The Fragmentation and Everydayness of Diasporic Citizenship: Experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the United Kingdom (Year 2000 and Beyond)

by

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Langton Miriyoga, do hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

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Thesis Abstract

This thesis draws on a range of theoretical lenses from different disciplines, to understand the implications of transnational migration and citizenship. It largely uses different strands of citizenship theory to guide thinking on the displacement and flight of Zimbabweans since the year 2000, conceptualising it as a product of a deep-rooted ‘citizenship crisis’ within Zimbabwe. This thesis focusses on Zimbabwean emigration since year 2000 and beyond because this period is considered the height of the socioeconomic and political crisis in Zimbabwe; but it also traces the historical roots of this crisis. This thesis therefore acknowledges how a focus on post-2000 developments and experiences, leaves out fragments of the Zimbabwean nation who left earlier in the nation’s history. Experiences of these older fragments of the Zimbabwean diaspora fall outside the scope of this thesis, but causes of their departure will be examined in Chapter three to reveal the link between citizenship and emigration.

This thesis also demonstrates how this crisis-driven emigration reconfigures the practice of citizenship profoundly, but it is not clear how. This makes it fascinating to explore the modes by which these emigrants negotiate citizenship both in the host country and country of origin, while hosted outside Zimbabwe. This multi-sited qualitative study examines experiences of a sample of 145 Zimbabweans living in selected locations in the UK and South Africa. This thesis also contains a stand-alone methodology chapter in which I critically reflect on my own unique fieldwork experiences, highlighting useful methodological and practical insights on researching diaspora citizenship in South Africa (in contradistinction to the UK).

These include the imperial diaspora who escaped repressive, discriminatory and violent colonial rule, those who left the Matabeleland and Midlands regions during the civil strife in the early 1980s, and those who left in response to the devastating neoliberal economic policies in the late 1980s-early 1990s.
Results of this study confirm that Zimbabwean migrants indeed constitute a fractured diasporas, but their fragmentation manifests not only materially but also in their modes of citizenship (Pasura, 2010; 2008). They imagine and enact citizenship in multiple ways, beyond universal, state-centric, modes of politico-legal citizenship. In terms of findings, with a small proportion of participants engaging in overt political activism aimed at directly influencing homeland political processes, discursive political activity (everyday political talk) emerged as a dominant way of indirectly engaging and contesting authoritarian state back in their homeland. This thesis shows how formal legal status, rights and claims-making directed at the state, also tend to be supplanted by diasporas’ everyday social practices. Lastly, this study shows how this fragmented and everyday diasporic citizenship is mediated by an interplay of historical, geographical and contextual factors. And comparing experiences of Zimbabweans in the South African and UK illustrates the role of context in shaping emerging modes of diaspora citizenship in those two places.
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Chapter One: Transnational Migration and the Reconfiguration of Citizenship

1.1 Chapter Introduction

People have become more mobile than ever before, resulting in political, economic and sociocultural changes (Urry, 2000; Adey, 2000). In 2010, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that 221 million of the world’s 6.7 billion people were living outside their countries of birth (UNCHR, 2010). In Africa, people continue to move from place to place and settle outside their own countries both within and outside the continent, for different reasons and motivations. Most of the migration within and from Sub-Saharan Africa is involuntary and crisis-driven, motivated by the need for protection and survival (Bascom, 1995; Akokpari, 1999; Betts, 2013; Adepoju, 2004). This pattern of migration is historical, but has intensified in recent years.

People from Sub-Saharan Africa, for instance, tend to emigrate as a result of unabated socioeconomic problems, repressive regimes, environmental pressures and other threats to their security and daily survival (see Chazan, 1987; Betts, 2013; Betts and Jones, 2016; Adepoju, 1991). This thesis uses Castles and Davidson (2000)’s concept of ‘crisis of citizenship’ as a lens with which to understand deep-seated drivers of emigration in Sub-Saharan Africa, with specific reference to post-2000 Zimbabwe (also see Open Society Foundation, 2009). The first dimension of this crisis of citizenship, manifests in the deficient relationship between the state and citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa, results in emigration. The second dimension of the crisis of citizenship is that it complicates and reconfigures modes of citizenship for those emigrants in the countries that host them (Castles and Davidson, 2000). It is this latter facet

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2 The crisis of citizenship generally denotes a failure of the western model of citizenship in other countries outside the west. This crisis is linked with the challenges and deficiencies facing the nation-state. Open Society Foundation also identifies deprivation of meaningful citizenship as one of the causes of civil conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa.
The crisis of citizenship makes it critical to explore how emigration is accompanied by new modes of citizenship for those scattered outside the country.

This thesis recognises that emigration does not result in perpetual dislocation and exclusion for those who would have exited the country (see Laguerre, 1998; Nyers, 2011; Betts and Jones, 2016). Instead, citizenship (or lack of it) is indeed crucial to the lives of migrant (and displaced) people, and those who migrate find ways of reclaiming it outside the territories of their countries (see Mehta and Napier-Moore, 2010). Citizenship crisis-driven migrants would, therefore, be in constant search of new modes of citizenship while hosted outside the country. It therefore becomes critical to explore emerging modes of citizenship for those displaced and pushed out of their countries by these kinds of crises. This thesis also suggests that to migrate itself is a demonstration of what Lister (1998) refers to as citizenship agency.

Although this study primarily focusses on the implications of transnational migration to citizenship, it would also be interesting to use the same concept of ‘crisis of citizenship’ to understand dynamics of internal displacement and migration (for example, rural-urban/urban-rural). This would be an interesting line of inquiry for another project. In the above context, the thrust of this thesis is not so much about characterising and explaining contemporary trends and patterns in transnational migration of people from sub-Saharan Africa, of Zimbabweans in particular. Rather, the primary focus is on experiences of migrants after emigrating and settling outside their countries of origin. This will be achieved by looking at the specific reference to experiences of Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa. As such, this thesis generates broader lessons and contributes to a number of debates on the relationship between migration and citizenship in contemporary world.
This study, for example, challenges the dominant, sedentarist, way of thinking about citizenship as territorially bounded national citizenship, based on an assumed congruency between the state, citizens and territory (Bellamy, 2008; Tambini, 2001; Bretell and Hollifield, 2007). This presupposed consistency between place, people and the state are, however, disrupted when those meant to be citizens within the state, physically move into spaces for other national communities (see Castles and Davidson, 2000). This presents uncertainty as to where and how those migrants become incorporated, while outside their country.

Another debate to which this thesis contributes is that on who migrants become after departure from their country of origin (Soyal, 1994; Baubock, 1994; Apadurai, 1993; Laguerre, 1998; Klusmeyer and Aleinkoff, 2001; Zeleza, 2003). With some holding that they assimilate in the host country; become a nation outside its territory (Anderson, 1983); or become global citizens (Soysal, 1994; Appadurai, 1993; Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Tambini, 2001). This thesis argues that emigrants do not adopt any universal and homogenous identity, but become a diaspora with multiple and fluid identities, both maintaining a commitment to their homeland and host country (Cohen, 1997; Laguerre, 1998; Zeleza, 2005; Pasura, 2010). It therefore, uses the concept of a diaspora as a lens with which to understand their everyday life experiences within the host country and transnational relationship with their homeland.

Another important area of contribution of this thesis relates to citizenship studies. It generates useful insights not only on how citizenship is reconfigured by transnational migration, but how we can begin to understand its practice by different diaspora communities hosted in different contexts. Broadly, there two citizenship theoretical traditions, with some that emphasis its politico-legal elements such as legal status, rights and political participation (Soysal, 1994; Bosniak, 2000; Kubal, 2012; Manby, 2009; Baubock, 2008; Itzigsohn and
Villacres, 2008). Other scholars emphasise the sociocultural expressions of citizenship including cultural identity, social practices and senses of belonging (Oldfield, 1997; Lister, 1997; Vertovec, 2001). This uses the concept of diasporic citizenship to demonstrate the multiplicity, fragmentation/fracturing and complexity that characterise citizenship as practiced by diasporas (Laguerre, 1998; Pasura, 2010).

The key proposition, in other words, is that diasporas do not practice citizenship in any universal way, but different sections of the diaspora express their citizenship in multiple ways. Citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, also occurs in multiple sites and is multi-scaled (see Staeheli, 1999). Another additional and key defining feature of citizenship, particularly for diasporas living in abject conditions, relates to its everydayness (see Dickinson et al, 2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012; Sharkey, 2008). These are some of the features of diaspora citizenship discussed in this thesis, and this generates insights on how citizenship is changing from national citizenship in the context of migration.

Lastly, this study generates specific empirical insights on experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora. A significant body of knowledge Zimbabweans’ day to day life experiences already exists, including work by McGregor and Primorac (2010), Pasura (2010), Muzondidya (2006) and Mbiba (2005) among other work in different contexts. As it is a new diaspora, according to McGregor and Primorac (2010), a lot is still to be understood, which makes empirical studies of this nature important.

The decision to focus on experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK was largely inspired by my own past experiences, having migrated and settled in these two

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3 Related concepts that also help us understand the everydayness of diaspora citizenship include abject/irregular citizenship (Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012). These will be discussed in subsequent sections.
countries. South Africa and the UK host significant populations of Zimbabweans (particularly South Africa), which made it worthwhile to explore the dynamics of their life experiences in these two places. My personal challenges I encountered attempting to acquire formal legal status in South Africa, despite feeling at home in that particular country, also triggered questions on what it means to be a citizen. I felt I had become a part of the South African society because of the number of years I had lived in that country and the contributions I felt I was making towards that society. Yet, the South African state was denying me that opportunity to formally become a part of South Africa.

My experiences, as a member of the diaspora, had contradictions and complexities, which warranted systematic exploration. My own experiences, both as a member of the Zimbabwean diaspora and an activist, also raised a number of unanswered questions, which I thought I could answer by way of empirical research of this nature. My work with a Cape Town-based organisation called PASSOP prior to my move to the UK, for example, heightened my interest in the plight of Zimbabweans. During the time of my activism, I witnessed different forms of exclusion and injustice perpetrated not only by the South African government but some sections of the broader society. What complicated my situation was that this hostility was being perpetrated by a country that is often celebrated as a progressive society.

It was also difficult for me to understand why people leave their own countries only to endure harsh experiences (which I thought were worse than those back in Zimbabwe, at times). I also failed to understand how Zimbabweans still managed to thrive in such a hostile environment, without secure legal statuses and with limited access to significant substantive benefits and entitlements associated with citizenship. On the other hand, my experiences in
South Africa felt in slight contrast to what I felt when I arrived in the UK, where Zimbabweans appeared to feel more comfortable and at home, compared to their South Africa counterparts. This, therefore, explains why I became interested in comparing modes of citizenship (if any) by Zimbabweans hosted in the two countries, more deeply and more systematically.

1.2 Key Concepts

A ‘crisis of citizenship’ occurs in circumstances of deficiencies in national citizenship such as legal status, rights and political participation. These dysfunctions in citizenship are accompanied by different consequences including conflict and emigration in African countries (Azarya, 1988; Open Society Foundation, 2009). This crisis of citizenship also encompasses how Marshallian citizenship based on welfare and social provisioning has not been effective – a key factor in the Zimbabwean context. A further dimension of this crisis of citizenship relates to the predicament of where and how best transnational migrants become incorporated (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, 2001). For instance, there is no universal model nor consensus among practitioners and scholars on whether they should remain citizens of their country of origin or become integrated in their host country; it is also unclear what rights, identity, welfare guarantees, and political inclusion should or can be extended to those transnational migrants. These are some of the issues characterising the second dimension of the crisis.

The concept of ‘diaspora’ (Zeleza, 2005; 2010; Sheffer, 2003; McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 2008; 2010) recognises how migrants do not become a homogenous nation outside their home territory, do not become cosmopolitan citizens of the world, and do not become integrated into one particular society. Rather, diaspora has a number of defining features
including scattering, settlement in multiple countries, commitment to homeland, multiple attachments and transnationalism. The concept of ‘fractured/fragmented diaspora’ (Pasura, 2010) is premised on the failure of nation-building and how emigrants from different backgrounds and in different circumstances develop multiple and fluid identities and allegiances towards both the host country and country of origin. This fracturing is traceable to the failure of the nation-building project, which is particularly acute in Zimbabwe, which has become a divided society since national independence.

The concept of ‘diasporic citizenship’ coined by Laguerre (1998) also helps characterise the differentiated, multiple and multi-scaled expressions of citizenship by different elements of the diaspora. ‘Transnationalism’ (Basch et al, 1994; Baubock, 1994; Levitt, 2004) depicts the enduring social ties sustained by members of diasporas simultaneously between homeland and host country. ‘Everyday citizenship’ (Dickinson, 2008; Hopkins, 2011; Desforges et al, 2005) is another key concept depicting how those with limited opportunities to claim citizenship by engaging the state, find ways of acting as citizens outside the state (also see Sharkey, 2008; Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012). This citizenship is localised, informal and is facilitated by (largely informal) civil society networks in different local spaces. Lastly, ‘affective citizenship’ (Fortier, 2016) encompasses subjective sentiments, emotions and feelings towards a particular state. This encompasses how diasporas ‘feel’ about both the host country and country of origin, particularly where they feel ‘at home’ (Anthias, 2006; Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2007). This dimension can be in contradistinction to material

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4 Nyers, Hepworth and Sharkey also propose the concept of ‘abject citizens’ to understand the day to day experiences of this category of the diaspora population.
expressions of citizenship explored in this study, including overt political and social practices, but the two components of citizenship are not entirely mutually exclusive.

1.3 Thesis Outline

Based on observations of the lived experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK, this study demonstrates that indeed transnational migration represents a critical citizenship issue today, particularly as it results from dysfunctional relationship between the state and citizens, prompting emigration from many Sub-Saharan African countries. It also shows that such transnational migration prompted by failure in national citizenship is accompanied by changes in how migrants relate with both their homeland and host country. In other words, although transnational migrants often appear perpetually excluded and marginalised in some host countries, experiences of Zimbabweans, in fact, reveal that migrants do not become passive victims of exclusion but find different ways of becoming citizens while outside their countries.

The key question is on what modes of citizenship evolve among transnational migrants, and this is a matter of ongoing scholarly debate as I will demonstrate in the literature review section. However, suffice to mention, experiences of Zimbabweans show that modes of citizenship become fragmented, with different sections imagining and enacting their citizenship differently (Young, 1989; Laguerre, 1989; Yuval-Davies, 1999). This thesis also demonstrates that arenas in which citizenship is practiced also become multiple, and so do the scales of citizenship, with the everyday becoming a key sphere of citizenship for the majority of Zimbabweans excluded from politico-legal and other state-centred modes of citizenship. This fragmentation of citizenship does not occur in a vacuum, but is mediated by
an interplay of historical, spatio-temporal and socio-demographic factors among many others.

In terms of structure, the thesis comprises two broad sections. The first part of this thesis contains two chapters - one conceptual and one methodological- and the rest of the thesis is empirically-based. Chapter two sets out and contains critical reflections on the methodology used to answer questions raised in this study, with a particular emphasis on the transformative and empowerment potential of approaches used in sampling, identification of participants and actual encounters with participants during the fieldwork process. Chapter three reconceptualises emigration using citizenship lenses, by proposing that the mass exodus of Zimbabweans was a result of a crisis of national citizenship. In so doing, this chapter also situates this kind of citizenship-crisis-driven emigration in its historical context, to counter the ahistorical manner in which migration causes and patterns are often approached.

The second part of the thesis contains three empirical chapters, which use empirical data to demonstrate the argument that diaspora citizenship is indeed fragmented, as follows: Chapter four argues and demonstrates that diasporas become citizens by engaging in different kinds of material and discursive political activities. Chapter five proposes that diaspora do not only become citizens by way of being political, but through everyday social practices that bear profound citizenship implications. The third empirical chapter, Chapter six, argues that diasporas do not only act as citizens in material ways, but diaspora citizenship is also subjectively (and inter-subjectively) constructed through senses of belonging. The Conclusions chapter ends by highlighting the study’s main findings, including a summary of the thesis, how it advances knowledge on the relationship between citizenship and migration, and suggestions on further areas of research. It also discusses implications for policy and
practice emanating from the findings of this study. The next section considers scholarly debates on the relationship between migration and citizenship, and different perspectives on emerging modes of citizenship for migrants.

1.4 The Fragmented and Everyday Diasporic Citizenship: A Survey of Literature

Significant volumes of scholarly work exist on the nexus between transnational migration and citizenship, but recent trends indicate what seems to be an overemphasis on growing movements of people, negating the implications of those patterns of human mobility. Growing crisis-driven migration from different crisis regions and countries across the world such as the Middle East, North Africa and other places, makes it increasingly critical to consider emerging modes of citizenship (Castles and Davidson, 2000). This is what primarily concerns this study, particularly what happens to the citizenship of those migrants once they get settled in different destination countries.

Apart from the primary focus on modes of citizenship emerging among those migrants, this study also revisits existing thinking on the causes of emigration, suggesting another way of thinking and understanding it beyond the traditional push-pull factor framework. This need to rethink the causes of migration emanates from the realisation of how migration is often understood from an immigration vantage point, often negating the emigration dimension (Castles and Davidson, 2000). This thesis, therefore, uses citizenship theory to understand the causes and implications of emigration in Sub-Saharan Africa, with specific reference to post-independence Zimbabwe.

Indeed, human mobility is ever-growing in the contemporary world, whose impact on existing social and political order has been seismic both in migrant hosting and sending countries (Castles and Davidson, 2000). For example, considerable work also exists on how
and where they become incorporated once they settle outside their countries. Some hold that they become fully incorporated in the host country, while others observe how they maintain ties with their countries of origin (see Anderson, 1991; Bulcha, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 1985). Another category of scholars, more usefully, recognises how complex and fragmented identities of migrants become, leading them to characterise those migrants as diasporas (Laguerre, 1998; Pasura, 2008; Zeleza, 2003; McGregor, 2010). Of course, there are certain other characteristics which render them diasporic, as I will highlight in following sections of this chapter.

It is generally accepted that most emigrants hosted outside the country do not automatically and completely become embedded in the host country, nor remain fully attached back to their home country, as suggested by some scholars (Bulcha, 1988; Harell-Bond, 1986; Hack-Polay, 2013). Recognising the effects of their fractious country of origin backgrounds and other factors, diasporas in reality tend to develop multiple allegiances and loyalties spanning host and home country. These are often expressed through diverse sociocultural, political and economic connections sustained in-between the two places (Baubock, 1994; Portes, 1999; Levitt, 2004; Vertovec, 2001; Laguerre, 1998). Additional features which make transnational migrants a diasporic community, including dispersal from a common country of origin (as discussed above), commitment to their homeland and maintaining separate and distinct identity from national identity of host country (McGregor, 2010; Muzondidya, 2006; Pasura, 2014; also see Brubaker, 2005; Sheffer, 2003; Shepperson, 1966). It is clear that transnationalism represents one of the defining component of diasporic communities.
However, the notion of a diasporic community has its own problematic elements. For example, referring to it as a community is somewhat essentialist and groupist, according to Brubaker, giving the impression of emigrants as constituting a coherent and homogenous entity outside the territory of their country (Brubaker, 2005). This negates the diversity that often characterises diasporic communities, particularly those originating from countries in the global south (Mehta and Napier-Moore, 2010). Rather, as Pasura correctly observes in relation to Zimbabweans in the UK, diasporas also tend to be fragmented and fractured, given the disunity and difference along the lines of gender, legal status, length of stay in the host country and other fractures (see Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014). This analysis, therefore, builds on this notion of fragmentation as a response to the holist and universalising ways of thinking about citizenship (see Young, 1989), and this will provide a useful lens with which to understand the empirical experiences of Zimbabweans living in different spaces within South Africa and the UK.

Diasporas would have left their countries of origin at different times and under different circumstances and crises, and they would have settled under different conditions in the host country. Therefore, these different fragments subsequently develop different conceptions of citizenship, identities and senses of belonging. Therefore, those Zimbabweans constitute a fractured transnational diaspora, encompassing all the above features. This thesis, therefore, shares the latter view that some migrants hosted in different contexts indeed constitute diasporic communities, particularly Zimbabweans who themselves have been observed to display these traits in the UK and South African contexts (see Pasura, 2008; McGregor, 2010; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Muzondidya, 2006). The next section considers the idea of diaspora citizenship, with an aim of identifying its key features.
1.4.1 Diasporas and Different Ways of Becoming Citizens

This thesis uses different theoretical lenses to understand how different sections of the diaspora imagine and practice citizenship differently. As a starting point, Laguerre’s notion of diasporic citizenship offers a useful way of characterising these multiple ways of becoming citizens (Laguerre, 1998; also see Thomas, 2002). Diasporic citizenship also becomes transnational, with multiple ways of becoming a citizen simultaneously directed at the host country and homeland (see Laguerre, 1998; Pasura, 2014; Levitt, 2004). This speaks to the nature of material, sentimental and other links diasporas sustain with their homeland, illustrating how diasporas direct their citizenship practices to more than one country (McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2005; also see Sheffer, 2003). The fragmentation and transnational nature of diasporic communities, as discussed earlier, also becomes another distinguishing feature of the ways of becoming citizens (Pasura, 2014). In other words, as theoretical and empirical evidence will demonstrate later, different categories of diasporas begin to act as citizens in multiple ways in terms of scale, loci, meanings and expressions of citizenship.

Citizenship itself is difficult to define with any degree of precision, but it generally encompasses the relationship between the state and people (Lister, 1997; Heater, 1999; Isin and Wood, 1999). It also implies membership in some form of a broader community, such as a nation, which raises questions of who is included and excluded (see Lister, 1997). Various other definitional features of citizenship can be identified (see Lister, 1997; Heater, 1999). It is multifaceted and scholars often emphasise different elements of it (Dwyer, 2000; Thomas,

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5 The idea of multiple ways of becoming citizens is also drawn from Elaine Thomas, who identifies several competing conceptions of political belonging. For example, she talks of citizenship on the basis of identity, contribution to society, legal status, blood and shared culture and way of life among other facets of citizenship.
2002). A liberal stance, for instance, often stresses the importance of legal status and rights, while communitarians place emphasis on commitment to and identifying with the wider community as a basis for being a citizen (see Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Heater, 1999).

A civic-republicanist conception of citizenship also views citizenship as practice, realised through performance of duties and responsibilities to the community (Thomas, 2002; Lister, 1997; Oldfield, 1990). This understanding of citizenship will be built upon in this thesis to understand how diasporas without formal citizenship enact citizenship through their everyday social practices. There are also some who propose that citizenship is not only an area of practice or status, but it is subjectively constructed (Fortier, 2016; also see Anderson, 1991). In this context, this thesis holds that indeed citizenship is not imagined and enacted by diasporas in universal ways; rather, it has many faces and can be realised in multiple material and non-material ways.

This understanding of citizenship is based on Elaine Thomas’s multifaceted conceptualisation of citizenship; and in the same fashion, diasporas can claim and enact their citizenship in multiple ways (Thomas, 2002). For Thomas, a person can be a citizen on the basis of ‘blood’ or descent, shared way life, contributions to society, legal status and other bases on which citizenship can be claimed (see Thomas, 2002). This only goes to show the importance of a conception of diaspora citizenship which takes into account the plural ways citizenship can be practiced. This challenges the universalist, state-centric politico-legal conceptions premised on the notion that citizenship is only performed through politico-legal means of formal legal status, rights and political participation (Bosniak, 2000; Laguerre, 1998).

This, again largely liberal, way of thinking about citizenship is thought to be only fully realised in the ostensible epicentre of citizenship (Western Europe and North America)
compared to the weak and second-class citizenship practiced in ‘failed states’ in Africa and the rest of the world (see Brysk and Shafir, 2004; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Open Society Foundation, 2009). The argument here is that diasporas of an African origin, including those hosted on the continent itself, do not always become completely ‘citizenship-less’, but conceive and enact citizenship differently to the universalistic (liberal) logic.

This kind of citizenship, as practiced by African diasporas, becomes less universal in the sense that it is no longer directly tied to the state, legal status and formal politics, but something that is practiced in various sociocultural, discursive and others ways as part of their daily lives (see Young, 1989; Laguerre, 1998; Thomas, 2002; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Desforges et al, 2005). This predominantly resonates with the experiences of those that live on the margins of host societies. While liberal citizenship would have us think migrants are predominantly completely excluded from any form of citizenship, this thesis shows how even those perceived to be marginalised still find spaces and strategies of negotiating citizenship (Isin and Rygiel, 2007; McGregor, 2008).

Those marginalised sections of the diaspora are often characterised as ‘abject citizens’ (Hepworth, 2012; Sharkey and Shields, 2008); or ‘irregular citizens’ (Nyers, 2011). They appear excluded in terms of their irregular and precarious legal statuses, exclusion from the formal economy, denial of formal political rights, disengaged from the mainstream political system, and lack of integration into mainstream sociocultural fabric of the society, but a closer analysis of their daily lives reveals how they negotiate citizenship through their, largely informal, everyday social practices.

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6 Castles and Davidson (2000) refer to this ostensible lack of citizenship in the global south as ‘chaos’.
7 The concept of ‘abject spaces’ helps map these spaces where marginalised diasporas negotiate inclusion and transnational ties.
A republicanist variant of the above liberal conception emphasises political participation aimed at influencing homeland politics, as the dominant expression of citizenship by diasporas (see Thomas, 2002; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Kuhlmann, 2008; Tarrow, 2005). Of course, there are some sections of the diaspora who find opportunities to participate in politics aimed at influencing homeland politics, but not everyone becomes political in the same way. In other words, political participation does not only occur in the form of overt, ‘Big P’ political activism (see Flint, 2003; also see Scott, 1985). Instead, they find other ways of being political, for example through partaking in discursive forms through online and offline everyday political discourses (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Shah et al., 2005; Huckfeldt, 2009; Klofstad, 2009).

There are various other, less distinctly political (in its ‘Big P sense), ways diasporas can negotiate citizenship, particularly through spatially-differentiated, informal social practices constituting a part of their daily lives (see Isin and Wood, 1999; Oldfield, 1998; Dickinson, 2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Desforges et al., 2005). This resonates with experiences of those sections of the diaspora population living in precarious conditions, excluded from mainstream political and economic life, primarily due to their irregular legal statuses and backgrounds (see Nyers, 2011).

In this formulation, citizenship also represents a means by which diasporas seek inclusion within broader society (both back home and in host country) through diverse strategies such as informal social and economic practices (see Laguerre, 1998 Levitt, 2004). Diaspora citizenship, therefore, is not only about legal status, rights and political participation,

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8 Ordinary people, particularly marginalised sections, do not only become political by partaking in overt political action (what Flint [2003] refers to as ‘Big P’ political participation) such as voting, petitioning, political party campaigning, and demonstrations aimed at directly influencing the state. Instead, there are various other ways, sometimes seemingly inconsequential, in which marginalised peoples still manage to be political.
but also encompasses lived experience in diasporas’ everyday lives (see Lister, 1998; Dickinson et al, 2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). Thirdly, this thesis also holds that diaspora citizenship is not only performed through material ways, but also encompasses subjective and intersubjective senses of belonging and attachment between homeland and host country (see Anthias, 2008; Fortier, 2016; McGregor, 2010; Laguerre, 1998). These diverse ways of becoming citizens show the differentiated nature of diasporic communities observed by other scholars, particularly by Pasura (2008) in his work with Zimbabweans in the UK. The point here is that migration does not always result in the exclusion of all migrants, but different sections find ways of being citizens in different contexts.

How diasporas perform citizenship is not the only contour of their fragmentation, but also where and the scale at which they engage as citizens (see Yuval-Davies, 1999). This aspect of the thesis recognises the reconfiguration of the arena in which citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, occur (Laguerre, 1998; Baubock, 1994). For example, the state no longer remains the sole site of citizenship as a result of growing transnational migration, globalisation and other factors, as observed by Laguerre (1998) and many other scholars, but spaces in which it is performed become multi-scaled (see Laguerre, 1998; Yuval-Davies, 1999; Tarrow, 2005; Dickinson, 2008; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). Although emphasis is often placed on transnational and global arenas above the level of the state, this thesis demonstrates the pre-eminence of everyday arenas (largely informal) invented by diasporas as part of their everyday lives, where citizenship is negotiated (see Desforges et al, 2005; Isin and Rygiel, 2007; Gaventa, 2006). Thus, diasporic citizenship is practiced in multiple ways, in different locations/sites and at different scales.
This thesis also notes several other defining and critical characteristics of diaspora citizenship, especially as experienced by diasporas hosted in contexts of marginalisation, poverty and xenophobia, as is the case with South Africa. These include its everydayness, bottom-up, struggle, contested, negotiated, survivalist and tactical nature of these new modes of citizenship become discernible, contrary to somewhat status-based and other dominant conceptions of citizenship portraying its practice as a top-down and effortless process (see Kubal, 2012; Desforges et al, 2005). Transnational and fragmented diaspora citizenship does not emerge in a vacuum but is mediated by an interplay of context, history, spatial and temporal variations and structural factors among many other factors determining how different categories of those migrants perform citizenship. Having provided a summary of the thesis, I now move on to conceptualising discussing dominant conceptions of citizenship, with an aim to highlight their inadequacy and demonstrate the need for other ways of thinking about citizenship in the context of transnational migration.

The attainment of formal legal status constitutes one of the ways citizenship is expressed, but there are multiple other ways of becoming citizens. These include everyday practices and political subjectivities constitute other ways of becoming citizens, as I will illustrate in this chapter. Therefore, building on Elaine Thomas’s and Pasura’s empirical work with Zimbabweans in the UK, this thesis suggests that diaspora citizenship becomes multifaceted and fragmented (Thomas, 2002; Pasura, 2008; also see Young, 1989). This challenges the universalistic way in which citizenship is thought about in liberal scholarship. Citizenship, at least as practiced by diasporas, is also mediated by historical, sociodemographic, spatial and other factors, which explains why different categories and

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9 Elaine Thomas (2002) notes more than five faces of citizenship including citizenship on the basis of contributions to society, citizenship by ‘blood’, citizenship by legal status among other dimensions.
sections of diasporas become citizens in different ways. The next section, therefore, discusses some of the different ways diasporas can act as citizens while outside their countries, starting with the dominant liberal conception of citizenship. Before that, it is worth acknowledging that discussing these expressions of citizenship separately by no means suggests their mutual exclusivity. These intersect, interrelate and mutually reinforce each other, but I will analyse them as distinct from each other just to demonstrate their multiplicity.

1.4.1.1 Diasporic Citizenship as Legal Status

Diasporas can perform citizenship on the basis of legal status. Most of the scholarship tends to speak of diasporic citizenship in terms of its liberal status-based and rights-based dimensions, for example observing the possibility for diasporas to obtain citizenship in the host state through naturalisation, or opportunities to acquire dual/multiple citizenships (Baubock, 1994; Bosniak, 2000; Muzondidya, 2006; Manby, 2009; Spiro, 2011; Stasiulis and Ross, 2006). In other words, migrants can become citizens in more than one country on the basis of obtaining legal status. This thesis challenges the above (dominant) liberal and state-centric conceptions of citizenship based on legal status, rights and political participation, which continue to dominate thinking on the relationship between migration and both the host and home country state today (see Bosniak, 2000; Sicakkan and Lithman, 2005; also see Kubal, 2012; Laguerre, 1998). The liberal model of citizenship does not always seamlessly match the experiences of diverse sections of diasporas. This thesis, therefore, holds that this liberal conception of citizenship is an important way of thinking about diaspora citizenship,

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10 Citizenship for diasporas tends to be narrowly conceived in terms of the denial of dual or multiple citizenships, as is the norm in many other African countries.
but its tenets do not reflect the experiences of the majority of the diasporas who find it difficult to engage the state directly in this way.

I will start by reflecting on the utility of legal status as a basis for diasporas to claim citizenship, highlighting its pros and cons. It is important to highlight that this thesis does not seek to dismiss the importance of legal status, rights and other aspects of liberal citizenship for diasporas. In fact, despite practical challenges migrants face when trying to obtain it, my view is that the desire for legal status becomes one of the priorities for diasporas as soon as they immigrate and settle in the host country (also see Morreira, 2011; Kubal, 2012). For example, having secure legal status is often associated with greater security, access to livelihood opportunities and allows diasporas to effectively partake in various transnational practices such as remittance-sending and travelling back home. In this context, diasporas often fight hard to get legal recognition, sometimes through illegal means (see Bosniak, 2000; Kubal, 2012). Despite its desirability and utility in migrants’ transnational lives, citizenship defined in terms of legal status has its own limitations.

The possibility of dual and multiple citizeships is often celebrated as they open opportunities for claiming rights and other entitlements that come with citizenship in more than one polity (Baubock, 1994). Yet in reality there is often resistance by conservative and nativist sections of host societies, who tend to view multiple allegiances and citizenships of diasporas as a hindrance to nationhood and immigrant integration into the host society (see Geyer, 1996). This points to the limits of status-based, flexible citizenship, particularly for diasporas with a desire to sustain transnational ties with their homelands. Legal status is also inherently exclusionary as it seeks not only to control who enters and settles within the territory of the political community, but to identify who belongs in the nation and who does
This is achieved by way of imposing identities, sometimes marginal identities such as ‘alien’, ‘foreigner’ ‘immigrant’ and so on, depending on the legal status one holds.

Restrictive rights, terms and conditions attached to legal status also allow some sections of the diaspora to become more incorporated than others. This leaves marginalised sections of the diaspora, particularly those without secure and stable legal statuses and limited livelihood opportunities, to engage in different survival and self-help strategies to realise citizenship (see Nyers, 2011; Sharkey, 2008). These include various social practices outside the ambit of the state and as part of their everyday lives, which enable them to thrive and sustain themselves (and loved ones) in the host society and back home (see Nyers, 2011; Kubal, 2012). As such, those marginalised often engage in a struggle to contest marginal statuses as well as rights, terms and conditions associated with them, thus negotiating new (in some cases semi-legal) statuses and legal identities.

Even if a country had the most liberal immigration and citizenship laws allowing diasporas to integrate through legal status, this thesis proposes that not everyone finds it easy to obtain legal status, as empirically demonstrated by numerous studies documenting the challenges immigrants often face in seeking to legalise their stay in host countries due to restrictive immigration and citizenship policies and practices among other factors (Kubal, 2012; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Nyers, 2011). Some diasporas find it easier to claim legal status than others within the host country due to their levels of education, professional backgrounds

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11 Brubaker (1992) observes the social functions of legal status as an approach to building a nation, by excluding those who do not belong in the nation.

12 Kubal proposes a useful concept - semi-legality - as a way of understanding those with ambiguous, in-between and unclear statuses. This is often the case in countries where opportunities for regularising immigration status and pursuing formal pathways to citizenship are limited.
and class. As a result, diasporas denied legal status at times adopt a range of strategies designed to contest their exclusion on the basis of their legal status.

Above strategies include seeking the support of mediators such as NGOs in contexts of power imbalances between immigrants and the state; some even resort to the use of illegal means to acquire legal status, including the use of fraudulently obtained documentation and breaching conditions of residency permits when travelling to country of origin (see Von Lieres and Piper, 2014; also see Kriger, 2010; Muzondidya, 2006). In this context, this thesis shows how legal recognition is not always granted ‘on a silver platter’, but struggled for and contested between the state and diasporas, as part of diasporas’ everyday struggles for survival. This, therefore, challenges the top-down notion of the state as the granter of and dictator of legal identities of diasporas, and this also shows the agency that seemingly disempowered diasporas may exercise in their relationship with the host state.

This tendency often affects migrants hosted in countries such as South Africa where exclusionary forces are entrenched; and those without background experience engaging with the state potentially find it difficult to meaningfully partake in the above form of citizenship. In such countries, migrants tend to be viewed as intruders, presenting themselves where they do not belong; thus, they are frequently met with hostility, antagonism and rejection in those societies which host them (Waldinger and Fitzgerald, 2004; Neocosmos, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2006). This, therefore, makes it clear that not everyone among immigrants indeed has an equal and easy opportunity to assert citizenship through legal status, as portrayed in mainstream, liberal, citizenship thinking (see Kubal, 2012). In countries such as South Africa, the majority of diasporas find it difficult to gain legal recognition in terms of citizenship and immigration documentation due to exclusionary immigration, citizenship and related policies.
and practices (see McGregor, 2008; Neocosmos, 2010; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Nyers, 2011). This demonstrates the need for new ways of thinking about how the majority of excluded indeed perform their citizenship in those contexts.

The above liberal conception of citizenship also gives the impression that citizenship is granted neatly without contention, which obscures the struggles and contestations for access to resources, recognition and other aspects of citizenship between diasporas and both the host and country of origin states (see Kabeer, 2002; also see Kubal, 2012; Manby, 2009). This means diasporas engage in everyday struggles to act as citizens, even in countries where they are not legally recognised as citizens or without participating in formal political processes as emphasised by other scholars (Bosniak, 2000; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001). This thesis, therefore, observes that not only does it become possible for African diasporas to practice citizenship outside the state, but it has historically been struggled for (see Manby, 2009; Gaventa, 2005). In this context, there is also always a likelihood that contestation and struggle continue to form part of the citizenship practice logic for diasporas hosted in countries on the continent which, in turn, demonstrates the limits of status-based citizenship, as a way of performing citizenship.

Citizenship on the basis of legal status is not only exclusionary and difficult to obtain, but also contradictory in that immigrants who may be more integrated through practices, sociocultural identities, contributions to society and other ways, may still be designated non-citizens. It is in this context, citizenship defined narrowly defined in terms of legal status

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13 Kubal (2012) poignantly captures the struggle for legal status between the state and migrants, as a way by which illegal immigrants or those with marginal legal statuses contest illegality or marginalisation. Manby emphasises the struggle nature of citizenship in the African context, where different forms of exclusion and inequality have been historically prevalent.

14 Manby (2009) emphasises the struggle nature of citizenship, underscoring how it was never granted by the state without some kind of a fight.
makes immigrants who are physically present and identify with the territory of the host state in sociocultural and other ways, strangers (also see Brubaker, 1992). Furthermore, citizenship on the basis of legal status is not only narrow and exclusionary, but also fundamentally divisive as it results in the fragmentation of the diasporic community according to the different statuses they hold (see Pasura, 2008). Different categories of the community are often granted different status such as ‘illegal’, ‘asylum seeker’, ‘refugee’, ‘permanent resident’, ‘dependent’ and so on; and one of the implications of this is that it creates internal inequalities within the diaspora community itself.

This tendency undermines the assumed principle of equality of status among all citizens, as is assumed by principle of liberal citizenship (Marshall, 1949; Thomas, 2002). In addition to pre-existing social hierarchies along lines of gender, class, ethnicity and region, imposed legal status adds another dimension in ways that further fracture the diaspora. This segmentation of the diaspora according to legal status also invalidates notions of diasporas as a ‘community’ or ‘long distance nationalists’, as proposed by some scholars (see Laguerre, 1998). This kind of imposed fracturing, also partly contributes to the difficulty diasporas often find in mobilising to speak with one ‘voice’ on various matters affecting them, in their engagements with the host and home country states (see Pasura, 2008). Let me turn the different ways diasporas become citizens, starting with their political expressions of citizenship while outside their country.

1.4.1.2 Diasporic Citizenship as Political Participation

As part of this liberal, materialist tradition, diasporas can also perform citizenship by way of political participation. However, most of the scholarship thinks of political participation in materialist terms, emphasising overt political activism of diasporas aimed at the home
country state. For example, emphasis is often placed on how diasporas find it possible to engage in various political activities aimed at influencing homeland politics (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008; Baubock, 2003). This represents a republicanist variant of this liberal mode of citizenship, which tends to emphasise the political activism of citizens within organised civil society on subnational, national and transnational scales, but with the same purpose of influencing the state and mainstream political processes (Yuval-Davies, 1999; Tarrow, 2005; also see Thomas, 2002; Kuhlmann, 2008).\(^{15}\) This thesis recognises that indeed partaking in political life constitutes an important way of enacting citizenship.

However, this thesis mainly contributes to debates on how diaspora political participation (as an expression of citizenship), is performed. Recognising how fragmented they frequently are, this thesis further argues that diasporas partake in political life in multiple ways. By exiting their countries of origin, transnational migrants become exposed to new citizenship statuses allowing them to participate in political processes aimed at influencing homeland politics, especially those hosted in ostensibly more democratic states in the global north (see Baubock, 2006; Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Castles and Davidson, 2000). Political activities they engage in include diaspora voting, running for political office (Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008). This likely resonates with past experience with political activism prior to their departure from their home country. In particular those hosted in countries with democratic political cultures and spaces are allowed to partake in active forms of political mobilisation.

\(^{15}\) This variant resonates with scholarship on diaspora political participation and transnational political activism.
As I indicated earlier, some categories of the diaspora are more likely to engage in overt forms of political activism than others depending on their context, individual circumstances, past experiences, gender and other factors. Diasporas participate in homeland electoral politics in different ways including forming political parties, voting and sourcing party funding (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Pasura, 2008; Lafleur, 2013). Similarly, those empowered to do so will enact their citizenship by partaking in different kinds of political activism such as organised protests, petitions, demonstrations, boycotts and other activities targeted at both the host and home country governments, as observed among diasporas in different contexts (Baubock, 2003; Betts and Jones, 2016; Pasura, 2008). Again, this is not the only other way of expressing citizenship neither are these conventional forms of political activism the only ones by which diasporas become political. Such an emphasis on the political, rights and legal status aspects of citizenship obscures its multifaceted-ness and everydayness.

At least two criticisms can be levelled against this way of thinking about citizenship. Firstly, it shares the state-centricity observed in relation to status-based citizenship, particularly discussing diaspora political participation (as an expression of citizenship) predominantly in terms of seeking to influence homeland political processes (see Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). Therefore, this conception of what it means to participate politically is somewhat narrow as it often only focusses on material elements of politics, thus ignoring discursive and other ways by which diasporas can be political (see Dorman, 2016; Fortier, 2016). For these and many other reasons, this thesis acknowledges that some sections of the diaspora may perform their citizenship in this way; however, it also recognises that not all diasporas can influence politics by way of conventional modes of political participation such as diaspora voting, political party membership and engaging in conventional forms of political activism. Instead, this thesis holds that
disengagement from overt forms of political activism and mobilisation does not suggest passivity or inactivity. Rather, diasporas potentially engage in other forms of political activity, beyond formal political processes.

While this thesis acknowledges the importance of political participation as one of the ways diasporas perform their citizenship, it suggests that only a minority are able to engage this way. This is due to historical, structural, institutional and other impediments making it difficult for most of diasporas with or without formal citizenship status to partake in politics both of the host and home country. Beyond the materialist conception of diaspora politics discussed earlier, this thesis also suggests that diasporas can be political in different other ways, including discursively (see Fortier, 2016). In other words, these sections not actively engaging with mainstream political processes are characterised by Pasura (2008) as a dormant section of the diaspora, can easily be mistaken as powerless or unwilling to influence political processes. However, this thesis argues that these seemingly inactive diasporas still find less overtly political ways of being political, such as engaging in everyday discussions, online and offline, political talk as an informal expression of political preferences (Wright, 2017; also see Crush, 2016; Peel, 2010; Willems, 2009; 2011). This represents a less risky, popular and convenient way of engaging discursively in politics, without necessarily overtly antagonising the government of the country of origin (see Wright et al, 2017; Willems, 2009).

This relates to James Scott’s recognition that chronically oppressed and excluded people, particularly from backgrounds of oppression as is the case with Zimbabwean diaspora, find ways of being political aimed at resisting, contesting and exposing the unreasonableness of actions of their oppressors (Scott, 1985; Spivak, 1988; Mbembe, 2001).

16 Based on Pasura’s empirical study of Zimbabweans in the UK.
To help us understand how a minority of diasporas, often with legal status, with experience of partaking in political activism and of higher socioeconomic status and hosted in countries conducive for their engagement in formal politics and political activism, the ‘Big P’/’small p’ might be a helpful conceptual framework as it illustrates the different ways in which diasporas can be political (see Flint, 2003). As a conceptual binary, it is still not nuanced enough to capture other diverse ways diasporas perform their citizenship, including discursively.

Given how dispersed diasporas tend to be, being hosted across different countries away from home, direct (in-situ) participation in homeland becomes limited by geographical distance and other factors. However, the internet is one of the factors making it possible for diasporas to connect and engage epistemically, by way of exchanging of information and ideas regarding homeland politics (Haas, 2011; Mansbridge, 1999; Dahlgren, 2005; Pasura, 2008; also see Peel, 2010). As such this study also considers how diasporas engage in everyday political talk (both online and offline), just to demonstrate how important political subjectivities are for diasporas.

In this context, thanks to the internet and existence of civic spaces for engagement in some host countries, diasporas often find online and offline spaces to talk, comment, joke and debate about the state, political actors and other political objects, without directly engaging the state or partaking in political activism on platforms created by organised civil society (Crick, 2000; Sloam, 2014; Wright, 2017). The relationship between online and offline forms of political engagement and mobilisation is a subject for debate, and this thesis will not delve into those debates. However, it is worth highlighting that some scholars found online

17 There is empirical evidence to support this tendency among Zimbabwean diaspora. For example, Pasura (2008) observes a section of Zimbabweans in the UK engaging in cyberpolitics; Clayton Peel also makes the same tendency among Zimbabweans of Ndebele and mixed-race origin.
and offline engagement mutually inextricable and reinforcing. For example, vernacular political discourses, can be useful in political conscientisation, awareness raising and mobilisation, which in turn potentially spurs those diasporas into overt forms of political activism (see Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1995; Shah et al, 2005).

It is also important to note that internet-based political talk does not always reflect experiences of everyone among diasporas, but resonates with relatively educated, young and socioeconomically advantaged sections of the diaspora who tend to have greater access to the internet. However, mobile technologies have been developing rapidly and now mobile platforms such as WhatsApp have also opened up for previously deprived citizens, including in rural parts of Zimbabwe (see Willems, 2009). The use of these technologies and platforms has not been limited to social networking, but also political conversations across geographical distance. Diasporas also engage in other kinds of citizenship practice, beyond seeking to directly or indirectly influencing mainstream politics. Having considered some of the dominant ways of thinking about citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, the next section considers other modes of citizenship for diasporas, outside the realms of the state.

1.4.1.3 Diasporic Citizenship as Everyday Social Practice

Diaspora citizenship, including its transnational dimension, has an everyday logic. Even those that seemingly face exclusion from the state, do find ways of performing citizenship. The majority of those ordinary migrants particularly resort to what might be characterised as everyday forms of citizenship (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Dickinson, et al, 2008; Desforges et al, 2005). There has been a renewed focus on the ‘everyday’ as a realm of citizenship in geography and sociology, having been overlooked for decades due to difficulties associated with researching people’s everyday lives (Jacobsen, 2009). And my suspicion is
that, with its penchant to focus on institutions, processes and other aspects of macro-politics, the discipline of political science potentially still lags behind in developing analytical and conceptual tools for understanding lived political realities of ordinary people.

Nevertheless, the premise of everyday citizenship is that non-citizens and other excluded groups who find it difficult to perform citizenship by engaging directly with the state, still find ways of acting as citizens (Isin, 2008; Oldfield, 1990; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011). Seemingly non-political and inconsequential everyday practices often bear profound implications to the relationship between those ordinary people and both the host state and country of origin (see Beaman, 2017; also see Tarrow, 2005; Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997). Through everyday practices, diasporas are able to contest their exclusion both within the host country and back home, while also becoming a survival strategy in contexts where the state does not guarantee livelihood security to non-citizens (see Riccio and Russo, 2011; also see Mbiba, 2005; McGregor, 2008; Crush et al, 2005; Gastrow and Amit, 2015).18 Citizenship, in this constellation, is not separable from day to day lives of ordinary people forming the diaspora.

This way of thinking about citizenship is also characterised by its emphasis on the bottom-up and informal nature as they occur outside the realms of the state, contrary to state-centric modes of citizenship discussed above (see Hopkins, 2011; Dickinson, et al, 2008; Laguerre, 1998; Isin, 2008).19 By being not directly centred on the state, alternative vehicles through which this mode of citizenship is practiced include social, kinship, clan and

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18 Riccio and Russo (2011) observed similar tendencies by second-generation immigrant youths in Italy, using everyday social practices to negotiate inclusion into Italian society. They also use these as a way of struggle to realise socioeconomic opportunities and social mobility in the context of exclusion.

19 This conception of citizenship builds on Laguerre (1998) and Isin and Turner’s (2008) observations that the practice of citizenship is not limited to the state.
nationality-based networks, as well as organised civil society (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; also see Tarrow, 2005). This study does not seek to engage in any deeper analysis of the role of organised civil society, but places more emphasis on unorganised and mundane daily social practices of diasporas in local communities they are settled.

It is also negotiated through daily relationships and transactions with other societal actors in various social spaces such as marketplace, workplace, local community and so on (Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997; also see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). In this constellation, diasporas assume new roles, identities, rights and substantive benefits out of these interactions, hence begin to extend the boundaries of their citizenship (see Riccio and Russo, 2011). Everyday citizenship is also one of the most fluid and elastic conceptions of citizenship, compared to status-based citizenship with rigid citizen/non-citizen boundaries, which makes it a useful strategy by which marginalised diasporas negotiate inclusion in host society (see Beaman, 2017).

Also, everyday citizenship is not always institutionally mediated occurring in spaces created by the state, NGOs or associations, as is the case with status-based citizenship, but constitutes an integral part of ordinary people’s everyday struggles for survival (see Riccio and Russo, 2011; also see Dickinson, 2008). This ties with my earlier observation that even legal status, livelihoods and other aspects related to diaspora citizenship are not always automatically granted by the host state, as implied by status-based scholarship (see Bosniak, 2000; Baubock, 2006). In the next sections, I discuss the everydayness of different spheres of diaspora life, just to demonstrate the usefulness of this way of thinking about diaspora citizenship.
Diaspora citizenship also has a substantive and material dimension, not only concerned with identitarian and discursive expressions. While most scholarship tends to emphasise the politico-legal aspects of citizenship discussed earlier, welfare and livelihood opportunities constitute an important element of citizenship form migrants escaping from poverty seeking survival, as is often the case with Zimbabweans most of whom were pushed out of the country by socioeconomic deprivation (see Betts, 2014; also see Crush and Tevera, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). This represents a Marshallian variant of this conception of citizenship provides that the state guarantees the welfare and livelihood opportunities to its formally recognised citizens (Bellamy, 2008; Marshall, 1949). This explains why access to employment, particularly the right to work, becomes a critical component of migrants’ struggles for legal status, including terms and conditions of stay attached to those statuses.

Welfare guarantees in the form of access to public services, housing, access to public health (such as HIV/AIDS treatment) and support for vulnerable sections of diaspora community, also become an important expectation for diasporas from countries where welfare systems would have collapsed as is often the case with Zimbabweans (see Polzer-Ngwato and Jinnah, 2012; Crush and Tevera, 2010; also see Kpessa, et al, 2011). Access to welfare, livelihoods and other socioeconomic opportunities represents a critical aspect of citizenship for diasporas, not only for their survival in the host country but also to be able to support their relatives back home through financial and other kinds of household remittances (see Landau, 2005; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; von Burgsdoff, 2010). This, therefore, explains why diasporas hosted in any context always take seriously the importance of gaining any kind of legal status that would allow them the right to live and work in the host country. Even when denied the right to work by the host state, the importance attached to this
The substantive component of citizenship by diasporas, also explain why those without residency permits allowing them to work find ways of contesting such statuses and changing the terms and conditions of their permits so that they somehow are able to look after themselves.

The above Marshallian conception of citizenship has its own limitations, however, particularly in relation to how diasporas access livelihood and welfare opportunities outside the country. For example, the notion of the state as a provider does not always match the realities of diasporas, particularly those without legal status who are not entitled to these substantive benefits and opportunities associated with citizenship. The role of the state in welfare has been limited in many African countries, compared to some countries in western Europe with intact welfare systems (Freund, 2007; Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010). This has been a result of a range of factors including economic problems induced by neoliberal structural adjustment programmes and economic mismanagement, resulting in diminished employment opportunities in the formal sectors of the economy, poor service delivery and weak welfare systems, in some of the migrant hosting countries on the African continent (see Turok, 2007; Freund, 2007; Kpessa, et al 2011).

In this context, this means that not only diasporas but also citizens find it difficult to access welfare and livelihood opportunities. And therefore, while some migrants find it easier to access welfare and livelihood guarantees, particularly those hosted in countries with strong welfare systems and with stable legal status, there is bound to be others denied access. Instead of relying on the state for granting access to welfare and livelihoods, those diasporas with limited access to these opportunities due to their legal status and other factors find alternative ways of sustaining themselves in their everyday lives. For example, some of those in abject conditions often end up resorting to other providers outside the state such as the
market, social networks and NGOs among other civil society actors (McGregor, 2008; Nyers, 2011; Polzer, 2012; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Misago, 2010). Others, living in abject conditions, often resort to informal social and kinship networks for support with their day to day needs while outside Zimbabwe (Muzondidya, 2006; Mbiba, 2011; Polzer, 2012; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Concepts of abject and everyday citizenship are just some of the useful tools for a deeper understanding the experiences of these sections of the diaspora who live on the margins of the host societies (Nyers, 2011; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Hepworth, 2012). The next section discusses yet another way by which diaspora citizenship is subjectively and differently felt among diasporas hosted in different contexts.

1.4.1.4 Diasporic Citizenship as Senses of Belonging

Diaspora citizenship also has an identitarian-attitudinal dimension, in addition to legal status, political participation and mundane social practices discussed above (see Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2007; Bocaggni, 2012; Fortier, 2016; also see McGregor, 2010). In addition to being a material reality experienced by diasporas, citizenship is also constructed through senses of belonging (see Fortier, 2016; Laguerre, 1998; Beaman, 2017). Anthias defines belonging as ‘the sense of being accepted or being a full member’; and ‘a sense of intimacy’ and love for that particular community which they see as their ‘home’ (Bocaggni, 2012; also see Anthias, 2006). What this tells us is that communities in which migrants seek or claim to belong also have their boundaries marking who belongs and who does not (see Yuval Davis 2006). Another more elastic understanding of belonging is that which is offered by Yuval Davis who defines it as being ‘about feeling ‘at home’ and ...about feeling ‘safe’’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006:2). People feel ‘at home’ and ‘safe’ in different places, and these feelings are mediated by circumstances and other factors.
Therefore, these senses of belonging are perhaps the most fluid and flexible aspects of diaspora citizenship, particularly in the sense that they can be directed towards more than one country and change rapidly (see Bocaggni, 2012; Anderson, 1991; also see McGregor, 2010). Unlike legal citizenship based on legal status and other material bases, this mode of citizenship is not fixed, but constantly fluid, unstable and uncertain subject to various factors including place, time and context. These senses of belonging also form the basis for claiming identity, based on what individual members of the diaspora subjectively feel in relation to both the host and home countries. And such identity claims can be justified and legitimised on a variety of bases (both real and perceived), including perceived contributions to society, sociocultural proximity and other various of bases.

These subjectively constructed senses of belonging are not arbitrarily imposed by the state, as is the case with legal status, which makes them an epitome of individual autonomy (see Fortier, 2016). These subjective constructions can also represent a way of contesting exclusion and marginalisation within host country, but also back in the country of origin. In other words, although structural and institutionalised forms of exclusion may be operating in both societies, these subjective senses of belonging can serve as an endogenous resource through which diasporas challenge and reject those marginalising societal forces. We have seen in the foregoing sections of this chapter that indeed citizenship has many faces and can be imagined and practiced in multiple, not necessarily mutually exclusive, ways. Another dimension of the fragmentation of diaspora citizenship relates to the multiplicity of sites in which it is practiced.

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20 For McGregor (2010), diaspora communities are products of historical, political and other processes through which ideas of belonging are defined by way of a shared national imaginary.
1.4.2 Multiple Arenas of Diasporic Citizenship

As I noted earlier, the liberal citizenship is universally state-centric as it assumes everyone engages with the state to access citizenship. This, makes it imperative to think about alternative opportunities for diasporas to act as citizens while outside the country (see Laguerre, 1998; Fortier, 2016). Although the state remains important in mediating certain aspects of diaspora lives including the granting of permission to enter, settle and work in the host country, not everyone is in a position to engage with the state for other substantive benefits associated with citizenship while in the host country. Different sections will relate and engage differently with the state, and they will hold varying perceptions about the state depending on their backgrounds and circumstances, immigration status, socioeconomic status, gender and so on. This thesis, however, notes how citizenship of the majority of diasporas generally shifts from the nation-state to other spaces above and below the state (Desforges et al, 2005; Laguerre, 1998; Miraftab, 2004; Yuval-Davies, 1999). In other words, citizenship claims and practices of diasporas are not always directed at their territorially-bounded nation-state only, as suggested by liberal conceptions of citizenship. And various new opportunities for diasporas to engage have been considered.

Firstly, other liberal universalist variants of this status-based citizenship argue that the state is no longer the arena of citizenship in a globalising world, but other arenas are thought to be emerging at the supranational and global scales (Soysal, 1994; Tarrow, 2005; Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Dickinson et al, 2008). Concomitantly, it is believed that a transnational civil society in which transnational migrants can partake with an aim of influencing supranational and global institutions of governance (Tarrow, 2005). However, this is not always the case with all migrants due to lack of empowerment to enable them to engage in
politics above the level of the state (Jones and Gaventa, 2007). Instead, some immigrants tactically rely on the above broader discourses of citizenship framework to claim rights and entitlement, allowing them to effectively become more embedded and contest exclusion within the host society (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004; Muzondidya, 2006; also see Mbiba, 2005). It is apparent that not everyone has an equal chance and capacity to perform citizenship by way of legal status, rights and welfare, as liberal scholarship tends to suggest; but some will partake in political activism, while others would have to find alternative ways of performing citizenship.

Another discourse on how the site of citizenship changes as a result of transnational migration ties with the transnational nature of diasporas, discussed earlier. In this configuration, the locus of their citizenship no longer occurs through the engagement of the diaspora and the host state with the latter seeking to integrate into the host society, but social and political lives of diasporas straddle the host and home country in a dynamic way thanks to ICTs, globalisation and other related factors (Laguerre, 1998; Tarrow, 2005). Diaspora citizenship, therefore, becomes transnationalised by way of sustained bottom-up transnational practices, political participation, legal status in the form of dual citizenship and so on (see Levitt, 2004; Tarrow, 2005; Baubock, 2006).

Although some diasporas may become embedded and assimilated into the host society permanently, not everyone shares this desire which explains why these diasporas simultaneously sustain transnational politico-legal links and connections with their countries of origin, as has been observed in different contexts (Baubock, 2006; Manby, 2009; Geyer, 1996). Therefore, one defining feature of diaspora citizenship relates to its transnational in nature (see Laguerre, 1998). However, this tendency by migrants to sustain transnational links...
with their home countries often becomes a source of antagonism between diasporas, and nativist and exclusionary forces within host countries.

Apart from its transnational dimension, diaspora citizenship does not exclusively revolve around the state, but diasporas find other arenas of citizenship outside the state (Laguerre, 1998; Desforges et al, 2005). While some scholars emphasise the upward rescaling of the locus of citizenship resulting in its trans-nationalisation, this thesis places more emphasis on the rescaling that occurs downwards to encompass invented, localised and informal spaces where citizenship is imagined, practiced and contested as part of their everyday lives (see Tarrow, 2005; Gaventa, 2006; Desforges et al, 2005; Painter and Philo, 1995). While diasporas settled in countries where modes of citizenship tend to be state-centric in terms of the liberal tradition are likely to find it opportune and easier to engage directly with the state (as citizens), those hosted in contexts of exclusion and marginalisation may not have the same opportunity (see Desforges et al, 2005; Von Lieres and Piper, 2014). Of course, several other factors such as class, socioeconomic status and gender among others, determine whether different sections of the diaspora are in a position to engage directly with the state (or with institutions at other levels of governance above it), or whether they resort to everyday spaces of citizenship, particularly if they are disempowered non-citizens.

This thesis also holds that state-centred citizenship is problematic for the majority of diasporas, at least in the African context where the state often represents a tool of repression, corruption and violence to be avoided, evaded or cheated both in the host country and home country (see Jackson and Rosberg, 1982; Ake, 1992; Chazan, 1997; Azarya, 1988; Sachikonye, 2011). It would, therefore, be difficult to anticipate whether diasporas whose origins are in such dysfunctional states, will have a strong inclination towards engaging with the state. It is
important to point out, however, that this cannot be generalised because some diasporas, 
depending on the nature of state and dominant political cultures in host countries, may hold 
patrimonial conceptions of the state, seeing it as a provider and guarantor of their success in 
their daily lives. In short, not all diasporas hate the state, but some look up to it for the 
requisite legal status allowing them to live and work among many other necessities for their 
survival outside their home country.

As such, because of citizenship deficiencies in countries where diasporas originate, 
citizenship (as practiced by the majority of African diasporas) becomes decentred, 
downscaled and localised, to include platforms and sites beyond and below the level of the 
nation-state (Desforges et al, 2005; Laguerre, 2000; Tarrow, 2005; also see Eke, 1975; 
Bhandari, 2006; Obadare, 2004).21 These new arenas below the nation-state level do not 
always pre-exist and are not always in the form of organised platforms such as transnational 
civil society straddling the host country, due to the limits of civil society (see Obadare, 2004). 
Instead, these highly informal spaces are often invented as part of diasporas’ everyday lives 
(see Miraftab, 2004; Cornwall, 2004; Gaventa, 2006). They may also include relationships, 
transactions and interactions with local community structures and people.

As such some diasporas will perform their citizenship through host country (and 
transnational) NGOs, social movements, diaspora associations; but also through daily 
platforms such as social and kinship networks, local communities, marketplace and workplace 
among other spaces where citizenship outcomes can be achieved (see Cornwall, 2002; 
Tarrow, 2005; also see Muzondidya, 2006). In short, with or without organised civil society

21 Diasporas often come from countries with more than one public, where some engage effectively with the 
state and other sections do not. The rest have to find alternative and less formal spaces to engage, including 
organised civil society and the everyday.
support, ordinary members of the diaspora community find spaces to perform their citizenship wherever they are hosted. Diasporas utilise these spaces to realise needs for their daily survival, support their transnational practices, and contesting their exclusion both within the host country and back home. Therefore, engagement in these alternative sites presents an opportunity for diasporas to act as citizens outside the state, even in countries they are not formally recognised as citizens in terms of their legal status, rights and entitlements.

As I noted earlier, diasporic citizenship is transnational in nature, but those transnational practices in which diasporas engage are not always directed at (or mediated by) both the home country and host country states. Instead, in addition to daily interactions with non-immigrant, fellow immigrants and compatriots within the host country, transnational practices of diasporas also constitute a part of their day to day interactions, relationships and transactions often sustained in these alternative spaces of citizenship across territorial borders (see Nyers, 2011; Bocagnni, 2012). Marginalised diasporas, for example, often avoid the state and its formal structures, opting for social, kinship and nationality-based networks, when engaging in remittance sending, communication, social interactions, cross-border trading and different other kinds of practices towards their countries of origin.

1.5 Concluding Discussion

This introductory chapter argued that transnational migration results from failure of modes of national citizenship, and the movement of people across territorial borders reconfigures the practice of citizenship. For one, those migrants often cease to be a coherent nation outside its territorial borders, but develop multiple and fluid identities qualifying them as diasporic communities. This thesis suggests another dimension of the diasporic nature of transnational migrants, and that relates to the way(s) they become (or fail to become) citizens.
while outside the country. National citizenship assumes that everyone universally belongs in the state often by ways of formal citizenship status accompanied by a set of citizenship rights.

However, this thesis argues that, once outside the county, different categories of the diaspora become citizens in different and multiple ways. These multiple and different expressions of citizenship by diasporas are characterised by the multiplicity of arenas and scales at which it occurs, with the majority of those unable to engage the state resorting to everyday spaces and practices of citizenship outside the direct ambit of the state. These fragmented modes of citizenship were observed empirically during six months of fieldwork I conducted with a total of 145 Zimbabweans living in South Africa and the UK from February to August 2015. The following chapter sets out the methodological framework of this study in greater detail, including reflections on experiences and lessons learned about fieldwork in general.
Chapter Two: Researching Diasporic Citizenship: Methods, Experiences and Challenges

2.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter discusses the sampling and qualitative data gathering techniques used during the field research phase of this study. I used a mixture of non-random sampling techniques - purposive and snowballing. I also used multiple data collection techniques such as focus groups, interviewing and participant observation among others, which I will discuss in greater detail in the following sections. This chapter also contains reflections on my fieldwork experiences with methodological and practical lessons on how to conduct research with marginalised migrants of the diaspora, particularly in the South African context. Although fieldwork in the UK had a number of peculiar lessons associated with it, I felt my experiences in South Africa were more fascinating and intriguing, as it would hopefully become apparent in this stand-alone chapter.

Some of the lessons learnt are as follows: the need for deliberate efforts to identify and negotiate access to marginalised sections of migrants so that they take part in research; secondly, creating space for them to speak and make their voices heard during the research process, which was far harder; and thirdly, being reflexive and sensitive to biases, identity differences and power dynamics. This chapter also highlights the importance of fieldwork planning and the ability to anticipate potential risks, pitfalls and opportunities before arriving in the field. It also highlights ethical and other issues that arose during fieldwork experience in South Africa, and the implications these may have to our understanding of how diaspora citizenship is researched in South Africa and other contexts where majority of diasporas tend to live on the margins of society.
2.2 Methodological Assumptions

As I stated earlier, this thesis is not only conceptual but also empirical in design, thus a robust methodological framework is required to collect data that enables the answering of the above question(s). This qualitative study is not only conceptually grounded, but also empirically rigorous and systematic. For example, I have also highlighted earlier, conceptually, the different ways in which diasporas can perform citizenship including through legal status, political participation, mundane daily social practices and subjectively through senses of belonging. Thus, recognising this multidimensionality and fragmented nature of citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, one of the assumptions underpinning the design of this study was that diaspora citizenship is not only material, but also encompasses subjectivities (see Della Porta and Keating, 2008). Therefore, diverse data collection tools had to be used which would enable an understanding not only of how diasporas overtly practise citizenship through a variety of political, socio-legal and sociocultural practices, but also how they imagine and feel about citizenship in terms of their sentimental and affective connections they sustain with the host and home country.

I have also noted how the state is no longer the exclusive arena in which citizenship is performed, with other sites of citizenship opening below (and above) the state, forming part of ordinary people’s everyday lives outside the state. It was, therefore, critically important to use methods that enabled an exploration of everyday aspects of migrant life outside the realms of direct interaction with the state. In terms of positionality, the best methodology would be that which would position me, as the researcher, as close to the researched diaspora community as possible in order to fully understand how they go about their daily lives (see Bourke, 2014; Ganga and Scott, 2006; Wolcott, 1995). Furthermore, marginalised sections of
society tend to be ignored in research, and some sections of the diaspora (such as undocumented persons and those living in squalid and relatively inaccessible urban spaces) fit in this category (Given, 2008). This recognition is important when researching the plight of migrants hosted in hostile societies where some sections of the population endure poverty, violence and different forms of exclusion in their daily lives, as is the case in South Africa.

In the above context, given how excluded and alienated South Africa-based Zimbabweans tend to be due to their identities and circumstances, the methodology of this study was guided by the need for the research process, and the emerging knowledge, to be as transformative and empowering as possible (see Liamputtong, 2010; Given, 2008; also see Hungwe, 2013). In doing so, this study was designed not only for ends of knowledge generation, but also as a tool for empowerment aimed at advancing social justice ends, as others have acknowledged (see Lorenzetti, 2013; Given, 2008). This is often achieved through the use of transformative qualitative methodologies, which seek to address skewed power relationships entrenched within researched populations’ everyday lives and specific social relationships forming part of the research processes (see Finley, 2008; Given, 2008). Researchers operating in a transformational mode ought to ask themselves some of the following reflexive questions: who is included in their study and why; whose voice is heard, and are minority segments of the community under study given space in the study (see Finley, 2008). The next section explains why I decided to focus on Zimbabweans in both South Africa and the UK.

2.3 Why Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK?

There is no doubt migration and its related phenomena represent a fascinating area of study across the world at present, and the focus of study could have been on any migrant
population hosted in different popular destination countries and regions. However, I decided to examine the experiences of Zimbabweans settled in three locations within two countries – Johannesburg and Cape Town (South Africa) and South-East England (UK). My decision to focus on Zimbabweans, was based on a number of considerations. Firstly, given the infeasibility of researching and generalising about the experiences of the entire migrant population given how diverse their experiences often are (see Levy and Lemeshaw, 2008; Barbie, 2008), I decided to narrow down my focus to Zimbabwean migrants (constituting a sizeable migrant population).

The decision to focus on Zimbabweans was motivated by a number of factors. My own past personal experiences, having lived for five years as an asylum seeker in South Africa and being subjected to injustices and xenophobia. Familiarity with both locations also influenced my decision, having lived in South Africa and the UK for a number of years. A focus on a familiar research population located in spaces I am versed with would, therefore, make it practically and logistically convenient to navigate both research sites in these two countries. Also, the presence of sizable migrant populations in both countries whose plight constitutes a policy and practical challenge, also ensured that some of the knowledge generated on both cases would potentially have meaningful and practical implications. As I indicated above, I examined experiences of Zimbabweans located in more than one site, specifically in Johannesburg, Cape Town and South-East England.

Multi-siting, as an ethnographic method, would be accompanied by methodological benefits to this study, compared to a focus on a single site (Marcus, 1995). For example, a multi-sited study would allow me to examine cross-contextual variations and uniformities in modes of citizenship of Zimbabweans hosted in those different contexts, which is difficult to achieve using a one-sited focus (Saukko, 2003; Marcus, 1995). Multi-siting would also enable
the exploration of transnational practices, flows and connections, which would, in turn, help overcome methodological nationalism (the tendency to organise research within confined territorially bounded national spaces) which is rife in political research (see Glick-Schiller, 1994). Instead, recognising how migration involves the transcendence of territorial borders, states and national communities, this study was designed to allow observation of Zimbabweans in more than one place. Having identified the broader population forming the focus of this study, it was important to identify a manageable sample on which to focus.

2.4 Who Was Included in the Study: Sampling Techniques and Issues

The process of selecting the participants was not unsystematic, but it was a matter of ‘trial and error’ to a large degree. In identifying and selecting participants in this study, on-random techniques such as purposive sampling and snowballing were primary techniques used. Snowballing uses personal contacts and social networks when identifying and selecting research participants, while purposive sampling enables the researcher to identify participants with pre-determined qualities that the researcher is interested in observing (Barbie, 2008; Given, 2008; Adler and Adler, 2001). In this regard, I found my own experiential knowledge of the research population and the spatial context in which the research was sited useful at this phase of the research process, as observed by other scholars (Given, 2008). I, therefore, relied on my own experiential knowledge of migrant life having lived in South Africa for more than 5 years as a migrant and a migrant rights campaigner.

I took advantage of my existing social, family and nationality-based networks to identify potential participants in the study. I was also able to identify and gain access to a significant number of Zimbabweans using formal and informal networks I built during my five-year stay in South Africa (2009-2013) working as a migrant rights activist at PASSOP. I made use of my own contacts from one of the church groups for Zimbabweans based in Lower
Crossroads, with branches in Kraaifontein, Masiphumelele, DuNoon and Worcester and other places around the Western Cape Province. Its name is Boarneges Apostolic Church. A sizeable proportion of the participants were members of this church and their involvement alleviated some of the logistical and other related challenges I would have met without such networks and contacts.

These strategies seemed to have worked better in Cape Town than Johannesburg, given my previous experience having lived and worked with immigrants in that location and general familiarity with Cape Town’s urban spaces, compared to Johannesburg and South-East England where I had limited knowledge on its geography as well as how the Zimbabwean community was constituted and distributed across the city. On the other hand, identifying participants in South-East England was difficult due to a number of social complexities, including work commitments, childcare and other everyday commitments of Zimbabweans in the UK. Social networks also appeared less knit in the UK compared to South Africa, probably due to growing problems of social desolation, atomisation and work-life imbalance, in many western societies (Hickman et al, 2016). Although there could be other explanations on why social networks seem less vibrant in the Zimbabwean migrant community, this is not the preoccupation of this study. The point here is that most Zimbabweans I encountered were not in a position to refer me to other Zimbabweans beyond their family and work networks, as was the case in South Africa.

In both Johannesburg and the UK, perhaps an effort to identify civil society groups, such as church organisations, political formations, NGOs and diaspora associations operating in these places, may have been helpful. This could have helped observe how they partake in political mobilisation, but the everyday and senses of belonging components of citizenship would require the researcher to be immersed in communities where Zimbabweans live. This
was the emphasis in this study. Nonetheless, the importance of collaboration with civil society was more evident in the Cape Town context, compared to Johannesburg and the UK.

Working with civil society was helpful in identifying participants for the study, particularly in Cape Town where I had worked prior to the PhD research as a migrant rights campaigner. This kind of collaboration between civil society and the academy has been acknowledged by other researchers in other contexts, especially if the outcomes of research are to have a more direct impact on practice (Polzer, 2012; Kapiszewski et al, 2015; Bastow et al, 2014; Legault and Vanderplaat, 2008). I, therefore, associated closely with a local civil society organisation based in Cape Town known as PASSOP, working with immigrants of different nationalities (including Zimbabweans), for information on the sociodemographic and other profiles of Zimbabweans around Cape Town. Again, this strategy was not as effective in Johannesburg and the UK due to a geographical bias among migrant and refugee NGOs which tend to be concentrated in metropoles in both places.

Furthermore, in an attempt to make the study transformative, it became important to use purposive sampling to specifically target and include marginalised sections of the migrant population in the study. This would respond to the observed tendency for marginalised and vulnerable sections of society to be excluded from research (Williamson, 2008). In this vein, I recognised the existence of an acutely marginalised and vulnerable section of the migrant population, particularly Zimbabweans in South Africa, some of whose day to day life experiences and struggles for survival are often concealed from many studies (Adida, 2014). Invisible sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora often include women, undocumented and those living in places that are difficult to access for different reasons such as crime-infested black townships in Johannesburg, Cape Town and other parts of South Africa (See Morreiera, 2010). I was, therefore, able to identify and select samples of 80 participants in Cape Town;
40 participants in Johannesburg; and 25 participants in the Blackwater Valley (Aldershot, Camberley, Farnborough, Bordon) and St Albans (South East England). The next section discusses how participants were accessed, including some of the limitations and ways of overcoming them.

2.4.1 Negotiating Access to Participants: Methodological and Practical Considerations

Identifying a suitable sample of research participants based on a sampling framework was not a straightforward process, but getting them to actually participate in the study was more challenging, as some researchers attest (see Liamputtong, 2007; Denscombe, 2010). Having identified a suitable sample for the study, I had to grapple with these challenges related to access, with budgetary and time implications. For example, during fieldwork planning, I somewhat naively anticipated that being a Zimbabwean and having lived in South Africa and the UK would make the process of fieldwork straightforward, but that was far from what actually transpired. The actual process of getting sufficient numbers of participants with suitable qualities at the right time and place, turned out to be messier and more time-consuming than I initially contemplated. It rather turned out to be an arduous and, in many ways, astonishing exercise during those three months I spent in South Africa, and I want to highlight, in the following sections.

When I arrived in the field, I took a few steps designed to make access to participants easier. For example, I held a consultative meeting with PASSOP just to make them aware of what I was trying to achieve in my research. This also helped identifying where ‘hidden’ migrants were located and just finding out more about recent developments affecting migrants in general; explaining and popularising my research; and networking (see Bloch 2007; Parrado et al. 2005). However, I could not do it as elaborately as planned due to time
and resource constraints. This study had various other potential biases relating to the accessibility of certain categories of Zimbabweans, which I had to be aware of and had to make efforts to circumvent. There is tendency for researchers, policy makers and practitioners to focus their attention on problems experienced in urban areas and overcoming this entrenched spatial bias would have been useful in this study (see Polzer, 2012; see Lipton, 1984; 1977). The spatial focus of this study was primarily urban, due to time, resource and other limitations.

By being unable to encompass Zimbabweans living in rural parts of South Africa and farming areas such as De Doorns in the Western Cape province as initially planned, I could have incorporated long-term residents, undocumented and circular labour migrants, often less educated Zimbabweans often from rural backgrounds back in Zimbabwe. The lived experiences of these sections of the migrant population outside large metropoles have been understudied, particularly the experiences of Zimbabweans living and working on the farms around the Cape Winelands in the Western Cape province (see Polzer, 2012). There are scant bodies of empirical work on experiences of Zimbabweans on the farms such as Blair Rutherford and Maxim Bolt, more work needs to be done (Rutherford, 2010; Bolt, 2011). Without any doubt, broadening the geographical scope of the study to these rural, peri-urban and farmland communities would have empirically enriched this study. Nevertheless, important methodological and empirical insights still emerged in the urban contexts which formed the primary focus of this study.

Methods and strategies of accessing participants and gathering data are also shaped by spatial dynamics in any context. I observed that acute spatial disparities that characterise the South African society which often shape the scope of focus of researchers, would also
affect this study. Immigrants are generally thought to prefer living in inner city enclaves because of perceived safety and security, opportunities for better paying jobs, easy access to immigration offices and high density of services providers like rights groups representing migrants in close proximity (Mbiba, 2011; Mbiba, 2012; Polzer, 2012; see Lipton, 1977). On the other hand, black townships tend to be less accessible for researchers because of prevalence of crime and other factors, which explains the relatively limited amount work done on immigrants living in those places (see Polzer, 2012; Landau and Freemantle, 2004). There is also a related tendency by researchers to target those with valid and secure immigrations statuses, because those without are often difficult to locate, because they tend to live ‘under the radar’ in the townships (Polzer, 2012; Morreira, 2011). I therefore made deliberate efforts to incorporate these segments of the Zimbabwean population, and devised strategies to penetrate those places considered inaccessible by some researchers and practitioners.

Concerns of security and safety pervaded the entire process of field research in South Africa. Considering how unsafe it tends to be in parts of South Africa, I had to employ some tactics aimed at avoiding being a victim. Firstly, I was constantly vigilant having anticipated and forethought about possible risks in such a context of violence and insecurity. All this was part of the risk assessment in the Geography Department, which forms part of the fieldwork planning process within the department. However, this was not enough; I had to deal with fear and anxiety throughout the process of fieldwork. Of course, I still had memories of muggings and petty crime in Phillipi and at the Refugee Reception Office before it moved from the Airport Industria to Maitland, and these past experiences fed into my own anxieties working in the townships.
However, I used everyday crime avoidance strategies derived from my past experience having lived in the townships of Langa, Khayelitsha and Lower Crossroads for a relatively long time prior to my move to the UK. Some of the tactics I employed included being ‘streetwise’ in terms of dressing and demeanour, by way of avoiding wearing expensive and fancy clothing and jewellery, not speaking in English language when in predominantly Xhosa, Sotho or Zulu speaking townships, not walking around with valuables such as wrist watches and smartphones, not walking about during night time, weekends and month-ends when people get paid because that is when petty criminals (‘amaskoli’) tended to be on the rampage.

Other challenges were encountered relating to the context in which the study was conducted. For example, the restrictive immigration and socio-political environment pushed participants underground, while risks of violent crime made all the more difficult to navigate urban spaces in South Africa (Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). This is in contrast to the UK and other popular migrant destination countries where regularisation of stay is relatively easier.

Given the difficulties associated with getting people to come forward voluntarily and share with me their experiences while in South Africa, I sought the collaboration of civil society organisations working with immigrants in South Africa, specifically PASSOP in Cape Town. Before embarking on my fieldwork, my expectation was that doing research while hosted by a civil society organisation in the migration sector has some advantages (see Polzer, 2012). Firstly, PASSOP provided me with unrestrained access to a pool of Zimbabwean migrants coming to their offices for support, which made it easier to interact with participants in a relatively safe environment. I was also able to rely on their networks and contacts, as they allowed me access to their contact databases they often use when mobilising immigrants for protests and campaigns. They also provided me with access to their internet, telephone and office space, which was logistically useful. I was also able to work with PASSOP activists
responsible for outreach social integration of immigrants work across Cape Town, which presented me with quality opportunities for encounters with participants, while observing them at work.

My experiences were slightly different in Johannesburg, where I resorted to the use of intermediaries to negotiate access to Zimbabweans in townships around Vosloorus and Boksburg. The inaccessibility of participants was compounded by the timing of the study, following the outbreak of xenophobic violence in parts of Johannesburg in April 2015, resulting in many non-South Africans becoming relatively invisible at the time. It was largely unsafe for both participants and myself to engage in public spaces, which threatened to derail my fieldwork plans in Johannesburg. With the help of intermediaries (Jabulani and Gregory), I managed to navigate areas such as Vosloorus, parts of which are notorious for petty crime and violence, without any problems.

Having intermediaries did not only help identifying participants, but seemed to alleviate or minimise the fear, anxiety and suspicion between the researcher and the researched (see Bloch 2007; Polzer, 2012). However, though useful, the use of intermediaries came with its own downside. Intermediaries, for example, put me under some pressure to complete interviews quickly, while they also tended to take me to places they thought I would find ‘good’ interviewees. Clearly, identifying a sample is not enough when conducting field research, but a number of practical strategies become useful as a way of circumventing practical challenges associated with gaining access to the participants during fieldwork. The following section considers the actual data collection tools employed and the rationale behind their use.
2.5 Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

The appropriateness of data collection techniques depended on whether they would allow me to achieve the aims of the study. I used diverse qualitative techniques I thought would enable an understanding of the fragmented nature of citizenship. As I noted earlier, citizenship encompasses a subjective dimension and therefore it was important to use tools allowing an exploration of participants’ subjectivities. Thirdly, given the everydayness of citizenship, techniques enabling the researcher to get as close to the daily lives of participants as possible were favoured.

2.5.1 Semi-Structured Interviewing

Semi-structured interviewing was the key technique used to collect data from participants, primarily due to its flexibility and possibility of further probing respondents (see Halperin and Heath, 2012; Barbie, 2007). The total number of interviews conducted was 145 and the distribution of the interviews across the three research sites was as follows: 80 in Cape Town; 40 in Johannesburg; and 25 in South East England. The interviews were guided by a set of open-ended questions. There were also some slight variations in the nature of questions I asked in South Africa and the UK, due to contextual differences. Interviewing was aimed at probing the interviewees’ experiences and perceptions and other subjective elements in relation to how they felt towards the two host countries and Zimbabwe. I carried out these interviews on a one-to-one basis at different venues and places. In all interviews, I usually started off our conversations by a bit of an ‘ice-breaker’, which is thought useful for alleviating anxiety and making the respondent free to speak (Halperin and Heath, 2012; Barbie, 2007). I achieved this by way of asking general questions without anything to do with the research questions, just to get them to start talking.
The clarity of questions during interviews is always critical so that respondents may not feel awkward or ignorant caused by repeated failure to understand the question (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Hence, I was very sensitive about this and made an effort to be careful in the way I posed questions to ensure that they would be clear and unambiguous. Linguistic and cultural barriers also tend to present challenges during field research, especially when conducting cross-cultural studies (see Liamputtong, 2007). If not managed carefully, these barriers negatively affect the accessibility of certain information and the overall quality of data emerging from the study (Liamputtong, 2007). In designing this study, I was careful to recognise the multicultural and multilingual nature of Zimbabweans as a people in the interest of multiculturalism, but the participants were predominantly Shona-speaking (with a small proportion of multi-lingual individuals). This, therefore, meant there were no serious language and cultural issues to be sensitive to and to deal with during encounters with research participants.

2.5.2 Focus Groups

Data was also gathered by way of talking to people in small groups of six – eight people at a time, throughout the process. A total of 18 focus group meetings were convened as follows: eight in Cape Town, four in Johannesburg and six in the UK. Focus group discussions are often helpful when trying to understand the intersubjective dimensions of any particular phenomenon, especially shared and diverging views and perceptions (Halperin and Heath, 2012). They are also considered flexible in that they could be used in combination with other techniques (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990), which made them particularly useful in combination with other qualitative techniques. However, focus groups, as a data gathering technique, have their own limitations as a technique. For example, there is always risk of groupthink where participants tend to agree with the dominant views expressed by the
majority; and powerful and articulate participants may capture and dominate discussions, while those without confidence to speak out may suppress their views and opinions (Barbie, 2008; Halperin and Heath, 2012).

One aspect of focus group discussions which inspired my decision to use them, was the idea that, if managed well and given sufficient trust between both among participants themselves and between them and the researcher, participants would be more inclined to feel empowered to speak openly and freely (Rwegoshora, 2014). This was critical considering the sense of insecurity, disempowerment and vulnerability marginalised sections of the diaspora (undocumented, women) often feel (see Nyers, 2011; Morreira, 2011; Adida, 2014). It is important to realise, however, that empowerment is elusive, and knowing whether it has happened or not would be a difficult exercise. Nevertheless, the ability to speak out and have a voice would act as an indicator that empowerment had been achieved in this study.

Furthermore, while some researchers emphasise the disadvantages of divulging personal experiences and any other disclosures by the researcher during focus group discussions (see Halperin and Heath, 2012), doing so helped participants feel at ease and safe to discuss more openly. Disclosure of researcher identity also helps in forging long-lasting contacts with the researched community after the fieldwork, which would be helpful in my post-PhD research work. I therefore constantly kept participants informed about who I was and made efforts to share my own personal experiences as a migrant in both South Africa and the UK, in ways that I thought would perhaps help boost their confidence.

The focus groups meetings were designed in ways that would make them inclusive and conducive for meaningful dialogue, in line with what many scholars have suggested (Hennink, 2007; Krueger and Casey, 2014). Another potential risk often associated with focus
group discussions that I had to be aware of and try to mitigate, was the problem of group-
thinking, which was not easy to decipher from genuinely shared realities and experiences (see
McDougall and Baum, 1997). I was only there to facilitate conversation and dialogue among
the participants by, for example, asking provocative questions and, as McDougall and Baum
(1997), suggest playing the devil’s advocate by way of asking questions designed to stimulate
discussion. As a result, all the meetings seem to have provided a platform for all participants
to discuss freely, judging by the intensity of debates and dialogue participants engaged in
among themselves.

2.5.3 Participant Observation: Being Immersed in the Community

Another technique I utilised was immersing myself, as a participant observer,
particularly in the community of Phillipi in Cape Town. The idea underpinning this technique
was to get as close to the participants as possible for a deeper insight into their everyday lives,
including everyday ways of being political (see Schatz, 2009; Van Maanen 2011). The whole
essence of fieldwork, as Van Maanen correctly observes, is to live with and live like those
being studied (Van Maanen, 2011). I, therefore, spent over two months immersed in a black
township in Cape Town called Philippi, carrying out interviews and observing how
Zimbabweans got on with their day to day lives in that particular community. During the
process, I had adequate opportunities to meet and have conversations with a number of
Zimbabweans in various settings around that community, discussing their views and
perceptions on life in South Africa compared to Zimbabwe. Immersion would, therefore, place
me in a better position to understand not only citizenship as everyday social practice but also
citizenship as sense of belonging.

Apart from set up face to face interview appointments, knowledge of social spaces
were potential participants are most accessible was important. For example, I was also able
to participate in various activities including attending church services at Boarneges Apostolic Church attended by Zimbabweans only, travelling around Philippi on public transport (Metrorail, Golden Arrow buses, taxis and ‘amaphela’), visited the local market and accompanied my associates and intermediaries for shopping and so on. The aim was to be in the spaces where Zimbabweans were so as to make my own impression of their experiences thus gaining experiential knowledge out of the process. Immersion also enabled me to observe ways of life and social relations between Zimbabweans and other actors such as South Africans, fellow immigrants, service providers and other relevant actors with local urban neighbourhood, which was helpful in understanding how citizenship is negotiated outside the state within urban settings (Ocejo, 2013).

One of the limits of this technique is that the researcher often foregoes the advantages associated with being a detached researcher; and the researcher begins to develop emotional commitments to that particular community in ways that compromises the objectivity of emerging data (see Tanner, 2008). My shared past experiences as a migrant and my identity as a Zimbabwe would still have led me to understand and make sense of those participants’ experiences in a subjective way anyway.

2.5.4 Being Immersed in an Intermediary Organisation

Another way by which I got close to the participants relates to organisational ethnography, like community immersion, falls within the ethnographical tradition (Kostera, 2007). Being a participant observer would help provide a good space in which to appreciate the nature of problems encountered by migrants more broadly, in a addition to those coming to the organisation for assistance. It would also allow a better understanding of the citizenship tradition underpinning the work of any particular organisation, thus enabling broader conclusions on the role of civil society in promoting diaspora citizenship (Neyland, 2007). This
technique would also be useful also due to its amenability to triangulation with other techniques, particularly interviews, observation and text analysis (Kostera, 1997).

Therefore, in the spirit of civil society-academia collaboration, I decided to spend over six weeks as a participant observer at PASSOP. This is a Cape Town-based civil society organisation assisting migrants from different nationalities with paralegal advice and advocating for the integration of immigrants in South Africa. Negotiating access to the organisation’s infrastructure, work and clientele was not difficult for me thanks to my pre-existing links with this organisation, since I had worked with it for nearly four years before moving to the UK to pursue PhD studies. Therefore, during my time as a participant observer at PASSOP, I was able to observe issues facing migrants in South Africa in general, civil society responses and assumptions about citizenship underpinning those approaches.

2.5.5 Being a Researcher on the Move

This study is firmly built on the recognition that we now live in a world of mobilities, where people are always on the move for different reasons in contemporary times (Adey, 2000; Jensen, 2009; Urry, 2000). This tendency has always been recognised in the global north (see Cresswell, 2006), but indeed mobility tendencies have also become a feature of ordinary people’s everyday lives in urban settings in the global south. People living in urban areas, for example, are always on the move travelling to and from work, going for shopping, visiting friends and relatives et cetera (see Amin and Thrift, 2002). Most research methods and techniques often employed by researchers on migration-related phenomena appear to be based on the underlying sedentarist notion of citizenship, which is flawed in its failure to take into account the mobile nature of people.
My intention was, therefore, to use the same logic to understand the conceptions and practices related to citizenship by Zimbabweans while on their everyday movements. This method has been used in a systematic way by other researchers observing mobilities of Zimbabweans in both rural and urban contexts (see Mbiba, 2011; Mutopo, 2014). Considering the mobile nature of diasporas, I therefore decided to travel with tens of Zimbabweans from Cape Town to Zimbabwe on 29th March 2015 on a cross-border bus (Chihwa) plying the Cape Town to Harare route. This bus, Chihwa Bus Service, was popular among Zimbabwean travellers at the time due to its affordable prices and other benefits it offered. This generated useful insights on the transnational practices of Zimbabweans, particularly the kinds of connections they forge and sustain between South Africa and Zimbabwe. I also gained useful insights into their different ideas about being in South Africa compared to their past life experiences back in Zimbabwe prior to their departure.

2.5.6 How Data Was Analysed

The kind of data I managed to collect during this study was entirely qualitative and its analysis of data started during the process of data collection, which means the two processes were merged initially (Halperin and Heath, 2012). After completion of data gathering, I transcribed and digitised the data by way of typing it out onto the computer for easy storage and access (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Also, as part of my analytical framework, I developed different structures and categories which would represent the different modes of incorporation (Portes, 1995)\(^\text{22}\); the different kinds of political communities; and the different facets/dimensions of citizenship, to see if any of the data fitted in any of these categories or not. Based on data emerging from the three different research sites, I also performed a

\(^\text{22}\) Portes’s concept of segmented integration helps understand the differentiated and layered incorporation of different categories of the diaspora population.
comparative analysis of both the dependent and some independent variables, mostly context and geographical distance, to see how these factors mediate emerging modes of citizenship among different categories of Zimbabweans. Conclusions were therefore based on a comparison of data from the field and different understandings of citizenship\textsuperscript{23}, to determine which best fits with the empirical realities of Zimbabweans.

2.6 The Researcher-Researched Relationship and Its Methodological Implications

This section contains the key highlights and reflections on the process of field research, with an aim to demonstrate some of the peculiarities and complexities associated with doing research and being a researcher in the African context. The following reflections on my own experiences will also confirm what Wolcott (1995) observed, that empirical research in the real world is far from being a neat and linear process. Instead, based on my own experience, fieldwork constitutes an organic, dialectical and ‘trial and error’ process, but filled with challenges and opportunities. I embarked on fieldwork at the beginning of February 2015 armed with a robust methodological framework, coupled with a set of preconceptions derived from research methods textbooks and research trainings about the research process. However, as the process unfolded, most of these were destabilised, prompting a rethink of the several elements of my research approach, strategy and techniques.

As a result, I learned a number of specific lessons on how to negotiate the field and interact with the researched in ways that help achieve research aims during field research. My experiences as a field researcher indeed show that field research methods are far from being an a neatly packaged way of acquiring knowledge, to be learned in seminar rooms and

\textsuperscript{23} As discussed in Chapter Two, these are: Citizenship as legal status, political participation, social practice or sense of belonging.
applied in the field, as Attia and Edge (2015) observe. Another lesson to learn from these experiences is that, as much as we try to plan and anticipate what happens during fieldwork, actual field is more complex. It presents a lot of unexpected opportunities and challenges which require innovativeness and creativity. Field research, therefore, requires flexibility and adaptation of techniques and strategies in response to the demands of the context in which the study is conducted, as I discovered during the three months I spent in Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Standard research methods textbooks tend to provide different qualitative techniques and tools for gathering data, but the actual encounters and interactions between the researcher and researched people present other interpersonal and other dynamics the researcher needs to be aware of to gain meaningful data. My experiences, therefore, indicate the need for reflexivity and sensitivity on the part of the researcher in order to build relationships with the researched people that allow us to understand their lives more deeply in any given context. This study, therefore, demonstrates that far from being a neat and technical process, field research is in many ways organic.

One of the biggest lessons emerging from this process is that qualitative field research is fundamentally about relationships with the researched and other intermediary actors involved in the process (see Kobayashi, 2001). The relationship between the researcher and researched people determines not only the quality of emerging data but also whether the process itself is empowering to those involved in the study. The following discussion emphasises this researcher-researched relationship as it is accompanied by important dynamics during qualitative research. I want to acknowledge the inescapability of subjectivities in social research, and then underscore the importance of being aware of them,
being honest about them (not to pretend to be objective), and how to begin to respond to them.

### 2.6.1 Subjectivities and Biases

Scholars subscribing to a positivist epistemology believe that good empirical research is one conducted by an objective, emotionally detached and unbiased researcher (Harding, 2015). However, when one conducts their research in contexts where the researched experience injustice, suffering and oppression, it becomes difficult for research to be totally ‘dispassionate’ and objective (see Dwyer and Limb, 2001). As my own experiences reveal, the researcher’s own subjectivities and biases will always permeate the entire research process – from the questions asked, how answers are generated and how the researcher makes sense of those results. Some even observe that emotional engagement is useful in generating good research outcomes, especially when researching lived experiences of marginalised and vulnerable groups in society (see Liamputtong, 2007; Tolman and Brydon-Miller, 2001). In the same vein and based on my own experiences, it is always crucial to acknowledge and be honest about those subjectivities and biases, as they are not easily voidable and escapable.

Although my fieldwork experiences confirm the advantages associated with having some degree of prior familiarity and connections with the target research population and spatial focus of the study, it is also apparent that subjectivity is inescapable during field research (see Given, 2008; Van Maanen, 2011; Liamputtong, 2008). My passion towards this research and the researched population emanated from my own past experiences as a migrant in Cape Town, which was useful for the study. Being a Zimbabwean who lived in South Africa for more than 5 years as a migrant, the intimacy of my emotional connection with the researched community is not questionable. Having also been directly affected by some of the
issues that form the subject of this research, especially the struggle for legal status and recognition as well as the different forms of discrimination that continue to be experienced, it was not possible to detach myself from the emotions and sentiments triggered by the experiences of Zimbabweans.

My background also shaped the kinds of subjectivities I had to deal with in the process of this study. I embarked on this research in the first place not only because I am Zimbabwean but also as a result of my own feelings about the discrimination and hostility I experienced when I lived in South Africa. I felt these experiences needed to be exposed in some way, one of which would be through research of this nature. This explains the strong empathy I constantly felt and displayed towards participants; and some of the personal stories invoked stronger emotions and imaginations including anger and painful memories of my own past struggles as a migrant in South Africa. This shows the inescapability of subjectivities when doing research with a primary focus on marginalised sections of society.

Some of the events and day to day occurrences facing the researched during fieldwork make emotion, passion, sentiment and other aspects of subjectivity more perceptible as the research process unfolds (Van Maanen, 2011). This is particularly true in contexts of socio-political instability, victimisation and exclusion targeting the researched group, as was the case in South Africa where I carried out my fieldwork (see Kobayashi, 2001). For example, the outbreak of xenophobic violence in Durban and Johannesburg in May 2015, coupled with attacks on Somali informal traders in Cape Town around the same time (see Marongwe and Mawere, 2016), further compounded my empathy towards the research population and feelings of anger towards South Africa and its nationals.
Here is another example of how subjectivities pervade the research process: I also witnessed a crime incident during my time in Philippi involving a Zimbabwean woman named Beaulah, whose house was broken into by armed men at 0130hrs. They assaulted her and got off with some of her belongings. Although the matter was reported to the South African Police Service immediately after the incident, police officers only arrived at the scene at around 0900hrs the following morning, 8 hours later. These events particularly made me feel upset and cynical at times the South African way of life. I therefore got the dominant impression that Zimbabweans were being subjected to exclusion and were no longer desired in the South African society, thus justifying my feelings of empathy towards them.

Being a Zimbabwean by nationality also meant I had my own viewpoints and sentiments regarding socioeconomic and political events and developments in Zimbabwe, which I held strongly during the process. These could have easily filtered into my own reading of the participants’ own perceptions of the same phenomenon. However, I think some of these aspects of my subjectivities placed me in a better vantage point from which to have a better view on what Zimbabweans were going through at the time perhaps in ways that socially and emotionally distant researchers would not have realised. That means I could easily grasp the agonies and trauma some of the participants shared with me during interviews and focus group discussions, and that meant I was more inclined to listen passionately and empathetically. All the above examples help demonstrate how subjectivity is not easily avoidable in social research, and at times can help the researcher relate more closely to the experiences and realities of the researched group.
2.6.2 Power Dynamics in the Field: The Researcher and the Researched

This study was partly built on a commitment to a transformative epistemological and methodological framework, with a particular emphasis on the relationship between the researcher and the researched aimed at empowering the latter (Liamputtong, 2007; Given, 2008). I shared the assumption that this transformative paradigm and related methodologies prove useful in societies characterised by structural imbalances in power relations among different categories of society among other forms of injustices operating in those societies (Finley, 2008). The question that potentially arises is on how to verify whether empowerment happened and who was empowered. While it is indeed difficult to measure empowerment, Davies (2008) provides elements for researchers observe in order to determine whether research methodologies are empowering or not, including creating space for them to speak and make their voices heard.

Davies (2008) also notes how empowering methodologies potentially reconfigure and equalise the relationship between the research and researched. This can be achieved in a number of ways, including the fostering of a collaborative relationship with participants. This realisation explains the particular attention I paid to the dynamic interaction between myself, as the researcher, and the participants; and how they related with each other during the process. For example, I avoided dominating discussions by way of asking too many questions and comments, in order to give participants more space and time to speak themselves. It was also always careful to ensure none of the participants captured and dominated discussions within focus groups.
2.6.3 Researching Historically Repressed Participants

Histories and backgrounds of violence, intimidation and marginalisation may have also limited the confidence of some potential participants to take part in the study. This issue was more acute in South Africa, compared to the UK perhaps due to geographical distance and exposure to liberal political values in the host country among other factors. Because of this, participants in the UK spoke more freely and confidently compared to those in South Africa who openly expressed their fear of being targeted and victimised upon to Zimbabwe. As a result of their past experiences again both back in Zimbabwe and in South Africa, Zimbabweans may have developed a lack of trust for other people they consider strangers or not part of them in different contexts; including those they perceive to be threats to their security while hosted in other countries outside their own (see Polzer, 2012). One of my suspicions is that this might have been the case with some Zimbabweans, particularly those who may have witnessed or been victims of traumatic and violent events before and after immigrating into South Africa.

Some of the Zimbabweans who could not come out for the study may have directly or indirectly experienced different forms of violence, human rights abuses, domination and repression at the hands of ZANU PF and the state back in Zimbabwe, in the past. There is a large body of literature which demonstrate how the post-independence Zimbabwean state has generally dominated its citizenry, sometimes using violent and repressive means (see Kasambala, 2007; Sachikonye, 2012; Dorman, 2016). Internalised and entrenched fear and suspicion also threatened to militate against the quality of encounters, particularly when some participants expressed their discomfort with having their life experiences researched. They feared for their own lives and the lives of their relatives back in Zimbabwe, if they were to speak negatively against the Zimbabwean state. What might also have aggravated the
wariness of some of the potential participants is the belief often shared among Zimbabwean ‘diaspora’ across the world, that the Zimbabwean government deployed intelligence operatives in countries where its citizens are hosted to spy on their activities and target ZANU PF regime’s opponents living in exile (see Pasura, 2014; Betts and Jones, 2016).

This fear of Zimbabwean intelligence operatives directly played out in my interactions with participants in Johannesburg. For instance, I had an encounter with a small group of Zimbabweans at Voslorus (Johannesburg) who openly displayed their suspicion that I was a Zimbabwean state agent. These participants were initially wary of engaging in open conversations with me in relation to their views and perceptions relating to their past experiences and imagined futures in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. This underscored the importance of building trust and proving my authenticity as a bona fide student; being introduced by intermediaries and my affiliation to PASSOP well known for being critical to the Zimbabwean government were some of the helpful tactics in gaining the confidence of participants. I also presented a one-page statement on paper with a Royal Holloway logo, detailing who I was and the purpose of my research. I also offered to share contact details of my supervisors, if anyone wanted to verify my identity as a student. This helped alleviate this challenge and I was able to engage with participants relatively smoothly.

2.6.4 Reflections on Power Dynamics During Encounters

Going into the field, I was aware that power dynamics could play out in different subtle, hidden ways not only among the researched themselves but also between them and the researcher. One question I constantly asked myself concerned how they would view me and how perceptions they would have of me would affect the nature of information they were inclined to share. Without awareness and forethought of these things, there was a risk that they could end up telling me what they thought would please me, or provide me with
distorted stories on their experiences. In extreme cases, my fear was that they would withhold information and perhaps withdraw from any meaningful conversations with me thinking I was out to use them and their experiences for my own benefit. It was therefore critical to build a relationship based on mutual trust, respect and confidence in the process to avoid or minimise such complications in the process.

This sense of ambivalence in me regarding the nature of relationship that would be appropriate between me and the participants was intense from the outset, particularly my concern that I would come across as wielding power over them. For example, I was not sure whether to introduce myself comprehensively in terms of who I was, my own personal achievements and what I was up to at the time, among other aspects of my own life story. On one hand, I thought it would have been not only ethical but also a gesture of openness towards them about who I am, but at the same time some of the participants might have thought I was a well-to-do, successful and powerful researcher who was down in South Africa to learn about their experiences for my own benefit. Particularly, their perception of me as someone powerful could have potentially perpetuated a sense of disempowerment and disadvantage among some of the participants some of whom, for example, may have lost their own educational and other life ambitions due to the situation back in Zimbabwe and other challenges related to their settlement in South Africa.

Therefore, I became aware that some of the participants often found themselves vulnerable and disadvantaged due to their legal status, discrimination and other factors compromising their life opportunities while hosted in South Africa, I anticipated that some of those participants could potentially begin to develop the perception that I was a privileged Zimbabwean merely using them to realise my ambitions to earn a doctorate in the UK. The fact that I pursue PhD studies at Royal Holloway in the UK constantly represented one of the
potential fault lines in my relationship with the migrants whose lives I was researching. While, some may have developed a sense of admiration and being proud of me as a Zimbabwean who had come a long way, at one point being an asylum seeker in South Africa and now being a PhD student in the UK; others however could have been conspicuously envious towards me for the same reasons.

During focus group discussions I conducted in Johannesburg, I observed that many people had the perception that I had power over them, and that seemed to have heightened their expectations for immediate financial benefits for their participation in the study. For example, some approached me for financial assistance saying ‘you dine with the British in the UK’ (*ndimi murikudyra nema British*). They got the impression that I was earning a lot of money in the form of British pounds by virtue of being a student in the UK and therefore I had the capacity to help them out. Unfortunately, I had no means to help them financially, just being a struggling international student here in the UK. Although I introspected in relation to the above issues, I realised that it was not always necessary for me to engage in any kind of artificial, faked behaviour or try to identify myself differently during our encounters, but rather strove towards being just myself during the process.

Although such dynamics put me in an awkward position most of the time, I also felt their perceptions may have been based on their lack of awareness of the difficulties and challenges foreign students face in the UK (see Mandiyani, 2009). These included the dominant feeling of being away from home, coupled with the financial difficulties I experienced as a mature student trying to balance research, family and survival in the UK. In this context, Tevera (1999) usefully captured these dynamics when he observed that overseas students tend to be compelled by socioeconomic hardships to expend a significant portion of their energies pursuing parallel survival strategies, rather than reading, reflecting and
publishing in scholarly journals (see Mandiyanike, 2009). Therefore, during our informal conversations, sometimes before or after our interviews and focus group discussions, I took the opportunity to ‘educate’ them about life in the UK including opportunities and challenges Zimbabweans face, particularly students.

To avoid being too sensitive and self-aware, I constantly strove towards remaining myself without trying to adjust my conduct and identity to suit the research participants at different stages of the fieldwork. I also made effort not to present myself as the ‘expert’ with all the knowledge on various aspects of immigrant life in South Africa (although I remain an activist and now a researcher studying for a PhD), and therefore was guided throughout the process by the assumption that the migrants know their lives better than me. While I may have been tempted to think that I had significant power over the participants by virtue of my academic and professional knowledge and experience, it was also critical to realise that they also had power by virtue of their experiential knowledge I was after derived from their day to day lives I was seeking to explore. They were the ones living in those risky parts of the townships, struggled to access public services, experienced life as ‘illegal’ immigrants and so on; hence I could not pretend to have more knowledge than them over those issues in any way. I also found ways of conscientising them and making them aware of this kind of power they had during the process, for instance by highlighting this aspect when I gave opening remarks at the start of focus group sessions.

2.6.5 Whose Voice Was Heard?

Ensuring that participants’ voices are heard constitutes one of the ways of empowering vulnerable and disempowered participants during the research process (Schwarzer et al, 2006). I have already highlighted how some categories of Zimbabweans may have been excluded from the research process because of their marginalisation which often
renders them invisible. Nevertheless, I also anticipated that some of those who had made it into the sample may not have the power to speak out about their experiences during our conversations due to fear, anxiety and other factors. Ways by which these dynamics could be detected and dealt with included being anticipative, sensitive and reflexive in each and every focus group or interview encounter.

One of the ways in which these power imbalances manifest in research is often through the silence of women. And, some scholars propose another way of dealing with women’s silence in research, which is by way of awareness of their cultural constraints emanating from patriarchy (Reinharz and Chase, 2001). In this vein, I have also highlighted how some women ended up being excluded from my sample and from taking part in the actual study because they were preoccupied with duties and tasks in the household domain. Moreover, although only a few women appeared not to be very comfortable sharing their experiences which they considered either too sensitive such as those relating to their relationships with their spouses.

Women migrants tend to be under-represented and their voices are often not heard during social research (Polzer, 2012). This is not always the case, but it is one of the dynamics I observed during fieldwork in South Africa. During the planning phase of the fieldwork, I had anticipated such a gender bias in the way participants took part and expressed themselves in the study, which made it easier for me to manage these dynamics. When fieldwork commenced, I was briefed by PASSOP activists about the tendency of most Zimbabwean women to not freely take part in researches, compared to men would not allow a male researcher to sit down with their women in private to have a confidential conversation.
Although I did not experience such incidences, I was sensitised by members of PASSOP about such dynamics based on their experiences working with the Zimbabwean migrant community.

Therefore, gender-sensitivity at all stages of the process was a critical way of guarding against and detecting any such forms of disempowerment during this research, as correctly observed by some scholars (Liamputtong, 2007; Reinharz and Chase, 2001). As a way of demonstrating sensitivity to these dynamics and to respond to it, identifying ‘safe spaces’ where women and other potentially vulnerable and disempowered participants would feel comfortable to share their stories and experiences, became a priority in all encounters. I had to seek the assistance of one of my former colleagues at PASSOP, a woman and a Zimbabwean, with great experience working with women migrants around Cape Town. She was of great help in identifying and inviting participants to PASSOP offices for interviews and ensuring some of those respondents felt safe and comfortable to speak to me.

It was only after identifying these dynamics that I was able to start considering different ways of addressing them. For example, when I observed that some respondents were dominating discussions and presenting their experiences in general terms during focus group discussions, I began posing mildly critical and ‘devil’s advocate questions to the dominant speakers as a way of counterbalancing their dominance. Dealing with such subtle issues is not always easy because of the possibility of silence being a result of internalised structural, systemic and historical victimhood causing a sense of powerlessness among some participants, which can never be addressed during the actual encounter itself. In other words, getting someone subjected to decades of oppression and domination in their home country, to speak during an interview tends to be futile, but require sustained efforts, as it became apparent in this study.
2.6.6 Being an Insider/Outsider: Issues of Positionality

Positionality was important in understanding participants’ everyday life experiences using citizenship lenses, particularly how they made sense of their relationship with both the host and homeland state. This ties with an idea of research as a relational process in which the researcher transacts with the researched during research encounters, thus shaping emerging knowledge (Finley, 2008; Dwyer and Limb, 2001; Visser, 2000). As an assumption, identifying with the researched group would help gain an inside view of their life experiences compared to ‘outsiders’ (see Dwyer and Limb, 2001; also see Merton, 1972). Several elements of my identity and background help shape my position in relation to the research participants throughout the study.

My identity, for example, played a key role in shaping my positionality and perhaps making them see me as an ‘insider’ included my being a black Zimbabwean who lived in South Africa for more than five years; having experienced immigration documentation problems; speaking the dominant Shona language fluently; having experienced xenophobia and other forms of discrimination affecting many other migrants while living in South Africa; and having worked with PASSOP advocating for the rights of migrants in South Africa. Based on my experiences in the field, the above elements of my identity and position in relation to the participants, helped me a lot in understanding daily experiences of participants in Cape Town, compared to those in Johannesburg and the UK where I had not lived for any considerable time.

However, even in Cape Town where I thought I was part of the immigrant community, not everyone shared a similar view of me as an ‘insider’ for several reasons. For example, my ‘insider’ status may have made other participants less comfortable and embarrassed to speak
truthfully about their experiences. Similarly, others may have become too ashamed or shy to speak out for fear that I might recognise their experiences and end up sharing them with other Zimbabweans. Also, others may have been pessimistic about me and taken my work for granted thinking that it would not result in any meaningful change in their plight, compared to the often-revered researchers coming down from the global north to do work on Africa (see Gallagher, 2016). Certainly, identity and background play important role in shaping dynamics surrounding researcher-researched relationship.

What is not certain is whether participants would have related differently with a researcher from any other background. Perhaps participants would have shared more intimate and deeper experiences if I were a white researcher, on the basis of the somewhat messianic view of ‘outsiders’ from the global north often held by impoverished researched groups in the global south. In other words, there is often a perception that ‘white’ researchers always have capacity to help with material and other solutions out of their problems and miseries. Therefore, it is not clear whether my being black, being Zimbabwean, and being a migrant, helped position me in ways that enabled me to gain an intimate view in the participants’ daily life experiences. Would experiences have been any different if it was a researcher of a different racial and nationality identity or indeed any other background.

2.7 Ethical Considerations in the Field

Ethics constitute an important consideration when carrying out research with human subjects, some of whom are vulnerable in many ways (Halperin and Heath, 2012). I highlight below, some of the issues that confronted me during fieldwork, and how I attempted to address them. Firstly, participation in the research has to be negotiated and consented by the participants on the basis of accurate information on what the research is about and its
implications (Barbie, 2007). Some participants, particularly those that are disempowered often lack the power to shape the direction of research processes, making them unable to refuse or agree to participate in research processes (see Jacobsen and Landau, 2003). Subsequently, some researchers will simply coerce or deceive them into being researched regardless of their will. This was problematic and I went into the field with great sensitivity to such issues. For instance, I asked them to sign Royal Holloway, University of London’s consent forms, which ensure compliance with the university’s ethical guidelines for researchers. However, most of the participants were reluctant to sign from the start of the study, without any explicit reason(s). Presumably this refusal to sign paperwork in the form of consent forms emanated from uncertainty regarding how their personal information would be used in future. Nonetheless, I decided that imposing them could have made it difficult to recruit and retain participants for the study entirely, while also compromising the trust between me and them.

Gaining formal consent on paper was therefore not possible owing to uncertainty regarding how the signed documents would be used, lack of adequate confidence in the process and mistrust on the part of the participants, especially those without documents, who tend not to trust anything official/formal. However, my view was that what matters was that consent was gained, regardless of the form in which it was expressed by the participants. I therefore resorted to reciting the consent form verbally and providing assurance that their anonymity and the confidentiality of what would be guaranteed. One of the ways we agreed this could be achieved was by ensuring that no names and residential addresses were written on the interview schedules and in my notes, but that I would use forenames and pseudonyms
in my records of the interviews and discussions, and in any subsequent publications of the work.

2.7.1 Anonymity and Confidentiality

Being aware of the risk of being harmed, victimised and other forms of backlash is always important when conducting research with human subjects, especially if the questions solicit potentially sensitive information from those participants (see Barbie, 2007; Halperin and Heath, 2012). This kind of awareness was critical for my study due to the context in which I was carrying out the study. These threats to the wellbeing of participants could be through subjection to xenophobic abuse by native South Africans or victimised by Zimbabwe’s notorious intelligence operatives as a result of their involvement. It was therefore important to ensure no harm or backlash would confront participants during and after the study because of their involvement or what they would have spoken about during the process.

Guaranteeing the anonymity and confidentiality of participants were two ways by which these risks could be mitigated. These concepts are sometimes mistakenly taken synonymously (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Anonymity entails the concealment of participants’ identities, while confidentiality refers to the guaranteeing of privacy to participants (Halperin and Heath, 2012). Assuring the privacy of everyone would be difficult (perhaps impossible) in practice simply because the outcome/findings of this research would inevitably be published in one way or another (see Liamputtong, 2007). Confidentiality also served to separate some of the participants from their narratives and experiences, perhaps against the will of some participants who may have wanted their experiences to be shared publicly.
2.7.2 Reducing/Avoiding Psychological Harm

Apart from external harm and repercussions as a result of participation in research, the research itself may be a source of harm and discomfort for participants. My research touched on sensitive and very personal aspects of participants’ lives, which always pose ethical questions in social research (see Liamputtong, 2007). For example, conversations with participants delved into issues that encroach on the private spheres and personal lives of participants; and such knowledge and information is subsequently shared with the public in the form of academic publications and presentations including research papers, journal articles and research reports. Apart from seeking their informed consent, it was also important to minimise or avoid harm to participants during the process and afterwards, often in the form of stress, trauma and anxiety (Denscombe, 2010; Halperin and Heath, 2012). My anticipation during the design of the study was that this would be an issue for my research considering the nature of the questions I was asking and issues that would likely emerge.

During the actual fieldwork, I was always sensitive throughout the process to avoid questions that would negatively affect the psychologically fragile and delicate participants, caused by the traumas and difficulties associated with their migrant life. This required greater sensitivity in the way research encounters were designed and managed, to minimise or avoid psychological harm to participants. Although some of the issues we discussed may have been sensitive and potentially harmful to the emotions of those who participated, I made efforts to be sensitive not to ask questions in ways that would cause distress or open ‘old wounds’ among participants.

For instance, when discussing issues to do with the causes and process of displacement of Zimbabweans from Zimbabwe, and their experiences during the 2008 xenophobic violence while hosted in South Africa, I tried to be careful and sensitive not to
discuss in ways that would bring back horrific memories of the past. In this context, I set up quick debriefing sessions after every set of interviews and group discussions following such sensitive and emotional conversations with participants. I also benefitted immensely from those sessions because such encounters in which sensitive issues were discussed certainly had triggered painful memories in me, as a migrant who lived in South Africa too.

### 2.7.3 Managing Expectations of Participants

Lastly, a pertinent ethical issue that is frequently overlooked by researchers, but one which I had to deal with, relates to managing the expectations of participants, researcher and gatekeepers. Given the socioeconomic deprivation and vulnerability of some of the participants, they took part in the study expecting practical change and other immediate tangible benefits out of the research process (see Clark-Kazak, 2013). This may not be a serious issue for researchers in other contexts but, as I observed and as other scholars attest, this presents a significant emotional and ethical challenge when researching Africa (See Clark-Kazak). For example, some participants clearly thought their participation in the study would be accompanied by immediate and direct material benefits from the research process. One of the challenges in these circumstances was on how to manage such expectations in ways that would not make me appear indifferent to their plight, without making false promises to them which would be highly unethical.

As a result, various strategies proved useful in addressing this complex situation. Firstly, I found it useful to explain the purpose of my research to the participants and in that process highlighted the potential impact of my research. This whole process made me realise the importance of being considering research impact to participants when designing research. I also appreciated the importance of being able to communicate it in an accessible way to various research audiences, including the participants during fieldwork. For example, I
mentioned that one ways my research could result in change in their circumstances would be by raising awareness about their experiences and challenges if its results get published; as well as shifting South Africans’ perception of immigrants which could, in turn, help in combatting xenophobia and other forms of discrimination against immigrants in the country.

2.8 Chapter Conclusions

To conclude, this chapter has sought to lay out a methodological foundation on which the quality of empirical material used in the rest of the thesis can be judged. The chapter itself contains several lessons about the nature of fieldwork in the African (particularly South African) context. For example, it is apparent that the conduct of fieldwork is not a rigid and objective enterprise, but requires flexibility in methods and approaches depending on context. Approaches and tools provided in standard research methodology textbooks will not always work the same way in all contexts, some of which demand their variation and adaptation. Therefore, whether a set of methods and techniques work depends on context and the peculiar qualities and circumstances of the researched population. Because of the uniqueness of each fieldwork endeavour, original insights are potentially generated on how to conduct research with that particular group and in that particular context.

It is also apparent that collecting data is not simply a matter of implementing methods and techniques preconceived at the design stage of the research, but largely depends on the relationships and encounters between the researcher and the researched. Reflexivity, awareness and sensitivity become critical additional tools designed to ensure the researcher is sensitive to power, bias, subjectivities and ethical considerations emanating from these interactions; these aspects of the researcher-researched relationship bear significant implications on the quality of data and empowerment potential of the process. In this context, the rest of this thesis uses empirical material on experiences of Zimbabweans gained from my
fieldwork endeavours in Cape Town, Gauteng and South-East England, to demonstrate how diasporas become citizens in multiple, fragmented, ways while outside their country. The following chapter zooms into the experiences of Zimbabweans with an aim to use citizenship theoretical lenses to understand and explain their mass emigration towards different destinations since year 2000.
Chapter Three: Emigration as a Response of the Crisis of Citizenship in Zimbabwe

3.1 Chapter Introduction

Why people their countries can be understood in different ways, using various conceptual lenses in different contexts. This chapter traces how the Zimbabwean diaspora emerged at different times of the country’s history, and the migratory pressures underpinning their flight. It also uses the concept of ‘crisis of citizenship’ as a lens with which to understand this crisis-driven emigration producing the Zimbabwean diaspora (Castles and Davidson, 2000; Crush and Tevera, 2010). This thesis holds that Zimbabweans living outside their country indeed constitute a diaspora due a number of features they display. In order for a diaspora to exist, a significant body of the national population has to have exited from their home country and become dispersed in more than one country (see Zeleza, 2003; Pasura, 2005). Though critical in the formation of a diaspora, emigration is by no means the only characteristic that makes those emigrants diasporic. There are other elements, including the modes of citizenship that emerge among them while living outside their homeland. Nevertheless, emigration provides the genesis and foundation of being a diaspora and this chapter tries to conceptualise those processes by which citizens exit their home countries and eventually become scattered across the world.

Emigration has received growing scholarly interest since the 2000s, and before then most of the attention was placed on the immigration side of the coin, and most of this immigration-centred scholarship often negates the dynamics obtaining in the migrant-sending countries (Stola, 1992; Okolski, 2007; Brettell and Holifield, 2000). 24 While looking at the forces

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24 Stola and Okolski make the same observations in the context of the current ‘migration crisis’, where there is limited emphasis and deep analysis of the forces driving those migrants out. Focus is often on receiving countries and factors believed to be ‘pulling’ those migrants from their home countries.
attracting immigrants into any particular country is a helpful way of thinking about human mobility, it does not assist us fully to grasp the entrenched drivers of transnational human mobility obtaining in societies from which those migrants originate. Therefore, using citizenship as a theoretical lens, this chapter focuses on the emigration dimension. It suggests that the massive exodus of people from most countries in sub-Saharan Africa in recent years, emanates from the historical failure of national citizenship. And most of the humanitarian, socioeconomic and political problems afflicting many countries in sub-Saharan Africa today, including countries such as Zimbabwe, mirror this ‘crisis of national citizenship’. This problem is not only a contemporary phenomenon but its seeds are traceable to the historical colonial and post-independence exclusionary systems of citizenship and governance on the African continent (Mamdani, 1996; Dorman et al, 2007; Geschiere, 2011). And today, this crisis has manifested in different ways, including socioeconomic and political problems directly responsible for the exodus of the citizenry.

With reference to the case of post-independence Zimbabwe, this chapter primarily aims to situate emigration from sub-Saharan African countries in the failure of conventional, Eurocentric, modes of national citizenship, which were historically imposed through colonial rule and have not worked after independence. By reconceptualising emigration as a response to the crisis of national citizenship, this chapter also suggests another way of thinking about the causes of transnational migration on the basis of existing empirical knowledge (see Azarya, 1987; also see Gaidzanwa, 1999; Trandafoiu, 2013). This thesis also draws parallels between experiences in different epochs in Zimbabwe’s nascent history of nationhood, as a way of demonstrating the historical roots of the failure of conventional modes of citizenship in Africa.
As such, this thesis also recognises that the crisis of citizenship does not end with emigration, but continues and takes a different dimension given the obscurity surrounding the modes of citizenship that emerge post-emigration. Therefore, understanding emigration from a citizenship perspective also enables us to compare prior modes of citizenship culminating in their departure from home country and those that emerge once those migrants settle in various host countries, to observe any parallels between migrants’ past and contemporary experiences in any context they are hosted. In other words, locating the citizenship crisis in its historical context will also help us understand emerging modes of citizenship for migrants, particularly how historical deprivation of meaningful national citizenship shape the ways migrants perform (or fail to perform) citizenship while outside the country.

3.2 Crisis of Citizenship: Conceptualising its Manifestations and Responses in Africa

The pervasive crisis of national citizenship bedevilling many African countries has been met with various responses by the citizenry. In other words, citizens have not been passive victims of this deprivation of citizenship, but they have sought to exercise their agency in different political, sociocultural and other ways. Some citizens have confronted their states violently resulting in armed civil conflict as has been the case in Ivory Coast and the Democratic Republic of Congo in recent decades (Azarya, 1988; Open Society Foundation, 2009). In this vein, the Open Society Foundation has attributed the prevalence of civil conflict and political instability on the African continent (Open Society Foundation, 2009). This shows that indeed deprivation of meaningful citizenship can have far reaching consequences. Citizens do not always become passive by-standers or victims of oppression, impoverishment and violence that come with this deprivation of citizenship, but will find ways of responding.
Political responses often include robust political activism and mobilisation, coups d’état and corruption in public office (see Chazan, 1987; Azarya, 1988; Trandafouiu). While those already empowered because of their education, class, ethnicity and socio-political connections find it easier to partake in these kinds of adversarial forms of engagement and contestation with the state, the majority of ordinary citizens often lack the capacity and socio-political capital to partake in these processes (see Azarya, 1988). This has not always been the case with civil (and wider) society often failing to engage effectively and mount opposition to the state in countries such as Zimbabwe (see Muzondidya, 2011; Dorman, 2016). In the absence of effective direct state-citizen engagement, another broad response to the failure of conventional modes of national citizenship take the form of disengagement from the state, with the citizenry relocating their citizenship to other sites within civil society (including community, social and kinship networks) outside the state.

And this represents one of the ways by which those deprived meaningful citizenship exercise political agency and reclaim it, primarily by way of avoiding directly interacting with their repressive state (Ake, 1992; Spivak, 1988; Scott, 1985; Mbembe, 2001). This is epitomised by the growing informalisation of livelihoods, and other aspects of citizens’ everyday survival strategies (see Chitando and Manyonganise, 2011; Chiumbu and Nyamanhindi, 2012; Azarya, 1988; Baker and Aina, 1997; Ake, 1992). In contexts where the state fails to meet the material welfare of its people, some citizens tend to move into the informal economy to secure their livelihoods, in which their economic activities thrive outside the purview of the state (See Obadare, 2004; Kabeer, 2008; Hammar, 2014). This illustrates that citizens respond in different ways, but also may start acting out their citizenship agency outside the direct ambit of the state.
Sociality, including indulgence in contemporary lifestyles, fashion, entertainment and other expressions of lifestyle identities, represents another dominant way through which disgruntled citizenry, especially urban youths, have sought to avoid direct engagement with the state (see Mafessoli, 1996). In this manner, state-centred citizenship is supplanted by an everyday form of citizenship in the face of repression, impoverishment and constrained civic spaces (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Desforges et al, 2005; Dickinson, 2008). These ways of contesting impoverishment, marginalisation and repressive rule are all territorially bounded, but at times citizens look beyond the borders of their country in search of survival.

It is in the above context that emigration is suggested here as representing another response to the failure of conventional modes of citizenship in Africa. Flight of this nature is not an act of passivity or a condition imposed on which those migrants have no power over, but a deliberate way of asserting their agency (see Azarya, 1988; Gaidzanwa, 1999). In other words, using Isin’s conception of how citizenship is practiced and reclaimed, emigration triggered by citizenship deficiencies in country of origin could be interpreted as an act of citizenship (see Isin, 2008). For example, it represents a way of expressing marginalised citizens’ lack of confidence in their state by disengaging and evading it, turning elsewhere for more meaningful relationship with another state in any particular destination country (see Azarya, 1988; also see Ake, 1992). Given the ways the state has often repressed, perpetrated organised violence, abused its power and corruptly exploited public resources, it is not unimaginable that some citizens may have found ways of cheating, avoiding or escaping from the tentacles of their lethal and exploitative states (Ake, 1992). What links the state and citizens is citizenship, and the state-side of the relationship has been the most deficient in the African context.
Apart from disengagement and engaging in informal spaces within territory of the state, emigration also shifts and relocates the site of citizenship geographically and territorially from the home country to the destination country (see Castles and Davidson, 2000; Betts and Jones, 2016). Thirdly, the immediate, substantive, reasons why people emigrate also constitute citizenship issues, if examined using citizenship lenses. The need for survival, livelihood opportunities, violence, human rights abuses and fear of persecution among others, directly or indirectly emanate from the dysfunctional relationship between the state and the citizenry, discussed above (Mamdani, 1996; Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010; Dorman et al, 2007). Put differently, some of the reasons why people emigrate can be viewed as fundamentally citizenship issues.

It is important to acknowledge that decisions to emigrate are more complex; and those who decide to leave their country look for their destinations on the basis of other considerations at any particular time. Perceived prospects of livelihood opportunities, socio-political stability and security, geographical proximity and immigration regime among other aspects when deciding where to move (see Crush and Tevera, 2010; Ndlovu, 2012; Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012). Personal circumstances and considerations also influences decisions on where to emigrate to, when, routes and modes of transport and so on (see Crush and Tevera, 2010; Betts, 2013). What modes of citizenship emerge for those pushed outside the country is not certain and constitutes the key question to be answered in subsequent chapters of this thesis. It is clear from the above discussion that emigration is essentially a citizenship issue, rooted in the historical failure of colonially imposed, western-centric, modes of citizenship (see Dorman et al, 2007). The next section considers how post-independence modes of citizenship are rooted in colonial history in Sub-Saharan African countries.
3.2.1 Emigration as a Response to Crisis of Citizenship: Conceptual Issues

There exist wide ranging perspectives trying to explain why people leave their countries destined for others. This part of the thesis uses citizenship lenses as another way of understanding the causes of emigration. This thesis, therefore, suggests that socioeconomic and political problems triggering the mass exodus of Zimbabweans, actually represent a manifestation of a deeper crisis in Zimbabwe. There is a pre-existing recognition that the emigration of Zimbabweans is survivalist and crisis-driven in nature, but there are different views on what the ‘crisis’ really is (see Crush and Tevera, 2010; Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012; Betts, 2014). This chapter locates the crisis in the dysfunctional relationship between the state and its citizens in Sub-Saharan Africa, which in turn accounts the prevalence of forced emigration from these countries.

This thesis seeks to contribute to this conversation by suggesting characterising the exodus and dispersal of Zimbabweans in recent years as a response to what Castles and Davidson (2000) characterise as a ‘crisis of citizenship’ affecting many countries, including those in Sub-Saharan Africa (Chazan, 1987; Azarya, 1988; Trandafoiu, 2013; Open Society Foundations, 2009; Moore et al, 2015). This ‘crisis of citizenship’ is linked to the challenges facing contemporary nation-states in a world thought to be globalising (Castles and Davidson, 2000). The following sections will characterise and contextualise this crisis as experienced in Sub-Saharan Africa, with specific reference to developments in post-2000 Zimbabwe.

In terms of conventional citizenship theory, people belong in the political community through a relationship with their governing state, which is the essence of citizenship (Bellamy,

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25 Trandafoiu (2013) notes how Romanians escaped from their country as a political act designed to show frustration and lack of confidence in the state.
Those who belong in the national community relate with the state as legally recognised citizens conferred with rights, entitlements, and duties associated with their membership (Bellamy, 2008; Isin and Turner, 2002; Marshall, 1949). Those who belong in the national community are not only bestowed formal legal status, rights and entitlements but also look up to the state for their material welfare (Bellamy, 2008; Isin and Turner, 2002; Marshall, 1949). There is also growing recognition that citizenship encompasses a subjective dimension, which often manifests in the form of sentimental attachment and loyalty to the state (see Fortier, 2016; also see Kpessa et al, 2011). This understanding of citizenship is derived from experiences in Western Europe and North America, and therefore may not always been consistent with African realities of citizenship.

The relationship between the state and citizens has been historically dysfunctional (or at least different) in both colonial and post-independence Africa, contrary to what is assumed in conventional citizenship theory (Mamdani, 1996; Ekeh, 1975; Ake, 1992; Sachikonye, 2011). This troubled state-citizen relationship has often taken the form of repressive, violent and corrupt modes of governance, coupled with socioeconomic problems causing the inability of the state to guarantee the welfare and livelihoods of the citizenry (See Turok, 1987; Betts, 2014; Betts and Jones, 2016; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011; Azarya, 1988). The latter aspect represents the failure that Marshallian citizenship has had more profound effects in countries like Zimbabwe, where poverty and socioeconomic deprivation has pushed citizens to respond in different ways just for their survival (see Betts, 2014; Crush and Tevera, 2016).

In the same vein, the majority of the citizenry in post-colonial societies, owing to the legacy of exclusion, domination and oppression by the colonial state, often lack the capacity
to directly engage with the state through participating in mainstream political processes and rights claims-making (see Azarya, 1988; Scott, 1985; Spivak, 1988). This does not, however, suggest passivity and lack of political agency on the part of the post-colonial citizenry, as postcolonial citizenship thinking referred to above shows us. And this has been the case with the majority of Zimbabweans who have had to find different ways of responding to and contesting authoritarian modes of governance entrenched in their country’s socio-political fabric. The crisis of national citizenship has also had identitarian-emotive manifestations, particularly marked by weakened senses of national belonging, particularly leaving large sections of the citizenry feeling less attached to the state (see Kpessa et al, 2011; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). Citizens in most African countries also tend to enjoy formal legal recognition represented by possession of legal identity paraphernalia such as birth certificates, passports and other forms of identity documents, but without greater corresponding access to other substantive benefits, entitlements and opportunities associated with citizenship.

However, there have been instances when some states have even sought to delegitimise and alienate sections of the citizenry from enjoying formal recognition as citizens, as has been the case with white Zimbabweans and Zimbabweans of an immigration background (see Muzondidya, 2010; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). All this shows how most how conventional modes of citizenship have not worked the same way they have done in western Europe, North America and other regions (see Castles and Davidson, 2000). It is also apparent from the above discussion that most of the political and socioeconomic problems directly responsible for the flight of citizens of an African origin are, fundamentally, issues of citizenship, emanating from the warped relationship between the state and citizens in those respective countries.
3.3 Crisis of Citizenship and its Colonial Roots

Colonial rule has had far reaching implications to questions of governance, citizenship and nationhood in the African context, and some of the political and socioeconomic problems we see today are rooted in these colonial systems. For instance, colonial territorial demarcations imposed arbitrarily at the Berlin Conference of 1884 lumped together different (and sometimes hostile) ethnic, cultural, linguistic and racial groups of people within the same territorial boundaries and under the same colonial authority (Dorman et al, 2007). Subsequent colonial policies sought to consolidate this coalescence of diverse peoples within the same territories, by placing them under different tribal authorities in their tribal lands.

Policies of segregation also reinforced the development of separate identities along racial lines in different areas within the same country; while ethnicity, tribe, clan and totem (not nationality) became primary modes of identity among native Africans domiciled in designated native areas (Mamdani, 1996; Ekeh, 1975). At the same time, white Europeans developed their own identities and relationship with the colonial state according to liberal principles and values associated with modern citizenship in their own geographical spaces (Mamdani, 1996). This kind of imposed societal differentiation would present various challenges for nation-building attempts after independence in many African countries.

The Westphalian notion of statehood, and related modes of citizenship, which essentialises the nation-state as the primary community in which people belong and identify, would also be challenged as different groups maintained their loyalty to particularistic communities such as ethnic, clan, regional and tribal village communities (see Bayart, 2001; Davidson, 1992). The imposed co-existence and enclosure of people with different ethnic, tribal, linguistic and cultural identities in the same territory explains the revival of precolonial
identity-based hostilities and incompatibilities following the demise of colonial rule which had
previously held them together (also see Dorman et al, 1997; Kpessa et al, 2011). The
emergence of such divided and diverse societies further complicated the development of
nations anchored on shared national identity and collective sense of belonging in the nation,
which undoubtedly served to undermine efforts to build cohesive societies in many post-
independence African countries, Zimbabwe included (Dorman et al, 2007; Nyamnjoh and
Englund, 2004).

Another important implication of segregated citizenship and governance adopted
along racial and ethnic lines during colonial rule is that it also produced unequal and unevenly
developed societies across the continent (Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). Policies of
racial segregation and differentiation were accompanied by separate, unequal and uneven
development with those areas inhabited by Europeans experiencing socioeconomic
prosperity compared to black townships and communal rural areas (Kpessa et al, 2011). What
made this situation even more unjust was that black majority people were paying taxes, levies
and forced to engage in forced labour without a corresponding provisioning of public services
(Olukoshi, 2000; Kpessa et al, 2011). Their means of livelihood were also disrupted and
deprived by way of expropriation of resources such as land and livestock (Kpessa et al, 2011).
Such colonial policies of segregation also accounted for the impoverishment and the general
neglect of the welfare needs of black Africans.

The paternalism that also characterised the vertical relationship between the colonial
state and natives based on domination, repression and violence did not create adequate
space for non-whites to engage meaningfully with the colonial state, hence this entrenched
an enduring sense of disempowerment and incapacity among the citizenry in relation to the


state (Mamdani, 1996; Sachikonye, 2012; Dorman et al, 2007). This systematic deprivation of substantive citizenship among black sections of the population was met with different responses in different countries. As a result of their discontent, non-white victims of colonial repression and impoverishment engaged in different forms of struggles, including nationalist agitation, non-violent protest and armed struggles. In the same vein, some sections of those opposed to and adversely affected by these differentiated and exclusionary modes of citizenship often escaped and ended up in exile within the African continent and beyond (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010).

In the specific context of Zimbabwe, this wave of emigration, comprising victims of colonial rule and modes of citizenship, represents another fragment of the Zimbabwean citizenry. I will not delve deeply into the dynamics surrounding their flight and their emerging modes of citizenship, as the scope of this study mainly focusses on those who have left Zimbabwe after year 2000. Clearly, national citizenship crisis has historical roots, and it is important to note that citizens have not been passive victims but have responded in various ways, including flight. The following sections seek to demonstrate how the historical failure of conventional modes of citizenship have manifested in contemporary political and socioeconomic crises pushing accompanied by recent waves of emigration in Africa, with specific reference to the experience in Zimbabwe since year 2000.

3.4 Crisis of Citizenship, Flight and the Post-Independence Zimbabwean Diaspora

During and soon after the struggle for independence in Zimbabwe, nationalists underscored the imperatives of building a new nation and making citizenship equally meaningful for everyone (see Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010). Apart from pursuing redress, nationalist leaders also stressed the importance of reconciliation, national cohesion
and developing a shared national identity among the diverse peoples in order to build a stable, united and peaceful society in Zimbabwe (Dorman et al, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). However, contradictions began to emerge in the twin-agenda of nation-building and redressing injustices of colonial rule by way of extending meaningful citizenship to the black majority, and it seemed one had to suffer at the expense of the other.

In a bid to fulfil their nation-building pledge, nationalists did not pursue retributive justice to make perpetrators of repression and atrocities before and during the armed struggle accountable for the atrocities they committed (Moore, et al, 2013; Muzondidya and Gatsheni, 2010). There were minimal radical administrative reforms and some white officials in the previous Rhodesian administration retained their positions (Muzondidya and Willems, 2010). This was the case with people like General Peter Walls who had been the commander of the Rhodesian Army but was retained as the Commander of the unified Zimbabwe National Army; and Ken Flower who carried on as the head of the Central Intelligence Organisation. Efforts were also made to integrate different guerrilla formations and the Rhodesian forces, with the assistance of the British Military Advisory Team, in what would become the Zimbabwe National Army (Alao, 2012). This demonstrates what seemed to be a genuine commitment to nation-building and inclusive citizenship on the part of the nationalist government of the time.

In the same spirit of national unity, radical redistributive economic programmes to address the socioeconomic disparities that had been created during colonial rule, were also not pursued as part of the new government’s policy agenda immediately after independence (Ndlovu-Gatsheni and Willems, 2010). While this strategy may have helped forge some degree of national unity, it would always remain a sitting time bomb without a clear resolution
of such an important aspect of the national question. Deep-seated and structural injustices along lines of race were therefore not tackled at the dawn of independence in Zimbabwe, meaning the majority blacks remained marginalised from the economy and other benefits and opportunities associated with citizenship. Principles of citizenship are also based on the premise of democratic rule and governance, allowing the people to choose who governs them by way of free and fair elections.

This, however, proved elusive for nationalist political leaders at the helm of state power immediately after independence in Zimbabwe. It emerged that Mugabe and his nationalist government were not committed to democratic government and multiparty system, but aimed at achieving a one-party state soon after independence, resulting in Nkomo and other more democratic nationalists advocating for a multiparty system (Alao, 2012). These differences among nationalists marked the genesis of what would soon become a devastating ‘ethnic’ conflict with far reaching implications on the nation-building project in post-independence Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009).

As part of its nation-building, the nationalist government led by Mugabe had made compromises and concessions to the white minority population in the interest of nation-building as noted above; but, equivalent efforts were not made to forge national unity among the diverse tribal, regional and ethnic communities across Zimbabwe (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Raftopoulos and Savage, 2004; Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997). As a result of ZANU’s political machinations highlighted above, conflict erupted in 1982 when some members of the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) (the military wing of ZAPU led by Joshua Nkomo) were accused of attempting to sabotage the new government and

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26 Raftopoulos refers to this tendency as selective reconciliation.
plotting an insurrection in their Matabeleland stronghold by engaging in terrorism, banditry and dissident activities (Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace, 1997; Mario, 2009; Raftopoulos and Savage, 2004; BBC, 1983).\textsuperscript{27} The exact cause of the conflict is disputed with the official narrative at the time being that it was a mission to suppress an insurrection led by Nkomo.

However, there are other competing understandings of what these civil disturbances were about. For example, it is widely believed in some circles that it was a continuation of age-old tribal conflict between the Ndebele and Shona tribes dating back to precolonial times (BBC, 1983; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009; Alao, 2012). However, there are some who contest this perception about the conflict, including Joshua Nkomo himself who denied that it was a horizontal, ethnic, conflict among different sections of the Zimbabwean people, arguing that it was about control of the state with an aim to dominate society.

Joshua Nkomo, for example, denied during an interview with the BBC’s Jeremy Paxman in London after escaping the conflict, that the conflict was not ethnic in nature but purely a political one in which Mugabe sought to impose his idea of a one-party state against the will of his opponents within the nationalist movement (see BBC, 1983). There is no agreement on what exactly the causes of this devastating conflict really are. But whatever the real cause may have been, what is clear is that the nationalist commitment to the building of a nation in which everyone belonged, as liberal citizenship theory holds, did not work (see Bellamy, 2008; Isin, 2002).

\textsuperscript{27} This conflict is often referred to as ‘Gukurahundi’ meaning the water that washes the chaff at the start of the rainy season.
It can be argued that nationalist leaders’ approaches to governance and leadership were premised on a flawed conception of citizenship without a desire to allow citizens to choose freely who governs, which led to civil conflict and strife. Citizenship theory is premised on the idea of equality, civil and political rights (see Bellamy, 2008); yet, membership in a political party, region and ethnic community and other particularistic collectives appeared to be considered more important in enjoying citizenship on the above basis. In this context, the equality and political inclusion components of citizenship (see Isin, 2002), were compromised by the ZANU PF nationalist government. As I argued earlier, citizenship deprivation generates different responses from the citizenry, and in this case banditry, destabilisation and other paramilitary ensued. This seems to have been the case during the 1980s, resulting in the marginalisation of not only Ndebele-speakers, but those in the Midlands and Masvingo and other regions, outside Mashonaland and Harare regions. This another way of understanding the causes of this civil conflict using citizenship lenses.

One of the consequences of this civil conflict was the flight and scattering of a fragment of the Zimbabwean nation predominantly from the Matabeleland and Midlands regions, forming a distinct segment of the Zimbabwean diaspora (see Betts and Jones, 2016). Popular destination countries for this older diaspora were Botswana, South Africa and the UK. National citizenship is not only premised on the political dimension of the relationship between the state and citizens, which clearly did not work well at the start of a new era in post-independence Zimbabwe. Instead, citizenship has a social dimension to the extent that it is to do with the material well-being and welfare of the citizenry, in terms of a Marshallian conception (Marshall, 1949). The next section examines how this component of citizenship emerged in post-independence Zimbabwe.
3.4.1 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme and its Citizenship Consequences in Post-independence Zimbabwe

Another manifestation of the citizenship crisis that has directly triggered mass exodus in Zimbabwe originates from the state’s failure to look after its citizens, what is often refers to as social citizenship (Marshall, 1949; Isin, 2002; Bellamy, 2008). The creation of a welfare state through a robust social policy represented one of the tools widely used by the nationalist government in Zimbabwe, and indeed in many other post-independence African countries, to redress the socioeconomic injustices of the past given decades of underdevelopment, poverty and socioeconomic stagnation in Sub-Saharan Africa (Kpessa et al, 2011). In addition to redressing the social injustices of the past and making citizenship meaningful, social provisioning was also regarded as an effective strategy for building national cohesion, solidarity and a shared sense of belonging among people from diverse backgrounds within the nation (Kpessa et al, 2011). For this reason, nationalists therefore continued echoing this legacy after independence in ways that evoked a shared sense of national solidarity around their material deprivation transcending pre-existing ethnic, tribal and other particularistic affinities (Kpessa et al, 2011). We will see how effectively this worked in subsequent paragraphs, but let me conceptualise the link between citizenship and welfare first.

It is important to note that this use of the welfare state for advancing national unity in Zimbabwe and other post-independence African countries was not without any conceptual and empirical bases. In a Marshallian conception of citizenship, those who belong in the national community as citizens are entitled to welfare and other material benefits and opportunities (Marshall, 1949). In other words, those who belong in the national community look up to the community for their welfare and material well-being – this has often been
termed social citizenship (Isin, 2002; Marshall, 1949). It is in this vein that citizenship has always carried a socioeconomic dimension for Zimbabweans due to the historical material deprivation and impoverishment endured by the majority of the citizenry under colonial rule. The realisation of socioeconomic benefits and livelihoods is therefore often associated with membership in the nation, without which citizenship becomes meaningless (Freund, 2007; Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). This logic underpinned the struggle against colonial rule; and it is therefore not surprising that the need for socioeconomic redress and social justice remained one of the key priorities of the nationalist government at independence.

Soon after 1980, nationalist political parties therefore continued to tap into existing socioeconomic grievances of the majority black people, in order to build horizontal solidarity among the disadvantaged black majority on the basis of shared grievances and aspirations (see Freund, 2007; Dorman et al, 2007; Kpessa et al, 2011). And nationalist leaders recognised the need to improve the general welfare of everyone through the provision of public services like education, healthcare, housing, clean water and sanitation et cetera for free. It therefore sought to use welfare as one of the strategies for advancing the nation-building agenda and making citizenship substantive for the majority of black Zimbabweans who had been previously denied it by the erstwhile colonial regime. Social policy also tends to encompass an in-built communal aspect encompassing shared needs, demands and values around which people from diverse backgrounds rally (Kpessa et al, 2011). It was also believed that the delivery of public services by the state would generate loyalty to the state among the citizens, thus improving the vertical relationship between the state and citizens (Kpessa et al, 2011).

Moreover, some well-developed welfare systems flourished in social democratic states in Western European and Nordic countries, where social provisioning was recognised
as one of the key pillars of modern citizenship in Marshallian terms (see Kpessa et al, 2011; Marshall, 1949). In these societies, an intimate connection between social policy and national identity had been established and nationalists accepted that the same model would work in their emerging post-independence (Kpessa et al, 2011). The fact that welfarism had also been used in some advanced multinational nations like Canada and Britain for forging national cohesion, also led African nationalists to believe that it would work in their post-independence African societies divided along the lines of ethnicity, class, race and region (Kpessa et al, 2011). A strong welfare system was therefore instituted and became an integral component of national development strategies adopted in different African countries as a result (see; Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010; Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). This helped to an extent in advancing substantive citizenship and redress the socioeconomic disparities emanating from uneven development during the colonial era.

It was in this context that Zimbabwe’s first development plans after independence – especially Growth with Equity implemented in 1981 - emphasised the provision of healthcare, education and other social services to all Zimbabweans across ethnic, regional and class distinctions (Government of Zimbabwe, 1981; also see Sachikonye, 2003; Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). Overall, however, a new chapter appeared to have been opened in the history of Zimbabwe by 1980 – the economy was doing well, public services were being delivered efficiently, Zimbabweans from different backgrounds co-existed without any manifest conflict, and there was relative peace and security for the first few years of independence. However, apart from the ‘Gukurahundi’ conflict, this narrative of a tranquil and prosperous post-independence Zimbabwe concealed latent historical tensions based on race, class and ethnicity (Herbst, 1990; Mlambo, 1997). It also ignores structural forms of
inequality carried over from the colonial era, which would mark the contours of citizenship struggles post-1990.

3.4.1.1 The Neoliberal Turn and Economic Citizenship in Zimbabwe

The crisis of national citizenship in Zimbabwe has also had a socioeconomic dimension, given how welfare and socioeconomic opportunities form a key element in Marshallian citizenship (see Marshall, 1949). I highlighted earlier how most post-independence governments had sought to use welfarism as a strategy for consolidating the new nation as well as cultivating social citizenship in post-independence Zimbabwe. Although this strategy worked well during the early years of independence in Zimbabwe, welfarism as an approach to nation-building and citizenship did not work as effectively as it had in social democracies and multinational countries in the global north (see Kpessa et al, 2011). The emphasis on the free provision of social services generated increased expectations and demands which many Africans failed to meet over time (Kpessa et al, 2011). The provision of free welfare also proved unsustainable over time due to escalating costs, inefficiencies in public management and lack of corresponding economic growth in many post-independence African countries (Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015; Kpessa et al, 2011). The general social impact of these development policies was devastating for the majority of ordinary Zimbabweans.

The implementation of the devastating Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in Zimbabwe further weakened the capacity of the already fragile state to deliver public services to citizens in many ways (see Mlambo, 1997; Kpessa et al, 2011). Such programmes were also adopted in many impoverished African countries, with disastrous consequences for ordinary citizens. For example, the emphasis on public spending reduction through cuts in social spending and subsidies left limited resources for social services; while
the privatisation and commercialisation of state owned entities, some of which had played a critical role in the delivery of public services, left many Zimbabweans worse off (Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015; Mlambo, 1997). The implementation of ESAP was accompanied by many adverse socioeconomic effects some of which Zimbabwe continues to grapple with to this day. I therefore want to suggest that some of these hardships that continue to drive people out of the country started when Zimbabwe adopted austerity programme conceived by the Bretton Woods institutions in the early 1990s (Mlambo and Elhiraika, 1998; Bond and Manyanya, 2002; Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015). This is based on the realisation that the majority of Zimbabweans have left the country in search of employment and socioeconomic opportunities, with the Zimbabwean economy in a state of comma thanks to economic mismanagement and ESAP (see Gaidzanwa, 1999; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1998; Muzvidziwa, 2001). This clearly shows the link between obtaining economic conditions induced by ESAP and emigration. Those who emigrated as a result of ESAP, coupled with the imperial, liberation war and ‘Gukurahundi’, form another distinct fragment of the Zimbabwean diaspora.

The implementation of a neoliberal economic programme in the form of ESAP had many other inimical effects on key aspects of national belonging and citizenship, particularly the relationship between the Zimbabwean state and its citizens, as well as on horizontal relationships among the people themselves in the country. As I indicated earlier, the social impact of ESAP also deprived meaningful social citizenship to the majority of the historically disadvantaged Zimbabweans both in urban and rural areas. According to Marshall (1949), those who belong in the national community must be entitled to welfare benefits in order to secure their material wellbeing. ESAP also weakened the delivery of public services, thus
dealing a major blow not only to substantive and material components of social citizenship such as employment and socioeconomic opportunities, but also subjective senses of belonging (Kpessa et al, 2011).

Another effect of ESAP was that many Zimbabweans began to feel a sense of being abandoned and neglected by the state, which has a duty to guarantee the welfare of citizens in terms of citizenship theory (Marshall, 1949; Isin, 2002). This disenchantment gradually culminated in the withdrawal and disengagement from mainstream of the citizenry from political life by a large section of ordinary Zimbabweans. (Murisa and Chikweche, 2015). The emergence of the informal economy for instance represents one of the many ways Zimbabweans gradually disengaged from the state. Furthermore, the sentimental and emotional attachment which binds the state and its citizens which often undermined by the lack of strong social policy (see Kpessa et al, 2011), seems to have also been weakened by the decline of the welfare state in Zimbabwe.

The emotional and material detachment of the citizenry from the state was also aggravated by the emergence of other parallel private and non-state actors jockeying with the state in the provision of welfare goods and services, thus competing with the state for loyalty of the citizenry (Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). For instance, Kpessa et al (2011) observes how some NGOs took over some of the responsibilities of the state in social provisioning, while some of these entities cultivated an ethos of self-reliance and localism in ways that weaned the citizenry from the tentacles of the state. In addition, some sections of the citizenry looked to particularistic entities such as the family, clan and tribal community for livelihood support in ways that provided a fertile ground for the resurgence and reinforcement of particularistic affinities at the expense of national cohesion (Kpessa et al,
It is apparent that the affective and sentimental glue that binds the nation together was severely weakened by the neoliberal onslaught on public services in Zimbabwe, with far-reaching implications to the emerging relationship between the Zimbabwean state and its citizens both living within and outside its territory.

Politically, even before a political party emerged out of the labour movement, ESAP result in increased state-citizen tensions and greater contestation within the ruling ZANU PF party itself. There was an emergence of opposition political formations in urban areas, predominantly built around a critique of the government’s ESAP programme at both ideological and policy levels. The prominent one was the Zimbabwe Unity Movement (ZUM), which was largely subscribed by students and workers; and independent candidates such as Margaret Dongo representing Harare South in the mid-1990s (New African, 1992; Mlambo, 1997). This emergence of new political formations marked the growing fracturing in the relationship between the state and citizens in post-1990 Zimbabwe, which saw urbanites later coalescing around the Movement for Democratic Change in 1999.

The collapse of the welfare system was also accompanied by intensified social unrests by the labour movement in the urban areas and growing contestation with the state (Mlambo, 1997; 2001). This resulted in the formation of Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) in Zimbabwe which was formed in 1999 (Mlambo, 2001; Raftopoulos and Sachikonye, 2001; LeBas, 2011). The emergence of this outcrop of political formations would not only become a source of social division and fragmentation but also redefined the relationship between the state and society which rapidly turned adversarial in post-2000 Zimbabwe.
In the above context, it is not difficult to appreciate how the collapse of the welfare system triggered by Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), directly created migratory flows in many African countries not excluding Zimbabwe. These prompted scholars like Ben Turok to observe that:

*The declining living standards and hardships have triggered a crisis of legitimacy of the African state and regimes* (resulting in) *general social turbulence. This is because the regimes have failed to “deliver the goods” as expected by the citizenry, raising questions of who benefits’* (Turok, 1987: 16).

The collapse of the welfare state in the 1990s arguably marked the genesis of other socioeconomic turmoil in post-independence Zimbabwe that would trigger the massive emigration of different categories of Zimbabweans in the 2000s. Since the implementation of ESAP, Zimbabwe has remained on a socioeconomic downward spiral since then, although it is easy to believe that the current socioeconomic problems are of a recent creation (see Bond and Manyanya, 2002). In terms of consequences, the implementation of ESAP, for instance, was marked by growing contestation between the labour movement and the state; and it is in this context that the labour-affiliated MDC party was formed in 1999 at the height of this socio-political and economic abrasion in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 2001; LeBas, 2011; Bond and Manyanya, 2002).

Another perhaps more profound consequence of ESAP was that it drove another fragment of the Zimbabwean nation out of the country in search of welfare and livelihood opportunities, in addition to the liberation war and ‘Gukurahundi’ diaspora that had left Zimbabwe earlier in the nation’s history (see McDonald et al, 2000). The inability of the Zimbabwean state to ‘deliver the goods’ meant a failure of one key nation-building strategy.
and social citizenship, which in turn was accompanied by another wave of emigration to places like the UK and Australia towards the end of the millennium. In addition, the collapse of the welfare and the implementation of ESAP elevated the importance of socioeconomic conditions as one of migratory and displacement pressures in Zimbabwe.

Many Zimbabweans left for different destination countries within the region and overseas to countries like the UK, for better socioeconomic and livelihood opportunities. This speaks to the deprivation of what Kessler-Harris (2003) refers to as economic citizenship, defined in terms of the opportunities, entitlements and privileges necessary for ordinary people to achieve independence and autonomy in their everyday lives (Kessler-Harris, 2003; Isin, 2008; Thomas, 2002). The economic order that accompanied ESAP made it difficult for ordinary people to survive due to unemployment, growing inequality and collapse in public services, which in turn explains massive exodus predominantly of those in urban areas (see Gaidzanwa, 1999; Mutizwa-Mangiza, 1998; Muzvidziwa, 2001). In addition to the fragment that left during the 1990s in response to ESAP, the socioeconomic turmoil that continue to see the exodus of many Zimbabweans today has some of its roots in the adoption and implementation of ESAP in the early 90s. It is therefore not coincidental, in this context, that many Zimbabweans continue to emigrate due to unrelenting and devastating socioeconomic hardships in recent years. The crisis of citizenship in Zimbabwe does not only have roots in neoliberal economic policies implemented in the 80s and 90s, which severely undermined the socioeconomic dimension of citizenship. As I have noted, Zimbabweans displayed their citizenship agency and responded in a number of ways, including the informalisation of the economy and emigration. The next section looks at other manifestations of weak citizenship and resulting patterns of emigration.
3.4.2 State-Citizen Relationship in Post-2000 Zimbabwe: Dynamics and Consequences

The socioeconomic and political crises that Zimbabwe faced for the past two decades tested the national belonging of Zimbabweans in various ways. An estimated three to four million Zimbabweans emigrated from the country in different directions at the height of the socioeconomic and political problems (see McGregor and Primorac, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011). Consequently, an estimated 3-4 million Zimbabwean nationals therefore left Zimbabwe since 2000 (McGregor & Primorac, 2010; Sachikonye, 2011). They emigrated towards different destinations, with popular destinations being countries within the Southern African region (see Alao, 2012; Tevera and Crush, 2010; McGregor and Primorac, 2010). For example, at one point, it was estimated that more than 1.5 million Zimbabweans lived in South Africa alone, and figures are thought to have continued to rise as the crises deepened over the years in Zimbabwe (Tevera and Crush, 2010). The reasons behind the mass exodus of Zimbabweans are too complex to explore deeply here, but some of the obvious ones relate to growing socioeconomic hardships, political repression, socio-political instability and the perceived opportunities in particular destination countries (Alao, 2012; Sachikonye, 2011; McGregor and Primorac, 2010).

The key trends of Zimbabwean emigration were as follows: firstly, there was a stream which departed when the Zimbabwean government embarked on what was referred to as the ‘Third Chimurenga’ when the controversial land reform programmes were implemented, which was followed by socioeconomic hardships and socio-political instability (Muzondidya, 2011); another mass left after the disputed harmonised elections of 2005 and the implementation of ‘Operation Murambatsvina’ (drive out rubbish), a forced slum clearance programme implemented by the Zimbabwean government resulting more than 3 million
people being negatively affected directly and indirectly in socioeconomic terms (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2006; Vambe, 2008; Mlambo, 2008; Sachikonye, 2011).

The effects of Murambatsvina have been documented including how it destroyed livelihoods of Zimbabweans in the urban areas and the fracturing of the nation, among other socio-political effects (Vambe, 2008; Mlambo, 2008; Solidarity Peace Trust). This intervention has been associated with the departure of another fragment of Zimbabweans, who left the country primarily in search of more secure habitats and livelihoods, leaving behind a fractured nation (Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010). Therefore, ‘Murambatsvina’ contributed to the fragmentation of the Zimbabwean nation, with another fragment of the Zimbabwean diaspora detaching from and leaving the nation in response to deprivation of livelihood opportunities (See Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005; Potts, 2008). This latter effect of Murambatsvina is often underemphasised by observers and commentators on Zimbabwe’s post-independence crisis.

The last major stream of migrations followed the controversial and violent elections of 2008 when more than 200 people lost their lives through political violence perpetrated by the ruling ZANU PF and security agents (Sachikonye, 2011). At present, the political and socioeconomic situation in Zimbabwe that forced the majority of the Zimbabweans out of the country, continues unresolved again following the disputed 2013 elections (Chan and Gallagher, 2014). Therefore, Zimbabwean migrants generally tend to fear not only the deterioration of socioeconomic conditions back home, but also socio-political instability and politically-motivated violence among other conditions making return migration difficult for many of them scattered across the world.
3.4.2.1 Third Chimurenga and its Impact on Citizenship in Post-2000 Zimbabwe

Contestations over constitutional and governance reforms also triggered another crisis resulting in the further deterioration and tensions between the Zimbabwean state and citizens. There had also been calls from various sections of the Zimbabwean society for reform of the old constitution adopted at the Lancaster Conference at the end of the armed resistance to colonial rule. Some of these calls had been coming from opposition political parties and civil society organisations such as the National Constitutional Assembly. In May 1999, Mugabe established a constitutional commission to spearhead the constitutional reform process, and a draft constitution was developed (Raftopoulos, 2001; Mlambo, 2008). The draft constitution was decided upon through a national referendum in which approximately 54% voted against the draft, while 45% voted for it (Sachikonye, 2013; also see Raftopoulos, 2001; Manby, 2002; Mlambo, 2008). While ZANU PF campaigned for the draft and mobilised its supporters to vote for it, civil society organisations and opposition parties campaigned against it; and there had been some incidences of violence before the referendum (Manby, 2002). The rejection of the draft constitution alarmed ZANU PF. What made ZANU PF unsettled was how opposition political formations and civil society organisations had managed to mobilise the electorate so effectively to vote against the wishes of ZANU PF. The socio-political climate changed rapidly since the referendum and ZANU PF became increasingly savage in the way it dealt with civil society, opposition and part of the ordinary citizenry perceived to be opposed to ZANU PF.

The subsequent parliamentary elections that followed in the same year 2000 were marred by violence, intimidation and denigration of opposition candidates through the state media during the campaign period (Manby, 2002). Political violence continued in 2001
towards presidential elections scheduled for year 2002; and it was reported that 48 people were killed before, during and after the elections (included those who were killed during land invasions) (Manby, 2002; Meredith, 2009). Subsequent harmonised elections in 2005 were similarly characterised by violence, harassment and intimidation of perceived supporters of opposition parties, mostly in the urban areas (Meredith, 2009). In short, the implementation of ESAP accompanied by the formation of the MDC again in 1999, the constitutional referendum in year 2000, and the start of violent farm seizures by the state in 1999, ushered in a new era of national polarisation and fragmentation.

Consequently, these events and their aftermath witnessed the exclusion and marginalisation of different categories of the Zimbabwean nation predominantly on the basis of political affiliation and class (Raftopoulos, 2001). Marginalisation also had a spatial dimension, with urban dwellers frequently becoming targets of repression and violence in the context of social activism and protestation against the devastating effects of ESAP (Raftopoulos, 2001; Chan, 2003; Sachikonye, 2011). It is important to recognise, therefore, that this was not a new trend. This tendency to marginalise and delegitimise any targeted sections of the citizenry before they are ‘dealt’ with (often violently), also occurred during the 1980s (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). During the 1980s, the basis for this kind of exclusion was ethnicity, region and political affiliation, while class, race and political affiliation became prominent in post-2000 Zimbabwe. This logic fits well with the emerging post-2000 relationship between the state and ZANU PF on the one hand, and civil society and opposition political formations on the other hand.

After independence, although Mugabe and ZANU espoused the imperatives of reconciliation and national cohesion, their desire was for certain parts of the population
(particularly the whites) to stay out of politics and ZANU PF would leave them alone (see Meredith, 2009). What this entailed was that white Zimbabweans were being denied the right to participate equally in Zimbabwe’s political life and denial of opportunities to express their political preferences and choices, which are both key citizenship principles (see Isin, 2008). In this configuration, white Zimbabweans were to be partial citizens enjoying only economic citizenship, but with limited and qualified political citizenship. Their citizenship was partial and qualified in the sense that they would only retain their superior economic citizenship as long as they would participate under ZANU PF or did not participate in opposition political formations.

However, when white Zimbabweans began to equally express their right to participate in the political life of the country the same way as other citizens, the ZANU PF and the state saw their move as a betrayal, and subsequently started treating them disdainfully (Meredith, 2009). The state and ZANU PF therefore decided to punish the white segment of the Zimbabwean nation, for their perceived recalcitrant tendencies of supporting the MDC (Meredith, 2009). Sporadic and violent farm invasions, and property seizures, ensued as early as 1999 spearheaded by war veterans (Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum, 2001). In these circumstances, the government officially announced the ‘fast track land reform programme in 2001 (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2001). Some white commercial farmers were tortured and with over a dozen reportedly killed in the process; and the majority were displaced from the farms (Meredith, 2005; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005). Similarly, most farmworkers working on those farms were also targeted in the harassment
and violence, with four reportedly killed while others lost their employment and became destitute (Manby, 2002; Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005; Mlambo, 2008).  

Another significant event occurred in 2005 when the government embarked on a slum clearance programme (Mlambo, 2008; Raftopoulos, 2008). This programme known as Operation Murambatsvina (Operation Drive out Rubbish) saw the demolition of properties and built structures that ‘violated’ town planning provisions (Vambe, 2008). Consequently, many people were left homeless while informal traders were affected adversely (Vambe, 2008). Although some ZANU PF members, ex-combatants, military and government officials had their structures destroyed in the process (see Sadomba, 2011; 2013), the backdrop and circumstances under which the intervention occurred make it easy to believe that it had other unstated aims. It is believed, for an instance, that the real and unstated aim of the programme was to flush out urbanites, perceived to be majority supporters of the opposition (Meredith, 2005). The timing of the programme also made it is easy to believe that it aimed at punishing urban dwellers (mostly in slums and shantytowns) for their perceived rebellious voting behaviour in the previous elections (Meredith, 2005).

Another important development since around 2006 relates to the calls for the indigenisation of the economy, following what ZANU PF considered to be a successful land reform programme (Meredith, 2009). Although some view it as a new policy in ZANU PF, calls for indigenisation of the economy has been on the party’s (and Mugabe’s government) agenda since the early 1990s (Raftopoulos and Moyo, 1994). The key message has been that ZANU PF was the party of the people with a mandate to empower Zimbabweans hence the

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28 The violent land seizures and farm displacements form part of the ‘Third Chimurenga’.
29 It is important to note that not all demolished structures violated urban and town planning regulations. For example, in Bulawayo, Victoria Falls and Harare, approved structures were reportedly destroyed in the process.
next phase of the struggle was to bring wealth to the people (*hupfumi kuvanhu*). A law was passed in the form of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act - obliging foreign-owned companies to cede 51% of their shares to black Zimbabweans (Government of Zimbabwe, 2008; Moore et al, 2013).

Again, this measure largely targeted whites and other foreign investors while at the same time benefitting top government officials and party-connected entrepreneurs on the basis of patronage. The indigenisation efforts have recently intensified as part of the current Zimbabwe Agenda for Socioeconomic Transformation (ZIMASSET) policy blueprint adopted after the end of the GNU (Government of Zimbabwe, 2013). This resulted in the exodus of investors was accompanied by worsening unemployment, in turn causing a significant loss of income and livelihoods for the majority of working people.

### 3.4.5 Understanding Contemporary Patterns of Emigration from Zimbabwe: 2008 and Beyond

In citizenship theory, the state is charged with managing the collective affairs of the entire national community, including its resources (Isin, 2002). The assumption underpinning this notion is that the state is benevolent, accountable and has the interests of the entire community at heart. Another underlying premise of this view of modern citizenship is that those who govern do so by the consent of the citizens, thus giving them democratic legitimacy (Isin, 2002; Bellamy, 2008). This, however, has not been the case in Zimbabwe. The right of citizens to choose who governs them as a principle of liberal political citizenship, however, has been historically undermined in presidential elections in Zimbabwe. This is evidenced by constant electoral contestation and efforts by the ruling party to retain state power using violence, electoral malpractices and other methods.
This was the case again in 2008, when the ruling ZANU PF made efforts to subvert the will and preferences of the majority of the citizenry using violence, intimidation and other tactics (Sachikonye, 2011; Meredith, 2009). For example, harmonised elections occurred in March 2008, with a less contested and less violent parliamentary election in which the MDC won majority of the seats. The 2008 presidential election was initially peaceful though tense, and Morgan Tsvangirai won 47.9% of the ballots while Robert Mugabe got 43.2% (Muzondidya, 2011; Sachikonye, 2011; Meredith, 2009). Although he won the election, Morgan Tsvangirai failed to win an outright majority which would allow him to form a government hence a run-off election was agreed. It would take place on 28th June 2008. The campaign process however was excessively violent resulting in the killing of more than 200 MDC supporters. Tsvangirai withdrew at the last minute from the presidential race.

The outcome of this election was highly contented with allegations of rigging and manipulation of the voters’ role, intimidation, violence and other electoral malpractices (Sachikonye, 2011; Masunungure, 2008; Meredith, 2009). The involvement of the security forces in the perpetration of violence, harassment and intimidation, coercing people to vote for ZANU PF, also marked a fundamental departure from democratic norms and principles (Sachikonye, 2012; Masunungure, 2008). This resulted in international condemnation of the entire election process, the nullification of the outcome and the formation of a government of national unity between ZANU PF and the two MDCs. Although there were tensions and contestations in the coalition, the GNU period from 2009 to 2013 was marked by relative socioeconomic stability (Chan and Gallagher, 2015).

This GNU period also witnessed the drafting and passing of a new constitution and the enactment of progressive political reforms culminating into the 2013 election, in which ZANU
PF extraordinarily did not rely on violence but covert intimidation, harassment and arrests of political opponents (Chan and Gallagher, 2015). This relative stability in government and change of political strategy by ZANU PF gave an impression of a reformed ZANU PF to the electorate, with devastating implications for opposition parties at the 2013 polls (Chan and Gallagher, 2013). Although ZANU PF won the election, there were largely unsubstantiated concerns relating to lack of electoral transparency and allegations of rigging of the ballots (Chan and Gallagher, 2015).

The trend has been that of intimidation, harassment and manipulation of the process and outcome, including the tendency for violence to occur before, during and after the elections. In other words, there tends to be violence during election season in Zimbabwe, which often leads to subsequent displacement and waves of emigration of those affected by the ills associated with the electoral process and undesirable outcomes. Elections in Zimbabwe have, therefore, not worked in the interest of nation-building as evidenced by the existence of election-related socio-political divisions that have emerged across the Zimbabwean society. Zimbabwe has historically been a polarised society and these divisions have often become more defined and manifest during election times. However, this phenomenon has become more complicated since the tenure of the GNU but this dynamic seems to have changed with political orientation having become more fragmented, ambivalent and fluid since the 2013 elections, beyond the traditional ZANU PF /MDC binary (Chan and Gallagher, 2015). In other words, although polarisation of society on the basis of

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30 Party-political polarisation did not start with ZANU PF and the MDC; instead, it has a long history. For example, it played out during the 1980, 1985, 1990 and subsequent elections.

31 Chan and Gallagher observe how traditional opposition party supporters have developed mixed feelings towards the dominant political parties, unsure which to support. For lack of a viable alternative, others ended up voting for the MDC during 2013 elections.
political affiliation, post-2013 political developments are showing signs of a shift from polarisation, to more complexity, fracturing and fluidity.

The above events help illustrate how socio-politically divided the Zimbabwean nation had become after 2008; and this phenomenon represents a significant migratory pressure which directly led to the flight of thousands across the country’s borders. In other words, electoral contestation in Zimbabwe goes to show that choosing who governs, as a fundamental component of citizenship in its liberal sense, has been a highly contested process, culminating in the displacement and flight of another significant fragment of the Zimbabwean nation, particularly victims of political violence, intimidation and harassment in their local communities. In the next few paragraphs, I will identify some of those adversely affected by the crisis of belonging and citizenship since the year 2000 (most of whom resorted to emigration) and how they may have been so disadvantaged.

3.5 Concluding Discussion: Patterns of Exclusion and Inclusion in Post-Independence Zimbabwe?

One of the key features of citizenship struggles in post-independence Zimbabwe described in preceding sections of this chapter has been the creation of winners and losers at any particular epoch of the nation’s history. One of the cumulative effects of socio-political and economic developments since independence in Zimbabwe is that some sections of the nation benefited materially while others were deprived of the opportunities, rights, entitlements and access to national resources. This was largely perpetrated by the state at various times and by various means since independence (Sachikonye, 2011). Before independence, those who largely benefitted from their membership in the colony were
obviously the whites on the basis of their race; but this dynamic has been rapidly changing since independence.

In the immediate aftermath of the armed struggle, when for the first few transitional years, everyone was optimistic about independence and there were signs that the new Zimbabwe would benefit all who belong in it. This dream however only lasted until 1983 when Gukurahundi ensued (Raftopoulos, 2013). During that time and soon afterwards, it was the majority Shona-speaking people in Mashonaland region some of whom seemed to benefit because of their ethnic identity and region. Hostilities ended however with ZAPU and ZANU signing the unity accord in the year 1987.

Dynamics shifted again and it appeared there would be another attempt at real national unity between the different segments of the Zimbabwean nation. It was not until the adoption of ESAP, the 1992 drought, awarding of the $50 000 gratuities to liberation war veterans and the decision to intervene in the DRC war, with devastating fiscal implications, that another phase of deprivation began this time caused not by overt conflict but along socioeconomic lines (Mlambo, 2008). The social impact of the Zimbabwe crisis has been the most visible and devastating on the majority of Zimbabweans (Murisa and Nyaguse, 2015). And the dynamics of material deprivation during this era largely followed a class dimension with working class urbanites having borne most of the brunt of structural adjustment programme – this segment of the Zimbabwean society was left worse off largely in terms of their material conditions due to biting socioeconomic hardships. The bourgeoisie as well as the ruling elites who were dependent on the state for material benefits by way of patronage,
corruption and nepotism, largely benefitted during this episode of the post-independence national crises.

The turn to the new millennium was also met with growing despair and despondency due to worsening socioeconomic hardships in Zimbabwe (Mlambo, 2008). The Zimbabwean state, through its system of patronage and partisanship, became the dominant employer, allocator of opportunities and bearer of opportunities for upward mobility for those that tow the party line (Ake, 1992; Hyden, 1983). For example, ZANU PF party elites, senior government officials, securocrats and some supporters benefitted from various state resources including land grabbed during the chaotic land reform exercise, while others grabbed companies as part of the ongoing indigenisation and empowerment initiative in recent years (Moore et al, 2015; Meredith, 2009; Manby, 2002). Similarly, those who fought in the liberation struggle continue to pledge their allegiance to ZANU PF and Mugabe and in so doing continue to claim special treatment and benefits by presenting their grievances and demands for top positions in government and state-owned firms, diplomatic posts, farmland and mining concessions.

The majority of Zimbabweans however seem to have lost more significantly and in different ways. For example, the ways in which the Zimbabwean state and the ruling ZANU PF party ascribed and imposed the political identity of enemy of the country/enemy within in alienating ways, partly explains the fracturing of the Zimbabwean nation (Meredith, 2009). In ZANU PF discourses, political enemies are often linked to the past chief detractor - Britain - as a way of delegitimising their claim to Zimbabweanness. Some sections of the population were therefore labelled and identified as ‘sell-outs’, ‘puppets’, ‘agents of regime change’, ‘unpatriotic’ and ‘treasonous’ (see Tendi, 2010; Chiumbu and Muswemwa, 2012). The
victimisation and targeting of different categories of those perceived ‘enemies of Zimbabwe’ not occurred only in the opposition political formations and civil society, but across the entire society in ways that further divided an already differentiated nation. Furthermore, those living in the urban areas, particularly in the high density, low income areas perceived to be opposition party strongholds were targeted for violence and intimidation for being sell-outs and supporters of the regime change agenda (Mlambo, 2008). They were also deprived in terms of service delivery and housing opportunities such as land allocation for building purposes.

The youth were also alienated for being born frees, not having participated in the struggle and for tendency to support the opposition parties, while intellectuals were alienated for nurturing democratic political ideas. Furthermore, because of their race, historical antipathy and perceived support for the opposition, white Zimbabweans were delegitimised by being labelled ‘enemies of the state’ and therefore alienated from the nation by being associated with colonial rule and the British (Meredith, 2009; Tendi, 2010; Chiumbu and Musemwa, 2012). As such, they were expected to have a political voice in the post-independence national dispensation and attempts to participate in political life was brutally repelled by ZANU PF through land seizures after 2000.

Similarly, ethnic and other minorities were abandoned by the state under the leadership of ZANU PF for being perceived different, strangers or disloyal to the nation (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009). For example, Zimbabwe also hosts a sizeable immigrant population born and domiciled within its territory; and their ancestors and parents historically immigrated into Zimbabwe in search of employment from as far as Malawi and Mozambique (Masunungure and Koga, 2013). Legal status, which sits at the heart of citizenship in the state,
was denied to these sections of the Zimbabwean nation, particularly those who are Zimbabwean by birth (Manby, 2009). This denial of legal citizenship is premised on the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act no. 23 of 1984 (Government of Zimbabwe, 1984). Without formal legal citizenship status were not only considered ‘alien’, but also deprived them of substantive benefits and entitlements associated with citizenship (see Isin, 2002; Manby, 2009). For example, Masunungure and Koga observe that:

*The regime disparagingly referred to the migrant population as ‘totemless aliens’, and via citizenship legislation, it deliberately excluded these populations from voting and benefiting from other government programmes like land redistribution.*

Subsequently, this often-ignored category of the Zimbabwean population became completely invisible in the Zimbabwean social and political landscape due to their exclusion.

This pattern of exclusion from meaningful substantive citizenship also applies to the plight of the coloured community which has been largely marginalised; which explains why Muzondidya (1999) referred to both immigrants and coloureds in Zimbabwe as ‘invisible minorities’. The material conditions of other groups deteriorated including farmworkers and farm managers; and urban dwellers some of whom were left homeless and deprived of their livelihoods as a result of a slum clearance programme famously known as Operation *Murambatsvina* (Operation Drive Out Rubbish) (Vambe, 2008; Chiambu, 2012). All the above dynamics represent failed citizenship, particularly when citizenship is conceived in terms of the relationship between the state and citizen (See Lewis, 1998). These issues can, therefore,

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33 See Masunungure and Koga’s paper here: [https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164681/afrobriefno116.pdf](https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164681/afrobriefno116.pdf)
be viewed as manifestations of the crisis of national citizenship, which in turn drove people out of Zimbabwe.

I have sought to demonstrate above that what troubles Zimbabwe could be thought of as a deep-rooted crisis of national citizenship affecting not only Zimbabwe but many post-independence Sub Saharan African countries. This crisis has manifested in different political and socioeconomic problems, to which citizens have responded to this failure of conventional modes of citizenship in a variety of ways, including flight and dispersal. The multifacetedness of the citizenship crisis described above, resonates with the fact that Zimbabwean migration patterns have been mixed (Crush et al, 2015). This chapter shows how national modes of citizenship based on liberal understanding of citizenship have failed in post-independence Zimbabwe, and this failure has manifested in political and socioeconomic problems pushing Zimbabweans out of the country.

It has also become evident that several fragments of the Zimbabwean nation have departed the country at various distinct phases of the unfolding national crisis since independence, including the liberation war, post-war, ‘Gukurahundi’, ESAP, land reform, ‘Murambatsvina and 27th June 2008 elections being some of the waves of departure from Zimbabwe. This difference in the causes, times and circumstances surrounding their departure represents another set of fault lines along which the Zimbabwean diaspora remains fragmented outside the country. This chapter has discussed elements of national citizenship and how deficient these elements have been in post-independence. However, it would have been more interesting to see how citizenship plays at sub-national, with a particular emphasis on how Zimbabweans negotiate citizenship and contest exclusion at community and local levels. This would be a fascinating line of inquiry going forward, after this PhD.
The question that, then, becomes pertinent in this study relates to whether this emigration has been accompanied by any new modes of citizenship; and if so, how can they be characterised. This is the primary question this thesis seeks to answer, and subsequent chapters demonstrate the fragmented ways the Zimbabwean diaspora begin to imagine and perform citizenship in different contexts they are hosted. It will also become clear how arenas of citizenship change and multiply, with different fragments of the Zimbabwean diaspora engaging as citizens in different arenas and at different scales. It will also become apparent that these differences in how diasporas imagine and practice citizenship while outside Zimbabwe are mediated by different sets of factors including context, past experiences, reasons for emigration, gender, immigration status and so on.
Chapter Four: Being Political in Multiple Ways: Experiences of the Zimbabwean Diaspora

4.1 Chapter Introduction

Citizenship is often understood as the vertical relationship between the state and its citizens; and citizens are formally recognised on the basis of their formal legal status which qualifies them as citizens (Oliver and Heater, 1994; Janoski, 1998). Citizens are not only recognised on the basis of their legal status, but a set of rights and entitlements also accompany that status (Bosniak, 2000; Bellamy, 2008). I have highlighted earlier, that citizenship is performed differently and one of the ways, from a republicanist perspective of citizenship, is through political participation (see Thomas, 2000). In other words, to be a citizen is to be political (see Isin, 2002). But what is not always clear is how people become political, especially when hosted outside their countries of origin.

I have also demonstrated in earlier chapters how large sections of the Zimbabwean citizenry, most of whom decided to emigrate and are subjects of this inquiry, did not have a meaningful opportunity to partake in mainstream politics back in Zimbabwe (see Sachikonye, 2011; Betts and Jones, 2016). This denial of meaningful substantive citizenship in its liberal sense of rights, political participation and welfare, manifested in different ways including denial of the right to vote, manipulation of citizens’ electoral choices, violation of civil and political rights, and state violence (see Betts and Jones, 2016; Dorman, 2016). This limited the majority of citizens’ ability to influence politics and the state in any meaningful way, which fundamentally amounts to a denial of citizenship. However, diasporas have been observed to find opportunities of contesting authoritarianism and repression across geographical distance (see Baubock, 1994; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008; also see Betts and Jones, 2016). This chapter seeks to determine if this is indeed true by looking at the extent to which
these observations reflect the experiences of Zimbabweans hosted in the UK and South Africa. If true, this chapter will also consider the way(s) those Zimbabweans become political while hosted in these respective countries.

4.1.1 Transnational Migration and Relocation of Politics

This thesis starts by concurring that emigration is indeed accompanied by the relocation of politics, with the different destination countries in which Zimbabweans are hosted becoming new sites of Zimbabwean politics. A number of studies have shown that diasporas engage in political activities across geographical distance and transcending territorial boundaries in different contexts, including Zimbabweans in Britain (See Baubock, 2006; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; also see Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura, 2008). This cross-border and long-distance nature of political participation, as practiced by diasporas, adds to the transnational nature of diaspora citizenship discussed in the introductory chapter of this thesis.

There are at least three challenges with transnational forms of politics as practiced by diasporas in diverse contexts: firstly, the emphasis is often on overt and material aspects of transnational political practices such as diaspora vote, protest, lobbying and other activities aimed at directly influencing homeland politics, negating political subjectivities and other ways of being political (see Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Baubock, 2003; Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura, 2008). Secondly, it is not always clear who participates and who does not, which conceals the fact that diasporas (diverse as they tend to be) do not partake in homeland politics in the same fashion.

Another deficit of existing scholarship on diaspora politics is that it underemphasises how modes of diaspora political participation are mediated and shaped by an interplay of
context, geography and history among other factors. This thesis generates insights on these three and other aspects of diaspora politics, with particular reference to experiences of Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa. It argues that, yes, Zimbabweans may find opportunity to participate in political life of the homeland, but not everyone has the opportunity or capacity to influence the politics of Zimbabwe from afar.

This thesis observes, instead, that different categories of Zimbabweans act politically in relation to Zimbabwe in different ways, which represents another dimension of the fragmented nature of diaspora citizenship. While some become involved in outward political activism and mobilisation mediated by the state, external political party structures, diaspora associations and non-state actors, others find other ways of being political. This thesis also acknowledges the different barriers to political mobilisation, leading some sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora (perhaps the majority) to start engaging in other kinds of political activity not directly aimed at influencing the state and mainstream political processes. These include discursive forms of politics by way of everyday political talk (online and offline) with compatriots within the host country and beyond. Finally, using empirical data, this study also acknowledges and explains the disengagement of some sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora in relation to the Zimbabwean state and its politics, particularly those that start to develop interest in politics of the host state.

4.1.2 Different Ways of Being Political

The ways in which different segments of the Zimbabwean migrant population engage in political activity outside their countries of origin are complex and diverse. They are also mediated by context and many other factors, and this chapter will highlight these dynamics of participation and non-participation. And I want to rely on Pasura’s multifaceted
conceptualisation of migrant participation and non-participation, which recognises that political agency of Zimbabwean migrants is asserted in different ways (Pasura, 2008). Pasura categorises Zimbabwean migrants into four types depending on the degree of their activism, which I discuss in the following section. For example, Pasura observes sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora that do not partake in overt political activism due to their complete loss of interest in Zimbabwean politics, referred to as silent (Pasura, 2008). This category of Zimbabweans was also present in the data from this study.

Empirical evidence supports this observation, and goes to explain this disengagement and disinterest in Zimbabwean politics among those in this category. Since citizenship has an affective and emotional component, one of the explanations for their apathy could be located in their senses of belonging and conceptions of home, which may have changed. In other words, this category of Zimbabweans may not necessarily have become completely inactive politically, but perhaps start developing an interest in the politics of the host country where they increasingly feel at home. Empirical data suggests that some sections of the Zimbabweans no longer solely and universally see Zimbabwe as their ‘home’ both in sentimental and material terms, having developed multiple affinities towards the host country (see Psura, 2010). This has implications on their desire, motivation and interest in Zimbabwean politics, and perhaps the lack of interest by this section of the diaspora partly suggests that they have become interested in the political life of the host country in which they now feel they belong.

Pasura also identifies a section of the migrant community that are visible depicting those actively engaged in migrant politics (Pasura, 2008). As I pointed out, this is the dominant material conception of diaspora political activism, emphasising how diasporas engage in
different political activities aimed at influencing the politics of their home countries (Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). This kind of diaspora political mobilisation includes activities such as extraterritorial voting, lobbying, protest action, electoral campaigning and political party fundraising (See Kuhlmann (2008); Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Pasura, 2008). It is possible that some Zimbabweans hosted in South Africa and the UK may engage in some of these activities, but not everyone has the capacity to be involved in such activism for different reasons.

How different sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora engaged politically was mediated by different factors. These included place of settlement, gender, immigration status, history, background and personal experience among several others, make it more convenient and desirable for some to participate than others. Similarly, participation in political activism is not a fixed and static phenomenon, but turbulent and fluctuating owing to different factors. For example, migrants may get involved in a campaign for tactical reasons, perhaps because they want to boost their claim for asylum; while on the next day they may not see the benefit of doing so. This makes it important to examine the dynamics of participation and non-participation to determine who participates and who does not in different contexts.

The above dynamics, therefore, potentially leave some sections of the population not engaging in this distinct kind of political activism. And these are often viewed as inactive or, in Pasura’s terms, dormant (Pasura, 2008). The dormancy of these Zimbabweans is a product of the dynamics of participation and non-participation alluded to above, which I will map out in the following empirical sections of this chapter. But, as findings of this study will show,

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34 Itzigsohn and Villacres empirically observed this kind of political transnationalism, especially external voting, among Dominican and Salvadoran migrants living in the US.
some Zimbabweans categorised as inactive or dormant because of their inability or lack of desire to participate in what Flint refers to as ‘Big P’ political activism, actually partake in other forms of political activity, including talking about politics as part of their everyday lives (Flint, 2003). In this respect, on the basis of empirical findings, I will also argue that non-participation indeed constitutes a way of exercising political agency by those who shun formal politics and overt political activism, opting for other more liberating ways of being political.

Furthermore, as I have argued earlier, the Zimbabwean diaspora comes from a history of exclusion, repression and denial of meaningful citizenship, as is generally accepted by scholars on African politics (see Ake, 1990; Azarya, 1988). Therefore, although some may engage in ‘Big P’ political activities, those who become disenfranchised and avoid participation through organised civil society (perhaps the majority of those historically and structurally disempowered) may opt into alternative forms of politics. This could be the case with Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK, most of whom have been observed to be disengaged from overt political mobilisation (see Pasura, 2008).

One of the ways in which the Zimbabwean diaspora express their political agency takes the form of everyday, unofficial and unorganised forms of discursive political activity (see Scott, 1985). And I suggest that Flint’s distinction between ‘Big P’ and ‘small p’ participation in political life, as a way of better understanding the different kinds of political activism the Zimbabwean diaspora potentially engages in (Flint, 2003). In Flint’s terms, the ‘Big P’ politics is concerned with the ways citizens engage formally with the structures of the

35 Flint characterises ‘big P’ politics as an old mode of politics centred around the state and its geopolitical relations, while ‘small p’ politics was not practiced by ‘card-carrying’ members of political parties. The latter is considered ‘new’, identity-based, mode of politics often not always based on direct engagement with the state.
36 See James Scott (1985) explores everyday strategies by which marginalised people resist and contest repression and domination.
state, while ‘small p’ focusses on the micro-politics manifest in citizens’ everyday lives outside the parameters of the state. This kind of political activity also tends to be vernacular, encompassing seemingly ‘non-political’ aspects, and occurs in different online and offline spaces.³⁷

There are various spaces in which discursive political activity occurs within the Zimbabwean diaspora, including the home, church, workplace, at funerals and in other social spaces where Zimbabweans meet and engage in informal political talk. There are also online platforms for such activity and Pasura correctly identifies the epistemic tendencies of those who engage in networking and ‘cyberpolitics’ on the internet (Pasura, 2008). However, Pasura’s characterisation of Zimbabweans’ political activity as ‘cyber-politics’ only captures the platform on which it occurs which is ‘cyber’ in nature. In this study, I want to add to this conception by exploring and characterising the discursive nature and substance of the political activity the majority of ordinary Zimbabweans engage in online and offline, what I will also refer to as everyday political talk. Pasura’s framework is useful in several ways, including its recognition that migrants partake in politics in multiple ways. What also makes Pasura’s analytical framework useful is that it acknowledges that some sections of the migrant community may not actively partake in political mobilisation for different reasons. It also recognises that not all migrants engage overtly and actively in politics in material ways, and I will use empirical findings to map out the different ways by which different categories of migrants engage in politics, including through every day political talk online and offline.

³⁷ See Wright et al (2012)'s work on the everyday political discourses on the internet.
4.2 **Being Political in Different Ways: Empirical Dynamics**

An average of 30% of the participants in South Africa (25% in Johannesburg and 5% in Cape Town) were engaged in ‘Big P’ political activism and mobilisation aimed at influencing the Zimbabwean state, homeland politics in general. They engaged in different activities including campaigning to vote in the next Zimbabwean elections, seeking political representation in the legislature and involvement with external structures of Zimbabwean political parties. However, in the UK, an average of 25% of participants engaged in overt political activism and mobilisation aimed at influencing political processes in Zimbabwe, through protesting, marching or picketing against the Zimbabwean government. Participants in this category across the three research sites tended to be men aged over 40 years and, although the majority of them were legally resident in both host countries, they held different immigration statuses. Most of these participants had previously been involved in political and social activism prior to their departure from Zimbabwe, and some escaped from the country for fear of being persecuted due to their political and civic activism. They were settled in different parts of the three places, with some living in low-income and others in more affluent parts of Johannesburg, Cape Town and south-east England.

However, in both host countries, participants without valid immigration status or completely undocumented frequently reported not being involved in overt political activities. There was another category composed of an average of 75% who did not engage in overt political activism and mobilisation, but were politically engaged through the sharing of views and preferences about Zimbabwean politics through various platforms. Interestingly, nearly half of these participants (mostly under 30 and women) had never voted in Zimbabwean elections while outside Zimbabwe. The same sub-category of younger participants had also
never actively participated in any political mobilisation with a focus on Zimbabwean politics. In terms of ‘Big P’ political participation, these participants viewed themselves as politically inactive, and it would have been interesting to find out if this was just a continuation of their voting apathy from back in Zimbabwe. Perhaps some had never voted before and, if so, such enduring apathy would not be attributable to diaspora conditions. This category of those who did not participate in mainstream political processes could be divided into two distinct sub-categories, as discussed below:

Firstly, there was a category of participants who engaged in frequent and sustained informal discussion and debate on Zimbabwean political issues, online and offline. For example, a total of 80% (25% in Johannesburg and 45% in Cape Town) of participants in South Africa indicated their involvement in political debates and discussions on the internet and mobile technologies such as WhatsApp groups engaging fellow Zimbabweans living in Zimbabwe and other parts of the world on Zimbabwean political issues. Almost 20% of these participants indicated that they engaged in a discussion about Zimbabwean politics at least once every week with fellow Zimbabweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg. Such political conversations occurred predominantly with groups formed through church and work.

On the other hand, this sub-category was noticeably larger in the UK where more than 75% of the participants reported having engaged in political discussion and debate online. This was achieved through online discussion and debate, as well as following online news outlets for updates on the political and socioeconomic situation back in Zimbabwe. These participants were relatively younger and women. They were also of mixed settlement locations and immigration statuses, including some who were completely undocumented. They also tended to be of higher socioeconomic status, being formally employed, relatively
highly educated and living in relatively affluent parts of Cape Town and Johannesburg. This sub-category was larger in the south-east England compared to the those in Cape Town and Johannesburg. This was partly because participants in the UK reported spending more time on the internet than in South Africa due to the greater accessibility and affordability of internet and mobile technologies in the UK.

UK-based participants were also spread evenly across South East England. Some of the spaces on which participants in both host countries engaged included social media platforms such as Twitter, YouTube and Facebook. It is also worth pointing out that participants in the UK almost exclusively engaged online due to cheaper and wider broadband coverage, while a larger proportion in South Africa relied on WhatsApp and other mobile platforms. Another sub-category comprised an average of 35% in South Africa (15% in Cape Town and 20% in Johannesburg) of those who were not participating in any visible form of political activism on Zimbabwean politics, but tended to express their political views, feelings and preferences towards the Zimbabwean state through vernacular discourses, built-in within their everyday conversations with fellow Zimbabweans. Such talk often occurred in different informal settings where Zimbabweans met, including at work, church and at home.

I also witnessed and took part in political conversations during my travel from Cape Town to Zimbabwe as part of my fieldwork, which suggests that Zimbabweans are indeed always thinking and talking about politics wherever they are. On the other hand, there was a significant proportion in the UK with 40% engaging in activities that fit in this category. One of the defining features of these unofficial, micro-political activities was that, although not happening in conventional arenas of politics, participants attached political meanings to those conversations. It was also evident that Zimbabweans engage in political talk various social
spaces including home, church, workplace and in asylum and immigration queues at the Department of Home Affairs among other places.

Lastly, a small proportion of participants displayed a lack of interest in Zimbabwean politics, particularly those who had acquired citizenship status in the UK and South Africa. For example, around 5% in South Africa (6% in Cape Town and 4% in Johannesburg) indicated that they had totally lost interest in Zimbabwean politics for different reasons. Less than half of these participants cited their engagement with the mainstream political system of South Africa as a reason for this disengagement. Other reasons were due to uncertainty about their future back in their country of origin, or likelihood of return. They also displayed a lack of trust in politicians and mainstream politics and some of their preoccupations included chasing livelihood opportunities and fighting to obtain a secure legal status in South Africa where they felt their future was. Although some were undocumented and living precariously, most of them tended to have lived in the host country for not less than 10 years, and tended to have acquired citizenship status and felt established.

On the other hand, a higher proportion of 20% in the UK indicated their complete disinterest in Zimbabwean politics, for almost similar reasons to those given by participants in South Africa. For example, about 15% of those disinterested in Zimbabwean politics reported having taken an interest in UK politics where they were beginning to feel ‘at home’. This latter sub-category was composed mostly of adults with indefinite leave to remain in the UK and British citizenship and who had lived in the UK for an average of 15 years; and they participated in UK politics mainly by voting in local government and national elections. The remaining 5% expressed total disinterest in both the politics of Zimbabwe and the UK for many reasons, including not identifying with Zimbabwe any more, not seeing the benefits of
participating in politics, and being too busy pursuing livelihood opportunities. This shows that indeed diasporas express their political agency in different ways, and those seemingly not participating or disinterested in Zimbabwean politics may be partaking in the politics of other polities other than their country of origin.

4.2.1 ‘Big P’ Political Mobilisation and Its Limits

Many studies have shown that diaspora populations find ways to mobilise politically in order to influence the politics of their homelands (Baubock, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2001; Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura; 2008). For example, they may push for political representation in their home country legislatures, demand extraterritorial voting rights, join political parties and lobby the state (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003; Lafleur, 2013). The Dominican diaspora in the US also demonstrates how migrants maintain attachments with their home countries across geographical space, taking advantage of flexible citizenship measures such as dual citizenship arrangements (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Baubock, 2008). Members of the Dominican diaspora, for instance, were observed engaging actively in homeland politics to the extent of running for political office, campaigning while based in the US and funding political campaigns back in their country of origin (Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). Some diasporas vote while outside their countries of origin, while others travel during election time to vote in their home country constituencies (see Lafleur, 2013). This pattern is confirmed in the case of Zimbabweans by my findings which show that 30% hosted in South Africa and 25% in the UK engaged in political activism aimed at contesting their authoritarian and repressive state back in Zimbabwe.

Other specific ways by which participants directly sought to influence political processes included campaigning for extraterritorial (diaspora) voting, protesting against the
Zimbabwean state at the Zimbabwean embassies and consular offices in London, Cape Town and Pretoria, lobbying the two host governments (UK and South Africa) to apply pressure on the Zimbabwean government to embark on political reforms and mobilising political party funding. For example, I interviewed 6 participants working as activists with Zimbabwean associations and NGOs such as the PASSOP in Cape Town, Zimbabwe Exiles Forum in Johannesburg and the Zimbabwe Association in London. They used various strategies aimed at influencing relevant political actors so that they respond to the longstanding Zimbabwean crisis. These included the systematic use of information through the media, website publications and research reports to publicise the ongoing political and socioeconomic crisis in Zimbabwe, in a bid to make the world aware of any such developments.

There were also some participants who had become card-carrying members of the MDC-T and other opposition political parties, with a total of 18 participants in South Africa and 6 in the UK actively involved in the external (provincial) structures of their parties. This has also been the case with Zimbabweans in South Africa in recent past who have consistently sought to push the South African government to change its foreign policy, advocating for a tougher stance against ZANU PF and the Zimbabwean government. The above kind of overt political activity by Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK closely resembles what is referred to as ‘visible’ participation by Pasura, discussed earlier (Pasura, 2008). It is important to note that the degree of effectiveness of this mode of political mobilisation is ambiguous.

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38 In 2013, the Zimbabwe Exiles Forum (ZEF) approached the Supreme Court of Appeal to file a case against ZANU PF and senior government officials involved in the torture of MDC activists during a police raid on the party’s headquarters in Harare. The ZEF sought a court order obliging the South African authorities to conduct an investigation that would result in the prosecution of the perpetrators of the crime, in terms of South Africa’s obligations to the International Criminal Court.
The success of these lobbying efforts depends on a number of factors, including the openness and inclusivity of the foreign policy-making process in the host country, particularly in some countries where policy-makers often invite diaspora participation on foreign policy issues affecting their countries. Although participants in the UK reported that the British government has occasionally solicited the views of Zimbabweans, it was often the ‘voice’ of civil society elites and organised associations that was heard. Ordinary Zimbabweans were often not consulted on foreign policy making on Zimbabwe. On the other hand, South Africa was accused of not opening up any space for the participation of Zimbabweans in its foreign policy-making.

Most of the scholarship on diaspora politics appears optimistic about their capacity to influence homeland political processes across geographical distance (Ostegaard-Nielsen, 2003; Kuhlmann, 2008; Pasura, 2008; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008; Lafleur, 2013). But, as indicated in the summary of findings above, not everyone will have an equal opportunity to participate in ‘Big P’ political activity for different reasons. In fact, some participants were better positioned and more likely to participate in certain kinds of political activity than others depending on their backgrounds, host country contexts, geographical distance and several other factors. Therefore, it is crucial to understand the dynamics surrounding the participation and non-participation of different categories of participants in ‘Big P’ politics in these two contexts.

4.2.1.1 Diaspora (Non) Participation in Historical Context

Histories and background experiences of various categories of diaspora populations sometimes continue to shape the ways they participate in political life while outside the country. As such, how the Zimbabwean diaspora population engages/fails to engage in overt
political activism has to be understood in its historical context. Particularly, the tendency by the majority of the participants to not get involved in different kinds of outward political activism is traceable to the historical modes of citizenship in Zimbabwe, designed to exclude the majority of black Africans from participating in political and governance processes. The majority of the participants in this study came from a background of impoverishment and repression back in Zimbabwe. Therefore, of course depending on their age and positions in Zimbabwe’s social structure, their propensity to engage (disengage) in ‘Big P’ political activism may have been directly or indirectly affected by the historical processes described below.

Participation in political life has also been historically bifurcated in post-colonial contexts where Zimbabweans originate, with some sections of the citizenry more actively and outwardly engaged in mainstream political life than others (see Mamdani, 1996; Ekeh, 1975). Although a lot of patchy and impromptu rebellions, protests and other forms of political action have occurred in different African contexts, there has not been an entrenched culture of political struggle among the majority of ordinary citizens since independence, at least in relation to Zimbabwe (Turok, 1987). This relatively non-participant political culture is rooted in repressive colonial and post-colonial regimes which limited spaces for meaningful participation in political life, and this has been the case with Zimbabwe too.

Exposure to years of violence, intimidation and repression by the post-independent state which has grown authoritarian in many countries has reinforced a sense of internalised powerlessness and fear among the African citizenry. Sachikonye, for example, characterised Zimbabwean citizens as:

*a society traumatized by fear, withdrawal and collective depression based on past memories of violence, intimidation and harassment* (Sachikonye, 2011: xvii).
The net effect of the above forces in Zimbabwe and many other African countries has been to make it difficult for a large section of Zimbabweans to engage actively and meaningfully in political life.\textsuperscript{39}

It is, therefore, not coincidental that only 25% of the UK-based and 30% of South Africa-based participants who reported their involvement in overt political activism, tended to have been historically involved with political and social activism back in Zimbabwe. Some Zimbabweans simply lack experience with navigating political institutions and processes, owing to their individual backgrounds. Where they lived, their socioeconomic status and what they were able to accomplish in their lives, affects their propensity to take part in political activism. This pattern was confirmed by a 55-year-old woman named Mai Unendoro in Cape Town:

\textit{I have never taken part in any demonstration or march organised by MDC or ZCTU during the time of ESAP back in Zimbabwe. I was always scared of taking part in demonstrations because people always ended up being arrested and beaten by the riot police. That is what used to happen before independence when Smith was still in power. Nothing really changed in Zimbabwe.}\textsuperscript{40}

However, it is also important to note that not all Zimbabweans have been affected by the dominant authoritarian and repressive form of governance practiced by the ZANU PF government since the 1980s. For example, some sections of the Zimbabwean citizenry, particularly the educated middle classes and urbanites, have often actively engaged with the mainstream political system in ways consistent with the principles of active citizenship.

\textsuperscript{39} See Ben Turok (1987) who characterises this phenomenon as universal demobilisation.
\textsuperscript{40} Interview held at Joe Gqabi Train Station, Philippi, Cape Town on 17 February 2015.
Some may also have engaged in political activism out of anger and the desire to see political change in Zimbabwe, especially those that were directly affected by ZANU PF repression and violence.⁴¹ For example, Cape Town-based Mr Mapfumo, a 44-year-old former MDC-T ward councillor in Zaka District who was violently displaced from his home by ZANU PF militia and war veterans forcing him to escape to South Africa, declared:

*Mugabe and his people caused a lot of suffering and destruction to many people. I was one of the direct victims of political violence and I was forced to abandon my family when I came here. I will not rest until Mugabe and his people are out of people. I will not stop fighting until justice prevails.*⁴²

At the same time, there has been a tendency by the ruling party ZANU PF to use intimidation, harassment and violence to coerce citizens into engaging in mainstream politics to support their party,⁴³ but this tendency was not observed among participants in South Africa and the UK. In this context, it is not difficult to understand why only a relatively small proportion of participants in both host countries tended to be actively mobilised and visibly participated in different kinds of overt political activism. Whether diasporas engage in transnational political activism and the nature of political activity they take part in, also depends on geographical distance.

**4.2.1.2 The Limits of External Political Structures**

External structures of country of origin political parties, accompanied by a robust diaspora voting rights framework, are often viewed as a vehicle for diaspora participation in

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⁴¹ See McGregor cited in McGregor and Primorac (2010). She discusses the post-election backlash targeting MDC voters and members following the victory of Morgan Tsvangirai over Robert Mugabe in the June 2008 election re-run.

⁴² Comments by participant during a focus group meeting at PASSOP offices, Cape Town.

⁴³ See Norma Kriger’s who systematically studied the deployment of political violence during election seasons by ZANU PF (Kriger, 2005). Also see Turok (1987) for a discussion on this tendency by ruling parties to force people into politics as a way of boosting electoral support.
homeland political life (Lafleur, 2013; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). Data from this study indeed supports this observation, albeit to a limited extent. The utility of Zimbabwean political parties as vehicles for diaspora political participation was confirmed by less than five percent of participants across the three sites who were either card-holding members or supporters of different Zimbabwean political parties. However, their ineffectiveness can cause some to disengage with politics, as findings demonstrate. Participants in the UK and South Africa also blamed Zimbabwean political parties for being invisible, negligent and ineffective, for their disillusionment with Zimbabwean mainstream politics. Political parties (mostly MDC-T) were accused of not penetrating and reaching out to Zimbabweans settled in all parts of Cape Town and Johannesburg, particularly to those living in impoverished black townships.

This perceived aloofness of political parties was captured by a participant named Jay Cee resident in Joe Gqabi (Phillipi) as follows:

I have never seen or heard about the MDC or ZANU PF here in Cape Town. I thought they were not allowed to operate in foreign countries. How can they expect us to support them if they do not come and talk to us and help us with our problems?  

Jay Cee captured another perception shared by participants in Johannesburg, that Zimbabwean political parties and politics in general was irrelevant to the day-to-day life struggles endured by many Zimbabweans hosted in South Africa. For example, one undocumented participant named Lenny in Johannesburg complained against the MDC-T and other parties for not helping with the problems Zimbabweans face, especially in their efforts

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44 Interview at Joe Gqabi, Philippi, Cape Town on 27 February 2015.
to become regularised and documented by the South African government. This was echoed by Colleta who complained that:

*They [parties] only want us to donate money to them. They don’t help us get papers. We have not even heard them condemning the South African government for ill-treating us in this country. So why should we support them?*

A similar theme emerged in the UK where Zimbabwean political activists have been observed to mobilise donor funding for political parties back in Zimbabwe (see Pasura, 2010). Restrictions on external donor funding for political parties in terms of the Political Parties Finance Act of 2001, often presents another challenge for diaspora political structures operating in host countries (see Pasura, 2010). There are several other challenges that limit the effectiveness of external party-political structures as a vehicle for diaspora participation in homeland politics.

Another issue causing frustration with Zimbabwean politics among Zimbabweans in the UK, however, relates to the perceived corruption and malfeasance among some party-political activists and leaders running external party structures in the UK. For example, participants highlighted the role played by the MDC’s UK structures in advocating and assisting undocumented Zimbabweans seeking asylum over the years. The party structures also assisted in mobilising financial support to victims of human rights abuses and political violence back in Zimbabwe. These monies would, for instance, help cover legal fees and hospital bills.

However, some participants who had been involved in political activism in the past bemoaned the lack of accountability which saw some of those funds not reaching their
intended beneficiaries back in Zimbabwe. MD who used to attend MDC meetings in Reading summed up these issues by saying:

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\text{We don’t see any difference between MDC and ZANU PF. The only difference is that ZANU PF is doing its corruption back in Zimbabwe, while MDC T is doing it here. Some of the leaders are self-serving crooks who are only after our money, and we don’t know where the money goes. Some of them also take advantage of desperate fellow Zimbabweans, which shows that they are not different from ZANU PF. We just don’t know whom to trust anymore.}^{45}
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Although MDC corruption has been observed in the past, the above findings demonstrate how this tendency by external party activists has resulted in disengagement from mainstream Zimbabwean politics by some in the UK (McGregor, 2010; Magaisa, 2006).^{46} Apart from the dysfunctions within formal political formations in Zimbabwean politics, disengagement from mainstream politics directed at the Zimbabwean state manifest in other ways.

**4.2.1.3 The (In)Effectiveness of the Zimbabwe Diaspora Vote Campaign**

Many Zimbabweans living outside the country are effectively disenfranchised, without the means to travel back to Zimbabwe to register and vote in national and sub-national elections. This was a prominent campaigning issue judging by the media interest it often generates, but one in which not many participants were actively involved in, which shows the degree of demobilisation of Zimbabweans even on a critical political right like the right to vote. For example, only 8 South Africa-based and 12 UK-based, ‘politically active’, participants

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45 Comments during focus group discussion at Camberley on 25th June 2015.

46 Magaisa observed how party activists operating in the diaspora developed a tendency to engage in various forms of corruption, including demanding payments and other favours in exchange for asylum application support letters.
indicated that they had taken part in any form of campaign activity on this issue, mostly by signing online petitions and attending protests against the Zimbabwean government. Although many African countries have ensured their citizens are able to vote from outside the borders of their countries, Zimbabwe still lags behind on this matter, compared to other countries within the Southern African region and the African continent more broadly (see Whitaker and Inyanji, 2015; Lafleur, 2013). It is not difficult, therefore, to understand why participants both in South Africa and the UK held the dominant feeling that the Zimbabwean government was acting unjustly by denying them their electoral rights in their country of origin, given the role they play in supporting their homeland (Lafleur, 2013). Even in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe, the failure by the Zimbabwean government to develop a framework for extra-territorial voting is unjust.

The new Constitution guarantees the right to vote to every citizen of Zimbabwe, but voter registration and the actual casting of ballots only occurs within Zimbabwe (see Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013). The requirement for Zimbabweans based outside the country to travel back to Zimbabwe to register and vote is often accompanied by logistical and other challenges. These include prohibitive costs of travel, travel restrictions for asylum seekers and fear of persecution upon return. Therefore, there has been a sustained campaign among diasporas in South Africa, the UK and beyond to push the Zimbabwean government, through its Zimbabwe Electoral Commission, to allow diasporas to register and vote while outside the country. Notably, there were more participants in the UK involved with the campaign than in South Africa. Perhaps demands for extraterritorial voting are relatively less

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47 Whitaker and Inyanji (2015) highlight how Kenya and other African countries have recently allowed their diaspora to vote extraterritorially.

48 Section 67 (3) of The Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013 guarantees the right to vote to all Zimbabweans, without any restrictions based on where they live.
pronounced among Zimbabwean in South Africa due to its geographical proximity (especially Johannesburg), which allows more people to return and vote.

Participants had a dominant perception that the Zimbabwean government was abusing and taking advantage of the diaspora population, only reaching out to them for their financial remittances and investment, but denying them political rights. For example, Mukoma A.M, who is a former member of the National Constitutional Assembly, now based in Vosloorus complained:

*Our government just wants our remittances and investment back in the country, but they don’t want to allow us to vote. Yes, the new constitution gave us the right to vote, but that right is meaningless if they have not put in place mechanisms to allow us to vote from outside. Why is it that South Africans living outside South Africa can vote at their embassies, but we cannot?*

This dynamic departs from the commonly held belief that home country governments extend extraterritorial voting rights in recognition of their contributions to homeland development (see Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). Some host governments also allow their diasporas to vote outside the country as a way a nation-building strategy, but Zimbabwe seems to be oblivious to the importance of such progressive moves (see Vertovec, 2005). The Zimbabwe government’s policy of not engaging the diaspora reflects the tendency by ZANU PF to put its party-political interests above national ones (see Chikuhwa, 2004). In this context, the Zimbabwean government has also been accused of fighting to keep the diaspora off the

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50 Interview at Abesutwini, Vosloorus, 22 March 2015.
electoral role as it perceives them to be supporters of the MDC and other opposition political formations (Betts and Jones, 2016).

Section 67 (3) of the Zimbabwean Constitution of 2013 guarantees the right to vote to all Zimbabwean citizens regardless of where they are hosted.\textsuperscript{51} For example, the Zimbabwe government was accused of reluctance to allow diasporas to vote, while the Zimbabwean embassies and consulates in both countries were not being used as a platform for political participation. Other participants who have travelled back to Zimbabwe complained over travel costs, difficulties in registering to vote, accessing polling stations and other inefficiencies in the electoral process back in Zimbabwe. Others also bemoaned the lack of transparency in the voting system, leading to manipulation of the outcome. This led Jairos M living in Phillipi, of voting age but had never voted, to question:

\textit{What does voting change in Zimbabwe. It is a waste of time because we all know who always wins elections.}\textsuperscript{52}

Also, Zimbabwe’s Electoral Act controversially requires that a person be resident in the constituency where they are registered to vote (Feltoe and Manyeruke, 2006), hence Zimbabweans living outside the country with an intention to vote ought to travel back to Zimbabwe in order to do so.

Furthermore, returnee Zimbabweans often face vilification, victimisation and other forms of reprisals at the hands of ZANU PF supporters in their local communities (Madziva, 2010). For example, they become subject to being labelled sell-outs and unpatriotic because of their flight at the height of the socioeconomic and political crisis, and this makes them

\textsuperscript{51} See Zimbabwe Constitution of 2013
\textsuperscript{52} Interview at Lower Crossroads, Cape Town 24 February 2015.
targets when political violence resurfaces during election seasons. This susceptibility of Zimbabwean exiles to victimisation and its negative implications on their political participation was confirmed by the findings of this study. For example, a total of seven Johannesburg-based participants indicated how they took advantage of the geographical proximity and cheaper transport costs to return back to Zimbabwe and vote in the 2013 harmonised elections. All seven reported directly or indirectly experiencing intimidation and harassment in their local communities and neighbourhoods for being based outside the country.

One of these South Africa-based participants named Spencer (39 years old) from the impoverished black township of Mbare (a ZANU PF hotspot), recalled the abuse, fear and anxiety he suffered during the 2013 harmonised elections. He cited an incident when a group of ZANU PF youths accused him of being a sell-out, sympathetic to agents of regime change, who had been sent by the enemies of Zimbabwe to observe how the elections were going. Some of those who harassed him were his former childhood friends, who had become members of the notorious ‘Chipangano’ terror group. Accounts like this reinforce the disillusionment of some sections of the diaspora population with Zimbabwean politics.

The fear of repercussions and backlash on family was also shared by participants in the UK, some of whom feared for their relatives left back in Zimbabwe. For example, Mukoma Donny expressed his fears in these words:

My parents are still at home in Marondera. I don’t want my pictures to come out in the media because they will be in trouble with ZANU PF back home. I have also heard that CIOs know everyone who is involved in politics outside Zimbabwe. Many MDC people
have been arrested and tortured at the Harare International Airport upon arrival from England. It’s too risky.\textsuperscript{53}

This does not only confirm the notoriety of the Zimbabwean state and the ruling party ZANU PF as violent political entities but, more profoundly, shows high levels of fear and timidity instilled in the citizenry living both within and outside Zimbabwe (Sachikonye, 2011). This, in turn, has an effect of compromising the determination of many Zimbabweans to engage in transnational political activism. In this context, the denial of voting rights and opportunities challenges the conventional, ‘big P’ mode of political participation espoused in dominant thinking on diaspora political transnationalism.

4.2.1.4 Being a Migrant and Political (In)Activism

The precarity that often characterises migrants’ everyday lives bears far-reaching implications on the ability of diasporas to partake in overt political activism. As observed by Pasura (2008), everyday life experiences in the host country present opportunities and limitations for transnational political activism among different categories of migrants. The ability to participate is mediated by several factors depending on where migrants live, their immigration status and settlement experiences, socioeconomic status and other factors.

There was a gender dimension to the political activism (inactivism) of participants. In both South Africa and the UK, women participants tended to be less involved in ‘Big P’ political activism, compared to their male counterparts. This is in contrast with activism displayed by the Zimbabwe Vigil and Restoration for Human Rights, where women significantly

\textsuperscript{53} Interview at Liss, Hampshire, UK on 27 June 2015.
participated in events and campaigns (Betts and Jones, 2016). Perhaps those affiliated in this mobilisation have a history of activism, or for other benefits.

Nevertheless, it was important to find out why such a sizeable proportion did not engage in political mobilisation. Participants cited various reasons including work-life imbalance with excessive work commitments in order to ‘pay the bills’, leaving them with limited time to be involved in social activities. Similarly, pressures to remit money back home also contributed to the non-involvement of many married and family oriented UK-based women in political activism.

In the UK, for instance, most women (particularly married and parenting women) indicated that they had limited time available to pursue politics due to childcare and other family commitments (Pasura, 2010). Women formally employed as nurses in the NHS and social care sector also blamed shift work and lack of work-life balance for their not attending protests and other political events and activities (see Mbiba, 2005; Pasura, 2010). This work-life imbalance among Zimbabwean migrant workers, at times resulting in mental and physical health problems, has been highlighted by Joann McGregor (McGregor, 2006). However, participants who had attended Zimbabwe Vigil and Restoration of Human Rights in Zimbabwe (ROHR), indicated tactical reasons behind their participation, particularly the need to prove their involvement in political activism to bolster claims for asylum at the Home Office.

The propensity to participate among different categories of Zimbabweans also has a spatial dimension, determined by where they live in the host country. For example, those living near Zimbabwe tended to be less involved in diaspora political mobilisation, because it was easier for them to travel back and take part in political processes back in Zimbabwe. There was also a widespread belief among participants in Johannesburg that members of the
notorious Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO) were based at the Zimbabwe Consulate offices in Bedfordview, conducting surveillance operations across Johannesburg (see Betts and Jones, 2016). This instilled an element of fear among participants, leading some to avoid engaging overtly in political activism.

Political activism also tends to thrive around places where prominent and influential political institutions of any given state are located. Therefore, participants living near metropolitan cities where key political institutions forming targets of lobbying, generally found it convenient to be involved in activism. Examples of such places include the Cape Town where the South African parliament and the Zimbabwean Consulate offices in Cape Town are housed; and London where the Zimbabwean Embassy in the UK and all key institutions of the British government are located. Perhaps this might be the reason why more participants (25%) in Cape Town tended to be involved in campaigning, petitioning, marching and other political activities directed at the South African parliament, compared to only 5% in Johannesburg which is slightly remotely located from Pretoria where the executive arm of the South African state is located. In the same vein, due to its proximity to London where key political institutions are located, the same proportion of participants (25%) across south east England were inclined to be involved in different political events and activities organised in London.

A spatial asymmetry was, however, cited by participants and blamed for non-participation by participants both in South Africa and the UK. For example, participants were critical of the tendency by political activists to organise political events in metropolitan cities

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54 Betts and Jones discovered the same fears and concerns that the diaspora, including some leaders of opposition party external structures, was infiltrated by CIO operatives.
such as London, Cape Town and Johannesburg, which presents difficulties relating to logistics and accessibility for those living in outlying areas. This spatial bias would also exclude most of the undocumented Zimbabweans who develop a tendency to move to outlying parts of England (up-north) such as Leeds, Birmingham, Coventry, Luton and Leicester, to join their family and social networks (Pasura, 2006; Mbiba, 2005).\(^55\) Echoing this concern, Stephen M who has lived in the UK since 2002 observed:

> We get a lot of emails and WhatsApp messages inviting us to attend protests in London. What they don’t realise is that many Zimbabweans moved up north because life is cheaper there and immigration enforcement is also less severe.\(^56\)

Therefore, getting Zimbabweans dispersed across the West Midlands, East Midlands and Yorkshire to participate effectively remains a real challenge for diaspora activists.

Spatial differences and biases also mediate political activism of Zimbabweans living in different parts of South Africa. Although Zimbabweans are dispersed across South Africa, most of those living without secure immigration statuses are settled, often under precarious conditions, in black townships both in Johannesburg and Cape Town (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Post-apartheid South Africa’s impoverished black townships are also generally held to be bastions of vibrant and radical political activism,\(^57\) hence Zimbabweans living in those spaces may have adopted the same political consciousness. Also, given the harsh living conditions and the precarity that characterises their day-to-day lives, it is not unreasonable

\(^{55}\) Pasura (2009) also observes that the dispersal of asylum seekers from London and the South East was enforced in terms of Immigration and Asylum Act of 1999.

\(^{56}\) Interview at St Albans, 29th July 2015.

\(^{57}\) Seidman (2015) highlights the vibrancy of township political organising and mobilisation across South Africa.
to expect this section of Zimbabweans to eagerly partake in homeland political activism inspired by their desire to return to a new Zimbabwe.

However, efforts to mobilise this marginal section of the Zimbabwean diaspora have not been very effective for different reasons. One of these problems is the marginalisation of those hosted in impoverished black townships, rural and peri-urban parts of South Africa. For example, participants living in black townships across Cape Town such as Phillipi, Imizamo Yethu, Masiphumelele, Delft and Dunoon among others, complained of being left out when protests, campaigns and events are organised in both Cape Town and Johannesburg. For instance, 58-year-old Noah of Phillipi expressed his frustration in the following terms:

*We only hear about protests at Parliament in Cape Town and rallies in Bellville, but we cannot afford to attend. MDC community organisers and campaigners have never reached out to us here in the townships. That’s not a smart way of mobilising supporters. They should do their rallies here because many Zimbabweans live in the townships.*

A member of the MDC Western Cape District named Brighton explained this dynamic, arguing that it was for fear of violent crime and xenophobia that the party could not penetrate some parts of Cape Town such as Khayelitsha, Langa and Crossroads. This also makes sense in the context of xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment that tends to manifest in those black townships, which pose security and other challenges for diaspora political mobilisation (Neocosmos, 2010; Morreira, 2011). Related to complexities of daily life in host country, legal

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58 Interview at Phillipi Business Small Business Centre, Cape Town, 21 February 2015.
status held by different categories of diasporas also influence their differential abilities to partake in ‘Big P’ politics (Flint, 2003), as demonstrated in the following section.

The likelihood of participating in Zimbabwean politics across geographical distance was also mediated by the immigration statuses those participants held. Although diasporans with secure legal statuses would engage in any kind of political activity without fear and anxiety, findings of this study show that those without secure legal statuses in the UK were more inclined to take part in transnational political activity for tactical reasons. Although it is accompanied by risks of arrest and removal from the UK, undocumented persons seeking asylum tended to engage in overt political activity to gain evidence to support their asylum claims at the Home Office. For example, many participants, mostly men, cited the same reason for taking part in political activism directed at Zimbabwe, so that pictures of them in picketing regalia could be taken and later presented as evidence to support asylum claims at Home Office. For example, 48-year-old MV who has been recently granted asylum status by the British government explained:

*I have taken part in the Zimbabwe Vigil’s protests at the Zimbabwe House a few times.*

*I had to do it. I had just put in my asylum claim at the Home Office and I wanted evidence to support my claim that I was a political activist.*

Conversely, those with precarious statuses and relative newcomers sometimes held the perception that any positive form of political change in Zimbabwe would diminish their chances of being granted secure immigration statuses by the British government. Some with

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60 Interview at Cove, Farnborough on 12th June 2015.
refugee status held the view that pushing for political change in Zimbabwe would result in the revocation of their statuses on the basis of an improvement in the country of origin situation.

Gaining secure legal status in the host country is also often accompanied by diminishing interest in homeland politics for some migrants, who opt to pursue greater incorporation into the host country. This is confirmed by findings which show that some participants, especially those who had been living in the UK for a long time and had established themselves, had lost interest in Zimbabwean politics. It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that not everyone engages with the mainstream political system while outside the country, and that there are different historical, spatial, gender and other reasons for their non-involvement in ‘Big P’ political activism. This, however, does not mean they have become totally politically inactive; they may have only substituted their interest in Zimbabwe’s politics, with focus on the host country.

In addition to legal status, subjective identities also determine whether (and how) they diasporas partake in the politics of their homeland and host country (Fortier, 2016). The assumption is that diasporas will participate in the politics of the country they feel they belong in. As shown in preceding sections of this chapter, there many reasons for explaining the engagement/disengagement of Zimbabweans in homeland politics, and I want to add senses of belonging as another such factor. Whether people participate or not depends on what they feel about their country of origin in relation to the host country, based on the recognition that senses of belonging shape emerging political behaviours of citizens (Fortier, 2016). The underlying assumption in most thinking on homeland political participation of Zimbabwean diaspora, is that every Zimbabwean (across racial, ethnic and other divides) maintains their love for Zimbabwe.
In the above configuration, that shared sentimental attachment to Zimbabwe (‘we feeling’) ostensibly continues to spur some into political action for the love of country (Glick-Schiller and Fourie, 2004; Anthias, 2006). Yet, as I will demonstrate in Chapter 6, senses of belonging are constantly in flux, meaning that diasporas do not always remain fixated on their country of origin over time. Sentimental attachment often becomes divided, multiple and, at times, ambivalent in ways that weaken the patriotism and loyalty to the country of origin, especially for those who have acquired citizenship and integrated into the host country. Also, those who have spent lengthy periods of time outside their country and without returning, tend to display weaker affinities for their home countries. Perhaps the political silence or disinterest by over 10% of participants in the UK and South Africa, suggests that their political interests have shifted to the host country over the years.

Some may have developed multiple loyalties, with some beginning to feel ‘at home’ in host country, while others may have multiple, fluctuating and ambivalent feelings about Zimbabwe and the host country. For example, my data indicates that the majority of participants who held ambivalent feelings about Zimbabwe were not participating, compared to those who displayed senses of nostalgia and a longing to return to Zimbabwe. For example, TK reasoned that:

*I’m not sure what the future holds for me. Problems are still going on in Zimbabwe so it is not certain that I will return there.*

This uncertainty was, therefore, used by many participants to justify their disinclination to engage in overt forms of political activism, particularly in South Africa. However, some

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61 TK has lived in the UK for more than 15 years and does not plan to return back Zimbabwe ever again. I interviewed him at his house in Aldershot (09\textsuperscript{th} July 2015).
participants living precariously in the UK, with uncertain feelings towards Zimbabwe felt the importance of engaging in Zimbabwean politics in case their quest for citizenship in the UK would not materialise. It is, therefore, safe to suggest that diasporas would likely engage, not only in homeland politics, but in the politics of that place where they feel their ‘home’ is while they live outside the country.

4.2.1.5 Other Limits of Diaspora Political Mobilisation

The political mobilisation of diaspora populations is not always aimed at influencing their home country state in a peaceful and beneficial way, with some engaging and supporting terrorist, radicalised, extremist and violent forms of political activity directed at their country of origin (Obadare, 2004; Vertovec, 2005). For example, some African diaspora populations have tended to support and perpetuate repression, political violence, civil strife and domestic insurgencies in their countries of origin, with devastating consequences for peace and security on the continent (Obadare, 2004). In terms of this study, none of the participants in either host countries displayed any violent and extremist tendencies, but everyone involved in different kinds of political activism expressed their belief and commitment to the peaceful resolution of the ongoing political crisis back in Zimbabwe. It was, however, difficult to determine if the political party funding mobilised by some of the UK-based participants (for both ZANU PF and MDC-T) did not end up supporting violent, corrupt and other forms of political practices, in ways that perpetuate the ongoing political crisis back in Zimbabwe.

However, a range of issues were raised by both UK-based and South Africa-based participants who had been involved in political activism, relating to malpractices by political activists leading to mobilisation efforts in the two countries. For example, one of the issues
raised in South Africa related to tribalism and regionalism among political activists, leading to fragmentation and rivalry between Ndebele and Shona activists.

Across three locations, white and mixed-race segments of the diaspora seemed relatively politically invisible because of their underrepresentation in political mobilisation efforts. However, mobilisation at the Zimbabwe Vigil in London represents another caveat, and it would be interesting to dig deeper into this apparent (self) exclusion. It would also be useful to compare external and internal participation for these categories of the Zimbabwean nation. The net effect of these dynamics is the incoherence, fragmentation and lack of representativeness of the mobilisation effort, resulting in the proliferation of many groups and entities claiming to speak on behalf of all Zimbabweans. This problem is more acute in South Africa.

Issues also emerged pertaining to allegations of corruption and lack of accountability by leaders of the political mobilisation effort, particularly in the UK. This confirms Magaisa’s (2006) observations of Zimbabwean political activists in the UK. These malpractices partly explain the frustration, resentment and disengagement of many sections of the diaspora from homeland political activism. Some equated their level of distrust and suspicion directed at the diaspora political and civic leaders, to that traditionally aimed at ZANU PF and the Zimbabwe government.

To conclude this section, it is apparent that not everyone engages in ‘Big P’ political activism, but only a limited proportion of participants, due to a number of dynamics discussed above. By concentrating on overt (Big P’) political activities, there is always a risk we will ignore other important ways in which Zimbabweans engage politically. It is important to constantly explore other ways by which diaspora populations reclaim their homeland
citizenship, through engaging in other forms of political activity aimed at contesting authoritarian and repressive forms of rule. According to data, one such alternative expression of citizenship relates to the discursive political activity in which the majority of participants, hosted both in the UK and South Africa, engaged. In other words, diasporas become citizens by being political, but this study shows that they act politically in different ways too. These include discursive ways discussed in the rest of this chapter.

4.3 Discursive Ways of Being Political

Political activism does not occur only through overt and, in many ways, formal political mobilisation against the authoritarian state. The majority of the participants in this study did not actively engage in ‘Big P’ political activities. However, a closer look at the data reveals that even those who appear passive and apathetic indeed find other, less risky, ways of expressing their political agency. And the rest of the chapter maps out and characterise the nature of discursive political activity among diaspora. It does not always follow that those disillusioned or excluded by various means from mainstream politics become completely inactive and disengaged from politics. Instead, participants mostly those that seemed passive or apathetic, did not only engage by way of overt praxis, but also discursively to construct and share their political views, sentiments and preferences with fellow Zimbabweans across geographical distance. In this context, over 80% of the 145 participants across the three research sites (Cape Town, Johannesburg and south-east England) confirmed that they frequently engaged in political talk with fellow Zimbabweans. These participants were of varying age ranges and located in different places within South Africa and the UK, and some of them simultaneously engaged in ‘Big P’ political activism organised by external political party structures and diaspora associations.
Discursive political activity is frequently resorted to by the citizenry when opportunities for participation in mainstream political and public life are limited by institutional, political and other factors, as is the case with Zimbabwean migrants. Therefore, findings show that many participants were not voting in Zimbabwean elections, not attending protests, and not members of any particular political party; but there was a lot of thinking and talking about Zimbabwean politics occurring among them. Both male and female, documented and undocumented, participants in both host countries held strong views and preferences in relation to the Zimbabwean state, but felt that they were not being asked or listened to. For example, participants in a focus group in Dawn Park shared this view expressed by Jabulani:

We have very good ideas and knowledge, but the Zimbabwe government has never asked for our views and opinions on how to solve the country’s problems. We share these among ourselves every day.62

It therefore emerged in this study that many of the non-participating Zimbabweans, referred to by Pasura (2008) as dormant, actually informally engaged in thinking and talking about politics with fellow Zimbabweans in their daily lives. Although there is a temptation to see these two kinds of political activity as mutually exclusive, as noted by Wright et al (2017) and as data shows, the two spheres of diaspora political activity sometimes complement each other. The next section offers a conceptualisation of the nature of these everyday political discourses in light of the experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora.

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62 Focus group meeting convened at Dawn Park, Boksburg, on 20th April 2015.
4.3.1 **Features of Discursive Political Activity**

Discursive politics is essentially about how people attach meaning to and make sense of political reality in their day-to-day lives, aimed at contesting dominant discourses, norms and practices in society (see Katzenstein, 1995). It is also viewed as a strategy of political resistance, which makes it instrumental to historically marginalised and repressed people in post-colonial contexts (Fraser, 1989; Obadare and Willems, 2014. It is important to recognise the resentment, dissatisfaction and fear citizens often hold towards the state in post-colonial countries such as Zimbabwe, due to the repressive and violent tendencies of the state in many post-independence countries, including Zimbabwe (see Sachikonye, 2011; Ake, 1992). Talking about politics outside the direct remit of the state, therefore, becomes another way of being political and expressing political agency.

In this vein, Claude Ake (1992) observed how this sense of antipathy and mistrust often leads the citizenry to see the state as a monster to be evaded and, if possible, to be defeated (also see Azarya, 1988). As demonstrated in Chapter three, emigration itself represents a political act of evading the state, and not engaging directly with it and opting for other informal and vernacular ways of being political, represents another way of avoiding and evading the state while outside the country. Therefore, citizens tend to shun formal and mainstream political processes opting for other ways of speaking and making their ‘voices’ heard (Scott, 1985). And engaging in unofficial and informal political activity in their day-to-day lives, represents one of those ways by which many members of the Zimbabwean diaspora seek to contest authoritarianism in their home country.

Another defining set of characteristics of this kind of political activity, identified by Wright et al (2012), is that it falls outside the immediate realms of formal politics. For
example, Zimbabweans, and indeed citizens in many post-independence countries, tend to think and talk about the state, political elites and political power often in terms of their capacity for violence and allocation of socioeconomic values (see Mbembe, 2001). And this tendency, a product of decades of repression and material deprivation during and after colonial rule, permeates Zimbabweans’ every day political talk in different settings. Lastly, discursive political activity relates to the space in which it occurs. Discursive political activity does not occur in created and invited spaces (Cornwall, 2004). 63 Instead, citizens engage in these kinds of conversations in various unofficial spaces manifesting in their everyday lives, thus avoiding the control of their discourses by the state and other organised political formations.

Discursive political activity of diasporas is also composed of the vernacular and expressive ways in which people engage in political talk in their everyday lives. These kinds of everyday discourses tend to be reciprocal, circular and reflexive, manifesting horizontally between ordinary people outside the ambits of the state (Wright et al, 2017). For example, this circular and horizontal nature of discursive political activity was confirmed by one UK-based woman named Sis Vee who spoke in a somewhat spirited way:

‘We don’t talk to our government anymore, but we are free and safe to talk about it each time we meet as Zimbabweans here in South Africa’. 64

Talking about the Zimbabwean state ‘behind its back’ suggests a couple of things about the relationship between the Zimbabwean state and its citizenry. Firstly, perhaps diasporas find

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63 See Andrea Cornwall’s (2001) work on how citizens increasingly find it difficult to utilise opportunities for political participation created by the state. Instead, they find their own alternative platforms and spaces to express their political views and preferences.

64 Interview at North Camp, Farnborough on 15 August 2015.
it safer to just talk about the state, than to seek its attention given its repressive, violent and unaccountable tendencies when it relates with the citizenry.\textsuperscript{65}

However, despite its potential as an alternative form of resistance and way of reclaiming citizenship, not everyone has the capacity to engage in meaningful political talk due to age, disability, level of education, place of settlement and cognitive limitations among many other factors. The content of these conversations is also mediated by various factors including political culture, history, socio-demographic characteristics, political backgrounds and experiences, and time of departure from Zimbabwe. Next, I look at some of the factors, particularly political culture, shaping everyday political discourses of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK.

\textbf{4.3.2 Everyday Political Talk and Political Culture}

There is no doubt that different sections of the Zimbabwean nation were subjected to different kinds of domination on the basis of their culture, gender, age, class and political affiliation for decades back in Zimbabwe. And these factors explain why some categories of Zimbabweans are more inclined to engage freely and meaningfully in political talk with their Zimbabwean compatriots than others. How ordinary Zimbabweans living outside the country make sense of and speak about Zimbabwean politics is culturally determined. It is shaped by the new values, norms and practices they had acquired before emigration and during their stay in the host country. For example, the strong liberal political values expressed by younger and educated participants who had been living for lengthy periods of time in South Africa and

\textsuperscript{65} See Sachikonye (2012) on how the Zimbabwean state tends to be violent and repressive on its citizens. Some participants even feared that talking about the state in South Africa would be met with violent responses (eg disappearances, assassinations and torture), based on the shared belief that CIOs had infiltrated the diaspora.
UK respectively, may have been shaped and reinforced by the dominant liberal political values of democracy, human rights, equality and social justice they found there.

Nevertheless, past experiences and subject political cultures dominant in some parts of Zimbabwe probably also had an influence on how some participants perceived and talked about politics – or indeed whether they were discussed at all. This also explains why some sections are inclined to engage in this kind of activity than others. The political culture of Zimbabweans has been characterised as ‘subject’, with a tendency to see themselves as obedient subjects not active citizens (see Chikerema and Chakunda, 2014; also see Turok, 1987). This also depended on which part of the country they came from, with those from rural areas more inclined to be conservative and subjected, compared to those from urban contexts where opposition political activism was incubated.

Patriarchy, as an aspect of African culture, may have been responsible for making men more likely to engage in political talk than women. Indeed, there was a small segment of participants in South Africa, most of these were religiously adherent women from rural backgrounds, who openly declared their avoidance of political talk at home and at work. They did so for several reasons including the fear associated with talking negatively about ZANU PF and President Mugabe, while others cited moral, cultural and other reasons. One woman from Masiphumelele named Mai M justified her position by saying:

- I always hear my husband talking about politics whenever his friends visit at our house.
- I don’t join in the conversation because the Bible does not allow us Christians to talk
about politics. I also don’t like some of the bad things they say about Mr Mugabe, like wishing he was dead. Our culture does not allow that.66

This supports the observation by some scholars that the political values and ideas people hold are partly shaped by the authoritarian attitudes dominant in societies where they originate, which might be true for some of these participants (see Wilson, 1973). The kind of discourses migrants engage in also tend to be influenced by dominant political values, norms, ideas and practices in the host country. The same ability to learn different political values, ideas and thinking about political objects was also demonstrated empirically among the Indian diaspora (see Kapur, 2010).67

In the above context, as data suggests, there was also a tendency by South Africa-based participants to emphasise how being in South Africa had made them feel comfortable and safe to talk about politics without fear. They also cited how they had learned a lot in terms of how a democratic state operates and were eager to remit those values, knowledge and ethos back to Zimbabwe. This was confirmed by one participant in named Mr Mapfumo who had lived in South Africa for nine years who stated that:

*We now know how democracy works. South Africa has taught us a lot because it is a democracy. This is how politics should be – free and open for everyone. People vote freely and there is no violence during times of elections. If South Africans are not happy with what the government is doing, they go out and protest freely without fear of the security agents.*68

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66 Interview at Masiphumelele, Cape Town on 02nd March 2015.
67 See the work of Kapur on how the Indian diaspora remit not only finances and investment, but political ideals, values and other aspects of political culture learned from different regimes under which they are hosted outside the country.
68 Interview with Mapfumo at PASSOP offices, Cape Town on 10th March 2015.
It is clear that Mr Mapfumo learned these political values, and the impartation of political values occurs through various agents of political socialisation in the host country (Kamrava, 1996). For example, the democratic norms and values displayed by Mr Mapfumo may have been transmitted through various vehicles including the media, educational institutions and workplaces during his stay in South Africa. The extent to which one acquires new political cultures also depends on a number of factors, including length of stay in the host country, with long-stayers likely to learn more than relative newcomers.

4.3.3 **Everyday Political Talk in Practice**

Just to give an idea of how Zimbabweans think and talk about the Zimbabwean state and politics, I discuss in the next section some of their views and preferences reflecting the meaning they attach to various political issues, actors, processes and objects. In this section, I want to highlight an extract of some of the ways Zimbabweans in Cape Town and Johannesburg are thinking and talking about the Zimbabwean state (and the country’s politics in general). For example, many participants, especially the older generations, spoke of how invincible Mugabe and ZANU PF were and the violence the Zimbabwean security forces were capable of dispensing on opposing political formations. However, others adopted different discourses contesting these imposed and internalised ways of thinking and talking about Zimbabwean politics and the political establishment. For example, younger participants spoke of how weak the ZANU PF regime had become, and shared their visions of a new, democratic and prosperous, Zimbabwe.

In the above context, I asked participants what they felt was wrong with Zimbabwe and what they wanted see changing there. A 38-year-old woman named Mai Moyondizvo
living in Boksburg, a former vendor who left Zimbabwe after the 2008 electoral violence responded:

*A government that looks after its people so that they never have to think about leaving the country again; a government which allows citizens [and] that does not interfere with the day to day life of citizens.*

The above statement shows that even ordinary participants least expected to participate in overt political activism also hold their own political ideas and preferences in relation to the Zimbabwean state. Mai Moyondizvo’s response also show that citizens who escape their authoritarian and repressive states do not always lack a sound conception of the state; instead, it confirms that they have an understanding of what is wrong with the state and how it can reform itself, especially as it relates to their welfare and its violent tendencies (see Gallagher, 2015). For example, I asked participants what came to their minds when they think of the Zimbabwean state and here is collection of some common phrases representing how they spoke about it:

‘They don’t listen to us’ (Jason C, 48 years old, Cape Town); ‘they don’t care about us and seeking their help is a waste of time’ (Mai Tariro, 31 years old, Boksburg); ‘we are afraid of it’ (Mbuya Chabikwa, 56 years old, Phillipi, Cape Town); ‘nothing will ever change’ (Bhunu D, 39 years old, Cape Town); ‘things will change very soon’ (Mai Chaza, 30 years old, Aldershot, UK); ‘We need external help, we cannot change the system on our own’ (Mr Webster Z, 52 years old, Farnborough, UK).

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69 Ibid focus group at Dawn Park, Boksburg  
70 Extracted from comments during focus group meeting at Aldershot on 10th August 2015.
Several qualities can be read from the above discourses. For example, it is clear that everyday discourses expressed by Zimbabweans are diverse and, sometimes, conflicting. It also confirms the above view that ordinary Zimbabweans, often considered demobilised and inactive, actually hold active imaginations and conceptions about the state. Although there is a dominant sense of pessimism and antipathy towards the Zimbabwean state, some participants articulated potentially useful visions and preferences in a new Zimbabwe they hope to see in the future. Another characteristic of their everyday political talk relates to the use of political humour in conveying it.

Political activism does not only encompass a formal dimension, but has its play and fun side (Gallagher, 2017; Peel, 2010; Willems, 2009). Zimbabweans are renowned for their humour, and that sense of humour is now frequently used by Zimbabweans (both at home and abroad) as a form of subterranean resistance (Willems, 2009; Chiumbu and Muswemwa, 2012; Chiumbu and Nyamanhindi, 2012; Obadare and Willems, 2014). This entails making fun of the Zimbabwean state, and those at its helm, with an aim to embarrass, mock and show contempt towards it without fear of reprisals. This kind of everyday political talk is not only a form of political participation on its own, but also a lubricant to other more formal forms of political engagement (Wright et al, 2017). Another effect of this kind of activism is the deepening of political consciousness among the diaspora population, while simultaneously making politics enjoyable (Wright et al, 2017). Political humour in the diaspora also potentially helps reduce the anxieties and stresses of migrant life in those different host countries, in the face of unresolved political and socioeconomic crises back home (Willems, 2009).

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71 This mode of politics has mental health benefits even for Zimbabweans back home in the face of biting socioeconomic hardships.
Therefore, the content of their political conversations did not always focus on political developments back in Zimbabwe, but included the use of satire, sarcasm and comedy. For example, participants with greater access to the internet and mobile technologies reported sharing funny images, humour and jokes about ZANU PF, Mugabe and other powerful political actors in Zimbabwean politics, with their friends and family members online and via WhatsApp and SMS (see Willem, 2009; Peel, 2010; Obadare and Willems, 2014). At the time of the study, there were images of President Mugabe caught sleeping at a conference, doing rounds on social media. Such images tend to generate a lot of online discussion and debate among Zimbabweans all over the world, on the need for succession in the context of Mugabe’s old age. This shows us how Zimbabweans display a great deal of awareness in relation to political developments back in Zimbabwe, but also their capacity to engage in serious political deliberation, despite their seemingly dormant and apathetic approach to ‘Big P’ political participation.

4.3.4 Spaces for Everyday Political Talk

Having looked at some of the typical content of everyday political talk, I now turn to the spaces and platforms on which it is expressed. I have already indicated that everyday public speech about politics occurs in informal (online/offline) social spaces among diasporas, wherever people can meet and interact (Graham, 2015; Wright et al, 2017). I want to adopt John Gaventa’s definitional framework defining ‘space’ in terms of the opportunities, moments and channels where citizens, including diasporas, can act to influence discourses (Gaventa, 2006). These spaces can be online and offline.

Spaces for political deliberation are also not always neutral arenas for deliberation among equal, but they themselves are laden with power relations and contested (Cornwall,
2002). Not everyone engages in equal terms, with those that are powerful based on their knowledge, information, experience and personal connections tending to dominate what gets discussed and the tone of the discussions in these spaces. A systematic and theoretically power analysis of these discursive spaces would be helpful to understand the structures and relations that shape these spaces, and represents another fascinating line of inquiry leading from this work.

As such, findings of this study show that a total of 18 older participants (over 50), often without regular access to the internet, found alternative social spaces and platform for discussing politics such in the home, at social gatherings and events such as funerals, parties and church services. This shows that, although many Zimbabweans seem not to participate in political life, they find different unofficial and informal opportunities to contest narratives spurned by their authoritarian state and other powerful political forces with interests in contemporary Zimbabwean politics.

Some participants were prohibited by their families, church organisations and other such social groups from engaging in political talk for the sake of social harmony. For example, Pastor Matemai who leads the Boarneges Apostolic Church at Lower Crossroads in Cape Town explained his church’s decision to ban political conversations within church premises:

“We realise how emotionally charged and divisive political discussions can be. Our church members are from diverse backgrounds and hold different views, and we fear that politics can end up causing divisions within the church along ethnic, party and factional lines.”

72 Interview at Lower Crossroads, Cape Town on 12th March 2015.
There was also evidence of fear and mistrust among the Zimbabwean diaspora populations in both countries, which prevented some participants from engaging freely in political discussion in public spaces where Zimbabweans met and interacted.

There was a notable tendency by participants to feel unsafe to engage in political conversations with fellow Zimbabweans for fear of transnational political violence sponsored by the Zimbabwean state. Participants in Johannesburg and Cape Town shared the belief that members of the intelligence services were deployed and attached to the Zimbabwean Consulate offices, their purpose being to infiltrate and perpetrate violence on opponents of Mugabe’s rule. Engaging in political talk also presupposes the availability of free and safe spaces in which to engage. Therefore, there was a tendency for participants in the UK to speak more freely than in South Africa. Those who felt most constrained were settled in the impoverished black townships, and this was presumably to do with their fear of xenophobic backlash from their South African counterparts. As I mentioned earlier, it would have been interesting to observe the power dynamics permeating through those deliberations empirically, but there is no space for that exercise in this chapter.

The internet provides an opportunity and platform for Zimbabweans to interact and engage in political talk without geographical limitations. The fact that the majority of participants indicated that they regularly thought and talked about Zimbabwean politics online during their stay in their host country, challenges the view that ICTs have been accompanied by political passivity and disengagement from politics (Putnam, 2000; Wright et al, 2017). This is an important insight on how the nature of political participation is changing in this age of ICTs and transnational migration. This tendency by transnational migrants to engage in different kinds of cyber-political activity in cyberspace represents a growing
phenomenon among diaspora populations, the Romanian diaspora being one of the prominent cases (Trandafoiu, 2013; also see Pasura, 2008).\textsuperscript{73} The discursive aspect of participants’ online political activity also resonates with the epistemic tendencies observed among the Zimbabwean diaspora hosted in the UK, particularly their proclivity to (global) networking across geographical distance (see Pasura, 2008). It is interesting to note that the global scope of diaspora networking resonates with practices associated with global citizenship, in a world believed to be globalising (see Mbiba, 2005; Peel, 2010).\textsuperscript{74}

Furthermore, to the extent that Zimbabweans engage in knowledge creation and exchange among members of the same national community scattered across the globe, one might characterise these ordinary diasporas as a kind of epistemic community (See Haas, 2016).\textsuperscript{75} Therefore, a sizeable proportion of participants viewed as passive, apathetic and disengaged, indeed tended to engage discursively through sharing vivid ideas and imaginations about different questions and matters of state, and talking about them publicly in their day to day lives.

Although some scholars accuse ICTs and mobile technologies of contributing to the perceived disengagement of the citizenry, particularly younger people, from politics, there is a growing recognition that this is not the case (Wright et al, 2017; Obadare and Willems, 2014; Peel, 2010; Putnam, 2000). The findings of this study help refute that viewpoint in relation to transnational migrants. Instead, data shows that ICTs provided one of the vehicles on which

\textsuperscript{73} Trandafoiu (2013) examined the transnational online activities of the Romanian diaspora scattered across Western Europe and other places, while Kenway and Langmead (2000) define cyberspace as the transnational space created by the use of internet and mobile technologies. Crucially, Pasura (2008) has also observed this tendency by some Zimbabweans in the UK engaging in cyber-politics.

\textsuperscript{74} ICTs transcend territorial boundaries and facilitate networking across the globe by diasporas scattered in different places.

\textsuperscript{75} An epistemic community as a group of people with shared repertoire whose goals include the creation and sharing of knowledge. As this study has shown, a lot of shared knowledge on Zimbabwean, therefore, circulates among Zimbabweans on and off the internet.
participants engaged discursively. This kind of discursive political activity taking place online was more pronounced among participants in the UK, compared to those in South Africa, perhaps due to limited accessibility and affordability of internet and mobile technologies among those hosted in South Africa. For example, an average of 45% of participants in South Africa and 60% in the UK shared their political views and preferences with fellow Zimbabweans in their social networks, through information sharing, discussion and debate on various online and mobile platforms. Most of these were younger participants aged below 40 years, with relatively stable sources of income enabling them to access internet and other ICT devices and other costs related to accessibility.

There is an array of online and offline spaces and platforms where diasporas meet, connect and engage informally, in political talk (Wright et al, 2017; Willems, 2009). For instance, discursive political activity is often conveyed in digital and online spaces, not limited by territorial boundaries and geographical distance. Alternatively, those without access to online platforms tended to talk about Zimbabwean politics in small groups with their compatriots, often with their families, in workplaces, at church and during social gatherings with fellow Zimbabweans. ICTs provide one of the popular and convenient spaces in which diasporas engage discursively in politics. Several platforms and personalities have also proliferated on Facebook and YouTube sharing live video broadcasts, a mixture of factual and satirical content, across the Zimbabwean diaspora (thanks to Facebook’s ‘go live’ platform). These included Magamba TV anchored by a ‘white’ Zimbabwean named Comrade Fatso and Bustop TV anchored by Samantha Kureya (popularly known as ‘Gonyeti’), sharing humorous and sarcastic videos on Zimbabwean politics.
Everyday political talk was not entirely uninformed or based on hearsay, but different sources of information were consulted before opinions and counternarratives were formed. One prominent social media personality with a substantial diaspora constituency and credited with informing the Zimbabwean diaspora on political developments online, is Ruvheneko Parirenyatwa, (daughter of Zimbabwe’s Minister of Health, Dr David Parirenyatwa). She runs what participants thought was a very informative show named *Ruvheneko* in which she invites political leaders for (Debora Patta-style)76 interviews aimed at promoting accountability and exposing corruption within the Zimbabwean government. This type of broadcasting is interactive, allowing followers the chance to convey their questions and comments via the ‘comments’ section, during the interviews. Along similar lines, some more or less mainstream media outlets (such as Star FM and Zimeye) have also recently established a strong social media presence, in ways that open up opportunities for ordinary diasporas located across the globe to engage and deliberate about Zimbabwean politics.

Participants also indicated their regular participation in WhatsApp groups in which they shared information on political developments and unofficial news reports. Participants also highlighted the existence of a UK-based online TV channel called Zimbo Live TV broadcasting via Facebook to Zimbabweans across the globe. Some participants cited how important this channel was as a source of news on political developments, as well as debate and discussion on matters affecting Zimbabweans back home and outside the country. The information gathered through these channels would, therefore, inform their ‘political talk’ with fellow Zimbabweans in different offline spaces.

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76 Debora is a Zimbabwe-born South African journalist well known for her hard-hitting and aggressive question when she hosted ‘3rd Degree’ on South Africa TV channel called ETV.
It is also important, on the other hand, not to overestimate the potential for online political talk in light of some of the ills of the ICTs as a tool for democratic citizenship. This study did not deeply engage with the utility of ICTs as a tool for political engagement for ordinary people, but below I discuss some of the indicative findings which emerged from data. It is important to recognise that not everyone use ICTs for information and debate about politics. Some use them for entertainment and social networking purposes. For example, Abel M in Cape Town’s Phillipi township indicated how she disliked politics in the following terms:

*Usually it is all bad news about tragedies, violence and disagreements here in South Africa and elsewhere. I don’t spend my data bundles for nothing by following political stuff on the internet. I only go on WhatsApp and Facebook whenever it is necessary because it’s a cheaper way of communicating with parents and family members back home.*

Zimbo Live TV as a platform for political engagement was, for example, contested by others viewing its broadcasting content as apolitical. Instead, there was a perception by some that Zimbo Live TV largely focussed on social issues and scandals. Some participants, mostly in South Africa, underscored their belief that ICTs were primarily for social networking, not politics. For example, Abel M confirmed his regular access to the internet via his mobile device, but emphasised his disinterest in political issues in these terms:

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77 Interview at Island, Philippi East, Cape Town on 12th March 2015.
I also frequently go on the internet using my smartphone, but I avoid reading political news articles and material. I just do Facebook and Instagram mostly to connect with friends, but I see a lot of my friends sharing political stuff on Facebook and WhatsApp.  

This shows that not everyone would engage in political discussion and debate online for a number of reasons, including their level of political awareness, accessibility and availability of ICTs devices and connectivity and ICT literacy among many other barriers to the expression of political views publicly online and offline.

However, as I noted earlier, the relative ease in accessing mobile technologies and smartphones means internet accessibility no longer represents a major barrier to digital political activity (see Peel, 2010; Willems, 2009). The lack of regulation also means a lot of hate speech and inciteful material gets shared via social media, including offensive, factually untrue information (fake news) and explicit content (see Wright et al, 2017). Overall, discursive political activity and deliberation is an effective way by which diasporas spread across geographical distance are able to connect and sustain political conversation and debate, with positive implications for democratic citizenship.

4.4 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter confirms that indeed politics is relocated by emigration, and diasporas begin to find different ways of being political towards their homeland. For example, there are sections of the diaspora which engage in overt (‘Big P’) political activism and mobilisation aimed at influencing the homeland state and its politics, but the proportion of those with a capacity and opportunity to partake in this kind of political activity is severely limited by many

78 Ibid
factors. These include context, history, geographical distance and immigration and settlement experiences among other variables mediated diaspora political participation.

However, the majority of diasporas often considered politically detached, turned out to partake in discursive forms of politics in the form of everyday political discourses. This shows a shift from formal and state-centred ‘Big P’ political participation, to an emphasis on its everyday and vernacular expressions (online and offline) in the day-to-day lives of the Zimbabwean diaspora population. This also suggests the changing arena of politics from the state, political parties and organised civil society, to unorganized, informal and everyday platforms (both online and offline). To sum up, the above pattern, therefore, confirms that indeed diaspora citizenship can be performed politically, but there are many ways by which diasporas become political towards their homeland beyond overt political mobilisation aimed at directly influencing the state across geographical distance.
Chapter Five: The Everydayness of Diaspora Citizenship: Citizenship as Social Practice

5.1 Chapter Introduction

As I demonstrated in Chapter Three, Zimbabweans constitute a transnational diaspora, whose connections and ties span Zimbabwe and the different countries in which they are hosted (also see Pasura, 2014; 2012; 2008). As a diaspora, they perform citizenship in different material, discursive and other ways, which include senses of belonging and different kinds of political activity. This chapter looks at another important way in which diasporas (particularly Zimbabweans) perform their citizenship, as a diaspora community. This is by way of everyday social practices forming part of their daily lives.

These social practices are often transnational, being simultaneously directed at the host country and country of origin (Levitt, 2004). What this confirms is that diaspora citizenship is performed not only in relation to the host country, but also country of origin across geographical space. Against this backdrop, the aim of this chapter is two-fold. Firstly, it seeks to describe the different forms this everyday citizenship takes, in contradistinction to state-centric and status-based conceptions of citizenship shaping states’ approaches to migrant incorporation. However, this thesis does not underestimate the importance of state-centred and status-based conceptions of citizenship, and it maps out intersections between these everyday social practices and formal, status-based modes of citizenship.

This chapter also demonstrates the importance of everyday social activity as a way by which diasporas, particularly those living in abject circumstances on the margins of host societies, contest exclusion and devise their own ways of seeking integration in those host societies. For example, some everyday practices become a tactical strategy for accessing substantive benefits of formal citizenship outside the state and without legal entitlement to
them. In other words, diasporas engage in everyday forms of struggle to realise even substantive and formal elements associated with formal citizenship such as legal status and welfare, which they would otherwise not be entitled to. Everyday social practices also become a way of contesting exclusion and asserting membership both in the host country and homeland. In all these ways, everyday social practices serve to extend and complicate the boundaries of citizenship and non-citizenship both in the host country and country of origin, as will be demonstrated in this chapter.

5.1.1 Diasporic Citizenship as Social Practice: Conceptual Issues

Everyday citizenship encapsulates a number of defining features. For instance, it ties well with Zolberg’s observation that beneath macro-political mobilisation, lies seemingly inconsequential micro-events which occur in people’s daily lives (Zolberg, 1972). These are instead important expressions of citizenship, as this study demonstrates. These specific daily social acts are not always overtly transformational and consequential, but also small and seemingly inconsequential daily mundane transactions, routines and practices, but with profound implications on different aspects of people’s lives (Tarrow, 2005).

The above phenomenon resonates with experiences of transnational diasporas who do not only seek to fight for the survival of their nuclear families but also relatives and clan members back in their countries of origin. In addition, these kinds of everyday practices located outside the state, formal politics and organised socio-political activism are not only bottom-up, but can be viewed as autonomous, empowering and liberating forms of social agency resulting in meaningful social change in migrants’ lives and their families. In the next section, I consider the utility of mundane social practices in advancing the de facto citizenship of non-citizen diasporas.
Understanding diaspora citizenship in terms of lived experiences and daily practices has many advantages. By occurring outside the traditional boundaries of the state and its citizenship system, these everyday mundane practices within the broader society also expand the arena in which diasporas can act as citizens (Jones and Gaventa, 2002; Isin, 2002). These daily social practices are sustained on the back of resources, opportunities and networks established within local communities, cities/urban contexts and broader society in which those diasporas live (see Tarrow, 2005; Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997). For example, enduring relationships with different societal actors such as NGOs, employers, service providers, the local community, and informal social and kinship networks, develop over time. These daily interactions and relationships, in turn, give them new roles, rights and responsibilities as employees, clients, consumers, taxpayers and ratepayers, and tenants among other new relationships that emerge out of those daily practices.

Therefore, mundane aspects of migrants’ daily lives often considered non-political, such as going to work, paying taxes, renting private accommodation, going shopping and being members of the community who experience similar problems with other members, help diasporas negotiate new socio-political locations and relationships necessary for their survival within the host society. This affirms the role of unofficial transactions, practices and relationships developed between diasporas and other societal actors within the wider society in which they are hosted, which the state wields limited (or no) direct control over (see Stasiulis and Bakan, 1997). For this reason, these negotiated relationships enable non-citizens to achieve substantive citizenship outcomes in the same way those with formal citizenship status are able to do. These interactions also help them access resources, opportunities and other substantive aspects of citizenship, which they would not be entitled to under the terms of the existing citizenship regime.
Everyday social practices, therefore, bear important implications for citizenship of diasporas. Zimbabweans, as a transnational diaspora, sustain cross border ties while in the different countries they are hosted (Pasura, 2014; 2010; 2008). Everyday social practices provide strategies by which diasporas sustain transnational ties with country of origin. Also, through a transnational set of everyday practices, diasporas simultaneously contest marginalisation and reassert their membership in the country of origin across geographical distance (see Goldring, 2001; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001). In this latter respect, some of diasporas’ everyday practices are designed to assert diasporas’ commitment to their country of origin, while also challenging their marginalisation and delegitimization by their stay-at-home compatriots, on the basis of their prolonged absence and other grounds. These cross border and long-distance practices include the remittance of money and other household goods to their relatives and families, regular travel back to the home country for holidays and sociocultural events and the maintenance of other sociocultural ties with their communities back in the home country, outside the realms of the state. Therefore, considering that diasporic communities tend to have more than one country which they call ‘home’, it will be interesting to see how Zimbabweans’ everyday social practices tend to be directed not only at South Africa and the UK, but also towards Zimbabwe.

Everyday social practices can also be viewed as tactical way by which diasporas seek not only to secure their survival, but to deepen their embeddedness in the host society (see Muzondidya, 2006). These everyday social practices can be used as a survival strategy, especially in contexts where they are denied access to livelihood opportunities by virtue of their non-citizen legal statuses. Many scholars have examined migrant survival strategies in urban contexts of different host countries such as South Africa, Namibia and other places in both the global south and north, which provides a useful empirical basis for our understanding
of the everydayness of diaspora citizenship, particularly as it occurs in urban contexts (Hungwe, 2013; Mbiba, 2011; 2012b). This study adds to this body of work empirically and conceptually as it looks at these survival strategies and other daily social practices and routines (using citizenship lenses) as acts of everyday citizenship.

The pre-eminence of this survivalist and everyday mode of citizenship can also be explained by background experiences of most of the diasporas, characterised by state fragility, socio-economic deprivation and violence and insecurity, prompting emigration from those diasporas’ countries of origin (Betts, 2013). This is true of Zimbabweans, most of who left Zimbabwe as a way out of poverty, feeling they could not survive in the above circumstances, and in search of better livelihood opportunities in other countries like South Africa and the UK (See Dzingirai et al, 2015). This survivalist conception of everyday citizenship also resonates with the experiences of diasporas living on the margins of both the host and country of origin societies, usually without stable legal status, excluded from mainstream political life and with limited rights.

Everyday citizenship also speaks to experiences of diasporas hosted in contexts marked by rampant poverty, unemployment and inequality, as is predominantly the case in South Africa (see Betts, 2013). Those identified as ‘abject’ or ‘irregular’ citizens living on the margin of society (see Nyers, 2011; Sharkey, 2008; Hepworth, 2012). Empirical studies have observed instances Zimbabweans living on the margins of the UK society, with Zimbabweans resorting to informality and social networks as a source of support (see Mbiba, 2011; 2012b). In terms of this mode of citizenship, thriving in the face of daily life challenges, such as negotiating illegality of status, coping with crime and violence, negotiating access to livelihood opportunities and basic services without entitlement, finding work without stable
and valid legal status, and providing livelihood support to family members left back home, become crucial elements of this kind of everyday form of citizenship.

The foregoing discussion makes it clear that everyday practices of migrants are not always just part of mundane daily practices, but this does not make them non-political and inconsequential to migrants’ daily lives. One of the net effects of mundane social practices as a way of performing citizenship, relates to the delinking of *de facto* citizenship from its narrow *de jure* conception, thus making it possible for non-citizens (in *de jure* terms), to start acting like citizens (in *de facto* terms) in their lives. For example, through everyday social practices, migrants begin to contest these imposed legal statuses by constructing and negotiating new relationships within the wider host society. This, therefore, renders the boundaries of citizenship murkier, as it becomes difficult to draw the line between those are citizens and those who are not. Also, as everyday social practices allow non-citizens to realise some of the material benefits associated with substantive, *de jure*, citizenship, which they would otherwise be excluded from by the state, it helps extend the boundaries of citizenship. Therefore, mundane social practices become diaspora inclusion and incorporation.

To demonstrate the utility of everyday social practices in advancing diaspora citizenship, this chapter starts by exploring how the state remains important is grantor of legal status, but no longer remains the exclusive arena of citizenship. This paves way for everyday social practices occurring in alternative arenas outside the state, which become ways of contesting state-centric modes of citizenship and identities. This chapter ends by discussing how Zimbabweans use everyday social practices to contest exclusion and assert their Zimbabweanness transnationally, across geographical distance, while hosted in the two host states – the UK and South Africa.
5.1.2 Limits of the State as an Arena of Diasporic Citizenship

The state is important in citizenship, but it does not represent the sole locus of citizenship, as experiences of a significant section of Zimbabweans observed in South Africa confirm (see Laguerre, 2000). This confirms the shift in thinking away from state-centred citizenship discourses and practices (see Isin, 2008; Isin and Turner, 2002; Jones and Gaventa, 2002). This decentring of citizenship was more defined in South Africa where nearly 85% of the participants in both Johannesburg and Cape Town expressed apathy, cynicism and distrust towards the both the South African and Zimbabwean states due to what they viewed as their exclusionary practices and lack of compassion. However, participants with valid immigration status indicated their recognition of role of the South African state, particularly in giving them the requisite legal status, which they deemed crucial for their survival. For example, according to Baba Muti (46 years old self-employed motor mechanic living in Philippi since in 2008):

*We only need the South African government to give us the papers [immigration documentation]. Nothing else.*

As such, it emerged that although these South Africa-based participants did not trust the South African state, and therefore also found ways of avoiding, evading and cheating it. I will discuss this aspect later, when I examine Zimbabweans’ daily struggles to remain in South Africa.

It is also clear from the above data that there was a desire for self-reliance, autonomy and non-interference from the South African state. For example, above 85% of the participants in South Africa tended to not see the South African state as having any important

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79 Interview at Philippi, Cape Town on 24 February 2015.
role to play in the provision of their material needs in their day to day lives, other than the granting of legal status. The above tendencies bear implications on our understanding of the role of the state in diaspora citizenship, as I discuss below.

This desire for non-interference and self-reliance, mirrors broader trends by which various aspects of South Africa-based immigrants are becoming informalised, with alternative arenas (often informal) being found outside the state (Von Lieres and Piper, 2014; also see Nyers, 2011; McGregor, 2008; Portes, 1995). The above dynamics also reflect the great sense of injustice felt by Zimbabweans towards the South African state, which is often thought to be treating immigrants unfairly by denying equal opportunities, compared to citizens (Neocosmos, 2010). This category of participants, especially the youthful ones, may have lacked experience engaging with the state either in mainstream political processes or as part of organised civil society back in Zimbabwe, which suggests this pattern could be traceable to the citizenship crisis responsible for their emigration in the first place (see Dzingirai et al, 2015; Betts and Jones, 2016; Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). This tendency by Zimbabweans in South Africa is not without context. The above finding also mirrors broader trends in Africa where citizens (and non-citizens) are increasingly disengaged from the state due to its failures as a vehicle for meaningful citizenship, thus becoming more inclined to perform citizenship outside the realms of the state (see Baker, 2001). This is a trend not only for Zimbabweans hosted in the country, but also those left back in Zimbabwe.

Also, due to its dominant, violent and repressive nature, the state in many Sub-Saharan African countries is often viewed by citizens rather cynically as an object of oppression and exclusion to be avoided, cheated or fought at every opportunity (see Ake, 1992; Azarya, 1988). It is also viewed as a tool for impoverishment. It is not surprising,
therefore, that the poverty and socio-economic deprivation that immigrants endure in South Africa is often blamed on the state, due to its failure effectively to manage the economy and distribute socio-economic benefits across society (Mkandawire, 2010; Kpessa et al, 2011). This is the background from which African diasporas usually come, and perhaps helps explain why the majority of South Africa-based participants were not keen on engaging with the South African state. However, not depending on the host state as a vehicle for citizenship, was not accompanied by total exclusion and marginalisation of the Zimbabwean community in South Africa, without any means to get on with their day to day lives.

It is important to note, however, that the tendency to by-pass the state was less defined among UK-based participants, where the state was seen as an irreplaceable arena of citizenship for both British citizens and non-citizens, regardless of their legal status, as Gift confirmed:

The government makes sure we live comfortably in this country. It protects and looks after everyone. And if anything goes wrong the government of this country is quick to act.80

This shared view in the data is, however, inconsistent with contemporary patterns in the UK given the draconian way the UK government deals with immigration and immigrants (House of Commons, 2006). There have also been wider issues relating to structural unemployment, downward social mobility and institutionalised racism for immigrants in the UK (Pasi, 2013), which again contradict this dominant perception among participants. In this context, civil society has been playing a key role in guaranteeing the rights, welfare and wellbeing of

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80 Interview at Camberley, Surrey, on 28th July 2015.
immigrants, including Zimbabweans (McGregor and Primorac, 2010; Pasura, 2010). Informal forms of support with access to employment and micro-enterprising on the basis of informal social networks (see Mbiba, 2011; 2012; von Lieres and Pier, 2014; Crush et al, 2015; Gastrow and Amit, 2015). Therefore, the view that the UK state guarantee substantive citizenship for Zimbabweans, expressed by participants is not entirely universal.

There was also a shared belief that legal status accorded by the state and directing claims to the state were critical for them to attain safety, protection and wellbeing in their everyday lives within the UK. This observation ties with contemporary thinking which seeks to move away from state-centric conceptions of citizenship, to an understanding of citizenship as lived experience outside the direct ambit of the state, its institutions and the formal political process (see Isin et al, 2008; 2002; Jones and Gaventa, 2002).

By implication, decentring citizenship helps expand the boundary of where citizenship is performed, which opens up opportunities for non-citizen diasporas to act as citizens outside the direct tentacles of the state (Miraftab, 2004; Tarrow, 2005; Nyers, 2011). This is largely true for diasporas in South Africa, compared to those in the UK whose practice of citizenship (and non-citizenship) is closely tied to the state, as shown in preceding sections of this chapter. This is not to suggest the lack of informal, everyday and bottom-up modes of citizenship for diasporas hosted in the UK, but this study shows that this is more defined in the South African context. This confirms the tendency by immigrants in South Africa to display a dominant desire for self-reliance, non-interference and autonomy, which I highlighted earlier (also see Mbiba, 2011; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Polzer, 2012). Given the tendency by Zimbabweans in South Africa to shun and by-pass the host state for their wellbeing and other

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81 Consider role of churches in dealing with mental health problems; pro bono lawyers helping navigate the asylum/immigration system; and NGO’s campaign for respect of rights of immigrants.
aspects of citizenship, it is important to determine alternative spaces in which they begin to engage.

5.1.3 Everyday Spaces for Diaspora Citizenship

Not engaging directly politically with the state, and lack of formal recognition as a citizens, does not always mean total deprivation of and exclusion from citizenship for diasporas (Laguerre, 1998; Fortier, 2016; Isin, 2008; Oldfield, 1997; Lister, 1998; Jones and Gaventa, 2002). Instead, findings of this study demonstrate that indeed ordinary Zimbabweans appeared to achieve a lot in terms of substantive outcomes of citizenship outside the state, perhaps more than what their South African counterparts enjoying formal citizenship are able to accomplish:

*The government [South African] does not want to help us. It is difficult but we can still survive. We are not citizens here but we seem to be living better lives than some South Africans in this place.*

The above statement indeed confirms that Zimbabweans are still able to thrive as de facto citizens under minimal state intervention and without secure legal statuses, validating the above view that citizenship can indeed be practiced outside legal status and the state (Von Lieres and Piper, 2014; Isin, 2008; 2008). As I pointed out, this mirrors broader trends on the African continent, where citizens disenchanted by the state find alternative arenas to practice their citizenship including civil society (see Baker, 2001; Azarya and Chazan, 1987). I now consider the role of organised civil society, to see if it provides an effective alternative vehicle for diasporas to perform their citizenship.

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82 Interview at PASSOP offices, Cape Town, 22 February 2015.
Some Zimbabweans, particularly new arrivals, vulnerable individuals and those struggling to legalise their immigration statuses among others, routinely seek the support of organised civil society in their quest for rights, legal status and other kinds of support in their daily lives (see Polzer, 2012; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). This tendency was more defined among those in South Africa, the undocumented and those in employment; whereas very limited migrant NGO activity was observed in the South-East of the UK. This was probably a result of methodology used, with a particular focus on areas with limited charities and social formations working with diasporas and other categories of immigrants.

Most of them were located in London and only two participants indicated that they had solicited support from an NGO. In relation to South Africa, I observed this tendency when I worked at a Cape Town-based organisation called PASSOP from April to May 2015. According to PASSOP’s statistics, an average of 30% of their daily clientele were Zimbabweans. They often approach the organisation with various problems for assistance, including advice on what immigration/asylum permits to apply for, preparing appeal submissions, negotiating access to healthcare, education and other public services among many other forms of assistance.

Most civil society organisations in the form of NGOs working with migrants, operate within a rights-based framework (see Polzer, 2012; Betts and Jones, 2016). And their primary aim is to turn those human rights to which migrants are entitled, into a living reality. Migrants are entitled to some rights enshrined in South Africa’s constitutional and legal framework, including the Constitution, Refugees Act and Immigration Act and other relevant laws (Kriger, 2007; Morreira, 2010; 2011; 2015). However, not all immigrants have the ability to claim and benefit from them and without robust claims-making, they remain lofty without any real and
meaningful impact in their daily lives (see Golub, 2003). Therefore, support and assistance from various civil society organisations with claiming rights is often sought, as is usually the case for other marginalised and disempowered sections of the migrant community (Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Beyond support in negotiating the Department of Home Affairs (and Home Office in the UK), Zimbabweans living in precarious conditions also receive welfare support from churches such as the Central Methodist Church in Johannesburg led by Bishop Paul Verryn, welfare NGOs such as Scalabrini Centre in Cape Town and similar organisations in London and other parts of the UK (see Polzer, 2012).

Lastly, my observation was that, in addition to rights issues, Zimbabweans often approach NGOs with a range of problems confronting them in their daily lives, at times not knowing whether they have a right or not. For example, some came to PASSOP with complaints related to the administrative injustices they would have suffered at the hands of the South African state. This reaffirms the intermediary role of NGOs and diaspora associations, mediating between the state and non-citizens, thus helping to translate rights into practice (Golub, 2006; Polzer, 2012). At times they came for help with engaging private persons and other entities outside of the South African state, denying them access to basic and public services, such as employers, landlords, banks, hospitals and schools.

As indicated in the foregoing discussion, Zimbabweans indeed frequently resort to NGOs for support, while other NGOs’ sole purpose is advocacy for an improvement in the plight of immigrants in both South Africa and the UK. This, therefore, confirms the view that migrant civil society indeed constitutes another vehicle through which diasporas assert citizenship claims (Tarrow, 2005; Isin and Turner, 2002). However, organised civil society has its own flaws which inhibit most Zimbabweans from accessing them. These limits include lack
of capacity, lack of awareness about their existence and spatial bias, with a tendency to be located in CBDs and affluent areas, thus precluding those in South Africa’s informal townships (Polzer Ngwato, 2012). I will not delve too deeply into the limits of organised civil society, except to underscore that it represents a crucial ally of ordinary immigrants in the absence of sustained migrants-state engagement. Another crucial observation to make is that, despite its useful role in advocating, representing and supporting diasporas, not many Zimbabweans are dependent on NGOs, who are not widespread across South Africa and the UK anyway.

The above tendency explains why only an average of 40% (20% in Cape Town, 15% in Johannesburg and five percent in the UK) of the total participants reported having resorted to NGOs for help at any point during their stay in South Africa and the UK. Instead, Zimbabweans routinely resorted to unorganised, mundane and unselfconscious, everyday survival strategies in their daily lives to achieve different citizenship outcomes. I confirmed this tendency during my observation when I spent over two months (February – April 2015) immersed in the township of Phillipi. For example, I observed that these strategies did not so much involve consulting NGOs or other representative above them, but included reliance on social and kinship ties and networks for assistance and support outside the state and organised civil society.

Now, it is interesting to see how Zimbabweans negotiate their survival in their daily lives, in the context of diminished limited formal engagement with the host country state. Since almost all of the participants in the three research sites, south-east England, Johannesburg and Cape Town, highlighted the need to continue residing and working within the two countries as their foremost twin-priorities for their survival, the following analysis will examine how everyday social practices help Zimbabweans achieve those outcomes.
It is worth pointing out that subsequent sections of this chapter will be devoted to the examination of unorganised, unselfconscious and mundane aspects of their everyday lives as ways of enacting citizenship. The next section considers how status-based, state-centric citizenship intersects with everyday social practices, particularly emphasising how migrants use everyday social practices to contest state-imposed legally imposed exclusion through illegal status.

5.2 Legal Status and Survival Among the Zimbabwean Diaspora: Empirical Dynamics

It is worth restating that this thesis does not intend to diminish the importance of legal status, the same way it has not rejected the importance of ‘Big P’ political participation, as a way in which citizenship is realised by diasporas. It represents another way by which migrants become citizens. In fact, ordinary migrants often desire to be legalised and recognised in the same fashion the state recognises its citizens, as this is perceived to enhance their livelihoods and prospects for social mobility within the host society (see Morreira, 2011). However, such recognition, or at least regularisation of status, is not always forthcoming from the host state, as evidenced by the draconian nature of immigration and citizenship laws and regulations both in South Africa and the UK, and the actual practical difficulties associated with negotiating immigration/asylum documentation application processes in both countries (see Pasura, 2008; Morreira, 2010; PASSOP, 2013). As is the case with political activism, status-based citizenship has its own limits which I will highlight in this section.

An examination of how immigrants negotiate acquisition of legal status with the host state, given how crucial having legal security is often considered to be by migrants themselves, can help to demonstrate how the state remains critical but not the sole vehicle through which citizenship outcomes are achieved by diasporas. The acquisition of legal status
represents a traditional way of defining citizenship based on legally defined identity (see Kubal, 2012; Bosniak, 2000). Having a secure legal status serves many purposes in the lives of diasporas, one of which was daily survival and attainment of better living standards in the host country.

Host states often use the immigration system as a tool for controlling immigration figures, reducing the number of people who enter, stay and need to be removed from the host country territory, as immigration is increasingly becoming politically contested and securitised (Kubal, 2012; Morreira, 2011). More importantly, legal permission to reside within the host country marks the boundaries of legality/illegality/semi-legality of non-citizens in terms of their legal status, making it an object of contestation between the host state and immigrants (Morreira, 2010; 2015; Kubal, 2012). Citizenship and immigration laws identify immigrants differently and this is meant to distinguish between those formally recognised members of that particular political community and those who are not.

However, as I noted earlier, data shows that immigrants often attach different meanings to legal status, one of which is that of a survival mechanism without which their lives would be difficult in the host country. For example, indeed as confirmed by data, having secure legal status is critical for the survival of immigrants hosted in any context, but diasporas often negotiate access to this status using everyday strategies and resources. This was confirmed by nearly 100% of the participants, who felt that having valid, secure and relatively permanent legal status was critical for their socioeconomic wellbeing in the host country. Regularising presence in the host country, and ensuring one obtains status with favourable conditions attached to it was, therefore, viewed as the next crucial element to fix, immediately after entry into either South Africa or the UK. In other words, how to get the right immigration and
residency status is always a perplexing question that preoccupies every immigrant’s mind, at times long after their arrival and settlement. For example, A. M (42 years old) who had lived in Vosloorus for 6 years had this to say:

*Once you arrive in this country, the next important thing is to get the right papers for you to stay and work. This determines how successful you will be in this country.*

Therefore, legal status is not only a way for identification or demographic control purposes, but is critical for survival and success in life. This, therefore, demonstrates how formal and informal dimensions intersect and complement each other.

Permission to enter and reside within the host country has another critical use. It is often used by host states to control immigrants’ access to resources, opportunities and other substantive benefits associated with citizenship, ostensibly with an aim to ensure non-citizens do not benefit from the resources meant for citizens (see Anderson, 2013). As I underscored earlier, access to livelihood opportunities is always a critical aspect of survival in the host country for African migrants, most of who would have endured socioeconomic deprivation in their lives before departure (Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012; Betts, 2014; also see McGregor, 2008; Mbiba, 2011; Dzingirai et al, 2015). There was broad consensus among participants both in the UK and South Africa, for example, that the acquisition of secure legal status constitutes a gateway into opportunities and quality of life while hosted in the two respective countries. Related to that is the use of legal status to become integrated into the host society, particularly in the economic activities of the country and being able to access opportunities otherwise reserved for formal citizens (Baubock, 2006; 1994). Almost every participant across the three research sites, mostly educated and professionally qualified, desired to have a valid

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83 Interview at Vosloorus taxi rank on 24th April 2015.
and stable legal status viewing it as a stepping stone to social mobility, better employment opportunities, enjoyment of rights and entitlements.

There was also a shared view that, without valid legal status allowing one to work, the capacity to sustain transnational practices such as sending remittances for the survival of their families and regular travel may become difficult to engage in, which defeats the purpose for their emigration in the first place (see von Burgsdoff, 2010; 2012; Crush et al, 2015). Certainly, this represents another critical use of legal status, particularly for those hosted in distant places such as the UK and Cape Town who need to travel significant distances to see relatives. Lastly, there was consensus that a stable residency status provided a guarantee of ‘peace of mind’ and ‘feeling at home’ without which mental health issues and other psychosocial problems would ensue:

*I’m always living in fear of being arrested and deported. That’s why I moved from Johannesburg to Cape Town. I don’t feel safe at all.*

In light of the above discussion, there is no doubt that having secure legal status means a lot for immigrants, and their success depends on its acquisition. It is clear that host states do not give due consideration to what legal status means to immigrants in different contests, particularly the importance immigrants place on it as a tool for their survival. The next section considers the everyday strategies used by Zimbabweans as part of their struggle to ensure their continued physical presence, terms of their stay and access to livelihood opportunities within the host country.

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84 Interview at Lower Crossroads on 15th March 2015.
5.2.1 The Struggle for Legal Status in South Africa and the UK

Having secure legal statuses is viewed as critical by Zimbabweans, but the acquisition of such statuses is not always easy. Debates about immigration and settlement of migrants are often state-centric and top-down, focussing on how the state imposes different statuses and conditions of residency in any particular country through the use of immigration and citizenship laws (Baubock, 2006). Non-citizens’ legal status often encompasses the types of residency permission held by a person, showing their identity, its degree of temporariness/permanency, what it allows the holder to do (and not to do) and conditions under which its validity ceases (see Baubock, 2006). The host state often uses the law and administrative mechanisms to determine and impose various categories of legal status (subject to set qualifications, criteria and application process) (see Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Bosniak, 2000; 2006; Baubock, 1994). For example, some are recognised as citizens, permanent residents, visitors, dependents, asylum seekers and illegals among other legal identities and categories by which diasporas are identified.

Formal approaches to citizenship give primacy to the host state as a granter of legal status, in a top-down fashion (Baubock, 1994; Jones and Gaventa, 2002). In others words, the state makes the laws, it determines residency permit categories and application criteria, sets up a government department that handles, processes and decides on applications; the task of the immigrant is to apply and meet the application requirements. This way of understanding the struggle for legal status is too neat and technicised to capture the actual lived experiences of immigrants when seeking to obtain legal status from the state. The above way of thinking represents a somewhat sanitised representation of what is essentially a negotiated and contested, at times messy, hellish and conflictual, process playing out in non-
citizens’ day-to-day lives. Therefore, the above state-centred conception of the acquisition of legal status problematically ignores the bottom-up struggles and claims by non-citizens aimed at achieving desirable terms of residency within the host country.

Despite the existence of (sometimes very progressive) immigration and citizenship laws, systems and procedures setting out how to apply for different categories of permission, data shows that not everyone finds it easy to navigate the immigration system and bureaucratic entities charged with these processes both in the UK and South Africa. For example, a tiny minority of participants (5% in Cape Town, 8% Johannesburg and 17% in south-east England) indicated that they had applied for residency permits without too much difficulty and without the need for assistance. This pattern mirrors what has been observed to be a systemic problem by civil society organisations, especially in the findings of PASSOP’s monitoring report in which the organisation documented the challenges faced by asylum seekers applying for asylum in the host country.\textsuperscript{85} Therefore, faced with the possibility of being returned by the host government back to Zimbabwe, where socioeconomic and political problems continue unabated, the Zimbabwean diaspora community devise mundane strategies aimed at allowing them to be able to not only reside but also survive in both South Africa and the UK. The concept of abject spaces is a useful way of understanding the spaces and strategies by which this marginalised section of the diaspora negotiate citizenship (Nyers, 2011; also see Hepworth, 2012; Sharkey, 2008; Morreira, 2011).

It became clear from interviews and observations at PASSOP that indeed permission to live and work in South Africa and the UK was not obtained easily due to a variety of socio-

\textsuperscript{85} PASSOP conducted a study on the accessibility of Refugee Reception Centres. The report entitled ‘The Road to Documentation: Asylum Seekers’ Access to Cape Town’s Refugee Reception Office’, highlighted the difficulties faced by asylum seekers seeking asylum in South Africa. This included corruption by officials, inefficiency and delays and poor queue management systems.
legal and other challenges. For example, a total of over 70% of the 140 participants in both countries complained about how difficult it was to obtain a suitable permit/visa which allowed them the right to work, without any restrictions. One of PASSOP’s activists highlighted the following challenges he thought made it difficult for Zimbabweans to obtain legal status in South Africa: exorbitant application fees and related costs, complexity of application procedures, hostile staff, high rejection rate, and corruption within the Department of Home Affairs. These are the same issues raised by civil society organisations advocating for greater inclusion and integration of non-citizens into South African society (PASSOP, 2012; Solidarity Peace Trust and PASSOP, 2012).

In addition to above concerns, duration of validity of those residency permits, which were often temporary. For example, holders of Section 22 asylum seeker permits were valid for three months, while ZDP permits were valid for three years. The same problem was reported in the UK where applying for work visas was an expensive and time-consuming process but their validity only stretched up to three years. It is apparent that obtaining legal status is not always a neat process. The next section, therefore, considers other localised, unofficial and mundane strategies used by Zimbabweans in South Africa, to struggle for formal recognition through legal status. It also discusses how non-citizens use every day social practices to contest imposed legal identities and residency statuses, as well as redefining the terms and conditions of residency outside those legally and institutionally dictated by the host state.

Abject citizens adopt a variety of day-to-day strategies (outside the state and organised civil society) aimed at ensuring that they continue to live and work in the host country (Nyers, 2011; Sharkey, 2008). Even when their chances of obtaining legal status
become next to non-existent for different reasons, they still find tactics to evade and cheat the host state to avoid removal from the host country. Although NGOs are often viewed as key alternative vehicle for citizenship among marginalised sections of society, this study shows that not everyone indeed always gets a chance to benefit from their interventions (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). For example, almost every participant highlighted that they had sought to legalise their status as soon as they arrived in South Africa or the UK, but only 40% in South Africa and 60% in the UK indicated that they had been successful. Those participants have not stopped their quest for legal status, but have explored different strategies of becoming documented. For example, of the total 140 participants across the three research sites, only 20% reported that they had sought help from NGOs. Reasons for not engaging the assistance of NGOs ranged from their inaccessibility due to spatial bias in their locations to lack of awareness about their assistance among many others.

During my time as a participant observer at PASSOP I also observed that the number of NGOs providing support to migrants in Cape Town alone was negligible, without any reputable diaspora association for Zimbabweans dealing with issues faced by the Zimbabwean community. Other NGOs like the Cape Town Refugee Centre avoided helping Zimbabweans on the basis that they are technically not refugees as they were not believed to be facing any fear of persecution. These latter two issues mirror the limited capacity within organised civil society and marginalisation of the Zimbabwean diaspora by refugee organisations, observed among Zimbabweans in Botswana by Betts (2013).

Therefore, in the context of limited (or no) state support, and limited civil society reach and capacity (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Polzer, 2012), the family, church and other Zimbabweans met at social events and gatherings, were cited as alternative sources of
information, advice and other kinds of support in pursuit of regularisation of stay. This confirms the important role of informal social ties and networks based on kinship, extended family, clan, friendship and nationality ties in promoting migrant settlement in different contexts (Muzondidya, 2006; Pasi, 2013; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; Mutsindikwa and Gelderblom, 2014). I now look at those unofficial and unorganised practices to see how diasporas make use of them to achieve their aim of residing and working in South Africa and the UK.

This thesis suggests that non-citizens will use every day social practices in arenas outside the state, to maintain physical residency and access to benefits associated with formal citizenship in the host country (Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016; also see Scott, 1985). For example, social networks and ties constitute an alternative source of support in the quest for legal status. For example, based on my own observations during my two-month immersion in the township of Philippi (Cape Town), this free of charge, vernacular, immigration-related advice and assistance often included little but critical mundane things like finding where the Department of Home Affairs’ offices are located, how to navigate the urban environment to reach the offices and what modes of transport to use. At times, useful tips and advice on how to increase chances of success were shared informally, including how to jump the queues at the immigration offices, how to make an appealing claim for asylum during asylum determination interviews, and other ‘dos and don’ts’ of immigration and asylum applications.

Furthermore, as I mentioned earlier, application processes are often expensive, and participants cited a number of costs associated with regularising their statuses in the host

86 Mutsindikwa and Gelderblom go further in their analysis to observe how friendship ties become more prominent as a basis for social capital and support among Zimbabweans in Botswana.
country. For example, considerable travel is often involved for those attending refugee status determination interviews, appeal hearings and travel to Pretoria’s Marabastad Refugee Reception Office (since the closure of the Cape Town Refugee Reception Office in 2012). Material assistance in the form of pocket money for bus fares and other needs while seeking to apply for legal status is also derived from networks. There were also costs associated with postage, application fees and related costs (such as radiography tests and criminal record checks by SAPS) for those applying for other immigration permits other than asylum status queuing during application processes.

Social capital, based on informal social connections, was also critical in the day to day survival, as a way of support during times of hardships (Putnam, 2000; Muzondidya, 2011).87 There were also concerns about the unbearable costs associated with tracking and following up on their submitted applications, for example, participants who were in the process of applying for ZDP permits bemoaned the decision by the Department of Home Affairs to contract VFS Global, which instructed that all applications would be made online. This presented challenges for those who could not afford internet and related costs. Therefore, in the absence of state or NGO support, participants concurred that the family, relatives, clan and other social networks were usually useful sources of help and support. This indeed confirms the utility of everyday relationships, transactions and networks as a source of resources by which citizenship outcomes can be achieved by those on the margins of society (see Tarrow, 2005; Sharkey, 2008; Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012).

87 Muzondidya observes that social capital is built on trust, solidarity and sense of togetherness and community. Putnam also observes the importance of reciprocity in sustaining social capital.
Furthermore, abject and irregular forms of citizenship practiced through everyday social practices are sometimes aimed at contesting illegality and marginalisation. Some Zimbabweans resort to fraudulent tactics in a bid to continue living in South Africa, confirming the view that migrants find it difficult always to comply with the law (Von Liéres and Piper, 2014). In some instances, participants cited cases in which some Zimbabweans designated illegal and liable for deportation had resorted to fraudulent documents, bribery and other corrupt practices (as a way of cheating the state) as an option for legalising their status. In this context, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) blame the South African government’s restrictive immigration and citizenship laws and regulations for compelling immigrants to find ways of purchasing immigration documents through illicit means just to stay legally in South Africa. This above tendency to obtain ‘fake’ legal status fraudulently reflects a similar trend that has been observed of Zimbabweans with a reputation of buying fraudulent South African identity documents in the Johannesburg area (Mawadza and Crush, 2010; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016). This has been more rampant in that part of South Africa due to its proximity to the head offices of the Department of Home Affairs in Pretoria where applications are processed, making it easier for officials with access to the applications to engage in corrupt and fraudulent practices.

These were desperate measures taken mostly by completely undocumented persons struggling to find employment and guarantee their survival in South Africa:

*It is difficult for us who failed to get the ZDP permits in 2010 because applying for the normal work permits is hard. They require a lot of things plus you can go for years*
without getting the result. That’s why we have to find other ways of getting the papers from the black market.\textsuperscript{88}

While in Phillipi, I personally observed that information was shared via WhatsApp and word of mouth among Zimbabweans on how to obtain fraudulent documentation and the contact information of those producing them, most of whom were of Nigerian and Congolese origin. This illustrates that social capital transcends nationality boundaries based on what may be termed inter-‘national’ solidarity across diasporas of different nationalities. Others had links with Department of Home Affairs officials selling permits in a corrupt way. Such desperate and extreme measures help confirm that the quest to stay within the territory of the host country can be heavily contested and struggled for. Also, Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw (2016) correctly observe that non-citizens are sometimes pressured by the prohibitive citizenship and immigration laws and practices of the host country to end up engaging in such desperate measures, especially given the importance they place on legal status as an instrument for their survival.

This tactic of cheating the state by way of working illegally was not only confined to South Africa, as it was also used by some in the UK, albeit at a smaller scale. For example, only four participants had applied for asylum reported knowing their fellow asylum seekers working illegally with employment agencies in the care industry. This would enable them to support not only their families but also to be able to remit money to their relatives who depend on them. These participants indicated that they were not allowed to work while their applications were still pending with the Home Office, and this caused a lot of anguish and hardship among affected persons. Clearly, apart from avoiding being physically removed from

\textsuperscript{88} Interview with 26-year-old L.M at Philippi on 09 March 2015.
the host country, Zimbabweans also used different everyday tactics to gain access to employment and other livelihood opportunities so as to guarantee their survival, and that of their families and relatives left back in Zimbabwe.

The above instances show that the terms and conditions under which non-citizens immigrate and reside within host countries are not only set by the state through the law, but they are constantly challenged and redefined through everyday practices of non-citizens themselves. I now look at other ways in which yet another category of Zimbabweans, those who had completely given up on trying to regularise their stay, use everyday practices to maintain physical presence within the host territory, given how presence within territory represents a crucial element of citizenship (see Bosniak, 2000; 2006; Baubock, 2006). Illegal diasporas also find other ways of maintaining physical presence within host country territory, forming part of their everyday lives, in order to continue accessing all other aspects of citizenship.

5.2.1.1 Evading the Host State as a Way of Contesting Illegality

In principle, the state is responsible for putting measures in place aimed at ensuring those living within its territory hold regular legal statuses, without which they are physically removed (see Bosniak, 2000; Morreira, 2010; Nyers, 2011; Kubal, 2012). To punish and deter others from living in the host country illegally, deportees are often held in degrading and dehumanising conditions, as has been reported to be the case at Lindela Immigration Detention Facility outside Johannesburg (Solidarity Peace Trust and PASSOP, 2012). This is not always the case, in reality, as undocumented diasporas adopt various everyday strategies aimed at contesting and resisting their arrest and physical exclusion from the territory of the host state (see Morreira, 2011; Kubal, 2012). Evading the host state is often used by
undocumented persons, liable for arrest, detention and deportation, as a way of contesting illegality of status, thereby continuing to stay illegally within the host state. This kind of everyday resistance often takes the form of little, subtle moves designed to resist the legal requirement to leave the country (see Scott, 1985; Kubal, 2012). The precarity of lives of this section of the diaspora, compared to other segments who would have settled relatively securely and integrated into the host society (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes, 1995).89

Therefore, without relying on the state or appealing to organised civil society for assistance, ordinary Zimbabweans (and undocumented immigrants in general) use a variety of tactical practices are often used to avoid detection and resist removal from the territory of either of the two host countries (see Kubal, 2012; Alfaro-Velcamp and Shaw, 2016). Again, this tendency resonates with Claude Ake’s observation that the African citizenry, with its history of being dominated and repressed by the state, views the state as an instrument of injustice and repression that is to be fought, cheated or evaded (Ake, 1992). This strategy was often relied on by Zimbabweans not meant to be physically resident in the host country in terms of the law due to immigration exclusions (with expired permits, failed applications, undesirable persons and criminals).

In terms of data, the evasion and tricking of the host state was more prevalent in South Africa where almost 50% of the participants were living precariously, without secure residency permission or completely undocumented. Interestingly, participants who were undocumented and liable for deportation rationalised their actions of remaining in South Africa illegally, viewing their actions as legitimate reactions in the circumstances. They also

89 This tendency for different categories of the diaspora to achieve differentiated integration could be explored and understood more deeply using Porter’s concept of segmented integration.
tended to blame the South African government for its restrictive immigration and citizenship policies and practices which rendered them illegal (also see Neocosmos, 2010). Therefore, there was a dominant feeling that they were justified in not complying with the law and avoiding deportation. For example, M.B (a 42-year failed asylum seeker, living in the township of Samora, Phillipi) reasoned as follows:

I have lived without papers for nearly 4 years. My asylum claim was rejected but everyone knows the situation is bad in Zimbabwe. Where does the South African government want me to go? I will keep staying under the radar forever and if they deport me I will come back the same day.90

M.B’s statement clearly illustrates how illegal status is contested and redefined through practice. It is also apparent that related imposed practices such as deportations are also challenged using everyday practice by those considered illegal, apart from seeking pro bono legal assistance to challenge it in court and NGO advocacy. For example, M.B is not only contesting illegality by ‘staying under the radar’ but also through his commitment to returning, which is perfectly feasible considering the geographical proximity of Zimbabwe.91

This approach to contesting illegality is also much more elusive for the South African state as it exposes the porosity of the South African border, and the costs to the taxpayer of deporting Zimbabweans some of whom repeatedly find their way back into South Africa.

Apart from not leaving the country voluntarily at the expiry of their documentation, various tactics were used to avoid detection, arrest, detention and deportation in South Africa. These everyday strategies and tactics used by those living underground were informed

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90 Interview at Philippi on 09th March 2015.
91 Focus group discussion at Mr A.M in Stock Road, Cape Town on 19th March 2015.
by understandings of the urban spaces and South African way of life enabling migrants to blend into the community. These strategies were also based on an understanding of the *modus operandi* of the immigration enforcement authorities.

In the above context, I spent some time with undocumented persons in Philippi during my fieldwork, trying to understand how they thrive ‘illegally’ within South Africa. The following discussion highlights some of the strategies they shared with me: settling in areas where immigration enforcement was less intense, and speaking in local languages in public spaces to avoid being suspected of being immigrants, the vastness of South Africa meant they would not be caught easily, living in overcrowded and overpopulated black townships where authorities find it difficult to navigate due to crime, lack of street names and physical addresses. For instance, 32-year-old W.M living in Marcus Garvey boasted that:

*We know that they would never find us here. Home Affairs target only those living in nice places, not us here. They will never find us because we just look like our fellow South Africans, plus there are no house number[s] and street names in this place, which makes it hard for them to locate us. Immigration enforcement people are also scared of being attacked by muggers and robbers who cause havoc in this community.*

This perception was also shared by participants in Johannesburg, where immigration authorities frequently conducted regular and intense immigration raids and checks within and around the CBD.

Not all places were considered safe in Cape Town, however, with the story being different for townships like Capricorn (Retreat, Cape Town) notorious for immigration raids. The above

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92 Interview at Marcus Garvey on 22 March 2015.
dynamics confirm the observation of Piper and Von Lieres (2016) in relation to their work on immigrant informal traders in Cape Town, which highlights how immigrants often find it difficult to live within the law all the time. Living underground also challenges the status-based approach to citizenship based on the law which commands that M.B is not supposed to be in South Africa. However, contrary to what the law says and on the basis of a different logic, he remains physically and socially present within the country by other means than the law itself and the state which made it. This kind of action represents a way of contesting the status of being illegal and the attached condition of having to be arrested, detained at Lindela Detention Facility, deportation and being declared an undesirable person barred from entering South Africa for five years. In the context of this study, although the law renders them illegal and liable for removal from the host country territory, everyday tactical practices enable them to contest arrest, detention and deportation within South Africa. The rest of the chapter explores other strategies by which Zimbabweans contest marginalisation and claim inclusion back in their country of origin, across geographical distance.

5.3 Everyday Transnational Social Practices in Situ

Everyday social practice, as a way of being citizens, has a transnational dimension too, as is the case with other modes of citizenship. Diasporas assert their commitment and membership in their homeland, which is a critical element of citizenship, through a range of social practices in their daily lives in places they get hosted. As I have highlighted earlier, and as others have also observed, Zimbabweans use their identities as a way of contesting marginal identities and labels back in South Africa (see Muzondidya, 2006). Similarly, they engage in mundane practices designed to assert their national identity in situ, often with fellow compatriots, to demonstrate their Zimbabweanness. The marginalising identities and
discourses discussed above are contested by expressing and sustaining different aspects of their Zimbabweanness in their everyday lives in the contexts they are hosted.

Based on my personal observations in the field and experiential knowledge as a Zimbabwean, most of these social practices were also performed through informal social networks based less on kinship, family, clan and other sociobiological ties. Instead, recognising the dislocation in the family that occurs out of transnational migration resulting in the reconfiguration of social ties within the diaspora, other new forms of social ties based on regional origin, ethnicity, shared immigration statuses and membership in social groups such as churches (see Pasura, 2014). Zimbabweanness as an assertion of national identity also forms the basis for social relations, with people ending up sharing accommodation, falling in love and networking on the basis of their being Zimbabwean. It is important to observe that the effect of social practices done through these social networks and ties is not only to ‘prove a point’ that they are Zimbabwean enough, but simultaneously result in the realisation of meaningful and material outcomes.

These mundane everyday practices often include going to Zimbabwean churches, parties, funerals and other social events with other Zimbabweans living within the same local community. In the context of material deprivations such as South Africa, helping each other in times of trouble, especially when a fellow Zimbabwean passes, was also a key way in which they maintained their Zimbabwean identity while outside the country. Everyone was expected to make financial contributions [kubvisa chema] to cover funeral costs, in the context of lack of support with body repatriation by both the South African/UK/Zimbabwean

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93 Pasura (2014) illustrates the reconfiguration of social ties from blood ties to other new social relations within the diaspora. This is understandable when considering the fact that some diasporas have no other family members joining them out of Zimbabwe. Also, Zimbabwean[‘Zimba’] identity becomes prominent as a form of national identity, providing a basis for social relations to form.
governments. Repatriation of dead bodies denotes an important way by which Zimbabweans claim and assert their Zimbabweanness while outside the country. Where a person is buried is given a deeper symbolic meaning in relation to senses of belonging, place and authenticity, which those deprived of legal status and related substantive citizenship turn to as an expression of their continued commitment to the nation. As Chabal (2009) observes, being buried in one’s ancestral land gives a sense of collective belonging, a sense of origin and being at home, which matters for identity (see Mbiba, 2010). Sociocultural rituals, for example, followed during times of bereavement and burial of a dead person tend to be of symbolic importance. They are often taken as a representation of the Zimbabwean diaspora’s continued commitment to the Zimbabwean way of life, even if they are hosted in the context of other cultures and ways of doing things.

Living outside the country is accompanied by many other types of challenges, and sociocultural networks become a source of support. For example, in the absence of publicly provided counselling and related support to bereaved (especially in South Africa), Zimbabweans often take it upon themselves to help each other in the spirit of compatriotism. This was done through the traditional, Zimbabwean ways of paying condolences [known as kubata mawoko], as a way of providing support and comfort in times of emotional stress and grief caused by refusal of immigration applications, death of a relative back in Zimbabwe, broken families and other social problems uniquely experienced by diasporas. This kind of assistance is also provided by the state and available to citizens during times of distress. However, those with irregular and illegal immigration statuses tend not to be entitled to any such assistance.
Being safe and secure from violent crime, was another crucial element of survival for Zimbabweans both established and newcomers. In the absence of effective crime prevention and community safety interventions in black townships by the South African government, informal social networks of Zimbabweans emerged as an important alternative in ensuring the safety and security of fellow Zimbabweans in South Africa. For example, tactical advice was shared on how to stay safe and avoid becoming a victim of crime, especially in the South African context. This kind of informal advice included avoiding speaking Zimbabwean languages and English language in public, importance of speaking like and dressing like a South African, being imposed to avoid attracting unnecessary attention of petty criminals and avoiding hanging in informal taverns [shebeens] which South Africans frequent (see Von Lieres and Piper, 2014).

Host governments and organised civil society in some countries such as Canada, tend to offer a lot of support during the process of settling in the host country (see Vineberg, 2012). This kind of assistance in the UK often depend on the visa conditions of the immigrant, with many participants indicating that they were not allowed any recourse to public funds when they arrived. Almost all participants recalled being assisted by relatives. The South African government offers minimal (perhaps none) settlement assistance to new arrivals with an intention to settle in the country; family members and informal networks of Zimbabweans therefore often play a crucial role in receiving newcomer relatives and family members at Cape Town and Johannesburg bus stations. They also helped with orientating their newcomer relatives in the host country, advising them on little but critical things like how to open a bank account, where recruitment spots for casual jobs are located, applying for immigration documentation and other aspects of tactical integration, which would allow them to partake in transnational life as quickly.
Outside the family, Zimbabweans often engage in their own civic and social spaces such as churches, social clubs for women, associations (for example, the Zimbabwe Association) and workplaces, especially in the UK where some care agencies predominantly employ Zimbabweans. For example, the Zimbabwe Association in London provides a platform to share and be proud of their Zimbabweanness by engaging in a variety of activities, including sewing, knitting and cooking lessons for women in which they do Zimbabwean fabrics and menus respectively. These spaces give them a platform to continue sharing Zimbabwean values, traditions and practices among themselves, while simultaneously also responding to the material need to tactically integrate into the host society.

Sociality represents another way by which those not realising citizenship act as citizens, particularly young people, as I have discussed in the literature review (see Maffesoli, 1989). One might want to question whether such social practices are matters of citizenship, which has been traditionally defined in terms of legal status, rights and political participation. I maintain that citizenship is enacted in many ways, as observed by Thomas (2002), and these everyday social practices represent another important way by which diasporas continue to identify with the way of life of their country of origin. This is the essence of what Isin (2008) described as recasting the social in citizenship, emphasising how citizenship is not only performed through politico-legal activities but through mundane practices in people’s everyday lives.

Sociality and related everyday practices, therefore, could be another way by which Zimbabwean diasporas, many of whom have limited chances of enacting their citizenship through rights claims and participating in political process, assert their citizenship from afar. This includes maintenance of Zimbabwean lifestyles and other elements of diaspora social
life, including their consumption patterns. For example, I observed many Zimbabweans engaging in mundane practices such as eating Zimbabwean foods and cuisine, listening to Zimbabwean music, speaking indigenous languages, supporting Zimbabwean sporting teams, and attending music shows by Zimbabwean artists frequenting places like Leicester, Dunstable and Luton in the UK; and Cape Town and Johannesburg. It is clear from the foregoing discussion, that transnational practices become an unselfconscious way of contesting marginalisation not only within the host country but also back in the country of origin. Besides, various other substantive citizenship outcomes in terms of livelihoods, welfare and safety, are achieved out of those mundane and seemingly inconsequential social practices.

5.3.1 Everyday Strategies for Contesting Marginality Within Host Country

Sections of the diaspora living on the margins of the host society encounter enormous structural forces of exclusion in the community, workplaces, property and labour markets, educational institutions among other spaces (see Nyers, 2011). For example, in addition to being a tool by which the state regulates who stays and who is physically removed from territory, legal status is a form of identity aimed at determining who is included and who is not, in terms of citizenship and the nation. For example, Brubaker refers to it as a tool for social closure, marking the boundaries of who is part of a nation and who is not in terms of identity (Brubaker, 1992). As I noted earlier, the host state also plays a key role in shaping identities and statuses assumed by diasporas while outside their countries, and one way it does this is through the imposition of various legal statuses on immigrants. As a result, some of these categorisations and labels (such as ‘refugee’, ‘immigrant’, ‘illegals’, ‘aliens’ and ‘deportees’ among others), provide a foundation for other forms of exclusion endured by
immigrants in the host country. In addition to state-imposed legal identities, xenophobic sections of the native population also often ascribe marginal labels to non-citizens, such as ‘foreigners’ (*Makwerekwere*), ‘immigrants’, and ‘aliens’ among others, as a way of representing their exclusion and alienation from citizenship. However, although the host state uses residency permits as a way of legally imposing a boundary between those who are legal and those who are not, findings of this study show that non-citizens contest this marginalisation through a range of daily practices.

However, status-based approaches to citizenship tend to ignore the capability of people self-identify as citizens or on-citizens, with an emphasis being on legal status, rights and political participation (Jones and Gaventa, 2002; Isin, 2002). Therefore, besides responding through social practices, diasporas also react to imposed marginal identities by articulating alternative self-identities and self-representations, manifesting in their daily lives. However, the above findings show the utility of everyday practices, identity claims and self-representations by non-citizens, as a strategy to contest this exclusion and to claim greater access to citizenship within the host country. Through everyday social practices within their communities and the broader society, diasporas are able to contest these forms of marginalisation by asserting claims for greater recognition within the host country through tactical practices and vernacular identity claims-making (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011).94 These claims and subjectivities also form the basis for more substantive demands for greater access to rights, entitlements and opportunities ordinarily reserved for those with formal citizenship within the host state.

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94 Hopkins and Reicher (2015) characterise this as an aspect of ‘everyday citizenship’.
The above tactical and unofficial claims are often couched in vernacular discourses. The construction of vernacular identities and self-representations on the basis of a shared pan-African identity, contributions made to society, shared historical past (such as colonial relationship between Britain and Zimbabwe), geographical neighbourliness, length of stay in the country, serve to contest imposed illegality by the state. As I noted earlier, undocumented persons often rely on these claims to rationalise and normalise their precarious settlement and residency in the host country, and how they continue to ‘cheat’ and ‘evade’ the host country authorities in order to continue staying within the territory of the host state. This indicates that legal statuses and categories imposed by the host state do not always correspond with the lived realities of diasporas and how they identify themselves in different contexts.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates how Zimbabweans in both South Africa and the UK use various strategies to negotiate their identities, statuses and negotiate new social locations within the host society, on the basis of their lived experiences in their everyday life. Negotiating new identities, beyond the imposed legal status, help position diasporas as an integral part of the host nation as they start identifying with the host country through contributing to the wellbeing of its society, adopting aspects of its way of life, length of stay and shared pan-African identities. It is also clear that a lot of these mundane practices that non-citizens partake in, become a basis for claims for greater formal recognition and secure legal status, beyond traditional qualifications for formal citizenship such as birth, ancestry and naturalisation.

Therefore, everyday social practices, transactions and relationships forged by diasporas, help contest alienation and marginalisation resulting in the obscuring of the
boundaries between citizens and non-citizens within the host state. The importance of everyday social practices, as a way of negotiating inclusion, is also observable in the transnational relationship between diasporas and their homeland. The following final section demonstrates the utility of everyday social practices in asserting their membership and contesting marginalisation back in their country of origin, across geographical distance.

5.3.2 Everyday Social Practices from Afar

The tendency for migrants to pursue dual citizenships has been observed in terms of legal status (see Baubock, 2006; Bosniak, 2000), but this section demonstrates how the same logic of dual and multiple citizenship is performed through everyday social practices. The assumption is that migrants direct their social practices to that country which they consider themselves citizens. I have already discussed how Zimbabweans rely on everyday social practices to negotiate incorporation in the host countries they are hosted, but their embeddedness is only tactical to the extent that it is designed to enable them to maintain different forms of transnational ties with Zimbabwe. For this reason, Zimbabweans are appropriately characterised as a transnational diaspora community whose ties span the host and sending country (Pasura, 2008; Levitt, 2001). Although some scholars observe that immigrants leave their countries with an intention to permanently integrate and assimilate in the host country (Bulcha, 1988; Brubaker, 2003; Jopkke and Morawska, 2003), this study proves that indeed Zimbabweans become transnationals because not all of them seek to completely detach from their home country and become fully embedded in the host country. However, some are forced by exclusionary social forces not to integrate, resulting in a segmented diaspora with different segments of the diaspora population differentially integrated (see Portes, 1995).
Instead, many of them engage in everyday forms of citizenship in a tactical way, just to enable them to sustain cross border and long-term attachments with compatriots back in Zimbabwe. These everyday practices, therefore, ‘serve a higher purpose’.\(^95\) For example, various survival strategies including struggling for legal status and livelihood pursuits among many other survival strategies discussed earlier, are designed to give them capacity to maintain cross border and long-distance activities asserting their commitment to Zimbabwe. In this configuration, most of the mundane practices the Zimbabwean diaspora engage in serve to better position them in the host society so that they are able to effectively partake in various transnational ties, networks and practices. It is often assumed that countries of origin will reach out to their diasporas and seek to incorporate them in the nation in pursuit of nation-building (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004; Basch et al, 2004; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003). However, Zimbabweans often encounter different forms of marginalisation not only in countries hosting them, as observed by many scholars (Muzondidya, 2006; Pasura, 2008); but also, back in their country of origin. This following section explores how Zimbabweans seek to maintain their Zimbabwean citizenship, not by way of legal status but through everyday practices across territory and geographical distance.

The Zimbabweanness of the Zimbabwean diaspora, which forms the basis for efforts to marginalise from substantive political and socioeconomic process back in Zimbabwe. In this context, although most of them maintain their legal status as Zimbabwean citizens, de facto incorporation in their country of origin is not granted and automatic, but has to be claimed, struggled for and asserted, as this study shows. This happens through what Levitt terms the transnational social field, encompassing practises, networks and ties connecting the home

\(^95\) Interview with JC at Stock Road Station 22\(^{nd}\) March 2015.
country and country of origin (Levitt, 2004). I observed a number of such mundane social practices during my observations in Vosloorus and when I travelled by bus observing the cross-border activities of travelling Zimbabweans.

Some of the transnational practices by which Zimbabweans asserted their commitment to Zimbabwe included: sending financial remittances to provide household support to their families back in Zimbabwe with money for food, school fees for children, payment of medical bills for their ill relatives and funeral assistance. Remittances of money and household goods continue to be sent from afar, as a way of providing direct support and assistance to families and relatives. This is crucial in Zimbabwe where, although it would have been the duty of the state to look after all citizens, the state has abrogated its duty to guarantee the welfare of its citizens.

Also, interestingly, Zimbabweans often avoid official channels and money transfer companies such as western union and MoneyGram, due to their strict requirements to see proof of immigration status, which a significant proportion do not hold (von Burgsdoff, 2012). They also often require those sending money to provide proof of addresses, which tends to negatively affect those living in the townships where some informal houses do not have street names and addresses. Above all, they tend to charge exorbitant amounts per transaction, which repels most of the customers towards informal money transfer agents. The majority of participants in South Africa, however, indicated that they had relied on informal transport providers (omalaitsha) for the remittance of goods and money. Although they charge relatively less, the safety and security of goods and money sent with them is often not guaranteed (Muzondidya, 2006). This leads most Zimbabweans to remit household goods and
money using trusted relatives, friends and other social connections at work or church, as observed by Tevera and Chikanda (2009).

Regular travel back to Zimbabwe also represents an expression of commitment to the nation and offers diasporas a chance of physically reconnecting with Zimbabwe in different ways. After speaking to travellers on my way to Zimbabwe from Cape Town, I also learnt that travel back to Zimbabwe was not just for fun or holidaying, but a show of loyalty and performing responsibilities to their families, including attending family events such as funerals, traditional marriages and other sociocultural activities. For example, participants felt a greater sense of being rights-bearing citizens during the travel process, particularly not having to justify their presence as is the norm back in South Africa.

The act of crossing the border from the South African to the Zimbabwean side of the border not only represents a chance to reconnect with territory, but also carries a symbolic meaning in terms of citizenship. I asked a participant named Mai Ndoro travelling from Cape Town for the first time in three years, and her responses were interesting. For her, crossing the border back into Zimbabwe symbolised being at home, feeling safe, and feeling like an authentic Zimbabwean. I also observed a great sense of excitement and relief among travellers on the Zimbabwean side of the border, which was displayed during interactions with border control, Zimbabwe Revenue Authority officials, bus staff and among travellers themselves. These above dynamics show that the ordinary everyday act of travelling back to the home country may be used by diasporas to claim their place within the home country nation, thereby challenging their marginalisation.

The above kinds of practices also serve to contest the rhetoric by the Zimbabwean government, that diasporas were not contributing to the development of the country by not
paying taxes and physical absence from the country’s territory. Furthermore, in Marshallian terms, some of the support and resources transfer through remittances serve to fill the gap left by the Zimbabwean state ever since the Zimbabwean crisis ensued, as part of its citizenship obligations to guarantee the welfare of citizens (see Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2011; Marshall, 1949). Although Zimbabweans were not remitting money through official channels, most of it directly assisted families and households with income support, social security for the elderly and disabled, children’s welfare, food security and poverty alleviation, aspects which the state would have been responsible for (see von Burgsdoff, 2010; 2012). In fact, households benefitting from diaspora remittances tend to be better off in terms of welfare, compared to those without the same support in Zimbabwe (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006; Brinkerhoff, 2006; Crush and Pendelton, 2009; Chikanda and Tevera, 2009). To underscore the importance of diasporas to the country, I would add that indeed if it was not for these kinds of seemingly insignificant support from the diaspora, the socioeconomic crisis that continue to grip Zimbabwe could have led to implosion.

At the same time, many Zimbabweans tend to be ambivalent about the possibility of their return and what a future Zimbabwe holds for them (also see Mortensen, 2013). What also adds to the pressure to sustain transnational connections and practices is the fear of being ashamed to return empty handed (see Mortensen, 2013). This pressure is reinforced by relatives back in Zimbabwe. Demands and expectations of support by relatives also necessitate the sustenance of everyday transnational practices and ties, especially in the context of socioeconomic hardships, poor service delivery by the state and collapsed welfare

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96 T H Marshall (1949) recognises the importance of welfare guarantees as an element of substantive citizenship. Kpessa et al (2011) and Mkandawire (2010) observe how many sub-Saharan African countries have not been keeping up with their citizenship obligation of looking after their citizens, since the adoption of devastating structural adjustment programmes in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
system. However, participants in both the UK and South Africa shared the view that some of their relatives were putting them under excessive pressure to remit money and household goods for their support. In some cases, relatives back home were misusing the remitted money and abusing remitted household belongings sent back by their family members living outside the country.

At the same time, many Zimbabwean diasporas recognise the precariousness and uncertainty associated with being integrated in the host country, fearing future exclusion, rejection and even expulsion. This tendency emerged in South African where participants felt they were under pressure to prepare for life back in Zimbabwe in anticipation of the worsening of the socioeconomic and political situation in South Africa, compared to those in the UK who were relatively under less pressure to invest and prepare for return back in Zimbabwe. According to B.D who is 28 years old and lives in Lower Crossroads:

“Our life in this country is not easy here in South Africa. Things can change any time. So, everyone is under pressure to make some developments back home in case the situation goes bad in South Africa. It will be embarrassing to return back home empty handed.”

Specific risks faced by South Africa-based participants included fears of changes in immigration policies resulting in revocation of immigration permits and mass deportations, loss of employment, xenophobic violence and unexpected socioeconomic downturn and political crisis.

97 Interview at Cape Town on 14 March 2015.
Therefore, fostering closer transnational identities, ties and networks also represents a future survival strategy and contingency plan, given the risks associated with migrant life in South Africa. The anxiety and ambivalence associated with return migration seems to push diasporas to have to engage in different forms of everyday struggles to generate financial resources not only for remittances purposes, but also to invest back in properties, livestock, residential land and other forms of accumulation, to avoid being ashamed upon their eventual return. Clearly, they have to keep cross-border socioeconomic ties with Zimbabwe, so that they can find somewhere to start from in the event of their eventual (voluntary/involuntary) return. As such, the sustenance of closer transnational ties with Zimbabwe may be interpreted as a futuristic and contingency strategy of guaranteeing substantive citizenship upon return. The foregoing discussion suggests that everyday social practices constitute a way of asserting commitment to the homeland, besides by way of political participation, rights claims and legal status. The next section considers how Zimbabweans also contest their alienation back in Zimbabwe by asserting their Zimbabweanness in the places where they tend to be hosted.

**5.3.2.1 Contesting Homeland Marginality from Afar**

Diasporas rely on seemingly inconsequential everyday social practices to challenge their delegitimization and marginalisation from their homeland by their hostile state and other political actors within and outside their home state. This is the case with Zimbabweans hosted outside the country. Zimbabwean diasporas tend to be vilified and demonised as enemies of the state by ZANU PF leadership, and unpatriotic sell-outs not doing enough to contribute to the development of the country (Tendi, 2010). For example, they are often blamed for deserting Zimbabwe at a critical time:
We have lived here for a long time and we have missed out on land allocations, residential stands and small business loans distributed by the government. MDC people also blame us for being cowards having abandoned the struggle against ZANU PF.\textsuperscript{98}

Zimbabweans outside the country have also historically been accused of not paying taxes, as claimed by one government official recently, hence this is used as justification for their exclusion from governance processes (Muzondidya, 2008; 2010).\textsuperscript{99} They also tend to be viewed as contributors to the economic problems facing Zimbabwe, being blamed for using their skills outside Zimbabwe for the benefit of other countries (Tevera and Chikanda, 2009; Gaidzanwa, 1999). Zimbabwean diasporas are often viewed as a national embarrassment doing menial and dirty jobs like care work in the UK and other places, as Mugabe has repeatedly said in the media.\textsuperscript{100}

There is also a tendency for the Zimbabwean state and other stay-at-home sections of the Zimbabwean nation, particularly those of a pro-ZANU PF and anti-western political worldview, to marginalise diasporas by questioning their loyalty to the nation. The Zimbabwean state and some compatriots who remained in the country also often assume that the Zimbabwean way of life of their compatriots living outside the country becomes contaminated due to their cultural encounters with other peoples, making them not patriotic enough (Tendi, 2010). These bases for marginalisation were summed up by a UK-based

\textsuperscript{98} Interview with KM at Stockroad Station on 22\textsuperscript{nd} March 2015.

\textsuperscript{99} Emmerson Mnangagwa, Deputy President, vowed that diasporas not paying tax would lose their citizenship.

\textsuperscript{100} Mugabe scolded Zimbabweans emigrating to South Africa and the UK during his Independence Day Speech, 18\textsuperscript{th} April 2006.
participant experienced an ordeal at the hands of ZANU PF supporters when she visited her relatives in Ushewokunze settlement (Harare South):

They asked me where I was coming from. One of them told me how I had become British and not Zimbabwean anymore.\textsuperscript{101}

The net effect of these perceptions and discourses are often to delegitimise the membership of the Zimbabwean diaspora within the Zimbabwean nation, portraying them as unauthentic citizens who are not Zimbabwean enough. However, everyday citizenship represents a strategy by which the Zimbabwean diaspora contest this marginalisation back home. And the next section looks at their efforts to contest marginalisation, but also to claim inclusion through everyday social practices.

\textbf{5.4 Chapter Conclusions}

This chapter has sought to demonstrate how citizenship is not only a top-down, politico-legal, status-based area of practice, but essentially an organic process of everyday social practices. Seemingly unselfconscious social practices, often viewed as non-political, in fact bear profound citizenship implications, including the attainment of substantive citizenship and extension of the boundaries of inclusion/exclusion. Firstly, results discussed in preceding sections, show that the state is not the sole arena for diaspora citizenship, often supplanted by organised civil society and even more flexible informal social and kinship networks based on the norm of reciprocity. Although it represents a critical ally, organised civil society has its own limits as a vehicle for diaspora citizenship, as I have demonstrated. This leaves diasporas to their own devices, contesting exclusion and fighting for inclusion by way of everyday

\textsuperscript{101} Interview at Feltham with CS on 29\textsuperscript{th} August 2015.
struggles. Another major outcome of mundane citizenship is that it results in *de facto*, bottom-up integration into host society, apart from imposed, state-led integration and hegemonic social cohesion initiatives. Instead, everyday social citizenship allows diasporas to integrate on their own terms, while allowing them to simultaneously maintain attachments with their country of origin.

Another net effect of the above discussed everyday practices of diasporas, is that they blur the boundary of who belongs in the political community and who does not, both in the host country and country of origin. Similarly, it is evident that the definition of who is a citizen and a non-citizen is contested, not entirely imposed by the state through laws, legal statuses and related state-centred practices. Legal identities and statuses are also defined, contested and changed through localised daily activities within the host society, involving diasporas themselves. It is also evident that mundane social practices provide a useful strategy at diasporas’ disposal for contesting exclusion transnationally, not only in the host country but also back in the country of origin. As such, it helps foster transnational citizenship by allowing diasporas to tactically integrate in the host country, while also sustaining cross border and long distance with the host state.

Everyday citizenship also provides a helpful strategy as a mode of citizenship for diasporas, with particular reference to its utility as a way of survival in hostile and exclusionary host country contexts. Everyday citizenship, therefore, also enables non-citizens to access resources, opportunities and benefits associated with substantive citizenship which they would otherwise not be entitled to, thus pushing back the boundaries of their exclusion. This aspect of the findings, particularly in relation to experiences of South Africa-based, shows us that while migrants are often blamed for being benefit mongers taking away opportunities
meant for citizens, achieving livelihood security for them is a product of daily struggle, resilience and tactful survival strategies. And at times, locals lack the same levels of determination, resilience and tactfulness, which explains why immigrants oftentimes appear relatively more successful than locals.
Chapter Six: Affective Dimensions of Diaspora Citizenship

6.1 Chapter Introduction

Diasporas continue to find different ways of expressing their citizenship in both their homeland and host country, and these may also be subjective and non-material (see Fortier, 2016). Material forms by which diasporas act like citizens encompass the different modes of political participation and mundane social practices discussed in Chapter Four and Chapter Five respectively. This chapter explores the subjective components of diaspora citizenship, particularly the sentimental and emotional attachment (detachment) of Zimbabweans in relation to Zimbabwe and the different countries they are hosted.

I have also demonstrated, in Chapter three how different manifestations of the citizenship crisis in post-independence Zimbabwe have left different sections of the Zimbabwean nation with a sense of rejection and exclusion (see Dorman, 2016; Ndakaripa, 2013; Kpessa et al, 2011). Both colonial and post-independence Zimbabwe have experienced overlaying displacements of various sections of the population across time and space, one of the consequences of which has been a kind of emotional crisis that has left many in constant search for ‘home’ (Hammar, et al, 2010). This sense of dislocation has also accompanied most of those who decided to emigrate at different times, out of Zimbabwe’s historical and extant citizenship crisis (Glenn et al, 2011). This shows that the citizenship crisis has not only manifested in material ways but also subjectively and inter-subjectively.

This makes it critical to determine what happens to their senses of belonging. The point of departure of this chapter is that diaspora citizenship is also felt both subjectively and

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102 Glenn et al (2011) describe dislocation in terms of a perpetual search for home by migrants and displacees that often accompanies migration.
inter-subjectively; however, such feelings and sensibilities become fractured as different categories of the Zimbabwean diaspora begin to feel differently about both Zimbabwe and the countries hosting them. These senses of belonging also often become ambivalent, uncertain and fluid owing to an interplay of different factors including context, immigration and settlement experiences among many others. This suggests a shift occurs in how citizenship is conceived, particularly in relation to diasporas, from an overemphasis on material, politico-legal aspects, to other subject and intersubjective elements, as I demonstrate conceptually below.

Until recently, the analysis of the ways by which citizenship is enacted has traditionally focussed on material aspects such as rights, legal status and political participation (Fortier, 2016; Thomas, 2002). As I have demonstrated earlier conceptually, in the literature review and in preceding empirical chapters, this understanding of citizenship is of limited applicability to the everyday life experiences of the majority of Zimbabweans. Instead, there is also growing recognition that the sentimental and emotional components of citizenship constitute a legitimate object of study in the multidisciplinary field of citizenship studies (Fortier, 2016). The notion of affective citizenship also recognises how citizens do not only act in a legal-rational manner, but also feel and care about politics and other aspects affecting their relationship with the state (See Jones, 2005; Ahmed 2004; Clarke et al. 2006; Marcus et al. 2002; Redlawsk 2006; Westen 2007). 103

It is critical to stress, however, that focus on the emotive and affective aspects is not new in the study of politics and citizenship, and I do not wish to rehearse these longstanding

103 Hung (2010) refers to them as ‘citizens with tears’, depicting the strong emotions and sentiments that accompany the practice of citizenship.
conceptual debates in this thesis (see Fortier, 2016).\textsuperscript{104} Nevertheless, as I will demonstrate empirically in subsequent sections of this chapter, emotions and sentiments constitute an important dimension of diaspora citizenship, given impediments often associated with claiming and enacting citizenship in material ways, as I indicated in preceding chapters. This resonates with experiences of abject citizens (Nyers, 2011; Hepworth, 2012), whose experiences on the margins of society invoke a mixture of sentiments and emotions. Nevertheless, this thesis maintains the view that affect and emotions constitute one of the ways through which migrants assert their citizenship while outside their countries of origin. In addition, given the fragmented and transnational nature of diaspora citizenship, those senses of belonging become multiple and fluid owing to context and other variables shaping them, as will become apparent later in this chapter.

6.2 To Be Citizens is to ‘Feel at Home’: Diasporic Citizenship as Sense of Belonging

The concept of senses of belonging offers another frequently used and analytically tested lens with which to understand the affective dimensions of citizenship alluded to above, in the context of migration. Anthias (2006) defines belonging as ‘the sense of being accepted or being a full member’; and ‘a sense of intimacy’ and love for that particular community which they see as their ‘home’ (Anthias, 2006; Cohen 1985; Yuval Davis 2006; Redlawsk, 2006). Another analytically more useful and elastic understanding of a sense of belonging is that of feeling ‘at home’, which entails a symbolic space of ‘familiarity, comfort, security and emotional attachment’ (Yuval-Davis, 2006:2; Jones and Kryzanowski, 2008). This latter conception, therefore, helps explore what migrants ‘feel’ about any particular community, precisely whether they feel included or excluded.

\textsuperscript{104} Fortier (2016) explores debates surrounding the role of emotions in politics more generally.
‘Home’, therefore, can be conceived primarily in three ways – feeling at home back in
country of origin, host country or both (Anderson, 1983; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004;
Bulcha, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 1986). It is also possible that diasporas may begin to feel more
affiliated and identify with the broader supranational and global community, by way of
cosmopolitan senses of belonging (Beck and Cronin, 2006; Appadurai, 1996; Soysal, 1994).
This thesis, however, holds that migrants often do not become universally and homogenously
attached to one particular community at any particular time, but develop more complex,
fragmented and transnational affinities (see Laguerre, 2000). This is consistent with the
experiences of Zimbabweans living outside the country who have been characterised as a
fractured, transnational, diaspora (see Pasura, 2008). In this context, this chapter maps out
the complex affinities and emotional attachments (or lack thereof) developed by a selected
sample of 145 Zimbabwean migrants hosted in two contexts - South Africa and the UK.

The primary aim is to determine whether they ‘feel at home’, while outside the
country. I want to suggest that the affinities and sentimental attachments of the Zimbabwean
diaspora do not become universally directed at either the host country or Zimbabwe. Instead,
they become transnational and fragmented, directed at more than one community. This
fluidity and multiplicity characterising their feelings and sentiments is shaped by the interplay
of various factors including context, geography and immigration status, among them. As I
indicate in later sections, senses of belonging displayed by Zimbabweans are also gendered,
with women often holding and displaying different feelings about both Zimbabwe and host
countries, compared to their men counterparts. The rest of the chapter explores these
dynamics.
6.2.1 Multiple Senses of Belonging: When Home is More than One Country

Findings of this study indicate that indeed Zimbabweans feel attached to more than one country at any given time, which confirms their fractured nature as a community (see Pasura, 2008). For example, a section of the participants in both the UK and South Africa indicated how they had begun to feel comfortable and ‘at home’ in both host countries. This feeling was somewhat stronger among participants in the UK compared to South Africa, with 18% of the participants in Cape Town and 15% in Johannesburg reported starting to feel at home in South Africa. For example, UK-based Zimbabweans displayed a greater tendency to feel at home in the host country, as evidenced by over 25% of participants who felt part of the British society, having significantly reduced their ties with Zimbabwe. UK-based participants cited a variety of reasons for feeling at home in the UK including historical connections between Britain and Zimbabwe, which gave them a sense of entitlement.

There was also a perception that the UK was homelier than Zimbabwe in terms of safety, access to livelihood opportunities and welfare guarantees, and a general perception that the British state and society were caring, compassionate and more inclusive. In contrast, in the context of South Africa, different bases were highlighted by those feeling comfortable in South Africa, including shared African identity, shared histories of struggle against racial domination, oppression and other forms of racial injustices of both Zimbabwe’s and South Africa’s pasts. Geographical proximity of the two countries and belonging in the same Southern African region, were also used as bases for feeling at home in South Africa, even by those legally considered non-citizens and without valid immigration status.
Diasporas indeed endure exclusion and marginalisation in countries that host them, in some cases to the extent of reinforcing their commitment to their homeland (see Zeleza, 2003; Pasura, 2008; McGregor, 2010). This marginalisation occurs in everyday life on the professional job market, housing sector and other socioeconomic spaces (Mbiba, 2005; 2011). And the concept of blocked mobility helps us understand structural, institutional and other conditions perpetuating this phenomenon in diaspora-hosting societies (see Mbiba, 2005; 2011; also see Portes and Rumbault, 2005). This tendency is displayed by South Africa-based participants who expressed a greater shared sense of exclusion, compared to their UK-based counterparts. For example, a significant proportion of Zimbabweans in South Africa generally expressed feelings of disgruntlement and frustration with their being in South Africa, and therefore tended to be more inclined to look back to Zimbabwe as their ultimate home to which they would eventually return. For example, nearly 35% in Cape Town and almost 40% fell in this category. These participants displayed senses of patriotism and love for their country across geographical distance, albeit not living within its territory (see Anderson, 1983; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004).

It is worth stressing that this significant sense of attachment to Zimbabwe by South Africa-based Zimbabweans was reinforced by resentment emanating from their perceived exclusion, victimisation and lack of recognition that they experienced in both countries. Some of these participants also reported that they were eagerly following the political and socio-economic situation back in Zimbabwe, anticipating a political and socio-economic change before their eventual return to a new Zimbabwe. This sense of anger, frustration and betrayal, therefore, pushed some of the participants to start developing nationalist sentiments. In contrast, none of the participants in the UK reported exclusively feeling the desire to return to Zimbabwe, even though had been living irregularly and in precarious conditions over time.
The above dominant sense of ‘homelessness’ and dislocation predominantly affected those in South Africa without secure legal statuses, unskilled, women and those living in black townships under conditions of squalor (see Glenn et al, 2011). A dominant collective feeling of being strangers within the South African society was displayed by these participants, which they attributed to pervasive xenophobia, denial of secure legal status, rights and livelihood opportunities by both the South African state and native population. While the tendency was for those who displayed this sense of rejection to look back to Zimbabwe in search of their real home, new arrivals (most of whom had witnessed violence and abuse back in Zimbabwe), were not eager to look back to Zimbabwe and thus felt in a state of limbo and ambivalence, akin to what Glenn et al (2011) referred to as a perpetual state of ‘homelessness’ and dislocation without a country to call home.

This study also identified that exclusion is not only experienced by diasporas hosted in countries in the global south, but also in the north as evidenced by senses of belonging of Zimbabweans in the UK. The dynamics of inclusion and exclusion were, however, slightly different to those in South Africa where nearly half of the participants felt rejected. This was based on their experiences and difficulties experienced when trying to obtain secure legal statuses. These experiences resonate with the blocked mobility experienced by diasporas, including Zimbabweans, living in the UK (see Mbiba, 2005; 2011; also see Portes and Rumbaut, 2005). In the UK, participants tended to feel marginalised on the bases of their insecure legal statuses and perceived lack of professional mobility among professionals on the basis of race, class and socioeconomic status. Older participants (for example, over 40s) generally bemoaned various other aspects of life in the UK, including what they viewed as a

105 Glenn et al (2011) observe how migrants often lose a sense of ‘home’, becoming disoriented and dislocated as a result of migration. This is what they metaphorically refer to as being ‘homeless’.
lack of social life, the prevalence of social problems such as divorce and mental health issues, disruption of social ties and networks, and subtle forms of exclusion from professional and socioeconomic opportunities on the basis of their race, nationality, class and way of speaking (accent) (see McGregor, 2008; Pasura, 2010; Mbiba, 2011; also see McNevin, 2011; Nyers, 2011). ¹⁰⁶

To support above observations, S.F, awaiting outcome of asylum application from Home Office confirmed that:

*If you do not speak in English with a British accent, then you won’t get a job or any career opportunity. I’m a qualified quantity surveyor from Zimbabwe, but I’m now doing care-work.* ¹⁰⁷

The key contrast, however, between these UK-based, excluded, participants and their South Africa-based counterparts was that the former displayed remarkable senses of hope and optimism that their fortunes would improve with time, while the latter section tended to despair and start looking back to Zimbabwe for better opportunities.

In contrast, UK-based displayed a tendency of remaining content with their continued presence in the UK in recognition of a variety of perceived benefits associated with continued stay such as safety, comfort and the fact that their ‘bread is buttered’ in the UK. ¹⁰⁸ Other reasons for not turning back to Zimbabwe to rediscover their old home, primarily because they did not want to return to socio-economic hardships during the height of the Zimbabwean crisis, resulting in their flight in the first place. This was coupled with a feeling that there was

¹⁰⁶ Blocked mobility is a useful concept for a deeper understanding of different forms of exclusion manifesting in these spaces.
¹⁰⁷ Interview at Guildford on 22 July 2015.
¹⁰⁸ Remarks by a respondent named M. C during an interview in Aldershot (5 August, 2015).
no hope of socioeconomic recovery and political change in Zimbabwe following decades of socio-economic and political malaise. The above inclusion/exclusion dynamics make it difficult to generalise as to where Zimbabweans’ home really is. In other words, it is not always a question of whether diasporas become included or excluded in both the host and home countries, but where they feel at home may actually become more than one country in a more complex way, as it will become clear in subsequent sections.

6.2.2 Fragmented Senses of Belonging

Senses of belonging displayed by participants also suggest that Zimbabweans indeed constitute a transnational diaspora, as observed in the UK (Pasura, 2008; McGregor, 2010). However, this transnationalism is based only on the subjectively constructed senses of belonging of Zimbabweans, in addition to the material manifestations of migrant transnationalism in much of existing scholarship on the Zimbabwean diaspora. For example, the majority of participants both in South Africa and the UK displayed affinities spanning the host country and the country of origin, which confirms the transnational nature of the Zimbabwean diaspora (see Pasura, 2008; Muzondidya, 2006; also see Levitt, 2004). This was evidenced by nearly 45% in Cape Town and just over half in Johannesburg, who displayed simultaneous, multiple and constantly varying affiliations to both host country and Zimbabwe. This category of South-Africa-based participants also displayed a great sense of uncertainty and ambivalence as to where exactly they belonged.

The same pattern emerged in the UK, where nearly half of participants had mixed feelings with regard to where they thought they belonged. Instead, most of these participants remaining attached to Zimbabwe while simultaneously seeking more or less permanent integration in UK society. The feeling of uncertainty and anxiety was more pronounced
among undocumented persons liable for arrest, detention and deportation. This fear of being physically removed from the host country and forcibly returned aggravated this sense of ambivalence, especially in the context of absence of clarity as to when and how longstanding socio-economic and political problems in Zimbabwe would be addressed. Results of this study, therefore, show that some migrants stay connected to communities from which they emigrated, but also simultaneously begin to feel at home in the host country (see Levitt, 2004). In this respect, diasporas’ desire to integrate into the host country does not always preclude their efforts to maintain cross border and long-distance attachments with their homeland. This, therefore, challenges the notion that home-country ties weaken with emigration as immigrants ostensibly become assimilate; instead, the above discussed findings show that senses of belonging become more complicated, with diasporas feeling part of more than one society. The next section illustrates how different senses of belonging displayed by Zimbabweans in this study intersect, reinforce and (in some instances) contradict with each other.

The notion that diasporas become universally attached to one particular country (whether host or home country), is not entirely applicable as illustrated in the following discussion. To see how this occurs, it is important to map out the intersections and interrelationships between different senses of belonging displayed by Zimbabweans in this study. This was evident both in South Africa and the UK. In South Africa, participants tended to rely on various bases to justify their feeling of being part of the South African society, including (as I have discussed earlier) a shared sense of Africanness, geographical proximity and shared geographical space as Africans. This resonates with what has been referred to as

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109 Integrationists tacitly assume complete detachment with country of origin and desire to integrate permanently in host country.
a cosmopolitan consciousness, which is used to legitimise their presence and integration into South African society (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004). In this regard, cosmopolitanism meets local emplacement and embeddedness, which suggests congruency between migrant cosmopolitanism and integration as different modes of belonging. This finding also confirms that indeed the local and the global are not divorced; instead, they serve to complement each other in ways akin to some form of glocalisation (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004; Beck and Cronin, 2006).

In the same vein, data suggests that integration into the host country and the sustenance of long distance affinities and attachments towards country of origin are not always mutually exclusive. This is evidenced by the simultaneity between the desire to become integrated and sustenance of emotional and material attachment with Zimbabwe. This supports the notion that the more integrated in the host country diasporas become, the more likely they are to maintain long distance ties with their countries of origin more effectively (Portes, 1999; Levitt, 2004). This, therefore, challenges notions, for example, that migrants become completely integrated, begin to engage in long distance nationalism, or become cosmopolitan in any universal way, as I discussed earlier as part of the conceptual framework for this chapter.

I have also highlighted the tendency of those feeling excluded and rejected, especially by South Africa-based participants, to develop more intense emotional connections with Zimbabwe. In this manner, exclusion fuels distance national attachments with the homeland in the form suggested by Benedict Anderson, which, in turn, demonstrates how senses of belonging feed into each other and reinforce each other (see Anderson, 1983). In other words, yes, diasporas sustain long distance emotional attachments with their homelands, but such
sections of the diaspora do not just start feeling connected to their homeland out of nowhere. Instead, such affinities are often bolstered by other sets of emotional dispositions, in this case by senses of rejection within countries hosting them.

In some instances, the tendency by those who had acquired British/South African citizenship suggest, greater integration may also contradict with and limit their long-distance attachment with homeland. The above category of diasporas often ends up completely severing substantive, material ties with homeland, beginning to feel at home in the host country. The above observations make it difficult to generalise about diaspora senses of belonging, apart from the fact that they are not universal and are not always directed to one particularly country. The rest of this chapter maps out the different dimensions of the fragmented nature of diaspora senses of belonging, with a particular emphasis to the different factors which mediate their fracturing in the two contexts.

**6.3 Mapping Fragmented Senses of Belonging: Dynamics and Patterns**

It is clear from the foregoing discussion how difficult it is to categorise and generalise the feelings and emotional orientations of participants, in light of the variation and complexity characterising them. Not every participant felt the same towards Zimbabwe and South Africa/UK. Instead, their emotional dispositions were quite multiple, mixed and fluid, while at times ambivalent and contradictory. This variegation of senses of belonging among participants in both the UK and South Africa, was mediated by the interplay of different contextual, socio-demographic and spatial factors among other independent variables.

Senses of belonging do not emerge out of a vacuum, but are shaped by the context in which those diasporas are hosted. For example, there is an evident tendency by participants living in South African townships to display senses of belonging marked by uncertainty,
ambivalence and anxiety. This could be a result of several factors. For example, South Africa is still struggling to redress the legacy of apartheid and other contemporary societal challenges manifesting in the form of socio-political instability and socioeconomic problems (see Neocosmos, 2010). These participants tended to regret their decisions to settle in South Africa, and were ashamed of their living conditions. For example, one participant, named Luckmore from Lower Crossroads (Phillipi), bemoaned in these terms:

Phillipi is like hell on earth because of crime, violence and conditions of living. I would not invite my relatives from Zimbabwe because they would feel sorry for me.

I also heard the local Xhosa elders who are members of the street committee the other day complaining that we foreigners are responsible for all the problems in this township. I am now always living in fear that they will one day attack us.110

This tendency by local South Africans to be antagonistic, blaming immigrants for all the problems facing their communities, was also observed by Misago (2016). This trend has also been present in the UK, perpetuated by right-wing political forces opposed to multiculturalism operating within British society (Hickman et al, 2012).

Safety and security constitute a critical element of citizenship and belonging, and whether one feels safe and secure depends on context too. As Yuval-Davies proposes, belonging entails feeling ‘at home’, ‘safe’ and ‘comfortable’ (Yuval-Davies, 2006). However, what makes people feel ‘at home’ in any particular place is not easy to understand and cannot be generalised. Different categories of people are motivated and contented (or depressed) by different triggers in different circumstances. Data suggest that the majority of participants

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110 Interview at Philippi on 10th March 2015
in South Africa do not ‘feel at home’ in that particular country for many reasons, crime being a key issue. For example, to support Luckmore’s fears and anxieties discussed above, I also witnessed a violent crime incident (burglary and armed robbery) just after midnight on a young Zimbabwean woman living next to my intermediary, while conducting my fieldwork in Lower Crossroads. I interviewed the victim several days after the incident and she complained at how the South African Police Service had handled the incident:

When I called 10111 to report the crime, the lady who answered my call kept speaking to me in isiXhosa, which I don’t understand. They responded 2 hours after I reported, yet the Phillipi East Police Station is less than a mile away. They are just good at arresting us foreigners for immigration offences but they cannot do their job of protecting the community.\(^1\)

These sentiments also suggest a general sense of distrust and resentment among immigrants directed towards the South African state, particularly the South Africa Police Service (Masuku, 2006). This tendency by the SAPS to direct their resources towards the arrest and detention of undocumented immigrants at the expense of effective and non-discriminatory policing, has been highlighted by other researchers and scholars in South Africa and other contexts (see Klaaren and Ramji, 2001).

Host governments’ restrictive immigration and citizenship policies, coupled with host populations’ increasing hostility towards immigrants both in South Africa and pre-Brexit UK, were cited by many participants as the causes of the fear and anxiety. This dominant anxiety mirrors a broader ‘culture of fear’ and the rise of the ‘neurotic citizen’ in migrant-hosting countries (see Isin, 2004: 217-219). This dominant feeling of fear and anxiety is thought to be

\(^{111}\) Interview at Stockroad SAPS station on 18\(^{th}\) March 2015.
affecting citizens of migrant-hosting countries in the context of growing threats of terrorism and adverse impact of globalisation (Isin and Nyers, 2011). However, the above aspect of the findings shows how migrants have also been affected by this pervasive sense of fear and anxiety, in contexts of xenophobic violence and discrimination among other structural and institutional forces of exclusion operating in South Africa and many other migrant-hosting countries in the global south. The next section discusses different contextual and other factors shaping these fragmented senses of belonging, particularly trying to explain why different sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora feel differently about the host country and homeland.

**6.3.1 The Welfare State and Migrant Senses of Belonging**

Zimbabweans in the UK, compared to their South Africa-based counterparts, also felt more comfortable and satisfied with their lives in the host country. This can be explained by contextual and other factors. It is important to note that feeling safe, secure and at home, is not only defined in terms of the absence of physical violence, but encompasses other aspects of wellbeing considered important by different categories of diasporas. Perhaps the concept of human security provides a more useful way of understanding the multidimensionality of security, encompassing all aspects of human life, including welfare, livelihoods and survival, which are critical for migrants coming from contexts of impoverishment and socio-economic deprivation, as is the case with most participants in this study (see Jinnah and Polza-Ngwato, 2012).

The above pattern contrasts the pattern I observed among South Africa-based participants who tended not to depend and rely on the host state for their welfare, livelihoods and wellbeing. This is presumably because of the country’s relatively nascent welfare system which excludes undocumented and other categories of immigrants (see Jinnah and Polzer-
Ngwato, 2012). For example, Eunice cited the existence of social assistance programmes as part of South Africa’s welfare system, but she lamented the exclusion of immigrants and their children from accessing them. For example, she indicated how her disabled child had been denied access to the disability grant from the South African Social Security Authority by virtue of their being non-South African and undocumented. This mirrors wider problems where vulnerable immigrants find it almost impossible to access social assistance in South Africa, even if they hold valid immigration documentation (see PASSOP, 2013; Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). This, therefore, tends to weaken senses of belonging of those immigrants, at times pushing them to look outside the state for assistance with these and other aspects of their everyday lives, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 5.

In contrast, the majority of participants in the UK felt a sense of being secure and comfortable owing to the country’s relative socio-economic prosperity and welfare guarantees from the welfare state. For instance, 48-year-old Dee compared her feelings towards Zimbabwe before and after coming to the UK:

*It was very hard in Zimbabwe after ESAP. We had to pay for all the school fees and hospital bills, but here I feel happy because health and education are for free.*

*Remember Zimbabwe used to be like this. Everything was for free.*

The role of the UK’s welfare state (including the NHS and free primary and secondary education) was accompanied by a shared sense of belonging in this study, particularly parents with children of school-going age and adults with chronic health conditions indicated how they felt protected and cared for thanks to the UK’s welfare state. The availability and

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112 See PASSOP’s report (2010) based on its ground-breaking research into the challenges faced by disabled immigrant children and other vulnerable immigrant groups integrating into the South African society.

113 Interview at Camberley on 22nd August 2015.
accessibility of social housing made UK-based participants, particularly those with valid and secure immigration status, feel comfortable and ‘at home’ in the UK. Although most participants displayed a cynical attitude towards the claiming of financial benefits from the Department of Works and Pensions, everyone expressed a desire to be allocated a council apartment in the South East of England.

This tendency confirms the link between the accessibility of welfare goods and services, and loyalty to the state and national solidarity (see Banting and Kymlicka, 2017). However, some participants indicated how much they detested claiming welfare benefits, citing the embarrassment and sense of inferiority associated with ‘life on the dole’, while those with temporary work, study and dependent visas had no recourse to public funds at all. This contradicts the perception by some sections of British society that immigrants come to the UK principally to claim benefits. Instead, most of the participants shared the belief that being granted the right to work was more important as it would allow them to be self-reliant and autonomous, than the right to claim benefits. Part of the explanation for this tendency among migrants from sub-Saharan African countries (including Zimbabweans) to shun some aspects of the welfare state relates to the deeply entrenched ethos of self-reliance with longer origins, cemented by the effects of neoliberal economic policies and other factors in recent decades (Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012). Also, as I indicated earlier, only those participants in the UK with the appropriate formal legal status have recourse to public funds.

6.3.2 Spatial Variations in Senses of Belonging

Socio-spatial variations in participants’ senses of belonging were evident in both South Africa and the UK. This thesis is committed to transformative qualitative methodologies as explained in the methodology chapter, which explains why it used a purposive sample to
deliberately target those living in impoverished and crime-ridden black townships such as Philippi in the City of Cape Town and Vosloorus in the City of Ekurhuleni for more sustained periods of immersion in these respective communities. These places have been historically affected by many social problems due to the legacies of apartheid, spatial inequality and other contemporary challenges associated with the rapid growth of South African cities (Landau et al., 2013). The Western Cape Province, where 80 participants were selected, is one of the most crime-infested parts of South Africa. Participants shared the view that crime was indeed a menace in their local communities, which made them feel a perpetual sense of anxiety in fear of being attacked. This fuelled a deep sense of exclusion, hopelessness and anxiety about their future prospects in South Africa, prompting some of them to look back to Zimbabwe in anticipation of a better and prosperous future.

However, there was a marked variation in senses of belonging among participants with higher levels of education and immigration status, who felt Johannesburg was better than Cape Town. This perception was shared by participants in Dawn Park (a middle-class suburb in Boksburg) who felt that that Gauteng was more welcoming to immigrants because people from different racial, national and ethnic backgrounds live in the city. Those who held this view also thought Johannesburg was a land of opportunity for many black people, compared to Cape Town and other cities across South Africa.

The dominant perception in relation to the above dynamic was that black professionals, irrespective of nationality, stood better chances of making it up the professional ladder than those in other parts of the country. As one participant, a Computer Scientist named G.M who completed his studies at the University of Zimbabwe in year 2001 and works for an IT firm in Johannesburg, put it:
black professionals do better in Johannesburg than in Cape Town, as long as you have the right immigration papers.\textsuperscript{114}

This notion that immigrant professionals had greater opportunities in Gauteng was, however, rejected by Cape Town-based participants as confirmed by a freelance journalist, B.C argued:

\textit{Cape Town is a land of opportunity because that is where the rich people are. You are likely to find a professional job here than anywhere else in South Africa.}\textsuperscript{115}

Spatial differences may only partly explain these variations in perceptions, but these perceived differences may be a product of differences in urban scales and levels of economic development, rather than location. Senses of belonging also varied depending on place of settlement within Cape Town and Johannesburg. Participants living in affluent parts of both Cape Town and Johannesburg were inclined to feel ‘at home’ in South Africa owing to the relative safety and security under which they live. Participants living near international transport hubs also had a tendency to display a stronger attachment to Zimbabwe, compared to those in outlying areas.

Variations in senses of belonging are also shaped by geographical distance from Zimbabwe, particularly in relation to the degree of proximity to Zimbabwe, of where participants were settled. The degree of emotional attachment to Zimbabwe of participants in Gauteng was not as intense as that displayed by participants both in Cape Town and the UK. This was aptly illustrated by A.M, who said:

\textit{Living in Johannesburg is not different from living back in Zimbabwe. If I decide to travel right now to spend time with relatives during the forthcoming Easter holidays, I}

\textsuperscript{114} Interview at Dawn Park, Boksburg on 29\textsuperscript{th} April 2015.
\textsuperscript{115} Interview held at PASSOP offices on 4\textsuperscript{th} March 2015.
would get to my rural home in a couple of hours’ time. If I die today here in Joburg, it
will not be difficult for my friends to take me back to Zimbabwe, where I would want
to be buried.116

As findings indicate, participants in Johannesburg showed how easy and convenient it was for
them to maintain cross-border connections with Zimbabwe, compared to those in the UK and
Cape Town (some of whom had not returned to Zimbabwe for decades). Many of those living
further away also displayed a great sense of emotional attachment and nostalgia about life in
Zimbabwe.

Participants also tended to show how they were occasionally affected by a
pathological feeling of ‘homesickness’,117 particularly when a close family member dies in
Zimbabwe and they are unable to attend the funeral due to immigration-related or financial
constraints. Norma118, who lost her father in 2014, recalled how she felt:

I really miss Zimbabwe. I have not gone back to Zimbabwe since 2001, so many family
members and relatives have died over the years and I have not managed to attend any
of the funerals. I had no money and I am on asylum so I could not travel back to
Zimbabwe for my father’s funeral. I felt lack of control and helpless.119

However, the role of geographical distance in shaping senses of belonging is mitigated by the
use of ICTs, particularly social media and mobile communication technologies. Participants
both in Cape Town and the UK reported how they had become more connected with their

116 Interview held at PASSOP offices on 4th March 2015.
117 Hack-Polay (2013) notes how some migrants suffer from emotional and personality disorders such as
nervousness, and presumably mental health issues as a result of protracted displacement.
118 Interview at Camberley, UK on 25 June 2015.
119 Interview at Camberley, UK 10th July 2015.
social networks back in Zimbabwe, but their accessibility is limited to those with stable incomes and gainfully employed.

6.3.3 Socio-demographic Differences and Fragmented Senses of Belonging

Senses of belonging were also differentiated at family and individual levels according to gender, age and other socio-demographic profiles of the participants in both the UK and South Africa. For example, older, male and married participants had a tendency to feel more attached to Zimbabwe and an eagerness to return, while women were more cautious and reluctant. Most women also felt more ‘at home’ in both the UK and South Africa for several reasons highlighted in the findings earlier, including greater access to livelihood opportunities and financial independence, rights and legal protection, and a general sense of equality with their male counterparts.

On the other hand, married men tended to be disgruntled and frustrated with this pattern, which most of them perceived as culturally inappropriate. Participants’ perceptions were also segmented according to their marital status and their perceptions were quite mixed. However, the interests, welfare and future of their families significantly influenced the view and orientations of married participants. For instance, there was no consensus among participants on whether continuing to stay outside Zimbabwe was best for their families or returning to Zimbabwe. These tensions emerged in one of the interviews with the M.T family, in which there were (emotionally charged) disagreements over their future in the UK. The wife argued:

I’m currently working towards completing my nursing degree at the University of Surrey and I will never return to Zimbabwe. I also will not be spending any more money
investing back there. There is nothing left for me there and most of my family members passed away, and some are here in the UK. And even if I die here, I will be buried here.\textsuperscript{120}

The husband strongly objected to this sentiment, maintaining his desire to invest in Zimbabwe and return when he retires in eight years’ time. Mr W.M (the husband) acknowledged that these differences were causing a strain in their marriage. This ambivalence was also evident among participants in South Africa, where participants were uncertain about the future of their families in both South Africa and Zimbabwe in light of mounting socio-economic hardships South Africa.

Another contour of fragmentation which was more pronounced among participants in the UK, followed the lines of age. Generally, younger participants (under 40) displayed a tendency to feel ‘at home’ in the UK, compared to older participants who felt closely attached to Zimbabwe. In some families I observed, there were open rifts between children (some of whom left Zimbabwe at very young ages or were born in the UK) and their parents who felt Zimbabwean and wanted to practice their Zimbabwean way of life in the UK. For example, tensions were evident in the M.R family in Camberley. Their two daughters M.N and KN aged 23 and 18 respectively) came to the UK more than 11 years ago. They attended Collingwood High School in Old Dean and attended the University of Wolverhampton. Such contradictions also presented a potential source of different domestic problems, including family conflict and breakdown.

Variations in senses of belonging also follow lines of gender. Data also indicate how senses of belonging are differentiated according to gender, coupled with marital status. For

\textsuperscript{120} Interview at Bordon, UK, on 22 June 2015.
example, married men displaying a general tendency to feel positively towards Zimbabwe than women. There was also a remarkable difference by gender in priorities which affected how settled migrants felt. Married women displayed a tendency to be concerned about the current needs and wellbeing of children, while men often based their sentiments on the need to build and accumulate property in Zimbabwe. However, the sense of feeling ‘at home’ in the host country was not as pronounced as with women in the UK. Men, on the other hand, still tended to maintain a consistently stronger emotional attachment to Zimbabwe than women. However, men in South Africa displayed a greater sense of uncertainty than in the UK, perhaps owing to declining socio-economic fortunes and uncertain immigration prospects as the ZDP permits expire in 2017. 121

Some of the women, particularly those who were married, explained their pessimism about Zimbabwe by recalling the difficult conditions under which they were initially left behind by their spouses. This dynamic was slightly different in the UK, where most of the women emigrated first and invited their husbands to join them at a later stage. Those who had stayed longer in Zimbabwe before joining their partners complained about the burden of raising children on their own in the context of ongoing socio-economic hardships in Zimbabwe. For example, Mai Chikonamombe in Cape Town openly declared:

*Baba Andy [father of Andy] left me alone with the children back in Zimbabwe and I suffered on my own. Now that we are all here and I am now working for myself as a Domestic worker in Rondebosch, he now starts to talk about returning to Zimbabwe. I don’t want to suffer again in Zimbabwe.*

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121 These are special immigration permits issued to 375 000 Zimbabweans in 2010 and renewed in 2014-15. They will expire in 2017 and the South African government has not announced its decision on whether they would be renewed or not.
This sentiment was shared by many other female participants, who felt returning to Zimbabwe would be accompanied by suffering. Most of the female participants in South Africa also cited how difficult it has generally been for them to come to join their spouses, having had to overcome discouragement from relatives; difficulties getting travelling and immigration documentation; anxieties and risks associated with travelling on their own with children; and fear of being in South Africa based on stories they had heard about violence and crime. On the other hand, this dynamic was more complex in the UK, where both men and women tended to complain of having experienced hardships during the migration and settlement experience.

However, the general tendency for women to feel more secure and comfortable in the host country than in Zimbabwe was more defined in the UK. Another reason why women tended to be more comfortable in the UK related to the predominant feeling of being empowered through opportunities to work and earn their own incomes. For instance, 12 out of 18 women respondents indicated that they only became gainfully employed upon their arrival in the UK, which gave them greater economic freedom and ameliorated their material conditions as well as expanding their life choices.

Women participants also expressed a sense of insecurity and uncertainty regarding the future of Zimbabwe and their prospects in the event of returning there. Above all, many women tended to express their uncertainty by asking what would happen if things do not work when they return to Zimbabwe. The general disaffection with Zimbabwe, and the reluctance to return, therefore largely emanated from the livelihood and insecurity most of them were anticipating upon their return. This was mostly thought of in terms of the availability and accessibility of basic education, healthcare and other public services for their
families. For instance, a woman named Loveness [Mai Tinotenda], who lives in Lower Crossroads in Cape Town, raised her concerns in the following terms:

\[ \text{Where do we start and how are we going to come back again to South Africa if the situation becomes bad again in Zimbabwe?} \]

As a result, most women thought they would be better off staying on in South Africa than going back, which is a similar sentiment expressed by those in the UK.

Most of them had the perception that South Africa offered better employment and other livelihood opportunities compared to Zimbabwe, where some of them only worked in the domestic domain as housewives. Therefore, some had become employed, and in some cases breadwinners, for the first time in their lifetimes, giving them power to choose how to spend their incomes and what to buy for themselves as well as their own families (not husbands’ families). This was echoed by Mai Admire in Vosloorus who asserted that:

\[ \text{I had never worked before in my entire life. I only started working for myself when I came here, and I now work as a domestic worker in Brakpan. I now have the freedom to use my own money to satisfy my own needs and to look after my relatives back in Mt Darwin [Zimbabwe].} \]

Although such perceptions were shared by many married women participants, not all of them were formally employed and were employable due to lack of basic skills, abilities and competencies. Other women participants thought South Africa was good for them because they enjoyed relative legal protection from domestic and gender-based violence. This theme emerged predominantly among research participants in Masiphumelele [Cape Town], where a number of human rights NGOs were operating in the area. For this reason, traditional gender relations were becoming reconfigured thanks to the existence of an elaborate human
rights framework (including gender rights) in South Africa, some which they did not enjoy back in Zimbabwe.

This general reluctance to share men’s emotional commitment towards Zimbabwe did not go down well with most of the male participants in both South Africa and the UK. For example, many respondents indicated that divorces had become prevalent among Zimbabweans living in the UK and part of the problem was to do with women becoming more powerful than the men. Many male respondents complained about changes in gender roles, with some men saying they were now expected to carry out household chores, childcare and other tasks traditionally assigned to women. These dynamics were cited to explain the tendency for men to long for the life they had lived in the past in Zimbabwe and to continue yearning for their ultimate return to their country of origin.

6.3.4 Levels of Education and Socio-economic Status

Whether participants felt at home in Zimbabwe or South Africa/UK also varied according to levels of education and socio-economic status. Participants with higher levels of education (with at least a tertiary qualification) putting them in higher earning occupations and enabling them to move up the social ladder, tended to think positively about their experiences living in both the UK and South Africa. This feeling was heightened among those who had acquired stable immigration status, irrespective of the length of time they had stayed in both countries. In South Africa, most of those who spoke positively about their life experiences and future prospects in South Africa also tended to reside in affluent suburbs of both Johannesburg and Cape Town.

Institutionalised and structural barriers to upward social mobility experienced by diasporas in the UK by other scholars, also triggered frustration and resentment in South
Africa (Mbiba, 2005; 2011). Levels of education produced mixed senses of belonging among Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK. For example, while participants in both South Africa and the UK frequently shared a sense of satisfaction and self-realisation while in both the UK and South Africa, unemployed participants with higher levels of education and socio-economic status expressed senses of frustration and anger towards the host country. Most of these seemingly successful and prosperous participants also voiced their frustration that both South Africa and the UK had not offered them equal opportunities for professional and social mobility.

This sense of exclusion among professionals and highly educated Zimbabweans was more defined in the UK because many participants had completed tertiary qualifications before arrival but were employed in the social care and healthcare sectors. These UK-based participants also perceived that their educational and professional qualifications were not being fully recognized because of their race, class and accents. As a result, most of these people had settled for social care and nursing jobs in the NHS, resulting in their de-skilling in ways that further compromise their employability and opportunities for upwards professional mobility. This indeed confirms that diasporas encounter enormous barriers which militate against their upward social mobility, and one of the consequences of this is greater sense of anger and frustration among those segments of the Zimbabwe diaspora.

The disaffection by educated participants in South Africa emanated from the tendency to place a ‘citizens only’ condition on many employment opportunities, by employers in both the public and private sectors. Some participants also held teaching qualifications but were not allowed to work without immigration status. These participants queried why the South
African government had not recognised teaching as one of the Critical Skills\textsuperscript{122} under its immigration policy, given the crisis in South Africa’s education system. This was captured by Bernard, who is a freelance journalist:

\textit{South Africa does not recognise how important our skills are because we are foreigners. Many of us Zimbabweans with skills are doing general jobs or unemployed at all, which is very frustrating. They reserve most jobs for ‘citizens only’, yet the government admits that South Africa faces a skills shortage.}

Most participants, therefore, felt they were being denied access to employment opportunities due to their nationality. Although a small minority seemed happy for having made it up the professional and social ladder, the majority had begun looking back to Zimbabwe for more accessible investment and other economic opportunities where they thought they legitimately had access to more rights and opportunities than in South Africa because they were citizens. Therefore, mixed feelings were revealed by different categories of highly qualified and educated participants in both the UK and South Africa.

\textbf{6.3.5 Being a Migrant and Sense of Belonging}

Different categories of Zimbabweans experience migrant life differently, and these experiences shape emerging senses of belonging. There were also variations in participants’ perceptions related to the immigration experiences and circumstances. Zimbabweans have left their country for multiple reasons, leading Crush et al (2015) to describe it as mixed migration. Research participants indicated their multiple reasons for leaving Zimbabwe, including political persecution, socio-economic hardship, forced displacement as part of a

\textsuperscript{122} South Africa’s Immigration Act of 2002 provides for a special work permit for holders of qualifications considered critical to South Africa. This type of permit provides a pathway to permanent residency and citizenship. Holders of this permit become eligible for permanent residency as soon as it is issued to them.
highly controversial urban renewal programme (*Operation Murambatsvina*) and family re-
union among other reasons (see Mlambo, 2008). These varied reasons for migration shaped 
emerging senses of belonging among different categories of participants. For example, those 
who were forced out of country by socio-economic hardships were more flexible about their 
prospects of return to Zimbabwe compared to those who were direct victims of political 
persecution. Those who left for socio-economic reasons tended to sustain close contacts with 
Zimbabwe, including through regular travel back to the country.

On the other hand, the situation was more complicated for victims of direct political 
persecution. For example, participants who (or whose close relatives) had suffered torture at 
the hands of ZANU PF expressed greater senses of fear, hatred and total disaffection towards 
Zimbabwe, compared to those without such background and experiences. These participants 
indicated that they had been granted protection in either South Africa or the UK and vowed 
ever to return to Zimbabwe. Those who had acquired permanent residency/indefinite leave 
to remain and citizenship in South Africa or the UK, and had settled for lengthy periods had 
established themselves securely. They felt at home and had completely detached from 
Zimbabwe, in a way consistent with integration and assimilation (Bulcha, 1988; Thomas, 2002; 
Hack-Polay, 2016). Among those who had emigrated for political reasons with an aim to seek 
asylum, there was another tendency by some, particularly those whose family members were 
still in Zimbabwe, to maintain a keen interest in political and socio-economic developments 
in Zimbabwe. This shows the importance of reason for migration and emerging senses of 
belonging among Zimbabweans.

Participants in both South Africa and the UK indicated in their responses that they had 
left Zimbabwe not only for different reasons but also at different times, using different routes,
entry points, modes of transport and travel documents. They also subsequently obtained different categories of immigration permission to stay in the country with different conditions as well as varying duration of validity. All these differences influenced their emerging feelings towards both the country of origin and host country. For example, to demonstrate the importance of time of departure as a variable, UK-based participants who left Zimbabwe before 2002, when Zimbabweans were still allowed into the UK without visas, and before the socio-economic and political problems intensified in Zimbabwe, tended to be nostalgic and to hold more positive feelings about Zimbabwe, compared to those who had left after 2008 when, as some believe, the Zimbabwean crisis reached its zenith (see Crush et al, 2015).

Another source of ambivalence and uncertainty related to the immigration status participants had acquired while in the UK or South Africa, particularly its degree of temporariness/permanency. The segmentation associated with different immigration statuses was accompanied by variation in senses of belonging. Two key factors about immigration status which shaped perceptions of participants, included the rights and entitlements and degree of permanency associated with each. For example, both South Africa-based and UK-based participants with immigration statuses allowing them unrestricted rights to employment and permanent leave to remain, tended to feel more comfortable and ‘at home’ compared to holders of other categories of immigration permission.

Participants in both South Africa and the UK placed strong emphases on the importance of having stable and secure immigration status. To underscore the importance of a valid immigration permission in order for one to realise the benefits of being in South Africa, A.M remarked during an interview that:

123 See Godfrey Tawodzera’s work entitled: Food Insecurity In A State Crisis (2016), in which he marks 2008 as the height of the socioeconomic and political crisis in Zimbabwe.
to have a valid immigration is to have a livelihood in South Africa... You cannot benefit from any opportunity even if you are qualified for it.124

Most of these participants viewed secure legal status as a gateway to a better quality of life and welfare security in the UK, as Beatrice (50 years old) observed:

I have been in the UK for more than 15 years. I can tell you that having stable legal status is a stepping stone to socio-economic benefits and opportunities. As soon as you are granted an indefinite [leave to remain in the UK], you can be anything you want to be here in the UK.125

Beatrice owns a house in Camberley and attributed her eligibility for a mortgage to her acquisition of British citizenship. And most of the participants on different legal paths to full citizenship expressed a remarkable sense of hope and pride about their futures in both countries.

On the other hand, there was a correlation between temporariness of immigration status and ambivalence and uncertainty in terms of senses of belonging. South Africa-based and UK-based participants without stable and permanent immigration statuses tended to display unstable and ambivalent senses of belonging. And those with rejected applications, expired documents and those who were completely undocumented were the most anxious and cynical about their stay in the UK or South Africa as they were facing arrest, detention and deportation. In the UK, violators of immigration rules and regulations by overstaying, working illegally and illegally making recourse to public funds, were also nervous, not knowing what the future holds for them.

124 Interview at Stockroad station on 23 March 2015
125 Interview at Camberley on 15 August 2015.
It is also important to point out, in addition, that what aggravated the uncertainty and anxiety of this latter category of participants was the lack of resolution of the socio-economic and political crises in Zimbabwe, which meant they had no option of looking to return home. And the severity of the anxiety and uncertainty expressed by some of the participants potentially made them susceptible to mental health issues and other social problems during their continued stay in the UK or South Africa. Holders of other immigration statuses expressed senses of uncertainty and various degrees of anxiety, but most of them were hopeful and positive in anticipation of obtaining the right to reside permanently (these included work visas, student visas and dependent visas (UK); section 22 asylum seeker permits, Section 24 Refugee Status, work permits, study permits, visitor’s permits, Zimbabwe Dispensation Project (ZDP) permits (South Africa).\textsuperscript{126} It is apparent in the foregoing discussion that legal status marks a major contour of fragmentation among Zimbabweans living in the UK and South Africa.

The following example serves to further illustrate the effect of temporariness of immigration status on senses of belonging. Although those with temporary residence permits, including Section 22 asylum-seeker permits and ZDP work, study and business permits were more positive about their current life experiences, they tended to feel uncertain and insecure about their future in South Africa because their statuses were only temporary. While some displayed high expectations and looked forward to expeditious political and socio-economic change in Zimbabwe, they were not certain that such change would happen and were unsure what the South African government would decide regarding the renewal of their immigration documents upon their expiry. As a result, many participants in both

\textsuperscript{126} The Zimbabwe Dispensation Project was a special initiative by the South African government in 2010 aimed at issuing work study and business permits to undocumented Zimbabweans living in South Africa since 2010.
countries reported feeling a kind of emotional limbo, not knowing what to feel about Zimbabwe and the host country.

6.4 Dynamics of Senses of Belonging: Fluidity, Multiplicity and Ambivalence

Senses of belonging were slightly more complex among participants living precariously in both South Africa and the UK. However, data also indicate that not every undocumented participant was unemployed and unhappy with being in South Africa. For example, some had managed to secure employment in the formal and informal sectors, while others had become formally employed before their temporary immigration and asylum-seeker documents expired. Nevertheless, despite being employed while undocumented, participants in this category cited their vulnerability to abuse and discrimination, including being subjected to unfair labour practices without any legal recourse because they would be avoiding contact with both the South African or UK public authorities for fear of arrest, detention and deportation.

Those who had been living illegally in both countries for relatively lengthy periods of time, wished they could return to Zimbabwe, while others were actually somewhat regretful that they had taken the decision to come to South Africa in the first place. With the political and socioeconomic situation back not getting any better at the time and facing arrest, detention and deportation for living in South Africa illegally, these participants displayed a great deal of uncertainty and anxiety about their future both in Zimbabwe and South Africa. It is also important to note, however, that not all those undocumented participants were anxious about their continued stay in either South Africa and the UK; and this incredible sense of hope under conditions of adversity was more defined among participants in South Africa. Some, especially the relatively new arrivals and youth, displayed a sense of hope that they would get settled with time and were continuing to explore options of getting their presence
regularized in order to start enjoying the benefits associated with being in their host country. This was illustrated by JB in Vosloorus:

_We have no papers [valid immigration] and life in South Africa has been tough, but we will soldier on. We will keep trying, maybe things will get better for us here in South Africa. Turning back to Zimbabwe is not an option because life is harder there._\(^{127}\)

For some of these participants, looking back was simply not an option in light of the experiences of poverty, hunger and violence they had endured in Zimbabwe.

Another cause of variation in senses of belonging related to immigration statuses was to do with the rights, entitlements and opportunities entitled to participants who held different categories of permits. Although holders of any kind of permit were allowed to work (except those with study permits), their immigration and asylum permits had different other conditions setting out their entitlements. Those with permits issued under the Zimbabwe Dispensation Project could work and study in the same manner holders of any other category of permit would, but some banks did not recognize their permits. Similarly, holders of Section 22 asylum-seeker permits indicated their difficulties opening personal bank accounts. On the other hand, holders of Section 24 refugee permits – those who had been granted refugee status – had more rights than holders of the former two categories. They had many entitlements and rights except voting, owning a business, could not qualify for a mortgage and were not allowed to take up employment in the national security and private security sectors, among other conditions. Documented Zimbabweans, together with holders of Section 22 asylum permits above, were prohibited from travelling back to Zimbabwe, which

\(^{127}\) _Interview at Abesutwini, Vosloorus, 19\(^{th}\) March 2015._
caused a lot of resentment. Those with permanent residence had more rights and entitlements, almost the same as those of citizens, except the right to vote. Those who had been granted permanent residence and refugee status had access to most of the material benefits accessed by citizens and therefore felt more ‘at home’ in South Africa than those with other categories of permits and those without documents at all.

Another key feature of defining senses of belonging of participants relate to the transience and instability characterising them. The cumulative effect of this acute uncertainty and ambivalence evident in participants’ senses of belonging was a sense of ‘not knowing where one belongs’ and perpetual in-betweenness, observed by Wodak and Krzyzanowski (2007) among migrants hosted in some European countries. Data indicate diaspora perceptions shift dramatically following new socio-economic and political developments and events both back in Zimbabwe and South Africa, at times causing a great deal of ambivalence and uncertainty among many participants regarding where exactly they thought they belonged.

Although participants both in South Africa and the UK felt alternating and fluctuating emotions and sentiments at different times, participants in South Africa reported more turbulent and unstable senses of belonging. This fluctuation was aptly captured by the following remark by Mr SN in Phillipi, Cape Town:

*Things are always changing here. Today I am happy but tomorrow I might be sad if something bad happens here or in Zimbabwe. [For example] today I am happy because my ZDP immigration permit has just been renewed by the Department of Home Affairs.*
[However] maybe I will be sad again when it expires because I do not know what will happen at the time.\textsuperscript{128}

This points to the fact that senses of belonging are not fixed and stable, but constantly in flux depending on events and key developments in the host country, back in their country or origin and beyond. The concept of critical moments may be useful in understanding these fluctuations and variations in senses of belonging in response to key developments and events (Mbiba, 2012, Lefebvre, 1996). Critical moments are transformative occurrences in people’s everyday lives which disturb existing equilibriums and certainties, and by so doing expose hidden tensions in society and individuals; and such moments produce changes that are positive and negative, desirable and undesirable (Mbiba, 2012).

Findings of this study, therefore, illustrate how senses of belonging held by participants were upset and disturbed by sudden contextual changes, triggering positive and negative changes in their sentiments and emotions. According to TC in Johannesburg,

\emph{Things are always changing. Today I feel happy and feel at home here in South Africa, but maybe the situation is going to change tomorrow making me feel like I want to go back to my country. We are always unsure what will happen and where we gonna end up tomorrow.}\textsuperscript{129}

Some of the key national events and developments both in Zimbabwe and South Africa triggering shifts in participants’ senses of belonging included elections in either country with a possibility of changes in governments; changes in immigration and other laws directly affecting their settlement in South Africa; and the eruption of widespread xenophobic violence. Participants, for example, shared the view that their senses of belonging have

\textsuperscript{128} Interview at Phillipi Small Business Centre on 21\textsuperscript{st} February 2015.

\textsuperscript{129} Interview at Vosloorus on 29 April 2015.
always shifted dramatically before and after elections in Zimbabwe, with reference to violent and contested elections in 2002, 2005, 2008 and 2013. Some of them recalled and described how they suddenly became hopeful whenever national elections were due to be held in Zimbabwe, in anticipation that the political and socio-economic situation would change and enable their eventual return.

6.4.1 **Critical Moments and Fluctuations in Senses of Belonging**

I held a series of focus group discussions both in the UK and South Africa in which I discussed with the participants a number of past events both in Zimbabwe and in the two host countries, and effects of these on their senses of belonging. For example, those that had been living in South Africa over a considerable period of time also recalled how their feelings about Zimbabwe changed during and after the occurrence of such critical events as the implementation of the land reform programme (*hondo yeminda*) in 2000; the closure of banks and financial institutions by the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe in 2004; and Operation Murambatsvina which was implemented by the Zimbabwean government in 2005. The formation of a government of national unity by the MDC and ZANU PF in 2009, coupled with the adoption of a multicurrency system in Zimbabwe, was also frequently cited as a period of hope and anticipation by many participants, and this sense of hope was more acute among participants in South Africa, who recalled being pressured by xenophobia and restrictive immigration policies at the time.

This hope was, however, shattered when the MDC lost the 2013 elections, resulting in a dominant sense of despair and perpetual limbo mostly among undocumented participants in South Africa. Many participants in both South Africa and the UK reported how their collective senses of hope and longing directed at Zimbabwe often rapidly disappeared.
following ZANU PF’s contested electoral victories. One of the victories of ZANU PF cited by many participants was during the 2013 elections. This was reflected by Mr SC in Cape Town:

*We thought our time to go back home had come. We were very positive the MDC would win and lead us into a new Zimbabwe because of the new constitution they had put in place and other changes during GNU period. Elections were free and no one was beaten so we thought ZANU PF would give MDC a chance, but we were wrong. I waited anxiously for the election results and my heart sank when I heard ZANU PF had won resoundingly. All my dreams for a future back in Zimbabwe were shattered.*

Many participants highlighted how they started feeling depressed and uncertain about their future again, leaving them with no option but to continue with their struggles to settle and establish sustainable livelihoods in South Africa.

Participants in South Africa also recalled how they felt unwanted, fearful and anxious during the time of xenophobic violence in 2008. On the other hand, developments in the host country also influence perceptions and sensibilities of migrants towards both their country of origin and host country. For example, participants indicated how they felt unsafe, rejected and homeless following outbreaks of xenophobic violence in South Africa at different times. Most participants who immigrated before 2008 recalled their experiences during that time of upheaval with sadness, fear and anger. However, what perplexed most participants during focus group discussions was that the May xenophobic violence occurred just after the nasty and brutal violence meted out against perceived supporters of the MDC during the March 2008 elections in Zimbabwe. As a result, most participants who were in South Africa at the

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130 Interview at PASSOP offices on 15 March 2015.
time describe the heightened feelings of homelessness and rejection in both South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Shifts in immigration policies and practices of the South African government at different times emerged as another source of fluctuating and unstable senses of belonging among participants. The tendency was for them to feel positive and hopeful about their future in South Africa and vice versa, when different policies are implemented. For example, some participants who were undocumented and struggling to make ends meet at the time reported how they felt they would finally get a chance to set themselves up and settle permanently in South Africa when the government announced the suspension of deportations of Zimbabweans around 2009-10. The South African government simultaneously adopted the decision to allow Zimbabweans in South Africa to apply for work, study and business permits until 13 December 2010. Participants who were in South Africa at the time shared the same feeling of hope and love for South Africa during that period of time, but that changed quickly when the South African government was not clear about whether those permits would be renewable or not, and whether beneficiaries would be entitled to apply for permanent residency upon the expiry of those permits. Another cause for despair was the resumption of deportations in 2011 and the tightening of immigration policy while Naledi Pandor was Minister of Home Affairs.

However, participants also reported another period of hope and optimism when South Africa hosted the World Cup in 2010. Other participants who were in the country before 2010 also described how they had mixed feelings when there was a change of government, with President Zuma taking over from President Mbeki. Although their anxieties were aggravated by the anti-immigrant tone of the immigration debate at the time, they also felt
positive and excited being in South Africa at the time due to the hosting of the soccer World Cup in 2010 and promises of economic boom in South Africa during that period.

Although participants in the UK felt their sentiments had been relatively stable and predictable, a number of moments were recalled when their feelings about their presence in the UK fluctuated. These shifts in senses of belonging were largely in response to changes in UK immigration policies and political developments in Zimbabwe. Another critical factor responsible for the instability in senses of belonging among participants in the UK was the succession of governments. A greater sense of belonging was reported by participants when Labour governments were in power in the UK, compared to Conservative governments whom UK-based participants thought were always determined to make life difficult for immigrants. It also happened that the Brexit vote occurred while fieldwork for this study was in progress and, as I noted earlier, there were mixed feelings about it. Lastly, political developments in Zimbabwe represented another critical moment associated with rapid changes in senses of belonging among participants. Although a longitudinal study of this temporal dimension of belonging could have been more revealing and insightful on how perceptions and orientations of Zimbabweans evolve and fluctuate over time, above discussion at least suggests that conceptions of belonging are not static and fixed, but are constantly in flux.

Another dimension of how time influences participants’ emerging senses of belonging, relates to their length of stay in both the UK and South Africa. Feelings towards the host country and country of origin varied depending on the length of time they had spent in the respective countries. For example, those who had stayed for a considerable time (for instance, five years and above) tended to have secure immigration status; more stable livelihoods; and therefore, viewed life in both the UK and South Africa more positively
compared to their newly arrived counterparts. The relatively stable settlement arrangements most of these participants enjoyed, led them to begin to feel ‘at home’ in both countries.

At the same time, those who had stayed in South Africa for a long time maintained some degree of sentimental attachment to Zimbabwe, while a tiny minority of participants in this category seemed to have lost any emotional attachment altogether (mostly in the UK). Given the length of time they had been absent from Zimbabwe, most of these participants cited a variety of reasons for diminished love of Zimbabwe including: they had become established and their children were attending schools; they had lost any social networks and relations in Zimbabwe; not knowing where to start upon return after a long period of absence; and the difficulties associated with returning to host country again in the event of failed reintegration in Zimbabwe.

Not everyone who had lived for longer periods outside Zimbabwe had diminished love for Zimbabwe. This feeling of frustration with the host country and hope towards Zimbabwe, was more acute among participants in South Africa. For example, Cape Town-based D M remarked that:

_We have been here for nine years without papers [immigration permission] and we have seen it all here in South Africa. We have had enough of being mugged and robbed, being called names by South Africans and living in constant fear. We will definitely have a better life in Zimbabwe when things change [referring to the political and socioeconomic situation].^{131}_

Participants who had not stayed for long periods tended to have fallen out of love with both host countries relatively quickly. This feeling was more pronounced among participants in

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^{131} Interview at PASSOP offices on 9\textsuperscript{th} March 2015
South Africa, largely due to what they felt were unfilled expectations and hardships upon their arrival and settlement in South Africa. Some of these participants actually regretted having left Zimbabwe. For example, it had been barely a year since Mr M.C had arrived and settled in Imizamo Yethu (Hout Bay). And he had this to say about his experiences so far:

*I wish I had not come here. People back in Zimbabwe lied to us that this country was a land of milk and honey. It’s not like that. I am definitely going back to Zimbabwe if I manage to save bus fare before the end of this year.*

Some of these newcomers, however, continued to find South Africa more comfortable than Zimbabwe and continue to live in the hope that their situations would improve over time. And therefore, many of them were not sure whether to return immediately following their arrival.

### 6.5 Becoming a Diaspora Through Senses of Belonging: Concluding Discussion

Subjective aspects of diaspora citizenship, in the form of senses of belonging, reveal deep insights about who those migrants become when settled outside their country. The first thing to learn in this chapter is that indeed citizenship is not only a material phenomenon but is also constructed subjectively, as scholars observe (see Fortier, 2016). It is also apparent that this constructed citizenship, in the form of senses of belonging, is the most fluid, flexible and unstable as they tend to be in constant flux. One of the implications of this is that it is accompanied by constantly shifting boundaries between who is a citizen and who is not. This means sections of the diaspora excluded from formal citizenship can still imagine and feel part of any particular society, even if they are denied formal and substantive citizenship. The results of this study, therefore, show that not all migrants become ‘homeless’, even in contexts where they appear to be visibly and systematically excluded, as they are always
inclined to self-identify with either the host country or homeland in any way (see Adida, 2014).

However, an analysis of senses of belonging of Zimbabweans reveals how difficult it is to pinpoint with certainty where those diasporas universally feel at home, given how they develop different constructions of ‘home’. However, it is also apparent that senses of belonging vary, with different sections of the Zimbabwean migrant population feeling differently towards Zimbabwe and the countries that host them. For instance, although some begin to ‘feel at home’ in host countries, as suggested by proponents of assimilation and integration (Bulcha, 1986; Harell-Bond, 1986), the above findings show that not everyone feels that way. Others maintain long distance and cross border sentimental attachments with their country of origin, in ways that resonate with long distance nationalism (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004; Anderson, 1983). However not everyone maintains the same level of emotional commitment to their country of origin, and whether one does so depend on their legal status, gender, socioeconomic status and background and experience.

Strikingly, few of the participants felt they had become ‘citizens of the world’ or global citizens (Mbiba, 2005), belonging in universal global community in the ways suggested by Appadurai (1996) and Soysal (1994). Those who displayed a cosmopolitan consciousness only did so in a tactical way as a way to legitimise their claims for inclusion and contesting exclusion in the host society (see Landau and Freemantle, 2004). Yet again, the above findings also show how migrants display a sense of dis-belonging, exclusion and ‘homelessness’ in both the country of origin and host country, observed to be prevalent among migrants hosted in the UK, EU and South Africa among other places (Hungwe, 2013; Yuval-Davis, 2006; Kabeer, 2005). Interestingly, the findings also show that migrant exclusion manifests not only in
material and substantive forms, but in the form of sentiment and emotion (‘feeling excluded’). The above findings, therefore, challenge the view that people belong in one country at any particular time, often where they are legally recognised as citizens (Fortier, 2016; Beck and Cronin, 2006). Instead, the senses of belonging of migrants become fragmented, with some developing ambivalent and fluid feelings about both Zimbabwe and the different countries hosting them. This differentiation in senses of belonging is mediated by gender, geography, context, time and other critical factors.

6.5.1 **A Nation Outside Its Territory?**

More profoundly, an analysis of Zimbabweans’ senses of belonging also helps determine who diasporas really become after dispersal from their homelands. For example, the fragmentation and transnationalism characterising senses of belonging displayed by participants, suggest that Zimbabwean migrants do not become a neatly constituted and homogenous nation outside the territorial borders of their country of origin, as suggested by proponents of long distance nationalism (Anderson, 1991; Glick-Schiller and Fouron 2004). One of the conceptions of a nation which is helpful in determining nationhood on the basis of senses of belonging, is that of an imagined community with its people sharing a sense of belonging in it (Anderson, 1983). However, although I have discussed how some categories of participants continue to feel attached to Zimbabwe for different reasons, not everyone maintains the same sentiment towards Zimbabwe. Their senses of belonging are too incoherent and fragmented to be viewed as a nation in Anderson’s terms.

This tendency among some Zimbabweans not to feel part of the Zimbabwean nation, also mirrors the deeper fractures that characterise the Zimbabwean nation back home, from which these respondents migrated. In other words, the fragmented senses of belonging
displayed by participants in this study may be viewed as an extension of what led Sabelo Gatsheni-Ndlovu to question whether ‘Zimbabweans’, as a nation, really exist (Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). It would therefore be somewhat misplaced, in this context, to expect a tightly knit Zimbabwean nation bound by a shared and universal sense of belonging outside the country. If they do not constitute a nation while outside the territorial borders of their country, it is still important to try and characterise the kind of a community those Zimbabweans approximate. Do they become a transnational community?

6.5.2 Zimbabweans as a Transnation?

The above findings show that some migrants hold transnational affinities displayed towards more than one country (Baubock, 2008; Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2004; Beck, 2000; Levitt, 2004; Basch et al, 1994). An analysis of the senses of belonging displayed by a significant proportion of the participants in this study reveals this transnationalist tendency, with many participants feeling ‘at home’ in both Zimbabwe and the host countries – South Africa and the UK (Levitt, 2004; Phizacklea and Westwood, 2000; Vertovec, 2001; Portes, 2001; Baubock, 2000). The dominant scholarly discourse on migrant transnationalism often emphasises migrants’ engagement in what is referred to as a transnational social field/space (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 1999; Levitt, 2004), depicting the complex social connections, practices and networks they sustain between their countries of origin and host countries. Others tend to focus on the political dimensions of migrant transnationalism (Baubock, 2008; Kuhlmann, 2008; Ostergaard-Nielsen, 2003).

However, the findings of this study demonstrate that transnationalism also has an affective dimension in the form of simultaneous affinities directed at both the country of origin and host country. And I would like to suggest that ‘affective transnationalism’ better
characterises these simultaneous affinities directed at both the country of origin and host country. The findings of this study, therefore, add to this materialist conception of transnationalism, demonstrating how senses of belonging of some Zimbabwean migrants are split between country of origin and host country across geographical distance and territorial borders (Fortier, 2016; Beck, 2000). They are also the most fluid, flexible and ambivalent aspect of diaspora citizenship, as shown by how they vary according to time, context, socioeconomic status and gender among other variables. It is important to acknowledge that the kind of affective transnationalism displayed by participants in this study is not a unique phenomenon, but has been observed among other migrants of an different backgrounds hosted in the UK and other contexts (Waite and Cook, 2011; Wodak and Krzyzanowski, 2007). Therefore, another contribution of this study relates to how those simultaneous affiliations are performed, with specific reference to Zimbabweans hosted in two distinct contexts – South Africa and the UK.

Although a significant proportion of participants displayed these simultaneous sentimental attachments with both Zimbabwe and the two host countries, findings still suggest that participants’ senses of belonging are not directed at the host and country of origin communities in a static and universal way, but are fragmented and differentiated. Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa are diverse as a community along the lines of gender, age, immigration status, length of stay and place of settlement among other lines of differentiation. Subsequently, as the above findings show, they tend to form diverse senses of belonging. Findings also show that participants’ senses of belonging vary and fluctuate in response to different socio-spatial, temporal and various contextual factors. This makes simplistic or universal generalisations impossible.


**6.5.3 Zimbabweans as a Fragmented Diaspora**

Based on the incredible complexity characterising the senses of belonging displayed by participants, perhaps Zimbabweans outside Zimbabwe indeed constitute a fragmented diaspora.\(^{132}\) In my view, whether Zimbabwean migrants can be viewed as a diaspora depends on how diaspora is defined. For example, a diaspora carries a metaphoric meaning by which it describes anyone resident away from home in a world perceived to be globalising (Pasura, 2010). On the basis of this conception, the fact that an estimated 3.5 million and 200 000 Zimbabweans are living in South Africa and the UK respectively, therefore qualifies them as a diaspora. However, it is also true that different sections of Zimbabweans make sense of their displacement and flight in different ways (see McGregor and Primorac, 2010). For example, as confirmed by the findings of this study, different categories of Zimbabweans migrated for a variety of reasons, at different times, through different routes and settled under very different circumstances in both host countries (Crush, 2015). In this context, it is not difficult to understand why the emerging senses of belonging of participants under study become so multiple and fragmented. Therefore, Zimbabweans were not only physically ‘dispersed’ and ‘scattered’ across the world from the country they once called ‘home’, but also, more profoundly, in their conceptions of ‘home’.

Another understanding of a diaspora, based on the experiences of the Jewish diaspora, provides that it is defined by following qualities: collective memory and vision of homeland, commitment to the restoration of the homeland, and lack of desire to integrate and assimilate in the host country (Safran, 1991). Although some participants displayed a

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\(^{132}\) Dominic Pasura’s empirical studies on experiences of Zimbabweans in the UK led him to conclude that they indeed constituted a fractured and fragmented diaspora (Pasura, 2008 and 2010); see also Betts and Jones (2016).
shared vision and nostalgia about Zimbabwe, and a desire to see the emergence of a new Zimbabwe after Mugabe, not everyone had the same feeling about Zimbabwe. Rather, not all participants continue to share the same memory of their experiences back in Zimbabwe and certainly hold different views about their future, with some not prepared to return back to Zimbabwe ever.

Therefore, the displacement of Zimbabweans and the circumstances under which they have settled in countries that host them have resulted in mixed sentiments and emotions towards Zimbabwe among different sections of those migrants, including anger, despair, hopelessness, nostalgia, hope and optimism. Although some did not completely cut their affinity for Zimbabwe, most of participants showed a strong desire to integrate in both the UK and South Africa for tactical reasons. Therefore, the above characterisation of Zimbabweans as a diasporic community is not entirely consistent with the findings of this study.
Chapter Seven: Changing Modes of Citizenship in an Age of Transnational Migration: Thesis

Conclusions

7.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter summarises the thesis advanced in this study. It also spells out the key methodological, empirical and empirical contributions of this study to existing knowledge on diasporic citizenship. This thesis adds to existing ways of thinking about the causes of migration. In light of the ever-growing body of work devoted to the analysis of the causes, routes and patterns of the migration of Zimbabweans using various conceptual lenses (Crush and Tevera, 2010; Mlambo, 2010). Emigration represents one of the many responses to the citizenship deficit experienced in most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (Open Society Foundation, 2009). Such a conception helps understand the citizenship implications of flight and dispersal, particularly the emerging modes of citizenship within diasporic community wherever they eventually settle (Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2003). In an area of study where many analyses tend to be ahistorical, this thesis also draws on Mlambo’s and other analyses on historical migration patterns of Zimbabweans, to situate the post-2000 migratory pressures pushing Zimbabweans out of Zimbabwe (Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa), in their historical context (see Mlambo, 2010).

Furthermore, building on this existing scholarly corpus of work and without wading too deeply into the theoretical debates surrounding migration, the thesis uses citizenship theory as another way of understanding the emigration of Zimbabweans since 2000. Post-independence Zimbabwe has experienced citizenship deficit as evidenced by the dysfunctional state-citizen relationship, which is inconsistent to conventional citizenship theory (Isin, 2002; Manby, 2009; Sachikonye, 2011; Masunungure and Koga, 2013). As
demonstrated in Chapter two, these citizenship deficiencies resulted in dislocation, political marginalisation and deprivation of sources of livelihoods among other aspects of citizenship (Kpessa et al, 2011; Mkandawire, 2010). This prompted different responses from different categories of Zimbabweans, including struggles for political change and flight towards other countries for better lives (see Azarya, 1988; Ake, 1992). In this context, this thesis proposes that emigrating represents another way of being political in the face of deprivation of political and economic opportunities among other facets of citizenship.

In the above context, this thesis suggests another way of thinking about migratory tendencies of Zimbabweans in the recent past few decades, from a citizenship perspective. The massive emigration of Zimbabweans is viewed not as representing a passive act of giving in to the repression of the state, but an expression of agency – a political act in search of better modes of citizenship elsewhere in a world where transnational human mobility is becoming easier (Oldfield, 1997; Castles and Davidson, 2000). It is a political act, by which emigrants engage in a form of protest against authoritarianism, repression, violence and impoverishment (see Trandafoiu, 2013; Azarya, 1988; Baker, 2001).

Thinking of migration as a way of being political goes beyond traditional understandings of what constitutes political action, at least in relation to scholarship on Zimbabwean politics.

Also, to demonstrate its political nature, the study shows that indeed emigration is not a neutral activity but a politically loaded endeavour with various political meanings and connotations attached to it, as discussed in chapter two. Therefore exit, represented a survival strategy for them and their families in the context of state intransigence and

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133 Oldfield talks of citizenship agency. Emigration can also be viewed as its expression. Castles and Davidson (2000) note how migration allows people to move around the world thus opening up opportunities for other modes of citizenship outside the nation-state.

134 Trandafoiu (2013) notes how the ‘great escape’ of Romanians after failed post-communist transition which was accompanied by authoritarianism and impoverishment of the majority of the citizenry. Bruce Baker (2001) also speaks of how exiting the state through political migration constitutes a political act, as a way of disengagement.
organised civil society ineffectiveness to usher in political and socioeconomic change in Zimbabwe (see Trandafoiu, 2013; Azarya, 1988).

In this context, survival, more than profound political change, becomes a primary priority for the majority of impoverished Zimbabweans, in the absence of a well-functioning state to guarantee welfare and livelihoods opportunities to all citizens.

Finally, in methodological terms, this study contributes useful insights on how to conduct fieldwork in the South African context, using empowering and transformative qualitative methodologies to research marginalised sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora. For example, I offer critical reflections on my own experiences during the three months I spent in South Africa, highlighting the importance of sensitivity to power dynamics and positionality in the relationship between the research and the researched on the one hand, and the researched themselves on the other. These reflections also underscore the messiness of conducting fieldwork with immigrants in South Africa, and some of the lessons learnt challenge conventional, textbook-based methods, portraying field research as a smooth and linear process.

7.1.1 Diasporic Citizenship: From Crisis to Fragmented and Everyday Citizenship

Flowing from above dynamics, this thesis sought to determine emerging modes of citizenship for those Zimbabweans driven out of the country by the historical citizenship deficit. This thesis recognises that where and how diasporas imagine and practice citizenship are not easy questions, which represent another dimension of the citizenship crisis (Klusmeyer and Aleinikoff, 2001; Spiro, 2009; 2011). This enables us to gain insights into the
kind of community they become following their departure from the territory of Zimbabwe.

This thesis also adds to current ways of thinking about features of diasporas and how they claim/contest inclusion/exclusion both in the host country and homeland (see Portes, 1995; Laguerre, 1998; Muzondidya, 2006; Betts and Jones, 2016).

With the crisis of national citizenship alluded to above in the backdrop, one of the key outcomes of this study has been to confirm that the emigration was indeed accompanied by a reconfiguration of Zimbabwean migrants’ modes of citizenship while outside the country (Castles and Davidson, 2000). However, it was also evident that the form taken by that kind of citizenship and how it is performed, had shifted from being national citizenship which is state-centric, territorially-bounded, status-based and universally applicable to all formally recognised citizenship, to being diasporic citizenship with its decentralised, fragmented, bottom-up and not always based on politico-legal aspects of legal status, rights and political participation (see McNevin, 2011; Pasura, 2008; Castles and Davidson, 2000; Laguerre, 1994). It has become apparent that diasporas find different ways of becoming citizens while outside the country. This thesis, therefore, provides a sustained critique of conventional modes of understanding citizenship throughout the write-up, demonstrating the limited applicability of these state-centric and citizenship-status-based, in light of the everyday experiences of Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK.

Beyond the somewhat narrow, universal, politico-legal and status-based conception of citizenship premised on formal legal recognition, rights and political participation, as emphasised by some scholars, this thesis also argues that diasporic citizenship is performed in multiple ways by different categories of Zimbabweans (see Bosniak, 2000; also see Baubock, 2006; Kuhlmann, 2008; Soysal, 1994). As shown in preceding chapters, relatively
empowered sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora are likely to partake in conventional political activism and rights claims-making, particularly those living in the UK.

However, the experiences of the majority of those without secure legal status and limited experience partaking in politics (mostly in South Africa) suggest that diaspora citizenship is indeed constructed, negotiated and contested through a variety of everyday sociocultural and other not overtly political, daily practices (Kymlicka and Norman, 1994; Turner, 1993). These other ways of being citizens include nurturing senses of belonging, everyday political talk (online and offline) and mundane social practices by which they contest exclusion and claim greater recognition and identity in both the host and country of origin. This multiplicity of ways of being citizens also underscore the importance of multidisciplinarity in order to fully grasp the different dimensions of citizenship. Political science and law, with their emphasis on status-based and ‘big P’ ways of being citizens, may not help us understand other more sociocultural and everyday modes of citizenship.

Results of this study also slightly diverge from the Marshallian idea that the state bears responsibility of guaranteeing the welfare and livelihoods of citizens under the rubric of social citizenship (see Marshall, 1949; also see Schmitter, 1979). This is the whole essence of social and economic citizenship (Isin, 2002; Kpessa et al, 2011). Instead, this thesis demonstrates how Zimbabweans often engage in everyday struggles for survival and livelihoods with limited reliance on the state and organised civil society, particularly those hosted in South Africa (compared to UK-based). Through these alternative spaces and vehicles of citizenship, most Zimbabweans in South Africa, particularly those with insecure

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136 Refer to chapters 4 and 5 to see how Zimbabweans in South Africa and the UK engage in sociocultural and other practices designed to contest imposed identities both in the home and host country. They construct their own bases on which they claim and justify their inclusion, thus blurring the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens.
immigration statuses, relatively newcomers and socioeconomically disadvantaged, begin to engage in these various forms of everyday citizenship, thus rendering conventional citizenship models rather not significantly applicable as a way of understanding diaspora experiences.

This tendency of non-citizens in South Africa not to rely much on NGOs and other organised civil society entities, for example, was also noted by the African Cities Study and Mobilisation study (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012; Polzer, 2012; Gastrow and Amit, 2015).\(^{137}\) Clearly, the arena of citizenship therefore shifts from the state and organised civil society; to alternative localised, informal and non-state arenas, including nationality-based, social and kinship networks as an alternative vehicle of everyday citizenship in different contexts. This is another confirmation of a recently observed tendency among Zimbabweans in South Africa who tend to negotiate integration outside the state (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012), as opposed to experiences of many of those in the UK whose citizenship is mediated by the state and its institutions.

It is important to note, however, that free support from social, nationality-based and kinship networks is not always accessible to everyone, with newcomers most likely to benefit from this kind of support. As such, the study demonstrates how market-based transactions with service providers and other market participants constitute another vehicle in which Zimbabweans without secure legal status negotiate access to substantive benefits of citizenship. New relationships and identities (such as customer, tenants, client and so on) emerge out of these transactions, with an effect of extending new entitlements and responsibilities to those non-citizen Zimbabweans outside the realms of the state. It is in the

\(^{137}\) Vanya Gastrow and Roni Amit made the same tendency of shunning NGOs for assistance among Somalis living in Cape Town. They often rely on religious and social networks, and the informal sector, for their survival.
above context, Zimbabweans and other immigrants hosted in South Africa’s urban areas tend to access public goods and services such as education, water, shelter, housing and livelihood opportunities essential for their survival, within the private sphere through market-based everyday transactions (see Misago et al, 2010; Jacobsen, 2006). This explains why the right to work and access to livelihoods emerged as a critical priority for the majority of Zimbabweans for their survival in the absence of state-guaranteed substantive citizenship (see Jinnah and Polzer-Ngwato, 2012).

Apart from the above material aspects of diaspora citizenship, this study also explored the subjective and intersubjective components, with a particular focus on senses of belonging displayed by various categories of Zimbabweans in the two distinct contexts. Thinking and having feelings about the state, constitutes one of the ways in which almost every member of the diaspora performs citizenship (see Fortier, 2016). Many empirical studies on the Zimbabwean diaspora tend to observe the diasporic tendencies of Zimbabweans on the basis of their material, observable sociocultural and political practices (Kuhlmann, 2008; Muzondidya, 2006; 2010). This study departs from this tendency by examining the subjective and intersubjective dimension of citizenship displayed by Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa. This thesis suggests that one dominant way in which Zimbabweans hosted outside of the country frequently perform citizenship, is by way of their subjectively held senses of belonging. This subjective aspect of citizenship has resonance with what has been referred to as affective citizenship, as discussed in chapter three (see Fortier, 2016). The empirical analysis in chapter three explored these senses of belonging, leading to the conclusion that

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138 Fortier (2016) criticises the materialist, politico-legal, conception of citizenship emphasising legal status, rights and political participation, by suggesting the need to explore subjective elements of citizenship such as senses of belonging, emotions, feelings and sentiments among others. These elements are categorised as ‘affective citizenship’. 
Zimbabweans living outside the territorial boundaries of the country indeed constitute a diasporic community (also see McGregor, 2010; Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2003).

On the basis of the senses of belonging they display, this study indicates that indeed Zimbabweans do constitute a transnational diaspora, with simultaneous ties spanning Zimbabwe and both South Africa/the UK (Levitt, 2004; Pasura, 2008; 2010). Furthermore, also drawing on Pasura’s insights based on his growing work of Zimbabweans in the UK, this thesis confirms the observation that Zimbabweans do not only become a transnational diaspora but a fragmented one (Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014). This thesis, however, builds on Pasura’s observations and suggests that this fragmentation also lies in the multiple ways they imagine and perform their citizenship. These include plural, fluid, uncertain and gendered feelings, imaginaries and sentiments about both the home and host country. These fractured conceptions of belonging are mediated by a range of factors including historical influences, contextual dynamics, place of settlement and immigration status and past experiences among a host of other factors.

Results of this study, for instance, suggest that senses of belonging displayed by Zimbabweans in South Africa tend to be more volatile, ambivalent and diverse, compared to those exhibited by their UK-based counterparts. Similarly, senses of Zimbabweans are also gendered, with women displaying a tendency to feel safer and ‘at home’ in the two host countries, compared to their male counterparts. The importance of historical forces in the fragmentation of the Zimbabwean diaspora is also underscored. Zimbabwe indeed constitutes a diverse nation fragmented by class, ethnicity, region, race and political affiliation, which makes it rather irrational to expect them to suddenly become a united and homogenous nation outside territory. The recognition that how Zimbabweans act as citizens
depends on a number of factors, marks another important contribution of this study. The next section discusses some of these.

7.2 Diasporic Citizenship as a Mediated Phenomenon

Diaspora citizenship does not occur in a vacuum, but is shaped by context and other forces. This thesis also emphasised how diasporic citizenship does not occur in a vacuum, but is mediated by historical, cultural, gender, structural and other contextual forces, as McGregor (2010) acknowledges in relation to the Zimbabwean diaspora. Whether (or how) any section of the Zimbabwean diaspora partakes in state-centric, status-based, rights-based and other forms of engagement with the state, or different kinds of everyday citizenship described in Chapters Four and Five, depends on the interplay of the above processes and forces. It is important to emphasise the notable contextual differences between how Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa perform their citizenship.

It is evident in the findings, for instance, that Zimbabweans in the UK tend to enact their citizenship in ways that closely approximate the liberal conception of status-based and state-mediated citizenship; while most of those in South Africa largely continuing to practice different kinds of everyday citizenship (described above) not only for their survival, but also to contest their exclusion within the South African society and back in Zimbabwe. While experiences of most of the UK-based Zimbabweans approximated the status-based model of citizenship, the majority of South Africa-based Zimbabweans (where most of the Zimbabwean diaspora is hosted), ordinarily considered ‘politically inactive’ and excluded, found other ways of being political and acting as citizens by way of everyday citizenship discussed above (see Hopkins and Blackwood, 2011; Dickinson et al, 2008). This study also makes it apparent that another set of settlement-related factors (such as immigration-status, length of stay and place
of settlement) influence the ways by which Zimbabweans settled in different spatial locations within both host countries are able to act as citizens.

History and background experiences of diasporas and the modes of citizenship they were exposed to in the past, also have a bearing on how they think about and perform citizenship. The negative experience of Zimbabweans with this citizenship model resulting in the citizenship crisis that pushed them out of the country, almost becomes replicated in South Africa as evidenced by exclusion on the basis of legal status and nationality. It is important to underscore, however, that Zimbabweans have not been passive victims of exclusion and, as they did in response to the citizenship crisis culminating in their departure from their home country, they found another way of performing citizenship (everyday citizenship) outside the host state (Betts and Jones, 2016).139 Perhaps experiences of the Zimbabwean diaspora indicate how ill-suited state-centric and status-based modes of citizenship are in post-colonial contexts, particularly in both migrant-sending and hosting countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Given how the majority of research participants based in South Africa resorted to everyday citizenship outside the state, this confirms a broader pattern in which marginalised and oppressed people always resort to everyday forms of resistance (see Scott, 1985).

As such, results of this study suggest that migrants from a post-colonial African background, with past encounters with authoritarian states and exclusionary modes of citizenship, tend to view the state in loathsome ways as a corrupt, repressive and abusive entity to be avoided, cheated and fought (Ake, 1992). This is often true of migrants from post-colonial societies, affected by different manifestations of citizenship crises, as discussed with

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139 This confirms the premise held by Betts and Jones in their analysis of diaspora political activism, that migrants are not passive victims of authoritarian rule, but exercise different kinds of agency aimed at contesting it. The same logic can be used to show how Zimbabweans contest exclusion from formal citizenship, by resorting to everyday forms of citizenship.
respect to Zimbabwe in chapter two of this thesis. The same logic may also apply to citizens hosted in post-colonial contexts where the relationship between the state and society tend to be historically troubled, as is the case with South Africa where over a million Zimbabweans were hosted by the year 2007 (Makina, 2007). This thinking also shapes the way they continue to perceive any state they come into interaction with while outside the country, usually resulting in a sense of apathy and disengagement from mainstream politics. This can also explain why some migrants develop a tendency to avoid asserting claims for substantive entitlements associated with citizenship (such as welfare and livelihoods, security, rights and legal status) both in the host and country of origin state, opting for other convenient sites and ways of performing it.

7.3 Conceptual and Scholarly Implications: Citizenship at Home and Abroad

Although the analysis partly from historical experiences back in Zimbabwe, insights generated on causes of migration and displacement have contemporary domestic implications. This study generates insights on citizenship challenges both in Zimbabwe and destination countries where Zimbabweans are hosted. Indeed, this study demonstrates how historical citizenship deficiencies have been accompanied by displacement and transnational migratory pressures. The same lens can be used to understand contemporary patterns of internal displacement and migration within Zimbabwe. In many of these instances, citizenship deficiencies caused by arbitrary, repressive and violent state action towards citizens have resulted in forced internal displacement and migration, including rural-urban-rural and rural-rural migration. The state was also instrumental in the forced removal of hundreds of households from Manzou Estate in Mazowe district, to pave way for expansion of farming activities of President Mugabe’s family (Chikuhwa, 2013). Flooding at the Towe Mukorsisi dam
also resulted in displacement, destitution and homelessness, while others have been resettled in precarious conditions (Human Rights Watch, 2015). This saw the state intervening to forcibly remove and resettle over 20 000 families in Chigwizi Camp within the Nuanetsi range, often using harassment, violence and withholding of humanitarian assistance to force villagers to move (Human Rights Watch, 2015). This event also displays this tendency by the Zimbabwean state to act arbitrarily, forcefully and, in some cases, violently, without due regard to the wishes and rights of the citizenry.

These recent events also share similar several similar patterns with Operation Murambatsvina in 2005, forced removals and displacement from Churu Farm in 1993 and other recent forced displacements (Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, 2005; Solidarity Peace Trust, 2005). These actions triggered internal and international migratory pressures; but more profoundly, they represent an assault on citizenship in that the state, meant to protect them as citizens, in fact used coercion and violence to perpetrate the violation of citizens’ rights and deprivation of sustainable livelihoods options (Sachikonye, 2012). Subsequently, these kinds of displacement and migration also raise questions in relation to where and how displaced people and migrants become incorporated, what rights they possess and who supports them. It is clear that the citizenship lens offers a helpful way of understanding contemporary causes of displacement and migration back in Zimbabwe, in the same way it helped analyse the historical national problems before and after independence in this study. Citizenship thinking also helps us thinking about subsequent developments after displacement and migration.

\[140\] Nuanetsi range is inhabitable due to wildlife infestation and infertile soils, and social networks and kinship relations have been disrupted in the process of resettlement.
The results of this study also indicate that Zimbabweans outside the country do not become a coherent nation outside its territory, as proponents of long-distance nationalism tend to suggest, but a fragmented transitional diaspora (Anderson, 1983; also see Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014; Gatsheni-Ndlovu, 2009). This observation also limits the applicability of the integrationist conception on migrant incorporation and becoming, which suggest that migrants become completely detached from their country of origin and (with an aim to) become embedded in the host country (Bulcha, 1988; Harrell-Bond, 1986). The same observed dynamic can also be used to refute the liberal universalist notion that transnational migrants become part of the universal supranational and global community through a transnational civil society (Tarrow, 2005; Soysal, 1994). This was not supported by the empirical findings of this study in both countries, presumably due to a number of factors including the remoteness of transnational civil society, limited capacity to engage at that level of politics among the majority of diasporas (especially in South Africa).

Instead, as results show, the transnational practices displayed by Zimbabweans in South Africa, as opposed to those in the UK, tended to be bottom-up, unorganised, informal and integrated into their day-to-day lives. As such, many of those engaged in such practices were frequently engaged in everyday struggles for survival, to meet the needs of their families back in Zimbabwe and against exclusion at a very local level. Clearly, these kinds of bottom-up transnational practices differ from those based on the activities of organised transnational civil society aimed at influencing global institutions of governance and states (see Cohen, 2011; Tarrow, 2005). However, as I have demonstrated in this thesis, the informal, everyday and unorganised elements of diaspora communities and transnational civil society are not mutually exclusive. They intersect and complement each other in different ways.
Another major implication is that this study further exposes the limited applicability of liberal, western-centric, conceptions of universal citizenship, with its emphasis on formal legal status, rights and claims-making, ‘Big P’ political participation and the role of organised civil society (see Baubock, 2008; Bosniak, 2000; Itzigsohn and Villacres, 2008). This is proven by the limited proportion of research participants engaging in these kinds of political activity and with formal recognition as citizens in both the UK and South Africa. Therefore, such denial of secure legal status and exclusion/disengagement of the majority Zimbabweans from political activism and rights claims-making experiences of the majority of Zimbabweans (predominantly in South Africa) mirror Laguerre’s observation that diaspora citizenship is not always directly and universally linked to the state by way of legal status and formal rights (Laguerre, 1998). Instead, it could be performed in multiple other material and non-material ways, at different scales and in different arenas, as empirical experiences of Zimbabweans have demonstrated in this study.

The study also generates insights on the changing arenas of diaspora citizenship from the state to other more localised, informal and everyday sites and vehicles. For example, this study shows that diaspora citizenship thrives without the state playing any interventionist role in the everyday lives of diasporas; the only sphere in which the active role of the state was desired was in relation to the granting of legal documentation allowing them the right to work necessary for their survival. This does not mean those without formal legal status or completely undocumented would resort to the state; instead, it was evident how these diasporas opted to avoid, evade and cheat the state just to remain and access livelihood opportunities within the territory of the state.
Similarly, although organised civil society is often thought of as the most important alternative site in which diasporas achieve citizenship outcomes, this thesis suggests everyday life as a more popular and convenient arena in which the majority of Zimbabweans enact their citizenship by engaging with different societal actors with or without the mediation of the state and organised civil society (Jacobsen, 2006). This tendency challenges the underlying premise that political spaces in which migrants engage exist ‘out there’, as a separate realm and sphere of activity; instead, it suggests that politics is entangled in migrants’ everyday lives, forming part of their daily survival and way of life (see Tarrow, 2005). The majority of diasporas who did not resort to the state and civil society for their welfare, protection and other substantive aspects of citizenship, found other sites outside the state in which to act as citizens in their daily lives.

Furthermore, as indicated earlier, this thesis also challenges the predominant emphasis on materialist conception of diaspora politics, with a predominant focus on overt political activism and mobilisation of Zimbabweans hosted in different countries, at the expense of their political subjectivities (Betts and Jones, 2016; Kuhlmann, 2008; Dorman, 2016). As is apparent in this analysis, both material and subjective (such as discursive) elements are critical for a more complete understanding of how diasporas do citizenship, which is why I have sought to explore both dimensions of diaspora citizenship (See Sheffer, 1986; McGregor, 2010; also see Dorman, 2016). This shows how diaspora citizenship is not practiced through any universally defined mode of being political, but encompasses different forms of overt and subjective elements.

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141 I observe the same tendency cautioned against by Dorman (2016), of privileging material aspects of Zimbabwean politics by Zimbabwean and Zimbabweanist political scientists, at the expense of political subjectivities.
Although everyday life represents a site in which the struggle for survival and resistance to exclusion occur, this study shows that it is not always about adversarial relationships. Rather, diasporas negotiate new relationships and transactions without the direct mediation and involvement of the state. And in so doing, everyday citizenship is an emancipatory mode of practice, particularly for marginalised sections of the diasporas such as those without citizenship, permanent residency or any other secure legal statuses and undocumented persons. In the same vein, as shown in chapter six which explores the everyday struggles for legal status by marginalised sections of Zimbabweans in South Africa, everyday practices provide a potent strategy by which those diasporas resist, cheat, contest or evade the repressive, irrational and unjust host state.

The same kinds of everyday citizenship mirror the bottom-up, informal and unorganised resistance to authoritarian state action by the Zimbabwean state in contemporary Zimbabwe. This pattern, therefore, suggests the importance of these everyday practices as a way by which oppressed people contest powerful actors and institutions in post-colonial contexts (see Scott, 1985; Ake, 1992; Flint, 2003). In other words, as I have demonstrated in preceding chapters, everyday forms of struggle remain useful for diasporas as they seek to contest exclusion and marginalisation in both host country and country of origin spaces.

Everyday citizenship is also used as a survival strategy by marginalised sections of the diaspora, which marks the continuation of the everyday struggles from which most of them fled. For example, as demonstrated in the study legal status and livelihoods constitute critical survival priorities for the survival of Zimbabweans both in the UK and South African contexts, and those without access to them engage in a kind of everyday struggle to continue staying and working within the host country. Also, everyday citizenship, particularly when practiced
in the form of everyday political talk and mundane social practices, becomes another way of contesting exclusion not only within the host country but back in the home country. This tendency also blurs the boundary of who is a citizen and who is not, and in so doing makes it possible for non-citizen sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora to access citizenship’s material benefits access to which they are otherwise denied due to their non-citizen status.

This kind of everydayness (simultaneously directed at host and home country societies) in the form of vernacular political discourses and mundane transnational social practices, further confirm Pasura’s (2008; 2010; 2014) observation that Zimbabweans indeed constitute a transnational diaspora. This study shows that Zimbabwean diaspora also act as citizens in relation to their country of origin – Zimbabwe – in various ways. Again, although they maintain legal status as Zimbabweans, this study shows that most of them are denied opportunities for enjoying the benefits associated with being Zimbabwean citizens, including rights, welfare benefits and political rights. They are also denied the opportunity for dual citizenship and the right to vote, which is viewed by many Zimbabweans as a fundamental injustice against them. Although some scholars tend to emphasise the diaspora political activism and mobilisation of Zimbabweans in the UK and South Africa (Kuhlmann, 2008; Betts and Jones, 2016), this study observed that the proportion of those engaged in this kind of political activity was not too significant. Instead, the majority engaged in various everyday forms of political activity, in the form of discursive everyday political talk, aimed at indirectly contesting the Zimbabwean state. They also rely on mundane transnational social practices to claim their Zimbabweanness and contest their marginalisation from the nation (see Levitt, 2004; Muzondidya, 2006; Pasura, 2008; 2010; 2014), which further affirms the importance of everyday citizenship for diasporas in asserting the transnational dimension of diaspora citizenship.
7.3.1 Conceptual Futures

This study provides conceptual pointers to help start thinking about questions relating to diaspora citizenship in the context of growing displacement and transnational migration, beyond this project. This section highlights some useful concepts for understanding how marginalised diasporas, often with insecure and illegal statuses and not effectively integrated onto the formal labour market, begin to engage alternative forms of citizenship. The concept of segmented integration provides another useful lens with which to understand these dynamics, particularly how the integration of diasporas become differentiated and layered while in the host county (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Heisler, 2000). This concept, for instance, acknowledges the inherent diversity of diasporas on the basis of structural forces such as backgrounds, class, gender and ethnic origin among other factors which mediate the differentiated integration of various categories of migrants in host societies (Portes and Zhou, 1995; Portes, 1995; Heisler, 2000).

The state, its institutions and the political process, are often considered opportune for practicing citizenship, but this study suggests the existence of other opportunities traditionally considered ‘non-political’ in which diasporas can act as citizens (Isin, 2002). This study placed an emphasis on everyday and localised expressions of citizenship; yet citizenship, as practiced by diasporas, occurs at different scales spanning the local, national, transnational, supranational and global scales (Jones and Gaventa, 2002). Diasporas find ways of engaging at these different scales of governance and citizenship, perhaps the concept of multi-scaled citizenship can be a useful conceptual lens to mapping out the geographies of diaspora citizenship (Groves and Ofer, 2016). This conception does not only help identify the different locations of citizenship, but also the interactions and contradictions between them.
This study examined experiences of different sections of the Zimbabwean diaspora living in South Africa and the UK; and one identifiable section incorporates those that live on the margins of the host society. This marginalised section of the diaspora turned out to engage in different kinds of agency, aimed at contesting structural and institutionalised forces of exclusion operating in the respective societies. The structure-agency dialectical relationship can also help understand how marginalised diasporas everyday struggles to overcome structural barriers to social mobility (Giddens, 1984; Lister, 1998; Bloch, 2010).

The above structural and institutionalised barriers, and how they impact negatively on diasporas’ efforts to integrate into host society, can also be understood more deeply using the concept of blocked mobility (Kloosterman and Rath, 2003; McGregor, 2008; Bloch, 2010; Mbiba, 2011). This understanding helps overcome the limits of structural determinism that characterises social exclusion thought, demonstrating how marginalised diasporas are able to express their citizenship agency in different ways (Lister, 1998). The idea of abject citizenship can also help understand how seemingly excluded, passive and politically disengaged sections of society, in fact find ways to negotiate inclusion (Sharkey, 2008; Hepworth, 2012; Nyers, 2011; McGregor, 2008). These concepts will be useful in digging deeper into the experience of this ‘excluded’ section of the diaspora, often including those without secure legal statuses and with limited rights and entitlement.

143 For Lister identifies to elements of human agency: simple agency which is located in dialectical relations between people and social structures; and citizenship agency which is embedded in social relations.
144 Consider how immigrants marginalised in the economy find spaces in the informal and moral economy in urban contexts. This is the case with opening spaza shops, hair saloons and cross border trading and so on may be understood as expressions of abject citizenship.
7.4 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

This study occurred in the context of time, financial and other constraints, without which it would have been valuable to spend more time in the three sites in Cape Town, Johannesburg and south-east England. Relatively less time was spent doing the UK and Johannesburg components of the study, compared to Cape Town where I had pre-existing social, kinship and nationality-based resources (and connections) which proved useful at various stages of the fieldwork. The implication of this is that I had more data on Cape Town, compared to two other sites, which presented challenges for the analysis. Perhaps, more time in the field could have allowed some degree of data equivalence for a deeper comparative analysis. As such, the analysis presented in this thesis reflects contains more insights on the experiences of South Africa-based Zimbabweans, in contradistinction to those of Zimbabweans in the UK.

Again methodologically, the study could have been designed to allow a more systematic and in-depth of any shifts in everyday practices and senses of belonging over time. This would have responded to the contemporaneity that generally characterises work on Zimbabwean politics, with its tendency to focus on contemporary events and developments, without explaining change and continuity over time (see Dorman, 2016). Also, Zimbabwe is a diverse nation and so is its diaspora, as this and many other studies have demonstrated. Yet the research sample in this study was predominantly composed of black, Shona-speaking Zimbabweans due to limited social connections and networks from which to recruit. Although there is a belief that most of these categories have disappeared in the ‘underground’ in the

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145 Dorman (2016) observes this gap in relation to approaches to the study of Zimbabwean politics, and this seems to be a challenge in the study of Zimbabwean diaspora politics.
UK and South Africa, depicting how they change their identities quickly, the sample could also have included other demographic categories such as white and coloured Zimbabweans to see how they negotiate citizenship in the two countries under study. Zimbabwe are a diaspora ‘scattered’ in different places within the region of Southern Africa and beyond, which is one characteristic of their diasporic nature (Muzondidya, 2004; Pasura, 2005; Zeleza, 2003). For example, a large population of Zimbabweans have been settled in Botswana and Namibia for a considerable time now, yet not much work has been done to examine their experiences, compared to existing work on the UK and South Africa I have done. It would be interesting to examine their experiences too, to appreciate their experiences in those unique contexts. The same applies to Zimbabweans in China, Dubai, Canada, USA and Cyprus among other popular host countries. These are some of the gaps which need filling in terms of scholarship on Zimbabwean diaspora.

7.5 Implications for Policy and Practice

The findings of this study allow us to revisit the way people think about migrants in general. Migrants are often perceived as an anomaly and a source of problems in societies hosting them (Neocosmos, 2010). Similarly, they are often looked at disdainfully by their governments and stay-at-home compatriots back in their countries of origin as unpatriotic, cowards, sell-outs ‘dining with the enemy’, not making a contribution to society, neglecting their communities and so on (see Tendi, 2010; Kabeer, 2008; 2005; 2002; 2000). This study, therefore, potentially results in shifts in attitudes both in the host country and back in their countries of origin, against these and many other exclusionary attitudes and perceptions. One way this study does this is by portraying immigrants as people who actually make a contribution in both the host and home country societies.
This study also demonstrates some of the challenges facing immigrants, which provides baseline information for policymakers and practitioners, with an intention to formulate policies to address them. It also acts as a review and impact assessment of some existing measures and interventions affecting immigrants’ lives. Particularly, it highlights the effectiveness of key policies, measures and interventions around the area of citizenship and immigration, based on perceptions and experiences of migrants themselves. This study shows that everyday lives and struggles of immigrants are too complex to be easily understood by ‘outsiders’ intending to make positive change in those lives. Yet, the voice of migrants is often not heard in policy making and practice, particularly those that directly affect their day to day experiences. Certainly, not everything is understood in terms of how immigrants go about their daily lives, especially their needs, expectations and priorities. Therefore, the way this study was designed allowed their voices to be heard, hence the results of this study may be a useful source of migrants’ voices with respect to various issues affecting them.

The results of this study also demonstrate the remarkable agency and resilience in contexts of injustices and other forms of adversities ordinary people are exposed to in their everyday lives (Lister, 1998). In the context of diminishing civil society capacity, this study demonstrates that immigrants still manage to get a lot accomplished on their own, which only underscores the importance of collaboration between those who want to help and immigrants themselves (Polzer, 2012). In other words, governments, NGOs, activists, social movements, political parties, donors, or any other concerned actors and ‘do-gooders’, may not fully appreciate and understand the everyday struggles of immigrants (or indeed any other marginalised section of our society). As much as they may have the capacity to assist, those concerned with the plight of immigrants in any context cannot take over the ownership of those struggles, by way of by-passing them and trying to find solutions on their behalf.
without involving them. Finally, civil society organisations are often credited, and this study recognises this, as allies and representatives of migrants by way of speaking for them (see Polzer, 2012). This study, however, also discusses some of the limitations of some of the organisations working with Zimbabweans in different both in the UK and South Africa, which might be a source of information to help with their learning and reflection processes.
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