Conceptualising Contemporary Antisemitism:
How Debates About Immigration
Have Shaped the Understanding
of Jew-Hatred in Germany and Britain
since 1945

by:
Doerte LETZMANN

A THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

Master of Philosophy

September 2015
Declaration

I, Doerte Letzmann, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed:

Dated:
Conceptualising Contemporary Antisemitism:
How Debates About Immigration Have Shaped
the Understanding of Jew-Hatred
in Germany and Britain since 1945

Doerte Letzmann

Abstract

This thesis is a comparative historical analysis of the understanding of antisemitism in Britain and Germany since 1945. Motivated by recent trends to equate antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments – or Jews and Muslims, it shows where the idea came from that these two hostilities can be compared. It critically analyses how concepts of antisemitism have been framed by national discourse and debates about identity and immigration by looking at the dynamic relationship between major events and debates about this issue and theorisations of antisemitism. The main finding is that although antisemitism is a global phenomenon, it is understood very differently in different contexts. Conceptualisations and comparisons differed between Britain and Germany, which is due to the ways in which national identity and racism in general were understood and critiqued. In Germany, there was, in reference to the Holocaust, a strong theoretical focus on antisemitism while racism and anti-Muslim resentments were initially much less dealt with, and later only through a prism of antisemitism theories. In Britain, racism theories developed in the context of colonial immigration and were open to an inclusion of particular anti-Muslim resentments, however, they not only largely omitted Jews as victims of any form of discrimination, they also failed to include the Holocaust in their analyses. The thesis shows how the equations of Jews and Muslims that were later made grew out of these different theoretical contexts in the two
countries. In both countries, however, there have been trends to find universalising explanations for antisemitism, even though the explanations themselves remain particular and embedded into national discourse.
1 Introduction 8

2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany 27
   2.1 Jews and Antisemitism in Britain .......................... 28
      2.1.1 Early History ........................................... 28
      2.1.2 Readmission and Resettlement .......................... 28
      2.1.3 Emancipation and Immigration .......................... 34
      2.1.4 British Jewry in the interwar period ................... 44
      2.1.5 Jews and antisemitism in contemporary Britain ....... 49
   2.2 Jews and Antisemitism in Germany .......................... 50
      2.2.1 Jews in medieval Germany .............................. 50
      2.2.2 Emancipation ............................................ 54
      2.2.3 The Holocaust .......................................... 67
      2.2.4 Jews in postwar Germany ............................... 69

3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany 73
   3.1 Britain: Understanding antisemitism through colonial immi-
      gration ....................................................... 74
      3.1.1 Psychological approaches to antisemitism in the 1950s
            and beyond .............................................. 75
      3.1.2 Approaches to domestic antisemitism .................... 79
      3.1.3 Managing ‘Race Relations’ ............................... 86
   3.2 Germany: Theorising antisemitism after the Holocaust .... 105
      3.2.1 Denial of Guilt ......................................... 106
      3.2.2 Understanding Antisemitism: Voices from Exile ....... 108
      3.2.3 German historians and antisemitism .................... 113
      3.2.4 The Left and anti-capitalism ........................... 116
      3.2.5 Addressing post-war antisemitism: social-psychological
            approaches .............................................. 118
3.2.6 Approaches to anti-foreigner hostility in the 1960s and 1970s ............... 128
3.2.7 Understanding antisemitism differently: Britain and Germany in comparison .......... 138

4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s 140
4.1 Britain: Racism, minority recognition and the double squeeze on antisemitism theories ........................................... 140
4.1.1 From interactionist to critical racism theories .......................... 141
4.1.2 Developments in racism research ........................................ 143
4.1.3 The Rushdie affair and anti-Muslim resentment ....................... 151
4.1.4 Downplaying antisemitism .............................................. 158
4.1.5 Zionism and anti-Zionism .............................................. 161
4.2 Germany: Remembering the past, forgetting the Jews .................... 170
4.2.1 Historikerstreit ......................................................... 175
4.2.2 The study of antisemitism .............................................. 179
4.2.3 The Fassbinder Affair .................................................. 187
4.2.4 Discourse analytical approaches ........................................ 194
4.2.5 Similarities to Britain: German multiculturalism? ...................... 196
4.2.6 Religion and Recognition: Turks in Germany ......................... 199
4.2.7 Thinking about antisemitism in a multicultural society ............... 202

5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism 204
5.1 Britain: Conceptualising Antisemitism in a multicultural society 205
5.1.1 New ways of thinking about minorities and citizenship ............ 205
5.1.2 Forging alliances ....................................................... 210
5.1.3 The Narrative of Waves of Immigration .............................. 214
5.1.4 Comparing Jews and Muslims in Britain ............................. 216
5.1.5 The Jewish ‘Other’: theories of antisemitic discourse ............... 217
5.1.6 Post-structuralist and post-colonial approaches to racism ......... 225
5.1.7 A new antisemitism? ..................................................... 228
Contents

5.1.8 The emergence of ‘Islamophobia’ .......................... 235
5.1.9 The ‘new’ racism and comparisons with anti-Semitism . 241
5.1.10 Orientalism ......................................................... 244
5.1.11 The Orientalised Jew ........................................... 249
5.2 Germany: Conceptualising Antisemitism in the context of a new
  found national self-understanding ............................... 253
  5.2.1 Right-wing extremism and theories of deprivation .... 254
  5.2.2 Remembering the Holocaust: the Goldhagen debate ... 258
  5.2.3 Remembering the Holocaust in a multicultural context . 265
  5.2.4 Understanding antisemitism in multicultural societies:
     the theory of ‘group-related hostility’ ...................... 267
  5.2.5 German multiculturalism .................................. 268
  5.2.6 Ethnic minority research ................................. 271
  5.2.7 Comparing Antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ in Germany 279

6 Conclusion .................................................................. 284
Introduction

This thesis is concerned with the development of conceptualisations of contemporary antisemitism in Germany and Britain in the context of labour immigration from the postwar years onwards. It is motivated by recent trends to emphasise comparisons between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hostilities. In the past decade it has been increasingly asserted by commentators, academics and politicians that Muslims are the ‘new Jews’. In both Britain and Germany, commentators have argued that antisemitism and anti-Muslim sentiments have significant similarities. The aim of this research is not to become part of this trend by listing similarities – or differences – between antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’\(^1\) or Jews and Muslims. Instead, it seeks to trace the origin of the idea that the two hostilities can be compared and the reasons why comparisons are deployed. In an interdisciplinary framework, it uses a comparison between Britain and Germany as a methodological tool to examine conceptualisations of antisemitism and comparisons with anti-Muslim resentments in specific national contexts. The basic argument is that comparisons between antisemitism and Islamophobia promote certain narratives of national identity. Comparisons are part of a narrative that determines how the past is related to and that assigns the place of Jews and Muslims within wider society. This thesis shows that this narrative significantly differs between Britain and Germany. In the case of Britain, this means that comparisons support the perception of Britain as a multicultural country of immigration, in which Muslims, just like Jews, will naturally progress to become British. In the case of

\(^1\)Although usage of the term ‘Islamophobia’ has become an established practice, it is highly contested and will therefore not be used as an accepted term in this thesis. For a discussion of this issue see chapter 4.
1 Introduction

Germany, comparisons are part of a ‘discourse of normalisation’ that seeks to normalise the German past and reinvent a positive German identity by equating antisemitism with hostilities against other minority groups. The result is that in both countries, dominant concepts of antisemitism fail to acknowledge its particularity. This introduction will give a brief overview over the research that has been undertaken so far, and outline structure and methodology of the thesis.

This thesis originally started out as a comparison between antisemitism and Islamophobia in the context of recent debates about this issue. In both Germany and Britain, it had been increasingly asserted that ‘Islamophobia’ is very similar to, or has indeed substituted, antisemitism. One example for this was the reaction by German historian and antisemitism researcher Wolfgang Benz to the racist remarks of Thilo Sarrazin, former financial senator for Berlin and then chairman of the German federal bank, in September 2009. Sarrazin had stated in an interview for the cultural magazine lettre international in Berlin that he does “not have to accept anyone who lives off this state, rejects this state, does not properly care for their children’s education and continuously produces little veiled girls. That is true for 70 percent of the Turkish population and 90 percent of the Arab population in Berlin”. He also pointed out that “a large number of Arabs and Turks in this city do not have any productive function other than selling fruit and vegetables and are unlikely to develop any perspective”.² Although his statements found supporters, among them German-Turkish feminist Necla Kelek, it also resulted in a threat to exclude him from the Social Democratic Party - as he was accused of harming the party’s image - as well as in a sharp reduction of his responsibilities at the federal bank. Benz equated Sarrazin’s statements with the anti-Jewish remarks that were made in Germany in the late 19th century. He argued that statements like that of historian Heinrich von Treitschke (1834-1896), who warned that the “ambitious, trouser selling youngsters” who pour into

1 Introduction

Germany from the “inexhaustible Polish cradle” will soon be “controlling Germany’s stock markets and newspapers”, were comparable to the contemporary fashion of using “Muslim fertility” as an argument in debates around “Islamisation”. Statements like that of Sarrazin, he emphasised, were comparable to antisemitic statements during the emancipation period in so far as they were characteristic of a debate about German identity at the time. According to his argument, anti-Muslim resentments today played the national identity shaping role that anti-Jewish resentments played then.

Similar claims were being made in Britain: in 2006, the Times’ India Knight saw in Jack Straw’s criticism of the veil a “sign of separation and difference” and the beginning of an “open season on Islam – Muslims are the new Jews”. The comparison was also made by Muslims themselves: in 2008 MP Shahid Malik said that Muslims today felt targeted like the Jews of Europe. In Britain however, the argument took two different directions. It was either asserted that British Muslims were comparable to British Jews in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, or it was argued that British Muslims are to an extent reliving the fate of German Jews before the Second World War.

Another example for a comparison was the Channel 4 TV documentary *The Enemy Within* (2009), which was first aired in October 2009 and which equated the anarchist movement of Victorian England – “a minority are prepared to bomb and kill to get what they want” – and the Islamist extremism of today. In the film, young Muslims spoke the words of the nineteenth century anarchists to point out that “parallels can be drawn with the modern day war on terror”. The striking parallel, it was suggested, was that the anarchist movement of the time largely consisted of East European Jewish immigrants,

---


4Knight, India: Muslims are the new Jews, in: The Sunday Times, 15 October 2006.

1 Introduction

who were then as a whole group targeted as alien and threatening to Britain by the press, just as Muslims were today, although only a small group of them could be held responsible for terrorist attacks. On the Channel 4 website, the TV documentary was advertised as examining the “feelings of oppression, persecution and anger that can lead to extremism”. The intention of the show, it seemed, was to point out not only that there are recurring patterns of British hostility towards immigrants, but more importantly that the immigrant groups themselves are comparable.

This comparison did not only appear in popular culture, it was addressed by academics as well. The subject of comparing antisemitism and Islamophobia as well as the Jewish and Muslim communities had been dealt with in a number of studies and research papers. These studies attempted to analyse the relationship between anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hostility or the relation of Jews and Muslims to a majority society. Some of them focused on Germany or Britain, but they all significantly differed in their methodological approaches and use of categories. Matti Bunzl, for example, analysed and compared antisemitism and Islamophobia with regard to their functions for the formation of a national and European identity. In this regard, he argued that while traditional antisemitism “has run its historical course with the supercession of the nation-state, Islamophobia is rapidly emerging as the defining condition of the new Europe”. He did not equate the two hatreds, but argued that they are time and place specific phenomena: “Whereas anti-Semites questioned Jews’ fitness for inclusion in the national community, Islamophobes are not particularly worried whether Muslims can be good Germans, Italians or Danes. Rather, they question whether Muslims can be good Europeans. Islamophobia, in other words, functions less in the interest of national purification than as a means of fortifying Europe.”

---

that no significant European party champions an antisemitic agenda, while they do champion an Islamophobic one. Both antisemitism and Islamophobia “are exclusionary ideologies mobilised in the interest of collective engineering”, but each has its time and place.\(^9\) Bunzl was right in emphasising that it is difficult to straightforwardly equate both forms of social hostility, but his analysis neglected to take into account post-Holocaust forms of antisemitism, which, if not on any political agenda, may nevertheless function for the formation of national identity.

The idea of this thesis was initially to contribute to this ongoing debate and compare antisemitism and Islamophobia in Germany and Britain. The aim was, by looking at the period from the 1960s onwards, to establish the validity of contemporary comparisons between Jews and Muslims and, in relation to that, the representation of Jews and Muslims in public discourse and the use of similar or dissimilar stereotypes. The research was motivated by a desire to provide clarification in this debate. What soon emerged in the course of the research, however, was that the more valuable question was not whether Jewish and Muslim histories and prejudices against them as minorities can be compared, but how this comparison actually originated and what ideas and concepts it is built on. Rather than listing similarities and differences between Jewish and Muslim histories and experiences, and becoming part of a particular debate, the research thus became about the genealogy of this comparison. Rather than situating itself as part of the debate, this research subsequently became about the debate. This new research focus required a more fundamental and theoretical approach than initially intended. It ceased to be an analysis of the discourse about Jews and Muslims, and became an analysis of the discourse about antisemitism and Islamophobia. This also required to take a step back to look at how antisemitism came to be understood and how this understanding provided the seeds for concepts of equation of and comparison between Antisemitism and Islamophobia. This thesis does therefore not deal with antisemitism and Islamophobia in equal measure, but

\(^9\)Ibid, p. 45.
1 Introduction

traces how concepts of antisemitism dealt with the relationship between hatred against Jews and hatred against other social groups, especially in the context of emerging multiculturalism and Muslim immigration from the 1950s onwards.

Emerging anti-Muslim resentments

It is important to note that the notion of asserting that Muslims are ‘the new Jews’ did not come out of nowhere. The comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments were made at a time when the issue of Islam in Europe had become an important issue. Most Western European states had effectively become multicultural states with significant Muslim populations. Both the integration of Muslim communities and the difficulties these communities faced, in the form of hostile attitudes of the majority population, were defining issues for multicultural policies and practices. It is therefore understandable that when struggling to understand and explain attitudes towards Muslims in particular, one is tempted to make reference to earlier forms of hostility against ethnic minorities in Europe.

Hostility towards Islam in particular has received increasing public attention since September 11th 2001, when a series of coordinated suicide attacks by radical Islamists upon the United States took place. Members of Muslim communities and also researchers point out the potential problems related to the negative stereotyping of Muslims in the media following the attacks.\(^{10}\) The coordinated suicide attacks by Islamists in London on 7 July 2005 and the train bombings in Madrid on 11 March 2004 have had similar repercussions for the Muslim communities in Britain and Europe. Since then, hostility towards Muslims and Islam as a particular form of social resentment has been a subject of research, but has also been subject of a political debate. Official European

bodies have recently acknowledged that Muslims in particular have been subjected to racial discrimination and violence and have incorporated this into their reports on racism in the EU member states. In these reports ‘Islamophobia’, derived from the term ‘xenophobia’, is measured based on available quantitative data. Their findings showed that Muslims feel increasingly discriminated against because of their religion as opposed to their nationality or skin colour.¹¹

Some researchers emphasise that the contemporary public hostility towards Islam surfaced a lot earlier and coincided with major events which led to greater public acquaintance with Islam. Most famously during the *Satanic Verses* controversy, the British (and also German) public noticed the presence of Muslims in their country, because Muslims voiced their concerns in the controversy as Muslims. Poynting and Mason pointed out that the *Satanic Verses* controversy as well as the first Gulf War have to be understood as the pivotal period framing the rise of Islamophobia, which led to the perpetuation of “deviant and enemy images of Muslims” in the media.¹² Consequently, derogatory representations of Islam and Muslims were the subject of research before September 11. One of the first studies on contemporary hostility towards Islam in particular was conducted by the Runnymede Trust in 1997. Their report titled: “Islamophobia, A Challenge for Us all” still serves as one


1 Introduction

The negative representation of Muslims did not only relate to struggles taking place in British or German society, but needs to be understood in the context of major geopolitical changes after the end of the Cold War, in which context the “Islamic World” was constructed as the new main enemy of “the West”. This has been argued most prominently by Samuel Huntington, who predicted a “clash of civilisations” amid the incongruity of “Western” and “Islamic” societies.14 More recent studies of representations of Muslims and Islam in British and German discourse consequently came to the conclusion that in both societies, Muslims and Islam were mostly portrayed in the context of foreign affairs, which arguably had an effect on how the public views Muslims living in Britain and Germany, possibly leading to sweeping allegations and suspicions of disloyalty.15 To address the problem of hostility towards Muslims because of their religion, the British government passed the Racial and Religious Hatred Act in 2006, which came into force in amended form in 2007 and which outlaws the incitement of hatred against another person on the grounds of their religion.

In this context, Muslim media as well as anti-racism organisations pointed out the rise of Islamophobia in Britain today and referred especially to one-sided and bigoted media coverage. Comparisons with antisemitism included the equation of the stereotyping and prejudiced media coverage of Muslims as well as the far-right concern with Islam with pre-Second World War anti-Jewish prejudice in Germany. A conference paper held by Christopher Allen at the Forum Against Islamophobia and Racism conference on September 29 2001 in London stated that media depictions of Muslims resemble pre-war German antisemitism: “Such expressions (...) warrant serious analogies being made to the representation of the Jews in such early twentieth century literature as

1 Introduction

Hitler’s Mein Kampf, where gross exaggeration and dehumanisation had extremely dangerous consequences.”\(^\text{16}\) The paper went even further and pointed out that “attitudes towards Islam and the current climate of hate against it could provoke a situation like the one that prompted Germany’s Kristallnacht in 1938. As we saw then, once the enemy was so dehumanised and parasitical, what justification was needed to persecute and finally exterminate it?”\(^\text{17}\)

Relevant for this research, however, is that while anti-Muslim prejudice has emerged as a pressing issue in recent years, this was not accompanied by a decrease in antisemitism. Surveys and opinion polls regularly show that significant numbers of British and German citizens hold antisemitic attitudes. There have also been significant numbers of antisemitic hate crimes across European countries. Recent antisemitism statistics showed that in Britain, 8% of the population harbour antisemitic attitudes, while in Germany, this number is 27%\(^\text{18}\). This suggests that the notion that Muslims may have replaced Jews as the outgroup of European societies is an oversimplification of a complex issue.

Adding to the complexity of this issue are newest findings of some reasearchers, who have pointed out that one major source of this form of antisemitism are Muslim minorities in Europe as well as countries where Islam is the majority religion.\(^\text{19}\) In this context, some commentators and researchers argued that there has been a resurgence of, or a ‘new’, antisemitism, which has most often been expressed in anti-Zionism.\(^\text{20}\) These findings further question the value

---

\(^\text{16}\) Allen: Islamophobia in the media since September 11th, p.6.
\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.
\(^\text{20}\) See Chesler, Phyllis: The New Anti-Semitism, The current crisis and what we must do about it, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 2003; for a discussion see also: Iganski, Paul
of comparisons between antisemitism and Islamophobia. They rather support
the need to trace the genealogy of these comparisons and analyse the theo-
ries of antisemitism and/or Islamophobia that are used as the basis of these
comparisons.

Comparing Britain and Germany in this respect proved particularly helpful,
as the respective concepts of antisemitism could not be more different. It was
asserted in both countries that (present) Muslims and (past) Jews are compa-
rable, sometimes, as mentioned above, even across national boundaries. Both
countries, however, have very particular Jewish and Muslim histories. The
British Jewish community developed under very different circumstances - an
already (re)established, if challenged, community grew in the late nineteenth
century when Eastern European Jews fled persecution – to the Muslim com-
munities, the members of which came to Britain mostly from the colonies and
for economic reasons, most of them after 1945. German Jews faced contin-
uous persecutions and achieved integration, if a fragile one, before their near
complete annihilation between 1933 and 1945, while the arrival of Muslims in
Germany is connected to labour recruitment schemes after 1945 as well as the
relations between Germany and the Ottoman Empire.

The complex and differing histories speak against easy comparisons between
a Jewish and Muslim experience. In context of this doubtful validity of com-
parisons, the question remains what purpose they might serve. In order to
find an answer to this question, this thesis is concerned with tracing how con-
ceptualisations of antisemitism are framed in order to allow comparisons with
hostilities towards other minorities. The premise of this research is the assump-
tion that there is not only an antisemitic discourse, but that conceptualisations
of antisemitism are formulated as part of, and serve, a discourse as well. The
aim of this research is therefore to find out how antisemitism came to be un-
derstood in Britain and Germany and how comparisons with other hostilities
derived out of this understanding. This means that rather than taking a side
in the above mentioned debates, this thesis is concerned with deconstructing

and Kosmin, Barry (eds.): A new antisemitism? Debating Judeophobia in 21st-century
dominant concepts of antisemitism by tracing their evolution.

The differences in understanding antisemitism in Germany and Britain are also the result of different understandings of citizenship. The relationship between minorities, whether ethnic, cultural, or religious, and majority society in Britain and Germany is markedly different. While Britain is effectively a multicultural country, governed by the idea of cultural plurality and the management of relationships between distinct groups, Germany has always had difficulties to accept itself as a country of immigration, and has thus made less effort to establish the integration of minorities. When comparing Germany and Britain, it becomes evident that approaches to integration vary according to different understandings of national identity. But what does this mean for Jews and Muslims in particular, and how does this affect comparisons of antisemitism and Islamophobia?

The integration of Jews and Muslims was framed in a fundamentally different way in Britain and Germany. In Britain, Jews and Muslims were both seen as minorities within a framework of a multicultural state. There was thus a direct relationship between them, as they are both ‘the Other’ to the majority culture. In Germany, in contrast, Jews and Muslims had very distinct positions in public discourse. Jews were in that sense a ‘special’ minority, set apart by history and the significance of the Holocaust for contemporary notions of German identity, which has wide repercussions. How Jews and Muslims were seen in each country built the basis for analyses and comparisons of antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment.

In this thesis, I will trace how approaches to minority integration developed, and assess what this meant for the relationship between Jews, Muslims, and British and German majority society by revisiting some of the major debates that shaped this relationship. The appearances of antisemitism during particular crisis events and their aftermaths often prompt public and academic controversies. It is hotly debated why anti-Jewish hostilities appear, how they can be evaluated and categorised, how serious they are and how they should be addressed, if at all. Strategies to deal with this phenomenon are derived out
1 Introduction

of the understanding of its history as well its evaluation in these controversies.

Defining Antisemitism

One major issue with research about antisemitism and the above summarised comparisons are their categories, which are by no means academically agreed upon. As this thesis shows, term and usage of ‘antisemitism’ has become highly politicised, which makes its use as a scientific category somewhat difficult. For this reason, some scholars have decided to refrain from using the term altogether. Although the main concern of this thesis is the discourse about conceptualisations of antisemitism, and therefore places itself beyond these debates, this does not mean that antisemitism is merely a social construct.

The discourse-theoretical approach of this research means that rather than making the case for or against a particular definition and conceptualisation of antisemitism and its relationship to ‘Islamophobia’ at this point, it takes exactly these debates about the terms and understandings of the phenomenon as its subject. It refrains from using antisemitism as an agreed upon term but rather examines its usage in German and British discourse. This approach is reflected in the methodology, which includes a comparative analysis of the formation of anti-Jewish hostility in Germany and Britain in a historical and theoretical frame, but which also uses elements of historical discourse analysis to examine understanding and assessment of anti-Jewish hostility and its relationship to anti-Muslim resentments in British and German public, cultural, and academic discourse since the 1960s.

This thesis shows that there are still many unresolved issues regarding the categorisation and conceptualisation of ‘antisemitism’. It is yet unclear, for example, how exactly it relates to contemporary anti-Zionism. The contested nature of the definition of antisemitism became evident through its most widely used definition, the 2005 working definition of antisemitism of the European Monitoring Centre for Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), later Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA).\footnote{This definition was published on the EUMC website in 2005 and was based on the dis-}
1 Introduction

the British Parliament. In their 2006 British parliamentary inquiry into antissemitism, the all-party parliamentary group against antisemitism argued that the nature of contemporary antisemitism could not be adequately addressed with the existing definition of harassment established in the Race Relations Act 1976. Instead, they requested the implementation of the EUMC definition, which stated that antisemitism was “a certain perception of Jews, which may be expressed as hatred toward Jews. Rhetorical and physical manifestations of antisemitism are directed toward Jewish or non-Jewish individuals and/or their property, toward Jewish community institutions and religious facilities”.

22 Calling for the killing of Jews in the name of an ideology or a religion, making allegations about the power of Jews as a collective, holding Jews collectively responsible for that acts of Jewish individuals, denying the Holocaust, accusing the Jews or Israel as a state of inventing or exaggerating the Holocaust and accusing Jewish citizens of being more loyal to Israel than to their own nation were all cited as examples of antisemitism in public life. Additionally, the EUMC stated that with regard to the state of Israel, the following examples can be categorised as antisemitism: denying Israel’s right to exist, applying double standards, using classically antisemitic symbols to characterise Israel or Israelis, comparing Israeli policy to that of the Nazis and holding Jews collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel. However, the EUMC also stated that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded antisemitic”.

23 This definition remained initially very broad, but then itemised particular examples of which some distinguish antisemitism from other forms of social hostility. However, its more descriptive character neglects to adequately conceptualise antisemitism. Not only is this definition strongly contested and has been rejected by a number of public organisations, like the University and College Union (UCU) in Britain, 

---


23 Ibid.
it has also recently been taken down from the website of the FRA, who subsequently insisted that they were not able to define antisemitism. For those who have based their efforts against antisemitism on this definition, this is most certainly a major setback. Rather than arguing for or against the use of this particular definition, the aim of this research is to show why it was adopted or rejected by particular organisations and individuals.

Previous Research

Locating this research within a field of previous research is difficult, as almost any work on antisemitism in Britain and Germany qualifies as the object of analysis of this research. In order to find out how a particular understanding of anti-Jewish hostility developed, it is important to analyse and critically assess the assumptions held and categories used by researchers, rather than to further develop their ideas. In that sense, much of this thesis is of a critical-theoretical nature. In addition, not only the methodology used in this thesis is interdisciplinary, but the sources are as well. Scholarship on antisemitism has appeared in a wide variety of disciplines. While there is a fair amount of literature on post-war antisemitism, especially in Germany, there is only very little scholarship on the development of antisemitism theories after 1945 in particular. An important if marginal study was that of Ismar Schorsch in 1964, who gave an overview over existing theories of antisemitism in Germany that were developed by Jewish and West German historians.24 In Britain, David Cesarani’s work on the study of antisemitism remains the only comprehensive overview on the subject.25 A related study for the British context is John Solomos’s book on the study of racism in Britain.26 Helen Fein’s contribution in The Persisting Question provided an overview over different sociological

approaches to antisemitism.\textsuperscript{27} In recent years, it has also been more common in Germany to reflect on existing scholarship on antisemitism. Most notably, the recently published reference book on antisemitism by the Centre for the Study of Antisemitism in Berlin contains overview articles on antisemitism theories, and on the development of antisemitism research in Germany.\textsuperscript{28} Samuel Salzborn’s book, in which he critically evaluated and analysed a number of well-known theories of antisemitism is a sociological study that tested these theories for their validity.\textsuperscript{29} Nevertheless, or perhaps because of that, his work is important for historians as well.

But this research is not only concerned with the development of social theories of antisemitism, it is also a comparison between two countries. It uses a comparison between Britain and Germany in order to conduct a meta-analysis of theories on antisemitism in both countries. It is therefore also related to sociological studies that compare minority integration and the understanding of citizenship in different European countries, like that of Karin Schönwälder\textsuperscript{30}, Joel Fetzer and Christopher Soper\textsuperscript{31}, as well as the most recent comparative analysis of European multiculturalisms by Anna Triandafyllidou, Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood.\textsuperscript{32} These studies came to the conclusion that Britain is


\textsuperscript{28}See the entry on ‘antisemitism research’ by Angelika Königseder in: Benz, Wolfgang (ed.): Handbuch des Antisemitismus, Judenfeindschaft in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vol. 3 (of 7), Begriffe, Theorien, Ideologien, Berlin: de Gruyter 2010, pp. 16 - 21, and the entry on ‘antisemitism theories’ by Klaus Holz in Ibid, pp. 316-328.


\textsuperscript{31}See Fetzer, Joel S. and Soper, Christopher J.: Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2005.

\textsuperscript{32}See Triandafyllidou, Anna; Modood, Tariq; Meer, Nasar (eds.): European Multiculturalisms, Cultural, Religious and Ethnic Challenges, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press 2012.
more multicultural than Germany, and minorities have been able to gain comparatively more recognition.

A further interesting approach is the use of the sociological concept of *frames* when comparing German and British culture. Peter Ullrich has used this approach to analyse how the British and German Left understand the conflict in the Middle East.\(^{33}\) He found that the differences in German and British culture lead to completely different understandings of the same topic. There are different *frames of reference* when Germans and Britons evaluate the Middle East.

In a sense, this thesis deals with exactly these frames of reference and how they differ. However, in contrast to Ullrich’s study, this research is not primarily of an empirical sociological nature, but sees itself located in social theory and intellectual history. It examines conceptualisations of antisemitism and locates antisemitism as well as the attempts to understand it in a historical context. It further examines how these attempts have shaped strategies to address anti-Jewish and, in relation to it, anti-Muslim hostility. It analyses and compares crisis events, scandals and media affairs relating to anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hostility and stereotyping and how these discourse events have been evaluated by the public and in academia. It traces the origins of the notion that hostility towards Jews and hostility towards Muslims can be compared and how and why this notion is deployed.

### Methodology and Structure

Numerous publications in various disciplines have been consulted on antisemitism and racism in Germany, and on antisemitism and racism in Britain. But rather than merely giving an overview over these studies, the aim is to also put them in their historical context. This thesis therefore includes an analysis of the debates over the manifestations of antisemitism in Britain and Germany since 1945. The chapters comment on case studies and studies of


1 Introduction

discourse events. These are major crisis events or media affairs in which antagonism towards Jews and Muslims has played a significant role, like the scandal around Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s *Garbage, the City and Death* in Germany in 1985, but also those controversies which have had a major impact on understandings of citizenship and minority-majority relations, like the *Satanic Verses* controversy in Britain in 1988/89. Most of these debates have been abundantly commented on at the time and often analysed by scholars. The thesis examines how public figures, commentators, and academics have understood and analysed these events. Most importantly, the thesis shows in how far understandings of antisemitism have influenced approaches to hostility to Muslims, and vice versa. Although this research essentially is a ‘meta-discourse analysis’, it makes use of elements of historical discourse analysis, which Ruth Wodak *et al* define as operating “multimethodologically and on the basis of a variety of empirical data as well as background information”.

The case studies and comments were examined in themselves as well as in their context, for which a variety of data was used. The data used in the thesis therefore focuses on scholarly texts, but also includes literary texts, political statements, newspaper articles and pamphlets that emerged in relation to the crisis events and media affairs, as well as other background information.

As mentioned earlier, this thesis used a comparison between Britain and Germany as a methodological tool for a meta-analysis of concepts of antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments. A comparison between British and German theories, debates and controversies about antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ is beneficial because it shows in how far anti-Jewish and anti-Muslim hostility and their understanding is country-specific, relating to and resulting out of a particular history and in how far it is related to European or even global developments.

The research concentrates on contemporary Germany and Britain from the postwar years onwards and focuses especially on the period of labour immigration to Germany and Britain. The 1950s and 1960s mark a significant period

---

1 Introduction

regarding ethnic relations for both Germany and Britain when the arrival and settlement of Turkish ‘guest workers’ in Germany and workers from the Commonwealth in Britain received increasing public attention and their status was subject of subsequent legislation.

The first part of the thesis gives a historical overview of the establishment of the Jewish communities and the genealogy of antisemitism in Germany and Britain up to the postwar years. It analyses and compares in detail how the Jewish communities were established, the adversity they faced and how they chose to respond. The detailed narrative serves as an essential basis for the following chapters, which, in a chronological fashion, evaluate how perceptions, stereotypes and appearances of violence against Jews have been assessed after the Holocaust and increasingly in the context of emerging debates about economic migration to Britain and Germany. The second chapter on the period between 1945 and the late 1970s accordingly includes a discussion of how minority-majority relationships have been assessed in academic discourse and how this differed between Britain and Germany. In this regard the chapter shows that in Germany there was largely a denial of antisemitism in public as well as in historic and sociological scholarship, but also emerging theories of antisemitism in relation to the Holocaust, which were later also applied to prejudices against ‘guestworkers’. In Britain, on the other hand, antisemitism was largely downplayed and marginalised. This was partly due to the timid mentality of the Jewish society in Britain, who did not acknowledge even violent outbursts as a serious threat. On the other hand, antisemitism became theorised in the context of approaches to colonial immigration and anti-racist policies, even though these approaches themselves neglected Jews as a racialised minority, and did not develop in reference to the Holocaust.

The third chapter follows up on this and further gives an account of the history, theorisations and explanations of antisemitism in the 1980s in Britain and Germany. The 1980s were a period of big debates in both Britain and Germany about citizenship, national identity and multiculturalism. In Germany, these issues were in fact negotiated through discussions about antisemitic ex-
1 Introduction

pressions and about how the past should be related to. In Britain, in contrast, these debates were slightly different in their nature and content. The Rushdie affair formed the beginning of a struggle for recognition of British Muslims and defined the status of religion in social cohesion. This had a significant impact on how minority-majority relations were understood and, indirectly, also on how antisemitism was conceptualised.

The fourth chapter covers the period from the 1990s up to recent times. It is during this period that comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments became increasingly popular. This chapter explains how this was related to particular national narratives by critically analysing the different approaches towards this issue. In Germany, dominant approaches explained antisemitism as one form of prejudice against an outgroup. Stripped of its particularity, antisemitism became a model for other forms of hostility. This explanation served a narrative of how Germany overcame its past and became a multicultural European nation just like any other. In Britain, concepts of antisemitism were conceived within the framework of dominant racism theories, which resulted largely in a denial of contemporary antisemitism, as it was either relegated to the past, or only accepted when expressed in particular ways that satisfied post-colonial and post-modern definitions of racism and racialisation.
This chapter seeks to give a comparative overview of the history of antisemitism in Germany and Britain. The aim is to show how anti-Jewish hostility has impacted on Jewish communities in both countries and how the communities chose to react to it. This chapter forms a vital basis for the following chapters, as it is this history that is referred back to in contemporary discourses about antisemitism. How this history is interpreted determines how past and present forms of antisemitism are conceptualised.

In this chapter it becomes apparent that the integration of Jews, both in Britain and Germany, was shaped by their status as members a stateless minority that was entirely dependent on the good-will of its environment. The often timid actions and reactions of Jews and their eagerness for acculturation can be understood in this context. The Jewish response to anti-Jewish hostility in Britain shows that the history of Anglo-Jewry is much more a history of antisemitism than often acknowledged. The story of a successful integration of Jews into British society neglects to consider how the currents of anti-Jewish hostility have shaped Anglo-Jewish behaviour. Although Jews in Britain cannot be described as a homogeneous entity, they tended and tend to be more unified in their response to antisemitic challenges. Jews have in fact felt a pressure to acculturate in order to be accepted as British citizens. This is perhaps similar to German Jews and their record of acculturation in light of hostility and integration pressure. However, as this chapter also shows, no form of antisemitism in Britain can be compared to that in Nazi Germany.
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

2.1 Jews and Antisemitism in Britain

2.1.1 Early History

A Jewish community in Britain existed in the late eleventh century, when Jewish merchants from France settled in Britain. During the reign of Henry I (1100-35), a charter of protection was issued that put the Jewish community in a position of privilege as a separate group protected by the king. The ‘fanatical spirit’ of the Crusades led to incidents of anti-Jewish hostility: in 1130, London Jews were accused of killing a sick man, which led to persecution and in 1144 the infamous Ritual Murder accusation emerged after the body of a young man was found near Norwich. During the reign of Henry II (1154-89), Jews were protected again, but were financially exploited by the king. The Ritual Murder accusation appeared several times between 1168 and 1183, and during the years 1189-1216 persecution became more serious and also manifested in violence.1 Before 1290, Jewish merchants and moneylenders performed unpopular economic operations but were an important source of income for the crown due to taxes and extraordinary levies. The decline of their wealth and their loss of fiscal utility along with a growing religious hostility paved the way for their expulsion in 1290, when Jews, at least in theory, lost their right to settle in England.2

2.1.2 Readmission and Resettlement

The readmission has to be understood as the outcome of complex and unforeseeable events and long-term currents.3 The new beginnings of Anglo-Jewry were unique compared to the rest of Europe: the Jewish community in Britain grew out of a secret body of Marranos - the members of this are known as Sephardim - which was detected only after the government had publicly dis-

3See ibid., p.19.
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany
cussed the question of a Jewish resettlement in England. In 1656 Jews were informally (re-)admitted to reside in England. The readmission process was based on an amalgam of politics, economics and religion. Between 1649 and 1656, the readmission of Jews into England was discussed and gradually became reality.

An important figure in the readmission process was Menasseh ben Israel, a member of the Jewish community in Amsterdam, who negotiated Jewish resettlement with the English government, most notably during the Whitehall Conference in 1655, where Oliver Cromwell and the Council of State discussed readmission with a group of lawyers, merchants and divines. The Dutch Jews had a particular interest in the establishment of Jewish settlement in London as that would enable them to circumvent the Navigation Act of 1651, which required merchandise imported into England to be carried in English ships or in ships belonging to the country where the goods originated. The outcome of the ‘Whitehall conference’, however, only secured the theoretical possibility of a readmission of the Jews. Although Menassah ben Israel was keen on establishing formal readmission, the secret Jewish community gained informal toleration by other means: after a humble petition sent to Cromwell in 1655/6 was rejected, the declaration of war against Spain in the same year forced the Marranos to avow their Judaism to avoid arrests and confiscation of their goods. This led to the reality of an open Jewish community in London. After Cromwell’s death in 1658, the Jewish community was firmly established. Although some disagreements remained, their position can be seen as more or

---

6On ben Israel see Mechoulan and Nahon: Menassah ben Israel: The hope of Israel.
less secure from then on.  

In light of a possible return, however, some fantasies about the Jews emerged among Christian Britons: there was the claim that Jews were organising to buy the Bodleian Library or St. Paul’s Cathedral in order to turn it into a synagogue.  

In 1660 London City circles petitioned to expel the Jews, as they “had just renewed the usurious practices with which they had oppressed the nation before their medieval expulsion, and flourished so profoundly during the reign of Cromwell that they tried to buy St. Paul’s cathedral with an eye towards transforming it into a synagogue”. Nevertheless, in 1664 the Jews were granted a formal statement of toleration by the state. Although they did not become emancipated until the middle of the nineteenth century they were assured that “there is no Law that forbids the Jews return into England.”

The immigration of Jews to England in the first three decades of the new community remained relatively small. It was only at the end of the seventeenth century that the Anglo-Jewish community started to grow rapidly, which was mostly due to immigration from central Europe. Up to the 1730s mostly Sephardim arrived from Portugal in flight from the Inquisition, but from the early eighteenth century on, the great majority of immigrants were Ashkenazim from Germany and Poland, who were mostly poor.

Jews faced certain civil ‘disabilities’: they were not legally equal to Englishmen and did not have full civil and legal rights. No special laws or privileges were enacted with regard to their legal position. Although the Blasphemy Act of 1698 as well as the Marriage Act of 1753 allowed some special provisions for Jews, their basic legal position was equal to that of other non-Anglicans. Jews were thus not permitted to hold municipal office, could not be employed in any office or trust, civil or military, were barred from taking a degree at university, could not vote nor be elected to parliament or engage in retail trade, because

---

9See Ibid., p. 114.
10Ibid, p. 140.
11Cited ibid, p. 144.
these activities required an oath on the new testament. They were, however, permitted as wholesale traders. Those who engaged in foreign trade had to pay high ‘alien’ duties. Harold Pollins pointed out, however, that while Jewish economic activities in the middle ages were characterised by imposed restrictions, the seventeenth century brought with it a freer atmosphere and legal restrictions were gradually removed. The barriers were religious, not racial, which means that a Jew who was willing to convert could enter the otherwise restricted occupations. While the main occupations of Jews in England were indeed to do with overseas trade, broking and finance, in fact “there is no evidence that Jews had to take up certain occupations, such as broking.”

While in the late eighteenth century, some Jews were occupied in the before mentioned trade, some were to be found in shopkeeping, as domestic servants and most of them were occupied as peddlers and old clothes dealers, an activity often bordering on criminality.

After 1664, the basic issue of Jewish residence in England was never again seriously questioned. It was, however, difficult for Jews to become fully assimilated ‘Englishmen’. Their status was not easy to define and social and religious barriers existed between Jews and ‘Englishmen’. Allegations of an international conspiracy of Jews in England and Holland that posed a threat to national commerce and security appeared, despite the fact that the Jews were never politically organised and their status was characterised by their minority position. Historians have traditionally argued that hostility towards Jews during the time in England was negligible. Harold Pollins pointed out that there are numerous examples of antagonism towards Jews to be found from the seventeenth century to the present day, but that “the formal restrictions they faced and the informal hostility they experienced were negligible compared with the majority of Jews in the world.” Endelman, similarly, concluded that “there is no question that the Jew’s position in England at the

---

15See ibid., p. 71.
16See Katz: The Jews in The History of England 1485-1850, p. 188.
17Ibid., p. 41.
end of the seventeenth century was superior to that of Jews in other European states”, which he thinks was due to the fact that the state ignored their presence and their legal status remained undefined. However, he admitted that “it would be incorrect to infer from this that the Jews of England no longer encountered the old vulgar prejudices or were accepted as members of the English nation.”

When analysing English cultural attitudes towards Jews at the time, on the other hand, it becomes evident that most scholars have wrongly dismissed and underestimated eighteenth century antisemitism. There was a certain stereotypical assertion about Jews that was deeply ingrained in popular wisdom at the time and the acceptance of Jews by the English “was frequently compromised through the haphazard endurances of anti-Semitic myths and folktales, many of which can be traced back at least to medieval times and more often than not to exegesis of the text and meaning of the Bible”. The Jew was in fact perceived as “the perpetual outsider whose unsettling presence serves to define the bounds that separate the native Englishmen from the alien Other”. These folktales evolved around the ‘Wandering Jew’, the blood libel, and ‘Shylock’. Popular attitudes came to light especially during the time of the controversy around the ‘Jew Bill’. In 1753 the Jewish Naturalisation Bill was passed in the English parliament which allowed foreign Jews naturalisation. After it became law in May that year, however, critics mounted a campaign against it. Even Endelman depicted the language of these critics as “intemperate”, “alarmist” and “hysterical”. He stressed that “the opponents of the act resurrected crude medieval libels” who were convinced that “Britain would be swamped with unscrupulous brokers, jobbers, and moneylenders, who would use their ill-gotten gains to acquire the estates of ruined landowners”. They warned that “Jews would control Parliament”, “convert St. Paul’s to a synagogue, circumcise their tenants, and perpetuate countless other anti-Christian

20Ibid, p. 3.
The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

Although Britons mostly defined themselves against the Catholic and French, the ubiquity of centuries-old stereotypes of Jews were used to define what was British. “The ‘Jews’ to whom the act’s opponents referred were largely imaginary creatures, constructed to represent threats to British national traditions, Christianity, manhood, landed property.” The bill was perceived as a menace to Church and state in particular: one writer expressed that “Naturalising the Jews, who are Infidels and Antichrists (...) will soon let in all Infidelity bare-fac’d; and open a Door to even the Great Antichrist”. As a result of a storm of opposition, the bill was finally repealed in December 1753.

Despite this controversy, the outcome of which may have significantly delayed emancipation, there was a high degree of acculturation of the Anglo-Jewish middle class in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Jews in Britain deserted or altered Jewish traditions to fit with the values and institutions of European culture and “the Jewish middle class began turning to the majority society for patterns of behaviour and modes of thought they had found previously within the confines of Jewish life”.

Over the course of the eighteenth century the Jewish population grew from 750 to 15,000 persons, but the “communal institutions necessary to sustain a traditional Jewish culture for a population that size failed to keep pace”. There was widespread literary hostility towards Jews and that although the lifestyle of the Anglo-Jewish elite was not different from that of other wealthy Englishmen, Jews were for example criticised for their “sexual misconducts” with Christian women. It is noteworthy that the Jews of the time were neither directly involved nor contributed to the English dialogue concerning their condition, nor did they attempt to refute the antisemitic charges made against them.

---

22 Ibid, p. 76.
25 Ibid.
26 See ibid, p. 289.
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

2.1.3 Emancipation and Immigration

In 1851, on the eve of Jewish emancipation, around 35,000 Jews lived in Britain, most of them in London’s East End, only the wealthier of them in the West End, and a minority in other industrial centres, rural areas, naval towns, and seaside resorts.\(^{28}\) The majority of them were Ashkenazim, who had migrated to London from Germany and Holland and other parts of central Europe to escape persecution and deprivation. Although many of them had started out as peddlers and hawkers, by 1850 many had moved into craft skills occupations like watch manufacturing. Nevertheless, the stereotype of the criminal Jewish peddler remained common.\(^{29}\)

There were various synagogues in London, one of the Spanish and Portuguese Jews in Bevis Marks and three Ashkenazi houses of worship. East London also housed Jewish almshouses, houses of study, and the Jews’ Free School, which was situated in Bell Lane, Spitalfields. Jewish migrants from Poland and Germany established further congregations. In these neighbourhoods, Jews of all economic conditions lived side by side, so there was generally no movement with upward social mobility. Some of the wealthier Jews, however, did move to the West End, where three Jewish communities evolved out of a first congregation that was established in 1768 and which was the origin of the Western Synagogue.\(^{30}\) It is important to acknowledge, however, that even if they moved, Jews generally stayed among Jews.\(^{31}\)

Structures of communal authority and cohesion had to be produced by Jews themselves, as there was - in contrast to Germany for example - no statutory recognition of Jews in Britain.\(^{32}\) The communal authorities were the Jewish Board of Deputies, founded in 1760 but more widely active only from the 1830s,


\(^{29}\) See ibid, p. 11.

\(^{30}\) See ibid, pp. 6-15.


that claimed authority over secular matters, as well as the Jewish Board of Guardians, created in 1859 to care for the metropolitan Jewish poor. In 1836 the Board of Deputies “received statutory recognition as the body competent to record marriages and ensure they were performed ‘according to the usages of the Jews’” and thus gained a powerful position in the community. Not all Jews recognised the Board of Deputies’ claim that it represented the Jewish community, but it was recognised by the non-Jewish community. It lobbied for legislation that was designed to place the Jewish community on a footing of equality with other religious groups. David Itzkowitz has argued that their perspective was that the English society needed to make special concessions to the Jewish community in order for them to become fully integrated into English society. He stressed that “increasingly after the 1850s the Board of Deputies was willing to argue that Jews deserved special exemption from laws that continued to apply to non-Jews. This willingness was not the result of a belief in Jewish separatism, but rather the result of a growing belief that it is legitimate for a polity to recognise the cultural differences among its constituent parts.” Thus, they were arguing “for a Jewish inclusion in British society and were, by implication, enunciating a new vision of British society based on pluralism.” The Anglo-Jewish response to the “Jewish question” was in this sense unique compared to that of other Jewish communities in Europe. However, in sharp contrast to Itzkowitz, other historians have interpreted the Board of Deputies as reactive and essentially defensive. Jews generally accepted the hegemony of Christian society and sought exceptional status only when significant interests were at risk, as will be discussed below.

While the Board of Deputies had self-proclaimed supremacy over secular matters, the Chief Rabbi had the supremacy over religious matters. The Anglo-Jewish newspaper, the *Jewish Chronicle*, which first appeared in 1841

---

36Ibid, p.98.
and then weekly from 1847, “enabled English Jews to perceive themselves as members of a Jewish community.”

The Jewish emancipation process in Britain can be described as occurring in a “piecemeal fashion”, took place between 1830 and 1871 and was connected to gradual changes in the Jews’ legal status and their admission to Parliament. The Jewish Municipal Relief Act in 1845 permitted Jews to hold all municipal offices. There is evidence, however, that Jews held such offices earlier than that. Followed by further permissions to engage in the retail trade (1828), to attend the secular University College London (1828) and to be admitted to the Bar (1833), by mid-century the legal equality of Jewish with non-Jewish citizens of the United Kingdom was almost complete. However, there was a debate around Jewish involvement in the English parliament and it was only in 1858 that the Jewish Relief Act gave the House of Commons permission to alter the words of the oath for Jews. In the same year, Lionel de Rothschild was allowed to sit in the House of Commons. By then, Benjamin Disraeli, a Christian with Jewish heritage had already become an MP and was to become Prime Minister in 1868.

In some ways the emancipation debate in Britain was unique: whereas in most European states emancipation was conditional - Jews were expected to abandon their social cohesion, national consciousness, ritual separatism and skewed occupational profile - in Britain, Christian supporters of the admission of Jews to the political nation did not set conditions of their emancipation. Supporters of Jewish emancipation did not make their support conditional, they found the Jews worthy of admission, as they were “sober, diligent, hard-working, loyal citizens.” Furthermore, “there was no public clamour that Jews renounce particularist rituals and doctrines in order to be integrated into society.”

---

37Feldman: Englishmen and Jews, p. 25.
39See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 55.
its public image. Jewish writers, for example, were expected to describe their community in ‘glowing’ and ‘angelic’ terms, they were supposed to show that “Jews were deserving of civil and social equality, and that their full emancipation could not be construed as a danger to Christian Britain.”42 In light of these findings the emancipation process might not have been as unconditional as Endelman has suggested.

The Jews themselves were at the time divided regarding the question of emancipation. Many were in favour of emancipation, but there was also opposition, if unorganised, as well as indifference. While emancipationists favoured legal equality and thought that “the English Jew differed from his fellow-subject only in the matter of creed”, oppositionists feared that emancipation “would wean the Jews from Judaism”.43

Jewish leaders and the Anglo-Jewish press tried to shape the ways in which the Jewish question was politically debated and tried to establish expressions of Jewish identity that did not contradict being Englishmen. Hostile commentators, however, used the terminology of race to show the racial character of Judaism and how it could never be a universal religion and actually prevented Jews from ever becoming true patriots.44

It is important to take into account the timid character of Jewish culture in Britain at the time, the high degree of Anglicisation, the exaggerated patriotism of British Jews and their ambivalent response to Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe when analysing the emancipation process. In addition to that, hostility towards Jews in the eighteenth century, the centrality of Protestantism and the conversionist ethos to English national identity, and the pressure on British Jews to conform to ideal Britishness were important aspects of the British struggle of self-definition.45 David Cesarani showed that the Jewish question that emerged in Britain after 1876 was tied to the search

42 Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 69f.
for a British identity and was in this sense parallel to the dealings with the Jewish question in other countries. Whereas continental traditions were built upon romantic nationalism, the British Jewish question “grew out of the intolerance of liberalism towards particularism” and further bore in effect the same outcomes as in Germany until 1914.46

Although there is a strong argument for the significance of anti-Jewish hostility for British nationalism, Endelman continued to stress the relatively innocuous character of antisemitism and argues that “before the late 1870s Jews did not loom large in the political or cultural imagination of the English”, so that “in politics and culture, the ‘other’ was more likely to be a Catholic, an Irishman, a Frenchman, or one of England’s colonised peoples than a Jew.”47 However, he acknowledged that “at a more popular level, in novels, newspapers, and the theatre, malicious or crude images of Jews were common fare” and that writers “manipulated stereotypical Jewish characteristics for artistic ends.”48

From the late 1870s there was a change in attitudes towards Jews. Public attention focused on Jews more frequently, which became apparent in the liberal and radical criticism of Benjamin Disraeli’s policies. Jews were accused of aligning with Turks during the period 1875-1878 and for supporting Disraeli in his ‘anti-Christian’ policy, in which British interests were allegedly subverted to those of Jewish bondholders. Furthermore, during the Boer War (1899-1902), “liberal and socialist critics of imperial expansion claimed that Jewish financiers in London and mine owners in Johannesburg had pushed Britain into war in order to safeguard and extend their interests in South Africa.”49 There was also hostility against what was perceived as a threatening concentration of Jewish businesses and workers in London’s East End. From the 1860s “educated opinion believed that the presence of a nonindustrial, casual labouring class in the heart of the capital - described as immoral, vicious,

46See ibid., p.55.
48Ibid., p. 151.
besotted, atheistic, and feckless - threatened Victorian civilisation.”

Bryan Cheyette showed that the uses of Jewish stereotypes in English literature between 1875 and 1945 in fact had a social significance and were not merely instruments for artistic ends. He emphasised “that writers inside an imperial culture were able to define ‘the self’ in relation to a semitic ‘other’ points ultimately, (…), to the power of such narratives to segregate and exclude in the name of a higher ‘culture’.” In addition, “the indeterminacy of the semitic representations under consideration meant that ‘the Jew’ can be constructed to represent both sides of a political or social or ideological divide.”

Taking into account Cesarani’s and Cheyette’s findings it is in fact possible to interpret British Jewish emancipation and its aftermath as a time of constant pressure by the dominant liberal culture and an expectation of Jews to show that they were worthy of being English. This underlying pressure can for example be detected when analysing the reaction of the established Anglo-Jewish community towards Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe.

Anglo-Jewish life was greatly affected by Jewish immigration from Russia and Eastern Europe following the assassination of Tsar Alexander II. By 1882, the Jewish population in Britain had increased to around 60,000 persons. Most of the 2.5 million Jews who emigrated from Eastern Europe - for economic reasons or to escape persecution - settled in the United States of America, but about 150,000 of them settled in Britain - the majority of them again in London’s East End - some of them certainly with the intention to continue their journey to America and stay in Britain only temporarily. When the temporary stay turned into permanent settlement the existing Jewish community in London felt overwhelmed by the newcomers. Many objected to foreign-born Jews coming to Britain because “these foreign Jews drew attention to

50 Ibid, p. 156.
52 Ibid.
53 See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 103.
54 Ibid, p. 111.
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

themselves, and brought political controversy in their wake, so that the public mind became focused on the Jews as foreigners and a cause for concern at the very time at which the established Jewry was trying its hardest to blend itself, chameleon-like, into its non-Jewish environment. Endelman, who made a similar argument, stressed that the settling of the East European Jews in Britain between 1881 and 1914 led to a radical transformation of Anglo-Jewry. In fact, it was perceived that “their poverty, occupations, and foreignness drew unwanted attention to them and native-born Jews alike, fuelling the fires of xenophobia and antisemitism.” The existing community felt that their safe and stable status within the majority society was threatened.

Immigrant Jewry initially formed ‘a society apart’ and there was little contact with neighbours. Immigrants generally “maintained much of their outward appearance and even the flavour of their former way of life.” That generally meant “strict marital fidelity, mutual affection and self-sacrifice between the generations, the home as the seat of most religious observance, patriarchal authority with a prominent role reserved for the mother.” The immigrant’s religion was not only a form of personal expression but the basis of a social life as well. Newly arrived Jews went to their relatives and former neighbours for help regarding employment and marriage and in order to “recreate the social and religious life which they had left behind.” The Jewishness of the immigrants was different from that of the settled community as “their identity included a strong element of national-ethnic distinctiveness, almost an inchoate nationalism”, which led to clashes with the old leadership over communal matters. In the new environment, however, it was difficult to maintain these traditions, as it meant for example finding a job where the Sabbath could be observed, which was not always possible. Through taking care of the education of the children of the immigrants in Board or Jewish voluntary schools,

---

55 Ibid, p. 120.
59 Ibid, p.185.
both the State and the native Jewish community tried to “make them English, Jewish, or Anglo-Jewish”.62 One example for this is the Jewish Lads’ and Girls’ Brigade, which started as an organised youth club for Jewish boys run by middle-class Anglo-Jewish gentleman in 1895, and which aimed at Anglicizing the Yiddish-speaking East European immigrants and turning them into respectable ‘Englishmen of the Mosaic persuasion’.63 Despite this effort, however, immigrant Jews continued to educate their children in the heder, where a headmaster taught the children in religious matters and where only Yiddish was spoken.64 In addition, the immigrants “were practically without representation in the institutional framework of British Jewry”.65

Through prejudice and discrimination almost none of the jobs were open to Jews, so most of the new arrivals, males and females alike, were engaged in the tailoring trades, some of them in boot, shoe and slipper manufacturing.66 By 1911 the majority of them was engaged in clothing trades, a minority in cabinet-making. Endelman, however, suggested that the impact of occupational discrimination was minimal and that most newcomers looked for work inside the Jewish sector voluntarily - most of them found low-paid work in sweat-shops.67 However, it is important to acknowledge, as Alderman has done, that there was anti-Jewish sentiment in the British public that connected Jews to the abominable conditions in sweat-shops and the poor housing conditions in the East End, even though these were of course not inherently “Jewish”. By this time, intellectuals and politicians had begun to take an interest in the issue of “aliens” in Britain and the problems that were perceived to arise out of their presence. Alderman emphasised that they adopted a tone towards Jews that was more racial in character and saw a problem in the character of Jews themselves, not in their numbers or occupations.68

64 Ibid, p. 221.
65 Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 152.
66 See ibid, p. 121.
68 See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 123.
of a general high rate of unemployment, claims were also heard that Jewish workers displaced native workers and were the cause of low wages in clothing and footwear industries.

Bill Fishman has described the rather grim conditions this form of occupation entailed. Due to the high supply of immigrant labour, the new immigrant, the ‘greener’, “made his way to the chazar mark (pig market!) - an open thoroughfare where the masters came to select ‘hands’ seeking employment”.69 This forcing down of wages due to the over-supply of labour and de-skilling eventually evoked a radical response among some immigrant Jews. The ‘radical intelligentsia’ that had fled from the Tsarist police found their people in the East End “exploited by their own masters, despised and rejected by the Gentile workers”.70 They founded radical groups dedicated to socialism which challenged Judaism and organised strikes as well as other forms of worker activism. One of the better known publication of the radicals was the monthly *Arbeter Fraint*, which was first published in 1885. By 1914, “the Anarchists were the most dynamic element in East End political life”, but that the movement eroded so that “by the early 1920s a few small esoteric groups remained, hovering on the periphery of the extreme Left, already functioning in obscurity”.71

Although there were claims that the Jewish immigrants and their radical unions were revolutionaries, Jews were at the time nevertheless “seen as economic individualists whose loyalties were to other Jews rather than to members of the same class”.72 In fact, “it was as if within every Jewish tailor there was a Rothschild bursting to get out.”73

In her essay on trade unionism in London and Leeds from 1872 to 1915, Anne Kershen analysed the work of Jewish trade unionists and pointed out that “the antagonisms that existed between English and alien workers stemmed

---

70 Ibid, p. 97.
71 Ibid, p. 302, 308.
72 Feldman: Englishmen and Jews, p. 143.
73 Ibid.
from a mutual concern for economic welfare plus, undeniably, that degree of 
anti-semitism that is to be found beneath the surface of all levels of English 
society”.74 She concluded, however, that the English labour movement did 
support Jewish workers in times of industrial strife, even though this was more 
a means to ensure acceptable wages and conditions to the English working man. 
The Jewish workers, on the other hand, did not initially see the advantages 
in uniting with English workers and many Jewish unionists did not want to 
sacrifice their Jewish identity.75 

Mass Jewish immigration quickly aroused a public backlash. The general 
public perception was that the Jewish immigrants brought with them poverty, 
health hazards and immoral work ethics. During the 1890s the “aliens” ques-
tion became an important issue in British politics. In 1892, the Conservative 
government was in favour of an “Aliens Bill” that would control immigration 
and there was also a small Jewish lobby in favour of this legislation. But the 
bill was not passed until 1905, when, for the first time in British history, im-
migration was restricted to those seeking to avoid persecution and punishment 
on religious or political grounds.76 Alderman emphasised that this came at 
a time of general anti-Jewish prejudice.77 John Garrard and Bernard Gainer 
have demonstrated how antisemitism was present in the anti-alien agitation at 
the time.78 

If one takes into account the different aspects of Jewish life in Britain, it 
is difficult to speak of a unified Jewish social experience or a clear-cut Jewish 
identity. ‘Anglo-Jewry’ therefore describes a wealth of experiences and iden-
tities, but one common aspect of these might have been the general hostility 

74 Kershen, Anne: Trade Unionism amongst the Jewish Tailoring Workers of London and 
75 Ibid, p. 52. 
76 See Alderman, Modern British Jewry p. 137. 
77 See bid, p. 134. 
78 See also Gainer, Bernard: The Alien Invasion: The Origins of the Aliens Act of 1905, 
London: Heinemann 1972, p.17; Garrard, John: The English and Immigration: A Com-
parative Study of the Jewish Influx 1880-1910, London: Oxford University Press 1971, 
ch.3.
Jews encountered, that did not discriminate between Jews in different social positions. In addition, it was significant for the shaping of a British national identity.

2.1.4 British Jewry in the interwar period

Although there was extreme poverty - and some extreme wealth - among Jews at the beginning of the twentieth century, they did move up the economic and social ladder. They progressed in institutions of higher education and were present in significant numbers as students at Oxford, Cambridge and other universities. In addition, Jews increasingly flourished in the armed forces and the civil service. There was also a number of Jewish artists. The more prosperous of the immigrant generations moved to the North-Eastern quarters of Hackney and Stamford Hill, from 1907 also to Hampstead and Golders Green in the North-West, as well as Finchley and Hendon. The anglicisation and patriotism that characterised British Jewish life at the time becomes especially apparent in the high number - 50,000 - who served in the British Armed Forces during the First World War.79

By 1918, the Jewish community in the East End “had become Anglicized if not fully integrated into the local non-Jewish society and had become almost entirely working class”.80 Upwardly mobile Jews moved to North-East and North-West London.

As Alderman has stressed, the “underlying theme of the communal politics of British Jewry in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the tension created by the desire of the established, Anglicized ruling elites to maintain their control of communal organisation and leadership, and the determination of the newer arrivals that these should ultimately fall under their sway”.81 Zionism played an important part in the communal affairs of British

81Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 207.
Jewry at the time, so much that “during the 1880s a number of what might be
termed Palestine support groups enjoyed meteoric existence” in Jewish com-
munities in Britain. Although there was evidence for widespread support for
Zionism among British Jewry, who called for the establishment of a “publicly
recognised, legally secured home for the Jewish people in Palestine” in a pe-
tition in 1915, Alderman concluded that in general, Zionism could not claim
mass support among British Jews before the war.

The Balfour Declaration of 1917, in which Britain formally stated that it
supported the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Pales-
tine, and the establishment of British Mandate Palestine in 1923, were impor-
tant events for the Zionist organisations in Britain. Despite the success of
the Zionist movement in obtaining the Balfour Declaration and securing the
British Mandate for Palestine from the League of Nations, Zionism did not put
down wide or deep roots in Jewish society in Britain. The old elites continued
to dominate the Board of Deputies and most other communal organisations
until the 1930s, when a new struggle for power ended with the victory of im-
migrants - many of whom were pro-Zionist. It has to be acknowledged though,
as Cesarani has pointed out, that although there was a “triumph of Zionism”,
it did not lead to an exodus of British Jews to Palestine, because “in practi-
cal terms the agenda of the Zionists in Britain was oriented entirely towards
domestic affairs. The ideology of the movement, as in other countries, pro-
vided a viable Jewish identity which enabled Jews to remain in the Diaspora
and a rhetoric of revolt for middle-class elements denied access to communal
power.”

The hostility Jews encountered during this period was frequently anti-Zionist,
although it also appeared as anti-Bolshevism or anti-alienism. At the begin-
ning of the 1920s The Jewish Peril (The Protocols of the Learned Elders of

---

82 Cited ibid, p. 229.
83 See bid, p. 221, p. 225.
84 Cesarani, David: Communal Authority in Anglo-Jewry, 1914-1940, in: Cesarani, David
(ed.): The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1990, pp. 115-140,
here p.140.
85 See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 263.
Zion) appeared and caused intense concern among British Jews.\textsuperscript{86} “Jewish shopkeepers were subjected to increasing criticism on account of aggressive and innovative sales and marketing techniques” and “the employment of eye-catching advertising gimmicks, and the abandonment of prices fixed by manufacturers (...) were projected in both the trade and the Fascist press as stereotypical aspects of an unacceptable face of capitalism which Jews were said (...) to embody”.\textsuperscript{87} There were concrete forms of anti-Jewish discrimination - for example many restaurants and hotels refused to cater to Jews - during the inter war period, so it is somewhat surprising that Endelman thought that, in sum, it was “neither brutish nor shrill.”\textsuperscript{88}

Although there was no evidence of official governmental antisemitism between 1879 and 1939, various strands of oppositional anti-Semitism were present and, in addition to that, “there was abundant evidence of an attitudinal hostility towards Jews which assumed different forms”, appearing in discrimination against Jews in the East End as well as in the “quiet genteel atmosphere at Oxford.” It is noteworthy that “both before 1914 and afterwards there was a tendency for some of this hostility towards Jews in Britain to manifest itself within a conspirational framework.”\textsuperscript{89}

Gisela Lebzelter showed the significance of political antisemitism in Great Britain during the interwar period. She says that it “served no longer merely as a ‘safety valve’ to release social tensions, or as an explanatory model to neutralise objective problems by attributing them to a scapegoat, the Jew, but became the central justification for the Fascist’s claim to power”. However, she interpreted antisemitism in Britain as only short-lived and less powerful than elsewhere.\textsuperscript{90}

Cesarani, on the other hand, emphasised that there was in fact also political

\textsuperscript{86}Ibid, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{87}Ibid, p. 289.
\textsuperscript{88}Endelman: The Jews of Britain 1656-2000, p. 201.
antisemitism in Britain and that the tenure of William Joynson Hicks, who was anti-alien, anti-communist and anti-Zionist, as Home Secretary between 1924 and 1929 caused great concern among Jews. He stresses that in England, an “anti-Jewish feeling was mobilised under the guise of anti-alienism, anti-Zionism and anti-Bolshevism by mainstream political figures”.91 Not only the Alien Act of 1905, but also the subsequent Acts of 1914 and 1919 had harsh impacts on Jews and its application was particularly oppressive to Jewish ‘aliens’.92

From 1933, Britain faced immigration from Jews seeking refuge from persecution in Nazi Germany. But the prospects of these Jews coming to Britain “gave rise to an anti-refugee lobby among some of the most respected sectors of British middle-class society”.93 Alderman depicted how “in 1933 and 1934 the British Medical Journal began reporting hostility from the medical profession to refugee doctors, in 1934 The Times carried a similar correspondence regarding university appointments”.94 There was in fact a policy of “ultra-cautious selectivity” and only “where it could be demonstrated that their permanent resettlement in Britain would benefit the British economy, they were welcomed”.95 The British attitude towards Jewish immigration in the 1930s was that Jews created antisemitism and should therefore only be allowed to immigrate in the least possible number, their wellbeing, moreover, was to be the responsibility of British Jewry, not the British taxpayer. This assessment is shared by Louise London, who pointed out how “British policy started from the position that anti-semitism was at least in part caused by Jews and hence must be contained by limiting total Jewish immigration to Britain”.96 The Anglo-Jewish community shared this attitude to an extent.

---

92 Ibid.
93 Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 272.
94 Ibid.
96 London, Louise: Jewish Refugees and British Government Policy 1930-1940, in: Cesarani,
and feared an antisemitic backlash.\textsuperscript{97}

As a consequence, the Jewish community did initially comply with the rules set up by the government and only after Kristallnacht in November 1938 made some efforts to gain relaxation of entry rules, so that between 1938 and 1939 around 50,000 Jewish refugees, among them around 9,000 children - were allowed to enter Britain.\textsuperscript{98} It needs to be acknowledged that “the approach of British Jewry to the refugee question, (...), was very heavily influenced by the fear of anti-Semitism”.\textsuperscript{99} This has to be seen in the context of the activities of the British Union of Fascists (BUF), for whom anti-Jewish propaganda became a central feature after 1934. It was the BUF who attempted a provocative march through the East End which ended in the battle of Cable Street and who was responsible for the reprisals against Jewish property in the area in the week following the battle.\textsuperscript{100}

As Tony Kushner has shown, between the late nineteenth century and 1939 Jews were on the one hand urged to assimilate, but were on the other excluded from many parts of British society. This became especially apparent in the immigration legislation. Although the alien legislation was not ‘per se antisemitic’, Kushner stressed that “in practice it was used specifically against the Jews in Britain”, for example to limit the inflow of Jewish refugees from the Nazi oppression in the 1930s.\textsuperscript{101} The period of alien internment in Britain in 1940, which specifically targeted Jewish refugees, indicated a high level of intensity of British antisemitism that may get overlooked when compared to ‘German standards’.\textsuperscript{102}

\textsuperscript{98}Ibid, p. 166.
\textsuperscript{99}See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p. 280.
\textsuperscript{100}See Holmes: Anti-Semitism in British Society 1876-1939, pp. 193-194.
2.1.5 Jews and antisemitism in contemporary Britain

British Jewry was in no respect united after 1945. While there were about 450,000 Jews in Britain in the mid-1950s - about 0.8% of the total population - this number reduced to 410,000 in 1968 and 330,000 in the 1980s. In the 1970s the number of synagogues reduced and Jews moved away from the original areas of settlement. At the same time, they moved up into the middle class and only a minority could still be considered working class.

The Anglo-Jewish community today is in fact “a series of communities some of which overlap to a greater or lesser extent”. In 1990, 22% of Jews in Britain were Reform and Progressives, 6.2% right-wing orthodox, just under 3% Sephardim and 68.5% central orthodox. These can only very roughly indicate the religiosity and attitudes of British Jews today and it needs to be acknowledged that there are certainly a number of people of Jewish descent who consider themselves completely secular.

The period between 1945 and 2000 can be described as a time of diversification and fracturing of Anglo-Jewry. Endelman described the increase in economic mobility and suburbanisation, a radical assimilation that worried religious leaders, the disappearance of opposition to Zionism - except among the ultra-Orthodox and hard left, decreasing antisemitism and an expansion of strict Orthodoxy. He suggests that support for the State of Israel along with the memorialisation of the Holocaust became “the pillar of Anglo-Jewish identity.”

However, in his assessment of post-war antisemitism, Endelman disregarded the fact that anti-Jewish hostility continued. There was, for example, significant social and institutional discrimination against Jews. Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were excluded from British labour recruitment schemes - although DPs who had fought for Germany were allowed to enter Britain under the scheme. Sports and social clubs denied Jews a membership and private

---

103 See Alderman: Modern British Jewry, pp. 321-322.
107 See Cesarani, David: Lacking in convictions: British War Crimes Policy and National
The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

Many of these exclusions were abolished through the anti-discrimination legislation in the 1960s and 1970s and it is today illegal to discriminate against Jews in any form. Nevertheless, there are growing concerns about a ‘new’ form of hostility towards Jews that has since the 1970s mostly appeared as anti-Zionism. Anthony Julius described this hostility as an ideological challenge to Israel that sees Zionism as a reactionary - and oppressive - form of nationalism. He maintains that this attitude is expressed across the political spectrum, but especially among leftist liberals, which makes it hegemonically present in the public sphere. It poses a threat to Jews in Britain, Israel and indeed globally, especially because it is also expressed by Islamists, even though it is sometimes propagated by Jews themselves.  

British antisemitism has found different forms of expression over time, but its seriousness cannot be underestimated: it has had obvious effects on British Jews. In addition, it is important to acknowledge that there is an inverted relationship between Jews and majority society with regard to antisemitism: it is not the behaviour of Jews which causes antisemitism, but it is antisemitism that has shaped Jewish behaviour.

2.2 Jews and Antisemitism in Germany

2.2.1 Jews in medieval Germany

Although Jews were present in Germany in Roman times, “for a long time Jewish life in Germany was a small scale affair, a matter of mere 5 commu-
nities established between the mid-10th and the mid-11th century”. This settlement, however, provided the basis for the development of a distinctive Jewish tradition and culture: Ashkenaz Jewry. In 1096, the so-called Crusade massacres led to bloodletting and forced conversion, but Jewish life was quickly re-established in all the affected places. The communities grew significantly in the Middle Ages through the immigration of Jewish traders into the Rhineland area, which became thriving centres of Jewish life. Jews had economic privileges, synagogues were established in Cologne, Worms and Trier between 1012 and 1066 along with Jewish schools and cemeteries. Jews lived in special Jewish quarters within the towns and were allowed a local autonomy which left them responsible for their own schools, culture and taxes. In the twelfth century, Jews were increasingly occupied in credit business, due to the Christian attitude towards interest.

Although special charters of protection were issued for Jews, in medieval Germany, like in Britain, “German Jews too had to face hostility and persecutions”. Toch suggests that German Jews were in a better position because they did not experience a wholesale expulsion from the medieval Reich. However, this perception is highly questionable given the amount and seriousness of anti-Jewish hostility in Germany during that period. Like in Britain - and indeed the rest of Europe - in Germany too, legends about Jews were propagated in order to legitimise anti-Jewish hostility. In 1144 the myth emerged that Jews conducted a ritual murder every year, and in 1215 the blood libel was added to

---

112 See Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, p. 68.
113 See Meyer: German-Jewish History, Vol 1, pp. 16 ff.
114 Ibid.
115 See Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, p. 54.
2 The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

the canon of anti-Jewish legends. Jews were additionally accused of the sacrilege of ritually repeating the sufferings of Christ by torturing a consecrated wafer with knives, nails and thorns. Wolfgang Benz points out that pilgrimages and literature aggravated as well traditionalised the religiously motivated anti-Jewish hostility. It also caused pogroms: during the “Rindfleischaufruhr” in 1298, 5,000 Jews were killed in Franconia, while during the “Armleder-Verfolgung” in Southern Germany between 1336 and 1338, 6,000 Jews died. Jews were discriminated against and segregated, they were depicted as pariah people, Christ murderers and prophets of Satan. Jews were accused of forming an alliance with Satan and being bloodthirsty. Wistrich points out that they were “indeed perceived as the spearhead of Antichrist’s legions in the coming battle to annihilate Christendom.”

Jewish settlement apparently reached its farthest extent in Germany in the 14th century. Due to the new waves of persecution - Jews were attacked and locally expelled - the first half of the 14th century was thus, as Toch points out, marked by an increased forced mobility. This increased mobility has to be seen as a significant aspect of the formation of Jewish communities in Germany. Toch identifies “the logic of dislocation as a trigger for the establishment of new places of residence” that “comes fully into its own in the second phase of Jewish settlement history, the one lasting from 1350 to the close of the middle ages”.

During pogroms in the thirteenth and fourteenth century, many Jewish communities in central Europe were annihilated. Helen Fein points out that religiously motivated anti-Jewish attitudes also became secular. Jews were now

118See Wistrich, Robert: Demonizing the Other - Antisemitism, Racism, and Xenophobia, Amsterdam: Harwood Academic 1999, p. 3.
119Ibid., p. 5.
120Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, p. 69.
Additionally accused of causing worldly evil, for example causing the black death by poisoning wells. Cities and rulers marginalised Jews through ghettoization and special regulations.\(^{121}\) In addition to that, the image of the Jewish profiteer emerged as Christians were not allowed to lend money at interest.\(^{122}\)

While the early and central middle ages of German Jewry, as Toch argues, “can be likened to the European expansion, its later middle ages were surely an age of adversity”. The reason for this were the “inner and outer colonisation” that “gave way to a special type of Wüstung, towns and regions depopulated of their Jewish component, most of which were only to be repopulated, under very different circumstances, in the 19th century”.\(^{123}\) By 1520 most Jews had been driven out of their former centres and occupations - even the credit business - and survived as small scale pawnbrokers, peddlers and beggars. Many were only allowed to stay in one town temporarily, forcing them to ‘wander’ in search of new opportunities.\(^{124}\)

Although Jews eventually resettled in their former places of residence through new immigration in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries - their number grew from 25,000 in 1700 to 60,000 in 1800\(^{125}\); they continually had to face hostility and violence. Werner Bergmann suggests that as a result of the enduring hatred, Jews were a discriminated group that was different concerning clothing, language and lifestyle and therefore detached from society. With the emergence of ideas of natural justice and secular thinking, however, the detached position of the Jews lost its legitimation and in the 18th century - as part of a general process of implementing legal equality, political and economic freedom, but also cultural homogenisation - the demand for an emancipation of the Jews was articulated. Yet the emancipation was contested, as Jewish culture was by some considered as ‘foreign’ and ‘unfit for assimilation’.\(^{126}\)

\(^{121}\) See Fein: Explanations of the Origin and Evolution of Antisemitism, p. 15.
\(^{122}\) See Benz: Antisemitismus, p.39.
\(^{123}\) Toch: Peasants and Jews in Medieval Germany, pp. 77-78.
\(^{124}\) Ibid.
\(^{125}\) See Meyer, Michael A.: German-Jewish History in Modern Times, Volume 1, p. 147.
\(^{126}\) See Bergmann, Werner: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, München: C.H.Beck 2006 (3rd
2.2.2 Emancipation

Mosse differentiates a number of phases or stages in the process of Jewish emancipation in Germany: “The first of these, extending from 1781 to 1815, witnessed the initial debates on the ‘Jewish Question’ accompanied by some early legislative enactments. This is likely to have culminated in the abortive attempt in 1815 to achieve an all-German solution. The next phase, extending to 1847, to the accompaniment of continued debate, saw a series of retrograde measures. The revolutions of 1848-49 then became the occasion of a second unsuccessful attempt at general emancipation. During the following period extending to 1871, initial political setbacks, accompanied, however, by rapid economic advance, were followed by a period of Liberal ascendency that saw the completion of legal emancipation.”  

This process was accompanied by a process of rapid acculturation which resulted in a limited social and cultural integration into German society. However, there remained a tendency for Jews to be socially segregated. This assessment is shared by Katz who points out that “in Germany the struggle for emancipation was focused first on the legislative bodies of the respective states” and that “important improvement in their legal status was achieved by the Jews of Frankfurt and the country of Württemberg in 1824 and 1828 respectively”. But although free choice of occupation and rights of residence were obtained, he argues, these can only be considered piecemeal amendments that “fell short of the coveted equality of rights”. Although the claims for Jewish legal emancipation gained strength in 1848-49, “a radical and universal remedy was secured only in 1866 and 1871 when, through the unification of the northern countries of Germany and the of the whole Reich by Bismarck, a new constitution, promulgated for the

---


128 See ibid, pp. 77, 80.


130 Ibid., p. 197.
North German Federation in 1869, accepted the principle of citizenship independent of religious confession”. By law, Jewish emancipation in Germany was completed in 1871, when the constitution prompted equal legal status to Jews and Germans. Although Jews remained barred from positions in the German armed forces and were not admitted to the bar, they became considerably acculturated and thrived in academia and other fields of occupations, successfully established small businesses and became industrialists.

However, the long road to formal emancipation was uneven and the transformation of Jewish society took a long time. Reinhard Rürup observes how, before the onset of emancipation, “Jews constituted a minority inexorably set apart from the majority by its religion, its language, culture and customs, its ancestry and its economic practices. They were looked upon as aliens whose residence in the country was of limited duration in in principle revocable, even where they had been settled for generations in one and the same locality.” Although they enjoyed the protection of the state, Jews were not members of civil society. Similarly, Werner Mosse points out that “a distinctive social stratification had developed within German Jewry in the course of the eighteenth century” due to restrictions on Jewish economic activity. Most Jews lived in precarious social and economic conditions as Hausierer (peddler) and Trödler (second-hand dealer), only very few of them were situated higher on the social scale as Hofjuden (court Jews), Adelsbürger (gentry) and Münzjuden (coin Jews). Jews were excluded from professional associations like guilds. The majority of Jews lived in villages or towns of fewer than twenty thousand inhabitants and Jewish communities in major cities were rel-

---

131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
134 See Mosse, Werner E.: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p. 61.
135 Ibid.
The History of Antisemitism in Britain and Germany

At a comparatively small: Hamburg in 1816 had 7,000, Breslau 4,409, Frankfurt 4,309 and Berlin 3,373 Jewish inhabitants. The Jewish legal status varied between and within the different territories of the German Empire until the second half of the nineteenth century. Generally, the situation was comparatively less restrictive for Jews in the newer provinces of South and East Prussia, where local Jews did not face professional disabilities and were allowed to work in handicrafts, farming, cattle breeding, transport and were admitted to perform wage labour. The percentage of Jews varied in the different German states, as well as their living conditions - in Bavaria, for example, they were banned from the cities.

Shulamit Volkov points out that:

“Up until the end of the eighteenth century, and in many cases well into the nineteenth, the majority of Jews were still living among their kind and their contacts with non-Jews, though perhaps more intense than one usually assumed, remained within clearly defined boundaries. They spoke a western Yiddish that was close to a German medieval dialect, and their conspicuously different dress marked them as strangers everywhere. (...) While they were not officially enclosed in real ghettos, they did usually live on certain streets (Judengassen) and in separate houses (Judenhäuser).”

But through the removal of restrictions on their economic activity Jews were able to move up the economic - and perhaps social - ladder. Mosse emphasises that “assisted by large and industrious families and notably wives, endowed with commercial expertise, an entrepreneurial spirit, and varying amounts of capital, they had risen not only into the rising German Bürgertum but also within it”, so that “upward economic mobility had preceded the completion of

---

137 See Mosse: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p.64.
140 Ibid.
The emancipation process did not reduce prejudice. On the contrary, it fostered negative perceptions of Jews. Humanist thinkers, most notably Christian Wilhelm Dohm, argued that Jews should be granted the same civil rights in order to make them “happier, better people, more useful members of society”. This legal equality therefore needed to coincide with a “moral education” of Jews in the values of the Enlightenment. Many German states consequently pursued an “educational policy” with regard to the Jews, in which legal equality was only granted in accordance with their “improvement”. Other thinkers however disagreed with Dohm and argued that “Mosaic law prevented the total integration of Jews within Christian society”. Many humanist thinkers, however, recognised that the social status of the Jews was not due to their ‘nature’, but due to prejudices and discrimination against them. They were thus in favour of a legal emancipation of the Jews. In turn, however, they expected Jews to give up their Jewishness in order to be part of a secular society, which, as they saw it, would also eradicate antisemitism. They favoured an ‘educational’ approach to integrate Jews into the majority society, meaning that Jews should be taught how to become ‘bürgerlich’. This perspective shaped the emancipation process in Germany, so that German Jews only very slowly gained legal equality and always on the condition of assimilation.

Although humanist thinkers recognised that anti-Jewish attitudes were based on prejudices, they considered Jewishness to be an obstacle for emancipation. Jews were only considered equal members of society without their Jewishness. Thus, the humanist’s approach to antisemitism was in itself anti-Jewish.

Jews themselves were divided on how to respond to the demand for change,

---

141 Mosse: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p. 77.
145 The major publication on this subject was Dohm, Christian Wilhelm: Über die Bürgerliche Verbesserung der Juden, Berlin 1783.
but eventual transformations in Jewish self-government, education and religion led to acculturation. The religious reform movement within the Jewish community even aimed at altering the image of Judaism for the general public and at adapting it towards the Christian example. Jews - and Christians alike - “came to believe that in the future Jews would share in the common culture and differ from Christians in their religion alone”. For most Jews, therefore, the aim was to become culturally German, while maintaining a Jewish belief.

Although Jews were increasingly integrated into German cultural life, and similarly into the political and social life - Jews were for example allowed into the army and local parliaments - they nevertheless remained excluded from state offices, clubs, and dignitaries’ associations. Michael Brenner concluded that “even as the door to German society was being opened to them, Jews were still barred from entering its innermost chambers”.

The German-Jewish population also experienced a major demographic change. After 1848 a rapid urbanisation occurred and Jews moved from rural areas and small towns to larger urban centres. Profound changes in the social and economic spheres coincided with this development and the majority of Jews moved up into the middle class. The number of Jews residing in the German states grew from 400,000 in 1848 to 470,000 in 1867, 1.2 per cent of the total population. But there was generally a high rate of emigration, despite the immigration of Jews from Eastern Europe.

As in Britain, German Jews reacted apprehensively to Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe during the 1880s. “Many of them found it necessary

---

to reiterate the distinction between themselves and the ‘backward’ newcomers’.\textsuperscript{151} This can be interpreted as an attempt by Jews to display a ‘true’ German identity and loyalty to the German state, which they felt was necessary in order to be accepted as Germans. The immigrants quickly joined the assimilationist efforts.\textsuperscript{152} Still, by 1919, 12\% of all Jews in Germany, mostly from the East, did not possess German citizenship and were legally considered resident aliens. The former immigrants and their descendants generally lived in an urban areas. About two thirds of them spoke German as a mother tongue.\textsuperscript{153}

The population of the Jewish community in Germany grew again between 1871 and 1910 from 512,000 to 615,000, but remained a proportion of around 1 per cent of the population.\textsuperscript{154} For German Jews at the time religious practice and identity became increasingly family-focussed. Bildung (cultivation), a trait that brought with it bourgeois respectability and yet fitted with a Jewish identity, became a central value. Bourgeois status was maintained through education, but also arranged marriages.\textsuperscript{155} The education of Jewish children equalled that of other German children - discipline, nationalism, the classics - and Jewish children received religious lessons only in private. Most Jews worked in commerce, some in industry, and some were able to build larger enterprises out of their small shops or their peddler stock and consequently acquired considerable wealth. But during the emancipation era, Germans were generally hostile to what they perceived as the ‘money grubbing’ exploitative ‘Jewish’ work ethic. The German work ethic, meaning housekeeping and agriculture, on the other hand, was described as ‘productive’.\textsuperscript{156} With the changing economy and growing capitalist middle class, the Jew came to embody everything the Germans disliked. This was a theme of the best-selling

\textsuperscript{151}\textsuperscript{ See Volkov: Germans, Jews, and Antisemites, p. 264.}
\textsuperscript{152}\textsuperscript{ Ibid, p. 272.}
\textsuperscript{153}\textsuperscript{ Ibid, p. 266.}
\textsuperscript{154}\textsuperscript{ See Kaplan, Marion: As Germans and as Jews in Imperial Germany, in idem (ed.): Jewish Daily Life in Germany, 1618-1945, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005, p. 175.}
\textsuperscript{155}\textsuperscript{ Ibid, p. 200.}
\textsuperscript{156}\textsuperscript{ Ibid, p. 215.}
Bildungsromane (educational novels) at the time, most notably in Soll und Haben (Debit and Credit) by Gustav Freytag, whose story evolves around a corrupt ‘Jewish’ speculator and an honest capitalist.

While the process of Jewish assimilation into German society was based on upward mobility, the Bürgertum was actually actively constructed by Germans and Jews who were climbing up the social ladder. The integration of Jews can therefore not be understood as an imitation of German culture, but has to be analysed against the backdrop of the complex processes and transformations of German nation building.

But while the Verbürgerlichung of German Jews in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was similar to that experienced by other members of the lower social strata, in contrast to any other social climbers, the integration of Jews into German society was discussed and disputed, because Christian society doubted if the Jews were willing and able to integrate. The Jewish cultural and legal emancipation process was always accompanied by a general anti-Jewish climate. There were numerous deliberately anti-Jewish laws in various German states and frequent violent attacks against the Jewish population. Emancipation was also characterised by an idea of “education” and “betterment” which meant total assimilation and implied the negation of any Jewish identity.

When the positive economic trend of the previous years was reversed and the Great Depression began in 1873, lasting until the mid-1890s, there was again widespread anti-Jewish hostility. “Anticapitalist resentment found a ready target in the Jews, widely blamed for fraudulent manipulations of the so called Gründungsschwindel”. Jewish social integration received a major setback. There were anti-Jewish campaigns and petitions, incidents of expul-

157 Volkov: Germans, Jews and Antisemites, p.178.
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid., p. 192.
161 See bid, pp. 27, 55, 84, 251.
162 See Mosse: Jewish Emancipation in Germany, p. 88.
The assimilation of immigrant Jews and demands for restriction on immigration. “There was a general anti-emancipatory and anti-Jewish atmosphere”. Historian Heinrich von Treitschke, most notably, wrote in 1879 that Jews of the Diaspora were people without a state, without history and without language, that they lived scattered around the world and abandon their identity, but at the same time always remain a separate nation and thus are at fault for the justifiable popular feelings against them.

It was during this time that the term ‘antisemitism’ (or ‘anti-Semitism’) was coined by the German Wilhelm Marr in 1873. It was the attempt to establish and rationalise anti-Jewish hostility. It ‘enhanced’ previous existing prejudices against Jews. Marr classified all Jews as ‘Semitic’ and established a counter movement against the perceived threat Jews posed to German culture. In pseudo-scientific ‘race’ theories, which became popular in the nineteenth century, the ‘Semitic race’ was constructed as a clearly defined ethnic group inferior to the constructed ‘Aryan race’. In Nazi Germany, this racialised anti-Jewish ideology merged with perceptions of Jewish power and a Jewish world conspiracy, which allegedly posed such a serious threat to Germany that it could only be averted with the destruction of all Jews on earth.

The assimilation that was demanded of German Jews during their emancipation did not eradicate antisemitism, but the question of Jewish emancipation and the idea of the ‘danger’ unassimilated Jews pose to Germany was revived at the end of the nineteenth century in the Berliner Antisemitismusstreit. Heinrich von Treitschke explained that emancipation was a gift of the Prussian monarchy to the Jews, who should behave accordingly. Treitschke warned of a cultural mix of German and Jewish heritage and proclaimed that the Jews as Jews were Germany’s misfortune. The Antisemitismusstreit was accompanied by massive anti-Jewish agitation and physical attacks on Jews.

In addition, to the Jews’ misfortune, Treitschke’s ideas of a danger of mixing
different cultures was easily connected with the emerging race science at the
time, which gave antisemitism a pseudo-biological basis. Race science under-
stood anti-Jewish resentments as part of a necessary conflict between different
‘races’.166

Many German Jews were very aware of the threat antisemitism posed to their
community, but there were different opinions on how antisemitism could be
explained. Jacob Katz pointed out that there were two fundamental concepts
that attempted to explain the antisemitism of the 1870s. One concept, which
was predominant in the Jewish community, believed that antisemitism was
a kind of social disease that could be avoided if only the competitors of the
Jews were not as jealous, if only the Jews were less ambitious, if only the
Christians were truly tolerant. This approach was characterised by a hope for
eventually achieving good minority-majority relations. The other approach,
as Katz emphasised, was the Zionist hypothesis, which was characterised by
“despair of ever seeing Jews integrated fully into Gentile society as equals”.
The only remedy proposed to this was emigration.167 Katz added that there
was also a socialist hypothesis, which saw antisemitism as part of the nature
of the capitalist system. Jews filled a highly visible role as investors and as
soon as the system showed signs of weakness, they would become a target for
criticism and accusation.168

Mosse argues that the antisemitism of that time had a novel feature, as
it targeted precisely emancipated and assimilated Jews. He points out that
in the 1880s and 1890s, Jews were virtually eliminated from German public
life. What he calls the great antiliberal and anti-emancipatory reaction led to
manifestations of anti-Jewish sentiments and the exclusion of Jews from volun-

166 For an overview of German race science and its adaption in National Socialism see
Schmuhl, Hans Walter: Rassenhygiene, Nationalsozialismus, Euthanasie. Von der
Verhütung zur Vernichtung ‘lebensunwerten Lebens’, 1890-1945, Goettingen: Vanden-
hoek 1987.
167 See Katz, Jacob: From Prejudice to Destruction, Anti-Semitism 1700-1933, Cambridge
168 Ibid., See also Schorsch, Ismar: Jewish Reactions to Anti-Semitism 1870-1914, New York
tary associations like fraternities and sports clubs.\textsuperscript{169} In practice, “the eighties and nineties witnessed the virtual elimination of Jews from German public life, not by the revocation of emancipation, but by administrative means”.\textsuperscript{170} As a result, “Jews were thrown back on their own resources”, so “wherever they were barred from membership, conspicuously in student fraternities and corporations, they created their own organisations”.\textsuperscript{171} As a response to the challenge of antisemitism, Jews founded a defence organisation in 1893, the Centralverein Deutsche Staatsburger Jüdischen Glaubens (Central Association of German Citizens of the Jewish Faith), known as C.V. The C.V. was pro-assimilationist and was therefore opposed to Zionist organisations, which it considered displayed a disloyalty to the German state.\textsuperscript{172}

One aim of the Centralverein was to combat the rising antisemitism in Germany.\textsuperscript{173} Through publications and later through their weekly newspaper, which appeared from 1922, the CV tried to raise awareness on the issue. From 1928 and with the support of Alfred Wiener, it documented Nazi activities and disseminated anti-Nazi material.

Historians disagree on whether these developments mean that Jewish emancipation in Germany failed. Michael Meyer points out that “the assimilated German Jews, paradoxically, drew attention to themselves on account of behaviour that was intrinsically assimilatory”. He argues that “if they truly wanted to be like everyone else, they had certainly failed”. Instead they “became more educated, more cultured than the norm”, which “aroused resentment”.\textsuperscript{174} As an objective, Meyer concludes, the process of assimilation pro-

\textsuperscript{169}See Mosse: Jewish emancipation in Germany, pp. 90-91.
\textsuperscript{170}Ibid, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{171}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{172}On the Centralverein see Schorsch: Jewish Reactions to Anti-Semitism 1870-1914.
ceeded very far, but “as a way of calling less attention to Jews it failed” because “in seeking to become more like everyone else, the German Jews nonetheless had remained different”.\textsuperscript{175}

Volkov stresses that although Jews participated in the intellectual life of the new Germany and consumed its cultural and material products, were integrated into new professions and residential areas, and relinquished many of their customs and social institutions, they had, at the same time, developed a unique private culture, a new form of Judaism that was accepting modernity, but still tied them together as a group.\textsuperscript{176} She argues that Jews were seeking to preserve their identity and at the same time integrate into German culture. Antisemitism, Jewish immigration from Eastern Europe and the complexities of the assimilation process itself led to a “dissimilation”, in which Jews distinguished themselves from the majority society, for example by founding Jewish organisations as substitutes for German organisations that did not grant them membership. Volkov interprets the establishment of the C.V., intended as an organisation serving the fight against antisemitism, as a form of organised return to Judaism.\textsuperscript{177}

The attempt to preserve a distinct Jewish identity was in Christian Wiese’s view an “anti-colonial” impulse “inherent in the demand to recognise Judaism as a cultural force of at least the same value as the Western Christian tradition”.\textsuperscript{178} In his study on the \textit{Wissenschaft des Judentums}, a nineteenth century movement based on the analysis of Jewish traditions from a deliberately Jewish point of view, he points out that “by contesting the master narrative of Western history, which was rooted in concepts of Christian religious supremacy and which metaphorically described Judaism as a “dead”,

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{175}Ibid, p. 25.
\textsuperscript{176}See Volkov: Germans, Jews and Antisemites, pp. 223, 263.
\textsuperscript{177}Ibid., p.260.
\end{flushright}
obsolete and even dangerous tradition, and by exploring Christianity from a Jewish point of view, the *Wissenschaft des Judentums* served as an important element of Jewish self-empowerment and provided a new version of Jewish and of European history, subversive and disturbing from a Christian perspective but bringing relief from a Jewish perspective*. 

The Jewish experience can be interpreted as ‘refused normality’, as “the majority of non-Jewish society, including most of the liberal intelligentsia, developed a completely opposite concept of ‘normality’ that culminated in the claim that Jews should gradually give up their so-called *Sonderbewusstsein* and thereby demonstrate their successful social and cultural integration*. 

But the Jewish enthusiasm for the First World War perhaps shows that Jews still felt obliged to demonstrate their Germanness. Although Ulrich Sieg argues that neither total assimilation nor hyper-patriotism characterised the Jewish war experience, but a “normal” German national engagement accompanied by a careful note of rising antisemitism, it is plausible that they had hoped to gain equality in German society through proving their patriotic spirit. 

Nevertheless, there were continuous efforts to discriminate against Jews in the German military and Jews were denounced as ‘cop-outs’ (*Drückeberger*). The right wing parties in the German parliament succeeded in lobbying for a ‘Jew count’, which was intended to examine the Jews’ commitment to the armed forces. It was never published. This gave way to yet more antisemitic charges and Bergmann argues that Jews felt generally disappointed in their country. 

But anti-Jewish hostility only grew more serious and culminated in the ‘*Dolchstosslegende*’ (stab-in-the-back-legend), which implied that international Jewry and German-Jewish revolutionaries were responsible for Ger-

---

179Ibid, p.82.
180Ibid, p.100.
182Bergmann: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, p.66.
many’s defeat in 1918.

After the First World War Jews continued to live in the Weimar Republic without drastic changes to their status - other than perhaps those originating in economic losses due to the financial crisis. But although integration developed further, anti-Jewish hostility increased as well. There is evidence that in light of the still difficult social relations, there was a ‘renaissance of Jewish culture’ among Jews in Weimar Germany. The systematic construction of a particular Jewish sphere was actually compatible with a participation in the larger non-Jewish society and culture. According to Brenner, the Jews of modern Germany served as an example of a minority population inventing or reinterpreting its tradition. “The process of establishing a distinct Jewish sphere in various cultural branches was expressed by a discourse whose basic patterns were taken over from the larger German society and transformed into a distinctly Jewish context.” Jews were thus, Brenner points out, attracted to the same ideas as many non-Jewish Germans at the time: Gemeinschaft, irrationalism, wholeness, statistics and hygiene. The Jewish cultural renaissance “promoted an allegedly authentic Judaism, just as German society propagated genuine forms of culture, as opposed to what was conceived as the decadent and superficial civilisation of the modern Western world.” Brenner furthermore notes that the changing self-definition within the liberal majority of German Jews led to a gradual shift from a community of faith to a community of common descent, exhibited in the fact that the Jewish Gemeinde in Weimar Germany was more and more dedicated to secular tasks in social welfare, culture and education.

The renaissance of Jewish culture in Weimar Germany can thus be interpreted as an attempt at Jewish self-definition within the majority culture, rather than as opposition to it. Jewish identity in Weimar Germany can more adequately be described as ‘hybrid’: Jews integrated into society but kept ex-

---
185 Ibid., p.6.
186 Ibid., p.6.
187 Ibid.
clusively Jewish networks. As Marion Kaplan puts it, “they had succeeded in redefining their “Jewishness” as individuals and as communities”.\textsuperscript{188}

Jewish life in Germany before 1933 - and even after for that matter - cannot be neatly pressed into one single scheme. This would neglect “deep schisms in German society during the era of modernisation, and the actual participation of minorities in all the tribulations of ambivalence brought about by that era”.\textsuperscript{189} Nevertheless, the German Jewish experience up to 1918 is characterised by encounters of serious hostility and only piecemeal integration, which not only becomes apparent when examining public discourse at the time, but also the Jewish responses to it, which often show that Jews felt it especially necessary to display patriotism and loyalty.

### 2.2.3 The Holocaust

Although Jews succeeded in establishing a ‘hybrid’ identity and indeed contributed much to a German society that was as a whole dealing with a process of emancipation, their integration into German society remained fragile. As Sieg points out, the war enhanced social fragmentation and boosted racist and \textit{volkisch} thought in Germany.\textsuperscript{190} Shortly after the First World War, anti-semitism became more radical than before and frequently erupted in violence; it was furthermore not only expressed by radical groups but also by parts of the majority population, which was connected to a general political radicalisation and the economic situation.\textsuperscript{191} While economic stabilisation led to a calmer period between 1924 and 1928, there was, despite a high level of integration, a silent exclusion of Jews from public organisations, clubs and universities.\textsuperscript{192} Peter Pulzer argues that it is difficult to fit the story of Weimar Jewry into one scheme. Although formal rights were now complete, as they had not been under the Empire, and discrimination by public bodies diminished, all of these were uncertain gains. “The new rights for Jews and their increased partic-

\textsuperscript{188}See Kaplan: Jewish Daily Life in Germany 1618-1945, p. 382.
\textsuperscript{189}Volkov: Germans, Jews and Antisemites, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{190}See Sieg: “Nothing more German than the Jews?” p. 216.
\textsuperscript{191}See Bergmann: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, p. 72.
\textsuperscript{192}See ibid., p. 78.
ipation were contested, because they were part of a wider democratisation also contested. The best measure of this was the fluctuating impact of antisemitism.\textsuperscript{193} Antisemitism increased yet again in the 1930s and in 1933, with the establishment of the National Socialist German state, antisemitism became state-sponsored and Jews were forced out of the German “racial” collective.\textsuperscript{194}

The exclusion of Jews from German society gradually radicalised; early discrimination and economic boycotts were soon followed by laws and measures that deprived German Jews of their civil rights and affected their professional as well as private life. Jews were forced out of public positions by law, quotas were implemented concerning Jewish students at schools and universities, Jews who had immigrated from Eastern Europe in 1918 were deprived of their citizenship, Jews were excluded from the press and Jewish students lost their right to finish their degrees in certain subjects. The \textit{Nürnberg Gesetze} from 1935 made intermarriages illegal, deprived all Jews of their rights as citizens and defined who was to be considered “Jewish” according to racial science. Being a Jew in Germany from then on not only meant a lower social status, it led to various forms of persecutions that affected daily life: personal documents were stamped with the letter ‘J’, park benches were reserved ‘for Aryans only’ and Jews were prohibited from visiting public swimming baths.\textsuperscript{195} Since 1935, anti-Jewish violence had increased and several pogroms took place. On November 9 1938, a state-coordinated and planned nation wide attack on Jewish people, synagogues and shops took place during which over 90 Jews lost their lives and around 30,000 Jewish men were arrested and temporarily incarcerated in concentration camps. Jews were forced out of the German economy and in 1938 a law was implemented that led to an \textit{Arisierung} - expropriation - of Jewish businesses. The daily reality of deprivation, ghettoization and social stigmatisation led to Jewish emigration; in 1939 75,000-80,000 Jews managed


\textsuperscript{194} See Kaplan: Jewish Daily Life in Germany 1618-1945, p. 382.

\textsuperscript{195} See Bergmann: Geschichte des Antisemitismus, p. 105.
to emigrate, despite immigration restrictions in the countries they wished to move to. With the onset of the war, however, emigration became severely restricted. The 200,000 Jews who remained in Germany - forced or voluntarily - were increasingly socially stigmatised, they were used for forced labour, were rounded up to live in distinct *Judenhäuser* and were only allowed to shop during limited times. A police order from September 1941 obliged Jews to wear a yellow star visible on their clothing. From October 1941, German Jews were systematically deported to Eastern Europe and killed by German forces.  

At the end of the Second World War in 1945, around 6 million Jews from all over Europe had died in a planned, systematic genocide that took place in extermination camps in Chelmno, Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Majdanek, Belzec and Sobibor, as well as in various ghettos, killing sites, concentration and labour camps across Germany.

There is not a single Jewish experience in Germany between 1933 and 1945, there are many experiences. Discrimination, persecution and the inconceivable atrocity of the Shoah, however, had an impact on every single Jewish life in Germany and has therefore an unparallelled significance for a post-Holocaust Jewish identity.

### 2.2.4 Jews in postwar Germany

Eva Kolinsky points out that “while scenarios of a new beginning varied between individuals, all shared a fear of Germany”. They reasonably asked themselves how they could “live in a country where anyone and everyone might have been a perpetrator, a guard, a tormenter and killer, and where the vast majority of the population had looked on or away when Jews were deported and maltreated?” Clearly, “in the eyes of Jewish Holocaust survivors, Germany was no place to live, let alone build a future in”. 

---

196 Ibid, p.106.
197 Ibid., p. 115.
199 Ibid.
In 1946/47, around 230,000 displaced Jews waited for resettlement in Germany. Most of them were placed in Displaced Persons camps. The few that decided to live elsewhere had to rely on state benefits, because their former possessions were not returned to them.

Atina Grossmann describes the Jewish experience and identity formation in the DP camps:

“From a ragged and exhausted group of displaced persons with very different backgrounds and wartime experiences there emerged over several years a new and self-conscious Jewish collectivity. They publicly identified as survivors of Nazi extermination plans, even if, as was the case for many of them, they had escaped because they had landed, either by choice or by force, in the Soviet Union. They appeared fiercely committed to Zionism and Jewish identity, even if, in many ways, this collective was only invented in the transitional protected and highly ideologized life of the DP camps.”

In addition to that, Grossman points out, Jewish officials in the young Federal Republic identified and criticised antisemitic tendencies, which seemed to intensify. Germans perceived the remaining DPs not as victims of persecution, but “as ‘asocial’ and ‘homeless’ foreigners, ‘parasites’ on West Germany’s developing economy and efforts to integrate millions of ethnic German refugees.”

Against this background, many Jews indeed emigrated to Israel as soon as possible, some, however, did decide to stay in Germany as they gained a voice and protected space in the stabilising democracy.

Michael Brenner identifies a total of 18,000 Jews living in 70 communities across Germany in 1952. This small heterogeneous group - the Jewish com-

---

200Ibid, p. 4.
201Ibid.
204See Kolinsky: After the Holocaust, p. 6.
205See Brenner, Michael: Epilogue or Preface, in: Romberg, Otto and Urban-Fahr, Susanne
munities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German communities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German communities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German communities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German communities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German communities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German communities in Germany are immigration communities that are culturally not homogeneous - grew and diversified in the subsequent decades. In the 1960s and 1970s, as Brenner points out, Jews immigrated to Germany from Persia, Hungary, Poland and the Soviet Union. In addition, “there was also a large, difficult-to-estimate influx of Israeli Jews of Ashkenazic and Oriental origin”. In the 1980s Jews gained more public representation, new synagogues and schools were built and their infrastructure boomed. The most significant change in the German Jewish community, however, has been the immigration of around 50,000 Jews from the former Soviet states in the 1990s.

These Jews gained privileged entry into Germany, but remained foreigners by nationality and thus disadvantaged in their treatment. It seems paradoxical, but the Jewish population in Germany is the only one that is increasing in comparison with other European states and is only surpassed by Jewish immigration to Israel and the USA. Kolinsky argues that by offering refuge for Russian-Jewish immigrants, “Jewish communities have affirmed their belief in Germany as a place where Jews might live safely”.

Because they were so small in size the Jewish communities in Germany initially had to rely on help from abroad in establishing their community structures, schools, and religious education. In the 1950s many organisations were rebuilt, like the Zionist organisation and the Jewish student union. The Allgemeine Jüdische Wochenzeitung reappeared in 1946.

Despite these rebuilding efforts, German-Jewish relations have remained fraught with difficulties. Although public expressions of antisemitism became a taboo, there were nevertheless continuous forms of antisemitism in German
society. Post-Holocaust antisemitism took on a variety of forms, but so called ‘secondary’ antisemitism, anti-Jewish prejudice that accuses Jews of being responsible for the German suffering after the Holocaust and of (financially) exploiting the memory, has had significant meaning for post-Holocaust German national identity and has widely appeared as an attitude beyond right wing circles.\textsuperscript{212}

\textsuperscript{212}See Rensmann, Lars: Demokratie und Judenbild, Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften 2004, p. 79.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

As we have seen in the last chapter, there was a history of antisemitism in both Germany and Britain, and in both countries there were forms of postwar antisemitism. The question I am trying to answer is what concepts were developed to understand this phenomenon, and how did these concepts relate to impressions of postwar immigration of non-Jewish minorities?

What this chapter shows is that in Britain, in contrast to Germany, the Holocaust did not prove a similar source of motivation to understand antisemitism and develop theories and approaches to the issue. While just after the Holocaust, some corresponding developments with regard to theorisations of antisemitism can be detected in both countries, the British and German paths soon diverged and British theories on antisemitism developed differently than their German counterparts. Paradoxically, antisemitism in Britain came to be understood not through the prism of the Holocaust and exterminationist antisemitism, but through the prism of colonial immigration to Britain. This development has to be understood in the context of how colonial immigration was perceived, what effects it had and what role it played in British national self-understanding.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

3.1 Britain: Understanding antisemitism through colonial immigration

When analysing approaches to antisemitism in the 1960s in Britain, the most glaring fact is that there were almost none. Antisemitism was of almost no interest outside the Jewish community, and although it was certainly a concern for British Jews, there were initially no explanations or theories at hand to understand antisemitism, and, on this basis, to build campaigns against it. This situation has to be understood in the context of the timid character and anxiety of the Anglo-Jewish community. Although there were fears among British Jews with regard to domestic antisemitism, the strategy of the Jewish community was to stress integration and loyalty to the British state, rather than to emphasise any anti-Jewish tendencies in British society.

Richard Bolchover has indicated that this mentality was characteristic for the Anglo-Jewish community even during the Holocaust. His study of Anglo-Jewish reactions to the Holocaust showed that these were overwhelmingly timid.1 To be sure, in light of events on the continent, some explanatory attempts were made. James Parkes, an early anti-antisemite, for example, interpreted antisemitism as an abnormal hostility towards Jews. Abnormal in the sense that “there is no adequate explanation for the form or severity of its manifestation in the actual contemporary conduct of the Jews against whom it is directed.”2 Although Parkes was further ahead than many of his contemporaries when he emphasised the disconnection between Jewish behaviour and antisemitism,3 his theoretical attempts did not translate into practical approaches against antisemitism. There was no effective or popular campaign to push the British government to help persecuted Jews from the continent. But

3 For an overview of James Parkes’ works on antisemitism see also the introductory chapter in Kushner, Tony and Valman, Nadia (eds.): Philosemitism, Antisemitism and ‘the Jews’, Perspectives from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century, Aldershot: Ashgate 2004.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Bolchover explained this with the insecurity the British Jewish community felt. "It was because British Jews had neither collective self-esteem nor a sense of being in control of their own lives. As a result they had no inclination to take risks. Anglo-Jewry had a phobia about anti-semitism - a neurosis which at times verged on self-hatred. Thus there could be no self-assertion in the face of adversity, rather paralysis marked by a series of absorbing and debilitating conflicts."\(^4\)

The most notable exception to what Bolchover described was the work undertaken by Alfred Wiener, a German Jew who had fled to Holland in 1933 and then to Britain in 1939. Wiener had been an executive in the *Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens* in Germany and took with him large amounts of documentation on the Nazi regime that he had amassed since the start of the Third Reich and which served as a source of information for the British government and the press. The Jewish Central Information Office, as it was first called, became the Wiener Library in 1947.\(^5\)

But although British Jews were concerned about what happened in Germany, this did not translate into more serious attempts to conduct research into *English* antisemitism. Only in 1954, two social-psychological studies were undertaken by J. H. Robb and H. J. Eysenck, who, inspired by continental approaches to the issue, wanted to understand attitudes towards Jews among members of British society.

3.1.1 Psychological approaches to antisemitism in the 1950s and beyond

Because antisemitism was not acknowledged as a serious social problem in Britain, no attempt was made to adequately explain and understand it. However, for a brief moment in the 1950s, antisemitism became a subject in political psychology. The above mentioned quantitative study by Eysenck in

\(^4\)Bolchover, Richard: British Jewry and the Holocaust, p. 156.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

1954 on political opinions and attitudes also looked at attitudes towards Jews. James H. Robb undertook a study in working class antisemitism in 1954. Both Eysenck’s and Robb’s study were influenced by the social-psychological approaches to antisemitism and fascism developed by Theodor W. Adorno and others in the _Authoritarian Personality_, a study conducted in the US. Eysenck’s study established different categories on a personality scale, ranging from radicalism to conservatism and tough-mindedness to tender-mindedness. He understood antisemitism, as, for example, ‘anti-Negroism’, as one item on a personality scale, in this case correlating with conservatism and tough-mindedness, therefore explaining antisemitism as part of an individual’s psyche.

In comparison, Robb took a more sophisticated theoretical approach in his psycho-analytical study. As a basis for his study, he established that prejudice is not biologically inherited, but arises in the course of an individual’s social development. Additionally, he took it as a matter of fact that Jewish stereotypes do not correspond with reality. Through interviews and psychological tests with a sample of members of the working class in Bethnal Green, the author came to the conclusion that some individuals are predisposed to antisemitism. These individuals were affected by anxiety-creating situations and suffered from feelings of powerlessness, pessimism and isolation. Devoid of the ability to reflect their situations and see themselves in a critical light, these individuals then blamed their misfortune on an ‘outgroup’, which in Bethnal Green happened to be the Jews. As an example, the author described one of his interviewees, Bob, whose career as a mechanic had been characterised by security and stability. The one dismissal that he did experience, however, Bob indirectly blamed on the Jews: “those Yids”, he said, can drive Englishmen out of their livelihood. Additionally, Bob expressed that “Jews have manoeuvred

---

9Robb, J H: Working-Class Anti-Semite, p.35.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

themselves into the position of being able to get the best of everything, particularly food”. Robb pointed out how Bob thought that “kosher rites (...) were merely ways of seeing that the best English meats go on to Jewish tables, while the likes of Bob must be content with imported frozen stuff”.

Robb therefore came to the conclusion that it is essentially a feeling of deprivation that causes antisemitism among individuals like Bob. The study’s ratings showed that people who suffered less deprivation, or who interpreted their deprivation differently, were less likely to be antisemitic. One major finding of the study was that “the characteristics attributed to the Jewish group under these circumstances are likely to reflect some of the needs and repressed wishes of the hostile individual”. The author additionally found that antisemitic individuals have “narrow, constricted, poorly organised personalities which are frequently displayed as clear-cut neurotic and even psychotic symptoms”, and that “they display a marked degree of pessimism and lack of confidence in themselves and in the groups to which they belong, but the weaknesses implied in these attitudes are not expressed and the attitudes are justified by the reference to the power of external forces”. According to Robb, the antisemitic character probably had a difficult, inconsistent childhood that produced a severe anxiety. This anxiety might then be turned inwards, resulting in depression, or projected onto another group. The study also came to the conclusion that there is no apparent connection between fascism and antisemitism, as only very few of the antisemites interviewed supported the movement. The main conclusion was that antisemitism “is a particular manifestation of prejudice rather than a unique situation”. Robb suggested that it is therefore related to what he called ‘anti-Negroism’.

Just like Eysenck’s study, Robb’s theoretical approach was also clearly inspired by American studies on the Authoritarian Character. Antisemitism was explained in terms of psychoanalytical categories, in which feelings of depri-

11Ibid, p. 163.
12Ibid, p.165.
13p.173 f.
14Ibid, pp. 156-173.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

eviation can lead to prejudiced attitudes. While this explanatory approach had
been very influential in German antisemitism research,\textsuperscript{15} it remained an aberra-
tion to approaches to antisemitism in Britain. In contrast to the overwhelming
majority of later antisemitism theories, Robb assumed that anti-Jewish stereo-
types do not correspond with reality, but in fact describe the felt shortcomings
of the antisemite. This has by no means always been agreed upon in later
antisemitism research in Britain. As in Germany, the theory of the Authori-
tarian Character also influenced empirical studies on attitudes towards recent
immigrants in Britain, for example W.W. Daniel’s study on racial discrimina-
tion.\textsuperscript{16} However, in contrast to Germany, social-psychological approaches to
antisemitism (or racism) did not become a dominant topic for researchers.

One exception was Michael Billig’s 1978 study on the radical right National
Front. In contrast to Robb and Eysenck, who saw antisemitism as similar to
what they called ‘anti-Negroism’, Billig in fact criticised those comparisons
that stated that “the National Front is just like the British Union of Fascists
except that it attacks the blacks and not the Jews”. He argued against the cur-
rent thinking within social psychology that prejudices can be easily substituted
for one another, since they are only outward signs of inner frustration and dis-
content and which predicts that economic frustration will lead to an increase
in prejudice against the nearest available and identifiable ethnic group. He ar-
gued that this is problematic, and that the National Front is the best example
for this, as “at the deepest levels of the National Front’s ideology anti-black
prejudice has not replaced anti-Semitism”.\textsuperscript{17} It has to be noted that Billig’s
point of view remained a rare exception in any antisemitism theories of the
time. As will be discussed later, even most antisemitism researchers held the
view that there may have been antisemitism in the past, but that this had now
been replaced by hostility against other ethnicities.

\textsuperscript{15}See section on Germany in this chapter.
1968.
\textsuperscript{17}Billig, Michael: Fascists, A Social Psychological View of the National Front, London:
3. As mentioned earlier, these social-psychological approaches were inspired by and therefore perhaps more similar to German approaches to antisemitism. But there were other and more dominant theoretical developments in Britain, which mark a significant difference between Germany and Britain with regard to approaches to antisemitism. While antisemitism was for example of interest to social psychologists, in the same time period, Anglo-Jewish historians marginalised the history of domestic antisemitism, which had profound effects on how contemporary antisemitism was thought about, too.

3.1.2 Approaches to domestic antisemitism

Antisemitism has in fact not been seriously discussed in Anglo-Jewish historiography until relatively recently. Where anti-Jewish currents were discussed they were characterised by their dismissal of antisemitism as a serious factor influencing Anglo-Jewish history.

The first professionally trained Anglo-Jewish historian, Cecil Roth, treated antisemitism as an un-English phenomenon and praised English tolerance. In his *History of the Jews in England* of 1941, Roth acknowledged the persecution of Jews in Britain up to their expulsion in 1290 as well as the hostility Jews encountered after readmission until the onset of emancipation. He described how many Jews found refuge in Britain from persecution on the continent, but that there was a “burst of xenophobia” when Jews immigrated from the continent during and after the French revolution. The Jews were suspected of “Jacobin sympathies” and the “Aliens Act of 1793, which placed foreigners settled in England under strict control, resulted in sporadic raids on Jewish pedlars and petty traders throughout the country, and the deportation of a number of them”.18 However, he understood the attitude of English Christians towards Jews between 1815 and 1858 as generally benevolent:

“No longer were the unbelievers considered an object for insult and reviling; they were approached in a spirit not only of friendship but almost of veneration, as the ancient people of God (...).”

---

3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

was freely admitted that Christendom owed a profound shame in respect of the past centuries of persecution and maltreatment (...) Hence in Evangelical circles the movement resulted in the development of a spirit of friendliness, which insisted on the recognition of the Jews as members of English society.”

Roth interpreted appearances of antisemitism after that as merely an anachronism. His interpretation of past antisemitism of course needs to be understood in the context of a general mentality of Anglo-Jewry at the time, which, as mentioned above, placed an emphasis on their loyalty and gratitude towards the British state. As antisemitism was not believed to be a serious threat in Britain, there was no need to develop a theory of it, not even in light of the Holocaust.

This attitude towards domestic antisemitism among historians did not change significantly until the 1980s. It also became evident in the ways the Jewish community reacted towards anti-Jewish violence. The Anglo-Jewish community at times faced serious violence, for example in Manchester and Liverpool after the explosion at the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in 1946 and the hanging of two British soldiers by Jewish guerillas at Natanya in 1947. There was a trend among leaders and members of the Jewish community to emphasise their strong roots within British society, which also involved the denial of any threat from antisemitism in Britain. This denial was upheld even during the most vicious antisemitic attacks on Jewish individuals and property.

During the anti-Jewish attacks that swept across Europe in 1960, for example, Jews continuously downplayed British antisemitism. The attacks started with a swastika daubing on a synagogue in Notting Hill in London on 31 December 1959, but vandalism against Jewish institutions and buildings continued throughout the first weeks of January 1960 and spread to many cities. This was generally seen as part of the worldwide ‘swastika plague’ that began with daubings on Christmas Eve in Germany. The Jewish Chronicle noted that the British Nazi Movement claimed responsibility.

Ibid, p.245

“Jew-Baiters Smear Swastikas In Twenty Countries – Threats to M.P.s and Communal
The British public condemned the events, but the Jewish community interpreted the attacks as marginal. In accounts and analyses of the incidents in the *Jewish Chronicle* these were interpreted as emulation of German neo-Nazi activities perpetrated by a ‘lunatic fringe’. The Minister of the Notting Hill Synagogue, Kensington Park Road, Rev. B. Susser, was cited as saying: “I think whoever did it was just trying to emulate the Germans. I do not think that we can regard it as a serious threat.”

Similarly, “a spokesman for the Board of Deputies said that the defacement of the Board’s offices and the Notting Hill Synagogue were ‘undoubtedly the work of a lunatic fringe of antisemite and Nazi sympathisers in Britain’. The Board had no doubt that the British people would not tolerate this scurrilous exhibitionism.”

Comments in the *Jewish Chronicle* showed a similar analysis. In an article titled ‘Sincerity is not enough’ in the edition of 8 January 1960, the point was made that “the widespread condemnation of the outrages by all the British press and all segments of public life are a gratifying reminder that the overwhelming majority of the British public is horrified by these squalid manifestations which offend everything which is hallowed in British tradition. This massive repudiation gives every reason for confidence that necessary measures will be taken, and is a reminder that though there is no room for complacency, there is even less room for alarm or despondency.”

This interpretation of contemporary British antisemitism stood in sharp contrast to how the same author saw post-war eruptions of antisemitism in Germany. Jew-baiting in Germany was in fact understood as by no means limited to a lunatic fringe, but it was acknowledged that “neo-Nazi organisations have tens of thousands of members, and, worse still, tentacles extend into many spheres of German life.”

---

21 “Swastika Menace Renewed – German Neo-Nazis Active – Synagogue and Monuments Defiled”, in: Jewish Chronicle, Friday 1 January 1960, title page.

22 “Strong Public Protests”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8 January 1960, title page, continued on p. 9., see also “Outrages ‘Not Organised’ ” on the same page.

23 “Sincerity is not enough”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8 January 1960, p. 18.

24 Ibid.
The comment in the following week continued in a similar tone. While not enough had been done in Germany to fight antisemitism, there should be no alarmism over antisemitic incidents in Britain: “While vigilance and firmness are as necessary as ever, it would be self-defeating to inflate clandestine daubing and anonymous letters into a major political movement, and to suggest that large-scale organised antisemitism is in the offing. What is happening outside Germany is the eruption, as though from a saturating pimple, of the poison which has been allowed to flow into the world’s bloodstream from the still active Nazi virus. Any tendency to compulsive pessimism which refuses to envisage improvement in the Jewish position can only hinder rational action and even encourages the antisemites.”

However, while the Jewish community insisted on the marginality of British antisemitism, the attacks and vandalism against Jewish institutions, including arson and petrol bomb attacks, in fact continued through the 1960s. The National Socialist Movement of Britain held a rally in Trafalgar Square in July 1962, at which it proclaimed to “Free Britain of Jewish Control” and which led to a fight with Jewish demonstrators. However, antisemitism was still seen as limited to a lunatic fringe that need not be taken too seriously. In Troubled Eden, Chaim Bermant came to the conclusion that “The antisemitism that manifestly does exist in this country is neither so deep nor so widespread that it can be harnessed for political ends.”

Bermant’s view of the issue was shared by others who studied British antisemitism. Although Colin Holmes acknowledged that “racial nationalists who operated in Britain in the late 1950s and early 1960s were undeterred and carried on their own tradition of hostility towards Jews, and continued to draw attention to what they categorised as ‘Jew-power’ and ‘the Jewish menace’, he eventually came to the conclusion that “down to 1971, however, anti-Semitism never became a serious social issue for the older and newer segments of Anglo-Jewry, and a number of factors have been brought forward to account for its

---

limited appeal." As reasons for this Holmes counted “the so called ‘recoil effect’ of the Holocaust, the favourable image of Jews which derived from the building and defence of Israel, the presence of easier targets, such as Blacks and newcomers from the Indian sub-continent, the relative affluence of postwar Britain and the alignment of interests between successive British governments and Anglo-Jewry."

In light of later research, Holmes’s analysis seemed to miss a number of key factors with regard to antisemitism in Britain entirely. It is for example questionable if there was what he called a ‘recoil effect’ of the Holocaust, or a favourable image of Jews because of the building of Israel. In hindsight, the opposite might be closer to the truth, especially with regard to the violent outbursts in reaction to events in British Mandate Palestine. But his comments make more sense when their context is taken into account: existing approaches to antisemitism were generally marginalising and dismissive. The Jewish community itself at times actively contributed to this particular perception of antisemitism. Any historic research into antisemitism by historians, most of whom were Jewish themselves, reified this position rather than challenging it.

This also applied to studies on fascism in Britain. In the 1960s antisemitism became a subject for scholars of British fascism in light of the re-emergence of fascist groups in Britain and discussions about the role of antisemitism for these groups. These approaches exactly reflected the reaction of the Jewish community to antisemitic attacks from the radical right. Colin Cross and Robert Benewick argued that antisemitism was a continental phenomenon that was only adopted by British fascists for tactical reasons and failed to win mass support. A later study by Gisela Lebzelter drew similar conclusions. Lebzelter investigated fascist antisemitism in Britain between 1918 and 1939 and said about antisemitism after the first World War that although widespread, it did

not win over the masses as it “lacked the organizational transmission necessary to stimulate a popular movement and was never exploited by any relevant political force in a deliberate attempt to stimulate anti-Jewish feelings”.\textsuperscript{29} She explained that this was due to the “relatively smooth” assimilation of Anglo-Jewry during the nineteenth century, and the absence of a historical tradition of antisemitism. She acknowledged that fascist agitators in the 1930s used antisemitic propaganda, but concluded that they did not convince the masses. The impact of antisemitic campaigns “remained limited to where it was directed against an identifiable body of foreigners, as was the case in Jewish settlement areas like the East End”.\textsuperscript{30}

This downplaying of antisemitism, even in light of antisemitic violence, characterised the overwhelming majority of studies in British-Jewish history. Apart from fascism, Jewish refugee immigration from Germany between 1939 and 1945 became a subject for British historians as well. A.J. Sherman and Bernard Wasserstein investigated the Jewish immigration and the reaction towards the refugees by the British. Sherman wrote that the standard charges that there was a lack of generosity and an indifference towards the fate of Jewish refugees from the Nazi regime “must receive the verdict ‘not proven’”.\textsuperscript{31} He argued that although the initial Government response was “sluggish and even niggardly”, a relatively large number of refugees “did manage to find sanctuary within Great Britain and her dependencies, and a comparison with other countries yields a not unimpressive record”.\textsuperscript{32} Bernard Wasserstein, on the other hand, concluded that “in spite of this relatively hospitable reception accorded to fifty thousand Jewish refugees between 1933 and 1939, there was a definite undercurrent of antagonism towards the arrivals”.\textsuperscript{33} He described how Jewish

\textsuperscript{30}Ibid, p.175.
\textsuperscript{32}Ibid.
organizations were powerless to change the guiding principles of British policy towards Jewish refugees during the war: the White Paper, limiting Jewish immigration to Palestine, remained in place, there was no admission of refugees from Nazi Europe to Britain and no entry for significant numbers to the colonial empire. Moreover, he emphasised that these principles formed the basis of official decision-making: one of the first British efforts after the start of the war was to seal the escape routes used by Jewish refugees from Nazi Europe. Wasserstein acknowledged that the British Government intended to halt immigration to Britain from Germany and Germany-occupied territories from the outset of the war, which mostly affected Jews trying to escape Nazi persecution. In addition, he pointed out that there was a wave of anti-alien feeling bordering on mass hysteria in the face of an imminent invasion of Britain. The new government formed by Churchill in 1940 decided to extend the internment of ‘enemy aliens’ that had begun in 1939. However, Wasserstein came to the conclusion that it was not antisemitism underlying the British actions towards Jewish refugees, but “the narrower horizons of the official mind” which “rarely stretched to encompass the vastness of the horror which had overtaken the Jews of Europe”. He suggested that although “there is no doubt that anti-Semitism was in the air in Britain during the war, partly as a result of general xenophobia and war hysteria, partly arising from resentment of immigrants and complaints of black market activity and war profiteering, (…), conscious anti-Semitism should not be regarded as an adequate explanation of official behaviour”. In sum, Wasserstein argued that the British government was not antisemitic, but just saw the Jews as a low priority.

The late 1970s and early 1980s saw several publications on Jews in Britain which generally emphasised the benign character of antisemitism and the tolerance of English liberalism and benevolence of British Christians. David Katz suggested that the readmission of Jews into England was characterised by the

---

34 Ibid, p. 38.
37 Ibid, p. 351 f.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

‘philo-Semitism’ of the British. Todd Endelman similarly pointed out that Anglo-Christians may not have been pro-Jewish, but they were ‘philo-Semitic’ in the sense that they tolerated the Jews and campaigned for their conversion to Christianity. This attitude, he argued, was of temporal advantage for Anglo-Jewry. Anti-Jewish sentiments, he suggested, although they did never fade away completely, were reduced to small circles and did not influence official state policy toward the Jews and secular anti-Jewish sentiments were limited to a fanatic fringe opposing Jewish emancipation.

What these studies show is that in their interpretations of antisemitism in British history, Jewish historians reflected the timid mentality of the Jewish society in Britain. They deemed domestic antisemitism as only a marginal problem, even in light of antisemitic violence. But the development of antisemitism theories in Britain was only partly the result of how Jewish historians treated the issue. Another important factor were current debates about immigration and minority integration. In order to understand how theories on antisemitism developed in Britain, it is vital to take into account general views on minority-majority relations and approaches to ‘race’ and racism. Theories that were developed in response to colonial immigration were, paradoxically, the most significant influence on how antisemitism came to be understood in Britain. After the 1960s, theories on antisemitism reflected developments and concepts in British racism studies, which were concerned with minority-majority relations in light of the recent immigration to Britain from (former) Colonies and Commonwealth countries.

3.1.3 Managing ‘Race Relations’

When analysing theories on antisemitism in Britain from the 1960s onwards, it becomes evident that the way antisemitism was understood reflected theories about and public attitudes towards current immigration. Racism studies

---


3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany
dveloped explanatory models for ‘racial tensions’ in British cities in the 1950s and 1960s and these models were used by antisemitism researchers to understand hostilities towards Jews in British history as well. The early racism theories were characterised by their intrinsic racial prejudice: tensions were interpreted as arising out of immigration itself. Racism researchers therefore became complicit in racist discourse by explaining racism as something related to the presence of immigrants. This was also true for approaches to antisemitism. Hostility against Jews was explained in terms of a large presence of Jews in certain areas that brought about ‘natural’ tensions. Although this approach was later discarded, at the time it served an important purpose. On the one hand, it was an early attempt to include antisemitism in the study of racism in Britain. In their attempt to explain hostilities against Colonial immigrants, racism researchers for the most part disregarded antisemitism completely. Jewish historians therefore tried to show how hostility towards Jews as an immigrant minority group was structurally similar to hostility against Colonial immigrants. Both racism theories and public opinion at the time, however, understood problems arising out of immigration in a framework of ‘race relations’ that needed to be managed. Later on, racism studies moved from a concept of ‘race relations’ and interactionist theories towards theories of power structures and racist discourse. The same applied to antisemitism research, if with a little delay. The central idea, however, was the same: Colonial immigration experiences could be compared to earlier Jewish immigration experiences.

Many of the immigrants who came to Britain between the 1950s and the 1970s were Muslims. From the 1950s and 1960s Muslims from the Indian subcontinent, as well as Cyprus and Morocco, “formed part of a broader migration from the former colonies to satisfy the need for replacement labour, both in growth industries, where a labour shortage had developed, and in declining ones which were in the process of being deserted by indigenous workers because of the low pay and poor conditions, and which therefore came to rely on immigrant labour”.40 The migration pattern that was most promi-

40 Ansari, Humayun: The Infidel Within, Muslims in Britain since 1800, London: C Hurst
nent within this labour migration was a chain migration - used by Turkish Cypriots, Moroccans, Yemenis and South Asian Muslims - resulting in kinship and friendship groups settling in the same communities, some of them in fact established by pre-war migration, in Britain and the establishment of institutions, organisations, and agents to facilitate the continued migration of relatives and friends. At the same time, both the British government as well as the Muslim migrants themselves assumed they would ‘return’ to the home country and not stay in Britain long term. The chain migration patterns created kinship and friendship networks. Language barriers as well as the lack of official British integration measures led to an encapsulation and high degree of dependency for many Muslim immigrants. In addition to that, many Muslims felt unwelcomed by the British society and discriminated against because of their skin colour.

The immigrants’ feeling of being unwelcome in Britain was more than legitimate. The immigrants from (former) colonies and Commonwealth countries who settled in Britain between the 1950s and the 1970s were generally met with hostility:

“Especially when they have arrived in large numbers, immigrants have not been universally welcomed. They were welcomed as allies in the Second World War when every person was needed in the struggle for national survival; they were welcomed as doctors, nurses, drivers, conductors, cleaners and carpenters and in a huge range of other capacities during the 1950s and 1960s, when labour was scarce. But as people, as friends and neighbours or even as fellow church members, the welcome was very much less enthusiastic. Even when recruited as replacement labour force to do the work that the natives rejected and to occupy inner-city accommodation that the natives wished to leave, they could still be seen by those

---

41Ibid, p. 149.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

who remained as competitors for jobs, housing and other scarce resources.”

To some degree, this resentment was seen as naturally arising out of immigration. Zig Layton Henry for example thought that

“Immigration has thus provided a stimulus for xenophobia and for campaigns for immigration control. When immigrants are non-European, latent feelings of racism may be stimulated and may have important consequences both among members of the political and economic elite and among the general population.”

Even though he acknowledged that there may be a form of latent xenophobia, he thought this was only triggered when Britons met actual immigrants. His interpretation of racism at the time reflected the widely held belief that immigration was the source of ‘racial tensions’, as opposed to, for example, prejudiced attitudes within British society that are unrelated to - and have existed before - immigrants arriving in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s.

This was despite there being some evidence for prejudiced attitudes: policies and public statements made at the time indicate that there was widespread concern and even hostility among the political and social elite in Britain against black immigrants and that “they were stereotyped as quarrelsome, lazy, unskilled and unenterprising.” Consequently, ‘coloured’ immigrants encountered discrimination in housing, education and the job-market and were more strongly affected by unemployment than the population as a whole.

**Immigration legislation**

It is important to note that the Jewish immigration experience was not automatically equated with that of Colonial immigrants, but that this was a

---

46 Ibid, p. 35.
development arising out of the interaction between public debates, theorisations of racism, and policy making. Legally, Jewish immigrants were more ‘alien’ than Colonial immigrants. In *John Bull’s Island*, Colin Holmes stressed that the immigration legislation of 1919 practically “remained the basis of official policy on alien immigration down to the 1971 Immigration Act”. For migrants living in Britain, there had been official restrictions on employment, for example in the civil service and armed forces, disadvantages in securing welfare benefits and difficulties put in path of applications for naturalisation in place until 1971. While these restrictions on entry and status had an effect on Jewish immigrants and refugees migrating to and living in Britain, this was initially not the case for the majority of immigrants coming to Britain after the Second World War. When men from the British Commonwealth were recruited for low-skilled labour in British cities, they were, under the 1948 British Nationality Act, entitled to free movement into Britain and were not subjected to official restrictions on employment.

Only when immigration and ‘racial tensions’ became a topic of public debate and immigration from the Colonies was eventually restricted, early attempts were made to see a Jewish immigration experience in Britain through the light of Colonial immigration. Historians intended to explain antisemitism in a framework of ‘race relations’. This was because in Britain in the 1960s, the interaction between all ethnic minority and majority communities was understood and dealt with as ‘race relations’ and early racism studies played a major part in this.

In his book *Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain*, John Solomos gave a comprehensive overview of the establishment of racism studies in Britain, the dominant theories and future challenges. He pointed out that the study of race in Britain was established in the 1940s and 1950s, influenced by American literature on the subject. He emphasised that “at that time British studies were dominated by two main themes: the issue of ‘coloured immigrants’ and

---

49 See ibid, p.309.
50 Solomos: *Race and Racism in Britain*, p.16.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

the reaction to them by white Britons; and the part played by colonialism in determining popular conceptions of colour and race in British society.51

Studies at the time dealt with patterns of immigration and labour market incorporation of ethnic minorities. They concentrated on interaction between minority and majority community in employment, housing and other social contexts.52

As mentioned above, this interaction between minority and majority communities was understood and dealt with as ‘race relations’, both in social sciences as well as public policy. The main work of the time on the subject was Michael Banton’s Race Relations, which categorised ‘race relations’ according to six basic orders: institutionalised contact, acculturation, domination, paternalism, integration and pluralism.53

For the state – and large parts of the public – the first solution to ‘racial tensions’ was the restriction of immigration. The issue of ‘race relations’ was so closely connected to immigration from (former) colonies and Commonwealth countries to Britain that the 1960s saw the passing of several laws that intended to control immigration on the grounds of a perceived oversaturation and at a time of the formation and reformation of nationalist and fascist groups like the National Front. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act and its Amendment in 1968 therefore restricted the right of entry previously enjoyed by citizens of the Commonwealth. These acts can be interpreted as a result of hostility against immigrants, evident for example in ‘Powellism’, the conservative, nationalist and anti-immigration view of politician Enoch Powell, and racial prejudice.

At the time, however, restriction of immigration was seen as a necessary condition for social cohesion. The following Immigration Act of 1971 was, as Colin Holmes has noted, a logical conclusion of the 1968 legislation: “Com-

51Ibid.
monwealth citizens with patrial status were allowed unrestricted entry into the
United Kingdom. However, entry for those citizens from the Commonwealth
who did not have the patrial connection was dependant on the issue of a work
permit. A permit did not confer residence rights, and all permits were subject
to the possibility of non-renewal.”

Holmes also stressed the significance of a
general public hostility against immigrants for this restrictive legislation.

When through the government measures in 1962, 1965, 1968 and the Im-
migration Act in 1971, immigration from the British Commonwealth was re-
stricted, this resulted in less differentiation between ‘aliens’ and non-patrial
Commonwealth citizens. The effect was initially adverse, however, as immigra-
tion increased significantly during the 1960s when the mostly male immigrants
brought their families to Britain. Eventually, many workers decided to stay
in Britain - despite their wish to return - because of the better economic sit-
uation and education system and because for some the political situation in
their home country did not allow a return. These factors continued to moti-
vate migration. Thus for example Bangladeshi Muslim migration to Britain
reached its peak long after 1971 due to the economic, political and environ-
mental circumstances in Bangladesh. The inflow of Muslim refugees from
Third World countries after 1971 added to the variety of migration patterns,
resulting in ‘a patchwork of communities’ in England, Scotland, Wales and
Northern Ireland.

While during that period the presence of diverse ethnic communities was
firmly established in Britain, government policies at the time were intended to
limit the growth of these communities to a ‘tolerable’ level. The immigration
policies of the British government at the time were clearly characterised by the
‘race’ issue. The Immigration Acts of 1962, 1968 and 1971 were also intended

54 Holmes, Colin: John Bull’s island, Immigration and British society 1871-1971,
55 Holmes: John Bull’s Island, p. 309.
56 Fetzer, Joel and Soper, Christopher: Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Ger-
57 Ansari: The Infidel Within, p. 157.
58 Ibid, p.166.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

to limit the flow of ‘coloured’ persons in order to avoid problems resulting out of ‘racial plurality’.\(^{59}\) Skin colour was perceived as the main issue establishing a division between different groups of people and both racism as well as anti-racism evolved around this factor of division, in which discrimination and conflict were defined in terms of ‘race’.

One example for this is a report on *Colour and Citizenship* published by The Institute of Race Relations in 1968. The research methodology and theoretical basis of the report was influenced by American Black-White relations and what was seen as the ‘Negro’ question, as well as social-psychological approaches to the *Authoritarian Personality*. Although the theoretical basis for the survey that was undertaken was similar to that of earlier socio-psychological approaches to antisemitism in Britain, so roughly based on the idea of the ‘Authoritarian Character’, this report deviated from this approach in one important aspect: it assumed that prejudices grew out of actual ‘racial’ relations and therefore, to an extent, reflected reality. Although this report was critical towards immigration restriction and the lack of anti-discrimination legislation, and acknowledged the role of racial prejudice in British society, it in fact supported ideas of fundamental differences between people and asserted that interaction is the root of racism.\(^{60}\)

The report included a survey of incidences of ‘race prejudice’ in Britain. Its general finding regarding the extent of tolerance in the British population was that 35 per cent of British citizens could be counted as tolerant, 38 per cent as tolerant inclined, 17 per cent as prejudiced inclined, and 10 per cent prejudiced.\(^{61}\) It also stated that conservative party supporters and members felt slightly more superior towards ‘coloureds’ than Labour party members and supporters and that people generally felt slightly more superior towards


\(^{61}\)See ibid, p. 553.
Africans than towards Asians. The 10 per cent registering extreme hostility were spread through all sections of the white population with regards to gender, age, economic situation and other factors. Women and young people in full time education were slightly less prejudiced. The report found that the 10 per cent registering extreme hostility showed a difference in their psychology and were much more prone to authoritarian approach to life – so much that they had an “exaggerated need to submit to authority and acute hostility towards any outgroups”. However, the underlying assumption of the report was that racial prejudice was influenced by the interaction between different ‘races’. This became evident in the discussion about methodology: the initial idea of sampling the whole population of Great Britain was rejected, because it was assumed that the degree of personal contact correlated with the degree of prejudice. The sample survey consequently concentrated on five local government units known to contain relatively large proportions of coloured Commonwealth immigrants.

The report exemplified how skin colour was seen as the most important factor with regards to ‘racial prejudice’ in British society. While the researchers used different national origin and even religion in their analysis and dealt with the different immigrant communities in separate chapters, they considered skin colour to be the decisive factor in the formation of prejudice. They noticed that “The character of the Pakistani immigration is different from that of the others. Even after seven years or more, nearly half of them have no family over here, and the level of remittances remains high for the earliest arrivals. Savings are high, household expenditure is low, and the amount spent on rent, even by the earliest arrivals, is low. Many of the Pakistanis exhibit the characteristics of transients, which is quite unlike the others, in particular the Indians”. They stressed that Pakistanis were different to other immigrants, as to Pakistanis Britain was a “foreign land whose language, customs, religion, and way of life

62 See ibid, pp. 559 and 567.
63 Ibid, p. 588.
64 See ibid, p. 551.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany were totally alien to them”.

However, in their interpretation of prejudice, the authors of the report saw colour as the deciding factor, not culture or religion. This is a reflection of the general understanding of ‘race relations’ and shows that there was no conceptualisation of prejudice based on religion or culture, or any understanding of a possible hostility or discrimination against minorities other than based on skin colour.

This was despite the fact that prejudice and hostility against immigrants was not only present among the radical right, but became part of mainstream public discourse. Racist organisations like the Union Movement of Oswald Mosley, the League of Empire Loyalists and the National Front in the 1950s and 1960s wanted to defend an exclusive and racialised form of Britishness and ‘white’ nationalism, but their racist politics had a significant impact on more mainstream discourses of national identity.

One article in *The Observer* in 1968, for example, in a special issue on ‘Race in Britain’, argued that ‘racial tensions’ arise from the actual relationship between minorities and majority society. Although immigrants were not at fault, it was their mere presence that caused problems. The author pointed out that “over a short period, the flow of Indian, Pakistani, African, Cypriot, Maltese and West Indian immigrants produced a highly charged situation in Bradford, the West Midlands and parts of London”, but that “because ‘race’ had become a taboo subject, there was almost no public discussion of the possibilities of the tensions that were being created”. In fact, “it was without any conscious act of volition that Britain found itself an increasingly multi-racial society”. Embedded in what is explicitly described as an ‘anti-racist’ argument, the problems that arose out of this situation were assessed within a context of a natural limitation of tolerance amid a large inflow of immigration and the necessity of group identification. It was argued that it would in fact be a service to the immigrants to limit their ‘inflow’, as it would only get increasingly difficult for them to live in an unwelcoming society, because

“in times of change and confusion it is usual that people feel their

---

3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

sense of identity and security threatened: often, as in Germany in the 1930s, they look for a scapegoat to explain their difficulties. The accidental arrival of many coloured people at this time in our history has confused the problems of colour with the unrelated frustrations and grievances widely felt among both workers and much of the middle class.”

The idea of ‘race relations’ continued to be the major approach to racism for quite some time and became the dominant idea within racism theories. The first one to provide a theoretical grounding for the ‘race relations’ problematic was John Rex. His explanation for racism was that “in relatively complex social systems individuals react to each other in classificatory and ascriptive ways, and that sometimes the other who is reacted to in this way is also the target for hostile attitudes and policies”. In addition, he pointed out that this “is particularly likely to be the case in situations (...) in which distinguishable groups find themselves in situations of conflict or competition with one another”. Rex saw this as in part “caused by men’s reactions to their enemies and competitors in some kind of basic struggle to survive and to earn a living”.

Rex understood racism as intergroup relations in which competition and therefore aggression arose. He emphasised that this is true for colonial societies like Britain, because there is ‘ethnic pluralism’. He argued that “the unequal treatment meted out to members of different groups in the colonial case will come to be characterised by racist ideas and beliefs and by racialist practice”. Based on a theory of social stratification, Rex stated that immigrants from the colonies then enter the lowest social strata in their host communities, or are in

---

68 “Stop shouting, start talking” in: The Observer, Race in Britain – Observer Special, 28 April 1968.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid, p. 146.
72 Ibid, p. 87.
fact placed “beneath the bottom of the stratification system”. According to Rex, ‘race relations’ therefore occurred when two or more groups are forced to live together in a single society, when there is a high degree of conflict between these groups, when ascriptive criteria are used to mark out the members of each group and when these ‘practices of ascriptive allocation’ are justified in a deterministic theory. He also emphasised the role of the mass media in disseminating foreshortened accounts of conflicts which are then interpreted by the public in a simplified, racist way.

Rex’s explanation falls in the category of interactionist theories, because he believed that ‘ethnic pluralism’ caused social tension and therefore racism. He did not see racism as an ideology and did not analyse minority majority relations with regard to political power. This approach to racism based on interactionist theories on a scholarly level was reflected in public policy at the time.

**Early Race Relations legislation**

At the same time the government introduced restrictions on immigration, there were also attempts to address racism. As Colin Holmes has indicated “at the same time as controls over entry were introduced, greater official attention was paid to the persistence of racial disadvantage in Britain. Before the 1960s successive governments had shown little or no interest in this issue. [...] However, by the mid 1960s there was a degree of shift in the official outlook, towards and emphasis on the need for ‘good race relations’.

With the Race Relations Acts in 1965 and 1968 the state attempted to ban discrimination on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin through legal sanctions and public regulations while at the same time promoting equal opportunities. However, it is important to understand that the promotion of racial equality was still based on the same assumptions that led to the restric-

---

74Ibid, p. 160.
76Holmes: John Bull’s island, p. 268.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

In response to immigration legislation. The underlying assumptions of these Acts were that the growing number of immigrants was the source of social conflicts.\(^{77}\) Instead of restricting immigration, the proposed solution here was the promotion of integrating immigrants into British society.

Both acts were inadequate to address actual racial discrimination and only the 1976 Act acknowledged that discrimination can appear directly as well as indirectly, and the Commission for Racial Equality was founded with powers to investigate cases of discrimination and enforce counter-measures.

The official British Race Relations Legislation of 1965, 1968 and 1976 gradually implemented equal treatment in housing, education and employment, even in the civil service but addressed discrimination on the grounds of race and ethnicity. For British Muslims, for example, this meant that they were not protected against discrimination by law because they were Muslims, but because they were considered ‘black’. Similarly, their immigration experience was not acknowledged in itself, but subsumed under a ‘black’ settling experience, both in legal and public discourse as well as in terms of a political category in opposition to the white majority within anti-racist discourse.

The race relations legislation had an impact on British Jews as well. There was both social and institutional discrimination against Jews in post-war Britain. Cesarani pointed out how Jewish survivors of the Holocaust were excluded from British labour recruitment schemes - although DPs who had fought for Germany were allowed to enter Britain under the scheme.\(^{78}\) Sports and social clubs denied Jews a membership and some private schools maintained a Jewish quota. Many of these exclusions were abolished through the anti-discrimination legislation in the 1960s and 1970s.

However, this was a side effect rather than an intended purpose. Antisemitism was neither high on the agenda for racism researchers and theorists, nor for the government. Early racism theories failed to include hostility to-

\(^{77}\) Solomos, John: Race and Racism in Contemporary Britain, p.72.

3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Towards Jews in their theories, but this problem was rectified by Jewish historians. In their interpretation of Jewish immigration experiences based on the methods of racism research, however, they reproduced antisemitic discourse, as well.

Interactionist approaches to antisemitism

When analysing historical approaches to antisemitism in the 1960s and 1970s, it becomes evident that these were heavily inspired by contemporary approaches to ‘race relations’ and the interaction between minorities and majority society. In a sense, Jewish immigration to Britain was also dealt with in a framework of ‘race relations’. Examples of this way of thinking can be found in the way historians started to analyse past Jewish immigration. The 1970s saw several studies on Jewish immigration to Britain at the end of the nineteenth century. John Garrard and Bernhard Gainer investigated the ‘anti-alien’ agitation at the time, which focussed on Jewish immigrants. Although they described the widespread and serious xenophobic English attitudes towards Jews, both reached the final conclusion that Britain was immune to outspoken racism.  

Colin Holmes’s major study on antisemitism in Britain, published in 1979, dealt with the period of Jewish immigration from 1875 to 1939. Although he acknowledged the anti-Jewish stereotypes present in public British discourse at the time, he believed that antisemitism originated in the interaction between Jews and Gentiles, between immigrants and ‘natives’.

Holmes pointed out that the Jewish immigration and settlement especially in the East End of London led to a ‘visibility’ of Jews in a spatial sense. He further suggested that “such a concentration could not only aid in the creation

---


of social problems by placing additional pressure on scarce resources in particular areas; it could also be used by those hostile to the Jewish community to add to a more generalized picture of Jewish power and influence”.

Regarding the stereotype of the business-minded Jew, Holmes remarked that Jews did in fact have “an influence out of all proportion to their numbers in the general population” when it came to the retail trades and businesses. He stressed that the history of Jewish emancipation in Britain was an example of liberal toleration and the belief that it was undesirable to discriminate against individuals on the grounds of their religion, but it also showed that there was the hope that Jews would forsake their ‘separateness’ and move closer to British society. According to Holmes, appearances of antisemitism after 1876 were connected to the social structure of British Jewry, their particular concentration in business, which gave rise to charges of undue material gain, as well as due to their history of migration, which produced a ‘sojourning image’. He suggested that additional situational pressures eventually generated antisemitism but that the liberal principle in Britain supported an ideology that was favourable towards Jews.

W.F. Mandle went even further in his study on antisemitism in the British Union of Fascists and stressed that Jews are at least partly at fault for hostility against them, as they had always been a minority and have “consistently refused to submit or integrate fully with the majority”, so that they “have become particularly susceptible to the arousal of hostile feelings”. And “in addition Jewish concentration upon urban, financial and manufacturing pursuits is subject to criticism”. He added that “another traditional cause of anti-Semitism is of course the attitude of the Churches to Jews ... (as) Judaism and Jews were from earliest times the subject of misrepresentation and

82 Ibid, pp. 6-9.
83 Ibid, p. 105.
attack”.86 But he stressed that “we must not, however, deny the importance of the Jewish factor in creating anti-Semitism. Jews are undeniably different and to an extent have chosen to remain so” and that “they have remained a stubbornly and proudly self-conscious minority and have therefore, many would argue, chosen to draw fire upon themselves”.87 He added that there must be at least some evidence of social or economic frustration for antisemitism to become attractive to the masses.88

Based on this, Mandle drew comparisons between past Jew-hatred and contemporary hostility towards immigrants:

“Anti-Semitism therefore appeals to deep-rooted social forces – psychological, religious, national and economic. In an era of mass politics such forces are available for use by parties or individuals unscrupulous, or unbalanced, enough to use them. In our own day the same racist feelings towards an urban, distinguishable, inter-penetrating minority can be seen at work, and being utilized by political groups and individuals in Britain with regard to Caribbean and Asian immigrants.”89

This ‘interactionist’ approach is characterised by the assumption that the English are not antisemitic from ‘the inside’ - it is in fact assumed that there is a particularly liberal and tolerant English character, but prejudices only arise within situations of social pressure and with outside influences. This approach initially also characterised investigations of post-war anti-Jewish violence in Britain. David Leitch’s study on the antisemitic riots in several English cities and towns in August 1947 explained the appearance of antisemitism to be closely connected to the events in Mandate Palestine, where Jewish terrorists were responsible for several casualties among British troops, most famously in the explosion at the King David Hotel on 22 July 1946. Leitch described the

86Ibid, p. 15.
87Ibid, pp. 15f.
88See ibid, p. 16.
89Ibid, pp. 16f.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

anti-Jewish hostility in Britain as a direct reaction to these events.\(^90\) Michael Cohen, on the other hand, suggested that the riots were connected to economic depression.\(^91\) Although Cohen’s approach is not strictly interactionist, it, too, assumes that there is a rational, if wrong, reason for prejudice.

It is noteworthy that while remnants of the theory of the Authoritarian Character did appear in a number of studies on antisemitism, this did not produce the same effect as in Germany and did not significantly influence antisemitism theories in Britain. The best example for this is Mandle’s study on the BUF. He came to the conclusion that the BUF was antisemitic because antisemitism could be used as a social force and because they needed an issue, but he also argued – based on the psychological study on antisemitism by Robb mentioned earlier – that the followers of the BUF were ‘predisposed’ to antisemitism on psychological grounds, meaning that they were authoritarian.\(^92\) At the same time, however, he concluded that the BUF, in comparison with the Nazis in Germany, were only hesitantly antisemitic, that there was no deeply-felt social and economical stress and that antisemitism was never intense enough, so that their antisemitism never became politically successful.\(^93\) Mandle used the theory of the Authoritarian personality to depict antisemitism as a pathology that is only limited to a ‘lunatic fringe’ and that it is not a problem of wider society. His interpretation of the issue shows that at the time, continental approaches to antisemitism had less impact on the development of theories of domestic British antisemitism. More important were both the reluctance of the Jewish community as a whole to acknowledge antisemitism as well as wider debates about British reactions to immigration. The framework of ‘race relations’ was adopted to explain antisemitism, as well, and hostility resulting out of interaction and social tension remained the dominant explanation for antisemitism in British history for quite some time. Although Alan Lee for example acknowl-


\(^{92}\) See Mandle: Anti-Semitism and the British Union of Fascists, p. 19.

\(^{93}\) See ibid, p. 70.
edged the hostility Jewish immigrants encountered in Victorian England, he suggested that when ‘Jewishness’ came to be less outstanding with gradual assimilation it reduced the significance of ethnic groupings and imagery.\(^{94}\) He emphasised that “many of the images of the Jews held before 1914 were, (…), based upon the experience of their poverty and economic competition, and the decline of those conditions weakened many of the responses which were tied to them”.\(^{95}\)

The study of antisemitism in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s was thus characterised by the belief in a liberal principle as an antidote to antisemitism, as well as the understanding that prejudices were necessarily connected to the real appearance, behaviour and character of the group affected by this prejudice. This was also showcased in the way the Holocaust was remembered in Britain. Far from being motivated by anti-racism it instead served a national narrative of the British war experience and its Jewish component was completely ignored.

It has to be noted that immediately after the war, Holocaust remembrance in Britain was virtually non-existent, even among the Jewish community. Geoffrey Alderman emphasised that in the immediate postwar period “and aided particularly by the euphoria generated by the re-establishment of the Jewish State so soon after the catastrophe of the Holocaust, there developed within British Jewry a collective amnesia (…) about the precise nature of its own reaction to news of the Final Solution and to the plight of its Jewish victims.”\(^{96}\)

In public discourse, the Jewish experience faded against the British experience during the war. Tony Kushner describes how after the immediate postwar trials, “the extermination of European Jewry, as opposed to Nazi atrocities in general, faded from popular consciousness” so much that “there was essentially no educational, cultural or artistic attempt to confront the subject”.\(^{97}\)


\(^{95}\)Ibid, p. 127

\(^{96}\)Alderman: Modern British Jewry, p.301.

\(^{97}\)Kushner, Tony: Remembering to Forget: Racism and anti-Racism in Postwar Britain, in:
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

memory of the British experience during the Second World War however continued to grow and became an important narrative for postwar British identity, but it excluded Jews and other minorities.

While Holocaust remembrance and education was at first not present at all, it was only established after struggle by a campaign by the Jewish community. One of these campaigns was the Warsaw Ghetto Memorial Committee, which, in light of recent race riots sought to use Holocaust remembrance as a pedagogical tool against racism in general. Tony Kushner however points out how difficult this was, as “there was an atmosphere in which the state itself blamed the victim for the existence of intolerance”, so that it was difficult “to promote Holocaust remembrance in the form of anti-racist initiatives”.

Further problems were the “commitment to liberal universalism” which “mitigated against remembering the fate of the Jews”, as well as “English parochialism, (which) insisted on the continued memory of the British war effort and the sacrifices made.”

While the campaigns of the Jewish community were eventually successful and the Holocaust was for example adopted as a subject in schools, there was ‘a crude universalistic tendency (...) present in the unsophisticated lumping together of Auschwitz, Hiroshima and Dresden as ‘the casualties of war’.” Holocaust awareness only increased in the 1980s as it became a topic in public debate and popular culture.

It can be concluded that the marginalisation of any form of antisemitism was very common in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s and it informed much of the later historical study of antisemitism in Britain. It was also characteristic of how contemporary antisemitism was understood. Contemporary antisemitism was thus predominantly seen as less serious, both in comparison to antisemitism in other countries, as well as in comparison to contem-

Ibid., p. 251.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

porary hostility towards colonial immigration. Paradoxically, this neglect of adequate study and theorisation of antisemitism was further exacerbated when approaches to ‘race’ and racism changed from the late 1970s and moved away from interactionist theories towards theorisations of political power, colonialism and discourse. The emphasis on colonialism as a root of racism did not include Jews as a possible racialised minority, neither in the past nor in the present. But just as interactionist theories on colonial immigration had influenced approaches to antisemitism in British history, this was again the case with theories on racist discourse and ideology. In fact, developments from the 1960s onwards proved to be a model with regard to influences on theories of antisemitism: attempts to understand racism towards colonial immigrants were used to understand hostility towards Jews as well. This had profound effects on the way antisemitism was understood. Compared to Germany, it is most significant that there were early signs that in British antisemitism theories, analyses of the Holocaust would only play a marginal role.

3.2 Germany: Theorising antisemitism after the Holocaust

In stark contrast to developments in Britain, and perhaps for obvious reasons, the Holocaust continually played a central role in German approaches to antisemitism. However, it needs to be noted that the immediate post-war period was not characterised by a German willingness to deal with the Holocaust - or antisemitism - at all. Quite the opposite: antisemitic attitudes prevailed while any German responsibility in relation to the Holocaust was denied. There was in fact a widespread latent antisemitism that was secondary in nature and connected to the desire of denial of guilt in postwar Germany, so much that “the verbal emphasis on that much desired reconciliation with the Jewish people (was), in fact, nothing less than the ongoing reconciliation of Germany as a
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

dnation with its own past”. 101

3.2.1 Denial of Guilt

Post-war German attitudes towards Jews were deeply connected with a German self-perception. Already in 1945, Germans perceived themselves as victims of the War. As mentioned earlier, immediately after the war, Germans perceived Jews not as victims, but as parasites on the developing economy. 102

As Frank Stern has noted, a very important feature of postwar German history was the ambivalence of public philosemitism and private antisemitism. He stressed that the philosemitic pattern of thinking had “much in common with similar, seemingly contrary antisemitic thought patterns”. 103 He described antisemitism in postwar Germany as bound up with traditional social, political, economic, cultural, and religious anti-Jewish biases and that for Germans, “Jews were seen as bearing responsibility for the ‘German catastrophe’, occupation policies seemed to be dictated by some fictive ‘World Jewry’, returning emigrés were mistrusted as strangers, the return of Jewish property was labelled as ‘revenge’, and the publication of writing by Jewish authors was denounced as cultural usurpation”. 104

Post-war Germany was characterised by an attempt to reframe German identity in discourse and culture, and the German past played a central role in this process. In the 1950s, for example, several low level literary works and serialised novels that were read by a mass audience dealt with German victimhood. In an analysis of serialised novels in widely read magazines like Quick and Stern, Michael Schornstheimer came to the conclusion that in these novels, no attempt to cope with the past took place, but that there was a “manic, passionate, obsessive preoccupation” with the past. 105 Taking a closer

103 Stern, Frank: The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge, p.392.
look at novels by writers like Kurt Ziesel, it became evident that the denial of guilt was a common and accepted form of interpreting the past. Both of Ziesel’s books, *Und was bleibt, ist der Mensch*, published in 1951, as well as *Daniel in der Löwengrube*, published in 1952, are full of antisemitic clichés. Jewish characters appeared in these stories only to contrast the German characters and, moreover, Jewish characters were used to affirm that Jews were themselves responsible for their fate and that Germans were the actual victims.\(^{106}\)

Ernestine Schlant has pointed out that early postwar German literature “focused predominantly not on the Nazi atrocities but on the wartime and postwar travails of the German population” and that it “carried within it the burden of an ominous silence” regarding atrocities perpetrated against the Jews.\(^{107}\) The work of nobel prize winner Heinrich Böll was a very prominent part of this postwar German literature. Although Böll included Jewish characters and even references to concentration camps in his short stories and novels, he relied on anti-Jewish clichés as well as the narrative of German victimhood, which set up a dualistic logic of ordinary men and madmen, of which only the latter were able to actually perpetrate crimes, whereas the former were characterised by an immense powerlessness.\(^{108}\)

This form of absent presence of Jewishness that continuously informed postwar German discourse has also been shown to play a role in post-war German play\(^{109}\) and film: Omar Bartov has suggested that “the representation of absence is arguably one of the most crucial tropes in German literary, cinematic,

The Holocaust has an unparalleled significance for post-war German identity. However, as Moishe Postone has argued, German Holocaust guilt constituted “a negative historical legacy that cannot ultimately be dealt with by normal juridical and political means”.\footnote{Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust: History and Identity in West Germany, in: Harms, Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R. and Dürr, Volker: Coping with the Past, Germany and Austria after 1945, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp. 233-251, here p. 233.} He stressed that “Modern anti-Semitism, properly understood, is intrinsically related to the ‘utopian’ dimension of Nazism as a movement. […] Rather than proceed on the basis of this relation, however, the public discussion has been characterized by an apparent antinomy, whereby anti-Semitism and other dimensions of National Socialism have, on the basis of a reductive understanding, been separated out and even opposed.”\footnote{Ibid, p. 235.}

### 3.2.2 Understanding Antisemitism: Voices from Exile

In this context it is therefore not surprising that there were significant differences in how German historians viewed the past, and how German-Jewish emigrés interpreted antisemitism. A number of the earliest post-war approaches to antisemitism were not undertaken by German historians, but by German-Jewish emigrés. The radicalism of National Socialist Antisemitism and the Holocaust had a profound effect on understandings and theorisations of as well as research on antisemitism in earlier as well as contemporary forms.

In his historiographical survey on post-war research on antisemitism, Ismar Schorsch has shown that while some of the early approaches interpreted Nazi antisemitism as a continuation of religious hatred or as a political tactic used to gain power,\footnote{See Schorsch: German Antisemitism in the Light of Post-War Historiography, pp. 257-} later approaches acknowledged a specific ideological dimension
Eva Reichmann’s intention in her 1950 study *Hostages of civilization* was to explain and understand Nazi antisemitism from a vantage point of political psychology. Reichmann, a German historian who immigrated to Britain in 1939, had previously been a spokesman of the *Centralverein deutscher Staatsbürger jüdischen Glaubens*, the defence organisation of German Jewry.\(^{114}\) In her study she examined the development of antisemitic ideas from Imperial Germany to National Socialism. Inspired by psychological research, her theoretical basis was the assumption that antisemitism was a special kind of group tension. She argued that the co-existence of different groups generally caused social tension because these groups had different principles of group homogeneity. On the one hand, she believed antisemitism to originate in concrete group conflicts.

However, she also recognised that there is a ‘subjective’ aspect to antisemitism because it functioned as an outlet for individual aggressiveness. The Jews were particularly suitable as an object of aggression as they were, in her words, “late-comers, weak, ubiquitous and recognisable”. In National Socialism, she concluded, antisemitism was mainly ‘subjective’ and thus, the Jewish emancipation failed, because it did not eradicate group tensions entirely. She pointed out that there was no ‘Jewish problem’ in Germany, but many other German problems which needed a solution, but for which the Germans wrongly held the Jews responsible. She summed up National Socialist antisemitism in five points: it was not entirely a result of real tensions between Jews and Gentiles, but rather an expression of a national self-mistrust; the antisemitism preached by the Nazis did not play a decisive part in winning adherents for the movement; Nazi antisemitism seized upon people because it gave psychological satisfaction and was an anti-symbol to what they resented; the antisemitism was less directed against actual Jews, but of a ‘mythical’ character and antisemites did not necessarily expect measures to be taken against Jews.\(^{115}\)

---

\(^{114}\)Ibid, p. 263.

3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Although Reichmann’s work was recognised, it proved not to be as influential as that of her contemporary Hannah Arendt. Arendt, a German-Jewish political theorist who had studied with philosopher Martin Heidegger, fled to France and then to the US to escape the Nazis in 1941. In her 1951 book *Origins of Totalitarianism* she investigated the historical and political roots of what she termed totalitarian societies, National Socialist Germany and Stalinist Russia. In order to understand antisemitism and the appeal it had for the Germans, she analysed political conflicts like the Dreyfus affair and the social status of Jews during emancipation in Germany as well as the connection of nationalism and antisemitism.

Arendt understood antisemitism as something that developed from a hostility against a particular group in real conflicts to a completely abstract ideology under national socialism. She distinguished between earlier manifestations of Jew-hatred and modern racist antisemitism. While the former was based on ‘experiences’ and historical conflicts, the latter became completely separated from any real experience with the victims, but functioned as an ideology within totalitarian systems.\(^{116}\) Arendt further argued that antisemitism had become an abstract hostility, which meant that its victims are interchangeable. For Arendt, antisemitism is not characterised by its content, but by a certain way of thinking. She argued that antisemitism had in fact become part of a totalitarian ideology that randomly chooses its victims.\(^{117}\) Consequently, this also meant that totalitarians are alike; not in the sense that they share a common ideology, but in the sense that they are characterised by a totalitarian way of thinking.\(^{118}\)

Arendt also pointed out that it was wrong to assume that antisemitism is necessarily related to rampant nationalism. On the contrary, she argued that Nazism was not a simple nationalism, but in fact aimed to be a trans-national movement.\(^{119}\)


\(^{117}\)See Rensmann: *Arendt und Adorno*, pp. 120 ff.

\(^{118}\)See Arendt: *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, chapter 13.

\(^{119}\)See *ibid*, p. 4., on this point as the key in Arendt’s approach to antisemitism see also Stoet-
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Arendt came to the conclusion that modern antisemitism was different to earlier manifestations of Jew-hatred. She also contended that there was a certain specificity of German antisemitism. Arendt’s interpretations of antisemitism have to be seen in the context of her experiences in post-war Germany. She was shocked by the ‘violent refusal’ of the German population to work through what happened and believed that this was a sign of a continuation of fascist and totalitarian ideology in German democracy. However, Arendt never returned to Germany and her dark interpretation of post-war German society was therefore different from those who actually experienced, and had to come to terms with, life as a Jew among those who, just years earlier, had sought to annihilate them. Their approaches were characterised by emphasising the discontinuities between pre- and post-war German society.

The most prominent of these was Eleonore Sterling, who had fled to the USA and returned to Frankfurt in 1953. In her doctoral dissertation about the antecedents of Nazi antisemitism in the nineteenth century, she understood antisemitism as a form of ‘displaced social protest’, which just happened to target Jews. Antisemitism was opportune for several sectors of German society and a political tactic of those who were in power. One interpretation of this particular understanding could be that she, upon her return, tried to “salvage her identification with Deutschtum” and may have drawn “needed solace from the idea that Jew-hatred was not authentically characteristic of the Volk but was, rather, the handiwork of Nazi fanatics and their predecessors in

---


3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany
demagogy who had manipulated desperate Germans into violence and ultimate
disaster. Sterling exemplified the mainstream German Jewish experience, one
committed to a dignified assimilation to the positive values of German history
and culture. She resisted the temptation to condemn the Volk and therefore
had to find less harsh explanations for its periodic descent into violence.”122

In contrast to Sterling’s more apologetic approach, German-Jewish emigré
George Mosse saw antisemitism as the outcome of a specific German völkisch
ideology. He described it as a backward looking ideology based on ideas of
soil and nation.123 Mosse further elaborated on antisemitism in his later book
Toward the Final Solution, where he interpreted it as racism. Here Mosse
traced the history of European racism and described the role racism played
in Nazi ideology. He for example emphasised the connection between the
Euthanasia programs and the genocide of the Jews.124

The idea of a specific German völkisch ideology also characterised the ap-
proach of Shulamit Volkov, whose parents had fled to Palestine in 1933. In
her 1978 study on antisemitism in Imperial Germany, she tried to combine his-
torical and social theoretical analysis. She accepted that there was some con-
tinuation in German antisemitism, but that there was nevertheless a modern
antisemitism that developed after 1870.125 Volkov understood antisemitism as
part of a particular German ideology: “The unique German culture emerging
in the 1890s was expressed in the ’German ideology’, in a radical anti-modern
mentality, rejecting liberalism, capitalism, socialism; in a nostalgic passion for
a long-lost world.”126

She further argued that in Imperial Germany, antisemitism became a sign

122Bergmann, Werner; Hoffmann, Christhard; Walser Smith, Helmut: Exclusionary Violence:
Antisemitic Riots in Modern German History, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press
124See Mosse, George L.: Toward the Final Solution, A History of European Racism, London:
JM Dent and Sons Ltd 1978, Chapter 13.
125Volkov, Shulamit: Antisemitism as a Cultural Code. Reflections on the History and
Historiography of Antisemitism in Imperial Germany, in: Leo Baeck Institute Yearbook
126Ibid, p. 31.
of cultural identity, a ‘cultural code’, as it was “a way of communicating an acceptance of a particular set of ideas and a preference for a specific social, political and moral norms”.\textsuperscript{127} Volkov emphasised that antisemitism did not originate in real social tensions, but was a way for antisemites to interpret the world. Although Volkov’s essay was first published in 1978, her theory did not get attention among German antisemitism researchers before her work was published in German in 1990.\textsuperscript{128} Her research was about antisemitism in the nineteenth century, but her theory grasped aspects of continuing forms of antisemitism and what it meant and still means for German culture. What her approach had in common with many of those who interpreted German antisemitism from a vantage point of personal experience, was its attempt to grasp the ideological dimensions of German antisemitism and to understand its political psychology. Many of these approaches had an understanding of antisemitism that went beyond its incarnation in Nazi Germany. This was in stark contrast to how German historians viewed the issue.

\textbf{3.2.3 German historians and antisemitism}

Antisemitism was not at the heart of German historical analysis. In light of what Postone has called the pressure to normalise at all costs, historians’ interpretations of past antisemitism reflected contemporary debates about Germany’s past. Historians thus evaded the question of German guilt by portraying National Socialism as a European, rather than a German phenomenon. In their eyes, it was also not the outcome of older traditions, but rather a crisis of modern liberal society. There was a general consensus among historians to emphasize a discontinuity between National Socialism and postwar Germany, and to portray it as a break with German traditions. This meant to trace the roots of National Socialism not in German, but in European history.\textsuperscript{129}

\textsuperscript{127}Ibid, p. 34.
\textsuperscript{129}See Kwiet, Konrad: Die NS-Zeit in der westdeutschen Forschung 1945-1961, in: Schulin, Ernst (ed.): Deutsche Geschichtswissenschaft nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg, München:
At the beginning of the 1960s, there was a trend towards letting go of the ‘break-theory’ and to adopt resistance as a main topic for research on the one hand, and a comparison between National Socialism and communism as totalitarianisms on the other.\textsuperscript{130} In these early approaches to National Socialism, antisemitism was marginalised and even denied.

Konrad Kwiet has indicated that antisemitism only became a subject for historians from the 1960s, in light of the Eichmann trial, as well as antisemitic violence in Germany. He also stressed that the persecution of the Jews became a subject in schools and universities, there were exhibitions and church debates. With the new generation of historians at German universities, there was an increasing number of studies on the extermination of the Jews. However, he stressed that this was an inadequate way of dealing with the past, as there was at the same time a form of immunisation among Germans against this topic.\textsuperscript{131}

In addition, these studies also often evaded the question of a continuation of antisemitism in post-war German society. In this category are studies that attributed the rise of antisemitism in Germany to its weak liberalism. Peter Pulzer, for example, tried to show that the political antisemitism in Imperial Germany was different from earlier forms of Jew-hatred. He argued that it had not been possible before that political movements were based on antisemitism and that antisemitism was part of a coherent set of ideas. Pulzer emphasised that “anti-Semitism was a ‘spontaneous product’, arising out of a particular situation, not a creed foisted on a public from above by an unscrupulous ruling class”.\textsuperscript{132} He argued that the permanent prominence of the Jewish Question facilitated the revival of anti-Jewish feelings with the economic down-turn. In his view, the vulnerable status of the Jews through the period of emancipation and the high degree of religiousness of the German population played an important role for the establishment of antisemitism. He also pointed out that

\textsuperscript{130}R. Oldenbourg Verlag 1989, pp. 181-198, here p. 187.
\textsuperscript{131}Ibid, p. 188, p. 191.
it was not in fact the declining strata that was most prone to antisemitism, but the socially mobile who had extreme nationalist views. He said that “nationalism had, by the beginning of the twentieth century, become the main driving force behind anti-Semitism”. Pulzer attested a general weakness of German liberalism and although he identified several political strains of antisemitism, he generally understood it to be a reaction against liberalism: “The antisemites opposed not only the institutions of Liberalism, they fought its whole moral system, and its whole concept of human existence”.

As Dan Stone has argued this was a way of not questioning liberalism itself or the relationship between German Nazism and the European liberal tradition. Another side effect of nearly all approaches to Germany’s past was the fact that antisemitism was either avoided directly, or presented so that it did not extend into the present German democracy. This is not to say that the increasing amounts of studies on Nazi antisemitism and the Holocaust were not accompanied by heavily diverging opinions on the matter. Scholars disagreed on whether there was a plan to eliminate all Jews and that Hitler personally gave the order to do so, or whether the destruction of the Jews was something that arose out of the structures of the Third Reich. This became known as the functionalism versus intentionalism debate. Both sides of the debate, however, portrayed antisemitism as something that only existed in Germany’s

133 Ibid, p.221.
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

The point here is not to retrace this debate among historians in detail, but to stress a side effect of these debates: while from the early post-war years though to the late 1970s, historians were preoccupied with Germany’s past, there were significantly fewer attempts to address continuing forms of antisemitism among Germans. Although openly expressed antisemitism had become a taboo in 1945, this by no means had the effect that Germans changed their attitudes towards Jews. Antisemitism in Germany did not cease to exist in 1945, but rather found new forms of expression. The taboo to publicly display antisemitism coincided with a move of expressions of antisemitic attitudes into private spheres.

In 1946 18% of Germans could be categorised as serious antisemites, 21% as antisemites and 22% as racists on the basis of surveys conducted by Allied military governments. Over the years, there was a general decline in antisemitic attitudes in Western Germany, although there were still 20% of Germans who displayed strong antisemitic attitudes according to surveys conducted in the 1970s. In 1992, this number was 16%.³³³

3.2.4 The Left and anti-capitalism

It is not surprising that German approaches to contemporary antisemitism in the 1960s and 1970s were influenced by debates about the German past. In order to fulfil a ‘normalisation at all costs’, it was necessary for the majority of Germans, many of whom had been complicit in Nazi crimes, to deny any continuation of antisemitism. But the younger generation also became complicit in marginalising antisemitism. The student movement of the late 1960s wanted to break with cultural and political continuities from the Nazi regime. Together with the formation of the coalition governments later led by the Social Democratic Party, this marked a sharp break in the history of postwar

In this process, the extermination of the Jews became subsumed under general categories, so that the role antisemitism played for the Nazis was not adequately dealt with. As Rita Chin has indicated, this was characteristic of the German Left, who condemned “the Federal Republic’s efforts to secure democracy through capitalism as a structural, political, and moral continuity from the Third Reich”. In this context, for the student movement, it was “precisely the obsession with ever-expanding production and the self-congratulatory attitude towards prosperity [...] that obscured West German society’s failure to deal with its troubling historical legacy”. Antisemitism was only a topic for the German Left in its relationship to capitalism.

“In dealing with National Socialism, the Left tended to concentrate on its function for capitalism, emphasizing the destruction of working-class organizations, Nazi social and economic policies, rearmament, expansionism, and, to some degree, the bureaucratic mechanisms of party and state domination. This one-sided analysis resulted in an incomplete image of Nazism. It became seen in terms of a terroristic bureaucratic police state operating in the immediate interests of big capital, based on authoritarian structures, glorifying the family, and using racism as one means of social cohesion.”

This resulted in an abstraction and therefore marginalisation of antisemitism.


\[139\] Chin, Rita: Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race, in: Chin, Rita; Fehrenbach, Heide; Eley, Geoff and Grossmann, Atina (eds.): After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press 2009, pp. 80-101, here p. 103.

\[140\] Postone: After the Holocaust, p. 244.
had the curious result of normalizing National Socialism and, in the process, marginalizing exterminatory anti-Semitism and the Holocaust.”\textsuperscript{141} This particular way of dealing with the Holocaust and antisemitism as an abstraction, and only under broader categories like capitalism, was also characteristic for leftist culture. One example for this is Peter Weiss’ play \textit{Die Ermittlung} in 1965, which dealt with the Auschwitz trials held from 1963 to 1965 in Frankfurt. The play was a collection of witness statements of victims which were contrasted with statements of perpetrators. In these statements, fascism and antisemitism are portrayed as a form of extreme capitalist exploitation.\textsuperscript{142} In light of this marginalisation of antisemitism, it is not surprising that major theorisations of continuing forms of antisemitism did not emanate from the German Left. Here, again, it was German-Jewish emigrés - and those who returned - who first approached this topic, and whose approaches went beyond current German interpretations of antisemitism.

3.2.5 Addressing post-war antisemitism: 
social-psychological approaches

During and shortly after the Holocaust, there were a small number of attempts to understand what was happening in Germany not by looking at Germany’s history, but by analysing the motivations of the antisemites. Psychological approaches to antisemitism built a basis on which later antisemitism theories were developed. One of the first attempts to understand and explain the psychology of antisemitism was undertaken by Sigmund Freud in his book \textit{Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion}, completed and published during his London exile in 1939. Although antisemitism was not the major subject of the book, but instead the evolution of the Jewish religion, it tried to explain the psychology of anti-Jewish hatred. Freud argued that hatred against the Jewish people is a hatred against the the intellectualism of the

\textsuperscript{141}Ibid, p. 246.
\textsuperscript{142}See Adelson, Leslie: Touching Tales of Turks, Germans, and Jews: Cultural Alterity, Historical Narrative and Literary Riddles for the 1990s, in: New German Critique, No. 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring-Summer 2000), pp. 93-124, here p. 109.
Jewish religion and a revolt against the renunciation of drives expected in Christianity.\textsuperscript{143} Freud’s psychoanalytical approach had a profound influence on later approaches to understand antisemitism.

Another very influential psychological approach, which built on Freud’s findings, was that of Ernst Simmel, a German Jewish psycho-analyst who survived in exile in California. Simmel tried to understand the mass psychology behind antisemitism. He assumed that irrational ideas and behaviour signify a pathological dysfunction in the character development of an individual and that antisemitism is a backlash into primitive states of being that reverses the process of civilisation. On this basis he showed that a whole society can be pathological in this sense as well.\textsuperscript{144};

A significant theoretical contribution to the understanding of antisemitism was made by French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in 1946. Sartre was among the first to argue that antisemitism is not caused by the relationship between real Jews and non-Jews, but was a product of the thought and emotions of the antisemite.\textsuperscript{145} What these approaches had in common was that they understood antisemitism not through the behaviour of Jews, but through the attitudes of antisemites. It is most significant that none of them feature in British approaches to antisemitism during that period, which instead focussed on a Jewish immigration experience and concrete Jewish non-Jewish relations. For German theories of antisemitism, on the other hand, they became highly influential. This is partly due to the fact that those who developed them were German-Jewish emigrés who were inspired by, and worked together with, American scholars of social-psychology.

This is best exemplified in the way these psychoanalytical approaches were influenced by the theories of Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer and other members of the Frankfurter Institut für Sozialforschung (the Frankfurt

\textsuperscript{143}See Freud, Sigmund: Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion, Drei Abhandlungen, Amsterdam 1939, p. 191
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

School) which was founded in 1924 and relocated to Columbia University in New York in 1934. Although antisemitism did not play a central role in the institute’s research before 1933, it became the main focus of the institute in exile.\textsuperscript{146} German Jewish social scientists and psychologists who were directly affected by anti-Jewish hostility in Germany after 1933 and who went into exile re-evaluated their assessment of antisemitism in their approach to understand the success of National Socialism in Germany and the role antisemitism played within it.\textsuperscript{147}

Shocked by the Nazi genocide Adorno had initially stated that writing poetry after the Holocaust is barbaric.\textsuperscript{148} On the one hand, this could be interpreted as a reluctance to dissect and analyse something that was perceived as unspeakable, whether in literary or any other form.\textsuperscript{149} On the other hand, however, Adorno’s scholarship on antisemitism after 1945 was directed by his proclamation that the most important part of any education was to prevent Auschwitz from ever happening again.\textsuperscript{150} To that end, it was Adorno and his colleagues who not only built the basis of modern German antisemitism theories, but who also produced the first empirical research on contemporary antisemitism in post-war Germany. Their approach to antisemitism became particularly relevant, as it was one of the only responses to forms of post-war antisemitism, and because it formed, in a simplified version, the basis of later German antisemitism research.

However, it has to be noted that as reflected in German culture and in German historiography, German sociologists in general expressed an extreme

\textsuperscript{146}On this issue see also Ziege, Eva Maria: Antisemitismus und Gesellschaftstheorie, die Frankfurter Schule im Amerikanischen Exil, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag 2009.
\textsuperscript{147}On the differences between earlier interpretations of antisemitism among members of the Frankfurt School, see Jay, Martin: Frankfurter Schule und Judentum. In: Geschichte und Gesellschaft, Vol 5, 1979, pp. 439-454.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

reluctance to deal with the Nazi past. Michal Y. Bodemann has described the relaunch of German sociology after the war as motivated “not with the appeal to fellow sociologists to study the catastrophe and what led to it, not with the insistence that sociology should unveil and analyze the enormity of mass murder and death factories, and not with the exhortation that sociology explain the system of totalitarian rule.” Quite the opposite was the case, and the majority of German sociologists followed an impetus of passing “over these twelve years in silence, pick up where [they] left off, and, like many other Germans at that time, shrug off Nazism as an extraneous force, a metaphysical mystery that cannot be explained by rational means or the tools of sociology.”

Bodemann argued that the Frankfurt School was also part of this silence, as their way of “dealing with the Shoah soon evaporated into the abstract”. However, for Adorno, the abstraction was not a way of avoiding Auschwitz. Rather, the abstraction was necessary to understand antisemitism not as a single phenomenon, but as part, and, in fact, at the centre, of a broader social theory. In light of this, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s approach to antisemitism could not have been more radical. Like their analysis of society in general, it was inspired by Marxist social theory as well as psychoanalysis. Their main philosophical work, Dialectics of Enlightenment, was part of their attempt to overcome the previous deterministic understanding of history in materialism and instead investigate what they saw as the two sides of Enlightenment: the overcoming of myth and religion in favour of natural science and rationality on the one hand, and the potential of instrumental reason and rationality devoid of humanism contained within this development on the other.

153 Ibid, p. 89.
154 See Salzborn: Der Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, pp. 96 ff.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Adorno and Horkheimer argued that antisemitism was fundamentally modern, which meant that it can only develop within modernity. More importantly, however, they understood antisemitism as a fundamental characteristic of modern society. Adorno and Horkheimer therefore distinguished between anti-Judaism and modern antisemitism, but still sought to trace the latter’s historical sources in earlier manifestations.\(^{155}\)

One main element of Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s theory of modern antisemitism was pathological projection. To explain this, it is important to understand their basic ideas about modern society in general. They assumed that in modern capitalistic societies, individuals have paradoxically lost the individuality which to install was one of the goals of Enlightenment. This is due to the way in which individuals relate to each other in fully developed capitalism. Human relations became ruled by functionality and dependency. Individuals thus became authoritarian personalities, which were in effect weak personalities who gave up their personal autonomy in favour of a ‘rule of society’. In Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s view, this created a disposition for antisemitism, because individuals gave up their autonomous critical rationality in favour of socialisation in modern capitalism – on the unconscious level –, so they are susceptible for world explanation theories and therefore antisemitic ideas, which explain what they cannot understand.\(^{156}\)

A very important precondition for antisemitism as pathological projection is that this lack of personal autonomy, unconsciously, fills people with anger and hatred. They then direct their anger against those who do not fit into society as they perceive it. Adorno and Horkheimer identified those to be “Vagabunden, Juden, Protestanten, Katholiken” (vagabonds, Jews, Protest-}


3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Because people feel betrayed – bourgeois society, capitalism, promised them happiness but did not deliver – they feel anger and hatred. This hatred against others is in fact a hatred against difference, because it is perceived that Jews indulge in something that others do not allow themselves. Antisemitism then means to make everything the same.

Although Horkheimer and Adorno argued that this mechanism does not necessarily have to target Jews, they pointed out that there are reasons that it affects Jews in a specific way. The main reason was that Jews have historically been identified with money and capitalism, which is now perceived as the main source of unhappiness. The image of the Jewish banker who funds Bolshevism then expresses the feeling of powerlessness, the image of the Jewish intellectual expresses the desire for a life without hard physical work.

Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s theory on antisemitism was necessarily very complex, and a fundamental part of their social theory. The central role and priority given to anti-Jewish resentments and fascist social structures in the institute’s research in its American exile led to several studies on antisemitic prejudice and fascist tendencies in individuals. This was most notably perhaps The Authoritarian Personality in 1950, a joint study by Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel Levinson and Nevitt Sanford, in which the authors investigated individual levels of authoritarianism, conformity, racism and prejudice among Americans, character traits which they believed to be related to right-wing ideology and therefore fascism.

Apart from the The Authoritarian Personality, which may be one of the best known today, the institute and its affiliated members in fact undertook a number of influential studies on the subject of antisemitism. These studies had a different vantage point than studies on historical antisemitism, as their intent was to understand antisemitism and how the Holocaust was possible, rather than to contribute to the debates German historians, or the German public, were embroiled in.

158 Ibid, p. 182 f.
159 Ibid, p. 181.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Paul W. Massing’s study on political antisemitism in Imperial Germany for example was undertaken on behalf of the institute during its exile at Columbia University.\textsuperscript{161} It was part of the \textit{Studies in Prejudice} under supervision of Max Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman, among which \textit{The Authoritarian Personality} had been published as well. Massing emphasised how the Jew-hatred of the time was deeply connected to the perception of capitalism. He showed how the antisemitic agitation of the time in face of the economic depression centred around a distinction between productive and honest German capital and a perceived greedy, unproductive ‘Jewish’ capital which was assumed to be responsible for the economic misery. He argued that this perception of financial capital as inherently ‘Jewish’ was based on legends of Jewish greed during medieval times. The general idea of distinguishing between productive and rapacious economy, he argued, originally stemmed from German romanticism. He pointed out that this argumentation hit the ‘weak’ spot of the middle classes: they were able to criticise financial capital, which had always seemed threatening to their way of life, without questioning their own economic basis.\textsuperscript{162} Massing stressed that this was also characteristic of the National Socialist understanding of economy, which was anti-international and against financial capital, but not against a national capitalist economy.

Massing’s main point was that this economic antisemitism was used to manipulate the masses. He explained how politicians used antisemitism to mobilise the middle classes in their favour. However, he concluded that they lost interest in antisemitism after 1895 when the economy recovered. The following era was, he argued, a time of Jewish flourishing and assimilation and as long as the Empire was perceived to be in good shape, hatred was turned on outside enemies like Britain and France. This also meant, however, that with the end of the dreams of international status after the end of the first


\textsuperscript{162}Ibid, p. 12 ff.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

World War, antisemitism was able to reemerge only more drastically. Massing’s main argument was that the German population had a perception of the world that was easily turned into Jew-hatred, but that it needed a certain political constellation in order to be mobilised. Massing’s interpretation of antisemitism clearly spelled out Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s earlier ideas: Jews were hated as they were perceived to embody the negative sides of capitalism. Massing’s study shows that the Institute positioned itself beyond the later debates about responsibility for the Holocaust. However, it needs to be taken into account that Massing’s approach was that of a sociologist. The aim of the Institut für Sozialforschung was to understand the social function of antisemitism and embed this in a wider social theory, which also meant that the members of the Institute acknowledged that antisemitism may have culminated in the Holocaust, but continued to exist and fulfil certain functions within post-war German society. Understanding the nature of antisemitism also meant to analyse why Jews were targeted in particular, and what this meant for society as a whole.

On this basis the Institute also addressed contemporary forms of antisemitism, and critically assessed exactly the earlier mentioned reluctance of the Germans to deal with the Nazi past. After the Institute re-settled in West Germany in 1953, it continued its research on the history of antisemitism as well as its post-war manifestations. It documented and analysed antisemitic violence and reactions to it by the German public and used these observations to understand post-war German society. From very early on, Adorno saw that Germans hold the Jews responsible for the Holocaust and think that Jews exploit the feeling of German guilt. This anti-Jewish hostility as a result of the Holocaust was initially described as ‘guilt-defensive antisemitism’, but was later termed ‘secondary antisemitism’.

---

Adorno saw in post-war German society the continuation of an anti-democratic authoritarianism, which bore particular habits and prejudices. When Adorno spoke to the Gesellschaft für Christlich Jüdische Zusammenarbeit (Society of Christian-Jewish Cooperation) on the topic of ‘Educating prejudice-free human beings’ (Erziehung vorurteilsfreier Menschen) at the first European Pedagogical Conference on 30 October 1962, he referred to a hidden or crypto-antisemitism in postwar German society. He stressed that antisemites today wanted to portray themselves as the persecuted: they are not allowed to voice their antisemitic opinions in public, and therefore feel oppressed. He proposed an anti-authoritarian education to combat antisemitism, as one element in the development of antisemitic attitudes were experiences as a child. In his view, education would have to stop the formation of authoritarian characters. However, he also strongly felt that antisemitism was a mainstream phenomenon in post-war Germany, and that fighting antisemitism would mean to go against the current.

What is perhaps significant in a comparison between Germany and Britain during that period is that in contrast to the majority of approaches to antisemitism in Britain, Adorno’s approach exhibited an understanding that antisemitic attitudes were not related to Jewish behaviour at all. He thus emphasized that anti-antisemitic education in this sense would not mean to portray Jews in a positive light in order to change attitudes among antisemites. He therefore doubted if ‘pretty pictures of Israeli irrigation plants’, or ‘eulogies about great Jewish men’ would be helpful in combating antisemitism.

In its research on post-war German antisemitism, the Frankfurt Institute applied Adorno’s ideas of this specific post-war German antisemitism to violent antisemitic outbursts. On 24 December 1959, Christmas Eve, the synagogue in Cologne, Germany, was daubed with Swastikas. The perpetrators, who were

---

166 See Rensmann: Das Besondere im Allgemeinen, p. 176.
168 Ibid, p. 120, p. 122 and p. 114.
arrested on Christmas Day, Arnold Strunk and Paul Josef Schönen, were identified as members of the nationalist Deutsche Reichspartei (DRP). However, their crime – which was classed as an abuse of an official religious community according to section 166 of the criminal code, did not remain an aberrant event, but was followed by hundreds of attacks on synagogues, Jewish cemeteries and buildings all over Germany.¹⁷⁰ Even more striking, the wave of attacks appeared in other countries, too.

According to a survey by the Frankfurt Institute right after the events in January, the majority of Germans condemned the attacks, but many also believed that these were just pranks pulled by youths which do not need to be taken too seriously.¹⁷¹ While the German government interpreted the events as reason enough to renew their previous efforts to ban the DRP, Rabbi Zvi Asaria of the Cologne synagogue believed that the perpetrators were just youths from problem families and that the attacks were not part of a politically organised action against Jews.¹⁷²

In his study on the events, Peter Schönbach interpreted the antisemitism he came across as part of an Authoritarian Character. However, he tailored this specifically to the German context. He explained that the German antisemite after the Holocaust is not only extremely dependant on external influences – authorities –, does not only show extreme conformism towards authorities, wishes to see his attitudes confirmed and rewarded by the authorities and shows repressive tendencies, he is also torn between denying any German guilt on the one hand and legitimising the German past on the other.¹⁷³ The study showed that most of those who can be classed as antisemites – the 16 per cent that showed mild and strong antisemitic reactions – tended to diminish the importance of the incidents. As an explanation, Schönbach said that “the adult antisemites in Germany were likely to be reminded by the incidents of

¹⁷¹ See Schönbach, Peter: Reaktionen auf die antisemitische Welle im Winter 1959/1960, p.31
¹⁷³ Schönbach, Peter: Reaktionen auf die antisemitische Welle, p. 23.
the persecutions of the Jews in the ‘Third Reich’ and the charges against the Nazis. Many of them tried to ward off their disquieting associations and guilt feelings by magnifying the psychological distance between the incidents and themselves. They achieved this by representing the incidents to themselves and to others as unpolitical pranks of hoodlums and foolish boys.”

Schönbach’s study is not only significant in its level of sophistication, but it also showed how in Germany, there was not only a reluctance to deal with the past, but there were also those who criticised this reluctance. Paradoxically, post-war German discourse made both possible: a denial of guilt as well a radical social critique based on the mechanism of this denial. In contrast to Britain, it is most notable that there were any attempts at all to understand antisemitism without marginalising or downplaying it. While in Britain, antisemitism eventually came to be understood through theories on colonial immigration, this was not the case in Germany, even though there were similar debates about immigration during the same period. For theories of antisemitism, debates about immigration in fact had a completely different effect: Anti-foreigner hostility was either not analysed at all, or explained in reference to the Holocaust by using concepts of antisemitism.

3.2.6 Approaches to anti-foreigner hostility in the 1960s and 1970s

Although there are some similarities between debates about minorities in Germany and Britain in the 1960s and 1970s, there was nevertheless a completely different understanding of minority-majority relationships in Germany, which also had profound effects on theorisations of antisemitism. This is best exemplified in the situation of the ‘guestworkers’, who came to Germany in the 1950s and 1960s. The largest presence of ethnic minorities in Germany today grew out of labour migration in the 1950s and 1960s. In order to recruit workers for Germany, the German government concluded recruitment-treaties with Italy in 1955, Spain and Greece in 1960, Turkey in 1963, Portugal in 1964, Tunisia

174 Ibid, p. 82.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany in 1965 and Yugoslavia in 1968.\textsuperscript{175} This labour migration was understood as a temporary economic measure. The “guestworkers” were mostly male, unskilled and semi-skilled workers that were expected to move home after a short time of employment in Germany. They lived in designated housing and were excluded from social services. However, the economic conditions in Germany motivated many workers to stay, despite the recruitment halt in 1973, and to make use of their right to family-reunification, granted by the German state.\textsuperscript{176} A temporary economic measure thus became an immigration reality that was for a long time denied by the state. However, the workers who decided they would stay still preserved the ‘myth of return’ in their minds, even though they decided to let their families join them in Germany.\textsuperscript{177} Most of those who decided to settle in Germany were Turks, so that they make up the majority of non-Germans in Germany today.\textsuperscript{178}

For the ‘guestworkers’, integration into German society was never intended and was thus not institutionalised. The legal status of the ‘guestworker’ was determined by a law dating back to 1938, which determines that foreigners working in Germany were contract labour without freedom of movement or residency rights. A new \textit{Ausländergesetz} (alien law) in 1965 did not change this principle, but was vague enough to allow de-facto settlement. Eva Kolinsky points out that “despite the de-facto emergence of a resident non-German minority, German policy makers and German society continue to look for means of preventing or obstructing settlement and, of course, curtailing or prohibiting new arrivals”.\textsuperscript{179} This is exemplified in the family unification principle, under which family members are only allowed to seek employment after 4 years of

\textsuperscript{177}Sen and Aydin: Islam in Deutschland, p.12.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid, p. 87-90.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

settlement, which led to economic disadvantage among these migrants.\textsuperscript{180} Because Germany did not consider itself a country of immigration, foreign workers could hardly apply for citizenship. This understanding of German nationhood originates from before the development of Germany as a nation-state when the “prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial community - as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft. On this understanding, nationhood is an ethnocultural, not a political fact.”\textsuperscript{181} Rogers Brubaker has pointed out that thus, “the German definition of citizenry is a community of descent, restrictive toward non-German immigrants yet remarkably expansive toward ethnic Germans from eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, reflects the pronounced ethnocultural inflection in German self-understanding.”\textsuperscript{182} Although it might have been expected that the völkisch ideology and German understanding as an ethnocultural nation was discredited after 1945, instead “the peculiar circumstances of the immediate post-war period - the total collapse of the state, the massive expulsion of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and the imposed division of Germany - reinforced and powerfully relegitimated that self-understanding” and “with the unconditional surrender and total collapse in 1945, Germany became again what it had been before unification: a nation without a state”.\textsuperscript{183} The postwar reconstruction of citizenship in conjunction with the establishment of the FDR in fact reflected this self-understanding as a nation without a state.\textsuperscript{184} This understanding of nationhood has greatly affected migrants in Germany and is one of the reasons why initially, the German state did very little to recognise, let alone meet, the educational, cultural, or religious needs of this largely male Muslim population.\textsuperscript{185} However, after the recruitment halt

\textsuperscript{180}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{182}Ibid, p. 14.
\textsuperscript{183}Ibid, p.168.
\textsuperscript{184}See bid, p. 169.
\textsuperscript{185}See Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain, France, and Germany, p. 101.
in 1973 the growing population of migrant workers and their families became de facto residents who had housing, educational, social welfare, and religious needs that had to be met, needs that had essentially been ignored under the guestworker regime.\textsuperscript{186}

As discussed above, the German state did little to accommodate the ‘guest-workers’ and meet their needs, who were in fact mostly Muslim. There were for example only very few mosques in Germany at the time of labour migration - most of them constructed with funds from Middle Eastern countries - and Turks used rooms in their hostels or factories for daily prayers.\textsuperscript{187} Later, disused factories were used as mosques and over time purpose-built mosques became more numerous, but not without meeting hostility from local German neighbours who feared that they would “turn the surrounding district into a Turkish ghetto, create parking problems, inconvenience non-Muslim residents, spoil the architectural ambience of a town or neighbourhood, and encourage the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Germany”.\textsuperscript{188}

Turks were also among the most despised minority groups in Germany. They encountered institutional discrimination, but the negative perception of Turks was part of mainstream German discourse. ‘Guestworkers’, but especially Turks were perceived as alien invaders. In 1973 the title story in Der Spiegel for example read “The Turks are coming - every man for himself”\textsuperscript{189} in relation to the metaphor of ‘drowning in immigrants’. The article dealt with Turkish immigration and the living conditions of Turks in Germany and in it took the position that Turkish immigration leads to an uncontrollable crisis in metropolitan areas. The “invasion” of Turkish immigrants into once neat and tidy, if poor, areas, would ultimately lead to “decay, crime and impoverishment like in Harlem”, according to the article. Describing changes in Berlin Kreuzberg, the article pointed out that where one once was able to breathe

\textsuperscript{186}See Ibid., p.102.
\textsuperscript{188}Ibid, p. 160.
\textsuperscript{189}“Die Türken kommen - rette sich wer kann”, in: Der Spiegel No. 81 1973, pp. 24-34.
“Berlin air”, now “women stroll in harem trousers”, “the vegetable display is lately of colourful opulence, in front of the butcher’s shop hang gutted muttons, and little Turkish flags with half moon and star everywhere show that here, Kreuzberg is Kleen-Smyrna”. The language of the article was surprisingly war-related. Turkish immigrants were “invading” Germany, building “fortresses” in formerly German apartment buildings and recruiting new “brigades” from the home country.

Surveys conducted in the 1970s and 1980s showed hostility towards non-German workers increased dramatically over time, while 39 per cent of Germans favoured the view that guest workers should return to their home country in 1978, this figure grew to 80 per cent in 1983, in conjunction with the perception of the increasingly unstable status of German economy.\footnote{See Just, Wolf-Dieter and P.C. Mühlen: Ausländerzunahme: Objektives Problem oder Einstellungsfrage? In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, Vol 25, 1982, pp. 35-38.}

Even though this article reflected public opinion, there were initially no attempts to address these attitudes in the form of anti-racist measures. There were no anti-discrimination laws in Germany that matched their British counterparts. However, after the recruitment of workers and their subsequent settlement in Germany turned into a reality, the ‘guestworker question’ or ‘foreigner question’ nevertheless became a topic in public and political debates as well as academic research. This situation was exacerbated when by the 1970s, the debates around the ‘guestworkers’ were increasingly led by newly formed or revived right-wing initiatives. Initiatives and groups like the ‘Deutsche Volksunion’, founded in 1971, were openly hostile to ‘foreigners’ and actively took part in the public discussions. Their ideas about German society were inspired by ‘völkisch’ thought and related to Nazi ideology.

However, there were initially no attempts to assess and criticise the way in which ‘guestworkers’ were perceived and portrayed in German society and public discourse. The empirical studies rather made ‘guestworkers’ the object of their research. It was therefore less the attitudes towards guest workers that were investigated, or their stereotypical representation, but more the migration patterns, social status and situation of guest workers in Germany. These
The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

Studies were often sympathetic of guest workers in the sense that they did not portray them in a negative way, but with sympathy. In his 1971 study on *Guestworkers as a European problem* Helmut Schrettenbrunner, for example, described the situation in the home countries of the workers as appalling and desolate, and portrayed their wish for economic migration as understandable. The ‘guestworkers’ in his study were portrayed as victims of economic exploitation, both in their home country as well as in Germany. The workers themselves, however, were not given a voice, but represented as passive, weak and vulnerable. Although his study did not intend to portray ‘guestworkers’ in a hostile way, his way of representing them was in fact stereotypical and strengthened common perceptions of ‘guestworkers’.

This was reflected in German culture as well: minorities were not given a voice, but were portrayed as victims without agency. The most prominent example for this were the films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder. Fassbinder was seen as a left-liberal artist whose films and plays were understood as sympathetic with social outsiders and, a rarity in German culture, with immigrants. In his earlier film *Katzelmacher* (1969), for example, Fassbinder explored the dynamics of a group of people when a Greek immigrant enters their life. His internationally acclaimed 1974 film *Ali: Fear eats the soul* dealt with the reactions towards a relationship between young Moroccan guest worker Ali and older German widow Emmi and the psychological and physical effects this has on Ali.

In contrast to antisemitism research, in which prejudice was automatically assumed to be irrational and not based on real experience, one topic of social research at the time was the question whether the negative perception of foreigners in Germany was legitimate or prejudiced. The result was often that although there was prejudice, this was not completely illegitimate, as there were in fact many criminal ‘foreigners’. Most studies of the time were characterised by the viewpoint that these attitudes were more or less related to

---

191 See Schrettenbrunner, Helmut: *Gastarbeiter, ein europäisches Problem aus der Sicht der Herkunftsländer und der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, Frankfurt am Main: Verlag Moritz Diesterweg, 1971, pp. 65 ff.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

either natural tensions between ‘ethnic groups’ or legitimate economic anxieties among Germans.192 In this regard these studies were similar to British studies on immigration during the same period, which dealt with the issue of immigration in a framework of ‘race relations’ and ‘ethnic tensions’. In contrast to Britain, however, there was no wider critical assessment of the context of the treatment of ‘foreigners’ in German society. Moreover, the treatment of ‘foreigners’ was far from being conceptualised as racism.

Rita Chin has argued that this was because the Nazi legacy altered the ways in which foreign labour recruitment could be understood. She stressed that “because race had served as a primary mode of social distinction during the Nazi period, a form of categorization that determined whether a person was valued by the state or marked for destruction, one of the implicit imperatives for the reconstruction of a more fully democratic West German society was to make the question of race a nonissue”.193 While there was thus a reality of racialist thinking and ideologies, neither policy makers nor scholars of the subject addressed the issue as racism.

One exception was the study of Ernst Klee, who documented the concrete living and working situations of ‘guestworkers’ in Europe and came to the conclusion that they were treated as modern slaves, like African-Americans had been treated during slavery.194 Klee acknowledged that forms of racism existed in post-war Germany, but saw it as an import of the forms of discrimination against African-Americans in the United States. But his interpretation was hardly a reflection of mainstream public discourse.

But when assessing the absence of analyses and approaches to racism in Germany in light of foreign labour recruitment, one important aspect is overlooked: the reason that those who studied the subject did not locate it within a racialisation framework was not that race as a category had become taboo, or at least not only that. The more important reason was that those who saw

192 See Just and Mühlens: Ausländerzunahme, S. 35-38.
193 Chin, Rita: Guest Worker Migration and the Unexpected Return of Race, p. 80 f.
anti-foreigner hostility in reference to the Holocaust and as a continuation of Nazi ideology did not understand this ideology only as ‘racism’, but as an ideology of which ‘race’ was just one aspect. There were trends towards a study of prejudice, rather than a study of ‘race relations’. Because antisemitism was not understood as racism, anti-foreigner hostilities were not understood as racism either. Adorno’s view on the subject was that antisemitism was structurally equal to other forms of ethnocentric reaction, for example, as he put it, prejudice against ‘Negroes’.195 There was thus another important development in approaches to anti-foreigner hostilities, which was directly related to the ways in which antisemitism was understood. In this sense, anti-foreigner resentments were interpreted in the context of post-Holocaust Germany and seen as a continuation of Nazi ideology. This was the premise of Peter Schönbach’s social-psychological study on the different effects between the usage of the term ‘guestworker’ and ‘foreign worker’ in everyday language. The study came to the conclusion that Germans usually associate non-German workers with negative images, but that this effect is stronger when talking about ‘foreign workers’ than when talking about ‘guest workers’.196 The theoretical understanding of the study was that the increased ability to use words affected the ability to be flexible with associations and therefore be less prejudiced. The study’s main finding was that that stereotypical associations appeared more often in less educated persons.197 Although the study was not directly undertaken with Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer at the Institut für Sozialforschung in Frankfurt, Schönbach mentioned their support in his foreword.198 His theoretical approach was influenced by the idea that during National Socialism, or even earlier than that, the German language changed in a way that now determines how Germans think and behave towards people and things.199

197 Ibid, p. 81ff, 105 ff.
199 Ibid, p. 9ff.
most studies on ‘guestworkers’ in Germany at the time, Schönbach’s work was one of the few that hinted at a continuation of Nazi ideology, in this case traceable in language, in reference to the treatment and perception of ‘foreigners’ in post-war Germany.

The relation between education and stereotypes remained a topic for social psychologists, as did the equation of antisemitism with other forms of prejudice. This became evident in Peter Schönbach’s later study on the relationship between education and intergroup attitudes. Building on his earlier study of the linguistic effects of using the terms ‘Gastarbeiter’ and ‘Fremdarbeiter’, Schönbach further explored his earlier hypothesis that individuals with lower education are more inclined to stereotypical attitudes than those who are well educated.\(^\text{200}\)

Although Schönbach focussed on Gastarbeiter ethnicities in Germany - Italians, Greeks and Turks - he did not differentiate between stereotypes about different ethnic groups, but subsumed these under a general category of intergroup relations. He used the same methods other studies have used to identify attitudes towards Jews and what he called ‘Negroes’ in the United States.\(^\text{201}\) He came to the conclusion that “low or vulnerable self-esteem and a lack of other bases for a positively valued social identity among many persons with low educational status may create a specific need for national identity and differentiation in these persons. [...] Negative attitudes towards other nations or ethnic groups would not only be a consequence of such a need but a constitutive component of a social identity thus achieved”.\(^\text{202}\) He further found that higher education led to “a more complex and flexible cognitive or associative disposition of a general nature that frequently facilitates, among other things, the development and maintenance of comparatively unstereotyped attitudes

---


\(^{201}\) Ibid, pp. 19-20.

\(^{202}\) Ibid, p. 173.
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany towards various outgroups.

It is noteworthy that Schönbach did not understand hostility against ‘foreigners’ in terms of racism, but in terms of prejudice. As later chapters will show, prejudice research became one of the most important approaches to antisemitism in Germany. From its inception, this kind of research did not emphasise the particularity of antisemitism, but drew on what were thought to be the common aspects of all types of prejudice. Perhaps unintentionally, this opened up the possibility of marginalising antisemitism by reducing it to merely a variant of other forms of prejudice.

One result of this was a difficulty to adequately analyse either antisemitism or anti-foreigner hostility. This became apparent in instances in which the image of Jewish suffering during the Holocaust was used to draw comparisons with other victims in other contexts. At the time, Leftists for example used the image of Jews during the Holocaust to demand attention for the plight of guestworkers in Germany. On a provocative political poster by Klaus Staeck in 1974, for example, one can see two obviously non-German workers emptying German trash who have a Star of David superimposed on their shirt pockets.

However, these kind of comparisons must be understood in the context of the Left’s focus on anti-fascism rather than anti-racism. In that sense, the poster did not mean to say that Turks or Muslims are exactly like Jews, but that German fascism extends into the Federal Republic and victimises immigrants. In line with what was discussed earlier, the perspective of the poster was not that of immigrants, but that of Germans. The poster was thus neither about Jews, nor about Turks, but about a particular way of interpreting the German past in relationship to the present. In doing so, the poster managed to marginalise both antisemitism and anti-foreigner hostility. The Holocaust was reduced to only a reference. As such, this poster is an example for the phenomenon that neither Germany’s past, nor Germany’s present were adequately dealt with.

\[203\] Ibid.

3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

3.2.7 Understanding antisemitism differently: Britain and Germany in comparison

In both Britain and Germany, the period between the 1960s and late 1970s was characteristic of a marginalisation of contemporary antisemitism. However, there were different reasons for this. On the one hand, German society and German scholarship largely denied a continuation of antisemitism after 1945. On the other hand, major theoretical developments were undertaken by German-Jewish emigrés, who saw little difference between the structures of Nazi antisemitism and later expressions of antisemitism. In Britain, in contrast, there was a complete lack of theoretical approaches to antisemitism that did not downplay or marginalise it.

In this context the surprising development is not that antisemitism in Germany was understood in light of the Holocaust, which overshadowed every aspect of post-war German identity, but that in Britain, it was not understood in light of the Holocaust. This goes beyond the fact that the Holocaust did not happen in Britain. There is a striking absence of the Holocaust and Nazi antisemitism as an analytical reference in British antisemitism theories up to the late 1970s. Rather than develop broader social theories, antisemitism researchers looked at specific periods and concrete interactions between Jews and non-Jews in British history, and through their methods reproduced the common assumption that prejudice only arose out of social interaction. If there was any antisemitism at all, according to these researchers, it was the result of antagonistic Jewish behaviour.

Although this changed somewhat, as the next chapter will show, from the end of the 1970s onwards, the theoretical and methodological development with regard to the study of antisemitism took almost exactly opposite paths in Britain and Germany. While in Germany, theories on antisemitism became a model for interpreting anti-foreigner hostilities, in Britain, racism theories became a model to interpret hostilities against Jews. Coupled with the underlying timid mentality of the Jewish community - and no one else took interest in antisemitism - this led to a serious marginalisation of antisemitism as merely
3 The Development of Post-War Antisemitism Theories in Britain and Germany

a side issue of racism, and, as the next chapter will show, this had significant repercussions for later research on the topic in Britain.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

The previous chapter dealt with influences on contemporary antisemitism theories in the context of the arrival of immigrants from the 1950s onwards and showed how these differed between Britain and Germany. Building on that, this chapter provides an analysis of debates about racism and minority-majority relations in the 1980s and evaluates how these have influenced antisemitism theories in a comparative perspective. In Britain, antisemitism was understood through a prism of these immigration debates as well as debates about Zionism and colonialism, which led to a neglect of any conceptualisations of antisemitism. This stood in stark contrast to ongoing debates about anti-Muslim sentiments in particular, which provided early grounds for comparisons between past Jews and present Muslims. In Germany, antisemitism theories continued to serve as a tool to understand and explain general anti-immigrant sentiments. However, dominant explanations for antisemitism also excluded its particular Jewish dimension.

4.1 Britain: Racism, minority recognition and the double squeeze on antisemitism theories

When analysing theoretical approaches to antisemitism in the 1980s, it not only becomes apparent that there were almost none, but that those who argued for
their formulation were often silenced. On the one hand, this was due to the fact that the Jewish community did not endorse a public fight against antisemitism, but remained rather quiet and promoted assimilation rather than recognition. This stood in stark contrast to general developments in minority-majority relationships in Britain and is perhaps most notably reflected in the debates about the position of Muslims in British society. The relationship between Muslim minority and British majority society was shaped by ‘milestones’ like the Rushdie affair, during which Muslims voiced their concerns and demanded that their needs are met. Not only did these debates lead to a rethinking of minority-majority relationships in Britain in general, which eventually also had an effect on Jews, but evaluations of anti-Muslim sentiment that emerged out of these debates led to early comparisons between past Jews and present Muslims. However, at the time, these did not lead to serious conceptualisations of antisemitism.

On the other hand this was due to the fact that racism theories did not include Jews and antisemitism, but were formulated with recent immigration to Britain as well as Britain’s relationship to the Colonies in mind. What proved additionally difficult was the fact that Zionism became a major topic in debates about racism, so much that any opposition to anti-Zionism within an anti-racist position became almost impossible.

4.1.1 From interactionist to critical racism theories

In a sense, the political background in Britain at the time was similar to that in Germany, which is discussed below. There was a rebirth of conservative ideology that culminated in the election of Margaret Thatcher as prime minister in 1979. The Holocaust became a topic in culture and media, too, but discussions about how to relate to the past did not have the same function for national identity as in Germany. For Britain, this central issue proved to be the perceived differences between ‘race’ and ‘culture’ and how they could be dealt with. And while similar arguments about the inherent difference of foreigners were made in Germany at the time, there was only peripheral research
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

into the topic and not, as in Britain, any form of established critical analyses of the way ‘race’ was understood in British society.

From the 1980s the assessment and policing of ‘racial tensions’ in the UK changed. The *Scarman report*, commissioned by the Home Office following the 1981 Brixton riots, found that ‘racial’ disadvantage and prejudice was a serious threat to community cohesion in Britain and suggested that the problem be addressed immediately. The report marked a shift of focus from ‘race relations’ to ‘community relations’ and multiculturalism. The basic idea of this multiculturalism was that “integration rests on the assumption that a process is to be created and governed between distinct but equivalent groups whose identity is to be defined by ‘culture’ rather than ‘race’”.¹ Nevertheless, Paul Ward points out that “in the 1980s there was a strong element within Conservatism of seeking to maintain an exclusive sense of British national identity”.² This can be seen in the tightening of immigration controls on racial lines. In addition, multiculturalism was largely based on decentralised policies of local governments rather than national policy.

David Feldman, however, has argued that multiculturalism has a longer history and a stronger grounding in British history than previously thought. He stressed that “policies which sanctioned cultural pluralism predate the drive to multiculturalism in the 1980s”.³ He added that this was also true under the Conservative government. “There were majoritarian initiatives in the Thatcher years but their success was qualified by the persistence of pluralism”.⁴ He came to the conclusion that in Britain, there was a “long history of pluralist solutions to the problem of reconciling different cultural communities within one single polity.”⁵

²Ward, Paul: Britishness since 1870, p.128.
⁵Ibid, p. 299f.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

From the 1980s, local administrations implemented multicultural policies, promoting the existence of various ‘ethnicities’. However, multiculturalism in Britain was not a single policy, but rather a multifaceted conglomerate of different national and local policies. Nevertheless, these new policies were both informed by, and influenced, theories about racism in British society.

4.1.2 Developments in racism research

Racism researchers in fact soon pointed out that this insistence on cultural difference was a new form of racism. Martin Barker for example stressed that although Conservatives did not claim that any culture was superior to another, there was still the idea that it was part of human nature to form distinct communities. The ‘British’ way of life and ‘British’ traditions were thus seen as having to be defended not against a perceived inferiority of immigrants but against their cultural difference. This ‘new racism’ used notions of culture and nation instead of pseudo-biological traits to differentiate groups and construct a sense of Britishness.6

A concept of ‘cultural racism’ proved to be a major influence on conceptualisations of antisemitism in the 1990s, as will be discussed in the next chapter. In order to explain this process, however, further developments have to be taken into account. As mentioned in the previous chapter, at the end of the 1970s, racism research began to move away from theories of ‘race relations’ and towards a more critical engagement with racist ideology. The Empire strikes back, a publication by the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, was in a sense a neo-Marxist response to the interactionist and immigrant-blaming racism theories of the 1960s and 1970s. The authors argued that there are links between racism and capitalist development, but also that racism was intricately linked to imperialist ideology.

The authors stressed that

“Racism as it exists and functions today cannot be treated simply

Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

from a sociological perspective: it has to be located historically and in terms of the wider structures and relations of British society. The historical roots of racist practices within the British state, the British dominant classes, and the ‘British’ working class, go deep and cannot be reduced to simple ideological phenomena. They have been conditioned, if not determined, by the historical development of colonial societies which was central to the reproduction of British imperialism. This process generated a specific type of ‘nationalism’ pertinent in the formation of British classes long before the ‘immigration’ issue became a central aspect of political discourse.”

In their assessment of racism in the 1970s, the authors argued that “the construction of an authoritarian state in Britain is fundamentally intertwined with the elaboration of popular racism in the 1970s.”

They thought that general developments in policies and economy showed how Britain developed into an authoritarian state and that there was a general increase in social control, which also related to racism. The authors wanted to show that the economic crisis in Britain in the 1970s was also crisis of hegemony and that “its content is not reducible to a cyclical economic crisis in the traditional sense, or a ‘crisis of the political system’ in the narrow sense. It consists rather of profound changes in the balance of forces, in the class struggle and in the configuration of the class alliances.”

They further argued that in the sixties the idea of ‘the enemy within’ developed, rather than a model of subversion from without, which had effects on how black people were perceived. Although this is not exactly correct, as the idea of an enemy within was present in earlier anti-alien resentments in British society as well, the authors rightly stressed that in this

---

4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

text, race is a central issue. They showed that in the 1970s, there was the
idea that blacks as enemies within are undermining the structures of society
and that racial violence was a result of alien presence. But not only were blacks
blamed for specific problems, there had also been a reworking of the concepts
of ‘nation’ and ‘citizen’, which “deny even the possibility that black people
can share the native population’s attachment to the national culture.”

Although these racism theories were progressive, Jews and antisemitism were
absent from them. As Michael Billig pointed out in his analysis of anti-Jewish
themes on the British left at the time, these neo-Marxist racism theories had
a very particular understanding of who can be a victim of racism. Jews were
in fact completely omitted as a minority suffering from racism.

Nevertheless, from the late 1970s and early 1980s these neo-Marxist ap-
proaches changed the way racism, and eventually also antisemitism, was anal-
ysed. Instead of focussing on minority majority relations, they investigated
race, power relations and political structures. The most significant publica-
tions were *Policing the Crisis* in 1978 and, as mentioned, *The Empire Strikes
Back* in 1982 by a group of academics at the Birmingham Centre for Contem-
porary Cultural Studies (CCCS), among them Stuart Hall and Paul Gilroy.

As Geoff Eley has pointed out, these studies analysed the racial ideology that
characterised British politics, but they saw racism through a prism of class:
for them, ‘race relations’ were ‘class relations’.

Nevertheless, they changed the way racism was thought about. A number
of studies dealt with the issue of migrant labour from this perspective.

---

10 Ibid, p.29.
11 See Billig, Michael: Anti-Jewish Themes and the British Far Left I, in: Patterns of
Prejudice, Vol 18, No 1, 1984, pp. 3-17.
12 See also Gilroy’s later publication Gilroy, Paul: There ain’t no Black in the Union Jack,
13 See Eley, Geoff: The Trouble with ‘Race’: Migrancy, Cultural Difference, and the Remak-
ing of Europe, in: Chin, Rita; Fehrenbach, Heide; Eley, Geoff and Grossmann, Atina:
After the Nazi Racial State: Difference and Democracy in Germany and Europe, Ann
14 See Phizacklea, Anni and Robert Miles: Labour and Racism, London: Routledge and
Kegan Paul 1980; Cross, M.: Migrant workers in European Cities: Concentration, Con-
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Solomos also pointed out the more serious studies on political mobilisation and participation since the early 1990s. He emphasised that “such research situates race and racism within a specifically political analysis of power and considers how the latter reproduces ethnoracial domination in particular societies”. Other studies focussed on race within political parties, race in electoral politics and growth of racist movements. From the 1990s, there have also been studies on Muslim recognition and participation in particular.

Race, class and rethinking antisemitism

When analysing these approaches to racism in detail, it is striking that only casual reference, if any, was made to Jews and antisemitism. On a theoretical level, Robert Miles criticised Banton and Rex’s earlier theories for approaching ‘race’ instead of racism. He argued that physical differences do not have a social meaning, but that “the significance of, for example, skin colour arises from the meaning that is given to it by the people”. Miles criticised ‘race relations’ as an object of study because it operates within the structures that should actually be critiqued. Within this approach, he argued, ‘race’ is reified.

Miles was also against the idea that the ideology of racism was formulated by colonialists in order to justify processes of slavery and exploitation. He contested that racism is a simple and direct consequence of the development of

---

146
capitalism and that the history of colonialism was the most important factor in the genesis of racism in England. This explanation, as he pointed out, would for example not explain English antisemitism.\textsuperscript{22} Instead, he wanted to emphasise that “racism is generated and reproduced as a real, lived phenomenon and is not simply (...) an ideological imposition of and by the ruling class (...) in the logical pursuit of its economic interests”.\textsuperscript{23} In his study on racism and labour migration, Miles investigated the migration of the Irish and the discrimination against them in the nineteenth century. He used this example of a racialised ‘white’ group to emphasise how ‘race’ is a construct, not a biological reality.\textsuperscript{24}

He concluded that “the process of racialisation is operating in Britain to assist both the reproduction of fractions of the working class and the structuring of the formation of a new reserve army of labour”.\textsuperscript{25} He argues that the social relations that exist between migrants and majority society are in fact class relations that are only constructed as ‘race relations’.

As a theoretical basis for his studies, Miles was interested in establishing a concept of racism which would identify what many different instances of racism have in common qua racism but additionally acknowledging the specificity of each case. For him, the concept of racism refers to an ideological phenomenon, in particular “to a process of categorisation, a representational process of defining an Other”.\textsuperscript{26} This categorisation can relate to visible somatic features like skin colour, but can also relate to non-visible allegedly biological features. Meaning is then attributed to these features. This process of ‘racialisation’ leads to racism, when these features are then evaluated negatively. Miles pointed out that this process of ‘racialisation’ also affects political institutions and processes, meaning that that participation and power are structured by the meanings attributed to ‘race’. This establishes an ‘institutional racism’, which occurs when “racism is embodied in exclusionary

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22}Ibid, p. 100.
\textsuperscript{23}Ibid, p. 103.
\textsuperscript{24}See ibid, pp. 121ff.
\textsuperscript{25}Ibid, p. 180.
\textsuperscript{26}Miles, Robert: Racism, London 1989, p. 75.
\end{flushright}
He also emphasised that racism can occur as a relatively coherent theory, but that “it also appears in the form of a less coherent assembly of stereotypes, images, attributions, and explanations which are constructed and employed to negotiate everyday life”. Its ideological articulation, he argued, is also often connected to the ideologies of sexism and nationalism.

Miles therefore made a case for analysing racism not only as textual or as a doctrine, but as a social and political relation. He emphasised that manifestations of racism are not historically random but rather that “any instance of racism will be the product of both a reworking of at least some of the substance of earlier instances, and a creation of novel elements”.

Miles’ approach is a sophisticated theorisation and analysis of processes of ‘racialisation’ and could be applied to various forms of prejudice and resentments. Although racism theories based on class did not include an analysis of antisemitism, they proved influential on the ways antisemitism in British history was thought about.

From the point of view of antisemitism researchers, it was evident that there was a form of collective blindness to antisemitism in any form in British racism studies. Hostility to Jews was not considered relevant. To counteract this gap and emphasise the importance of the issue, approaches to antisemitism soon copied the new methods and concepts from racism studies and moved away from interactionist theories and towards an analysis of the relationship between society, class, and hostility against Jews in British history. The results were radically different to earlier studies on antisemitism and completely changed the previously upheld image of a liberal and tolerant Britain. In his study on Manchester Jewry, Bill Williams pointed out that it was a tradition of English liberalism that reproduced antisemitism. He described how the ‘liberal contract’ marked out the terms of an alliance of convenience between a Jewish and a gentile middle-class. It was strictly functional in character as it gave room to
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Jewish middle-class enterprise, but was in effect only superficial, because “it muted the open expression of anti-Jewish prejudice (...) but could not guarantee (...) the validation of the Jewish identity per se or the demise of older anti-Semitic traditions, which continued to travel freely along the informal channels of communication and which were readily absorbed into the pages of the new literary press and into early debates centring on the desirability of the immigrant Jewish poor”.

Williams’ study proved to be the beginning of a new era in antisemitism research. Historians began to assess antisemitism in British history in ways that included theories on the formation of British national identity and representation of Jews. This development took off only from the early 1990s onwards, and will therefore be discussed in the next chapter. Racism theories at the time, on the other hand, continued to ‘forget’ Jews in their analyses.

**Race and Identity**

This was especially the case in those approaches to racism that were not based on theories of political economy, but stressed the cultural and discursive side of racism. In this respect, another neo-Marxist approach to understand and study racism in opposition to earlier approaches to the issue was that of Stuart Hall and the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham.

Stuart Hall stressed the importance of discursive processes in understanding racism. He emphasised that within discourse, identities are constructed and that these identities can be understood as the product of the marking of difference and exclusion.

“Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly evoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference. This entails the radically disturbing recognition that it

---

is only through the relation to the Other, the relation to what is not, to precisely what it lacks, to what has been called its constitutive outside that the ‘positive’ meaning of any term - and thus its ‘identity’ - can be constructed”.  

This also means that identity constructs a form of closure, an internal homogeneity. Hall also pointed out, however, that this is a process rather than a static form, which is why he would prefer the term ‘identification’ over ‘identity’ to describe this process.

Hall’s point was to describe how representation creates identity as its negation. A dominant discursive representation of coloured people, for example, then serves to create a non-Black identity. Hall described how the black experience in British culture was placed at the margins of this culture “as a set of quite specific political and cultural practices, which regulated, governed, and ‘normalized’ the representational and discursive spaces of English society”. Representations thus gain a constitutive role in shaping identities.

Hall emphasised that in these representations, Blacks have usually been objects rather than subjects and their experience was simplified and presented in stereotypical characters. However, he also argued that this hegemonic discourse was also the basis for a cultural politics that challenged the dominant regimes or representation in music, literature and film. He described how this challenge was designed both to provide access for black artists to the cultural sphere and to contest the forms of representation by providing a positive black imagery. He stressed, however, that there was a shift “in terms of a change from a struggle over the relations of representation to a politics of representation itself”. It came to be understood that ‘black’ was merely a politically and culturally constructed category, which did not respond with

---


34 Ibid. p. 90.

35 Ibid. p. 91.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

realities or nature. The problem was in fact not whether black people were presented as good or as bad, but that they were represented as the same. He pointed out that racism “operates by constructing impassable symbolic boundaries between racially constituted categories, and its typically binary system of representation constantly marks and attempts to fix and naturalize the difference between belongingness and otherness.” This also meant, however, that anti-racism is often founded on the strategy of ‘reversal and inversion’, thus also creating difference. In general, representations that are monolithic, self-contained and stabilized only foster racist structures and it is in fact a deconstruction of these structures that is required.

This theoretical approach built a basis for studies that dealt with racist discourse and representations of ethnic minorities in British culture. However, for the most part, they completely omitted Jews and antisemitism. But this was not the only particular issue they omitted: in their analysis they usually subsumed experiences of racism in one category ‘Black’. What soon emerged, however, was that this was inadequate to describe how racism affected particular minority communities, not only Jews. This became apparent when in the 1980s, a Muslim struggle for recognition coincided with increasing anti-Muslim sentiments. The debates that ensued in this context provided early opportunities to compare Jews and Muslims and proved that general categories of racism were not always able to enhance the understanding of hostilities against particular groups.

4.1.3 The Rushdie affair and anti-Muslim resentment

The 1980s marked a significant change in relation to representations of British Muslim identity as well as the significance of religion in social cohesion. Ansari pointed out that “the 1980s saw Muslims in Britain struggling for official acknowledgement of religious rights against a backdrop of increasing anti-Muslim sentiments. The debates that ensued in this context provided early opportunities to compare Jews and Muslims and proved that general categories of racism were not always able to enhance the understanding of hostilities against particular groups.

---

36Ibid, p. 92.
It has to be acknowledged that Muslims have participated in British political life before the 1980s. Since most Muslims were British citizens, they could theoretically take part in local and nationwide politics. After having created organisations in the 1970s to pursue their interests, their agendas widened after the 1980s but remained on the basis of community organisations. Ansari showed that Muslim political participation has taken various forms, including voting, party membership and standing as candidates for election and has steadily grown since the 1970s.

It has to emphasised, though, that to this day there is no homogeneous political representation of Muslims in national politics, which is due to the ethnic differences within the Muslim community. The UMO (Union of Muslim Organisations of UK and Eire) was established as an umbrella organisation in 1970, but was relatively unsuccessful in securing changes, UKACIA (UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs) was established in 1988, but its authority was soon challenged; the Muslim Parliament, inaugurated in 1992, aimed at addressing Muslim dissatisfaction with British institutions, but it failed to mobilise sufficient support among Muslims. The effort to achieve national coordination through establishing an organisation that was not closely aligned to any particular tradition and working within British mainstream politics led to the founding of the Muslim Council of Britain in 1996. However, although it may have been the most successful attempt to establish organisational unity, it cannot be considered to represent the whole of the Muslim community in Britain. In addition, economic deprivation and social exclusion has caused some British Muslims to regard mainstream politics as ideological betrayal and an attempt of cultural homogenisation. Nevertheless, Ansari concludes, younger generations of Muslims have been engaging with British culture, politics, educational institutions and the media to a higher degree than their parents.

38 Ansari, The Infidel Within, p.232.
39 Ibid., pp. 360-365.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

The question of Muslim participation in political life is tied to their struggle for public recognition of their religion. Parveen Akhtar has noted that there was a form of Islamic regeneration among British Muslims in light of the hostility they faced and that this return to religion “offers individuals who feel in some way constrained by their circumstances and alternative ideology, a sense of belonging, solidarity, and a means of political mobilisation”.41 This return to religion was perhaps similar to that of young German Muslims who found a sense of identity in Islam, as we shall later see.

Given the complex character the Muslim communities have in Britain, it is still unclear “to what degree Islam has influenced the configuration of the British Muslim population and how significant religion has been in the rapidly changing realities it has experienced since 1945.”42 Nevertheless, Muslims have interacted with British society as Muslims and fought for recognition as such, even if perhaps not exclusively as Muslims. Unlike for Jews, British Muslims were faced with a completely new situation when settling in Britain: living as Muslims an a society with a large non-Muslim majority, non-Muslim law, government and institutions. There has been a variety of Muslim reactions to this, but a number of public debates in the 1980s showed how highly Muslims valued their religious identity and its official recognition.

This increase of anti-Muslim sentiment was closely connected to major events taking place in the 1980s, most importantly perhaps the Rushdie affair, which “in a way eventually concretised the place of Muslims in the public sphere”.43 Just before the Rushdie affair, one of the first ‘milestones’ of anti-Muslim resentment in British society was the Honeyford affair. The Honeyford Affair was a scandal that began in March 1984 when an article by Ray Honeyford, a headteacher in Bradford, on the issue of multi-ethnic education appeared in the Salisbury Review and triggered a major reaction and received extensive

42Ansari: The Infidel within, p.166.
43Vertovec, Steven: Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p.23.
media coverage. Honeyford eventually accepted an early retirement settlement in December 1985, but continued to publish articles on the issue. Honeyford’s main arguments were that immigrants should adapt to British culture, commit to British education and practise their culture only privately. He added that any positive discrimination of minorities would be misguided and that it is not racism that is holding black children back, but the lack of support from their parents as well as a lack of ambition. In his later articles, Honeyford’s tone became increasingly sharper, and he used incidents from his work to support his arguments. He spoke out against the Council’s multi-cultural policies that he had to carry out at his school, and mainly criticised the introduction of halal meat for school dinners, and that Muslim girls were allowed to cover their legs during PE lessons. He later also mentioned that there is a problem with Asian children visiting the Indian subcontinent during term times. His articles spoke of a ‘race relations lobby’ that promotes misguided multi-culturalism.44

The reactions towards Honeyford were diverse. The more conservative press was in favour of his positions and portrayed him as “the man who dared to speak his mind” who was being “unreasonably persecuted by leftwingers”. Leftist publications such as Searchlight accused him of “insulting ethnic minorities through his articles and whipping up the fears of white people, and had thus proved himself to be unsuitable for the headship of a multi-ethnic school”. Another viewpoint was that the affair centred around the issue of free speech and that Honeyford was dismissed for voicing criticism.45 Central to the Honeyford affair was the question of free speech: were Honeyford’s allegations acceptable criticism or did they venture into anti-Muslim prejudice? For Muslims, this was an opportunity to negotiate recognition as Muslims in particular, rather than as a ‘black’ minority.

Even more than during the Honeyford affair, this was a central issue during the Rushdie affair. The Rushdie affair began when in October 1988 the Union of Muslim organisations in Britain called for the book The Satanic Verses

Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

by British-Indian author Salman Rushdie, that had been published by Viking Penguin the month before, to be prosecuted. The book, for which Rushdie later won the Whitbread award and which was shortlisted for the Man Booker prize, dealt with Indian expatriates in contemporary England, but also contained dream sequences. These dream sequences happened to a potentially schizophrenic character and are inspired by the life of Mohammed. However, they were altered in so far as there is doubt whether Mohammed was not in fact a false prophet and that the Quran not in fact dictated by Satan.

Muslims were concerned about the book because they understood it as an insult to Mohammed and Islam. The affair took a dramatic turn when in January 1989, Muslims in Bradford openly burned the book and when in February 1989 the Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa calling for the execution of Salman Rushdie. Muslim ambassadors had protested to the Home Office and asked the UK to change its blasphemy laws. The UK government repeatedly refused to do this, so that in March 1989, Iran broke diplomatic relations with the UK.46

Parts of the Muslim Community sought the banning of the book and wrote a Memorandum of Request to the owners of Penguin Books Ltd, on 29 January 1989, in which they expressed their disappointment that Penguin refused to apologise and stop publishing the Satanic Verses. Numerous people however endorsed freedom of speech in light of the controversy: this was for example expressed in a letter from several authors, published in The Independent on 7 February 1989, which was signed by famous authors like Angela Carter, Harold Pinter and others. A letter from Diane Abbott, Labour MP for Hackney North and Stoke Newington, in The Guardian on 16 February 1989 had a similar tone. There was also a statement by the International committee for the defence of Salman Rushdie and his publishers, published in the Index on Censorship on 23 February 1989.47


47 see ibid p. 8-11.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Muslims on the other hand pointed out that freedom of speech must end where deliberate abuse begins, which is how they understood the book. Some Muslim leaders tried to point out that the issue here is that Muslims in Britain had been ignored for a long time and that it is time to listen to them. Professor Bhikhu Parekh, deputy Chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality, criticised the treatment of Muslims in the press in an article in *The Independent* on 23 February 1989. He stressed that

“The influence of racism and anti-Muslim feeling should not be underestimated. The bulk of influential public opinion in Britain tends to dismiss most Muslims as fundamentalists, and fundamentalism as a new form of barbarism. Thus they are infantilised, ridiculed as illiterate peasants preferring the sleep of superstition to liberal light, and placed outside the pale of civilised discourse.”

He also pointed out that this ignorance did not occur only during the Rushdie affair, but that the Press did not listen to Muslims before the book burning incident either. However, he also criticised the Muslim community for its lack of leadership and divided loyalties.48

An article by Yasmin Ali in the *New Statesman and Society* on 17 March 1989 showed that not all Muslims felt hurt by the words of Salman Rushdie, but that they could in fact relate to his analysis of Muslim identity. In the article Ali went on to criticise multiculturalism as it created a form of community leadership that enabled the continuation of stifling structures of power and authority in Muslim communities and stunted their political development.49 At the opposite end of the spectrum, some Muslim leaders encouraged fundamentalism in the wake of the affair. In an article the *Observer* on 26 March 1989, Dr Shabbir Akhtar, member of the Bradford Council of Mosques, reminded Muslims that:

“For all Muslims, as for pre-Enlightenment Christians, faith should be an all-or-nothing affair. The reasons are as decisive as they are

48See ibid, p. 15-17.
simple. One cannot properly endorse the authoritative integrity of a partly fallible scripture. It follows that fundamentalism, far from being a dead option, actually conceals the only defensible attitude towards the word of God.”

Muslim opinions on the matter were obviously varied, but what they showed was that the issue for them was their religion rather than their ethnicity. Although some Muslims saw the treatment of Muslims during the affair as a form of racism, for the opponents of the book the issue was not racial stereotype, but blasphemy.

For critics of Rushdie, freedom of expression should not extend to insults of religion, and Islam in particular. Nevertheless, in a letter to The Guardian on 23 January 1989, the Chairman of The Islamic Society for the Promotion of Religious Tolerance compared what he saw as an insult and abuse that Muslims had to endure in the pages of Salman Rushdie’s book to antisemitism in Germany in the 1920s.

“Is this the purpose of freedom of expression? Can you not sympathise with those who are hurt, and who do not have the literary and publishing powers that lay at the disposal of Mr Rushdie? Would you not agree that freedom must have its responsibility, and that misusing the freedom of expression in this way can only backfire in the long run, like it did in the 1920s when free expression of irresponsible opinion, expressed in the waves of anti-semitic literature, has cost the lives of such a huge number of Jews as well as Christians and Muslims? Are we to go the same way again? Are we to stand for the expression of responsible or irresponsible opinion? That is the issue at the centre of this controversy.”

It is noteworthy that he did not compare any form of racist vilification of Muslims in the press with German antisemitism, but the issue of freedom of speech and the perceived insult against Islam. The Rushdie affair proved that

50Ibid, pp. 32-33.
51Ibid, p. 4.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

for many Muslims, religion was a more important factor for their identity than
‘race’ or ethnicity. However, existing definitions of racism were insufficient
to grasp this particular dimension of what Muslims felt was deeply offensive. Nevertheless, it soon emerged that Muslims and Islam in particular became perceived as one of the major threats against British society.

While the Honeyford and Rushdie affairs were important events with regard to recognition of Muslims in the public sphere, the Rushdie affair also “served as a watershed moment for framing the Muslim ‘other’ as a threat - the ‘stranger within’ and possible ‘fifth column’ under the influence of the Ayatollah Khomeini - framed by the West in the wake of the Islamic Revolution as the epitome of evil”. Research showed that media coverage of the controversy created an image of Muslims as a homogeneous community, as antimodern and dangerous to British society and values, both nationalist ideologies as well as liberal notions about freedom and human rights. The same assessment has been made for media coverage of the Gulf war in the early 1990s, when again considerable attention was given to British Muslims, and again Muslims were often portrayed as homogeneously antiwestern, antiliberal and as a threat to British society.

What was additionally striking was that the debates about Muslim recognition and anti-Muslim sentiments stood in stark contrast to the way antisemitism was talked about.

4.1.4 Downplaying antisemitism

While anti-Muslim resentments and negotiation of Muslim recognition became a major topic of public discussion, especially after the affairs discussed above, this was not equally the case for Jews and antisemitism, as it was something that was believed to be, if at all, a past phenomenon. The British state

---


53 Poynting and Mason: The resistible rise of Islamophobia, p.69.

4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

certainly did not feel responsible for past crimes against Jewish minorities. This is best exemplified in the debate about the introduction of a legislation that allowed the persecution of war criminals who had entered and built a life in Britain after the Second World War. As David Cesarani pointed out in his book about the debate, when the War Crimes Bill was finally signed into law in May 1991, it was the result of a long and drawn out debate between proponents and opponents of the bill, which was accompanied by numerous expressions of antisemitic stereotypes like that of the vengeful Jew. The debate took place when consciousness of the Holocaust in general burgeoned, and public attention was given to East European war criminals living in countries like Canada and US, later also Australia. “Britain remained the only Anglo-Saxon country to absorb large numbers of East Europeans after the war that had not engaged in an exhaustive process of self-examination”.  

Even though the War Crimes debate highlighted that antisemitic expressions remained largely uncontested in the public domain, in Britain, antisemitism was not believed to be of British concern. The Jewish community itself at times actively contributed to this particular perception of antisemitism. This strategy of downplaying antisemitism and emphasising the secure position of Anglo-Jewry continued. In the 1980s the Jewish community was seen as very well integrated, and the leadership of the community was strongly Thatcherite. One example of this loyalty is the 1985 report From Doom to Hope by then Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits. The report was a response to a report published by the Archbishop of Canterbury called Faith in the City about poverty and social deprivation in Britain. In it, the Archbishop criticised Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s strategies to combat these issues. In his response Chief Rabbi Immanuel Jakobovits defended Thatcher’s strategies and instead called for immigrants to follow the Jewish model of integration and work harder to achieve prosperity. The downplay of antisemitism and the insistence on integration and assimilation were part of what can be called a ‘strategy of security’ of the leadership of the Jewish community.  

56 See Gidley, Ben and Kahn-Harris, Keith: Turbulent Times, The British Jewish Commu-
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

During a time when British Muslims pointed out that they were discriminated against and fought for recognition in British society, British Jews emphasised how well they were assimilated and how loyal they were to Britain. This also became evident in the reaction of the Chief Rabbi to the Rushdie affair. In an article in *The Times* on 4 February 1989, he empathised with the sense of hurt of the Muslim community, but did not endorse a change in blasphemy laws:

“In my view Jews should not seek an extension of the blasphemy laws. In any event, the Jewish definition of blasphemy is confined to ‘cursing God’ and does not include an affront to any prophet (not even Moses, in our case). Living in a predominantly Christian society, with an established Church, we should be quite content to leave the legislation on blasphemy as it stands enshrining the national respect for the majority faith.”

He argued in favour of controlling this issue not as a religious offence, but as a social one, for example as inciting racial hatred. The message of this quote was that Jews were not only able but also willing to integrate into British society. They would not try to fight for unreasonable levels of recognition - levels that would require a change in law - out of respect for the majority culture. By saying this in the context of the Rushdie affair, the Chief Rabbi implied that Muslims were in fact not able and willing to integrate into British society. The successful integration of the Jewish community was portrayed *in contrast* to the Muslim minority.

However, while to the public, the Jewish community maintained the strategy of ‘security’, leaders were nevertheless concerned about the safety of Jews in Britain. The Jewish Board of Deputies has monitored antisemitic incidents since 1984, and the founding of the Community Security Trust (CST) in 1994 was a response to antisemitic attacks and threats by far-right and

---

57The Rushdie Affair: A Documentation, Research Papers Muslims in Europe No 42, June 1989, Published by the Centre for the Study of Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations, Birmingham, p. 21-22.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Islamist groups. The CST is a body that both monitors crimes and offences against the Jewish community and organises security at Jewish institutions and events. This organisation is in that sense a paradox in the narrative of successful integration: rather than relying on the state to afford practical and preemptive protection, the Jewish community itself felt responsible to monitor and organise its own security.

Amid these threats that were also the reason for the founding of the CST, more critical Jewish voices at the time pointed out that the ‘security’-centred approach of the Jewish leadership was problematic. Not only were antisemitic hate crimes played down and lied about, which was “part of the wider attempt to maintain the image of a secure, comfortable community living in harmony with its neighbours”. This also inevitably led to a neglect of “attempts to understand anti-Semitism in relation to other forms of oppression and to forge alliances with other oppressed or persecuted communities”.

To an extent, these critical voices were eventually heard and the years after 1990 are characterised not only by an improvement in the acknowledgement of contemporary antisemitism, but also by the forging of alliances between Jews and Muslims with regard to fighting hate crimes. This was a direct result of the action of Muslim communities in the 1980s and the subsequent recognition of religion as a factor in social cohesion, as the Jewish community could be construed as a religious community fighting for recognition as well. However, this issue was further complicated by the fact that Zionism and its opposition was a hotly debated subject at the time.

4.1.5 Zionism and anti-Zionism

As discussed above, at the same time the Muslim community started to fight for recognition and make anti-Muslim resentments a topic, the Jewish community remained quiet, and great efforts were made to portray antisemitism in Britain

Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

as only marginal. At a time when issues like multiculturalism, racialisation, racism, and later anti-Muslim resentments were high on the public agenda, there were initially no attempts to include British antisemitism in particular in these debates. Leftists and critical voices within the Jewish community therefore rightly asked:

“What theory of oppression, formulated by either Jews or non-Jews, has incorporated an analysis of the history of anti-Semitism outside of the movement and within it, a theory that would reflect a caring for the fate of the Jews?....The truth is that the issue of anti-Semitism has been ignored, has been treated as either non-existent or unimportant.”

Recognizing that analyses of racism have neglected the issue of antisemitism altogether, Jewish leftists asked for an approach to describe oppression and persecution that would include the Jewish experience. The problem was that especially among the Left, the opposite happened: antisemitism was not considered to be an issue, while the ‘anti-racist’ struggle against Zionism was perceived as a major issue.

In both Britain and Germany, in the 1960s the Left embraced anti-Imperialism, anti-Colonialism and Third World struggles, and saw Zionism as inherently colonial and racist. Colin Holmes later argued that the Arab-Israeli War of 1967 alienated those parts of the Left that were already hostile to Zionism, “and proceeded to generate a strand of pro-Palestinian sentiment which at times was indistinguishable from anti-Semitism.”

Geoffrey Alderman tried to explain the antisemitism of this part of the left in relation to their post-colonialist stance:

“The left in Britain views Britain’s colonial era as an economic mistake, a political catastrophe and a moral disaster. To the extent that the Palestine Mandate grew out of that era, and to the

---

61Holmes, Colin: John Bull's Island, p. 246.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

extent that the ‘plantation’ of Jews into Mandate Palestine was, in whatever sense, a colonial imperative, the left views the eventual re-establishment of the Jewish State as a post-colonial perversion, which allegedly dispossessed thousands of Palestinian Arabs into the bargain. Israel, viewed from this perspective, is an artificial legacy of the colonial era, for whose creation Britain bears a very heavy responsibility (...) Behind left-wing opposition to Zionism lies a refusal to accept the reality of Jewish nationhood and a denial of the legitimacy of the Jewish claim to national self-determination. On the face of it this posture is extremely odd, since historically the left has supported and legitimated an amazing variety of types of national liberation movements.”

There was thus a double squeeze on any concept of antisemitism: from a conservative viewpoint it was, in order to create a sense of security and out of respect for the majority culture, largely denied, while the Left did not only neglect to deal with it, but instead considered Zionism to be racism. From their viewpoint, anti-Zionism was automatically anti-racist and therefore not antisemitic. Furthermore, to be considered part of the Left, an anti-Zionist stance was considered to be a necessary condition. The dominating mindset among the Left that Zionism was racism became apparent in the numerous debates about the issue, which were usually connected to events in the Middle East. The arguments that were made in these debates repeat themselves in later debates, but usually centred around two main points: Zionism is (colonial) racism and must be opposed and Israel is perpetrating a ‘holocaust’ against the Palestinian people.

The Israel-Lebanon war in 1982 for example spurred debates among feminists about Zionism and Jewish feminist identity in Britain. Articles and comments in the feminist magazines Spare Rib and Outwrite showed that many feminists believed that feminism and anti-Zionism were politically inseparable.

Feminist writer Juliet Pope showed that during these debates, anti-Zionism became central to the feminist movement as a whole, as it characterised its internationalism. She pointed out that there was change in women’s movement before this debate: in the context of political struggles at home and abroad, the feminist movement became aware of its own limitations and increasingly became interested in analysing and fighting against for example the interrelation between sexual and racial discrimination. Pope also stressed that while there was the earlier radical feminist phase that was marked by ‘consciousness-raising’ groups, this seemed to have given way to a more socialist phase, which was characterized by a concern for unemployment, government expenditure on social services affecting women. This was a form of opposition to the policies of the Thatcher government as well as new form of internationalism. In addition, anti-Zionism appeared to be a common ground for feminists of different political persuasions.63

Consequently, during the 1982 Lebanon war, Spare Rib published articles that portrayed the plight of Palestinian women, but which also declared Zionism as a form of racism that must be opposed to stop the perceived ‘holocaust’ against the Palestinian people. In the voice of one Palestinian woman:

“What Israel is doing now in the Lebanon is nothing new but an extreme part of its nature. Killing people barbarically, children, women, with poisoned gas and with cluster bombs. It’s hard to imagine how human beings can do this (...). Women must come out against it because our sisters are being murdered. (...) It’s because of the bloody Western countries that they are suffering. It’s not just Israel. It’s because of the West’s interests that all those people died. I am calling you sisters, to come together against the holocaust of the Palestinian and Lebanese people. There is no way we can sit quietly and do nothing about it.”64


64 “Women Speak Out Against Zionism”, in: Spare Rib, Issue 121, August 1982, pp. 22-23,
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

It was stressed that Israel was an aggressor using inappropriate means to ‘ethnically cleanse’ the Palestinian people by employing ‘internationally prohibited weapons’ and perpetrating a ‘massacre (...) of thousands of Palestinians and Lebanese’.65

Some Jewish feminists on the other hand expressed their concern that feminists who do not oppose Zionism would be silenced and that their experience as Jewish women and of racism would be invalidated. In a counter article in Spare Rib a few months later, they stressed that

“For as long as Jewish women have been involved in the women’s movement in Britain, it has been virtually impossible to speak about our lives as Jewish women and our experience of anti-semitism both within the movement and in the wider society. The recent upsurge in ‘anti-Zionism’, while it has actively intensified our experience of antisemitism by legitimating Jew hating, also seriously threatens to make our experience and history completely inaudible and invisible.”66

Their warning, however, fell on deaf hears. Moreover, what crystallised in this and other debates was that many believed that not only was Zionism like Nazism, but that Zionists actively worked together with the Nazis to create the state of Israel. In one Spare Rib article, Zionists were accused of sacrificing Jews in the Holocaust. From this point of view, Zionism was only in so far interested in fighting anti-semitism as it motivated Jews to emigrate to Israel. The article further stated that Zionist leaders refused to save Jews during World War II as a bargaining tool to be able to create a Jewish state. The authors in fact claimed that the Americans and the British made several proposals to save the Jewish people, but that the Zionist movement refused to cooperate.67

4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

In British anti-Zionism, however, this was taken even further, and Zionists were accused of continuing to behave like Nazis. Feminists stressed that it is important to differentiate between Jews and Zionists, because progressive anti-Zionist Jews are also victims of Zionism and forced to flee Palestine. Moreover, in their view Zionists even went so far that in order to convince Jews from Arab countries to move to Israel, they put bombs in synagogues to create tension between Muslims and Jews. This is based upon the idea that Israel is portrayed as similar to Nazi ideology, because it believes that Jews cannot live among Gentiles. Consequently, Zionism was seen as an exclusionary ideology.

“Zionism claimed to speak in the name of Jews. In fact, it was created by European Jews who used anti-semitism for their own interests. Its aim was never to fight anti-semitism, moreover, it saw anti-semitism as its best ally...If we are concerned about anti-semitism we must fight Zionism. To be anti-Zionist is to be anti-imperialist, and to be against the fact that Zionism (and the founding of the state of Israel) caused Palestinians to be refugees”.68

But not only were Zionists accused of working together with Nazis, of still behaving like Nazis, they were also accused of abusing the Holocaust to stifle any criticism of Israel. One article in Spare Rib saw a direct line between the actions of the 'Zionist movement' during the Holocaust and the actions of Israel today:

“Since 1948 Israel has not stopped expanding. The recent bloodshed in the Lebanon is the last series of expansionist drives. Throughout, the horrors of the Holocaust have been used in a manipulative way to stop any criticism of Israel’s attempt to eliminate the Palestinians as a people and a nation, and carve up the Lebanon and appropriate the South of Lebanon. The fight for justice and freedom of the Jewish people who died in the concentration camps has been abused and trampled upon.”69

The idea that the Jews in Auschwitz were Zionism’s first victims and that the memory of the Holocaust is abused by Jews to legitimise Israel’s policies was not limited to feminist circles, as the debate around the play *Perdition*, staged by the Royal Court Theatre in 1987, showed. During the debate that later ensued between the writers and defenders of the play and Jewish historians, many of the above mentioned arguments reappear: Zionism is portrayed as a racist ideology that must be opposed from an anti-racist stance, and Zionists collaborated with the Nazis and sacrificed Jews in order to found the state of Israel.

This accusation was in fact subject of the play itself: the play is a court-room drama set in Britain in 1967, and deals with a libel case brought by Doctor Malkiel Yaron against Ruth Kaplan, who had written a pamphlet accusing Doctor Yaron of not only collaborating with the Nazis when he was active in the Judenrat in Hungary during the Second World War, but of wilfully sacrificing Jews because he was a Zionist and in order to legitimise Zionism. During the trial Yaron at first maintains that he had no other choice and tried to save as many Jews as possible, but at the end he breaks down and admits that he can not live with the guilt about what he did.

Although the performance of the play was planned for early 1987, it was first delayed, then planned for 22 January, then moved to January 27, but it was eventually cancelled on short notice, as the artistic director of the Royal Court, Max Stafford-Clark, who had commissioned a report by historian David Cesarani and later also sought the advice of historian Martin Gilbert, did not believe in the accuracy of the play any more. He had realised that people might find it offensive and later called his choice to stage the play a mistake.

This position was supported by David Rose’s article “Rewriting the Holocaust” in *The Guardian* on 14 January 1987. Rose criticised Allen’s conflation between the Hungarian Zionists and the Judenrat, and also pointed out how

---


Allen seemed to have distorted these facts on purpose, and even exaggerated the questionable sources he used.\footnote{See Allen: A play in two acts, p. 121.}

Rather than discussing the problematic historical facts in the play, the playwright himself, Jim Allen, immediately accused ‘Zionists’ of crying antisemitism and stifling his free speech. He insisted on the legitimacy of his play and on its anti-racist message, which included Jews as victims of Zionists. In a letter to The Guardian on 17 January 1987, Allen stressed that Rose’s article “summarises the Zionist viewpoint, that the play is anti-semitic, a travesty of the facts, and a libel on the Jewish people”. Although a number of historians and journalists shared the viewpoint that the play was historically inaccurate, and members of the Jewish community saw it as ‘poisonous and reactionary’, the play also had notable supporters, for example poet Erich Fried, who, in a letter to The Guardian on 4 February 1987, stressed that “the author and producer of Perdition are quite right that Zionism, as it has developed […] has become a death-trap for Jews in Israel and a vehicle for anti-semitism elsewhere.” Karl Sabbagh, in a letter to The Guardian on 29 January 1989, supported Jim Allen and claimed that he had surely not made up any facts, but that it is in fact the Jews, who “object to any public criticism of Jewish actions, however legitimate, because it might fuel or give rise to antisemitism.” He added that “the current campaign against the Royal Court shows the characteristics of other recent organised protests against criticism of Israel and Zionism: whatever the content of the criticism, the key accusation is one of antisemitism; the major criticism of content comes down to the fact that the writer had not accepted the interpretation that is most favourable to Jews.”\footnote{All cited ibid, pp. 121, 129 - 130.}

In the course of the debate, the historians who had criticised the play were themselves accused of being part of a Zionist lobby. Jim Allen expressed how appalled he was at the charges and accusations against him by ‘Holocaust experts’. He stressed that “here lies the source of the pollution. Among the ‘experts’ are Martin Gilbert, David Cesarani, and the Institute of Jewish
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Affairs.” He claimed that these cannot be considered the only reliable sources and that his play was indeed well researched. In a similar vein, in a letter to the New Statesman on 20 February 87, Tony Greenstein pointed out that it is wrong to rely on the opinions of David Cesarani and Martin Gilbert when it comes to criticising Perdition, as “both are dedicated Zionists and both have axes to grind”. Perdition was in fact far from antisemitic in his opinion, but a play that Jewish people “have a right to see”.

At this point in the debate the idea of a powerful Zionist lobby that had forced the Royal Court to cancel the play became even stronger. In an article in the New Statesman on 20 February 1987, titled “Censorship and Perdition”, authors Ken Loach and Andrew Hornung criticised the “virulent attacks” on the play. Moreover, they saw a Zionist conspiracy and pointed out how “the play’s opponents used their influence to lobby and manipulate behind the scenes” to get the play banned. But “the efforts of the Zionist campaign did not end with the ban at the Royal Court. The lobby has tried to ensure that no theatre will stage the play in London or elsewhere.” Loach and Hornung considered this group to be the actual cause of antisemitism, as they are a “political group had used every device to prevent discussion of its own political past. In fact, these people encourage the very anti-semitism they seek to prevent, because it appears that a powerful clique has, through its influence in the press and elsewhere, stopped the play from being performed”. They stressed that critics do not see that the play showed Jews as victims, and depicted only Zionists as a problem.

These debates set the tone for virtually any later debate on anti-Zionism. Anti-Zionists were convinced that there is an anti-racist duty to oppose Zionism, and the Palestinian people were victims of a second Holocaust. Moreover, allegations of antisemitism did not have to be taken seriously, because the merely represented a Zionist strategy to stifle any criticism of Israel.

This was later poignantly expressed by Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silverman:

---

74See ibid, p. 135.
75See ibid, pp. 136-138.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

“Originally, Zionism’s intention to normalize Jewish existence by making it similar to that of other nations was driven by the aim of eradicating antisemitism. However, the endemic view of antisemitism has been recruited to serve a different cause: antisemitism could not be eradicated (...) and the non-Jewish world would always be hostile, in which case any critique of Israel and of Jewish communities could be explained in terms of antisemitism and consequently delegitimized. This position - that those who criticize Israel are antisemities - has served as a powerful weapon in the armoury of those who supported the policies of the Israeli state, especially after the 1967 war and the occupation by Israel of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.” 76

From this perspective, any allegation of antisemitism in connection to actions of the Israeli state were then illegitimate. In a critical anti-racist context, it became difficult to frame Zionism as anything other than a colonial and oppressive power with Nazi allegiances. This meant that it also became a challenge to conceptualise antisemitism in an anti-racist framework. What approaches were used to overcome this issue are discussed in the following chapter.

4.2 Germany: Remembering the past, forgetting the Jews

Dealing with the National Socialist past has played a major role for the formation of contemporary German society. Public debates about how Germans should relate to the past and about what constitutes taboo-breaking forms of post-war antisemitism have shaped Germany’s national self-understanding, especially since the 1980s. 77 What additionally united these debates, however,

77 see Bericht des Expertenkreises Antisemitismus: Antisemitismus in Deutschland. Erscheinungsformen, Bedingungen, Präventionsansätze, Bundesministerium des Innern, Berlin
was that Jews or Jewish concerns were for the most part generally absent. This was also true for the study of antisemitism, which moved towards abstract concepts of prejudice research instead of, for example, critically engaging with the Shoah. However, researchers saw the need to analyse both antisemitism and hostility towards non-German minorities in the context of an emerging multicultural society. In contrast to Britain, however, this process evolved not in a framework of theorisations of colonial immigration, but in a framework of dealing with the Nazi past.

From the conservative turn to the Historikerstreit

As touched upon in the last chapter, Germany’s collective coping strategy regarding the Second World War and the Holocaust was for a long time characterised by the attempt to fight off guilt. During the so called ‘Schlussstrich-Debate’ concerns were voiced about the perceived unnecessary persistence of accusations against Germany. Germans felt that it was time to let the past rest and move on. This negotiation of German identity has to be seen in the context of general political and cultural developments in West Germany in the 1980s. The election win of the Christian Democratic Party, with which conservative Helmut Kohl became chancellor, in 1983, marked what can be considered a ‘conservative turn’ in politics, but was also the expression of a wider public and cultural development.

Richard Evans has pointed out that as had happened a decade and a half before with the change to a liberal and social democratic government,

“the new change in political climate was accompanied by a change of intellectual mood. Encouraged by the new government, its publicity machine, and its appointments policy, conservative intellectuals began to seize the initiative back from the liberals and Social Democrats. This was the so-called Tendenzwende, the ‘change of tack’ in which the achievements of the 1970s were to be denied and reversed on all fronts. Spurred on by the new note of patriotism

2011, p. 6.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

struck by the Reagan presidency in the United States, Chancellor Kohl’s government now began to strike a patriotic chord itself. The moment for a renewal of German patriotism was opportune.”

This renewal of patriotism was first evident in the new government’s plans to build a German historical Museum in Berlin and a House of the History of the Federal Republic in Bonn, which caused a huge controversy. While leftist intellectuals saw an attempt to form a new German identity and ‘do away’ with the past, the idea of a German museum “was backed up by a growing chorus of opinion on the political right, declaring that the time has come for the West Germans to stop feeling guilty about the past and start feeling proud of themselves once more.”

A similar controversy was caused by President Reagan’s visit to the military cemetery in Bitburg in 1985. As Charles Meier has pointed out, “for Chancellor Helmut Kohl and his political advisers, the American president’s visit was intended symbolically to wipe away the last moral residues of probation under which the Federal Republic still laboured. The pointed omission of German representatives from the 1984 D-Day commemoration still rankled.”

However, it turned out that forty-nine SS soldiers were also buried in Bitburg. Germans insisted on differentiating between different segments of the SS. The conservative CDU deputy Alfred Dregger for example warned American senators that a cancellation of the visit would be an affront, and stressed that all fallen soldiers were entitled to equal honour. According to Maier, “Bitburg history unites oppressors and victims, Nazi perpetrators of violence with those who were struck down by it, in a common dialectic”. He stresses that “Bitburg history finds it difficult to pin down any notions of collective responsibility”.

78 Evans, Richard: In Hitler’s shadow. West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape from the Nazi past, London: I.B. Tauris, 1989, p.15
79 Ibid. p. 19
81 Ibid, p. 11.
82 Ibid, p. 14, see also Rabinbach, Anson: Beyond Bitburg: The Place of the ‘Jewish
The German past was not only a topic in politics, but in the media, too: by
the early 1980s the Holocaust was discussed in the press, on TV and in books.
The US TV series 'Holocaust' that was broadcast in 1979 had already gained 20
million German viewers at the time, the numerous other films and series dealing
with the topic during the 1980s were hits as well. It is important to note,
however, that many of the films and also literature of the time did not deal with
Jewish victimhood as much as they dealt with an alleged German victimhood.
This is perhaps best exemplified in Edgar Reitz's multi-episode film Heimat,
broadcast in 1984, that was well received by critics and audiences. The film
depicts the story of a German village over 60 years, and while it contains
many situations of death and mourning - of German soldiers for example, it
completely omits the Holocaust. Eric Rentschler commented on the success of
Heimat:

“Heimat proved to be successful in Germany precisely because it
recounted the most disturbing portion of German history in a way
that disavowed burdensome aspects of the past, ..., confronting
the Third Reich and at the same time evading it, neutralising and
concealing the experience of fascism, while simultaneously binding
the audience by an undeniable appeal to their emotional persons
and powers of identification”.

This is in line with the phenomenon in post-war German literature that
Ernestine Schlant has termed a ‘language of silence’ with regard to the Holo-
caust. This silence does not mean that the Holocaust is never mentioned, quite
the opposite, but that there is ‘a contradictory endeavour to keep silent’ and
that there is no true ‘Vergangenheitsbewältigung’. For Schlant, this is true

---

83 Rentschler, Eric: The Use and Abuse of Memory: New German Film and the Discourse
of Bitburg, in: New German Critique, No 36, Special Issue on Heimat 1985, pp. 67-90,
here p. 84.
84 Schlant: The Language of Silence, pp. 21 ff.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

whether or not there are Jewish characters present at all. With regard to films, Omer Bartov has observed that Jewish characters are not only often used to redeem any past guilt, but also that these depictions are antisemitic, not in the sense that these characters are portrayed negatively, but that the negative stereotypes have been replaced by positive ones. He stressed that

“numerous postwar films exhibit an urge to use the figure of ‘the Jew’ both as a historical embodiment of the victim and as a liberating tool for the present - whether by recognising past sins, omissions, and repressions, or by humanising a present reality perceived as cold and insensitive precisely because it no longer contains this ‘Jew’. Perhaps because the burden of this double role is too great, such films often end up caricaturing the very figure they intend to bring back to life. In a sense, they become implicated in the antisemitic discourse on the ‘Jew’ even as they believe themselves to be in the process of undermining it.” 85

German culture at the time was preoccupied with a denial of guilt and redemption - which was in fact a continuation from the very early postwar years, but which only now found a reflection in politics. The idea of German victimhood was for example publicly expressed in President Weizsäcker’s speech on the anniversary of the ’Machtergreifung’ in 1985. He interpreted Germany’s defeat in 1945 as a liberation, indicating that the German people had been the first victims of National Socialism. As Moishe Postone has indicated, “For many Germans, […], the reemergence of the past has been in the form of a renewed call for a return to normalcy, particularly among conservatives. This time, however, normalcy was not to be based on denial, but on a more openly affirmative attitude toward the past.” 86 One example of this notion of normalcy was that the the Bundestag passed a law that made it a criminal offense

86Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust: History and Identity in West Germany, in: Harms, Kathy; Reuter, Lutz R. and Dürr, Volker: Coping with the Past, Germany and Austria after 1945, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press 1990, pp. 233-251, here p. 239.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s to both deny or speak lightly of the Holocaust or of the expulsion of Germans from the East in 1944-45. Postone rightly pointed out that this was a law that equated the sufferings of the Germans with the annihilation of the Jews and thereby sought to “wipe the historical ledger clean”.\textsuperscript{87}

It was in this context that the ‘Historikerstreit’ ensued: a sometimes heated discussion between German historians about the question of German guilt and how it should be dealt with. The Historikerstreit in fact signified the changes in the political climate and the historical consciousness of the Federal Republic.\textsuperscript{88} Postone remarked on the Historikerstreit that “the debate really was one which had been initiated by conservatives as part of a more general attempt to positively revise the official public attitude toward the Nazi past.”\textsuperscript{89}

4.2.1 Historikerstreit

As described in the previous chapter, the same historians involved in this debate always had diverging opinions on the matter of National socialism and the Holocaust. More so than the previous debates, the Historikerstreit evolved around central ideas about German identity and remembrance.

As Charles Meier has pointed out, the central theme of the Historikerstreit was the question “whether the Nazi crimes were unique, a legacy of evil in a class by themselves, irreparably burdening any concept of German nationhood, or whether they are comparable to other national atrocities, especially Stalinist terror.”\textsuperscript{7} He also stressed that it was not an isolated debate about the German past, but that it was as much about contemporary German identity and that it “reveals a wider spectrum of loyalties and potential national orientations than were earlier evident.”\textsuperscript{90}

A sort of prologue to the debate is Andreas Hillgruber’s book \textit{Zweierlei}}
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Untergang. Die Zerschlagung des deutschen Reiches und das Ende des europäischen Judentums (Two sorts of demise: The shattering of the German Reich and the end of European Jewry) that was published in 1986. Charles Maier rightly pointed out that “the title alone suggested that the end of the German Reich and the end of European Jewry are events or processes on an equal level.” He saw Hillgruber’s book as first of all a defence of German militarism. Hillgruber justified the actions of the German Wehrmacht and suggested that only Hitler was “possessed of a monomaniacal ideological commitment to win Lebensraum and complete his genocidal project.”

The Wehrmacht only acted under Hitler’s orders. At the same time, Hillgruber evoked a vivid imagery of German suffering: how millions of German civilians spent harrowing months under Soviet troops after they defeated the Germans. In contrast, he did not commit as much effort and space to describe Jewish suffering. Maier called Hillgruber’s argument the ‘geopolitics of nostalgia’, as he emphasised the “Wilhelmine Empire was pushed into war by British encirclement and frustration of legitimate national goals.”

In his article ‘Die Vergangenheit die nicht vergehen will’ in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 6 June 1986, Ernst Nolte went even further and argued in favour of a ‘Schlussstrich’, an end to the preoccupation with the Holocaust - or more precisely, especially with Jewish suffering. He claimed that only the persecuted have an interest in keeping the idea of German guilt alive, in order to claim a permanently privileged position. He also argued that the idea of German guilt was dangerously close to the idea of Jewish guilt, which was an argument the Nazis used to legitimise their antisemitism. Not only did he implicitly compare the Nazi terror to the Allied bombings, he claimed that the attention given to the ‘Final Solution’ only deflects from other important issues during the Nazi era, like the Euthanasia projects or the treatment of Russian prisoners of war. More importantly, however, he saw a deflection from contemporary issues like the ‘genocides’ in Vietnam and Afghanistan.

It was in fact not the first time that Nolte had compared what he called

92Ibid, p. 23.
the ‘Nazi terror’ to other forms of persecution and oppression. In an article in the same newspaper in 1980 he even went so far as to suggest that National Socialism was a reaction to Bolshevism. Moreover, he emphasised that the ‘Red Terror’ had been significantly worse than the ‘White Terror’, that it in fact operated in another dimension. He claimed that the mass killings ordered by Lenin on the basis of class were more horrific than the shootings of war prisoners by the ‘Whites’ and that this terror was more acutely felt in Germany at the time than in any other Western country. His conclusion was, therefore, that the Third Reich needed to be taken out of its (analytical) isolation and studied in context of the Russian Revolution. He added that it cannot be accepted that the Third Reich is demonised, and that while it is singular, it should be the subject of historical scholarship.93

Only in 1986, however, did his position provoke an extensive critical reaction, most famously by Jürgen Habermas in an article in Die Zeit on 11 July 1986.94 Habermas’s article was a reply to what he understood as the revisionist positions of Andreas Hillgruber, Michael Stürmer, Klaus Hildebrand, and Ernst Nolte. He accused the historians of pursuing the reestablishment of a national identity by constructing an ‘asiatic danger’ for the past that is seen as a danger today as well.

In an article in the FAZ on 29 August, Joachim Fest attempted to support his colleague Nolte.95 He accused Habermas of ideological prejudice as he denied national identity outright. He rightly pointed out that Nolte did in fact state that the saw the Holocaust as a singularity. However, he went


on to support the claim that this singularity should at least be questioned, considering the “millions of victims of genocides that have been forgotten, from the Armenians to the victims of the Gulag and the Cambodians”.

Hans Mommsen later analysed the revisionist position taken by Nolte, Fest and others and came to the conclusion that theories of totalitarianism can easily be used to both equate different genocides and relativise the Holocaust and to take political positions in the context of the Cold War. He pointed out that the demarcation against any totalitarian dictatorship functioned as a legitimisation of an armed democracy. He further argued that a focus on Hitler in historic scholarship served as an apology for conservatives of the time on the one hand and as an excuse for the German public on the other. The history of the Third Reich was then treated as a kind of foreign body. He concluded that any normalisation of the Holocaust and the Third Reich would be a political act and not what historical scholarship should be about.\textsuperscript{96}

The Historikerstreit dealt with the question of German-Jewish relations only insofar as these became relevant for German national identity. In fact, although both sides of the debate were obsessed with the Holocaust, they were much less concerned about actual Jews. In addition, as Lars Rensmann has later shown, the debate itself was riddled with the usage of antisemitic stereotypes.\textsuperscript{97} So the German revision of the official attitude to the past, which the Historikerstreit stood for, coincided with a slow but steady erosion of the taboo to openly express antisemitism. Another development that coincided with the re-emerging themes about the past was, however, the establishment of dedicated institutions for antisemitism research. On the one hand, this research was critical in the sense that it allowed to call some expressions used in the Historikerstreit antisemitic. The ‘secondary antisemitism’ displayed in the debate became an

\textsuperscript{96}See Mommsen, Hans: Suche nach der ‘verlorenen Geschichte’? Bemerkungen zum historischen Selbstverständnis der Bundesrepublik, in: Merkur, September/Oktober 1986, pp 864-874.

4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

important analytical tool for German antisemitism researchers. On the other hand, however, the establishment of antisemitism studies in Germany was actually a crucial part of the process to positively incorporate the past into a new German identity.

4.2.2 The study of antisemitism

While the question of German guilt was the topic most prominently discussed in public - and among historians, there were in fact important developments in the theorisation of antisemitism beyond these debates. In the early 1980s, antisemitism research became more systematic with the foundation of two research centres focussing entirely on the history and contemporary manifestations of antisemitism. The *Vidal Sassoon Centre for the Study of Antisemitism* was founded in 1982 and is affiliated with the Hebrew University in Israel, while the *Berlin Zentrum für Antisemitismusforschung (ZfA)* had already been founded in 1979, but did not appoint its first director, Herbert A. Strauss, before 1982. The ZfA was founded on initiative of the Jewish community in Berlin and is an institute at the Technical University. Both centres stressed the interdisciplinary nature of antisemitism research and mirrored this in their publications.

This institutionalisation of antisemitism research was accompanied by a wealth of publications on the matter in the 1980s and 1990s. The early publications of the ZfA under the directorship of Herbert Strauss were clearly influenced by American research on the topic. The ZfA’s series on *Current Research on Antisemitism* brought together previous research from different subjects and perspectives, mainly sociology, psychology and history. However, the series also showed that scholars disagreed on the definition, understanding and assessment of antisemitism. The first publication, edited by Helen Fein, an American historical sociologist, dealt with descriptions of and explanations of antisemitism in general and with historical as well as contemporary manifestations.98

In her contribution to the book, Fein was the first to reflect critically on current antisemitism research. She recognised what she called three different schools: the first explained current antisemitism with its origin in Christian traditions. It focussed on hegemonic organisations, institutions and ideologies of western civilization. The second was the ‘interactionist’ school, which regarded the presence of Jews among majority populations as a source for tension. The third explanation was a ‘neo-Marxist functionalist’ one, which interpreted antisemitism as a channeled aggression against outsiders in capitalist societies.\(^9\) Fein, on the other hand, wanted to go beyond these interpretations and understood antisemitism as “a persisting latent structure of hostile beliefs toward Jews as a collectivity manifested in individuals as attitudes, and in culture as myth, ideology, folklore, and imagery, and in actions - social or legal discrimination, political mobilization against the Jews, and collective or state violence - which results in and/or is designed to distance, displace, or destroy Jews as Jews”.\(^10\) She emphasised that she did not regard antisemitism as a historically-specific ideology. By not distinguishing different varieties of antisemitism, she intended to avoid using the attacker’s justification to define the phenomenon.\(^11\) Her interpretation of antisemitism strongly argued for an interpretation of antisemitism as a continuation through the ages.

However, the volume also showed that this was highly disputed, as other scholars began to distinguish different forms of antisemitism. In the same publication, Gavin A. Langmuir argued that there had been obvious changes in some characteristics of hostility against Jews over time so that it is difficult to speak of a general antisemitism.\(^12\) He emphasised that it is important to distinguish two different kinds of threats to Jews: on the one hand Jews may be subject to general xenophobia, “which uses the real conduct of some

\(^{9}\)See Fein, Helen: Explanations of the Origin and Evolution of Antisemitism, in: Fein: The Persisting Question, part 1, chapter 1, pp. 3-22.


\(^{11}\)Ibid, p. 69.

Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

members of an outgroup to symbolize a social menace”, and on the other hand Jews are seriously endangered because “real Jews have been converted in the minds of many into a symbol that denies their empirical reality and justifies their total elimination from the earth”.

What soon crystallised in the research of the Zentrum, however, was that German research on the topic took a slightly different turn. The first sign for this was the the ZfA started to focus its theoretical development primarily on contemporary antisemitism, rather than its historical forms. Contemporary antisemitism in fact became the topic of several studies and essays on particular manifestations like cemetery desecrations, images of ‘the Jew’ in German media and antisemitic behaviour among youths. Studies were undertaken on issues like Christianity and contemporary antisemitism, right-wing extremism, and antisemitic anti-Zionism.

The second edition of the ZfA publication Current Research on Antisemitism, edited by Werner Bergmann, dealt with social psychological approaches to prejudice in general and anti-Jewish prejudice in particular. It depicted how prejudice studies have been both influenced by psychological studies of inter-group hostility as well as studies of prejudice against the Black minority, both emanating from and focussing on the US. The volume argued for a revival and reassessment of psychological research on prejudice. It was argued that previous approaches to antisemitism based on personality theory, which understood antisemitism in terms of an underlying personality conflict, should be substituted by approaches based on group theory and ethnic relations. These

103 Ibid, p.127.
newer approaches combined psychology and sociology and focussed on group relations rather than on individuals, which had mostly superseded personality theory. Bergmann emphasised that these approaches are not only valid for antisemitism, but for all prejudice in general.\footnote{106} With this assessment, Bergmann gave the directions for future antisemitism research in Germany.

But the later research of the ZfA on contemporary antisemitism did not diminish investigations of historical antisemitism. The third volume of Current Research on Antisemitism edited by Herbert A Strauss and published in 1993 had a decidedly more historical, comparative viewpoint. It summarised what was considered the most important research on antisemitism history in different countries from the 1960s to the early 1990s and included contributions by Hans Rosenberg, Werner Jochmann, Shulamit Volkov, Saul Friedlaender and Andreas Hillgruber, among others.\footnote{107} The varying contributions also showed, however, that there were very different opinions on the history of antisemitism in Germany and its meaning for German society and identity.

The general perspective of publications on the history of antisemitism by the ZfA was on the distinction between different phases of antisemitism. Benz and Bergmann later argued that while there is a certain continuity on the level of anti-Jewish imagery, there are important qualitative changes between the antisemitism of the emancipation period and the antisemitism after the first World War.\footnote{108} Consequently, they came to the conclusion that the antisemitism in Germany after 1945 is not simply a continuation of what it was before, but - in reference to Theodor Adorno - a ‘secondary’ antisemitism. They argued that antisemitic prejudice in Germany after 1945 was not concerned with legal equality, religious tolerance or even economic competition, but was a resentment that results from the way the Holocaust was remembered.

\footnote{106}{See Bergmann, Werner: Error Without Trial: Psychological Research on Antisemitism, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter 1988, p. 139 ff.}
\footnote{108}{See Benz, Wolfgang and Werner Bergmann (eds.): Vorurteil und Völkermord, Entwicklungslinien des Antisemitismus, Freiburg: Herder 1997, introductory chapter.}
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s in Germany.\textsuperscript{109}

Under the directorship of Wolfgang Benz from 1992 onwards, the ZfA, most notably Wolfgang Benz and Werner Bergmann, later developed a consistent theoretical approach to analyse and explain antisemitism in Germany’s past and present based on the group relations theory Bergmann had proposed earlier. This theory was in fact inclusive of other forms of social exclusion next to antisemitism, like racism, homophobia, and later even Islamophobia. This approach was not established until well after the 1980s, however, when there was still a lack in studies on any form of discrimination besides antisemitism. An important part of the work of the Zentrum was the collection of quantitative data on German attitudes towards Jews. Werner Bergmann and Rainer Erb used surveys conducted by the Allies after 1945 as well as data from surveys on German antisemitism irregularly conducted from the 1960s to the 1990s to assess German attitudes towards Jews between 1945 and 1996.\textsuperscript{110}

Although this approach to antisemitism reflected on the inability of the Germans to deal with the Holocaust, it nevertheless stood in striking contrast, and did not engage in serious dialogue with, more critical theoretical approaches to antisemitism by (mostly) American historians and sociologists.

\textbf{Critical theoretical approaches to German Antisemitism}

Mostly American scholars concerned with the wider issues of antisemitic tendencies in German society, their meaning for German national and cultural identity, investigated antisemitism as a topic in philosophy, cultural studies and literary criticism. Their critique was based on the understanding that antisemitism is an ideology with certain social functions and they often used the theoretical approaches developed by the members of the Frankfurt School - and also, but less so, Hannah Arendt - to describe and assess the recent eruptions of antisemitism in Germany, but also to re-evaluate the history of

\textsuperscript{109}Ibid, p. 434.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s
antisemitism. Most prominently, the New German Critique, a German Studies
journal based at Cornell University, devoted several issues to the topic with es-
says by Moishe Postone, Andy Markovits, Frank Stern, Detlev Claussen, Dan
Diner and other historians and cultural theorists who regularly published on
the subject.\footnote{New German Critique No 19, Special Issue 1: Germans and Jews, 1980; New German
Critique No 20, Special Issue 2: Germans and Jews, 1980; New German Critique, No 38,
Special Issue on the German-Jewish controversy (Spring-Summer 1986)}

Frank Stern investigated German post-war Philo-Semitism and emphasised
that the use of ‘positive’ stereotypes is just as much a pattern of differen-
tiation as the use of negative stereotypes, so that both philo-Semitism and
antisemitism are anti-Jewish. He criticised German memory politics with re-
gard to the Holocaust and observed a tendency of a diminishing philo-Semitism
and rising antisemitism between the 1960s and the 1980s in Germany that was
related to the way the Holocaust was remembered:

“Effective modification, neutralization and re-evaluation of the official
concepts of history - including current images and clichés about Jews -
began at the end of the 1960s, continuing through the 1970s, and
becoming socially acceptable in the 1980s. Where there had
previously been at least some acknowledgement of responsibility,
a version of history stressing ‘normalcy’ is now becoming predom-
inant. The twelve years of the Third Reich have been discarded,
filed away as no more than an unpleasant episode, a dark chapter
in Germany’s glorious thousand-year history. Trivializations and
re-evaluations abound in the media and book stores.”\footnote{Stern, Frank: From Overt Philosemitism to Discreet Antisemitism and Beyond: Anti-
Jewish Developments in the Political Culture of the Federal Republic of Germany, in:
Almog, Shmuel (ed.): Antisemitism through the Ages, Oxford: Pergamon Press 1988,
pp. 385-404, here p. 389.}

Stern showed that antisemitic stereotypes like that of the ‘rich Jew’ and
‘Jewish power’ and the ‘international Jewish conspiracy’ became prevalent in
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

Germany once again in the 1980s. He also emphasises, however, that the appearance of these stereotypes is connected to the search for a German identity and the attempt to absolve German society from any guilt. Antisemitic stereotypes in Germany after 1945 therefore relate to the Holocaust. At the same time, he observed a convergence of intellectual right-wing extremism and the Conservative establishment.

In light of the current memory politics and resurging antisemitism, Moishe Postone was concerned with understanding the particularity of (German) antisemitism from a Marxist and critical theoretical perspective. He therefore sought to relate the ideological preconditions of the Holocaust to the large-scale social and cultural transformations of capitalism in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He argued that the Holocaust must be understood with reference to modern antisemitism and that it is important to understand the particularity of this form of antisemitism. Although in all forms of antisemitism, a degree of power is attributed to the Jews, it is the quality of power attributed that distinguishes antisemitism. This power is understood as ‘mysteriously intangible, abstract, and universal’ and perceived as hidden and conspirational.

Postone attempted to analyse modern antisemitism with reference to the categories of capitalism. His main argument is in fact that Jews were identified with the abstract side of capitalism like finance capital. National Socialist antisemitism was therefore anti-capitalist in the sense that it was “based on a one-sided attack on the abstract - abstract law, abstract reason, or, on another level, money and finance capital - from the standpoint of the ‘healthy’, ‘rooted’,

\[113\] Ibid, p.393.
\[114\] See ibid, p. 396.
\[115\] A first version of this text appeared as Postone, Moishe: Anti-Semitism and National Socialism, Notes on the German Reaction to ‘Holocaust’, in: New German Critique No 19, Special Issue 1: Germans and Jews 1980; an adapted and revised version can be found in: Postone, Moishe: The Holocaust and the Trajectory of the Twentieth Century, in: idem and Santner, Eric (eds): Catastrophe and Meaning, Chicago: Chicago University Press 2003, pp. 81-115, here p. 89.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

‘natural’ concrete”.¹¹⁶

Postone argued that the centrality of the destruction of the Jews for the Nazis cannot be overemphasised. He concluded that “Auschwitz, not the Nazi seizure of power in 1933, was the real ‘German Revolution’, the attempted ‘overthrow’ not merely of the political order but of the existing social formation. By this one deed the world was to be made safe from the tyranny of the abstract. In the process, the Nazis ‘liberated’ themselves from humanity”.¹¹⁷

Detlev Claussen’s theoretical approach to antisemitism is similarly based on Marxist categories and the theories of the Frankfurt School. Similar to Postone, Claussen argued that Nazi antisemitism was the attempt to ‘liquidate’ the sphere of money circulation that the Nazis saw personified in the Jews.¹¹⁸ He emphasised that the anti-capitalist aspect of antisemitism was not characteristic of earlier forms of Jew-hatred, so that modern antisemitism must be distinguished from its earlier forms. He further argued that this aspect of modern antisemitism is still true for contemporary forms of this hatred. However, he pointed out that within secondary antisemitism, not real Jews are considered to be the enemy, but characteristics perceived as Jewish, financial speculations and intellectualism.¹¹⁹

Both Postone’s as well as Claussen’s approach to understand antisemitism were of a more philosophical-theoretical nature. However, they both made the important observation that antisemitism is often comprised of conspiracy theories. These conspiracy theories are often based on the urge to blame concrete persons or groups for something that is abstract and incomprehensible - like financial capital -, accompanied by the inability to accept any structural dimension of for example financial speculations.¹²⁰ This affects Jews in particular, as they are perceived as the ultimate capitalists. It is questionable, however, that after 1945, as Claussen suggested, this does not target concrete

¹¹⁶Ibid, p. 93.
¹¹⁷Ibid, p. 95.
¹¹⁹See bid.
¹²⁰See also Salzbach, Samuel: Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, p. 167.
Jews anymore, but only ‘Jewish’ characteristics. This approach, does, on the other hand, provide an explanation for left-wing antisemitism, as conspiracy theories and the aversion against global financial capitalism are not solely a right-wing phenomenon. Andrei S. Markovits has pointed out that this form of antisemitism is also closely connected to anti-Americanism.\textsuperscript{121}

The difference between how the ZfA interpreted antisemitism, and how these more critical voices saw the issue, became most apparent in their assessments of the Fassbinder affair.

### 4.2.3 The Fassbinder Affair

While the British Left at the time was pre-occupied with fighting Zionism from an anti-racist stance, for the German Left, anti-capitalism was the much more important struggle. Rather than interpreting Zionism as a kind of continuation of Nazism, like the British Left did, the German Left saw an analogy between past fascism and contemporary capitalism.

To be sure, the German left was anti-Zionist. As Thomas Haury has shown for antisemitism in the former GDR, the strong anti-capitalist notion that used antisemitic stereotypes was later combined with anti-Zionism. Zionism came to be seen as connected to a conspiracy of Wall Street capitalism and imperialism. Most importantly, this is not a form of antisemitism that is in any way based on biological or racist arguments.\textsuperscript{122}

In comparison with Britain, however, where anti-Zionism became a defining characteristic of the Left, the anti-capitalist notion was a stronger factor for the German Left. Unfortunately, this form of anti-capitalism was open to the use of anti-Jewish stereotypes as well. This became evident during the major controversy of the 1980s about the performance of the play by Rainer Werner Fassbinder \textit{Garbage, the City and Death}. The play had been written in 1976 and there was an attempt to stage it in Frankfurt in 1985, which resulted in


4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

massive protests and the cancellation of performances.

The first performance on 31 October 1985 in Frankfurt had to be cancelled after only a few minutes because several members of the audience – among them many members of the Jewish community – decided to occupy the stage and stop the actors from continuing their show on the grounds that the play was antisemitic in content and effect. The protesters saw the antisemitic content of the play embodied in the character of the ‘rich Jew’, a real estate speculator, who is portrayed as vengeful and cold and – in the end – as a murderer. This character says things like: “I buy old houses in this city, tear them down, build new ones and sell them for a profit. The city protects me. It has to. (...) I must not care, whether children weep, whether old people are harmed, I must not care.”

The question whether or on what grounds exactly the play can be called antisemitic was at the time discussed in newspaper articles and also in academia. However, the debate around the play and its performance did not only focus on the potentially antisemitic content, but also on a matter of principle: is it legitimate to stop a play from being performed on the grounds of, as critics put it, the subjective suspicion of antisemitism? Based on liberal values, it was argued, this play and its text should have been made available to the public and subjected to an open debate. Others argued in favour of Fassbinder’s play due to its highly critical value regarding the housing market in Frankfurt. These pro-play positions were mostly taken by left-wing intellectuals, members of the Green party, parts of the SPD and newspapers like the Frankfurter Rundschau. Voices against the play objected to the blatant antisemitism they saw in it. This position was mostly taken by conservatives, members of the CDU and FDP, the Christian churches and newspapers like the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and most parts of the Jewish community.

This freedom of speech controversy was similar to the debate about Perdition in Britain around the same time. However, the basic premise of Garbage was a quite different one. The play has to be understood in the context of

Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

general debates about capitalism and housing situations at the time. In 1985, and inspired by the play, articles were written about the conditions in the city of Frankfurt and its post-war housing market, as this was assumed to form the background of the play. In one article in Der Spiegel on 11 November 1985, the (unnamed) author tried to trace exactly how valid Fassbinder’s depiction of the Jew is by examining status, agents and history of the building industry in Frankfurt. He came to the conclusion that the building industry, which he understood as being connected to the entertainment industry in the Frankfurter Westend, was in fact, just as Fassbinder’s Jewish hero represented, a gangster syndicate, and in addition one in which Jews happened to appear as agents in a relatively high proportion. The article investigated – to an extent – the life of two real existing people, Ignatz Bubis and Hersch Beker, two Jews who at the time owned a significant amount of property in Frankfurt and asked which of them might have posed for Fassbinder’s Jewish character. On the way to an answer to this question, the reader was informed about the dynamics of “speculators”, “gambling dens”, of money, power and influence and the obscenity of brothels. A prominent historian was in due course cited to explain why Jews in Frankfurt appear in such high proportion in professions that have to do with money, power and speculation: because they were not allowed to participate in any other trade during the 18th and even 19th century, they inevitably became bearers of the credit system. This historic situation, according to the article, led to the emergence of Frankfurt as a banking city and hub for international trade, a fact owed mostly to Jewish endeavour.

However, the article also stressed that “tough property business [is] not a Jewish privilege” as there was also a Muslim business man involved. The most important fact – as it is presented in the article - about the Frankfurt housing “monopoly” is mentioned at the end of the article and as if to underline the validity of the argument, the conclusion was presented by citing Beker, a Jew, who explains why he is critically opposed to the Fassbinder play. He complained about the fact that “the executives of banks and insurance com-

124“Spekulanten, Magistrat-Gangstersyndikat”, in: Der Spiegel, No. 46, 1985, pp. 34-45
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

panies are not portrayed”, but instead “the Jewish business man”, who is, in comparison, “just a flea”. Whatever Beker’s intentions were regarding this statement, the article certainly seemed to imply that there are higher, less visible structures of money, power and influence connected to banks and insurance companies that need to be taken into consideration when examining local housing markets.

If one takes a closer look at Fassbinder’s play, very similar lines of thought may be traced. It is in fact not so much the “rich Jew” who all other characters fall prey to, but he is merely one agent – albeit different from the others - within the general conditions that turn humans into victims. The main theme in the play is in fact the alienation and destruction of humanity, so it is the city, it is garbage, it is modern society that causes the death of true human interaction.

Critics extensively debated in what respects Garbage, the City and Death was antisemitic or possibly fostered antisemitism. Seyla Benhabib argued that Fassbinder portrayed the Jewish character in the play as a flawed ‘Other’, but that it is precisely the love for the ‘Other’ that characterised Fassbinder’s work.125 Within this line of interpretation, Fassbinder has good intentions and sympathises with the ‘Other’, however, these intentions become compromised because his portrayals are not put in context and not interpreted. Consequently, there is the danger that “Fassbinder’s play (can) become a metaphor for German identity (...), expressed in the desire of large numbers of West Germans to be able to speak not only about themselves, but also about the others, the Jews, without being suffocated by the censure of guilt and the past”.126 Examining Garbage in the context of other Fassbinder works and also of other German works regarding representations of Germans, Jews and German-Jewish history, however, makes Gertrude Koch’s interpretation more

125 See Benhabib, Seyla, Markovits, Andrei S. and Postone, Moishe: Rainer Werner Fassbinder’s Garbage, the City and Death: Renewed Antagonisms in the Complex Relationship Between Jews and Germans in the Federal Republic of Germany, in: New German Critique No. 38., Special Issue on the German-Jewish Controversy, Spring-Summer 1986, pp.3-27, p. 18.
plausible: Fassbinder placed Jewish figures in prominent positions in his work and although his work was characterised by empathy for the victims, for the fringe groups of society, Jews were not actually given a place among these groups\textsuperscript{127}, the Jewish figure rather “slips into a privileged position”\textsuperscript{128}. Fassbinder may not have been an antisemite, however, “there lies at the root of his creation an anti-Semitic motif, which often manifests itself in the form of a philo-semitic stereotype: the picture of the Jew as the strict patriarch and man of intellect, law abiding and austere”.\textsuperscript{129} Fassbinder’s work was in many ways unique. The prominent positioning of Jewish figures is certainly not very common for post-war German film and drama. However, the way in which Fassbinder presented Jews and Jewishness was not at odds with the dynamic of a “language of silence”\textsuperscript{130}, or a “representation of absence”\textsuperscript{131}, the art of post-war German representations of Jewishness, in which Jewish characters or the absence of these function as the anti-figures for representations of post-war Germanness. In this sense, Fassbinder’s Jewish character can in fact be interpreted as a product of the particular West-German obsession with national identity and redemption.

But Fassbinder’s Jewish character served a further purpose: it cemented the identification of Jews with capital. Critique of capitalism in left-wing as well as in right-wing discourses uses simple constructions of who the enemy is - CEOs, politicians, lobbyists. Everything that is perceived as bad in the world is projected onto this enemy - greed, injustice, indecency. This simplified form of anti-capitalism is expressed in forms of evil vs. good patterns: ‘greedy locusts’ against ‘decent German businesses’, ‘bad financial capitalists’ against ‘good German workers’, ‘creative’ against ‘rapacious’ capital. It becomes apparent that capitalism is in this mindset separated into an abstract

\textsuperscript{127}See Koch, Gertrud: Torments of the Flesh, Coldness of the Spirit: Jewish Figures in the Films of Rainer Werner Fassbinder, in: New German Critique No.38, Special Issue on the German-Jewish Controversy, Spring-Summer 1986, pp. 28-38, p. 33.
\textsuperscript{128}ibid, p. 35.
\textsuperscript{129}ibid, p. 37.
\textsuperscript{130}See Schlant: The Language of Silence, introductory chapter
\textsuperscript{131}See Bartov: “Seit die Juden weg sind ...”, p. 209.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

sphere of circulation and a concrete sphere of production, whereas the abstract sphere is perceived as negative, the concrete sphere as positive. For Germans, Jews therefore occupy a ‘special’ position in two ways: they are central to a notion of German identity that is incomparable with other minorities, and antisemitic stereotypes evolve around different themes than those for other minorities. This has wide repercussions for comparisons between Jews and other minorities, but the ZfA’s work, in contrast, emphasised the common aspects of prejudice against different ethnic minorities.

In addition, while the ZfA generally represented - and still represents - the viewpoint that contemporary antisemitism needs to be taken seriously, it also saw strong anti-antisemitic tendencies in German society and public. Bergmann and Erb concluded that these anti-antisemitic tendencies in Germany today emanated from a fight against a possible continuation of antisemitic traditions in schools and in public.\textsuperscript{132} One reason for this was that just as debates about antisemitism came to characterise German identity, the ability to deal with current antisemitism became a fundamental part of German democracy.

Although especially later research produced by the ZfA showed a plethora of different expressions of antisemitism in private and public, the underlying assumption of this research was that there was a public safety net: any expression of antisemitism would ultimately be refuted. This stood in contrast to later studies who detected a form of ‘normalisation’ in antisemitic discourse in Germany. One could speculate on the reasons for antisemitism researchers not to be alarmist. From the 1980s onwards, anti-antisemitism grew into a fundamental part of German society and, as Stuart Taberner has shown, this rejection of racist prejudice was about a stabilisation of political culture in

Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

But what is also striking about this kind of prejudice research is that neither Jews nor the Shoah figured greatly in its theoretical foundations. It was in fact the dangerous abstraction of antisemitism that Postone had once warned against that characterised the approach of the ZfA:

“The abstract nature of the treatment of National Socialism and the dialectic of guilt and identification have in common an attempt at constituting identity through an act of abstract negation of the past. Instead of taking responsibility for the past while rejecting it, the attempt is made to escape from it, that is, to criticize the past from a position that seeks to be ‘other’ by refusing to recognize its own personal and cultural connections to the past.”

In line with Postone, critical theoretical approaches saw antisemitism as something that was constitutive for German society as a whole. Mainstream antisemitism research in Germany faced the problem that it had to be affirmative of a new German society. In its analysis, antisemitism was thus limited to a certain percentage of the German population, and its prevention meant to work against those elements that practised social exclusion.

In this sense, antisemitism research became part of a new German identity. This also meant that from very early on, the ZfA saw the study of antisemitism as a model for, and an integral part of, the study of hostilities against other ethnic minorities. It was recognised that the integration of minorities was the yardstick by which the new German democracy would have to be measured. This was already the case under the directorship of Herbert Strauss, who saw the immigration problematic as related to earlier antisemitism. Under his leadership, the ZfA dedicated two of its ‘Lerntage’ (workshops), to asylum practices in 1985 and integration policies in 1989 respectively.

However,

---


134 Postone, Moishe: After the Holocaust, p. 247.

hostility against non-Germans was not analysed as racism, but as prejudice. The involvement of the ZfA in debates about foreigners thus stood in contrast to emerging approaches in discourse analytical studies, which framed anti-foreigner hostility in Germany as racism, based on prominent Anglo-American theories on the subject.

4.2.4 Discourse analytical approaches

Although there was not a theorisation of anti-‘foreigner’ hostility on a scale comparable to theories of antisemitism, there have been attempts to take cues from theoretical approaches to racism in other countries and apply these to German society. From the late 1980s and early 1990s and inspired by the works of British scholars Robert Miles and Stuart Hall, researchers of anti-‘foreigner’ hostility in Germany began to understand it as a discourse and a topic to be investigated with the methods of discourse analysis. From very early on, they saw their topic as ‘racism’ rather than anti-‘foreigner’ hostility, which as a concept had dominated previous research on the topic.

Although Miles and Hall each have different approaches to racism, they generally agree that racism is a discursive practice expressed in politics, language and culture. Most notably Siegfried Jäger and his method of ‘critical discourse analysis’ and, although much later, Ruth Wodak’s ‘historical discourse analysis’ have since shaped methods, means and theory of racism research in Germany and German-speaking countries. Both methods have a strong linguistic and textual focus. Ruth Wodak and others, however, place their emphasis not solely on the texts and discourses, but on their social and historical context as well.\(^{136}\)

In his studies on the topic of ‘foreigner’ hostility, Jäger emphasised that he understands racism is a discourse, meaning that it is not confined to single

4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s actions but manifests itself in a way of thinking and speaking. Jäger’s approach was also based on Michel Foucault’s theory of discourse and power. Foucault argued that through language and discourse, structures of power are produced and reproduced. Under Jäger’s supervision, the study of right-wing extremism, racism and nationalism as discourse with the help of critical discourse analysis became one of the main objects of the private and left-leaning Duisburger Institut für Sprach- und Sozialforschung (Duisburg Institute for Linguistics and Social Science), which was founded in 1987.

Jäger pointed out that racism was an everyday phenomenon and not confined to violent actions of the radical right. Both Jäger and Wodak understood the dynamics of racism to be the same as in antisemitism. Wodak emphasised that this is also true for ‘ethnicist’ or sexist prejudice. A number of studies have since used this method to investigate German racism and have for example dealt with media depictions of asylum seekers and racism in the press.

This discourse analytical approach was also used in one of the studies that dealt with anti-Muslim prejudice in particular. Irmgard Pinn and Marlies Wehner investigated how German media depict Muslim women. They showed that there was a striking difference between the image of the Muslim woman in Arab countries, and the image of the Muslim women living in Germany. While Iranians for example were depicted as mysterious and threatening, Turkish women in Germany were portrayed as asexual, submissive, oppressed by their

139 Ibid, p. 141.
141 See especially the contributions in: Jäger, Siegfried (ed.): Der Diskurs des Rassismus, Osnabrück 1992.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

husbands and hard working.\textsuperscript{143} They pointed out that the media coverage of
the Gulf War, for example, led to the establishment of an image of Islam as
an enemy to the Western World. However, they also emphasised that this me-
dia image had real consequences on attitudes and behaviour towards Muslim
women, when they are for example not considered for higher ranking jobs or
when they are patronised and forced to decide between wearing a head scarf
or working in a public place.\textsuperscript{144}

In contrast to Britain, however, studies about racist discourse remained
marginal in Germany, and, more importantly, never translated into policies.
In addition, while the 1970s and 1980s in Britain were characterised by the
struggle for recognition of minority communities and major developments in
national self-understanding towards multiculturalism, this was not equally the
case in Germany. There were neither comparable anti-discrimination laws,
nor laws that encouraged inclusion and integration of minorities, mirroring
developments in Britain.

4.2.5 Similarities to Britain: German multiculturalism?

Some progress towards integration of especially the Turkish minority was nev-
evertheless made. While the 1960s and 1970s had been characterised by a denial
of the German government that the earlier recruited guest workers intended
to stay and build a life in Germany, this slowly changed in the 1980s. Al-
ready in 1979, the coalition of social democrats and liberals under chancellor
Helmut Schmidt attempted a new approach to the guest worker question. As
Rita Chin has pointed out, the older notion of guest workers as temporary
labour forces was abandoned in favour of an acknowledgement of the need of
‘integration’. In the wake of these changes, numerous studies were funded to
assess the situation of immigrants, the ‘Ausländerbeauftragte’ was created and
a curricular reform was promoted. The ‘foreigner problem’ also became a topic

\textsuperscript{143}Ibid, p. 182 f.
\textsuperscript{144}See ibid, p. 190.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

As Chin has indicated, the CDU’s position at the time was that different cultures are distinct and self-contained entities. With regard to Turkish guest workers in Germany, this meant that they were required to fully assimilate or to return to their home country. In this sense the CDU sought “to restore national self-esteem based on the Federal Republic’s position as a now mature liberal democracy” while maintaining that “national cultures could not cross pollinate and belonged to wholly separate natural habitats.” Thus, the idea of integration “relied on the idea of cultural difference to explain the inherent difficulty of Germans and guest workers (primarily Turks) living together in the same society.”

This is exemplified in the publication of the Heidelberger Manifest in the newspaper Die Zeit of 17 June 1982. It showed that the belief that ‘foreigners’ pose a threat to German society was widespread and accepted. The manifesto claimed that the different ‘Völker’ were biological and cultural systems that are distinguishable from each other. Multiculturalism was perceived as an ‘ethnic catastrophe’ and ‘over-alienation’ should by all means be avoided. The manifesto was not signed by radical right-wing activists, but by well known politicians and academics, among them members of the conservative Christian Democratic Party (CDU).

In the 1990s, studies revealed that German hostility against foreigners was


146 Ibid, p. 252.


4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

in fact mostly directed against Turks.\(^{150}\) Already in 1982, two thirds of the Germans agreed that the “guestworkers” should leave the country and in 1989, even more held this view.\(^{151}\) After unification there was an increase in violence against immigrants and asylum seekers and migrants were attacked in Hoyerswerda and Rostock in 1991 and 1992.\(^{152}\)

It is important to acknowledge that until 1990, the majority of foreigners living in Germany held only a restricted residency status, meaning that they regularly needed to reapply for residency at their local authority. Only the amendment of the foreigners’ legislation allowed for the application for permanent residency after eight years. The amendment also included the right for foreign born nationals to become Germans, providing they give up their former nationality, when turning eighteen.\(^{153}\) This legislation reflects the exclusionary understanding of German nationality and the extent to which institutions perpetuated this notion.

This exclusionary notion of Germanness also became evident in the asylum policies of the Federal Republic. Since the 1980s, an increasing number of migrants have been seeking asylum in Germany due to the political situation in their countries. Among these migrants were for example Iranians, Afghans, and Lebanese. In contrast to the former labour immigrants, they often had a different legal status and their entry into Germany was subject to an asylum seeker policy. Their stay in Germany was only tolerated, which resulted in a lack of fundamental rights: a work permit was usually not issued and as soon as the political situation in their home country allowed a return - according to the assessment of German administrative workers - they faced deportation. After unification, the Bundestag amended the Basic Law so that refugees could only apply for asylum if they arrived directly from the state where they were


\(^{151}\)Fetzer and Soper, Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, p.104.

\(^{152}\)Ibid.

\(^{153}\)Kolinsky: Non-German Minorities in German Society, p. 91.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

In the context of the relationship between conservatism, antisemitism and an anti-immigration stance, it is not surprising that antisemitism researchers saw the need to combine the analysis of all three. It is striking, however, that this kind of research did not stand in a context of a struggle for recognition of the minorities themselves. To be sure, that struggle did happen, but in comparison to events in Britain, it was much more subdued and quieter, and partly bore different effects. In addition, and what most scholars of racism and antisemitism did not realise, religion became an important factor for the Turkish minority in Germany.

4.2.6 Religion and Recognition: Turks in Germany

There are no comparable ‘milestones’ like the Honeyford and Rushdie affair with regard to Muslims in German discourse. The German state put only little effort into its relationship with the Turkish minority, and disregarded their religious needs completely. The German state in fact considered the religious needs of their foreign workers to be part of the state’s foreign affairs. The Turkish prime minister formed a separate division of the official religious affairs office to handle the religious needs of Turks abroad. However, the DITIB (Turkish-Islamic Association for Religious Affairs) was not officially founded in Germany until 1984. Fetzer and Soper concluded that “thus, DITIB was not sufficiently organised early enough to provide for the religious needs of at least the first generation of Turkish Gastarbeiter.” They showed that “in its absence, Muslims in Germany formed their own organisations to respond to the religious, cultural, and political interests of the Muslim population” and that “already in 1980, for example, the Verband Islamischer Kulturzentren (VIKZ, or Union of Islamic Cultural Centres, part of the Süleyman movement) claimed around eighteen thousand members, and the Milli Gorus - affiliated Islamische Union Deutschlands - reported twenty thousand.”

There is a great organisational diversity of Turkish Islam in Germany. In

\[154\] Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany, p. 103.
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

1995, more than two thousand Turkish-Islamic organisations existed in Germany, the majority of their organisational leaders are resident in Germany. Next to DITIB the second largest umbrella organisation is the Association for a New World View in Europe (AMTG), which is Islamist in orientation and includes 262 member organisations. There are a variety of other organisations, some of which with a militant fundamentalist outlook, the Turkish extremist group the Grey Wolves, an intellectual ‘order’ with training schools, and 82 Alevite communities.\(^{155}\) Attempts to establish a central representative body have resulted in the foundation of the Islamic Council for the Federal Republic of Germany in 1986, which advocates Muslim integration into German society and the religious practice of Islam in a secular environment. The Central Council of Muslims in Germany was founded in December 1994, which aims at improving the legal situation of Muslims and representing the interests of Muslims in German administrative, social or legal contexts. The variety of organisations reflects the multi-faceted structure of the Turkish minority. Karakasoglu concluded that in general, Islamic organisations in Germany “have tended to argue their case on the basis of European Enlightenment concepts such as ‘human rights’, ‘religious freedom’ and ‘human dignity’”.\(^{156}\)

While there are now purpose-built mosques in Germany, Fetzer and Soper concluded that “German policy continues to disadvantage Muslims in some ways.” They pointed out that “no Muslim group has yet received the public corporation status that would secure various privileges for the community and, even more importantly, demonstrate the state’s symbolic acceptance of the Muslim presence in Germany.” \(^{157}\)

This stood in contrast to the fact that religion has played a significant role for most Muslims in Germany. With regard to Turks, it can be said that “whatever the different schools of thought and varieties of religious practice among Turks in Germany, Islam has been the moving force behind the development of organisational networks within the Turkish minority”.\(^{158}\) Examples of this

\(^{155}\)Karakasoglu: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany, p.170.

\(^{156}\)Ibid, p. 173.

\(^{157}\)Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the State in Britain France and Germany, p. 129.

\(^{158}\)Karakasoglu: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany and the Role of Islam, p.158.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s are the Turkish religious organisations and the Turkish language press. The importance of Islam has increased in the lives of Turkish migrants in Germany. One reason for this could be that during times of high unemployment among Turks, Islamic organisations provided social and material support, just as they provide support in other everyday issues like child care and religious education. They also played a leading role in organising protests when xenophobic attacks intensified in Germany after unification.

Further reasons for the increasing religiousness of German Turks are the strong family values in conjunction with the experience of social exclusion. After their families joined them in Germany and faced with social exclusion, Turkish migrants “turned back to the cultural and value orientations of their home country, not to those in the surrounding host society”. Everyday values of ‘family honour’, ‘respect for the head of the family’, ‘regard and obedience’ became much more relevant again after family reunions and characterised the return to Turkish cultural context and traditions. For Turks in Germany, the family played a key role: it passes on social norms, provides material security and contributes to the stability of the established value systems. In this regard, “the honour of the family itself tends to be linked to the ‘honourable’ behaviour of its female members and their adherence to their traditional role” but “the extent to which families adhere to these values in their daily lives depends on the urban or rural living environment and on the social status, educational qualification or religious orientation of the parents”.

For the second generation Turkish migrants, religious orientation was even more strongly linked to experiences of hostility in the German host society. Studies showed that Islam became an attractive form of identity for young Muslims who encounter social exclusion in Germany. However, the second

---

159 Ibid, p. 166.
160 Kolinsky: Non-German Minorities in German Society, p. 161.
161 Ibid.
162 See Nökel, Sigrid: Islam und Selbstbehauptung - Alltagsweltliche Strategien junger Frauen in Deutschland, in: Klein Hessling, Ruth; Nökel, Sigrid; Werner, Karin (Hrsg.): Der neue Islam der Frauen, Weibliche Lebenspraxis in der globalisierten Moderne, Fallstudien aus Afrika, Asien und Europa, Bielefeld: Transcript 1999, pp. 124-146; Tietze, Nikola:
4 Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

and third generation Muslims have their own approach to religion, which is
more intellectual than the popular Islam of their parents.163

In addition to the social exclusion Turks experience in Germany, German in-
tegration efforts have tended to be patronising rather than empowering. Since
the 1970s there have been a number of activists, initiatives and action groups
aimed at helping Turks to integrate into German society. They organised
language classes, helped with German bureaucracy and established womens’
circles. These circles were generally liberal in their intention and therefore
believed that adapting to German culture and values would be necessary and
beneficial with regard to integration.164 But although Turks have acquired Ger-
man citizenship in order to become doctors or lawyers, many remain Turkish
and Kolinsky concluded that instead of accepting their situation in Germany
“they are finding their own voice, their own advocates, and their own under-
standing of what it means and what it should mean to be of Turkish origin in
German society”.165

4.2.7 Thinking about antisemitism in a multicultural society

In contrast to Britain, where religion became the issue for social cohesion in
the 1980s, this process took on different forms in Germany. This was partly
because there was no equal struggle for recognition by minorities in Germany.
But most importantly, there was no multicultural framework equal to that in
Britain in which minorities could claim any kind of recognition. While in-
tegration policies introduced an aspect of care into the relationship between
state and minorities, which had previously been absent, these were also char-
acterised by the patronising assumption that minorities could not speak for
themselves.

Although the antisemitism researchers at the ZfA, and those who studied

Islamische Identitäten, Formen muslimischer Religiösität junger Männer in Deutschland

163 Karakasoglu: Turkish Cultural Orientations in Germany, p. 172.
164 Kolinsky, Eva: Introduction, in: Kolinsky, Eva and Horrocks, David (eds.): Turkish
165 Ibid.
Explaining past and present antisemitism: The big debates of the 1980s

antisemitism in other contexts, recognised the need to measure Germany’s attitudes towards foreigners and put this in relationship to Germany’s self-image as a democracy, in their analysis and methodologies they also became complicit in denying these minorities their agency. This reflected the way in which this research was characterised by an absence of Jews and Jewish issues. Antisemitism research and prejudice research thus became about the new Germany rather than about Jews or Turks.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

The previous chapters have dealt with conceptualisations of antisemitism up to the 1990s as well as the role of Jews, and in relation to them, of other minorities in German and British discourse. This chapter deals with the question how and why, on this basis, comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments developed. I argue that comparisons are drawn in line with dominant national narratives about the place of minorities in each national discourse. This means that in Germany, comparing antisemitism and Islamophobia is part of a discourse of normalisation. Antisemitism is normalised by equating it with other forms of hostility, which is a strategy of dealing with the Nazi past. In Britain, in contrast, there is a different dynamic: comparing Muslims and Jews arises naturally out of how minority-majority relations are understood in a multicultural framework. Jews and Muslims are thought to be equally affected by racism as they both equally represent the ‘Other’ for British national identity. In both countries, this has the effect that antisemitism as a concept has been universalised. Any particular dimension it may have has been filtered out in order to fit into certain narratives.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

5.1 Britain: Conceptualising Antisemitism in a multicultural society

The previous chapter showed that over the past five decades, the understanding of the relationship between immigrants and native Britons has changed. This relationship was first seen in a framework of ‘race relations’, in which immigrants were thought to be responsible for any ‘racial tensions’. Over time, however, it became what can be called multiculturalism, a system in which immigrants are even assumed to have contributed to British society. The basic assumption, however, is still governed by the idea of cultural plurality: there are distinct social groups that need to be managed. This has had effects on all ethnic minorities, including Jews, and has strongly influenced conceptualisations of forms of hatred against these minority groups. While neither Jews nor Muslims in particular were protected by earlier race relations legislation, they are now both (somewhat) protected as religious minorities in a multicultural state. This is a fairly recent development and the result of a struggle for recognition from Muslims that began in the 1980s.

As we have seen in the previous chapters, there was a serious gap of concepts of antisemitism in Britain. This gap was only filled from the late 1980s. Nevertheless, there was a reality of antisemitism, and researchers and practitioners were eager to find ways to categorise antisemitism that satisfied this reality. This chapter shows that in the 1990s, a particular understanding of antisemitism developed that was set in this particular framework of minority-majority relations and was directly influenced by debates about the relationship between Muslims and the British state, but also built on racism theories.

5.1.1 New ways of thinking about minorities and citizenship

From 1997, under ‘New Labour’, there have been important shifts and legislative initiatives regarding ‘race’ and ‘community’ relations. The Race Relations Act was amended in 2000, as a result of the Macpherson report, and now requires authorities to address not only institutional discrimination, but to pre-
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

The Commission for Racial Equality, founded in 1976, became the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which not only protects but promotes equality across age, disability, gender, race, religion and belief, sexual orientation and gender reassignment.

Tariq Modood described this as a true multiculturalism: “Multiculturalism (...) has grown up, sometimes in contradictory ways, in response to crises as well as mature reflection, and so is evolutionary and multifaceted. The ‘multi’ is an essential feature of what I am talking about for the policy and institutional arrangements have grown out of and continue to be part of ways to address not just Muslims but a plurality of minorities. The ‘multi’ does not merely refer to the fact that a number of minority groups are within the frame but also to the fact that different kinds of groups are being referred to. Some groups are defined by ‘race’ or ‘colour’ (...) some by national origins (...), some by religion (...).”

Especially when compared to Germany, this means that in Britain, “minorities are being allowed to maintain and develop their cultural specificities, with host institutions sensitive to this cultural diversity and (...) encouraged to modify their procedures and practices accordingly.”

This form of multiculturalism has had a profound positive impact for Muslims. With the Racial and Religious Hatred Act in 2006, which came into force in amended form in 2007 and which outlaws the incitement of hatred against another person on the grounds of their religion, the British government particularly acknowledged and addressed the acute problem of hostility towards Muslims. This form of multiculturalism also meant that on local levels Muslims were able to ensure that their requirements are met, for example by obtaining permission for the building of mosques, practising halal slaughter

---

The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism and establishing Muslim cemeteries. Furthermore, since religious education in schools is organised under local authority, Muslims were in some cases able to secure that their claims concerning religious education in schools are being met. However, only in 2001 were the first two Muslim schools granted state funding, which appears belated in the light of the state funding of several Jewish, Hindu, and Sikh schools and at least seemingly puts Islam on the level of a ‘second class religion’.

Muslims were, in addition to that, also able to gain recognition in matters of law. Joly points out that although their claims regarding the use of Shari’a law for family matters have not been met, several cases imply “that the cultural and religious specificities of Muslims are sometimes taken into account.” According to Vertovec, traditional Muslim values concerning marriage, polygamy, divorce, heritage, funerals and slaughter are sometimes factored in by British courts.

As Tariq Modood pointed out, however, “the new political relevance of religion has not come from the state or ‘top-down’ but from the political mobilisation of specific minorities or parts of minorities who prioritised their religious identity over that of ethnicity and ‘colour’.” This development can be traced by looking at some of the major debates that mark the fight for Muslim recognition.

Since then the issue of Islam in Britain has played a significant role in public discourse. In the 1990s “there has been a noticeable increase in derogatory

---

5See Fetzer and Soper: Muslims and the state in Britain, France and Germany, p.45.
7Vertovec: Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p.179.
images of Islam, patterns of anti-Muslim discrimination in employment, institutional intolerance of Muslim values, and occasional acts of physical violence against Muslims in Britain". This development caused the Commission for Racial Equality to look into cases of religious discrimination already in the early 1990s as well as the establishment of a Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia by the Runnymede Trust in 1996, which published the report *Islamophobia: a challenge for us all* in 1997, calling for serious anti-discrimination measures and a betterment of the social status of Muslims in Britain.

Research suggests that since the Islamist terrorist attacks in New York on 11 September 2001 and London on 7 July 2005, the public perception of Muslims has worsened, and Muslims have increasingly been victims of hate crimes. This is a European phenomenon: as the EUMC’s *Summary Report into Islamophobia in the EU following 11 September 2001* shows, Muslims became indiscriminate victims of an upsurge of both verbal and physical attacks following the events of 11 September.10

One of the findings of the Runnymede Report was that Muslims have been overwhelmingly seen as part of a monolithic and static entity. Chris Allen showed that Muslim “all have become indiscriminately characterised by the same negative and stereotypical attributes, where all Muslims have the capability to either be terrorists or at least be supportive of terrorism”.11 With regard to media representation, Chris Allen stressed that “Islam and Muslims have been clearly presented in terms of being incompatible with the norms of ‘our’ (British) society and ‘our’ (British) way of life.”12

The London bombings of 2005 have warranted the government to implement not only anti-terrorism policies, but also to inquire how British Muslims become radicalised and how this could be prevented. The Home Office established seven working groups under the title ‘Preventing Extremism Together’

---

9Vertovec, Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p.24.
12Ibid, p. 87.
in 2005, focusing on Muslim youth, education, women’s issues, regional, local, and community projects, the training of imams and the role of mosques, community security and police relations, and tackling extremism and radicalisation. The reports published by these groups suggested an inquiry into the process in which some Muslims become radicalised and emphasised that the solutions to radicalism and extremism lie in “tackling inequality, discrimination, deprivation and inconsistent Government policy, in particular foreign policy”.

In 2006 the government launched the Commission on Integration and Cohesion, which published its report in 2007. The Commission suggested new ways of approaching integration and cohesion and policies that enable local communities to enhance integration. The underlying assumption of the report was that radicalisation was caused by a lack of integration. For this the report has been criticised, as it neglected to take into account other factors that may affect or cause Muslim radicalisation, like British foreign policy.

Although the New Labour approach to community relations has on the whole brought important changes to anti-discrimination legislation and its implementation, some scholars detect a retreat of multiculturalism under Labour, relating to failure of multicultural policies but also a new assertiveness of the liberal state to impose liberal principles. Labour’s policies and actions could be interpreted as a move from multiculturalism to civic integration, especially since its reaction to the 2001 riots in various English cities and the subsequent Cantle Report.

Nasar Meer, on the other hand, stressed that there is certainly not a retreat from multiculturalism. The establishment of the aforementioned Equality and Human Rights Commission, which operates on the basis of a single Equality Act and which is a single point of contact to provide information for the public, is an enhancement. Muslim integration and matters are no longer discussed in terms of ‘race’ or ethnicity, but in a framework of multiculturalism.

---

13 Cited in Brighton: British Muslims, multiculturalism and UK foreign policy, p.2.
14 Ibid.
that acknowledges the intersectionality of forms of discrimination. He also explained that “This recognition of complex discrimination is (...) coupled to a new emphasis on a journey into citizenship in which the acquisition of citizenship marks neither the beginning nor the end of the processes of integration.”¹⁶ This idea of a journey into citizenship was exemplified in the *Paths to Citizenship* Green Paper of February 2008. As Meer puts it, the dynamic of British multicultural citizenship “has successfully and legislatively embedded a recognition of ‘difference’ - with the goal of promoting equality of access and opportunity - into Britain’s self-image, and that this has led to some significant accommodations for certain groups. British Muslims are presently appealing to this tradition as one means of achieving greater civic inclusion and elevating their civic-status”.¹⁷

### 5.1.2 Forging alliances

From a point of view of multiculturalism, it makes sense for minorities to forge alliances: in a majority-minority relationship, it can be beneficial for minorities to unite their fight for common goals. In the context of British multiculturalism, which promotes diversity, fighting for recognition of religious practices and cultural plurality, combating hate crime and promoting equality are all areas of common interest to Jews and Muslims in the UK.

One of the first indicators that there was a trend to subsume the fight against antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments in one category was the 1994 Runnymede Trust report *A Very Light Sleeper*, a forerunner of the later report on *Islamophobia*. What was new about the report was that it portrayed antisemitism as racism and as more dangerous than previously thought. In its policy recommendations it stated that antisemitism cannot be regarded as only an attitude of a right-wing fringe, but is something that has to do with notions and concepts of ‘being British’. It also argued in favour of fighting different racist prejudices together: “Action against antisemitism should be integrated

---

¹⁶Meer and Modood: The Multicultural States We’re in, p. 67.

¹⁷Meer, Nasar: Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism, p. 5.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism with action against other forms of racism”.  

The report outlined that “The struggle against racism needs to be holistic and indivisible: an attack on one minority group is an attack on all. Antisemitism clearly has both similarities and connections with forms of racism directed at non-white people. Too often in recent years, however, the seriousness and existence of modern antisemitism have been forgotten, and the links with other forms of racism have been obscured.”  

The tone of the report was markedly different to the words of the Chief Rabbi on the situation of the Jewish community discussed in the previous chapter. The report instead defended multiculturalism as a strategy to prevent racism. One of the key policies stated that “Both liberal democracy and cultural pluralism need to be strengthened”. Also outlined are issues regarding practical multiculturalism. The report asked how society can balance values and meanings with the need for minorities to have their freedom for development. Dual loyalties should be positively welcomed and there should be real choices with regard to ‘assimilation’ and ‘integration’.  

These issues were seen as inherently connected with the fight against anti-Muslim resentments and the interests of the Muslim community in particular. One of the members of the Runnymede Trust commission, Akbar Ahmed, emphasised the importance of dialogue and openness between different religions and cultures. One of his reasons to join the commission was: “I felt that a Muslim voice representing broad Muslim opinion was crucial in understanding the problem of antisemitism in the UK and to convey the feelings of Muslims to the Commission. If Jews are easily stereotyped and misunderstood so too are Muslims. There is a real danger of seeing Muslims - or Jews - as a

19 Ibid, p. 12
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

monolith.” He further stated that he hoped that through the Commission “both communities would be able to move closer towards each other”, as it is “imperative that people of good will from all sides play their part in dialogue and discussion.”

The report firstly marked a change in the way antisemitism was framed: it was defined as racism and central to the formation of Britishness. It secondly marked a change in the way the Jewish community was portrayed. Instead of pointing out that it was different to other minorities - more loyal and willing to integrate - it sought to unite with other minorities in opposition to the majority culture. Instead of stressing how ‘British’ Jews were, the report showed that Jews were also a racialised minority. Since the report, the dialogue that Ahmed was talking about has been continued, for example in interfaith groups such as Alif-Aleph or the Joseph Interfaith Foundation, whose work exclusively deals with Jewish-Muslim relations. However, this is not always an equal relationship. In British multiculturalism, and in line with a development towards a national narrative of ‘journeys into citizenship’, the Jewish community is still seen as a model of integration into British society, especially for the Muslim community. The Jewish approach to integration into British society is thus still seen as a particular successful one. There are also issues that are a ‘thorn’ in the alliance between Jews and Muslims, and are also problematic for a straightforward narrative of Jewish integration. One of these is Holocaust remembrance.

As described in the previous chapter, there was a universalistic tendency in British Holocaust remembrance. This was still characteristic for Holocaust remembrance in Britain from the 1990s onwards, but the focus has shifted from remembering the ‘casualties of war’ towards remembering victims of genocide and racism in general. In Britain, a ceremony to mark Holocaust Memorial Day on 27 January - the liberation of Auschwitz - was first held in 2001. For the Holocaust Memorial Day Trust it is a day to remember all the people killed in the Holocaust and subsequent genocides, to honour their survivors and to

---

22 Ibid, p. 15.
23 Ibid.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

learn from their experience.

For critics of the Holocaust Memorial Day, however, this was not enough. Nira Yuval-Davis and Max Silverman for example pointed out that the Memorial Day completely neglected to incorporate how Britain denied Jewish refugees entry into the country, and that it also neglected to take into account other forms of racism. From their point of view, a memorial day against genocides should be based on the opposition to all forms of racism, especially those dominant in Britain itself:

“We have suggested (...) that antiracism needs to be founded on a more comprehensive understanding of the multidimensional nature of racialized discourses and racialized minorities. We need to establish a framework in which antisemitism and antiblack racism (not to mention other forms of racism against Muslims, asylum seekers, gypsies and so on) can be viewed in terms of their interconnections. The Holocaust Memorial Day may have allowed for a consideration of forms of recent genocide other than the holocaust itself, but it does not appear to allow for a more searching understandig of forms of racialization and racism.”

In this sense, they ask for a ‘National Day against Racism’ dedicated to examining Britain’s own racist discourses and practices. Yuval-Davis and Silverman were not alone in arguing that the Holocaust Memorial Day focussed too much on the Jewish genocide. For some leaders of the Muslim community, however, the issue was a different one. In a press release of 26 January 2001, the Muslim Council of Britain stated that it would not attend the Holocaust Memorial Day ceremony, because “it totally excludes and ignores the ongoing genocide and violation of Human Rights in the occupied Palestinian territories and because it includes the alleged Armenian genocide as well as the so-called gay-genocide.”

The boycott of the Holocaust Memorial Day lasted until 2010, when the MCB sent a junior representative to the ceremony.

---

25 See MCB Press Release of 26 January 2001: Holocaust Memorial Ceremony- MCB re-
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

Although the MCB can not claim to represent the Muslim community as a whole, their boycott showed that the issue of Israel and Palestine was and is of high importance to Muslims in Britain. Although it expressed empathy with the victims of the Holocaust, they felt that the more pressing issue at hand was the ‘Israeli occupation of Palestine’:

“There is great concern in the community that our government has done precious little to make clear its moral outrage nor has it exercised its considerable economic and political influence in order to help bring about an end to both the Israel occupation and unceasing brutalisation of the Palestinian people and the deadly violation of their human rights. More recently, hundreds of children and civilians have been killed.”

This debate showed that some parts of the Muslim community felt that the national Holocaust remembrance ignored their position and their boycott was seen as offensive to the Jewish community. Although it highlighted how Jewish and Muslim positions in Britain differ and how fraught Muslim-Jewish relations can be, in public discourse there were nevertheless tendencies to lump Jews and Muslims together in one general ‘immigrant community’. This had profound effects on the understanding of antisemitism.

5.1.3 The Narrative of Waves of Immigration

In contrast to earlier notions of exclusive Britishness, in the late 1990s and 2000s developed a public acknowledgement of the contribution of immigration to British society. This was exemplified in government reports like that of the Commission for Racial Equality: *Roots of the Future: Ethnic Diversity in the Making of Britain* (1996), which stressed the contribution made by minority groups to Britain. A similar approach was taken in *Life in the United Kingdom: A journey to Citizenship* in 2004. This report stated that “We are a


26Ibid.
nation of immigrants - able to trace our roots to countries throughout Europe, Russia, the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.\(^\text{27}\) Immigration to Britain is in this context perceived as a process that took place in different ‘waves’ of immigrants coming to Britain over time and eventually becoming part of British society. Robert Winder’s and Panikos Panayi’s works followed a similar thought pattern.\(^\text{28}\) They described the immigration of first Huguenots, of Irish, then Jews, and more recently the arrival of immigrants from former Colonies, who all faced similar struggles on their journeys into British society. Later, the image of immigration in ‘waves’ also became a theme in culture, perhaps best exemplified in the 2009 play *England people very nice* by Richard Bean.

Tony Kushner showed that this is a national narrative, rather than the recognition of actual migrant journeys. Thus, there is a streamlining of the stories of immigration to form a picture of inclusive and liberal Britishness coupled with the ommittance of journeys that do not fit well into this narrative. With regard to Jews, for example, this meant that the Kindertransports, which were organised by the British government and volunteer organisations in 1938 and saved almost ten thousand mostly Jewish children from Nazi persecution became a nationally celebrated and often remembered event, while the more uncomfortable part of this journey - the exclusion of parents, many of whom perished in the Holocaust - remains unmentioned in the celebrations.\(^\text{29}\) Nevertheless, this particular narrative of ‘waves’ of immigration arriving and eventually becoming part of British society provided the framework for comparisons between Jews and Muslims.


\(^{29}\)See Kushner, Tony: The Battle of Britishness, Chapter 5.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

5.1.4 Comparing Jews and Muslims in Britain

As established in the previous chapters, there were strong tendencies in Britain to subsume Jewish and Muslim immigration experiences under one category and to see antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ as similar forms of resentments. This is a result of the way minority-majority relationships were understood and was most often expressed in comparisons in which a past Jewish integration experience was seen as a model for a present Muslim integration experience.

One of these comparisons was drawn by Sander Gilman, who examined whether the experience of Diaspora Judaism in the eighteenth and nineteenth century can serve as a model for Islam in today’s multicultural Europe through an analysis of (past) Jewish and (present) Muslim fiction. His analysis was based on the fact that in both cases “a religious minority enters into a self-described secular (or secularising) society that is Christian in its rhetoric and presuppositions and that perceives a ‘special relationship' with its minority”.

He argued that modern Judaism was established through a series of cultural negotiations in the Diaspora and that there was a process of acculturation through high culture and Bildung, especially through literature. This process of acculturation may then “provide some indicators for the world of European Muslims in regard to their rethinking of their identity as ethnic culture bearers”. He argued that there were already parallels between the Jewish, Hispanic, and African-American minority experience and that this indicated a possible similarity between the Jewish and Muslim experience as well.

Gilman of course neglected to take into account fundamental aspects of the history of the Jewish community. When Jews immigrated to Britain in the 1880s and 1890s, the established Jewish communities felt responsible for them even though the immigrants’ Jewish culture was different to the established one. The immigrants did not immigrate as members of European states, but as members of a persecuted minority with a particular Jewish culture that had developed within a minority situation. Anglo-Jews responded towards

---

31 Ibid, p.22.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

Jewish immigrants by trying to ‘anglicise’ them as quickly as possible. This response can be interpreted as a reaction to anti-Jewish hostility relating to the process of Jewish emancipation, and it is doubtful whether easy comparisons can be drawn to the experience of other minorities. But comparisons are also drawn from a different perspective. In comparisons evolving around theories of racism, it is not so much a Jewish or Muslim experience that is taken as a basis for a comparison, but theories about the perception of Jews and Muslims by the majority society. These comparisons build on theories of a Jewish ‘Other’.

5.1.5 The Jewish ‘Other’: theories of antisemitic discourse

When historians reviewed antisemitism in British history from the beginning of the 1990s, they concluded that there was in fact a trend towards an ethnically exclusive English identity that forced Jews to show their loyalty and civic endeavour.\(^{32}\)

Of course, not all Anglo-Jewish historians agreed with these new ideas about British antisemitism. In his study on Englishmen and Jews in Victorian England, David Feldman argued that it is revisionist to suggest that liberalism produced hostility to Jews. He agreed with Todd Endelman that “anti-Semitism was a feeble weed in the garden of England”.\(^{33}\) He came to this conclusion after analysing attitudes towards Jews in Victorian England in their context of political debate and social interaction and by adopting “a more dynamic understanding of the political and cultural meanings of anti-Jewish attitudes for those who held them.”\(^{34}\) This led him to the question of not why people objected to Jews, but “what they meant when they were doing do”. With his research he intended to produce an answer that “lead beyond the phenomenon of antisemitism and attitudes to the Jews towards a consideration of those col-


\(^{34}\)Ibid, p. 14.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

lectivities in English society which strove to accommodate the Jewish presence as well as those which aspired to exclude it.”

Although the material Feldman presented showed that Victorians held a plethora of stereotypical views of Jews - Jews as financiers, as powerful - he argued that these were not about Jews as much as they were about the nation and who could be accommodated. He concluded that there were no deterministic views of Jews, but that there were discontinuities, which meant that “to categorise individuals, discourses or institutions as anti-Semitic or tolerant, or to fix the degree of anti-Semitism or tolerance they displayed, prove to be inert.”

Feldman therefore suggested that in mid-Victorian England, attitudes towards Jews emerged from discussions and debates in which Jews were not the central category but to which they were related. “The Jewish issue arose in political argument as one facet of a debate between contending visions of that nation. Since conceptions of the nation changed over time so too did controversy over the Jews.”

He stressed that this controversy sparked longstanding stereotypical images of the Jew, but that the discontinuities in attitudes towards Jews make it impossible to use the category antisemitism, as the issue was rather the question whether Jews could be contained within the national community. He argued that “Jewish emancipation was an episode in the history of nationalism as well as of liberalism in England”. For Jews this meant that “they were not merely acquiring as individuals the same rights as other citizens, it also meant they were being allowed access to a positive community - the nation.”

Nevertheless, he argued that after 1885, the ‘Jewish problem’ was impacted by the growth of collectivism and new visions of the national community that were used to express a new relation between state and society. He suggested that the new concept of citizenship had a more positive role for the state, but that it also gave rise to the understanding that the social rights enjoyed

---

35Ibid.
37Ibid., p.135f.
38Ibid, p.47.
39See ibid, p.263.
by individuals were defined by their contribution to society. Consequently, the growing prominence of both radical Conservatism and new Liberalism in British politics after 1900 again raised the question whether Jewish immigrants could be integrated into English society. Through the Aliens Act of 1905 it was intended to regulate immigration concerning the individuals ‘usefulness’ to English society. Feldman describes the Act as “an expression of the collectivism of the right” and “an attempt to re-draw the boundaries of the state and the ideology of the nation.”

Feldman’s idea was to analyse attitudes to Jews not from the vantagepoint of the Jewish minority but that of the Gentile majority. He concluded that from this perspective, it became evident that the use of anti-Jewish stereotypes was not about Jews, but about national identity and about “competing visions of national community”. Victorians were either tolerant or intolerant towards Jews, but in either case, their attitude was not about Jews. On the one hand, Feldman was right. As the example of Germany shows, expressing anti-Jewish stereotypes may serve the purpose of creating national identity, even in the absence of actual Jews. However, Feldman betrayed a very concretistic view of antisemitism when he assumed that antisemitism is only expressed in the context of actual social relations. He further assumed that someone’s motive when expressing anti-Jewish attitudes was the decisive factor in determining whether a position or expression was antisemitic or not. From this perspective, as soon as the motive of a person is pro-emancipation, their utterances cease to be antisemitic, even when they contain stereotypical views about Jews. As David Cesarani has pointed out, in such cases it is necessary “to deconstruct the rhetoric about Jews, rather than to disembark on a futile mission to dissect the ‘actual’ social relations being described or the ‘motive’ of those involved”.

Feldman’s view was neither in line with recent developments in the study of antisemitism, nor in line with developments in the understanding of racism, which focussed on racial ideology and its expressions in discourse. The study

40Ibid., p.290.
41Ibid, p. 380.
42Cesarani: The Study of Antisemitism in Britain, p. 258.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

of antisemitism in Britain thus moved into the opposite direction of what Feldman had suggested: with the help of methods and tools from racism studies, discourses about Jews were analysed.

As mentioned previously, Bryan Cheyette for example emphasised that there was in fact an anti-Jewish cultural discourse in British society at least up to 1945. By investigating the discursive reproduction and usage of the image of ‘the Jew’ in modern English literature, he found out that ‘the Jew’ could be various, contradictory things and was used to construct British national identity. This did not necessarily happen by using ‘the Jew’ in negative terms, but as part of a ‘semitic’ discourse in which ‘the Jew’ was constructed as ‘the Other’ to Englishness.43

Cheyette’s approach is particularly interesting because it is based on the theoretical approach of sociologist Zygmunt Bauman. In his book on Modernity and the Holocaust Baumann made the case for a sociological approach to the Holocaust. On the basis of sociological theories he suggested to interpret the Holocaust “as a rare, yet significant and reliable, test of the hidden possibilities of modern society.”44 His understanding of antisemitism is based on this approach. He criticised previous approaches to understand the Holocaust, which, so he argued, interpreted it either as something that happened to the Jewish people and was seen as the outcome of the persistent Christian Jew-hatred and therefore unique. Or it was seen as an extreme case of social hostility, like other genocides, which modern society will inevitably overcome. His suggestion, however, was to understand the Holocaust as a problem of the rational society, civilisation and culture, as a problem of modernity. Bauman’s theory placed an emphasis on bureaucracy; he argued that “it was the spirit of instrumental rationality, and its modern, bureaucratic form of institutionalization, which made the Holocaust-style solutions (...) ‘reasonable’”.45

43Cheyette, Brian: Constructions of ‘the Jew’ in English Literature and Society, p. 8; see also Cheyette, Bryan and Nadia Valman (eds): The image of the Jew in European Liberal Culture 1789-1914, London: Vallentine Mitchell 2004, introductory and concluding chapters.
Bauman’s understanding of the Holocaust is the crucial basis for his interpretation of antisemitism, which also relates to Hannah Arendt’s approach to the subject. Like Arendt, he established that Jews were seen as a non-nation and therefore different to other ‘foreigners’, who would eventually belong to some nation, even if it was one deemed to be inferior. He stressed that “the world tightly packed with nations and nation-states abhorred the non-national void. Jews were in such a void: they were such a void”.46 Modernity however, was what made racism possible, or, in fact, demanded racism. Modernity - which is bureaucratic social order - demands flawlessness. Racism, therefore, was “a practice that combines strategies of architecture and gardening with that of medicine - in the service of the construction of an artificial order, through cutting out the elements of the present reality that neither fit the visualized perfect reality, nor can be changed so that they do”.47 He understood the Third Reich as such a visualization of perfection. Therefore, the National Socialist project “was an exercise in social engineering on a grandiose scale.” 48 He emphasised that the Jews were not simply aliens that needed to be fenced in, but that they were perceived as the anti-race, “a race to undermine and poison all other races, to sap not just the identity of any race in particular, but the racial order itself”.49 Most importantly, however, he stressed that the source of this is Enlightenment, because it installed the worship of nature and science.50 What is important about Bauman’s approach is that it takes the Holocaust as its analytical basis and is therefore different to most other approaches to antisemitism in Britain at the time. Bauman, a Polish Jew who has lived in England since 1971, developed his theory of antisemitism from a different viewpoint than Anglo-Jewish historians and sociologists.

Just like Cheyette, Frank Felsenstein similarly analysed English cultural attitudes towards Jews from the seventeenth to the nineteenth-century and came to the conclusion that most scholars have dismissed and underestimated eigh-

46Ibid, p. 53.
48Ibid, p. 66.
49Ibid, p. 68.
50Ibid
teenth century antisemitism. He argued that there was a certain stereotypical assertion about Jews that was deeply ingrained in popular wisdom at the time and that the acceptance of Jews by the English “was frequently compromised through the haphazard endurance of anti-Semitic myths and folktales, many of which can be traced back at least to medieval times and more often than not to exegesis of the text and meaning of the Bible”.

The Jew was in fact perceived as “the perpetual outsider whose unsettling presence serves to define the bounds that separate the native Englishmen from the alien Other”.

In other studies, too, the image of ‘the Jew’ - and ‘the Jewess’- in British literature in different periods was critically investigated.

This new approach to study and understand anti-Jewish resentments moved away from ‘interactionist’ theories and tried to assess these resentments as part of a process of ‘Othering’, for which the racists and the structures they produce, not those affected by racism, are responsible. This new approach required previous findings on antisemitism, anti-alienism and fascism in Britain to be reassessed. From this perspective, Tony Kushner for example emphasised that there is no clear dividing line between fascist and popular antisemitism. He cited sources that show how many Britons shared the fascists’ attitudes towards Jews, only that unlike the fascists, they did not intend to take action on the grounds of these attitudes. Political antisemitism was thus not totally isolated and it could “reinforce hostility to Jews from all sections of British

---

52 Ibid, p.3.
With regard to the antisemitic riots in 1947, which David Leitch had explained as connected to Jewish terrorism in Mandate Palestine, Tony Kushner pointed to the wider context of British racism and emphasised that the riots were an indication of who did and did not belong to British society. He suggested that they defined the status of minority groups and under what conditions they would be tolerated. He concluded that “the riots of 1947, whilst part of the story relating to the final years of Britain and Palestine, are also integral to our understanding of British national identity in the immediate post-war year”. Kushner also took into account that the immediate postwar period was characterised by a tendency of inward-looking nationalism that also shaped the post-war immigration policies. He interpreted the riots as part of the immigration debate that represented a process of forming a new British identity.

Building on this, Kushner and Lunn criticised the insularity with regard to the analysis of minorities. They argued that this has led to “a failure to recognize the ethnic diversity of the British” as well as “an equal reluctance to identify a parallel tradition [my emphasis] of intolerance towards the ethnic, racial, and religious minorities’ of Britain”.

Elsewhere Kushner argued that there is an analytical necessity to embrace an inclusive racialisation problematic. His approach was based on Miles, who had demonstrated how racism is not confined to Western European nation states shaped by the consequences of colonial migrations and should not

---

55 Ibid.
57 Ibid, p. 159.
be interpreted as continuous and unchanging. In addition, Miles showed the independence of the process of racialisation from biological traits by using the racism against the Irish as an example. Similarly, Kushner argued that the problem is not race, but racisms, not relations between races but relations which have been racialised, not the physical attributes of Blacks or their presumed inferiority, but the motivation of non-Blacks and the obstacles they impose. From this perspective he showed how Jews have been racialised in British history.⁶⁰

To an extent, this idea was echoed by other antisemitism researchers. The idea was to categorise antisemitism as a form of racism parallel to other forms of racism, which all operate through a process of creating the ‘Other’ to British identity. On the one hand, this meant that for the first time, antisemitism was taken seriously by researchers. On the other hand, however, this also meant that antisemitism could not be portrayed as something particular or unique. In this context, even the term antisemitism did not make sense any more. David Cesarani stressed that he did not want to use the term antisemitism, but instead speak of “a discourse about Jews which makes use of certain stereotypes. These images of the Jews are positive or negative depending on the context and the intention (as distinct from the motive) of the user. The Jew is constructed as the Other in this discourse, a process which occurs in the case of women and predominantly, not exclusively, non-white, non-Christian ethnic minorities in Western societies. (...) Hence it is important to understand that Jews are constructed in culture as the Other in ways that are not unique.” [My emphasis].⁶¹ Although Cesarani still maintained that there was a ‘singularity’ of anti-Jewish discourse, his colleagues stressed even more that the Jewish experience in Britain was similar to other immigration and integration experiences.

These newer approaches understood antisemitism as not limited to an extremist fringe and related to other forms of anti-‘alien’ hostilities in its ability

---

⁶⁰Ibid, p. 210
to construct national identity. This had two effects: on the one hand it was a clear deviation from earlier approaches that had generally marginalised antisemitism and praised English tolerance. On the other hand, by using tools and methods created to study discrimination of recent immigrants, it created an image of a unity between Jews and other minorities, as they were shown to be affected by similar discrimination experiences. There is thus a universalising tendency within British antisemitism research, in which antisemitism is categorised as a form of racism, and which positions Jews alongside other minorities in Britain. It is important to note that this also meant to ‘let go’ of the Holocaust as a major analytical reference when conceptualising antisemitism.

5.1.6 Post-structuralist and post-colonial approaches to racism

While in the 1990s, efforts were made to theorise antisemitism within a general framework of racialisation processes, newer conceptual developments in racism research became much more difficult to harmonise with concepts of any form of anti-Jewish hostility. Poststructuralist and postmodernist approaches to racism investigate how ideological relations can provide a basis for the articulation of racist discourses and practices. Post-colonial studies analyse the cultural legacy of colonialism in literature, film, philosophy, religion, geography, gender studies, sociology and political science with a post-modern approach. These approaches developed within the specific context of the aftermath of colonial immigration to countries like Britain, France, and the United States and were an attempt to deconstruct persisting colonial power relations. Not only did these approaches not consider antisemitism in their analysis, they also, as will be shown below, provided ground for the equation of Zionism with racism.

One major theoretical contribution to this approach was made by the Ameri-

---

can scholar Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, who introduced the terms ‘subaltern’, who are the ‘cultural others’, and ‘essentialism’ when talking about minorities in Western societies and their political domination and cultural erasure.\textsuperscript{64} One aspect of postcolonial studies is the attempt to identify and deconstruct ‘colonial structures’ in general. The aim is to show that the whole way of thinking about race, culture, and identity is a product of ‘Western’ or ‘European’ culture. It is a radical approach in so far as it claims that not only the way the ‘Western’ world thinks about culture or identity is questionable, but that the idea of cultures and identity in themselves may originate in Western thought and may not be applicable to the rest of the world. The claim is not that Western thought is flawed, but that it is not ‘true’ or ‘truer’ than other ways of thinking. Colonialism did therefore not only entail a physical domination and exploitation of other parts of the world, but also a colonisation of thought. Not only the content but also the structures of Western science, for example, are seen as inherently colonial. Post-structuralist and post-colonial scholars try to reflect and deconstruct this all-encompassing colonisation for example in their ways of writing. Their texts are often very abstract and remain relatively vague in their argument and content - on purpose. One of their main subjects is the relationship between minority and majority cultures in the ‘Western’ world that result out of the legacy of colonialism. This approach developed in the 1980s, but became more established in the 1990s.

Homi Bhaba for example made a case for the fluidity of cultures, for cultural ‘hybridization’.\textsuperscript{65} He argued that this applies more to minority cultures which are therefore ‘partial cultures’, cultures that are in-between, because minorities ‘occupy historically and temporally disjunct positions within the nation’s space’.\textsuperscript{66} Minority cultures are therefore different to majority cultures not in their content, but in their stage of development as cultures. Because they are


\textsuperscript{65}See Bhabha, Homi K.: Culture’s In-Between, in: Hall, Stuart and Paul Du Gay (eds.): Questions of Cultural Identity, London 1996, pp. 53-60, here p. 54.

\textsuperscript{66}Ibid, p. 57.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

neither ‘at home’ in their ‘host’ nation, nor completely identical to the culture of where they come from.

According to Bhabha, multiculturalism is discriminating in so far as the liberal idea of cultural diversity strives for cultures of equal value existing next to each other, but from a majority culture’s point of view. They do not acknowledge the ‘disjunctive temporalities’ of minority cultures. Bhaba advocated the concept of ‘hybridity’ as a strategy for minority cultures to contest majority cultural authority. This strategy is not assimilation nor collaboration, but “the hybrid strategy or discourse opens up a space of negotiation”.

Bhabha acknowledged that cultures are not fixed entities but in a constant process of producing themselves. Especially minority cultures should therefore invent themselves as hybrid cultures, a minority culture shaped by its particular history of existing within a majority culture. He pointed out that this includes the construction and re-construction of historical narratives, but sees this as a chance for healing, a chance for ‘working though the present’.

John Solomos emphasised that post-colonial studies are not (yet) the mainstream approach in racism studies in Britain. However, there are centres for post-colonial studies at many universities in the UK and academic journals dedicated to the subject. With regards to the study of racism, the important point that the post-colonial approach raises is that racism is not confined to certain parts of society, not even confined to certain discourses but is a basic structure of Western European discourse and thought. Post-colonialists recognise for example that Western European languages are not ‘neutral’ - if that is possible at all - in themselves but are structurally open to racism because of the way they linguistically create identity and difference. Racism is far reaching and deeply rooted and the fight against it requires thorough social self-reflection.

However, with its strong focus on colonialism and its effects, this approach

---

67 Ibid, p.58.
is not necessarily helpful in understanding racism in general, or antisemitism in particular. It assumes the connection of racism and colonialism and neglects to take into account a possible different history of racism. In addition, it does not recognise racisms that affected people who were not colonised. A generalisation of post-colonial theories when investigating racism in contemporary Britain may therefore result in foreshortened analyses of racism as well as exclusions of forms of racism that do not fit into a colonial pattern. Other racism researchers have recognised this and developed approaches that are less dependent on a colonial frame of reference. Most notably, Floya Anthias and Nira Yuval-Davis have argued that race should be conceptualised as ethnicity. The authors critically analysed concepts of race and racism and argued that ‘race’ “must be located within the wider category of ‘ethnos’ that provides its analytical axis. Racism, on the other hand, cannot be seen as derivative of race or ethnic phenomena, but needs to be understood with reference to the discourses and practices by which ethnic groups are inferiorized, excluded and subordinated.”

In her later book *Gender and Nation*, Yuval Davis positioned herself beyond the modernist/postmodernist debate. Her point was to mainly criticise identity politics, and to promote what she calls a transversalism, which can be understood as related to an approach of intersectionalism. She pointed out that identities are constructed along many factors, including race, gender, religion etc. and that it is wrong to have essentialist notions about groups. She stressed that cultures are in fact heterogeneous and there are shifting boundaries for the individuals involved.

### 5.1.7 A new antisemitism?

In light of these recent developments within racism studies and how antisemitism research has depended on its concepts, it became more difficult to

---


contain antisemitism in a conceptual framework of racism. However, rather
than rethinking their conceptualisation of antisemitism, some historians and
social theorists have reacted to these developments by dismissing those ele-
ments of antisemitism that do not fit into a postmodern or post-colonial concept
of racialisation. This became particularly evident in debates about a possible
‘resurgence’ of antisemitism in the form of anti-Zionism.

Debates on Zionism and Israel and on antisemitism and its ‘new’ forms in
Britain and elsewhere, in academia as well as in public,72 centred around cur-
rent appearances of anti-Jewish hostility on the Left, among anti-racists and
among Muslims as well as on Holocaust denial with regard to Israel and Zion-
ism. Within these debates it was generally agreed that today’s anti-Zionism
emerged in relation to the Six Day War in the 1960s - early discussion on this
‘new’ antisemitism can in fact be traced back to the 1970s.

Some scholars pointed out that the focus on Israel as the Jewish state was the
novel feature of this ‘new’ antisemitism. In addition, they emphasised that it is
a continuation of older forms of antisemitism and that it united unusual allies
like Leftists, Islamists and the radical right. Very early on, Robert Wistrich
for example pointed out the links between classical and ‘new’ antisemitism,
the acutest manifestations of which he saw among Muslims and the political
Left.

“Both ideologies seek in practice to deprive the Jew of his right to
an equal place in the world; to limit his activity and freedom of
movement; his human civic and political rights, and even his very
right to exist - at least in the more radical formulation.”73

Wistrich saw this threat as mostly emanating from Arab countries, but also

72 For a discussion on ‘new’ antisemitism see for example Iganski, Paul and Barry Kosmin:
73 Wistrich, Robert: Anti-Zionism as an expression of Anti-Semitism in Recent Years, Lecture
held on 10 December 1984 at the Study Circle on World Jewry at the home of the
pointed out that this form of antisemitism in its Soviet version is adopted by Western Europe’s political Left, particularly Trotskyists. He emphasised that “this trend is most striking in Great Britain (...), a country which in the last decade has proved increasingly receptive to the most varied kind of anti-Zionist rhetoric”.74

More recently, Anthony Julius argued that anti-Zionism, the ‘new antisemitism’ in Britain, was a resurgence of older forms of antisemitism but that its novel feature was its appearance on the political Left:

“It first emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s in consequence of the Six Day War, but became hegemonic in the 1990s and 2000s in consequence of certain developments mostly unrelated to the Middle East. It is to be distinguished from the ‘old antisemitism’ because it takes Israel and the Zionist project as its collective term for the Jews, because its geographic hub is Western Europe, because it is adopted by people who profess deep hostility to anti-Semitism, because self-identified Jews are among its advocates, and because it comes from the Left - indeed, has become part of the common sense among people of broadly progressive temper. It is taken to be continuous with the ‘old antisemitism’ in its principal stratagems and tropes, while novel in its specific focus upon the Jewish state.”75

Julius explained this progressive leftist anti-Zionism out of its anti-national cosmopolitan stance as well as its opposition to globalization and ‘neoliberalism’. In his view, the anti-national position opposes unrestrained state sovereignty and endorses international and transnational legal institutions, it values human rights above national security and esteems post-national forms of citizenship identities. He emphasised that the globalization opponents have abandoned the leftist idea of an international proletariat in favour of the transnationalism of the Muslim Umma and are vaguely opposed to anything.76

74Ibid.
76Ibid, pp. 453-454.
According to Julius, both positions are open to antisemitism because they are preoccupied with the ‘fight for Palestine’ but conceive the reality of its subject, Israel and Zionism, in a partial and distorted form. Julius pointed out that this secular form of anti-Zionism is closely connected to contemporary confessional, Muslim, Jewish and Christian, anti-Zionisms.

Even though Julius categorised antisemitism as racism, approaches like those of Wistrich and Julius do not fit well into general trends in British antisemitism research, which are more concerned with processes of racialisation that help to form British national identity. Within this context, there is a tendency to postulate that anti-Zionism, or certain forms of it, cannot be considered antisemitism. British scholar Brian Klug, for example, argued that hostility towards Israel cannot be considered antisemitic, because it does not target Israel as a Jewish state, “but as European interloper or as American client or (...) as oppressor”, which he considered perfectly legitimate.

Categorising anti-Zionism as antisemitism has often been dismissed as analytically flawed. David Cesarani, for example, warned against the conflation of anti-Zionism and antisemitism. Tony Kushner came to the inevitable conclusion that other forms of racism are worse than antisemitism: “State and popular animosity towards such groups has been of far higher level of intensity than that against Jews even with a so-called ‘resurgence’ of antisemitism.” He, too, warned against alarmism: “Jewish fears are certainly not without foundation and any form of intolerance must be opposed by effective pan-European laws and popular protest, but Jewish leaderships and those involved in the study, monitoring and countering of antisemitism have a duty to maintain...
It is interesting to note that at the time, even those who argued that there was antisemitism in Britain beyond a right-wing fringe were extremely cautious to call anti-Zionism antisemitism, or to accept that it could be a danger to the Jewish community. The authors of *A Very Light Sleeper*, noted that “anti-Zionism in its various forms has generally become a much weaker phenomenon”. Conflating anti-Zionism and antisemitism was generally thought to be alarmist. In 1991, *Patterns of Prejudice* published, together with the Institute of Jewish affairs, a special issue on *Antisemitism in the 1990s: A Symposium*, a collection of essays from Jews and non-Jews from around the world on the issue of antisemitism. Anthony Lerman, at the time Editor of *Patterns of Prejudice* and Executive Director of the Institute of Jewish Affairs no less, spoke out against alarmism with regard to antisemitism: “We are witnessing a resurgence of antisemitism - but it is a limited resurgence and does not alter the underlying picture of antisemitism as essentially a marginal phenomenon”. He thought that “it remains marginal for essentially two reasons: first, the extent and degree of counterveiling forces - education, political opposition, Jewish defence and so on; second, the extremely unlikely possibility of antisemitism having a serious operative impact on Jews - in most of the places where antisemitism is resurgent, Jews are very few in number, are free to emigrate or can be evacuated in an emergency.”

What first appears as a paradox makes sense when considering the overall trend at the time towards explaining British Jewish history was one of the various ‘journeys’ into citizenship. In this context, there was thus nothing special about hostility towards Jews. Neither concepts of antisemitism that go beyond localised forms of animosity towards Jews as immigrants in Britain, nor concepts of anti-Zionism as a form of antisemitism fit into a narrative of ‘journeys’ into British citizenship. To make Jews similar to other minorities,

---

82Ibid, p. 38.
83Runnymede Trust: Anti-Semitism: A Very Light Sleeper, p. 49.
hostility towards them can neither be particular, nor extend beyond the Jewish community in Britain.

Opposition to antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism become even more difficult when critical approaches to hostilities towards any minority are equally based on ‘race’. If Jews are a racialised minority and victims of British notions of national identity, it is difficult to oppose those who argue that Palestinians are a racialised minority who are perceived as victims of Jewish notions of national identity. This difficulty also became evident in the report of the All-Party Parliamentary Inquiry into Antisemitism in 2006. The inquiry had been established to investigate whether the belief held by many in the Jewish community that antisemitism was rising, was justified. After gathering a plethora of evidence, the inquiry came to the conclusion that this belief was indeed justified. One aim of the report was to define the term ‘antisemitism’. One the one hand, the report used the definition of racism as expressed in the Macpherson Report of the Stephen Lawrence inquiry, which established that a racist act is defined by its victim. Accordingly, “any remark, insult or act the purpose or effect of which is to violate a Jewish person’s dignity or create an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment for him is antisemitic. This reflects the definition of harassment under the Race Relations Act 1976. This definition can be applied to individuals and to the Jewish community as a whole.”

However, anti-Zionism was one element of antisemitism that, although it made up the majority of evidence, could not be grasped by this definition. The inquiry therefore recommended to add the EUMC working definition of antisemitism, mentioned earlier, which catalogues a number of antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism. The EUMC definition of antisemitism was added because it was clear that it would be difficult to account for antisemitic forms of anti-Zionism within the existing definition of racism in Britain. The problem is that anti-Zionism is a specific element of antisemitism, and therefore not easily accommodated in common understandings of minority-majority relationships in Britain, which universalise minority ex-

In one way or another, ‘race’ is the underlying category of most approaches to antisemitism in Britain. This is also true for those approaches that want to combine an anti-racist struggle with an analysis of antisemitism without defining it away or limiting its scope. In an attempt to do so, Robert Fine proposed a new way of thinking about antisemitism. He criticized the way in which the debate about the ‘new’ antisemitism has polarized those who see antisemitism as a serious threat and those who see antisemitism as confined to history. Instead, he argued, one should accept, based on Hannah Arendt’s social theory, the universal responsibility that resulted out of the Holocaust and antisemitism. This means to address racism in all its forms and appearances and to see the interconnection between antisemitism and other racisms.\(^{86}\)

What Fine suggested, however, is precisely not what characterised most British approaches to antisemitism. Rather, the majority of antisemitism research in Britain became complicit in what David Seymour has called Holocaust dissolution, a concept building on the idea that the “memory of the ‘new Europe’ rests ultimately on dissolving its specifically Jewish dimensions of genocide into an overarching concept of ‘modernity’ – a modernity now transcended, but thought to capture the essence of the ‘old’ Europe.”\(^{87}\)

The dissolution of the Holocaust David Seymour talks about has had significant repercussions for any conceptualisations of both racism and antisemitism. It not only meant that the Holocaust has lost its significance and particularity, but, paradoxically, that it no longer figures as an analytical tool in concepts of antisemitism. As a consequence, neither racism nor antisemitism are interpreted through the Holocaust, but through a universal history of racism in


which the Holocaust was just one episode. This form of Holocaust dissolution can also be detected in the study of antisemitism, and it becomes particularly evident when antisemitism is compared with ‘Islamophobia’ or when it is argued that ‘Islamophobia’ has replaced antisemitism.

5.1.8 The emergence of ‘Islamophobia’

Since the late 1980s the issue of Islam in Britain has played a significant role in public discourse and the situation of Muslims became a topic of research. Although there is not nearly as much research on this topic than on the topic of antisemitism, several studies have for example dealt with Muslim recognition and participation in particular.

The increased public attention to Muslims and Islam and the discrimination against them in recent times has warranted anti-racist organisations to focus on campaigning against Islamophobia in particular. However, because the conceptualisation of a particular anti-Muslim hostility, as opposed to for example anti-‘Black’ racism, is relatively young, it remains an open discussion how to actually grasp and define Islamophobia. Research on Islamophobia is still in its early stages. However, an increase in hostility against Muslims caused the Commission for Racial Equality to look into cases of religious discrimination already in the early 1990s as well as the establishment of a Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia by the Runnymede Trust in 1996, which published the report Islamophobia: a challenge for us all in 1997, calling for serious anti-discrimination measures and a betterment of the social status of Muslims in Britain.

The Report defined Islamophobia through eight open and closed views of Islam. Distinctions were made between whether Islam is seen as monolithic or diverse, whether it is seen as separate or interacting, whether as inferior or different, whether as an enemy or a partner, whether as manipulative or

---

5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

sincere, whether criticism made by Islam of the ‘West’ was rejected or considered, whether discrimination against Muslims was defended or criticised and whether Islamophobia is seen as natural or problematic. According to this definition, Islamophobia occurs when Islam is seen as a monolithic bloc, as separate from other cultures, as inferior to the West, as barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist, violent, aggressive, threatening, supportive of terrorism and engaged in a clash of civilisations.\textsuperscript{89} According to the Report, Islamophobia manifests in social exclusion, discrimination, violence and prejudice and the media plays an important role in disseminating negative images about Islam.\textsuperscript{90} The Runnymede Trust Report can be considered the most influential work on Islamophobia to date. There is hardly a study that does not build on its definition of ‘Islamophobia’.

Robert Miles and Michael Brown additionally stressed that Islamophobia can be “defined primarily as a hostility towards Islam, rather than Muslims, though it must manifest itself (secondarily) as hostility towards Muslims. When the hatred of the theology is not present, we are more likely to be seeing an anti-immigrant sentiment, racism or xenophobia”.\textsuperscript{91} Miles’ and Brown’s addition to defining Islamophobia illustrated that there is a variety of hostilities that can affect Muslims.

Concurring with the Report, Steven Vertovec for example emphasised that in the 1990s “there has been a noticeable increase in derogatory images of Islam, patterns of anti-Muslim discrimination in employment, institutional intolerance of Muslim values, and occasional acts of physical violence against Muslims in Britain”.\textsuperscript{92}

In his more recent account on Muslims in Britain before and after 11 September 2001, Tahir Abbas similarly used the Runnymede definition to point out the dangers of the media bias against Muslims since that day.\textsuperscript{93} It was also the

\textsuperscript{90}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{92}Vertovec, Islamophobia and Muslim Recognition in Britain, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{93}See Abbas, Tahir: British South Asian Muslims: before and after September 11, in:
    Abbas, Tahir (ed.): Muslim Britain, Communities under Pressure, London: Zed Books
basis for Chris Allen’s investigation into new forms of discrimination, in which he came to the conclusion that “the anti-Muslim discourse prevails to the extent that society is becoming increasingly receptive to such ideas”. Allen suggested that this new form of discrimination calls for protection against religious discrimination next to protection against racial discrimination, which had been established in Britain with the Race Relations Acts since 1976.

These contributions are also part of a highly politicized debate about Muslims in Britain and the discrimination against them. One concern regarding the relationship between British Muslims and the British public has been the attitude of Muslims to violence and terrorism, which was perceived to be apologetic if not supportive of Islamist terrorist acts. The Gallup Co-Exist survey 2009 points out that 37 per cent of British Muslims find it morally justified to use violence for a noble cause. A ‘noble cause’ is not further defined. Other findings in fact suggest that Muslims have a variety of views on whether and how acts of violence can be justified within Islam. Views regarding suicide bombings for example are complex and variable.

The often derogatory representation of Muslims in British media does not reflect the reality of Muslims living in Britain. The character of Muslim communities in Britain and the range of interpretations of Islam are very differentiated. Muslims have responded in various ways to life in Britain. There have been tendencies of rejection of participation in British culture, but also secularisation and integration efforts. Although there is a movement towards Islamic homogeneity that seeks to re-establish a global collective Muslim identity as an answer to what is perceived as ‘Western dominance’, this movement

---

237
is in itself diversified and challenged. In sum, there is in fact not a neatly identifiable British Muslim identity, “but a range of identities co-existing within Britain’s Muslim communities”. 98

In this context, it is far from agreed upon what constitutes ‘Islamophobia’ or how anti-Muslim resentments should be defined and understood. Fred Halliday for example criticised the Runnymede approach. He argued that the term ‘Islamophobia’ is misleading because it is not ‘Islam’ as a religion or a culture that is being attacked, but Muslims as a people. He stressed that it is wrong to assume that religion was the core of the conflict, but that there may be more contingent and contemporary forces at work. 99 He further emphasised that today, not Islam as a faith but Muslims as a people, especially as immigrants, are considered to be the enemy, which calls for using the more accurate term ‘anti-Muslimism’ instead of ‘Islamophobia’ when referring to contemporary hatred of Muslims.

Halliday rightly stressed that it is important to acknowledge that hostility towards Muslims throughout history as well as today can have a a variety of causes and is not necessarily rooted in the hostility towards their religion, but perhaps also or instead towards their national and ethnic origins. However, contemporary hostility to Islam does not only appear as hostility to Muslims as ‘a people’ or as individuals, but the values and traditions of what is perceived as Islam are considered a threat to European and ‘Western’ national values as well. The perceived enemy may therefore be Islam as a faith and a culture as well as Muslims as a people (as immigrants and bearer of this ‘enemy’ faith), which makes anti-Muslim hostility very difficult to grasp and define. Neither ‘anti-Muslimism’ nor existing categories like ‘racism’ or ‘xenophobia’ would grasp all the dimensions that are possibly included in anti-Muslim hostility. A case could therefore be made for using the term ‘Islamophobia’, but existing definitions include the danger of political instrumentalisation.

But Halliday criticised the term ‘Islamophobia’ for reproducing the distort-

98 Ansari: The Infidel Within, p. 394.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

tion that there is one Islam and for obscuring the reality of diversity between and within Muslim communities.\textsuperscript{100} He pointed out that the term can easily be used to classify critics of Islamic traditions on human rights grounds as well as Muslims challenging conservative readings of Islamic texts as Islamophobes. Regarding the Runnymede report in particular he argued that “the danger in these reports is that they are defined, if not monopolised, by representatives of religious bodies, and of community organisations”, which may silence any critical examination.\textsuperscript{101} Like Halliday, other critics dismissed the validity of the term ‘Islamophobia’, questioned the subject it intended to describe and argued that it is merely used for illegitimate political reasons. These critics claimed that the existing broad definition of Islamophobia was used to silence any valid critique of Islam\textsuperscript{102} for example the critique of oppression of women in Islam.\textsuperscript{103}

This danger was in fact inherent in many broadly applied definitions, like the one by FAIR, The Forum against Islamophobia and Racism, a London-based organisation established in 2001. FAIR defines ‘Islamophobia as “fear, hatred, or hostility directed towards Islam or Muslims”.\textsuperscript{104} This definition remains very general and could easily be instrumentalised for political ends, because ‘fear, hatred, or hostility’ lacks a further definition and objectivity and can include criticism as well as exaggerated fear and hatred.

As the FAIR definition shows, however, and despite Halliday’s critique, the Runnymede Definition was overwhelmingly accepted by scholars and is still used today. Most recently, Chris Allen has applied it in is book Islamophobia. He acknowledged that the concept is contested and suggested a new definition of ‘Islamophobia’, but based on the theoretical content of the Runnymede definition. He argued that there are three different components of Islamophobia,

\textsuperscript{100}Ibid, p 898.
\textsuperscript{101}Ibid, p. 899.
\textsuperscript{104}See the definition of ‘Islamophobia on FAIR’s Website [online], Available from: http://www.fairuk.org [Accessed on 5 March 2010].
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

namely that is is an ideology, that there are ‘modes of operation’ in which this ideology is sustained and that there are exclusionary practices. He thus concluded that

“Islamophobia is an ideology, similar (...) to racism (...), that sustains and perpetuates negatively evaluated meaning about Muslims and Islam in the contemporary setting in similar ways to that which it has historically, although not necessarily as a continuum, subsequently pertaining, influencing and impacting on social action, (...), shaping and determining understanding, perceptions and attitudes in the social consensus (...) that inform and construct thinking about Muslims and Islam as Other.”

Allen added, however, that exclusionary practices are only ‘Islamophobia’ if there is an acknowledged ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ element present. Allen’s definition remained very close to the Runnymede definition, although he made it more usable by adding particular islamophobic exclusionary practices. Interestingly, however, he emphasised that ‘Islamophobia’ is only similar to racism and not the same phenomenon. Other theoretical approaches, on the other hand, have tried to conceptualise anti-Muslim resentments as racism.

Pnina Werbner’s theoretical approach to the issue is one example, and her approach also showcased the idea that current racism against Muslims has replaced earlier forms of racism. Werbner analysed anti-Muslim resentments, and other racisms for that matter, with regard to modern and postmodern nationalism in which an ‘Other’ (‘folk devils’) is constructed as a threat to the purity and order of the nation. She acknowledged that there have been various forms of racism, but argued that ‘Islamophobia’ is the racism of the postmodern age. This is because

“The tension within the nation-state between individual citizenship rights and the reproductions of the nation as a unified moral community requires that cultural pluralism within the nation-state be

Allen, Chris: Islamophobia, p. 188 f.
Ibid, p. 190.
grounded in shared ethical convictions about the validity of cultural difference. The globalized images of the Muslim religious fanatic seem to deny the possibility of such ethical commonalities.”

Werbner therefore traced anti-Muslim resentments in the contemporary function they have for the construction of national identity. Although it may be questionable whether ‘Islamophobia’ is indeed the most important racism of today, her approach took into account the context of national identity formation and racism. Her theoretical approach intended to be inclusive of different forms of racialisation, apart from those related to colonialism. However, her approach not only equated ‘Islamophobia’ with other forms of racism, like antisemitism, it also relegated antisemitism exclusively to the past. This idea of a past antisemitism that has been replaced by newer forms of racism, especially Islamophobia, also became apparent in the concept of ‘cultural racism’.

5.1.9 The ‘new’ racism and comparisons with antisemitism

As Werbner’s approach touched upon, what became a significant analytical category for racism theories was culture. This approach was particularly fitting to describe both antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments. As discussed earlier, the changes in British public discourse and policy in the 1980s prompted novel theoretical approaches to analyse racism in Britain, some of which also incorporated theorisations of anti-Muslim resentments. Authors saw a ‘new racism’ that used notions of culture and nation instead of pseudo-biological traits to differentiate groups and construct a sense of Britishness.

In his analysis of racism, Etienne Balibar explained that contemporary racism did not necessarily rely on ‘biological’ signifiers to mark out the Other any more. Instead, he observed the establishment of a ‘racism without races’. There was, as it were, a racism “whose dominant theme is not biological heredity but the insurmountability of cultural differences, a racism which, at first sight, does not postulate the superiority of certain groups or peoples in relation

---

5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

to others but ‘only’ the harmfulness of abolishing frontiers, the incompatibility of life-styles and traditions”.\(^{108}\) Within the racism Balibar described, culture is racialised. ‘Cultures’ are seen as homogenised, monolithic entities. Other ‘cultures’ are not necessarily seen as negative, but believed to be inherently different. Balibar argued that this belief has effects similar to biological racism. The behaviour of people and what is believed to be their ‘character’ is not explained in terms of biology, but in terms of their belonging to historical ‘cultures’. He showed that seemingly progressive anti-racists were in fact culturally racist because they argue that a ‘mixing of cultures’ would result in the death of their tradition and identity.\(^{109}\) In other words, “culture can also function like a nature”.\(^{110}\)

This analysis of ‘cultural racism’ had a profound influence on later comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment. Although Balibar for example described this form of racism to be a relatively recent development, he also pointed out that there has always existed a racism that does not rely on the pseudo-biological concept of race and that its prototype is antisemitism.\(^{111}\) In fact, he said that “anti-Semitism is supremely ‘differentialist’ and in many respects the whole of current differentialist racism may be considered, from the formal point of view, as a generalized anti-Semitism”.\(^{112}\) He further argued that this perspective is particularly useful when interpreting contemporary anti-Muslim resentments.

Balibar’s argument for the comparability of antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments was further elaborated on in a more recent paper by Nasar Meer and Teseln Noorani. They argued that there are “important analogies in the racial content of anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment”. They categorised both antisemitism and Islamophobia as forms of cultural racism. In


\(^{109}\)See ibid, p. 22.

\(^{110}\)Ibid.

\(^{111}\)Ibid p.23.

\(^{112}\)Ibid, p. 24.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

this prevalent form of contemporary racism “cultural difference functions like nature”. They argued that because there has been a strong focus on cultural difference besides alleged biological difference in pre-Second World War antisemitism, it can be understood as cultural racism’s prototype. Thus, there are “forms of pathologising” earlier Jewish minorities and present Muslim minorities that are “constituted through a cultural racism”. The main point of comparison, they argued, is “the way in which British Jews were associated with anarchism and Bolshevism”, for which an analogy operates for “fundamentalist Muslims/Islamic Terrorists”. What Meer and Noorani did here was to utilise Anglo-Jewish history to point out similarities between what they consider racism against Jews and Muslims.

A very similar approach was that of Thomas Linehan. When examining to what extent discourses on immigration in contemporary Britain resemble antisemitic discourses in Britain during and between the two World Wars, Linehan came to the conclusion that “Asian Muslims, like earlier with Britain’s Jews, are being cast as the ultimate alien ‘Others’, outsiders or ‘strangers’ who seem always to be operating beyond the frame of mainstream society and its norms and conventions.”

Linehan’s concept of antisemitism was such that he saw important analogies to Islamophobia. Building on an analysis of ‘cultural racism’, Linehan differentiated between conspirational, cultural, religious and economic antisemitism that emanated from far-right groups in Britain during and between the World Wars. With the exception of its economic element, he concluded that past antisemitism was parallel to contemporary Islamphobia. He stressed that conspirational Islamophobia “has its roots, as did Jewish conspiracy theories during the Great War and the post-Bolshevik Revolution years, in wider geopolitical


tensions and associated fears concerning national security.”

He also explained the fear of “gradual Islamisation’ in reference to earlier forms of antisemitism:

“There are parallels between this perception of an expansionist Islamic project and the earlier myth of the Jewish bid for world power. Both phobias tend to greatly inflate the perceived threat, magnify the power of the protagonist, whether the ‘internal enemy’ was the Islamist jihadist of the Jewish Bolshevik, Anarchist, or Financier, and construct all members of the ‘settler’ community as real or potential antagonists who post a threat to safety, cohesion, and values of the ‘host’ society.”

As this quote shows, Linehan, just as Meer and Noorani, developed concepts of racism within a framework of immigration and settlement of minority groups in contemporary Britain. They saw antisemitism as firmly remaining in the past, because in their mind, new minority groups, mainly Muslims, have taken the place of Jews. Antisemitism was subsequently interpreted through the lens of contemporary hostility against Muslims. This pattern of conceptualising antisemitism also became evident in comparisons between antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ that were drawn within a framework of theories of ‘Orientalism’, which are related to concepts of cultural racism and discourses of the ‘Other’.

5.1.10 Orientalism

One theoretical approach that is particularly fitting to describe hostility against Muslims is situated in post-colonial studies, which have uniquely shaped and influenced the study and theorisation of ‘Islamophobia’. This is mainly due to one of the main theoretical works of post-colonialism, the book Orientalism by Edward Said, which dealt with the Western colonialist construction of the ‘Orient’ and ‘Orientals’. Said pointed out that he does not see an imperialist plot to hold down the ‘Oriental’, but that there is a colonial discourse,
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

a ‘geopolitical awareness’ represented in aesthetic, scholarly economic, sociological, historical and philological texts. This representation is intended to “control, manipulate, even to incorporate what is a manifestly different (...) world”.\textsuperscript{117}

Edward Said argued that British scholarly as well as artistic discourse from the eighteenth century on has constructed an ‘Orient’, that entailed parts of Arabia and Asia but which did not exist in reality, for the means of legitimising imperial hegemony. He argued that this ‘Orientalism’ essentialised people from the ‘Orient’ and established a superiority of Britons and Britain over other people and other parts of the world and has shaped British responses to Islam ever since.\textsuperscript{118} Although Said made an important contribution to the study of discourse formation regarding Islam in Britain - perhaps less so elsewhere - his findings have to be treated carefully. Robert Irwin, for example, pointed out that it cannot be easily concluded that British scholarly attention towards Islam or the Arab World was consistently negative and argues that it was in fact more varied and rich than Said admits. He brought forward numerous examples of scholars who studied Islam with ‘a lust of knowing’ rather than a condescending intent - or discursive effect - and took into account the important contribution that German scholars made towards British ‘Orientalism’, which was almost completely neglected by Said. He concluded that “if there was a connection between nineteenth century imperialism and Orientalism, it was chiefly this - that imperial servants, lonely and bored in remote outposts, took up the study of exotic languages and histories as their hobby”.\textsuperscript{119} Although this might be polemically exaggerated, it needs to be acknowledged that British responses to Islam since the seventeenth century, as Linda Colley points out, were never static or uniform. “They changed in tandem with shifts in the intellectual scene, and in the power and reputation of the great Islamic empires.” They also changed “in accordance with the estimates made


The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

by Britons of their own state and of its potential.”¹²⁰ These aspects have to be taken into account when looking at the reality of a Muslim presence in Europe and when debating the dimensions of British ‘Islamophobia’.

On the other hand, Said rightly detected that there was an inherent racism in the way British colonialists viewed Muslims. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Britons generally viewed Muslims - not necessarily as Muslims but as members of their ethnicity or ‘race’- as ‘subject people’. There was a widespread hostility, which became especially apparent in the way Muslims were used and treated as servants. Muslims, on the other hand, did not necessarily see themselves that way and did not always meekly endure their fate as slaves. Any social interaction between Britons and Muslims, however, was characterised by this imposed hierarchy. But there were also examples of British slave owners who were fascinated and impressed by their servant’s religious devotion and even granted them freedom. In addition, despite the subordinated social status of Muslims in Britain, some Indian Muslim travellers who did not see themselves or their civilisation as inferior were in fact highly welcomed by British elite circles.¹²¹ Also, “there was much less of the condescension and patronising arrogance that characterised contact between the colonisers and the colonised from the middle of the nineteenth century”.¹²² Although interracial sexual relations and mixed marriages were disapproved of, they were not uncommon. Yet there was still popular prejudice related to British dominance and perceptions of Christian superiority. As Ansari indicated, this has to be seen in the context of a development of pseudo-scientific race theories in Britain, which greatly affected Muslims as ‘blacks’.¹²³

In this context it is thus not surprising that the basic premises of Said’s theory became highly influential for studies assessing anti-Arab or anti-Muslim discourses. Said argued that the discourse of the ‘Orient’, which is depicted as backward and wild, is used to construct a European self by establishing

¹²¹See Ansari: The Infidel Within, pp. 53-56.
¹²²Ibid, p. 57.
a binary of ‘Orient’ and ‘Occident’. He described this colonial pattern of representation as ‘Orientalism’ and emphasised that in the latest phase of ‘Orientalism’, which began after the Second World War, the Arab Muslim is seen as the ‘Oriental’, especially in US media, where Arabs are constructed as menacing and evil.\textsuperscript{124} Said repeated this argument in more detail in his later book \textit{Covering Islam}, in which he investigated contemporary Western perceptions of the Islamic world.\textsuperscript{125} Ziauddin Sardar developed this concept further in his book \textit{Orientalism}, in which he argued that the West constructs an Orient on which to project its fears.\textsuperscript{126} This argument has often been related to a critique of what is called \textit{Eurocentrism}, a view of the world that centres around Europe or the West and that automatically marginalised other views of the world.

The idea of an ‘Orientalist’ discourse built the basis for studies on anti-Muslim resentments and stereotyped representations in Britain. Elizabeth Poole used Said’s theory to analyse recent representations of Islam in British media. She understood these representations in the context of constructions of an ‘Other’ to ‘the West’. She argued that

“Political Islam, which has emerged out of different experiences of colonialism and oppression, its initial signifier being the Iranian Revolution (1979), has allowed ‘the West’ to construct Islam as the new enemy (a global force that represents an ideological and physical threat) based on an historically polarized relationship. This has been necessary for ‘the West’ in order to reassert its power over an economically rich area and, in doing so, to defend its supreme Western identity. Consequently, the media as an instrument of public ideology demonizes Islam, portraying it as a threat to Western interests, thus reproducing, producing and sustaining the ideology

\textsuperscript{124}Ibid, chapter 3, part 4.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

necessary to subjugate Muslims both internationally and domesti-
cally."\(^{127}\)

Orientalism is an analytical category in a number of studies on representations of Muslims in British media.\(^{128}\) In John E. Richardson’s study on election reporting of Muslims in British newspapers, which was part of a wider research project conducted for the Commission of Racial Equality, the author argued that Muslims in Britain are represented as a single and essentialised Muslim community that is the most significant threat to European civilisation. According to the author, this was due to the West’s Orientalism: “The con-
struction of a single Orient is one of the more significant accomplishments of Orientalist representations.”\(^{129}\) As a consequence, Muslims as a “social group become viewed as being so different that they threaten social stability”.\(^{130}\)

Representations of Muslims in Britain and the discrimination against them is then understood as both a result out of colonialism as well as a form of continued colonialism that requires to subjugate the ‘Orient’ and Muslims in reality as well as in discourse. There is in fact no theorisation of ‘Islamophobia’ that does not in some way relate to Said’s theory of ‘Orientalism’. The major flaw in this line of thought is of course that anti-Muslim resentments are not wholly explicable through the way in which Muslims are represented in discourse, but the context has to be taken into account. Perceptions and representations of Muslims are not completely detached from factual develop-


\(^{130}\)Ibid, p. 146.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

ments. But what is more important is that the study of ‘Orientalism’, and in relation to that, the concept of the ‘Other’, have shaped conceptualisations of antisemitism as well.

5.1.11 The Orientalised Jew

The concept of Orientalism was developed in the particular context of post-colonialism. It was an attempt to explain how colonial power structures were established and have been perpetuated into the present day. At first sight, Orientalism does not easily incorporate concepts of antisemitism. As discussed earlier, Jewish immigrants to Britain have not been colonised. Quite the opposite, they have been seen as colonisers themselves. Antisemitism researchers have therefore tried to promote concepts of racism that are independent from colonialism and include racialisation of Jews and other minorities without a colonial experience. However, these concepts of antisemitism still built on concepts of racism that were developed in the context of colonial immigration to Britain. As this chapter has shown, the understanding of antisemitism has therefore been derived from developments in the understanding of racism. The same pattern is in fact evident with the concept of Orientalism. Newer approaches to antisemitism argue that the Jewish “Other” is the orientalised Jew. Orientalisation thus includes Muslims and Jews.

This was for example the premise in Didi Herman’s book on Jews and Jewishness in English law. As a starting point of her research Hermann argued - in line with for example Tony Kushner - that Jews are generally not considered in racism theories: “we have a very partial picture of racialization processes in England, and there is an erasure of peoples who do not conform to phenotypical or twentieth-century postcolonial paradigms.” She then suggested that Orientalism might in fact be a useful category when analysing processes of racialization that have affected Jews: “orientalism provides a useful shorthand to signify a range of judicial practices towards Jews and Jewishness. These

include particular ways of characterizing people and practices that have come from ‘the east’, along with recurring restatements of what is ‘English’.

Herman’s methodology was explicitly drawn from Said’s concept of *Orientalism*, “where he argued for work that highlighted processes of representation”.

Herman stressed that she is “less interested in identifying ‘antisemitism’, and more interested in exploring racialized understandings”.

In line with previous antisemitism scholars, who based their understanding on concepts of racism, and who questioned the validity of the term ‘antisemitism’, Herman, too, rejected the term. She drew from David Feldman, who had said that antisemitism “has a tendency to reduce the historical question to one of whether an individual was for or against the Jews”.

As this is not her intention, Herman stressed that she did not want to catalogue instances of racism, but rather analyse racial discourse: she rejected Anthony Julius’ interpretation of antisemitism as hatred or malice, as her point is to show that there is an ‘ambivalence’ in English culture towards Jews.

But Herman’s approach was not entirely new. On the one hand, it built on approaches in gender studies that seek to understand representations of minority women.

On the other hand, it drew from works on the persecution of minorities in medieval Europe. R.I. Moore for example showed that the treatment of minority groups, including Jews, but also lepers, in medieval Europe cannot be explained independently, but was part of a ‘pattern of persecution’ that did not discriminate between victims. A similar conclusion was drawn by Ivan Kalmar and Derek Penslar, who argued that both Jews and Muslims were the Oriental ‘Other’ to the Christian West.

When analysing compar-

---

132 Ibid.
134 Ibid.
135 Cited in ibid, p. 25.
136 Ibid.
139 See the introduction in Kalmar, Ivan Davidson and Penslar, Derek J (eds.): Orientalism
isons between antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’, this approach to antisemitism is particularly relevant as it proposes that there is a long history of a parallel exclusion of Jews and Muslims from European society.

This is also what Didi Herman suggested in her above mentioned study. As commented on in the previous chapter, Herman showed that there were orientalising and racialising processes with regard to the representation of Jews in English legal history. She concluded that her critique of legal texts showed that “current attempts to analyse Islamophobia in England would greatly benefit from some historical knowledge of how Jews and Jewishness have been understood”.

Her findings led her to the conclusion that there is a strong Christian normativity within the British legal system, which has in fact affected both Jews and Muslims: “it must be possible to name the asymmetric power Christianity in various forms has in the world today and has had ever since its early form fused with imperial state power in the Roman and Byzantine empires. This is a power that has had material effects through, among other things: a long European history of anti-Jewish and anti-Islamic thinking and practice; in past colonial projects of domination, and in current ones that justify the post 9-11 ‘war on terror’ on the grounds that Christian civilization (and democracy) - associated with the Western values of North America and Europe - are under threat.”

Herman’s approach saw Jews and Muslims both as the ‘Oriental Other’ to British or Western identity. This was also Maleiha Malik’s interpretation of a recent debate about the ban of the full face-veil in Britain. Malik argued that “today’s debates about, and treatment of Muslim women are akin to the way heretics, lepers and Jews were talked about in medieval Europe”. She

---


Ibid, pp. 18-19.

5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

stresses that in medieval Europe, there was a legal shift towards persecution of those groups that were considered incompatible with ‘emerging definitions of what it meant to be European’. There are parallels with Muslims today: “Post 9-11 and 7-7 discussion of Muslims have generated an anti-Islam ideology that has now been adopted by the far right throughout Europe.”

Malik and Herman represent the latest development in antisemitism scholarship: to use the concepts of ‘Orientalism’ and ‘Christian normativity’ to analyse representations of Jews and Muslims in British discourse. Their argument is that being the ‘Other’ to this Christian and orientalising discourse is what Jews and Muslims, and possibly other minority groups, have in common. Both Maleiha Malik and Didi Herman see themselves as part of critical Jewish or ethnic minority studies. However, their concepts remain within categories that are very specific to British history. The exact thing that they want to criticise, the creation of ‘Englishness’, is the very thing they cannot escape. Their concepts remain in line with a consensus on what constitutes antisemitism and what constitutes racism in a multicultural framework. In this context, both Jews and Muslims are seen as minorities opposed to majority society. Scholarship on antisemitism and racism seems to have naturally gravitated towards confirming this basic assumption of multiculturalism, rather than questioning it.

These comparisons are not, like in Germany, part of a discourse of normalisation that seeks to normalise the German past, but they function as part of discourse of negotiation of the place of minorities in British society. Thus, even though these comparisons may intend to be critical, they nevertheless oversimplify concepts of antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments.

This chapter shows that the comparisons between antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ have developed very differently in Britain and Germany. Nevertheless, they both perpetuate particular notions of national identity. In a sense, this specific interpretation of minority persecution in history is related to interpretations of contemporary minority-majority relationships in Britain. Within multiculturalism, all minorities are, or at least can be, equally affected by pro-
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism
cesses of racialisation. The most important conclusion of these texts is that
there is nothing specific about the persecution of Jews, on the contrary, Jews
and other minorities are similarly affected by Christian normativity, or exclu-
sive notions of national identity. These approaches can therefore be located
within a framework of a particular understanding of racism as a discursive
practice that resulted out of the British colonial historic context.

What is most striking about this theory about antisemitism is that it makes
only casual references to the Holocaust, if at all. It does not acknowledge
a history of antisemitism in particular. In that sense it is a truly multicultu-
ral approach by equating different minorities. More importantly, however,
it considers the West’s relationship with parts of the world that have been
constructed as the ‘Orient’ as the most fundamental category in theorising
racism. As this chapter has shown, this is also due to the changing notions of
citizenship and religion that developed in the process of a Muslim struggle for
recognition. The inherent danger in this approach is a differentiation between
those Jews who can be considered ‘Oriental’, and become victims of racist
discourse, and those who themselves are perceived as ‘Orientalist’, and thus
as producing racist discourse. This becomes even more evident in compari-
son with approaches to antisemitism, racism, and anti-Muslim resentments in
Germany, which have taken a different path, but produced very similar results.

5.2 Germany: Conceptualising Antisemitism in
the context of a new found national
self-understanding

Just as in Britain, in Germany, too, there were universalising tendencies with
regard to the understanding of antisemitism and racism. However, in the Ger-
man context, it has to be taken into account that the Nazi past remained
central for the formation of German identity. What this chapter shows is
that from the 1990s, new forms of Holocaust remembrance realised the ear-
lier desire of the German public to become ‘normal’, and the Nazi past was
positively integrated into a new German identity. What I argue is that antisemitism research became part of this normalisation process as well. Building on what was discussed in the last chapter, I show how in the context of new understandings of German citizenship in a multicultural reality, antisemitism theories increasingly moved away from a concept of any particularity of antisemitism and towards abstract theories of prejudice, which neglected to take into account actual experiences of Jews or other minorities.

5.2.1 Right-wing extremism and theories of deprivation

While the last chapter described how racism research had been largely marginalised until the end of the 1980s, the wave of right-wing violence that shook the newly united Germany in 1991, the arson attacks on the homes of asylum seekers in the former East German towns of Hoyerswerda and Rostock, prompted research on both the radical right as well as on general racism in the context of united Germany. The focus of this research was to understand the character of the racist attacks and the ideology behind it as well as to explain the attraction of right-wing ideas for young men from the former East Germany. Initially, these studies downplayed any connections between radical right-wing attitudes and attitudes in mainstream society.

In several studies on the subject, Christoph Butterwegge convincingly showed that the contemporary racism of the radical right in Germany ran along ‘völkisch’-nationalist lines. However, he also emphasised that the manifestation of radical right-wing violence at the beginning of the 1990s was related to the social situation in Germany. He pointed out that the poverty that had spread after the recession in Germany in the early 1980s led to a decrease in solidarity and welfare and and increase of egoism, deregulation, consumerism and conformity, which was, in his view, a breeding ground for right-wing populism. Butterwegge’s approach to understand racism therefore relied on a

---


144 Ibid, p. 185.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

theory of economic deprivation, which saw economically deprived young males as vulnerable to right-wing recruitment.

A similar but more multi-levelled theoretical approach to the issue was displayed in Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s early study on right-wing violence among young men. This study, too, was generally based on a theory of deprivation. However, he took into account that economic deprivation does not necessarily lead young men to become right-wing activists, but that particular factors in an individual’s socialisation process benefit the attraction to right-wing ideology, only one of which is economic deprivation. On a wider social level, Heitmeyer agreed with Butterwegge that there are increasing individualisation tendencies and decreasing solidarity in conjunction with increasing instability and social inequality.145 However, whether an individual actually becomes radical was also dependant on the milieu structure they lived in as well as on individual psychology.146 Contrary to Butterwegge, Heitmeyer emphasised that it is wrong to assume that the right-wing extremism of the united Germany is related to earlier right-wing ideologies.147

Although outbursts of racial prejudice and violence prompted research on the issue, there was in fact no systematic investigation or theorisation of hostility against non-German and non-Jewish minorities in wider German society. Studies focused primarily on right-wing extremism and scholars who pointed out the relation between right-wing ideologies and mainstream racism remained rare and relatively isolated. But theoretical and empirical approaches to racist outbursts in re-united Germany soon took into account the attitudes of German society as a whole, rather than focusing on the right-wing movement in particular. In a more sophisticated theoretical approach, Nora Räthzel thus explained the appearance of racist violence in Germany after 1990 with a quest for German identity. In her study on media depictions of ‘foreigners’ after the violence she observed that ‘foreigners’ were constructed as the Other to the

147 Ibid, p. 25.
newly re-united Germany. Their function was to create an image of a homogenised Germany, a harmony between East and West Germany in their dislike of the ‘alien’. In addition, Margaret Jäger pointed out that after 1990, a reappearance of ideas inspired by völkisch thought could be detected in public discourse. She emphasised that the discourse of the radical right centred around the German nation and German identity.

To a degree, the findings of these discourse-analytical approaches were later recognised in other social research. A later study by Christoph Butterwegge and Alexander Häusler, for example, concurred with this finding. They added that the appearance of ‘völkisch’ ideas can not only be observed in right-wing discourse, but in mainstream discourse as well. They concluded that racism and nationalism were characteristic for authoritarian developments in German society. Their argument was based on the observation that throughout the 1990s, national identity became a topic of significant public interest, ‘German values’ and ‘German interests’ were discussed and multiculturalism rejected. They also pointed out that there was at the same time the paradoxical tendency to deny the occurrence of racism in the German political ‘middle’ in conjunction with strong opposition against the radical right. When racism was discussed within mainstream discourse it was portrayed as a marginal phenomenon originating in the radical right.

The studies of right-wing ideology in the context of German identity, overshadowed by racist outbursts, also resonated within antisemitism research. Studies began to focus on mainstream attitudes towards Jews rather than the radical right. In his study *Demokratie und Judenbild* in which he investigated

---

151 Ibid, p. 228.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

anti-Jewish resentments in German political culture, Lars Rensmann acknowledged the numerous and distinct theoretical approaches to antisemitism and incorporated them into his analysis of several antisemitism scandals of the 1990s and early 2000s in Germany. He gave a comprehensive overview over every aspect of contemporary antisemitism in Germany in right-wing extremism as well as mainstream society, and in its different appearances as classical antisemitic conspiracy theories, coded and secondary antisemitism, Holocaust denial and left-wing anti-Zionism by analysing public scandals like the Walser-debate or the Goldhagen-debate and their subsequent discussion in the media. In contrast to Bergmann and Erb, Rensmann did not see an anti-antisemitic consensus in German public. Instead, he argued that the way antisemitism is dealt with is very complex. His findings on the public debates and scandals showed that antisemitism in fact became political again and that these antisemitic eruptions were accompanied by a general turn to the right and to nationalism. However, he also emphasised that antisemitic stereotypes were not confined to the Right - and not to the Left either - but could be found in every social spectrum. He concluded that antisemitism had increased, despite the fact that it was still considered a taboo to voice antisemitism in public. These debates in fact showed that there is a stronger emphasis on questions of national identity. Hostility towards Jews re-appeared on a political level in right-wing extremism, but was also existent in a latent form in mainstream society.\(^{152}\) The debates that Rensmann analysed do not only have to be seen as a reappearance of antisemitism, but have to be understood in the context of changes in German national self-understanding. First and foremost, this meant that the Holocaust took on a different meaning for re-united Germany. One effect of this new meaning of the Holocaust was that it also changed the way contemporary antisemitism was understood.

5.2.2 Remembering the Holocaust: the Goldhagen debate

From the 1990s onwards, Holocaust remembrance in Germany moved from a defense reflex and an unwillingness to deal with the past to positively integrating the Holocaust into the German national narrative. This was accompanied by a process of normalisation of both the Holocaust, as well as antisemitic rhetoric. One major milestone for this was the Goldhagen-debate, about a decade after the Historikerstreit. When Daniel Goldhagen’s book *Hitler’s willing executioners* was published in Germany in 1996, the media reaction to it was overwhelmingly hostile. Many historians criticised Goldhagen for making a very thin scholarly contribution and the publisher for overhyping the book.\textsuperscript{153}

Reviews of the book followed a similar pattern as during the Historikerstreit. Thus, many reviews of Goldhagen’s book displayed what can be described as a guilt-defensive antisemitism, as there was an outright refusal to properly deal with what Goldhagen had actually said in his book.\textsuperscript{154} Instead, reviews were full of hostile-aggressive behaviour, as well as defamations and antisemitic stereotypes. Goldhagen was criticised for accusing Germans of being collectively guilty of the Holocaust, Jews were in turn accused of libel, vengeance, and anti-German racism.

In *Ein Volk von Endl"osern*, Norbert Frei for example criticised Goldhagen for presenting the German people as a nation that wanted the genocide. He pointed out that Goldhagen’s book was a provocation intended to make his career. He accused Goldhagen of not practising proper history by using mainly secondary literature and easily available sources. In order to contrast what he saw as an extreme Sonderweg argument that Goldhagen made in his book,


which branded German society as a whole as antisemitic, Frei pointed out that there were in fact Germans who were sympathetic with Jews and showed that they cared, but were also afraid of being denounced for doing so.\textsuperscript{155}

In an article in the FAZ, Frank Schirrmacher concluded that

“Goldhagen’s book has little to do with scholarship and with demonstrability. It is a curious countermanifesto against the civilizing efforts to which the Germans have subjected themselves since 1945, and in its attitude and language it recalls the many psychological reports that the Allies had drawn up all over the country from March 1945 until the summer of 1947. It gives rise to that kind of inconsequential self-accusation that is really nothing other than a comprehensive form of self-appeasement.” \textsuperscript{156}

Publicist Rudolf Augstein, in \textit{Der Soziologe als Scharfrichter}, also valued the book’s academic contribution as zero. He argued that the police men Goldhagen portrayed in his book do not in fact represent German society - which Goldhagen claimed they did - but that they were very simple men, because the braver and smarter ones were able to escape killing duties. Still, even those who murdered felt that they had no choice. Moreover, however, Augstein pointed out that only Jewish columnists - and certainly not historians - had lauded the book. He found the accusation that there was an ‘eliminationist’ character in German antisemitism for at least 150 years prior to Hitler ‘at best ignorant, if not downright mean-spirited.’\textsuperscript{157}

A curious bias became evident in Augstein’s and other reviews. German critics questioned Goldhagen’s ability to be objective, as he was the son of a survivor. Omer Bartov rightly pointed out that this was a uniquely German viewpoint:

“while in the United States Goldhagen’s family history was seen as a validation of his work, and as adding moral authority to his text,

5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

in Germany curious assumption was made that Germans could somehow maintain greater ‘scientific’ detachment from the horrors of the Holocaust than Jews, who, unlike their German counterparts, would never be liberated from their ‘understandable’ mystifying predilections and emotional involvement.”

In line with this bias, Historian Eberhard Jäckel called Goldhagen’s book ‘a failure of a dissertation’, ‘faultily researched’ and accused Goldhagen of anti-German racism, as the book is ‘a relapse to the most primitive of all stereotypes.’ However, while many reviewers displayed hostility and even antisemitism, other historians argued that while the book may be flawed, it would also be wrong to reject it outright, as it contained several elements worth discussing. This was for example argued by Ulrich Herbert and Hans Ulrich Wehler. The book also received positive reviews from Jewish historians like Julius Schoeps and Micha Brumlik.

Geoff Eley rightly pointed out that the Goldhagen debate was not about the content of the book at all. He admitted that book showed many flaws and that there is not enough evidence to speak of an ‘eliminationist antisemitism’. He also stressed how Goldhagen ignored large parts of Holocaust historiography. However, he came to the conclusion that there was what he called a ‘Goldhagen effect’, which became evident in the controversy around the book, and which was part of a number of debates that started with the Historikerstreit:

“The book’s reception and the remarkable enthusiasm around its publication and the author’s public appearances weren’t ‘about’ the substantive historical and historiographical arguments at all. They were the latest instalment in a long-running public struggle to ground the ethics of democratic citizenship in a country where fascism seemed to have successfully claimed - and disqualified - the

---


national past as a source of inspiration. Goldhagen’s book rega-

1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

lvanized public attentions for a self-critical perspective precisely as the
countervailing pressures mounted for bringing Germany’s struggle
with the Nazi past to some final and reassuring closure.” 161

While the book was vilified by German critics, it was in fact a commercial
success. Omer Bartov argued that this was because it spoke to the third
generation. The book and the rhetoric Goldhagen used to promote his book on
the tour through Germany managed to “distance the younger generation from
the event and its ostensible primary cause, by emphasizing ... that postwar
Germany had gone through a complete metamorphosis and was therefore no
longer plagued by that unique brand of antisemitism that had previously made
it essentially different.” 162

What was striking however, was that not only many historians refused to
deal with Goldhagen’s hypotheses, but that German social research focussed
on the Goldhagen debate rather than his hypotheses. To be sure, the anti-
semitic content of articles published in context of the debate has been widely
analysed. But what Philosopher Jürgen Habermas had said about Goldhagen’s
book and its potential usage did not actually happen. Habermas had publicly
defended Goldhagen during the debate and stressed the validity of his findings.
When the Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik awarded Goldhagen
their Democracy Prize in 1997, Habermas gave a speech in which he criticised
those historians who had rejected the book and thanked Goldhagen for paving
the way for an “ethical-political discourse of collective self-understanding”. He
argued that through Goldhagen’s work it was possible to detect specific tra-
ditions and mentalities that can then be changed and transformed through
political enlightenment.

However, with two notable exceptions, the content of Goldhagen’s study
has not been ‘worked through’ by German sociologists. The debate was rather

161 Eley, Geoff: Ordinary Germans, Nazism, and Judeocide, in: Eley, Geoff (ed.): The ‘Gold-
hagen Effect’, History, Memory, Nazism - Facing the German Past, Ann Arbor: The
seen as yet another scandal in which antisemitic remarks were made, but which were quickly countered by strong anti-antisemitic elements in German society. This interpretation stood in stark contrast to what Lars Rensmann concluded about another debate just two years later. This debate ignited when writer Martin Walser gave a speech on 11. October 1998 after receiving the peace prize of the German book trade. In his speech, Walser criticised German intellectuals for continuing to emphasise Germany’s ‘shame’, which he said was instrumentalised in the name of a ‘negative nationalism’. These ‘smart intellectuals’ were using Auschwitz as a ‘moral cudgel’ to threaten all Germans, who were actually a ‘normal’ nation and society. At the time, his speech was very well received, but after Ignatz Bubis, leader of the Central Council of German Jews, judged it as incitement, an intense and long lasting debate ensued. Most voices in the debate actually agreed with Walser. Bubis’s critique was in most cases judged as oversensitivity, but in many cases Jews in general were accused of instrumentalising Auschwitz to insist on German guilt, sometimes even for financial gains. Lars Rensmann pointed out that there were less critical voices than during other debates. Many newspaper articles in fact insisted on the normality of the German population. He interpreted this as a discourse shift: what was previously taboo to be expressed in public was suddenly not any more, so that there was in a sense a normalisation of antisemitic discourse.  

This normalisation of antisemitic discourse was related to a general process of normalisation of German identity. While the previous chapters touched upon the desire of the German public to become ‘normal’, this chapter shows that the period after unification was a time when it gradually became a reality. This normalisation process has to be seen as part of a larger process of German identity formation. While for a long time, Holocaust remembrance in Germany was characterised by fending off guilt, after the Goldhagen debate, this attitude changed or transformed into a different national narrative: the Second World War and Shoah became the centres of reference for a positive new Germany. This position is closely connected to the perception of Germans as victims of

---

163 Rensmann: Demokratie und Judenbild, p. 372.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

the Second World War.\textsuperscript{164}

Taking into account more recent cultural representations of the Nazi past, for example films like \textit{Downfall} (2004), it became evident that Germans began to increasingly consider themselves and their ancestors as victims of an irrational clique that acted out their brutal plan to dominate Europe. National Socialism, the Second World War and the Shoah thus became a history lesson for the German nation. A lesson that, although it almost destroyed them, left the Germans as an especially refined people behind. In this context, Germans do not have to deny their guilt any more, but can freely admit to being guilty of not resisting a brutal dictatorship. But in addition to this form of redemption, the Holocaust also became a history lesson and provided German society with an increased awareness of necessary resistance against human rights abuses today, especially possible genocides in other countries. This new found identity along with the desire for normality found its concrete form in the Holocaust Memorial in Berlin, which the government decided to build after a long debate and which was unveiled in 2008. The Holocaust Memorial can be interpreted as the end of the ‘Schlussstrich’-Debate. It allowed Holocaust commemoration publicly in the heart of the new Republic. Guilt is no longer denied, but positively integrated into German identity. Then-chancellor Gerhard Schröder said about the memorial that is should be a place where Germans like to go. In this light, the Holocaust Memorial becomes a symbol for a new ‘Schlussstrich’, it made history out of and at the same time reinvented a German identity.

After unification, German reactions to the Nazi past slowly changed. However, Holocaust remembrance remained central for a German self-understanding. As Atina Grossman described this process:

“Certainly in the last twenty years, but in many ways from the very onset, national identity (and political legitimacy) in the Federal Republic was shaped by the confrontation - whether willing or not - with the Holocaust and the persecution of Jews [...] postwar German identity had depended on, and profited by, this appropria-

\textsuperscript{164}See for example Heer, Hannes: \textit{Vom Verschwinden der Taeter}, Berlin 2006 (2nd ed.).
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

tion of the experience of their Jewish victims. Remembrance of the Holocaust has become an integral part of West German national identity.”

However, what this significance of the Holocaust to German identity also entailed was that it did not relate to actual Jews living in Germany. This had detrimental effects on German-Jewish relations. It is important to understand that all the debates discussed above functioned as a way of negotiating German identity, rather than Jewish identity in Germany. Actual Jews living in Germany rarely figured in these debates, let alone contributed to them, but these debates related to Jews only as an abstraction. Jews were in that sense a vehicle to negotiate German identity. If anything, Jews are even more absent in German public discourse than before. Atina Grossman argued that there was a new obsession with Täter (perpetrator) rather than Opfer (victims) but that this attention “complemented, if it did not displace, a preceding and often romanticized fascination with Opfer (victims), especially Jews, Jewish culture, and, in a different fashion, women”.

It is therefore not surprising that despite high levels of integration of Jews in Germany today, despite Germany’s post-war agreement to compensate the survivors of the Holocaust and despite the fact that their main representative body, the Central Council of Jews in Germany, was granted equal status to the main Christian Churches and receives state funding since 2002, Germans and Jews remain set apart by history. The inadequate denazification process, the persistence of postwar antisemitism, and variable attempts in Germany to come to terms with the past have impacted the social and political relations between Jews and Germans so much that “Jews in contemporary Germany are still struggling to find their place in German society, but their struggles today are with the trauma of the Holocaust, and with the people of the nation

---


5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

responsible for its occurrence.”

5.2.3 Remembering the Holocaust in a multicultural context

But the German process of coming to terms with its past has not only had effects on the Jewish minority, it has impacted other minorities living in Germany as well. As Leslie Adelson has pointed out, because the Third Reich and the Holocaust were key points of reference for Germans, this built “an interpretative landscape in which Germany’s resident Turks have tended to figure only indirectly, if at all.”

Using a more textual approach Leslie Adelson focused her analysis on German-Turkish literature. She pointed out that, rather than assuming an analogousness, the Turkish immigration experience in Germany needs to be understood within the context of a “triangular relationship” of Germans, Turks and Jews. She emphasised that Turks who immigrated into a post-Holocaust Germany were excluded not despite but because of the Holocaust: because Turks have not shared this particular and utmost significant historical event, they were not welcomed into German society and had to remain outside. German-Turkish literature was then often concerned with the ‘immigration into Germany’s past’ that seemed at the same time impossible and necessary for acceptance. The middle of the triangle, then, is the Holocaust. Her approach was not directly concerned with hostility towards Muslims but it nevertheless illustrated the centrality of the Holocaust for German - and perhaps even European - identity and the changes it has brought.

According to Adelson, there is a German-Jewish dichotomy in which Turks do not figure, and in order to change this, Turks must, in a sense, immigrate into the defining chapters of German history as Germanness is defined by the

168 Adelson, Leslie: Touching Tales of Turks, Germans, and Jews: Cultural Alterity, Historical Narrative and Literary Riddles for the 1990s, in: New German Critique, No. 80, Special Issue on the Holocaust (Spring-Summer 2000), pp. 93-124, here p. 95.
169 See Ibid.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

Holocaust. One character in German-Turkish writer Safer Senocak’s novel *Gefährliche Verwandtschaft* (1995) seemed to have acutely felt this when he asked himself: “So I had missed the historical event. Do I still belong here?”

Perhaps unexpectedly, this question of belonging of Turks in Germany has been dealt with by antisemitism researchers. More recently, there has been a move towards more inclusive theories of social prejudice. On the one hand, this reflects the processes of normalisation with regard to Holocaust remembrance mentioned above. Antisemitism loses its specificity and Jews their ‘special’ position for the formation of German identity. On the other hand, however, newer theories on antisemitism acknowledge the reality of hostility against minorities in Germany. Theories on antisemitism in Germany have, from very early on, attempted to find an explanation for both antisemitism and racism in one theoretical approach, and put antisemitism in relation to recent immigration. The period after unification increased the urgency to find theoretical approaches that would not completely ignore the new reality of minority communities living in Germany. There was a need to find an approach that would explain the antisemitism still present among a large number of Germans, as well as forms of racism against immigrants. One of those approaches was the theory of the ‘third person’.

This theoretical contribution has been made by sociologist Klaus Holz, who based his argument and theory on Hannah Arendt’s and Zygmunt Bauman’s approach to antisemitism. Holz was mostly concerned with the way in which antisemitism is communicated and what this means for the construction of national identity. He argued that there are semantic constructions of the images of the national self and the ‘Other’. The Jews are constructed as the ‘third person’ to this bi-polar scheme, because they are not perceived as members of other nations, but as destroyer of the national order. However, the flaw in this approach was that Holz developed a model for antisemitism which can

\[170\] as cited in Adelson: Touching Tales, p. 122. - the character referred to the fall of the Berlin wall, but Adelson stressed that this might as well be a reference to the Holocaust.

be applied at any time and at any place, and does not acknowledge historic specificities of nationalisms and antisemitisms, but his approach itself is in that sense very specific to the current German context. The idea of the Jew as ‘the third person’, he is able to stress the specificity of antisemitism while at the same time acknowledging that there are other ‘Others’. But while Holz insisted on the particularity of Jews for German nationalism, other antisemitism researchers let go of this idea in favour of an all-encompassing approach to both antisemitism and other forms of hostility.

5.2.4 Understanding antisemitism in multicultural societies: the theory of ‘group-related hostility’

This theoretical development was related to the emergence of prejudice research that was inspired by social-psychological research on antisemitism in particular, and in fact used its methods and theories. In 1987, Werner Bergmann had proposed that future psychological research on antisemitism needed to be based on psychological theories of group relations. He dismissed earlier theories that tried to explain antisemitism on an individual level because they had failed to explain racial prejudice. Instead, he suggested an antisemitism research based on theories of the formation of group relations. This theory, in turn, built on earlier research on prejudice undertaken by American social-psychologists, who tried to explain social hostility with group identification, social deprivation and mobility, perceptions of economic competition and ethnocentrism on a group instead of an individual level.

These theories formed the basis of Wilhelm Heitmeyer’s long-term social-psychological study on ‘group related hostility’, initiated in 2002. Based at the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence at Bielefeld University, it has become the largest and most influential study on racial and other prejudice in German society and its findings are published yearly in

\[^{172}\text{See above section on Antisemitism Research in Germany.}\]
\[^{173}\text{See Bergmann, Werner: Group Theory and Ethnic Relations, p. 139.}\]
\[^{174}\text{Ibid, p. 140.}\]
\[^{175}\text{Ibid.}\]
5.2.5 German multiculturalism

Since the 1990s, Germany’s approach to minority integration has slowly changed. While the German state for a long time completely ignored its responsibility in fostering integration of ‘guestworkers’ and their families, integration efforts intensified in the 1980s and 1990s. The new nationality law of 1999 allowed

\[^{176}\]See Heitmeyer, Wilhelm (ed.): Deutsche Zustände, volumes 1-9, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 2002-2010.

the acquisition of German citizenship after eight years of legal residence, giving many young Turks the opportunity to gain German citizenship easier and faster than before.\textsuperscript{178} Many young Turks were also given access to German public education and training programmes, but the majority of them continued to be employed in unskilled or semi-skilled economic sectors. Only a small number advanced into skilled labour and the move into the middle class has been a particularly slow process.\textsuperscript{179} There is an increasing number of Turkish professionals, intellectuals, writers, artists and filmmakers. But their cases, even their success, often exemplify the exclusionist character of German culture. The entrance of German-Turkish figures and subjects into mainstream culture in Germany is still perceived as an exotic and folkloristic phenomenon. This is not only true for German-Turkish film but also for German-Turkish literature. Although German-Turkish writers like Feridun Zaimoglu and Safer Senocak have established themselves as successful writers in Germany and their work deals with ethnic ambiguity of Turkish Diaspora identities in Germany, their work is perceived as ‘Turkish’ rather than ‘German’ or ‘German-Turkish’, which is a phenomenon that can be described as a “habit of thought that implicitly relegates Turks in Germany to a place imagined to be outside Germany and outside modernity.”\textsuperscript{180} Taking part in the German cultural sphere is considered to be insufficient in order to be German.

As Nasar Meer and Tariq Modood concluded in their comparative study on citizenship in Europe:

“Following decades of pursuing an ethno-national citizenship, Germany has since the late 1990s undergone significant changes in its management of immigration and integration, and in its conception of citizenship. While the federal policies had previously focused almost entirely on the control and return of migrants, in 1998 the

\textsuperscript{178}Freyer-Stowasser: Turks in Germany, p. 65.
\textsuperscript{179}Ibid, pp.62-64.
Red-Green government characterised Germany as an ‘immigration country’ and amended the Citizenship Law (2000) to introduce the principle of *ius soli*. These developments have been accompanied by others such as the introduction of the Immigration Law (2005) which encourages the cultivation of ‘integration’ strategies, and which in turn was followed by the invitation to migrants and civil society actors to take part in a National Integration Summit (2006). Yet the content of this ‘integration’ has also included a nationalist imperative, whereby newcomers are expected to undertake 300 to 600 hours of German language classes and lessons on German society and history.”  

The new German self-understanding became especially apparent in the way the German state has changed its approach to the Muslim community. Recently, the German state has sought ways to integrate Muslims into German society and to engage in a dialogue with Muslim communities. The *Islamkonferenz*, a meeting between German state officials and delegates of several Muslim organisations, was hosted in Berlin in 2006 and in subsequent years. As a result of these meetings, the Koordinierungsrat der Muslime in Deutschland (coordination council of Muslims in Germany) was founded by the four largest Muslim organisations: the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (central council of Muslims in Germany) (ZMD), the Türkisch-Islamischen Union der Anstalt für Religion (DITIB), the Islamrat für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Islam council for the Federal Republic of Germany) (IRD) and the Verband der Islamischen Kulturzentren (association of Islamic cultural centres) (VIKZ). Tezcan Levent points out how these efforts by the German government are intended to change the Muslim organisational structure in Germany. He stresses that there is a request for a central Muslim organisation in political and public discourse and that this organisation, representing a nationally domesticated Islam, is expected to take over integration efforts. The Imam is supposed to play

---

181 Meer, Nasar and Modood, Tariq: Framing Contemporary Citizenship and Diversity in Europe, pp. 33-60, here pp. 35 f.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

a central role in these efforts by acting as a guide for a controlled integration and by representing the community, thus having a ‘pastoral’ role.\textsuperscript{182}

This new approach by the German state is perhaps an effort towards a more British model of multiculturalism, based on fostering a relationship between state and minority culture, rather than the German model of denying responsibility for integration. Angela Merkel said that multiculturalism is dead, although the country never adopted such a policy.\textsuperscript{183} With that, she expressed exactly the opposite: the German self-understanding has changed in the past 20 years. The German state is increasingly seeking dialogue with minority communities, and not only with Jews. In contrast to Britain, however, this is less about how minority communities see themselves, but about how the German state wants to relate to them.

5.2.6 Ethnic minority research

Still, this development towards multiculturalism has also been reflected in social research, although the acknowledgement of a hostility that affects Muslims in particular is relatively new to German research on resentments and prejudice. This has to do with the way in which non-Germans were mainly perceived as members of ‘foreign’ nations, mainly as Turks, and the way in which this shaped research on the topic. Werner Schiffauer pointed out that it was in fact only after September 11th that immigrants in Germany began to be primarily perceived as Muslims, and only secondarily as members of other nations.\textsuperscript{184} Consequently, research on hostility towards them in particular has only recently been established.

However, similar to earlier studies on ‘guestworkers’, research focused heavily on Muslims as an object of research. Studies have investigated their social sta-\textsuperscript{182}See Levent, Tezcan: Governmentality, Pastoral Care and Integration, in: Al-Harmaneh, Ala and Joern Thielemann (eds.): Islam and Muslims in Germany, Leiden: Brill 2008. pp. 119-132.
\textsuperscript{183}See Meer: Citizenship, Identity and the Politics of Multiculturalism, p. 1.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

tus, their religiousness and their attitudes rather than the resentments against
them.\textsuperscript{185}

But this idea of dealing with Muslims through studying them became even
more blatantly obvious in the 2007 quantitative study “Muslime in Deutsch-
land”, which had been commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior. It focused
on Muslims of all backgrounds in Germany and their attitudes towards religion,
state, and democracy. The study revealed that religion was highly important
for Muslims in Germany and that religious ties were far more intense compared
to non-Muslims.\textsuperscript{186} However, the forms of religiousness were varied and the
study made a distinction between fundamentalist, traditional and orthodox
orientations. Curiously, their numbers indicated that about 40\% of German
Muslims were fundamentalist, but it was stressed that this did not necessarily
correlate with anti-democratic attitudes. It was further suggested that around
12\% of Muslims in Germany were strongly morally critical towards Western
democracies and societies and propagated the use of physical and death penal-
ties according to Islamic law. The reasons for this were thought to be varied:
whereas a subgroup within these 12\% belong to an educated, individually less
discriminated group that developed these attitudes because of the perception
of a collective discrimination experience towards Muslims in Germany, another
subgroup, a less educated one, developed this attitude out of individual experi-
ences of discrimination.\textsuperscript{187} The study also indicated that there were tendencies
of self-exclusion among yet another subgroup with a traditional religious atti-
dute that is opposed to integration.\textsuperscript{188} Another conclusion the study drew was
that the attitudes of this minority of Muslims in Germany could be compared
to xenophobia and right-wing extremism among ‘white’ young Germans, as
they similarly seek for simple solutions, clear rules and have a binary world

\textsuperscript{185}See for example Tietze: Islamische Identitäten, and Nökel: Islam und Selbstbehauptung.
\textsuperscript{186}See Brettfeld, Katrin and Wetzels, Peter (ed.): Muslime in Deutschland - Integration,
Integrationsbarrieren, Religion sowie Einstellungen zu Demokratie, Rechtsstaat und
\textsuperscript{187}Ibid, p.494.
\textsuperscript{188}Ibid.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

Although the study perhaps overemphasised the negative aspects of Muslim attitudes in Germany, it is the largest study of its kind so far in Germany and their main findings do not disagree with other findings, like those of Sigrid Nökel and Nicola Tietze. There were a number of issues with this study, but one of them was certainly that it failed to see that attitudes among Muslims in Germany cannot be seen out of context of the heritage of Germany’s failure to accommodate their needs and the institutional discrimination they encountered.

While social research was thus slow to truly embrace multiculturalism in its methodologies, there were nevertheless a small number of historical studies that looked the presence of Muslims in Germany and their contribution to German society beyond ‘guestworker’ immigration. Gerhard Höpp, for example, wrote about the establishment of Muslim communities in Germany before and during the First World War.  

His findings showed that there was a Muslim presence in Germany long before Turks arrived as ‘guestworkers’. This Muslim presence was established when during the Wars with the Turks, Turkish fighters (Beutetürken) were imprisoned on German soil, and when Prussia recruited Volga Tatars and Bosnian Muslims for their Ulan regiment between 1741 and 1745. These regiments recruited more Tatars over time and Friedrich II granted them and their families the right to settle in Germany and practise their religion. He even assured them that he wanted to build mosques for them and treat them as any other subject. The Muslim communities in Germany grew when Ottoman delegates and Arab Muslims came to Germany, and Berlin in particular, where a cemetery was established for those who died there. After 1871 a number of Muslims had settled in Germany as lecturers, students, apprentices, teach-

---

189 Ibid. p.500.
191 See bid, p. 10.
192 Ibid.
193 See ibid, p.11.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

ers, merchants, entertainers and diplomats. This community grew with the
arrival of Muslim soldiers and officers that came to Berlin and Potsdam for
military training to fight on Germany’s side and the imprisonment of a signif-
icant number of Muslims from Algeria, Senegal, Siberia, India and Morocco
who fought in the British, French, and Russian forces. These prisoners of war
were brought together in a single prison in Zossen near Berlin, where even a
mosque was built to enable them to carry out their religious rituals.

But researchers also became interested in stereotypical representations of
Muslims in Germany’s past and present. In cultural studies, and inspired
by theories of ‘Orientalism’, scholars have applied a theoretical framework of
post-colonialism to the German case in order to account for specific prejudices
against immigrants from ‘Oriental’ countries and regions.

**Approaches to anti-Muslim racism in cultural studies**

Apart from the more social scientific and linguistic approaches to contempo-
rary racism mentioned in the previous chapter, representations of Turks and
Muslims have thus become a subject for German cultural studies. Early studies
of this kind in fact date back to the 1970s. They focus on cultural representa-
tions and perceptions of Turks in medieval and early modern times as well
as in present day Germany. Senol Ozyurt investigated the image of the ‘Turk’
in German folk songs since the 1300s and came to the conclusion that they
expressed a bipolarity of the ‘good Christian’ and the ‘barbarian Turk’. While
the Christian was always presented as great, good, brave and noble, the Turk
was depicted as barbaric.

Scholars also analysed the way Turks and Arabs had been depicted in early
German scholarship and came to the conclusion that there was an inherent
feeling of superiority among Christian Germans towards Turks and Arabs. In
his research of the study of Arab and Islam at German Universities, Rudi Paret
traced the beginnings of ‘Orientalist’ scholarship back to the 12th century,

---

194 Ibid.
195 See ibid, pp. 38 f.
when the Koran was first translated into Latin. He interpreted the study of Islam as part of a Christian missionary ideology, of which the aim was to convince Muslims that their religion was inherently flawed. He concluded that during the middle ages the western attitude concerning Islam can be characterised as apologetic and polemic and that interpretation of primary sources was blinded by the assumption that Islam was the enemy religion.\footnote{See Paret, Rudi: Arabistik und Islamkunde an deutschen Universitäten, Wiesbaden 1966, p. 2.}

In contrast to later, more critical approaches, Paret betrayed an inadequate understanding of ‘Orientalism’. He thought that a turn towards more positive interpretations of Islam since the 19th century meant that intent and content of the study of Islam and Arabic had dramatically changed. He did not see any problematic ‘exoticism’ in the way scholars showed their appreciation of the intellectual world that is represented by Islam and its various forms of appearance and that has influenced Arab literature. \footnote{Ibid., p.3. on this subject see also Alexander Haridi’s study on secular Islam scholarship. He showed that although there was an attempt to systematise the study of Islam by applying a secular and materialist analysis, the attitude towards Islam was characterised by the attempt to show Europe’s superiority: not as before on a theological, but now on a secular level. - Haridi, Alexander: Das Paradigma der “Islamischen Zivilisation” - oder die Begründung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Heinrich Becker (1876-1933), Würzburg: Ergon 2005, p. 17.}

From the end of the 1980s, this theoretical approach to racist discourse became more established. Inspired by American and British postcolonial studies, German cultural studies began to use Edward Said’s theory of an ‘Orientalist’ colonial discourse that created the image of a backward and underdeveloped ‘Orient’ to legitimise colonialism in their approaches to German depictions of Turks and the ‘Orient’. Cornelia Kleinlogel’s study on the image of the Turk in early modern German literature emphasised that, while German texts initially depicted Turks as threats, this image was first succeeded by a dramatic exotism and later by a more sexualised image in the 19th century. After what she calls the ‘pornographic turn’, the Orient was depicted as sensual, erotic and luscious, and thus as a dangerous allurement. She argued that this image
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

is still used today. Apart from literature, the ‘Orientalism’ discourse also became the subject of studies of German art.

The theory of ‘Orientalism’ in fact became the most dominant interpretation of the history of anti-Turkish prejudice in Germany. The material Margret Spohn collected for her study on the history of anti-Turkish prejudice in Germany showed that Germans considered the Muslims of the Ottoman Empire as a threat. During the Wars with the Turks in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, German clergy and gentry agitated against Turks by creating images of a ‘barbaric mortal enemy’ and ‘anti-Christ’ who intends to annihilate all Christians.

Bernd Bauknecht applied the theory of ‘Orientalism’ in a more consequent way and also related it to racism based on skin colour. He pointed out that already during medieval times, Muslims - called Saracens then - were considered black and because the colour black was a symbol for death and the underworld, Muslims were regarded as evil. But he also highlights that Europe’s relation to the “Orient” was characterised not only by xenophobia but also by exoticism: the image of the strange and exotic “Orient” functioned and still functions as a means to form a ‘pure’ European identity. According to Bauknecht, depictions of the Orient and Islam since the fourteenth century have to be read in connection with political and social circumstances and struggles. He argued that members of the church were very careful to speak positively about Islam out of fear of excommunication. The gentry, however, in seeking to distinguish themselves from the clergy as well as the lower social stratum, wanted to show its imperial power by collecting exotic souvenirs and

\[199\] See Kleinlogel, Cornelia: Exotik-Erotik, zur Geschichte des Türkenbildes in der deutschen Literatur der frühen Neuzeit (1453-1800), Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang 1989, pp. 1, 97, 415.

\[200\] See Günther, Erika: Die Faszination des Fremden, Der Malerische Orientalismus in Deutschland, Münster: Lit Verlag 1990.

\[201\] See Spohn, Margret: Alles getürkt. 500 Jahre (Vor)Urteile der Deutschen über die Türken, Oldenburg 1993, p.29.

The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

adopting a luxurious lifestyle that inherited elements of the - real or imagined - “Orient”. For craftspeople and peasants, Bauknecht points out, the rejection of everything Oriental was thus a rebellion against the authorities. He highlights as an example the usage of costumes during carnival that exhibited a critique of a luxury and decadence - people dressed up as “wild black men”, “seductive women”, and “barbarians”. He argued that Oriental literature and art was very popular but often served two functions. It depicted ‘oriental people’ as uncivilised, uneducated and raw and thus legitimised white men’s domination over these people while at the same time, through the depiction of wild and untamed sexuality and physicalness as well as total control over the female body, it satisfied white male fantasies.

More recently, Almut Höfert emphasised that medieval depictions of Turks were dependent on the dominant Christian worldview, which understood Islam only in relation to Christianity. The dominant perception was that Muslims were godless heathens or heretics who harassed Christians, which the latter took as a sign of the beginning of the end of the world. Höfert explicitly stated that her work is inspired by postcolonial studies and that her intention is to deconstruct the dichotomy of the Western and non-Western world.

Cultural representations of Turks and ‘foreigners’ in Germany have also been subject of studies with a more contemporary focus. Nazire Akbulut investigated depictions of Turks in German literature of the 1980s. She came to the conclusion that Turks are represented in a way that is sympathetic of their situation in Germany, but nevertheless clichéd.

---

203 Ibid, p.34-35.
204 Ibid.
205 Ibid, p. 37 f.
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

study of representations of 'foreigners’ in German film similarly showed that
in the 1970s minorities were depicted from a humanist-pedagogical perspective,
benevolent, but stereotypical.\textsuperscript{209}

Studies of this kind have to be understood not only in relation to British
postcolonial studies, which form their theoretical basis, but also in the context
of developments in Germany towards a multicultural society. These studies
are attempts to explain anti-Turkish resentments in light of the reality of a
Turkish minority in Germany. Most recently, and based on Edward Said’s
theory of ‘Orientalism’, Iman Attia argued that with regard to anti-Muslim
racism, it is important to acknowledge that German knowledge about Islam is
actually a constructed image of an ‘Orient’, which affects Muslims in Germany
today.\textsuperscript{210} Although she admits that Said’s hypothesis of a colonial construction
of an 'Orient' does not apply to Germany as much as it applies for example
to Britain, she argues that there has been a similar dynamic for Christian
constructions of Muslims as the ‘Other’ to Christian Europe, traces of which
can be found in German discourse even today.\textsuperscript{211} According to Attia, this
dynamic functions as a means to reproduce power relations in contemporary
Germany.\textsuperscript{212}

While Attia’s approach was based relatively straightforwardly on Said’s the-
ory of ‘Orientalism’ and colonial power relations, Nina Berman has been more
balanced in her approach to the issue. She emphasised that images of Turks
and the ‘Orient’ throughout Germany’s history relied on Germany’s economic
and military status as well as on political relations and fluctuated between fear
and fascination.\textsuperscript{213} The effect, however, has been the production of a power-

\textsuperscript{209}See Seesslen, Georg: Das Kino der doppelten Kulturen, in: epd Film, No 12, 2000, p. 2.
\textsuperscript{210}See Attia, Iman: Kulturrassismus und Gesellschaftskritik, in: Attia, Iman (ed): Oriental-
    und Islambilder, Orient- und Islambilder, Interdisziplinäre Beiträge zu Orientalismus und
    antimuslimischem Rassismus, Münster: Unrast 2007, pp. 5-29, here p. 5.
\textsuperscript{211}Ibid, p. 9.
\textsuperscript{212}Ibid, p. 21.
\textsuperscript{213}See Berman, Nina: Historische Phasen orientalisierender Diskurse in Deutschland, in:
    Attia, Iman: Orient- und Islambilder, pp. 71-83.; see also Berman, Nina: Orientalismus,
    Kolonialismus und Moderne: Zum Bild des Orients in der deutschen Kultur um 1900,
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

ful stereotypical image of the ‘Orient’ that affects Muslims living in Germany today.

These explanatory approaches to anti-Muslim racism in Germany - and especially the ones based in cultural studies even try to trace continuities in representations over time - were clearly inspired by British post-colonial theories on racism, and tried to apply this to the history of German-Ottoman relations. Their aim was to understand attitudes of Germans towards Turks in Germany today in relation to the history of Germany’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire, rather than in relation to Holocaust history. This was an explicit attempt to separate the study of racism from its reference to the Holocaust. Attia had in fact criticised how Turkish and Arab experiences in Germany were interpreted in a framework of German-Jewish relations, and not acknowledged or dignified in their own right.²¹⁴

But in contrast to developments in Britain, where post-colonial approaches to racism are much better established, and also eventually provided a framework to interpret antisemitism, these approaches were not in any way integrated into research on antisemitism, or sought a dialogue with them. However, it is at this juncture where comparisons between antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ in particular become significant.

5.2.7 Comparing Antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ in Germany

On the one hand, German theories on antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentments do not allow for easy comparisons. The place of Jews in the public eye is so different to that of Muslims that it seems far fetched to compare the two. While Jews play a central role for the formation of German self-understanding, Muslims play, if at all, a supporting role.

In German antisemitism research, the idea that antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’ can be directly compared only came up very recently. The first comparison was drawn by Sabine Schiffer in her book on Islam in German media.

²¹⁴See Attia: Kulturassismus und Gesellschaftskritik, p. 15.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

Here she argued that not only do anti-Muslim stereotypes regularly appear in mainstream media, but that these stereotypes are exactly like those used against Jews in Germany at the end of the 19th century. This comparison was the main focus of her later book *Antisemitismus und Islamophobie - ein Vergleich* (Antisemitism and Islamophobia - a comparison), co-authored by Constantin Wagner. Although the authors admitted that there are important differences between antisemitism and hostility against Muslims, they stressed that the discrimination experiences of Jews at the end of the 19th century and Muslims today were very similar.\[215\] In both cases, Jews and Muslims have been perceived as an enemy. While today, the economic crises lead to social instability, insecurity, a fear of globalisation and the creation of Islam as an enemy, this was also the case for Jews at the end of the nineteenth century, when after the end of the German-French war in 1871, there was similar insecurity and instability with regard to the future.\[216\]

The two scholars used the antisemitic discourse of late nineteenth century Germany to analyse modern day Islamophobia. Antisemitism, in other words, is used as a paradigmatic tool to understand Islamophobia. They argued that there are striking parallels: while nineteenth century Jews were for example accused of disloyalty, this is also true for today’s Muslims. Thus, the decisive characteristics of the anti-Jewish resentments of the past - the perception of Jews as the ultimate ‘other’ to German nationalism, the resentment against them within all classes and social strata but especially among intellectuals, the use of anti-Jewish stereotypes in political statements and for political ends - are alleged to reappear in anti-Muslim hostility. The racist discourse then and now functions for excluding the ‘other’ and legitimates a hierarchy that has led to the persecution and extermination of Jews and may well lead to the same fate for Muslims, if the warning signs that the history of antisemitism illustrates are not heeded.\[217\]


\[216\] Ibid, p. 73.

\[217\] Ibid, p. 199 f.
According to Schiffer and Wagner, both antisemitism and ‘Islamophobia’, have a long history, in the form of Christian anti-Judaism and Orientalism and colonialism respectively.\textsuperscript{218} The authors further gave examples of how random citations from the Torah in nineteenth century Germany and the Qur’an in Germany today were and are used in similar ways to show that Jews then and Muslims today are a danger to Western society. Both forms of racism, as they categorised it, rely on irrational conspiracy theories, and both Jews in the past and Muslims today are faced with the demand to fully assimilate into German society, while they are at the same time accused of only faking their allegiance to the German nation.\textsuperscript{219} Unlike most approaches to antisemitism, Schiffer and Wagner’s approach drew its theoretical groundings from the ‘Orientalism’ research mentioned earlier.

Schiffer was supported by well-known antisemitism researcher Wolfgang Benz. In a paper presented at the conference \textit{Feindbild Islam - Feindbild Jude} at the Centre for Antisemitism Research in Berlin in December 2008, at which Schiffer also spoke, Benz pointed out that there are significant parallels between antisemitism and hostility towards Muslims: the same stereotypes and constructs that are used as instruments within antisemitism reappear in anti-Muslim resentments. According to Benz, these include conspiracy theories as well as alleged religious principles.\textsuperscript{220} He drew a direct comparison between resistance against the building of synagogues in 19th century Germany, and the movements against the building of mosques in Germany today.\textsuperscript{221}

In the context of recent developments of how antisemitism is conceptualised in Germany, his comparison made sense. Benz argued that antisemitism research is meant to use the methods and tools developed to understand hostility towards Jews to analyse hostility levelled against other groups as well. His approach is part of the group-focused enmity-approach, which is the basis of

\textsuperscript{218}Ibid, p. 84-85.
\textsuperscript{219}Ibid, p. 98-99.
\textsuperscript{221}Ibid, p. 20.
5 The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

mainstream antisemitism research in Germany today. As Benz said himself:
Antisemitism researchers are experts in researching prejudices and their aim
is to transfer the dynamic and function of hostility towards certain groups. Benz has since further developed his idea to apply the methods used in anti-
semitism research to analyse anti-Muslim resentments in particular in his book
Die Feinde aus dem Morgenland (Enemies from the Orient).

The idea of making antisemitism comparable fits in the context of general
developments of how the Nazi past is dealt with in contemporary Germany.
The idea to remove antisemitism from the special position it may once have
had is in line in with the idea to universalise the Holocaust and turn it into a
general reference for genocide and atrocity. Antisemitism is thus perhaps still
singular, but not different from other forms of ‘group focused enmity’, which
may, in other contexts and in worst cases, even lead to genocide.

However, as the ‘group-focused-enmity’-approach is just one of various ap-
proaches to antisemitism, Schiffer and Benz received criticism for their compar-
ison, for example from researcher and writer Matthias Küntzel, whose expertise
lies in Muslim antisemitism. Others pointed out that this approach neglects
to take into account particular stereotypes that only appear in antisemitism,
like the identification of Jews with international capital, the international con-
spiracy, the perceived threat of extermination, and that there is no parallel to
the alleged ‘Jewish power’. However, it is important to note that these crit-
ical voices are not what could be considered the mainstream of antisemitism
research, nor that their understanding of antisemitism is always right.

One accusation that could be levelled against the critics of a comparison be-
tween antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment is that insisting on the speci-
ficity of antisemitism is a purely German interest, in which the particularity of
antisemitism is seen as a form of distinction. But this is also true for the oppo-

223See Benz, Wolfgang: Die Feinde aus dem Morgenland - Wie die Angst vor den Muslimen
unsere Demokratie gefährdet, München, CH Beck 2012.
224See Krauth, Stefan: Antiislamosemitophobismus, in: Jungle World No. 51, 18. De-
32312.html, [Accessed on 18 December 2013].
The 1990s and beyond: universalising and comparing antisemitism

site: insisting that antisemitism is just like other forms of hostility supports a discourse of normalisation, and is therefore of national interest. Germans can believe that they are just like any other nation and can on the one hand finally let the past rest and on the other use it as a pedagogical tool to educate others. This is most poignant in an international context. The message is that what can happen here can happen anywhere and anytime. Sabine Schiffer expressed this directly when she said that unexpected hostilities can surface and lead, in their worst case, to a new crime against humanity.225

In that regard, Schiffer’s and Benz’ approach to comparing antisemitism and anti-Muslim resentment is very German: it fits very well into a contemporary German narrative of the past and its meaning for the present. In line with this narrative there is a striking absence in the discussion about comparisons. Those who would be directly affected by antisemitism or anti-Muslim resentment do not get a voice.

But while comparisons are on the one hand part of a normalisation discourse themselves, they also have to be understood in the context of Germany’s new understanding as a country of immigration. There is a reality of different minorities living in Germany, and a reality of discrimination against these minorities. Conceptualising antisemitism within this context means to put it in relation to other forms of social hostility. In the absence of a significant dialogue between approaches to antisemitism based on Germany’s Nazi past and approaches to racism based on Germany’s other past, comparative approaches to antisemitism are thus seeking a form of integration by proxy: If, as touched upon earlier, Turks, in order to become German, have to immigrate into Germany’s past, perhaps it is a form of immigrating into Germany’s past to equate their experience with that of the Jews. If Turks cannot become Germans, they can at least become the ‘new Jews’.

Conclusion

Just as there is a discourse about Jews, there is a discourse about antisemitism, too. In this discourse, ideas about what antisemitism is are expressed and negotiated. If one looks at this discourse in particular contexts, like contemporary British and German societies, it becomes evident that concepts of antisemitism are constructed to relate to particular narratives of what the past means for the present. These narratives are born out of concepts of citizenship and national identity.

However, just because theories of antisemitism are part of a discourse, that does not mean that antisemitism is only a construct and not also a reality. As I have shown in the first chapter, there is a reality of anti-Jewish prejudice, persecution and extermination throughout history, and remnants of this history extend into the present. This is acutely felt by Jewish communities across Europe today.

Notwithstanding the facts, however, the question that led this research is how these facts are interpreted and made sense of. How is antisemitism understood? This question is particularly relevant in the context of multiculturalism in Western European societies, where large parts of society hold a multitude of prejudices against ethnic minorities other than Jews. With this in mind, I asked how concepts of antisemitism allow for comparisons between antisemitism and anti-Muslim attitudes and what value these comparisons have. To that end, I analysed and compared the genealogy of German and British theories on antisemitism since the 1950s in the context of recent immigration of non-Jewish minorities, as both countries have very different histories regarding this issue.
6 Conclusion

The result is that despite the historical differences of both countries, in the past few decades there has been a development towards denying any particularity of antisemitism, and instead emphasising that Jews are just like other minorities, and antisemitism just like any other form of hostile attitude towards another group. This meant that theories became dominant that saw antisemitism as one form of prejudice, or one form of racism among others. On the one hand, this is a good thing. There is much value in minorities standing together against discrimination and hate crimes, which affect them in similar measures. This research has shown that in Germany especially, theories about antisemitism have been used as a model to understand other forms of prejudice. This stands in contrast to denying today’s multi-ethnic reality and its accompanying racism. Concepts of antisemitism can therefore serve to make contemporary racism intelligible. On the other hand, however, there is a danger that such a model moves too far away from reality and becomes a narrative rather than something that describes reality. This understanding of antisemitism is closely related to how Germany interprets its past. Germany’s interpretation of its own past moved from vehemently denying any guilt associated with the Holocaust, to positively incorporating it into German national identity. One way of doing this was to emphasise the European aspect of ‘the catastrophe’, and to point out the guilt of others. The result of this way of portraying the past is that antisemitism looses its particularity – and so does the Holocaust. Germany becomes a nation among others, with a history of atrocities similar to that of other nations. In Germany, this theoretical development initially bore out of critical intellectual movements with the intention that the Shoah shall never be repeated, but it eventually came to serve a narrative of a reunited and multicultural nation, although there is some continuation of critical theories of antisemitism as well. Because antisemitism plays such a major role in German identity, there is little danger that comparing antisemitism will eventually lead to it being considered of no analytical value as a category, which is a dominant development in Britain.

In Britain, there have been strong tendencies to vehemently deny any par-
ticularity, seriousness or even the existence of antisemitism. It is important
to note that in some sense, antisemitism theories in Germany and Britain de-
veloped diametrically opposed to each other. While in Germany, concepts of
antisemitism became a model for concepts of racism and other forms of prej-
udices, in Britain, antisemitism as a particular category had to be extracted
from general racism theories. These racism theories developed in the context
of immigration from Commonwealth countries from the late 1940s onwards,
and attitudes towards British Jews, who had, for the most part, by that time
settled in Britain, were not on their agenda. Newer critical neo-Marxist racism
theories that developed from the 1970s and explained racism based on class
similarly neglected to take antisemitism into account. Because there was a long
tradition within the Jewish community in Britain to refrain from any alarmism
about any hostility against them, there were initially no initiatives to fight for
recognition of antisemitism. However, these started to develop from the 1980s,
when historians started to point out homegrown British hostility against Jews
in British history. The idea was to emphasise that Jews were equally affected
by the racism described in previous theories. In a sense, this strategy backfired.
It firstly paved the way for comparisons between Jews and other minorities.
While this can be helpful and unite minority communities, it can also lead
to a relegation of antisemitism into Britain’s past, as there seem to be other,
more contemporary and urgent forms of racism, like Islamophobia, to con-
tend with. On a theoretical level, as this research has shown, it meant that
antisemitism as a category became almost a taboo. Considered a dated and
defunct category because it grants Jews a particular status, the aim of most
antisemitism researchers today is to analyse how processes of racialisation af-
fect Jews. This is a result of the influence of post-colonial theories on concepts
of racism, which not only exclude antisemitism, but even see Jewish nation-
alism as the worst form of contemporary racism. To be sure, there are those
voices in Britain who fight for the inclusion of a fight against antisemitism in
particular within the anti-racist struggle in general. However, in light of recent
theoretical developments this is most certainly an uphill struggle.
6 Conclusion

The most general conclusion that can be drawn from this research is that different frames of reference lead to different interpretations of the same thing. National history and traditions inevitably influence our way of thinking. This research has shown that antisemitism and the way to combat it are thought of very differently in Germany and Britain, even though there might be, at times, similar outcomes of these different ways of thinking. What this research has also shown is the importance of being self-reflective. Only through self-reflection is it possible to realise that sometimes, what is meant to be critical, turns out to not be critical at all. It just reifies ways of thinking that support the exact power structures that were supposed to be criticised. For example, postcolonial theories aim to deconstruct existing power structures, but they operate solely within colonialism as a singular frame of reference. Within the scope of this research, they thus turned out to be very British. Explaining antisemitism within this frame of reference means to let go of antisemitism as a term and to attempt to turn Jews into colonised people. Taking a step further would mean to explain the Holocaust in terms of colonialism. This very specific viewpoint on antisemitism has its limits. Antisemitism is a particular, but also a transnational phenomenon. To a large extent, antisemitic attitudes transcend national borders, and any concept of antisemitism needs to take that into account.


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography

[74] Busch, Stefan: Auch eine Form von Vergangenheitsbewältigung: Die Darstellung von Juden und Judenvernichtung in Nachkriegsromanen von NS-Autoren, in o’ Dochartaigh, Pol (ed.): Jews in German Literature since 1945: German-Jewish literature?, Amsterdam: Rodopi 1999


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


[221] Lüdke, Tilman: Jihad made in Germany, Ottoman and German Propaganda and Intelligence Operations in the First World War, Münster: Lit Verlag 2005.


Bibliography


Bibliography


[243] Moore, Kerry; Mason, Paul and Lewis, Justin: Images of Islam in the UK: The Representation of British Muslims in the National Print News
Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


[271] Räthzel, Nora: Zur Bedeutung von Asylpolitik und neuen Rassismen bei der Reorganisierung der nationalen Identität im vereinigten Deutschland,
Bibliography

in: Butterwegge, Christoph and Jäger, Siegfried (eds.): Rassismus in Europa, Köln: Bund Verlag 1993, pp. 213-229.


Bibliography


Bibliography


[293] Salzborn: Der Antisemitismus als negative Leitidee der Moderne, Sozialwissenschaftliche Theorien im Vergleich, Frankfurt am Main: Campus 2010.


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


[322] “Sincerity is not enough”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8 January 1960, p. 18.


Bibliography


[338] “Strong Public Protests”, in: Jewish Chronicle Friday 8 January 1960, title page, continued on p. 9


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


Bibliography


