![Figure 1.12: Hokkien temple in 2015](image2)

From 1848 through to 1950, there were eighteen Chinese temples and associations. Of this number, thirteen belonged to the Hainanese, and Surat Thani was hence the most important stronghold of the Hainanese diaspora. While the Hakka settled in Surat Thani in the early twentieth century, they officially established their native-place associations and temples after the 1950s. Shenke Hakka founded the Hakka Association of Surat Thani (素叻府客家會館) in 1963, and Banshanke Hakka built Dabogong Temple (大伯公廟) in 1981. However, the position of the Hainanese was challenged by the Teochew during the twentieth century. Despite the fact that the largest number of Chinese were Hainanese, the leading Chinese luminaries that had an impact on the

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174 See Chapter 5, where the history of these native-place associations is discussed in depth.
Chinese community were Shou Caikun and Liao Chiangsoon, two Teochews of Bandon, who had royal connections and were granted exceptional privileges.\textsuperscript{175}

Teochews were known, during the reign of King Taksin or Zheng Xin (鄭信), a son of a Chinese migrant from Shantou, Guangdong, (1767-1782) as “royal Chinese”, and granted exceptional privileges. This caused a huge increase in migration of Teochews, especially to the trading centre established across the river from Taksin’s palace in Thonburi, the new capital after Ayutthaya. The migration rate of the Chinese sharply increased during his reign and was maintained at a high level by all of the early Chakri kings.\textsuperscript{176}

No ethnic group, however, could control Chinese society in Siam, which eventually led to conflict among the groups. Chinese ethnic groups, as observed in 1837 by a Westerner, were “strongly opposed to each other, as much so, indeed, as if they belonged to rival nations.”\textsuperscript{177} Each single group had its own guilds, benevolent societies, mutual-aid and regional associations. In other words, there were leaders of particular ethnic groups but no Chinese leaders.

The belief in the hierarchy of deities in the spirit world among the migrants in a community was also a source of ethnic conflict in the early twentieth century. The replacement of Mazu as patron saint in the Hokkien temple at Bandon to Lifuwangyegong, who was a prince before being deified, was possibly because the

\textsuperscript{175} For the contributions of these two leading Chinese families in the Chinese community of Surat Thani see Chapter 5. For the contributions of the Shou family, and Section VI, Chapter 3, and Chapter 5 for the Liao family.

\textsuperscript{176} The reigns of the first five Chakri kings were as follows: Rama I (1782-1809), Rama II (1809-1824), Rama III (1824-1851), Rama IV (1851-1868), Rama V (1868-1910). See G. William Skinner, Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Thailand (New York: Cornell University Press, 1958), 4-5.

\textsuperscript{177} George Winsor Earl, The Eastern Seas, or Voyages and Discoveries in the Indian Archipelago in 1832-33-34 (London: W. H. Allen, 1837), 170.
committee wanted to claim superiority of the god they believed in over other clans, who had a lower status based on the hierarchy in the spirit world.178

However, it is also possible that the deity was changed due to the diseases and illnesses that affected believers in the Chinese community. Another story goes that Mazu, the former patron saint of the Hokkien temple, was replaced by Lifuwangyegong deity because their members did not recover from illness when they prayed to the Sea Goddess. Khosiew or Xu Jiawen (許嘉文), a committee member in the early twentieth century, who opened a Chinese drugstore and often travelled to Fujian, brought the new deity statue from Quemoy.179 This reveals the transnational Hokkien networks of Surat Thani with Fujian.

In Singapore there was considerable conflict between the rival groups of Hokkien and Hakka. Although Fujian province was identified as their homeland, the Hokkien’s Fujian claim was more forthright.180 The tension was exacerbated after the Hakka people began to migrate by sea in the eighteenth century, their route passing through the homelands of Hokkien and the Cantonese Pearl River Delta. In a migrant community, power was developed from wealth, and in Singapore the Hokkien controlled the Hokkien association (新加坡福建會館) and Fujian seats in the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce (新嘉坡中華總商會). The migration of Hakka led to a challenge to Hokkien monopoly of the representation of Fujian interests.181

In Surat Thani, during the first half of the twentieth century, the story of the Banshanke Hakka demonstrates the concept of the “ethnic division of labour”. This ethnic group tended to have less power and wealth compared with other dialect groups in

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178 Cai Guohui (菜國輝) or Boonchart Thamcharoensak, a committee member of the Hokkien temple, claimed during an interview that the status of Hokkien temple was superior to others because the patron saint was a royal prince.
179 Cai Guohui. Interview, 7 September 2015. Due to Khosiew’s stone tablet in Hokkien cemetery, he migrated from Quemoy (金門縣), Fujian.
181 Ibid., 143.
the city, and most of them rented government land to work as vegetable gardeners. They settled together in an area which today is used as a military camp and was quite far from the business centre of Bandon. Dabogong temple was established as their native-place association in the rental area after the majority of Banshanke Hakka settlers settled there.\textsuperscript{182}

In mainland China, there was a tradition of reliance on migration in the \textit{qiaoxiang}, meaning the regions from which the Chinese came. Families at home expected them to send money, and the remittances contributed significantly to the wealth of the \textit{qiaoxiang}. There were networks of commercial enterprises with headquarters in the British colony of Hong Kong, and these networks were comprised of recruiters to find labourers, banks and money shops to manage remittances, shipping companies to deal with travel, and suppliers to export local products.\textsuperscript{183}

There were services operated for migrants and their families, including health checks before migration, the repatriation of distressed migrants, and returning dead bodies.\textsuperscript{184} They sent money through money shops in migrant communities and sometimes they sent goods or jewellery and gold, which could be sold in China. In the late 1920s and early 1930s there were about three or four million Chinese migrants living around the world sending money back to China every year.\textsuperscript{185} The telegraph, which reached China in the late nineteenth century, was important for transoceanic migration as it was used in recruitment, booking passages and remittances.\textsuperscript{186}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{182} Sese Kwankawin. Interview, 19 September 2015. His family was the biggest Hakka family in the Hakka community and his father, Lee Chinhon (呂清漢), migrated from China to Songkhla and finally settled in Bandon. He had eleven children. However, most of them studied in Thai schools owing to the fact that the Chinese school in Bandon was quite expensive. Today, his children have established the Lee Chinhon ancestral hall (河東公祠). More than 200 family members gather here every year to celebrate Chinese New Year.
\textsuperscript{183} Lary, \textit{Chinese Migrations}, 93.
\textsuperscript{184} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{185} Ibid., 109.
\textsuperscript{186} Ibid., 118.
\end{flushright}
With the continued growth in migration and permanent settlement abroad, Chinese social networks became established in foreign countries. Apart from native-place associations, there were also clan and surname associations. Therefore, they rarely associated with the host societies, preferring to operate within their own communities and sending money and contacting home by letters via Chinatown merchants.\(^{187}\)

In brief, Chinese migrants built their networks through the establishment of native-place associations. Temples were built not only for religious purposes, but also for the building of ethnic associations. There was also conflict among the migrants in that wealth could be developed into enhanced power for their clansmen in the migrant communities. In a community where there were many migrants, they exerted their ethnic identity through religious objects such as bells, wooden plates and even deities. However, these materials also reveal the transnational networks between the country of origin and the host country. The change of deities by migrants also shows the conflict of migrants who came from a different homeland and the development of migrant communities. In contrast, in smaller communities migrants had to live with local people, and were thus forced by circumstances to create a social field where they could share and exert their identity together with the local people. Many hybrid temples also reveal that a son of a Chinese migrant and Siamese mother established a new space to serve his dual identities. The most important thing is that the impact of migrant beliefs even had an impact on the economy. The next section will explore the immigration of Chinese women into Surat Thani and other parts of Siam.

### IV. The Immigration of Chinese Women

Prior to the migration of Chinese women in the late nineteenth century, Chinese migrants assimilated into Siamese society through the intermarriage with local women. Moreover, they participated in the activity of the Siamese temple and acculturated themselves to the Siamese form of Buddhism. They also sent their children to Siamese schools. In this

\(^{187}\) Ibid., 99.
manner, the Chinese became a part of the local society. Nevertheless, the emigration of Chinese women, together with the development of the Chinese native-place associations and the enlarged numbers of Chinese, led to an end of the assimilation of the Chinese into Siamese society. This section aims to investigate the immigration of Chinese women into Surat Thani and other parts of Siam in order to discover how it impacted the Chinese community.

Figure 1.13: A mural painting depicts Chinese men, their Siamese wives and their children during the early nineteenth century at Matchimawat temple, Songkhla.

Prior to 1893, women almost never emigrated from China. During the period of immigration from 1882-1892, females did not account for more than two or three per cent of Chinese arrivals. Therefore, many Chinese men married local women although a large number of those men already had wives in China, as can be seen in the mural painting in Figure 1.13.

In addition, the Chinese also participated in events in the Siamese temples and associated with Siamese people. On the Buddhist Sabbath, they went to the Siamese temple to participate in the celebrations and some of them even hired a Chinese opera to perform there along with Likay, a Siamese popular folk theatre. This portrays the

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assimilation of the Chinese into local society, leading them to become a part of the Siamese society. An example of the performance of the Chinese opera in a Siamese temple can be seen in Figure 1.14.

![Figure 1.14: A mural painting at Matchimawat temple, Songkhla, during the reign of King Mongkut (1804-1868), showing the performance of Chinese opera and a Chinese audience at a Buddhist ordination ceremony in a Siamese temple.](image)

Chinese migrants were also said to have readily acculturated themselves to the Siamese form of Buddhism, the oldest public Chinese cemetery having been built in Bangkok in 1884. In nineteenth-century Siam, most Chinese cremated their dead and their corpses were buried in the precincts of Siamese temples. However, some Chinese rented the landed property from the Siamese temples to stay in or do business. Many Siamese temples even allowed the Chinese to establish their own Chinese temples in their areas.

The way the Chinese created their own space in local temples to bury their relatives was made through donations to local temples. Here the network between migrants and local temples was established. This is notable in that it shows the gradual process of the creation of space in the country of settlement since their donation of two

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189 Ibid., 127.
190 The collection of NAT, MOE 7.6 provides many documents about the property of Thai temples for rent. There are also temple lots that indicate the names of tenants, positions of the structures and surroundings.
bells to a Siamese temple in the sixteenth century. In the case of the Hainanese community at Pak Kradae in Surat Thani, the Chinese chairman of the Hainanese temple had to donate the landed property of the temple to build a new Thai temple in order to bury their clansmen in the community.\(^{191}\) This proves that the only way to have their own cemetery for their clansmen in the Siamese temple precincts was to donate their landed property to the Siamese temple.

![Figure 1.15: Pak Kradae cemetery](image)

![Figure 1.16: A mural painting in Pak Kradae Hainanese temple](image)

In this space of the local temple they also exerted their identity through the building and decoration of the graveyards. When the Pak Kradae Hainanese temple was renovated in the late 20\(^{th}\) century, a committee board decided to paint the story of the first wave of Chinese migration who had travelled by junk based on the stories of their ancestors, as seen in Figure 1.16. The paintings of Chinese junks (see Figure 1.15) were also decorated in the graveyard.\(^{192}\)

Another example of the exertion of their identity in the cemeteries in the precinct of local temples is the graveyards of the “Peranakan”. In the early Qing dynasty, trade-related emigration increasingly expanded, encouraging people to move within and abroad. This developed into a global proliferation of Chinese commercial activities, particularly within South East Asia. Chinese merchants also traded with growing plantations in this region and, in so doing, some decided to settle with their entire

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\(^{191}\) Nikoon Chuleetham (Li Pat Poon). Interview, 9 September 2015. Li is the guardian and spirit medium of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae, Kanchanadit district.

\(^{192}\) Ibid.
families in the Straits Settlements (Malacca, Penang, and Singapore) and Indonesia. Some had both families abroad and in their homelands. Most of the emigrants were from Southern Fujian and Chaozhou, in Guangdong, and their offspring were known as “Peranakan”.193

![Figure 1.17: A grave in a Chinese cemetery in Phuket.](image)

However, in Siam, Phuket is home to the Peranakan. From the sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, tin mining was the main source of income, and Hokkiens were the dominant dialect group among immigrants to the Strait Settlements.194 In 1902, Kaw Simbee (許森美), a son of Kaw Suchiang (許泗章), who was a Chinese migrant to Penang about 1810 before moving to Ranong on the western coast of South Siam, was appointed the new governor of Phuket. He encouraged Chinese immigration (primarily Hokkiens via Penang), and provided them with funds to work in the tin mining industry.195 According to Figure 1.17, showing a female costume in the grave, reveals that it belongs to Peranakan.

In a Siamese temple in Pak Nam Tha Thong, a coastal Hainanese village, the Chinese utilised space within the temple for their graveyard. Although the majority of

195 Ibid., 151. See also “นักเดินทาง…เพื่อเข้าใจในแผ่นดิน” (Travel Guide for Understanding In Phuket), (Bangkok: Sarakadee, 2000), 47.
them cremated their dead bodies, the graveyard processed both Siamese and Chinese characteristics, as can be seen in Figure 1.18.

![Image](image.jpg)

*Figure 1.18: A Chinese graveyard, which portrays their assimilation into Siamese society. The graveyard processed Siamese characteristics while there was a Chinese stone tablet in front.*

In the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, there were signs that the Chinese had begun to separate themselves from Siamese society due to the enlargement of the Chinese population. In 1884, the first public Chinese cemetery was built in Bangkok. By 1900, all five major ethnic groups in Bangkok had their own cemeteries. In the early twentieth century, the space within the Chinese public cemeteries was not sufficient to provide for everyone. A Chinese descendant whose relative or ancestor was not the member of an ethnic association would have found it difficult to bury their corpses. It is also possible that to be a member of an association or to bury their relatives would possibly mean they would have to pay a large sum of money. Therefore, some Chinese thought of a business plan to rent a cemetery at a Siamese temple to charge those Chinese who wanted to bury their relatives.

In 1905, for example, Lam and Toe, a Chinese and a Siamese, wrote a letter to the government for permission to rent a cemetery at Sangveswitsayaram temple in Bangkok. Their business plan was to charge those who wanted to be cremated or to bury their relatives. There had been many earlier requests from within the Chinese community, but
all were declined. The officer, inasmuch as there had never been any temple that allowed its property to be rented for this purpose before, rejected this proposal too.\textsuperscript{196}

In the case of Surat Thani, in many small Chinese communities, they buried their ancestors or relatives in the precincts of the Siamese temple, where their cemetery was separated from the Siamese graveyard. There were Chinese public cemeteries owned by the five major dialect groups only in the downtown area of Bandon. However, not all Chinese were buried there, for some chose to bury their ancestors on their own private landed property due to the fact that people who wanted to bury their relatives in the cemeteries of the native-place associations had to pay a certain amount of money.

The period of the late nineteenth century and the early twentieth century was the turning point of the history of Chinese migration to Surat Thani and other parts of Siam. Chinese women started to migrate abroad, which made the assimilation of the Chinese into the Siamese society gradually decrease. Chinese children born of these Chinese mothers might have to speak Chinese at home and no longer have to learn the Thai language. Some might gradually stop sending their Chinese children to Siamese schools. In addition, there was the introduction of the Law of Nationality (Siam) in 1913, the first nationality law, which had an effect on Chinese migrants, making them more cohesive and homogeneous. The law stated that every person born on Siamese territory had to be considered as Siamese and a Siamese woman who married an alien had to lose her Siamese nationality, which made intermarriage harder.\textsuperscript{197} The Chinese communities had become seen as spaces of alien difference in the eyes of Siamese people.

In Hainan, the motherland of the majority of Surat Thani’s Chinese, Hainanese women were strictly forbidden from migrating outside the island owing to an ancient Hainanese superstition that doing so would bring bad luck. Even in the early twentieth century, this practice still existed. In 1915, there was a dispute among Hainanese men at a port in Bangkok after they discovered that a Hainanese man had also travelled with his

\textsuperscript{196} NAT, MOE 7.6/6 เธ่ หลวงปู่ (Toe and Lam asking permission to rent a cemetery of Sangveswitsayaram temple), Luang Phirom to MOE, letter dated 19/01/1905.
\textsuperscript{197} TNA, FO 628/31. Document dated 1913, 1.
wife, who had hidden herself in a junk leaving Haikou, the capital city of Hainan, for Siam. In the meantime, some Siamese women who travelled with their Chinese husbands to China completely dressed as Chinese women and were criticised for making their local-born children become more Chinese than Siamese.

A gravestone in Ayutthaya, a former capital of Siam, in Figure 1.19, reveals that a Siamese woman who married a Chinese migrant adopted the word Xian (暹), or Siam as her surname, something which can also be seen in the large number of gravestones bearing this surname for local women. However, some women adopted the word Tai (泰), or Thai, as their surname when they married Chinese men, as shown in Figure 1.20. Normally the name of the first wife would be written on the right side of the gravestone. Almost all Chinese migrants had left their wives in China, but some brought them to Siam or had more than one wife. In Figure 1.20, the Chinese wife is written as the second wife. The most important thing that the second stone tablet portrays is that the Chinese

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199 Mr. Rampueng’s opinion in Siam Observer Newspaper, dated 8/12/1915. See Ibid., 7.
200 This idea and figures 1.16 and 1.17 were derived from Somchai Kwangtongpanich, an expert on Thai-Chinese history that the author met in person during the field research in Thailand in 2015.
women had migrated from China and settled into the local society together with Siamese women.

Another impact of the immigration of Chinese women was that their Chinese children gradually separated themselves from the Siamese society although some of them studied in Siamese schools due to the fact that Chinese schools were not established throughout the country yet. In some Siamese schools where the majority of the students were Chinese, they had begun to be seen as problematic in the eyes of the Siamese authorities. The Chinese children did not completely assimilate themselves into local society and still celebrated their Chinese New Year and traditions. In the collection of NAT, MOE 4.2, for example, there are a number of letters written by Siamese headteachers asking for permission to cancel classes during term time. Most public Siamese schools were temple schools located in the precincts of the temple. There are some letters stating that the reasons why the headteachers cancelled the classes were, among others, the performance of Chinese opera in the Siamese temple when it came to religious ceremonies and festivals.

In 1913, there was a report that a school had to be closed for two days owing to a Chinese opera hired by a Chinese company performing in front of the school playground.201 The opera was hired to play for only one day on the Buddhist Sabbath but the Chinese community collected money for a second day performance.202 Some Chinese within the community utilised a school pavilion as a morgue for a day until the body was cremated or buried.203 During Chinese New Year, in schools such as Pratoomkongka School, which had a Chinese majority, it had been the custom to close for three days. However, the headmaster had to ask permission every year beforehand from the inspector of the Ministry of Education.204

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201 NAT, MOE 4.2/4 เชื่อมั่นในการปิดเปิดโรงเรียน 29 เม.-29 พ.ค. 2456 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1913), Nai Sri to Khun Phirunphittayaphan, letter dated 11/03/1913, 145.
202 Ibid.
203 NAT, MOE 4.2/5 เชื่อมั่นในการปิดเปิดโรงเรียน ศก 2457 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1914), Ratchaburut to Khun Worawetphisit, letter dated 24/08/1914, 46.
204 NAT, MOE 4.2/3 เชื่อมั่นในการปิดเปิดโรงเรียน ศก 131 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1913), A. Sulton to Luang Anubhart, letter dated 28/01/1913, 16.
In 1914 a government officer marked that this custom should be eliminated and the school should be run as normal even though there were just five or six students.\textsuperscript{205} After 1916 there was a last report on the closure of the school due to interference from the Chinese opera, which suggests that the majority of Chinese children might possibly have chosen to study in Chinese schools once public Chinese education was introduced in Siam.\textsuperscript{206} These documents reveal the difficulties facing Chinese children and parents to maintain their Chinese identity through the celebration of Chinese New Year and enjoying their own entertainment, such as Chinese opera, while studying in Siamese schools.

To summarise, prior to the immigration of Chinese women, Chinese migrants assimilated themselves into local society through intermarriage with local women. They established the networks with local temples by having their own cemeteries through donations and exerted their identity into the local space through the performance of their own entertainment. They became a part of local society. However, during the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, there was a greater influx of Chinese into local society, and as their communities got stronger, native-place associations were established to serve them. The development of local place associations as well as the emigration of Chinese women in the late nineteenth century led to an end of the assimilation of the Chinese into local society. The enlarged numbers of Chinese as well as their children in local society led local authorities to begin to see them as a problem because they did not completely assimilate themselves into local society. Furthermore, the first nationality law of Siam, in 1913, together with the immigration of Chinese women, acted as a catalyst for the end of the assimilation. The following section looks at the introduction of Chinese schools. Mass public Chinese education in the early twentieth century had made the Chinese communities separate from Siamese society. The migrants and children rarely spoke Thai or associated with local society and had, to all intents and

\textsuperscript{205} NAT, MOE 4.2/5 เรื่องการปิดเปิดโรงเรียน ศก 2457 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1914), Anusit Wiboon, letter dated 27/02/1914, 144.
\textsuperscript{206} NAT, MOE 4.2/6 เรื่องการปิดเปิดโรงเรียนต่าง ๆ พ.ศ. 2459 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1916), Nai Chaeng to Khun Arakdarunphon, letter dated 23/05/1916, 3.
purposes, become aliens in the eyes of Siamese people. The situation led to the Thai-ification policy launched by the authorities in a bid to force the Chinese to become Thai.

V. The Introduction of Chinese Schools and the Preservation of Chinese Ethnic Identity

As the networks of Chinese migrants had been firmly embedded in Siam through the establishment of Chinese native-place associations and the migration of Chinese women in the twentieth century, the Chinese communities continued to flourish and enlarge. These factors brought an end to Chinese assimilation into Siamese society. Chinese mass public education was later introduced into migrant communities to serve the needs of Chinese parents to preserve their Chinese ethnic identity for the second generation of Chinese. Chinese schools prior to the first three decades of the twentieth century focused on their native-place based education, using their own language to teach.

The establishment of Chinese schools in the first decade of the twentieth century had much to do with economy. The Chinese communities were not only enlarged but also the complexity of business dictated as such. There was a need for workers with knowledge of Chinese for efficient bookkeeping and filing in large firms, for banking, for contact with Chinese firms in Singapore and Hong Kong among others.\(^{207}\) However, Xinmin school was the first community-supported Chinese school for all the five major ethnic groups. However, it failed to meet the needs of other dialect groups as it used Teochew as the language of instruction. As a result, the Hakka founded “the Chin-te (Jin Tek) school in 1913, the Cantonese Association the Ming-te school in 1914, and the Hokkien Association the Pei-yuan school in 1916. Only in 1921 was the first Hainanese school, Yu-min, established.”\(^{208}\) The order nearly parallels the order of the power and resources of dialect groups.\(^{209}\)


\(^{208}\) Ibid.

\(^{209}\) Ibid.
In the meantime, Keemong School, the first Chinese school in Surat Thani, was introduced and financially supported by Liao Chiangsoon (廖昌順), also known as Liao Baoshan (廖葆珊), Khun Prasertsawamiphak, and Phraya Pradinun-Bhumirat, a southern tycoon who migrated from Chenghai district near Shantou.\(^{210}\) At the turn of the 20\(^{th}\) century, Liao obtained the largest share of the bird’s nest industry in Siam and was based in Bandon. He later built a sprawling market with a modern cinema, rice mill, saw mill, and an ice-making factory, and was one of the very few Chinese to be appointed to the title \textit{phraya} by King Vajiravudh.\(^{211}\)

There is no definitive evidence as to when Keemong School was founded exactly, as it had not been registered with the government. However, on 3 October 1918, the managers of the school were commanded to register within two months. Therefore, Liao Hantheng (廖漢建), a member of Liao’s family, and Chia Chongkui (謝棕奎), a Hakka, who were managers of the school at the time, officially registered the school on 10 December 1918. Koe Khunbok, a Chinese, served as a headmaster while Chua Khengnguan (蔡慶元), a Teochew, was a Chinese teacher. The school utilised a Chinese vegetarian cafeteria that was located in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown as the school’s building.\(^{212}\) This was due to the fact that the Ministry of Education wanted to regulate Chinese education.

The Private Schools Act was introduced in 1918, the first Siamese legislation to regulate Chinese education. It forced every foreign school to register with the Ministry of Education and the principals of these schools to be educated to the standards set by the Ministry for the second year of secondary school. Moreover, all foreign teachers were required to study Thai and pass examinations in the Thai language six months and one

\(^{210}\) Kanok Nganphairot, “โรงเรียนจีนในบ้านดอน,” (Chinese Schools in Bandon) in ๗๕ ปีราษฎร์ราชานา (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of the city) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2010), 46.

\(^{211}\) Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 273. For more information on Liao Chiangsoon see อนุสรณ์งานณาปณกิจ คุณพ่อเล็ก เสรฐภักดี ๒ ธันวาคม ๒๕๔๕ (The Funeral Memorial Book of Lek Sethbhakdi, 2 December 2002).

\(^{212}\) NAT, MOE 54.9/3 อนุญาตให้ตั้งโรงเรียนเกี่ยวกับโรงเรียนคีมง ตั้งอยู่ที่ตลาดหมู่ที่ 4 ตำบลตลาด อําเภอบ้านดอน จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี อยู่ต่อไป (Granting Keemong School, located at Moo 4, Talat, Bandon, Surat Thani, permission to maintain). Document dated 10/12/1918 to 17/12/1919, 4-7.
year after they had begun teaching. The Thai language must be taught in the school at least three hours each week.\textsuperscript{213}

On the basis of this regulation, Keemong School experienced difficulties. The headmaster was changed every six months. Koe Khunbok was replaced by Chua Khengnguan. In late 1919, the school received Sunho, a local-born Chinese with a Siamese nationality, as its headmaster while Chua returned to teaching. By the end of 1920, the school had hired another Chinese teacher, Kho Chochai (許楚材), but he was also Teochew.\textsuperscript{214} Therefore, it could be assumed that this school might have used Teochew as the language of instruction and there is no evidence that other ethnic groups were welcomed at this school.

\textbf{Figure 1.21: A photocopy of a school certificate of Chua Khengnguan}

\textsuperscript{214} NAT, MOE 54.8/1 เมนที่พระราชทานรายงานประจำปีพ.ศ. 2462 ของโรงเรียนคีมงและโรงเรียนคีมงขอรับ ครูน้อย (Monthon Surat Thani submitted the annual report of 1919 about Keemong School and Keemong School asked permission to receive a teacher). Document dated 13/05/1920 to 25/02/1920, 1-20.
In the early twentieth century, those who migrated were not only limited to the working class, but the educated people also migrated into Siam due to the requirement of Chinese teachers. This made the Chinese community fill with migrants from many social classes. In the case of Keemong School, Chua got his school certificate from Chaozhou Government Middle School (潮州官立中學堂) in Guangdong (see Figure 1.21). In the meantime, six teachers of Hakka’s Jin Tek School all produced their high school certificates from China to prove that they were qualified to be Chinese teachers.\textsuperscript{215} It is worth noting that every teacher from each Chinese school all shared the same hometown due to the benefit of the networks established from the native-place association. Leaders of the Chinese community also had the responsibility to find Chinese teachers.

The following year, the passing of the Compulsory Education Act of 1921 was initiated by the government. This law demanded all children aged 7 (in some cases 8, 9 or 10) to 14 to attend primary school for at least four years.\textsuperscript{216} Moreover, all children of compulsory school age in every kind of school must study Thai language for at least 800 hours per year, or approximately three hours per day.

In the early twentieth century, most Chinese schools in Siam were located near Chinese temples. Some were in the temples and together they formed temple schools. In Bangkok, a Chinese native asked for permission in 1919 to open Guan Yu temple primary school, in which students would be instructed inside the temple. However, the school was only finally allowed to open a kindergarten as the space and building did not meet the requirements of the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{217}

Due to the large numbers of Chinese temples that were formerly established in almost every Chinese community, mass public Chinese education was easily spread. In

\textsuperscript{215} NAT, MOE 541/31 เรื่องอนุญาตให้คำร้องเรียนจินเตกยืนต่อไป (The permission for Jin Tek school to exist). Document dated 2/09/1918-19/05/1920, 1-42.
\textsuperscript{216} Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 228.
\textsuperscript{217} NAT, MOE 541/212 เรื่องอนุญาตให้ตั้งโรงเรียนศาลเจ้ากวนยู (The permission for Guan Yu temple school to be established). Document dated 08-31/10/1919, 1-6.
Surat Thani, the Chinese also utilised their temples to offer Chinese education. In Ko Samui, the Hainanese community at Nathon used their Hainanese temple to establish Tiang Thon O’iao School. However, there is no evidence as to when the school was exactly founded but it was possibly some time in the 1920s because Yu-min School, the first Hainanese school, in Bangkok, was only established in 1921. Before 1926, there were four managers operating this school, namely Ngao Toneyeng (吳選仍), Lim Hongyao (林鴻曜), Po Kokhui (潘鵠輝) and Pu Hongseng (符洪成). They were all Hainanese.

Similar to the Chinatowns in the US and Canada, which were created to be “spaces of difference” developed from the exclusionary legislation in 1882 and the unfriendly social environment, Chinatowns in Siam had gradually become “spaces of difference.” Strong transnational networks were firmly established. There were many Chinese temples and native-place associations that served as the centres of their networks. In addition, there was also the migration of Chinese women and the founding of many Chinese schools throughout Siam. Therefore, their settlements had become so large that they felt that they no longer derived any benefit from learning the local language.

Despite the enlarged Chinese communities, the Chinese, however, were oriented towards their original locality; they still felt that they were Hainanese, Teochew and others. In other words, the Chinese successfully created their own space in the early twentieth century but there were spaces developed separately within the larger space. Similar to Keemong School, which might use Teochew as the language of instruction, the three Hainanese schools in Ko Samui and Phunphin might instruct their students in Hainanese.

Many Chinese teachers refused to assimilate themselves into local society. A large number of them did not even try to study the Thai language and had to resign from

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218 NAT, MOE 54.5/11 รร.เสียงออกไกลเสียง รร.เสียงอื่น ผนงเลขอิงวิธีการและภูมิทัศน์ของบ้านเกิด (Tiang Thon O’iao and Tuanghua Schools asked for a permission to give an authorisation to only one manager to represent their schools). Document dated 18 February-21 March 1926), 2-7.
their posts after they did not pass the language exam. Some tried to extend the test date so many times that the officer regarded it as a trick. This could be found in the case of the teachers from both Keemong School and Jin Tek School. Therefore, the Siamese authorities found that they should find a way to limit the growth of Chinese education. Moreover, the Chinese residing overseas, in the late 1920s, were captivated by the ideas of race and nation promoted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen, ideas which were also transmitted to the Chinese community in Surat Thani and other parts of South East Asia.  

Therefore, the Siamese authorities found that they should find a way to limit the growth of Chinese education. In 1927, a model was proposed to merge Siamese schools with Chinese schools by the Ministry of Education. The model was to be used in small Chinese communities as an experiment before applying it to the larger communities. In May, Bao Muikiab (傅美甲), a Hainanese, asked for permission to open “Tang Tum” private school in Ko Pha-ngan, Surat Thani. The Ministry of Education plotted a secret plan to merge a Siamese school with a new Chinese school on the island. The new government school was originally planned to be used as a model to merge Siamese schools with Tiang Thon O’Hiao School, which was owned by a Hainanese native on Ko Samui, some time in the future because it would be easier for the Ministry to control the school and for the government to control local-born Chinese.  

Luang Borwonsarnwichachao was sent by the Ministry to inspect the school and the Chinese communities on Ko Samui. His significant role was to persuade the Chinese in the community to agree with the model of merging schools. When he arrived on Ko Pha-gan he called a meeting to discuss the new model. In the meeting, both Chinese and Siamese headmen, together with people from both the Chinese and Siamese communities, participated. The Chinese finally agreed with the plan and the new school was named

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219 See Chapter 2 for more information.
“Prachaban Tambon Madueawan 1 (Kok Mian 国民)”, where both Chinese and Thai languages would be taught equally.\textsuperscript{221}

However, the government would only pay for Siamese teachers, not Chinese ones, and moreover, in the report he suggested that Siamese children should study how to do commerce in the new school because the economy of Ko Pha-ngan was completely dominated by the Chinese. They even set the price of coconuts because there was no business-meeting environment like theirs and he added that the best locations were owned by the Chinese.\textsuperscript{222} However, what he termed ‘business meeting place’ would actually be the temple, which was used as both a meeting place and for business connections in almost every Chinese community.

In addition, the inspector wanted the school to have more buildings to receive both Siamese and Chinese students. Therefore, the Chinese volunteered to raise the necessary funds, and there was a fundraising campaign to use the Chinese New year to gather money donated by people.\textsuperscript{223} This reveals the cooperation of the Chinese in the local community and the success of the native-place associations, which were firmly established to serve people in the community for not only religious purposes, but also for business connections and the education of the second generation Chinese.

In brief, once networks had been firmly established in the country of settlement due to the influx of Chinese men and later, in the twentieth century, with women, the Chinese communities had enlarged and Chinatowns were seen in the eyes of local authorities as “spaces of difference”. In the Chinatowns, in the first three decades of the century, and before the establishment of the Nationalist government in 1928 in Nanjing, there were conflicts between the different groups. Even the schools were separated from each other based on the use of the language of instruction: there were Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese, and Hakka schools, but there were no “Chinese national” schools. In the early decades of the century, when the Chinese communities had evolved,

\textsuperscript{221} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{222} Ibid., 1-28.
\textsuperscript{223} Ibid.
the local government began to launch the Thai-ification programmes through the regulation and restriction of Chinese education. However, the inspection of Chinese schools was not carried out in a strict and unyielding manner compared with what was to come in the 1930s. The Chinese ethnic community had changed to become a Chinese national community after the movement to use Guoyu, or Mandarin, in Chinese schools in the late 1920s. This served as the first mark of the transformation of Chinese identities, which will be discussed in depth in the next chapter.

VI.  Conclusion

The migrant communities in Surat Thani and also in greater Siam had fluid and complicated characteristics that were susceptible to change over time. For the sake of trade and economy the Chinese had been in Siam for a long time. However, they only began to establish themselves into Siamese society around the sixteenth century, based on evidence found, such as the bells and the graveyards during that period. Early networks were built through the donation of bells in the sixteenth century. In this way, they exerted Chinese identity and this was the beginning of the assimilation of the Chinese people into the local society. Therefore, the Chinese became a part of the Siamese community as they interacted within the space of the local people.

However, the industrial revolution, together with colonialism, caused the massive migration of the Chinese into Siam. The early migrants in the modern period assimilated themselves into the local identity owing to the fact that their women never migrated in this period, and so the men intermarried with local women. The influx of these Chinese led to the enlargement of their communities and the firm establishment of native-place associations at the centre of networks. Their space, which had become larger in the local space of the host country, had complicated characteristics in that within their space there were many other smaller spaces established there.

Prior to the twentieth century Chinese migrants had families in both China and in Siam. In the early twentieth century the migration of Chinese women had brought an end
to the assimilation of the Chinese into Siamese society. The names of the Chinese women were written on graves along with those Siamese and local-born Chinese women. They were seen in the eyes of the Siamese as aliens and the Chinatowns were “spaces of difference”. In this period, Chinese schools were established based on the needs of Chinese education due to the complexity of transnational networks. However, there were no “Chinese national” schools, but separate Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hananese, and Hakka establishments. There was also the migration of educated people, which made Chinese schools become more distinct as they refused to learn the Thai language and forced Chinese and local-born Chinese to stop associating with Siamese society.

Space and place are indispensable components of diaspora owing to people’s existence and interaction within the said space and place. Spatial interaction is characterised by the movement of people, capital, goods, ideas and information across networked space between homeland and settled land or others where a diasporic person has settled. To conclude from this case study, the Chinese diaspora is about the creation and interaction of “space”. Within a space there are many smaller spaces created and interacted in by migrants. However, the space created by migrants can be dynamic and fluid. This reveals the complicated characteristics of the “space” in migrant communities.

In the late 1920s, the introduction of Guoyu as the language of instruction in Chinese schools marked as the first sign of the transformation of Chinese identities from ethnic to national ones. The Chinese communities had become a single unit, their space was growing larger and becoming distinct and this led to severe restrictions and many policies to end Chinese-only education and make Chinese children become Siamese. The transformation of Chinese identities from ethnic to national ones will be discussed in the next chapter.

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Chapter Two
The Chinese Response to the Thai-ification Programme (1928-1937)

I. Introduction

After being impacted by the industrial revolution and colonialism, there was an influx of Chinese into Surat Thani in the mid-nineteenth century through the early twentieth century. These early migrants established their native-place associations through the construction of Chinese temples to serve as centres of networks. In the late nineteenth century, Chinese women started to migrate in significant numbers, making the Chinese intermarriage and assimilation into the Siamese society decrease gradually. In the early twentieth century, mass public Chinese education was introduced to Siam. In Surat Thani, many Chinese schools were established in Chinatowns to serve the needs of Chinese parents that desired to preserve their Chinese ethnic identity for the second generation of Chinese. Most Chinese schools were in or located near the Chinese temples. However, there were no Chinese national schools but rather Hainanese and Teochew schools. As the Chinese community enlarged and homogenised, it began to be seen in the eyes of the Siamese government as a “space of difference,” and a Thai-ification programme was therefore launched through the regulation and restriction of Chinese education. Nevertheless, the inspection of Chinese schools was not carried out in a strict and unyielding manner.

On mainland China, Chinese intellectuals, in the early twentieth century, put a great deal of effort into reshaping China into a modern nation-state which could confront foreign threats. People, commodities, finance and ideas could be mobilised within and outside China by diverse layers of social networks as a consequence of globalisation.\(^{225}\) The ideas of race and nation promoted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen (1866-1925), a Chinese physician and revolutionary and the Father of the Republic of China who went on to

become the first leader of the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Guomindang (GMD, 國民黨), were also transmitted to overseas Chinese communities including Surat Thani. These ideas captivated many Chinese sojourners.\textsuperscript{226}

After the Nationalists successfully reunited the country in 1928, China quickly gained international recognition. The nation seemed to be gradually modernising.\textsuperscript{227} The Chinese national identity was focused round the concept of the Republican citizen recognizable by modern customs and symbols such as having short hair and wearing a felt hat, bowing, and taking part in National Day ceremonies based on the solar calendar. New customs of the Republic, nevertheless, were constructed from previous ethnic identities. The new Republican government did not intend to abolish the festivals of the lunar calendar because the modern state required both guojia (國家), or a country, and minzu (民族), or race. The idea of a single unified traditional China was a product of the new political culture of the twentieth century.\textsuperscript{228}

In addition, the idea of the Chinese national identity and the concept of overseas Chinese, or huaqiao (華僑), a call for unity of all Chinese emphasising what was national in China, were brought to Chinatowns in Surat Thani and elsewhere. The expansion of the Chinese printing industry in major treaty ports and the introduction of modern Chinese schools in every place were important factors for rapid change such that the idea of the national was soon implanted into the consciousness of local-born Chinese students. In colonies and elsewhere, the Chinese, having been conquered and governed by foreigners, hoped to reclaim their independence and self-respect.\textsuperscript{229}


\textsuperscript{227} Patricia Buckley Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 277.


\textsuperscript{229} Wang, “Local and National,” 4-5.
The concept of Chinese national identity, however, provoked the local authorities in Siam as the Chinese refused to assimilate into local society. They rarely spoke Thai or associated with the locals. The Siamese authorities thus launched the Thai-ification policy to force the Chinese to become Thai. In 1918, the Siamese government introduced the first legislation to regulate Chinese education, or the Private School Act of 1918. The law required that in every foreign school the principal must have completed at least two years of Siamese schooling, that every foreign teacher must study Thai and pass government examinations in the language within one year, and that the Thai language must be taught. In 1921, the first Compulsory Education Act was passed. It demanded all children aged 7 to 14 to attend primary schools run by the government or private schools that were granted permits from the government for at least four years. Moreover, all children of compulsory school age in every kind of school must study Thai language at least 800 hours per year, approximately 3 hours per day.\footnote{Victor Purcell, \textit{The Chinese in Southeast Asia} (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 142-143 and Narong Phuangphit, \textit{นโยบายเกี่ยวกับการศึกษาของคนจีนในประเทศไทยในรัชสมัยพระบาทสมเด็จพระปรมินทรมหาภูมิพลอดุลยเดช} (Bangkok: Bhannakij Publishing, 1975), 91-92.}

In 1927, the Private School Act of 1918 was amended in order to devise a more adequate control of Chinese schools after the Education officers had found many loopholes. King Prajadhipok (1893-1941) was so worried about the political movement of the Chinese, especially from the Chinese communists, that books about communism were seized at Bangkok port in 1926. Furthermore, the Siamese authorities also inspected Chinese textbooks in 1928 after the King visited southern provinces, including Surat Thani, and the Chinese schools were found perpetuating the Chinese language and Chinese nationalism. These were considered a threat to the absolute monarchy. At the same time, criticisms of the absolute monarchy and the idea of revolution were also widespread in local newspapers in 1928 so as to foment radical ideas in the country.\footnote{Charnvit Kasetsiri, \textit{ประวัติการเมืองไทยสยาม พ.ศ. 2475-2500} (A Political History of Thailand-Siam 1932-1957) (Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 2016), 45.} In 1932, foreign language was limited to seven and a half hours per week in schools and applied to all areas except Bangkok.
After the Siamese Revolution of 1932, new government introduced serious regulations demanding that all children receive a Thai education in order to improve the sense of citizenship across the nation. So the provisions of the Compulsory Education Act were promulgated in Bangkok and all areas in March 1933, in which the inspection of the Chinese schools was extremely strict and unyielding. In 1936, the Thai government amended the Private School Act so that Chinese language was permitted in Chinese primary schools for only 2 hours per week. It was, nevertheless, reported in 1938 by a British officer that the Chinese communities still remained distinct national communities in every town in Siam.232

This chapter seeks to investigate the rise of Chinese nationalism and the transformation of the Chinese identities from ethnic to national. While the assimilation of the Chinese into local society seems to have come naturally when they chose to settle in Siam prior to the late 1920s, the Siamese government did engage in forced assimilation. Thus, it is interesting to examine how the Chinese identities shifted from ethnic to national identities and how the Chinese in Surat Thani responded to the Thai-ification programme from 1928 to 1937. This chapter has four main sections. The first section is to investigate the rise of Chinese nationalism. Then, the Chinese communist movement and the reaction and response of the Chinese to the Thai-ification programme from 1928 to 1932 will be explored. The third section discusses the ideas planned by the Siamese authorities to launch the Private School Act of 1932 during 1930 to 1934, on which the Private School Act of 1936 was largely based. The last section investigates the Chinese response to the Thai-ification policies after the Siamese Revolution of 1932.

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II. The Rise of Chinese Nationalism

After the establishment of the Chinese Nationalist government in 1928, modern Chinese education was introduced to Surat Thani for propaganda purposes through the contact and transnational networks between their native-place associations established in Surat Thani and those in their motherland districts in South China.\(^{233}\) The revolutionary cause of Sun Yat-sen was celebrated throughout Chinatowns in Surat Thani and elsewhere in South East Asia. This alarmed the Siamese authorities and later led to a crackdown on many Chinese schools. This section aims to investigate the rise of Chinese nationalism that was implanted into Chinese children in many Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere and the transformation of the Chinese identities from ethnic to national. In addition, it examines the early reaction of the Siamese authorities towards the rise of Chinese national identity.

To comprehend Chinese nationalism, it is important to address the concepts of tradition and modernity. There has been no common consensus on the meanings of these two concepts. Some maintain that the first is anything old while the latter is anything new.\(^{234}\) However, Suryadinata observes that many academics have utilised the term “modernity” to refer to “a process of change, especially economic, social and cultural change, from simplicity to complexity, from the agricultural to the industrial, from rural to the urban, from the local to the national.”\(^ {235}\) These transformations occur under the impact of the rapid industrialisation and globalisation.\(^ {236}\) He concludes that ethnic Chinese in a migrant community are naturally oriented towards their Chinese locality. Having been migrated for a while and encountered with “Chinese nation-state,” the modern concept, they had been forced to transform from the ethnic Chinese into national

\(^{235}\) Ibid., ix.
\(^{236}\) Ibid.
Chinese. Wang also proposes that “Chinese national” highlights the political good of larger community and its interests are prioritised.

In the latter half of the 1920s, the Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam venerated Sun Yat-sen as the Nationalist patron saint. His portrait was worshipped ardently throughout the Chinese community, which alarmed the Siamese authorities. In order to put it in context, it is necessary to look briefly at the history of the early Chinese Republic that the new political culture had developed in China between the inauguration of Dr. Sun as President of the Republic of China on January 1912 and the reburial ceremony of his remains in 1929 at Nanjing. The modern customs and symbols such as bowing and taking part in National Day ceremonies based on the solar calendar came to identify people who defined themselves as citizens of the Chinese Republic.

Following the death of Sun Yat-sen on 12 March 1925, he became a Chinese national hero and the ‘Father of the Country’ as obituaries and appreciations followed. Sun was repeatedly stated to be the founder of the Republic of China and often compared to George Washington, one of the founders of the USA. Moreover, he became a national symbol, and huge demonstrations followed his funeral procession shouting slogans: ‘Love live Sun Yat-sen’s thought!’ ‘Love live the people’s revolution!’ ‘Down with imperialism!’ ‘Down with the warlords!’ Such slogans captured the major political issues of the times. In the Central Park of Beijing, where Sun lay in state, a recording of his speaking was broadcast through loudspeakers. Leaflets with the Shining Sun flag, the portrait of Sun, his dying testament or extracts from his doctrines were handed to visitors.

The Sanminzhuyi (三民主義), or the Three Principles of Sun Yat-sen, together with the modern Chinese customs and symbols, were also transmitted to many

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237 Ibid.
239 Harrison, The Making of the Republican Citizen, 240.
240 Ibid., 60-61.
241 Ibid., 133-144.
Chinatowns in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam. Chinese schools were founded to perpetuate Chinese nationalism. In 1927, an education inspector found that illegal Chinese language teaching was taking place in Zhaoying Temple at Maenam, a Hainanese community in Ko Samui. Additionally, books relating to Chinese politics were also discovered.\(^{242}\) Meanwhile, it was found that there were ceremonies of National Day of the Chinese Republic on 10 October 1927 in Sanmin, a Chinese kindergarten in Bangkok. The Shining Sun flags were decorated in front of Sanmin School. Many scrolls were hung on the wall at the entrance of the school, expressing the revolutionary doctrine of Sun.\(^{243}\)

The loyalty of the Chinese to the royal institution in Siam began to be questioned by the Siamese authorities because one of the principles of Dr. Sun, democracy (anti-monarchy), obviously undermined the notion of an absolute monarchy, as was the practice in Siam at the time. The ‘Three Principles of the People’ elaborated by Sun Yat-Sen, encouraged by Mikhail Boradin, a Comintern advisor, comprised an ideology for the Nationalist Party, consisting of nationalism (anti-imperialism), democracy (anti-monarchy), and ‘people’s livelihood’ (similar to socialism now).\(^{244}\) Moreover, in January 1928, the Siamese authorities found that every Chinese paid respect to the portrait of Sun Yat-sen on a stage at a student performance in a Chinese school in Bangkok. In contrast, and more shockingly, they did not stand during the royal anthem for King Prajadhipok after the end of the performance.\(^{245}\)

The doctrine was a potential threat to the monarchy in the eyes of the authorities; therefore, they paid extra attention to Chinese loyalty. There was an idea to force Chinese


\(^{243}\) Narong Phuangphit, พระราชวังศรีอยุธยา: กระแสชนกลุ่มฮันนาและเป้าหมายเพื่ออาณาการ (Prince Bidyalabh Bridhyakon and the policy about Chinese schools in Thailand when he served as Minister of Education) (Bangkok: Prachan, 1974), 7.

\(^{244}\) Ebrey, The Cambridge Illustrated History of China, 274.

\(^{245}\) NAT, MOE 4/11 กระทรวงมหาดไทยควรจะมีการบังคับให้คณะโรงเรียนจีนในทุกแห่งส่งเสริมพระบารมีพระยา ควนมารดาฝ่ายสตรี สมาส พระยาภักดีศรี ในโอกาสอันควร (Ministry of the Interior should force Chinese students to sing the royal anthem in order to pay respect to the nation, religion and king at appropriate occasions), the Minister of Interior to the Minister of Education, letter dated 21/01/1928, 4.
students in Surat Thai and elsewhere in Siam to sing the royal anthem in order to show their loyalty to the country and its institutions. Prince Dhani Niwat, the Minister of Education, called a meeting of managers and headmasters from Chinese schools to instruct them to make singing the royal anthem and showing respect for the king and queen a top priority in every occasion.246

This instruction was possibly due to the fact that Chinese students were more loyal to China than to the Siamese government or possibly even stood against the government system of Siam. When Prajadhipok visited Jintek School in Bangkok on 24 March 1927, the Chinese students sang Qingyunge (卿雲歌), or “Song to the Auspicious Cloud,” which was once sung by Emperor Shun (帝舜, 2233 BC-2184 BC). The Chinese teachers, additionally, did not dare to reply when the king asked them to translate. However, it took more than a year to be finally translated, and in April 1928 a Chinese translator claimed that Chinese teachers wanted Chinese students in Siam to sing this song in order to encourage them to study hard.247 In reality, the classical version of the song was preferred by many Chinese to become the national anthem of the Beiyang government after the end of the monarchy.

During his lifetime, Sun Yat-sen had been a controversial politician. However, he became a Chinese national hero and the Father of the Chinese Republic after his death. But he was a symbol open to various interpretations.248 People could use his image or different reasons. Many Chinese managers of Chinese schools in Siam used his portrait as a tool to gather money to support their Chinese schools. For example, on 11 April 1928, Chinese books, together with the pictures of Dr. Sun, were distributed and sold to many Chinese shops by Sunwen School (孫文學校) in Bangkok’s Chinatown. However, when an officer inspected the school on 16 April, the Chinese manager and teachers were seen

[246] Ibid.
[247] NAT, MOE 54.1/1399 เรื่อง เพลงสรรเสริญภาษาจีนที่นักเรียนโรงเรียนจีนเต็งถวายเมื่อคราวเสด็จพระราชาดาเนินโรงเรียน (The Chinese anthem sung by the students of Jintek School to pay respect to the king when the he visited the school). Document dated 19/04/1928 to 11/05/1928, 1-10.
helping to decorate the picture of the King. The Chinese possibly pretended to show their loyalty to the King to the education inspector in order to escape the crackdown as it had just used the Chinese books and the portraits of Sun to gather money. It is also possible that the school obeyed the instruction from Prince Dhani Niwat, who had told the managers and headmasters of Chinese schools to make showing respect to the king and queen a top priority.

It could be said that the Chinese Nationalists also wanted to mobilise the overseas Chinese for the benefit of Chinese national politics. The description of the pictures, found at Sunwen School in 1928, was Sun’s instruction in 1925 to build the Republic for all Chinese people to fight against warlordism, imperialism and end unequal treaties. In China, the recruitment of the union and party by both the Chinese Communists and the Chinese Nationalists succeeded after Chinese demonstrators, protesting against capitalist factory owners, unequal treaties and the privileges of foreigners in treaty ports, were killed in Shanghai and Guangzhou on 30 May 1925. This incident has been called Wusacanan (五卅惨案), or the May 30th Massacre. In these circumstances, it was suitable to mobilise patriots across the country to fight against those enemies as instructed by Dr. Sun.

Chinese schools had now developed into spaces for all Chinese ethnic groups. Based on a 1928 letter of Sunwen School sent to the owner of a shop in Chinatown in Bangkok, the managers of the school aimed to accept Chinese children from every dialect group and also welcomed all Chinese nationals to be sponsors and members of the school committee and association. They had to donate a certain amount of money every month to get voting rights or become a chairperson. There was also an election in

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249 NAT, MOE 54.1/1398 เรื่องกรมตารวจภูธรหาว่า ร.ร. จีนหวุ่นไฟจีน 3 คน ทำหนังสือจีนพร้อมสามรูปภาพของชาย绤เห่ากำลังแพร่กระจายตามที่ร้านเพื่อเรียกเงิน บัตรร管委会ในelligence (The Provincial Police Division accused three Chinese from Sunwen School of making and distributing Chinese books and pictures of Dr, Sun Yat-Sen to Chinese shops to gather money to support ‘Guomin’ doctrine). Document dated 14/04/1928 to 21/04/1928, 1-15.

250 Ibid.


252 NAT, MOE 54.1/1398, 8-11.
Tianghuahakhao School in Satun, mostly by a committee of managers and merchants.\textsuperscript{253} The managers of Zhongshan School in Chumphon were also comprised of people from different dialect groups - Hakka, Hainanese, Cantonese and Hokkien. Furthermore, there were many Chinese teachers from diverse dialect groups working together in schools in this period.\textsuperscript{254} As a Chinese national language based on Northern Mandarin was introduced as the language of instruction following the consolidation of the Nationalist Government in Nanjing in 1928, Chinese teachers from different dialect groups might have communicated in Mandarin. This symbolises the transformation from ethnically based Chinese communities to Chinese viewing themselves through the prism of the concept of a modern nation-state.

The Siamese Government did not financially support Chinese schools. The self-reliance of Chinese schools in Siam showed the attitude that the Siamese authorities did not want Chinese education as they were afraid that this would further reinforce a lack of assimilation into local society and further strengthen Chinese involvement with Chinese national politics. This was also the case with the colonial government. In British Malaya, for example, the British authorities rarely helped migrant children, both Chinese and Indian, to meet their educational needs. The power of the state was exercised mainly to prevent students and teachers from being involved with radical political movements. Financial assistance provided to English and Malay schools greatly exceeded that given to Chinese schools. The donations from Chinese merchants, often collected to bridge the gap between fees and running costs, were paid for land, buildings and equipment. Local leaders were socially and morally obliged to keep the schools going. Chinese teachers were also blessed with both status and respect for their role in meeting social and cultural requirements.\textsuperscript{255}

\textsuperscript{253} NAT, MOE 54.5/83 เรื่อง เปลี่ยนแปลงผู้จัดการและการบริหารโรงเรียนจีนคลาสคลาสศึกษา (Changing the managers and headmasters of the schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 7/04/1933 to 29/08/1934, 99.
\textsuperscript{254} E.g. Donghua School received new teachers that were from Fujian and Chaozhou see NAT, MOE 54.5/46 เรื่อง ตั้งเลิกสถานที่จัดการเรียนรู้เมืองนครศรีธรรมราช (The establishment and relocation of schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 12/03/1931 to 3/03/1932, 61.
As many governments in South East Asia did not financially support Chinese education, Chinese schools had to rely on money donated from the Chinese in Chinatowns. Sometimes, the donation came from the Chinese residing in many different countries, revealing the transnationalism of networks of Chinese in South East Asia. The Chinese had been establishing native-place associations as centres of the transnational networks since the second half of the nineteenth century as vehicles of mutual assistance and co-operation. Worried by the transnational nature of Chinese communities, the government of British Malaya banned the donations from outside the country to Chinese schools. Donations were henceforth monitored by a director general of education or his regional assistant. This method of preventing the development of Chinese education was a model for the education policy of the Siamese government, stemming from the fact that the Chinese residing in different places always assisted each other. In 1917, for example, when the Chinese from the Central Market of Songkhla, one of the southern provinces of Siam, wanted to establish a Chinese school, Chinese merchants residing in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, a neighbouring area of Surat Thani, and in Singapore and Penang, two states of British Malaya at the time, donated money to support the school.

Another aspect of the popularity of Dr. Sun is that, following his death in 1925, many Chinese schools were named after him throughout the country during the second half of the 1920s. Nevertheless, in order to disguise their lauding of him, the Chinese attempted to deceive the authorities. For example, in Chumphon, Surat Thani’s neighbouring province, the managers of Zhongshan School (中山) translated the name “middle mountain” as “public school where everyone can study,” when they asked for permission to establish the school on 23 April 1928. On February 1926, the Chinese

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256 NAT, (2) MOE 8.1/1 เรื่องเกี่ยวกับพระราชบัญญัติโรงเรียนราษฎรปี 2473-2477 (About the Private Schools Act 1930-1934). Document dated 1918 to 4/12/1934, 204.
257 NAT, (2) MOE 8/77 ธรรมการณ์และขอให้กรมศึกษาธิการส่งครูสอนภาษาจีน (Monthon Education officer asked the Department of Education to send Chinese teachers). Document dated 21/11/1917 to 28/12/1917, 2.
community in Langsuan, Chumphon, asked to establish ‘Yat-sen Night School,’ which was opened in May 1927, to teach the regular Thai curriculum, English and Chinese to people aged 15 to 45 years old. Its name came to the attention of Phraya Thudsayunrungsarit, the commissioner of Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, who thought that its teaching might focus on Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine, which would be counter to the policy and the law on Private Schools. Moreover, it educated both young people and mature students at night school, raising suspicions that it might have a hidden agenda. It was also difficult to inspect the school at night. The Chinese school was told by an officer to be temporarily closed and permission for its re-opening was delayed in order to disrupt its running. This had an effect on the popularity of the school in the community because the school relied on money donated by merchants and students. Finally, it was allowed to run on 27 October 1927, but the number of students was limited to ten because it did not meet the sanitary requirements following an inspection by a doctor. The minister had instructed that the permission be withdrawn following a legal stipulation that allows for this in the event of school premises failing hygiene and sanitation checks.

Following the death of Sun Yat-sen, paying honour to him became a mark of Chinese nationalism. Respect for him had grown. On 1 June 1929, Chinese worldwide observed the reburial ceremony of Dr. Sun. On this mournful day, the Chinese residing in many Chinatowns of Surat Thani went to pay respect to the Father of the Republic in their Chinese temples and native-place associations, where wreaths and offerings were

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260 Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat was an administrative subdivision of Siam. In 1925, Monthon Surat was incorporated into Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat. The province of Surat Thani, therefore, was in this Monthon since 1925.
262 Ibid., 17-18.
263 Ibid., 31.
264 Ibid., the Minister of Education to Phraya Thudsayunrungsarit, the commissioner of Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, letter dated 13 August 1927, 25.
placed before Sun’s portrait as he became the Nationalist patron saint, and acquiring religious-like status.265

![Figure 2.1: A portrait of Sun at Banpot Temple, Xiajie Association in Donsak, a district in Surat Thani, was replaced by Mao’s portrait in 1976](image1)

![Figure 2.2: A portrait of Sun in a house at a Hainanese community in Banpot, Donsak](image2)

In ceremonies, the Chinese venerated him as a deity. In Xiajie association, at a Hainanese temple at Donsak, a district in Surat Thani, a portrait of Sun was hung on the temple wall (see Figure 2.1). In Ko Rat Temple, located in another Hainanese community in Donsak, also hung a portrait of Sun. At the same time, some held memorial ceremonies as a tribute to Sun at private houses, as his portrait was also hung in many houses in Surat Thani’s Chinatowns (see Figure 2.2). Before Sun’s re-internment on June 1 1929, the Chinese community asked for permission from the Police Department to propagate the Three Principles of Sun and hold a ceremony, but the police refused to grant permission and issued an order that the Chinese could hold memorial ceremonies only in private houses.266

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265 The Bangkok Daily Mail, 1 June 1929. See NAT, ม. 18/8 พวกจีนมีการประชุมทำกิจการพูนยั้งชื่น แต่กระทำห้ามทะลุ (The Chinese paid tribute to Sun Yat-sen and they were prohibited by the police). Document dated 13/06/1929, 6.

266 The Bangkok Daily Mail, 2 June 1929. See ibid.
In spite of the fact that the ceremonies were strictly prohibited in Chinese associations and Chinese schools, the order was widely violated. In the Chinese Association (中華會館) in Bangkok, for example, a mock reburial ceremony of Sun was organised in accordance with the actual procession in Nanjing. A portrait of Sun was set up on a table and the Chinese brought wreaths and flowers or written passages praising him as tributes.267

At the Chinese Association in Bangkok, the police suppressed the ceremonies and closed the entrance gate. They furthermore commanded that the portrait of Sun, hung on the wall, be taken down.268 This provoked the indignation of the Chinese across the country, who had heard of this incident.269 An anonymous Chinese wrote to The Bangkok Daily Mail on 8 June 1929, warning that, “No silly actions such as this will happen in the future or the amity between Siamese and Chinese may be lost forever.”270 A secret society to boycott Siamese products was established in a Chinese school in Surat Thani as a result of the incident. The Chinese in Bangkok set a nationwide precedent that Chinese teachers wanted Chinese students born of either Chinese or Siamese mothers to stop associating with Siamese society. In December 1929, a Siamese headmaster reported that a Chinese teacher of Tiang Thon O’Hiao School, in Ko Samui, established Sae Ji Hui, a name of a secret society that students had to pay to join. Every member received a booklet about the rules and regulations, which were strictly enforced. The society commanded Chinese students to see only Chinese opera and buy goods from Chinese markets. Additionally, they were prohibited from watching Likay, a form of Siamese popular folk theatre.271

267 Ibid.
268 The Bangkok Daily Mail, 2 June 1929. See NAT, ม. 18/8.
269 Ibid., 3 June 1929.
270 Ibid., 8.
271 NAT, (2) MOE 8/341 เรื่องส่งส่งเรื่องคุรุนีย์โรงเรียนสำหรับเด็กไทยในโรงเรียน อำเภอเกาะสมุย จังหวัดสระแก้ว (To send the photocopied documents about the establishment of ‘Sae Ji Hui’ society in Tiang Thon O’Hiao school, Samui). Document dated 23/01/1929, 1-15.
Another modern aspect of the Chinese community was the change from traditional buildings to modern. Although these large European-style buildings of Chinese schools represented a mere surface of modernity and could be found anywhere throughout the big cities in China and South East Asia, it is worth nothing this change. The change occurred because the modern Chinese education was more popular than before as Chinese schools and their buildings in Siam became larger and stronger.\textsuperscript{272} Most of them were superior even to Siamese schools. Looking at the development of Chinese schools, the Siamese accused the Chinese of causing commodity prices to rise by

\textsuperscript{272} NAT, (2) MOE 8.1/1., 16.
doubling the price of the materials used to build such schools. The building of Donghua School (中華學校), in a traditional Chinese townhouse in 1929 (Figure 2.3), was constructed into a larger building in European style in 1930 (Figure 2.4) after only one year in operation. This shows the popularity of modern Chinese education, which was attracting Chinese parents and children, together with the growing affluence of the Chinese.

Leaflets and books of the *Sunbun* (孫文) doctrine were found decorating a picture frame in 1929. For example, a local education officer found a leaflet in Jengmeng School and a book in Kakmin School in Ayutthaya. In the leaflet, the words “sovereignty belongs to people” were written, catching the attention of the authorities. However, it was not illegal because the 1918 education law had not been amended to address such things and there was no obvious evidence that the doctrine was taught in Chinese schools. A political pamphlet was published in Tang Tek An Printing Press in Bangkok’s Chinatown. This confirms the idea that the authorities were afraid that these pamphlets threatened the royal institution.

In brief, the ethnic Chinese had transformed to national Chinese when they encountered the modern concept of the “nation-state”, influenced by the current aspects of globalisation and the implantation of a Chinese national consciousness into local-born and Chinese children through the introduction of Chinese education into Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam. At the same time, Sun Yat-sen became one of the central symbols of the nation after his death. The Chinese throughout Siam honoured him, and this was yet another mark of Chinese nationalism.

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273 Ibid., 64.
274 NAT, MOE 54.1/21 เรื่อง ตั้งและเลิก ร.ร.ม.ท.นครศรีธรรมราช (The establishment and the closure of schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 24/01/1928 to 31/12/1929, 47-67 and NAT, MOE 54.1/1468 เรื่อง ผู้จัดการโรงเรียนต้องยื่น คำร้องว่า ขอให้สภานักเรียนทำคำร้องไปทำการสอบ ณ ตึก 2 ชั้น ชื่อให้สำรองชื่อใหม่ (The managers of Donghua School in Tha Wang asked for permission to relocate their school to the new building). Document dated, 15/05/1930 to 28/07/1930, 2-18.
275 NAT, MOE 54.14/48 เรื่องการตรวจสอบคำแปลใบปลิวแปลงและคำแปลใบปลิว “ลัทธิซุนบุ๋น” ซึ่งตรวจพบ ที่โรงเรียนจีน (Monthon Ayutthaya Education officer sent the manuscript and translation of the “Sun Bun doctrine” leaflet found in a Chinese school). Document dated 26/10/1929 to 6/12/1929, 1-10.
276 Ibid.
nevertheless, monitored closely the Chinese, whose celebrations of the principles of Sun were deemed harmful to Siam’s internal stability. This later led to the Thai-ification programme and the Private School Act of 1927 was introduced to control Chinese schools more efficiently.

III. The Reaction of the Siamese Authorities and the Response of the Chinese to the Thai-ification programme from 1928 to 1932

This section examines the movement of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) found in Chinese schools and the Private School Act of 1927, which was amended to deal with the rise of Chinese nationalism as well as Communist propaganda in Chinese schools in Surat Thani from 1927 to 1932. After 1927, the law was more seriously enforced than earlier and affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani to a great extent. Before looking into the 1927 Private School Act, it is necessary to consider the Private School Act of 1918.

The Private School Act of 1918 was the first legislation to regulate foreign schools that had an effect on Chinese education. Under the law, it required that the principals of foreign schools must have completed at least two years of Siamese schooling, that all foreign teachers must study Thai and pass government examinations in the Thai language within a year, and that Thai language must be taught in the schools at least three hours each week. The Compulsory Education Act was issued in 1921, requiring every child aged between 7 and 14 to attend primary schools operated by the Siamese government or private schools that received permits from the government for at least four years. It also required all children of compulsory school age in every school to study Thai language for at least 800 hours per year, around 3 hours per day.

The Private School Act of 1918, however, was not aimed at controlling Chinese schools but missionary schools owned by Westerners. Prince Dhani Nivat, the Minister of Education from 1927 to 1932, wrote that Chinese schools had not become a problem by the time the law of 1918 was imposed, since the Chinese did not perpetuate Chinese

277 NAT, (2) MOE 8.1/1, 63-64.
nationalism and did not refuse to assimilate into the Siamese society.\textsuperscript{278} The Chinese schools, moreover, were founded to preserve the culture of ethnic and dialect groups from the beginning, and were not enthused by Chinese nationalism.\textsuperscript{279}

In 1926, the Siamese authorities seized books imported from China to Siam at a port in Bangkok. King Prajadhipok was concerned about the political movement of the CCP as communism was considered as a threat to the absolute monarchy. The King himself read all of the books and the documents that were seized, and he was profoundly concerned particularly about those books that espoused communism.\textsuperscript{280}

The Private School Act of 1927, therefore, was launched to control Chinese schools better after the Siamese government had found that the Chinese were utilising Chinese schools as vehicles to implant Chinese nationalism and/or communism into Chinese students. The law was similar to that of 1918, but it was added that a school must be closed forthwith if it was found to be teaching or preparing to teach any doctrine inciting hatred towards the Siamese king or the Siamese government, which caused class antagonisms, and which encouraged people to violate the law. Phuangphit proposes that the law of 1927 was amended to control Chinese schools in particular and was so strict that a Chinese school must be immediately closed if it broke the regulation.\textsuperscript{281}

The law of 1927 affected many Chinese schools in Surat Thani, particularly the Hainanese ones, which were later closed after the Siamese authorities found the political activities of the CCP in such schools. In addition to the rise of Chinese nationalism, another dimension of the Chinese community was the political movement associated with the CCP in Surat Thani and elsewhere in South East Asia. In order to understand the transnational networks of the CCP in South East Asia and how they affected Chinese schools, particularly in Ko Samui, one of the most important strongholds of the

\textsuperscript{278} Phuangphit, พระวรวงศ์เธอ, 18.
\textsuperscript{279} Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 144.
\textsuperscript{280} Eiji Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม การเคลื่อนไหวทางการเมืองของชาวจีนโพ้นทะเลในประเทศไทย ค.ศ. 1924-1941 (Sino-Siamese Politics: Political Movement of the Overseas Chinese in Thailand from 1924-1941), (Bangkok: Goodwill Press (Thailand) Co., LTD., 1996), 79.
\textsuperscript{281} Phuangphit, พระวรวงศ์เธอ, 16-17.
Hainanese diaspora and the CCP, it is necessary to consider briefly the history of the CCP in Siam.

The first Chinese communist who engaged with the political movement in Siam was Tan Zhensan (譚振三), who founded a Chinese newspaper named Kew Sing (僑聲) in 1922. His printing press was also used for printing documents about the Bolsheviks and he opened a library to spread communist ideas.\(^{282}\) As a result of his ideas and activities, he was deported on 19 May 1926. Zheng Shengyi (鄭省一) and Wang Buxian (王步先), who were members of the CCP and joined the Nationalist Party, took over Kew Sing and changed its name to Li Sae (勵青). When the CCP separated from the Nationalist Party in 1927, the two of them were expelled from the committee of the Nationalist Party in Siam. Therefore, Li Sae was used in the struggle against the Nationalists, who used Chino-Siamese Daily News (華暹新報) as its mouthpiece.\(^{283}\)

It should be noted that the majority of the CCP members were Hainanese, the largest dialect group in Surat Thani. Additionally, they contacted with other CCP organisations in British Malaya.\(^{284}\) Shortly after the establishment of the CCP branch in Siam in 1927, a group of Hainanese in Bangkok founded Ia Bu Lao Tong Lian Ha Huai Kan Chiang, meaning “the association of labour who worked with foreigners in Siam”. This secret association aimed to control labour and follow the principles of communism.\(^{285}\) In British Malaya, the purging of the CCP in 1927 by Chiang Kai-shek, or Jiang Jieshi (蔣介石, 1887-1975), a Chinese military leader, head of the Chinese Nationalist government (1928-1949) and the government in exile on Taiwan (1950-1975), resulted in a split in the radicals, leading to the establishment of splinter organisations such as the Modern Revolutionary Committee of the GMD of China, the Southseas Provisional Commission of the Communist Party of China, the Communist Youth Party

\(^{282}\) Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 75.
\(^{283}\) Ibid., 76.
\(^{284}\) Phuangphit, นโยบาย, 26.
\(^{285}\) Ibid., 25.
and the Nanyang Labour Union. These organisations consisted mostly of the Hainanese, who devoted their energy to spreading communism amongst Malayan Chinese.\footnote{286 Purcell, \textit{The Chinese in Southeast Asia}, 299.}

The CCP was also involved in Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam. Many Chinese teachers were accused of being Bolsheviks and induced Siamese to join. In 1927, Lim Zhakchuan, a Teochiu who worked in Sammin School at Hat Yai, was accused of being a Bolshevik in Zheng Shengyi’s gang and expatriated on 6 June.\footnote{287 Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 79.} Murashima observes the difference in the political movements between the GMD and the CCP, noting that the GMD aimed to mobilise only the Chinese in Siam while the later wanted to include Siamese people as members.\footnote{288 Ibid., 86.} This led to the severe crackdown on Chinese schools because many Chinese teachers were CCP members.

The severe crackdown on Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam can be traced back to the visit of King Prajadhipok to Ko Samui and other southern provinces in 1928. He found that many Chinese schools were flagrantly violating the law and ignoring the orders of the education inspectors. His tour was immediately followed by the new Minister of Education devising a new law to control these schools adequately.\footnote{289 Purcell, \textit{The Chinese in Southeast Asia}, 143.} Following His Majesty’s tour in 1928, the Siamese authorities strictly enforced the Private School Act of 1927 as a tool to crackdown on Chinese schools. By the end of 1928, the education officer of Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat, of which Surat Thani was a part, commanded that Chinese teachers in this area, even in kindergarten, must have a good command of the Thai language and strictly follow the law on Private Schools. For the kindergartens, there was normally no educational requirement for teachers prior to 1928.\footnote{290 NAT, MOE 54.5/20 เรื่อง ธรรมการมณฑลนครศรีธรรมราชหารือเรื่องครูร.อ.อนุบาลจะต้องมีความรู้ภาษาไทยด้วยหรือไม่ (Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat Education officer asked for an advice of elementary school teachers should have a command of Thai language based on the Private Schools Act). Document dated 24 November- 5 December 1928, 2-5.} This led to an interesting phenomenon. Some Chinese had to close their schools for a period of time to find qualified teachers. Chinese teacher wages
had risen due to their popularity and the shortage of them until these brought into the closure of many Chinese schools following 1928.

In Ko Samui, Lim Xixiam, a Chinese teacher at Tiang Thon O’iao School, resigned his position on 30 April 1929 after complaining that there were too many students to teach and having a request for a payrise rejected by the manager. Therefore, Ngao Dengxim, the manager, had to find new two teachers, Ngao Sengsuan and Oui Thonggian, to do the Thai language examination. Sengsuan successfully passed the exam on 1 August while Thonggian did not. However, he was later accused of being a communist and sent to Bangkok on January 1930. In Chumphon, a neighbouring province of Surat Thani, Yat-sen School (Night School) in Chumphon had to close its door in April 1928 after all students resigned because the manager could not find any qualified Chinese teachers. Meanwhile, Dongsunkokmin School in Nakhon Si Thammarat, another neighbouring province, also suffered the same fate.

In the case of Keemong School, in Bandon’s Chinatown, Shou Caikun, or Luang Prajak, a Teochew tycoon, the manager of the school asked for permission to accept Lim Mengzheng, a Teochew, to be a teacher on 2 September 1929. Although he failed the Thai language test, he did well compared with other Chinese teachers in the area. In contrast, Phraya Surat Thani, the governor of Surat Thani, wrote to Phraya Si Thammarat on 19 September that this case should be considered leniently, because he had paid a lot of attention to Thai language study. He thus should be allowed to study Thai language additionally if he would be allowed to teach. On 22 September, Phraya Si Thammarat,  

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291 NAT, MOE 54.5/24 เรื่อง เปลี่ยนแปลงผู้จัดการและครูร. มาช นครศรีธรรมราช (Asking to change the managers and teachers of the schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 1930-1932, 328-350.  
292 NAT, MOE 54.1/1474 เรื่อง ร.ร.ต่างๆ มนตรีเขตศรีธรรมราช ขอให้ร.ร.เลิกการสอน (The Schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat asked for permission to close their schools). Document dated 1928, 2-8.  
293 NAT, MOE 54.1/1471 ส่งรายงานของผู้จัดการโรงเรียนของจังหวัดนครศรีธรรมราช (The manager of Dongsunkokmin School asked for a permission to close his school). Document dated 16 June-25 September 1930, 1-12.  
294 NAT, MOE 54.5/24, 291-294.  
295 NAT, MOE 54.5/35 เรื่อง ส่งข้อสอบ คำตอบ บัญชีตัววิเคราะห์คะแนนสอบความรู้และความเห็นเจ้าหน้าที่ กับรายงานวิเคราะห์ (Sending exam, answer, score table and officer’s comment on receiving teacher). Document dated 2/09/1929 to 13/11/1929, 3.
the governor of Nakhon Si Thammarat, strongly opposed the idea and insisted that the regulations must be unyielding for private Chinese schools.

Here we start to see the effect of Thai-ification programme. The Chinese began to struggle to maintain their Chinese schools. Some of them, for example, signed their names in Thai with the royal title received from the Siamese king to show their royal connections. Shou Caikun, the manager of Keemong School, signed his name in Thai with his royal title (see Figure 2.5).296 Another manager of Keemong School, Khun Chinkanaphiban (Jiam Xiukiam) (see Figure 2.6), who received royal title on 8 November 1930, also did the same.297 This also happened in the case of Khun Piyarataree, a manager of Fakiaogongli in Nakhon Si Thammarat, and Khun Chinthurakan, or Tianiew Limkoonpong, and Khunpoonphanit of Tianghuahakhao, in Satun, a province in southern Siam, while others signed in Chinese.298 In addition, the chairman of the board of Huanan School in Pattani, another southern province, signed his royal title in Thai to communicate with the Ministry while other Chinese who had no royal title signed in Chinese.299

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296 NAT, MOE 54.5/24, 293.
297 NAT, MOE 54.5/83, 70.
299 NAT, MOE 54.5/84 เรื่อง แจ้งความจำนงต้องโรงเรียนมณฑลนครศรีธรรมราช (Asking for permission to establish schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 1933, 45-46.
Moreover, many Chinese schools sent their teachers to study Thai language in Bangkok in order to prepare for the language examinations, particularly in the case of Tueanghua School in Satun, a South Siam province. The manager of this school sent a teacher to Bangkok until his accent was similar to that of Bangkok, for which he was praised by the local officer.  

In addition, the Siamese government made communicating with them more difficult and cumbersome. Therefore, many Chinese schools appointed only one manager to communicate with the Siamese authorities. Firstly, the Chinese schools might simply want to contact with the local authorities easier and faster. Secondly, they possibly wanted to appoint a person who had power or royal connections to deal with the local authorities. Lastly, they might want to hide certain Chinese from the Siamese government because it was possible that some of them were members of the CCP or participated in Chinese national politics while they financially supported the Chinese schools. In Ko Samui, a stronghold of the Hainanese diaspora and the CCP, Pu Hongseung (符洪成) was given authorization by three former managers, namely Ngao Toneyeng (吳選仍), Lim Yongyao (林鴻曜), and Po Kokhui (潘鵠輝), to act on behalf of the matter of Tiang Thon O’iao School on February 1926. In 1928, the task was handed over to Ngao Dengsim (吳盛深) after the school elected a new group of managers. Zhongshan School in Chumphon, and Fakiaogongli School, Nakhon Si Thammarat, also asked for the same permission. In general, there were mostly four managers in Chinese schools. Some, nevertheless, had eight managers such as Dongsunkokmin School in Nakhon Si Thammarat etc.

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300 NAT, MOE 54.5/31 เรื่องกระทรวงสอนภาษาไทยให้แก่ผู้เรียนในโรงเรียนจังหวัดนครศรีธรรมราช โรงเรียนจังหวัดนครศรีธรรมราชให้สู่จัดการคนหนึ่ง (The Ministry of Education allowed Mr. Luwifa Saelu to be Chinese teacher at Tueanghua School). Document dated 27 May-25 July 1929, 3-4.

301 NAT, MOE 54.5/11 โรงเรียนจังหวัดนครศรีธรรมราชให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่งให้ผู้จัดการคนหนึ่�
By the end of 1929, the political movement of the CCP in Siam was very active. Leaflets about Communist propaganda, not only in Chinese but also in Thai and English, were published by “The South Sea Communist Party, the Special Committee in Siam” (南洋共產黨暹羅特別委員會). The CCP members, for example, were bold enough to spread leaflets by car on Bangkok streets on 11 December 1929. Two interesting demands appeared on the leaflets: a call for people to topple a tyrant, aristocracy and landlords in Siam; and a demand that a democratic republic in Siam be established.304 On 12 December 1929, those Chinese who spread these leaflets were arrested at a meeting at Jintek School in Bangkok. The group members consisted of 18 Hainanese, two Cantonese, two Teochew and two representatives from the head office in Singapore.305 This is significant as it underlined the fact that most of CCP members in South East Asia were Hainanese and that the CCP members of these transnational political organisations were connected together.

Surat Thani was one of the most important CCP networks in South East Asia. The Chinese in Ko Samui and other Chinatowns in the coastal area of Surat Thani controlled the coconut industry of Siam and had connections with the Hainanese who traded with them in Bangkok. Peicai School in Ko Samui established after the end of the Second World War, was also financially supported by the Bangkok Chinese who traded in coconut products.306 By the end of 1929, the movement of the CCP in Ko Samui was also apparent. On 31 January 1930, Ngao Sengsuan, a Hainese working as a teacher at Tiang Thon O’iao School, was accused of being a Communist and was arrested in Ko Samui.307 Ngao, who had passed the language test on 1 August 1929 with a high score (72.50%), was officially allowed with the Ministry in December of that year. Another teacher, Oui Thongkian, who was a Hainanese and took the examination on the same day, failed the test. Being a communist and failing the test led to the catastrophe of Chinese

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304 Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 80.
305 Ibid.
306 See Chapter 5.
307 NAT, MOE 54.5/24, Ngao Dengxim, the manager of Tiang Thon O’iao School, to Prince Dhani Nivat, the Minister of Education, in a letter dated 10 February 1930, 350.
education in Ko Samui. Tiang Thon O’iao School started to encounter financial problems and therefore had to ask permission to temporarily close for two months from May to June in 1930 in order to gather donations from the Chinese community and to find qualified Chinese teachers.\textsuperscript{308} The school, utilising the building of the Hainanese temple of Nathon, finally closed its doors on 1 July owing to a shortage of funds and money.\textsuperscript{309}

Meanwhile, on 15 April 1930, the police arrested seven Hainanese in Ko Samui and accused them of spreading communism. The police wrote that they “criticised the system of Siamese government, committed lese-majeste, encouraged people to rebel, fought against imperialism, founded a democratic movement and mounted a propaganda campaign against the Emperors’ supporters.”\textsuperscript{310} Two of them were brought to court and the others were deported to China.

In 1930, His Majesty also expressed his concern about the CCP’s attempts to spread communism and the fact that many radicals remained at large. His statement spurred heightened police activity and the subsequent capture and arrest of many CCP members, including Ngo Tichi (伍治之), a Teochew who used to be a teacher, now a CCP leader in Siam.\textsuperscript{311} Deportation was used as a tool by the Siamese government to deal with the CCP movement, and many anarchists or Communists/Bolsheviks were deported.\textsuperscript{312} Throughout 1929 to 1930, many Chinese were arrested and accused of being communists. For example, in 1929 in Bangkok a newspaper accused Jisai School of being communist and an alleged Chinese visitor who was a friend of the school keeper was arrested. However, the Siamese school headmaster also sent textbooks used in the school to the inspector, one of which was a textbook about the Three Principles of Sun

\textsuperscript{308} NAT, MOE 54.1/1464 ส่งรายงานของผู้จัดการโรงเรียนเดียงก้องมา ขอยืมทำการสอน ๒ เดือน (The manager of Tiang Thon O’iao School asked for permission to temporarily close his school for two months). Document dated 1930, 1-13.
\textsuperscript{309} NAT, MOE 54.1/1476 ส่งรายงานของผู้จัดการโรงเรียนเดียงก้องมาขอเลิกโรงเรียน (The manager of Tiang Thon O’iao School asked for permission to close his school). Document dated 22 July 1930, 1-8.
\textsuperscript{310} NAT, ร. 7 ม.18/12 Cited in Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 83.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid., 87-88.
\textsuperscript{312} Ibid., 82.
Yatsen. In 1929, Iangchai School in Bangkok had to close its doors because its teachers were accused of being Communists. On February 1929, Dang Lak, a Chinese teacher, was arrested for being a Communist and inciting others to join in a leaflet in three languages. In 1930, four Chinese teachers of Mikang School were captured for being Communists after the police found books about communism during an inspection. They were finally deported on 5 September. This led to the closure of the school by the manager, Im Taekoon (姚子謙).

Many Chinese claimed that they aimed to teach Chinese students commercial skills when they asked permission to open Chinese schools. For example, in 1931 Lim Mengdong and Dan Kheelim, two Hainanese from Phunphin, Surat Thani, founded Yok Hian School, whose room shared the same building with their Hainanese temple. It aimed to equip Chinese students with commercial skills. This attracted some Siamese children to study in Chinese schools because they wanted to study the Chinese language, as it was the lingua franca of commerce in the region. However, although this may have been true to an extent, Chinese schools generally perpetuated Chinese nationalism and taught politics. The King thus ordered that there would be Chinese language classes in some Siamese schools in order to prevent these Siamese children from Chinese teachers who might teach them political doctrines that were deemed a threat to his throne. His view paved the way for a Chinese language curriculum in many Siamese commercial colleges which were founded by the civilian government after the Siamese revolution of 1932.

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313 NAT, MOE 54.1/1449 หนังสือพิมพ์พลังชาเรื่อง ร.ร.จิลัยเป็นคอมมิวนิสต์ 2472 (A newspaper published an article accusing Jisai School of being Communists in 1929). Document dated 1929, 1-10.
314 NAT, MOE 54.1/1450 เรื่อง โรงเรียนยื้อและายุการสนับสนุนคอมมิวนิสต์ (Iangchai School was accused of being Communists). Document dated 8/02/1929 to 18/02/1929, 2-10.
315 NAT, MOE 54.1/1478 เรื่อง จับครูโรงเรียนมีๆ ถูกจับ zarathustra ซึ่งเป็นคอมมิวนิสต์ (Mikang School’s teachers were arrested of being Communists). Document dated 29/07/1930 to 26/09/1930, 2-30.
316 NAT, MOE 54.8/2 หมายเหตุรายชื่อโรงเรียนมีและจังหวัดที่มีการยื่นคำร้องเรื่องการอนุญาตโรงเรียนเป็นภาษาจีน (Asking for permission to establish Yok Hian School at Phunphin, Thakham, Surat Thani). Document dated 7/05/1931 to 10/01/1931, 1-18.
317 Phuangphit, นโยบาย, 97.
In conclusion, the CCP in Surat Thai and elsewhere in Siam tried to mobilise not only Chinese nationals but also Siamese people, while the GMD targeted only their fellow countrymen. The Siamese government, therefore, amended the Private School Act in 1927 to control both Chinese nationalism and the CCP. This affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani, leading to the closure of Tiang Thon O’iao School in Ko Samui. At the same time, many Chinese teachers and others were captured and deported from Siam. The next section discusses the Chinese response to the Thai-ification policies after the Siamese revolution of 1932.

IV. The Chinese Response to the Thai-ification Policies after the Siamese Revolution of 1932

The kings of the Chakri Dynasty ruled Siam as absolute monarchs. During one of the most intense periods of European imperialism, Siam survived colonialism. Chulalongkorn (1853-1910), the venerated king on the throne during this critical period, launched a programme of reforms to modernise his country. The two less capable kings, Vajiravudh (1880-1925) and Prajadhipok, who succeeded him, were unsuccessful in maintaining the positive momentum, however. In 1932, Western-educated and dissatisfied civilians and military officials, namely the Promoters of the People’s Party, mounted a coup detat that put an end to the absolute monarchy and changed the system of government to a constitutional monarchy. Prajadhipok visited England for medical treatment in 1934 and abdicated the throne the following year. The Promoters replaced him with Ananda Mahidol (1925-1946), who did not return to Siam but was studying in Switzerland. After the Siamese revolution of 1932, the new government ordered that all children should receive a national education to prepare them to be beneficial citizens of the country. The new Compulsory Education Act was introduced in 1932 stating that every Chinese primary school was commanded to teach Chinese language no more than seven and a half hours per week. The law was applied in Surat Thani and every province except Bangkok and Phuket. The following year, the provisions of this act were promulgated in all areas and the Private School Act of 1927 was applied seriously, which

affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani to a great extent. The civilian government also launched the Private School Act of 1936, which had a considerable effect on Chinese education in Siam. This section investigates the Chinese response to the Thai-ification programme from 1932 to 1937.

Before addressing the launch of the Private School Act of 1936, it is necessary to examine the draft of the Private School Act of 1932 that the law of 1936 was based, and which had affected Chinese schools in Surat Thani and elsewhere. This draft not only revealed the Siamese point of view towards Chinese education, but also the ways the Chinese devised to preserve their Chinese schools. The Private School Act of 1932, drafted from 1930 to 1934, paved the way for the Private School Act of 1936 that was launched by the civilian government. However, even though there was a draft, but the law did not come into effect until 1936.

Despite the introduction and the strict usage of the Private School Act of 1927, the Chinese still exploited loopholes of the law to escape the Thai-ification programme. Some of them even violated and ignored the law and orders of the inspectors. Political Chinese movements were still found in many Chinese schools. The response of the Siamese government to this defiance took the form of a plan to launch the Private School Act of 1932, but it was not introduced due to the Siamese Revolution of 1932, which marked the end of absolute monarchy and changed the government system to a constitutional monarchy. The Siamese government began to draft the law of 1932 in 1930 and the civilian government even continued to discuss until 1934. The year 1930 was seen by the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary as time to crackdown on such schools because the Chinese nationalism and the movement of the CCP in Siam were very active (see Section III). 319

The laws of 1918 and 1927 required that in every foreign school the principal must have completed at least two years of Siamese schooling. Therefore, the Chinese had to hire mostly Siamese headmasters to work for their Chinese schools. The Siamese

319 NAT, (2) MOE 8.1/1., 304.
authorities, however, discovered that these Siamese headmasters were paid by the MChinese to work for many different Chinese schools at the same time because they did not have to stay or teach at school according to the regulations. The law was thus adapted to add that headmasters must work in only one school because the Siamese government wished to use them to inspire Chinese students to speak Thai. The law also commanded that headmasters must have a sufficient knowledge of the colloquial language and be able to speak it fairly well even at kindergartens in order to inspire those preschoolers to cherish the Thai language and make the subject popular.\textsuperscript{320}

Almost all Chinese in Siam had more than one name and, moreover, changed their names many times to avoid the inspections.\textsuperscript{321} It was therefore difficult for the Siamese authorities to inspect the schools. The law of 1932 was thus amended to state that every letter requesting permission to open a school must attach photographs of managers, headmasters and teachers to prevent violations. For example, Dua Tao, a Chinese teacher at Handong School, left the position because he could not pass the Thai language examination. However, he changed his name to Daixiu in order to apply for a post of Chinese teacher at Xiamhua School, Petchaburi. The government thought that he had never registered as a Chinese teacher before and then allowed him to temporarily teach until he passed the language test.\textsuperscript{322} The idea of having the Chinese attach their pictures was modeled on the French Cochinchina, which required those asking for a license to establish Chinese schools to attach their pictures with the documents.\textsuperscript{323}

As the Siamese authorities found many Chinese textbooks about Chinese politics that were dangerous in the eyes of the Siamese government, it was proposed in 1928 to inspect those textbooks. Legally, those who brought books into the country had to send them to the National Library to be inspected. However, there was no mark or symbol that they were approved for use in schools.\textsuperscript{324} As a result, the Chinese could freely bring and use any book in their schools. The authorities also found them difficult to inspect because

\textsuperscript{320} Ibid., 179.
\textsuperscript{321} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{322} Ibid., 12.
\textsuperscript{323} Ibid., 187.
\textsuperscript{324} Ibid., 16.
most of them did not know Chinese. They also did not trust the translators because most of them were ethnic Chinese.

World history textbooks of the Nanjing period (1927-1937) emphasized imperialism and anti-colonialism, influenced by Sun Yatsen’s anti-imperialist nationalism and the growing global trend of anti-colonialism which had emerged after World War I. Sun’s words for “weak and small peoples” (弱小民族) was used to show the shared experience of imperialist domination and anti-colonial resistance by non-European communities. That leaders of the Nationalist Party and affiliated intellectuals adopted this narrative of nation formation on the Euro-American pattern as a model for world history was analysed by Robert J. Culp. The flip side of the “weak and small people” made Siamese authorities believe that they were being looked down on for being exploited as it was written that Chinese students were taught Siam was controlled by the “Imperialist” for “exploitation”.

The authorities, therefore, cooperated with other colonial governments in South East Asia to regulate Chinese schools better. A list of banned Chinese textbooks was exchanged amongst them. In the case of Batavia, there were a variety of books used in Chinese schools that ran into hundreds. However, the Dutch East Indian Government (D.E.I.) regulated that such schools should be kept free from all political influence as far as the pupils were concerned although the establishment and expansion of such schools were not restricted. In the eyes of the colonial governments, the GMD were using the textbooks in which the revolutionary doctrine of Dr. Sun was being promulgated to spread these political doctrines outside China. To prevent politics from entering Chinese schools, Chinese education was placed under control in 1923.

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325 Ibid., 14.
326 Ibid., 64.
328 Ibid., 64.
In 1931, it was planned to regulate the plates of the Chinese schools to be “prominently inscribed in Siamese” in order to make the Thai alphabet larger than Chinese characters.\textsuperscript{330} In 1934, it was reported that the Chinese schools were used as a place for business meetings and meetings of the members of the GMD and the CCP, which obviously had nothing to do with education. Therefore, it was later proposed that the schools should be used only for the meetings of managers, teachers and students. It prohibited any visitors from staying at schools.\textsuperscript{331} This was due to the fact that Chinese communists or adherents of other political doctrines were often captured with their inflammatory literature in Chinese school buildings.

By looking at the draft of the Private School Act of 1932, we can see that the Chinese from 1930 to 1934 used many ways to preserve Chinese education. Although the Siamese government planned to launch the law in 1932, it was not enforced, as there came an end of the absolute monarchy in Siam. The law was eventually applied in 1936 when the civilian government decided to launch another Private School Act to control the Chinese schools more efficiently.

Another event in many Chinatowns after the Siamese revolution of 1932 was that the Chinese established many English language schools. Notably, some night schools were established in the local schools and donated part of their profits to the local schools. For example, Boe Yang English Night School in Songkhla, a southern province located in the same Monthon as Surat Thani, was established by Senglim Jeeraphan, a son of Chinese, in the building of Phrachaban Boe Yang 1 School.\textsuperscript{332} However, most of them were local-born Chinese and had graduated from Siamese schools.

\textsuperscript{330} Ibid., 185.
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 177.
\textsuperscript{332} NAT, MOE 54.5/46., 131-140.
There was also a movement to teach English in Chinese schools. For instance, Huanan School asked for permission to teach English in 1933. This year also saw the high popularity of English education until Songkhla English Night School, which was established on the premises of Fakiao School, was forced to terminate operations because the managers of Fakiao wanted to open their own English night school in order to gain more money to support their own daytime school.

Suryadinata proposes that the division amongst the older generation Chinese in Malaysia and Singapore was between the Chinese-educated and English-educated. The economic activities of the Peranakan and Sinkeh, or Xinke (新客), meaning new comers, were different. The former participated mostly in the shipping and banking sectors, which required knowledge of the English language, while the latter worked more in agriculture and trading. Moreover, the Peranakan elites were politically UK-oriented, while the Sinkeh considered themselves part of the larger Chinese nation. In 1950s, Diana Ooi used the term “Baba” to refer to “English-educated Chinese,” as if every Baba was English-educated. In South Siam, there were no reports of English language study in Surat Thani. This was partly because most of the Chinese were farmers and traders. Based on the archival documents, English language study was popular in Monthon Phuket, where the Chinese engaged in tin mining and had a close relationship with the Peranakan in Penang, who also participated in tin mining, and Songkhla, where the Chinese had established contacts with Singapore.

In the colonial era, the Peranakan were also known as the “Straits Chinese”. To be Straits Chinese meant “a socially higher and even superior status than that of other Chinese.” In South Siam, many Chinese started to sign their name in English in

333 NAT, MOE 54/5/84.
334 NAT, MOE 52.5/82 เรื่อง ผู้จัดการร.ร.นางบุษบกกลีกสกิลสารถั่วรำคั้นแง้ว ผู้จัดการร.ร.นางบุษบกกลีกสกิลสารถั่วรำคั้น (The manager of Songkhla English School asked for the instruction after the managers of Fa Kiao School no longer wanted to allow his school to utilise the school premises), 2-6.
336 Ibid., 84.
communications with the authorities. For example, Oui Boon Kia signed his name in English to acknowledge to the Ministry of Education that he was the new manager of Tianghuohakhao School in Satun.\(^{337}\) The manager of Poyek School in Trang, a province once in Monthon Phuket, also signed his name in English in communication with the authorities (see Figure 2.7).\(^{338}\)

![Figure 2.7: The signature of the manager of Poyek School](image)

After 1932, many Chinese schools began to hire local-born Chinese who studied in Chinese primary schools in Siam and graduated from Chinese high schools in China, Penang and Singapore. This was due to the fact that they did not have to take a Thai language examination. For examine, Kao Xiaoyok, a local-born Hainanese, was hired by Pakbun School in Nakhon Si Thammarat after his graduation from Singapore because he did not have to take the Thai language examination, as did the mainland-born Chinese.\(^{339}\) Similarly, Fakiao School in Songkhla preferred to hire a local-born Chinese with a certificate from China.\(^{340}\) In Phuket, Poihua School also hired Hokzhai Chaowana, a local-born Chinese, who graduated from Penang in 1933.\(^{341}\) Many Chinese teachers even

\(^{337}\) NAT, MOE 54.5/83., 100.
\(^{338}\) NAT, MOE 54.11/62 เรื$อง รับและจําหน่ายครูน ้อยมณฑลภูเก็ต (Registration and withdrawal of the teachers), 70.
\(^{339}\) Ibid., 56.
\(^{340}\) Ibid., 108.
\(^{341}\) NAT, MOE 54.11/62, 1-16.
graduated from university, as did Hiu Hiudai, a Hakka who graduated from Jinan University in Nanjing and worked at Poyek School in Trang, another southern province.\(^{342}\)

As many local-born Chinese went to China for a Chinese education, there was a movement to establish Thai student associations in China in 1933 by Meng Leelaphan, a local-born Chinese. The association, which had its head office in Hong Kong, was not recognised by the Siamese government until late 1932.\(^{343}\) The Siamese government eventually recognised its existence because it might have wanted to maintain connections with Thai students, even though they were Chinese by blood, in case they worked as government officers in the future. It could mean that not all Chinese were loyal to Chiang Kai-shek. Perhaps they wanted to play games. Nevertheless, it shows that people could be on both sides, possibly because they wanted to remain on good terms with the two governments.

To mobilise Chinese children and people in Siam, plays were used as a tool to construct Chinese national consciousness. Student performances were also used to collect money to support Chinese schools. Pengbin School in Nakhon Si Thammarat, for example, closed its school for 20 days to have Chinese students perform in Songkhla in order to collect money for a new building.\(^{344}\) The “public commemoration of war” or “ritual” could shape the perception of citizens on their own culture and define who they were or “others” were. Historically speaking, in Taiwan Japan used textbooks as a tool to

\(^{342}\) Ibid., 68-77.

\(^{343}\) NAT, MOE 26/1044 เข้าพุทธารายการรัฐมนตรี ขอให้ผู้สอบสวนความเป็นไปของสมาคมนักเรียนไทยในประเทศจีน (The Secretary of the Prime Minister wanted to investigate the association of Thai students in China), Prachet, the Secretary of the Ministry of Education, to the Secretary of the Prime Minister, in a letter dated 18 November 1936, 7.

\(^{344}\) NAT, MOE 54.5/61 เรื่อง โรงเรียนป้องกัน ขออนุญาตปิดโรงเรียนชั่วคราว (Pengbin School asked permission to temporarily close its school), Chua Yokpek (蔡正常) to Phra Phinetsukpracha, Chief District of Pak Phranang, in a letter dated 15 October 1932.
mobilise people to support Japan’s war effort. Stories of battles and soldiers were featured even in Shotoka ongaku (初等科音樂), or Elementary Music.\textsuperscript{345}

Therefore, the Chinese in Siam would also use plays to implant a sense of Chinese nationalism in their students. In 1933, Daitong School in Bangkok held a student fair and performed a celebration to raise money. Some of the plays from the list were related to the situation in China and Chinese nationalism such as Soul of the Nation (國魂).\textsuperscript{346} Five plays out of eleven were related to gender equality. For example, “the love of father” (爸爸的愛) was used to object to “inappropriate traditions” such as arranged marriages in order to free women and “civilise” China. Some plays also showed pictures of women who were dedicated to nation and war. “Lonely woman” (孤女) joined the volunteer regiment to fight after she lost her mother in war. “A wound” (傷後) was about two male and female students who fell in love and volunteered to be a soldier and a nurse in order to rid the country of its enemies. “A philanthropist” (慈善家) told a story about a young woman who raised money donated from people for flood victims in China. “No time yet” (未到時候) shows the ability of teachers and students to use English.\textsuperscript{347} However, this situation also reveals that the Thai-ification programme was successful as the permission of the Siamese government had to be asked to stage these plays.

The promotion of Siamese education was an important plank in the platform of the new Siamese government after the Siamese revolution of 1932. Within ten years, the Siamese government wanted to have a population 50 per cent literate, and Chinese schools were seen as an impediment to attaining this goal.\textsuperscript{348} To check the progress, the Siamese authorities inspected Chinese schools in Bangkok and found that many of them could not even read the Thai language although they had been studying for years.


\textsuperscript{346} NAT, MOE 54.1/1615 เรื่อง ผู้จัดการโรงเรียนได้ทำการแสดงละครและคืนปิดกลับของเพื่อความรื่นเริง แล้วเก็บเงินบํารุงโรงเรียน (The manager of Daitong School would have the plays and student fairs for celebrations and to collect money to support the school), 5.

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid., 1-10.

\textsuperscript{348} Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, 144.
Therefore, the provisions of the Compulsory Education Act were promulgated and came into force in every province in March 1933, and were accompanied by rigorous and unyielding inspections of Chinese schools.

In 1932, the government commanded that every Chinese primary school must teach the government curriculum for 25 hours per week, limiting foreign language to seven and a half hours per week. The law was applied to all areas except Bangkok, while Phuket was given special status by its governor, Aditaya Dibabha, and Chinese language was allowed to be taught for 11 hours per week in recognition of the large contribution of the Chinese to commerce in this area. In 1933, many Chinese schools reportedly violated the law by establishing schools without permission, hiring outsiders to teach and refusing to stick to the timetable. As a result, Phraya Amornsakprasit, Phuket’s new governor, issued an instruction to every governor in Monthon Phuket to strictly enforce the law and the special status was withdrawn.

According to the report of an education official in Surat Thani (1932), Keemong School was the single Chinese school left in the province. It was reported that there were three Teochew male teachers, two Thai teachers, and 40 Thai male students, 13 Thai female students, 37 Chinese male students and 16 Chinese female students. The year of the closure of this school is unknown but it is highly possible that it was closed between 1933 and 1936, after the Compulsory Education Act of 1933 was enforced and the inspection of Chinese schools became stricter.

During 1932 to 1933, we began to see the effects of the new Compulsory Education Act introduced by the civilian government and the serious application of the

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349 NAT, MOE 54.11/71 เรื่องจังหวัดภูเก็ตขอให้พิจารณา รร.สอนภาษาจีนเป็นพิเศษเพราะเหตุภาษาจีนเป็นสิ่งสำคัญในการประกอบอาชีพทางพาณิชยกรรมของจังหวัด (Phuket province asked for the reconsideration of the law applied to Chinese schools in the province because it was an important tool of provincial commerce), 129.
350 NAT, MOE 54.11/63 เรื่องแนวทางเกี่ยวกับการดำเนินการปฏิบัติตามพระราชบัญญัติ ร.ราชบุรีสิ่งไม่ให้จัดการพิเศษตามบัญญัติ (Monthon Phuket sent the draft of suggestions on how to follow the Private School Act), 1-9.
Private School Act of 1927 in Surat Thani’s Chinatown. Keemong, the first Chinese school in Surat Thani, was established and financially supported by Liao Chiangsoon, one of the most well-known Chinese in Siam, from the beginning, but in the 1930s the task was handed over to Shou Caikun, another notable Teochew in Bandon’s Chinatown. The last contact with local education officers that could be found occurred in 1933. It was written that Jiam Xiukiam, or Khun Chinkhanaphiban, was the only remaining manager of the school after Shou died in 1932. On 22 February 1932, Jinkia Patjakkhapat, a son of Shou, was invited to be the second manager to help further run the business of the school. Jinkia was a local-born Teochew in Bandon, and was revered by many Chinese in Chinatown.352

In 1934, the Siamese newspapers started to publish articles attacking the Chinese for challenging the Compulsory Education Act. One person, for example, on June 1934, wrote an article in Siam Newspaper about Chinese parents and their children. In the article, Chinese parents were accused of being conservative and stated that female Chinese children in particular were told by their parents to help their family to do commerce instead of going to school. These Chinese children chose to study in Chinese schools owing to the fact that they could choose when to go and leave their schools.353 Therefore, on 18 January 1934, Phra Sarasesprapan, the minister of Education, called a meeting of the Chinese school managers and handed over documents stating that all licenses given to Chinese schools had to be withdrawn because many Chinese schools did not obey the regulations. It was ordered that all primary schools where the Chinese language was taught had to close their doors by 1 April 1935.354 The Chinese language was seen as a threat because the education authorities wanted to “protect the country from

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352 NAT, MOE 54.5/78 เรื่อง เปลี่ยนแปลงผู้จัดการโรงเรียนคีมง (Changing the manager of Kee-Mong School), 1-19.
353 NAT, (2) MOE 1/219 สงส่าบทบาทโรงเรียนที่มีการรับผิดชอบในงานศึกษา จ.ดาว (An article in “Siam” newspaper about education in many provinces), 9.
354 NAT, (2) SOC (The Secretariat of the Cabinet) 0201.24.2/1 เรื่อง เหมาะสมการสอนและจำนวนเวลาเรียนประถมศึกษาให้แก่โรงเรียนมัธยมศึกษา (Curriculum matching up and the number of units or hours required in primary school lectures for each course to private schools, Rene Perros), the manager of Mission Roman Catholic School of Bangkok to Phraya Phahonphonphayuhasena, the Prime Minister, in a letter dated 14 February 1934, 77.
being swallowed…“.

The Chinese were compared to European Jews by the Minister of Education and Sun’s principles were seen as nothing other than German nationalism in Germany and Poland.

Moreover, the Siamese government wanted to prepare the local born Chinese to be ready for the election since the election law of 1932 was amended in 1933 stating that Thai nationals had the right to vote, but if their father was a foreigner they must study in the national curriculum until ninth grade. Therefore, the Chinese were indirectly forced to study in Siamese schools if they wanted to enjoy this right.

In the response to this critical situation, many Chinese schools from Siam were relocated to British Malaya and D.E.I.

In South Siam, after the closure of all Chinese schools in Songkhla, a rumour spread in 1934 that the government would stop Chinese children from going abroad in 1935. Without government permission, those who insisted on going had to pay 100-200 Baht. Chinese parents, therefore, sent a large number of their children to study abroad after they heard the rumour. Some even considered establishing Chinese schools in Padang Besar, Perlis, a city of British Malaya, situated on the border of Songkhla. The panic of the Chinese in Songkhla and other parts of South Siam, including Surat Thani, was reported in Krungdeb Varasab on 5 March 1934, which stated that “Southern Chinese rushed their children to go abroad.” It claimed that Chinese merchants sent about 500 children, both male and female, abroad. Penang was the most favoured destination.

The Police Department, under the control of the Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, saw the actions of the Ministry of Education as too severe

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355 Ibid., the Minister of Education to the Prime Minister, in a letter dated 28 March 1934, 93.
356 Ibid., 123.
357 Ibid., Memo of Phra Sarasas, 118.
358 Ibid., 122.
359 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.77/2 เบ็ดเตล็ด (หลายเรื่อง) เกี่ยวกับจีนในประเทศไทย (Miscellaneous stories about the Chinese in Thailand), Chuea Sriyaphai, a representative of Songkhla province, to Luang Praditmanutham, the Minister of Interior, letter dated 20 December 1934, 35.
360 Ibid., Krungdeb Varasab 5/03/1934, 41.
and potentially contributing to conflict in the future. Therefore, a committee was established to discuss this matter.\textsuperscript{361} After the meeting of the cabinet on 29 March 1934, private schools were still allowed to match up their curriculum based on the Act of Compulsory Primary Education B.E. 2464 (1921), in which the Thai language was set to 23 hours/week and subjects taught in Thai language were fixed.\textsuperscript{362} Other subjects, in addition to the 23 hours/week, had to be reported to the Ministry of Education.\textsuperscript{363} Many Thai newspapers, such as \textit{Lak Mueang} on 2 April 1934 and \textit{Krungdeb Varasab} on 3 April, reported that this was due to the warning by Guangdong Rice Traders Association to boycott rice from Siam from being imported into Guangdong province after they had heard that the Siamese government would order the end of Chinese primary schools in Siam.\textsuperscript{364}

On 21 February 1935, the Minister of Education only granted permits for private schools to teach foreign languages for approximately four or five hours per week. In contrast, all grants given to private schools that taught the Chinese language were withdrawn.\textsuperscript{365} In July, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Bangkok sent several telegraphic instructions to the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Chinese schools acting as representatives of Chinese nationals in Saigon in order to agitate for a boycott of Siam and to serve as an intermediary to the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{366} To pressure the local authorities, the Chinese possibly spread the rumour that China should boycott rice imported from Siam. In the opinion of the Chinese Ambassador to Japan, he thought the Chinese in Siam were the originators of the rumour.\textsuperscript{367}

In 1936, the Chinese Embassy in Tokyo, Japan, asked the Thai government to amend the Private School Act. It was stated that the Embassy had received an official

\textsuperscript{361} NAT, (2) SOC 0201.24.2/1, 148.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., Phithak, Meeting Minutes of the Cabinet (79/1934), 29 March 1934, 128.
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., Chuea, 125.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid., 137.
\textsuperscript{365} Ibid., the Minister of Education to Prime Minister, 21 February 1935, 144.
\textsuperscript{366} NAT, (2) SOC 0201.77/2, Prayoon, the Siamese Consul, Saigon, to the State Councillor, telegraph dated 9 July 1935, 52.
\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., Mitrakarm, the Siamese Minister, Tokio, to the State Councillor, telegram dated 12 June 1935.
letter from the Foreign Office, Nanjing, stating that Chinese Residents in Siam were disadvantaged by the law due to the many strict restrictions placed on Chinese schools.\textsuperscript{368} For the Siamese point of view, this secret document disclosed that the law had to be strict and unyielding because of the fear that the Chinese would teach only their own language, communism and anti-foreigner sentiments, which would lead to unrest.\textsuperscript{369} Therefore, the Siamese government launched the Private School Act of 1936, which stated that the Chinese language could only be taught in Chinese primary schools for two hours per week. It was nevertheless reported in 1938 by a British officer that the Chinese communities still retained distinct national communities in every town in Siam.\textsuperscript{370}

In sum, by looking at the draft of the Private School Act of 1932, the Chinese found numerous ways to preserve Chinese education, such as forming different identities to mislead or negotiate with the authorities. These tactics were seen by the government as evidence that the Chinese did not desire to assimilate with Siamese society. In order to plug loopholes, the Siamese government planned to launch the Private School Act of 1932. However, the Siamese Revolution of 1932 meant that the act was postponed until the Private School Act of 1936 was passed which was based on the draft of the law of 1932. After the Siamese revolution of 1932, the managers of Chinese schools hired local-born Chinese teachers, many of whom had graduated from China, Penang and Singapore, to deal with the strict enforcement of the Private School Act of 1927. However, in 1933 the provisions of the Compulsory Education Act were promulgated in every province and the education law was carried out in a strict and unyielding manner. On the basis of this law, Keemong School, the first Chinese school in Surat Thani, was closed. In 1934, managers of Chinese schools were informed that all primary schools where Chinese language was taught had to close in 1935. There was a movement to establish Chinese

\textsuperscript{368} NAT, (2) MOE 21/44 กระทรวงการต่างประเทศแจ้งเรื่องสถานเอกอัครราชทูตจรรญ ณ กรุงโตเกียว ขอให้แก้ไขร่างพระราชบัญญัติโรงเรียนประชาบาล (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed about the calling from Chinese Embassy at Tokio to amend the Private School Act), Mitkamraksa, Ambassador to Tokio to Minister of Foreign Affairs, letter dated 19 March 1936, 5-6.

\textsuperscript{369} Ibid., Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Education to Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, letter dated 14 May 1936, 7.

\textsuperscript{370} TNA, WO 203/5587, Commander HQ, Force 136 to Director of Intelligence HQ, S.A.C.S.E.A., letter dated 14/11/45, 4.
schools on the border with Malaysia and there was a flood of Chinese children out of the country to study abroad. Instead of writing petitions to the Siamese government, the Chinese asked the Chinese government to put pressure on the Siamese government.

V. Conclusion

After encountering the modern concept of the “nation-state” and the implantation of a Chinese national consciousness into Chinese children via the introduction of Chinese education under the influence of globalisation, multiple ethnic Chinese consciousnesses were gradually transformed into a united national Chinese consciousness. Another mark of Chinese nationalism was the fact that the Chinese in Surat Thai and elsewhere in Siam honoured Sun Yat-sen and paid respect to his portrait. In addition, there was also a movement of the CCP, particularly in Chinese schools. The Siamese government saw these developments as dangerous to its internal stability and thus rigorously enforced the Private School Act of 1927 in order to control Chinese nationalism and the activities of the CCP in Siam. Stipulations such as harder language tests and higher standards were enforced to fail Chinese teachers. Many Chinese schools were closed on the basis of this tactic. Some managers signed their names in Thai with a royal title, hoping to demonstrate loyalty to monarchy in a bid to preserve their schools. On the basis of the law of 1927, Chinese schools in Surat Thani were closed, such as Tiang Thon O’iao School in Ko Samui, as the Siamese authorities discovered that the ideas of CCP were being promoted in this school.

Despite the strict enforcement of the Private School Act of 1927, the Chinese still found loopholes in order to escape the crackdown, and some of them even violated and ignored the law and the orders of the inspectors. The Siamese government hence planned to launch the Private School Act of 1932 to control the Chinese schools better, but it did not carry this through because of the Siamese revolution of 1932. The promotion of education was an essential plank in the platform of the new civilian government. It wanted to have a population 50 per cent literate within ten years, and Chinese schools were seen as an obstacle to this policy. This led to the provisions of the Compulsory Act,
which was promulgated in 1933 throughout the country. In 1935, the Chinese were informed that all Chinese schools would be closed. Consequently, Chinese parents sent their children for a Chinese education abroad. There was also a plan to establish Chinese schools along the border between Siam and Malaysia. Later, the Chinese asked their government for help to put pressure on the Siamese government to ease its Thai-ification programme.
Chapter Three
The Chinese Reaction to the Japanese Invasion of both China and Thailand (1937-1941)

I. Introduction

Following the establishment of the Chinese Nationalist government in Nanjing in 1928, modern Chinese education was introduced to the Chinese community in Surat Thani’s schools, with the Chinese national language – based on Mandarin – used as the language of instruction. The Chinese had been captivated by the ideas of race and nation promoted by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam they celebrated Sun’s revolutionary cause and fervently worshipped his portrait. Veneration of Sun became a mark of Chinese nationalism. Ethnic Chinese consciousness, accordingly, gradually evolved into a united national Chinese consciousness. Moreover, Chinese schools were used as a tool to implant not only Chinese nationalism but also communism into the students. Aware that the dissemination of one of the principles of Sun – democracy (anti-monarchy) – as well as the communist ideas disseminated in the schools and wider community manifestly undermined the notion of an absolute monarchy, the Siamese government thus launched the Private School Act of 1927 in order to control Chinese schools adequately. In South East Asia, Surat Thani was one of the most essential CCP networks where the CCP’s political activities were undertaken in Chinese schools. Many Chinese teachers in Ko Samui were arrested and deported from Siam, leading to the closure of Tiang Thon O’iao School in 1930. Following the Siamese Revolution of 1932, the new civilian government wanted all children to receive a Thai education to improve the sense of citizenship. Chinese schools were seen as an impediment to this policy, and the Thai government launched the new Compulsory Education Act in 1932, ordering all Chinese primary schools to teach Chinese language for no more than seven and a half hours per week. The Private School Act of 1927, which was launched to deal with the rise of Chinese nationalism as well as Communist propaganda in Chinese schools, seriously affected the operation of Chinese schools in Surat Thani. In 1933, Keemong
School was the single Chinese school left. In 1936, the Siamese government further tightened restrictions by amending the Private School Act to allow the Chinese language to be taught for only two hours per week. This affected most Chinese schools in Siam. However, in 1938 the Chinese communities still remained distinct national communities in every town of Siam.

The conflict between China and Japan had been brewing for decades. The Middle Kingdom and its smaller island neighbour were said to be ‘as close as lips and teeth’.\textsuperscript{371} In the summer of 1937, Japanese troops were heavily stationed in the area around \textit{Lugouqiao} (盧溝橋), otherwise known as the Marco Polo Bridge, in the West.\textsuperscript{372} This bridge, where the historic fortress town of Wanping (宛平) was located, southwest of Beijing, turned out to be the pivot of a bitter dispute that would develop into the Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW hereafter, 1937-1945), an all-out war between the two nations.\textsuperscript{373} In the sweltering summer weather, the Chinese 29\textsuperscript{th} Army was deployed nearby the soldiers of the Japanese North China Garrison Army. Japanese troops were allowed to garrison in the area under the agreements concluded after the Boxer Movement (1899-1901), which gave foreign powers the right to position troops to protect their nation’s citizens against another uprising.\textsuperscript{374} On the night of 7 July, the Japanese regimental commander Mutaguchi Renya telephoned Ji Xingwen (吉星文), the Chinese garrison commander of the town, to inform him that one of his soldiers had gone missing and to request entry to Wanping to search for him. Afraid that Chinese sovereignty would be contravened, he rejected the request, but allowed the search to meet them halfway. The search was fruitless, and at 5 am the following morning the Japanese troops started firing on the town and seized this significant crossing.\textsuperscript{375} Historically known as the ‘Marco Polo Bridge Incident’, this incident was the marker for the commencement of the war. Chiang Kai-shek was determined that it was time to fight, writing, “This is our very


\textsuperscript{372} Ibid., 73.

\textsuperscript{373} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{374} Ibid., 73.

last remedy against the Japanese dwarfs,” despite the fact that a number of similar clashes prior to this had usually evaporated after China made some concessions.  

In the eyes of Chiang, the war was possibly seen as “a spiritual, sacred trust, a continuation of the 1911 revolution symbolised by Sun Yat-sen,” making him refuse to bow to the enemy.  

A specific modernisation project of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Government in Nanjing was disrupted by the outbreak of the SSJW in 1937. The aim of the project was to transform Nanjing into a city that would become a model of Chinese modernisation and similar to other global cities such as London, New York, and Paris. Chiang also attempted to solve many social problems, such as beggary, poverty, and prostitution, which had existed in Chinese society for a long time. Efforts to regularise and modernise Chinese society during the Nanjing decade proved to be unsuccessful and his dreams of building a modernised society failed to materialise as planned.  

During the first episode of the war, Chinese troops courageously fought against the Japanese but inefficiently, and they continued to pull back. The advancing enemy forces seized Beijing and the major port city of Tianjin within a month. Shanghai suffered the same fate by November. The Chinese capital of Nanjing was rapidly captured in December, where the Nanjing Massacre was carried out by the Imperial Japanese Army after they took control of the ill-fated city.  

After the beginning of the skirmish, the Guomindang government realised that the patriotism of the large international diaspora and the resources of migrants could be utilised to contribute to the war effort. In the late 1920s, the ethnic Chinese had gradually transformed into national Chinese after the rise of Chinese nationalism.

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376 See Zhou Tiandu, “Cong 7.7 shibian qianhou Jiang Jieshi riji kan ta de KangRi zhuzhang” ['Chiang Kai-shek’s Advocacy of Resistance to Japan as Seen from his Diary around 7 July 1937’], KangRi zhanzheng yanjiu 2 (2008): 137. It was quoted in Mitter, China’s War with Japan, 81.  
377 Ibid., 89.  
380 Ibid., 57-58.
throughout all Chinatowns around the world. The expansion of the Chinese printing industry in major treaty ports and the introduction of mass public Chinese education had been essential factors in this rapid transformation. There was the implantation of Chinese national consciousness into Chinese children. Even local-born Chinese tended to be obsessed with Chinese national politics. The majority of the Chinese residing overseas, therefore, was likely to identify politically and culturally with their motherland, and was not reluctant to get involved in the war.

This chapter examines the Chinese reaction to the SSJW from its outbreak in 1937 to December 1941 in Chinese communities in Surat Thani. The role of Liao Jingsong (廖振松), a patriotic entrepreneur based in Surat Thani who supported the anti-Japanese movement by being a major donor in fundraising campaigns to help China’s war effort, will be discussed.\(^{381}\) When the Japanese troops had landed on 8 December in Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani and “Chinatown,” as described by its provincial governor, the unpredicted reaction of the Chinese was that many had armed themselves to fight against Japan. Kobkun Saetang, a second-generation Chinese, became a heroine. Therefore, this chapter also investigates how the Chinese in the city came to fight one of the bloodiest wars in history. In addition, there was a global response among Chinese living overseas, who established transnational networks, particularly in South East Asia, to contribute to the motherland’s war effort. As there was support from the Chinese outside China, the war, therefore, was not geographically limited to China but also the countries where Chinese resided, so it was in effect shaped into a global conflict.\(^{382}\) The story of these Chinese such as Liao and Kobkun Saetang shows that there were the Chinese residing outside mainland China who also considered themselves at war from 1937. The violence committed by the Japanese in China had been globally spread to the extent that feelings of deep resentment towards the Japanese reached Surat Thani, a small Chinese community, where the authorities had always observed and suppressed Chinese nationalist movements. There will be three sections in this chapter. The first

\(^{381}\) Liao Jingsong was also known as Liao Gongpow (廖公圃) and Khun Sethbhakdi.

section will address the Chinese response to the Sino-Japanese conflicts prior to the SSJW in Siam. The next section covers the leading Chinese of Surat Thani and their contribution to China’s war effort. The last section will investigate the Chinese response to the Japanese invasion of Surat Thani on 8 December 1941.

II. As Close as Lips and Teeth: Sino-Japanese Relations

The conflict between China and Japan and the anti-Japanese feeling amongst the Chinese in the overseas Chinese communities started before 1937. In order to comprehend the dispute, it is thus necessary to return to the late nineteenth century and sketch a brief history of the discord. This section investigates the Chinese response to the conflicts prior to the SSJW in the Chinese communities in Siam in order to pave the way for a better understanding of the participation of leading Chinese from Surat Thani in the resistance movements and the resistance to Japanese troops in Surat Thani once they landed in the city in 1941.

After the modernisation which occurred during the reign of Emperor Meiji, who ascended the throne in 1867, Japan cast its eyes towards Korea, another of China’s suzerain powers. The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), therefore, was fought between the two nations for control of the Korean Peninsula, ending with China’s defeat. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed on 17 April 1895 following the cession to Japan in perpetuity of the Pescadores and Formosa, or Taiwan, which remained a Japanese colony until 1945. This treaty inflamed anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the overseas Chinese and this feeling continued to exist through events such as the Twenty-One Demands presented by Japan to Yuan Shikai (袁世凱) for special rights in northeast China in 1915, the May Fourth Movement after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919, and the annexation of Manchuria in 1931. Chinese perceptions of injustices against their nation on the global stage thus flamed Chinese nationalism among Chinese living overseas. In a world being shaped by industrialisation and imperialism, China was now becoming ‘the
victim of a new international system’ where once it had been a self-confident civilisation.\(^{383}\)

Following the events of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, the Chinese in Siam determined to boycott Japanese products. On 25 August 1915, rumours of the boycott spread in Bangkok and it was confirmed after an officer was told by Japanese merchants during his city patrol that they were greatly affected by the boycott. Anonymous letters were sent to Chinese owners of rice mills threatening them that those with Japanese merchandise on a ship would have salt water thrown at them once the ship arrived in China. Those Chinese who traded with Japanese goods also received similar letters. Interestingly, the Ghost Festival, or Zhongyuanjie (中元節), which is on the fifteenth day of the seventh month in the lunar calendar, was used as the first day of the boycott.\(^{384}\) This kind of political activity seems to be found throughout Siam as it was also reported that in Monthon Phayap, the provinces in Northern Siam, there was a meeting of Chinese merchants concluding that all Japanese products must be sold within two months from the beginning of September.\(^{385}\) These Chinese merchants delayed their move because some of them were participating in the boycott at their own pace, even though they wanted to be patriotic. Moreover, those who violated the regulations would be fined twice the price of merchandise, with half of the charge given to the informer and another to the Chinese temple.\(^{386}\)

In British Malaya, Chinese boycotts were regarded by the colonial authorities as more like riots rather than political protests.\(^{387}\) While the Siamese authorities, who were afraid that the Chinese might view them as being under Japan’s influence because the Japanese consulate had also asked for their help, acted as neutral observers during the event, but said they would arrest and exile those who resorted to the violence. Tik Sua

\(^{383}\) Mitter, *China’s War with Japan*, 17.
\(^{384}\) NAT, ม.25/49 rador อดีต โป่งกัน (The Chinese boycotted Japanese merchandise), Yomarat to Phraya Burinawarat, His Majesty’s Private Secretary, letter dated 26/08/1915, 2-5.
\(^{385}\) NAT, ม.25/49, Phraya Mahaamatyathibodi to HRH Prince Pravitrat Vadhanodom, His Majesty’s Private Secretary, report dated 17/09/1915, 13-15.
\(^{386}\) Ibid.
and Peng Yuchi, two Chinese who sold Japanese-made products, were knifed by three Chinese members of Kongsihoklak Secret Society in Bangkok’s Chinatown. Kongsihoklak extremists, including Zhua, Seng Tian and Sun Hao, who were later deported from Siam, also hired Chinese children to puncture seagoing junks carrying Japanese merchandise.\(^{388}\) This deportation act was used as a vehicle to suppress those foreign patriots and the act would be used to suppress those local-born foreigners in the future too.\(^{389}\) It seems that this tool was effective because it was reported by an informer that the Chinese would stop using violence towards those who traded in Japanese products because they were afraid of being deported. However, they announced that they would resort to violence in China instead.\(^{390}\)

After the Treaty of Versailles was signed in 1919, Japan gained Qingdao, Shandong province, given up by Germany. The Chinese presumed that Qingdao would be returned to China as compensation for the efforts of thousands of Chinese coolies recruited by the Allies to work on the Western Front during the First World War. The response in Beijing to this news was rapid and aggressive. A student demonstration began within hours.\(^{391}\) The event also sparked the attention of the Siamese authorities as the Chinese in Shanghai and Canton reportedly started to boycott Japanese merchandise again and the movement quickly spread to Hong Kong and Shantou. The local authorities closely observed the situation in Bangkok and it was found that the Chinese were planning to boycott Japanese products there too.\(^{392}\) The Siamese government also paid attention to the Chinese movement by having officers read and translate important news articles in Chinese newspapers to the Siamese authorities. This is evidence that the Chinese residing in Siam were interested in the Japanese agitation in China and there was a surge of Chinese nationalism in the Chinese community.

\(^{388}\) NAT, อ-5.6 อ.25/49, 6-11.
\(^{389}\) Ibid., Wenwiset to Phraya Burinawarat, letter dated 3/09/1915, 19.
\(^{390}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{391}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{392}\) Ibid.
\(^{392}\) Ibid., 16.
\(^{391}\) Ibid., Wenwiset to Phraya Burinawarat, letter dated 3/09/1915, 19.
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC hereafter) in Bangkok was thus warned by the Police authorities that this political activity should be disencouraged.\textsuperscript{393} The imperial government in Beijing promoted the establishment of the CCC in coastal China and the South Seas in order to mobilise financial support from wealthy overseas Chinese and improve relations with Chinese merchant communities.\textsuperscript{394} In Singapore, the CCC was established in 1906. In Siam, while the Bangkok Chamber of Commerce had been founded by European businessmen in 1898, the Chinese also needed their own chamber of commerce to represent and protect their mutual benefit, and Bangkok’s CCC was thus founded in 1908. The organisation was soon representing the whole Chinese community and its officials became the recognised leaders of the Chinese community.\textsuperscript{395} The boycott movement in Shanghai and other parts of China had been daily reported in the local Chinese newspapers, notably the \textit{Chinese Daily News} (中華民報) and the \textit{Chino-Siamese Daily News} (華暹新報), new bilingual newspapers. The Chinese residents in Siam were also roused to take revenge on the “traitors” and on China’s “eastern neighbour”.\textsuperscript{396} Moreover, a telegram, revealing the signatures of fourteen Chinese students in Bangkok, forwarded to the students of Peking University to approve the campaign, was published in an article entitled “The Righteous Indignation of Resident Students” in the \textit{Chino-Siamese Daily News} on 31 May 1919. Informed that a boycott was being incubated amongst many Cantonese merchants in Siam and fearful that the movement might burst out in the near future, the Japanese Minister consequently requested that the Siamese authorities prevent the Chinese outrage and boycott.\textsuperscript{397}

A letter by Mr. Pua Hakxiu, presumably a Chinese residing in Southeast Asia, was published in the \textit{Chinese Daily News}, on 10 June 1919. The letter was addressed to newspaper organisations, the CCC, coolies, educators, and all Chinese residing in

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{393} NAT, \textit{ม.6} 25/49, Devawongse to Mr. Genshiro Nishi, letter dated 11/06/1919, 80.
  \item \textsuperscript{394} Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bidalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese} (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 297.
  \item \textsuperscript{396} Japanese Minister presented the memorandum of the event to Siamese Foreign Minister see NAT, \textit{ม.6} 25/49, the Memorandum, dated 6/06/1919, 39.
  \item \textsuperscript{397} Ibid., 39-40.
\end{itemize}
colonies in South East Asia, including Siam. He roused the Chinese residing overseas to establish a Chinese national salvation association and telegraphed his message to the Chinese in every province to do the same. Additionally, he asked the Chinese to seriously boycott the Japanese merchandise and to resort to violence towards those who were still trading in Japanese products.398

The Siamese authorities took further steps. Chinese newspapers in Siam were warned not to publish any news of agitation against Japan, the posting of placards or the distribution of flysheets was prevented and violation was punished.399 The colonial authorities in British Malaya proclaimed martial law because the anti-Japanese situation in Singapore was so extreme. In Penang, a state of British Malaya, a boycott of Japanese products commenced on 22 June 1919, and all stores trading Japanese merchandise were closed and there were no rickshaws in road.400

![Figure 3.1: Wong Kian, or K. Wong, and his family in Ban Na San](image)

Surat Thani had a close connection with Penang. While tin, one of the most important natural resources in Phuket, attracted most Hokkiens from Penang, the tin

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398 NAT, ม.5.6 ฉบ.25/49, Letter of Mr. Pua Hakxiu translated from Zhonghua Minbao Newspaper, dated 10/06/1919, 134-138.
399 NAT, ม.5.6 ฉบ.25/49, Devawongse to Mr. Genshiro Nishi, letter dated 11/06/1919, 80-81.
400 NAT, ม.5.6 ฉบ.25/49, Devawongse, letter dated 22/06/1919, 106.
401 Kiang Koetnasan, 77 ปี Bản Na San พื้นที่กราจ ๒๕๐๒-พื้นที่กราจ ๒๕๕๗ (77 years of Ban Na San from 1939 to 2016) (Surat Thani: Udomlap, 2017), 34.
mining industry in Ban Na San district in Surat Thani was dominated by Hakka tin miners from Penang. In the early twentieth century, Hor Sunglong, a Penang Hakka, pioneered the tin mining industry and a contract to build the railway in Ban Na San. His success led to the migration of Hakka tin miners from Penang to this district, such as by Guihian, Hor’s sister, K. Wong (see Figure 3.1). Tan Wanlai, who was a Hakka tin miner from Perak, a state of British Malaya and a neighbouring state of Penang, also migrated to Ban Na San.402

The news of the boycott of Japanese products in Penang would have reached the Chinese residing in Surat Thani who had family ties with Penang. Meanwhile, the serious riot in Penang was directly telegraphed from the Siamese consulate in Penang to Phuket to observe the political movement of the Chinese. Phuket was a province in South Siam where tin mining was a major source of income and the Chinese residing in Phuket had family ties with the Chinese in Penang who also participated in tin mining. Directly after the Penang riot, the local authorities in Phuket found that the Chinese were posting placards to ask the Chinese to boycott Japanese products.403 The Chinese also refused to work for the Japanese.404

Warships, therefore, were commanded by Bangkok authorities to prevent the situation in Phuket from deteriorating.405 The authorities of every province, including Surat Thani, were also told to closely observe the movement of the Chinese. However, it seems that the Chinese extremists operated underground despite being warned by the Siamese authorities not to foment agitation against the Japanese. A threatening letter, presummably written in Chinese on 25 May (Chinese Calendar) by a secret society called, “Thirty Two Correspondents Society,” was directed to Chinese merchants but discovered by the Siamese authorities.406 This secret society told the Chinese in Siam to rouse

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403 NAT, ม-5.6 น.25/49, Chao Phraya Surasri, the Minister of the Ministry of Interior, to HRH Prince Pravitra Vadhavanodom, His Majesty’s Private Secretary, letter dated 26/06/1919, 112-113.
404 Ibid., Copy of the Telegraph from Phuket by Phraya Surasri, dated 26/06/1919, 114.
405 Ibid., Chao Phraya Surasri, the Minister of the Ministry of Interior, to HRH Prince Pravitra Vadhavanodom, His Majesty’s Private Secretary, letter dated 26/06/1919, 113.
406 We did not have a lot of information about the “Thirty Two Correspondents Society”.

themselves to save their country and warned Chinese merchants trading in Japanese products that they would be assassinated at the hands of a skilled swordsman.\textsuperscript{407}

The Penang riot seemed to spark the attention of the local authorities in every province in South Siam, including Surat Thani, with particular attention paid to Monthon Songkhla, which shared a border with British Malaya. There was knowledge of the donations made by the Chinese in Nakhon Si Thammarat, a neighbouring province of Surat Thani, to support the movement in Penang and strike on the first day of July 1919. The police were told to take precautionary measures against any contingency of the movement, particularly in the tin districts in Nakhon Si Thammarat, where there were meeting places of Chinese miners, and the downtown of Songkhla, where the majority of Chinese resided. The regiments in Nakhon Si Thammarat and Phatthalung were also told to observe this event and a warship was also requested to patrol Songkhla.\textsuperscript{408} At that time, Surat Thani was also under the control of the Viceroy of the South. Therefore, the Chinese political movements in the province had to be closely observed. In addition, the political activities of the Chinese in Surat Thani had long been under observation and control as the Chinese had considerable influence. Moreover, the majority of the population in the downtown of Bandon, the capital district of the province, was Chinese.\textsuperscript{409}

The measures taken to prevent a deterioration in the situation seem to be effective. Seow Hoodseng (蕭佛成, 1863-1939), a powerful overseas Chinese and leader of the GMD in Siam, told a prominent Japanese merchant that the Chinese political movement against the Japanese in Siam would not be as severe as in Singapore and Penang because

\textsuperscript{407} NAT, ม.ร.6 ม.25/49, Threatening Letter of the Chinese, dated 25/05/1919, 118.
\textsuperscript{408} Ibid. HRH Prince Yugala Dighambara, Viceroy of the South, to Ministry of Interior, telegraph dated 29/06/1919, 152-153.
\textsuperscript{409} NAT, (2) MOE 25/3473 เรื่องห้ายอนสม ผู้ว่าการพักราชการและให้กลับเข้ารับราชการตามเดิม (Allowing Soi Watthana who was given a suspension during the investigation to go back to his position), Chalo Charuchinda, the provincial governor, to the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Education, letter dated 8/01/1943, 19.
they were afraid of the local authorities, who were sending police and soldiers to observe the situation daily.\textsuperscript{410}

Seow Hoodseang was a Hokkien born in Bangkok and a leader of the Chinese revolutionaries in Siam. His background suited him for his activist role. After the fall of the Ming dynasty in the mid-seventeenth century, his ancestors fought with the anti-Manchu resistance.\textsuperscript{411} Seow’s ancestors, together with some of the exiles, eventually fled to Taiwan, headed by Zheng Chenggong (鄭成功), or Koxinga (1624-1662), a Chinese Ming royalist who resisted the Manchu conquest of China. After the grandson of Koxinga was sent to Beijing, Taiwan was finally integrated into China in 1683.\textsuperscript{412} Seow’s family thus fled to Malacca, a British Malaya state ruled by the Dutch from 1641 to 1789 and again from 1818 to 1825, from where Seow’s father migrated to Bangkok almost two centuries later. Seow was a successful attorney and merchant. In 1905, influenced by the revolutionary movement of Dr. Sun, Seow contacted the \textit{China Daily} (中國日報), a pro-revolutionary Chinese newspaper in Hong Kong, for help to start a mouthpiece for the movement in Bangkok. He established the \textit{Maenam Daily} (美南日報), a Chinese newspaper.\textsuperscript{413} Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance (同盟會) in Bangkok during his second visit in 1906, when he was appointed chairman. Wong Hangchoa (王杏洲), a Cantonese and one of the six founders of the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital (天華慈善醫院) in Bangkok, was one of the first leaders of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance.\textsuperscript{414} In 1906, Seow founded the \textit{Chino-Siamese Daily News} as a mouthpiece for his political movement. In 1908, he also established the Chinese Association (中華會館) as a front organisation for the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance.\textsuperscript{415}

\textsuperscript{410} The conversation was published on 16 July 1919 in \textit{Chino-Siamese Daily News} see NAT, ม-ร.6 น. 20.19/94, คำสนทนาระหว่างนายเซวฮูดเซงกับคนญี่ปุ่น เรื่องจับยอมทอดคดีญี่ปุ่น (The conversation between Seow Hood-seang and a Japanese on Chinese boycott of Japanese merchandise), 2-6.


\textsuperscript{413} Skinner, \textit{Chinese Society in Thailand}, 156.

\textsuperscript{414} For the background of the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, please see Section III.

\textsuperscript{415} Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 295-296, 299.
Despite heavy monitoring by the authorities, the boycott started to expand throughout Bangkok at the end of July 1919. Instead of using threatening letters as usual, verbal threats were made. Chinese merchants, around 400-500 persons, also took turns to meet and listen to the boycott regulations at Linfong restaurant in Bangkok’s Chinatown, headed by Co Tianyian, the owner of Minkok pharmacy. After the investigation, he admitted that he was also the leader of the Resistance of the Overseas Chinese against the Japanese (華僑抗日聯合會). This association was a secret society and a branch of Canton in Siam, aiming to unite the Chinese coolies. He was subsequently deported. 416 In addition, Chinese students in Siam also took part in the boycott. The Siamese authorities were afraid that the Chinese students would follow the example of the students in Beijing. To prevent this, the authorities commanded inspectors to patrol every Chinese school in order to prevent the burgeoning political movement. 417 The political movement of Chinese students in Beijing and other provinces in China influenced the Chinese students in Siam to establish the Chinese Student Association in Siam with the express aim of implanting patriotism. 418

Another wave of the boycott against Japanese products started with the Jinan Incident, the Japanese agitation in Jinan, the capital of Shandong province, which occurred in early May 1928. A major cause of this incident was that the Japanese military was worried about the safety of more than two thousand Japanese people residing in Jinan should Chiang Kai-shek’s Northern Expedition follow its plan to pass through the city in the Spring of 1928. However, an unpredictable clash between two parties broke out on the morning of 3 May, even though there were many negotiations between Chiang and the Japanese cabinet to avoid conflict. The skirmish grew into a larger battle that left many thousand dead. Chiang thus made a decision to withdraw from Jinan. 419

In May 1928, Chinese merchants in Siam reportedly persuaded one another to stop purchasing Japanese products.\(^{420}\) A Japanese charge d’affaires reported to the police in Bangkok that two Chinese were killed and others physically attacked because they traded in Japanese merchandise. These incidents were, however, difficult to investigate as the Chinese tried to hide their political movement as much as possible.\(^{421}\) On 21 May, Seow Hoodseng also disseminated a Chinese leaflet of the ‘Chinese national salvation organisation to get rid of the Japanese in Siam’ to the police, the content of which sparked anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese and induced them to boycott such products and stop working for the Japanese. The police, nevertheless, believed that it might belong to Seow himself, or the Guomindang Party in Bangkok, because he was the leader of the boycott of which Tan Lengsue (陳寧思) and Nai Kurtai (賴渠岱) were the chief executors and leading the boycott.\(^{422}\) On 9 June, the \textit{Chinese Daily News} was temporarily closed by the authorities due to articles fanning anti-Japanese sentiment and supporting the Chinese to resort to violence against their enemies.\(^{423}\) Six Chinese were arrested for threatening and attacking those who traded in Japanese merchandise were also deported from the country.\(^{424}\)

King Prajadhipok, reigning from 1925-1935, was worried about the economic situation he had inherited from his predecessor. The budget had been in deficit for many years. In the meantime, the Chinese controlled most of the country’s economy. On 7 May 1926, he wrote a letter to Prince Chula Chakrabongse, his nephew, who was studying in England, informing him that it was time the Siamese people should improve commerce and industry. He also expressed the opinion that Siamese people should find other jobs except government officers.\(^{425}\) In 1928, Prajadhipok thus recommended that Siamese

\(^{420}\) NAT, ม. ร. 7 ม/17 เรื่องรัษฎาสิทธิ์ผู้บุกเบิกและหยุดงาน และให้คนไทยทำงานแทน (The Chinese boycott of the Japanese merchandise, Chinese strike and having Thai people take their jobs.) Document dated 19/05/1928 to 5/12/1928, 3.

\(^{421}\) Ibid., 7-9.

\(^{422}\) Tan Lengsue was also known as Chen Zisi (陳字思). Ibid., 10-11, 45.

\(^{423}\) Ibid., 13-21.

\(^{424}\) Ibid., 32.

\(^{425}\) Narong Phuangphit, นโยบายเกี่ยวกับการศึกษาของคนจีนในประเทศไทยในรัชสมัยพระบาทสมเด็จพระปรมินทรมหาภูมิพลอดุลยเดช (The policy on the education of the Chinese in Thailand during the reign of King Prajadhipok) (Bangkok: Bhannakij Publishing, 1975), 79-80.
people should be hired to replace the Chinese coolies because if the Chinese stopped working for the Japanese it would harm trade in Siam. This was also due to a request for help from the Japanese charge d’affaires, who claimed that Japan was buying a lot of rice. Therefore, the Siamese authorities recommended a shipping agent to the Japanese which was to be commanded by the Siamese authorities to hire only Siamese workers on the day Japanese ships arrived.

Following the annexation of Manchuria in 1931, all Chinese newspapers in Siam criticised the Japanese intensely. Despite the strong anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese residing in Siam, they could not provide much economic assistance to China compared with the aid in 1928 due to the Great Depression of the 1930s. When Tan Siewmeng (陳守明), the newly elected chairman of the CCC in 1932, organised a fundraising campaign for the relief of war refugees in Shanghai, only the small sum of 21,000 baht was collected. Furthermore, he restrained the CCC from boycotting Japanese merchandise. Due to the Great Depression, the Chinese were not in a position to boycott Japanese products until 1933. During 1931-1933, Japanese trade with Siam thus increased significantly. This confirms the idea that some merchants were forced to think of the economic reality and take part in the boycott at their own pace, as noted earlier. If the economy was depressed, they could not afford to be that patriotic.

Following the outbreak of the SSJW, the Japanese seized most of the port cities in South China in 1937-1938, which led to Japan importing rice from China. After the Japanese realised that China was importing rice from Siam, they started to purchase rice directly from there too. However, the Chinese merchants who controlled the rice industry in Thailand refused to sell to them. In order to solve this problem, in 1938, Mah Lapkun (馬立群), a Cantonese man known as Ma Bulakul, the former chairman of the CCC (1929-1932) and the president of the Kwongsiew Association (廣肇會館), was selected by the Siamese government to be the manager of the Thai Rice Company, which was

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426 NAT, ว-5.7 ว/17, 13.
427 Ibid., 14-15.
428 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 324.
owned by the government. The government rented one of his rice mills to produce rice for export.\textsuperscript{429} The business went well and the government aimed to utilise the company as a tool to seize the rice market in Siam from the Chinese and control this industry.\textsuperscript{430}

In conclusion, the surge of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese sentiment among the diaspora in South East Asia had been brewing for decades even prior to the start of the SSJW in 1937. This upsurge in nationalism was mirrored elsewhere, even in the small Chinese communities. The Chinese responded to the Japanese agitation in China by boycotting Japanese merchandise, which was possibly the most damaging anti-Japanese activity as it caused severe damage to Japanese interests. Some of them resorted to violence to make the boycott more efficient. This alarmed the Siamese government, who thought it would harm national trade; therefore, the boycott was closely observed by the government and those who took to violence were deported to China. The anti-Japanese sentiment later inspired Liao Jingsong, a Chinese rooted in Surat Thani and one of the most powerful Chinese in Siam, to identify culturally and politically with China to contribute to the Chinese war effort.

III. Chinese Diaspora at War: Leading Chinese of Surat Thani and their Contribution to China’s War Effort

The relief fund movements or the anti-Japanese activities across the South Seas were normally led and supported by Chinese luminaries in the diaspora. This section examines the networks and connections between the leading Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam in order to find out how the powerful Chinese from the province had become involved in Chinese national politics and the anti-Japanese movements in the country.

As anti-Japanese sentiment had been in the making for some time, Chinese migrants around the world who identified politically with China predictably participated

\textsuperscript{429} More information about Kwongsiew Association will come up in Chapter Five.
\textsuperscript{430} NAT, (2) SOC 0201.46.3/31 เรื่องพระราชทานเครื่องราชอิสสริยาภรณ์แด่ข้าราชการและพ่อค้าประชาชนผู้มีความชอบต่างๆ (Giving insignias to government officers, merchants and people who benefited the country), M.L. Dej Sanitwong, the Minister of Commerce, to the Prime Minister, letter dated 1/01/1933, 127-129.
in displays of patriotism and support for China’s war effort against Japan. Even far from their motherland there was an increase of Chinese nationalism, for example in the pan-European diaspora, a patriotic network centred on Britain, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, and in North America, where the Pan-European Federation was established in 1937 to help China fight against Japan.⁴³¹

![Figure 3.2: Liao Chiangsoon and Xiucheng (秀清) (left), and (right) one of his wives in 1923 at the Royal Photographic Studio, Saranrom Gardens⁴³²](image)

Into the 1930s, in the Chinese community in Siam the Chinese, who were mostly Teochew, had emerged as ‘notable people’⁴³³. One of them was Liao Jingsong, a product of Surat Thani Chinese and widely known in the Chinese community. Liao was a patriotic entrepreneur and one of the leading Chinese in the province and a major donor to fundraising campaigns to support China’s war efforts against Japan. He was a son of Liao Chiangsoon (see Figure 3.2), a southern tycoon, a patriotic entrepreneur and one of

⁴³² อนุสรณ์งานฌาปนกิจคุณพ่อเล็ก เสรฐภักดี ณ วัดธาตุทอง วันที่ 2 ธันวาคม พ.ศ. 2545 (Cremation volume of Lek Sethbhakdi 廖欣圃 at Wat That Thong on 2 December 2002), 24, 25.
⁴³³ Wu Jiyue, 60 ปีพัฒนาชาติ 六十年海外見聞錄 (60 Years of the Overseas Chinese), trans. Panatda Lertlamampai (Bangkok: Post Publishing Public Co., Ltd., 2010), 231.
the leading Chinese in Surat Thani, having migrated from Chenghai district near Shantou for Bangkok in 1867 when he was 15.434 With the assistance of relatives who had migrated before, Liao inherited a domestic shipping business from his uncle, which gave him the opportunity to travel to southern Siam regularly.435 This was where Liao’s perseverance and honesty caught the eye of Phraya Nakhon Si Thammarat, who patronised him and later appointed him to be a tax farmer in Surat Thani, where he established himself in Bandon. At the turn of the 20th century, he held the largest share of the birds’ nest industry in Siam. He later built a sprawling market with a modern cinema, rice mill, saw mill, and an ice-making factory in Surat Thani.436 Bandon, a small market town at the time, had become the capital of the bird’s nest industry.

In 1919, Liao was appointed to be Phraya Pradinan-Bhumirat by King Vadjiravudh. He was preferred by the king, who knew him at court as the palace’s supplier of the best-quality birds’ nests and a generous supporter of many charitable campaigns. Liao was also one of a very few Chinese to be appointed to the title phraya during his reign.437 After Vadjiravudh ascended the throne, many leading Chinese from different provinces were ennobled as Khun or Luang. The titles were awarded for services to the provincial governor, for large contributions to the royal cause or for entertaining the king on his tours.438 With his royal connections and the phraya title (see Figure 3.3), Liao was held in high regard in the Chinese community. His privilege of being favoured by King Vadjiravudh led him to become involved in politics and connect with other Chinese community luminaries in Siam.439 Liao and other leading Chinese in Siam, particularly those who established the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, congregated

434 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 273-274. For other names of Liao Chiangsoon, please see Chapter One, Section VI.
435 Ibid., 273.
436 อุบายงานนามบุญเพื่อเล็ก เรียบถั่งศักดิ์ ณ วัดธาตุทอง วันที่ 2 ธันวาคม พ.ศ. 2545 (Cremation volume of Lek Sethbhakdi 廖欣圃 at Wat That Thong on 2 December 2002), 7.
437 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 273.
438 Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 153. The titles of the bureaucratic nobility were not often bestowed on the Chinese. In descending order of rank, these were Chao Phraya, Phraya, Phra, Luang and Khun. Chao Phraya was held by only a very select few; Phraya by governors, department heads, senior judges, and so on; Phra by division chiefs; Luang by selection chiefs or lesser judges; and Khun by those in minor posts.
439 Wu, 60 ปีโพ้นทะเล, 261.
in 1907 to set up the CCC in the following year. The Thian Fah Foundation Hospital survived after the war and is still operation today. Another two leading Chinese who joined the group were Tan Kaihor (陳開河), a powerful member of the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, and Tan Lipbuay (Wanglee) (陳立梅), the head of Wanglee family and eldest son of Tan Tsuhuang (陳慈賢), who founded Wanglee, a successful rice export company in Siam.\textsuperscript{440}

\textbf{Figure 3.3:} King Vadjiravudh gave the Sethbhakdi surname to Liao Chiangsoon in 1919\textsuperscript{441}

The Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, founded in 1903 and completed in 1905, was another important organisation at the turn of the twentieth century that was cooperated by all five major dialect groups. The six founders were Lau Chongmin (劉聰敏), a Hokkien and the official leader of the Chinese in Siam, Ng Miaongian (Lamsam) (伍淼源), a Hakka, Lao Gibing (劉繼賓), a Teochew, Wong Hangchao (王杏洲), a Cantonese, Tia

\textsuperscript{440} The close relationship between Liao’s family and Chen or Wanglee’s family will come up below.

\textsuperscript{441} อนุสรณ์งานฌาปนกิจคุณพ่อเล็ก เล็กเสตธบัคดี ณ วัดธาตุทอง วันที่ 2 ธันวาคม พ.ศ. 2545 (Cremation volume of Lek Sethbhakdi 陳欣圃 ณ Wat That Thong on 2 December 2002), 7.
Giangsam (張見三), a Teochew, and Koh Huijia (高暉石), a Teochew.\footnote{Lau Chongmin was also known as Min Laohasetthi or Phraya Choduk-Rachasretthi. Lao Giping was also known as Phraya Phakdi-Phattrakorn. Tia Giangsam was also known as Phra Sophon-Phetcharat. See 二百週年 天華醫院百周年紀念 100 ปี The 100\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary of Thian Fah Foundation Hospital 2446-2547 (1903-2004), 43 and Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 287.} The establishment of the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital, located in Bangkok’s Chinatown, by these six founders portrayed the unity that transcended regional and dialect groups amongst the Chinese in Siam. The hospital provided 250 beds and a fund of 160,000 baht, largely solicited from the Chinese community in Siam. In addition, King Chulalongkorn donated 8,000 baht when he attended the ceremonial opening on 19 September 1905.\footnote{Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 287, 291.} During the SSJW, the Thian Fah Foundation Hospital also trained nurses to be sent to China for service with the army, but this activity was brought to a halt in 1940 after its chairman was deported to China by the Thai government.\footnote{Skinner, \textit{Chinese Society in Thailand}, 270.} The founders of the hospital chose Liao Chiangsoon, on account of his royal connections, to inform King Vadjiravudh about the initiative to launch the CCC, of which the king expressed his appreciation.\footnote{Wu, 60 ปีโพนทะเล, 261.} The CCC was formed in 1908 and registered with the Manchu government.\footnote{Skinner, \textit{Chinese Society in Thailand}, 170-171.}

During the first twenty years of the establishment of the CCC, its work was mostly limited to business.\footnote{Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 273.} It is possible that the Siamese authorities particularly observed its movement as the police warned the CCC that its political activity should be disencouraged during the May Fourth Movement in 1919 (see Section II). However, in 1924, when Chaozhou in Guangdong province was battered by a devastating typhoon, Liao Chiangsoon was elected the ninth chairman of the CCC and he notified Vadjiravudh of the disaster in his motherland and was given 5,000 to assist his countrymen.\footnote{Wu, 60 ปีโพนทะเล, 262.} When this news spread throughout the country, Chinese from all walks of life contributed nearly a hundred thousand baht to the typhoon relief campaign. The CCC stepped beyond business circles and went into public service to lead the Chinese in Siam to express their patriotism under Chairman Liao. He also raised funds to move the CCC into a better area. 

\footnote{Wu, 60 ปีโพนทะเล, 261.}
and was the first person to donate ten thousand baht for this campaign. However, he passed away in 1925\textsuperscript{449}, and his second son, Liao Jingsong (1892-1980), became head of the family.

Owing to Liao Chiangsoon’s move from business circles, a committee of prominent Chinese was formed in Siam for the collection of subscriptions from the Chinese, who wanted to help people suffering from Japanese agitation in Shandong due to the Jinan Incident in 1928. A preliminary general meeting was held in the CCC at which Lau Chongmin and Lao Gibing, Liao’s friends, were reportedly amongst the leaders of the board of management to collect the funds.\textsuperscript{450}

Liao Jingsong was second-generation Chinese born in Nakhon Si Thammarat, a neighbouring province of Surat Thani, on 7 January 1892. His mother was Siamese from Nakhon Si Thammarat. When he was three, his mother died in a boat accident. Liao Chiangsoon therefore sent Jingsong to China for education under the care of Madam Chua, his Chinese stepmother. He was assigned to take care of his father’s business during the pioneering era of Bandon when he was just 15. Liao Chiangsoon not only left his business to his son, but also his connections and networks with Chinese luminaries in Siam, which also led Liao Jingsong becoming involved in politics. After the death of Liao Chiangsoon, he later expanded the business to four provinces in South Siam, including Bandon in Surat Thani, Chumphon, a neighbouring province of Surat Thani, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Hat Yai in Songkhla, where he established power stations to provide electricity to the towns. Due to his development performances, King Prajadhipok appointed him Khun Sethbhakdi. He also expanded the business into banking, insurance, rice milling and shipping in Bangkok and expanded to Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{451} He also assigned Gor Thongsiew to be the manager of Liaoyongheng (廖榮興), his family company based

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\textsuperscript{449} Wu, 60 ปีพื้นทะเล, 262.
\textsuperscript{450} NAT, ม.5.7 ม/17, 39.
\textsuperscript{451} Dilok Wutthipanit, “ขุนเสธบHASH Mik (เลี้ยงจักรัตน์เสธบHASH Mik): วิถีชีวิต,” (The Life of Khun Sethbhakdi or Liao Jingsong) in จีนทักษิณ วิถีและพลัง (The Life of the Chinese in South Siam) (Bangkok: The Thailand Research Fund, 2001), 243-244.
\end{flushright}
in Bandon, to build a new cinema in Bandon in 1936.\footnote{NAT, MOI 2.2.5/849 โรงมหรสพในตลาดอำเภอบ้านดอน จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (The cinema in Bandon’s market, Surat Thani). Document dated 1936, 1-8.} This cinema later became a meeting place between government officers and Chinese merchants in Bandon’s Chinatown to induce the merchants to open their business as usual after the Japanese had landed in Surat Thani.\footnote{NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 รายงานคณะผู้แทนรัฐบาลไปเยี่ยมช้าราชการและประชาชนภาคใต้เยาวุณรัฐบาล ในกรณีของภัยพิบัติ (The report of the government representatives on the visit of government officers and people in the Southern in case of an emergency). Document dated 19/12/1941 to 25/03/1942, 8.}

The factional division within the GMD in China was also reflected abroad. In Siam, in the 1930s—at least until the outbreak of the SSJW in 1937— the GMD branch was divided between a Southwest faction, or Xinan faction (西南), and a pro-Chiang Kai-shek faction, or the commercial attaché faction (商務專員).\footnote{Eiji Murashima, “The Thai-Japanese Alliance and the Chinese of Thailand,” in Southeast Asian Minorities in the Wartime Japanese Empire, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Oxon: Routledge, 2002), 193-194.} The Southwest faction was under Seow Hoodseng owing to his close relationship with Hu Hanmin (胡漢民), the leader of the Southwest faction, since his visit to Bangkok with Sun Yat-sen in 1908. Seow was appointed to the central committee of the Xinan government and moved to Canton following the 1931 division. He lived there until the death of Hu in 1936. Fearing that Chiang Kai-shek would arrest him after the collapse of the faction, Seow fled to Bangkok.\footnote{Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 327, 433.} Tan Siewmeng, the chairman of the CCC from 1932 to 1936, was the leader of the commercial pro-Chiang Kai-shek attaché faction. With his success in business and political connections with Bangkok’s high society, Tan Siewmeng was selected by the Nanjing government to be the commissioner of commerce to establish diplomatic relations with Siam and the office “unofficial legation” was set up.\footnote{Ibid., 327-328.} Tan Siewmeng was against the takeover of Liao Jingsong’s group on the CCC. When the chairman of the CCC was available in 1936, the Southwest faction nominated candidates to compete for leadership of the Chinese community. The group of Liao Jingsong, mentored by Seow Hoodseng, was comprised of well-known Teochew people at the time, namely Liao
Jingsong, Tan Gengchuang (Tanthana) (陳景川), Tae Juebing (Techapaiboon) (鄭子彬), U Chuliang (Uahwatanasakul) (余子亮), and Hia Guang-iam (Iamsuree) (蟻光炎).457

The competition ended with the victory of the Southwest faction. In an election held on 1 March 1936, Hia Guang-iam was elected the new chairman of the CCC. The gang of five, Liao and his friends, had a strong political connection with the Southwest faction under Seow Hoodseng. Tan Lengsue, the father of Tan Gengchuang, was Seow’s close friend and his father was also the chief executor of the boycott in 1928. Tae Juebing was persuaded to be a member of the Chinese Revolutionary Alliance by Seow. Furthermore, almost everyone from Liao’s group attended the funeral of Tan Muitueng (陳美堂), hosted by Seow and Lim Baegee (林伯岐), while no one from Tan Siewmeng’s pro-Chiang Kai-shek faction appeared.458 Based on a Japanese document, it was also written that Hia Guang-iam and Tan Gengchuang were in the Southwest faction and Liao Jingsong was against Tan Siewmeng faction.459 Later, the members of Liao’s group were the founders of the Teochew Association and were called Teochew Association Faction.460

Seow Hoodseng and Liao Jiangsong’s group shared the same passion to help their ancestral homeland fight against the Japanese. After the outbreak of the SSJW, Liao and his friends registered the Teochew Association on 14 February 1938 as a vehicle to contribute to the Chinese war effort and carry out anti-Japanese activities, including the boycotts. Tan Gengchuang was the first president of the association and Liao became the vice president while Hia Guang-iam served as the treasurer and U Chuliang was the secretary. To arouse strong anti-Japanese sentiment, the China Daily, the Teochew Association Faction’s own newspaper, was founded on 1 October. Lee Keeyong (李其

457 Ibid., 328-329.
459 Ibid., 38-39.
460 Ibid., 38.
a relative of Liao, who was an intellectual and had obtained economics degree from Shanghai, served as the editor.\footnote{461}

Nationalist fundraising activities were concerned with selling Chungking government bonds. A branch unit called the “Government Bond Selling Campaign Committee Branch in Siam” was established by Liao and his friends. Seow Hoodseng worked as its president while the Teochew Association faction served as the five vice presidents of the bond-selling committee.\footnote{462} However, the contribution of Siam in the war relief funds raised across the South Seas accounted for only 5.12 per cent although the Chinese community in the country was one of the largest in the world (see Table 3.1).

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\caption{Contributions of the Chinese in the South Seas, November 1938-December 1940\footnote{463}}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Country/colony & Funds raised & Funds raised \\
 & (raw total, in Yuan) & (percentage) \\
\hline
1. Malaya & 30,459,164 & 48.71 \\
2. Dutch East Indies & 14,046,665 & 22.47 \\
3. Philippines & 9,218,562 & 14.74 \\
4. Burma & 4,351,530 & 6.96 \\
5. Siam & 3,200,000 & 5.12 \\
6. British Borneo & 1,243,143 & 2.0 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

The small proportion of donations made in Siam was possibly due to the ceaseless observation and crackdown by the Siamese authorities from 1928. The Siamese government also suspected that insignificant funds were sent to China in 1928 when it came to donations due to the fact that funds were distributed amongst the leaders of the boycott associations.\footnote{464} In other words, some of them were corrupted and pocketed the funds themselves. Moreover, the Siamese government enacted the Fund Raising

\footnotesize
\begin{footnotes}
\item[461] Ibid., 41.
\item[462] Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 335.
\item[464] NAT, ม-ร 11/17, 33-34.
\end{footnotes}
Restriction Act in 1937, which banned fundraising activities against the Japanese.\textsuperscript{465} The Siamese government not only prohibited the collection of war funds because it wanted to conciliate Japan, but the boycott was also considered to be a conspiracy which restricted trade and thereby hindered economic activity. The Chinese, therefore, went underground or resorted to subterfuge.\textsuperscript{466} Apart from fundraising activities, Liao and his friends also sent rice to China when their countrymen in Chaozhuo and Shantou suffered from famine as a result of the war. The Teochew faction established a rice trading company to sell at subsidised prices to their motherland. After Shantou had fallen to the Japanese in June 1939, this activity was halted.\textsuperscript{467} Saving his nation in the form of donated rice was a tactic designed to avoid the government bans.

Meanwhile, in British Malaya the Singapore China Relief Fund Association was established within a month after the commencement of the SSJW by a group of leading Chinese merchants in the CCC in Singapore. At the same time, the Hokkien Clan Association formed a committee to find ways to raise funds and assist their motherland. In September 1937, the Penang China Relief Fund Association was set up by clan associations in Penang while a relief fund institution was established at the same time by the leaders of the Chinese associations and principles of Chinese schools in Selangor, a state of British Malaya.\textsuperscript{468} Such meetings to establish relief fund institutions against the Japanese could not be held in Siam due to the fact that, as noted, the Siamese government had introduced the Fund Raising Restriction Act in 1937, banning fundraising activities against the Japanese, partly to conciliate Japan and partly to prevent the economy from being harmed.

After Xiamen, the home city of many Hokkiens in British Malaya, had fallen to the Japanese in May 1938, communications between merchants and labourers in the South Seas were severed, heightening awareness of the war and attracting even the least

\textsuperscript{465} Murashima, “The Thai-Japanese Alliance and the Chinese of Thailand,” 195.  
\textsuperscript{467} Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 336-337.  
nationalistic overseas Chinese into the relief movement.\textsuperscript{469} Kong Xiangxi (孔祥熙), also known as H. H. Kung, the Premier of the Republic of China, encouraged Tan Kah-kee (陳嘉庚, 1874-1961), one of the leading Chinese leaders in the South Seas, to organise a pan-Southeast Asia national salvation organisation. Tan Kah-kee then sent telegrams to many relief fund groups in South East Asia, informing them that a conference of all Southeast Asia associations would be held at the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Middle School in Singapore on 10 October.\textsuperscript{470}

As Tan Kah-kee was one of the notable overseas Chinese, it is essential to briefly sketch his background. Tan Kah-kee was a Hokkien born in Xiamen, or Amoy, in Fujian province. Immigrating to Singapore in 1890 at the age of 17, he spent more than fifty years of his life there. Tan became a wealthy merchant from rubber trading, manufacturing, rice mills etc. By 1911, he was a millionaire and a multi-millionaire by the end of the First World War (1914-1918). With enormous wealth, he provided economic aid to China through many major events. He assumed leadership in the Shandong Relief Fund, Singapore-China Relief Fund and the Federation of China Relief Fund of the South Seas (南洋華僑籌賑祖國難民總會, or 南僑總會) (FCRFSS hereafter). He also founded Amoy University in 1921 and many colleges and schools in Fujian. After his death, he was widely known in South East Asia and China as a pioneer industrialist, philanthropist, social reformer and supporter of movements for socio-political change.\textsuperscript{471}

The major consequence of the conference of all Southeast Asia associations in Singapore on 10 October 1938 was the creation of the FCRFSS, which, with its headquarters in Singapore, coordinated all relief efforts in South East Asia. One hundred and sixty-five delegates from relief fund associations and merchant groups from British Malaya and Burma, the Dutch East Indies, French Indochina, Siam and the Philippines

\textsuperscript{469} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{470} Ibid., 64-65.
gathered at the conference.\textsuperscript{472} Tan Kah-kee wrote that Chinese delegates from Siam comprised the smallest number. The Siamese government forbade the Chinese from raising funds for the war. Most of the delegates were from Chinese communities in South Siam, namely Pattani, Narathiwat, Trang and Ron Phibun in Nakhon Si Thammarat.\textsuperscript{473} The \textit{China Daily} of 26 January 1939 reported about Seow Hoodseng and mentioned the FCRFSS, the name of this conference. Therefore, Liao Jingsong and his friends, who had a close relationship with Seow, would have sent their representatives to this conference.\textsuperscript{474}

The year 1939 was possibly the worst year for the Chinese community since the outbreak of the war. Siam changed its name to Thailand and Chinese descendants who worked in the military and government services were forced to change their names and surnames to Thai names. In February, Hainan was occupied by the Japanese, which dismayed many Hainanese, the first largest dialect group in Surat Thani and the second largest in Bangkok. Shantou, in Guangdong province, had fallen to the Japanese in June. All Chinese schools were closed down and only one Chinese newspaper was allowed to be published. Seow Hoodseng passed away in May and Hia Guang-iam was killed in November. The anti-Japanese activities were severely repressed by the Thai government and they gradually declined after the death of Hia.\textsuperscript{475} Many Chinese were deported to China in 1939, with the government deporting approximately 200-400 people each trip/round until there was a growth in anti-Thai feelings in the Chinese community in Hong Kong.\textsuperscript{476}

Realising that the Chinese residing overseas did not contribute enough to help China’s war effort, Liao Jingsong traveled across the Southern provinces, including Surat

\textsuperscript{472} Ibid., 65.
\textsuperscript{473} See Tan Kah Kee, 南僑回憶錄 (The Memoirs of an Overseas Chinese of the South Seas) (Hong Kong: Nanyang yin shua she, 1979), 48-49, 59. It was quoted in Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 48.
\textsuperscript{474} The idea is proposed by Murashima. See ibid.
\textsuperscript{475} Sng and Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese}, 339-342.
\textsuperscript{476} NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/1 การนาระเทศจีนไปยังกวางตุ้ง (The deportation of the Chinese to Guangdong). Document dated 17/07/1939-30/08/1939, 1-31.
Thani, his hometown, to raise funds for his ancestral homeland. "National prosperity or catastrophe depends on the dutiful son" was his motto. After the Japanese landed in Thailand on 8 December 1941, Liao and his friends realised that they were in danger. Having planned to take refuge in Yunnan through Burma, a total of thirteen, including Tan Genghuang and Tan Juebing, fled Bangkok for Northern Thailand. When they reached the border, the Japanese had already surrounded the place, so they returned to Bangkok, where the Japanese soldiers finally captured them. Liao was sentenced to lifetime imprisonment and his brother, Liao Hinpoh (廖欣圃), also known as Lek Sethbhakdi, to a 16-year term due for anti-Japanese activities in Thailand after Liao had refused to cooperate with the Japanese to support the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. They were released at the end of the war while their friend, U Chuliang, successfully escaped to Penang before the Japanese invasion.

In prison, Liao Jingsong suffered grievously. His agonising pain was expressed in one of his poems, Zhongqiu (“Mid-Autumn”, 中秋), composed during the Mid-Autumn Festival while he was still in the prison. The poem reads:

Suffering under long dark nights and the pitter-patter of unstoppable rain, I am filled with hatred and will sing opera without makeup during the Mid-Autumn Festival. My meal was full but tasteless. When would I be released from prison?”

After the end of the war, he was selected to be one of the Overseas Chinese representatives in 1947 to participate in the national convention in Nanjing, where he met President Chiang Kai-shek. When Deng Xiaoping visited Thailand in 1978, he was also on the welcoming committee. Liao Jingsong had six sons and one daughter from

477 Wutthipanit, “ขุนเศรษฐภักดี,” 244.
478 It was translated from “ชาติเจริญหรือล่มสลาย ชาติชายย่อมมีภาระหน้าที่” quoted in ibid. See Sng and Bisalpultra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 274.
479 Wu, 60 ปีพื้นทะเล, 248.
480 Sng and Bisalpultra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 274.
481 Wutthipanit, ‘ขุนเศรษฐภักดี,’ 245.
four wives. Kamthorn and Kamyong Sethbhakdi, his eldest and second children, stayed in Bandon to look after his businesses in Southern Thailand.  

The war also had a profound effect on Liao Hinpoh, one of the committee members of the Teochew Association. As the war had intensified, Liao Hinpoh sent his wife and children to take a refuge in Penang. He was worried and cut off from his family when he learnt that Penang was also under Japanese occupation from December 1941.  

After the end of the war, he avoided all political activities, instructing Somkiat, one of his children, who was about to study in Australia, to “work hard, be careful with your money and stay away from political activities.” His concerns in this regard might have derived from his life in prison, where he had experienced day-to-day misery and uncertainty about his family in occupied Penang and the shattered family businesses. What upset him most was his experience of seeing other political inmates tortured. His fate was described by his son as having “resulted from being part of a civic group of prominent Thai-Chinese merchants.”

After the end of the war, Liao Jingsong and his brother connected with their friends from the Teochew Association Faction and became business partners. They co-founded Srinakorn Bank, which was supported by Teochew customers in the earliest stage (see Figure 3.4). His marriage with Tan Jaexiam (陳靜蟾), whom he had met in 1933, confirms the idea that there was a network of connections between the leading Chinese families in Surat Thani and in Bangkok. Tan Jaexiam was a niece of Tan Lipbuay, the patriarch of the Wanglee family, who also joined the establishment of the CCC with Liao Chiangsoon, as mentioned earlier.

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482 Ibid., p. 246. The role of Kamthorn Sethbhakdi will come up in Chapter Five.
483 อนุสรณ์งานฌาปนกิจคุณพ่อเล็ก เสรฐภักดี ณ วัดธาตุทอง วันที่ 2 ธันวาคม พ.ศ. 2545 (Cremation volume of Lek Sethbhakdi 廖欣圃 at Wat That Thong on 2 December 2002), 8-9.
484 Ibid., 55.
485 Ibid.
486 Ibid., 9.
On 25 November 1941, thirteen days before the Japanese landed in Surat Thani, Pramote Chongcharoen, the Thai Consul of Penang, observed, “There are certain classes of Thai people who have relatives in the Malay Peninsula and are planning to evacuate from Thailand to stay with their relatives.” There is no doubt that he was referring to the Chinese in Surat Thani, who had networks with those Chinese in Penang. Therefore, he asked the government to put restrictions on the evacuation of them from the country while the government was also preparing to pass this kind of law. Moreover, Penang was also a place where many Chinese, particularly from the Southern Peninsula, went to get a Chinese education (see Chapter Two), after every local Chinese school had been closed down by the Phibun government from 1938 to 1940.

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487 Tae Liangim was also known as Kiat Srifuengfung and Tae Ngowlow was also known as Udane Techapaiboon. This figure was from ibid., 47.
488 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/4 การออกกักเพื่อไว้ใจการย้ายพ่อแม่ออกจากประเทศไทย (The prohibition on the evacuation of Thai people from Thailand), Pramote Chongcharoen, Thai Consul of Penang, to Minister of Foreign Affairs, telegram 25/11/1941, 2.
489 Ibid and ibid., Luang Wichitwathakan, the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Pramote Chongcharoen, Thai Consul of Penang, letter 30/11/1941, 5.
Patjakphattikan, a leading Chinese family in Surat Thani who went to Penang to study in Chung Ling High School (锺靈中學校) after the closure of every Chinese school in Surat Thani. He took a train with his friends from Trang and Phuket back to the Southern Peninsula after his school in Penang was bombed in December.491

Liao Chiangsoon was preferred by King Vadjiravudh. This made him become involved in politics and connect with other Chinese luminaries in Siam. He was chosen as the representative of these Chinese to inform the King about the initiative to launch the CCC. In 1924, Liao became the ninth chairman of the CCC and organised the typhoon relief campaign to help his motherland. Following his death in 1925, Liao Jingsong became head of the family. However, Liao Chiangsoon not only left his business to Jingsong but also his connections with leading Chinese in Siam, which inspired him to participate in politics. He and his friends met Seow Hoodseng, the leader of the Southwest faction in Siam and anti-Japanese movement prior to the war, with whom he shared his passion to help China fight against Japan. In 1936, Hia Guang-iam became the new chairman of the CCC. After the outbreak of the war in 1937, Hia and his friends, including Liao, registered the Teochew Association in 1938 as a tool to contribute to the Chinese war effort. Liao was also a vice president of the bond-selling committee to organise the fundraising campaign. After Shantou had fallen to the Japanese military in 1939, he travelled across the southern provinces, including Surat Thani, to raise funds for China. After the Japanese landed in Thailand in December 1941, he and his brother were imprisoned owing to their anti-Japanese activities after they refused to cooperate with the Japanese to support the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

491 อนุสรณ์ในงานฌาปนกิจศพ  นายมนินทร์ ปัจจักขะภัติ วันอาทิตย์ที่ ๑๐ พฤศจิกายน ๒๕๕๖ (Cremation volume of Manin Patjakkhapat on 10 November 2013), 63.


IV. The Japanese Invasion of 8 December 1941

Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani, considered Chinatown at the time, was one of the destinations the Japanese had decided to invade on 8 December 1941. The majority of the population in Bandon’s downtown was Chinese, as mentioned by Chalo Charuchinda, the provincial governor from 1942-1943. Unlike other provinces, the people in the city chose to fight back and clashes occurred in Bandon’s Chinatown. This section discloses how the Chinese in the town responded to the Japanese invasion when their Chinese community turned into a warzone.

During the war, Japanese military commanders were aware of their necessity to act with urgency to establish the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by using their military control over the South Seas, the scheme based on the ‘Nanshinron’ or ‘Southern Expansion Policy’. Located in the centre of Southeast Asia, Thailand was geographically the most desirable place where Japan could dispatch troop reinforcements, food supplies, weapons and war equipment. Kiattisahakul pointed out that the most important strategy of the Japanese army was control over the Thai southern railways because they could be used to transport troops, war equipment and food supplies in their frontline battlefields in British Malaya and Burma.492

In order to conquer British Malaya and Burma, the Japanese had to utilise ports, airfields and railways in Thailand. Therefore, Surat Thani was one of six destinations in the Southern Peninsula the Japanese troops had planned to invade on 8 December 1941. The others were Prachuap Khiri Khan, Chumphon, Nakhon Si Thammarat, Songkhla and Pattani, where the Southern Line, a Thai railway line, was also located along these provinces. Prachuap Khiri Khan was only 17 kilometres away from British Burma and Chumphon provided the way to Victoria Point, where the second largest airfield in the

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492 Puengthip Kiattisahakul, “The Japanese Army and Thailand’s Southern Railways During the Greater East Asia War, 1941-1945” (PhD diss., Chulalongkorn University, 2004), 3.
South Seas was located. Pattani was the place where the Japanese could pass through to invade British Malaya.  

On 8 December 1941, Constitution Day, many police, government officers, scouts and people in Bandon, the market town and capital district of Surat Thani, woke early to gather at City Hall, located at the present city pillar shrine, on the east bank of the Tapi River, to commemorate Siam’s 1932 passage to a constitutional monarchy. Many Chinese merchants and hawkers wished to make a lot of profit on the day and they went to sell their goods and food at the event while many shops in Chinatown were waiting for customers who would spend money in the Chinese community during and after the end of the event. However, while everyone, including the Chinese, was ready to enjoy an air of festivity, the Japanese troops in the Gulf of Thailand were heading to various points in the Southern Peninsula, including Surat Thani, the only one of these six provinces where no military unit was stationed.

On that day, at 8 a.m., the commander of Amphoe Ban Na San Police Station received a telegraph from the commander of the Provincial Police Region 8 in Nakhon Si Thammarat, informing him that Japanese troops had landed at Pattani. Calculating that Bandon, one of the important strongholds in the Southern Peninsula, where an airfield was located, would also be attacked, the provincial governor and the superintendent of the police station in Bandon had planned to resist the Japanese. At the same time, a Japanese troopship was moving through the Tapi River towards Talat Lang, a market in the coastal city of Bandon and the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown, where Hainanese and Hokkien temples were located. People in Chinatown appeared to panic when they heard that the Japanese were heading to the Chinese community (see Figure 3.5).

493 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 รายงานคณะผู้แทนรัฐบาลไปเยี่ยมขาราชการและประชากรภาคไต้ยามฉุกเฉิน (The report of the government representatives on the visit of government officers and people in the Southern in case of an emergency). Document dated 19/12/1941 to 25/03/1942, 72-75.
494 NAT, MOI 2.2.5/856 เรื่องคณะคณะการจ้างขาดราชาราชการขาราชการและประชากรภาคไต้ยามฉุกเฉิน (Surat Thani provincial committee asked for an exception to for the royal insignia of Mr. Sai Phramnanun which was burn together with the city hall during the fight with the Japanese troops and asked for a substitution), Mr. Sai Phramnanun to the Provincial Prosecutor, letter dated 12/01/1942, 3-4.
495 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 16.
The superintendent summoned a meeting of the police to organise the resistance against the invaders. The resistance groups were stationed around the City Hall and down the roads and lanes in Bandon. Apart from the police, government officers and members of the public also volunteered to receive firearms at the police station only 15 minutes before the encounter with the Japanese army. Those firearms reportedly included 185 rifles and only one Bergmann machine gun. Learning that the Japanese were about to invade Bandon, Zhan Kimha, a local born Chinese and owner of Puensurat (素叻槍店), a

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

Figure 3.5: On the morning of 8 December 1941, people in Bandon’s Chinatown seemed to be panic when they learnt that the Japanese troops were heading towards Bandon.
gun shop (see Figure 3.6), told Fak Mitphakdi, a clerk of Surat Thani Municipality and Yuean Somboonying, a veteran of the Franco-Thai War (1940-1941), to load all of his 34 guns and 5,000 bullets into the pick-up truck of the Municipality to fight against the Japanese.\footnote{Zhan Kimha was also known as Wiwat Chantharaporn. Based on the letter of Kimha Saezhan or Zhan Kimha about the Japanese invasion on 8 December 1941 cited in Thossaphon Nganphairot, หลายเรื(องเมืองสุราษฎร์ฯ (many stories of Surat Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 41.}

Zhan Kimha (see Figure 3.7) was a son of Khun Natchinarak and a local-born Chinese in Nakhon Si Thammarat. He was also a product of Chinese education in Penang. He had married Tae Kimio (鄭), a local-born Chinese in Bandon, and settled in Surat Thani with his wife.\footnote{This figure was from Chompunuch Chantharaporn.} He also owned Zhansuanseng Shop, selling sewing machines, typewriters and tricycles. Before opening his gun shop in Bandon’s Chinatown, he had been a tin miner in Ban Na San.\footnote{Tae Kimio was also known as Orawan Thirawat.}

\textit{Figure 3.6: Zhan Kimha’s shop in Bandon’s Chinatown}\footnote{Nganphairot, หลายเรื(องเมืองสุราษฎร์ฯ, 40.}
In the meantime, shortly before the Japanese invasion, many people, both Thai and Chinese, particularly the elderly and children, hastily headed to Phatthanaram Temple, another Thai temple in Bandon’s Chinatown that was founded by Kimchun, a local-born Chinese who had become a monk. While Kimchun was meditating at the time, many people went to ask him for help on account of his prestige and the belief that he would be able to protect them from the Japanese. Walking from his parsonage with a cane, 80 year-old Kimchun calmed the people by using his walking stick to draw a circle around these frightened people and telling them that they would be safe from bullets. Then he went back to do meditation. After the clash between the people and the Japanese soldiers ended, many myths about his supernatural powers were created. Therefore, many people, including those from different religions, became disciples of Kimchun. Furthermore, during the Pacific War, Kimchun’s temple also served as the first clinic in Bandon’s Chinatown, due to his knowledge and interest in traditional medicine. When

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501 This figure was from Chompunuch Chanharaporn.
502 For the biography of Kimchun, see Section V of Chapter 4. Santithammarangsri, ed., ๑๐๐ ปี วัดธรรมบูชา (100 years of Wat Tham Bucha) (Bangkok: Thammasapa, 2004), 250-251.
there was a shortage of conventional drugs during the outbreak of the Pacific War, Kimchun transformed his temple to cure patients.\textsuperscript{503}

As anti-Japanese sentiment had been brewing for decades and was mirrored in the Chinese diaspora around the world, it was possible that well-known Chinese heroes and heroines such as Zhan Kimha, Kobkun Saetang, and Koi Anaui identified politically with China, although they were second-generation Chinese. Li Patpoon, a third-generation Chinese and guardian of a Hainanese Temple in Pak Kradae, recalled the period after the Japanese invasion when his father always scolded the Japanese in his house as ‘Boe Aoi’ and ‘Boe Kiao,’ Hainanese derogatory terms for the Japanese meaning ‘dwarf’.\textsuperscript{504}

\textbf{Figure 3.8: The small port in Bandon where the Japanese landed on 8 December 1941}

\textsuperscript{503} Praphan Ruengnarong, ๑๐๐ เรื่องเมืองใต้ (100 stories of southern Thailand) (Bangkok: Amarin, 2010), 195.

\textsuperscript{504} Nikoon Chuleetham (Li Patpoon). Interview, 9 September 2015. Li, a third-generation Chinese, is the guardian and spirit medium of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae.
Figure 3.9: Pamphlets of the Japanese were given to people once they landed in the Southern Peninsula on 8 December 1941 to induce them not resist. Words on this pamphlet read, “The Thai and Japanese armies, which would drive out the British for peace in Asia, were impending. Thai people! Attack (the British) for the nation!”

After the preparations to resist the Japanese troops, the superintendent and deputy superintendent of the police station, together with the headmaster of Suratthani School, patrolled the city to monitor the situation. They met with Japanese who had just landed at the small port (Figure 3.8) in front of Kobkhan Naruemit Market, owned by a Hokkien, and walked from the Chinatown towards the City Hall to negotiate with Thai officers. The Japanese also gave pamphlets to people to induce them not resist to the Japanese invasion (see Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10). Ijiro Nakagawa (1887-1977), a Japanese

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505 This figure was from NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12.
506 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 16.
507 Nganphairot, หลายเรื่องเมืองสุราษฎร์, 10.
translator, informed them that the Thai government had already agreed to Japanese passage through the country and the Japanese army would head to Bandon’s airfield, where there was a community of Hakka farmers.\textsuperscript{508} The superintendent objected on the grounds that he had not received any order from the government. Not long after the meeting, the Japanese started firing at him while he and his group were walking back to the area of resistance about only 200 metres away, and prepared for an encounter with the Japanese. The two sides started fighting at around 8.45 a.m.\textsuperscript{509}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure3.10.png}
\caption{Another pamphlet reads, “The Japanese troops who want to help Thailand have just arrived. Let Japan and Thailand collaborate to fight against England to get the lost territories back.”\textsuperscript{510}}
\end{figure}

Ijiro Nakagawa was a Japanese merchant who had been settled in Surat Thani for many years. Before settling down in the downtown and opening a shop called Nakagawa Yoko (中川洋行), selling ceramics, glassware and ironware, he owned a fabric shop in Chaiya’s market, where he married Sali Kanthawa, a daughter of Khun Phisanbannawet, a chief district officer of Chaiya.\textsuperscript{511} Being a translator of the Japanese troops and walking

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{508} Ijiro Nakagawa was known by people in Bandon as Nakagawa Uko.
\item \textsuperscript{509} NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 16.
\item \textsuperscript{510} This figure was from NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12.
\item \textsuperscript{511} Nganphairot, หลายเรื่องเมืองสุราษฎร์, 10-11.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
with them that day, he was accused of being a Japanese spy and soldier by many people.\textsuperscript{512} According to his daughter’s account, Saranya Yankitti, a daughter of Nakagawa, informed that her father was not a soldier but a merchant who was asked to be a translator to negotiate with the Thai officers while the Japanese were walking through his shop in the market.\textsuperscript{513} However, he was only mentioned in the Thai document as a “translator”. Moreover, he was not the only Japanese in the city. S.V. Mako, another Japanese, had also opened a store – a photo studio – in Bandon.

In Thailand, most Chinese migrants stayed together in their communities, where they established a Chinatown. Apart from building their own temples and native-place associations, some of them built markets, shops and houses in Chinatown. Most of the Chinese communities, therefore, had become downtowns or centres of many provinces in Thailand. To secure the airfield in Bandon and the major train station in Phun Phin, the Japanese had to negotiate with the provincial governor first. Instead of going directly to the City Hall or train station, they had chosen to go through Bandon’s Chinatown. As the fight happened in the centre of the Chinese communities, there was no doubt that the Japanese invasion had a greater effect on the Chinese citizens than on the local people.

Bandon was important because it was the district capital of Surat Thani, where the City Hall and other official places were located in the city. However, the majority of the population in Bandon’s downtown was Chinese. As Chalo Charuchinda, the governor from 1942-1943, wrote, “Bandon is the centre of this province and a large number of aliens are settled there. I could almost say it is Chinatown and it is not an ordinary Chinatown. They (the Chinese) have considerable influence and we always have observed their movements and suppressed them.”\textsuperscript{514}

\textsuperscript{512} Ibid., 28.
\textsuperscript{513} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{514} NAT, (2) MOE 25/3473 เรื่องให้นายดอย นางรัตน์ ท้าวราชวงศ์ ให้กลับเข้ารับราชการตามเดิม (Allowing Soi Watthana, who was suspended during the investigation, to go back to his position), Chalo Charuchinda, the provincial governor, to the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Education, letter dated 8/01/1943, 19.
Table 3.2 Casualties in the resistance against the Japanese invasion on 8 December 1941 in the Southern Peninsula

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Surat Thani</th>
<th>Prachuap Khiri Khan</th>
<th>Chumphon</th>
<th>Nakhon Si Thammarat</th>
<th>Songkhla</th>
<th>Pattani</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>Deaths</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Soldier</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Police</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Government officer</td>
<td>517</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Civilian</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total deaths and injuries</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Compared to other provinces such as Prachuap Khiri Khan and Chumphon, the number of Japanese soldiers who had arrived in Bandon was greater. The Japanese had superior firearms including rifles, machine guns, and hand grenades. This explains why the death toll in Surat Thani was higher than in other provinces (see Table 3.2). At 3 p.m., the Thai side, therefore, gradually retreated. Fighting valiantly against the enemy, the officers received a telegraph at 4 p.m. from the Commanding Officer of the 6th Military ordering them to halt their resistance. Nevertheless, Police Captain Charung Sawettanan, the Commander of Amphoe Chaiya Police Station, who was on duty at Bandon, together with the Deputy Governor, represented the Thai side to negotiate a ceasefire with the Japanese military commander in the Chinatown area. The encounter was completely ended after the provincial governor went to negotiate with the Japanese himself at 6.30 p.m.

According to Table 3.2, the number of casualties in Surat Thani was the highest from all the provinces. Most of the deaths and injuries were made up of civilians. As mentioned above, the number of Japanese soldiers who had arrived in Bandon was higher than for other provinces and they had superior firearms. In addition, the high civilian toll

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515 This table was based on information from NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 3-91.
516 The number of injuries was unknown but people were reported with petty injuries.
517 Teachers and scouts are included in this category.
518 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 65.
519 Ibid., 16-17.
could be attributed to the fact that the resistance against the Japanese happened in the densely populated downtown. As the fight happened in Chinatown and they were shooting on the side of the road, it can be assumed that the majority of the civilian deaths and injuries were Chinese.\(^{520}\) Even Chinese rickshaws participated in the fighting.\(^{521}\)

![Figures 3.11 and 3.12: Kobkun Saetang and her children\(^{522}\)](image)

During the resistance by the police and the public, a national heroine emerged, namely Kobkun Saetang, from Ban Na San. She had courageously helped transport ammunition and food to the police while some senior government officers had fled the town when they heard in the morning that the Japanese were heading towards Bandon Bay.\(^{523}\) Kobkun Saetang (陳, 1921-1998), was a local-born Chinese whose family had settled in front of Wat Phra Yok, a temple in Chinatown (see Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12).\(^{524}\) Her father, Tang Engchiang, was a Teochew who had married Amorn Binnai, a Siamese woman.\(^{525}\) At the age of 20, she was a waitress at Khun Paen Restaurant, owned by her aunt and located close to City Hall. On her way from home to the restaurant, she

\(^{520}\) NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 64.
\(^{521}\) Nganphairoth, หลายเรื(องเมืองสุราษฎร์, 13.
\(^{522}\) These figures were from Mayuree Puttarnlek.
\(^{523}\) NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 64.
\(^{524}\) Kobkun Saetang was also known as Paew.
\(^{525}\) Tang Engchiang was also known as Kiang Saetang.
heard many people shouting that the Japanese were about to invade Bandon and the police asked people to volunteer to fight against the enemy. She quickly headed to the police station to volunteer for a gun in order to fight the Japanese. At the police station, she was the only woman from Chinese and Thai civilians who were waiting for the police to teach them how to use the gun. As the only woman, she then volunteered to transport ammunition and food to the police and other volunteers on the front line. While the police and volunteers were shooting at the Japanese soldiers, Kobkun did her best by running to transport the ammunition to them and many police and volunteers remembered her bravery.  

Apart from the police, teachers and scouts were also involved in the resistance against the Japanese. Lamyong Wisuppakan, a Thai teacher, led his students from Suratthani School to participate in the Constitution Day held at the City Hall. On that day, he asked Koi Anaui, a scout and his student, together with other scouts, to receive firearms at the police station to resist the Japanese. During the fight, at around 11 a.m., Koi Anaui was shot dead by the Japanese, as was Wisuppakan, who had run to help him.  

Koi Anaui was a local-born Chinese from Surat Thani and the fourth child of eight by An Aui (黃才, 1886-1966), who had migrated from Chaozhou and traded in Maluan, Phun Phin. An Aui married a Siamese woman. Later, he was elected to be a village headman of Maluan and changed his name to Chu Wongsuan. Koi Anaui had been influenced greatly by his Chinese father as he grew up as a Chinese son surrounded by Chinese culture.

In the case of the other provinces, they all had military camps. Therefore, the Japanese troops were confronted by Thai soldiers. For example, after landing in Prachuap Khiri Khan, the Japanese directly seized the police station and airfield. The 15th Artillery Battalion in Nakhon Si Thammarat was also attacked after the Japanese landed

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526 Nganphairot, หลายเรื(องเมืองสุราษฎร์, 34-37.  
527 Ibid., 18-19.  
528 Sakorn Wongsuan. Interview, 6 January 2017. An interviewee was a niece of Koi Anaui and a granddaughter of An Aui. She was the only one who settled near her grandfather’s tomb.  
529 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 59.
in the province. There was less general panic and fear as the fighting was far from downtown. \(^{530}\) In Chumphon, the 38th Infantry Battalion was stationed in the capital district. \(^{531}\) In Pattani, the Japanese encountered resistance from the 42nd Infantry Battalion, with support from the police, government officers and general public. \(^{532}\) In Songkhla, there were few casualties because senior officers and people had fled before the Japanese arrived in Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai, the huge Chinese communities in South Siam. However, they clashed with Thai soldiers stationed in Songkhla on their way to secure the train station in Hat Yai. \(^{533}\)

In sum, Chinese civilians in Surat Thani chose to fight against the Japanese when they landed in Bandon’s Chinatown on 8 December 1941. Some of them became national heroes and heroines, particularly Kobkun Saetang, who was praised by the government and had her Chinese surname officially changed to a Thai surname.

V. Conclusion

The surge of Chinese nationalism and the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese communities in Surat Thani and elsewhere in the South Seas had been brewing before 1937. The Chinese actively responded to the Japanese aggression in their motherland through boycotts of Japanese products, an activity which caused severe damage to the Japanese economy. Some resorted to violence by attacking the Chinese who traded with the Japanese in order to make the boycott more efficient.

In addition, the Chinese luminaries of Surat Thani also participated in Chinese national politics and the anti-Japanese movement in Siam. Liao Chiangsoon was placed in a high position in the Chinese community in Siam as he had received the royal title and had royal connections. He became involved in politics and built networks with other

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\(^{530}\) Ibid., 25, 66.  
\(^{531}\) Ibid., 14.  
\(^{532}\) Ibid., 21-22.  
\(^{533}\) Ibid., 68-69.
leading Chinese in Bangkok. With his privilege of being favoured by King Vajiravudh, he was asked by his friends to tell the King about the initiative to launch the CCC. Liao was also elected the ninth chairman of the CCC. Under him, the CCC provided a large sum of money to aid a natural disaster in China. Following his death, he not only left his business to Liao Jingsong, his son, but also his connections with leading Chinese in Siam, which influenced him to get involved in politics. Liao Jingsong and his friends met Seow Hoodseng, the leader of anti-Japanese movements. The Teochew Association was also founded by Liao and his friends as a vehicle to contribute to the Chinese war effort.

Once the Japanese landed in Thailand in December 1941, Liao and his friends were arrested as they refused to collaborate with the Japanese army. In the meantime, Chinese people in Surat Thani chose to arm themselves to fight against the Japanese. Some of them became national heroes and heroines, particularly Kobkun Saetang, the only woman that joined in the armed resistance against the Japanese invasion. Her bravery was praised by the government and her Chinese surname was later changed to a Thai surname under orders of the Thai government.
Chapter Four
‘Traitors or Opportunists?’: the Splits amongst the Chinese during Thailand’s Military Alliance with Japan (1941-1945)

I. Introduction

The anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere had been brewing for decades, even before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW) in 1937. One of the most effective anti-Japanese activities was organised boycotts of Japanese products. When China was agitated by Japan, the boycott was used as a tool to express their patriotism. However, the Siamese government closely observed the boycotts and cracked down on violence because it was afraid that this kind of political activity would damage its national trade, so when the war between China and Japan broke out in 1937 notable Chinese from Surat Thani, particularly Liao Jingsong and his family members, contributed to the Chinese war effort to a great extent. In 1938, Liao and his friends registered the Teochew Association as a vehicle for organising contributions to the Chinese war effort. Liao also served as a vice president of the fundraising committee. After the Japanese military seized Shantou in Guangdong province in 1939, Liao travelled across Surat Thani and other provinces in peninsular Thailand to raise funds for his ancestral homeland. When the Japanese invaded Thailand in December 1941, he and his brother were imprisoned for their anti-Japanese activities after they refused to cooperate with the Japanese. On 8 December 1941, the Japanese also landed in the downtown of Bandon, the capital district of Surat Thani, seen as the Chinatown of the region at the time given that the majority of the population was Chinese. Clashes broke out there between Japanese forces and the Chinese people, who identified culturally and politically with China. Zhan Kimha, the owner of a gun shop, provided guns and bullets to Chinese fighters. During the fight, Kobkun Saetang, bravely transported ammunition to the police and volunteers. Compared with other provinces, Surat Thani had the highest number of casualties, mostly civilians, because the number of the Japanese soldiers was higher than in other areas and the fight occurred in the built-up and heavily populated area of Chinatown.
On 8 December 1941, a few hours before the seizure of peninsular Thailand, the Japanese troops attacked Pearl Harbour, expanding the conflict previously contained to China and its smaller island neighbour. The attack marked the beginning of the Pacific War, which was partly due to Japanese resentment at the deadlock in the mainland and American economic sanctions imposed by the Roosevelt Administration.\footnote{Ernest Koh, “The Pacific War,” in \textit{Diaspora at War: the Chinese of Singapore between Empire and Nation, 1937-1945} (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 119.} For the Chinese, residing in the Chinese diaspora elsewhere, including Surat Thani, the Pacific War was a protraction of the SSJW. The Chinese living in South East Asia, however, had not yet experienced the war directly or suffered occupation, although they contributed to the Chinese war effort by using various tools such as boycotts and fundraising campaigns to help the motherland after the beginning of the SSJW. An examination of the Chinese diaspora in the separate war time frame is indispensable to set the context of the research.

Prior to the Pacific War, Thailand, which was the only independent state in South East Asia and dominated by European colonial powers, became the object of competition between Great Britain and Japan in the 1930s. The rivalry came to an end once the Japanese army landed in Thailand on 8 December 1941 and the government of Thailand’s Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram agreed to an alliance with Japan.\footnote{E. Bruce Reynolds, \textit{Thailand’s Secret War: The Free Thai, OSS, and SOE during the World War II} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 1.} With strong backing from the military, in 1938 Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram became the nation’s Prime Minister. Influenced by the global political trend towards fascism, and himself a personal admirer of Mussolini, Phibun swiftly eliminated his political rivals and consolidated power into a military dictatorship.\footnote{Ibid., 2.} Perhaps a shift that signalled a tragic fate for the Chinese in the country was that in 1939 the Field Marshal formally changed their host country’s name, Siam, to Thailand, revealing his interest in recovering control of the nation’s economy from the Chinese to ethnic Thais. Prior to 1939, multiple ethnic Chinese consciousnesses had gradually evolved into a united national Chinese consciousness and refused to assimilate with the local society, but they also got involved
in the Chinese national politics by boycotting Japanese merchandise in response to the Japanese agitation in their ancestral homeland.

Under the Japanese occupation, the economic Thai-ification policies were strengthened and accompanied by a series of cultural mandates to endorse the Thai-ification of the country. In 1942, the Phibun government issued a royal decree to reserve twenty-seven different occupations and professions for Thai nationals. During this period, the number of the Chinese applying for naturalisation was higher than those in the preceding period. Some Chinese also changed their Chinese nationality to Japanese instead of Thai for business purposes. This not only disturbed the Thai government, but also caused tensions amongst Chinese migrants, with Chinese who co-operated with the Japanese accused of being traitors during the last phase of the war.

This chapter examines the Chinese splits during the Japanese occupation in Surat Thani. In southern provinces, including Surat Thani, Chinese merchants were reportedly divided into two groups: those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. Chinese patriots condemned the Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese as traitors. This chapter will also examine the Chinese community under the Japanese occupation. On 8 December 1941, the Chinese in Bandon chose to fight back and fighting broke out in the city. The Chinese were shocked to learn that the Thai government had chosen to co-operate with the Japanese. It is therefore interesting to investigate Chinese life in the wartime Chinese community. After this, the economic Thai-ification programme will be examined to see how the Chinese responded to the policies. Lastly, the political and cultural Thai-ification programme that the Phibun government introduced to motivate the Chinese to assimilate into Thai society will be investigated. The political Thai-ification policies had a considerable effect on Chinese identity and self-identification. The last section addresses three themes related to this: changing name, nationality, and women and clothing.

II. The Chinese Diaspora under the Japanese Occupation

During the first phase of the SSJW, anti-Japanese sentiment was mirrored in the Chinese diaspora, including in Surat Thani. When the Japanese troops landed in Bandon’s Chinatown in 1941, the local Chinese decided to fight back. However, the Thai government agreed to an alliance with Japan, sparking a state of panic within the Chinese community. This section aims to investigate the Chinese diaspora and the lives of the Chinese under the Japanese occupation.

In December 1941, Japan launched coordinated attacks on Pearl Harbour, Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines. In Hong Kong, the Japanese launched an assault on 8 December, triumphantly occupying the island after the British surrender on 25 December 1941. The Chinese also engaged in looting to vent their envy of the luxurious life led by foreign-born business men, the Taipans (大班). Some stripped the dead lying in the streets of their clothes to keep themselves warm. Throughout the celebration of the fall of Hong Kong, for three days Japanese soldiers stalked the streets, taking whatever they wanted from stores and conducting rapes of local women. The population of the Chinese residents was reduced by famine, repatriation, and escapees to about one-third of its pre-invasion level. In Malaya, the Japanese landed in peninsular Thailand and northern Malaya on 8 December 1941, choosing to invade Singapore overland through Malaya. During the invasion, the Chinese Mobilisation Committee was founded under the chairmanship of Mr. Tan Kah-kee in order to recruit Chinese volunteers to defend Malaya. Many of them were labourers on defence work, although a force of about 1,000, mostly Chinese communists, became a part of ‘Dalforce,’ or a newly-recruited group of Chinese volunteers in Singapore to resist the Japanese invasion. During the Japanese advance, not only the Japanese engaged in the looting and rioting, but also Chinese gangs. However, these Chinese looters and robbers were publicly executed as an example and

538 Alan Birch and Martin Cole, Captive Years: The Occupation of Hong Kong, 1941-45 (Hong Kong: Heinemann Asia, 1982), 16-18, 112.
their heads showed on poles in the market areas and on bridges to prevent locals from rioting. The Chinese gangs of armed robbers indulged in mass rapes, albeit on a smaller scale than that of the Japanese soldiers. Soon after the Japanese triumphantly occupied Singapore, on 15 February 1942, the Chinese were seen as enemies. Many victims accused of operating against the Japanese were singled out by informers and executed. According to the evidence given at the war crimes trials in 1947, about 5,000 Chinese were executed. These Chinese fell into various categories: 1) those who were related to the China Relief Fund; 2) rich merchants who donated to the Relief Fund; 3) supporters of Tan Kah-kee; 4) newspapermen, school headmasters, and high-school students; 5) Hainanese, whom the Japanese considered as communists; 6) newcomers to Malaya whom the Japanese thought had left mainland China because they hated the Japanese; 7) men with tattoos whom the Japanese assumed were members of secret societies; 8) volunteers and members of ‘Dalforce’; and 9) pro-British government officers.541

In Thailand, on the eve of the Japanese military attack, Phibun disappeared, leaving his cabinet unable to decide how to respond to the Japanese invasion. The Japanese troops faced opposition from soldiers, policemen, government officers and civilians, both Thai and Chinese, when their army landed in Surat Thani and the Southern peninsula on 8 December 1941. After dawn on that day, Phibun returned to Bangkok and permitted the passage of the Japanese troops through Thailand. The Japanese delegates demanded an alliance providing for military, political and economic co-operation between the two nations. Phibun finally agreed to the alliance on 10 December and the agreement was formally signed on 21 December.542 He was partly eager to salvage a degree of autonomy and desperate to enjoy any potential benefits should Japan emerge victorious from the war; therefore, he agreed to the alliance and allowed the Japanese full

541 Ibid., 305-306.
542 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/64 สำนักงานคณะกรมการตามพ.ร.b. อาญถูกกระทำการตามความของไทยโดยรัฐบาลเพื่อให้ถูกย้ายค่า
พระยาจากนายทุกสิ่งในและพลเรือตรีชากอนิกุ เพื่อประกอบการค้นคดีอาญบัณฑิตพันพัน.ฟุบลส่งมา (The Committee appointed by virtue of the War Crime Act requested the statements of Mr. Teiji Tsubokami and Rear-Admiral Naomasa Sakonju to be used as evidence in the War Crime action which had been brought against Field-Marshal Phibun Songkhram), memorandum of an interrogation of Mr. Tsubokami, dated 2/05/1946, 10.
use of Thai facilities.\textsuperscript{543} Later, on 25 January 1942, he also acceded to the Japanese demands to declare war on Britain and the United States.

The day after the Japanese landed in Thailand, there were arrests of the Chinese suspected of being connected with anti-Japanese activities at the outbreak of the SSJW. A large number of important Chinese leaders in Thailand, including Liao Jingsong and his brother, Liao Hinpoh, were captured by the Japanese soldiers and imprisoned. Liao’s friends from the Teochew Association Faction met the same fate. The Japanese also stripped the Hainanese, the largest dialect group in Surat Thani and the second largest in Bangkok, of their top leadership. In December, the chairman of the Kengjiu Association (瓊州會所) was also arrested by the Japanese. The other ethnic groups’ leadership was also weakened.\textsuperscript{544}

After the alliance with Japan was agreed by Phibun, the movements and activities of the Chinese in Surat Thani were more heavily observed by the local authorities. The Chinese who worked in the government sectors were also observed. For example, Mr. Soi Munggu, who had recently changed his surname to Mungwatthana, had worked as a clerk of the district education section in Bandon since April 1941. After the Japanese occupied Surat Thani for about a week, he was accused of being a Chinese spy due to the fact that his father had migrated from China and he was loyal to China because he always associated himself with the Chinese and utilised his position to publicly and privately help the Chinese community. The provincial governor, therefore, took the opportunity to suspend him on 20 December 1941 after he forgot to ask for a one-day leave of absence a few days prior to this despite the fact that there was no evidence that he was a spy. He was finally dismissed from the position on 1 April 1943 after a suspension of over a year.\textsuperscript{545}

\textsuperscript{543} Reynolds, \textit{Thailand’s Secret War}, 8.
\textsuperscript{545} NAT, (2) MOE 25/3473 เรื่องให้ นายสอย มุ่งวัธนา พักธุรกิจและให้กลับเข้ารับราชการตามเดิม (Allowing Soi Mungwatthana, who was given a suspension during the investigation, to return to his position), Chalo Charuchinda, the provincial governor, to the Permanent Secretary for the Ministry of Education, letter dated 8/01/1943, 1-60.
After a ceasefire between the Japanese army and the provincial governor of Surat Thani was negotiated at 6.30 p.m. on 8 December 1941, the Japanese soldiers resided in the pavilion at Wat Sai Temple (see Figure 4.1), located in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown, location of the present-day Chinese Temple Night Market. At the same time, the local authorities utilised the building of Tao Ing School (陶英學校), which was closed by the Phibun government before the Japanese occupation, as a temporary city hall of Surat Thani after the former one was burned down during the Japanese invasion. Additionally, the Japanese also established their military base in the rubber plantation of Liao Jingsong in Phun Phin, another district in Surat Thani. The possible reason why the Japanese preferred to use Chinese institutions such as Wat Sai Temple rather than Thai institutions was that they would not want to undermine the relationship between them and the local – Thai – people. At the same time, the Thai authorities used the building of the

Figure 4.1: Chinatown gateway to Wat Sai Temple, recently built in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown, portrays the role of the local temple in serving the Chinese.

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546 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 รายงานคณะผู้แทนรัฐบาลในการไปเยี่ยมสำนักงานและประชากรภาคใต้ตามฉุกเฉิน (The report of the government representatives on the visit of government officers and people in the Southern in case of an emergency). Document dated 19/12/1941 to 25/03/1942, 65.

547 Kanok Nganphairo, “โรงเรียนจีนในบ้านดอน,” (Chinese Schools in Bandon) in ๗๕ ปีพระราชทานนามพระราชาท่าน (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of the city) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2010), 46.
Chinese school as the temporary hall instead of the Thai school either because the building was available or they would not want to trouble the Thai people.

Despite the resistance of the Chinese civilians in Bandon’s Chinatown, the Japanese army did not treat people badly compared to those in the southernmost provinces of Songkhla, Pattani and Yala. This was due to the fact that there were senior government officials on hand who negotiated a ceasefire with the Japanese. At the beginning, the Japanese aimed at winning the support of the Chinese, so there were none of the kind of mass persecutions and even killings which happened in British Malaya. In Bangkok, shortly after the occupation, the Japanese Commander visited the chairmen of the leading Chinese associations. Additionally, he paid respect to the patron saint of the Baode Benevolent Society (報德善堂) and donated 1,000 baht. 548

Although there was no official record of the monetary loss in the occupied provinces in Thailand, the following examples portray the hardships caused by the Japanese invasion and occupation during the first phase of the Pacific War. In terms of the economic loss, Songkhla was the most adversely impacted province in peninsular Thailand. It was estimated by the Thai government that the loss ran into many million baht. After hearing that the Japanese army was approaching, Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai’s Chinatowns were abandoned within a few hours. The Japanese thought that they had defeated Thailand; therefore, people were treated similarly to those from the defeated nation. The Japanese promptly seized people’s properties and occupied in government offices, shops, markets and civilian houses in the abandoned Chinatowns. The Japanese occupied every nook and cranny of the Chinatowns and every shop was closed, causing many Chinese to become impoverished overnight. 549 In the case of Pattani, almost all people had fled the Chinatown before the Japanese invaded. Lim Kiam Tai Shop was plundered by the Japanese. 550 Meng Xian Shop in Yala’s Chinatown was also robbed and

549 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 19-21, 69-76.
550 Ibid., 72-73.
its major market was inhabited by the Japanese soldiers.\textsuperscript{551} Although, as noted, there was no official record of the total monetary loss in the occupied provinces, these few instances are examples of the degree of hardship suffered by many Chinese citizens during the Japanese invasion and occupation in the early stages of the Pacific War.

On 14 December 1941, when the Thai government announced that people should fly the Thai flag together with the Japanese to show harmony, some Japanese regiments, Thai government officers and civilians paraded through Bandon’s Chinatown.\textsuperscript{552} In the case of Prachuap Khiri Khan, located in the northern part of the Malay Peninsula about 366 km north of Surat Thani, the Japanese wanted to hoist the Japanese flag together with the Thai flag after the ceasefire was negotiated on 8 December. However, there was no senior government officer to raise the Thai flag. A merchant in Chinatown, presumably Chinese, was therefore told by the Japanese to represent the Thai side.\textsuperscript{553} On 18 February 1942, three days after the surrender of Singapore, the three flags of Japan, Thailand and the Chinese flag of the government in Nanjing were also flown by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce (CCC) to celebrate this victory. This was a superficial display of cooperation from the leaders of the Chinese community.\textsuperscript{554} When Phibun sent the Thai army and triumphantly occupied the Federated Shan States, an administrative division of the British Empire during British rule in Burma, after getting rid of the Nationalist Chinese forces of Chiang Kai-shek on 5 May 1942, the government encouraged people, including all aliens in Thailand, to fly the Thai flag to celebrate the victory. In order to observe feelings of foreigners, Phibun simultaneously ordered the Ministry of Interior to have officers of every province observe whether foreigners, including Japanese, German, Italian, Indian, Burmese, and Chinese nationals, followed Phibun’s instruction.\textsuperscript{555}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{551} Ibid., 74-77.
\item \textsuperscript{552} Ibid., 65.
\item \textsuperscript{553} Ibid., 61.
\item \textsuperscript{554} Jeffery Sng and Pimpraphai Bisalputra, \textit{A History of the Thai-Chinese} (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2015), 347-348.
\item \textsuperscript{555} NAT, MFA (2) 7.1.9/11 เรื่องส่งบัญชีข้าราชการที่ยึดครองทหารไทยอีกเมืองที่อยู่ต่อไป (Sending the list of foreigners who hoisted the national flag when the Thai army occupied Kengtung), Lt. Col. Chai Prateepasen to Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, letter dated 5/09/1942.
\end{itemize}
Overall, the Chinese from almost all the Southern provinces followed the instruction, including Surat Thani, where only 573 of all 6,654 Chinese nationals did not follow the instruction. This was probably due to the fact that many Chinese from peninsular Thailand had been arrested and deported for anti-Japanese activities since the outbreak of the SSJW, so those remaining were possibly afraid that their lives would be disrupted if they did not obey Phibun’s instruction. In addition, the Japanese invaded and established their military bases in many Southern provinces, so the Chinese had to be active to any news in order to know what happened because the Thai authorities and the Japanese in particular observed their movements. Only three provinces, namely Songkhla, Phuket, and Nakhon Si Thammarat, where more than 50 per cent of the total number of Chinese nationals in Thailand at the time lived, did not obey Phibun.\textsuperscript{556}

On 8 December 1941, many Chinese in Surat Thani were in sudden panic after they learnt that Japanese troops were about to invade Bandon’s Chinatown. Aui Phonglian (黃蘭蓮), a Hainanese, visualised how her Chinese father, Huang Shanye (黃善業), a Hainanese goldsmith who owned a gold shop, coped with the Japanese invasion, which happened when she was 12 years old. Although Huang was scared of the Japanese soldiers, he was more worried about his treasure. Therefore, he did not flee from Chinatown with other family members, but rather put his wares in jars and buried them deep in his house.\textsuperscript{557} Although a week had passed, Soi Munggu, a clerk of the district education section in Bandon and a local-born Chinese, reported that people in Bandon’s Chinatown were still in a panic. The economy, commerce and communication of the town were in crisis.\textsuperscript{558} Similar to many provinces in southern Thailand, most of the shops in Bandon closed their doors because the Chinese probably wanted to play the situation by ear. Rice, moreover, was in short supply in Ko Samui, one of the most important strongholds of the Hainanese diaspora (known as the world’s second Hainan Island).

\textsuperscript{556} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{557} Aui Phonglian or Kanda Kanchanasuk. Interview, 20 September 2015. Born in 1929, Aui, a local-born Chinese of Hainanese descent, went to help her mother sell goods at City Hall on Constitution Day when the Japanese landed in Bandon on 8 December 1941.
\textsuperscript{558} NAT, (2) MOE 25/3473, Mr. Soi Mungwatthana to Mueang Surat Thani’s district-chief officer, letter dated 22/12/1941, 8.
because the shipment of goods from Bandon to Ko Samui came to a halt for more than a week.\textsuperscript{559}

After a ceasefire was negotiated and Phibun agreed to contract an alliance with Japan, panic was still widespread across peninsular Thailand due to the occupation. In order to deal with the panic, a government delegation was sent to visit the provinces which had been most affected by the Japanese army. Its aims were to demonstrate its policies and persuade the civilians to co-operate with the government in alliance with Japan. Interestingly, the government visited only the Chinatown of each province to persuade the merchants, presumably the Chinese, to reopen their shops.\textsuperscript{560} The delegation reached Surat Thani on 17 December 1941 and convened a meeting with the government officers in the province to instruct them on government policies. After visiting the Japanese soldiers at Wat Sai Temple, the government representatives met with the merchants, the luminaries and people of Bandon’s Chinatown in the afternoon at a theatre in the centre of the Chinese community. Around 1,000 people were persuaded to reopen their shops, stay calm and strictly follow the government’s instructions.\textsuperscript{561} After almost all the Japanese soldiers had moved from Bandon to other places in late December, the situation returned to normal. The relocation of the Japanese troops will be discussed in the final section.\textsuperscript{562}

When the Japanese army took over its occupied territories in South East Asia, the Japanese soldiers used their Japanese military yen, sometimes dollars, the currency issued by the Japanese Military Authority, as a replacement for local currency. The Japanese military yen could not be used in Japan. In Surat Thani and other provinces in Southern Thailand, the Japanese soldiers also used their Japanese military yen and dollar once they had successfully occupied Thailand (see Figure 4.2). In Prachuap Khiri Khan, most of the merchants had to close their shops during the first week of the occupation for this reason, while in the Chinatowns of Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai there were many different

\textsuperscript{559} NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 17.
\textsuperscript{560} NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12, 3-77.
\textsuperscript{561} Ibid., 8, 17-19.
\textsuperscript{562} Ibid. 65.
types of banknote, including Indochinese, Hong Kong, Korean, Manchukuo, Chinese, and Japanese.\(^{563}\) The exchange rate between the military dollar and Thai baht was 1 to 1.\(^{564}\) In Nakhon Si Thammarat, relations between the Japanese and local people were good; therefore, the exchange rate was 152 dollar to 100 baht. Later, in show of remorse, the Japanese soldiers stopped using the military banknote in this province after the people acted in a friendly way towards them.\(^{565}\) Similar to Bandon’s Chinatown, the Japanese utilised their banknote in the first place and later used Thai money to purchase goods. The Japanese here were quite generous compared to other provinces, despite the fact that they had encountered resistance from the local community during the invasion.\(^{566}\) The Japanese generosity towards people in Surat Thani possibly derived from the fact that the local people followed the Thai government instructions on 14 December 1941 to fly the Thai flag together with the Japanese flag as a show of harmony. In addition, there was also a parade of Japanese regiments, Thai government officers and civilians through Bandon’s Chinatown as mentioned previously. Therefore, the Japanese possibly saw the local population as good natured and affable towards them, similar to the situation in Nakhon Si Thammarat.

![Figure 4.2: A Japanese military note used by the Japanese soldiers in Southern Thailand\(^{567}\)](image)

\(^{563}\) Ibid., 60.
\(^{564}\) Ibid., 21.
\(^{565}\) Ibid., 67, 76.
\(^{566}\) Ibid., 65.
\(^{567}\) This figure was from NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12.
The difference in the exchange rate led to trade in the Japanese military notes, particularly in Surat Thani and other places in peninsular Thailand, after the Japanese had occupied the country for almost a year. Among Chinese merchants, the exchange rate was 83.30 Japanese military dollar to 100 baht, which was high because there was a need for Chinese merchants to buy goods such as cars, bicycles, and tyres, bicycles, etc., on the border of Thailand and Malaya. Therefore, many southern Chinese earned a profit from purchasing Japanese military dollars in Bangkok and northern Thailand where there was a circulation of the military notes throughout 1942 at 1 to 1.\footnote{NAT, SCH 2.6.9/2 การรับแลกเปลี่ยนบัตรเงินทหารญี่ปุ่นในจังหวัดภาคใต้ประเทศไทย (Offering the Japanese military dollars circulated in the southern provinces), document dated 27/12/1941 to 3/12/1942, 7, 24, 42, 53.}

In Songkhla, the entire Chinese community was in a state of panic for almost a year. Although the delegation visited Mueang Songkhla and Hat Yai, these two cities had important Chinese communities in Thailand, on 21 December 1941. In November 1942, people prepared to migrate to nearby suburbs again as rumours about an impending occupation by Japanese troops were circulating around the cities. The provincial governor, consequently, arranged a meeting to tell people to remain calm and prepare to sell their products to the Japanese soldiers in the event that they came instead of being afraid of them. In Hat Yai, 1,000 people, including Thais, Chinese and Malays, attended a meeting to this effect, with the governor using a Chinese translator to translate his messages.\footnote{NAT, MOI 2.1/24 ข้อ clang ปาภัยสงครามครั้งครั้งนี้และวิธีย์จัดการคืนเงิน Getty изъявлений (The provincial governor of Songkhla called the meeting with people to make them calm from the peril of war). Document dated 1942, 1-3.} This small point reflected the fact that the Chinese community during this period remained a distinct Chinese national community although the government had launched a number of Thai-ification policies before the Pacific War.

In sum, the Chinese residing in Surat Thani experienced hardships under the Japanese occupation. The Japanese army resided in Wat Sai Temple, at the heart of Bandon’s Chinatown, while the local authorities especially observed the movements of the Chinese after Thailand’s alliance with Japan. Commerce and communication in the Chinese diaspora were paralysed for a while and the Chinese were still in a panic
although some time had passed since the invasion. The Chinese were able to solve the problem of Japanese military banknotes used by the Japanese, even profiting from the situation. They furthermore tried to be amiable with the invaders, as witnessed in the parade in Chinatown, although it could also be considered a superficial show of co-operation.

III. Chinese Collaborators during the Pacific War

Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese community faced a dilemma. While many, such as Liao Jingsong and his friends, refused to collaborate with the Japanese, others chose to co-operate, and some were forced to. These collaborators were condemned by the patriotic Chinese as traitors. This led to splits amongst the Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Thailand. This section examines how the Chinese coped with the situation when they were faced with the dilemma of choosing between patriotic displays of non-cooperation and/or resistance and working with the Japanese. It also investigates how these Chinese collaborators were seen in the eyes of other Chinese.

As discussed in Chapter Three, while Liao Jingsong and his friends were imprisoned after they had refused to collaborate with the Japanese in the pursuit of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, many leading Chinese were persuaded or forced to cooperate. Amongst them were Tan Siewmeng, the leader of the commercial attaché faction and the former chairman of the CCC, and Tia Langsing (張蘭臣), the chairman of the CCC. Both of them went into hiding from the Japanese for a while. Succumbing to pressure, Tia Langsing later agreed to co-operate with the Japanese by giving an opening speech on behalf of the CCC in support of the alliance between Thailand and Japan and to offer co-operation in building a New Order in East Asia. In January 1942, the Japanese also demanded they telegraph both the Nanjing government to support

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570 Tia Langsing was also known as Sahas Mahakhun.
571 NAT, (2) SOC 0201.46.3/31  เรื่องพระราชทานเครื่องราชอิสสริยาภรณ์แด่ราชการและพ่อค้าประชาชนผู้มีความชอบต่างๆ (Giving insignias to government officers, merchants and people who benefited the country), letter dated 6/01/1946, 151.
572 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 347.
Wang Jingwei (汪精衛, 1883-1944), the head of the Nanjing government, and to Chiang Kai-shek in Chungking to stop fighting against Japan and merge with the government in Nanjing. The messages were addressed in the name of the representatives of all Chinese civilians in Thailand, and hence they represented Surat Thani’s Chinese.\(^{573}\)

Later, the Japanese told these leading Chinese to meet again in 1942 by asking them to organise a fundraising campaign to help Japan, but they declined. However, they did negotiate to run a fundraising campaign for the Thai army instead. In 1943, these Chinese were also forced by Kenji Fujishima, an officer of the Embassy of Japan in Thailand, to be a partner in establishing a company that provided sea-going vessels for the Japanese army to transport rice and weapons to Malaya. Tan Siewmeng, in particular, was a generous benefactor, donating around 50,000 baht, while at the same time also cooperating with other Chinese leaders to establish an anti-Japanese organisation and secretly supplied it with funds.\(^{574}\) In late 1942, the CCC was asked by the Japanese again to provide coolies to work on the railway being constructed from Banpong to the Burmese border. These Chinese leaders rejected but promised to do if the Thai government asked for help.\(^{575}\) Finally, the CCC was pressured by the Thai authorities in March 1943 to send Chinese labourers to work on this line.\(^{576}\) Tan Siewmeng, now the chairman of the CCC, was unable to decline.

When there was a need for additional labour in June, another 13,000 Chinese workers were recruited by the CCC, provincial governors and Chinese merchants in the provinces in July and August.\(^{577}\) Cantonese from Bandon’s Chinatown were also recruited to construct the railway. The majority of the Cantonese in Bandon worked as building contractors, carpenters and woodworkers.\(^{578}\) One of the most well-known and

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\(^{573}\) NAT, (2) SOC 0201.46.3/31, letter dated 6/01/1946, 151.

\(^{574}\) Ibid., 151-152.

\(^{575}\) Ibid., 151.

\(^{576}\) Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 348.

\(^{577}\) Ibid. 348-349.

\(^{578}\) Kam Hammnam. Interview, 7 January 2017. Kam, a third-generation Chinese of Cantonese descent, is the president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani and a former president of the Lions Club of Surat Thani.
leading Cantonese families was the family of Huang Zuguang (黃祖光). Huang migrated from Guangdong to Bangkok in the early twentieth century. He was a carpenter in Bangkok and moved to Bandon’s Chinatown during the pioneering era of Bandon. As the town was growing, Huang, together with his Cantonese friends, received many building contracts to build townhouses and official places such as a police station in Kanchanadit.\(^{579}\) In addition, the Cantonese in Bandon privately worked for the Japanese in some construction projects such as a Japanese port and fixing a railway line in Surat Thani.\(^{580}\) Similar to Surat Thani, the Japanese also hired Chinese construction companies to provide Chinese and Thai coolies to work on building projects. For example, a Chinese from Namthai Company in Bangkok recruited Chinese coolies to split stone in Kanchanaburi.\(^{581}\)

In 1943, amongst the Chinese in Thailand there was a conflict. Some Chinese nationals in the country changed their Chinese nationality to Japanese instead of Thai for business purposes, which alarmed the Phibun government.\(^{582}\) Some of these Chinese used their Japanese nationality to arrogate to themselves the power to indulge in illegal activities. Other Chinese did not want to change their nationality to Japanese because they were afraid that they would not be allowed to return to China.\(^{583}\) In southern Thailand, including Surat Thani, the Chinese merchants split into two groups. There was a conflict between those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. According to a Thai officer, “There are lots of Chinese Taiwan or Chinese who flatter the Japanese for benefit.”\(^{584}\) It was possible that those mainlanders who worked for the Japanese were called “Taiwan” because Taiwan was under Japanese rule at that period and some

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\(^{579}\) Huang Chunxin (黃春新), also known as Sathorn Luengpratiphan. Interview, 19 September 2015. Huang, a son of Huang Zuguang, is a leading Cantonese in Bandon and the former president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani.

\(^{580}\) Kam Hamnam. Interview, 7 January 2017.

\(^{581}\) NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/39, 67.

\(^{582}\) NAT, (2) MFA 7.1.9/15 เรื่องแจ้งผลการประชุมคณะกรรมการการต่างประเทศประจำกระทรวงกลาโหม 28 พ.ค. 2486 (The meeting report of the foreign affairs committee from the Ministry of Defence on 28 May 1943). We do not have much detail about these Chinese who changed their nationality to Japanese.

\(^{583}\) NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/39, 95, 68.

\(^{584}\) NAT, (2) MFA 7.1.9/15.
Taiwanese identified politically with the Japanese. It also referred to the Taiwanese who were in Thailand during the wartime period.

The Taiwanese had migrated to Siam to trade around 1882. They pioneered a Taiwanese tea market. When many Taiwanese came to Siam, they realised that there was an urgent need to establish the Taiwanese Association, and from 1935, they temporarily used Mida Company (美達行) as a base. There are two possible reasons why the Taiwanese established their association late although they had been settled in Siam for more than 50 years. Firstly, before Taiwan fell under Japanese rule in 1895 following China’s defeat in the First Sino-Japanese War, the Taiwanese in Thailand would associate themselves with Fujian province rather than Taiwan. They saw themselves as Hokkiens because it became a part of Fujian province after Taiwan was integrated into China in 1683 (see Chapter Three). In 1887, Taiwan became an independent province, but its governor still had to report to the governor in Fujian province. Therefore, politically, Taiwan was still linked together with Fujian. Secondly, as the Taiwanese identity was not strong enough, the Taiwanese in Siam would need to find support from the Hokkien Association. However, in 1935, the year that the Taiwanese Association was founded in Siam, Taiwan had been under Japanese rule for 40 years. This lengthy period of time suggests two things. Firstly, Taiwanese identity had become stronger, as Taiwan had been separated from Fujian for a long time. Secondly, it would be a part of the Japanese government plan. The Taiwanese merchants would work together with the Japanese to promote a Japanese friendly pan-Asian identity. During the wartime period, some Taiwanese preferred to use their Japanese identity while staying in Thailand, as could be seen from the case of a Taiwanese called Chonsan in Chonburi, a province in Central Thailand, who preferred to identify himself with the Japanese and adopted a Japanese name. However, the number of the Taiwanese in Thailand was very small compared to those major five dialect groups.

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585 泰國臺灣會館碑記 (The history of the Taiwan Association of Thailand inscribed on a tablet) see 泰國台灣會館: 2002 年度活動特刊 (The Taiwan Association of Thailand: Special Activity Issue of 2002).
586 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/39, 116.
After the Allied forces had successfully invaded Italy on 3 September 1943, the Italian government agreed to surrender to the Allies. The Chinese, who identified politically with the Chungking government, circulated this news across the country throughout September. The Thai authorities, therefore, in particular observed the movements of the Chinese.\textsuperscript{587} As the war started to go unfavourably for the Axis in Europe, there were many Chinese underground organisations operating against the Japanese in Bangkok and Southern Thailand. Therefore, the Kempeitai, the Japanese military police, who wore plain clothes Chinese trousers and a suit, were deployed to observe the anti-Japanese activities.\textsuperscript{588} From September to October 1943, thirty Chinese and local-born Chinese were captured by the Kempeitai. Of these, thirteen were arrested in Bangkok, followed by ten and seven in Hat Yai and Trang respectively.\textsuperscript{589} The capture was due to the fact that after the Japanese cracked down on the head office of a secret society in Shanghai in 1943, Shanghai communists were implicated in a relationship with Chinese merchants in Siam. Members of this secret society were interrogated by the Japanese and they disclosed that many other members went to British Malaya and contacted with Chinese merchants in Bangkok and Southern Thailand. Therefore, these Chinese merchants in Siam, who contacted with these Shanghai communists, were arrested and tortured by the Kempeitai. In the meantime, the Japanese simultaneously put many Chinese who had participated in the anti-Japanese activities prior to the Japanese occupation in Thailand into prison in order to prevent future resistance.\textsuperscript{590}

In Surat Thani, Ngao Sengpu (吳清芙), a local-born Chinese of Hainanese descent in Tha Chana, born in 1933, recalled that during the Japanese occupation there were a lot of the Japanese at Tha Chana’s train station and he went to sell watermelons to them. However, when he was around 10, his father and his Chinese brother, Ngao Sengwa, had escaped to a forest with the Japanese were heading towards his house because his brother had circulated the secret society in Shanghai and was implicated in a relationship with Chinese merchants in Siam.

\textsuperscript{587} Ibid., 103, 107.
\textsuperscript{588} NAT, SCH 2.7/4/25 สห.ญี#ปุ่นโดยพละการ (The Japanese military police arbitrarily captured both Thai and Chinese people in Bangkok and other provinces that were suspected of operating against the Japanese). Document dated 14/10/1943 to 16/11/1943, 13.
\textsuperscript{589} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{590} Ibid., 8, 14.
news in late 1943 about the impending defeat of the Japanese and was accused by the Japanese of being a Chinese spy.591

The military alliance between Thailand and Japan started to cause problems after the Phibun authorities did not gain the benefits of the relations between the two countries they had expected. As pledged in the treaty’s secret protocol, Phibun was interested in expanding the country’s territory, but the Japanese later withheld his plan and relations therefore decreased promptly.592 As a result, when the Chinese government in Nanjing proposed that diplomatic representatives of ambassadorial rank be exchanged with Thailand after the government of Nanjing was formally recognised by Thailand on 7 July 1942, Phibun accepted the proposal due to his strategy that the two countries would cooperate to work against Japan in the future.593 In the meantime, as the food situation in China was getting desperate, Nanjing wanted to establish diplomatic relations with Thailand as soon as possible to solve this problem by importing rice.594

The Thai authorities believed that Wang Jingwei and his supporters, together with other Chinese collaborators in Thailand, did not wholeheartedly support the Japanese as they had pretended.595 This suspicion was confirmed by the revelation of the Chinese Ambassador to Japan that the Chinese in Nanjing hated the Japanese, as did Chinese students in Japan.596 While his government was condemned as a treacherous by the Chungking government, he thought that his way of dealing with the Japanese would bring China prosperity. Moreover, he noted that, “If the Chungking government is able to unite with us, Wang Jingwei and I are always ready to resign our posts and allow Chiang Kai-

591 Ngao Sengpu. Interview, 30 March 2017. Ngao, a successful merchant from Tha Chana’s Chinatown, was one of the founders of Dabogong Temple of Tha Chana.
593 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1.1/2 การแลกเปลี่ยนผู้แทนทางทูตระหว่างรัฐบาลไทยกับรัฐบาลนานกิง (The exchange of the diplomatic representatives between the Thai and Nanjing governments). Document dated 11/07/1942 to 15/01/1944, 99, 10.
594 Ibid., 164-166.
595 Ibid., 10-11.
596 Ibid., 143-146.
shek to be the leader, but he must pursue the policy of Wang Jingwei that China has to befriend the Japanese first."\textsuperscript{597}

At the same time, the status of Chinese residents in Thailand remained a major obstacle in the path of the establishment of Sino-Thai relations. The Thai authorities then delayed the exchange of diplomatic representatives due to the fact that they wanted to settle this matter first.\textsuperscript{598} A draft of notes was sent to the Chinese on August 1942, the gist of which was to have the Chinese officially accept that they would not touch the status of Chinese people in Thailand. However, Nanjing rejected the proposal and insisted on looking after the interest of Chinese people in Thailand.\textsuperscript{599} On the other hand, the failure of the diplomatic exchange met the Japanese need to actually want to see their ambassadors second to none in Thailand or even across the whole Co-prosperity Sphere.\textsuperscript{600} The Japanese were also afraid that the Chinese would foster solidarity amongst the Chinese in Thailand.\textsuperscript{601} Although the Japanese mostly hired the Chinese as reporters to serve their propaganda, they still distrusted them, as Asada, a Japanese officer of the Japanese Embassy in Bangkok, pointed out: “the Chinese are still the Chinese,” who it is expected will protect their own benefits and help their compatriots.\textsuperscript{602}

Wang Jingwei is an extraordinarily complicated character in the history of modern China. In his youth, he was a more eminent nationalist and revolutionary than either Mao Zedong or Chiang Kai-shek. He was even second in command to Sun Yat-sen. However, Wang became a ‘traitor’ against the Chinese people during the war against Japan.\textsuperscript{603} The descriptions of him often differ. Hwang Dongyoun summarised different views of scholars towards Wang in his paper, “Some Reflections on Wang Jingwei’s Collaboration.” He wrote that Chinese scholars uniformly characterised him as a traitor.

\textsuperscript{597} Ibid., 135-138.
\textsuperscript{598} Ibid., 42-43.
\textsuperscript{599} Ibid., 206.
\textsuperscript{600} Ibid., 121.
\textsuperscript{601} Ibid., 54-55.
\textsuperscript{602} Ibid., 67-69.
For example, Cai Dejin, a Chinese scholar, tried to reveal his ‘bourgeois nature,’ an evaluation based on nationalistic emotion. Poshek Fu proposed that Wang’s collaboration with Japan was moral guilt. American scholars, such as John H. Boyle, wrote that Wang was a ‘collaborator,’ a term which had a broad scale of meaning, and provided an example of the story of Aung San of Burma, another collaborator with Japan who was widely accepted as a hero, not a traitor, in his homeland. Hwang concluded that Wang should be understood as a historical figure, rather than be judged as “a villain in a morality play”. Moreover, he proposed that Wang’s collaboration meant saving China from the leadership of Chiang’s Nationalist Government, which had failed to preserve territories and protect people, and the dangerous influence of the CCP, which he believed would lead his nation to inevitable extinction.\footnote{For the original comments of Cai Dejin, Poshek Fu, and John H. Boyle, please see Hwang Dongyoun “Some Reflection on Wang Jingwei’s Collaboration,” in Working Papers in Asian-Pacific Studies (North Carolina: Asian/Pacific Studies Institute, Duke University, 1998), 1-20.}

Lily Chang argued that rigid orthodoxies dominated Chinese-language scholarship on the subject of collaboration, leading to China’s official narrative of the war as one of Japanese aggression and Chinese resistance. Collaborationist activities were filled with not only political implications but also moral ones. Thus, how collaborationist activities could have served as a reasonable alternative to patriotism, or how a person could collaborate with the Japanese while keeping one’s Chinese identity, is not easy for many Chinese to understand because it opposes the dominant historical narrative of the war. In contrast, the subject of collaboration is not a new concept for historians of Europe.\footnote{Lily Chang, “Contested Childhoods: Law and Social Deviance in Wartime China, 1937-1945” (PhD diss., University of Oxford, 2011), 19-22.}

Timothy Brook, in his essay “Hesitating before the Judgment of History,” researched the 1946 trial of Liang Hongzhi (梁鴻志), China’s first head of state under the Japanese and Wang’s predecessor in the Nanjing regime. Brook proposes that the historian’s job is not to create moral knowledge and render judgment, but to use the wisdom of hesitation. Hesitation is important for understanding that the moral
circumstances as people understand them were different from the circumstances in which historical figures understood themselves to be embedded. In his trial in Shanghai on 5 June 1946, Liang said that his collaboration could be regarded as resistance by other means. Throughout the two years of his government, he did everything to relieve the plight of war victims and hobble the Japanese. He also insisted that he made secret reports on the situation of the Japanese to Chungking. However, in November, Liang was executed for treason. It seems appropriate to agree with Hwang and Brook that Wang and other collaborators should be understood as historical actors and not be judged with the benefit of a hindsight devoid of concrete context in which they operated. Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese were confronted with a dilemma. Wang Jingwei and Tan Siewmeng collaborated with the Japanese because they were compelled to. Their collaboration was superficial and they all shared the same anti-Japanese sentiments that other patriotic Chinese held.

As Japan had suffered constant defeats by the end of 1943, Phibun contacted the Chungking regime to broker relations with Britain and the US in January 1944. However, the plan was unsuccessful. Another example of his conciliatory gestures to the Chinese was that he had permitted the *Thai-Chinese Business Newspaper* (泰華商報) to operate in 1943. The new Chinese newspaper was Thai-owned, but it was supported by Free Thai leaders and hired many Chinese newspapermen who were anti-Japanese. However, its content was pro-Japanese, similar to the *Chinese Daily News* (中原報), another Chinese newspaper that was taken over by the Japanese and served as a propaganda organ. This was possibly due to the fact that the Japanese often went to the office of the *Thai-Chinese Business Newspaper* in order to threaten the Chinese newspapermen.

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609 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/49กล่าวยรารุ่งมันในการใครษาข่าวข้อ (The co-operation with Japan in the spreading of propaganda). Document dated 16/12/1943 to 17/02/1944, 4-7.
Phibun’s change of heart could not wash away the feelings of resentment towards him in the Chinese community. To observe the movements and feelings of the Chinese residents in Thailand, the Thai authorities therefore investigated the newspaper headlines of these two printing presses, together with Bangkok Nippo, a Japanese newspaper, during May to September 1944. Unable to refuse, the Thai-Chinese Business Newspaper had to publish false news and untrue articles supporting the Japanese and implanting anti-Chungking sentiments that were “in a strong contrast to the genuine feelings of the Chinese”.

In brief, under the Japanese occupation the Chinese were faced with a difficult dilemma. While Liao Jingsong refused to co-operate with the Japanese, many leading Chinese in Thailand, such as Tan Siewmeng and Wang Jingwei, the head of the Nanjing government, co-operated with the Japanese because they were forced to. Therefore, the co-operation was superficial. The Cantonese people from Surat Thani were also recruited to construct a railway and some of them worked for the Japanese in construction projects. Patriotic Chinese condemned these collaborators as traitors, so the Chinese split into two groups. However, the two sides all shared the same feeling that was anti-Japanese sentiments.

IV. The Economic Thai-ification Programme

Over the course of the early twentieth century, the Chinese in Siam participated in Chinese national politics and reacted to the Japanese agitation in the mainland by boycotting Japanese goods that threatened the Siamese economy. At the same time, Thai leaders started to realise that most of their country’s economy was controlled by the Chinese. When Phibun came to power in 1938, the programme of economic Thai-ification was launched to overturn the economic domination of Siam by the Chinese. The Phibun government strengthened the programme during the Japanese occupation. This

611 Ibid., 19-20.
section investigates the Chinese hardships and their reactions towards the economic Thai-
ification programme in Surat Thani during the Pacific War.

To see clearly the picture of the difficult lives for the Chinese during the wartime
Chinatown in Surat Thani, it is vital to sketch a brief history of the position of the
Chinese prior to 1938. Their position in Siam was strong in 1938 with nearly 90 per cent
of commerce in the hands of the Chinese owing to their superior commercial ability,
industriousness, and networks throughout South East Asia. As the Chinese refused to
assimilate into Siamese society, their Chinatowns had remained “distinct national
communities in every Siamese town of any size, even down to the second and third
generations,” although the law in 1913 forced any child born in Siam to become a
Siamese subject automatically.612

The position of the Chinese in the economy of Siam was very strong, so they had
enjoyed the lion’s share of national income. From 1910 to 1938, the four major products
of Siam were rice, timber, tin and rubber, accounting for 85 to 90 per cent of total exports.
Excluding timber, these goods were predominantly controlled by the Chinese at all levels.
Other major food products, such as pork, fish, vegetables, and sugar were mostly
produced and marketed by the Chinese. Following the Siamese revolution of 1932, one of
the major policies of the Peoples’ Party, the first political party in Siam, was to resolve
the unemployment problem of Thai people because the majority of nonagricultural labour
was also done by Chinese. Therefore, a law was regulated in 1935 to have rice mills hire
at least 50 per cent Thai workers and prohibit aliens from taxi driving from the following
year. Furthermore, the Chinese even controlled shop-keeping and interregional trade in
rural areas.613 Additionally, the situation of the trade in rural areas was resented by the
Siamese authorities. Long-range economic planning was introduced to encourage young
Thai to know how to enter trade; therefore, vocational, and commercial training was
emphasised.614 Similar to other provinces, an agricultural school was also established in

612 TNA, WO 203/5587, Commander HQ, Force 136 to Director of Intelligence HQ, S.A.C.S.E.A., letter
dated 14/11/45, 4.
614 Ibid., 223.
Surat Thani during 1930s. However, many economic Thai-ification policies which were launched against the Chinese before 1938, had little effect on the Chinese position.

In December 1938, Phibun, an advocate of hyper-nationalism, had become the Prime Minister and changed the country’s name from Siam to Thailand in June 1939 in order to define specifically that it was a country of ethnic Thai people. This move was symbolic of his longer-term aim of diminishing Chinese control of the economy. Under his leadership, a strong sense of Thai nationalism emerged. Phibun had a hatred for the Chinese influence over their country’s economy. To promote nationalistic feelings amongst children in February 1939, students of every school had to attend the Thai national flag raising ceremony each morning and they also had to sing while the flag was raising. This practice was emphasised in the meeting of education officers and teachers in Surat Thani, when a senior government officer from the Ministry of Education visited many districts in Surat Thani in August 1940.

In January 1939, another law was implemented to reserve bird’s nest concessions for government development. This affected the family business of Liao Jingsong, whose father had the largest monopoly of the bird’s nest industry in Siam and established himself in Bandon, the capital of his bird’s nest empire. However, Liao specially provided his motorboat to pick Phibun up from the train station in Phun Phin to Bandon.

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616 Ibid., 223.
617 NAT, (2) MOE 15/4 การเปลี่ยนแปลงกฎหมายการแรงงานภาษาไทย “ประเทศไทย”แทนด้วยภาษา “สยาม” (The persuasion of the Ministry of Education to use the term “Thailand” instead of Siam). Document dated 1939, 5.
619 NAT, (2) MOE 4/46 ระเบียบกระทรวงศึกษาธิการวางกำหนดระยะเวลาการพัก养护ที่ซับซ้อนสำนักฯ พ.ศ. 2482 (The rules of the Ministry of Education in 1939 regarding the salutation when the Thai national flag is raised), Sintusongkramchai, the Minister of the Ministry of Education, document dated 13/02/1939, 4-5.
620 NAT, (2) MOE 13/14 หลวงคุรุนิติพิศิล ชำนาญการแผนกรกระจายงานตรวจราชการในจังหวัดชุมพรและจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (The report on a tour of inspection in Chumphon and Surat Thani by Luangkuranithiphisan). Document dated 15/08/1940 to 26/09/1940, 45.
when Phibun’s committee visited Surat Thani in May 1940. People in Bandon, including Chinese merchants, warmly greeted him despite the fact that many policies against the Chinese were promulgated throughout 1939. The objective of his visit was to inspect Bandon’s Chinatown. At the same time, he also went to a nearby Thai community to examine the occupations of Thai people.\(^\text{622}\) It goes without saying that the information collected during this tour would contribute to the economic Thai-ification programme to improve economic conditions for the Thai people as opposed to the Chinese.

Another move in the economic Thai-ification campaign was the Revenue Code on March 1939, which aimed to increase the income of the government. It had an effect on many Chinese communities in Surat Thani. The merchant class was taxed heavily, and fees for gambling and opium-den licences were increased.\(^\text{623}\) The Chinese in Surat Thani and elsewhere in Siam had enjoyed a card game, the most popular form of gambling, during the Chinese New Year. Moreover, the Thai authorities limited licences and areas where gambling occurred because they were afraid that Thai people would become addicted to gambling. The Chinese residents in Surat Thani were also fond of playing poker, with one observer noting in August 1936 that “This kind of gambling is popular amongst the Chinese while almost all Thai people do not know how to play…”\(^\text{624}\). As a result, only big Chinatowns such as Bandon, Phun Phin, and Ko Samui were permitted to grant the licence, although its number was allowed to exceed this limit during Chinese festivals throughout the year.\(^\text{625}\) At the same time, those Chinese who were granted licences, were encouraged to donate money to be used for public spending in the province, for example, by Phra Boriboonwutthirat, the provincial governor of Surat Thani, in 1936.

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\(^{622}\) NAT, MOI 2.2.3/156 เรื่องข่าวหลวงประจําจังหวัดราชุบุรี รายงานเรื่องนายกรัฐมนตรีไปตรวจราชการที่จังหวัด (The governor reported about the inspection of the Prime Minister in Surat Thani). Document dated 26/05/1940, 2.


\(^{624}\) NAT, MOI 2.2.3/155 เรื่องข่าวหลวงประจําจังหวัดราชุบุรีรายงานเหตุผลเพื่อขออนุญาตการตําหนิโทษนายเลี'ยง ลีหะหุต หัวหน้าแผนกเบ็ดเตล็ด กองกลาง ป. เยื้อครั้งเป็นนายอำเภอป่าคลอง (Surat Thani’s governor sent a report to remove the punishment of Mr. Liang Leehahut when he was the district officer of Bandon), Laor Wichaidit, the minutes of the provincial committee, dated 8/10/1936, 4.

\(^{625}\) Ibid., 4-5.
One of the indispensable laws, which was passed in March 1939, was the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for Food, intending to replace Chinese by Thais as pig slaughterers and pork wholesalers. For the first time in history, the Thai people started to slaughter and butcher pork in November 1939 under the provisions of the Act.\textsuperscript{626} Due to their Buddhist beliefs, Thais avoided any work connected with killing animals. Therefore, the Chinese ran the pork and poultry industry in the country and controlled prices.\textsuperscript{627} This belief was reflected in a mural painting at Phattanaram Temple in Bandon’s Chinatown, which was built by Phat Phatthanapong, whose Chinese surname was Lao (劉) (1862-1942), a descendant of Teochew migrant and a well-known abbot in South Siam (see Figure 4.3). This led to difficulties experienced by the government during the Pacific War because Thais still refused to sell pigs and the Chinese were still controlling the trade.\textsuperscript{628}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{mural_painting.jpg}
\caption{A mural painting at Phattanaram Temple in Bandon depicts the Buddha refusing to receive a pork dish offered by the son of a Chinese migrant and telling him to bury it.}
\end{figure}

In 1939, the Thai authorities not only encouraged the Thais to slaughter pig, but they also encouraged local people to do edible gardening and raise chickens in their own

\textsuperscript{626} Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 262.
\textsuperscript{627} NAT, MOI 2.2.5/564 คณะกรมการจังหวัดภูเก็ตเสนอความเห็นเรื่องเห็นควรประกาศใช้พระราชบัญญัติควบคุมการฆ่าขายโค กระบือ แพะ และสุกรในท้องที่จังหวัดภูเก็ต (The provincial committee of Phuket suggests that the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for Food should be enforced in Phuket). Document dated 12/08/1940.
\textsuperscript{628} Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 276.
house gardens for consumption as preparation for possible food shortages in the future due to the outbreak of war in Europe. It was also aimed at getting Thais to stop buying poultry and vegetables from the Chinese, who controlled these industries. To set a good example for people, government officials, teachers, and students were told to obey the government instruction first. The command was sent to Surat Thani in September. The following month, vegetable seeds were dispatched to every district in each province throughout Thailand, except the market areas. This confirms the belief that this policy operated against the Chinese, owing to the fact that most of the Chinese stayed together in the market areas in every town of any size. Shortly before the war, on 18 August 1941, the director-general of the Ministry of Interior also visited Surat Thani to inspect the progress of this policy and check on improvements in the economic conditions of Thai people.

Phibun consolidated this policy when he agreed to contract an alliance with Japan on December 1941. Afraid that there would be acute food crises and rising food prices because many provinces including Surat Thani were occupied by Japanese troops, Phibun commanded within a month that everyone had to become more serious about edible gardening and raising animals for meat. The rice price crisis was normally caused by the Japanese, who bought rice from unscrupulous merchants irrespective of high prices. Thus, the Thai authorities strengthened the policy again when the Japanese increased the number of soldiers deployed in the southern provinces, including Surat Thani, in 1943. Phibun not only commanded people and government officials throughout the country to

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629 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/2 เลขาธิการคณะกรรมาธิการส่งเสริมการทำสวนครัวและเลี้ยงสัตว์ (The Secretary-General to the Cabinet established a committee to encourage people to do edible gardening and raise meat animals). Document dated 25/07/1939 to 22/01/1939, 3-53.
630 NAT, MOI 2.2.5/854 คณะกรรมาธิการจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานีรายงานเรื่องการตรวจราชการที่จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (The director-general of the Ministry of Interior visited Surat Thani). Document dated 1941.
631 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.2/3 ขอความร่วมมือส่งเสริมให้ราษฎรหรือองค์การต่าง ๆ ช่วยปลูกพืชไม้ปีกบิน เพิ่มขึ้น (Asking for a co-operation to encourage people and organisations to increase the amount of vegetable produce). Document dated 21/12/1941 to 28/12/1941.
632 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/39, 37.
raise chicken, but also duck, pig, pigeon, frog, fish, river snail, rabbit, etc. In addition, Phibun threatened to punish those anyone who did not obey his command.  

In 1943, the Japanese wanted to establish their second base in Ban Na San, a district in Surat Thani. They originally chose a Chinese community as the location. However, this alarmed the Chinese because they were afraid that their community would become a target of allied air strikes. Therefore, Ouan Surakun, the district officer of Ban Na San, acted as a middleman for the Chinese to inform the Japanese company commander that the Chinese would close their market and evacuate to other areas, leading to a lack of provisions for both Thais and Japanese. The negotiation was successful, as in the end the Japanese changed their base to a district that was four kilometres from the Chinese district.  

Ban Na San was not only the capital of the tin mining industry in Surat Thani, but there were also many forests and rubber trees. Before the Pacific War started, Hakka tin miners from Penang not only dominated the tin industry in Ban Na San, but also the British and Japanese. However, after Phibun declared war on Britain and the US, the Thai government seized a British dredger. Phibun had the Mineral and Thai Rubber Company, a state-owned, carry out mining operations. This company also hired only Thai citizens as workers. In Ko Samui and Ko Phangan, strongholds of the Hainanese diaspora, the Thai government successfully started experimental mining with Thai labour in 1939.  

Phibun’s policy was actually modelled on the previous work of Kaw Sim Bee (許森美), a Chinese who was appointed governor of Phuket in 1902. Kaw Sim Bee encouraged people under his rule to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat, and

633 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.2/6 ขอความร่วมมือราชการทำสวนครัวและเลี้ยงสัตว์ (Asking for a co-operation from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat). Document dated 13/08/1943, 2.  
634 Diary of Ouan Surakun, the district officer of Ban Na San in 1943. See Kiang Koetnasan, 77ปีบ้านนาสาร พุทธศักราช 2462-พุทธศักราช 2557 (77 years of Ban Na San from 1939 to 2016) (Surat Thani: Udomlap, 2017), 143-144.  
635 Ibid., 142.  
he inspected progress regularly.\textsuperscript{637} Nevertheless, these activities were practiced in most of the Chinatowns in Siam for a long time despite the fact that the Chinese had limited space in their houses. Some of them made a fortune in the meat industry, particularly pork. This habit of the Chinese was reflected in \textit{Nirat Mueangphet}, a poem by Sunthorn Phu (1786-1855), the Shakespeare of Thailand, about his journey to Phetchaburi, describing the Chinese community that all Chinese in their houses sold pigs.\textsuperscript{638}

In Ko Samui, a centre of the Hainanese diaspora, chicken and pig breeds were also carried on junks when they migrated from Hainan. A Hainanese breed of domestic pig, widely known as \textit{Diamboo} in Hainanese and \textit{Keephra} in Thai, was commonly raised in coconut gardens. Furthermore, coconut residues were utilised as an ingredient to feed these pigs. Importantly, these animals were also very indispensable to rituals held in a Chinese community throughout the year. For example, to worship deities in the Chinese temple, pig heads, whole chickens, whole ducks, among other animals, were indispensable offerings during weddings and at Chinese New Year.\textsuperscript{639} Ko Samui was also designated as “the coconut island,” reflecting the agricultural produce. This industry was nevertheless controlled by the Hainanese. Even the Hainanese Guanwu Temple (蘇梅島關帝神廟) in Hua Thanon had been established in the coconut garden around the market area of Na Khai’s Chinatown. Prince Bhanubandhu Vongsevoradej recorded in 1884 that a coconut garden and a store in this area were owned by Kim Yee, a Hainanese \textit{laoban} (老闆), or boss. Moreover, other smaller gardens were owned by the Hainanese.\textsuperscript{640}

Another economic Thai-ification campaign was aimed at Chinese noodle hawkers. In 1942, Phibun persuaded people to eat noodles and every government official to sell

\textsuperscript{637} NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.2/9 ขอความร่วมมือให้ราชการทำสวนครัวและเลี้ยงสัตว์เพื่อเป็นตัวอย่างแก่ประชาชน (Asking for a co-operation from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat to set a good example for people). Document dated 27/05/1949 to 3/11/1949, 29-30.

\textsuperscript{638} Santi Leksukhum, \textit{จิตรกรรมไทยสมัยรัชกาลที0: ความคิดเปลี่ยน การแสดงออกเปลี่ยนตาม} (Mural paintings in the era of King Rama III: the change of concept and expression) (Bangkok: Mueang Boran, 2005), 253.

\textsuperscript{639} Pu Gui. Interview, 2 October 2015. Pu Gui is a guardian of Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua Thanon, Ko Samui district.

\textsuperscript{640} Jittra Kornanthakiat, “Guanwu Temple at Na Khai Hua Thanon in Ko Samui: Part 1,” \textit{Nationweekend}. The extract of this article was displayed at a museum at the Guanwu Temple in Hua Thanon.
noodles in order to attract Thais into this industry. His next move was to provide financial support to Thai civilians throughout the country to work as noodle hawkers. At the same time, a number of Thai people were trained to produce noodles and sell them together with beansprouts and other ingredients in each market to serve Thai hawkers. However, many hawkers preferred to buy noodles from the Chinese manufacturers, who were dumping their products at cheaper prices to compete with the Thais, bringing Thai noodle production to a halt.

Whilst most Thai hawkers quit their job due to the fact that they were not skilled at carrying goods and wandering the streets selling their wares compared to the Chinese. Therefore, the Thai authorities especially invented noodle pushcarts for the Thais and started selling them to government officials in Surat Thani and elsewhere to set an example for Thai civilians. From 1943 to 1944, provincial governors throughout the country were commanded to select and train numbers of Thai civilians to produce noodles and other major ingredients such as tofu, soybean paste, fish sauce, etc. They were also taught to know how to enter trade.

To conclude, in 1938 the position of the Chinese in Siam was strong, controlling most of the country’s commerce and thus enjoying the bulk of the national income. After Phibun became Prime Minister in December 1938, he launched the economic Thaiification programme in order to eliminate the economic domination of the Chinese. The bird’s nest business of the Liao family was affected by the law of 1939 to reserve bird’s nest concessions for government development. In Ko Samui and Ko Phangan, the Thai government successfully began experimental mining with Thai labour. In 1939, the Revenue Code was introduced to increase the income of the government, taxing the

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641 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/26 ให้เจ้าหน้าที่ของกระทรวง工商และกรมต่าง ๆ ร่วมมือในการขายก๋วยเตี๋ยว (Asking for the co-operation from government officers of each ministry to sell noodles). Document dated 12/11/1942, 2.
642 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/32 การขายก๋วยเตี๋ยว (Noodle selling). Document dated 14/10/1943 to 23/12/1943, 2-3, 8.
643 Ibid., 3, 8.
644 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/28 สงวนทะเบียนการประชุมและบันทึกลงเอกสารของกระทรวงพาณิชย์ไทยให้ (Sending the meeting agenda of the Ministry of Interior on the people training). Document dated 3/06/1943 to 21/03/1944, 3-6.
merchant class heavily and increasing fees for gambling and opium-den licences. Phibun also wanted to replace the Chinese with Thais as pig slaughterers and pork wholesalers by introducing the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for Food. In addition, Phibun encouraged Thai people to engage in edible gardening and raising chickens in their house gardens for consumption in order to not only have people prepare for the possibility of food shortages, but also to have Thai people stop purchasing poultry and vegetables from the Chinese. After the Pacific War started, the economic Thai-ification programme was consolidated by the Thai government. Phibun was afraid that there would be acute food crises and rising food prices, as Surat Thani and many provinces were occupied by the Japanese troops. In 1942, Phibun also persuaded Thai people to sell noodles. However, the Chinese were still able to control some industries such as the meat and vegetables, as could be seen in the case of Ban Na San, where the Chinese successfully prevented the Japanese from establishing a military base in their community and thereby disrupting their trading activities.

V. The Political Thai-ification Programme

The Phibun government did not only launch economic Thai-ification policies, but they also introduced many laws to motivate the Chinese to assimilate into Thai society. In 1939, Phibun encouraged officials of Chinese descent to take a Thai name and surname. He also introduced naturalisation for the first time in history to encourage Chinese citizens to change their nationality to Thai. During the war, these political Thai-ification policies were strengthened due to the fact that the Chinese still remained Chinese citizens and refused to assimilate into Thai society. In addition, many policies were launched by Phibun that had an effect on the self-identification of the Chinese. This section aims to investigate these political Thai-ification policies. In order to discuss the political Thai-ification programme properly, this section, however, comprises three major themes: changing name, nationality, and women and clothing.

To better understand the practice of changing name from Chinese to Thai, it is important to appreciate the history of this practice, as it had existed before Phibun’s
policy in 1939, although in a very different form. The practice was influenced by Buddhist monks in Siam. As mentioned in Chapter Three, one of the well-known abbots in Surat Thani, who was widely revered by both Thai and Chinese people throughout Southern Siam, was Phat Phathanapong (1862-1942), a local-born Chinese whose Chinese surname was Lao (see Figure 4.4). His father, Chun, had migrated from Shantou. When he was 25, Lao entered the priesthood at Wat Phrayok, a Thai temple in Bandon’s Chinatown, where he was educated by monks from a young age. During his priesthood, he was notable for spiritual enlightenment and invulnerability. In 1900, he founded Phathanaram Temple in Bandon’s Chinatown, with considerable support from local people due to his reputation and service as the first abbot. Owing to the fact that he was Chinese, he preferred to adopt a Chinese surname, Kimchun, which was combined from his Teochew uncle and father’s names under the law in 1913 which stated that people in the country must have surnames. However, Phatharamunee, a Bandon citizen and a prior at Thong Nopphakhun Temple in Bangkok, instructed him to change his surname to Thai, Phathanapong (博打那蓬). This practice was expanded to those Chinese who worked as teachers in Siamese temple schools located in the precinct of Thai temples. The Chinese teachers and workers were normally instructed to change their surnames by monks. Many monks who were the benefactors of the schools normally thought that the Chinese should change their names to Thai if they wanted to make a progress in government jobs, whilst others thought that the Chinese names were not melodious.

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645 Santithammarangsri, ed., ๑๐๐ ปี วัดธรรมบูชา (100 years of Wat Tham Bucha) (Bangkok: Thammasapa, 2004), 241-245.
646 Praphan Ruengnarong, ๑๐๐ เรื่องเมืองใต้ (100 stories of southern Thailand) (Bangkok: Amarin, 2010), 195.
647 NAT, MOE 3.13/4 นายเด็กชาย ครูโรงเรียนสายบวช ขอเปลี่ยนชื่อเป็นนายสิริ (Tekhuad, a teacher of Saiburi School asked for a permission to change his name to Huad). Document dated 1914, 2 and NAT, MOE 3.13/2 นายแสบ ครูโรงเรียนวัดบางพลีใหญ่ขอเปลี่ยนชื่อเป็นนายสิริ (Seng, a teacher of Bangpliyai Temple School asked for a permission to change his name to Samniang). Document dated 1914, 1-3.
One of the most efficient Thai-ification policies that had a huge effect on Chinese identity was the instruction of Phibun’s government to encourage government officials and employees to have a Thai name and surname in June 1939. It was particularly targeted at those officials of Chinese descent whose surname normally began with the prefix Sae, meaning surname (姓) in Chinese, and followed by their original Chinese surname after the Surname Act was passed in 1913 by King Vajiravudh. The policy was strengthened again in 1942 to warn all government officials to follow the Phibun’s instruction.

One illustrious exemplification of the Thai-ification of names is the case of Kobkun Saetang, widely known in Surat Thani as Miss Kobkun, who, as seen in Chapter Three, became a national heroine for her bravery in resisting the Japanese. Her compelling story was that she quickly headed to the police station to receive a gun in order to join the fight after she learned that the Japanese were about to invade Bandon’s Chinatown. Despite the fact that many senior government officials escaped from the town

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648 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/1 ให้หน่วยงานราชการและลูกจ้างเปลี่ยนนามเป็นสำเนียงไทยเสียงว่ากัน (The instructions to have government officers and employees change their names to Thai). Document dated 5/06/1939 to 19/06/1939, 2-17.

649 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/23 ให้เห็นสำนักการปฏิบัติตามประกาศสำนักนายกรัฐมนตรี เรื่องข้อมูลเกี่ยวกับ (Please warn government officers to follow the announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister about the name). Document dated 3/02/1942, 3.
prior to the invasion, she was the only woman from amongst Chinese and Thai volunteers. As she did not know how to shoot, she volunteered to transport the ammunition and food to the police and volunteers on the front line. During the fighting, she bravely transported the ammunition until her story was widely spoken by the Chinese and Thai throughout Surat Thani. She became a national heroine. Her brave resistance was published in many newspapers and reached the ears of the Thai authorities.\footnote{Thossaphon Ngaanphairot, หลายเรื่องเมืองสุราษฎร์ (many stories of Surat Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 36.}

Khuang Aphaiwong, the Minister of Transport during Phibun’s government and later Prime Minister from August 1944 to 1945, from January to May 1946, and from November 1947 to April 1948, and Seni Pramoj, the Prime Minister from September 1945 to January 1946, were particularly impressed by her courage. Therefore, when Seni and his committee visited Surat Thani after the end of the Pacific War, Paew was invited to a dinner at Tiechunki, one of the best Chinese restaurants in Bandon’s Chinatown at the time.\footnote{Ibid.} Influenced by Phibun’s Thai-ification policy, Seni and his committee questioned Paew’s Chinese surname, Saetang (姓陳), and instructed her to change her surname to Thai. Her new name was Kobkun Pinphithak.

The Thai-ification programme with regards to acquiring citizenship was one of the most effective policies enforced by Phibun to make the Chinese become Thai citizens. Afraid that China would ask for the exchange of the diplomatic representatives when the SSJW ended, Phibun quickly launched the naturalisation policy on 1 April 1939, allowing Chinese citizens to apply for naturalisation for the first time in history.\footnote{Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 176-180.} To encourage assimilation, Phibun publicly revealed on November 1939 that he was also of Chinese ancestry and that there was even a Chinese altar table in his house. Phibun’s father, Wujie (吳杰), was a local born Chinese whose own father was a Cantonese who had married a Siamese woman. At the outbreak of the SSJW, many Chinese were arrested and deported to China owing to their anti-Japanese activities. Many Chinese hence bribed officials to register their nationality to Thai in the 1937 census of the
Siamese government. However, some still operated against the Japanese and were later deported after the authorities discovered that they were actually Chinese nationals.\textsuperscript{653}

Prior to the Japanese occupation, there were few applications by the Chinese for naturalisation, down to fewer than 170 per year.\textsuperscript{654} However, those who were granted naturalisation were normally high-income earners and had social status to some extent. Such people usually worked as government officials, employees of western companies, merchants, mine and rubber plantation owners, etc. Of the number of those Chinese who resided outside Bangkok, they were mostly village headmen.\textsuperscript{655} Two village headmen were Chinese from Surat Thani: Sui and Kiewli (see Figure 4.5). After the naturalisation policy was launched in 1939, Sui and Kiewli, who were relatives and had migrated from Fujian to Tha Chana, Surat Thani, applied for naturalisation in April and May 1940. Hired to construct the southern railway during the early 20\textsuperscript{th} century, they were among the first group of the Hokkien that settled in Tha Chana district. They then established themselves in Paknam Tha Krachai, a Thai and Chinese fishing village, where the Hainanese was the majority group, followed by the Hokkien and Teochew

\textsuperscript{653} Ibid., 178-180.  
\textsuperscript{655} Murashima, การเมืองจีนสยาม, 186.
respectively. Later, they served as headmen, with Sui working in the Chinatown of Tha Chana and Kiewli in the fishing village.

However, to change their Chinese nationality to Thai was not easy as the authorities thoroughly checked many things, such as Thai language skills, property, occupation, spouse’s nationality and children’s education. In the case of these Hokkiens from Surat Thani, two of them changed their Chinese names into Thai, with Sakon Phaksunthorn becoming the name of Sui and Maitree Phaksunthorn belonging to Kiewli. The two headmen, moreover, donated money to the Thai army and government for public spending. All of these efforts had been made in order to be granted Thai nationality. Nevertheless, those Chinese that had changed their nationality to Thai remained spiritually Chinese and still refused to assimilate into Thai society. Therefore, in 1942 the Thai government convened a meeting to find an effective way to resolve this problem and control the Chinese in Thailand more effectively. The Thai government commanded that the authorities only allowed the Chinese to be the unofficial head of their Chinese community but not official Chinese headmen, as they were afraid that the Chinese would establish a state within a state and thereby accrue too much power.

During the Pacific War, many Chinese applied for Thai nationality, with more than 6,086 in 1943 applying for naturalisation. It was possible that the Thai government strengthened the economic Thai-ification programme during the Japanese occupation. Nevertheless, this number was considered comparatively small to the total number of Chinese nationals in Thailand because many Chinese were afraid that they would be conscripted into the Thai army, although some of them wanted to apply for naturalisation. However, only 2,761 of the 6,086 were granted Thai nationality.
was due to the fact that obtaining Thai nationality was not easy, because, as detailed above, the Thai authorities thoroughly checked a number of factors related to naturalisation. Those who were granted naturalisation were high-income earners and had social status to a certain extent, as noted earlier. In addition, those Chinese who did not receive Thai nationality remained Chinese.

Figure 4.6: Chinese men in their Chinese trousers standing on the left, and their Siamese wives sitting on the right. The first woman from the left is dressed in a sabai (a silk breast-wrapper) across her left shoulder over a blouse with a chong kraben, while the two women sitting next to her are dressed in shawls over blouses with chong krabens. This photo was taken when King Chulalongkorn (1853-1910) visited Nakhon Si Thammarat. (NAT 59M0054).

With regard to culture, Phibun also launched many policies that also had an effect on the self-identification of the Chinese. He asked people to stop wearing Chong Kraben, a cloth, worn by both men and women, that is drawn tightly up between the legs and secured around the waist, and to wear instead international-style attire (see figures 4.6, 4.7 and 4.8). Additionally, Phibun encouraged women to wear western skirts or sarongs.

He finally issued a law on dress in 1941 mainly aimed at forcing people to wear western attire. It was part of Phibun’s policies to make Thailand become what he saw as a more civilised nation in order to make a favourable impression on the Japanese. At the same time, the Thai authorities discouraged men from wearing Chinese silk trousers, as it was also deemed uncouth.

Figure 4.7: A woman holding an umbrella on the right and other women standing on the street next to her, dressed in sabais across their left shoulders over blouses with chong krabens, Bandon’s Chinatown, 1933.

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662 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/13 ขอความร่วมมือให้ช่วยส่งเสริมการแต่งกายของผู้หญิงไทย (Asking for cooperation to promote the instructions for Thai women about the dress). Document dated 14/03/1941, 4.


664 NAT, (2) MOE 15.2.1/20 ความสำคัญในการรักษาวัฒนธรรมของชาติ (The importance of cherishing the national culture). Document dated 1941-1942, 6.

665 คำว่า ปี ราชสุราภานพระราชาทัน (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of the city) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2010), 139.
Figure 4.8: A Hainanese man in his Chinese shirt with chong kraben and his Siamese wife wearing a sabai over a blouse with chong kraben, at Ko Pha-ngan.

Figure 4.9: Jia Guangyian’s Hakka family in Ban Na San. Peranakan women are dressed in sarong kebaya while men wear Western attire.666

666 Koetnasan, 77 ปีนานมาหารา 2542-พุทธศักราช 2557, 35.
The Chinese community in Siam prior to the twentieth century was called ‘Chin Chong Kraben,’ a term suggested by Phuthorn Bhumadhon because the Chinese assimilated into the Siamese society under the influence of Siamese wives, who wore chong krabens. Although their sons remained Chinese, their daughters wore chong krabens as their Siamese mothers did. However, in the Straits Settlements and many provinces in South Siam, Peranakan women wore a sarong kebaya, a long-sleeved blouse worn with a batik sarong (see Figure 4.9). Peranakan men were known as Baba (峇峇) while the women were referred to as Nyonya (娘惹). While Phuket was home to Peranakan, primarily Hokkiens who had been encouraged by Kaw Simbee, the governor of Phuket, to work in the tin mining industry in Phuket via Penang, Ban Na San in Surat Thani was home to Hakka Peranakan, who had migrated from Penang. The Peranakan costume worn by Nyonyas, as seen in the figure 4.10, also portrayed the close connection between Hakka Peranakan in Surat Thani with Penang in British Malaya. However, the

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667 This photo was from Peter Lee, *Sarong Kebaya: Peranakan Fashion in an Interconnected World 1500-1950* (Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2014), 271.

Chinese in Siam during the Republican era in China were called “overseas Chinese” because they refused to assimilate into local society.\textsuperscript{669} Despite this, the self-identification of the Chinese as Chinese had become less conspicuous as both Chinese and Thai men, especially those from the upper classes, chose to wear western attire in the twenties. Whilst women in general were more conservative in terms of dress, younger women started to wear western dress in the late thirties.\textsuperscript{670} Nevertheless, some Chinese women in Surat Thani got used to wearing the sarong although the war had ended and the policy had been lifted (see Figure 4.11).

\textbf{Figure 4.11:} Chinese students wearing sarongs in front of Zhonghua School of Ban Na San (那訕中華學校) after 1950\textsuperscript{671}

To sum up, Phibun launched numerous policies to encourage the assimilation of the Chinese into Thai society, many of which had significant effects on the self-identification of the Chinese. Influenced by Phibun’s policies, the Thai authorities instructed Kobkun to change her Chinese surname to Thai. Many Chinese also applied for naturalisation, encouraged by the Thai government after they had begun to experience the hardships of the economic Thai-ification programmes.

\textsuperscript{669} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{671} Koetnasan, \textit{77 ปีบ้านนาสาร พุทธศักราช ๒๔๘๒-พุทธศักราช ๒๕๕๗}, 72.
VI. Conclusion

During the last stages of the Pacific War in 1943, Allied bombing became more extreme in Bangkok and the southern provinces, including Surat Thani. On October 1943, the government prepared to evacuate people from crowded communities where train stations were located because they were used by the Japanese to transport their soldiers and provisions and hence were being targeted by Allied aircraft. For example, in Surat Thani, after the Japanese successfully landed in Bandon in December 1941, they strategically established their military base at Tha Kham (呈坎), a Chinese district of Phun Phin, in which the provincial train station was located.

![Figure 4.12: The bridge over Tapi River before it was destroyed by the aircraft in 1943](image)

There were many Japanese military bases in Tha Kham, but two that were indispensable were in the rubber plantation of Liao Jingsong and around the bridge on the Tapi River. The Chinese community also suffered from the Allied bombings. In modern warfare, railways became an arm that the Japanese employed for military transport from

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672 NAT, (2) MOE 15.3/53 การอพยพพลเมืองเพื่อป้องกันทางอากาศ (The evacuation of people for the air raid relief). Document dated 16/10/1943, 2.
673 ผอ. 002 ทะเบียน 25/22 NAT-P008446.
Malaya to Burma. Therefore, the railway bridge on the Tapi River (see Figure 4.12) was an allied target and in 1943 it was destroyed. Many Chinese went into air raid shelters after they heard the air raid siren, located in the middle of the Chinese community, sounded over the Chinatown. Another bomb that had a considerable effect on the Chinese community was dropped on a Japanese warehouse behind the train station, setting both the train station and the wider Chinatown area on fire. Moreover, the fighter plane also fired into the community, injuring many and killing a few people.674

Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese were faced with the dilemma of deciding to co-operate despite generally sharing anti-Japanese sentiments. At the same time, they were caught “between the tiger and the crocodile” as the Thai authorities agreed to an alliance with Japan and simultaneously strengthened the economic Thai-ification policies to eliminate Chinese domination of the nation’s economy. The Thai authorities also pushed the Chinese towards assimilation into Thai society by launching cultural policies.

Based on the Chinese reactions to the hardships experienced under the Japanese occupation, this study shows that the Chinese were divided into four groups. The first group, with individuals such as Liao Jingsong and the Chinese in Surat Thani, refused to co-operate with the Japanese and resisted them. The Chinese merchants and others who still ran the underground activities against the Japanese were also in this group. The second group was the Chinese who were pressured by the Japanese and succumbed to pressure to work for them, such as Wang Jingwei and the Chinese in Bandon who superficially welcomed the Japanese. The third group was those who made a profit from the Japanese, such as the Cantonese in Bandon and those who changed their nationality to Japanese for their own interests. The last group was the Chinese who co-operated with the Japanese but financially supported various anti-Japanese activities. However, the Chinese reactions to the Thai authorities during the period could be broken down into two groups. The first was those who changed their nationality to Thai for their benefit, and

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those who did not and surrendered economic opportunities. Nevertheless, both of them faced the difficulties which followed from Phibun’s policies to some extent.

Eiji Murashima, in his book *Sino-Siamese Politics*, separated the Chinese during the outbreak of the SSJW into three groups. One of these groups was the Chinese who followed the Thai government’s policies, changed their nationality to Thai, and benefitted from the Japanese because they had become Thai citizens. Nevertheless, despite their superficial co-operation with the Japanese, my study shows that these Chinese were still Chinese, with a shared anti-Japanese sentiment. Although the Chinese had changed their nationality to Thai, they still preserved their Chinese identity to a great extent. As Phibun himself, these Chinese were trying to survive the hardships under Japanese occupation, and should thus be judged according to those circumstances.
Chapter Five
The Aftermath of the War and the Division of the Chinese in Society (1945-1949)

I. Introduction

During the Second Sino-Japanese War (hereafter SSJW) of 1937-1945, a large number of Chinese residents in Surat Thani identified politically and culturally with their motherland. They therefore contributed to the Chinese war effort by using various means such as boycotts and fundraising campaigns to help China fight against the Japanese during the first phase of the war. They also resisted the Japanese invasion when the Japanese landed in Bandon’s Chinatown on 8 December 1941. Under the Japanese occupation, the Chinese suffered immense hardships as a result of Japanese repression and the Thai government’s policy of Thai-ification of the economy. The Chinese were faced with a dilemma. Liao Jingsong, a patriotic Teochew entrepreneur, refused to collaborate with the Japanese and was instantly imprisoned at the outbreak of the Pacific War. In contrast, Tan Siewmeng, another leading Chinese, and Wang Jingwei, the head of the Nanjing government, decided to co-operate with the enemy. They and other Chinese who collaborated with the Japanese were accused of being traitors during the last phase of the war.

Following the dropping of the second atomic bomb on the Japanese city of Nagasaki, Japan unconditionally surrendered on 15 August 1945, bringing the eight-year Resistance War (八年抗戰) and the Pacific War to a sudden end. On the mainland, the Japanese were commanded to surrender not to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) forces but only to the Guomindang (GMD). Gradually, the GMD forces regained control of the majority of the cities that had been occupied by the Japanese. Following news of Japan’s defeat, there were not only spontaneous victory celebrations in the majority of the

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cities in China, but the Chinese in Thailand and elsewhere also celebrated. After the victory celebrations, they would become dispirited and weary because of acute upcoming hardships. A full-scale civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists was imminent. Many urban elites, such as businessmen, intellectuals and local leaders, were alienated by the introduction of new taxes, monopolies, and levies on them to fund the civil war. The GMD government’s mismanagement of the economy had a dramatic impact. There was no reduction in government spending on the military, and rising inflation caused economic misery for the bulk of the population.

In Thailand, there was a resurgence of Chinese nationalism in the post-war period. The flags of the Republic of China (hereafter ROC) were hung throughout Chinese communities to celebrate the victory of China in September 1945. The celebrations, however, abruptly led to incessant conflict with local Thai people. The Chinese not only wanted to hoist their national flags on their own (despite a law stipulating that any foreign flags must be flown together with the Thai national flag), but they also regarded Thailand as a defeated nation. Revenge came shortly thereafter. In the events which came to be known as the “September Incidents,” or the “Yaowarat Incident of 1945,” many Chinese shops in Bangkok’s Chinatown were plundered and looted.

During World War II, the Thai government declared war on Britain and the United States in 1942. However, Seni Pramoj, the Thai ambassador to Washington, refused to deliver Phibun’s declaration of war to the US. The American government thus did not declare war on Thailand. Seni also organised the Free Thai Movement, a Thai underground resistance movement against Japan, with help of the US. Following Japan’s defeat, Seni, the new prime minister, successfully prevented the US and the Allied Powers from treating Thailand as an enemy country through the good offices of Chiang

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676 Ibid., 170.
678 Lary, The Chinese People at War, 170.
Kai-shek in the post-war negotiations. Nevertheless, before signing a peace treaty with Thailand, Britain demanded war reparations in the form of rice shipments to Malaya. Meanwhile, France ordered Thailand to return the Indochinese territories annexed during wartime, while the Soviet Union demanded that all legislation against communism be repealed. In order to avoid conflict with the west, Thailand and Thai, the names of the country and people, were renamed Siam and Siamese on 7 September 1945. Seni Pramoj was appointed prime minister on 17 September, the day he returned from the US, in order to negotiate with the world powers. Under Seni’s government, Chinese schools and newspapers were allowed to reopen.

In the post-war period, there was a lack of cohesion in Chinese society. The CCP, which had become stronger during the war, was ready to fight the GMD for control of China. The victory over Japan was the beginning of a bitter civil war which lasted from 1946 to 1949. Meanwhile, in Thailand this conflict could also be seen in the Chinese community in Surat Thani and elsewhere. In Bandon’s Chinatown, the two sides established and financially supported Chinese schools to implant their ideologies in Chinese students. However, in November 1947, Phibun overthrew the elected government and seized power in a military coup. He then changed the name of the country back to Thailand in 1948 and resumed his anti-Chinese campaign. The country’s policy became severely anti-communist.

Following the end of World War II, China had emerged as a world leader and Thailand had to rely on the GMD government in order to remain independent. The Chinese Embassy was established in Thailand to protect Chinese residents and Chinese schools thrived. However, after the GMD government entered the war with the CCP and

681 Ibid. Although Thailand and Thai were renamed Siam and Siamese, this chapter will only use Thailand and Thai for the sake of consistency.
682 Charnvit Kasetsiri, ประวัติการเมืองไทย 2475-2500 (A Political History of Thailand-Siam 1932-1957) (Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, 2016), 408.
683 Lary, *The Chinese People at War*, 1-2, 189, 199.
suffered constant defeats, Chinese native-place associations and schools were divided into two basic groups: pro-GMD and pro-CCP. As the GMD government became weaker, the Thai government seized the opportunity to reinforce the Thai-ification programme and launch its anti-Chinese policies. With the victory of the Chinese communists in the civil war, the CCP’s leader, Mao Zedong (毛澤東), proclaimed the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 October 1949. Following the victory of the CCP, China became isolated from the rest of the world and also from the Overseas Chinese. The Thai government utilised this situation to do whatever it wished with Thailand’s Chinese community. In 1953, following a disastrous fire in Surat Thani, the Thai government launched an economic Thai-ification programme.

This chapter investigates the ideological conflict between GMD and CCP supporters that was reflected in the division of Chinese native-place associations and schools in Surat Thani from 1945 to 1949. It comprises four sections: treatment of collaborators and native-place associations; disputes between Chinese and Thais; Chinese schools from 1945 to the 1950s; and the Great Fire of Bandon. The first section examines what happened to Chinese collaborators after the war ended and how the tensions between those collaborators and patriotic Chinese were resolved. It also investigates the division of native-place associations in the post-war years. The second section examines how the Chinese took revenge on the Thai authorities and how this aggravated the situation until it grew into violent disputes between Chinese and Thais. The third section discusses the ideological divisions in the Chinese schools. It explores out how the Thai government took advantage of the situation in China to control Chinese people and their education. The last section investigates Phibun’s housing policy, a part of the economic Thai-ification programme after the Great Fire of Bandon in 1953.

II. Treatment of Collaborators and Native-place Associations

Immediately after Japan’s surrender, no one knew what the fate of the Chinese who had co-operated with the Japanese would be. In mainland China, many major collaborators were committed to trial and some of them received the death sentence. Meanwhile, in
Thailand the government did not have a policy on how to treat those collaborators as the Thai government had also co-operated with Japan during the war. Therefore, ‘unofficial punishment’ was meted out to Tan Siewmeng, a major collaborator. After the assassination of Tan, lesser collaborators continued to thrive and control local resources and facilities as they were not punished. In Surat Thani, many Cantonese collaborators became wealthy and officially founded their native-place associations immediately after the war ended. The Chinese Civil War had sparked an ideological conflict amongst Chinese residents in Thailand. This conflict was also reflected in the division of the native-place associations, which was divided between pro-GMD and pro-CCP associations. This section investigates the fate of Chinese collaborators in Surat Thani and other parts of the country in order to discover what happened to them after the end of the war and how the tensions between the collaborators and the patriotic Chinese were resolved. It then examines the ideological conflicts reflected in the native-place associations in the Chinese community in Surat Thani in the post-war period.

Following news of Japan’s defeat, there was a resurgence of Chinese nationalism. They celebrated their victory as a sense of excitement swept over the Chinese community of Surat Thani, one of the largest Chinese communities in Thailand.684 Besides their great joy, the Chinese also used these celebrations to vent their anger on the Thai government, who had caused their hardships during wartime. As the celebrations of the Chinese laid the foundations for incessant disputes between Chinese and Thai people, a brief history of the celebrations is necessary.

At the end of World War II, Chiang Kai-shek gained considerable prestige and influence in the international arena. In contrast, Phibun and his fascist ministers were arrested and put on trial at the War Crimes Tribunal in Bangkok.685 China was one of the

685 In 1946, the War Crimes Tribunal, however, found Phibun and his cabinet members not guilty. See Karl DeRouen Jr. and Paul Bellamy, eds., International Security and the United States: An Encyclopedia (Connecticut: Praeger, 2008), 805.
victorious “Big Five”.\textsuperscript{686} The emergence of China as a world leader made the Chinese in Thailand feel confident and more united than ever before.\textsuperscript{687} They were joyous at the news of their victory and the new status of their motherland.

To vent their anger on the Thai government, the Chinese residents in Surat Thani and other parts of the country immediately regarded Thailand as a defeated nation, while their motherland was celebrated as one of the victorious five powers.\textsuperscript{688} They also began to spread rumours that GMD troops were about to occupy Thailand. In Bangkok, some Chinese people assaulted Thai people as acts of revenge.\textsuperscript{689} Moreover, Chinese people ignored a law stipulating that the Siamese national must be flown alongside any foreign flags by decorating their houses, shops and associations with ROC flags to celebrate their victory and to challenge the Thai authorities. There were also parades in many major Chinatowns throughout the country.\textsuperscript{690}

In Surat Thani, the Cantonese established the Kwong Siew Association (廣肇高公所), their native-place association, in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown on 10 October 1945, the anniversary of the Double Tenth Day, or the national day of the ROC. Shortly after Japan’s defeat, the Cantonese were finally able to be reunited for the first time in the history of the Chinese diaspora in Surat Thani. Such defiant expressions of patriotism stemmed from the new-found confidence that the emergence of China as a world leader had instilled in them.\textsuperscript{691}

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\item[687] TNA, WO 203/5587, from Director of Intelligence, HQ, SACSEA to C.O.S., letter dated 18/10/1945, 16.
\item[688] Ibid., 7.
\item[689] Songprasert, จีนโพ้ นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 157-158.
\item[690] Ibid. Please also see TNA, WO 203/5587, 4.
\item[691] I accidentally found the original wooden plate of the Cantonese association name in a storeroom of the association. The year of the establishment was written in Chinese as 中華民國卅四年雙十節立 or established on the Double Tenth Day in the 34\textsuperscript{th} year of the ROC.
\end{footnotes}
For Thais, they witnessed the first manifestation of the growth of Chinese political influence throughout South East Asia. As Seni, Thailand’s new prime minister, had resorted to relying on the support of Chiang Kai-shek in post-war negotiations to prevent the Allies Powers from treating Thailand as a defeated nation, the Thai authorities could not do much about the Chinese community’s expressions of patriotism beyond requesting that they abide by the law regarding the national flags and refrain from indulging stories about Thailand being a defeated nation.692

As China was one of the victors and had become one of the five global powers at the end of the war, “Chineseness” was no longer looked down upon.693 Many ruling elites came forward to claim that they had Chinese blood and praised their Chinese names. For example, Pridi Banomyong, a leader of the civilian faction that carried out the Siamese revolution of 1932, was of Chinese descent with the surname Tan (陳). Thamrong Navasawad, the Prime Minister of Siam from 1946-1947, was Zheng Liandan (鄭連淡). Luang Wichitwathakan, a Thai politician and novelist who had in 1938 compared the Chinese to the Jews in Germany, was born Tan Kimliang (陳金良).694

The end of the war saw countless family and community reunions of people who had escaped from the Japanese in China during late 1945 and early 1946.695 One example of that is the story of Liao Jingsong, who, as was mentioned in Chapter Three, was sentenced to life imprisonment, and his brother, Liao Hinpoh sentenced to a sixteen-year term when Japanese troops landed in Thailand on 8 December 1941 because they had refused to collaborate. Liao Hinpoh’s wife and children had escaped to Penang before the Japanese invasion. The grief Liao Hinpoh felt over the separation was unbearable, as no one was certain when the war would end. However, he was finally reunited with his family when they immediately returned from Penang after the end of the war.696

692 “Communiqué,” issued by Publicity Department on 22 and 23 September 1946 see ibid., 11-12.
693 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 360.
694 Ibid.
695 Lary, The Chinese People at War, 179.
696 อนุสรณ์งานฌาปนกิจคุณพ่อเล็ก เสรฐภักดี ณ วัดธาตุทอง วันที่ 2 ธันวาคม พ.ศ. 2545 (Cremation volume of Lek Sethbhakdi 廖欣圃 at Wat That Thong on 2 December 2002), 52, 55.
As a result of the war, Liao family’s businesses were shattered, so Hinpoh avoided all political activities. Social charities were greatly reduced. The Teochew Association of Thailand was handicapped because everyone was reluctant to resume top offices after they saw the example of Liao’s family and two former Chinese Chamber of Commerce (hereafter CCC) chairmen of Teochew origin, Hia Guang-iam and Tan Siewmeng, who decided to co-operate with the Japanese and met a tragic fate after the SSJW came to an end.\(^697\) However, Jingsong continued to help the Chinese community in Surat Thani and other areas. Although he had been staying in Bangkok at the end of the war, Liao Jingsong still regarded Surat Thani, the capital of his family business, as his hometown. He donated 600,000 baht to Suratthani Hospital, a sum higher than another in Nakhon Si Thammarat, where his Siamese mother and he were born. He also gave his businesses in Bandon to Kamthorn and Kamyong Sethbhakdi, his eldest and second sons, who had been staying in Surat Thani, to look after.\(^698\)

In Malaya, during the Japanese occupation, there was a minority that collaborated with the Japanese for financial reasons, but many of these collaborators overtly despised the ‘barbarian dwarf,’ a derogatory term applied to the Japanese, for whom they were working. They did not become involved with the Japanese and avoided offering their services as much as possible. On the other hand, the majority of Malays welcomed the Japanese occupation because the Japanese promised to eliminate the economic and political encroachment of the Chinese. At the same time, the Japanese utilised the Malayan police force, consisting mostly of Malays, to suppress the anti-Japanese movement. Accordingly, the Chinese harboured considerable resentment towards the Malays. In September 1945, the British reoccupied Malaya. Following the news of Japan’s surrender, the Chinese retaliated against the Malay police. They also took revenge on Malay aggressors with whom they had clashed during the war, killing 30 or 40 Malays at a village on the Perak River in March 1946. The Chinese communists also


challenged the British in order to bring them into hatred. They issued manifestoes promulgating that the British had cowardly abandoned the people of Malaya in 1942, a betrayal mourned by declaring a public holiday on 15 February 1946 to celebrate the day Singapore fell to the Japanese. There would be processions throughout the country on this day, but in Singapore cordons successfully surrounded the city to prevent this movement. Ten Chinese, acting behind the scenes, were later deported to China.699

In China, official vengeance was wreaked upon major collaborators. The Chinese government brought important people who had co-operated with the Japanese to trial. Although Wang Jingwei had left for Japan to undergo treatment for wounds inflicted by an assassination attempt in 1939, and died in Japan in 1944, less than a year before Japan surrendered his closest colleagues, including Zhou Fohai (周佛海), Chu Minyi (褚民誼) and Chen Gongbo (陳公博), were convicted of treason and executed. Liang Hongzhi, Wang’s predecessor in the Nanjing regime, met the same fate. Furthermore, Chen Bijun (陳璧君), the wife of Wang, was sentenced to a long term of imprisonment.700

Tan Siewmeng, meanwhile, a major collaborator in Thailand, received an unofficial punishment. On 16 August 1945, one day after Victory over Japan Day, he was shot by an anonymous assassin. The main motive for the murder was the fact that he had recruited a great deal of Chinese labour, including those in Surat Thani, to work for the Thai-Burma railway. Many Chinese patriots thus verbally attacked him, as well as Chinese merchants who had worked for the Japanese, and reported them to the Chungking government. Later, Tan Siewmeng and other CCC directors were condemned by Chungking Central Radio Station in a broadcast that caused some Chinese patriots, who wanted to express loyalty towards their motherland, to kill Tan.701

700 Lary, The Chinese People at War, 183.
701 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1.9/42 ถัดจากกรมนายกองชีวมัง อดีตราชการรัฐผู้มีชื่อเสียง (Murder of Tan Siewmeng, a former Chinese government officer who flavoured Japan), Direk Chainam, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Minister of Interior, letter dated 18/05/1946, 3-5.
The death of Tan Siewmeng was symbolic of the political controversy that was about to disturb the Chinese community throughout the postwar period. Following a police investigation, the crime was committed by unknown members of the CCP because he paid a far smaller sum of money after he had been asked for a contribution of 20,000 baht to support anti-Japanese activities in Thailand. In the 2000s, Henri Chen KeZhan, a renowned Singapore artist and a descendant of the Tan family in Singapore, believed that a Hainanese communist assassin killed the ex-chairman of the CCC after a Communist source confided to him. This emphasised the fact that the majority of the CCP members were Hainanese, as discussed in Chapter Two. It should be noted that Surat Thani was one of the most important Hainanese and CCP networks in South East Asia, and one where the CCP had been politically active since the late 1920s. Many Chinese teachers in Ko Samui were arrested and deported from the country for spreading communism.

Following the assassination of Tan Siewmeng, lesser collaborators continued to move on with their lives. Following Japan’s defeat, the strongest and most influential native-place association in Thailand was the Cantonese Association. In Surat Thani, the Cantonese privately worked for the Japanese in some construction projects and some of them were also recruited to construct the Thai-Burma railway during the war. Immediately after Japan’s surrender, many Cantonese found money that the Japanese had buried underground and took some materials off the Japanese. They survived the punishment of the patriotic Chinese and continued to control resources, becoming

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703 TNA, WO 203/5587, Commander HQ, Force 136 to Director of Intelligence HQ, S.A.C.S.E.A., report on Sino-Siamese relations in Bangkok dated 14/11/45, 6 and NAT, (2) MFA 7.1.9/42, Siri Khachahiran, the Metropolitan Inspector, to the Metropolitan Commander, letter dated 23/07/1946, 10. The murder remains a mystery. His brother, Tan Siewding, was filled with indignation and announced that descendants of Tan family would henceforth not devote their energy and money to Chinese society. See Wu Jiyue, ปี โพ้นทะเล หมิ่น (60 Years of the Overseas Chinese), trans. Panatda Lertlamampai (Bangkok: Post Publishing Public Co., Ltd., 2010), 244.
704 Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 354.
706 Kam Hammam. Interview, 7 January 2017. Kam is the president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani.
wealthy in the process. In October 1945, they finally established the Cantonese Association in Bandon’s Chinatown, as noted above.

There were three reasons for their survival. Firstly, Tan Siewmeng, a major collaborator, was killed in reprisal for treason. The conflict was, accordingly, considered settled to some extent. Similar to the situation in mainland China, the Chinese government did not have a definite policy on the treatment of lesser collaborators beyond the trials of major collaborators, as mentioned above. As the civil war was impending, many collaborators were considered useful for the GMD to revive the pre-war economic and social situation. The CCP also needed many new supporters as the party extended its control over the northern parts of China. Hence, both sides had to make sure that they were not too harsh in meting out justice for wartime acts. Furthermore, an enormous number of people had lived under the Japanese occupation, so the Chinese government could not hold them all responsible for being traitors. Secondly, as communism was illegal in Thailand at that time, the activities of the CCP sympathisers might be specially observed after the assassination of Tan, the most important collaborator. The Chinese communists, consequently, could not do much about it, although there were many Chinese communists and there was evidence of CCP activities in many Hainanese communities throughout Surat Thani. Lastly, the Chinese might not have had time to exact revenge on other collaborators as they were probably exhausted from the eight-year Resistance War and there were already concerns about the brewing civil war. Moreover, conflict between Thais and Chinese was also on the horizon.

The fate of Taiwanese civilians and Chinese migrants who had changed their nationality to the Japanese during the war was dictated by the Thai army, who received instructions at the end of the war. In September 1945, they had been under house arrest and later transferred to a concentration camp in Bangkok, along with Japanese and Korean people in Thailand. Additionally, their property was confiscated as enemy property. They were only allowed to take as much property as they could carry by

708 TNA, WO 203/5587, 6.
themselves to the camp. As noted in Chapter Four, during the war there was a conflict between those who supported the Japanese and those who did not. Those who had worked for the Japanese were called “Taiwan”. This term meant “traitors” at that time, owing to the fact that some Taiwanese in Thailand identified politically with the Japanese during the war. Thus, the conflict was resolved to a certain extent, as the Taiwanese and those mainlanders who had changed their nationality to Japanese were imprisoned in concentration camps.

In Taiwan, locals were the target of mainland Chinese anger. The incoming Chinese treated the Taiwanese almost as enemy aliens. Their property was also confiscated because they had lived with the Japanese. This process satisfied the needs of newcomers from mainland China and the Taiwanese felt that they were being reoccupied. Many Taiwanese were unemployed when the economic ties between Taiwan and Japan were broken. Subsequently, this caused another conflict between the Taiwanese and Chinese mainlanders. These economic losses paved the way for huge demonstrations in February 1947, known as the Ererba Incident (二二八事件). The protests were violently suppressed by the Chinese government and a large number of people were massacred. Four decades later, this incident was a major impetus for the Taiwanese independence movement.

However, the Taiwanese in Thailand were released from the concentration camp after Li Tiezheng (李鐵錚), the Chinese ambassador to Thailand, and Sun Binggan (孫秉乾), the consul general, had successfully negotiated with the allied forces. The Taiwanese claimed that they realised the importance of mutual assistance and cooperation. They therefore organised and registered their native-place association with the Committee of Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Thai government. The Taiwanese native-place

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709 NAT, (2) MFA 7.1/63 การกักคุมชนชาติญีปุ่นในประเทศไทย และการแจ้งใหสถานเอกอัครราชทูตญีปุ่น ณ กรุงเทพฯ หยุดปฏิบัติหน้าที (Internment of Japanese civilians in Thailand and Notification that the Embassy of Japan in Bangkok had been requested to cease functioning). Document dated 13/09/1945 to 20/10/1945, 10-32.

710 Lary, The Chinese People at War, 172, 181-182.

711 Ibid., 172.
association (台灣同鄉會) was officially established in 1946.\textsuperscript{712} The official establishment of their association shortly gained a position alongside the five major native-place associations and the Jiangzhe Association (江浙會館). This change was considered local recognition of China’s postwar reincorporation of Taiwan.\textsuperscript{713} In 1947, the association was renamed the Taiwan Association of Thailand (泰國台灣會館).\textsuperscript{714}

The ideological conflict of the Chinese was also reflected in the Chinese native-place associations. The Hainanese community split in half immediately after the end of the Pacific War. Since 1909, there had been two Hainanese associations in Thailand: the Qiongdao Association (瓊島會所) and the Kengjiu Association (瓊州公所). The first was established by Dr. Sun for political purposes, while the latter was organised along similar lines to other native-place associations and was the oldest Hainanese organisation in the country. The majority of the Hainanese in Surat Thani belonged to the Kengjiu Association. However, the Qionghai Native-place Association (瓊海同鄉會) was founded in 1945. After the GMD government learnt that it was pro-CCP, it insisted that the Qiongdao Association be reorganised as the only Hainanese association. This led to a protest of the Kengjiu Association, which did not want to cede priority, so the two organisations were incorporated into the Hainan Association (海南會館) in 1946, which followed the regulations of the GMD government.\textsuperscript{715}

As the civil war went unfavourably for the GMD from late 1947 onwards, many native-place associations began to be pro-CCP. To have the former and newly formed Chinese associations controlled by the Nanjing government, the Chinese embassy and consulates were used as a tool.\textsuperscript{716} After the end of the civil war, the Chinese embassy continued to function as normal.\textsuperscript{717} In September 1957, a representative of the Chinese

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\item \textsuperscript{712} The history of the Taiwan Association of Thailand inscribed on a tablet see 泰國臺灣會館: 2002 年度活動特刊 (The Taiwan Association of Thailand: Special Activity Issue of 2002).
\item \textsuperscript{713} Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 294.
\item \textsuperscript{714} See 泰國臺灣會館碑記.
\item \textsuperscript{715} Skinner, Chinese Society in Thailand, 293.
\item \textsuperscript{716} Ibid., 295-296, 323.
\item \textsuperscript{717} The establishment of the Chinese embassy will be discussed in Section V.
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ambassador visited Surat Thani and five other southern provinces to show a film about everyday life, commerce, agriculture and industry in Taiwan and to comply with the instructions of the GMD government in Taiwan. Many pro-GMD Chinese in Surat Thani welcomed the delegates.  

Figure 5.1: The consul general of the ROC, together with Chen Bibo (陈碧波), the vice-consul, in Songkhla, visiting the Cantonese Association of Surat Thani. They took a picture with leaders of overseas Chinese in Surat Thani in front of the Cantonese Association on 15 August 1964.

Figure 5.1 shows that the Cantonese Association of Surat Thani continued to support the GMD, even though Chiang Kai-shek suffered from constant defeats in the civil war and Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the PRC in 1949. Li Jinzhi (李金枝), or Kobkarn Chaisong, the only woman in the picture, who was an advisor of the Hokkien Association, also welcomed the GMD government officers. Her daughter, Chusi Chaisong, married Shou Kiangjiao, a grandchild of Shou Caikun, whose family had...
financially supported the pro-GMD Dongjia School. Therefore, it could be assumed that the Hokkien Association at the time was also pro-GMD.\textsuperscript{719}

In short, the Chinese in Surat Thani and other parts of Thailand were joyous after they learnt that China had won the war. The emergence of China as a world power made them confident and more united than ever before. Therefore, they regarded Thailand as a defeated nation and hung their national flags in front of their houses to challenge the Thai authorities. Violent conflicts between Chinese and Thai in the post-war period were initiated by these provocations. Moreover, the tensions between Chinese collaborators and patriotic Chinese were resolved to some extent. Tan Siewmeng, a major collaborator, was murdered. The Chinese communists, who were suspected of assassinating Tan, could not harm others because the Thai authorities were closely observing the movements of the communists following the death of Tan. Additionally, everyone was exhausted from the SSJW and, moreover, the Chinese Civil War was approaching. Meanwhile, the Taiwanese were put into concentration camps. This explains why lessor collaborators in Surat Thani survived and continued to control resources and move on with their lives. In addition, there was also an ideological conflict that was reflected in the division of the native-place associations. The Hainanese community was split in two – the pro-GMD Hainan Association and the pro-CCP Qionghai Native-place Association – while the Cantonese and Hokkien associations identified politically with the GMD.

III. Disputes between Chinese and Thais

While the conflict between the Chinese collaborators and the patriotic Chinese was to some extent settled, tensions between the Chinese who had experienced the hardships of the Thai-economic campaign and the Thai government, who had also collaborated with the Japanese, had not yet been resolved. After the end of the war, the Chinese regarded Thailand as a defeated nation and challenged the Thai government by flying their

\textsuperscript{719} After Thailand established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1975, the Cantonese Association, together with four other major ethnic-place associations, were pro-PRC. This picture, and a portrait of Sun Yat-sen, were no longer displayed in the auditorium, but they were kept in the storeroom of the association.
national flags in Chinese communities. These provocations caused violent conflicts between Chinese and Thai in Surat Thani and other parts of the country. This section examines how the Chinese exacted revenge on the Thai authorities. In addition, a Chinese embassy was also established to represent Chinese residents in Thailand. Therefore, this section also investigates how the existence of the Chinese embassy had an impact on the Chinese community in Surat Thani and beyond.

As discussed in Chapter Four, in 1938, Phibun came to power and launched an anti-Chinese campaign. The programme of economic Thai-ification was also introduced to dissipate the economic domination of the Chinese. His government strengthened the programme during the Japanese occupation. Many Chinese in Surat Thani and other parts of the country had thus experienced hardships during wartime. For example, the merchant class was taxed heavily. In addition, Surat Thani’s Chinese enjoyed card games, the most popular form of gambling, during the Chinese New Year, but fees for gambling were increased. Another important law that had an effect on the Chinese of Surat Thani, who ran the province’s pork and poultry industry, was the Act for the Slaughter of Animals for Food, a law designed to replace Chinese domination of this industry with Thai merchants and wholesalers. Many government companies were also founded to compete with Chinese merchants. Apart from these policies, the police also suppressed the Chinese anti-Japanese movement during the SSJW. 720 The local authorities closely observed the activities of the Chinese in Bandon as it was seen as one of the most important Chinatowns in Thailand during the Pacific War. Soi Munggu, a local-born Chinese, was dismissed from his position as a public official after he was suspected of being a Chinese spy. Although the government adopted a conciliatory approach to the Chinese and many laws against Chinese migrants were repealed during the latter stages of the war, feelings of resentment towards the Thai authorities lingered.

Immediately after Japan’s surrender, the Chinese in Thailand were now ethnically descended from one of the world’s big five powers, celebrated the victory. They flew the Chinese national flag throughout major Chinatowns in Bangkok and other parts of

720 TNA, WO 203/5587, 16.
Thailand to challenge the Thai authorities, in direct contravention of a law preventing foreigners from flying their national flags without the Thai flag, as noted earlier. Due to a sense of growing power of the motherland and their long-standing grievances against the Thai government during the war, some Chinese took revenge on the Thai authorities by assaulting Thai people.\textsuperscript{721} Tensions between Chinese and Thais were coming to a climax. On the night of 20 September 1945, many Chinese assaulted Thai people in Bangkok’s Chinatown and then a group of Chinese fired warning shots from machine guns. On the following day, the Thai authorities dispatched the police and troops to protect Thai people and ordered that Yaowarat Road, the main artery of Bangkok’s Chinatown, be closed to traffic in order to search for arms.\textsuperscript{722}

The Chinese, now nationals of one of the “Big Five”, resented the fact that they were not allowed to fly their national flags alone whilst they saw the national flags of the other four powers decorated without those flags of Thailand. This provocation led to a police clampdown on Chinatowns across the country, essentially a state of siege, which the Chinese saw as reason to punish the police. The Chinese had not forgotten that their anti-Japanese activities during the SSJW had been suppressed by the police.\textsuperscript{723} With such memories still fresh in their minds, a group of Chinese shot at police officers from high buildings in Bangkok’s Chinatown on the night of 21 September. The police, together with troops, returned fire and a firefight lasted the whole night.\textsuperscript{724} At the same time, the Thai police and soldiers looted Chinese shops and forcibly extracted money from Chinese shopkeepers the next day. To resist, leaflets were circulated to Chinese shopkeepers on 23 September to ask them to close down their shops in protest against the injustices being done to them. At the same time, they demanded the withdrawal of armed troops and the police from Chinatown. The shops were reopened after the police and military were withdrawn in late September and the Thai authorities had promised to give equal justice. This incident came to be known as “the September Incidents.”\textsuperscript{725}

\textsuperscript{721} Ibid., 7, 11.
\textsuperscript{722} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{723} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{724} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{725} Ibid., 10.
Five important groups had been formed to resist the Japanese during the war, and Chinese political divisions were numerous and unclear due to the fact that their activities had to be carried out secretly to avoid a crackdown by the Japanese and the Thai authorities. GMD was the first of these groups, with approximately 50,000 members drawn largely from small merchants and the middle classes in Bangkok and Southern Thailand, including Surat Thani. The second was the Overseas Chinese Resistance Group, organised by Pra Pinit, a Thai police general, and financially supported by rich Chinese merchants. The CCP was the third, with around 20,000 members made up mostly of Chinese labourers. The fourth was the Blue Shirts Society (藍衣社), a secretive fascist clique in the GMD consisting mostly of men and youths. The last was the Free Thai Movement, which also recruited some local-born Chinese. Their headquarters was established in Bangkok and recognised by the Thai government as the Headquarters of the Overseas Branch of the GMD. It was unknown which of these groups had taken part in the attacks on the Thai police in Bangkok’s Chinatown, and it was difficult to postulate, as the incident did not last long. Some believed that the CCP was responsible while others claimed it was the Blue Shirts, as they had been sent to stir up trouble in Thailand.

After the September Incidents, conflicts between Chinese and Thai increased dramatically. At least two Thai secret societies, namely the ‘Black Swan’ and the ‘Black Lion,’ operated against the Chinese. The Chinese complained that there were attempts to cause fires in Bangkok’s Chinatown. Additionally, there were many other disputes throughout Thailand. On 27 January 1946, there was a dispute between Chinese and Thais in Nakhon Pathom (佛統府), a neighbouring province of Bangkok, resulting in many casualties and the death of Chinese man. This dispute happened when Chinese from all walks of life headed to Nakhon Pathom to welcome the Chinese envoy headed by Li Tiezheng, who had come to negotiate the formal establishment of Sino-Thai

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726 Ibid., 4-7.
727 Ibid., 7-8.
728 Ibid., 8.
In Surat Thani, Thai people also threatened Chinese and plundered their shops.\footnote{See NAT, MFA (2) 7.1.9/33 เรื่อง กรณีปะทะกันด้วยกำลังอาวุธปืนระหว่างคณะจีนที่นครปฐมกับตํารวจไทย (A clash between a group of Chinese men and Thai police who both used firearms), Provincial Committee of Nakhon Pathom to the Minister of Interior, letter dated 27/01/1946.}

Shortly thereafter, extreme Thai nationalists demanded that the Thai government resume the anti-Chinese campaign that had been forced on the Chinese during wartime.\footnote{Huang Chunxin, or Sathorn Luengpratiphan. Interview, 19 September 2015. Huang is a leading Cantonese in Bandon and the former president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani. Unfortunately, we do not have much information about the anti-Chinese incidents in Surat Thani.} The disputes between Chinese and Thais paved the way for the anti-Chinese policies that were resumed after Phibun seized power in 1947 to restore the confidence of the army and to control the Chinese. His return to power represented a Thai nationalism to counter the surge of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese in Surat Thani later suffered from his anti-Chinese campaigns.

The disputes between Chinese and Thais paved the way for the anti-Chinese policies that were resumed after Phibun seized power in 1947 to restore the confidence of the army and to control the Chinese. His return to power represented a Thai nationalism to counter the surge of Chinese nationalism. Many Chinese in Surat Thani later suffered from his anti-Chinese campaigns.

However, the arrival of the Chinese envoy brought hope that there would be the presence of a Chinese Embassy to represent their voice would led to an end to tensions. The Chinese envoy impressed the Chinese in Thailand. Li called for the repeal of the economic Thai-ification policies during negotiation with the Thai government. He also insisted that all Chinese descendants, either Chinese- or Thai-born, should be considered Chinese citizens.\footnote{TNA, FO 371/54416, a report from Chungking radio, dated 12/1/1946, 4-5 and ibid, letter from Mr. Bird to Foreign Office, dated 24/1/1914, 9-10.} Moreover, he put pressure on the Thai authorities to investigate the incident in Nakhon Pathom. The Chinese were satisfied with Li’s actions and tensions between Chinese and Thai eased to a certain extent. The Chinese hoped that Li would be selected to become the first Chinese ambassador to Thailand in order to represent their voice and solve their problems.

Indeed, once Sino-Thai relations were consolidated in January 1946, the Chinese did appoint Li as the first Chinese ambassador to Thailand following requests from the
Chinese community in Thailand. In September 1946, houses and shops in Chinatowns in Bangkok were decorated with the national flags of the two countries to welcome him. Enormous crowds of Chinese flocked to the wharfside to greet him on the day that he arrived. The Chinese had been waiting for the establishment of a Chinese embassy for a long time, as they wanted a Chinese ambassador present to resolve their issues with the Thai government, particularly concerning Chinese schools and education for their children. The law on nationality had been another problem because they had been unable to record their children as Chinese nationals. 

The flag-hoisting ceremony on 17 September marked the beginning of the formal establishment of Chinese diplomatic representation in Thailand. Chinese representatives of major native-place associations and students from Chinese schools in Bangkok and nearby provinces thronged the Chinese embassy to witness its official opening. In addition, overseas Chinese financially supported the embassy. In the afternoon, a group of Chinese merchants from overseas Chinese organisations met Li and donated 495,000 baht to the embassy for relief in China. Hence, the Chinese embassy served as a new centre of their networks that they did not have to rely merely on their native-place associations and secret societies.

Furthermore, the Chinese embassy replaced the former office of the Japanese embassy and its flagpole was adjusted to have the same height as the British embassy, a symbol of China’s growing power. A Chinese consulate was also established in each main region of the country. In Peninsular Thailand, a Chinese consulate was established in Songkhla, meaning Surat Thani’s Chinese could rely on local Chinese government officials to solve their problems. In the meantime, the Thais saw this manifestation of China’s growing power and the grand reception the local Chinese put on for the arrival of

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733 Ibid., Mr. Thompson to Foreign Office, telegraph dated 28/04/1946, 26.
734 Ibid., Mr. Thompson to Foreign Office, telegram dated 7/09/1946, 46.
735 Ibid., Mr. Thompson, letter dated 23/09/1946, 53.
736 Ibid., letter dated 31/08/1946, 49.
737 "Ambassador Addresses Chinese People," Liberty, 18 September 1946. See ibid., 57.
738 Ibid.
739 Ibid., Mr. Thompson to Foreign Office, telegram dated 7/09/1946, 46.
the Chinese ambassador with mixed feelings. For the first time, the Chinese in Thailand were officially represented; they could now raise issues directly with the Chinese government. Furthermore, it would be more difficult for the Thai government to deal with the Chinese problems on account of the growth of Chinese political influence throughout South East Asia. Therefore, the establishment of the Chinese embassy opened a new chapter in the history of Thailand. The arrival of Li would inevitably raise the profile of problems local Chinese were facing. Based on the Law of Nationality (Siam), the first nationality law, introduced in 1913, every person born on Siamese territory had to be considered Siamese except when his or her parents recorded the birth at the father’s consulate, legation or embassy. Since there had been no exchange of diplomatic representatives between the Chinese and Thai governments prior to 1946, no Chinese, therefore, could register their children as Chinese nationals. From 1946 onwards, it would accordingly be difficult for the Thai authorities to push the Chinese toward assimilation and Thai citizenship.

According to the 1947 census, there were 835,915 people of the Chinese race from every nationality, accounting for 4.79% of the total population of 17,442,689. Of this number, 476,588 were Chinese nationals. But these figures exclude the descendants of Chinese. Although it was difficult to document in a legal sense the exact size of the Chinese population, Li claimed there were over three million Chinese in total residing in Thailand when he presented his credentials to the Thai government in September 1946. It was often calculated that Chinese nationals and local-born Chinese accounted for around 20% of the total population. Based on this estimation, then, there were some

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740 Ibid., 46-47.
741 Ibid., Mr. Thompson, letter dated 23/09/1946, 52-53.
742 TNA, CO 537/4755, B.R. Pearn to Foreign Office Research Department, letter dated 17/02/1949, 6.
743 การสำรวจและบันทึกข้อมูลอาณาจักรไทย พุทธศักราช ๒๔๙๐ (The 1947 Census of Thailand) (Bangkok: Ministry of Interior), 1-2.
744 “Over 3,000,000 Chinese living in Siam, says Ambassador,” 18 September 1946. See TNA, FO 371/54416, 58.
745 TNA, CO 537/4755, B.R. Pearn to Foreign Office Research Department, letter dated 17/02/1949, 6.
3,488,538 Chinese. However, other estimates have put the figure at five million, meaning Thais accounted for only 12 million.\textsuperscript{746}

About a year after the war had come to an end, there was a huge influx of Chinese into Thailand, estimated at more than 170,000.\textsuperscript{747} Economic misery, caused by the economic mismanagement of the GMD government, post-war famine, and social dislocation had caused this movement of people. In August 1946, one month before the formal establishment of the Chinese embassy, 40,000 to 50,000 Chinese in famine-stricken southern China were waiting to embark to Thailand.\textsuperscript{748} In addition, the entry fee was cheap at the time owing to the fact that it had not been raised since the pre-war days, whilst the value of the baht had fallen dramatically due to post-war inflation. These factors contribute to the wave of Chinese migrants to Thailand at the time.\textsuperscript{749} In September, however, the Thai government directed Kenneth Patton, an American adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to study the most effective tool to curb Chinese migration into Thailand.\textsuperscript{750} To tackle the crisis, the Thai government in the end decided to place a quota on the number of Chinese migrants for the first time in the country’s history. After an extended negotiation with Li in 1947, both agreed that only 10,000 persons per year were allowed to enter the country.\textsuperscript{751} The Thai government, however, did not impose a quota on Chinese teachers sent by the Chinese government.\textsuperscript{752}

In brief, due to the fact that the Thai police had suppressed Chinese anti-Japanese movements during wartime, the Chinese in Thailand loathed the Thai authorities and took revenge by assaulting Thai people after they had become nationals of a new emergent world power. In September, when Bangkok’s Chinatown was put under police siege, the Chinese shot at them from high buildings. This incident sparked other events, in Surat Thani and other parts of the country. However, the arrival of the Chinese envoy brought

\textsuperscript{746} Songprasert, จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 212.
\textsuperscript{747} Ibid., 213.
\textsuperscript{748} Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 361.
\textsuperscript{749} Songprasert, จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 213.
\textsuperscript{750} TNA, FO 371/54416, Mr. Thompson, letter dated 23/09/1946, 53.
\textsuperscript{751} Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 362.
\textsuperscript{752} Songprasert, จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 213.
hope that a Chinese Embassy would lend authority to their voice. The embassy became a new centre for Thailand’s Chinese community. They did not have to depend only on native-place associations and secret societies. In southern Thailand, a Chinese consulate was also founded in Songkhla, to which the Chinese in Surat Thani could address their problems directly to the Chinese government. Additionally, they could now register their children as Chinese nationals at the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok and the local consulate. It therefore became more difficult for the Thai authorities to push the Chinese towards assimilation and Thai citizenship. The Chinese were satisfied and the tensions between Chinese and Thais eased. The founding of the Chinese Embassy seemed to be an effective solution at the time. However, it did not last very long because a civil conflict in China soon began, weakening greatly the operations and effectiveness of the Chinese Embassy in Bangkok. The Thai government saw a window of opportunity to exploit the situation and deal with the problem of Chinese education and renew a reinforced Thai-ification programme.

IV. Chinese Schools from 1945 to the 1950s

The Chinese school issue had existed before the Pacific War. Chinese schools in Thailand were all closed down in 1939 and the issue was temporarily resolved during World War II as a result of them being closed down. Following the end of the war, the issue was taken up again and increasing numbers of Chinese schools were reopened throughout the country. Therefore, Chinese education thrived during the early post-war years. Indeed, the Chinese embassy had been opened partly to protect Chinese schools. The sufferings of the Chinese, who had experienced hardships under Japanese occupation and as a result of the Thai-ification programme, were temporarily eased. However, the situation changed when in June 1946 the Chinese Civil War broke out fully after Chiang launched large-scale attacks in Manchuria, the heartland of the CCP. In Thailand, there was a new surge of ideological conflict between Chinese supporters of the GMD and the CCP. Bangkok became a centre where Chinese of all political colours and from all parts of South East
Asia met. The ideological conflict was not only reflected in the division of the Chinese native-place associations, but also in Chinese schools. This conflict was also seen in Surat Thani’s Chinese community. The two sides established and financially supported Chinese schools to implant their ideologies in Chinese students. Nevertheless, due to the weakness of the GMD government during the Chinese Civil War and ideological differences, the Thai government exploited the opportunity to tighten control over Chinese schools and reinforce its Thai-ification programme. Chinese education declined, as many Chinese schools were closed after Phibun became prime minister again in 1948. This section seeks to investigate the ideological conflict between the GMD and CCP supporters, which was reflected in the division of Chinese schools in Surat Thani from 1945 to 1950s. It also examines how the civil war in China influenced Thailand’s policies towards the Chinese.

Phichai Rattanapon, in his master’s thesis “Development of the Controls of the Chinese Schools in Thailand,” proposed that Chinese schools be divided into three groups following the end of the war in 1945. The first group identified politically with the GMD. The second was with the CCP. The last one was neutral. The pro-CCP schools were mostly small and had little property. Most of them followed the regulations of the Thai government while the other two refused to register with the Thai government and took to flying ROC flags. However, after the CCP won repeated victories against the GMD, Chinese committees and teachers at Chinese schools in Thailand were largely divided into two groups: the GMD and the CCP sympathisers. When Mao Zedong conquered the entire mainland and proclaimed the PRC on 1 October 1949, many Chinese school’s supporters began to identify politically with the CCP, and some children ran away from their Chinese parents and went to mainland China to study. By 1949, the Assembly Hall of the CCC was no longer available for celebrating the

753 TNA, FO 371/54416, “Memorandum on Chinese Politics in Bangkok,” R. Whittington, the Counsellor to British Legation in Bangkok, letter dated 28/11/1946, 64.
755 Ibid., 113, 116.
anniversary of Double Tenth Day, or the national day of the ROC, after Tia Langsing, a pro-CCP, became its president.756

As a large number of Chinese schools were immediately established at the end of the war throughout the country within a few years, the Thai government saw dangers in Chinese education in the country. The GMD government declared that the Chinese education system in Thailand should be directly controlled by the Chinese embassy in Bangkok.757 Additionally, the Chinese government wanted to found Chinese teachers colleges and Chinese universities so that Chinese children in Thailand could access a Chinese education at every level.758

Any policy on Chinese schools was to be carefully designed by the Thai government because it was obvious that the Chinese government wished to use Chinese education as a tool to exert influence over the Chinese community in Thailand. At the same time, Thailand could not respond too harshly to the Chinese government’s requests owing to the fact that the country wanted China to guarantee Thailand’s independence after the war and support Thailand’s designs on restoring international standing. Therefore, the majority of Chinese schools did not follow regulations and did not even register their schools with the Thai government because they were aware that they were being protected by the Chinese embassy.759 Li also sent many appeals from the Chinese community to the Thai government during 1946 and 1947.760 Up until November 1946, the Chinese Embassy received a handful of anonymous Thai letters. In turn, the Chinese were accused of oppressing the Thais and were threatened with a violent response.761

757 Songprasert, จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 213.
759 Songprasert, จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 214.
760 Ibid.
In the early post-war years, Chinese schools thrived in Surat Thani. Iao Ing School, or Thow Ing School (陶英學校), an old school, reopened in 1947. New schools were established, such as Peicai Primary School (培材小學) in 1946 and Dongjia School (中止學校) (see Figure 5.2) and Zhonghua School of Na San (那訕中華學校) in 1947. Additionally, the Li Jin Association of Bandon offered Chinese tutorial classes at night. By 1947, there were more than 600 Chinese schools throughout Thailand, but only 38 were legally registered with the Thai government.

Meanwhile in mainland China, the balance of power between the two rival Chinese parties still stood in the GMD’s favour following Japan’s surrender in 1945. But

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62 This figure was from Chalin Rattanasuwan.
63 The year of the reopening and establishment of these Chinese schools was based on a description in Chinese of the pictures of the schools. However, Kanok, a writer of a short article on Chinese schools in Bandon, proposed the idea that Dongjia School was established in 1949 was incorrect. See Kanok Nganphairoth, “โรงเรียนจีนในบ้านดอน,” (Chinese Schools in Bandon) in ๗๕ ปีสำราญราษฎร์นารามราชธานี (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of the city) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2010), 46-47 and “History of Zhonghua School,” Zhonghua School, http://www.thaischool1.in.th/_files_school/84120001/data/84120001_1_20170904-215424.pdf. (accessed 5 July 2018).
64 Songprasert, จีนโพ้ นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 213.
when the Chinese Civil War started fully in 1946, the GMD suffered constant defeats despite US economic and military assistance. CCP troops began to seize the military initiative from late 1947 onwards. In the midst of this political turmoil, Phibun, together with a number of conservative civilians, carried out a coup on 8 November 1947, forcing Prime Minister Thamrong to step down. Li Tiezheng warned his countrymen not to get involved in Thai politics. As the military coup risked international condemnation, Khuang became prime minister again.

The Thai government could no longer tolerate the flourishing of Chinese schools in the country. In late 1947 and 1948 there was a resurgence of Thai ultra-nationalism, boosted by the Thai military, to oppose Chinese nationalism. In February 1948, The Chinese were accused in an anti-Chinese diatribe of possessing “filthy habits and a rapacious character” in Tahan Mah, a military journal sponsored by Phibun. As Li’s term came to an end, he immediately told the Chinese government that the anti-Chinese campaign would be resumed upon his departure for Nanjing. In the meantime, the Thais began to question and attack the flying of ROC flags in Chinese schools, regarded by them as a violation of their sovereignty and a symbol of Chinese ultra-nationalism.

In March 1948, the government of Khuang closed 14 Chinese schools in Bangkok due to their refusal to fly the flag of Thailand. However, there was no marked shift in government policy towards the Chinese more generally. Phibun, Commander-in-Chief at the time, issued an ultimatum in April that the authorities must closely control foreigners. Khuang was forced to resign and Phibun became Prime Minister in April. Siam, the name of the country, reverted back to Thailand, possibly revealing Phibun’s determination to remind the Chinese that the country was for Thais. Although he did not say anything specifically about the Chinese, he admitted that he was studying the

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immigration policy of the UK and US.\textsuperscript{771} Within a month, 342 Chinese schools that had previously violated regulations were closed. The police simultaneously arrested many Chinese teachers, who were immediately deported from Thailand despite protests from many Chinese community leaders and the GMD government.\textsuperscript{772}

The Thai government then determined to impose a quota on the number of Chinese schools as part of the Thai-ification programme. On 11 May 1948, Mangkorn Promyodhi, the Minister of Education, announced that the government allowed Phra Nakhon to have only eight Chinese schools, while only three were to be allowed in each of Thonburi, Chiangmai, Nakhon Si Thammarat and Ubon Ratchathani. Other provinces, including Surat Thani, were allowed to have only two each. Nevertheless, the government permitted those that asked the permission before this date to establish their schools.\textsuperscript{773}

Only three Chinese schools in Surat Thani, namely Iao Ing School, Dongjia School, and Zhonghua School of Na San, received permission from the Thai government before 11 May 1948. In 1948, Dan Siton and Phu Khikiao, two Hainanese, ran a fundraising campaign to establish a Chinese school in Hua Thanon, Ko Samui. A two-storey building was constructed, but was not allowed to open.\textsuperscript{774} In the meantime, in Tha Kham market, a Chinatown of Phun Phin, the Chinese bought a piece of land and built a two-storey wooden building for Zhonghua School (中華學校). However, the school was not allowed due to the new regulations. The building was abandoned in 1948. Later, in 1950, Decho Boonchuchuai, a Thai, asked for permission from a Chinese committee to utilise the building of the Chinese school and transform it into Theerasom Wittaya School, a Thai school.\textsuperscript{775}

\textsuperscript{772} Songprasert, รัสี่พาหะสมัยใหม่, 215.
\textsuperscript{774} Jittra Kornanthakiat, “Guanwu Temple at Na Khai Hua Thanon in Ko Samui: Part 1,” \textit{Nationweekend}. The extract of this article was displayed at a museum at the Guanwu Temple in Hua Thanon.
\textsuperscript{775} Kanok Ngamphaiboot, “Back in time on Tha Kham,” in หลายเรื่องเมืองสุราษฎร์ (many stories of Surat Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 124.
To deal with the ongoing crisis in Chinese education in Thailand, the GMD government strongly protested and threatened to send troops to protect Chinese people and their interests from Phibun’s anti-Chinese campaign. As the GMD government had been suffering ongoing defeats in mainland China and was losing its bargaining power on the global stage, the Thai government saw these threats as hollow, and Phibun was unyielding in his policies towards the Chinese.\textsuperscript{776} The Private School Act of 1936, as mentioned in Chapter Two, was used as a tool to close remaining Chinese schools again. By the end of May, many Chinese schools had been closed on the basis of this law, leaving only around 500 across the country. This led to a protest by Carmel Brickman, a British representative of the International Union of Students, who had been invited by the Chinese government to observe the situation and ask for an amendment to the law to help Chinese schools in Thailand.\textsuperscript{777} The Thai government, however, considered the issue as interference in its internal affairs despite the fact that Brickman threatened to refer the matter to UNESCO.\textsuperscript{778} By early July 1948, only 426 Chinese schools remained in the country, including the three schools in Surat Thani. Mangkorn, the Minister of Education, was sharply criticised by UNESCO in mid-July.\textsuperscript{779} In the meantime, many Chinese parents started to send their children to Hong Kong and mainland China to receive a Chinese education.\textsuperscript{780} Many Chinese students whose Chinese schools were closed moved to study in the remaining Chinese schools.\textsuperscript{781}

Due to the weak position of the GMD in China, Phibun seized the opportunity to suppress secret Chinese associations because Chinese supporters of the GMD were

\textsuperscript{776} Songprasert, จีนโพ้บแห่งสมัยใหม่, 215.


\textsuperscript{779} Ibid., Mr. Whittington to Foreign Office, a Communique issued by the Siamese Government dated 24/06/1948, 64. “Foreign Interference Seen In School Issue,” \textit{The Bangkok Post}, 14 July 1948. See ibid., 60.

\textsuperscript{780} “82 Schools Reopened In Bangkok,” \textit{The Bangkok Post}, 8 July 1948. See ibid., 58.

\textsuperscript{781} Ibid., Mr. Whittington to Foreign Office, a Communique issued by the Siamese Government dated 24/06/1948, 64.
demanding higher contributions from Chinese merchants to finance the civil war. In every Chinatown across the country, the fundraising was mainly organised by a committee of each Chinese school and Chinese association, who put quotas on people based on their personal income. Chinese merchants who refused to donate were often condemned by other members of the Chinese community, and in some cases their children were prevented from entering Chinese schools.\(^\text{782}\) This behaviour angered some people, so this conflict was based on money, not about ideology. In addition, it pushed some people into supporting the CCP.

Most Chinese merchants were unable to refuse, so some of them doubled the price of their goods to contribute to the war effort, causing commodity prices to increase. Others lowered the prices of agricultural products, which had an adverse effect on Thai people. Phibun, accordingly, commanded provincial governors of Surat Thani and other provinces to observe this illegal activity.\(^\text{783}\) Many Chinese who had become involved in collecting these donations were arrested throughout the country in August 1948. The GMD could do nothing but only call for their release.\(^\text{784}\) Some were later deported to China in late 1948.\(^\text{785}\)

Meanwhile, in China CCP forces had mounted a full-scale attack in Manchuria in September and occupied the entire region by November 1948. Beijing and Tianjin, the two major northern cities, fell to CCP occupation. The CCP went on to conquer the northern half of China by the end of January 1949.\(^\text{786}\) These victories had an influence on the Chinese community in Surat Thani and elsewhere. Chinese schools became a contested space, with sympathisers of the two rival Chinese parties seeking to utilise them to disseminate their respective ideologies in Chinese students. At the same time, Phibun used the situation in China as a pretext to arrest of many Chinese who were collecting contributions to finance the civil war and crack down on Chinese schools.

\(^{782}\) Songprasert, จีนโพ้ นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 215-216.
\(^{783}\) TNA, FO 371/70030, Mr. Thompson to Foreign Office, letter dated 12/11/1948, 71-72.
\(^{784}\) Ibid., Mr. Palliser, Foreign Office minute dated 28/08/1948, 65-68 and ibid., Mr. Whittington to Foreign Office, letter dated 31/08/1948, 69-70.
\(^{785}\) Songprasert, จีนโพ้ นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 217.
\(^{786}\) Mark, China and the World since 1945, 13.
Despite the fact that Phibun revealed anxiety about the political situation in China during November and commanded provincial governors of Surat Thani and others to observe the movements of Chinese communists, Phibun, in fact, arrested many well-known supporters of the GMD, who forced many Chinese to finance the war.\(^{787}\)

The Thai government began to blame the Chinese for bringing communism to Thailand.\(^{788}\) Because Phibun regarded northern Thailand as vulnerable to infiltration of communism, he closed many Chinese schools even though their headmasters and students identified politically with the GMD. In addition, some smaller anti-GMD schools thrived despite their ‘red’ reputations.\(^{789}\) In January 1949, Phibun also seized on the opportunity to cut the quota for Chinese migration from 10,000 to 200 persons annually.\(^{790}\)

In Bandon’s Chinatown, Shou and Liao’s families, the two leading Chinese families in Surat Thani, had not only competed in business and local charities from the early twentieth century, they also financially supported Chinese schools that were said to be competing with one another. Iao Ing School, established and supported by Kamthorn and his friends, was widely seen as identifying politically with the CCP, whereas Dongjia School, founded by Jenkit, an heir to Shou Caikun, was a pro-GMD school.\(^{791}\) After the end of the Chinese Civil War, Kamthorn’s school began celebrating the National Day of the PRC every 1 October. As mentioned in Chapter Three, Kamthorn’s grandfather and father, Liao Chiangsoon and Liao Jingsong, had had political connections with the CCC before. Chiangsoon was one of the founders and the ninth chairman of the CCC. Jingsong had a strong connection with Seow Hoodseng, a central committee of the Xinan

\(^{788}\) TNA, FO 991/22, British Consulate, Chiang Mai to Whittington, letter dated 1/11/1948, 5.
\(^{789}\) Ibid., E. Hutchinson to Whittington, letter dated 13/09/1948, 7.
\(^{790}\) Songprasert, จีนโพ้ นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 221.
\(^{791}\) Bang Daokian (馮所權), also known as Somboon Phongvutipong. Interview, 24 December 2016. Bang, a successful merchant and a leading Chinese of Hainanese descent from Phunphin district, is the president of Thakham Temple and Association.
government, who fled the crackdown by Chiang Kaishek to Bangkok in 1936, and was also a close friend of Hia Guang-iam, a chairman of the CCC during the early SSJW.⁷⁹²

![Graduation certificate of Qiu Lixiang, a Chinese student of Dongjia School in Bandon’s Chinatown, issued on 5 December 1949](image)

Although the CCC under the pro-CCC Tia Langsing was not active, as communism was illegal in Thailand, its chairman was still a leader of seven major native-place associations in the country.⁷⁹⁴ According to the close connections with the CCC and the new political realities, Kamthorn chose to identify politically with the PRC. In contrast, Jenkit, an heir to Shou’s family, and other supporters of Dongjia School, had been loyal to the GMD although Chiang Kaishek had retreated from mainland China to Taiwan in December 1949. This school still celebrated the GMD’s Double Tenth Day anniversary. In addition, some students of this school also went to Taiwan for more Chinese education after graduation.⁷⁹⁵ The graduation certificate of Qiu Lixiang (邱立响), an eighteen-year-old Chinese student from Dongjia School, issued on 5 December 1949

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⁷⁹² See Chapter Three.
⁷⁹³ This figure was from Chalin Rattanasuwan.
⁷⁹⁴ Songprasert. จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 218.
by Chen Dongmeng (陳東猛), a headmaster at that time, reaffirms the conviction that this school was pro-GMD (see Figure 5.3). The portrait of Sun Yat-sen, the flag of the ROC, and the party flag of the GMD or the blue-and-white canton of the ROC flag were still displayed on the graduation certificate, although the CCP had already conquered mainland China.

Following the establishment of the PRC in October 1949, Phibun decided to ally himself with the US and became staunchly anti-communist in the 1950s, and the Anti-Communist Act was enacted in 1952. Phibun, however, utilised the law as a tool to suppress the Chinese until anti-communist equated with anti-Chinese. In 1950, there were about 300 Chinese schools, including the three from Surat Thani. Many Chinese teachers had by 1953 been arrested on the basis of this act.\(^\text{796}\) In the meantime, Phibun did not only allow the Chinese sympathisers of the GMD to run activities to help the ROC, but also co-operated with these supporters to establish Chinese voluntary organisations in 1952 to suppress the CCP in Thailand. Therefore, the Chinese community lost much of its cohesion.\(^\text{797}\) In late 1950s, Chinese schools were largely primary schools and allowed to teach the Chinese language for only 6 hours per week. From the 1960s onwards, Chinese children began to enter Thai schools, either public or private, and missionary schools. In this way the problem of Chinese schools decreased.\(^\text{798}\)

In sum, Chinese education thrived during the early post-war years. As China became one of the victorious five powers and Thailand’s Chinese were protected by the Chinese embassy, most Chinese schools did not follow government regulations and the Thai government could not crack down on them. However, from late 1947 onwards, the GMD suffered a series of defeats and the position and authority of the Chinese Embassy in Thailand weakened. Phibun’s government seized this opportunity to carry out anti-Chinese policies and strengthen its Thai-ification programme. Many Chinese schools that violated the regulations were immediately closed. At the same time, many of the Chinese

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\(^{796}\) Songprasert, จีนโพ้นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 219-222.

\(^{797}\) Ibid.

\(^{798}\) Ibid.
who collected donations to help the GMD fight against the CCP in mainland China were arrested. By the end of January 1949, Chinese schools were largely divided into two groups: pro-GMD and pro-CCP schools. This ideological division was also reflected in the native-place associations. In Surat Thani, Dongjia School was pro-GMD, while Iao Ing School was pro-CCP. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949 and the GMD had become powerless to protect the Chinese in Thailand, the Thai authorities felt that they were able to treat the Chinese as they wished. The anti-communist law was used as a tool to suppress them. In other words, anti-communist equated to anti-Chinese. The next section will discuss the Great Fire of Bandon in 1953, which the Thai government used as a pretext to reinforce its economic Thai-ification programme.

V. The Great Fire of Bandon

By the 1950s, Bandon was one of the largest market towns in Peninsular Thailand. The market was the commercial heart of Surat Thani, and the place where most Chinese lived together in tightly packed townhouses constructed of wood and thus highly vulnerable to fire. In the Chinese community, townhouses were not only places of residency, but also served as commercial premises and as stores of diverse materials. This dual function gave them the title ‘shophouses’. Other Chinese migrants lived in simple wooden huts. On 4 June 1953, a fire spread through the business centre of Bandon, one of the largest Chinatowns in Thailand, leaving more than a thousand families homeless. Some 100,000 square metres, making up almost the entirety of Chinatown, were on fire in a seven-hour conflagration considered one of the worst in Thai history, far more damaging than any other that had occurred anywhere in the country up to that date.799 Suspicions soon arose that the fire was no accident, and because of the ideological conflict in the Chinese community, Chinese communists were immediately suspected of having started it. At the same time, after the GMD government was defeated in the Chinese Civil War and the overseas Chinese community became isolated from mainland China, the Thai

799 The memorandum of Pol.Col. Phat Nilawatthananon, the representative of Surat Thani, on 11 June 1953. See Charat Chanphomrat, “พระเพลิงบ้านดอน,” (The conflagration of Bandon) in ๗๕ ปีสุราษฎร์ธานี นามพระราชาท่าน (75 years of Surat Thani after King Vajiravudh bestowed a title of the city) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2010), 64-65.
government saw in the conflagration a chance to reinforce its economic Thai-ification programme by launching a housing policy to diminish the economic domination of the Chinese. This section examines the economic Thai-ification programme that began with the Great Fire of Bandon.

The Great Fire of Bandon was not the first disastrous conflagration in the area. Two other fires had occurred, in 1947 and 1951. On November 1947, a fire accidentally started by Yong Kao, a Cantonese employee of a Chinese furniture shop, destroyed about 360 houses. It was estimated that the total financial loss was 15 million baht, but no one was killed. The local authorities provided relief for the fire victims.\(^{800}\) The second fire was started accidentally at the Kobkarn Rice Mill of the pro-GMD Li Jinzhi on 17 May 1951, and, lasting from 2 a.m. to 5.30 a.m., destroyed 61 houses, a value of 1.5 million baht. The local authorities also established a fire relief committee to help the victims. A city plan, devised after the 1947 fire, was officially launched immediately after this second fire. The Expropriation of Immovable Act, moreover, was issued to eliminate fire risk and widen the roads, based on the city plan drawn up after the first disaster.\(^{801}\) Therefore, the local authorities devised new tools to deal with such events following the 1947 fire.

On 4 June 1953, a fire started at 3.30 a.m. in Yoo Seng’s shophouse, which Mang Sae was renting to store goods (which he sold from a shophouse opposite) and use as a dwelling for his children. The winds fanned the townhouse fire into a firestorm that lasted seven hours and devoured more than a thousand houses, two major Chinese markets, two major Chinese temples, three Thai temples and a number of properties belonging to the city authorities. A survey of 310 families made by the local authorities four days later revealed that the loss was calculated at 30 million baht. The fire also killed Mang Sae’s six daughters and a local beggar.\(^{802}\) Later, the government estimated that the loss was

\(^{800}\) NAT, SOC 0201.4/31 เพลิงไหม้จังหวัดสระสุราภิบาล (The conflagrations in Surat Thani). Document dated 1932 to 1953, 9.

\(^{801}\) Ibid., 17-18.

\(^{802}\) Ibid., 22, 29.
calculated at 100 million baht and an expert analysed that it would cost more than 200 million baht to rebuild Chinatown, which lay in ruins (see figures 5.4 and 5.5).\footnote{Chanphomrat, “พระเพลิงบ้านดอน,” 53, 64.}

Following a police investigation, it was determined that the fire was deliberately started by someone residing in Xinhua Shop (新華), a tailor’s located on the left side of Yoo Seng. The police concluded two possible reasons for the fire: either to claim insurance money (the owner of Xinhua Shop, as the majority of local shopkeepers, had fire insurance); or for political reasons (Li Patdong and Oui Bochiat, pro-CCP Hainanese living in Xinhua Shop, were immediately arrested).\footnote{NAT, ฉ/ท/1064 and ฉ/ท/1065.} A relief committee was established after the big fire to register victims and provide them with free food, other necessaries of life and temporary accommodation. After only three days, commercial activities resumed as the local authorities allowed the Chinese to establish temporary market stalls to get on with their lives while they were waiting for resettlement. In fact, within a day of the disaster more than four hundred people had pressed the local authorities to allow them to reopen their shops.\footnote{NAT, ฉ/ท/1061 and ฉ/ท/1063, 28, 30, 34.}

It is ironic that only three months prior to the fire the government had commanded the police to prevent arson in Surat Thani. The police subsequently observed a movement
of pro-CCP saboteurs, but the local authorities did not act on the police’s concerns. Nevertheless, the two Hainanese were later deported to mainland China through the Anti-Communist Act of 1952.\textsuperscript{807} Phibun also used this law as a vehicle to arrest and deport non-CCP Chinese who opposed Thai government policy. Gradually, being pro-CCP was not the specific reason for repressing the Chinese community: merely being Chinese was enough in itself.\textsuperscript{808} However, the Chinese who went back to the PRC were not all deportees. The victory of the CCP in China’s civil war in 1949 attracted members of the intelligentsia and young people inspired by Mao Zedong’s victory. On 12 November 1953, a ship carried a thousand Chinese passengers back home, of which only 250 were deportees.\textsuperscript{809}

After the fire of 1953, fire victims did not immediately receive resettlement in the area of fire. Instead, the government seized the opportunity to introduce a city plan devised after the 1947 fire and used the Expropriation of Immovable Act in the fire area that prevented the resettlement of fire victims without the government’s permission. In addition, a decree was immediately passed to control building. The government encouraged landowners to borrow money from the government to construct new buildings and repay the loans within ten years. However, they had to follow the building plans of the government in order to make sure that they were strong enough to prevent conflagration in the event of a fire.\textsuperscript{810}

On 19 June 1953, Phibun visited Bandon’s Chinatown and expressed his condolences to the victims of the fire (see figures 5.6 and 5.7). On the surface, Phibun announced his intention to assist the victims, but in reality he did not. Instead, the housing policy launched by the Thai government was intended to eliminate the economic domination of the Chinese. Those landowners who borrowed money from the government were legally bound by the contract to have Thai people rent at least 50% of the number of newly constructed townhouses to do business. This was a direct attempt by

\textsuperscript{807} NAT, SOC 0201.4/31, 30-31, 41. \\
\textsuperscript{808} Songprasert, จีนโพ้ นทะเลสมัยใหม่, 221-222. \\
\textsuperscript{809} Sng and Bisalputra, A History of the Thai-Chinese, 363. \\
\textsuperscript{810} NAT, SOC 0201.4/31, 28.
the Phibun government to break the hold on the city’s commercial hub in order to allow Thais to compete with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{811}

In short, the Great Fire of Bandon was a fortuitous tragedy for the Phibun government because it could be used as a pretext to kickstart his economic Thai-ification programme. With this new housing policy, the Thai government not only wanted to reduce the economic activity of the Chinese in Surat Thani, but also make it harder for the Chinese to stay together and help each other as a community. Not only did the boundaries of each ethnic group in the Chinese community become less defined, but the boundary of the entire Chinese community also became less important as the housing policy made it easier for Thais to infiltrate the heart of Chinese commercial power. Another side-effect of the policy was that it would make it easier, theoretically, for the Chinese to assimilate into Thai society.

To conclude, the ashes of the Great Fire of Bandon benefited the Thai government. The fire brought about a new housing policy that Phibun used to reinforce the economic Thai-ification programme. With this housing policy, the Phibun government not only destroyed the financial domination of the Chinese, but also eroded the physical boundaries of the Chinese community by ensuring that Thai people could make

\textsuperscript{811} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{812} NAT, ฉtracted/1061 and ฉtracted/1063.
significant inroads into the Chinese community’s stranglehold on commerce by making it easier for them to compete. Highlighting how Phibun was quick enough to exploit the tragedy for his advantage, the fire represented a victory for the Thai government over the Chinese community.

VI. Conclusion

Following the end of the SSJW, tensions between those who collaborated with the Japanese and those who did not were to an extent settled. Tan Siewmeng, a major collaborator, was assassinated. Chinese communists, the suspects, were closely observed as a result, making it difficult for them to target other collaborators. This explains why lesser collaborators in Surat Thani survived. In addition, all participants were exhausted from the war and were apprehensive about the impending Chinese Civil War. Tensions between the Chinese and Thais were resolved to a certain extent after the arrival of the Chinese envoy and the establishment of a Chinese Embassy in 1946 to represent the Chinese community’s voice and solve their problems.

The Chinese Embassy became a new centre for the Chinese community, while Surat Thani’s Chinese could rely on the consulate in Songkhla. They could now register their children as Chinese nationals for the first time. Chinese schools thrived during these early post-war years, with over 600 founded in 1947 alone. However, shielded from criticism by the Chinese Embassy, most of these schools did not adhere to the regulations of the Thai government. Additionally, the Thai government could not crack down on the Chinese school as it sought China’s help to guarantee its independence.

After the civil war began to go unfavourably for the GMD from late 1947 onwards, the authority of the Chinese Embassy was weakened. Chinese native-place associations and schools were essentially divided into two: pro-GMD and pro-CCP. When Phibun seized power and became prime minister, he took advantage of the political turmoil in China to resume the Thai-ification programme, and many Chinese schools
were closed. At the same time, he suppressed the secret associations that were collecting money to finance the Chinese Civil War.

After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, Phibun introduced an anti-communist law to suppress the Chinese. Chinese education had declined as many schools were closed. Most of the major native-place associations identified politically with the GMD, whilst the Hainanese were split in half. The Great Fire of Bandon in 1953 helped the Thai government to reinforce the economic Thai-ification programme by introducing a new housing policy that not only aimed to eliminate the economic domination of the Chinese by helping Thai people infiltrate their commercial centre, but also to bring about more Chinese assimilation into Thai society. Phibun’s success in these actions represents a significant victory for the Thai government over Thailand’s Chinese community.
Conclusion

During the first half of the twentieth century, the Chinese communities in Surat Thani and also more widely across Thailand adapted themselves to changing socio-political contexts to forge their own national, diasporic, and communal identities. Surat Thani was the destination for some of the earliest Chinese migration to Thailand. In the late sixteenth century, early migrants established networks and exerted their Chinese identity through the donation of two Chinese bells to local temples. In nineteenth-century Siam, colonialism brought a huge influx of Chinese, mostly Hainanese, into Surat Thani. There was the expansion of rice cultivation for export after Siam had agreed to sign the Bowring Treaty in 1855. Therefore, Surat Thani was the base for transnational Hainanese networks, unlike the west coast of the Southern Peninsula, which was dominated by the Hokkien, and Bangkok, where the Teochew prevailed. These migrants built Chinese temples to be at the centre of their communities in order to serve people who spoke common dialects.

Before Chinese women arrived in early-twentieth-century Siam in large numbers, Chinese men assimilated into Siamese society via intermarriage with local Siamese women. The Chinese became an established part of Siamese society, participating in Siamese temples’ activities, acculturating themselves to the Siamese form of Buddhism, and sending their children to Siamese schools. The offspring of the intermarriage between Chinese and Siamese were called lukchin, or Chinese children, by the Siamese, whilst these children called themselves dengnangkia. In the countryside, these Sino-Siamese children, who had many opportunities to interact with the native Siamese, established hybrid temples to serve both Chinese and native Siamese people. These hybrid temples represented inter-cultural exchanges and processes of assimilation.

Owing to the reformed system of the provincial administration in the late nineteenth century and the construction of the peninsular railway in the early twentieth century, Surat Thani became an important port, a development that drew a large number of Chinese from many different ethnic groups, in particular in Bandon. In spite of the fact that the largest number of Chinese population was Hainanese, the most influential dialect
group in early-twentieth-century Surat Thani was Teochew. In particular, the Liao and Shou families had intimate connections with the Siamese royalty in Bangkok and Siamese elites in the peninsula and as a result enjoyed exceptional privileges. As these Chinese communities thrived and enlarged, the Chinese gradually stopped assimilating into Siamese society. For example, the Teochew and Hainanese established their own schools to preserve their Chinese ethnic community, utilising their own dialect as a medium of instruction.

The southern railway also drew Chinese immigrants from Northern Malaya, especially Penang, to Surat Thani. Unlike the west coast of Southern Siam, which attracted Hokkien tin miners from Penang, the tin mining industry in Ban Na San was mostly owned and operated by Hakka tin miners from Penang. The peranakan community in Ban Na San represented the family and business networks which existed between Surat Thani and Northern Malaya. The arrival of these tin miners was important in reinforcing economic links with Northern Malaya. Moreover, education tied the Chinese communities of Surat Thani with Penang. In the early twentieth century, many Penang-oriented Chinese parents in Surat Thani and across South Siam sent their children to Penang for an education in Chinese and English.

Despite the fact that the Chinese communities grew in the early twentieth century, the Chinese nevertheless were oriented towards their original locality. Similar to the Chinese communities elsewhere in South East Asia, modern Chinese education was transmitted to Surat Thani’s Chinese schools, where Mandarin was used as the language of instruction following the founding of the Chinese Nationalist Government in Nanjing in 1928. Indeed, Dr. Sun Yat-sen became a central symbol of China after his death and veneration of Sun became a mark of Chinese nationalism. Therefore, ethnic Chinese consciousness gradually evolved into a united national Chinese consciousness. When the Second Sino-Japanese War (SSJW) broke out in 1937, the Chinese, who identified politically and culturally with China, were not reluctant to contribute to the Chinese war effort and armed themselves against the Japanese when the Japanese landed in Bandon’s downtown on 8 December 1941.
Under the Japanese occupation, despite their strong anti-Japanese sentiments, the Chinese were faced with the thorny dilemma of deciding whether or not to co-operate with the invaders. The Chinese were essentially divided into two groups: those who collaborated with the Japanese and those who did not. Whilst Liao Jingsong was imprisoned after he refused to collaborate, many Chinese, such as Tan Siewmeng and Wang Jingwei, decided to collaborate with the Japanese, albeit after being put under significant pressure to do so. In reality, this “co-operation” was superficial. In Surat Thani and across southern Thailand, those who worked for the Japanese were called “Taiwan,” meaning “traitors”, as some Taiwanese in Thailand were politically oriented towards Japan. However, in reality both patriotic Chinese and Chinese collaborators shared anti-Japanese sentiments.

During the SSJW, the Phibun government launched an economic and cultural Thai-ification programme to motivate the Chinese to assimilate into Thai society. Many Chinese not only indulged in Thaification of their names and surnames, but also became Thai nationals. However, these Chinese retained their Chinese identity by remaining culturally and socially Chinese. Assimilation was a somewhat superficial phenomenon whereby name-changing and applying for naturalisation was seen as a means of making life easy rather than a heartfelt move to become Thai.

Another dimension of the Chinese community in Surat Thani was the political movement of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP hereafter). Surat Thani had one of the most essential CCP networks in South East Asia. As most CCP members in South East Asia were Hainanese, the largest dialect group in Surat Thani, a large number of Hainanese in Surat Thani were politically oriented to communist ideas. The CCP had been politically active in Surat Thani, particularly in Ko Samui, since the late 1920s. Chinese schools were found to be hotbeds of communism and many teachers were arrested and deported for spreading communist ideas. In addition, pro-CCP Hainanese were closely connected with those residing in mainland China, Bangkok, and British Malaya.
The early post-war years saw a resurgence of Chinese nationalism. Following the victory of China over Japan and a concomitant sense of growing Chinese power, the Chinese in Thailand felt confident and more united than ever before. At the same time, the Thai government found it more difficult to push the Chinese towards assimilation and Thai citizenship because the Chinese could now register their children as Chinese nationals following the establishment of the Chinese Embassy and the local consulate in 1946. Due to the Chinese Civil War (1946 to 1949), the operations and effectiveness of the embassy weakened. The ideological conflict between communism and nationalism was reflected in the Chinese communities in Surat Thani, where the Chinese were essentially divided into two groups: pro-Chinese Nationalist and pro-CCP. At the same time, the Thai government took advantage of the political turmoil in China to resume the Thai-ification programme and push the Chinese towards assimilation again.

At the end of the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong, China’s communist leader, declared the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC hereafter) in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square on 1 October 1949. Following this move, the overseas Chinese community was cut off from mainland China. Observation of the role of Chinese temples as an aspect of investigating post-1949 Chinese identity reveals that the second half of the twentieth century saw a strengthening of diverse ethnic Chinese identities and a resurfacing of disputes within the Chinese community in Surat Thani.

One of the disputes was a claim on Bentougong Temple (本頭公廟), a dispute that still rages to this day amongst the ethnic Chinese in Bandon’s Chinatown. In the fire that swept Bandon in 1947, more than 300 houses, as well as Bentougong Temple, were destroyed. The temple is referred to as a “Teochew Temple” in an official document of the local authorities in 1949 (and is a name shown in the list of the landowners) by the ethnic Teochew, who were the main victims of the fire. However, there was no evidence when the temple was actually founded because all related documentation and

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813 Phongsak Phothikruprasert et al., งานประชุมสมาคมเครือสัมพันธ์ภาคใต้ ครั้งที่ 4 วันที่ 13-14 กรกฎาคม 2555 จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (The fourth meeting of Teochew associations in Southern Thailand during 13-14 July 2012 at Surat Thani), 28.
artefacts were destroyed in the fire. The temple was rebuilt in 1954 according to a city plan devised by the city after the 1947 fire. According to the Teochew Association’s account, members of the Liao and Shou families, the two leading Teochew families, organised a fundraising campaign to rebuild the temple, but other dialect groups also donated and helped. Therefore, when a nameplate of this temple as a “Teochew Temple” was hung after reconstruction, the Teochew immediately got embroiled in a dispute with other dialect groups. The upshot of the dispute was that the temple was renamed a Bentougong Temple. Today, the Teochew still claim over the temple and refer to it as a “Teochew Temple” even though they still cannot hung their nameplate outside.

After Shou Kiangjiao, a leading Teochew and a grandson of Shou Caikun, became a committee member of the temple and realised that other major dialect groups all had their own native-place associations in Surat Thani, Shou and his friends hence established the Teochew Association of Surat Thani (素叻府潮州會館) in the new area on 10 October 1980, the national day of the Republic of China, and Shou served as the first chairman of the association. This choice of opening day illustrates that Shou was still loyal to the Guomindang, although Thailand established diplomatic ties with the PRC on 1 July 1975. It took fourteen years for Shou, together with the other four leaders of the major dialect groups in Bandon, to welcome delegates of the PRC consulate from Songkhla in front of the Teochew Association in 1994.

The Cantonese and Hakka associations have also claimed rights over the temple and have their own version of its history. According to the Cantonese account, Bentougong Temple was constructed by the Cantonese. The Teochew only gained control over the operation of the temple after the fire in 1947, so the Cantonese gradually retreated from involvement in temple’s activities. Whilst the version of the Hakka concurs with the Cantonese, the Hakka claim that the temple was constructed by the Cantonese but did not belong to any particular dialect group. Therefore, the Hakka

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814 Ibid., 25.
815 Ibid., 29.
816 Kam Hamnam. Interview, 7 January 2017. Kam is the president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani.
became involved in the temple’s activities. During the early twentieth century, the temple was called the “Chinese City Pillar” and was revered by all dialect groups. However, the Teochew, led by Shou Kiangjiao, organised a fundraising campaign from every dialect group to rebuild the temple after the 1947 conflagration. As they contributed a large proportion of the donations, they hence controlled the operation of the temple.\textsuperscript{817} Interestingly, this kind of conflict was also reflected in other Chinese communities in Surat Thani. For example, in Phunphin district, the Hainanese claimed Bentougong Temple of Surat Thani (素叻本頭公廟), which belongs to the Teochew today.\textsuperscript{818}

The story of a conflict within the Hakka in Bandon was also remarkable. In the early twentieth century, earlier arrivals worked as vegetable gardeners on government-owned property located quite far from the business centre of Bandon at the time. However, most latter arrivals migrated from Kanchanaburi, the province where the Chinese were hired to construct the Thai-Burma railway.\textsuperscript{819} This was due to the fact that in December 1942 Kanchanaburi, where the line was to pass through, was designated a prohibited area that aliens, including the Chinese, were told to evacuate within seven days.\textsuperscript{820} The Hakka vegetable gardeners from Kanchanaburi migrated to settle with the earlier arrivals, while Hakka merchants settled in the centre of Bandon’s Chinatown. The majority of the gardeners were Hakka of Banshanke descent (半山客) from Chaozhou, while the merchants of Shenke (深客) hailed from Meizhou (梅州). After the end of the war, Zhang Zhenhua, a Chinese headmaster of Iao Ing School, gathered a small group of Shenke people in downtown Bandon to form an unofficial Hakka association. The Banshanke, however, were prevented from participating in the association’s activities as they tended to have less wealth.\textsuperscript{821} Therefore, the Hakka split into two groups, each with

\textsuperscript{817} Wang Ronghui (王榮輝), Cai Wanrong (蔡萬榮), Huang Liangcai (黃良才), Wen Tihua (溫揚華), Cai Weijian (蔡偉建). Interview, 18 March 2017. All interviewees are the important members of the Hakka Association of Surat Thani.

\textsuperscript{818} Kanok Nganphairoj, “Back in time on Tha Kham,” in หลายเรื่องเมืองสุราษฎร์ (many stories of Surat Thani) (Surat Thani: Lertchai, 2000), 126.

\textsuperscript{819} Huang Liangcai. Interview, 18 March 2017.


its own association to serve them. The Hakka gardeners built Dabogong Temple (大伯公) as the centre of their community while the Hakka merchants officially founded the Hakka Association of Surat Thani (素叻客家會館) in 1963. They had been rivals, as the Hakka merchants refused to associate with the gardeners and often looked down on them. Until 1981, many Banshanke were allowed to join the Hakka Association in the Chinatown. However, the two organisations remain separate until today. Due to the fact that the Thai authorities wanted to suppress communists that were active at the time, the Hakka gardeners’ community, together with their temple, was replaced by a military camp. Dabogong Temple was relocated and established in another area in 1982 and renamed Wudimiao (五帝廟).

Although the early twentieth period saw the evolution of a nationalist Chinese identity, it would not be wrong to state that after the establishment of the PRC in 1949 the Chinese in Surat Thani reverted to a strengthening of diverse ethnic Chinese identities. Supang Chantavanich, in her study “From Siamese-Chinese to Chinese-Thai,” claimed that political circumstances in China and the Thai-ification programme after 1949 forced the Chinese to downplay their Chinese national identity and to emphasise instead their Chinese ethnic identities and aspects of Thai identity in order to survive. As mentioned in Chapter Five, the Chinese Nationalist Party had become powerless to protect the Chinese in Thailand. At the same time, the uncertain future of the communist regime in mainland China accelerated the orientation of the Chinese towards Thailand. The Thai authorities also launched the Nationalist Act of 1956, which allowed any person born in Thailand to register as a Thai citizen, leading to more Chinese becoming Thai citizens. In other words, the Chinese reverted once again to seeking assimilation into Thai society again while at the same time emphasising their ethnic Chinese identities over a united Chinese national identity. As Chantavanich claimed, the Chinese during the second half.

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823 Ibid.
of the twentieth century were referred to as “Chinese-Thai” because while they expressed their Thai national identity they also demonstrated their ethnic Chinese identities.824

The political movement of the Chinese communists in Surat Thani is also worth noting. After the establishment of the PRC in 1949, many Chinese communists joined the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT hereafter). Khao Chong Chang, a mountain range in Ban Na San district, became an important stronghold of the CPT. Li Patpoon, a local-born Chinese of Hainanese descent in Pak Kradae, Kanchanadit district, recalled that he felt resentful of Phibun’s government, which had limited the rights of Chinese descendants over certain occupations. Thus, he went to Khao Chong Chang and joined the CPT.825 Two key events occurred. In 1979, in Ban Na San, a train was robbed by Surachai Saedan (陳嘉前), a leading member of the CPT of Hainanese descent from Nakhon Si Thammarat, and his forces. The second event was the bombing of Surat Thani’s city hall in 1982. Due to these events, many Hainanese in Surat Thani, who shared the Chinese surname with Surachai, had to change their surname to Thai out of fear they would be persecuted and/or rejected from job applications on account of their surname.826

During the term of Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda (1980-1988), a “Peaceful South” (Tai Rom Yen) policy was introduced in 1981 against the communists. This policy prioritised political solutions over a military response by encouraging communists to defect and granting amnesty to them.827 As the political movement of the CPT was very active in Surat Thani, in 1982 Harn Leenanon, the southern army chief, asked for co-operation from leading Chinese merchants to subvert the communists. Shou Kiangjiao, a supporter of the Guomindang, and Chaweng Srisawat, a successful merchant of

824 Ibid.
825 Li Patpoon, the guardian of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae. Interview, 9 September 2015.
826 For example, Mengdek Saedan, the guardian of Chaopoe Bantai Temple in Ko Pha-ngan, changed his name to Somsak Danwiriyakun. Interview, 19 March 2017.
827 John Funston, Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), 17.
Hainanese descent, were not reluctant to co-operate. This policy led to a decline in the CPT over the next three to four years.\textsuperscript{828}

From 1950 to today, many other Chinese temples have been founded, such as Yangde Charitable Temple (陽德善堂), Mingmiaorenxin Charitable Temple (明妙仁心善堂), Bansong Fude Charitable Temple (萬松福德善堂), Old Bentougong Temple in Ban Na San (本頭公古廟), Bentougong Temple of Chaiya (採耶本頭公廟), Dabogong Temple of Tha Chana (大伯公廟), Goddess Shuiwei Temple (水尾聖娘廟), Caishen Temple (財神廟). In the second half of the twentieth century, Zhonghua School of Ban Na San was the only Chinese school that had survived the crackdown of the Thai authorities and was able to offer Chinese language classes (and continues to do so today). Iao Ing School and Dongjia School in Bandon were both closed down by the Thai government as they were alleged to have been spreading communist ideas among their students. In 2005, the Chinese community in Bandon founded Wamin Wittaya School (華盟學校). Zhang Jiuhuan (張九桓), China Ambassador to Thailand, presided over the opening ceremony of the school and the number of the students rapidly increased, from 367 in 2006 to 810 in 2012.\textsuperscript{829}

Another Chinese association of note is the Bandon Christian Association (萬隆基督教會), which was established after the war by Western missionaries and a small number of Chinese from different dialect groups.\textsuperscript{830} The association has its own cemetery for members, but its space is inside a Chinese graveyard where people from all dialect groups are buried. A visit to the graveyard found that rich members could secure the best

\textsuperscript{828} อนุสรณ์ในงานฌาปนกิจศพ นายมนินทร์ ปัจจักขะภัติ วันอาทิตย์ที่ ๑๐ พฤศจิกายน ๒๕๕๖ (Cremation volume of Manin Patjakkhapat on 10 November 2013), 110.
\textsuperscript{829} Phongsak Phothikruprasert, ประวัติโรงเรียนวัฒน์วิทยา (อังเฝ้) (History of Wamin Wittaya School (Huameng)), in 華盟學校：慶祝新教學樓成揭幕暨建校七週年紀念特刊 (Wamin Wittaya School: Special issue for the inauguration of new school building and the 7th anniversary of the establishment of the school) (2012), 54-59.
\textsuperscript{830} ฉลองครบรอบ 60 ปี คริสตจักรบ้านตะวันออก (Special issue for the 60th anniversary of Bandon Christian Association) (Surat Thani: Udomlarp, 2014), 22.
feng shui (風水), a Chinese philosophical system of harmonizing everyone with the surrounding environment.

Many well-known Chinese from Surat Thani have played prominent role in Thai society, such as Buddhadasa Bhikkhu (佛使比丘, 1906-1993), a leading Thai Buddhist thinker of Hokkien descent who was officially listed by UNESCO as one of the world’s “great personalities” in 2006, Somdet Kiaw (1928-2013), the acting Supreme Patriarch of Hainanese descent and leader of all Buddhist monks in Thailand, Banyat Bantadtan (1942-present), a Chinese of Hainanese descent and chairman of the Democrat Party (2003 to 2005), and Suthep Thaugsuban (1949-present), another person of Hainanese descent and a former Thai deputy prime minister, secretary-general of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, and organiser of the street protests against the Shinawatra government in Bangkok in 2013-2014, which paved the way for the 2014 military coup.\(^{831}\) It should be noted that this conclusion does not pretend to be exhaustive and much more research is needed to generate a more comprehensive picture of the Chinese community in the second half of the twentieth century.

\(^{831}\) On 7 April 2014, the historian Benedict Anderson claimed, on the Thai TV programme “Divas Café” that Suthep Thaugsuban is a Chinese of Hainanese descent.
Appendix One

This table shows the chronological list of Chinese bells in Surat Thani from 1848 through to the first half of the twentieth century.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Temple</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ethnic group</th>
<th>Deity to whom offered</th>
<th>Donator</th>
<th>Foundry</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1848</td>
<td>Wangao Temple</td>
<td>Ko Pha-ongan</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Bentougongyeye</td>
<td>Shi Lincheng (士林騰)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae</td>
<td>Kanchanadit</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Bentousanxian yeye</td>
<td>From Wenchang, Hainan, Xie Jialuan (謝家薰), Xie Chuanle (謝訓樂), Xie Jiaheng (謝家亨), Chen Guixiu (陳貴琇)</td>
<td>Wanchang (萬唱), Hainan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1855</td>
<td>Wanqian Temple</td>
<td>Ko Pha-ongan</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Bentouhouwang</td>
<td>Chen (陳)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1885</td>
<td>Wanluntianhou shengmu Temple</td>
<td>Bandon</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Wangshengdidijun (罔聖帝帝君), Wuzu (五祖), Bentougong gong, Bentoumama</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1897</td>
<td>Zhaoying Temple</td>
<td>Ko Samui</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>108 brothers</td>
<td>Brother He (兄何), from Poxin (坡心), Gou Village (溝村) , Hainan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua</td>
<td>Ko Samui</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Guanshengdijun, Bentougong</td>
<td>Yang family (楊), Yangmin (楊民), Yuanchun (元春), Linyang (林陽),</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Clan</td>
<td>Language</td>
<td>Association</td>
<td>Place</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Banpot Temple and Association</td>
<td>Don Sak</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>Bentouyeyesan xianhouwang</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Qingtonggan gboutou Temple</td>
<td>Kanchanadit</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Foshan (佛山), Guangdong</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samui Temple (Nathon)</td>
<td>Ko Samui</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guan Yu Temple and Association</td>
<td>Ko Samui</td>
<td>Hainanese</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Thanon</th>
<th>Tianwei (天維), Nengfu (能富)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899</td>
<td>Banpot Temple and Association</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>Qingtonggan gboutou Temple</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Samui Temple (Nathon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guan Yu Temple and Association</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Unknown: Ko Samui Hainanese

Unknown: Ko Samui Hainanese
Appendix Two: Oral History Biographies

Ruemun
Ruemun, over 80 years old, is a Tanka. She, together with her family, migrated from China when she was a child. She lived on a junk with other members of her family until the age of 13, when the junk was damaged and she and her family were forced to move onshore at Ko Pha-ngan. She fished for a living. She married Go Tek, a Hainanese merchant. She refers to herself as Cantonese.

Khuay Ngiyuat, or Prayat Saekhuay
Born in 1932, Khuay Ngiyuat is a guardian of Guanshengdijun Temple (關聖帝君廟) at Thongsara, Ko Pha-ngan district. His parents migrated from Hainan to the province of Chonburi in Central Thailand, where he was born and grew up. After his father died, his mother and Khuay migrated to Ko Pha-ngan when he was around 11-12 years old.

Pu Gui, or Gui Saepu
Born in 1948, Pu Gui is a guardian of Guan Yu Temple and Association of Hua Thanon (蘇梅島關帝神廟會館) at Hua Thanon, Ko Samui district. Her parents migrated from Bon-shio, or Wenchang (文昌), Hainan, to Bangkok and subsequently to Ko Samui. Her parents worked as coconut gardeners and pig farmers. As her house is next to the temple, she has been responsible for the temple since the age of 50. At the same time, she works as a coconut gardener.

On Srirak
On Srirak was born in 1920 and is a guardian of Maeyaichao Temple at Tha Chang. She was a daughter-in-law of Champa Srirak (Saeli), who constructed the temple and was an agent who sourced Chinese migrants to build the railway. Champa was a merchant and crocodile hunter, and was born to a Siamese mother and a Chinese father.
Go Kaew
Over 80 years old, Go Kaew is a successful Hakka merchant from Tha Chang. His father migrated from China to Bangkok and later moved to Tha Chang. His father owned a local cinema.

Cai Guohui (菜國輝), or Boonchart Thamcharoensak
Born in 1965, Cai Guohui is a committee member of the Hokkien Association. His grandparents migrated from Putian in Fujian province to Hat Yai in Songkhla province, before moving to Bandon. In Bandon, Cai owns a car parts shop, which is his family’s business.

Sese Kwankawin
Born in 1955, Sese Kwankawin is a second-generation Hakka. His family was the biggest Hakka family in the Hakka community. Lee Chinhon (呂清漢), his father, migrated from China to Songkhla and finally settled in Bandon, where Lee, together with his family members, worked as a vegetable gardener. Lee had eleven children. Sese’s family is a successful Hakka family in Surat Thani. Lee Chinhon Ancestral Hall (河東公祠), founded by Sese and his family members, is where more than 200 family members gather annually to celebrate Chinese New Year. Sese is the owner of a video rental shop.

Li Patpoon, or Nikoon Chuleetham
Born in 1932, Li Patpoon, a third-generation Chinese, is the guardian and spirit medium of the Hainanese Temple of Pak Kradae (關聖帝君廟), Kanchanadit district. His grandparents migrated from Hainan to Surat Thani. His paternal grandfather was a basket weaver and strong supporter of the Chinese Communist Party, and his maternal grandfather was a successful merchant. Li Honglop, his father, served as chairman of the temple and the Kengjiu Association of Pak Kradae. Two of his uncles were sent by his paternal grandfather to be soldiers, one of whom was killed by the Japanese during World War II. Li Patpoon studied at Iao Ing School in Bandon. In the post-war years, he felt resentful of Phibun’s government, so he went to Khao Chong Chang and joined the
Communist Party of Thailand. After he defected to the Thai government, he returned home and worked as a fisherman.

**Sakorn Wongsuban**

Born in 1953, Sakorn Wongsuban is a third-generation Chinese of Teochew descent. She is a niece of Koi Anaui, who armed himself to fight against the Japanese during the Japanese invasion of Surat Thani, and a granddaughter of An Aui, who had migrated from Chaozhou and was elected a village headman of Maluan in Phunphin district. She was the only person who settled near An Aui’s tomb.

**Aui Phonglian (黃蘭蓮), or Kanda Kanchanasuk**

Born in 1929, Aui Phonglian is a local-born Chinese of Hainanese descent. Her father, Huang Shanye (黃善業), who migrated from Bon-shio in Hainan, was a Hainanese goldsmith who owned a gold shop in Bandon’s Chinatown. As a girl, she attended a Thai school while her brothers were sent to Hainan for a Chinese education. After the Second Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, her brothers fled to Thailand. On 8 December 1941, the day the Japanese landed in Thailand, Aui Phonglian, aged 12, went to help her mother sell goods at City Hall on Constitution Day. Learning that Japanese troops were about to invade Bandon, she fled Chinatown with other family members. When Allied bombing became more extreme in Surat Thani, she found refuge in air raid shelters located at Wat Phra Yok, a Thai temple, together with other people in Chinatown. She later opened Baoxing (寶興), a dressmaker’s shop in the centre of the Chinatown.

**Kam Hamnam (譚錦南), or Namkiat Wiriyokhun**

Born in 1957, Kam Hamnam is the president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani (素叻廣肇會館) and a former president of the Lions Club of Surat Thani. Kam is a third-generation Chinese of Cantonese descent. His grandparents migrated from Guangdong to Chumphon and later moved to Surat Thani. His father worked as a building contractor and undertook many large construction projects such as Tapee Hotel. Kam is a building contractor.
Huang Chunxin (黃春新), or Sathorn Luengpratiphan
Born in 1937, Huang Chunxin is a leading Cantonese in Bandon and the former president of the Kwong Siew Association of Surat Thani. His father, Huang Zuguang (黃祖光), migrated from Guangdong to Bangkok in the early twentieth century and moved to Bandon’s Chinatown. His father was a successful Cantonese who received many building contracts to build townhouses and official places in Surat Thani. During World War II, his father also made substantial profit by working for the Japanese in construction projects. In 1979, Huang Chunxin was the Secretary of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce in Surat Thani. He is the owner of Sathorn Book Centre, one of the largest bookshops in Surat Thani.

Ngao Sengpu (吳清芙), or Pot Chayakun
Born in 1933, Ngao Sengpu is a second-generation Chinese of Hainanese descent in Tha Chana district. His father, Ngao Sengwa, had migrated from Hainan and was a merchant. Ngao Sengpu attended Iao Ing School in Bandon in the post-war years. He is a leading Chinese and owns of a gold shop in Tha Chana’s Chinatown. He was also one of the founders of Dabogong Temple of Tha Chana (大伯公廟).

Bang Daokian (馮所權), or Somboon Phongvutipong
Born in 1946, Bang Daokian is a successful merchant and leading Chinese of Hainanese descent from Phunphin district. He is also the president of Thakham Temple and Association (呈坎公所). He is the owner of a gold shop in Thakham’s Chinatown and a major financial supporter of Wamin Wittaya School (華盟學校), a Chinese school in Bandon.

Wang Ronghui (王榮輝), Cai Wanrong (蔡萬榮), Huang Liangcai (黃良才), Wen Tihua (溫揚華), and Cai Weijian (蔡偉建)
These five people are local-born Chinese of Hakka descent and important members of the Hakka Association of Surat Thani (素叻客家會館). Born in 1949, Wang Ronghui was in
charge of looking after the Hakka association. Cai Wanrong and Huang Liangcai were
born in 1935 and 1951. Cai Weijian was a student of Iao Ing School.

**Dan Mengdek, or Somsak Danwiriyakun**
Born in 1933, Dan Mengdek is a second-generation Chinese of Hainanese descent and
the guardian of Chaopoe Bantai Temple (萬前廟), Ko Pha-ngan. His father, Dan
Yuankee, migrated from Hainan to Ko Pha-ngan and was a merchant. Aged around 9-13,
Dan Mengdek used to take private Hainanese language classes at the temple with Bin
Tintae (先生), meaning Teacher Bin, who was a Chinese teacher and guardian of the
temple. He works as a coconut gardener.
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MOE 4.2/4 เรื่องการปิดเปิดโรงเรียน 29 เม.ย.-29 มิ.ค. 2456 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1913). Document dated 1913.
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MOE 4.2/3 เรื่องการปิดเปิดโรงเรียน ศก 131 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1913). Document dated 1913.

MOE 4.2/6 เรื่องการปิดเปิดโรงเรียนต่างๆ พ.ศ. 2459 (Asking permission to cancel the class in 1916). Document dated 1916.

MOE 54.9/3 อนุญาตให้จัดการเปิดโรงเรียนคีมงตั้งอยู่ที่ตลาดหมู่ที่ 4 ตำบลตลาดบ้านดอน จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี อยู่ต่อไป (Granting Keemong School, located at Moo 4, Talat, Bandon, Surat Thani, permission to maintain). Document dated 10/12/1918 to 17/12/1919.

MOE 54.8/1 มณฑลสุราษฎร์ส่งรายงานประจำปี พ.ศ. 2462 ของโรงเรียนคีมงและโรงเรียนคีมงขอรับครูน้อย (Monthon Surat Thani submitted the annual report of 1919 about Keemong School and Keemong School asked permission to receive a teacher). Document dated 13/05/1920 to 25/02/1920.

MOE 541/31 เรื่องอนุญาตให้ตั้งโรงเรียนศาลเจ้ากวนอู (The permission for Jin Tek school to exist). Document dated 2/09/1918 - 19/05/1920.

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MOE 4/11 กระทรวงมหาดไทยควรจะมีการบังคับให้คณะโรงเรียนจีนร้องเพลงสรรเสริญพระบารมีทำคว้าความเคารพต่อชาติ ศาสนา พระมหากษัตริย์ ในโอกาสสำคัญ (Ministry of the Interior should force Chinese students to sing the royal anthem in order to pay respect to the nation, religion and king at appropriate occasions). Document dated 1928.

MOE 54.1/1399 เรื่องเพลงสรรเสริญภาษาจีนที่นักเรียนโรงเรียนจีนต้องร้อง เพื่อแสดงความเคารพต่อปวงชนชาวกรุงเทพฯ เมื่อคราวเสด็จพระราชดำเนินโรงเรียน (The Chinese anthem sung by the students of Jintek School to pay respect to the king when he visited the school). Document dated 19/04/1928 to 11/05/1928.

MOE 54.1/1398 เรื่องคดีการกระทำความผิดทางร.ร. ชุมชนใหญ่จีน 3 คน ทำหนังสือจีนพร้อมด้วยรูปภาพข้อความไปยังจังหวัดท่าวัง จ.BERSANG เพื่อเรียกปวงร.ร.โรงเรียนในลักษณะเกี่ยวกับการสมัครจีน (The Provincial Police Division accused three Chinese from Sunwen School of making and distributing Chinese books and pictures of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen to Chinese shops to gather money to support ‘Guomin’ doctrine). Document dated 14/04/1928 to 21/04/1928.
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MOE 54.5/20 เรื่องธรรมการณ์แผนบริหารโรงเรียน หรือเรื่องครู ร.ส.อนุบาลจะต้องมีความรู้ภาษาไทยตามลักษณะครูน้อย ร.ส. (Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat Education officer asked for an advice of elementary school teachers should have a command of Thai language based on the Private Schools Act). Document dated 24 November-5 December 1928.

MOE 54.5/24 เรื่อง เปลี่ยนแปลงผู้จัดการและครูร. มาตรศาสตร์ (Asking to change the managers and teachers of the schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat). Document dated 1930-1932.

MOE 54.1/1474 เรื่องร.ต่าง ๆ ยกเลิกแผนรายชื่อผู้สอบความรู้และความเห็นเกี่ยวกับกำหนดการเรียนรู้และเรียนรู้ (The Schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat asked for permission to close their schools). Document dated 1928.

MOE 54.5/31 เรื่องการขออนุญาตให้นายอุทัย แซ่เลาเป็นครูน้อยร.เต็งอ้าย (The Ministry of Education allowed Mr. Luwifa Saelu to be Chinese teacher at Tueanghua School). Document dated 27 May-25 July 1929.

MOE 54.5/19 โรงเรียนต่าง ๆ ยกเลิกแผนรายชื่อผู้จัดการ ครูหนึ่งของโรงเรียนในนครศรีธรรมราช อนุมัติการย้ายแผนรายชื่อผู้จัดการครูน้อย (Schools in Monthon Nakhon Si Thammarat asked for permission to give authorisation to only one manager to represent their schools). Document dated 25 April-18 October 1928.

MOE 54.1/1464 ส่งรายงานของผู้จัดการโรงเรียนเด็กชายและผู้จัดการโรงเรียนเด็กหญิงของโรงเรียนต่าง ๆ จบการสอน (The manager of Tiang Thon O’iao School asked for permission to temporarily close his school for two months). Document dated 1930.

MOE 54.1/1449 หนังสือพิมพ์พลังข่าวเรื่อง ร.ร.ซ้ายเป็นคอมมิวนิสต์ 2472 (A newspaper published an article accusing Jisai School of being Communists in 1929). Document dated 1929.
MOE 54.1/1450 เรื่อง โรงเรียนเฉียงใต้ถูกจับฐานคอมมิวนิสต์ (Iangchai School was accused of being Communists). Document dated 8/02/1929 to 18/02/1929.

MOE 54.1/1478 เรื่อง จับครูโรงเรียนอีก หาว่ากระทำการแกล้งปล้นคอมมิวนิสต์ (Mikang School’s teachers were arrested of being Communists). Document dated 29/07/1930 to 26/09/1930.

MOE 54.8/2 มอบหมาย สุริยาสุขส่งจดความถึง ร.ร. ยกเหยียบชนิด ร.ร.ราษฎร์ ต่างมุ่งพินิต อำเภอท่าชาย จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (Asking for permission to establish Yok Hian School at Phunphin, Thakham, Surat Thani). Document dated 7/05/1931 to 10/01/1931.

MOE 52.5/82 เป็นการรายงานถึงกรณี ขอให้ช่วยสอบความเป็นไปของสมาคมฯ เรียนไทยในประเทศจีน (The Secretary of the Prime Minister wanted to investigate the association of Thai students in China). Document dated 1936.

MOE 54.5/61 เรื่อง โรงเรียนเปิ่งยืน ขออนุญาตปิดโรงเรียนชั่วคราว (Pengbin School asked permission to temporarily close its school). Document dated 1932.

MOE 54.1/1615 เรื่อง ผู้จัดการโรงเรียนได้ทิ้งไว้ที่โรงเรียนสำหรับการแสดงละครและใช้เป็นห้องเรียนเพื่อ หาการเรียนและเก็บเงินบำรุงโรงเรียน (The manager of Daitong School would have the plays and student fairs for celebrations and to collect money to support the school).

MOE 54.11/71 เรื่องการจัดห้องเก็บของให้จราจร ร. customerId เป็นพื้นที่ของโรงเรียน (Phuket province asked for the reconsideration of the law applied to Chinese schools in the province because it was an important tool of provincial commerce).

MOE 54.11/63 เรื่องมอบหมายเก็บสองคำแนะนำการปฏิบัติตามพระราชบัญญัติ ร.ร. ราษฎร์มาให้จราจรเพื่อถือปฏิบัติต่อไป (Monthon Phuket sent the draft of suggestions on how to follow the Private School Act).


MOE 54.5/78 เรื่อง เปลี่ยนแปลงผู้จัดการโรงเรียนศิลป์ (Changing the manager of Kee-Mong School).
(2) MOE 1/219 ส่งสำนักหนังสือพิมพ์ข่าวสยาม ลงข่าวเรื่องการศึกษาให้ จ.ว.ต่างๆ (An article in “Siam” newspaper about education in many provinces).

(2) MOE 21/44 กระทรวงการต่างประเทศแจ้งเรื่องสถานเอกอัครราชทูตจีน ณ กรุงโตเกียว ขอให้แก้ไขร่างพระราชบัญญัติโรงเรียนประชานิยม (The Ministry of Foreign Affairs informed about the calling from Chinese Embassy at Tokio to amend the Private School Act). Document dated 1936.

(2) MOE 25/3473 สำนักนายทะเบียน สำนักงานการศึกษา (Allowing Soi Watthana who was given a suspension during the investigation to go back to his position). Document dated 1943.

(2) MOE 25/3461 ส่งสำนักค้ำแข็ง (Sending a copy of instruction). Document dated 1939.

(2) MOE 15/4 คำขั้นบันของกระทรวงการศึกษาเรื่องให้ใช้คำว่า “ประเทศไทย”แทนคำว่าประเทศไทย (The persuasion of the Ministry of Education to use the term “Thailand” instead of Siam). Document dated 1939.

(2) MOE 4/46 ระเบียบกระทรวงศึกษาธิการว่าด้วยการเคารพในขณะขั้วสาทิติไทยซึ่งสูงกว่าในสุราษฎร์ธานี (The rules of the Ministry of Education in 1939 regarding the salutation when the Thai national flag is raised). Document dated 1939.

(2) MOE 13/14 หลวงครุติพิศาล ข้าหลวงตรวจการแผนกธรรมการ รายงานตรวจราชการ ในจังหวัดชุมพรและจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (The report on a tour of inspection in Chumphon and Surat Thani by Luangkurunithiphisan). Document dated 15/08/1940 to 26/09/1940.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/2 เลขาธิการคณะรัฐมนตรีสั่งกรมการส่งเสริมการทำสวนครัวและเลี้ยงสัตว์ (The Secretary-General to the Cabinet established a committee to encourage people to do edible gardening and raise meat animals). Document dated 25/07/1939 to 22/01/1939.

(2) MOE 15.2.2/3 ขอความร่วมมือส่งเสริมให้ราชการหรือองค์การต่างๆช่วยปลูกพืชให้มีปริมาณเพิ่มขึ้น (Asking for a co-operation to encourage people and organisations to increase the amount of vegetable produce). Document dated 21/12/1941 to 28/12/1941.

(2) MOE 15.2.2/6 ขอความร่วมมือย้ายราชการทำสวนครัวและเลี้ยงสัตว์ (Asking for a co-operation from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat). Document dated 13/08/1943.

(2) MOE 15.2.2/9 ขอความร่วมมือให้ราชการทำสวนครัวและเลี้ยงสัตว์เพื่อเป็นตัวอย่างแก่ประชาชน (Asking for a co-operation from government officers to do edible gardening and raise animals for meat to set a good example for people). Document dated 27/05/1949 to 3/11/1949.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/26 ให้เจ้าหน้าที่ของกระทรวง Wähงกรมต่างๆ ร่วมมือในการขายค้าเดียว (Asking for the co-operation from government officers of each ministry to sell noodles). Document dated 12/11/1942.
(2) MOE 15.2.1/32 การขายก๋วยเตี๋ยว (Noodle selling). Document dated 14/10/1943 to 23/12/1943.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/28 ส่งระเบียบการประชุมและอบรมสั่งสอนราชการของกระทรวงมหาดไทย มาไห (Sending the meeting agenda of the Ministry of Interior on the people training). Document dated 3/06/1943 to 21/03/1944.

MOE 3.13/4 นายเด็กษวด ครูโรงเรียนสายบูรี ขอเปลี่ยนชื่อเป็นนายธาตว (Tekhuad, a teacher of Saiburi School asked for a permission to change his name to Huad). Document dated 1914.

MOE 3.13/2 นายแสง ครูโรงเรียนวัดบางพลีใหญ่ขอเปลี่ยนชื่อเป็นนายสำเนียง (Seng, a teacher of Bangpliyai Temple School asked for a permission to change his name to Samniang). Document dated 1914.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/1 ให้แนะนำข่าวราชการและสั่งการเปลี่ยนนามเป็นสำเนียงไทยเสียงทั่วกัน (The instructions to have government officers and employees change their names to Thai). Document dated 5/06/1939 to 19/06/1939.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/23 ให้เดือนข่าวราชการปฏิบัติตามประกาศสำนักนายกรัฐมนตรีเรื่องชื่อ บุคคล (Please warn government officers to follow the announcement of the Office of the Prime Minister about the name). Document dated 3/02/1942.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/13 ขอความร่วมมือให้ช่วยส่งเสริมการแต่งกายของสตรีไทย (Asking for a co-operation to promote the instructions for Thai women about the dress). Document dated 14/03/1941.

(2) MOE 15.2.1/20 ความสำคัญในการปรากฏวัฒนธรรมของชาติ (The importance of cherishing the national culture). Document dated 1941-1942.

(2) MOE 15.3/53 การอพยพพลเมืองเพื่อป้องกันภัยทางอากาศ (The evacuation of people for the air raid relief). Document dated 16/10/1943.

(2) MOE 26/584 ขอคำร้องจ้านเกี่ยวกับการศึกษา จะจัดตั้งสมาคมจ้านขึ้นในประเทศไทย (A plan about Chinese education of the Chinese government and a plan to establish Chinese education association in Siam). Document dated 18 May to 24 September 1946.

Microfilms

ม. 18/8 พاลจีนได้ประชุมทำก้าร/powerful Chinese leaders and ดาแรงทำประประว贫困村 (The Chinese paid tribute to Sun Yat-sen and they were prohibited by the police). Document dated 13/06/1929.


ม.ร.6 น. 20.19/94, คำเสนอทางนานาชาติที่ยุติสงครามเก็บข้อสั่งเริ่มจิบบ คัดปฏิสินคำสั่ง (The conversation between Seow Hood-seng and a Japanese on Chinese boycott of Japanese merchandise).

ม.ร.7 น.17 เริ่มจีนคัดปฏิสินคำสั่งและหยุดงาน และให้คนไทยทำงานแทน (The Chinese boycott of the Japanese merchandise, Chinese strike and having Thai people take their jobs.) Document dated 19/05/1928 to 5/12/1928.

The Ministry of Interior

MOI 20.18/47 ตรุสปีใหม่ (Chinese New Year). Document dated 23/11/1915 to 8/05/1917.

MOI 2.2.5/849 โรงมหรสพในตลาดอ่าเภอบ้านดอน จังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานี (The cinema in Bandon’s market, Surat Thani). Document dated 1936.

MOI 2.2.5/856 เรื่องค่อนข้างรื่องจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานีขอให้แต่งการใช้คำการเรื่องร้ายร้ายศรีการข่าวหมายอนาคตทรัพย์สินที่ถูกพลิกใหม่ทีมจีนสั่งทำอัตราวิหารกับญี่ปุ่นกับภัยสงครามที่ไทย (Surat Thani provincial committee asked for an exception to for the royal insignia of Mr. Sai Phramnanun which was burn together with the city hall during the fight with the Japanese troops and asked for a substitution). Document dated 12/01/1942.

MOI 2.1/24 ข้าหลวงลงลายประกาศราษฎร์เพื่อระงับการตื่นเต้นจากภัยสงคราม (The provincial governor of Songkhla called the meeting with people to make them calm from the peril of war). Document dated 1942.

MOI 2.2.3/156 เรื่องข้าหลวงประจำจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานีรายงานเรื่องนายก丞รูณตรีไปตรวจราชการที่จังหวัด (The governor reported about the inspection of the Prime Minister in Surat Thani). Document dated 26/05/1940.

MOI 2.2.3/155 เรื่องข้าหลวงประจำจังหวัดสุราษฎร์ธานีรายงานเหตุผลเพื่อขอลบล้างการค้าภัยผอ. นายเลิม ลีฮะหุต หัวหน้าแผนกเม็ดเล็ก กองกลาง ป. เนื่องคร้งเป็นนายอำเภอ บ้านดอน (Surat Thani’s governor sent a report to remove the punishment of Mr. Liang Leelahut when he was the district officer of Bandon). Document dated 8/10/1936.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs

(2) MFA 7.1/1 การเบิกทิศ incorrect (The deportation of the Chinese to Guangdong). Document dated 17/07/1939-30/08/1939.

(2) MFA 7.1/4 การออกบัตรให้คนไทยพยพลออกจากประเทศไทย (The prohibition on the evacuation of Thai people from Thailand). Document dated 1941.

(2) MFA 7.1/64 สำนักงานคณะกรมการตามพ.ร.บ. อาชญากรรมสงครามให้คดีผู้ใดถึงคำสั่งจำหน่ายตามบัญญัติ และหลักเกณฑ์บางประการเพื่อประกอบการคดีอาญามาตรฐานในรัฐบาลทหาร ที่ให้คำสั่งของคณะกรรมการทหาร (The Committee appointed by virtue of the War Crime Act requested the statements of Mr. Teiji Tsubokami and Rear-Admiral Naomasa Sakonju to be used as evidence in the War Crime action which had been brought against Field-Marshall Phibun Songkhram), memorandum of an interrogation of Mr. Tsubokami, dated 2/05/1946.

(2) MFA 7.1/9/11 เรื่องสลับผู้แทนทางทหารไทยยิ่งเมื่อชี้แจงคดี (Sending the list of foreigners who hoisted the national flag when the Thai army occupied Kengtung). Document dated 1942.

(2) MFA 7.1/9/15 เรื่องแจ้งผลการประชุมคณะกรมการต่างประเทศประจำกระทรวงกลาโหม 28 พ.ค. 2486 (The meeting report of the foreign affairs committee from the Ministry of Defence on 28 May 1943).

(2) MFA 7.1/1/2 การแลกเปลี่ยนผู้แทนทางทหารระหว่างรัฐบาลไทยกับรัฐบาลนานกิง (The exchange of the diplomatic representatives between the Thai and Nanjing governments). Document dated 11/07/1942 to 15/01/1944.

(2) MFA 7.1/49 การร่วมมือกับญี่ปุ่นในการจัดการอานุรักษ์ (The co-operation with Japan in the spreading of propaganda). Document dated 16/12/1943 to 17/02/1944.

(2) MFA 7.1.9/42 คลิปภาพกรรมาธิการด้านชีวมวล อีกค่าราชการรับผู้ติดภูมิ (Murder of Tan Siewmeng, a former Chinese government officer who flavoured Japan). Document dated 1946.

(2) MFA 7.1/63 การกักคุมประชาชนในประเทศไทยและการแจ้งให้สถานเอกอัครราชทูตในกรุงเทพฯ หยุดปฎิบัติหน้าที่ (Internment of Japanese civilians in Thailand and Notification that the Embassy of Japan in Bangkok had been requested to cease functioning). Document dated 13/09/1945 to 20/10/1945.

(2) MFA 7.1.9/33 เรื่องกรณีปะทะกันด้วยกำลังอาวุธปืนระหว่างคณะจีนหนุ่มกับต่าราวจีนที่นครปฐม (A clash between a group of Chinese men and Thai police who both used firearms). Document dated 1946.

The Secretariat of the Cabinet

(2) SOC 0201.24.2/1 เรื่องเทียบหลักสูตรและอัตราเวลาเรียนประถมศึกษาให้แก่โรงเรียนราชภัฏ (Curriculum matching up and the number of units or hours required in primary school lectures for each course to private schools, Rene Perros). Document 1934.

(2) SOC 0201.77/2 เบ็ดเตล็ด (หลายเรื่อง) เกี่ยวกับจีนในประเทศไทย (Miscellaneous stories about the Chinese in Thailand).

(2) SOC 0201.46.3/31 เรื่องพระราชทานเครื่องราชอิสสระแก่ราชการและพ่อค้าประชาชนผู้มีความชอบต่างๆ (Giving insignias to government officers, merchants and people who benefitted the country). Document 1946.

(2) SOC 0201.98/12 รายงานคณะผู้แทนรัฐบาลไปเยี่ยมราชการและประชาราษฎรใต้ลูกค้า (The report of the government representatives on the visit of government officers and people in the Southern in case of an emergency). Document dated 19/12/1941 to 25/03/1942.

(2) SOC 0201.82.2/3 คนในบังคับเจ้าของแปลงปลัดเป็นคนในบังคับไทย (Chinese subjects asked for permission to change their nationality to Thai). Document dated 19/03/1939 to 4/11/1941.

SOC 0201.4/31 เพลิงไหม้โรงเรียนพระธรรมรักทิพย์ (The conflagrations in Surat Thani). Document dated 1932 to 1953.
The Supreme Command Headquarters
SCH 2.6.9/2 การรับแลกเงินบัตรคลองในอารยธรรมญี่ปุ่นที่ใช้กันในจังหวัดภาคใต้ประเทศไทย (Offering the Japanese military dollars circulated in the southern provinces). Document dated 27/12/1941 to 3/12/1942.

SCH 2.7.4/25 สห.ญี่ปุ่นในภาคใต้และจันทิ่งในจ.พระนครและต่างจังหวัดซึ่งสงสัยเป็นปฏิบัติการญี่ปุ่นโดยพลURAL (The Japanese military police arbitrarily captured both Thai and Chinese people in Bangkok and other provinces that were suspected of operating against the Japanese). Document dated 14/10/1943 to 16/11/1943.

Photographs
NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 กองทัพไทยญี่ปุ่นที่รุกใส่อังกฤษเคลื่อนที่ สันดิษฐาเข้าไทยกอล์ก จะถล่มล่า ชูธงชาติไทยเพื่อชาติ (The Thai and Japanese armies, which would drive out the British for peace in Asia, were impending. Thai people! Attack (the British) for the nation!).

NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 กองทัพญี่ปุ่นที่จะขยับไทยมาถล่มล่า ญี่ปุ่นไทยร่วมกันล่าสู่ อังกฤษ ต้าคืนแผนที่เสียไปกลับศักดิ์เกียรติ (The Japanese troops who want to help Thailand have just arrived. Let Japan and Thailand collaborate to fight against England to get the lost territories back.)

NAT, (2) SOC 0201.98/12 บันทึกล้อตแคร์ทาร์พืนญี่ปุ่นที่ใช้กันในภาคใต้ (A Japanese military note used by the Japanese soldiers in Southern Thailand).

NAT 59M0054 พระราชที่ 5 เสด็จประพาสนครศรีธรรมราช (King Chulalongkorn visited Nakhon Si Thammarat).

กล. 002 พวก 25/22 NAT-P008446 สะพานเศรษฐีภูษี (A bridge at Surat Thani).

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