Germany's ‘War on Terror’
Exploring Frames and Imaginations in Practical and Popular Geopolitics

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FOR THE DEGREE OF PHD
Declaration of Authorship

I, Leonhardt van Efferink, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis.

Date: 

Signature:

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- The quote on the cover page is from Christine Buchholz, MP for *Die Linke* (taken from the minutes of the *Der Bundestag* debate on 20 February 2014)
Abstract

The thesis explores the geopolitical imaginations of Afghanistan within major political parties in Germany and the influential news magazine Der Spiegel. It seeks to identify assumptions regarding the territory, identity, sovereignty and security of Afghanistan and Germany in parliamentary speeches of five political parties and on magazine covers.

Germany was the third-largest contributor to the multilateral military mission in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2014. Thousands of German troops and police officers were stationed in this state as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). The German participation in ISAF was unprecedented and resulted in nearly 60 deaths among German soldiers. Popular and practical geopolitics in Germany were divided about the state’s role in the ‘War on Terror’, reflecting a historically complicated relationship to war and violence.

To study aforementioned assumptions, the thesis develops a framework that analyses the forms, variability and changing nature of geopolitical imaginations. The framework takes a mixed methods approach and draws on earlier work in critical geopolitics, political geography, International Relations and media studies. It enables the identification, interpretation and analysis of geopolitical frames in textual and textual-visual representations. The framework raises awareness of the role of knowledge and assumptions in scholarly interpretations of geopolitical representations. This adds to methodological rigour and analytical transparency. Such transparency further opens new opportunities for a better structured dialogue about meaning-making processes that involve space and power.

The study of parliamentary speeches and Der Spiegel covers contributes to academic debates on German’s foreign policy. Moreover, the analysis of how German political parties and the printed press made sense of the ‘War on Terror’ generates a deeper understanding of the critical geopolitics of Afghanistan. By way of conclusion, the thesis offers methodological and empirical contributions to the manner in which scholars engage with representations of states and Germany in particular.
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<tbody>
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<td>AAG</td>
<td>American Association of Geographers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACT</td>
<td>Allied Command Transformation (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AfD</td>
<td>Alternative für Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>AP</td>
<td>Associated Press</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARD</td>
<td>Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland</td>
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<tr>
<td>AWACS</td>
<td>Airborne Warning And Control System</td>
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<tr>
<td>BTC</td>
<td>Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>Christlich-Soziale Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCDC</td>
<td>Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>Freie Demokratische Partei</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAZ</td>
<td>Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDR</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic (East Germany)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ SACT</td>
<td>Headquarters Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>International Relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFOR</td>
<td>Implementation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>KSK</td>
<td>Kommando Spezial Kräfte</td>
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<td>MoD</td>
<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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List of Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Member of Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTRT</td>
<td>More Than Representational Theory</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRT</td>
<td>Non-Representational Theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEF</td>
<td>Operation Enduring Freedom</td>
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<tr>
<td>PDS</td>
<td>Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAF</td>
<td>Rote Armee Faktion</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFL</td>
<td>Systemic Functional Linguistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SED</td>
<td>Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilisation Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands</td>
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<tr>
<td>SZ</td>
<td>Süddeutsche Zeitung</td>
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<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>WASG</td>
<td>Wahlalternative Arbeit und Soziale Gerechtigkeit</td>
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<tr>
<td>WDR</td>
<td>West Deutscher Rundfunk</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>World Trade Organization</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>Second World War</td>
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Acknowledgements

"Time is an ocean but it ends at the shore. You may not see me tomorrow." - Bob Dylan

In our last chat before submission, my main supervisor Klaus Dodds said that doing a PhD is like being on a journey. During my journey, I had many nice people around.

To start, I would like to thank my mother Liesbeth for all her love and patience that contributed enormously to who I am today. Although she would have loved to talk about my progress and setbacks during my PhD project, she could not. Over the past seven years, she first forgot the name of the kind of research I was doing (i.e. PhD), then that I was actually doing any research and eventually who I was. But we managed to stay close. In terms of this PhD, dementia made her lose her sense of actorness, time and place. It further made my mother lose her knowledge of grammar, words and connotations. However, she didn’t lose her ability to speak. As a result, she now speaks with little coherence, often using neologisms of which we will never hear again.

People with dementia are often framed as being non-normal by those who still possess their cognitive capabilities. My father Hans van Efferink however keeps framing my mother as a "normal" human being, both in his representations of her and the practices that are involved in nursing her. In fact, he confirmed the late Foucault’s claim that resistance against dominant discourses is possible. Moreover, he helped me overcome many hurdles.

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1 Talking about meaning potential, ‘late’ has at least two possible meanings here.
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Every journey teaches you things. What I learned from 11 years in banking, one year in government and eight years in academia is that life is not about having money, having power or having knowledge. Life is about having people around. Nice people.

Leonhardt van Efferink, March 2019

Thesis is dedicated to Johannes and Joanna for helping me face the highest hurdle.
1 Introduction

1.1 Unprecedented Role of Textual-Visual Frames

"People go to war because of how they see, perceive, picture, imagine and speak of others: that is, how they construct the difference of others as well as the similarities of themselves through representation." (Derek Gregory, 2004, p. 20)

Not so long ago, we lived in a world where the identities, roles and characteristics that were used to describe states were quite stable. For example, many people saw each state as a part of either the First, Second or Third World. Nowadays, the ways in which states are described (framed) by presidents, media and experts has become much more diverse. Words and images in both traditional media (such as news magazines and television) and on social media (such as Facebook and Twitter) play a large role in how identities, roles and characteristics of states are framed. In fact, textual and visual representations have always played a central role in how human beings have made sense of their lives (Barthes, 1977a; Mitchell, 1987; Rose, 2016). The importance of these representations in the (re)construction of geopolitical realities has been studied by many critical geopolitical works in the 1990s and 2000s (Sharp, 1993; Ó Tuathail 1996; Dodds, 2008a). After that, we can observe a paradox. On the one hand, critical geopolitics has increasingly studied other factors that are important in the interaction between spaces and power, such as affect (Ó Tuathail, 2003; Müller, 2015a), assemblages (Bingham, 2009; Dittmer, 2013b) and materiality (Anderson and Harrison, 2010; Müller, 2015b). Representations as such account for a small part of the research output of this sub-discipline (Agnew, 2012; Mamadouh, 2012; Jones, 2014b; Ide, 2016). On the other hand, as noted, internet and social media have facilitated an abundance of textual and visual representations spread across the world. As a result, people are continually bombarded with textual and visual frames about their own state and other states. The social construction of reality has taken an unprecedented form and size in this global framing contest. Simultaneously, there is a growing uncertainty regarding national identities and international relations. Yet, with so much to negotiate, we lack an easily accessible and understandable tool to explore how geopolitical meaning can be attributed in different contexts to representations where texts and images interact. Accordingly, this PhD thesis starts with the premise that this is the right moment to bring representations back to the centre stage in critical geopolitics. Its key contribution concerns the development of a meticulous framework to study textual(-
visual) representations of timely foreign policy issues. The framework helps generate more insights into how texts and images reflect and affect geopolitical imaginations concerning the state(s) of our world. In this thesis, it is applied to critically examine geopolitical frames in Germany's 'War On Terror.'

1.2 Unprecedented Challenges to Germany's Foreign Policy

„Werteorientierung, wie sie gern von uns Deutschen für unsere Außenpolitik in Anspruch genommen wird, wird allein jedenfalls nicht ausreichen, um sich in dieser von wirtschaftlichen, politischen und militärischen Egoismen geprägten Welt zu behaupten.“ (Sigmar Gabriel, Minister of Foreign Affairs, December 2017; Bundesregierung, 2017)

„An orientation towards values, as we Germans like to take in our foreign policy, is not adequate anymore for Germany to maintain its position in this world that is being shaped by economic, political and military forms of egoism.“ (translation by author)

In 2018, the foreign policy of Germany is subject to a heated debate. For example, Omid Nouripour (2018), MP for the Greens, and journalist Stefan Braun (2018) advise the new government to pay more attention to Germany's international role. Moreover, Bittner et al (2018) call for a strategic dialogue on foreign policy including the capacity to intervene abroad in Die Zeit. A final example here concerns Herzinger (2018), who argues in Die Welt that Germany needs to develop a mature foreign policy. The debate might seem remarkable in a state where foreign policy has been committed to the same objectives for decades (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017). These objectives include European integration, transatlantic partnership, rule-based world order, support of human rights and democracy, commitment to an equitable globalisation and engagement for security and peace.

The debate is better understandable in light of various external and internal challenges to Germany's foreign policy. A key external challenge to Germany's foreign policy include the difficulties with several other member states of the European Union (Von Marschall, 2018). For example, Germany is at odds with France about security and the euro-related issues and with Poland about Russia and political freedoms. Furthermore, the peak in the number of arriving refugees in the EU in 2015 raised tensions between Germany and some other EU members (Chase, 2018). A key question was the national responsibility of each state towards the refugees. Furthermore, the recent eurozone crisis and the increased popularity of political parties with a right-wing
signature in various EU-states raised once more difficult questions of Germany’s power (Klinke, 2018).

Another external challenge is Germany’s worsened relationship with the United States (Von Marschall, 2018). Germany continues to be dependent on the United States for its security (Casdorff, 2018). In addition, the United States remains Germany’s largest export market. Controversial issues between both states include NATO, international trade and energy. The new tensions are rooted in the election of Donald Trump as American president, which has changed the German debate on foreign policy (Kluth, 2018). One of the themes that has been recently added is whether Germany should develop its own nuclear weapons. Moreover, the (then) Minister of Foreign Affairs Sigmar Gabriel argued in December 2017 that Germany should clearly set limits to its solidarity with the United States (Bundesregierung, 2017). Germany should in his view stop taking a ‘wait and see’ position towards foreign US policy changes.

A third challenge that the external environment poses to Germany’s foreign policy is related to the previous two and concerns the weakening coherence of the “West” and the breaking down of the liberal international order (Von Marschall, 2018).

A strong domestic challenge to Germany’s foreign policy concerns a recent change in the political landscape. In September 2017, the Alternative für Deutschland was elected to the Germany’s national parliament for the first time (DW, 2018). It is a right-wing populist party that is critical of Germany’s policies towards the European Union and immigration. Its rise can partially be explained by the unprecedented inflow of nearly 900,000 registered refugees into Germany in 2015 (Chase, 2018). The election of a party such as AfD into the national parliament was unprecedented after WWII. This is because its discursive othering of particular groups in the population had long been a taboo after WWII. During the Nazi government of Germany in the 1930s and 1940s, such processes eventually resulted in the genocide of millions of Jews (Fulbrook, 1999). AfD is openly critical of Islam, and is further believed to have anti-Semitic tendencies (Schult and Medick, 2018). In terms of foreign policy preferences, AfD (the most right-wing party in parliament) has several similarities with Die Linke (the most left-wing party) (Meier-Walser, 2016). Both political parties are critical of Germany’s deep integration in the European Union, eurozone and NATO. They further criticise the closeness of Germany with the United States and are in favour of closer relations with Russia.

A second domestic challenge to Germany’s foreign policy -with partially external roots- is the weak situation of the government finances (Miskimmon et al, 2010). The resource constraints are the result of the international financial crisis during the
previous decade, the subsequent crisis in the euro area and Germany’s limited economic growth.

Given the aforementioned challenges, it does not come as a surprise that many recent studies in Political Science, International Relations and Security Studies engage with Germany (e.g. Mader and Pötzschke, 2014; Hein, 2016; Koenig, 2018). This strong interest is undoubtedly related to a fundamental question about Germany that Garton Ash (1994, p. 70) posed 25 years ago: “What foreign policy will be made on these substantial but shifting foundations, and how will it be made?” Critical geopolitics, the disciplinary starting point of this thesis, has however not shared this strong interest². Most recent critical geopolitical studies of Germany focus on themes related to the Cold War. These included the German team that won the Football World Cup in 1954 (Coulter, 2011), Central European dissidents in the 1980s (Szulecki, 2015) and nuclear bunkers and nuclear war games in Germany (Klinke, 2015, 2016a). The few recent works in critical geopolitics about Germany’s foreign policy in the 21st century address its objectives and instruments (Bachmann, 2010), the construction of energy security and the ‘new Cold War’ in popular and practical geopolitics (Ciută and Klinke, 2010) and current geopolitical discourses in formal geopolitics (Klinke, 2018). This lack of attention among critical geopolitical scholars is unjustified. As this thesis shows, the debate on Germany’s foreign policy in and outside parliament (re)produces a rich variety of views on territory, identity, sovereignty and security, and their mutual interaction (Bialasiewicz, 2008; Dittrmer, 2010). Germany’s mission in Afghanistan during 2001-2014 is a case in point.

1.3 Unprecedented Scope of Germany’s ISAF Mission

² It is important to acknowledge that the boundaries of critical geopolitics have been increasingly blurred since its conception in the 1980s. In the words of Ciuta and Klinke (2010, p. 330), “one of the key strengths of critical geopolitics, the constant stretching of its analytical boundaries, may also become a liability: the absence of clear conceptual markers makes unsustainable the booming industry in appending new qualifiers to geopolitics, which has seen the emergence of, among others, feminist, radical, emotional, embodied, subaltern, actor-network, everyday, and bio-geopolitics.”
Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) ended nearly four years ago in 2014. It was the most expensive foreign military mission of post-WWII Germany in terms of government spending. The government spent nearly 9 billion euros on the military mission (Stanzel, 2016). On top of that, around 3 billion euros were spent on non-military assistance to Afghanistan. Moreover, ISAF was among the longest military missions of Germany (and NATO) ever (Seliger, 2014).

Germany’s military presence in Afghanistan did not stop with the end of ISAF. Germany has since been participating in the Resolute Support mission that seeks to train, advise and assist Afghan security forces (Bundeswehr, 2017b). Next to Afghanistan, the German army is also present in nine other territories and two maritime regions (Mediterranean Sea and Horn of Africa). As Resolute Support is likely to be continued in 2019, Afghanistan could become the stage of the second-longest presence abroad of the German army after WWII. It is further Germany’s largest current mission in terms of (wo)manpower, accounting for nearly one-third of the total number of German troops on foreign missions (Bundeswehr, 2018a). Afghanistan further has the highest share of all states in Germany’s development aid budget (Bauer, 2018a).

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3 Michael Schmidt is journalist of the German newspaper Der Tagesspiegel.

4 This accounts for just over half of total German government spending on the around 40 foreign military missions since 1993 (Bundeswehr, 2017a).

5 The territories are located in Africa (5: Libya, Mali, South Sudan, Sudan and Western Sahara), the Middle East (3: Iraq, Lebanon and Syria) and Europe (1: Kosovo). The number of German troops on two missions in Mali is close to troop number in Afghanistan (Bundeswehr, 2018a).

6 German troops have stayed in Kosovo for nearly 20 years, which is currently the longest foreign presence of the German army (KFOR), and stayed for nearly 17.5 years in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995-2012; Focus, 2018; Bundeswehr, 2014).

7 Around 8% of the German troops in Resolute Support are women (Bundeswehr, 2018a).
Four aspects of the ISAF mission remain subject to discussion. The first concerns the rationale behind Germany’s engagement with Afghanistan. This applies to engagement with other states as well (Philippi, 2001). Referring to Afghanistan, Stanzel (2016), a former diplomat, argues in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* that it is not clear yet whether the reasons for Germany’s military presence were right. Bauer (2018a), a journalist, however, strongly argues in *Die Zeit* that Afghanistan continues to pose a potential threat to Germany. In the most recent White Book, in which the German government offers its view on security policy and the German army, chancellor Merkel (2016) expresses Germany’s willingness to intervene quickly in other states to prevent the emergence or escalation of conflicts abroad. This position is however supported by only a quarter of the German population (Kirchhoff, 2018).

A second controversial aspect of the ISAF mission is the balance between military and non-military means. Germany’s security policy prioritises political solutions through diplomatic efforts (*Auswärtiges Amt*, 2017). Only if necessary, does Germany also apply military foreign policy instruments to achieve peace and security in other states. Accordingly, the subsequent German governments initially spoke of ISAF as stabilisation mission (Bauer 2018a; Stanzel, 2016). Government officials started to acknowledge that Germany was on a war mission in Afghanistan from 2010 onwards. This was due to the gradual rise in victims among the German troops that gradually changed perceptions of the mission. More generally, the appropriate level of military force abroad is a controversial issue in Germany (Philippi, 2001). Bauer (2018a) argues in this regard that Germany can only reduce the threats residing in Afghanistan by the use of offensive military violence.

A third issue that is still subject to discussion is what Germany has actually achieved in Afghanistan. More broadly speaking, this question touches upon the ability of Germany in general and the Germany army in particular to have the desired impact on other states (Philippi, 2001). Once more referring to Afghanistan, earlier mentioned former German diplomat Stanzel (2016) argues that it still needs to be established whether Germany achieved its objectives. The reason for his position is the ongoing Resolution Support mission. Earlier mentioned journalist Bauer (2018a) is nonetheless clearly negative in this regard with his claim that Germany should admit defeat in Afghanistan. He further speaks of failure and argues that the chaos in Afghanistan has further increased in recent years (Bauer, 2018b). In this regard, chancellor Merkel (2016) acknowledges that Germany’s capability to contribute to the end of conflicts abroad is constrained. Moreover, Mölling et al (2018) argue that the international ambitions of the Germany army exceed its capabilities. These capabilities are constrained by insufficient funding from government. This confirms the claim of Bauer (2018a) that the
current skills of the German army need to be raised in order to have the intended impact on Afghanistan.

A fourth controversial issue regarding ISAF concerns the victims of the mission. In fact, it was the most expensive German military mission in terms of human costs as well. (Bundeswehr, 2015) 55 German soldiers died in Afghanistan during the ISAF mission⁸. More broadly, it was the bloodiest NATO mission ever, taking the lives of nearly 3,500 soldiers from NATO states (Seliger, 2014). At least as important are the thousands of Afghan civilians who died as a consequence of armed conflict during ISAF (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016). Estimates of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) suggest that the annual number of Afghan civilians who got killed by conflict violence went up by more than 50% between 2009 and 2014 (UNAMA, 2018). In 2014, around 3,700 Afghan civilians lost their lives as a consequence of violence. In this regard, the role of Germans during WWII as perpetrators and/or victims is still a controversial issue in Germany (Niven, 2006). It still affects the ways in which current foreign operations of the German army are perceived (Philippi, 2001; Von Bredow, 2015). Bauer (2018a) for example argues that Germany could only have the desired impact on Afghanistan if the state becomes less sensitive regarding the possible deaths of German soldiers during military operations abroad.

In all, the geopolitical imaginations informing the German debate on ISAF have not lost their relevance after this Afghanistan mission ended. In fact, four questions are paramount in how Germany will look back at ISAF, and how it will decide on future military engagements abroad. First, why did Germany send troops to Afghanistan? Second, how much military force did Germany use in Afghanistan, and was that appropriate? Third, to what extent has Germany been able to change Afghanistan in the desired direction? Fourth, what have been the human costs of ISAF and who bears responsibility for them? The empirical part of this thesis examines how these questions were addressed in practical and popular geopolitics⁹. More specifically, which meanings were attributed to ISAF by parliamentary speeches and the textual-visual representations of Afghanistan on the Der Spiegel covers?

1.4 Research Opportunities

This thesis seeks to address three research opportunities that critical geopolitics offers.

⁸ To put this number in perspective, it equals slightly more than the total number of fallen soldiers during all other military operations of the German army after WWII (Bundeswehr, 2017a).

⁹ These four questions have been re-phrased as the research questions 1.1.1-1.1.4 of this thesis (section 1.5). They also form the basis of the four geopolitical frame categories (section 5.5).
1 Introduction

The first opportunity concerns the interaction between texts and images in meaning-making processes. Critical geopolitics encompasses a rich literature on both textual and visual representations, and how they can jointly produce meaning. It has however not yet embraced the explicit methods that have been developed in social semiotics to study text-image relations and their impact on potential meanings.

The second one is framing. This concept has found wide resonance in media and communication studies, but has been applied relatively little in the critical geopolitical literature. This is surprising since the frames offer valuable opportunities to make the study of geopolitical imaginations more transparent and rigorous.

The third opportunity concerns the geopolitical imaginations and frames in Germany. Despite its important political position in the European Union and its large economy, the state has so far been subject to rather few studies in critical geopolitics.

In all, this thesis seeks to advance critical geopolitics conceptually and methodologically, and produce knowledge about Germany’s ‘War on Terror’.

1.5 Research Questions

The thesis seizes these research opportunities by drawing on critical geopolitical literature, in combination with works from geography, IR, political science, media studies and social semiotics. It does so by critically examining textual(-visual) representations of Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The analysis seeks to answer these questions:

1 What is the role of geopolitical imaginations in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’?
   1.1 Which geopolitical frames do five political parties and news magazine *Der Spiegel* produce with their representations of Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) during 2001-2014?
      1.1.1 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to will of Germany to intervene Afghanistan?
      1.1.2 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to the militarisation of Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan?
      1.1.3 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to capacity of Germany to intervene in Afghanistan?
      1.1.4 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to the victims and perpetrators during Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan?
1.2 To what extent do geopolitical frames differ among political parties and *Der Spiegel*?

### 1.6 Structure of the Thesis

In chapter 2, the diminished importance of representation-based geopolitics on the critical geopolitical research agenda is critically examined. It starts with an overview of the influential works in the 1990s, when textual analysis was common in critical geopolitics. This is followed by a discussion of the concepts and approaches that jointly managed to end the representational hegemony within critical geopolitics, such as more than representational theories, materiality and media ecologies. The chapter concludes with the observations that representations as such still matter in geopolitics, and that a multimodal approach towards them would likely yield new insights.

Chapter 3 offers a critical evaluation of nine concepts that have been used by critical scholars in geography and geopolitics to study the ways in which the world is being continuously divided discursively, and their possible material consequences. The main conclusion is that frames have gained a much smaller prominence within critical geopolitics than in media and communication studies, although they have a potential to contribute to the critical geopolitical research agenda.

Chapter 4 argues that Germany forms an interesting stage for geopolitical framing analysis during the ‘War on Terror’. The first section explains the importance of studying geopolitical frames in different languages and the German one in particular. Then follow sections on Germany’s identities and the state’s foreign policy approaches. The final section discusses various frames in the American ‘War on Terror’.

The methodological chapter 5 draws heavily on the preceding three chapters. It develops an analytical framework to study geopolitical frames in both purely textual and textual-visual representations in a German context. The framework is based on methods to study frames from media/communication studies, a method to study text-image relations from social semiotics and the concepts discussed in previous chapter. The framework enables the scholar to reconstruct geopolitical frames from long texts and representations with both textual and visual elements. It also contributes to more transparency regarding the ways in which a scholar identifies geopolitical frames in textual(-visual) representations.

In chapter 6, the selection of the sources for the empirical studies is explained. First, the importance of practical geopolitics is discussed. Then follows a critical evaluation of political speeches as data source, and a brief introduction to the selected political
parties. The second half of the chapter opens with a discussion about why popular geopolitics matters. It is followed by a critical examination of the importance of magazines in the (re)production of frames. The last section then explains why the German news magazine Der Spiegel is a valuable data source.

In chapter 7, the selected speeches and statements by MPs from five political parties during seven parliamentary debates on ISAF take centre stage. It includes a description of the selection process of the 112 texts and a critical examination of the identified geopolitical frames in the debates between 2001 and 2014.

Chapter 8 then presents the findings of the second empirical study. It concerns an analysis of 20 Der Spiegel covers that referred to the military engagement of Germany with Afghanistan and Germany’s foreign military missions in general. This chapter also compares how the five political parties and Der Spiegel framed the German contribution to ISAF.

Chapter 9 provides the conclusion, in which the main findings, the key contributions and some limitations of the research are discussed. It closes with key recommendations for future research.

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10 Appendix 1 (chapter 11) offers an overview of the selected and excluded political speeches and written statements.

11 Appendix 2 (chapter 12) offers an overview of the selected magazine covers. This includes two tables for each cover to show how the interpretation process has taken place.
2 The Multimodal Turn in Representation-Based Geopolitics

2.1 Introduction

"[H]ow can claims be made as to the ‘construction of meaning’ or the ‘framing’ of a particular event or discourse based singularly upon the quantification of terms from a database that strips out the very organization and contextualization of these terms, namely layout, images, captions, whether these are in a print newspaper or online?" (Andrew Hoskins, 2013, p. 4).

This chapter re-engages with the geographically imperative debate in critical geopolitics on the politics and power of representations. Representational geopolitics was the main focus of scholars in this discipline in the late 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Dalby, 1990a; Sharp, 1993; Ó Tuathail, 1996). During the 2000s and 2010s, however critical geopolitical scholars increasingly turned their attention towards other aspects of space-power interaction, such as practices (e.g. Müller, 2008), affect (e.g. Carter and McCormack, 2006) and assemblages (e.g. Dittmer, 2014). In the spirit of Wallerstein’s claim “the crucial terrain of struggle may well turn out to be that of methodology” (1983, p. 306; cited by Taylor 1989, p. 334), this and the next chapter identify research opportunities for critical geopolitics: one methodological and one conceptual – both of which, it is suggested, present further opportunities for research innovation.

The first one concerns multimodality (Van Leeuwen, 2005; Kress, 2010; Carey et al, 2016). Critical geopolitical scholars have analysed various multimodal representations, such as films (e.g. Dodds, 2013), magazines (e.g. Sharp, 2000) and video games (e.g. Power, 2007). This research has so far not developed a rigorous framework to analyse the individual and joint contributions of the different elements in the form of text, image and other semiotic modes to meaning-making processes. In other words, critical geopolitics has not yet systematically engaged with the question of how elements from different semiotic modes (e.g. textual elements and visual elements) can jointly affect the potential meanings of a representation. This chapter critically examines the history of critical geopolitical engagement in which the interaction between different semiotic modes played a role. These works are contextualised by a thorough examination of the literature on both representational geopolitics and more recent interventions in non-representational theory (e.g. from Thrift 2000 onwards).
2.2 The Linguistic Turn

Critical geopolitics is a sub-discipline of human geography (Dodds et al, 2013). The first time its name appeared in an academic setting was in 1984 in an article review letter by Peter Taylor after Gerard Toal published his earliest piece in Political Geography Quarterly in 1986 (Toal/Ó Tuathail, 1986, 2013). The adjective in the name of the sub-discipline reflects the strong influence of French philosopher Michel Foucault. He saw "a critique" as a process of "pointing out on what assumptions, what kind of familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes of thought the practices that we accept rest" (Foucault 1988, cited by Campbell, 1998, p. 191). Moreover, his stress on the importance of the power-knowledge nexus has taken form in the assumption widely held among critical geopolitical scholars that the knowledge of a particular space is strongly linked to the power relations in that space (Müller, 2010). Initially, the sub-discipline was seen as “a project to challenge and expose dominant power-knowledge structures underlying classical geopolitical reasoning” (Jones, 2014a, p. 626).

Representations were the most important research objects in critical geopolitics in the 1990s (Müller, 2015a). This focus was the result of the linguistic turn that took place in human geography (Burgess, 2005). This turn drew on among others the works of poststructuralist philosophers such as Jacques Derrida (1978/1967), criticizing the assumption that language can convey universal meanings, and Richard Rorty (1979), criticizing the assumption that the world can be objectively represented with language. Postmodern philosophers such as Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984), who rejected the assumption that language enables the conveying of fixed meanings to all people in a society in the form of metanarratives, were influential in this regard as well. As a result, "all inquiry…[had] to be concerned with the social constitution of meaning, the linguistic construction of reality and the historicity of knowledge" (Campbell, 2007, pp. 209-210). After the linguistic turn, cultural geography focused on “a human subject who relates to the world by representing aspects of the world through an act of interpretation” (Anderson, 2009, p. 503). Accordingly, qualitative methods to interpret written language and other representational modes were often applied. Geography was widely considered as a literary form of ‘earthly-writing’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The importance of written texts in early critical geopolitical works is underlined by the fact that in the 1980s they formed the research objects of the doctoral theses of both pioneers of critical

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12 In this sentence, the thesis follows the classification of philosophers by Peet (1998, p. 208) who argues that "poststructural philosophy criticizes the certainties of modern knowledge, as with its claims to coherence, neutrality and truth, while postmodern philosophy carries this further into an alternative discourse based on oppositional modes of understanding.”
2 The Multimodal Turn in Representation-Based Geopolitics

geopolitics, Simon Dalby and Gerard Toal. Their theses interrogated US representations of the Soviet Union during the Cold War period.

Representations were assumed to contribute to the construction of boundaries between the imagined self and the others. It was assumed that the construction of spatial and human identities occurred simultaneously (Scott, 2011). This was based on Edward Said’s seminal book "Orientalism" (2003, first published in 1978). Said (2003/1978) assumed that the constructed difference between a "familiar us" and "strange them" does not only apply to the two constructed spaces, but also to the identity of the people that live there. Drawing on this, human geographers widely assume that places and people mutually constitute each other (e.g. Sack, 1997). In terms of critical geopolitics, "expressions of geographical difference contribute to a politics of identity formation" (Dodds, 2005, p. 32). Referring to conflict situations, Dalby (1988) adds that the division, contestation and controlling of territories results in the widespread idea that citizens of one particular territory are a ‘homogeneous self’, while citizens outside that territory are seen as ‘others’ and ‘enemies’. This ‘geopolitical othering’ seeks to create a dualism in which a representation of one state means that the opposite is true for the other state (Dalby, 1990a).

An influential perspective in critical geopolitics is from Ó Tuathail (2006a, p. 1) who sees geopolitics as “discourse about world politics.” More specifically, geopolitics refers to "a discourse about the division and control of global political space" (Agnew and Corbridge, 1989, p. 267). Geopolitical discourses can refer to places, people and power and give meaning to the social relations within and between places (Müller, 2013). They further construct places and differences between them (Dalby, 1990b). In fact, discourses contribute to inequality on a national and global level by marginalizing particular groups and states. Therefore, the early critical geopolitical scholars sought to question dominant discourses that are used by powerful actors and states to justify political practices and legitimate exclusion and violence (e.g. Dalby 1990b, Dodds et al, 2013). Despite the popularity of the concept in critical geopolitical studies, Müller (2008, p. 323) rightfully claims that “[t]here is a tendency for discourse to become a catch-all term” and points at “a high degree of arbitrariness in the application of the concept to empirical material.”

One conceptual tension within critical geopolitics is exemplified by the observation that a Foucauldian angle could result in two different, yet closely related conceptualisations of discourse. The first one refers to the rules that a group or society use to give meaning to its existence in the form of spoken words, written texts and activities (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). What complicates the analysis of discourses as rules is
however that they exist only in latent form, and discourses can only be observed when they manifest themselves in representations or practices. The second angle refers to actual manifestation of rules and defines discourses as "a specific series of representations and practises through which meanings are produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical outcomes made more or less possible" (Campbell, 2007, p. 216). One alternative approach that locates discourses between the (latent) rules and the (manifest) representations comes from Gerard Toal (2000, p. 126), who defines discourses as "rhetorical strategies and representational techniques". Another alternative conceptualisation of discourses takes into account both rules and their manifestation. Dalby (1988, p. 416) for example argues that "discourses are much more than linguistic performances; they are also plays of power which mobilize rules, codes and procedures to assert a particular understanding, through the construction of knowledge." This is also the approach that Agnew and Corbridge (1995) take for geopolitical discourses, referring to both rules and concepts that are used to construct a world of places, people and conflicts. More abstractly, a discourse can be seen as "a theory about how the world works" (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995, p. 47).

In line with the aforementioned ‘linguistic turn’, the focus on discourse initially resulted in a strong interest in texts (e.g. Dalby, 1988; Sharp, 1993; Robison, 2004; Hammett, 2011). Written texts were assumed to be key (re)producers of geopolitical discourses. Drawing on Foucault (2000), many studies assume that truth does not exist independently from power, and is powerful itself (Müller, 2013). More concrete, “[e]ach society has its regime of truth”, which refers to the “circular relation [between the truth and] systems of power that produce and sustain it” (Foucault, 2000, pp. 131-132). Knowledge is both a cause and effect of power in such a regime, and every society is involved in a truth battle. Truth is not seen as knowledge that is available to be discovered and accepted by a society, but as a set of rules that draw a line between what is true and what is false. The regime of truth further refers to mechanisms for
recognizing what is true and false, ways to respond to true and false statements and the procedures to produce knowledge. It also includes and excludes particular groups from knowledge production. Academic disciplines can also be considered as such a regime, as exemplified by Ó Tuathail (1996, p. 82): “In the nineteenth century, geography was a regime of truth spoken by privileged white European men who conceived of themselves as heroic explorers of a feminized nature.”

Many early critical geopolitical works (e.g. Dalby 1988, 1990a; Sharp 1993) assume that words have deferred meanings, drawing on Derrida and his writings on logocentrism (1978/1967). A meaning of a representation is in his view never final, always work in progress, changing from context to context and moment to moment. A meaning of a representation can only be stable at one particular moment among one group of people. Based on this assumption, Derrida (1976/1967) developed deconstructionism, a strategy that sought to reverse the order of preference regarding two categories of a dualism in a representation. This has been a key approach towards the analysis of texts in early critical works (Müller 2013). The approach that initially becomes dominant is largely initiated by Ó Tuathail (e.g. 1996) and Dalby (e.g. 1990a) and builds on postmodern and critical interpretations of international relations theory (e.g. Walker, 1993). The idea behind this approach is that the scholar first identifies which words or phrases in a text can be considered part of a binary axis (e.g. 'bad' as part of a moral axis) (Müller, 2013). This step seeks to show that reality can have different meanings (e.g. it could be 'good' as well). Moreover, it makes clear that all texts contain absences and that the meaning of a particular element is never fixed (e.g. US foreign policy could be 'bad' and 'good'). Subsequently, the scholar who uses the deconstructionist approach then argues that the represented actor, trend or object can have an opposite meaning as well. The objective of such an exercise is to stress that all assumptions related to power, spaces and identities can be challenged and question ‘common sense’ knowledge. As Müller (2013, p. 53) notes, drawing on Derrida, “deconstruction can only take place through reapplying the very form of meaning construction that is deconstructed.” Consequently, early critical geopolitical works produced meanings that are no more true or valid than those of the texts the scholars deconstruct.

Later critical geopolitical works expanded their focus to visual representations as well (e.g. Campbell, 2007; Hughes, 2007 Dodds, 2008b). As Sharp (2009, p. 7) rightfully argues, “we cannot only look to written sources but must also closely examine images” to understand how people develop an understanding of a particular area. Hughes (2007) adds that images play a central role in how politicians, diplomats and voters come to know the world. Campbell (2007, p. 220) adds that “[v]isual imaginary is of particular importance for international politics because it is one of the principal ways in
which news from distant places is brought home." Images that have become intrinsically linked to particular events, spaces or periods exemplify the importance of representations in particular settings. Such "iconic images can work to normalise and neutralise geopolitical violence" (Hughes, 2007, pp. 984-5). Visual representations are also valuable research objects in critical geopolitics since they may generate more attention to marginalised people and spaces (Hughes 2007). As with texts, a key question is whether photos published by media challenge or reproduce the geographical knowledge of elites.

### 2.3 The Non-Representational Turn

Today, practices have become one of the central research objects in critical geopolitics. Simon Dalby (1988) demonstrated awareness of this change three decades earlier. He noted that not only geopolitical reasoning, but also practices and social positions (re)produce particular ways of understanding the world. However, critical geopolitical research in the 1990s left practices largely out of their analyses (explicitly as least). This changed in the next decade, following Nigel Thrift’s call for a "discourse understood in a broader way, and one which is less taken in by representation and more attuned to actual practices" (in Dodds and Atkinson 2000, p. 385). In fact, he hoped that his observation would result in a new research agenda for critical geopolitics. This seems like an odd remark by a non-political geographer at the end of a book of nearly 400-pages that was not even explicitly about critical geopolitics (though many of its scholars had contributed to it). Nonetheless, his call has since had a strong impact on critical geopolitical research. The change in focus from representations to practices was also clear at the 2001 AAG meeting in New York: "there had been a significant shift in presentations from those primarily concerned with the critical analysis of texts and representations to those much more clearly focused on research `on the ground" (Dowler and Sharp, 2001, p. 167). Twenty years after Dalby’s related observation, the call by Müller (2008) to take practices at least as seriously as geopolitical reasoning in the study space-power relations reflected the changed focus of the sub-discipline.

A key contribution in this debate comes from Hyndman (2004) with her insight that the human body is a crucial element of geopolitical practices. In her view, human bodies should be a part of any conceptualisation of security as they are not just irrelevant, non-participating things in geopolitical practices, but crucial sites of the underlying

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13 In fact, Thrift’s contribution actually became the most cited element of the book and was for many the most memorable element of the edited collection (Dodds 2015, personal remark).
processes. Bodies are not passively, but actively involved in situations of conflict, violence and disease. This requires more research into the material aspects of how security works out in space. Hyndman (2004, p. 318) argues convincingly why the human body is a key factor in power-space-identity dynamics with her observation that "[p]eople’s bodies are construed as territory or property. They become public sites of violence on which constructions of the nation and its boundaries take place, and are therefore, of central concern to feminist geopolitics." Swanson (2014) makes clear how the body can also play an important role in resistance against dominant actors. In her analysis of the demonstrations against the Mubarak government in Egypt in 2011, human bodies jointly produced a space with a revolutionary energy on Tahrir Square.

Encouraged by feminist interventions, the ‘turn to practices’ resulted in more attention to ‘micro geopolitics’. This refers to studies of the links between everyday experiences of individuals and notions of power, space and identity in societies (Müller 2010; Dittmer 2013b). Practices can be seen as repeated acts that reproduce discourses both cognitively and consciously (Müller, 2008). Alternatively, practices can be seen as acts that are beyond discourse and have a pre-cognitive nature. The latter refers to non-representational theory (NRT), or ‘more-than-representational’ theory (MTRT). This approach, along with assemblage theory, gained currency in critical geopolitics and more broadly human geography in the 2000s. Scholars increasingly share the concern that research had been too much focused on the role of representations in how people give meaning to the world (Müller, 2008, Anderson, 2009). Instead of critically examining texts as the sole factor in geopolitical meaning-making processes, scholars start to increasingly analyse heterogeneous groups of research objects that do or do not include representations (Dittmer, 2013b; Müller, 2013). MTRT sees practices as the central unit of analysis, and not representations (Müller, 2015a).

Another central aspect of MTRT concerns affect, referring to the assumption that “much happens before and after conscious reflexive thought” (Anderson, 2009, p. 503). In other words, people give meaning to their experiences with the world affectively and unconsciously (Müller, 2015a). The focus on embodiment is a central feature of assemblage theory as well. An assemblage is “a mode of ordering heterogeneous entities so that they work together for a certain time” (Müller, 2015b, p. 28). It is assumed that because of the interaction between these entities, meanings are created (Bingham, 2009). The entities in an assemblage can be both animate and inanimate;

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14 The name ‘non-representational theory’ that was coined by Thrift (1997) later received some criticism. Lorimer (2005, p. 84) for example rather speaks “of 'more-than representational' geography, the teleology of the original 'non-' title having proven an unfortunate hindrance.” In this thesis, the abbreviation MTRT is used when referring to non-representational theory.
human and non-human; material and non-material (Müller, 2015b). Moreover, society is seen by MTRT as a set of assemblages in which coherence and change are driven by practices that are embodied by the people involved (Anderson, 2009). Dittmer (2013b, p. 499) offers a telling example of an everyday assemblage which revolves around a joke: "the emergence of new collective subjects through the enmeshing of biology and culture; it therefore requires attention to both the social (humour) and the somatic (laughter)." When people who do not know each other laugh about a joke during an assembly of the Model United Nations, the affective connects with the cognitive and the body. These processes construct a temporary collective identity. Implicitly calling for more research into affect at the ‘micro’ level’, Dittmer (2013b, p. 496) argues that “greater attention should be paid to the geopolitics of humour as affective experience.” Ó Tuathail (2003) shows that taking a ‘macro’ angle on affect matters as well. His study of the American legitimisation of the 2003 invasion in Iraq was one of the first critical geopolitical studies of affect. Here he conceptualises affect based on earlier work by William Connolly (2002). Human beings are assumed to not only take on board their external environment in the form of observed representations. In addition, they also do so in the form of physical, non-representational elements such as a faster blood circulation or a change in the skin condition (Connolly 2011).

MTRT also fuelled a stronger “concern for materiality – objects, bodies and matter” in critical geopolitics and more broadly human geography (Müller, 2015b, p. 27). The role of material factors in global politics had also been stressed in earlier feminist geopolitical works (Dowler and Sharp, 2001). A key issue in this regard is “the capacities to affect and be affected of human and non-human materialities” (Anderson and Harrison, 2010, p. 16). This focus on materiality and its relationships with human beings is another feature of MTRT that is found in assemblage theory as well (Müller, 2015b). This post-human angle\textsuperscript{15} acknowledges the agency of non-human actors, denying a human monopoly on agency (Dittmer, 2013a). Although human beings are seen as the only beings that have reflexivity and intentionality, other beings and objects can also affect the outcome of processes. Non-human living beings such as animals and inanimate beings such as water have agency as well (Anderson, 2009). It is assumed that “[t]he relation between humans and their surroundings is thus a two-way street: humans act as much as they are acted upon.” (Müller, 2015a, p. 410). Accordingly, assemblage theory assumes forms of joint agency between human actors and other (non-) living actors. The social is made up of several material entities that

\textsuperscript{15} Following the same line of reasoning of Lorimer (2005, p. 84) who suggests speaking of ‘more than representational’ instead of ‘non-representational’, it would be more appropriate here to speak of ‘more than human’.

cannot be separately identified and named (Anderson and Harrison, 2010). Assemblages matter in human geography because they are assumed to be productive, creating new realities or aspects of reality such as places, actors or processes (Müller, 2015b). Assemblages are continually involved in the construction, transformation and tearing apart of territories – in a relationship that echoes debates about the relationship between de-territorialisation and re-territorialisation. Spaces as such can be important geopolitical factors thanks to their agency, but should always be considered in relational terms (Dittmer, 2013a). They should not be analysed in isolation, but always in relation to other spaces. Studies with this angle address the elemental materialities of water (Steinberg and Peters, 2015), air (Elden, 2013; McCormack, 2009) and cities (Edensor, 2012). Squire (2016) analyses the role of the four elements water, fire, rock and air in the conflict between Spain and UK over Gibraltar. Her approach draws on McCormack (2015), who argues that human bodies and the four elements mutually constitute each other. In his analysis of the construction of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline that transports oil from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Turkey (i.e. from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean), Barry (2013) stresses the joint role of human beings and inanimate materials in power-space dynamics. In his view, materiality and practices are vital in the production of knowledge.

MTRT further assumes that the world is always subject to change in unexpected ways. MTRT considers the social as “an ordering rather than an order – emergent from multiple spatially and temporally distanciated relations” (Anderson, 2009, p. 504). A telling example is provided by Antonsich (2016, p. 38): "[r]ather than a single, homogeneous national ‘we’, evenly reproduced through the banality of nationalism, nationhood appears as a much more complex phenomenon when looked through the ways people make it meaningful in their everyday." This assumption is the third that MTRT has in common with assemblage theory, which stresses the temporary nature of the interaction between the heterogeneous elements of an assemblage (Müller, 2015b). The entities that form an assemblage also exist independently (before and after the existence) of the assemblage, and their features cannot explain the relations within the assemblage (Dittmer, 2013a). An assemblage does not have fixed structures that determine its internal organisation and the hierarchy among its elements. A telling example is a volcano, which could be seen as “an assemblage of human-nature constituents, including the livelihoods, identities, cultures and imaginations of populations, alongside the physical movement of magma in the earth and the scientific

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16 Not surprisingly, thinking in terms of assemblages was already implicitly done in geography in the 1980s. Johnston and Taylor (1989, p. 13) for example argue that scholars should "not separate out the parts and treat their problems as curable independent of the other parts" when analysing crises.
interpretation of the signals it provokes" (Donovan, 2017, p. 49). A related concept, geopolitical construct, has recently been developed by Flint (2016). It combines structures and agents and assumes that each of them have their own geographical and temporal reach. Human practices, material circumstances and social norms jointly determine the activities and achievements of a geopolitical construct. These activities and achievement are always dependent on other geopolitical constructs.

The methodological consequence of its central assumptions is that MTRT is a way of engaging with the world that starts with practices and productive ways to get involved in them (Anderson, 2009). Accordingly, its research has a more experimental and less desk-focused nature than the analysis of geopolitical reasoning (Müller, 2015a). Research methods drawing on MTRT seek “to learn to witness the ongoing taking-place of life as a composite of embodied practices” (Anderson, 2009, p. 505). The focus is on ways in which human presentations (and not representations) in the form of everyday practices contribute to the production of new events or, more broadly, new realities.

2.4 The New Media Ecology

The doubts about the generic importance of representations in meaning-making processes regarding world politics have also been expressed more specifically about media representations and in different disciplines such as International Relations (IR). A key argument from Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010) is that changes in material conditions and related practices have had a huge impact on how the production, distribution and consumption of media content operates. Human beings, technology and traditional and new media, and particularly their connections, are in their view all part of “the same and unavoidable knowledge environment” that they call the “new media ecology” (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 5). This approach towards knowledge production is reminiscent of thinking in terms of assemblages. Nonetheless, Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010) do not refer at all to this concept in their book. A key feature of the new media ecology is that, today, many more aspects from reality are recorded than in the previous century. Moreover, each aspect can and is often recorded by many more people, creating many more angles, and these recordings are often immediately shared across wide spaces. Ordinary civilians, within and between more economically prosperous and technologically developed states in particular, can easily engage in a deterritorialised dialogue in which geopolitical imaginations are actively exchanged, confirmed and challenged (Adams, 2007). The traditional role of bounded places in media production and consumption is now taken by virtual place. This change resulted according to Debrix (2007, p. 14) to “a cultural context where the
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distinction between being inside actual media forms or networks or outside them no longer matters because it is no longer possible to ascertain what is part of the mediascape and what is not.” It has therefore become more difficult to understand how the geopolitical discourses conveyed by (traditional) media are processed in different places (Adams, 2007). They could either raise tensions between groups with different cultural backgrounds that participate in the online encounters or contribute to the emergence of virtual communities that transcend national identity. Consequently, “[n]obody knows who will see an event, where and when they will see it or how they will interpret it” (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 2). It is not the media content that affects the legitimacy of what is represented, but the ways in which the content has been circulated.

The new media ecology makes the traditional division in formal, practical and popular geopolitics (Ó Tuathail, 1996) within the critical geopolitical sub-discipline less relevant (Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014). Practical geopolitics refers to the actors in a society that are directly involved in foreign policy, such as politicians and diplomats (Pinkerton, 2013). Formal geopolitics concerns all actors that conduct research into and provide advice on foreign policy, such as scholars. These last two forms of geopolitics are considered elitist (MacDonald et al, 2010). Popular geopolitics refers to popular culture and everyday practices and includes media representations (Sharp, 2000). Traditionally, mass media were assumed to play a prominent role in exposing the population to hegemonic geopolitical imaginations. The boundaries between the three forms of geopolitics have always been seen as porous, because actors can influence each other beyond their formal position, have multiple positions and move between groups. Journalists are a telling example of actors that cross the boundaries between popular geopolitics, formal geopolitics and practical geopolitics (Pinkerton, 2013).

Furthermore, technological changes have made it much easier for citizens to become self-made journalists (Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014), exemplifying how technology also affects the relations between actors within one particular form of geopolitics. As a result, citizens obtain a form of agency that is closely interwoven with their everyday experience of national belonging and enables them to move beyond the boundaries of popular geopolitics. In their analysis of the Malvinas/Falklands dispute, Pinkerton and Benwell (2014, p. 21) show how the boundary between popular geopolitics and practical geopolitics is being erased somewhat: “The blurring of the activities of politicians and citizens, and the emergence of ‘citizen statecraft’, provides an opportunity for this process to occur well away from Foreign Ministries and diplomatic residences, and to instead take root within alternative online spaces shared by Argentine, British and Falkland Islander communities.” The emergence of social media
and other new virtual spaces have in their view enabled citizens from different states to engage in dialogues with each other that may contribute to new angles on long-lasting conflicts between their governments.

Fully taking into account the assumptions of the new media ecology in research poses some substantial methodological challenges (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010). A study of how a news story is interpreted around the world through practices will likely require the compilation of a multilingual dataset, the identification of seemingly incomprehensible feedback loops and the conducting of expensive audience research. The study of these practices further “demands that we seek to identify links between subjects, objects and their relations […] and implicate the medial dimensions of these relationships. The challenge of doing such identifying and understanding or explaining such links demands approaches that do not take units of analysis as given, but take these phenomena as emergent” (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 191). One new methodological challenge is for example the interpretation of images in the new media ecology. The ‘War on Terror’ began in a period in which images were produced and circulated at an exponentially growing rate thanks to social media (Mitchell, 2011). This “pictorial turn” was accompanied by a “war of images”, in which images became weapons to bring down the morale of enemies and manipulate the own population (Mitchell, 2011, p. 2). The US government for example distributed photos and video footage to legitimise its foreign policy choices, which is a recurring practice (Hughes, 2007). Mitchell (2005, p. 56) refers in this regard to the Abu Ghraib photos and “their uncontrollable and unpredictable quality, their ability to spread virally across linguistic and territorial borders, and to provoke instantaneous mass emotions.” Both scholars do however not acknowledge the role of accompanying texts (either written or spoken) in the interpretation of visual representations of unknown places and people. Despite the valuable new insights into how the new media ecology affects meaning-making processes, the question of how the content of a textual-visual representation can be interpreted by a human being with a particular cultural background remains important as well. Before this research opportunity is addressed, one question needs to be answered: does representational geopolitics still matter after the emergence of MTRT?

2.5 Representations Re-Considered

MTRT focuses on “what human and/or non-humans do, and how the reproduction and revision of practices underpin the genesis and maintenance of interpretation and thus meaning” (Anderson, 2009, p. 503). Like representation-focused approaches, it assumes that signification is the most important relationship between human subjects and the world (Dewsbury et al, 2002). MTRT does not completely ignore
representations, but assumes that practices, things and embodied experiences contribute to meaning-making processes as well (Müller, 2015a). The focus of MTRT is on the processes by which discourses are thought, embodied and experienced by social groups in an everyday, ‘micro’ setting (Müller, 2008). The discourses that the representations convey can also be resisted. In the words of Müller (2008, p. 333), “[t]he enactment of identities often stages a show that is completely different from what the screenplay would prescribe and it gives us clues as to where seemingly hegemonic discourses are contested and subverted – and where they are reinforced.” Therefore, MTRT rejects representationalism, the idea that meaning is always cognitive and required to understand social identities and actions (Dewsbury et al, 2002). It does not see “representations as masks, gazes, reflections, veils, dreams, ideologies, as anything, in short, that is a covering which is laid over the ontic” (Dewsbury et al, 2002, p. 438). A representation is not seen as the outcome of an action in the form of a message, but as an action itself. It is performative, material and actually a “presentation, continually assembling and disassembling, timing and spacing; worlding” (Dewsbury et al, 2002, p. 438). Therefore, efforts to identify intended meanings, ideological traces or untrue aspects in a representation do not make sense. Müller (2008) takes a less strict angle on MTRT in relation to representations. He acknowledges the important role in identity formation of particular representations such as political speeches and media representations.

Müller (2008) further points at the mutual constitution of practices and representations. As a result, a practice and a representation can convey the same discourse. In this spirit, Megoran (2010) focuses on both representations and practices. His methodology combines a discourse analysis of textual and visual representations with an ethnographic approach. This applies as well to Cresswell (2006), who notes that human mobility has both practical and representational sides. Practices can be representations, and vice versa. A telling example in this regard shows how practices and representations jointly give meaning to life during a dance class: “the tension between the threat of actual lived and embodied motion – always potentially excessive and threatening – and the rationalized and abstracted mobility of dance instructors and choreographers who have attempted, through representation and practice, to make mobility functional, ordered and, in the end, knowable” (Cresswell, 2006, p. 59). The body is here not only a cognitive carrier, but also an affective carrier and a materiality. Klinke (2008) acknowledges the importance of practices and materiality in geopolitics. However, he simultaneously points at the difficulty of conceptually separating representations and practices: “a narrative approach that focuses on written and spoken language does not mean to deny the existence of a material world, but to
accept the fact that to disentangle the two would be a Sisyphean challenge. In the realm of geopolitics, it is precisely the narrative construction of the material ('land power', 'sea power') that is worth studying” (Klinke, 2008, p. 112). Agnew (2012, p. 303) makes a similar point by stressing the continued importance of representations in geopolitics, without denying the importance of other factors:

“I would reject the contention that these narratives are somehow not equivalent to a discourse (or meaningful and potentially long-lasting script) because they privilege “texts” authored by “agents” more than eventual practices or actual policies (Müller, 2008). The entire point is to identify those clusters of selected ideas and historical events that potentially animate practices and policies. They are not the same thing as those practices and policies. This is why we have different words for each.”

This section makes clear that several recent studies in critical geopolitics take representations into account only in combination with other geopolitical (f)actors such as objects, practices and embodiment. However, as Müller (2015a, p. 418) argues, “care needs to be taken not to throw out the insights of representational research”. In fact, the analysis of representations as such can still offer invaluable insights into geopolitical processes and can therefore advance critical geopolitics. Methodological innovations would be required to realise this potential. After all, “there is no shared formula for doing critical geopolitics and [there remains] considerable debate about its conceptualization and blind spots” (Toal/Ó Tuathail, 2013, p. xxi).

2.6 The Multimodal Turn

As Gillian Rose (2016, p. 138) notes, "nothing is ever just visual, and [...] all visual images are accompanied by other kinds of semiotic resources that are integral to their meaning." In other words, a visual analysis should take into account other representational modes that are part of the representation. A missing or incomplete awareness of the interaction between multiple representational modes can be observed in various critical geopolitical works. To start, Hughes (2007) notes that television and film are part of visual culture, however without acknowledging explicitly that these media are in fact ‘more than visual.’ Not only are they texts in a broad sense, they also have a more than textual quality as well — technological systems, cabling, screens, electricity and so on. Another example concerns Sharp (2000), who focuses her analysis of a magazine on one representational mode (i.e. written text). The representations concerned consist in fact of multiple modes. Referring to photos of statesmen published by Reader's Digest, she concludes that a smile on the face of a
visualised politician from another state (e.g. Yugoslavia) signified good relations between the US and that state. Communist states with which the US maintained bad relations (e.g. Russia) were always associated with the absence of smiles on the faces of their leaders. Sharp does however not explicitly take into account the possible effect of the accompanying caption and (sub-)headline on the connotative meaning of these photos. The analysis by Dodds (2005) of the song "Sunday Bloody Sunday" from the band U2 also lacks a full awareness of multimodality. The song is about the outrage among the minority Catholic population of Northern Ireland, caused by lethal shots from British soldiers during a demonstration by Catholic citizens in Northern Ireland in 1972. The interpretation of Dodds (2005) refers only to the lyrics (i.e. written text). It does not take into account the way in which the song is being sung and the music. Furthermore, McFarlane and Hay (2003) do not include visual representations in their analysis of newspaper articles that include both textual and visual elements. As a result, their interpretations neglect the impact of photos and text-image relations on the possible meanings of the articles. In the words of Graber (1989, p. 145) "purely verbal analyses not only miss the information contained in the pictures [...], they even fail to interpret the verbal content appropriately because that content is modified by its combination with picture messages."

Some other critical geopolitical works interpret representations that are composed of multiple modes without clarifying how the interaction between moving images, written texts, spoken texts and/or other sounds informed their interpretation. A first example concerns the analysis by Dodds (2008a) of the American-British film adaption of George Orwell's novel Animal Farm (1954). He studies how the film was used to convey particular understandings of communism and totalitarianism. Orwell wanted to stress with his novel "that there was effectively no difference between communist and capitalist tyrannies" (Dodds, 2008a, p. 214). The film however suggested that states with communist systems were corrupt and eventually would be losing against the capitalist, non-corrupt states. A second example concerns the analysis by Glynn and Cupples (2014) of the American television series "Commander in Chief". They do not make explicit how the interaction between different semiotic modes (e.g. spoken text, moving images and other sounds) produces particular meanings.

Some scholars acknowledge the importance of text-image relations in the interpretation of textual-visual representations, without clarifying how they (would) study such representations in a rigorous way. In a study of a war planes guide, Williams (2014, p. 16) implicitly stresses the importance of text in the meaning potential of photos:
"[d]evoid of textual contextualisations and “therefore charged by a frustration of narrative expectations” (Bury, 2004), this work actively disrupts established understandings of how both the spotter's guide's immaculate imagery and the print media's images of warplanes work to represent military aircraft as machines used by states to project their power and how we experience that discourse."

Sharp (2000) refers as well to text-image relations by highlighting the joint role of titles, subtitles and images in the production of a preferred reading of a magazine article. Campbell (2007, p. 377) does so as well with his observation that

"the pictures of refugees and rebels in conjunction with their discursive framing as “Arabs” versus “Africans” has cast the conflict as a tribal war in which the victims appear to the outside world as another set of decontextualised casualties in the long history of African conflict."

He does however not make clear how he analyses the interaction between textual and visual elements. Ó Tuathail (1996) acknowledges the importance of text-image relations in his seminal book “Critical Geopolitics”. He observes observing that the world map in Mackinder's 1904 article “The Geopolitical Pivot in History” is not only visual, since it contains both visual and textual elements. As a consequence of the resulting text-image relations, "[h]uge swaths of territory are stamped with a definitive positionality and function" (Ó Tuathail, 1996, p. 33). Relevant in this regard is as well the observation by W.J.T. Mitchell (2011), an English Professor in English and Art History, that textual and visual representations have different potentials to make meaning. He does however not acknowledge the necessity of text (either written or spoken) in the contextualisation of visual representations when he speaks of the Abu Ghraib photos and "their uncontrollable and unpredictable quality, their ability to spread virally across linguistic and territorial borders, and to provoke instantaneous mass emotions" (Mitchell, 2005, pp. 129-30).

Jones (2014b) stresses the importance of textual and visual representations on public perceptions of borders and more broadly immigration policy. The highlighting of only a limited number of geographical, historical and social factors plays an important role in this process. Jones (2014b, p. 541, emphasis added) at times makes explicit which representational modes of a television programme by National Geographic on the Mexican-American boundary contribute to the intended meanings:

“Sinister music begins in the background and the daytime moving images are replaced by a series of snapshots that resemble those taken surreptitiously by a
police team on a stakeout. They are in \textit{black and white} and each new image is accompanied by the \textit{clicking sound} of a camera. These production effects imply something extremely illegal was filmed and could only be seen through these secretive means. The \textit{voiceover} explains: [...]"

He does however not use a rigorous method to identify which representational elements matter most, and how meaning can be attributed to each of them and their mutual interaction.

In 2016, the \textit{Political Geography} journal published its first article where multimodality as semiotic concept was explicitly acknowledged (Ide, 2016). The study examines how textbooks construct causality between conflicts and their environment. It also looked into the geographical imaginations that were conveyed by the representations. Regarding his analytical framework, Ide (2016, p. 63) notes that "[i]n order to do justice to the character of school textbooks as multimodal, the study employed a multi-method approach, which combined quantitative and qualitative approaches and focused on texts as well as on images." The analysis focuses on among other things the photos that accompany the texts about the links between conflicts and environment where they take place. Based on the textual-visual interaction, the author concludes that it is suggested that such conflicts do not have socio-political causes. This innovative work by Ide (2016) suggests that addressing text-image relations methodologically can contribute to a better understanding of how representations with both textual and visual elements give meaning to geopolitical processes. Although the author is not a geographer, this methodological intervention in critical geopolitics highlights the importance of further research into how texts and images can jointly produce meanings.

As this section demonstrates, multimodality has been implicitly acknowledged in critical geopolitics. However, it has never been fully conceptualised and methodologically addressed. We could say that critical geopolitics has yet to truly engage with the multimodal turn in media and communication studies. To reiterate, multimodality concerns the identification of the modes that are used in a representation, such as text, image and sound (Kress, 2010). These so-called semiotic modes "are the result of a social and historical shaping of materials chosen by a society for representation." (Kress, 2010, p. 11). It is assumed that these semiotic materials can change from context to context and over time (Van Leeuwen, 2005). Multimodality does however not refer to the materials and meanings of semiotic modes. Here social semiotics complements multimodality, since the former is about the "processes of making and
remaking meaning through the making of signs – simple or complex- in representation” (Kress, 2010, p. 34).

Müller (2015a) argues that critical geopolitics initially has “a purely semiotic understanding of the world, predicated on the analysis of human-made meaning”. Nonetheless, (social) semiotics has hardly been applied in critical geopolitics and human geography. A rare example is Steinberg and McDowell (2003) who analyse whether national internet domain extensions signify the identity, territory and sovereignty of states. They find American organisations rarely use their national domain extension to signify their identity. Moreover, some companies that are located in a particular state use the domain name of another state for commercial reasons. Based on their findings, Steinberg and McDowell (2003, p. 63) conclude that "the internet has a political geography that ranges from the inconsistent to the seemingly absurd"; calling these extensions “floating state signifiers” since they “lack material association with nation, government, or territory.” Steinberg and McDowell (2003) implicitly refer here to the semiotic potential of meaning-carrying devices or so-called semiotic resources (Van Leeuwen, 2005). Semiotic resources can take the form of textual, visual and aural elements, or more generally, physical activities and material artefacts. Particular moves, facial expressions and colours could have different meanings in different social environments.

Chandler (2007, p. 217) argues that "[m]any of the criticisms of semiotics are directed at a form of semiotics to which few contemporary semioticians adhere." This may explain the lack of interest in social semiotics within critical geopolitical circles as well. After all, a century ago, Ferdinand de Saussure (1915; first published in English in 1959) assumed a fixed link between any signifier and its signified. Contemporary (social) semiotics however stresses the dynamic nature of meaning-making processes: "[s]tudying the semiotic potential of a given semiotic resource is studying how that resource has been, is and can be used for our purposes of communication" (Van Leeuwen, 2005, p. 5). Like social semiotics, critical geopolitical scholars including Ó Tuathail (1996, 2002, 2004) also reject the assumption that a particular word or text has one fixed meaning.

### 2.7 Implementation and Summary

Practices, materiality, affect and assemblages have become important concepts in critical geopolitics this decade. In the context of geographies of everyday life, various scholars convincingly argue that they matter at least as much as representations. As a result, the era of 'representational geopolitics' in this sub-discipline has come to an
end. Nonetheless, representations are still subject to critical geopolitical studies (e.g. Mamadouh, 2012; Jones, 2014b; Ide, 2016). This is unsurprising since "representing is still a key strategy knowingly or unknowingly utilized by virtually everyone every day" (Dittmer, 2010, p. 52). Particularly in foreign policy legitimisation, representations are still important. As Jones (2014b, p. 532) rightfully observes, this importance follows from their "critical role in shaping perceptions of chaotic and distant events. We cannot be everywhere at once and we cannot know what is occurring over a vast area [without representations from this area]."

A discourse analysis of texts or images was a popular methodological approach in critical geopolitics in the 1990s, and to a lesser extent in the 2000s and 2010s. As this chapter demonstrates, it has however been insufficiently acknowledged how the presence of elements from different representational modes, and their mutual relations, can contribute to the meaning(s) of these representations. A framework based on social semiotics would enable a more rigorous identification and interpretation of these textual and visual elements. Critical geopolitics would be methodologically strengthened by such a framework as a result of a more nuanced understanding of how texts and images work together to co-produce geopolitical imaginations.

The inclusion of text-image relations in the analysis of geopolitical representations would respond to McFarlane and Hay (2003) who have called for more research into the representational techniques of popular culture, that are then used to produce and disseminate dominant geopolitical imaginations. Such a multimodal framework could further provide a modest, yet important, contribution to what Ó Tuathail (1996, p. 33) calls a "reorganization of the experience of seeing" in critical geopolitics. Ó Tuathail (1994) considers critical geopolitics as a question and an approach, and not an answer or a theory. Indeed, Van Leeuwen (2005, p. xiii) notes that "[s]ocial semiotics is a form of enquiry. It does not offer ready-made answers. It offers ideas for formulating questions and ways of searching for answers." Therefore, social semiotics may offer a new interrogative, on-going perspective to critical geopolitics.

The development of a framework to study text-image relations in a critical geopolitical setting requires also a thorough understanding of geopolitical imaginations and related concepts. These concepts are the main focus of the next chapter.
3 From Geopolitical Imaginations to Geopolitical Frames

3.1 Introduction

“[B]esides discourse, a motley mixture of alternative terms abounds, the conceptual boundaries between which have become increasingly blurred if they have ever been drawn. Alongside discourse we find terms such as “geopolitical storylines,” “geopolitical imaginations,” “geopolitical scripts,” “geopolitical narratives,” “geopolitical visions” and “geopolitical fantasies”.” (Martin Müller, 2008, p. 323)

The previous chapter stresses the importance of representations and discourse for critical geopolitics. A key observation is that this sub-discipline has so far not explicitly conceptualised text-image relations, pointing at a research opportunity. This chapter continues with a critical examination of the concepts that have been used to interpret geopolitical representations. Next to six concepts mentioned above by Müller (2008), the following will also be critically examined: geopolitical codes (Gaddis, 1982; Flint and Taylor, 2011), geopolitical motifs (Adams, 2007) and geopolitical frames (McFarlane and Hay, 2003; Ifversen and Kølvraa, 2011; Joris et al, 2015). This chapter opens with a section on geopolitical imaginations and closely related concepts (e.g. Gregory, 1994, 2004; Bialasiewicz, 2008; Dittmer, 2010). It then continues with geopolitical code and the related concept of geopolitical vision (introduced by Dijkink, 1996). The subsequent section is about concepts in which time plays a relatively important role: geopolitical script (e.g. Ó Tuathail, 1992), geopolitical storyline (e.g. Ó Tuathail, 2002) and geopolitical narrative (e.g. Klinke, 2008). After these time-related concepts follow geopolitical motifs and geopolitical fantasies (e.g. Ó Loughlin, 2001), which are concepts that have hardly been used by critical geopolitical scholars so far. The same applies to frames, the central theme of the last section in this chapter. Frames have been a central concept in media and communication studies (e.g. Entman, 1991; 2004; Iyengar, 1991; Gamson, 1992; Reese et al, 2003; Dahinden, 2006; D’Angelo and Kuypers, 2010; Potthoff, 2012; Geise and Lobinger, 2013; Lakoff, 2014; D’Angelo, 2018). However, only a few critical geopolitical scholars referred to frames in their work (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Agnew, 2003; Carter, 2007, Jeffrey, 2007). In fact, only McFarlane and Hay (2003) have so far conceptualised frames thoroughly. Moreover, the concept of geopolitical framing was developed by non-critical geopolitical scholars Ifversen and Kølvraa (2011) and Joris et al (2015).
3.2 Geopolitical Imaginations

The geopolitical imagination, with its various variations, is a concept that has been pivotal in the study of the construction of space. It is rooted in the term “imaginative geography” that refers to “this universal practice of designating in one's mind a familiar space which is 'ours' and an unfamiliar space beyond 'ours' which is 'theirs'” (Said, 2003/1978, p. 54). Gregory (1994; 2004) pluralised Said's term as imaginative geographies, referring to spaces that do not pre-exist, but instead are constructed by representational practices. These practices are assumed to have a non-deterministic nature, resulting in precarious and contingent spaces. They further construct differences and distances between spaces, which are in flux and relative. These assumptions about the construction of space also underlie the other eight concepts in this chapter. They further form a key theoretical fundament supporting critical geopolitical studies. Also drawing on Said (2003/1978), Schwartz and Ryan (2003, p. 6) define imaginative geographies as “perceptions of place” and geographical imagination as “the mechanism by which people come to know the world and situate themselves in space and time.” The geographical imagination consists in their view of a series of practices and processes that people use to obtain and evaluate geographical information. As noted, Said’s term “imaginative geography” is used in a pluralised and reversed form as well in human geography. Most geographers consider the singular as a reflection of hegemonic discourses, and prefer the plural instead (Gregory, 2009). The use of geographical imaginations in the plural implies that they are subject to diversity on a national and international scale. It further stresses their political significance and the possibility, and need, to question them.

Bialasiewicz (2008, p. 71) defines geographical imaginations as “the highly normative and normalizing assumptions regarding territory, sovereignty and identity and the necessary relations between these same.” This definition highlights the importance in such imaginations of places, people and power, and their relations. Another relevant aspect of the definition of Bialasiewicz (2008) is the inclusion of assumptions. An assumption can be defined as “something that you accept as true without question or proof” (Cambridge Advance Learner's Dictionary, 2008, np). This suggests a link between geographical imaginations and Foucault’s regimes of truth (Foucault, 2000). As discussed in section 2.2, these regimes concern the mechanisms within a society that determine what is true and false and (re)produce (geographical) knowledge. Dittmer (2010, p. 19) speaks of the geopolitical imagination (singular) and defines it as “[a] person’s (or society’s) constellation of taken-for-granted truths about the world and the way in which power should be utilized in that world.” This definition indicates that the construction of places has both an individual and collective nature. In other words,
3 From Geopolitical Imaginations to Geopolitical Frames

geopolitical imaginations are constructed and contested at different levels of society. Like Bialasiewicz (2008), Dittmer (2010) implicitly stresses the importance of comparing truth claims within societies. Moreover, Dittmer (2010, p. 19) prefers the adjective geopolitical instead of geographical to highlight “the sense of the power and danger that is mediated along with these discourses.” His observation suggests that geopolitical imaginations also refer to assumptions regarding security. Drawing on Said (2003/1978), Ó Loughlin et al (2005, p. 324) define geopolitical imaginations as “[b]oundary drawing practices between inside/ outside, us/ them, national self/ foreign other.” Next to a process, these imaginations are in their view also the output of that process: “the prevalent images, conceptualisations and discourses amongst the general population of where that state is positioned and located within the world’s community of states” (Ó Loughlin et al, 2005, p. 324). Like Bialasiewicz (2008), their conceptualisation refers to how the identity of a state is situated versus other states. Robinson (2008, p. 359) defines “the geopolitical imaginations of states” in the form of a question: “how do governments and policy makers define the relative significance of different parts of the world?” A state is assumed to only use its resources to affect places and people outside its borders if these places and people are considered sufficiently near this state. A telling example is the Middle East that “may be half a planet away from the US, but [has] been brought very close to the concerns and interests of this [economy]” (Robinson, 2008, p. 362). Müller (2008, p. 323) defines geopolitical imaginations as “the imaginary spatial positioning of people, regions, states and the shifting boundaries that accompany this positioning.” His definition concerns people and places, multiple scales and a dynamic process. It implicitly raises the question how changes in the boundaries between constructed spaces and groups of people can be analysed. What all definitions in this section assume, yet do not all make explicit, is that the construction of geopolitical spaces is a dynamic, situated and multi-scalar process that involves the construction of human identities as well.

3.3 Geopolitical Codes and Geopolitical Visions

Geopolitical code is attributed to historian John Gaddis (1982) and refers to a set of geographical assumptions regarding the world outside a particular state. The comparison between these assumptions and national interests affects the construction of threats from other states, foreign policy responses and the legitimisation of these responses. Flint and Taylor (2011) change the definition of geopolitical code from Gaddis (1982) somewhat, referring first to the (potential) allies and (potential) enemies of a state. A geopolitical code further concerns the policies that are conducted to maintain relations with both kinds of states. The final element of the geopolitical code is
in their view the way in which the government legitimises its foreign policy to its population and to actors abroad. Geopolitical codes can have a local character (bordering states only), regional character (continent where state is located) or global character, depending on the power aspirations of a state (Flint, 2017). Geopolitical code is used and not defined in the work of various other scholars (e.g. Ciută and Klinke, 2010, Fregonese, 2012). Flint et al (2009) define geopolitical code in line with earlier work of Flint and Taylor (2001) in their analysis of speeches by American presidents between 1988 and 2008. Ambrosio and Lange (2014) do so as well in their analysis of speeches of President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan. In their view, “[b]y studying this geopolitical code, one can better reveal the context within which foreign policy creators feel they are acting, how they view their state’s current conditions and circumstances, and how they pursue opportunities and respond to threats” (Ambrosio and Lange, 2014, p. 538). They implicitly include opportunities abroad for states in their conceptualisation of geopolitical codes. They further implicitly raise the important question about how geopolitical imaginations in a state could change in times of profound political changes in other states: “Nazarbayev’s geopolitical code is remarkably consistent: the absence of state-level threats, an emphasis on pursuing a multi-vector foreign policy, and the need to integrate Kazakhstan into the global economic system. […] This assumption has seemingly not varied despite changes in the leaderships of other states, such as Russia, China, and the United States” (Ambrosio and Lange, 2014, p. 555). In his analysis of a series of Finnish cartoons about Muhammed, Ridanpää (2009, pp. 738-9) defines geopolitical code as “a certain kind of mechanism that distorts information about the world to which governments (or national representatives) and the public are subjected.” The verb ‘distorts’ seems somewhat misleading here, suggesting that the scholar who analyses geopolitical codes knows what “reality” entails. The verb ‘constructs’ would be a clearer option. Ridanpää (2009) further exemplifies the way in which a geopolitical code offers insights into how spatial assumptions could inform foreign policy. Based on the perceived threat directly at its Eastern boundary (i.e. Soviet Union), “[t]he ‘geopolitical code of Finnish government was to take as cautious a line as possible and to try to be diplomatic in all directions” (Ridanpää, 2009, p. 738). This observation puts his ‘applied’ conceptualisation of geopolitical code closer to that of Gaddis (1982).

Another concept that has been used to study geopolitical representations is geopolitical vision. Dijkink (1996, p. 11) defines this as "any idea concerning the relation between one's own and other places, involving feelings of (in)security or (dis)advantage (and/or)
invoking ideas about a collective mission or foreign policy strategy\textsuperscript{17}. This concept suggests that constructed spatial differences can construct otherness as a threat or as inferior. The concept of geopolitical vision further stresses the link between the construction of geopolitical spaces and foreign policy preferences. Dijkink (1996) uses a template to analyse geopolitical visions. This template includes first the justification of the national boundaries. Second, It refers to the definition of allies and enemies and the identification of role models or bad examples. Third, the template concerns the formulation of perspectives on the national mission. Finally, the template includes the identification of determinist ideas in domains such as geography, economics and religion. With this template, Dijkink (1996) seeks to operationalise geopolitical vision, which concerns expressing it in terms that can be identified in textual representations. For example, the way in which boundaries are described by a text gives an indication of the underlying ideas about relations between the constructed places concerned. Furthermore, the way in which enemies are described conveys ideas about the security of the own national territory or place. As Dijkink (1996) acknowledges, his operationalisation of geopolitical vision refers partially to geopolitical codes, through the inclusion of the perceptions about who are allies and who are enemies of a state. Accordingly, his template to identify geopolitical visions in texts confirms the observation of Müller (2008) that concepts used to study the social construction of space can overlap. Geopolitical vision as conceptualised by Dijkink (1996) has had a limited presence in critical geopolitical research. Chaturvedi (2005) uses it to analyse the meanings that have been given to the Indian diaspora. He stresses the importance of the changes in the (re)production of geopolitical visions among people who migrate to other states. In his analysis, world views are a key component of geopolitical visions. Furthermore, Mahapatra (2016) uses geopolitical visions as conceptualised by Dijkink (1996) to study their role in the resolutions of the United Nations Security Council on Syria and Mali. Her main finding is that the geopolitical visions of the five veto-holding states in the Council can largely if not completely explain the body’s decisions. As soon as geopolitical visions of these five states clash, a decision on military interventions or other issues is not possible. A case in point is the comparison between Syria and Mali, where the conflicts had a similar nature in the view of Mahapatra (2016). Conflicting geopolitical visions prevented the realisation of a UNSC-sanctioned foreign military intervention in Syria. However, a lack of conflicting geopolitical visions made a UNSC-sanctioned foreign military intervention in Mali possible.

\textsuperscript{17} The distinction between collective mission and foreign policy strategy is made to make the concept also of relevance to study groups that do not have their own state and do not (or are assumed not to) have their own foreign policy. However, as McConnell (2016) makes clear in the case of the Tibetan people, it is possible for groups without a state to perform a foreign policy.
Kearns (2008) is the only other scholar who also defines geopolitical vision, but very different from Dijkink (1996). He sees it as a “world picture” that is closely connected to a desired end state for the world (Kearns, 2008, p. 174). Each geopolitical vision uses one spatial-social category to divide the world in different spaces, such as race (Mackinder), class (Lenin) and ethnic nations (Wilson). These visions also define one dominant group (e.g. labour class) and include a scenario in which this group will eventually rule the whole world. Various other scholars that mention geopolitical visions neither attribute the concept to Dijkink (1996) nor explicitly define it (Kuus, 2011; Manzo, 2012; Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014; Last, 2015; Richardson, 2016). Geopolitical vision instead seems to refer to an unspecified view of the world, reminiscent of the meaning that Kearns (2008) has given to it. This is exemplified by Last (2015, pp. 56/58) who uses the phrases “dominant […] geopolitical visions” and “hegemonic geopolitical worldview” interchangeably. In his analysis of Russian perspectives about the state’s national boundaries, Richardson (2016) uses the term geopolitical visions in the title. However, he does not use the concept at all in the article itself. Instead, he discusses geopolitical narratives, geopolitical aspirations, geopolitical imperatives and geopolitical expediency in his article.

3.4 Geopolitical Motifs and Geopolitical Fantasies

Geopolitical motifs (Adams, 2007) are closely related to geopolitical imaginations, geopolitical visions and geopolitical codes. These motifs are “place-bound, simplistic theories about history and geography that usually remain implicit rather than explicit, but that attach themselves to a huge number of discourses” (Adams, 2007, p. 24). They include to start ideas about the past and the desired future of the state. Geopolitical motifs further refer to territory and boundaries, national identity and the ideological orientation of a state. The interaction between representations (motifs or discourses), perceptions (how people gain knowledge; for example by observing what happens around them) and conceptions (knowledge structures, norms, beliefs; for example what people assume than can possibly happen) is a key component of the analytical framework of Adams (2007; figure 3.1). This interaction and the geopolitical context of the state mutually affect each other.
The conceptualisation of geopolitical motifs is somewhat confusing. Motifs are the same as representations (figure 3.1), refer to “a way of representing something” (Adams, 2007, p. 21) and are theories that attach themselves to discourses. These different conceptualisations are reminiscent of discourse, as discussed in section 2.2. A motif can be a rule, a representational technique or a representation. Adding to the confusion is that a geopolitical motif can also be an event: “[e]vents alone do not shape the political landscape; their power comes only as they are transformed into motifs, structures of meaning that make sense of the world” (Adams, 2007, p. 21, emphasis added). Here, it seems to be more appropriate to speak of “transformed by” to make clear that the construction of the event is based on a motif. Possibly related to its somewhat unclear definition, geopolitical motif as conceptualised by Adams (2007) has not been used in critical geopolitics. Dittmer and Sharp (2013) use the term in a completely different way, referring to the geopolitical theories that were used to legitimise Hitler’s devastating policies in the 1930s and 1940s towards Jews (Holocaust), other groups in Germany and several states. Atkinson and Dodds (2000) had already spoken of geopolitical motifs in 2000 to refer to terms that construct spaces, enemies and dangers.

Another concept that has not been often used in critical geopolitical research is the geopolitical fantasy. O’Loughlin (2001) uses it without offering a definition. Geopolitical fantasy refers to deterministic and unrealistic ideas about the role of geography in Russia’s foreign policy. Giaccaria and Minca (2016) use the term in a similar fashion to refer to ideas in Nazi Germany about the control over spaces and their populations (e.g. Lebensraum). One could say that the analysis of James Bond films by Dodds (2003) also refers to geopolitical fantasies, defined as unrealistic ideas about the role of
a state in world politics. He prefers to call the James Bond genre a national or (post-)imperial fantasy about a British secret service agent who “saves the world again with no direct help from the United States and other NATO allies” (Dodds, 2003, p. 148). James Bond operates as if the Great Power status that Great Britain once had, still applies, thereby contributing to a sense of national belonging among the British population. Klinke (2016b) also does not provide a definition of geopolitical fantasy either in his analysis of representations of Russian women. His study is worth mentioning here because of its rare focus on psycho-analytical understandings of geopolitics\(^{18}\). It addresses the question how British online news portals, websites that offer women for marriage and internet forums make Russian cyber-brides into geopolitical fantasies. His focus is on “the way in which discourses on love and sex are permeated by geopolitical language” (Klinke, 2016b, pp. 197-8). The analysis finds strong links between everyday lives and assumptions about national and supra-national (here: “Eastern”) Others.

The geopolitical motif and geopolitical fantasy both bear witness to the many efforts that have been undertaken in critical geopolitics to conceptualise the ways in which geopolitical spaces are constructed. However, so far both concepts have been either unclearly or insufficiently conceptualised.

### 3.5 Geopolitical Scripts, Geopolitical Storylines and Geopolitical Narratives

Ó Tuathail (1992, p. 156) defines a script (without the adjective geopolitical) as “a set of representations, a collection of descriptions, scenarios and attributes which are deemed relevant to defining a place in foreign policy.” This definition highlights the connection between representations and foreign policy preferences. However, the inclusion of ‘representations’ followed by three examples is somewhat confusing. This definition could also be seen as an operationalisation of the concept, suggesting where the elements of a geopolitical script can be identified in textual representations. This type of operational nature is suggested by the telling examples that are provided. For example, Ó Tuathail (1992, p. 156) notes that the verbal image “bleeding country” and other negative evaluations reduces the appetite of foreign policy makers to engage with a state. On the other hand, associating the same state with “vital interests” has the

\(^{18}\) The historian Daniel Pick (2012) offers a rich example in this regard as well with his analysis of how governments of some states that fought against Germany during the Second World War used psycho-analysis to better understand the German leaders and its population. In an earlier work, he studies different perspectives of war in the nineteenth and twentieth century, including British fantasies about the French threat if a tunnel were built under the Channel between the UK and the European mainland (Pick, 1996)
opposite effect. Scenarios, to which Ó Tuathail (1992) also refers, have never been further developed in critical geopolitics. Debrix (2008) nonetheless refers to scenarios, without conceptualising them. He analysed scenarios about the implosion of particular areas and its possible negative impact on the US. These scenarios are in his view part of a particular representational style of foreign policy makers (‘tabloid realism’). Such scenarios provide support for defensive foreign policy measures such as border controls and the containment of unstable areas. Alternatively, ‘tabloid imperialism’ involves global disaster scenarios in which the US faces direct confrontation with opponents from particular areas. The offensive foreign policy preferences that are legitimised by these scenarios revolve around notions of “revenge, offense, attack, and conquest” (Debrix, 2008, p. 936).

Ten years after his aforementioned study, Ó Tuathail (2002) clarifies the difference between the definition of geopolitical script and the operationalisation of the concept. He defines a geopolitical script as “a tacit set of rules for how foreign policy actors are to perform in certain speech situations, and how they are to articulate responses to policy challenges and problems” (Ó Tuathail, 2002, pp. 619-620). Such a script helps political leaders explain events abroad to their population, and formulate and communicate the related foreign policy responses. Obviously, these scripts are not set in stone, but always leave room for flexibility in response to new events. A geopolitical script consists of nine components, of which the first five constitute geopolitical storylines that give meaning to a foreign crisis (see below). The final four components include first the problem definition. Then there is the strategy implementation that refers to the stages that the government expects to go through in addressing the foreign challenge. Third, geopolitical accommodation concerns the generally modest measures to alleviate the concerns of other actors involved in the foreign crises. The final component of geopolitical storylines, problem closure, refers to formulation and promotion of a particular solution. However, it “may not actually provide any kind of resolution of the problem but may operate as a form of postponement in the hope that it goes away and retreats from media and public consciousness” (Ó Tuathail, 2002, p. 623).

Various other studies use geopolitical script, however without explicitly defining it (Dittmer, 2005; Jeffrey, 2007, 2009; Dittmer and Spears, 2009; Koch, 2013, Moore and Perdue, 2014). Dittmer (2005, p. 627) does reflect on the function of geopolitical scripts with his observation that they “are attempts to create order out of the complexity of global events by constructing narratives through which the region’s place in the world is understandable and legitimate.” A key objective of these scripts is to generate one particular understanding of an event among large parts of the population. The
assumption that a geopolitical script serves “to define the American sense of place and purpose in a complex world” (Dittmer, 2005, p. 330) draws on both the definition of Ó Tuathail (1992) at the start of this section and on the geopolitical vision as conceptualised by Dijkink (reference to national mission; 1996). Jeffrey (2007, p. 269) does not define geopolitical script either, but his observation that there are “geopolitical scripts that imagine Bosnia in orientalist terms” brings the concept close to geopolitical imaginations. In another study, Jeffrey (2009) analyses how American and British foreign policymakers scripted their military intervention in Iraq geopolitically in 2003 in three stages. In the first stage, the government of Iraq was constructed as a threat due to its presumed possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). In a later stage, when WMD could not be found, the suffering of the population of Iraq took centre stage in the scripting of the American-British invasion. Finally, in the third stage, responsibility for the stability in the post-invasion Iraqi state was attributed to the new Iraqi government. These three stages of the script helped to legitimise the military intervention in Iraq. Koch (2013, p. 123) gives a very rich example of geopolitical scripts in which spatial, social and temporal constructions play a role:

“In both countries [Kazakhstan and Turkey], geographic location is seen to imply an automatic and uncontentious “fusion” of people and time (with the East standing for a traditional past and the West for a modern present) that underlies both states’ developmentalist nation-building projects. As part of the nationalist rhetoric, the images of the Silk Road and of East-West bridges are also important to geopolitical scripts in both countries, in which the geographic location of each state is used to legitimate foreign relations (e.g. the Turkish-Kazakhstani partnership), alongside political and economic interests at a broader, interstate scale”.

Once more, the representations of a geopolitical script inform foreign policy, while the reference to national interests is reminiscent of geopolitical codes. Koch (2013, p. 123) further connects scripts with imaginations and narratives by examining

“the discursive scripts of Atatürk as the father of the nation and of the capital; the geographic imaginaries of Ankara developed on a tabula rasa at the epicenter of the state’s territory, uniting the entire nation; and the consistently repeated and performed identity narratives of Turkish brotherhood and the notion of a “spiritual bridge” connecting the two countries.”

For clarification purposes, it would have been beneficial if she had defined these three concepts and explained where they differ. Another scholar that applied scripts in his analysis of representations is Herb (2004). He compares the ways in which atlases and
geography textbooks from East and West Germany between 1949 and 1989 constructed national territory. He speaks of “territorial scripts” and conceptualises them as

“the rationales that tie together the fate of the nation and the territory. They explain why a given territory belongs rightfully to the nation, how the nation arrived at the present territorial situation, and which territory would fulfill the destiny” (Herb, 2004, p. 156).

Geopolitical storyline, another concept to analyse spatial constructions, has not been used in many studies. It does however reflect the importance of Ó Tuathail as a key driver behind methodological advancement within critical geopolitics in the 1990s and 2000s. As noted, geopolitical storylines can be part of geopolitical scripts (Ó Tuathail, 2002). Storylines are a “set of arguments”, while geopolitical storylines are defined as “sense-making organizational devices tying the different elements of a policy challenge together into a reasonably coherent and convincing narrative” (Ó Tuathail, 2002, pp. 617, 619). In his so-called grammar of geopolitics, a storyline consists of five questions. In case of a war, these questions refer to where it takes place, who is involved, what exactly happens (situation), why it happens (causality and attribution of responsibility) and why it is of concern for a particular state. The last question is in fact “so what?” and refers in his framework to the national interests of a state. This approach forms the basis for the study by O'Loughlin et al (2004) of the Russian response to the American declaration of the ‘War on Terror’. A geopolitical storyline is defined as “the way in which geopolitical events, locations, protagonists, processes and interests are organised into a relatively coherent narrative of explanation and meaning” (O'Loughlin et al, 2004, pp. 284-5). Although the clarification about which five components jointly constitute a storyline is commendable, the definition is unclear about how storylines and narratives relate to each other. One of the few other studies that also uses geopolitical storylines, considers these storylines and geopolitical narratives as synonyms (Mamadouh, 2012). O'Loughlin et al (2004, p. 285) link scripts to storylines in a similar fashion as Ó Tuathail (2002): “[u]nlike the scripts that political leaders draw upon to respond to everyday events or publicly articulate policy before the media, storylines are arguments that gradually cohere and congeal around persistent public policy challenges and dilemmas”. In the case of Russia, such a storyline seeks “to explain the event itself and its immediate causes, to explain its implications for Russia and to articulate a vision of Russia's national interest amidst the unfolding of [the event]” (O'Loughlin et al, 2004, p. 285). What is important here is the link between the

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19 One could argue that narrative is the academic equivalent of a story (Gillespie, 2006)
event, its causes and its consequences for a particular state. A storyline about common
enemies would support Russian cooperation with other states, whereas a storyline
about American imperialism would likely rule out cooperation with the US. A striking
finding of O’Loughlin et al (2004, p. 313) is that “[m]ost storylines are ultimately
muddled and somewhat incoherent but remain politically powerful nevertheless.” In
other words, spatial representations do not need to be fully coherent in order to be
effective. Consequently, efforts by scholars to (re)construct the spatial assumptions in
representations do not necessarily result in clear-cut interpretations. The approach by
O’Loughlin et al (2004) is further commendable for allowing the possibility of more than
only two opposing perspectives, as opposed to deconstructionism20.

The last concept in this section is geopolitical narrative. It is among the most used
concepts to study the construction of geopolitical spaces, although often without being
defined (e.g. Debrix, 2007; Nicley, 2009; Agnew, 2012; Mamadouh, 2012; Oakes,
2012; Jones, 2014b; Moore and Purdue, 2014). Klinke (2008, p. 112) does not define it
either, but does define narratives without the adjective ‘geopolitical’ as

“accounts that have the characteristics of stories and therefore include a
protagonist and a tripartite plot. Furthermore, narratives present issues in a
sequential, linear and intentional form. Crucially, they narrate certain versions of
the past, present and future (of a state, a nation or some other protagonist) in a
way [to trigger action].”

In other words, a narrative is a series of events that are linked to each other in a causal
chain with a number of important spaces and moments (Gillespie, 2006). An initial
situation is followed by several transformations and the narrative ends with a different
situation. The beginning of a narrative is essential since it has an impact on the
meaning of all subsequent events (Dittmer, 2013a). For example, multiple narratives
about the identity of states exist, partially because it is never possible to agree on the
exact moment when the collective entity came into being. These narratives about
national identity are “constructed in the discursive arena, in which different narratives
compete against one another to establish knowledge and ultimately truth through
references to space, place and sovereignty” (Klinke, 2008, p. 112). This angle on
geopolitical narratives is reminiscent of geographical imaginations defined as the
assumptions regarding territory, sovereignty and identity (Bialasiewicz, 2008). This
applies as well to the assumption of Klinke (2008) that narratives are part and parcel of
an ongoing clash between discursive formations about spatial truths. This assumption

20 Discussed in section 2.2.
refers to discourse as conceptualised by Foucault (2010/1972, p. 80) as “a regulated practice that accounts for a certain number of statements.” A key element concerning the role of space in narratives is “how narrative space and movement in space is constructed and made meaningful” (Gillespie, 2006, p. 96). Moreover, geopolitical narratives produce meanings through highlighting and connecting particular aspects of reality while ignoring others (Klinke, 2008). They contain both actions and the ways in which these are legitimised. A telling example is the finding of Klinke (2008, p. 125) that Russian narratives on Belarus confirm “the existence of an intimate relationship between the imagined geographies that geopolitical narratives conjure and foreign policy practice.”

Miskimmon et al (2013, p. 5), three International Relations scholars, have developed the concept strategic narratives, which they define as “representations of a sequence of events and identities [that] attempt to give determined meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives.” These narratives suggest the best ways to achieve particular desired end states. They are communicative tools with which political actors pursue their goals and serve their interests. In general, “[a] narrative entails an initial order or status quo, a problem that disrupts that order, and a resolution that re-establishes that order, often bringing a slightly altered situation” (Miskimmon et al, 2013, p. 181). In strategic narratives, the construction of identities of actors is a key objective, with a central role for reputation. Reputations are built and damaged by highlighting particular aspects of the character and actions of the actors concerned. The analysis of strategic narratives “is central to understanding how all aspects of a conflict are defined, constructed and understood. The combatants and their grievances, claims and aspirations are all subject to characterization, the attribution of motives, and attention to any reputation earned” (Roselle et al21, 2014, p. 79).

Frames22 are an essential element of strategic narratives (Miskimmon et al, 2013). They refer to the highlighting of particular aspects of reality in order to promote a particular interpretation. A difference between both concepts is in the view of Miskimmon et al (2013, p. 7) that “frames as analytical units lack the temporal and causal features narratives necessarily possess”. In their view, framing does not necessarily involve causes of a current situation or its possible future scenarios for it. Depending on the conceptualisation of frames, they could refer to both causes of a situation and future actions of actors involved (e.g. Entman, 2004). Despite the critical

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21 These are the same three IR scholars as previous reference (Miskimmon et al, 2013).

22 This concept can also be used on its own to study the construction of geopolitical spaces (see next section).
note on framing, Miskimmon et al (2013) see narratives and frames as equals, both being aspects of representation that continually interact with each other. Consequently, an analysis of one of them also contributes to a better understanding of the other. Miskimmon et al (2013, p. 7) take a Foucauldian approach towards discourses and define them as “the raw material of communication–bodies of knowledge about science, law, history, technology–that actors plot into narratives. [They are] a set of meanings and practices that contain rules about what is say-able and know-able and that create roles that actors fill.” The discourses that are available to actors are assumed to determine the options to produce narratives, thus functioning as structures. The produced narratives incorporate assumptions of their producers on how to effectively influence their target audiences. Strategic narratives further contribute to methodological rigour by referring to methods to study the concept in its different stages (Roselle et al, 2014). The formation of strategic narratives could be studied in three stages, of which the first concerns an examination of political texts or interviews with political actors. The second stage, projection, refers to the ways in which the strategic narratives flow through the media ecology. Here, the analysis of texts, networks and big data could be helpful. Such an analysis identifies the components of narratives in several types of media to explore how are narratives are reproduced, transformed and contested. The third stage, the reception of the narratives, could be analysed with help of focus groups. Focus groups can provide insights into the ways in which audiences engage with the components of a strategic narrative. These components could be actors, actions, conflicts, spaces and solutions.

To conclude, geopolitical and strategic narratives allow for multiple ways in which geopolitical spaces can be constructed. This enables a broader analysis than studies where the focus is only on one dominant and one opposing, marginalised narrative. As Agnew (2012, p. 302) exemplifies,

“rather than a single story that all accept, and notwithstanding political pressures to keep their imaginations in check, a wide range of actors is actively engaged in constructing narratives about how the past can inform the present and the future in China’s relations with the rest of the world.”

### 3.6 Geopolitical Frames

The frame has become a key concept in media and communication studies, as noted in the introduction of this chapter. It can refer to either the highlighted aspects of a particular issue, event or process, or to a more detailed understanding thereof (Gamson et al., 1992). For example, in the latter case, a frame can take the form of a
problem definition, problem cause(s), problem solution(s) and/or underlying values (Entman, 2004). Despite the widespread application of frames in media and communication studies, critical geopolitical scholars have never thoroughly conceptualised geopolitical frames. In fact, only a few studies in this sub-discipline use geopolitical frames or geopolitical framing. However, these studies do not define these two concepts. For example, Jeffrey (2007) uses the term ‘geopolitical framing’ in the title of his article. He examines the role of non-governmental organisations during and immediately after the Bosnia conflict in the 1990s. Nonetheless, ‘geopolitical framing’ occurs only twice in the article and –more importantly– is not defined. Jeffrey (2007, pp. 251-252) once uses frame as a synonym for the word label by writing “this geopolitical labelling” when referring to “the geopolitical framing.” He further implicitly highlights two valuable methodological features of frames. They can be subject to change, and refer to both opportunities and problems. Agnew (2003) also refers to geopolitical framing without defining it. He argues that the geopolitical framing of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia by the US and Germany in the early 1990s pointed at different national interests of both states. The geographers Fluri and Lehr (2015, p. 26) also use geopolitical framing without offering a definition, in the phrase “geopolitical framing of humanitarian aid”. They also speak of “geopolitical gendered frames” without defining them (Fluri and Lehr, 2015, pp. 25). Drawing on Butler (2006, 2009), they do however define framing, as the intentional and unintentional processes that are “demarcating what, and how a thing[,] is represented as ‘reality’” (Fluri and Lehr, 2015, p. 16).

Agnew (2003, p. 3) uses ‘framing’ as well with the adjective ‘geographical’:

"[t]he world is actively spatialized, divided up, labelled, sorted out into a hierarchy of places of greater or lesser ‘importance’ by political geographers, other academics and political leaders. This process provides the geographical framing within which political elites and mass publics act in the world in pursuit of their own identities and interests."

Agnew (2003) does not define geographical framing here. However, he suggests that it is an ongoing process in which spaces are constructed and evaluated. At least as important is his observation that the resulting frames feed into the actions of governments, citizens and others. Some earlier critical geopolitical works refer to frames and framing without either the adjective ‘geopolitical’ or ‘geographical’. Dodds (2014) forms an exception by actually defining framing, as the ways in which media explain their stories to their audiences. In the two other studies mentioned as follows, the meaning of frames is clear from its specific context. Power (2007, p. 279, emphasis added) observes that "games use all of the same techniques as movies for framing..."
3 From Geopolitical Imaginations to Geopolitical Frames

shots”. In addition, Dodds (1998, p. 170) speaks of the cartoonist Bell's "single-framed images and cartoon-strips." Both examples implicitly refer to the following meaning of frame: "one of the single pictures which together form a television or cinema film" (Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary, 2008, np). In some other critical geopolitical studies where frame or framing have not been defined, they seem to be synonyms for the verb ‘construct’ or the noun ‘construction’. Agnew (2003, p. 15, emphasis added) for example assumes that "the observer […] frames the world, as apart from, and prior to the places and people it contains". Moreover, Agnew and Corbridge (1995, p. 80, emphasis added) argue that "the established understanding of the spatio-temporal framing of 'international relations' is increasingly being questioned." Furthermore, Megoran (2010, p. 385, emphasis added) notes how particular actors "frame geopolitical knowledge in ways that contribute towards more harmonious relations between states and other human groups." Other telling examples are Woon (2011, p. 288, emphasis added) and Williams (2014, p. 15, emphasis added) who write respectively "framing of the island as a lawless terrorist haven" and "framing military aircraft as tools of power projection."

So far, the only critical geopolitical study that analyses and thoroughly conceptualises and operationalises frames, by McFarlane and Hay (2003), does not speak of geopolitical frames. The study focuses on the techniques that Australian newspapers use to delegitimise, marginalise and demonise demonstrators during the anti-globalisation protests in Seattle in 1999. Drawing on Entman (1991), they define framing as "the deliberate or unintentional deployment of specific properties of a news narrative which encourages people perceiving and thinking about events to develop particular understandings of them" (McFarlane and Hay, 2003, p. 217). An important assumption here is that a frame can be constructed either consciously or unconsciously. This implies that for the identification of frames in representations the intentions of their producers do not always need to be known. McFarlane and Hay (2003) operationalise the concept by providing guidelines to identify frames in texts, contributing to methodological rigour. For example, these guidelines concern the presence of particular themes, labels and common cultural symbols. Furthermore, McFarlane and Hay (2003) look at the used sources, definitions and references to public opinion, and how these relate to government perspectives on globalisation. They assume that frames have effects on how citizens perceive, understand and evaluate particular people and places (as well as events and issues). In other words, frames "organize and structure information in ways that engender particular interpretations of events" (McFarlane and Hay, 2003, p. 217). They further explore the possibilities of combining qualitative with quantitative research methods. Their quantitative analysis
concludes that in terms of quotes and opinion articles, supporters of the WTO agenda were more visible in the newspaper coverage than their opponents. The qualitative analysis of McFarlane and Hay (2003, p. 227) finds that the newspaper coverage was characterised by an event orientation (Iyengar, 1991) that ignored longer-term issues and processes. The possible role of wealth and power inequalities at the national or global scale was not referred to. Furthermore, the feelings of discontent of the demonstrators were represented as being a temporary phenomenon that would not affect the status quo. Despite their significant methodological contribution to critical geopolitics by conceptualising frames thoroughly for the first time, the framework of McFarlane and Hay (2003) has never been further developed in other research by this discipline despite (or possibly thanks to) some unaddressed analytical questions. First of all, they ignore the grey (non-binary) positions in geopolitical reasoning by focusing only on supporters and opponents of a particular perspective. Second, their framework does not allow for a systematic analysis of the roles of geopolitical imaginations in the perspectives on globalisation. This precludes a detailed analysis of the foreign policy options concerning globalisation that would rest on particular different geopolitical imaginations. Third, McFarlane and Hay (2003) focus only on texts in their analysis. They did not take into account how the photos in the newspaper articles and the resulting text-image interaction contributed to the construction of problems and solutions.

Ifversen and Kølvraa (2011), who are not critical geopolitical scholars per se, are among the very few scholars who so far have conceptualised geopolitical framing. They distinguish between this form of framing and civilisational framing in their analysis of EU documents about the European Neighbourhood Policy. Where geopolitical framing refers to interests, civilisational framing refers to values. Another difference is that geopolitics concerns the drawing of spatial, social and cultural boundaries, whereas civilisation has a universal and inclusionary nature. The study of Ifversen and Kølvraa (2011) is commendable for its operationalisation of geopolitical framing, which is the expression of the concept in terms of the analysed EU documents and speeches. Geopolitical framing can be identified by looking for textual representations that express the need to control people living in and moving through territories outside the EU in order to keep the EU territory safe from danger. The examples that the scholars find in EU documents and speeches include phrases such “Gates of Europe” and “Zones of Instability.” Geopolitical framing further takes the form of representations that suggest that neighbouring states could not be held accountable for the threats to the

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23 See also section 2.6.
EU that came from their territory. These states are represented as transit states through which dangerous actors (can) enter the EU. The last two examples show how frame analysis can contribute to a better understanding of how states are problematised by representations, and how this can affect the possible foreign policy responses from other states.

Geopolitical framing is also used by Joris et al (2015), scholars with a background in media studies. They analyse newspaper coverage of the euro crisis during 2010-2013. In their view, framing is the way in which news highlights particular aspects of reality. The frames that they identify in the articles are in fact metaphors that refer to war, disease, natural disasters, construction or sports and games. Geopolitical framing is the attributing of the problems to a particular state or supra-national space (i.e. EU). In their three conceptualised geopolitical frames, the euro crisis can either be seen as domestic, European or foreign problem. In an operationalised form (i.e. in terms of the newspaper articles), the geopolitical frames refer to situations in which media suggest to their audiences that the crisis happens to 'us' as a state, to 'us' as the Europe-wide community or to 'them' in another state. These frames matter according to Joris et al (2015) since they reflect how media imagine Europe and contribute to the (re)production of national and European identities. This suggests that frame analysis can also be helpful to identify geopolitical imaginations in representations. The study of Joris et al (2015) further finds who is made responsible for the emergence of the euro crisis and for its solution. The link between cause and solution of the problem is exemplified by their observation that if the hardest hit states had been made solely responsible for their situation, it could have raised support for their exit of the euro zone.

3.7 Implementation and Summary

The literature review of nine concepts that have been used to study geopolitical representations generates several valuable findings. First, geopolitical imaginations (including closely related concepts), geopolitical narratives and, to a lesser extent, geopolitical scripts are among the most popular concepts. Second, it is striking how many studies use a concept without offering a definition, even though a clear definition contributes to analytical transparency. Third, the operationalisation of most concepts is either missing or only implicitly (partially) included in the definition. Operationalisation refers to a description of how the concept can be linked to the data (Früh, 2017). It can for example concern particular words or types of phrases (e.g. metaphors) that refer to the concept. A thorough operationalisation of a concept adds to methodological rigour. It enables a clear-cut separation between two key steps in the analysis of
representations: the identification of relevant representational elements and their subsequent interpretation of them.

Few studies have so far conceptualised geopolitical framing. This is remarkable since the studies that apply this approach (McFarlane and Hay, 2003; Ifversen and Kølvraa, 2011; Joris et al, 2015) suggest its high potential for methodological rigour and analytical transparency. Ifversen and Kølvraa (2011) and Joris et al (2015) further make clear how framing analysis can be used to study how states are problematised by representations and how these problem definitions can affect the foreign policy responses from other states. These studies also highlight the potential of the framing approach to take the analysis of constructed geopolitical spaces beyond the hegemonic/non-hegemonic binary of deconstructionism24.

The findings of this chapter identified methodological rigour and analytical transparency as research opportunities for critical geopolitics. Concurrently, it finds that the few studies that have so far applied geopolitical framing suggest that the further development of the concept ‘geopolitical frame’ could help seizing these research opportunities. Taking on board the conclusion of chapter 2 as well, research into the construction of geopolitical spaces could benefit from an analytical framework to identify and interpret frames in representations with both textual and visual elements. In line with a central item on the critical geopolitical research agenda, the main focus of this framework should be textual-visual problematisations of particular spaces and the related foreign policy preferences. Such a framework is developed in chapter 5, taking stock of the insights generated by this and the previous chapter. The next chapter continues with the relevance of Germany for critical geopolitical research.

24 See section 2.2.
4 Framing Germany: The National, Non-Nationalist, Trouble with War

4.1 Introduction

"[T]here remain substantial brakes on Germany's willingness and ability to consider wide-scale military deployments around the globe" (Alister Miskimmon, 2009, p. 114).

The Al Qaida attacks on the US in 2001 and the subsequent 'War on Terror' have been subject to much academic research. Within critical geopolitics, these studies focused on representational, affective and material aspects (e.g. Gregory 2004, Jeffrey 2009, Ó Tuathail 2003). An example concerns the role of representations in the legitimisation of the military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, which were studied in related disciplines as well (e.g. Debrix, 2008; Hodges, 2011; Holland, 2013).

Representations of the 'War on Terror' matter as a research object for three reasons. First, the terrorist attacks resulted in "a total reorganization of world politics, with the US government claiming the right to intervene militarily wherever and whenever it wants" (Agnew, 2003, p. 1). Second, the geopolitical awareness of people born after 1990 has largely been shaped by the terrorist attacks (Flint, 2006). Consequently, representations of the War on Terror have been very influential in the development of their understanding of geopolitics. Third, and most relevant to this study, "the term War on Terror does not denote a stable and coherent referent object, but is caught up in complex discursive struggles for legitimacy" (Ingram and Dodds, 2009, p. 3).

Various scholars working in critical geopolitics, geography and International Relations investigated how meaning was given to the 'War on Terror' using case studies from the US and UK (e.g. Jackson, 2005; Jeffrey, 2009; Croft, 2006). This is not surprising since these states provided most troops for the military missions in Afghanistan and Iraq. With the 'War on Terror' being coined in the US, the question rises how this 'War' was understood in states with other national languages, notions of national identity and foreign policy preferences. This chapter argues that the claim of Ciută (2016, p. 30) that "Romania is an intriguing addition to the roster of studies of the local geopolitics of the ['War on Terror']" applies to Germany as well. This implies a research opportunity for critical geopolitics, since this sub-discipline has not analysed yet how Germany engaged with the 'War on Terror' in practical and popular geopolitical terms.
To contextualise Germany’s ‘War on Terror’, the next section offers insights into as to why and how the American government started this ‘War’. Then follows a section on the role of (German) language in framing. The section hereafter critically reflects on notions of Germany’s identity, including the role of Germany’s past in this regard. The final section before the conclusion focuses on the main pillars of and controversies in Germany’s foreign policy. This chapter adheres to the view of Orgad (2012, p. 98) that “what impact the contestation of frames over the interpretation of events has on how we come to imagine our national belonging can only be examined and understood in relation to specific contexts.” It needs to be added however that the collective self-images of people in turn also affect how these people interpret events.

4.2 The American ‘War on Terror’

In retrospect, the ‘War on Terror’ started on 11 September 2001. On the morning of that day, four American civilian airline planes were hijacked with the intention to use their destructive force to kill people in the World Trade Center (New York), the American Ministry of Defence (Pentagon in Washington DC) and (presumably) the White House (Washington DC, Friedman, 2004). The hijackers had wanted to strike simultaneously against places that signified America’s political, economic and military might. The hijackers managed to fly a plane into each tower of the World Trade Center, shortly after each other, and let another plane crash on the Pentagon. The fourth group of hijackers failed their mission and the plane concerned crashed in the countryside of Pennsylvania. These terrorist attacks were “very quickly rendered a national event” (Smith, 2011, p.3). The Americanisation of the problem and solution was immediately visible in American government texts on the ‘War on Terror’ (Jeffrey, 2009). These texts assumed that the US had a monopoly on the ability to objectively identify, evaluate and solve problems in places where state sovereignty was insufficient. They supported the view that it was the ultimate American responsibility to eradicate evil anywhere and everywhere in the world (Ó Tuathail, 2006c; Gregory, 2011).

The US government held Afghanistan accountable for the terrorist attacks, because Afghan territory was claimed to pose a threat to the international order due the presence of terrorists. Moreover, the Taliban government was accused of repressing the Afghan population (Müller and Wolff, 2012). Al Qaeda was thought to be intrinsically linked to Afghanistan by basing its operations there (“performance of territory”; Gregory, 2004, p. 50). Therefore, the American strategy to destruct Al Qaeda was initially concentrated on Afghan territory only (Dodds 2005; Jeffrey, 2009). The justification of the decision to intervene in Afghanistan was partially based on the imagination of Afghanistan as a coherent state (“performance of sovereignty”) and the
idea that removal of the Taliban government would eliminate the threat that Afghanistan or Al-Qaeda groups residing there could pose to the US in the future (Gregory, 2004, p. 50). In other words, the meaning that the American government gave to the attacks of Al Qaeda against the United States offered support to the willingness to intervene in Afghanistan. This applied as well to the willingness to intervene in Iraq, which was constructed as a source of Al Qaeda related danger (Dodds, 2005). At the same time, Saudi Arabia was not constructed as a state where the US should intervene. Nonetheless, 15 of the 19 Al Qaeda perpetrators had Saudi Arabian nationality (Friedman, 2004). These examples indicate a form of framing that intentionally disconnects a state with troubled places and connects with others to decline or acknowledge the need to project power abroad (Jeffrey, 2009).

The will to intervene in Afghanistan was not only expressed in terms of security, but also in terms of human rights (Dodds, 2005). As a result, humanitarian intervention was a key phrase during the 'War on Terror' (Jeffrey, 2009). It was in fact a floating signifier since each humanitarian intervention raises the question of what the participating states mean by it (i.e. how each state defines human rights; Dodds, 2005). A key priority of the intervening states in this regard was often the well-being of the civilian population in the intervened states. Neo-classical thinker George Friedman (2004) offers an alternative angle on the meanings given to the Al Qaeda attacks against the US. He does not reject the idea that a war was the right response to the terrorist attacks, but points at the arbitrary wording of the 'War on Terror'. He suggests instead "the Fourth Global War, the U.S.-Jihadist War, the U.S.-Al Qaeda War, or the U.S.-Islamist War" (Friedman, 2004, p. xi). Particularly the third name could in his view have resulted in quite a different foreign policy response.

Two other interpretations of the Al Qaeda attacks are worth mentioning here as well, since they refer to the strength of the American military. The first one concerns the partial destruction of the American Department of Defense building (Pentagon) that left 184 people dead. This destruction has left virtually no traces in the collective American memory of the terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the image of the second plane flying into the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 has become a defining visual feature of the al-Qaida attacks against the US (Smith, 2011). In fact, Dodds (2005) argues that is has become such a feature for the twenty-first-century as a whole. Smith (2011, p. 3) raises a highly relevant question in this regard: "Why did the World Trade Center become enshrined as the victim laden ‘Ground Zero’ when the Pentagon far better symbolises US military might?" His answer is that most media, in the US and overseas, focused on the suffering and vulnerability of American citizens and the American economy. As a result, they did not refer to "the prostrate helplessness of the
US military” on that day, ruling out any impressions that would "[contradict] its projection of inviolable power" (Smith, 2011, p. 3). In other words, the representations of the terrorist attacks do not discredit the idea that the US military would be best suited to solve the problems that these attacks reflected. Accordingly, the dominant representations of the attacks by Al Qaida against the US did not question the capacity of the American army to intervene abroad.

The militarisation of the foreign policy response to the Al Qaida attacks was reflected by the interpretations of the Al Qaida attacks. The signifier ‘war’ soon became leading in this regard (Ó Tuathail, 2006c). President Bush considered the attacks ‘acts of war’ and both the government and many media spoke of ‘a declaration of war’. The word ‘war’ remained a key element in the speeches of President Bush in the next year and was invoked 12 times in his 2002 State of the Union speech (Entman, 2004). The connection made between attacks and the word ‘war’ suggested that the enemy (i.e. Al Qaida) posed a continued threat that could only be removed by confrontation (Juergensmeyer, 2002). More generally, war "suggests an all-or-nothing struggle against an enemy who is determined to destroy" (Juergensmeyer, 2002, p. 31). The dominant interpretation of the Al Qaida attacks against the US in 2001 as being "acts of war" made a military response (solution) unavoidable (Dodds, 2005). The highly militarised foreign policy of the US under President Bush was deeply rooted in American geopolitical culture (Enloe, 2004). During the 20th century, the popular American magazine Reader's Digest for example saw foreign interventions not as an option of US foreign policy, but a necessity (Sharp, 2000).

The attacks could also have been problematised in a way that would not require a massive military response. A critical geopolitical angle is that if the problem had been framed as a crime against humanity, a solution grounded in international law would have been very likely (Dodds, 2005). Smith (2011) adds that the response to the terrorist attack could have been more cosmopolitan. In that case, the national diversity of the victims had featured more prominently in US government representations of the terrorist attacks. Moreover, many other governments, also from states with which US maintained strained relations, had condemned the attacks (Ó Tuathail, 2006c). It was further suggested that war was not the right response from a strategic point of view since "[it] is too blunt an instrument to be very effective against an invisible and unlocatable enemy that wears no uniform and mingle with, or is simply part of, a population" (Mitchell, 2011, p. xiii). In fact, the attacks on the US in 2001 were a shocking expression of a new kind of networked political power (Flint, 2006), which enabled Al Qaida to pose a fluid threat to its opponents (Dodds, 2005).
Another influential signifier in America’s ‘War on Terror’ was ‘Evil’ (Ó Tuathail, 2006c). It was often expressed in the form of the binary “good versus evil”. President Bush assumed that the world consists of states that could only be either good or evil and it was the ultimate American responsibility to conquer evil anywhere in the world. This essentialised, black-and-white view on national identity as a ‘being’ also had its ‘doing’ variety in Bush’s reasoning: states can only fight against terrorism or support it. Gregory (2004) criticises the framing of the ‘War on Terror’ as a battle between the ‘good self’ and the ‘evil other.’ In his view, this constructed battle seeks to justify the world-wide use of American military violence. It further considers some states as places where the American army can kill local people without any (legal) repercussions. This perspective of Gregory (2004) reflects a concern within critical geopolitics with all civilian victims of the ‘War on Terror’ and the responsibility for them.

4.3 German Language

Following the verbal examples from America’s ‘War on Terror’, this section reflects on the role of (German) language in framing. In fact, language matters in the (re)production of frames for three reasons. First, language affects the thoughts of their users by incorporating particular assumptions, ideas and values and ideas (Bleiker, 2000). In more geopolitical terms, each language "embodies a world-view that implicitly promotes certain social values and certain political, ethical, and spatial perceptions of world politics" (Bleiker, 2000, p. 42). This observation confirms the continued relevance of the 20-year old observation by Ó Tuathail (1996) that systems of signification and, more specifically, signs are key elements in geopolitical reasoning. Belsey (2002, p.3) gives a telling example: "[i]n learning to use words like 'democracy' and 'dictatorship' appropriately […] Western children find out about political systems, but they also absorb as they do so the value their culture invests in these respective forms of government." In fact, languages are systems of inclusion and exclusion (Bleiker, 2000) by offering specific ways in which actors and their actions can be represented (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). During the Nazi government between 1933 and 1945, Germans experienced "the destructive potential of demonizing language" (Reinke de Buitrago, 2010, p. 142). Therefore, many Germans nowadays still face linguistic constraints on how to express themselves. A recent example of how language can exclude and include, concerns the German word for people (Volk). Demonstrators against the government of East Germany in 1989 initially used the slogan Wir sind das Volk! (“We are the people!”) (Breuilly, 1992). They referred to the East German ‘self’ and expressed their desire for democratic reforms in East Germany. This slogan later changed to Wir sind ein Volk! (“We are one people!”). This refers to one German ‘self’
and expressing a desire for re-unification. In the words of Breuilly (1992, p. 227), “[n]ever have the multiple meanings of the word Volk [people], combined with a shift from the definite to the indefinite article, reflected so profound a change in mood and purpose.”

Second, one particular language can allow its users to give meaning to a conflict in a way that are not available in other languages. An example is the German word Vergangenheitsbewältigung that refers to collective efforts to master the Nazi past and WWII (Fulbrook, 1999). In other words, it means “to bring the past into such a state of order that its remembrance no longer burdens the present” (Schlink, 2010, p. 44). Fulbrook (1999) refers in this regard to the drawing of a fixed and impermeable line between the present and past (Schlußstrich in German). In a political speech in 1985, the then German president Von Weizsäcker said that mastering Germany’s past is not possible if it is defined as changing or making undone what happened (Bundespräsidialamt, 1985). Instead, he calls for an interpretation of the word Vergangenheitsbewältigung as a collective remembering of the unhuman practices of the Nazi regime. Lack of awareness of this shared past results in his view to a blindness for contemporary dangers. In the words of Schlink (2010, p. 38), “[t]here is no mastering the past. But there is living consciously with present-day questions and emotions that the past releases.” The word Vergangenheitsbewältigung, which has no equivalent in the English language, exemplifies how a collective past can affect a national language.

Another example of how language-specific a particular frame can be concerns the difference between the phrases “Never again war” and “Never again Auschwitz”. These phrases refer to the same conflict (WWII), yet, they can be used to frame two opposing foreign policy options by highlighting different aspects of that conflict (Stahl, 2006). The phrases can be used to frame military interventions in opposing ways. By highlighting the cruelties in which the German army was involved during the Nazi period, a German politician can argue against participation of the Bundeswehr in foreign military interventions. By using the geopolitical framing device “Never again war”, foreign military interventions to achieve Germany’s foreign policy objectives is problematised. The cause of this problem is that military violence is wrong under all circumstances. The solution is that Germany should never get involved in any war and therefore the Bundeswehr cannot legitimately operate outside Germany. On the other hand, by highlighting another aspect of the Nazi period, the cruelties of the Holocaust, a German

\[^{25}\text{Bundeswehr} \text{ is post-WWII name of (West-)German army. Under the Nazi government, the German army was called Wehrmacht} \text{ (Mann, 1992).}\]
politician can argue that a foreign military intervention could offer the solution. By using the geopolitical framing device “Never again Auschwitz” in relation to a particular conflict, she or he can problematise an area, with as principal cause human rights abuses. In this frame, Germany has a responsibility to prevent these abuses, requiring a foreign military mission in which the Bundeswehr legitimately participates to protect human life.

Third, a (near) literal translation of one word into another language could result in a word that is uncommon in the other linguistic context, or a word with a different connotation. The literal translation to German of the English word ‘racism’ is for example hardly used in Germany (Reisigl and Wodak, 2001). Instead, three other German words are more common to refer to racism. Behnke (2006) gives another example how a literal translation of a word from one language to the other can result in an awkward situation. It concerns the English word geopolitics, which in German would be Geopolitik. Only the English word for geopolitics played a role in (West) Germany’s foreign policy after WWII, because “[a]ll international politics takes place within a spatially organised international system, and the definition of national identities, political roles, and collective allegiances have to reflect this” (Behnke, 2006, p. 415). The German version of the word did not play any role in this regard, although the online German dictionary Leo considers the words to be equivalent. The reason is that Geopolitik refers in Germany to the particular form of geopolitics that the Nazis used to legitimise their domestic and foreign policies. This German word therefore stands for an ‘other’ which is pivotal in the construction of the contemporary German ‘self’.

Another telling example of a possibly confusing translation concerns the seemingly equivalent words homeland and Heimat. Where both refer to a state, the second can however also refer to a region, city or village (Confino and Skaria, 2002). ‘Heimat’ became an important aspect of German self-images after WWII exactly because of its malleable meaning. It was used to define the national, which had lost its appeal following the devastating Nazi period, in terms of the local. In most states, the hierarchy is reversed, with the local being defined in terms of the national. By considering the local as the most important lens to look through at history, responsibility for the Nazi atrocities could be linguistically ignored by using Heimat instead of nation. The role of Heimat in drawing boundaries between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ was also significant among Germans who had to move to Germany with its new post-WWII boundaries from areas that used to belong to Germany. For them, Heimat referred to the area where they had lived before, or at least to the meaning they gave to that area how it once was.
4.4 German Identities

A contextualisation of the German ‘War on Terror’ further requires a critical overview of how differences between the German ‘selves’ and ‘others’ have been constructed since the state came into being in 1871. After all, the relationship between a constructed ‘self’ and its ‘others’ always needs to be seen in a historical perspective (Shapiro, 1992). After Prussia managed to bring many areas together in one German state (Breuilly, 1992), Germany’s identity immediately became an issue (Sandner, 1994). The formal and informal organisation of the included areas defied traditional interpretations of national identity, territory and sovereignty. The identities of the people who lived in the German state varied widely, with complex differences and overlaps. Power had always been spatially fragmented in what had now become a national territory. The areas that now jointly formed Germany had been ruled by various kinds of political units such as dynasties, princedoms, religion-based polities and city-states (Breuilly, 1992). The unification of dozens of areas into a German state was not so much rooted in the desire to create a national home, but sought to stimulate economic development in the areas involved (Dijkink, 1996). Around 1900, ideas of Germany's position in the world formed "a mix of cosmopolitan thinking and xenophobic nationalism, a sense of inferiority and megalomania, idealisation of primeval habits, contempt for 'lower civilizations', a belief in personal genius, and the enjoyment of being lost in the crowd or in an orgy of destruction" (Dijkink, 1996, p. 25). Before the Nazis took control of Germany, many Germans took pride in framing their state as the ‘land of poets and thinkers’ (Fulbrook, 1999, p. 19).

Between 1933 and 1945, the Nazi government headed by Adolf Hitler ruled over Germany (Mann, 1992). This government constructed Germany as an empire and practiced a form of “militant nationalism” (Connor, 1994, p. 98). The national leader Hitler actively propagated frames of Germany as a state, nation and homeland. He further framed the Germans as being part of a “race” that could be protected against foreign threats by suppressing all human life that deviated from the constructed norms for being German (Allen, 1992). These frames were used to legitimise the genocide of the Jewish population in this and other states (Fulbrook, 1999). Ironically in light of this thesis on German military intervention in Afghanistan, Germany itself faced a military intervention by foreign armies after losing WWII (Mann, 1992). Subsequently, the four states involved, US, UK, France and USSR, occupied Germany. Both East Germany (the former Soviet part of Germany) and West Germany (consisting of the former American, British and French parts) became semi-sovereign states where the foreign armies maintained their presence in the subsequent decades.
West Germany had a democratic and federalist structure (Breuilly, 1992). This reflected a lack of interest among the German population in a concentration of sovereignty in the hands of the central government, following the disastrous experiences with the Nazi regime. Another response to the Nazi past was that German governments abstained from using nationalist language (Dijkink, 1996). In West Germany, “the end of the Second World War ripped a hole in the country’s sense of historical continuity” (Klinke, 2011, p. 720). There were widely shared feelings of guilt concerning the appalling human rights record and aggressive foreign policy of Nazi Germany during the 1930s and 1940s (Dijkink, 1996). Feelings of fear were also omnipresent, related to the break-up of Germany, the subsequent authoritarian rule in the Eastern part and the presence of foreign troops in both West and East Germany (Helmut Schmidt, 1987; cited by Dijkink, 1996, p. 17). Large parts of the population of West Germany saw the German partition as a punishment for the Nazi crimes (Şenocak, 2011). In this setting, the national ability to develop a strong economy and a just legal system from scratch became the hallmarks of ‘being German’. Nazi Germany became the ‘other’ of post-war Germany, since “the definition of the Nazi past had to become the baseline for what the new Germany was not” (Fulbrook, 1999, p. 28). This approach towards dealing with a past ‘self’ that was simultaneously seen as an evil ‘other’ is in the view of Şenocak (2011) unique in the history of humankind. This ‘othering’ of Nazi Germany was also done by president Von Weizsäcker (1985) by considering 8 May 1945, when the Nazis surrendered, as a day of liberation\footnote{A similar claim was implicitly made by the German chancellor in 2005: “Gerhard Schröder’s full participation in the victory celebrations [for the end of WWII] signalled the acceptance of a new democratic Germany into the circle of those democratic Allied nations who had defeated Nazi Germany” (Berger, 2006, pp. 223-4).}. On this day, he said, the German population could start anew after the horrendous years of Nazi rule.

The construction of the ‘Nazi Germany’ as the ‘other’ of contemporary Germany has however not become a stable point of reference (Fulbrook, 1999). After going through a period of destruction, defeat and occupation during WWII, many Germans wanted their state to be (seen) as normal as other states (Kettenacker, 1997). This desire raised at times concerns, since it could imply that the Holocaust is made into a normal (morally neutral) process. As a consequence, the interpretation of what had happened during the Nazi period was at times subject to an intense debate. In the 1980s, there was a polemic between philosopher Jürgen Habermas and some historians (Schmitz, 2006). Two prominent historians in the polemic were Ernst Nolte and Andreas Hillgruber. Their disagreement concerned among other things the comparison between the suffering of Jewish Germans, non-Jewish Germans in Eastern Europe and German troops on the
Eastern fronts. Habermas strongly disapproved the claim of the historians that all these forms of sufferings could and should be put on a par with each other. Their disagreement was also about the centrality of the Holocaust in the evaluation of Nazi Germany. Habermas criticised the suggestion that the Nazi era could be compared with and related to developments in other states and from other periods. Then in 1998, the German author Martin Walser made a controversial claim that partially drew on the two historians. He argued that one single meaning of the Holocaust had been decided on, fixed and defended by the German (left-wing) elite (Schmitz, 2006). Walser called for an end of the taboo on individual interpretations of the Holocaust.

Nationalist ideas had a negative connotation in West Germany (Alter, 1992). They were often associated with the Nazi regime and seen as detrimental to a free democracy. As a result, Europe, regions and local areas played a key role in individual and collective identity constitution processes (Klinke, 2011; Götz, 2011). A telling example dates back to 1945, when the Süddeutsche Zeitung in its first edition in October stressed its South German, Bavarian and European perspective, while rejecting an “un-Germanic centralism” and the “Prussian-militaristic tendencies” (translation by Fulbrook, 1999, p. 200). Moreover, many West Germans implicitly equalled ‘Germanness’ to “constitutional nationalism”, a “post-national identity” or “being anti-nationalist” (Götz, 2011, p. 16). However, the desire for German re-unification during the Cold War indicated that the German national identity remained (latent) present under some parts of the Western German population (Kettenacker, 1997).

A complicating factor in the construction of German identity was the competition between memories of the German Jewish victims and the German non-Jewish victims (Schmitz, 2006). On the one hand, Germans had conceived and launched the Holocaust, and conducted most of the related murders (Niven, 2006). On the other hand, German civilians suffered in various ways during the war, for example from air strikes of Nazi opponents (Niven, 2006). They also suffered in the first years after the war, for example as refugees from Eastern Europe in West Germany or as prosecuted citizens of East Germany and other states). Schmitz (2006, p. 96) summarises the complexity of the situation as follows:

"Those Germans who lived through Nazism largely as bystanders are faced with the problem of how to address and represent their own suffering and loss during the war legitimately, while at the same time having to come to terms with the legacy of guilt and responsibility for Nazism and the Holocaust"

Although each German who lived during the Nazi period was a perpetrator, victim or both, the victimhood of Germans remained a taboo for decades after WWII (Niven,
2006). A telling example hereof concerns a claim made by US-President Ronald Reagan in 1985 during a ceremony to commemorate the end of WWII (Moeller, 2006). He said that members of the special military unit of the Nazi government (Waffen SS) were as much victims of the Nazis as the people who suffered and died in the concentration camps.

Another complicating factor in the construction of German identity was the division of Germany in 1949 into a western and eastern part (Götz, 2011). Each part was uneasily constituted by the same past ideological ‘other’ (i.e. Nazi Germany), but had a different contemporary ideological ‘other’ (i.e. the other part of Germany). To complicate matters further, this ideological ‘other’ was in fact a ‘self’ as well from a national angle. This was reflected by the institutional embeddedness of the so-called “East Policy” of West German chancellor Willy Brandt, which sought to improve the relationship with East Germany (Staack, 2014). This policy issue was neither part of home affairs nor of foreign policy.

East Germany understood itself as an anti-fascist and West Germany as a neo-fascist state (Niven, 2006). Meanwhile, West Germany understood itself as democratic and East Germany as the continuation of dictatorship in socialist guise. Blame for the Nazi past was thus frequently passed over the border to the ‘other’ Germany ” (Niven, 2006, p.1). Moreover, Herb (2004) finds that East German atlases and textbooks suggested that socialism was a key element of the (trans)national identity of its population. Moreover, the West German ones continued to construct national identity in line with pre-Nazi notions of Germanness, thereby suggesting that the division of Germany was temporary and unbeneficial. What East and West Germany had in common, was the idea that Germany’s identity was generally not related to any sense of nation (Götz, 2011). The ruling elites of East Germany propagated a collective identity in which the people formed a socialist class. A popular aspect of this identity was that the people shared a tradition of anti-fascist struggle that formed the fundament of the ‘real Germany’ (Reicher and Hopkins, 2001).

A remarkable aspect of the relationship between East and West Germany was the terrorist group Rote Armee Faktion (RAF) that was founded in 1970 (Aust, 2010). The organisation operated in West Germany and was supported by East Germany through its secret services. It was opposed to a capitalist system, the US war in Vietnam and the presence of former Nazi officials in West Germany's bureaucracy. Over a period of more than 20 years, it conducted several violent acts in West Germany and other states, such as the murder of officials and police officers, and bank robberies. Colvin (2009, p. 14) wrote a book about the texts of RAF-member Ulrike Meinhof (1934-1976)
and argues that “[i]n the current world context of a “war on terror”, Germany is a useful point of reference.”\textsuperscript{27} The state is still trying the cope with its terrorist past. The key questions that remain are what exactly caused the emergence of the RAF, and whether the government response to its violence has been legitimate.

After German re-unification in 1990, many German citizens continued to see themselves in non-nationalist terms (Götz, 2011). As Schlink (2010, p. 14) notes: “[m]any of us tend to regard ourselves as world citizens of a global society, as free citizens in a free world, as Westerners or Europeans, rather than as Germans.” Nonetheless, as Götz (2011) convincingly argues in her book “German Identities” (translation by author), the German identity is increasingly (re)produced, therefore subject to change and fracture. She distinguishes between two main approaches towards German identity formation in the 1990s: a flexible, informal and festival-oriented one, and one that revolved around renationalisation, solidification and sealing off. In-between these extremes of the German identity spectrum, various other senses of ‘Germanness’ developed. Another major fracture in the German identity is exemplified by the various locations of the national capital in the 20th century. Berlin was capital of Germany between 1871 and 1945 (Rössler, 1994). It kept this position in East Germany subsequently, while Bonn became capital of West Germany in 1949. In 1991, Berlin became the capital of a re-united Germany. Representing two conflicting views on ‘Germanness’, Rössler (1994, p. 92) frames both cities as “Beethoven’s Bonn” and “Bismarck’s Berlin”. Where the first constructs Germany as a cultural and civilised state, the second constructs a state with authoritarian, militaristic and imperialist tendencies. Bonn as capital of Western Germany also represents another fracture in Germany’s identity. Bonn represented the idea that West Germany had a ‘Western’ identity, which opposes the idea that Germany is a bridge between East and West (Dijkink, 1996). Goethe (1796) pointed at another fracture that refers to formal geopolitics and practical geopolitics: “Germany? Where is it? I don’t know how to find the country. [Where the intellectual] Germany begins, the political one ends” (translation by Rössler, 1994, p. 93)\textsuperscript{28}. On the other hand, Ratzel (1898) suggested that the German ‘self’ could refer to opposing features by conceptualizing Germany both in peaceful (e.g. as a spiritual leader) and militaristic terms (e.g. constantly under threat from its environment).

\textsuperscript{27} An article by Rosenfeld (2014) about the eventually successful strategy of the West German government to combat the RAF in the 1970s refers to “West Germany’s War on Terror” in the title.

\textsuperscript{28} These observations about the German ‘self’ were made long before Germany became a unified state.
After re-unification, victimhood and perpetration during the Nazi period remained important elements in the construction of German identities (Niven, 2006). Until 1998, German victimhood during WWII was subject to strong political influence. That year, a Red-Green coalition government was formed. Many government members had been part of the 1968 movement in Germany that called for more awareness among Germans of the Nazi past. Many of them argued at the end of the 1990s that Germany had become a 'normal' state that had come to terms with its Nazi past. Awareness of what Germany in the role of perpetrator had done during the Nazi government was no longer considered a crucial element in remembering the Nazi past.

As a result, the role of Germans as victims during and after WWII has gained in importance as compared to their role as perpetrators in the same period. This is exemplified by the growing attention for the suffering of non-Jewish minorities under the Nazi regime from the 1990s onwards. These groups concern Yehova’s witnesses, Sinti, Roma, homosexual (wo)men and deserters from the Nazi army. In general, there was an enormous rise in the public debate on the German victims during and after WWII. Popular geopolitics played an important role in this regard. This is exemplified by the call of Bild in 2005 to the British Queen to offer her apologies to Germany for the bombing of Dresden in 1945. This resulted in a warning from British Prime-Minister Tony Blair against "nurturing a culture of victimhood" (Bild, 2005; cited by Niven, 2006, p. 8). He did however acknowledge the suffering of the Germans who had to flee from Eastern Europe after WWII.

Niven (2006) stresses the importance of how victims are represented (textually at commemoration sites) with a telling example of Germany’s central memorial site for WWII (Neue Wache in Berlin). Niven (2006) considers the site as a reflection of how chancellor Kohl sought to construct Germany’s identity by using references to German victimhood. The first sentence of the central text at the site commemorates “the victims of war and the rule of violence” and "peoples who suffered through war" (Niven, 2006, p. 5). The subsequent references to the victims in the text are more specific. They concern time (i.e. during both World Wars), innocence (i.e. civilians), place (i.e. homeland) and movement (i.e. those expelled from their homeland). Then the text mentions “the murdered Jews, Sinti, Roma and homosexuals”, which indicates a "problematic memory hierarchy" according to Niven (2006, p. 5). He argues that the Jews should have been mentioned first in the overview of more specific victim categories since they concerned the largest group of victims of war and violence. Instead, the commemorative text suggests that the Germans were the most important victims of the wars. More specifically, mentioning the Jews separately after the German victims suggests that the murdered Jews were not Germans.
Another aspect in the construction of German identities that remained after re-unification is the (internal) East-West divide. For example, Johnson (2011) examines how prominent Germans such as former chancellor Helmut Schmidt compared this divide with the North-South divide in Italy. He found at least 15 articles in three quality newspapers each (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt) that made this comparison in the period 1997-2007. Johnson (2011, p. 163) describes the ways in which the population of both German halves problematises the ‘other half’ as follows:

“The ‘colonization’ by the West as viewed from the East is framed as Besserwessis (‘know-it-all westerners’), while from the West (and in much of the West-controlled media) there was a sense of disbelief at ungratefulness of the Jammererossis (‘whiners from the East’).”

He further identifies four narratives about the relationship between the East and the West. These narratives concern the structural dependency of the East on the West, the questionable effectiveness of infrastructure investments in the East, the geographically undifferentiated nature of government policies and the burden that the East puts on the state as a whole. Johnson (2011, p. 172) warns against stereotyping East Germany since “the region is by no means a homogeneous space, and the visitor to Jena or Dresden is struck by the buzz of economic activity and remarkable feeling of prosperity.” He further argues that comparing East Germany with South Italy serves to construct a particular ideal image of (West) Germany. Herb (2004, p. 160) concludes as well that the East-West divide is persistent within Germany: “[t]he discontinuities and changes brought about by unification are still unresolved, and [consequently, there is still no] coherent story for all members of the German nation.”

After re-unification, the construction of German identities also took place in terms of the identities of other states. For example, Ide (2016) analyses how German geography textbooks for schools represent environmental disasters and construct differences between Germany and much poorer states. These differences were constructed, by among other things, highlighting the problems of relatively wealthy states, while simultaneously suggesting that people from relatively poor states act irresponsibly and pose a threat to the more wealthy states. Von Lucke et al (2014) compare American and German climate change frames in mainly documents from think tanks and NGOs. They find that the US government focuses on military solutions to the problems that are the result of climate change. In Germany, however, the reports often stress the importance of sustainable, long-term and international responses to climate change. German policy recommendations often revolve around fostering economic
development in poorer areas, and explicitly rule out a militarisation of the solutions to the problems that are related to climate change. Klinke (2011) analyses the German-Russian relationship and seeks to identify traces of the “New Cold War” narrative and the “Strategic Partnership” narrative. He compares the period 2006-2008 with the period 2000-2002, because the “New Cold War” narrative had not yet emerged in the latter period. He finds that Russia is often seen as an inferior apprentice of the master and role model Germany. The related narrative is that Germany will help Russia become more civilised and obtain a European identity, while benefitting from the flow of natural resources from Russia to Germany.

Before the next section on German foreign policy begins, it is important to stress that the Nazi period and WWII have also become an important basis for geopolitical reasoning outside Germany (Dijkink, 1996). For example, the Holocaust is among the most represented processes in culture of the previous century (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010). Bernhard Schlink (2010, p. 27) refers in this regard to the role of historical analogies: “I have seen Kosovo and Darfur compared to Auschwitz, Saddam Hussein to Hitler, East German border guards who patrolled the Berlin Wall to concentration camp murderers, and current prejudices against foreigners to those against Jews back then.” Such analogies have been widely used to attribute the roles of victim and perpetrator to particular actors involved in various conflicts (Mihelj, 2011). An example of the related framing is the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s, when several parties involved called the soldiers of their opponents Nazis to attribute blame for the conflict to the ‘other’. Moreover, “the very idea of the prevention of or intervention to stop genocide is bound up in the legacy of the Holocaust” (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 89). If a conflict in a particular state is problematised in terms of genocide, the proposed solution is likely to be a military intervention.

4.5 German Foreign Policy

Another essential element in the proper contextualisation of Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ concerns its foreign policy. West Germany was constitutionally obliged to contribute to a world order where peace, international law and human rights mattered (Staack, 2014). Another central policy objective was political and economic cooperation with other states in Western Europe, once more to take distance from the Nazi government (Dijkink, 1996). Moreover, West German governments did not want to be associated with geopolitics or use it to legitimise their policies (Klinke, 2011). This was a response

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29 This section is about foreign policy of Germany before the ‘War on Terror’ started in 2001. It further discusses general aspects of German foreign policy. Sections 6.2 and 6.5 focus on foreign policy issues directly related to the ‘War on Terror’, with a focus on the ISAF mission in Afghanistan.
to the way in which the Nazi government had used geopolitics to legitimise its horrendous policies. However, (West) Germany was intentionally playing a part in two geopolitical scripts. One was about the Cold War and the other about the European Union.

Germany’s foreign policy objectives have not changed significantly since German reunification. According to Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the contemporary foreign policy of Germany has a political, economic and cultural pillar (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017a). Concerning the political pillar, multilateralism remains a key element, as reflected by Germany’s continued and intensive engagement with integration within European Union and NATO since the end of the Cold War (Miskimmon, 2009). A telling example of that engagement is that Germany’s military command structure is completely linked with that of NATO. Moreover, the United States and France have traditionally been the most important foreign policy partners of Germany (Maull, 2006b). In fact, Germany is "deeply embedded in the international community with a large range of allegiances and partners" (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2009, p. 227). Germany’s foreign policy guidelines also traditionally include a preference for non-military foreign policy instruments over military ones (Maull, 2006b).

A key question in the analysis of Germany’s foreign policy is to what extent it has been ‘normalised’ following the externally and self-imposed constraints after WWII (Wagener, 2006). Normalisation revolves around the question of whether Germany uses its foreign policy to maximise its power and wealth potential, or whether Germany continues to have a foreign policy strategy that is based on national restraint and close cooperation with international organisations (Maull, 2006b). In other words, ‘normalisation’ is about ‘normalising’ foreign policy by not taking into account the Nazi past anymore, while simultaneously wishing to keep the memory of the ‘abnormal’ German past alive (Klinke, 2011). The extent to which one aspect of German foreign policy is ‘normalised’ can be assessed with different factors (Wagener, 2006). For example, the factors for foreign military engagement are the possible rationales for Germany’s military missions, the capability of the German army, the willingness to engage in combat missions and the willingness to assume command responsibility during military missions. Germany could be considered ‘normal’ if the militarisation of its projection of power abroad is the same as for similar states. Similarity between

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30 This section does not discuss the economic pillar of Germany’s foreign policy, which concerns the support of German companies that operate on foreign markets (Auswärtiges Amt, 2017). Also excluded is the cultural pillar that focuses on academic exchanges, fostering education in other states and promotion of the use of German as non-native language.
states can be assessed with economic, demographic and territorial factors. France and the United Kingdom could in this respect be considered as peers of Germany.

A key concept in the analysis of Germany's foreign policy has been civilian power (Maull, 2007). It refers to a particular role that a state plays in international relations. This role includes among other factors being a reliable partner for other states and the lack of ambition to become a ‘Great Power.’ Civilian powers further promote democracy, focus on the creation of wealth and seek to abstain from nationalist government policies. Moreover, Germany specifically is assumed to reject Nazi policies explicitly and sets its foreign policy accordingly. The role as civilian power further implies a deep integration in Western, democratic alliances and a firm brake on the militarisation of foreign policy.

Despite its economic success, the military power of West Germany remained limited (Bierling, 2014). This reflected the objective that this state would never start a war again. As Witte (1994, pp. 241-2) explains, this peaceful attitude nonetheless caused some friction: “[t]o the surprise of many foreign observers, the Germans were resistant when their wartime enemies demanded at the beginning of the Cold War that German soldiers be incorporated into their respective alliances. Those who started to build a new democracy on the ruins of the hegemonial dictatorship followed a threefold "Never again!": No more dictatorship, no more war, no more imperial power." As a result, West Germany had a limited capacity to intervene, and was hardly asked to participate in military interventions abroad before the 1990s (Bierling, 2014). In the 1960s, the West German military was involved in multilateral military operations in Cyprus (decided in 1964) and Israel (decided in 1967). However, these were non-fighting missions. In the 1970s and 1980s, various German governments decided against German participation in so-called out-of-area missions (i.e. Bundeswehr presence outside the territory of NATO member states). West Germany did however contribute financially and logistically to various foreign missions of other states.

After German re-unification in 1990, the German army changed from an army that served only to defend (West) German territory against a threat from territories in the East to an army that needs to address territorially and otherwise more complicated threats (Wagener, 2006). For example, German troops needed to be able to fight in a situation of asymmetric warfare. Moreover, the German army needed capabilities to be involved in "evacuation and rescue, peace-keeping, conflict management, and peace-making" (Wagener, 2006, p. 85). Nonetheless, Germany continued to have a "culture of reticence" towards the use of military violence abroad (Maull, 2006b). Yet, the world had changed, and more situations were internationally regarded as requiring collective
action. The global changes had raised the expectations of other states regarding Germany’s willingness to engage in combat operations abroad. Nevertheless, in the 1990s, Germany initially participated mostly in non-combat missions (often so-called blue-helmet missions of United Nations; Pradetto, 2006). In 1991, German troops were stationed in Turkey to help protect this state against a possible attack from Iraq (Bierling, 2014). Germany further sent a mine sweeper to the Persian Gulf after the Iraqi army had surrendered following the international military campaign. Germany also provided substantial financial support to this campaign. Between 1992 and 1995, Germany participated in several multilateral missions in the dissolving Yugoslav Republic, Cambodia and Somalia. The 2,400 German soldiers in the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia in 1996 marked the first substantial foreign mission of the Bundeswehr. This operation meant the end of the “Kohl doctrine” that referred to the objective not to station any German troops in areas where the army of the Nazi government had been fighting during WWII.

The Schröder government showed a higher willingness to engage in combat operations than the previous one (Wagener, 2006). This was exemplified by its decision in 1999 to send Tornado planes to Kosovo to attack ground targets. The NATO air strikes sought to end the violence in the Serbian province Kosovo between Serbian troops and police staff on the one hand and Albanian civilians and resistance fighters on the other hand (Bierling, 2014). In Kosovo, Germany used offensive military force abroad for the first time since World War II (Miskimmon, 2009). This “taboo-breaking involvement” in a foreign military mission was an important marking point in the militarisation of German foreign policy. The decision on this mission reflected both constitutional and political changes (Van der Wusten and Dijkink, 2002). chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) and Minister of Foreign Affairs Joshka Fisher (the Greens) supported the German involvement in the NATO mission against Serbia without UN-mandate because part of the population of Serbia was massively threatened by its own government. Nevertheless, the joint government declaration of the two left-wing government parties SPD and Greens referred to the maintenance of the UN monopoly on decisions that involved the use of violence against states by other states (Bierling, 2014). It also stressed the importance of peace as a foundation of Germany’s foreign policy. In his personal statements, Joshka Fischer referred to the Holocaust (Fried, 2010). According to Bierling (2014), the use of such a strong historical analogy showed that the doubt about the rightfulness of the air strikes within his own party (the Greens) was substantial.

31 See also section 6.3.
Following the Kosovo mission, Germany increasingly used military foreign policy instruments in the 2000s (Wagener, 2006). One month before the Al Qaida attacks on the US in September 2001, a majority in the German parliament supported a Bundeswehr mission in Macedonia (Bierling, 2014). Furthermore, during the government of Schröder, sometimes more than 10,000 German troops were operating abroad (Wagener, 2006). This was rather high as compared to the peak of 2,800 under the Kohl governments in the 1990s. In fact, the German army developed into an intervention army in the early 2000s, reflecting fewer doubts in foreign policy circles about sending troops to areas outside the NATO states (Miskimmon, 2009). The 2006 White Paper of the German government officially announced this new role of the German army in Germany's foreign policy. The German army should be able to operate around the world (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2009). The number of total German troops on foreign missions was 14,000, involved in five simultaneous missions at most (Miskimmon, 2009). Nonetheless, Germany’s capacity to intervene was limited by decisions of the Schröder government to increase the presence of the German army abroad without sufficiently raising the defence budget (Wagener, 2006). Accordingly, the achievements of Germany's foreign military missions have been constrained by budgetary restrictions (Hough, 2009). These constraints concern both the level and effectiveness of defence spending (Miskimmon and Paterson, 2009). Miskimmon (2009, p. 113) speaks in this regard of a “significant under-investment in the transformation of the Bundeswehr.” In all, the will and capacity of the German army to intervene abroad, as well as the militarisation of foreign policy, have remained controversial issues in Germany.

4.6 Implementation and Summary

This chapter demonstrates that geopolitical reasoning in Germany offers valuable issues for critical geopolitical research. One of them concerns Germany's engagement with the ‘War on Terror.’ This is an appealing research theme, since the ‘War on Terror’ is “not an objective condition, but rather a social construction in which certain interpretations of the world became dominant, excluding other possible constructions which might not legitimate military intervention” (Solomon, 2012, p. 911). In this regard it is of importance that Germany has a different language than the US, raising the question of how particular symbols from the American 'War on Terror' are engaged with in the German context. In other words, how did Germany make sense of a 'War’ that was conceived, conceptualised and designed in the US? For example, contrary to the United States, nationalism is a troublesome term in Germany. Most of its citizens do not have a problem with living in their state and being part of it, but are reluctant to be
This difference is well described by Dittmer (2013a, p. 181): “If something is national, it is simply associated with a particular nation [while nationalist refers to cultivating] a particular vision of the nation-state and its role in the world.” Moreover, the construction of the German identity is highly problematic as a consequence of Germany’s role in WWII. The constructed difference between contemporary Germany and Germany under the Nazi government (1933-1945) is a case in point. This construction of difference with a past version of the national ‘self’ is quite uncommon in the United States, Actually, the contemporary American nation is frequently constructed as being similar to the American nation in the 18th century (Ó Tuathail, 2006b). Furthermore, contrary to the US, Germany does not have a traditional militarisation of foreign policy. This was reflected by conflicting angles on foreign military missions of Germany between and within political parties. Accordingly, decision processes that are related to the will and capacity of Germany to intervene are more complicated than in the US. The controversial nature of the militarisation of foreign policy is rooted as well in the Nazi past of Germany. This past also explains why politicians in Germany are reluctant to speak of ‘war’. This exemplifies the importance of language in geopolitical reasoning, and another interesting difference between Germany and the US.

The two last sections further show that Germany’s foreign policy and national identity have always mutually influenced each other (Hellmann et al, 2014). A key example is that “in today’s Germany, national identity and foreign policy [...] still seem firmly based on awareness of German perpetration in the past ” (Niven, 2006, p. 16). The mutual construction of national identity and foreign policy applies to other states as well, such as the United States (Campbell 1998; Hansen, 2006). What Germany and the United States further have in common, with all other states, are “[p]ractices of differentiation and modes of exclusion” in foreign policy (Campbell, 1998, p. 196). This thesis analyses representations of Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ that were undoubtedly the result of such practices and modes as well.

This and the previous two chapters conclude that text-image relations, frames and Germany offer appealing research opportunities to critical geopolitics. The next chapter develops an analytical framework to seize these opportunities. The framework is designed to analyse geopolitical frames in textual(-visual) representations during Germany’s ‘War on Terror.’
5 Methodology: Geopolitical Framing Analysis

5.1 Introduction

"[A]ny frame that delineates a world [...] may be considered problematic" (Gaye Tuchman, 1978)

This chapter introduces the analytical framework that this thesis applies to realise the research opportunities for critical geopolitics that the previous three chapters identified. To recall, the first opportunity is the application of social semiotic methods to study text-image relations in representations. The role of such relations, or more broadly multimodality, in meaning-making processes has been implicitly acknowledged in earlier work in critical geopolitics. The acknowledgement has nonetheless not been followed by an exploration of the analytical opportunities of social semiotics. The second opportunity concerns the introduction of a more rigorous approach towards framing than those that have so far been developed in critical geopolitics. The third opportunity is the analysis of geopolitical frames during Germany’s ‘War on Terror.’

Before the methods to study geopolitical and multimodal frames are introduced, the next section critically reflects on positionality. What is the background of the author of this thesis and how can this situatedness affect the findings of the thesis? The remaining sections in this chapter take into account that "[m]ethods are techniques for [among other things] conducting interpretations in a transparent and retroductable way" (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 16). Accordingly, they clarify how the research process has been designed. The structure of these sections further takes on board methodological insights from Geise et al (2013) and Potthoff (2012). A key premise is that concepts to study geopolitical framing need to be both theoretically well-embedded and practically well-defined in order to connect them with the empirical data (operationalisation; Dahinden, 2006). The first of the research design sections critically examines the academic literature on frames and framing. The next section then conceptualises geopolitical frames, geopolitical framing and geopolitical imaginations. This process takes the definitions of geographical imaginations and geopolitical imagination of respectively Bialasiewicz (2008) and Dittmer (2010) as a starting point. The underlying theoretical assumptions are clarified as well, in line with the observation of Dodds (2005, p. 26) that scholars can only make meaningful geopolitical claims if
they "consider very carefully the ontological and epistemological basis from which [they] make [their] claims about the world." The next section continues with the operationalisation of geopolitical frames. It explains the inductive and deductive aspects of the analytical framework. It also introduces the geopolitical frame categories of this framework and their geopolitical frames. Then follow two sections on the conceptualisation and operationalisation of multimodal frames. The first of them reflects on the thesis assumptions concerning semiotic modes and text-image relations. The second one discusses the role of geopolitical framing devices in the identification of geopolitical frames in textual-visual representations. The final section summarises the implications of this chapter for the next chapters.

5.2 Positionality

This chapter opens with some reflections on the positionality of the author since it affects all decisions about the next sections of the chapter. This section pays tribute to the observation of Haraway (1988, p. 583, emphasis in original) that "all eyes, including our own organic ones, are active perceptual systems, building on translations and specific ways of seeing, that is, ways of life." As a result, (political) geographers do not only describe the world, but also help shape it (Painter and Jeffrey, 2009). In the words of (Toal/Ó Tuathail, 2013, p. xx), "critical geopolitics [is] inevitably a form of geopolitics itself". Critical geopolitical scholars are part of the world that they critically reflect on, and this situatedness should be acknowledged in their studies. David Storey (2005, p. 995) notes that this in fact applies to all disciplines: "[t]he academy is far from a politically neutral arena". In line with this perspective, critical geopolitics has widely adopted the related view of feminist geographers (e.g. Rose, 1997; Hyndman 2004; Dowler and Sharp, 2011) that geographical knowledge always needs to be accompanied by a contextualisation of the background of its producer. Dodds (2005, p. 228) for example is very clear and concise what positionality means in practice: "my reflections of global geopolitics should be seen for what they are: partial, situated and unquestionably contestable." Feminist geographers also disapprove of the lack of variety in the backgrounds of critical geopolitical scholars (e.g. Dowler and Sharp, 2011). Therefore, it important to note here that I am a Dutch ('Western'), white and male scholar, and how I think it affects my work.

32 One should add that the other senses are important as well in how people experience their external environment (Stöckl, 2004)

33 I fully concur with sociologist Steph Lawler (2014, p. 187, f. 1) that "Western' is a conceptual rather than a geographic term" and that "[language] always fails us [...] in these terms." Or as
One key question in this regard is whether my not being a citizen of the states I analyse is a bad thing. Here I would agree with James Sidaway (1992, p. 406) that "there are no simple answers." I have never been to Afghanistan, but that does not automatically limit the potential merits of my research. In the words of Hutcheon (2002, p. 7), it is "not a study of mimetic mirroring." I also took note of the observations in Jonathan Mendel's excellent piece on Afghanistan (2010), where he convincingly argues that the state is as diverse, complex and dynamic as any other state. Furthermore, drawing on Haraway (1988), any knowledge production of Afghanistan, or the analysis hereof, by either Afghans or non-Afghans would always be situated.

Regarding my focus on practical and popular geopolitics in Germany, knowledge of the context in which these representations have been produced is necessary. In that respect, it is important to note my engagement with this state that started when I was still a little boy. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, this engagement was limited to infrequent visits to Germany, seeing this state on the television news and reading newspaper articles about it at times. Since 2005, I have gradually stepped up my engagement with political, cultural and linguistic aspects of this state thanks to over 20 visits to different parts of the Germany. These visits were for leisure, professional assignments and fieldwork for this study. Next to direct encounters with Germans, I have also increasingly engaged with representations from that state that are not directly related to my theme and dataset. I have watched at least one German police TV series a week since 2002. Some of these police series are well-known for their critical engagement with timely societal issues. Furthermore, I read the German weekly quality newspaper Die Zeit in detail in 2012/13, which taught me particularly the ins and outs of Germany's internal divisions.

Moreover, I did a 26-week German course (C1 level) at the Goethe Institute in Amsterdam in 2011/12. The course improved particularly my knowledge of the complicated German grammar, my ability to write in German and my understanding of less literal German phrases (Redewendungen). I have since maintained my German level through regular conversations in German with native speakers from Austria, Germany and Switzerland on different occasions. Furthermore, I actively engaged with German academic literature during the last 24 months of my PhD, and continued watching German TV series. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that the way I translate the German texts in the dataset affects my research findings. Drawing on Professor of Gilian Rose (2008, p. 217) notes, the 'West' "refers more to a set of cultural values than to a physical location."

The same applies to knowledge production of Germany.
Translation and Intercultural Studies Anthony Pym (1992, p. 234) and Professor of Linguistics Paul Chilton (2004, p.211, f. 4), I see "translating as discursive work" and "an interpretation process" of which the result is once more a representation. As Campbell (1998) notes, representations can never be neutral, and this applies to my work as well. As translator of the relevant parts of my dataset, I see it as my responsibility, "as both the receiver and producer of text, [to perceive] the meaning potential of particular choices within the cultural and linguistic community of the source text and [relay] that same potential, by suitable linguistic means, to a target readership" (Mason, 1994, p. 23).

As Kearns (1984, p. 23) observes, "[g]eographers are obviously influenced by a wide range of factors external to the narrower concerns identified by their professional labels." In this regard, it is important to note that I have been involved in various activities of the German military (Bundeswehr), British military (MoD) and NATO (HQ SACT) while writing my PhD. To start, I gave talks, organised workshops and moderated panel discussions on five different occasions for the Germany military. All the sessions were about themes related to my three key research interests: geopolitics, media representations and country risk. During these sessions, I also talked informally about my research and the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan. Two of these appearances were followed by a related contribution to the Geopolitical Yearbook of the Bundeswehr, and I wrote a paper on national power for their geopolitical department.

In the UK, I participated in a consulting session at Royal Holloway with British army officers, on invitation by one of my supervisors. They were looking for different perspectives around the UK on the global future for the "Global Strategic Trends - Out to 2045" publication. This was published in 2014 by the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) of the British Ministry of Defence (MoD). Then Warwick University invited me to engage in a scenario building session that they had organised together with University of Bologna for NATO (ACT). With around 40 experts in various fields from around the world, I explored possible global, regional and national futures. After that, I was asked to moderate discussions between NATO experts on possible future threats to the member states of this organisation. These discussions took place in Shrivenham at the earlier mentioned DCDC of the British Ministry of Defence (MoD). Finally, I attended a NATO seminar on the achievements of ISAF in Afghanistan in The Hague, once more by invitation. During all my appearances in military circles, I made known my critical approach towards geopolitical knowledge. The resulting discussions were however always held in a good atmosphere. For some of my activities for the Bundeswehr, MoD and NATO, I received financial compensation. Overall, the
compensation accounts for a minor part of my total PhD funding. Moreover, I have never been dependent on it at any stage, and I have never been asked to change my research in any way in return for the compensation.

In line with the observation of Kim England (1994, p. 182) that "a more reflexive geography must require careful consideration of the consequences of the interactions with those being investigated", the engagement with the work of scholars in critical geopolitics and critical discourse analysis has had a far more profound impact on my work than the conversations with army officers. The following quote from Agnew (2003, p. 3) has been most influential in my writing and teaching:

"[t]he world is actively spatialized, divided up, labeled, sorted out into a hierarchy of places of greater or lesser ‘importance’ by political geographers, other academics and political leaders. This process provides the geographical framing within which political elites and mass publics act in the world in pursuit of their own identities and interests."

In addition, I agree with Agnew (2003) that the drawing of boundaries between societies is not wrong as such, but in fact inevitable in order to make their existence possible. The following observation of Orgad (2012, p. 55) is also very relevant in this context: "difference has a divided legacy. It is necessary for the production of meaning, the formation of language, culture and identity, but at the same time it is threatening, a site of hostility towards and anxieties about the other." As this PhD argues, the (re)production of geopolitical imaginations, and their mobilisation in the foreign policy debate, should however always be subject to critical reflection. In fact, I agree with many critical geopolitical scholars (e.g. Ingram and Dodds, 2009) that the ‘War on Terror’ was not inevitable and that the American government should have considered non-military ways to respond to the attacks by Al Qaida against the United States in 2001.

In practical terms, this thesis concurs with Strüver (2007, p. 691) that “the assumption either to find an author’s subjective, underlying intention for a text or to find the “true, objective” meaning of a text has to be rejected, but the disclosure and control of the interpretative process – as general hermeneutic claim – are adopted” (Strüver, 2007, p. 691). Philosophical hermeneutics is relevant in this regard since it seeks to investigate the nature of human understanding (Gadamer, 1989). The meaning that an observer assigns to an observed object does not depend on the object as such, but on the

35 Also cited in section 3.6 in another context.
observer’s prejudices. Accordingly, someone who analyses a text must be “aware of one’s own bias, so that the text can present itself in all its otherness and thus assert its own truth against one’s own [prejudices]” (ibid, p. 271-272). The stress that Strüver puts on openness on how a representation is interpreted by the scholar is reflected by the systematic nature of the analytical framework. Moreover, drawing on Müller and Reuber (2006), the interpretations of representations in this thesis are considered as reconstructions of these representations. In other words, the findings of this thesis are another form of geopolitics.

Following aforementioned reflections, I would rather argue that, in the words of Moisio et al (2011, p. 248), my "situatedness [is a resource] for knowledge production" than that the "openness about [my] positionality can reduce its negative impacts." In my view, I can reduce the effects of my positionality most effectively by being as explicit and open as possible about my methodology, interpretations and translations. Also relevant in this regard is the reference of Woon (2013) to "the instability of [his] positionalities, subjectivities and emotionalities". After all, my positionality may have a plural, and as Foucault (1988, p. 14) suggests, may even be dynamic:

“When people say, ‘Well, you thought this a few years ago and now you say something else,’ my answer is …[laughs] ‘Well, do you think I have worked like that all those years to say the same thing and not to be changed?’ This transformation of one’s self by one’s own knowledge is, I think, something rather close to the aesthetic experience. Why should a painter work if he is not transformed by his own painting?”

5.3 Frames and Framing

To conceptualise geopolitical frames in a way that enables an advancement of the critical geopolitical research agenda, we need to return section 3.2. The definition by Bialasiewicz (2008, p. 71) of geographical imaginations is a valuable starting point for this endeavour: “the highly normative and normalizing assumptions regarding territory, sovereignty and identity and the necessary relations between these same.” This definition is highly relevant here for three reasons. First, Bialasiewicz (2008) does not clarify how she identifies these imaginations in texts. In other words, she does not make explicit why she includes (and excludes) particular words in (from) her analysis. Her analysis does however give valuable examples of the words that could suggest the presence of geographical imaginations in texts with her observation that Europe is represented “as 'uncertain', 'complicated', ‘contradictory’, even ‘messy’” (Bialasiewicz, 2008, p. 71). Words that are used to describe a particular place can in her view be
5 Methodology: Geopolitical Framing Analysis

used to identify the underlying assumptions regarding that place (e.g. EU). Second, the inclusion of the word ‘normalizing’ in the definition of Bialasiewicz (2008) suggests that normality is subject to a process, and that its underlying assumptions can be questioned. Third, one key aspect of geographical imaginations is in her view that they have (geo)political effects. This and the other remaining sections in this chapter explore to what extent the conceptualisation by Bialasiewicz (2008) can function as a catalyst for further conceptual and methodological innovation within critical geopolitics. Aforementioned observations raise three questions that are leading in this chapter. What are the options for the development of a rigorous and transparent method to identify words (and visual elements) that refer to geopolitical imaginations? Could such a method revolve around the notion that “normality” is subject to an ongoing contest within a society? And could such a method also be used to analyse (geo)political effects of textual (and visual) representations?

To address these questions, this section critically investigates earlier conceptualisations of framing and frames. It is important to acknowledge that, as Entman (2004, p. 9) observes, there are different ways to “frame framing.” The lack of a systematic and widely shared terminology in framing research hampers a thorough comparison between different frame studies (Dahinden, 2006). As a result of the “uncontrolled terminological growth”, fruitful dialogues within academia about frames are difficult (Dahinden, 2006, p. 199; translation by author). Generally speaking, framing refers to processes of meaning production in Communication Studies (Herbers and Volpers, 2013). More concrete, it concerns the construction of an issue that is often disputed (Nelson et al, 1997). Framing can for example be done by reproducing “ways of understanding the world [with] verbal and visual symbolic resources” (Reese, 2003, p. 11) or by “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making connections among them”

A (representation-based frame) is the empirically observable result of framing (Herbers and Volpers, 2013). In the words of Reese (2003, p. 15), it is “a moment in a chain of signification.” While framing concerns active meaning-making processes, frames are the outcomes of these processes. An observation from more than 25 years ago gives a still timely sketch of two extreme poles in framing research: “there is an

36 In line with Dittmer (2010) and explained below, the thesis speaks of geopolitical imaginations instead of geographical ones.

37 Framing research is not only done in communication/media studies, but also in various academic disciplines (Potthoff, 2012).

38 In this section and the next, “representation-based frame” is used to as catch-all term where applicable to refer to media frames, text frames and frames. This is to prevent terminological confusion.
inherent ambiguity in the use of a word that has two somewhat different meanings in English – frame as in picture frame and frame as in the frame of a building” (Gamson et al., 1992, pp. 385). The latter conceptualisation is exemplified by Entman (e.g. 2004), being in fact the most widely used one (Potthoff, 2012). A frame is conceptualised as a coherent set of two to four elements (functions; Entman, 2004). A frame consists at least of problem definition(s) and problem solution(s), possibly joined by problem cause(s) and/or underlying moral values. For example, a widespread problem definition based on the attacks of Al Qaida against the United States in 2001 was the death of thousands of civilians as a result of an aggressive act against the United States. The problem causes in this example were the government of Afghanistan, Al Qaida and their leaders. The moral values concerned the evil nature of aforementioned actors, and the problem solution was the intervention in Afghanistan in 2001. Potthoff (2012) acknowledges that the four frame elements are helpful to structure the analysis of frames and clarify the presentation of the findings. He nonetheless criticises Entman's framework because the selection of these four elements has not been theoretically or empirically supported. Moreover, the definitions of these elements are rather vague, as reflected by the large differences between the definitions in other research that was based on this conceptualisation of frames.

As noted by Dahinden (2006), there are many different definitions of frames. Among the many examples in the literature are "central organizing idea[s]" (Gamson and Modigliani, 1987, p. 149); "organizing principles" (Reese, 2003, p. 11); "structures of meaning" (Hertog and McLeod, 2003, pp. 139-140); "interpretive structures" (Norris et al, 2003, pp. 10-11); "network[s] of judgments" (Matthes, 2009, p. 143, translation by author); and "pattern[s] of statements" (Potthoff, 2012, p. 62; translation by author). What most conceptualisations have in common is that frames are used to give meaning to an otherwise incomprehensibly complex reality (Gitlin, 1980). According to Van Gorp (2010, p. 104), “people require a clear explanation why things happen, partly because they want to have the feeling that they can control their environment. Frames can help to fulfil this need.” They do so by structuring information and reducing complexity (Dahinden, 2006). As a result, frames “promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution” (Entman, 2004, p. 5). It is important to stress that frames are not only present in representations, but also play a role in the production and reception of these representations (Entman, 1991).

Cognitive frames are a key factor in the last two processes. They are present in the thoughts and memory of human beings (Potthoff, 2012). A cognitive frame is based on the assumption of sociologist Irving Goffman (1974) that a human being can never achieve a complete overview of all that happens in the world (around her/him). As a
result, (s)he has no access to all information required for everyday decisions. Following this line of reasoning, frames are cognitive tools to interpret, classify and understand experiences by reducing their complexity. They leave out many details and focus on particular patterns. These cognitive frames function as shortcuts that people use to make sense of their experiences. Taking a similar angle, Tversky and Kahneman (1981, p. 453) define a frame as "a decision maker's conception of the acts, outcomes, and contingencies associated with a particular choice." In other words, cognitive frames are mental constructs (Potthoff, 2012). Representation-based and cognitive frames are assumed to mutually constitute each other. The first kind of frame can have a cognitive impact on human beings, but cognitive factors also can affect the way in which people interpret (reconstruct) a textual frame. However, both concepts are subject to many other influences as well. The interpretation of a representation-based frame for example depends on the knowledge base of the receiver. Knowledge is often socially shared among groups, with small differences possible among its members. Representation-based frames can therefore be interpreted similarly in homogenous groups, but differently among other groups with fundamentally different knowledge bases. As a result, there is likely a difference between the cognitive frame that a person develops based on a representation-based frame and this latter frame itself. Moreover, people cannot make cognitive duplicates of their environment, so they may not observe a representation-based frame completely. Alternatively, the frames that people observe in representations may not be completely as intended by the producers of these representations. Furthermore, there does not exist a reliable method to identify schemata because the scientific understanding of the human mind is not adequate (Potthoff, 2012). Based on these considerations, Potthoff (2012) prefers to use the concept schema (plural: schemata or schemas) instead of cognitive frame. This demarcates it stronger from a representation-based frame. Entman (1993, p. 53) defines schemata as "mentally stored clusters of ideas that guide individuals' processing of information." Norris et al (2003) assume that schemata help journalists and politicians to design their messages in a way that makes them easy to understand for their audiences, while they help people to understand the messages of these politicians, journalists and others.

39 After all, the so-called “intentional approach” towards meanings is “flawed” (Hall, 2013, p. 11)

40 Some scholars who have tried this, asked open questions and considered the answers as elements of schemata (Potthoff, 2012). However, this raises complex questions. Are people aware of their schemata, can they verbalize their schemata and, if so, do verbalized schemata have the same meaning as the cognitive ones?

41 Frame and schema have different, at times opposing, meanings among scholars (Dahinden, 2006). This exemplifies the lack of a unified academic language to speak of frames.
The difference between frames and schemata is important in order to critically reflect on the conceptualisation of framing as "an ideological contest" that involves "different actors with competing goals, interests, or messages." (Pan and Kosicki, 2003, pp. 40/48). Not only media or elites produce representation-based frames, but all individuals and groups in a society do. Actors have different abilities to get their frames widely accepted. Each actor involved in political processes seeks to raise support for her or his ideas by "altering the frames or interpretive dimensions by which the facts are evaluated" (Miller and Parnell Riechert, 2003, p. 107). Criticism of existing frames can take different forms (Cooper, 2010). Actors can raise the appeal of their frames by suggesting links between them and the news values in order to get more positive attention in media (Pan and Kosicki, 2003). Alternatively, they can raise this appeal by constructing links between their frames and widely shared values, to get more support in policy circles. Framing as a contest is about "the applicability of semantic or visual devices in communication to underlying culturally shared audience schemas" (Scheufele and Scheufele, 2010, p. 128). Reframing concerns the offering of alternative interpretations than those from an existing frame (Cooper, 2010). Important in this regard is that a representation-based frame cannot simply be imposed on its recipient in the form of an identical schema (Potthoff, 2012). This further raises questions about the effects of representation-based frames on human beings. Such effects can take the form of a change in the cognition of the recipients of such frames, the evaluation of issues by the recipients and behaviour of the recipients. The effect of one particular representation-based frame on one particular human being is difficult to establish since such a frame "changes its identity in the process of being observed by a cognitive system" (Potthoff, 2012, p. 221). Such an effect depends both on its representational manifestation and among other factors knowledge, emotions and values of the recipient. It further depends on how credible the frame source is in the eyes of the recipient (Druckman, 2001). Another complicating factor in the assessment of representation-based frame effects is the replacement of the traditional bounded places of media production and media consumption by virtual places (Adams, 2007). This has further blurred the boundaries between popular geopolitics and practical geopolitics (Pinkerton and Benwell, 2014) and between traditional media and society at large (Debrix, 2007). It has therefore become more difficult to understand how geopolitical representations conveyed by (traditional) media are processed in different places (Adams, 2007). The ways in which media content has been circulated has

42 This has also implications for academic research since a representational frame "will not by definition present itself in the same way to the academic scholar and other recipients" (Potthoff, 2012, p. 221). This issue is addressed in section 5.2.

43 This and some of the next observations are also made in other context in section 2.4.
become another important factor in how representational frames affect schemata of their recipients (Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2010). To summarise, assessing the effects of representation-based frames on an individual human being is extremely difficult. Human beings are complex research objects in this regard because of the many factors that influence their meaning-making processes (Potthoff, 2012).

5.4 Conceptualisation of Geopolitical Frames

Drawing on the critical examination of the literature on frames and framing above, geopolitical frames are now conceptualised. This conceptualisation is based on several considerations. An important one is that geopolitical frames are partially defined in terms that are reminiscent of some earlier definitions of geopolitical imaginations. This connects geopolitical frames directly to earlier critical geopolitical studies of representations, stimulating the conceptual debate. Moreover, geopolitical imaginations are defined as well, to put geopolitical frames better in perspective. As noted in section 3.2, Dittmer (2010) prefers to speak of geopolitical imagination (singular) where Bialasiewicz (2008) speaks of geographical imaginations (plural). This thesis prefers the plural to stress the variety of these imaginations, their political significance and the need to question them (Gregory, 2009). Where geopolitical imaginations are conceptualised in this thesis as schemata, geopolitical frames are representation-based frames. Paraphrasing Scheufele and Scheufele (2010, p. 111), geopolitical imaginations are seen as cognitive tools for information processing that manifest themselves in geopolitical frames. In other words, geopolitical frames are assumed to be indicative of geopolitical imaginations. This assumption connects the meta research question of this thesis, concerning the role of geopolitical imaginations in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’, to the underlying central research questions that are about geopolitical frames. Another important element in the conceptualisation of geopolitical frames is their frame of reference. While earlier studies focus for example on issues and controversies (Nelson et al, 1997); issues and events (Reese, 2003; Entman (2004); and ideas (Hammond, 2007), the analysis of frames in this thesis revolves around states. This focus is rooted in the research questions that focus on how various states have been made meaningful during Germany’s ‘War on Terror’.

44 Original quote: “Frames are cognitive tools for information processing (cognitive level), which [...] manifest themselves in discourse products (textual level).” (Scheufele and Scheufele, 2010, p. 111).

45 As noted in section 5.3, a one-on-one relationship between these frames and imaginations cannot be assumed.

46 This is not to disregard the valuable literature in critical geopolitics on power relations on other scales such the local and the body (e.g. Hyndman, 2004).
As explained below, geographical imaginations as conceptualised by Bialasiewicz (2008) have the strongest impact on the conceptualisation of frames in this thesis. Preference is here however given to the adjective geopolitical, as does Dittmer (2010) with geopolitical imagination. This adjective better reflects the importance of power and security in these frames. Where the conceptualisation of geopolitical frames does however draw on the definition of geographical imaginations by Bialasiewicz (2008), is the inclusion of territory and identity. Frames are valuable analytical constructs in this regard since they "draw boundaries, set up categories [and] define some ideas as out and others in" (Reese, 2007, p. 150). The thesis assumes that national territory is not a fixed spatial configuration, but subject to continual processes of unmaking and making (Elden, 2009). Re-phrasing Elden (2009, p. xxviii) in terms of the framework of Entman (2004), territory actually played a central role in the ‘War on Terror’ in terms of both problem definitions (“imaginaries of threat”) and policy solutions (“practices of retribution”). Moreover, national identity is assumed to be an ongoing process in which boundaries between the ‘self’ and the ‘other’ are drawn (Neumann, 1996). Frames play an important role in this process (Pan and Kosicki, 2003), also by constructing roles of subjects that are part of the frame (Hertog and McLeod, 2003).

The conceptualisation of geopolitical frames in the thesis also includes sovereignty, like the definition of geographical imaginations by Bialasiewicz (2008). However, this term is changed to government power in the definition of geopolitical frames. Sovereignty refers to a state that “holds supreme authority domestically and independent authority internationally” (Jackson, 2007, p. 6). Authority is the right to act, and government authority (i.e. sovereignty) either exists or not. With only two possible values (i.e. yes or no), authority does not pay tribute to the potential of frames to study more than two possible interpretations. Power is a more valuable concept to include in the definition of geopolitical frames because

“it is relative, a matter of degree, of more or less. Power is capability and capacity, strength or weakness, in regard to the policies and activities a government or any other actor undertakes, and in relation to other actors it is involved with” (Jackson, 2007, p. 15).

Next to territory, identity and sovereignty (re-named), security is included as well in the definition of geopolitical frames. This is based on the observation of Dittmer (2010) that the geopolitical imagination mediates notions of danger. Security refers here to the survival of both states and individual human beings (respectively the narrow and broad approach; Jarvis and Holland, 2015). Human security revolves around harm inflicted by political violence (Kaldor, 2007).
5 Methodology: Geopolitical Framing Analysis

Finally, instead of focussing on assumptions like the definition of geographical imaginations by Bialasiewicz (2008), the conceptualisation of geopolitical frames revolves around constructions. It is assumed that territory has no meaning of itself and only becomes meaningful when people represent it (Strüver, 2007). The same constructivist approach (Dahinden, 2006) is taken towards identity, government power and security of states. Accordingly, the thesis is “not concerned with how representations reflect or fail to reflect reality, but how they create meaning and compete over its construction.” (Orgad, 2012, p. 25). In line with this argument, framing is conceptualised as a contest. After all, being geopolitical is about among other things challenging the notions of common sense that are constructed by the representations of foreign policy issues by other geopolitical actors (Flint, 2017). Aforementioned considerations resulted in the following conceptualisations of geopolitical frames, geopolitical imaginations and geopolitical framing:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Geopolitical frames are textual and visual constructions of the territory, identity, government power and/or security of states.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical imaginations are cognitive constructions of the territory, identity, government power and/or security of states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geopolitical framing refers to the contest between politicians, journalists and other actors over the rightfulness of their own constructions of the territory, identity, government power and/or security of states.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In terms of Entman (2004), the focus of the thesis is on problem definitions in the form of the constructed states. It is important to stress that problem definitions are not always negative (Van Gorp, 2010). Problem solutions take the form of voting behaviour (in parliament) and the implied foreign policy preference (on magazine covers). The connection between problem definitions and problem solutions in foreign policy decisions is one of the foci of critical geopolitics, since “[i]mages and other forms of representation of world politics are profoundly important in shaping patterns and responses to world political events” (Dodds, 2005, p. 72). A telling example is provided by Campbell (2007), concerning the definition of past famines in African states in British media. Representations of famine that would emphasise the social aspects of famine (e.g. continued war) instead of the common individual ones (e.g. child that is dying) are likely to result in a completely different policy response. The first

47 As observed in chapter 3, their impact on foreign policy is a key aspect of concepts such as geopolitical codes (Taylor and Flint, 2011), geopolitical imaginations (Robinson, 2008), geopolitical narratives (Agnew, 2012), geopolitical scripts (Ó Tuatháil, 1992, 2002), geopolitical storylines (O’Loughlin et al, 2004) and geopolitical visions (Dijkink, 1996).
representation focuses on the cause of the famine and suggests that a process of conflict resolution is needed. The second representation however focuses on the consequence of the famine, leaving aside a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of the famine is sought. The resulting preferred foreign policy option is now emergency aid. These examples confirm the observation of Ó Tuathail (2002, p. 622) that "[h]ow problems are defined and delimited — what is included in or excluded from the description and specification of a policy challenge — is crucial in understanding how geopolitics operates". The conceptualisation of geopolitical frames in particular and the analytical framework in general can also contribute to a better understanding of how the same frame can be used to argue in favour and against a particular issue (Van Gorp, 2010). The framework further enables the analysis of the (deliberate) ignorance of geographical complexity (Ó Tuathail, 1996). As Flint and Mamadouh (2015, p. 1) note, many geopolitical realities are still “based on gross simplifications of the world’s complexities.

5.5 Operationalisation of Geopolitical Frames

Where conceptualisation is about the theoretical foundations of an analysis, operationalisation concerns the subsequent methodological implementation (Lobinger and Geise, 2013). Therefore, this section formulates the procedures to identify and interpret frames in representations. This so-called operationalisation is insufficient in many studies according to Dahinden (2006). A difficulty with the identification of frames in texts is that they are often present in a latent, and not manifest, way (Dahinden, 2006). The scholar should therefore make clear that the identification of frames is not a purely subjective and random process. The process should further be applicable to other texts outside the dataset (validity). Moreover, it should be resulting in the same or similar findings when repeated by other scholars (reliability). Therefore, it is crucial that the scholar defines clear, inter-subjectively understood criteria for the presence of frames in representations.

Two approaches to doing so have been often used in framing research. The first one is the qualitative-inductive approach towards frames. Frames are defined during the analysis of the dataset, without explicitly formulating any frame beforehand (Scheufele and Scheufele, 2010). This approach requires clarity from the scholar about how (s)he has identified the frames in a dataset. Its systematic nature implies, in the words of Ambrosio and Lange (2014, p. 538) that

“it does not begin with an argument and seek to justify it, but rather allows the data itself to drive the conclusions. While this may at times appear more
descriptive than analytical, it has the advantage of avoiding the danger of selection bias by cherry-picking certain speeches or statements.”

Another analytical strength of qualitative-inductive approach is that its findings are very close to the data (Dahinden, 2006) and can be relatively easily checked by other scholars (Gamson, 1992). This approach further has the potential to "allow for ambiguity, historical contingency [and] the implicit" (Reese, 2003, p. 8) and enables scholars to identify new and/or unknown frames (Dahinden, 2006). An analytical weakness of the qualitative-inductive approach is that it is relatively time-consuming. Moreover, applying this approach generates rather specific frames. This could complicate a comparison of the identified frames with other research, and the use of them in research into representations of other issues.

An alternative to the qualitative-inductive approach is the quantitative-deductive approach, which has also been used frequently. Here, the different frames are defined before the scholar starts analysing the representations in the dataset (Scheufele and Scheufele, 2010). This can be done based on theoretical considerations (Dahinden, 2006). Analytical strengths of this approach are that frames can be defined in relatively abstract and theme-independent terms. This makes a comparison with other framing studies easier. Moreover, the quantitative-deductive approach requires significantly less time from scholars. An analytical weakness of this approach is that it can be unclear how the selected frames come into being and evolve (Van Gorp, 2010). Moreover, this approach tends to have a "reductionist urge to sort media texts and discourses into containers and count their size and frequency" (Reese, 2003, p. 7). It further tends to focus only on what is present in a text, thereby overlooking relevant absences. Finally, the quantitative-deductive approach may overlook potential aspects of framing that result from the interaction between words. Looking ahead to the conceptualisation and operationalisation of multimodal frames in the next two sections, this approach also makes it hard to analyse the role of text-image relations in the identification of frames.

It is not possible to categorically claim which of the two approaches is most valuable for framing research. Their analytical value is context-dependent and related to the research objectives. A third option is the quantitative-inductive approach, which is a blend of aforementioned approaches. This approach is taken in this thesis.

Another key question in the operationalisation of frames is which textual and visual elements are assumed to contribute to particular frames (Lobinger and Geise, 2013). Van Gorp (2010) distinguished between 22 aspects of a representation that could indicate the presence of a frame (figure 5.1).
5 Methodology: Geopolitical Framing Analysis

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<tr>
<td>5. Causal connections</td>
<td>10. Historical examples</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.1 Examples of framing devices (Van Gorp, 2010, p. 91)

Conceptualizing the framing devices of Van Gorp (2010) in a way to make them valuable in the study of geopolitical frames yields the following definition:

**Geopolitical framing devices are words, visual elements and combinations of them that directly or indirectly refer to the territory, identity, government power and/or security of states.**

The use of (geopolitical) framing devices “allows us to examine how the dominance of competing frames can shift over time in public discourse and news media” (Miller and Parnell Riechert, 2003, p. 111). Moreover, the identification of geopolitical framing devices in the analysis of textual(-visual)representations, instead of directly reconstructing geopolitical frames, adds to methodological rigour. It helps the scholar to look at the whole representation more thoroughly. This makes it less likely that a scholar would overlook particular relevant phrases and sentences. Paraphrasing Flint (2017, p. 22), the identification of geopolitical framing devices helps to unpack the ways in which textual (and visual) representations suggest the uniqueness of states “through a combination of physical, social, economic, and political attributes.”

The identification, translation and interpretation of geopolitical framing devices in the parliamentary speeches and written statements48 has been done in Excel (figure 5.2 for example). A practical advantage of Excel is that it eases the processing of data in multiple and transparent steps (Caple, 2013). This step-by-step process contributes to analytical transparency. The translation process can be easily checked by other

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48 The analytical process for the textual-visual representations on the Der Spiegel covers is explained in the next two sections.
scholars by going through relatively short text fragments. Second, it clarifies which parts of the texts are considered most relevant in terms of geopolitical framing, and which are not. Excel can also help raise the methodological rigour with its one-page overviews of all framing devices in a representation. This eases the process of checking for causal relations between framing devices that are not located close to each other. Since the speeches and statements are in German and the thesis is in English, a translation process was required. The left column in figure 5.2 contains a fragment of the original German text. The textual elements that have been used for the geopolitical framing devices in the right column are bold, underlined and followed by a number that matches the number of the related device in the right column. The right column only contains the geopolitical framing devices, in their English translation.

| Herr Präsident! Verehrte Kolleginnen und Kollegen! Ich habe nicht gerade das Gefühl, dass ich mit irgendjemandem im Bett liege. Ich muss aber zugeben, dass es eine verführerische Alternative zu dem wäre, was hier abläuft. Man kann ja einmal darüber nachdenken. Wir sollten uns ernsthaft damit auseinander setzen - das ist der Gegenstand der Diskussion in meiner Fraktion - wie rasch Hilfe für das afganische Volk erfolgen kann (01), für ein Volk, das von Kriegen und Grausamkeiten geschunden ist (02), für ein Volk, das militärische Interventionen - sei es von Großbritannien als Kolonialmacht, sei es von der Sowjetunion oder sei es von den Amerikanern - über sich ergehen lassen musste (03), für ein Volk, auf das Bomben und Raketen abgeworfen worden sind (04) und das von örtlichen Kriegsherren, von Fanatikern und von Mörderbanden ausgeplündert worden ist (05). Das ist unsere Zielsetzung. Wir glauben, dass es nicht so geht, wie es von der Mehrheit hier vorgeschlagen wird. | 01 How quick can support from Germany to Afghanistan be effective; 02 The people of Afghanistan have been damaged by wars and cruelty/barbarity; 03 The people of Afghanistan had to accept military interventions from colonial power Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the US; 04 The people of Afghanistan have been thrown bombs and rockets at; 05 The people of Afghanistan have been plundered by war lords, fanatics and murderous gangs; |

Figure 5.2 Example of translation from German to English of geopolitical framing devices in parliamentary speech

Before continuing with the operationalisation of geopolitical frames, four geopolitical frame categories are defined. This is in line with the implicit call from Nisbet (2010, p. 46) for the development of “a generalizable typology of latent meanings that are directly applicable to understanding a specific issue [in a particular policy field].” In this regard,
Holtz-Bacha and Kaid (2013, p. 400) speak of “frame categories” to refer to “types of frames that can [be] applied across different types of content, different issues, and different countries.” An often cited example concerns the division between thematic frames, where the focus is on structures and other rather abstract contextual features, and episodic frames, where a theme is represented in the form of events and other concrete features (Iyengar, 1991). Moreover, Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) use the frame categories conflict, morality, economy, human interest and attribution of responsibility. They identify frames in texts about European integration and crime through 20 questions that can only be answered by ‘yes’ or ‘no’. Dahinden (2006) finds that all studies that he analysed applied five so-called basic frames in various forms. These are conflict, moral, economy, personalisation and progress. He divides these basic frames into sub-frames, such as efficiency and effectiveness for economy. Of relevance for the geopolitical frame categories of this thesis are the main frames of Gamson (1992). Each main frame has a name of one or two words, and is formed by a series of assumptions and claims of mostly 10-20 sentences. These referred to the definitions, causes and possible solutions to a problem. Examples of main frames in the Arab-Israeli conflict are “Arab intransigence” and “Israeli expansionism” (Gamson, 1992, p. 246). These main frames consist of various sub-frames that are expressed in the form of one to three sentences. A sub-frame that is part of the first main frame is “Arabs blame others, try to escape responsibility; delude themselves; make war and bring suffering on themselves” (Gamson, 1992, p. 253). Another one that is part of the second main frame is “Israel is constantly expanding, trying to take over more and more Arab territory and to dominate its Arab neighbours” (Gamson, 1992, p. 255).

Based on aforementioned observations, geopolitical frame categories are defined as follows:

Geopolitical frame categories assemble several geopolitical frames that are related to one particular aspect of a foreign policy issue. In this thesis, the foreign policy issue concerns Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan.

The formulation of geopolitical frame categories and the geopolitical frames that they contain is based on several considerations. To start, the number of geopolitical frame categories is limited, in line with the advice from Gamson (1992). Dahinden (2006) adds that the number of frames should be limited as well in order to make the findings presentable and understandable. Furthermore, the definitions of the categories and frames acknowledge that “coming up with the names for frames itself involves a kind of framing” (Tankard, 2001, p. 98). Then, contrary to the main frames of Gamson (1992), the categories themselves refer to aspects of an issue, and do not contain explicit
evaluations. Moreover, the definitions of categories and frames are narrowed down where possible in line with a warning from Potthoff (2012). In his view, very broad definitions make it difficult to study frames, since all textual elements could be considered for inclusion in such frames. Finally, the four categories and their frames take into account that clarity is required concerning how each of them can be identified in representations (Reese, 2003). This is done in a deductive way for the geopolitical frame categories, thus being based on earlier academic literature. The geopolitical frames have been based on both the academic literature and the dataset (i.e. mixed approach with deductive and inductive elements). As a result, the inclusion and phrasing of some of these frames are partially based on the geopolitical framing devices that have been identified in the data. This is further explained below for the frames to which this applies. The identification process of the frames is made explicit in the form of questions, drawing on Semetko and Valkenburg (2000).

The geopolitical frame categories in this thesis are (1) will to intervene; (2) militarisation of intervention; (3) capacity to intervene; (4) victims during intervention. The 24 geopolitical frames are introduced below.

The first geopolitical frame category ‘Will to Intervene’ is based on a key issue among German foreign policy makers (Wagener, 2006; Miskimmon, 2009). In this thesis, it refers to the willingness of states to project power in places and on people beyond their borders (Robinson, 2008). The will of a particular state to intervene in another state is assumed to depend on the constructed closeness of the latter state. This closeness is defined in relation to the interests of the former state. More specifically, the will of Germany to intervene in Afghanistan is based on “strategically informed understandings of the relevance and importance [of Afghanistan] to the interests and concerns of [Germany]” (Robinson, 2008, p. 376, emphasis added and paraphrased).

Constructing one particular state as a threat can for example contribute to the will of another state to intervene there. Alternatively, constructing one particular state as inferior and violent could reduce the appeal of an intervention in that state. There is however no automatic relationship between such constructions of other states (geopolitical frames) and actual interventions in other states: “if whole swathes of the world are deemed “anarchic”, then policies combining non-involvement (such as

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49 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.

50 Original words: “strategically informed understandings of the relevance and importance of different places to the interests and concerns of powerful states” (Robinson, 2008, p. 376).
Rwanda) or military intervention (such as Afghanistan) in other cases may be implemented with little need to explain or defend them” (Flint, 2017, p. 85-86).

The focus on the four frames for ‘Will to Intervene’ is on security. Security does not only concern military factors here, but also economic and social ones (Kaldor, 2005; Robinson, 2008). Furthermore, it refers to the national level in this geopolitical frame category (Jarvis and Holland, 2015), whereas individual victims are addressed by the fourth category ‘Victims during Intervention’. The four frames are considered to be supportive of the will to intervene in the debate on Germany’s ISAF mission, but not decisive.

A key aspect in applying the four frames of the ‘Will to Intervene’ category is whether they concern Afghanistan before or, hypothetically, without ISAF. To clarify, if some form of security in Afghanistan is constructed to be low in Afghanistan during the decades before ISAF, it is assumed to be about the will to intervene. However, if security in Afghanistan is seen as low during (despite) the ISAF mission, it is also assumed to be a matter of capacity to intervene. Figure 5.3 presents the four frames in the geopolitical frame category ‘Will to Intervene’. Where frames 1.1, 1.3 and 1.4 are based on aforementioned literature (deductive nature), frame 1.2 is based on the political texts (inductive nature). These texts at times frame Afghanistan as a threat to multiple states or one particular state other than Germany (e.g. United States). In these cases, frame 1.2 applies.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Will to Intervene</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of Germany before/without ISAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of states other than Germany before/without ISAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Afghan governments fail to protect the population of Afghanistan before/without ISAF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Afghan governments fail to bring modernisation and development to Afghanistan before/without ISAF</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.3 Frames in the geopolitical frame category “Will to Intervene”

In order to identify these frames in the data, the following questions were guiding:
Do speeches, statements and covers contain explicit or implicit references to the situation in Afghanistan, either before ISAF started or if ISAF would end immediately, in which

a) Afghanistan poses a threat to only German state or German population? [1.1]
b) Afghanistan poses a threat to one particular state other than Germany? [1.2]
c) Afghanistan poses a threat to multiple states? [1.2]
d) there is war or widespread political violence in Afghanistan [1.3]
e) Afghan government harms the population of Afghanistan? [1.3]
f) unspecified actors harm the population of Afghanistan? [1.3]
g) Afghanistan is a backward or traditional state? [1.4]
h) Afghanistan has low development level, high poverty level, non-democratic political system or poor public services? [1.4]

The second geopolitical frame category is ‘Militarisation of Intervention.’ As noted in the previous chapter, (West) Germany's foreign policy makers traditionally preferred non-military foreign policy instruments over military ones (Maull, 2006a). In the 2000s, Germany engaged increasingly in combat operations, after having done so for the first time in Kosovo in Kosovo in 1999. An exception to Germany's foreign policy objective of re-assuring partner states concerned foreign military missions (Maull, 2006a). Germany however continued to have a preference for military restraint in foreign policy (Miskimmon, 2009). The militarisation of foreign policy and societies has been a key theme in critical geopolitics as well (Farish, 2013). Militarisation is closely related to militarism (Enloe, 2004). Militarism is an ideology that embraces armed violent action. Particularly its assumption that military force is always the best way to reduce tensions is relevant in the German context. Drawing on Enloe (2004), Bernazzoli and Flint (2009, p. 402) define militarisation as “the process of preparing, reshaping, and reorienting society in order to wage wars.” In the broad terms of this thesis, militarisation can be seen as a framing contest in which geopolitical actors manage to increasingly normalise militarism within a society. In more narrow and constructivist terms, it concerns the extent to which the political speeches, written statements of German MPs and the Der Spiegel covers construct the ISAF mission as a combat or war mission. This is particularly important in the German context since "[d]escribing events as ‘war’ can question the legitimacy of the acts of the [state] involved in these events and may invite symbolic distancing from, rather than identification with, that nation" (Orgad, 2012, p. 96). Figure 5.4 presents the four frames in this geopolitical frame category. Here, frames 2.4 and 2.5 have an inductive nature. The first one (frame 2.4) is based on one political text that highlights the importance of words in geopolitical reasoning. As section 7.5 further explains, speaking of a war mission could
have profound legal repercussions for Germany. Frame 2.5 is an example of how geopolitical reasoning can be used for ‘othering’ processes that concern allies. This frame is produced multiple times by the political texts.

### 2. Militarisation of Intervention

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Germany is on a peace/stabilisation mission in Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2 Germany is on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Germany is both on a peace/stabilisation mission and a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Germany’s ISAF mission is not a war mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Other states are on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.4 Frames in the geopolitical frame category “Militarisation of Intervention”**

In order to identify these frames in the data, the following questions were guiding:

1) Do speeches, statements and covers contain explicit claims about ISAF being
   a) a “peace mission” or a “stabilisation mission”? [2.1]
   b) a “war mission” or a “fighting mission”? [2.2]
   c) *both* a “peace mission” or “stabilisation mission” and a “war mission” or “fighting mission”? [2.3]
   d) *not* a “war mission” or “fighting mission”? [2.4]

2) Do speeches, statements and cover contain implicit claims about ISAF or OEF being
   a) a peace/stabilisation mission through references to German army only using violence for defensive purposes or only being involved in peaceful/non-combat operations? [2.1]
   b) a war/fighting mission through references to German army using violence for offensive purposes or being involved in combat/aggressive operations? [2.2]
   c) *both* a peace/stabilisation mission and war/fighting mission through references to German army using violence for both defensive and offensive purposes, or to German army being involved in *both* peaceful/non-combat operations and aggressive/combat operations? [2.3]
   d) a war/fighting mission through references to armies of other states conducting combat/war operations, air strikes or targeted killings? [2.5]
5 Methodology: Geopolitical Framing Analysis

A difficulty with developing this geopolitical framing category concerns the level of linguistic detail with which the labels used for the mission should be analysed. Here the labels “war mission” (in German language *Kriegseinsatz*) and combat mission (in German language *Kampfeinsatz*) refer to the same frames (2.2 or 2.3). Creating a separate frame for each of them could yield more insights into geopolitical framing in the Bundestag. However, a downside would be that the number of frames in the methodology as a whole would further rise. The current number of frames (24) is already rather high as compared to other framing studies.

The third geopolitical frame category ‘Capacity to Intervene’ concerns another controversial issue in Germany’s foreign policy (Wagener, 2006; Miskimmon, 2009). Robinson (2008, p. 354) defines it as “[t]he ability to reach out and broadcast power across the globe [or] to attain a presence and influence events in distant parts of the planet”. States have various resources to project power abroad, such as their economies and armies. Robinson (2008) does however not define power. Traditional notions of power assume that it flows unchallenged from one identifiable, dominant and central place to other subjugated places (Allen, 2008). An alternative perspective comes from Foucault (2003), who claims that power circulates through society and forms networks. In his view, power flows through individuals who can both exercise it and submit to it. The frames for ‘Capacity to Intervene’ require a conceptualisation of power that relates to the textual(-visual) representations in the dataset. Contributors to an edited volume of Maull (2006a) about the power of Germany abroad used policy outcomes to make an assessment of Germany’s power. This was done because “[c]omparing power resources [...] is a notoriously difficult and crude form of measuring power” (Maull, 2006b, p. 6).

Related to the focus on policy outcomes, the frames in the ‘Capacity to Intervene’ category draw on the concept superior power (Smith, 2012). This form of power refers to actions of an actor (in this thesis: Germany) that have an intended impact. Moreover, this geopolitical frame category approaches the capacity to intervene in two different ways. The first three frames are more narrow and revolve around the “logistical capabilities [that] are required to deploy forces, deliver food supplies and arrange the munitions and hardware” (Robinson, 2008, p. 377). The other four frames focus on policy outcomes, like aforementioned edited volume (Maull, 2006a). These frames are about the intended impact of Germany and/or ISAF on Afghanistan, drawing on superior power (Smith, 2012).

Figure 5.5 presents the eight frames in this geopolitical frame category. The difference between frames 3.2 and 3.3 has a partially inductive nature. When referring to the
lacking capacity of the German army to intervene, the political texts suggest both conditional reasons (such as the defence budget and size of the troops; frame 3.2) and unconditional reasons (frame 3.3). Two other frames in this geopolitical frame category (3.4 and 3.5) have a deductive nature and take into account two dimensions of power. The first dimension is “domain” (Baldwin, 2013, p. 275) that refers here to the spatial reach of power (frame 3.5). The other dimension of Baldwin (2013, p. 275) is “scope”, which is about the policy issues where power is assumed (frame 3.4). Moreover, adding to the framework of Baldwin (2013) and based on the political texts, this geopolitical frame category includes the temporal reach (i.e. duration) of power as well (frame 3.6).

3. Capacity to Intervene

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.1 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is currently sufficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is currently insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan will always be insufficient</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Germany and/or other ISAF states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some policy issues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Germany and/or other ISAF states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some places</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.6 Germany and/or other ISAF states have intended impact on Afghanistan for now</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Germany and/or other ISAF states do not have intended impact on Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.5 Frames in the geopolitical frame category “Capacity to Intervene”

In order to identify these frames in the data, the following questions were guiding:
1) Do speeches, statements and covers contain explicit references to capacity of Germany’s army to intervene in Afghanistan
   a) being adequate to realise intended changes in Afghanistan? [3.1]
   b) facing constraints in terms of funding, troop size, skills or equipment? [3.2]
   c) being inadequate to realise any intended change in Afghanistan at any moment”? [3.3]

2) Do speeches, statements and covers contain implicit claims about capacity of Germany’s army to intervene in Afghanistan through references to
   a) successes during other missions [3.1]
   b) spending cuts on defence budget or lack of skills or equipment on other missions or in the German military as a whole? [3.3]
   c) failures of other states to control Afghanistan in the past, or failed past attempts to control other states such as Vietnam? [3.3]

3) Do speeches, statements and covers contain explicit references to impact of Germany or ISAF on Afghanistan
   a) being as intended for one or more policy issues? [3.4]
   b) being as intended in particular places only? [3.5]
   c) being as intended for the moment only? [3.6]
   d) not being as intended (or unintended) for one or more policy issues? [3.7]

4) Do speeches, statements and covers contain implicit claims about impact of Germany or ISAF on Afghanistan through references to
   a) successes of ISAF mission in general? [3.4]
   b) achievements in particular areas? [3.5]
   c) achievements that can last only when foreign troops were to stay in Afghanistan? [3.6]
   d) failure of ISAF mission in general; ongoing (civil) war, insecurity and enemy operations from armed non-state actors; (rising) drugs production; persistent corruption, poverty and backwardness? [3.7]

Applying the frames of this geopolitical frame category in different analytical contexts could result in some difficulties. First, it can be difficult to identify the implicit references to the (lack of) impact of foreign troops on a particular state in texts and images. In terms of this thesis, to what extent can the changes in Afghanistan that the politicians and Der Spiegel referred to be related to the presence of the ISAF troops? Second, the
intentions of the various foreign actors involved in a foreign mission can differ, making it difficult to speak of universal intentions among all actors. In that case, what is meant by the intended impact of a foreign military mission? A third potential difficulty concerns the spatial and temporal reach of the impact. Textual and visual representations are not always clear about how long it lasts before the assumed impact starts to materialise, how long it will last, and how fluid its spatial reach is assumed to be.

The fourth and final geopolitical frame category is “Victims during Intervention.” As noted in previous chapter, this is a key issue in debates on both Germany’s identity and foreign policy (Niven, 2006). A key question about the Germans during WWII is in this regard the balance between “the deeds they committed [and] those committed against them" (Niven, 2006, p. 12). Relevant for this thesis is as well the observation that the construction of the related German victimhood largely took place in practical geopolitics until the 1990s (Niven, 2006). Since then, popular geopolitics has taken a much larger role in this regard. The way that the victims who fell in Afghanistan have been represented by American sources is analysed by Fluri and Lehr (2015). They make a comparison with the victims of the terrorist attacks on the US in 2001. One of their findings is that American sources represented the suffering of Afghan women when they are alive, but did not represent Afghan women when had been killed by American military violence. The German obsession with victimhood and perpetration (Niven, 2006) and the analysis by Fluri and Lehr (2015) raise the question of how victims and perpetrators of political violence (Kaldor, 2007) in Afghanistan have been constructed by the selected German sources of this thesis. Figure 5.6 presents the eight frames in this geopolitical frame category. Drawing on Fluri and Lehr (2015), nationality forms the basis of the first three frames for the victims and the perpetrators. The presence of German troops in Afghanistan explains the decision to include the frames that refer to both states (4.1, 4.2, 4.5 and 4.6). To keep the number of frames within limits, all other nationalities (or unspecified ones) are brought together in one frame for respectively victims and perpetrators (4.3 and 4.7). However, the (wo)men that often fought against ISAF troops, such as members of Taliban and Al-Qaida, have nationalities that are commonly not mentioned by politicians and Der Spiegel. Therefore, nationality cannot form the basis for a frame that concerns these fighters. Their presence in this geopolitical framing category is nonetheless important since these actors occur frequently in the political texts and, less frequently, on the magazine covers. This explains the inductive nature of frames 4.4 and 4.8, which refer to members of armed non-state groups.
4. Victims during Intervention

4.1 Afghans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)

4.2 Germans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)

4.3 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)

4.4 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission

4.5 Afghans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)

4.6 Germans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)

4.7 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)

4.8 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission

(*) excluding members of armed non-state groups

Figure 5.6 Frames in the geopolitical frame category “Victims during Intervention”

In order to identify these frames in the data, the following questions were guiding:

1) Do speeches, statements and covers explicitly state that people being killed or wounded in Afghanistan during ISAF mission, or otherwise suffer from political violence, or suffer from the ISAF mission for other reasons, in the past or possibly in the future,
   a) have Afghan nationality? Or is there any reference to Kunduz air strike in 2009, or suicide attacks? [4.1]
   b) have German nationality? [4.2]
   c) have nationality other than German or Afghan, or unspecified nationality? Or is there any reference to suicide attacks? [4.3]
   d) are members of armed, non-state groups? Or is there any reference to targeted killings? [4.4]
2) Do speeches, statements and covers explicitly state that people who killed or wounded others in Afghanistan during ISAF mission, or otherwise make people suffer for political reasons, in the past or possibly in the future,
   a) have Afghan nationality? [4.5]
   b) have German nationality? Or is there any reference to Kunduz air strike? [4.6]
   c) have nationality other than German or Afghan, or unspecified one? Or is there any reference to air strikes with civilian casualties (excluding Kunduz air strike in 2009), or targeted killings? [4.7]
   d) are members of armed, non-state groups? Or is there any reference to suicide attacks? [4.8]

The classification of the frames in the “Victims during Intervention” category can result in various difficult choices. A key issue is that not all actors in a textual and/or visual representation are attributed a nationality. In this thesis, this is addressed by the frames 4.3 and 4.7, which refer to unspecified nationalities as well. An exception is formed by people without a known nationality who are represented as victims or perpetrators who belong to an armed non-state group. These people are classified as respectively frame 4.4 and 4.8. Conceptualizing people as members of non-state groups consistently over time can be difficult if the groups concerned formed the government for a while (e.g. Taliban), or if these groups are very close to the government (e.g. some warlords).

Another difficulty is that the victims are not always explicitly described. This thesis addresses this by assuming the presence of the frames for Afghan victims (4.1) and German perpetrators (4.6) when there is a reference to the Kunduz air strike in 2009. Other air strikes that killed civilians are assumed to refer to frames for Afghan victims (4.1) and perpetrators from other states (4.7). Moreover, references to suicide attacks are classified with three frames: Afghan victims (4.1); victims with an unspecified nationality (4.3); and members of armed non-state groups as perpetrators (4.8). It needs to be acknowledged that these decisions affect the findings of this study considerably. Mentioning these decisions does not make this work less subjective, however, it answers the call for methodological transparency and addresses positionality.

Another important question is how the relationship between victim and perpetrator is represented. Which actor is the victim of which other actor (i.e. the perpetrator)? Another possible extension of this geopolitical framing category concerns the different forms of victimhood. For example, in another setting, the frames in this category could...
distinguish between being killed; being wounded; and grieving over a lost one. To keep the number of frames limited to 24, two valuable insights from the Critical Discourse Analysis\textsuperscript{51} (CDA) literature have not been taken into account here. First, the modality of sentences plays a major role in language (Richardson, 2007). This refers to the linguistic strength of a claim, varying from “it might be” (weak) to “it is” (strong). Particularly the frame of Germany as perpetrator (4.6) has various modalities in the dataset. Another alternative angle would be to what extent the victims are personalized in the political texts and on the Der Spiegel texts. For example, some politicians referred to Afghan victims during the ISAF mission with their names (“nomination”, Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 40).

To conclude this section, two general difficulties encountered during the development of the methodology need to be acknowledged. First, as outlined earlier in this chapter, the number of frames needs to be manageable. This can be an enormous challenge with political texts that refer to the geopolitical frame categories in so many different ways. As suggested in the previous paragraphs, the possibilities to define frames are seemingly without limits. The key here is to find the right abstraction level. A frame should be sufficiently concrete to relate it to the data, and yet sufficiently abstract to relate it to the academic literature. This trade-off explains why a mixed method towards the definition of frames (i.e. deductive and inductive) can be very constructive for a study of geopolitical frames.

Another difficulty concerns the observation of the number of frames in a political text. A long speech likely produces a particular frame more often than a written statement of one paragraph. If the multiple occurrences of the same frame in one political text were included in the dataset, long political texts would dominate the findings. At least as important, they would dominate in the comparison between the political texts and the magazine covers. These covers produce relatively few frames since they have relatively little text. To solve this potential problem, a frame that is produced by a political text is only included once in the total number of observed frames.

\textsuperscript{51} Critical Discourse Analysis refers to various methods to study texts (increasingly also other semiotic modes) that enable scholars to “investigate which options are chosen in which institutional and social contexts, and why these choices have been made, what interests are served by them, and what purposes achieved” (Theo van Leeuwen, 2008, p.33).
5.6 Conceptualisation of Multimodal Frames

The analysis of Der Spiegel covers is different from the speeches. This is related to the presence of visual elements on the covers, and the resulting text-image relations. Accordingly, geopolitical framing devices can take the form of words, phrases and visual elements. Therefore, the analysis of magazine covers requires a multimodal approach towards frames. Such an approach requires a conceptualisation of three concepts: semiotic modes, multimodality and semiotic resources.

A semiotic mode can be defined as a socially shared, culturally embedded and dynamic collection of material resources, with which meanings can be produced (Kress, 2010, 2014). Each mode enables people to engage with the world in a different way, and has its potentials and limitations. What is considered a semiotic mode and what not is a complex matter. Modes can for example be based on the related human senses. This would result in a ‘hearing mode’, ‘seeing mode’ and so on. However, music and spoken text are both examples of sound, yet, often considered as distinct modes. Other telling examples are texts and images. They are both observed by the human eyes, however, often seen as two distinct modes. A related issue is that “[i]t seems difficult to neatly distinguish modes as they frequently overlap, intermingle and combine” (Stöckl, 2009, p. 206). Kress (2010, 2014) argues that what constitutes a mode needs to be defined anew in each social and academic context. In everyday life, the perspectives on modes depend on the communication needs of social groups. In academic work, the theoretical assumptions should in his view be leading in the decision on what is seen as a semiotic mode. In line with Geise and Baden (2013), the empirical study of magazine covers in this thesis focuses on the interaction between written texts and still images. These modes are among the most important semiotic modes (Stöckl, 2009). Photos in print media are for example always surrounded by text, mostly in the form of a complete article, or only captions (Grittman and Ammann, 2014).

Multimodality refers to representations of which the meaning(s) depend on more than one semiotic mode. This thesis conceptualises multimodality in terms of text-image relations. In many contexts, both written texts and still images play an important role in the construction of frames (Tankard, 2001). The frames are constructed by textual framing devices, visual framing devices and combinations of both. Frames can for example be (co-)constituted textually by headlines, sub-headlines and leads, jointly with an accompanying photo and its caption. Entman (2004, p. 6) assumes that both “words and images” can construct frames, without referring to text-image relations. His reference to words as elements in a text that construct frames applies to the elements
of images as well. Therefore, this thesis assumes that visual elements, and for the sake of consistency, textual elements (i.e. words) separately or jointly construct frames.

A third central concept in the analysis of multimodal frames is which visual and textual elements can be part of a frame. In other words, what are the smallest possible textual and visual units of analysis in the identification of frames? Here the concept of semiotic resource\(^\text{52}\) can be of value. Such a resource is broadly defined as an artefact or action that human beings use to communicate (Van Leeuwen, 2005). Examples of semiotic resources are facial expressions, clothes, and, most importantly for this thesis, representational elements in textual and visual form. Where Ferdinand de Saussure (1974/1916) spoke of a signifier with a fixed meaning, a semiotic resource has a meaning that is not pre-given (Van Leeuwen, 2005). A semiotic resource has instead a meaning potential\(^\text{53}\), and its actual meaning depends on the context in which it is used. Semiotic resources do however not have an endless number of possible meanings, since many people are continually involved in the fixing and controlling of their meaning(s). A focus on semiotic resources can contribute to a better understanding of how textual and visual elements jointly generate particular interpretations of a representation (Machin, 2007). In other words, a social semiotic angle on textual-visual representations can help to “breakdown compositions in their most basic components and then understand how these work together, how relationships can be made between them […] in order to create meaning” (Machin, 2007, p. viii). A focus on semiotic resources requires that a text is seen as a collection of textual elements, and an image as a collection of visual elements. The question of what exactly constitutes such a demarcated semiotic resource as a unit of analysis is a complex matter (Bateman, 2014). Parry (2010) for example implicitly refers to the importance of breaking down a photo into several visual elements with her observation that photos can have multiple themes. She remains however unclear about the criteria for the constitution of a theme, since its presence depends on whether visual elements from “a substantial part of the captured image” are related to the theme (Parry, 2010, p. 75).

\(^{52}\) Please note that in the academic literature, semiotic mode and semiotic resource are sometimes used interchangeably. An example is the observation that “meaning is made with different semiotic resources, each offering distinct potentialities and limitations” (Jewitt et al, 2016, p. 3). In this quote, semiotic resources actually refer to semiotic modes as defined by Kress (mentioned earlier in this section).

\(^{53}\) Van Leeuwen (2005, p. 4) speaks of semiotic potential of a semiotic resource, which sounds somewhat superfluous. Since he also defines this potential as “the kinds of meanings [the semiotic resource] allows”, preference in this thesis is given to the term meaning potential. After all, in the glossary, Van Leeuwen (2005, p. 285) uses “meaning potential”. This is also the preferred term of Machin (2007, p. 3).
The conceptualisation of multimodal frames (and their subsequent operationalisation in next section) is based on the social semiotic framework of Royce (2006). A key concept in this approach is inter-semiotic complementarity. This refers to a situation where “both the verbal and visual modes of communication, within the boundaries of a single text, complement each other in the ways that they project meaning” (Royce, 2006, p. 63). This concept forms a valuable contribution to analytical framework of thesis since it can help map the ways in which texts and images jointly construct frames. Inter-semiotic complementarity draws on Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) as developed by Michael Halliday (1978; Halliday and Matthiessen, 2014). This approach is based on four theoretical assumptions. First, language is functional because of what is does and can do. It is further semantic because it facilitates meaning-making. Third, language is contextual because meanings always depend on the social and cultural circumstances in which communication takes place. Finally, it is semiotic because producing meanings always involves the selection of resources. SFL also assumes that language has three meta-functions, of which the ideational one is most relevant for the methodology of this thesis. It refers to the ability of language to represent the experiences (external world) and imaginations (internal world) of human beings (Halliday, 1985). The assumption that the ideational meta-function for text can also be applied to images is fundamental for the analytical framework of Royce (2006). He used the framework to study a 1993 article from *The Economist* about insurance company Lloyd’s that also contained a cartoon and two line graphs.

It is further assumed that textual and visual elements can convey the same meanings, although in different ways. Kress and Van Leeuwen (2006) assume that a photo plays a similar role as the sentence in meaning-making processes, with the possible meanings of its content subject to particular rules. In both photos and texts, the way that actors are represented, including their actions, relations and context, are important in their meaning potential. Photos, like texts, are able to reflect on reality, establish an interaction with the viewer and form a coherent whole with other photos and texts. A telling example from the critical geopolitical literature where texts and images produce similar meanings in different ways is Robison (2004). She finds that some newspaper articles linked the concentration camps organised by Serb Bosnians to the horrors committed by the Nazi regime both textually (by references to Auschwitz) and visually (by juxtaposing photos of Auschwitz and the Bosnian concentration camp). In this way, the geographical proximity of the Bosnian concentration camps to the sites of genocide during WWII was stressed.

A final assumption of the framework of this thesis is that texts and images can have multiple meanings. As Barthes (1977b) notes, and where Gadamer (1989) agrees, the
meaning of a text is given by its readers, and not its author. By reading a text, a reader is writing the text anew (Barthes, 1977c). One of the reasons for this is that “[w]hat people experience depends on external and internal factors—what they are looking at and what they are looking for” (Zakia, 2007, p. 64). To address the polysemic nature of texts and images, an additional assumption is that text and images have meaning potentials (Halliday, 1985; Machin, 2007). The meaning of a textual or visual element is not fixed before it is interpreted, but is instead realised in the interaction with other representational elements and the social environment in which it is used. The systematic approach of the framework is also of value here. By describing the link between representation and particular interpretation in a detailed way, alternative interpretations can easier be explored by changing the assumptions of the interpretation process. In terms of textual-visual representations, different reading paths could for example result in different interpretations of a representation (Bucher, 2012). This step-by-step approach further takes on board the view of Machin (2007, p. xi) that

“many academic disciplines [tend] to place higher status on analysis over description. Analysis is viewed as a superior intellectual activity. This means that the important initial work of description is often not given sufficient attention. But it is this that facilitates good analysis.”

5.7 Operationalisation of Multimodal Frames

The identification of the geopolitical framing devices on the Der Spiegel covers is based on the framework of Royce (2006). The first two steps in this framework to study intersemiotic complementarity concern the identification of four linguistic categories to which visual (first step) and textual elements (second step) can refer. These categories are participants, attributes, processes and circumstances. Participants are “all the elements or entities that are actually present in the [image or text], whether animate or inanimate” (Royce, 2006, pp. 66). Participants can thus refer to human beings, other living creatures and objects. The framework of this thesis distinguishes between human actors (e.g. soldiers and civilians) and non-human actors (e.g. military equipment). Both are important in geopolitical processes (Dittmer, 2013a). Attributes refer in the framework of Royce (2006, p. 70) to “the qualities and characteristics of the participants”. In the thesis, this concept is re-named human attributes to focus on the ways in which human actors have been represented. Processes, another concept in the framework of Royce (2006, p. 70), concerns “what action is taking place, who or what is the actor or is acting, and who or what is the recipient or object of that action”. In the thesis, processes are mostly referred to by verbs, sometimes in combination with
actors. Finally, circumstances are "the wider context of situation[, being] locative or concerned with the setting, of accompaniment in terms of participants used by the actors" (Royce, 2006, p. 70). Circumstances refer to spaces and moments/periods in the thesis. Spaces could refer to one or more national territories, or parts of them. The six linguistic categories in the empirical study of the Der Spiegel covers and their relation to the framework of Royce (2006) are shown by figure 5.7.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linguistic category in thesis</th>
<th>Based on concept by Royce (2006)</th>
<th>Example from dataset</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Human actors</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>German soldier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human attributes</td>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Beard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-human actors</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>Rocket launching device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>Processes</td>
<td>Having a terror mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spaces</td>
<td>Circumstances</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moments/periods</td>
<td>Circumstances</td>
<td>Soon</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 5.7 Linguistic categories for geopolitical framing devices on Der Spiegel covers*

Particular combinations of the six categories in the selected texts and/or images are not assumed to always result in the same interpretation among all audiences. Representational elements do not produce fixed or dominant meanings, but contribute to the meaning potential of the textual and/or visual representation that contains them. Therefore, the identification and interpretation of frames in a textual-visual representation is not a clear-cut exercise with fixed meanings as a result. How a textual-visual representation is interpreted depends for example on whether the textual elements or the visual elements are first perceived (Stöckl, 2009). Perception however takes place in a messy way. As a result, the interpretation of such a representation depends on the order in which the reader/viewer switches between the semiotic resources from the two different semiotic modes (Bateman 2014). The thesis concurs with the claim of Lobinger and Geise (2013) that the impact of text-image relations are best analysed by first interpreting the textual and visual elements in multimodal representations on their own merits. The textual and visual elements on the Der Spiegel covers are first summarised in two tables. Figures 5.8. and 5.9 offer an
example that refers to the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40\textsuperscript{54}. The first column of both tables has one or more rows that contain the German words on a cover. The words that may be geopolitical framing devices are then translated from German to English in the second column of the first table (figure 5.8). Subsequently, textual framing devices are attributed to one or more of the six categories in the remaining columns of the first and second table. For example, the main headline of the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40 consists of the words “abyss Afghanistan” (translated from German), which refer to the space “Afghanistan” and the process “being an abyss” (figure 5.9). The last row of the first column of both tables refer to the images on the Der Spiegel covers as “[Visual framing devices]”. The visual framing devices do not need a translation in the second column (figure 5.8). The visual framing devices are also attributed to one or more of the six categories, being expressed as words\textsuperscript{55}. Whether textual and visual framing devices are actual geopolitical framing devices becomes clear in interpretation process. For reasons of transparency, all textual and visual elements of the selected Der Spiegel covers have been described in the tables with framing devices.

\textsuperscript{54} Appendix 2 (chapter 12) contains images of all Der Spiegel covers. Each section also includes two tables for each cover to summarize the categorisation of textual and visual elements that could function as geopolitical framing devices.

\textsuperscript{55} These are the so-called visual message elements in the framework of Royce (2006).
### Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abgrund Afghanistan</td>
<td>Abyss Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aufmarsch am Hindukush</td>
<td>Advance on the Hindu Kush</td>
<td>[Troops from United States, United Kingdom, Northern Alliance]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Terrorauftrag</td>
<td>The terror mission</td>
<td>[Supporters of Al Qaida]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gehirnwäsche im Namen Allah</td>
<td>Brainwashing in the name of Allah</td>
<td>[Leaders of Al Qaida]</td>
<td>(Islamic religion)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Three men</td>
<td>Beards, turbans, one on the foreground has unfriendly look in his eyes, (men do not wear military uniforms)</td>
<td>Grenade/ rocket launching device</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.8 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40 (1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/ Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abgrund Afghanistan</td>
<td>Being an abyss</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aufmarsch am Hindukush</td>
<td>Making a [military] advance</td>
<td>Hindu Kush (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>[Soon]</td>
<td>1-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Terrorauftrag</td>
<td>Having a terror mission</td>
<td>[in Europe]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gehirnwäsche im Namen Allah</td>
<td>Brainwashing</td>
<td>(Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>One man looks upwards, two men are moving grenade/ rocket launching device</td>
<td>(Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 5.9 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40 (2)**
This categorisation of framing devices may seem straightforward and unnecessary to interpret a magazine cover. However, it can help the scholar critically reflect on the knowledge that she or he uses to interpret representations. Therefore, the tables contain words between parentheses and square brackets if additional knowledge has been used to reconstruct frames from the magazine covers. Words between parentheses refer to aspects that have been added based on other framing devices on the same cover. The attribution of the framing device “Advance on the Hindu Kush” (sub-headline) to the category “spaces” as “Hindu Kush (Afghanistan)” is a case in point (figure 5.9). Afghanistan is not explicitly mentioned on the cover, but the words “Hindu Kush” refer to this territory implicitly. Square brackets refer to aspects that have been added based on knowledge that is not referred to on the cover. The framing device “Advance on the Hindu Kush” has for example attributed to the category human actors as “[Troops from United States, United Kingdom, Northern Alliance].” It has further been categorised as process as “Making a [military] advance”. The advancement concerns a military one, but this was not made explicit. The categorisation further contributes to the ability of a scholar to analyse textual-visual representations in a consistent way (rigour). It also helps other scholars better understand the interpretations (transparency).

The categorisation of textual and visual framing devices can also help detect possible harmonious or conflicting interactions between textual and visual elements. This refers to the third step in the framework of Royce (2006). This step concerns the interaction between visual and textual elements and its role in the meaning potential of a representation. Accordingly, the relations between the textual and visual framing devices are analysed as well, next to the phrases, sentences and images on the Der Spiegel covers. Royce (2006) draws once more on Halliday (1985) by using six concepts to conceptualise possible text-image relations, of which three are relevant for the thesis (figure 5.10). The first one is repetition, which refers to an explicitly equal meaning of a visual element and textual element. An example is the cover with Obama both mentioned in the text and visually represented (Der Spiegel 2008/7; figure 12.28). The second form of text-image relations is meronymy. In the words of Royce (2006, p. 74), “intersemiotic meronymy [is] concerned with part-whole relations.” An example is the cover that shows the last remaining walls of the World Trade Center after the attacks of Al Qaida against the United States (Der Spiegel 2001/43; figure 12.7). This building used be part of the city New York, which is explicitly referred to by the text. Finally, antonymy refers to opposing meanings of a visual and textual element. An example of an antonymy was the textual reference to war, without the visually
represented German soldiers being involved in explicit war operations (*Der Spiegel* 2010/16, 2011/36, 2013/13; figures 12.43, 12.49, 12.52).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Repetition</td>
<td>A visual and textual element in one representation have the same explicit meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Meronymy</td>
<td>A visual element represents a part of the textual element, or vice versa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antonymy</td>
<td>A visual element has the opposite meaning from a textual element</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5.10 Examples of text-image relations (Royce, 2006)

Finally, a key difference between the selected parliamentary texts and magazine covers concerns their scope. While the selected speeches and statements are all focused on ISAF, the selected *Der Spiegel* covers often address other issues as well. Framing devices on these covers that are considered completely unrelated to ISAF are not included in the analysis. If they are however indirectly or metaphorically linked to ISAF, they are included. A telling example is provided by the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2010/16 (figure 12.57). The second headline frames Iceland as a state with volcanoes, while the main headline frames Germany as a state that is being at war.

### 5.8 Implementation and Summary

The analytical framework that is developed in this chapter seeks to address the question what can be done to re-invigorate the methodological debate in critical geopolitics\(^{56}\) (Ó Tuathail, 2002; Müller, 2010). It consists of a step-by-step trajectory towards the interpretation of representations with a textual or textual-visual nature. This framework contributes to methodological rigour and analytical transparency, in line with the call of Müller (2010). This contributes to a better understanding of the complexity of meaning-making processes, and the role of the scholar in the interpretation process. The explicit nature of the framework further contributes to a representation-based geopolitics that is more open to critique as defined by Foucault (1988). The framework further brings more conceptual clarity, in line with calls of Müller (2008) and Dittmer (2015). Concepts such as geopolitical frames, geopolitical imaginations and

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\(^{56}\) There does not exist a handbook with critical geopolitical methods (Klaus Dodds, 2017, personal remark).
geopolitical framing devices are explicitly defined, with an eye for their mutual relationship. This takes on board the criticism by Dahinden (2006) of various earlier studies of frames. Another important observation is that framing analysis can form an appealing alternative to deconstructionism. Framing encompasses more than simply the stances pro, contra and neutral (Tankard, 2001). This broad angle makes framing analysis an adequate approach to perform “a central task of critical geopolitics [: to] form a corrective to the frequently essentialist, natural-determinist or causalist arguments in politics and the media” (Reuber and Wolkersdorfer, 2002, p. 57). Moreover, such an angle addresses concerns of Glynn and Cupples (2014). They disapprove of scholars who analyse texts as if these sources either fully comply with or completely reject particular dominant geopolitical perspectives. Their criticism is further about the assumption that representations evoke fixed and visible meanings in neatly ordered ‘either-or’ categories. In the words of Mountz (2013, p. 832), "[although] poststructuralist and feminist scholarship might encourage the deconstruction – or at least the complication – of such binary thinking, the binary persists in political geography." The framework further enables the analysis of how geopolitical frames change over time, taking into account a claim by Hyndman (2015). In her view, the analysis by Ó Tuathail (2002) of American geopolitical reasoning in newspapers does not take into account its dynamic nature: "[h]e illustrates the genealogy of geopolitical tropes, not the evolution of them." (Hyndman, 2015, p. 667). This confirms the argument of Campbell (1998) that changes in geopolitical reasoning cannot be divided in clearly demarcated stages. After all, framing is a contradictory and messy process (Orgad, 2012).
6 Sources of Frames: Political Parties and the Print Media in Germany

6.1 Introduction

"[R]epresentations offered in media reports or political speeches select-in and filter-out, make some aspects of the issue prominent and some invisible." (Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin, 2010, p. 166)

This chapter is strongly related to the previous one, since "[m]ethods are [also] techniques for gathering evidence, e.g. for collecting and selecting data (cases, units of analysis)" (Wodak and Meyer, 2016, p. 16). Therefore, the sources that are used to study geopolitical frames in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ are now introduced.

The selection of the data from both practical and popular geopolitics draws on Sharp (2000, p. 172), who stresses the importance of "studying popular accounts of geopolitics and imagined geographies in tandem with studies of more formal or official versions." Such a double approach is important because mass media, as part of the public discourse, continually shapes, refines and erodes the official policy discourse (Ó Tuathail and Luke, 1994). Moreover, as Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010, p. 166) observe "mainstream media and party political leaders are the primary source of information or opinions about war for audiences (unless they are involved in a war themselves), [so] the representations offered by media and politicians may be the only version of the war that audiences know."

The comparison of representations of the ‘War on Terror’ in practical and popular geopolitics in Germany is also relevant because of what happened in the US\textsuperscript{57}. There, confrontations between the government on the one side and mass media or the political opposition were rare during the ‘War on Terror’ (Entman 2004; Smith 2011). The US government managed to win the lion’s share of the media for its understanding of the terrorist attacks and the related foreign policy options. Breithaupt (2003, p. 81) speaks of "self-censorship by the media" that resulted in "unreflected collective nationalism."

\textsuperscript{57}See also section 4.2.
The analysis of the political frames in Germany's 'War on Terror' is done through the parliamentary speeches of the five main political parties. The first section discusses key sections of the role of practical geopolitics in Germany's 'War on Terror.' Then follows a section on the relevance of parliamentary speeches in the (re)production of geopolitical frames. The selected political parties for the empirical study in the next chapter are discussed in the subsequent section. The second half of this chapter begins with a critical examination of popular geopolitical accounts of the 'War on Terror' in Germany. These accounts are books, television films and a popular song on the 'War on Terror.' Subsequently, the general role of magazines and their covers as (re)producers of geopolitical frames is discussed. This is followed by a section about the weekly news magazine Der Spiegel, which occupies a unique position in Germany’s media landscape.

6.2 Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ and Practical Geopolitics

To contextualise the analysis of German political speeches on ISAF, this section offers an overview of the key issues in this regard in practical geopolitics in Germany. When the American government declared the ‘War on Terror’ in 2001, Gerhard Schröder was chancellor in a government formed by his Social Democratic Party (SPD) and the Greens (full name: Alliance ‘90/ The Greens; Bierling, 2014; figure 6.1). One of the familiar pillars of Germany’s foreign policy during this government term remained multilateralism, as reflected by Schröder’s objective to be a reliable partner for other member states of NATO and EU. Another familiar pillar was the importance of Germany’s participation in peacekeeping missions. Both pillars were reflected by the response of the government on what happened in the US on 11 September 2001. A day after the Al Qaida attacks on the US, chancellor Schröder announced Germany’s unconditional solidarity with the US. This included support for seeing the attacks as an attack against NATO as a whole, which eventually contributed to the activation of Article 5 of the NATO treaty. Accordingly, Germany and all other NATO members considered the Al Qaida attacks sufficient reason to help the US defend itself militarily against Al Qaida.
The first military operation of the US in Afghanistan, Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), started in October 2001. It was a combat mission that did not fall under NATO command. The first proposal of the government for German military support to the US was discussed in parliament in November 2001. The proposal included the sending of at most 3,900 troops to various regions in the world, implying the first Bundeswehr mission with a military character outside Europe (Hellmann et al, 2014). 100 of the soldiers involved concerned special forces (KSK) to assist the Americans in Afghanistan. Other proposed operations were in the US (aerial surveillance), the Mediterranean (aerial surveillance), at the Horn of Africa (maritime surveillance) and in Germany itself (territorial surveillance of a US basis; Bierling, 2014). From a constitutional point of view, the parliament could approve this proposal due to the approval of the American operations in Afghanistan by the UN Security Council and NATO. Nonetheless, various MPs of Schröder’s own party the SPD and coalition partner the Greens considered voting against the German involvement. This was the reason Schröder made the vote about military support into a vote of confidence for his government (Colschen, 2010). This was the fourth vote of confidence in Germany, but the first that was linked to a policy proposal. Seeing it purely as a confidence vote, the opposition parties FDP and CDU/CSU voted against the proposal, although they supported the policy proposal. Eventually, only a few MPs of the Greens voted against the proposal, resulting in a narrow majority of less than 51% who supported it. Germany further organised the Petersberg conference in November/December 2001, followed by two other Afghanistan conferences in 2002 and 2004. During the first conference, many Afghan groups together with external donors developed a plan for the democratic future of Afghanistan. They agreed on establishing an interim government in Kabul, which would be protected by a foreign military force (Von Krause, 2016).

The military responsibilities of Germany in Afghanistan would however soon be extended. In December, the UN Security Council decide to create the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) (Bierling, 2014). Its main objective initially was to guarantee the security in the Afghan capital and its surrounding areas. Two days later,
the German parliament approved a government proposal to send up to 1,200 soldiers to Afghanistan to participate in ISAF. Early in 2003, Germany raised its number of troops to 2,250 after this state had obtained the lead of ISAF jointly with the Netherlands. In 2003, the UN Security Council decided for the first time to enlarge the area in Afghanistan where ISAF was responsible for security. Germany gave up its joint control over ISAF in favour of NATO and became responsible for the Kunduz province in October 2003, followed by the Faisabad province in mid-2004. Officially, the German troops in these provinces should ensure that the condition of schools, medical facilities and roads would improve. The official objectives of the Bundeswehr presence in Afghanistan were the reconstruction of this state and the development of a local police force in order to stabilise the territory. German foreign policymakers felt very comfortable with the initial role of ISAF as a stabilisation mission, in which the foreign troops could only use military force to defend themselves. This role mirrored the preferences of the German population. Polls in December 2001 indicated that 68% of the German population supported the contribution of the Bundeswehr to ISAF, with only one-third in favour of the Bundeswehr getting involved in combat situations (Jacobi et al., 2011).

Despite Germany’s support for the first initiatives of the US following the attacks of Al Qaida against the US, the ‘War on Terror’ would also bring to the surface some fractures in the decades-old US-German partnership. Undoubtedly, the strongest conflict between Germany and the US emerged in 2002 and 2003. Fewer than 18 months after the start of the American operations in Afghanistan, a US-led international military force invaded Iraq (Bierling, 2014). A key reason for this invasion was the claim that Iraq was in possession of weapons of mass destruction. The German government, still formed by SPD and Alliance ’90/Greens, decided not to participate in this international military operation, mainly because it lacked a multilateral basis (Katzenstein, 2003). Another reason was that the American government had started to openly consider the military intervention in 2002, during the months before chancellor Schröder faced new elections (Bierling, 2014). His clear position on this foreign policy issue did well with the voters, since more than half of the Germans were opposed to a military operation against Iraq. The loudly expressed opposition of the Schröder government did understandably harm relations at both state level and personal level (Bush-Schröder). Meanwhile, the cooperation between both states in the field of intelligence continued, and the American army was still allowed to use German air space and military bases in Germany for its military operations. Schröder’s position was not only related to concerns about the elections, but also to his perspective on Germany’s foreign policy. Schröder wanted to ‘normalise’ the external affairs of
Germany. Just like other states (i.e. without a Nazi past), Germany should in his view pursue a foreign policy based on its own national interests. More generally, Germany should feel neither superior nor inferior to any other state. His stance offers a striking contrast with the Nazi era (German superiority as basis of foreign policy) and the Cold War era (German inferiority as basis of foreign policy). Another difference between the US and Germany during the ‘War on Terror’ was that most German politicians did not consider themselves capable of making their state completely invulnerable to external threats (Reinke de Buitrago, 2010). This contrasted with the US, where the assumption that the government is capable of making the state totally invulnerable to external threats is widespread. Moreover, contrary to the US government, the German government assumed that "war […] was less suitable for defeating global terrorist networks than careful attention to the underlying social and economic causes of terrorism in failing states, patient police cooperation, intelligence sharing, and international legal proceedings" (Katzenstein, 2003, p. 733). Several German policymakers took a stricter angle and considered the militarisation of American foreign policy following the 2001 terrorist attacks to be responsible for an increase in global insecurity (Reinke de Buitrago, 2010). In terms of framing, they did not attribute responsibility for the perceived rise in insecurity to Al Qaida, but to the US. In other words, not only the meaning of (in)security differs from state to state (Buzan, 1983), but also the assumed causes.

Despite differences in opinion, the German governments always sought to accommodate the US demands where possible (Bierling, 2014). For example, the aforementioned extension of the operational area of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan in 2003 and 2004 was particularly meant to improve relations with the US. In September 2005, the number of German ISAF troops was raised to 3,000, but their spatial scope remained limited to Kabul and the provinces of Kunduz and Faisabad. Referring to another structural difficulty for the successive German governments during the ‘War on Terror’, the Schröder government continued to stress the peaceful nature of the military operations in Afghanistan, in order to maintain popular support at an acceptable level. As a result, the difficult balancing act between the demands of the US and other NATO partners on the one hand and the wishes of their voters on the other hand became a recurrent issue for all three governments during the ‘War on Terror’.

Next to the refusal of the German government to participate in the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the scope of the Bundeswehr operations in Afghanistan caused tensions with the US and other NATO members as well (Bierling, 2014). While the Taliban started attacking ISAF troops in South Afghanistan in the same year, German troops were not allowed to operate in those areas to assist troops from other NATO members.
Meanwhile, the Northern provinces where the Bundeswehr operated remained relatively safe. After the de facto change in the military character of ISAF in South Afghanistan, its de jure character changed considerably as well. In December 2005, NATO decided to allow for offensive operations in Afghanistan as well. The rift between Germany and other ISAF states increased further as a result since German foreign policymakers still defined the German ISAF contribution in defensive, non-combat terms. German troops could for example not search houses, use their helicopters at night or participate in offensive operations of NATO partners. When Germany became the lead nation for nine provinces in Northern Afghanistan in June 2006, German policymakers once more stressed the peaceful nature of the Bundeswehr mission in Afghanistan. The area for which the Bundeswehr now was responsible was half as large as Germany (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016). The claim of a peaceful German military mission became harder to sustain from 2007 onwards, when the Taliban started to actively attack German soldiers (Bierling, 2014). Moreover, the Taliban quickly regained control of various districts in Kunduz province and hampered the efforts of the Bundeswehr to do civilian work. This resulted in a situation that can be described as “the paradox [of getting] involved in a war without being able to act accordingly” (Bierling, 2004, p. 160, translation by author). Under continued pressure from other NATO members to engage more with Afghanistan, Germany sent six Tornado surveillance planes to Afghanistan in early 2007. Although the planes could formally operate above the whole Afghan territory, their military significance was limited since they were not allowed to engage in combat operations. Consequently, despite having their own planes in the area, German ground troops in Afghanistan remained dependent on aerial support from other NATO members. This formed another controversial paradox. Criticism of Germany’s preference for the relatively safe Northern provinces from other NATO members further intensified in 2008. Chancellor Merkel, however, was adamant and repeated that German soldiers would not operate in other areas and would only use violence for defensive purposes. This was in line with the preferences of large segments of the population, of which more than four-fifths would reject a Bundeswehr presence in the South of Afghanistan (Jacobi et al, 2011).

One specific event embodied the complexity of Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ as no other one, since it laid bare the difficult position of the government vis-à-vis both the German population and its NATO partners. Early in September 2009, the Taliban hijacked two fuel trucks that subsequently got stuck in the Kunduz river (Bierling, 2014). The German Commander in Kunduz province had ordered American fighter jets to bomb both trucks because he thought the trucks would be used to attack a German basis nearby. The air strike killed dozens of people including civilians. This action was
completely out of line with the carefully created and maintained image that Germany was involved in a peace mission in Afghanistan. The air strike had no major impact on the German contribution to ISAF, since the new CDU/CSU/FDP cabinet that started in October 2009 did not change the mandate. The political interpretation of the air strike did however result in problems for two ministers. Franz-Josef Jung, who was Minister of Defence at the time of the air strike, stepped down from his new position as Minister of Labour in November. It turned out that he had misinformed the parliament on the number and background of the casualties of the air strike. The first three days after the air strike, Germany’s Minister of Defence Franz-Josef Jung, repeatedly stated that he had no reason to assume there were civilians among the victims (ZEIT Online, 2009). Eventual estimates of the number of casualties range from 17 to 142, with among them up to 40 civilians. This does not include the wounded people. The new Minister of Defence, Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, also got in trouble when he declared that the air strike had been an appropriate measure from a military perspective (Bierling, 2014). Since an internal ISAF investigation concluded the opposite, he changed his statement 180 degrees a few days later. As a result of the air strike and the German involvement in the death of dozens of foreign civilians, popular support for the German contribution to ISAF went down further. The share of the population that preferred a swift withdrawal of the Bundeswehr from Afghanistan rose to 70% by the end of 2009, as compared to 56% three years earlier (Jacobi et al, 2011). The air strike also soured relations with the US, who had conducted it, because the intelligence on which the air strike was based, turned out to be not fully correct (Green et al, 2012).

During the last four years of ISAF, Germany still faced criticism from its NATO partners. At a NATO Summit in December 2010, it was decided to end the ISAF mission in December 2014 (Bierling, 2014). Despite strong US pressure for a strong rise in troop levels for the next few years, some states had already withdrawn (Netherlands) or were about to withdraw (Canada and Denmark, 2011; France, 2012) their troops from Afghanistan. While the US raised its number of troops in Afghanistan substantially between 2009 and 2011, Germany raised its contribution slightly from 4,500 to 5,350 soldiers in 2010. The extra troops got civilian responsibilities (e.g. training of Afghan policemen) or were added to the reservists. In March 2011, the German government decided to add 300 soldiers to the German ISAF mission by tapping into the reservists for this mission. This decision was once more an attempt to address criticism from its NATO partners. They disapproved of Germany’s abstention in a vote in the UN Security Council about a militarily enforced aerial blockade of Libya. Minister of Foreign Affairs, Guido Westerwelle, stated explicitly that Germany preferred a political solution, and implicitly that it was reluctant to send troops to Libya (Miskinnon, 2014). According
to Bierling (2014, p. 170), this was not the first government decision about ISAF that was a compensation deal, in which “[a]lliance-political calculations triumphed over the definition of national interests, mission requirements or military strategic considerations.” Germany started to reduce its number of ISAF troops in 2012 (Bierling, 2014) and its last ISAF troops left Afghanistan in December 2014 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2014). The popular verdict on the German ISAF mission had been negative, as reflected by a December 2014 poll that found that 60% of Germans considered the mission have been ineffective (ZEIT Online, 2014). Looking forward, more than half of Germans was against renewed Bundeswehr military missions abroad, while less than one third was in favour of them. Nonetheless, ISAF was immediately followed by the current, smaller international mission in Afghanistan called ‘Resolute Support’ (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2016). Around 1,000 German troops had as their main task to train and assist the Afghan police, military and security forces. Despite their reduced responsibilities and numbers, the presence of German troops in Afghanistan remained unpopular among the German population. In December 2016, a poll indicated that 40% of Germans supported the new operation of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan, while 23% of them were opposed to it (Steinbrecher et al, 2016).

The presence of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan in light of ISAF was remarkable for its duration and intensity. What began as a six-month peace mission in 2001, became the longest and largest Bundeswehr mission ever (Bierling, 2014; Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2014). German soldiers further got involved in heavy fighting for the first time since the Bundeswehr had been established in 1955. As a result, ISAF became the bloodiest Bundeswehr mission ever (Bundeswehr, 2015, 2018b). It took the lives of 55 German soldiers, of which 35 had fallen because of actions of the enemy. The many casualties among the Bundeswehr troops raised the question of how they should be commemorated (Conradt and Langenbacher, 2013). The initiative of the Ministry of Defence to establish a memorial in Berlin was criticised by some for promoting militarism. Including non-German troops as well, the war in Afghanistan took the lives of nearly 3,500 ISAF soldiers between 2001 and 2014, of which more than two-third were Americans (ICasualties.org, no date). The civilian death toll in Afghanistan was however much higher, estimated by Crawford (2016) to be 31,000.

The ISAF mission also highlighted more structural aspects of Germany’s foreign policy. This concerned, for example, the potential of two foreign policy objectives to clash: to be a reliable multilateral partner and to be a civilian power that kept the use of

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58 See also section 4.5 on pre-ISAF and structural features of German foreign policy.
military violence to a minimum (Naumann, 2013). In other words, post-ISAF governments would continue to face the difficulty of finding a sustainable balance between the expectations of NATO partners (i.e. combat missions if necessary) and the foreign policy preferences of its population (humanitarian missions at most) (Bierling, 2014). In this regard, it is important to note that ISAF also made clear, that the differences regarding foreign military missions between NATO members are considerable in terms of risk appetite, threat perception and political manoeuvring room (Rühle, 2011). Another ISAF related issue is that even if the population becomes more supportive of foreign combat missions in the future, the *Bundeswehr* would face severe capability constraints (Von Krause, 2016). These constraints are the result of a structural lack of government funding. Germany spent less than 1.2% of GDP on defence in 2015, far below the 2% threshold of NATO. The ISAF mission further made clear that legitimising foreign military missions in terms of the national interest remained problematic in Germany, despite the normalisation process that Schröder referred to at the end of the 1990s (Miskimmon et al, 2013). In 2010, Germany’s president Horst Köhler, who had a strictly ceremonial role, resigned following a national outcry over the connection he had made between ISAF and Germany’s economic interests (Green et al, 2012). The implicit failure of Schröder’s attempt to normalise German foreign policy confirms the assumption of Hellmann et al (2014) that political culture can be rather persistent. Although a political culture is not set in stone, politicians may still find it hard to change particular national self-images, world views and related policy principles. Another lesson from the ISAF mission that Miskimmon (2014, p. 223) draws concerns “the appearance that foreign policy decisions have been linked to domestic electoral calculations, rather than long-term policy objectives.” This factor is related to the just-mentioned lack of explicitly-defined national interests. This contrasts with the widely-shared view on German values, which include freedom, peace and human rights (Schwegmann, 2011). More generally, the intense experiences during the ISAF mission have not triggered any of the five German governments to develop a clear vision on Germany’s role in the world (Von Krause, 2016).

The ISAF mission further confirmed the important role of language in geopolitical reasoning. Human rights had a relatively strong role in the German geopolitical reasoning about the ‘War on Terror’ as compared to the US. The parties in favour of ISAF often legitimised the presence of the *Bundeswehr* in Afghanistan by referring to human rights (Bierling, 2014). They referred, for example, to the position of women and the opportunities for children. A legitimisation of the ISAF mission in terms of security was far less effective. An exception formed the claim of Peter Struck (2002, np,
that "the security of Germany was also being defended at the Hindu Kush". He was Germany’s Minister of Defence in 2002 (Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2018). It became one of the most cited and controversial claims related to Germany’s foreign policy of this century. A security-based legitimisation of ISAF was not really popular among the population. A poll in 2006 found that more than two-thirds of the population did not agree with Struck’s claim (Jacobi et al., 2011). The use of the words ‘terrorism’ and ‘evil’ was also different in Germany’s geopolitical reasoning as compared to the US (Reinke de Buitrago, 2010). German policymakers and their policy documents did not represent terrorism as an absolute evil and did not dehumanise and demonise the terrorists. Instead, they referred to "[the] internal structure and dynamics of terrorist groups", "individual aspects" and "the underlying causes of terrorism" (Reinke de Buitrago, 2010, p. 134). Moreover, the terrorists were depicted in an unemotional way without attributing specific traits to them. Reinke de Buitrago (2010) also found that references to notions of enmity to describe the Al Qaida organisation were non-existent. This confirmed in her view the German taboo on speaking of enemies, being rooted in the trauma over the Nazi period. As a result, German policymakers referred to Al Qaida simply by its name.

The concept of ‘war’ that featured prominently in the American ‘War on Terror’ seemed however to be taboo among German policymakers in relation to the Bundeswehr presence in Afghanistan (Feldhoff, 2011). A former German Minister of Defence from before the ‘War on Terror’ considered this a big lie by the politicians to their voters. The taboo was reflected for example by the claim from the then Minister of Defence Franz-Josef Jung that the German contribution to ISAF was a ‘battle mission’ (Encke, 2009, np). He assumed that speaking of a war would make many Germans think that the situation in Afghanistan was as intense as during the air strikes on Germany in WWII (Feldhoff, 2011). This position differed enormously from governments of other states that participated in ISAF, as exemplified during a visit by Jung to Afghanistan in the Autumn of 2008. Immediately after he said that Germany was not at war, David McKiernan, the American ISAF-Commander who stood next to him, replied that there was a war going on in Afghanistan. Soon after, the taboo would be broken by the new Minister of Defence Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg who spoke of ‘war-like conditions’ in Afghanistan (Encke, 2009, np). In April 2010, he went one step further during a mourning service for soldiers who had fallen in Afghanistan. Zu Guttenberg said that it made sense that many saw the death of the soldiers as a consequence of a war, and that he agreed (Bundesregierung, 2010). On the same

59 See section 4.2.
occasion, chancellor Merkel was more careful and said that the situation in Afghanistan was not an international armed conflict according to international law. She did however express an understanding for the German soldiers in Afghanistan who argued that there was a (civil) war taking place in this state.

### 6.3 Parliamentary Speeches

Now that the role of practical geopolitics in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ has been clarified, it is time to discuss why parliamentary speeches on the ‘War on Terror’ are such a valuable source of geopolitical frames. In general, the representations from foreign policy-makers of international crises convey how politicians use classifications, analogies and scenarios with which national audiences can identify (Ó Tuathail, 2002). Moreover, politicians often interpret world politics by using particular national symbols (Dijkink, 1996). Political speeches further remain important reminders of how national identity can be reproduced (Müller, 2008), often in hardly noticeable ways (Mihelj, 2011). Research into the language of foreign policy formulation can therefore contribute to a better understanding of the mindset of the policymakers (Ó Tuathail, 1986). The importance of speeches in analyses of geopolitical reasoning has also been confirmed by the findings of Flint et al (2009), Ambrosio and Vandrovec (2013) and Ambrosio and Lange (2014).

According to Sharp (2013, p. 21), the variety of perspectives in the speeches (and other writings) of Tanzania’s former President Julius Nyerere underline the importance of “a political geography that is open and engaging with a number of voices.” This variety can also be found in German parliament, since political parties with distinctive ideological backgrounds are part of it⁶⁰ (Decker, 2015). Furthermore, it happens quite regularly that some MPs vote differently than the majority of their party (or abstain from voting). MPs who do so often write personal statements to explain their position. The resulting diversity of geopolitical frames among and within political parties makes it likely that German parliamentary speeches and written statements (re)produce geopolitical frames that go beyond the binary. Also relevant in this regard is the observation of Longhurst (2005, p. 2) that parliamentary speeches in Germany are “imbued with convictions of the ‘weight of the past’, ‘the lessons of German history’, [and] ‘the defence culture of [this] country.’"

Another aspect of parliamentary texts that further raises their appeal as research objects to study geopolitical frames during the ‘War on Terror’ is the essential role of

⁶⁰ See also next section.
the German parliament in decisions on foreign military missions. This is reflected by the strong responsibility of German MPs in the decisions on foreign missions of the Bundeswehr. Constitutional changes in the 1990s and 2000s enlarged the political room for policymakers to use the military to achieve foreign policy objectives and made the parliament responsible for military missions abroad (Staack, 2014). In 1993, the Constitutional Court ruled that Germany could only get militarily involved abroad if there was a parliamentary majority in favour of such a mission (Bierling, 2014). In fact, the government would always need approval of parliament in such a decision. A year later, the same court ruled that German obligations that followed from inter-state systems of mutual security protection (e.g. membership of NATO or UN) would not violate the German constitution. The Constitutional Court left however in the middle where (e.g. inside or outside Europe?) and in what kind of mission (e.g. peacekeeping or in active combat) the Bundeswehr could be involved (Staack, 2014). In 2005, the Parliamentary Participation Law was implemented, easing the parliamentary decision processes on these missions and giving the parliament the opportunity to end such a mission at any moment (Staack, 2014). It further stipulated that the government should inform the parliament more thoroughly in terms of duration, number of soldiers, military equipment and costs on proposed foreign military missions (Bierling, 2014).

6.4 Five Political Parties

After discussing the relevance of parliamentary speeches in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’, the political parties included in the dataset are now introduced. It is crucial that these parties do justice to Germany’s political party system. This system can be seen as a “fluid five-party system” (Hornsteiner and Saalfeld, 2014, p. 87). Like the US and the UK, (Western) Germany had a political landscape dominated by two parties/blocs (CDU/CSU and SPD) in the 1950s and 1960. However, over the years, first the FDP, then the Alliance90/The Greens and later the Left Party gradually became increasingly important in German parliament (Green et al, 2012). The re-unified Germany has always had coalition governments (Miskimmon, 2009). They consisted either of a large party (CDU/CSU or SPD) and small party (FDP or the Greens) or CDU/CSU and SPD.

The dataset of this study contains speeches of five political parties. The first is the Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (Christian Democratic Union or CDU) (Decker, 2015). The CDU forms one parliamentary block with the Christlich-Soziale Union (Christian-Social Union or CSU). CSU is a regional political party that

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61 This section focuses on the political landscape during the ISAF debate (2001-2014). Section 1.2 briefly discusses recent political developments in Germany.
participates only in Bavaria during the elections for the national parliament. Therefore, speeches and statements of CSU are not included in the dataset of this thesis. The CDU participates in all federal states apart from Bavaria during the legislative elections. Both parties are broadly-oriented with most support among the self-employed and business (wo)men. CDU/CSU can be seen as centre-right bloc (Hough, 2009). Their foreign policy preferences reflect a rather strong loyalty towards the United States (Miskimmon, 2009). Following the 1994 ruling of the Constitutional Court, CDU and CSU were the first parties to express support for Bundeswehr missions outside NATO territory that were based on a multilateral mandate (Bierling, 2014).

The second party in the dataset is the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of Germany; SPD) (Decker, 2015). SPD has become a centre-left party over the decades (Hough, 2009), after being rather left-wing in the 1950s (Decker, 2015). Accordingly, the voters of the party have changed from predominantly labour class based to a blend of employees, civil servants and students. The SDP is closer to Russia than CDU/CSU (Miskimmon, 2009). A prominent party member and former Minister of Defence argues that Germany should seek to have similar relations with Russia and United States. Moreover, SPD took a more conditional position towards foreign military missions than CDU/CSU in the years after the constitutional ruling in 1994 (Bierling, 2014). SPD supported only German involvement in multilateral missions that focused on peacekeeping and were fully managed by the UN. In 1995 and 1996, a majority of SPD MPs voted in favour of the three UN missions in Bosnia (IFOR and SFOR). As happened more often with proposals on foreign military missions, various SPD MPs voted differently than the official party line.

The Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, FDP) is the third party in the dataset (Decker, 2015). FDP can be seen as centre-right party (Hough, 2009). Next to CDU and CSU, FDP was the only other party in the West German parliament between 1949 and German unification in 1990 (Auswärtiges Amt, 2008). It promotes as little state intervention in the economy as possible. FDP is popular among the most wealthy groups and highest educated people in Germany. Like CDU/CSU, FDP supported Bundeswehr missions outside the NATO territory following the Constitutional Court ruling in 1994, as long as these missions were based on a multilateral mandate (Bierling, 2014).

The fourth party in the dataset is the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (Alliance ’90/ The Greens) (Decker, 2015). They have been in the (West) German parliament since 1983. The Greens can be seen as centre-left party (Hough, 2009). They promote a market economy that takes into account the limitations and needs of the environment...
Sources of Frames: Political Parties and the Print Media in Germany

(Auswärtiges Amt, 2008). The Greens get most votes from the relatively well-educated, high-income Germans. They can be divided into two mainstream strands (Hough, 2009). The so-called *Realos* consider their party as a constructive government partner or opposition party. They are in favour of gradual changes of German society. The *Fundis* on the other hand are far less willing to make compromises and seek to achieve a more fundamental change of Germany. The participation of the Greens in the coalition government between 1998 and 2005 reflected the strength of the *Realos*. Before their participation in government in 1999, this was different. The official party line of the Greens was fundamental opposition to the use of military force to achieve and maintain peace in any area. MPs of the Greens did however not always vote in line with the official party line on proposals for foreign military missions. Several of the MPs of the Greens voted in favour of the first two Bosnia missions of the *Bundeswehr* (IFOR), and a majority of them supported the proposal for the third Bosnia mission (SFOR; Bierling, 2014).

The fifth and last party in the dataset concerns *Die Linke* (The Left) (Decker, 2015). The Left is the successor to the *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (Socialist Unity Party of Germany; SED). The SED ruled over Eastern Germany in an authoritarian way. The party then entered the democratic system of the unified Germany as *Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus* (Party of Democratic Socialism; PDS). In 2007, PDS became the Left. The change in name followed a merger of the PDS with the *Wahlalternative Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit* (WASG), a split-off party of the SPD that had been founded in 2005. The issues that feature most prominently on its political agenda include the position of Eastern Germany and social justice. This party gets most of its votes in areas that used to belong to the German Democratic Republic (GDR; Dijkink and Van der Wusten, 2002). The continued popularity of the Left is largely a reflection of the continued social boundary between large parts of the population who live in places that belonged to East Germany and the rest of the population (Van der Wusten and Dijkink, 2002; Schlink, 2010). As Fulbrook (1999, p. 141) notes about this East-West divide, “forty years of different exposure to historical material and conditions of debate had left remarkably strong traces.” In her view, the existence of two German states was long enough to affect, also after reunification, the ways in which their respective (former) populations saw themselves, their German ‘others’ and the German past. The divide was also reflected by the popular support for foreign military missions in the 1990s (Bierling, 2014). A majority of the population as a

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62 Thesis refers to DIE LINKE/ PDS when it concerns speech or statement of both parties.

63 See also section 4.4.
whole then supported a more active role for Germany on the international stage in the form of military missions. Nonetheless, a majority of the population of the areas that used to be part of East Germany was opposed to them. With its East German roots and its anti-militarist stance (Hough, 2009; Decker, 2015), the Left is a valuable research object in the analysis of a ‘War’ that was conceived in the US\(^{64}\).

The diversity of perspectives in the German parliament was an important aspect of the German ‘War on Terror’\(^{65}\). At first sight, the voting behaviour of the five major parties in parliament seems straightforward. The parliamentary votes on the German contribution to ISAF always obtained a large majority thanks to votes from MPs from the parties CDU/CSU, SPD, the Greens and FDP\(^{66}\) (Bierling, 2014). These parties were all part of at least one of the five German governments that supported the ISAF mission between 2001 and 2014 (Zicht, 2013; figure 6.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2005(^{67})</th>
<th>2007</th>
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<th>2011</th>
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<td>603</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>614</td>
<td>622</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>538</td>
<td>531</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>405</td>
<td>460</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>498</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>84</td>
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<td>593</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>556</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>599</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.2 Total votes for selected ISAF proposals of government\(^{68}\).

Despite the seemingly fixed roles of political parties in debates on the ISAF mission, these parties rarely voted as one bloc (figure 6.3). During the ‘War on Terror’, some MPs from all (former) government parties voted against one or more ISAF related proposals, or abstained from voting (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2014). In fact, the support for the German contribution to ISAF among MPs from SPD and the Greens had been shrinking since 2009 (Bierling, 2014). In February 2013, more than half of the MPs of the Greens voted against the extension of the ISAF mission. Less

---

\(^{64}\) See also section 4.2.

\(^{65}\) See also previous section.

\(^{66}\) The FDP lost its parliamentary presence in 2013 since it did not manage to get the required 5% of the votes (election threshold; Zicht, 2013).

\(^{67}\) The MPs who were elected on 18 September 2005 became MPs on 18 October. Therefore, the 2005 debate on ISAF on 28 September took place in the parliamentary composition of before the elections. Source: www. Bundestag.de.

\(^{68}\) Source: www. Bundestag.de.
than twelve years earlier, the party was still part of the government that decided to participate in the same mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>2001</th>
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<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>248</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>311</td>
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<tr>
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<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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**SPD**

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<th>2014</th>
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<td>Total MPs (*)</td>
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<td>251</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>222</td>
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<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>16</td>
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**FDP**

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<th>2009</th>
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<td>47</td>
<td>61</td>
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<td>93</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
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<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstained</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
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**The Greens**

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<tr>
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<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total MPs (*)</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstained</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**The Left**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>2003</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total MPs (*)</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>76</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In favour</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abstained</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
<td>(M)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.3 Votes per political party for selected ISAF proposals

(M) Large majority among MPs from same party; (N/A) Not applicable; (*) Usually not all MPs voted

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69 Source: www.Bundestag.de.
6.5 Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ and Popular Geopolitics

Following the focus on practical geopolitics of the previous three sections, this section discusses a selection of sources in popular geopolitics. These are a bestseller from an Afghanistan veteran, two books by well-respected newspaper journalists, three television films, four episodes of a popular television series and a song from a well-known singer-songwriter.

A book by an Afghanistan veteran that became a national bestseller in Germany was “Four days in November. My Battle Mission in Afghanistan” by Johannes Clair (2014, translation by author). The author refers to his relationship with both the Afghan population and the Afghan territory. He writes for example about his ideal of contributing to improvements in the lives of Afghan civilians. Moreover, he reflects on the harsh conditions he and his comrades faced during military confrontations with the Taliban. He further notes that the ISAF mission has created a new difference within Germany. That is because the Bundeswehr presence in Afghanistan produced German war veterans for the first time since WWII. Next to admitting that he is treated for post-traumatic stress, Clair (2014, p. 409, translation by author) also feels positive about some aspects of his ISAF mission such as “the overwhelming beauty of this wild country [Afghanistan]”. With his book, he seeks to reduce the aforementioned new difference within Germany by bringing closer the German Afghanistan veterans and the other Germans. He does not consider his book as a mirror of reality, but as an overview of his own impressions. The little photo section of his book features 32 images, of which a small majority show German soldiers with their military equipment. On nine photos, Afghan civilians are depicted. Five photos related to non-combat practices, such as those of a shop, a meal, the dormitory, the kitchen and a memorial for fallen comrades.

The book by Bild journalists Julian Reichelt and Jan Meyer (2010) is very critical of the German contribution to ISAF. Its title says it all: “Rest In Peace, Soldiers! How politics and Bundeswehr cover up the truth about Afghanistan” (translation by author). In their view, contemporary Germany has never learned how to deal with being involved in a war, and how it can be reconciled with democracy. Reichelt and Meyer (2010) also point at differences within Germany that are related to the ISAF mission. They criticise citizens opposed to Germany’s involvement in military violence abroad for expressing their views anonymously in polls instead of visibly on the streets. The authors further express their disapproval of the objective of Germany to train Afghan policemen in order for them to maintain stability after the ISAF troops leave. To start, it is in their
view unclear where the boundary is drawn between members of the police force and soldiers. More severe are their claims that many policemen are corrupt and illiterate, making them highly unpopular among the population. The police force is also infiltrated by the Taliban on a large scale. While constructing difference between the Afghan police force and the Afghan population, Reichelt and Meyer (2010) blur the boundaries between the Afghan police forces and respectively the Afghan soldiers and the Taliban.

Another well-informed Afghanistan journalist who wrote a critical book about ISAF was Stefan Kornelius of the Süddeutsche Zeitung (2009). The title of his book is very clear as well: “The unclarified war. Germany’s self-deception in Afghanistan” (translation by author). The self-deception is in his view reflected by the rivalry over the right words to describe the mission, implicitly stressing the importance of the analysis of textual representations. In fact, many relevant aspects of the ISAF mission remain unspoken, and what is referred to is, in his view, often not (completely) true. Kornelius (2009) calls for a widespread acknowledgement among German policymakers that the situation in Afghanistan is complex. As an example, he argues that the references to North and South Afghanistan should not be used anymore. They are in fact irrelevant because they hamper a clear view of the state’s complexity. In other words, he criticises the construction of difference in Afghanistan by constructing two spaces within the state that in turn result in the homogenisation of two varied spaces. Kornelius (2009) further regrets the tension between the Bundeswehr soldiers who fight in Afghanistan and the population that is widely not interested in the ISAF mission, pointing at a difference within Germany. Assuming that the Taliban can never be militarily beaten, he proposes reducing the intensity of the conflict between the Afghan state and the Taliban as much as possible. This would require a strong Afghan state. Kornelius (2009) questions in this regard the effectiveness of the German efforts to cooperate with the local population in North Afghanistan. To what extent do these efforts keep the power bases of local warlords in place? How do these efforts affect the sovereignty of the national government? And how do they contribute to an improvement of the structural and national fundaments of the state?

Television has also been a medium where the ISAF mission have been actively framed. Next to the daily news programmes, various television films have offered interpretations of the Bundeswehr presence in Afghanistan, and what this meant for Germany. For example, the experiences of a returned ISAF soldier were for the first time addressed by a television film in 2008. The film was called Nacht vor Augen (“night before eyes”) and had been made by the public regional television station SWR (2009). The protagonist David cannot deal with his fears. He cannot communicate with his wife anymore, and faces increasing tensions with other people around him. In other
words, the film constructs a difference within Germany within soldiers who had been on mission in Afghanistan, and others. Nobody understands his emotional distress, resulting in isolation. Another German film about ISAF, Auslandseinsatz (“foreign military mission”), was broadcast by the public regional television station WDR in 2012 (Slagman, 2012). It tells the story two German soldiers in Afghanistan: Ronnie is the extrovert, aggressive soldier, and Daniel the more introvert, naïve soldier. They talk a lot about what the Bundeswehr should and can achieve in Afghanistan, together with Emal, a German soldier with Afghan roots, Sarah, a German female army doctor and Anna, a German woman who works with an NGO. Their conversations are at times joined by the Afghan local leader Jamal. The film ends with a suicide bomb attack by an Afghan boy. This film constructs similarities and differences within the German army. The German public national television station ARD broadcast the film Eine mörderische Entscheidung (“A murderous decision”) in 2013 (Löwenstein, 2013). The film is about the Kunduz air strike and revolved around the German army officer who ordered the strike. It is in fact a dramatised documentary with both shots of actors acting and actual video footage. Several conversations between the actors are based on recordings of, or notes on, the air strike. An example is the dialogue between the two American pilots who executed the air strike. They repeatedly asked whether there were really no civilians near the two trucks, and admitted to each other that they felt awkward about the order to bomb. The non-fiction video footage included interviews with journalists, politicians and experts. More remarkably, the film also contained interviews with relatives of the Afghan civilian victims of the air strike. Journalists of both Der Spiegel (preferring “tragic”) and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (preferring “wrong”) disagreed with the adjective “murderous” in the film title (Buß, 2013; Löwenstein, 2013). The actor who played the German army officer who ordered the strike was Matthias Brandt, son of former chancellor Willy Brandt (Hildebrandt, 2013). He criticised the way in which the German state gave meaning to the air strike: “the tragedy was immediately represented in a language that is impossible to understand outside the military and politics” (Hildebrandt, 2013, p. 4, translation by author). This exemplified in his view a routine among politicians to convince civilians that a particular issue is too complex for them, and none of their business.

The ISAF mission also featured in several episodes of German television series. The popular German police drama series Tatort, which has been broadcast by the first public TV channel ARD since 1970 (Das Erste, 2018), is a case in point. Each week the series features another one of the over 15 German Tatort cities that all have their own police detective(s). For example, the episode Heimatfront (“Home front”) in Saarbrücken in 2011 dealt with the difficulties that former Afghanistan soldiers faced
when trying to return to a civilian life (Das Erste, 2012a, 2012b). It constructed the aforementioned difference within Germany between Afghanistan veterans and the rest of the German population. During a performance, a female artist is shot from far away. Since the performance is critical of ISAF and the shot that killed the woman is extremely difficult, a group of four Afghanistan veterans are the main suspects. Another reason for this suspicion is that the soldiers are traumatised and in therapy, and the artist uses video footage of their therapy sessions in her performance. The two detectives find it hard to find the right murder suspect, because the four veterans offer each other mutual alibis out of loyalty, pointing at the construction of similarities between German soldiers. In another Tatort episode in Bremen in 2013, called Er wird töten (“he will kill”), the male detective from a mixed police duo returns from Afghanistan after having trained Afghan police forces for a while (Das Erste, 2013a, 2013b). He faces difficulties adapting to his old role, as reflected by his new tendency to shoot and then think. Another Tatort episode, shot in Leipzig in the same year and called Schwarzer Afghane (“Black Afghan”), was about the death of a young Afghan man (Das Erste, 2013c). The episode showed a number of different geopolitical frames in the form of representations of Afghan people and the spatial and social relations between Germany and Afghanistan. The killed young man studied physics in Germany and had a job with a transport company until briefly before his death. Moreover, that company shipped, among other things, goods to German organisations in Afghanistan. Then there was the relationship between the daughter of the German company owner and an illegal Afghan immigrant. On top of this, later in the episode, the two police detectives find Afghan weed in the burnt down storage building of the company. The ISAF mission features as well in the special thousandth episode of Tatort in 2016, called Taxi nach Leipzig (“Cab to Leipzig”). The police detectives from Kiel and Hannover are more or less taken hostage by a cab driver, who used to work for the German special forces in Afghanistan (Das Erste, 2016; Dell, 2016). After the cab driver kills another passenger with one simple, yet effective move, he wants to take the two police detectives to Leipzig. In fact, he wants to take revenge on his ex-wife, who is about to marry his former military commander from during his time in Afghanistan. The cab driver is furious about the imminent wedding, because his former head provided him with wrong intelligence. Based on this information, the cab driver had killed innocent Afghan civilians. This resulted in an enduring trauma for him, preventing him from adapting to a civilian life again. This storyline constructs difference between German Afghanistan veterans and the rest of the population, and between German soldiers with different responsibilities during the ISAF mission.
ISAF also featured in a song from the popular German singer-songwriter Reinhard Mey (2007). The song *Kai* tells the story of German parents who receive the news that their son has been killed in Afghanistan while distributing aid to civilians. It forms a telling example of anti-geopolitics, which refers to non-elitist ideas about power-space dynamics (Routledge, 2003).

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Original German text</th>
<th>Translation to English (by author)</th>
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<tr>
<td>„Und lebendige Menschen in einem sich’ren Parliament</td>
<td>„And living people in a secure parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entsenden ein weiteres Truppenkontingent</td>
<td>Send abroad another troop contingent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mit Worten wie Beistand, die edel scheinen</td>
<td>With words such as Support, that seem honourable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wie Friedensmission und die doch nichts andres meinen</td>
<td>Such as Peace Mission, words that however do only mean:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Als: Wir schicken junge Menschen hinaus in ein Land,</td>
<td>We are sending young people to a country,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In dem sie nicht willkommen sind, ihr Dienst nicht anerkannt</td>
<td>Where they are not welcome, their added value not acknowledged,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihr Opfer nicht geachtet, ihre Uniform verhaßt -</td>
<td>Their sacrifices not appreciated, their uniform hated -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ihr armen Kinder, wißt ihr, wofür ihr euch verheizen laßt?</td>
<td>You poor children, do you realise why you make this effort?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gewalt wird neue Gewalt gebären</td>
<td>Violence will bring about new violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terror wird neuen Terror nähren</td>
<td>Terror will feed into new terror.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und wieder ziehen Mütter daraus keine Lehre</td>
<td>And mothers again do not learn from this experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Und wieder schenken Väter Söhnen Spielzeuggewehre</td>
<td>And fathers keep on giving their sons toy guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Es liegt nicht brach, es dörrt nicht aus, das verfluchte Feld der Ehre! &quot;</td>
<td>It is not brackish, it is not drying out, this damned field of honour!&quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 6.4 Excerpt from *Kai* (Mey, 2007)*

The lyrics (Mey, 2007) do not only construct the direct relation between Kai and Afghanistan, but also an indirect one between the parents of Kai and Afghanistan. The song includes several German people that are directly or indirectly involved in ISAF:
politicians, soldiers, mothers, fathers and their sons. The song only refers to Afghanistan indirectly, which can be understood from references to a “poppy field” and the increase in German troop numbers in the years before 2007. The lyrics, particularly in the last paragraph, leave little room for ambiguity: Mey (2007) is opposed to the presence of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan. He implicitly refers to the dangerous nature of ISAF by constructing the parliament that decides on the mission as a secure and lively place, before mentioning the sacrifices that the German ISAF troops need to make. It forms a powerful example of how lyrics can construct differences within states, in this case between German politicians and German soldiers. He further constructs and problematises a relation between Germany and Afghanistan by defining a peace mission as the sending of (German) troops to a state where they are not appreciated at all (by the Afghan population). He also clearly differentiated spatially between Germany and Afghanistan. The latter is constructed as a “far away country” that is located “at the end of the world.” A final example of geopolitical framing is the warning of Mey (2007) that violence is not the solution to the problems of Afghanistan, since it will only cause more violence. The geopolitical frames in this song clearly indicate a lack of will in Germany to intervene in Afghanistan.

6.6 Magazine Covers

Following some examples of representations of ISAF in German popular geopolitics, this section continues with the relevance of magazines and their covers as research objects. To start, magazines produce content that reflects the preferences and values of their readers (Picard, 2011). This is to raise the likelihood that magazines make a profit and stay in business. Accordingly, many frames that they reproduce must have been considered by editors and journalists before publication. This does however not imply that the production of magazines is always a joint effort of different people without any conflicting values and interests (Rothenberg, 2007).

Of importance to the analytical appeal of Der Spiegel is the observation that weekly news magazines indicate which events are deemed sufficiently relevant to be presented to a national audience (Schwalbe, 2013). Moreover, editors of these magazines have more time to select photos than their colleagues at the television and newspapers, because of a longer news cycle. The longer production process allows for more reflection on what is reported, and, indeed, how it is framed (McLoughlin, 2000). As Crowley (2006, p. 58) notes, “magazines can offer seasoned reflection and commentary on affairs rather than report the drama of events as they unfold.” This sets magazines apart from social media, where opinions about events are often immediately expressed (Cawelti, 2010). In the words of Griffin and Lee (1995, p. 814),
"Because newsmagazines hit the stands more than a week after the events they report on, they serve as a kind of news digest - compressing, recapitulating, elaborating upon, and even critiquing the television and newspaper reports of a previous week. In the case of the Gulf War, the photographs in these magazines [were] offering a set of visual "highlights" that reiterated the news images of each week’s events. For these reasons, the weekly newsmagazines provide a useful site for examining the way the conflict was pictured for U.S. audiences."

Next to the newsmagazines themselves, their covers also have specific features that are valuable from an analytical perspective. To start, these covers summarise and visualise the content of the publication in a specific way, thus highlighting particular aspects of news (Crowley, 2006). They further try to capture the contemporary atmosphere of the state where they are read. Moreover, magazine covers are important in the strategies of their producers to attract the attention of potential buyers (McLoughlin, 2000). In fact, magazine covers have generally been designed in ways that are in line with results of market research about which aspects contribute to higher sales figures (Kery, 1982). Therefore, cover editors focus on creating appealing combinations of language, typography, layout and images. Text, image and their relations on the magazine covers are used to create difference (with other magazines) and sameness (with earlier editions and with the ideal reader) (McCracken, 1993). Multimodality is therefore an important tool for cover editors to create an identity for the magazine and develop bonds with the readers. In the words of McCracken (1993, p. 19), “the cover serves to label not only the magazine but the consumer who possesses it.” These multimodal aspects also make news magazines a valuable research object for this thesis.

Earlier research into magazine covers produced several stimulating findings. For example, Delaney et al (2015) study headlines on the cover of magazines that have American citizens with a Latin American background as target audience. Their content analysis of six popular magazines targeting women and parents found that 12 themes were most often used to make the magazines appealing to their target audiences. Seven of them were in their view typical for magazines that targeted an audience with a Latin American background, thereby constructing a difference with other American citizens. Another valuable example concerns the study by Jenkins and Tandoc (2017). They analyse online comments on a Rolling Stone cover of a man who was responsible for an explosion during the Boston Marathon in 2013. Their qualitative textual analysis finds that the comments contributed to the process in which the identities of both the magazine and its readers were constructed. Cover pages also
constructed gender in various ways. Moreover, Bachmann et al (2017) study 21 American magazine covers of Hillary Clinton in the period 2010-2015. They focus on which visual aspects of Clinton are highlighted by the magazine covers, and how these contribute to the (re)production of assumptions concerning power, politics and gender. They find that Clinton is constructed as a very ambitious, power-hungry woman who is not authentic. In their view, this framing of Clinton arouses misogynist feelings among the magazine readers and is therefore disadvantageous for female politicians. Another rich example concerns Kristen and Paage (2014). They study the construction of femininity and masculinity in online comments on a 2012 cover of TIME that showed a woman breastfeeding. They find that many comments were heteronormative and constructed breastfeeding as a sexualised act. This act was defined as being suitable only for children of a particular age, and not for public spaces. A final example of research into magazine covers is Woolridge (2010). She studies the construction masculinity through photos of football players on the covers of two English magazines in the period 1950-1975. Assuming that the covers reflected the changes in preferences of their target audiences through the years, she finds that the photos sought to portray the depicted football players as role models of professional, working-class men. In all, “[m]agazine covers are designed to make some kind of statement, whether it’s political, comedic, thought provoking or trendsetting” (Folio: the Magazine for Magazine Management, 2015, p. 28).

6.7 News Magazine Der Spiegel

Following the observations on the magazine covers in the previous section, this section focuses on the importance of Der Spiegel as (re)producer of geopolitical frames in Germany. Four British officers played indirectly a central role in the conceiving of this news magazine (Der Spiegel, 2007). In 1946, they approached Rudolf Augstein, journalist for a local newspaper in Hannover, to contribute to this news magazine Diese Woche (“This Week”). Two of the aforementioned officers became editors of this new publication (Kohler, 2016). They had not expected that their effort to contribute to a free press in post-Nazi Germany would result in criticism of the British occupation force of North Germany (Der Spiegel, 2007). However, articles in Diese Woche accused the British occupation forces of conducting idiotic policies, being responsible for the lack of basic goods in Germany and taking German machines and know-how to the United Kingdom. This publication ceased to exist after only five editions, being replaced by Der Spiegel (“The Mirror”). Rudolf Augstein became editor and publisher of this news magazine (Kohler, 2016). He saw the magazine as a beacon of democracy, which should counter tendencies within the German government to undermine democracy.
with secret deals and corruption. *Der Spiegel* would become well-known for its investigative journalism in the subsequent decades. The stepping down of Defence Minister Franz Josef Strauss in 1962 is widely considered to be strongest effect of *Der Spiegel* on Germany. After a publication of this magazine on Germany’s military capabilities, Strauss had Augstein and some of his colleagues arrested for treason. Nonetheless, the journalists were eventually released for lack of evidence, and Strauss lost his powerful position. In 1993, Augstein noted that it had been his aim to bring down Strauss and prevent him from becoming chancellor (Koelbl et al, 1993). The magazine did however not have an official political agenda and accordingly, *Der Spiegel* took a “neutral” position towards the anti-establishment movement that emerged in 1968 in Germany (Kohler, 2016). In terms of exposure and influence, the magazine reached a peak in the 1990s. *Der Spiegel* then often sold more than a million copies each week, and was widely seen as the leading German news medium.

In the 21st century so far, *Der Spiegel* has gradually lost its monopoly on being the leading news medium (Kohler, 2016). The key reason is a strong change in the German media landscape. After decades of uninterrupted growth, Germany’s traditional mass media have been faced with a difficult operating environment since the beginning of this century (Meyn and Tonnemacher 2012). The internet boom in the early years led to many failed investments in technology-related projects that eventually did not pay off. Some years later, a financial and economic crisis led to a substantial fall in advertising revenues. As a result, print media have suffered from declining circulation figures as younger generations turn increasingly to the internet for news. This led to large scale mergers, bankruptcies and mass lay-offs in Germany’s media sector.

The influence of traditional mass media remains nonetheless larger than suggested by circulation and audience numbers. These media remain important thanks to their function as information provider, contributor to public opinion and critical/controlling role towards politics. In fact, *Der Spiegel* is still considered to be one of the most influential German media (Kohler, 2016). In line with general media trends, its printed edition suffered from the downward trend in circulation numbers. The circulation of *Der Spiegel* was still over 1 million copies until 2009 (Voß and Mantel, 2009). In the third quarter of 2018, this number stood at 543,000 (Schröder, 2018a). This still compares well to the other German news magazines *Stern* (320,000) and *Focus* (229,000)70. The downward trend in sales of its printed version has not ended the strong position of *Der Spiegel* in

70 They have not been included in dataset of this thesis since (too) few of their covers were about ISAF in the research period.
terms of agenda-setting. In fact, the news magazine was the most quoted news medium in Germany after Bild during the first nine months of 2018 (Media Tenor, 2018). This confirms the observation of Dahinden (2006) that also if news producers such as Der Spiegel are not read by the majority of the population, they can still have influence through agenda setting (selection of themes) and framing (providing particular angle on selected themes). Next to the printed edition, Der Spiegel now also has an online portal. Spiegel Online was the second-largest online news provider of Germany in August 2018 with 242 million visits71 (Schröder, 2018b). This new portal confirms the general trend among German news producers to expand on the internet (Pürer, 2015). This increased online presence is an important way for the press to compensate for the decrease in sales of their printed editions.

As noted at the start of this section, Der Spiegel literally means the mirror. This suggests an undistorted perspective on German society. This study however assumes, in line with the view of Lutz and Collins (1993, p. xiii) on National Geographic, that the magazine does not offer "a simple and objective mirror of reality." In fact, articles in Der Spiegel are generally written in a style that wrongly suggests that reality is represented in an uncontroversial, truthful way (Schneider and Raue, 2009). This is an effective way to hide opinions under a veil of objective news coverage. As applies to all journalists, however, journalists of Der Spiegel cannot represent all ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty related to a particular event or issue (Harcup and O'Neill, 2001). After all, journalists of Der Spiegel also need to select particular options from a multitude of possibilities. In terms of this thesis, this implies that they are (re)producers of geopolitical frames as well. In the words of (Cooper, 2010, p. 140),

"news production inherently involves framing, no matter how scrupulously the reporter and editor may try to bright-line a distinction between straight news and opinion, and no matter how carefully they might try to remain neutral in reporting on some controversy."

This is confirmed by a study by Tseronis (2015), who compares the covers of Der Spiegel and Focus. He analyses how Greece is constructed during the euro crisis. The method he uses is reminiscent of a framing analysis of textual-visual representations. He finds that ‘The ‘we’ vs. ‘Greece’ distinction is present only in the first cover [and] Der Spiegel does not appear putting a judgment on Greece as being the direct cause of the crisis or the only threat for the euro” (Tseronis, 2015, p. 26).

71 Once more, Bild held the number one position with its portal Bild.de.
In all, there are four compelling reasons for including *Der Spiegel* in the dataset. First, the news magazine remains one of the most influential media of Germany. Second, it continues to be well respected for its critical reflections on politics (Meyn and Tonnemacher 2012). In fact, a content analysis of the research institute Media Tenor (2018) finds that *Der Spiegel* was more critical of all political parties and politicians, including chancellor Merkel than *Bild*. Third, the magazine is still widely praised for its ability to inform the public substantially more detailed than the daily press (Meyn and Tonnemacher 2012). Fourth, *Der Spiegel* remains also well-known for its courage to discuss controversial themes and uncover shady practices. A classic example concerns the buying of MP votes in 1950 to support Bonn (and not Frankfurt am Main) as Germany’s new capital.

Accordingly, *Der Spiegel* is an important (re)producer of geopolitical imaginations in the German context. However, it needs to be stressed once more here that this thesis concerns a textual-visual content analysis. As a consequence, the intended meanings of the magazine covers are not analysed through interviews with the editors of *Der Spiegel*. Such interviews would also have clarified the selection process of photos that the editors go through during the production of the *Der Spiegel* covers. More specifically, interviews would have brought more insights into the limitations that *Der Spiegel* faced in terms of the supply of photos from Afghanistan. They would further have been beneficial to generate knowledge about how the editor address the limitations that result from the relatively few words on the magazine cover. Interviews would further enable to investigate whether the editors make a conscious difference in the selection of intended meanings between the covers and the related articles in the magazine. Another valuable aspect that interviews would clarify, is the role of the commercial appeal in decisions on the textual-visual design of the magazine cover.

This thesis also leaves out audience reception of the *Der Spiegel* covers. Interviews with various readers of this magazine would result in more knowledge of how the magazine is understood by its German audience. These interviews would undoubtedly yield differences in interpretations between my research and the interviewees. As (Potthoff, 2012, p. 221, also footnote 42 in section 5.3) rightfully claims, a representational frame “will not by definition present itself in the same way to the academic scholar and other recipients” If this were to happen, further questions could focus both on what the interviewee knew and felt about Germany’s ISAF mission. At least as important is that interviews would offer me the opportunity to investigate how the German audience of *Der Spiegel* (implicitly) thought about key concepts in this study, such as Germany’s power, Germany’s security and particular forms of victimhood. Interviews with the magazine readers would undoubtedly also have
resulted in more knowledge of the local and regional differences in the interpretations of the magazine covers. More general, such interviews would also have generated insights into the differences between different German regions, and within them, regarding the support for Germany’s ISAF mission.

6.8 Implementation and Summary

This chapter introduces the data sources for the empirical chapters. The dataset consists of parliamentary speeches, personal statements of MPs and magazine covers. Five German parties have been selected for the political text analysis, while the news magazine *Der Spiegel* is included as well. This composition takes into account that framing plays particularly an important role in the interaction between politics and media (Reese, 2003). The comparison of the geopolitical frames found in political texts and on the cover of an influential news magazine is expected to generate a better understanding of how practical geopolitics and popular geopolitics reflected and affected geopolitical imaginations during Germany’s ‘War on Terror.’

Figure 6.5 pays tribute to the previous chapter. It gives a brief overview of the general features of the dataset. The table further shows which methodological requirements the dataset poses. In the next two empirical chapters, the dataset is introduced in more detail to contextualise the subsequent analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>General features</th>
<th>Parliamentary Speeches/Statements</th>
<th>Magazine Covers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Source type</td>
<td>Political party</td>
<td>News magazine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source names</td>
<td>FDP; CDU; SPD; The Greens; The Left</td>
<td><em>Der Spiegel</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data type</td>
<td>Speech Transcript, Written Statement</td>
<td>Magazine Cover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Period</td>
<td>2001-2014 (selection)</td>
<td>2001-2014 (selection)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological requirements</td>
<td>Written text</td>
<td>Written text, still image</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written texts - short word combinations such as headlines and captions</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Written texts - multiple full sentences</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Text-image relations – interaction between words and image(s)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 6.5 Main features of the data sources
7 Geopolitical Frames in the Bundestag Debates on ISAF (2001-2014)

7.1 Introduction

“The War on Terror is not an objective condition, but rather a social construction in which certain interpretations of the world became dominant, excluding other possible constructions which might not legitimate military intervention” (Ty Solomon, 2012, p. 911).

The previous chapters critically examined conceptual and methodological progress in critical geopolitics and literature on Germany’s identities and foreign policy. These chapters subsequently informed the design of the methodology and the selection of sources for this thesis. This is the first of two empirical chapters. It presents the findings of research into representations of Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ in practical geopolitics. Parliamentary speeches and personal statements of MPs have been selected as research objects. As section 6.3 demonstrates, parliamentary speeches on the ‘War on Terror’ are key producers of geopolitical frames in Germany (Longhurst, 2005). A state-specific reason is that the German parliament always needs to give approval to government proposals about foreign military missions (Staack, 2014). Moreover, Germany has a tradition of coalition governments and a parliament with five parties with various ideological roots (Decker, 2015). More generally, the analysis of political texts can help us understand how politicians connect with their voters (Ó Tuathail, 2002), how national symbols are used (Dijkink, 1996) and how notions of national identity are reproduced (Müller, 2008). Research by Flint et al (2009) and Ambrosio and Lange (2014) confirmed that political speeches constitute valuable material for a geopolitical analysis.

The next section introduces in detail which speech transcripts and written statements have been selected for the empirical study of practical geopolitics. Then follows a section with some general findings of the analysis, as a general contextualisation for the more detailed four sections thereafter. These sections present the findings for each of the four respective geopolitical frame categories in more detail. The conclusion at the end of the chapter summarises the main findings and forms a bridge to the next empirical chapter about popular geopolitics in Germany.
7.2 Selected Speeches and Statements

The Bundestag, the German parliament, held 19 debates on ISAF between December 2001 and February 2014 (figure 7.1) (Deutscher Bundestag, 2016). Seven of them have been selected for the empirical study in this chapter. Six of them were about landmark decisions, such as the beginning (2001) and end of the mission (2014) and its largest spatial extension (2003). Three other important decisions concerned the use of military planes in Afghanistan (2007, 2009, 2011). The 2005 debate has been added to keep the gap between all debates at less than three years. This allows an analysis of how frames changed during the ISAF mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Decision on Germany’s contribution to ISAF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>14.06.2002</td>
<td>Mission continued without significant changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>20.12.2002</td>
<td>Number of soldiers raised to 2,500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>24.10.2003</td>
<td>Spatial extension of Bundeswehr presence (to Northern Afghanistan).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>30.10.2004</td>
<td>Mission continued without significant changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>28.09.2005</td>
<td>Number of soldiers raised to 3,000.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>28.09.2006</td>
<td>Mission continued without significant changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>09.03.2007</td>
<td>Six Tornado surveillance planes sent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>12.10.2007</td>
<td>Mission continued without significant changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16.10.2008</td>
<td>Number of soldiers raised to 4,500.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>02.07.2009</td>
<td>Participation in Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS, never implemented).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>08.09.2009</td>
<td>None [debate on Kunduz air strike].</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>03.12.2009</td>
<td>Mission continued without significant changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>26.02.2010</td>
<td>Number of soldiers raised to 5,350.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>28.01.2011</td>
<td>Mission continued without significant changes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>25.03.2011</td>
<td>Participation in Airborne Warning And Control System (AWACS).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>26.01.2012</td>
<td>Number of soldiers reduced to 4,900.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>31.01.2013</td>
<td>Number of soldiers reduced to 4,400.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.1 All Bundestag debates on ISAF (highlighted in green: included in dataset)

The dataset includes next to speeches also personal statements during the selected ISAF debates. These statements can be made by all members of the German
parliament, either individually or collectively (Deutscher Bundestag, nd). They are usually shared only in written form. Personal statements are often made by MPs who abstain from voting or vote differently than the majority in their party. During the seven selected debates, 72 speeches and 65 statements were presented to the Bundestag in spoken and/or written form (figure 7.2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number of Transcripts</th>
<th>Number of Statements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>22.12.2001</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>24.10.2003</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>28.09.2005</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>09.03.2007</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>02.07.2009</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>25.03.2011</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>20.02.2014</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.2 Total number of speech transcripts and written statements per debate

Another consideration in the data selection is the dominance of presidents in earlier studies of political speeches (e.g. Flint et al. 2009; Sharp, 2013; Ambrosio and Lange, 2014). To seize this research opportunity, this thesis focuses on speeches (and statements) of MPs only. Accordingly, the nine speeches by ministers in the seven selected debates are not part of the dataset (figure 7.3). In addition, the speeches by MPs from the CSU have been left out of the dataset as well. The CSU is the Bavarian sister party of CDU and therefore lacks a (near-)national scope. Finally, seven statements from the seven selected debates are not part of the dataset because they were very similar to other statements. As a result, the dataset consists of 56 speeches and 56 statements.

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72 See also section 6.4.
The speech transcripts and written statements of the selected debates have been obtained from the website of the German parliament. After downloading the minutes of the selected Bundestag sessions, the relevant speech transcripts and written statements were selected (figure 7.5 for example). After doing this, these texts were copied to Word. They still contained at that stage much information that was not part of this analysis, including page numbers, references to interruptions such as applause, and statements made by the Chair of parliament. Therefore, all speeches and statements were first edited. The resulting texts were then broken down in small paragraphs and copied to a separate worksheet in Excel.\textsuperscript{74}

\textsuperscript{73} Figures 11.1 to 11.6 in Appendix 1 offer a complete and detailed overview of selected and excluded speeches and statements.

\textsuperscript{74} Section 4.4 explains how the speeches and statements have been analysed in Excel.
7.3 Geopolitical Frame Categories

The analysis of the geopolitical frames in the political texts in the following four sections requires a general contextualisation. To start, the importance of the geopolitical frame categories varied enormously in these texts (figure 7.5). In fact, a main finding of the analysis is that the capacity to intervene is one of the main concerns of the MPs. Nearly one-third of all identified frames belong to this category. In this regard, MPs framed the actual impact of Germany and ISAF on Afghanistan far more often than the capabilities of the German army (further discussed in section 7.6). Another strong concern of the MPs were the victims during the ISAF mission, and the responsibility for their suffering. The relative importance of this category differed substantially among the parties, as discussed in section 7.7. A quarter of the identified frames refers to the will to intervene. All political parties framed the insecurity in the Afghan territory itself more often than the threat posed to other states emanating from that same territory. Moreover, the relative importance of the two frames that construct Afghanistan as a threat to other states (1.1 and 1.2) as compared to the other 22 frames varied however widely between the parties (as section 7.4 further discusses). The least discussed category was the militarisation of ISAF. Frames that constructed ISAF as a peace mission, war mission or a blend of them have all been frequently identified in the political texts. The political texts also produced many frames about the nature of the Afghanistan interventions of other states, particularly the United States

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75 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.

76 In the remainder of this chapter, “(political) texts” are often used as shorthand for “speech transcripts and written statements.” The same applies to “categories” and “frames” as shorthand for “geopolitical frame categories” and “geopolitical frames.”
(further explained in section 7.5). Please note that one particular geopolitical frame category can occur multiple times in one text in the form of two or more different frames that belong to this category.

Figure 7.5 Number of occurrences of all frames in each geopolitical frame category in the political texts

Another valuable aspect to contextualise the findings of the geopolitical framing analysis is the relative importance of the geopolitical frame categories at party level (figure 7.6). Security is particularly of relevance to particular CDU and FDP (as key factor in the will to intervene), whereas both parties frame the militarisation of ISAF relatively few times. On the other hand, the Greens, SPD and particularly the Left frame the victims and perpetrators during the ISAF mission relatively often.

Figure 7.6 Relative importance of geopolitical frame categories in political texts
As figure 7.6 exemplifies, percentages are preferred over numbers in this chapter. Accordingly, the number of times that a frame or category has been identified for a political party is usually expressed in terms of the total number of observations for that party. Figure 7.7 implicitly stresses the importance of working with shares (percentages) as opposed to absolute numbers. The bar graph reflects well how large the differences are between the parties concerning the number of frames they produced. This implies that a particular number of observed frames is less striking for a party that produced a large number of frames than for another party that produced much fewer frames.

Figure 7.7 Number of occurrences of all frames in the political texts of each party

7.4 Will to Intervene

One of the few aspects in the ISAF debates where all parties showed the same pattern, was the relative importance of the inability of the government to protect its population within the “Will to Intervene” category” (figure 7.9). Despite this equal relative importance, the shares of this frame in the total number of frames of each party varied widely. In fact, this frame (1.3) accounted for more than one-sixth of all identified frames of FDP, which is more than twice as high than the Left. The CDU stressed particularly the threat that Afghanistan posed to Germany and other states in this category (frames 1.1 and 1.2), where this was no major issue in the texts of the Left and SPD.
Figure 7.8 “Will to Intervene” frames

Figure 7.9 Relative importance of frames in “Will to Intervene” category among parties

It is good to realise that the categories and frames of the research framework in this thesis are not mutually exclusive, and could overlap. This exemplified by the claim of Lothar Binding (SPD) in 2007 that a militant opposition, local/regional leaders and organised crime jointly pose a serious threat towards Afghan and international security forces, and societal, social and economic development. Another telling example of how Afghanistan was framed as a threat to Germany comes from a speech of dr. Werner Hoyer (FDP) in 2003. He constructs the Afghan threat to German security and Germany’s inability to have an intended impact on Afghanistan by means of a sentence with powerful visual images that connect the Kunduz region to three large cities in Germany (translation by author):

“It is likely that the German people will soon watch on German television screens images of German soldiers in Kunduz who stand, with no room to act, in front of beautifully flourishing poppy seed fields or places where drugs are..."
produced and traded, that eventually will be sold to our children in Frankfurt, Köln and Hamburg.”

Next to the four frames discussed in this section, other factors can also play a role in the will of a state to intervene in other states. One such factor, which has been excluded from the analysis, is to what extent the loyalty towards other states should play a role in where and how foreign military interventions take place. One word in the 2003 speech of dr. Gesine Lötzsch (the Left) is a case in point. The word exemplifies how the English and German language (and many others) can have two different words for the same meaning. In her speech, dr. Löttsch said that “[t]he temporal extension and spatial expansion of the German ISAF mission have less to do with Afghanistan itself than with the German horse trade with the Americans.” In the original German text, however, the German equivalent of the English word cow trade (Kuhhandel) was used. This example points at the complexity of translating texts before conducting a framing analysis of them. It further confirms the importance of metaphors in framing analysis (Van Gorp, 2010). The use of the German equivalent of horse trade in this context does not refer to deals between buyers and sellers of one particular animal (literal meaning), but to the deals between Germany and the United States. In fact, this metaphor implies a negative evaluation in both the German and English language (Duden Deutsches Universal Wörterbuch, 2007; Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, 2008). The metaphor refers here to Germany taking over responsibilities from the United States in Afghanistan. This was done to enable the United States to focus more on its military intervention in Iraq77.

### 7.5 Militarisation of Intervention

The analysis of the frames in the “Militarisation of Intervention” yields a slightly messy picture of the five parties (figure 7.11). Particularly the Left frames Germany’s ISAF contribution as a war/combat mission (frame 2.2). Moreover, MPs from the Greens, and to a lesser extent the Left and SPD, frame the presence of troops from other states (particularly United States) often as a war mission. A telling example is a written statement in 2007 from several MPs of the Greens (among them Winfried Nachtwei and Jürgen Trittin). These MPs wrote that foreign troops often used undifferentiated and disproportionally military violence in South and East Afghanistan and spoke of a dirty battle. Their observations frame particularly the United States as ‘other’ that, contrary to Germany, uses military force for offensive purposes. Overall, spatial homogenisation of Afghanistan was commonplace in the speeches and on the

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77 See also section 6.2.
magazine covers. Little differentiation was made between different Afghan spaces and if Afghanistan was divided up in two spaces, these spaces were subsequently homogenised. This tendency to homogenise Afghanistan explains the call from journalist Stefan Kornelius (2009) for a widespread acknowledgement among German policymakers that the situation in Afghanistan is complex. In his view, the references to North and South Afghanistan should not be used anymore. They are in fact irrelevant because they hamper in his view a clear view on the state’s complexity. Returning to the findings of the analysis, the frame (2.3) that Germany’s ISAF contribution has aspects of both a peace/stabilisation mission and a war/combat mission is found among members of all political parties. Within the SPD, this frame is relatively most common. Dr. Axel Berg (SPD) framed the German ISAF mission clearly as both a stabilisation and combat mission with his observation in 2007 that the German Tornado planes could both contribute to stabilisation operations in West, North and Central Afghanistan, and to the at times very intensive battle operations in the fight against the armed non-state groups in South and East Afghanistan. Moreover, MPs of the FDP never framed Germany’s ISAF mission as either a peace/stabilisation mission or a war/combat mission, and never framed the militarisation of the interventions of other states in Afghanistan. A frame (2.4) that was among the least produced ones in the research period was “Germany’s ISAF mission is not a war mission.” However, it confirms the observation of Reese (2003) that a rarely observed frame is not by definition an unimportant frame. MP Eckart von Klaeden (CDU) argued in 2009 that Germany should not speak of a war mission in Afghanistan. If that was done, Taliban fighters were given combatant status. In his view, Taliban conducted criminal actions in Afghanistan, like the Rote Armee Faktion (RAF) did in Germany in the 1970s. RAF members also claimed combatant status, and were according to MP Von Klaeden criminals as well.

| 2.1 Germany is on a peace/stabilisation mission in Afghanistan |
| 2.2 Germany is on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan |
| 2.3 Germany is both on a peace/stabilisation mission and a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan |
| 2.4 Germany’s ISAF mission is not a war mission |
| 2.5 Other states are on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan |

Figure 7.10 “Militarisation of Intervention” frames
Figure 7.11 Relative importance of frames in “Militarisation of Intervention” category among parties

7.6 Capacity to Intervene

As explained in section 5.5., the “Capacity to Intervene” category refers first to the capabilities of the German to operate abroad (or more specifically in Afghanistan; frames 3.1. to 3.3). This category further concerns the extent to which Germany and other states have an intended impact on Afghanistan (frames 3.4 to 3.7). Starting with these military capabilities, an ideological divide is suggested by the findings (figure 7.13). The centre-right FDP and to a lesser extent CDU attach relatively much value to them in the debates. Both parties frame these capabilities nonetheless more often as insufficient than as sufficient. On the other hand, the centre-left parties SPD and the Greens and left-wing party the Left frame the capabilities not often in comparison with other aspects of ISAF.

| 3.1 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is sufficient |
| 3.2 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is currently insufficient |
| 3.3 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan will always be insufficient |

Figure 7.12 ‘Intended Impact of Germany Army’ frames
The lack of intended impact on Afghanistan from Germany is the second aspect where parties show a similar pattern (figure 7.15). At least 12% of the frames that each party produced, constructed Germany as being unable to have an intended impact on Afghanistan (frame 3.7). The Left was the only party that framed Germany as only having no intended impact on Afghanistan. The other parties also produced frames that suggested that Germany had an intended impact in a few policy areas or places, or for the time being. Such a perspective is exemplified by the text of Peter Beyer (CDU) in 2014, in which he argued that the ISAF mission of Germany had not failed. He commended ISAF for enabling the training of new teachers, both female and male, and the building of new schools in Afghanistan. He spoke in this regard of the “ISAF-generation” that can read and write.

**Figure 7.13 Relative importance of frames in “Capacity to Intervene” category among parties (1)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Frame 3.1</th>
<th>Frame 3.2</th>
<th>Frame 3.3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 7.14 ‘Intended Impact of States’ frames**

3.4 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some policy issues

3.5 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some places

3.6 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan for now

3.7 Germany and/or foreign states do not have intended impact on Afghanistan
Returning to the shared pattern among the parties, all parties went so far as to suggest that Germany did have unintended effects on Afghanistan. This is related to the concept of inferior power of Smith (2012) that refers to actions that result in undesired outcomes. Hans-Christian Ströbele (the Greens) for example suggested in 2014 that Germany contributes to the rise in violence in Afghanistan, and expects therefore a higher risk of terrorist attacks. Seven years earlier, a group of SPD MPs (among them Petra Merkel) expected that the sending of German Tornado planes to Afghanistan would result in increased Taliban suicide activity. Both views confirm the observation of Robinson (2008, p. 377) that “[i]n conflict situations, the very resources being offered as assistance can sometimes fuel further violence”. Moreover, Jan van Aken (the Left) argued in 2011 that the ISAF mission prevented peace from being achieved in Afghanistan. In 2013, Klaus-Jürgen Hedrich (CDU) further pointed in 2003 at the ironic situation where some people that are protected by the German army in Afghanistan earned their money with drugs production and arms trading. Dr Werner Hoyer (FDP) added in the same debate that ISAF troops look away from the drugs production and thus help strengthen the position of regional leaders vis-à-vis the Afghan central government.

### 7.7 Victims during Intervention

The analysis of the framing of victimhood reveals a striking difference between particular parties (figure 7.17). Whereas the Greens and to a lesser extent the Left frame Afghan victims more often, the reverse is true for CDU, FDP and SDP. In light of the Nazi past and the related German sensitivities about victims of German military
force (Niven, 2006), it is remarkable that some parties seem to attach more value to German lives than Afghan lives. Nonetheless, one needs to be careful here not to frame Germans as being responsible for all ISAF related casualties among the Afghans during the ISAF mission. Nonetheless, Wolfgang Gehrcke (the Left) raised the question in 2014 as to who was responsible for the death of 70,000 people in the conflict in Afghanistan. Jan van Aken (the Left) summarised in 2011 the view of his party on ISAF and foreign policy in general with the words that if Germany and ISAF ended the war in Afghanistan (i.e. withdrawal of their troops), nobody would be killed anymore in that state. He also cited UN data that stated that two-third of the victims among Afghan citizens is the result of Taliban operations and the remaining one-third of ISAF and OEF operations.

| 4.1 Afghans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*) |
| 4.2 Germans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*) |
| 4.3 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*) |
| 4.4 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission |

Figure 7.16 ‘Victim’ frames

![Bar chart showing the relative importance of Victim frames among parties](image)

Figure 7.17 Relative importance of Victim frames among parties

The frames that the political parties produced on perpetration during the ISAF debates also varied widely (figure 7.19). CDU, SPD and FDP framed members of armed non-state groups most often as perpetrators and did this significantly less frequently for Germans. The Greens and the Left framed Germans much more often as perpetrators, as well as other states (mainly United States).
7 Geopolitical Frames in the Bundestag Debates on ISAF (2001-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.5 Afghans are or may be perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.6 Germans are or may be perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.7 People from other state(s) are or may be perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.8 Members of armed non-state groups are perpetrators during ISAF mission</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 7.18 ‘Perpetrator’ frames

![Graph showing the relative importance of Perpetrator frames among parties]

Figure 7.19 Relative importance of Perpetrator frames among parties

The richness of Germany’s parliamentary speeches and statements is not only rooted in the different ideological background of the parties. It is also rooted in the diversity within the parties. This is exemplified by the opposing views within the SPD on German responsibility for casualties among Afghan citizens during the 2007 debate on ISAF. Rainer Arnold argued that German Tornado planes can contribute to the prevention of civilian casualties during ISAF air strikes. Nonetheless, another MP of his party; Dr. Axel Berg, argued that sending German Tornado planes to Afghanistan would not substantially reduce the risk of civilian casualties. The analysis further makes clear that perpetration can be constructed in many different ways. In 2007, Dr. Rainer Stinner (FDP) did not frame Germany as having responsibility for the victims during the ISAF mission, however, suggested that German Tornado planes to Afghanistan would help prevent collateral damage. Two MPs of his party framed the responsibility of armed non-state groups for (other) victims in Afghanistan in explicit terms in the same debate. Such groups posed a threat to a dam in Afghanistan (Dr Werner Hoyer) and

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78 See also section 6.4.

79 See also section 6.3.
had stepped up the number of suicide attacks in Afghanistan (Birgit Homburger). The responsibility of Germany for (some of the) victims is made more explicit by the Greens and the Left. Uwe Kekeritz and some other MPs of the Greens suggested in 2011 that Germany could become responsible for targeted killings in Afghanistan if the parliament were to give the green light to German participation in the AWACS air surveillance system in Afghanistan.

7.8 Main Findings of Bundestag Analysis

The analysis of the speeches resulted in various findings. First, the Left framed Germany’s ISAF mission most frequent as a war mission. Second, CDU and FDP framed the capabilities of the German army to have an intended impact on Afghanistan as sufficient relatively frequent, while also framing them as insufficient most frequently (to be discussed below). Another difference between the parties was that the Afghans were more often framed as victims by the Greens and the Left, whereas Germans were more often framed as victims by CDU, SPD and FDP. What the framing practices of the five political parties had in common, is that these resulted for all in relatively many frames that constructed the Afghan government as being unable to protect its population. Furthermore, political texts of the CDU framed Afghanistan relatively often as a threat to Germany. Finally, CDU, SPD, FDP and the Greens were to varying degrees positive on the chances that Germany could have an intended impact in some policy areas, some places or for some time.

Two traditional interests of Germany in its foreign policy are good relations with member states of EU and NATO and military restraint. More specifically, to contextualise the finding of the framing analysis in this chapter, particularly the relationship with the United States is important, the level of defence spending and the level of violence that German soldiers could use in Afghanistan. Broadly speaking, CDU and FDP maintained the closest relations with the United States, called most frequently for higher defence spending and most flexible towards the use of violence by German soldiers abroad. This is reflected by the relatively many frames in the “will to intervene” category that they produced in the selected political texts. Moreover, they produced the fewest frames in the “militarisation of the intervention” category. Both parties also produced relatively many frames that suggested that Germany had an impact on Afghanistan in some policy fields, in some areas or for some time. Remarkably, both parties framed the German army relatively frequently as being both sufficiently and insufficiently capable to have an intended impact on Afghanistan. The first framing provided support for the US-initiated ISAF mission. Although the second framing can be used to question support for a foreign military mission, this did not apply
Various MPs from both parties who used this framing voted in favour of ISAF, while also calling for higher defence spending. This is an example of where a particular frame is linked to a particular policy preference (Entman, 2004). A final observation concerning both parties is that they frame Germans relatively often as victims as compared to the Afghans.

In the political texts of the Left and the Greens, it is the other way round. Representing an overall stronger reluctance to use military force abroad, both parties maintain a stronger position on the consequences of Germany’s Nazi past for Germany’s contemporary foreign policy. Both parties frame Germany (and other states) relatively often as perpetrators in Afghanistan, while framing Afghan people more frequently as victims than Germans. They further produce relative many frames in the “militarisation of intervention” category. Particularly the Left stressed time and again that Germany’s ISAF mission was a war mission. Both parties also ‘othered’ the United States most frequently as a state that is on a war mission in Afghanistan. Finally, the Left and the Greens were among the most negative parties when it came to the intended impact of Germany on Afghanistan.

As the last observation highlights, rule-like relationships between the identified frames and the foreign policy preferences of political parties cannot be established by this study. In fact, the FDP produced the most frames that suggested that Germany cannot have an intended impact on Afghanistan. Furthermore, the diversity of frames within political parties also rules out strong claims about the relationship between the identified frames in this study and the foreign policy preferences of political parties.

As a visual conclusion of this chapter, figure 7.20 offers an overview of the relative importance of each of the 24 geopolitical frames in the dataset. The bar graphs shows that the frame that constructed Germany as having no impact on Afghanistan was most prominent in the political texts. The second-most significant frame in the dataset constructed Afghanistan as a state with a government that cannot protect its population. These results are used as basis to make the comparison with the Der Spiegel covers in section 8.9 of the next chapter. There they are presented in relative terms to make them better comparable (as explained in section 7.3). The next chapter expands the analytical scope of this thesis in two ways. First, it investigates popular geopolitical frames on covers of the leading German news magazine Der Spiegel. Words and short phrases are here the common devices to produce geopolitical frames, contrary to the full sentences of the practical geopolitical texts in this chapter. Another new methodological aspect in the next chapter concerns the analysis of images, and their relations with the surrounding or overlapping words and phrases.
Figure 7.20 Relative importance of each geopolitical frame in all political texts
8 Geopolitical Frames on the Der Spiegel Covers on ISAF (2001-2014)

8.1 Introduction

“Newsmagazine covers are particularly useful because they typically summarize the dominant framing of major foreign and domestic policy issues” (Robert Entman, 2004, p. 100)

News magazines are important (re)producers of geopolitical frames\(^\text{80}\). To start, they contribute to us-them dichotomies in the (re)construction of identities (Sharp, 2000; Kitch, 2005). American news magazines such as Time and Life saw themselves, and were seen, as the driving force of the national community during the second half of the previous century. Moreover, the geopolitical imaginations that were evoked by articles of Reader’s Digest on the Soviet Union from the 1940s until the 1980s contributed to both the construction of the American identity and the decisions on foreign policy (Sharp, 2000). National Geographic also contributed to the drawing and erasing of boundaries between states in the twentieth century, by framing states in a rather positive (e.g. about Panama or the Philippines) or negative way (e.g. Egypt and Nicaragua; Rothenberg, 2007). The continued relevance of news magazines and their covers is also rooted in the fact that they reflect that same society: “[m]agazine covers are visual representations of the mores, ideals, and the social and cultural values of the nation as filtered through the lens of the mass media” (Heller and Fili, 1996, p.8). It is therefore surprising that there are relatively few studies of magazines in a critical geopolitical setting (e.g. Sharp, 2000) or critical geographical setting (Lutz and Collins, 1993). Also in light of the observation of Griffin (2004, p. 387) that news magazines offer many people “a ready visual summary of news events, especially in times of crises” thanks to their visibility “at news-stands, supermarkets, pharmacies, and in myriad waiting rooms (from dentists’ offices to auto repair shops”

To seize the research opportunity that news magazines offer, this chapter addresses how a German news magazine framed the ‘War on Terror’ in Germany. More specifically, the focus is on how the textual and visual elements on the Der Spiegel\(^\text{81}\)

\(^{80}\) See also section 6.6 and 6.7.

\(^{81}\) See also section 6.7.
covers jointly (re)produce geopolitical frames. The next section discusses the process in which 20 covers have been selected. Then follows a quantitative analysis of the geopolitical frame categories and the geopolitical frames that have been identified. A more detailed qualitative analysis then follows in the subsequent four sections. These sections discuss the identified geopolitical frames for each respective geopolitical frame category: will to intervene, militarisation of intervention, capacity to intervene and victims during intervention. Hereafter, a comparison between the identified geopolitical frames on the Der Spiegel covers and in the political speeches and written statements is made. The conclusion closes this chapter with the main findings.

8.2 Selected Covers

This chapter analyses 20 covers of Der Spiegel in the period October 2001-December 2014. The first step in the research process is an analysis of all Der Spiegel covers from the period commencing in mid-September 2001 until the end of December 2014. The start of the period is based on the attacks by Al Qaida against the United States in 2001, which triggered the Bush government to start the ‘War on Terror’ (Ó Tuathail, 2003) and eventually resulted in Germany’s contribution to the ISAF mission. The end of the ISAF mission in December 2014 explains why this month forms the end point of the overall analysis. The 693 Der Spiegel covers in the research period have been downloaded from the website of Der Spiegel (figure 8.1).

Figure 8.1 page on Der Spiegel website with images of covers of printed edition in 2009

82 Source: http://www.spiegel.de/spiegel/print/index-2009.html
For this study, twenty editions of Der Spiegel have been selected (figure 8.2). With the analysis focusing on the German military engagement with Afghanistan during the 'War on Terror', the central criterion is that Afghanistan had to be textually present on the cover of the magazine. This is in line with Grittmann and Ammann (2014) who also select texts and photos for their study based on the content of the texts, and not the photos. They analyse the visual coverage of 9/11 by seven print media in Germany: the newspapers Bild, FAZ, Frankfurter Rundschau, SZ and Die Welt, and the magazines Der Spiegel and Stern. Moreover, it is often not possible to say (with certainty) which particular state is constructed by a magazine cover purely based on the image. Afghanistan was textually referred to on 16 of the selected covers in the research period. Two of these did actually not mention Afghanistan, but referred to Kunduz or contained the noun "Afghans". In addition, one cover that is selected does not explicitly refer to Afghanistan, but was selected for its headline "The war after the victory" in the given context (November 2001). Two other covers were selected since they referred explicitly to all Germany's military missions abroad. The last selected cover problematises Germany's uneasy relationship with war in a visually powerful way. It contains a far-away shot of refugees in a heavily damaged Berlin and a close shot of a boy who looks lost, presumably taken close after WWII, juxtaposed by a recent photo of Bundeswehr soldiers on patrol while holding weaponry.

The analysis starts with the Der Spiegel cover that mentioned the advancements in Afghanistan of American ground troops in September 2001. The last cover is from the month that the ISAF mission came to an end. The selection of 20 cover pages over a time span of 14 years makes it possible to get a better understanding of how the 'War on Terror' frames have evolved over time in Der Spiegel. It must be noted here however that possible changes cannot be linearly interpreted (i.e. on a continuous annual scale), because half of the covers were published in less than 12 months (periods in 2001 and 2010). Figure 8.2 shows the selected editions, including the sub-headlines (translated to English) that relate to ISAF. The images of the covers of the selected Der Spiegel covers are shown by figure 8.3.
### Figure 8.2 (Sub-)headlines that refer to ISAF on the selected *Der Spiegel* covers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Edition</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>(Sub-)Headline on the Cover (translated to English by author)</th>
<th>(H)headline or (S)Sub-Headline</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>2001/42</td>
<td>15.10.2001</td>
<td>Bin Laden’s sleeper. Trained in Afghanistan, as asylum seekers in Europe.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>2001/43</td>
<td>22.10.2001</td>
<td>The war on the ground adventure. American troops in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>2001/45</td>
<td>05.11.2001</td>
<td>The case Afghanistan. America’s awful war of bombs and the ghost of Vietnam.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>2001/47</td>
<td>19.11.2001</td>
<td>The war after the victory. The hunt on Bin Laden and the fear of new terrorist attacks.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2002/04</td>
<td>21.01.2002</td>
<td>Spiegel interview with Afghans’ Prime-Minister Karzai: Leading role for the Germans.”</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>2002/11</td>
<td>11.03.2002</td>
<td>The overburdened army. Germans on all fronts.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>2006/47</td>
<td>20.11.2006</td>
<td>&quot;The Germans need to learn to kill.&quot; How Afghanistan turns into a severe issue.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>2009/38</td>
<td>14.9.2009</td>
<td>Nightmare Afghanistan. A war that can't be won.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>2009/49</td>
<td>20.11.2009</td>
<td>When are the German allowed to kill? The <strong>Bundeswehr</strong>, Afghanistan and the war in the 21st century.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>2010/05</td>
<td>1.2.2010</td>
<td>The secret Kunduz file. Record of a lethal mistake.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>2010/16</td>
<td>29.4.2010</td>
<td>In war. German soldiers about the killing and dying in Afghanistan.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>2011/36</td>
<td>5.9.2011</td>
<td>When Germany entered the war. Afghanistan: the (hi)story of a mistake.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>2013/13</td>
<td>25.03.2003</td>
<td>The eternal trauma. The war and the Germans.</td>
<td>H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>2014/40</td>
<td>29.9.2014</td>
<td>Armament. Not well prepared for foreign missions. The <strong>Bundeswehr</strong> Disaster.</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Total                           -                              -                                                                                      12 (H); 8 (S)
Figure 8.3 Images of the selected Der Spiegel covers (© DER SPIEGEL)

Appendix 2 offers large images of the Der Spiegel covers in the dataset.
As figure 8.3. shows, the design of the cover has been rather stable during the research period (2001-2014). Its common textual and visual elements are now discussed, following the diagrammatic approach. This approach is shown by figure 8.4 (Quinn, nd). Some of the names of the cover elements are different from this example.

Figure 8.4 Breaking down a magazine cover with the diagrammatic approach (Quinn, nd)

To start, there is the name of the magazine, Der Spiegel, on each cover (figure 8.5 for example). The name of the magazine plays a key part in managing the expectations of the reader (McLoughlin, 2000). The name has been present in the same way during the research period. The name was printed with the same font, the same white letters and the same hardly noticeable black drop shadow. Right on top of the cover, there was always the number of the edition, followed by the date and the domestic price. The same corner also hosted the bar code, explaining why there was never an extra text box located in this corner. Right on the bottom of the page, there was always the website address of the magazine. Only in weeks when there was a text box in this corner, the website address moved to the left bottom of the page (see example here on the right). On the left edge of the cover were the prices of the magazine abroad, joined by the text “Printed in Germany” (below yellow text box in figure 8.5, but hard to read here).
Another stable feature during the research period is the red colour of the edges of the cover. The tone of this red has however been subject to some variation at times (see figure 8.3). Next to the red ‘frame’ that surrounds the lead image(s) of the cover every week, there is a subtle white ‘frame’ in-between them. The white of this easy-to-overlook visual element of the cover corresponds with the white of the font in which the name is printed. Also important to note here is that the cover is printed on a glossy kind of paper, that is thicker than the paper that is used for the other pages. All these features of the cover contributed every week, as applies to all magazines, to the appeal of the magazine to potential buyers on stations, in kiosks and at supermarkets (Crowley, 2006). Nonetheless, these features are not taken into account in the following analysis.

Instead, the thesis focuses on the features that are used to perform another role of the magazine cover, to summarise and visualise its content (Crowley, 2006). The analysis of the 20 covers accordingly revolves around the variable textual elements on the cover.
and their juxtaposition or mingling with the cover image. This image mostly concerned one photo, but in some cases two photos were used, a drawn image or a mixed visual form. *Der Spiegel* focuses in general on text and is not pre-occupied with images (Lengelsen, 2012). Nonetheless, the magazine has a good reputation when it comes to bringing together text and image in appealing ways. The (sub-)headlines also had different forms. The headline was very often accompanied by a sub-headline and less frequently, there was also a text box in one of the corners with two additional sub-headlines. Lengelsen (2012) makes clear that text-image relations do affect the way in which readers interpreted *Der Spiegel* articles.

### 8.3 Geopolitical Frame Categories

This section offers a general overview of the findings of the study of *Der Spiegel* covers, as contextualisation for the next four sections on the frames per geopolitical frame category. The number of frames that have been identified for each category varies somewhat (figure 8.6). The average number of frames per geopolitical framing category is 16. The number of identified frames in each category is high enough to allow for an insightful qualitative comparison of the magazine covers.

![Figure 8.6 Number of occurrences on all Der Spiegel covers for each geopolitical frame category](image)

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84 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.

85 It needs to be stressed that the dataset is far too small to make sound statistical claims, but this is not the objective of this thesis.
Figure 8.7 provides insights into how the identified geopolitical framing categories are spread over the research period. Whereas ‘Will to Intervene’ has been predominantly identified during the beginning, the other categories are relatively equally spread over the research period. When reading this graph, it needs to be taken into account that Afghanistan, ISAF and foreign missions of Bundeswehr in general were relatively often the theme of the covers during the first five months of the ‘War on Terror’. In fact, 35% of the selected Der Spiegel covers were published in the first five months, thus representing only 3% of the research period.

![Graph showing number of occurrences on each Der Spiegel cover for each geopolitical frame category]

**Figure 8.7 Number of occurrences on each Der Spiegel cover for each geopolitical frame category**

### 8.4 Will to Intervene

This section analyses the geopolitical frames in the geopolitical frame category “Will to Intervene”. This is the only category of which all frames have been identified on the selected Der Spiegel covers. The number of frames that refer to Afghanistan as a threat to Germany and other states (1.1 and 1.2) is exactly the same as the frames that refer to notions of security that apply to Afghan territory (1.3 and 1.4; figure 8.9).

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86 Please note that images of the Der Spiegel covers, as well as their description in terms of geopolitical framing devices, can be found in Appendix 2 (Chapter 12).

87 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.
1.1 Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of Germany only before/without ISAF

1.2 Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of states other than Germany before/without ISAF

1.3 Afghan governments fail to protect the population of Afghanistan before/without ISAF

1.4 Afghan governments fail to bring modernisation and development to Afghanistan before/without ISAF

Figure 8.8 “Will to Intervene” frames

Figure 8.9 Number of occurrences on all Der Spiegel covers for each geopolitical frame in the geopolitical frame category “Will to Intervene”

The Der Spiegel covers reproduced the frames in this category relatively often in 2001 (figure 8.10). Overall, over three-quarter of these frames were produced during the first five months of the ‘War on Terror’. Moreover, both the first two (1.1 and 1.2) and last two frames (1.3 and 1.4) were often jointly produced on the Der Spiegel covers. This reflects the assumption that one magazine cover can contain more than one frame.

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88 This rather high share needs to be put in perspective somewhat. As noted above, the 35% of the selected Der Spiegel covers, on which these frames have been identified, represent only 3% of the weeks during the research period.
Frame 1.1 - Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of Germany before/without ISAF

Frame 1.1 has been identified four times on the selected Der Spiegel covers. The first one concerns Der Spiegel 2001/40. Its second headline and its sub-headline are (translated to from German to English) “the terror mission” and “brainwashing in the name of Allah”. They do not make explicit to which human actors they refer. Therefore, the brainwashing is assumed to refer to leaders of Al Qaida, also due to the words “in the name of Allah”. The terror missions are assumed to refer to Al Qaida members. Another assumption is that the brainwashing takes place in Afghanistan, since first main headline (“Hindu Kush”) refers to this state. Accordingly, this cover suggests that Al Qaida can operate from Afghanistan and pose a threat to other states including Germany.

Der Spiegel 2001/42 produces frame 1.1 as well. It constructs two worlds with both textual and visual elements. The main headline reads in English “War of (the) Worlds.” These worlds are constructed by the second headline and sub-headline, which are

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89 For your reading convenience, a text box with the geopolitical frame that is analysed is located at the start of each analysis.

90 In the remainder of this chapter, when “Der Spiegel” followed by an edition number appears in a sentence, it refers to the cover of this edition.

91 This applies to all (sub-)headlines and other texts on the Der Spiegel covers and is therefore not mentioned anymore in the remainder of the chapter. Appendix 2 (Chapter 12) offers an overview of all translated words (as potential geopolitical framing devices) on the covers.
respectively “Bin Laden’s sleepers” and “Trained in Afghanistan, as asylum seekers in Europe.” The images on this cover construct these worlds in more detail. The meaning potential of the images depends on among other things knowledge about what they depict. The upper one was taken on 7 October 2001 on the USS Enterprise and shows an American fighter jet taking off to conduct air strikes against Afghanistan (Daily Telegraph, nd). The other photo shows men who demonstrate, with some having turbans or beards, and some waving with white flags or holding sticks. These visual elements suggest a violent nature and backward society. A key element on this photo is the black-white striped flag, which belongs to the organisation Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Wikimedia Commons, No Date). This is an orthodox Islamic party in Pakistan, particularly popular in the border areas with Afghanistan (Dawn.com, 2013). Based on these textual and visual framing devices, one constructed world is modern and includes Europe and the United States. The other world is backward and includes Afghanistan and Pakistan. Their relationship is verbally constructed as war by the first headline. A state of war is also suggested by the two images. The upper one depicts an air strike by the constructed modern world against the constructed backward world. The bottom one depicts a demonstration in the constructed backward world against the constructed modern world.

*Der Spiegel* 2001/46 constructs Afghanistan as a threat to Germany as well. The threat is actually more rooted in an upcoming vote on Afghanistan in parliament than Afghanistan as such. Relevant in this regard are the main headline “An emergency for the Red-Green coalition” and the sub-headline “Bundeswehr to Afghanistan.” These refer to a controversial proposal of the German government to send German troops to Afghanistan as part of OEF. This edition of *Der Spiegel* was published less than a week before the vote. At that moment, the government proposal did not have the support of the majority of MPs of the government parties SPD and Bündnis90/Die Grünen (Döring and Hönnige, 2006). The image on this cover adds to the aforementioned (sub-)headline in terms of meaning potential, but needs the textual element to realise this potential. It shows a cross made of two birch branches with a helmet on top of it, which is often used on soldier graves in Germany (e.g. Reitmeier, 2016). The vertical birch branch is red, and the horizontal one is green, referring to the colours of the two government parties SDP and the Greens. The image and first headline jointly suggest that if the government loses the vote of confidence, it needs to step down and call new parliamentary elections. This meaning potential reflects the increasing pressure on chancellor Schröder to dissolve his government if he cannot get a majority of MPs of the government parties in favour of his OEF proposal92 (Döring

92 See also section 6.2.
and Hönnige, 2006). In fact, the cover suggests that both winning and losing this vote would have a negative impact on the government through respectively becoming responsible for the deaths of German troops in Afghanistan and the dissolution of this government. A last valuable observation here is that this cover with its reference to an emergency is not as disapproving of ISAF as some later covers. These last covers construct the ISAF mission as a mistake.

The last cover that produces frame 1.1 is *Der Spiegel* 2001/47. Its sub-headline “The hunt for Bin Laden and the fear of new terrorist attacks” indicates a threat from Afghanistan to Germany. These attacks are related to Afghanistan through an image that has been taken in that state (see discussion of same cover in section 2.5). Like *Der Spiegel* 2001/46, this cover constructs a threat of Afghanistan to Germany in the form of the (then recently held) vote on Afghanistan in parliament. This is done through the second sub-headline “Chancellor with [and] without majority.” This suggests that Germany has a weak government that only just survived a vote of confidence related to the vote on sending German troops to Afghanistan. This particular meaning potential is based on the fact that chancellor Schröder had made the vote on the German contribution to OEF a vote of confidence for his government (Döring and Hönnige, 2006). He had done so because several MPs of the two government parties considered voting against the proposal. Consequently, the opposition parties CDU/CSU and FDP voted against this proposal, although they were actually in favour of the German contribution to OEF. Schröder still managed to get a very slim majority among MPs of the two government parties through strong pressure and political games. This is what the second headline “‘Monkey business in Berlin’ refers to.

| Frame 1.2 - Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of states other than Germany before/without ISAF |

Frame 1.2 has been identified on five of the selected *Der Spiegel* covers. To start, the analysis of frame 1.1 simultaneously identified frame 1.2 on some of the covers involved. These covers are *Der Spiegel* 2001/40 (Al Qaida as Afghanistan-based threat to other states), *Der Spiegel* 2001/42 (threat from Afghanistan applies to Europe as a whole and United States) and *Der Spiegel* 2001/47 (fear of new terrorist attacks from Afghanistan at unspecified places abroad).

Frame 1.2 is also produced by *Der Spiegel* 2001/43, where it concerns the threat of Afghanistan to the United States. The cover zooms in on a central material

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93 This interpretation is further discussed in section 8.7 on the geopolitical frame category ‘Victims during Intervention.’
consequence of the Al Qaida attacks against the United States on 11 September. The main headline is “New York”, with a sub-headline “the damaged city”. The image exemplifies the harm done to this city with an image of a heavily damaged wall of the World Trade Center that still partially stands up. The identification of frame 1.2 here is based on the knowledge that the Al Qaida attack had been (partially) prepared from Afghanistan.

Der Spiegel 2008/07 also produces frame 1.2, although in a more indirect way. This cover addresses an important political change in the United States. The first headline and sub-headline are “The Messiah Factor” and “Barack Obama and the desire for a new America”. The other headlines are “Spiegel interview with American MP John McCain” and “We need more Germans in Afghanistan”. McCain had just lost the presidential elections to Obama. It is assumed here that the United States wants Germany to send more troops to Afghanistan because the latter state poses a threat to American interests.

Frame 1.3 - Afghan governments fail to protect the population of Afghanistan before/without ISAF

Frame 1.3 has been identified on four Der Spiegel covers. The first one is Der Spiegel 2001/40, which produces this frame through text-image relations. The image on the cover depicts three men with beards and turbans. The beards and turbans are assumed to refer to stereotypes about the violent nature of Muslims (Elliott, 2003; Jackson, 1996). One man is foregrounded and looks in a seemingly unfriendly way upward to his right, thereby not looking into the camera. The two other men are moving a device to launch grenades or rockets. It is assumed that these men are located in Afghanistan when the photo was taken. Without any accompanying words, it would not have been possible to attribute a nationality to these men. That is, if one does not know them. This photo of AP could have been taken outside Afghanistan, or these men may not be Afghan after all. However, the men are assumed to be Afghan because the headline refers to this state. In fact, this cover is a telling example of how important words are in the interpretation of images of states (and other places). The lack of government control is suggested by the fact that the men in the image do not wear soldier uniforms while operating heavy weaponry. Moreover, they are not being checked upon or guarded by soldiers or other civil servants. A total lack of (human)

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94 Applies to written form, spoken form and human thinking processes.

95 These men are actually said to be members of the Taliban (Impuls Afghanistan, nd). It is still unknown to author when the photo was taken. So these men could have hypothetically been loyal to the central government of Afghanistan when the photo was taken, if the Taliban then formed this government.
security is also suggested by the word “Abyss” in the headline, in relation to Afghanistan.

Frame 1.3 has also been identified on Der Spiegel 2001/42, again being produced by both textual and visual elements. While the second sub-headline “Trained in Afghanistan, as asylum seekers in Europe” refers to Afghanistan, the image depicts men who demonstrate. Some of them wear turbans or have beards, and some wave with flags or hold sticks. On the image, there are no soldiers or other civil servants who keep these men in control. This suggests an unaddressed threat to the population of Afghanistan.

The image on Der Spiegel 2002/04 produces frame 1.3 indirectly. The second headline and sub-headline on the cover are “Spiegel interview with Afghans’ Prime-Minister Karzai” and “Leading role for the Germans.” These headlines are assumed to indicate that Afghanistan needs (more) German assistance because the Afghan government is not able to provide security to its population. In other words, the request of the Afghan prime-minister constructs Afghanistan as a state that has a government with limited domestic sovereignty.

Finally, the cover of Der Spiegel 2010/04 suggests that Afghanistan has faced widespread violence since centuries through the sub-headline “Afghanistan: the 200-year war.” This implies that Afghan governments have failed to protect their population sufficiently for centuries.

### Frame 1.4 - Afghan governments fail to bring modernisation and development to Afghanistan before/without ISAF

Frame 1.4 has been identified on five Der Spiegel covers. To start, the analysis of frame 1.3 on Der Spiegel 2001/40 also pointed at the presence of frame 1.4. The combination of beards, turbans and traditional clothes on the image and Afghanistan in the headline constructs Afghanistan as a backward state. The construction of Afghanistan as “abyss” by the headline further suggests that Afghanistan is about to implode, implying an end to civilisation in this state. In fact, “abyss” has a historical connotation in Germany. Many Germans had the idea that Germany was close to the abyss at the end of WWII and closely thereafter (Kettenacker, 1997). The word “abyss” in the headline is further of relevance here because it has been translated from German. However, what is lost in the translation is the interaction in the headline between the German prefixes ‘up’ (“auf” in “Aufmarsch”, or “advancement”) and ‘down’ (“ab” in “Abgrund”, or “Abyss”). The use of both words can be an effective and hardly noticeable way to construct social differences (Lakoff and Johnson, 2003/1980). Where
‘up’ is widely seen as positive, ‘down’ has many negative connotations in the English and German language. This could reinforce the notion that Afghanistan is a backward state (that experiences intervention by modern states).

*Der Spiegel* 2001/42 also suggests that Afghanistan is a backward state. The image depicts men who wear turbans and other traditional clothes, and some have beards. Drawing on the analysis of frames 1.1 and 1.3, the cover constructs two different worlds. One of these worlds is modern, as suggested by the image of aircraft carrier in action as signifier for a hyper-modern Navy. The other constructed world is backward, as suggested by the lower image with angry, traditionally dressed men with flags and sticks, and Islamic, as suggested by second headline “Bin Laden's sleepers”.

*Der Spiegel* 2002/04 indirectly suggests that Afghanistan is a backward state. The main headline and sub-headline are “The artificial children blessing” and “Baby-Boom from the test tube.” As noted in analysis of frame 1.3, the headlines refer to the Afghan prime-minister asking Germany for (more) support. The link between the image and the second (sub-)headline (“Spiegel interview with Afghans' Prime-Minister Karzai” and “Leading role for the Germans”) in terms of meaning potential is rather hard to assess in this case. One could interpret the image as suggesting that Germany is a modern state, constructing Afghanistan indirectly as a backward state.

Frame 1.4 has been identified on *Der Spiegel* 2010/04 through the traditional clothes that the Afghan resistance fighters (Mujahideen) wear. These clothes suggest that Afghanistan is a backward state.

*Der Spiegel* 2014/52 produces frame 1.4 in an indirect way. The first headline and sub-headline on the cover of this German news magazine are “The birth of God” and “Archaeologists discover the origin of the Bible.” This seems to refer to Germany’s Christian roots. The second headline and sub-headline concern Germany’s military mission in Afghanistan: “Withdrawal from Afghanistan” and “How thirteen years of war changed Germany.” The other (sub-)headlines are “Internet. Europa misses out on the business of the future” and “Host mother. A blessed child per order.” These headlines could construct Germany as a state that keeps on developing and has become modern (internet, surrogate mothers) thanks to its Christian roots (bible). On the other hand, due to lack of explicit references in this regard, the cover further constructs Afghanistan as a state that has not changed for decades or centuries. As a result, Afghanistan is a backward state. It needs to be acknowledged that this interpretation and related frame may be more far-fetched than most other ones in this chapter. From a methodological perspective, the presence of relatively many, not closely related themes on one cover
extends the meaning potential of it, and complicates the interpretation process considerably.

8.5 Militarisation of Intervention

The geopolitical frames in the geopolitical frame category “Militarisation of Intervention” are analysed in this section. Frames 2.2. (“Germany is on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan”) and 2.5 (“Other states are on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan”) have often been identified on the selected Der Spiegel covers (figure 8.12). The other frames have not been produced by the selected Der Spiegel covers96.

| 2.1 Germany is on a peace/stabilisation mission in Afghanistan |
| 2.2 Germany is on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan |
| 2.3 Germany is both on a peace/stabilisation mission and a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan |
| 2.4 Germany’s ISAF mission is not a war mission |
| 2.5 Other states are on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan |

Figure 8.11 “Militarisation of Intervention” frames

Figure 8.12 Number of occurrences on all Der Spiegel covers for each geopolitical frame in the geopolitical frame category “Militarisation of Intervention”

The selected Der Spiegel covers produced frames in this geopolitical framing category during the whole research period (figure 8.13). Initially, this concerned predominantly frame 2.5, and from 2009 onwards predominantly frame 2.2.

96 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.
Frame 2.2 - Germany is on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan

Frame 2.2 has been identified seven times on the selected Der Spiegel covers. Der Spiegel 2001/47 does so indirectly through its first headline “The war after the victory.” It refers to the war that needs to be conducted in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban government. Since Germany just decided to send elite troops (KSK) to Afghanistan as part of OEF\textsuperscript{97} (Hellmann et al, 2014), Germany was going to be part of that war.

The subsequent covers that produced frame 2.2 all spoke explicitly of “war”. For example, Der Spiegel 2009/38 produces this frame through its second headline and sub-headline “Nightmare Afghanistan” and “A war that can't be won.” This suggests explicitly that Germany is on a war mission in Afghanistan.

Frame 2.2 has also been identified on Der Spiegel 2009/49. The first sub-headline “The Bundeswehr, Afghanistan and the war in the 21st century” clearly suggests that Germany is on a war mission in Afghanistan. The first headline “When are the Germans allowed to kill?” raises the question as to which types of military force the

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\textsuperscript{97} See also section 6.2.
German troops can use for which purposes. If one would argue that German troops could only use military force when being attacked (defensive military force), one could say that this cover page suggests that Germany could be on both a peace and war mission. However, when including the image in the analysis, more offensive options for the use of military force seem referred to (further elaborated on in the analysis of frame 4.6). Another possible interpretation of this cover is that Germany is suggested to conduct war in the 21st century differently than in the 20th century. This constructs a difference between Germany in the 21st century and Germany in the 20th century. More specifically, assuming knowledge about Germany’s history, Nazi Germany is constructed as the (evil) ‘other’ of the (good) contemporary Germany. The cover then constructs Nazi Germany as a state where it was considered normal that its army killed people abroad. On the contrary, contemporary Germany is constructed as a post-Nazi state where the killing of people by the national army abroad is a taboo.

Another cover that produced frame 2.2. concerns Der Spiegel 2010/16. Its first headline and sub-headline are “In war” and “German soldiers about the killing and dying in Afghanistan.” This explicitly constructs the situation where Germany is on a war mission in Afghanistan. In terms of other framing approaches (e.g. Tankard, 2001), it is worth mentioning that this cover associated Germany for the first time directly with the war in Afghanistan in the first headline. Although the second headline “Iceland’s eerie volcanoes” is thematically unrelated to war, this headline could be metaphorically linked to it. The combination of an explicit reference to German soldiers being at war and a headline on volcanoes confirms the rather sensitive nature of war in Germany.

Der Spiegel 2011/36 is the most explicit cover in terms of disapproving of Germany’s ISAF mission. The main headline is “When Germany entered the war” and the sub-headline is “Afghanistan: the (hi)story of a mistake.” Consequently, the cover of Der Spiegel 2011/36 textually constructs Germany’s engagement with Afghanistan as a war mission. Nonetheless, this cover is a telling example of conflicting meaning potentials as a result of the interaction between textual and visual elements. The body language and the processes in which the soldiers in the image are involved do not suggest that they are actively involved in some kind of war operation. Two German soldiers in the foreground look around them with their rifles pointed at the ground. Another soldier in the background is sitting on a military vehicle with his hands on an automatic weapon. Various other soldiers behind the two foregrounded soldiers are standing apparently without holding any weapon. Whereas the text on this cover clearly produces frame

98 See also sections 4.4 and 4.5.
99 See also sections 4.4 and 4.5.
2.2, the image suggests a mission where German troops can be off guard. Furthermore, this cover is a telling example of how text-image relations can construct causal responsibility (Iyengar, 1991). Whereas the sub-headline produces the problem (as frame function), two of the images construct the problem cause (as another frame function; Entman, 2004). The problem is that Germany decided to participate in the war in Afghanistan in 2001. The images of Joschka Fischer, former Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Gerhard Schröder, former Chancellor, suggest that both men are the problem cause (because of their decision to send German troops to Afghanistan).

Frame 2.2 on Der Spiegel 2013/13 is produced by text-image relations. The sub-headline “The war and the Germans” refers to (among other things) Afghanistan through the cover image. In fact, knowledge of the lower half of this image is required to reconstruct this frame. The photo concerned depicts German soldiers on patrol near Kunduz (Löwenstein, 2009).

Finally, Der Spiegel 2014/52\textsuperscript{100} produces frame 2.2 directly through its second headline and sub-headline “Withdrawal from Afghanistan” and “How thirteen years of war changed Germany.”

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|l|}
\hline
\textbf{Frame 2.5 - Other states are on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Frame 2.5 was produced by seven Der Spiegel covers. This was implicitly done by Der Spiegel 2001/40 with the sub-headline “Advancement at the Hindu Kush”. This referred to the military advancements of the Americans (and their partners) in Afghanistan. Moreover, Der Spiegel 2001/42 explicitly suggest that the United States is on a war mission in Afghanistan through text-image relations. Its headline is “War of (the) Worlds” and one of the photos depicts an American jet departing from a US-warship to bomb Afghanistan. Frame 2.5 was produced on Der Spiegel 2001/43 as well, through the (sub-)headlines “The war on the ground adventure” and “American troops in Afghanistan.” Also Der Spiegel 2001/45 is textually explicit about the American war mission in Afghanistan with the sub-headline “America's awful war of bombs and the ghost of Vietnam.” Contrary to previous covers, Der Spiegel 2001/46 is implicitly suggesting that the United States is on a war mission in Afghanistan with its second sub-headline “in-between American bombs and Taliban terror.”

Der Spiegel 2001/47 has as its main headline “The war after the victory”. Its sub-headline is “The hunt for Bin Laden and the fear of new terrorist attacks.” This cover does not contain any explicit references to Afghanistan or the United States. Therefore,

\textsuperscript{100} The meaning potentials of the covers of Der Spiegel 2014/40 and 2014/52 are larger than those of the previous 18 covers. Contrary to earlier covers, both of them contain four (sub-)headlines.
the reconstruction of frame 2.5 from this cover is based on particular knowledge. In the days before publication of this edition of Der Spiegel, the Northern Alliance had reached Kabul and taken control of it, after the Taliban had abandoned the city (Tanner, 2009). Meanwhile, special forces of the United States and United Kingdom, as well as forces of the Northern Alliance, were still involved in some fighting with Taliban elsewhere in Afghanistan. The photo on this cover also contributes to frame 2.5, but does not make any reference to Bin Laden, the terrorist threat and the war operations in Afghanistan. Therefore, the interpretation of this photo also requires particular knowledge that the cover does not provide. The photo depicts an American special forces soldier (Herold, 2002). He wears a military uniform, helmet, protective glasses, rifle and backpack, while some of the men behind him wear a local hat, turban, beard or moustache. The soldier is standing and looking to the left and ahead of him, so not making contact with the viewer of the image or the people near him in the photo. Some of the men behind him are looking straight into the camera and others are looking at each other, while boys behind the men are sitting or standing on a little hill or pile. The human actors that surround the American soldiers, their attributes and the processes on this image do not refer explicitly to war. Therefore, one could argue that the photo weakens the textually produced frame that the United States in on a war mission in Afghanistan.

Finally, Der Spiegel 2010/30 produces frame 2.5 through the words “America's secret war” in its sub-headline.

8.6 Capacity to Intervene

This section examines the geopolitical frames in the geopolitical frame category “Capacity identified on the selected Der Spiegel covers. Two of these frames refer to the current (3.2) or structural incapacity (3.3.) of the Germany army to have an intended impact on Afghanistan. The third frame concerns the lack of actual impact of the (German) ISAF mission on Afghanistan (3.7) 101 to Intervene”. As figure 8.15 shows, only three of the seven frames in this category have been identified.

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101 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.
3.1 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is sufficient

3.2 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is currently insufficient

3.3 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan will always be insufficient

3.4 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some policy issues

3.5 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some places

3.6 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan for now

3.7 Germany and/or foreign states do not have intended impact on Afghanistan

Figure 8.14 ‘Capacity to Intervene’ frames

Figure 8.15 Number of occurrences on all Der Spiegel covers for each geopolitical frame in the geopolitical frame category “Capacity to Intervene”

The capacity of the German army to intervene was always framed as insufficient (figure 8.16). This happened most often during the first six months of the ‘War on Terror’. Not surprisingly, the references to Germany not having the intended impact on Afghanistan became important later in the research period.
Frame 3.2 - Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is currently insufficient

Frame 3.2 has been identified twice on the selected Der Spiegel covers. Der Spiegel 2002/11 explicitly produces this frame with its headline “Germans on all fronts” and sub-headline “The overburdened army.” The image on this cover however weakens this textually produced frame. The German soldier on the image does for example not reveal any form of stress through his facial expression, posture or other possible signs of an inability to deal with the people behind him. Moreover, contrary to the headline, the image does not contain any visual elements that suggest a conflict at that place. The German soldier holds his rifle down, looks to his right and does not indicate in any way that he is immediately threatened. Moreover, some of men behind him smile or look curious, with no signs of any imminent threat. These men do not look traumatised either, but more like they are feeling cold with their thick coats and blankets. In terms of Entman (2004), the text on this cover constructs the overburdened state of the German army as problem and the presence of German troops in all foreign conflict areas as its cause. The image does however not construct this problem and cause.

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102 Germanness of soldier is visually confirmed by little German flag sewn on shoulder part of his uniform.
8 Geopolitical Frames on the Der Spiegel Covers on ISAF (2001-2014)

*Der Spiegel* 2014/40\(^{103}\) produces frame 3.2 explicitly as well. The second headline and sub-headline are “Armament” and “Limited preparedness for a foreign mission - the *Bundeswehr* disaster.” The third headline and sub-headline refer to foreign military missions as well: “Air strikes” and “The strategy of Obama in the war against IS.” This suggests that the United States do have a strategy for a particular foreign military intervention from which Germany need to learn. This is undoubtedly one of many more possible interpretations of this cover. In fact, the meaning potentials of the four (sub-)headlines and the image of the German author Franz Kafka seem endless.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Frame 3.3 - Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan will always be insufficient</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Four *Der Spiegel* covers produced frame 3.3. The first concerns *Der Spiegel* 2001/40, assuming that Afghanistan remains an “abyss” after the military invasion from other states. Afghanistan constructed as permanent abyss rules out that the capacity to intervene of any army will be sufficient to have the intended impact on Afghanistan. Similar claims were made in the American debate on the Bosnia War in politics and media in the first half of the 1990s (Ó Tuathail, 1996). The Clinton government initially compared Bosnia to Vietnam, thereby constructing similarities through historical analogy. An American military intervention in Bosnia would not be able to have the intended impact, since this was not the case in Vietnam. Bosnia was also constructed as a quagmire, morass or sinkhole back then. Some other American mass media, American diplomats and foreign mass media did however construct Bosnia in terms of Europe at the time of Nazi dominance, holocaust and genocide. This historical analogy suggested that foreign states could have an intended impact on Bosnia thanks to their capacity to intervene.

*Der Spiegel* 2001/45 produces frame 3.3 with a historical analogy. Its main headline is “Trap Afghanistan” and the sub-headline “America’s awful war of bombs and the ghost of Vietnam.” The main headline and the sub-headline on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2001/45 construct Afghanistan as a trap for the United States. They suggest that the United States would have the same experience in Afghanistan as it had in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. Efforts of the United States to support South Vietnam in its war against communist North Vietnam eventually proved fruitless, and the United States withdrew its troops in 1973 from Vietnam after North Vietnam had won the war (Dijkink, 1996). This experience cost the lives of over 58,000 American soldiers (Dodds, 2005). It also caused feelings of despair among the American political elites in the 1970s.

\(^{103}\) The meaning potentials of the covers of *Der Spiegel* 2014/40 and 2014/52 are larger than those of the previous 18 covers. Contrary to earlier covers, both of them contain four (sub-)headlines.
Moreover, losing the war in Vietnam eroded American popular support for foreign military missions for many years to come.

Frame 3.3 is also produced by the second headline and sub-headline on Der Spiegel 2001/47. They are respectively “The war on the ground adventure” and “American troops in Afghanistan.” The identification of this frame is based on the assumption that adventure here implies that a ground war in Afghanistan would always be very risky.

Finally, Der Spiegel 2010/04 produces frame 3.3 both textually and visually. The main headline reads “Graveyard of the superpowers” and the sub-headline is “Afghanistan: the 200-year war.” These superpowers are the United States (OEF and ISAF since 2001), Russia (1979-1989; Tanner, 2009) and Great Britain (the three Afghan Wars between 1839 and 1919; Fremont-Barnes, 2009). Afghanistan is textually constructed as a state that cannot be controlled by superpowers. The image, in combination with the headline, suggests that Afghan groups have always offered successful resistance to foreign states that intervened Afghanistan, and will always do so. It depicts Afghan resistance fighters (Mujahideen) who are standing on a Russian military helicopter that is heavily damaged (Getty Images, nd). It was taken in January 1980, briefly after the Russians had invaded Afghanistan.

**Frame 3.7 - Germany and/or other ISAF states do not have intended impact on Afghanistan**

The analysis identified frame 3.7 four times on the selected Der Spiegel covers. Der Spiegel 2006/47 produces this frame by textually referring to Afghanistan as becoming an emergency after five years of a German military presence. Another headline claims that German soldiers need to learn to kill, which suggests that their earlier strategy has not been effective.

Der Spiegel 2009/38 produces frame 3.3 both textually and visually. The second headline and sub-headline are very explicit in this regard and are “Nightmare Afghanistan” and “A war that cannot be won.” Moreover, the image of the matchstick reinforces the textually produced frame. The upper half of the matchstick is black, indicating that the fire has gone out. It may suggest that there was a problem that has been solved. However, a new fire is starting at the bottom of the match, thus suggesting the re-emergence of the same problem.

Der Spiegel 2009/49 indirectly suggests that German does not have the intended impact on Afghanistan. The image seems to be a photo taken from high altitude by a plane. It depicts a man who can be considered non-innocent since he has a cross on his back. The man is followed by a boy who is assumed to be innocent. Without
realising it, the man is assumed to be targeted by a German soldier (explaining the cross). The soldier needs to decide whether to attempt to kill the man, how to do this and whether he can save the boy’s life when hitting at the man. In fact, this image reflects the difficulty for foreign troops in Afghanistan to distinguish between friendly people and enemies among the local population in the areas where they operate. The image suggests that Germany does not have the intended impact on Afghanistan because it lacks the means to make this distinction, both on the ground and when assessing air photos of people on the ground.

To conclude, the cover of Der Spiegel 2014/52 produces frame 3.7 indirectly if it is assumed that the omission of something is meaningful in this regard. The second sub-headline is “How thirteen years of war changed Germany.” Leaving out Afghanistan in this reference to change seems to suggest that ISAF had an impact on Germany, but not the intended impact on Afghanistan.

### 8.7 Victims during Intervention

This section examines the geopolitical frames in the geopolitical frame category “Victims during Intervention”. Six of the eight frames in this category have been identified on the Der Spiegel covers (figure 8.18). Two of them refer to Afghan victims (4.1) and German victims (4.2), and the third to victims among members of armed non-state groups (4.4). The other three identified frames concern the role of perpetrator for Germans (4.6), people from other states (4.7) and members of armed non-state groups (4.8).
4.1 Afghans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)
4.2 Germans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)
4.3 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)
4.4 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission
4.5 Afghans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)
4.6 Germans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)
4.7 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)
4.8 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission

Figure 8.17 “Victims during Intervention” frames

Figure 8.18 Number of occurrences on all Der Spiegel covers for each geopolitical frame in the geopolitical frame category “Victims during Intervention”

The identified frames are spread fairly well over the research period (figure 8.19). The same number of frames about Afghan and German victims have been identified. Members of armed non-state groups are framed as victims equally often, but always implicitly. Moreover, Germans are framed as perpetrators slightly more often than Americans and members of armed non-state groups. The role of Germany as perpetrator was referred to in the middle of this period (2006, 2009, 2010), in between the references to the American role as perpetrator.
Frame 4.1 - Afghans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (excluding members of armed non-state groups)

Frame 4.1 has been identified four times on the selected Der Spiegel covers. It is produced implicitly by Der Spiegel 2001/45 through the reference to the awful American bombs that fall on Afghanistan. Der Spiegel 2001/46 produces this frame textually. Assuming that the refugees are Afghan civilians, this is done through the second headline and sub-headline “Reports from refugees” and “in-between American bombs and Taliban terror.”

Der Spiegel 2010/05 produces frame 4.1 through its indirect reference to the Afghan victims of the Kunduz air strike. This air strike was requested by German Commander and executed by American fighter jets in 2009104. The air strike killed dozens of Afghan civilians and caused an outrage in Germany (Der Spiegel, 2010a). The cover refers to the air strike and its victims through the second headline and sub-headline “The secret Kunduz file” and “Written record of a lethal mistake.” These headlines suggest that the German government is not open about the Kunduz air strike, and that the air strike was wrong. The textual reference to financial criminals in the first sub-headline “Financial crisis: the hunt for serious (financial sector) criminals” further suggests that the air strike may have been a crime. Moreover, although the cover image refers to first headline, it could affect the interpretation of the second headline as well. The visualised difference between the identified fingerprints with a square around them and

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104 See also section 6.2.
unidentified fingerprints suggests a responsibility for the Kunduz air strike that is still hidden.

The image on Der Spiegel 2009/49 produces frame 4.1 as well. Assuming that the word “Afghanistan” refers to the nationality of the two human beings depicted, this image depicts an Afghan man who seems to be non-innocent (due to cross on his back) and an innocent Afghan boy. Although the man is not harmed yet, he is being threatened by the imaginary German soldier who wonders whether he could kill this man. This interpretation is also based on the first headline “When are the Germans allowed to kill?”

**Frame 4.2 - Germans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission** (excluding members of armed non-state groups)

The selected Der Spiegel covers produced frame 4.2 four times. Der Spiegel 2001/46 produces this frame with text-image relations. The text that contributes to this frame is the first sub-headline “Bundeswehr to Afghanistan.” The visual element that does so as well is the cross made of two birches with a helmet on top of it (often used on soldier graves in Germany). Frame 4.2 is also identified on Der Spiegel 2006/47 due to the implicit reference to the dangers that German soldiers face in Afghanistan.

The sub-headline “German soldiers about the killing and dying in Afghanistan” produces frame 4.2 on Der Spiegel 2010/16. Nonetheless, the accompanying image weakens this frame. It shows a German soldier who holds a rifle and looks at his environment, but he is not dying. Moreover, there are also no visual elements that suggest that anybody is making an attempt to kill him, or that the German soldier faces such a threat.

Der Spiegel 2013/13 fully focuses on German victimhood. Textually, the focus is on two historical periods in Germany’s history that left their traces in contemporary Germany in different ways. The main headline and sub-headline are “The eternal trauma” and “The war and the Germans”. The headline refers to “the intense collective physical and moral trauma in West Germany, manifest in the notion of Stunde Null or ‘zero hour’” after the end of WWII (Longhurst, 2005, p.2). Since the re-unification of Germany in 1990, German self-images have generally become less occupied being a traumatised state (Götz, 2011). The second headline and sub-headline are “Euro crisis” and “The fear of the currency”. They refer to the early 1920s when Germany faced hyperinflation (Mann, 1992). This cover textually constructs German civilians as permanent victims due to their traumatised state of mind. This cover actually confirms the assumption of Dijkink (1996, p. ix) that any state is also “an information system linking traumatic or
joyous events in history to a particular territory." The images on the cover partially confirm this construction. At first sight, the upper half of the image seems to depict German citizens who are fleeing to/through Berlin, with one boy being foregrounded. It seems to concern one photo, also thanks to the same colouring. In fact, the refugees and the boy are taken from two different photos. The boy was called Hans-Georg Henke and worked in the German army in 1945 (Der Spiegel, 1997). The photo was taken when he was on the run from Russian air strikes. Both the boy (particularly through his eyes) and the refugees near Brandenburger Tor (through their body language) show signs of being traumatised. The lower half of the image concerns a photo of German soldiers on patrol near Kunduz (Löwenstein, 2009). In fact, this photo in combination with the first headline produce frame 4.2. Contrary to the two photos that make up the upper half of the image, the soldiers on this photo do not show any signs of trauma. Therefore, the photo of the German soldiers on patrol in Afghanistan weakens the frame on this cover. These soldiers do not show similar signs of trauma as the Germans on the two upper photos.

### 4.4 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission

Frame 4.4 has been identified four times. Der Spiegel 2006/47, Der Spiegel 2009/49 and Der Spiegel 2010/16 produce frame 4.4 by implicitly suggesting that occasionally German soldiers may (or need to) kill members of armed non-state groups in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the cover of Der Spiegel 2010/30 refers to targeted killing operations of the United States in Afghanistan. The targets of these operations were members of armed non-state groups such as Taliban and Al-Qaida (sub-section on frame 4.7 offers further analysis).

### Frame 4.6 - Germans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission
(excluding members of armed non-state groups)

The analysis of the selected Der Spiegel covers identified frame 4.6 four times. Der Spiegel 2006/47 constructs Germany’s role as perpetrator as a necessity in Afghanistan, thus producing this frame directly. The sub-headline "The Germans need to learn to kill" suggests this necessity. The problem is suggested to be that German soldiers are not used to kill, whereas Afghanistan has become a very dangerous place for German soldiers. Nevertheless, the image weakens this frame. It depicts a soldier with a German flag sewn on the arm part of his uniform and a German flag on his vehicle. This German soldier has his gun pointed at the ground. The image does
further not show any other human actors, human attributes, non-human actors or processes that could signify danger.

*Der Spiegel* 2009/49 produces frame 4.6 through the first headline “When are the Germans allowed to kill?” However, Germany’s role as perpetrator is more explored than fully constructed here. The question is whether the imaginary German soldier that sees the men on the image should attempt to kill them both or one of them. The cover further raises the question how the German army should evaluate the accidental killing of innocent people when killing non-innocent people (so-called “collateral damage”).

Drawing on the analysis of frame 4.1, *Der Spiegel* 2010/05 produces frame 4.6 as well. This is indirectly done through the second headline and sub-headline “The secret Kunduz file” and “Written record of a lethal mistake.”

Frame 4.6 is also produced on *Der Spiegel* 2010/16. The German role as perpetrator is here not constructed through a call to learn how to kill (cover of *Der Spiegel* 2006/47) or a question when to kill (cover of *Der Spiegel* 2009/49), but as representing killing as a current practice. The headline reads “In war”, with the accompanying sub-headline being “German soldiers about the killing and dying in Afghanistan.” These headlines suggest that German soldiers are killing human beings in Afghanistan. The image on this cover weakens the frame, nevertheless. It shows a German soldier who holds a rifle and looks at his environment. He is not killing anybody, or looking like he is going to do this later.

**Frame 4.7 - People from other state(s) are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (excluding members of armed non-state groups)**

The selected *Der Spiegel* covers produced frame 4.7 three times. The first sub-headline “America’s awful war of bombs and the ghost of Vietnam” on *Der Spiegel* 2001/45 is a case in point. The textual evaluation of this role is clear: American bombs on Afghanistan are awful. However, the image on the cover is out of sync with this evaluation. It suggests that the consequences of the American bombs that fall on Afghanistan are unclear. It shows the explosions from a very long distance, making it impossible to assess their possible destruction in material and human terms. Moreover, the image does not show the planes that are assumed to have caused the explosions. So where the textual elements are explicit in their framing of the awful consequences and the low effectiveness of American air strikes on Afghanistan, the image leaves both in the middle. This cover shows that textual and visual elements can produce (partially) conflicting frames. As discussed in section 5.7, these conflicts are called...
antonymies (Royce 2006). As some other interpretations in this chapter confirmed, they complicate the identification of frames in textual-visual representations.

Frame 4.7 has also been identified on Der Spiegel 2001/46. United States is constructed as perpetrator with the second headline and sub-headline “Reports from refugees” and “in-between American bombs and Taliban terror.” The suffering caused by the United States is put at par with the suffering caused by Taliban.

The production of frame 4.7 on Der Spiegel 2010/30 is based on particular knowledge that cover does not provide. The main-headline is “Task Force 373” and the sub-headline is “The Afghanistan logs. America’s secret war.” The required knowledge to reconstruct this frame is that the so-called “Task Force 373” killed suspected leaders of Taliban and Al Qaida without offering them any trial (Davies, 2010). The image of the three soldiers reinforces the American role as perpetrator. At least, if it is assumed that the soldier who loads his pistol, does so in preparation for another targeted killing.

| Frame 4.8 - Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission |

To conclude, frame 4.8 has been identified three times on the selected Der Spiegel covers. Drawing on the analysis of frame 4.7, Der Spiegel 2001/46 also produces frame 4.8. This is done through the second headline and sub-headline “Reports from refugees” and “in-between American bombs and Taliban terror.” Moreover, Der Spiegel 2006/47 and Der Spiegel 2010/16 implicitly produce frame 4.8, since the lives of German soldiers are threatened by armed non-state groups such as Taliban.

8.8 Main Findings of Der Spiegel Analysis

This chapter offers an indication of how popular geopolitics in Germany made sense of the ‘War on Terror’ between 2001 and 2014. This has been done through the analysis of frames in the German news magazine Der Spiegel. The research objects are 20 covers of this magazine that engaged with Germany’s ISAF mission or German foreign military missions in general. The findings of this chapter contribute to earlier literature on Germany thanks to its focus on four particular concepts. These concepts have been selected based on the literature review on Germany in chapter 4. The concepts are; will to intervene; militarisation of intervention; capacity to intervene; and victims during the intervention. They have here taken the form of geopolitical frame categories. Each category consist of between four and eight geopolitical frames.
A key quantitative finding of this chapter is that the frames in each geopolitical frame category have been produced at least ten times by the Der Spiegel covers in the dataset. This suggests that Der Spiegel is an important reproducer of geopolitical frames in Germany that shapes and is shaped by geopolitical imaginations in this state. Moreover, each selected Der Spiegel cover produced at least one the 24 geopolitical frames that the analytical framework of this thesis has conceptualised (figure 8.20). In fact, 13 out of the 20 covers in the dataset contained three or more frames.

Figure 8.20 Number of occurrences of all frames on each Der Spiegel cover

The analysis of the 20 Der Spiegel covers has further resulted in several other valuable findings. First, the will to intervene was referred to most often of all geopolitical frame categories. Afghanistan was repeatedly constructed as a threat to other states. Moreover, various covers suggested that the government of this state was/would not be able to protect its population and modernise the state before/without ISAF. The production of the frame in this category was particularly done through references to terrorist attacks, the seemingly perpetual state of war in Afghanistan and the traditional appearances of its population. Afghanistan was also constructed as a backward state through textual and/or visual opposition towards Germany and the United States. This perspective is shared by some Germans who assume that their state is located on the east side of Western civilisation with high governance and development levels (Kettenacker, 1997). These Germans associate the East with chaos, disorder and threats.

In all, Der Spiegel framed Afghanistan in terms of key German foreign policy concerns such as national security and human rights (Hellmann et al, 2014). In other words, it was repeatedly suggested that Afghanistan was important to Germany. This
importance is a key aspect of the will to intervene as conceptualised by Robinson (2008). However, as noted earlier in this thesis, linking another state to the interests of your own state does not automatically justify a military intervention in that other state (Flint, 2017).

Second, Der Spiegel never showed any doubt on its covers about its position that Germany is on a war mission in Afghanistan. Accordingly, the magazine suggests that the militarisation of Germany’s foreign policy is rather advanced. After an implicit reference in 2001, the words on the covers from 2009 onwards explicitly claimed that Germany was at war in Afghanistan. Instead, the soldiers were never surrounded by any enemies on the photos, and never seem to feel threatened. Another frame in this geopolitical frame category that frequently occurred, was that other states were on a war mission in Afghanistan as well. In all cases, the other state was in fact the United States. Initially, the militarisation of foreign policy was predominantly linked by the selected covers to the United States. After the Kunduz air strike in September 2009, nearly all references to militarisation concerned Germany. In all, the militarist nature of the foreign intervention was a central theme on the Der Spiegel covers. None of these covers suggested that Germany’s ISAF contribution was (partially) a peace mission. Furthermore, the frames that suggest Germany and the United States are at war in Afghanistan have been identified the most of all 24 frames that have been studied (each seven times). In fact, the frames that suggest that either Germany or the United States is on a war mission in Afghanistan jointly accounted for one-fifth of all identified frames on the selected Der Spiegel covers. A striking finding in this regard is that the images on the covers never followed suit by depicting violent war operations of the German or American army. This is in line with the observation of Schwalbe (2013, p. 254) that “[w]hat readers do not see can be as revealing as what they do see. Not showing the harsh realities of war can give readers a lopsided, sanitized view that dehumanizes, both enemy troops and noncombatants.”

Third, regarding Germany’s capacity to intervene in Afghanistan, Der Spiegel is once more very clear on its position. Germany is constructed twice as a state with an army that currently does not have sufficient capabilities to have an intended impact in Afghanistan. Four other covers suggest that Germany’s army will never be able to have such an impact. This structural inability is constructed with historical analogies that for example refer to America’s failure in Vietnam. Another analogy that was used is the failure of the Soviet Union and Great Britain to control Afghanistan in the past. The actual impact of Germany on Afghanistan during the ISAF mission was constructed four times as being not as intended. None of the Der Spiegel covers suggested that Germany ever had any intended impact on Afghanistan during the ISAF mission.
Fourth, *Der Spiegel* was quite balanced in attributing the roles of victims and perpetrators in Afghanistan during the ISAF mission. Afghans and Germans were both framed three times as victims. For example, Afghans were framed as such through a reference to the Kunduz air strike (cover in 2010) and Germans through a reference to the vulnerability of German soldiers in Afghanistan. The cover of *Der Spiegel* 2013/13 is worth mentioning here since it constructs a German soldier in WWII as a victim. This confirms the trend that popular geopolitics has become much more active in constructing victimhood and perpetration of Germans during WWII over the past 20 years (Niven, 2006). In fact, this cover visually constructs a similarity between the German soldier in 1945 and the German soldiers in Afghanistan in 2013. Moreover, there were no explicit textual or visual references to people who got actually killed. This is in line with the finding of Zelizer (2005) that war deaths are prominently referred to in texts, but hardly visualised in news articles. Furthermore, the selection process for photos for the *Der Spiegel* covers on victims and perpetrators (as well as war) seems to be in line with that of American news magazines. These magazines consider photos “as uncomplicated symbolic markers of pre-established classes of content [that] serve to prime viewers towards certain discourse paradigms and frames of interpretation” (Griffin, 2004, p. 399).

In terms of the Afghan victims, there was a notable change from victims as a result of American actions (a cover in 2001) to victims for which Germans were held accountable (covers in 2009 and 2010). An exception formed the targeted killings of the United States that were referred to on one cover in 2010 that framed members of armed non-state groups as victims. Concerning perpetrators, Germans were framed four times as such, and the Americans three times. The act of killing was however never visualised. This confirms a finding of Schwalbe (2013) that the photos in *Newsweek*, *TIME* and *U.S. News of the World* of the first 16 months of the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 often highlighted the bravery of the American troops and the sophisticated nature of their weaponry.

Fifth, the analysis confirms the critical stance of *Der Spiegel* towards all (government) parties in Germany. Both the governments of SDP/the Greens and CDU/CSU/FDP have been criticised for their decisions on Germany’s ISAF mission. The former parties were criticised for taking wrong decisions on ISAF (on covers in 2001 and 2011), while the latter parties received criticism of lack of transparency (cover in 2010). In the words of Crowley (2006, p.58), *Der Spiegel* has remained “an enduring thorn in the side of the German authorities” This is also a relevant observation in light of the American ‘War on

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105 See also section 6.7.

8.9 Comparison of Der Spiegel and Bundestag

This section closes the chapter with a comparison between the frames on the Der Spiegel covers and in the Bundestag debates. The frames that have been identified in popular and practical geopolitical settings are compared category-wise. For each category, a brief quantitative analysis of the respective frames is followed by some relevant examples. Figure 8.21 provides a contextualisation for this analysis. This bar graph shows some significant differences between news magazine and parliament. First, Der Spiegel produced slightly more frames that were related to both the security in Afghanistan and the perspective that this state poses a threat to other states (as indication of the will to intervene). Second, Germany’s leading news magazine framed the militarisation of the ISAF mission substantially more often than the Bundestag, leaving no doubt that it was in its view a war mission (see section 8.5 and below). Third, the capacity to intervene was framed far more often in the Bundestag debates. The difference between these popular and practical geopolitical producers of frames was relatively small for the frames about victims and perpetrators. The differences are further elaborated upon below.

106 See also section 4.2.

107 All these observations are in relative terms and based on the importance of a category or frame in terms of the total number of times that categories were referred to or frames were produced in the debates or on the covers.
Starting with the “Will to Intervene” category, *Der Spiegel* frames Afghanistan more frequently as a threat to Germany and other states or as a state that is backward (figure 8.22). The *Bundestag* debates framed Afghanistan however more frequently as a state where the government cannot protect its population. One of the resemblances between magazine covers and speeches that the framing analysis has identified, concerns the framing of Afghanistan as a backward state (i.e. frame 1.4). On its cover 2001/42, *Der Spiegel* framed Afghanistan as a backward state and suggested that there was a war going on between the backward world and the modern world. Modernity was suggested to be common in states such as the United States and Germany. This modern-backward binary was also constructed by dr. Wolfgang Schäuble (CDU) in the 2003 debate on ISAF, when he claimed that Europe and Afghanistan were completely different in terms of the level of development, cultural experiences and background.

![Figure 8.21 Comparison between geopolitical frame category frequencies on Der Spiegel covers and in Bundestag debates](image-url)
Figure 8.22 Comparison between frame frequencies on Der Spiegel covers and in Bundestag debates 1: “Will to Intervene” category

Continuing with the militarisation of ISAF, it is striking how outspoken Der Spiegel is in this regard as compared to the political parties (figure 8.23). The frame that constructs Germany’s contribution to ISAF as war/combat mission is produced the most in both the news magazine and the Bundestag debates. However, whereas Germany’s ISAF contribution was also framed in the debates as peace/stabilisation mission, or a mix of this and a war/combat mission, Der Spiegel was adamant that it concerned a war mission. The frame that constructed the United States as state that is on a war mission in Afghanistan (as part of frame 1.5) was also more prominent in the news magazine. One remarkable similarity between a speech from Monika Knoche (the Left) and a Der Spiegel cover concerned the question what kind of war took place in Afghanistan. While MP Knoche claimed in July 2009 that the situation in Afghanistan was not a war like in the 19th or 20th century, Der Spiegel spoke four months later on its cover (2009/49) about the war in the 21st century. Moreover, the claim of Knoche that the situation in Afghanistan was in fact an asymmetric war, with the Afghan civilians as the first victims, was more or less visualised on that same magazine cover four months later. The concept of strategic narrative (Roselle et al, 2014) could be helpful here to establish how ideas about different kinds of warfare and their role in defining an era, constructing national identity and informing foreign policy spread through states and change over time.
Regarding the capacity to intervene, the Bundestag shows a more varied picture (figure 8.24). All seven frames in this category were produced in the debates. Whereas the frame that constructs Germany and other ISAF states as having an intended impact on Afghanistan in some policy areas is frequently produced in the debates, it was fully absent on the covers of *Der Spiegel*. In fact, *Der Spiegel* was remarkably more negative about the possibility that Germany could ever have sufficient military capabilities to have an intended impact on Afghanistan. This position was framed a few times through historical analogies, such as the Soviet failure to control Afghanistan in the 1980s and the American failure to control Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s. The reference to Vietnam was also made by MP Oskar Lafontaine (the Left) in 2007. In the same speech, he also suggested that Afghanistan was impossible to control for other states by using the name of another state as the verb. In his view, Afghanistan was in the process of "Iraq-ising." Aforementioned cover of *Der Spiegel* 2009/49 also framed ISAF as not being able to have the intended impact on Afghanistan through a blurry air photo of a man and boy walking. This issue was also raised by dr. Axel Berg (SPD) in 2007, who assumed that German Tornado planes in Afghanistan would not substantially reduce the risk of civilian casualties during air strikes. In his view, this was precisely because of the difficulty of distinguishing between farmers and Taliban fighters from high in the sky. Similar claims were made by MPs from the Left in 2007 and 2011.

![Comparison between frame frequencies on Der Spiegel covers and in Bundestag debates 2: “Militarisation of Intervention” category](image_url)
To conclude this section and this chapter, the comparison between the victim frames and perpetrator frames does not generate any significant differences (figure 8.25). Both parliament and magazine acknowledge that the Germans in Afghanistan can be both victims and perpetrators. As applies particularly to this category in light of Germany's history, it would be enlightening to make this comparison between Der Spiegel and the five individual political parties (next paragraphs offer more detailed analysis). One of the similarities that this analysis identified concerns the written statement in 2003 of various MPs from the Greens (Uwe Kekeritz and others) and the Der Spiegel cover 2010/30. Both construct the United States as a perpetrator that conducts targeted killings in Afghanistan. This observation also points at the only occurrences in the data where armed non-state groups are frames as victims. The statement of MPs of the Greens also links these killings to Germany's contribution to ISAF. Another resemblance concerns the observation of Eckart von Klaeden (CDU) in 2009 about the German soldiers in Afghanistan. In order to do their job, they were increasingly involved in combat operations that could wound or kill them. Nine months later, Der Spiegel published the print edition 2010/16 with on its cover the sub-headline “German soldiers about the killing and dying in Afghanistan.” A final similarity worth mentioning here is the observation in 2009 by MP Manfred Kolbe (CDU) that the air strikes by foreign states against ground targets in Afghanistan had already taken more lives of innocent Afghan civilians than the number of victims during the horrible terror attacks on 11 September 2001 in New York, Washington DC and Pennsylvania. The cover of Der Spiegel 2001/43 also compared the victims that Al Qaida had made in the United States in 2001 with the victims that the United States would make in Afghanistan. This comparison was done by visually depicting the remaining walls of the World Trade
Center in New York after the attacks from Al Qaida in 2001, while textually referring to the new military adventure of the United States in Afghanistan.

Figure 8.25 Comparison between frame frequencies on Der Spiegel covers and in Bundestag debates 4: “Victims during Intervention” category

The comparison between Der Spiegel and the five political parties in the Bundestag raises the question of which foreign policy preferences the magazine (implicitly) supports. In other words, did Der Spiegel consistently produce similar frames as one particular political party during the ISAF period? The data are rather clear about this question. They do not suggest that the frames that Der Spiegel produced were similar to those of one particular political party. For example, the magazine relatively often framed Afghanistan as a state that poses a threat to Germany and/or other states (frames 1.1 and 1.2; figure 8.26). In this regard, its framing of Germany’s ISAF mission was closest to that of the CDU.
Nonetheless, in terms of the nature of Germany's ISAF mission, Der Spiegel was closest to the Left (figure 8.27). Both the magazine and the MPs of this political party framed the mission relatively frequent as a war or combat mission (frame 2.2). Der Spiegel also framed other states (i.e. the United States) as being on a war mission in Afghanistan (frame 2.5), bringing the magazine closest to the Greens in this regard.

Concerning the framing of the capacity of the Bundeswehr to intervene in Afghanistan, Der Spiegel was not close to any political party at all (figure 8.28). The magazine framed this capacity as non-existing under all circumstances far more frequent than any political party.
As noted above, Der Spiegel framed members of armed non-state groups four times as victims, and the Left and the Greens did so as well a few times (frame 4.4; figure 8.29). The magazine was different from all political parties in the complete absence of covers that frame people from states other than Afghanistan and Germany as victims (frame 4.3).

In all, the 20 analysed covers make clear that Der Spiegel has always been opposed to the military intervention of Germany in Afghanistan. This position was highlighted explicitly, by using historical analogies or by referring to Germany’s insufficient military capabilities. During most of the ISAF mission, a majority of the German population was opposed to the ISAF mission as well. In this case, Der Spiegel could be seen as a true
“mirror” (German language: *Spiegel*) of the German society. At least as important to mention at the end of this chapter is the role of the magazine in catalysing the debate on the role of the army in projecting Germany’s power abroad. Its covers raised paramount questions about the nature of war in the 21st century, the need of German soldiers to kill in some circumstances abroad and the difficulties in distinguishing on air photos between armed opponents and innocent people. This confirm the magazine’s important role in the foreign policy debate. Based on the analysis of this thesis, *Der Spiegel* seems to have both affected and reflected the political and societal debates on Germany’s ISAF mission in varying degrees over time.
9 Conclusions and Implications

9.1 Introduction

“[T]he past itself is a creation of historical time-fluid, porous and multi-layered. [It] can and must be revisited—but not without critical acknowledgement that these visits, departing for the past from different presents, will not leave it unchanged” (Dagmar Barnouw, 2008[1996], p. 222)

In this final chapter, the main findings of the thesis are outlined in response to the research questions. In addition, the main disciplinary contributions are set out along with a discussion on the limitations and implications for future research. The chapter closes with some final words on the words critical, constructive and constructivist. The chapter brings together the key themes and conclusions presented throughout the thesis, drawing together key findings.

The research questions addressed in the thesis are:

1 What is the role of geopolitical imaginations in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’?
   1.1 Which geopolitical frames do five political parties and news magazine Der Spiegel produce with their representations of Germany’s contribution to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) during 2001-2014?
     1.1.1 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to will of Germany to intervene Afghanistan?
     1.1.2 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to the militarisation of Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan?
     1.1.3 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to capacity of Germany to intervene in Afghanistan?
     1.1.4 How do political speeches and magazine covers refer to the victims and perpetrators during Germany’s intervention in Afghanistan?
   1.2 To what extent do geopolitical frames differ among political parties and Der Spiegel?

9.2 Contextual Findings

The thesis outlined the contextual backdrop to German engagement in military activity. The ISAF mission was Germany’s first military mission outside Europe after WWII. It was supported by every German government and always gained a parliamentary
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A majority between 2001 and 2014. Nonetheless, the thesis has demonstrated how popular support for the mission was never strong. The lack of support was particularly related to concerns about Germany’s militaristic Nazi past, and was strongest in areas that were of East Germany until 1990. As a result, Germany’s contribution to ISAF was subject to a nationwide debate inside and outside parliament, with active involvement from journalists, Afghanistan veterans and public television channels.

Further to this, it sparked off a more general debate about the capacity of the German army to carry out foreign missions with a military focus. After the end of the ISAF mission, the foreign military engagement of Germany continued to be on the political agenda. To this day, the Bundeswehr is present in Afghanistan, although with substantially fewer soldiers and a focus on the training of Afghan security forces. Moreover, Germany participates in missions of the United Nations in states such as Mali, South Sudan and Sudan. Although the ISAF mission ended in 2014, the experiences in Afghanistan and the representations that were used to make sense of them will remain relevant for Germany’s self-image and future decisions on foreign military missions. The entry of the right-wing party Alternative für Deutschland in the German parliament after the elections in Autumn 2017 has added new geopolitical frames to the German debate on such missions and, more generally, Germany’s foreign policy.

9.3 Empirical Findings

The final series of findings are the result of the application of the analytical framework to the political speeches and magazine covers. These empirical findings provide the answers to the central research questions of this thesis. At the end of this section, the overarching research question about geopolitical imaginations in Germany’s ‘War on Terror’ is discussed.

The analysis of the speeches identified some significant differences and similarities in the ways in which the five political parties framed Germany’s ISAF mission. The first identified a dividing line between the parties, and showed that the Left framed Germany’s ISAF mission far more often as a war mission than any of the parties more to the right along the political spectrum. Another ideological divide concerns the capabilities of the German army to have an intended impact on Afghanistan, which were much more frequently framed as being sufficient by the right of centre parties CDU and FDP. The frames that both parties produced do however also suggest that the capabilities of the German army are more often inadequate than adequate (explained below). An ideological divide is also noticeable in the framing of victimhood and perpetration during the ISAF mission. Where the Greens and the Left frame
Afghan people more often as victims, CDU and FDP frame Germans more often as victims. A deeper analysis revealed that some MPs of the FDP spoke in indirect terms about the possible responsibility of Germany for Afghan civilian casualties. However, when armed non-state actors were framed by other MPs of the FDP, their role as perpetrators was constructed in rather explicit terms. Differences within parties also came to the surface in the analysis of the frames in the political texts. A telling example concerns the ability of German Tornado planes to reduce the risk of civilian casualties during air strikes. During one of the debates, two MPs disagreed on this issue, thus exemplifying the important role of Germany’s parliament in the (re)production of geopolitical frames.

A key similarity was that all parties framed the inability of the Afghan government to protect its population the most frequently in the will to intervene category. However, the relative importance of this frame differed widely among parties. This frame was for example much more prominent in FDP speeches than in texts of the Left. Moreover, the CDU frames Afghanistan more often as a threat to Germany than other political parties. Another similarity among all parties concerned the high share of frames that constructed Germany as not having an intended impact on Afghanistan. Further analysis has made clear that FDP and SPD were relatively most positive concerning Germany having an intended impact in at least some policy areas.

Taking these empirical findings one abstraction level higher, a first traditional foreign policy interest of Germany is good relations with the France, United States and other member states of EU and NATO. A second interest concerns military restraint in foreign policy. To contextualize the findings of this empirical study, it is important to acknowledge that CDU and FDP were overall most focused on good relations with the United States, were generally speaking most in favour of higher defence spending and problematised the use of violence by German soldiers abroad the least of all parties. Their relatively few frames in the “militarisation of the intervention” category and their relatively many frames in the “will to intervene” category in this empirical study confirms their relative flexible position towards foreign military missions. Both parties were also relatively optimistic about Germany’s impact on Afghanistan in some policy fields, in some areas or for some time. Remarkably, both parties framed the German army relatively frequently as being both sufficiently and insufficiently capable to have an intended impact on Afghanistan. The first framing provided support for the US-initiated ISAF mission. The second may seem to be intended to question this support. However, this was not the case since it was often used to stress the importance of higher defence spending. This is an example of where a particular frame is linked to a particular policy preference (Entman, 2004). A final observation concerning both parties
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is that they frame Germans relatively often as victims as compared to the Afghans. The empirical study of the texts of the Left and the Greens found the opposite. Reflecting their reluctance to use military force abroad, both parties frame Germany (and other states; particularly US) relatively often as perpetrators in Afghanistan. They further refer quite frequently to the militarisation of ISAF, with particularly the Left stressing that Germany’s ISAF mission was a war mission. Both parties also referred to the war mission of the United States in Afghanistan most frequently. Moreover, the Left and the Greens were rather negative about the intended impact of Germany on Afghanistan. Despite aforementioned observations, this study does not seek to establish strong relationships between the identified frames and the foreign policy preferences of political parties. In fact, the FDP produced more frequently than the Left and the Greens the frame where Germany cannot have an intended impact on Afghanistan. The diversity of viewpoints on Germany’s ISAF mission within political parties also explains the senselessness of making too strong claims about the relationship between the identified frames in this study and the foreign policy preferences of political parties. This diversity actually confirms the observation by the Dutch political scientist Paul Lucardie (2018, p. 55, translation from German by author) that “parties cannot so easily be put in a drawer [category], as applies to human beings as well.”

The second empirical chapter concludes among other things that the covers of Der Spiegel in the dataset produced 15 of the 24 defined geopolitical frames. In two geopolitical frame categories, the defined frames were produced in relatively equal numbers. One of them was the category will to intervene, which revolves around notions of military and human security. Until 2009, Afghanistan was framed nine times as a state that poses a threat to Germany and/or other states. The same number of times was this state framed as having a government that cannot protect its population and/or foster modernity and development in Afghanistan. Although notions of security can be used by foreign policy makers to construct an interest of their state in another state (Robinson, 2008), the references to security on the covers do not imply that Der Spiegel was in favour of the German ISAF mission. This becomes clear from the identified frames in the following two geopolitical frame categories.

Concerning the militarisation of Germany’s ISAF mission, Der Spiegel did not leave any room for ambiguity. The frame that constructs Germany as being on a war mission was produced seven times in the research period, which is the highest frequency of all frames on the Der Spiegel covers. This was indirectly done in 2001, but explicitly from

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108 Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.
2009 onwards. A key question is whether this was related to the Kunduz air strike in September 2009. The air strike had caused an outcry in Germany, because it had been ordered by a German officer and caused dozens of casualties among Afghan civilians. (*Der Spiegel*, 2010a). The American operations in Afghanistan were also consistently framed as being part of a war mission. Whereas this happened for Germany rather late in the research period, the frame that constructs the war mission of the United States was predominantly produced in 2001. One can say that the “Afghan War” was increasingly Germanised, after its initial Americanisation.

The capacity to intervene category was identified the least on the *Der Spiegel* covers (ten times). In this regard, the news magazine was very clear as well. The capabilities of the German army were insufficient from either a contemporary perspective or a structural perspective. Where the first frame was constructed with words such as overburdened and badly prepared, the second frame was constructed with among other devices historical analogies. These analogies referred for example to the experiences of the United States in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Another element of this geopolitical frame category concerns the intended impact of Germany on Afghanistan. Also in this regard, *Der Spiegel* was only negative about the German ISAF mission, suggesting that Germany never had an intended impact on Afghanistan.

In terms of the framing of victims and perpetrators, *Der Spiegel* was rather balanced. Both Afghans and Germans were framed four times as victims. In other words, there was not a stronger concern about the German victims. Moreover, the Germans were framed four times as perpetrators. This happened three times to both the Americans and members of armed non-state groups. These figures also show that *Der Spiegel* did not shy away from problematising the role of Germans as perpetrators in a foreign state. The co-occurring framing of operations from the United States and Taliban as being harmful to the Afghan population was remarkable as well. In fact, the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2001/46 constructed a commonality between the United States and Taliban that suggested they were equals in one aspect. Another *Der Spiegel* cover (2001/45) problematised the United States in a similar way as Al Qaida. The attacks by Al Qaida against the United States with two civilian airplanes and the American air strikes against Afghanistan were on a par with each other. Therefore, this cover suggested a form of equality between United States and Al Qaida. In fact, Hyndman (2003, p.2) did the same with her following observation:

“To my mind, nothing justified the killing of innocent people on September 11th. Nothing justifies the retaliatory killing of innocent people anywhere else. [...]
Equally, I do not condone US and British bombing in Afghanistan, which has killed uncounted civilians and imperiled the lives of hundreds of thousands more. Such 'collateral damage', as these deaths are euphemistically referred to by the perpetrators, are unlikely to ever be prosecuted. Terror in the US on September 11th has been met with more terror in Afghanistan since October 7th:

The empirical analysis of *Der Spiegel* also finds that this news magazine is a central (re)producer of geopolitical frames in Germany. Not only did the magazine engage with all four geopolitical frame categories, it also criticised all government parties during Germany’s ISAF mission. Furthermore, the empirical findings of this study do not suggest that *Der Spiegel* framed Germany’s ISAF mission in a similar way as one particular political party. Its framing of particular aspects of Germany’s ISAF mission could be closest to various parties, including CDU, the Greens and the Left. Remarkably, in terms of the capacity of the Bundeswehr to intervene in Afghanistan, the framing of *Der Spiegel* was not close to any political party. The magazine framed this capacity continually as non-existing. Overall, the empirical study of the *Der Spiegel* covers shows the consistent opposition of this magazine against military intervention of Germany in Afghanistan. This was in line with the view of a majority of the German population during most of the ISAF mission, confirming the magazine’s role as “mirror” (German language: *Spiegel*) of the German society. The magazine further raised important questions about Germany's foreign policy in the 21st century, exemplifying its continued attempts to be a serious actor in Germany's foreign policy debate.

Compared to the political texts, the covers of *Der Spiegel* produced relatively numerous frames that were related to the will to intervene. This particularly related to frames that construct Afghanistan either as a threat to Germany and other states or as a backward state. *Der Spiegel* also produced relatively many frames compared to the *Bundestag* that constructed Germany and the United States as states that were on a war mission in Afghanistan. The parliament in turn produced many more frames related to the capacity to intervene of Germany. Whereas the question whether Germany had an intended impact on Afghanistan was subject to a contest in parliament, *Der Spiegel* consistently framed Germany as a state without any intended impact on Afghanistan. The differences regarding victims and perpetrators were less pronounced between the news magazine and parliament. The analysis further makes clear *Der Spiegel* sometimes produced particular geopolitical frames in similar fashion as MPs did in parliament. A telling example that the has been identified in the dataset of this thesis is the quality of air photos, which was constructed as being insufficient to distinguish a farmer from a Taliban fighter. Other identified examples refer to the kind of warfare in
Afghanistan and the at times difficult position of German soldiers between harming others and being harmed. The use of historical analogies to frame Afghanistan as a state where Germany’s military capabilities would always be inadequate has also been identified both on the magazine covers and political texts.

Referring to the overarching research question, it can be concluded that geopolitical imaginations play a dynamic, yet complex role in how foreign processes are understood in practical and popular geopolitics in Germany. In fact, the empirical study confirmed Germany’s richness in terms of geopolitical frames. As noted in section 5.4, this thesis assumes that frames are more or less the representational counterparts of (cognitive) imaginations. Accordingly, the identified geopolitical frames can be seen as a good reflection of how German politicians and journalists imagine their own state and the world at large.

To conclude this section, research into how new foreign military interventions are framed in practical and popular geopolitics in Germany and other states remains recommendable. After all,

"what lies beyond the frame remains a source of anxiety and concern: how much has been left out of the account, and whose purpose does that serve? Such questions are always worth raising, but especially so in war reports, when the bludgeon of national interest (or national uninterest) knocks news stories into shape." (Taylor, 1998, p. 195)

### 9.4 Methodological Contributions

In addition to providing comment and analysis on the German context and how this fits with bigger picture political challenges across the world, there are also important methodological findings of the thesis. To study geopolitical framing, various concepts are introduced. They combine definitions from both critical geopolitics and framing analysis. The central concept is the geopolitical frame, which is a textual and/or visual construction of the territory, identity, government power and/or security of states. Moreover, geopolitical imaginations are conceptualised as the cognitive counterparts of geopolitical frames. Geopolitical framing is seen as the contest between politicians, journalists and other actors over the rightfulness of their own constructions of the territory, identity, government power and/or security of states.
The thesis further uses a qualitative-quantitative framework that consists of 4 geopolitical frame categories\(^{109}\). The categories are will to intervene, militarisation of intervention, capacity to intervene and victims during intervention. These categories have been defined in a deductive process, based on academic literature from critical geopolitical/geography and International Relations. Each geopolitical frame category consists of between four and eight geopolitical frames. These frames have been defined in a deductive-inductive process. Next to academic literature on concepts such as power and security, the *Bundestag* speeches also played a role in the formulation of the geopolitical frames.

To identify geopolitical frames in textual(-visual) representations, the geopolitical framing device is introduced. It operationalises geopolitical frames by expressing them in terms of the data. Accordingly, in the analysis of speeches, these devices are sentences that refer to territory, identity, government power and security of states. In the analysis of the magazine covers, geopolitical framing devices can take the form of words, phrases and visual elements. Questions have been formulated to help the scholar identify the devices in the data. The devices that have been identified on the magazine covers have been coded in terms of human actors, human attributes, processes, non-human actors, spaces and moments/periods. The identification of geopolitical framing devices as an additional first step in the analysis of textual(-visual)representations, instead of directly reconstructing geopolitical frames in that representation, adds to methodological rigour. It forces the scholar to look at the whole representation. This prevents what Müller (2013, p. 58) calls “under-analysis through summary [that] cautions against merely providing a résumé of the content of a text. Providing summaries necessarily simplifies, often smooths over inconsistencies and draws attention to some elements of the text while ignoring others. At worst, it risks distorting the object of analysis if beliefs, policies, political orientations and so on are imputed.” Geopolitical framing devices add to analytical transparency because the application of them forces the scholar to make clear which aspects of a representation have been taken into account, and which have not. This does not rule out what Müller (2013, p. 58) calls “under-analysis through taking sides [as] the analyst [positions] herself vis-à-vis the data by expressing support or disapproval of a certain text.” However, the transparency that results from making explicit on which geopolitical framing device a particular basis geopolitical frame is based, makes it easier to identify the knowledge, assumptions and values that played a role in the interpretation of a textual or textual-visual representation.

\(^{109}\) Appendix 3 (Chapter 13) offers an overview of the four geopolitical frame categories and the 24 geopolitical frames that have been developed and applied in this thesis.
Based on frame-specific questions, geopolitical frames have been identified in 112 speeches of five political parties and on 20 Der Spiegel covers, and subsequently coded. This coding process enables an analysis of which geopolitical frame categories and geopolitical frames were produced most frequently by the selected representations of Germany’s ISAF mission. The coding also makes possible a comparison between speeches and magazine covers, based on 24 frames.

This focus enhances analytical transparency by its relative openness on the meanings attached to textual elements, visual elements and combinations of them. Moreover, it allows for a more thorough debate on the possible interpretations of representations, since scholars who disagree with each other are forced to break down their interpretations in a consistent way. By studying the meaning potential of a representation, instead of the meaning of it, the scholar makes explicit that his or her interpretations will not only be disputed, but must actually be disputed.

Like Rome, the analytical framework was not built in a day, for various reasons. The first general difficulty encountered during the development of the methodology is that the number of frames needs to be manageable. This can be an enormous challenge with political texts that refer to geopolitical concepts in many ways. The framework in this thesis seeks to find the right abstraction level to solve this potential bottleneck. A frame should be sufficiently concrete to relate it to the data, and yet sufficiently abstract to relate it to the academic literature. In this regard, the mixed method for the definition of frames (i.e. deductive and inductive) turned out to be very productive during the development of the analytical framework in this thesis.

A second general difficulty that the development of the methodology faced was that the number of observed frames could differ widely between long and short political text, and between these texts and the magazine covers. Inclusion of multiple occurrences of the same frame in one political text would have made the long political texts dominate the empirical findings of this study. Accordingly, the analytical framework counts a frame that is produced by a political text only once, regardless of how often it is identified in that text.

The development of the methodology met with various other, more specific analytical challenges. First, the level of linguistic detail in the definition of frames needed to be considered repeatedly. The number of frames in the methodology tended to become too high to present the empirical findings in a manageable way. Second, the concept of power can be hard to apply to texts and images. If words or a photo are not explicit about this, when can a change in Afghanistan be frames as impact of ISAF, and when not? It can further be difficult to establish whether the impact of ISAF, if established,
was intended, and what its spatial and temporal reach will be. Third, the classification of victims and perpetrators based on nationality can be complicated by the lack of knowledge of the nationality of a human being. In this regard, the thesis could have also developed frames for the relationship between victim and perpetrator, different forms of victimhood, the modality of sentences and the personalisation of victims.

The way in which aforementioned challenges have been met, may affect the findings of this study considerably. Mentioning these considerations and the ways in which they have been addressed does not seek to make this thesis less subjective, however, it fosters methodological transparency and highlights the positionality of the author of the thesis. To conclude, the methodology of this thesis hopefully catalyses further methodological advancement in geopolitical framing analysis. It would be a valuable endeavour to apply the methodology to a different dataset, ideally adapting the methodology to its new context.

9.5 Contributions to Critical Geopolitics

The thesis advances the critical geopolitical research agenda in three ways. The first contribution of the thesis to critical geopolitics concerns the role that geopolitical frames can play in studies of texts that are produced in practical geopolitics. The use of geopolitical frames in this study allows for a systematic identification and interpretation of textual elements that construct identities, territories, power and security. The first step in the analytical process, the identification of geopolitical framing devices in a text, adds to methodological rigour since the scholar is forced to consider the framing potential of each sentence, phrase and word. It also contributes to analytical transparency, if being done with software like Excel, because it is clear which textual elements have been selected, and which have not.

A second methodological contribution concerns the insight into how textual-visual representations can be broken down into different meaning-carriers. This analytical process allows for a better understanding of how different meanings can be attributed to such representations. This is the result of bringing the concept meaning potential and a method to study intersemiotic complementarity from the social semiotic literature to a critical geopolitical setting. The analysis of text-image relations on the *Der Spiegel* covers exemplifies how important particular knowledge is in the attribution of one particular meaning to a cover.

The final contribution to the critical geopolitical literature concerns an additional understanding of German geopolitical reasoning. More specifically, the thesis offers a stimulating view on the ways in which the ‘War on Terror’ was discursively processed in
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practical and popular geopolitics in Germany. Contrary to the United States, Germany had five political parties in the parliament during most of the ISAF mission. This resulted in a dataset with a wide variety of ways in which key foreign policy issues such as militarisation and responsibility for (possible) victims abroad were framed. On a more abstract level, the findings of the analysis show the complexity of the meaning-making processes related to the projection of power abroad. Simply framing Germany as a powerful state neglects the strong variety of views that exist in Germany on the nature and use of its power abroad. As the analysis further shows, the wish to keep the lessons of the Nazi past present in the current foreign policy setting, as well as the wish to be a reliable partner for the United States, still result in a very broad debate on timely foreign policy issues. Moreover, the impossibility of relating the frames that Der Spiegel produced about Germany’s ISAF mission to one particular party suggests that German media can have an independent role in foreign policy debates in Germany. As in every state, practical and popular geopolitical reasoning in Germany both reflects and affects the ways in which people in this state imagined themselves and the world around them.

Overall, in the modern day context where geopolitical uncertainty is combined with endless communication possibilities, the need for methodological rigour and transparent approaches to data is vital. The thesis has shown how we might work with textual and textual-visual sources. While this may be a starting point, it is clear that critical geopolitics needs new ways to make sense of what is becoming an increasingly complicated geopolitical situation.

9.6 Limitations of This Research

A structural limitation of studies of representations is that any interpretation is context-bound, and never fixed. In the words of Cooper (2010, p. 149),

"[t]he stunning complexity and subtlety of language - the many ways to express thoughts denotatively with a multiplicity of connotative meanings - is a caution that careful study of framing is by no means a simplistic venture."

Thinking in terms of meaning potentials and applying a rigorous and transparent framework to interpret representations does not address this issue. The private, educational and professional background of a scholar always has an impact on her or his interpretations. Regardless of how rigorous and transparent the method to interpret texts and images, "[t]he practice of semiotics [remains] of course itself inevitably a semiotic act, unable to declare absolute truths about reality, while constantly doing so - as we are doing with this sentence" (Hodge and Kress, 1988, pp. 122-3). Related to this limitation is that translation of texts inevitably leads to changes in the meaning.
Another limitation is that the study of Der Spiegel covers was not “fully” multimodal. Multimodality refers not only to texts and images, but also to other semiotic modes such as materiality (Van Leeuwen, 2005). Accordingly, the look, feel and smell of the paper on which Der Spiegel is printed may also affect the meaning potential of its cover, as would the manner in which the manner in which the magazine is read and distributed within the private and public sphere. Der Spiegel is a popular high-brow magazine which is commonly found in hotels, airport bookshops and other public places. It is marketed for well-informed and professional readers and designed, at least, in paper form to be fairly robust and thus capable of being read multiple times. Der Spiegel is also available online (and also via an English edition) so the ‘look, feel and smell’ of the magazine varies depending on context, content and material form.

Moreover, it needs to be acknowledged that “framing analysis can only admittedly offer a ‘partial account’ without additional research into production processes and media audiences” (Parry, 2011, p. 1190). As implicitly suggested by Parry (2011), the thesis would have benefited from interviews with professionals involved in the production process of Der Spiegel and the Bundestag speeches. Interviews with the photographers of the images on the Der Spiegel covers would undoubtedly gain more insights into framing processes as well. Furthermore, the intended meanings of the political texts and magazine covers could have been analysed through interviews. Such interviews would have generated more insights into the intended meanings of the texts and the covers. Furthermore, interviews could have generated more knowledge of how German policymakers and magazine editors choose their words and photos when you give meaning to foreign policy issues. This thesis does further not analyse the reception among audiences of the political texts and magazines. How are they understood by the German population, and what impact do they have on people with different backgrounds? Such interviews could also bring more insights into what German knew and how they felt about Germany’s ISAF mission.

Finally, the analytical framework is not able to distinguish between possible differences in opinion on themes and practices at Der Spiegel. It is however noted that this news magazine, like Reader’s Digest in the US, should not be brought back to simply one essential dimension (Sharp, 2000). After all, “what is seen in media texts is often the result of many interrelated, competing principles from contending sources and media professionals” (Reese, 2003, p. 14).
9.7 Suggestions for Further Research

A first suggestion is to use the framework to study text-image relations as developed in the thesis for the analysis of audience reception as well. For example, a scholar can conduct interviews or organise focus groups and first ask the people involved what meaning they attribute particular textual-visual representations. The follow-up question would then which parts of a representation are most important for the interviewee or focus group in the meaning-making process. With help of the adapted framework of Royce (2006) that is developed in the thesis, the answers can subsequently be coded and interpreted.

Future research could also change the conceptualisation of speeches as written text. This focus results in this thesis in some valuable insights into geopolitical frames in Germany, since the speeches reflected the preferences of the MPs and mostly a majority of their parties. However, to assess how these speeches affected voters, quotes in the written press or online references to it, it is important to acknowledge that these speeches also took the form of spoken text when they were held. For a better understanding of these speeches and their potential impact, other semiotic modes such as facial expressions, body language and gestures could be taken into account in future studies.

Related to the previous suggestion is that the thesis has a cognitive starting point. Future research could however look into the affective impact on television viewers of the spoken text and non-verbal expressions of an MP during his or her speech. A key question would be whether affect played a role in the reception of the speech by its audiences, and if so, whether it had an impact on the meaning potential of the content of this speech.

Furthermore, it would be enlightening to apply the methodology of the thesis to speeches of politicians in other states. This could generate more understanding of how a national context is reflected by the production of geopolitical frames by politicians. Such an approach could for example be fruitful to map the different perspectives on a particular space that is claimed by two or more states. Alternatively, whereas the thesis focuses on the meaning potential of isolated textual and textual-visual representations in an individual setting, future research could expand and adapt the methodology to study frames in a dynamic social context.

To conclude, the methodology of the thesis could be further developed to contribute to the analysis of strategic narratives (Roselle et al, 2014). It could for example contribute to more insights into how textual and visual frames in these narratives change over
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9.8 Final Words: Critical, Constructive and Constructivist

In their working paper, Bachmann and Moisio (2018, np, emphasis added) call for “a constructive form of geopolitics which seeks to provide alternative geographical knowledge for policy practices.” In their view, critical geopolitics should not only identify forms of exclusion, but also help societies overcome them. Not answering to aforementioned call, this thesis has developed a constructivist approach towards critical geopolitics. Drawing on Dahinden (2006), this approach assumes that a frame as such is not bad since it helps actors make sense of their environment. The conceptualisation of ‘critical’ in this constructivist approach towards critical geopolitics is based on Van Leeuwen (2015, np), who argues that “critical doesn’t necessarily always mean ‘that is wrong’[, but] that you are open to what the outcome is.” A valuable aspect of this conceptualisation is that ‘critical’ does not conflict with ‘constructivist.’ Thus it takes into account the criticism from Potthoff (2012) of the critical approach towards framing of Entman (1991; 2004). The conceptualisation of critical in the work of Entman is not reconcilable with the constructivist roots of framing methods according to the former scholar. Entman seeks to confirm negative evaluations of particular elite practices with his research, whereas constructivism does not presume taking an explicit position. In line with the latter, this thesis has not been based on an a priori (negative) evaluation of its topic (i.e. Germany’s engagement with ‘War on Terror’ in the form of ISAF mission). Instead, it has sought to be “a grounded, motivated, evidence-based critique that can be a positive contribution to thinking about what needs to be done different” (Van Leeuwen, 2015, np). The rigorous, transparent framework of this thesis, in combination with section 5.2 on positionality, exemplify the spirit of the words of Van Leeuwen. Paraphrasing Baker110 (2010, p. 314), the thesis does not seek to examine textual(-visual) representations in terms of the extent to which they deviate from or match a single supposed “real” or “honest” portrayal. Instead, by comparing five political parties and a news magazine with each other, it

110 Original quote: “I do not wish to examine representations in terms of the extent to which they deviate from or match a single supposed "real" or "honest" portrayal, instead [...] by comparing different types of newspapers against each other, we can begin to obtain an idea of the range of possible ways that Muslims can be represented” (Baker, 2010, p. 314).
offers insights into the range of possible ways that the ‘War on Terror’ can be represented in Germany.

Finally, like the approach of Bachmann and Moisio (2018), the constructivist approach that this thesis has developed seeks to be constructive. Nonetheless, drawing on Dahinden (2006), constructive refers here to the intention to raise more awareness among the population of all powerful and less powerful geopolitical frames in societies. This awareness should also include how these frames are related to foreign policy, and whose interests the frames serve. This awareness of what Flint (2017, pp. 54) calls “representational geopolitics” is paramount to engage more citizens in foreign policy decisions and democratis geopolitics. After all, the following observation by Richardson (2007, p. 49, emphasis in original) also applies to states: “We all simultaneously possess a range of identities, roles and characteristics that could be used to describe us equally accurately but not with the same meaning.” In this regard, geopolitical framing analysis can help us better understand which meanings we attribute to our state(s) and the many others around us.

To conclude, it is important to stress that geopolitical framing is not restricted to professionals who make foreign policy or sell news magazines. Everybody frames. As Flint (2017, p. 304) rightfully argues, “we are all geopoliticians.”
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### Appendix 1: Selected Speeches and Statements

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Figure 11.2 Selected and excluded speeches and statements (1b)
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# Appendix 1: Selected Speeches and Statements

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## Figure 11.5 Selected and excluded speeches and statements (3a)

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Figure 11.7 Selected and excluded speeches and statements (4a)
### Figure 11.8 Selected and excluded speeches and statements (4b)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Ref. Data</th>
<th>Name of politician(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>90</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
<td>Harald Friese, Waltraud Wolff (Wörmn, Stendal), Rüdiger Ved, Klaus Barthel (Starnberg), Götz Peter Lehmann (Neubrandenburg), Christine Lucyna, Thomas Saurauer, Konrad Kurzick</td>
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<td>91</td>
<td>03/2001</td>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Dr. Uwe Jepsen</td>
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<td>92</td>
<td>04/2003</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Gernot Erfer</td>
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<td>05/2005</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Gernot Erfer</td>
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<td>94</td>
<td>06/2007</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Rainer Arnold</td>
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<td>95</td>
<td>07/2007</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Dr. Hans-Peter Bartels</td>
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<tr>
<td>96</td>
<td>08/2007</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Ortwin Runde, Renate Schmidt (Nürnberg), Elke Fener, Dr. Ernst Dieter Rossman, Lothar Mark, Petra Merkel (Berlin), Margret Spielmann, Stineker Rix, Dr. Rainer Tabilllon, Reinhold Hemker, Angelika Krüger-Leitner, Frank Hofmann (Volkach), Mechthild Rawert, Renate Gradischen, Hilde Mathies, Wolfgang Spanier, Martin Burkert, Ute Kumpf, Gabriele Hille-Ohm, Jürgen Kucharczyk und Christel Humme</td>
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<td>97</td>
<td>09/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Andrea Nahles, Niels Annen, Gerold Reichenbach, Monika Griefahn, Ursula Mogg, Garrett Duin, Annette Kramme, Nicolette Kress und Kerstin Griesse</td>
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<tr>
<td>98</td>
<td>10/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Heinz Schmitt (Landau), Angelika Graf (Rosenheim), Dr. Marlies Volkmer, Detlef Müller (Chemnitz), Waltraud Lehn, Christel Riemann-Hanewinkel, Dr. Bärbel Kofler, Dr. Wolfgang Wodarg, Christine Lambrecht und Elvira Drabinski-Weiß</td>
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<td>99</td>
<td>11/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Ernst Kranz und Frank Schwabe</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>12/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Dr. Axel Berg</td>
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<td>14/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Lothar Binding (Heidelberg)</td>
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<td>102</td>
<td>15/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Klaus Brandner</td>
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<td>103</td>
<td>16/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Petra Hinz (Essen)</td>
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<td>17/2007</td>
<td>CON</td>
<td>Iris Hoffmann (Wismar)</td>
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<td>CON</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
<td>Ute Kumpf</td>
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<td>PRO</td>
<td>Christoph Strassner, Doris Barnett, Dirk Becker, Uwe Beckmeyer, Gerd Vollmann, Petra Cronin, Elvira Drobinski-Weiß, Siegmund Ehrmann, Gabriele Foschiers, Dagmar Freitag, Ida Gierke, Ulrike Gottschalck, Angelika Graf (Rosenheim), Hans Joachim Hacke, Bettina Hagedorn, Klaus Hagemann, Christine Lambrecht, Kristel Lohmann, Carsten Marks, Petra Merkel (Berlin), Ulrich Mêmener, Manfred Nirk, Oliver Kaczmarek, Dr. Carola Reimann, Kain Roth (Esslingen), Michael Roth (Hemmers), Bernd Scheelen, Marianne Schieder (Schwandorf), Ulla Schmidt (Aschen), Rita Schwarzelüthy-Sutter, Franz Thönes und Heidemarie Wiedemeyer-Zeul</td>
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<td>Dr. Rolf Mützenich</td>
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<td>112</td>
<td>25/2014</td>
<td>PRO</td>
<td>Thomas Hitzschke</td>
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(Names of politicians in italics denote those who have been excluded from the analysis.)
12 Appendix 2: Selected Der Spiegel Covers

12.1 Cover 1: 1 October 2001

Figure 12.1 Cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abgrund Afghanistan</td>
<td>Abyss Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aufmarsch am Hindukush</td>
<td>Advance on the Hindu Kush</td>
<td>[Troops from United States, United Kingdom, Northern Alliance]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Terrorauftrag</td>
<td>The terror mission</td>
<td>[Supporters of Al Qaida]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gehirnwäsche im Namen Allahs</td>
<td>Brainwashing in the name of Allah</td>
<td>[Leaders of Al Qaida]</td>
<td>(Islamic religion)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Three men</td>
<td>Beards, turbans, one on the foreground has unfriendly look in his eyes, (men do not wear military uniforms)</td>
<td>Grenade/rocket launching device</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.2 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/ Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abgrund Afghanistan</td>
<td>Being an abyss</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aufmarsch am Hindukush</td>
<td>Making a [military] advance</td>
<td>Hindu Kush (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>[Soon]</td>
<td>1-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Terrorsauftrag</td>
<td>Having a terror mission</td>
<td>[in Europe]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gehirnwäsche im Namen Allahs</td>
<td>Brainwashing</td>
<td>(Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-4-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>One man looks upwards, two men are moving grenade/ rocket launching device</td>
<td>(Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-5-2</td>
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</table>

Figure 12.3 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/40 (2)
12.2 Cover 2: 15 October 2001

Figure 12.4 Cover of *Der Spiegel* 2001/42 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text) or description (images)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krieg der Welten</td>
<td>War of (the) Worlds (Population of different “worlds”)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bin Ladens Schläfer:</td>
<td>Bin Laden’s sleeper (Wo)Men who are silently loyal to Bin Laden and willing/ready to commit terrorist attack</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Afghanistan trainiert- als Asylanten in Europa</td>
<td>Trained in Afghanistan, as asylum seekers in Europe People from unmentioned states</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>(not visible: American soldiers on board of USS Enterprise), (not visible: pilot of fighter jet that just took off)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>A line formed by light, surrounded by other lights and darkness, [large American war ship, USS Enterprise, with fighter jets on it]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.5 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/42 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krieg der Welten</td>
<td>Conducting war; being in a war</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bin Ladens Schläfer:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Afghanistan trainiert- als Asylanten in Europa</td>
<td>Being trained (to commit terrorist attacks); applying for asylum; being granted asylum</td>
<td>Afghanistan, Europe [European Union, Germany]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-3-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>[Bombing plane taking off]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-4-1</td>
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<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Assembling, demonstrating, some men are waving flags, some are holding sticks</td>
<td>[Pakistan], sandy soil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2-5-2</td>
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</table>

Figure 12.6 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/42 (2)
12.3 Cover 3: 22 October 2001

Figure 12.7 Cover of Der Spiegel 2001/43 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
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<td>New York</td>
<td>New York</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Die verwundete Stadt</td>
<td>The wounded city</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abenteuer Bodenkrieg:</td>
<td>The war on the ground adventure</td>
<td>(American soldiers)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>US-Truppen in Afghanistan</td>
<td>American troops in Afghanistan</td>
<td>American soldiers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Remainings of one small part of World Trade Center, hubris</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.8 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/43 (1)
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<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>New York</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die verwundete Stadt</td>
<td>Being wounded City (New York)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03-2-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abenteuer Bodenkrieg:</td>
<td>Conducting a ground war that is an adventure</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03-3-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US-Truppen in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Operating Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03-4-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Standing, lying on the soil (New York), (United States)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>03-5-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12.9 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/43 (2)**
12.4 Cover 4: 5 November 2001

Figure 12.10 Cover of Der Spiegel 2001/45 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falle Afghanistan:</td>
<td>Trap Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerikas heilloser Bombenkrieg und das Gespenst von Vietnam</td>
<td>America's awful war of bombs and the ghost of Vietnam.</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bombs; ghost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jahre danach:</td>
<td>25 years later:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf Biermann über seine Ausbürgerung</td>
<td>Wolf Biermann about losing his citizenship</td>
<td>Wolf Biermann [GDR citizen and artist]</td>
<td>citizenship</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>sandy hill with some bushes in the foreground, (presumably) exploding bombs on the hills in the background</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.11 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2001/45 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Falle Afghanistan:</td>
<td>Being a trap</td>
<td>Afghanistan (stage of current war)</td>
<td>The present</td>
<td>04-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amerikas heilloser Bombenkrieg und das Gespenst von Vietnam</td>
<td>Conducting an awful war of bombs</td>
<td>Vietnam (stage of earlier war)</td>
<td>The past (period of Vietnam War)</td>
<td>04-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 Jahre danach:</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25 years later [refers more or less to time between Vietnam War and this cover on Afghanistan as well]</td>
<td>04-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wolf Biermann über seine Ausbürgerung</td>
<td>Losing citizenship</td>
<td>German Democratic Republic</td>
<td>[Cold War]</td>
<td>04-4-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.12 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/45 (2)
Figure 12.13 Cover of Der Spiegel 2001/46 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ernstfall für Rot-Grün</td>
<td>An emergency for the Red-Green coalition</td>
<td>[Members of the] Government of SPD and Bündnis90/ Die Grünen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundeswehr nach Afghanistan</td>
<td>Bundeswehr to Afghanistan</td>
<td>German army</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flüchtlingsberichte:</td>
<td>Reports from refugees:</td>
<td>(Afghan) refugees</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwischen US-Bomben und Taliban-Terror</td>
<td>Inbetween American bombs and Taliban terror</td>
<td>United States, Taliban</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bombs, terror</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Visual framing devices] - Cross of two birch branches with soldier helmet on top of the vertical one [referring to soldier's grave], one green birch branch, one red birch branch [referring to colours of government parties]

Figure 12.14 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2001/46 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ernstfall für Rot-Grün</td>
<td>Being faced with an emergency [vote of confidence, tied to parliamentary vote on German participation in OEF]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>05-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bundeswehr nach Afghanistan</td>
<td>(Being sent to)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>05-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flüchtlingsberichte:</td>
<td>Giving statements about experiences</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>05-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zwischen US-Bomben und Taliban-Terror</td>
<td>Being faced with American bombs and Taliban terror</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>05-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>05-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.15 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/46 (2)
12.6 Cover 6: 19 November 2001

Figure 12.16 Cover of Der Spiegel 2001/47 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Krieg nach dem Sieg</td>
<td>The war after the victory</td>
<td>[United States] [OEF forces]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Jagd auf Bin Laden und die Angst vor neuen Terror-Anschläge</td>
<td>The hunt on Bin Laden and the fear of new terrorist attacks.</td>
<td>[United States] [OEF forces] [American people] [German people]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauler Zauber in Berlin:</td>
<td>Humbug / Hanky Panky / Mumbo-Jumbo / Monkey Business in Berlin:</td>
<td>[Chancellor] [Members of government parties]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanzler mit ohne Mehrheit</td>
<td>Chancellor without majority</td>
<td>[Chancellor]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>White [American] soldier, non-white [Aghan] civilian men, [Afghan] boys</td>
<td>Soldier with military uniform, helmet, protective glasses, rifle and backpack, four men local hats/turbans, two with beards, one with moustache, boys mostly with local hats</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.17 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2001/47 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Krieg nach dem Sieg</td>
<td>Conducting a war; achieving a victory</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Jagd auf Bin Laden und die Angst vor neuen Terror-Anschlägen</td>
<td>Trying to trace down Bin Laden, being afraid of new terrorist attacks</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fauler Zauber in Berlin:</td>
<td>Being involved in political games</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanzler mit ohne Mehrheit</td>
<td>Not having a majority</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Soldier is standing and looking to the left and ahead of him, not looking straight into the camera, not looking at the people behind him, men are standing behind him, some looking straight into the camera, others looking at each other, boys sitting/standing on little hill/pile behind men</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>06-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.18 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2001/47 (2)
12.7 Cover 7: 21 January 2002

Figure 12.19 Cover of *Der Spiegel* 2002/4 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der künstliche Kindersegen</td>
<td>The artificial children blessing</td>
<td>Artificial children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby-Boom aus der Retorte</td>
<td>Baby-Boom from the test tube</td>
<td>[German women]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit Afhanen-Premier Karzai:</td>
<td>Spiegel interview with Afghans' Prime-Minister Karzai</td>
<td>Spiegel magazine staff, Afghan President Karzai</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Führungsrolle für die Deutschen&quot;</td>
<td>Leading role for the Germans.&quot; [referring to lead nation status within ISAF]</td>
<td>Germans [German soldiers]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Three babies, [adult to whom belongs the hand]</td>
<td>Blond, well-combed hair, blue eyes</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.20 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2002/4 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der künstliche Kindersegen</td>
<td>[Germany]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07-1-1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baby-Boom aus der Retorte</td>
<td>Giving birth to babies that have been conceived with help of test tube</td>
<td>[Germany]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPIEGEL-Gespräch mit Afhanen-Premier Karzai:</td>
<td>[Making a statement]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Führungsrolle für die Deutschen&quot;</td>
<td>German soldiers taking a leadership role in Afghanistan, Germany becoming a lead nation within ISAF</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Adult holding round plastic dish with three babies lying in it, two babies seem to look at adult, one is looking away, but straight in the eyes of the viewer of the image</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>07-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.21 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2002/4 (2)
12.8 Cover 8: 11 March 2002

Figure 12.22 Cover of Der Spiegel 2002/11 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die überforderte Armee</td>
<td>The overburdened army</td>
<td>[German] army</td>
<td>overburdened</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche an allen Fronten</td>
<td>Germans on all fronts</td>
<td>Germans, [German army], [German soldiers]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[German] soldier, seven [Afghan?] men, strong difference in the parts of them that are visible</td>
<td>Soldier with military uniform, red baret, gloves and German flag sewn on his right arm, some men have beards, some have blanket or scarf wrapped around them</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.23 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2002/11 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die überforderte Armee</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>08-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche an allen Fronten</td>
<td>Being located</td>
<td>On all fronts [everywhere where there is a conflict]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>08-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Soldier is standing in front of group of men, looking to the left, not to the men near him, not straight into the camera, holding a rifle that is pointed down, men are standing behind soldier, having different facial expressions (smiling or looking serious)</td>
<td>Building or wall in the background</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>08-3-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.24 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2002/11 (2)
12.9 Cover 9: 20 November 2006

Figure 12.25 Cover of Der Spiegel 2006/47 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Die Deutschen müssen das Töten lernen.”</td>
<td>“The Germans need to learn to kill.”</td>
<td>Germans (German soldiers)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wie Afghanistan zum Ernstfall wird</td>
<td>How Afghanistan turns into an emergency</td>
<td>[German soldiers]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>(German) male soldier</td>
<td>Military uniform, short sleeves, military hat, sunglasses, rifle, German flag sewn on top part of his left sleeve</td>
<td>(presumably) military vehicle, with image of German flag stuck on it and Germany written on it in Dari</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.26 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2006/47 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>“Die Deutschen müssen das Töten lernen.”</td>
<td>Having the need to learn how to kill</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>09-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wie Afghanistan zum Ernstfall wird</td>
<td>Being on a military mission in Afghanistan that is becoming an emergency</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>09-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Standing next to military vehicle, wearing a military uniform with short sleeves. Wearing military hat, wearing sunglasses, holding a rifle that points downwards</td>
<td>Sand road, green soil and rocks in the background</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>09-3-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.27 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2006/47 (2)
12.10 Cover 10: 11 February 2008

Figure 12.28 Cover of *Der Spiegel* 2008/7 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Messias-Faktor</td>
<td>The Messias Factor</td>
<td>[American President Obama]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama und die Sehnsucht nach einem neuen Amerika</td>
<td>Barack Obama and the desire for a new America</td>
<td>American President Obama</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiegel-Gespräch mit US-Senator John McCain</td>
<td>Spiegel interview with American MoP John McCain</td>
<td>Spiegel magazine staff, American MP John McCain</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Wir brauchen mehr Deutsche in Afghanistan&quot;</td>
<td>&quot;We need more Germans in Afghanistan&quot; (United States)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>American President Obama</td>
<td>Dark suit, white shirt, light tie, two microphones</td>
<td>White dots on black background surround Obama's face, suggesting fairy dust (and confirming messias status), Colours and stars of American flag used in textual elements: word &quot;Faktor&quot; is red, the i in &quot;Messias&quot; has blue star instead of white dot on top, sub-headline in blue, background of sub-title is blue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.29 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2008/7 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Messias-Faktor</td>
<td>Being seen as a messias</td>
<td>[United States]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barack Obama und die Sehnsucht nach einem neuen Amerika</td>
<td>Feeling a desire for change</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiegel-Gespräch mit US-Senator John McCain</td>
<td>[Doing an interview], [Making a statement]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Wir brauchen mehr Deutsche in Afghanistan&quot;</td>
<td>Needing more German troops in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Looking to the left, but not into the camera, pointing his hand in the same direction</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.30 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2008/7 (2)
12.11  Cover 11: 14 September 2009

![Der Spiegel Cover 11: 14 September 2009](image)

Figure 12.31 Cover of *Der Spiegel* 2009/38 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ein Jahr danach</td>
<td>One year later</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warum die Welt durch die Finanzkrise ärmer, aber nicht kluger wurde</td>
<td>Why the financial crisis made the world poorer, but not more clever</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>World population, financial sector professionals</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alptraum Afghanistan</td>
<td>Nightmare Afghanistan</td>
<td>[German army], [German state]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Krieg, der nicht zu gewinnen ist</td>
<td>A war that can't be won</td>
<td>[German army], [German state]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Match of which more than top half was burned, while it is burning again at bottom, against while background</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.32 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2009/38 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ein Jahr danach</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>One year later</td>
<td>11-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warum die Welt durch die Finanzkrise ärmer, aber nicht kluger wurde</td>
<td>Being in a financial crisis, becoming poorer, not getting more clever</td>
<td>World</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alptraum Afghanistan</td>
<td>Being on a military mission in Afghanistan that is a nightmare</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ein Krieg, der nicht zu gewinnen ist</td>
<td>Being involved in a war that cannot be won</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11-4-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.33 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2009/38 (2)
12.12 Cover 12: 20 November 2009

Figure 12.34 Cover of Der Spiegel 2009/49 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wann dürfen Deutsche töten?</td>
<td>When are the Germans allowed to kill?</td>
<td>Germans (German soldiers)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Bundeswehr, Afghanistan und der Krieg im 21. Jahrhundert</td>
<td>The Bundeswehr, Afghanistan and the war in the 21st century.</td>
<td>German army</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiegel-Serie</td>
<td>Spiegel series</td>
<td>(Spiegel magazine staff)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was gegen den Klimawandel zu tun ist</td>
<td>What we can/should do against climate change</td>
<td>[German population]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Climate (change)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Man, being seen from above and behind, square cross with centre on his back added to image, boy</td>
<td>Man with local [Afghan] clothes and turban, Boy with dark T-shirt, light trousers, some non-identifiable equipment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.35 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2009/49 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wann dürfen Deutsche töten?</td>
<td>Being allowed to kill</td>
<td>[in Afghanistan]</td>
<td></td>
<td>12-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiegel-Serie</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Was gegen den Klimawandel zu tun ist</td>
<td>Preventing/slowing down climate change</td>
<td>[World]</td>
<td>[21st century]</td>
<td>12-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Man is walking, Boy is walking behind him, carrying some non-identifiable equipment (possibly a shovel)</td>
<td>Sandy, rocky soil [in Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.36 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2009/49 (2)
12.13 Cover 13: 25 January 2010

Figure 12.37 Cover of Der Spiegel 2010/4 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friedhof der Supermächte</td>
<td>Graveyard of the superpowers</td>
<td>Superpowers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Graveyard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: der 200-jährige Krieg</td>
<td>Afghanistan: the 200-year war</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.38 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2010/4 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Friedhof der Supermächte</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: der 200-jährige Krieg</td>
<td>Being the stage of war(s)</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>period since 1810</td>
<td>13-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Men standing on top of helicopter, looking in all directions, some look straight into the camera, wearing local [Afghan] clothes, wearing local [Afghan] hats, some holding rifles, one seems to wave at photographer, one aims his rifle in other direction, one stands on the left of the photo and looks to his right “outside” the photo, men seem to be at ease or happy</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>[January, 1980]</td>
<td>13-3-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.39 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2010/4 (2)
12.14  Cover 14: 1 February 2010

Figure 12.40 Cover of Der Spiegel 2010/5 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Abrechnung</td>
<td>Day of reckoning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finanzkrise: Jagd auf die Kapital-Verbrecher</td>
<td>Financial crisis: the hunt for serious (financial sector) criminals</td>
<td>Serious (financial sector) criminals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geheimakt Kunduz</td>
<td>The secret Kunduz file</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protokoll eines tödlichen Fehlers</td>
<td>Written record of a leathal mistake</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>USD bill, Euro bill, largely invisible behind USD bill, Five fingerprints, two of them with square around them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.41 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2010/5 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Abrechnung</td>
<td>Day of reckoning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finanzkrise: Jagd auf die Kapital-Verbrecher</td>
<td>Financial crisis: the hunt for serious (financial sector) criminals</td>
<td>Serious (financial sector) criminals</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geheimakt Kunduz</td>
<td>The secret Kunduz file</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protokoll eines tödlichen Fehlers</td>
<td>Written record of a leathal mistake</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>USD bill, Euro bill, largely invisible behind USD bill, Five fingerprints, two of them with square around them</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.42 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2010/5 (2)
12.15  Cover 15: 29 April 2010

Figure 12.43 Cover of Der Spiegel 2010/16 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Im Krieg</td>
<td>In war</td>
<td>[Germany], [German army]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Soldaten über das Töten und Sterben in Afghanistan</td>
<td>German soldiers about the killing and dying in Afghanistan</td>
<td>German soldiers</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands unheimliche Vulkane</td>
<td>Iceland's eerie volcanoes</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Volcanoes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[German] soldier</td>
<td>Sunglasses, rifle, military hat, military uniform, surrounded by what seem to be sand bags, German flag sewn on his left sleeve</td>
<td>Two vehicles in the background, hardly visible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.44 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2010/16 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Im Krieg</td>
<td>Being involved in a war</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deutsche Soldaten über das Töten und Sterben in Afghanistan</td>
<td>Killing, being killed</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islands unheimliche Vulkane</td>
<td>Volcanoes erupting and being eerie</td>
<td>[Iceland]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Looking to the left of the image, pointing his rifle in this direction as well</td>
<td>Sandy, dusty road/soil, (Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15-4-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.45 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2010/16 (2)
12.16  Cover 16: 26 July 2010

Figure 12.46 Cover of *Der Spiegel* 2010/30 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force 373</td>
<td>Task Force 373</td>
<td>Task Force 373</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Afghanistan Protokolle. Amerikas geheimer Krieg.</td>
<td>The Afghanistan logs. America’s secret war.</td>
<td>(United States)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Logs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Three (American) soldiers</td>
<td>Soldiers with uniform and helmets, two with sunglasses, one with rifle and ammunition, facially partially or not visible</td>
<td>American flag, partially made lighter, forming the background of the text</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.47 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2010/30 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task Force 373</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Afghanistan Protokolle. Amerikas geheimer Krieg.</td>
<td>Conducting a secret war</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>One soldier is loading a pistol</td>
<td>[Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>16-3-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.48 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2010/30 (2)
12.17  Cover 17: 5 September 2011

Figure 12.49 Cover of Der Spiegel 2011/36 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Als Deutschland in den Krieg zog</td>
<td>When Germany entered the war</td>
<td>German state</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: Die Geschichte eines Irrtums</td>
<td>Afghanistan: the (hi)story of a mistake</td>
<td>[German state]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Joshka Fischer [Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2001]</td>
<td>White collar; top part of jacket</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Gerhard Schröder [Chancellor in 2001]</td>
<td>White collar; top part of jacket</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Two (German) soldiers on the foreground, and eight (German) soldiers in the background, only one of their faces visible from a distance, their bodies partially or largely invisible, another (German) soldier on top of military vehicle</td>
<td>All soldiers with military uniform, some with boots, caps, sunglasses, one with ring beard, automatic weapon</td>
<td>Military vehicle</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.50 Framing devices on the cover of *Der Spiegel* 2011/36 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Als Deutschland in den Krieg zog</td>
<td>Entering a war;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>[2001]</td>
<td>17-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan: Die Geschichte eines Irrtums</td>
<td>Being on a military mission in Afghanistan; Making a mistake</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17-2-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Looking straight into the camera</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17-3-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Looking straight into the camera</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17-4-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Most soldiers are standing, one is sitting, some are holding automatic weapons (Afghanistan), sandy soil</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17-5-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.51 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2011/36 (2)
Figure 12.52 Cover of Der Spiegel 2013/13 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Das Ewige Trauma</td>
<td>The eternal trauma</td>
<td>[German people]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Krieg und die Deutschen</td>
<td>The war and the Germans</td>
<td>[German people]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Krise</td>
<td>Euro crisis</td>
<td>[Germany]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Angst ums Geld</td>
<td>The fear for the money/the currency</td>
<td>[German people]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Brandenburger Tor</td>
<td>Women, Children</td>
<td>Suitcases</td>
<td>Clouds with different shades of grey</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Boy</td>
<td>Military uniform; eyes that express fear</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>visual elements&gt;</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Three German soldiers in foreground, two non-recognisable people in background</td>
<td>Military uniform, boots and helmets (three soldiers), automatic gun pointing downward (two soldiers), automatic gun pointing upward (one soldier), sunglasses (one soldier), moustache (one soldier)</td>
<td>Military vehicle (further details not visible)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.53 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2013/13 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Das Ewige Trauma</td>
<td>Being traumatized</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18-01-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Der Krieg und die Deutschen</td>
<td>Conducting war; being in a war</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18-02-01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Euro-Krise</td>
<td>Being in (euro) crisis</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18-3-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Die Angst ums Geld</td>
<td>Being afraid of the currency</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18-4-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Walking with their heads down, walking away from the Brandenburger Tor (so in Western direction), looking depressed</td>
<td>(Brandenburger Tor, Berlin)</td>
<td>[Briefly after end of WWII]</td>
<td>18-5-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Standing, Looking straight into the camera</td>
<td>[Germany]</td>
<td>[April, 1945]</td>
<td>18-6-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Walking; Not looking into the camera</td>
<td>Sandy road/ environment, Variably cloudy sky with some rays of light as well, behind German soldiers, [Kunduz region, Afghanistan]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>18-7-2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.54 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2013/13 (2)
12.19 Cover 19: 29 September 2014

Figure 12.55 Cover of Der Spiegel 2014/40 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Seher</td>
<td>The visionary</td>
<td>[Franz Kafka]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vor 100 Jahren: Franz Kafka beschreibt die Ängste des modernen Menschen</td>
<td>100 years ago: Franz Kafka describes the fears of the modern human being</td>
<td>Franz Kafka, modern (German) human beings</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Portrait photo of Franz Kafka, including his shoulders, Background of different shades of blue and pink, Words are visible in (presumably) Kafka's own handwriting, some more legible than others, depending on colour contrast of letters with background, making the sentences they form impossible to decipher completely [the words are from Kafka's book &quot;Der Prozess&quot;/ &quot;The Process&quot;]</td>
<td>(Franz Kafka)</td>
<td>White collar, tie, jacket (presumably), [no beard], [no turban]</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.56 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2014/40 (1)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Der Seher</td>
<td>Being a Visionary</td>
<td>[Germany]</td>
<td></td>
<td>19-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vor 100 Jahren: Franz Kafka beschreibt die Ängste des modernen Menschen</td>
<td>Describing, Having fears</td>
<td>[Germany]</td>
<td>Modern era</td>
<td>19-2-1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.57 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2014/40 (2)
12.20  Cover 20: 20 December 2016

Figure 12.58 Cover of Der Spiegel 2014/52 (© DER SPIEGEL)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Translation (text)</th>
<th>Human actors</th>
<th>Human attributes</th>
<th>Non-human actors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Geburt Gottes</td>
<td>The birth of God</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archäologen entdecken den Ursprung der Bibel</td>
<td>Archeologists discover the origin of the Bible</td>
<td>Archeologists</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Bible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Internet, 2-Afghanistan-Abzug, 3-Leihmutter</td>
<td>1-Internet, 2-Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 3-Host mother</td>
<td>2-(German soldiers), 3-Surrogate mother</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1-Internet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Face of an old man, presumably being God (drawing on text)</td>
<td>Grey beard, long hair, halo around his head</td>
<td>(God), mountain, vulcano, dark sky, white stars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 12.59 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2014/52 (1)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Textual framing devices (in German) or visual framing devices</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Spaces</th>
<th>Moments/ Periods</th>
<th>Frame device number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Die Geburt Gottes</td>
<td>Being born</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20-1-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archäologen entdecken den Ursprung der Bibel</td>
<td>Discovering; Coming into being</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20-1-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Internet, 2-Afghanistan-Abzug, 3-Leihmutter</td>
<td>2-Withdrawing from Afghanistan</td>
<td>2-(Germany), 2-Afghanistan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20-1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-Europa verpasst das Geschäft der Zukunft, 2-Wie dreizehn Jahre Krieg Deutschland veränderten, 3-Kindersegen auf Bestellung</td>
<td>2-Conducting a 13-year long war, 2-The changing of Germany</td>
<td>1-Europa, 2-Germany, 2-(Afghanistan)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20-1-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[Visual framing devices]</td>
<td>Looking seriously, not straight into the camera</td>
<td>(Heaven)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20-1-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 12.60 Framing devices on the cover of Der Spiegel 2014/52 (2)
### Appendix 3: Geopolitical Frames

#### 1. Will to Intervene

1. Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of Germany only before/without ISAF
2. Afghanistan poses threat to national security/interest of states other than Germany before/without ISAF
3. Afghan governments fail to protect the population of Afghanistan before/without ISAF
4. Afghan governments fail to bring modernisation and development to Afghanistan before/without ISAF

#### 2. Militarisation of Intervention

1. Germany is on a peace/stabilisation mission in Afghanistan
2. Germany is on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan
3. Germany is both on a peace/stabilisation mission and a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan
4. Germany’s ISAF mission is not a war mission
5. Other states are on a war/fighting mission in Afghanistan

Figure 13.1 Geopolitical frames in the geopolitical framing categories “Will to Intervene” and “Militarisation of Intervention”
3. Capacity to Intervene

3.1 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is sufficient
3.2 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan is currently insufficient
3.3 Capacity of German army to have intended impact on Afghanistan will always be insufficient
3.4 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some policy issues
3.5 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan in some places
3.6 Germany and/or foreign states have intended impact on Afghanistan for now
3.7 Germany and/or foreign states do not have intended impact on Afghanistan

4. Victims during Intervention

4.1 Afghans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)
4.2 Germans are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)
4.3 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission (*)
4.4 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) victims during ISAF mission
4.5 Afghans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)
4.6 Germans are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)
4.7 People from other state(s) are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission (*)
4.8 Members of armed non-state groups are or may be(come) perpetrators during ISAF mission

Figure 13.2 Geopolitical frames in the geopolitical framing categories “Capacity to Intervene” and “Victims during Intervention”