

**Menandrian Characters in Context:
Menander's Characters in the fourth
century BC and their reception in
Modern Greek Theatre.**

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Stavroula Kiritsi, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

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Date: _____ 27/06/2017 _____

Abstract

The thesis explores the way in which character is represented in Menander's comedies and in the revival, translation, and reception of Menandrian comedy in the modern Greek theatre. Although modern translators and directors may have sought to reproduce the ancient dramas faithfully, they inevitably reshaped and reinterpreted them to conform to audience expectations and the new cultural context. Comparing aspects of character in the ancient and modern plays sheds light on both traditions. In assessing how character was conceived in the Hellenistic period, I make use of ethical works by Aristotle and other philosophers, which provide an appropriate vocabulary for identifying the assumptions of Menander and his audience. For the modern adaptations, I have made extensive use of a variety of archival materials as well as interviews with artists engaged at every stage of the production.

The thesis comprises an **Introduction**, two **Parts (I-II)**, and **Conclusion**.

Part I examines Menandrian characters in the context of the Hellenistic Greek audience and society, with special reference to Aristotle's and Theophrastus' accounts of character and emotion.

In the first chapter of **Part II** I survey the 'loss and survival' of Menander from antiquity and Hellenistic times, through Byzantium and the post-Byzantine period, to nineteenth-century Greece. Along the way I discuss references to Menander in the commentaries on comedy of Konstantinos Oikonomos (1816); a comedy from the 15th century by Dimitrios Moschos written in Renaissance Italy (the first modern Greek instance of the reception of Menander); the theatrical play *Agora* by Demetrios Pappariopoulos (1871), the second known adaptation of Menander's plays in modern Greek; and the first ever Greek production of Menander's *Epitrepontes* in 1908.

The rest part of Part II examines the reception of Menandrian characters in the modern Greek theatre. In particular, I examine the construction of characters in two more recent Greek productions of *Epitrepontes* (1959 and 1980) and in two productions of *Dyskolos* (1960 and 1985).

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Abbreviations

For Journals, I follow the abbreviations of *L'Année Philologique*

Other Abbreviation

Aristotle's treatises

Nicomachean Ethics: *NE*

Eudemian Ethics: *EE*

De Anima: *DA*

Magna Moralia: *MM*

De Motu Animalium: *De motu.*

Virtues and Vices: *Vir.*

K-A: Kassel, R and Austin C. (eds.) (1983-2001), *Poetae Comici Graeci*. 8 Vols., Berlin.

LSJ: Liddell, H.G, Scott. R. and Jones H.S. (eds.) (1940), (9th ed., with supplement published in 1996), *Greek-English Lexicon*, Oxford

OED: *Oxford English Dictionary*

Fr: fragment

Frr: fragments

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Introduction

This dissertation is a study of the representation of character and emotion in two historical epochs: classical Athens of the fourth and third centuries BC and modern Greece of the twentieth century. In this respect, it is an exercise in historical interpretation, in accord with the injunction of Frederic Jameson: 'Always historicize!'¹ Modern approaches to literary and cultural analysis have recognized for some time that values differ from one society to another, and that ancient Greece cannot be taken simply as the crucible of our own ideals, as though nothing had changed in the course of two millennia and vast alterations of social conditions. Yet some areas of human experience have remained resistant to historical interpretation in this sense, above all the domain of emotion, where it is still common to suppose that ancient Greek anger or love or pity correspond closely or even exactly to the meanings elicited by the equivalent terms in modern languages.

In order to provide a proper basis for comparison, I have elected to examine the fortunes of a single genre, that of New Comedy, for which there survive original Greek examples that permit of interpretation only from the pen of Menander. For the modern era, I have chosen to investigate not the tradition of New Comedy, broadly conceived, in the form of plays, movies, television series, and the like, where the influence of the classical genre is palpable. Rather, we will look at those modern translations and adaptations of Menander's comedies themselves, intended for production in the theatre, in order to see how changes, both obvious and subtle, in plotting,

¹ Jameson (1981), p. ix, 'Always historicize' a 'slogan ... "transhistorical" of all dialectical thought'.

characterization, and language respond to deep transformations in the social and indeed psychological make-up of the modern world. Tracing the modern Greek recuperation of Menander is of particular interest, and poses some special problems, for various reasons. Because Menander's plays were effectively lost until the very end of the nineteenth century, when substantial papyrus fragments were discovered and published, his reputation had been overshadowed by that of Aristophanes, whose flamboyant comic style had a major impact, as we shall see, on modern Greek taste. What is more, choosing to stage a comedy by Menander required considerable creativity on the part of the translator and producer, since scenes and whole acts remained to be filled in, at least until the discovery of the *Dyskolos*, which was the first, and till now still the only, Menandrian comedy to survive substantially intact. But this very circumstance is advantageous to the present investigation, since it allows us to see and evaluate more clearly how modern adaptations alter and transform the spirit of the originals, as well as the ways in which they remain faithful to Menander's own conception. What is more, the recovery of Menander for the modern Greek stage constitutes a special chapter in the cultural history of Greece today, one that we can examine, albeit only partially in this thesis, from its beginnings down to recent times. Although the discovery of new fragments of Menander created considerable excitement in the scholarly world, it took time for his plays to make a comparable impression on the wider public, and the Greek scholars, poets, producers, directors, actors, and critics who brought Menander to a general audience were engaged in a highly creative and socially conscious enterprise.

Questions of methodology loom large in a project such as this one. After all, the scholar too lives in the modern world, as much as the troupes that have been bringing Menander to life in the theatre, and if we are to investigate the differences in characterization and emotion in Menander's comedies and

modern revivals, we need to be sure that we are not projecting our own conceptions and values onto the ancient Greek models – that is, performing the work of adaptation even as we purport to compare and contrast the classical and the contemporary ‘structures of feeling’, to employ the useful expression introduced by Raymond Williams.² In order, then, to have at least some control on the interpretation of character and emotion in Menander, I have had recourse to the detailed and profound analyses provided by Aristotle, Menander’s near contemporary, above all in his *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric*, along with material from Plato, and from the *Characters* of Theophrastus, Aristotle’s successor as head of the Academy and very possibly a fellow student with Menander. For all their rich detail, transferring the descriptions (and sometimes prescriptions) by these Peripatetic thinkers to a work of drama entails risks: a playwright is not bound by convention, after all, and may well seek to subvert social norms. Nevertheless, the way Menander’s characters think, feel, and behave must be recognizable to the audience, and so conform in their basic lineaments to the shared perceptions of what Barbara Rosenwein, in her study of affect in western mediaeval society, has called ‘emotional communities’.³ Thus, without taking Aristotle’s definitions and character portraits as the last word on the structure of ancient Greek sentiments, and allowing for differences, sometimes substantial, between the representation of character and emotion in Menander and in Aristotle, by taking full account of the rich materials that the philosopher affords we can be more confident that we are approaching and interpreting the comedies in terms adequate to the culture in which they were produced, and which they inevitably reflect. We may note too, in this context, that Aristotle often begins his analysis of a problem with a review of commonly held opinions, or at least those of respectable people, which he refers to as

² Williams (1954, 1961 and 1977).

³ Rosenwein (2006).

endoxa.⁴ His predilection for making sure that his theories and explanations do not depart too radically from the prevailing views in his society puts a brake on the tendency among philosophers to construct idiosyncratic definitions of emotions and values, which do not necessarily reflect popular morality. So too, Aristotle's *Rhetoric* has the pragmatic goal of enabling speakers to be more persuasive, and so must take account of the sentiments and convictions of the Athenian public.

Analyzing Aristotle's views of character and emotion is a difficult task in itself, for various reasons. Aristotle's analyses are situated within a general philosophical framework that is in some respects alien to modern ways of thinking, and which must be considered when explicating his treatment. Especially in the case of the emotions, but also regarding virtues, vices, and other traits of character, there has been considerable discussion among scholars, and in some cases a properly historical approach has only recently been developed. For it is natural to suppose that the basic emotions have remained pretty much the same since classical antiquity. As David Konstan has written in his path-breaking study of the ancient Greek emotions: 'It may seem strange, even impertinent, to question whether the emotions of the Greeks were the same as ours. We respond profoundly to their epic and tragic poetry, laugh at their comedies, are moved by their love lyrics, and look to their philosophy as a model for our own. How could this be the case if their emotional repertoire was in some important respect different from ours? Besides, emotions such as love, fear and anger are surely basic human capacities, and their manifestations must be similar everywhere, whether in

⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1145b2-23. I have used, as point of departure, the *endoxa* in my analysis of *erōs* in male characters in Menander's plays, see Kiritsi (2013a), p. 86 with n.7, where I also give further bibliography on Aristotle's views on *endoxa*. DaVia (2015) has recently argued, convincingly in my view, that Aristotle appeals to *endoxa* only when he finds a topic to be especially opaque or controversial

antiquity or today'.⁵ Nevertheless, as Konstan demonstrates over the course of his book, there are significant differences between the way the Greeks understood such basic emotions as love, anger, fear, pity, shame, and other sentiments, and the way they are commonly perceived today, at least in the English-speaking world – and, as we shall see, in modern Greek as well. As Konstan and I argued in a presentation we gave on the occasion of the opening of the Onassis Cultural Centre in Athens in 2010, the classical notion of pity has in many respects given way to the modern sentiment of sympathy, with the result that a modern Greek (or for that matter English) version of Sophocles' *Philoctetes* has a different emotional register from the original tragedy. As we wrote: 'although the term "sympathy" may be out of place when analyzing the original Greek audience's expectations and responses to tragedy, and to Sophocles' *Philoctetes* in particular, it is entirely possible that it is the appropriate term to represent a modern audience's response to the play, especially if it is seen in translation. If so, then a translation of a drama such as *Philoctetes* will, however faithful it may be, inevitably undergo a certain transformation, for it will invite responses that fall within the range of sentiments available to the culture in which it is performed – and we cannot assume a priori that our culture is the same as that of classical Athens'.⁶ But this shift in sensibility does not mean that our response to an ancient work is necessarily impoverished; indeed, a self-conscious awareness of the horizon of our own structure of feeling not only grants us a critical perspective on our own literature but may also, retroactively and paradoxically, enrich the original work as well, in such a way that Sophocles' or Menander's characters and sentiments 'acquire new dimensions for us that were not present in the

⁵ Konstan (2006), p. 5.

⁶ Konstan and Kiritsi (2010), available at <http://athensdialogues.chs.harvard.edu/cgi-bin/WebObjects/athensdialogues.woa/wa/dist?dis=46>.

original work or perceived in the same way by the spectators at the original performance.’⁷

Antonis Petrides has called attention to another dimension of the cultural gap between Menander’s comedy and the modern comedy of manners. As he puts it, to approach Menander’s New Comedy ‘via the Comedy of Manners is to look at it through profoundly un-Greek eyes’.⁸ The reason, in part, is the way in which ‘the semiotised New Comedy mask ... denotes *ēthos*. This *ēthos* is not “character” in either the modern psychological sense or that of “total personality”: *ēthos* is a constituent of action.’ The mask, Petrides explains, is a sign in New Comedy ‘not because this genre is concerned with “manners” in any way,’ but rather because the mask expresses the relationship between ‘the structure of the soul, the behaviour of the citizen, and the wellbeing of the polis’.⁹ As I show in the chapters that follow, modern Greek producers of Menandrian comedy thought of Menander’s characters mainly as ‘types’, lacking any depth or interiority: they were not imagined as modern individuals, the bearers of a ‘total personality,’ but neither did they reflect the integrated social self that Petrides identifies as figured by the ancient mask. Correspondingly, the directors regarded Menander’s comedies as devoid of any political dimension, and so did not suppose that the behaviour of his characters as citizens had any impact on the wellbeing of the city, as Petrides suggests. Rather, they thought of Menander’s comedies as wholly apolitical, a view that has, to be sure, been challenged in recent criticism but has even

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Comedy of Manners refers to the kind of light, often cynical drama that became popular during the English Restoration (17th century), with the works of William Congreve and his contemporaries, which satirized aristocratic customs and pretensions, and is nowadays applied to similar exposés of upper class habits such as Oscar Wilde’s *Importance of Being Ernest*.

⁹ Petrides (2014), pp. 169 and 179 respectively. Petrides uses the term ‘total personality’ to signify ‘the accumulation of small, coalescing ethical peculiarities’ (p. 164), borrowed from Poe (1996). In general, see Gill (1986), pp. 251-273.

today its defenders among scholars, the more so insofar as critics have confidently identified Menander as a spokesman for the elite aristocracy associated with Demetrius of Phalerum and with equal assurance as a defender of the radical democracy.¹⁰

It may be said as well that the directors of the modern productions showed little if any interest in Aristotle's views as indicative of the cultural context of the original plays. The polis, according to Aristotle, comes into being not only so that individuals may live, but so that they may live together with fellow human beings, and live well.¹¹ He affirms that the purpose of political science is to help make citizens both good and disposed to perform noble actions.¹² We need a polis, along with political and public action, because it is in these spheres, as well as in the household and in personal friendships, that we are able to act for the good of others. But even if the political character of Menander's comedies is in doubt, the fact that the modern producers and directors of the revivals of Menander's plays regarded the role of character and politics in the originals as irrelevant does not mean that their versions reflect with greater fidelity the ostensibly apolitical spirit of the ancient genre; on the contrary, such a denaturing of the comedies may remove them further from the spirit of Menander's plays. But the ways in which modern adaptations diverge from the ancient models may have less to do with a modern notion of character as 'total personality' and more with implicit changes in values and in the way the audience is expected to respond to the action on stage. To the extent that the modern versions are not 'comedies of manners,' any more than the ancient originals, they may offer a fruitful

¹⁰ For a political dimension in Menander's plays, see mainly the different approaches by Major (1997) and Lape (2004) and more recently for a general study of politics in Greek comedy, including Menander Sommerstein (2014c).

¹¹ Aristotle, *Politics* 1280b30-40.

¹² Aristotle, *NE* 1099b29-32.

perspective on the classical comic theatre by virtue of the very contrasts that they exhibit, and which invite a closer attention to often neglected features of the classical models.

The question of character bears also on the ostensible realism of Menandrian comedy. The inspiration for regarding Menander's plays as a mirror of real life is the famous exclamation of Aristophanes of Byzantium: 'ὦ Μένανδρε καὶ βίε πότερος ἄρ' ὑμῶν πότερον ἀπεμιμήσατο;' (Ah, Menander and life which of you imitated which? test. 83 K-A), and his example has influenced a great number of modern studies. For example, the modern Greek scholar Charambos Anninos argued back in 1894, before the discovery of papyri which included extended fragments of Menandrian plays, that Menandrian comedy has an enduring significance because its aim is to represent 'a common action of [daily] life', and its hero is the *anthrōpos*, that is, the common man.¹³ Petrides has challenged this notion of Menandrian realism, arguing that realism is rather a starting point for his dramas; although Menander deals with family crises in a 'faithfully captured urban milieu' (or sometimes rural milieu, as in the *Dyskolos*), these crises are resolved through 'magical' solutions that have little to do with real life.¹⁴ It may be profitable, however, to distinguish between realism and naturalism. Menander's plots, to be sure, do not conform to ordinary events in real life, any more than the fact that they are speaking in verse does. However, his plots may be said to distill from the variety of human experiences just those that constitute a significant pattern of action, or what Aristotle in the *Poetics* calls a *praxis*, that is, the kind of story or *mythos* that is suited to the theatre, whether tragedy or comedy. Since Menander's characters respond in expected ways to their

¹³ Anninos (1894), pp. 417-418 'ὁ Μένανδρος εἶνε κωμικὸς ἠθογράφος λαμβάνων συνήθως ὡς ὑπόθεσιν κοινήν τινα τοῦ βίου προᾶξιν, ὡς ἥρωα δὲ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τοῦ ὁποῦ περιγράφει τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἀτυχήματα ...'.

¹⁴ Petrides (2014), pp. 3, 21 and 42.

circumstances, their delineation is to this extent naturalistic. New Comedy has been characterized as realistic comedy with reference to its plots, delineation of character, its setting.¹⁵ Modern Greek directors, translators and actors involved in productions of Menander have in general considered the plots of his plays to be something like folk tales for the predictability of their happy endings, and so not quite to the taste of modern audiences. However, his characters have been taken to be rather like us, our neighbours and the people whom we meet in daily life. Of course, they recognize full well that theatre never exactly imitates life (though life more often, perhaps, imitates the theatre – an alternative interpretation of Aristophanes of Byzantium's *bon mot*). But compared to Aristophanic comedy, which had been the dominant model for modern Greek comedy, many of the directors and translators saw Menander's plays as highly realistic, especially since their focus, like Menander's, was on *ēthography*¹⁶, that is, the delineation of human character and behaviour.

The idea of a creative interaction between ancient and modern works is at the heart of the new discipline – insofar as it is new – of reception theory, which is now very much in fashion in classical studies. Rather than simply tracing the influence of the classics on contemporary literature or art, reception studies renders the interface between languages and cultural traditions as a field of investigation in its own right. This is the view that Walter Benjamin proposed, in his classic essay on translation:

No translation would be possible if, in accord with its ultimate essence, it were to strive for similarity to the original. For in its continuing life,

¹⁵ For a discussion on Menander's realism, see especially Segal (2001), pp. 153-183, Miles (2014) and Petrides (2014), pp.10-83.

¹⁶ *Ēthography* was a movement in Greek literature between 1880-1930.

which could not be so called if it were not the transformation and renewal of a living thing, the original is changed.... For just as the tone and significance of great literary works are completely transformed over the centuries, the translator's native language is also transformed. Indeed, whereas the poetic word endures in its own language, even the greatest translation is destined to be taken up into the growth of its language and perish as a result of its renewal. Far from being a sterile similarity between two languages that have died out, translation is, of all modes, precisely the one called upon to mark the after-ripening of the alien word, and the birth pangs of its own.¹⁷

In Benjamin's view, words do not merely persist in fossilized form, they ripen and mature, and this occurs at least in part as a result of the contact between languages of translation. Thus, the process that Benjamin suggests occurs not only across languages, but within any given language, as it develops over time; and as we concluded in the above-mentioned paper, 'what better material for a case study than translations of ancient Greek into modern Greek?' Benjamin's vision has been taken up and refined by scholars of the classics. Charles Martindale, in his influential study, *Redeeming the text: Latin poetry and the hermeneutics of reception*, notes that 'discussions of translation usually assume that the meaning of the original is fixed, and that the translator's task is to reproduce it as far as possible in the target language; any argument is about the appropriate mode for so doing' (Martindale refers here to Dryden's distinction, in his *Preface to Ovid's Epistles* (1680), between metaphrase, paraphrase, and imitation). 'But,' Martindale continues, 'if meaning is not so fixed but constantly reconstructed, contextually and discursively, by communities of readers, then no translation, even an

¹⁷ Trans. Rendall (1997), pp. 155-156.

interlinear “construing”, is ever “innocent”, but always an act of interpretation, of rendering readable, which might involve (for example) foregrounding some elements and erasing others.... Translation, like interpretation, becomes rather a saying in other words, a constant renegotiation of sameness-within-difference and difference-within-sameness’.¹⁸

In this connection, we may observe too that the ‘original text’ in the case of the modern Greek translations of Menander was not always fixed, since few translators consulted previous translations or editions of the same play, including those places where previous translators had filled in fragmentary portions in the surviving texts. Inevitably, then, the translators were working with different editions, and given the lacunose nature of the text, there was plenty of room for subjective reconstruction and consequent divergence. In many cases, which I indicate in the individual chapters dedicated to the modern versions, the translator did indeed believe he was as close to the original text as was possible. In other cases, however, they included in their translation their own interpretation as well, based on the modern Greek cultural context and ideology and making liberal use of modern Greek terms, especially relating to emotions, which often carry Christian connotations that differ significantly from the sense of the corresponding ancient Greek words. In this regard, I would characterize the modern Greek translations of Menander, broadly speaking, as adaptations, some with a closer affinity to the original while others permit themselves more freedom in translating at least certain parts of the play, depending on the requirements of the production and the need, in some cases, to make aspects of classical Greek culture intelligible to a modern Greek audience. As Lorna Hardwick has argued: ‘Translating cultures is multi-layered. It suggests, at one level, that

¹⁸ Martindale (1993), p. 86.

translating words also involves translating or transplanting into the receiving culture the cultural framework within which an ancient text is embedded'.¹⁹ Thus, I have had to take into consideration modern Greek culture and ideology from 1908-1985, the period during which the two Menandrian plays examined here were repeatedly translated and produced, as well as attending to the ways in which each translation, to a greater or smaller degree, set the pattern for the subsequent versions of a given comedy.

Recently, Dimitris Maronitis has highlighted several so-called 'divisions and dilemmas' regarding translation, such as 'those between oral and written, faithful and unfaithful, systematic and ad hoc, between translation and paraphrase and so forth.' He goes on to observe that these and other such oppositions have a special salience in regard to intralingual translations; as he puts it: 'These primary distinctions along with the secondary divisions need to be taken urgently into account within the framework of Greek intralingual translation, which in our case covers the transfer of ancient Greek texts into modern Greek'.²⁰ Maronitis goes on to observe: 'it is important to decide upon the relation between the source and the target languages (ancient and modern Greek), both of which come in contact in the field of intralingual translation. The decision must be made by choosing between two contrasting interpretations: the first, ideologically charged as it is, considers the relation to be as unproblematically evident as the one between a parent and his or her offspring.... The other interpretation, which celebrates its liberation from the ideological prison of older times, claims that ancient and modern Greek are separated by a series of drastic linguistic changes (in prosody, phonology, morphology, semantics, and lexicon)'.²¹ Maronitis is alluding here to a deep

¹⁹ Hardwick (2000), p. 22.

²⁰ Maronitis (2008), p. 368.

²¹ Maronitis (2008), pp. 368-369.

controversy in the Greek intellectual world over the relationship of modern Greek to the classical language, which has considerable political and even religious implications (for example, in regard precisely to the Byzantine heritage).²² But he stresses as well, very much in the spirit of Benjamin and Martindale, that ‘a good translation (especially an intralingual one) is not a unidirectional act of a transfer of a text between two languages. In fact, what actually happens is the meeting of two languages and two texts somewhere midway on the bridge that connects them. The source language and the target language ... meet precisely at the point where translation takes place’.²³

A further distinction, not emphasized by Maronitis, is between translations that aim at rendering a work textually and those that are produced mainly if not exclusively with the aim of mounting a theatrical production, as is the case with those that are examined in the present thesis. These translators and directors wish to produce a text that can be enacted on stage and move a living audience, and not to aim simply at creating a version that is philologically accurate. Lorna Hardwick has pointed out that when a translation is used as a performance text (that is, one intended for a production), it can affect audiences in synergy with other factors, which also become part of the overall translation: ‘when meaning is transmitted through the medium of a stage performance, words are not the sole or even necessarily the most important vehicle of translation. Every aspect of the staging -- set, design, lighting, costume, music, physical movement including body language, gesture and choreography — is part of the process of

²² For a scholarly approach to the question of the continuity and discontinuity of Greek language and culture through the centuries, see Vryonis (1978).

²³ Maronitis (2008), p. 374. An important factor in any evaluation of the intralingual translation is the ‘Language Question’ in *Modern Greek* at p. 373. For a linguistic and cultural analysis of the terms metaphrase and paraphrase and their significance for intralingual translation, see pp.375-376.

interaction with the audience, and thus is part of the translation. When subjected to analysis, these aspects of the production provide a kind of commentary, both on the ways in which the director, designer and actors have interpreted the play and also on how they see its relationship with the receiving cultures, in which the members of audiences are situated and out of which they respond'.²⁴

In my study of modern Greek productions of Menander's comedies, I have taken into consideration the several scholarly approaches to the reception of ancient texts outlined above, in particular those that were intended for performance for modern audiences.²⁵ But the nature of my material, which ranges from Aristotle and Menander to a series of modern Greek playwrights and directors, has obliged me to formulate my own approach to reception, which I hope to have articulated in a clear and appropriate way.

I may point out here that the term 'reception', which appears in the title of the thesis, has itself invited, I suppose inevitably, a certain amount of controversy. Thus, Martindale writes: 'It is worth asking if the concept of 'reception' today serves any useful purpose, now that the word's power to provoke has largely subsided. Simon Goldhill thinks it "too blunt, too *passive* a term for the dynamics of resistance and appropriation, recognition and self-aggrandisement"' that he sees in the cultural process he explores. Perhaps so,

²⁴ Hardwick (2000), p. 19. Hardwick further observes: 'There is also, of course, the role of the translator's interpretation of the wider meaning of the source text...this aspect raises big questions about how the translator/writer views the relationship between ancient and modern, not just in terms of language but also in terms of values and ideas. The relationship between the two texts is also shaped by the readers or audience, who receive the new version and in their turn give it meaning', p. 10.

²⁵ I have found the following to be especially useful: Van Steen (2000), Hardwick (2000, 2003), Hall (2004, 2008), Hall and Wrigley (2004), Hall and Macintosh (2005), Easterling (2005), Hall and Harrop (2010), Michelakis (2006, 2010), Martindale (1993), and Martindale and Thomas (2006).

but it is worth remembering that reception was chosen, in place of words like 'tradition' or 'heritage', precisely to stress the *active* role played by receivers. Reception can still serve the interests of a wider range of those receivers than classics has traditionally acknowledged, by recovering or rescuing diverse receptions.²⁶ In this regard, I am content to align myself with Martindale's view.

One final point deserves mention, and that is a certain divergence, not to say incompatibility, between the way I have identified popular values in classical antiquity and today. Thus, I have made use of Aristotle and other classical texts in order to get closer to the way that ancient character and emotions were perceived, but when it comes to the modern translations and adaptations of Menander, we have many other sources of information, and do not need to have recourse to philosophical or rhetorical treatises on these topics. Modern native speakers of a language can to some extent rely on their own linguistic intuitions, and these can be supplemented by direct access to contemporary speakers. The method employed here has taken advantage of a resource that may bring us even closer to the way in which the modern versions of Menander have been conceived. For I have had the good fortune to be able to consult not only such textual sources as programme notes for performance, critical reviews, and other archival materials but also the producers, directors, actors, in the form of direct interviews with the major figures involved in the productions. To be sure, interviews²⁷ are a different genre from philosophical treatises, and the insights that may be gleaned from interviews do not necessarily map neatly onto the precise definitions and

²⁶ Martindale (2006), p. 11.

²⁷ In fact, the role of interviews in reception studies has been the subject of theoretical discussion. For the advantages and the limitations of interviews with modern directors and others, see Burke and Innes (2007), available at <http://www2.open.ac.uk/ClassicalStudies/GreekPlays/essays/burkeacademic.htm>.

descriptions provided by Aristotle. But this means simply that both kinds of source must be used with care and with full awareness of possible disparities in the nature of our information due to the differences in the form by which we acquire it. More generally, the modern theatre is in many ways profoundly different from the ancient, and the different nature of our sources for the two may itself help us to keep in mind the great discrepancies between the respective social and cultural environments.

I proceed now to a brief review of the chapters that follow. The thesis comprises an Introduction, two Parts (I-II), and a brief Conclusion. Part I examines Menandrian characters in the context of the Hellenistic Greek audience and society, whereas Part II examines the reception of Menandrian comedy, with particular attention to character, in the Modern Greek theatre. Part I itself is divided into three sections. In the first (chapter 1), I consider Aristotle's view of character and emotion, as indicated above all in his *Rhetoric* (especially for his account of emotions), the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and *De anima*. This discussion provides the background to the analysis of character and emotion in Menander's comedies, with special focus on the *Epitrepontes* (chapter 2) and *Dyskolos* (chapter 3). The focus in this part is in large measure on *orgē*, the emotion that Aristotle treats in greatest detail in the *Rhetoric* and which is the model for his discussion of other emotions. The close analysis of *orgē* permits us to see how other emotions or traits of characters function. I may point out that I use Aristotle as a hermeneutic tool, and not as a model for Menandrian aesthetics or ethics.

In the first chapter of Part II (chapter 4) I survey the 'loss and survival' of Menander from antiquity and Hellenistic times, through Byzantium and the post-Byzantine period, to nineteenth-century Greece. Along the way, I discuss references to Menander in the commentaries on comedy of Konstantinos

Oikonomos (1816); a comedy from the 15th century by Dimitrios Moschos written in Renaissance Italy (the first modern Greek instance of the reception of Menander); the theatrical play *Agora* by Demetrios Pappargopoulos (1871), the second known adaptation of Menander's plays in modern Greek; and the first ever Greek production of Menander's *Epitrepontes* in 1908.

Chapter 5 examines the construction of characters in two modern Greek productions of *Epitrepontes*, in 1959 and 1980 (and its repetition in 1985), and chapter 6 in two productions of *Dyskolos*, in 1960 and 1985. Here, I keep continually in mind the departures from the ancient Greek models, whether deliberate, as in the filling in of parts that are missing in the original plays, or unintentional, a result of subtle changes in customs and vocabulary over the ages. As will be seen, there is a remarkable continuity in some respects, even as the deeper bases for the understanding of character and emotion have undergone crucial transformations. In eliciting the values of the modern works, it is hoped that some significant and sometimes overlooked features of the ancient comedies will also come into focus, thus living up to the challenging demand of reception theory that criticism illuminate not only the modern version but the original model as well.

Part I

Chapter 1

The Conceptual World of Menander's Comedies

The objective of this thesis is to investigate how the reception of Menandrian comedy on the modern Greek stage entailed or imported representations of character and sentiment that inevitably departed from the original versions. To this end, we need to determine, to the extent possible, how character and sentiment were perceived in Menander's own time. Various approaches to this question are possible, for example, a study of contemporary inscriptions or historical writing, insofar as it survives, or a close analysis of Menander's own language. But the latter method runs the risk of circularity, since we might easily be reading our own expectations into Menander's words. A method that avoids this pitfall – although it is exposed to other dangers – is to make use of the accounts of character and emotion by philosophers who provided explicit and systematic accounts of these matters, and who not only lived and wrote around the time of Menander himself but are believed to have had an influence on his outlook. The philosophers in question are Aristotle and his successor as head of the Lyceum, Theophrastus. There are many reasons why a close study of their analyses and theories are rewarding for the present enterprise, as will

become evident in the course of the discussion that follows. The hazards of such an approach, in turn, are first that no two individuals concur entirely in their understanding of values and sentiments, even if they come from the same social milieu; and second, this is the more so if they are operating in such different genres as the philosophical essay and dramatic comedy. The first objection, however, verges on nominalism: in spite of personal differences, people reared in the same society share a common cultural lexicon, and it is a principle of the history of ideas that, used with proper caution, disparate texts may illuminate one another. But can a philosopher's systematic and abstract account shed light on the creative and imaginative world of a comic poet? As William Short observes, 'un modello professionale ... è un modello che fornisce una descrizione esplicita di un'esperienza, elaborato per spiegarne un certo aspetto nella maniera piu rigorosamente analitica e comprensiva possibile.' On the contrary, 'Un modello folk può invece essere definito come comprensione non tecnica o naïve che serve da "teoria operativa" in un dominio dell'esperienza'.²⁸ But Greek New Comedy itself operated with an abstraction from folk typologies, and there is no good reason to draw a sharp distinction between the accounts of Aristotle and Theophrastus, who illustrated their discussions with astute descriptions of everyday behavior, and the dramatic representations of Menander. I proceed, accordingly, to make cautious use of the best evidence we have for how emotion and character were conceived in Menander's own time. How useful the procedure is will become clear to the extent that this material helps us better to understand Menander's comedies and the new 'structure of feeling' that emerges in the modern adaptations.

Aristotle, Theophrastus and Menander: the state of the question

²⁸ Bettini and Short (2014), p. 339.

We begin with a review of the relationship between Menander and the Peripatetic tradition, since this will help to situate the question of possible philosophical influence on Menander's conception of character and emotion.

A number of scholars have expressed the view that there is a strong Aristotelian or Peripatetic philosophical influence, on Menander's plays. However, there is no consensus as to the nature of this influence. Briefly, the main approaches are as follows. Webster argues that there is a definite link between Aristotle's theory of poetry in the *Poetics* and the composition of the Menandrian plays. He also points out that 'for the most part Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Rhetoric* provide the parallels needed for Menander, and it is a reasonable assumption that the main views in them were known to the better educated members of his audience'. In addition, Webster traces influences on Menander's plays by Aristotle's pupil Theophrastus.²⁹ Bozanic, following Webster, claims that the presentation of character and events in Menander is governed by the principle of probability and necessity, as discussed by Aristotle in the *Poetics*.³⁰ Post and more recently Cusset have argued that the recognition scenes of Menandrian plays can be understood in terms of Aristotle's theory in the *Poetics*, raising the question of whether, and to what extent, these aspects of Aristotelian theory influenced Menander's art.³¹ More importantly, Gaiser³², Barigazzi,³³ Fortenbaugh³⁴, and Lord³⁵ have found a strong association between Menander and Aristotle's philosophy. Barigazzi in particular has read Menander's plays through the lens of Aristotle's aesthetic and ethical theory.

²⁹ Webster (1974), pp. 43-55 and 68-70.

³⁰ Bozanic (1977), esp. pp. 7-18.

³¹ Post (1938), Cusset (2003).

³² Gaiser (1960).

³³ Barigazzi (1965).

³⁴ Fortenbaugh (1974).

³⁵ Lord (1977).

The influence of Theophrastus' *Characters* on Menander has been discussed by Ussher³⁶, Webster³⁷, Hunter³⁸, Reckford³⁹, Habicht⁴⁰, though their views differ as far as the extent of his influence on particular Menandrian characters is concerned.

Perhaps the most salient treatment of Peripatetic influence on Menandrian scholarship has been that of David Wiles. It is thus worth pausing to explain in what way my views relate to his seminal study,⁴¹ especially since it focuses on character. The core of Wiles' work is an interpretation of the nature of Aristotelian influence on Menander's crafting of his characters and their presentation on stage. Wiles' approach is based on the semiotic theories of Barthes, among others, and he applies a semiotic reading of Aristotle to the interpretation of Menandrian characters. More specifically, Wiles identifies and decodes the non-textual signs of Menander's characters, or what he takes to be the *langue*, the hidden 'structural' elements or conventions embedded in Menander's art. He then asks to what extent these features are essential to the understanding of the *parole*, that is, the individual comedies, in which the *langue* manifests itself.

If I understand Wiles' model of interpretation correctly, the link between *langue* and *parole* lies in Aristotle's concept of *ēthos*. The essence of character, according to Wiles, lies in habituated thought in relation to *prohairesis*.⁴²

³⁶ Ussher (1960), esp. pp. 27-31 and 75-77.

³⁷ Webster (1960), pp. 210-217.

³⁸ Hunter (1985), pp. 148-149.

³⁹ Reckford (1987), pp. 355-358.

⁴⁰ Habicht (1997), p. 122-123.

⁴¹ Wiles (1991).

⁴² None of the standard English translations of *prohairesis*, as 'intention' 'choice', or 'forechoice,' quite captures the sense of the term, as defined in the relevant passages of the ethical treatises.

Following Fortenbaugh, Nussbaum and other Aristotelian scholars, Wiles interprets emotions to be either judgments, or expressions of judgments, so that, as he states, 'An emotion is seen as a form of knowledge'.⁴³ Extracting this cognitive inclination of the character as the permanent essence of character, Wiles argues that Menander's masks were the code which the poet shared with the audience, and hence the key to the understanding of the characters.

Wiles stresses that the Hellenistic audience was acquainted not only with theatrical codes but also with cultural codes (such as the reading of physiological signs) and gestural codes, for understanding certain emotions according to movements of the body. In sum, he argues that Menandrian characters make sense if we analyze them according to Aristotelian ideas of *ēthos* and *pathos* as these are expressed in Aristotle's *Ethics* and *Rhetoric* and in the Peripatetic treatise *Physiognomics*. All three treatises together, taken as a system of signs, are crystallized in the making of masks, Wiles continues, where the mask presents a known, permanent and pre-formed ethical disposition, and where moral choices are made in relation to such rooted traits. Though Wiles' approach has revealed important non-textual dimensions of Menander's comedy in relation to Aristotle's theory of character, my own approach to Menander's characters is different. Based on a close reading of Aristotle's treatises *De Anima*, *Ethics*, *Rhetoric*, I treat Menandrian character as a unity, placing the emphasis on the text and the plot. In my view, *pathos*, *hexis*, *dianoia*, and *prohairesis* work together to constitute and reveal character and inform the intricate action of the plays.

Most recently, Valeria Cinaglia has developed a new approach to the connection between Aristotle and Menander, based on analogies between

⁴³ Wiles (1991), p. 12.

their thought-worlds: 'Aristotle and Menander have similar views about how understanding develops, why it fails and what are the consequences of this failure.'⁴⁴ Aristotle is well aware of the circumstances that may impede arriving at a successful understanding, and Menander's comedies illustrate how this may happen, whether through misunderstanding on the part of the agent or accidents that have combined to shape an individual's character. Character is largely formed through interpersonal relationships, and here again, Cinaglia shows, there are significant similarities between Aristotle's ethics (that is, his understanding of *ēthos*) and Menander's dramatizations. Emotions too may interfere with the ability to draw correct inferences from the information available. Cinaglia's study in many ways complements my own. However, whereas I focus on the way *pathē* and character are manifested in Menandrian comedy, Cinaglia's interest is rather in what we may call the detective work that goes on in the plays – it is the cognitive lapses that are at the centre of her study. As she writes: 'Achieving ... excellence in theoretical and practical understanding, and thus developing ethical and intellectual virtues, offers people the opportunity of living the best possible life that human beings can hope for.'⁴⁵ The problem is that such clarity is not easy to attain: 'One can fail in controlling one's emotions when responding to given circumstances.' Cinaglia argues that the moments of *anagnōrisis* in particular illustrate the difficulty of achieving understanding or *ἐπιστήμη*, and the similarities that she educes between Aristotle and Menander reside above all in 'the relevance that the individual's attitude has for the completion of a successful intellectual process' and 'the importance for the individual of forming a comprehensive framework of understanding that enables him or her to make sense of her experience in any given situation'.⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Cinaglia (2015), p. 9.

⁴⁵ Cinaglia (2015), p. 2.

⁴⁶ Cinaglia (2015), p. 9.

Aristotle's analyses help us to understand the expectations that Menander's audience would have entertained as the action in the plays unfolded.

Aristotle's theory of *pathē* in the context of character⁴⁷

The emotions, or *pathē*, are part and parcel of the formation of character in Aristotle's conception. But *pathē* are not simply emotions: as ever, we must beware of imposing modern definitions on ancient terminology. Aristotle discusses *pathē* in the context of drama (*Poetics*),⁴⁸ political theory (*Politics* V and VI),⁴⁹ ethics and, to a lesser extent logic (*Topics*). However, it is in his *Rhetoric* that he gives a detailed analysis of his theory of *pathē*,⁵⁰ stressing the importance for speakers and orators to understand *pathē* in order to be able to communicate with, and master, the audience.⁵¹ *Pathē* are discussed in his ethical treatises (*Nicomachean* and *Eudemian Ethics* and *Magna Moralia*) as part of his study of human character,⁵² as well as in his treatise *De Anima*, in the context of the

⁴⁷ For the Greek texts of *Nicomachean Ethics*, *De Anima* and *Rhetoric* I use the Oxford Classical texts while for the *Eudemian Ethics*, *Magna Moralia*, *Politics*, *Categories* and *Poetics* I use the Loeb editions.

⁴⁸ Namely *phobos* and *eleos* experienced by the audience, both of which lead to *katharsis*: *Poetics* 1449b27-8; cf. 1452a2-3, 1452b32 –1453a4. On the audience's emotional response to tragedy, see Halliwell (1986), pp. 168-201, Lada (1993) and Konstan (1999). On dramatic *ēthos* in the *Poetics*, see Blundell (1992), esp. pp. 155-160, who convincingly argues that the interconnection between *ēthos*, *dianoia*, *phronēsis*, *prohairesis* and *praxis* in the *Poetics* must be considered also in the light of Aristotle's ethical treatises and the *Rhetoric*.

⁴⁹ In the context of anger as a social disorder.

⁵⁰ On various renderings of the Greek term *pathos*, see Konstan (2006) pp. 3-4, where he traces the linguistic origin of the word *pathos* (from *paschō*) and its meaning in philosophical language, drawing attention to the difference between 'emotion' and 'pathos', pointing out that 'insofar as a *pathos* is a reaction to an impinging event or circumstance, it looks to the outside stimulus to which it responds'. Fitzgerald (2008), pp. 2-5 offers a comprehensive survey of the Greek term and English translations (including 'emotion', 'affection', and 'passion') used by modern scholars in their study of *pathē* in Greek philosophical thought; Fortenbaugh (2002) prefers the English term 'emotion'; for a distinction between 'passion' and 'emotion' based on an interpretation of Plato's *Philebus*, see Fitzgerald (2008), p. 30.

⁵¹ Cf. Cope (1877), vol. II, p. 32, with reference to the use of *orgē* by the speaker/orator.

⁵² For a discussion on *pathē* with relation to *endoxa* in the *Rhetoric* and the ethical treatises, see Striker (1996), pp. 286-287, Irwin (1996), pp. 142-143 and Cooper (1999), esp. pp. 281-291. See also above, pp. 12-13.

motion of living bodies. The depth and scale of Aristotle's analysis and his approach to *pathē* varies, depending on the nature and purpose of the discourse.⁵³ Thus, scholars have expressed different views and interpretations of Aristotle's theory, depending on their selection of works and passages. In certain cases, modern psychological or psychoanalytic notions have been used by scholars, adding to the plurality and complexity of interpretation.⁵⁴ The aim of this section is to discuss Aristotle's theory of *pathē* in the wider context of his views on human character, in the light of recent scholarship, and with a view to illustrating its relevance to Menander's comedies.

What are *pathē*?

According to Aristotle, 'the emotions [*pathē*] are those things through which, by undergoing change, people come to differ in their judgements...'.⁵⁵ He moreover defines *pathē* to be *enuloi logoi*.⁵⁶ This term has received a number of interpretations, including 'notions embedded in matter,' 'forms or notions realized in matter',⁵⁷ 'principles involving matter',⁵⁸ and 'formulae expressed (or inscribed) in matter'.⁵⁹ Though *pathē*, according to Aristotle, are associated with matter, nevertheless they belong to the soul, which forms part of a complete being; hence when in operation they manifest themselves and affect the body.⁶⁰ The *pathē*, listed by Aristotle with small variations in different

⁵³ See also Sorabji (2000), pp. 22-25.

⁵⁴ For a detailed survey of the discussion on human *pathē* in modern scholarship, see Konstan (2006), pp. 8-40.

⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378a19-22, trans. Kennedy (1991), p. 121.

⁵⁶ Aristotle, *DA* 403a24-25. For Aristotle's 'hylomorphism' (body and soul as complementary aspects of a living being, see van der Eijk (2000), pp. 63-69. Anger, for example, may manifest itself as a boiling of the blood around the heart, but the definition of anger is a desire for revenge, in response to a certain kind of slight.

⁵⁷ Hicks (1907), p. 7; cf. Ross (1961), p. 168.

⁵⁸ Hamlyn (1968), p. 4.

⁵⁹ See Kalimtzis (2005), p. 100; Cairns (1993), p. 405 with n. 196, convincingly argues that the *pathē* are 'socio-cultural' as well as biological.

⁶⁰ Aristotle, *DA* 403a1-28; cf. *NE* 1105b19-23.

treatises,⁶¹ are accompanied by pain (*lupē*) and pleasure (*hēdonē*),⁶² which are ‘components’ of the *pathē*, and not *pathē* per se.⁶³ Interestingly, in two of the passages where Aristotle lists *pathē*, *epithymiai* are also included.⁶⁴ In addition, he names *pothos* as a *pathos* without further defining its nature as sexual or otherwise in the *Nicomachean Ethics*,⁶⁵ while a passage in the *Eudemian Ethics* which discusses the *dunamis* of a certain *pathos* defining a certain person as *erōtikos*, suggests that one of the *epithymiai* for Aristotle is *erōs* – the primary motive in Menandrian comedy.⁶⁶

Though *pathē* have no positive or negative value in themselves⁶⁷ (they are neutral, neither good nor bad), the intensity with which they are experienced varies, according to internal and external circumstances. In *pathē*, as in *praxeis*, there are three modes: (a) excess (b) deficiency and (c) the mean, which plays a key role in Aristotle’s account of *aretē*.⁶⁸ The mean, equally removed from two opposite extremes, ‘... is determined by the dictates of the right rule ...’.⁶⁹ Human beings are oriented towards these three modes and intermediary degrees, and have the potential to achieve *aretē*, through *hexis*⁷⁰ —the habituated behaviour that operates as a second nature⁷¹— which in turn affects their *prohairesis*.⁷² *Hexis* and *prohairesis* together with *pathē* and other traits (both

⁶¹ Aristotle, *DA* 403a7 and 16-19, *NE* 1105b21-24, *EE* 1220b12-13.

⁶² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378a20-21, *NE* 1105b23, *EE* 1220b13-14.

⁶³ Konstan (2006), pp. 21, 33-34, 42-43 and (2008b), p. 2; cf. Cooper (1999), pp. 414-416.

⁶⁴ Aristotle, *NE*, 1151b8-9 and *EE* 1120b12-14.

⁶⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1105b21-22.

⁶⁶ Aristotle, *EE* 1220b17. For *erōs* as *epithymia*, see *Rhetoric* 1385a21-24 and 1392a22-23.

⁶⁷ Aristotle, *EE* 1220b12-16; cf. *NE* 1105b28-1106a1. In the *Rhetoric*, 1387b22-34, however, Aristotle states that *phthonos* is not an emotion experienced by a decent person; see Konstan (2006), pp.112-113.

⁶⁸ Aristotle, *NE* 1106b16-28; cf. Striker (1996), p. 286.

⁶⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1138b18-20, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 137.

⁷⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1103a14-23; cf. Stewart (1892), vol. I, pp. 169-170, who discusses Aristotle’s distinction between *physikē* and *ēthikē aretē*, and how the former can be developed into the latter by abiding by law within society (cf. 1144b4-5).

⁷¹ Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* 9a1-3 and *Rhetoric* 1370a5-10.

⁷² On Aristotle’s theory of *prohairesis*, see below, p. 44.

internal and external)⁷³ constitute human character, which is revealed in action.⁷⁴

Aristotle gives an account of the causes of *pathē*, taking as a paradigm anger (*orgē*), which again is a crucial motive in New Comedy.⁷⁵ This *pathos*, he says, is caused by heat around the heart (material cause), is aroused by an apparent slight (*phainomenē oligōria*), is accompanied by pain, and seeks retribution (final cause), which is anticipated with pleasure. This pleasure is due to the expectation, on the part of the person who experiences the *pathos*, that he will satisfy his desire for vengeance.⁷⁶ *Oligōria*, defined by Aristotle as ‘an actualization of opinion about what seems worthless’, and takes three forms: *kataphronēsis* (contempt), *epēreasmos* (spite), and *hubris* (insult). *Oligōria* requires self-evaluation and an assessment of one’s relationship towards fellow citizens and other members of society.⁷⁷

The arousal of the *pathē*, Aristotle explains, depends on several variable conditions and factors:⁷⁸

(a) *pōs echontes*, namely the state in which one experiences a certain *pathos*. People, Aristotle says, who are unable to, or prevented from, fulfilling their aim or gratifying their desire, become irascible (*orgiloi*) and easily excited against

⁷³ For example, wealth and age group. See Blundell (1992), p.165. On the role and importance of external circumstances, such as *tychē* in humans’ life and *eudaimonia* according to Aristotle, see NE 1099b10-17; cf. Cooper (1999), pp. 290-291.

⁷⁴ See Sifakis (2004), pp. 175-176, citing Aristotle, MM 1187b17, NE 1105b19-1107a27 and 1139a31-35, *Poetics* 1405b8, and *Rhetoric* 1395b13.

⁷⁵ Aristotle, DA 403a25-b19; cf. Kalimtzis (2005), pp. 100-101 and 104, Hamlyn (1968), p. 80. For the emotion of *orgē*, see *Rhetoric* 1378a30-1380b34. For a detailed analysis of Aristotle’s views on anger, its stimuli, causes, and expression, see Konstan (2006), pp. 41-76, Fortenbaugh (2002), p. 15 and van der Eijk (2000), esp. p. 66.

⁷⁶ Concerning the pain and pleasure which accompany the *pathē*, see also Aristotle, EE 1220b 12-14, Fortenbaugh (2002), pp. 109-112, Frede (1996) and Cope (1877) vol. II, pp. 13-14

⁷⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378b11-1379a9, trans. Kennedy (1991), p. 125; cf. Cope (1877), vol. II p. 15.

⁷⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1379a10-1380a5; cf. Cope (1877), vol. II pp. 21-23 and Kennedy (1991), pp. 127-130.

those who show contempt for their present condition. These people are easily moved to anger, depending on circumstances related to specific seasons/time, dispositions (*diatheseis*) and ages.

(b) *tisin*, namely toward whom one experiences this *pathos*. Aristotle distinguishes various categories, including *philoï* and those who have been on the receiving end when they appear to cause offence (which is useful in our study of Menandrian characters).

(c) *dia poia*, that is, the reasons one experiences the *pathos*, namely the kind of insult. Thus, it is not enough to know what arouses a *pathos*, Aristotle says, but one must also know the conditions under which it is likely to occur. For example, some conditions, such as being hungry or lovesick, or in general suffering some pain, are conducive to the manifestation of a certain *pathos*, in this case anger.

Aristotle points out that it is not easy to distinguish all these conditions, since this depends on the particulars (*kath' hekasta*).⁷⁹ For 'the man who is angry at the right things and with the right people and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised. This will be the good-tempered man (*praos*) then, since good temper (*praotēs*) is praised. For the good-tempered man tends to be unperturbed and not to be led by passion, but to be angry in the manner, at the things, and for the length of time that rule dictates'.⁸⁰

To be sure, a good person is subject to experiencing *pathos*. But experiencing a *pathos*, as we said above, is not in itself good or bad. How one expresses, that is, how one habitually chooses to express a *pathos*, is what reveals a person's

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1126b2-4.

⁸⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1125b31-1126a1, trans. Ross et al. (1998), pp. 96-97.

character, his *ēthos*. For a person, Aristotle affirms, is not 'blamed for being angry merely, but for being angry in a certain way'.⁸¹

What is of special importance for our study is the arousal of a *pathos*. For in Menandrian comedy the comical situations that ignite the passions of the characters are at the very heart of the plot. According to William Fortenbaugh, it is thought and belief, which may be true or false, that arouse a *pathos*. In support of his interpretation he cites passages from the *Rhetoric* and *Topics*.⁸² In his discussion of the causes of *orgē* Aristotle uses, among other terms which indicate cognition, forms of the verb *hupolambanein*.⁸³ Although *hupolēpsis* is linked with the intellectual part of the human soul it is not pure knowledge (*epistēmē*), and it is possible for *hupolēpsis* as well as *doxa* to be mistaken or deceived, as Aristotle explicitly states when he discusses the means by which the soul achieves the truth.

David Konstan, following Fortenbaugh's cognitive approach, points out that

The role of evaluation in emotion is ... not merely constitutive but dynamic: a belief enters into the formation of an emotion that in turn contributes to modifying some other belief or, perhaps, intensifying the original one. In the latter case, the emotion would act on belief in such a way as to confirm the emotion itself. Although Aristotle does not spell out the implications of this cycle, it would help explain why emotions are sometimes difficult to eradicate: emotions tend to be self-validating

⁸¹ Aristotle, *NE* 1105b29-1106a1.

⁸² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378a30-32 and *Topics* 127b26-32, 150b27-151a19; Fortenbaugh (2002), pp. 11-12 and (2008), pp. 31-32; Cairns (1993), p. 395 with n. 156, suggested that according to Aristotle the efficient cause of pathos is belief (with reference to *Topics* 151a16-17).

⁸³ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378b14 and b21. For Aristotle's views on *hypolēpsis*, see also *DA* 427b14-26 and *NE* 1139b14-21.

because they can affect beliefs in such a way as to reproduce and strengthen the judgment that constituted the original stimulus to the emotion, thus generating a closed or circular cognitive system.⁸⁴

But once emotions are elicited, reason can invent or detect further motives to justify them, Konstan argues, in the way that a fearful person sees danger where a more courageous individual does not. We see this dialectic of reasons generating emotions, which stimulate further reasons in turn, in action, as we observe how characters interact in Menander's comedies.

Sceptical about the purely cognitive approach concerning the arousal of the *pathē*, Kostas Kalimtzis has proposed a different interpretation of Aristotle's views. Analysing Aristotle's definition of anger in the *Rhetoric* especially the terms *phainomenēs timōrias* and *phainomenēn oligōrian*), Kalimtzis states that

Aristotle argues that the passions can be aroused both cognitively and non-cognitively, but in *both* cases what does the arousing is the hedonically charged imagination or *phantasia*. *Phantasia* is appetitive (*orectic*) and this is what allows it to prompt passion into action...Aristotle believes that the passion of animals, children and mature persons who are either sick or intemperate operate under the sway of what he calls *aisthētikē phantasia*... But *phantasia* can also be cognitive. In this latter case the images, *the phantasiai* ... are under the control of *prohairesis* and this faculty allows for a deliberative evaluation of a range of alternative choices for action.⁸⁵

⁸⁴ Konstan (2006), p. 37.

⁸⁵ Kalimtzis (2005), p. 101-102. For a discussion of the etymology of *phantasia*, see Frede (1992), pp. 279-280. For a detailed analysis of *phantasia* in Aristotle's treatises in association with the arousal of emotions, see Fortenbaugh (2002), pp. 95-103.

To the question what arouses a *pathos* and in particular the *pathos* of anger, however, Aristotle himself provides an answer (in the context of *akrasia*), stressing the speed with which anger is aroused:

Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it ... so anger by reason of the warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge. For argument (*logos*) or imagination (*phantasia*) informs us that we have been insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that anything like this must be fought against, boils up straightaway; while appetite, if argument or perception merely says that an object is pleasant, springs to the enjoyment of it. Therefore, anger obeys the argument in a sense, but appetite does not.⁸⁶

It is clear, therefore, that what arouses a *pathos* according to Aristotle is either *logos* or *phantasia*. We shall see in the sequel how this account squares with Menander's characters response to the actions of others.

Phantasia and pathē

Since Aristotle associates the arousal of certain *pathē* with *phantasia*, how things appear to us, we shall discuss *phantasia* in more detail, although modern scholars do not always agree about the cognitive nature of *phantasia*.⁸⁷ Aristotle discusses *phantasia* as one of the causes (alongside *orexis* and *nous*) that move living beings; this association with movement and hence with action is an

⁸⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1149a25-1149b1, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 173; cf. Stewart (1892), vol. II, p. 183.

⁸⁷ Frede (1992), p. 280, who discusses in detail the cognitive role of *phantasia* in various Aristotelian treatises and points out real and apparent inconsistencies in his treatment.

essential aspect of my investigation. *Phantasia*, according to Aristotle, differs from both sense-perception (*aisthēsis*) and intellect (*dianoia*), in the sense that it is identified with neither of them.⁸⁸ *Phantasia* is not the same as thinking, believing, or judging.⁸⁹ For, according to Aristotle, *phantasia* ‘is in our power when we wish (we can set something before our eyes, as those do who place things in mnemonic pigeon-holes and then form images of them), but believing is not at our discretion; it must be either true or false’.⁹⁰ Aristotle does not specify whether *phantasia* can exist without *aisthēsis*, though he does assert in the *Rhetoric* that ‘*phantasia* is a kind of weak *aisthēsis*’,⁹¹ which implies that both are in some way interconnected. Moreover, in the *Metaphysics* Aristotle associates *phantasia*, *aisthēsis*, memory and experience when he states that memory comes from *aisthēsis* and experience from memory.⁹²

What produces movement is always the object of *orexis* (*orekton*) and this is either the good (*agathon*) or the apparent good (*phainomenon agathon*)⁹³ — and not every good but the practicable good (*prakton agathon*), which can be also

⁸⁸ Aristotle, *DA*, 427b14-17 and 433a9-30; cf. *De motu* 700b17-18. Nussbaum (1978), p. 333 commenting on this passage states that ‘*aisthēsis* and *phantasia* are, there, not types of *nous*, but faculties that ‘hold the same place as’ *nous*. The desiring faculty also has three species: wish, spiritedness, and appetite. The division suggests that both cognition and desire, in some form, must be mentioned in every explanation of action, and that neither is alone, sufficient to move the animal’.

⁸⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *DA* 427b1-b21.

⁹⁰ Ross (1961), p. 282, commenting on *DA* 427a17 and 427b7-b16.

⁹¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1370a27. Various interpretations of this passage, with reference to the relation between *phantasia* and *aisthēsis* have been suggested, see Cope (1877), vol. I pp. 205-206 and Hicks (1907), p. 460. Various scholars have observed that Aristotle’s view of *phantasia* as a decaying sensation is not maintained consistently in his works, see for example Nussbaum (1978), esp. pp. 222-223.

⁹² Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 980a27-9 and 980b28-9.

⁹³ As Aristotle calls it also in *EE* 1235b24-30; cf. *NE* 1113a17-26. Nussbaum (1978), p. 231 with n. 22 (cf. p. 245), notes that ‘what *phainetai* F to someone is, after all, what is seen by him as F. His *phainomenon agathon* is his view of good. The *phainomena* are things in the world *as seen* (and reported) by human observers. This broad interest in how things appear to sentient beings seems to form the basis for Aristotle’s more specialized discussions of envisaging and the sort of awareness that leads to action ...’.

otherwise (*endechomenon kai allōs echein*).⁹⁴ Hence the crucial importance of choice. The *phainomenon* and the *agathon*, however, are identified in the judgement and actions only of the *agathos* person.⁹⁵ In the *Nicomachean Ethics* the *prakton* is also linked with *phronēsis*, intellectual virtue⁹⁶ associated with, and expressed in, action, since it has a practical and not a theoretical end as its aim.⁹⁷ Aristotle associates *phantasia* with *orexis* and man's responsibility for his own actions, when he states that: 'Now someone may say that all men aim at the apparent good, but have no control over the appearance, but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. We reply that if each man is somehow responsible for his state of character, he will also be himself somehow responsible for the appearance; but if not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing, but everyone who does evil acts through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he will get what is best.'⁹⁸

Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of *phantasia*: *aisthētikē*, and *bouleutikē* or *logistikē*. The *aisthētikē* is shared among living beings, namely animals and man, while *bouleutikē phantasia*, connected with thinking and *prohairesis* (consequently also with *phronēsis* leading to *aretē*),⁹⁹ belongs to man alone.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Aristotle, *DA* 433a26-27; cf. Hicks (1907), pp. 558-559 with reference to this passage and the role *nous* and *phantasia* play in man's action.

⁹⁵ Hicks (1907), p. 541.

⁹⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1103a14-18. On the link between the intellectual virtues, their aquirement through habituation (as the *ēthikai aretai*) but also through teaching, see Stewart (1892), vol. I, p. 169

⁹⁷ Aristotle *NE* 1140b4-6.

⁹⁸ Aristotle, *NE* 1114a32-1114b5, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 62; cf. Stewart (1892), vol. I, pp. 278-279.

⁹⁹ Aristotle *NE* 1106b36-1107a1, 1145a4-5, 1111b20-30 and esp. 1111b29-30; *MM* 1197a14-20. On Aristotle's view on the importance of *phronēsis* for the lives of the individuals as citizens within the polis (individual and collective life), and hence the 'political' importance of *phronēsis*, see Sifakis (2004), pp. 176-178; on *phronēsis* and its link with the emotional disposition of man, see Striker (1996), pp. 298-299; the failure of *prohairesis* to follow the reason, see van der Eijk (2000), pp. 75-77; cf. Kalimtzis (2000), p. 59.

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle, *DA* 434a5-10. On Aristotle's use of *aisthētikē*, and *bouleutikē phantasia*, see Ross (1961), pp. 317-318.

These two kinds of *phantasia* should not be considered as two different forms which function separately from one another. For *aisthētikē phantasia* can develop into/result in *bouleutikē phantasia* in the context of action.¹⁰¹ As said above, those who have correct ethical desires and habits will have mental images of the things which are really good to pursue; those who do not, will pursue only the *phainomenon agathon*.¹⁰²

To return, then, to the nature of the *pathē*, John Cooper has called attention to two passages in the Aristotelian *Topics* which link the arousal of *pathē* with belief in the sense of *hupolēpsis* and a third passage of the same treatise which defines the *pathos* of *orgē* as *orexis*¹⁰³. Cooper points out that in the first two definitions ‘the angry person’s view that he has been belittled is cast in terms of belief, as opinion rationally arrived at (*hupolēpsis*), rather than merely an impression or appearance’. This is not the case in the third definition. ‘The *Rhetoric*’ Cooper continues ‘seems more self-consciously decisive in favor of the latter type of definition, not only in the case of anger but in that of other emotions as well’.¹⁰⁴

In the case of anger, Konstan suggests, citing Aristotle, that a ‘perceived (*phainomenēs*) revenge, on account of a perceived (*phainomenēn*) slight’, that is, the other person must feel the vengeance (hence, for example, that he or she not be dead). This does involve perception rather than calculation or reasoning,

¹⁰¹ Aristotle, *DA* 431b6-11, and 434a 1-21. See also Frede (1992), p. 290 and O’Gorman (2005), p. 5 with reference to 431b6-11 ‘yet *phantasia*’s unique and critical place in human art and reasoning is in deliberation. *De Anima* states that all human deliberation depends on *phantasia*, whether it be of the philosophical sort or the practical sort, whether it concerns fact or value’. For an interpretation of Aristotle’s view regarding the role of *phantasia* within *phronēsis*, see Striker (1996), pp. 298-299.

¹⁰² Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1113a15-1113b1. On *phainomenon agathon*, see Nussbaum (1978), pp. 231, 245.

¹⁰³ Aristotle, *Topics* 127b30-31, 151a15-16; 156a32-33, respectively.

¹⁰⁴ Cooper (1999), pp. 419-420.

but it is a kind of perception that responds to a belittlement, and hence not one that an animal would be able to have. It is this respect, Konstan maintains, *phantasia*, or at least *phainomenē*, takes on a larger role than mere *aisthēsis*. 'Impression' covers over the difference, but cognition', Konstan argues, 'is at work in the emotions, precisely in this respect'.¹⁰⁵

From the above discussion of Aristotle's expressed views on what arouses *pathē*, namely *logos* or *phantasia*, and his analysis of the nature and role of *phantasia*, it seems to me that in Aristotelian terms *pathē* are aroused by a combination of factors, including *logos* (though not in the sense of pure reason), belief, memory and *phantasia*. It is this matrix of complex synergies that arouses a *pathos* through which a character is revealed and moved to choose and act. That *pathos* may be aroused not only by verifiable fact but also by subjective aspects of the situation, and not only by the current and actual situation but by recollection, will be important in our analysis of the behaviour of Menander's characters. To anticipate, Gorgias in the *Dyskolos* 'knows' that Sostratos is trying to seduce his sister, and Demeas in the *Samia* 'knows' that his son has fathered a baby on his mistress. Here again, Aristotle's account helps us to understand the motivations of the characters in the comedies.

***Prohairesis*: its nature and role in human character**

We now turn to the nature of *prohairesis*, which is a crucial element in Aristotle's conception of *ēthos*, before proceeding to a discussion of *phronēsis*. The role of *prohairesis*, according to Aristotle, is to exercise deliberative control over *pathē*, in order to evaluate the appropriate response and choose between alternative

¹⁰⁵ Konstan (2006), pp. 42-43.

courses of action. Thus, *prohairesis* can be associated with *pathē*, in the sense that ‘virtue ... is a state of character concerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us...’¹⁰⁶ and the mean is equally removed from the two opposites or extremes (i.e., deficiency and excess). As already mentioned, one of the principles of human action is *orexis*, and *orexis* is also involved in *prohairesis*.¹⁰⁷ What differentiates, however, the kind of *orexis* involved in *prohairesis* from that involved in *epithymiai* is that the *orexis* of *prohairesis* ‘is a steadily operating appetite, proceeding from and declaring the ἡθικὴ ἕξις or ἦθος of its subject’.¹⁰⁸ Moreover, the manifestation or operation of *prohairesis* presupposes *logos* and *dianoia*,¹⁰⁹ a precondition for deliberation. Connected with both the orectic and the intellectual faculty, *prohairesis* is thus defined by Aristotle as *orexis dianoētikē*.¹¹⁰ Therefore, both these elements (orectic and intellectual) of *prohairesis* define the nature of a person’s action. Ultimately, *prohairesis* is identified with man himself, the agent of his actions, in the sense that *prohairesis* defines a person.¹¹¹ If the *prohairesis* is to be *spoudaia*, the *orexis* and the *dianoia* preceding the *prohairesis* must be correct and true.¹¹²

¹⁰⁶ Aristotle *NE* 1106b36-1107a1, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 39; cf. *EE* 1227b6-9.

¹⁰⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1113 a9-12 and 1139 a23.

¹⁰⁸ Stewart (1892), vol. II, p. 28.

¹⁰⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1112a15-16. See also Stewart (1892), vol I, p. 244 ‘... it [*prohairesis*] is μετά λόγου καὶ διανοίας, i.e., implies the exercise of the reasoning faculty. It is not an irrational impulse, like ἐπιθυμία or θυμός, and, at the same time, it is not purely intellectual like δόξα, but belongs to the appetitive side of our nature (ὄρεξις)’.

¹¹⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1139b4-6.

¹¹¹ Aristotle, *NE*, 1112a1-2; cf. 1111a21-b17 and 1114b21-25 and Stewart (1892), vol. I, pp. 236-7. On Aristotle’s view on what prompts the human action, including an analysis *orexis*, *prohairesis* and *dianoia*, see Furley (1980), esp. p. 59 with reference to 1111a22.

¹¹² Sifakis (2004), p.175 with n. 20 with reference to Aristotle, *NE* 1139a23-31; see also Hicks (1907), p. 540.

Phronēsis

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, Aristotle discusses the *orthos logos* by which man can achieve the balanced state of character, avoiding the two extremes (deficiency and excess). He states that 'the mean is determined by the dictates of the right rule',¹¹³ which is manifested in several ways as expressed in the intellectual faculty.

According to Aristotle the soul consists of two parts, 'that which grasps a rule or rational principle, and the irrational',¹¹⁴ and he distinguishes five states by which the soul reaches truth through affirmation and denial: *technē*, *epistēmē*, *phronēsis*, *sophia*, and *nous* (reason).¹¹⁵ The *logikon* part is itself divided into two parts: 'One by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable' (that is, the *epistēmonikon* part) 'and one by which we contemplate variable things' (that is, the *logistikon* part). The *logistikon* and the *bouleutikon* parts of the soul are the same (*tauton*), since both are linked to 'variable things'.¹¹⁶ The truth reached through *epistēmē* is definite, in the sense that it is 'not even capable of being otherwise',¹¹⁷ and therefore objective, whereas the truth reached through *technē* and *phronēsis*, based on variable things, is not necessarily objective.¹¹⁸ Since man alone among animals calculates

¹¹³ Aristotle *NE* 1138b19-20, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 137.

¹¹⁴ Aristotle *NE* 1139b8-9, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 137.

¹¹⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1139b15-17; cf. 1141a2-8.

¹¹⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1139a6-14, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 138

¹¹⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1139b20-21, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 140.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1140b31-1141a7.

and deliberates on matters that are variable he must be able to discern and choose among all the possibilities available to him and proceed with, or modify, his actions accordingly. In our study of Menander's characters, we are interested in the *logistikon* part of the soul, which is related both to 'variable things' and to man's actions, as the *logistikon* is the principle of action.¹¹⁹ The *aretē* of the *epistēmonikon* is *sophia*, Aristotle states, while the *aretē* of the *logistikon* part of the soul is *phronēsis*.¹²⁰

Aristotle defines *phronēsis* as 'a true and reasoned state of capacity (*hexis*) to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man'.¹²¹ *Phronēsis* (together with *deinotēs*) is linked with the *doxastikon* part of the soul, namely the part which forms opinions, since both *phronēsis* and *doxa* are concerned with matters which are variable. *Phronēsis*, however, is not simply a *hexis*. It is an excellent *hexis* of the intellect and one of the virtues,¹²² which together with all the *ēthikai aretai* enables man to pursue actions that define his character. For, *ethical virtue*, Aristotle says, 'makes us aim at the right mark', reflected in our *prohairesis*, 'and practical wisdom (*phronēsis*) makes us take the right means'.¹²³ Since *phronēsis* concerns what makes man *eudaimōn*, and hence is associated with just and good things,¹²⁴ it is not enough for man only to know what is good and just; he needs to direct his actions towards these things. This direction in life requires a combination of *prohairesis*, *ēthikē aretē* and *phronēsis*.¹²⁵ The virtue of *phronēsis* is necessary in life since it can restrain and moderate a person's *pathē*, preparing man to achieve the mastery of all virtues, *sophia*.¹²⁶

¹¹⁹ Cf. Stewart (1892), vol. II, p. 16.

¹²⁰ Cf. Aristotle *NE* 1144a9-11 and Stewart (1892), vol. II, p. 100.

¹²¹ Aristotle, *NE* 1140b4-6, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 142; cf. 1141b21.

¹²² Aristotle, *NE* 1140b24-28.

¹²³ Aristotle, *NE* 1144a6-9, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 155; cf. 1144b21-1145a6.

¹²⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1143b20-23.

¹²⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1143b18-1145a11, esp. 1145a1-6.

¹²⁶ Aristotle, *MM* 1198b4-20. For the close link between *sōphrosunē* and *phronēsis*, see also *NE* 1140b11-12.

The *phronimos* is a person who is able ‘to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of things conduce to health or strength, but about what sorts of things conduce to the good life in general’.¹²⁷ In the deliberation that precedes an action, the *phronimos* must consider not only the universals but also, and most importantly, the particulars of each situation. The close bond between *phronēsis* and the particulars requires that the *phronimos* should be experienced, which will enable him to make deliberations, distinctions and choices before he acts, taking into consideration the particulars. Since experience is acquired over time,¹²⁸ for Aristotle *phronēsis* is a characteristic of old men.¹²⁹ For due to their age, young people are inexperienced and thus it is impossible for them to be *phronimoi*,¹³⁰ in the sense of being capable of establishing *virtues* in their lives as *kuriai aretai* and placing them under the control of *phronēsis*. As the young grow up they acquire experience, which together with correct education enables them to master their passions and desires through habituation. Thus, rather than having to follow any external force or pressure, they should be able to act by themselves according to *orthos logos*.¹³¹ *Phronēsis* does not operate in a proper way in a person whose reason has been corrupted by *hēdonē* (pleasure) and *lupē*

¹²⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1140a25-28, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 142; cf. 1140a30-31 and 1141b8-16. See also Stewart (1892), vol. II, pp. 59-60, on the close link between *phronēsis* and *action*.

¹²⁸ Aristotle, *NE* 1141b14-22 and 1143b11-14.

¹²⁹ Aristotle, *Politics* 1329a15-16.

¹³⁰ Cf. Aristotle *NE* 1142a11-15.

¹³¹ Aristotle *NE* 1144b19-28. See Stewart (1892), vol. II, pp. 108-109 ‘by habituation the natural tendencies to proper conduct (φυσικαὶ ἀρεταί) become fixed in relation to one another; ... Φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ becomes κυρία ἀρετὴ, by habituation, under the eye of φρόνησις, which itself becomes clearer as the passions are reduced to order. Αἰδώς, for example, is the natural basis of σωφροσύνη (*Eudemian Ethics* 1234a33-34, and in general 1234a24-35). This natural tendency to refrain from acts of intemperance is strengthened by educating till it begins to attract its possessor’s attention, and he makes intemperance and temperance objects of moral reflection in relation to other objects of moral experience’.

(pain).¹³² Damage to reason is caused either by some kind of vice, Aristotle says, or excessive *pathos*, *epithymia*, or *agnoia* (ignorance), or *hamartia*.¹³³

Phronēsis, *sunesis* and *gnōmē* are *hexeis*, all of which point in the same direction. 'All these faculties', Aristotle says, 'deal with ultimates, i.e., with particulars'.¹³⁴ 'Being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being able to judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned; for decency is common to all good men in relation to other men'.¹³⁵ *Gnōmē*, linked with forgiveness (*syngnōmē*) and equity, is the correct judgement of the equitable, the decent person.¹³⁶ Though *sunesis* (sagacity, understanding) and *phronēsis* are linked to each other, since both are concerned with the same objects, nevertheless they are not the same. They differ because *phronēsis* is linked with action, while *sunesis* refers only to judgment.¹³⁷

Aristotle on specific *pathē*

It is time now to examine Aristotle's views of the several *pathē*, to the extent that they are relevant to Menandrian comedy. As we have noted, in the *Rhetoric* Aristotle instructs the orator on how to arouse the various *pathē* in his audience, which presumes an understanding of how they operate, including their causes, that is what arouses a certain *pathos* and what its aim is. In addition, Aristotle states that in each case the orator must know the spectrum of conditions conducive to arousing passion, as well as the dispositions and types of persons conducive to its arousal. His approach to all the passions is similar to his approach to anger. Thus, the pattern for understanding anger¹³⁸

¹³² Aristotle, *NE* 1140b16-19.

¹³³ Aristotle, *NE* 1145b7-1146b5; cf. 1142a20-24.

¹³⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1143a1-17, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 152.

¹³⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1143a28-32, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 152, modified.

¹³⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1143a19-24.

¹³⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1143a8-9; cf. Stewart (1892), vol. II, pp.83-84.

¹³⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1387a30-1380a5.

can be applied to the understanding of the other passions, *mutatis mutandis*. As mentioned above, Aristotle tells us that all the *pathē* are *enuloi logoi*, each one having an end, a certain stimulus that arouses it, and some formal configuration that differentiates one from the other. In the section below, each *pathos* affecting characters in Menander's *Epitrepontes* and *Dyskolos* will be analysed separately, as a preliminary to examining these *pathē* in detail in the context of the plot of each of these plays.

Charis

The person who gives a *charis* or favour serves a fellow human being in need for the sake of the recipient, with no intention to gain anything for himself.¹³⁹ According to Aristotle, the recipient's needs are certain *orexeis*, including *erōs*, associated with *lupē*, in the sense that these *orexeis* generate *lupē* in the person who experiences them if that person cannot fulfil the desires.¹⁴⁰ It is in the context of the state in which the recipient finds himself before receiving *charis* that *lupē* is mentioned, since the recipient is unable to fulfil his *orexeis* by himself. The fact that Aristotle does not refer to any emotional response, either pleasure or pain, which would have accompanied *charis* on the part of the dispenser, has raised the question whether *charis* as analysed in the *Rhetoric* can qualify as a *pathos*.¹⁴¹ Konstan argues that the *pathos* in question is rather associated with receipt of the *charis* (*charin echein*), in other words, with gratitude,¹⁴² stressing that this *pathos* is 'elicited by a gratuitous act of generosity'.¹⁴³ This is why, according to Konstan, Aristotle does not specify how the dispenser of *charis* feels when he grants the *charis*. Konstan points out that

¹³⁹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385a15-1385b10.

¹⁴⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385a23-33.

¹⁴¹ See Fortenbaugh (2002), pp. 107 and 109.

¹⁴² Konstan (2006), p. 158-159. For a similar interpretation, see Striker (1996), pp. 292 and 301.

¹⁴³ Konstan (2006), p. 166.

the expression *charin echein* in Greek literature has only the meaning of ‘feel gratitude’ on the recipient’s part, and not to ‘show favour towards someone, be kindly, do a service, or anything of the sort’ on the part of the dispenser, for in this case other expressions are used, such as *charin pherein*, *tithesthai* or *charizesthai*.¹⁴⁴

By interpreting *charis*, or rather *charin echein*, as ‘gratitude,’ Konstan is able to qualify it as an Aristotelian *pathos*, in the sense that *charis* responds to the behaviour of fellow human beings: ‘Performing a kindness is not an emotion; neither is kindness ... If a favour were to be prompted by an emotion, the relevant pathos would be love or *philia*. The *pathē* in Aristotle are typical responses to the behaviour of others ... Gratitude involves just such a relative positioning, since it derives from the prior need of the recipient in relation to the generosity of the benefactor, and the continued state of inferiority until the debt can be repaid (in this, it resembles anger as Aristotle conceives it)’.¹⁴⁵

As mentioned, Konstan emphasizes the sense of inferiority the recipient experiences until the *charis* is returned in the form of repayment. This seems contrary to his statement that, although gratitude forms part of the ‘social system of reciprocity ... gratitude is never owed’.¹⁴⁶ But though *charis* is, as Aristotle insists, a favour freely granted and without expectation of return, there is nevertheless an implicit norm by which the beneficiary is understood to acknowledge the service emotionally, even if no practical return is possible – a point that is compatible with Konstan’s view but is not developed by him in his discussion of this chapter in the *Rhetoric*.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ Konstan (2006), p. 158.

¹⁴⁵ Konstan (2006), pp. 163-165.

¹⁴⁶ Konstan (2006), p. 167.

¹⁴⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1374a23-24, cited by Fortenbaugh (2002), p. 108. For the traditional view that the emotion in question is an ‘altruistic feeling of kindness’, see Kennedy (1991), p. 149.

The interpretation of Aristotelian *charis* as an action characterized by ‘altruism’ (in the sense of ‘self-less concern for the other’)¹⁴⁸ on the part of the dispenser, would appear to be supported by the definition of *acharistia*. According to Aristotle *acharistoi* are those, ‘who either they were performing or had performed a service for their own advantage (and this [by definition] was not *kharis*) or that it fell out by chance or that they had been acting under constraint or that they gave back rather than freely gave [a favor],¹⁴⁹ either knowingly or not knowingly; for in both cases there is a return for something and thus it would not be *kharis*’.¹⁵⁰

In other words, the dispenser of *charis* is a person who performs a *hupourgia* intentionally, out of his free will and not for his own advantage, and more importantly without expecting anything in return. Similar views are expressed by Aristotle when he identifies *charis* as a factor that generates the *pathos* of *philein*.¹⁵¹ Aristotle stresses that a *philos* acts for the benefit of another person with whom he shares *philia*, aiming at what the other person considers as *agathon* and not what he considers as such, and for the sake of the other and not of himself.¹⁵² In this case, the *phainomenon agathon* is, rather unusually, given preference over the *agathon simpliciter* (*haplōs agathon*), which is a sign of just how generous a conception of friendship and favours Aristotle is prepared to

Fortenbaugh (2002), pp. 107-09, justifies Aristotle’s silence concerning the feelings experienced by the dispenser of *charis*, by stressing that Aristotle is only concerned with the pain experienced by the recipient of *charis* (1385a23, 25, 33).

¹⁴⁸ See Gill (1998), p. 308, n. 5, ‘the OED definition is "Devotion to the welfare of others, regard for others, as a principle of action; opposed to egoism or selfishness"’.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. Cope (1877), vol. II, p. 92: ‘this offer is prompted by no *χάρις* or kindly feeling ... for it is no free gift but the mere payment of a debt. Consequently, he is *ἀχάριστος*, and we owe him no *χάρις*, or gratitude, in return’.

¹⁵⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385b1-5, trans. Kennedy (1991), p. 151.

¹⁵¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381b35-37; cf. also Cope (1877), vol. II, pp. 55-6, n. 29.

¹⁵² Aristotle, *NE* 1155b31, 1159a8-10, 1166a2-5, 1166a15 and *EE* 1240a23-25.

adopt. But of course, *philia* presupposes the sharing of common principles and ideals actualized within the *polis*.¹⁵³

In his discussion of *philia* in a passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (which was not cited by Fortenbaugh and Konstan in this connection), Aristotle states that, 'to the benefactor what is noble is that which depends on his action, so that he delights in the object of his action'. However, for the recipient, Aristotle continues, 'there is nothing noble in the agent, but at most something advantageous', which is 'less pleasant and lovable'. The pleasure one feels, Aristotle says, when granting a benefaction towards a fellow human being (even if the recipient might not be useful to the dispenser in the future) extends to the feeling of *agapan*, that is, the same kind of affection that a mother feels for her child.¹⁵⁴

Finally, in his analysis of *charis* Aristotle distinguishes certain factors to be considered in regard to the state of the recipient: (a) *hois* or *hote*¹⁵⁵, (b) *eph' hois* with relation to those in need of a benefaction; and (c) *pōs echousi*, the state of those in need. Aristotle further classifies the general conditions under which the action of *charis* should be considered, this time from the dispenser's point of view: (a) *todi*, (b) *tosonde*, (c) *toionde*, (d) *pote*, and (e) *pou*. By way of example Aristotle describes the *acharistos* as one who offers less than he should, equal or more to his enemies (than to his own friends), or a petty service knowing it to

¹⁵³ Cf. Aristotle, *EE* 1237a26-30, 1241a15-18. On the social and political dimension of *charis* and reciprocity which is essential for communal solidarity, see MacLachlan (1993), pp. 5, 80-81 and Gill (1998), pp. 319-321.

¹⁵⁴ For Aristotle's use of *agapan* and *stergein* in the context of *philia*, see *Metaphysics* 980a22-23, *NE* 1156a12-16, 1162b30-31, 1164a9-12, 1167a1-3; cf. Konstan (1997), p. 73.

¹⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385a32-33. Cope (1877), vol. II, pp. 90-91 opted for ὅτε instead of οἷς; cf. 1385a16-7.

be such.¹⁵⁶ Aristotle concludes by stating that his discussion refers to *charizesthai* and *acharistein*.¹⁵⁷ Although Aristotle's discussion of *charis* in this section includes the behaviour of both the dispenser and the recipient of a favor, only the response of the beneficiary counts as a *pathos*.

To philein/philia

In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle discusses the *pathos* of *to philein* and in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he associates *philia* with *aretē*, a *hexis prohairetikē*.¹⁵⁸ Aristotle defines *philein* as 'wishing' [or 'wanting'] for someone [*boulesthai tini*, i.e. a friend]¹⁵⁹ to have those things which he [the friend] considers good, for his sake and not for one's own sake, and to act to the best of one's ability for our friend to achieve them'.¹⁶⁰ Only wishing well for another person is not enough for Aristotle for a deep, friendly bond to grow and last. In this case, [when we only wish well to the other], it is just good will (*eunoia*).¹⁶¹

'A friend', Aristotle continues, 'is one who loves and is loved in return', stressing the mutual character of this relationship, which is the foundation and precondition of friendship. A friend, moreover, necessarily rejoices together

¹⁵⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385b6-11; cf. *NE* 1164b25-1165a36.

¹⁵⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1385b11-16; cf. Konstan (2006), p. 163, on the meaning of *acharistein*: 'I think, [it is] "act ungratefully", although it is possible, I suppose, that it bears the sense of "be grudge" or "withhold"'.
¹⁵⁸ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a1-2 and 1106b36; cf. the judicious remark on the Aristotelian perception of *philia* by Stewart (1892), p. 266: 'φιλία in the wide acceptance of the term is not itself an ἀρετή: it is that sense of being a member of the body politic without which the individual could not have the various ἀρεταί included under the general designation of ἡ ὅλη δικαιοσύνη. But ἡ τελεία φιλία ... in which the *communis sensus* is displayed in the most eminent way, may be described as ἀρετή τις—and also μετ' ἀρετῆς, because it manifests itself in association with τελεία ἀρετή'.

¹⁵⁹ For Aristotle's definition of *boulēsis*, see *DA* 414b2 and 432b5, *EE* 1225b32-1226a33, 1227a3-5 and *NE* 1111b22-30.

¹⁶⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1380b36-1381a1, my trans.; cf. Cope (1877), vol. II, p. 43 and Cooper (1980), p. 302.

¹⁶¹ On *eunoia*, see below p.63

with his friend when pleasant things happen to him, and suffers together when misfortunes befall his friend.¹⁶² Friends who do not share pleasure and pain over the same things cannot be friends any more.¹⁶³ Both positive and negative emotional responses occur for our friend's sake without any ulterior motive on our part,¹⁶⁴ and this happens because 'a friend is another self'.¹⁶⁵

Aristotle analyses the *pathos* of *philein*, listing those to *whom* one feels this *pathos* and for what reason, and describing the various character traits which attract and foster *philia*. This is useful in studying such traits in characters associated with *philia* in Menandrian plays. Aristotle states that people *philein* their own benefactors, or the benefactors of those people they care for, and those who offer their services to fellow human beings in various ways, including material benefits and personal safety.¹⁶⁶ For this reason, people honour the *eleutherioi* and *andreioi*. Aristotle includes in this list also the *dikaioi*, because they earn their living from their own labour without depending on others, as for example farmers, as well as the *sophrones* and *apragmones* - for they, too, are *dikaioi* according to him, since they do not interfere in other people's personal affairs.

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The types of character to whom people are attracted to form friendships, Aristotle says, include the good according to virtue; those who are honoured either by all or by the best; those whom we admire, and those who admire us; those who are pleasant to live with and spend the day with, such as the easily agreeable (*eukoloi*), and those who are not contentious (*philonikoi*) or

¹⁶² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1380b36-1381a7; cf. *EE* 1236a14-15; this passage is cited by Gill (1998), p. 319, n. 35 to support his argument on the reciprocal nature of friendship.

¹⁶³ Aristotle, *NE* 1165b27-30 and *EE* 1240a36-40.

¹⁶⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381a2-4.

¹⁶⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1166a31-32.

¹⁶⁶ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381a10-13.

¹⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381a20-25; cf. Cope (1877), vol. II, pp. 46-47.

quarrelsome (*duserides*); those who praise the good qualities in the other [that is, the friend], and in particular the qualities which people fear they themselves do not actually possess; those who do not criticize friends for their wrongs and do not publicize the benefits they have offered to their friends; those who are not vengeful and do not cherish the recollection of past complaints, but on the contrary are easily appeased; those who do not react when friends feel angry or are preoccupied with some serious matters; those who do not perform acts which are objectively and publicly considered shameful; those with whom we contend or strive for honours; those who we wish will only feel *zēlos* and not *phthonos*¹⁶⁸ for what we possess, since *zēlos* is a trait of an equitable person while *phthonos* is a trait of a base one.¹⁶⁹ Finally, we can form friendships with those who do not assume an artificial character (*mē plattomenous*) and do not hide their faults and flaws from their friends, but are sincere and straightforward.¹⁷⁰ We may note in passing that physical appearance too matters to the formation of friendships, and the dress and masks of Menander's characters may well have influenced his audience's perception of how the plot would unfold.¹⁷¹

Aristotle concludes his discussion of *philia* in the *Rhetoric* by naming the kinds of *philia*, including companionship (*hetaireia*), intimacy (*oikeiotēs*), that is, *philia* which exists among the members of an *oikos*, and kinship (*sungeneia*).¹⁷² Thus, Aristotle's discussion of *philia* covers a wide range of social relations starting from familial bonds and those developed within the *oikos*, and extending to society at large. In the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle adds to the types of *philiai* those he calls *politikai*, namely friendships of association 'which seem to rest on

¹⁶⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381a26-35 and 1381b1-23; cf. Kennedy (1991), p.136, Cope (1877), vol. II. p. 53.

¹⁶⁹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1388a35-36.

¹⁷⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381b28-31; cf. Cope (1877), vol. II. pp. 54-55 and *NE* 1165b6-12.

¹⁷¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381b1-2; cf. Cope (1877), vol. II. pp. 50-51.

¹⁷² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381b34; cf. Kennedy (1991), p. 137.

a sort of compact' (*kath' homologian*).¹⁷³ Political friendship for Aristotle, among free and equal men, is an essential requirement in order for true and virtuous friendship to be developed.¹⁷⁴

Philia for Aristotle is a fundamental quality, 'most necessary with a view to living' in society.¹⁷⁵ It is what binds (*sunechei*) the *polis*.¹⁷⁶ Having *philo* is considered not supplementary to one's life but essential. Even people who possess external *agatha*, such as wealth and power, would not choose to live without friends.¹⁷⁷ The reason Aristotle gives for the necessity of friends in one's life is that the advantage of material prosperity is meaningless unless it is actualized and shared in the form of benefactions towards friends.¹⁷⁸ Friends offer their support on different occasions, according to the needs of their friends. Aristotle distinguishes types of needs by age groups and by what friends can offer each other. Among young people friends assist each other for protection against wrongdoing, while among old people friends contribute in matters which they cannot perform themselves due to their advanced age and natural weakness. Among those who are in their prime, friends enable and encourage each other to perform good deeds.¹⁷⁹ Menander's *Dyskolos* offers, as we shall see, telling examples of these several advantages associated with friendship.

¹⁷³ Aristotle, *NE* 1161b11-15; trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 212.

¹⁷⁴ See Coleman (2008), pp. 116-117.

¹⁷⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a4, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 192; cf. Cooper (1980), p. 302.

¹⁷⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a22-23.

¹⁷⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a5-7.

¹⁷⁸ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a7-9. See Konstan (1997), pp. 80-81.

¹⁷⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a11-16.

Motivations and types of friendship

If we turn now to the account of *philia* in Aristotle's ethical works (the *Nicomachean Ethics* and the *Eudemian Ethics*), we find that it is defined with reference to the object of love (*to philēton*), namely whether this is good pleasant or useful. The friendship characterized only as pleasant or useful is subject to change and is terminated when the object for which the love exists is satisfied; an example is the friendship among lovers, unless they come to appreciate each other's characters, in which case *erōs* can be sublimated into *philia*.¹⁸⁰ Useful friendship can exist among the old, among younger people, and among those who are in their prime. For old people pursue not what is pleasant but primarily what is useful, while those who are young or in their prime and form useful friendships do so because they pursue profit through the friendship.¹⁸¹ Usefulness can equally serve as the basis for *philia* between *phauloi*, where it is the binding element (*ta pragmata*), and it is limited to personal advantage among friends as opposed to the motivation springing from internal goodness.¹⁸²

For Aristotle *philia* based on pleasure commonly but not necessarily occurs among young people where both parties feel pleasure at the same things and feel joy in their companionship.¹⁸³

For Aristotle, the ideal friendship is perfect *philia* which involves men who are *agathoi* and alike in virtue. These men consider the good of their friends as their own good. What Aristotle stresses is that perfect *philo*i act in this way because

¹⁸⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1155b17-22, 1156a6-1156b6. See Konstan (1997), pp. 72-73.

¹⁸¹ Aristotle, *NE* 1156a21-27. For the types of friendship which old and young people form, see also *Rhetoric* 1389a35-1389b2, 1389b22-25 and 35-36.

¹⁸² Aristotle, *EE* 1237b30-34.

¹⁸³ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1158a18-20.

of their own choice and not incidentally. As a result, perfect friendship ‘lasts as long as they are *agathoi*—and goodness is enduring’.¹⁸⁴ Perfect *philia* is rare and extremely hard to find or achieve. For there are only a few people ‘alike in virtue’, and in addition this type of friendship requires time to develop, as well as mutual trust, familiarity and experience of each other and hence it is not subject to slander.¹⁸⁵ Aristotle does not exclude pleasure and utility from perfect *philia*, that is, the friendship among *spoudaioi*, but perfect *philia* transcends these elements.¹⁸⁶

The question arises as to whether, for Aristotle, only perfect human beings, with regard to their *aretai*, are destined to form pure and true friendships. It has been convincingly argued that this does not seem to be what Aristotle meant;¹⁸⁷ for more than once he uses the expression ‘friendship of character’ (*hē tōn ēthōn philia*) which develops among friends who do not possess perfect *aretē*.¹⁸⁸ This kind of friendship lasts because it is formed and based on the character of the parties,¹⁸⁹ their positive qualities, and not on any incidental factor destined not to last (pleasure and utility alone). More importantly in this context [friendship amongst unequal characters], familial friendship is identified by Aristotle as the cradle of *philia*. For it is within the family that various kinds of *philia* develop among its members who are unequal in status and virtue, including complete friendship.¹⁹⁰ Although man is a political animal, he is

¹⁸⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1156b6-15, trans. based on Ross et al. (1998), p. 196; cf. *NE* 1156a10-19 and Konstan (1997), p. 74-75.

¹⁸⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1156b24-6, 1157a20-21, 1158a14-16 and 1165b30-33; cf. *EE* 1237b13-17.

¹⁸⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1157a1-3 and 1158a33-34.

¹⁸⁷ Cooper (1980), p. 308. On friendship among unequals in character and status, see *NE* 1163b29-35.

¹⁸⁸ Cooper (1980), pp. 307-308 with reference to *NE* 1157a11-12, 1162b21-23, 1164a12, 1165b8-9 and 23-36; *EE* 1241a10, cf. 1242b37, 1243a35; cf. Belfiore (2001), p. 113.

¹⁸⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1164a12-13.

¹⁹⁰ On Aristotle’s views on familial friendships, see Belfiore (2001) and Irwin (2007), p. 225

firstly and most importantly ‘a pairing and a household animal’, since the household precedes the *polis*.¹⁹¹

Philia between superior and inferior, including the *philia* between father/son, husband/wife, elder/younger, ruler/subject, is discussed by Aristotle in the context of unequal *philia*.¹⁹² This kind of *philia* is based on superiority (*huperochē*) in relation to a number of factors, including goodness of character, and the goods the parties can offer to each other. The motivation or reason why such *philoī* love each other differs, according to Aristotle, in the sense that the superior offers more than he receives. What is of importance in unequal friendships is the proportion not only in terms of giving but also in terms of feelings, that is how much each loves the other.¹⁹³

Discussing the forms and expressions of *philia*, not in connection with *aretē* but in the sense of friendly and rather instinctive feeling¹⁹⁴, Aristotle praises *tous philanthrōpous* for the natural *philia* they display towards their fellow men,¹⁹⁵ stressing that it is *philanthrōpia* that makes young men compassionate towards fellow human beings.¹⁹⁶ In this sense, *philia* can be displayed, Aristotle says, also towards slaves, who though a ‘living tool’, nonetheless form part of the social system. ‘*Qua* slave’, Aristotle states, ‘then, one cannot be friends with him. But *qua* man one can’. The reason for this, according to Aristotle, is that

¹⁹¹ Aristotle, *NE* 1097b10-11, 1162a17-19, *EE* 1242a23-24, *Politics* 1253a1-5. See also Lockwood (2003), p. 3.

¹⁹² Aristotle, *NE* 1158b11-19; cf. *EE* 1238b23-26.

¹⁹³ Aristotle, *NE* 1158b23-28. On the greater degree of love parents offer to their children in comparison to that offered by the children to them, see also *NE* 1161b19-22, 1165a16-18 and 1161a15-21. On the reciprocity and solidarity among unequal partners in *philia*, see Gill (1998), pp. 318-9.

¹⁹⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a20-21.

¹⁹⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a16-21. On the meaning of *philanthrōpon* (sometimes translated as ‘human sympathy’ or ‘human satisfaction’) in the *Poetics*, see Halliwell (1986), p. 219 and 314 and Sherman (1992), p. 182.

¹⁹⁶ See Cope (1877), vol. II, p. 157.

‘there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement; therefore, there can also be friendship with him in so far as he is a man.’¹⁹⁷ The slaves in Menander’s comedies are sometimes treated instrumentally (as in the beginning of the *Aspis*) but also enter into affective relations with their masters.¹⁹⁸

Homonoia

Homonoia, according to Aristotle, pertains to the category of *philia*¹⁹⁹. The significance of *homonoia* is underlined by Aristotle with reference to the actualization of *philia*, which can take place both among individuals within the *polis* and among *poleis*.²⁰⁰ As the word indicates, *homonoia* characterizes people and institutions that are in accord, of one mind. Aristotle distinguishes *homonoia* from *homodoxia* (identity of opinion), and *homognōmia* (identity of views), for *homonoia* is related to important matters which need to be acted upon concerning the common good and aiming at ‘living together’.²⁰¹ Aristotle identifies *homonoia* with political friendship, for both are ‘concerned with things that are to our interest and have an influence on our life’. *Homonoia*, Aristotle continues, can occur only among the virtuous (*epieikeis*). As for the *phauloi*, as in the case of *philia*, Aristotle states, *homonoia* can exist among them

¹⁹⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1161b2-8, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 212.

¹⁹⁸ See Konstan (2013a) for examples.

¹⁹⁹ Plato, *Republic* 351d also associates *dikaiousunē*, *homonoia*, and *philia*: he states that injustice, and hatred produce fights and discord, while justice secures *homonoia* and *philia* among the citizens.

²⁰⁰ On Aristotle’s analysis of *homonoia* see Klonoski (1996), who convincingly argues that for Aristotle, as he analyses it in the ethical treatises, *homonoia* has a moral and political dimension and cannot be reduced to an advantageous type of *philia* (utility friendship), but aims at the pursuit and preservation of the common good (at p. 318). Klonoski at p. 319 with n. 28 stresses that his views on Aristotelian *homonoia* have a ‘Platonic flavour’ in the sense that the order of the souls of the individual reflects in cities. Kalimtzi (2000), pp. 79-84 offers a survey of scholarly views on the Aristotelian concept of *homonoia*. For Kalimtzi too the *homonoia* of the individual is necessary for *homonoia* within the city and among cities.

²⁰¹ Aristotle, *EE* 1241a16-24; cf. Rackham (1935), pp. 408-409.

only to a small extent, since what binds them is not the common good but their personal advantage.²⁰²

By associating *homonoia* with political friendship²⁰³ and justice, Aristotle emphasizes its fundamental role in social unity and stability.²⁰⁴ Acknowledging the truth of the proverb 'what friends have is common property', Aristotle stresses the fact that 'friendship exists in communion', in the sense that it depends on community,²⁰⁵ which can be manifested in various forms of association, including 'religious guilds and social clubs; for these exist respectively for the sake of offering sacrifice and of companionship; for it aims not at present advantage but at what is advantageous for life as a whole'.²⁰⁶ Such bonds of affection among citizens enable social stability and limit class differentiation, which are central themes in such Menandrian comedies as *Dyskolos* and *Samia*.

The necessity of *philia* for society is further discussed by Aristotle in Book IV of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he analyses various types of character as ethical dispositions or *hexeis*, as is observed in everyday life in society and regarding the social relationships they form. This *hexis*, which is similar to *philia* but does not have a separate name, corresponds to the middle state of a character, having as its deficiency *dyskolia* and its excess *kolakeia*. This unnamed middle state differs from the *philia* which is the focus of *Nicomachean Ethics* books VIII and IX, because it lacks intention and the expression of affection (*stergein*).

²⁰² Aristotle, *NE* 1167a22-1167b16, trans. Ross et al. (1998), pp. 231-232.

²⁰³ Aristotle, *EE* 1241a34 and *NE* 1167b2. Klonoski (1993), p. 323, argues that, as a utility friendship, political friendship for Aristotle is a 'pragmatic or expedient manifestation of concord'.

²⁰⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1155a22-28.

²⁰⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1159b31-32, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 207.

²⁰⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1160a18-23, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 208; cf. Stewart (1892), vol. II, p. 305.

Although the possessor of this *hexis* behaves in the same way to both strangers and friends, i.e., in a friendly way, his behaviour is adapted to the person he communicates with. In other words, this person behaves appropriately. Aristotle's description of this person implies that he can evaluate on each occasion his relation to the person he encounters, an attitude which does not characterize those who are *dyskoloi* or *kolakes* since the relevant *hexis* (of *kolakeia* or *dyskolia*) overcomes their judgements. Hence, the person who belongs to the mean, that of *philia*, friendliness, as Irwin names it, communicates appropriately, taking into consideration the context of the association, namely family, friends, fellow citizens and so forth. This person will not display the same care to a stranger as to his intimate companions, nor will he cause the same pain to each of these groups. He will not aim, after rational thinking and deliberation, at giving pain or pleasure to his fellow human beings, holding as a principle what is good and honourable not only for himself but for his associates as well.²⁰⁷ Such people can share common social aims that promote not only personal advantage but also the common good, since they consider what is just for society and are prepared to deliberate and act together to achieve it for the community.²⁰⁸

Eunoia

Aristotle distinguishes *philia*, as said above, from *eunoia*, usually interpreted as 'goodwill', 'wishing well', 'thinking favourably of someone', and 'recognizing another's worthiness'.²⁰⁹ *Eunoia*, which resembles *philia*, can arise instinctively,

²⁰⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1126b11-1127a12; cf. Ross et al. (1998), pp. 99-100 and *EE* 1221a7.

²⁰⁸ For Aristotle's view of this type of friendship, see Irwin (2007), p. 225.

²⁰⁹ For a detailed analysis of Aristotle's views on *eunoia* and *homonoia* as primary conditions for social and political stability and *philia* in society, see Kalimtzis (2000), pp. 76-84. For *eunoia* and *philia*, see Hadreas (1995), Cooper (1999), pp. 316, 321-323 and 329-331, and Konstan (2008a), pp. 209-210.

even among strangers, it is associated with social contact, when people accept each other, but it is distinguished from true and lasting *philia*, for it does not share *philia*'s essential characteristics, namely the reciprocation of affection, *philia*'s intensity, and the desire to live with each other. The feeling which accompanies instinctive *eunoia* is named by Aristotle as a 'superficial affection' and is compared to the visual pleasure which accompanies the beginning of *erōs*, when those who experience *erōs* are delighted by looking at each other's face. Aristotle metaphorically characterizes *eunoia* as 'inactive friendship' which, if prolonged, based on mutual appreciation of the agents' internal positive and permanent qualities, can reach the point of intimacy and develop into friendship. Although the person who feels *eunoia* shares another person's wishes, he is not prepared to do anything for this, in the sense that the agent would not participate in the actions the other person performs for his own good, unless they have developed *eunoia* into friendship.²¹⁰

To misein

Aristotle treats *to misein* (hatred) as the opposite of *philia*. Anger, for example, is defined as a kind of pain, whereas hatred is not necessarily accompanied by pain. The reason would appear to be that hatred is more like a settled disposition. What is more, anger is directed at individuals – 'I am angry at this person in particular' – whereas hatred may take as its object classes of people, for instance the sycophants. Most generally, hatred, as the opposite of love, of *philia*, is aroused by character traits in another person (or group of people), that is, by vices, just as love is elicited by virtues (as well as by pleasurable traits or

²¹⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1157b11-19, 1166b30-1167a21 and *EE* 1241a8-15; cf. Stewart (1892), vol. II. p. 366 and Ross et al. (1998), pp. 230-231.

usefulness).²¹¹ The distinction between hatred and anger, and hatred's relationship to *philia*, will become apparent in Knemon's character in *Dyskolos*.

Conclusion

Although Aristotle is a systematic thinker, and his definitions of ethical concepts and emotions cannot always be taken to reflect popular views, he was very much concerned to address and, to a certain degree reform, the values of the society in which he lived. To this extent, his approach was practical: advice to budding orators such as he offers in his *Rhetoric* would be useless if his understanding of the emotions diverged substantially from that of his fellow citizens, and his recommendations for educating the young on how to be good citizens of a polity would have been equally beside the point. This is partly why, when he addressed a particularly thorny concept, he began with a review of the *endoxa*, that is, the opinions entertained by respectable people. As we now turn to Menander's comedies, we shall see again and again that, despite a certain tendency to schematization, Aristotle's crisp explications capture important elements in the behaviour and emotional repertory of the characters on stage. It is time now to put our discussion to the test.

The comparison use of Aristotle's ethical theories to illuminate Menander's comedies involves a crossing of genres that may seem odd today, when philosophy has assumed a highly technical form in many areas and literature is seen as a world apart. But classical Greek comedy interacted with philosophy and vice versa in numerous ways, of which Aristophanes' *Clouds* is the most conspicuous but by no means the only example. Plato, Epicurus, the Stoics, Cynics, and others were regular targets of satire and occasionally praised for their wisdom. In a world where a philosophical lecturer like

²¹¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1382a1-29. For a detailed discussion of Aristotle on *to misein*, see Konstan (2006), pp. 185-200.

Theophrastus could draw thousands to his performances, the boundaries between philosophy and theatre was far more porous than we might suppose today.²¹²

Chapter 2

*Epitrepontes*²¹³

The plot of *Epitrepontes* revolves around the birth of a child.²¹⁴ Through a series of misunderstandings and a dose of dramatic irony regarding the child's parents, Menander examines the estrangement and reconciliation of a married couple. In the process, he presents the characters of the father Smikrines, his daughter Pamphile and her husband Charisios and each sheds light on the other. It is a comedy of exaggerated emotions, that come close to breaking up an *oikos*.

Smikrines

Smikrines' character unfolds progressively in the play, though the fragmentary nature of important sections of the text in which he has a role makes it difficult to draw a full picture of him. In what follows, I explore two principal aspects: first, the complex interplay between his miserliness and his sense of honour, both of which contribute to his anger; second, I note his failure, as a

²¹² See Konstan (2014) for examples and discussion.

²¹³ For *Epitrepontes*, I base my interpretation on Furley's edition (2009), comparing when it is necessary with Sandbach (1972), Arnott (1979) and Ireland (2010).

²¹⁴ So too in *Samia*; the plot type was common, for example Terence's *Hekyra*, based on an original by Apollodorus of Carystus.

consequence of his irate disposition, to take proper account of the facts, which in turn exacerbates his rage, since he readily jumps to false conclusions. The discussion is thus organized thematically, and does not strictly follow the order of events in the play.

When we first meet him Smikrines is shocked (ἐκπλήτ[τομαι, 127] at his son-in-law's squandering of Pamphile's dowry on expensive wine and hiring a *hetaira* from a pimp (127²¹⁵, 130-131 and 136-137).²¹⁶ He has even calculated the money that is being squandered: an obol for each pint of wine and twelve drachmas for the pimp per day, enough to feed a person for thirty-six days (139-140). For his part, Chairestratos, who is eavesdropping, appears to agree with Smikrines' calculations (εὖ] λελ[όγ]ισται, 140), giving some more information indicative of Smikrines' tightness: the money would be sufficient to feed a starving man on barley soup (141). Smikrines' comments on Charisios' overspending seem at this point to overshadow his criticisms of his son-in-law's mistreatment of his wife Pamphile (134-137). There is no mention here of familial disgrace as a consequence of his abandoning her (Smikrines does not yet know the cause of it) and, even worse, his openly living with a *hetaira*, especially since Charisios and Pamphile were newly married. Instead there is criticism of the irresponsible squandering of his daughter's dowry, which

²¹⁵ Furley (2009), p. 42 in the apparatus has '127 ante hunc v.(πίνει δὲ πολυτελέστατον) ...'.

²¹⁶ On Smikrines' legal *kyrieia* over Pamphile as a woman and over her dowry after her marriage, see Harrison (1968), pp. 30-32 and 40, MacDowell (1986), pp. 87-88, Todd (1993), p. 214, Omitowoju (2002), p. 175 and Petrides (2014), p. 272. For a detailed analysis of Charisios and Pamphile's case and Charisios' obligations towards Smikrines after he abandoned Pamphile, see Furley (2009), pp. 27-29. Traill (2008), pp. 179-188 offers an interesting view about who Pamphile's *kyrios* would be after her marriage and includes in her interpretation the new fragments of Act IV with the verses attributed to Pamphile (see below, p. 83ff). In particular Traill argues that Pamphile 'demands the right to be consulted and to make the final choice and even accuses him [Smikrines] of overstepping his authority, since she no longer considers herself under his *kyrieia*' (at 179), 'the point of denying her father's *kyrieia* is to recognize her husband's; later in the speech she will insist that they are married for better or worse (820)' (at 180).

together with the public exposure of the family's misfortune seems to be the driving cause of Smikrines' *orgē* at this stage.

Smikrines' enraged state is highlighted in the exchange between Chairestratos and Habrotonon (142-144), which takes place out of Smikrines' earshot. Habrotonon asks Chairestratos (142) who the man is who has just arrived, possibly surprised by his alarming appearance and emotional state. Chairestratos' description of Smikrines is revealing; on Furley's reconstruction, he explains: ὁ τῆς [νύμφης π]ατήρ. δοῦν βλέπ]ων ὡς ἄθλιός τις φιλόσοφος ἀκριβολογεῖθ' (143-144).²¹⁷ Editors have suggested various readings of the fragmentary lines 143-144, one of which attributes them to Habrotonon rather than to Chairestratos and reads: 'ἀλλὰ τί παθ]ῶν ὡς ἄθλιός τις [φιλόσοφος βλέπει σκύθρωφ' ὁ] τρισκακοδ[αίμων;]' (144-145).²¹⁸ Regardless of the exact wording of the phrase that describes Smikrines' look, however, it is certain that his anger has already become obvious to people around him. At this point Smikrines informs the audience of his plan of action in response to Charisios' insulting behaviour. He will first inquire directly of his daughter about the situation (161-162) and then he will deliberate (βουλευσομαι, 163) how he will 'attack' or 'approach' Charisios (164). The use of asyndeton in Smikrines' declaration of his intentions (162-164) once more points to Smikrines' emotional distress.²¹⁹

If we attempt to interpret Smikrines' *pathos* of *orgē* at this stage, there are no signs that he suffers from any anger-related character flaws. Due to the mutilated text at crucial points we cannot tell whether he is 'quick-tempered'

²¹⁷ For the identification of the speakers at verses 144-146 see Furley (2009), p. 132.

²¹⁸ Cf. Arnott (1979), p. 400 followed to a great extent by Ireland (2010), pp. 130-131.

²¹⁹ For the use of asyndeton by Menandrian characters and its relation to their emotional state, see Wiles (1991), esp. pp. 214 and 221, Beroutsos (2005), p. 88 and Cusset (2014), p. 172.

or 'harsh-tempered' or 'of a bitter temperament'. Instead his anger would seem to arise from the dominant flaw in his character, namely, his stinginess, a flaw that Plato, Aristotle and Theophrastus analyse under the character trait they called *aneleutheria* (illiberality or meanness) and *mikrologia* (stinginess).²²⁰ In a society sensitive to issues of status and prestige and to the importance of preserving and transmitting property, concern for the potential loss of a large dowry is not unnatural; it is the extent to which this dominates Smikrines' thought and speech, and the way this takes precedence over his daughter's welfare, that suggests stinginess.

Nevertheless, meanness is not the entire cause of Smikrines' wrath. In the first place, in line with Aristotle's analysis of anger in the *Rhetoric*, we might regard the cause of Smikrines' rage as at least in part the pain provoked by an *oligōria*, in the sense that his son-in-law's apparent profligacy is a kind of disregard for Smikrines' own dignity. What is more, Smikrines is also annoyed that Charisios' case is known to everyone in the city (*περιβόητον*, 666), and he further characterizes Charisios as *akratēs* and not in control of himself, taking up, as he puts it, with a cheap little whore (667). Smikrines declares that his daughter would never have put up with such a marriage unless she were a metic (690-691), which of course she is not; the idea is evidently that, in Smikrines' mind, Charisios has treated him, and his daughter, as though they were foreigners without full civic rights, ready to endure any degree of disrespect in return for the signal honour of marriage with an Athenian (something in any case not possible for a metic, according to the conventions of New Comedy and an Athenian law dating back to the year 451). As Furley says, 'Smikrines means: his daughter wouldn't stay a minute longer in

²²⁰ For *aneleutheria* and *mikrologia* see Plato, *Republic* 486a and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 995a8-12, cited by Diggle (2004), p. 301.

Charisios' house under the present intolerable circumstances, *unless*, that is, their family had no rights in Athens as metics and she must be grateful to Charisios for so much as tolerating her presence in this embarrassing situation'.²²¹ I am reminded here of Achilles' complaint in the *Iliad*, that Agamemnon had treated him as though he were a vagrant without honour (1.356 and 9.648), which of course he was not (had he been, he would have been obliged to accept his inferior status and so not experience anger).

At the same time, we observe that Smikrines does not deliberate or seek to discover the truth. Though the defective text does not allow us to say whether he asked either Pamphile or Charisios the reason for their separation, nowhere in the extant parts of the play is it suggested that he knew (when Smikrines encounters Pamphile in Act IV, under the false impression that Charisios has also fathered a child by Habrotonon (645-646), he fails to ask his daughter why Charisios abandoned her and why he is behaving in so strange and dishonourable a way). Yes, his honour and that of his daughter have been damaged, and he is still very much concerned about the squandering of the dowry (688). It is clear, however, that he is all too eager to accept the facts as he sees them, or rather as they appear, in large part, it would seem, because they are congruent with his inner 'smallness' regarding money matters. In terms of Aristotelian psychology, we may say that his anger is aroused by *phantasia* and his reasoning in turn confirms his understanding of the facts as he sees them. In sum, although the text from 645ff is mutilated, from the surviving bits it seems that, acting under the sway of appearances,²²² Smikrines intends to take his daughter away from her husband (658) in order to save the dowry – which

²²¹ Furley (2009), p. 205.

²²² I agree with Traill's view (2008), pp. 203-204 that 'appearances are misleading in many circumstances in *Epitrepontes* and the whole play 'explores the difficulties of judging actions that are open to multiple interpretations'.

he announces early on, with self-righteous wrath, to have been four talents (134) – and to preserve the dignity of his family.

We should not be surprised that Menander has endowed Smikrines' character with a certain complexity: he is stingy, to be sure, but he is also sensitive, and understandably so, to the dishonour inflicted on him and his daughter. Menander plays with character types but does not offer caricatures, and the contrast with Theophrastus' vignettes is illuminating. Although Theophrastus' *Characters* may shed light on aspects of this or that figure in Menander's comedies, they correspond only partially to the behaviour and motivations of figures like Smikrines. We may observe, however, that an Aristotelian analysis illuminates both sides of his character, which taken together explain the nature of his reaction to his daughter's predicament and his comic inability to register the facts of the case.

If we look first to Smikrines' evident meanness as the cause that triggers his *pathos* of *orgē*, then the vice in question is that of *aneleutheria*. According to Plato, *aneleutheria* is a negative condition of the soul.²²³ The *aneleutheros* is opposite to the *eleutheros* – the person who is free because he is truly the *archē* of his own actions, and seeks his good through *paideia* and noble actions.²²⁴ In contradistinction, the *aneleutheros* is, broadly speaking, servile, *tapeinos*. Rather than his mind being the source of his self-directed actions, he allows external factors, or irrational internal factors that rule over him like a tyrant, to drag him this or that way, like a slave. He is driven either by tyrannical appetites from within, or by tyrant desires and objectives, or by masters from without.²²⁵

²²³ Plato, *Republic* 486a4.

²²⁴ Plato, *Laws* 643e-644a.

²²⁵ Plato, *Republic* 577d1-11; cf *Laws* 728e5.

More importantly, the *aneleutheros* has a malformed *thumos*. Therefore, he can be deceived by flattery or the prospect of gain.²²⁶ Though there are a variety of reasons for this flawed condition (and different types of expression of this flaw), ultimately, at least according to Plato, its cause is a failed *paideia*.²²⁷ The *aneleutheros* may be *philochrēmatos*, *banausos*, *agroikos* and *mikrologos* (petty), in pursuit of a technical skill at the expense of his spiritual and physical development.²²⁸ He *will* tend to get angry in the wrong way. Rather than feel *orgē* over injustice and dishonour, therefore, such a person with a blighted *thumos* may well ignore such humiliations and instead get infuriated if his servile expectations are not fulfilled.

In both the *Eudemian* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* Aristotle mentions the *kimbix*, ‘the skinflint is he who is very excited about small sums’.²²⁹ Aristotle also points out that sometimes *aneleutheria* may reflect a desire to avoid doing something base, whereas at other times it may be caused by fear.²³⁰ He also states that because this flaw in giving or taking is on a small scale, *aneleutheria* differs from the rampant looting of tyrants and kings who plunder on a grand scale and are evil. The *aneleutheroi* are not wicked (*ponēroi*) – a matter relevant to Menander’s representation of Smikrines, who has often been taken to be a wholly nasty specimen.

In considering Smikrines’ character, it is important too to consider his age. In the *Rhetoric* Aristotle also discusses the *ēthē tōn presbuterōn*, stating that they are

²²⁶ Plato, *Republic* 590b6.

²²⁷ Plato, *Laws* 644a.

²²⁸ Plato, *Republic* 590b6ff; for the close connection among *thumos*, passions, honour and self-worth in Plato, see Kalimtzis (2005), pp. 97-99.

²²⁹ Aristotle, *EE* 1232a10-18, trans. Rackham (1935), p. 337; cf. *NE* 1121b21-31. On the meaning of κίμβιξ see *LSJ* s.v.

²³⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1121b12-31.

mikropsuchoi and *aneleutheroi*. Their *aneleutheria* is manifested in guarding the property which they have acquired with hard labour. It is their experience which leads them to be *aneleutheroi*.²³¹ The fact that they lead their lives more according to calculation (*logismon*) than to their *ēthos* is stressed by Aristotle *vis-à-vis* their *aneleutheria*. Old men commit wrongdoing due to their malice rather than *hubris*²³², whereas young men do so precisely out of *hubris*.²³³ The different behaviours of the two age groups are in part due to the love of honour associated with youth.²³⁴ Thus, Smikrines' age may help to justify, or at least explain, his *aneleutheria*. It is not clear, however, whether meanness is part of Smikrines' character as a result of a lifetime's practice (as Onesimos stresses), or a *hexis* that has emerged or been further developed in his old age. Either way, this characterization does justice to Smikrines' name, by manifesting one of the most glaring traits of his character, his *smikrotēs*.²³⁵

Once again, however, we must stress that this characterisation, though accurate as far as it goes, is only a partial account of Smikrines' motives. Real life is rarely so simple, and Menander never is: Smikrines has good reason to feel belittled by Charisios' treatment of his daughter, and he is not merely a mindlessly greedy father. Smikrines' honour is truly at stake, even if he himself distorts the matter by his compulsive references to the dowry. It is remarkable how well Aristotle's analyses shed light on both aspects, contrary as they may seem, of Smikrines' personality. Furthermore, although Smikrines may be *aneleutheros*, this flaw in his character does not diminish his concern for his daughter's welfare, as when he warns her that she will suffer both financially and emotionally when Charisios will have to support her and his *hetaira* at the

²³¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1389b27-35.

²³² Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1390a15-21.

²³³ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1389b7-8.

²³⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1389a10-15.

²³⁵ See MacCary (1970), p. 282.

same time (753-755 and 793-794). The two aspects of his character are particularly in evidence in his speech at the beginning of Act IV. From what we can judge, Smikrines' first complaint is economic: 'Consider his wasteful lifestyle' (750)²³⁶, he admonishes his daughter but he switches next (after a lacuna of 24 lines or so) to the matter of his daughter's reputation (δία]βαλεῖ 787). What appears is once again the subtly nuanced depiction of Smikrines as a skinflint, perhaps, but also a man who knows how the world works and has reasonably good judgement, as evidenced earlier in his handling of the arbitration over the fate of the baby.

The extent to which Smikrines is characterized by *aneleutheria* at this point depends, then, on how we evaluate his *orgē*. On the one hand, rather than being infuriated solely over what appears to be an unjust stain on his daughter's reputation, he calculates with minute attention to detail the number of days a hungry person can survive at the cost of a night with a *hetaira*; it is clear that his calculation is well thought out, but the rate is also the lowest expenditure (two obols per day) that could be made to last for the longest period of time. Smikrines' *orgē* reaches its peak in the last Act (V). Following his failure to convince Pamphile to abandon Charisios, Smikrines brings with him Sophrone, his daughter's old nurse, who is aware of Pamphile's misfortune (the rape and the birth and exposure of the baby), though she has not informed her master of this. Smikrines demands that Sophrone persuade Pamphile to abandon Charisios, and says that he has come to get the dowry before Charisios spends it all (1065). Convinced of his own assessment of the situation, Smikrines, rather than using persuasive arguments, opts to hurl violent threats at the old nurse, should she fail in the task entrusted to her (1070-1073). Onesimos astutely observes that Smikrines has come in a calculating frame of mind (he calls him

²³⁶ Furley (2009), p. 110.

a *logistikos anēr*) (1081-1082).²³⁷ *Logistikos* is normally associated not so much with reasoning as with petty calculation.²³⁸ In Smikrines' case this is an indication that, subordinated to *aneleutheria*, his reasoning is at least in part misdirected to base aims.

On the other hand, we have already noted Smikrines' concern with public opinion, for which a passage in Act III offers further evidence. Having described the old man as he returns from the town as *ταρα[κτι]κῶς ἔχων* (578), Onesimos assumes that the reason for Smikrines' distress is that he may have learnt the truth about the child, without however knowing the particulars. Onesimos' lines (578-582) and Smikrines' monologue that follows (583-602) are preserved only in fragments and hence it is impossible to draw a safe conclusion about the reasons for and extent of Smikrines' emotional state.²³⁹ It has been accepted by many editors of *Epitrepontes* that fr. 882 Kock fits perfectly around the missing parts of 584-585: 'ἄσωτ [ἡ πόλις] ὅλη γὰρ ἄδει τὸ κακόν]'.²⁴⁰ This is in agreement with the description of Smikrines as being annoyed by the stories, possibly with a tone of exaggeration, that he has heard about Charisios' behaviour in the town.

Another aspect of Menander's presentation of Smikrines' character is reflected in Act II, where he is invited to become the arbitrator over the ownership of the trinkets of the exposed baby, who happens to be his grandson, although

²³⁷ On Smikrines' tightness, see Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 294, MacCary (1971), p. 306, Goldberg (1980), p. 62; Scafuro (1997), p. 313 also states that Smikrines 'concern appears to be financial and limited to the material well-being of his daughter'.

²³⁸ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 377 regarding Plato, *Republic* 439d and Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.2.28.

²³⁹ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 346-347, Arnott (1979), pp. 462-465 and Ireland (2010), pp. 238-239. Furley (2009), p. 198 stresses that in this fragmentary monologue Smikrines 'is as upset by Charisios' running through the dowry as he is by the young man's neglect of his daughter'.

²⁴⁰ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 346, Arnott (1979), pp. 462-464 and Furley (2009), p. 199

Smikrines is unaware of this. Daos, a slave, found the baby, and though willing to look after it, because of his poverty he decides to hand it over to Chairestratos 'slave Syriskos. In the process, however, the two slaves argue over the possession of the trinkets. Smikrines, who happens to pass by, is invited by Daos and Syriskos to become the arbitrator, hence the title of the play. At first Smikrines appears to be irritated by the slaves' sudden invitation (228-230). It does not take him long, however, to be persuaded (236-237). Smikrines starts by asking Daos to present his side of the story (238). Throughout the scene Smikrines conducts his role as arbitrator with fairness and impatience. This is also indicated by the slight irritation reflected in his remark to Syriskos, when the latter attempts to interrupt Daos (249-250). Smikrines concludes that the trinkets should not be given as a reward to Daos who found the baby together with these objects, but should go to the rightful owner, the baby, and consequently should be entrusted to Syriskos who undertook its upbringing (353-357).²⁴¹ It is not clear whether Smikrines reaches his decision on the basis of the facts alone, or whether he is persuaded by Syriskos' rhetorical skill and techniques, which provoke an emotional response in him. What is beyond doubt is that Smikrines acts fairly in this instance, in which he has, as he supposes, nothing personal at stake.²⁴² It is another matter whether justice is

²⁴¹ For an analysis of the arbitration scene in *Epitrepontes*, see Cohoon (1914); for a discussion of the arbitration scenes in *Epitrepontes* and Plautus' *Rudens*, see Scafuro (1997), pp. 154-168, who concentrates on the dramatization of procedures, the issue in dispute, the manner of settlement and the choice of the arbitrator in both plays; Cinaglia (2014), pp. 26-29 considers the arbitration scene in *Epitrepontes* to be one of the *anagnoriseis* of the play, which exposes the characters' understanding and reasoning while dealing with the issue of arbitration. Iversen (2001) persuasively argued that Syriskos may have self-interested motives in mind, namely that he plans to take the trinkets and give them to his master as part of the payment *apophora* (380) that he owes him. And certainly, one cannot rule out a selfish motive on the part of Syriskos but it cannot be confirmed since the text is not explicit on the matter.

²⁴² It is possible that what shapes his judgment in this case is also his proclivity to gain. Aristotle observes that people who are overly concerned with profit may be sensitive about encroaching on other people's property out of fear that others may encroach in turn on theirs; cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1121b12-31.

an established part of his character.²⁴³ What Menander gives us with Smikrines is a figure who, despite his flaws, can still function effectively in many social contexts; as Aristotle says, he is not wicked.

Menander presents Smikrines as a free citizen who is not only convinced by a slave (Syriskos in the arbitration scene, 293-352) but also takes lessons from a slave (Onesimos in Act V, 1084-1130). Such reversals of social hierarchy are a feature of comedy, and Smikrines' willingness to attend to a slave indicates a certain dignity in his temperament, or at least confidence in his status: Menander does not reduce even his most stereotyped figures to one-dimensional cardboard characters).

Any attempt to attribute a reasoned, deliberative clarity to Smikrines is hard to justify from the text. His thinking is clouded by his flaws, which snatch at appearances and drive him to securing his daughter's dowry before it is squandered, and before investigating the situation in full. As has been pointed out, although Chairestratos praises Smikrines' reasoning, this praise is full of irony. Onesimos' assessment of Smikrines' calculation (λογιστικοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς, 1081) points in the same direction.²⁴⁴ Again, Onesimos' insult to Smikrines (1114) on account of the latter's attempt to snatch away daughter and dowry, and his comment on Smikrines' failure to guard his daughter properly (1115-1116), suggest that Smikrines' reasoning is limited to certain types of action that are consistent with the flaw of stinginess or illiberality, though he also betrays a streak of stubbornness that disinclines him to rethink his position. But his stinginess is confirmed by the expression κίναδος (165), used by Chairestratos to assess Smikrines' potential involvement in Charisios' and

²⁴³ MacCary (1971), p. 306-308.

²⁴⁴ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 377.

Pamphile's life. In this case, Chairestratos warns the audience that Smikrines' reasoning is not limited to petty calculations, but may include cunning planning.²⁴⁵

Another aspect of Smikrines' nature is revealed, perhaps, by Pamphile's use of the word δεσπότης when addressing her father in Act IV ('but if you rescue me by force, not words, you won't deserve the name of the father, but of tyrant' (or 'master'), 713-714).²⁴⁶ Relations between father and daughter, she implies, are distinct from those between master and slave, and to confound the categories as he seems to do with his imperious behaviour is precisely a sign of illiberality. Smikrines' unwillingness simply to force his daughter to leave Charisios suggests a redeeming aspect to his character – he is not in fact a mere 'tyrant,' however irritable he may seem. We may compare the situation in Plautus' comedy, *Stichus*, where once again two sisters are in conflict with their father, who wants them to end their marriage with their husbands, who had been profligate with their resources. The husbands in this case have been away for three years, in an effort to recoup their losses by means of a merchant venture. The daughters wish to stay with their husbands, which puts them in conflict with their father's wishes. It is interesting to note that they plead duty (*officium*), claiming that it is their obligation to their father that requires that they stay in their marriages, since it was he who gave them to their husbands

²⁴⁵ On κίναδος see Dunbar (1997), p. 299, citing Aristophanes, *Clouds* 448, Sophocles, *Ajax* 103 and Furley (2009), p. 134.

²⁴⁶ 'Tyrant' is Furley's rendering (2009), p. 110. He also states, pp. 212-213, that Pamphile's words 'reflect on the kind of relationship which she wishes to have with her father. Put colloquially, she does not want him to boss her around'. Furley also cites Wehrli's views on the "humanized" father-figure in Menander' that is in agreement with 'the Peripatetic ideal of the benevolent paternalism of a free society which does not force citizens to comply'. Such a model of the father bears a degree of resemblance to Demeas in *Samia* but less so to Smikrines in *Epitrepontes* who is rather more like a 'tyrant father' (at 213).

in the first place; thus, they are in reality obeying rather than defying him (141-142).²⁴⁷

It remains to consider Theophrastus' description of the *aneleutheros* and the *mikrologos*, and to what degree the descriptions of these traits in action help to illuminate Smikrines' character.²⁴⁸ The Theophrastean text seems not to provide a direct link to Smikrines' character as presented by Menander, because the examples Theophrastus presents to illustrate the behaviour of the *aneleutheros* and the *mikrologos*, in other words how their *aneleutheria* and *mikrologia* find expression in specific circumstances in both their private and public life, are not identical with the situations in which Smikrines reveals his own *aneleutheria* in the plot of the play. However, Theophrastus' sketches provide a framework in which a character like Smikrines can be identified as *aneleutheros* and *mikrologos*. For, both the Theophrastean *aneleutheros/mikrologos* and Smikrines are preoccupied with petty calculations which concern money, in our case the daughter's dowry.

To appreciate Theophrastus' contribution to interpreting Smikrines in particular, and Menandrian characters in general, it is useful to examine the *Characters* in relation to Plato's and Aristotle's analyses of character. In the case of the *aneleutheros* and *mikrologos*, clearly the analysis of *aneleutheria* in Plato or Aristotle differs from Theophrastus' description of the illiberal man and penny-pincher.²⁴⁹ In the former each of the elements of this character is subject to

²⁴⁷ Scafuro (1997), pp. 313-319, argues that scenes involving a father persuading his daughter to leave her husband, like that of Smikrines and Pamphile, or the reverse, are a *topos* in drama, in the sense of 'a clearly defined subject of debate which has well-known supporting or opposing arguments' (p. 315). Apart from *Epitrepontes* Scafuro draws evidence from Isaeus (2.9), the Didot rhesis (*com. adesp.* 1000), and Plautus' *Stichus*. On the similarities between *Stichus* and *Epitrepontes*, see also Traill (2008), pp. 214 and 218-220.

²⁴⁸ Diggle (2004), *mikrologos*: pp. 96-97 and 301-313, *aneleutheros*: pp. 126-127 and 419-430.

²⁴⁹ *Characters* XXII and X respectively.

systematic analysis, and an account is given of how these elements are related to each other and how they are synergized so as to result in a predictable type of behaviour — a behaviour that stems from a habituated nexus/web of interrelated psychological faculties.

As already stated, in his *Rhetoric* Aristotle explains that even a systematic understanding of the internal complexities of character, how a *pathos* has been moulded, is not enough to explain the actual expression of a *pathos*. We must also take into consideration the occasions, the circumstances, the disposition of the person who is being affected and the type of person who is the subject of the *pathos*. These occasions are not causes, but they are the environment, so to speak, within which a certain cause may or may not be conducive to arousing a certain *pathos*. We thus see that Aristotle's *Ethics* and Plato's writings on traits of character offer deep analyses of causes, while Theophrastus' sketches take causes for granted and instead examine the expression in action of these causes under variable conditions. Though Theophrastus takes universal traits as a premise, he is interested in the particular occasions on which a given trait of character is expressed.²⁵⁰ For Aristotle, examining the variable occasions (both in private and public life) is essential, for these must be grasped in order to predict whether the causes will actually be realized as behaviours. For the orator, the dramatist, or anyone dealing with the actual circumstances of life, in which traits of character are expressed, should have a grasp of the range of circumstances in which these traits are likely to be expressed and how they tend to be expressed.

Unfortunately, the definition which precedes Theophrastus' sketch of *aneleutheria* is fragmentary and interpolated. Hence the restoration of the

²⁵⁰ Diggle (2004), p. 7.

missing fragment associating *aneleutheria* with *philotimia* is hypothetical.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, certain actions performed by the *aneleutheros* show that this person is not concerned about his *honour* as much as he is concerned about his money. For example, when the *aneleutheros* as *chorēgos* is awarded the prize for the best tragic chorus, his votive to Dionysos (a strip of wood on which he prints his name) is worthless in terms of monetary value, unsuitable for a god, and disproportionate to the honour he received from the *polis*. His *aneleutheria* holds him back from acting honourably. Similarly, such a person avoids voluntarily contributing to the state at a time of special need.²⁵² Dominated by his flaw, the *aneleutheros* slips away from the meeting of the Assembly where the donation is about to take place. The same indifference is demonstrated by his decision not to send his children to school during the festival of the Muses, using as an excuse for their absence that they are unwell.²⁵³ Apart from dishonourable actions in his public life, the *aneleutheros* is distinguished by degrading actions concerning himself and his family. For example, he wears shoes even though their soles have been often repaired, claiming that they are ‘as strong as horn’.²⁵⁴ He refuses to buy a maid for his wife although she has brought him a dowry, and instead hires a girl to accompany her whenever she needs to go out. His meanness does not spare even his friends. If rumours have reached him concerning a friend who is in financial need and is raising subscriptions among his friends, the *aneleutheros* changes his route when he sees from afar the needy friend approaching, thus revealing in addition his cowardliness and dishonesty.²⁵⁵ The Theophrastean *aneleutheros*, though aware of his responsibilities as a citizen, husband and friend, is dominated by his flaw,

²⁵¹ Diggle (2004), pp. 12, 17, 126-127, 420 and Rusten et al. (1993), pp. 126-127.

²⁵² Diggle (2004), p. 422.

²⁵³ Diggle (2004), p. 425.

²⁵⁴ Diggle (2004), p. 129; cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1121a27-30. Menander uses the word *mikrologos* in his *Deisidaimōn*, fr. 106 K-A, to describe a person of a similar behaviour.

²⁵⁵ Diggle (2004), p. 426.

bringing his inner self into a state of *douleia*, directing his reasoning to petty affairs unworthy of a respectable free citizen.

According to the definition preceding Theophrastus' description of the *mikrologos*, *mikrologia* is 'a sparing of expense beyond reasonable limits'. The *mikrologos* is described as petty and mean, mainly in his private life. His pettiness is such that he even prohibits a person from picking up a fallen olive in his orchard, or from walking through his land. He prohibits his wife from lending spices or insignificant household items to people, maintaining that although the items are small they 'add up to a tidy sum in the course of a year'.²⁵⁶ When he entertains guests he counts the cups of wine which each of the guests has consumed. Once more, the *mikrologos*, similarly to the *aneleutheros*, appears to calculate everything (λογίζεταί, 4).²⁵⁷

In sum, in order to know how a certain trait comes into being one has to refer to Plato and Aristotle, but to grasp the variety of its expressions under variable circumstances, Theophrastus' sketches are useful, though his tendency to see people exclusively in terms of one characteristic, along with his penchant for comical caricature, means that Menander is often more subtle than Theophrastus, and nowhere more so, perhaps, than in his sketch of Smikrines' temperament – a mixture of stinginess, a sense of honour, and a genuine concern for his daughter that soften the edges of the stereotype and make him, in the end, a sympathetic figure, the beneficiary of Menander's profound humanism.

²⁵⁶ Diggle (2004), p. 97.

²⁵⁷ For this interpretation, based on the transitive syntax of the verb λογίζεταί, see Diggle (2004), pp. 304-305.

Pamphile

Pamphile is one of Menander's brilliant female creations, a woman who, like Glykera in the *Perikeiromene*²⁵⁸ or Chrysis in the *Samia*, succeeds in making a profound impression on the spectator or reader in the few words that are allotted to her. Pamphile stands out for her loyalty to her husband, which is based on a sympathetic understanding of his character and motive in abandoning her, once he learned that she had conceived a child prior to their marriage.²⁵⁹ Her major appearance in the play is in dialogue with her father, Smikrines, who, as we have seen, is determined to dissolve her marriage to Charisios on the grounds that Charisios has left her and is in the process of squandering his resources, including the dowry, on riotous living and prostitutes. The speech reveals crucial aspects of her character, but it is sadly damaged. The publication of new fragments of her *rhēsis* has added important new information, but there remains a deep division of opinion among scholars concerning just how to restore the text and, as a consequence, how Pamphile is represented. Furley, on the one hand in his 2009 edition and in his papers, published in 2013 and 2014,²⁶⁰ in which he takes account of

²⁵⁸ Traill (2008), p. 206, points out that Pamphile's speech in Act IV is reminiscent of Glykera's speech in *Perikeiromene* in language and values. For women in Menander's plays and Glykera's character in particular, see also Furley (2015), pp. 1-8.

²⁵⁹ Traill (2008), p. 213 suggests an alternative interpretation of Pamphile's behavior towards Charisios, as evidenced by her speech: 'For the audience, her words carry a double meaning. Behind the protestation of loyalty lies a truth that would partly exonerate Charisios. ... We may also detect a hint of self-interest, or at least wishful thinking, behind her forgiving persona'. Lape (2004), p. 251, offers a more conventional and to my mind convincing approach to Pamphile's character, in contrast to that of Charisios, treating Pamphile's understanding and forgiveness of Charisios' behaviour as 'a common "Greek", or at any rate nonbarbarian, structure of feeling and code of conduct'; thus, in her view, 'the play allows Pamphile to emerge as a moral exemplar for her errant husband in a way that seems not to contest prevailing gender categories'.

²⁶⁰ Furley (2009), esp. pp. 64-66, 109-111 and 218-222 and Furley (2013) and (2014).

Römer's restorations²⁶¹ and of Casanova's interpretation²⁶², sees in Pamphile's speech a rhetorical sophistication and subtlety that may seem exceptional in a newly married young woman, until we recall that she had the wits and grit to expose her child and has also had time to reflect on her situation and how she might best handle her grumpy father. Casanova, on the other hand, has filled in the blanks in such a way as to emphasize Pamphile's humility vis-à-vis her father, and her intention to express herself in the simplest and most straightforward language.²⁶³ Casanova's interpretation is not necessarily incompatible with a certain rhetorical *savoir-faire* on Pamphile's part: protesting one's inability at clever speaking is itself a rhetorical topos, after all, designed to win the favour of one's audience.²⁶⁴ But the elements most relevant to the present analysis concern her references to such ethically charged categories as justice, misfortune, and chance, as well as her understanding of the emotional reactions of both her husband and her father.

Casanova's discussion of Pamphile's speech proffers an explicitly Aristotelian analysis, in the footsteps of, and in homage to, his teacher Adelmo Barigazzi.²⁶⁵ He notes especially the way in which Pamphile contrasts *atukhēmata*, that is, the consequences of behaviour that is not voluntary or intended and whose cause lies outside the agent, with *adikēmata* which are voluntary wrongs for which the agent is held responsible (*aitios*). Between these two categories, according to Aristotle, are *hamartēmata*, those errors or

²⁶¹ Römer (2012a). On the new Pamphile fragments see also Austin (2008), Ireland (2010), pp. 176-183 and 244-246 and Blanchard (2013).

²⁶² Casanova (2014a and b).

²⁶³ Casanova (2014c), pp. 143-144.

²⁶⁴ Traill (2008), p. 205 also stresses that Pamphile's rhetorical ability, 'fulfills many of the functions of a deliberation speech' and sees Pamphile as 'a skilled speaker in a dilemma: admitting to her out-of-wedlock pregnancy would partly excuse Charisios, but it would also confirm Smikrines' belief that the marriage was a failure; not admitting to it, however, leaves her with no defense of Charisios' (p. 221); cf. Scafuro (1997), p. 315, cited by Traill (2008), p. 216, n. 70.

²⁶⁵ See especially Barigazzi (1965).

mistakes that are not strictly intended but for which nevertheless the agent bears some responsibility.²⁶⁶ There appears to be a conscious strategy on Pamphile's part to exonerate her husband's behaviour in terms familiar from contemporary ethical discourse, no doubt reflected in Aristotle's rigorous analysis of Greek ethical terminology.²⁶⁷ As Casanova observes 'la parola τύχη e i suoi composti (ἀτυχία, εὐτυχία, συνευτυχία) e i suoi sinonimi si susseguono continuamente nel brano.'²⁶⁸ There is also a self-conscious juxtaposition of terms for chance misfortune and wrongdoing that, as Casanova points out, is practically an oxymoron (807).²⁶⁹

In addition to the quasi-technical deployment of the Greek ethical lexicon, there is also an affective dimension to Pamphile's response, in relation to both her husband and her father.²⁷⁰ Casanova has called attention to the use of *eunoia* in the passage, and he observes with due precision: 'εὐνοια non è "voler bene": non *eunoia* è *philia*. *Eunoia* è un termine menandro che, come ha illustrato Barigazzi, riporta decisamente ad Aristotele, che nel *Etica Nicomachea* la distingue nettamente dall'amore, dall'amicizia e dall'affetto, e ne fa un preciso valore etico.... È la base per una corretta e solidale convivenza civile: è correttezza, benevolenza, buona volontà nei rapporti interpersonali'.²⁷¹ Aristotle's treatment of *eunoia* is in fact somewhat more complex. In his initial definition of *philia* as a mutual affection between two friends, Aristotle remarks: 'they say that one must wish good things for a

²⁶⁶ Casanova (2014c), p. 146.

²⁶⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1135a20-b25.

²⁶⁸ Casanova (2014b), p. 21.

²⁶⁹ Casanova (2014c), p. 145.

²⁷⁰ Regarding the restoration of v. 804, where Pamphile uses εὐνοια to define her regard for her father, Furley (2013), p. 88 observes (rightly, I believe): 'Pamphile means, I suggest, that she feels obliged by "goodwill" (filial respect) not to answer her father's fighting language with equally acrimonious words'.

²⁷¹ With reference to Aristotle, *NE* 8.2 and 9.5, Casanova (2014b), pp. 20-21; to be sure, the use of *eunoia* is earlier than Aristotle, but Aristotle gave it a special sense that seems to be reflected in Menander.

friend for his sake. They call those who wish good things in this way ‘well-disposed [*eunous*], if the same [wish] does not occur on the other person’s part as well. For [they say] that goodwill in people who experience it mutually [*en antipeponthosi*] is *philia*’.²⁷² Aristotle stipulates further that each partner to the relation must be aware that the other feels the same way. *Eunoia* here, then, is as it were half of *philia*, the affection that, when it is reciprocated, constitutes a relationship as true friendship. It is distinct, as Aristotle notes, from what he calls *philēsis*, that is, the kind of fondness we feel for wine or other inanimate things which is by definition unidirectional, and which is distinct from true love, as Aristotle understands it, in that it bears no altruistic desire for the benefit of the other, which for Aristotle is constitutive of *philia*; as Aristotle observes, we wish that the wine not go sour not for its sake but our own. Nevertheless, when Aristotle returns to a more detailed account of *eunoia* in the *Nicomachean Ethics* ²⁷³, he distinguishes it both from *philia* and *philēsis*, and describes it as a rather cold or dispassionate kind of affection,²⁷⁴ specifying that it does not even have the ‘tension and longing’ that are characteristic of *philēsis*. Goodwill, Aristotle goes on to say, may arise quite suddenly, and does not require the gestation period by which such a kindly disposition may mature into genuine affection, as good will may. *Eunoia* is, then, the starting point or source (*arkhē*) of *philia*, in the same way that beauty inspires erotic attraction: merely to take pleasure in the good looks of someone does not amount to *erōs*, which, when it develops, is marked by a passionate longing for the presence of the beloved.²⁷⁵ It is true, Aristotle affirms, that people who feel goodwill toward another person wish good things for her or him – in this respect it is analogous to *philia* – but they are not inclined to take the trouble

²⁷² Konstan (2006), pp. 172-173 with reference to *NE*1155b27-34; cf. p. 209.

²⁷³ Aristotle, *NE* 1166b30-1167a21.

²⁷⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *EE* 1241a3-14.

²⁷⁵ For the association between beauty and erotic attraction, which Aristotle notes, see Konstan (2014), pp. 62-72; on Aristotle’s treatment of *eunoia*, see also above, p. 63.

to provide them, as friendship requires. Aristotle thus characterizes goodwill as a kind of 'lazy' love, though it can develop into *philia* proper given time and familiarity (*sunētheia*).

Casanova remarks that 'Al inizio, nei vv. 804-5, Panfile ha detto chiaramente che conta sulla eunoia del padre,' and adds that, toward the end of her speech, she will once again affirm her *eunoia* toward her husband is the instrument that will win him over. Casanova says: 'Non parla di amore, né de affetto, né de amicizia (né ἔρως, né φιλία, né φιλησις). Non dice "ma io lo amo"; non dice "restiamo amici": conta sulla *eunoia* per continuare, una benevolenza intesa come disponibilità alla collaborazione che non implica contraccambio e non presuppone nemmeno la conoscenza, come spiega ripetutamente Aristotele (E.N. 1155b33 ss.; cf. 1166b30 ss.).'²⁷⁶ All this is to paint too cold a picture of Pamphile's disposition, converting love into a kind of duty comparable to the *officium* that the sisters in Plautus' *Stichus* allege as the reason for sticking with their husbands, despite their father's protestations.²⁷⁷ Furley too shares this rather calculating sense of her conduct, leading him to conclude that, at 824-825, 'Pamphile seems to be saying that she does not object in principle to a second marriage.'²⁷⁸ Now, no one familiar with the conventions of New Comedy would expect Pamphile or any other citizen woman to express *erōs* for her husband; only *hetairai* are cast as subjects of erotic passion in this genre.²⁷⁹ An expression of *philōsis* is equally out of the question: it is evidently a term coined by Aristotle for a particular purpose, and does not occur anywhere in classical comedy or tragedy (or in literature of any sort, it appears). She might have used a form of the verb *philein*, to be sure, which is the normal term for affection between husband

²⁷⁶ Casanova (2014b), p. 21.

²⁷⁷ See Traill (2008), pp. 214 and 218-220.

²⁷⁸ Furley (2009), p. 211.

²⁷⁹ See Konstan (1994), p. 224.

and wife (although she would not have described him as her *philos*).²⁸⁰ But this is unlikely to have carried much weight with her father, who is concerned with the practical consequences of Charisios' behavior and not with Pamphile's sentimental attachment to him.²⁸¹ The case she is making is that she will win back her husband's affection by exhibiting her love for him – that one-way goodwill that is the half of mutual *philia* and its *arkhē*, that is, starting point or principle. She will be obliging, helpful, no doubt wears a cheerful expression and do all she can to please her husband as a way of gaining his affection in turn, and restoring the *philia* that is proper to a married couple.

Charisios

Charisios is a more complicated character than Smikrines. In analysing his character traits, I begin with his emotional response once he is informed, off-stage, by Onesimos that Pamphile gave birth to a child, which was subsequently exposed. Possessed by *orgē*, Charisios abandons his wife without asking her for details. It is not clear in the fragmentary text on what grounds Charisios reached this decision.²⁸² According to Athenian law, a husband could dismiss his wife simply by sending her away, to her family, thus terminating the marriage. The only obligation on his part was to return the woman along with the dowry she brought to her original *kurios*, or his heir.²⁸³ However, in the event that an Athenian wife was raped, as in the case of Pamphile, there is

²⁸⁰ See Konstan (1997), pp. 70-72.

²⁸¹ See Brown (1993), p. 200 for *philia* as the prevailing feeling rather than *erôs* in 'arranged' marriages in New Comedy. According to Brown, p. 201, while Charisios is presented as a young husband in love with his wife, in the case of Pamphile's character, the stress is on her 'wifely devotion' to Charisios; cf. Ireland (2010), p. 246.

²⁸² Konstan (1994), esp. pp. 224-226 and Konstan (1995), p. 148 supports the view that Charisios abandoned Pamphile mainly due to the *nothos* child.

²⁸³ On divorce procedures and legal obligations on the part of the husband, see Harrison (1968), pp. 40-43.

no evidence to suggest that she would suffer any legal or social sanction, or that her husband was legally obliged to put her aside.²⁸⁴

Charisios, therefore, could divorce Pamphile by simply sending her to Smikrines with her dowry intact.²⁸⁵ The question arises as to why Charisios avoided such an action: was it because of his inability to return the dowry intact to Smikrines, or because of his love and respect for his wife? The first hypothesis, though maybe implied by Smikrines' expressed anxiety for the possible squandering of the dowry by Charisios, is not supported by evidence in the surviving text. Moreover, the text makes no mention of Charisios' own property and financial situation, although one assumes he must have enjoyed a similar social and financial status to that of his father-in-law. Concerning the second hypothesis, one might conclude that, far from showing love and respect, Charisios' action to abandon his wife and move to his friend Chairestratos' house, and in addition hire a *hetaira*, show that his primary intention was to humiliate and avenge himself on Pamphile. Our text provides no clear evidence, but the audience would likely have inferred Charisios' feelings for Pamphile. In Menandrian comedy, young men, especially those who are protagonists of the plays, marry principally out of love – *erōs* in the first instance, but a passion that gradually evolves into the more stable sentiment of *philia*. Even if this was not made clearer in portions of the play now lost, it is reasonable to assume that Menander could count on spectators' familiarity with the norms of the genre to come to an appropriate understanding. Love, then, might well have been the implicit reason why

²⁸⁴ Carey (1995), p. 414 and Ogden (1996), p. 143. Though in practice (as distinct from law) it may be that people in such circumstances would regard the act as shaming and respond accordingly. This would be all the more true if the rape occurred prior to the marriage, as happens in this play.

²⁸⁵ For the procedures of dissolution of marriages in Athens and what happens to the dowry after the dissolution, see Harrison (1968), pp. 40-44 and 55-60.

Charisios is reluctant to terminate his marriage at this point. It is also possible that Charisios abandoned his wife out of distaste after she had a sexual relation with another man, and which has caused her to be, or seem, polluted,²⁸⁶ or because he was embittered by her choice not to reveal her true condition to him, or due to his jealousy and insecurity in the face of a possible male rival, at least in the past, or simply because of the child, that is, the fact that his wife is the mother of a child of dubious origin:²⁸⁷ most probably, his reaction is due to a combination of all these factors.

Nor is it clear whether Charisios' *orgē* on hearing the news about the child and its exposure, as described by Onesimos (422-425), is directed towards himself, or his wife, or towards Onesimos who revealed the misfortune, or indeed towards all three.²⁸⁸ But Onesimos certainly perceives a threat to himself, just as Parmenon does in the *Samia* when he runs away in fear that Demeas in his fury will brand him, and is later struck in the mouth by Moschion when he hesitates to carry out a shocking order (320-324 and 675-680); as far as Onesimos is concerned, at least, Charisios is angry. What is clear, in any case, is that Charisios acts hastily. Rather than seriously deliberating he is led by his *pathē* and *epithymia*.²⁸⁹ It is this aspect of his character that ignites the plot. In Act IV

²⁸⁶ See Ogden (1996), p. 143-146, contra Konstan (1995), p. 148.

²⁸⁷ Konstan (1994), p. 228 discusses the cultural attitudes of men regarding the sexual experience of unmarried girls in Classical Athens: 'male anger over adultery or the violation of a virgin girl seems to have been based as much on a sense of personal or proprietary injury as on feelings of jealousy and insecurity'. According to Konstan, pp. 223-224, Charisios abandoned Pamphile mainly because she had given birth to a *nothos*; cf. Lape (2004), pp. 246-247. Rosivach (1998), p. 31 supports that view that Charisios rejected his wife out of concern for his own reputation 'which would be damaged ... by remaining married to a wife who had given birth to another man's bastard'. For the reasons, why Charisios may have felt guilty, see also Arnott (1968), p. 16.

²⁸⁸ Konstan (1995), p. 149, convincingly argues that Charisios does not seem to blame anyone, though Onesimos appears to be constantly terrified by the thought that he may become the object of Charisios' rage for having revealed the news of Pamphile's *nothos*.

²⁸⁹ For Aristotle acting hastily constitutes *propeteia* which is a form of *akrasia*, see Aristotle, *NE* 1150b19-28. Derivatives of the term *propeteia* are used more than once in *Epitrepontes* to describe

Charisios overhears the discussion between Smikrines and Pamphile, in which Smikrines strongly advises her to leave her husband, a suggestion rejected by Pamphile who, though she has been informed about Charisios' own *nothos*, refuses to abandon him. At this stage Charisios is possessed once more by extreme passion, a combination of shame and bitter self-reproach (878-907) reflected in Onesimos' choice of words to describe his master's state (ὑπομαίνεσθαι, μαίνεται, μεμάνητ' ἀληθῶς, μαίνεται, χολή μέλαινα προσπέπτωκεν, ἥλλατε χρώματα, βουχηθμός, τιλμός, ἔκστασις,).

Charisios' passion is aroused by his self-critical response to his own actions, and rests on his high opinion of himself. He momentarily adopts the common rhetorical strategy of shifting the blame to an external factor (the *daimonion* that punishes him, 912). We may compare Agamemnon's reference to *atē* in the *Iliad* as the source of his behaviour toward Achilles.²⁹⁰ But a comparison of Pamphile's reaction, which exhibits loyalty and understanding, with his own response to her situation in abandoning his wife, leads Charisios to express a genuine remorse (908-932)²⁹¹, once he recognizes that he behaved in an unforgiving and uncivilized way (ἀλιτήριος, 894; οὐδ' ἔδωκα συγγνώμης μέρος / οὐθὲν ἀτυχούση ταῦτ' ἐκείνη, βάρβαρος ἀνηλεῆς τε, 897-899, σκαιὸς ἀγνώμων τ' ἀνήρ, 918). While Pamphile treats Charisios *ēpiōs*,²⁹² that is, gently

actions or intended actions of characters; cf. *propetōs* (523) of Habrotonon and of Smikrines (1064), and Onesimos' characterization of Smikrines' action as *propetē* (1111).

²⁹⁰ See Konstan (2010), pp. 61-63.

²⁹¹ For Charisios' monologue, see Furley's (2009) convincing remarks, pp. 20-21, 233-234 and especially his observation that 'the central figure of the play, Charisios himself, is characterized as someone who has received the best sort of education in the philosophical schools, as Gaiser (1967) has well recognized. ... I think we feel genuine sympathy with Charisios' despair in this scene, but we should not ignore Menander's characterization. He has brought Charisios to this low point in order to ridicule him'(21). For Charisios' feelings towards himself, Pamphile and Onesimos, see Ireland (2010), p. 113. Fantham (1975), p. 68 states that Charisios seems to think of his supposedly *nothos* child by Habrotonon as a 'divine retribution' for having treated his wife as he did because she had given birth to a *nothos*.

²⁹² On *ēpiōs* see Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 364. In Homer, the word *ēpiōs* expresses degrees of care, kindness, and friendly disposition, a behaviour which is opposite to anger; for few examples see *Iliad* 8.40, 16.72-3, *Odyssey* 2.46-7 and 229-234.

and fairly (916-917), he had shown inappropriate disrespect for her, which dishonours her. Though Pamphile grants him more than what she has received from him, not only was Charisios unable to reciprocate, but he defamed her into the bargain. Perhaps the names Menander gives to these two characters are not accidental. For Charisios is shown to be lacking *charis*, in the sense of benevolent giving for the good of another human being and also in the sense of gratitude, while Pamphile has treated him with *philia* and *epieikeia*.²⁹³

Charisios' *orgē*, therefore, is initiated more by his feeling of belittlement than by self-examination, for his main concern is with his supposed *nothos* with Habrotonon and not the action itself that produced the *nothos*, namely the rape. He even compares (in the voice of his *daimonion*)²⁹⁴ Pamphile's misfortune with his own 'similar' situation (914-915).²⁹⁵ The use of the word *akousion atuchēma* in this case seems to fit Charisios' confused and self-centred or haughty character, in the sense that even at this moment of remorse and self-examination, he is incapable of realising the difference between the victim and the agent of the rape.²⁹⁶ By characterising his action as 'similar' to an *akousion atuchēma* Charisios dismisses his own responsibility for the rape, namely, that it was a result of his own *prohairesis*, even under the influence of drunkenness

²⁹³ See Romilly (2007), p. 208.

²⁹⁴ On Charisios' use of *daimonion*, its echo of Socrates and its association with the pardon for which Charisios pleads, see Furley (2009), pp. 21, 233 and 235.

²⁹⁵ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 364.

²⁹⁶ Blanchard (1983), p. 333-334, cited by Konstan (1995), p. 145, suggests that Menander through Charisios expresses a feminist attitude in which a woman's fault must be judged in the same way as the man's; although this type of feminism is 'strange' since Charisios' fault was not similar to Pamphile's. See also Wilamowitz (1925), cited by Konstan (1995), p. 146, who expresses a contrary view. Konstan supports the view that Menander was aware of the difference between *atuchēma* and *adikēma*, as fr. 688 K-A suggests: 'ἀτύχημα καὶ δίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίνεται, τὸ δ' αἰρέσει; cf. fr. 321 K-A from *Ραπιζομένη*. Konstan takes Charisios to be referring here to the misfortune of having fathered a *nothos*, in which respect his situation does resemble that of Pamphile. Perhaps one may identify a confusion in Charisios, by which he is simultaneously reacting to the matter of the *nothos* and to the rape: this would allow him a more complex emotional response, and hence render him a richer character.

(as we are led to think by Onesimos' words concerning the loss of the ring, 406-407).

According to Aristotle, *atuchēma* is one of the three kinds of acts caused by ignorance: 'of people then who act by reason of ignorance he who regrets is thought an involuntary agent, and the man who does not regret may, since he is different, be called a not voluntary agent'. Moreover, Aristotle states that 'a man who is drunk or in a rage is thought to act as a result not out of ignorance ... yet not knowingly but in ignorance.'²⁹⁷ In so far as the scale or degree of wrong-doing is concerned Aristotle distinguishes *atuchēma*, when 'the injury takes place contrary to reasonable expectation', from *hamartēma*, when 'it is not contrary to reasonable expectation but does not imply vice', and *adikēma*, when one 'acts with knowledge but not after deliberation'.²⁹⁸ Though we need to bear in mind that this is Charisios (hardly a disinterested commentator) speaking and that there are parallels for using the language of bad luck to palliate bad judgement, in the light of Aristotle's fine distinctions Charisios' action would seem at first sight to be justifiably characterised as an *akousion atuchēma* caused not intentionally but under his drunkenness, which would make him an involuntary agent because of his expressed remorse for an action he caused in ignorance.

The question arises to what extent Charisios should be considered responsible for being unable to control the circumstances, in this case his drunkenness, under which he committed this action: in other words, whether he ought to have avoided drinking, knowing that this would affect his rational and civilized behaviour. Aristotle is clear on this when he discusses drunkenness among the various causes of crimes and their punishments by the lawgiver. A man is punished 'for his very ignorance if he is thought responsible for the

²⁹⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1110b18-1111a1, trans. Ross et al. (1998), pp. 50-51.

²⁹⁸ Aristotle, *NE* 1135b16-22, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 127.

ignorance, as when penalties are doubled in the case of drunkenness; for the moving principle is in the man himself, since he had the power of not getting drunk and his getting drunk was the cause of his ignorance'.²⁹⁹ In Aristotelian terms, therefore, Charisios' drunkenness is not moved by external forces or the given circumstances, but the *archē* of this action is in himself, for he is responsible for his ignorance by overestimating himself in terms of his ability to keep sober and therefore to control himself. In other words, Aristotle would attribute Charisios' drunkenness to his own *prohairesis* despite the fact that ignorance may be involved. Consequently, the rape that resulted from Charisios' drunkenness appears to be in fact a *hamartēma*, for Charisios himself is responsible for the ignorance, since the act of rape, though not intentional and therefore not implying vice, is within reasonable expectation under drunkenness.³⁰⁰ Would Menander's audience have reasoned this way? It is impossible to know, of course, but given that the effects of the rape are so vividly described, they may have reflected, if only half-consciously, that drunkenness is no excuse for such behaviour. Aristotle is a witness to the fact that the question was in the air at the time. It is possible, therefore, to argue also that Charisios' youth is a factor, which makes him prone to, and incontinent in respect to, *aphrodisia*³⁰¹ — he thus has a weak *prohairesis* which prevails in relation to his reason.³⁰² This leads him to excessive drink and consequently to committing the rape.³⁰³

²⁹⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1113b30-33, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 60. But it is worth noting that drunkenness was sometimes considered a basis for pardon among the Greek rhetoricians, e.g. Apsines (276.3–7), see Konstan (2010), p. 40.

³⁰⁰ See Konstan (2010), pp. 36-37 and 50-51

³⁰¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1389a1-7.

³⁰² See Aristotle, *NE* 1112a15-17, 1139a22-26, *EE* 1226b15-21.

³⁰³ As in *Samia* (Demeas' speech, vv. 335-342) youth was commonly adduced as an extenuating factor.

According to Aristotle,³⁰⁴ under the influence of a *pathos* the *akratēs* succumbs to desires, for he does not possess true knowledge (*epistēmē*) of the situation. Thus, he considers his own evaluation of a given situation to be the best, whereas in fact it may not be so, for his evaluation is based solely on his own opinion and is not confirmed by generally accepted views.³⁰⁵ The absence of *epistēmē* in the *akratēs* is evident when they express themselves. Aristotle compares the condition of *akratēs* with those who are ‘asleep, mad or drunk’, in the sense that the language and arguments they utter may *seem* to be reasonable and knowledgeable, yet they are not based on sound and complete knowledge. ‘The use of language by men in an incontinent state’, Aristotle says, ‘means no more than its utterance by actors on the stage’.³⁰⁶

Aristotle thus provides a key to interpreting Menander’s representation of Charisios. Charisios had believed himself to be flawless, incorruptible, blameless (ἀναμάρτητος, 908; ἀκέραιος³⁰⁷; ἀνεπίπληκτος αὐτὸς τῷ βίῳ, 910),

³⁰⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1145b19-20.

³⁰⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1145b22-1146a4, with special relevance for my argument at 1145b32-1146a4 ‘But there are some who go along with Socrates’ view in some respects but not in others: they agree that nothing is superior to knowledge, but they do not agree that no one acts contrary to what has seemed to him better, and because of this they say that the un-self-controlled person is overcome by pleasures not when he has knowledge of something but when it has merely seemed to him to be so. And yet if it is a matter of mere seeming and not knowledge, and the belief that is resisting is not a strong but only a light one, as with people in two minds about something ...’, trans. Broadie and Rowe (2002), p. 191. See also Stewart’s (1892), comments on pp. 128-129 on δόξα and ἐπιστήμη in *NE* VII. 3.4.

³⁰⁶ Aristotle, *NE* 1147a13-23; trans. Ross et al. (1998), pp. 165-166.

³⁰⁷ The word appears with the meaning of ‘uncontaminated, uncorrupted’ in Euripides’ *Orestes* in a strikingly similar linguistic environment (ἀκέραιος, ἀνεπίπληκτον ἠσκηκῶς βίον, 922). The adjective ἀκέραιος, like the rest of the terms in *Orestes*, is used to describe a farmer who, nevertheless, possesses these high and praiseworthy qualities in his character. In addition, he is characterized as intelligent and keen to use convincing arguments (ξυνετὸς δὲ, χωρεῖν ὁμόσε τοῖς λόγοις θέλων, 921) in front of the assembly discussing Orestes’ matricide action. The word ἀκέραιος appears also in Plato, *Republic* 409a-b, where he states that if a soul intends to judge other souls, in order for its judgment to be just it ‘must remain itself pure and have no experience of bad character while it’s young’, trans. Grube (1997), p. 1045. For the references from both Euripides and Plato, see Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 363, and Martina (2000), p. 910.

a person with judgment (καὶ τὸ καλὸν ὃ τι πότε' ἔστι καὶ ταισχροὺν σκοπῶν 909), concerned about his reputation (εἰς δόξαν βλέπων, 908), but now admits that he overestimated himself. His misfortune (in the words of his *daimonion*) has shown him that he is merely a human being (912). It seems that his high-mindedness, however, is more complex than it would appear and thus open to more interpretations.

This character trait is stressed in his monologue (908-932), and in particular by the use of the word 'haughty' (ὕψηλός), both when Charisios evaluates himself (922) and when Smikrines describes his son-in-law with some contempt (693).³⁰⁸ This is compatible with the attitude that many people would have towards the haughty, since such persons tend to be judgemental and show contempt for the very things that most people admire. Such people are also prone to anger when they are crossed. In this case, Smikrines wants to keep his money, while Charisios shows contempt for it with his extravagant behaviour. Charisios' hiring of Habrotonon is clearly another sign of contempt towards Pamphile. His refusal to have intercourse with Habrotonon may be yet another sign of haughty disdain, but it may also be a sign of his longing for his own wife, whom he has reluctantly abandoned and about whom he continues to feel conflicted. It seems that his hiring of Habrotonon has an ulterior purpose: she is a means for calculated revenge which includes a display of contempt towards his wife. At the same time, it perhaps indicates that he is still loyal to his wife, and suffering over the loss of her; we may compare Polemon's similar attitude toward Glykera in the *Perikeiromene*. Once again, Menander suggests the complex nature of human behaviour in difficult circumstances, in which a single act is susceptible to multiple interpretations -- and multiple motivations.

³⁰⁸ On Charisios' use of *hupsēlos*, see also Furley (2009), p. 21.

Charisios' view of himself as *hupsēlos* bears some resemblance to the *megalopsuchos*, and also to the *alazōn*.³⁰⁹ An important aspect of the *megalopsuchos* is that he is big-hearted and always ready to give more than he receives. According to Aristotle, being on the receiving end suggests inferiority, and so the *megalopsuchos* feels ashamed when he receives benefits.³¹⁰ However, as Aristotle points out in his description of *megalopsuchia*, sometimes good fortune, such as being born into wealth, will make one believe or act in ways that resemble this moral quality without one's really possessing it.³¹¹ Therefore, Charisios' perception of himself as *hupsēlos* and his actual possession of the quality of *megalopsuchia* are two different things.³¹² The *megalopsuchos* will do nothing to dishonour himself, yet Charisios has raped a young woman in a state of drunkenness — a shameful act. This is an event that Charisios seems to suppress, for he does not divulge this act even to his friend Chairestratos, and there is no evidence that he spoke about it to anyone.³¹³ Should it come into the open it would clash with the self-image he has of himself, something which he finally had to face when he supposedly fathered a *nothos* by Habrotonon

³⁰⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1123b 1-3: 'δοκεῖ δὴ μεγαλόψυχος εἶναι ὁ μέγαν ἀξίων ἄξιος ὢν', and 1123b21-22: 'περὶ τιμᾶς δὴ καὶ ἀτιμίας ὁ μεγαλόψυχος ἐστίν', 'now the man is thought to be proud who thinks himself worthy of great things, being worthy of them', trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 89.

³¹⁰ Aristotle, *NE* 1124b9-11 'καὶ οἷος εὖ ποιεῖν, εὐεργετούμενος δ' αἰσχύνεται' τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερέχοντος, τὸ δ' ὑπερεχομένου. καὶ ἀντεεργετικὸς πλειόνων', 'And he is the sort of man to confer benefits, but he is ashamed of receiving them; for the one is the mark of a superior, the other of an inferior. And he is apt to confer greater benefits in return', trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 92.

³¹¹ Aristotle, *NE* 4.3.

³¹² Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1124a30-b3: 'ἄνευ γὰρ ἀρετῆς οὐ ῥάδιον φέρειν ἐμμελῶς τὰ εὐτυχήματα· οὐ δυνάμενοι δὲ φέρειν καὶ οἰόμενοι τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν ἐκείνων μὲν καταφρονοῦσιν, αὐτοὶ δ' ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι πράττουσιν. μιμοῦνται γὰρ τὸν μεγαλόψυχον οὐχ ὅμοιοι ὄντες ...', 'For without virtue it is not easy to bear gracefully the goods of fortune; and, being unable to bear them, and thinking themselves superior to others, they despise others and themselves do what they please. They imitate the proud man without being like him', trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 92.

³¹³ Pierce (1997), p. 165, has argued that the reason Charisios does not mention anything about his own action concerning the rape is that he made no mental connection between his action and his abandoning Pamphile.

(contrast Moschion's attitude toward what he has done in the prologue to *Samia*).

Thus, Charisios' contempt (*kataphronēsis*), an important characteristic of the true *megalopsuchos*,³¹⁴ has a different significance, for it is now shown to have been not high-minded, but mean and small spirited. Charisios never possessed the quality that he thought made him *hupsēlos*. He never gave his wife a chance to explain, to sort things out. He showed himself incapable of adopting an attitude of *syngnōmē*, which requires that one has the internal resources to examine with *epieikeia* the particulars of a complex situation in which blame is being apportioned. The word *agnōmōn*,³¹⁵ which Charisios uses to describe himself (918), confirms this interpretation.

Nevertheless, Charisios is aware that he did not express *syngnōmē* to Pamphile when he ought to have done so (897). Forgiving, as already said involves a special type of judgment. What is unusual in this passage is that Charisios seems suddenly to have matured, as a result of his painful separation from his wife and his awareness of her profound loyalty to him: for whatever the assumptions about character in Aristotle and Theophrastus, Menander's figures do learn from their mistakes, and acquire a deeper self-knowledge over the course of the comedy.

It may be suggested that the word *agnōmōn* in Charisios' monologue is used once more by Menander with the meaning of *acharistos* (unkind, ungrateful),³¹⁶

³¹⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1124b1-6 and esp. 1124b5-6: 'ὁ μὲν μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ ἀληθῶς), οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως', 'For the proud man despises justly (since he thinks truly), but the many so at random', trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 92.

³¹⁵ Cf. Menander, fr. 641 K-A: "Ἕλληνες εἰσιν ἄνδρες οὐκ ἀγνώμονες καὶ μετὰ λογισμοῦ πάντα πράττουσίν τινας."

³¹⁶ *LSJ*, s.v.: 'ill-judging, headstrong, arrogant, unkind'. The word *agnōmōn* is associated with *acharistos* in Xenophon, *Cyropaideia* (8.3.49-50) in the context of *charis* and *anticharis*.

an interpretation supported by the context of the monologue and especially by the words *hupsēlos* and *suggnomē* used by Charisios to describe himself and his behaviour towards Pamphile. It is not surprising that Charisios' second excessive outburst of remorse occurs when he realizes that Pamphile has treated him *ēpiōs*, despite the fact that he did not treat her that way when she was in need of his support and understanding. According to Aristotle *megalopsuchia* reflects superiority, a view that tallies with Charisios' own self-image as *hupsēlos*. Charisios' outburst of *orgē* is excessive precisely because he feels ashamed and inferior to Pamphile, for she has offered him *charis* in his time of need, without his asking for it (as reflected in Charisios' report of overhearing her words to Smikrines: κοινῶνδὸς ἤκειν τοῦ βίου, 920). Her supportive stance toward Charisios may suggest a selfless offer which has sprung from the friendship or love (as suggested by her name) she has shared with her husband (as Charisios' monologue suggests, 920-922). In any case, her behaviour punctures Charisios' hollow self-regard and exposes a certain youthful insecurity in him that we can well imagine triggered an unreflective rage. Pamphile's *charis* for Charisios may help us to understand Charisios' *acharistia*, when viewed from the perspective of Aristotle's discussion of *charis* and gratitude.

Aristotle uses the word *acharistos*, as said above,³¹⁷ when he discusses the conditions under which a *charis* or favour is not genuine, but is offered out of calculation on the benefactor's side. Thus, a person is considered *acharistos* if the motivation for granting a favour is personal profit, which is not Pamphile's case,³¹⁸ and if he does not return a *kat' analogian charis*, as in the case of

³¹⁷ Pp. 51-53.

³¹⁸ But the term also signifies 'ungrateful', and in this usage, is the opposite of *charin echein*, see Konstan (2006), pp. 163-165.

Charisios.³¹⁹ Such a balance, in the context of *charis*, is of great importance for the unity of a society. Aristotle's definition of *acharistia* captures the subjective condition of *charis* that requires one actively to take to heart the needs of the person requiring a service. Merely to give to someone is inadequate; if one's internal disposition in giving involves calculating the advantage to oneself, then it is not a *charis*.

Apart from his false *megalopsuchia*, Charisios' contempt, *agnōmosunē* and as he sees it (918 and 922), *hupsēlotēs* are also closely linked to *alazoneia*. Indeed, Smikrines' ironic description of his son-in-law as *hupsēlos* implies that he considers him an *alazōn*. It may not be coincidence that Charisios (in Onesimos' monologue, 894) describes himself as *alitērios*. In a Menandrian fragment *alitērios* and *alazōn* are connected. One should not expect that Charisios fits the comic type of *alazōn* as presented in Aristophanes, although it is very possible that this is one of the models that Menander had in mind when developing Charisios' character.³²⁰ Charisios' *alazoneia* (by way of *hupsēlotēs*) echoes more discourses than comedy, and at the same time gives his character greater complexity. Although the Aristophanic *alazōn* professes to be an expert in anything that contributes to his self-importance, Charisios does not do so. He rather believes that he possesses high moral qualities. Charisios' arrogance is linked to his high opinion of himself, his choice (i.e, to abandon his wife) and in believing he possesses high moral qualities, he seems to have expected other

³¹⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *NE*1132b31-1133a7 and Burnet (1900), p. 225 regarding this passage and *Politics* 1261a30 'διόπερ τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς σώζει τὰς πόλεις, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς ἠθικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον', 'Hence reciprocal equality is the preservative of states, as has been said before in *Ethics*', trans. Rackham (1932), p. 73.

³²⁰ Cf. Menander, fr. 608 K-A: 'σφάττει με, λεπτὸς γίνομ' εὐωχούμενος. τὰ σκώμμαθ' οἷα τὰ σοφὰ τε καὶ στρατηγικά· οἷος δ' ἀλαζών ἐστιν ἀλιτήριος'. On *alitērios* interpreted also as *alazōn*, see Eupolis fr 103 and 113 from *Dēmoi* and fr 157 from *Kolakes*, in Storey (2003), pp. 134-136 and 184-188, though Storey does not accept the equation of the two terms. On the meaning of *alazōn* in Aristophanes' comedies, see MacDowell (1990), pp. 287-292.

people to honour and praise him, a desire shared by both an *alazōn* and a *megalopsuchos*.³²¹

An examination of the Theophrastean description of an *alazōn* may shed more light on the Menandrian Charisios. Theophrastus, in a humorous description, presents the type of *alazōn*, who displays this trait in his behaviour on a number of occasions.³²² For example, the *alazōn*, standing in the market place, boasts to strangers about his wealth, which he has invested in the maritime business. He is prone to tell anyone who happens to walk with him that he has not only served in the army of Alexander, but that he was also on friendly terms with him. Furthermore, as a reward for campaigning with Alexander's army he acquired artistic cups, decorated with precious stones. Apparently, the boastful man has never been away from his home. Furthermore, he brags to people that another important political figure, Antipater, has sent him letters not only inviting him to visit Macedonia but also offering him the right to do some profitable commercial business in the area. The boastful man, however, has declined the offer in order to avoid accusations from fellow citizens, probably due to his affiliation with the Macedonian politicians (unless he was lying about the whole business). He also boasts to his interlocutor, who is a stranger, that he intends to sell his family house, since it is too small and thus prohibits him from entertaining his friends. Such a type, therefore, is constantly engaged in self-praise and this need leads him to boast and tell lies to people who do not know him.

³²¹ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1127b9-21 and 1123b21-24. For Aristotle's discussion on *alazoneia* and how his analysis differs from Theophrastus' sketch, see Diggle (2004), pp. 431-432, who also stresses the change in meaning of the term in the fifth and fourth centuries. Regarding 1127b9-21, Diggle, at p. 431, states that 'the alazon of Aristotle is prompted by desire either for reputation or for gain'.

³²² For the sketch of *alazōn*, see Diggle (2004), pp. 130-131.

From Theophrastus' vignette it seems that an *alazōn* would not have boasted about himself to people who were aware of his true way of life. The knowledge that people have of the boaster restricts his boasting, for such knowledge would expose his lies. Instead of earning awe or recognition he would only earn contempt and ridicule. It must follow then that *alazoneia* requires an absence of personal acquaintance, the unlikelihood that the boaster's true circumstances will be revealed, and the absence of shame, either because exposure is unlikely or because the boaster is shameless. In not revealing the rape to his friend Chairestratos or even to his slave Onesimos, Charisios appears to be aware of the consequences of the possible exposure of his action and the shame that this would entail. His boastfulness, accordingly, is moderated, as he is quite capable of feeling shame. We may contrast Chaerea's boasting to a friend, in Terence's *Eunuch*, of having raped a girl (the play is based on a Menandrian original); once again, we see how Menander lends his characters subtle nuances and complexities, so that they are not reducible to bare types.

The Theophrastean *alazōn* does not seem to illuminate the complexity of Charisios' character further, unless (as in Smikrines' case) Theophrastus' description is understood and interpreted in the light of Plato and Aristotle's analyses of the elements of character, which in fact allow us to grasp the threads connecting all aspects of Theophrastus' description of the *alazōn* in action. A comparison between Theophrastus' sketch of *alazoneia* and *Republic* VIII,³²³ where Plato analyzes the inner workings of *alazoneia* in one's character, suggests a productive approach. In this passage, Plato lays out the entire process of the development and establishment of *alazoneia* as a trait of character. In other words, he gives the *causes*, he explains how *alazoneia* is established in

³²³ Plato, *Republic* 560c5-561a4. For a detailed analysis of Plato's concept of *alazoneia* (*Republic* 489e3-490a3 and 560c-e) and how it sheds light on Theophrastus' *alazōn*, see Kalimtzis (1997), (2000), p.123, and (2005), p.99.

relation to the *logistikon*, to the *thumos* and to the *epithumētikon*. His analysis is complex. He shows that *alazoneia* is a 'shutting down of the mind', where one presumes to have knowledge one does not have. In this perverse condition *alazones logoi* are the sentries used by the *thumos* to shut down the mind. Such *logoi*, reasoning or arguments, are used to shut down *logos*: '...these boastful words close the gates of the royal wall within him to prevent these allies from entering...'.³²⁴ What the alazonic sentries do is prevent reasoning that is contrary to the *desires* from entering. These arguments are fought off as alien intruders. How this occurs is then analyzed. The braggart's discourses banish any sense of shame, they perform rites that celebrate *hubris*, and generate a new language that is appropriate to the new occupants of the citadel. In short, the elements that come together in a perverse way (reasoning, *thumos*, and appetite) are dissected, and furthermore the sequence of operations responsible for the emergence and establishment of this trait are explained.

Aristotle defines the *alazōn* as the person who 'is thought to be apt to claim the things that bring glory, when he has not got them, or to claim more of them than he has'.³²⁵ *Alazoneia*, according to Aristotle, is the deficiency of the mean of *alētheia*, with *eirōneia* being the excess. In order, however, to understand the *alazōn* better, and hence to evaluate his actions using Aristotle's definition, one has to examine the elements of *prohairesis* and *hexis* in the *alazōn*. The question arises, therefore, as to whether Charisios' ill judgement in assessing himself suggests a flawed reasoning manifested in his *prohairesis*, or should be attributed to a *hexis*, or indeed both.

³²⁴ Plato, *Republic* 560d, trans. Grube (1997), p. 1171.

³²⁵ Aristotle, *NE* 1127a20-22, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p.100; on the meaning of *alazōn*, see also *EE* 1221a24-25.

Menander apparently does not want us to see Charisios as a fool or a clown, as a person whose high mindedness is a comical sham, despite his sometimes wild behaviour, which I have illustrated above. He is simply flawed, responding to errors and misunderstandings, for which he is partly responsible, in the event proving able to examine himself, even though he is compelled to do so by the circumstances rather than by independent choice. Therefore, it is clear that Charisios lacks the excellences which he attributes to himself. But under stress, when he has to come to grips with his mistakes that have brought injury to his wife, he chooses to make amends and not to continue on his destructive course. He reveals that he is capable of responding according to the noble trait that provides him with a dignified sense of who he is. By recognizing that he has acted like a little or petty person he has also shown that he is not a vulgar character. In recognizing his lack of *charis* he has shown his capacity for *charis*. He is not the victim of blind rage and headstrong haughtiness. Though his *prohairesis* for noble action is flawed, he shows that his choices are the result of the high-minded view he has of himself, and it is this view that prevails within him in a moment of great crisis.

In an attempt to interpret Charisios' *pathos* of *orgē* according to the Aristotelian theory, it appears that the formal cause is his pain from a series of apparent slights concerning his honour, when he was offended by the supposed child of his wife and, very possibly, by the thought that he himself was responsible for the birth of a *nothos* by Habrotonon, and by his feeling of belittlement as a result of Pamphile's superior behaviour towards him. The final cause is his desire for retribution, when he abandons his wife and hires a *hetaira*. The efficient cause of his *orgē* resides in *phantasia* and Charisios' own subjective reasoning concerning the aforementioned apparent slights. To this we may add his deep sense of shame and self-reproach, when he comes to see how wrong he was: he is able to exhibit a genuine remorse, a sense of his own injustice or unfairness,

and this contributes to the overall positive evaluation of his character. Finally, we may fairly infer that Charisios still feels love for Pamphile, and perhaps too pity or sympathy; he is not portrayed as wholly unfeeling, and we must recall that he is newly married. Nor should we exclude the fact that Charisios is in a state of shock.

Conclusion

The philosophical models of character discussed above can be used as a framework to understand better both Smikrines' and Charisios' natures. Both react to unexpected situations in which all the synergised elements of their characters, namely their intellectual faculty and *prohairesis*, are revealed. Smikrines and Charisios are not bad-tempered or angry by nature. Anger is not the prevailing *pathos* in their characters. Nor are they perceived as angry characters by the other characters of the play. Their angry responses to the situations, to which they are provoked to respond, reveal other predominant sides and flaws of their characters. In Smikrines' case his angry reaction reveals his main flaw, his stinginess. In addition, his reaction not only to the main situation, namely the abandonment of his daughter by Charisios, but also to the arbitration scene, reveals his malformed reasoning. Charisios' angry response, on the other hand, discloses further and more positive sides of his character, all of which suggest that his reasoning, too, does not function properly, but his aberrations are of a more temporary nature. This is the main cause of his being carried away by his *pathos* of *orgē*.³²⁶

³²⁶ On the cognitive and no cognitive arousal of *orgē*, cf. NE 1149a26-33: 'ἔοικε γὰρ ὁ θυμὸς ἀκούειν μὲν τι τοῦ λόγου, παρακούειν δε, καθάπερ οἱ ταχεῖς τῶν διακόνων... οὕτως ὁ θυμὸς διὰ θερμότητα καὶ ταχυτητα τῆς φύσεως ἀκούσας μὲν, οὐκ ἐπίταγμα δ' ἀκούσας, ὀρμᾶ πρὸς τὴν τιμωρίαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν.', 'Anger seems to listen to argument to some extent, but to mishear it, as do hasty servants who run out before they have heard the whole of what one says, and then muddle the order, or as dogs bark if there is but a knock at the door, before looking to see if it is a friend; so anger by

Aristotle's analysis of *philia*, in turn, sheds light on the role of Pamphile. Her loyalty to her husband Charisios is predicated on affection, and it is by her affection that she hopes to regain his love. In her attempts to persuade her father Smikrines not to dissolve her marriage, she appeals to the quasi-technical distinction between misfortune and injustice, and if she sounds overly philosophical, it is no doubt because philosophy was in the air, part of the everyday parlance of educated Athenians.

Menander's choice of words such as ἀκέραιος, ἀγνώμων, ὑψηλός, ἥπιος, shows that he developed Charisios' character not only with dramatic models in mind, but also Homer and philosophy. As I have noted, the Athenians breathed philosophy and philosophy responded to popular opinion; this very play offers an example of how the audience could be invited to reflect on such wisdom. In the last scene of the comedy, Onesimos reproaches Smikrines for his *smikrotēs*, and paraphrasing Heraclitus (or Epicharmos) (ἦθος ἀνθρώπων δαίμων)³²⁷ chastises him with the assertion that his character flaws are leading him to disaster. The evocation of the gods gives Onesimos the chance to lecture Smikrines about the role of the gods in the lives of men. It is not the gods who save or destroy a man but his own *tropos*: 'they've implanted in each of us a watchdog character',³²⁸ he concludes (1093-1094). Agitated by this remark, Smikrines asks Onesimos what is wrong with his *tropos*, and he receives the direct response that it is his *tropos* that ultimately destroys him

reason of warmth and hastiness of its nature, though it hears, does not hear an order, and springs to take revenge. For argument or imagination informs us that we have been insulted or slighted ...', trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 173.

³²⁷ See Diels (1912), vol. I, fr 119, p. 100; cf Epicharmos, fr 17, p. 123: 'ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρωποισι δαίμων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακός. The Byzantine teacher and scholar John Tzetzes (1100-1180/5) attributed a similar saying to Menander: 'ὁ νοῦς γὰρ ἡμῶν ἐστὶν ἐν ἐκάστῳ θεός', fr.889 K-A.

³²⁸ Furley (2009), p. 116.

(1101 and 1106).³²⁹ What saves Smikrines in this instance – at least in Onesimos' eyes - is pure chance (1108) and not his own choice and actions.³³⁰ Here again we see the intimate connection or osmosis between philosophical categories and popular conversation.

³²⁹ For an 'inconsistency' in the use of the term *tropos* by Onesimos for comic purposes and how it affects our image of Smikrines' character, see Furley (2009), p. 248.

³³⁰ For the role of *to automaton* in the happy ending of *Epitrepontes*, see Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 379-380 and Cinaglia (2014), pp. 137-139.

CHAPTER 3

*Dyskolos*³³¹

The most complete text we possess among the extant Menandrian plays is that of *Dyskolos*, which includes a prologue presented by the god Pan.³³² Together with the pastoral image Pan evokes, appropriate for the scene and the plot of the play, Menander uses the god as a personification of sexual desire.³³³ Having no family himself, he does not encourage or protect marriage, but reserves for himself the role of patron of erotic desire. Pan has another side which is presented in *Phaedrus* (279b-c), where Plato discusses the nature and limitations of rhetoric.³³⁴ Invoking Pan among other gods (perhaps not without a note of irony)³³⁵ Socrates asks to be granted inner beauty and that Pan ‘grant me to become fair within. Let all that I have without be friendly to my inner state’. ‘May I believe’, Socrates says, ‘the wise man rich. May I have such quantity of gold as would attract the trafficking only of the moderate man’.³³⁶ These sides of Pan might have encouraged Menander’s choice of this deity as speaker of the prologue, providing a preliminary idea of the multiple dimensions of the plot in which the characters will move and at the same time stressing the power of external forces, which though initiating the plot do not

³³¹ The numbering of the verses is that of Handley’s (1965) edition.

³³² On Euripides’ influence on Pan’s prologue, see Photiades (1958), pp. 108-122. On Menander’s prologues in general see Ireland (1981); on the prologue in *Dyskolos* and Pan’s role, see Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 134 and Ireland (1995), pp. 18-21.

³³³ On Pan as a deity, see Borgeaud (1988), esp. pp. 3, 74-87 and 137-162; he is associated with panic, but primarily with the countryside and rural life. Cf. Theocritus 1.123-130; Aratus is said to have composed a hymn to Pan (*Life of Aratus* 15), as did Kastorion of Soloi (*Supplementum Hellenisticum* 310), see Bing (1985).

³³⁴ Nehamas and Woodruff (1997), p. 555.

³³⁵ See Jackson (1971), p. 36. For Socrates’ prayer in *Phaedrus*, see Rosenmeyer (1962), pp. 34 and 36-37.

³³⁶ Borgeaud (1988), p. 139.

intervene openly in its fulfilment in the course of the drama. Instead, the characters and their responses to the circumstances through their choices will direct the course of action.

The play revolves around the *erōs* of Sostratos, a rich young Athenian citizen, for the unnamed daughter of Knemon (44), a well-off Athenian (327-328)³³⁷ and hardcore misanthrope (according to a later tradition an alternative title of the play was *The Misanthrope*).³³⁸ Sostratos' *erōs* is incited by Pan as a reward for Knemon's daughter, for the piety she has shown towards the god and on account of her own good character (34-39, 43-44).³³⁹ Sostratos' intentions are indeed honourable. He immediately sends his slave Pyrrhias to inquire about her father or *kurios* in order to ask her hand in marriage (71-73). Pan's plan, however, is bound to face a major impediment in Knemon's *dyskolia*.³⁴⁰

It is Knemon's *orgē*, a consequence of his habitual *dyskolia* and emanating from his *misos* for society as a whole, that we shall explore. What are the impediments posed by the *Dyskolos*? What does it mean to be *dyskolos* – towards one's *oikos*, neighbours, wife, daughter, and fellow citizens? What are the traits of the other characters in the play who will have to deal with and overcome these obstacles in order to fulfill Pan's plans? These are some questions that we shall attempt to answer in the light of Plato and Aristotle's

³³⁷ See Handley (1965), p. 190 and Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 186-187.

³³⁸ For the author of the *hypothesis* of the play, see Handley (1965), pp.121-122 and Ireland (1995), p. 107. For comic plays representing different degrees of *misanthrōpia*, see Goldberg (1980), p. 72. Haegemans (2001), pp. 676-77 convincingly argues that Knemon's character derives from a synthesis of literary 'miser' predecessors with the philosophical aspects of such types.

³³⁹ Pan's attitude shows *philanthrōpia* towards the girl.

³⁴⁰ Concerning the plot, Zagagi (1979) suggested that though 'a homogenous story with convincing inner force', *Dyskolos* is 'formed of two separate plot-lines', that of Knemon's *dyskolia* and Sostratos' *erōs* (p. 47). Brown (1992) convincingly stresses the unified, well structured and integrated plot, a position that Anderson (1970), p. 199, also supports. The characterization of the plot by Arnott (1989), p. 29, as simple, predictable and 'implausibly contrived', does not seem convincing, given also the complexity of characters in the play.

thought as well as Theophrastos' *Characters*. *Dyskolos* is primarily a play about the forging of friendship. For only with *philia* will Pan's plan be materialized. We will, therefore, also examine how the characters in the play are drawn to *philia* within the matrix of their flaws and strengths.

Knemon

Pan describes Knemon as antisocial, *ἀπάνθρωπος*, a *δύσκολος* towards everyone (6-7).³⁴¹ Apart from the god, Knemon is described as *dyskolos* by other characters in the play (242, 893) as well as by himself (747). Knemon has chosen to isolate himself from society. His only company is that of his daughter with an old woman as his slave. Knemon is continuously occupied with manual work (31-32 and 441-442), farming solely and by himself a piece of his land located far from the public road (the land is almost a reflection of its owner), in order to avoid any possible contact with passers-by (163-165).

As a result of his *tropos* (13) Knemon was abandoned by his wife, Myrrhine, who was unable to bear her hard life with him any more. Myrrhine now lives with her son from a previous marriage, Gorgias, a poor Athenian farmer (17-23). Knemon dislikes all people generally and unreflectively, regardless of their social class (355-357 and 365-366), although it becomes clear in the course of the play that he bears a particular hostility to idle folk, such as the wealthy young sons of upper class citizens (he has also been disillusioned by the selfishness he has seen in others). In the development of the plot Knemon's *dyskolia* finds expression above all in his excessive anger. According to Aristotle, as said above, *orgē* is 'concerned with particulars', directed at a particular person for a particular reason. In the case of our *dyskolos*, however, *orgē* is combined with

³⁴¹ See Haegemans (2001), p. 681.

misein.³⁴² In the words of Pan, Knemon ‘detests (μισῶν) the whole world, from his wife and neighbours here, right to Cholargos down there, every single man’ (32-34).³⁴³

Dyskolos and *dyskolia*

The concept of *dyskolos* and *dyskolia*, so central in the play, carries a particular meaning in Greek culture and philosophical thought, underlining the expectations of the audience of characters such as Knemon. To understand a *dyskolos*, such as Knemon, one must first examine the general nature of *dyskolia*, the cultural concept that places it in the realm of psychological ‘disease’. The word *dyskolos* has been translated by Menandrian scholars as ‘peevish to everybody’,³⁴⁴ ‘old cantankerous’, one ‘who snarls at everyone’,³⁴⁵ ‘bad-tempered towards everyone’³⁴⁶, ‘bad tempered ... cross-grained to all’.³⁴⁷ These translations, or interpretations, however, do not precisely reflect the Greek concept of *dyskolos*, which is associated with misanthropy and the notion that one who has this trait of character is at the outer fringes of humanity.³⁴⁸ For example, none of the meanings offered in the *OED* for *peevish*, *cantankerous* and *cross-grained* captures the connection of *dyskolia* with *misanthrōpia*, and its status as a limiting condition of humanity.³⁴⁹ *Peevishness* and the like reduce a complex character, one forged out of a number of aberrant psychological factors, to a single, flattened-out emotive dimension which understates the scale of the aberration.

³⁴² See above, pp. 64-65, for the distinction between *misein* and *orgē*.

³⁴³ Arnott (1979), p. 187.

³⁴⁴ Arnott (1979), p. 185.

³⁴⁵ Miller (1987), title and p. 23, respectively.

³⁴⁶ Ireland (1995), p. 33.

³⁴⁷ Balme (2001), title and p. 4, respectively.

³⁴⁸ For example, compare the employment of the terms *orgē*, *chalepotēs* and *dyskolia* by Aristophanes in his description of old Philocleon’s *nosos* (of being *philēliastēs* 88-89): *Wasps* 243, 403-404, 942-943, 1105 and 1356.

³⁴⁹ See Haegemans (2001), p. 676.

The reason for this reduction is not accidental. The *dyskolos* is a type of aberrant character that Hellenic culture had described in various ways as the opposite of the character traits that made a human being fit for citizenship, for friendship, for co-operative endeavours within the *polis* community.³⁵⁰ *Dyskolia* deprives a person of the power to associate (*koinōnein*) as a friend and describes an inner condition that condemns one to exist in an antisocial state. It is an extreme condition of dysfunctional humanity, which when fully realized verges on *agriotēs*,³⁵¹ whether as a temporary state or a trait of character. *Dyskolia*, therefore, cannot be reduced to *orgē*, for anger may be a recurrent *pathos* or emotion, but *dyskolia* is a cluster of traits that results in an *apanthrōpos* condition. Our difficulty in placing *dyskolia* in the contemporary context results from the fact that we do not live in *polis* communities, we do not share their values, we do not cultivate their different functions within the *oikos*, nor can we say of our associations what Aristotle said of his, namely that every type of association brings with it a type of friendship, and that what binds the *polis* (more than justice) is friendship.³⁵² In addition, Aristotle states that a man's character and age play an important role in the formation of *philia*: 'friendship ... occurs less in the sour-tempered and elderly people in so far as they are harder to get on with and get less enjoyment from interactions with other

³⁵⁰ Demosthenes 6.30: *dyskolos* is linked with *dystropos*, Aeschines 3.59: *dyskolia* linked with *physis*, Xenophon *Oeconomicus* 15.10 and Aristophanes *Wasps* 942: *dyskolia* linked with the farmer's profession. The opposite of *dyskolos* is *eukolos*, namely an easy-going, peaceable, good-tempered man who is moreover a good citizen; cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1381a31-33, and Aristophanes, *Frogs* 82 and 359 with a characterization of Sophocles and another citizen as *eukoloi*. Sommerstein (1996), p. 188 (with reference to *Frogs* 359), stresses the good citizenship linked with the *eukolos*, who does not involve himself in arguments and quarrels for minor offences, but for the sake of the community is prepared to 'swallow' them and avoid retaliation. According to Dover (1993) p. 204, 'good temper and an equable manner (*eukolia*) could also be regarded as both a private ... and a public virtue, since in Ar. *Frogs* 359 the man who is *eukolos* to his fellow-citizens is the antithesis of the man who stirs up civil strife'.

³⁵¹ The extreme prototype of an *agrion thērion* who led a bestial and solitary life, was Polyphemus, the Cyclops, son of Poseidon, see Nagle (2006), p. 141-143 (citing also Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a3).

³⁵² Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1155a21-26. See also above, pp. 55 and 62.

people'.³⁵³ The focus on the social aspect of *dyskolos* reflects the profound importance of social life in the polis.

Although Aristotle associates the *dyskolos* with the *duseris*, namely a quarrelsome or contentious person,³⁵⁴ he does not associate *dyskolia* with *misanthrōpia*. It is Plato who examines *misanthrōpia* and *dyskolia* in greatest detail. Plato associates the term *dyskolos* and its derivatives, in the context of the structure of bodily diseases and those of the soul, with an absence of health generally, with an unhealthy condition hard to reverse.³⁵⁵ When he uses the term *dyskolon* to speak of disease he does so to convey the notion that one of its symptoms is irritability.³⁵⁶ The disease, having become a permanent condition, will manifest anger against any direct treatment that threatens to alter it. This has practical implications for our play. Plato goes to the origins of *dyskolia* when he discusses the upbringing of children.³⁵⁷ He uses the word *dyskolia* to describe not just a character trait, but a deviant condition of the soul, one contrary to *eupsuchia*, which results in *kakopsuchia*. The *dyskolos* character will be 'a moaner and a grumbler'. Plato recommends an upbringing that is as pleasurable and free from pain as possible, which can be achieved through habituation. In the same passage, Plato distinguishes *dyskolia* from *misanthrōpia*. Though both conditions develop through habituation, he states that 'luxury makes a child bad-tempered, irritable, and apt to react violently to trivial things. At the other extreme, unduly savage repression turns children into cringing slaves and puts

³⁵³ Aristotle, *NE* 1158a1-4, trans. Broadie and Rowe (2002), p. 214; cf. Haegemans (2001), p. 680, n. 15, who cites the same passage and in addition *Rhetoric* 1390a19 to juxtapose the behaviour of young and old.

³⁵⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1126b14-17, 1108a26-30; cf. Haegemans (2001), pp. 678-679.

³⁵⁵ Plato, *Timaeus* 87a.

³⁵⁶ Plato, *Timaeus* 89d.

³⁵⁷ Plato, *Laws* 791c-792e.

them so much at odds with the world that they become unfit to be members of a community'.³⁵⁸

In *Phaedo* Plato associates *misanthrōpia* with *misologia* and describes their causes: 'misology and misanthropy arise in the same way. Misanthropy comes when a man without knowledge or skill has placed great trust in someone and believes him to be altogether truthful, sound and trustworthy; then, a short time afterwards he finds him to be wicked and unreliable, and then this happens in another case; when one has frequently had that experience, especially with those whom one believed one's closest friends, then, in the end, after many such blows, one comes to hate all men and to believe that no one is sound in any way at all'.³⁵⁹ This is very much the way Knemon describes his own pathology. *Misanthrōpia*, as described by Plato, terminates in an unreflective condition wherein all humankind has unreflectively been grouped into a single category. This is a process that culminates in an irrational condition that is distrustful of humankind in general. One begins with unrealistic expectations, perhaps, and when these are not met, for they cannot be met given the intermediate nature, flaws and wicknesses of human beings, the person becomes disappointed. Trusting a fellow human being becomes impossible for a *misanthrōpos*.³⁶⁰

Plato links *dyskolia* with *thumos*, anger; but in this case, it is *dyskolia* that can arise from indulgence in anger.³⁶¹ Therefore, *dyskolia* can be viewed as a stage in the evolution of anger. Anger becomes hardened into *dyskolia* as a trait of

³⁵⁸ Trans. Saunders (1997), p. 1461.

³⁵⁹ Plato, *Phaedo*, 89d-90a, trans. Grube (1997), p. 77; cf. Hunter (1985), p. 173 and Haegemans (2001), p. 680.

³⁶⁰ In a different context, discussing the relationship between the lover and beloved, Plato connects the *dyskolos* with the *apistos* (*Phaedrus* 241c); cf. Haegemans (2001), p. 692.

³⁶¹ Plato, *Republic* 586c-d.

character and that anger can lead directly to a pathological condition, indeed to madness itself, was a commonly accepted notion in antiquity.³⁶² One becomes *dyskolos* as one's anger becomes not just a trait of a certain type, but the trait *par excellence* of one's character and thus prevails over all other pathē.

Plato describes the behaviour of the *dyskolos* and *misanthrōpos* also in terms of his association with his fellow citizens and the institutions of the polis in general. A *dyskolos* is unwilling even to share water rights with his neighbours, thus obstructing the more efficient irrigation of private land and households.³⁶³ In other words, he shows inability to co-operate, not far from what Aristotle describes in his discussion of *philia* and *dyskolia*. Both reciprocity and *philia*, far from being utopian ideals, were at the very core of Athenian life, including farming. Both were essential between kinsmen, for 'no other mechanism existed for the survival of the household.'³⁶⁴ If, therefore, *dyskolia* prevents one from being a good neighbour, then *philia*, one of the foundations of the polis which sustains the *oikos*, will be seriously damaged. Moreover, the *misanthrōpoi* are described by Plato as savages who lack the institutions of a civilized polis, that is, education, law courts and law, which encourage a citizen to cultivate virtue.³⁶⁵

In his discussion of the *thumoeides* part of the soul, Plato associates *dyskolia* with *authadeia*.³⁶⁶ The permanently angered person is not merely in a perennial state of pain but also experiences the relief of pleasure in an anger which is vengeful.

³⁶² Cf. Seneca *On Anger* 4.36.5: *nulla celerior ad insaniam uia est*; also, *Aiacem in mortem egit furor, in furorem ira*: 'madness drove Ajax to death, but anger drove him to madness', and Cicero *Tusculan Disputations* 3.7ff, see Konstan (2013b) who deals with this topic.

³⁶³ Plato, *Laws*, 844c-d.

³⁶⁴ Nagle (2006), pp. 61-64 at 63 and Cox (1998), pp. 194-202.

³⁶⁵ Plato, *Protagoras* 327d. In this passage, Plato refers to Pherecrates' play *Agrioi* and more specifically to the *misanthrōpoi* that composed the chorus.

³⁶⁶ Plato, *Republic* 590a; cf. Haegemans (2001), p. 681.

A *dyskolos* and *authadēs* does not take into account the other. He is out to hurt the other. This is a feature of Aristotle's account of hatred: the person who hates, according to Aristotle, seeks simply to eliminate the other, whereas one who is angry wishes the other party to continue living, so that he might feel in turn (*antipathein*) the insult or humiliation that he inflicted.³⁶⁷

Though *dyskolos* is not included in Theophrastos' *Characters*, Plato's and Aristotle's descriptions of *dyskolia* in association with *duseris* and *authadeia* are essential for a better understanding of Theophrastos' sketch that comes closest to describing an aspect of *dyskolos*, that is the *authadēs*. According to the definition (which must have been added at a later stage) introducing the sketch, *authadeia* 'is implacability in social relations displayed in speech.' In response to the greetings he receives, this person, according to Theophrastos, cuts off any possibility of human contact by replying, 'Don't bother me'. He curses even the stone on which he happened to stub his toe -- a stone cannot be responsible for an *oligōria*, and so, in Aristotelian terms, this behaviour is wholly irrational. His approach to his friends is similar: if one wants to borrow money from the *authadēs* he will first face a flat rejection, and when he finally succeeds in his request, he will receive the money from the *authadēs* with the remark that this 'is more money wasted'.³⁶⁸ Though no money is borrowed in *Dyskolos*, there is an analogous situation in the servants' requests to borrow household items (427-514). In addition, the behaviour of the *authadēs* to the gods shows disrespect, in the sense that he does not acknowledge the help he receives from them. Simply, the *authadēs* is not a person with whom one would want to associate.

³⁶⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1382a13-15. Although Plato does not stress the root element in 'misology' and 'misanthropy', his discussion of the terms invites comparison Aristotle's analysis of the emotion of *misein*.

³⁶⁸ Diggle (2004), pp. 108-109 and 343-348.

Knemon's *dyskolia*

Knemon's *dyskolia* finds expression above all in his *orgē*. It is mainly this pathos that moves the plot in a series of scenes where it is either described by other characters or is manifested by Knemon's own words and actions.³⁶⁹ Gorgias' description of Knemon as a man whose like has never existed in the past or in the present (324-325) in terms of his *dyskolia* fits well with the report given to Sostratos by Pyrrhias, who experienced Knemon's *orgē* when he attempted to approach him in a 'friendly and tactful' way (105-106) to convey his master's message (103-111). Knemon's sudden and unprovoked anger, roused by this intrusion upon his privacy, is manifested through verbal and physical abuse. Pyrrhias describes Knemon's fierce reaction as that of a lunatic, grabbing a stick and flogging him, then chasing him over a long distance, throwing stones and prickly pears at him for no apparent reason (81-84, 108-110, 113-115 and 117-121). The horrified slave implores his master to deliver him from having to face the same experience again (86-87 and 123) with this berserk madman (88-89), 'the son of grief' (88) who is ready to eat him alive (124-125).³⁷⁰ In this way, Knemon succeeds in maintaining his reputation as a man who has opted to live and work in isolation without being prepared to receive any help from anybody, taking pleasure in seeing no one, putting up with nobody — except his daughter (326-337). According to Gorgias, despite Knemon's aspiration to marry her to a man of similar character to his own (337), he will find this impossible, since Knemon is uniquely *dyskolos*, a total catastrophe (326).³⁷¹ What

³⁶⁹ Goldberg (1980), p. 83, points out that the descriptions of Knemon by various characters serve to present him as a more complex character, at the same time keeping him 'distinct from farce'.

³⁷⁰ Arnott (1979), pp. 196-197 and 203. Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 148, convincingly argues that Knemon is *ὀδυνηρός*, causing distress to other people, and/or he himself suffers distress and that 'the 'tyrannical man' is *μελαγχολικός* because he thinks he can "rule gods and men"; the *μελαγχολικός* knows no restraint: Arist. *EN* 1150b25. Aristophanes' use of the verb, *Birds* 14, *Plutus* 12, 366, 903, shows it to have been a popular expression'.

³⁷¹ See Haegemans (2001), p. 680.

is clear is that Knemon gets angry easily from the moment he considers his privacy intruded upon by people other than his daughter and his slave. Knemon reacts with rapid and severe anger to anything which frustrates or inconveniences him, and even his daughter and his slave are fearful of him.

Although at first Sostratos pooh-poohs Pyrrhias' fear, insisting that the slave must have offended the old man or is otherwise exaggerating, he soon perceives for himself the wild nature of the misanthrope, and he and his friend Chaireas realize that Pyrrhias' representation of Knemon's outburst of *orgē* and of his fear of Knemon's following him are entirely valid. It is worth noting that Sostratos does not easily accept the picture of a person who distances himself so radically from the community, which is predicated on *philia*, and it takes the evidence of his senses to convince him. Although Sostratos (like Chaireas) was not present during Knemon's outburst, he is surprised at the scale of his anger (πεπαρώνηκε δεῦρο, 93). Handley and Arnott supplied παραφρονῶν (93) attributing it to Chaireas. This is a reasonable conjecture, given Pyrrhias' description of Knemon's mad state.³⁷² Pyrrhias continues to describe the moment he first saw Knemon from afar, after the old servant pointed him out on the hill (94-102). As the reading of the marginal *nota personae* in B is mutilated (]τρ), it is not clear whether the expression ὡς ὀργίλωσ (102) that follows Pyrrhias' description concerns Knemon or Pyrrhias; in other words whether the speaker is Pyrrhias describing Knemon's enraged state, or either Chaireas or Sostratos commenting on Pyrrhias' own anger at how he has been treated.³⁷³ This is important both for interpreting the perception of Knemon by other characters in the play and for understanding the use of the word ὀργίλωσ by Menander. For this reason, we shall analyse it a little further.

³⁷² Handley (1965), pp. 82-83, 146-147 and Arnott (1979), pp. 198-199. For the arguments concerning the identification of the speakers of vv. 92-95, see also Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 150-151.

³⁷³ Martin (1958), pp. 26-27.

Sandbach opted to restore the mutilated *nota personae* with χαλιῶ attributing ὡς ὀργίλως (102, an expression that means ‘how anger-ridden’) and τί, ὦ μακάριε that follows (103) to Chaireas, though he did not rule out the other two possibilities, namely Sostratos and Pyrrhias.³⁷⁴ In their commentary Gomme and Sandbach attribute both phrases with caution to Chaireas or Sostratos with reference to Pyrrhias.³⁷⁵ According to Handley the ὡς ὀργίλως is addressed by Chaireas to Pyrrhias, while the τί, ὦ μακάριε is addressed by Pyrrhias to Chaireas.³⁷⁶ Although the paleographical evidence does not permit a firm conclusion, it is noteworthy that Menander uses here the adverb (ὀργίλως) rather than the adjective (ὀργίλος). Whereas the adjective would necessarily describe the character of the person, its adverbial use (ὡς ὀργίλως, understood ἔχειν) may describe both the person’s character and behaviour, and the whole situation. It is possible, therefore, that Menander uses this expression to describe the perception by the speaker (either Chaireas or Sostratos) of the general state of fury or of the particular state of those present in this episode, either Pyrrhias or Knemon or both.³⁷⁷ Pyrrhias, however, is breathless and terrified (evident in the asyndeton in 81-82) but not ὀργίλος, for to be possessed by *orgē* one should be free from fear, according to the Aristotelian psychology of fear.³⁷⁸ The most plausible scenario is that Knemon is perceived by the speaker as being excessive in his anger, a description that tallies with Aristotle’s definition of *orgilotēs*.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁴ Sandbach (1972), p. 51.

³⁷⁵ Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 154 regarding v. 102.

³⁷⁶ Handley (1965), pp. 83 and 149.

³⁷⁷ Cf. *LSJ*, s.v. ὀργίλος and Demosthenes 21.215, 45.67.

³⁷⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1380a33-34.

³⁷⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1125b29-30, *Rhetoric* 1380a1-5, *MM* 1186a17-21, *EE* 1221a15-17. We may note here that in the *Rhetoric* 1380a14-19, Aristotle makes it clear that slaves do not typically express anger toward their masters, least of all when their masters are angry at them. This is especially evident in Parmenon's behavior in the *Samia* (641-57). Thus, if it is in fact Pyrrhias who is being described, there is doubtless a certain irony at work: ‘Look how this slave is bold enough to act

Aristotle's definition and account of the context of *orgilotēs* also sheds light on Knemon's tendency to overreact verbally and/or physically in incidents involving mainly characters of lower social status, including Sikon the cook (487-514), and the slaves Pyrrhias (81-123) and Getas (466-486), either because he considers them as intruders into his privacy, or merely because he is annoyed with them even for simple things, such as lending household utensils for a sacrifice (427-514),³⁸⁰ much to their astonishment. This makes them wonder about the cause of Knemon's excessive anger, given that their requests were not unusual but part of everyday life (487-488 and 509-511). It should be stressed that Knemon responds in this way irrespective of the manner in which the slaves and the cook approach him. For example, as we have noted, Pyrrhias approaches Knemon in a friendly and tactful way (105). In the case of Sikon, though he intends to employ flattery (492-493), Knemon does not leave space for communication. Getas, under duress, approaches Knemon in a similar way (463-465).³⁸¹ Once more, Knemon's response is the same. Angry as he is, Knemon does not hesitate to express his exasperation, not only by cursing the slaves (108-109) and his fellow citizens (432 and 442) but also by accusing the Nymphs of being responsible for the gathering in honour of Pan, which Knemon regards as the source of his own trouble (444-447). Such behavior is *authadēs* in the extreme; but one may nevertheless observe that Knemon does not insult Pan directly, as Pan makes clear, much as he resents the god; this

as though he is angry!' If, however, Pyrrhias is describing the attitude of his masters, then the language is surprising, perhaps, but not impossible.

³⁸⁰ For an interpretation of Knemon's proverbial expression (506-508), see Tzifopoulos (1995), pp. 174-176, who emphasizes the significance of salt for hospitality and friendship in Greek culture.

³⁸¹ See Handley (1965), pp. 217-218. On the possible use of the diminutive *levition* as an indication of Getas' gentle request, see Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 209.

perhaps offers some hope that Knemon can be rescued for humanity, as his apology later in the comedy at least in part suggests.³⁸²

The element of hyperbole in the manifestation of Knemon's anger is present also in his monologue following his encounter with Pyrrhias, when he states that he envies Perseus who used to turn people to stone (153-157).³⁸³ On the other hand, though Knemon is irritated by Sostratos for merely standing in front of his door, he overreacts, to be sure, but he does not resort to violence (169-170 and 172-178). This reaction might suggest that though Knemon's *dyskolia* dominates his character, he is able to restrain himself from attacking a fellow citizen, as this was considered a legal offence. Nevertheless, this response does not assuage Sostratos' fear and suspicion that Knemon might overreact once more (168). Knemon's irrational behaviour (talking and shouting to himself while he walks along, 149-151) and the fact that he does not look at all amenable to Sostratos (147-148), increases the latter's fear and suspicion of Knemon's state of mind (150-152). Sostratos is terrified by the mere thought that Knemon might be angry and violent with him (171). Sostratos is a thoroughly timid character, in the play, but in this case his fear is well founded, since he has heard Pyrrhias' account of Knemon's anger. Thus, it is clear that, with the exception of Gorgias, the emotional response of all characters in the play towards Knemon is the same, namely fear. This relates to the scale of his anger and his lack of sociability.

³⁸² Professor Chris Carey suggests to me that the description of Knemon as *dyskolos* rather than *misanthropos* (reflected in the primary title for the play) may indicate a less vicious temperament and hence more sympathetic in the end.

³⁸³ Handley (1965), p. 159, stresses that Knemon's use of Perseus as an example includes an 'element of hyperbole ... which recalls one of Plautus' favourite forms of monologue opening: e.g. Ba. 925ff'. Ireland (1995) too, p. 124 notes that the use of the mythological reference of Perseus 'is a frequent oratotal device' in New Comedy.

Menander employs the word *chalepos* to characterize Knemon through Sostratos (325) who had experienced Knemon's *orgē* (326). It is important that Aristotle uses the word *chalepos* to describe the type of person who leads an isolated life away from friends.³⁸⁴ Aristotle is very conscious that even though men are political animals, living together poses a severe strain. This suggests that there are contrary impulses, one towards friendship and gentleness, and one towards enmity over injustices suffered and harshness in response. If a man goes to the extreme of exaggerating the injustices, he may break the bonds of friendship and undermine the foundations for participation in a polis. Justice implies the possibility of injustice, virtue the possibility of evil. To be human is to struggle for the positive outcome, for this is what our well-being depends on. To withdraw, not to participate, and to become *dyskolos* (as a character trait) is to become slavish, never to fulfil one's humanity.³⁸⁵ Aristotle uses the words *chalepos* and *chalepainō* also in a slightly different sense, to describe a man who experiences an excessive degree of anger.³⁸⁶ His deviation is above all in the omnipresence of anger. This is why *chalepos*, which means 'difficult', is appropriately used by Menander in this context, for Knemon is a difficult person to be with *all* the time, since he is prone to get excessively angry with just about anything, even a slave unintentionally dropping a bucket in the well (e.g., 195-199, 203-206). Aristotle connects *chalepotēs* with *orgilotēs*, stating that all traits of the *orgilos*, *chalepos* and *agrios* belong to the same disposition.³⁸⁷ Both uses of *chalepos* by Aristotle are relevant to Knemon's mode of life and behaviour.

Knemon's *orgē* in relation to his expressed *dyskolia* towards the other characters in the play and society at large has its causes. When Sostratos and Chaireas try

³⁸⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1170a5-8.

³⁸⁵ Aristotle, *Politics* 1263a5-17.

³⁸⁶ Aristotle, *EE* 1221b13-15, *NE* 1125b35-1126a1 and 1126a26-29.

³⁸⁷ Aristotle, *EE* 1231b6-10.

to explain Knemon's excessively angry reaction, Sostratos suggests that it might have been provoked by an injustice done to him by Pyrrhias (141-142), while Chaireas thinks that it may be since Knemon is a poor farmer struggling to survive, implying the bitterness of hard work and poor return (129-130, 115-116 and 603-606),³⁸⁸ or that Knemon simply happened to have had a bad day (125-126). Chaireas' explanations for Knemon's angry state have a tone of conjecture. Sostratos, however, appears to be more certain (141-142), for he considers Pyrrhias to be the direct cause of Knemon's anger, even though the slave had described in detail the friendly way in which he approached Knemon (104-108). Thus, Chaireas locates the source in the aggressor, while Sostratos locates it in the victim. Chaireas' suggestion to make a second attempt to approach Knemon on behalf of Sostratos the following day shows that he is prepared to give Knemon the benefit of the doubt as to the causes of his excessive *orgē*, considering his anger as a temporary state (127-133), while at the same time he avoids facing Knemon out of either fear, or precaution. In this, Chaireas appears to be the more sensible of the two; Sostratos does the slave an injustice, simply because he wants to believe that Knemon will be favourable toward himself -- but of course, as a slave, Pyrrhias is in no position to react angrily to his master. What the two explanations share is a desire to give Knemon the benefit of the doubt; they struggle to come to terms with the scale of his *dyskolia*.

Menander makes Knemon himself explain the cause of his anger when he attacks those who, instead of honouring the gods, in fact benefit themselves.³⁸⁹ Knemon's disrespectful behaviour towards the Nymphs turns out to be above

³⁸⁸ See also above, p. 112, n. 353.

³⁸⁹ For a philosophical allusion to Knemon's distaste for extravagance in sacrifices in Theophrastos' *Piety* preserved in Porphyry, *On the Abstinence of Animals*, see Fortenbaugh (1992), pp. 404-433; for the motif of sacrificial practice in comedy in general (e.g. Aristophanes, Middle comedy) and its satirical tone, see Handley (1965), pp. 214-215.

all a criticism of the excessive private sacrificial offerings which apparently satisfy more those who offer them than the gods who receive them (447-453 and 474-475). His condemnation of such large-scale hypocrisy indicates one of the most important causes of the anger he feels against society.³⁹⁰ At this stage Menander includes an element of *nemesan* or indignation in Knemon's *orgē* -- in Aristotle's definition, the painful sentiment of perceiving that someone else is prospering undeservedly,³⁹¹ and this may generate a certain degree of sympathy for him. But this does not really explain the whole of his anger; it merely hints at a dimension previously unseen. Similarly, when Sostratos finds himself in front of Knemon's house, Knemon addresses him declaring, 'ἐπηρεασμὸς τὸ κακὸν εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ' (178), though it is not clear whether this is a general remark or concerns Sostratos in particular.³⁹² As already mentioned, Aristotle uses the term *epēreasmos* (spite) with reference to one of the causes of *orgē*.³⁹³ According to Aristotle, 'the spiteful person is an impediment to [another's] wishes, not to get anything himself, but so that the other does not'.³⁹⁴ Knemon believes that the cause of his problems, which fuels his *orgē*, is the fact that other people prevent him from living as he wishes, namely away from society. Aristotle states that spiteful behaviour is entirely unmotivated, save for the desire to subject the other party to humiliation,³⁹⁵ and this too corresponds to Knemon's perception, since he does not believe that Sostratos has any other motive than to annoy him (in fact, of course, Sostratos does: to ask for his daughter's hand in marriage). The oversensitivity that Knemon experiences and perceives as spite is characteristic of people with

³⁹⁰ Haegemans (2001), p. 683.

³⁹¹ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1387a8-11.

³⁹² On the use of ἐπηρεάζω see *LSJ*, s.v., citing Demosthenes 18.1 and 38, 21.14, Antiphon 6.8, Xenophon, *Memorabilia* III. 5.16. See also Gagarin (1997), p. 228

³⁹³ See above, p. 36.

³⁹⁴ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378b19-21, trans. Kennedy (1991), p. 125.

³⁹⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378b17-23.

exaggerated emotional responses, according to Aristotle.³⁹⁶ Thus, the term *epereasmos* will suggest a complex of ideas to the Greek audience that English ‘spite’ does not quite capture.

Epēreasmos alone, however, cannot explain why Knemon chose to live in isolation. In a long, revealing monologue Menander makes Knemon confess that it was his profound disappointment with society that led him to this decision when he faced an impasse, and that as a result of this disappointment his character was transformed (οὕτω σφόδρα διεφθάρμην, 718),³⁹⁷ by observing the lives of men, everybody approaching everyone else without *eunoia* (the beginning of friendship for Aristotle and not *philia* per se, but necessary for human contact and understanding, as said above³⁹⁸), but only with profit in mind (719-721). This was his obstacle (721-722). Consequently, Knemon ended by believing that he would be able to lead a totally independent and self-sufficient way of life (... αὐ[τ]άρκης τις εἶναι καὶ δεήσεσθ’ οὐδενός, 713) away from the polis.³⁹⁹

However, his accidental fall into the well reminded him that death is unpredictable. This is what led him to re-evaluate his life. Addressing his rescuer (Gorgias), Knemon admits that though nobody would have been able to persuade him to change his opinion⁴⁰⁰ about the ulterior motive behind people’s actions (711-712), he finally has been proved wrong. It was Gorgias’ altruistic action in saving his life (722-726) that convinced Knemon of the

³⁹⁶ Aristotle, *On Sleep and Dreams* 460b3-27, see also Gallop (1996), pp.147-148.

³⁹⁷ Martin (1958), pp. 76-77 ‘restored’ the reading εφθάρμην in B with διεφθάρμην. His suggestion was followed by: Handley (1965), p. 107, Sandbach (1972), p. 79 Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 244, Arnott (1979), p. 300 and Ireland (1995), pp. 78-79.

³⁹⁸ P. 63.

³⁹⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1097b6-21. For Knemon’s self-sufficiency and its Aristotelian echoes, see Handley (1965), pp. 253-254 and Ireland (1995), pp. 159-160.

⁴⁰⁰ On the motif of the *dyskolos* as difficult to persuade, see Menander, *Monostichon* no: 788: ὕδωρ θαλάσσης ὁ τρόπος τῶν δυσκόλων” in Liapis (2002), pp. 228 and 473.

possibility of a *charis*, an unselfish, gratuitously given favour, not in response to earlier good treatment, just as Aristotle defines it.⁴⁰¹ Knemon's characterization of this action as a deed of supreme nobility (723) is a recognition of Gorgias' friendly feelings towards him, which Knemon welcomes. Knemon realizes that perhaps he has made a mistake (ἐν δ' ἴσω[ς] ἥμαρτον, 713).⁴⁰² What he now abjures is the underlying motive for rejecting society. He confesses that his past convictions which led him to self-isolation were wrong (716). He admits too that in fact he, like everybody else, is constantly in need of help in life (717).

The conceptual framework for expounding the Hellenic view of the *dyskolos* in relation to *autarkeia* and *philia*⁴⁰³ within the polis, stressed by Knemon in this passage, is discussed in the same context by Aristotle in his *Politics*: 'The proof that the state is a creation of nature and prior to the individual is that the individual, when isolated, is not self-sufficient; and therefore, he is like a part in relation to the whole. But he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is not part of a state'.⁴⁰⁴ Thus, outside of a polis there are two possible extremes for human existence. There is no place in Hellenic life for a Romantic vision of a loner, of a pure man of the wilderness, and such like. It is through the polis association that one becomes fully human.

It is significant that the supposedly *autarkēs* Knemon uses the word *chrēsimos* and not *philos* with regard to his relationship with Gorgias. When Knemon

⁴⁰¹ See above, pp. 50ff., for Aristotle's analysis of *charis*.

⁴⁰² For a detailed discussion of Knemon's *hamartia*, see Anderson (1970) and Dworacki (1977), pp. 17-24.

⁴⁰³ The necessity of *philia* regardless of the social and financial condition of people, in the sense that even wealthy people need friends, was discussed above, p. 57.

⁴⁰⁴ Aristotle, *Politics* 1253a25-29; trans. Everson (1996), p. 14. For Aristotle's view of *autarkeia vis-à-vis monōtēs*, see Belfiore (2001), p. 115.

stresses his deep appreciation of Gorgias' action towards him he compares it with his own lack of *chrēsīmotēs* towards Gorgias (728). For Knemon derived benefit from Gorgias although he had never shown any friendliness to Gorgias, either in word or in deed (724-726). Once again, we may note the spontaneous altruism of Gorgias' action, without regard to past benefit or future reward. Though *chrēsīmotēs* is a motivation for *philia*, according to Aristotle, it is not *philia* itself. Nevertheless, Gorgias' *chrēsīmos* action (694-697) is instrumental in inducing Knemon to show reciprocity towards Gorgias not only by adopting him, a young sensible man (736), but also by appointing him as *kurios* of his *oikos* and guardian of his daughter (and Gorgias' half-sister) (731-739). It has been suggested that Knemon's action is what 'a sensible and equitable man would have been expected to do in similar circumstances'.⁴⁰⁵ Indeed, Knemon's reasoning in declaring his adoption of Gorgias is a *topos* in forensic speeches, aimed at persuading the audience that a decision was reached without external pressures in a sound state of mind.⁴⁰⁶ However, given Knemon's deeply rooted *dyskolia*, it is possible that, rather than genuine reciprocation, Knemon's action may conceal an ulterior motive. It may be seen as a means to pass on to Gorgias his own responsibilities towards his *oikos*, including the task of finding a suitable husband for the daughter (337 and 734-735). But in line with the complex characterization of Knemon in the play (typical of Menander's generosity toward even his most curmudgeonly characters), it is worth recalling that he is also parting with half his wealth. In that case this is not solely – if at all – self-regarding.

⁴⁰⁵ See Handley (1965), pp. 257-260.

⁴⁰⁶ For this and the usual reasons for adoption by Athenian citizens, namely *γηροτροφία*, proper burial, and memorial rites on the part of the adoptee, as well as the *epiklēros*, see Rubinstein (1993), pp. 62-76 and 96-97. Goldberg (1980), p. 87 states that Knemon's adoption of Gorgias was a kind of reward, since Gorgias 'defended the interests of Knemon's household'.

A closer examination of the text may shed light on yet another aspect of Knemon's character linked with the well-being of his *oikos*. Until he faced the fear of his own death Knemon kept a rudimentary contact with society through his *oikos*, consisting of his daughter and a slave, which prevented him from deteriorating into the condition of *agriotēs*.⁴⁰⁷ The experience of his accident offered him a chance to re-evaluate his life and re-connect with society through his *oikos*, this time including Gorgias and his own estranged wife. Knemon has now realized that he was wrong in isolating himself but he had reasons to do so. This is implied in his remarks about his personal experience with people who failed to appreciate him, and in his general observation of this condition in society (720).⁴⁰⁸ He could, in theory, rejoin society after his new experience with Gorgias. But his *dyskolia* seems to be too ingrained for him to change (ἀλλ' ἐμὲ μὲν, <ἄν ζῶ,> ζῆν ἔᾶθ' ὡς βούλομαι, 735).⁴⁰⁹ Nevertheless the fact that Knemon acknowledges Gorgias' noble act⁴¹⁰ shows that he is capable of

⁴⁰⁷ Contra Lape (2004), p. 115, who sees Knemon regressing 'to a Cyclopean state of presocial savagery'; cf. Hunter (1985), pp. 144-145 and 173.

⁴⁰⁸ According to Jauss (1983), p. 309, in Knemon's monologue Menander does not illuminate us about the reason for Knemon's misanthropy. Instead he only reveals that Knemon's mistake was living the life of an *autarkēs*. Jauss also pointed out that Menander 'implies a question which Theophrastus had not yet asked in his characterology: how can a person, against his own nature, become an enemy of mankind?'. Though my presentation of Knemon's character agrees with Jauss' view that Knemon's punishment at the end of the play, although a form of a poetic justice, is 'foreign to us' (p. 306), Jauss concentrates on non-Greek social environments. My analysis stresses how *dyskolia* is a condition of character within Greek culture.

⁴⁰⁹ Jauss (1983), p. 310, points out that Knemon's decision to remain withdrawn from society at this stage tallies with his character, in the sense that this is the only moment that he takes the initiative to react and not to act; cf. Zagagi (1979), p. 42. n. 9, Arnott (1989), p. 31 and Brown (1992), p. 9. For the principle of living as one pleases as a primary feature of democracy, Knemon's protestation allows for more than one interpretation. For variations of this expression as one of the main principles of democracy, see Aristotle, *Politics* 1317b13, Thucydides 1.37.3, Demosthenes 22. 62 (with a negative connotation), Aeschines 1.34, Lysias 26.5. In the time of the thirty tyrants living freely had turned into impunity.

⁴¹⁰ Commenting on Knemon's characterization of Gorgias as *eugenestatos* (723), Wiles (1984), p. 175, points out that this is ironical, for 'Menander's audience was concerned by the problem of wealth. Demetrios' regime was an oligarchy of the wealthy, not of the well-born'. There is nothing new – or especially topical – in recognizing innate excellence in people who are not *eugenes* in any social sense; see for example Euripides *Electra*, Electra's and Orestes' remarks about the *autourgos*, vv. 253, 262 and 367-390. For a contrast and comparison between the

recognizing qualities of character in Gorgias. Knemon, however, does not seem to be in a position to allow himself to be rescued by someone who was not associated with him, a total stranger, thus accepting the generosity of a fellow human being without any reservation.⁴¹¹ The fact that he fiercely resists Getas' offer of help (598-600) points in this direction.⁴¹² It is worth noting, however, that although Knemon can recognize that Sostratos too is worthy of respect for having helped Gorgias extract him from the well, he cannot bring himself actually to hand his daughter over to another person; this is why he makes Gorgias her *kurios*. So Knemon has come part way -- he can make the intellectual judgment concerning Sostratos' merits -- but cannot go all the way to the point of translating that judgment into action (nor would so abrupt a transformation be plausible, I expect, after so thoroughgoing a representation of his unsociability).

Knemon goes on to declare that if all citizens were like himself there would be no need for law-courts, prisons and wars (743-745). There is a pronounced element of irony, when Knemon implicitly attributes to himself virtuous qualities, such as justice,⁴¹³ honesty and lack of greed (745), and a life of genuine pleasure free from pain⁴¹⁴ while he actually exemplifies the vice of deficiency

characters of Electra, Orestes and the *autourgos*, see Lape (2004), p. 211, Yoon (2012), pp. 99-105 and Petrides (2014), p. 274.

⁴¹¹ See Brown (1992), p. 11, who points out that Knemon's rescue by Gorgias has a stronger effect on the old man, than if Sostratos had been his saviour. Anderson (1970), pp. 206-207, expresses the view that by choosing Gorgias rather than Sostratos as the protagonist in the rescuing scene, Menander displays his competence as a dramatist.

⁴¹² For the restoration of vv. 598-600, see Handley (1965), p. 237. On Knemon's refusal to accept Getas' help, see Anderson (1970), p. 205.

⁴¹³ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1103b14-25 (πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι... ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας...) with relation to Knemon's monologue, and his statement that if people were like him there would be no need for law courts, further indicating the relevance of Aristotle's views to Knemon's conception of *autarkeia* and *eudaimonia*.

⁴¹⁴ A possible but not necessary allusion to Epicurean philosophy, though Menander may have been familiar with Epicurus' views. On pain and pleasure, as the core of Epicurus' philosophy and their association with *pathē*, see Konstan (2008b).

manifested in his *dyskolia* (... <ὁ> χαλεπὸς δύσκολός τ' ἔσται γέρον, 747).⁴¹⁵ People like him do not readily seek to harm others or their property. Thus, he has some claim to respect. But he exercises 'virtue' by avoiding and thereby ultimately negating society. Knemon realizes that his ideal society is utopian and he is prepared to accept the reality, as he states to Gorgias, his mother and sister (without excluding the audience) (746).⁴¹⁶ What he finds impossible to accept, however, is to return to society, for as he states he is *chalepos* and *dyskolos*, and in addition too old (747, cf. 8-10). It is not clear whether Knemon's self-characterization reflects his own self-perception or that of other people of him, or both — not without a tone of bitterness. Knemon refuses to participate not only in society but also in decisions concerning the life of his own family (750-752). Exasperated by his intransigent *tropos* (869-870), Sostratos declares his own defeat, while the slaves find an opportunity to ridicule Knemon on account of his ever present *dyskolia* (890-958). Knemon is incapable of choosing to make a further step towards full reconciliation and *philia* with his family and society at large, for what prevails is not his pure reason, but, as we have stressed, his ingrained *dyskolia* which developed over the years through habituation. The effect, therefore, is paralysis.

It has been argued that Knemon does not become 'a convinced philanthropist' overnight; rather he 'only becomes somewhat more agreeable'.⁴¹⁷ This view does not seem convincing. According to Gorgias, at first Knemon is unwilling even to take part in the wedding ceremony of his own daughter (854). Instead,

⁴¹⁵ On the possible allusion of this verse to events of the immediate past in Athens, see Handley (1965), p. 261 who also compares Knemon's visionary picture of a city' with Plato, *Laws* 679b ff.

⁴¹⁶ Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 248 argue that these verses are reminiscent of the Aristophanic *parabasis*, and that Knemon addresses the audience and not Gorgias, his mother and sister, on the grounds that the latter 'are not litigious, warmongers, or criminals, nor is there any ground for supposing them sympathetic to these blots on society'.

⁴¹⁷ Haegemans (2001), pp. 695.

he asks Gorgias to take Simiche along with his mother and sister, so that Knemon be left completely alone (868-869). Simiche, who criticizes Knemon's attitude, seems to be forced by him to join the feast (874-875). Finally, worn out by his injuries and 'tortured' by the slaves' behaviour towards him, Knemon gives up. He surrenders to participating in the wedding feast in order to be rescued from the slaves' torment and mockery. Getas assumes the responsibility of taming Knemon (902-903)⁴¹⁸ as the latter was about to become a member of the Kallippides-Sostratos family and hence if untamed it is the slaves who will have to put up with him (903-905) -- an interesting sidelight on the precarious position of slaves in a household, when they cannot give vent to their indignation, however just it may be.

It is ultimately in the context of *dyskolia*, the deficient state of the *hexis* of *philia*, that Knemon's *orgē* can be best understood. Knemon seems to be in constant pain caused by these two states. His anger is aroused by his perceived slights, triggered by external stimuli and fostered by his imagination, his faulty reasoning, and his personal experiences.⁴¹⁹ It is not a temporary state: Knemon does not fall in the category of *pōs diakeimenoī*,⁴²⁰ a temporary proneness to a *pathos*, for example the irritable mood of a person who had a bad day (as Chaireas suggests for Knemon). The external stimuli that trigger Knemon's *orgē* affect the ingrained condition of his *dyskolia* which in the course of time has developed to a permanent character trait. Once only, as mentioned above, Knemon names the cause of his *pathos* as *epēreasmos*; at least this is how *he* interprets other people's behaviour towards him.

⁴¹⁸ Against ημερωτερος in B see Martin (1958), pp. 92-93, Handley (1965), p. 289 'corrected' to ημερωτέος, which makes better sense; cf. Arnott (1979), p. 336 and Ireland (1995), p. 90.

⁴¹⁹ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1370a27-35.

⁴²⁰ Cf. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1378a23.

Aristotle's discussion of *phronēsis*, alongside *hupolēpsis* and *doxa*, may help us to understand better how Knemon's mind operates within, and as a result of, his *pathē*. A man who does not depend on his *hupolēpsis* and *doxa*, that is his own perceptions (or misperceptions) and beliefs, but through teaching and habituation has reached the virtue of *phronēsis*, will be able to perceive reality as it is and act accordingly. His imagination---in that case *bouleutikē*-- combined with his *phronēsis* will constantly desire and pursue the right things. Knemon, in contrast, perceives the world and acts according to his own *hupolēpseis* and *doxai* (using words such as *dokō* and *oiomai*) to pursue *autarkeia*. For he is incapable of acquiring true knowledge since he has not developed the intellectual virtues, in particular that of *phronēsis*. The only time when Knemon employs *gignōskō*, admitting his own mistake in believing that *autarkeia* would solve his problems, is the moment he realizes, as a result of his accident, the possibility of unexpected death.

It has been argued that Knemon's '*ēthos* was formed by conscious choice, after a process of deliberation, in the best Aristotelian manner,' and that 'it was in choosing the means', namely *autarkeia*, 'rather than the end', one assumes *agathon*, 'that he made his mistake'.⁴²¹ But the claim that one chooses a disease, and forms one's character consciously as a diseased whole is improbable. One might claim that the disease arose from an error of judgment, but what Aristotle's theory stresses is that one must search for the cause that led to these judgments in the first place. Often the causes are to be found in the poor

⁴²¹ See Anderson (1970), p. 204. Anderson mainly argued that Menander, as 'any competent dramatist is bound to follow, in broad outline, the principles laid down in [Aristotle's] *Poetics*', stressing that Aristotle's view of character, as presented in the *Poetics*, is manifested not only in the characters' behaviour, but also in the way these characters move the plot through their actions (p. 206). Anderson focuses on their *prohairesis*, associated with *ēthos* and *dianoia*, and manifested in their actions. His approach in interpreting Knemon's character differs from our own also in the sense that our main aim is to analyse how *dyskolia* is formed and what it means to be *dyskolos* according to Plato and Aristotle (other than in the *Poetics*).

moulding of our responses to the pleasures and pains associated with passions.⁴²² According to Aristotle, the main principles of an action cannot become obvious to a person who has been utterly corrupted by pain or pleasure. Therefore, such a person is incapable of choosing either the end or the means to achieve this end.⁴²³

The retribution Knemon seeks should be also understood in the context of his *dyskolia*. The uncompromising attitude of the *dyskolos* is satisfied by constantly reproaching his fellow human beings indiscriminately, denying himself the basic need of human contact and participation in society. *Philia* and sociability are precisely what Knemon resists. His *pathos* of *orgē* is thus closely connected with his *dyskolia*, his disinclination to participate in society. Aristotle's brief comments on the nature of *dyskolia*, along with the Platonic antecedents that shed light on these comments, are important guideposts for understanding the character of Knemon and they provide a broad framework for approaching the text.

Gorgias⁴²⁴

Though the title of the play implies that the *Dyskolos*, namely Knemon, is the protagonist, in the course of the play it is evident that the play revolves around the *philia* of the two young male characters, which counterbalances and to some extent neutralizes Knemon's *dyskolia*.⁴²⁵ Although the two young men, who belong to different social classes, start their relationship in an antagonistic way, brought on by a misunderstanding (235-301), they end up forming a close

⁴²² Cf. Plato, *Laws* 791d5-9.

⁴²³ Aristotle, *NE* 1140b16-19.

⁴²⁴ On Sostratos-Gorgias' confrontation, see Arnott (1964).

⁴²⁵ For the construction of the plot of *Dyskolos* and Knemon's instrumental role in Sostratos' marriage to his daughter, see Ireland (1995), pp. 10, 12-13 and 15-16.

friendship (315-320). It is in the process of their winning Knemon over to supporting the marriage that the two young men come to understand one another.

Gorgias does not appear to be possessed by the *pathos* of *orgē*. The only scene that shows him under emotional duress is when, misunderstanding Sostratos' intentions, he checks his approach towards his sister (271-287 and 289-298). Convinced of Sostratos' ill intentions, and considering that the honour of Knemon's *oikos* (to which, however, he does not legally belong)⁴²⁶ is at stake, Gorgias accuses Sostratos of attempting to seduce the girl.⁴²⁷ When Sostratos knocks at Knemon's door, Gorgias is agitated also by signs of Sostratos' affluence. However, the text does not indicate any sign of anger on Gorgias' part. Instead, in a series of *gnōmai* (maxims), Gorgias gives Sostratos a moralizing lesson on the unpredictability of *tychē* (271-287).⁴²⁸ Although the *gnōmai* are apt, at least to the situation as he understands it, the aphoristic style is unsuitable for a young man, as Aristotle noted.⁴²⁹ Conceivably, Menander chose the name Gorgias to remind his audience of the famous sophist. Nevertheless, the maxims contribute to Gorgias' image as a young man of good character, especially since his reaction is measured, even if misdirected. Puzzled by Gorgias' lecturing, Sostratos wonders whether he is giving the impression of doing something absurd (288), which suggests that Gorgias is acting on the belief that rich people go about seducing innocent girls (292-293).⁴³⁰

⁴²⁶ See Lowe (1987), p. 130.

⁴²⁷ See Handley (1965), p. 177.

⁴²⁸ According to Handley (1965), p. 182, 'the speech itself (271-298) falls into three sections, a new direction being given twice by Sostratos' interruptions at 288 and 293'. For the role of *tychē* in the plots of Menander's plays, see mainly Vogt-Spira (1992) and Petrides (2014), p. 20.

⁴²⁹ For a definition of *gnomē* by Aristotle and how it affects and colours the character of the person who uses them, see *Rhetoric* 1394a19-31, 1395a2-8 and 22-25 and 1395b5-20.

⁴³⁰ See Handley (1965), p. 186. Ireland's (1995), p. 135 observation on v. 292 is important for the understanding of Gorgias' character and his respect for social and family values: 'though

Pan has already prepared the audience for Gorgias' mature attitude, which was moulded by the difficulties of his life (28-29). And in fact, once Sostratos makes his intentions clear (301-314), Gorgias not only unreservedly apologizes for his unjust accusation, but offers him his friendship (καὶ φίλον μ' ἔχεις, 317), in part, no doubt, because he had witnessed Sostratos' honest intentions when he saw him ready to knock at Knemon's door (267-268).

It is clear, therefore, that Gorgias makes use of his own judgement, taking account of the particulars (*kath' hekasta*) and perceiving that Sostratos does not seem to be like other rich young men. Though he is aware of Knemon's *tropos* (254), he does not hesitate to make him aware of the danger to the girl. What really matters to Gorgias is the good of his sister, though he does not expect to cure Knemon of his *dyskolia* (249-254).⁴³¹ In doing so Gorgias proves not only to be a man of principle (244-245), but also experienced, decisive, and practical, characteristics central to Aristotle's idea of *phronēsis*.⁴³²

Gorgias, then, exercises judgment, controls his emotions, apologizes to Sostratos, and forgives Knemon for his behaviour towards him. Sostratos returns Gorgias' offer of friendship, calling him γεννικός (321), that is, noble, magnanimous and high-minded.⁴³³ Gorgias, though poor, is aware that a poor person who suffers wrong at the hands of the rich can be excessively *dyskolos*

Gorgias does not use the specific terms for seduction or attempted rape, the tenor of his whole statement suggests they are what he means ... yet there is also comic irony in Gorgias' accusation...'.⁴³¹

⁴³¹ For the fragmentary nature of this section in B and its restoration, see Handley (1965), pp. 178-180 and Ireland (1995), pp. 130-131. According to Astorga (1990), p. 48, although in verses 253-254 'we have antithesis, as Aristophanes did in fr. 724, and homeoptoton, as in Eq. 437, and even similar sounding line ends, as at Ach. 1124-5, we have no humour produced. Instead the lines are serious and give the impression of a sententious old-fashioned young man'.

⁴³² See above, pp. 46-49.

⁴³³ *LSJ*, s.v.

(296),⁴³⁴ for he would consider the wrong simply as an injustice.⁴³⁵ Nevertheless, he declares that a poor person can be εὐγενής, ‘well-born’, by graciously putting up with hardships (an external condition which does not always depend on him) and by not committing any injustice (271-287). Aristotle characterizes as magnanimous (μεγαλόψυχος), noble, and generous (γεννάδας, a Doric word broadly equivalent to γεννικός)⁴³⁶ a person who ‘bears repeated and great misfortunes calmly, not because he is insensitive to them but because he is a person of nobility and greatness of soul.’⁴³⁷ Aristotle’s description pertains, no doubt, to a relatively well-off individual who can afford to be generous and proud; Menander, with a keen sensibility for the common man, has adapted this conception to describe rather an impoverished man.

Having appreciated Gorgias’ character, Sostratos forms a friendship with him, which is instrumental to marrying the girl, and commends Gorgias to his father as a suitable husband for his own sister. Gorgias, however, considers this a change of fortune beyond his station (823-826). Kallippides comments on Gorgias’ nobility (835), although in the absence of the following word in P (836) it is difficult to tell whether Kallippides’ remark expresses his true appreciation

⁴³⁴ For the use of δυσκολώτερος in a similar context, see Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1105; cf. Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 182. Haegemans (2001), p. 693, interprets the word δυσκολώτατον (296) as *misanthrōpia*, and argues that like Knemon, Gorgias is likely to turn into a *misanthrōpos* if nothing changes in his life, however *philanthrōpos* he is at this stage.

⁴³⁵ Handley (1965), p. 90, supplied the last missing word of the verse in B with ὕβρις. This choice is in accord both with Gorgias’ style of speech and with the required metrical form; cf. Arnott (1979), p. 226, and Ireland (1995), p. 50. Handley (1965), p. 186 supports this conjecture, associating the nature of the particular wrong with Aristotle’s discussion of hybris in *Politics* 1295b10f, *Rhetoric* 1375a13, 1378b22-26 and 1389b7, with reference to the young and rich who are in particular prone to hybristic acts of this kind. Martin (1958), p. 43 opted for τύχην instead of ὕβριν.

⁴³⁶ See *LSJ*, sv. γέννα. Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 186 stress that ‘unfortunately the word [γεννικός] is too uncommon in a straightforward sense (... Plato, *Phaedr.* 279a, of Isocrates) for its precise force to be appreciated, but its congeners γενναῖος and εὐγενής suggest the man who not only has high motives but also acts firmly upon them’.

⁴³⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1100b30-2, trans. Rowe and Broadie (2002), p. 107.

of the young man or is ironic.⁴³⁸ Whatever the case, Gorgias' refusal to marry the girl reveals his self-respect and unwillingness to exploit the generosity of others (825-826 and 833-834). At the same time, his attitude is a sign of pride (833) and perhaps too of shame, masked as pride, which however succumbs quickly to Kallippides' encouragement (838-840), in the spirit of comedy.

Gorgias' character is a consequence of his *empeiria*, earned through his difficulties in life, and not a result of his age. It is his practical mindset which enables him to moralise on the *kath' olou* while recognising the *kath' hekasta*, and to take appropriate action under particular circumstances.⁴³⁹ Experience is also associated with memory, as Aristotle noted, for 'it is from memory that men acquire experience, because the numerous memories of the same thing eventually produce the effect of a single experience'.⁴⁴⁰ In contrast to Knemon's memories of bad experiences with people over a long period of time, the young Gorgias has gentler memories, which explains to some extent his trusting attitude towards Sostratos, even before he can fully assess his character.

From this examination of Gorgias' character it seems that his emotional reactions are limited to measured agitation, which cannot be described as *orgē*, although there may be an element of just indignation. He shows the same measured emotion in his criticism of Getas. Getas has (he suggests) treated the girl's reputation as though he were totally unconnected with her, when they both have a responsibility toward her as family. This is a reasonable objection, given his suspicions of the leisured rich, rather than a sign of inappropriate

⁴³⁸ See Martin (1958), p. 87 (ἀνόητος), Handley (1965), pp. 112 (περίεργος), 276, Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 261-2 (παράλογος), Arnott (1979), p. 322 (παράλογος) and Ireland (1995), p. 86 (παράδοξος).

⁴³⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1141b14-18.

⁴⁴⁰ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 980b28-981a2, trans. Tredennick (1933), p.4

passion, and he delivers his reproach in moderate tones, without the threats of violence that masters often employ (e.g., Demeas in *Samia*, 641-657).

Sostratos

Sostratos, as already mentioned, has a difficult task: to overcome Knemon's *dyskolia* in order to fulfill Pan's plan. Though to a certain extent Pan predetermines the audience's view by his remarks on Sostratos' age and status in society (39-41), as well as the circumstances in which he was stricken by *erōs* (43-45), he does not offer any information about Sostratos' character, contrary to what he says about Gorgias (28-29). The fulfilment of Pan's plan therefore remains in Sostratos' hands. He succeeds by forging a friendship with Gorgias. In order to assess his character, we shall examine how Sostratos reacts to the circumstances he faces, for it is action that reveals one's reason, *pathē* and choices.

Sostratos' main problem seems to be his inexperience, which makes him depend on other people, such as Chaireas and Getas.⁴⁴¹ He is aware of his inability to speak persuasively and so lacks self-confidence (145-146).⁴⁴² The question is whether Sostratos will develop confidence over the course of the play, and how or whether the emotions of cowardice, fear and shame will affect

⁴⁴¹ According to Zagagi (1979), esp. p. 42, Sostratos' main trait of character is his over-activeness and eagerness, which moves and links the plot, a view followed by Brown (1992), p. 14. Sommerstein (1998), p. 110 stresses another important dimension of Sostratos' character: '[Sostratos] is also in other ways one of the least masculine of Menander's young men. He is indecisive, diffident and ineffective, relying mainly on others to secure for him the goals at which he aims. ... He is expensively dressed, pale of face, and unused to sun.... characteristics, for the most part, thought of as typically *feminine*'.

⁴⁴² There is an analogy here with Moschion's lack of courage in *Samia* (δειλός, 65); he too is young, but by the end is bold enough to stand up to his father, and he has a sense of shame (ὀκνῶ λέγειν τὰ λοίπ' ἴσως δ' αἰσχύνομαι, 47). Ireland (1995), p. 123 notes that Sostratos' loss of nerve here is 'dramatically necessary for a number of reasons', among them that 'within New Comedy young men in love were conventionally ineffectual. In this respect Sostratos does not disappoint our genre expectations'.

his behaviour. The use of $\lambda\lambda\tilde{\omega}$ is not accidental, for this verb conveys the sense of ‘chatter’ or ‘prattle’.⁴⁴³ Sostratos has no skill at pointless, ‘unnecessary talk’,⁴⁴⁴ as reflected too in his response to Gorgias (301). It is his inexperience and lack of self-confidence⁴⁴⁵ that derail his attempts to approach Knemon.⁴⁴⁶ Acting on impulse, Sostratos first sends Pyrrhias to deal with Knemon simply because he happens to be present (he later repents of making use of a slave in this way). His second attempt also fails, since Chaireas, whom Sostratos considers a true friend and a practical man with good judgement (55-57), refuses to act on his behalf at this stage. Despite the fact that Sostratos acquires first-hand knowledge of Knemon’s *dyskolia*, he contemplates a third attempt, this time through Getas, whom he considers, once again, a most experienced man (181-185).

By recognizing the value of *empeiria*, Sostratos shows good judgement. However, the fact that he successively entrusts such a serious matter to inappropriate people shows *erōs* and youth cloud his judgment. This aspect of Sostratos’ character seems to be confirmed by his final attempt to approach Knemon face-to-face, which reflects both naivety and Knemon’s exceptional *dyskolia*. Sostratos wants to get on with this task quickly (266-268) and without much thought (266), but changes his mind out of fear of Knemon. Yet this does not curb Sostratos’ determination.

Sostratos’ behaviour towards the girl is more complex than Aristotle’s description of the *ēthē* of young men as being *akrateis* with reference to *aphrodisia*

⁴⁴³ *LSJ*, s.v. For the use of *lalein* in the context of ordinary conversation, see Alexis, *Aesopus* 1.10 in Arnott (1996b), p. 79. In Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 21 and 409 the verb has the meaning of ‘unnecessary or unwanted talk’, see Olson (2002), p. 73.

⁴⁴⁴ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 184.

⁴⁴⁵ See Goldberg (1980), pp. 75-76 and 80.

⁴⁴⁶ Though Brown (1992), pp. 12-14 has pointed out the impasse faced by Sostratos, he does not associate Sostratos’ unsuccessful attempts with a flaw of character.

would indicate.⁴⁴⁷ Sostratos displays (through his own choice) a ‘virtuous’ disposition in respect to *erōs*, and may be described as ‘*enkratēs*’. His self-control is the clearer in that Gorgias expresses the common view that when a young man encounters an attractive girl (at least in this genre), rape immediately presents itself as a likely outcome. We see here clearly how Menander exploits and at the same time subverts conventional stereotypes. Though he is in love and has the opportunity to take advantage of the girl, Sostratos limits himself to extolling her beauty (191-193) and helping her to fill her jar with water (197-199). The few words they exchange (199-201 and 211-212) are enough to fuel Sostratos’ *erōs*, but he also expresses his appreciation of her character, remarking on the contrast between her background (ἄγροικος) and her behaviour (ἐλευθερίως γέ).⁴⁴⁸ Though he idealises the girl under the influence of *erōs*, his view of her is confirmed later on (387).⁴⁴⁹ Sostratos approves of Knemon’s fierceness (387), to the extent that the girl’s virtues are a product of her upbringing. When Sostratos is informed by Gorgias about the girl’s upbringing (381-389), he characterizes Knemon as ‘hater of knaves’ (μισοπονήρου, 387).⁴⁵⁰ Without excusing Knemon’s surliness, this sentiment anticipates Knemon’s apologia and hints at a positive side to his character.⁴⁵¹ The only moment when Sostratos shows loss of self-control is when he almost cannot resist kissing the girl, and he does this only once, though in a most inappropriate situation (during Knemon’s rescue, 686-689), which also serves the comic purpose.

⁴⁴⁷ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1389a3-8.

⁴⁴⁸ Romilly (1979), pp. 101 and 201-214, discusses in detail the connection among the terms *philanthrōpia*, *koinōnikos*, *praotēs*, *epieikeia* and *sungnōmē* in Menander.

⁴⁴⁹ See Handley (1965), p. 167.

⁴⁵⁰ For a description of *misoponēros*, see Antiphanes’ *Misoponēros* fr. 157 K-A, Handley (1965), p. 197 and Lape (2004), p. 128, n. 44. For a discussion of *philoponēros* in the context of *philia*, see Aristotle, *NE* 1165b15-18 and Theophrastos’ character XXIV, the ‘Φιλοπόνηρος’ in Diggle (2004), pp. 152-153 and 499-500. for the political connotations of *ponēria* in Athens.

⁴⁵¹ Cf. Lysias’ 19.12-16 admiration for the man who preferred to marry a woman without a dowry (although he could have chosen a woman with great fortune), on account of her father’s *chrēstotēs* and good citizenship.

The question arises whether Sostratos' emotional response to Knemon is different from that of the other characters. With the exception of Gorgias, as mentioned above, the other characters are terrified of Knemon's *dyskolia*, manifested mainly in his excessive *orgē*. One might have thought that Sostratos would feel *orgē* towards the *dyskolos*, as the obstacle to his desire, but that is not the way *orgē* works, at least as Aristotle treats it. It might have been more appropriate later, when Knemon seems to hold him in some contempt as a rich and idle young man, but then, the young are inclined to accept gestures of disapproval from their elders. Instead, like the other characters, Sostratos is possessed by fear (δέδοικα, 151), which, according to Aristotle,⁴⁵² is incompatible with anger. Menander's preference for this verb over other synonymous words, such as φοβοῦμαι, does not seem to be based solely on metrical factors, for although *phobos* and *deos* seem to 'largely overlap',⁴⁵³ *dedoika* has a 'slightly more elevated tone', carrying a connotation of awe.⁴⁵⁴ Sostratos is aware of the possible consequences of his encounter with Knemon (151). His opinion (φαίνεται, 147; δοκεῖ, 150) of the nature of the approaching threat⁴⁵⁵ is based on his own perception and evaluation (147), which were accentuated by Pyrrhias' account.⁴⁵⁶ In response to the imminent threat Sostratos reacts by retreating from Knemon's sight in order to protect himself (148-149). Nevertheless, Sostratos remains optimistic that Knemon's *dyskolia* can be effectively dealt with by an *empeiros* character that is, Getas.

⁴⁵² See above, p. 118.

⁴⁵³ Konstan (2006), pp. 153-154; Stewart (1892), vol. I pp. 283-284, maintains the same view.

⁴⁵⁴ Konstan (2006), p. 154, with reference to Plato, *Protagoras* 358d, Ammonius distinguishes between *deos* and *phobos*, the latter being more lasting.

⁴⁵⁵ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1382a37-34 defines as φοβερά things which have the power to destroy us and give us great pain. We can recognize a threat as terrifying by its signs. Among these are the emotions of *orgē* and *echthra* because we are afraid that those who are under the influence of these emotions may wrong us.

⁴⁵⁶ See above, p. 116.

When Gorgias confronts Sostratos (271-298), though the latter is offended and upset (τετάρραγμ', 313) by the unfair accusation, he does not feel either fear or *orgē*. Sostratos begins his defence in terms that reflect a gentle disposition (299-300). This is followed by a phrase in the imperative, which suggests a tone of outspokenness rather than admonition: καὶ σύ γ' ὁ λαλῶν, πρ[όσεχε δὴ (301).⁴⁵⁷ Sostratos' short speech centres on his intentions. He first presents Gorgias with the facts (302), and then proceeds to explain his own choices and actions (304-306), before refuting Gorgias' accusation about his supposed criminal intentions (303). He also stresses his social and financial status (306-307), and expresses his honourable intention to marry the girl without a dowry, promising 'to cherish her' (στέργων) (309). *Stergein* is important here. Sostratos does feel *erōs*, but he would not confess that to Gorgias, since it is not the appropriate way to ask for a girl's hand in marriage.⁴⁵⁸ Sostratos is expressing his intention to take care of the girl and treat her as a parent would. After all, she is still practically a child.⁴⁵⁹ The term, then, expresses his kindly intentions, and looks to distance his motive from mere sexual *erōs*. By personally approaching Knemon, Sostratos gives Gorgias proof of this intention and commitment, while he invokes Pan and the Nymphs as his witnesses to overcome Gorgias' suspicion (311-314). Through his speech Sostratos succeeds not only in making Gorgias apologize (315-316) but also in changing his mind about him. Despite Sostratos' conviction that he is incapable of persuading people (145-146), when it comes to Gorgias' accusations he manages to overcome his deficiency. This echoes Aristotle's analysis of the means of

⁴⁵⁷ The conjecture πρ[όσεχε δὴ, proposed by Martin (1958), p. 43 and adopted by Handley (1965), p. 90 and Arnott (1979), p. 226.

⁴⁵⁸ Moschion in *Samia* (624-625) not only feels *pothos* for Plangon but also affection which developed through *sunētheia* and is a necessary element for the further development of *philia*, see Sommerstein (2013), p. 292.

⁴⁵⁹ In Greek literature *storgē* and *stergein* are rarely used to suggest love between husband and wife. Aristotle mainly uses *stergein* for the affection parents feel towards their children and that between siblings (*NE* 1157a28-29, 1161b18-26 and 1162a9-14).

persuasion (*pisteis*), above all the role the speaker's *ēthos* plays in convincing an audience: 'For we believe fair-minded people to a greater extent and more quickly [than we do others] on all subjects in general and completely so in cases where there is no exact knowledge but room for doubt. And this should result from the speech, not from a previous opinion that the speaker is a certain kind of person'.⁴⁶⁰

It is Sostratos' *ēthos*, then, that convinces Gorgias, despite his prejudice against Sostratos' social class. In contrast to Gorgias, Sostratos does not employ maxims. His speech rather depends on revealing his reasoning and *prohairesis*. Later, however, in his conversation with his father in Act V, Sostratos does speak in the sententious manner of Gorgias; this is a good example of how conversational style depends in part on the relationship between the parties, and not just on character taken in isolation: with a simple man like Gorgias, Sostratos can be allowed to sound more like the superior speaker.

What lies behind Sostratos' inability to fulfil his task is essentially his inexperience, which as we said can be attributed to his young age.⁴⁶¹ It is in the final stage of his attempts to approach Knemon that *tychē* throws Sostratos into the hands of Gorgias, who has the experience that he lacks, who can think correctly regarding what actions to take and, most importantly, who will take Sostratos' interest to heart in the manner of a friend. Aristotle's ideas on *philia*, discussed in Chapter 1, help us to understand the sudden emergence of Sostratos and Gorgias' friendship. A parallel presentation of Sostratos and Gorgias, once their misunderstanding is resolved in the play, illuminates further the elements of their characters as revealed through their common action toward a common end.

⁴⁶⁰ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1356a5-10, trans. Kennedy (1991), p. 38.

⁴⁶¹ Cf. Aristotle, *NE* 1142a15-16.

The *philia* of Sostratos and Gorgias

The beginning of their friendship occurs when Gorgias starts to see Sostratos' own point of view (putting aside his well-founded prejudices), and cautiously shows that he is willing to enter into Sostratos' world and assist him in realizing his desires. In turn, Sostratos for the first time in the play responds to someone in the manner of a friend, –rather than as an instrument to provide him with a service. Menander brilliantly plays on the audience's expectations by having Sostratos respond to Gorgias' declaration that 'you have me as friend' (317), with the words that Gorgias will thus be *chrēsimos* (320) with respect to his affairs.⁴⁶²

The word *chrēsimos* here is ambiguous. The conjunction *καὶ* introducing Sostratos' response (320) to Gorgias' offer of *philia* (317) may imply that Sostratos regards Gorgias both as *philos* and as *chrēsimos* or may emphasize Sostratos' intention to use Gorgias instrumentally.⁴⁶³ A superficial reading might suggest that Sostratos has his self-interest in mind, and that he sees Gorgias only as someone who can help him out.⁴⁶⁴ But it is clear from the context and from what follows that what Sostratos means is that he is desperate for help. When Gorgias asks him in what way he can help (321) Sostratos' reply is unexpected: rather than setting out his problems with Knemon or giving any other particulars, he says, 'I see that you have a kind heart/a spirited character' (321).⁴⁶⁵ This is how Gorgias can be of help, by way of his *tropos*, his character.

⁴⁶² Jäkel (1979), p. 262 underlines the fact that Sostratos had an ideal model of a friend in mind and he found one in Gorgias; that is why he calls Gorgias a friend right after they meet.

⁴⁶³ Ireland (1995), p. 137 argues that 'Sostratos' speedy recourse to the word indicates his continuing tendency to be parasitic on the efforts of others, and perhaps an unspoken sigh of relief at not having to put into practice his earlier resolve to knock at Knemon's door'.

⁴⁶⁴ See Anderson (1970), p. 206.

⁴⁶⁵ Arnott (1979), p. 229 and Ireland (1995), p. 53 respectively.

The young men recognize each other's worthiness in different aspects of their characters.

Aristotle, as stated above, stresses the importance and duration of that *philia* which is based on the internal goodness of men and not on *ta pragmata* alone.⁴⁶⁶ Sostratos' utterance reveals his *ēthos*. The turning point of the mutual recognition of one another's characters lies in Sostratos' acknowledgement of Gorgias' character (321). Rather than listing *ta pragmata* Sostratos expresses trust in the character traits of Gorgias. It seems, therefore, that Sostratos too has grasped that he is being seen now as he *is*, and that his own aims towards Gorgias' sister are being met with approval. Gorgias immediately responds in the mode of a friend. Rather than telling Sostratos what he might want to hear, such as promise of access to Knemon and his own influence, he offers him a blunt list of the difficulties to be faced.⁴⁶⁷ He is not a *kolax*; rather, he wants Sostratos to know the obstacles and his limited ability, to help. He seems also to insinuate that there may be an insurmountable obstacle in that Knemon's daughter is his sole solace in life, and he may not be willing to part with her. Furthermore, he will marry her only to an *homotropos* (337).

Despite the obstacles indicated by Gorgias,⁴⁶⁸ Sostratos insists that his love for the girl is genuine and that nothing can stop him, not even digging in the fields, which he actually does as a way of approaching Knemon. Sostratos' determination creates a sense of trust on Gorgias' part, since it gives a rather touching proof of his sincerity, callow as he might seem. Later, in his effort to help Sostratos, Gorgias, who has knowledge of Knemon's *dyskolia*,⁴⁶⁹ does not hesitate to attribute Knemon's rescue also to Sostratos (753), even though

⁴⁶⁶ See above, p. 57 and Aristotle, *EE* 1236b1-3 and 1237b30-34.

⁴⁶⁷ See Zagagi (1979), p. 44.

⁴⁶⁸ On Gorgias' characterization of Knemon, see Handley (1965), p. 189.

⁴⁶⁹ See above, p. 25.

Sostratos himself admits that this was far from true (671-672).⁴⁷⁰ This is again a sign of true friendship. As Aristotle says, a true friend not only wishes good for the other but also does what he can to promote it, and will even give credit to a friend for a good deed of his own.⁴⁷¹ Gorgias is moved by Sostratos' undisguised *ēthos* (764),⁴⁷² displayed in action (i.e., digging in the field, 766-767),⁴⁷³ and by his respectful attitude towards people of lower social status, contrary to what one would usually expect from a wealthy young man (765-769).⁴⁷⁴ This is enough proof for Gorgias (770). His remark that he wishes Sostratos not to change his character (771) expresses affection but also a desire to continue their friendship.

Sostratos' attitude towards Gorgias is more reserved. It takes some time for him to call Gorgias a friend. Evidently, Gorgias, too, has to give proof of his character, in order to be considered by Sostratos not only as *chrēsimos* (320 and 561) and an ally for his own plans (562), but also a *philos*.⁴⁷⁵ It is when Gorgias refuses to participate in the sacrificial feast (611-2) that Sostratos calls him a 'συνήθης' (614), and with exaggeration a *πάλαι φίλος* (615).⁴⁷⁶ At this point Sostratos has already experienced Gorgias' attitude and friendship towards him, expressed through Gorgias' use of the word *philos* (317) and his implicit consent for Sostratos to follow him and Daos to the fields (371-374). Sostratos' use of *συνήθης* here is a sign of his impulsive nature: he imagines that he and

⁴⁷⁰ See Arnott (1989), p. 29 and Brown (1992), pp. 16-7.

⁴⁷¹ Cf. Aristotle *NE* 1157b31-1158a1.

⁴⁷² As stated above, esp. pp. 57-59, one of the characteristics that attract friends to each other is a genuine character.

⁴⁷³ See Brown (1992), p. 16.

⁴⁷⁴ According to Groningen (1961), p. 108, Gorgias is presented as a model of *sōphrosunē*, so highly valued in Greek culture; but Sostratos is equally sensible.

⁴⁷⁵ See Handley (1965), p. 231.

⁴⁷⁶ See Arnott (1979), pp. 282-283 with n. 1 and Ireland (1995), pp. 153-154. According to Handley (1965), p. 239, Gorgias refuses to join the party mainly because of his shyness and 'the inverted pride of the poor countryman [which] will not let him accept what he takes as a favour'.

Gorgias are old friends, and no doubt sincerely at the moment, but it is scarcely true. Aristotle insists that *συνήθεια* is a necessary condition for friendship. To be sure, one cannot show a friendship forming over time in a comedy, where the action takes place so rapidly; perhaps the present scene, and Sostratos' absurd exclamation, are Menander's way of turning the commonsense understanding of friendship that we see encapsulated in Aristotle's prescription to comic purposes. At first sight, it would appear that the use of the words *συνήθης* and *πάλαι φίλος* might imply cunning or flattery on Sostratos' part, since the friendship derives only from utility. However, even Aristotle does not exclude usefulness from genuine friendship, and does not automatically impugn a person's virtue.⁴⁷⁷ Sostratos, though openly acknowledging that he is using Gorgias for his own benefit (320 and 561-562), nonetheless is prepared to treat him as a genuine friend.

Menander puts the word *φιλανθρωπέυσομαι* (573) in the mouth of Sostratos, in connection with the family feast to which Gorgias is invited, and this may be associated with *philia* in the general sense of how a person should treat fellow citizens and human beings generally. Scholars have rendered *philanthrōpeuesthai* as 'to be generous'⁴⁷⁸ but there is no agreement among them on whom this word refers to.⁴⁷⁹ Balme's suggestion that Sostratos addresses Pan and displays generosity towards the god does not seem convincing.⁴⁸⁰ Gomme-Sandbach argue more plausibly that *philanthrōpeuesthai* takes a man (Gorgias or

⁴⁷⁷ Cf. Aristotle *NE* 1156b14-15, 1157a1-3.

⁴⁷⁸ See Arnott (1979), p. 275, Ireland (1995), p. 69 and Balme (2001), p. 25. According to Luck (1975), p. 264, Menander seems to use *philanthrōpōs* and derivatives with various connotations depending on the context. For example, in *Aspis* 395, *Samia* 35, and *Dyskolos* 105, 573, it has the meaning of 'kind', 'friendly', 'generous', 'courteous', almost 'well-mannered', reflecting politeness, understanding and sympathy and 'broadly speaking *humanitas* corresponds either to *philanthrōpia* or *paideia* or to a combination of both. For the moral and philosophical dimension of *philanthrōpia* in Menander's plays, see Haegemans (2001), esp. pp. 678-680.

⁴⁷⁹ Ireland (1995), p. 151.

⁴⁸⁰ Balme (2001), p. 295, states that Sostratos 'will give generous gifts to Pan'.

Daos), and not a god (Pan), as object.⁴⁸¹ Though Sostratos can be thought of as being generous to Pan through the abundance of his mother's offerings to the god, Gomme-Sandbach's interpretation seems better, for by inviting not only Gorgias but also Daos to the feast, Sostratos exhibits *philanthrōpia* towards his fellow beings. The same core idea appears in *Dyskolos* with reference to Knemon's behaviour (in a negative sense: οὐ πάνυ φιλόανθρωπον, 147) and to that of Pyrrhias towards Knemon (φιλόανθρωπος, 105). In both cases Menander uses this term in a way that corresponds to Aristotle's view of *philanthrōpia*.⁴⁸² That a religious feast is the context in which *philia* and *philanthrōpia* are mentioned suggests the communal and sacred aspect of friendship (κεκοινωνηκότες ἱερῶν 560-561), which forms a firmer basis for the alliance of the principals.⁴⁸³ Having shown *philia* and *philanthrōpia* towards Gorgias, Sostratos takes the opportunity to express both his admiration for Gorgias' titanic action (683-684)⁴⁸⁴ during Knemon's rescue, and his own inactivity (682-683), since he was besotted by the girl.⁴⁸⁵ Thanks perhaps to his admiration for Gorgias' character, Sostratos now has the confidence and the generosity of spirit to lecture his own father (797-812), who refuses at first to accept Gorgias as his son-in-law on account of Gorgias' poverty (795-796).⁴⁸⁶ At the beginning of their friendship, their utility was not mutual, since Sostratos had nothing to give to Gorgias in return for his assistance. Theirs was not a *tit-for-tat* friendship, where both parties weigh the advantage to be gained. When Sostratos offers his sister to Gorgias in marriage, the reciprocation is a sign of

⁴⁸¹ Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 223-224.

⁴⁸² See above, p. 60. Demosthenes more often than any other orator uses the word *philanthrōpia* and its derivatives as a civic virtue that pertains to both institutions and citizens in the *polis*; for example, see speeches: 21.5, 112, 209, 231; 25. 51, 81; 24. 24, 193; cf Isocrates, *Philippus* 114, 116; see also, Dover (1974), pp. 201-203 and Konstan (2001) pp. 88-94.

⁴⁸³ See above, pp. 60-63.

⁴⁸⁴ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 238 and Ireland (1995), p. 157.

⁴⁸⁵ See Handley (1965), p. 247.

⁴⁸⁶ Rather than *philia*, Goldberg (1980), p. 84, detects an increasing sympathy on the part of Sostratos for Gorgias (vv. 522-551 and 666-680), based on the latter's 'likeable traits'.

his maturity, acquired in the course of his ordeal and under Gorgias' guidance.⁴⁸⁷

When he makes his proposal to his father, Sostratos is no longer running to others for help. Instead of enumerating Gorgias' qualities, Sostratos issues general comments on the futility of material, hidden wealth (812), in contrast to the value of visible friendship (811).⁴⁸⁸ Sostratos supports his proposal by appealing to the principle of friendship as a certain guide to happiness, whereas wealth is a product of fickle chance. If, as Aristotle says, *philia* is what binds the *polis*⁴⁸⁹ Sostratos' attitude reflects an affirmation of a supreme political principle in action. Finally, persuaded by his son's mature approach, Kallippides gives his consent,⁴⁹⁰ having first affirmed that Sostratos has in fact tested his friend (816).⁴⁹¹ It is reasonable to suppose that Kallippides' trusting attitude towards his son's judgment and willingness to accept his proposal (789-790) reflect the relationships in his own *oikos*, in contrast to Knemon's.⁴⁹² Gorgias reciprocates Sostratos' trust and friendship by remarking on his own feelings, indicated by the verb ἀγαπῶ (824). He has respect and admiration for his friend (823-824), an emotional dimension that cannot be absent from a true friendship.⁴⁹³

⁴⁸⁷ Zagagi (1979), p. 47, observes a redirection of Sostratos' behaviour here.

⁴⁸⁸ Handley (1965), p. 274, stresses the technical connotation of ἀφανής and ἐμφανής οὐσία.

⁴⁸⁹ Aristotle, *NE* 1155a22-24.

⁴⁹⁰ Anderson (1970), p. 201 describes Kallippides as 'a good example of ... the liberal man', as discussed by Aristotle, *NE* 1119b20 ff; cf. Ireland (1995), pp. 164-165.

⁴⁹¹ Perhaps an allusion by Menander to the legal term *dokimasia*, namely the examination of suitability by the *boulē* which the archons had to undergo before entering office. On the procedure of *dokimasia*, see MacDowell (1986), pp. 58, 69, 160 and 167-169.

⁴⁹² For an appreciation of Kallippides' untypical comic type of *kurios* and husband, see Groningen (1961), p. 103-104.

⁴⁹³ See above, p. 58 and p. 144, n. 465.

Chaireas

As suggested earlier, despite his inexperience Sostratos' judgment of people is not wrong. In the case of Chaireas, Sostratos' opinion does not seem to be the result of a poor judgment of character but rather a sign that Chaireas is not a real friend, unlike Gorgias. Sostratos is in urgent need of an experienced man to help him out, and Chaireas here fits the bill; as he puts it, a friend (58) capable of choosing the best course of action in a given case,⁴⁹⁴ and Chaireas is experienced in the matter of acquiring a woman (57-68), whether she is an *hetaira* (59) or a free citizen (64), in which case marriage is the object.⁴⁹⁵ Chaireas, unlike Sostratos, has practical skills in managing (68) affairs, and is prepared to collect the necessary information about the girl's family (65), financial state (66)⁴⁹⁶ and behaviour (66).⁴⁹⁷

Chaireas' claims to expertise are reminiscent of the sophists' claim that their mastery of *kairos* allowed them to fit any speech to the occasion for the purpose of persuasion.⁴⁹⁸ As has been noted, a notion of *kairos* was attributed to the sophist Gorgias, too, and it was generally recognized that knowledge of the rules of rhetoric must be complemented by knowledge of the appropriate time and manner to apply the rules.⁴⁹⁹ So too Chaireas tries to persuade Sostratos

⁴⁹⁴ On Chaireas' name and role in the play, see Handley (1965), pp. 140-141, Gomme and Sandbach (1973), pp. 131-132 and Ireland (1995), pp. 116-117.

⁴⁹⁵ Lape (2004), p. 111, offers a different interpretation of Chaireas' speech (vv. 58-66), arguing that 'in so doing [Chaireas] suggests that Sostratos has gotten his plots mixed up, that he is treating a freeborn girl like a courtesan.'

⁴⁹⁶ See Gomme and Sandbach (1973), p. 146.

⁴⁹⁷ Cf. Menander fr. 804 K-A.

⁴⁹⁸ The Sophist Protagoras is said to have been the first to introduce the importance of *kairos* into the art of rhetoric: *Diogenes Laertius* 9.52.5-8.

⁴⁹⁹ See Kennedy (1994), p. 35. Kennedy explains that a consequence of the sophistic position that true knowledge is impossible is 'that the value of opinions of what is true ... should be judged from the circumstances as understood by individuals at a particular time; courses of practical action can best be determined by considering the advantages of the alternatives' (at p. 8).

that he knows how to apply the rules to all cases, including the case before them involving a belligerent and rustic parent. Chaireas is careful to insist on Sostratos' own lack of self confidence, while scorning all the alternatives that Sostratos has thought of in his desperation. Chaireas' remarks, not without a note of exaggeration, are aimed at showing that there is only one sound advisor, that is, himself.

Chaireas is not a genuine friend to Sostratos -- though even here, as we shall see, there is room for the complex characterization favoured by Menander. Frightened of Knemon, Chaireas does not hesitate to abandon Sostratos, promising to deal with his problem at a more suitable time (*πρακτικώτερον εὐκαιρία*, 128-129).⁵⁰⁰ A look at the use of *εὐκαιρία* by Chaireas in the context of his association with Sostratos is relevant to assessing his character. We may turn here to Plato, who discusses *eukairia* in relation to speech as a means to educate the soul. Plato points out that one must not only know the soul abstractly; the orator has to study the division of souls into different character types and the types of speeches by which each is affected. 'He must learn this well,' Plato points out, 'then put his theory into practice and develop the ability to discern each kind clearly as it occurs in the actions of real life. Otherwise, he won't be any better off than he was when he was still listening to these discussions in school'.⁵⁰¹ This method rests on probability as an alternative, and what is probable is simply 'what is likely' to be the case. This is the rhetoric which in *Gorgias* Plato calls a type of *kolakeia*.⁵⁰² *Kolakeia*, according to Plato, is not based on knowing but on a kind of 'knack'. In this sense, the *eukairia* espoused by the *kolax* differs from the *eukairia* of the one who truly knows.

⁵⁰⁰ According to Brown (1992), p. 10, Sostratos simply 'brings a friend along to help him; that friend does not even stay around long enough to meet Knemon but withdraws smartly on hearing the report of the slave'.

⁵⁰¹ Plato, *Phaedrus* 261 and 270a-272e, trans. Nehamas and Woodruff (1997), pp. 546-548.

⁵⁰² Plato, *Gorgias* 463b, trans. Irwin (1979), p. 31.

Plato's view of a correct *eukairia* and his contrast with mere probability as a form of *kolakeia* parallels the sophistic view of *kairos* discussed above.

Returning now to Chaireas, we may note that he possesses a soul that has the ability to calculate as a result of experience, but certainly not a brave soul,⁵⁰³ which would enable him to face Knemon. Like Menander's characters generally, Chaireas is not a philosopher's model personality but a complex figure in a naturalistic comedy. He is not even as courageous as Getas and Sikon in their response to Knemon's inhumane behaviour (470-472 and 510-511), for even if they fail to possess genuinely brave souls (on account of their low social status as a slave and a cook, respectively), they nevertheless do not hesitate to confront Knemon with a kind of audacity. Chaireas, however, avoids facing Knemon on the pretext that he will wait till he finds Knemon at a more appropriate moment. Chaireas is weak, although he does show signs of being 'prudent' in the colloquial sense, in that he wisely protects himself against Knemon's evident rage (for Chaireas too, discretion is, as Falstaff put it, the better part of valor). His strategy is not without reason: after all, Sostratos himself does not stand up to Knemon's onslaught. Though Knemon is not likely to soften or to be more approachable at another moment, at the time that Chaireas offers his counsel, neither he nor Sostratos is in a position to know this. For all his apparent fecklessness, not even Chaireas -- a thoroughly minor and protatic character -- is treated as a mere cardboard type.

For Aristotle, a *kolax* is 'a man [who contributes pleasure] in order that he may get some advantage in the direction of money or the things that money buys.'⁵⁰⁴ Nowhere in his short appearance in the play does Chaireas show any sign of such a money-directed attitude. Aristotle, however, may help us to understand

⁵⁰³ See Irwin (1979), p. 132.

⁵⁰⁴ Aristotle, *NE* 1127a8-10, trans. Ross et al. (1998), p. 100.

Chaireas' *kolakeia*. For, according to his description a *kolax* 'accommodates himself readily to his associates' desires'⁵⁰⁵ This clearly resembles Chaireas' attitude. The absence of mention of advantage to Chaireas perhaps suggests that Menander is interested in a deeper portrait true and false friendships rather than in outright exploitation. Moreover, the use in *Dyskolos* of *kolakeia* as a means to approach people in the case of Chaireas (and Sikon: *κολακικόν*, 492) may be connected with Aristotle's view of a certain kind of character that one sees in every-day life). These types include *kolakes* and obsequious people, *areskoi*,⁵⁰⁶ both of whom in order 'to give pleasure praise everything and never oppose'; in turn, one often meets their opposites, the *dyskoloi* and contentious folks, 'who oppose everything and care not a whit about giving pain'; finally, there are the *philoï*, who occupy the mean, 'in virtue of which a man will put up with and will resent the right things and in the right way', an *hexis* which Aristotle finds commendable.⁵⁰⁷

It is indicative that, in the list of *dramatis personae* in B, Chaireas is identified not as a *philos* but as *parasitos*,⁵⁰⁸ one assumes on account of the traits he displays.⁵⁰⁹ Until Alexis' time *parasitos* was synonymous with *kolax* in everyday use.⁵¹⁰ Middle Comedy devotes whole plays to the *parasitos*, while the *kolax* in Eupolis (*Kolakes*) and Aristophanes has pretty much this same character.⁵¹¹ It seems, therefore, that the reception of Chaireas as *parasitos* rather than *kolax* in the late

⁵⁰⁵ Aristotle, *EE* 1233b30-32, trans. Rackham (1935), p. 351.

⁵⁰⁶ Sostratos' use of the word ἀρεσκόντως (69) with reference to Chaireas' attitude in dealing with his situation might be an allusion to *areskeia*. Sostratos uses the word in the sense of not being in agreement with Chaireas' attitude and hence not pleased with that. Sostratos' comment might suggest that in the past Chaireas was more pleasant to him.

⁵⁰⁷ Aristotle, *NE* 1126b11-1127a13, trans. Ross et al. (1998), pp. 98-99.

⁵⁰⁸ Martin (1958), p. 1, Handley (1965), pp. 37, 48 and 138-139, followed by Lape (2004), p. 110, n. 4.

⁵⁰⁹ See Groningen (1961), p. 103.

⁵¹⁰ See Arnott (1996b), pp. 542-550, who also mentions Antiphanes and Diphilus who composed plays entitled *Parasitos*. For Eupolis' *Kolakes*, see Storey (2003), pp. 179-197.

⁵¹¹ For example, Aristophanes, *Wasps* 43, 419 and 683.

third-early fourth century AD, when B was copied, was closer to the perception of a *kolax* in Middle Comedy.

At first sight, it would appear that there is no direct relationship between Chaireas' behaviour and Theophrastos' description of the *kolax*.⁵¹² Theophrastos defines *kolakeia* as a degrading, disgraceful, or shameful (*aischron*) association for the advantage of the *kolax*. In all the examples of his behaviour that Theophrastos gives, the *kolax* acts with an excess of praise or seemingly friendly actions; the actions of the *kolax* never originate from a desire for the good of the associate. To be sure, Theophrastos' descriptions are caricatures, but they are not simply whimsical; rather, they exaggerate features that are recognizable in the types portrayed. But the fact that Chaireas never praises Sostratos is not evidence that he is not a *kolax*. Though we find Chaireas being critical of Sostratos (70-71 and 74-75), his remonstrations are not inconsistent with *kolakeia* in the given situation. In the eyes of the inexperienced Sostratos, Chaireas is not a *kolax*, but merely a *praktikos philos* (56); the audience, however, sharing in the understanding of social relations as we find articulated by Theophrastos, Aristotle, and indeed Plato, might well have perceived a more insidious side to Chaireas' nature.

Conclusion

Looking at *Dyskolos* through the prism of Platonic and Aristotelian philosophical models of character as well as Theophrastos' descriptions of character types, we are able to appreciate better the complexity of the characters of the play, their flaws and their strengths. In particular, we acquire a better understanding of Knemon's *dyskolia*, a *hexis* which pervades and dominates his

⁵¹² Theophrastos, *Characters* II, Diggle (2004), pp. 68-71 and 181-198.

character, and finds expression in his excessive *pathē* of *orgē* and *misos*, ultimately alienating him from his family and society. The *dyskolos* serves as a paradigm of how one should *not* behave in a *polis*. *Dyskolia*, on the other hand, is counterbalanced by the emergence of *philia* in the relationship between Gorgias and Sostratos. The δοκιμασία of friendship by way of their response to Knemon's *dyskolia* brings the young men closer and ultimately leads to the creation of two new *oikoi*. Chaereas, for his part, is conveniently removed from the action, to be replaced as a friend by the more humble and reliable Gorgias.

Part II

CHAPTER 4

Menander's survival and revival in Modern Greek culture: from Renaissance Italy to 1908 Athens, some case studies

The reception of Menander in the Roman period has been thoroughly examined. Terence and Plautus were influenced to a great extent by Menander, and they translated or adapted several of his comedies.⁵¹³

Following the establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the Empire, some at least of the plays of the tragedians and of Aristophanes continued to be studied as part of Byzantine culture and education. There is less agreement among scholars, however, as to whether Menander's plays were part of the school curriculum, since the evidence is not always clear.⁵¹⁴

Given that the plots of Menander's plays were given over to the theme of *erōs*, which tended to be viewed as transgressive, and the selective approach to studying classical texts typical of Byzantium and exemplified in Basil of

⁵¹³ See for example, Konstan (1983), Fantham (1984), Hunter (1985), Sharrock and Ash (2002), pp. 139-145 and 192-199, Goldberg (2007), Papaioannou (2010) and Nervegna (2013), pp. 70-83.

⁵¹⁴ For Menander's fate in antiquity and the Byzantine era, see Blanchard (1997), Criboire (2001), pp. 197-201, Easterling (2003) pp. 319-334, Sommerstein (2010), pp. 412-413 and Handley (2011). For a thorough study of Menander's reception in antiquity, see Nervegna (2013). Hunter (2014) offers an interesting comparison between the reception of Menander and Aristophanes in a variety of Hellenistic and Roman sources, as well as the relative balance sheet between the two comic playwrights and between Menander and Euripides.

Caesarea's admonition to youths,⁵¹⁵ it is not surprising that Byzantine scholars and students were familiar with Menander's thought mainly through his moral *gnōmai* (*Maxims*) rather than his plays.⁵¹⁶ This is evident in the number of extant Greek manuscripts of the period with collections of his *gnōmai monostichoi*. With the invention of print classical texts in the original Greek and in Latin translations proliferated,⁵¹⁷ among them editions of a version of Menander's *gnōmai* by Janus Lascaris, printed by Lorenzo di Francesco di Alopa in Florence in 1494, and a year later by Aldus Manutius in Venice.⁵¹⁸ Although the recent discovery in 2003 in the Vatican library of a palimpsest which includes lines from *Dyskolos* and the lost play *Titthe*, has further encouraged the debate regarding Menander's transmission to the Renaissance,⁵¹⁹ the fact remains that, during the Renaissance, Menander was mainly known in, and appreciated by, humanistic circles through the study of Plautus and Terence.⁵²⁰

The absence of actual Menandrian manuscripts with substantial fragments of his plays or printed editions of his plays until the 19th century did not prevent modern Greek authors and scholars from recreating Menander from the indirect tradition and left ample space for imagination to fill the lacuna in the

⁵¹⁵ For Basil's text and brief commentary, see Wilson (1975). Easterling (2003), p. 325 and Webb (2008), pp. 66-67 and 70, stress the bee image in Basil's treatise as the key to approaching classical texts.

⁵¹⁶ Arnott (1979), pp. xxiii-xxiv, suggests that Menander's non-pure Attic language may have been the main reason that his plays were excluded from the Byzantine school curriculum. Easterling (1995), pp. 154-157, emphasizes the unedifying nature of Menander's subject matter for a Christian audience. Nervegna (2013), esp. pp. 105, 202-207, 211-213, 217, 220, 223, discusses Menander's place in school curricula along with the methods employed for the teaching of classical texts, which affected the reception of the dramatist's work and his survival.

⁵¹⁷ Manousakas and Staikos (1986) and Staikos (1998).

⁵¹⁸ See Easterling (1995), pp. 155 and 160 with n. 32 and Liapis (2002) pp. 76-84. For Menander's *gnōmai*, see also Pernigotti (2008).

⁵¹⁹ On the Vatican palimpsest and the scholarly debate regarding Menander's survival, see Blume (2010), pp. 29, Pearse (2011), Handley (2011), pp. 140-141 and Nervegna (2013), p. 256 with n. 22.

⁵²⁰ Easterling (1995), p. 160.

evidence. Menander comes to represent Greekness, modernity and the modern European tradition in which Greece played a crucial role, thanks in part to his influence on the modern European theatre. Greek intellectuals in the 19th century used imaginative ways to imitate what they considered to be plays by Menander or plays that were strongly influenced by him. This is evident in the introduction to the translation of Molière's *L'Avare* (*The Miser*) into vernacular Greek (mixed with local dialects), entitled *Ὁ Ἐξηνταβελώνης*, by the priest, teacher in the Philological school in Smyrna, and scholar Constantinos Oikonomos (1780-1857), published in Vienna in 1816⁵²¹

Though we [modern Greeks] may have lost the theatre, nevertheless we have not entirely lost the sense of the muse of theatre. For such poems belong to us par excellence, by hereditary right from our ancestors [the ancient Greeks]. Plautus, a Roman playwright, wrote among other works a comedy on the *Avaricious Man* [i.e., *Aulularia*] which survives to our days. Plautus, as well as other of his compatriot dramatists, copied or imitated Greek drama. Terence translated Menander's comedies. Plautus imitated Epicharmos, and Diphilos and Philemon. Most probably, his *Avaricious Man* too belongs to one of our ancient dramatists; and this is attested by the Greek names with which he clothes almost all the characters of his work. Molière imitated Plautus and copied whole scenes.⁵²²

⁵²¹ See Skalioras (1994), pp. 23-31. Oikonomos composed also other works including text books for his students in the Philological Gymnasium of Smyrna, the most famous being the *Γραμματικῶν ἢ ἐγκυκλίων παιδευμάτων βιβλία Δ'* (Vienna, 1817), which devotes a whole chapter to the development of 'Neoclassical Comedy' from Menander to Molière, see Chatzepantazes (2003), p. 28.

⁵²² Constantinos Oikonomos in Skalioras (1994), p. 23, my translation. See also Chatzepantazes (2003), pp. 27-30.

In an act of re-appropriation of Menander from the intervening European tradition Oikonomos, fluent in French and well versed in Latin literature,⁵²³ adapted Molière to the realities, customs and behaviour of modern Greek life by using various idioms of vernacular Greek. In a gesture which prefigures the twentieth century reception of Menander he also placed his translation of *Ὁ Ἐξηνταβελώνης* in the wider context of the ‘Language Question’, the great controversy among Greek litterati of the period between the demotikistai who favoured the use, in written forms of the language (including literature), of the demotic Greek spoken by the people and the *kathareuoussianoï* who opted for the *kathareuoussa*.⁵²⁴ Oikonomos chose the demotic language because, as he says, ‘man’s living spoken language is different than the imposed imitations of the parrot’.⁵²⁵ He also expressed his views about the purpose of comedy and its imitative power, close to the Aristotelian definition of tragedy or the definition of comedy in the *Tractatus Coislinianus* and about his theory of *mimēsis*,⁵²⁶ which is another reason that led him to translate Molière’s play and to adapt it to modern Greek ‘*ēthē*’:

Comedy is a mimesis of a base and ridiculous act, aimed at the painless cure of vice and the teaching of virtue. For comedy to achieve these aims, it must imitate well the characters and the behaviour and customs of the nation that it addresses. Molière depicts his *Miser* based on the behaviour of his fellow-countrymen. A Greek playwright must depict

⁵²³ Skaliōras (1994), p. 21 and 28-29.

⁵²⁴ For the ‘Language Question’, see Ferguson (1959), Alexiou (1982), Beaton (1994), pp. 296-395, Philippaki-Warburton (1999), Stavride-Patrikiou (2001) and Kopidakēs (2010).

⁵²⁵ Constantine Oikonomos, *Γραμματικά*, p. νγ’ in Skaliōras (1994), p. 17. The proper register (i.e., *demotic* or *kathareuoussa*) adopted for the translation of Menander’s plays in Modern Greece preoccupied translators and directors who staged his plays for modern Greek audiences. See the sections below dealing with modern productions where the issues of language and register of specific Menandrian translations are discussed.

⁵²⁶ For the text of the *Tractatus Coislinianus* and its relation to Aristotle corpus, see Janko (1984).

the same character according to the behaviour of his own fellow-countrymen. Theatre, and especially comedy, must have a national dimension. Although most vices and virtues are common to all nations, there are, however, some variations in their manifestations from one nation to another, depending on factors such as the education of each nation, its institutions and its culture. Consequently, in my translation of Molière's *Miser*, I used expressions different from those of the original proverbs and scenes, so that the new elements depict more accurately the characters of my fellow countrymen.⁵²⁷

The educational and pedagogical purpose of theatre played an important role in Oikonomos' decision to opt for the vernacular for his *Ο Εξηνταβελώνης*,⁵²⁸ a text which was used for theatrical performances in Athens and Constantinople many times in the 19th century by amateur companies.⁵²⁹ With his translation of *Ο Εξηνταβελώνης* and with his scholarly views on the definition of modern comedy, Oikonomos outlined the direction in which modern Greek culture would have to go in order to shape its own contemporary identity and future.

In 1845, Andreas Moustoxydes published for the first time (as he notes) an edition of a comedy written in classical Greek prose under the title *Neaira*.⁵³⁰

⁵²⁷ Skaliaras (1994), pp. 24-25, my translation.

⁵²⁸ Skaliaras (1994), pp. 16-18.

⁵²⁹ Puchner (1999), p. 43.

⁵³⁰ Moustoxydes (1845), pp. 400-401, states that his edition was based on a manuscript in the Mediceus Laurentianus Library. Following Moustoxydes' edition, *Neaira* was published in German by Ellissen in 1859. Moustoxydes (1845) pp. 389 and 392-395 states, using as the source for his information the Italian scholar Lilius Gregorius Gyraldus (1479-1552), that Moschos wrote in a variety of genres, such as epic, epigrams, elegy and comedy, but he was not keen to publish his work. He rather preferred to communicate it to his intellectual circle. Moschos' versatile scholarly activity includes also the writing of at least two religious hymns dedicated to Virgin Mary and Jesus and inspired by Jesus' crucifixion and his mother's lament. Both hymns have been published by Bouboulides (1974).

The play was composed in Renaissance Italy by a Greek scholar from Sparta, Dimitrios Moschos, sometime around 1475, and dedicated to Ludovico Marquis Gonzaga, of Mantua.⁵³¹ Moustoxydes affirms that the play contributed greatly in the revival of theatrical productions, mainly comedies, in the regions of Mantua and Florence in the 15th century. Moustoxydes suggests that Moschos' play may have been inspired by a lost Menandrian original, but it depended on Latin adaptations since only the imitations of the original Menandrian play had survived. The belief that Menander's plays were superior to his Latin imitators was becoming strong in the mid-nineteenth century, when Greek culture and identity were facing a crisis. Moschos himself does not mention Menander, and it is clear that the main classical models for the plot of the *Neaira*, as Moustoxydes states, were the plays of Terence, the 'semi-Menander', as well as Apollodorus' speech on the prostitute Neaira⁵³² and Lucian's *The Dialogues of the Courtesans*.⁵³³ Yet the very decision to adapt new comic themes to a play written in the classical Greek tongue suggests an awareness and indeed an affirmation of the Greek inspiration for Roman comedy. But Moschos' drama is of interest also, in this connection, for the way in which it updates the plot types of New Comedy in conformity with modern themes and expectations, for in this respect it anticipates the kinds of problems and solutions developed by the twentieth-century translators and directors, who are the primary focus of this study. Thus, a brief digression on the nature of Moschos' *Neaira* is not out of place

⁵³¹ Moustoxydes (1845), p. 401 cites as his source for the date of the production of *Neaira* the literary critic Girolamo Tiraboschi, (1731 – 1794). On the role that Greek scholars played in Renaissance Europe and especially Italy and their impact on the humanistic movement, see Geanakoplos (1962), Wilson (1992), Festa (2000) and Karamanolis (2003).

⁵³² In Demosthenes' corpus oration 59, see Carey (1992) and Kapparis (1999).

⁵³³ Moustoxydes (1845), pp. 400 and 402. Although, Moustoxydes does not mention this, another possible source for Moschos' *Neaira* might have been Alciphron's *Letters of the courtesans*.

here, and will serve also to call attention to this fascinating exercise, which seems to have gone almost wholly unnoticed in Western Europe.

The primary elements of the *Neaira* are familiar from Roman New Comedy: a young man in love with a courtesan (the Neaira of the title), a father who opposes his infatuation, a rival who also seeks the courtesan's favours, an assortment of slaves, a parasite, and a pimp or bodyguard, though the latter's role is unusual in connection with an independent *hetaira*. The chief Roman models would seem to be Terence's *Eunuch* and his *Heautontimorumenos*, the former for the professions of sincere love on the part of Neaira and the role of the rival, the latter for the initially harsh opposition to the affair on the part of the father, who seeks to send his son on a far voyage to cure him of his passion, and his subsequent repentance when he reflects on the danger to his son and his affection for him.⁵³⁴ There are, however, novel elements specific to Moschos' comedy. For one thing, Neaira's declarations of true love are not in the least sincere: she is more cynical than any courtesan in ancient comedy who plays a major role in the drama, playing the two rivals off against one another without any genuine preference for either of them, save insofar as their money is concerned. The particularities of the schemes to obtain money from the father are also novel, and a sign of Moschos' inventiveness. But the most remarkable feature, one that is wholly unprecedented in the ancient models, is the appearance in the final act of a magician from Lebanon, who for a fee, willingly paid by the father, recovers the money that the courtesan had swindled out of his son (an effort to steal it on the part of a slave fails

⁵³⁴ The parasite, named Trophon in Moschos' play, may be compared with Artotrogus, the parasite, in Plautus *Miles Gloriosus* and Gnatho in Terence's *Eunuchus*. Bacchis in Terence's *Heautontimoroumenos* and Thais in his *Eunuchus* are possible models for the character of Neaira, see Knorr (1995). The name Neaira appears as a title of comedies by Timocles and Philemon, see Auhagen (2009) p. 124. On the idea of travel abroad as a cure for love, see also Ovid, *Remedia amoris* 213-224 and Propertius, 1.1.29-30.

utterly) and at the same time cures him of his hopeless passion. Though the bit of pseudo-Arabic language that the magician speaks may recall the phoney Carthaginian in Plautus' *Poenulus*, and if we look to Aristophanes, then there are perhaps precedents in the pseudo-Persian of the speech by the King's Eye in the *Acharnians* and the Scythian slave in the *Thesmophoriazusae*, Moschos has contrived an entirely new kind of denouement by introducing, in the role of a *deus ex machina*, a wholly extraneous figure who resolves the basic tensions of the plot with a wave of the wand. In classical sources generally, magicians were treated with a healthy scepticism, for instance, in Lucian's *Alexander the Oracle-Monger* or Apuleius' caricature of Diophanes in the *Golden Ass* (2.13-14; but see Lucian's *Dialogues of Courtesans* 4 for an apparently positive example), or were associated with evil spells, like Canidia in Horace's epodes.⁵³⁵ It is conceivable that Moschos adopted the figure of the problem-solving⁵³⁶ magician from contemporary conceptions of magic as one stage along the road to spiritual awareness and union with God; for example, Pico della Mirandola, a younger contemporary of Moschos', affirmed in his *Oration on the Dignity of Man* that magic and the Kabala are the best proofs of Christ's divinity.⁵³⁷ Whatever the influences, this radical tampering with the structure of ancient New Comedy marks a new stage of invention in the evolution of the tradition, and a stepping stone toward the modern recuperations of Menander and his peers that is our subject here.⁵³⁸

⁵³⁵ On the character and literary antecedents of Canidia and the other witches in Horace's epodes, see Manning (1970), pp. 393-401. Another possible influence is Niceros' story in Petronius' *Satyricon* 61-63, see Veenstra (2002), p. 138-139.

⁵³⁶ The magician in *Neaira* may be reminiscent of the *deus ex machina* in Greek tragedies.

⁵³⁷ For Giovanni Pico della Mirandola, see Copenhaver (2016), available at <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2012/entries/pico-della-mirandola>. Moustoxides (1845), p. 390 reports that Moschos was associated with Pico. Geanakoplos (1962), p. 124 n. 53, also mentions that 'Demetrius [Moschos] instructed in Greek at Ferrara, Mirandola, Venice as well as at Corfu. Demetrius may have taught Pico Greek'. For the main themes in Renaissance literature, see Hebron (2008).

⁵³⁸ *Neaira* was staged for the first and only time until today in Greece in 1985 by the director Spyros Evangelatos, see Diamantakou (2007), p. 357. For Evangelatos' production of *Epitrepontes* see below, pp. 205ff.

The playwright and intellectual Demetrios Paparigopoulos (1843-1873),⁵³⁹ was the first modern Greek author to create a play dedicated to Menander, and this play was part of his own comedy, the *Agora* (1871). *Agora*, according to Michalis Meracles, is 'a tragically romantic condemnation of the Athenian contemporary political and cultural present... The condemnation is the result of the comparison between modern Athens and the ancient Athenian democracy'.⁵⁴⁰ Paparigopoulos was a complex personality, who composed philosophical and political essays from a very young age, and devoted himself to poetry and prose compositions. His poetry is marked by intense pessimism, often reflecting an obsession with death.

The *Agora*, which was composed in prose and verse, comprises a prologue and five Acts (I-V). There is no record of the play being staged⁵⁴¹ but it was published in 1871. The plot is set in the historic centre of Athens in the year 1870. It is remarkable that the play includes the search for a Menandrian manuscript (Act III) as part of the plot, in this way anticipating Tony Harrison's *The Trackers of Oxyrhynchus*, based on Sophocles' satyr play *Ichneutai*, which exploits the same device.⁵⁴² In the *Agora*, the desperate Kimon, a poet, has decided to put an end to his sufferings after Charikleia's rejection of his *erōs*.⁵⁴³ Before he commits suicide, however, he reflects on his

⁵³⁹ Demetrios, the son of the great historian Constantinos Paparigopoulos, studied Law.

⁵⁴⁰ Meracles (1981), p. 8, my translation. For Paparigopoulos' work and personality, see also Mastrodimitris (2005), pp. 172-173 and Polites (1985), p. 178.

⁵⁴¹ The archives of the Theatrical Museum of Athens have no record of a production of *Agora*, though they possess records of two productions of Paparigopoulos' political comedy *Συζύγων εκλογή* (1868) (*Choice of a Wife*), one in Athens and the other in Egypt; see also Meracles (1981), p. 9.

⁵⁴² See Harrison (1991) and Marshall (2012), who stresses the importance of Harrison's *The Trackers of Oxyrhynchus* for the reception of classical texts for modern audiences.

⁵⁴³ The choice of the names Kimon and Charikleia might have been intended by Paparigopoulos to remind the audience and readers of the famous Athenian statesman of the 5th century BC and the heroine of Heliodorus' novel *Charikleia and Theagenes*.

life and the possibility of an after-life. While Kimon is counting the hours until midnight, after which he plans to take his own life, he is visited by famous Athenians of classical and late antiquity in succession. The fact that this night is the feast day of *Psychosabbaton* (All Souls' Day) is not coincidental, for according to the Orthodox Church it is on that day that the deceased are commemorated, while popular custom has it that the living are visited by the souls of the dead.⁵⁴⁴ Paparigopoulos does not make this connection clear at the beginning of the play, for example by way of a dream or a vision (one thinks here of the classical device of the omniscient prologue). Rather, it is only in the last Act (V) that he links Kimon's dream to this festival.⁵⁴⁵

Famous Athenian writers, philosophers and statesmen revisit Athens after more than two millennia, with Kimon as their guide. In the prologue of the play Aeschylus and Lucian converse with Kimon, and are joined later by Plato who takes a walk towards the river Ilissos, and Pericles who sighs as he stares at the columns of the temple of Olympian Zeus; these figures are followed in turn by Aristophanes, who walks whistling towards the theatre of Dionysos.⁵⁴⁶ The party is joined at a later stage by the Athenian *hetairai* Kleonike and Thrasykleia.⁵⁴⁷ A nostalgia for the classical past permeates the whole play, emphasizing the decay of the modern city. Contemporary Athenian life and society are criticised, for they cannot stand comparison with the glorious Athenian past.⁵⁴⁸

⁵⁴⁴ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 8.

⁵⁴⁵ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 290.

⁵⁴⁶ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 17.

⁵⁴⁷ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 12 and 14.

⁵⁴⁸ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 186, Aristophanes ironically says that they have seen the new Athens, which has acquired a new social and intellectual identity.

After visiting the theatre of Dionysos, Aristophanes, disappointed by how contemporary Greeks treat his god, nearly crushes his head on the base of Menander's statue.⁵⁴⁹ This incident causes Aristophanes to express his exasperation with Menander, whose fame always tortures him, and his relief that Menander's text has perished.⁵⁵⁰ This statement is the first indication in the play of Paparigopoulos' own appreciation of Menander. By listening to or overhearing what people say about various aspects of their lives, the visitors (and the audience) get a picture of modern Athenian life, including daily preoccupations, anxieties, aspirations and disappointments, as well as values, ideals, tastes, pleasures and hopes.

During their Athens-by-night tour Kimon and his eminent group pay a visit to a contemporary Greek theatre, to attend a performance. It so happens that the plays performed are two comedies: *The Dream Life* (Ὁ βίος ὄνειρος) and *The Manuscript* (Τὸ χειρόγραφον). While there is no consent among the group about the quality of the former play,⁵⁵¹ no views at all are expressed about the latter.

The *Manuscript* revolves around the search for a Menandrian manuscript. Laskaris, a teacher and scholar, is hunting for this manuscript. In his obsession to acquire 'this valuable manuscript with a comedy by Menander',⁵⁵² Laskaris does not hesitate to pretend that he is in love with

⁵⁴⁹ Paparigopoulos (1871), p.17. See Palagia (2005), esp. pp. 287-289, on the 'sculpted image' of Menander made by Kephisodotos II and Timarchos which stood in the theatre of Dionysus, and which is mentioned by Pausanias (1.21.1). Today only the statue base has survived, bearing Menander's name and the signature of the artists.

⁵⁵⁰ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 17. For Menander's popularity during his lifetime, see Konstantakos (2008), especially p. 100; Konstantakos cites the anecdote according to which Sophocles expressed his relief on Euripides' death as evidence of the topos found in the biographies of famous poets.

⁵⁵¹ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 151.

⁵⁵² Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 168. Laskaris' name may be also an allusion to the famous Byzantine scholar of the Renaissance, Ianos Laskaris (1445-1535), who was, among other things,

Kleonike and even promises to marry her, since she possesses the manuscript. When Laskaris learns that Kleonike has presented the manuscript to her friend Maria, he abandons Kleonike and sets out to pursue Maria. Kleonike, in bitterness, remarks that actually Laskaris 'was about to marry the manuscript' that she had given to Maria.⁵⁵³ Kleonike on the rebound returns to her former lover Charidemos, who never stopped loving her. When Maria pretends that she has given the manuscript to the servant Katero, Laskaris in turn starts pursuing the servant. The manuscript, originally considered to be a cause of potential happiness, finally becomes 'the cause of evil',⁵⁵⁴ as far as the relations among the characters of the play are concerned. Disappointed by modern Athens, its people and way of life, the eminent group disappears from the stage, while Kimon wakes up from his dream and, hopeless about his own future, puts his original plan into execution by shooting himself.⁵⁵⁵

In this witty and sophisticated comedy, Paparigopoulos seems to be invoking the name of Menander as a way of reflecting on literary questions and controversies of his time. Reflecting the intellectual movement that has been labeled 'Romantic Classicism' (Ρομαντικός Κλασικισμός) that was current in his time,⁵⁵⁶ Paparigopoulos combined in the *Agora* the principles of Classicism, based on the revival of the models of classical Greek antiquity and stressing the universality of classical culture, with the tendency of Romanticism to emphasize the role of emotions and instinct, while at the same time affirming the ideals of democracy.

connected to the library in Florence, one of the centres of Renaissance culture. Such an allusion would not be surprising, since Paparigopoulos' *Agora* is rich in evocative names.

⁵⁵³ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 174.

⁵⁵⁴ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 175.

⁵⁵⁵ Paparigopoulos (1871), pp. 186-187 and Act IV.

⁵⁵⁶ Chatzepantazes (2003), p. 61-62 with n. 26, stresses the role of Paparigopoulos' *Agora* as a manifesto of 'Classicizing' Athenian Romanticism. On the movement of Romanticism in Greece, see Mastrodimitris (2005), pp. 166-176.

The *Agora* is characterized by its extensive length, loose connection among the various acts and total lack of realism.⁵⁵⁷ It is not coincidental that Aristotle is treated to some extent with irony in *Agora*. Though absent from the eminent group of old Athenian intellectuals re-visiting Athens, Aristotle is alluded to by Laskaris, the scholar and author of *My Organon* in imitation of Aristotle's treatise⁵⁵⁸ who, obsessed with the Menandrian manuscript, does not hesitate to sacrifice all sense of honour and humanity in order to fulfil his goal. By creating a pedantic, insensitive, ruthless and unimaginative character like Laskaris and placing him in pursuit of a Menandrian manuscript, Paparigopoulos expresses his own antagonism toward Aristotle's strict principles of dramatic composition, as they were understood at the time. Indeed, it has been argued that the *Agora* is actually a forceful reply to the 'Aristotelian domination' of nineteenth-century Athenian intellectual circles.⁵⁵⁹ Menander's absence from the eminent group and at the same time his omnipresence in the form of the immense value placed on his manuscript, testify to a sense that Menander might point the way to a new, or at any rate enriched, aesthetic of the theatre.

In the absence of any substantial fragments of Menander's plays, and the fact that Roman playwrights were pretty much the exclusive representatives of New Comedy, the importance of Menander in the *Agora* was at best a wish or hypothesis. By choosing to focus on a lost play by Menander, a playwright of whom nothing substantial had survived in his time, Paparigopoulos may have intended to suggest that the loss of the old Athenian past was symbolized by the loss of a great author like Menander. At the same time, it is striking that Paparigopoulos chose Menander, whose works were entirely

⁵⁵⁷ Chatzepantazes (2003), p. 61.

⁵⁵⁸ Paparigopoulos (1871), p. 173.

⁵⁵⁹ Chatzepantazes (2003), p. 61.

lost, rather than, for example, a manuscript of Aeschylus. Menander's plays stand for something irrecoverable, a symbol of a profound rupture in Greek culture. At the same time, by placing Menander in the *Agora* next to Aristophanes, Aeschylus, Pericles, Lucian and Plato, Pappasopoulos was following, consciously or not, a tradition that held Menander to be as important as Homer or the tragic poets, and which represented him in paintings and other forms of art together with the aforementioned figures.⁵⁶⁰ There is a certain irony in the fact that Pappasopoulos wrote just thirty years or so before the first papyrological discoveries of substantial Menandrian fragments.

The Parnassos production

The discovery in 1905 of the papyrus which included fragments of *Epitrepontes* and their subsequent publication by Gustave Lefebvre⁵⁶¹ marked a turning point in Menandrian studies. In Greece, this discovery was considered a major event in intellectual circles. Menander's greatness as a playwright in antiquity was no longer a fantasy, but a reality.

The newly discovered fragments of *Epitrepontes*, which included the arbitration scene of the play, sparked the first recorded production of Menander in Greece. A performance of this scene took place in the *Parnassos Philological Society* (*Φιλολογικός Σύλλογος Παρνασσός*) in Athens on 16 April 1908. The performance of the arbitration scene in the *Parnassos* was preceded by a long introductory talk by Georgios Soteriades on New Comedy, Menander, and this

⁵⁶⁰ See Nervegna (2013), pp. 201-202 where she stresses that Menander appeared 'to be on a par with Homer' in various forms of art, a clear sign of Menander's importance as a dramatist in antiquity.

⁵⁶¹ Lefebvre (1907).

fragment of *Epitrepontes*, in a form of commentary.⁵⁶² The purpose of the lecture was not only to introduce the Greek public to Menander but also to inform them about the importance of the discovery to the European theatrical tradition.

The script used for the Parnassos production was translated into demotic Greek by Eustratios Eustratiades. His translation was based not on the original Menandrian text of the papyrus but on the French translation and the reconstruction of the text by Maurice Croiset.⁵⁶³ Croiset had presented the papyrus fragments of *Epitrepontes* to an academic audience in Paris in 1908, prior to the Greek production in the same year. Greek intellectuals, like Eustratiades and Soteriades, were keen to present the precious discovery to the Greek public as soon as possible, so they decided to secure the French text themselves and translate it into Greek. Soteriades' ironic comment that Menander's play came to his own country with a French passport⁵⁶⁴ suggests that he and the other intellectuals who were involved in the production did not have sufficient faith that the Greek authorities would be interested in sponsoring an edition, and thus they acted promptly to secure a copy of the original text.⁵⁶⁵

Eustratiades' translation also includes colloquial and idiomatic expressions,⁵⁶⁶ which make the modern Greek text lively and potentially appealing to a much

⁵⁶² Soteriades was a distinguished archaeologist and philologist and a fervent demoticist. Among his translations of ancient texts is that of Aeschylus' *Oresteia* into vernacular Greek for the 1903 Thomas Oikonomou's production at the Royal Theatre in Athens. On Soteriades' *Oresteia*, see Van Steen (2000), p. 113. For the Greek text of the *Epitrepontes* production and Soteriades' introductory talk, see Soteriades (1909).

⁵⁶³ See Croiset (1908).

⁵⁶⁴ Soteriades (1909), p. 16.

⁵⁶⁵ On the *Parnassos*' production, see also Diamantakou (2007), pp. 366-369 and Van Steen (2014), p. 443.

⁵⁶⁶ For example: Syriskos: 'Ε! Κουμπάρε δὲ μᾶς κάνεις τὴ χάρι, νά μᾶς δώσης μιὰ γνώμη'; Smikrines: 'Βρὲ χαμένα κορμιά, γιὰ νὰ κάνετε δίκη γυρίζετ' ἐδῶ πέρα μὲ τίς προβιές στὴ ράχη σας'; Syriskos: 'Ναῖσκει, Δάο' ('You, my friend' [literally: my best man, as best man in weddings] ... could you do us a favour and give us your opinion?' Smikrines:

wider audience than a few intellectuals. As far as I know, contemporary scholarly reviews of the play were not critical of the translator's linguistic choice. This is worth mentioning, since, as noted above, the language issue in Greece at the beginning of the 20th century was the cause of serious controversy.

Soteriades' lecture began with a description of a piece of broken white marble which lay in the theatre of Dionysus in Athens. The inscription reveals that this marble used to be the pedestal of a statue of the poet Menander.⁵⁶⁷ Once again, Menander's statue in the theatre of Dionysus has been used as a starting point for his return to his homeland, but in Soteriades' case Menander's return is a fact and not a matter of wishful thinking, as it was for Paparigopoulos. Like Moustoxydes, Soteriades emphasized that before the discovery of the 1905 papyrus Menander's plays were known only through Latin imitations or rather, as the Greeks sometimes viewed it, through Latin plagiarisms by Plautus and Terence.⁵⁶⁸ However, Soteriades maintained that Menander's art was of much higher quality than the plays of his imitators. In particular, Soteriades praised the way Menander delineated his characters. The arbitration scene of *Epitrepontes* is a good example of Menander's unique talent. Soteriades argued that the poet presented the behaviour and emotions of the characters in the scene with great skill and subtlety, and at the same time he was able to make manifest the issues of justice and philanthropy which were important to the scene.⁵⁶⁹ Following Croiset's reconstruction of the original text, Soteriades highlighted Smikrines' fairness as a judge in the arbitration, although he considered him a cantankerous and tight-fisted old man who cared mainly about retrieving the dowry he had paid for his

'you losers, are you hanging around wearing lambskin on your backs to arrange a trial?' Syriskos: 'yes, indeed', see Soteriades (1909), pp. 4 and 11 respectively, my translation.

⁵⁶⁷ Soteriades (1909), p. 3.

⁵⁶⁸ Soteriades (1909), p. 6.

⁵⁶⁹ Soteriades (1909), p. 13-16.

daughter.⁵⁷⁰ Charisios is presented as a good-hearted, very placid man, who only got angry when he discovered that he had fathered an illegitimate child with (as he believed) Habrotonon. Soteriades praises Habrotonon's intelligence (εὐστροφία), kindness and generosity (φιλόανθρωπον κορίτσι) in the difficult task of identifying the parents of the baby. As for Pamphile, Soteriades stress her generosity (γενναιοφροσύνη), as against her father's mean-spiritedness (μικρότητα), when Smikrines tries to convince her to abandon her husband. Soteriades seems to enjoy the way the rascal slave Onesimos reveals the story about Pamphile's out-of-wedlock baby to Smikrines, who habitually gives lessons of moral life to everyone: 'he [Onesimos] shakes the mean old Smikrines out'.⁵⁷¹

In addition to the importance of the Menandrian characters, Soteriades considered the emotions that these characters evoked in the audience to be significant: 'we laugh at these characters because we feel pity for them. The end of the play, with its serene outcome - when the unpleasant events of the plot have a happy ending - purify our souls from the tragicomic spectacle which we experience'.⁵⁷² Menandrian plays offer a decent and elegant entertainment far-removed from Aristophanic obscenity.⁵⁷³ Soteriades' appreciation of Menander's aesthetic may recall Plutarch's comment 'for what

⁵⁷⁰ Soteriades (1909), pp. 18,19 and. 36 and Sideris (1976), p. 231. The arbitration scene was subsequently recited by the actor Panagiotis Lazarides in the Music Club (Μουσική Ἐταιρεία) in Volos (May 1908) and in Tripolis (February 1909). Both recitations of the scene were preceded by talks given by distinguished local classicists in Volos and Tripoli, see Soteriades (1909), p. 39 and 48. The discovery of the papyrus with the arbitration scene also attracted the attention of the Classical Club of Harvard University, which staged it in a private house in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1909, see Hains (1910), pp. 27-28. This was in line with the tradition, according to which Menander's plays were performed at private dinner parties, see Nervegna (2013), pp. 120-200.

⁵⁷¹ Soteriades (1909), pp.16-19.

⁵⁷² Soteriades (1909), p. 14 and 19. We note here the 'presence' of Aristotle's *Poetics* 5; cf. Halliwell (1998), pp. 200 and 274-276. For the *catharsis* in Greek comedy, see Sutton (1994).

⁵⁷³ Soteriades (1909), p. 11.

reason, in fact, is it truly worth while for an educated man to go to the theatre, except to enjoy Menander?'.⁵⁷⁴

Soteriades also informed the audience about the destiny of Menander's plays through the centuries. He did not accept the view that fanatical priests and monks of the Byzantine period contributed to the destruction of the manuscripts which included Menander's plays. On the contrary, Soteriades believed that Menander's plays were rejected by pedantic scholars as early as the 6th century AD because they disliked Menander's linguistic style. These scholars, according to Soteriades, ignored and despised Menander because they did not consider him a serious author, since the language he used was not difficult and challenging in comparison with classical Attic, and especially Aristophanes' style.⁵⁷⁵ Soteriades was thus reclaiming Menander for the contemporary popular theatre, a poet for his own times, even as he rescued him from the contempt of philologists. One may wonder how Pappariopoulos' pedantic teacher, Laskaris, would have reacted if he had discovered the papyrus with the fragments of *Epitrepontes*. Would he have considered that all the false protestations of love that he made to the women while seeking the papyrus had really been worthwhile? Soteriades pointed out that although Aristophanes' plays pretty much constituted the comic genre in antiquity, this genre survived and even evolved further with the poets of New Comedy and especially with Menander. From this perspective, the development of the comic genre was accompanied by a development of

⁵⁷⁴ Plutarch, *Moralia* 853-854 with Hunter (2000). Similar to Soteriades' is the view of the academic Socrates Kougeas (1908), p. 195, who praises the finesse of Menander's humour and the elegance of the dialogues in his play. He evokes Plutarch's comparison between Menander and Aristophanes and he opts without hesitation for the propriety of Menander's comic style; see also Diamantakou (2007), p. 368.

⁵⁷⁵ Soteriades (1909), pp. 4-5. On Menander's linguistic style in general, and how it was perceived by various sources in antiquity and the early Christian era, including lexicographers and church authorities, see Sandbach (1970), Bozanic (1977), Goldberg-Shalev (1996), Nervegna (2013), pp. 252-260 and Tribulato (2014).

language and style and a change in themes and plots. If only the scholars who despised Menander in the past had considered these issues with a critical but appreciative mind they would have admired Menander, as he deserved, and his plays would have survived alongside Aristophanes' plays.⁵⁷⁶ However, Soteriades did not praise Menander at Aristophanes' expense. He critically evaluated the poets within their cultural contexts and gave equal praise to both, although for different reasons. His excitement over the discovery of Menander was charged, in his time, with national sentiment and questions of Greek identity, and for this reason he and all the members of the original audience took a special pride in their Greek past, which survived in all its glory, as the plays of Menander could testify, even after the destruction of the famous Athenian empire at the end of the fifth century.⁵⁷⁷ The Parnassos production, Soteriades' views, and the Menandrian script used for this production undoubtedly influenced the next translation of *Epitrepontes* in Greece by the classicist Thrasyboulos Stavrou,⁵⁷⁸ and directly or indirectly also the subsequent translations and adaptations of the play which were used in modern Greek productions.

The rediscovery of Menander was in many ways a turning point in the relationship between modern Greece and its classical past. Here was a poet for everyman, who spoke to common concerns. His plays did not deal with the remote, aristocratic figures of tragedy and their grand passions, nor did

⁵⁷⁶ Soteriades (1909), p. 7.

⁵⁷⁷ Soteriades (1909), p. 11-12.

⁵⁷⁸ Stavrou (1954). His edition was based on the papyri which were published up until the 1950s and includes texts, modern Greek translations, introductions with plot summaries and some comments on: *Γεωργός*, *Ἐπιτρέποντες*, *Ἥρω*, *Θεοφορουμένη*, *Κιθαριστής*, *Κόλαξ*, *Κωνειαζόμενοι*, *Μισούμενος*, *Περικειρομένη*, *Περίνθια*, *Σαμία*, *Φάσμα*, and a few fragments from unidentified plays. Stavrou considered in his edition (as he mentions, p. 7, with notes 1 and 2), Kock (1888), vol. III and Wilamowitz' (1925) edition of *Epitrepontes*. He does not say explicitly whether he considered also other editions of fragments by Koerte (1912) or Lefebvre (1907).

they stage the burlesque antics of Aristophanic comedy, as this genre was perceived and revived. Menander was dignified without being inaccessible; his characters felt the way members of the audience might feel, in situations they could imagine in their own lives. There were differences, of course: the classical structure of feeling, as we have seen in the chapters on Aristotle and Menander, differed in important ways from modern sensibilities. It is to these modern adaptations, and the sentiments and values that they represent, that we now turn in the following sections of the thesis.

CHAPTER 5

PRODUCTIONS OF *EPITREPONTES*

As we turn now to modern productions of Menander, we enter upon a new and tricky terrain. Translation inevitably involves change, whether it is for the stage or other genre, and when a distance of more than two millennia separates the original from the reproduction, new cultural horizons condition the meaning of the texts, even where the wording may seem the same.⁵⁷⁹ There is also a further difficulty: with the ancient dramas, we had to rely on philosophers to acquire a sense of the shared experience of author and his audience, whereas in the case of the modern productions we have a wealth of information of diverse kinds, from our first-hand knowledge of colloquial language and literary experience to direct conversations with the participants in the productions. Catherine Lutz observes: 'The process of coming to understand the emotional lives of people in different cultures can be seen first and foremost as a problem of translation. What must be translated are the meanings of the emotion words spoken in everyday conversation, of the emotionally imbued events of everyday life, of tears and other gestures, and of audience reaction to emotional performance'.⁵⁸⁰ We must engage in still another aspect of translation, just because, in the following sections on some modern productions of Menander, I have had access to materials of an entirely different order. As mentioned above⁵⁸¹ I have had personal interviews with translators, directors, actors, and others involved in the

⁵⁷⁹ See above, esp. pp. 12-13 and 19-20.

⁵⁸⁰ Lutz (1988), p. 8.

⁵⁸¹ P. 23.

productions, which to be sure require interpretation, sometimes in ways at odds with the words of the interviewees.⁵⁸² As Socrates observed in Plato's *Apology* (22b-c), the poets turned out to be among the least capable of explaining their own works. I have also exploited essays or notes by the directors and translators in the programmes of the productions, along with their views on Menander's art in general and the particular play being staged; recordings of productions; newspaper reviews; scripts of the several productions, as they appear either in the programmes or in published editions following the productions themselves. Among other things, such programmes serve to create or influence audience expectations of the work.⁵⁸³ But the productions are themselves influenced by prior versions, and this process can run back over several stages, with the result that a new production or translation resembles a palimpsest, which bears traces not just of prior productions but of collective memory and presuppositions. Indeed, many directors and translators have affirmed that Menander influenced modern European comedy long before the recovery of his plays (though they differ in their specific illustrations, as we shall see), and that he has survived right down to the modern Greek movies of 1950s and 1960s. Certain productions allude to various European or Greek theatrical genres or movies, including the *komeidyllio* or comedy romance and the literary genre of Greek *ēthographia* or character portrayal at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century.⁵⁸⁴

⁵⁸² In my chapters I cite only extracts from the interviews that are relevant to the present discussion. I interviewed Kanellos Apostolou on 12th September 2008, Spyros Evangelatos on 3rd December 2010, Tassos Roussos on 17th September 2008, Kostas Tsianos on 10th September 2008, Evis Gavrielides on 19th September 2008, Yannis Varveris on 22nd September 2008 and Leonidas Malenis on 7th June 2013.

⁵⁸³ See Michelakis (2010). All translations from modern Greek into English are mine. This includes: scripts and translations of the productions of *Epitrepontes* and *Dyskolos*, programme notes, interviews with directors, translators and actors, and newspaper reviews regarding the productions.

⁵⁸⁴ The modern Greek genres *komeidyllio* or comedy romance and *ēthographia* were part of the cultural, literary and theatrical background to the productions of *Samia* in 1993 and 2000-2001

A. The staging of *Epitrepontes* in 1959: the first Greek adaptation of the entire surviving play.

Framing the production

After the celebrated 1908 production of the arbitration scene, we might have expected a flurry of modern Greek productions of a poet so much admired in his absence. In fact, Menander did not appear again on a Greek theatrical stage for 50 years. In the summer of 1959 a newly established theatrical company, *The Theatre of 59* (Θέατρο του 59) and its director, Kanellos Apostolou, decided to stage *Epitrepontes*, based on a recent translation and completion of the fragmentary text by the novelist, poet and translator Nikos Sfyroeras (1913-1989). Sfyroeras' translation is in verse, although it does not follow strictly any modern Greek metrical form.⁵⁸⁵ It was the first time that the director and translator had worked together directing and translating an ancient Greek comedy for a modern Greek audience.⁵⁸⁶ Sfyroeras also

and of *Epitrepontes* in 2003 by the Cypriot director Evis Gavrielides and the translations of both plays into katharevousa by the poet Yannis Varveris. For Gavrielides' and Varveris' productions of *Samia*, see Kiritsi (2013b).

⁵⁸⁵ For modern Greek productions of Menander's, Plautus's and Terence's plays in Greece up to 2005, see Diamantakou (2007), pp.331-436. Sfyroeras completed the translation of *Epitrepontes* in 1959. The metres used in modern Greek poetry, especially until the beginning of the 20th century, vary. The Byzantine metrical form of the iambic decapentasyllabic prevailed in many forms of Greek poetry from the 10th to the 15th centuries, including folk songs (δημοτικά τραγούδια). In the 19th century, the literary movement of the Ionian islands poets (Επτανησιακή Σχολή), under the influence of Italian poetry, wrote poems in iambic hendecasyllables, anapaestic decasyllables and trochaic octasyllables. The Athenian literary movement (Αθηναϊκή Σχολή) from the same century, inspired by ancient Greek metres, wrote poems mainly in iambic hendecasyllabic, dōdecasyllabic and dactylic decaepentasyllabic meters. On the modern Greek metrical forms, see Stavrou (1974).

⁵⁸⁶ For plays of Aristophanes directed by Apostolou, see Van Steen (2000), pp. 226-227.

translated *Dyskolos*, after *Epitrepontes*⁵⁸⁷, with the intention that the translation be used for the staging of the play; however, it was not the preferred version for the 1960 production of *Dyskolos*, as we will see below.

Apostolou, an extremely well-educated director and musician who studied theatre and music in Greece and London,⁵⁸⁸ chose to stage Menander's *Epitrepontes* in a summer theatre in Kallithea, a neighbourhood closer to Faliro and Piraeus, as a form of light entertainment. Apostolou was drawn to Menander for several reasons, as he explained to me in an interview. First, he believed that the bourgeois style of Menandrian comedy was comparable to the bourgeois Athenian society of the late 1950s, and that there was a cultural similarity between the two societies, despite the vast interval of time. Second, since an entire Menandrian play had not been staged previously either in Greece or in Europe, he wished to introduce Menander's art to the modern Greek audience. Third, Sfyroeras' translation, reconstruction and adaptation of the play promised to offer a good script for his production, and its style conformed nicely to Apostolou's own artistic taste. Finally, Apostolou was influenced by pragmatic considerations; the staging of a Menandrian play was less expensive than staging a play by Aristophanes or Molière, which would have required money for a larger cast of actors and chorus.

Interestingly, though Apostolou said that he likes Menander's style of comedy, and he agrees that Menander influenced the modern European comic genre, he is not entirely convinced by the praise that Menander's characters receive, since he finds that they do not have the psychological complexity of Molière's characters, for example, or the characters of

⁵⁸⁷ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 8, n. 2.

⁵⁸⁸ Apostolou graduated from the Greek National Theatre Drama School. He attended classes on voice and speech by Clifford Turner and dance classes by Audrey De Vos in England.

Euripides, for that matter, to whom Menander is often compared by scholars. For Apostolou, Menander's characters are mainly types.⁵⁸⁹

Apostolou also stressed that he prefers, in general, Aristophanes to Menander as a comic playwright because Aristophanes' theatrical style is weightier and his poetic language more ornate, colourful and versatile.⁵⁹⁰ Apostolou's motive for putting on a play by Menander for a modern Greek audience was mainly artistic and practical, and was not a matter of national pride in staging a play by a famous ancient Athenian poet, or of inspiring the audience's admiration for their ancestors. In this respect, his motivation was quite different from that of Soteriades.⁵⁹¹

In contrast, Sfyroeras, as translator, was full of praise for Menander's poetic art.⁵⁹² With his translation he intended to initiate the modern Greek audience

⁵⁸⁹ Apostolou's interview: 'Επέλεξα να ανεβάσω Μένανδρο για πολλούς λόγους. Ήταν καλοκαιρί και έπρεπε να αποφασίσω τι έργο θα ανέβαζα στο καλοκαιρινό θέατρο της Καλλιθέας, σε μια περιοχή εκτός του κέντρου των Αθηνών. Σκέφτηκα να ανεβάσω κωμωδία αλλά ποιά κωμωδία, μία του Μολιέρου ή μία του Αριστοφάνη; Το ανέβασμα ενός Αριστοφανικού έργου εκείνο το καλοκαιρί και σ' αυτό το θέατρο θα ήταν πολύ δύσκολο και πιο ακριβό επειδή θα χρειαζόμουν και μεγαλύτερο θιάσο και χορό. Τότε σκέφτηκα το Μένανδρο. Υπήρχε η μετάφραση του Σφυρόερα με όλο το έργο και συμπληρώσεις και επειδή ο Μένανδρος όλοκληρος δεν είχε ανέβει ποτέ ως τότε στην Ελλάδα ή και στην Ευρώπη σκέφτηκα να παρουσιάσω ένα έργο του στο ελληνικό ακροατήριο. Επίσης μου το στυλ της' μετάφρασης του Σφυρόερα μου άρεσε. Έπαιξε επίσης ρόλο [στην επιλογή μου να ανεβάσω Μένανδρο] ο αστικός χαρακτήρας των κωμωδιών του Μένανδρου αλλά και η αστική κοινωνία της Αθήνας εκείνης της εποχής. Θα μπορούσα να πω ότι υπήρχε ένα είδος, κάποιας 'ομοιότητας' των δύο [κοινωνιών], αν και σε εντελώς διαφορετικές χρονικές και πολιτισμικές εποχές'.

⁵⁹⁰ Apostolou's interview: 'ο θεατρικός λόγος του [Αριστοφάνη] είναι πιο υπολογίσιμος και η γλώσσα του έχει περισσότερα χρώματα, αστείρευτη γλωσσική και θεατρική ποικιλία'.

⁵⁹¹ See above, pp. 169 and 171.

⁵⁹² Sfyroeras' note in the production's programme, which belongs to the personal Archives of Kanelos Apostolou's and the Archives of the Theatrical Museum in Athens (there are no page numbers in the programme): 'Next to Sophocles I am not aware of any other Greek author whom I like more than Menander. He is absolutely hilarious, great, and his charm is indestructible. It is a pity that we have so few surviving fragments by Menander, but these are invaluable'.

into the comedy of Menander, a playwright who was admired by many intellectuals throughout the centuries especially for the delineation of his 'characters'. He stresses that Menander's 'types' echo 'even in the theatre of our time [i.e, modern European comedy], as well as in the theatre of Rome [i.e., Latin comedy], the theatre of Renaissance ... Still more surprising is Menander's 'prophecy' when, for example, he puts in Pamphile's mouth a declaration of women's right to self-determination'.⁵⁹³

Sfyroeras favoured *Epitrepontes* because the genre of: 'New Comedy will now speak in a different language about man [compared to previous types of Greek comedy, that is, Ancient and Middle], it will pay attention to man's feelings, it will reveal the secrets of his soul and his life, and by leaving aside the stories of the gods, heroes and ancestors of the past, it will focus on ordinary people... The *Epitrepontes* concentrates on the private life of ... a newly wedded couple who separate due to misunderstanding, but they do not stop loving each other.... It is a simple story but a theatrical play of deep meaning and importance'. In addition, the translator praised Menander's plays for their refined humour, which provokes smiles rather than laughter.⁵⁹⁴ In the programme notes, Sfyroeras made the audience aware of the type of humour to expect from the production, and I believe he was thereby indirectly suggesting that it was modern interpolations in the original play, rather than the spirit of the original, that were responsible for any excessive laughter that this production might arouse, as was also the case with Act I in Evangelatos' production.⁵⁹⁵ The director Apostolou had a similar attitude regarding the quality of Menander's humour. For him too, the comic in

⁵⁹³ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 7.

⁵⁹⁴ Sfyroeras' note in the programme.

⁵⁹⁵ See below, p. 207ff.

Menander is related to misunderstandings due to characters' flaws and the situations in which they are involved.⁵⁹⁶

Sfyroeras states, in the translator's note in the production's programme, that around 800 verses from *Epitrepontes* have been preserved, enough to offer a firm grasp of the plot of the play. He therefore decided to fill in the gaps in the fragments so that they could be used as a basis for staging the play.

According to Sfyroeras, it would have been a pity if this great play written by Menander with the purpose of being performed had remained a fragmentary text known only to classical scholars rather than being made accessible to a wider theatrical audience. The translator informed the audience as well that in reconstructing the text he gave primary consideration to the fragments of the original play and filled in the gaps by taking account of Menander's style as well as scholarly views about Menander, his theatre, and the cultural environment of his era, in particular his 'Theophrastean characterizations, his Isocratean morality and his Epicurean philosophical thinking' although, as we shall see, he did at times cater subtly to modern taste.⁵⁹⁷

For his translation, Sfyroeras stated that he mainly used Jensen's edition of the play, based on the Cairo papyrus,⁵⁹⁸ and Croiset's translation, which was used for the Parnassos production of the arbitration scene – a version he knew well.⁵⁹⁹ However, Sfyroeras did not mention that he took into consideration too the earlier translation and completion of the play by Thrasyvoulos

⁵⁹⁶ Apostolou's interview: 'κωμωδία ηθών/ηθογραφική και κωμωδία παρεξηγήσεων λόγων των ελαττωμάτων των χαρακτήρων'.

⁵⁹⁷ Sfyroeras' note in the programme and Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 7-11.

⁵⁹⁸ Jensen (1929).

⁵⁹⁹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 72.

Stavrou, even though one can see some influences of this version on Sfyroeras' text.⁶⁰⁰

It must be noted that Sfyroeras felt very proud about reconstructing Menander's entire *Epitrepontes* for the modern Greek audience. He compares his philological restoration of the fragmentary text to the job that an archaeologist performs in order to put together pieces of a broken amphora which found in an excavation. In order to underline that his initiative also had scholarly approval and was an important scholarly achievement in its own right, he even cited Soteriades' hopeful wish.⁶⁰¹ Soteriades had said: 'I imagine that one day it would not be impossible for a creative modern Greek intellectual to reconstruct the whole beautiful building [the whole play] through the ruins [fragments] of the play and also by cleverly choosing [and adding] new lines [to the existing fragments]'. The translator's views about Menander's theatre and the glorious Greek past seem to accord with the views of the participants in the 1908 production, contrary to what Apostolou indicated.

In addition to the more scholarly procedures used by Sfyroeras to reconstruct the text of Menander there was another and equally important resource which allowed him both to fill the gaps and simultaneously to bring his Menander closer to the modern audience. Sfyroeras' own textual additions to the Menandrian text served to introduce his audience to a comedy with popular motifs not far from the type of domestic or romantic comedy with which the audience of 1959 was familiar, mainly through films. Certain motifs and characters played a central role in 1950s films in Greece for example, a

⁶⁰⁰ Stavrou (1954) and above, p. 173.

⁶⁰¹ Part of Soteriades' speech before the Parnassos production of the arbitration scene, Sfyroeras (1975), p. 9 with n. 2.

married man's infidelity; a married woman's supposed infidelity;⁶⁰² and a single young woman who has had a love affair with a man who subsequently abandoned her, their affair resulting in an illegitimate baby and which the woman, in many cases, exposes so as not to shame herself and her family (this last theme resembles the events in *Epitrepontes*, as we shall see, but has no precise precedent in Menandrian comedy).⁶⁰³ There are even examples of the exposure of infants, so common in New Comedy and specifically in *Epitrepontes*. Although Sfyroeras does not mention in the production's programme or in his introduction to the published edition of the play⁶⁰⁴ that he was influenced by Greek films, character types from popular movies of the 1950s can be recognized in his adaptation. On the other hand, Apostolou maintains that some of Menander's characters and plot motifs also survived in the Greek comic films of the 1950s, especially, but not exclusively, those written by two famous Greek film screenwriters and playwrights, Alekos Sakellarios and Christos Yannakopoulos. These films, mainly comedies, focus on family lives, romances, character types, for example 'A hero in his slippers', 'Mrs Midwife', 'Mademoiselle age 39', 'Aunt from Chicago', 'The

⁶⁰² For example, 'Neither cat nor damage' ('Ούτε γάτα ούτε ζημιά', 1955), 'A pebble in the lake' ('Ένα βότσαλο στη λίμνη' 1952); both films are comedies and include also misunderstandings between married couples. In addition, the latter has as its main character a stereotypically stingy man, the husband in the story who had an influence on the image of Smikrines in Tassos Roussos' translation, used in Evangelatos' production, as Roussos told me (this will be analysed below).

⁶⁰³ For example, 'The jinx' ('Ο γρουσουζης', 1952), 'I am your child mum' ('Είμαι παιδί σου μανούλα', 1958), and 'Nanny with force' ('Νταντά με το ζόρι', 1959). The motif of the unmarried girl with an illegitimate baby had also some other variations: the mother of the girl presents as her own the child of her single daughter to save the honour of the family but at the end the truth comes out ('The mother's sacrifice', 'Η θυσία της μάνας', 1956); an unmarried girl ends up with an illegitimate baby but instead of exposing it she gives it up for adoption and after many dramatic turns is reunited with her child and marries the man who adopted it ('Fate writes the history/the story', 'Η μοίρα γράφει την ιστορία', 1957). For the movie, *The Jinx*, as background to the *Dyskolos* production, see also below, Chapter 6.

⁶⁰⁴ Sfyroeras (1975).

fortune teller', 'Spare the rod and spoil the child', 'I will make you a queen', 'My son-in-law the fortune-hunter'.⁶⁰⁵

Despite his exploitation of motifs from contemporary Greek film, when it came to the production's setting and costumes, the director opted not for modern costume drama but for a style reminiscent of Menander's time. There was however no attempt to recreate the ancient theatre in painstaking detail; the actors did not wear masks because Apostolou thought that his approach to the play, as a bourgeois (αστική) comedy with reference to real life, was incompatible with the use of masks. However, he did not reject the use of masks in contemporary Menandrian productions, if the style of the production was compatible with this prop.⁶⁰⁶ As for choral parts, Apostolou used instrumental music, that is, music without lyrics. During the musical intervals, the actors danced and responded playfully to the sound of the music, which involved a type of musical interval which was close to the original Menandrian style, as the director told me. He wanted to respect the form of the original choral parts, which in the papyrus are indicated simply by the label "chorus", without any words, and so he did not elect to use songs with lyrics.⁶⁰⁷

⁶⁰⁵ The Greek titles of the films are: 'Ένας ήρωας με παντούφλες' (1958), 'Η κυρά μας η μαμή' (1958), 'Δεσποινής ετών 39' (1954), 'Η θεία από το Σικάγο' (1957), 'Η καφετζού' (1956), 'Το ξύλο βγήκε από τον παράδεισο' (1959), and a later film of the 1960s 'Ο γαμπρός μου ο προικοθήρας' (1967). For all except the last film, the script and/or direction were by Alekos Sakellarios and Christos Yannakopoulos. The script of the last was written by Stephanos Photiades. This type of film was also mentioned by Tassos Roussos in relation to his characterization of Charisios' character in Evangelatos' production.

⁶⁰⁶ Apostolou's interview: 'Δεν ταίριαζαν στη δική μου παράσταση οι μάσκες. Θα μπορούσαν να χρησιμοποιηθούν σε άλλο είδος παράστασης και προσέγγισης του Μενάνδρου, σε παράσταση, στυλ κουκλοθέατρου, ας πούμε. Αν κάποιος είχε την κατάλληλη έμπνευση και φαντασία για τέτοιου είδους προσέγγιση, θα μπορούσε να χρησιμοποιήσει μάσκες'.

⁶⁰⁷ Apostolou's interview: 'Ός προς τα χορικά: είχα μόνον μουσική, όχι τραγούδια, εκεί που το αρχαίο κείμενο λέει 'Του χορού'. Οι ηθοποιοί συμμετείχαν στα χορικά, χορεύοντας και γλεντώντας. Δεν πρωτοτύπησα με το να βάλω χορικά με τραγούδια αλλά και δεν παραβίασα το Μενανδρικό κείμενο'.

I will focus my analysis on Acts I and III where Sfyroeras heavily reconstructed the original text, and on Act V where some new elements were introduced to the original Menandrian text, in order to underline the style of the new play and the way its characters suited the taste of the 1959 audience. I may note, moreover, that Sfyroeras' text significantly influenced Tassos Roussos' translation of the play for Spyros Evangelatos' landmark production in 1980, a point to which we return below.

Onesimos and Karion's rewriting of the story of Charisios' and Pamphile's estrangement in Act I

Sfyroeras' additional verses in Act I serve: a) as a kind of extensive prologue to the play in order to inform the modern Greek audience about the characters and the plot (the original prologue is lost, but Sfyroeras' intuition, as Furley shows, was sound)⁶⁰⁸ and b) to fill in the extremely fragmentary condition of the original text, since he needed to turn it into a theatrical script with a complete story. Instead of a monologue, Sfyroeras introduced his version by means of a dialogue between two relatively minor characters, a technique he may well have found in the comedies of Terence who himself had displaced the prologues of his Menandrian originals with just such scenes (for example, the dialogue between two slaves with which the *Phormio* opens). Sfyroeras made use of the surviving fragments attributed to Act I of *Epitrepontes*,⁶⁰⁹ but he enriched them with spicy information about the main theme of the play, that is, the reason why Charisios has abandoned his wife – this was the use to which he put the dialogue he invented between the slave Onesimos and the

⁶⁰⁸ For the supposed lost prologue of the original play and the possible identity of the character who would have delivered this part of the play, see Furley (2009), pp. 8-10. Furley proposes that the prologue of the play might have been delivered by a personification of Reconciliation, *Diallagē*.

⁶⁰⁹ Jensen (1929), pp. 14-15 fr. 1-6; cf. Furley (2009), pp.39-42 and 121-127.

cook Karion. For not only is this the type of gossip that a slave and a cook might normally engage in – a touch of dramatic realism or the low comic style – but it also served, as we shall see, to hint at a story line familiar to a modern audience. Sfyroeras did not locate all the fragments which were attributed to Act I of the original play at the beginning, but distributed them among the many verses he added in Act I, from the beginning of the adaptation to the point at which Smikrines appears on stage in his version as well as in the original text.⁶¹⁰

The modern Greek text presents Karion as a cunning and manipulative fellow who persuades the stupid and talkative Onesimos into giving him information about Charisios and Pamphile to satisfy his curiosity and desire for gossip. By presenting Onesimos in this way, Sfyroeras prepares the audience for Onesimos' monologue in Act III, which is full of self-pity, and for his manipulation again by Habrotonon in the same act. Sfyroeras' adaptation sharpens the characterization of both, Onesimos and Karion.

Onesimos informs the cook that his poor master developed a lump (καρούμπαλο) on his head before he had the chance to enjoy life with his new wife. Karion wonders why Charisios did not seek a cure for his lump, to which Onesimos responds that for this type of painful lump there is no cure unless one uproots the problem before it appears.⁶¹¹ From the first lines in the play, then, the translator creates a bawdy atmosphere through the allusion to Charisios' wife's possible infidelity. The use of the word καρούμπαλο brings to the audience's mind the word κέρατο (horn) which, in colloquial Greek, is

⁶¹⁰ Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 43-52; cf. Jensen (1929), p. 15, Sandbach (1990), p. 98 and Furley (2009), p. 42.

⁶¹¹ Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 43-44.

associated with a cuckold.⁶¹² Onesimos regrets his garrulity and soliloquizes: 'I think I was carried away too much. Damn my tongue'.⁶¹³

Karion fails to catch the double entendre and cannot explain the behaviour of a newly married man who abandons his wife unless she is ugly; he wonders whether Charisios was deceived regarding her dowry. Onesimos assures the cook that Pamphile is pretty and her dowry was considerable, even though Smikrines, the father of his mistress, is a penny-pinching man. Karion is more puzzled about what prompted Charisios to behave in the way he has.

Onesimos replies with the conventional phrase: 'blind Tyche plays hide and seek with all of us and does not unravel what is going to happen to us, but the actual events reveal their nature to us only when they happen'. Onesimos' answer heightens Karion's curiosity and he is determined to know everything before he leaves the house. After all, he must enhance the reputation of his profession in respect to spreading rumours. According to Karion, gossip is like the salt that cooks add to the meals they prepare for their clients.⁶¹⁴ He offers Onesimos wine to make him relaxed, and manages to convince him to have a drink, but his ultimate purpose is to make Onesimos dizzy, if not drunk, so as to extract the information he wants. Onesimos cannot resist Karion's friendly gesture and enjoys his high-quality wine, a product of Koropi, famous for its grapes.⁶¹⁵ Karion assures the innocent Onesimos that he is a quiet man who is not at all interested in the lives of the couples he cooks for, in order to avoid getting involved in their quarrels. But he insists on knowing why Charisios and his wife quarrelled. This is not a common story. He cannot imagine that the wife would have been responsible for the quarrel but rather blames the husband, as the facts indicate: Charisios

⁶¹² Babiniotis (1998), s.v. κέρατο and καρούμπαλο.

⁶¹³ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 44.

⁶¹⁴ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 45; cf. fr. 5 of the original play, Jensen (1929), p.14.

⁶¹⁵ Sfyroeras (1975) p. 46; cf. fr. 2 of the original play, Jensen (1929), p.14.

abandoned his wife the moment he got hold of her dowry and he prefers to live with an hetaira. All this byplay of course heightens the spectators' own curiosity, leading them on by means of innuendos that suggest a bawdy back story to the plot. The technique is not dissimilar to Menander's own, and shows Sfyroeras' feel for the dynamics of the original.

Once he is tipsy, Onesimos says that Charisios abandoned his wife after he accidentally found out about what she had done. Pamphile and her cunning old father, who must have known his daughter's character all too well as a loose or ill-behaved girl, Onesimos insinuates, were in a hurry for the wedding, and that is why the stingy old man gave Charisios such a dowry: here, the dramatist hints not so much at marital infidelity as at a promiscuous past for the daughter. Smikrines was cunning enough to give Charisios the entire dowry he had promised because he wanted to get her off his hands, knowing that her probable behaviour would render her ineligible for marriage if the truth about her past came out.⁶¹⁶ This insinuation of a possible prior affair on the part of Pamphile, like the cook's suggestion of marital infidelity, is a nod to the conventions of cinematic romance, which did not hesitate to expose amorous alliances of the heroine prior to marriage. There were variations on the motif in films of the 1950s, for example that the girl who lost her virginity was innocent and fell in love with a man who abused her and made her pregnant, or else that the girl was adventurous and aware of the consequences of her behaviour. In both scenarios, the family of the girl had only one aim: to cover the shame of the family and marry the girl off without revealing anything about her past to her future husband. In Menandrian comedy, a young citizen girl may have been subjected to rape (as Pamphile was), but is never represented as enamoured of another man –

⁶¹⁶ Sfyroeras (1975) p. 46.

indeed, strictly speaking (that is, in the sense of experiencing *erōs*), not even of her own husband.⁶¹⁷ By exaggerating his description of an old man obsessed with his money, Onesimos overdoes even the ancient stereotype of the miser for the purpose of arousing laughter in the audience, even as it provides an explanation for Charisios' otherwise astonishing actions.

Onesimos asks Karion for more wine before making still further revelations. Karion comments on Onesimos' request by citing a verse from the poet Anacreon, famous for his drinking: 'the wine confesses the whole truth'.⁶¹⁸ Before dropping the bombshell about Pamphile's newborn baby, Onesimos asks Karion about the length of a woman's pregnancy and what he knows about it. Although Karion is surprised by the question, he replies that it takes nine months unless a woman goes to Naxos to give birth where it is said that women give birth in the eighth month of their pregnancy because Dionysos has granted the women of Naxos this privilege.⁶¹⁹ The comic exchange between the two men is followed by the news about Pamphile, who, we are informed, gave birth five months after her wedding. Onesimos reveals, however, that he congratulated his master on the arrival of the baby but his revelation was the beginning of the troubles. As he tells Karion: 'Charisios asks his wife "where is the baby?" The cunning fishwife (κυράτσα) pretends that she does not understand and replies "which baby?" Charisios insists "the five-month-old bugger (τὸ μούλικο) that you gave birth to while I was away from home and for which Onesimos patted me on the back". Pamphile was adamant that "Onesimos must be mad. Call him to confess in front of me by

⁶¹⁷ See Dutsch and Konstan (2010), pp. 60 and 68 and Kiritsi (2013a), where I discuss *erōs* is experienced only by male characters in Menander's plays. For the theme of *erōs* in Menander's comedies, see especially Konstan (1995), pp. 93-106.

⁶¹⁸ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 47.

⁶¹⁹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 48, n. 1 cites as source for Dionysos' story Asclepiades (in Stephanos Byzantios 13.9 Billerbeck-Lentini-Hartmann). Sfyroeras is familiar with myths and local stories about Naxos because he comes from the island.

taking an oath that I gave birth'''. Pamphile's confidence made Onesimos wonder whether he witnessed Pamphile giving birth or dreamt it. Pamphile accused him of lying, spat in his face and challenged him, in front of Charisios, to show the baby. Onesimos claims he answered back: 'Hold on, hold on.... I am your slave ... and not a ball that you can kick and punch whenever you wish'.⁶²⁰ Karion flatters Onesimos by admiring his courage.

Onesimos is angry also with Sophrone, his mistress' confidante, who acted as a midwife for the birth of Pamphile's baby. He is sure that the two cunning women exposed Pamphile's baby to protect her dignity, according to the fashion of the age. In the end Charisios believed Onesimos; as he says: 'It is a shame for a free man to be duped but it is humane to go through pain'.⁶²¹

Onesimos believes that Charisios is a dignified and reasonable man, who cares about his honour, and that is why he abandoned Pamphile and went to stay with his friend. Charisios did not make a scene with Pamphile, despite the seriousness of the matter. Sfyroeras presents Onesimos as appreciative of Charisios in spite of Charisios's anger towards him, while he dislikes Pamphile and her behaviour. He refers to her often in the play (see also above) as 'κυράτσα', a colloquial expression used in everyday speech with a derogatory meaning. Κυράτσα is used for a woman from a low social and financial class who unsuccessfully imitates the behaviour of women in the upper class. It also means a woman who gossips and shouts at others in order to impose her views, in which she has perfect confidence.⁶²² Onesimos regards Pamphile's hypocritical behaviour as unsuitable for a person of her class.

⁶²⁰ Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 49-50.

⁶²¹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 51; cf. these verses in the translation with fr. 9 in Jensen (1929), p. 46, fr. 10 (176 K) from Stobaeus in Sandbach (1990), p. 130, and Furley (2009), pp. 41-42.

⁶²² Babiniotis (1998), s.v. κυράτσα.

Regarding characterization, we can see several innovations in the modern version of the comedy. Pamphile is far from the modest figure she cuts in Menander's original play, where she speaks only to affirm her unconditional loyalty to her husband. Here, she is bold and cheeky, threatening Onesimos and challenging him to produce evidence, when she knows full well that he is telling the truth. Onesimos himself is ready to speak up in his own defence, rather than slink away, as slaves in ancient comedy mostly do when intimidated by their masters, and speaks back to his mistress in an uppity fashion typical of modern comic servants. These alterations are of a piece with the Terentian style of dramatic dialogue, which permits the characters to make false inferences about the motives of the principals, as opposed to the omniscient prologue which reports the truth of the situation. Just this technique, in turn, allows the modern writer to insinuate a plot line, involving possible promiscuity on the part of Pamphile that accords with the audience's expectations of the genre but is in fact wrong, since the story will evolve in accord with the narrative line established by Menander. For where Menander's original lines survive, Sfyroeras makes no changes: Pamphile remains demure, with no hint of forwardness, not to mention a dissolute past, the slave Onesimos is terrified at the consequences of his indiscretions, Smikrines exhibits no cunning at all in respect to arranging his daughter's marriage, and what is more, acts as a fair-minded judge in the arbitration scene that gives the play its name, and no trace of the alternative motives for the break-up of Charisios' marriage to Pamphile suggested in the opening act remains. Sfyroeras has created a brilliant hybrid that simultaneously respects the surviving fragments in every detail and yet fills in the missing parts in such a way as to satisfy the expectations of a modern Greek audience without exposing the seams and sutures.

Smikrines

Act I

Smikrines' arrival interrupts the gossip between Onesimos and Karion. Sfyroeras begins the delineation of Smikrines' character with the surviving verses of fragment 6 in Jensen's edition.⁶²³ The old man is angry with his lazy and prodigal son-in-law. Sfyroeras completes Smikrines' fragmentary speech in the original text by representing him in a furious and sarcastic humour regarding Charisios, once again stretching the original characterization but not to the point at which it violates Menandrian decorum.⁶²⁴ Smikrines addresses the audience in tones dripping with irony: 'It is such bad luck to have a son-in-law like mine, the good for nothing Charisios, because all your property will of course thrive. The dowry you gave him will, to be sure, be inherited by his child and his grandchild'. He describes Charisios' habits with several colloquial adjectives which express his anger: Charisios is ἀχαΐρευτος (good for nothing)⁶²⁵, ἀχόρταγος καλοφαγός (a greedy gourmand), ἀρχιτεμπέλης (the leader of the lazy people), προικοχάφτης (a man who devours his wife's dowry). Smikrines cannot come to terms with the fact that as soon as Charisios got his hands on the dowry, Smikrines' hard earned money, he abandoned his wife and squandered it by living an extravagant life, drinking expensive wines and having fun with a hetaira. The more Smikrines reflects on Charisios' behaviour the more angry and puzzled he becomes about what kind of man Charisios is: 'I cannot believe it: to snatch four silver talents and not to feel any obligation towards his wife. He sleeps out and pays the pimp twelve drachmas a day...Why do I bother myself? I

⁶²³ Jensen (1929), p. 14 and Furley (2009), p. 42 and 127.

⁶²⁴ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 52.

⁶²⁵ The actual Greek meaning of the word is a person who lacks diligence, industry and prosperity, Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ἀχαΐρευτος.

wish he would break his neck'.⁶²⁶ Smikrines feels the injustice of Charisios' wasting his money and hurting his daughter's feelings, in a way that is at most only adumbrated in what survives of Menander's original. By revealing this side of Smikrines' character in Act I, Sfyroeras may have intended to prepare the audience for his role in the arbitration scene in Act II, where he appears as a stern and somewhat impatient man but at the same time fair-minded and reasonable.

Charisios' friends, Chairestratos and Simias, take Smikrines' soliloquy as an evil sign or jinx (ὁ γρουσούζαρος).⁶²⁷ Both men believe that Smikrines' presence will mean trouble for Charisios. Smikrines wishes to go to his daughter's house to acquire first-hand information from her about the events. Following the Menandrian text, Sfyroeras has not yet had Smikrines decide to remove his daughter from her husband's home.

Act III

Sfyroeras specifies that to restore and translate Smikrines' monologue in the fragments of Act III he took into consideration Jensen's reading of the fragments of his monologue in lines 583-609 as well as Jensen's suggestions, in some cases, for filling in lacunae in the text. Smikrines starts his monologue by repeating the accusation that his son-in-law is a cunning, greedy, good-for-nothing fellow who has taken Smikrines and Pamphile for a ride. Smikrines then expresses his concern about his public honour as the master of his household, since everybody in the city is gossiping about Charisios' shameful deeds. Indeed, Smikrines' name and honour have become, he says,

⁶²⁶ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 53.

⁶²⁷ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 54. Γρουσούζης is a person who brings bad luck, and he is also a miser, Babiniotis (1998), s.v. The compound word, γρουσούζαρος is not only colloquial but also magnifies the activity of such a man; cf. τρισκακοδ[αίμων in Jensen (1929), p. 16.

objects of derision. In Menander's text, we are told that the whole city is gossiping about Charisios' behaviour. The rumour, as Smikrines presents it, is that Charisios has been having fun with the hetaira for the past three days, and ultimately Smikrines is paying for this continuous party because Charisios is spending Pamphile's dowry. Smikrines feels self-pity (expressed in ἀλλοίμονό μου, ὁ φουκαρῶς), because there is the devil to pay, and this devil is Charisios.⁶²⁸

Charisios has deceived Smikrines⁶²⁹ by giving him the impression, when he asked for Pamphile's hand in marriage, that he was a good and reliable man. But Charisios' intention, according to Smikrines, was to take control of Smikrines' household and property. Smikrines trusted Charisios and gave his consent to marry his daughter. He did not even request information about his character from other sources. Instead, he was a compliant father, behaving like a blind person, embracing Charisios with full confidence in him. But Sfyroeras has no qualms about expanding notions implicit, as he saw it, in the original. Thus, his Smikrines expresses the view that he should have asked his fellow citizens about Charisios' character before giving his consent to marry his daughter. There is precedent for this kind of caution in regard to marriage in Menander's *Dyskolos* in Chaereas' advice to Sostratos (57-69), but Sfyroeras does not make any connection in his comments or in the translation, although he knew the text of *Dyskolos* very well, as said above. Rather, Sfyroeras addition at this point in the *Epitrepontes* reflects Greek custom in the 1950s or earlier especially but not exclusively in some provincial areas. The

⁶²⁸ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 72; cf. Jensen (1929), p. 30, v. 368 ὅλη γὰρ ἄδει τὸ κακόν... and Furley (2009), p. 60 and his comment on p. 199 with reference to vv. 584-585.

⁶²⁹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 72; cf. Jensen (1929), p. 31, v. 380 πυνθαν[όμενος ... ἠπάτ]ησέ με. Although in Jensen's text we find the words ἠπάτ]ησέ με (38), it is impossible to tell in just what respect Charisios is imagined as deceiving Smikrines. See also Furley (2009), p. 60, although he does not comment on ἠπάτ]ησέ με.

father or guardian of a girl who was about to marry a man from a neighbouring town or from the same city, in the case of big cities such as Athens, usually sought information about the man's family. This happened not only for financial or status reasons but also to check on the moral and social values of the girl's family, which would be reflected in the upbringing of the prospective bride. In this respect, customs in post-war Greece had not changed so radically since the Athens reflected in Menander's comedies.

Smikrines is astonished because his son-in-law feels no shame for his actions, that is having a legal wife and at the same time having a music-girl as his mistress, gambling, drinking and having fun without limit. By stressing once again Charisios' lack of shame over the way he acts,⁶³⁰ Sfyroeras further underlines Smikrines' anger at his son-in-law's behaviour and the social implications of this behaviour for him and his daughter, which was a very important issue both during Menander's time and in modern Greek society. Nevertheless, as we have seen, some doubt has been cast on Smikrines' control over his daughter, with the innuendo on the part of Onesimos that she may have been promiscuous before her marriage. The modern audience is at liberty to regard Onesimos' suggestion as false, reflecting perhaps a slave's cynical view of life. Yet he also reports, in the modern version, that she rather brazenly lied about the birth of the child (though Smikrines himself is still ignorant of his daughter's pregnancy). Thus, Smikrines' complaints about Charisios' lack of shame may ring somewhat hollow in the minds of the spectators; this kind of suspicion cast on the motives of the principals, and above all the virtuous wife, represents a departure from the classical patterns

⁶³⁰ Cf. Jensen (1929), p. 31, and his proposed supplement to the lacunae of 366-375, especially 'τοῦνομ[α καταισχύνοντα μετὰ τῆς] ψαλτρίας, and p.33, vv. 428-429 'ύμῶν ἑταῖρος οὗτος οὐ[δ]' ἤσ[χύ]νετο παιδάρι[ον] ἐκ πόρνης [ποεῖν. Furley (2009), p. 60 and 62 does not agree with the reconstruction of 'οὐδ' ἤισχύνετο'.

of characterization, though it nicely serves the dramatic function of casting doubt on the protagonists that will only be resolved in the end.

Smikrines curses Charisios. He feels more self-pity and anger as he recalls how many sacrifices and hardships he went through in the past and how much hard work he put into acquiring his possessions, which are now being squandered by Charisios so selfishly and impetuously.⁶³¹ Thus, on the one hand Sfyroeras adopts Jensen's reading of the text, according to which Smikrines' extreme meanness is emphasized,⁶³² but on the other hand he makes the modern Greek audience rather more sympathetic regarding his situation (in Menander, Smikrines calls himself 'unfortunate').⁶³³ It must be noted that in the 1950s Greece was not so prosperous and a reasonable meanness was recommended by the generation who went through World War II, the subsequent Civil War, and all the hardships of the time. And yet, once again, there is a precedent in Menander for such a complex characterization of a miserly misanthrope, precisely in the *Dyskolos*; for Knemon is alternately represented as monstrous in his aggression toward his fellows and as a typical hardworking farmer, a stern and even virtuous member of the species.⁶³⁴ On the other hand, the motif of a young man who intended to marry a young woman mainly, if not only, for her dowry, or is suspected of doing so, according to the girl's family, was a common theme or subplot in films in Greece before and after the 1950s, in dramatic genres (such

⁶³¹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 72.

⁶³² Jensen (1929), p. 31, v. 381 'φιλά[ργυρος]'.
⁶³³ Jensen (1929), p. 33, v. 436. Furley (2009), p. 62 and 201, notices the repetition of

δυστυχοῦς and δυστυχή in vv. 653-654 and suggests change of speaker here attributing the first use of the adjective to Smikrines and the second to Chairestratos.

⁶³⁴ For Knemon's character in *Dyskolos* in general and its influence on modern European drama, see Konstan (1995), pp. 93-164 and especially, pp. 95 and 99-100. See also above my analysis of Knemon's character in Chapter 3 and below, Knemon's character in the two productions of *Dyskolos*, Chapter 6.

the *komeidyllio*) and in daily life.⁶³⁵ The pejorative adjective *προικοθήρας* (fortune hunter; cf. Smikrines' term *προικοχάφτης*, above), which was and is still used for this type of character, connotes the kinds of vices that Smikrines attributes to Charisios. In the Menandrian text, however, we do not have any indication that Charisios was a poor man, even the angry Smikrines does not call him poor in his fragmentary monologues in Act III.

Smikrines also pities his daughter, given the fate that has befallen her with such a husband.⁶³⁶ With the closing remark of Smikrines' monologue, Sfyroeras chooses to highlight his caring side as a father, rather than stressing his meanness, rendering him an agreeable and likeable character regardless of his flaws, which are epitomized by his meanness. Here again, Sfyroeras has modified, by artful insertions, the image of Smikrines in Menander's original (Jensen's edition), even as he respects the text wherever it is well enough preserved to follow; the tension in characterization that results adds an element of complexity, in conformity with modern conceptions of individual personality as opposed to comic stereotype (though Menander himself developed his characters to a considerable extent in this direction).⁶³⁷ In addition, Smikrines' final words have a dramatic function, which is to prepare for his meeting with his daughter and their conversation in Act IV.

⁶³⁵ In some films, however, this initial selfish motif on the part of the young man is changed, insofar as *erōs* had entered his heart; see for example the film, 'The Apaches of Athens' ('Οι Απάχηδες των Αθηνών', 1950). For the family's suspicion that their daughter's poor boyfriend was aiming at her dowry, see for example the film, 'The barrel-organ, poverty and pride' ('Λατέρινα, φτώχεια και φιλότιμο', 1955). For the characters and plots of *komeidyllio*, see Chatzepantazes (1981a).

⁶³⁶ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 72.

⁶³⁷ As said above, in Chapter 2, the newly published fragments from Smikrines' speech in Act IV of the original text show a more nuanced representation of Smikrines and reveal that he was genuinely concerned about his daughter's welfare as well as her dowry; see also Römer (2012a and 2012b).

The encounter between the cook, Karion, and Smikrines is used by the translator to reveal as well provocative information about Charisios' behaviour towards Habrotonon, a topic close to popular taste, even as it exposes Smikrines' character. Smikrines asks Karion for information about the feast (τσιμπούσι, a colloquial term) which is to take place in the house where he is employed to cook. He wants to know how many people will be attending, which matters to him since he thinks he will be paying for it. Karion is ignorant of Smikrines' identity as Charisios' father-in-law, and his information makes the old man angrier, but he controls his reaction until he hears all the information. Karion states: 'What is taking place now is nothing compared to what will follow in a little while because we will have here the baby's christening and a wedding here, both at the same time and many people will get into a frightful tangle'. The baby in question is at this point believed to be that of Habrotonon, conceived with Charisios, since she has, in accord with Menander's plot, pretended for the moment that it is hers, in order to be sure that Charisios is indeed the father. Smikrines is curious to know more about Charisios' relationship with Habrotonon, and Karion, as a gossip, twists the reality: 'Now she [Habrotonon] sits next to him, they drink and they are full of flirting and mush. [He tells her] I love you and she replies: "oh, my darling!"'.⁶³⁸ Smikrines is astounded by the news: 'Damn him! He cannot squander my money in this way. I will take my daughter away from him and let the hetaira be the mistress of his household'. The Menandrian text does not indicate whether Karion was still present at this point in the action⁶³⁹, and I do not know whether he was represented in the modern production as overhearing Smikrines' exclamation; if so, then Smikrines may well have dropped all pretence of being a stranger to Pamphile's situation.

⁶³⁸ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 73. These are not terms in which Menander's Charisios is likely to have addressed Habrotonon.

⁶³⁹ Jensen (1929), p. 33, v. 437.

Simias and Chairestratos appear next.⁶⁴⁰ Their overheard comments about Charisios' baby with Habrotonon make Smikrines still more angry, and he manifests his exasperation by using a common expression in modern Greek: 'Who can accuse the murderer of being in the wrong?' Apart from the comic dimension, Sfyroeras' choice of words may remind the audience of the theme of crimes of passion, a favourite topic not only in art (in films, in popular and rebetika songs especially from the 1930s onwards) but also in real life⁶⁴¹ where killing to defend one's honour was excusable in some people's eyes. Smikrines does not mean that he intends to kill Charisios but the translator has him overstate his feelings (at least implicitly) under the influence of his emotions.⁶⁴²

Smikrines cannot digest Charisios' unjust behaviour towards Pamphile: 'So, your friend has fathered a child [with the hetaira] and he dares to find fault with my daughter. I said it and I will do it: I will take my daughter away from him even by force. It is better for her to pamper me rather than Charisios and his bastard'.⁶⁴³ The apparent symmetry between Charisios' fathering a child and the fault of Pamphile is misleading at this point, since Smikrines still has no idea that Pamphile herself has given birth; he means only that Charisios may have rejected Pamphile for her prior misbehaviour (if indeed he has

⁶⁴⁰ Although Sfyroeras following Lefebvre's, identification of characters at this point (cf. Jensen (1929), p. 33), introduces Chairestratos and Simias, he attributes a few words to Chairestratos and a longer speaking part to Simias. Sfyroeras' choice is not in agreement either with Jensen (1929), pp. 33-35 or with later editions of the Menandrian play in this respect. See Arnott (1979), pp. 385 and 472-473 and Furley (2009), pp.61-63 and 200, where he argues that the character Σ]μίας 'is not refereed to elsewhere in the play' and 'he was certainly a *kōphon prosōpon*'.

⁶⁴¹ Cf. killing due to vendetta in Crete, or in the region of Mani in the Peloponnese. For the rebetika songs, see Holst-Warhaft (2013), available at <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com.ezproxy01.rhul.ac.uk/subscriber/article/grove/music/51102?q=rebetika&search=quick&pos=1&start=1#firsthit>.

⁶⁴² See Furley (2009), p. 205.

⁶⁴³ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 74; cf. Jensen (1929), p. 33, vv. 420-427.

accepted Onesimos' insinuation in Act I), without mentioning that his daughter has dishonoured her family with an illegitimate child of her own. Of course, Smikrines' remark anticipates the revelation in the final act, when Charisios will indeed repent of having rejected Pamphile for having borne a child. Once again, Smikrines' caring side towards his daughter would have appealed to a modern Greek audience, where parents try to excuse their own children's mistakes, preferring to blame somebody else for them or else simply circumstances. Smikrines believes that rescuing Pamphile from her immoral husband will have more than one advantage. Among them is that she will nurse him in his old age, which echoes Greek customs regarding parents' expectations of their children, in antiquity as well as today. Even in his caring moments, Smikrines appears calculating, though this view of children's responsibilities was common and perfectly acceptable in classical literature – and not entirely alien to the modern Greek culture of Sfyroeras' time.

Simias warns Chairestratos that their friend Charisios' position is difficult because Smikrines is not joking. Smikrines responds sarcastically: 'What luck to have him [Charisios] as your friend. He feels no shame fathering a child with a slut'. Simias expresses his support for Charisios, who, he says, is not convinced by Habrotonon's story, although she showed Charisios his own ring as evidence of his identity. Simias feels pity for Charisios: 'One must cry for him since he lives in a dark misfortune'. Smikrines is now more decisive about taking his daughter away from Charisios, and asks Simias and Chairestratos to back him up in public in case he is criticized: Charisios is 'a scoundrel ... an impotent man' ('τί κουμάσι εἶναι... ὁ ἀνίκανος'), who has fun

with sluts while he abandons his daughter.⁶⁴⁴ The word ἀνίκανος, with which Smikrines characterizes Charisios, is a strong term in modern Greek, implying intellectual incapacity, worthlessness, and sexual impotence.⁶⁴⁵ Smikrines perhaps considers Charisios to be worthless because he does not work and instead wastes his money. As a father, he is embittered to discover that his son-in-law prefers having fun with a slut, abandoning his decent wife without fulfilling his role as a husband. It is possible too that Smikrines wishes to augment the insult by questioning Charisios' masculinity, but in this case it sits oddly with the reference to his carrying on with a whore – Sfyroeras was doubtless having some fun here. Simias, in any case, reacts immediately to Smikrines' characterization of Charisios as impotent: 'Certainly not impotent! As I can see he is not missing anything'. However, in a derogatory tone, Smikrines insists on his characterization: 'Look at his [Charisios'] face' (with the meaning 'what a rascal Charisios is'). He firmly believes that Charisios does not deserve a woman like Pamphile. Here, Smikrines anticipates Charisios' monologue in Act IV, in the production as in the original, in which he lauds his wife's character to the skies.

The content and tone of Smikrines' final words regarding Charisios' life once again have a touch of exaggeration. He concludes his speech by revealing his hurt and disappointment as Pamphile's father at the fact that Charisios is ignoring and showing contempt for his wife.⁶⁴⁶

To sum up, Sfyroera's representation of Smikrines' character builds gradually between Acts I and III, and though the number of fragments has grown since

⁶⁴⁴ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 74; cf. Jensen (1929), p. 34, v. 443 ὁμο[λογεῖν and Furley (2009), p. 62, vv. ὕμᾱς δ' ὁμό[σας' and p. 201. Smikrines at this point 'calls Chairestratos to witness his declaration, as one of those present when the marriage was joined'.

⁶⁴⁵ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ἀνίκανος.

⁶⁴⁶ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 75.

his day, nothing which has appeared subsequently contradicts his vision. The main characteristics of Smikrines presented in Act I become clearer in Act III, where we see how Smikrines has been influenced by public rumours about Charisios' behaviour. Smikrines' anger is sharpened by the translator but it is not overdone, compared to the Menandrian text. Smikrines' use of colloquial expressions⁶⁴⁷ assimilate him to a type one could meet in real life, as the director pointed out to me. Karion's interaction with Smikrines in Act III may be interpreted as trying to collect information from all possible quarters before asking his daughter to abandon her husband. Perhaps without meaning to, the cook teases Smikrines with his tantalizing bits and pieces of information, which adds to the humour of the scene.

Charisios

Act V

When the misunderstanding between Charisios and Pamphile has been resolved, the happy couple appear on stage. To their surprise, they come upon a quarrel between Onesimos and Syriskos, who found the exposed baby in the first place. Syriskos has come back to ask Onesimos to return the ring that he gave him to identify the baby's father. Instead of revealing the truth Onesimos makes fun of Syriskos. He tells Syriskos that he will not get the ring because this refined jewel is not suitable for his rough hands, which are full of cartilage.⁶⁴⁸ Syriskos accuses Onesimos of being a thief and slaps him about the face. Onesimos calls for help from his master and Charisios emerges to support his faithful slave. That Charisios is the owner of the ring is now confirmed by all the characters on stage, including Smikrines, Syriskos, and

⁶⁴⁷ Like many of the other characters in the adaptation, such as the slaves in Act II and Onesimos and Habrotonon in Act III.

⁶⁴⁸ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 88.

Onesimos. Syriskos is disappointed about losing the ring and curses Daos and Onesimos for it; but Charisios is not happy that Syriskos is angry at Onesimos and so he offers him compensation of three obols.⁶⁴⁹ The translator stresses Charisios' generosity at this point.

Although Sfyroeras believed that in the Menandrian text Charisios might have freed Habrotonon in Act V as a reward for her behaviour, he did not include this scene in his adaptation.⁶⁵⁰ The happy ending to the play includes Charisios' kind and respectful gesture to Smikrines: 'My dear father-in-law, you can return now relaxed to your house. You can visit us as often as you like to see your grand-son'. The last image of Charisios in the play stresses the translator's view of him as a decent man who dealt with his wife's problem with dignity without being dramatic on account of jealousy.⁶⁵¹

Reactions to the production by theatre critics

The production was well received. Theatre critics stressed the importance of Menander's contribution to the creation of modern European theatre and especially Menander's realistic style. In particular, Vassos Varikas praised Menander's plays because they focus on 'man as a social being with his *pathē* and flaws. With Menander, the theatre becomes ...the mirror of society. [Menander's plays] project and judge the characters, their behaviours and customs'.⁶⁵² *Epitrepontes* offers the audience a representative taste of the poet's technique, according to Varikas. The novelist, playwright and critic Angelos Terzakis characterizes *Epitrepontes* as a 'romantic adventure' with realistic elements, similar in type to the theatrical genre of romantic adventure

⁶⁴⁹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 90.

⁶⁵⁰ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 7; cf. Sfyroeras' article in the newspaper *Vradyne* on 28th August 1959.

⁶⁵¹ Sfyroeras (1975), p.4.

⁶⁵² Vassos Varikas' review in the newspaper *Ta Nea* on 3rd August 1959.

in the 16th century.⁶⁵³ For him, the romantic spirit of the play concerns the story between Pamphile and Charisios, their temporary separation due to Charisios' jealousy, contrary to the translator's view, and their reunion. The rape of Pamphile and the characters' reaction to the events are realistic elements. Both critics praise Sfyroeras' translation and completion of the Menandrian play. However, Terzakis pointed out that Sfyroeras' additions in Act I, the interaction between Onesimos and Karion, are in 'a very modern style'. Varikas regarded Sfyroeras' 'adaptation' as creative as it helped the audience to follow the story of the original play. Terzakis did not elaborate on this, but some of the novel elements we have indicated above may have contributed to his judgement.

Reviewers of the production in general, including Varikas and Terzakis, did not disapprove of the linguistic style that Sfyroeras used for his adaptation, although the 'Language Question' debate was still lively in 1959. One possible explanation is that Sfyroeras' translation did not offend the political and media establishment, thanks to the apolitical style of Menander's comedy, which did not threaten social and political norms by satire. It must be noted, however, that in the same year, 1959, Vassilis Rotas' demotic translation of Karolos Koun's *Birds* was attacked, among other things, for its linguistic style.⁶⁵⁴

Apostolou's staging of the play received positive reviews, except for one critical comment by Terzakis. Terzakis pointed out that the humour in Menander is light, that is, amusing and uplifting rather than buffoonish. Modern Greek productions of ancient comedy, mainly Aristophanes, tended to identify comedy with buffoonery and Terzakis perceived this inclination in

⁶⁵³ Angelos Terzakis' review in the newspaper *To Vema* on 26th July 1959.

⁶⁵⁴ Van Steen (2000), p. 125-133.

Apostolou's and Sfyroeras' production. For Terzakis the correct staging of Menander's comedy would be like staging Marivaux's plays. Terzakis' view of Menander's humour will prove to be shared by a number of Greek intellectuals who were involved after 1959 with productions of Menander in Greece, among them the poet Yannis Varveris in his translations of *Samia* and *Epitrepontes*.⁶⁵⁵

B. *Epitrepontes* in 1980: Five Acts in Five Eras⁶⁵⁶

Epitrepontes was staged for the third time in modern Greece in 1980 by the director and academic Spyros Evangelatos and his theatrical company *Amphi-theatre*.⁶⁵⁷ The *Epitrepontes* production was the first time the *Amphi-theatre* participated in the Epidauros summer festival, and it was an occasion for celebration. The production was restaged in 1985 in various summer theatres in Greece and also travelled to a number of European cities. Evangelatos' landmark production of the play uses as its framework five theatrical eras of

⁶⁵⁵ See above, pp. 176-177, n. 586. Varveris in his interview with me stressed that Menander's humour is very refined and mainly resides in the misunderstandings generated by the plots; thus, for his adaptations to appeal to modern Greek audiences as a comedy, he had to make some additions to the original play, at the same time as he respected Menander's style. In other words, he did not turn Menander into Aristophanes in his translations. Varveris' additions to *Samia* and *Epitrepontes* occur especially in the lyrics of the choral songs, which he wrote, where he allows himself some sexual innuendos in speaking about the babies; his use of a simple form of *kathareuoussa* made the text funny but also kept it discreet rather than coarse.

⁶⁵⁶ Sections of Evangelatos' production appear also in my brief discussion of the play in my publication Kiritsi (2014a), although the analysis here is considerably more detailed.

⁶⁵⁷ Professor Evangelatos (1940-2017) had degrees from the University of Athens, School of Philology (specialized in Archaeology and History), the Drama School of the National Theatre in Athens, and the University of Vienna. He translated into modern Greek plays by various European playwrights, among them Brecht, Ibsen, Goethe, Strindberg, and Shakespeare, and ancient Greek plays including Aristophanes' *Ecclesiazusae* and Euripides' *Medea*, *Hecuba*, *Andromache*, and *Ion*. He directed a huge number of ancient Greek, modern Greek, and other European plays for the National Theatre of Greece (Athens), the National Theatre of Northern Greece (Thessaloniki), and his own company, the *Amphi-Theatre*. For a detailed academic and professional biography, see Evangelatos (2004).

European comedy, each represented in a separate act. As he saw it, Menander's Hellenistic comedy provided the forerunner for each of these distinct comic styles. He explains clearly what made him choose this theatrical structure for this production of *Epitrepontes*:

I was aware that the play for a modern audience is not complex. Its plot is unsophisticated, and its characters are dated. Regarding their melodramatic dimension, the characters remind us of a faded Molière or Goldoni or, to some extent, Oscar Wilde. Nevertheless, I believed firmly – if unreasonably – that this was the right play for the debut of the *Amphi-Theatre* in Epidaurus alongside my collaborators: Tassos Roussos⁶⁵⁸ (who translated the play and filled in the fragmentary lines of the original play)⁶⁵⁹, Yiorgos Patsas (he did the stage-design and, costumes), and Yannis Markopoulos (the composer whose music we used in the production). The actors, nearly all of whom were regular members of the *Amphi-Theatre* and experienced in a variety of acting styles, nevertheless had difficulty in finding the appropriate style for this play. In addition to the actors who were to perform the play, there were three actresses who were to perform the interludes (the play has

⁶⁵⁸ Roussos (1934-2015), a classicist, wrote and published poetry and novels, and translated almost all the plays of Aristophanes, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Menander. His *Samia* was used for a production of the play in 1975-1976 by the National Theatre of Northern Greece-Thessaloniki; his translation of *Dyskolos* has not yet been used in any professional production but it was published in 1993, but his *Epitrepontes* was used for Evangelatos' production. He also translated Plautus' *Amphitryon*, Terence's *Andria* and Seneca's *Medea*, *Phaedra* and *Oedipus*, for productions of various theatrical companies, among them the National Theatre of Greece. His translations of the three tragedians and Aristophanes are highly regarded in Greece and are still used extensively for theatrical productions.

⁶⁵⁹ Evangelatos' view that the Menandrian characters remind us of 'a faded Molière or Goldoni' is shared by Roussos. Roussos told me in his interview that: 'Menander's characters are simple, ordinary people of his time. I might perhaps dare to say that their lives [as they are depicted in the comedies] look like a reportage of ordinary people. The gossip cook, the cunning, slave etc. All these types survived in later forms of European theatre and in particular in the genre of comedy'.

no chorus). What songs would they sing? Patsas (the costumer designer) was anxious about the time slipping by. Suddenly, I saw the light.... We could transform the 'weaknesses' of the play to its advantage. We aimed at underlining Menander's influence on European theatre; to begin with, Menander's influence on his Roman imitators, Plautus and Terence, and through them, Menander's influence on the entire European theatre. Performing Menander's play in this way presented a danger however; namely, would it turn the performance into an exposition of the history of theatre? This danger, though, was overcome thanks to the artistic temperament of the director (at the same time a scholar and an artist) and thanks to the inspired participation of the actors and all the other contributors to the production. The play is divided into five acts. ... One wonders how all these acts, in the five different theatrical ages, were connected to each other on the grounds of theatricality. The link was made with a prologue, four interludes and the epilogue. The music of Yannis Markopoulos accompanied the interludes, in which three actresses representing a 'lost' theatrical troupe moved through the ages.... Thanks to the interludes the performance took off.⁶⁶⁰

Before Act I: Let the show begin

My analysis of Evangelatos' production is based on the recorded version of the 1980 production in Epidauros and the repetition of the show in 1985, along with the translation of the play which was also the script for the production and is

⁶⁶⁰ Evangelatos' article in the newspaper *Kathimerine* 19th June 2005, supplement *Epta Imeres* (50 Χρόνια Επίδαυρος: οι 30 καλύτερες παραστάσεις).

reproduced in its entirety in the programmes of both productions (I will refer to the text of the production by 'Programme' and the relevant page number).⁶⁶¹

The production starts with an added prologue, so to speak, which leads into act I. This addition serves to introduce the plot line which is specific to the adaptation, that is, the trajectory of Menander's influence on European drama. In the prologue, there appear a troupe of actors who have roles in the production and a chorus, who perform the choral interludes. The actors and the chorus enter together and, in a meta-theatrical gesture, prepare the empty stage for the setting of the first act. The setting for this act is minimalist: it represents a Hellenistic house abstractly, in the form of some ancient columns. The scene is accompanied by the music of a famous Greek song entitled 'a thousand, ten thousand waves away from Aivali', which was composed in 1972 by Markopoulos⁶⁶²; it is performed instrumentally, without the lyrics written by the classicist and translator Kostas Georgousopoulos. The words of the song refer to the traumatic experience of the Greek population of the city of Aivali (modern Ayvalik), which was captured by the Turks in 1922. The population was in despair as they searched for new settlements in Greece and other countries. The link between the song's content and the 'loss and survival' (in Pat Easterling's phrase⁶⁶³) of Menander's plays and, more specifically, the return home, as it were, of *Epitrepontes* in the form of a production in Menander's homeland, cannot be missed. I shall discuss in more detail below the function of the choral songs in this production, and why the director chose

⁶⁶¹ For the programme, see *Amphi-Theatre* Spyros A. Evangelatos/*Αμφι-Θέατρο* Σπύρου Α. Ευαγγελιάτου (1980/ 1985). The 1980 show that I consulted belongs to the Archives of the *Amphi-theatre*, while for 1985 production, see *Menander Epitrepontes* Production (1985), available at <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NGpedRnt4X4>.

⁶⁶² Χίλια μύρια κύματα μακριά από τ' Αϊβαλί, is the Greek title of the song. Markopoulos is known to British audiences for his composition of the music for the BBC show 'Who Pays the Ferry Man' in 1977. The lyrics of the son are by Myres (1972), available at http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=856.

⁶⁶³ See above, Chapter 4, esp. pp. 155-156.

established and popular music by Markopoulos, not written for the purpose of the production.

Onesimos and Karion, before mounting the stage and while the instrumental music of the introductory part is still playing, put the final touches on each other's costumes, as a modern dresser would for the actors before their appearance on stage. They are visible beneath the stage, and are like actors in their dressing rooms, oblivious to the spectators' presence as they remain silent and listen with attention to the music. Both characters wear costumes reminiscent of the tunic or chiton, short in length, and sandals with straps that are fitted around their legs. Their masks are modern, intended to recall ancient Greek theatrical masks but simplified and unadorned. The features of the masks are not distorted or exaggerated and do not follow any ancient physiognomic theories in their construction. The front part of the masks simply covers the face, having holes for the eyes and the mouths. The movements of the actors, as one can see from the recording of the show,⁶⁶⁴ take the form of expansive gestures, large steps and hand movements such as ancient actors might have done. The actors, as Evangelatos said, aimed to introduce the spectators to the performance environment of Hellenistic drama, and comedy in particular. Karion carries with him the utensils of a cook, a small and a large pot. Evangelatos opted for the traditional representation of the cook, close to the context of the ancient comedy, contrary to Gavrielides' innovative representation of the cook in his *Dyskolos*.

⁶⁶⁴ Archives of the *Amphi-Theatre* and the Theatrical Museum in Athens.

Act I: Greece in the Hellenistic era

Evangelatos does not clarify whether the location of act I is Athens or another Greek city. In his article in *Kathimerine* the director describes the theatrical setting of this act as follows '[the first part] was played in a completely old-fashioned way ... with masks, cothurnus and gestures which were based on vase paintings or any other artistic evidence representing original performances of the Hellenistic age'.⁶⁶⁵ The intention was to give the spectators a rough idea of how an ancient Greek theatrical production would have looked at the time of the original performance.

Roussos translated *Epitrepontes* for this particular production, as mentioned above, at the director's request, and he based his translation on Sandbach's edition of the play.⁶⁶⁶ Roussos also consulted closely Sfyroeras' translation of the play and was influenced by it in a number of instances, as mentioned above, and as I show further, below, in my analysis of this production, where I compare parts of both translations. My comparison between the two translations also aims to show that Roussos went his own way, compared to Sfyroeras, and in close co-operation with Evangelatos produced a text to support the nature of the performance as Evangelatos conceived it. Thus, the performance script is less elaborated linguistically, with relatively few figures of speech or rhetorical flourishes. Especially where the translator added parts in his text, the language is less flashy.

Roussos' translation is in verse, as is Sfyroeras' translation. In his interview, Roussos stated that he chose the Modern Greek iambic hendecasyllables because this metre is flexible, helps the actors' delivery, and is the common metre employed when Ancient Greek drama is translated into modern Greek

⁶⁶⁵ See above, p. 206.

⁶⁶⁶ Sandbach (1972). Roussos published his translation in 1992.

verse. Roussos did not opt for the iambic decapentasyllabic Modern Greek metre because it might have recalled Greek folk songs, which use this metre. Regardless of Roussos' determined effort to use iambic hendecasyllables throughout *Epitrepontes*, there are cases where the metrical form is loose.⁶⁶⁷

In Roussos' text, as in the original text and in Apostolou's production in 1959, the act opens with Karion and Onesimos conversing about what led Charisios to abandon his wife and his home. Their dialogue is not as long as in Sfyroeras' version, although Roussos too added text to fill in the fragmentary original. In a few cases his additions are as daring as those of Sfyroeras (though different in kind), and in others he keeps close to the spirit of the original, in contrast to Sfyroeras' more free adaptation of Act I. Roussos' Karion is curious and shrewd but he does not resort to every kind of temptation, such as wine, to extract from Onesimos the information and gossip he wants concerning Charisios' life. Onesimos, on the other hand, gives away a lot of information to Karion, since he likes gossiping, but without the contempt and disgust, introduced by Sfyroeras, concerning Pamphile's behaviour and the lies she told Charisios about the child and her life in general before the rape (assuming that the audience was meant to give credence to Onesimos' report).

⁶⁶⁷ Roussos' Interview: 'Η μετρική φόρμα που ακολούθησα στο Μένανδρο είναι ο ιαμβικός ενδεκασύλλαβος. Ο ενδεκασύλλαβος που επέλεξα για τις μεταφράσεις του Μενάνδρου χρησιμοποιείται εκ παραδόσεως για μεταφράσεις αρχαίου δράματος. Οι περισσότεροι Έλληνες μεταφραστές αρχαίου δράματος χρησιμοποιούν τον ενδεκασύλλαβο στίχο και σπανίως τον δεκατρισύλλαβο, ο οποίος δεν είναι τόσο ευκίνητος και ευλύγιστος στίχος σε σύγκριση με τον ενδεκασύλλαβο. Επίσης δεν θα χρησιμοποιούσα τον δεκαπεντασύλλαβο γιατί φέρνει συνειρμούς από το δημοτικό τραγούδι. Εγώ δεν μπορούσα, ως φιλόλογος, να μεταφράσω ένα κείμενο το οποίο είναι μετρικά γραμμένο σε πρόζα. Θα ήταν βέβαια πολύ πιο εύκολο να μεταφράσω το Μένανδρο σε πρόζα. Επίσης πιστεύω ότι το μέτρο βοηθούσε και τους ηθοποιούς της εποχής του Μενάνδρου αλλά βοηθάει και τους σύγχρονους'.

Initiating the dialogue, Karion asks Onesimos: 'Well, Onesimos, tell me, tell me, for god's sake, your master who has Avroula⁶⁶⁸, the singer, as his girlfriend, isn't he newly-married?' Reacting to Onesimos' curt confirmation that his master was indeed married just five months ago, Karion seems still more puzzled: 'Now that your master has got into the honey, well and truly, he abandons it? Isn't his behaviour unnatural?' Onesimos, however, justifies his master's action: 'No, not at all. I consider his behaviour right and natural'. Karion is not only confused but also irritated: 'What are you talking about, man? Who abandons the pleasures of marriage before he even tastes them, and slips out? Unless he married an ugly, hunch-backed and knock-kneed woman, but with a substantial dowry?' Onesimos confirms that his mistress's dowry is indeed substantial, but her beauty is also great. Karion doubts, even after Onesimos' affirmation, that Charisios' wife is beautiful because he cannot find a possible reason for Charisios' behaviour in abandoning her. In all this, Roussos closely followed Sfyroeras' text.

Karion wonders whether Charisios' problem is his sexuality and thinks that perhaps he is not a real man: 'Is then your master, is he?'. Karion accompanies his question by pointing at his genitals, making a pendulum-like motion with his hands that is suggestive (among Greek gestures) of weak sexual energy and of males who are not real men. Although his gesture is suggestive and rather vulgar, his language is not explicit or crude. The director employs action to supplement the characters' words, allowing the play to achieve a balance between fidelity to the original text and accessibility to a modern audience, since Karion's gestures may recall the style of Aristophanes' plays with which the modern Greek public is familiar. Onesimos reacts strongly to Karion's question: he kicks Karion and firmly replies: 'There is no if or but. My master

⁶⁶⁸ Roussos opted for the name Avroula for the character of Habrotonon, following Stavrou's and Sfyroeras' choice of this name.

is a bull with strong kidneys (νεφρά), an upstanding and daring man.’⁶⁶⁹ In Sfyroeras’ text Charisios’ masculinity is only touched upon implicitly by the furious Smikrines, an addition by the translator to the fragmentary Act III.

Karion tries to justify his curiosity to Onesimos by reference to his profession, in a witty manner: ‘Now pay attention to me. How can I cook food which would be appropriate for my clients if I don’t know their troubles and their desires? Just think what a mistake it would be to serve one who is deeply upset something heavy, such as baked beans or baked fish with onions and garlic, and in addition stuffed intestines. That is it. He will blow up. If one is angry and you serve him salty snacks which make him thirsty, he will start drinking wine and then the wine coupled with anger will get him all steamed up. And before you could say Jack Robinson, everything will be smashed up, with a rumpus and all the rest’. In Sfyroeras’ text Karion’s excuse for his curiosity was simpler and was based mainly on lines preserved by Athenaeus.

Onesimos is convinced by Karion’s speech and accepts his reasons as to why he needs to know Charisios’ situation, and so he explains about Pamphile’s illegitimate baby, the exposure of the baby in the forest, the nurse Sophrone’s assistance, and finally Charisios’ reaction. Karion considers that what has befallen Charisios is a total debacle (καζίκι, a colloquial expression). Onesimos also reveals to Karion that it was he who informed Charisios about his wife’s story, and this has created severe problems for him. As Onesimos puts it: ‘Now, I pay for the damage. Wherever Charisios meets me, he adds insults to injury.

⁶⁶⁹ Programme, p. 15. ‘Kidney’ in modern Greek does not elsewhere have the secondary sense of testicles, as it did, according to Athenaeus (9.384e), in classical Greek, though here it clearly signifies masculine energy.

As if I were responsible for my mistress giving birth to a child after five months of marriage'.⁶⁷⁰

In Roussos' adaptation, the discussion between Karion and Onesimos focuses mainly on Charisios and Pamphile's situation. In Sfyroeras' text, on the other hand, Onesimos and Karion, apart from gossiping about Charisios' life, make general remarks about the relationships of modern couples, their quarrels, the fact that some modern women refuse to have babies because they wish to preserve the shape of their bodies, a picture of women which is far from the way Menander represents them in the original text. The last remark is made in reference to Onesimos' involvement in Charisios and Pamphile's conflict. Sfyroeras' style is not far from the everyday conversations that neighbours typically had in Athens and other Greek cities in the 1950s and 60s when a family's reputation was in constant danger. Onesimos' and Karion's views thus echo the popular morality of modern Greece in those decades (and beyond).

Moreover, Sfyroeras has Karion embroider his speech with references to ancient authors or myths, as noted above⁶⁷¹, comparing these with Charisios' case, in the course of his dialogue with Onesimos; this renders him more educated as compared to the uncouth Onesimos. Roussos' representation of Karion differs in this respect. Roussos informed me in his interview that he based the reconstruction of the character of the cook on the stereotypical cook who appears in Middle and New Comedy and hence his Karion is closer to the original character than Sfyroeras.

The additions Sfyroeras made to Onesimos' character, as he filled in the fragmentary Act I, and in particular Onesimos' opinion about Charisios'

⁶⁷⁰ Programme, p. 16. Καζίκι literally means 'pole, stake', while in a metaphorical sense, which is used here, it means 'a big problem, a difficult situation which occurs suddenly', see Babiniotis (1998), s.v.

⁶⁷¹ Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 46-47 (regarding Anacreon) and 48 (with reference to Dionysus).

character and his positive appraisal of his master's behaviour toward Pamphile,⁶⁷² did not inspire Roussos to reproduce them. Roussos' Onesimos confines himself to presenting the facts, namely that his master did not believe his wife but walked out of his home and is now drinking to forget his problems; he is more reserved about passing judgment concerning Charisios' character while conversing with the cook.⁶⁷³ After all, it might have sounded hypocritical to praise him, since he stresses how badly Charisios treated him after he told him about the baby.

The added scene with Onesimos and Karion produced such a hilarious response in the audience that Evangelatos commented to Roussos during the Epidaurus show (according to the translator's comment in his interview) that Roussos' adaptation elicited more laughter than the original Menandrian play.

⁶⁷⁴ For all his desire to stick to the Menandrian model, as Roussos conceived it, even in this Act, where Evangelatos chose to set the scene in ancient Athens, the translator and the director made clear concessions to modern taste. The suspicions of Charisios' motives in marrying Pamphile, the idea that he might be less virile than he seems, the low motives that are ascribed to him for moving in with another woman, all smack of modern popular comedy. The signs of effort in adapting Menander to the modern Greek stage are already in evidence

⁶⁷² Sfyroeras (1975), p. 51.

⁶⁷³ Programme, p. 16.

⁶⁷⁴ Roussos' interview: *Τα αποσπάσματα της Μέσης και Νέας Κωμωδίας, που παρουσιάζουν μαγείρους, με βοήθησαν στην παρουσίαση αυτού του τύπου. Σκέφτηκα ότι ο μάγειρας στο Μένανδρο θα ήταν ένας τύπος φλύαρος και κουτσομπόλης. Το γεγονός επίσης ότι οι μάγειροι ενοικιάζονταν, γνώριζαν πολλά σπίτια και έκαναν κουτσομπολιό με όσα άκουγαν και μάθαιναν μ'έκανε να παρουσιάσω το μάγειρα όπως τον παρουσίασα. Η συμπλήρωση που έκανα εισάγει επίσης το θεατή στην υπόθεση του έργου. Όταν το έργο πρωτο-παίχτηκε στην Επίδαυρο, με την αρχή που είχα συμπληρώσει, το κοινό της Επιδαύρου γέλασε αρκετά και ο Σπύρος Ευαγγελάτος, κάνοντας και το γνωστό του χιούμορ, μου είπε «εσύ δηλαδή λες περισσότερα αστεία από το Μένανδρο».*

even in the scene which advertises itself as closest to the original production in material terms.

Smikrines

After the scene between Onesimos and Karion, Smikrines appears on stage in a fury. He wears a long black chiton, a colour and style suitable for an old man, as the director believed, and a mask with a long beard, and he holds a long stick twice his size. Apart from the beard, however, the masks of all three characters, that is Smikrines, Onesimos and Karion, are similar, and do not differentiate character types. Smikrines' stick, as a prop, helps the old man walk and permits him to threaten other characters with whom he converses if he does not agree with them.

Smikrines' part in Act I serves two purposes for the audience: it allows them to discover more about Charisios' situation and behaviour, and to learn something about Smikrines' own character and role in the play. Roussos was influenced a good deal in his adaptation by the additions Sfyroeras made to Smikrines' original, fragmentary monologue in Act I. But Roussos makes some further additions to Smikrines' monologue to conform to the director's perception of him and of Charisios. The old man is furious and he describes the character of his son-in-law using several negative adjectives, such as greedy, yobbo, good for nothing, liar, foreign to the tone of the original. Smikrines adds that when Charisios approached him to ask for Pamphile's hand, he pretended to be a different person: 'he seemed good, modest, a keen worker, a man with tidy habits, and he showed my daughter genuine affection and love. He could have deceived even the judges of Hades; the hypocrite.... As soon as he got married and got hold of the dowry that I, poor man, gave him, he abandoned his house to have the time of his life'.

In Act III, Sfyroeras' Smikrines (thanks to his additions to the fragmentary monologue), confesses, similarly to Roussos' version at this point, that he was a victim of the first impression he had of Charisios, who deceived him in order to become his son-in-law and get hold of his daughter's dowry. But in Sfyroeras' text, we are left with the impression that Smikrines was in a hurry to marry off his daughter, not because he was trusting, as he claims, but because she was naughty. That is why, as he states, he didn't consult anybody in advance regarding Charisios' character. Roussos, on the other hand, does not leave any room for guesswork anywhere in the text; his Smikrines clearly explains why he made a wrong choice for his daughter's husband and how effective Charisios was at cheating him. In Roussos' and Evangelatos' version, Smikrines also characterizes Charisios as a 'drunkard' ('μεθύστακας'),⁶⁷⁵ thereby preparing the spectators for Charisios' first appearance in Act IV.

While Smikrines soliloquizes, Chairestratos and Simias appear on stage, as in Sfyroeras' text. Roussos here puts in Chairestratos' mouth the colloquial word 'lout' or 'boor' (γομάρι) in reference to Smikrines, which metaphorically means an insensitive man; this adds one more adjective to Sfyroeras' negative representation of Smikrines.⁶⁷⁶ Chairestratos thinks Smikrines is loutish because he cares about the money Charisios is spending on drinks and fun, and because, with his shouting, Smikrines intends to upset the house in which Charisios has taken shelter, thereby disturbing not only Charisios but other people too.⁶⁷⁷ Nevertheless, this pejorative term and words like it are not applied to Smikrines in the rest of the text, and indeed the stingy old man will not prove insensitive towards his daughter's problem in this version.

⁶⁷⁵ Programme, p. 16

⁶⁷⁶ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. γομάρι; cf. Sfyroeras (1975), pp.53-54.

⁶⁷⁷ Programme, p. 17.

The director, the translator, and Kostas Tsianos, the actor who played Smikrines, told me in their interviews that they perceived Smikrines as a tight-fisted old man but also a caring father. Their view of Smikrines will be evident in Act IV, when Smikrines urges Pamphile to abandon Charisios. Of course, financial issues emerge, since meanness is part of his character and he cannot control it. This reading of Smikrines' character may look like a concession to modern Greek sentimentality, but in fact it is not very far from the spirit of recent papyrus fragments that include parts of Smikrines' great speech.⁶⁷⁸ However, Evangelatos departs from Menander (in the surviving fragments) in representing Smikrines as a loud-mouthed, coarse, and blustering character; this too is a way of catering to modern taste and amusing his audience, by presenting a grumpy angry old man, but it also, more subtly, hints at the stereotype of this character in later theatrical forms and anticipates Smikrines' appearance in Act II, where the genre is that of *Commedia dell'Arte*.

Kostas Tsianos told me that he modelled his acting style for Smikrines' character on the Greek actor Orestis Makris, who starred in 1950s and 60s melodramas and comedy films, playing multifaceted characters who were at once authoritarian and sarcastic but also caring, protective, fair, strict and old-fashioned in their concern for their daughters. This is one more way of adapting Menander to a contemporary audience, which would have recognized familiar cues to character and emotion in the acting style.

⁶⁷⁸ See above, pp. 66ff.

Act II: Commedia dell' Arte

Act II is set in the age of Commedia dell' Arte in Italy. The background of the stage represents, by way of drawings, images and sketches, an Italian city, while the action takes place in an outdoors location.

Smikrines becomes *Pantalone*, the *senex* type in the Commedia, as Evangelatos stated clearly in his interview.⁶⁷⁹ As for Syriskos and Daos, their costumes, movements and gestures recall *Arlecchino* and *Brighella* respectively. After the end of the arbitration scene, Onesimos appears (as in the original Menandrian text), in dialogue with Syriskos about the ring found with the exposed baby. Onesimos wears a baggy white costume, a black carnival-type mask, and a hat. Although his costume bears a connection with the *Zanni*, one of the slave types in the Commedia, his overall behaviour in Evangelatos' production does not recall the character of the astute trickster type of the *Zanni* in the Commedia. His character in the production, not far from the Menandrian original, cannot be completely identified with any of the cunning slaves of the Commedia. Nevertheless, Onesimos' gestures and physical movements, way of walking, etc., in Act II do recall the *Zanni* of the Commedia – another instance in which gesture complements the spoken word in this production. The *Zanni* in the Commedia often interacts with the *Pantalone*, which would have marked a connection with Menander's play, save that Onesimos and Smikrines do not interact in Act II of either the original or the modern version.

The identification of the characters, apart from Smikrines, with specific Commedia figures is my own, based on their role and function in the Commedia portion of the play. The director did not indicate explicitly who

⁶⁷⁹ Evangelatos' interview: 'Η δεύτερη πράξη είναι στην Ιταλία της Κομμέντια, όπου ο γέρος γίνεται Πανταλόνε ... '.

was to be equated with whom in this act. Although he stated that a slave turned into a harlequin, he did not specify which slave, Onesimos, Daos or Syriskos, and he did not offer an opinion as to whether a complete identification of each of the Menandrian characters with a corresponding Commedia role mattered for his purposes. The harlequin, however, can be a *Zanni* in the Commedia.⁶⁸⁰ Evangelatos wrote: 'The second act transfers the audience to Italy and to the dramatic form of the Commedia dell'Arte (beginning of the 17th century); the slave now is changed to a harlequin, etc. The actors and their roles are the same throughout the play, but their acting style changes'.⁶⁸¹

During the arbitration scene and while they present the case to Smikrines, Daos and Syriskos perform some acrobatics, such as a somersault, and they move quickly and run about on stage, uttering shouts ('α, ου, λαλλα'). The addition of the acrobatics in the production was intended to provide more entertainment but also to recall another feature of the Commedia, that of physical theatre and acrobatics.⁶⁸² Whereas both these characters display a great deal of physical movement, Smikrines, throughout the arbitration, sits on a stool and his movements are far more restrained. His speech is accompanied simply by gestures. Chairestratos and Simias are also present as mute characters during the arbitration scene, invisible to those on stage. They pay close attention to the arbitration and by their gestures suggest their opinions of what the participants in the scene enact. Their function as commentators is not especially lively and they do not make the other characters or the audience laugh, as the silent commentator in

⁶⁸⁰ For the theatrical influences on and of the Commedia dell'Arte, its sources, characters and audience see, Oreglia (1991), George and Gossip (1993) and Henke (2002), esp. pp. 13 and 18 on *Pantalone's* and *zanni's* ancestors in New Comedy.

⁶⁸¹ *Kathimerine* 19th June 2005.

⁶⁸² For acrobatics in the genre of Commedia, see especially Oreglia (1991), p. 3

Gavrielides' *Dyskolos* did (see below p. 282), at least to judge by the recordings of the original performances. Syriskos' wife is also present during the arbitration scene, with the baby in her arms; she is a mute character but visible to the other characters. When the arbitration is concluded, her husband gives her the belongings of the baby and she hides them in her bodice. Her costume is that of a housemaid of the period of the Commedia.

Since the main portion of Act II in the original text is preserved with minimal mutilation, Roussos did not add extra bits in his adaptation but simply filled in the beginning of the act, where the original is missing a number of lines.⁶⁸³ Following Sfyroeras' identification of characters in the fragmentary beginning of the act rather than Sandbach, Roussos attributes these lines to Smikrines.⁶⁸⁴ In the adaptation, Smikrines emerges from his daughter's house in a rage, and he soliloquizes: 'There is no stability and consistency any more in the actions and the habits of people. Everything has turned upside down, I reckon. The slave tricks the master and young people laugh at the old. Respect and confidence [in a fellow human being] have gone, have flown away'.⁶⁸⁵ The content and style of the lines added by Roussos are very close to Sfyroeras' version.

What is of interest in Roussos' adaptation in this act is the variety in the vocabulary and linguistic style that the characters, who come from various social backgrounds (three slaves and a master), employ, and the way this multiplicity of registers is played out in the context of a genre that is not

⁶⁸³ Roussos supplies six lines, taking into consideration the mutilated verses 172-177 in Sandbach's edition, p. 101. Furley (2009), pp. 44-47 and 136-137 discusses extensively the number of missing lines, their possible context, and the problem with the identification of speakers; cf. Ireland (2010), pp. 134-137 and 215-216.

⁶⁸⁴ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 17 and 55.

⁶⁸⁵ Programme, p. 17.

Greek (i.e., the *Commedia*) and was not a popular spectacle in Greece at that time, when only a small part of the audience at most would have been familiar with productions of *Commedia*. It may well have been a gesture toward the more elite spectators. Many more members of the audience who attended Evangelatos' production would have been familiar with Aristophanes' comedies or perhaps with Molière's plays, since both playwrights are performed often on the modern Greek stage. Nevertheless, the *Arlecchino* and *Pantalone* types might have been recognizable to members of the audience due to their costumes, since they figure in improvised comic sketches and as carnival figures in popular spectacles in modern Greek culture in general.

Smikrines, Daos, Syriskos and Onesimos use a mixture of colloquial expressions, expressions drawn from everyday speech, ordinary or standard words, and metaphors. Roussos' variety of linguistic style in this act is close to that of Sfyroeras, though the details differ, whether in terms selected or the characters who employ them; both, however, seek to enliven Menander's Greek, which stays within the bounds of polite conversation. Smikrines' anger is underlined with expressions such as 'good riddance' and 'damn!' (cf. 236-237). Daos ironically characterizes Syriskos as a 'sharp-witted person' ('I am involved with a sharp-witted orator'; cf. 236).⁶⁸⁶ He uses the colloquial word 'γιορντάνια' ('necklaces, ornaments'; cf. 246 δέροια) to refer to the valuable objects of the baby and at the same time characterizes them as 'καθάγια', an elevated word in modern Greek and suited to more learned people than Daos.⁶⁸⁷ When Daos mentions to Smikrines how Syriskos convinced him to give him the baby, he uses the colloquial metaphor 'μέ τούμπαραε' ('he

⁶⁸⁶ Programme, p. 18: 'έχω μπλεχτεί μέ ρήτορα ξουράφι',

⁶⁸⁷ Babinotis (1998), s.v. γιορντάνι and καθάριος.

capsized me’).⁶⁸⁸ Syriskos characterizes Daos with the emphatic noun ‘κλέφταρος’⁶⁸⁹ (cf. 312 λελωποδυτηκότα), as one who has no reservations about keeping for himself the baby’s precious belongings. In his effort to persuade Smikrines that the objects belong to the baby and hence to him as the rescuer of the baby, Syriskos asks Smikrines to consider cases from history or mythology in which lost kings were identified by their belongings. What would have happened, he says: ‘If some Daos had pinched them (τά βουτούσε) and sold them in order to shovel in (γιά να κονομήσει), let us say, twelve drachmas’ (cf. 334-335),⁶⁹⁰ two highly colloquial expressions.⁶⁹¹ When the arbitration is finished and Syriskos is the winner, he shows off his superiority to Daos by swearing and cursing him, using the strong colloquial term ‘choke’ (‘βρέ πλάνταξε’; cf. 375 οϊμωζε) and also ‘go away’ (‘καί φεῦγα’).⁶⁹² Syriskos announces to his wife that they will spend the night in Chairestratos’ house and the next morning will depart after having repaid their debt to Chairestratos, using the words ‘πλερώνοντας σ’ ἐκεῖνος τό χρέος μας’ (cf. 380 τὴν ἀποφορὰν ἀποδόντες). Πλερώνοντας is colloquial,⁶⁹³ often used by speakers with a tough guy style. Syriskos will become the type of the modern Greek *magkas* (μάγκας) or cunning type in Evangelatos’ Act V (see below), where he has a brief part in the adaptation that has no basis in the original Menandrian text.

⁶⁸⁸ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. τουμπάρω.

⁶⁸⁹ Κλεφταράς/κλέφταρος are pejorative terms for a person who steals a lot and continuously; see Babiniotis (1998), s.v. κλεφταράς.

⁶⁹⁰ Programme, p. 19.

⁶⁹¹ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. βουτώ and οικονομώ.

⁶⁹² Programme, p. 20 and Babiniotis (1998), s.v. πλαντάζω.

⁶⁹³ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. πληρώνω.

Act III: France and Molière

The theatrical setting of the act is France in Molière's time and the characters are intended to recall to the audience characters in Molière's comedies, although the director does not indicate references to specific plays.⁶⁹⁴ The backdrop of the stage represents the interior of an elegant house decorated with chandeliers. The first part of act III is dominated by Onesimos, at first alone and then joined by Syriskos and, when he exits, by Avroula. Roussos did not add any extra lines to the speaking parts of the above-mentioned characters in the original Menandrian text. The second part of Act III presents Smikrines with Karion, Simias and Chairestratos. For the reconstruction of this fragmentary original here Roussos closely followed Sfyroeras' reconstruction, introducing very few changes.

Onesimos and Syriskos

Onesimos' and Syriskos' costumes are similar, in light colours and in the fashion of French men of low status. There are only two differences in their appearance: Onesimos wears a beret while Syriskos wears a hat that is reminiscent of a country man and carries a small gunnysack.⁶⁹⁵

⁶⁹⁴ Molière's plays have been translated frequently into Greek since 1815, mainly by Greek intellectuals who lived either in Constantinople or in European cities such as Vienna and Bucharest. Oikonomos' translation of *The Miser* in 1816 (see above, pp. 157) was popular. Professional theatrical companies in Athens and Constantinople included Molière's *Tartuffe* in their repertoire since 1860. In addition, Molière's theatrical techniques and his characters have influenced modern Greek playwrights who wrote 'ethographical' comedies beginning around 1830, see Puchner (1992), pp. 188-181, 208-209 and Puchner (1999), pp. 42-43.

⁶⁹⁵ For Molière's theatrical costumes, see Dock (1992). For influences on Molière from the Italian theatrical tradition, including Plautus, Terence and *Commedia dell' Arte*, see Wadsworth (1977), especially pp. 3-25, 89, 103 and 115 and Konstan (1995), pp. 153-164. For Molière's theatrical art, humour, irony and his characters, see Bradby and Calder (2006).

In the opening monologue of the act, Onesimos is annoyed because he could not approach the exasperated Charisios: the term he uses to characterize him is ‘φουρκισμένος’, literally someone struck by a rod but metaphorically signifying one who is extremely angry⁶⁹⁶, to indicate the intensity of Charisios’ emotional state. This is an addition by Roussos to the Menandrian text.⁶⁹⁷

Onesimos hesitates to reveal to Charisios that he has found his lost ring because Charisios has already cursed him for the initial revelation about Pamphile’s baby. If he discloses another bombshell he is afraid that Charisios, if he should be reconciled with Pamphile: ‘will snatch me (νά με βουτήξει) and chop me up (καί νά μέ λιανίσει)’.⁶⁹⁸ The verbs βουτώ and λιανίζω are used here in a metaphorical sense and the whole phrase is associated with daily spoken communication and was emphasized by an expressive gesture by the actor that revealed his and Charisios’ feelings.⁶⁹⁹

In translating Syriskos’ part, Roussos remains close to the original text, and refrains from adding popular or slang expressions to his speech. Although Evangelatos depicts him as a brusque character in general, in the actual performance of this scene the actor adopted a courteous tone and even greeted Avroula with a bow when she entered the stage while he was on his way to the city. His manner was appropriate for the epoch in which the act was set, that is, the France of Molière’s time. In Act V Syriskos will reappear, an addition to the Menandrian text, and there he will represent a popular figure in modern Greek society, that is, the magkas. In Sfyroeras’ text, at the

⁶⁹⁶ The passive participle of the verb φουρκίζω in metaphorical sense means ‘I provoke excessive anger in someone’. Φουρκίζω is linked with the noun φούρκα which means ‘a two-ply stake, or pole, a rope, gallows. A φουρκισμένος is so angry that behaves as though he were being hit by a two-ply pole; see Babiniotis (1998), s.v. φουρκίζω.

⁶⁹⁷ Programme p. 21; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 109: 422-423 and Furley (2009), p. 169. Ireland (2010), p. 230 describes Charisios’ mood at this point in the play as ‘sullen anger’.

⁶⁹⁸ Programme p. 21; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 109: 425-427.

⁶⁹⁹ Babiniotis (1998) s.v. λειανίζω.

same point in the action, Syriskos uses colloquial expressions and his linguistic style does accord with a man who is a *magkas* type, and so might well encourage the actor to adopt such a style. For example, Syriskos warns Onesimos not to cheat him out of Charisios' ring: 'In case you decide to pilfer the ring with skulduggery and you think that I will spare you, you have miscalculated. There is no sharing with me ... Have I explained myself?'⁷⁰⁰ Although Roussos was not directly or at least obviously influenced by Sfyroeras' Syriskos in this act, I believe that he took into account the way Sfyroeras represented Syriskos' character in creating his own *magkas* type in Act V (see below). It must be stressed that in the 1959 production Syriskos too made an appearance in Act V, as in Evangelatos' production. We may observe once again that productions of Menander are engaged not just in dialogue with the original but with each predecessor, whether in the form of a full-scale production or as scholarly interpretation and translation. Evangelatos' production looks to Menander but it does so, as it were, over the shoulder of Sfyroeras, though sometimes in a rather oblique way. Reception is a process of continual interaction and renovation.

Avroula and Onesimos

Avroula (the name given to Habrotonon in this production) wears an elegant long dress with a low neckline that recalls the style of women in 17th century France. She also holds a folding fan which she uses while acting her part and especially when the action gets intense. Avroula's costume in Apostolou and Sfyroeras' production recalled ancient Greek styles, as can be seen in photographs of the production, and this was also the case with all the costumes in the 1959 production. Roussos' Avroula is closer to the

⁷⁰⁰ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 67.

Menandrian text than Sfyroeras' Avroula, which is rather a free rendering of the original. This is evident from any number of examples of how Avroula speaks in the adaptations. Avroula's language is plainer, and her whole representation, as Evangelatos conceived it, aims at calling to mind a character in Molière's time, with the appropriate costume, gestures and movements. In fact, the staged image of Avroula's character and her acting style are more noticeable than her words.

In an addition by Evangelatos to the original, Avroula appears on stage accompanied by Chairestratos and Simias, who attempt to detain her (physically, but gently) and simultaneously to persuade her to stay in Chairestratos' house to entertain Charisios: 'Oh, Avroula stay, all will change', both men assure her.⁷⁰¹ She does not wish to stay, as she states: 'Please do (you: singular) not, please do (you: plural) not pull me, (you: plural) leave me alone. I think I've deceived myself, poor me, without realizing it. He [Charisios] does not feel any love for me, not even a tiny bit of love, as I patiently waited for; he feels instead only hatred, enormous hatred for me'.⁷⁰² Avroula's unhappiness and hurt, due to Charisios' rejection of her as a woman, are further underlined by her coquettish movements that nevertheless do not exaggerate her sexuality. Roussos' translation of these lines does not introduce any colloquial expressions. Sfyroeras' translation of the same lines, on the other hand, is a free rendering of the original

⁷⁰¹ This addition was part of the performance and not included in the printed version of the adaptation, which is reproduced in the programme material.

⁷⁰² Programme, p. 21; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 110: 430-434. Furley (2009), p. 171 states that Habrotonon 'may enter here for a breath of fresh air' as it were, having been humiliated by Charisios' who loathes her with extraordinary force ...'. Furley disagrees with those scholars, among them Ireland (2010), p.231, who maintain that Habrotonon is here addressing as well those who may have tried to molest her at the party; we may infer her reaction from the alteration between singular and plural in her opening remarks. I agree with Furley's interpretation of the scene. It is clear, however, in the production that Avroula's protest was aimed only at Charisios.

Menandrian text; for example, he puts in Avroula's mouth a metaphor derived from everyday language, in order to convey her distress the more vividly: '... Until now I thought that he loved me but the man cannot stand me at all (δὲ μὲ σηκώνει, ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καθόλου).⁷⁰³ He does not want me to lie next to him, poor me, but he always pushes me away'.⁷⁰⁴ Roussos' Avroula continues to express her disappointment over Charisios' lack of interest in her, as in the original Menandrian text (cf. 436-441): 'I am so miserable. Why does he waste so much money without even touching me? As I am now, I am like a virgin, who could even join the basket carriers in the Panathenaia'.⁷⁰⁵

Sfyroeras' Avroula is a money-oriented woman, who believes that she can buy everything with cash: 'How stupid he [Charisios] is! Why does he waste so much money? If I had it in my hand, I could even go as a *kanēphoros* to the Panatheneia, since, poor me, I have been a virgin these last three days'.⁷⁰⁶

Sfyroeras might have intended to evoke a laugh with Avroula's words, which suggest a woman of low class or else a cunning and greedy type who thinks that money can buy everything. If so, I am not sure that the audience would have caught the subtler aspect of the joke in the context of ancient Athenian ritual, since they would not necessarily have known what a *kanēphoros* was, or that it was not possible for a woman to buy a place in this ritual, no matter how rich she was, if she did not meet other, more important requirements.⁷⁰⁷ In addition, Sfyroeras' Avroula enriches her speeches in Act III with a mixture of everyday words, colloquial expressions, and literary phrases; he created a style for a woman of her status designed to appeal to a

⁷⁰³ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 65. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. σηκώνω, in metaphorical sense, 'to put up with, stand for, tolerate'.

⁷⁰⁴ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 65.

⁷⁰⁵ Programme p. 21.

⁷⁰⁶ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 66.

⁷⁰⁷ For the status of a *kanēphoros* in the Panatheneaea, see Furley (2009), pp. 172-173.

modern audience's expectations. When Avroula reveals her plan to Onesimos for identifying the parents of the baby, she states: 'I hesitate to go first to the women [with whom I was in the festival], without evidence, and to prattle with them (νὰ κουρκουσέψω) [about the identity of the girl] ... before I am sure who the man was who dishonoured the girl; I do not wish either to look for the girl or to gossip about her situation'.⁷⁰⁸ The verb κουρκουσεύω is not recorded in modern Greek dictionaries. It is likely that Sfyroeras' invention derives from the noun κουσκούς, which means 'gossip' or 'chat' and is widely used in daily conversation.⁷⁰⁹ When Avroula tries to find possible reasons why or how Charisios might have lost his ring, she uses colloquial phrases that suggest a woman who knows the habits of the 'market place', that is, ordinary commerce or business. She says that Charisios might have been playing dice and pledged his ring in the 'πάγκα' (a colloquial form of the usual word 'μπάνκα'⁷¹⁰), that is, a gambler's bankroll, or that he might have given his ring as 'μπροστάντζα', another colloquial word, which means a deposit one lays down for a purchase.⁷¹¹

Avroula in Roussos' translation states her views regarding Charisios' ring in a style which might be that of women of any social status, intelligent and with some experience of life but not necessarily loose or lower-class women. It is also a timeless style, in that the diction has not changed much from the time of the translation in 1980 until today. Avroula says: 'I am afraid to go to the women I just mentioned to you and narrate to them things that I cannot support by evidence. Who knows whether some one of his companions took the ring then as collateral and lost it afterwards or whether he [Charisios]

⁷⁰⁸ Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 68-69.

⁷⁰⁹ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. κουσκούς. The word has also the meaning of the well-known food, couscous.

⁷¹⁰ The main meaning of (η) μπάνκα is bank. The word is also used in gambling contexts, for example 'κάνω μπάνκα', which means 'I distribute the cards' and τινάζω την μπάνκα στον αέρα, 'I win all the money', see Babiniotis (1998), s.v. μπάνκα.

⁷¹¹ Babiniotis (1998) s.v. μπροστάντζα.

while playing dice might have given it as a mortgage? It may also be possible that he [Charisios] gave it as a deposit for a deal he made for something. Things like that happen often in parties. So before I find out who her rapist was I do not want either to look for the girl or to disclose any word about these matters'.⁷¹² When Avroula plans a way to fish information out of Charisios by pretending that he raped her in the Tauropolia and communicates her plan to Onesimos, Evangelatos and Roussos have her express it in a mannered style, that is, playing up in an affected or coquettish way, the 'γιομάτη νάζι' by which she characterizes herself (cf. 526 'ἀκκιοῦμαι τῷ λόγῳ).⁷¹³ Avroula states: 'Whatever Charisios tells me [when I try to know the true story] I will agree with him, in order to avoid the mistake of expressing my own views first [before listening to him]... then in my coquettish way, I will list the things that have happened between us [on that particular night] "oh my god, what boldness and audacity you had ... "'⁷¹⁴ This manner of behaviour is attached to her role, by Evangelatos, from the moment she appears on stage but without overdoing it or allowing it to take over her character or make it her dominant trait. Their intention was to underline her undisputed charm, which recalls that of French women in Molière's plays and the society of his time, and which still appeals to modern audiences. Evangelatos also presented Avroula as a woman who is confident of her ability to carry out difficult tasks, intelligent and with a good heart but not entirely altruistic.⁷¹⁵ The rest of Evangelatos and Roussos' representation

⁷¹² Programme, p. 22.

⁷¹³ Sandbach (1972), p. 114.

⁷¹⁴ Programme, pp. 22-23.

⁷¹⁵ Ireland (2010), p. 236 expresses an interesting view about Habrotonon's character in the original, affirming that Menander 'depicts her as a credible personality, rather than a two-dimensional personification of virtue like Bacchis in Terence's *Hecyra*. She may be a slave with noble sentiments, but she is someone whose role in society would make total altruism unnatural'. Arnott (1979), p. xxxiv too believes that Habrotonon 'combines the opportunism typical of her class (cf. 541, 548) with a suppressed maternal instinct (contrast 464ff, where Habrotonon is absorbed in the baby, with 547ff) and an inventive flair that turns her very

of Avroula, while she is in dialogue with Onesimos, is in the same style, linguistically and theatrically, as it has been so far in the act.

It is worth mentioning that Roussos' Avroula wishes that Charisios will grant her freedom if she succeeds with her plan and if he is indeed the father of the baby,⁷¹⁶ and she considers such an action by Charisios to be the utmost *charis* for her.⁷¹⁷ In modern Greek, as in ancient Greek, *charis* has a variety of meanings, including 'favour,' 'charisma', 'charm: in respect to behaviour and manners', and 'gratitude', and it is not a strictly philosophical term, as it is in the Aristotelian context.⁷¹⁸ On Avroula's lips the sense is closer to the meaning of favour or gratitude, but it is also well suited to the way her role is imagined by Evangelatos and Roussos, as a charming woman. The meaning 'gratitude' is also in conformity with the sense of *charis* of the original text (563- 565)⁷¹⁹ as used by Onesimos in his monologue after the conclusion of his dialogue with Avroula. Roussos has Onesimos say: 'Look how stupidly I think, expecting a woman to show gratitude to me'. Gratitude is a fundamental value in modern Greek culture, as it was in the classical period, and in many cases *anticharis* is expected from the person who has received an act of kindness in a difficult moment. This is also the case with Sfyroeras' rendering of Avroula's part in the above-mentioned lines: 'Gods, I only want my freedom to be granted, as a return for my *charis* for all these things'.⁷²⁰

unexpectedly into a planning slave'. For Habrotonon's character and role in the play, see also Traill (2008), esp. pp. 196-203.

⁷¹⁶ On whether Habrotonon in the original play was freed or not, see below Act V, pp 246ff, where Avroula is given her freedom in the modern production.

⁷¹⁷ Programme, p. 23; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 115: 549.

⁷¹⁸ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. (η) χάρις.

⁷¹⁹ Sandbach (1972), p. 115.

⁷²⁰ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 70.

Both Roussos and Sfyroeras stay close to one of the main moral themes of the play, which is precisely gratitude or the lack of it, as expressed clearly by Charisios in his monologue in Act IV of the Menandrian text, but they extend it to other characters in the play not only to make them likeable to modern Greek audiences but also as a way of echoing the everyday popular morality of modern Greek culture. I asked Evangelatos whether the prominent social values in Menander's play, including *charis*, had played a role in his production, and whether he had wished to stress it. He replied that although these values are everlasting and have a deep meaning for human beings in modern times too, in Modern Greece as well as elsewhere: 'They hold no interest for modern spectators because they are commonplace (that is, clichéd and overly familiar). Only the performance, via acting, spectacle, and so forth, as opposed to mere words on the page, can bring these values to life and communicate them to audiences', according to Evangelatos.⁷²¹ Evangelatos' views on *charis* and *anticharis* are manifested theatrically in Acts IV and V, through Charisios' behaviour.

When the dialogue between Onesimos and Avroula ends, Onesimos, in Roussos' adaptation, expresses his amazement at Avroula's intelligence in conceiving the plan to extract information from Charisios and at the same time his own self-pity about his intellectual abilities, just as in the original text.⁷²² Onesimos uses colloquial terms to characterize himself and Avroula. He describes Avroula's mind as a 'razor', using the word 'ξουράφι', a metaphor in this context that describes a person with a very sharp mind.⁷²³ He

⁷²¹ Evangelatos' interview: 'Αυτές οι αξίες είναι αιώνιες έχουν μεν σημασία για το σημερινό άνθρωπο, αλλά δεν έχουν ενδιαφέρον για το κοινό, ως θέαμα, γιατί είναι κοινοί τόποι. Γι' αυτό χρειάζεται η παράσταση'.

⁷²² For Onesimos as a 'slow minded and fearful' character, and how this affects his role in the plot of the original play, see also Cinaglia (2014), p. 173.

⁷²³ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ξουράφι.

feels sorry for himself because he will always remain: ‘A stupid, a snivelling (μυξιάρης) slave, incapable of forming a proper thought’. The colloquial term ‘μυξιάρης’ accurately renders Menander’s original word ‘λέμφος’, and in modern Greek is used to describe the kind of behaviour that Furley associates with λέμφος: ‘lit. snot, here = ‘snivelling’.⁷²⁴ Sfyroeras’ Onesimos characterizes himself with the colloquial ‘κουτεντές’ (gullible).⁷²⁵ Roussos’ Onesimos too expresses by way of metaphors his relief at ‘having disentangled’ (‘ξέμπλεξα’) himself from the situation of the baby and that it is Avroula who will ‘cook’ up (‘μαγειρεύει’) a solution to the complicated story.⁷²⁶ Once again Roussos’ adaptation is close to the style of the Menandrian text, in particular in the case of the word ‘ξέμπλεξα’, where the original also has a metaphor expressed by the verb ἐκνενευκέναι (572).⁷²⁷ Sfyroeras’ text was the first to have Onesimos say of Avroula that she was ‘cooking up’ a solution, which Roussos followed in his adaptation. Moreover, Sfyroeras had put in Onesimos’ mouth a lively slang expression which is used in daily conversation, by which Onesimos voiced his concern and fear for himself at what he would have to go through if the baby ended up being that of another woman rather than Pamphile; for it was he who told Charisios in the first place that the baby was in fact Pamphile’s. Onesimos appears certain that in this case his master will marry that other woman and that: ‘He will be left high and dry’, an expression of daily parlance.⁷²⁸

⁷²⁴ Furley (2009), p. 195.

⁷²⁵ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 71.

⁷²⁶ Programme, p. 23. Babiniotis (1998) s.v. ξεμπλεδεύω in metaphorical sense, explains that it means, ‘I finish with a complicated and time-consuming or annoying situation.’ Μαγειρεύω may also suggest ‘I cook something up in a scheming and sneaky way,’ Babiniotis (1998), s.v.

⁷²⁷ Sandbach (1972), p. 116. Furley (2009), p. 196 ‘χαριέντως ἐκνενευκέναι δο[κῶ]: literally “it seems I’ve elegantly swum clear” or to use the same metaphor in English ‘... I’ve got out of that swimmingly’.

⁷²⁸ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 71. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. (η) μπουκάλα, means a large bottle and in the phrase μένω μπουκάλα, the sense is, ‘I am left with empty hands, without having received what I expected’.

In Onesimos' final monologue in Act III both Roussos and Sfyroeras stuck close to the Menandrian text in their representation of Onesimos' character, apart from introducing a number of colloquial expressions. Neither attempted to make him seem more simple-minded or given to self-pity than he was in the original text, even though the sentiment of self-pity has rather a strong place in the emotional canvas of modern Greek culture, something that was not the case in the culture of Menander's time.

Act IV: Victorian England

In Act IV the background is the era of Victorian England, at the time when playwrights such as Oscar Wilde and Tom Robertson flourished. In their comedies of manners Modern Greek directors of Menander's plays, among them Evangelatos, detected a resemblance to Menander's style of comedy.⁷²⁹ Plays such as Wilde's *The Importance of Being Earnest* and Robertson's *Society* thus offered an appropriate setting for this act of Evangelatos' *Epitrepontes*.⁷³⁰ Moreover, various themes and values that were typical of the Victorian theatre, such as the virtues of domestic life, family relations, and a focus on proper social behaviour have an affinity with Menandrian comedy, as the director conceived it. Apostolou's comment (see above, p. 178) that Athenian society of 1959 bore a similarity to Menander's Hellenistic society and that this was one of the reasons that led him to produce a Menandrian play is like Evangelatos' view of the connection between the social worlds of the Victorian and Hellenistic ages.

⁷²⁹ For theatrical plays in the Victorian age, see Booth (1991), especially, 94, 130 and 213 regarding Robertson's realism. For an analysis of *The Importance of Being Earnest*, see Bloom (1998). On Wilde's debt to Menander, see Witzke (2014).

⁷³⁰ An image of one of Robertson's productions of *Society* of 1865 is also included in the programme of Evangelatos' production; cf. Kiritsi (2014a), pp. 235 and 243.

The setting of the Act is a Victorian style living room, in the house belonging to Charisios and Pamphile, a notable contrast with the ancient theatrical tradition which, apart perhaps from the mime, did not make use of indoor scenes.

Pamphile and Smikrines

Pamphile is dressed in a long white dress, an outfit reminiscent of high-class women of the Victorian era.⁷³¹ Evangelatos has Pamphile appear at the beginning of the act, as in the original text, in a very emotional state, crying while holding a photo of Charisios and kissing it. Charisios' photo decorates a little table in the room and Pamphile picks it and holds in her hands, as if she were embracing Charisios. Her reaction suggests that she misses her husband and is overwhelmed by the whole situation between them. Her intimate moment with Charisios' photo and her tears are interrupted when Smikrines arrives at her door, as Onesimos announces: 'Lady, your father has just arrived'.⁷³² The director added this scene in the production in order to indicate Pamphile's psychological state and her feelings towards her husband to the audience. Until this moment the audience has known about her only from what other characters in the play have said. In this Act Onesimos has become the butler of a high-class household. He wears an appropriate outfit and behaves in a cool and kindly way. Smikrines wears a black suit with tail cut jacket, puff style tie, white collar, and black top hat, standard attire for a high-class Englishman of the 19th century.

Smikrines is in a hurry and the moment he walks into the room he tells Pamphile, in an impatient tone: 'My daughter, I came to take you away from

⁷³¹ For Victorian era clothing, see Gernsheim (1981) and Cunnington (1990).

⁷³² Onesimos: 'Κυρία, ό πατέρας σας'.

here⁷³³, an addition to the production that comes just before Smikrines delivers his long monologue, as in the original. This additional line by Smikrines and the above line by Onesimos, with which he announces Smikrines' arrival to Pamphile, are included only in the performance and not in the printed script of the production, as translated by Roussos. Hence, these additions are the director's innovations. The director no doubt felt the need to intensify Smikrines' eagerness to take his daughter back from Charisios by adding this line, coincidentally anticipating the discovery of new fragmentary lines which have now been attributed to Smikrines' speech at the beginning of Act IV.⁷³⁴ Sandbach's edition (717- 758)⁷³⁵, which was used by Roussos, did not include these new fragments. But Furley provides a convincing reconstruction of the new fragments now attributed to Smikrines' speech, taking into consideration previous scholarly views. Furley translates: 'I know no [other solution to] this. You must leave him, Pamphile. It's always wise for respectable people to avoid the dissolute'.⁷³⁶

Despite Smikrines' injunction, Pamphile stands her ground and despite her emotional state, responds bravely to her father: 'If you strive hard to save, without first convincing me that [what you propose] this is the right thing, you are a tyrant and not a father'. Roussos follows the original text here, and refrains from giving any extra lines to Pamphile, just as Sfyroeras did in his rendering.⁷³⁷ In the production, Pamphile is visibly upset but also determined when she delivers these lines. As I noted above, Evangelatos and Roussos further stressed Pamphile's love for Charisios by having her kiss his photograph, and it was her love that caused her to dismiss all Smikrines'

⁷³³ Smikrines: 'Κόρη μου ἤρθα νά σέ πάρω'.

⁷³⁴ See also above, p. 198, n. 640.

⁷³⁵ Sandbach (1972), pp. 119-120.

⁷³⁶ Furley (2009), p. 64, 109.

⁷³⁷ Sandbach (1972), p. 119: 714-715 and Sfyroeras' (1975) pp. 76-77.

arguments concerning her impossible position in the triangle between Charisios, herself and Habrotonon. The representation of Pamphile in the production is a remarkable anticipation of what the recently published fragments reveal about her determination to stay with Charisios as a consequence of her unconditional love for him.

Roussos and Evangelatos did add lines to Smikrines' fragmentary monologue, which follows the above scene (as presented in Sandbach's edition), indicating Smikrines' genuine concern for his daughter's happiness. He tries to convince Pamphile to abandon Charisios for various reasons and promises her a better life if she does so: 'I have in mind to marry you with a wealthy and decent man. With him, you will have a happy life without sorrows'.⁷³⁸ This Modern Greek addition anticipated once again the later discovery of what is now line 824 (Furley's edition) of the original text, in which Smikrines makes a similar proposal to Pamphile. Smikrines' attitude in the production sounds very modern, designed to appeal to a contemporary Greek audience: a caring father with an open mind who wants to remarry his divorced daughter to a good man. It is an attitude that would seem to echo everyday conversations among neighbours who share family concerns, an accurate expression of contemporary popular morality. And yet, the tone of Evangelatos' and Roussos' supplement is not far from that of fragment 7 (placed after 758 in Sandbach's edition), which is also attributed to Smikrines' long monologue.⁷³⁹ Furley, in his reconstruction of the passage, characterizes Smikrines' speech as a 'rhetorical tour-de-force', and notes in particular the way Smikrines' conclusion takes the form of 'the *gnōmē* it's hard for a wife to compete with a man's mistress'.⁷⁴⁰ This kind of *gnōmē* smacks of the popular

⁷³⁸ Programme, p. 25.

⁷³⁹ Sandbach (1972), p. 120.

⁷⁴⁰ Furley (2009) pp. 65, 110-111 and 216.

morality of Menander's own time, and in this respect the modern version neatly complements the ancient at this point. Sfyroeras, we may observe, made Smikrines more imperious at this point: 'I want you to listen to what I am telling you', he declares, demanding obedience on the part of his daughter and omitting any reference to possible plans to restore her life in the future should she abandon Charisios.⁷⁴¹

There are a few further innovations, which also take the form of additions to the original text, in Evangelatos' production in this same scene between father and daughter. Their conversation is soon interrupted by Onesimos, who enters the room to serve them tea in the manner of a discreet and polite English butler. While Onesimos is present, Smikrines stops talking to Pamphile, though he must try hard to control himself and remain silent. This interruption lightens the atmosphere and at the same time adds a note of humour to the exchange, what with Onesimos dressed as a butler who is well-mannered and respectful, and no longer curses the stingy old man for his behaviour. After Onesimos' departure, Smikrines resumes his lecture to Pamphile in the earlier style with a mixture of impatience, tension and concern. Pamphile stubbornly refuses to abandon Charisios, after she has heard Smikrines' arguments: 'I will never abandon my husband'.⁷⁴² Smikrines is upset at his daughter's resistance and as he prepares to depart he begins talking to himself, thereby revealing his thinking concerning his next move to rescue his daughter: 'Now, Sophrone is the only one who can save me'.⁷⁴³ As his last hope, Smikrines imagines that Sophrone will manage to convince Pamphile to desert her husband, thus sparing him and his daughter further misery with this man. The addition by Roussos to the original text is not

⁷⁴¹ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 76.

⁷⁴² In the show, only and not in the printed version of the adaptation: 'Τόν άντρα μου δέν τόν έγκαταλείπω, πότε!'

⁷⁴³ Smikrines: 'Έ τώρα, μόνον ή Σωφρόνη θά μέ σώσει'.

random but is based on Act V of the original (1062-1077),⁷⁴⁴ where Smikrines brings Sophrone along with him in order to change Pamphile's mind about Charisios.

After Pamphile affirms to her father that she is not going to abandon her husband, Charisios, who had been eavesdropping on the conversation (as may have been the case in the original), appears on stage and expresses his admiration for Pamphile's behaviour. He is drunk, he staggers, and he is holding a bottle of some alcoholic drink, importing once again the kind of slapstick that is absent in Menander's version. As his presence goes unnoticed by Smikrines and Pamphile, Charisios exclaims with joyful relief: 'Oh, gods, gods, my wife is loyal to her feelings (στό αἴσθημά της)'. It is noteworthy that Roussos chose the modern Greek word 'το αἴσθημα', which in the singular has not only the meaning of 'feeling, sentiment and affection' but also, and indeed mainly, the sense of a 'romantic/erotic partner' or a 'romantic/erotic affair'. The same word in the plural bears the sense of 'feelings, sentiments, and emotions'.⁷⁴⁵ As I noted above, free women like Pamphile were not presented as feeling *erōs* even for their husbands in Menander's time. The double connotation of the Modern Greek term 'αἴσθημα' suggests that Charisios, even if he was drunk and perhaps unable to find quite the right words to describe his feelings for Pamphile, nevertheless reveals that the love between them was genuinely romantic and based on *erōs*. So too, Pamphile's behaviour in kissing Charisios' photograph is of a piece with my interpretation of Evangelatos' innovations in his version. The theme of romantic love is also prominent, of course, in plays of the Victorian era, especially the comedies by Oscar Wilde. What is more, it was also a theme dear to the Modern Greek audience that attended the

⁷⁴⁴ Sandbach (1972), p. 127.

⁷⁴⁵ Babiniotis (1998) s.v. (το) αἴσθημα.

productions and was familiar with similar stories from popular Greek movies of the 1950s through the 1970s, which were, and are, repeatedly shown on Greek TV. With this addition, Evangelatos thus offered his audience a foretaste of Charisios' final reaction to his wife's behaviour, which will shortly be communicated to the spectators by Onesimos and Charisios himself in this same act.

Avroula and Pamphile

The next scene in the production, as in the original text, includes the interaction between Avroula and Pamphile and the recognition of the child's identity by Pamphile alone at this point.⁷⁴⁶ The adaptation is close to the original, and has no additional lines. Avroula is dressed as a woman of the higher classes in the Victorian era, with an elaborate long dress and a hat with feathers. There is nothing in her costume that reveals her profession. She also carries with her the baby in a pushchair decorated with white lace. At the beginning of the scene, she is presented as talking to the baby, just as in the original text, (856-857)⁷⁴⁷, with great affection: 'When, my little darling, will you meet your mother again?'⁷⁴⁸

The recognition between the two women takes place at Pamphile's house, after Avroula has asked to go inside to have a conversation with her, again as in the original text. Pamphile nearly faints when Avroula reveals to her that the father of her child is Charisios. Pamphile wants to know all the details about Avroula's discovery and withdraws with her into another room of the

⁷⁴⁶ For a detailed commentary on this scene in the original (853-877), see Furley (2009), pp. 223-226 and Ireland (2010), pp. 247-248.

⁷⁴⁷ Sandbach (1972), p. 121.

⁷⁴⁸ Programme, p. 25.

house to have privacy; to this end too, she asks Onesimos to forbid anyone to disturb them.⁷⁴⁹

Onesimos remains alone on stage and delivers the monologue in which he describes Charisios' reaction when his master overheard Pamphile's and Smikrines' conversation.

Onesimos' monologue

Onesimos' monologue in the production, from a textual point of view, is close to the original. Roussos, like Sfyroeras in his adaptation,⁷⁵⁰ employs metaphors, colloquialisms, and expressions drawn from everyday parlance by which Onesimos give vivid expression to Charisios' emotional state upon overhearing the dialogue between Smikrines and Pamphile. But Evangelatos' production is particularly hilarious, in that Onesimos, who after all is now a butler in the style of Victorian England, describes the whole business in a cool style, as though he was sniffing at Charisios' excessive anger, even as he uses language of the most ordinary, down-to-earth kind. He sits on a couch, utterly relaxed, and enjoys a cup of tea while he narrates Charisios' reaction. Onesimos begins his account with a variety of expressions to describe Charisios' condition: 'He lost his mind' (ἔχασε τό νοῦ του), he is mad (τρελάθηκε), he is truly cracked (ζουρλάθηκε στ' ἀλήθεια, a colloquial expression), he is seriously screwed up (του' στριψε για καλά, a metaphor) ...'.⁷⁵¹ Even when he quotes the words with which his master expressed his own desperation, anger at himself, and self-accusation, Onesimos' tone

⁷⁴⁹ In the show: "Ονήσιμε, νά μή μᾶς ἐνοχλήσει κανείς".

⁷⁵⁰ Cf. Sfyroeras (1975), p. 78.

⁷⁵¹ Cf. the repetition of μαίνομαι forms in the original, Sandbach (1972), p. 122: 878-880 and Furley (2009), p. 227. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ζουρλαίνω, it means: 'I bring somebody to a state of psychological disturbance, I make the person lose his mental clarity'; Babiniotis (1998), s.v. στρίβω for expressions which use the verb στρίβω in the metaphorical sense, 'I lose my mind, I go mad'.

remains cool and distant. And as he communicates his own emotional state, his fear of Charisios' anger and how it may affect him, since he is the man who revealed the story about Pamphile's baby to Charisios, he is remarkably undisturbed and phlegmatic: 'I was trembling and was stunned by fear' (ἀπ' τό φόβο ξεράθηκα, a metaphor; cf. 901 αὔος).⁷⁵² It was obvious in the performance that the spectators took delight in Onesimos' part and his style: Evangelatos' innovation certainly made them laugh. Did they notice the contradiction with the earlier representation of his character? It is hard to say, but the shift in dramatic style from scene to scene was so striking that they presumably accepted whatever conventions of characterization best accorded with each.

Charisios' monologue and his dialogue with Onesimos and Avroula

Charisios' second appearance on stage in the same act shows a man whose emotional and physical situation has deteriorated since his first appearance. His black suit and black tie are scruffy. He is still drunk and he keeps taking sips from the bottle that he holds in his hands while he delivers his speech. He directs his remorse and self-pity to the photograph of himself, the same one that Pamphile was kissing earlier, and in this sense, we may say that his photograph serves as mirror of himself. In the performance, as in Menander's original, Charisios chastises himself for his inhumane treatment of his wife in very strong, even melodramatic, language calling himself 'ungrateful' (ἀχάριστος; cf. 918 ἀγνώμων), 'little man' (ἄνθρωπάκι; cf. 912 ἄνθρωπος

⁷⁵² Programme, p. 26 and Sandbach (1972), p. 123. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ξεραίνω, in the metaphoric sense: 'I am speechless and motionless due to astonishment'. For a detailed analysis of the terms πέφρικα and αὔος (901) in Menander and in funerary contexts, and their allusive tone in Onesimos' speech, see Furley (2009), p. 231. Ireland (2010), p. 248 states that 'Onesimos' account of his master's tirade is represented in paratragic terms as insanity, its force comically intensified, as we learn at 901ff, as much by fears for his own safety as by alarm for Charisios'.

ᾶν), ‘uncouth’ (‘παλιοχωριάτης’; cf. 924 βάρβαρος), ‘sordid’, and ‘lewd’ (‘πρόστυχος’; cf. 918 σκαίος)⁷⁵³. Πρόστυχος covers a variety of negative behavioural characteristics, signifying an immoral, base person who lacks decency and respect towards his fellow beings;⁷⁵⁴ the word suggests that Charisios’ sexual behaviour has crossed social and ethical limits, and the modern Greek word is stronger than the original σκαίος. Charisios uses this word twice in his speech, once in reference to his supposed ability to distinguish between good and bad actions, before the discovery of his illegal child, (‘τί’ ναι καλό ἐξετάζοντας καί τί’ ναι πρόστυχο’; cf. 909)⁷⁵⁵ and once to characterize his lack of moral behaviour, decency and respect for Pamphile, in the passage just cited.

While Charisios is speaking, Onesimos overhears him and comments on his master’s remarks with expressions of astonishment, doubtless intended for humorous effect, given his British posture, such as: ‘Oh dear, oh my God!’ Charisios reprimands him, after noticing his presence: ‘Are you still talking? I will tear you to pieces if I catch you’, an addition by Roussos to the original text.⁷⁵⁶ Charisios directs his anger more forcefully than previously at the person who he thinks is responsible for his unfair treatment of Pamphile, that is Onesimos. He chases him round the room to give substance to his threat. Onesimos, once again cool as can be, responds to Charisios in the polite second person plural in the production: ‘Sir, you have been unjust to me’.⁷⁵⁷ Onesimos’ style is suitable for an English butler, to be sure, but hardly for a terrified slave of Menander’s time, who would have addressed his furious

⁷⁵³ Sandbach (1972), pp. 123-124.

⁷⁵⁴ This meaning is close to ancient Greek σκαίος, especially when it appears together with words such as ἀναίσθητος; see for example Demosthenes 26.17, *LSJ*, s.v. For the meanings of πρόστυχος, see Babiniotis (1998), s.v.

⁷⁵⁵ Cf. Sfyroeras (1975), p. 79.

⁷⁵⁶ Programme, p. 26; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 124: 935

⁷⁵⁷ Onesimos: ‘μέ ἀδικεῖτε κύριε’.

master, if at all, in the most deferential way. As Aristotle observes in his treatment of anger in the *Rhetoric*, slaves are not in a position to take offence at insults, but must take care to appease their masters' anger by humbling themselves, confessing that they are at fault, and not talking back: back-talk in and of itself constitutes a slight, and threatens to exacerbate the master's anger, since a slave who speaks up in his own defence is presuming to treat his master as an equal.⁷⁵⁸ In fact, Charisios' performance at this point provoked much laughter in the spectators.

The intense scene between master and slave is interrupted in the production, as in the original play, when Avroula rushes into the room to reveal the truth about the mother of the baby to Charisios. She was still in Charisios' house with Pamphile, disclosing to her all the details about her own involvement in the story. Roussos fills in the fragmentary text at some points in the ensuing dialogue between Charisios and Avroula. When Charisios asks Avroula whose the baby is, then, if it is not hers, she does not reply immediately, but first tries to secure Charisios' promise that he will grant her freedom if she reveals the identity of the actual mother of the child.⁷⁵⁹ Charisios is so angry and impatient that he cannot tolerate even the least delay resulting from further discussion with her: 'If you do not tell me now, bugger off!' Avroula finally tells him that the child is his and Pamphile's, and asks Onesimos to confirm that this is the truth. Charisios is all the angrier when he realizes that Onesimos and Avroula both knew the truth, when he himself did not: 'Did you say Onesimos? Did you both have fun at my expense, as though I were a stupid man?' Onesimos calmly replies: 'She persuaded me to do so, by Apollo and the gods.'⁷⁶⁰ Avroula tries to calm Charisios down, as in the original, by

⁷⁵⁸ Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1380a15-18.

⁷⁵⁹ Programme, p. 26; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 125: 946.

⁷⁶⁰ Programme, p. 27; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 125: 951 and Furley (2009), p. 240, for the restoration of the line by supplementing the missing letters in the verb ἐξεπειράθη[τέ μου;]

repeating that the child is indeed Pamphile's. Charisios' emotional condition changes immediately. He seems to have overcome his drunkenness, but is still unable to believe what Avroula has told him about the mother of his child. He begs Avroula not to give him false hopes, just as in the original, and insists on hearing why he is told the truth only now, this last an addition by Roussos.

The fragmentary text which follows, around ten lines in the original, is filled in by the translator in the adaptation. Avroula replies that she wanted first to discover the identity of the mother and only then to inform him. Charisios agrees with her responsible decision and asks Avroula what *charis* he owes her for the good she has done for him. All Avroula wants is her freedom, which Charisios gratefully offers her. Meanwhile, Onesimos intervenes in support of Avroula's request, but Charisios gets annoyed, once again, at his presence, regardless of the happy end to his story. Charisios states to Avroula, Onesimos and the spectators that he now wants to hear the whole story from Pamphile herself, and how all this misunderstanding arose.⁷⁶¹

On Charisios' departure, Onesimos reminds Avroula of the *charis* that she promised him, when she recruited him as her helper in the mission to find the parents of the baby, to which Avroula replies: 'I have not forgotten it, but am waiting for a little while, to make sure that everything turns out well'.⁷⁶² Her promise can be read in more than one way: on the one hand, she is being responsible and wants to make sure that no further misunderstandings will arise between Charisios and Pamphile; but she may also wish to avoid any bother from Onesimos at the moment: she will keep her word to him but will

and his comment about Charisios' reaction which is not far from Roussos' text 'Charisios is realizing angrily that he has been duped by Habroton and Onesimos in tandem'.

⁷⁶¹ Programme, p. 27; cf. Sandbach (1972), pp. 125: 952-957 and Furley (2009), pp. 71, 114 and 240.

⁷⁶² Programme, p.27.

grant him the *charis* when she decides to do so, since she is a free woman now. All these interpretations of Roussos' text match Avroula's character, as the director and the translator construed it in the production. Roussos' restoration of the original text here too is in the spirit of the original text of Act III, where Onesimos and Avroula joined forces to identify the parents of the baby.⁷⁶³ Once again, as in Act III of the adaptation, *charis* plays an essential role in the relationship among Charisios, Avroula, and Onesimos.⁷⁶⁴

In sum, Evangelatos has exhibited Charisios' character in the production through the language he uses in his monologue, in which he reveals his self-perception both prior to the misfortune that befell him and afterwards, as well as by means of props (the drinking bottle, the photograph of himself, his outfit) and his acting style, which is reminiscent of characters in modern Greek movies, both melodramatic and comic. It is worth mentioning that the director had also in mind, while constructing Charisios' character in the production, roles played by a well-known actor, Nikos Xanthopoulos, in many social drama movies of the 1960s, thereby again enhancing the appeal to the contemporary audience. Xanthopoulos played the role of an honest, proud man whom fate had hit hard, and who was fighting for social justice, protecting the poor and always respectful of women. An image representing this actor, taken from the movie 'The humble and scorned man,'⁷⁶⁵ was part of the programme for the production. Evangelatos, as he told me, considered Charisios to be a young man who simply wished to live his life to the full, out to have fun in a cheerful and comfortable way. On Evangelatos' view, Charisios, like Menandrian characters generally, does not have a secret side. His character has no genuine depth, in comparison, say, to Euripidean

⁷⁶³ For relationships and networking among slaves and between slaves and free citizens apart from their masters in Menander's plays, see Bathrellou (2014).

⁷⁶⁴ Cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 114: 538-544.

⁷⁶⁵ The Greek title is 'Ταπεινός και καταφρονεμένος'.

characters. He is just a type'.⁷⁶⁶ As for Charisios' drinking habit in the production, it was just an expression of a man trying to drown his misery in alcohol. He was not, according to the director, an alcoholic. In this respect, Evangelatos is at a considerable remove from the Aristotelian analysis of character, not so much treating Charisios' behaviour as a manifestation of *ēthos*, by which our fundamental ethical choices or *prohaireseis* are determined, but rather treating him as a typical nice fellow.

Act V: Greek movies of the 1950s and 1960s

The setting of Act V reflects that of Greek movies (romantic comedies and social dramas) of the 1950s with a gigantic cinema screen hanging on stage in order to stress the artistic survival of Menander's characters and plot motifs in modern Greek movies. The location is a Greek tavern. Taverns and nightclubs, such as the well-known 'bouzoukia',⁷⁶⁷ figured in films as the locales where the characters used to go either to enjoy themselves or to listen to songs, as a kind of consolation for their troubles, and to drink until they forgot their problems. In Evangelatos' production, we see two tables in the tavern. Simias and Chairestratos are sitting at one, while at the other are

⁷⁶⁶ Evangelatos' interview: 'Ο ρόλος [του Χαρίσιου] δεν είναι τίποτα ιδιαίτερο. Ένας νέος είναι, που προσπαθεί να ζήσει με έναν τρόπο άνετο και ωραίο. Δεν κρύβει κάποιο μυστικό ο Χαρίσιος, όπως και όλοι οι άλλοι χαρακτήρες. Οι Μενανδρικοί χαρακτήρες είναι τύποι. Δεν έχουν βάθος. Καμμία σχέση δεν έχουν οι Μενανδρικοί χαρακτήρες με τους χαρακτήρες του Ευριπίδη, που είναι πιο σύνθετοι ακόμη και από τους χαρακτήρες του Αισχύλου'. Many scholars have argued that Menandrian comedy was influenced by Euripides. They detect influences in plot motifs, linguistic patterns, a common interest in characters and their behaviour, dramatic techniques (such as *peripeteia* and *anagnorisis*), and the construction of the plots (e.g. the use of prologues). I mention a few who have discussed the topic: Andrewes (1924), Pertusi (1953), Webster (1974), Katsouris (1975a and b), Goldberg (1980), Belardinelli (1984), Zagagi (1994), Porter (2000), Cusset (2003), Blanchard (2008) and Petrides (2014), pp. 54-56, 121, 124-125, 130 and 273-275.

⁷⁶⁷ 'Bouzoukia' are nightclubs and are named after the stringed instrument which is the main instrument of the orchestras in these clubs. 'Bouzoukia' bands play popular music (λαϊκή μουσική).

Avroula, Onesimos and two men who have no roles in the act, and probably represent simply clients of the tavern, there to have some fun. Onesimos has now become a waiter, dressed in the style of the 1950s. Avroula also wears a dress reflecting women's fashion of the same period. Avroula's group is in a cheerful mood, and all together sing a popular song of the 1950s, 'Let your hair be ruffled [by the wind]'.⁷⁶⁸ The song is in the rhythm of a waltz and was performed for the first time in the 1951 romantic, melodramatic movie titled 'Those women who should not love'.⁷⁶⁹

Simias, Chairestratos and Onesimos

Roussos opens the act with a dialogue between Simias and Chairestratos and completes the fragmentary original text with his additions, up to the point where Smikrines appears on stage in the performance text and in the original text (1062).⁷⁷⁰ Roussos chose to follow those scholars who attributed the opening part of Act V to Simias, but this requires nevertheless a good deal of invention on the translator's part.⁷⁷¹ Simias is happy because Charisios has

⁷⁶⁸ 'Άστα τα μαλλάκια σου ανακατεμένα'. The song is rather melancholy and talks about a young man's advice to his young girlfriend to let her beautiful hair be ruffled by the summer wind, enjoy her youth and not worry about the future. There will come a moment in her later life when she will recall with nostalgia her carefree youth. The lyrics of the song are by Sakellarios and Giannakopoulos (1951), available at http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=3466.

⁷⁶⁹ 'Εκείνες που δεν πρόπει ν'αγαπούν'. Evangelatos may have thought that the plot lines of the movie bore a certain resemblance to the story of *Epitrepontes*, although they were not exactly the same. In the movie, a poor young man who studies music has a romantic affair with a poor but honest girl who is truly in love with him. The man, at some point, is seduced by a famous, high-class courtesan and abandons his girlfriend for her. The affair with the courtesan turns out badly, and in the end, the young woman manages to win him back with her genuine love. For the plot and the characters of the movie, see Triantafyllides (2000), p. 60.

⁷⁷⁰ Sandbach (1972), p. 127.

⁷⁷¹ Sandbach (1972), p. 126: 979-89. Furley (2009), p. 241 argues that 'if the restoration of Chairestratos' name in 982 is correct, the opening lines are either spoken by someone to Chairestratos or by himself in self-address'. As for Chairestratos' role in this scene, Furley states that Chairestratos might not have been informed yet about the identity of the baby and that Charisios and Pamphile are his parents: '... We should imagine a Chairestratos'

appreciated Avroula's role in rescuing his son and has granted her freedom. After all, Avroula's intelligence and good character won her the freedom, as Simias believes and regards as fair. He warns Chairestratos to show respect for her, since he has been appointed Avroula's guardian by Charisios.⁷⁷² Chairestratos, on the other hand, is not happy with Avroula's new status and his role as her guardian. He also believes that a woman who is an *ex-hetaira* can never change her habits and way of life. He goes so far as to compare a slave's persistence in old habits to the behaviour of a wolf. Avroula will always remain, he opines, a *hetaira* and a slave. Chairestratos further accuses Avroula of having won her freedom by means of lies and tricks, and thus she does not deserve it. In the verbal dispute between Simias and Chairestratos, Onesimos interferes, another addition by Roussos. Onesimos has overheard

returning to the scene to confront what for him is a major problem: how to succeed with Habrotonon while she is officially with Charisios? ... [the audience] see Chairestratos in an ironic light, pondering the choice between his friendship for Charisios and his desire for Habrotonon'. Ireland (2010), p. 255 holds that the speaker is Chairestratos. Roussos, as we can see from his reconstruction of the scene, was very much on the right track in his handling of the issues that the fragmentary original text has posed to scholars, all of them clearly discussed in Furley's reading of the scene and his comments. Roussos also followed Sfyroeras (1975), p. 82 in attributing the initial monologue to Simias. In Sfyroeras' adaptation too, Simias and Chairestratos are aware of the baby's identity and Avroula is granted freedom. But Sfyroeras did not include in his adaptation a dialogue between Simias, Chairestratos and Onesimos, as Roussos did.

⁷⁷² Programme, p. 27. There is no agreement among scholars regarding Habrotonon's freedom at the end of the original play. A number of scholars support the view that Habrotonon was not freed; see for example, Fantham (1975), p. 64 and Rosivach (1998), pp. 99-100. Sommerstein (2014b), p. 15 argues that Charisios freed Habrotonon as an indication of his gratitude to her for all she did for him and Pamphile. Furley (2009), pp. 29 and 191 too does not exclude the possibility that Habrotonon was freed by Charisios at the end of the play: 'We do not learn in the extant portions of *Epitrep.* whether or not Habrotonon does obtain her freedom. As an illustration of how a slave might obtain his or her freedom through doing some good turn for the master one may compare Plaut. *Rud.* 121ff., where Trachalio wins his freedom by enabling Daemones to identify his long-lost daughter'. Roussos' addition regarding Avroula's guardian after she was freed is arbitrary and has no connection with the role of women's protectors in antiquity. Chairestratos was not Avroula's master in the adaptation or in the original. Apollodoros' speech against *Neaira* (Demosthenes 59) is the main source for the legal tutelage of women, whether citizen or not, *pallakē* or prostitute, by a *kyrios* or guardian in financial and legal contexts in Athens; see Carey (1992) p. 5, 15-16, 23, 44-45 and esp. 104-105: 'for a slave manumitted in Athens the patron would usually be the former master'.

their discussion and speaks in support of Avroula, who justly deserves her freedom because she has rescued the baby. Chairestratos disagrees and argues that Tyche has rescued the baby and nobody else. He is annoyed that Simias supports Avroula and decides to leave the tavern. Simias remarks that Chairestratos is upset because, as Avroula's guardian, he will have to avoid any indecent treatment of her. Simias affirms that he will respect her as a free woman from now on, upon which he departs from the stage.⁷⁷³

Onesimos, Smikrines, and Sophrone

Onesimos announces to Avroula and her company in the tavern that Smikrines and Sophrone are approaching, as clients of the tavern. Onesimos, knowing that Smikrines has not yet been informed that the problem between Pamphile and Charisios has been resolved, intends to torment and mock him, as he confides to Avroula and the other clients: 'Look, Smikrines is coming and is dragging the old lady Sophrone with him. They are quarrelling. Well, we will have lots of fun. I am withdrawing because I do not wish to be seen. Stingy old man, I will make you jump through hoops! (τώρα για τὰ καλά θὰ σέ χορέψω)'.⁷⁷⁴ This brief introduction to the scene by Onesimos is Roussos' addition to the original text, serving as a quasi-prologue or internal commentator to alert the audience to what is happening. Onesimos' scheme to taunt Smikrines is reminiscent of 'the chastisement of Knemon' by the slave and the cook in Act V of *Dyskolos*.⁷⁷⁵ Roussos confirmed in his interview that Knemon's comic comeuppance was his inspiration for Smikrines' treatment

⁷⁷³ Programme, pp. 27-28.

⁷⁷⁴ Programme, p. 28. The expression 'χορεύω κάποιον στο ταψί', 'I make somebody dance in the baking dish' is of course metaphorical, see Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ταψί.

⁷⁷⁵ For a comparison between Knemon's and Smikrines' chastisement, see Furley (2009), p. 243.

here, since both men shared, regardless of their differences, a similar character trait: they were old and grumpy, and difficult to deal with.⁷⁷⁶

Smikrines is dressed as a prosperous upper-middle-class Greek gentleman of the 1950s or 1960s, and Sophrone's costume is also that of an elegant upper-class woman, complete with a hat with feathers and a fur shawl. In the performance text, Sophrone is not a mute character, as in the original, as we will see below. Smikrines' monologue in the performance text, however, remains on the whole close to the original text. The old man is furious with Charisios and also with Sophrone, who does not realize why he is in such a hurry. He shouts at Sophrone that he is not going to wait until Charisios gnaws away⁷⁷⁷ all his property. He rather prefers to disentangle the whole situation immediately. Although we have not yet heard Sophrone expressing her views to Smikrines, he warns her not to say a word more, suggesting that she might have said something before they entered. If, however, she dares to disobey his order, he threatens, he will toss her right out.⁷⁷⁸ Roussos, following the original text, chose to keep the rhetorical questions⁷⁷⁹ that Smikrines addressed to Sophrone, and peppered them with pejorative words and metaphors to heighten the emotional tone. The verbal register of the adaptation was supported by rapid movements and gestures on the part of the actor, Kostas Tsianos.

⁷⁷⁶ Roussos' interview: 'Σκέφτηκα να βάλω τον Ονήσιμο να κάνει ένα μικρό σχόλιο, πριν εμφανιστεί ο Σμικρίνης, για να γελάσει ο κόσμος. Η συμπληρωσή μου αυτή δεν απέχει από το στυλ του Μενάνδρου, αφού στο Δύσκολο οι δούλοι 'βασανίζουν' και περιγελούν τον γρουσουζή Κνήμωνα. Οι δύο άντρες παρά τις διαφορές στη συμπεριφορά τους, έχουν ένα κοινό χαρακτηριστικό: είναι γέροι γκρινιάρηδες, που δεν υποφέρονται εύκολα'.

⁷⁷⁷ Programme, p. 28 'Λοιπόν νά περιμένω ώσπου ό καλός της ό άντρας νά ροκανίσει τήν προίκα μου όλη ...'; cf. 1065 'καταφαγείν τήν προίκα μου'. Babiniotis (1998) s.v. ροκανίζω, in a metaphorical sense, 'I use up slowly an amount of money which does not belong to me'.

⁷⁷⁸ Programme, p. 28. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ξεμπερδεύω in a metaphorical sense: 'I clarify and arrange a complicated situation, finish something which is difficult and challenging'; s.v. ξαποστέλνω, in a pejorative sense: 'I get rid of something or someone, usually in an abrupt and violent manner'.

⁷⁷⁹ Cf. Furley (2009), p. 244 regarding 1064-1066.

Onesimos welcomes in sarcastic terms, as in the original text, ‘the grumpy’ (‘ὁ γκρινιάρης’) and self-seeking old man, who has come for no other reason than to get the loot.

Onesimos’ discussion with Smikrines in this scene takes place while he serves Smikrines wine, as a waiter in the tavern, a reminiscence of his role as butler in the previous act. Smikrines’ reaction, when Onesimos informs him about his grandchild, is captured by the vivid slang term he uses: ‘What grandchild are you talking about, you scoundrel (παλιοτομάρι)?’ Onesimos responds to Smikrines in the same terms: ‘You’re a scoundrel (τομάρι) yourself, although you think of yourself as a clever man. Is this the right way to watch over a marriageable daughter? And this is the miracle: we are taking care of a newborn baby after a pregnancy of five months!’⁷⁸⁰ In Roussos’ adaptation, Smikrines and Onesimos exhibit a mutual lack of respect in their use of the pejorative terms ‘παλιοτομάρι, τομάρι’ (roughly, ‘scoundrel’ or ‘blackguard’). The word ‘τομάρι’ in Onesimos’ mouth, in reference to Smikrines’ lack of proper care for his daughter, is stronger than Menander’s term παχύδερμος (1114). In Modern Greek ‘παχύδερμος’ bears a similar meaning to the ancient term, that is ‘insensitive’,⁷⁸¹ but this word was inadequate to express Onesimos’ view of Smikrines’ behaviour, as the translator and director perceived it. Apart from importing a more aggressive tone to the exchange between the two, the translator and director evidently sought to exploit the comic effect of the coarse language, departing in this respect from the more measured discourse characteristic of Menander.

⁷⁸⁰ Programme, p. 28; cf. Sandbach (1972), pp. 127-129: 1097-1083 and 1113.-1116. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. (το) πλιάτσικο, a colloquial word of everyday speech; s.v. το τομάρι: the skin of a beast; in a pejorative sense, it is a slang word: an immoral and deceitful person, scoundrel, son of a gun. See also Furley (2009), p. 116 and Ireland (2010), pp. 200-201: 1104-1114.

⁷⁸¹ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. παχύδερμος.

Smikrines is astonished and demands that Onesimos clarify what he means by a five-month baby. Onesimos tells Smikrines, in a sarcastic and smirking manner, that although he does not understand, Sophrone knows exactly what he means. Sophrone interjects: 'Oh yes!', accompanying her words with hand gestures to confirm that she has full knowledge of Pamphile's story. It is here that Roussos attributes to Sophrone the lines of the original that most scholars ascribe rather to Onesimos, with the result that she is not a mute character in the production.⁷⁸² She says: 'Nature made the decision [i.e, concerning Pamphile's baby], which does not follow any human rule. Anyway, this is the woman's fate'. Smikrines is shocked by Sophrone's philosophical and highhanded answer, given the seriousness of the problem, and thinks that something must be wrong with her: 'Have you lost your mind?' he asks. Sophrone, who had underestimated Smikrines' ability to figure the matter out assumes a haughty tone and replies: 'Smikrines, if you cannot understand [what has happened], I will recite a whole monologue from Auge's tragedy'. With this, she flips through a book or perhaps a lady's magazine containing popular romantic stories that she has with her, so she can find the relevant passage to convince Smikrines. It seems that Sophrone, accustomed to Smikrines' outbursts, does not pay him much attention and is content, when he is upset about something, to entertain herself with women's magazines. Smikrines is angry and says, with an expression of disgust: 'You turn my guts upside down, with these silly mags (παλιοφυλλάδες)'.⁷⁸³

⁷⁸² For Sophrone as a mute character in the original, see Furley (2009), p. 253, citing also Sandbach's view on why it is not likely that Sophrone would have had a speaking role in the original play 'Sandbach points out that it suits Onesimos' character to goad Smikrines with the cheeky quote from Euripides, not Sophrone's ("a nurse with literary interests is unparalleled in comedy")'.

⁷⁸³ Programme, p. 29. The Greek word 'η φυλλάδα' means magazines or newspapers of low quality, see Babiniotis (1998), s.v.; cf. 1123-1126 which are attributed to Onesimos by Sandbach (1972), p. 129, Arnott (1979), p. 518, Furley (2009), p. 75 and Ireland (2010), p. 202-203. For an association between Euripides' *Auge* and Menander's *Epitrepontes*, see Anderson (1982), Furley (2009), pp. 253-254 and Petrides (2014), pp. 65-66.

Although the translator and the director preserved in the adaptation the reference to Auge's story in the original, since this name would have meant very little to the majority of the modern Greek spectators, they embedded it in the theatrical byplay of Sophrone's ostentatious reading of the magazine and embellished it with Smikrines' strong expression of disgust, in a style reminiscent rather of Aristophanic comedy. Sophrone is not in the least bothered by Smikrines' scornful remark and informs him that she knows everything, with the implication that she knows exactly what has happened about Pamphile and her baby and also that she is an educated woman who has read similar romantic stories in her favourite magazines and can adduce them to enlighten less favoured folks. The nod to modern comedy at this point in the adaptation is evident.

When Onesimos announces that Pamphile's baby was fathered by Charisios, Sophrone considers this to be the greatest blessing. She further confirms Onesimos' revelation regarding her own role as Pamphile's midwife. Smikrines is furious at this, and threatens to drown her in the dirty swamp which they passed on their way to Pamphile's house for having kept the secret about Pamphile's pregnancy from him. Roussos' addition here is based on Smikrines' first monologue in this act in the original, text, as we saw above. Sophrone, in another addition by Roussos, insolently replies: 'What did you want poor me to do? Do you think I could have brought you the good news? my dear master, congratulations on your grandchild! You would have asked somebody to beat me for a whole day. Is it easy to report such shameful things? Your daughter has been married only for five months and she has already given birth? How can you reveal such things?' Regardless of her unconditional support for Pamphile, Sophrone, in Roussos' adaptation, is a respectable woman who observes proper social etiquette. When Smikrines is

informed by Onesimos that Sophrone exposed the bastard baby in the woods and two shepherds rescued it, he loses all control and berates the old woman: 'What? you Lamia, [a mythical monster or bogeywoman], did you expose my grandchild?' Smikrines immediately recalls his role as arbitrator just a little while ago in connection with the guardianship of a baby, and he grows angry in part because he realizes that the baby in question was his own grandchild. Sophrone, now adopting a cool and cheerful tone, tries to calm him down by telling him that it was Tyche's plan that he be asked by the two shepherds to decide his own grandchild's destiny. Although he is happy to know that he now has a grandson, he still accuses and bullies Sophrone because she kept him in the dark.⁷⁸⁴

In his treatment of Sophrone's role, Roussos was influenced by Sfyroeras' adaptation; here again a modern version views Menander prismatically through the subsequent reception tradition. In Sfyroeras' text too, Sophrone is a speaking character (the modern playwright is not hampered by the ancient restriction on the number of speaking roles), an outspoken woman who strongly defends her role as Pamphile's helper in front of the furious Smikrines. She believes that it was not a bad deed to expose the bastard baby, and she justifies it by explaining it was done to save Pamphile's marriage, although she did not manage to do so in the end, since Charisios abandoned her when he learned about the baby. She firmly believes that, had Charisios not learned about the baby, the couple would have lived happily for the rest of their life, since she would have been the only one who knew about Pamphile's bastard child. Sophrone's argument in defence of the exposure of the baby is sophisticated and reveals her to be a more cheeky and decisive woman than in Roussos' text. Onesimos, after having heard her arguments, in

⁷⁸⁴ Programme, p. 29.

Sfyroeras' version called her 'a fox', a woman who knows how to make black seem white and cunningly avoid the consequences of her deceptions.

Smikrines too was less angry after having heard Sophrone's defence of her action, and was, in Sfyroeras' script, convinced by her reasoning. He did not threaten to drown her in a swamp, as he does in Roussos' version even after the happy conclusion to Pamphile's problem.⁷⁸⁵

Roussos and Evangelatos chose to assign Sophrone a simpler way of speaking in their production, without elaborate arguments, but they made her stand out in the scene with Smikrines and Onesimos by way of her histrionic acting, her indifference to Smikrines' threats, and her accoutrements, both the clothing and the magazine. She also joins Onesimos, in Evangelatos' production, in humiliating and teasing Smikrines, which again added to the burlesque quality.

Syriskos, Onesimos and Charisios

After the revelation about the baby, Smikrines leaves the stage and goes to see his grandson, while Sophrone remains on stage but has no further role in the action. As mentioned above, Syriskos appears in Act V of Evangelatos' production. This time he is a *magkas*, a type whose behaviour and manners are those of a person with too much confidence in his own abilities, a tough guy who usually tries to impose himself by showing off his physical power and his masculinity.⁷⁸⁶ Although this Greek word has no exact equivalent in English, it signifies something like 'too cool for school'. The *magkas'* way of speaking differs from ordinary discourse, employing many slang expressions. He also adopts a pretentious way of walking to fit his assumed masculinity and speaking style. In some cases, a *magkas* can be an intelligent, educated

⁷⁸⁵ Sfyroeras (1975), p. 87.

⁷⁸⁶ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. μάγκας.

man who has a lot of experience of life, in particular street life, and hence his abilities and experience may be appreciated because they are useful for helping other people out in difficult situations. One may think here of the character of Phormio in Terence's play by that name, a sophisticated man-about-town in the guise of a conventional parasite, who puts himself at the service of the young lover. *Magkas'* manners and linguistic style can be adopted also by upper-class people when they wish to render themselves likeable to the lower classes and win them over.

Syriskos, however, is a low class *magkas* in the production. He is dressed in a dark-coloured suit, leans over when he is talking, and plays continually with his worry beads (*komboloi*). The style is striking, intentionally so: the character is both consistent across the several acts and yet is transformed in unexpected ways, doubtless the effect desired by the producer. He has returned to retrieve the baby's ring from Onesimos. He had trusted Onesimos with it for a short time, as Onesimos had asked him to do, with the promise to return it to him soon. Syriskos is not aware that the parents of the baby, as well as the owner of the ring, have now been identified. Onesimos, now relieved thanks to the happy ending of Charisios' story, is in a cool and playful mood, and he initially responds in a light and ironic way to Syriskos' demand: 'The ring? It has now flown away. It has gone!' Syriskos calls him a liar and threatens to strangle him if he does not give him back the ring. With this, he sets out in pursuit of Onesimos, who shouts for help, injecting a bit of extra clowning into Menander's somewhat more prim style. Charisios, Pamphile, the baby and Smikrines all enter the tavern, in joyful mood, another innovation by Evangelatos in accord with his version of the end of the play. Charisios realizes that the ring Syriskos demands is his own, and was one of the tokens left with the baby when it was exposed. Charisios explains to Syriskos what has happened and offers him and Avroula gold coins as a gift, thanking them

heartily for their help. Smikrines' look suggests that he disapproves of his son-in-law's generosity but he remains silent. Charisios also expresses his gratitude to Pamphile, who thought to provide the exposed baby with his ring, which would in the end be the means of identifying them as parents of the baby. Charisios even promises to wear this ring for the rest of his life, as a reminder of how weak humans are at the hands of Tyche.⁷⁸⁷ Roussos' text in this final scene of Act V substantially resembles that of Sfyroeras'.⁷⁸⁸

The production ends with a popular song of 1952, sung by everybody on stage. The theme of the song, echoing Charisios' last words, is the endless troubles and problems in life of a person who nevertheless manages to remain optimistic, in the confidence that happiness will arrive at some point and all will be well from then on.⁷⁸⁹

Choral interludes

Evangelatos' production included choral intervals at the end of each Act where the Menandrian text has the indication 'XOPOY'. The director used only the instrumental music from established, popular Greek songs, omitting the lyrics. The music for all the songs in the interludes was composed by Markopoulos, as also the song of the added prologue (see above, p. 208), for various theatrical and concert occasions long before the first production of Evangelatos' *Epitrepontes* in 1980, and were not written for the purpose of this production. The chorus in all its appearances, including the added prologue and in each of the interludes, represents a travelling theatrical troupe of three women. They are dressed in long dark costumes and have facial expressions

⁷⁸⁷ Programme, p. 30.

⁷⁸⁸ Cf. Sfyroeras (1975), pp. 88-90.

⁷⁸⁹ The title of the song is *Τρα λαλά*. The lyrics of the song are by Oikonomides (1952), available at http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=26556.

indicating mental and physical distress, recalling women who go through hardships; they pull a cart behind them. Their style is reminiscent of a tragic rather than a comic chorus, since this was the more familiar model: an Aristophanic chorus would have been wholly out of place. The cart serves to carry off the props as each act is completed. There is a lead member of the chorus, in the original production played by the late Leda Tassopoulou. The songs that follow Acts I, II and III all have political connotations and were well known to the majority of the audience not only for their political tone at the time of their production but also, and mainly, because they became popular songs in modern Greek culture after the 1970s.

The director stressed that he did not choose these particular songs for any political reason, since he was not in the least interested in including any political innuendos in his production. He selected the songs for artistic reasons, he said, because they were written in a rhythm that was suited to the movements of the chorus, as he had conceived their performance.⁷⁹⁰

At the end of Act I the music of the song 'Golden words' is heard.⁷⁹¹ The song was published in 1974 but the lyrics were possibly written as early as 1971. The lyrics of the song hint at several important historical and political moments of the country, including the occupation by the Nazi Germans, World War II, the Greek Civil war (1945-1949),⁷⁹² the struggles of the Greek workers' movement for social equality and justice during the 20th century, and finally the Greek Military Junta of 1967-1974, which resulted in the abolition

⁷⁹⁰ Evangelatos' Interview: 'Κάποια από τα τραγούδια, που χρησιμοποιήθηκαν στην παράσταση, την εποχή που γράφτηκαν (1970-1974) είχαν πολιτική απόχρωση, εγώ όμως δεν είχα τέτοιο ενδιαφέρον. Επέλεξα τα τραγούδια αυτά γιατί ήταν σε ρυθμό 2/4, ένας ρυθμός που βαδίζεται και ήταν ο κατάλληλος ρυθμός για να συνοδεύει τον χορό, όπως τον είχα προσλάβει'.

⁷⁹¹ *Μαλαματένια λόγια* is the Greek title. The lyrics of the song are by Eleftheriou (1974), available at http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=885.

⁷⁹² On the Greek Civil War, see Kalyvas (1999).

of democracy and sent into exile many Greek citizens who opposed the regime. The song after the end of Act II, 'The enemy invaded the city',⁷⁹³ published in 1972, speaks of various enemies, without naming them, who have attacked Greece throughout its history with the object of undermining Greek identity and culture. In many cases people, the lyrics imply, do not attach proper seriousness to the threat of 'enemies', and may take such threats light-heartedly. But when they finally realize the real danger posed by the enemy it may be too late for their cultural identity and their safety.

A close comparison of the content of this song with that of the poem 'Waiting for the Barbarians', published in 1904 by Constantine Cavafy,⁷⁹⁴ suggests that the song's lyricist, may have been influenced by Cavafy's poem. Both the song and the poem use allegory to underline how vulnerable a society may be to various physical, emotional, cultural and national dangers, when it is subject to social and moral decline. Greece was at one of its moments of cultural crisis when Markopoulos and Skourtis' song was produced. The responsibility for ridding oneself of the enemy and ultimately overcoming moral decadence belongs equally to the political leaders of a country and its people. This is the deep message that permeates Cavafy's poem and Markopoulos and Skourtis' song as well.

⁷⁹³ *Μπήκαν στην πόλη οι οχτροί* is the Greek title. The song was initially heard in a theatrical production of the play 'The Musicians', produced by the director Karolos Koun and his company 'Art Theatre' (Θέατρο Τέχνης) in Athens in 1971-1972. The lyrics of the song are by Skourtis (1972), available at

http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=1125.

⁷⁹⁴ Cavafy's poem, translated by Keeley and Sherrard (1975), available at <http://www.cavafy.com/poems/content.asp?id=119&cat=1>.

The song, 'I talk about my children and I sweat'⁷⁹⁵, heard after the end of Act III, is not explicitly, at first sight, political but it carries a socio-political dimension all the same. The lyrics were written once again by Skourtis and the song was published in 1974. The song speaks of a poor mother who emigrated to a prosperous country, possibly in Europe, to support financially her children who were being looked after by their grandmother in Greece. The mother misses the children and she always suffers when she receives letters with news of them. She feels that she has lost a great deal of the joy of seeing her children as they grow up. The socio-political tone of the song is bound up with the Greek emigration which took place especially in the 1950s and 1960s, when Greece faced economic instability after the Wars (World War II and the civil war) and many Greeks who were impoverished emigrated to Europe or to other continents in order to survive.

At the end of Act IV, when the situation between Charisios and Pamphile has been resolved, the choral interlude seems to reflect this happy dénouement. Before the entrance of the chorus, a boy of five or six years of age is present on stage and seems lost, sad and in suspense. As the chorus arrive, the lead woman suddenly notices his presence, recognizes him, calls to him and embraces him tenderly and affectionately. The boy briefly greets the other two women who make up the chorus but returns to the leader's arms, and she holds him tightly, in apparent fear of losing him again. The song which is heard here is entitled 'Colours and scents'.⁷⁹⁶ In this case the lyrics to the song had no particular political connotations even in their original context; rather,

⁷⁹⁵ *Μιλώ για τα παιδιά μου και ιδρώνω* is the Greek title. The lyrics of the song are by Skourtis (1974), available at http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=11093.

⁷⁹⁶ *Την εικόνα σου- Χρώματα και αρώματα* is the Greek title. The lyrics of the son are by Katsaros (1972), available at http://www.stixoi.info/stixoi.php?info=Lyrics&act=details&song_id=3227.

they evoke emotions of tenderness, melancholy and respect, without specifying the object of these feelings – thus, though it could be read as romantic, it may also have a wider application. It was left to the audience, once again, to summon up the lyrics, since here too, the music is solely instrumental. But most of the spectators would have recalled at once the well-known words: ‘I worshipped your image and protected it; I will clasp my hands on it sooner than surrender it to begging. Colours, colours and scents... Stop acting up’. An allusion to the recovery of the child, and perhaps the reconciliation between the parents, is not far to seek.

When I asked Evangelatos whether this interlude was in fact intended to represent the reunion of Charisios with Pamphile and of the two with their baby, or if it might even have had a meta-theatrical significance, symbolizing the return of Menander’s plays to his homeland, he did not offer a definitive answer. But he did not exclude my interpretations. For him the presence of the child at this point, as he told me, carries an ‘abstract or surrealistic’ meaning and it was rather linked with human sensitivity in general or the sensitivity of art, in the sense that art through imitation can depict tender moments and gentle emotions.⁷⁹⁷

At the end of Act V, the chorus and the actors of the last act of the play together gather all the props used in the act, thereby deconstructing the stage, probably for another artistic activity. The instrumental music that is heard during the interlude of Act V is the same as that in the added prologue of the production: ‘A thousand, ten thousand waves away from Aivali’. Thus, the

⁷⁹⁷ Evangelatos’ Interview: ‘Έχουν γραφτεί διάφορες ερμηνείες για την παρουσία του παιδιού, αλλά δεν έχω ενστερνιστεί καμμία γιατί η δική μου άποψη ήταν αφαιρετική, σουρρεαλιστική. Με ενδιέφερε η τρυφερότητα, η αγκαλιά ενός παιδιού και ειδικά όταν το έπαιρνε στην αγκαλιά της η κορυφαία του χορού και έφευγε. Είχε να κάνει [η παρουσία του παιδιού] μάλλον με την ανθρώπινη ευαισθησία, και την ευασθησία της τέχνης’.

chorus closes the production with a kind of ring composition, like completing the circle. Evangelatos expressed his admiration for the important role of the chorus in his production. For him, it bore a 'poetic' function which gave to the whole production the power to 'fly', as said above. His Menandrian adaptation, thanks to the choral interludes, as he argued, became a theatrical 'mythos' which told the story of Menander's plays' destiny over the course of the centuries and their influence on modern European comedy.

Concluding remarks

What is perhaps most distinctive about Evangelatos' production is the role of spectacle or *opsis*, as Aristotle calls it. The production script, as we have seen, recalls in many cases Sfyroeras' text, which was used for the 1959 production of *Epitrepontes* and, what is more, generally takes second place to the spectacle. The constant shift in scene and style, running from the Italian Commedia to Molière's France, Victorian England, and Greek movies of the 1950s and 1960s, is manifested less in the dialogue than in the costumes, gestures and settings. This is a core difference from what we can reconstruct of classical productions, even if we must take with a grain of salt Aristotle's dictum in the *Poetics* that a good tragedy should produce its effect when read as much as when viewed on stage (1450b15-20). The production, according to newspaper reports of the time, was extremely successful in terms of audience attendance in Epidaurus, where it was first staged in 1980, and at all successive performances in Greece and abroad. The critics' reactions to the production varied. For example, Tassos Lignanis, a well-known classicist and theatre critic, was sceptical about the style of the production. He wrote that Evangelatos' staging distracted the spectators' attention from the plot and theme of the original play and drew them to the spectacle instead. The reason, he wrote, is that the director thought that Menander's plays could not

speak to modern audiences the way Aristophanes' plays do. He also added that: 'Although in this production we saw excellent acting, and a text based on a very careful and philologically responsible translation, we did not see the real Menander, an original Menandrian play'.⁷⁹⁸ Perseus Athenaios was more appreciative of Evangelatos' approach to Menander. He stressed that the director presented the play over five theatrical ages because he intended to underline that people remain always the same and that comedy treats human life in the same way, no matter if the play belongs to ancient Greece or Molière's France.⁷⁹⁹

We may note that Evangelatos' production of *Epitrepontes* influenced to a limited extent his production of Moschos' *Neaira*,⁸⁰⁰ in which one can detect traces of features from the Commedia and modern Greek movies, and to a larger extent Gavrielides' productions of *Samia* in 1993, 2000 and 2013 and his productions of *Epitrepontes* in 1996 and 2003. Gavrielides concentrated more on Menander's influence on European comedy, such as Molière, and on the Greek romantic comedy, a genre that was imported to Greece from Europe. This concern with the cross-influence of comic genres and their ultimate debt to Menander thus became an important part of the representation of Menandrian comedy in the modern Greek theatre. Kostas Georgopoulos, in his review of Gavrielides' *Epitrepontes*, wrote that although Gavrielides' approach to Menander was interesting, he could not surpass Evangelatos' *Epitrepontes*, which in his view, was one of the most important shows ever staged in the theatre of Epidaurus. Georgopoulos also stressed that Evangelatos' original approach to Menander was exemplary.⁸⁰¹

⁷⁹⁸ Newspaper, *Mesimvri* 28th August 1980.

⁷⁹⁹ Newspaper, *Imerisia* 4th August 1985.

⁸⁰⁰ Evangelatos' *Neaira* was staged in 1985 at the summer Festival of the deme of Pentelis in Attica.

⁸⁰¹ Newspaper, *Ta Nea* on 11th August 2003.

Edith Hall has observed that: ‘the fullest intellectual insights into Performance Reception will always take place at the precise intersection of the diachronic history of a particular text, especially but not exclusively its previous performance history and the synchronic reconstruction of what such a text will have meant at the time of the production being investigated. Productions are ephemeral, far more ephemeral than novels, lyric poems, or paintings, a quality which makes the synchronic plane peculiarly important to understanding them. The power of theatre is actually inseparable from its ephemerality. But theatrical productions are also peculiarly dense in their accrued genealogical status, because of the contribution of previous performers and directors as well as previous writers, translators, and adaptors’.⁸⁰² There is perhaps no better illustration of the layered quality of drama than Evangelatos’ self-conscious adaptation of Menander’s *Epitrepontes*, which puts before the eyes of the spectators each of the phases in the evolution of romantic comedy, until Menander comes face to face with modern theatre and television, and the continuity in difference of ancient New Comedy becomes visible to all.

⁸⁰² Hall (2004), pp. 66-67.

CHAPTER 6

PRODUCTIONS OF *DYSKOLOS*

A. The first production of *Dyskolos* in 1960

Dyskolos was staged for the first time in Greece in 1960, by the National Theatre, as one of its main productions for the summer festival of ancient drama at the theatre of Epidaurus, along with Aristophanes' *Lysistrata*.⁸⁰³ Both productions were directed by Alexis Solomos, a well-known director who was experienced in staging ancient drama, and Aristophanes in particular. The National Theatre chose to stage Menander's *Dyskolos* out of national pride and appreciation both for the newly discovered papyrus, which included the entire play, and for the edition by Victor Martin in 1958, just one year before the staging of Sfyroeras' translation of *Epitrepontes*. The Greek National Tourism Organization invited Martin to the performance to stress the significance of the event for modern Greek culture.

Dyskolos was translated into demotic Greek verse, in two metrical forms⁸⁰⁴, exclusively for this production, by Thrasyvoulos Stavrou⁸⁰⁵. The translator based the Greek version of the play on Martin's edition.⁸⁰⁶ In the translator's

⁸⁰³ The production of *Lysistrata* in 1960 was a repetition of the production of 1957, directed by Solomos; cf. Solomos (1980), p. 63 and Van Steen (2000), pp. 199. Van Steen also comments on Solomos' style in directing Aristophanes' plays, describing it as marked by 'plentiful visual and musical variety, with Anatolian-Greek dances substituting for lost classical choreography ... This feature was typical of witty operettas, light musicals, and epitheorese-style spectacles, with which the director's productions were often compared' (at 200 and 202).

⁸⁰⁴ The whole play, except for Knemon's monologue in Act IV, has been translated in the modern Greek form of the iambic metre with mainly eleven syllables. Knemon's monologue has been translated in the modern Greek form of the trochaic meter with a variety in number of syllables, between sixteen and eighteen. The verses in the translation do not rhyme.

⁸⁰⁵ For Stavrou's edition of Menander, see also above, p. 173, n. 578.

⁸⁰⁶ Stavrou (1972), p. 15 and Martin (1958). For my analysis, I use the published edition of the play in 1972, which is a revised form of the text that was used for the 1960 production, as Stavrou states. The script of the production is not available in the Archives of the National

note in the programme of *Dyskolos*, Stavrou describes *Dyskolos* as a romantic comedy.⁸⁰⁷ In the same note he stresses Menander's influence on the development of the modern European comedy of character, especially Molière, and through him, Menander's influence on modern Greek comic theatrical plays and films. All the translators and directors of the *Epitrepontes* productions, whom I mentioned above, stressed this aspect.⁸⁰⁸ Stavrou too, like the translators and directors of both *Epitrepontes* productions, seems to have been influenced, although he does not state it explicitly, by modern Greek films and, more specifically, as I believe, by one particular popular theatrical play, *Το Στραβόξυλο* (*The Curmudgeon*), in his portrayal of Knemon's character,⁸⁰⁹ since the main terms that characters in the play use to characterize Knemon are 'στραβόξυλο' (curmudgeon) and 'γρουσουζης' (jinx, hoodoo).⁸¹⁰ Knemon also characterizes himself as a 'jinx and grumpy, complainer' ('γκρινιάρης') in his monologue (Act IV). The characters in the

Theatre. Stavrou points out (p. 15) that in the years that had intervened between Martin's edition and his own publication of the translation in 1972 there were some scholarly publications regarding various linguistic and cultural issues of the play and he took them into consideration in creating the revised text of 1972.

⁸⁰⁷ The programme of the production belongs to the Archives of the Theatrical Museum in Athens, see Organization of the National theatre, programme (1960); cf. Stavrou (1972), p. 8, citing Plutarch's view about the main theme of Menander's plays: 'τῶν Μενάνδρου δραμάτων ὁμαλῶς ἀπάντων ἐν συνεκτικόν ἐστιν, ὁ ἕρκως, ὥσπερ πνεῦμα κοινόν διαπεπνευκός'. For the place of this extract in Plutarch's corpus and an analysis of it in relation to *erōs* in Menander's plays, see Morales (2004), pp. 18-19. Once again Greek intellectuals used Plutarch's view in evaluating Menander's art; see Kougeas' views above, p. 171, n. 574.

⁸⁰⁸ Programme, 'εἶναι ἡ παλιότερη ἀκέραυη κωμῶδία χαρακτήρων τοῦ παγκόσμιου θεάτρου' and Stavrou (1972), p. 7.

⁸⁰⁹ *The Curmudgeon* and *The Jinx* (see also above, p. 184, n. 605) were the titles of two successful comic movies screened in Greece in 1952. Moreover, the film *The Curmudgeon* was based on a popular 1940 theatrical play by Dimitris Psathas of the same title.

⁸¹⁰ Programme. Stavrou explains that the content of the ancient Greek word δύσκολος in modern Greek can be rendered with the meanings of, 'δύστροπος' ('cantankerous'), 'παράξενος' ('odd, eccentric'), 'ιδιότροπος' ('fussy'), 'στρυφνός' ('sour, snappish'), 'ζόρικος' ('tough, tricky'), 'γκρινιάρης' ('grouch'), 'στραβόξυλο' ('curmudgeon'). Babiniotis (1998), defines δύσκολος as, 'somebody who creates problems, whose fussy (ιδιότροπος) character is difficult to deal with'. As synonyms to δύσκολος, Babiniotis offers 'δύστροπος, ζόρικος, ιδιότροπος, στρυφνός, ανάποδος, στριμμένος'.

modern translation also use some other terms, such as ‘mentally disturbed’ (‘βλαμμένος’), ‘completely crazy’ (‘θεοπάλαβος’), ‘tough’, ‘difficult to deal with’ (‘ζόρικός’), and ‘difficult’ (‘δύστροπος’), to describe Knemon’s *dyskolos*. These terms are consistent with the wide sense of *dyskolos* in modern Greek, which can include lighter manifestations of ill-temper, whereas the ancient Greek notion of *dyskolos* represented more extreme behaviour and carried a philosophical sense that the modern Greek word lacks. In this respect, the ancient Greek term was more complex.

Solomos expressed views similar to those of Stavrou about Menander’s influence on modern European theatre, and especially on Molière, Marivaux, Sheridan, and others. According to Solomos Knemon’s character influenced Goldoni’s ‘Grumpy Mr Todero’ (*Sior Todero brontolon*) by way of the plays of Plautus and Terence and it was also the precursor of similar character types in Greek films in the 1950s as the director himself indicated, a view similar to that of Kanelos Apostolou.⁸¹¹ But it is worth noting that some features of Knemon’s character resemble those of Smikrines in the *Epitrepontes*, which was staged just the previous year, and some of the colloquial words and phrases applied to Knemon are anticipated in the version of the *Epitrepontes*, though the latter was in general more restrained in this regard than Stavrou’s version of the *Dyskolos* (this tendency will be even more pronounced in the 1985 version of *Dyskolos*, which we shall discuss below).

⁸¹¹ See above, pp. 178-179. Solomos’ views are recorded in his article in the newspaper *Kathimerini* on 10th July 1960. Solomos also states that the Greek comedy romance plays, the *komeidyllio*, of the 19th century, and their main playwright Demetrios Koromilas were influenced indirectly by Menander, through the Latin playwrights and modern European comedy; once again similar views were expressed by Varveris and Gavrielides, in their productions of *Samia* and *Epitrepontes*, as mentioned above, p. 205. For the popularity of *Dyskolos* due to Knemon’s character in antiquity and modern literature, see Konstan (1995), pp. 94-96 and 106.

Apart from the use of various colloquial and popular expressions by all the characters⁸¹², Stavrou's translation of *Dyskolos* did not make many additions or changes to the original Menandrian text. We cannot distinguish a particular linguistic style for each character, since there is rather a uniform style for all of them. In some instances, the intense emotions of the characters are expressed with lively metaphors. For example, Knemon in Act I, states 'νά σκάς τὸν ἄλλον· νά ἡ ἀρρώστια ποὺ ἔχουν' ('to make the other person blow up; this is the disease people suffer today').⁸¹³ Knemon's daughter states that if her father realizes that Simiche, the old woman slave, dropped the bucket in the well 'στὸ ξύλο θὰ τὴ στρώσει', ('he will straighten her by beating her black and blue').⁸¹⁴ Daos in Act I curses his poverty 'καταραμένη φτώχεια, βαριά στυλώθηκες μπροστά μας' ('damn poverty, you have been planted in front of us').⁸¹⁵ Gorgias in Act II explains to Sostratos that he cannot fall in love because 'ἡ ἔγνοια τῶν βασάνων ποὺ μὲ ζώνουν κι οὔτε στιγμή γιὰ ἀνάπαυση δὲ δίνει' ('the concerns and the troubles which encircle me do not allow [me] a moment of rest').⁸¹⁶ Knemon, in Act III is so angry with the crowd that has come to sacrifice to Pan that he wants to stay at his home to guard it against any unwelcome intruders. The supposed believers have forced him 'to tie his hands' ('μ' ἀναγκάζουν τὰ χέρια μου νὰ δέσω').⁸¹⁷

⁸¹² For example, Stavrou (1972) p. 20 Pan 'κουτσοζούν' ('scratch a living'; cf. 24-26); p. 24 Pyrrhias in Act I 'βάρδα' ('out of the way, look out'; cf. 80), Babiniotis (1998), s.v. who classifies it as popular exclamation; p. 32 Knemon in Act I 'χλαλοή' ('rhubarb, babel'; cf. 166), Babiniotis (1998), s.v; p. 40 Gorgias, Act II, 'οὔτε με το στανιό στον ίσιο δρόμο δεν μπορῶ να τον βάλω' ('forcibly'; cf. 250-251), Babiniotis (1998) s.v. στανιό.

⁸¹³ Stavrou (1972), p. 33; cf. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. σκάζω and Martin (1958), p.33: 178 ἐπηρθεασμὸς τὸ κακὸν εἶναί μοι δοκεῖ.

⁸¹⁴ Stavrou (1972), p. 34; cf. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. στρώνω and Martin (1958), p. 33: 195-196.

⁸¹⁵ Stavrou (1972), p. 36; cf. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. στυλώνω and Martin (1958), p. 35: 208-209. Arnott's (1979), p. 215 translation of the line also resorts to a metaphor, 'Poverty! Damn and blast you! Why did we plumb your depths?'

⁸¹⁶ Stavrou (1972), p. 46; cf. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. ζώνω and Martin (1958), p.47: 343-344.

⁸¹⁷ Stavrou (1972) p. 59; cf. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. δένω 'δένω τα χέρια κάποιου': 'to make somebody powerless or inert/inactive'; cf. Martin (1998), p. 55: 442-443. For the role of metaphor and metonymy in Modern Greek and the relationship between body, emotion,

In some cases, however, Stavrou opts for a free rendering of the original text to create something closer to the modern Greek language, style, and audience expectations of comedy. Examples are: Knemon's phrase 'νά σκᾶς τὸν ἄλλον' νά ἡ ἀρρώστια ποὺ ἔχουν' (as said above); Sostratos' view of Knemon: 'ἐδῶ ἔχομε δουλειὰ ποὺ θὰ στοιχίσει κόπο βαρὺ κι ἀσήκωτο, νομίζω· δὲν εἶναι παῖξε γέλασε,' τὸ βλέπω' ('here we have a task to handle that will cost a lot of heavy effort –I think it's no laughing matter'; cf. 179-181); Sostratos' words to Knemon's daughter when they part: 'στὸν πατέρα τὰ σέβη μου, καὶ γειά σου' ('please convey my respects to your Dad and goodbye'; cf. 213).⁸¹⁸ In a few cases he also varies the original text in such a way as to make it more compatible with his view of Menander's style and the motifs of his plots (such as family life), the representation of characters from various social backgrounds, and class differences evident in *Dyskolos*, although he is not consistent in this last respect. For example, Kallippides, addressing Gorgias after Gorgias expresses his reluctance to marry Kallippides' daughter because he is poor, tells him: 'you love to behave like a rich person, although you are not'.⁸¹⁹ The Menandrian text has nothing like this at this point, no suggestion that Kallippides is opposed to having a poor son-in-law.⁸²⁰ Stavrou evidently thought that a kind of class disdain was an element in Kallippides' character, and he was not entirely wrong, given Kallippides' earlier reluctance to accept Gorgias as a son-in-law. Earlier in the

cognition and language, in an interdisciplinary approach, see Theodoropoulou (2012 a and 2012 b).

⁸¹⁸ Stavrou (1972), pp. 33 and 36. Handley (1965), p. 169 commenting on v. 213, states that this is 'a polite, conventional leave-taking – not without its humour in the circumstances'. Although Stavrou could have translated 'ἐπιμελοῦ τε τοῦ πατρός' in modern Greek as 'να φροντίζεις τον πατέρα σου/ να προσέχεις τον πατέρα σου', he chose the more common phrase which people may add when they say good-bye to each other, which adds a humorous tone to the occasion, since Sostratos knows Knemon well by now.

⁸¹⁹ Stavrou (1972), p. 95, Act V 'σὰν πλούσιος νὰ φέρονεσαι ἀγαπᾶς, ἐνῶ δὲν εἶσαι'.

⁸²⁰ Cf. Martin (1958), p. 87: 835-836.

play, where Gorgias' character in the original was praised as γεννικός by Sostratos (321), a word that suggests a kind of nobility, Stavrou renders it as εὐγενικός, kind,⁸²¹ a term that in the everyday language is not exclusively connected with high-class and wealthy people, thereby softening, if not quite eliminating, the class consciousness of the original version.⁸²²

In some cases, Stavrou sharpens the characters' emotions and their reactions by using stronger terms in modern Greek than we find in the original (he perhaps sought something closer to Aristophanes' style of comedy and hence more appealing to the modern Greek audience); in other cases, he chooses a softer term in comparison with the original text. Gorgias, in Act I, before his face-to-face encounter with Sostratos but basing his view of him on Daos' description of Sostratos' encounter with his sister and his past experience of rich people, characterizes Sostratos' look as 'κατεργάρης' ('rascal, crafty, dodgy')⁸²³, a term softer than the original κακοῦργος (258).⁸²⁴ On the contrary, Daos, upon witnessing Sostratos' verbal exchange with Gorgias' sister, in the translation calls Sostratos 'ἄχρῆϊος' ('base, rogue, villain'),⁸²⁵ while the original text at this point describes Sostratos simply as 'οὔτος' (cf. 224-225), although the whole incident had been described earlier as 'πονηρόν' (220) by Daos.

⁸²¹ Stavrou (1972), p. 45.

⁸²² Babiniotis (1998), s.v. εὐγενικός: a) a person with good manners, kindness, b) a person with values and honourable ambitions, c) a person with refined and noble manners.

⁸²³ Stavrou (1972), p. 41. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. commenting on the meaning of the word 'κατεργάρης' in Greek, he notes that, as in other languages, some words which have a negative or pejorative sense are used in every day verbal language with 'a positive characterization, suggesting tolerance, sympathy, approval and occasionally admiration on the speaker's part'.

⁸²⁴ Cf. *LSJ*, s.v.

⁸²⁵ Stavrou (1972), p. 37 'it seems, that the rogue got wind of this [the innocent girl] and he crept in here, with the thought that she is an easy prey'; cf. vv. 224-226. The modern Greek text creates a vivid image of Sostratos, reminiscent of a wild animal or bird that is lying in wait for its quarry.

Gorgias, addressing Sostratos in his first monologue, warns him about the reactions of poor people if they experience injustice at the hands of the rich: ‘Generally speaking, you should know that the poor man who is wronged bites and everyone feels pity for him; besides everyone considers what happens to the poor person not merely as unfairness but as abuse of power’.⁸²⁶ Stavrou departs from the original text where the poor man who is wronged is said to become extremely difficult (δυσκολώτατος, 296) and the poor man also attributes the injustice he suffers to ‘τύχη’, a word supplemented in the original fragmentary line 298 by Martin. Other scholars have supplemented the fragmentary line with the word ‘ὕβρις’ which seems more suitable for the context of the lines.⁸²⁷ Stavrou does not retain ‘ὕβρις’, a term which exists in modern Greek but without the legal implications of the ancient Greek. His choice of ‘κατάχρησι ἐξουσίας’, might have been motivated by everyday expressions such as ‘κατάχρησι καλοσύνης’ (‘make a convenience of somebody, trespass upon somebody’s kindness’). His text thus underscores Gorgias’ feelings by means of a lively modern Greek phrase, which might also be supported by the actor’s manner and facial expression, since he did not wear a mask.

Stavrou’s choices are not inconsistent with the original text, nor do they disregard it (he was, after all, a professional classicist); rather, they serve dramatic purposes in connection with the modern staging of a play. Stavrou avails himself of such liberties where ancient words have acquired additional nuances in Modern Greek.⁸²⁸

⁸²⁶ Stavrou (1972), p. 43.

⁸²⁷ See Handley (1965), p. 90: 298 and pp. 186-187. Handley chooses ὕβρις and he convincingly argues for his choice, taking into consideration the context of the passage, the preceding word ἀδικία, and Aristotle’s discussion of injustices due to ὕβρις, which the Menandrian text may echo.

⁸²⁸ For Stavrou’s style of Aristophanes’ translation, see Van Steen (2000), p.200, where she states that ‘in several renditions [of Aristophanes’ plays], Stavrou inserted versified explanatory comments, drawn from the hermeneutic scholia tradition, and he indicated these changes in notes. He asserted “I may say something that the poet did not say, but never

The inclusion of music and dances in the production, possibly at the end of each act, may have been intended to provide entertainment catering to various tastes and types of spectators. For the musical intervals in the production, Solomos chose music and rhythms from familiar songs composed by the famous composer Nikos Skalkotas. Unfortunately, the production's songs are not recorded in the National Theatre's archives. For his music Skalkotas drew inspiration from classical music and the Greek tradition, including folk music. The mixture suggests that the composer thought of the folk music as suitable style for an ancient Greek comedy, even in a modern revival. The classical music may point to Menander's influence on modern European comedy, which is more elegant than Aristophanes' style, but in the absence of evidence for the composer's view, this must remain conjectural.

There was no recording of the production by Greek television at the time so we lack the opportunity for a direct appreciation of the production. The theatre critics praised Stavrou's translation as an accurate rendering of the ancient text and, at the same time, they praised the style of the modern Greek version as suitable for comedy, although quite different from Stavrou's translations of Aristophanes' plays.⁸²⁹ On the other hand, Solomos' direction was criticised by several critics as unsuitable for Menander. For example, Marios Ploritis disliked Solomos' approach because he used the same style in staging Aristophanes' plays, that is, coarse comedy mixed with elements from the revue (επιθεώρηση) and the circus (Solomos' style for Menander was adopted to an extent in Gavrielides' production, discussed below, mixing various elements from Aristophanes, modern Greek and European

something that he could not have said". Stavrou's alterations constituted a practice of making the plays conform to Aristophanes' supposed objective, to a hypothetical streamlined past'.

⁸²⁹ See, for example, St. Spiliotopoulos in the newspaper *Akropolis* on 12th July 1960.

comedies).⁸³⁰ Victor Martin also expressed his dissatisfaction with the director's approach to the play on the grounds that it was not in keeping with the spirit of the original play and instead imitated *Lysistrata*.⁸³¹

Although Solomos justified his approach to *Dyskolos* in a series of essays in the newspapers of the time, he realized that *Dyskolos* failed to please the wider audience nurtured on the Aristophanic style of comedy, the more so in that *Lysistrata* was staged together with *Dyskolos* on that occasion. Solomos wrote that: 'in Epidaurus *Dyskolos* was sunk ingloriously amidst the waves of Aristophanic laughter'.⁸³² This itself points to a lack of confidence in Menander on the part of the director.

B. 'Menander's new adventure': *Dyskolos*' production in 1985 by the Theatrical Organization of Cyprus

Dyskolos was staged again in 1985 by the Theatrical Organization of Cyprus at the summer festival in Epidaurus (the play was staged in various open air theatres in Cyprus before its performance in Epidaurus.).⁸³³ This production is important for Menander's revival in modern Greece, for the following reasons. First, its director, Evis Gavrielides, is the only Greek director to have staged three well preserved Menandrian plays, *Dyskolos* (in 1985), *Samia*, and

⁸³⁰ Marios Ploritis in the newspaper *Eleftheria* on 12th July 1960. His criticism tallies with Van Steen's view about Solomos' style in directing Aristophanes' plays, see above, p. 265, n. 803. The genre of revue also influenced Gavrielides' production of *Dyskolos*; see below, p. 279, n. 847.

⁸³¹ Victor Martin's views, as recorded by the newspapers *Vradyni* and *Ta Nea* on 16th July 1960; cf. Handley (1975), p. 118 regarding the modern critics' views about Plautus' plays.

⁸³² Solomos (1980), p. 63.

⁸³³ For *Dyskolos* productions which used Stavrou's translation after 1960 until 1975 and for subsequent productions of *Dyskolos* on the modern Greek stage between 1960-2007, see Topouzis (1997), pp. 127-136 and Diamantakou (2007), esp. pp. 218-222, 346, 371-376, 381-382, 388-391, 399-407, 419-421, 427-430, 432 and 436.

Epitrepontes.⁸³⁴ Second, Gavrielides experimented with the staging of Menander and changed the way he staged *Dyskolos* when he came to produce *Samia* in 1993, a very successful production, translated into a simple form of *katharevousa* by the poet Yannis Varveris. Third, the director used various theatrical genres and innovations for staging *Dyskolos*; and fourth, all of Gavrielides' theatrical productions of Menander's plays were produced by either the Theatrical Organization of Cyprus (ΘΟΚ), the national theatre of Cyprus, or the National Theatre of Northern Greece, and the majority of them were included in the summer festivals in Epidaurus.

Evis Gavrielides (1929-2015) studied acting in the famous Karolos Koun theatrical school in Athens, attended Koun's classes, and continued his studies on stage directing in London, France and the United States. Since 1963 he directed plays for Greek theatrical companies in Greece and Cyprus. An important aspect of his work was teaching theatre direction in various drama schools. Gavrielides directed a great number of plays written by European dramatists (such as Ibsen, Shakespeare, Marivaux); among ancient Greek dramas he directed (apart from Menander) Aristophanes' *Wasps*, *Birds* and *Wealth*, but he did not try his hand at tragedy.

Gavrielides had a deep admiration for Menander's art. In fact, he called Menander his 'theatrical mentor'. Early on, he had acted in comedies or sketches that included farce and misunderstandings. Later in his career, as Gavrielides recalled in his interview with me, he discovered that it was Menander who created such comic devices, and he read extensively about Menander's art and his influence on modern European theatre. The way Gavrielides approached Menander's plays as a director is different, he believed, from the way he approached Aristophanes' plays. In a lively

⁸³⁴ For the dates of all the productions, see above, p. 205.

comparison between Menander and Aristophanes, Gavrielides stated in his interview: 'I stage Menander like a contemporary artist, like a familiar part of my life. Menander is like taking it from my own life; his characters are familiar to me either from other contemporary theatrical plays or modern Greek films or from life, in the sense that they remind us of real people. On the other hand, in staging Aristophanes I need to go and search for his life [because his life is not familiar to me], I need to know him.... I imagine Aristophanes being staged in the various ways that directors have proposed, provided that, if Aristophanes had been among the spectators, he would have burst into laughter'. Regardless of Gavrielides' statement, his staging of Menander reminds one of productions of Aristophanes in modern Greece, in his *Dyskolos* to a greater extent than in his *Samia* and *Epitrepontes*.⁸³⁵

Gavrielides also stated clearly in his interview that in staging *Dyskolos* he was not influenced by the 1960 production of that play by Solomos, since he had not seen it, although he said that he appreciated very much Solomos' approach to directing in general and that he considered Solomos to be an intelligent director. Gavrielides' experience, as a spectator, of previous modern Greek productions of Menander (before he staged *Dyskolos*) was

⁸³⁵ Gavrielides' interview: 'Τον έναν (Μένανδρο) τον ανεβάζεις σαν να είναι σύγχρονος και δικός σου, σαν να είναι ένα κομμάτι από τη ζωή σου, και τον άλλον (Αριστοφάνη) φροντίζεις εσύ να πας και να βρεις τη ζωή του και να δεις τι θα ήθελε αυτός από την παράσταση. Ο Μένανδρος είναι σαν από τη ζωή τη δική μου, τη σημερινή. Οι άνθρωποι των έργων του [του Μενάνδρου] μου είναι οικείοι είτε από άλλα σύγχρονα θεατρικά έργα, Ελληνικό κινηματογράφο ή από την καθημερινή μας ζωή. Ενώ στον Αριστοφάνη, τον βλέπω μέσα από όλους, αλλά θα ήθελα να δω τι θα ήθελε ο Αριστοφάνης να πει με το έργο του και αυτή τη φαντασία ακολουθώ. Φαντάζομαι τον Αριστοφάνη να ανεβαίνει με οποιαδήποτε πρόταση σκηνοθετική, σε οποιαδήποτε εποχή αποφασίζει ο σκηνοθέτης, φτάνει αν καθόταν ο Αριστοφάνης μεταξύ των θεατών να πέθαινε στα γέλια. Εμένα προσωπικά μου μιλάει πολύ [ο Μένανδρος], γιατί, αν θέλεις, ανδρώθηκα θεατρικά, ξεκινώντας από απλά θέματα κωμωδιών. Έχω κάνει μπουλούκια αρκετά χρόνια και η φάρσα ήταν μέσα στα πράγματα που ασχολήθηκα, γιατί περιοδεύοντας κάνεις έργα εμπορικά. Και ξαφνικά είδα ότι ο Μένανδρος έχει αναγάγει σε σοβαρό θέατρο, και σε θέατρο ποιότητας, όλα αυτά που κορόϊδεψα κάνοντας τον ηθοποιό και περιοδεύοντας σε διάφορα χωριά και επαρχίες. Γι'αυτό θα έλεγα ότι είναι ο μέντορας μου θεατρικά'.

limited to the production of *Samia* in 1975 directed by Panos Charitoglou for the National Theatre of Northern Greece.

The translator of *Dyskolos* for Gavrielides' production, Leonidas Malenis, a Cypriot journalist and poet, but not a classicist, likes Menander but he told me he would think twice if asked to translate another of Menander's plays. He said that Menander's characters and plots have been largely eclipsed in Greece by films and comic and romantic series on popular TV, as modern day audiences possibly find Menander's original plays uninteresting and unexciting. It must be noted that there is a profound ambiguity in the approach of modern Greek directors and translators of Menander's plays. Although there is a deep respect for him, it is a respect due to a Greek classic author, not always a genuine appreciation of his style of comedy, since this style was deemed to have been surpassed by other modern comic genres. Malenis expressed a similar view regarding Menander's appeal to the modern Greek audience in his essay in the programme for the production of *Dyskolos*,⁸³⁶ where he explains to the spectators in a humorous way why he translated *Dyskolos* as he did. In a fictitious dialogue with his wife and daughter in his essay, Malenis tries to respond to their criticism of how he dared to translate a playwright who was a phallocrat, since the women Menander presents in *Dyskolos* had no voice regarding their fate or marriage; they were 'spineless creatures' ('άβουλα πλάσματα'). An implicit comparison between Menander and Aristophanes is obvious. In the same essay Malenis defends the verses of the songs he wrote at the director's request, which were performed at the end of each act. Amusingly, Malenis states that he conducted an opinion poll for the type of songs the production

⁸³⁶ Malenis' essay in the programme of the production, p. 3, which is entitled 'Menander's new adventure' ('Ο Μένανδρος σε νέες περιπέτειες'), see Theatrical Organization of Cyprus, programme (1985).

would include. The respondents included the director, modern Greek revue and vaudeville writers, Liza Minelli, female entertainers in nightclubs (either singers or call girls), and representatives of the upper middle class, mainly in Cyprus and Greece. In other words, Malenis and Gavrielides' songs aimed to entertain spectators with different tastes.⁸³⁷ Malenis was aware that the reviewers might not approve of his adaptation, but he wrote humorously in his essay that Menander assured him when he visited him in a dream that he should not worry about the reviewers because in his own lifetime judges did not approve of much of his work, as he only won a few dramatic competitions despite writing more than a hundred plays.⁸³⁸

For the translation of the play, Malenis consulted mainly the Oxford edition,⁸³⁹ at the director's recommendation, and Stavrou's translation, though he did not like its style. Malenis told me that his aim was to create an 'adaptation' ('διασκευή') of the original play and a text appropriate for the director's plan for the production. Malenis believed that the style of his adaptation had to be close to common or everyday parlance since the theme of the original play (love and family life) focuses on ordinary people's lives and concerns. Malenis' views are not far from Sandbach's, who wrote: 'The representation of life for which Menander was praised cannot then be a simple realism in language any more than in incident. It is a procedure that selects from life and modifies what it selects, but with a tact that leaves a result that seems lifelike'.⁸⁴⁰ In addition, for Malenis, Menander's linguistic

⁸³⁷ The music was written by Christos Philippou and the choreography was by Catherine Christophidou.

⁸³⁸ Programme, p. 4.

⁸³⁹ Sandbach (1972).

⁸⁴⁰ Sandbach (1970), p. 114. For Menander's conversational style and its colloquialism, see Horrocks (1997), pp. 52- 56. For a discussion whether Menander's plays represent the Athenian society of his time or not, see Préuax (1957).

style is simple rather than highly poetic, in contrast to tragedy and Aristophanes.⁸⁴¹

Malenis remained quite faithful to the Menandrian text. The language of the adaptation, in demotic Greek in prose, includes free rendering of the ancient text in many verses, and to facilitate better understanding by the modern audience it includes substantially more popular and colloquial expressions used in daily conversation in modern Greek than did Stavrou's translation, as well as a limited number of Cypriot dialect expressions. A few examples of colloquial expressions show clearly the style of the adaptation. Pan in the prologue calls the nymphs 'τα μανούλια' ('cute birds/chicks', an addition to the original text); Pan describes Knemon's character and behaviour as 'δύσκολος άνθρωπος, στριμμένο άντερο, ανυπόφορος' ('a difficult man, a twisted intestine (literally a crosspatch), an unbearable man; cf. 6-7), who is so angry all the time that he is 'stewed' in his own juices day and night' ('βράζει με το ζουμί του μέρα νύχτα'). Pan characterizes Sostratos as 'Ένα παληκαράκι όργιο' ('a young man, who is an orgy!), meaning that he is incapable of doing anything right, a clumsy man,⁸⁴² but at the same time, in the context of Pan's speech, it has also a sexual connotation. (cf. 39-41).⁸⁴³ Sostratos expresses his disappointment at Chaireas' unwillingness to help him with the expression 'με το στανιό⁸⁴⁴ ήρθε μαζί μου' ('in spite of himself'; cf. 136).⁸⁴⁵ Gorgias too voices his initial reaction to Sostratos with a colloquial

⁸⁴¹ Malenis' interview: 'Η γλώσσα της διασκευής ταιρίαζε στο στυλ της κωμωδίας του Μένανδρου. Ο Μένανδρος έγραφε για θέματα που απασχολούσαν τους απλούς, καθημερινούς ανθρώπους της εποχής του και η γλώσσα του πιστεύω ότι ήταν ταιριαστή με το στυλ των θεμάτων των κωμωδιών του. Η γλώσσα του Μένανδρου δεν είναι 'ποιητική' (με την έννοια της υψηλής ποιήσης, πχ. Περσών Αισχύλου), αλλά κοντά στον καθημερινό λόγο. Τα θέματα των κωμωδιών του Μένανδρου θυμίζουν σύγχρονα κωμικά σήριαλ, που το σενάριο γράφει για παράδειγμα ο Χάρης Ρώμας, ή ταινίες με την Αλίκη Βουγιουκλάκη'.

⁸⁴² Babiniotis (1998), s.v. όργιο.

⁸⁴³ Programme, pp. 23-24.

⁸⁴⁴ Babiniotis (1998), s.v. στανιό, a colloquial term meaning 'coercion, force'.

⁸⁴⁵ Programme, p. 26.

expression 'τι μέρος του λόγου ήταν ο ξένος ; διπλάρωσε την αδελφή μου' ('which figure of speech is this stranger [who] has accosted my sister?' (cf. 235).⁸⁴⁶ Malenis employs this linguistic style, adorned with colloquial expressions, with all the characters in his adaptation, as Stavrou did too.

The various theatrical genres that contributed to the adaptation, according to the director and translator's views, were mainly revues (επιθεώρηση), a genre which is staged in modern Greece, usually every summer, at various commercial theatres;⁸⁴⁷ Greek movies of the 1950s and 1960s; to some extent, modern productions of Aristophanes' plays (especially by Karolos Koun and Alexis Solomos, since Gavrielides admired their directing approach in general and was Koun's student); and modern Greek TV comedy series.

Despite the realistic linguistic register of the script, Gavrielides gave his characters masks, but contrary to the practice in antiquity, they did not wear them on their faces. They were attached rather to the top of long sticks and in form were abstract, representing facial characteristics, such as eyebrows or women's lips, or objects related to the characters and their behaviour. The effect is striking: an allusion to the stylized nature of Menandrian comedy, but tricked out to remind the audience that they are seeing a modern adaptation. Sostratos' mother's mask had a hat placed on the stick, such as elegant ladies would wear for an evening party. Pyrrhias' stick had a white

⁸⁴⁶ Programme, p. 28.

⁸⁴⁷ For a definition and description of the theatrical genre of revue, see Hartnoll (1972), s.v. revue, pp. 451-452. The revue is a theatrical genre which mixes music, dance and singing with parts in prose, in the form of dialogues and monologues. The Greek version of the revue is known for its strong satirical nature, mocking social and political events and personalities. Mauroleon (2010), pp. 79-82, points out that the revue is the popular theatrical genre par excellence; it started its life in modern Greece in 1894 and continues to be performed, though less frequently in the last decade or so (2002-2012). For representative titles of revues, filled with political satire, between 1974 (after the abolition of the military junta and the restoration of democracy) and 2007, see p. 79, n. 66.

triangle on top, which possibly represented a face with two huge holes in place of eyes, very likely his wide-open eyes after Pyrrhias' encounter with Knemon. Sostratos' stick-mask was topped by some glitter and gold decoration to stress his social position. Maria Loizidou, the artist who designed the masks, was inspired by the role of each character. Each character had his or her own mask and when a character by 'intentional mistake' took another character's mask, he or she started talking like the person represented by that mask. This device provoked laughter among the audience and, at the same time, it informed the audience, or at least those of them who were aware of the conventions of ancient drama, that in Menander's original play each character type has his or her own mask.⁸⁴⁸ This type of mask, although far from Menander's original masks, is in fact a clever device, capturing the role of stylization in Menander's original plays (Gavrielides told me that he had a general knowledge of Pollux's list of masks in the *Onomastikon* but he did not mention modern interpretations of the use of masks, and I don't know whether he was aware of any). Gavrielides used the same device with masks in his TV film of *Samia*. In *Samia*, however, the characters' costumes alluded to the ancient style and so the masks, although far from resembling ancient masks with any fidelity, seemed more in tune with the kind of play he was staging, whereas in the *Dyskolos* production the masks were abstract and innovative.⁸⁴⁹

The characters' costumes⁸⁵⁰ were another innovation by the director. Some of the characters wore everyday clothes. For example, Knemon and Gorgias wore countrymen's costumes, while others, such as Sostratos, his mother,

⁸⁴⁸ For an excellent discussion on cognitive, neuroscientific approach to the masks, especially in Greek tragedy, see Meineck (2011).

⁸⁴⁹ For the system and types of masks in Menander's plays see mainly, Wiles (1991) and Petrides (2014).

⁸⁵⁰ The staging and the costumes were designed by Nikos Kourousis.

sister and father wore costumes which might have been worn by eccentric wealthy people at various times. The cross-fertilization between life and theatre, another characteristic of Menander's drama, was evident through both costume and linguistic style.

A first impression of the play, drawn from the production programme

The spectators had an initial taste of this imaginative production from its programme. The cover of the programme shows a mask representing a female face with expressive lips. It evidently represents the desirable female of the play, that is, Knemon's daughter, although it was not her actual mask in the play; she played an important role in the original plot, regardless of the brevity of her appearance, because it was she who inspired *erōs* in Sostratos. The girl is even more important in the adaptation, since Gavrielides and Malenis give her a special appeal for a modern audience, as we will see below. Inside the programme, pictures showing Pan's modernised 'cave' and the characters' costumes and masks excite the audience's curiosity about the spectacle.⁸⁵¹ As noted above, Malenis' essay on his approach to Menander forms a prominent part of the programme and with its humour prepares the spectators for a versatile, comic and entertaining show. Malenis' translation of the play is also part of the programme.⁸⁵² *Dyskolos*' hypothesis, which is attributed to Aristophanes of Byzantium as it appears in the Bodmer papyrus, is presented on the same page as Konstantinos Cavafy's poem 'Displeased Theatregoer' (Θεατῆς Δυσαρεστημένου), and a footnote on this page names those plays by Terence that were adaptations of Menander's comedies; it also

⁸⁵¹ Programme, pp. 4, 5, 7, 9-11.

⁸⁵² Programme, pp. 23-42.

mentions that Plautus had been influenced by Menander's art.⁸⁵³ Cavafy's poem echoes, in a way, modern reviewers' views about the production (as we will see below), although the designers of the programme could not have predicted this.⁸⁵⁴ An extract from Albin Lesky's essay about Menander's art and New Comedy completes the educational aspect of the programme.⁸⁵⁵ Gavrielides' involvement and experience with Menander are communicated to the audience through a photo of the TV film of *Samia* in 1972.

Turning now to the production itself, the first thing to note is that throughout the action, a silent observer sits on stage in his chair, dressed in everyday clothes, and he claps and laughs, along with pantomime gestures, to indicate his approval or disapproval of the actions and behaviour of the characters. This was one of the director's ways of providing a character with whom the audience could identify. As he said in his interview: 'The silent observer is a popular type (in the sense of the folk), who comments on what happens on the stage. I also wanted to create with this observer a distance between reality and the story on stage'.⁸⁵⁶ Pantomime was a popular classical form, and adapting it to a modern context once again combines fidelity to antique models with a self-conscious theatricality that calls attention to its own innovativeness.

⁸⁵³ Programme, p.8.

⁸⁵⁴ The relevant verses of the poem are: 'Menander's are they, then, these weak *données*, these unpolished verses, this childish speech? Let me leave this theatre straight away that I may go home—with no little relief'. Cavafy's poem translated by Daniel Mendelsohn, see [Cavafy, K. P. The Official Website of the Cavafy Archive](http://www.cavafy.com), accessible at <http://www.cavafy.com/poems/content.asp?id=265&cat=4>.

⁸⁵⁵ Programme, pp. 20-22. The extract is part of Lesky's relevant chapter in the *Geschichte der griechischen Literatur*, translated into Greek by Tsopanakes (1964), pp. 882-917.

⁸⁵⁶ Gavrielides' choice of the silent observer alludes to the *alienation or distancing effect*, (*Verfremdung*, in German), an idea that was developed by Bertolt Brecht and used in his theatre. For the alienation effect, see Thomson and Sacks (1994), pp. 191-195.

Pan and the nymphs in the opening scene of the play and in the first choral song

The play starts with the landing of a spaceship, which represents Pan's cave. Pan's followers, the nymphs, are the first to emerge from the spaceship. The nymphs in the production are presented as a group of women entertainers and call-girls with costumes reminiscent of the girls in *Playboy* magazine. The leader of the nymphs opens the play with a song added to the production. She tries to organize the group of nymphs to welcome Pan, and her commands are reminiscent of instructions by a ballet teacher or an athletic trainer or by a director training his actors: 'Come on nymphs, dryads, ladies of the springs, naiads, gather, line up as though you were dancing, take your positions, pull in your stomach, come on all of you, be ready to recite your words, the tempo, let us all flock around the cave to greet Pan. Come on nymphs, Pan is coming out of his cave and he is brandishing his flute (ελάτε, μέσ' από τη σπηλιά του βγαίνει ο Πάνας και το σουραύλι του κραδαίνει)'. The last phrase ('και το σουραύλι του κραδαίνει') is expressed by the leader of the chorus in a passionate voice that carries a sexual intimation, which is supported by the verb κραδαίνω, which in modern Greek may derive from the ancient Greek κόρδαξ, a licentious type of dance that was associated with Old Comedy.⁸⁵⁷

Pan in the production is a rock star of the 1970s or 1980s and the manager of a night club. He wears a fancy, glitter costume. The director was puzzled as to how to present an ancient god to the modern Greek audience in the context of a comedy, bearing in mind the nature of Pan's role in the prologue of the original play. Gavrielides finally decided to present Pan as a wise,

⁸⁵⁷ For the linguistic derivation of κραδαίνω, see Babiniotis (1998), s.v. For κόρδαξ and its association with comedy, see Aristophanes' *Clouds* v. 540 and Dover's comment (1968), p. 169.

experienced man, an authority figure, who enjoys life and likes having fun with beautiful women, a type familiar to the audience through TV shows and the music industry.⁸⁵⁸ In addition, the director's choice implies that modern TV stars and singers are worshipped like gods. Gavrielides' characterization of Pan in a way reproduces the combination of realism and stylization that is characteristic of Menander's art.⁸⁵⁹ Pan calls the nymphs 'cute birds' or 'chicks' ('μανούλια'), as mentioned above, and he exchanges flirty and passionate glances with them while delivering his prologue, in prose and song. Pan describes Knemon's daughter as a 'virgin', and adds that he wants to find a good man for her because when he hears about virgins he becomes a carpet for them to walk on, he melts at the name of virgins.⁸⁶⁰ Although in ancient mythology Pan is linked with joy, music and sexual powers, Gavrielides' portrayal of him sharpens his characteristics to suit a modern audience's taste and at the same time makes Pan in the production a paternal figure, unlike Pan in the original.

When the first act ends, a male chorus dressed in Mexican-style costumes enters the stage to perform the first choral song, in a musical style reminiscent of Mexican rhythms. The songs themselves are only loosely related to the action.⁸⁶¹ The Mexicans are pilgrims who have come from far away to pay their respects to the god Pan and ask favours of him, as the modern Greeks do

⁸⁵⁸ Gavrielides in his interview commented on his choice to present Pan in the way he did: 'Αν παρουσίαζα έναν θεό να βγαίνει από μια σπηλιά και να λέει έναν μονόλογο, θα ήταν βαρετό για το κοινό. Και σε μένα μια τέτοια παρουσίαση δεν έλεγε τίποτα. Φαντάστηκα τον Πάνα να προΐσταται ενός νυχτερινού κλάμπ, να είναι ένας σοφός, με πείρα, γνώσεις που ξέρει όμως και να περνάει καλά στη ζωή του με όμορφες γυναίκες'.

⁸⁵⁹ I owe this suggestion to Professor Chris Carey.

⁸⁶⁰ Programme, p. 24; cf. Sandbach (1972), p. 48: 34-39.

⁸⁶¹ For the lyrics of the choral songs of the production, which come at the end of each act, see the Programme, pp. 27-28, 31, 34-35, 37, 41-42. The choral song after Act II, entitled 'The unloved virgin sheep' (Ανέραστο, παρθένο) and the choral song after Act IV entitled 'Attica by night', which the nymphs perform with a focus on the hard life of sex workers, have noticeable sexual connotations.

of Christian saints and the ancient Greeks did of their own gods.⁸⁶² The director chose Mexicans for this part of the play, as he told me, because Mexican music and culture, and the Mexican way of life are fun and attractive to modern Greek people and to himself. This might have created a distance between the chorus and the players, not unlike the Menandrian practice, where the chorus are an entr'acte with little relevance to the plot. However, the director chose to integrate the chorus into the action. One member of the chorus, a father, asks Pan to find a good groom, a wealthy and potent young lad, for his single daughter, as he did for Knemon's daughter. Another asks Pan to find him a good job, since Pan is well connected, and a third, an old man, asks the god to rejuvenate him sexually, since his wife is not happy with his sexual performance. Exasperated, Pan confesses that this is a difficult time to be a god, since people make so many crazy demands and 'they have broken his balls' ('μας τὰ χουν πρήξει με τις τόσες απαιτήσεις'), a colloquial modern Greek expression. Gavrielides was humorously criticizing the habits of modern Greeks, but this type of song is also reminiscent of some productions of Aristophanes in modern Greece, which are filled with contemporary political and social allusions and criticism and also recall contemporary revues which include political satire. Gavrielides handled Pan as Aristophanes did Euripides in the *Frogs*, 'by bringing everyday matters on stage, things we're used to, things we're familiar with, things about which I was open to refutation, because these people knew all about them and could have exposed any flaw in my art'.⁸⁶³

⁸⁶² The personal style of Pan's prologue in the original text has been stressed further in the production; cf. Photiades (1958) and especially p. 111.

⁸⁶³ Aristophanes' *Frogs* 959-960, trans. Sommerstein (1996), p. 113. Gavrielides' aim was far from making his spectators 'better members of the community', as has been argued for Euripides, whose plays might educate the Athenian spectators; cf. Sommerstein (1996), p. 241.

Presentation of the characters

In this section I discuss some indicative examples of the changes in the way characters are presented in Gavrielides' production. As we noted earlier, one problem the translator faced in adapting Menander's world to the present was that the sharp distinction in gender roles was increasingly being left behind in the late twentieth century. Menander's texts left his females (with rare exceptions) voiceless. In the production, Malenis rectified Menander's 'phallocracy,' as Malenis' daughter called it, first in the representation of Knemon's daughter, the cause of Sostratos' *erōs*, and second in the representation of Sostratos' sister. This is one way in which Menander's characters are adapted for the modern world. Although Malenis and Gavrielides remained faithful to the Menandrian text, in the sense that they did not make Knemon's daughter speak extra verses, they gave her a name, that is, Myrrhine, the name of Knemon's wife in the original text, who mattered less to the modern director. In her first encounter with Sostratos the girl appears to like the young man. She smiles at him, looks directly at Sostratos' eyes, sighs when she gives Sostratos the jar to fill it for her with water, and murmurs 'what a pain!' ('*αχ, βάσανα*') but without letting Sostratos hear it, a phrase that implies that the sweet bite of love has just touched her; her body language also reveals her feelings, although in a decent and restrained manner. Her whispered remark is similar to what Sostratos expressed a little earlier in a dreamy tone, a sign of a person in love: 'I am going [to fill your jar], what a pain!' ('*πάω, αχ, βάσανα!*'). When Sostratos returns the filled jar to her, they look into each other's eyes once again, she thanks him, and they part happily. The girl has acquired a quasi-voice in the production through the staging, which expands on the original text. She is not just an object of the transaction, since she is allowed to be attracted to a man,

another innovation of the production in conformity with the taste of modern spectators. Gavrielides developed this technique further in the case of Plangon in his *Samia*.⁸⁶⁴

Knemon's daughter is not the only female in the comedy; Sostratos' sister also acquires a voice in Gavrielides' production. She is called Plangon, the name of someone addressed by Sostratos' mother in *Dyskolos* 430. Plangon in the production appears with her mother in Act III, both dressed in expensive and distinctive clothes. They are followed by maids and slaves whom they need to prepare the sacrifice in the shrine of Pan. Plangon and her mother have a posh style. When her mother asks her to hurry up because they are already late for the performance of the sacrifice (‘έλα Πλαγγόνα, βιάσου, αργήσαμε’), as her mother also does in the original text (30-31), Plangon in the modern production not only replies but does so in French: ‘Oui, maman, je viens tout de suite’. At one point Plangon leaves her mask unattended and the silent observer of the production examines it, curious about the character whom the mask represents; he has already witnessed the grand entrance of Plangon and her mother on stage. When Plangon goes to collect her mask and suddenly sees this stranger observing it, she pinches her nose, a sign of disgust, not only because the man did not emit a sweet smell but also, and mainly, because he is a common person of the lower class. This goes a step beyond Menander's representation of social class, assigning a certain prissy haughtiness to a girl who was innocent of such a trait in the original comedy. Plangon does not speak or appear again in the adaptation, following in this respect the original text. It was part of the mentality of high-class and upper middle-class families in modern Greece for many years that their daughters learned French and played the piano. Gavrielides' representation of Plangon

⁸⁶⁴ See Kiritsi (2013b), p. 104.

here reflects these customs and at the same time mocks them for humorous purposes, since members of the audience would likely recall similar experiences either from life or from films and TV shows.

Gavrielides and Malenis chose to give names and identities to the two young girls in the adaptation, who through their marriages started new lives. On the other hand, Sostratos' mother has not been given a name and Knemon's wife has been stripped of her original name in favour of her daughter. The image of independent young Greek women inspired the director's and the translator's choices, but not going so far as to imitate the bold and shameless Pamphile in the part added to the production by Sfyroeras and Apostolou.

Turning now to a couple of auxiliary characters, the cook Sikon and the slave Getas are funny figures in the original text and they give Knemon a good lesson at the end of the play. Gavrielides particularly liked Sikon's style and he decided to make him even more popular and funny to suit the modern audience's taste. The director believed that a character who boasts about his art, a Mr Know-All who gossips about other people's lives, has a strong feminine side, and so he made Sikon gay. Gavrielides' Sikon comes from Constantinople, that is, from the *Polis*, as the city is usually called in modern Greece, because women and men from Constantinople were famous for their cooking skills, whether professionals or not. He also speaks with the accent of the Greek people from Constantinople. This linguistic choice of Gavrielides for Getas is reminiscent of Oikonomos' translation of *Ὁ Ἐξηνταβελώνης*, where he used various idioms of vernacular Greek for characters from different provinces and social backgrounds⁸⁶⁵, and also of the linguist style of the *komeidyllio* (comedy romance), which differentiates characters according to

⁸⁶⁵ See above, p. 158.

their origin. As mentioned before, the *komeidyllio* has been regarded by Greek directors as a genre influenced by Menander's art.⁸⁶⁶ In creating Sikon's role, the director, as he told me in his interview, also had in mind the image of an actual gay person, famous among contemporary Athenians, a distinctive person in Athens not a cook, but a hawker who died recently.⁸⁶⁷ This hawker was known for his jokes and conveyance of gossip among the various neighbourhoods in the historic centre of Athens, where he wandered, proud of his trade, which was the selling of feather dusters.

Sikon's costume is a mix of ancient and modern styles, which reflects also his patchwork character, according to the director. He wears a tutu which is reminiscent of the Greek *fustanella* which is now worn by the guards of the monument of the unknown soldier in Athens. In Act II Getas narrates to Sikon the dream of Sostratos' mother which urged her to sacrifice to Pan so that he might be benevolent towards her son (cf. 406-418). Malenis, at the director's suggestion, but without changing the words of the original play, had him not only notice Sostratos' good looks (cf. 414)⁸⁶⁸ but also express through his acting a special liking for Sostratos, a kind of homo-erotic desire but without exaggerating it and turning it into an indecent innuendo. In Act IV, commenting on Knemon's rescue by Gorgias and Sostratos, Sikon observes that because both young men are 'invigorating'⁸⁶⁹ they will succeed in lifting the old man from the well. Sikon's delivery once again suggests sexual activity. At this point the Menandrian text has a lacuna (649-654) and

⁸⁶⁶ For the typology (social, professional types etc.) and their linguistic idioms in *komeidyllio*, see Chatzepantazes (1981a), pp. 102-126.

⁸⁶⁷ Gavrielides' interview: 'Στο αρχαίο κείμενο ο μάγειρας λέει πράγματα εξυπνακίστικα, χαριτωμένα, κουτσομπολίστικα, που θεώρησα ότι ένας γκέυ τύπος μπορεί να τα αποδώσει πιο διασκεδαστικά και κωμικά. Το κοστούμι του μάγειρα είναι ένα καμουφλάζ της προσωπικότητάς του και ένα κολάζ εποχών. Όταν έφτιαχνα τον τύπο του μάγειρα στο πίσω μέρος του μυαλού μου είχα έναν πραγματικό τύπο, δημοφιλή στους δρόμους της Αθήνας, τη 'φτερού'. Ο Σικόν μου κατάγεται από την Πόλη, γιατί οι Πολίτες και οι Πολίτισσες έχουν τη φήμη του καλού μαγειρα ή της καλής μαγειρίσσας'.

⁸⁶⁸ Programme, p. 30.

⁸⁶⁹ Programme, p. 35.

so the translator's addition is not a change in the actual words of the original text. But the sexual dimension is a novelty, in that there is no suggestion of a particular sexual orientation for Sikon in the original.

In the adaptation, the cook's boastful attitude in the original text is overshadowed by his overt demonstration of sexuality. It would have been too daring for Solomos in the 1960 production to present such a character, but Gavrielides said that this innovation attracted more gays to his production, although this was not his motivation for Sikon's reception and representation. In the production of *Samia* in 1993 Gavrielides retains the same gay style for the cook and he also entrusts him with a further role, that is, to deliver a choral song concerning the identity of the baby, complete with sexual terms, which is a highlight of the production.⁸⁷⁰ As we have already discussed, the cook in the *Epitrepontes* 1959 production was given an identity far from the fragmentary text that survives of Menander's original.

To match Sikon, Getas is also gay. He is another mixed type in the production, a circus clown and a classical slave and his costume projects his character. Apart from the innovations with regard to sexuality and costume, the translator and the director give the characters of Sikon and the slave some lively linguistic expressions, mainly colloquial, which add to their theatricality and humorous dimension. This attention to lower-class characters does evince a good feeling for Menander. For example, in Act V, when Knemon is alone in his house and everybody else has gone to Sostratos' house, Getas believes that this is the right moment for them to give Knemon a lesson. He calls out to Sikon: 'Sikon, Sikon, carry your body out. Sikon, Polyphemus' daughter, come out.... Come on, my tortured and complaining friend. Come, the time has come for you to take your revenge'. The intensity

⁸⁷⁰ See Kiritsi (2013b), pp. 98-99 and Varveris (1997), p. 84.

of the revenge they will take on Knemon is expressed by Getas in the comparison between Sikon and a supposed daughter of the mythical Polyphemus, using the colloquial expression 'to satisfy an intense desire' along with the description of Sikon's emotional state (tortured and complaining) due to Knemon's behaviour (cf. 889-892). The anticipation of the pleasure that they will feel when Knemon suffers at their hands is underlined by both men. Getas states that: 'He [Knemon] will blow his top' while Sikon adds that: 'He will be like a mad dog'.⁸⁷¹

Knemon

Knemon is the character who remains closest to the original in the production. His strong emotions are stressed, in some instances, in the adaptation using colloquial expressions, metaphors, and additional phrases or short lines added to the original text. The director did not represent Knemon as a caricature but as an extremely angry and grumpy old man. In his first appearance in Act I, Knemon envies Perseus and he wishes he had Perseus' wings so he might not meet all the 'worms' ('σκουλίκια') who walk around him (cf. 155; the reference to Perseus is in the original but is enhanced in the adaptation). The worst thing is that: 'the human population has grown so much in numbers, damn them. What kind of life is this?', an addition to the original text (153-162).

People not only invade his property but, in addition: 'they have the audacity to talk to him'. Though he is addressing Sostratos who took shelter in front of his house, Knemon's anger is directed not only at Sostratos but at the whole world, which takes pleasure in torturing him, 'hey you, you will not be happy

⁸⁷¹ Programme, p. 39.

unless you give somebody hell. You delude yourself with vain hopes'. The actual Greek phrase means 'in what swing are you weaving?' ('Κούνια που σας κούναγε'; cf. 177-178)⁸⁷² The word 'ἐπηρεασμός' in the Menandrian text, as the main cause of Knemon's anger, is expressed in the modern Greek version with a vivid slang expression, commonly used when people are annoyed or upset and implicitly threaten revenge, though the offender may not be fully aware of the danger.

Knemon refers to those who take part in the sacrifices in Pan's shrine as 'good for nothing' ('αχαΐρευτοι') and 'wastrels' ('χαραιοφάηδες'), who come to sacrifices only to 'guzzle' ('για να περιδρομιάσετε') and not out of respect for the god (cf. 442-449).⁸⁷³ When Getas knocks at his door, asking for cooking pans, Knemon not only drives him away with an intense show of anger and curses all those who bother him, but promises to himself: 'I will tear to bits the next person I catch outside my door' (cf. 483-484). When Sikon approaches Knemon and asks for a 'skillet', Knemon states that he has neither skillet, nor salt, nor vinegar, but only 'a strap for his [Sikon's] back to whip him' ('λουρί έχω για τη ράχη σου'; cf. 505-508).⁸⁷⁴ So once more in the production there is a ratcheting up of effects, with Knemon here more violent than in the original.

After his rescue by Gorgias, Knemon confesses: 'I have escaped by the skin of my teeth, although I wish I had not escaped, having ended up in this state'. The translator has filled a lacuna in the original text (cf. 703-710) with a phrase that shows once again the intense feelings that Knemon experiences, an odd mixture of relief, remorse and self-pity. The phrase 'ended up in this state' can

⁸⁷² Programme, p. 26. Babiniotis (1998), s.v. κούνια. (swing). The expression 'κούνια που σε κούναγε' is used for 'people who are ignorant of a danger, underestimate the seriousness of a situation or overestimate themselves'.

⁸⁷³ Programme, p. 31.

⁸⁷⁴ Programme, p. 32.

be taken either with reference to his physical state of injury or with reference to his emotional state of confusion. Malenis and Gavrielides make Knemon characterize himself in his long monologue explicitly as ‘a misanthrope’, a term which does not exist in the Menandrian text. The Menandrian character is self-aware, to be sure, but his self-awareness is still more conspicuous in the adaptation. He became a misanthrope due to the unkindness and selfishness that surrounded him (cf. 718-722). In his closing monologue, Knemon characterizes himself ‘a grouchy old man’ (‘ο γερογκρινιάρης’),⁸⁷⁵ a milder term than the ‘χαλεπὸς δύσκολος τ’ ἔσται γέρον’ (747) of the original text, and one that covers a wide range of meanings from grumpy to difficult but without the philosophical implications that the ancient Greek δύσκολος had.

Critical reception of the production

According to the Theatrical Organization of Cyprus, Gavrielides’ production was quite successful in terms of audience attendance.⁸⁷⁶ However, the reaction of many newspaper reviewers, especially those from Cyprus, was not positive. They thought that the ‘popular and modern’ version of Menander (‘λαϊκή και εκμοντερνισμένη’ παράσταση, are the Greek terms used by the reviews) in Malenis’ ‘popular translation’ (‘λαϊκή μετάφραση’)⁸⁷⁷ was too far removed from the spirit of the Greek tradition and from the playwright’s style, in particular the delineation of character.⁸⁷⁸ They wrote that the director introduced a great number of elements from the revue genre and musicals and in some instances reached the point of kitsch. One critic was so severe in

⁸⁷⁵ Programme, p. 36.

⁸⁷⁶ For the type of audience that attended Menander’s plays in his time, see Rosivach (2000).

⁸⁷⁷ For a definition and account of the characteristics of western popular theatre, see Mayer and Richards (1977), pp. 257-277.

⁸⁷⁸ For example, I. Rossides in the newspaper, *Simerini* on 27th June 1985, Ch. Georgiou in the newspaper *Nea* on 30th June 1985, A. Karagian in the newspaper *Phileleftheros* on 23rd June 1985.

his review that he wrote that: 'Menander would have turned in his grave' if he had watched this show and how Gavrielides and Malenis retrofit his play.⁸⁷⁹

It is, then, interesting to note that, contrary to what one might have expected, the 1959 production of *Epitrepontes* stayed relatively close to the spirit of Menander, both linguistically and in characterization, even though the translator was not only free but obliged to insert new material to fill in the substantial lacunas in the surviving fragments, whereas the inaugural production of *Dyskolos* in 1960 availed itself of a more colloquial tone throughout and, to judge from reviews and comments at the time, made use of a more extravagant kind of staging that reminded critics of Aristophanic comedy, even though the translator had at his disposal an all but complete edition of the ancient Greek text. This tendency to transform the Menandrian original was far more pronounced in the 1985 version (and in subsequent productions of Menander's comedies in Greece). It would seem that, precisely as Menander's plays became better known, translators and directors were the more disposed to adapt them freely to modern tastes. Moreover, every adaptation involves not just a change of style and characterization, but a subtle departure from the core themes and values of the original comedy: the structure of emotions, and the way they influence or are betrayed by the actions of the characters, exhibit changes as well. Modernity is evident not only in linguistic details or matters of stagecraft, but in the conception of self and personality that are specific to contemporary social life.

⁸⁷⁹ N. Chatzikyriakou in the newspaper *Nea* on 24th July 1985.

Conclusion

A spectre haunts Menandrian comedy, in antiquity as today: it is the spectre of Aristophanes. As Geoffrey Arnott has written:

The ghost of Aristophanes still breathes over the shoulder of anybody who wants to discuss, praise, or debunk Menander. Aristophanes' spiritual presence is both inevitable and irrelevant. Inevitable, because to our western world Aristophanes is the Athenian comic poet par excellence, who achieved that miraculous synthesis of imaginative fantasy, vicious satire, elegant parody, comic invention, civic shrewdness, witty obscenity, and the evocative poetry of precise observation. But the ghost of Aristophanes is also an irritating irrelevance when one is considering Menander. An irrelevance, because Aristophanes and the genre that he and other contemporary practitioners had perfected in the last quarter of the fifth century B.C. were as extinct as the great auk a century later, when Menander and a new type of comedy reigned supreme if not unchallenged.⁸⁸⁰

If the ghost of Aristophanes hovers over the criticism and reception of Menander's own comedies, this is all the more true in the case of the modern Greek translations and adaptations and productions that were staged in the past century or so, since the recovery of a significant portion of Menander's original plays. For Aristophanes had dominated the popular media well before Menander was rediscovered, and had come to represent a style of buffoonery that predominated on the stage and cinema and, later, on

⁸⁸⁰ Arnott (1968), p. 1.

television, though for the most part lacking the open political satire of the original versions. I have indicated, in my discussion of the several productions of Menander in modern Greek, just how the producers, often working together with translators, could not escape Aristophanes' powerful presence, and altered the tone of their versions in keeping with popular taste and expectations.

Recent studies of Menander's humour have revealed his engagement with contemporary social issues, although opinions about his political allegiances are sharply divided, some scholars regarding him as a partisan of the democracy, whereas others see him as closely associated with Demetrius of Phalerum and rather inclined toward oligarchy.⁸⁸¹ It is not necessary to enter into that controversy here, which is unlikely to come to a conclusion: Menander's comedies project a broadly liberal vision of social life, one with which members of democratic and aristocratic *poleis* could equally identify. Still, Menander did not shy away from representing disturbing scenes of violence and suffering, any more than Charlie Chaplin did in his sentimental comedies. Stephen Halliwell, in discussing the several styles of humour in Menander and Aristophanes and their influence on the audiences, highlights the opening scene of Menander's *Aspis* as a particularly disturbing moment. Davos, the slave and *paidagōgos* of Cleostratos, has returned from a campaign in Lycia, where Cleostratos has been killed – or so he believes. He enters carrying Cleostratos' shield, along with various bits of treasure and several captives (36-37). Cleostratos and a band of mercenaries had been pillaging local villages and selling the prisoners into slavery (32), but they were routed in a surprise attack by the enemy. Davos had been sent off to safeguard Cleostratos' money and slaves, and when, after the battle, he found

⁸⁸¹ See above, p. 15.

Cleostratos' shield covering a decomposed and unrecognizable body, he concluded that his master was dead, though in fact he was taken prisoner and will soon return. The role of the newly captured slaves is unclear; they seem to have been employed on stage to carry in the booty, as *personae mutae*. Davos himself is a Phrygian, and it is fair to assume that he was at some earlier time captured and sold into slavery. Yet for all that the text reveals that, he has no particular sympathy for the men and women who have only just now been reduced to slavery.⁸⁸² David Konstan, in his study of slavery in Menander, asks 'What, then, did the spectators think? Were they alert to some irony in the fact that an old and faithful retainer, who had hopes, if not for freedom, then for some release from his labors, is shown committing recently captured prisoners into servitude? Or were these wretched people nothing more than tokens of the wealth that motivates Smicrines to want Cleostratos' sister, thus setting the plot in motion -- in themselves, no more significant than inanimate property?'⁸⁸³

Halliwell has suggested that the grimness of the scene with which the *Aspis* opens would have been tempered by the very fact that it appears in a comedy rather than a tragedy, since audience reactions would have been conditioned by their knowledge of the conventions of the form. Thus, he writes 'Menander's original audience(s), familiar with the grammar of the genre, would have known intuitively that this sombre scenario, whose details extend to the gruesomely bloated faces of four-day-old corpses (69–72), could not continue indefinitely without comic "correction"'.⁸⁸⁴ According to Halliwell, 'Menandrian laughter, unlike the "shameless" pleasures offered by Aristophanic comedy, is in part a gauge of fluctuations in the audience's as

⁸⁸² Contrast Dejanira's pity for the enslaved Iole in Sophocles' *Trachiniae* 243 and 298-302; also the chorus' pity for Cassandra in Aeschylus' *Agamemnon* 1069.

⁸⁸³ Konstan (2013a).

⁸⁸⁴ Halliwell (2014), p. 198.

well as the characters' relationship to events'.⁸⁸⁵ In comparison with the sentimental quality of Menander's comedies, Aristophanic humour is rather more intellectual, analogous less to the films of Charlie Chaplin than to those of the Marx Brothers. Although it may sound odd to characterize Aristophanes' wild burlesques, not to mention Groucho Marx's antics, as cerebral comedy, especially when compared with the carefully structured plots of New Comedy, in fact Aristophanic wit may be said to appeal more to the mind than to the emotions. Old Comedy delights in puns, in newly coined words and expressions, in carefully balanced debates (the *agōn*) in which two sides set out their case and in which even the absurdities are of the brainy sort. If it is true, as Halliwell observes, that 'Menandrian drama operates a much tighter economy of the possibilities of laughter than its Aristophanic ancestor had done',⁸⁸⁶ it is because in Menander's comedies laughter is aroused not so much by means of jokes – and jokes are quintessentially intellectual in nature – as by the overall structure or trajectory of the story: without a happy ending, Menandrian comedy would take a tragic turn, arousing pity and fear rather than the more elated feelings associated with a comic plot.

The relationship between humour and morality is an abiding problem: sometimes we laugh, for example, at the weaknesses of others, or at their mishaps, even when they are not wholly deserved. Thomas Hobbes famously affirmed that 'The passion which makes those grimaces called laughter ... is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleases [people]; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves'. To be sure, Hobbes did not (as is sometimes supposed) approve wholeheartedly of such derisive laughter. He

⁸⁸⁵ Halliwell (2014), p. 201.

⁸⁸⁶ Halliwell (2014), p. 203.

continues by noting that such laughter is characteristic of those people who 'Are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour by observing the imperfections of other men. And therefore, much laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of pusillanimity. For of great minds, one of the proper works is, to help and free others from scorn; and to compare themselves only with the most able'.⁸⁸⁷ Descartes too regarded laughter as a form of contempt. As he puts it 'Ridicule or derision is a kind of joy mixed with hatred which results from our perceiving some small misfortune in a person who we think deserves it: we hate this misfortune, but enjoy seeing it come to someone who deserves it. When this comes upon us unexpectedly, the surprise of wonder causes us to burst into laughter'.⁸⁸⁸ The other side of the coin is our tendency to identify with reprobates in comedy, and rejoice at their outrageous and immoral antics. Sir Kenneth Dover was alarmed, for example, at his own sympathy for Philocleon, the hero – or anti-hero – of Aristophanes' *Wasps*. Philocleon, who is addicted to jury service, takes pride in humiliating defendants in trials. What is more, he boasts of his thefts, and indeed references to stealing are plentiful in the play. Dover inscribes what amounts to a formal indictment of Philocleon, and admits that he is 'astonished at the hidden strength of antinomian sentiment' which his affection for the character implies.⁸⁸⁹

Although Menander's comedies seem to offer a more civilized form of humour, there are nevertheless disturbing questions about the way that some characters are subject to ridicule. Thus, with reference to Menander's *Epitrepontes*, Halliwell asks 'Why should the concerned father of the wronged

⁸⁸⁷ Hobbes (1651), part 1 chapter 6, see Tuck (1991), p. 43.

⁸⁸⁸ Descartes (1649), part 3, article 178, English translation by Bennett (2010), p. 50.

⁸⁸⁹ Dover (1972), pp. 126-127.

Pamphile be made to some extent laughable?’ To this, Halliwell replies ‘The answer involves a conjunction of his pardonable ignorance with his not-so-pardonable and overwrought temperament’, and he goes on to explain ‘Menandrian comedy, quite unlike the *ēthos* of Aristophanes’ plays, conveys a nagging sense that ignorance is a besetting factor in the human condition: much depends on how individuals adapt to its consequences. Smikrines is made less attractive by a penchant for haranguing, bullying and insulting others, not always with sufficient reason’.⁸⁹⁰ We may note, however, that even the misanthropic Knemon earns some sympathy from Sostratos, the young man in love with Knemon’s daughter, for his strict life and hard-working temperament, and is allowed to utter some words in defence of his style of life. For all that Menander’s characters conform to certain stereotypes, they are never without qualities of their own that distinguish the young lover or stern father in one play from their counterparts in another. This again is a resource of New Comedy, at least as represented by Menander, that is lacking in the Old, where consistency of characterization is not a high aesthetic priority and where the protagonists are too invulnerable to harm, too overdone and hyperbolic, ever to tug at the heartstrings of the spectators.

The approach to character championed by Menander has an analogue in the studies of character and emotion developed by Aristotle and his school. Aristotle is the first Greek thinker to assemble under the single label *pathos* something like the range of sentiments that we think of as emotions, and he provided sketches of character in his *Nicomachean Ethics* that betray both analytic subtlety that would find further expression in Theophrastus’ witty, sympathetic, and condescending portraits in his *Characters*. I have tried to

⁸⁹⁰ Halliwell (2014), p. 202. Halliwell compares Smikrines to Knemon in the *Dyskolos* – both are called ‘curmudgeonly’ or *χαλεπός*: *Epitrepontes* 1079, *Dyskolos* 325, 628, 747 – but he notes that, in Smikrines’ case ‘The pressure of his daughter’s marital crisis mitigates his agitated behaviour’.

show that there is a homology between Aristotle's way of thinking about character and the representation of character in Menander's comedies. A reading of Aristotle helps to elicit those features of personality and sentiment that are specific to Menandrian comedy and to sharpen the contrast with the Old Comedy of Aristophanes and his peers.

When Menander and his fellow New Comic poets began staging their comedies, the Aristophanic form had been out of fashion for almost a century (some have argued that Aristophanes' later comedies, as exemplified by the *Ecclesiazusae* and the *Ploutos*, anticipate the later genre), and so Menander did not have to compete with very different expectations in his audience of what a comedy should be like. The situation was in this respect very different from the one that which confronted the producers of modern versions of Menander's plays. As I have tried to demonstrate in the course of the present dissertation, the modern Greek audience that first saw productions of Menandrian comedies had been nurtured on theatrical, cinematic, and televised comedies and skits that left them more radically unprepared for this late-comer to the contemporary stage. The producers, translators, adapters, and actors who collectively mounted Menandrian revivals were aware of, and had necessarily to adjust their sights to, this specific 'horizon of expectations' in their audiences. The phrase, 'horizon of expectations' (German 'Erwartungshorizont') was coined by Hans-Robert Jauss, to indicate the criteria by which an audience judges and responds to a work of art in any given period and context. Jauss, one of the leading figures in the theory of reception, noted that such expectations are subject to change in each succeeding generation, and affirmed that there thus arises, in the history of any work, an 'aesthetic distance', which is the measure of the extent to which a work is perceived differently than it was by its first readers or audience. As Jauss writes 'The quality and rank of a literary work result neither from the

biographical conditions of its origin, nor from its place in the sequence of the development of a genre alone, but rather from the criteria of influence, reception, and posthumous fame'.⁸⁹¹ The translators and producers of Menander's comedies were working in a complex environment, in which their public was primed to respond to Menander in accord with criteria generated by their experience of Aristophanes, which itself was already subject to that 'change of horizons' (again, Jauss's term) that results, inevitably, in a new aesthetic code or juncture. In adapting their productions to this contemporary environment, they subtly altered the emotional tenor of the comedies, moving away from the Aristotelian models, as I have identified them, and generating a new, hybrid sentimentality more in line with modern dramatic comedy. This compromise, or rather creative combination, has resulted in an original contribution to the Greek theatre. In the course of this study, I hope to have done justice not only to Menander's own oeuvre, but also to its rich heritage on the modern Greek stage.

⁸⁹¹ Jauss (1982), p. 5.

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