Access, engagement, suppression, and empowerment: a political ecology of voice (PEV) study into Peruvian citizen ability and willingness to report Petroperu environmental pollution incidents

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Declaration of Authorship

I Adrian Gonzalez hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: __________________________ Date: __________________________
They [indigenous people] know they have their rights and nobody can ignore them without being punished. They know they have a voice and it is being heard (Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman) (DDP) representative) (NSI4R1)

If I could make a call to … Petro[peru] and the state, to come see this problem, because they have put information on [the] internet saying that the problem is over but we know it [isn’t] and we see things coming down from the gorge and we want them to come again even if only to visit us and explain why they left us behind. That’s what I want to ask you, that you … could make this call from … Cuninico town, that some state organisation come to give us a hand because we haven’t heard from them. Why did they leave us? They abandoned us (Cuninico resident IRC13).

Brothers, I ask you … please make this reach the government. Make them concerned about us. Pity us. That they’ll have a Christian heart. So that we can survive. We don’t want to die, we want to live. We have our lands here to cultivate. When the mothers and the fathers die, who is going to look [after] it? Do they want the kids to suffer? (Cuninico resident IRC9).
Photograph 0.1: ‘Pluspetrol = murder’ Graffiti in Iquitos

Photograph 0.2: Cuninico indigenous emergency workers at the remediation site (summer 2014).

1 Source: see Acknowledgements Footnote 3.
2 Source: see Acknowledgements Footnote 3.
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Lastly, I wish to dedicate this thesis to my grandfather Stanley Brice and my auntie, Linda Hemming.3

3 Photograph 0.1: Photograph taken by researcher. Note; all thesis photographs are taken by the researcher (dated April-May 2015) aside from Photograph 6.6 which was taken by one of my interpreters (in June 2015) and used with his permission and Photograph 7.1 which is from a website (Infoamazonia no date). Photograph 0.2: This Photograph alongside Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Photographs 3.1 and 3.2 and Chapter 7, Section 7.2, Photographs 7.4, 7.5, 7.7, 7.8, 7.10.1 and 7.11.1/2 were given to me by a Cuninico resident and have been used with his permission. Although another resident (IRC13) confirmed that they took pictures of the spill which were given to the Catholic Church for the subsequent legal process (discussed in Chapter 8, Section 8.3), these photographs were taken by a Petroperu worker in summer 2014 who gave them to the community member in the belief that they would be useful.
Abstract

This thesis has explored how effectively citizens and other stakeholders (community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) in Peru’s Loreto Region have been able to hold the oil company Petroperu accountable for environmental pollution. To do this, a theoretical framework called the political ecology of voice (PEV) has been developed which can be defined as an investigation into a specific temporal political, economic, social, and geographical environment in which citizens and other stakeholders voice over an environmental issue. Semi-structured interviews were concentrated predominantly on two oil-based communities; Barrio Florido adjacent to the Iquitos refinery, and Cuninico situated near the North Peruvian oil pipeline. The PEV theoretical framework has revealed many fascinating issues within the Loreto Region. Poor rural development, economic poverty, political disinterest and racialised class consciousness mean that both communities lack access to state institutions or their representatives to voice. Meanwhile, Petroperu strictly controls their access and relationship which resulted in no means of communication for Cuninico prior to a 2014 oil spill and limited dialogue for Barrio Florido. Citizen poverty and their economic dependency on Petroperu has also strengthened its power and influence over these communities allowing them to establish a climate of fear thus weakening citizen willingness to voice. For CBO/NGO state/resource extraction industry (REI) access and engagement, this can be positively co-operative (stemming from the former’s mutual aims and/or conciliatory support) or negatively obstructive (resulting from the former’s scrutiny-based voice) with those in the latter affected through state-orchestrated anti-NGO rhetoric and REI fragmentation of indigenous federations. Despite this, these actors perform many useful educational and accountability based roles which strengthen citizen voice. However, their involvement does not always guarantee success due to their own visions which can impact their representation of citizen voice. Overall, the PEV environment for Loreton stakeholders can be described as restrictive, intolerant and suppressive, particularly for citizens who must rely on the support of collective voice actors to hold REIs accountable for pollution.
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Acronyms

ACODECOSPAT: Cocama Conservation and Development Association San Pablo de Tipishca
ANA: Autoridad Nacional del Agua, National Authority of Water
ANP: Áreas Naturales Protegidas, Natural Protected Areas
Bbl: oil barrel unit (singular)
B/d: oil barrel production per day (usually measured in thousands)
BTI: The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index
CAR: Regional Environmental Commission
CBO: community-based organisation
CBO\(_nR_n\): CBO\(_n\) representative\(_n\)
CDR: community-driven regulation
CIDSE: Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité, International Co-operation for Development and Solidarity
CNDDHH: Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, National Co-ordinator of Human Rights
CONFIEP: Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas, The National Confederation of Private Business Institutions
COP21: 2015 UN Climate Change Conference
CSR: corporate social responsibility
DAR, Derecho Ambiental y Recursos Naturales (Law, Environment and Natural Resources)
DDP: Defensoría del Pueblo, Office of the Ombudsman
DGAAE: Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales Energía, General Directorate of Energy-Related Environmental Affairs
DIGESA: Dirección General de Salud Ambiental e Inocuidad Alimentaria, General Director’s Office of Environmental Health
DIREPRO: La Dirección Regional de la Producción, Regional Production Management Loreto
DIRESA: Dirección Regional de Salud Loreto, Regional Directorate of Health Loreto
DPLF: Fundación para el Devido Proceso Legal, Due Process of Law Foundation
EIA: Estudio de Impacto Ambiental, Environmental Impact Assessment
EIU: The Economist Intelligence Unit
EMaDE: Emerging Market and Developing Economy
FAO: Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FECONAALCA: Federation of Native Communities of Alto Curaray and Arabela
FECONANCUA: Federation of Communities Natives of the Napo, Curaray and Arabela Rivers
FEPIBAC: Federation of Indigenous People of the Lower and Upper Rio Corrientes
FIRCn: former indigenous resident of Cuninico
FLD: Front Line Defenders
FONCODES: El Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social, The Co-operation Fund for Social Development
FOPOWn: former occidental Petroleum oil worker
GAHP: Global Alliance on Health and Pollution
GEC: global environmental certification
HRD: human rights defender
IACHR: Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IBC: Instituto de Bien Común, Institute for the Common Good
ICCPR: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICWn: Iquitos construction worker
IDL: Instituto de Defensa Legal, Institute of Legal Defence
IEA: International Energy Agency
IEVA: internally elected volunteer authorities
IFAD: International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFAW: International Fund for Animal Welfare
IFIs: international financial institutions
IGOs: intergovernmental organisations
II: Iquitos journalist
ILO: International Labour Organisation
ILPn: Iquitos legal professional
IMF: International Monetary Fund
INDECI: *Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil*, The National Institute of Civil Defence
INDEPA: *Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblo Andinos, Amazónicos y Afroperuano*, National Institute for the Development of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Populations
INEI: *Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática*, National Continuous Survey
IOGP: International Association of Oil & Gas Producers, formerly known as OGP
IPCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
IRCn: Indigenous resident of Cuninico n
IRCPn: indigenous resident of Cuninico participant n
ITOPF: International Tanker Owners’ Pollution Federation
IUAn: Iquitos university academic n
IUSn: Iquitos university student n
LIEO: liberal international economic order
MBPD: millions of barrels per day
MDGs: Millennium Development Goals
MEND: Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
MESICIC: Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption
MINAM: *Ministerio del Ambiente del Peru*, Ministry of Environment of Peru
MINEM: *Ministerio de Energía y Minas del Peru*, Ministry of Energy and Mines of Peru
MINSA: *Ministerio de Salud del Peru*, Ministry of Health of Peru
MOE/OEA: *La Misión de Observación Electoral de la Organización de los Estados Americanos*, The Electoral Observation Mission of the Organisation of American States
MRBFn: *Mestizo* resident of Barrio Florido n
MRE: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Peru
MRG: Minority Rights Group International
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCI: *Naturaleza y Cultura Internacional*, Nature and Culture International
NCSSCrn: non-case study *selva* citizen n
NGDO: non-governmental development organisation
NGO: non-governmental organisation
NGOnRn: NGO n representative n
NIMBY: not in my back yard
NREI: national resource extraction industries
NSInRn: National state institution n representative n
OAS: Organisation of American States
OCMAL: Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina, Latin American Miners Conflict Observatory
OECD: Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development
OEFA: Organismo de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental, Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement
OMNIS: Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Stratégiques, Office of National Mines and Strategic Industries
OPEC: Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORPIAN: Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Northern Amazon of Peru
ORPIO: La Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente, Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the East
OSINERGMIN: Organismo Supervisor de la Inversion en Energia y Minería, Supervisory Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining
PEV: political ecology of voice
PID: Programa Integral de Desarrollo, Comprehensive Development Plan
PILAS: Postgraduates in Latin American Studies
PPEDC: Procurador Público Especializadi en Delitos Anticorrupción, Public Prosecutor Specialised in Crimes of Corruption
PPK: Peruanos Por el Kambio, Peruvian for Change
PUINAMUDT: Indigenous Amazonian States in Defence of their Territories
REDD: Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation
REDNNA: Red de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes, National Network of Children and Adolescents
REIs: resource extraction industries
RGRn: Regional government representative n
RREIs: regional resource extraction industries
SAPs: Structural Adjustment Programmes
SCDV: *selva* civil development vacuum
SCNREIs: state controlled national resource extraction industries
SCRREIs: state controlled regional resource extraction industries
SCTNREIs: state controlled transnational resource extraction industries
SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals
SENACE: *Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles*, National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investment
SERNANP: *Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado*, National Service of Protected Areas by the State
SHDV: *selva* hydrocarbon and development vision
SINADA: *Servicio de Información Nacional de Denuncias Ambientales*, The National Information System on Environmental Complaints
SINANPE: *Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas*, National System of Protected Natural Areas by the State
SINEFA: *Sistema Nacional de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental*, National System of Evaluation and Environmental Control
SLAS: Society for Latin American Studies
SPDA: *Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental*, Peruvian Society of Environmental Law
SPREP: South Pacific Regional Environment Programme
SSI: semi-structured interviews
TNCs: transnational companies
TNREI: transnational resource extraction industries
TR: Territorial Reserves
UN: United Nations
UNICEF: United Nations Children’s Fund
WHO: World Health Organisation
Glossary of Spanish terms

Achuar: indigenous people who reside either side of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border
Amiguismo: cronyism
Área de Conservación Regional: Regional Conservation Area
Asesora: advisor
Apu: indigenous community leader. Also used for other leadership positions, notably indigenous federations
Aymaras: indigenous ethnic group
Asambleas: public meetings
Bandido: bandit
Blanco: white person
Botes fluvial or botes: small boats used for local travel which have a cargo capacity of 100 tons or less and can accommodate roughly 50 passengers
Campamento: oil encampment
Campesino: farmer
Castillos: castles
Chaleros: manual vegetation work removed around oil sites
Chino: broad term for Asian ethnicity
Chocolatada: a social event where drinking and eating chocolate is the central activity of the meeting and usually occurs for a festive or commemorative event
Cocha: smallholding or small farm
Cocama: indigenous people numbering approximately 10,000-15,000 who predominantly reside in the Loreto Amazonian basin along several rivers including the Marañón, Nucuray, Pastaza and Urituyacu
Comisión Multisectorial: Multi-sectoral Commission. This combined several relevant government bodies (ANA, Council of Ministers, DIGESA, OEFA, OSINERGMIN), indigenous federations and their affiliated organisations to assess the environmental and social impact within four Loreto river basins (Corrientes, Pastaza, Marañón and Tigre)
Consejo de ministros: Council of Ministers. This encompasses all the Ministers of State presided over by a President, a position akin to a Prime Minister
Consulta previa: prior consultation
Conveniencia: convenience
Criollo: person from Spanish South or Central America, especially one with pure Spanish descent
Cuenca: river basin
Delizadore or rápido: small fast passenger carrying boats which carry no cargo
Distrito: District
Guarina: biscuits
Hidrovia Amazonica: Amazon waterway
Hospedaje: lodge or host
Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonia Peruana: Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon
Kichwa: indigenous people, part of the much larger Quechua people of South America
Matsés: indigenous people split across the Brazil-Peru border
Mesas de Desarrollo: development round-table discussion
Mestizo or cholo: mixed-race person
Minga: rice-based drink
Moloqua: community hall
Motonaves or lanchas: larger, slow, cargo and passenger carrying ferries with a capacity of 100 tons or more of cargo and space for roughly 100 passengers
Oleoducto Norperuano: North Peruvian pipeline
Oleoducto Ramal Norte: Ramal Norte pipeline
Otro: other
Plantain: cooking banana
Portala: porridge
Posta: (medical) post
Provincia: Provincial (government)
Pueblo: community
Quechua: the largest indigenous people of Peru and an indigenous language
Rio: river
Selva: rainforest
Serrano: person of the Highlands
Sierra: mountain highland region
Soles: Peru’s national currency
Subgerencia: local government
Subgerencia de indígenas: regional government intercultural department
Teniente: Lieutenant
Tuk Tuk or motocaro: rickshaw
Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana: National University of the Peruvian Amazon
Urarina: indigenous people who inhabit the Chambirai, Corrientes and Urituyacu river basins
Yucca: a shrub, also known as cassava, native to South America and a major staple food
Chapter 1 Introduction

1.1 Research problem: The inequality of environmental pollution between nations and citizens

While the dawn of the Twenty-First Century has seen many advances in medicine, technology and science, humanity continues to search for and understand its role and relationship with “Mother Nature.” Is the world merely a resource basket from which we exploit and take what we need for humanity’s survival and development? If we exploit resources, how much should we extract or is exhausting a resource permissible? Should humans instead play a more custodial role that seeks to safeguard and nurture the environment for future generations and thus limit our development levels? Though it is impossible to state the right or wrong answers to these questions unequivocally, the changes to the human – natural world relationship has two significant interconnected consequences; environmental change and environmental pollution.

Their interconnectedness can be clearly understood if one considers environmental pollution at various spatial scales i.e. local, regional and global (see Wapner 1994 pp. 177-179). Crucially, over time, local and regional environmental problems have the potential to become global issues despite only initially affecting a circumscribed area (ibid. p. 179; see also Wingvist 2014 p. 5) and by doing so can help alter the Earth’s climate. It is an exploration into the factors behind increased levels of environmental pollution, specifically oil, in certain countries, which is the core focus of this thesis.

Page (2002 pp. 32-33) briefly discusses the causes of climate change and concludes that no one state is responsible for most pollution that drives climate change and no single state will bear the brunt of the environmental impact. ‘Rather, the causes and effects, costs and benefits, of

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4 A report by Sida’s Helpdesk for Environment and Climate Change cites Mitchell (2009), who provides several reasons why this can happen. Firstly, an environmental problem like watercourse pollution, acid rain or marine pollution originating in a single country can become an international concern once these impacts cross a national border and are detected (Wingvist 2014 p. 5). ‘Secondly, activities resulting in negative impacts on global commons (e.g. atmospheric ozone depletion or climate change), become an international problem once the impacts are discovered and concerns start to grow.’ Thirdly, an environmental impact at the local level ‘can become a regional or international problem if it occurs in many countries’ (ibid. author’s emphasis).
climate change (as well as many other environmental changes) cannot be entirely explained in terms of national states’ (ibid. p. 33). On the face of it, these remarks appear to summarise aptly how climate change and environmental degradation are driven by a high anthropogenic impact (see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 2013; Committee on Climate Change 2016). Yet, though no single state is to blame, responsibility can be placed with a set of nation states (advanced economies) whilst another group (emerging market and developing economies, EMaDEs) bear the brunt of environmental pollution.

The evidence is striking. Within EMaDEs, pollution ‘is the leading cause of death’ with ‘[e]xposure to polluted soil, water and air (both indoor and outdoor) result[ing] in 8.4 million deaths in 2012’ (Global Alliance on Health and Pollution (GAHP) no date p. 1; see also Briggs 2003; World Health Organisation (WHO) 2014; Landrigan and Fuller 2015). Though the clear majority of deaths are attributable to insidious forms of pollution, especially household air (WHO 2014), 18 per cent of the 8.4 million deaths are related to contaminated sites (10 per cent) and water, sanitation and hygiene (8 per cent) problems (GAHP no date p. 2), an unspecified number of which stem from pollution caused through natural resource extraction, including oil.

More specific statistics from the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (IOGP) and International Tanker Owners’ Pollution Federation (ITOPF) have shown a reduction in the number of onshore and offshore oil spills since the early period of the Twenty-First Century when figures first became available (IOGP 2009 pp. 23-25; 2015 pp. 47-52) and accidental marine-based transport oil spills since the 1970s (ITOPF no date). However, recent IOGP statistics for each global region (Africa, Asia/Australasia, Europe, Former Soviet Union (Russia), Middle East, North America and Central and South America) show a disparity based upon oil spill numbers and quantity of onshore oil spilt (Tables 1.1, 1.2). Over the period 2003-2014, the main three oil spill regions were South and Central America (nine years with the highest spill numbers), North America (11 years with the second highest spill numbers) and Africa (11 years with the third highest spill numbers) (Table 1.1). These regions also featured prominently in oil spilt levels;

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5 According to the International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), one should treat these figures with caution as ‘a general lack of information prevents a thorough evaluation of true current levels of oil pollution at sea’ (Camphuysen no date p. 7). An indicator of this can be seen from the 2009 article by Ferraro et al. which was the first study to present a comprehensive review on the level of marine-based pollution in European waters.
Africa had the highest volume spilt for six years with the second highest level for a further five years, Central and South America had three years apiece for the first and second highest levels and North America is ranked in third place for six years (Table 1.2).\(^6\)

Overall one can see from these tables that EMaDE producers based within Africa and Latin America suffer from far higher frequencies and magnitudes of oil spills in comparison to other producers (aside from North America). In Africa, a key illustration is Nigeria’s oil-producing Niger Delta region, which has witnessed severe environmental contamination from oil spills for several decades e.g. in 2014 alone, more than 550 spills occurred (Amnesty International 2015)\(^7\) and a similar picture is visible in Latin American oil producers such as Ecuador and Peru.

Ecuador’s oil pollution ‘has been characterised as “one of the largest environmental disasters in history” by Rainforest Action Network …’ (Business & Human Rights Resource Centre no date) where oil extraction saw ‘as many as 16 million gallons of spilled crude’ and an estimated 18 billion gallons of produced water (Feige 2008). In Peru’s north-east oil producing Loreto Region, 90 oil spills occurred between 2009-2011 in just two oil Block areas (Hance 2011) while the North Peruvian oil pipeline (Oleoducto Norperuano) which transports crude from Loreto to the Pacific coast saw five spills in 2014 and seven spills in 2016 (Law in Action no date) detailed in Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 82. Why do these EMaDE countries suffer increased levels of environmental pollution, particularly oil pollution, in comparison to advanced economy producers? This question lies at the heart of this thesis’ research aims and questions outlined below.

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\(^6\) Unfortunately, data for Russia and the Middle East are unavailable for many of these years, which makes Table 1.2’s data less accurate.

\(^7\) For further statistics see Gonzalez (2016a).

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<th>Years</th>
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<th>Asia/ Australasia</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>Russia</th>
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Key: Highest spill figures per year; second highest spill figures per year; third highest spill figures per year

*Measured in raw statistical figures

**Measured in spills per million tonnes of oil equivalent production (> 1 barrel (bbl))

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Key: **Highest spill volumes per year; second highest spill volumes per year; third highest spill volumes per year**

*Measured in tonnes

**Measured in tonnes per million tonnes
1.2 Research aims, questions and study originality

The key aim of this research is to improve our understanding of, and the reasons behind, the increased number of oil spill/pollution incidents for African and Latin American oil-producing countries. To achieve this, an innovative theoretical framework called the political ecology of voice (PEV) has been designed to investigate how effectively stakeholders (including citizens, community-based organisations (CBOs) and non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) have been able to hold resource extraction industries (REIs) to account for environmental pollution. This framework’s holistic and multi-faceted approach combining the theoretical framework of political ecology with the theory of voice proposed by Albert Hirschman (1970; 1978; 1981; 1982; 1995) can evaluate the voice options available to stakeholders through a study of the PEV environment in which they operate. This includes exploration of political freedom, societal influences (race, discrimination), economic means and access (geographical, technological). This constitutes a key part of the originality of this thesis since political ecology and Hirschman’s theory of voice action have never been integrated together in this way or the latter’s voice theory applied within the context of environmental pollution problems.

What do we mean by accountability and how does voice relate to this term? In relation to accountability in an environmental context, this thesis utilises the term laid out by the United Nations in the Glossary of Environment Statistics (1997): ‘Accountability is the responsibility for the deterioration of the natural environment, implying the allocation of environmental costs to the economic activities that cause such deterioration’ (United Nations 1997 p. 1). Hirschman originally noted in the consumer-industry context that voice ‘is an attempt at changing the practices, policies, and outputs of the firm from which one buys or of the organisation to which one belongs’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 30). Therefore, one can understand the action of voice as an act of protest. In this context, it is as an attempt to allocate responsibility for environmental costs attributable to economic actor(s) so that an objectionable state of affairs (i.e. a pollution event) ends and a possible change in operational practice occurs.

The action of voice itself, outlined in the “typology of protest voice” (see Chapter 2, Section 2.8), shows how this can occur through active or passive forms that are, in turn, subdivided into more specific forms of voice action (e.g. radical voice, or unorthodox informal voice). A study of the PEV environment in which this voice action occurs can show why a particular manifestation of vocal protest is undertaken. In turn, this will help evaluate the ability
of different voice stakeholders to hold REIs accountable for pollution issues. The term ‘voice stakeholders’ underscores how this research also explores voice in non-protest forms. Different types of voice stakeholders or actors are visible, including individual (citizen) voice, collective (CBO/NGO) voice and institutional (government/REI) voice. Together, the different voice actions and actors constitute the typology of protest voice. It is this study of voice action which differentiates PEV from third generation post-structural political ecology and its acknowledgement of and research into discourse (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5).

This thesis explores PEV in Peru’s oil-producing Loreto Region, which has been the site of long-term oil production. What makes Loreto so invaluable for PEV are the unfortunately high number of documented oil spills and connected social protests which thus presented many opportunities to engage with a study of voice in this context. Moreover, unlike its oil-producing neighbour, Ecuador, which continues to generate a significant body of research on the country’s oil politics, management and wider impacts, there has been little systematic and detailed study of Loreto’s oil production within academia. Part of the reason behind using Loreto as a case-study of PEV was to help fill this literature gap and counterbalance the level of academic and wider media attention which the situation in Ecuador receives.

The overarching research question aims to evaluate the extent to which Peruvian Loreto stakeholders can effectively voice and hold REIs, specifically Petroperu, accountable for environmental issues through a study of political (power), social (position in society), economic (financial means) and access-based (geographical remoteness from key decision-making mechanisms, lack of ICT access) issues. Encompassing this, several important sub-questions have formed the basis of fieldwork data collection. These are:

- What is Peru’s national political environment’s freedom of voice level for stakeholders i.e. permissible level of voice? Are stakeholders constrained in any way by Peruvian laws or consultative (or lack thereof) mechanisms?

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8 Unfortunately, despite insider fieldwork connections, I was unable to access any REI institutional voice representatives. This has meant that the voice of oil companies is largely absent from the thesis. However, I was able to interview several former oil workers (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.1).

9 For books see for example; Gerlach (2003); Sawyer (2004); Martin (2011); Barrett (2014) and Vasquez (2014). For articles see Centre for Economic and Social Rights (1994); Kimerling (1995; 1996); San Sebastián et al. (2001); Lyons (2004) and Gomez (2015).
• What level of state presence and engagement with civil society exists in Loreto, particularly with remote oil-producing areas? How does this impact upon the use of voice by stakeholders?
• What impact do societal influences e.g. discrimination, different ontological views have upon the interactions and relationships between state and citizens, citizens and business and citizens and other actors (CBOs, NGOs)?
• Are REIs deliberately utilising sub-standard operational practices in geographically remote locations and/or against citizens who do not have the knowledge or the means to challenge them?
• Are REIs withholding or controlling the ability of stakeholder voices to be effectively used in decision-making mechanisms?
• What are the REIs legal obligations surrounding consultation and communication with stakeholders and what is the on the ground reality in Loreto?
• What impact and influence do collective-voice organisations (CBOs and NGOs) have on citizen voice?

1.3 Research methodology

The research for these various sub-questions was generated through a three-and-a-half-month fieldwork trip to Loreto from March-June 2015. A multi-method qualitative methodology was utilised incorporating semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and micro-geography analysis. Altogether, 110 interviews were undertaken with 105 different participants from various Loreton voice actor groups, including citizens from two case-study communities affected by oil contamination, other citizen voices of interest including university academics, students, legal professionals and former oil workers and collective (CBO, NGO) and institutional (government) voice representatives. The multitude of different interview participants constitute the various individual, collective and institutional voice groups.

Pre-fieldwork contact was made with several NGO representatives who were not only interviewed in Loreto but provided valuable information on Loreto oil politics, other useful contacts and possible case-study communities to investigate. The latter factor was important as I hoped that the possibility of travelling to indigenous communities with these non-threatening

10 As implied, several participants were interviewed more than once. See Chapter 4, Section 4.2, Footnote 90.
collective voice organisations rather than institutional representatives would help develop greater trust and willingness for citizens to communicate in interviews, aided by a recruitment of local Loreton interpreters (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2.4).

As fieldwork progressed and my knowledge of the Loreton situation improved, my work coalesced into a focus on the state-controlled oil company, Petroperu, and the experiences of two of its oil-based communities. The first was Barrio Florida, a non-indigenous mestizo (mixed-race) pueblo (community) adjacent to Petroperu’s Iquitos (the Loreton Regional capital) refinery and Cuninico, a Cocama indigenous rainforest community situated on the banks of the Rio (river) Marañón and near the Oleoducto Norperuan in the Marañón Cuenca (river basin) (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2.1). Their voices form the heart of this research (see Chapter Four, Section 4.2.2 and Chapters 5-8).

To assess my data, a weak form of inductive (or conventional) content analysis was used, coded through NVivo electronic software via a range of concepts, categories and propositions (together called typologies). A pre-fieldwork storyline of analyst-based typologies was set up to provide a rough framework for my interview coding. As analysis continued, these analyst-based typologies were confirmed, divided, expanded, built-upon, re-defined and removed into a post-fieldwork storyline which also accommodated indigenous typologies originating from the SSI data. The coding process was supported through my use of extension, bridging and surfacing techniques along with a focus on negative cases and surprising findings (see Chapter Four, Section 4.3).

1.4 Reasons for undertaking this research

The interest in this topic stems from my MA in War Studies at King’s College London, where I undertook a module examining the role of natural resource conflict. This immediately fascinated me as it was something which I had never studied or thought about before. The first essay for that module explored the role of oil in the prolongation of conflict, which I based around the experiences of three African countries (Angola, Nigeria and Sudan), whilst the second essay investigated the extent to which resource conflict is driven by local claims versus national interest via Bolivian, Ecuadorian, Nigerian and Peruvian case studies. My passion and

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11 An indigenous people numbering approximately 10,000-15,000 who predominantly reside in the Loreton Amazonian basin along several rivers including the Marañón, Nucuray, Pastaza and Uritayacu.
talent for this work helped generate my first two publications in the *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development* (Gonzalez 2010; 2011) based around these essays, and I subsequently continued to pursue my research interest in this field alongside secondary school history and music teaching for two years. This culminated in my two most recently published papers (Gonzalez 2016a; 2016b), which centred on Nigeria’s Niger Delta and the issues and possible policy solutions to the social conflict, its lack of socio-economic development and wider state corruption (the natural resource curse). These papers were extensively redrafted during my PhD work, thus benefiting from my Peruvian experience and the conceptual and comparative insights being developed from this thesis and the associated writing and prose improvements.

All this research helped propel me to decide to undertake a PhD to study this topic in greater depth, which I think was driven by a sense of anger at the injustice face by marginalised peoples and the world’s poor. Over the course of this initial research, I had been particularly fascinated by the impact of oil extraction upon the relationships among state, society and business and why certain oil-producing countries in Africa and Latin America continue to suffer greater levels of social conflict and environmental degradation. I feel an emotive connection to the latter continent owing to my father’s Venezuelan indigenous heritage and I have always wanted to visit this continent to connect with this part of my culture. The study of PEV within Peru’s Amazon basin has given me an opportunity to do this. It’s clear that at some level, my positionality incorporates an underlying shared emotive and cultural insider connection to the continent and its indigenous peoples despite my more obvious exterior connotations. However, analysis of my role as a researcher highlights that I’m not part of any one stakeholder group that encompasses my research but instead have a reflexive positionality which recognises the temporally fluid and unique contextual situations which research can create (see Chapter 4, Section 4.2.4).

1.5 Summary and structure of the thesis

Overall, through PEV, this thesis presents a remarkable study into how effectively Loreton stakeholders can hold REIs, particularly Petroperu, accountable for environmental pollution. This incorporates an exploration into the relationships among Loreton stakeholders, the state and REIs as well as the relationships between citizens and other stakeholders (CBOs, NGOs) themselves. By doing so, it is hoped that further insight into the causes of increased African and Latin American oil pollution will become clear.
Chapter Two provides a literature review exploring the causes of environmental degradation in EMaDEs, split into eight major sections. A brief introduction narrates the literature themes explored within this thesis; this leads into two interlinked parts that examine the causes behind increased EMaDE pollution; power inequality and the dominance of western socio-economic processes (Section 2.1) and environmental governance (Section 2.2). This narrative is summarised before introducing PEV (Section 2.3), which is explored in several parts. It starts with an investigation into wider literature surrounding citizens and environmental management (Section 2.4) before Section 2.5 shows why voice can be situated within the political ecology framework. Section 2.6 introduces Albert Hirschman’s exit and voice theories, which are subsequently reconceptualised within an environmental pollution context; Section 2.6.1 for exit and Section 2.6.2 for voice, the latter forming the basis for PEV. This is followed by an exploration of how the contextual factors surrounding the application of voice by citizens and other stakeholders can be combined with certain elements of political ecology (specifically, power, scale, space and time) to form PEV and a discussion of how PEV is differentiated from third generation post-structural political ecology (Section 2.7). Section 2.8 sets out the typology of protest voice which explores different forms of voice action and its actors before a brief conclusion summarises this section (Section 2.9).

Chapter Three provides a detailed contextual overview of Peru’s oil history and the choice of it and Loreto as a case study. Section 3.1 sets out my academic journey and the changes to fieldwork location in the first year of study, which helped lead to Peru’s Loreto Region. Section 3.2 and Section 3.3 are interlinked parts that delve into the country’s oil history; the first from 1900 to the early 1980s while the second explores Peru’s contemporary oil history from the mid-1980s to the present-day. Finally, Section 3.4 sketches out Loreto as a case study in greater detail, including its geographical terrain, political administration and oil economy.

Chapter Four then explains the methodology adopted for the research. It begins by summarising the quantitative and qualitative research methods and philosophies (Section 4.1), before setting out the researcher’s use of multi-method qualitative research incorporating SSIs and micro-geography analysis (Section 4.2). Several sub-sections lay out other important considerations, including the use of gatekeepers and choice of fieldwork sites (Section 4.2.1), gathering data and data levels (Section 4.2.2), interview questions (Section 4.2.3), use of audio
recording devices, interpreters, translators and researcher’s positionality (Section 4.2.3) and ethical reflections (Section 4.2.5). Lastly, Section 4.3 discusses qualitative data analysis and the methods used to undertake this.

Chapter Five is the first of four analysis chapters based upon the primary fieldwork. Chapter Five sets out PEV in the wider Peruvian physical and emotive world by exploring the freedom of voice and societal influences on this action. Section 5.1 investigates the freedom for stakeholders to voice through an evaluative study of the Peruvian state and the laws and regulations surrounding voice. Section 5.2 details the mechanisms and societal influences within Peruvian society, split into two smaller sub-sections; Section 5.2.1 studies the impact of class, discrimination and race whilst Section 2.5.2 lays out the impact of bureaucracy and the role of amiguismo (cronyism) before a concluding section (Section 5.3).

Chapter Six moves into PEV analysis of the feasibility of Loreton stakeholder engagement with the government. Section 6.1 which is split into four smaller sub-sections details the state’s engagement, presence and relationships with Barrio Florido and Cuninico. The first (Section 6.1.1) appraises selva (rainforest) civil society development for the two pueblos, the response by state officials to public requests for development and the consequences that the poor public transport network has for selva communities. Section 6.2.2 delves into politicians’ engagement with selva-based pueblos through the experiences found within Barrio Florido and Cuninico. The two resulting overarching impacts from the situation are then explored (Section 6.1.3). Together, they help to frame citizen access to the state and dialogue and voice actions for both communities in relation to the contamination events described in Section 6.1.4. Section 6.2 moves into a study of collective voice-based access and relationships with the state before the conclusion in Section 6.3 draws together the various points raised for citizens and other collective voice stakeholders in relation to the state PEV environment.

Chapter Seven moves into an evaluation of Loreton stakeholder engagement with Petroperu. It commences with Section 7.1, that provides an overview of REI presence in the Loreton selva and their historic and contemporary access arrangements for citizens before narrowing onto the Petroperu situation. This is followed by Section 7.2, that investigates Cuninico’s relationship and ability to voice with Petroperu with focus on a 2014 oil pollution event and their treatment during and after the spill. In a similar vein, Section 7.3 sets out Barrio
Florido’s relationship with the oil company, and how their day to day relationship influences citizens voice during environmental pollution and other critical incidents. The penultimate section (7.4) tackles collective-voice REI access and engagement before Section 7.5 ties together the preceding sections into a conclusion.

Chapter Eight, the final analysis chapter, investigates the shaping and moulding of citizen voice by Petroperu and collective-voice-based stakeholders. This has been split into four sections, the first detailing REI strategies. Section 8.1 highlights REIs suppression of voice through economic, development and other threats in Barrio Florido and Cuninico before Section 8.2 explores REI fragmentation of CBO voice. The penultimate section (8.3) details the impact and influence that collective voice organisations (CBO, NGO groups) have on citizen voice, their voice strength, chosen action(s) and access to the state and/or REIs. Chapter Nine is the main conclusion of the thesis, which has been split into ten sections. Sections 9.1 to 9.6 answer the various research sub-questions outlined in Section 1.2 of this introduction and which lead into a summary (Section 9.7) of Peruvian Loreton stakeholders PEV and the main research question. Section 9.8 evaluates the effectiveness of PEV and wider methodological issues before a penultimate section details my self-reflection upon this research’s outcome (Section 9.9). Lastly, Section 9.10 provides a brief discussion of possible future research directions for PEV.12

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12 Before the thesis proceeds, a brief note on punctuation and grammar. Singular quotation marks are used when citing references and double punctuation marks are used for interviewees and when referring to “so-called” words or phrases. All Spanish words are in italic font and are immediately defined in brackets or in a footnote and are listed in the Glossary of Spanish terms. Rounded brackets are used throughout the thesis except in instances where I have inserted words or definitions into a quote in which case square brackets are used. Lastly, all measurements are provided in metric and written out in full.
Chapter 2 Sustaining the unsustainable; the causes of environmental pollution

Chapter 1 has sketched out the rationale behind this thesis’s research into the increased frequency of oil spills for African and Latin American producers, one specific pollutant that typifies higher levels of EMaDE pollution. Initially, my reading was focused on understanding the impact that global mechanisms have on this issue. This involved a study of the operational difficulties within the international political system (including the dominance of realist international politics) and the apparent onset of (economic and cultural) globalisation and their subsequent effects on supranational environmental governance. Gradually, my reading moved into a more detailed study of where responsibility can be placed within these global mechanisms incorporating research into ecological distribution conflicts, ecological footprinting and externalities and why, which comprised enquiry into geographical distance, environmental racism, post-ecologism, neoliberalism, sustainable development and the role and relationship between specific actors (states, NGOs, international financial institutions (IFIs), transnational companies (TNCs) and consumers). The possible theoretical solutions to these international mechanisms was also broached via exploration into the work of green political theorists, social and shallow ecologists and survivalist and ecopolitical theorists.

This analysis originally led me to consider research into advanced economy consumer accountability options for oil TNCs revolving around ethical purchase behaviour and/or transnational ICT-based coalition movements. Whilst these ideas were discontinued owing to their impracticability and the time constraints of the PhD, the reading surrounding consumer accountability of business led me to examine Albert Hirschman’s (1970) theories of exit and voice, which now forms part of the theoretical bedrock of this thesis. The function of voice vis-à-vis environmental problems saw me return to analysis of political ecology and the creation of PEV, which was bolstered through research into participatory development and participatory conservation.

The impact of global mechanisms and the causes of increased EMaDE pollution are, nevertheless, very important factors which merit discussion and as such appear within two interlinked sections: power inequality and the dominance of western socio-economic processes (Section 2.1). Their impact will then be traced within Section 2.2, exploring environmental
governance before a summary (Section 2.3) leads into the final parts of this chapter (Sections 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7, 2.8) which sets out my own PEV theoretical framework to explore oil pollution issues.

2.1 Power inequality and the dominance of western socio-economic processes

An investigation into the notion of power is hugely important for exploration into environmental pollution. As Peet, Robbins and Watts (2011 p. 31) identify, ‘[e]nvironmental problems (and their possible solutions) are inevitably entangled with questions of power and governance.’ A state’s ability to regulate environmental problems is dependent on its levels of power and influence which can be measured and explored through consideration of a state’s position in, and modus operandi of, the international political system.

For neo-realists\(^{13}\) (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2006 p. 72), the state’s pursuit of hegemonic power indicates an anarchic political system where power is unequally distributed and advanced economies, particularly the United States, remain dominant (Nadelmann 1990 p. 484; Vogler 2000 p. 209, cited in Redclift 2002 p. 75). This has helped establish an ongoing process of cultural and economic globalisation, the ‘only game in town’ (Bluhdorn and Welsh 2007 p. 190) with the latter’s advanced economy development model (described shortly) seen by many social scientists as exclusively serving advanced economy corporate interests (Barber 1992; 1995; Foller 1999 p. 58; Barnet and Cavanagh 2003; Clarke 2003 pp. 71-73; Korten 2003 p. 39; Mander 2003 p. 2; Soete and Weehuizen 2003 p. 12).

However, institutionalist\(^{14}\) scholars are critical of hegemonic powers’ role (Young 1989 pp. 65-66; 1990 p. 341), instead seeing an emerging global governance system indicating a ‘nobody in charge process’ (Myers 1988 p. 413; see also Lipschutz 1997 p. 96). Meanwhile evidence of the hotly debated and contested nature of globalisation (Soete and Weehuizen 2003

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\(^{13}\) The realist school argues that states are sovereign and consequently autonomous of each other and ‘are bound only by forcible → coercion or their own → consent’ (Slaughter 2011 p. 1 author’s emphasis). More specifically, neo or structural realists believe that the lack of a higher international authority compels states to pursue power as ‘there is no guarantee that one will not attack another’ (Mearsheimer 2006 p. 72). This contrasts with classical realists who suggest state pursuit of power is caused by human nature (see Morgenthau and Thompson1993).

\(^{14}\) Institutionalists share many realist assumptions about the international political system but believe that state co-operation is possible through ‘institutions – defined as a set of rules, norms, practices and decision-making procedures that shape expectations – [which] can overcome the uncertainty that undermines co-operation’ (Slaughter 2011 pp. 2-3; see also Jonsson and Tallberg (2001) for detailed analysis on different varieties of institutionalism).
p. 7) can be seen in the global-local relationship explored by postmodernists 15 (the “glocalisation” and “globalisation as hybridisation” concepts), development geographers (strengthening of cultural boundaries) and political ecologists (“place”, territorialisation and “globalised local” resource extraction sites) (Friedman 1995; Robertson 1995; Pieterse 1995; Hall 1997; Watts 2000a; Voisey and O’Riordan 2001; Biersack 2006 p. 16; Greenberg 2006).

Therefore, despite advanced economy power, a transformative system (Rosenau 1995 p. 17) of global governance has been established, encapsulating a multilevel and ‘crowded [and] dynamic’ (Soete and Weehuizen 2003 p. 39) multiactor16 system where states have lost ‘some of their earlier dominance’ (Rosenau 1995 p. 39) to these actors who can now construct international politics and economics (Rosenau 1999 pp. 295-296; Clarke 2003 p. 71; Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000; Rixecker and Tipense-Matua 2003 p. 253; Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006; Weiss, Seyle and Coolidge 2013).

Despite state power loss in this multi-centric and multi-level political system, advanced economies have retained influence by entrenching their economic values (capitalism, neoliberalism and consumerism) into the global economic system. This idea draws upon political geographers like O’Lear (2010 p. 8) who have examined the concept of scale and the ‘relationships among actors and places and … [the] systems of rules or values that emerge to shape these relationships’ and their transference from non-local places and actors. Political ecologists’ work is also important as they perceive the creation of a “globalised local” discourse occurring via a dominant advanced economy discourse (Lohmann 1995; Shiva 1995) and the establishment of a liberal international economic order (LIEO).

The contemporary political and economic influence of advanced economy countries can be understood if one considers the colonial European-based empires which symbolised and were an instrument of their power. The LIEO has continued this through the creation of IFIs (International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank) which provided the USA and UK with investment and trade influence (Young 2002 p. 20).

15 There is no general definition of postmodernism which can be written here as the term is instead used in various contexts with several meanings (Devetak 1999 p. 62). In this international relations context, it can be understood as ‘an attempt to avoid slipping into totalising views of epistemology and ontology and technical applications of theory to practice’ and ‘must be willing to question self-evident truths about the ‘real world’ and the agents of change’ (ibid. p. 73).

16 These include CBOs, IFIs, NGOs, TNCs (Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000 pp. 1-2) and more specifically REIs.
Social scientists argue that part of globalisation’s success has been its ability to expand the market and advanced economy economic principles to swathes of the planet where it never previously existed (Korten 1995 p. 12; Retallack 2003 p. 202). The dominance of these ideas is not ‘through any “inherent” power of the ideas themselves’ (Heynen et al. 2007a p. 7) but instead explained through political mechanisms like IFIs that propel their entrenchment as the colonial ‘norm’ (Pieterse 2001 p. 165; see also Goldsmith, E. 2003; Shiva 2003 p. 204). IFI’s almost religious fervour towards advanced economy-based development (George and Sabelli 1994) has been matched by the political pressure they have exerted on EMaDEs to follow their unilateral “advice” effectively (Kay 1989 p. 12; Goldman 2001a p. 509; 2001b p. 193; Mander 2003 pp. 10-11; Retallack 2003 p. 195; North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1483).

Two key IFI policies illustrate LIEO ideals; their Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and acceptance of advanced economy-centric, growth-based sustainable development (Engel 1990 p. 10; Kothari 1990 p. 27; Schor 1995; Worster 1995; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Helm 2000; Broadhead 2002; Reed 2002 p. 206; Bello 2003 p. 127; Clarke 2003 pp. 73-75; Willis 2005 p. 52; Bluhdorn and Welsh 2007; Heynen et al. 2007a p. 7; Fuchs and Boll 2011). For Bluhdorn and Welsh (2007), these indicate the entering of a “post-ecological” age in which ‘the management of the inability and unwillingness to become sustainable has taken centre ground’ (p. 192 authors emphasis) through acceptance of capitalism within sustainable development and the non-negotiability of democratic consumer capitalism (ibid. pp. 187, 198). More recently, Bluhdorn (2013 p. 20) noted that though urgent changes to capitalist consumer society have never been as widely accepted within mainstream societal discourse, this has failed to soften the defence of socio-economic structures and lifestyles that encompass this post-ecological paradox. The key reason behind this is power; EMaDEs lack power to influence or challenge the LIEO.

The crucial issue is to now consider the LIEO’s environmental impact. Certain institutionalist and realist scholars have defended LIEO processes from “misplaced” criticism over free trade and growth impacts (Porter and Brown 1991 p. 142; Bhagwati 1993 p. 43; 2004; Payne 1995 p. 49; Vogler 2011 p. 16). However, social scientists including political ecologists and political economists spell out the damaging environmental “entropy” (Frank 2006) which the LIEO socio-economic values and processes continue to have (Hirschman 1992 p. 135; Hildyard 1995 pp. 29-30; Sachs 1995 p. 4; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Hajer and Fischer 1999 p. 39
Firstly, IFI SAP deregulation of environmental policy helped create short-term profit maximisation, severe environmental abuses and a lack of environmental regulatory oversight which in turn led to a “race to the bottom” over environmental standards\textsuperscript{17} (felt particularly by countries rich in natural resources), issues which continue under a Twenty-First Century neo-extractivism policy approach in Latin America (Collinson 1996; Dore 1996; Kaimowitz 1996 p. 20; Reed 2002; Clarke 2003 pp. 73-75; Retallack 2003; Sobhani and Retallack 2003; North and Grinspun 2016). This not only allowed TNCs, (especially REIs) to engage in environmentally harmful actions that would be illegal in advanced economies and/or would incur heavy financial penalties (Retallack 2003 p. 193) but the race to the bottom gave greater power to corporate interests, particularly TNCs to veto environmental regulatory improvements (Hirschman 1978 p. 100; North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1495). The impact of these unequal state-business power relations is an important point, not only due to the potential environmental repercussions and the level of influence the latter has over environmental governance (discussed in greater detail in Section 2.3) but also raises the prospect of power inequality in relationships with other stakeholders e.g. citizens, a point discussed shortly and one visible within the analysis chapters (see Chapter 7, Sections 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.5).

Secondly, environmental costs of development remain unfairly distributed between advanced economies and EMaDEs through environmental externalities. Bhaskar and Glyn (1995) define these as environmental bads ‘inflicted by consumers and firms upon other agents in the economy’ (p. 3) due to the failure of the capitalist price system to incorporate social, environmental and long-term costs associated with production and consumption that can see consumers shielded from market production costs (Beckenbach 1994 p. 97; Princen 1997; Labban 2011 p. 332). Crucially, they ‘are often what the rich and powerful do to the weak and hungry’ (Bhaskar and Glyn 1995 p. 4) and are a symptom of “ecological distribution conflicts.”

\textsuperscript{17} See Herrmann (1995 p. 286), Korten (1995 pp. 129-130), Goldsmith, A. (2003 p. 141) and Kelly (no date) for a Mexico “maquiladoras” example.
Environmental justice movement scholars argue that at national and global levels, most environmental degradation is caused by advanced economies and affluent societal members who have helped lead to a major increase in transboundary problems which disproportionately impact the world’s poor (Korten 1995; Ehresman and Stevis 2011; Agyeman, Bullard and Evans 2003a pp. 1-2; Blowers 2003 p. 70; McLaren 2003; Rees and Westra 2003; Bluhdorn and Welsh 2007). Ecological footprinting studies show a disparity in livelihood impacts between advanced economies and EMaDEs and the former’s overconsumption, which remains the primary driver of climate change and environmental pollution (Schor 1995; Sen 1995; Mitchell 1996; Wackernagel and Rees 1996; Princen 1999; Fuchs and Lorek 2002; Rees and Westra 2003; Horton 2006 p. 128; Wilk 2006; Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010).

Various authors imply that part of the problem lies in the relationship between producers and consumers with the latter’s geographical isolation and wealth protecting them from its negative consequences or necessary social responses (Gould, Schnaiberg and Weinberg 1996 p. 34, cited in Blowers 2003 p. 70; Rees and Westra 2003 p. 107), a term Princen (1997) calls distancing. Geographical distance leaves advanced economies and their societies in a powerful position where individual and collective responsibility for pollution caused through lifestyle choices and economic processes is never fully tackled. As Princen (1997 p. 249) notes, ‘no established principle of distribution would hold individuals responsible for the consequences of their actions when they are so removed that the individuals can have no effect.’

However, this argument cannot alone answer Blowers’ (2003) conclusion that certain people and places suffer (p. 70 emphasis added). It is useful to draw upon Princen’s (1997) work on the political economy of degradation (p. 236) and efforts by business leaders to establish frontier economies’ which shows how ‘short-term, cut-and-run, mine-and-depart behaviour’ leads to externalities (ibid. p. 237) particularly for EMaDEs and the most marginalised citizens that ‘have little clout’ (ibid. p. 238) or opportunity (Tilly 1978 p. 55) to make their concerns known. For Princen (1997 p. 237), this is caused by jurisdictional discontinuity and the operation of businesses, particularly TNCs across international borders which limits the levels of redress that can be achieved by aggrieved parties over an environmental issue due to ‘myriad legal, cultural and political obstacles.’ As Sachs (2009 p. 23) concludes, ‘[t]hrough transnationalisation, capital is in the position to escape any links of loyalty to a particular society.’ Here one can see issues of power inequality between citizens,
particularly marginalised citizens, and TNCs and the difficulties that the former may face in holding the latter accountable for environmental pollution issues, though one must acknowledge the important role which the media (especially civil society media) and social media can now play in spanning this distance and providing information (see Clark 2003 p. 85; Hintz 2006).

These points are extremely important for this thesis and are connected to the environmental justice movement’s efforts to investigate how environmental racism can help explain environmental injustice (Wright 2003; see also Cole and Foster 2001; Agbola and Alabi 2003; Eady 2003; Faber and McCarthy 2003; Martinez-Alier 2003; Walker 2012; Nurse 2016). Environmental racism suggests that the most politically oppressed members of society are the ones ‘being selectively victimised to the greatest extent by corporate interests’ (Johnston 1994 p. 11, cited in Faber and McCarthy 2003 p. 39 author italics). In reality, corporate interests adopt less stringent environmental regulations if it is politically expedient to do so as the less political power a community commands, the fewer resources it has to defend its inhabitants. This implies that their awareness of, and mobilisation against, ecological issues, is lower (Faber and McCarthy 2003 p. 39).

The evidence is compelling. A US case study highlights how ethnic minority citizens suffered higher environmental degradation than white communities in the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s (Chavis and Lee 1987; Goldman and Fitton 1994; Lavelle and Coyle 1992; Eady 2003; Wright 2003). Most significantly for this thesis, environmental racism can also be found in EMaDEs including Nigeria, South Africa and Philippines, alongside the historical narrative of the Amazonian rubber boom in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru (Vitug 1993 p. 144; Hvalkof 2000; Forero and Woodgate 2002 pp. 250-251; Agbola and Alabi 2003; Roberts 2003; Wright 2003; Van Valen 2013). As Newell (2005 p. 543) notes, the geographical isolation and/or closer proximity to areas of mineral wealth will often see poorer communities in the front line of REI activity and ‘are most likely to be among the victims of irresponsible investment in sectors such as mining, oil extraction and logging.’ This is clearly visible in Petroperu’s treatment of the Cocama Cuninico community but also the impoverished Barrio Florido pueblo (see Chapter 7, Sections 7.2, 7.3).

Overall, the literature has generated several concluding points. Crucially, drawing upon political ecologists (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Roberts and Parks 2007), one can see multiple
forms of inequality applied to interlinked political, economic, social and environmental problems at multiple scales with environmental change neither ‘neutral’ (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 28) nor distributed fairly (ibid. p. 34). Globalisation, SAP and LIEO impacts have not been a drive towards progress but are instead ‘an ongoing struggle between rich and poor countries over the balance of dominance, dependence, and autonomy with which countries, especially the … [EMaDEs], would be left’ (Hawkins 1993 p. 233). While advanced economies, like EMaDEs, suffer from environmental racism, the impact is worse for the latter, who are already receiving a higher level of environmental pollution. This can make accountability a difficult process, especially for marginalised citizens. How does this multifaceted inequality affect environmental governance at national and international levels? The next section will explore these issues surrounding power and their impact on environmental governance.

2.2 Environmental governance

Academics have debated the validity of using the nation-state system in relation to environmental governance. Some political ecologists, for instance, argue that the nation state is a hindrance to environmental governance (White 1993). Dallimer and Strange (2015) explain this through boundary relationships (habitat/ecosystem and socio-political entities) that suggest increased costs and likelihood of conflict stemming from socio-political boundaries and their major influence on ecosystem management (as geographically shaped political mechanisms) despite serving no ecological function (pp. 132-133; see also Greenberg 1998).

For this researcher, the state remains crucial due to its essential governance role within the multi-centric and multi-level political system (the only actor capable of unifying the various components of Twenty-First Century environmental governance, including the direct or indirect governance of important intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)), the only actor responsible for ensuring environmental integrity and the only actor with the necessary human and financial resources to implement scientific and technical projects to determine, monitor and preserve the global environment (Porter and Brown 1991; Liftin 1993; Hermann 1995 p. 287; Kimerling 1995 pp. 307-309; Campbell and Hushagen 2002; O’Neill 2009; Berg 2010; Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010 p. 53).
Yet, the operation of states within a multi-centric and multi-level political system and LIEO have two interlinked impacts, particularly on EMaDEs and environmental regulation. Firstly, social scientists contend that the state protects the global economy and is mobilised to become the ‘representative or guardian of the interests of global markets’ (Kutting 2011 p. 3) and promote market-based regulatory measures (Brenner and Theodore 2007 p. 154; see also Ribot 1993 p. 27; Schmitz 2007 p. 2). The liberalisation of trade is likely to undermine environmental regulation and quality (McCarthy 2007), particularly in EMaDEs, where severe social and economic constraints compromise their ability to formulate competent environmental policy (Costi 2003 p. 296).

Secondly, EMaDEs often have weaker state structures, which makes them more susceptible (even collectively) to powerful national and international actors and individuals who can wield high degrees of influence and shape government policy decisions (Blaike 1985; Nadelmann 1990 p. 483; Bayart 1993; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Anderberg 1999 pp. 139-140; Hyden 1999 p. 153; Falkner 2009; Rodgers et al. 1999; Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010).\footnote{18 However, despite their more robust state structures, advanced economies also suffer these pressures (Goldsmith, E. 2003 p. 33).}

Though Payne (1995 pp. 43-45) counters the claim that some groups have greater influence than others, clearly certain non-state actors’ power (TNCs) can often supersede other actors (NGOs). Porter and Brown (1991 p. 42) argue that strong environmental groups can overcome vested interests surrounding global environmental issues through translation into electoral influence. Yet, as the USA shows, the $1 billion a year investment by conservative economic interests to deny climate science and fund conservative political elements (Brulle 2014; Goldenberg 2013; 2015) not only underscores NGO financial disparity to achieve this but also the former’s requirement to only ‘avert international [environmental] action rather than … get consensus for it’ (Porter and Brown 1991 p. 65).

Alongside the transboundary nature of pollution problems, these issues have led institutionalists, Foucauldian and social scientists, including political ecologists and green political theorists, to suggest that countries should collectively regulate environmental problems at regional or international levels (termed supranational environmental governance) (Young 1989; 1990; Goodin 1992 p. 5; White 1993; Nitsch 1994 p. 24; Amalric 1995; Bhaskar
and Glyn 1995; Ekins and Jacobs 1995; Fuchs and Lorek 2002; Chasek, Downie and Brown 2010; Death 2010). Nevertheless, other literature has laid out issues with supranational environmental governance which can be broken down into five key interlinked concerns.

Firstly, some social scientists argue that diplomatic efforts to secure individual national development advantages cause environmental concerns to be treated as ‘bargaining chips’ (Sachs 1995 pp. 12-13), with a chief focus placed on protecting each nation from the costs of global environmental degradation (Porter and Brown 1991; Banuri 1995 p. 64). Many authors highlight how the vested interests of advanced economies surrounding environmental governance and LIEO maintenance, combined with their greater power, means that environmental summits become victories for advanced economies over EMaDEs and prevents states behaving in the same way in relation to supranational environmental governance (i.e. curbing climate change and pollution) (Hildyard 1995; Lohmann 1995 p. 158; Miller 1995; Conca and Dabelko 1998 p. 9; Death 2010).

Secondly, advanced economy reluctance to relinquish their political and economic privileges voluntarily has generated EMaDE distrust over supranational environmental governance which helps explain why co-operative agreements have been difficult to attain and sustain in world politics (Porter and Brown 1991 p. 127; Lipschutz and Conca 1993 p. 332; Sutcliffe 1995 p. 255; Conca and Dabelko 1998 p. 9; Robert and Parks 2007; Fehling, Nelson and Venkatapuram 2013; Kroll 2015; Loewe and Rippin 2015; Carty and Le Comte 2016), evident in many recent agreements e.g. 2015 UN Climate Change Conference (COP21), Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) 2015-2030, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Consequently, due to conflicting policy objectives (Montgomery 1991 pp. 17-18), it is clear to see why a single international environmental agency is ‘quite improbable’ (Lipschutz 1997 p. 85).

Thirdly, the multi-centric and multi-level political system has also transformed the applications of environmental governance mechanisms, particularly for business. Their more visible presence in international politics since the 1980s via representative groups (e.g. the World Business Council for Sustainable Development) and Corporate Social Responsibility

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19 There are differences in opinion over the use of regional regimes (Young 1989 p. 122) versus an international body (White 1993 p. 167).
(CSR) schemes, has strengthened and legitimised the corporate sector’s role in global environmental policy making (Prout 1983 p. 42; Myers 1988; Falkner 2009; Clapp 2011 p. 48).

Whilst environmental management is vital for business survival (Friedman 1992 p. 92), Myers (1988) believes that TNCs can play a constructive role in natural resource sectors (p. 411) ‘because these actors are not just a source of problems but also an integral part of solutions’ (Holme and Watts 2000, cited in Clapp 2011 p. 48). Not all share this view. Giving TNCs a strong voice at the table will lead to diluted agreements because industry has an interest in ensuring that regulation is not stringent (Fuchs 2005; Bruno 2002, cited in Clapp 2011 p. 48), an outcome pursued through international relations lobbying and the shaping of public discourses surrounding environmental problems (Falkner 2009 pp. 9-10).

Others view their influence via privatised self-regulation as a clear indication of their new decision-making ability vis-à-vis nation states which allows them to delay or avoid the imposition of other rules which may be stricter, compulsory or less convenient for the company (thereby weakening international environmental and human rights law) and significantly reducing independent policy monitoring (Kimerling 1996 pp. 62, 67; Newell 2005; Utting 2005; Ford 2011 p. 38; Kutting 2011 p. 2). Business self-regulation is reliant on business leaders’ moral insight (as to what specific situations require) and moral commitment (to act in accord with appropriate norms even when this is in direct opposition to significant economic interests). This conflicts with their primary profit and growth drivers, the latter placing increasing demands on resources that can contribute directly to environmental degradation (Reed 2002 p. 218; Ford 2011 p. 35).

However, even with the creation of supranational environmental governance regulatory frameworks at various spatial scales, two further difficulties can limit their practical implementation. Fourthly, efforts to improve compliance through benefit increases (to outweigh costs) and through greater non-compliance penalties will still not prevent supranational environmental governance compliance mechanisms from being an incomplete mechanism that will allow non-compliance (Young 1989 p. 62; Heyes 2000). An illustration can be seen in the case of the South Pacific island state of Kiribati, which despite being a member of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) and a signatory of various environmental treaties aimed at establishing a protective regime for the South Pacific
region, ‘has generally neglected the domestication of the provisions of these treaties [i.e. incorporating them into their domestic laws], a necessary requirement for … making them enforceable’ and ‘has often failed to submit its periodic reports to the treaty monitoring bodies as and when due’ (Olowu 2007 p. 266).

Fifth and finally, successful supranational environmental governance depends on the nature of the environmental activity in question and its vulnerability to international suppression efforts by states, with the most difficult problems hinging around those with a resilient and substantial consumer demand that is ‘not readily substituted for by alternative activities or products’ (Nadelmann 1990 p. 486). One can see this through food consumption; though fair trade and organic producers have expanded their production, cheap and convenient fast food and nutrient poor processed food continues to grow coming ‘at the cost of environmental degradation and social injustice’ (Isenhour 2011 p. 12; see also Dragusanu, Giovannucci and Nunn 2014; Fisher 2015; Soil Association Certification no date). This is visible in the spoiling and squandering of one-third of the world’s food production before its consumption, a problem contributing to almost 1 billion people around the world going hungry (Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 2015; no date). It is also applicable to oil production and resulting environmental problems; substantial advanced economy consumer demand combined with limited alternatives (public transport, electric vehicles) maintains the necessity for oil production.

Overall, the new directions of environmental governance (CSR) and issues surrounding supranational environmental governance have divided academics between those that see an evolving non-state governance system increasingly making decisions for states and helping establish neoliberal governance via self-regulatory voluntarist regimes (Mathews 1997; McCarthy and Prudham 2004 p. 276; Himley 2008 p. 442) and those who counter suggestions of business control of the global environmental agenda (Falkner 2011). For this researcher, the Twenty-First Century will see mixed or hybrid systems of governance involving states and non-state authorities in the creation and maintenance of decision-making procedures (Clapp 1998 p. 295, cited in Ford 2011 p. 37; see also O’Neill 2009 p. 194), a modus operandi which

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20 This is a regional umbrella organisation for 21 Pacific island member countries and four countries with direct interests in the region (Olowu 2007 p. 264; see p. 265 for list of treaties).
poses greater problems for EMaDE environmental management due to their weaker political power and voice at the negotiating table.

2.3 Summarising the situation and the political ecology of voice (PEV)

Overall, several interconnected factors stemming from inequality can cause environmental pollution to become more frequent and have a greater impact in EMaDEs. Though advanced economies international power has been curtailed since the colonial period, the LIEO has cemented their economic processes, leaving EMaDEs struggling to challenge or influence this system. This has helped usher in a post-ecological age of unsustainability visible in the high advanced economy consumption levels which externalise environmental costs and generate significant levels of transboundary pollution. As the resulting ecological distribution conflicts indicate, these adversely impact the world’s poor located in EMaDEs.

At the same time, LIEO IFI actors and economic processes have imposed a certain development mode on EMaDEs which has caused increased environmental pollution through lax environmental regulation, accentuated in turn by weaker state structures. Business power in these countries is subsequently strengthened. State efforts to implement supranational environmental governance mechanisms are hampered by objective differences between advanced economies and EMaDEs whilst the hybrid governance system has diluted the role of states and increased business power to shape the environmental regulatory agenda.

Lastly, environmental racism shows that poor and marginalised citizens will face higher levels of environmental pollution from economic actors and may struggle to hold them accountable for these issues, particularly with industries like REIs that may utilise short-term national contracts. It is important to stress that higher levels of oil pollution, found in African and Latin American oil producing regions (Nigeria’s Niger Delta, Ecuador’s Napo, Oriente and Sucumbios Provinces and Peru’s Loreto Region), are also home to significantly large indigenous and traditional community populations, which thus makes environmental racism a significant factor for this research (see Minority Rights Group International (MRG) no date a; no date b; no date c). The question of accountability and power inequality between citizens and business offers fascinating scope for research as it may shed new light on the causes of increased environmental pollution in EMaDEs, particularly surrounding REI projects.
This thesis has built on this idea by creating PEV, an innovative theoretical framework which combines a political ecology framework with the theory of voice developed by Albert Hirschman (1970). ‘PEV can be defined as the study of a specific temporal, [political,] economic, social, and geographical environment in which various stakeholders [citizens, CBOs and NGOs] utilise their voice over an environmental issue’ (Gonzalez 2015 p. 467). By drawing together these temporally influenced factors, a comprehensive theoretical framework is established which will study the feasibility of stakeholder voice actions surrounding their accountability of economic actors for environmental pollution.

These final sections will explore the creation of PEV. Section 2.4 will start by establishing the literature surrounding citizen accountability of business and wider research on the relationship between citizens, the state and business vis-à-vis environmental management before setting out why voice can be situated so successfully within political ecology (Section 2.5). Section 2.6 explores Hirschman’s theories of exit and voice before showing why voice can be successfully integrated into an environmental context. This is followed by an exploration of how the contextual factors surrounding the application of voice by citizens can be combined with certain elements of political ecology (specifically, power, scale, space and time) to form PEV (Section 2.7). This leads into a detailed discussion on the typology of protest voice (Section 2.8) before a brief conclusion summarises this section (Section 2.9).

2.4 Citizens and environmental management

The feasibility of citizen accountability of industry and wider citizen relationships with business and state has been examined by a vast array of literature. Broadly, scholars have focused on the important relationships between companies and local communities that host their industry (Madeley 1999; Evans, Goodman and Lansbury 2002). More specifically, research has explored the participatory relationships21 between industry managers and local people in environmental and developmental situations, including citizen accountability of CSR practices (Cragg and Greenbaum 2002; Newell 2005; Utting 2008; Yakovleva and Vazquez-Brust 2012; Bixler et al. 2015). This is part of a wider debate on the meaning of participation, the degree to which stakeholders are engaged and the nature rather than the degree of

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21 Cornwall (2008) provides a useful characterisation or description of the term participation: ‘An infinitely malleable concept, ‘participation’ can be used to evoke – and to signify – almost anything that involves people’ (p. 269).
participation in areas such as science, technology and democracy (Arnstein 1969; Stiefel and Wolfe 1994; Pretty 1995; Rowe and Frewer 2000; Cummings 2001; Fung 2006; Lawrence 2006; Cornwall 2008). The weakening of state-centric natural resource management has given rise to the establishment of participatory conservation practices in which non-state actors are now involved in natural resource conservation decisions (Bixler et al. 2015 p. 166). Areas of contemporary study include community-based natural resource management and conservation and the difficulties surrounding their implementation, governance interactions between actors involved in environmental management, efforts by local communities to gain access and power over natural resource management, and the process of negotiation between local communities and companies (Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Howitt 2001; Nhantumbo, Norfolk and Perira 2003; Andersson 2004; Brosius, Lowenhaupt Tsing and Zerner 2005; Chirenje, Giliba and Musamba 2013; Le Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 2013). Linked to this have been studies examining businesses being held accountable by local people (e.g. via ‘community-driven regulation’ (CDR)) (O’Rourke 2004) and consumers through ethical purchase behaviour (Smith 1990) and via Hirschman’s (1970) theories of exit and voice discussed shortly.

In some research areas, particularly surrounding participatory approaches, there are clear links with voice through the efforts at understanding the level and nature of engagement (Bixler et al. 2015) between different actors (IFIs, national governments and NGOs), each with their own agendas and participatory interpretations which influence practical application (ibid. p. 165) and the study of the opportunity of individual freedom in pursuit of developmental outcomes (Sen 2001). Since voice can be understood as a form or act of participation, the research on this topic is very relevant.

Crucially, Cornwall (2008) argues that ‘participation is ultimately about power and control’ (p. 271). For instance, Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation split into its three rungs (citizen power, tokenism and non-participation) reveals how token consultation activities are often used by development organisations as a way to legitimise and provide moral authority to decisions already taken (ibid. p. 270). ‘Being involved in a process is not equivalent to having a voice’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 278). Evidence of this is clear in Chapter Five, Section 5.1 detailing Peru’s hydrocarbon consultation mechanisms.
Equally, Pretty’s (1995) typology of participation shows how participation can go from negative or bad participatory forms such as manipulative participation (e.g. the inclusion of token representatives with no real power) or passive participation (people participating in a process where they are told what has been decided or already happened) into more positive forms like consultative participation (participation occurring through consultation) or interactive participation (incorporating structured learning so that local people partake in joint analysis and action plan development before eventually taking over control of local decisions). Power and control is thus more equitable within more positive forms of participation.

In a similar vein, Farrington et al. (1993) discuss participation in relation to depth and breadth: “deep” engagement sees participants involved in all stages of a given activity or “shallow” if they are only informed or consulted. “Wide” engagement incorporates a whole range of people or conversely has “narrow” participation involving only a handful of people or particular interest groups. Power and control become evident in understanding precisely ‘who participates’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 276 author’s emphasis) (e.g. only elite male community members) and who has perhaps been excluded (e.g. the young, women) (ibid.) and the depth to which this participation occurs. Examples of how these participatory approaches operate can be seen in Chapter 8, Section 8.3 detailing collective voice stakeholder impact on citizen voice.

However, the generalised nature of these participatory governance theories requires greater placement ‘within the contours of place-based institutional and environmental histories’ as ‘institutional factors shape outcomes and these vary across a wide spectrum’ (Bixler et al. 2015 p. 177). As (Reed 2008 p. 2426) notes, research needs to better understand and prioritise the factors ‘that make stakeholder participation lead to stronger and more durable decisions in different contexts’ including those surrounding socio-cultural and biophysical differences. A stronger theoretical approach can examine these influences and their impact on participation i.e. voice directly, with PEV offering one such approach.

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22 One must note that while deep and wide participatory approaches would appear to be the best forms of participation, they can be ‘virtually impossible to achieve or so cumbersome and time-consuming that everyone begins to lose interest’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 276). Instead, an ‘optimum participation’ mode must be found that balances between depth and inclusion dependent upon the situation at hand (ibid. author’s emphasis).
In other studies, voice-related issues emerge out of other investigatory themes (e.g. in discussion on the development of Bolivian gas extraction) (Hinojosa et al. 2015 pp. 111-113) or through the application of different theoretical perspectives (e.g. the diffusion process) (Le Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 2013) which make voice appear to be a by-product of other influences or a subsidiary aspect of research. This is by no means a criticism of this vital research, which has improved our understanding of the difficulties surrounding environmental management, the implications of poor governance and the relationship and interaction between actors. Instead, PEV allows voice to become the research’s central focus by mapping out and uncovering the complexities surrounding its application, and ‘its placement within institutional and environmental histories’ (Gonzalez 2015 p. 467). The importance of these institutional and environmental histories and questions of power and governance for voice application requires accommodation within a multi-faceted theoretical framework and political ecology offers the most relevant theoretical site.

2.5 Situating voice within political ecology

‘We consciously seek to avoid disciplining political ecology …. To the contrary, we encourage the flourishing of political ecology to include the fullest possible range of approaches’ (Zimmerer and Bassett 2003 p. 3).

A definition of political ecology is ‘ill-advised’ (Greenberg and Park 1994 p. 8) as it has been used in so many different ways ‘that there is little overlap in meaning’ (Newmann 2005 p. 3; see also Biersack 1999 p. 11). The array of modifiers and approaches shows this, seeing it described as a “research agenda” (Bryant 1992), an “approach” (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a; Warren, Batterby and Osbahr 2001), a “development discourse” (Peet and Watts 1996) and a “perspective” (Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayer and Wangari 1996) alongside sub-fields that include critical, feminist, third world and urban political ecology (Rocheleau 1995; Rocheleau, Thomas-Slayer and Wangari 1996; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Sayre 1999; Forsyth 2003; Heynen 2013; Ioris 2012; 2014a).23 Despite the lack of a ‘grand theory,’ a meta-narrative, or a comprehensive theoretical underpinning’ (Khan 2013 p. 460), there are still ‘some family resemblances [that] need not share a common core’ (Greenberg and Park 1994 p. 8) but provide a degree of coherence to the field while still leaving space for exploration (Neumann 2005 p. 10).

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23 See also Bryant (2015a) and Perreault, Bridge and McCarthy (2015) for a broad range of approaches.
First generation political ecology can be traced back to the work of Blaikie (1985) and Blaikie and Brookfield (1987a; 1987b; 1987c; 1987d; 1987e), which laid the seeds through efforts at understanding how soil erosion and degradation are not solely environmental processes but ones influenced by human activity effects. The 1987 text defined it as a merger of ecological and political economy concerns, the latter used in a broad but Marxist sense (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a p. 17; Newmann 2005 p. 9; Paulson, Gezon and Watts 2005 p. 27; Watts 2015 p. 34) and can be understood in this thesis to refer to the politics of environmental problems without specific debate of ecology (Forsyth 2003 p. 4). The centre of analysis in this early work was on power and ‘regimes of accumulation’ incorporating a focus on accumulation patterns, ‘access to and control of resources and changing class structure’ (Watts 2015 p. 34 author’s emphasis; see also Biersack 2006 p. 3).

Political ecology has continued to evolve into a second generational form that has been influenced by “post” theoretical trends (e.g. post-Marxism), ‘cross-fertilisation’ with other academic fields e.g. environmental history, green justice, race theory, and deployment in advanced economy settings (Watts 2015 p. 34; see also Biersack 2006 p. 4; Escobar 2010 p. 91). This second generation political ecology gives important consideration to economic, political and social structures and their institutions, and how these impact the human construction, management and transformation of already humanised ‘natural’ ecosystems (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Newmann 2005; Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Ioris 2011; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Watts 2015 pp. 32-35). There are four key elements that have not only helped advance first-generation political ecology but also require greater analysis due to their significance for voice and thus PEV, namely power, scale, space and time.

One of the most significant attributes of second generation political ecology is that it characteristically views ‘ecological systems as power laden rather than politically inert’ (Robbins 2012 p. 13) and reveals tensions between social actor groups struggling for access and use of natural resources (Simsik 2002). This underlines its recognition of the diverse nature of (authoritative) power and how it defines, facilitates, manages and controls human-environmental interactions in contexts like resource extraction and land ownership (Bryant

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24 The early period of the Twenty-First Century has also witnessed a third generation of political ecology (see Escobar 2010) though ‘orientations from the second phase are still dominant’ (ibid. p. 91). This third generation political ecology is discussed shortly in relation to discourse.
1998; Simsik 2002; Neumann 2005; Bridge 2011; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Bixler 2013; Batterbury 2015) and this has led to a focus on actors including the state (Ioris 2013; 2014b), non-state actors (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Khan 2013) and businesses (Orssatto and Clegg 1999; Bebbington and Bury 2013).

Crucially however, power relations between the actors are often unequal (Tan-Mullins 2007). One can see this between business actors and their relationships with citizens (Cragg and Greenbaum 2002; Himley 2008) and are thus linked to conflicts over forms of access and control of natural resources, particularly in EMaDEs, where new resource ownership and user rights have often been violently forced upon local communities (Le Billon 2003 p. 69; see also Simsik 2002) and the power implications for environmental health and sustainable livelihoods (Watts 2000b p. 257). Crucially, one must consider the relationship between economic actors and citizens and the extent to which businesses can manage and control citizen access to decision-making mechanisms concerning natural resource management and environmental problems.

Similarly, participatory relationships between citizens and NGOs can see citizens struggle to hold NGOs accountable due to the obvious lack of accountability options. Communities cannot withdraw funding like donors and cannot impose conditionalities like governments (Najam 1996 pp. 345-347) and effectively lack power to force ‘downward accountability’ (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). Here, thought must again be given to accountability and power relationships and the support and influence given by these non-state actors to citizens vis-a-vis their voice action(s).

Finally, inequality is also visible in the use of power by the state. As noted in Section 2.3, the state’s prioritisation of industrial interests lends power to dominant actors and social groups at the expense of other actors whose interests are marginalised if they threaten those of the dominant group (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a p. 17; Nash and Lewis 2006). Consequently, one finds that in environmental situations that affect a state’s economy and society, it will respond through a ‘state-fix’ that applies ‘only within the limits of the hegemonic political priorities that shape environmental statehood’ (Ioris 2014b p. 15; see also Ioris 2014c). Consequently, the state’s diffusion of power, influence and access to specific actors and social groups influences the ability and likelihood of citizens and CBO/NGO groups holding
economic actors accountable for pollution incidents. Political ecologists’ research into the retention and use of state power is hugely important and highlighted within PEV.

Turning from a direct examination of power, there are other factors that can limit stakeholder efforts for environmental accountability. Lipschitz (1997) highlights how at a macro-level, individual choice and action are constrained by an array of spatial, economic, social and historical contextual forces (p. 89) that prevent changing the habit-driven characteristics of people in specific social and political contexts (ibid. pp. 90-91). Scale, space and time are also important aspects of political ecology and PEV.

Scale is significant due to its relationship to power, a so-called ‘politics of scale’ (Lebel, Garden and Imamura 2005) and is thus critical in efforts to identify the occurrence and causes of environmental degradation (Newmann 2005 p. 76). Research surrounding the question of spatial power explores “frontiers” (Karlsson 2011) and “territories” (M’Gonigle 1999; Greenberg 2006 pp. 126-129; Baird 2009) with conclusions showing that the state imposes administrative and territorial hierarchies in its effort to control resources and protected areas (Greenberg 2006 p. 127; see also Sneddon 2003; Molle 2007; Baird 2009; Neumann 2009).

Spatial-power dynamics often involve a concentration of power in the centre which leaves territorial power dispersed through social forms in villages, markets and community halls (M’Gonigle 1999 p. 17). This type of power simplification for state control (Karlsson 2011) indicates the state’s ability to ‘junk, rejig, recalibrate, modify, and transform the existing scale division’ to defend and consolidate its authority and ‘to define the scalar scaffold against which solutions to ecological problems are framed’ (Boyle 2002 p. 191).

A challenge for communities living in these spatially remote localities, particularly those on the peripheries of mainstream society who wish for greater rights or self-determination, is to overcome potential state reluctance to devolve and share power and support scale-specific institutions (Silvern 1999; Finley-Brook 2016 p. 351), e.g. protected area management (Baird 2009), an indication of how social inequalities surrounding access and

unequal power relations are mapped and (re-)produced via spatial categories (Dietz, Engles, and Pye 2015; Larson et al. 2016). Other social processes and interests originating from different spatial scales will converge in a ‘clash of scale’ and unfold within different local level spaces (Natter and Zierhoefer 2002 p. 226; see also Paasi 2003 p. 112).

Consequently, one must consider the impact these spatial power relations have on citizen access to state decision and consultation mechanisms, which is particularly important for remotely situated citizens. Fossil fuel sites, for example, are often spatially remote, a situation which can help amplify REI power which is borne through their control of specific areas of land (Bridge 2011 p. 319). ‘[T]he control of space is a fundamental source of social power’ (Paasi 2003 p. 112). This raises potential implications for citizens located within or surrounding these sites or spaces as their possible spatial remoteness “away” from the state will further increase REI power in their relationship and interaction with citizens. The interconnection between power and scale unfolding in different geographical spaces is therefore an important point. Indeed, the analysis chapters (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1 and Chapter 7, Sections 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3) highlight this within Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s relationship with the state and Petroperu.

Lastly, tied to these discussions is an awareness that the relationships among economic, political, social and spatial processes and their impact on the environment change over time (Blaikie and Brookfield 1987c; Batterbury and Bebbington 1999 p. 281) and are mere ‘moments in temporal trajectories’ (Mathevet et al. 2015 p. 2). Political ecologists have attempted to describe the spatial and temporal impact of capitalism (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 3) and the progressive incorporation of EMaDEs into the LIEO, which provides a crucial understanding of ‘contemporary patterns of human-environmental interaction and associated power relations’ (Bryant 1998 p. 85) and is particularly important when investigating environmental problems in modified or engineered environments (Mathevet et al. 2015 p. 1). This makes it partly historical (Davis 2015; Mathevet et al. 2015) and has indeed led to a historical sub-field of political ecology.26

Acknowledging the historical element within this research is important given that some factors influencing environmental degradation are only visible over long periods of time

One can see that the distribution of power changes markedly over time. The influence/power/position of people also changes; for instance, Hvalkof (2006 p. 197) shows how the indigenous Peruvian Ashénika people of Gran Pajonal transformed from exploited colonial labourers to active political agents. Contemporary political ecology reflects this by recognising the speed of human ingenuity and technological transformations which have made nature unrecognisable (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 5; Berglund 2006 p. 99).

Political ecology has continued to adapt and evolve through three generational phases. In the latest third generation, political ecology has engaged ‘with certain ideas and concepts derived from post-structuralism28 and discourse theory29’ (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 13). Given the focus on Hirschman’s voice theory, the latter is of interest so that one can see precisely how PEV differentiates from third generation post-structural political ecology.

In his 2002 Liberation Ecologies book chapter, Arturo Escobar sets out a post-structural political ecology. It is a reflection of the ‘growing belief that nature is socially constructed’ (different from saying that “there is no real nature out there”) but goes further by insisting ‘that the constructs of political economy and ecology as specifically modern forms of knowledge, as well as their objects of study, must be analysed discursively’ (ibid. p. 46). Power analysis occurs by indicating the significant role of discourse and political presentation of the facts (Bixler et al. 2015 p. 168). For example, global discourses are described as ‘knowledge regimes’ (Adger et al. 2001 p. 683) or ‘“regulatory knowledge”’ (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 11) which are ‘often created, owned and advanced by socially and culturally defined groups (operating at the global, national and local levels)’ (Bixler et al. 2015 pp. 168-169). Crucially, ‘[s]ocial groups that have been most successful at perpetuating and popularising their discourse are those that have the power and the means to do so’ (ibid. p. 169). Political ecologists provide examples of sustainable development and participatory conservation and development (see

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28 ‘Poststructuralism treats language not as a reflection of ‘reality’ but as constitutive of it’ (Escobar 2010 p. 93).
29 ‘A discourse contains a corpus of expressions in which we find homogeneity in message as well as in expressive means. Homogeneity message implies that the expressions share a certain knowledge and perception of the phenomenon in question, and there may also be shared beliefs concerning causes of problems and appropriate responses’ (Adger et al. 2001 p. 685). It is ‘the articulation of knowledge and power, of statements and visibilities and the expressible. Discourse is the process through which social reality comes into being’ (Escobar 2002 p. 46). They can vary among ‘often competing, even conflicting’ gender, class, racial, cultural and other differing interests (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 14).
Watts 1993; Escobar 2002; Bixler et al. 2015) but there are others (see Adger et al. 2001). These forms of modern western development discourse can be described as hegemonic discourses as they dominate thinking and have been adapted into institutional arrangements (Adger et al. 2001 p. 685).

Thus, third generation, post-structural political ecology suggests that we need ‘a new language’ (Escobar 2002 p. 61) to speak of the new post-industrial and postmodern society (Escobar 1994 cited in Escobar 2002 p. 60). Within post-structural political ecology, there is a recognition that the discourse underpinning the theoretical framework must accommodate the reinvention of nature seen in the new era of post-industrial and post-modern society. A form of voice via discourse is therefore present within political ecology by focusing on theories and ideologies and the impact these have on the human construction of nature. This extends into efforts at exploring and making visible the ‘suppression of subaltern knowledges’ (Escobar 2010 p. 100).

Post-structural third generation political ecology utilises ‘relational ontologies’ (see Braun 2008 cited Escobar 2010 p. 100) to explore the modern binarisms like nature (domain of objects) and culture (domain of subjects) and can work with indigenous, traditional and other community oriented groups. It ‘constitutes an attempt to develop a way to talk about emergent forms of politics that are not based on homogenised conceptions of indigeneity, race or essentialised cultures or identities’ (Escobar 2010 p. 100; see also Escobar 2008) categorised as ‘challenging or alternative discourses’ (Adger et al. 2001 p. 685). In this way third generation political ecology becomes ‘a political ecology of difference, or ... a political ontology’ (Escobar 2010 p. 100) which seeks to engage practically with ‘with new movements, organisations, and institutions of civil society, challenging conventional notions of development, politics, democracy, and sustainability’ (Peets and Watts 2002 p. 3). A ‘space is created in which a range of beliefs, logs, and discourses can be valorised’ (ibid. p. 16).

Within third generation political ecology, there is consequently an effort to give voice to subaltern peoples and ontological ideas which do not proscribe to modern/western concepts surrounding society and nature. Indeed, in a political ecology paper examining poverty and development in the Amazon, Ioris (2016 p. 180) made clear that ‘[a] decisive element of the research was the commitment to give voice to forest-dependent poor in order to articulate their concerns over degradation and deforestation.’
Accordingly, the PEV theoretical framework has not been developed to fulfil a vacuum where voice is not present in political ecology. Third generation, post-structural political ecology explores forms of voice through discourse (acknowledging the impact that the current dominant discourse is having on nature and society relations and the management of the environment) and relational ontologies (making visible and giving voice to other marginalised voices). Dependent upon the context of study, PEV can also help give voice to marginalised communities and make their knowledge and worlds visible.

Where PEV is different is in its efforts to understand how and why a particular voice articulation occurs, i.e. the action of voicing itself through active or passive means, and what this says about the multiplicity of voice actor(s) operating in a specific contextual environment and time-frame. Analysis of this PEV environment, incorporating access, spatial and (vertical/horizontal) power relationships between different actors will uncover the voice motives and potential difficulties which actors face in achieving a predetermined outcome, e.g. for citizens, an end to a particular pollution event. Therefore, like wider political ecology, it wrestles with ‘management questions’, particularly the form and access to public and private regulatory apparatus but also ‘institutions and organisations in the context of shifting configurations of state and market roles’ (Peet and Watts 2002 p. 9). PEV investigations will also help to show the strength of different voices, how some voices are listened to and ignored (between but also within different voice actor groups) and what this reveals about their ability to have dialogue with horizontal and vertical voice actors. Consequently, PEV can be considered as a discourse on the action of voicing itself explored through political ecology. One must add that there is a form of connection to post-structural political ecology; these pollution incidents will say something about environmental management and the impact which these theoretical discourses will be having on the natural world. PEV extends this by looking at how, through voice, different actors react to these events and seek redress.

Overall, the focus on the various interconnected elements of political ecology (power, scale, space and time) reveal the most important areas to integrate with Hirschman’s voice theory in an environmental context. PEV, like political ecology can be seen to be borne from

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30 The main voice actors are citizen (or individual) voice, collective voice (CBO/NGO groups) and institutional voice (business, government) (see Section 2.8).
efforts to promote and contribute to positive social, ecological and structural political change and justice (Bridge, McCarthy and Perreault 2015 p. 8; Bryant 2015b p. 22) and to fight against the way that politics, economics, culture and ecology can come together unjustly (Bryant 2015b) and help cause environmental pollution. In this manner, the study of voice has a natural academic home within political ecology. The integration of Hirschman’s concept of voice with political ecology allows it to become the central objective of research through this theoretical framework.

2.6 Albert Hirschman’s exit and voice, and reconceptualisation with an environmental scenario

‘Gaining voice is a struggle but so too is giving voice’ (Bryant 2015b p. 23).

Albert Hirschman set out his relevant theories in Exit, voice and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organisations and states (1970) which were subsequently re-examined (see Hirschman 1978; 1981; 1982; 1995). His initial investigation centred on economic actors, whose ‘repairable lapses’ away ‘from efficient, rational, law-abiding … behaviour’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 1 author’s emphasis) can be corrected through a recuperation mechanism (ibid. p. 3). While these repairable lapses can occur ‘[u]nder any economic, social, or political system’ that affects firms and individuals (ibid. p. 1), economists have remained unconcerned with them due to the competitive (economic) mechanism of recuperation (ibid. p. 3). Instead, Hirschman suggested that an alternative mechanism through exit and voice ‘can come into play either when the competitive mechanism is unavailable or as a complement to it’ (ibid.).

The exit option often occurs when consumers are willing to stop buying a firm’s products due to a reduction in quality or members leave an organisation (Hirschman 1970).31 It is described as a neat (‘one either exits or one does not’) (ibid. p. 15), impersonal (no face-to-face confrontation between customer and firm), indirect (a firm’s recovery comes through the economic ‘Invisible Hand’ as an unintended by-product of the customer’s decision to shift) (ibid. pp. 15-16) and typically private and silent decision and activity (Hirschman 1995 p. 34). It can be summarised as ‘a fairly crude, binary response’ (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 471).

31 Exit from a firm is not solely down to product deterioration but also due to initial consumer over-estimation of product quality in the first place (Barry 1974 p. 90).
Rather than exit ‘from an objectionable state of affairs’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 30), voice sees customer’s or organisation member’s express dissatisfaction (ibid. p. 4) via individual or collective petition or through other types of action or protest ‘to mobilise public opinion’ (ibid. p. 30). It is ‘messy’ due to the different gradients that encompass voice (‘all the way from faint grumbling to violent protest’), public (articulating one’s critical opinion openly) and overall is ‘direct and straightforward rather than roundabout’ (ibid. p. 16).

In a subsequent text, Hirschman (1981) went on to provide four further important characteristics of voice: (1) it ‘is rich and modulated …. Convey[ing] more information than exit’; (2) ‘is exuberant’ and can be ‘enjoyed for its own sake’ especially when used in the public interest; (3) ‘is hazardous’ as relevant organisations attempt to silence those voicing through retaliation or extending special favours; and (4) ‘is treacherous’ as generally a few will voice on behalf of a larger group, which can lead to achieved changes occurring ‘primarily in the interests of the articulate few’ (p. 244). One can see interrelation between these strengths and weaknesses.

It is precisely because voice can convey so large and varied an array of information (item 1) that those who actually do the voicing can pick and choose and emphasise those items useful to their own interests (item 4); and it is because voice can become so joyful and exuberant an activity (item 2) that organisations faced with this sort of dangerous thrust become resourceful in deflecting and stunting it through effort at retaliation and corruption (item 3) (ibid.).

Figure 2.1 provides a rough summary of organisations classified in relation to the absence or presence of exit and voice (Hirschman 1970 p. 120). There are minimal cases where exit and voice play important roles but some examples are in the top left-hand corner e.g. some business clients will attempt, via voice, to influence a firm’s policy directly instead of choosing exit, though this remains an option (ibid. p. 121). In contrast, probably no organisation is ‘wholly immune to … exit or voice’ with those listed in the bottom-right hand corner less viable long-term. In these instances, exit and voice are only utilised when deterioration is highly advanced or recovery is either impossible or desired (ibid.).

Initially, Hirschman saw exit more closely interlined with economics (ibid. p. 15) (as economists remain biased toward the use of exit rather than voice) (ibid p. 17) and voice aligned with politics and public actions (ibid. p. 15; Hirschman 1982 p. 65) though there was later
acknowledgement that this was not exclusive. On this point, one can mention a useful revision to Hirschman’s theories by Barry (1974), who saw them as actions that were ‘each … one side of a dichotomy’ (p. 97). This involves ‘[o]ne choice … between exit (leaving) and non-exit (staying)’ and another ‘between voice (activity, participation) and silence (inactivity, non-participation)’ (ibid. p. 91) and one further category of ‘exit plus voice’ in which ‘someone campaigns for improvements after leaving’ (ibid. p. 92). In the previous two sections, this revision helps set out Hirschman’s original theories in greater clarity and detail, especially when re-contextualising the theories into an environmental pollution scenario. Indeed, Hirschman’s exit and voice theories have been widely contextually analysed, highlighting how his theories serve as useful evaluative tools (Picciotto 2015). The next two sub-sections set out their possibility of application within an environmental pollutant scenario.

Figure 2.1: The elusive optimal mix of exit and voice

Organisations whose members react strongly via

Voluntary associations, competitive political parties, and some business enterprises, for example, those selling output to a few buyers

Competitive business enterprise in relation to customers

(Exit)

Yes

Voluntary associations, competitive political parties, and some business enterprises, for example, those selling output to a few buyers

Competitive business enterprise in relation to customers

Yes

Family, tribe, nation, church, parties in non-totalitarian one-party systems

Parties in totalitarian one-party systems, terrorist groups, and criminal gangs

No

(Hirschman 1970 p. 121).

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33 See Birch (1974 p. 77) for a public/private school illustration.
2.6.1 Exit in an environmental pollutant context

In this context, exit or ‘distancing’ (Zuindeau 2009 p. 155), can be especially problematic for citizens. Firstly, exit is tied to the concept of loyalty (see Figure 2.2), which is similar to trust (Hirschman 1992 pp. 80-81) and ‘marks the attachment of the individual or the group to a product, an organisation, or a territory’ (Zuindeau 2009 p. 156; see also Picciotto 2015 p. 8). However, loyalty is not a singular concept and should instead be viewed as a quad-faceted idea (loyalty to a product or loyalty to a family, organisation or tribe and reformist and passive loyalty) dependent on its contextual application which has an impact on the use of exit and thus by extension voice.

Dowding et al. (2000 p. 476) suggest a visible difference between loyalty to a product and to an organisation, family or tribe ‘which may be thought of as a ‘group’ which one identifies’ with. This is a critical distinction because group loyalty influences citizens’ choice of exit vis-à-vis environmental problems. Its strength, dependent on the amount one has invested in that object and its ties to our personal history (including loyalty to a nation, local community or geographic region), may prevent people exiting and distancing themselves from a particular location (ibid. p. 477; see also Hirschman 1995 p. 38). In a similar way, a family may be reluctant to leave their land despite environmental deterioration because it has been in their household for several generations (Blaikie 1985 pp. 26-27). The importance of contextual accuracy and impact on exit can be understood when one examines Graham and Keeley’s (1992) discussion of passive and reformist loyalty which is borne out of the importance of the particular issue at hand; reformist loyalty ‘is shown by attempting to correct and reverse the process of organisational deterioration [i.e. through voice], while passive loyalty implies remaining silent’ (p. 197; see also Birch 1974 p. 75).
The underlying influences on people’s loyalty have been researched by Groves (2015) and Zuindeau (2009) whose focus on exit and voice in the face of environmental risks led to a study on “attachments” and four key variables for generalised analysis which exert an important role in the intensity and forms of behaviour of voice and exit; the scale of potential damage associated with the environmental problem; the possible complementarity between environmental issues and other issues, particularly economic; the geographical area of the environmental problem; the degree of uncertainty inherent in the problem (p. 162 author’s emphasis).

It is the second variable which can explain why people can be unwilling to exit. Individuals and groups may have emotional attachments to their environment incorporating interpersonal relationships, relationships between local residents and an industry and life-world attachments that are historical as well as social (Castán Broto 2013 p. 4; Groves 2015 pp. 855-859). If the second variable is negative, a pollution event may see a person take into consideration their health and those of their family versus staying silent to defend their economic interests, even disputing other legitimate critical voices (Zuindeau 2009 p. 162). While distancing oneself from the problem is a tactic, it then becomes a question of comparing well-being advantages and economic costs (possible monetary loss on a house sale, daily transportation expenditure) caused by distance alongside delocalisation-relocalisation costs (ibid.; see also Soete and

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35 If the complementarity is positive, exit behaviour ‘will be high if one fears that the situation will deteriorate more, whereas it will be more limited if one expects … [future improvement] (attitude of patience).’ However, if the complementarity is negative but applies to others instead, voice use will be higher, but in positions where obstacles to voice are present (e.g. being a minority citizen), exit is favoured (Zuindeau 2009 p. 162).
Weehuizen 2003 p. 27), factors that those with deeper-rooted localised ethical, cultural and spiritual connections will take very seriously.

Consequently, it is probable that a strong range of economic and social attachments to a geographical area will increase one’s loyalty and help limit exit from a negative environmental scenario (dependent on the temporal context discussed shortly), increasing the likelihood of voice. This is particularly acute for marginalised citizens or groups as the ability or possibility to exit remains unequally distributed due to income and wealth (Hirschman 1978 pp. 95-96; Blaikie 1985 p. 6), an issue for both case-study communities (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1). Indeed, the use of exit by those who can financially afford to do so allows it to become an example of the ‘tyranny of small decisions’ as they fail to consider the affliction of a public bad (Hirschman 1992 p. 80; see also Hirschman 1978 pp. 96-101; 1981 p. 243). Though private self-interest may extend as far as one’s family (Dobson and Bell 2006 p. 2; Rousseau 2012), this may not cover one’s community, a modern-day indicator of private sphere dominance (work, home and family) over the public sphere ‘practices of public service, citizen participation, loyalty to the community, and activity for the common good’ (Barry 2006 pp. 36-37).

Furthermore, the exit decision has two consequences on voice. Firstly, it will ‘drive out’ voice (Hirschman 1970 p. 76) or deprive its potential carriers (Hirschman 1995 p. 13) as the ‘alert’ who may have voiced, exit instead, leaving the ‘inert’ to suffer in silence (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 472), a situation labelled ‘silent non-exit’ (Barry 1974 p. 91). Exit use in advanced economy societies with greater environmental impact is an evasion of their responsibilities and the “politics of obligation” (Smith 1998). Exit could also see the continuation of pollution that could grow in magnitude and/or affect other people that were unable to exit (so called ‘cumulative decline’) (Hirschman 1992 p. 90). Zuindeau’s (2009 p. 163) third variable (the geographical scope of the problem) attests to this issue by suggesting that the greater the geographic scope and magnitude of the problem, the more difficult it is to exit.

Secondly, Hirschman originally saw consumer exit often taken only in light of the prospective effectiveness of voice use (Hirschman 1970 p. 37) which can and should

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36 However, silent non-exit can also be understood as a form of passive voice protest (see Section 2.8).
complement and occasionally supersede exit (Hirschman 1981 p. 214). If consumers are sufficiently convinced of the effectiveness of voice, people ‘may well postpone exit’ as once you have exited, you have lost the opportunity to use voice from within (Hirschman 1970 p. 105 my emphasis) but not vice versa (ibid. p. 37). Combined with the influence of group and reformist loyalty and life-world attachments outlined earlier, it suggests that in an environmental pollution scenario, exit is a last resort action, which is particularly true if one considers the temporal aspect of loyalty and voice. In this instance, loyalty will hold exit at bay and activate voice (ibid. p. 78) due to the influential impact of a person’s time horizon (Graham and Keeley 1992 p. 198; Castán Broto 2013 p. 10). It is thus unlikely that a citizen would relocate abruptly to a different location at the first sign of environmental degradation without first voicing concerns and allowing time for implementing a solution.

Overall, exit in this environmental pollutant scenario is constrained by strong group and reformist loyalty stemming from a complex array of individual attachments. While it can be utilised by citizens with the financial means to do so, this can damage the voices of those left behind and fail to prevent the continuation of the pollution issue. In its relationship to voice, it can be a last resort action, taken only after a period of time has elapsed in which voice has failed to garner a solution or when a person’s group loyalty and attachments to their present location are weaker. Therefore, while exit has been shown to be implausible and difficult surrounding environmental problems, voice offers greater scope in this setting.

2.6.2 Voice in an environmental pollutant context

‘[T]he use of voice can suddenly become a most sought after, fulfilling activity, in fact, the ultimate justification of human existence’ (Hirschman 1981 p. 215).

Hirschman originally noted that individual customers have different perceptions on the appreciation of quality for products (Hirschman 1970 p. 48), a situation partly attributable to consumer ignorance (Hirschman 1981 p. 219). While this may impact a person’s willingness to use their voice in several ways (i.e. a cheap poor quality consumer product may not see consumers’ voice or it might be used for products of which a consumer has expert knowledge),

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37 At the moment of exit, Kolarska and Aldrich (1980) discuss how people can do so whilst voicing, ‘attempting to convince others in the organisation [or equally, a community] to join them, appealing to leaders to correct problems, and so forth’ (p. 44). This vocal exit forms one element of the typology of protest voice discussed in Section 2.8.
the situation in relation to citizens and environmental quality is very different. Despite voice being a costly option (conditioned by the influence and bargaining power of customers and members within a firm they buy from or organisation of which they are part) (Hirschman 1970 p. 40), wider contextual application is crucial. Thus, the action will have an ‘occasional edge’ over exit in situations affecting public happiness (Hirschman 1981 p. 217) or public interest (Hirschman 1982 pp. 6-7) such as a food hazard, automobile safety problem (Hirschman 1981 p. 217; see also Hirschman 1998 p. 20) or conceivably an environmental problem.

The public interest surrounding the environment is clear; many democratic states incorporate a right to a healthy environment in their constitutions while various UN agencies have adopted similar positions (UN 2007; Knox no date) reinforcing the civilised world’s understanding that citizens deserve an environment that permits adequate and dignified life conditions (United Nations Environment Programme 1972 Principle 1).

There are possible constraints to a citizen’s willingness to voice. The first is the degree of “uncertainty” within the prospects for successful advocacy of a public policy (Hirschman 1981 p. 216). In effect, citizens will negate the uncertainty and participate through the investment of their resources if they feel strongly about the desired outcome (Dahl 1961 p. 274; Hirschman 1981 p. 216) or equally be dissuaded from taking part if they feel less strongly about the issue. Secondly, the “free rider” phenomenon may see a public good enjoyed ‘by all regardless of prior participation’ (Hirschman 1982 p. 78) and consequently may see an individual withhold or understate their contribution in the belief that others will exert themselves on their behalf (Hirschman 1971 pp. 4-5; 1982 p. 78) while they enjoy the results (Hirschman 1981 p. 81). Finally, an individual’s confidence in success has a huge impact on their willingness to attempt to influence decisions (Dahl 1961 p. 286). Those individuals with high confidence are more likely to attempt action than citizens whose confidence is constrained by a wide array of emotive factors (ibid. pp. 286-287), which can lead to cases of ‘self-exclusion’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 279 author’s emphasis). One finds, therefore, that participation and political confidence ‘evidently reinforce one another’ (Dahl 1961 p. 287).

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38 These include a citizen who feels ‘that people like him have no say about what the government does … or that the politics and government are too complicated for him to understand what is going on, or that local officials don’t care much for what he thinks’ (Dahl 1961 p. 287; see also Cornwall 2008 p. 279).
However, in an environmental pollution context, these constraints can be negated. For citizens, themselves, voice is highly relevant for an environmental problem as ‘everyone has a strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 53). This issue contains a varying degree of public interest (context dependent i.e. severity) that will help negate free riding, especially if the pollution has been occurring for an extended period of time and/or directly affects a wide group of people and will certainly cause a strong degree of feeling over desired outcomes (i.e. ending pollution) that would help outweigh people’s possible participatory uncertainty. Indeed, Barry’s (1974) formulaic assessment of Hirschman’s theories shows that voice will occur when ‘the expected value of the quality resulting from the exercise of the optimal amount of voice minus the cost of exercising it is higher than the value of the best that can be obtained without using voice’ (p. 91); in other words, whether the use and cost of exercising voice will lead to better public interest improvements (i.e. ending a pollution event) compared to any improvements that might be obtained without using voice. Consequently, public participation through voice empowers citizens as they seek a stronger role in decisions that affect their lives (Zimmerman and Rappaport 1988, cited in Laurian 2004 p. 53) and this applies wholly to the environment and instances of pollution.

Lastly, one must draw attention to the exploration of voice in political/public action scenarios. The typology of protest voice in Section 2.8 describes the different voice actors and forms of voice action that can be utilised, but here one can start by discussing “collective” and “individual” voice alongside “horizontal” and “vertical” voices, all of which are interlinked and help reinforce the connection between voice and environmental problems. Hirschman (1992) suggested that the functioning and formation of voice depend on the ‘potential for collective action’ (p. 79 my emphasis; see also Hirschman 1995 p. 12) where an individual’s intention to act contributes to the pursuit of a common goal (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473; Tilly 1978 p. 7). Individual voice refers to ‘actions where the intention of the individual in acting is to bring about the desired effect solely through that action’ (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473).

This, in turn, is linked to the division of voice between horizontal and vertical settings (O’Donnell 1986; Le Meur, Horowitz and Mennesson 2013; Ravnborg and Gomez 2015). Horizontal voice refers to communication with similar actors who share some form of collective identity at the same level whilst vertical voice encompasses dialogue with actors at different levels e.g. industry manager or government (O’Donnell 1986 p. 251; Ravnborg and
Gomez 2015 p. 73). Significantly, in (democratic) politics, vertical voice is often collective (O’Donnell 1986 p. 251) due to the frequent hostile state and society forces that help lead to solidarity and joint action (Hirschman 1984 p. 28), a strategy utilised by the poor and powerless and the rich and powerful albeit for different reasons (Tilly 1978 pp. 75-76). Nevertheless, horizontal voice can be more important as it remains a necessary precondition for vertical voice (O’Donnell 1986 p. 251; Ravnborg and Gomez 2015 p. 73).

The collective action approach would be applicable to environmental problems, not only due to the potential number of people affected by the pollution, but also because environmental problems are dealt with through vertical political channels that would lend themselves to the strengths of collective voice. Individuals dealing with a vertical hierarchy and their probable lack of power vis-à-vis states and business elites know that they will not be able to ‘achieve powerful speech, a legitimate, known, recognised, authorised and authoritative voice’ (Bourdieu 1986 p. 301) without collectively pooling their voice in an indirect fashion.

Nonetheless, ‘use of individual voice depends upon their belief in its expected efficacy’ (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473) which highlights that voice analysis must specify its ‘contextual assumptions’ (O’Donnell 1986 p. 250) and the outcomes it will have. The penultimate section sets out the contextual environment for voice, and reveals that its use by citizens and other collective voice actors is dependent on and influenced by specific temporal, political, economic, social and geographical factors that are studied by political ecologists, thus formulating a “political ecology of voice.”

2.7 The contextual factors that influence citizens and other stakeholders exercising voice

Though the previous section established that the functioning and formation of voice depend on the prospects for collective action, a citizen’s ability to do this rests partly ‘upon their legal rights’ in their country (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 473), a reflection that voice can be hazardous where organisations (and the state) try and silence protests (Hirschman 1981 p. 244).

39 ‘Relatively poor and powerless groups which have already mobilised are more likely to act collectively by claiming new rights, privileges, and advantages’ while ‘the rich and powerful are more likely to act collectively in defence of what they already have’ (Tilly 1978 pp. 75-76).
O’Donnell’s (1986 p. 252) vertical and horizontal divisions are based on this assumption; the possibility of almost unrestricted horizontal voice is identifiable with democratic and non-repressive contexts which also permit the exercise of collective vertical voice. The application of citizen voice is directly affected by the national political environment in which they live and operate, and their ‘opportunity’ (Tilly 1978 p. 55; van Deth 1997 p. 1) for this action. This can be understood as ‘the relationship between the population’s interest and the current state of the world around it’ (Tilly 1978 p. 55), particularly in relation to political freedoms (Sen 2001), and ‘the opportunities for citizens to cooperate’ and form associations and organisations (van Deth 1997 p. 1). Therefore, one finds that authoritarian versus democratic political contexts have a key influence on voice.

To gain power and stability (Hirschman 1992 p. 82), extreme authoritarian regimes will try and limit participatory encounters (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994 p. 6) by ‘collaps[ing] … public and private society’ (Yashar 1997 p. 242) and ‘close institutional mediations between state and society’ (Hochstetler 1997 p. 199) through the suppression of vertical and horizontal voice. This will convert ‘citizens into isolated, wholly private, and narrowly self-centred individuals’ (Hirschman 1992 p. 82). Illustrations include the Former Soviet Union’s Great Terror (Kuromiya 2007), the Guatemalan civil-war (1960-1996) (Yashar 1997; Ball, Kobrak and Spirer 1999) and political violence in Peru during the 1980s and 1990s (Garcia 2005; Burt 2007). Meanwhile, in democracies, stronger civic and legal laws mean that ‘[v]oice and equality are central to democratic participation’ (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 1) through fair and free elections and expression (Fox 1997 p. 391), and citizen rights to organise to defend their own interests without fear of punishment or external interference (ibid. p. 392). As Hirschman (1982 pp. 4-5) summarises, ‘it is easier to participate in a public protest when one only loses time through the act of participation than when one thereby risks losing one’s head.’ Moreover, the state’s political system and societal freedom has significant impacts on the ability of citizens and collective voice actors to hold economic actors accountable for pollution. An example is Burma, where the former authoritarian regime’s business as usual (Bryant 1996) approach to environmental management left environmental politics as a type of resistance politics leaving few options for dissent (Doyle and Simpson 2006) (a situation which has changed since the 2015 general election, the country’s first openly-contested election since 1990).
The links between voice and political ecology are clearly visible here. Individual and collective voice capacity are based upon the retention or unequal distribution of power by the state to particular social groups or actors. Consequently, PEV must analyse the wider national political environment in which the environmental pollution is occurring to establish the permitted levels of citizen voice; a democratic country will tolerate a higher level (or ceiling) than an authoritarian one (Hirschman 1981 p. 224).

Even so, a study of voice from this state political perspective cannot generalise countries simplistically into advanced economies and EMaDEs. For instance, while all Latin American countries ‘share a common basis in law, language, history, culture, sociology, colonial experience, and overall political patterns that enable us to discuss the region in general terms ….’ (Wiarda and Kline 2001 p. 1) each has a specific environment encompassing different laws and regulations, distinct social stratas, income levels and opportunities, customs and values etc. in which citizens live and apply their voice. This is a vital point; though hydrocarbon conflicts around the world may have similar causes and effects, each case must be analysed in relation ‘to its very specific …. socio[-]political and economic scenario’ (Vasquez 2014 p. xvii), a conclusion also applicable to other relevant events such as development project outcomes (Ballet and Randrianalijaona 2014 p. 218). Therefore, investigations into voice use surrounding environmental pollution issues cannot be generalised, a point which is made clear in the Methodology Chapter and this thesis’s focus on Peru’s Loreto Region and Petroperu (see Chapter 4, Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2).

Yet even within a democracy, voice opportunity does not guarantee success; rather (voice) opportunity relates to the term “potential” (Callaghy 1994 p. 240, cited in Meagher 2010 p. 53) which is formed by several other factors besides the wider national political environment. For citizen voice to be effective, individuals will need to possess reserves of political influence that they can call upon when sufficiently aroused (Hirschman 1970 pp. 70-71). Though political influence is not a precondition to voice over consumer products, for environmental pollution issues, it’s key for two interlinked reasons. Firstly, the wider (albeit variable) collective scalar impact of environmental problems and the range of actors involved

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40 However, there will be a ceiling limit as ‘there are levels of exit (disintegration) and voice (disruption) beyond which it is impossible for an organisation to exist as an organisation’ (Hirschman 1981 p. 224). One must also note that there must be some ‘minimal or floor level of exit and voice in order to receive the necessary feedback about performance’ (ibid. author’s emphasis; see also Hirschman 1992 p. 93), the latter posing a dilemma in authoritarian countries due to suppressive tendencies.
(IFIs, NGOs, government, industry) highlights that the influence of an individual citizen voice rests greatly upon their political influence and ability to engage with these actors. While horizontal voice is seen by some to be far less costly, ‘and has psychological benefits of expressing, [and] sharing’, context dependent,⁴¹ vertical voice is costlier, ‘and has some psychological costs (the stress of speaking critically to superiors)’ (Soete and Weehuizen 2003 p. 27) suggesting that citizens with stronger political influence will stand a greater chance of success.

In this public interest context, the idea of ‘[n]early every citizen in the community [having] access to unused political resources’ (Dahl 1961 p. 309) is erroneous on the basis that a person’s reserves of political influence depend upon their societal position. Thorp and Paredes (2010 p. 2) label this “group or horizontal inequalities”, which refers to ‘inequalities between groups of people, rather than simply between individuals.’ Thus, Sen’s (2001) instrumental freedom of social opportunity is important given that the arrangements societies make for education, healthcare etc., ensure more effective participation in economic and political matters e.g. illiteracy can hinder political participation by preventing newspaper reading, written communication with others (p. 39) or holding actors accountable through the legal system.

Socio-demographic research show that participation is costly due to the time, effort, and money required (Dahl 1961 p. 273; Hirschman 1981 p. 214; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 pp. 288-303; Laurian 2004 p. 55). Those with more political confidence (Dahl 1961 pp. 286-293) and resources are more likely to bear these participatory costs (Dahl 1961 p. 274; Lyons and Lowery 1986, cited in Laurian 2004 p. 55), leaving high-income and upper-middle-class citizens as the most effective interest groups in local politics (Dahl 1961 pp. 273, 282-283; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 188, cited in Laurian 2004 p. 55). Sen (2001) typifies this as “economic facilities” which will depend on the individual’s level of resources owned or available for use (pp. 38-39), which by extension includes opportunity to voice, though the author cautions against making generalised links between income (and other resources) and individual achievements and freedoms on the other owing to various social and economic circumstances that affect individuals (ibid. see ch. 4-5).

⁴¹Dowding et al. (2000 p. 472) note that horizontal voice is costly in certain circumstances; ‘complaining about the government under repressive regimes, for example.’
In socially unequal countries, e.g. in Latin America, these issues are particularly striking. Here, large inequities remain ‘in relation to the number of people who have political decision-making power’ and ‘who benefit from the rule of law’, with historically entrenched patterns of clientelism and corruption necessitating a strong position and thus voice in society in order to advance one’s interests (Vasquez 2014 p. 47; see also Wiarda and Kline 2001 p. 36). At the same time, there is a ‘persistent devaluation of indigenous people, women, the poor, and the young, all of whom confront objective barriers to participation in the institutional context of a state and a democracy’ (Vilas 1997 p. 8). Consequently, low rankings of EMaDEs on Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index reflect the ‘little confidence’ that citizens have in ‘fair and effective government institutions’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47). Poor government trust levels (Wiarda and Kline 2001 pp. 46-47) can, in turn, impact upon an individual’s willingness to voice, i.e. high trust is essential to help foster higher levels of participation (Docherty, Goodlad and Paddison 2001) though this has been contested (Gamson 1968; Carreira, Machado and Vasconcelos 2016).

Therefore, voice application by those in more marginalised societal positions becomes extremely difficult. This is particularly true for indigenous peoples, who have borne the brunt of European colonisation, seen exclusion in cultural, political and economic spheres (Varese 1996; Selverston 1997 p. 172) and, like other weak/marginalised citizens, are hit hard by costs stemming from environmental problems (Bryant and Bailey 1997 p. 40; Reed 2002 p. 213). Natural resource extraction projects can often occur in remote locations like the Amazon rainforest. Their geographically isolated position alongside elite state manipulation has serious impacts on equality ‘because economically disadvantaged groups lack the tools [strong social position and voice] for accessing the authorities through parallel channels’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47).

Through PEV, thought must also be given to the geographical position of citizens affected by pollution and their accessibility to voice mechanisms, a factor not originally discussed by Hirschman but which is clearly important. For instance, Laurian (2004 p. 54), in a US case study, argues that the nature of the problem (the siting of toxic waste sites) and the high clean-up costs necessitates involvement of federal, state, and local government agencies all of which are (theoretically) committed to public participation in planning. A similar
evaluation is applicable to other environmental problems and the role of spatially different political agencies; the severity, scale and nature of an environmental problem will require co-ordinated responses between local, regional and national government mechanisms and the ability to integrate citizens’ voices at each level. However, while democratic states should theoretically be able to provide citizens with voice access at different spatial levels and in different formats (community meetings, ICT methods), this can vary across social groups and in terms of geography.

‘In the first place, it needs to be restated that space qua space has no causal power and spatial relations of themselves do not produce effects’ (Slater 1989 p. 13) but that ‘depending on the nature of the constituents, their spatial relations may make a crucial difference’ only in terms of ‘the particular casual powers and liabilities constituting it’ (Sayer 1985 p. 52 author’s emphasis, cited in Slater 1989 p. 13). A key component that influences these spatial relations is the nation state. In a general sense, EMaDEs lack advanced economies’ ability to be able to shift resources quickly into desired areas (Stolper 1966 p. 205) due to their scarcity (ibid. p. 215). This can be seen in the provision of state mechanisms like education and health care where their recurrent costs and staffing problems limit what can be done in remoter geographic areas (ibid; see also Reed 2002 p. 212). One could also hypothesise that other state mechanisms designed to give citizens access to voice mechanisms in these areas may also be missing or not within easy reach of isolated citizens. Indeed, Vasquez (2014 p. 65) noted that ‘[o]ne of the main complaints of local communities affected by hydrocarbons projects is the lack of state presence in their territories, which are usually remote or neglected areas far from the capital city where most decisions are made.’ Therefore the absence of easily accessible government mechanisms can lead to cases of citizen disengagement from the state.

A key issue for political ecologists is the relationship between central decision-making mechanisms and those in frontiers or remotely located territories. PEV investigations must consider the extent to which the spatial locality of environmental management or natural resource project decisions influence voice and participation. However, this question of citizen accessibility must also extend into analysis of businesses and their decision-making mechanisms and modes of communication.
Hirschman (1982 p. 103) provides initial guidance for this. Certain ‘strict limits’ are placed on citizens regarding ‘their involvement in public affairs as certain political institutions [and arguably business] keep them from expressing the full intensity of their feelings on these matters.’ So, business may withhold or control access to decision making mechanisms, an issue in extraction industry projects to which Himley (2008) and Ballet and Randrianalijaona (2014) attest.

Himley (2008) examined the Pierina Project, a large open-pit gold mine in the Peruvian Amazon owned and operated by Barrick Gold Corporation of Canada. The study shows how the ‘neoliberalisation of resource governance’ has produced

new spatial relations of governance at the point of extraction: the community relations office, now a critical node of decision-making regarding the livelihood impacts of mining in adjacent communities, is located on mine property, behind a closely guarded gate (ibid. p. 446 author’s emphasis).

Community residents must pass through the gate and armed security officials in order to access the office, highlighting how the firm itself (not the state) administers access to a crucial decision-making site, the capacity to do so enabled by private property rights (ibid.). Similarly, in Madagascar, the 1980s QMM mining project (a joint venture by the Canadian company QIT-Fer et Titane Inc., and the OMNIS (Office des Mines Nationales et des Industries Strategiques, Supervisory Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining) a Malaysian public agency), saw criticism over low levels of local population involvement in the project and a restricted participatory process that did not necessarily represent diverse societal opinions (Ballet and Randrianalijaona 2014 p. 222).

What do these two brief examples show? To begin with, they highlight the unequal power relations between citizens and business. Hirschman broached this issue through a focus on consumer ignorance, which is present in the disparity of knowledge between seller and buyer over certain types of products e.g. medical services, complex technological products (Arrow 1973, cited in Hirschman 1981 pp. 219-220) or between citizens and REIs over extraction processes. Citizens will have a degree of ignorance that will make their understanding of REI production techniques or safety processes difficult (see Cragg and Greenbaum 2002). Crucially, in cases where the citizen have ‘an inferior or impotent position’ in which exit and voice will not adequately ‘safeguard … their interests’, some form of pubic
intervention or business self-regulating policy is necessary (Hirschman 1981 p. 220). The increase in business self-regulatory mechanisms and the ‘neoliberalisation of resource governance’ (Himley 2008 p. 446) thus presents a challenge for citizens as it reinforces clear ‘power inequities’ (Newell 2005 p. 543) between citizens and business and the latter’s control and/or withholding of access, consultation and information. This has ‘important implications for the types of accountability mechanisms that can realistically be constructed between companies and communities’ (ibid.).

In relation to REIs, accessible decision-making mechanisms are particularly important to indigenous peoples and ethnic minorities who have historically lacked effective participatory influence in decision-making (Reed 2002 p. 220). Reed (2002) evaluates that while firms are willing to consult with local communities, take their concerns into consideration and possibly modify their plans, they are not willing to include local communities into decision-making mechanisms or consider the possibility that local community desires take precedence over the REIs (p. 221 my emphasis; see also Cragg and Greenbaum 2002), an issue termed as “decoupling” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Backer 2007 pp. 33-34). Based upon their different costs and benefits, the REI treatment of these stakeholders is crucial for PEV due to its influence on industry relationships with local citizens and the influence which business can have over citizen voice and their opportunity at being heard.

They can seek to quash voice through ‘special favours’ to individual complainants (whose preferential treatment buys off their voice) or to collective voice movement leaders (resulting in militancy reduction or absolute corruption), which allow firms to avoid performance quality improvements (Hirschman 1981 p. 241 author’s emphasis). More radical suppression of voice can see firms degrade their treatment of internal employees, or retaliate through violent reprisals against local citizens (ibid. pp. 240-241; see also Birch 1974 pp. 75-76; Frynas 2001) and other groups (e.g. Rowell 1996 ch. 8), a ‘green backlash’ which can extend to some corporations funding anti-environmental groups and right-wing think tanks (Rowell 1996). Such strategies underline the ‘tremendous power differentials between the actors and in which there is no set of enforceable rules’ (Reed 2002 pp. 221-222) that leads to disagreement on who counts as a stakeholder, the fair apportionment of costs and benefits and how these are to be conceived (Cragg and Greenbaum 2002 p. 320). Accordingly, non-state economic actors can control and manage the parameters of citizen voice (when, where, how, frequency of contact) regardless of the wider state political context.
Given the importance of contextual accuracy, an accurate depiction of the relevant economic actors, particularly business, is key, and this can be illustrated for oil companies. Judging social and environmental performances of all oil companies in the same way fails to consider their own individual operating styles which differ in their incorporation of environmental and social safeguards (Vasquez 2014 pp. 123-124). A more secure financial position enables larger REIs to implement greater CSR investment, larger CSR teams and better social and environmental impact monitoring, while smaller REIs have less financial security and alongside short-term contracts tend to devote fewer resources and effort to long-term social and environmental development policies (ibid. p. 124).42

Consequently, the lack of standardised industry procedures for dealing with stakeholders means that the level, accessibility and therefore strength of various stakeholder voices will differ dependent upon the REI. The type of REI impacts upon voice and accessibility and to aid investigation into their social effects, they have been categorised in Figure 2.3. A similar process can also be undertaken with other REIs, notably mining companies.

42 See Amaeshi and Amao (2009) for REI operational differences in Nigeria.
Lastly, and linked to all of these points, is that the study of voice changes over time (Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 5; Lindell 2010b p. 17), even within Hirschman’s original focus on the consumer-industry relationship (Pitt et al. 2002). In the case of authoritarian countries, for instance, transformation of the political regime via the opening up of the opportunity to exit ‘changes the human agents’ as, by being allowed more choice, citizens become more aware of their options, thereby increasing the likelihood of vocal behaviour (Hirschman 1995 p. 14 author’s emphasis; see also Birch 1974 p. 79). Social position, economic wealth and opportunity will also change for citizens over their life course, dependent on context. Equally, citizen – economic actor interaction will change dependent on new business laws and regulations on consultation and changes in shareholder aims, values and ethos. Here, the links between voice and political ecology are noticeable. Voice analysis at one moment will provide

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43 The acronyms in this column differ slightly from the published version (Gonzalez 2015 p. 477) to make clear that states can enter partnership with other actors but retain a controlling stake.
only a “snapshot” of citizen voice at that time and thus the work of the “present” must be situated and related to the past.

2.8 The typology of protest voice

An understanding of history also helps lead citizens and other voice actors to deploy what they feel are the most effective methods of voice action in pursuit of their goals, environmental or otherwise. Hirschman and other academics have explored different types of voice action, the circumstances in which a voice action is used, the actors who use it and the implications this can have on achieving stakeholder aims.

The first major underlying aspect of voice action is whether it occurs in active or passive forms. Zuindeau (2009) noted that voice ‘should frequently be considered as active (significant formalisation, effective search for communication), but can also be passive (rumours, muted remarks … characterised as “background noise”)’ (p. 158). Zuindeau’s research goes on to explore how different levels and forms of violence encompass voice actions within these active and passive forms (Figure 2.4). Within active voice, the most clear illustration is radical voice such as demonstrations, riots and revolutions (Lyons and Lowery 1986 p. 332), categorised by Hirschman as unconventional ‘participatory explosions’ (1971 p. 42), for ‘which there are no parallels’ (Hirschman 1981 p. 215). Radical voice actions will ‘greatly increase the likelihood that the event will be noticed’ (Tilly 1978 p. 92) which may help to force through changes to the issue at hand. In Bolivia, the 2000 “Water War” and 2003 “Gas War” saw protestors reject the neoliberal restructuring and re-scaling of resource governance and, through protests, blockades and resistance, seek procedural and distributive justice (Perreault 2006).

An examination of these events, or “critical moments” (Khan 2013) can help reveal their causes. Outsider radical action may indicate longing for inclusion (Zahar 2006 p. 39) in a specific contextual format (e.g. system, organisation or event) from which they feel alienated and consequently are unable to use their voice in any other way. Equally, Herring’s (1989 p. 139) inherency theory rejects the idea of “illegitimate” versus “legitimate” kinds of political activities on the basis that some political challengers are denied access to the privileges and advantages available to others and so will resort to tactics, even if they are radical in nature, which they feel will produce the results they want. An example can be seen in the hunter-gather Penan in Malaysia, whose efforts to repel the logging companies through the building of
blockades arose because the government wasn’t listening to them. Hence this action was an effort to get the government to listen (Brosius 2006 p. 316). Such actions thus become “weapons of the weak” to cite Scott’s (1985) book title and are a form of resistance used by the less powerful to express disapproval of corporate activities (Newell 2005 p. 548).

Figure 2.4: Proposal for a renewed exit and voice model

ACTIVE

Violence

Voice: critical voice, legitimisation of violence;
Exit: relocatisation, withdrawal

Voice: explicit support, search for reform;
Exit: departure of critical agents

CRITICISM

Voice: critical “background noise;”
Exit: resignation destabilising abstention

Voice: favourable “background noise;”
Exit: legitimising abstention

REINFORCEMENT

Apathy

PASSIVE

(Zuindeau 2009 p. 157).

Equally, in Latin America, the failure to reinforce the democratic system and implement a strong and equitable state presence limits open participation for self-expression and has prevented violence and other radical actions being used to voice grievances and hold authorities accountable (Berkman 2007 p. 8; Vasquez 2014 pp. 53-54). People are not violent because they are poor but rather that the ‘long-term segregation of people within neighborhoods of
concentrated poverty’ causes people to adapt to deprivation conditions that see them ‘come to rely on violence as a basic tool for survival’ (Sanchez R 2006 p. 181).

Radical voice is not confined to marginalised social groups. Resistance and violence is generally a last resort for people whose peaceful attempts have been frustrated or ignored (Zahar 2006 p. 50) (a more acute issue for citizens in authoritarian countries) (see Hirschman 1984 ch. 3; Campbell 2003 p. 80). Illustrations can be seen in the 1996 Mexican citizens’ rebellion in Tepotzlan over the imposition of top-down ‘development’ by unresponsive elected officials and developers (Simon 1998) or the Zapatista rebellion in which indigenous people ‘were prepared to risk their lives in an attempt to be heard’ (Harvey 1998 p. 229) and have their grievances addressed (see Harvey 1998; Godelmann 2014). Still, for peripheral and mainstream groups, care must be taken in radical voice application as ‘people might forget their deferential obligations and let voice get carried away’ (Adelman 2013 p. 443) which may hinder long-term efforts at securing a goal from vertical actors.

Turning to passive forms of voice, these are defined as ‘quiet’ resistance forms (Lindell 2010a p. 5) such as rumours or muted remarks (Zuindeau 2009 p. 158). In Domination and the arts of resistance: hidden transcripts, Scott (1992) explores the action of subjected people though the term “public and private transcripts” which at their heart discuss the nature of power relations between these actors in these two scenarios. ‘[P]ublic transcript’ (ibid. p. 2 author’s emphasis) describes open interaction between subordinates and those dominating them and will most often see subordinates shape their public performance ‘out of prudence, fear, and a desire to curry favour’ in order ‘to appeal to the expectations of the powerful’ (ibid.).

Crucially, it is only when the performers or actors are spoken to “offstage, beyond direct observation by powerholders’ and the public transcript scenario (ibid. p. 4) that one can unmask a fuller story surrounding their power relations (ibid. p. 2). ‘Each hidden transcript ... is actually elaborated among a restricted “public” place that excludes – that is hidden from – certain specified others’ (ibid. p. 14). ‘The hidden transcript is thus derivative in the sense that it consists of those offstage speeches, gestures, and practices that confirm, contradict, or inflect

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44 Public transcript is defined by the Scott thus: ‘Public here refers to action that is avowed to the other party in the power relationship, and transcript is used almost in its juridical sense (procès verbal) of a complete record of what is said. This complete record, however, would also include nonspeech acts such as gestures and expressions’ (1992 p. 2, footnote 1, author’s emphasis).
what appears in the public transcript’ (ibid. pp. 4-5). This closed transcript scenario can be described as a more passive form of voice and can occur as a critical protest form of vocalisation where direct discussion between the citizen and those in question does not occur and is perhaps not sought.

Another important area of research is the study of silence. Although Hill (1979) explores how symbolic protest and calculated silence or ‘silent non-exit’ (Barry 1974 p. 91) can occur if the risks individuals may face may outweigh the benefits of protesting against a serious injustice, silence is also a passive form of vocal protest. It can be a type of political protest (Gal 1991 p. 176) and activism (see Hatzisavvidou 2015) and a ‘strategic defence against the powerful as when Western Apache men use it to baffle, disconcert, and exclude white outsiders’ (Basso 1979 cited in Gal 1991 p. 175). The issue with this and other forms of passive voice is that in this environmental pollutant scenario, citizens will continue to suffer from immediate pollution in silence (Dowding et al. 2000 p. 472) unless some form of more active vocalisation occurs.

Lastly, one must give thought to precisely who is vocalising and there are three notable actors present. There is individual (i.e. citizen) voice in which ‘the intention of the individual in acting is to bring about the desired effect solely through that action’ (ibid. p. 473). There is also institutional voice (i.e. the voice of the government, business or REIs) and can be singular in nature i.e. via a spokesperson, even though they are representative of a larger collective body. Consequently, one can consider institutional voice to be a form of the third type of voice actor, collective voice. This final voice actor requires greater explanation.

On the one hand, collective voice can be be seen as another type of voice action. Global democratisation and decentralisation trends have opened new political spaces for marginalised people to voice, but their success is dependent on the institutions they can access and organisational ability (Devas 2005, cited in Brown and Lyons 2010 p. 34; see also Lindell 2010b pp. 19-22), the latter an issue due to their limited time and resources and lack of leadership (Devas 2004 p. 190, cited in Brown and Lyons 2010 p. 36). Collective voice can go

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45 One must note that the hidden transcript discourse cannot be seen as “true” and open transcript discourse as false. Equally, hidden transcript dialogue is not a realm of freedom and open transcript discourse one of necessity (Scott 1992 p. 5). Instead, ‘the hidden transcript is produced for a different audience and under different constraints of power than the public transcript’ (ibid.).
some way to combating difficulties that disadvantaged and/or non-influential groups and those forced to use violence can face in vertical voice dialogue. However, as will be explained, collective voice can also be understood, as it is here, as a separate category of voice actor.

‘In … resource management [and more specifically an environmental pollutant scenario] there are multiple voices’ (Howitt 2001 p. 66) and one can differentiate between stakeholders or ‘interlocutors’ (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994) ‘that have a legal, moral or presumed claim on the firm and groups that have an ability to influence the firm’s behaviour, direction, process, or outcomes’ (Mitchell, Agle and Wood 1997 p. 859). The former includes citizens with a direct or local “stake” in the pollution alongside CBOs charged with the collective defence of its individual members’ interests (Bourdieu 1986 p. 301). Other CBOs include religious movements, trade unions, student groups and women’s movements (Stiefel and Wolfe 1994 pp. 139-143; Campbell 2003 p. 81). The latter comprises local, national and international NGOs and other global citizens (who are perhaps connected to a campaign run by an NGO) (Chalmers, Martin and Piester 1997 p. 573) whose range of objectives (e.g. human rights, environmental protection) lead them to lobby economic actors. So, while each stakeholder group (citizens, different collective voice actors) has a different voice, they are also often interconnected due to these collective groups’ ability to influence citizen voice, how it is heard and by whom, and the strength given to citizen voice in vertical situations. Therefore, collectivising voice has several benefits.

Research by Vasquez (2014 p. 90) found that a unified indigenous voice e.g. via an indigenous federation, allows for faster resolution of oil and gas conflicts as they are more likely to be able to use the prevailing socio-political climate advantageously. ‘[T]he globalisation of opposition’ to certain industries (in this case mining) allows the network to report on mining company and local community negotiations which can be used as a reference point or benchmark for other communities in negotiations (Kapelus 2002 p. 277). NGOs’ ability to mobilise communities at the grassroots level46 is important, especially in cases where there are unequal power relations between communities and other actors47 while their capacity to work with businesses as well can help ensure they utilise more environmentally responsible practices (Reed 2002 p. 207). Celebrities and other high profile individuals can also strengthen

46 E.g. Lund-Thomsen (2005 p. 629).
local collective voice through involvement in environmental campaigns (see Brosius 2006). In this thesis, Chapter Eight, Section 8.3 analyses the crucial role which the Catholic Church had in strengthening and expanding the voice options for the Cuninico community.

There are problems with pooling voice in this way. In some situations, citizens risk “dispossession” of their voice, ‘deprived of an expression which specifically expresses’ themselves and their interests which are ‘denied and annulled, by the common voice, the opinion communis as produced and uttered by the accredited spokesperson’ (Bourdieu 1986 pp. 301-302 author’s emphasis; see also Moore, Jr 1984 pp. 267-268; Cornwall 2008 p. 277). This is evident for grassroot activists who are unable to participate directly in transnational movements ‘and are dependent upon ‘imagineers’, actors who are critical in furthering connectivity, in channelling information and in ‘translating’ the vision of the network to the grass roots’ (Lindell 2010b p. 24; see also Cumbers, Routledge and Nativel 2008 p. 189, cited in Lindell 2010b p. 24). Consequently, whilst political parties offer excluded or marginalised citizens the best means of making their interests and voices heard, established parties can still cater predominantly to elite interests (Stiefel and Wolf 1994 pp. 139-140), an indicator of the difficulties which these groups face in formal processes of participation established by government (Friedman 2006).

Within groups, a campaign originally designed to cater for the wider collective can instead predominantly cater for a minority (Hirschman 1981 pp. 242-243; see also Michels 1962; Hirschman 1992 p. 84; Roche 1999 p. 148). Hirschman typifies this as the “treachery of voice”, whereby changes achieved through voice are primarily in the interests of the few (1981 p. 244) and weaker voices are “drowned out”, a factor which may constrain individuals from collective voice participation. As noted in Section 2.5, whilst NGOs and their supporters must be accountable to communities, downward accountability is underdeveloped and thus weak, for example when the NGO pursues technical strategies unfamiliar to local actors or have different objectives (Ebrahim 2003; Kamat 2004 pp. 167-168).

Through PEV, researchers must give thought to ‘whose interests’ these collective voice actors serve, ‘particularly where they claim to represent and defend the interests of poor members’ (Lindell 2010b p. 11; see also Cornwall 2008 p. 271). For instance, O’Dwyer and

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48 E.g. Larson et al. (2016); Finley-Brook (2016 pp. 341-342).
Unerman (2010 p. 465) recounted how interviews with Dochas (the Irish NGDO (non-governmental development organisation) umbrella body) personnel revealed that NGDO local elites in Chad determined what was good for their fellow citizens, how Chadian society should develop and the rights individuals should claim with little actual citizen consultation.

Overall, the research into forms of voice in this and preceding sections has been coalesced into a typology of protest voice for study into voice vis-a-vis environmental pollution events. ‘Typologies are a useful starting point for differentiating degrees and kinds of participation’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 270). They have ‘clarity through specificity’ – spelling out what exactly people are being enjoined to participate in, for what purpose, who is involved and who is absent’ which will ‘help make clear what exactly is at stake when ‘participation’ is being advocated’ (ibid. p. 281). In a similar vein, a typology of protest voice will also bring clarity to the action of voicing by categorising different voice stakeholders and forms of voice which a study of the PEV environment can explain the use of. This, in turn, will help make clear the ease with which different stakeholders can hold REIs accountable for pollution issues.

Figure 2.5 details the typology of protest voice. Running down the central y axis is the degree of violence within the voice action ranging from highly violent down to non-violent or passive actions. Split between the x axis are the two overarching forms of voice, active and passive voice. Within active voice, there are various forms of voice action starting with the most violent termed radical voice. This is followed by a less violent form of voice termed unorthodox informal voice in which vertical or horizontal voicing to particular voice actor(s) occurs through an unorthodox non-formal method. Scrutiny-based voice is utilised by collective stakeholder groups who disseminate or project their voice and its findings into wider society. The least violent active form of voice is orthodox formal voice in vertical or horizontal situations and includes legally or socially acceptable forms of voicing such as electoral voting, consultation mechanisms, government meetings and petitions. These forms of orthodox formal voice action are more likely to be found in democratic states as opposed to authoritarian regimes, but as Section 2.7 describes, they also need to be accessible for citizens to participate and therefore report environmental pollution issues. It is orthodox formal voice action which should theoretically typify the normalised mode of communication between citizens and the state/REIs. On the far right hand side of the x axis there is also one type of active voice action linked to exit termed vocal exit in which people vocalise their objections ‘vociferously’
Kolarska and Aldrich 1980 p. 43) as they leave a given scenario. Vocal exit action can contain a differing degree of violence and voice, again dependent on context.

Passive voice has three main categories. Since this is a typology of protest voice, critical background noise such as negative judgements, gossip and conversations, ‘[q]uiet’ forms of resistance (Lindell 2010a p. 5) have been catalogued. The second form of passive voice is ‘silent non-exit’ (Barry 1974 p. 91) or silence which can be understood as a symbolic form of protest. Lastly, silent exit is categorised. Whilst, silent exit is an “action”, it is also a passive form of voice in which actors choose to leave a situation without choosing to voice their objections. In these passive forms of voice, resolving environmental pollution issues is minimal. More active forms of voice are crucial. At the bottom, the typology lists the three key forms of voice actor; individual (citizen), collective (citizen, CBO, NGO) and institutional (government, business, REIs).

In relation to participation Cornwall (2008) noted that ‘[w]hen forms of participation are contextualised, however, they become more ambiguous’ (p. 271). ‘In practice, all the forms and meanings of participation identified ... may be found in a single project or process, at different stages’ (ibid. pp. 273-274). My typology of protest voice diagram shows a range of active and passive voice and connected exit actions and the three key actors within environmental pollution incidents. These actors can use a range of different active or passive voice actions. They may have a dominant voice strategy which is supported by other types of voice actions. Equally, people may change or adopt their voice strategy in new or similar circumstances. Contextual specificity is thus key, a factor which PEV fully acknowledges.
Figure 2.5: The typology of protest voice.

**VOICE**

**ACTIVE VOICE**: significant formalisation, effective search for communication (Zuindeau 2009 p. 158).

**Radical voice**: ‘participatory explosions’ (Hirschman 1971 p. 42) such as riots or protests.

**Scrutiny-based voice**: CBO/NGO groups and citizens (e.g. academics, journalists) investigating environmental and human rights issues disseminate their findings.

**Orthodox formal voice**: legal or socially acceptable forms of non-violent voice action in horizontal/vertical situations e.g. electoral voting, consultation mechanisms, petitions, interviews, (government) meetings, discussions, debates, lectures.

**Unorthodox informal voice**: used due to an absence of orthodox formal voice access to the vertical actor in question.


**Silent non-exit**: here understood as a symbolic form of protest.

**EXIT**

**Degree of Violence**

**Vocal exit**: as one exits, one also voices (Kolarska and Aldrich 1980 p. 44). The degree or level of voice (and therefore violence) is variable and dependent on context.

**Silent exit**: as one exits, one does so silently.

**VOICE ACTORS**: individual (citizen); collective (citizen, CBO, NGO); institutional (government, business, REI).
2.9 Conclusion

Overall, PEV enables one to study the possibilities for, and strength of, individual and collective voice by citizens and other actors. ‘This is a good starting point from which the political ecology of a struggle or a campaign may be understood in context and in relation to cause(s) of these actions’ (Gonzalez 2015 p. 478). For instance, is it driven by structural flaws in the state system, social position, the influence or absence of collective-voice organisations or the impact of specific economic actors’ policies towards stakeholder engagement and dialogue? Figure 2.6 provides a visual representation of the real-world contextual influences on voice. Each facet requires investigation to build up a comprehensive evaluative assessment of why particular voice actions are used/not used within the typology of protest voice and the potential barriers faced by stakeholders in their efforts at holding economic actors accountable for pollution. As the four analysis chapters (5-8) in this thesis show, individual and collective voice stakeholders can face a multitude of different impediments to their voice which can complicate and prevent the necessary accountability of Petroperu.

Hirschman’s voice theory has a significant role to play in relation to understanding actor responses to environmental degradation. Voice investigation is a truly multi-faceted process and has been shown to offer strong integration into political ecology’s efforts to comprehend the origins and possible solutions to environmental degradation. Importantly, one can see how the study of voice action through integrating Hirschman’s theory with a political ecology theoretical framework is entirely different from post-structural political ecology and discourse. PEV provides researchers with a theoretical framework to explore temporally specific political, economic, social, and geographical environments in which citizen and collective voice organisations operate and voice, and can be applied to a specific case and context. Stakeholder voice has been shown to be influenced by power relations in various relationships: state-citizens, businesses-citizens, CBO/NGO-states, CBO/NGO-citizens, CBO/NGO-business, and is linked to control, and thus access to, decision-making mechanisms. Crucially, these relationships surrounding access are influenced not only by the macro-political environment but also localised power relationships involving businesses which great influence in dictating the scope and frequency of stakeholder engagement. Access to decision-making mechanisms is also linked to spatial scale and locality, and the type of voice mechanisms used by the state and each business actor. Together, these issues will have a significant bearing on
stakeholder trust, their inclination to voice and the type of voice action used described within the typology of protest voice developed in this Chapter.

The study of voice requires a focus on these macro and micro influences through the broad themes of power, spatial location, place and time via a political ecology lens. In this thesis, PEV’s innovative theoretical framework will aim to broaden our understanding of why oil-rich EMaDEs suffer higher levels of environmental pollution. Given the importance of contextualisation in PEV, a single country (Peru) has been chosen as a case study, alongside a focus on state-run Petroperu. The next chapter will now begin with a contextual overview of Peru’s oil industry and detailed analysis of Loreto’s importance for the oil industry.
Figure 2.6: The political ecology of voice (PEV).

**The theoretical rationale for applying voice to environmental problems**
- The perceived benefit of voicing over public interest problems (like pollution issues) will help to outweigh individual cost (time, effort, money) of voicing.
- Citizen’s willing to voice to defend their own quality of life will help outweigh participatory uncertainty.
- Loyalty (to a territory) will hold exit at bay and activate voice. This is influenced by a person’s time horizons e.g. won’t immediately exit to give time for a solution.
- The solutions to environmental problems generally occur through vertical political settings which are most successfully influenced through collective voice. Environmental pollution impacts a collective (variably sized) group of citizens creating a collective voice.

**Geographical location and technological access**
- Geographical location of individual/collective group will influence their access to vertical power structures or those they seek to voice to. This also applies to technological access to the state which can strengthen or limit voice.

**Non-state actors’ involvement**
- Industries (e.g. REIs) can each have different access arrangements. This will influence how successful individual/collective voice will be in reporting environmental pollution issues.
- Collective groups that represent citizens (CBOs, NGOs) influence citizen voice and their choice of action described within the typology of protest voice.

**Real-world contextual influences on voice which require investigation**

**Time**
- Voice is not applied within a static temporal time-period. Changes in political the system will increase/decrease voice opportunity.

**Political (state) environment**
- Voice shaped by the political system in which it operates i.e. democratic vs. authoritarian regimes.

**Socio-economic and racial influences**
- The stronger a person’s societal position and ability to meet participatory costs (time, effort, money), the stronger their ability to voice and access and influence voice mechanisms. This means that marginalised citizens (e.g. indigenous groups or ethnic minorities) who are in lower social positions will often have a weaker voice and may face difficulties meeting participatory costs. These problems are accentuated in socially unequal countries.

- The higher an individual’s level of political influence, the greater their chance of success in vertical voice situations.
Chapter 3 The research context: Peru’s oil history and the search for *selva* oil in the Loreto Region

‘For many Latin Americans, oil is *el excremento del diablo*’ (the devil’s excrement) (Philip 1982 p. 1, author’s emphasis).

This chapter, split into four sections, will provide a brief history of Peru’s oil history, detailing the main production sites, their linkages to the wider regional and international economy and why the Loreto Region offers such a valuable case-study location to examine PEV. Section 3.1 sets out the practical and academic changes to the fieldwork location over the course of the first year of study. This is followed by two interlinked sections that discuss Peru’s oil history; Section 3.2 narrates the country’s oil history from 1900 to the early 1980s while Section 3.2 continues the journey from the late 1980s to the present day. Finally, Section 3.4 details the Loreto case-study location, with a focus on its geography, political administration and oil economy.

3.1 Practical and academic changes to fieldwork location

To understand why Peru’s Loreto Region was chosen as the research fieldwork sites for a PEV-based study, it is important to discuss the academic journey that has transpired since the first year of doctoral research. In the initial research proposal submitted in March 2013, the aim was to understand the reasons behind oil facility sabotage in the Niger Delta (specifically Ogoniland), Nigeria, a region suffering from severe oil environmental pollution and connected social impacts (Okonta 2003; Jike 2004; Dung, Bombom and Agusomu 2008; Jernelov 2010; Francis, Lapin and Rossiasco 2011; Pegg and Zabbey 2013; Fentiman and Zabbey 2015). However, the ongoing militant actions of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) at the time (superseded since 2016 by the Niger Delta Avengers) alongside wider national instability (e.g. Boko Haram terror threat) made fieldwork impossible.

Consequently, the proposal’s aim was redrafted towards analysis of whether oil spills in EMaDEs were due to transnational REI production “double standards”, a research question drawn directly from the initial proposal. South America’s numerous oil producing countries and documented oil pollution incidents in Brazil’s Camamu and Guanabara Bays (Leeuwen and Tulder 2006; Paixao et al. 2010; Soares-Gomes et al. 2010), Ecuador’s Oriente Basin
Upon commencing the degree, I decided to narrow focus onto Ecuador’s Oriente, a region previously studied in my Master’s programme and which has suffered tremendous environmental damage from oil extraction, particularly by Chevron-Texaco during their 1967-1993 operations. On this basis, the proposal was accepted and fieldwork was scheduled for autumn 2014, at the start of the second year of study. However, as the research progressed and preparatory groundwork was undertaken, it became clear that Ecuador was infeasible as a viable research location. While the main oil producing Oriente region has several potential oil sites, those in the north surrounding Nueva Loja town are within a 12-mile (20-kilometre) exclusion zone along the Colombian border, into which the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has advised against all travel. Communication with various Ecuadorian university academics also indicated that some of the oil sites in the south are relatively geographically inaccessible, while entrance to oil zones had been tightened recently, making it more difficult for foreign researchers to gain admission. Over the course of 2013, the government also moved towards production-sharing agreements which increased the state’s share of revenue and deterred private sector participation and investment (US Energy Information Administration 2014a; 2014b pp. 3-4), which would have implications for my focus on transnational REI extraction sites.

Accordingly, in spring/summer 2014, a change of fieldwork location again became necessary. While this would appear to throw the research question into doubt, the proposal had altered significantly as the literature review progressed. The focus on REI double standards

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49 See Gonzalez (2011).
50 This resulted in an ongoing lawsuit (first filed in Texas’ state court in 1994) on behalf of 1,500 Ecuadorian Indians and farmers over multiple allegations of untreated, oil-laced water being released from the drilling (Scott 2000 p. 199). For more on the court-case see Gomez (2015); Steinitz and Gowder (2016); Stewart (2016); ChevronToxico (no date).
51 My 2011 Ecuador paper (Gonzalez 2011) was based on secondary sources rather than fieldwork.
52 This was not a sudden change of events; following the 2010 reforms to the hydrocarbon law, private companies lost their right to keep their share of oil funds and were instead required to hand over oil production to the state in exchange for a flat fee that varied from contract to contract and from barrel to barrel (Vasquez 2014 p. 31). The departure of four major oil REIs (Petrobas, National Petroleum Company, Canada Grande and Energy Development Company) was the culmination of these policies (Ortiz 2010; Vasquez 2014 p. 31).
had culminated in spring 2014 with a possible focus on the lack of advanced economy consumer knowledge surrounding oil production standards in EMaDEs but this was eventually discounted due to its impracticality and time constraints. Despite this, the underlying emphasis on REI oil pollution accountability remained and it was through further reading and discussion with my supervisor that the PEV theoretical framework was formulated. Coinciding with the creation of PEV was the decision to shift attention onto the Peruvian Loreton Region. This was not only a safer and more accessible location but also has a huge array of oil production sites, contamination issues and associated social conflicts which therefore made it an invaluable site for a PEV-based study (see Section 3.4).

Therefore, upon reflection, the changes to the fieldwork sites and the delay in its commencement (early 2015) worked out advantageously as they allowed me to narrow the accountability theme into an innovative theoretical framework which was ready to use for fieldwork. The next two sections provide a brief account of the country’s oil history.

3.2 Peru’s early oil history 1900-early 1980s

‘It is … far from obvious that the interests of the majority of Peruvians are best served by this form of development’ (Philip 1984 p. 26).

Peru, like its northern neighbour, Ecuador, is a resource-rich country that has, throughout the Twentieth Century, relied heavily on capital-intensive projects that promoted raw material exports (Philip 1984 p. 1). Peru has a long history of oil production which began in the 1860s and continued until the beginning of the Twentieth Century at very low levels and with slow growth (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 95; Tejada-Bailly 1981 p. 118; Vasquez 2014 p. 18). After Edwin Drake’s successful drilling of the first oil well in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859, initial discoveries in Peru were made on the Pacific north-west coast and include the site of the western hemisphere’s second oil well in an area just north of La Brea y Pariñas (La Brea) on 2nd November 1863 (Pinelo 1973 p. 6).

Between 1890 and 1930, production expanded greatly, with three key fields established in the coastal north-western Piura Region; La Brea (owned by the oldest oil producing company in Latin America, the London and South Pacific Petroleum Company Ltd which had been the lease holder since 1st July 1899), Lobitos (owned by UK company Lobitos oilfields who had
discovered the site via wildcat drilling in 1901 before production began in 1904-05) located north of Negritos, and Zorritos (operated by a Peruvian company called Piaggio which had been created by an Italian immigrant merchant), a small and geographically-complex field located further north again (Pinelo 1973 p. 10 and footnote 43 p. 28; Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp. 95-96, 99; Vasquez 2014 p. 18 and footnote 5 p. 146; Taylor 2015 p. 155).  

Despite these sites, at the turn of the Twentieth Century the major oil companies viewed most Latin American countries ‘as a backwater where high tariffs and poor communications inhibited sales’ (Philip 1982 p. 9; see also Wilkins 1970 pp. 185-186, cited in Philip 1982 p. 10). This perhaps helps explain why Peru remained South America’s first oil producer until 1924 (Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 207). Nevertheless, the period after 1904 marked the take-off for the Peruvian oil industry, which was encouraged by the emergence of a large national market for fuel oil (due to the switch from coal to oil by the Peruvian Steamship Company) and rising international demand (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 97). By 1920, the industry was in a radically different position (Philip 1982 p. 10), as reflected by increased production levels during the rest of the 1920s (Table 3.1), and accounting for 30 per cent of total export earnings by 1929 (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 98).

Table 3.1: Oil production in Latin America 1916-1928 (ooo barrels a day, b/d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1916</th>
<th>1918</th>
<th>1920</th>
<th>1922</th>
<th>1924</th>
<th>1926</th>
<th>1928</th>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>24.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
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<td>neg.</td>
<td>neg.</td>
<td>neg.</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>32.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>24.7</td>
<td>101.1</td>
<td>289.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>111.1</td>
<td>174.9</td>
<td>430.3</td>
<td>499.4</td>
<td>247.7</td>
<td>137.4</td>
<td>108.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Neg: negative
(Philip 1982 p. 11).

Part of this situation was attributable to new investment and development. In early Twentieth Century Peru, two of the north-western onshore oil fields (La Brea and Lagunitas)

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53 A fourth, far smaller site of four square miles (approximately 10.4 square kilometres) near Talara (a port city in the north-west) was operated by the Lagunitas Oil Company, a Chilean-financed firm that worked in close alliance with London and Pacific (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 99).
had not had their production suitably developed by their owners and their UK operating companies were subsequently bought by the International Petroleum Company (an affiliate of the Canadian firm Imperial Oil Ltd, itself a subsidiary of the American oil company, Jersey Standard) in 1913 and 1914 respectively (Pinelo 1973 pp. 10-11; Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 100; Brown 1985 p. 16; Bucheli and Sommer 2014 pp. 153-154). Moreover, since world oil markets were subject to growing oligopolistic control and International Petroleum Company offered easy access to these markets, Lobitos Oilfields entered a working alliance with Jersey Standard by selling all their oil through International Petroleum Company (Wilkins 1970 p. 186; Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 100). This effectively made International Petroleum Company the key oil operator for the whole country.55

A total of $370 million worth of oilfield investment in the early 1920s helped International Petroleum Company drill more than 487 new wells by 1921, increase La Brea production and expand their Talara refinery (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 98; Brown 1985 p. 17). This expansion programme generated increasing production volumes throughout the 1920s and 1930s which contributed to Peru’s rising production in the latter decade (Table 3.2) and its position as a net exporter (Pinelo 1973 p. 42; Brown 1985 pp. 20-21; Clayton 1999 p. 92).

55 The Zorritos field reached full-capacity production by the early Twentieth Century and by the 1930s was nearing exhaustion (Thorp and Betram 1978 p. 96). The oilfield, refinery and port were eventually bought out by the government in 1939 who also gained a group of experienced technicians and workers (ibid. p. 167, footnote 50 p. 384).
Table 3.2: World oil output and output of main Latin American countries 1932-1937 (b/d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1932</th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1934</th>
<th>1935</th>
<th>1936</th>
<th>1937</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>2,963,371</td>
<td>3,883,894</td>
<td>4,102,854</td>
<td>3,894,268</td>
<td>4,913,765</td>
<td>5,566,426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>1,1784,560</td>
<td>2,462,922</td>
<td>2,490,978</td>
<td>2,690,534</td>
<td>3,009,773</td>
<td>3,496,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>340,801</td>
<td>410,428</td>
<td>462,100</td>
<td>460290</td>
<td>525,826</td>
<td>525,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>318,418</td>
<td>331,215</td>
<td>389,273</td>
<td>408,247</td>
<td>427,185</td>
<td>512,247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>90,517</td>
<td>92,902</td>
<td>104,582</td>
<td>109,601</td>
<td>112,405</td>
<td>128,511</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>35,956</td>
<td>36,051</td>
<td>39,773</td>
<td>49,320</td>
<td>50,647</td>
<td>55,542</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>37,404</td>
<td>37,516</td>
<td>38,447</td>
<td>39,170</td>
<td>42,341</td>
<td>44,926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>36,328</td>
<td>38,154</td>
<td>38,412</td>
<td>44,926</td>
<td>48,200</td>
<td>52,077</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>4,438</td>
<td>4,446</td>
<td>4,532</td>
<td>4,653</td>
<td>5,342</td>
<td>5,928</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Philip 1982 p. 47).

The interest of (foreign) REIs in these north-western sites was no accident: ‘one would expect the most accessible resources to be developed first’ (Phillip 1984 p. 15), which had consequently seen Peru’s easier mining and mineral development prospects exhausted in the previous hundred years (ibid. p. 16). By the end of the 1930s, it became apparent that new exploration would need to occur in unconventional areas like the selva, especially as La Brea production had begun to decline at the very end of the 1930s (Thorpe and Bertram 1978 p. 165). These unconventional sites tend to be marginal in nature due to their heavy development costs, difficult technology and tendency to be smaller and take more time to develop, yet run dry faster (Philip 1984 p. 15; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 208). These factors in one of the most difficult terrains in the world limited REI interest (Philip 1984).56

Oil industry exploration hesitation appeared to be valid; despite 30 wells being sunk in the selva prior to 1969, only two small finds were made in the 1930s and 1950s (Tejada-Bailly 1981 p. 121; Thorpe and Bertram 1978 p. 166; Philip 1984 p. 224). Consequently, until around 1960, Peru’s oil production still came overwhelmingly from onshore fields on the north-western coast and a limited amount of offshore production sites (Philip 1984 p. 3). While production from these sites was able to increase overall production during the 1940s-1960s

56 Moreover, by the end of World War II, South American oil development became relegated to secondary status after the commencement of (large-scale) Middle Eastern production (see BP 1951 p. 2), which has much lower production costs than the world average (Philip 1982 p. 152; Wirth 1985 p. xi).
(Table 3.3), it was not sufficient to meet the growing domestic demand in the post-war period, especially as exploration in the Sechura desert between 1953-1956 had also failed to lead to any major finds (Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp. 101, 223-224). Indeed, aside from the Aguaytia natural gas and condensates field discovered by Mobil in 1961, no new oilfield discoveries were made between 1948-1970, which caused Peru to switch being a net exporter to a net importer in 1962 (Thorp and Bertram 1978 p. 229; Philip 1984 p. 3; Wise 2007 p. 309).

Table 3.3: Oil production and exports in Peru (million barrels, annual average) (1935-1969)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Production</th>
<th>Exports</th>
<th>Internal consumption (including imports)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935-39</td>
<td>16.3</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-9</td>
<td>13.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950-4</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955-59</td>
<td>18.3</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960-64</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>21.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965-69</td>
<td>25.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>31.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Philip 1982 p. 245).

The lack of oil discoveries, coupled with the difficulty and expense of developing offshore and selva-based oil-fields led to many of the Peruvian REI firms established under the Petroleum Law (March 1952) to vanish by the end of the 1960s and be replaced by foreign REIs (Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp. 222-226). At this stage, foreign REI interest in the selva had grown due to the exploration successes in neighbouring Colombia (the Putumayo field was established in 1964) and Ecuador (the Oriente basin oil was discovered in 1967), the latter achieving 245,000 b/d piped through their Trans-Andean pipeline by mid-1974 (Stepan 1978 p. 264; Philip 1984 p. 3).

Of these foreign REIs, International Petroleum Company had been able to maintain its near monopoly over the country’s oil industry (controlling 80 per cent of Peru’s output in 1949 and the country’s economy) by using their powerful position to dictate terms and conditions to impoverished governments by offering short-term loans and cash (Thorp and Bertram 1978 pp.
However, due to various interconnected factors, the company was expropriated by the military regime of Army Chief of Staff General Juan Velasco Alvarado (1968-1975) under dramatic conditions in 1968-1969, which resulted in the creation of the national oil company Petroperu. Even so, the nationalisation of the International Petroleum Company did nothing to dissuade other American (or foreign) REIs from investing in the country; only days after the seizure in October 1968, Belco Petroleum announced an investment programme to continue its offshore exploration (Krasner 1978 p. 242; Philip 1982 p. 109).

Nonetheless, by 1968, Peru’s oil industry was declining and the finds made in the north-west fields had become less and less significant (Philip 1982 pp. 432-433; Wise 2007 p. 309; Taylor 2015 p. 166). With declining oil production and smaller north-west finds, exploration in the *selva* region was again seen as necessary, so from the beginning of 1969 Petroperu moved towards establishing itself in this area (Philip 1982 pp. 433-434), discovering significant oil reserves in the early 1970s (Philip 1984 p. 4; Haller et al. 2007 p. 388). This exploration decision was ‘momentous for a number of reasons’ (Philip 1982 p. 434). The Peruvian state, via Petroperu became the architect of *selva* oil development which has given the state-run company a long association and impact upon *selva* oil production here. Moreover, the high costs of successfully exploring a 1-million-hectare (estimated by Petroperu to be $877 million, with $260 million of this committed before any expected return) was many times higher than the 1971 $73.3 million approximate value of the company (Philip 1982 p. 434; Portocarrero M 1982 pp. 439-440).

Subsequently, the decision was taken to secure large credit from international capital and maximise resources by joining forces via contracts with private REIs via “Peruvian model” contracts (Philip 1982. pp. 127, 436; Portocarrero M 1982 p. 440; Ascher 1999 p. 124; Mikesell 2015 pp. 70-71). Sixteen of these were signed by 1973 (and a further two for exploration offshore), the former each covering 1 million hectares (Philip 1982 p. 127; 1984 p. 4; Mikesell 2015 p. 70). Coinciding with this came plans to create an oil transport pipeline across the

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57 See Pinelo (1973); Goodsell (1974 pp. 141-146); Philip (1978 ch. 2; 1982 ch. 12); Sigmund (1980); Bucheli and Sommer (2014 pp. 155-158).

58 These contracts were for 35 years from the date of signing and saw the company provide all technical and financial resources for exploitation and development. Produced petroleum was divided between Petroperu and the company and ranged from between 44 to 50 per cent for the company (Mikesell 2015 p. 70).
Andes, a project declared to be a national priority in 1972 (Philip 1982 p. 438). Despite severe costs, serious work on the *Oleoducto Norperuano* began in 1974 and was finally completed in 1977 at a cost of over $729 million rather than the original estimated 1974 figure of $550 million (Philip 1982 pp. 442-443; 1984 p. 6; Ascher 1999 p. 124).59

Despite these developments, initial *selva* prospects proved disappointing; Petroperu’s exploration had resulted in only one exploitable field between 1973 and 1977 while problems were encountered in its existing discoveries (Philip 1984 p. 4). By 1977, all private REIs except Belco (which operated offshore sites) and Occidental Petroleum, the first *selva* contractor (which did develop feasible operations) had left the country (Sanders 1981 p. 93; Philip 1982 p. 438; Mikesell 2015 p. 70). This was due to a combination of disappointing geological surveys (REIs spent $300 million in the process), an increasingly nationalistic Peruvian government and changes to 1975 US tax laws which made foreign exploration less attractive (Philip 1982 pp. 127-128; 1984 pp. 4-5; Ascher 1999 p. 124; Leonard 2006 p. 47).

Though there was a gradual rise in Peru’s 1970s petroleum production (Table 3.4), and five commercially exploitable Amazonian fields with a potential capacity of 40,000 b/d (Philip 1982 p. 438), Petroperu’s position continued to decline due to a range of factors60 that limited its contribution to Loreto regional development (Ascher 1999 pp. 124-125).61 These circumstances helped to strengthen Occidental Petroleum’s position in the country where the firm was already making heavy profits through an extremely profitable production agreement signed under the 1971 Peruvian model contract (giving them a tax-free share) (Philip 1984 p. 9; Mikesell 2015 pp. 70-71). Moreover, the Peruvian government was not able to renegotiate these favourable terms because of the precarious economic position of the country and could ill afford disruption to Peru’s (or Occidental Petroleum’s) oil production (Philip 1982 p. 447).

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59 The main pipeline is 24 inches (61 centimetres) in diameter and runs for 306 kilometres from Station 1 at San José de Saramuro in Urarinas District, Loreto Province (International Business Publications 2013 p. 69; Segovia 2014 p. 1) before joining a pipeline extension, the *Oleoducto Ramal Norte* (the Ramal Norte pipeline). This is a 276-kilometre pipeline added in 1976 to transport crude from the Andoas oilfield area which joins the main pipeline at Station 5 in the town of Borja, Manseriche District, Daren Del Marañón Province (Petroperu no date a). Here it becomes a 35-inch (90 centimetres) system that carries crude oil for 547 kilometres to a refinery at Sechura Bay on the Pacific coast (International Business Publications 2013 p. 69; Goldenberg 2014).

60 Several factors lie behind Petroperu’s performance decline. These included an increase in the company’s debts, a legal problem with the Peruvian contract model and Petroperu serving as a battleground for competing factions after the illness of President Velasco in February 1973, culminating in his overthrow by Morales Bermudez in August 1975 (Philip 1982 p. 443; 1984 p. 7; Ascher 1999 p. 127).

61 The result was that only two exploration wells were drilled in 1979 compared to 14 in 1978, 15 in 1977 and 18 in 1976 (Philip 1984 p. 8).
Consequently, Occidental Petroleum could expand its Peruvian investment, which rose to $137.6 million in 1976 and $201.9 million in 1977 (ibid.). This period has been characterised as Peru’s first hydrocarbon exploration boom (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 p. 7), in which ‘[n]early 63,000 km of seismic lines were cut during the four years between 1972 and 1975, over half of all historic activity’ (ibid. p. 8).

Table 3.4: Production in main Latin American countries 1973-79 (000 b/d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>3,384</td>
<td>2,987</td>
<td>2,353</td>
<td>2,294</td>
<td>2,239</td>
<td>2,165</td>
<td>2,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mexico</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>652</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>896</td>
<td>1,040</td>
<td>1,330</td>
<td>1,616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>421</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>152</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>202</td>
<td>218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Philip 1982 p. 126).

The end of the 1970s witnessed radical changes in oil contract policy that mirrored the wider national economic and political situation. Peru’s recovery of its foreign exchange position allowed it to renegotiate its contract with Occidental Petroleum in 1978 which were subjected to taxes on profits as well as the existing 50 per cent share of their crude oil production (Philip 1982 p. 447; 1984 p. 9; Mikesell 2015 pp. 71-72). However, the election of President Belaunde in July 1980 signalled the introduction of a more liberal policy stance via tax credits (Decree Law 23231, December 1980) up to a maximum of 40 per cent of the pretax profit which attracted investment from Superior and Royal Dutch Shell, both signing selva exploration contracts in 1981 (Philip 1982 p. 448; 1984 p. 10).62

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62 However, Congressional and military opposition to the liberal policies led to procedural delays in the approval of contracts, some of which were terminated, like Shell, which left Peru in 1988 (Philip 1984 p. 10; Wise 2007 p. 307).
Efforts were also made to improve the performance of Petroperu by legislatively changing the corporate status of the company in 1981 to exempt it from wage controls applied to central government employees, while its financial position was strengthened through World Bank loans ($32.4 million in 1981 and further $81.2 million in 1982) that helped it resume its exploration activities and led to a significant find in Nueva Esperanza (Philip 1982 p. 448; 1984 p. 10; Mainhardt-Gibbs 2003 p. 15). By 1981, Peru had once again become an oil exporting country (Philip 1982 p. 449), with *selva* production at the start of the decade at around (or a little under) 130,000 b/d encompassing 100,000 b/d produced by Occidental Petroleum and 30,000 b/d produced by Petroperu, a market value approaching $5,000 million and total production barrels of more than 200 million (Philip 1984 p. 10).

3.3 Peru’s contemporary oil history: mid-1980s to the present day

“You cannot escape or name one particular area where the oil spillages have not made an irreversible impact on the environment and indigenous people” (FOPOW3, former plant operator foreman for Occidental Petroleum 1981-1991).

Peruvian oil development and production have changed remarkably since the 1980s. From a global perspective, the 1980s saw Middle Eastern nations remain the primary oil exporters, with Mexico and the North Sea the main producers outside this region. Peru was able to increase production and become a net exporter with production hovering at around 200,000 bpd (Oxford Business Group 2014 p. 93).

Since then, a gradual shift has been noted. Production figures for the 1990s and the first decade of the Twenty-First Century show clearly that crude oil is being supplied in greater quantity (albeit with some variable trends) from non-Organisation of Petroleum Exporting (OPEC) countries heralding from North America (Canada, USA), Europe and Eurasia (Kazakhstan, Russia) South and Central America (Brazil, Colombia, Peru) and Asia Pacific (China, Thailand) (BP 2014 p. 8; Vasquez 2014 p. 12; BP 2015 p. 8; 2016 p. 8). Projections on non-OPEC crude and lease condensate (light oil, shale oil, extra-heavy oil and bitumen) production from 2020 to 2040 based on five-year intervals show that this trend looks set to continue (US Energy Information Administration 2014c pp. 9-14; 2016 p. 27), though more likely with a high oil barrel cost (US Energy Information Administration 2015 p. c–13).

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63 One must note here that most of this increase is attributable to only five countries; Brazil, Canada, Kazakhstan, Russia and the USA (US Energy Information Administration 2014c p. 9).
As conventional oil supplies have started to dwindle, the development of new sites are critical for mid and long-term outlook for international markets (International Energy Agency (IEA) 2011 p. 103). This is especially important to satisfy increases in world energy demand, projected to see a 30-year increase of 56 per cent between 2020-2040 (US Energy Information Administration 2013 p. 9) and projected 2020-2040 increases in world liquid consumption from non-Organisation for Economic and Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (US Energy Information Administration 2014c p. 26; 2014d p. MT-4).

Moreover, despite noticeable oil price fluctuations, the first decade and a half of the Twenty-First Century have witnessed higher oil prices than the preceding 1990s and late 1980s (US Energy Information Administration no date) which increased investor interest and helped turn ‘previously expensive unconventional Amazon oil into a more tangible option’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 11; see also US Energy Information Administration 2009 p. 21). Indeed, when one factors in natural gas, of which Peru became the first exporter in liquefied form in 2010 and the production of which has risen tremendously (see Ministerio de Energía y Minas del Peru (Ministry of Energy and Mines of Peru, MINEM) 2015 p. 9), the wider western Amazonia basin has taken a prominent place in the Latin American continent and wider hydrocarbon market (Vasquez 2014 pp. 11-12).

BP (2006 p. 6) figures for proven oil reserves at the end of 2005 show South and Central Latin American producers (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Trinidad & Tobago, Venezuela and others) had an 8.6 per cent share (103.5 billion barrels) of the world total of proven reserves behind all other regions (Middle East 61.9 per cent; Europe & Eurasia 11.7 per cent; Africa 9.5 per cent; North America 5 per cent) bar the Asia Pacific region (3.4 per cent). However, by the end of 2015, the share of proven oil reserves for South and Central Latin American producers had increased significantly to 19.4 per cent (329.2 million barrels) putting it ahead of every other region (North America 14 per cent; Europe & Eurasia 9.1 per cent; Africa 7.6 per cent; Asia Pacific 2.5 per cent) except the Middle East (47.3 per cent) (BP 2016 p. 6; see also BP 2014a p. 6). This section will now chart Peru’s contemporary contribution to these figures.

64 Indeed, despite slower economic growth in key non-OECD countries (Brazil, China and India) towards the latter half of the 2000s resulting in a downward trench of liquid consumption, ‘liquid fuels consumption rises by an annual average of 1.1 million b/d’ (US Energy Information Administration 2016 p. 20).
The Peruvian government was forced to expand oil production in the 1990s due to decreasing production, evident since the 1960s, and lack of a substantial oil discovery reserve, which left the country importing petroleum at very high cost (approaching $500 million annually by the end of the 1990s) (Haller et al. 2007 p. 387; Wise 2007 p. 314; Vasquez 2014 p. 27). Under President Fujimori (1990-2000), enormous changes were made to the relationship between citizens and state. A new constitution was adopted in 1993, which dismantled the recognition of indigenous and communally owned lands and emphasised indefinite state ownership of all sub-surface mineral and hydrocarbon resources (Smith 2005 pp. 236-237; Haller et al. 2007 p. 387). A raft of laws provided an incentive for foreign investment (Decree Law 662), privatisation (Decree Law 674) and a framework for large-scale investment in natural resources (Decree Law 818) that allowed concessions to be purchased with few limitations (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 171; Vasquez 2014 p. 31 and footnote 9 p. 146).

Additional legislation such as the 1993 Law to Regulate Hydrocarbon Activities in the National Territory (no. 26221) aimed to attract foreign REIs through competitive contracts while a new government agency Perupetro was created (Article 6 of Law 26221) to promote hydrocarbon investments and oversee contract implementation (Mainhardt-Gibbs 2003 p. 19; Haller et al. 2007 pp. 387-388; Wise 2007 p. 307; Powers 2012 p. 7). Petroperu’s upstream (exploration, exploitation, contracting) and downstream (refining, marketing, distribution) operations were also separated, with Petroperu in charge of the latter and Perupetro overseeing the former (Wise 2007 p. 313).

The law also legalised hydrocarbon exploration and exploitation in territorial reserves for the protection of indigenous peoples in voluntary isolation (covering 3.6 per cent of Peru’s Amazon), areas where indigenous communities held land titles (covering 13.5 per cent of Peru’s Amazon)65 and natural protected areas (covering 32.5 per cent of Peru’s Amazon) (Instituto de Bien Común (Institute for the Common Good, IBC) 2009, cited in Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 207; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 207). This not only highlights Peru’s recent commitment to oil exploration in the selva and the state-driven land grab (North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1494) but shows why a Loreton PEV study is so interesting given that the

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65 Indigenous peoples must provide right of way for all state-constructed roads and free passage to oil and gas pipelines, among other infrastructures (Stocks 2005, cited in Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 213).
state is overriding the protection, land rights and voices of the country’s most marginalised citizens.

These neoliberal reforms opened the floodgates to foreign direct investment in the extractive sector (Bury and Bebbington 2013 pp. 40-43) and had a positive financial impact, with foreign oil investment rising from $19.89 million in 1993 to $187 million in 1997. However, despite this investment drive totalling almost $1 billion, no new oil deposits were found and REI interest dropped (Weintraub 2007 p. 27; Vasquez 2014 pp. 27-28). Mirroring these reductions were a significant fall in oil production and proven oil reserves over the course of the 1990s into 2000.⁶⁶

The lack of new oil discoveries and falling investment led to a second aggressive oil exploration plan in 2004, characterised as a second hydrocarbon exploration boom, supported by investor-friendly policies⁶⁷ that generated new REI contracts for the development of marginal sites, many again located within the selva (Finer et al. 2008 p. 2; Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010; Vasquez 2014 p. 28). In 2003, just 28 oil and gas licences were granted, of which 7.1 per cent covered the Amazon selva region (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 p. 4; Vasquez 2014 p. 14). By the end of December 2009, 41.2 per cent of the selva was covered by oil and gas licenses that totalled 52 active hydrocarbon concessions (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 pp. 3-4; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 208). When these Blocks are combined with the 2010 bidding-round for 18 additional sites, 81 active and proposed oil and gas Blocks covered a staggering 70 per cent of the Peruvian Amazon (Finer and Orta-Martinez 2010 p. 4; Iannone 2013 pp. 63-64; see also Figure 3.1) highlighting the scale of selva oil production and the higher likelihood of locating possible PEV case studies.

However, these bidding rounds have not translated into practical benefits. Peru still does not produce enough oil to meet national consumption (Vasquez 2014 p. 29) but is

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⁶⁶ Production increased in the 1990s from 116,000 b/d in 1991 to a high of 128,000 b/d in 1994 before decreasing to 100,000 b/d in 2000 (BP 2002 p. 6), whilst proven oil reserves fell from 800,000 barrels in 1981 to 300,000 in 2000 (ibid. p. 4).

⁶⁷ These included royalty rates as low as five per cent and the introduction in 2007 of a new system of competitive bidding which abandoned the one-one negotiations between Perupetro and selected oil companies (Vasquez 2014 pp. 28-29). In 2005, Peru’s Congress also granted Petroperu complete autonomy to undertake exploration and development activities and to participate in the whole production chain of hydrocarbon activities in competition with other players (ibid. p. 31) signalling to private REIs that the state would no longer be given favourable treatment.
Planned upgrades to the Talara refinery would allow the processing of the domestically produced heavy crude without needing to import expensive oil from abroad (Vasquez 2014 p. 29). Meanwhile, production in two key Loreto oil blocks; Block 67, which contains 35 per cent (324.8 million barrels) of the 928 million barrels of estimated reserves in Blocks 39, 64 and 67 and Block 63, which commenced production in 2013 and contains almost 300,000 barrels of heavy crude, will also help combat the country’s oil deficit (MINEM 2012, cited in Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 5; Vasquez 2014 p. 29). This was forecast to lead to a substantial increase in oil production from the *selva* region from 2015 to 2018 (Perupetro 2014 p. 14; see Figure 3.2) but has not been without complications or cost.

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68 From 2005-2015, production has fluctuated but overall increased; from 92,000 b/d in 2005 to 113,000 b/d in 2015 (BP 2016 p. 8). However, during the same period, consumption has substantially risen year-on-year (except 2006) rising from 152,000 b/d in 2005 to 243,000 b/d in 2015 (ibid. p. 9).
Figure 3.1: Contract operational Blocks and 2010 bidding round

(Perupetro 2010).
Figure 3.2: Petroleum production and forecast 1994-2018

Many oil and gas concessions overlap existing and proposed reserves (dating from 2000-09) (Table 3.5a, b) implemented through President Alan Garcia’s (2006-11) ‘aggressive’ neoliberal natural resource drive in the Amazon region (Stetson 2012 p. 78). One crucial piece of legislation was the 2006 Law for the Protection of Isolated Peoples in Voluntary Isolation (Law 28736) which allowed the “untouchable” character of protective reserves for people in voluntary isolation to be broken for natural resource exploitation ‘deemed by the state to be in the public interest’ (Finer et al. 2008 p. 6), whilst a series of almost 100 legislative decrees under the Free Trade Agreement with the USA facilitated the sale of inhabited lands to oil, gas and timber developers (Napolitano and Ryan 2007 p. 9; De La Pedraja 2016 p. 188). Finer, Jenkins and Powers (2013 p. 10) ‘found that nearly half (48 [per cent]) of the total hydrocarbon block area in Loreto overlaps at least one key ecological or social factor’ (protected area, indigenous territory, white-sand forests or the Nanay watershed), while 80 per cent of planned exploratory wells, 100 per cent of planned production platforms and 59 per cent of planned pipelines contain such an overlap.

These measures helped cause the 2009 indigenous protest, which culminated in more radical action in which around 800 indigenous protestors took over oil and gas infrastructures, blocked access roads, and interrupted exports from the country’s oil production areas in Bagua Province, Amazonas Region (Stetson 2012 pp. 78-80; Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 pp. 7-8; Vasquez 2014 p. 1). Unfortunately, on 5th June 2009, at least 32 protestors were killed and hundreds injured as Peruvian security forces clashed with the indigenous peoples. After international condemnation, the government agreed to rescind the contracts (and legislative decrees) and open the way for negotiation with the indigenous peoples (Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 pp. 9-11; Vasquez 2014 pp. 1-2).

The radical collective voice actions pursued by Loreton indigenous citizens in defence of their territorial reserves and land titles shows why a PEV study exploring voice vis-à-vis environmental pollution issues can be deployed productively here. Vocal protest and social conflict (explored in Chapter 5, Section 5.1) has been and remains part of the fabric of Peruvian life and is caused not only by this aggressive neoliberal resource boom but also because of ongoing environmental contamination (discussed in this Chapter’s final section). This helps to

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69 The indigenous demands centred around the restoration of land rights lost in amendments to the 1993 constitution and the process of consultation (see Peru Support Group 2009; Vasquez 2014 pp. 82-83).
explain why former President Humala’s foreign investment drive for oil (Bucheli and Sommer 2014 p. 146) have been largely ineffective. A 2013 bidding round was suspended due to a lack of investor interest and only seven Blocks were made available for international bidding in 2014 (BMI Research 2014; Quesada 2014 p. 25) and only a further eight Blocks were announced in June-July 2015 (Quesada 2015 p. 20).

Overall, Figure 3.3, a timeline of Peru’s key oil history events highlights the phenomenal change witnessed since petroleum’s discovery in 1863. From these humble beginnings, Peruvian oil production has undergone two hydrocarbon exploration booms in the selva region which has become the most significant area of petroleum production for the country. This final section will set out to explore this selva region of Peru in more detail and explain why it offers such a valuable case-study for PEV.
Table 3.5: a. Oil and gas concessions from 2000 to 2009 overlapping existing and proposed territorial reserves for indigenous people living in voluntary isolation b. Operating companies and existing and proposed territorial reserves for each oil and gas concession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>2000</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Oil and gas concession</th>
<th>Operating company</th>
<th>Territorial reserve</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas concessions overlapping territorial reserves (TR)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>Pluspetrol Kugapakori-Nahua TR</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating company</td>
<td>Sapet</td>
<td>Petrobas</td>
<td>Pacific Golden</td>
<td>Isconahua TR</td>
<td>Isconahua TR</td>
<td>132A/132B</td>
<td>132B</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>Perez Compac Isconahua TR</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR overlapped (ha)</td>
<td>105,254</td>
<td>214,308</td>
<td>214,308</td>
<td>105,254</td>
<td>1,205,786</td>
<td>1,205,786</td>
<td>1,225,344</td>
<td>1,225,344</td>
<td>1,227,426</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.59</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>7.32</td>
<td>3.59</td>
<td>3.60</td>
<td>41.18</td>
<td>41.18</td>
<td>41.85</td>
<td>41.85</td>
<td>17.09</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil and gas concessions overlapping territorial reserves proposed (TR)</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>31B</td>
<td>Maple Kapanawa TRP</td>
<td>18.39</td>
<td>19.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operating company</td>
<td>Barrett/Repsol</td>
<td>Barrett/Perenco</td>
<td>Napo Tigre TR</td>
<td>Napo Tigre TR</td>
<td>Napo Tigre TR</td>
<td>Maple Kapanawa TRP</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR overlapped (ha)</td>
<td>775,113</td>
<td>813,105</td>
<td>813,105</td>
<td>813,105</td>
<td>775,667</td>
<td>873,673</td>
<td>1,621,141</td>
<td>3,477,160</td>
<td>3,488,471</td>
<td>2,594,844</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TR overlapped (%)</td>
<td>18.39</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>19.29</td>
<td>18.40</td>
<td>20.73</td>
<td>82.49</td>
<td>82.76</td>
<td>60.92</td>
<td>162</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 3.3: Timeline of key Peruvian oil history events.

1863
- Oil first discovered in Peru on north-west coast.

1890-1930
- Production expanded at three key fields in the Piura region.
- Take-off period of the Peruvian oil industry.
- International Petroleum Company purchases two of the three Piura oil fields.

1920-1930
- International Petroleum Company invest heavily in their Peruvian oil holdings.
- Become key operator of Peru.
- Oil production levels rise throughout the decade.

1930-1940
- Oil production continues to rise. Peru becomes a net exporter.
- First small selva well found.

1940-1960
- Second small selva well found.
- Domestic post-war demand for oil grows.
- North-west oil production continues to expand. However, cannot meet domestic demand.
1960-1970
- Peru becomes a net importer. Oil production declines.
- International Petroleum Company nationalised by Peruvian government.
- Petroperu established.

1970-1980
- Petroperu uncover significant selva oil reserves.
- Oleoducto Norperuano constructed.
- Sixteen selva Peruvian model contracts signed with REIs. However, initial discoveries disappointing and all companies bar Occidental Petroleum vacant the selva.
- Occidental Petroleum heavily invest in their Peruvian selva sites leading to the country’s first hydrocarbon exploration boom.
- Their production causes significant socio-environmental problems.
- Petroperu’s performance declines towards the end of the decade.

1990-2000
- Peru becomes a net importer again.
- Neoliberal resource drive under President Fujimori.
- 1993 constitution reaffirms states ownership of subsoil mineral and hydrocarbon resources.
- Petroperu splits and Perupetro established.
- Despite large international investments, no new oil discoveries made. Production and proven oil reserves drop further.

2000-2016
- Second hydrocarbon boom. By 2010, 70 per cent of the selva covered by oil and gas Blocks.
- 190 oil pipeline spills across Peru, many in Loreto between 1997-2016.
- Seven oil spills occur along Oleoducto Norperuano in Loreto in 2016.
- Significant social protests occurring due to neoliberal laws (2009) and ongoing socio-environmental contamination stemming from oil production.
- Peru still importing oil to meet domestic demand.
3.4 Loreto as a case study

“[T]he exploitation of oil has changed greatly in the last years. What used to be done [40] years ago, is not what it is done now. What used to be done before was a brutality, a barbarity” (IUA1 anthropologist at the Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonia Peruana (Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon) and former government employee in the office of the Prime Minister).

Peru’s Amazon forms part of the wider western Amazonia region, which encompasses areas of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and western Brazil (Finer et al. 2008 p. 1). This region maintains large tracts of intact tropical moist forest that have a high probability of stable climatic conditions in the face of global warming (Killeen et al. 2007 cited in Finer et al. 2008 p. 1). It is also one of the most biodiverse areas of the world (Terborgh et al. 1990; Patton et al. 2000; Pitman et al. 2002; Lucky, Erwin and Witman 2006).

Peru contains a significant portion of this western Amazon region. The FAO’s most recent (2015) report for Peru stated it had a forest area of 73,793 hectares, which covers 58 per cent of Peru’s landmass area. These hectares give it the second largest area of rainforest after Brazil (FAO 2016 p. 17). Of this forest area, 19,674 hectares (27 per cent) have been designated primarily for conservation of biodiversity (placing it tenth internationally), whilst a further 18,844 hectares (25 per cent) lie within protected areas (placing it ninth internationally) (ibid. pp. 29-30). It is home to 52 of the country’s 55 indigenous groups (the latter encompassing 14 per cent or more than 4 million people of the country’s 28.2 million inhabitants) split between several different ethnic groups organised in 1,786 communities (Agurto and Marino 2016 p. 156).

Several of Peru’s regional political bodies incorporate this selva basin, including Amazonas, Cajamarca, Huánuco, Loreto, Madre de Dios, Puno, San Martin and Ucayali. However, the largest region and the one encompassing the greatest proportion of the western Amazon basin is Loreto, a territory covering nearly 369,000 square kilometres (Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 2) making it larger than Germany and almost the size of Montana (ibid. p. 10) (Figure 3.4). Loreto has an overall population of approximately 1 million people, with ‘[45 per cent] liv[ing] in the regional capital … with the remainder dwelling in over 2,000 small, often remote, river-edge
communities along the Amazon’ (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 180). This region is integral to Peru’s *selva* oil operations and became the primary location of fieldwork.

Figure 3.4: Case-study area

(Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 2).

Loreto, like other regions of Peru, encompasses regional and local decision-making power mechanisms.\(^70\) ‘Regional governments are elected by popular vote and are organised following the

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\(^{70}\) The 1993 Peruvian constitution established Peru as a decentralised but unitary state with three levels of government encompassing national, regional and local levels of governance (see Articles 43 and 189) (Constituteproject 2009 pp. 15 and 48).
political “departments”71 to organise and conduct regional public management’ (Fernandini and Sousa 2015 p. 3).72 Iquitos serves as the regional capital of the Gobierno Regional de Loreto (Regional Government of Loreto, GOREL). Local governments are also elected by popular vote, with the term referring ‘to both Provincial [Provincia] and District [Distrito] governments, with Districts housed within Provinces’ (ibid. p. 4).73 Each Province and District have their own Provincial and District capitals. In Loreto, there are eight Provinces split into 53 Districts.74

Loreto has many exploration and production wells, with the latter predominantly focused on three oil Blocks (Blocks 8, 31 and 192) (see Apendix 1a, b). Blocks 8 and 1AB (now Block 192 since August 2015) have been the longest-running oil Blocks in the selva. Unfortunately, this has led to huge environmental costs, particularly in these two Blocks. Block 1AB had initially been signed in the 1970s to Occidental Petroleum (1971-2000) before being taken over by Pluspetrol (2000-2015) and most recently Pacific Stratus Energy (2015-2017) when it became Block 192 in August 2015.75 According to a chemical engineering professor at Iquitos’ Universidad Nacional de la Amazonia Peruana (National University of the Peruvian Amazon) with extensive knowledge

71 On Peruvian independence in 1826, the republic was divided into eight Departments, which subsequently fragmented into 18 in less than half a century and most recently stood at 25 (Thorp and Paredes 2010 pp. 12-13). These Departments are, in turn, divided into Provinces which also followed the same tendency, rising from 50 to 100 units and close to 200 today (Contreras and Cueto 1999, cited in Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 13). To rectify this, by 2002, 25 “Regions” have been created using the boundaries of the previous Departments (though the original 25 Departments are still the main way of describing regional aspects of Peru) (Thorp and Paredes 2010 pp. 13-14). For the sake of consistency, this thesis will use the term Region.

72 Regional governments encompass the following bodies: Regional Council which is “[t]he regional government’s policy-making and supervisory body … composed of regional [councillors] elected by direct vote for a period of four years;” Regional President ‘is the regional government executive body … elected by direct vote along with the vice president for a term of four years;’ and lastly a Regional Coordination Council which ‘is the regional government’s coordinating and advisory entity with local governments and civil society. It is made up of the region’s provincial mayors and representatives of civil society organisations’ (Fernandini and Sousa 2015 p. 3).

73 ‘The Provincial Municipality has jurisdiction over the territory of the province and the District Municipality has jurisdiction over the territory of the district. It is relevant to note that the district territory is physically smaller than the provincial one’ (Fernandini and Sousa 2015 footnote 25 p. 4). The basic structure of the local government includes: The Municipal Council (a ‘policy-making and supervisory board of local government’ formed by the mayor and a number of councilors), Mayors Office (‘the executive entity of local government’ with the mayor ‘legal representative of local government and its highest administrative authority’ elected every four years) and the Local Co-ordination bodies encompassing ‘The Local Co-ordination Council (provincial or district) and the Neighbourhood Correspondents Meeting [which] are in charge of promoting public participation mechanisms’ (ibid. p. 4).

74 The eight Provinces and bracketed Provincial capitals are Alto Amazonas (Yurimaguas), Datem del Marañón (San Lorenzo), Loreto (Nauta), Mariscal Ramón Castilla (Caballochocha), Maynas (Iquitos), Requena (Requena), Ucayali (Contamana) and Putumayo (San Antonio del Estrecho). Given the focus on Loreto Region, only the District and Provinces for cited Loreto locations are mentioned unless occurring outside of the case-study region.

75 However, a series of violent strikes in the Region has forced the government to begin proceedings to transfer the Block to Petroperu (see Ojeda 2015).
of the oil-industry and these two Blocks, when production commenced there was no ‘regulation on how to preserve the environment [and] nothing to tell them the limits’ or seek to control of environmental pollution (IUA2). Contaminated water was dumped into rivers (CBO1R1; CBO3R1; FOPOW1; FOPOW2; FOPOW3; IUA2; IUA3; NGO1R1; NSI4R1; NSI7R1; RGR1; RGR3), a practice that saw Occidental Petroleum dump 9 billion barrels (850,000 barrels a day) of contaminated water in its three decades of operations (Amazon Watch no date). For IUA2, this has helped create a very slow polluting effect, termed “pollution by passives”, which remain hidden below surface level for “20, 30 or 40 years” (IUA2). Natural weather events like rain help to filter the pollution further underground where it will join rivers, lakes and other water sources (ibid.), thus dispersing it further.\(^7^6\) The extent of the contamination in these two Blocks alone shows why Loreto’s selva is such a suitable Region from which to conduct a PEV-based study surrounding oil pollution issues.

Numerous reports and research articles have documented indigenous peoples’ decreasing living standards – visible in their health problems, including increased concentrations of metals (barium, cadmium, lead and mercury) and hydrocarbons in surface water and river sediment (NSI7R1; MINEM 1998; Dirección General de Salud Ambiental e Inocuidad Alimentaria (General Director’s Office of Environmental Health, DIGESA) 2006; La Torre Lopez and Napolitano 2007 p. 110; Anticona et al. 2011; Anticona, Bergdahl and San Sebastian 2012; Huaynate 2012; Reátegui-Zirena et al. 2012; Congreso de la República del Peru (Congress of the Republic of Peru) 2012-2013; Ministerio del Ambiente del Peru (Ministry of Environment of Peru, MINAM) 2013; Fraser 2016a). The environmental degradation has also had a significant impact on their food security surrounding fish and game animals (e.g. having to go longer distances to find uncontaminated food sources), which are the main sources of protein for local people but are affected by the same contaminated water (NSI7R1; NGO4R2a; Reátegui-Zirena et al. 2012; Congreso de la República del Peru (Congress of the Republic of Peru) 2012-2013 p. 34). This has contributed to malnutrition (Orta-Martínez et al. 2007 p. 34) and a high suicide rate among

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\(^7^6\) FOPOW2, a former Occidenta Petroleum community relations officer, believed that ongoing pollution events in selva operating sites was historic Occidental Petroleum contamination and not “because of [REI] ill maintenance.” Though there is some validity to this argument given IUA2’s comments, this is not entirely correct. For example, between 2009 and 2012, 25 oil spills in Block 1AB resulted from ‘the corrosion of old pipelines and the overflow of storage tanks’ (Lu 2016 p. 104).
indigenous communities (*Congreso de la República del Perú* (Congress of the Republic of Peru) 2012-2013 p. 34). Sexual abuses, illegal logging, and hunting and commercialisation of bushmeat causing overexploitation to the detriment of indigenous peoples’ livelihoods and accusations of forced relocation by REIs have also been reported (NSI7R1; Napolitano and Ryan 2007 pp. 6-7; Orta-Martinez and Finer 2010 p. 211).

Protests by *quechua* indigenous residents finally forced the government and Pluspetrol to complete several negotiated agreements with the affected citizens surrounding REI operational practices and remediation and socio-economic development for the affected areas. Sadly, the government’s failure to honour its parts of the agreements (e.g. GORELs administration of PID funds) and Pluspetrol’s lack of compliance on remediation led to the resumption of various indigenous protests (IUA1; NGO4R2a; Vasquez 2014 p. 99; Lu 2016 pp. 98-100). These, in turn, forced the state to establish a *Comisión Multisectorial* (Multi-sectoral Commission) in 2012 to investigate the oil contamination in Loreto (NSI1R1a; NSI2R1). Their work in the four *cuencas* incorporating Blocks 8 and 192 (*Corrientes, Marañón, Pastaza, and Tigre*) resulted in the *Pastaza*

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77 The largest indigenous people of Peru.

78 In October 2006, the Dorissa Accord was agreed between Pluspetrol, the national and regional government, the *Defensoría del Pueblo* (Office of the Ombudsman, DDP) (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1, Footnote 114) and affected indigenous groups (Vasquez 2014 p. 99). The stipulations included: Pluspetrol would reinject contaminated waters into the subsoil from Blocks 1AB and 8; Pluspetrol would pay 40,169,986 soles (Peru’s national currency) (ca. $14.4 million) over a ten-year period to fund a comprehensive health plan via the Ministry of Health’s regional office; Loreto’s GOREL would construct a hospital in Villa Trompeteros (District capital of Trompeteros, Loreto Province) funded by Pluspetrol; Loreto’s GOREL would prepare, lead and execute a comprehensive development plan (*Programa Integral de Desarrollo*, PID) in the river basin for 11 million soles (ca. $3.94 million) (Bebbington and Scarrah 2013 p. 183). Further agreements were also signed; the May 2011 Pastaza accord between GOREL and Federation of Native Communities of Alto Tigre (FECONAT) committed GOREL ‘to persuade Pluspetrol to draft a work plan’ addressing local people’s environmental concerns and complying with the agreements (Lu 2016 p. 95) and the June 2012 Accord of Topal between the national government and FECONAT in which the government agreed ‘that within ten – fifteen days it would create a “high-level” commission to (a) conduct a health campaign in Alianza Topal [village in Andoas District, Datem del Marañón Province] and address the health concerns of the people living in the Corrientes, Tigre, Pastaza and Marañón river basins; and (b) draft a comprehensive health plan for the aforementioned communities.’ To date, the enforcement of these agreements has been incomplete (ibid. p. 97) helping to generate ongoing social protest (i.e. radical voice) indigenous responses.

79 The Multi-sectoral Commission combined a number of relevant government bodies (*Autoridad Nacional del Agua* (National Authority of Water, ANA), *Consejo de ministros*, (Council of Ministers (this encompasses all the Ministers of State presided over by a President, a position akin to a Prime Minister)), DIGESA, MINEM, *Organismo de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental* (Agency for Environmental Assessment and Enforcement, OEFA), *Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energía y Minería* (Supervisory Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining, OSINERGMIN) (NSI1R1a) and indigenous federations alongside their affiliated organisations (such as E-Tech International which was an independent observer) (NGO1R1) in order to assess the environmental and social impacts within the four river basins (see MINEM no date; MINAM no date). “Each [state] institution produces a report” which is presented in a commission meeting to the Council of Ministers who decide what action to take (NSI1R1a).
Cuenca being classified as an environmental disaster area in March 2013 with subsequent environmental emergencies declared in the Corrientes and Tigre Cuencas (Collyns 2013; Lewis 2014; Hill 2015a) and an action plan for the affected areas. \(^{80}\) Again, despite these announcements, remediation work and development plans have not been implemented, causing further indigenous protests (see Collyns 2014; Cultural Survival 2015a). \(^{81}\) The context of this PEV-based study, namely exploring responses taken by citizens and other stakeholders to environmental pollution, underscores why the widespread social harm (predominantly impacting upon indigenous citizens) and resulting social protests makes this such a valuable place to site the study.

Environmental and social problems are not just limited to these sites. The Oleoducto Norperuano and connecting pipelines operated by Petroperu have also been a source of huge socio-environmental damage, primarily due to their age and poor maintenance (CBO4R1a; CBO4R3; IRC1; IRC3; NGO7R1; NSI1R1b). From 1997 to 12 August 2016, OSINERGMIN registered 190 oil pipeline spills across the country (although 67 of these were attributed to sabotage) (Hill 2016a). The Amazon region has been a major source of these pipeline breakages. Since 2011, 21 oil spills have taken place directly attributable to Petroperu with the most recent year (2016) having seven oil spills reported in Loreto and neighbouring regions (Peru Support Group 2016a; b; c; d; Law in Action no date). \(^{82}\) The huge number of Amazon contamination events combined with the essential role that the Oleoducto Norperuano plays in Loreto’s (and wider Peru’s) oil production provides an extremely useful platform from which to conduct a PEV-based study. Indeed, one of the

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\(^{80}\) MINAM ‘coordinated new action plans for the area that included the installation of emergency health services, provision of drinking water, assessments and rehabilitation of the areas affected by effluent discharges and/or oil spills, an environmental monitoring system and surveillance of priority areas’ (Lu 2016 p. 108).

\(^{81}\) A representative from ANA noted that in 2014, GOREL’s refusal to provide any additional funds to Dirección Regional de Salud (Loreto Regional Directorate of Health, DIRESA) meant that “[t]hey couldn’t deliver water kits … [and] couldn’t develop the health services in the area” (NSI1R1a).

\(^{82}\) The first spill took place on the 25 January near Chiriaco and Imaza indigenous communities located in Imaza District, Bagua Province, Amazonas Region. Six indigenous communities were directly affected with contamination occurring in the Ríos Inayo, Chiriaco and Marañón. The second spill took place on the 3 February in Morona District, Datem del Marañón Province, and spilt over 2,000 barrels into the Ríos Mayuriaga and Morona. A 90-day health emergency was declared in relation to drinking water in both cases (Peru Support Group 2016c). A third oil spill was reported on the 24 June spilling approximately 600 barrels and affecting an estimated 400 people from Barranca District, Datem del Marañón Province (Peru Support Group 2016d). The fourth spill occurred in early August affecting the Uchichiangos indigenous community located in Nieve District, Condorcanqui Province, Amazonas Region (Vélez 2016). Two further spills of an estimated 4,000 barrels occurred in late August near Nueva Alianza in Urarinas District, Loreto Province (Fraser 2016b) with a further spill in September, the last two blamed on vandalism by Petroperu. Together, all seven incidents have spilt an estimated 10,000 barrels of oil (Law in Action 2016; Peru Support Group 2016b).
pipeline’s most significant oil spills, occurring near the village of Cuninico in 2014, became one of the primary case-studies for this thesis (see Photographs 3.1; 3.2).

Photograph 3.1 View of the *Oleoducto Norperuano* after the Cuninico oil spill.\(^{83}\)

Photograph 3.2 Snake covered in oil after the Cuninico spill.

\(^{83}\) For Chapter 3 photograph sources see Footnote 3.
3.5 Conclusion

Overall, this chapter has traced Peru’s oil history and analysed the Loreto oil producing region in greater depth. Oil remains an important cornerstone of Peru’s economic and energy output and has also played a central role in shaping the country’s politics, visible in the political influence that the International Petroleum Company could wield in the early-mid Twentieth Century through to the 1968 coup against President Belaúnde by Army Chief of Staff, General Alvarado. Yet despite the grand neoliberal *selva* resource extraction drive implemented by successive governments, Peruvian Amazonian oil development has not been able to replicate the country’s early-mid Twentieth Century’s north-western onshore production successes, a situation exacerbated by increased national demand.

The state, via Petroperu, has been the primary driver of the growth of *selva* oilfield development and therefore makes the company worthy of investigation for this PEV study. Its long-running control of the extensive *Oleoducto Norperuano*, arguably the most important but also most difficult part of Peru’s oil infrastructure to maintain, stands as a testament to *selva* oil development. However, its age and poor maintenance have made it a huge source of ongoing environmental contamination in Loreto and this situation served as an important catalyst for focus on one such pollution event in Cuninico.

The difficult operational *selva* conditions for REIs, combined with the non-existent regulatory structure, continues to cause significant environmental costs throughout Loreto which impact upon local, predominantly indigenous people. Indeed, the history of broken promises, absence of concrete action and ongoing oil spills had culminated, since late September 2016 in ‘an indefinite protest’ by various indigenous peoples (including the Achuar, Cocamas, Kichwa and Urarina),\(^{(84)}\) numbering at least 2,000 Indians (Hill 2016a). This action is centred on the *Oleoducto Norperuano* pumping Station 1 at San José de Saramuro (but also encompasses a blockade of the *Rio Marañón* and the detaining of tourist and provision boats) to request discussion with central

\(^{(84)}\) The Achuar reside either side of the Peruvian-Ecuadorian border, the Kichwa are part of the much larger Quechua people of South America and the Urarina inhabit the Chambirai, Corrientes and Urituyacu river basins.
government over these issues and the wider viability of Loreton oil activity (Hill 2016a; Peru Support Group 2016b).

The long-running and wide-ranging nature of oil production here and the unfortunately high number of documented historic and recent oil spills and contamination, show clearly why Loreto and Petroperu offered such an interesting place and actor to base a PEV study on oil pollution incidents. Chapter Four will now continue this analysis by focusing on the Methodology used for PEV in Loreto and expanding upon the choice of fieldwork locations in this region.
Chapter 4 Methodology

‘I have no doubts today that qualitative research is heart work, but it also has a powerfully political potential’ (Aitken 2010 p. 47).

This chapter examines the methodology developed for this thesis. It comprises three key sections. Section 4.1 provides a general overview of the differences between quantitative and qualitative methods and philosophies and my choice of qualitative research and my critical geography philosophical outlook. Section 4.2 starts by describing the multi-method qualitative approaches used in the research, before moving on to discuss gatekeepers and fieldwork case studies (Section 4.2.1), gathering data and data collection levels (Section 4.2.2), interview guides and interview questions (Section 4.2.3), audio recordings, interpreters, translators and positionality (Section 4.2.4) and ethical considerations (Section 4.2.5). Lastly, Section 4.3 describes the qualitative data analysis methods used within the thesis.

4.1 Quantitative and qualitative research methods and philosophies

The nature of PEV lends itself to methods that can harness this focus on voice and it is clear that the qualitative school and SSIs alongside micro-geography analysis offer approaches that can be used appropriately with the different stakeholder groups. To understand how this conclusion has been drawn, I provide a brief narrative of the quantitative school and the important role that ontological and epistemological questions play for me.

For decades, there was deep division in academic quarters between quantitative (geographic) research methods and the ‘soft approaches’ of qualitative (geographic) processes (Newman and Benz 1998 p. 2; Openshaw 1998 p. 317; Martin 2001; Johnson and Onwueguzie 2004 p. 14) with qualitative approaches criticised for lacking scientific rigour (Mays and Pope 1995 p. 109; Berg and Lune 2014 pp. 3-5). However, Twenty-First Century academics now recognise that both traditions simply ‘represent different ontological and epistemological approaches to knowledge and data’ (DeLyser et al. 2010 p. 6), highlighting that the division was philosophical (i.e. ontological) in nature rather than methodological (Denzin and Lincoln 2000 pp. 8-10; Kraus 2005 p. 759). Even so, academics have stressed that

consideration must be given to the theoretical research paradigm\textsuperscript{87} that guides the investigator in the choice of methods and these ontological and epistemological questions (Guba and Lincoln 1994 p. 105).

Quantitative research is most often associated (though by no means exclusively) with the philosophy of (post)-positivism that is utilised within the naturalist school of thought (Graham 2005; Hubbard et al. 2005 pp. 31-32; Kitchin 2006). This paradigm’s belief that there is only one truth (namely the world as it exists), observation and measurement of data and collection of things that are known to exist (Sale, Lohfeld and Brazil 2002 p. 44; Sale and Brazil 2004 p. 353; Hubbard et al. 2005 p. 29) would make little sense for PEV, with its focus on drawing out stakeholder opinions and ideas. Instead, anti-naturalism offers greater evidence of the suitability of qualitative methodologies.

Anti-naturalism ‘unmask[s] the alleged objectivity of all forms of research, including science’ (Wicks and Freeman 1998 p. 127) and holds that ‘[s]ocially transmitted concepts and names direct how reality is perceived and structured’ (Goles and Hirschheim 2000 p. 252; see also Black 2002 pp. 2-3). This approach is more aligned with qualitative research, the premise of which is to ‘understand situations in their uniqueness as part of a particular context and the interactions there’ (Patton 1985 p. 1, cited in Merriam 2002 p. 5).

Moreover, anti-naturalism does not reduce people, settings, and groups to variables but views them holistically, with the researcher getting to know people personally, experience what they experience in their daily struggles and learn about concepts such as pain, faith, suffering and love (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 8) and in this case voice. Qualitative researchers require methods that can access these personal experiences in an ever-changing world (DeLyser et al. 2010 p. 6), enable the researcher to experience the world as they experience it (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 7) and understand the person’s worldview in its current or “live” setting.

The researcher’s function as the primary instrument for data collection and analysis (Merriam 2002 p. 5) has several notable impacts; the interaction with people and places invariably affects our array of senses that makes it impossible to be detached from data collection (DeLyser et al. 2010 p. 7) impacting positionality (see Section 4.2.4), places great

\textsuperscript{87} See Guba and Lincoln (1994 pp. 107-108).
importance on ethical considerations within data collection (see Section 4.2.5) and reinforces why the researcher must be clear on their own philosophical outlook. In this case, it is critical geography.

While lacking a distinctive theoretical identity, critical geography brings together those working from different approaches with a shared commitment to exposing the social-spatial processes that reproduce inequalities between people and places. A significant focus is on the study of social, cultural, economic or political relations and the way they change to create uneven, unjust and exploitative geographies (see Harvey 1996; Proctor and Smith 1999; Glassman 2010; 2011) so includes engagement with moral philosophy, social, and environmental justice (Hubbard et al. 2005 p. 62). This is part of a broader shift towards emphasis on investigation into the multiple axes of power which are fluid, fragmented and socially constructed, the way these create social and economic divides and its impact on marginalised groups within society (ibid. p. 63).

Two facets of this school are important for this research and which again reinforce why critical geography offers excellent integration into PEV. The first is political ecology, which has already been discussed in relation to Hirschman’s voice theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.5). The second is the geography of domination and resistance, in which socio-spatial processes serve to oppress certain groups socially, politically and economically, leading to resistance through activism, civil disobedience, the use of formal political systems (Hubbard et al. 2005 pp. 69-73) or even everyday practices (a spoken word or movement) (see de Certeau 1981, cited in Hubbard et al. 2005 p. 69). While the former’s links to PEV are clear, the latter’s focus on resistance to domination through radical voice acts shows it is undoubtedly an important theoretical feature of PEV deserving mention.

Thus, qualitative research through a critical theoretical perspective offers the most relevant and useful approach for this thesis. The qualitative focus on understanding contextually unique situations make its methods ideally suited to an investigation based on current, past and future periods in a specific geographical, cultural and social environment. The approach will enable the voices of Loreton citizens to be heard and make critical geography’s emphasis on the exploration of inequalities and environmental justice an integral perspective from which conclusions can be drawn.
4.2 Multi-method qualitative research: semi-structured interviews (SSIs) and micro-geometry analysis

‘The reason why we have two ears and only one mouth is that we may listen the more and talk the less’ (Greek philosopher Zeno of Citium in 300 B.C., cited in Patton 1987 p. 108).

Qualitative data methods offer researchers a vast array of options. I used a multi-method qualitative approach, a system that can be applied to the standard domain of qualitative work (Collier and Elman 2008 p. 782) and has been successfully employed in a range of fields (see Darbyshire, MacDougall and Schiller 2005; Palakshappa and Gordon 2006). While the implementation of multiple methods can be complex (Hoggart, Lees and Davies 2002 p. 69), they are still deployed in qualitative studies due to several interconnecting factors.

Many of the qualitative methods ‘can only provide a partial account and may require … [supplementation] by other data’ (Morgan et al. 2002 p. 18). A multi-method approach partially overcomes the deficiencies that flow from using a single method (Denzin 2009 p. 300) which at the same time enhances the internal reliability and validity of qualitative research (Mathison 1988 p. 13; Eisenhardt 1989 pp. 537-538; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 80; Denzin 2009 p. 300; Suter 2012 p. 309). Furthermore, due to the interdisciplinary nature of social problems, the adoption of an interdisciplinary approach is necessary to enhance the potential for understanding meaning and behaviour (Harrison and Livingstone 1980 p. 28; Hoggart, Lees and Davies 2002 p. 67) and allowing the ‘multiple facets of the phenomenon to be revealed and understood’ (Baxter and Jack 2008 p. 544). Indeed, it is important to note that SSIs cannot hope to capture all the data that could prove valuable for analysis; a recording of a conversation between the researcher and a participant does not include the physical or emotive gestures and expressions that are apparent when we converse or the wider socio-economic personal, family and community circumstances which are integral to PEV.

A multi-method approach can seek to capture this “non-spoken data” in order to strengthen the scope, scale and validity of my research findings. Academics have cautioned however, that it is not about using diverse data sources as such but about using complementary mechanisms that utilise separate means of information collection to highlight different aspects of the research problem (Hoggart, Lees and Davies 2002 p. 71; Berg and Lune 2014 pp. 5-8). My multi-method approach utilises SSIs supported by micro-geometry analysis.
Unlike other qualitative methods, interviewing can usually be completed in a shorter period, which can make efficient use of researcher’s possible fieldwork time constraints (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 91). Despite the time efficiency for researchers, it does not mean that it is a justification for superficial research (ibid.); great pains must be taken in the choice of fieldwork location and its accessibility for my data collection, the structure of SSI questions, the type of interview supporting equipment used and wider ethical considerations. Before these aspects are discussed we must examine what interviewing entails.

‘Interviewing may be defined simply as a conversation with a purpose’ (Berg and Lune 2014 p. 105). It ‘allows the evaluator to enter another person’s world, to understand that person’s perspective’ (Patton 1987 p. 109). Qualitative interviewing techniques, such as SSIs, are powerful and flexible tools which are useful for studying specific situations (Laforest 2009 p. 1; Rabionet 2011 p. 563) and provide a method through which we can learn about things that we cannot directly observe such as thoughts, feelings, intentions or behaviours (Patton 1987 p. 109). Again, these are relevant to PEV.

The use of interviews places responsibility on the interviewer to provide a framework that will allow people to respond comfortably, accurately and honestly to questions, with the quality of the obtained information largely dependent on the interviewer (ibid.) and interview approach. SSIs have several advantages over structured and unstructured interviews. Unlike structured interviews, SSIs allow a freedom of digression for researchers to probe beyond answers to their prepared structured questions (Berg and Lune 2014 p. 112). Moreover, while researchers will make every effort to formulate their structured questions in words familiar to the interviewee, the SSI approach enables the researcher to adjust the level of language of structured or unscheduled probes that may arise from the interview itself (ibid.).

Conversely, unstructured interviews offer the same highly adaptable system to interviewing but require a great deal of time to get systematic information (Patton 1987 p. 110) and run the risk of not eliciting the necessary information from participants. SSIs provide greater scope for this but also make sure that the participant stories are heard (Rabionet 2011 p. 563).

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which is imperative as it is through these stories that their opinion and experiences can be gained (Ramirez-Rubio et al. 2013 p. 2).

Pre-fieldwork, the decision was taken to utilise individual SSI interviews over group interviews or focus group discussions\textsuperscript{89} for two key reasons. Due to my intermediate level of Spanish, I conducted SSIs with an interpreter, which made individual interviews a more manageable process by preventing them from having to act as a facilitator and moderator in group/focus group interviews and helped me to concentrate on each interviewee’s responses. I also felt that single interviews would allow interviewees to focus solely on their own personal experiences and opinions which could become muddled or lost in group/ focus group interviews.

Overall, this strategy was deployed successfully during my 2015 fieldwork. Of the 110 interviews conducted with 105 interviewees,\textsuperscript{90} 75 were in Spanish and of these 56 were conducted with only one interviewee.\textsuperscript{91} However, there were instances where two (13 interviews), three (two interviews), four (three interviews) and five (one interview) interviewees were present. The reasons behind this are varied but are due to the practical constraints of fieldwork. Some were focus groups born out of data collection necessity (e.g. in the case of Cuninico interviews IRC26-IRC29, it was my last day in the pueblo and I needed to speak to several older women to hear more of their voices) and data collection opportunity (e.g. I interviewed four members of Red de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes (National Network of Children and Adolescents) (REDNNA) (CBO2R1-4) after I was invited to meet them by one

\textsuperscript{89} See Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 113-115).

\textsuperscript{90} A representative from the NGO, The Peru Mission, had three interviews labelled a, b, c (NGO21a, b, c). A similar categorisation was used for the ANA national government agency spokesperson (NSI1R1) (two interviews), NGO ProNaturaleza representative 2 (NGO4R2) (two interviews) (who was involved in a colleague’s interview (NGO4R1) but had their own separate interview) and Catholic Church interviewee 1 (CBO4R1) who answered several supplementary questions over email after fieldwork had finished. Finally, two indigenous Cuninico women and one man made passing remarks in three interviews but were not directly interviewed and so are not part of this total. They have been labelled “indigenous resident of Cuninico participant” (IRCPn) in the thesis.

\textsuperscript{91} Each participant was given a coded category. This was based on a combination of their broad professional occupation, ethnicity, geographical location and the number of the organisation and interviewee (n). The main codes are as follows: mestizo (mixed-race) resident of Barrio Florido n (MRBFn), indigenous resident of Cuninico n (IRCn), national state institution n representative n (NSInRn), regional government representative n (RGRn), CBO n representative n (CBOnRn), NGO n representative n (NGOnRn). For other smaller groups of interviewed professionals and groups, the following codes have been used: Iquitos university academic n (IUAkn), non-case study selva citizen n (NCSSCn), former Occidental Petroleum oil worker n (POPOWn), Iquitos university student n (IUSn), Iquitos legal professional n (ILPn), Iquitos construction worker n (ICWn), Iquitos journalist n (IJn) and former indigenous resident of Cuninico n (FIRCn). See Appendix 4 for the coded interviews categories and name and information on each government, CBO and NGO organisation.
of my interpreters). Other scheduled interviews with a CBO/NGO representative evolved into interviews with two interviewees (e.g. I was only expecting to interview Catholic Church representative 1 (CBO4R1) but also ended up interviewing a second representative (CBO4R2), whilst other such instances were due to circumstance (e.g. in Barrio Florido and Cuninico, some citizens would sit together outside their homes and would be interviewed in pairs or small groups since anything else would have been perceived as rude).

Despite my pre-fieldwork concerns, these group interviews proved to be as useful as the single-interviewee discussions. Aside from the second participant confirming specific facts raised by the other interviewee, focus/group interviews also gave some interviewees, particularly indigenous women, the confidence to participate. However, I didn’t wish to conduct all my citizen interviews in this manner for two reasons; the latter problem wasn’t an issue for every indigenous female and there could have been a possibility of detracting from individual voice, particularly with the complexities of conducting these through an interpreter. My own judgement based upon the context of each interview was thus key.

Regardless of their nature, SSIs cannot ever fully capture voice in all its complexity and contextual detail. Instead, the use of SSIs provided a snapshot of a participant’s voice but in a way which is less prescribed than structured interviews and considered (as much as possible) my own language barrier. These points help to underscore why it was important to support the SSIs through a complementary approach that can strengthen and enhance data collection. Given the importance that personal, family and community socio-economic circumstances have in PEV, participant observation92 was an obvious methodology to consider. However, the short fieldwork period and intermittent Barrio Florido and Cuninico community visits meant that there would have been only limited time to use this method effectively. Instead, a form of participatory observation was operated within the SSIs themselves to formulate my multi-method approach.

A fascinating article by Elwood and Martin (2000) discuss how the sites of interviews produce ‘micro-geographies’ encompassing ‘spatial relations and meaning, where multiple

92 ‘Participant observation is used to cover a mixture of observation and interviewing’ to ‘understand how the cultures they are studying ‘work’, that is, to grasp what the world looks like to the people who live in the fishing village, the boarding school or the mining community’ (Delamont 2007 p. 206).
scales of social relations intersect in the research interview’ (p. 649). In essence, the interview site is not removed from social and cultural contexts that operate at or through other levels but instead provides a ‘microscale of social spatial relations’ that manifest in ‘the intersection of broader power dynamics – at multiple scales, such as the neighbourhood, city, region, and so on – with the social relations constructed in the interview setting’ (ibid. p. 650). In many respects, micro-geographies are similar to efforts to form an impression management (e.g. see Leary 1996) of each individual, how they view themselves and/or want to be viewed by others and what this tells you about them (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 76) all of which underscore why micro-geography analysis is so useful.

These micro-geographies ‘provide an important opportunity for researchers to make observations that generate richer and more detailed information than can be gleaned from the interview content alone’ (Elwood and Martin 2000 p. 653). Interviews conducted in Barrio Florido and Cuninico citizens’ homes ‘enable researchers to enrich their understanding of explanations offered by participants’ (ibid. p. 652). For instance, through a written journal (see Section 4.2.4), I was able to record information surrounding their economic status and livelihoods which fed into research analysis (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.1). Micro-geographies also helped to situate a participant in relation to other actors and their own multiple identities and roles which affected the information communicated in the interview and thus the power dynamics of the interview itself (ibid. pp. 652-653). This was noticeable in interviews with collective (CBO1R1; NGO2R1; NGO3R1) and institutional (government) (NSI2R1) employees which were often conducted in their home away from their professional office and at times afforded very open answers to questions that would not have been handled in the same way in a professional capacity (e.g. the OEFA spokesperson (NSI2R1)).

Linked to this was consideration of where the interview locations themselves were chosen. Giving interviewees the choice of interview location helped to empower the interaction with the researcher and reduce the power discrepancy that may be felt between the researcher and the participant who occupies a different power position (Elwood and Martin 2000 p. 656; see also Rose 1997 p. 307). Many Barrio Florido and Cuninico citizens chose to have the interviews conducted in their homes and I felt this allowed participant’s to be more

93 These were public, private or office locations and in two cases electronically (email and skype, the latter purely for practicality).
relaxed and calmer in a personal setting. This was important given that I was unable to spend long periods of time in each community building up trust. A similar conclusion can also be reached for the other collective and institutional actors; despite my inferior power position, offering these participants the choice of interview location still produced the same effect and possibly led to interviewee’s being more open about their respective organisations’ voice.

4.2.1 Gatekeepers, fieldwork case-studies

Pre-fieldwork research had established some of the actors that I would seek to collect data from (individual (citizen), collective (CBO/NGO) and institutional voice (government, REI)). I was also able to commence the fieldwork with a rough idea of the number of case-study locations that I would work towards. By its nature, qualitative research can be incredibly time-intensive, especially when dealing with a culture distinct from one’s own. This makes it a slow process from which to develop cultural familiarity and rapport with site members to be able to ask the right questions and have faith in the answers (Herbert 2010 p. 76). I therefore opted to focus on two or three communities to build up trust and rapport. Without the trust and confidence of interviewees, ‘researchers cannot be sure if they can rely on what they are being told’ (Higgins 1980 p. 185). This, of course, does raise problems; there are limitations to the generalisability of theories or conclusions that are made (Voss, Tsikriktsis and Frohlich 2001 p. 201) from a small number of field sites but as will be explained in Section 4.2.2, my chief aim was not to produce generalisations but rather sample and collect relevant data that may expand or refine my research or lead to new insights.

A key consideration became how to access these stakeholders, which in turn influenced my specific Loreto case studies. I decided to wait until my arrival in Loreto in March 2015 so that I had time to meet with several CBO/NGO gatekeepers I had been emailing. To gain access to potential fieldwork sites, a researcher must gain permission from gatekeepers by convincing them that they’re a non-threatening person who will not harm the organisation or

94 These were Red Ambiental Loretana, an indigenous environmental watch-dog CBO (CBO1R1) and three NGOs; E-Tech International which provides environmental technical support to EMaDE communities (NGO1R1), The Peru Mission who provide developmental support to Loreton communities (NGO2R1), and Alianza Arkana, a development grassroots organisation providing development support to indigenous communities and raising awareness and supporting campaigns surrounding indigenous human rights abuses (NGO7R1). Except E-Tech International (NGO1R1), all were based in Iquitos and found through a Google internet search.
community in any way which may necessitate guarantees for access to participants (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 29, 34) e.g. confidentiality, an aspect tackled in Section 4.2.4.

The decision to contact these collective voice gatekeepers rather than institutional actors (government/REIs) was twofold; I had to consider how I presented myself to local people and I believed that, in the context of my research and the high level of ongoing environmental damage, local communities would probably have a more positive and potentially more trusting relationship with CBO/NGO gatekeepers. In this case, my actions proved beneficial. As the OEEA spokesperson noted, in Peruvian civil society “[y]ou [are] either with the companies or with the people” (NSI2R1) so travelling to fieldwork locations with institutional representatives may have damaged my own efforts at gaining citizen trust or compromised my position as a researcher due to my identification with them (NGO2R1a).

Meetings with these collective voice gatekeepers focused on my fieldwork aims, their interest in an interview, possible case-study communities and other contacts of relevance. The latter, i.e. the snowballing effect,95 was the main method deployed to recruit interviewees. These aims were achieved. Each of the pre-fieldwork contacts agreed to at least one interview. Discussions with these contacts helped me to understand Loreton REI oil production and installations including the location of Petroperu’s Iquitos refinery which through further investigation coalesced into the Barrio Florido case-study. The Peru Mission representative’s (NGO2R1) knowledge and contacts within the Catholic Church (CBO4R1-CBO4R2) is fundamental to me gaining gatekeeper access to the Cocama pueblo of Cuninico, which helped improve the community’s trust of me.96 Overall, this helped to focus the research primarily onto a case-study of Petroperu and two affiliated communities, supported through other testimonies on different REIs.

However, there were instances where these collective voice gatekeepers failed to gain me interview access, particularly to REIs. For example, though NGO2R1 had several friends within Pluspetrol, it did not help me secure an interview with a representative. Despite my own efforts at trying to meet the Petroperu refinery manager at Barrio Florido and other staff in

95 See Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 32-33).
96 IRC6 told me that I was “welcome” in Cuninico due to my connection with the accompanying Catholic Church representatives. On another occasion, I was also informed that the community’s warm and generous welcome, particularly from IRC6 and their family who acted as hosts during my stay was due to this link (ibid.).
Iquitos, I was unable to talk to any current REI employees or representatives except several former oil workers from Occidental Petroleum (FO POW1; FO POW2; FO POW3). This has unfortunately meant that REI voices are largely absent in this thesis but the experience with NGO2R1 shows that even gatekeepers with personal connections do not always guarantee success.97 Institutional voice is thus focused solely on Peruvian political (national and regional) government representatives.

As noted, the two-main case-study locations are Barrio Florido and Cuninico (Figure 4.1). The first is a non-indigenous community of 840 inhabitants (MRBF2) situated on the banks of the Rio Amazon and adjacent to the Iquitos Petroperu refinery in Puchana District, Maynas Province (Latitude: -3.64056, Longitude: -73.21583). It is split into four administrative zones; Barrio Florido, Barrio Porvenir (closest to the refinery), Barrio Tivinsa and Barrio Escavino (MRBF6). Residents reported that the refinery “pollute everywhere” (MRBF4) with small amounts of “contamination every year” (MRBF24). “All the waste from Petroperu is thrown to the back part” of the refinery and eventually arriving in the lake (MRBF6) which feeds into a small creek (the Rio Ramirez) situated between the refinery and village that, in turn, drains into the Rio Amazon. The pollution affects all the residents, “especially … the kids …. [who] bathe there, in the ravine [lake]” (MRBF24) and contaminates the pueblo’s source of food (fish) and water (MRBF27) from these two connected water sources.

Two major oil pollution incidents were reported by interviewees. The first (2009) in which heavy rain caused four barrels of oil to spill into the Rio Ramirez accidentally, killing fish and causing illness (“headaches, general sickness … also diarrhoea”) (MRBF14) in children (MRBF1; MRBF13; MRBF14; MRBF18; One to One International 2010). The second incident (2011) saw an unknown quantity of oil from several storage tanks connected to the refinery’s storm drain system leak into the Rio Ramirez, which residents said “killed many fish and animals” and affected the population (MRBF6; see also LaRepublica.pe 2011). At the time of fieldwork (March-June 2015), more recent pollution was alluded to by MRBF12 showing that contamination remains an ongoing problem.

97 I’m not alone in this; IJ1, a journalist has found that companies never “respond to anything I ask.” They remain, as my interpreter noted, “closed off.”
Cuninico, established on the 8th October 1959, is a Cocama indigenous community numbering between 450-500 inhabitants98 (CBO4R1b; IRC2) split into 143 families (IRC2) located on the banks of the Rio Marañón, Urarinas District, Loreto Province (Latitude: -4.81667, Longitude: -75.16667). Interviews in this pueblo centred on the events surrounding the 2,000-barrel oil spill from the Oleoducto Norperuano in 2014, which burst into the dredged waterway that follows it and flows into the Rio Cuninico, which in turn feeds into the Rio Marañón and subsequently the Rio Amazon (NSI1R1b; Segovia 2014 p. 1; Fraser 2016a p. 642). In the first week of June, residents noticed that the fish they were consuming and water they were drinking tasted of gasoline, while the oil and dead fish floating down-river from the Rio Cuninico helped them eventually to locate the leak and raise the alarm after three weeks on the 30th June 2014 (CBO4R1b; IRC2; IRC7; IRC8; IRC11; IRC13; Fraser 2016a p. 642). This spill forms the basis of the second case study.

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98 Catholic Church interviewee CBO4R1 provides a figure of “roughly 450” (CBO4R1b) with a community leader giving a specific figure of 486 inhabitants (IRC2).
Figure 4.1: Approximate case-study locations

(Hill, K. 2013).
4.2.2 Gathering data and data levels

Unlike collective voice actors, citizen voice is not a group that speaks with one voice. While citizen voice is made up of an infinite number of individual voices, my PEV narrative has shown that its use may be influenced by a range of demographic indicators (age, gender, race) that provided an obvious way for me to categorise it in greater detail to help analysis and draw conclusions from the data. Appendix 2 sets out the categorisations that have been chosen for this study and included gender (male/female), age (16-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50+), ethnicity and occupation. The latter two require more explanation.

The ethnic and racial groupings are based on the 2006 *Instituto Nacional de Estadistica e Informatica* (National Continuous Survey, INEI) (INEI 2006 p. 91) which indicate that 59.9 per cent of Peruvians identified as *mestizo*, 22.7 per cent as *Quechua* (indigenous ethnic group), 4.9 per cent as *blanco* (white), 2.7 per cent as *Aymaras* (indigenous ethnic group), 1.8 per cent as *de la Amazonia* (presumably affiliated with an indigenous group but not specified by individual survey respondents), 1.6 per cent as *negro* (black) and 6.7 per cent as *otro* (other) (predominantly Chinese and Japanese). These classifications were utilised except for the distinct indigenous groups which were amalgamated into a single “indigenous” category.

By doing this, I showed that individuals within this final group are separate from other ethnic and racial groups but without causing unnecessary complexity in the data collection tables. Nevertheless, I’m clear in my research that fieldwork was undertaken with only one indigenous ethnic community. Other communities’ cultures, histories and experiences of oil development are all different (IJ1) (a point expanded upon in Chapter Eight, Section 8.2) so I have been cautious when extrapolating the results from this study into a discussion on Loreton indigenous voice, their treatment by REIs etc. This one study cannot “speak” for all Loreton indigenous communities.

A similar reasoning was applicable for the four occupation bands based on the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and resolution ISCO-08 (ILO 2007 pp. 3-12). By banding the major and sub-major professional groupings into wider alignments, I created a classification system that still enabled me to examine
a participant’s occupation and the impact this may have on their voice action (e.g. economic means) without delving into unnecessary occupational intricacy. It also helped me make sure that I was achieving gender balance and discussions with young/old, rich/poor, professional/primary occupations. One can see that a fifth band was added to the table; this was based upon my own research findings and the need to classify those not in some of employment including students, housewives and retirees. Appendix 3a, b lists the collected data for male and female participants.

This leads me onto sample size data levels. Qualitative researchers will often typically define their samples on an ongoing basis as the study progresses (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 26). The term “theoretical sampling” (Glaser and Strauss 1967, cited in Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 26) refers to a procedure whereby ‘researchers consciously select additional cases to be studied according to the potential for developing new insights or expanding and refining those already gained’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 27) with maximum variation in the additional selected cases allowing the applicable theoretical insights to be broadened (ibid.). In effect, I was not an ethnographer trying to get the fullest data to create empirical generalisations on a group, location, setting, context or temporal period but rather a researcher that was actively sampling for relevant data that offered ‘variably situated knowledges’ (Derrington 2014 p. 24; see also Higgins 1980 p. 192; Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 9; Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007 p. 238; Glaser and Strauss 2012 p. 58) in relation to PEV. Gans (1962 p. 350 author’s emphasis) terms his study a ‘reconnaissance – an initial exploration of a community to provide an overview – guided by the canons of sociological theory and method but not attempting to offer documentation for all the findings’, a term that I feel aptly encapsulates this methodology and the importance that context plays in PEV.

A similar sampling system was used during data collection. Altogether 110 interviews were conducted with 105 interviewees from the various voice actor groups. Of the interviewees, nine participants representing eight separate NGOs took part (NGO1R1; NGO2R1; NGO3R1; NGO4R1-R2; NGO5R1; NGO6R1; NGO7R1; NGO8R1) along with ten CBO representatives from four separate organisations (CBO1R1; CBO2R1-4; CBO3R1; CBO4R1-3), 11 interviewees from different national and regional government bodies (NSI1R1; NSI2R1; NSI3R1; NSI4R1; NSI5R1; NSI6R1; NSI7R1; RGR1; RGR2; RGR3; RGR4) and 59 citizens from the two-case study communities (30 for Barrio Florido and 29 for Cuninico). The remainder (16) were a mix of other
citizens whose views were deliberately sought via snowballing or who were part of fieldwork “chance encounters” (e.g. FIRC1; ICW1). They incorporated three academics (IUA1; IUA2; IUA3), three citizens from three different selva communities (NCSSC1; NCSSC2; NCSSC3), three former Occidental Petroleum oil workers (FOPOW1; FOPOW2; FOPOW3), two legal professionals (ILP1; ILP2), two students (IUS1; IUS2), a journalist (IJ1), a construction worker (ICW1) and one former Cuninico community member (FIRC1) (see Appendix 4). I feel this method was successful in capturing a wide variety of citizen, collective and institutional voices which has provided analytical depth to the PEV analysis.

4.2.3 Interview guides and interview questions

I now set out the precise types of SSI questions and the format used for my interviews. Before fieldwork, I composed an interview guide99 which consisted of various topics and subject areas that I was free to explore via probing questions100 that elucidate and highlight a subject (Patton 1987 p. 111). Interview guides are an excellent platform for SSIs as they remain merely a checklist for the topics that should be covered; the interviewer is free to adapt the words and sequencing of questions, build a conversation within a subject area or word questions spontaneously while maintaining the focus on a predetermined subject from the checklist. They allowed me to keep an outline of the topics discussed in each interview and track previous topics and changes, modify future interview questions and refer to specific points raised in prior conversations (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 115). It also helped me make use of the limited time available in interview situations (ibid.), an important point when the fieldwork was located on a different continent where only a predetermined amount of time was spent.

As an interviewer, I must start by finding ‘ways of getting people to start to talk about their perspectives and experiences without overly structuring the conversation and defining what the interviewee should say’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 102). According to these authors, one of the best methods to utilise is known as descriptive questioning in order to create what Spradley (1979, cited in Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 102) calls “grand-tour” questions. While this may lead to off-

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topic conversations, this isn’t bad as the participant gains confidence to open-up and should not be interrupted but instead gently steered back on topic through subtle gestures such as refraining from nodding (Taylor, Bogdan and DeVault 2016 pp. 116-117). My interview guide placed these questions within the first section alongside neutral grand-tour demographic questions which lead into three theme-based topics that have a mix of open-ended questions based around opinion/belief, knowledge and feeling questions (see Patton 1987 pp. 118-119), all supplemented by probing questions. Initially, each of these themes had certain types of questions directed at one or more of the stakeholders depending on their relevance, though as will be discussed below, this was changed with the creation of specialised stakeholder interview guides.

Due to the influence of time on PEV, past and future questions (based on a ten-year period) were inserted into the theme-based sections after a focus on the present day. As questions about the past tend to be easier for respondents to answer than hypothetical speculation on the future, they were placed after the focus on the present day, which acted as a useful baseline for past reflection before any broaching of the future (Patton 1987 p. 121). While some of the questions based around knowledge can be quite threatening for the interviewee (ibid. p. 120), it was hoped the initial grand-tour questions helped the interviewee feel at ease before moving into the topic areas. A similar issue can be found with the more sensitive and potentially uncomfortable demographic questions (age, ethnicity) so these were split up and placed in a final section (see Patton 1987 p. 121).

The SSI interview guide questions have been pretested as per the standards suggested by Patton (1987) and Berg and Lune (2014). Firstly, the interview questions were assessed by my supervisor to help facilitate ‘the identification of poorly worded questions, questions with offensive or emotion-laden wording, or questions revealing the researchers’ own biases, personal values or blind spots’ (Berg and Lune 2014 p. 126) that could prove problematic. This resulted in an updated pre-fieldwork interview guide written in English and Spanish.

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101 A decade was chosen as it was felt this would provide a general time-frame for interviewees that was not overtly large which may have been too difficult to reflect and hypothesise on.
Secondly, upon reaching Loreto, this interview guide was put through several pilot interviews (IUS1; NGO1R1; NCSSC1; NCSSC2; NCSSC3) (bar NGO1R1 which was conducted before fieldwork) to assess how well it worked and whether the sought information was obtained (Creswell 2013 p. 165). I quote the work of Chadwick, Bahr and Albrecht (1984 p. 120, cited in Berg 2007 pp. 105-106) who suggest five questions for assessing an interview to help save time and cost:

1. Has the researcher included all of the questions necessary to test the research hypothesis?
2. Do the questions elicit the types of response that were anticipated?
3. Is the language of the research instrument meaningful to the respondents?
4. Are there other problems with the questions, such as double meaning or multiple issues embedded in the question?
5. Finally, does the interview guide, as developed, help to motivate respondents to participate in the study?

To fulfil this latter point, I interspersed support, recognition and praise responses throughout the interview guide to provide positive reinforcement to the interviewee from time to time so that they felt the process was worthwhile (Patton 1987 pp. 126-127).

Tied to this was the importance of a reflection period after each interview, which allowed me to perform quality control checks to make sure I was gaining useful, reliable and valid data (ibid. p. 140). Through a template contact summary sheet (see Miles and Huberman 1994 pp. 51-55) (Appendix 5) conducted after almost every interview, I was able to change or modify interview questions or their language by utilising words or phrasing of initial interviewees to help make questions clearer for future participants (ibid. p. 123), develop broad data interpretations straight away rather than at the end of the study (which provided me with an opportunity to test these notions in subsequent data collection) (Gans 1962 p. 348) and reflect on my own interview experience and performance. This fed into a weekly evaluative summary (Figure 4.2) of my fieldwork discussing my interview technique and thoughts, tasks and actions taken, which was also sent to my supervisor for information and evaluation.
As fieldwork progressed, these pilot interviews and contact summary sheets made clear that changes to the interview guide were necessary and that a single interview guide for all
stakeholders was proving ineffective and unwieldy. The stakeholder interview guide underwent three major changes during fieldwork (see Appendix 6 for the final version with new/amended questions marked in bold) while interview guides were specifically created for Barrio Florido and Cuninico pueblo residents, CBO/NGO groups (where possible compiling interview guides based upon internet obtained public information about the groups) and government and REI contacts.

4.2.4 Audio recording, interpreters, translators and positionality

To record these SSI questions and the micro-geography analysis successfully, a written journal, an observer’s main tool (Shrum, Duque and Brown 2005 p. 3) was maintained supported by audio equipment. The use of electronic equipment has been contentious for researchers; Douglas (1976 p. 53, cited in Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 70), for example argued that ‘there is every reason to believe that obtrusive recording devices have fundamental effects in determining what actors think and feel about the researcher (mainly, it makes them terribly suspicious and on guard) and what they do in his presence.’ As Taylor and Bogdan (1998) conclude, ‘it is naïve to assume that filming or taping will not alter what some people may say or do’ (p. 70) or what they believe or will say or do in other situations (p. 91), issues which are more pronounced for those who may feel inhibited by the prospect of the interview to begin with, such as vulnerable groups e.g. the elderly (see Skovdahl, Kihlgren and Kihlgren 2003 p. 518).

Still, one must not overstate the detrimental impact these devices can have. While it is true that they may make interviewees feel uncomfortable, these participants have agreed to be interviewed, so that should make them feel less alarmed by an audio recorder so long as it has a minimal presence and is unobtrusive (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 112-113). Moreover, I believe that this equipment provided several positive benefits that outweigh these issues. Audio recording the interviews allowed me to focus on responding appropriately to interviewee needs and cues (Patton 1987 pp. 126-127), improve the accuracy of my data from the interviews and allowed me to securely store the data in an external hard drive and two electronic storage programmes (Dropbox, Googledocs) to prevent data loss. It was initially planned to film the interviews but pilot interviewee hesitation made me realise that this would have impeded my SSIs and perhaps have made some government participants less willing to contribute despite anonymity. Instead, I noted
down each participant’s micro-geography observations and emotive and physical gestures through the written journal, which though less accurate, still captured interview and participant micro-geographies.

The use of audio recordings has great bearing on three further important factors that I must discuss; the use of interpreters and translators102 and my positionality. As I have already stated, my intermediate level of Spanish required the use of an interpreter for my SSIs, which were then passed on to several UK-based translators. Although these mechanisms have often been used by researchers, they have received little attention in qualitative research (Temple and Edwards 2002 pp. 1-2) despite the clear impact they can have on data collection. Academics who have spoken about the use of interpreters have rightly raised concern about their translation of a respondent’s answers and whether it has captured their meaning (see Merriam et al. 2001 p. 415) which leaves academics with no choice but to trust their interpreter (ibid.).

To explain why, one can turn back to anti-naturalism’s view of a multi-layered and constructed world that is unique for everyone; by extension this means that ‘there is no one translation’ with an array of possible word combinations used to convey meaning, some of which may not have been spoken by the research participants (Temple and Edwards 2002 p. 2). Moreover, translation, like words are dependent on the same range of contextual circumstances (Hatim and Mason 1994, cited in Temple 1997 p. 609) such as ‘who said them, when, and in relation to what’ (Temple 1997 p. 609); the difficulty is that there is no singular cultural inhabitable field in their use (Temple 1997 p. 609; Temple and Edwards 2002 p. 3) which makes determining “cultural meaning” problematic (Temple and Edwards 2002 p. 3).

Where did this leave my use of interpreters and UK-based translators? For Temple (1997), the problems raised above must be put into the wider perspective of what humans and researchers do; we all ‘translate’ the experiences of others …. to be able to communicate’ (ibid. p. 609) which suggests that the use of interpreters and translators merely add another layer to an already present process. Even so, there were several ways I improved these mechanisms.

102 The key difference between the two ‘is the mode of expression. Interpreters deal with spoken language and translate orally, while translators deal with written text’ (Northeast Ohio Translators Association 2007).
I utilised two Iquitos-based university students (who incidentally were the children of my *hospedaje* owner) who had a good grasp of English. This allowed me to talk through my research in detail, its aims, the interview guides, the sort of information I was interested in hearing from participants and how I expected them to conduct themselves. After each interview, I asked them to evaluate it and their performance and I answered any questions they had. Despite not being experienced interpreters, they were fantastically hard-working individuals and my detailed research brief enabled them to grasp the type of follow-up questions and details I was interested in which allowed the interview to flow.

At times, I was perhaps not leading the interview enough but this was expected given my lack of previous interview experience. However, my solid level of Spanish comprehension meant that I could follow interviews well and listen out for conversations going “off topic” or ask interpreters to confirm interviewee answers before asking a follow-up question. At other points, the interpreters did not always understand my question and asked a participant a different enquiry but overall this rarely occurred, a testament to their grasp of English and our friendship which generated very successful interviews.

Initially, I intended utilising a Peruvian or wider South American transcription agency for the translation process. However, my limited financial means meant that transcription agency fees were too high. Instead, they were translated by eight paid individuals, seven of whom were postgraduate students and one professional translator, the former all found through the Society for Latin American Studies (SLAS) postgraduate group in the UK (Postgraduates for Latin American Studies, PILAS). Each was given a detailed brief of the presentation of the interview transcript in Microsoft Word.

Studies that involve interviewing will see ‘researchers attempt to give readers a feeling of walking in the informants’ shoes – understanding their inner experiences and seeing things from their points of view’ (Taylor and Bogdan 2016 p. 162). However, due to the research oriented nature of interviews and the aim of testing or finding answers to research questions, researchers will often struggle with their efforts at representing ‘the ‘truth’ of their findings as well as allowing
the ‘voices’ of their participants to be heard’ (Merriam et al. 2001 p. 414). How then did this affect my own contextual portrayal of stakeholder’s voices and instructions to translators?

A denaturalised approach was taken. This has ‘less to do with depicting accents or involuntary vocalisation’ and instead ‘accuracy … [surrounding] the substance of the interview, that is, the meanings and perceptions shared during a conversation’ (Oliver, Serovich and Mason 2005 p. 1277). In practice, this meant removing repeated words or phrases, conversational stutters and audible acknowledgements from the interviewee, interpreter and researcher. The objective here was not to subvert or change stakeholder voices in any way but rather create a textual space in which their voices are more clearly heard by the reader without any interference from communicative oral phrases that we use in conversations (see Derrington 2014 p. 34). This allowed me to engage more clearly with my interview data and present their voices in an open and accessible manner for the reader. However, I felt it was important to convey some participant conversational actions (e.g. long pauses, emotion, marked between []) as this helped feed into my use of micro-geography analysis and the emotions which this PEV topic aroused within interviewees.

Other instructions were also given to the translators. Only the question I posed was written out, except in the few instances where the translator did not ask the right question, so that duplicate English-Spanish written questions didn’t occur. The participant’s answers were written in English and I instructed the translators also to write out any poignant phrases in italicised Spanish with further phrases also chosen by myself and subsequently written in Spanish by my Father accompanied by a bracketed English translation. This was done to connect more strongly with the original interview participant’s voice and language and the context of the Peruvian fieldwork. Overall, this system was successful and helped generate detailed transcripts.

Lastly, my positionality (age, gender, nationality, race, social and economic status and sexuality) (see Madge 1993 p. 296, cited in Rose 1997 p. 308) is also tied implicitly to this issue of translation. Temple (1997) notes that ‘[r]esearchers reconstruct the experiences of others in their own terms and from their own reference points’ (p. 609), which therefore affected my relationship and interaction with stakeholders and how it could influence the compiled “data” and therefore the
information that is coded as “knowledge” (Madge 1993 p. 296, cited in Rose 1997 p. 308). At first glance, as a straight, male, late twenties postgraduate research student heralding from the UK and conducting fieldwork in Peru, my positionality appeared akin to an outsider status, a general issue for advanced economy academics working in EMaDEs (Madge 1993; Radcliffe 1994, cited in Laurie et al. 2014 p. 51).

Yet I do have personal and emotive connections to South America through my father, who was born and raised in Venezuela until his emigration to the USA and subsequently the UK. Putting to one side the pride that I feel in my South American heritage, my father’s indigenous ancestry has always been a source of interest to me, with this underlying emotive connection perhaps inexorably drawing me towards research on this continent. Thus, at some level, there would appear to be a shared emotive cultural insider connection to the continent and its indigenous citizens despite the more obvious exterior outsider connotations. This reinforces why ‘as researchers, we can be insiders and outsiders to a particular community of research participants at many different levels and at different times’ (Villenas 1996 p. 722, cited in Merriam et al. 2001 p. 411), with positionality therefore resting ‘on the assumption that a culture is more than a monolithic entity to which one belongs or not’ (Merriam et al. 2001 p. 411).

While the insider-outsider dichotomy highlights some interesting personal reflections, this dualism is seen by some as ‘overly simplistic’ (Dwyer and Buckle 2009 p. 60). Instead, an analysis of my position as a researcher would appear to place me in the ‘spaces of inbetweenness’ (Kobayashi 1994, cited in Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138). This position accepts that I’m not fully part of any Loreton stakeholder group and neither can I retreat to my own personal space or a distant researcher role (Dwyer and Buckle 2009 p. 61; Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138) leaving me ‘straddling multiple spaces’ (Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138). What this implies is that the ‘positions in which research places the researcher and those involved in the research may be multiple and may vary over time and space’ (Laurie et al. 2014 p. 52), circumstances that qualitative researchers appreciate due to ‘the fluidity and multi-layered complexity of human experience’ (Dwyer and Buckle 2009 p. 60).
Consequently, the role of alliances between interviewer and interviewee shows how the positionality of the researcher can shift (Laurie et al. 2014 p. 51) and be constantly renegotiated, a strategy deployed by Chattopadhyay (2013) through every day acts in her work with displaced Adivasi communities in western India.

How I ate, how I sat (especially the height, if on a chair or stool, as that signified a vertical hierarchy) and where I sat mattered …. These ways of presenting myself and interacting with my participants, however mundane, are not insignificant because they narrate my embodied situatedness as the researcher (p. 154).

Through this reflexive positionality, a researcher can approach fieldwork from an adaptable perspective that recognises that each person has a unique biography with different personal histories and lived experiences (England 1994 p. 248). Reflexive positionality has a willingness to understand researcher “position” as a temporally fluid concept, contextually situated in unique environments within which a study participant’s relationship to the researcher and vice-versa will constantly change but which can help strengthen the ethical commitments to conducting ‘‘good’ research based on building mutual respect and recognition’ (Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 154). In relation to my interpreter, I felt that by recruiting someone from Loreto who shares closer cultural links and affiliations with interviewees, my own reflexive positionality was strengthened, particularly in the initial stages of meeting participants as it could have positively influenced their willingness to engage and discuss their “voice” with me.

4.2.5 Ethical considerations

A common misconception is that ethical issues arise only during data collection, whereas they are actually present in several phases of the research process: prior to study conduct, at the beginning of the study, during data collection and in data analysis (Creswell 2013 pp. 56-57). Prior to fieldwork, it was clear that participant ethical considerations were of high importance due to the nature of the qualitative methodology deployed in the field. As such, and in line with my university’s ethical procedures, a light touch process was utilised where ethical issues and responses were discussed with my supervisor alongside the completion of university ethics approval and risk assessment forms which were cleared by Royal Holloway before the commencement of fieldwork.
It was also important to contemplate the level of information given to gatekeepers and participants concerning my research procedures. Taylor and Bogdan (1998 pp. 33) are of the view that a researcher should remain ‘truthful, but vague and imprecise’ with it ‘generally unwise’ to give details surrounding the research but acknowledge that what each researcher says is dependent on each research design. In relation to PEV, several important points can be made. For gatekeepers and interviewees, it seemed appropriate to explain broadly what “voice” in this context meant and how their own thoughts, views and opinions form the heart of the study which is important as there are no right or wrong answer to these questions. By understanding this, it was hoped participants felt more emboldened to answer thoughtfully and with higher levels of confidence.

My effort to explain voice and the discussion topics was also important due to the possible emotional risks that could arise for interviewees who may not have felt willing to discuss some of the themes. Their welfare and the need to have a humane research experience was paramount, so a form of informed consent was utilised in which I briefed the participant about the nature of my research before asking them if they understand the information and were willing to take part (Appendix 7). ‘Affirmative [oral] responses and completed interviews serve the purpose of implying consent in the absence of a signed consent slip’ (Berg 2007 p. 79), the latter ruled out due to the ethical dilemma of preserving a formal record of participants’ names (ibid. p. 78).

Informed consent also applied to audio recording equipment; if participants objected, then with their permission written notes would have been taken but this was not necessary as each participant agreed. I also endeavoured to make sure that the interviewee remained calm and relaxed through the process and that I remained non-judgmental of people by accepting them ‘for who and what they are’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 100). If, despite informed consent, there was a reluctance to supply information to a question then it would be omitted or the interview terminated. Again, this did not occur.

Consideration was also given to reciprocity (Creswell 2013 p. 55). ‘It is unclear what, if anything, informants stand to gain from the relationship, other than the satisfaction that someone thinks their lives and views are important’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 110-111). However,
reciprocity is important and accordingly a review of what participants gained from this study was conducted (Creswell 2013 p. 55). I believe that PEV’s topic provided participants with an opportunity for self-reflection on their own voice and its current, past and possible future position within their local community and wider area. It is a type of life history (see Temple 1997 p. 608), a point relevant especially for citizens who may come to understand more about themselves and the way they have engaged with environmental problems in their lives. Indeed, this self-reflection could even lead to proactive changes on the part of participants who may seek to address or improve what they perceive as issues with their use of voice.

Thought has also been given to participant feedback in my research and for this, the gatekeeper groups play a pivotal role. I provided gatekeepers and each participant with my contact details so that they could contact me with any further questions or thoughts about the interviews. During the write-up period, I have liaised with gatekeepers and where possible, with individual interviewees about my research through the provision of a short summary report that covers the essentials of my research findings and main conclusions. I feel that this short report prevented me from merely diving into and then out of the fieldwork without giving any further thought to those involved and their connection to the work and offered a personal and hence genuine measure of thanks compared to the provision of the full (and in places highly technical) PhD document.

Finally, confidentiality and the privacy of participants within the study is a crucial concern for researchers who should ‘go out of [their] way’ to let participants know that information taken from the research and used in any format will not carry any identifying information (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 34). Informed consent was sought after each interview to ask whether publication of their transcript quotes and/or photographs was permissible while each interviewee had a pseudonym in the form of a code (see Section 4.2 Footnote 91) adopted in the thesis to prevent identification. Participants are described only in very broad terms (e.g. university professor) to provide some degree of accuracy to the analysis. In terms of the data itself, it was held in two encrypted electronic storage sites with the list of recorded interviews removed after they had been fully utilised to help bolster confidentiality (Berg 2007 p. 80).
4.3 Qualitative data analysis

‘I have tried to give a voice to a people who are rarely heard’ (Lewis 1965 p. xii).

So far, I have set out my qualitative multi-method approach via SSIs and micro-geography analysis supported by interview guide(s), audio recording equipment and ethical considerations that underpin this research. The latter leads into a discussion on the way I analysed my data created predominantly through SSIs.

Academics have noted that qualitative data analysis is a creative process that sees researchers develop their own methods of organisation, analysis and interpretation due to the lack of standardised methods that are apparent in statistics or broad quantitative methodologies (Patton 1987; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 140-141). Nevertheless, there are some widespread systems of data analysis that have been discussed broadly in the literature which offered apt analytical methods. One of these is known as the “constant comparative method” by Glaser and Strauss (2012) which is used alongside my chosen data collection strategy of theoretical sampling (ibid. p. 102).

Firstly, I began by repeatedly reading through each interview transcript, my fieldwork journal and contact summary sheets, making annotative memos on initial thoughts or ideas that struck me so that I could engage with the data (see Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 142) in a more systematic fashion. This was aided through my use of QSR NVivo 10 software in which I coded my data through a range of concepts, categories and propositions (i.e. typologies) via a weak form of inductive (or conventional) content analysis. This method’s ‘primary purpose … is to describe and classify’ (Patton 1987 p. 153 author’s emphasis) but also to help lead into the

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103 *Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential information compiled during a study. Codes usually are attached to “chunks” of varying size – words, phrases, sentences, or whole paragraphs, connected or unconnected to a specific setting* (Miles and Huberman 1994 p. 56 authors emphasis).

104 They form the basic units of analysis (Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 7; see also Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 144-146).

105 They are higher level groupings than concepts (see Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 7).

106 This is formed between concepts and categories (see Pandit 1996, p. 2; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 pp. 144-146).

107 Inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes and categories of analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than being decided prior to data collection and analysis’ (Patton 1987 p. 150; see also Hsieh and Shannon 2005 p. 1286; Zhang and Wildemuth 2009 p. 2).
validated creation of these typologies that moved me from ‘description to interpretation and theory’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 144).

I chose to use an inductive approach for several reasons. Through PEV, I have created an untested qualitative research theoretical framework and research questions surrounding voice vis-à-vis environmental problems which makes the inductive approach most appropriate. Moreover, the inductive method should help nullify the problem of “confirmation bias” that researchers may have when testing a prior hypothesis (Greenwald et al. 1986, cited in Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007 p. 236). While I do have a PEV framework structure that has a broad set of propositions from which to study voice, the data to assess it is grounded within the individual stakeholder voices; their views, thoughts or opinions form the bedrock of the concepts and categories that ultimately take shape from within the data and help illuminate my research questions and PEV theoretical framework. The inductive analysis was combined for the most part with analyst-based typologies and where possible indigenous or emic typologies. PEV’s strongly defined theoretical framework meant that many of the elements of voice to study were already in place prior to fieldwork. However, using indigenous typologies made sure that wherever possible I “heard” the voices of my participants and utilised them in a way that did not sully or change it.

To help support the coding process, I developed a loose research storyline based upon my PEV theoretical framework that set out initial concepts and categories I wanted to communicate in my study and how my data were initially organised and coded (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 151). Taylor and Bogdan (1998 p. 151) suggest that one should think of coding in terms of writing a book; by deciding on the major focus of my book or research storyline through one or more “core categories” (Strauss 1987 pp. 34-36), I could create a rough number of chapters based on the research questions within PEV. I duly set out my core category (the functioning of stakeholder voice within Peru’s Loreto Region) and initial chapters (propositions) based upon the PEV theoretical framework which I used to create an NVivo framework.

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108 Concepts, categories and propositions ‘that appear to exist but that are not a part of a participants’ vocabulary’ are created by the researcher (Patton 1987 p. 152).
With this drawn up, I started coding the interviews directly into NVivo and this storyline. Again, where possible, the concepts produced from the data were based as much as possible on indigenous typologies and remained merely tentative categorisations until more data validated and where necessary reformed them (Strauss 1987 p. 32). I must point out here that data analysis should not be an action committed after or independent of data collection but rather one which goes ‘hand in hand’ with this process (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 141), hence the use of theoretical sampling and the constant comparative method.

As I continued to code each interview and collect and build up my data, categories were revisited and modified recursively (Derrington (2014); I worked through my coding categories and SSI concepts to test, refine and validate the emerging categories (ibid. p. 35), collapse concepts (where appropriate) that were related or overlap into wider typologies and modify my initial research story and chapter outline (see Miles and Huberman 1994, cited in Zhang and Wildemuth 1999 p. 4). In this way, I worked through a system of open coding (‘components of ‘theories’ formulated personally by the producers of the text in question’ (Bohm 2004 p. 271) seen through concept creation) and axial coding (‘reassembling data’ by creating connections or relationships between each category and linked concepts) (Strauss and Corbin 1998 p. 124) that encompass the constant comparative model. In this way, a final research storyline was established encompassing analyst and indigenous typologies.

To help this recursive process and category formulation, the data were assessed through several additional criteria and methods. This is important as ‘[w]hat is discovered during analysis must be verified by going back to the data under study and examining the extent to which the emergent analysis really fits the program and works to explain what has been observed’ (Patton 1987 p. 160). Qualitative categories are often judged on two merits; their internal homogeneity (‘the extent to which the data that belong in a certain category hold together’) (ibid. p. 154) and external homogeneity (‘the extent to which differences among categories are bold and clear’) (ibid.). To help combat the problem of divergence noted by Guba (1978, cited in Patton 1987 p. 154) (dealing with how to “flesh out” the categories) (Patton 1987 p. 154), I utilised the ‘processes of extension (building on items of information already known), bridging (making connections among different items), and surfacing (proposing new information that ought to fit and then
verifying its existence’ (ibid.). However, the ability to create mutually exclusive (external homogeneity) categories (see Krippendorff 2004) is difficult in qualitative research ‘owing to the intertwined nature of human experiences’ particularly ‘when a text deals with experiences’ (Graneheim and Lundman 2004 p. 107; see also Thomas 2003 p. 5), a conclusion relevant for my PEV work. Indeed, qualitative content data analysis allows the researcher to assign data, where appropriate, to more than one category simultaneously (Tesch 1990 p. 121), an approach which I felt was of relevance for PEV.

In this endeavour, the constant comparative method (see Glaser and Strauss 2012) was extremely useful; through its process of comparing multiple pieces of data, it allowed me to tighten up my ideas ‘and gradually move [me] to a higher level of conceptualisation’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 156) by helping confirm, divide, expand, build upon, re-define and remove pre-fieldwork storyline concepts to accommodate SSI data (Corbin and Strauss 1990 p. 9; Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 156).

I also focused on examining negative cases (Kidder 1981; Katz 2015 pp. 133-136) and surprising findings (Onwuegbuzie and Leech 2007 p. 243) within these categories which helped increase my understanding of qualitative patterns that did not fit within the wider form (Patton 1987 p. 160; 1999 pp. 1191-1192). By forcing myself to examine these instances, I refined and qualified concepts and propositions (Taylor and Bogdan 1998 p. 139) and could assert greater claims regarding the general nature of what I found (ibid. pp. 139-140) as the more ‘differences discovered within the data, the greater the number of possible negative cases, and thus the more broadly valid the resulting theory’ (Katz 1983 p. 136). ‘The test is not whether a final state of perfect explanation has been achieved but the distance that has been travelled over negative cases and through consequent qualifications from an initial state of knowledge’ (Katz 2015 p. 135 author’s emphasis).

Finally, I must also mention the way that the data are presented in the thesis. As noted in Section 4.2.4, the denaturalised process was used in the writing up of each interview and was also applied to their inclusion within the main thesis text. Here, I modified participants’ grammatical language to the correct format and at some points changed the tense in which a certain word was
utilised through square brackets. This was not done to subvert interviewee voices but to allow the main text to flow smoothly and enable me to use their words to fit into a point(s) I was making.

The next four chapters present the PEV research conducted in Loreto through the multi-method qualitative approach (SSI and micro-geography analysis) analysed through an NVivo coding system set out in this Chapter. As noted, the focus is on Petroperu and the experiences of two of its oil communities; Barrio Florido and Cuninico which have been supported by further participant testimony from collective (CBO/NGO), institutional (government) and other individual citizen voices.
Chapter 5 PEV in the Peruvian physical and emotive world: Freedom of voice and societal influences on voice

The analysis in the next four chapters explores the PEV of Loreto stakeholder groups with the state and Petroperu. This can be broadly split into two categories; citizen voice, explored primarily through the Barrio Florido and Cuninico case studies, and collective voice, incorporating the CBO (Catholic Church) linked to Cuninico and wider Loreton movements. This chapter examines the national political – state environment in which voice operates and some of the wider societal influences that shape government and REI engagement with citizens and other stakeholders. Section 5.1 investigates the national political – state environment through an assessment of the freedom for stakeholders to voice and the laws and regulations surrounding this action. Section 5.2 considers the national environment’s societal influences that appear to shape the levels of access and engagement given to Peruvian stakeholders. This has been split into two sections; Section 5.2.1 explores the impact of class, race and discrimination and Section 5.2.2 investigates bureaucracy and the role of amiguismo.

5.1 Freedom of voice: assessing Peru’s political state environment

‘What we want to do with this law today is make it important for your voice to be heard. For you to be treated as citizens, and not as small children who are neither questioned nor consulted’ Former President Ollanta Humala. Bagua, September 6, 2011 (cited in Sanborn and Paredes 2015 p. 2).

Peru has had a chequered political history. Since 1821 independence, ‘it has had 13 constitutions, with only [nine] of 19 elected governments completing their terms’ (Taft-Morales 2013 p. 1). The military has been at the forefront of shaping the country’s history throughout the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries with approximately 60 per cent of Peruvian presidents from independence through to 1995 having a military background (Eatock no date). It is little wonder that democracy has been stifled, taking until 1980 for the country’s most recent democratic transition to occur (Taft-Morales 2013 p. 1). This process was marred by Alberto Fujimori’s ‘ten years of assault on Peru’s democratic institutions’ and has only recommenced since the election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001 (Hood 2004 p. 69).
As the PEV theoretical framework makes clear, a democratic country should offer greater scope for freedom to voice than an authoritarian country. My 2015 fieldwork coincided with a period of democratic stability marked by successive free elections since 2001.\textsuperscript{110} However, modern Peru can also be categorised as undergoing a period of democratic consolidation which helps explain the nation’s mediocre Voice and Accountability score under the Worldwide Governance Indicators (World Bank no date)\textsuperscript{111} and its evaluation as a “flawed” and “defective” democracy within The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index\textsuperscript{112} and The Bertelsmann Stiftung Transformation Index (BTI)\textsuperscript{113} respectively. To understand these classifications and what they mean for the freedom to voice in Peru, one must explore the rights and privileges given to society through national, regional and international law.

The nation’s current constitution, enacted on 31\textsuperscript{st} December 1993 (and revised in 2009), sets out various rights under Title 1: The Person and Society Chapter I, Article 2 which provide a strong freedom to voice for citizens. Firstly, Peruvians cannot be ‘persecuted on a basis of his ideas or beliefs’ and there exists ‘no crime of opinion’ (Constituteproject 2016 p. 4). Peruvian nationals have the right to ‘freedom of information, opinion, expression, and dissemination of thought, whether oral, written, or in images, through any medium of social communication, and without previous authorisation, censorship, or impediment, under penalty of law’ (Article 2, point 4) (ibid.). Equally, people have the right to their ‘own voice and image’ (Article 2, point 7) (ibid. p. 5). ‘[P]eaceful assembly without arms’ is guaranteed though notice must be given if these are held in public squares or thoroughfares and may be prohibited due to public health and safety issue (Article 2, point 12) (ibid.). Foundations and other not-for-profit legal organisations can be


\textsuperscript{111} This measure ‘captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.’ Scores are given between -2.5 to 2.5. Peru’s most recent (2015) score is 0.2 which is a marginal improvement over previous fluctuating scores of -0.1, 0.0 and 0.1 since 2002 (ibid.).

\textsuperscript{112} The Democracy Index categorises countries into full democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes and authoritarian regimes (Yang 2014 pp. 31-32). Peru ranks 65\textsuperscript{th} out of 167 countries (or 45\textsuperscript{th} out of the flawed democracies category) (EIU 2015 p. 14).

\textsuperscript{113} The BTI ‘analyses and evaluates the quality of democracy, a market economy and political management in 129’ EMaDEs (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016a). Peru had a “limited” overall status (combining political, economic and social – economic aspects) and is ranked 31\textsuperscript{st} of 129 countries in 2016 (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b).
established and associated with and cannot be ‘dissolved by administrative resolution’ (Article 2, point 13) (ibid. p. 6).

Citizens are also able to participate, either as individuals or in collective groups, ‘in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the Nation’ (point 17) (ibid.) and can submit written petitions (again individually or collectively) to the competent authority who have a duty to respond in writing to the interested party (point 20) (ibid.). Given this thesis’s specific focus on voice vis-à-vis environmental pollution, citizens also have the right to the protection of their health, family and community environment (Article 7, Chapter II) (ibid. p. 8). Finally, these rights are protected through the DDP (Chapter XI: The Office of the Ombudsman, Article 161, 162) which seeks ‘to defend the constitutional and fundamental rights of the person and the community, and to ensure the enforcement of the state administration duties, as well as the provision of public services to citizens’ (Article 162) (ibid. p. 43).114

From a wider regional and national perspective, various mechanisms and laws strengthen Peruvian society’s freedom of voice. At a regional level, the country is a member of the Organisation of American States (OAS)115 with its IACHR116 and Inter-American Court of Human Rights117 and accompanying conventions (American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man (signed 1948) and American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica” (ratified 1978) and its additional protocols) formally acknowledged and ratified. At an international level, various treaties have been signed, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (ratified 1978), Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified 1990) and the ILO’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples’ Convention, 1989 (ILO Convention 169) (ratified 1994), all of which are important for this thesis.

Taken together, these constitutionally enshrined laws and international conventions and treaties theoretically provide an open freedom of voice for Peruvians. However, contemporary

114 The DDP can take cases directly to the Constitutional Court, the highest court in the country or to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (Vasquez 2014 p. 115; see also Evans no date).
115 See OAS (no date).
116 See IACHR (no date); International Justice Resource Centre (no date).
117 See Inter American Court of Human Rights (no date).
democratic Latin American countries have faced ‘difficulty integrating the agendas and dynamics’ of social movements, which aided the establishment of representative democracy ‘into the constitution and functioning of institutions’ (Vilas 1997 p. 6). In Peru’s case this has helped lead to institutionally weak state mechanisms and regulation (CBO2R1; IJ1; NSI2R1; NSI4R1; NSI5R1; NGO8R1; RGR4).118 As a PhD student and judicial assistant among my interviewees noted, “the government can say many things on paper but [pause] it’s another thing to implement the law … bring it into effect, make it real” (IUS2). Consequently, ‘[a] state that is unable to enforce its legality supports a democracy of low intensity citizenship’ (O’Donnell 1993 p. 14), a situation also brought about due to the country’s diversity and social discriminatory practices (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016c), factors discussed in Section 5.2.

It is these ‘problems in governance’ (EIU 2015 p. 45) which contribute to Peru’s classification as a flawed and defective democracy. Ample evidence can be found from various studies. The BTI’s study encompasses a focus on its “Rule of Law” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016b) and concludes that whilst ‘the state respects civil liberties in principle’ it has failed to ‘strengthen them further and occasionally does not protect them adequately’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016c). ‘[T]he state’s weak authority, and especially a weak and corrupt judiciary’ sees ‘civil rights … violated in some parts of the country or citizens … discouraged from claiming their rights’ (ibid.).

This conclusion is also shared by Freedom House who in their 2016 edition of Freedom in the World, categorised Peru’s status as “free” with a score of 71 (0= worst, 100= best) (Freedom House 2016a). This position and numerical score places it higher than five other countries on the continent, all given a “partly free” status (Bolivia (68), Paraguay (64), Colombia (63), Ecuador (59) and Venezuela (35)) but numerically lower than seven other countries (Guyana (74), Suriname (77), Argentina (79), Brazil (81), French Guiana (91), Chile (95) and Uruguay (98)) (ibid.). However, the nation’s political rights and civil liberties categorisation provide further evidence of its more limited position in these areas. Peru’s political liberties are weakened due to ‘corruption, limits on the functioning of political parties and opposition groups, and foreign or military influence on politics’ while some civil liberties are neglected (Freedom House 2016b, my emphasis).

This word *neglect* has been emphasised as an important reason. By moving away from a generalised overview of Peru’s freedom of voice into the contextually specific focus of the PEV surrounding REI projects and wider national development, a more accurate evaluation can be made. In this setting, it becomes apparent that the national environment for stakeholders to voice is restricted, intolerant and suppressive.

Upon reflection, the co-ordinator of the Catholic Church’s *Comisión de Justicia y Paz - Derechos Humanos del Vicariato de Iquitos* (Commission for Justice and Peace - Human Rights of the Vicariate of Iquitos) believed that the state is “more willing to listen” (CBO4R1a) to *selva* citizens’ voices than REIs. Other interviewees agreed. A national government civil servant argued that “the [indigenous people] know they have a voice and it is being heard” (NSI4R1) because, as the *La Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente* (Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the East) (ORPIO) representative mused, “they [the state] can’t promote investment by stepping on indigenous Peruvians’ rights” and require agreement “on at least some points of convergence” (CBO3R1). However, as Chapter Three has shown, contemporary Peru has pushed oil exploitation aggressively in the Loreto *selva* Region, often over existing and proposed indigenous territories and mining projects situated along the coastal and near-coastal region (see EY and Ministry of Foreign Affairs Peru (MRE) 2015 pp. 30-32), a process supported by Peru’s constitutionally enshrined ownership of natural resources.119

These hydrocarbon policies symbolise an “ultra-liberal/capitalist” (RGR2) “pro-business and … private investment” (IUA1) national development policy vision for the *sierra* (mountain highland region) and *selva* orchestrated by MINEM, Perupetro and Petroperu. They are, understandably, “very pro-oil and … business” (NGO1R1), protective of foreign capital (CBO4R3) and whose power in the government allows them to direct and run the economy effectively (CBO1R1). In terms of the *selva*, the “state knows very clearly what it wants for the Amazon and … is preparing a set of very controversial measures … involving the pipeline … the

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119 ‘Natural resources, renewable and non-renewable, are patrimony of the Nation. The State is sovereign in their utilisation’ (Article 66, Chapter II: The Environment and Natural Resources) (Constituteproject 2016 p. 19).
waterway … the dams in the *Marañón* … the electricity concession coming from Moyobamba to Iquitos” (CBO4R3)\(^{120}\) and other large transport projects.\(^{121}\)

What impact has this “*selva* hydrocarbon and development vision” (SHDV) had on citizens’ rights and their ability to voice? A more detailed study of various laws and regulations surrounding REI projects and national development reveal state efforts to suppress and constrict the freedom of voice for affected people.

The *Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la Solidarité* (International Co-operation for Development and Solidarity, CIDSE) note that in Latin America, countries have routinely tried to criminalise social protest, particularly surrounding large investment projects (CIDSE 2011 pp. 1-2). New or adapted legislation has sought to ‘convert legitimate protest into criminal acts. The aim of criminalisation is to create fear, tarnish reputations, weaken resistance, force opponents to expend time and resources defending themselves and to justify the use of force against them’ (ibid. p. 2). A clear example is the 1992 Article 2, Law No. 25475, which sets out a broad definition of terrorism which has been harshly criticised due to its application ‘on acts … not related to actual terrorism’ (Scheinin 2010 p. 16),\(^ {122}\) such as those surrounding environmental and indigenous issues.

Other laws have been built on this. In July 2007, Law No. 982 expanded the legal definition of extortion to incorporate actions broadly associated with public protest, including ‘the obstruction of roads and the disturbance of government functions for any … reason, both of which became punishable by up to 25 years in prison’ (Aiello no date). This was followed in December

\(^{120}\) The pipeline is a reference to the 6.5-mile (10.5-kilometre) extension to the Camisea Gas pipeline project in Block 88 in the Ucayali Basin, south-eastern Peru. Almost 75 per cent of this Block overlaps the KNN Territorial Reserve and Manu Buffer Zone (Hill 2014a; 2014b).

\(^{121}\) The waterway is a reference to the *Hidrovia Amazonica* (Amazon Waterway) project (see InfraPPP 2015).

\(^{122}\) See also IACHR (2000 Ch. II Section C.1.c); Ruebner et al. (2004).
2008 by Supreme Decree 012-2008-DE/CFFAA, which removed the requirement for the government to declare a state of emergency before army deployment (Latin American Andean Group Report 2010 p. 12). In September 2010, Law No. 1095 permitted armed forces deployment in public security operations, including protests and regulated the use of lethal force against “hostile groups” (Front Line Defenders (FLD) 2014 pp. 1-2). In January 2014, Law No. 3051 (an amendment to country’s Criminal Code (Article 20 (11)) ‘granted members of the armed forces and the national police exemption from criminal responsibility if they cause injury or death, including through … use of guns or other weapons, while on duty’ (ibid. p. 2; see also FLD 2014 p. 3; OAS 2014). Despite these laws being widely condemned (see Scheinin 2010 pp. 2, 16; OAS 2014; Peru Support Group 2014), they and other regulations (see Aiello no date) have been used to brutal effect by the state.

In 2009, the state sent riot police in response to indigenous protestors occupying Andoas airfield (Andoas District, Datem del Marañón Province), which resulted in one police officer and protester being killed and the subsequent arrest of 25 indigenous protestors who were taken to Iquitos prison, tortured and sentenced (CBO1R1) though they were later exonerated in a December 2011 court ruling due to lack of evidence (NSI7R1). In May 2015, troops were deployed and a state of emergency declared near the Tia Maria copper mine in Islay Province, Arequipa Region after several deaths (BBC News 2015a; 2015b). This was followed by a second state of emergency later in the year, this time for 30 days over events at Las Bambas cooper mine in the Apurimac Region (BBC News 2015b), leading to at least three citizen deaths (BBC News 2015c). From July 2011, when former President Ollanta Humala took office, until September 2014, 34 citizens were killed in various social conflicts across the country (Human Rights Watch 2015).

More widely, a FLD report reveals that environmental human rights defenders working with indigenous or campesino [farmer] communities have been the direct target of death threats, physical attacks, surveillance, stigmatisation, smear campaigns, and judicial harassment. Reports from the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos [National Co-ordinator for Human Rights] (CNDDHH) found that, in 2012 alone, 70 [per cent] of the attacks reported in Peru against HRDs [human rights defenders] were to environmentalists and those working on indigenous issues (FLD 2014 p. 2).
Most recently, 12 land and environmental defenders were killed in 2015, the fourth highest figures in the world that year (Global Witness 2016a pp. 8-9). These add to the 38 fatalities witnessed between 2010-2014 (Global Witness 2016b).

This trend should be understood as part of a wider government effort to clamp down on organisations and individuals that agitate against the SHDV, including those working for the state (NSI5R1). A lawyer working for Alianza Arkana, an NGO specialising in indigenous development and human rights support felt that “NGOs are really attacked by the Peruvian government” (NGO7R1). The “official discourse of the government” is to de-legitimise the work of these organisations in the eyes of society by “painting” a falsified image of what they are there for (ibid.) and causing them term to “effectively [become] a dirty word” (I1). “Some say we are anti-mining, anti-hydrocarbon … that we are here to encourage protests, some others say that we are trying to protect the interests of the USA and Europe, so it is complicated to work in this environment” (NGO6R1).

An illustration was provided by an interview with Red Ambiental Loretana, a Loreton indigenous environmental watchdog group based in Iquitos (CBO1R1). Peruvian law stipulates that oil contracts signed after 2005 must reinject contaminated waters (Vasquez 2014 p. 93) but this does not apply to retrospective contracts like Block 1AB. In 2004, Red Ambiental Loretana began campaigning against this situation through “sit downs, protests … meetings, talk[ing] to the press … [and visiting] schools … [and] universities.” Initially, the government viewed these actions as “a nuisance” but “became very sensitive to our … voice” and moved to expel the CBO co-ordinator back to his native country (CBO1R1). However, significant support from citizens,

123 A representative from the Procurador Público Especializado en Delitos Anticorrupción (PPEDC) descentralizado del Distrito Judicial de Loreto (Public Prosecutor Specialised in Crimes of Corruption for the decentralised Judicial District of Loreto) described how their former work in the Ucayali Region surrounding logging caused “too many problems … even … life threats” (NSI5R1).
124 For example, IUA1, an anthropologist at the Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon and former national government civil servant believed that “whenever there is an oil project in [an] area … NGOs bring these films, and show them to people to scare them” whilst the director of an Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonia Peruana (Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon) research department suggested that indigenous communities were being “taught wrong” by NGOs (IUA3).
CBOs and NGOs at the local, national and international level helped force a government back-
down.\textsuperscript{125}

A second example was provided by a teacher and human rights lawyer (ILP1), who
described the experience of Gregoria Santos, governor of Cajamarca, who has led the opposition
to Newmont Mining’s $5 billion Conga copper and gold project since 2011 (Jamasmie 2014). Santos was subsequently jailed on corruption charges for fourteen months at the end of 2014, charges which many felt were the culmination of a government campaign against him (ibid.).

Aside from suppression, what evaluation can be made of various legal mechanisms for
stakeholders, particularly citizens, to voice through orthodox formal channels?

[I]t is important to be clear about exactly which decisions the public have the opportunity
to participate in’ as ‘claims to have ‘involved the public’ may boil down to having a few conversations with a couple of community leaders or calling people to a public meeting, which only the most active members of a community attend (Cornwall 2008 p. 280 author’s emphasis).

A report by the Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal (Due Process of Law Foundation) (DPLF) for Oxfam described Peru’s legal and regulatory provisions as ‘fragmented, inadequate, and insufficient’ (Galvis 2011 p. 13) and two contextually important examples illustrate this; the 2011 law of Consulta Previa (Prior Consultation) and Estudio de Impacto Ambiental (Environmental Impact Assessment, EIAs). Both highlight the dominance of the SHDV.

The Law of Prior Consultation was based on ILO Convention 169 and the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, both of which set out the need for consultation with indigenous people prior to the development of natural resources in their territories.\textsuperscript{126} Until this point, the right to consultation had been regulated in very general terms by the 2005 General

\textsuperscript{125} This campaign helped lead to the Dorissa Accord (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 78).

\textsuperscript{126} Crucially, states are obligated to have indigenous ‘consent as the objective of the consultation mechanism’ before projects like hydrocarbon exploitation occur (Asia Pacific Forum of Human Rights and Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2013 p. 26 my emphasis).
Environment Law (no. 28611) (Vasquez 2014 p. 79; see also Perupetro no date a) and accordingly represents a positive evolution for indigenous communities (CBO3R1).

Whilst the new law provided a far more comprehensive framework\(^{127}\) and to some extent increased dialogue (CBO3R1),\(^{128}\) various objections were raised by indigenous organisations. These centred on the stringent criteria for initiating Prior Consultation, the inflexible (short) time-scale for consultation and the state’s leadership in carrying out each respective measure of the process (IUA1; Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 pp. 14-18). Two prominent flaws reinforce the view that the Peruvian State is intent on pursuing development in the selva and wider country and consequently constrict any voices critical to this objective.

Firstly, the fourth information stage for all affected communities and citizens therein “is the most important stage” of the process (CBO3R1). However, “[t]he information in other [later] stages is not shared with everyone … only … with the leaders” (termed Apus) (ibid.), meaning that “[t]he ordinary people in the village very often don’t know what’s been agreed [or] what’s been talked about” (CBO1R1) since the fourth stage. Limiting vocal engagement to civil society leaders directly contravenes stipulations laid out in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (Articles XVIII and XXIII).\(^{129}\) The subsequent lack of wider civil society involvement or information will also prevent clear, concise opinions to formulate making community consensus harder to gain. This is already a difficult prospect when oil and gas projects can split communities and/or cause tensions between those who see it as a potential benefit and others as a threat)

\(^{127}\) The Law of Prior Consultation’s Article 8 lists seven stages to the consultation process:
a) Identification of legislative or administrative measures subject to consultation.
b) Identification of indigenous or native peoples to be consulted.
c) Publication of the legislative or administrative measure.
d) Supplying information pertaining to the legislative or administrative measure.
\(^{128}\) At the time of fieldwork, CBO3R1 confirmed that five Loreton consultation mechanisms had been completed with a sixth for Block 196 ongoing.
Crucially, if no community(ies) consensus is reached, the lead state entity will take the final decision (Schilling-Vacaflor and Flemmer 2013 p. 15; Vasquez 2014 p. 109).

Secondly, in an interview with a GOREL Manager of Health and Environment, they stated that the state and REI “need the approval from the communities directly affected by that [REI] intervention” (RGR1). This is not correct. The law has only a consultative power and ‘does not give the communities the right of veto’ (Villanueva M 2013 p. 100; NSI7R1). Subsequently, the Peruvian government can legitimise its extractive and wider development drive under the guise of the Law of Prior Consultation. No extractive development projects can be stopped. Interviewees summarised it as “a salute to the bandido [bandit]” (NGO2R1c), a top-down (ILP1), non-transparent (NSI2R1), unequitable process (NSI7R1), required by law but not considered (NGO4R1) and “conditioned by international [REIs]” (ILP1). It is they which the government is more interested in achieving a good agreement with (NGO7R1). This ILO interpretation has been done for the benefit of the state (RGR2) that fails to satisfy local citizen concerns (CBO3R1) and effectively ignores their voice.

One can also find issues with EIAs, a tool which was introduced through the 1990 National Code for Environmental and Natural Resources (Legislative Decree 163) (Castro et al. 2014 p. 1). They are carried out before the commencement of ‘any hydrocarbon activity likely to cause environmental impacts, such as seismic exploration, drilling of exploratory and development wells, construction of production facilities, etc.’ (Perupetro no date b). Despite their importance, two CBO interviewees described them as merely “formalities” (CBO1R1; CBO4R1a) and one can see this in the two citizen participation mechanisms; Taller Informativo (Informative Workshops) and Audiencia Pública (Public Hearing) (NSI2R1; Stetson 2012 p. 85; Shoobridge and Kapila no date p. 95). These do “not allow … its citizens [to] know the impact [that the SHDV] has” (CBO4R3).

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130 One ProNaturaleza NGO interviewee alludes to this point: “Both in conservation and in services projects [environmental monitoring], we identify three groups of people in the communities: 1) the ones against; 2) the pro-activity ones, and 3) indifferent ones” (NGO4R1; see also Chapter 8, Section 8.4 where a Loreton Regional Councillor (RGR2) suggests deliberate government efforts at creating division).

131 For reform history see Glasson, Thirivel and Chadwick (2005 pp. 313-315) and Castro et al. (2014 p. 2).
For example, the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator recounted that in the case of the Amazon Waterway project (see Footnote 120), the environmental impact report and the contractor’s study “should have been done with the involvement of the population and they haven’t” (CBO4R1a). Discrepancies can also be found in relation to oil extraction projects. In the case of Perenco in Block 67, the Red Ambiental Loretana spokesperson noted that the company had “actually started work” building heliports and establishing camps “before their studies had been finished” (CBO1R1) an indicator of the level of REI contempt to this “weak” and uncontrolled system of participation (NSI2R1).

Efforts to improve EIAs have been undertaken. They were originally controlled by each government ministry which meant that those for hydrocarbon projects were approved by MINEM, specifically the Dirección General de Asuntos Ambientales Energía (General Directorate of Energy-Related Environmental Affairs, DGAAE) (Powers 2012 p. 6). This situation ‘[set] up a direct conflict of interest: the mining industry has responsibility for both promoting investment and enforcing social and environmental regulations’ (Slack 2009 p. 6). However, in December 2012, a new agency, Servicio Nacional de Certificación Ambiental para las Inversiones Sostenibles (National Service of Environmental Certification for Sustainable Investment, SENACE) was established and is now part of MINAM (Watts and Collyns 2012), thus helping remove conflict of interest.

Nevertheless, the prominence given to the SHDV remains. The July 2014 Law No. 30230 ‘reduces to 45 days the time allotted to governmental entities for reviewing [EIAs with] civil servants … subject to sanctions for failing to meet the deadline’ (OECD 2015 p. 188). This “ridiculous” timeframe (NGO2R1c) made them irrelevant formalities (RGR2), but was useful to speed up hydrocarbon project implementation.

Consequently, one finds that community consultation via Informative Workshops and Public Hearings ‘take place after the government has already negotiated and signed leases with oil and gas companies’ which is unlikely ‘to cancel already signed concessions’ (Stetson 2012 p. 86 author’s emphasis). Indigenous citizens are “the last ones to know something” (Interpreter in ILP2
interview; see also Vasquez 2014 p. 108). Moreover, they appear to remain rubber stamping exercises. CBO1R1 concluded that he’d “known of no case … where the previous studies have ever said no, you can’t carry on. There always approved” (CBO1R1), consequently providing further clear evidence of the state’s zealous pursuit of the SHDV and the constraint placed upon the freedom of voice for citizens and other stakeholders.¹³³

Though there are high levels of social conflict in Peru,¹³⁴ these limited formal mechanisms for public engagement surrounding resource extraction projects and the latter’s divisive impact have been a fundamental cause of these problems. In a 2009 report by DPLF, 126 (44 per cent) of the 288 social conflicts were related to problems with the consultation process (Fundación para el Debido Proceso Legal 2010 p. 46, cited in Vasquez 2014 p. 108). A 2016 report by three environmental NGOs (CooperAcción, Fedepaz and Grufides) found that under former President Humula’s political administration, government social conflicts averaged 217 in any one month (Peru Support Group 2016e) of which just shy of 70 per cent were socio-environmental (CooperAcción, Fedepaz and Grufides 2016 p. 16) in nature. The clear majority of these (62.7 per cent) are related to mining (ibid.), which has a history of causing social conflict in Peru.¹³⁵ Nevertheless, 15.9 per cent of these conflicts are caused by the hydrocarbon sector (ibid.) due to the consultation issues, the overlapping of their indigenous lands, the impact of environmental pollution¹³⁶ and the difficulties in gaining environmental legal justice (NSI7R1).¹³⁷

¹³² I uncovered only one partial case. Perenco had been awarded Block 67 in 2008 (Perenco no date). However, in 2012, its EIA for its next operational stage was blocked by MINEM, partly due to its failure to obtain technical support from the Instituto Nacional de Desarrollo de Pueblo Andinos, Amazonicos y Afroperuanos (National Institute for the Development of the Andean, Amazonian and Afro-Peruvian Populations, INDEPA) (Hill 2012).

¹³³ Recent reforms continue this trend. In May 2015 Law No. 30327 was enacted which allowed investment projects to obtain global environmental certification (GEC) combining EIA and environmental permitting; for projects in the same geographical area to share the same baseline (reducing EIA implementation by an estimated year); and for environmental permits from different government agencies to be granted in a simultaneous rather than sequential manner (OECD 2015 p. 188).

¹³⁴ A DDP report shows that there were 210 social conflicts, 149 of which were active and 61 latent (DDP 2015 p. 1).

¹³⁵ In 2005, the DDP ‘recorded thirty-three separate conflicts related to mining’ whilst ‘the World Bank noted that at least fifteen mining zones were affected by conflicts’ (Bebbington et al. 2007 p. 6; see also Observatorio de Conflictos Mineros de América Latina (Latin American Miners Conflict Observatory, OCMAL) (no date).

¹³⁶ For instance, after the second oil spill from the Oleoducto Norperuano in February 2016 (see Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 82), the Wampis community responded by taking ‘at least eight public officials hostage to demand help from the central government’ (Hill 2016b).

¹³⁷ Indeed, the PPEDC lawyer reported that even when complaints “against the companies have been formally [i.e. legally] presented … the problem is that ecological crimes have very short penalties, four to five years so …. once the time … has passed … criminals don’t have to be persecuted any longer” (NSI7R1). For selva citizens, gaining legal
Overall, this section has highlighted that freedom of voice in Peru is fragile. Whilst Peru’s consolidation of democracy does bestow civil rights on its citizens and other collective voice actors, within the context of hydrocarbon projects and state development, a far more dangerous, inflexible and intolerant environment is found. The country’s aggressive hydrocarbon expansion is proliferated through and protected by various laws governing citizen consultation and engagement where one can see a ‘closure of the democratic spaces in which people struggle for redistributive policies’ (North and Grinspun 2016 p. 1485). In other words, tokenistic forms of participation (Arnstein 1969) exist for citizens to formally voice through. At the same time, the labelling of anti-mining and wider selva indigenous protestors as “anti-mining terrorists” (Post 2016a) and “intransigents” (CBO3R1), highly charged terms for a country wracked by the Shining Path insurgency, shows that supporters of the state’s SHDV are seeking to de-legitimise genuine stakeholder grievances in the eyes of wider society. One NGO, CooperAcción concluded that there is ‘an intent to present all this [the anti-mining movement] as a kind of plot against investment, against development, against the country’ (Hill 2015c). Consequently, the state will “always take the side of the oil companies [and other REIs] to defend private investment” (CBO4R3) a measure of which can be seen in the freedom of voice levels for stakeholders surrounding hydrocarbon and state development.

At this point, one can return to CBO4R1, CBO3R1 and NSI4R1’s beliefs that the state is more willing to listen to local selva communities than REIs. For the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator, potential improvement in this regard over the next ten years was dependent on “who’s in government” (CBO4R1). This opinion can be challenged. Looking at the two main contestants in the 2016 Peruvian Presidential elections both were “very neoliberal” adherents of capitalism with a focus on resource use rather than a social development and sustainability agenda (NGO6R1). Both shared a belief in selva and sierra development and whilst specific polices may have differed, their pledges run in a similar vein to contemporary former administrations.138

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138 See Peruanos Por el Kambio (Peruvian for Change, PPK no date pp. 9, 14) and Fuerza Popular (Popular Force) (no date).
Is it all doom and gloom? The establishment of the 1.3-million-hectare Sierra del Divisor National Park (see Erickson-Davis and Joshi 2015) is a significant achievement, whilst the national government has formally acknowledged the environmental harm caused by oil companies in Loreto (NGO1R1) via the *acta historica de diez de Marzo* (Historic Act 10th March 2015, Historic Act) (NGO7R1). However, these measures in no way deny the implementation of the SHDV or the importance placed upon this policy. In fact, some interviewees felt that despite the Historic Act, the government were still not taking environmental remediation or the fulfilment of wider socio-economic commitments to *selva* communities seriously enough (CBO1R1; NGO2R1b; IUA1) reinforcing the dominance of certain state mechanisms (MINEM, Perupetro and Petroperu) and private interests (*Confederación Nacional de Instituciones Empresariales Privadas*, The National Confederation of Private Business Institutions, CONFIEP) and the weakness of MINAM (CBO1R1; NSI2R1) who do not necessarily share the ruling regimes neoliberal extractivism (Bebbington and Scurrah 2013 p. 174).

One sixteen-year-old girl from REDNNA concluded that “oil is one of the most important activities for Peru and it’s something that is not going to … go away” (CBO2R1). For extractive stakeholders, no matter who won in 2016, their PEV environment remained shaped and restricted by the importance that the state has placed on hydrocarbon activities and their defence of REIs, “even against its own people” (CBO4R3) and the protection of their rights (ILP2; IUA1; NSI7R1; NGO8R1).

5.2 The social influences and mechanisms within Peruvian society

“They [the central government] don’t want a dialogue with the people here, not ever” (IRC7).

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139 The agreement included the ‘installation of provisional clean water system’, the creation of a 50 million *soles* guarantee fund and remediation work by the responsible company (Kerremans 2015).

140 For the Red Ambiental representative, the 50 million *soles* fund was “a pittance” and believed that 500–600 million *soles* were necessary (CBO1R1).

141 In 2014, Law No. 30230 weakened MINAM and OEFA (NSI2R1) by revoking the former’s ability ‘to enforce air, soil and water quality standards …. [and] establish nature reserves’ while OEFA’s level of fines given to REI’s have been cut by half (Southwick 2014).
Loreton fieldwork made clear that several national societal influences were at work which have a significant impact on government and REI professionals’ engagement and access for citizens. In an interview with The Peru Mission spokesperson, class, age and race were listed as several underlying influences which have shaped indigenous people’s use of radical action in the selva (NGO2R1b). The assessment of these and other interconnected factors within Peruvian society help uncover their role in formulating the national PEV environment for citizens and their ability to voice and be heard effectively.

5.2.1 Class, race and discrimination

[T]hey [Petroperu] wanted to argue with us, they were challenging us, and we said, yes, they are educated … but we also have some education, at least high school to defend ourselves at least, and we said that [just] because they are professionals [doesn’t mean] they can humiliate us (IRC13 recounting a conversation with Petroperu engineers).

Two interviewees felt that two of the most important interconnected features of Peruvian society are its strong class system (IJ1; NGO2R1c) upheld through the dominance of race and discrimination. From a historical perspective, South American countries ‘have shown an entrenched pattern of clientelism and corruption, usually determined by the extent of influence individuals or groups can exert on the authorities to advance their own interests’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47). Traditionally, in Peru, the social organisation was ‘essentially dualistic, with the blancos [reflecting the old Spanish and Portuguese elite] and the mestizos occupying the upper and middle strata respectively’ whilst the lower classes contained two distinct groups, the marginalised Indians and the rapidly growing cholo or mestizo group (Paulston 1971 p. 90).

The evolution of the state ‘was profoundly shaped’ by these white business elites (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 112). Their focus on economically productive regions and advanced economy trade created highly uneven national development, a process strengthened ‘by a political system increasingly responsive to an electorate concentrated in the Coast’ at the expense of the sierra and selva (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 112; see also Slater 1989 p. 67; Santos-Granero and Barclay 1998 p. 64; Aljovin and Lopez 2005).142

142 Under the 1895 electoral law, ‘illiterate citizens could not vote. Thus, in 1899, only 108,597 people, or around 2.5 [per cent] of Peru’s population, were eligible to vote’ (Hunefeldt 2004 p. 158).
‘In contrast to this external orientation, interrelationships among the mining zones and other regions within Peru were much more limited’ (Slater 1989 p. 67), with the *sierra* seen as an area for the provision of cheap labour (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 206). Race was also tightly linked to this spatial economic focus. To early Twentieth Century elites, a ‘*serrano* (person of the highlands) … [was seen] as primitive while the coastal *criollo* [a person from South or Central America, especially one with pure Spanish descent] was representative of modern Peru, and considered “white” regardless of skin colour’ (de la Cadea 2000 p. 21, cited in Ewig 2010 p. 15) while ‘the Amazon … was not inhabited by primitive Indians, but by “savages” that had nothing to offer Peru’s nation-building project’ (Ewig 2010 p. 15). The discriminatory views fed into indigenous exploitation in the latter Nineteenth and early Twentieth Century rubber boom in the Putumayo Province of Loreto (IUA1; IUS2; NGO3R1).

For contemporary Peru, the country’s key problem (CBO4R3) remains its ‘historically rooted’ ‘pervasively discriminatory society’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016d pp. 7, 12; see also Saavedra, Torero and Nopo 2002). Indigenous people, suggested by a Catholic Church priest to have a “fifth category” societal status (CBO4R3), have been persistently exploited (ILP2), excluded and ignored (CBO4R1; NSI7R1)143 and have only a limited voice in the Peruvian political system (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 204). It is little wonder to find that ‘[e]qual opportunity is not a reality in Peru’ (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016d p. 22) with one in two Peruvians living in poverty (Drinot 2006 p. 13).144 This discrimination is fed by a state which continues to view the indigenous, particularly those in the *selva*, as an obstacle to the fulfilment of the SHDV.145

The scale of Peruvian discrimination can be glimpsed from some of the Loreton interviews. In Barrio Florido, indigenous people were seen to “always exaggerate” the problems they have and do “so for the money. They block it [the river] to get money” (MRBF2). Other residents

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143 As two *Cocama* Cunicino residents stated; “we are marginalised in …our country, we are forgotten” (IRC2) and “insignificant” (IRC7).
144 For instance, the Gini Index shows that income distribution is unequal across the whole population and far higher than other EMaDEs (Iguales and Oxfam 2015 p. 5).
145 For example, in a 2007 *El Comercio* newspaper article, former President Alan Garcia defined indigenous people as second-class citizens and went on to describe them as obstacles to transnational privatisation of the Amazon indigenous land (see Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times 2007; Gonzales 2012 p. 223).
believed that they’re always “looking for benefits” from REIs and aren’t willing to work for their income (MRBF1) or even fish, and were drinkers (MRBF3).

A former government employee, now an anthropologist at the Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon, thought that indigenous people only want “to be given money” and that if you did so, they would “shut their mouths” and stop complaining “about this and that” (IUA1) whilst a colleague labelled them as “closed-minded” (IUA3). Meanwhile, a construction worker believed indigenous people to be “very, very lazy … people …. [who] don’t like to work” (ICW1).

A symbolic phrase by many Peruvians is to see their country as ‘a beggar sitting on a bench of gold’ (Drinot 2006 p. 12), an expression illustrative of ‘the highly racialised character of development thinking in Peru’ (ibid. p. 15). The beggar is handicapped and cannot properly exploit the country’s riches due to the predominance of Peru’s indigenous masses, who are characterised as ‘dirty, ignorant, dependent on others, as well as devious and untrustworthy’ (ibid.). At the same time, the society ‘integrated in such a way as to perpetrate the inferiority of the indigenous culture vis-à-vis the Hispanic culture and rural areas vis-à-vis urban areas’ (Paulston 1971 pp. 90-91).

In Iquitos, this manifests itself through urban resident efforts to “divorce themselves” from the selva and their own indigenous heritage (NGO2R1c) (even though an estimated 80 per cent of the city is indigenous) (CBO4R3) through their “risen” materialist and urbanised status e.g. ownership of a Tuk Tuk (rickshaw), TV, Nike trainers etc. (NGO2R1c). The issues faced by indigenous peoples are insensitively viewed as their own internal problems (NGO2R1c; IUA1). “There is an element of “well, they want to live there …. If they don’t want that, they should come and live in the city”” (NGO2R1c). “In all cases, they [wider society] see it as a problem that is not theirs, but a problem of indigenous peoples” (IUA1). This socio-cultural and spiritual divorce is not only a result of discrimination but also a lack of understanding that Peruvian’s in general and those living in urban centres have for the rainforest, its people and their different cultures (IJ1; NGO3R1), beliefs, traditions and livelihoods.146 This is not an exclusively Peruvian issue with

146 Conversations with Barrio Florido residents typify this. MRBF2 believed that “indigenous people receive a lot of benefits from the state for their education.” MRBF3 recounted how friends of his working in the selva told him that indigenous villages “get a lot of help …. [like] light, water, oil, satellite, etc.” (MRBF3) and “are given everything” (MRBF21). For most communities, the opposite is true. Whilst a tiny proportion adjacent to oil extraction sites receive
wider indigenous and non-indigenous intercultural relations characterised by ‘paternalism, ignorance and misunderstanding’ (Howitt 2001 p. 25).

Consequently, while all Peruvians are considered citizens, citizenship remains constrained by the long-standing ethnic and class-based divisions of Peruvian society which has seen the state reinforce the historic divisions of Peruvians into first and second class citizens rather than promote democratic citizenship (Burt 2007 p. 50). Even the mestizo or mixed ethnic based citizenship has not prevented discriminatory practices based on cultural and racial traits (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 7).

In sum, racism in Peru structures social hierarchies and shapes development policies because, by racialising culture and culturalising race (by making ideas of racial and cultural superiority/inferiority mutually reinforcing), it constructs the non-white ‘other’ (the indigenous, the mestizo, the Afro-Peruvian, the chino [broad term for Asian ethnicity]) as the depository and agent of poverty, cultural backwardness and national failure (Drinot 2006 p. 19).

Given the predominance of Peru’s racialised class consciousness and widespread indigenous discrimination and apparent cultural inferiority, what impact could these negative societal traits have on the work and outlook of Peruvian professional elites such as engineers, lawyers, doctors or public servants? Evidence suggests that it directly influences their engagement with society, particularly with lower-class indigenous citizens, from mundane everyday interactions through to more official levels of communication. As a Peruvian professional, “I don’t have to open the door to you if I don’t want to, I don’t have to concede you a visit” (NGO2R1b). Of importance for this research was the opinion of some interviewees that some professionals, chiefly state representatives, were reluctant to interact and engage with the population, especially those in the selva (CBO4R3; NGO2R1; NSI2R1). In other words, institutional (i.e. government) societal voice engagement was seen to suffer.

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147 NGO2R1c provides a detailed example. On one occasion, several priests visited his home for a meal and “they wouldn’t speak” until his indigenous housekeeper who ate her meals with NGO2R1 “had left the room.” Despite NGO2R1’s protestations, they argued that “we can’t possibly have a conversation amongst priests who are professionals with her present.”
In The Peru Mission representative’s experience, regional government politicians “get a nice office with air conditioning and don’t want to leave it” and “get their hand[s] dirty” (NGO2R1b). Leaving their urban environment and travelling into the selva for people who aren’t “really worth bothering” (IJ1) with creates “a resentment about it” (NGO2R1b). “[T]hey don’t go. They seem comfortable where they are” (NGO4R1). For instance, a GOREL regional development and intercultural advisor felt that the Peruvian state has low compliance for the Prior Consultation law because state officials “feel … they live apart from the indigenous people” making many of them “indifferent” to the law and “not … up for the job” of supporting these communities (RGR4). Consequently, whilst these representatives may go out in speedboats for a day or two (NGO2R1b) to visit closely situated communities, going to high selva (remoter rainforest) pueblos “just doesn’t interest them” (NGO2R1c).\(^\text{148}\) They “don’t want to go out to the jungle and get hot and sweaty and bitten by mosquitoes” (NGO2R1b), use “primitive” facilities (RGR3) or have to eat basic foodstuffs like banana, fish and yucca\(^\text{149}\) for several days (NGO2R1c).

This reluctance stemming from discrimination generates an unwillingness to see anything clearly or put themselves in a position where they can’t avoid seeing (CBO4R3) or sympathising with selva-based communities (NSI2R1), an attitude not lost on interviewed citizens. In Barrio Florido, a housewife found that politicians weren’t “humble” (MRBF24) and once elected “don’t even know you” (MRBF25) while the Petroperu refinery manager “looked down on people just for being in charge” (MRBF6). In Cuninico, a male manual labourer felt that Petroperu and government officials “think themselves important because they’re educated people” (IRC19) whilst Petroperu must view them as “ignorant” natives who “don’t know anything” (IRC28). Petroperu workers “think … [that because] they have more money than somebody else, they don’t have to pay any attention to them” (IRC4), an attitude and treatment the female interviewee levelled at the company in their relationship with Cuninico.

\(^{148}\) For example, the incumbent GOREL president was the first office holder to ever visit villages along the upper Rio Tigre. “They've had oil companies there for forty years and [this was] the first time that a Regional President [had] visited” (IJ1).

\(^{149}\) A shrub, also known as cassava, native to South America and a major staple food.
One should acknowledge interviewees who suggest that these issues are not universal throughout all state officials. Younger professionals, such as agricultural and forestry engineers, are prepared to go out into the *selva* (NGO2R1b), whilst government agency staff (e.g. ANA, DIGESA, *Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado* (National Service of Protected Areas by the State, SERNANP), OEFA) have “been willing to go into the [selva] villages at some points and present their … findings”, often at *asambleas* (public meetings) (NGO1R1), particularly since the Multi-sectoral Commission’s establishment (NSI1R1a). Accordingly, it’s important to distinguish among these different government institutional representatives (politicians and civil servant agencies) when analysing state engagement in Chapter 6 to test the validity of these opinions and provide a more accurate analysis.

Yet, crucially, even when dialogue does occur, *selva* indigenous communities and state representatives can struggle to understand one another due to their two completely different realities that are “not on the same field” (NGO3R1; NSI7R1; see also Howitt 2001 p. 59). In CBO and NGO interviews (CBO4R1a; NGO2R1b), interviewees alluded to the indigenous belief in a “holistic cosmovision of creation” (NGO2R1c), an idea that Nature is their Mother which manifests itself through great respect for Creation and Nature (NGO2R1b) and a spiritual life which sees humans and animals as one and the same (CBO1R1; NGO3R1; NSI7R1).

We may think of something differently from them, because we have an occidental mentality. They have a different “cosmovision” and there’s a difference with the way the state communicates. How can an occidental person think that the water has a mother? And how underneath the river there’s life? We have worked with them … and I start to understand, but at first it was difficult for me …. For example, … Miguelito told us about his family being in Brazil, and how his sons were going to take him there …. Turns out that for them Brazil was underneath the river, and next month he didn’t come back to the workshop because he went with his sons. For me, Miguelito passed away. But for the

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150 ANA, located within the Ministry of Agriculture manages and monitors aquatic water sources except those for human consumption (NSI1R1a; ANA no date). Water for human consumption is monitored by DIGESA located within the Ministry of Health (DIGESA 2010). SERNANP, located within MINAM is the governing body of *Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas* (National System of Protected Natural Areas by the State, SINANPE) (SERNANP no date). Lastly OEFA is an environmental enforcement agency working as the governing body of the *Sistema Nacional de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental* (National System of Evaluation and Environmental Control, SINEFA) (OEFA no date a) located within MINAM (OEFA no date b).
people Miguelito went with his sons (CBO4R1a).\textsuperscript{151}

This holistic cosmological worldview is common among indigenous communities worldwide (e.g. see Grieves 2008; Poroch et al. 2009). It affords them a completely different “perception of reality … than ours” (NGO3R1), one based around subsistence rural livelihoods and is subsequently “difficult for us to see and understand … especially [for] the state” (CBO4R1a) who “don’t take enough time to try and understand” it (NGO2R1 in CBO4R1-2 interview).

This can lead to difficulties in communication between the state/REIs representatives and indigenous people. For instance, a Catholic Church spokesperson recounted an argument she had with a government authority over cosmovision:

I told him about the cosmovision, and he said he understood it but then in the end he was only attacking them not understanding. You need to listen to people if you want to start a dialogue and understand them, but he didn’t see it that way. He was from the government and the state acted that way. I think the state doesn’t believe in that dialogue, they can’t see it from an indigenous point of view (CBO4R1a).

This is perhaps born out of fear for what the state/REIs might find if they “peel[ed] back the layers too much” (NGO2R1c). It may reveal that indigenous people “have a legitimate set of values and customs and oppositions to [resource] extraction” (ibid.); in other words, a vision which contradicts the state’s SHDV and consequently one which it struggles to reconcile or accept. This shows ‘[t]he dominance of industrial values in shaping resource management systems’ that deny the cultural integrity (Howitt 2001 p. 59) and worldview of indigenous peoples whose “rhythm of life” can be transformed by oil development (RGR1).

These issues are multi-directional. The indigenous reality, one lived outside “the legal framework of modern society” (NGO3R1) can present practical and conceptual difficulties in their own interaction with wider Peruvian state and society. An anthropologist at the Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon noted that they “are in a situation of interaction … which they are not used to, and in which similar situations of interaction, they have not fared well, where they been

\textsuperscript{151} In a later email exchange, the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator noted that the Cocama are connected to their indigenous land within the Pacaya Samiria Áreas de Conservación Regional (Regional Conservation Area) as it is there that the midwife buried her umbilical cord when they were born (CBO4R1b).
deceived” such as the Nineteenth Century rubber boom (IUA1). This event has undeniably damaged their trust of government and exterior actors and dialogue and interaction with them. At the same time, their understanding of the processes behind these interactions can be limited. Selva indigenous people can fail to recognise that “processes take quite a bit of time” which can leave them frustrated with the lack of immediate results (NGO3R1) or the notion that they can expect instantaneous meetings with political representatives upon their arrival in urban centres (NGO3R1; NSI6R1; RGR4). Practically, subsistence selva-based lifestyle do not make it easy to keep documentation which might be needed in dialogue with the government (NGO3R1). Together, these two realities and the intolerance that the state may have for socio-cultural customs and values at odds with their own industrial/developmental ideas and agendas can hinder dialogue and interaction between the state, REIs and indigenous peoples.

5.2.2 Formalised bureaucracy and amiguismo

Two further aspects of Peruvian society must now also be discussed. Firstly, politicians’ aversion to interaction with selva-based citizens is supported by the broader bureaucratic (ILP2; IUA2; NGO2R1b, c; NGO3R1; RGR3) and formalised culture of dialogue in Peru by government personnel. The Peru Mission interviewee noted that exchanges are “very official … and bureaucratic”, usually occurring through an institutional – organisational format rather than institutional – individual citizen (NGO2R1b). This often sees citizens require the support of CBOs such as indigenous federations to raise issues with the state. Highly formalised typed and printed introductory letters are required to garner interviews with state officials and other professionals152 but the process is slow. “A document may have to go through different sectors and it may take days to transfer, even though it can be done in hours” (IUA2). The requested official documentation also requires printing and administrative payment costs and thus saw an Iquitos lawyer conclude that “the bureaucracy goes hand in hand with corruption” (ILP2), an issue which

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152 I experienced the formality of this during fieldwork; in the early stages, I did not gain government interviews due to my failure to provide two formal letters of introduction. Whilst my generic formal letter (see Appendix 8) gained me access to government interviewees, it is a distinctly western letter. Appendix 9, a letter written by my hospedaje owner (and lawyer), provides an idea of the type of formal letter required to establish a state meeting.
“affects the environment … on a huge level” (CBO1R1) and is so deeply entrenched that the former President was unable to “dominate” and “delete it” (MRBF2)\textsuperscript{153}

The results of this are twofold. Citizens with weaker education and limited access to technology such as computers and printers, a problem for \textit{selva}-based citizens, will obviously face difficulty in producing formal letters and will require, if possible, CBO assistance. They, in turn, face a “hugely time consuming … expensive” (NGO2R1c) and possibly corrupt bureaucratic state dialogue process, generating the correct letters, visiting the necessary people and receiving the information and documentation they require. In this bureaucratic and formalised environment of dialogue, state officials can conceivably use it to help them filter the type of citizens able to access them.

A second crucial barrier for citizens is the \textit{modus operandi} of the political system, termed \textit{amiguismo}. “A lot depends here … on… “\textit{amiguismo}”, having a friend in power … then you have … fast and easy access” (NGO2R1b). The Peru Misison interviewee goes on to admit that he personally tends “to use friends to … [organise] interviews … because I know that that’s how it works” (ibid.) here. \textit{Amiguismo} is particularly important given that government employees lack institutional email and instead utilise personal addresses (NGO2R1c) and phone numbers (NSI1R1a; NSI3R1), reinforcing the personalised nature of contact. For instance, NSI3R1, who works for SERNANP in Loreto, is contacted personally by friends in the \textit{selva} about oil pollution incidents. “We’re [SERNANP] not very close to the people; I work for the state. They [local people] used to tell me what was going on because we were friends” (ibid.), a personalised method of access which raises issues for non-acquaintances.

During my fieldwork, I had direct experience of \textit{amiguismo}. Through NGO2R1, an interview was arranged with the GOREL Regional President but, upon arrival, we were informed

\textsuperscript{153}One can see this clear corruption in Loreto. RGR2, a GOREL Regional Councillor stated that between 2011-2015, 54 million \textit{soles} were misappropriated which should have been given to indigenous communities via the canon payment system (this appropriates some of the oil revenue to oil producing Regions, other actors and local people). NSI5R1, a public prosecutor lamented that one District, Trompeteros (Loreto Province) has particularly bad corruption with local mayors “reported for corruption \textit{[e]very year}” (one for stealing half a million \textit{soles}).
that he had been called away. There had been no need to write a formal letter of introduction to his secretary. Instead, a phone call from NGO2R1 was enough to provide smooth access.\footnote{However, one must wonder whether, even with the provision of a formal letter, the Regional President might not have found something more urgent to do.}

Iquitos’ lack of “civil society” (NGO7R1) is perhaps one result of amiguismo, where community cohesion and collective support are suppressed. For citizens lacking the ability or opportunity to establish amiguismo-based access (i.e. selva-based citizens), voice in this vertical setting becomes more difficult and their state access and/or speed of access must occur through more formalised channels of communication or through CBO-based groups.

One of the primary ways that amiguismo can flourish is the lack of a permanent civil service. Peru’s public employment conditions for the public sector are governed by a legal framework (Legislative Decree No. 276) and its regulation (Reglamento de la Carrera Administrativa, DS No 005-90-PCM) (Webb and Valencia 2006 p. 200). This has, however, ‘rarely been fully applied’ (World Bank 2003 p. 117) and is ‘weak’, leading to a ‘chaotic’ status for the civil service (ibid. p. 118; see also Mechanism for Follow-Up on the Implementation of the Inter-American Convention against Corruption (MESICIC) 2016). Unlike the UK where there is a permanent ‘politically impartial and independent’ civil service (GOV.UK no date), Peru ‘has … banned by decree’ permanent civil service positions (Burdescu et al. 2007 p. 73). This has led to the government resorting to staff hiring on a contractual basis, ‘a process that is not subject to any required procedures for recruitment and selection’ (World Bank 2003 p. 115)\footnote{One or two staff from each department are permanent and are not contracted personnel (CBO1R1; NGO2R1c).} and allows nepotism appointments to flourish; “the cousin [pause] gives work to the other cousin” (ILP2).

This system has helped contribute to a civil service ‘that is poorly prepared, poorly trained, poorly supervised, and, consequently, of very low productivity’ (Lopez-Calix 2006 p. 49). An OEFA interviewee described the Regional Government as “completely crap” and “only an obstacle …. a stone in your [shoe]” (NSI2R1) whilst a former government civil servant described its personnel as “awful … imbeciles …. very insensitive, and very irresponsible” (IUA1). Two NGOs representatives labelled it weak (NGO7R1; NGO8R1) and lacking experience and capacity
(NGO8R1). On this latter point, one can often find that new public servants “take a year to find out what they are meant to be doing”, usually because they have been assigned a job where they lack training or professional competency (NGO2R1c; NSI2R1).

The impact of these staff changes can be extensive. The Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator (CBO4R1) noted that under the former administration of Alan Garcia, the government created a course on the transformation of social conflict, which their members studied alongside other government officials. However, under the Humula administration, these “skilled people aren’t there anymore” (ibid.), reinforcing the damage that this lack of permanent, skilled staff can have. Continuity and strong relationships cannot form. Actors like the Catholic Church and NGOs are forced “to contact them [the government] again and explain to them what we’re doing” (NGO4R1). In this light, though the 2013 Civil Service Law reform aims to create a system based upon the twin pillars of meritocracy and citizen-service approach (MESICIC 2016 p. 8), it remains to be seen whether the functioning of this system will help alleviate the impact of amiguismo.

Overall, one can see that state and lower class indigenous citizen interaction is adversely affected by wider societal influences, notably racialised class consciousness and discrimination and the lack of shared reality and understanding, all of which act as a barrier for these citizens. Discrimination and decades of mistreatment have caused indigenous mistrust of the state (CBO4R1a; NGO2R1b) and REIs (NGO1R1) which generates “resentment” and “[p]sychological bitterness” (CBO1R1), an issue not helped by the cultural distrust which their communities are built upon (CBO4R3).156 This can make dialogue all the more difficult, especially as “for them [there] is only one government” (NSI2R1) which can hinder the help given by certain state organisations.157 There have been efforts by the Peruvian government to improve its understanding of indigenous culture through a national intercultural department and a regional institution (the subgerencia de indigenas) (RGR4; see also Duenas 2015 p. 21; Peru Ministerio de Cultura no date a) and are hence “trying more and more to take intercultural issues into consideration” (NGO5R1).

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156 As a Catholic Church priest who has worked extensively in the selva with Río Marañón communities noted, “[d]istrust is the basic element of union in a group to build a community. Not like we think in Europe, where trust is what generates community, here … it is the opposite …. Distrust, gossip, witchcraft, everything” (CBO4R3).
157 The OEFA interviewee recounted a visit their agency made to a Río Marañón pueblo where an indigenous leader lambasted them for issues caused by another government department (NSI2R1).
However, the latter’s highly bureaucratic and advisory capacity (RGR4) suggest that the state is not open towards ideas that hinder the SHDV or more open engagement with indigenous people to improve the PEV environment for citizens. Consequently, the country’s ongoing low Transparency International Index rankings (Transparency International no date) reflect a society ‘hav[ing] little confidence that they have fair and effective governmental institutions’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47) or an environment that serves all of Peruvian society.

5.3 Conclusion

The preceding sections have outlined the impact that the national political – state environment and the mechanisms and social influences within Peruvian society have on Loreton stakeholders’ PEV. The state’s pursuit of the SHDV fundamentally alters Peru’s weak democracy and civil liberties, which subsequently impacts upon the freedom of voice afforded to stakeholders. Hydrocarbon dialogue mechanisms are limited and brief tokenism (Arnstein 1969) formalities which fail to provide citizens with the necessary information and, more importantly, gain their consent over development projects. This is linked to a wider state effort to tarnish, delegitimise and suppress the voices of actors that pose a threat to the SHDV, evident, in its most extreme form, in the high number of Peruvian environmental and human rights defender deaths.

Tied to this are the impacts stemming from social influences and mechanisms within Peruvian society. Peru’s racialised class consciousness continues to shape Peruvian development thinking by reinforcing the idea that the country remains handicapped by its indigenous peoples. Therefore, selva hydrocarbon voice mechanisms are not only limited because of the state’s wish to achieve extensive Amazonian (hydrocarbon) development but also because the affected citizens are natives whose views can be disregarded as those of culturally inferior, ignorant people. This racialised class consciousness exacerbates an urban socio-cultural divorce from indigenous people, strengthening the discriminatory stereotypes of the “other” and negatively impacting upon interaction between Peruvian professionals and indigenous and mestizo rural citizens. At the same time, the bureaucratic and formalised nature of state dialogue and amiguismo reinforce the accessibility barriers which rural indigenous and mestizo citizens can face in voicing to the government.
This overview chapter has provided an introduction into Chapter 6, which takes a more detailed investigative journey into state access and engagement for citizens, centred predominantly on Barrio Florido and Cuninico and collective voice-based organisations. Through this, one can see many of the themes and issues set out in this chapter and understand the difficulties that these stakeholders have in using their voice and accessing the government to report environmental pollution incidents by Petroperu.
Chapter 6 PEV in the Loreton physical and emotive world: The feasibility of Loreton stakeholder engagement with the government

As Chapter Five showed, the freedom of voice for stakeholders surrounding hydrocarbon and development processes is restricted, intolerant and suppressive. At the same time, the mechanisms and social influences within Peruvian society (discrimination, bureaucracy and amiguismo) can serve as barriers to access and dialogue between the state and its citizens. This Chapter will explore these findings further through a contextually specific focus on Loreto and the feasibility of stakeholder engagement with the government which has been split into three over-arching sections.

Section 6.1 details the state’s presence, engagement and relationships with Barrio Florido and Cuninico. It begins with an examination of the state’s physical presence in Loreto before focusing on the situation in the two communities and the causes of the chronic lack of development. This feeds into four sub-sections which explore various impacts on the PEV environment of Loreton citizens. Section 6.1.1 evaluates selva civil society development for Barrio Florido and Cuninico, the political response to public requests for development and the repercussions of the poor public transport network for selva communities. Section 6.1.2 examines politicians’ engagement with selva-based pueblos and Section 6.1.3 documents two overarching impacts that result from the circumstances set out in the previous two sections. Altogether, they help frame state access, dialogue and voice actions for both communities for contamination events described in Section 6.1.4.

Section 6.2 investigates collective voice-based access and relationships with the state centred on two points; the SHDV will impede access to some but not all government actors and secondly, their access and relationship can also be dependent on the skills and expertise of collective voice based groups which the state may require. Lastly, Section 6.3 draws together the various points to provide an overview of the key findings for stakeholders PEV environment relating to the state.
6.1 State presence, engagement and relationship with Barrio Florido and Cuninico

“But they [the government] don’t want a dialogue with the people here, not ever” (IRC7).

During discussions with interviewees about state presence in Loreto, a key word utilised was “centralisation” (CBO1R1; IUA3 NGO2R1b), focused predominantly on Iquitos but also other bigger towns where subgerencia [local government] offices for the Provincial and District capitals are based (NGO2R1b; NSI7R1). However, as one moves further away from Iquitos (NGO3R1) and other urban focal points, state presence in Loreto’s smaller towns and villages (numbering over 2,000 along the Amazon and its tributaries) (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 180) is described as “invisible” (IJ1; NGO1R1), “absent” (CBO4R3; NSI4R1; RGR3), “inaccessible” (NSI4R1) and “almost negligible” (NGO2R1b), especially surrounding education, health, legal services and other infrastructure (CBO4R3; IJ1; NGO2R1b; NGO6R1; NSI4R1; NSI5R1; RGR1).

Importantly, this is also apparent within crucial state selva dialogue mechanisms; the DDP spokesperson (NSI4R1) noted that their government agency (working in Loreto since 1999) was unable to participate in all consulta previa meetings because “there’s reduced staff” with only “seven [lawyers] for the whole region [which] is quite limited.” Just as significantly, they recounted that MINEM’s Loreto office for social issues which is charged with ensuring productive working relationships between companies and communities “only has one person …. [who] cannot deal with all this work” (NSI4R1). Thus, “[t]he people here would say the state doesn’t reach …. In Spanish, they’d say “el estado no lo alcanza” it doesn’t reach those places” (NGO2R1b). Both case-study communities highlight this situation.

In Cuninico, “[t]his community is in extreme poverty like you both see” (IRC20). A single-roomed primary school is centrally situated next to a communal field, whilst unconnected electrical pylon posts and street lights (Photograph 6.1) run alongside a small cement pathway (Photograph 6.2) past the moloqua (community hall) (Photograph 6.3). The community initially had a

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158 On health-care issues see Brierley et al. (2014). In relation to legal services, the PPEDC interviewee noted that in 2011, only one anti-corruption public prosecutor was in Loreto (based in Iquitos) to process cases for the entire Region and though things have improved (there are now four lawyers and two assistants) (NSI5R1) the staffing levels are hopelessly inadequate to deal with the volume of cases. Equally, ANA and OEFA representatives confirmed that their office staff were only located in Iquitos (NSI1R1; NSI2R1).
communal generator to provide electricity (IRC29) but this was broken by Petroperu (IRC23; IRC29) after their arrival in the pueblo for the 2014 pollution event.\footnote{See Chapter 7, Section 7.2.} Some families do have their own generators, which they use sparingly due to their difficult and costly access for fuel (IRC28; IRC29) but overall, the majority of resident’s lack electricity (IRC14; IRC15).\footnote{I counted three generators used by families.} Cuninico doesn’t have a medical facility (IRC12; IRC14; IRC15; IRC17; IRC20; IRC24) which forces residents to travel upriver to Maypuco (Urarinas District capital, Loreto Province) on a 45-minute riverboat journey (IRC14). Finally, there is no secondary school (IRC7) or access to clean water or basic sanitary systems and only one public satellite telephone for communication (IRC1) though other residents do have their own telephones (IRC13).

Photograph 6.1: Electric lights line the main street in Cuninico. This view is taken from the moloqua looking out onto the central public space during the annual Rio Marañón flooding.\footnote{For Chapter 6 photograph sources see Footnote 3.}
Photograph 6.2: View of the main street in Cunico, where the flooded small cement pathway is visible.

Photograph 6.3: Cunico’s moloqua taken from a resident’s canoe.

Similarly, in Barrio Florido, a 30-year-old school building (MRBF1; MRBF15), sinking into the ground and in need of repair (MRBF1; MRBF15; MRBF21; MRBF22) (Photograph 6.4)
was nearby a small medical \textit{posta} (post), open sporadically (MRBF13)\textsuperscript{162} and lacking the necessary medicines (MRBF22). This was adjacent to a cement single-track road (Photograph 6.5) which ran towards a small dock and public field which floods during the seasonal Amazon flooding (Photograph 6.6).

A low bridge connecting two parts of the \textit{pueblo} had been built by community residents (MRBF5) and improved by \textit{El Fondo de Cooperación para el Desarrollo Social} (The Co-operation Fund for Social Development, FONCODES) (MRBF3) but was now in a state of disrepair (Photograph 6.7). A water tower had also been built by FONCODES (MRBF15) but this provides insufficient capacity for the \textit{pueblo} and is only accessible to citizens who can afford to pay for the water (MRBF6; MRBF30).\textsuperscript{163} This situation forces others to drink water from a pond (MRBF13). Meanwhile, electrical meters, now broken, had been installed by the former GOREL administration (ICW1; MRBF1; MRBF4) next to each house along with the provision of tin roofs for some (MRBF24) but not all residents (MRBF27). Whilst Barrio Florido has electricity, it is supplied by the refinery, not the state.\textsuperscript{164} Overall, the state development in a \textit{pueblo} where “there is nothing new” (MRBF19) can be summarised by MRBF15; “como un cero a la izquierda” (we are a waste of space, here there is nothing).

\textsuperscript{162} Over several visits, I never saw the medical centre open.
\textsuperscript{163} The water is provided by Petroperu roughly every week and collected by residents by canoe from the refinery (MRBF25; MRBF27; MRBF30). The water tower is administered by the local municipal agent (MRBF2) who sells water for 20 cents per bucket (MRBF6). When this water runs out, it is filled with pond water (MRBF11).
\textsuperscript{164} The “[e]lectricity is not free. We pay” (MBF18) through the cultivation (maintenance) of the pipeline which “they convert into consumption” (MRBF2). A minimal monthly monetary sum is also paid (13 or 18 \textit{soles}) depending on each houses’ appliances and is provided from 6am until 1.30pm on weekdays and from 8am to 4pm at weekends and if someone in the \textit{pueblo} dies (MRBF6; see also Chapter 7 Section 7.3, Footnote 205).
Photograph 6.4: Barrio Florido’s school building.

Photograph 6.5: Barrio Florido’s single-track cement road wide enough for a *motocaro*.
Photograph 6.6: One of two Barrio Florido public spaces. This one, visible when the Amazon water had subsided is adjacent to the community *moloqua* and the launch-point for boats.

Photograph 6.7: Barrio Florido’s bridge taken from the small hill at the top of the *pueblo*.

From these conditions, one can see that government support and development of *selva* communities extends only to the provision of “token gestures that don’t really affect the way the whole economy operates in Loreto” (NGO1R1) and do “nothing to improve the situation of
people’s lives” (CBO4R3). The Alianza Arkana representative felt this situation was caused by a “lack of political will” (NGO7R1). However, it is perhaps more pertinent to suggest a misplaced political will.

As Chapter Five, Section 5.1 described, Peru’s political elites are focused on the SHDV. Whilst this might appear to offer positive developments for a forgotten region of Peru (NGO3R1; RGR3), Loreto’s people are not part of this vision (NGO2R1c), as is evident from the lack of interest in human capital investment (RGR2). This is an indicator of the lack of priority and care afforded to indigenous peoples (CBO4R3) and wider civil society, reflecting the impact of corruption (NSI7R1) and influence of racialised class consciousness and discrimination. As a lawyer in Iquitos reflected, “the state … plays a very important role in the defence of their [indigenous peoples] lands [pause] [but] they haven’t done it with the due respect when they … exploit[ed] their lands [for] hydrocarbon” (ILP2). At the same time, there is also “political disinterest … [in] ensuring that the indigenous communities in the [selva] are [pause] in a good state … and maintaining their quality of life” (IUS2 my emphasis). Taken together, racialised class consciousness, societal discrimination and political disinterest shape the PEV environment of Loreto citizens and their ability to voice to the state in several important ways.

6.1.1 Selva civil society development

“This village has no resources” (MRBF2).

To begin with, as testimonies in Barrio Florido and Cuninico indicate, these factors help to explain the “selva civil development vacuum” (SCDV). Cuninico residents have struggled to improve the pueblo because “in the past, nobody has listened to us” (IRC7). “[W]henever we ask for something, suddenly the mayor isn’t available” (IRC7) with it “taken as a joke” when they ask the local government for support (IRC11). “That’s why we’re here, in this state of abandonment” (IRC7). Inhabitants for example were still awaiting the installation of clean water after a meeting with the municipal government (IRC7 in IRC26-29 interview; IRC29). Consequently, in Cuninico one finds that “pretty much everything” had been built by the Catholic Church (CBO4R3) and local people, with only limited state assistance.
Likewise, in Barrio Florido, inhabitants were dismissive of state assistance and development with municipal (MRBF6) and regional government (MRBF24) providing no support. “In the ten years that I’ve been living here I haven’t seen improvement” (MRBF26) or “any benefits from the government” (MRBF1). “They [only] help you with the bare minimum” (MRBF26) such as the annual flooding event which sees the Instituto Nacional de Defensa Civil (The National Institute of Civil Defence, INDECI) supply tents (MRBF13; MRBF15; MRBF24) and small packets of rice to those affected (MRBF21), while the local government provide wooden planks to use as duckboards (MRBF11; MRBF16; see Photograph 6.8). “[M]eaningful donations from the regional government” during the annual flood haven’t been seen by residents (MRBF13).

Photograph 6.8: Duckboards enable the community to move around during the annual flooding.

Politicians “never pay attention to the community’s needs” (ILP1) and this political disinterest is apparent from interviews. Barrio Florido holds two assembly meetings each month to discuss what they need and write documents to the government requesting support (MRBF15).
Projects requested include the building of a pavement and football field (MRBF14), construction materials for a tourism viewpoint (MRBF2) and a bridge (MRBF11; MRBF26) and the fixing of the school classroom (MRBF12; MRBF30). These plans have been denied (MRBF14) or so far come to nothing (MRBF7; MRBF11; MRBF21) with the local mayor “talk[ing] a lot and offer[ing] empty promises” (MRBF30). Bureaucracy has also been a useful tool for the government to frustrate Barrio Florido citizens’ dialogue. A male retiree recounted how the community had requested support after the 2015 flooding by presenting a document but were told “no, come tomorrow, come the day after tomorrow .... Just like that” (MRBF11), which is a major problem for citizens who lack money to leave the pueblo (MRBF8; MRBF14). The result is that it often takes several years “to hear back from the government” (MRBF15), especially as these written documents can easily and deliberately be lost by politicians (NGO2R1c). In terms of the school classroom, “[w]e are still waiting .... And our children are studying there, taking the risk of using that classroom which can fall anytime” (MRBF12).

When one considers the above narrative within the PEV theoretical framework, a direct result of this SCDV is the repercussions that this has on selva citizens’ ability to access the state from a technological and transport-based approach. These pueblos have limited or non-existent access to basic services like electricity and IT, including PCs, printers and the internet. This is “a major barrier to the folk in the rainforest being able to have their voices … heard” (NGO2R1c) as it restricts their access to online government systems of accountability i.e. orthodox voice. Given the nature of this study, this discovery is of vital importance.

From an environmental perspective, OEFA have a service called Servicio de Información Nacional de Denuncias Ambientales (The National Information System on Environmental Complaints, SINADA) which ‘allows citizens that become aware of any environmental damage, to report and alert the Government, be it in person, via the internet or by post’ (OEFA no date c). SINADA has undoubtedly improved citizen access to voice vis-à-vis environmental problems especially for those living in Iquitos but for selva-based citizens this is not the case and whilst there is an opportunity to make a formal report in person at OEFA’s Iquitos office, the limited nature of public transport and citizen poverty makes this difficult.
Economic liberalisation in the 1990s led to the deregulation of public transport and a significant surge in imported motorised vehicles, which together ‘contributed to a rapid increase in informal taxis, minibuses, and moto-taxis’ (Independent Evaluation Group 2015 p. 1). Iquitos has several small privately-run bus operators that provide cheap but limited transport around the city and between it and the port city of Nauta along Loreto’s only major road. A similar non-public transport system operates on the Rio Amazon and its major waterways (Corrientes, Marañón, Tigre and Ucayali) using three general types of vessel.\textsuperscript{165} However, as E-Tech international reported, “mobility [remains] a huge issue in the area” (NGO1R1) and other rural regions (International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) 2013 p. 2) and is one of the reasons “why the indigenous people are greatly abandoned” (ILP2). A GOREL Manger of Health and Environment jokingly stated that if selva communities want to come to Iquitos “they use the boats of the [oil] compan[ies]” (RGR1), a situation which also occurs for state representatives (CBO4R3) who can also be forced to rely on NGO logistical support (NGO4R2b; NGO6R1).

Photograph 6.9: A fishing canoe.

\textsuperscript{165} The first are canoes, usually family owned and fitted with an outboard engine for short journeys (Photograph 6.9). \textit{Botes fluvial (botes)} are also used for local travel and on waterways that are too shallow for larger ships. They have a cargo capacity of less than 100 tons and can accommodate roughly 50 passengers (Vuori 2009 p. 30) (Photograph 6.10). \textit{Motonaves}, also known as \textit{lanchas}, are larger, slow, cargo and passenger-carrying ferries with a capacity of 100 tons or more of cargo and roughly 100 passengers and are used on the Amazon and its major tributaries like the Marañón. Finally, \textit{delizadores} or \textit{rápido} are fitted with powerful engines and provide faster but more expensive passenger transport along the Amazon (ibid.).
Even with the limited nature of transport, the poverty of both *pueblos* citizens means that transport costs are “very expensive” (IRC3) which acts as a further barrier to state access, even to state-run *selva* meetings (NSI1R1a)/166 Appendix 3a/b details Barrio Florido and Cunicino residents’ employment statistics. In Barrio Florido, 29 of the 30 interviewed citizens provided employment details. The largest employment category was Band 3 employment (low skilled) (six) followed by Band 1 (manager/professional) (three) and Band 2 (technical/associate and clerical support) and Band 4 (elementary) (two each). 16 residents were in Band 5 unpaid positions (11 housewives, three retirees, one student and one unemployed person). One can see that the clear majority of families were reliant on a single source of predominantly male income.

At a national level, the Peruvian average monthly income for most residents below Band 1 is low. For Band 3 low skilled employment (e.g. MRBF1 is an iron monger), monthly salaries are around 1,350 *soles* (Trading Economics no date a), just over £311 in July 2016 currency conversion, whilst Band 4 elementary occupations (e.g. MRBF16 is an unskilled labourer in the

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166 The ANA official found that community attendance at *selva* located meetings “is limited because they do not have petrol” and rely on support from their respective federations (NSI1R1a).
Petroperu refinery), have an income of 750 soles, Peru’s minimum wage (Trading Economic no date b), just under £173 in July 2016 conversion. However, one must factor in Loreto’s rural location, where family income per capita is 500 soles per month (Clancy and Kerremans no date p. 13) and the 2010 poverty rate was 49.1 per cent (USAID/Peru 2012 p. 5). For residents working within the informal economy (MRBF7; MRBF12; MRBF14), they will ‘earn approximately 40 [per cent] less than urban formal sector workers’ (Inter-American Development Bank 1999 p. 34). Further proof of their poverty was seen in the makeshift homes put together with wooden plank walls and tin roofs whilst sparse interiors housed hammocks and the occasional piece of furniture (Photograph 6.11).

Photograph 6.11: A typical Barrio Florido dwelling.

In Cuninico, 27 of the 29 interviews had employment data taken. The largest employment category was again Band 3 (five) followed by Band 1 (three), Band 4 (two) and Band 2 (one). 16 residents were categorised as Band 5 with 14 of these acting as houseparents (one other studied and one was unemployed). Their main method of employment was as subsistence farmers, fishers, hunters and gathers (Band 3) with their cocha (smallholding or small farm) (CBO4R1a) farming probably occurring on a small-scale of five hectares or less (Hotz and Guarín 2014 p. 4). “Here people don’t get paid from the state. It’s from their own means” by “liv[ing] from their animals”
(IRC28) and leading “a very quiet life” (IRC13). The specific income level was not requested but can be accurately gauged from other research; of the 179 adult inhabitants in ten remote *pueblos* who participated in 2014 research, ‘87.7 [per cent] (N=157) reported earning [less than] 1 US$ per day’ (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 181) and one can suggest a similar figure here.

Their extreme poverty is visible in their homes, which, like Barrio Florido, are again improvised with timbers and tarpaulin for the walls and corrugated tin and straw-based roofs (Photographs 6.2 and 6.12). Many residents cooked over open fires and have little in the way of furniture or other possessions. However, from what was observed, a small number of households did own a satellite television set, possibly bought (though unverified) through their employment in paid remediation work outlined in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.

Prior to the 2014 oil spill, citizens would grow bananas, *yucca* and corn (IRC7) in their *cocha* and fish for their daily consumption, the latter sold to residents (IRC13) or in urban market centres in Iquitos, Nauta and Yurimaguas (CBO4R1a). However, the oil spill has irrevocably “changed … our life cost” (IRC13) and subsistence livelihoods. Fishing from “the gorge [*Rio Cuninico*] … was the source of our life” (IRC13) but the loss of fish from this area (ibid.) forces fishermen to “go out and look for other fishes … to have something to eat” (IRC19), often leaving at 3am to travel three hours up-river away from the pollution to fishing sites (researchers notes). While the fish caught at these locations were clean, they are nomadic and “don’t stay” (IRC13).

Moreover, the spill had, in my translator’s words, created “a bad image of the community” (Interpreter in IRC23 interview) for people outside of their locality and this had a huge impact on their subsistence livelihoods and income. Selling the fish to get other food to eat (IRC7) and a small income could no longer occur (IRC2; IRC3; IRC4; IRC13; IRC23). One elderly housewife, for example, recounted that buyers in Yurimaguas, upon learning that the fish were from Cuninico, stated that it was “not worth anything” (IRC23). Thus, one can understand the fear felt by another housewife who told a Petroperu engineer that “we live for our jobs. You will hurt our wealth. In the first place, we get our money from fish. If they take away the fish, we’ll have no money. Where will we get the money or the food from?” (IRC29). How will we “meet the needs of our kids?” (IRC2).
Given this economic situation, it is unsurprising to find citizens from both communities unable to afford travel costs. For example, in Cuninico, whilst

a few people who have business go there [to Iquitos] once a month …. mostly, because of the cost of the journey [a single one-way journey costs 45 soles by lancha or 90 soles by rápido], they send their produce by boat and don’t travel with it, and then their money gets sent back to them. People travel very rarely, because of the cost of the journey …. and then extra costs here and there (IRC3).

In Barrio Florido, where transport costs to Iquitos are markedly cheaper (six soles each way), citizens rely on their “internally elected volunteer authorities” (IEVAs) (discussed shortly) to deliver the pueblo’s written development project requests to the government (MRBF24) and even then, the volunteer officials must borrow money to travel (MRBF6). Consequently, one finds that in a general sense, “the people in the jungle haven’t got the money to get down here [to Iquitos]” (NGO2R1b).

“Why isn’t there … [an affordable] public transport system in the Amazon? A state-run public transport system that allows people” greater access and mobility. “It’s like the key problem”
(IJ1). This question posed by a journalist was answered by other citizens who broadly shared a similar conclusion. A retired Cuninico lady with children in Lima felt that the poor selva transport links allowed “[t]he state [to take] advantage that there is no means of communication” in comparison to those living in more accessible regions, like the sierra, where they get the trucks. They all reach the congress. They just park in parque universitarios [a park centrally located in Lima] and stay there …. From la sierra … because of the mines. They travel three-four times. They protest and they reach the congress and they are heard but from here there are no means of transport (IRC28).

Six interviewees whose professional employment (government, academic and NGO) was linked to the selva, suggested that access is difficult for the government and citizens due to the geographical distance, travel costs and poor logistical capabilities (IUA1; IUA2; IUA3; NGO6R1; RGR1; RGR2) which limits state engagement with selva communities (IUA3; RGR1; RGR2). However, the Red Ambiental interviewee (CBO1R1) and judge in the Superior Courts of Justice (Judicial District of Loreto) (NSI7R1) disputed this. CBO1R1 believed that a “justification” on the part of the government for their engagement with communities is that “there’s difficult access and everything else. But given the time that the petrol companies have been in Loreto … one would have thought regional or national government[s] would have done something about making it [i.e. accessibility] easier” (ibid.). The interviewed judge ties this back to the interlinked impact of political disinterest and racialised class and discrimination:

[T]he issue regarding communication with the communities is political will …. When someone wants to go somewhere, they go either by air or using the river …. Yes, the area is large [and the] … region is rather difficult for the indigenous and for us [legal representatives], but not for the state or companies that have a lot of resources and can do it …. The problem is that there has always been asked “who is there?” A small group of indigenous, so they don’t care …. So, the issue … is the lack of will to respect as part of the state policy (NSI7R1).

6.1.2 Politicians engagement with selva-based pueblos

This lack of public transport and unaffordable transport costs for citizens with low incomes and subsistence livelihoods mean that their interaction with state officials is entirely in the hands of state representatives to reach these communities. However, testimonies from Barrio Florido
(MRBF4; MRBF5; MRBF7; MRBF12; MRBF14; MRBF15; MRBF16; MRBF19; MRBF20; MRBF21; MRBF23; MRBF24; MRBF27; MRBF29) and Cuninico (FIRC1; IRC1; IRC3; IRC5; IRC7; IRC8; IRC11; IRC12; IRC13; IRC18; IRC19; IRC20; IRC21; IRC25; IRC27; IRCP3) indicate highly sporadic, often, non-existent communication with the various levels of government (local, regional and national). “The government doesn’t come”, stated one female middle-aged Barrio Florido resident (MRBF7), even after 2014 GOREL elections (MRBF12). “They don’t remember us” said a young male student in Cuninico (IRC25). GOREL “never comes here” (IRC5), not even sending a representative (IRC18; IRC19). As IRC11 concluded; “I am 66 years of age and I’ve never seen anyone”.

Political disinterest extends historically not only to other selva pueblos167 but is also evident in the state’s choice of location for consultation meetings. For example, EIA Public Hearings and Informative Workshops and Prior Consultation meetings will only happen in cities like Nauta and San Lorenzo, “when they want to be politically correct” (NGO3R1), but usually taking place in Iquitos and Lima (NGO1R1; NGO3R1; NSI4R1; RGR2; RGR4) for only a day (CBO1R1). These issues and the fact that only the community leader(s) are present means that knowledge of this mechanism is poor (RGR4) and wider community participation doesn’t occur (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1). This problem can be traced back to:

the embedding of inequalities over time which can make the problem almost imperceptible: Given the history of centralisation on Lima, it seemed ‘natural’ to hold public hearings [there] …. Yet this was to ignore the real costs and resulting lack of voice suffered by indigenous populations because of transport costs, opportunity costs and lack of information (Thorp and Paredes 2010 pp. 175-176).

For selva asambleas that do occur, state mechanisms like the Council of Ministers and politicians “are usually missing in action” (NGO1R1). For instance, The Peru Mission interviewee observed one EIA meeting held by Palmas del Espino in Maniti (Indiana District, Loreto Province) roughly five hours along the Rio Amazon where “there were no government authorities present”

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167 A missionary father working with indigenous communities in the Trompeteros District (Loreto Province) said that in two years of work there “I haven’t see any of the governmental entities” (NCSSC2). From a historical angle, a truck and plant driver for Occidental Petroleum stated that during his entire selva oilfield employment (1981-1991), “I never saw an official government inspection or any proactivity from any official about the whole oil process or its impact on the local communities” (FOPOW3).
(NGO2R1c), evidence of the impact that GOREL staff shortages play in preventing its presence at all selva dialogue mechanisms (NSI4R1).

However, a significant caveat is visible to the limited selva dialogue that does occur. Barrio Florido residents had slightly less intermittent interaction with government representatives, who would sometimes be “present” (MRBF3), often for celebratory events like Mothers Day (MRBF11; MRBF24) or when campaigning for approaching elections (MRBF1; MRBF4; MRBF6; MRBF9; MRBF14; MRBF15; MRBF16; MRBF17; MRBF18; MRBF19; MRBF22; MRBF23; MRBF24; MRBF25; MRBF26; MRBF27; MRBF29). In Cuninico, whilst no residents mentioned state representatives visiting on celebratory days, they would also sometimes see candidates campaigning for forthcoming elections (IRC8; IRC11; IRC15; IRCP3) or have the local government representative (the mayor) stop by (IRC1; IRC5; IRC22), often only once per year (IRC5). “[U]sually [though] you don’t see anybody” (IRCP3 in IRC2 interview).

Consequently, whilst politicians are disinterested in the plight of selva communities, sporadic communication appears to occur only when it serves their electoral ambitions (ILP1; NSI2R1). Residents in both communities certainly thought this was the case. In Barrio Florido, “when they’re on a campaign they come for our votes, but after winning they’re not interested anymore” (MRBF4). “Little or nothing [do] they care” visiting “usually when they need votes” (MRBF14). “When they come, they sit on that couch and they do nothing, but when it’s about getting votes .... madam a signature for this petition” (MRBF21) and “never honour[ing] their promises” (MRBF15). Inhabitants had been promised playing fields and a park by politicians (MRBF23), a store (MRBF25), the fixing of the bridge, road and water tank (MRBF24) but nothing has transpired (MRBF23; MRBF24), an issue MRBF26 felt was caused by their focus on personal greed (MRBF26) rather than a sincere wish to help the populace. Equally, in Cuninico, a man recounted how politicians visit for elections “[b]ut after that, they disappear” (IRC15). IRC22 noted that her husband would “go to the sessions and listen” to the mayor promise things. ““Let’s go make your medical centre, give you your water”” and a “school” (ibid.), none of which materialised.

168 See Section 6.1.
Further evidence of politically self-serving dialogue can be seen if one factors in the vastly different geographical locations of both *pueblos*. Barrio Florido is “not … far away from Iquitos” (MRBF13) (roughly 12 kilometres). In comparison, Cuninico, situated in a “rural” (IRCP3 in IRC2 interview) “[i]solated” (IRC16; IRC17) position “right at the edge of the country” (IRC6), is 45-minute boat journey away from Maypuco, their closest point of state contact (IRC14). This situation is, of course, not unique to the Peruvian *selva* and can be seen in other EMaDEs (see Inderst and Stewart 2014). However, combined with politicians’ inconsistent and self-serving dialogue, the SCDV and citizens’ economic poverty, the PEV environment for these communities to formally voice becomes ever more restrictive.

One would expect Barrio Florido’s closer proximity to Iquitos to have led to a noticeably improved level of state representative interaction in comparison to Cuninico but this is not the case. For Cuninico, they have almost complete state detachment, particularly from GOREL and their geographical distance cannot serve as an excuse. A retired Cuninico lady argued that they were located “very close to Iquitos” with it “just an overnight journey to [the city] from here” (IRC7). Transportion, though limited, does exist, and for Cuninico requires a far shorter journey than other more remote Loreton areas.¹⁶⁹ This suggests that politicians *could* reach these communities but appear to only do so when it serves their own electoral interests.

### 6.1.3 Overarching impacts of this situation

Overall, the combination of political disinterest and discrimination help explain the SCDV and high levels of political detachment between the state and *selva* communities. These issues result in two overarching impacts for *selva* citizens and communities.

First, trust in the government for citizens was absent. People in Barrio Florido felt that the government wasn’t on their side (MRBF16). “No, not me, not me, I always depend on myself and have no hope on them” (MRBF15). “They don’t do anything for us” (MRBF20) and instead “does

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¹⁶⁹ For instance, on a *lancha*, the journey between Nauta and Cuninico would take 24 hours whilst on a *rápido* the journey would take 12 hours. In comparison, the missionary father’s journey to Trompeteros required a three-and-a-half-day *lancha* journey or a 15-hour *rápido* journey (NCSSC2).
things to deceive us” (MRBF7) and “tell lies” (MRBF11). Political apathy was present. “I voted clean [blank] [pause]. What’s it worth to vote for the right person if they offer [things] and never come” (MRBF24). In Cuninico, inhabitants described a feeling of abandonment by the government (IRC6; IRC7), and sense of being forgotten (IRCP3; IRC6) by the “liars” (IRC3) and Regional President “rat” (IRC9). “[T]hey [GOREL] never follow through with anything they say, so we don’t believe that it’s going to get better” (IRC5).

Understandably, it confirmed for many inhabitants the influence of discrimination which is preventing consistent dialogue. Upon being asked why GOREL doesn’t visit Cuninico, a farmer felt that “it’s because it’s not important to them. They’re over there … in power” (IRC6). Another Cocama thought it was “[b]ecause … well, they’ve forgotten us, they don’t value us, they see us like wild, irrational animals … like dogs or something” (IRC1) despite having enough money “to go where they want” (IRC5). Other residents felt that “we are outsiders to them …. so they don’t have to look after us” (IRC4) and as “[t]hey [indigenous people] don’t know anything, there’s no need to help [them]” (IRC6). This mistrust will inevitably affect the willingness of these communities to voice to the state with any real conviction and may see citizens seek out alternative voice actions.

Secondly, according to some informants, these communities “don’t really live within the legal framework of modern society” (NGO3R1). In Barrio Florido for instance, the pueblo “work for themselves” (MRBF18) by being “self-sufficient” (MRBF6). Research by Azarya and Chazan (1987) show how state disengagement by citizens (e.g. through the absence of accessible government mechanisms (see Chapter 2, Section 2.7)) leads to the creation of parallel systems which include examples such as ‘black markets, smuggling, corruption, and the use of alternative methods of justice’ (p. 121) or equally systems of governance. In both communities, local informal systems of governance (IEVAs) operate that are not part of the government system and help to fill the state SCDV and poor engagement. In Cuninico, an Apu and deputy administer justice, with the former acting as the pueblo’s representative in indigenous federation meetings and other functions. Likewise, in Barrio Florido, three IEVAs known as the Agent, Judge and Teniente (Lieutenant) run the pueblo (MRBF6; MRBF11). They are unpaid by the state and rely on tips from the village (MRBF6) with the Teniente and Agent elected on an annual basis via an asamblea (MRBF6;
Residents rely on these IEVAs to hand-out items and materials donated by people (MRBF11), monitor the provision of water from the water tank (MRBF6) and, crucially, represent the pueblo in dialogue with the refinery discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.3.

Despite establishing their own informal governance structures to replicate the state, these do not improve citizen access to the formal state. Moreover, combined with the absence of state engagement, this situation makes it far harder for citizens to be able to access state channels of dialogue through which to utilise orthodox formal voice, a situation feeding into citizen mistrust and confirming for some the issue of discrimination. Significantly, as the next section explores, these issues have a major impact on Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s ability to accessibly voice to the government and the actions they choose to take when affected by oil contamination. What is more, the government response, and dialogue with both communities appears to reinforce the disinterest, discrimination and detachment that politicians have for selva-based communities.

6.1.4 Barrio Florido and Cuninico state access, dialogue and voice actions for contamination events

“[I]t [GOREL] talks about helping us, but it’s all a lie, this is the truth, the reality. Anybody that comes, they’ll see, this is the reality of it” (IRC7).

In Barrio Florido, their choice of actions in the face of contamination events reinforces the impact that state disengagement and citizen mistrust of the government has had. After residents noticed the contamination in 2009, two residents chose to ring the radio (MRBF13) which led to various stations, “Radio Loreto, Radio La Caribena …. [and] Radio Arpegio” arriving half an hour later (MRBF13), followed by TV channels, “América Televisión” (MRBF12), “Panamericana [Televisión and] Frecuencia Latina” to report about the contamination (MRBF13).

Though not directly suggested by one of the interviewees who phoned the radio, doing so was influenced by their knowledge of other hydrocarbon-related voice events in Saramuro and Trompeteros.

So we ... in a very ignorant way … went there [to the refinery] and thought that we could take advantage because we were listening to Saramuro or Trompeteros, there is Pluspetrol
and … whatever that community asks for, they just give it to them, and we thought that here it would be the same … (MRBF13).

As another male inhabitant explained, for the government to “listen to you [pause] you have to … make a racket …. in the news, you see Huancayo, in those places where they close roads and that’s how the government listens to you” (IRC14). The radio became their attempt at making a racket.

As for the government, they were contacted almost as an afterthought (MRBF12). There are several reasons for this. First, a housewife touched upon a fear which has infected residents. “[M]any of the inhabitants are afraid, they are afraid to talk …. [and express] themselves” a situation born out of their fear “that their words will be rejected” and they will not be listened to (MRBF13), a statement seemingly confirming the impact that political disengagement and disinterest has had on local citizens who clearly feel scared about voicing and mistrustful of the state.

Second, this fear of voicing and government disinterest could have conceivably pushed citizens to contact a mechanism they could easily access, and this is partly due to the issue of state bureaucracy. One resident stated that they didn’t initially alert the government because the process was “too slow” (MRBF25). The government “sometimes … give you appointments … and all that” (MRBF25) a procedure that hadn’t yielded positive results for Barrio Florido. A quicker, more immediate voice action was necessary and the radio became that unorthodox informal voice response.

Third, citizens’ poverty prevented them from reaching the government and would have helped precipitate remotely calling the radio. As MRBF27 noted “[w]e work as merchants, [if] something happens … how are we going to go protest [to the government?] Where would we get [the money from unworked hours] from?” Equally, contacting the refinery, discussed in Chapter 7, Section 7.2 was chosen because “at times there is no money to go somewhere else” (MRBF14). Finally, the absence of IT technology prevented citizens from being able to access OEFA’s online complaints system.

170 IRC14 is referring to events in the Junin Region and the La Oraya smelter where a miner’s strike had blocked off the Carretera Central Highway (see Post 2015).
In the light of these actions, civil service departments, including DDP, MINAM, and OSINERGMIN, arrived to discuss the pollution but it would seem the inhabitants failed to find a sympathetic ear for the situation. Barrio Florido citizens on a tour of the contaminated area accompanied by these (and Petroperu) representatives “talked [together] … and we witnessed a woman throwing her garbage into the water …. So … [we were told], “what are you asking for when you are obviously an important part of the contamination here!”” (MRBF13). This response not only fails to acknowledge the impact that missing state services such as refuse collection are having but rather unfairly attributes blame onto the local people. This lack of sympathy and scorn would have done little to improve the pueblo’s opinion of the state.

Residents recounted that water samples were taken for analysis (MRBF3; MRBF12; MRBF13) by DIGESA (Velarde 2009) and, whilst one resident was aware that results indicated a lack of contamination within the Rio Ramirez (MRBF3), intermittent state interaction undoubtedly increased inhabitants’ mistrust of the state response. For example, MRBF13 believed that DIGESA individuals “would take [samples] from a different place above the contaminated one” and “never got samples from the polluted area.”

Regardless of this reaction, the 2009 event “gave us the strength” (MRBF13) to remain vocal. Consequently, the 2011 incident saw residents again inform the radio (ibid.) and the press (MRBF6) resulting in the latter arriving to investigate (MRBF1; MRBF7; MRBF11; MRBF18). Nonetheless, this appeared to have generated scant political response despite residents being forced to consume contaminated fish and water (MRBF13). Only GOREL state representatives made an appearance (MRBF11), whilst local government representatives did not (MRBF16). One resident (MRBF12) spoke about water samples (taken by DIGESA) taken a month and a half before the interview (roughly April 2015) but no interviewees mentioned result distribution.

There also seemed to be little state interest to pursue legal justice. The DDP’s arrival saw “[t]he whole neighbourhood” go there to put pressure on them (MRBF15) about the situation. Their response was “that they needed time for the [legal] process but never have we …. gotten anything from them” (MRBF15). This was probably because there was no legal case to answer, a
conclusion which should have been passed onto the pueblo or, equally, due to apathy. Regardless, the lack of communication merely ‘reinforced popular views of the justice system as corrupt and as a tool for the powerful to preserve their privileges, rather than as a mechanism for conflict resolution or to seek redress in the face of injustice’ (Burt 2007 p. 50). As the PPEDC legal representative lamented, “you tell me, can you trust the justice system? …. I feel helpless here, there is a legal vacuum …. because there isn’t justice” (NSI5R1).\footnote{More widely, this is also due to the legal difficulties for ecological crimes (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1, Footnote 137).}

In Cuninico, testimony evidence shows that their state access was extremely restricted. Residents confirmed that they were not able to alert the government about the oil spill due to their lack of knowledge about whom to contact (IRC1; IRC15; IRC24; IRC25), a phone number to ring and their absence of IT capabilities. A female retiree admitted that whilst the community have “never really tried to … contact the government [directly]”, they themselves have “never come here” (IRC7). Unlike Barrio Florido, no radio or TV channels were alerted to the oil spill, highlighting their heightened geographical isolation and limited involvement in wider Peruvian civic society. Indeed, only their geographical proximity to Maypuco allowed the Cocama to travel there and alert local authorities to the spill (IRC13) showing that orthodox voice options were severely restricted. Moreover, it was their direct contact of Petroperu, discussed in Chapter 7, alongside the Catholic Church that helped draw the wider state’s attention rather than the local government whose institutional effectiveness in these situations has been rightly questioned (CBO1R1).

\footnote{This is assumed to be ANA.}

\footnote{This is assumed to be OEFA.}

As noted in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1, it is useful to distinguish between civil servant and politicians’ responses to the spill. In terms of the former, residents noted that the first to arrive were OEFA, who reached them ten to 15 days after the spill (roughly mid-July) (IRC3; IRC5). Other agencies arrived about 20 days after this (IRC5) and set to work taking water and soil samples and examining the tree damage over a three-day period (IRC3; IRC14)\footnote{This is assumed to be ANA.} whilst interviews were conducted with residents about the spill (IRC1).\footnote{This is assumed to be OEFA.} However, analysis of
interviews shows that the provision of information and support to Cunicino from these civil service departments was meagre.

On the one hand, there were positive aspects. In OEFA’s case they maintained monthly contact with the pueblo and were present in November (IRC19) and December 2014 (IRC3; IRC7; IRC29), and visited on three occasions (IRC7) as well as holding an unspecified number of meetings with the Apu in Iquitos (CBO4R1a). Equally, DIGESA (IRC7 in IRC25-29 interview; NSI1R1b) and ANA also held meetings, the latter’s “two or three” included allowing community leaders to observe the collection of water source samples and another held with OEFA in December 2014 for result distribution (NSI1R1b). This shows that ANA staff were proactive in their engagement with Cunicino and sought to reassure residents over the environmental impact of the spill, an important point given the cultural and spiritual significance which the rainforest has for these indigenous citizens (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1).

However, there were limitations. Despite OEFA’s swift arrival, residents insisted that its officials “told the community nothing” (IRC3) and instead “came just to investigate …. question people, conduct interviews” but have not received any follow-up results from this (IRC1). “They’ve never come here to the village to tell us. Nobody, none of those organisations, has come here” (IRC6), assertions corroborated by other citizens in relation to DIGESA, which “didn’t want to give any results” (IRC7 in IRC25-29 interview) about the water quality and contamination (IRC13; IRC18; IRC29).174 This indicates that the presentation of data results were not held with the whole pueblo (perhaps only its leaders)175 and that precise information was not offered and/or understood by the Cocama, the latter issue explored fully in Chapter 8, Section 8.3.

Meanwhile DIGESA promises in December 2014 to explore the lack of clean water had, at the time of interviews (May 2015), come to nothing (IRC29) whilst residents were still awaiting delivery of water purification kits (IRC3; NSI1R1a), thus damaging their trust in the DIGESA

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174 IRC14 went as far as to question the validity of the entire water sampling process itself.
175 There is further evidence of this. IRC18 recollects that a group of seven or eight citizens went with OEFA personnel to the oil site and were given results at the end of each month. Clearly, OEFA did not adequately ensure that these results were presented to the whole community via an asamblea which could explain some of their ignorance about data results. Equally, there was a failure by these citizens to disseminate the results to the wider community, possibly due to their inability to articulate or explain what they had been told, a factor discussed under Chapter 8, Section 8.3.
“liars” (IRC29). The level of support by regional health agencies was also poor. On 4th July 2014, representatives from GOREL’s DIRESA visited Cuninico to provide them with chlorine tablets for water (CBO4R1b; IRC27; IRC29) but this was the extent of their support throughout the entire remediation work (IRC12; MINSA 2015 p. 3).

In comparison to these Peruvian national agency representatives, the political response was woefully slow. The Vice-President of Peru, GOREL representatives and various other ministers “didn’t come directly” (IRC13), instead arriving several months after the spill (IRC1; IRC14). Whilst there is logic in bringing all non-local government representatives together at the same time, it is difficult to understand why the response, particularly by GOREL, was so slow.

Was their failure to get there quicker born out discriminatory indifference? One female resident seemed to think so:

I think they [the politicians] only saw the spill but they didn’t check on …. the community and I also think that they didn’t make any comments about … what had happened to people’s skin or the impact the oil spill had on children, adults … I think it was more about the river and the spill and that people don’t have fishes to fish (IRCP2 in IRC12 interview).

While this question cannot be conclusively answered, this quote and level of political dialogue after the initial visit mean discriminatory indifference was probably a factor.

Inhabitants noted that government representatives visited Cuninico only once after the spill (MRBF29) and that since the departure of national agency staff in December 2014 (IRC1; IRC7; IRC29), no politicians had returned at the time of the first research trip (1-3 May 2015) (IRC1). An extension of this detachment was the lack of government information (IRC13; IRC18) who “didn’t tell us anything” (IRC8). This is particularly poor given that their appearance a few months later would have provided them with clarity about the pollution event and the issues faced by Cuninico and the opportunity to answer questions. Basic support from the various levels of

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176 This situation can be explained. A 2015 Ministerio de Salud del Peru (Ministry of Health of Peru, MINSA) document under point 2.5 states that water and food provision are ‘not the concern of DIGESA’ which instead correspond to the Oleoducto Norperuano operator who per ‘number 3, item 3.2, Appendix 4 of D.S. No. O81-2007-EM’ will provide affected communities with drinking water until DIGESA declares the water free of contamination produced from the spillage (MINSA 2015 p. 3; see Chapter 7, Section 7.2).
government was also non-existent; a community leader stated that despite their knowledge of Cuninico’s predicament regarding health issues and absence of clean water and food, the government (nationally or regionally) helped them (IRC2). “Nothing, in terms of support, nothing” (IRC13). Technically, one can argue that the state did respond through Petroperu’s limited provisions (see Chapter 7, Section 7.2) but this lasted only five months (August-December 2014) (IRC2; IRC18; IRC19) whilst the state’s own long-term support has not materialised.177

In the light of this Cuninico evidence, it is understandable why residents felt that the government “didn’t respond” (IRC6) to the pollution and “has forgotten” the pueblo (IRC25). Clearly, civil servants and politicians can’t be at this site permanently or make trips every fortnight but their lack of consistent presence, provision of information and support reinforces the view that there must have been an unwillingness or reluctance to do so. Those working with Cuninico and its citizens draw similar conclusions. The “big consequences” from the spill are ones which “not even the state wants to assume” (CBO4R1a). “They don’t want to face up to it all” (IRCP3) stated an inhabitant, a reference perhaps to the severity and scale of the spill which would force politicians, at least initially, to enter the selva.

For other Cocama inhabitants, it was due to discrimination. The spill saw a community leader and the rest of the village “demand that the government recognise us as human beings. That we are Peruvians. We are indigenous, but we are human beings.” (IRC2). “They know perfectly [the] state the area is in” (ibid.) but were “incapable of helping us, of having a conscience” by sending “us some basic supplies, a bit of water, on behalf of [GOREL]’ (IRC7). These “[r]ich people” are indifferent to their suffering; “what does it matter, one more or less [indigenous], what is the difference?” (IRC27). For people already distrustful of the state, its failure to provide stronger support to Cuninico has naturally damaged their trust even further (IRC7; IRC15; IRC22; IRC23).

Overall, the situations in Barrio Florido and Cuninico show remarkably similar levels of socio-economic development and state engagement, which have fed into both communities’

177 Two residents (IRC7; IRC29) spoke about a meeting with the local government to install a water tank with an NGO “[b]ut so far they haven’t come” (IRC29) and is probably another empty promise.
distrust of the state and their formation of informal governance structures that operate beyond the state system. The political disinterest, detachment and discrimination seen from politicians has had a significant impact on these two communities. It has meant that both lack accessible orthodox voice options to report environmental contamination issues. This has left Barrio Florido and Cuninico utilising unorthodox informal voice actions, a situation seen in other pueblos around the selva. The state’s patchy support of pueblos in these events combined with the lack of clear data dissemination only confirms for many why the state isn’t on their side.

6.2 Collective voice-based access and relationship to the state

“We are the voice of those who don’t have one” (CBO2R1, member of Red de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes (REDNNA) (National Network of Children and Adolescents)).

For other collective voice-based organisations, their access to the state revolves around a different set of influences. State infrastructural presence and political engagement with selva-based communities does not dictate the latter’s access or engagement to the state. These groups are usually situated in urban centres of political decision-making even if their work takes place in the selva. Each CBO and NGO interviewed for this thesis was in Iquitos or had the financial resources to travel there (e.g. E-Tech International (NGO1R1)), providing physically easier access to government departments and personnel. Even so, their access is dependent on two central factors.

Firstly, one national government employee remarked that “sometimes the state considers that the position of some NGOs was contrary to the interests of the state” (NSI4R1). Therefore, one finds that the state’s SHDV runs contrary to the concerns and vested interests of many Loreton CBO and NGO groups. Unsurprisingly, environmental activists and other similar NGOs will “probably have a more difficult time accessing people in the government” (NGO1R1) due to their lack of shared vision and threat they could pose to government interests. For instance, despite their extensive Loreton experience (since 2006), E-Tech International has “very little access” to GOREL, a result the interviewee felt of its close ties to the oil industry (NGO1R1). Others

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178 NCSSC3, a farmer, lives in San Jorge, a pueblo on the banks of the Río Marañón in Nauta District, Loreto Province. When Petroperu oil contamination occurs, they protest to the company and call the local government “but sometimes they won’t listen to us” and don’t visit to see the pollution “[b]ecause they don’t want to.”
(NGO7R1) only ever had government communication through indigenous federations but were willing to have dialogue if asked. The difficulty however is that state representatives are “[i]ncapable” of forging alliances (ibid.) and working with other stakeholders due to the anti-NGO state discourse discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.

This anti-NGO rhetoric has also damaged collective voice-based groups’ work with citizens, communities, and other CBOs. NGO7R1 experienced this with their work in Putumayo Province, where they received a lot of “negative comments”, first because they were foreigners, second because they were from an NGO. People would question what they were doing there when “they drink [well], they have good houses” and are clearly “living out of our money, they are asking for money on our behalf” (ibid.). The widespread nature of this discourse was evident from comments by my interpreter and a Barrio Florido housewife who had never tried to contact an NGO for help. “At times, NGOs, when they see that there is some money involved, they are there” (MRBF13) because “[t]hey are always looking for money” (Interpreter) so to “join them is like to waste time” (MRBF13).179

Bureaucracy is another problem which would appear to be used as a tool to deliberately disengage with collective-voice based stakeholders whose requests and/or work is not in the government’s interests. For example, the E-Tech International interviewee recalled one instance when their NGO tried to get GOREL funding for environmental evaluation work with indigenous communities:

And so … that money was promised to us, they paraded us around, they lost the proposal four or five times, they promised that the cheque was [going to] be there in 24 hours and they did this over and over and over again, basically just dragging out the process and in the end, they did nothing (NGO1R1).

179 Equally, IUA2, a professor at the National University of the Peruvian Amazon, believed that a major problem with indigenous people “is that the [vast] majority of them are handled by NGOs” whose negative influence causes communities to ask REIs for things and “do something” (i.e. strike) if not received. The GOREL Manager of Health and Environment also believed that some NGOs have an overly “radical” nature and “don’t look [after] people’s needs properly” (RGR1).
Barriers to government access also include specific government mechanisms. E-Tech International encountered interference in relation to Mesas de Desarrollo (development round-table discussions). These “include[s] all the different players from the indigenous federations to … government ministries … and is supposed to include the oil company” (though they apparently never show up). In NGO1R1’s experience “we have seen some cases where the … [MINAM] for example has tried to push us out of these Mesas because they know that we have a critical and legitimate technical voice at the table and so makes them a little bit nervous.” Consequently, their scrutiny-based voice, one based on technical and knowledgeable experience, is a threat to the state.

Collective voice-based stakeholders’ work can grant them access to some mechanisms in the government who do not fully adhere to the SHDV. E-Tech International had “quite easy” access to OEFA and MINAM due to their long history of selva employment and the connections they had made in the latter’s ministry (NGO1R1). Their relationship with these agencies allows them to “have very honest discussions with them about how we think things need to improve from a technical point of view” (ibid.). Here though, one can also see the importance that amiguismo can play in aiding access further. The Peru Mission interviewee noted that he could easily access GOREL to arrange meetings due to his position as an authoritative figure (NGO2R1b), a position that most citizens don’t have and cannot use to gain improved and more efficient contact.

Three other NGOs (NGO4R1-R2; NGO5R1; NGO6R1) also had a working relationship with the government and the reason for this is made clear by one of the interviewees. The Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Peruvian Society of Environmental Law) (SPDA) which promotes environmental policies and legislation “identified … that the region has a need for … professionals in law and environmental law to ensure better management of natural resources” (NGO5R1). As Chapter 5, Section 5.2.2 highlighted, GOREL’s weak and inexperienced nature forces this institution to reach out to NGOs that have experience in various areas. Consequently, Naturaleza y Cultura Internacional (Nature and Culture International) (NCI), who have been working with GOREL for ten years have tried “to establish conservation areas for the region”\(^\text{180}\)

\(^{180}\) They have helped to successfully establish three Regional Conservation Areas; the 2.4 million acres Alto Nanay-Pinuyacu-Chambira in 2008, the 1 million acres Tamshiyacu Tahuayo in 2009 and the nearly 977,600 acres Maijuna Kichwa in 2015.
and are also involved “in various spaces” with the government, including the “technical table for watershed protection [and] the management committee for conservation areas” (NGO6R1). They are part of these mechanisms “due to our experience and also because of the schemes we have been developing” (ibid.).

NGO4R1-R2’s privately-funded NGO, ProNaturaleza, which focuses on conservation work and natural resource management in protected areas (e.g. Pecaya Samiria Regional Conservation Area), has a good but indirect relationship with the state based on its professional experience (NGO4R1-2b). Their knowledge of various areas like “fishing management” will see their professional opinion sought and has led them to promote and “work with several state organisations in our projects” (NGO4R1) including La Dirección Regional de la Producción (Regional Production Management Loreto, DIREPRO) related to fishing (NGO4R2b) and their involvement in other technical mechanisms including “Mesa REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) …. [and] CAR (Regional Environmental Commission)” (NGO4R1).

Similarly, SPDA’s Loreton regional office (established 2006) has given technical advice, training and accompanied GOREL on issues “within the frame[work] of environmental politics and … environmental legislation in Peru”, conservation issues and social conflict situations (NGO5R1). The latter saw them working together on a scheme called “conservation for peace … a [two-year] project about environmental conflict-management linked to the use of natural resources” implemented in Alto Nanay District (Maynas Province) with four communities, two of which are indigenous (ibid.). Given the importance of Loreto for Peru’s onshore oil production and the need to reduce the high levels of social conflict (see Chapter 3, Sections 3.3, 3.4), GOREL’s partnership with this NGO and other similar actors is hugely important.

Therefore, one finds that in this context, collective voice actors who offer technical expertise and adopt a conciliatory supportive approach can develop far more accessible and positive relationships to the state in comparison to other scrutiny-based (environmental and human-rights) groups.
6.3 Conclusion

“Sadly enough, the State itself isn’t very good at communicating, they don’t reach people or communities as fast as they should and … react only when the conflict is already taking place” (NCI representative NGO6R1).

The narrative described in the preceding sections has provided further analytical detail of the PEV environment for Loreton stakeholders. For Barrio Florido and Cuninico, their socio-economic decay highlight the state’s SCDV and its centralised focus on Iquitos and other Provincial and District capitals, though the latter still only have basic facilities.\textsuperscript{181} Crucially, for these citizens, the lack of affordable and frequent river public transport combined with their own poverty and absence of IT connectivity, means that their ability to report contamination events either in person or over the internet via formal voice channels is thus lost. Citizens and their respective communities therefore become heavily reliant on their links to collective-voice organisations (discussed in Chapter 8, Section 8.3) and state representatives’ own engagement with them to voice.

The 2002 Decentralisation Law (Law No. 27783) ‘aims at a balanced division of powers and functions among the three governments levels’ and improved public participation (Fernandini and Sousa 2015 p. 1). Despite its lofty ambitions, the experiences of Barrio Florido and Cuninico show that the Peruvian state is far from achieving this. Political disinterest, combined with racialised class consciousness, social discrimination and staff shortages have meant that contact between the state and these pueblos “isn’t a fluid communication” (IUA3) which usually only occurs to serve electoral self-interest rather than any effort at establishing a strong relationship. The communities’ IEVA systems of parallel governance indicate their disengagement from the state (Azarya and Chazan 1987) and do little to improve their formal access to or trust of the state.

One must recognise that some civil agencies are more involved than other political apparatuses. The ANA agency used to only run data presentations in Iquitos (to involve and integrate GOREL and indigenous federations) but soon found that this “didn’t work” as indigenous leaders failed to always present their results to communities (NSIIR1a). Instead, presentations are

\textsuperscript{181} For instance, IRC12, whose son was ill from oil contamination in the 
Rio Marañón, had to be sent to Iquitos for “his blood to be washed” (possibly dialysis) as the staff were not “specialist” (IRC12) and lacked the necessary equipment to carry out the procedure.
now duplicated in locations central to each cuenca “so that communities … can be present and learn the results …. In this way, everybody is taking part” (ibid.). Whilst positive, their selva dialogue is limited to a specialised reactionary role (i.e. responding to environmental issues), which does not encompass the wider socio-political and economic community concerns or their political representation at local, regional and national levels. In this sense, the pueblos are “left on their own” (NSI7R1) to operate beyond the state political system.

This has four impacts within their PEV environment. First, the absence of dialogue left Cuninico without any idea of who to contact to report the pollution and so an inability to access or voice through orthodox formal channels. Second, it damages citizen/community trust of the state (NSI4R1) which for indigenous communities like Cuninico reinforces historic feelings of discrimination and further damages their willingness to voice. Thirdly, limited state engagement alongside these other two influences can force communities to take more radical or unorthodox informal voice action to be heard, the latter witnessed in Barrio Florido and their plea for help through the radio. As the NCI interviewee evaluated, “if the communities don’t protest, then the State at times wouldn’t even know that they exist or … they wouldn’t even take into consideration their needs” (NGO6R1). “That is precisely why native communities … have to take over the [oil] wells …. Only then [do] people realise [that] they are demanding something” (NSI7R1). Finally, the state’s poor response to these contamination events can further reinforce selva citizens’ perceived need to take radical or unorthodox informal voice actions which can become their only means of communication. Accordingly, citizen accountability of REI oil spills issues suffers.

In relation to collective-voice organisations, Section 6.2 has shown that though they can have easier government access, this is highly dependent on their aims and objectives. The SHDV can often determine the scope and scale of this engagement with those scrutinising this aim struggling to gain access or establish a working relationship. This is apparent in various ways. NGOs have encountered the repercussions of the state-sponsored anti-NGO rhetoric which has damaged civil society trust and understanding for what these organisations do. Hence, it is likely that any involvement by these actors in a pueblo like Barrio Florido may be unwelcome and viewed with suspicion by some residents despite the possible improvements they could bring to citizen state voice access. Other NGOs (NGO1R1), have had their access to state mechanisms like the
development round-table discussions impeded due to their technical scrutiny-based voice and the heightened levels of environmental accountability that they can bring to these discussions.

Yet at the same time, state institutional inexperience and incompetence (NSI4R1), particularly within GOREL, is one of the key causes for the constructive relationship found between the state and some collective-voice actors. The latter’s work in areas like conservation, conflict and natural resource management and sustainable development have allowed them to form partnerships on projects or have their voice recognised and listened to by the state. It is these supportive or conciliatory collective voice actors that form relationships with the state rather than other scrutiny-based voice organisations like E-Tech International’s (NGO1R1). This is not altogether useful when it is the latter that are often fighting to protect citizens and society from the SHDV’s potentially detrimental impact.

As noted in the PEV theoretical framework (Chapter 2, Sections 2.6, 2.7, 2.8), the state forms only one part of the PEV research into REI accountability. The next Chapter focuses on REIs, specifically Petroperu, and their relationships and engagement with Barrio Florido and Cuninico and collective-voice actors, the latter section taking a broader look into their REI relationships.
Chapter 7 PEV in the Loreton physical and emotive world: The feasibility of Loreton stakeholder engagement with Petroperu

“Occidental Petroleum didn’t want us getting close to them [natives] [pause] because they were afraid that we would give them information … so they put us within the least amount of contact with them” (FOPOW1, former mechanical engineer for Occidental Petroleum).

This chapter sets out stakeholder engagement with Petroperu bolstered through collective voice-based testimony related to other REIs. It begins by setting out REI presence in the Loreto selva and their historic and contemporary access arrangements for citizens before re-affirming the need to explore each REI individually. This leads into Section 7.2, which investigates Petroperu’s relationship with Cuninico and the pueblo’s ability to voice surrounding the 2014 oil pollution event. Their treatment during and after the spill including their remediation clean-up employment, the provision of medical aid, food and clean water clearly highlight discrimination discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.2.1.

Section 7.3 investigates Barrio Florido and Petroperu’s relationship which focuses on their day to day relationship and instances of voice protest (e.g. environmental pollution). The penultimate section tackles collective-voice and REI access and engagement and the power of the latter to control dialogue. Together with the previous sections, this feeds into a conclusion (Section 7.5) summarising Petroperu’s modus operandi in their relationship with and response to stakeholder issues.

7.1 REI presence, engagement and relationship with stakeholders

REI infrastructural presence is dictated by the location of petroleum and the relevant facilities needed to extract and transport it. In Loreto, Petroperu’s infrastructure is situated at Iquitos (fuel
supply plant), Barrio Florido (refinery) and the *Oleoducto Norperuano* and *Oleoducto Ramal Norte* and its pumping stations and storage tanks (Petroperu no date a; no date b).\(^{182}\)

These oil extractive *campamento* (camps) sites are “like another world” (NSI2R1), described as “*castillos* [castles] in the *selva*” (IUA2). The camps are surrounded by electric fencing, with workers having access to accommodation, medical facilities, clean water, food, electricity and air conditioning (IUA2; MRBF26; NGO2R1b; NSI2R1; NSI7R1). Effectively, they are “like a gated community in the middle of a native community” (NSI2R1).\(^{183}\) What sort of access and engagement do local communities have with this infrastructure and personnel working there?

The Red Ambiental Loretana spokesperson (CBO1R1), who has lived in Iquitos for 14 years, concluded that industry access and engagement for citizens has improved. A decade or more ago, “there was no access” for citizens, with REIs lacking a Loreton community relations office (ibid.). Today, its “getting better” with REIs having an Iquitos office (ibid.) e.g. Perenco (NSI2R1) and Pluspetrol (IUA2), whilst the latter company also have a Trompeteros office where their oil Blocks were located, staffed by an intermediary who liaises with the seven or eight communities nearby (NCSSC2). REIs also try and hold information sessions in *cuenca* urban centres. For instance, Perenco, working in Blocks 39 and 67 in Napo District, Maynas Province, held various meetings in the District capital, Santa Clotilde (CBO1R1).

However, this rosier contemporary picture is misleading. According to the OEFA interviewee, the level of communication between oil communities and REIs is “very informal” due to the lack of specific regulation surrounding this dialogue within their EIAs (NSI2R1). This provides companies with huge flexibility on the type of relationship they want, exacerbated by the

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\(^{182}\) Loreton *Oleoducto Norperuano* pumping stations are Station 1 and Station 5 (Borja) and storage tanks at Station 1 and 5 and on the *Oleoducto Ramal Norte* at Andoas and Morona (Morona District, Datem del Marañón Province) (Petroperu no date a).

\(^{183}\) The term gated community refers to areas of land that are surrounded by walls or fencing and whose access is ‘rigorously controlled’ (Rossi and Vanolo 2012 p. 115). In Africa and Latin America, ‘extraction industries are confined to isolated enclaves, militarily controlled and disconnected from the local society, which does not benefit in substantial ways from their presence’ (ibid. p. 116).
inadequate staffing levels of the MINEM Loreton social issues office which presents “a big challenge” to their monitoring of oil company – citizen relations (NSI4R1).184

Hence, one finds that, broadly speaking, REI selva sites will not have an office or a permanent community relations presence (CBO1R1; NGO2R1b) leaving citizens either to wait until the company visits or they travel to Iquitos themselves (NGO2R1b). Whilst companies have an Iquitos office, this isn’t always for community relations purposes with personnel (usually comprising only small teams) (NSI4R1) often based in Lima, where they travel from to conduct community relations in different areas (CBO1R1). The lack of REI website information (NGO7R1) makes it difficult to gauge accurately the contact levels between REI employees and oil communities but various participants broadly agree on what dialogue can be like.

Interviewees believed that REIs “try not to engage with the communities as much as they possibly can” (NGO2R1b) and “won’t give them any attention” (RGR4). For the Superior Courts of Justice judge, “[i]t is like apartheid in South Africa. Whites would never go where blacks were, and blacks weren’t allowed to be with whites. That’s how companies work here. The camp is here and indigenous aren’t allowed …. Everyone lives in their own world” (NSI7R1). Oil workers and professionals with direct experience of their selva operations confirm these (racialised) engagement and access assertions. In FOPOW1’s 1980-2001 Occidental Petroleum work as a mechanical engineer, he noted that “natives were … marginalised [pause] because they [the REI] would suspend me if I took a native in the truck – it was prohibited to give a life to the native.” Moreover, “there was a lot of control …. [over] dialogue with them … they didn’t want us getting close to them [natives] – because they were afraid that we would give them information …” (ibid.). Equally, FOPOW3, an Occidental Petroleum plant operator foreman from 1981-1991 recounted that indigenous contact with oil workers at the camp was “prohibited”, the latter extending to the causally contracted indigenous workers who were denied access to the camp canteen or the use of the shower and toilet facilities.

From a more recent perspective, the National University of the Peruvian Amazon chemical engineer professor (IUA2) who spent ten years analysing Pluspetrol-produced waters recalled that

184 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1.
oil site access is strictly controlled by the REI which requires individuals to state the purpose of their visit before deciding whether to grant authorisation and a specific date to travel on. Likewise, it is mandatory for Apus’ to register at the REI camp entrance and follow a parallel protocol method which, dependent on the availability of personnel, will see a meeting occur immediately or on a specific date (IUA2). In a similar vein to the previous Occidental Petroleum testimonies, a Pluspetrol Block 8 oil worker explained that “a rule” made it “forbidden” for oil workers to have “relationships with the community” or visit them (MRBF26). One finds that in Cuninico’s case, “you usually don’t see the oil companies [Petroperu] at the communities” (CBO4R3).

Consequently, “[i]t would be very difficult [for selva citizens] bar them saying to some security guard on the [camp] gate, these are our problems we would like you to know about them…[because] there’s nobody there constantly doing community relations work” (NGO2R1b). The result is the creation of “lots of barriers to accessibility” seen through a lack “of running dialogue between the next-door neighbours”, which forces citizens to travel to Iquitos and make an appointment to see someone (ibid.). However, as the PEV framework noted,\(^\text{185}\) it is important not to generalise. Each REI has “a different relation … a different approach” (NGO4R2b) to stakeholder dialogue and access arrangements. The focus of this chapter will be on state-run Petroperu.

7.2 Petroperu’s engagement and relationship with Cuninico

“Petroperu doesn’t want to talk to us” (IRC22, a housewife).

Prior to the oil spill, Petroperu had never visited the community (IRC1; IRC2; IRC3), a situation confirmed by one former resident who had left the pueblo in 1995 at the age of 14 (FIRC1). “They’ve never been friendly with us. Never.” (IRC3). “We don’t know them” (IRC16), leading to a relationship described as “contradictory” and “not in balance” (IRC17), even though Station I is located only three hours away by rápido or four hours by lancha or bote fluvial (CBO4R1b). Consequently, whilst the company has geographically close personnel, this has not improved Cuninico residents’ access to Petroperu to report environmental pollution issues.

\(^{185}\) See Chapter 2, Section 2.7.
For example, Petroperu’s annual book donation to school students in *pueblos* like Cuninico (CBO4R1b; IRC2; IRC14) occurs through the Education Institution (CBO4R1b) rather than direct visits. Similarly, despite a community leader suggesting that Cuninico could help keep watch over the pipeline, the company have never been there to establish this (IRC2). Were it not for the spill, it is probable that the lack of contact between Cuninico and Petroperu would have continued.

This absence of dialogue has major repercussions in crisis situations like the 2014 oil spill. One farmer described how inhabitants were left not knowing “what … the proper process for us [is] to follow” (IRC6). The *Cocama* were uncertain who to ring (IRC4) because they weren’t sure which company was responsible for the pipeline (IRC2). However, even if they did know, they lacked a Petroperu telephone number (IRC1), eventually finding one in the distributed school books which put them through to the Talara refinery in Piura (IRC2; IRC3; IRC14; IRC15). Without this, Cuninico wouldn’t have been able to contact the company (IRC23) through formal voice channels. This raises a huge issue vis-à-vis their ability to report and hold Petroperu accountable for pollution issues. Given the nature of this study, this is a highly significant point. For one community leader, these issues occurred “because they [Petroperu] never came here for meetings, to even introduce themselves” (IRC2). A glimpse of how ill prepared Cuninico was can be found from one housewife who was “surprised” and “scared” when Petroperu landed a helicopter nearby (IRC20) on 30th June 2014 (CBO4R1b).

The spill brought Cuninico citizens and Petroperu personnel physically closer together than they ever had been before. Oil workers stayed in the village for approximately six months and employed residents as “emergency workers” in the initial remediation work which lasted roughly four months (CBO4R1a, b; IRC3; IRC11) (discussed later in this section). Analysis of these events highlight the power and control Petroperu had in setting the dialogue parameters and information.

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186 To the company’s credit, their response to the morning telephone call (IRC5; IRC14) made on the 30th June 2014 was prompt, arriving in the afternoon (IRC2; IRC5) at 4pm (IRC23).
187 CBO4R1 suggests that Petroperu were aware of the spill because the amount of oil sent through the pipeline did not reach Station 5 but did not have the location of the breakage (CBO4R1b).
188 Though unconfirmed, this would fit the description of later events discussed shortly.
provision which were minimal and the influence of discrimination in their treatment of the Cocama.

Petroperu’s arrival into the community shows disrespect and discrimination and a lack of understanding for how these indigenous communities live. Petroperu’s oil workers failed to apologise for the spill (IRC3; IRC5; IRC6; IRC7; IRC8; IRC11; IRC15; IRC16; IRC19; IRC22), instead arriving angrily (IRC27; IRC29) and were “direct in [their] treatment” (IRC8) of Cuninico. “[C]an you believed it?” exclaimed one elderly resident (IRC29). Indeed, they were even willing to go as far as to blame residents themselves for the spill (IRC13). Cocama interviewees described Petroperu asking to stay in Cuninico without residents’ permission (IRC24; IRC25). The “high price[s]” that they paid for food such as plantains (cooking banana) (20-25 soles), “a bag of yucca for 30-40 soles” and hens (40-50 soles) when values were originally between five (for plantain) and ten soles (for yucca) (IRC13) would have been seen as arrogantly extravagant and a vain reinforcement of their perceived societal superiority.

Whilst renting various people’s homes (IRC4; IRC5; IRC9; IRC29), “they didn’t treat us well …. We were there before using just a tiny little light, but when they came … they installed a lot … of little machines … and they used a lot of energy, and the [community’s] generator gave out” (IRC7). After apparently failing to replace the community’s generator, they brought in their own to hook up refrigeration units (IRC23; IRC29) but refused to share the generators or electricity with the pueblo (IRC23; IRC27; IRC29).

Once in the village, Petroperu’s minimal interaction with Cuninico became clear. “[T]hey just wanted to check on their oil, because it was spilling out, nothing more” (IRC4 my emphasis). “Whenever we wanted to speak to anyone, even if they were right there in front of us, they would say that we were … it wasn’t “impeding”, they used another word … that we were stopping them from doing their work, stopping them from cleaning” (IRC7). This excuse evidently became a way

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189 The tube was at least three metres underwater. “Who is the person who is going to hold his breath so much to cut that … Nobody! Therefore, they lie” (IRC13).
190 Roughly 25 workers stayed in Cuninico (IRC16; IRC17).
191 It has also meant that since Petroperu left, “the same people from the community … come but they want to sell the plantain to the same price [sold to Petroperu] …. this is one of the things that hurt us the most” (IRC13).
192 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1.
of preventing any form of casual communication between oil workers and Cuninico whilst the former resided in the *pueblo*. “They just wanted to get away from us” (ibid.).

As one would expect in this situation, the Cocama were desperate for information and contact. A young male topographer wished that Petroperu had “held a general assembly” so that they would inform the community about “what the problem is and what it’ll cause” (IRC18). Instead, the company communicated solely with and through the *Apu* and his deputy (IRC8; IRC9) (explored more fully in Chapter 8, Section 8.1), which would help suppress wider critical questions raised against the company which would instead be directed at their leaders. The two community *asambleas* that five interviewees mention (IRC6; IRC13; IRC15; IRC20; IRC21) only occurred due to residents’ protestation and extreme action (locking Petroperu engineers in the *Apu’s* house). All other instances of invited attendance at town meetings were refused (IRC9; IRC16; IRC17; IRC18), showing that dialogue, whenever possible, was strictly controlled and resisted by the company, a situation it used to its advantage as Chapter 8, Section 8.1 discusses.

In this early period, Cuninico’s access to information from Petroperu was negligible, misinforming and discriminatory. A community leader noted that, whilst residents were working at the remediation site, the meetings he had with Petroperu in Cuninico “were only ever to do with [the] work, there wasn’t anything else” discussed (IRC2). Other residents confirm that Petroperu refused to provide them with any information (IRC5; IRC7; IRC16; IRC17; IRC23; IRC25; IRC29) including on the size of the spill or the security measures put in place (IRC3), water quality results (IRC27), a report on the clean-up process (IRC14; IRC15), how the spill can affect residents (IRC21), particularly if they bathe in certain areas or eat certain food (IRC22), any idea of “when it will get better” (IRC6) or the diagnosis and treatment of oil labourers who became sick (IRC7; IRC13). Like the pre-spill period, Petroperu did not provide any training sessions (IRC6; IRC16; IRC19), an action which particularly impacted indigenous remediation labourers (IRC16; IRC17), who “never knew about these things [remediation work]” (IRC16). Petroperu made deliberate use

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193 The first stemmed from residents demanding an increase in food provision, which resulted in an *asamblea* to confirm this would happen (IRC13), though as discussed shortly, the increased supplies were still not enough. The second *asamblea* occurred when Petroperu engineers were locked in the *Apu’s* house by residents as they were leaving Cuninico in December 2014 after they demanded answers to their environmental concerns and the resolving of the *pueblo’s* long-term clean-water access (IRC23; IRC22 in IRC23 interview).
of their naivety. “I mean, if I would have known that the oil could hurt us, I would have never gotten into that” (IRC13). “We were in the dark. We didn’t know … about those things, about the spill. We didn’t know where we were … No one said anything, nothing” (IRC16).

Tied in with this lack of information were deliberate efforts to misinform Cuninico. One resident recalled that in their initial visit “they told us that in 15 days everything would be solved … [and] will go back to the way it used to be” (IRC13) whilst a community leader was later told that the spill was “mild” (IRC2). A second example is Petroperu’s reaction to residents’ concerns raised at the second asamblea that the environment, specifically the water and fish, were contaminated. Petroperu personnel were upset and angry with Cuninico (IRC16; IRC17; IRC23; IRC25) and denied that there was any contamination (IRC6; IRC7) of water or fish which could be drunk and consumed safely (IRC23; IRC25). A farmer noted that despite telling the community that they were waiting for confirmation of results (presumably from DIGESA), “as far as they’re concerned, we’re not contaminated” (IRC7).

The Cocama, however, refused to believe this. Three residents (IRC7; IRC23; IRC29) described how they “demanded” (IRC7; IRC23) that the Petroperu personnel eat and drink a fish and river water “so they can see if they would get diarrhoea or not” (IRC23). “We … told them “look sir … I’ll give you … this water …. Because you say that the water … was left cleaned where you[‘re] working. I’m [going to] give you a fish that was obtained here from the water … so you can eat it …”” (IRC29). Water was brought but the personnel refused to drink it (IRC23; IRC29; IRCP1 in IRC24-25 interview). For residents, the result was that they didn’t know “what’s safe and what’s not here … if the water weren’t contaminated, like they say, they would have washed in it and drank it with us, but they never let even a drop of water touch them” (IRC7). This researcher’s photographs of oil visible in three separate locations on the Rio Cuninico up-river from Cuninico (Photographs 7.1-7.3) show that pollution was still a problem 11 months after the spill.

194 See also Section 7.2, Footnote 193 and Chapter 8, Section 8.3.
Photograph 7.1.1: First oil site on the *Rio Cuninico* approximately 20 minutes up-river from Cuninico.¹⁹⁵

Photograph 7.1.2: Close-up of the first oil site.

¹⁹⁵ For Chapter 7 photograph sources see Footnote 3.
Photograph 7.2.1: Second oil site on the *Rio Cuninico* approximately 30 minutes up-river from Cuninico.

Photograph 7.2.2: Close-up of the second oil site.
Photograph 7.3.1: Third oil spill site on the *Rio Cuninico* approximately 45 minutes up-river from Cuninico taken at the entrance to the ravine leading to the *Oleoducto Norperuano*.

Photograph 7.3.2: Close-up of the third oil site.

Petroperu’s perception that these were merely ignorant natives was evident in other brief exchanges. “[H]ow can these [engineers] say that it will take two – three months [to clean]? Lies. Tell them to tell the truth” (IRC9). A community leader recalled showing Petroperu oily water in
Cuninico (IRC2). Their response was to “say it’s vegetable oil .... But we are also indigenous people, and we can see the difference between what is vegetable oil, and what is from the pipe. …. They’re absurd explanations that they give to us.”

Discriminatory scorn for the village’s plight can also be seen in the medical, clean water and food provisions. Regarding the former, Petroperu’s support was crude. One young mother’s baby became physically swollen (IRC12; IRCP2 in IRC12 interview), covered in “large red welts, that [were] very ugly” and suffering from a fever after being showered in the Rio Marañón (IRC12). Petroperu’s provision of an ineffective lotion was the extent of their medical support, which itself stopped once they left Cuninico, forcing the mother to use her own money to travel to Maypuco’s health centre (ibid.).

Clean water and food provisions were also meagre. Initially, when Petroperu first arrived, “they weren’t giv[ing] us groceries. It was like they were mocking us” (IRC23) but after two weeks’ supplies started (IRC13). However, they were given only five litres of water for 6-7 people (CBO4R1a; IRC5; IRC7; IRC13; IRC23) which was not enough to shower and drink with (IRC13). “How are we supposed to drink that water in five days? Like a small bucket of paint” exclaimed IRC23. The food provision was also limited (IRC26)\(^\text{196}\) and despite increased supplies (via the second asamblea meeting), were still not enough to stop residents being forced to eat contaminated fish “out of necessity” (IRC7). Moreover, these supplies lasted only five months (August – December 2014), ending when Petroperu left the pueblo and remediation site which compelled the Cocama to drink boiled rain or river water (IRC2; IRC3; IRC14; IRC15; IRC19; IRC24; IRC28; IRC29).\(^\text{197}\) As IRC13 noted, “Petroperu thought to leave us aside without giving us enough value as human beings.” So, whilst they “came … they didn’t stay to help us” (IRC4) and were clearly apathetic to the community’s problems from the spill.

However, perhaps the greatest indicator of Petroperu’s contempt and discrimination can be seen from their employment of 150 Cuninico citizens as emergency workers for roughly four

\(^{196}\) Supplies included either four (IRC7; IRC13) or seven kilos of rice (IRC19; IRC29), “four of millet flour … [and] six fillets” (IRC7) along with “guarina [biscuits], oil, a preserve [and] milk” per family each week (IRC29).

\(^{197}\) Access to clean water remains an ongoing issue in 2016 (Fraser 2016c; Fraser and Tarabochia 2016).
months (CBO4R1a, b; IRC3; IRC11) in the remediation work. Petroperu personnel (IRC16; IRC20; IRC23; IRC25) arrived at the pueblo to find causal labourers, aided by one Cuninico resident who helped organise this process (IRC20). The Cuninico and other pueblo residents involved in the remediation work were split into work groups numbering roughly 100 people (IRC1; IRC21). One group was given the task of carrying “out a survey of the source [the pipeline], to fix it, and to stop it from spilling” (IRC3), a second “recuperation” (or remediation) and cleaning, a third as “chaleros” (cutting away vegetation) and a final group to gather the polluted vegetation etc. (IRC21). Though the work was a mix of manual and heavy labour, residents were not given any initial training (IRC1; IRC13) or protective clothing (CBO4R1a; IRC6; IRC7; IRC13; IRC14; IRC19; IRC20; IRC22) by Petroperu or its contractor (IRC6) and almost no equipment (IRC1).

The experience of these indigenous workers, particularly those locating the pipeline break was harrowing. Initially, a community leader watched citizens go into the ravine without protection and wading into the oil. Because it was crude oil … it was twice as thick. That’s what you need to imagine, that they were working right in it, trying to find out where the break was, because it was underwater, it was about three metres deep. So … to find the break … they dived until they found it … and raised it up, and they were all completely exhausted, but they patched it up (IRC2).

A citizen who took part recounted that

to try to lift the pipeline, we had to immerse in that water without any protection … under the instruction of engineers, they told us that we had to try to reach it, so we did immerse there without any clothing, only underwear and it was full of crude oil, it was thick (IRC13; see also Photographs 7.4, 7.5 and 7.6).

A Cuninico lady saw her husband return from the oil site “really black, you could only see his … teeth and his eyes, nothing else” (IRC24).

198 A further 350 indigenous citizens from other local pueblos (San Antonia, Esperanza) were also employed (CBO4R1b; IRC16) but only a total of 12 women (IRC16; IRC20), the rest were male.
Photograph 7.4: *Cocama* work without protective clothing locating the pipeline break.

Photograph 7.5: *Cocama* residents inserting or removing one of the large wooden timbers that supports the pipeline.
Other residents were given “very simple gear” (IRC25) including a helmet (IRC16; IRC23), long-sleeved shirts, trousers, boots, (IRC16) and gloves (IRC25). Those clearing away oil scooped it into buckets and used a funnel to pour it into cylinders (IRC16; IRC25), a process that spilt it onto their bodies (IRC25) whilst the gloves would “break … with the heat from the oil” (IRC20; see also Photograph 7.7). Citizens would shower and clean themselves with significant quantities of gasoline (IRC23; IRC24) and a moisturiser (IRC13; IRC16; IRC23; IRC24; IRC25; Photograph 7.8) provided by Petroperu. The hours were long, with residents roughly leaving the pueblo between 3-6am, and returning between 6-8pm or working at night from 5pm until 2am (IRC17) resting only to eat the limited food provided (IRC6; IRC16; IRC20; IRC24; IRC25).  

Most damning was the employment of four indigenous children (CBO4R1a; IRC23), an action which explicitly contravenes Article 32 of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) no date p. 10). One of these, IRC25, who was 15 at the time, was interviewed for this research. According to his testimony, the contractor knew that he was

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199 Breakfast included *portala* (porridge) (IRC20), “a cup of *minga* [rice-based drink] with rice and *yucca* and two breads” which was expected to sustain them until 2pm (IRC25). Lunch included half a fish (ibid).

200 IRC25’s mother stated that two children were aged 16 and 17 respectively and two others were aged 15 (IRC23).
under-age when he provided them with his yellow DNI national identity card (the colour for all Peruvian minors) (ibid.). He goes on to explain that initially he “started working gathering the rubbish” but was soon “working with the oil, getting it out of the water” sinking “my body up to the waist” without any protection (ibid.; see also Photograph 7.9). Despite their employment ending with the arrival of journalists (IRC20), it apparently continued in a clandestine fashion for several months afterwards (IRC23; IRC25).

According to Cuninico residents, they worked at the site for almost a month without any protective clothing (CBO4R1b; IRC13; IRC16; IRC20) and unsurprisingly, there were major health impacts. Residents suffered headaches (IRC16; IRC20; IRC24) and bronchitis whilst another woman fainted twice from the smell (IRC20). Burns, rashes, allergic reactions (IRC10; IRC11; IRC17; IRC19) and boils (IRC20) were reported, numbness and weakness in their bodies (IRC2; IRC8; IRC11), sore and locked joints (IRC1; IRC13), stomach problems (CBO4R2), breathing difficulties (IRC24), fevers (IRC23; IRC24), and pain and blood from urinating (IRC9; IRC23). As one former oil worker lamented “para que trabajar para la recuperacion de esta compania de la muerte” (why work on the recovery with this company of death?) (IRC8).

201 When OEFA arrived for the first inspection, the minors were hidden in the selva and continued employment on the condition that they hid on future inspections (IRC25). Whilst one could argue that the indigenous people may have willingly wanted their children employed due to their economic poverty, this was combined with a company that was deliberately overlooking this fact.
Photograph 7.7: *Cocama* residents removing the polluted wood and vegetation from the contamination site.

Photograph 7.8: *Cocama* residents cleaning themselves off after searching for the pipeline break.
The emergency workers were finally provided with thin protective white overalls (IRC13; IRC15; IRC16; IRC17; IRC20; IRC22) but these were inadequate (IRC13; IRC14; IRC20; IRC25; Photograph 7.10). For example, the remediation work which began after the pipeline was fixed (IRC2) saw a group of men ordered to clear the oil from the ravine surface (IRC20), which forced them to step into oil up to their waist (IRC1).

When we [were] immersed there, the oil made it [the overalls] tear to pieces, it didn’t resist. Perhaps three to four mins, ten mins at the most but with our movement in that crude ... it tore apart and the oil would attach very easily to the textile …. [T]here were some very deep places where we had … to clean … and suddenly you would feel [“plum” sound made] and the oil coming inside your cloth (IRC13; see also Photographs 7.11.1/2).

It was only the arrival of journalists and OEFA for inspections which seems to have prompted Petroperu to provide the necessary clothing (helmets, googles, ear protectors, masks and gloves) (IRC6; IRC16), suggesting it was done purely for show rather than any care for the indigenous.202

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202 See also Chapter 8, Section 8.1.
Photograph 7.10.1: *Cocama* residents in the white overalls.

Photograph 7.10.2: Protective rubber feet and leg protectors worn under the white overalls.
Photograph 7.10.3: Mask worn by some of the oil workers.

Photograph 7.11.1: *Cocama* residents working on removing oil from the ravine.
Discrimination is rife throughout this chain of events. If Petroperu could initially arrive with “barriers” (IRC2; see Photographs 7.3.1/2) and specialist pumping equipment 15 days later (IRC1; IRC2; IRC14; IRC24), why did they also not have protective equipment with them? Moreover, indigenous people were given the most dangerous and difficult task of locating the pipeline break without any training, protection or equipment. As IRC13 noted, “they just waited for us to do the toughest job” before lifting the fixed piece of pipeline into place themselves.

For citizens, their sense of fear and frustration after this lack of dialogue and dangerous emergency work would have deepened when the oil workers “fled” (IRC4; IRC9; IRC20; IRC22; IRC23) Cuninico “like thieves” (IRC16) one night in December 2014 “[w]ithout thanking us” (IRC9) or paying residents for their hospitality (IRC5; IRC16; IRC26). Then, “suddenly people were talking to them a lot … asking them, clamouring, wanting to know what was happening to the wildlife, but they didn’t get it …. They didn’t want to share anything with us, and in the end, they just left” (IRC7). The Cocama’s concern for their cosmovision and natural world is evident here but they were never likely to be reassured. Instead, leaving the pueblo allowed Petroperu to reinforce the disengagement, difficult access and lack of information seen during the spill.
At the time of the research field trip in May 2015, remediation work by Petroperu was continuing. Whilst oil workers travel past Cuninico on boats, none of them stop to talk (IRC2). Other testimonies (IRC4; IRC5; IRC8; IRC13; IRC14; IRC17; IRC19) confirm that Petroperu have failed to communicate with the whole pueblo, despite Cuninico trying to fight back and get in touch (IRC4). “[I]t’s been a very long time since they came” (IRC7). One unemployed resident concluded that “for about four and a half months they considered us, but after that, nothing, fin, let’s go. Just like that” (IRC1).

Instead, Cuninico’s only contact occurs through the Apu, who visits the company’s offices in Saramuro (IRC2). Whilst the community leader suggests the meetings are a sign of Petroperu thinking about the distance involved for Cuninico, they remain controlled by the company who have maintained “difficult” communication, something “we don’t understand, we don’t know why they don’t come to coordinate with us” (ibid.). For Cuninico, the REI should come, because they know exactly what’s happened … [because] of this spill, the state it’s left us in, so they have an obligation …. That’s what we’re hoping for, to coordinate with them, make them see what we’re living through right now, then maybe we’ll be listened to by them or … the state (ibid).

Overall, were it not for the spill, Cuninico would almost certainly never have had any contact with Petroperu, despite their close proximity to the Oleoducto Norperuano and this raised significant issues for their ability to alert the company verbally through orthodox formal voice channels to contamination problems. Petroperu’s actions during and after the pollution event show that they were never interested in the village. That’s what I understood from them. Because, when I met with them, I made them aware of the community’s needs. I insisted that the water was contaminated … I asked them what they were going to do for us when the flood [the annual rising of the Amazon tributaries] would come? It would contaminate even more! It would harm us even more! …. But they were far from recognising, considering or thinking about what they were to do as a company …. (ibid.).
Their lack of concern and efforts to disengage and misinform the *pueblo* not only generated rumours but also destroyed the trust placed in the company. Petroperu’s lack of values (IRC28), conscience (IRC7), disrespect (IRC24) and abuse of citizens (IRC24) due to their poor class (IRC19) was because “ellas eran unas personas que no sabian sentir por otras personas” (they seemed like people who didn’t know how to feel anything for others) (IRC5). “Como ellos son ingenieros y educados ellos nos ponen por el suelo” (They think that because they are engineers, they are better than us. They treat us like dirt) (IRC11). Though the spill brought Cuninico and Petroperu physically together, the events during and post-spill have driven them even further apart and this makes any future vocal exchange even more difficult to envisage.

7.3 Petroperu’s engagement and relationship with Barrio Florido

“Yes, again the manager called us, particularly me, the manager sent a watchman to ask me to go see him, I went to meet him and he told us “if there is a problem, there is no need to call the radio or other people”” (MRBF13).

In Barrio Florido, a cursory appraisal would suggest that their situation is radically different to Cuninico’s. “We have a friendly relationship” (MRBF6) due to there being “more communication here” (MRBF4) and are “hand [in] hand with Petroperu” (MRBF7), which can be seen in their close geographical proximity, the refinery’s important provision of electricity and jobs for residents, as will be discussed shortly. However, deeper analysis has shown a far more cautious evaluation of citizen interaction and voice opportunity is needed.

The refinery, founded in 1982 (MRBF27; Petroperu no date b), and Barrio Florido have “grown together” (MRBF2). When one resident arrived in 1971, there “weren’t many houses” (MRBF3) but the construction of the refinery gradually drew more citizens to relocate seeking work. By doing so, they moved into the refinery’s sphere of influence, which is particularly powerful given the SCDV and the subsequent provision of electricity and source of jobs for local

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203 Residents thought that there were still broken pipes (IRC22) and that another rupture had occurred, which Petroperu were searching for and couldn’t find (IRC14).

204 “They only come to fool” (IRC9) and lie about the number of spilt barrels (IRC14), had deliberately blocked the telecommunication mast near the *pueblo* so that they couldn’t contact and speak with anybody (IRC3) and paid Cuninico citizens to act as informants (IRC18; IRC19; IRC28), the latter a clear indicator of the paranoia which the spill had created.

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residents. This has exaggerated the power disparity between the two parties, which have helped Petroperu create a voice environment with Barrio Florido i.e. the frequency of meetings, where they occur and their composition, that is advantageous to them. This has been regulated through a so-called “formalisation of dialogue” which manifests itself in two ways; their everyday relationship and instances of voice protest.

Firstly, in periods like 2015 when “las aguas estan calmadas” (waters are calm) (MRBF13) i.e. when contentious issues haven’t occurred, Petroperu maintains an infrequent, controlled cordiality with Barrio Florido. In these periods, interaction with the refinery “isn’t very often, it has its moments” (MRBF15) whilst they provide minimal (MRBF26) “symbolic support” (MRBF11) for the pueblo.

Analysis of testimonies make clear that Petroperu sought to liaise only on an infrequent basis with the pueblo’s three elected representatives (i.e. IEVAs) (MRBF2; MRBF4; MRBF6; MRBF16). Meetings with these IEVAs occur in the refinery every six months concerning their informal Petroperu work (MRBF18). Whilst one of the representatives insisted that these meetings can occur “at anytime” and that “[t]here’s no problem with access” (MRBF2), this does not appear to be strictly correct. Authoritative exchanges appear to be highly formalised and controlled; occurring through an appointment (MRBF13) which needs to be made through a written formal letter delivered through the pueblo’s IEVAs (MRBF3; MRBF12). “[E]verything has to be formal” (MRBF12).

That is not to say that larger community meetings and wider engagement don’t happen. Petroperu “maybe visit about four times … a year” usually “let[ting] us know in advance” (MRBF15) by inviting residents (MRBF18 my emphasis) to events (MRBF16; MRBF18; MRBF26) run at specific points in the year. During the summer holidays, they do things for the children including sports activities in February and a football competition in March. In April, they

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205 The refinery pays Barrio Florido every three months for the “cultivation” (MRBF2) i.e. maintenance of the pipeline by cutting vegetation. This is used to pay for electrical consumption (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Footnote 164) and provides a 3,900 soles income (MRBF6). This is appropriated for each person based on the number of metres they cut (“if you do 15 metres, they will pay you 20-30 soles”) (MRBF6) with the remaining soles used for the village (MRBF2; MRBF6). Three more batches of work in the neighbouring refinery areas is also offered “every four months” (MRBF6) worth 2,000 soles (MRBF2; MRBF6).
deliver school supplies whilst September sees another football competition called the “Poleoducto Cup” involving teams from each of the pueblo’s zones and other pipeline communities (MRBF2; MRBF3; MRBF11; MRBF12; MRBF15). In October “they make games for the whole community and there are prizes” (MRBF12), whilst in December they visit for Christmas, bringing toys and holding a chocolatada²⁰⁶ (MRBF2; MRBF18). The annual flooding (MRBF22; MRBF24; MRBF28) of Barrio Florido areas results in Petroperu staff visiting to make donations and provide support (MRBF13; MRBF15; MRBF21) such as groceries (MRBF7; MRBF16; MRBF20; MRBF25; MRBF28).

Other non-specific calendar engagements and support have also taken place. At least one moloqua asamblea has taken place (MRBF8; MRBF9; MRBF10; MRBF25; MRBF30) as several interviewees were aware of whom to contact in the event of environmental pollution (MRBF23).²⁰⁷ “[A]t times … [they provide] health related” (MRBF15) support. For instance, when there are no doctors at the medical posta and it’s an emergency, residents are seen in the refinery (MRBF23) and taken to Iquitos by Petroperu (MRBF13; MRBF15; MRBF18) whilst “they come with different medical doctors” (MRBF15) like in early April 2015 when they provided medicine for children for flu, parasites and diarrhoea (MRBF6; MRBF15; MRBF19). The pueblo is also supplied with water for the reservoir tank, transported from the refinery roughly every week in big containers by canoe (MRBF25; MRBF27; MRBF30).

One should acknowledge that Barrio Florido “is in a better position than other villages” (MRBF3). However, “apenas lo que ellos quieren, no lo que el pueblo quiere” (they provide what they want, not what the town wants) (MRBF14), indicating that their power in these interactions is absolute. This allows Petroperu to “promise things and then … never do anything” which left one IEVA feeling the need “to record or take a photo of what’s happening … [so] that I can put pressure on them” (MRBF6) and improve accountability.

²⁰⁶ A social event where drinking and eating chocolate is the central activity of the meeting and usually occurs for a festive or commemorative event.
²⁰⁷ “So, the first thing you do is you tell the company what’s happening and so they will put [out] an alert” (MRBF3) i.e. a siren so that residents enter their homes quickly (MRBF17; MRBF23).
At certain times, Petroperu are invited by the *pueblo* “so that they can see the work we want to do” (MRBF18). However, residents spoke about their recent request for increased water supply, something which the refinery offered (MRBF7; MRBF26; MRBF27) and then failed to implement (MRBF7; MRBF14). Other inhabitants complained that the refinery refuse to supply “energy for a special activity in town …. even if we ask” (MRBF14) and that their request for 24-hour electricity was not supported by their local leaders (MRBF10; MRBF27).208 In the case of the 2011 oil spill, the *pueblo* requested “water, and for doctors to analyse people and check their health …. They gave us water [for several days] but they didn’t send any doctors” (MRBF6).

So far, one can see the parameters of the infrequent, controlled cordiality between Petroperu and Barrio Florido. Meetings and engagement between the two parties are infrequent and whilst cordial friendly relations “have [been] fought for” by the IEVAs (MRBF6), they are strictly controlled by the refinery. An extension of their power can also be seen in the provision of small, cheap “symbolic support” (MRBF11) and again, despite the elected authorities fighting for it (MRBF6), it is Petroperu not Barrio Florido which decides the specific help.

However, this everyday relationship is in a state of flux. The most noticeable influence is the change of refinery manager. “This company always changes its manager [every year or two] and at times it [their relationship] gets better and at times it gets worse” (MRBF12). The impact on support and dialogue would appear to be profound. “If there’s a manager who supports, then he’ll come here and start meeting with us and there’s a fluid relationship …. But some others we don’t even see them” (MRBF3).

For instance, testimonies spoke about a more proactive “nicer” (MRBF25) manager, a “wonderful person” (MRBF12). Under his management, “championships” were held in the *pueblo* and he “constantly came to visit the town and … see our needs, to talk to the authorities” (MRBF13). The manager during my 2015 fieldwork, who had been at the refinery for roughly eight months (MRBF25), was described in vastly different terms. He was “quiet” and unwilling to

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208 This is understandable given that Barrio Florido’s level of electricity has been explicitly laid out in a “covenant” signed between the local leaders and the refinery (MRBF6) which commenced six years after the establishment of the refinery (ICW1) and has been recently negotiated (see Section 7.3, Footnote 209). As the local volunteer judge states; “if there’s a case that is not going to favour us, I will stop it” (MRBF6).
“reach out here so often” so that residents “barely [saw] him” (MRBF3). “This one is a little rebellious, as the authorities say” and wasn’t friendly (MRBF25). Contacting him took a long time and he would often say that there weren’t any funds for community projects (MRBF3) causing him to be labelled as “a bit stingy” and there to be less events than previous years (MRBF13). Though the manager has visited the pueblo on at least one occasion (to check progress on the painting of the school), a sense of detachment persists through his use of representatives to cover his absence at community events to which he was invited (MRBF3).

Thus, refinery manager staff changes do greatly impact upon the nature of their everyday relationship; whilst the 2015 fieldwork period had a disengaged and unsupportive manager generating an infrequent, controlled cordiality, previous individuals have shown more involvement which would have undoubtedly improved the everyday voice environment for citizens.

However, as noted, the formalisation of dialogue manifests itself in two ways. There are instances which cause the pueblo to test Petroperu’s control of their dialogue and the restrictions placed upon them. “[I]f they’re [the citizens] abused then the village may raise against it [Petroperu] …. their pipes go through the village and so we claim responsibility when there’s pollution, or when they don’t comply with the agreement” (MRBF2) for the provision of electricity for Barrio Floridio. When the community asks these more serious protestation questions, Petroperu responds with calculated, suppressive formality attempting to diffuse and disperse the collective group arrayed against them.

Evidence of this can be seen in one interviewee’s discussion of the village’s actions concerning 2013 electrical supply issues which involved around 20 residents (MRBF14) and was, though unconfirmed, a request for 24-hour provision noted by MRBF27. Initially, the refinery stipulated that they “just wanted the Lieutenant to come in with someone else, only two people” (probably one other IEVA) rather than allow the rest of the inhabitants’ access (MRBF14). Despite Petroperu conceding that a “maximum” group of eight residents would be given entry, “from those eight they only wanted three people to talk, no more” (MRBF14), no doubt Barrio Floridio’s
Indeed, the IEVA judge noted that if “the community [is] going to protest against [the refinery] … they call the leaders Teniente, Agent, etc; and they go as a Committee representing them” (MRBF6). “Always, when there is a problem, it’s … the authorities that go and talk to them” (MRBF16) reinforcing the levels of control that Petroperu had over Barrio Florido citizens in this vertical voice situation.

The 2009 oil pollution incident also saw challenges to Petroperu but this time their control were less successful. After the incident, a Commission of roughly 20 residents was formed, two of whom alerted the local press (MRBF13). However, the manager “didn’t want to come to the town”, instead giving them an appointment for a meeting in the refinery auditorium alongside the press and DDP (ibid.), highlighting their control over the location and meeting participants. Though they were unable to restrict their communication to formal discussion with Barrio Florido’s IEVAs, Petroperu continued to control proceedings in other ways. At the meeting, dialogue was non-existent; “nos comieron con zapato y todo” (they didn’t even let us talk) (ibid.) whilst the company alongside state representatives attempted to discredit the residents’ claims in the eyes of the journalists.210 Despite this, press and public prosecutor involvement increased the levels of scrutiny on Petroperu,211 which is undoubtedly why they were so reluctant to have the press involved in the 2011 incident.

In this case, one or more unknown citizens called the radio (MRBF13; MRBF14). Due to MRBF13’s 2009 involvement, the manager sent a security guard to ask her and other residents to visit him (MRBF25). Once there

he told us “if there is a problem, there is no need to call the radio or other people” …. he was very nice and he said that they would definitely give us a solution …. Senora, particularmente usted (madam, particularly you!) [laughs] Meaning that I enjoy being in

209 In this instance, the Committee secured an improved electrical supply agreement. Initially, electricity was only supplied “in the morning Monday-Friday, 8am-10am … and so, we asked them to give us a broader timetable” to run from “6am to 1.30pm” (MRBF6). After “excuses” from the refinery and arguments during negotiations, they agreed to extend the electrical supply to its current level (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Footnote 164). The revised agreement was signed by “myself, Teniente and the agent. And the Director [of the refinery]” (ibid.).

210 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1.4.

211 The 2009 incident did mean the redirection of effluent from the Rio Ramirez directly into the Rio Amazon (MRBF1; MRBF6; MRBF11; MRBF12). However, by doing so “they haven’t improved the system” (MRBF1) as the same levels of waste are now being emitted directly to the Amazon river (see also Velarde 2009).
the media, “don’t call them” and I told him “I didn’t call them this time, I don’t want any more trouble, I have no idea who called them” (MRBF13).

Whilst the refinery is in a prime position to solve the environmental pollution, the manager’s intent on speaking to the resident(s) they felt were responsible for alerting the radio and the suggestion to refrain from vocalising beyond the confines of their relationship indicates that “[t]hey wanted to avoid the authorities [coming], and journalists as well” (MRBF6). “[I]f the media come, then they are pushed to make an agreement” and this was seen to be one reason “why they don’t support with what the town …. wants” (MRBF14).

Overall, in these circumstances, Petroperu responds with a tightening of control over the voice environment for Barrio Florido citizens. Whilst the change in refinery manager may impact upon the frequency and support of their everyday relationship, it is probable that it wouldn’t alter each manager’s response to these protest voice situations. In these cases, the interests and reputation of the company are threatened and the refinery will seek to maintain dialogue explicitly between themselves and the pueblo where their power is greatly enhanced.

7.4 Collective voice-based access to REIs and Petroperu

“[W]e have to get right to the point … [and] provide the evidence right away …. because they aren’t interested in having … honest open discussions. They’re on the attack right away … and we need to be ready for that” (E-Tech International representative describing REI dialogue (NGO1R1)).

“[P]etrol companies don’t like us” (CBO4R1a) and do not see us as legitimate stakeholders (NGO7R1), instead merely “part of … indigenous federations” (NGO1R1). By unpacking these responses, it becomes clear that collective voice REI access and engagement echo some of the same parameters as citizens’ experience.

Firstly, REIs would appear to try to control their CBO/NGO exchanges. For example, a Catholic Church requested meeting with Cuninico representatives and Petroperu was accepted by the company so long as the Bishop attended who in turn stipulated the presence of CBO4R1’s team. By trying to frame the parameters of the exchange in this way, the REI hoped that the Bishop
would have helped “maintain cordiality” by acting as a buffer against the undoubtedly hostile reception and voices from Cuninico residents (NGO2R1 in CBO4R1-R2 interview). The presence of the Catholic Church’s human rights legal team posed a threat and the meeting never occurred (CBO4R1a), showing that REIs can choose to reject participation if they cannot control it. The Alianza Arkana interviewee recalled how Pluspetrol were not willing to take part in the Messa de Desarrollo Multi-sectoral Commission talks that led to the signing of the Historic Act and were reluctant to sign it (NGO7R1) highlighting the lack of a participatory enforcement mechanism. REI power vis-à-vis collective groups means that the latter, especially scrutiny-based voice groups, can struggle to achieve dialogue like citizens.

However, this situation doesn’t apply to all NGOs. In E-Tech International’s case, their technical scrutiny-based based voice means that “[t]hey [REIs] have to listen to us.” “Our social justice work comes from the technical documents” they produce whilst former oil industry employees have more “direct connections to people within oil companies” (NGO1R1). This does not lead to a more positive relationship. The representative found that “it can be a little more difficult to deal [with] the people operating in Loreto …. because they’re used to doing things their way” e.g. Pluspetrol. Consequently, “we have to get right to the point … [and] provide the evidence right away …. because they aren’t interested in having … honest open discussions. They’re on the attack right away … and we need to be ready for that.” Moreover, “their willingness to listen to us only goes as far as … their best interests” (ibid.), rather than any profound sense of best practice or concern for their oil exploitation impacts.

Nevertheless, more recent international REI arrivals such as Gran Tierra have been more open in setting a good example (NGO1R1; NGO4R1), allowing E-Tech International and NCI to access plenty of information (NGO1R1) and establish a “relationship with them” through “the ... regional conservation management committee” (NGO6R1). It is probable that this REI lacks local extractive knowledge which makes these stakeholder groups useful. At the same time, their status as “new kid on the block” means that it’s imperative for them to create positive relationships with other experienced actors to help lead to a stable operating environment which, at least in the short-term, reduces collective-voice-actor scrutiny of their operations.
Secondly, like the state, one finds that “an NGO that is prepared to work, to keep the people soft towards the [oil] company is going to be favoured by them and an NGO that is more militant is[n’t]” (NGO2R1c). A clear illustration is SPDA (NGO5R1), which partly focuses on social conflict and natural resource management. “[W]e are always in contact with them [REIs] or they have contact with us because they identify our experience and consult with us to be able to develop their activities” (ibid.) One of the most crucial practical aspects is their role as impartial intermediaries in conflict management between indigenous communities and REIs, a difficult role given the bias which communities may feel the NGO is showing towards oil companies (ibid.). Moreover, SPDA’s help linking some REI “activities to the communities where we also operate” (ibid.), is also useful as it allows the NGO to act as the benign non-corporate face of REIs with indigenous communities that may mistrust these actors (NGO6R1) and help establish relations through their own pueblo contact. This is particularly useful for REI’s which move into new oil Blocks who will lack local contacts and personalised relationships.

Likewise, ProNaturaleza (NGO4R1-R2) is also closely affiliated to REIs, which provide economic support for their projects along with other international and private donors (NGO4R1). 212 Specific support from the companies includes funding for community-based environmental monitoring programmes operating in the Corrientes Cuenca and CSR projects in their extractive zones such as “fishing management” (working with five communities on the Rio Corrientes) (NGO4R2b), the purchase of land for use as a conservation area and an indigenous scholarship programme (NGO4R1; NGO4R2b).

These projects are extremely beneficial for REIs; in the case of the monitoring programme they act “like … [an] alarm” which allows “contingency plans [to be] delivered asap” and can prevent social conflict issues from taking root. Given the history of environmental contamination, and the resentment communities may have for REI activities (NGO4R2a), their funding of

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212 We “have received up to $800,000 per year from the oil companies” (NGO4R1).
ProNaturaleza’s CSR programme allows them to make use of an actor whose work with communities may have been occurring for longer and in a more positive and trustful manner. This local knowledge, particularly their identification of “pro-activity” (i.e. pro-oil) people born through formal and informal dialogue events, can help spread the message and evangelise other citizens to see the benefits of oil development (NGO4R1). This is undoubtedly beneficial for REI operations whose own staff “don’t do that evangelisation” and may not have such detailed local knowledge (ibid.). Consequently, though ProNaturaleza’s first interviewee states that their close REI relationship is an opportunity to develop “our work and our projects” (my emphasis) and generated a triple-win situation for the NGO, REI and selva communities (NGO4R1) it is clear that these are almost fully if not wholly orchestrated and aligned with oil companies who gain many useful undeclared benefits not felt by communities.

Consequently, REI self-interest and the services that these non-state actors can offer for extractive operations will allow some supportive NGOs to have strong working relationships in comparison to scrutiny-based voice actors. REI control and power will also allow them to seek out meetings with these stakeholders proactively, motivated by self-interest rather than a search for dialogue. For example, the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator recalled one occasion when Pluspetrol flew from Lima to meet to discuss oil contamination and the positive remediation work they were doing and their concern at negative media reports stemming from CBO4R1. In another case, *Derecho Ambiental y Recursos Naturales* (Law, Environment and Natural Resources, DAR), an NGO focused on governance, sustainable development and the promotion of Amazonian indigenous peoples’ rights, described how REIs strategically approach NGOs like

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213 Their institution has been operating for 20 years in Loreto with the interviewee having worked 15 years, travelling and staying with communities for 35 days at a time (NGO4R1).
214 “I think that communities would believe more in an institution like ProNaturaleza. They see the company as the one who comes to take things from them, and the state as someone who doesn’t do anything” (NGO4R1). “They trust us, because our intervention is part of a link between the person/fisherman and the specialist, where the values of the professional are very important” (NGO4R2b).
215 Formal tools occur through “regional assemblies” while informal tools include “sports evenings, cinema, etc.” (NGO4R1).
216 “I have personally met some of the community relations’ people [from REIs] who … didn’t know the name of the main representative of the community” (NGO4R1).
217 “We both win from the situation [pause] we win because we get a name, and the company get a better image from the work they do, and finally the communities also win because they benefit from that situation” (NGO4R1).
their’s to assist them in their extractive projects by helping with community relations i.e. galvanising positive local support (NGO8R1). However, for these stakeholders, “you don’t want companies to support you either” (NGO7R1) “because sometimes the indigenous people think you’ve sold yourself” (CBO4R1a), an issue which ProNaturaleza has found with their close REI links, 218 highlighting the tightrope and contentious environment which can form between REIs, CBO/NGO groups and their respective citizen links.

7.5 Conclusion

Overall, two overarching points are apparent from this citizen and collective voice situation with Petroperu and other REIs. Firstly, both case-study communities show that Petroperu’s selva civil engagement can be summarised as a responsive “sticking plaster” approach (NGO2R1b). Whilst a community leader in Cuninico is right to note that it has an “obligation” (IRC2) to co-ordinate with the pueblo, the citizens have no way of forcing it to do so. The GOREL Manager of Health and Environment utilised a chess analogy that is aptly suited to this conclusion. “Negotiations are like a chess game. We have Garry Kasparov [Russian chess Grand Master] here, for example, and then the communities are just like a trainee. The negotiations go this way: while he has been thinking about five different ways of doing things, the others haven’t even started thinking” (RGR1). The power and knowledge reside almost solely with the REI who dictate dialogue terms.

Accordingly, one finds that REIs will travel into the selva and meet communities in response to environmental disasters or radical action taken by citizens (NGO2R1a, b). There is never any ongoing style of communication, evidenced most strongly in Cuninico’s case, where they “distanced themselves from the community” (IRC8) and left them without any orthodox formal voice access. In Barrio Florido, their geographical proximity and economic and energy ties necessities some form of exchange but here again, the community cannot enforce it do so with the everyday relationship controlled by Petroperu who seek to internalise dialogue to the IEVAs, especially in instances of voice protest. Even so, this pueblo is treated significantly better than

218 The indigenous pueblos are aware that this NGO is partially funded by REIs. “At the beginning, it was questioned by the communities” (NGO4R2b) who “may feel like we’re supporting companies and that’s not the case” (NGO4R1). However, “after six years of work, we have proved that being funded by the company doesn’t necessarily mean that the results will be on their best interest” (NGO4R2b).
Cuninico, where discrimination is evident from their remediation work and short-term limited supplies provided by Petroperu. It is conceivable that if Barrio Florido were an indigenous *pueblo*, their everyday relationship would be significantly worse.

Unfortunately, these experiences are not unique for Petroperu\(^{219}\) or indeed the Loreto and the wider EMaDE oil industry. A Catholic Church human-rights lawyer recounted the experiences of the Saramurillo indigenous *pueblo* (Urarinas District, Loreto Province) who were affected by a Pluspetrol oil spill in 2011. They started asking for dialogue with them [the REI], they’re neighbours. They called them, invited them, because they wanted their waters to be cleaned …. [But] they [the REI] didn’t pay attention. They have invited them several times and they have felt discriminated [against] (CBO4R2).

Equally, in Nigeria’s oil-rich Niger Delta region, communities have often been blamed for ongoing oil spills through pipeline sabotage (see Gonzalez 2016a; 2016b) which until very recently helped stop REI’s giving financial payments to affected communities (Vidal 2014).\(^{220}\)

For collective voice-based stakeholders, their access and relationship is dependent upon the rationale of their work. Organisations which scrutinise REI operations have struggled to establish contact with REIs unless it’s in REI interests to do so. Only technical scrutiny voice-based organisations (i.e. E-Tech International, NGO1R1) are in a stronger position and cannot be so easily ignored, a situation aided by insider contacts and industry links. For supportive voice actors (e.g. ProNaturaleza, NGO4R1-R2 and SPDA, NGO5R1), they are able to establish strong working relationships due to their technical skills and range of *selva* projects which can be very beneficial for REI operations.

\(^{219}\) For example, NCSSC3 from San Jorge community have a representative president who “will have some dialogue with the company [Petroperu].” The most recent oil pollution in September 2014 did see the REI provide “water and food [rice]” but only for a short time. More recently, the first two 2016 *Oleoducto Norperuano* oil spills saw reports (denied by Petroperu) of children employed in remediation work (Post 2016b) whilst indigenous remediation work on the third oil spill in June 2016 saw them lack proper safety equipment (Fraser 2016d; see also Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 82).

\(^{220}\) After a three-year legal battle, Shell agreed to a £55 million ($84 million) settlement with residents of the Bodo community in 2015 (BBC News 2015d), a deal which throws open the door to future cases against the REI and the impact from sabotage or stolen oil (Vidal 2014).
Secondly, the state SCDV means that communities turn to companies instead, which are viewed as “more solvent and organised” (NSI4R1). They often must adopt state duties to provide basic services (which are “not the company’s responsibility” (IUA2) or “obligation” (RGR1) in exchange for local community operational consent ‘that generates a sort of bargaining momentum’, which ‘has very little government involvement’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 65). Indigenous communities “need them because there’s nobody there for you in cases of emergencies” (NGO7R1) reinforcing their REI dependency (RGR2) and increasing the power of companies who can control what this support entails.

Despite RGR1’s assertion that REIs provide frequent help and productive societal projects such as “health campaigns [or] schools”, Barrio Florido has shown that this support is minimal (MRBF26), symbolic (MRBF11), low cost and “simple” (FOPOW1) and usually only done if it’s in the company’s interests or at the whim of staff who “show off how much they’ve given” (MRBF29).221 These “companies are doing it because … it ticks the box, not because they really believe this is the way forward’ (NGO2R1b), leading to a lack of “productive projects” (NSI2R1) and a haphazard development approach evident in other REI selva operations.222 Though some indigenous communities have seen simple benefits they “haven’t been enough to balance out the symmetry that exists in the oil [Blocks] and the indigenous communities … [who] perceive [pause] the prejudices against these communities more than the benefits” (IUS2). This is a particularly powerful evaluation when one considers the lack of Petroperu development and benefits for Cuninico, a situation reinforcing the discriminatory nature of this REI who clearly, wherever possible, cut back on CSR initiatives for indigenous communities even more than they do for non-indigenous communities. As the Earthwatch interviewee noted, “there’s no social side to oil …. Oil is a social disaster. Where is oil not a social disaster?” (NGO3R1). Indeed, “Loreto [Province]

221 IUA2, MRBF26 and NSI2R1 recalled how Pluspetrol, which ran Andoas airfield, would “give out a few seats” (NSI2R1) on their chartered light aircraft to indigenous people requiring medical treatment in Iquitos.
222 For instance, the SERNANP interviewee evaluated that “Pluspetrol has a terrible social policy…. They don’t comply with [agreements and] …. don’t take communities seriously” (NSI3R1) and evidence of this can be seen from a school built in Doce de Octobre on the Rio Tigre (Tigre District, Loreto Province) that had no teachers to staff it (NSI2R1). “Pluspetrol and many companies only care for the infrastructure” (ibid.) rather than consider the wider practicalities of this support.
has given Peru a lot of the country’s petrol …. and in return there [are] only bars …. prostitution, drunk people [pause]. So, petrol doesn’t help” (RGR2).

Even so, REI CSR control affords them the opportunity to utilise it to influence protest voices arrayed against them. These ‘special favours’ to individual complainant’s or collective voice leaders (Hirschman 1981 p. 241 author’s emphasis) represent only one strategy that Loreton REIs have deployed against possible threats and these will be discussed in the following Chapter alongside the influential role which CBO/NGO groups also play in shaping citizen voice.
Chapter 8 Petroperu and collective voice-based stakeholders shaping and moulding voice

Throughout the previous three chapters, the thesis has highlighted the difficulties facing stakeholders in their engagement and relationship with the government and Petroperu. The state has failed to be present in both case-study communities in a physical and authoritative sense and this has had two important impacts. Firstly, as noted in Chapter Seven, this has put REIs in an even more powerful position vis-à-vis selva-based communities and Section 8.1 will explore how Petroperu have sought to use this position to control and suppress critical citizen voice in Barrio Florido and Cuninico. Section 8.2 will explore their fragmentation of CBO-based voices. Secondly, the SCDV has strengthened the influence and role of CBO/NGO groups over citizens and their voice actions, generating both positive and negative effects, which will be discussed within Section 8.3.

8.1 REIs’ suppression of voice through economic, development and other threats

“[H]e said you know this is a private company and they would never want information to filter outside, the things they do” (IRC13 recounting a conversation with a Petroperu engineer).

As Chapters Six and Seven have shown, the refinery is the main employment source for Barrio Florido (MRBF4; MRBF7; MRBF21; MRBF27), usually taking the form of short-term temporary (elementary occupation) contracts (MRBF18), although during fieldwork only a few residents were employed (MRBF15; MRBF18). Nevertheless, these short-term contracts, alongside the money they make for the maintenance of the pipeline, make the pueblo economically dependent on Petroperu and this has generated a societal environment of fear and an unwillingness to voice. Evidence of this can be seen from the reaction of one female resident who declined to take part in an interview upon learning what it was about. MRBF13 felt this happened because “everyone is afraid … [as] they all depend on the refinery.”

This situation has a major impact on the inclination of inhabitants to voice. Testimonies spoke about refinery workers’ reluctance to criticise Petroperu because they would lose their jobs
“Mostly because all people from here work there, if they protest they will get fired” (MRBF21). “Oh yes. They don’t denounce …. it’s like they’re mute” (MRBF27). Consequently, in the 2009 oil spill, “some of them [neighbours] supported me but there were … others …. They all work here at the refinery and they are afraid of losing their jobs” (MRBF13).

Other residents believed that the IEVAs were also caught up in this climate of economic fear in two ways. “The authorities work there and they [the refinery manager] threaten to fire them from the job” (MRBF24) or “always give money to the Lieutenants” (MRBF27) to buy their silence (MRBF6: MRBF22; MRBF26; MRBF27; MRBF29). Interviewees felt this helped to suppress IEVA willingness to voice by keeping them “quiet” (MRBF24; MRBF29) or “asleep” in their jobs (MRBF6), reduce the threat of radical action being taken and make them obedient to the refinery manager (MRBF6; MRBF22). The result is that when pollution events or contentious moments occur, IEVAs don’t “do anything” (MRBF6) and trust in them by the pueblo must suffer.

The root cause of this situation is the economic dependency of Barrio Florido, which all but prevents the pueblo from having impartial IEVAs. “For example, always when we have elections here, candidates shouldn’t have any relationship with the refinery but that’s impossible because … [most] people … like [90] per cent … from here work there” (MRBF12). For successful candidates, “[t]here is always this pretext, what do you love more, your job [pause] …. so, they, of course, abstain from saying anything, so almost never has the refinery [had] problems” (MRBF12). Understandably, residents wished this was different. “For me [it would be best] that the authorities be strong and [say], “you can fire me and I can see the betterment of the pueblo”’” (MRBF24). Sadly, no interviewees alluded to this happening.

Yet these job losses would appear to be based on fears and rumours rather than fact. No interviewees could name citizens who had lost their job. Indeed, after the 2009 event, MRBF13, the housewife who had initially contacted the radio noted that “at the end no-one was made redundant, no one lost his job, they are all working” (MRBF13). Are these rumours spread by Petroperu or residents concerned that the vocal actions of others may cause them to be fired? The source(s) will never be substantiated but this misses the point; for Petroperu, they are a useful economic threat to suppress protest voices. As one young manual refinery labourer noted, there
was no need for Petroperu to “say anything to us” as we “know that if we complain or say something [pause] they’ll just fire us” (MRBF16). Words do not need to be expressed; the climate of fear which envelops Barrio Florido provides the necessary deterrent for voice.

Petroperu have been able to use this environment to great effect in other ways, notably their unverified employment of citizen informers. “If you have a meeting done here, next day first thing in the morning the general manager knows what we said the night before ...” (MRBF13). On one occasion, residents had put together an agenda asking the refinery for some things but “we hadn’t even arrived and the general manager already knew what we wanted to ask for” (ibid.). The threat of temporary contract termination, personal greed and citizen poverty are all underlying motives for informers, whose actions would imbue the refinery with a greater sense of power in the pueblo’s eyes. By using informers, Petroperu can fracture Barrio Florido’s collective voice strength by sowing seeds of disunity and mistrust.

The climate of fear has also been used concerning electrical provision. Some residents suggested a reluctance to voice due to the “essential” electrical provision (MRBF15) and the threat from Petroperu to “take away the electricity” (MRBF25). Though these “rumours” ignored the long-running energy agreement between Barrio Florido and the refinery (MRBF12), 223 they would have been useful in drawing the pueblo into negotiations where they could placate the radical voice threat (MRBF11; MRBF25) through an increase in electrical provision.224

The fear and voice suppression within Barrio Florido are not a continuous cycle. One housewife felt that whilst people had feared job losses in the past, “right now it seems that people aren’t that afraid” (MRBF13), illustrated perhaps through the 2011 phone call to the radio. The new-found optimism may also be based on the pueblo’s recent IEVAs. The volunteer judge, the same individual who successfully renegotiated the increased electrical provision in 2013, also worked at the refinery but argued that it didn’t mean he would “stop talking just because the refinery is paying me. I am a worker but also an authority. They can’t buy me” (MRBF6).

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223 See Chapter 6, Section 6.1, Footnote 164 and Chapter 7, Section 7.3, Footnote 208.
224 See Chapter 7, Section 7.3, Footnote 209.
MRBF6’s strength of character, perhaps aided by a family relative acting as Teniente allowed them to “fight” and not “just stand there and not do anything about it [i.e. issues]. We will listen to what they [Petroperu] say, but then we’ll do what’s necessary.”

Consequently, the moral strength of individuals’ characters also play a role in shaping how successful Petroperu is in silencing the pueblo’s voice, particularly its IEVAs. However, the annual electoral cycle for IEVAs means that stronger, more resolute individuals may not always be elected. New authorities, who can seem “shy” and reluctant to “step up”, have sometimes required community encouragement (MRBF25), a situation stemming not only from their inexperience as authoritative figures but also borne through the pueblo’s economic dependency and climate of fear.

Despite being a vastly different context, Petroperu orchestrated a similar climate of fear in Cuninico, with the exclusive aim of suppressing citizen voice. Petroperu sought to “negotiate silently with … [the pueblo] without anyone’s knowledge” to conclude a deal to “hide everything” (CBO4R3), clean the spill quickly (IRC25) and therefore prevent wider public knowledge of the spill. Residents noted that the company embarked upon “little secret meetings” (IRC8) “in silence” (IRC24) with the IEVAs (the Apu and his deputy) who were shut off by themselves rather than held with the rest of the community (IRC8; IRC14) to buy them off (IRC23; IRC24; IRC25). “That’s how it was. That’s how they behaved. They didn’t want to have meetings with the village … to discuss the contamination with us …. It was all hidden …. they closed the door, so that nobody could go in, and they had the meetings inside” (IRC7). These meetings led to an agreement that included job provision in exchange for their silence (CBO4R3), the IEVAs informing the community that “everything [had] been solved now” (IRC24). This agreement gave Petroperu the opportunity to begin its suppressive voice strategy.

Residents were told that ““if you speak out against us [Petroperu], there won’t be any work at all”” (IRC7). The community’s economic poverty and work opportunity on a wage of 80 soles a day (IRC11; IRC13; IRC14; IRC18; IRC20; IRC22; IRC25) (rising to 150 soles a day for workers lifting and repairing the pipeline (IRC13)) was received very happily (IRC3) by almost all the Cocama, who “offered themselves up” (IRC7) for employment. “Ochenta soles. Era un plata y teníamos que trabajar por la necesidad” (80 soles. That was a fortune in those days and
we had to work for necessity) (IRC11). Given these circumstances, this blunt threat was taken “seriously” (IRC7) by residents and left them, as Petroperu hoped, feeling “scared”, “afraid to talk … [and] silent [with] … only three or four people … who spoke up and defended the village” (IRC7).

This economic suppression of voice continued for those working at the remediation site. Testimonies make clear that resident labourers were warned not to criticise Petroperu in any way otherwise they would lose their job (IRC6; IRC7; IRC11; IRC15). “[W]hen the workers … claim their food, they [Petroperu] got angry and said that they were paying well for that and you do not have to claim …. Because if you start claiming you’re gonna be fired” (IRC24). The threats became reality; IRC13 was fired for questioning the company about the spill, their remediation methods and for being secretly present at an oil camp meeting between Petroperu and state representatives which none of Cuninico’s IEVAs could attend.225

Given these circumstances, people “didn’t say a word” (IRC7) and “kept quiet” about their employment conditions and “endur[ed] it” (IRC6). Citizens were worried; IRC7 believed they were observed and that “if anybody spoke up …. they’d remove us from the workforce”, leaving residents anxious and “throwing themselves at this work.” The threat of job losses helped force workers to complete tasks they were hesitant about. In one instance, the group of female workers were “threatened … that if we didn’t complete the tasks [helping remove oil from the ravine without protective clothing] [pause] they would fire us” (IRC20). As IRC7 summarised, Petroperu “were clever” and “knew” that residents “were … afraid that they’d remove you from the work.”

Yet this blanket of fear over job provision also ran parallel to a range of promises made to community members in exchange for their silence. Cocama interviewees spoke about Petroperu promising to “send us everything” (IRC5) and “whatever you want” (IRC3) like “food for a year” (IRC5), the provision of a generator so “you don’t talk” (IRC15), a medical posta staffed by a doctor (IRC5; IRC6; IRC7; IRC8; IRC9) and a water tank (IRC9; IRC13), all of which “at the end wasn’t true, they lied” (IRC13). Other residents (IRC6; IRC7; IRC9) don’t recall these promises

225 The absence of IEVAs at the meeting is unsurprising; IRC13 asserted that Petroperu lied about Cuninico’s (positive) opinion concerning their remediation work and the provision of medical and subsistence aid.
being made suggesting that Petroperu were making these verbal commitments to different people in an intimate manner to generate a web of falsehoods that would suppress any immediate community protest voice. Indeed, upon asking one fisherman why Cuninico hadn’t staged a strike over the pollution, their reply highlights the initial success Petroperu had in stifling voice.

Because we thought that Petroperu was going to cooperate and keep their promises to us, because they told us “we’re going to help you with whatever you want, so don’t protest. We’re going to keep our word to you.” So, we waited. But then later, when we saw that they were resisting a bit, we called people in to help us …. that’s why we didn’t do anything earlier (IRC3).

In other villages, this strategy of offering employment, small-scale development promises and money has been successful in keeping “everyone quiet” (NGO2R1b). A Catholic Church priest, whose parish covers communities in the *Marañón Cuenca*, provides an illustration of

San José de Saramuro, [where] people value the possibility of having a job at the oil company [*Oleoducto Norperuano* Station 1], and that is above any other claim. When the spill in Cuninico took place, one week before that, there was a spill in San José de Saramuro. Does somebody know about [this spill]? No …. Why [do] people know about Cuninico? Well … because they requested our help … but San José de Saramuro, which is also part of the parish … didn’t want anything (CBO4R3).

Therefore, even in a community that had Catholic Church support, Petroperu could suppress their voice.226

Why was Cuninico willing and able to remove the veil of fear and suppression caused by Petroperu? Arguably, it could perhaps be the failure of Petroperu to deliver their promises in a timely manner and subsequent refusal to provide help (IRC3). However, like Barrio Florido, individual figures played an important role in shaping Cuninico’s ongoing reaction to Petroperu’s initial suppressive strategy.

Firstly, IRC3 who was “an organiser at the [Catholic] Church” (IRC3) had significant influence over the decision to contact the Catholic Church repeatedly for help (CBO4R3). IRC3’s

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226 Equally, two interviewees recounted Pluspetrol’s efforts to secure private deals with communities (NCSSC2; NGO2R1a) to prevent them from trying to seek other forms of legal justice discussed in Section 8.3.
“pushing” along of these authorities “saying that, please they had to look at the situation with the spill in this community” (IRC3) was therefore instrumental. “We have to thank this guy, that he was an animator” (IRC29) of their Catholic Church-based alliance.

Secondly, despite Petroperu’s efforts, one elderly resident concluded that “the Apu cannot sell himself”, not only because he had grown up in Cuninico but also because “[h]e’s very much a stand-up guy” (IRC9), a phrase taken to mean honourable, moral and principled. This was a leader who was willing to “[fight] for the people” (ibid.) and not be silenced through bribery or intimidation. Through his leadership and the community’s close Catholic Church connection, they almost completely unified and had the strength to seek out this actor’s support.227 As one fisherman remarked, “we didn’t want to be controlled by Petroperu. If we’d carried on working for them instead of looking for [pause] well, we wouldn’t have carried on with the suit [the legal case], nothing” (IRC6).

Yet even with the involvement of the Catholic Church, Petroperu continued to try and maintain control over proceedings and limit the fall-out from the oil spill response. The company sought to secure private financial agreements with the families of the employed minors to make them “forget about [the] complaint”, an arrangement the mother was “very reluctant” to consent to due to the hurt caused to her son (IRC23). Other testimonies spoke of a “settlement” (IRC22; IRC23) or “liquidation” (IRC20) payment for the manual workers ranging from between 1,300 to 1,700 soles (IRC20; IRC22), no doubt an effort to try and weaken the resolve of these workers to protest and continue their Catholic Church relationship.

Petroperu also took steps to suppress knowledge about the full extent of the spill and their employment of indigenous people without protective clothing. Oil workers who brought their camera phones to the oil site had them confiscated (IRC13).228 When government agency representatives (ANA, DIGESA, OEFA) or journalists arrived to document the spill, the oil workers in the clean-up of the dredged waterway were removed and hidden in the selva, being

227 IRC19 noted that only a handful (two to four) inhabitants who worked for Petroperu (in what capacity it isn’t clear) were reluctant to forge a Catholic Church connection for fear of what it might lead to.
228 This was not altogether successful; IRC13 confirms that community members did take photos which were given to the Catholic Church.
allowed to return to work after the inspections had left (IRC11; IRC13; IRC20; IRC24; IRC25). In this way, they never saw “what we did, they never took pictures of us inside the canal as we used to work” without adequate protection and instead “would only see people from other areas with wheelbarrow[s] or doing maintenance” work (IRC13).

Moreover, by stopping this cleaning work, Petroperu was able to “cheat” (IRC8) the inspection process by showing state representatives “that it was all clean” (IRC14) rather than land “full of ... oil” (IRC16). This was also achieved through the use of a chemical applied to the remediation site that sank the oil into the ground or to the bottom of water (CBO4R1a; IRC2; IRC8; IRC9; IRC13; IRC14; IRC16; IRC17; IRC19; IRC20) and by taking government representatives and journalists to areas “where there wasn’t any ... oil” (IRC19). Other oil workers employed in basic maintenance and clean-up duties were told “to continue our work” but denied the chance to speak to journalists (IRC14). The arrival of journalists saw “the ones that were too black” from the oil “given white overalls ... boots ... gloves ... [and a] helmet” to change into “so they could say that’s how ... we worked” (IRC25). Workers “listened to them for fear of getting fired” (IRC20).

Petroperu also sought to subvert Cuninico’s workers’ voice. Under job loss threats (IRC17), a group of roughly ten workers were “prepared” (IRC14) by Petroperu for interviews with visiting government figures or journalists. They were instructed to say that “it’s clean” (IRC14), the spill was less severe than it was and that the workers were given protection (IRC16). Petroperu’s success here was dependent on how individual citizens responded to this situation. IRC16 didn’t want to be interviewed and instead left whilst others “came out against what we were supposed to communicate” (IRC20). However, a 60-year-old Cuninico man “scared” of the situation felt he faced a dilemma between depriving the people of work and selling himself but decided that “because of the needs of the people, I had to say that it wasn’t contaminated” (IRC9)

229 IRC13 travelled with Catholic Church representatives to show them areas where the oil had been buried. “[T]hey did wash the first layer but underneath it was dirty, and ... I ... took my spade ... [and] dug and we could see how it was full of oil.”

230 Incidentally, a similar strategy was utilised by Occidental Petroleum in their former operations by taking state representatives to collect samples from non-polluted locations (IUA1).
whilst IRC16 recalled that one interviewed lady was saying “everything in [Petroperu’s] favour” which was “to the contrary” and untrue. Petroperu staff sought to disseminate these accounts to journalists brought along by the company (ibid.).

Overall, both communities show similar Petroperu efforts to subvert and stifle their voices. This can occur through dependency, which occurs in each pueblo in two different ways. For Barrio Florido, the state SCDV and disengagement runs alongside its Petroperu socio-economic dependency which the oil company utilises against the pueblo to suppress protest voices. In Cuninico’s case, their form of dependency came through their remediation jobs in exchange for their silence, maintained through veiled employment threats and promises of small-scale development gifts. With Catholic Church involvement, the REI went into damage limitation mode by trying to buy off labourers and subvert their voice to the government and media.

However, the events in José de Saramuro make clear that this strategy is widespread. “When there’s a spill, that’s how Petroperu is. They go to the towns. They recruit everyone, the president, the Apu, the deputy, the authorities … [they] are [all] paid, and there’s nobody who speaks out” (IRC6). Local mayors who show an interest in REI operations would reach “an agreement” with them to not “stir up any trouble” in exchange for favours such as free river transport (CBO1R1) which can irrevocably damage local community trust for these authorities.231 For selva oil-based communities, their weaker power, REI dependency and the latter’s economic voice suppression means that “you’re not gonna stand up against them …. Or … question them …” (NGO7R1).

8.2 Fragmenting voice: divide and rule

“[T]hey [REIs] try to separate … communities, they try to divide them” (OEFA representative NSI2R1).

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231 One Cuninico housewife animatedly suggested that the (then) new local mayor’s lack of post-spill support was because “Petroperu [had] paid him”, which led to him “play[ing] dumb” and “stay[ing] mute” (IRC20).
Citizen voice suppression is not the only strategy applied by REIs. Indigenous federations, collective voice organisations which are present across the selva and wider Peru, are a fractured and divided force in Peruvian socio-political life. REIs have had a hand in this division.

Within Loreto, there are four major indigenous organisations which span the cuencas. These are Cocama Conservation and Development Association San Pablo de Tipishca (ACODECOSPAT) in the Marañón Cuenca (which represent Cuninico), FECONAT in the Tigre Cuenca, Federation of Native Communities of Corrientes (FECONACO) in the Corrientes Cuenca and Indigenous Federation of Pastaza Quechua (FEDIQUEP) in the Pastaza Cuenca. Other indigenous organisations of various sizes bring the total number to 22 (CBO3R1), an indication of Loreto’s geographical size and the multitude of indigenous groups residing there. These are represented by ORPIO (Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the East) at a regional “second level to give a place for dialoguing with the Government … where the state can hear about the problems of … indigenous people” (CBO3R1). Alongside eight other regional federations, they are represented at a national level by Association Interethnic Development of the Peruvian Jungle (AIDESEP) (AIDESEP no date).

The management of indigenous federations should offer advantages for Loreton indigenous citizens. This local network and their connection to larger regional and national organisations provides citizens with different levels of collective voice platforms from which to engage with and build and support dialogue with the government and REIs, e.g. monitoring remediation agreement implementation with the latter (CBO3R1). This is particularly useful in vertical voice dialogue with REIs, the stronger power of which vis-à-vis citizens can be rebalanced by a collective negotiating platform (NSI4R1). However, though this representative system should strengthen indigenous voice, it is fractured and divided at all spatial levels.

At a local Loreton level, ProNaturaleza working in the Corrientes Cuenca recounted that “[t]here are two federations in the Corrientes – FECONACO, the oldest federation; and FEPIBAC [Federation of Indigenous People of the Lower and Upper Rio Corrientes]. There are communities where they are all FECONACO and they are all FEPIBAC” (NGO4R2b). This results in two representative Apus’, who divide the cuencas collective voice through needless distractive conflict,
meaning that “they tend to miss … opportunities to fight for their resources” (NGO4R2b) and rights.

Another illustration can be seen from the establishment of Indigenous Amazonian States in Defence of their Territories (PUINAMUDT) in 2011 by nine indigenous Loreto federations (see Baker 2013-2014 p. 13; PUINAMUDT no date), a semi-regional organisation which conceivably weakened ORPIO’s collective voice. Similarly, at a national level, AIDESEP is also joined by a rival federation, The Confederation of Amazonian Nationalities of Peru (CONAP) (Peru Ministerio de Cultura no date b), which includes numerous indigenous Amazonian groups (Forestry Legality Alliance no date).

While both groups are critical of government land policies, CONAP favours a more accommodating approach since it holds that development is inevitable and communities should focus [on] getting a fair share of the benefits. On the other hand, any territorial encroachments at all are opposed by AIDESEP (Minorities at Risk 2003; see also Earle and Pratt 2009 pp. 18-19).

Once again, as with the Loreton regional situation, these two national federations and their different visions prevent a more unified national voice from being established (NGO8R1).

Yet, is it even possible to generate a unity of purpose and single, strong indigenous voice in Loreto and Peru? There are two key reasons why this is highly difficult. Firstly, whilst communities have Apus, they are still traditionally run through a clan and family-based approach (NGO7R1). This creates a far wider horizontal authority structure and can generate a greater variety of opinion. Leaders will almost inevitably create conflict with individuals, families, groups or whole communities somewhere at some stage for decisions they make. Indeed, one can also recall Hirschman’s (1981 p. 244) point on the “treachery of voice” evident in this collective voice scenario.232 There is thus a multiplicity of voices and opinions preventing the establishment of a strong unified indigenous voice.

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232 See Chapter 2, Section 2.6.
Secondly and more specifically for Loreto, the Red Ambiental Loretana interviewee makes clear that there was never “a single voice or a collectivity” of voices sharing the same ideas and this is fundamentally to do with the evolution of Loreton oil development over time. Going back to the commencement of CBO1R1’s CBO, only Achuar and Kichwa communities living in the Corrientes and Tigre Cuencas were affected by oil development but other communities “really didn’t voice” (CBO1R1) as they were “asleep” and “didn’t anticipate that anything could happen” (FOPOW1) and lacked experience “of what contamination might be like” (CBO1R1). Consequently, the communities were at different stages in their relationship with REIs and therefore wanted different things; “one group [was] already working with the companies, others [were] complaining about what will happen, others now ready to talk to the company, it was a whole evolution so it’s never been a Loreton movement” (CBO1R1).

In this climate, REIs have had a conceivably easier time fragmenting indigenous collective voice and numerous examples show them helping to create smaller, weaker and conflicting entities. Perenco’s Block 67 operations have seen the emergence of a new indigenous federation with links to the REI. A report by CooperAcción noted that Perenco’s actions (compensation payments to only a few communities) caused the division of FECONANCUCA (Federation of Communities Natives of the Napo, Curaray and Arabela Rivers) into FECONAALCA (Federation of Native Communities of Alto Curaray and Arabela) (Claps 2013 p. 34). “It is enough that … an employee from an oil company says that a particular person received money for an organisation to divide or … weaken” (CBO4R3).

Similarly, in Block 116 (Santiago Basin, Amazonas Region) operated by Canadian-Columbian Pacific Rubiales and French Maurel et Prom, indigenous communities have been divided by the REI. “‘Before the arrival of the companies we were united”, Shawit [a Shawit indigenous federation member] said. “We shared the same fight, but the company has created divisions”” (Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times 2014). In relation to Pluspetrol’s former Block 1AB operations, there was “an internal conflict … with the indigenous people because the company … started to split the organisations” via their payments to certain communities for the rights of way (CBO4R1a).
Other REI strategies include focusing their attentions onto federation leaders to subdue possible protest voice leaders. In one case, a federation leader was flown to Lima by Pluspetrol and “[o]ffered everything … beer, drugs and women”, with which they can then blackmail the leaders or continue providing if they like it (IJ1). Money is also offered: the former President of the *Matsés* indigenous people\(^{233}\) “took 10,000 soles from a company and completely changed his public position … from being sternly against … for three years and then … effectively supporting the company” (IJ1). At other times, gossip alluding to payments to leaders is generated, a tactic magnified due to the indigenous culture of mistrust (CBO4R3). Together, these methods help to alienate leaders from their citizens (IJ1) and subsequently weaken them as authoritative figures within these important collective voice movements.

Overall, REIs have been able to utilise the fractured indigenous collective voice situation to their advantage. Their tactics have helped generate a more destabilised and less unified indigenous voice response to oil development as well as directly suppress any collective protest voice movements. While it is impossible to speculate on the direction that Peruvian indigenous politics will take, it is probable that division will remain a feature of the indigenous PEV landscape which in practice will see each people deal with REIs “to the best of their ability” (CBO1R1).

### 8.3 CBO/NGO and *asesora* influences: The good, the bad and the ugly

Interpreter: “Why do you think native communities go to strikes?”
MRBF1: “They are being manipulated by more prepared people, like NGOs – they dominate that conversation.”

Aside from REIs, there are other important collective voice actors (CBO/NGO) and individuals (*asesoras* or advisors) like anthropologists and lawyers, who have a significant influence on citizen voice, in this case helping to shape their government and REI access and the protest voice actions they choose to take. Two NGO interviewees sought to make their Loreton work vis-à-vis the government clear. The SPDA spokesperson noted that their NGO’s mission “isn’t to fulfil the state’s role” and instead seek to co-operate, advise and accompany the state in the fulfilment of various aims within environmental politics and law based themes (NGO5R1). Likewise, the NCI

\(^{233}\) An indigenous people split across the Brazil-Peru border.
interviewee stated explicitly that they “are not the state and by no means do we pretend to occupy their place. We work with the communities … but we try to do our activities together with those from the state …. so that … activities are led by [them]” (NGO6R1).

However, as Chapter 6 has shown, there is state SCDV and disengagement which has allowed the establishment of an open space (NSI2R1) and “a gap that the state isn’t filling” (NGO6R1) that these other actors can operate and have a great deal of influence in (CBO3R1; NGO4R1). Their influence on citizens is not only high due to the SCDV but also because selva indigenous citizens are, in a general sense, unsure and conflicted about what they want from the SHDV (NGO2R1a; NSI2R1). This is primarily caused by low educational levels (NSI2R1; NSI5R1; RGR1), poor educational opportunities and weak indigenous capacities, “logistic[al], technical or scientific” (CBO3R1). This leaves them unable to formulate informed responses and open to possible manipulation by people “with more knowledge … [and] education” (NSI5R1). Consequently, these external actors have an operating environment which allows them to impose their own individual selva visions on indigenous peoples (NGO7R1) which can have positive and more contentious impacts.

Firstly, these groups provide many positive supportive mechanisms for citizens to voice. One of the most important was empowerment “so that they [indigenous peoples] can defend themselves” (NGO7R1) and this was most resolutely achieved through education (CBO4R3; NGO6R1; NGO7R1; NGO8R1), particularly through the knowledge about their hydrocarbon process rights. These sorts of activities are vital given that there has not been “too much care of the government to really … educate the … indigenous organisations” and “no methodologies provided by the government to explain to indigenous people about their rights” (NGO8R1). Whilst the Ministry of Culture and Vice Ministry of Interculturalism have been created, they are still relatively new (established in 2011), meaning that CBO and NGO actors will continue to play an important role in educating and supporting indigenous organisations (NGO8R1) in the years to come.

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234 A 2014 study found that of the 179 adult inhabitants of ten remote pueblos ‘30.2 [per cent] (N=54) had not completed primary education, with 54.2 [per cent] (N=97) having completed primary education and no further education. Eight [per cent] (N=12) were illiterate and could not sign their name’ (Brierley et al. 2014 p. 181).
For instance, DAR work predominantly work with indigenous federations rather than at grassroots level and seek to improve the “capacities” of federation leaders in the Ucayali Province. They provide them with an understanding of “the legal framework for hydrocarbon activities”, the EIA process and their rights related to these procedures, achieved through a special methodology for indigenous people that utilises “[d]idactic materials” for them to understand (NGO8R1).

Two other NGOs also focus on capacities but from a grassroots level. NCI “trains communities in their rights so that they know them …. [and] how they can … claim them” (NGO6R1). SPDA, which “has been working for almost 30 years in topics related to environmental politics, and environmental legislation within Peru”, is currently employed on the aforementioned “conservation for peace” (NGO5R1).235 By strengthening them in this way, “we expect to have an early warning protocol that will be managed by some of the communities’ leaders which will help with conflict management” (ibid.). As with DAR, some publications are “adjusted so that they can be interactive and good for communities” whilst “a team of professional communicators who specialise in trying … to identify the ways in which these communities can access information [has been established], so [that we can] reach people in the most appropriate ways” (ibid.).

Similarly, the Catholic Church through the interviewed parish priest (CBO4R3) not only completed religious duties for over 60 communities in the Marañón Cuenca but also “put itself at the service of indigenous people who didn’t understand what was happening [to their environment].” To that end they focused on “preparing various leaders in different topics, one of them, indigenous rights” to improve indigenous federation internal knowledge (ibid.). Often these collective voiced-based actors are “just there to provide all that information that they have been missing for so much for so long” (NGO1R1).

The educational provision that these organisations deliver includes supporting indigenous youth in higher education (NGO7R1). Crucially an effort is made not to “disconnect them from

235 See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.
their communities and federations” so that these *pueblos* will “have their own human resources” (NGO7R1) leading to an increased talent pool which strengthens their future capacities and voice.

Aside from a focus on improving indigenous hydrocarbon rights and knowledge, practical educational or technical activities were also carried out. Two important aims were apparent. The most common was “vigilancia de la comunidad” (NGO8R1) or environmental monitoring which NGOs were involved with (CBO3R1) including several interviewed organisations (E-Tech International (NGO1R1); ProNaturaleza (NGO4R1-R2); DAR (NGO8R1)). This complements government-backed monitoring training sought out by some federations (NSI1R1a) but also helps to implement it in areas that still lack this mechanism (NGO1R1). ProNaturaleza has established environmental monitoring services in the *Corrientes Cuenca* for the last eight years which provides training and capability [through equipment including GPS and cameras] to the people in charge of monitoring the communities (elected by Assembly) … to be able to monitor … oil activity. The community monitoring programmes don’t replace [required company monitoring] but … complements it (NGO4R1).

DAR was seeking to “improve their system of monitoring” by standardising the process across the various Regions (Amazonas, Loreto, Junin and Ucayali), invaluable work which will strengthen vital local civic-run dialogue and accountability mechanisms vis-à-vis REIs (NGO8R1).

Secondly, the practical support that these institutions can provide is also incredibly useful for *selva* communities. Economic support is sometimes provided (CBO1R1) to improve community access but given their own Loreto operational costs (CBO3R1; NGO1R1; NGO6R1), it is probably minimal. Others (E-Tech International (NGO1R1); ProNaturaleza (NGO4R1-R2)) support *selva pueblos* through technical document production on a range of issues

236 In 2013, ANA was approached by FECONAT to provide environmental monitoring training for about 20 citizens who were taught how to use the GPS equipment (NSI1R1a).
237 The E-Tech International interviewee recounted one instance where a single boat journey from Iquitos up the length of the *Rio Pastaza* cost $2,000 for the fuel (NGO1R1). Meanwhile, the Loreto indigenous federation ORPIO get to their representative indigenous communities “where we can, depending on the resources/possibilities … as we aren’t the Government … we don’t have so much money, we can’t go that often” (CBO3R1).
surrounding hydrocarbon extraction (e.g. mercury levels in rivers) (NGO1R1) which can be used by the communities to “hand over to the government” (ibid.) and strengthen vocal dialogue with them. More basically, CBO/NGO groups can act as interpreters in assemblea meetings (CBO3R1; NGO1R1) and therefore support Vice Ministry of Interculturalism indigenous interpreters (CBO3R1). NGO actors can also review EIA proposals helping to improve the indigenous people’s language capacity and understanding of these complex procedures and documents (NGO1R1).238

From a different angle, a former government employee with experience of the Prior Consultation process highlighted the difficulties of state and REI consultation with selva communities:

[Indigenous people] … are given the … project …. who read nothing…. But obviously, the gravity … dimension … [and] the depth of the project … [means] they are incapable of understanding it. There is such a great gap in terms of the lack of comprehension and understanding, and the scope of the projects between these people here [state/REI] and these people here [indigenous citizens]. This is the problem (IUA1).

This is particularly evident with “[o]il or mining companies [who] …. don’t have the most educational approach to inform communities about their activities …. [and] can use … technical words that people cannot relate [to]” (NGO5R1). Therefore, the verification of citizen comprehension of these processes (ibid.) and simplification of state and REI information that five interviewed NGOs provide (E-Tech International (NGO1R1); Earthwatch Institute (NGO3R1); ProNaturaleza (NGO4R2b); SPDA (NGO5R1); Alianza Arkana (NGO7R1)) is an invaluable activity.

“When we have … a workshop with a community, we take [the] technical language and … put it into rural language” (NGO3R1). This often follows the official “technical … very dry … inaccessible … presentations with our own interpretations … present[ed] … in a way that can be understood by people in communities” (NGO1R1) including through the use of pictures and the provision of hard copies (NGO4R2b).239 Although the anthropologist at the Research Institute of

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238 Despite Quechua being an official language in Peru (MRG 2016 p. 111), Spanish ‘is the language of commerce, education, and government’ (Cultural Survival no date).
239 IUA1 stated that the state will simplify hydrocarbon activity information through “drawings, and schemes to make them understand” intercultural approaches which the state is trying to take into consideration (NGO5R1). However,
the Peruvian Amazon believes that “you cannot bridge this gap [between the state/REIs and indigenous people] with a workshop, or five workshops or a public audience” (IUA1), simplifying the information is extremely useful. “[W]hen you have something clear and simple and non-controversial, everyone reacts to it very well, even the people who are … aligned with the oil company” (NGO1R1).240

For these actions to prove beneficial, there needs to be a strong degree of community trust in these actors, otherwise they will not believe the simplified information (NGO7R1), an issue which limits state/REI ability to do this given the levels of indigenous mistrust. Interviewed NGOs overcome this by working with the “permission of the people” (NGO1R1) or those that seek them out for their expertise and support for grassroots initiatives (NGO1R1; NGO5R1; NGO6R1) whilst long term-relationships and/or frequent contact by the same staff (NGO1R1; NGO4R1; NGO5R1; NGO6R1) are key.241 Moreover, their efforts to make clear to communities “that they have the ability [and] brains to make their own decisions” (NGO1R1) build up this trust.

These actors can also act as an accountability check for selva communities who are “concerned they are going to be fed nonsense” by the REIs or MIEM (ibid.). “[S]o when somebody from the oil company pipes up and says something completely ridiculous and technically unfeasible they [indigenous people] might not necessarily recognise it and so that’s why they want us there, to call them out on their nonsense” (ibid.). The Peru Mission spokesperson believed that the Palmas del Espino EIA in Maniti (see Chapter 6, Section 6.1.2) saw the local people given “inaccurate … false … [and] cobbled together” information (NGO2R1c).242 Without the involvement of external actors, the state and REIs can falsify the information presented to citizens.

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240 There are of course limits; “some issues, seismic for example – it’s very technical. And it seems like they [the state or REIs] didn’t find a way to make it in a simpler language” (NGO4R2b).

241 In ProNaturaleza’s case, staff have “a 20/10 regime – 20 days in the field, ten days here [Iquitos]” (NGO4R2) whilst NCI staff live and work permanently in their respective locations (NGO6R1). SPDA staff travel to the communities each month and aside from their regional office now have one located in Alto Nanay District to provide easier follow-up access to local projects (NGO5R1).

242 The citizens, many of whom “could barely read and write were laughing” at the presented information (NGO2R1c).
Lastly, some actors will seek “strategic alliances” (NGO5R1) from other organisations in the local, national or international arenas to promote local level human-rights or environmental issues (CBO3R1; CBO4R3; NGO5R1; NGO7R1). Alianza Arkana has worked with international partners including the press and film makers, one of whom produced a film (Pastaza) which explores indigenous peoples struggle over contamination and their search for justice (NGO7R1; see Chaikuni Institute and Alianza Arkana 2014). For Cuninico, the Catholic Church leaders sent journalists to document the spill (IRC7; CBO4R3) and increase public awareness of the event.

From these sections, how much impact are these actors and their “social processes” (NGO7R1) having? Though some felt that they “can’t really measure what you’re doing” (ibid.), others expressed noticeable improvements. For DAR, “we see the changes. For example, in the [Ucayali] leadership …. there is a leader …. now … very recognised in [hydrocarbon issues. We] see how … in three years [they know] how to make the letters to the government asking for their rights” (NGO8R1). Similarly, the DDP spokesperson who has had experience of the hydrocarbon industry and state dialogue processes evaluated that in seven years of Loreton employment “I have seen some evolution – there is more awareness … [and] empowerment for indigenous people. They know they have their rights and nobody can ignore them without being punished” (NSI4R1).

The root of these positive changes is built both on the SCDV creating operational room for these actors and on a constructive relationship where the citizens and these actors share a similar agenda and vision. Problems arise when these do not align or when these actors impose their own selva visions on indigenous citizens (NGO7R1). For example, a ProNaturaleza interviewee acknowledged that in its conservation work and services [the establishment of environmental monitoring and the running of REI CSR projects], we have had some rejection [from indigenous communities]. Because when you go into a conservation project, they feel like you’re there to impose something to them or to restrict them (NGO4R1).

Consequently, one finds that these visions are dependent on their “different intentions” (NSI2R1), focuses (NGO7R1), agendas (NGO2R1b; NGO3R1) and interests (CBO4R3; NSI4R1) which
have a significant impact on their representation of citizen voice, and their guidance over voice protest actions communities and their CBOs should use.

Fundamentally, it can weaken and divide CBO voices like indigenous federations. For instance, Alianza Arkana, who has worked closely with PUINAMUDT, concluded that it was “falling apart” and had a false unity projected towards “the outside world” (NGO7R1). Two or three communities in FEDIQUEP (member of PUINAMUDT) no longer wished to participate “with [this federation] in the consulta previa” for Block 192 and were angry that the FEDIQUEP leader had signed the Historic Act (ibid.) on their behalf. Similarly, FECONACO (another PUINAMUDT member) signed the Historic Act while “one of their communities was having a 30-day protest. So, they just ignored their community” (ibid.).

Several points can be concluded from this. Firstly, the failure by federation leaders to communicate effectively with their cuenca pueblos about the stance taken regarding major events can lead to division and disunity within these organisations (ILP1; NGO2R1c; NGO7R1). At the same time, individual leaders will formulate their own opinion on issues which aren’t always shared by everyone at the grassroots level. So, whilst federations can achieve success (e.g. helping to pressure Pluspetrol into using reinjection technology) (NGO1R1), “these federations aren’t really [representative of] what’s going on in the communities” and this can lead to disconnection between local citizen/community voices and their federation leaders (NGO7R1). This is evidence of the argument that citizens risk “dispossession” of their voice when it occurs collectively through a spokersperson (Bourdieu 1986 pp. 301-302).

The “differences in vision” (ibid/) can impact upon these actors’ efforts at working together. For instance, the Alianza Arkana interviewee found their Multi-sectoral Commission experience to be “a mess. It was just like chaos” partly due to asesoras involvement whose role was undefined (despite them being the most influential figures for the Apus) and led to confusion over what the other actors could contribute (NGO7R1). Meanwhile, in the Catholic Church’s experience, “Greenpeace never wanted to help” support their environmental and indigenous rights campaign as “it was not a priority for them” (CBO4R3).
The differences in vision can also mean that these collective voice actors have a great deal of influence over the type of citizen protest voice actions chosen and what their actions hope to achieve. Three examples illustrate this; private deals between community’s and/or their federations and REIs, radical voice and the search for legal justice.

In an interview with the Catholic Church human rights co-ordinator, they felt some indigenous advisors were “not so good” owing to their misguided advice (CBO4R1). Two interviewees (IJ1; NGO7R1) mention two NGOs (ProNaturaleza and SPDA) whose representatives were interviewed for this research (NGO4R1-R2 from ProNaturaleza and NGO5R1 from SPDA) which were described as “corporate … environmental organisation[s]” (IJ1) that “work together with the [companies and] …. have, other kind of ethics” (NGO7R1). “I wouldn’t touch them with a barge pole” (IJ1). To understand where these negative views stem from, one must explore the private negotiated settlements between indigenous communities/federations and REIs.

The Alianza Arkana interviewee (NGO7R1) did not believe that these private deals should occur, yet other asesoras do advise this rather than legal action (NSI2R1; RGR1), a tactic which helps to exacerbate community division already occurring due to the lure of REI money (NGO4R2b).243 The difficulty is that whilst communities “deserve this compensation” for socio-environmental damages, “the right way” (for some, not others) is through legal justice (NSI2R1). However, at the same time, Cuninico’s Catholic Church priest argued that

[p]eople need money. Those are places [the selva] where money does not flow … then, the possibility of an oil company is the possibility of money flowing and people want that …. and we would be naive if we said that they don’t look for money …. You can’t live isolated [lives], saying, well, I don’t belong in the world … they realise it is poisoned money … but they need [it] (CBO4R3).

243 A recent illustration can be seen with Occidental Petroleum’s 30-year period of oil extraction operations in the Corrientes Cuenca and the resulting socio-environmental impacts on nearby Achuar residents (see Goldman, López and Ramos 2007). In 2007, a legal case (Maynas Carijano v. Occidental Petroleum) was started on the behalf of 25 indigenous plaintiffs by Amazon Watch and Earth Rights International in the Los Angeles U.S. Federal Court. Ultimately however, the case never came to trial as the parties reached a confidential mutual settlement in September 2013, only publicly announcing it in March 2015 (Cultural Survival 2015b; Earth Rights International 2015).
Consequently, whilst some international NGOs such as Cultural Survival view successful cases like the Achuar – Occidental settlement (see Footnote 243) as ‘an inspiration to all Indigenous people seeking to defend their rights and territories’ (Cultural Survival 2015b), others label them as “desperate acts” (NSI2R1). This is caused by poor advice, some of which reflects the close relationships that some collective voice actors have to the hydrocarbon industry (e.g. ProNaturaleza) or their perceived view on justice.

The use of radical voice is interesting. Though none of the interviewed institutions supported indigenous radical voice in the present day (NGO6R1; NGO7R1; NGO8R1), and in SPDA’s case attempted to avoid it (NGO5R1), Catholic Church priest interviewee CBO4R3 spoke of their backing of it in previous decades, primarily driven by the lack of wider national attention to or support for Loreton environmental problems. In CBO4R3’s case, the Catholic Church has been encouraging “the environmental topic” in the Marañón Cuenca for 20 years, “well ahead” of wider society who didn’t give it importance. Faced with this national environment, they encouraged the communities “[t]o keep protesting, to organise themselves, to look for external support [and] to claim their rights” taking part directly in these actions (CBO4R3).

With “a little bit of environmental concern” growing in the country (CBO4R3), a greater number of NGO’s involved on the ground (CBO1R1) and an increase in media environmental reporting (ILP1; NGO2R1b) “our voice now … doesn’t have to be a protest” (CBO1R1). Instead, interviews with these actors indicate growth for pursuing “passive” and “proactive” legal support roles with selva communities and federations.

NGO8R1 does not support (via advice or money) any illegal actions or support or pursue litigation cases. Instead, through passive legal support, they offer citizens advice in report preparation “according to the national legal framework” and check completed documentation, vital work due to the “gap” that exists for communities to access and afford legal justice (NGO8R1). In Alianza Arkana’s case, however, they take a proactive stance by working with other NGO’s to

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244 As the interviewee noted “[y]ou can’t go to a community and tell them, you go protest and keep yourself behind” (CBO4R3).

245 “I need to say there’s a radio “Voz de la selva” and they [indigenous people] can be heard with that” (ILP1).
initiate legal action against REIs (NGO7R1). Whilst they acknowledged that protests allow pressure to be put onto REIs, it’s “not responsible” to advise communities or federations to do this and instead believe advisors should suggest other mechanisms like legal action and campaigning (ibid.).

For the Catholic Church, support and solidarity with communities for radical action can still be found, an indication of the civil community role which Catholic Church layman have and their long-running environmental campaigning. However, this would only appear to be for non-violent, legal demonstrations such as the 2014 Cocama 3-day “walk of sacrifice” (from the selva communities to Nauta by boat and then walking from Nauta to Iquitos) which the Catholic Church accompanied them on, provided basic provisions and held a religious service for (CBO4R1a). More importantly, the Catholic Church has now established the Comisión de Justicia y Paz - Derechos Humanos del Vicariato de Iquitos (Commission for Justice and Peace - Human Rights of the Vicariate of Iquitos) to provide legal support to “people or organisation[s] that feel vulnerable and don’t have a legal advisor” (CBO4R1a) and lack access to the legal system (IRC13) and were in 2015 supporting three claims (CBO4R2). Whilst Cuninico’s church leaders have played a part in supporting more radical indigenous voice actions, their pursuit of legal justice through this human-rights commission can be seen after the Cuninico oil spill.

Given that CBO4R3 and their colleagues have been defending indigenous and environmental rights over the last 20 years, it is no surprise to find that post-spill, several residents (notably IRC6) contacted the Catholic Church who, after “wait[ing] some days to see if they’re serious or … simply want[ed] to negotiate [a private deal] with the oil company” (CBO4R3) became actively involved in Cuninico’s plight.

The Catholic Church had an immediate positive impact. Upon arrival, they “wanted to stop these private meetings [with the IEVAs and] bring them out into the open” (IRC7) and prevent the town being bought (IRC24). The Catholic Church also encouraged Cuninico to “band together” with ACODECOSPAT, thereby further strengthening their collective voice and drawing in other actors that sought to help solve the environmental problem (CBO4R3).
The Catholic Church’s educational role combined with their legal support paid dividends in crucial events. At the final *asamblea* between Cuninico and Petroperu in December 2014, the engineer in charge “wanted us to sign something stating that we were pleased to let them leave like this” (IRC13), presumably legitimising the absence of promised development projects and/or ongoing provisions. However, the community “didn’t want to sign anything because we knew well that it was going to play against us” (ibid.). When residents subsequently locked the engineer in the *Apu’s* house (IRC13; IRC22; IRC23) and planned to “confiscate valuable things that they had here” until they resolved these issues, a telephone consultation between the *Apu* and the Catholic Church made clear to the *pueblo* that they couldn’t pressure Petroperu in this way “because they would say that we were threatening them” (IRC13), circumstances which would damage the Catholic Church’s legal case.

Their role in Cuninico’s decision to pursue legal action was vital but it is interesting to explore how this option was reached. The “push” or “initiative” for this was theirs (the Catholic Church) without whom the *pueblo* “couldn’t have done it” (IRC19). However, in instances where there could be division in a community’s response, the Catholic Church “try and listen to” the various arguments and opinions of the whole community (i.e. wide participation) (Farrington et al. 1993) after which they attempt to reach a “consensus” (CBO4R1a). Efforts are made to make this a unified (100 per cent) consensus as its important “[t]hey … feel that what they get is for everyone’s benefit” (ibid.) but if there are any people not in favour of an agreed action, they retire from the process (NGO2R1 in CBO4R1-R2 interview; CBO4R1a). “Until now, we haven’t seen any disagreement or disunion” and this is because the Catholic Church doesn’t “do something they don’t want to do” (CBO4R1a). Testimonies (IRC6; IRC7) provide evidence of the Catholic Church talking to residents about the spill in a simple, clear way, whilst their provision of written information showing Petroperu’s lack of compliance with Peruvian laws (IRC9) and long-term education and training allowed residents “to be informed” (IRC6) and make a choice they more fully understood. Indeed, Cuninico interviewees “notic[ed] that it’s our right[s]” that were affected by the spill and were willing “to fight until we get it [justice]” (IRC18) by being “on the right path” (IRC6) showing that despite lacking the finances or tools necessary to pursue legal action, citizens understood why they could and should do so through the Catholic Church and were united in doing so (IRC8; IRC13). Once legal action was decided, several Catholic Church workshops were held...
with Cuninico inhabitants so that community testimonies could be “translated … [into] a more legal language” (CBO4R1a). This is an example of an “invited dialogue space” in which ‘opportunities to participate are made available’ to community members (p. 275; see also Cornwall 2000) who regard participation ‘as a means to gain access to benefits or to improve their own access to services’ (Cornwall 2008 p. 275) both clearly evident in this case.

It’s unsurprising to find that residents felt grateful and trustful of the Catholic Church (IRC6; IRC11; IRC13; IRC16; IRC20; IRC23), feelings not only reflecting their legal assistance and its co-ordinated (IRC1), inclusive (CBO4R1a) and proactive\textsuperscript{246} approach but also because they received more support from them “than the officials [the government], when this spill happened” (IRC8). “[T]he church is the only one, our only support … that would defend us” (IRC13) and so far, has been successful in doing so.

The Catholic Church, along with its partner organisations (the Instituto de Defensa Legal (Institute of Legal Defence, IDL) and the Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the Northern Amazon of Peru (ORPIAN)) and Cuninico, formally requested a public hearing (the 158\textsuperscript{th} Period of Sessions) at the IACHR. This was held on the 9\textsuperscript{th} June 2016 in Santiago, Chile, attended by a Peruvian state delegation comprising representatives of the Ministry of Justice, the Foreign Ministry and Petroperu’s Chairman. Here testimony from two Cuninico citizens (whose travel costs were funded by the Catholic Church and its partners) saw Petroperu for the first time admit responsibility for the oil spills which have affected communities like Cuninico (Peru Support Group 2016a; Varela 2016).

Though the Catholic Church and its partners welcomed Petroperu’s public admission of guilt and the government’s invitation to the IACHR to visit the affected sites (which it accepted), these vocal commitments need to be followed up with concrete measures to ensure these communities have a safe future (Peru Support Group 2016a; Varela 2016).\textsuperscript{247} Crucially, ‘indigenous organisations have succeeded in placing the issue of systematic oil spillages on the

\textsuperscript{246} Residents are kept regularly updated about the legal case (IRC4; IRC8; IRC19) through the Apu who is “call[ed]…every week” and subsequently updates Cuninico (IRC13). Similarly, Catholic Church representatives visit the pueblo every fortnight each month (IRC11).

\textsuperscript{247} See Peru Support Group (2016a) for the commitment list.
agenda of the IACHR’ (Varela 2016) and this has been able to occur through the Catholic Church and its partners’ support and access.

Overall, one can see the positive Catholic Church role for Cuninico, helping to support and open voice opportunities that wouldn’t have been accessible to them. This was achieved through the creation of an invited dialogue space (Cornwall 2000; 2008) and a form of participation that combined elements of interactive and consultative participation. Interactive participation comprised interactive and structured learning processes and educational outcomes and consultative participation included local residents’ participation through consultation and information gathering sessions for the latter (Pretty 1995). One can also see that a wide and deep approach was taken to participation (Farrington et al. 1993). By doing so, this institution made participation a positive and slightly more equitable process, which helped lead to an optimum participation level (Cornwall 2008 p. 276) where citizen voice was significantly strengthened.

As with any counterfactual situation, it is pure conjecture to summarise how Cuninico would have responded after the spill without the Catholic Church’s involvement. In terms of radical voice action, no testimonies mention this post-spill, possibly because Cocama indigenous people are “not as aggressive … or violent” (NGO3R1) as other indigenous groups. In relation to legal action, one resident stated that the pueblo had “the same idea [as CBO4R1] … but we needed people that supported us” (IRC8) as they had residents (IRC15; IRC23) and “authorities here [who] don’t have any knowledge” (IRC19) for legal action and wouldn’t have known “[w]hat to do [or] how to defend ourselves” (IRC23). “It can’t be said, but I suspect that without the [Catholic] Church’s action nothing would have happened …. It’s just that … who do they go to? You have to know people to ask for help, so, who do they go to?” (CBO4R3). “Really, we would have been [an] … abandoned” (IRC6), “forgotten town” (IRC13).

8.4 Conclusion

“If it wasn’t for the international cooperation the situation of the communities would be really bad, because the Government isn’t interested” (ORPIO interviewee CBO3R1).
Overall, what does this chapter show us? Firstly, the state’s SCDV and the important socio-economic development offered by Petroperu has created a dependency culture evident within Barrio Florido’s permanent relationship and Cuninico’s short-term remediation work. These circumstances have enabled the company to create a climate of fear that sought deliberately to suppress citizen protest voice over Petroperu’s contamination events but also other issues such as working conditions and electricity provision. San José de Saramuro highlights that these are not unique scenarios but appear to be part of a wider stance taken by them and other Loreton REIs.

The suppression of citizen voice also extends into their fragmentation of indigenous federations and their efforts to compromise its leaders (thereby undermining their credibility and authority) so that a stronger collective voice cannot occur so easily. Interestingly, an interviewed Loreton Regional Councillor stated that voice fragmentation was also used by the state concerning agreement for forthcoming oil projects and Prior Consultation engagements:

The Peruvian government has generated a division among native organisations, generating federations and other organisations inside [indigenous federations]. It seems like they have a shared agreement [between the state and these new generated federations] but that is not necessarily true. They divide the [indigenous] social groups [creating new pro-development groups] and that gives the impression they have an agreement [for the development] (RGR2).

Although the interviewee provides no evidence for this claim, it nevertheless indicates that some Peruvians believe that the state is willing to subvert its own consultation and dialogue mechanisms in order to achieve the SHDV. This is further compounded by the horizontal authority structures within indigenous communities and the diverse community opinions based upon their different experiences of REI projects. There is a genuine sense then that indigenous collective responses to oil development run by strong, trusted (and therefore credible) authoritative figures can remain difficult to achieve in Loreto. The PPEDC legal representative thoughtfully compared Peru’s environmental politics to Brazil’s and felt that a crucial difference was that the latter had “a hero …. Chico Mendez …. [who] was someone representing something but in Peru we haven’t had that, if there was a Chico Mendez in Peru, there would be an environmental revolution” (NSISR1). In this sense, the fragmentation of collective citizen voice has been successful.
Secondly, the state’s SCDV has been filled by a “whole spectrum” (IJ1) of NGOs and other actors who provide a plethora of educational and practical supportive measures to strengthen indigenous voice and knowledge of their rights (NSI4R1). The relationships built by some of these actors are achieved on a platform of patience and a willingness to listen (CBO4R1a), long-term, frequent, integrated engagement by staff to build up trust (CBO4R1a; NGO1R1; NGO4R1; NGO6R1), and an alignment of their vision and agenda. “We’re not just [going] come into a place because we think we should be there” (NGO1R1).

Some communities like Barrio Florido, do not have any relationship with these actors, narrowing their voice and constricting them to community-based actions. Other communities are in a similar position, partly due to the impact of travel distance, cost, time and agendas of exterior actors, meaning that, alongside the absence of their own internal professional citizens, they remain “completely abandoned” (CBO3R1) and consequently unable to “legally claim” (RGR2) their rights. At the same time, other pueblos may have a relationship or contact with one or more of these actors. As the Catholic Prish priest for Cuninico notes,

[i]n this area [the Marañón Cuenca], there are not isolated indigenous, they … have contact with western society … [but], it depends, people can have contact with the government but not with the [Catholic] Church, or with the Pentecostal Church but not with the Catholic. Each one decides what they want (CBO4R3).

Thus, each selva community will have a unique relationship with these CBOs, NGOs and asesora’s based upon the latter’s topics or agendas (NGO8R1) which will shape citizen access, strength of voice, actions taken and the type of voice or participatory relationship sought.

However, the problem is that this cannot entirely fill the SCDV. For example, the NGO environmental monitoring programmes are very important mechanisms enabling people to voice. In ProNaturaleza’s case, they provide “more specialised access to” REIs by acting as an

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248 CBO4R3 and a colleague’s Catholic Church work encompasses over 60 communities in the Marañón Cuenca, which meant that distance and time were their biggest issues. ORPIO’s indigenous federation was in a similar position; of the 300 represented communities, they lacked adequate access to an estimated 50 due to the distance and costs of reaching them (CBO3R1). CBO3R1 also noted that the Urarina people living along the Rio Chambira (Alto Nanay District, Maynas Province) do not have any NGOs working with them (possibly because no NGO mission or agenda has taken them there) which has left the local people highly isolated.
intermediary for this work through frequent (three monthly) REI contact and the production of reports based on the local situation (NGO4R2b). Their system also provides a boost for local access; citizens can deliver environmental reports to their regional office in Trompeteros and there “ask for coupons … for river or air access” (NGO4R2a) to improve their own accessibility to voice. Whilst this is a constructive system, it only occurs in the Corrientes Cuenca through 16 monitors observing different areas (NGO4R2b), reinforcing how different accessibility can be for selva communities and why CBO/NGO actors cannot entirely fill the SCDV.

Thirdly, whilst indigenous people and their federations have “powerful people around” (NGO3R1), this is no guarantee that citizens’ voice will be strengthened or their objectives achieved. This is noticeable when these actors choose to impose their own selva visions on indigenous people unilaterally (NGO7R1) or there is conflict over their voice action aims. Equally, REIs also have huge power and influence over citizen voice and can prevent citizens from voicing. Indeed, José de Saramuro shows that this power and influence over citizen voice can supersed the power and influence of other CBO/NGO actors (NSI7R1) like the Catholic Church.

Lastly, what of radical voice action? Why is it taken? There is no single answer to this but instead multiple interlinked reasons within the Loreton PEV. These include conflicted indigenous responses to the SHDV caused through their own poor educational levels and absence of professional capacities and the influence of collective voice and asesora actors on this action. However, an indigenous federation leader also made clear that radical voice is taken because “[w]e see that the government treats indigenous people differently” through their lack of compliance to remediation work (CBO3R1). The latter’s “extreme” (CBO3R1) “non-conformity” (NSI7R1) are a crucial mechanism to protect, defend and claim their rights (CBO3R1), particularly in the light of the state SHDV and SCDV and widespread discrimination. The ORPIO representative made clear that “these extreme measures … [would] decrease when the government starts demonstrating … interest, respect and compliance” (CBO3R1). Sadly, but rather predictably, the government labels radical voice as the work of “intransigents, even terrorists [with an] extremist ideology” (ibid.), thereby widening the gulf between state and indigenous citizens and reinforcing the need for radical voice action to be taken.
Chapter 9 Trying to be heard: voice, oil spills and justice

“And where is the justice? We talk so much about justice, no? But there isn’t any” (MRBF26).

The previous four chapters have charted Loreton stakeholders’ PEV by focusing on the experiences of Barrio Florido and Cuninico and their state, Petroperu and collective-voice-based group relationships. An exploration of collective-voice actors own PEV surrounding the state and Petroperu has also been undertaken. This study was conducted to evaluate the extent to which Peruvian Loreton stakeholders can voice effectively and hold REIs, specifically Petroperu, accountable for environmental issues by analysing a range of political (power), social (position in society), economic (financial means) and access-based (geographical remoteness from key decision-making mechanisms, lack of ICT access) issues. The first six sections (9.1-9.6) summarise each research sub-questions’ findings which leads into a summary for the overarching research question (Section 9.7). This is followed by an evaluation of PEV and wider methodological processes (Section 9.8), self-reflection on this thesis’s outcomes (Section 9.9) and lastly prospective future research (Section 9.10).

9.1 What is Peru’s national political environment’s freedom of voice level for stakeholders i.e. permissible level of voice? Are stakeholders constrained in any way by Peruvian laws or consultative (or lack thereof) mechanisms?

From a national state perspective, Peru’s freedom of voice has improved but remains weak. Scrutinising the country’s entire post-1821 political history, one must acknowledge that it has undergone a positive transformation. Its tumultuous political history, seen through numerous short-lived governments and shaped predominantly by the military in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries gave way to a 2001 democratic transition which has been consolidated by successive free and fair elections. These political freedoms are an integral part of the country’s most recent constitution (1993, revised 2009) which sets out, in detail, individual and collective citizen rights to freedom of speech and expression and the defence of their health, family and community environment. This situation is a far cry from the regressive policies visible in Peru’s history e.g. the November 1895 reform of the 1860 constitution which disenfranchised non-literate
citizens that was subsequently reaffirmed in the 1920 and 1933 constitutions and the absence of universal female suffrage until 1955 (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 110; Acuña 2015 p. 3).

Despite these advancements, BTI, EIU and World Bank governance indicators and interviewees make clear that Peru’s democracy remains flawed, particularly surrounding the scope and scale of civil liberties and their practical governance application by the state. Crucially, these two factors are seen clearly in relation to the national PEV environment for hydrocarbon and wider national development projects. In this context, a far more dangerous, inflexible and intolerant PEV environment for stakeholders is visible.

As Chapter Three outlined, oil has long played a vital role in Peru’s economic policies. As growing domestic demand outstripped north-west oilfield production, successive Twentieth Century governments attempted to increase the scale of selva oilfield exploration and exploitation, a resource drive that typifies LIEO neoliberal policies. In contemporary Peru, this has culminated in the state’s constitutionally enshrined ownership of natural resources (via the 1993 constitution) and its ability to exploit them on protective reserves for people in voluntary isolation if deemed to be in the public interest (2006 Law for the Protection of Isolated Peoples in Voluntary Isolation, Law 28736). These statutes have helped to usher in a second hydrocarbon exploration boom that covers large swathes of the selva and significantly, a high number of territorial reserves for people in voluntary isolation. Consequently, though indigenous people have acquired universal electoral suffrage, the territorial rights and protection afforded to these and other citizens are wholly superseded by the state’s subsoil natural resource ownership allowing it to maintain its dominion over the way citizens’ land can be used and by whom.

Yet this state natural resource ownership and second hydrocarbon boom are symptoms of a far larger plan for the selva, categorised as a SHDV. The Camisea Gas pipeline extension, Amazon Waterway project, possible Rio Marañón dam construction and the Myobamba-Iquitos electricity concession symbolise the state’s wider Loreton (non-societal-based) development drive. This represents an effort to overcome a geographical and perceived societal (i.e. indigenous) barrier to the region’s and wider country’s progress, the dominance of certain state actors (MINEM, Perupetro, Petroperu) and private interests (CONFIEP) and the weakness of others
(MINAM, OEFA). The fulfilment of this vision by the state fundamentally alters the PEV environment for stakeholders.

A raft of laws, outlined in Chapter 5, Section 5.1, reflects the state’s militaristic approach to civil protest, particularly surrounding hydrocarbon issues. The inability to organise horizontal voice-based movements so freely is a huge issue for citizens as these are a necessary precondition for vertical voice dialogue (O’Donnell 1986 p. 251; Ravnborg and Gomez 2014 p. 73). Suppression rather than dialogue appears to be the mantra for Peruvian government responses to resource extraction unrest, as exemplified by the 2009 Andoas and 2015 Tia Maria and Las Bambas copper mine protests. Further evidence for this can be seen in the direct targeting (through death threats, smear campaigns, physical attacks and even killings) of environmental and human rights defenders seeking to defend citizens from extractive projects. The experiences of my interviewee CBO1R1 and Gregoria Santos are two examples that should not be regarded as isolated incidents but rather an indication of a wider government strategy to delegitimise these actors in the eyes of society due to the threat they pose to the implementation of the SHDV and wider neoliberal extraction policies and investment. It is, in effect, Peru’s own ‘green backlash’ (Rowell 1996).

Unsurprisingly, it also has repercussions on the ability of environmental and human-rights collective voice-based stakeholders to access the government, especially key proponents of the SHDV (e.g. GOREL, MINEM), or specific government mechanisms (e.g. development roundtable discussions). These groups can be impeded by bureaucracy and the unwillingness of state representatives to forge alliances with these knowledgeable stakeholders. Indeed, their experience, local knowledge and technical expertise can mean that their scrutiny-based voices, which pose a potential threat to the state, are sidelined wherever possible. This, though, does not encompass the whole state apparatus; one NGO (E-Tech International, NGO1R1) had productive and positive relationships with some state actors (MINAM and OEFA), which, given their rationale, were happy to gain constructive advice on their technical work. At the same time, other NGOs, with work focused on (environmental) law and conservation and natural resource management, had very productive relationships with the state, especially GOREL, where lack of professional
competency (caused by contractual *amiguismo* work procurement) necessitated this help. Crucially however, these supportive voices enhanced rather than conflicted with the state’s SHDV.

For citizens affected by hydrocarbon development, their ‘opportunity’ (Tilly 1978 p. 55) to voice is curtailed by a restrictive consultation and engagement process noted within two important mechanisms, the Law of Prior Consultation and EIAs. The ORPIO indigenous spokesperson acknowledged that these are “a meeting point/collusion of different interests. Indigenous peoples have their own interests ... that their rights are respected, that their territory is respected” (CBO3R1) whilst for the state it is the SHDV.

Whilst vertical voice dialogue between citizens and state is always better than a lack of communication, it serves no purpose if the parameters of the exchanges set by the state occur through limited and irrelevant rubber-stamping tokenism (Arnstein 1969) forms of participation that are controlled by the state and which fail to *listen* to local people to gain their *consent*. ‘The dilemma for many authorities is that they both need and fear people’s participation. They need people’s agreement and support, but they fear that this wider involvement is less controllable, less precise and so likely to slow down the planning process (Pretty 1995 pp. 1251-1252). By doing so, such processes will undoubtedly lead to cases of NIMBYism (not in my back yard), but one can see that, in this case, the government’s aggressive SHDV stance wholly displaces its own citizens’ interests and fails to protect and strengthen Peru’s most marginalised and vulnerable communities. Little wonder that the country suffers from such high levels of social unrest surrounding hydrocarbon projects when state-orchestrated dialogue mechanisms are so regressive and restrictive for affected citizens who are denied the opportunity to be heard. Alongside the efforts by the state to present environmental and human-rights CBOs, NGOs and other individuals as “anti-development” and thus, by extension, anti-progress and anti-Peru, it is conceivable that some political elites are clearly intolerant of any local-level citizen and wider collective voices that raise concerns about the neoliberal economic and development choices which the country takes.
9.2 What impact do societal influences e.g. discrimination, different ontological views have upon the interactions and relationships between state and citizens, citizens and business and citizens and other actors (CBOs, NGOs)?

Linked to this evaluation are the important influences which societal discrimination and racialised class consciousness continue to have within Peruvian society. The country’s Eighteenth and Nineteenth Century socio-political and economic mechanisms and values were shaped by the systematic discrimination of indigenous people residing in the sierra and selva, whose supposedly savage nature and uncultured, ignorant views made them inferior to the coastal criollo population and therefore targets for brutal exploitation. Peru’s contemporary social strata, from a former President down to interviewed government employees, academics and non-indigenous citizens, illustrate that these discriminatory opinions remain entrenched and widespread within the country, which reinforces the lack of respect and understanding that non-indigenous society has for indigenous people.

Though a somewhat crude assessment, the notion of there being two realities for indigenous and non-indigenous selva people is, in a general sense, accurate. The former’s holistic cosmovision of creation built through lives spent in the selva stands in stark contrast to other Peruvian citizens, particularly urban political elites whose own nature/natural resource management ideas are shaped by LIEO values. There is a failure to comprehend and respect each other’s worldviews. Troublingly for indigenous people, societal discrimination and lack of cultural understanding are caught up in the wider neoliberal and development discourses established by successive governments that portray their subsistence livelihoods and beliefs as an impediment to the nation’s progress. This helps to reinforce historically-rooted prejudices that view these people as second-class, wholly inferior citizens and throws into doubt the state’s genuine commitment to improving its understanding of indigenous cultures through national and regional government intercultural departments.

This indigenous inferiority feeds into the country’s racialised class consciousness and is visible in a wider, predominantly urban, socio-cultural and spiritual divorce from indigenous peoples. The complex questions surrounding hydrocarbon development vis-à-vis indigenous people become insensitively viewed as their own internal problems which higher urban class
citizens need not concern themselves with. “[I]t was, me here, you there, and let the problem fall on you” (IUA1). The non-white “other” accordingly becomes a symbol of Peruvian backwardness, from which urban citizens, despite their indigenous heritage, are keen to disassociate themselves. One can also see this in the way that professional educated classes interact with lower-class mestizo and indigenous citizens in everyday situations and more formalised methods of communication. The Peru Mission participant (NGO2R1) reported that they had easy access to the government due to their authoritative societal position but also conceivably due to their ethnic (white) status, which garnered them improved accessibility (NGO2R1b). Indeed, several participants drew attention to the belief that politicians were reluctant to engage with the population, particularly those residing in the selva, because of the environment (i.e. its humidity) and the inhabitants’ class, ethnicity and livelihoods, which generates a lack of sympathy and arrogant indifference for selva citizen concerns. Moreover, the state’s ‘persistent devaluation of indigenous people’ (Vilas 1997 p. 8) becomes one way in which it seeks to convert non-indigenous ‘citizens into isolated, wholly private, and narrowly self-centred individuals’ (Hirschman 1992 p. 82). This helps to prevent indigenous citizens’ from successfully projecting their voice into wider society to generate debate on selva hydrocarbon development (particularly as there remains only a limited indigenous political voice) (Thorp and Paredes 2010 p. 204) or the creation of a societal movement in support of indigenous peoples’ concerns.

Petroperu, an SCNREI, i.e. a state controlled national resource extraction industry, not only reinforces but heightens the impact that these underlying influences have on state – indigenous citizen interaction. Their general treatment of Cuninico was heavily prejudiced by discrimination and perceived racial superiority and was evident in various ways; the absence of an apology for the spill, arrogant readiness to pay higher prices for foodstuffs, the failure to repair/replace the community’s generator and subsequent refusal to share electricity from their own machines, limited medical aid, five-month provision of meagre food and water, failure to pay residents for their hospitality and blatant falsehoods told to citizens about the remediation process and pollution impact. The starkest example is their employment of 150 Cuninico workers and four minors alongside another 350 Cocama workers from other villagers. Without any prior training or proper equipment, the Cocama were deliberately given some of the most dangerous manual and heavy labour tasks, working long hours with limited provisions and for almost a month without any
protective clothing. The provision of protective clothing proved ineffective, thereby exacerbating severe long-term health-related illnesses from illegal overexposure to the oil. This showed the indifference which Petroperu’s Peruvian oil workers had for their fellow indigenous citizens. Sadly, the employment of indigenous villagers, including unverified employment of indigenous minors in 2016 remediation work,249 confirms that Cuninico’s experience are not unique and that Petroperu has shown little interest in improving its operational practices away from the systematic abuse and exploitation of indigenous people.

For other collective voice-based stakeholders, there was little sense of discriminatory views shaping their work with indigenous communities. Rather, it was their agendas which had the most significant impact. In some cases, NGO actors had constructive, supportive relationships and roles that sought to strengthen indigenous capacities (e.g. via education or through environmental monitoring mechanisms) and thus their voice. However, differences in vision e.g. over what constitutes justice, had a significant impact on the type of protest voice action utilised by local people, an issue outlined in Section 9.6.

9.3 What level of state presence and engagement with civil society exists in Loreto, particularly with remote oil-producing areas? How does this impact upon the use of voice by stakeholders?

The racialised class consciousness and discrimination within Peruvian society has several notable impacts on the state’s presence and development within Loreto and the voice access and type of actions utilised by the case-study communities. At first glance, the implementation of the SHDV suggests state acknowledgement of the need for greater focus on its often-forgotten Amazonian regions. However, the vision’s goals are not centred around improvements to selva-based citizens’ lives, a feature which reinforces the notion of a misplaced political will rather than the lack of one and resulting in the SCDV. At the same time, it also reflects the political disinterest which Peruvian elites have for the livelihoods of selva-based, predominantly indigenous citizens (evident in their failure to implement several socio-economic development remediation agreements250) a factor linked to racialised class consciousness and societal discrimination. Evidence for the SCDV is

249 See Chapter 7, Section 7.5, Footnote 219.
250 See Chapter 3, Section 3.4, Footnote 78.
extensive. State presence is virtually non-existent in the 2,000 or so smaller towns and *pueblos* dotted along the multitude of Loreto’s waterways. The state focuses on Iquitos and to a lesser extent some of the other larger towns, leaving the rest of the region neglected, both in a physical infrastructural sense but also in relation to its engagement with *selva pueblos* and wider dialogue mechanisms which only a handful of national state entities are implementing in the *selva*.251

Both *pueblos* lack access to clean water or basic sanitation amenities, electricity or internet connectivity, have limited educational facilities (primary but not secondary schools) and no law enforcement authorities or connections to the state judicial system. The situation for Cuninico was worse, however, as they do not have a medical *posta*, thus necessitating a 45-minute riverboat journey to the Urarinas District capital, Maypuco.

Interviewees made clear their sense of abandonment and the absence of meaningful assistance from the state which, crucially, was seen by citizens not to listen to their *pueblos* concerns. Dogged determination by Barrio Florido residents to request state support for various development projects has not proven successful. Their petitions have often been affected by state bureaucracy, a *modus operandi* which enables state representatives to filter development requests and conceivably delay or ignore those from communities based upon their ethnicity and/or lack of *amiguismo* government contact(s) or money to aid their petition’s progress.

Crucially, the SCDV has a direct impact on these communities’ ability effectively to voice to the government due to inadequate transport and technology infrastructure. Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s non-existent IT access restricts their use of online governmental systems of accountability such as OEFA’s SINADA, which now plays a vital role in allowing citizens to report environmental pollution issues directly to the relevant government department. An electronic means of vertical orthodox voicing is therefore denied them. At the same time, the state requirement for highly formal typed introductory letters and affiliated documents can prove to be a barrier for citizens with weaker education and those without IT access. There is then a need for

251 This explains the Alaianza Arkana’s experience of Putumayo Province, in which local citizens wanted SERNANP to establish a protected conservation area in the Region because “it’s a kind of *conveniencia* [convenience] [to have a permanent state actor in the vicinity]. It’s the same ... with the [oil company]. You need them because there’s nobody there for you in cases of emergencies” (NGO7R1).
citizens to have the support of CBO/NGO groups (particularly as state – societal exchanges usually occur through an institutional – organisational format rather than an institutional – individual citizen interaction). However, as Barrio Florido shows, not every pueblo has contact with these organisations. These various IT issues narrow the citizens’ range of accessible orthodox formal voice options to report environmental problems and presents a major barrier to holding Loreton REIs like Petroperu accountable for pollution events.

Citizen access is restricted further by the absence of a frequent and affordable Loreton public riverboat system, which hinders selva pueblo access to Iquitos, the centralised political heart of the region. This is not an issue for interviewed collective-voice based groups; their administrative location in Iquitos (bar E-Tech International (NGO1R1), which had the financial resources to travel there) provided geographically easier access to Loreto’s main political decision-making site though not, as noted, resulting in easier contact.

Is Loreton public transport deliberately kept poor by the state? Certain interviewees seemed to believe so and one can understand why. One must remember that REIs have been operating in Loreto’s selva for over 40 years showing that the apparent geographical difficulties surrounding oil extraction have, to a certain extent, been overcome. In this light, interviewed state representatives alluding to the impact of geographical distance and the high transport costs vis-à-vis selva government engagement cannot use this as a legitimate excuse. Instead, by hindering selva pueblo access to Iquitos, the state limits the extent to which indigenous selva i.e. rural protest voices reach GOREL and quell their ability to voice collectively through more radical actions. In sierra mining regions, more accessible transport allows easier access to regional government cities and Lima. Once there, collective radical voice actions have proven to be effective in garnering national and international media attention and making the mining industry a crucial feature of the 2016 Peruvian presidential election and the incumbent administration’s domestic policy.

However, even with the limited Loreton public transport options Barrio Florido and Cuninico citizen poverty is a huge impediment for them to be able proactively to seek out interaction with the state. Despite Barrio Florido’s cheaper river transport costs owing to their proximity to Iquitos and their non-subsistence based employment, residents were still reliant on
their IEVAs to reach the state. The IEVAs themselves had to borrow money for transport and associated costs. This resident poverty, evident in their income levels, house construction and lack of basic amenities shows that the 12 soles return cost to Iquitos was money that could not be spared. The situation is worse for Cuninico. Their greater distance from state representatives in Maypuco but more significantly Iquitos, and the latter’s increased associated costs (45 or 90 soles one-way) and travel time (11 or 24 hours depending on the boat), meant that residents, most of whom are poor subsistence farmers, lacked the income or the time to visit state representatives, even to travel with their products to market. Consequently, this not only helps lead to rural citizen state disengagement but confirms that participation costs (time, effort and money) are more likely to be borne by middle and high-income citizens, who become the most effective interest groups in local politics (Dahl 1961 pp. 273, 282-283; Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 188, cited in Laurian 2004 p. 55). At the same time, it also leaves state engagement with these rural communities in the hands of politicians and other officials.

Testimonies from both pueblos show that communication with the government (local, regional and national) is highly sporadic and often non-existent. Political disinterest, racialised class consciousness and discrimination are all underlying causes for this situation. Despite the SCDV, there is a degree of genuine political disinterest in the plight of these case-study selva pueblos (tied to racialised class and discrimination). This was also evident in the choice of Iquitos (but sometimes even Lima) for EIA Public Hearings and Informative Workshops and Prior Consultation meetings which limits their accessibility for affected Apus from remoter Loreton areas but allows politicians to remain within the confines of the urbanised, and in their eyes, more civilised environment.

An important caveat to their engagement was noted. Both Barrio Florido and Cuninico testimonies show that politicians were willing to visit occasionally when campaigning for approaching elections and in the former’s case, make appearances at celebratory event days. Given its geographical proximity to Iquitos, one would expect the former pueblo to have a higher level of state engagement but this does not appear to have been the case. Instead these self-serving community engagements, often accompanied by development promises (which subsequently go unfulfilled), show that the state, through its political representatives, can access selva pueblos but
choose to do so only when it serves their own electoral interests. The representatives’ appearance at Barrio Florido on celebratory days supports this notion, a tactic conceivably not used in Cuninico’s case due to the different indigenous cultural traditions, towards which some (one cannot say all) state representatives may feel ambivalence, misunderstanding, even hostility, owing to differences in ontology and worldview.

The lack of a permanent civil service, contractual staff recruitment (amiguismo) and absence of institutional emails for government staff necessitates the need for citizens to have highly personalised knowledge of who to contact in government. In a country with strong racialised class consciousness and discrimination, this raises a major access barrier for citizens lacking these amiguismo contacts, particularly those who are marginalised, poor, uneducated and rurally located to formally voice to the state.

These factors (racialised class consciousness and discrimination, political disinterest and self-serving infrequent dialogue) have two over-arching impacts for these two selva communities. Firstly, trust in the government was minimal, with political apathy and anger visible in participants’ opinions of the state, which in Cuninico’s case is unsurprising given the history of Peruvian indigenous discrimination and mistreatment. This high level of mistrust will inevitably impact upon both communities’ willingness to voice to the state with any degree of conviction or confidence (particularly for indigenous communities which are built upon cultural distrust) thus confirming the essential requirement of trust to foster higher participation levels (Docherty, Goodlad and Paddison 2001). Furthermore, it may in fact, given the environmental pollution context of this research, increase the possibility of radical or unorthodox informal forms of voice action rather than non-vocalisation i.e. silent non-exit (Barry 1974 p. 91).

Secondly, both communities operate beyond the state system. While both pueblos’ informal systems of governance have different names, they operate in a similar manner, with IEVAs assuming roles left absent by the state’s SCDV which has induced lower-class citizens to organise their own solutions to social issues. Unfortunately, both communities’ poor social opportunity freedoms limit their effective participation in wider economic and political matters.

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252 See also Burt 2007 (pp. 50-51).
(Sen 2001) by reducing their ability to access formal channels of dialogue which in turn feeds into citizen mistrust of the state.

Overall, the combination of these issues has major repercussions for citizens to be able to communicate with the state, establish positive relationships with its political representatives and importantly for this thesis, hold Petroperu accountable for oil pollution issues. Evidence of this was clear in the *pueblos*’ experiences surrounding oil pollution incidents.

In Barrio Florido’s 2009 incident, two residents chose to phone the radio to denounce the refinery rather than first attempt government contact. This unorthodox informal voice response was used for several reasons which reaffirm the *pueblo’s* difficult access to and relationship with the state. Firstly, an interviewee established that Barrio Florido inhabitants were afraid to voice and express themselves due to a fear that their views would be rejected, a statement which appears to confirm their state mistrust and the impact that political disengagement and disinterest by politicians they had experienced. This, in turn, would have pushed the two citizens to seek contact with other mechanisms they could easily access and whose response would potentially be more successful than the state’s bureaucratically slow process which had failed the *pueblo* in the past. Combined with inhabitants’ poverty and lack of access to electronic accountability systems, contacting the radio remotely alongside the refinery (discussed shortly) were cost-effective solutions. Lastly, the decision to contact the radio was based around their knowledge of other oil-related voice events in other Loreton locations and the perceived need to, in the words of IRC14, “make a racket” so that the government sits up and listens.

Though this action successfully gained the attention and subsequent arrival of various civil servants from government departments, their response (arrogantly blaming residents for helping cause environmental pollution via waste disposal dumping despite the state’s failure to implement *selva* waste disposal services) did not help build a positive trusting relationship between citizens and state for the former to try and use orthodox formal voice channels in the future. Indeed, an indication of how distrustful the relationships is can be seen in the belief by one inhabitant that DIGESA’s water samples were not taken from polluted areas of the *Rio Ramirez*.
Notwithstanding this negative reaction, the use of radio had proven effective and was called upon again by residents in the 2011 incident, garnering press and some civil servant but scant political reaction. The DDP’s lack of co-ordination and communication with inhabitants over the possibility of commencing legal proceedings against Petroperu (if indeed there was a case to answer) would have done little to improve the commonplace societal view that the justice system is a corrupt and prejudiced mechanism that fails to adequately serve Peru’s poor and marginalised citizens effectively (Burt 2007 p. 50).

For Cuninico’s 2014 oil spill, the population’s inability to contact the state was even more pronounced. Aside from their geographical proximity to Maypuco, which allowed them to travel there to alert the police and local government (the mayor) to the spill, they had no wider knowledge of whom to contact in the government at regional or national levels and lacked any technological (online) access to alert the state. Their indigenous reality, located in the heart of the Amazon, away from wider (urban) Peruvian civic society may have also been a reason why Loreton newspapers and radio stations were not contacted and were instead reliant on the Catholic Church informing the state.

The reaction by civil servants and politicians to the spill highlights the influence of racialised class consciousness and discrimination, the absence of intercultural understanding and differences in cosmovision in their engagement with indigenous communities. There were positive aspects, noted in their swift arrival, consistent contact for four months (in OEFA’s case) and community meetings, including by ANA, who were aware of the importance of nature in the indigenous cosmovision. However, resident testimonies show that they were not given data results, indicating that data presentations may have not been held with the whole pueblo and that precise information was not offered and/or understood by the Cocama. This would have increased the likelihood of rumours spreading about the spill and reinforced in their mind why the state isn’t “on their side.” Moreover, DIGESAs and DIRESAs lack of clean water was also troubling and indicates indifference to these citizens’ welfare, a capacity shortfall to deal with the crisis and, considering the amiguismo contractual state employment basis, their staffing competencies.
Politicians’ slow response, arriving two to five months after the spill (approximately August-October 2014), represented the only visit made by GOREL and national government politicians up to the time of my first Cuninico field trip (1-3 May 2015). None of these political representatives provided the Cocama with any information about the spill (of which, after several months, they would presumably have greater knowledge) or any long-term subsistence support (clean water and food) aside from through Petroperu’s limited provisions. Though GOREL and national political representatives cannot be expected to make fortnightly pueblo trips, it strongly insinuated that this pollution event was a nuisance for urban political elites that had no wish to enter the selva and engage with the community. Furthermore, their absence of long-term support testifies to their discrimination against this indigenous community which has undoubtedly damaged their limited pre-spill state engagement and trust.

Together, the government response to the Barrio Florido and Cuninico spill events had several major impacts on the communities’ PEV in relation to the state. Firstly, both lacked access and high trust levels of the state which made it extremely difficult for them to formally voice to the government and, instead, forced citizens to utilise unorthodox informal voice dialogue (the radio) or contact with other actors (Catholic Church and Petroperu). Secondly, the state’s political response shows that they can reach the selva and interact with communities “but not to resolve the problems associated with oil companies” (CBO3R1) “because they don’t want the oil activity to stop” (NCSSC2) or their wider extractive policies to be endangered (CBO1R1; NGO1R1). “I have heard some communities saying that if it weren’t for their problems with the oil company, the state would never have come here” (NSI4R1).

The subsequent absence of support or ongoing post-spill engagement makes it highly likely that both pueblos would be hesitant and lack confidence in voicing formally to the state if another pollution event were to occur, even if they were more aware of who to contact. This therefore raises the prospect that they would become dependent on radical or unorthodox informal voice actions which, given the state’s views on hydrocarbon protest, it would suppress rather than listen to. In turn, this reinforces the need for CBO/NGO group access or, in Barrio Florido’s case, pulls it closer to the refinery, which has become its main benefactor for employment, development and
civil events which has significant ramifications for the willingness of residents to voice individually and collectively.

Collective voice-based stakeholders’ state access and relationships are influenced by different factors. The SCDV and political engagement do not have a bearing on collective voice-based groups. Instead, the interlinked effects of their individual aims and voice types (supportive/conciliatory and scrutiny-based voice actors) are most significant. Supportive NGOs working on areas including environmental law, conservation and natural resource management have enabled them to form practical cooperative positive partnerships and projects and have their voice recognised and listened to by the state. Troublingly, scrutiny-based voice groups, the environmental and human-rights aims of which diverge from those of the SHDV, are denied this same level of access despite often fighting to protect and support the most marginalised citizens from the effects of this vision.

9.4 Are REIs withholding or controlling the ability of stakeholder voices to be effectively used in decision-making mechanisms? What are the REIs’ legal obligations surrounding consultation and communication with stakeholders and what is the on the ground reality in Loreto?

As noted in Section 9.1, the Peruvian state has created a highly restrictive environment for citizens to voice over hydrocarbon issues. Petroperu has gone further than this by systematically attempting to control, via silencing, critical citizen stakeholder voices and protests (Hirschman 1981 p. 244) surrounding oil pollution issues. For Cuninico, despite the company’s relative closeness, the total dislocation of both parties prior to the spill shows that geographical proximity alone does not determine or improve access. Instead, it reveals how Petroperu had total power and control to set citizen access and engagement parameters which, were it not for the spill, would have remained inaccessible to local people. This had major repercussions on community members’ ability to directly voice to the company, as demonstrated in the 2014 oil pollution event, and thus hold them accountable for pollution issues. The Cocama were left unaware of the correct procedure to follow and lacked any form of contact information, indeed even which company operated the pipeline. This was only remedied by the resourceful thinking of residents to check a Petroperu-sponsored school book for a phone number, indicating their isolated status in this vertical voice situation. The
oil spill *forced* Petroperu to engage with Cuninico rather than any preconceived notion to do so. Their subsequent interaction with the *pueblo* shows Petroperu’s ongoing power and control to establish a climate of fear to suppress citizen voice and set minimal dialogue parameters and information provision.

One can see evidence of these points in their initial decision to communicate solely through the *Apu* and his deputy in private meetings. This not only helped suppress the threat of collective citizen voices raised against the company, which were instead directed at the community’s leaders, but allowed them to pressurise its leaders into an agreement in which the *pueblo* was offered remediation work in exchange for their silence surrounding the spill. A climate of fear was established, supported wherever possible through deliberate disengagement and misinformation.

The threat of job losses for voicing against Petroperu, combined with (for subsistence farmers) high pay levels, generated the necessary result; residents were afraid to voice. This reduced outspoken community members to a mere handful as opposed to a larger vocal collective group. As remediation work continued, IRC13’s sacking showed that these were not empty threats and would have helped maintain *Cocama* fear for speaking out about their working conditions and tasks.

Yet, the climate of fear was supported by verbal promises which certain residents recalled were made to them in exchange for their silence. Whilst these in the end came to nothing, this web of falsehoods helped counter any immediate effort by the *pueblo* to voice and may have been aimed deliberately at certain more vocal citizens noted by Petroperu. It also underscores how initial interaction with the community was almost purely on the company’s terms; casual exchanges between oil workers and Cuninico inhabitants were shut down while the former resided in the *pueblo* and it took extreme citizen protestation and radical action to force two community *asambleas* to go ahead. The Catholic Church’s subsequent involvement did alter the power balance between the company and Cuninico (ending the secret dialogue between Petroperu and the IEVAs) but not enough to establish consistent dialogue which was resisted by Petroperu. This was evident in their dismissal of further citizen requests for meetings and abrupt 2014 Cuninico departure which established sole (and extremely poor) contact through the *Apu* and in relation to a Catholic
Church requested Catholic Church/Cuninico/Petroperu meeting which was conditioned by the company’s efforts to control precisely who attended.

Indeed, the Catholic Church’s participation did little to stem Petroperu’s continued efforts to control proceedings and limit the possible damage their actions during the oil spill remediation work could now have. Private financial arrangements with oil workers were intentionally undertaken to try and weaken their resolve to continue their Catholic Church relationship and add their testimonies to the Catholic Church’s legal case. Meanwhile, deliberate efforts to suppress knowledge about the full extent of the spill can be seen in their confiscation of Cuninico oil workers’ camera phones, their removal from the remediation site during inspections and Petroperu’s specific choice of inspection locations and use of chemicals to sink oil into the water and ground. The company’s subversion of Cuninico’s oil workers’ voices via job loss threats was equally effective and enabled them to disseminate their own version of events to wider Peruvian society through journalists and other media outlets sympathetic to their discourse that would act as a counter-narrative to the Catholic Church. Lastly, the information presented to inhabitants was negligible, which contributed to rumours which fed into wider tensions and paranoia that the spill had caused, evident in the claim of Petroperu informants.

Despite the radically different context, Barrio Florido’s relationship with Petroperu shows many similarities to Cuninico. Once again, the actors’ geographical proximity, seen in their side-by-side existence, has not translated into improved citizen voice access, though notably it has forced the company to have some measure of contact. However, Petroperu’s power, heightened by SCDV and the company’s important economic and energy roles, has helped them create an advantageous voice environment and relationship with the pueblo. This encompasses the frequency, location and composition of meetings, regulated and controlled through the formalisation of dialogue. This manifests itself in the everyday relationship with the community and in instances of protest voice.

The everyday relationship can be described as infrequent, controlled cordiality between Petroperu and Barrio Florido, occurring through three formalised and refinery-controlled arrangements: six-monthly meetings with the community’s IEVAs held at the refinery and
occurring through a written formal appointment system, Petroperú’s invitation to the pueblo to attend a handful of annual resident themed low-cost events and finally, other non-specific calendar engagements and support including water provision for the reservoir tank roughly every week, occasional medical support and at least one asamblea meeting with inhabitants concerning protocol (i.e. whom to contact) in the event of environmental pollution.

Despite this improved Petroperu-citizen interaction, it is important to note that only the community’s IEVAs had refinery access. This represents the lone consistent interaction in which non-casual dialogue took place (discussing Barrio Florido’s informal refinery work) and even then, the cordial nature of these exchanges had to be fought for by the IEVAs. Moreover, as Himley’s (2008) case study shows, it is Petroperu, not the Peruvian state that administers dialogue access. These meetings and wider everyday relationship have also rested to a great degree on the individual personalities of each refinery manager, some of whom have been more proactive in their engagement than others.

Petroperu’s power remained extensive. This is evident in their dialogue construction in this everyday relationship and the ability of individual refinery managers, as opposed to Barrio Florido’s IEVAs, to shape the ongoing level of infrequent, controlled cordiality between both parties. Moreover, the SCDV has generated an unaccountable ‘bargaining momentum’ for REIs with communities (Vasquez 2014 p. 65) that has allowed the refinery to fill this vacuum at a local level. This has given it the capacity to dictate the precise nature of support for the pueblo, evident in their reneging on costly development initiatives suggested by residents and provision instead of low-cost support like the annual events.

Whilst citizens’ only conventional option is to accede to individual refinery manager decisions and keep requesting more essential support, their possible use of unorthodox informal voice actions is constrained by refinery dependence surrounding employment, energy and income. Petroperu has used this situation to great effect in citizen protest voice events that test the company’s restrictive control of dialogue.
Unlike Cuninico, Petroperu is the main employment source for Barrio Florido via short-term elementary occupational contracts and pipeline maintenance income as well as the pueblo’s electrical provider under the provisions of an informal agreement. These services are fundamentally important to Barrio Florido and Petroperu uses this situation to generate a climate of fear surrounding their possible termination which diminishes citizen voice. Interviewees confirmed that community refinery workers were hesitant about criticising any aspect of the everyday relationship for fear of job losses, rumours which were proven to be unfounded but had the desired effect of pacifying dissent. The pueblo’s three IEVAs, who incidentally work in the refinery, were also seen by residents to be affected by this, resulting in their quiet conformity and the prevention of these authoritative figures from implementing or leading collective protest voice groups. The pueblo’s close economic ties mean that impartial IEVAs are almost impossible, which raises clear conflict of interest for these individuals between their own job in the refinery (and the generated income) versus supporting community grievances via collective action protest. Understandably, given their economic poverty, economic self-interest has often prevailed, which is also apparent in the unverified willingness of some citizens to act as Petroperu informers. This not only imbues the refinery with an enhanced sense of power and control in the eyes of Barrio Florido but allows the seeds of mistrust and disunity to be sown that can fracture any collective voice strength the community sought to generate through action.

In non-oil pollution instances of protest voice, this climate of fear is one part of a calculated, suppressive formality response by Petroperu to disperse and diffuse any collective group arrayed against them; those within Barrio Florido considering collective community action are aware from their everyday engagement that only the IEVAs can initiate direct dialogue. Interestingly, though the climate of fear has been effective in dampening general support for critical citizen voice actions, one aspect (electricity provision) has in fact galvanised local people to question Petroperu as the 2013 incident showed. Even then, the climate of fear was still successful; rumours that Petroperu would take away electricity altogether, which ignored the long-established energy agreement, prevented a larger collective group from forming. Nevertheless, the resulting negotiations show how much control of proceedings the refinery had; while eight of the 20 protesting residents gained refinery admittance (determined by Petroperu), only three (presumably the IEVAs) spoke on behalf of the pueblo, useful when their impartiality is compromised. It also
underscores the disparity in power between the pueblo and the company. Petroperu is under no legal obligation to offer electrical provision to Barrio Florido or any other community. This not only weakened the legitimacy of the protestors’ aims (24-hour electrical provision) but allowed the refinery almost total freedom to set the terms and conditions of negotiation. The resulting agreement (an improvement in electrical provision), placated the protestors and nullified the threat of further disturbances. Though the protestors’ radical voice action had been successful in gaining refinery dialogue and an improvement in the contract, there was little they could do to enforce Petroperu’s total accession to their demand, particularly for fear of the consequences i.e. a reversal of the agreement or an end to electrical provision altogether.

However, the climate of fear could not completely deter residents from voicing over environmental pollution issues, as the 2009 and 2011 events show. For the 2009 event, some oil workers and conceivably, the IEVAs, were unwilling to participate for fear of job losses. Phoning the radio suggests that the two residents lacked IEVA backing and therefore did not have alternative Petroperu access arrangements. However, it again underscores the powerful emotive feelings that environmental contamination can generate and the willingness of people, despite external actor pressures, to defend their quality of life regardless of their own socio-economic circumstances. One must acknowledge that, in this case, the external Petroperu pressure does not impact upon all residents as MRBF13, a housewife and one of the radio callers, was not employed at the refinery so could not be silenced through job loss fears.

Nevertheless, even with subsequent journalist and DDP involvement, Petroperu continued to try to control citizen voice through suppression (not allowing them to speak) and counter-narratives directed to the journalists on the causes of local pollution. Despite this, the citizen success in increasing the scrutiny surrounding the oil-spill was perhaps the cause of the unspecified date for the asamblea meeting held by Petroperu with inhabitants concerning protocol (i.e. who to contact) in the event of environmental pollution. Though the details of the meeting are unconfirmed, it is likely that they reiterated the need to avoid involving external actors. This idea is strengthened when one considers Petroperu’s reaction to the 2011 incident, in which the radio was again contacted, resulting in the likely culprit (MRBF13) being asked to visit the refinery
manager and politely be warned to not do so again. This action shows Petroperu’s clear intention to pressurise Barrio Florido citizens into silence rather than attempt accessing external actors.

The experiences of collective-voice-based groups vis-à-vis REIs echo some of these *pueblo* access parameters but also the way that the state has managed interaction with critical and supportive collective voices. Like citizens, some collective voice actors (CBOs, environmental and human-rights NGOs) have weaker power vis-à-vis REIs which makes it difficult for them to establish dialogue unless it is proactively sought by oil companies. When dialogue does occur, REIs have attempted to control the engagement and limit protest voices within these groups, seen in Petroperu’s refusal to accept the presence of the Catholic Church’s legal professionals at a meeting with Cuninico residents. This hasn’t always been effective, notably when technical scrutiny-based voice organisations (e.g. NGO1R1) can bypass initial REI dialogue reluctance through insider (*amiguismo*) contacts.

These types of collective voice groups haven’t been viewed favourably by REIs, particularly well-established operators, as their extraction industry technical and local knowledge poses a threat to their entrenched operational practices and thus does not lead to clear, honest discussion. As NGO1R1 noted, “I think we have an interesting dance with the companies” who are only willing to listen when it’s “in their best interests.” On the other hand, newer REIs like Gran Tierra have been more open to contact. This is partly due to their lack of local extractive knowledge and willingness to do things differently to other, more established operators. However, for a new regional operator, having positive relationships with these other experienced scrutiny-based voice actors helps them to create a stable operating environment and reduces initial criticism of their operations by these collective voice groups.

Other collective voice groups, especially indigenous federations which already have a very divided indigenous voice at local, regional and national levels, are deliberately weakened further by REIs. Federation leaders are bought off (an example of Hirschman’s (1981 p. 241 author’s emphasis) *‘special favours’*) so that instances of protest voice are minimised or their resistance to oil development is quashed whilst at other times, rumours alluding to personal financial gain are generated, which together damage local citizen trust of its leaders and therefore, by extension,
these collective voice movements. Moreover, the emergence of new pro-oil, rival indigenous federation power structures in oil Blocks with links to various REIs is useful for companies as their establishment can legitimise oil company claims of operational consent from indigenous communities and local people. The creation of these smaller entities also generates intra- and inter-community conflict that can prevent and destabilise stronger collective voices from occurring surrounding oil development and consequently helps leave each Loreton indigenous federation to deal with REIs in a more isolationist manner.

This analysis reinforces the extent to which REIs control the scope of collective voice engagement which, like the state, is governed by self-interest. Whilst scrutiny collective voices pose a threat and can, in relation to some CBOs, be deliberately fragmented, REIs will choose proactively to form constructive working relationships with supportive voice actors whose work, skills and experience with selva communities can cover a whole host of incredibly useful functions for oil companies. These include their role as impartial intermediaries in the management of conflict between indigenous communities and REIs; REI investment in their CSR projects (therefore becoming the benign non-corporate face of the oil company for communities that may distrust them or with which the organisation has more experience); helping to identify pro-oil activity community members in order to advance the evangelisation (pro-oil development) process in a local area; and REI funding for community-based environmental monitoring programmes (which act as an REI alarm system by allowing the swift implementation of contingency plans to prevent social conflict issues from arising).

Several points can be gleaned from Barrio Florido, Cuninico and collective-voice organisations’ experiences. Firstly, the communities show that Petroperu possesses extensive power to shape its operational approach to community resource management relations, which can be summarised as a responsive approach to dialogue occurring predominantly through authoritative citizen formal and infrequent contact. Meanwhile, oil company self-interest sees supportive collective voice organisations given greater access and engagement in comparison to scrutiny-based voice actors that threaten REI oil Block operations. There is no illegality in these actions; Peru’s EIAs lack specific regulation surrounding company – community, company – society communication levels and so consequently provide huge flexibility for each company to
determine the style and type of relationship they want. For Petroperu, limited, almost total disengagement from the selva and other scrutiny-based collective voices has been established mirroring the state SCDV. Though one must be careful to not extrapolate these Petroperu findings across the whole oil industry, interviewees nevertheless made clear that the company’s treatment of Cuninico and Barrio Florido were part of a wider REI trend to “decouple” (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Backer 2007 pp. 33-34) their working relationship (i.e. oil Block management and interaction between oil workers and local people) from selva inhabitants. Reed’s (2002 p. 221) assertion that REIs have an unwillingness to incorporate local citizens into decision-making mechanisms does not go far enough in Peru’s Loreto Region; here there are systematic efforts to suppress critical citizen voices surrounding environmental pollution issues for them to try to avoid performance quality improvements (Hirschman 1981 p. 241).

Still, the climate of fear was successfully punctuated in both communities by the strength of individual characters; the Barrio Florido housewife and another unknown resident and Cuninico’s Apu and Catholic Church organiser. It is these strong, confident individual figures, undaunted by the Petroperu climate of fear that has meant that the company ultimately failed to silence each community’s voice. While elections and leadership changes mean that strong individual leaders may not always be in place in each pueblo, Barrio Florido resident actions show that this doesn’t necessarily prevent citizens from voicing. For Cuninico, their community’s response to the pollution event was further aided by their knowledge of, and access to the Catholic Church, one CBO which has had a significant influence on the strength and chosen action of this community’s voice.

9.5 Are REIs deliberately utilising sub-standard operational practices in geographically remote locations and/or against citizens who do not have the knowledge or the means to challenge them?

The Barrio Florido, Cuninico and other non-case-study community (José de Saramuro) experiences and ongoing Oleoducto Norperuano environmental pollution problems enable an evaluative answer to be made regarding Petroperu’s Loreto operational practices. Petroperu’s presence at several selva oil sites and limited engagement with oil-based communities would have made the company imminently aware of the latter’s wholly marginalised lives, SCDV and reliance
on non-state authoritative power structures and links to the wider non-
selva country through collective-voice actors. Therefore, the scrutiny and accountability of Petroperu’s operations by
citizens becomes far more difficult, which, in turn, provides the company with an environment in
which sub-standard practices can be consistently deployed without too much fear of the
consequences.

This is most starkly evident in relation to the Oleoducto Norperuano, which has been
neglected “year upon year” (IRC2) and is now in a state of chronic disrepair (CBO4R1a; CBO4R3;
IRC1; IRC3; NGO7R1; NSI1R1b). The seven 2016 oil spills testify to the calculated indifference
which Petroperu has for their selva operations. The question one must ask is whether this situation
would be occurring if the oil and the pipeline were situated in the coastal region? It is, of course,
pure conjecture. However, the presence of middle and higher class urban citizens and their
improved transport accessibility and technological connectivity would have meant that Petroperu
faced higher levels of scrutiny and vocal protest if oil spill(s) occurred. Consequently, the
challenges faced by selva citizens and other collective-voice actors to maintain accountability of
Petroperu’s sub-standard practices are considerably higher.

9.6 What impact and influence do collective-voice organisations (CBOs and NGOs)
have on citizen voice?

Like Petroperu, these collective voice groups and other advisory figures are interconnected to selva
citizen voice through the impact and influence they have on it. The combination of the state SCDV,
indigenous uncertainty about hydrocarbon development and lack of knowledge vis-à-vis
hydrocarbon development’s impact (partly caused by their own low educational levels), has
generated a space in which these actors can impose their own ideas (selva visions) on indigenous
people. Some of these actors have developed positive long-term relationships built through initial
citizen and federation permission to work with them or alternatively contacted directly by them,
and they undertake several roles, which make a hugely positive contribution to indigenous people
and the strength of their voice. These include educational empowerment and federation capacity
building (so that indigenous communities and their federations can more resolutely defend
themselves and understand the implications, processes and procedures of hydrocarbon
development and their wider indigenous rights) but also other types of capacity activities including
the establishment of environmental monitoring systems (critical for a region which continues to suffer high pollution levels). Smaller, but no less important practical support for indigenous-state/REI engagement (acting as interpreters and accountability checks at asambleas, reviewing and simplifying hydrocarbon technical documents’ language and producing them for state or REI dialogue) and wider societal engagement (efforts at forging local, national and international alliances to promote local indigenous voice issues) are also carried out.

What is significant to stress about these actors and their constructive work with indigenous communities and federations is the shared selva agenda and vision which aims to strengthen, rather than impose upon, indigenous people or their chosen voice action(s). However, the vast range of intentions, agendas and focuses which citizens, federations and other collective voice actors have means that the strengthening of citizen voice doesn’t always occur. One can see this manifest in citizen – federation relationships in which individual communities and their respective leaders may have opposing opinions, even amongst themselves, on hydrocarbon development in comparison to their respective federation. This can damage the prospect of a more unified national indigenous voice vis-à-vis hydrocarbon development, though one must acknowledge the difficulty in achieving this, owing to the wider horizontal authoritative structure within indigenous communities and the different community opinions based upon their experience of REI projects i.e. no local extraction, long-term exploitation etc.

Divergent selva visions can also occur amongst wider citizen/federation-NGO/advisor relationships, which can lead to difficulties forming a constructive partnership or indeed, any relationship at all, but also cause conflict over the type of advice given to citizens and their federations. In circumstances where collective voice actors seek to impose their own voice agendas onto citizens, there is a risk that the latter are dispossessed and deprived of their voice (Bourdieu 1986 pp. 301-302) and have their own interests swallowed up by external interests, especially as citizens, particularly those who are marginalised and poorly educated, lack power to force ‘downward accountability’ (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2010). This was evident in discussions surrounding the use of private financial deals between communities/federations and REIs and radical voice actions.
“Justice” (see Cole and Foster 2001; Wright 2003; Walker 2012; Nurse 2016) can mean different things for different people and there is scope for arguing that private monetary deals suggested and supported by some NGO/advisors provide communities with important compensation for environmental issues. Nevertheless, by doing so, the community are denied the opportunity to pursue legal justice which can, beyond the community’s mere financial reward, help challenge and change REI operational practices in Peru and further abroad. Similarly, radical voice can prove to be highly effective in numerous ways (historically, creating wider societal knowledge about Loreton resource extraction impact, helping make the government and REIs visit the selva, maintaining pressure on these actors over a certain issue) but, by itself does not always necessarily guarantee success, i.e. making the state or REIs listen, particularly as the state can portray these radical actions as the work of ignorant, misguided natives whipped up by external NGO environmental terrorists. Thus, it remains important to consider whose interests are being served by these vocal responses and whether they have the best intentions of the local people at heart.

Where the latter (i.e. best intentions) are more noticeable is in the legal passive and proactive roles and technical support undertaken by several interviewed CBO and NGO actors which provide the greatest assistance for selva citizens to vocally gain justice and serve their interest as opposed to the external actor’s own (NGO1R1). Unfortunately for Barrio Florido, they lacked the support of a CBO/NGO offering this passive/proactive legal support (or indeed any CBO/NGO) and, therefore, did not have the vocal strength to maintain access to, and pressure on, the legal system to achieve environmental justice. For Cuninico however, the Catholic Church has been the catalyst for the community’s vocal search for legal justice.

The Catholic Church’s encouragement of radical action in Loreto in the previous 20 years has transformed into proactive legal support for communities implemented through a Loreton human-rights based commission. Their regular and long-term contact with Cuninico and other Marañón communities, in a religious but also wider educational capacity, meant that this community had knowledge of and access to a supportive CBO actor and had community members who did not wish to maintain their silence.
Their impact was immediate; from helping end the secretive meetings between Petroperu staff and Cuninico’s IEVAs to strengthening the community’s wider collective voice by encouraging contact with its federation, ACODECOSPAT. But it is their push for Cuninico to take legal action, undertaken by discussing the spill in a simple clear way and aided by their long-term training and education about their rights, which meant that the whole pueblo reached a choice they fully accepted and crucially, understood. Residents were wholly part of the legal process, not only through the provision of consistent Catholic Church engagement and dialogue but also through the translation of their vocal testimonies into legal evidence in an invited dialogue space (Cornwall 2000; 2008) and the appearance of two citizens at an IACHR public hearing in Santiago, Chile in June 2016. A participatory relationship was established which combined elements of interactive and consultative participation (Pretty 1995). This was implemented through a wide and deep approach (Farrington et al. 1993) that reached an optimum level of engagement (Cornwall 2008 p. 276) which served to strengthen Cuninico’s voice. Residents admit that despite their initial willingness to pursue legal justice, without the Catholic Church’s involvement, access to this justice (from economic and professional-knowledge capacity perspectives) would have been impossible. This would have reduced wider knowledge of and interest in, the spill, reinforcing why the Catholic Church’s collective voice served the interests of Cuninico rather than their own (Lindell 2010b p. 11). Most importantly, the ability of Cuninico to hold Petroperu legally accountable for the oil spill would have been lost.

To summarise the involvement of collective voice actors in the selva, there is a huge variation in the relationships they form with communities and federations and their impact upon their voice. Each community will have their own opinions on hydrocarbon development and pollution incidents which is influenced by the agendas of these other collective/advisory actors that will go on to shape the voice actions that they have access to and seek to take. It is therefore impossible to generalise their selva community impact but what is clear is that the SCDV is leaving selva communities with a lottery-based access to justice and the strengthening of their voice.
9.7 Summarising Peruvian Loreto stakeholders’ PEV

Overall, one can summarise the extent to which the PEV of Peruvian stakeholders in Loreto can hold REIs, specifically Petroperu, accountable for environmental issues. The freedom of voice for Loreton stakeholders is severely affected by the state’s resolute SHDV implementation. This has led to the establishment of a dangerous, inflexible and intolerant PEV environment, visible in the citizen consultation processes and hostile discourse surrounding scrutiny-based NGOs and other human-rights and environmental defenders. There is, thus, an overarching national environment in which voices of protest are deliberately suppressed or obstructed whilst selva indigenous voices, cultures and societies remain misunderstood and discriminated against.

From a practical perspective, this would appear to result in the deliberate creation of a state SCDV in which its predominantly indigenous citizens have “impossible” (NGO1R1) access to the state, evident in their inadequate transport, ICT and political engagement to report environmental pollution issues and their lack of internal professional and technical capacities to engage with hydrocarbon development. These communities are effectively living beyond the state. The combination of these factors means that rural citizens can struggle to voice through orthodox formal voice channels, therefore restricting their ability to hold REIs accountable for pollution issues.

The absence of a strong and equitable state presence in these rural localities not only intensifies residents’ mistrust of this actor but also increases the likelihood of radical and unorthodox voice responses occurring. These should not be viewed as illegitimate political actions (Herring 1989 p. 139). Instead, radical or unorthodox informal voice actions highlight state inaccessibility and the self-interested approach to selva engagement (e.g. electoral or in response to social protests against extractive activities) which is not fulfilling its job (CBO4R3) and the absence of access ‘through parallel [amiguismo] channels’ (Vasquez 2014 p. 47). The subsequent inability to access or secure justice, legal or otherwise, can increase the likelihood of radical action being taken (IRC2; IRC3; IRC4; IRC9; IRC24; IRC25).\(^{253}\)

\(^{253}\) Despite Cocama not being as violent as other indigenous peoples (NGO3R1), Cuninico residents stated that if the legal route failed, they “would take drastic measures” including closing the river so that “no company would have
For Peru’s indigenous peoples, radical action represents an “extremely pragmatic” response, the “one thing they’ve got up their sleeve … their strong point … the card they can play” that “really terrifies the government” (IJ1). “The protests of Bagua were a key point for indigenous people: they saw what they can do and what they can claim [from] the state” (NSI4R1) but also represents a possible longing for inclusion (Zahar 2006 p. 39) in a country that has alienated them from society and left them unable to use their voice in any other way. It epitomises their anger at discrimination, injustice and perceived institutionalised indifference to their voice and wider environmental concerns, particularly as indigenous inhabitants have borne the brunt of Peru’s neoliberal extractive agenda. The state must apologise publicly, perhaps through a permanent monument, over its mistreatment of indigenous people (CBO1R1) and seek “to be more inclusive [and] open” in consultative mechanisms (ILP1) and remediation work (NGO1R1). Their must be greater respect of indigenous people (CBO3R1) and their cultures by ending the “relationship of exploiter and victims” (NSI7R1), an effort to comply with signed remediation agreements (CBO3R1; IUA3; NSI4R1) and take “exceptional measures” to promote indigenous political voices (IUS2). Until these points are achieved, trust between them will never be improved and oil “conflicts between the population and the state … [will be] almost permanent” (NSI7R1).

This state SCDV has provided an open space for collective voice stakeholders and Petroperu to strengthen, shape and control citizen voice. Collective voice actors can do so through positive and negative impacts including strengthening and projecting their voice via access to formal legal mechanisms, educational empowerment and capacity building such as the establishment of grassroots environmental monitoring mechanisms. They can also represent citizens in dialogue with higher vertical national, regional and international actors, help support REI-aligned goals and contentiously seek to shape citizen/federations to pursue non-legal-based voice options, i.e. private financial deals and radical voice. In the Catholic Church’s case, the collective voice movement’s interests serve the Cuninico people rather than their own but, sadly, their work and presence alongside other organisations “aren’t everywhere” (CBO3R1) and so cannot entirely replace the state SCDV. Nonetheless, for rural citizens, these actors offer the come here” (IRC25) and implementing “[a] strike …. [aimed at] the government” (IRC9) evident in the 2016 events (see Chapter 3, Section 3.5).
greatest opportunity for citizens to successfully project and strengthen their voice so that they may try and hold REIs accountable for pollution.

Petroperu has had an undeniably more negative suppressive influence on citizen voice, a deliberate strategy that incorporates the establishment of a climate of fear borne through community socio-economic and development dependency on their support, limited/total disengagement or decoupling from communities, hostility to citizen protest voice actions and more widely, the fragmentation and division of indigenous federations. Their power to shape citizen voice and prevent vocalisation appears to match, and in San José de Saramuro’s case, be far greater, than the influence that a positive constructive relationship with one or more CBO/NGO/advisors can have. How many other communities have had their voices suppressed in this manner? Though there is no accurate answer to this question, these case studies and other recent pipeline spillages indicate that Petroperu is utilising poor operational practices against citizens who lack the knowledge, amiguismo government contacts and access to challenge them through voice. Consequently, whilst the political and development arms of the state are not present in the selva, its dangerous, inflexible, intolerant and restrictive approach to hydrocarbon stakeholder voice is, which is fulfilled through the actions of Petroperu.

9.8 Evaluating the effectiveness of PEV and wider methodological processes

At the heart of this thesis has been the focus on accountability and power inequality, themes which helped steer the literature review into political ecology. This is focused predominantly on investigations into myriad forms of inequality within political, economic and social structures and relationships between actors at various spatial scales and their impacts on land-use and natural resources access and control over time (Blaikie 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield 1987a; 1987b; 1987c; 1987d; 1987e; Bryant and Bailey 1997; Batterbury and Bebbington 1999 pp. 281-282; Simsik 2002; Molle 2007; Newmann 2005; Biersack and Greenberg 2006; Baird 2009; Ioris 2011; Peet, Robbins and Watts 2011b; Watts 2015 pp. 32-35). At the same time, political ecology seeks to promote and contribute to positive transformations of these processes and actor relationships in order to counter the way in which they can come together in unjust ways (Bridge, McCarthy and Perreault 2015 p. 8; Bryant 2015b p. 22) and cause environmental pollution.
Hirschman’s theory of voice has been explored in a vast array of concepts but never in relation to citizens or other stakeholders holding industry to account vis-à-vis environmental pollution. At the same time, despite a form of voice (i.e. discourse) being part of third generation post-structural political ecology, evident in efforts at ‘giv[ing] voice’ to marginalised and disadvantaged people concerning environmental issues (Ioris 2016 p. 180), the study of voice as an action, by whom it was taken and why, has not been undertaken. As Bryant (2015b p. 23) states, ‘[g]aining voice is a struggle but so too is giving voice’ and in this spirit, it became clear that political ecology provides a natural basis for the study of voice in relation to environmental pollution issues. Combined with the framework’s lack of a ‘grand theory’ (Khan 2013 p. 460), there was academic space to establish PEV within political ecology.

PEV provides researchers with a theoretical framework that can explore the problems surrounding environmental pollution from multiple angles. By focusing on the macro and micro political, economic, social and geographical environments and the relationships between actors therein, a comprehensive review can be undertaken of the way that stakeholders operate and the unjust barriers they may face to voice. By doing so, the connections between micro and macro factors, which may not be immediately obvious, can be unmasked and more fully understood.

Notwithstanding the impact of environmental pollution, Barrio Florido and Cuninico’s residents have remained in the same place and have not attempted to relocate i.e. exit, highlighting several interconnected factors that show PEV’s strength. Firstly, it shows that both communities lacked the wealth and income to relocate, corroborating exit’s unfair societal distribution (Hirschman 1978 pp. 95-96; Blaikie 1985 p. 3). Secondly, both pueblos had a degree of group and reformist loyalty influenced by life-world attachments (Zuindeau 2009; Castán Broto 2013 p. 4; Groves 2015 pp. 855-859) (economic, socio-cultural and spiritual) and reformist loyalty (Graham and Keeley 1992 p. 197) in which they have instead sought to correct and reverse the issues through voice as opposed to (vocal) exit. Lastly, it provides evidence of Hirschman’s argument that voice has an ‘occasional edge’ over exit in situations affecting public happiness (Hirschman 1981 p. 217) or public interest (Hirschman 1982 pp. 6-7) like the environment. As the case studies show,
‘everyone has a strong motivation to defend the quality of life at his own station’ (Hirschman 1970 p. 53). Accordingly, both case studies have utilised active rather than passive forms of voice.

Overall, PEV has not only been able to apply Hirschman’s voice theory successfully onto a important public interest issue but incorporate it with and expand the political ecology framework so that “voice” as an action can become the central focus of analysis. Though the PEV framework, like political ecology, creates a broad academic space for researchers, PEV’s defined areas of exploration do offer a more cohesive, integrated means of investigation into the possible struggles and injustices faced in voicing. In this fashion, PEV can strengthen political ecology by enabling comparisons to be more easily and accurately made between different PEV studies within and/or amongst countries compared to those carried out purely through a political ecology lens. The investigation of voice through PEV can consequently take political ecology forward into new and exciting avenues of research. It is this framework which constitutes my main original contribution to political ecology and wider knowledge.

PEV’s multi-faceted nature lent itself to multi-method (SSI and micro-geography analysis) qualitative research that sought to capture and understand participant voice in that time and environment. SSIs provided participants with the freedom to express themselves openly rather than through a more restrictive structured interview process which at the same time was beneficial for me as new topics, themes and perspectives emerged out of loosely scripted conversations. At the same time, the use of a loose research storyline, based around the PEV theoretical framework diagram (Diagram 2.6, Chapter 2, Section 2.9), enabled the participants’ voices to play a central role in the coding process.

My own critical geographical philosophical outlook, particularly stemming from the geography of domination and resistance combined with my own emotional personal connections to the continent, meant that I felt a genuine commitment to uncovering the injustices faced by the two case-study communities and through my research help project their voices into the wider world. Despite this, I do not feel I was overly biased or gained insider status with any one stakeholder group. My researcher’s reflexive positionality meant that I could place myself in the ‘spaces of inbetweenness’ (Kobayashi 1994, cited in Chattopadhyay 2013 p. 138) vis-à-vis
stakeholder groups and recognise and respect each person’s individual voice which provided access (bar REIs) and interview opportunities with other non-case-study community stakeholders (CBOs/NGOs) and actors (the state). This commitment to inclusivity meant that, ethically, my work did not seek to discriminate against participants or their views, even if they were not my own, whilst my confidentiality levels meant that interviewees felt confident that they were unidentifiable in the research, thereby facilitating more open interviews.

9.9 Self-reflecting upon the outcomes of the research

In hindsight, the research has been altogether successful. Even with limited self-funding means, the fieldwork afforded me the time to conduct a detailed study of two Petroperu oil communities. However, there are limitations to the study. It would have been beneficial to contact and interview the national indigenous federation organisations and analyse a third or possibly even fourth Petroperu-based community (e.g. José de Saramuro) so that a stronger evaluative summary of their Loreton operations could have been made. Alternatively, a parallel focus on a different oil company, particularly a privately-operated company, would have provided initial indications of how widespread Petroperu’s actions vis-à-vis citizens were in the Loreton oil industry and allowed comparisons to be made between state and non-state industrial actors. This latter idea had crossed my mind during fieldwork but several problems prevented me from following it through: the lack of fieldwork contacts to reach non-Petroperu communities, their far more remote geographical locations which would have taken longer and cost more to reach and my limited fieldwork window, which became taken up with compiling data for my first two case studies and other stakeholders.

Lastly, this thesis has considered voice almost exclusively through the use of SSI’s. Photograph 0.1 provides a clear indication of the other forms of non-voice protest in Loreto, which could have been catalogued and analysed alongside the SSI data. If I were to conduct the study again under the same fieldwork circumstances (i.e. self-funded time-frame), I would maintain focus on Petroperu but make at least one two-day visit, via the Catholic Church, to San José de Saramuro so that the collected interviewee experiences could have expanded the relevant points within this thesis. If possible, I would also seek to document non-verbal forms of voice protest to gauge their prevalence, impact and effectiveness.
9.10 Prospective future research

This PEV research has thrown open several more avenues for further research which can be undertaken in Loreto or in Peru and other resource-rich EMaDEs. In Loreto, it would be interesting to explore the fragmentation of indigenous collective voice movements in greater depth to understand how widely and effectively this is utilised by oil companies. Similarly, investigation into José de Saramuro and other pollution affected communities would provide a far more authoritative picture of the way that Petroperu and the state deal with oil pollution incidents, the freedom of voice for these communities, their access/non-access to the state and role of exterior CBO/NGO/advisory groups. More widely, research into the Peruvian mining protests would give greater insight into the state’s approach to resource development and citizen consultation. However, in relation to environmental pollution, Loreto’s experiences appear to bear striking similarities to the issues within Nigeria’s Niger Delta. Here, the lack of state socio-economic development, the questions of resource ownership and income, ongoing environmental contamination and the growth of radical voice organisations provide a dispiriting PEV environment in which local people’s lives have not been valued or respected and their voices ignored.
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Appendices


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<tr>
<th>Exploratory wells (as of October 2012)</th>
<th>223 with 28 drilled since 1998. Of these, 17 have encountered hydrocarbons</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| Exploratory wells and corresponding Blocks (as of October 2012) | Block 31E (shale gas)  
Block 39 (heavy oil)  
Block 64 (light oil)  
Block 67 (heavy oil)  
Block 95 (medium oil)  
Block 100 |
| Exploratory wells now in production (as of 2015) | Blocks 31E, 64 and 67 |
| Non-producing exploratory wells proven, probable and possible estimated reserves (2015) | Block 39: proven (0), probable (0), possible (0)  
Block 95: proven (0), probable (0), possible (0)  
Block 100: proven (0), probable (0), possible (0) |
Appendix 1b Loreton oil production: active wells (Finer, Jenkins and Powers 2013 p. 5; MINEM 2015 p. 15; Perupetro 2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Production wells (as of October 2012)</th>
<th>219</th>
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<tr>
<td>Production wells and corresponding Blocks with known percentage of production wells (as of October 2012)</td>
<td>Block 1AB (now Block 192 since August 2015) (62.5 per cent) Block 8 (20.5 per cent) Block 31 (17 per cent) Block 31E Block 64 Block 67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main production wells proven, probable and possible reserves (2015)</td>
<td>534, 259 proven, probable and possible oil barrels from production Blocks Blocks 1AB/192 and 8 account for just over quarter (26.8 per cent or 143,132 barrels) of this total.</td>
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Appendix 2 Participant categorisation (independent table columns).²⁵⁴

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BAND 1 (two sub-groups):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>16-29</td>
<td>Mestizo (mixed-race people)</td>
<td>Managers (chief executives, senior officials and legislators, traditional</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>30-39</td>
<td>Indigenous (mainly for the Andean</td>
<td>chiefs and heads of villages) and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>40-49</td>
<td>groups Quechua and Aymara) (I)</td>
<td>Professionals (e.g. chemists, civil engineers, medical doctors, dentists</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>50+</td>
<td>Other (including Asians)</td>
<td>and nurses, accountants, lawyers and judges, priests)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>Whites</td>
<td>BAND 2 (two sub-groups):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>Blacks (negro and zambo)</td>
<td>Technical and associate professionals (e.g. chemical engineering technician,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td>(In order of ascending size)</td>
<td>mining supervisor, petroleum and natural gas refining operator, midwife)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>clerical support workers (e.g. bank tellers, hotel receptionists, payroll</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>clerks, cooks, shopkeeper, teacher’s aide, security guard)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BAND 3 (four sub-groups):</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Service and sales workers (cooks, waiters and bartenders, hairdressers,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>travel attendants)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Skilled agricultural, forestry and fishery workers (market oriented skilled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>agricultural workers, subsistence farmers, fishers, hunters and gathers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Craft and related trade workers (building and related trade workers e.g.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>house builders, carpenters and joiners; metal and machine related trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>workers e.g. blacksmiths; machinery mechanics and repairs; handicraft and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>printing workers; electrical and electronic trade workers; food processing,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>woodworking, garment and other craft related trade workers e.g. wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>treaters, cabinet makers)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Plant machine operators and assemblers (stationary plant and machine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>operators, assemblers, drivers and mobile plant operators)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Band 4 (one sub-group):</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

²⁵⁴ This table was used to document the data of all interviewees. The first four employment bands are based upon the ILO) International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) and resolution ISCO-08. The fifth band was established to categorise those not within some form of employment.
| | | **Elementary occupation** (cleaners and helpers, agricultural, forestry and fishery labourers, labourers in mining, construction, manufacturing and transport, food preparation assistants, street and related sales and service workers, refuse and other elementary workers)  
**Band 5 (one sub-group):**  
**Unpaid positions** (student, houseparent, retired, unemployed) |
Appendix 3a Male interview participant categorisation by ethnicity, occupation, age group, residence and interview site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity \ age</th>
<th>16-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mestizo</td>
<td>CBO2R3, CBO2R4, CBO2R5, IUS1, IUS2, MRBF16, MRBF17, MRBF27</td>
<td>MRBF6, MRBF15, MRBF26, NCSSC2, NGO1R1, NGO5R1, NSI4R1, NSI5R1</td>
<td>IUA1, MRBF1, MRBF2, MRBF12, MRBF23, MRBF30, NGO4R1, NSI3R1, RGR1</td>
<td>FOPOW1, FOPOW2, FOPOW3, ILP2, IUA2, IUA3, MRBF3, MRBF14, MRBF18, MRBF29, NCSSC1, NSI7R1, RGR2, RGR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>IRC17, IRC18, IRC25</td>
<td>IRC13, IRC15, IRC19</td>
<td>CBO3R1, IRC1, IRC2, IRC3, IRC5, IRC8, IRC14</td>
<td>IRC6, IRC9, IRC11, IRC21, MRBF11, NCSSC3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (incl. Asian)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occupation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(Band 1) Manager</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NSI4R1</td>
<td>CBO3R1, IRC1, IUA1, NGO2R1, NGO4R1, NSI3R1, RGR1</td>
<td>CBO1R1, RGR2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

255 Each participant was given a coded category. This was based on a combination of their broad professional occupation, ethnicity, geographical location and the number of the organisation and interviewee (n). The main codes are as follows: mestizo (mixed-race) resident of Barrio Florido n (MRBFn), indigenous resident of Cuninico n (IRCn), national state institution n representative n (NSInRn), regional government representative n (RGRn), CBO n representative n (CBOInRn), NGO n representative n (NGOnRn). For other smaller groups of interviewed professionals and groups, the following codes have been used: Iquitos university academic n (IUAIn), non-case study selva citizen n (NCSSCn), former Occidental Petroleum oil worker n (FOPOWn), Iquitos university student n (IUSn), Iquitos legal professional n (ILPn), Iquitos construction worker n (ICWn), Iquitos journalist n (IJn) and former indigenous resident of Cuninico n (FIRCn). This coding has been used in Appendix 3b and 4.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band</th>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Positions</th>
<th>Codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professional</td>
<td>IJ1, IRC15, MRBF6, NCSSC2, NGO5R1, NSI5R1</td>
<td>IRC14, MRBF2, CBO4R3, ILP2, IUA2, IUA3, MRBF3, NGO3R1, NSI7R1, RGR3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Technical/associate professionals</td>
<td>IRC18</td>
<td>NGO1R1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Clerical support</td>
<td>MRBF12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Service and sales</td>
<td>MRBF18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Skilled agriculture</td>
<td>MRBF27, IRC3, IRC5, IRC6, IRC11, IRC21, MRBF14, NCSSC1, NCSSC3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Craft/trade</td>
<td>MRBF15, MRBF16</td>
<td>MRBF1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Plant, machine operator</td>
<td>MRBF26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>IRC17, MRBF16</td>
<td>IRC19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Studying</td>
<td>CBO2R3, CBO2R4, CBO2R5, IUS1, IUS2, IRC25, MRBF17</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Houseparent</td>
<td>IRC9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Band 5) Retired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>FOPOW1, FOPOW2, FOPOW3, MRBF11, MRBF29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Band 5) Unemployed</td>
<td></td>
<td>IRC1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>CBO2R3, CBO2R4, CBO2R5, IUS1, IUS2</th>
<th>IJ1, NGO5R1, NSI5R1, NSI4R1</th>
<th>CBO3R1, IUA1, MRBF23, NGO2R1, NGO4R1, NSI3R1, RGR1</th>
<th>CBO1R1, CBO4R3, FOPOW1, FOPOW2, FOPOW3, ILP2, IUA2, IUA3, NGO3R1, NSI7R1 RGR2, RGR3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>IRC17, IRC18, IRC25, MRBF16, MRBF17, MRBF27</td>
<td>IRC13, IRC15, IRC19, MRBF15, MRBF26</td>
<td>IRC1, IRC2, IRC3, IRC5, IRC8, IRC14, MRBF1, MRBF2, MRBF12, MRBF30</td>
<td>IRC6, IRC9, IRC21, IRC11, MRBF3, MRBF11, MRBF14, MRBF18, MRBF29, NCSSC1, NCSSC3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interview location**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Home</th>
<th>IRC25, IUS1, IUS2, MRBF16, MRBF17</th>
<th>IRC13, IRC19, MRBF15, MRBF26</th>
<th>IRC5, IRC8, MRBF12, MRBF30, NSI3R1</th>
<th>CBO1R1, FOPOW3, ILP2, IRC6, IRC9, IRC11, IRC21, MRBF11, MRBF18, MRBF29, NGO3R1, RGR3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>CBO2R3, CBO2R4, CBO2R5, IRC17, IRC18</td>
<td>IJ1, IRC15, NCSSC2</td>
<td>IRC1, IRC2, IRC3, IRC14, IUA1, MRBF1, MRBF2</td>
<td>FOPOW1, FOPOW2, MRBF3, NCSSC1, NCSSC3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>NGO5R1, NSI4R1, NSI5R1</td>
<td>CBO3R1, NGO2R1, NGO4R1, RGR1</td>
<td>CBO4R3, IUA2, IUA3, MRBF14, NSI7R1, RGR2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic (Skype)</td>
<td>NGO1R1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*NGO6R1 (no age data taken but Band 1 (professional) and office interview)*  
*ICW1 (no age data taken but 3 (craft/trade) and public interview)*
Appendix 3b Female interview participant categorisation by ethnicity, occupation, age group, residence and interview site.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity \ age</th>
<th>16-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>50+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Mestizo</em></td>
<td>CBO2R1, CBO2R2, MRBF4, MRBF21, MRBF22</td>
<td>CBO4R2, MRBF8, MRBF13, MRBF19, MRBF23, NGO8R1, NSI1R1, NSI2R1</td>
<td>CBO4R1, MRBF9, MRBF20, MRBF25, NGO4R2, RGR4</td>
<td>ILP1, MRBF5, MRBF7, MRBF10, MRBF28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td>IRC12, IRC16, IRC22</td>
<td>IRC20, IRC23, IRC24</td>
<td>IRC4, IRC7, IRC10, IRC26</td>
<td>FIRC1, IRC27, IRC28, IRC29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (incl. Asian)</td>
<td>NSI6R1</td>
<td>NGO7R1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Occupation**

(Band 1) Manager

| | NGO7R1, NSI2R1 | RGR4 |

(Band 1) Professional

| | CBO4R2, NGO8R1, NSI1R1 | CBO4R1 | ILP1 |

(Band 2)

Technical/associate professionals

| | | MRBF25, NGO4R2 |

(Band 2) Clerical support

| | |

(Band 3) Service and sales

<p>| | NSI6R1 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Band 3) Skilled agriculture</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Band 3) Craft/trade</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band 3) Plant, machine operator</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band 4) Elementary</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MRBF7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band 5) Studying</td>
<td>CBO2R1, CBO2R2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band 5) Houseparent</td>
<td>IRC12, IRC16, IRC22, MRBF21, MRBF22</td>
<td>IRC20, IRC23, IRC24, MRBF8, MRBF13, MRBF19, MRBF23</td>
<td>IRC4, IRC7, IRC10, IRC26, MRBF9, MRBF20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band 5) Retired</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MRBF28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Band 5) (Unemployed)</td>
<td>MRBF4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Residence**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Urban</th>
<th>CBO2R1, CBO2R2, NSI6R1</th>
<th>CBO4R2, NGO7R1, NGO8R1, NSI1R1, NSI2R1</th>
<th>CBO4R1, NGO4R2, RGR4</th>
<th>ILP1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>IRC12, IRC16, IRC22, MRBF4, MRBF21, MRBF22</td>
<td>MRBF8, MRBF13, MRBF19, MRBF23</td>
<td>IRC4, IRC7, IRC10, IRC26, MRBF9, MRBF20, MRBF24, MRBF25</td>
<td>FIRC1, IRC27, IRC28, IRC29, MRBF5, MRBF10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interview location</td>
<td>IRC20, IRC23, IRC24</td>
<td>IRC20, IRC23, IRC24, MRBF13, MRBF19, MRBF23, NGO7R, NSI2R1</td>
<td>IRC7, IRC10, IRC26, MRBF9, MRBF25, RGR4</td>
<td>IRC27, IRC28, IRC29, MRBF5, MRBF7, MRBF10, MRBF28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------</td>
<td>---------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home</td>
<td>IRC12, IRC16, IRC22, MRBF4, NSI6R1</td>
<td>IRC20, IRC24, MRBF13, MRBF19, MRBF23, NGO7R, NSI2R1</td>
<td>IRC7, IRC10, IRC26, MRBF9, MRBF25, RGR4</td>
<td>IRC27, IRC28, IRC29, MRBF5, MRBF7, MRBF10, MRBF28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>CBO2R1, CBO2R2, MRBF21, MRBF22</td>
<td>IRC4, MRBF20, MRBF24</td>
<td>FIRC1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office</td>
<td>CBO4R2, NSI1R1, NGO8R1</td>
<td>CBO4R1, NGO4R2</td>
<td>ILP1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic (Skype)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix 4 Grouping of interviews.

Barrio Florido (30 citizens). Coded as: **Mestizo resident of Barrio Florido n (MRBFn)**: MRBF1; MRBF2; MRBF3; MRBF4; MRBF5; MRBF6; MRBF7; MRBF8; MRBF9; MRBF10; MRBF11; MRBF12; MRBF13; MRBF14; MRBF15; MRBF16; MRBF17; MRBF18; MRBF19; MRBF20; MRBF21; MRBF22; MRBF23; MRBF24; MRBF25; MRBF26; MRBF27; MRBF28; MRBF29; MRBF30

Cuninico (29 citizens). Coded as: **Indigenous resident of Cuninico n (IRCn)**: IRC1; IRC2; IRC3; IRC4; IRC5; IRC6; IRC7; IRC8; IRC9; IRC10; IRC11; IRC12; IRC13; IRC14; IRC15; IRC16; IRC17; IRC18; IRC19; IRC20; IRC21; IRC22; IRC23; IRC24; IRC25; IRC26; IRC27; IRC28; IRC29

Also three non-interviewed Cuninico citizens (two women and one man) who made passing comments in interviews but are not part of the interview total coded as: **Indigenous resident of Cuninico participant n (IRCPn)**: IRCP1; IRCP2; IRCP3

State representatives (11):

National government. Coded as: **National state institution n representative n (NSInRn)**

- **NSI1R1a, b. Autoridad Nacional del Agua** (National Authority of Water) (ANA). ANA, located within the Ministry of Agriculture manages and monitors aquatic water sources except water for human consumption (ANA no date).

- **NSI2R1. Organismo de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental** (National Environmental Monitoring Agency) (OEFA). OEFA is an environmental enforcement agency working as the governing body of the *Sistema Nacional de Evaluacion y Fiscalizacion Ambiental* (National System of Evaluation and Environmental Control, SINEFA) (OEFA no date a) located within MINAM (OEFA no date b).

- **NSI3R1. Servicio Nacional de Areas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado** *Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado* (National Service of Protected Areas by the State) (SERNANP). SERNANP located within MINAM is the governing body of *Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas* (National System of Protected Natural Areas by the State, SINANPE) and is in charge of the technical and administrative criteria for the
conservation of Áreas Naturales Protegidas (Natural Protected Areas (ANP)) (SERNANP no date).

- **NSI4R1.** Defensoría del Pueblo (Office of the Ombudsman) (DDP).
  This agency, enshrined within the Peruvian constitution is tasked with defending the constitution rights of Peruvian citizens and enforce state administrative responsibilities. Though it cannot issue sentences or impose fines or penalties it can instead produces reports for the authorities based on technical, ethical and legal arguments (DDP no date).

- **NSI5R1.** Procurador Público Especializado en Delitos Anticorrupción (PPEDC) descentralizado del Distrito Judicial de Loreto (Public Prosecutor Specialised in Crimes of Corruption for the decentralised Judicial District of Loreto).
  Part of the Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos (Ministry of Justice and Human Rights) this agency operates in each of Peru’s Judicial Districts and is tasked with investigating issues of corruption and recovering assets (see Ministerio de Justicia y Derechos Humanos no date a, b).

- **NSI6R1.** Organismo Supervisor de la Inversión en Energía y Minería (Supervisory Agent for Investment in Energy and Mining) (OSINERGMIN).
  This institution is charged with regulating and supervising companies in the electricity, hydrocarbon and mining sectors to comply with Peruvian law (see OSINERGMIN no date).

- **NSI7R1.** Judge (Justice), Superior Courts of Justice, Judicial District of Loreto.

Loreto regional government (GOREL). Coded as: Regional government representative n (RGRn)

- **RGR1.** GOREL Manager of Health and Environment.
- **RGR2.** Loreto Regional Councillor.
- **RGR3.** Loreto Municipal Councillor.
- **RGR4.** GOREL regional development and intercultural advisor.

CBO (four organisations). Coded as: CBO n representative n (CBOonRn)

- **CBO1R1.** Red Ambiental Loretana.
  An indigenous environmental watch-dog organisation, it was established in Iquitos in 2005. It originated from Corrientes and Tigres Cuenca indigenous communities.
environmental concerns surrounding the oil industry and illegal logging. It helped to organise the campaign for the reinjection of Pluspetrol contaminated waters in 2004.

- **CBO2R1-4. Red de Ninos, Ninas y Adolescentes, (National Network of Children and Adolescents) (REDNNA).**
  A national organisation, REDNNA has networks in each Peruvian region with the Loreton branch based in Iquitos. Its objective is to provide a forum in which young children and adolescents can come to discuss various development, social and environmental objectives to improve young their quality of life. Their discussions feed into the Consejo Asesor para Niños y Adolescentes (Advisory Council for Children and Adolescents (CCONNA)), a national body which is part of the Departamento de la Mujer y Desarrollo Social (Department of the Ministry of Women and Social Development (MIMDES)).

- **CBO3R1. La Organizacion de Pueblos Indigenas del Oriente, (Regional Organisation of Indigenous Peoples of the East) (ORPIO).**
  ORPIO is a Loreton indigenous organisation that represents several smaller individual federations (ACODECOSPAT in the Marañón Cuenca, FECONAT in the Tigre Cuenca, FECONACO in the Corrientes Cuenca and FEDIQUEP in the Pastaza Cuenca. ORPIO provides a higher (vertical) level of indigenous dialogue with the government and other actors (notably REIs) surrounding indigenous issues as well as practical support such as the monitoring of the prior consultation mechanism. ORPIO’s work feeds the national indigenous body AIDESEP.

- **CBO4R1-3. Catholic Church. The Apostolic Vicariate of Iquitos.**
  This is an ecclesiastical province comprising the provinces of Maynas and Loreto and operate in the regional capital but also the selva, notably the Marañón Cuenca. Aside from this, the Catholic Church also operates the Comisión de Justicia y Paz - Derechos Humanos del Vicariato de Iquitos (Commission for Justice and Peace - Human Rights of the Vicariate of Iquitos). This commission is based in Iquitos and provides legal support to citizens and federations surrounding human rights issues.

NGO (eight organisations). Coded as: **NGO n representative n (NGOnRn)**

- **NGO1R1. E-Tech International.**
  Based in New Mexico, USA, E-Tech International provides environmental technical support to communities in EMaDEs on the potential environmental impacts
surrounding development projects and capacity building including environmental monitoring projects. They work closely with local partners including indigenous federations, local, regional and national governments, civil society, academia and industrial professionals alongside companies conducting the development (E-Tech international no date).

- **NGO2R1a, b, c. The Peru Mission.**
  Established in 2012, this charity has its roots in Catholic parishes and schools in the UK but now works with all Christian denominations and secular agencies. Based in Iquitos, its objective is to contribute to the betterment of conditions for the poorest members of Peruvian society in Loreto and further afield. Projects include medical support (e.g. UK volunteer medical interns work in Loreto whilst mosquito nets are purchased for selva communities) and educational/development help (building schools and classrooms and implementing skills training for young people in in poorer communities) (The Peru Mission no date).

- **NGO3R1. Earthwatch Institute.**
  Established in 1971, Earthwatch has offices located in several countries including the USA, UK, Japan and Australia. Working in over 40 countries, their aim is to engage with people in scientific field research and education to promote the understanding and the need for a sustainable environment. Through their scientists, they implement field research experiences surrounding key themes including climate change, wildlife and ecosystems and ocean health. These are designed to benefit local communities who are consulted on and collaborate in these projects (Earthwatch institute 2017).

- **NGO4R1-2a, b. ProNaturaleza (Peruvian Foundation for the Conservation of Nature).**
  A private Peruvian NGO established in 1984 with offices around the country including in Iquitos. Their work is financed through private donors (e.g. REIs), international cooperation and national funding sources. Their focus is on conservation and biodiversity and the sustainable use of natural resources. Project themes include participation in the management of protected natural areas (e.g. Loreto’s Pacaya Samiria Regional Conservation Area) and advocacy and implementation of socio-environmental responsibility in extractive industries (e.g. running community environmental monitoring programmes) (ProNaturaleza no date).

- **NGO5R1. Sociedad Peruana de Derecho Ambiental (Peruvian Society of Environmental Law) (SPDA).**
Established in 1986, its focus has been on the promotion of Peruvian environmental policies and legislation particularly surrounding development. They have offices in Lima, Iquitos and Puerto Maldonado (Madre de Dios regional capital). SPDA has three strategic areas of focus incorporating natural heritage (working towards the protection and sustainable use of the environment), institutions and legislation (promoting coherent and systematic environmental legislation) and crucially environmental justice (implementing environmental monitoring systems, environmental conflict prevention schemes) (SPDA no date).

  Established in 1996, NCI seek to protect biologically diverse ecosystems with the support of local people in Latin America. They now have 17 local offices in Ecuador, Peru and Mexico and operate in 20 biodiverse regions in Latin America including Loreto. In this region and wider Peru, NCI goals include environmental objectives (protection of Loreto's Amazonian rainforest) and societal aims (working to improve and enhance selva community economic benefits through the sustainable use of natural resources, increasing their rights over resources and improving their benefits from conserving natural areas) (NCI no date).

- **NGO7R1. Alianza Arkana.**
  A grassroots alliance, Alianza Arkana now work primarily with rural and urban-fringe Shipibo communities in the Ucayali region of the Peruvian Amazon but originally operated in Loreto. These are centred on the completion of development objectives including improving access to clean water, sanitation and hygiene, nutrition and education. Each project is guided by each community and are run by the communities themselves. Aside from these development objectives, Alianza Arkana also work to raise national and international awareness about environmental and human rights issues in the Amazon, research into the socio-environmental impact of extractive industries, gather and document evidence of extractive industry illegalities and provide legal support for communities in defence of their rights (Alianza Arkana no date).

- **NGO8R1. Derecho Ambiental y Recursos Naturales** (Law, Environment and Natural Resources) (DAR).
  DAR have offices in both Lima and Iquitos and aim to build governance, sustainable development and the promotion of indigenous peoples’ rights in the Amazon. In Loreto
they are focused on several objectives including indigenous environmental monitoring, co-management of Regional Conservation Areas, promoting good practice and transparency within the hydrocarbon industry and educational support for communities surrounding their hydrocarbon rights. (DAR no date).

Other citizen voices (16)

- Three academics. Coded as: **Iquitos university academic n (IUAn)**:
  - **IUA1**. Anthropologist researcher at *Instituto de Investigaciones de la Amazonía Peruana*, (Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon). Formerly government civil servant in the office of the Prime Minister.
  - **IUA2**. Chemical engineering professor at *Universidad Nacional de la Amazonía Peruana*, (National University of the Peruvian Amazon).
  - **IUA3**. Research director at Research Institute of the Peruvian Amazon.

- Three non-case study *selva* residents from three different *pueblos*. Coded as: **non-case study selva citizen n (NCSSCn)**.
  - **NCSSC1**. Farmer from Orellna (Vargas Guerra district capital), situated on the banks of the *Rio Marañón*.
  - **NCSSC2**. Missionary father living with communities in Trompeteros District, Loreto Province.
  - **NCSSC3**. Farmer from San Jorge (Nauta district, Loreto Province), a *pueblo* on the banks of the *Rio Marañón*.

- Three former Occidental Petroleum oil workers. Coded as: **former occidental Petroleum oil worker n (FOPOWn)**.
  - **FOPOW1**. Mechanical engineer.
  - **FOPOW2**. Former community relations officer.
  - **FOPOW3**. Truck driver then plant operator.

- Two university students. Coded as: **Iquitos university student n (IUSn)**.
  - **IUS1**;
  - **IUS2**

- Two legal professionals. Coded as: **Iquitos legal professional n (ILPn)**.
**ILP1.** Iquitos teacher and human rights lawyer (working pro bono) for indigenous communities.

**ILP2.** Iquitos lawyer.

- One construction worker. Coded as: *Iquitos construction worker n (ICWn).*
  ICW1

- One journalist. Coded as: *Iquitos journalist n (IJn)*
  IJ1. Environmental journalist for an international newspaper based in Iquitos.

- One former Cuninico community member. Coded as: *former indigenous resident of Cuninico n (FIRCn).*
  FIRC1
Appendix 5 Template contact summary sheet (based on Miles and Huberman 1994 pp. 51-52).

Contact type: Date: Location:

1. Summarise the information I gained for each of the interview guide themes. Which did the participant bear on most centrally? What struck me the most from these sections?

Topic 2: The Peruvian state and stakeholder voice:

Topic 3: Stakeholder voice actions and CBO/NGO use of individual citizen voice:

Topic 4: Stakeholder voices and their relationship with REIs:

2. What new hypotheses, speculations, or hunches were suggested by the participant? What struck me the most from this new information?

3. Based on the above questions, are there new kinds of information (concepts) that need to be sought in future interviews?

4. Are any alterations needed on the interview questions (e.g. through the inclusion of indigenous typologies)?

5. How was my own performance in the interview? Was I able to gain the level of information I wanted?
Appendix 6 Citizen interview guide (created April 2015).

**Topic 1: Stakeholder citizen**

Citizen stakeholder possible questions:

I wonder if you could start by telling me a little bit about yourself. Have you always lived here? What do you do for a living?

Has the environment changed in the last ten years? (Why?)

What do you think the environment will be like in the next ten years? (Why?)

**Topic 2: Stakeholder PEV: The Peruvian state**

How involved do you feel you are in the development of oil production in the *selva*?

At what stage are you consulted by the government about potential oil development projects near your local community, i.e. does the government come and ask for your opinion before oil production starts?

Has this consultation process got better or worse in the last ten years?

What do you think the consultation process will be like in the next ten years?

If you wanted to report an environmental problem (e.g. an oil spill) to the government who would you contact in the government and/or where would you go? (What is your opinion about that?)

How accessible are government officials like the District Mayor or the regional government to report these problems to?

**How prevalent is the problem of cronyism (“amiguismo”) and does it affect your ability to access government to report an environmental problem? Do indigenous people lack this nepotism access to government?**
Do you believe that social class and status impact on your access to government and in what way?

How often do the government visit *selva* communities? (If they don’t visit often, why do you think that is?)

What are the problems in Peru’s political system? If there are any, does this impact upon you reporting an environmental problem?

Has access to the government improved or deteriorated in the last ten years?

Do you see your access to government changing in the next ten years?

How could the government improve its presence in the *selva*?

Where do meetings on the pollution issues occur in Loreto? In Iquitos, in Provincial *selva* capitals like Parnari, Santa Clotilde, Trompeteros or in your local community?

How often do these meetings occur?

Do you think the government could do more to improve this?

Do the meetings occur in Spanish or in your local language? Does the community have an interpreter to help the meetings occur?

What is your opinion on the EIAs (Environmental Impact Assessment) workshops that help ensure citizen participation? How do you think the government views them? (Have you ever had any experience with EIAs that you can tell me about? (Where was this?) (When?) (Who were you with?) (How does this make you feel as a citizen?)

Do you believe that that the government is doing enough to monitor potential environmental problems like oil spills?

How much trust do you have in the government to rectify an environmental problem if you reported it?

Is your trust of government damaged by corruption and if so does this impact on the way you consult with the government over environmental problems?

How does this affect your willingness to speak out about the environmental issue?

Has your level of trust changed in the past ten years?
Will your trust in government change in the next ten years?
Do you believe the issue of racism in Peru is one of the reasons why governments in Iquitos and Lima do not always listen to your voices and environmental concerns?
Do you think that the state (national, regional, local government) need to publicly apologise to the selva communities for the contamination through a memorial ceremony with a promise of doing better for you to trust government?

In these last ten years has your willingness to speak out and report an environmental problem changed at all?

What do you think the next ten years will be like? (Why do you think that?)

The indigenous leaders and the government recently agreed to a 50 million soles remediation figure. How was this figure arrived at? How open is the government and indigenous leaders in consulting and listening to individual citizens?

**Topic 3: Stakeholder PEV actions and CBO/NGO use of individual citizen PEV.**

In the last ten years, what sort of actions were you willing to use to complain about environmental pollution? For example, strikes, protests, deliberate sabotage (ask where, when, with who)

What sort of actions do you use today? (Ask why change/why no change)

Does your community ever travel to oil company offices in Iquitos to present your demands and concerns or do you prefer taking action against the oil sites near your community? Why is that?

Do you believe that these actions (protests, strikes) bring about the change you want? (Why do you think that?)
What do you think to the government’s perception of and response to the direct action? Has the government responded with violent repression or has it been willing to suggest consultation through meetings and roundtable discussions?
Has government violence damaged your relationship with the state?

How do you use technology (mobile phones, cameras, video recording equipment, and internet) surrounding environmental problems?
Do you use it to hold oil companies to account for pollution?
Do you post images onto social media, through NGO websites or to newspapers?
Do you try and connect with citizens from around the world to increase awareness?
How effective do you find technology is in helping make the government in Iquitos and Lima and the oil company aware of the problems?

Have you ever worked or been involved with organisations that try to protect the environment or support you in relation to the oil industry?
(Which organisation was this with?) (Do you believe that they are effective at voicing your concerns to government than you would be?) (Why?)

Do you find them a help or a hindrance in your efforts to understand the potential positive and negative aspects of development in the selva? Do you feel that they try and influence your opinions on the sort of actions to take?

Has this relationship with these organisations changed in the past ten years?

What do you foresee the next ten years to be like in your relationship with these organisations?

Does your local community have an environmental monitor? Did they receive any oil company or government training for the job? Who do they report problems to? How often do they meet oil company or government officials?

How often do you see the Apu leader of your federation? Do they keep you up to date on negotiations or actions to take surrounding environmental pollution?
Has this consultation with your community improved or deteriorated in the last ten years? What do you think the next ten years will be like?

**Topic 4: Stakeholder PEV and their relationship with REIs.**

If an oil company’s exploration activities caused an environmental problem, how would you go about raising this with the company?

*Which company have you had experience with? (If more than one; have you ever noticed a difference in their relationship and level of access for you?)*

If you are dealing with a company rather than the government does this change how you would liaise with them? (Why is that?) (Can you give me an example?)

*Do you think that you and other selva citizens can approach oil companies about environmental problems and request a consultation/meeting with them OR do you think companies dictate if/when this happens? Who has the power? Would the level of access be different for non-indigenous citizens?*

Who are these oil companies willing to work with from the local community?

What form and how often do these meetings take?

*Where do the meetings occur?*

Depending on interviewee location;  
As you are downriver of REI site, have you ever had contact with the REI? How often?  
As you are adjacent to the REI site, have you ever had contact with the REI? How often?

How has this situation or relationship changed in the last ten years with oil companies? (Why?) (Can you provide me with an example?)
How do you perceive the situation will change in the next ten years?  
(Why?) (Can you provide me with an example?)

Have you ever found that international oil companies provide better/worse access to talk with than Petroperu?

Do you think Peruvians should have the right to own the resources beneath their ground? Is this one of the underlying reasons underneath oil protests in the selva?

**Topic 5: Stakeholder citizen final questions**

May I ask how old are you?

_Do I have permission for part of this interview to be published in my work? As I stated, your name will be a pseudonym to prevent identification but please do not feel you must agree._
Appendix 7 Oral informed consent form.

My name is Adrian Gonzalez and I am a research student at Royal Holloway University of London. I am conducting research in Peru’s Loreto region on its oil production and the way that Peruvian people and organisations respond to environmental pollution, who they report a problem to and their access to Peruvian government and oil company officials.

Cuatro puntos claves en la entrevista:

1. No hay respuestas correctas o incorrectas en esta entrevista. Estoy muy interesado en escuchar sus ideas y opiniones acerca de los problemas de la contaminación ambiental de Loreto y áreas adyacentes.

2. La participación en esta entrevista es completamente voluntaria y usted puede retirarse o, abstenerse en cualquier momento y sin indicación de los motivos o puede negarse a contestar cualquier pregunta en particular.

3. Durante esta entrevista, y con su permiso voy a grabar sus respuestas en un diario y cinta la entrevista. Sólo voy a usar este dispositivo con su permiso.
4. Todo el material de esta entrevista se mantendrá estrictamente confidencial y cualquier material utilizado en publicaciones o presentaciones se asegurará de que las personas no pueden ser identificados.

Do you have any questions?

Oral consent checklist – please just answer yes or no to the following questions

1. I understand that the interview is voluntary and that I may refuse to any a question or withdraw at any time without giving a reason. My identity cannot be identified from this research.
2. Do you agree to take part in this study?
3. Do you agree that the interview can be tape recorded?

¿Tiene alguna pregunta?

Consentimiento oral – por favor, simplemente responder sí o no a las siguientes preguntas:

1. Entiendo que la entrevista es voluntaria y que puedo negarme a cualquier pregunta o retirarme en cualquier momento sin dar una razón. Mi identidad no se puede identificar a partir de esta investigación
2. ¿Está de acuerdo en participar en este estudio?
3. ¿Está de acuerdo que la entrevista puede ser suministrada con casete de cinta para grabar?
Estimado señor o señora,

Mi nombre es Adrián González y soy un estudiante de doctorado en geografía de Reino Unido en la Universidad Royal Holloway de Londres que está siendo supervisado por el profesor David Simon. Estoy viviendo en Iquitos por poco menos de cuatro meses (de marzo a junio de 2015) para llevar a cabo una investigación sobre producción de petróleo y la forma en que los ciudadanos y las organizaciones de peruanos responden a esta contaminación ambiental en la región de Loreto Perú, las cuales reportan problemas por la dificultad del acceso al Gobierno Peruano y las compañías petroleras funcionarios.

Toda oportunidad de concertar una cita con su organización es bienvenida, en el momento que usted crea conveniente llevar a cabo con el fin de obtener una entrevista para mi investigación.

- La entrevista tendrá una duración de aproximadamente 1 hora
- La entrevista es estrictamente anónima y totalmente voluntaria con el entrevistado capaz de negarse a responder a cualquier pregunta o retirarse en cualquier momento.
- Durante la entrevista Yo y con su permiso grabaré sus respuestas de la entrevista.
- Por último, todo el material de la entrevista se mantendrá estrictamente confidencial y cualquier material utilizado en presentaciones o publicaciones se asegurará de que las personas no puedan ser identificadas.

Estoy encantado de enviar por correo electrónico las preguntas de antemano para que usted pueda leerlas y enterarse los temas de la entrevista. Si usted tiene alguna pregunta sobre esta entrevista o mi investigación por favor no dude en ponerse en contacto conmigo a través de la dirección de correo electrónico en la parte superior de esta carta o en persona en la dirección antes mencionada.

Atentamente,

Adrián González
SOLICITA: AUDIENCIA CON EL SR. PRESIDENTE DEL GOREL.

SEÑOR PRESIDENTE DEL GOBIERNO REGIONAL DE LORETO.

Lic. Sr. FERNANDO MELENDEZ CELIS.

CARLOS ALBERTO LEÓN BLAS, de profesión Abogado, identificado con CAL N° 1319, con DNI N° 17982186, con domicilio Real y Procesal en la Avda. Abelardo Quiñones N° 837 del distrito de Belén, Provincia de Maynas, Región Loreto; en representación del Sr. ADRIAN ALBERTO GONZALEZ, siendo estudiante de investigación en el ROYAL HOLLOWAY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON - REINO UNIDO, en representación Sr. FERNANDO HERNANDEZ ORTIZ, siendo VICEPRESIDENTE DE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE EX TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS OXY REIVINDICACIÓN, POR LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS - ASETRAPPETREIHDH, ante Ud., nos presentamos y decimos:

Que, previo saludo, deseándole éxitos en su gestión y siendo oportuno llevar a cabo una AUDIENCIA, por medio de la cual le SOLICITAMOS, se sirva fijarnos día y hora para una Audiencia para con su persona en su despacho del GOREL, nuestra comitiva está conformada por CINCO REPRESENTANTES, esto para ponerle en conocimiento sobre el proceso de investigación que se está realizando, por el cual solicitamos su apoyo incondicional, siendo estas indagaciones y / o consultas las Siguientes

1.- LA INVESTIGACION EN LA REGION LORETO –PERU, RELACIONADO A LA PRODUCCIÓN DE PETRÓLEO Y LAS FORMAS EN QUE LAS PERSONAS Y ORGANIZACIONES PERUANAS RESPONDEN AL AREA DE LA CONTAMINACIÓN AMBIENTAL. QUIENES REPORTAN PROBLEMAS OCASIONADOS AL MEDIO AMBIENTEY A SUS COMUNIDADES NATIVAS.

2.- LA INVESTIGACIÓN, RELACIONADO AL GRAVE DAÑO OCASIONADO POR LAS PETROLERAS DE TURNO EN LAS DIFERENTES CUENCAS DEL RIO CORRIENTES Y PASTAZA, TIGRE, ESPECIFICAMENTE EN LOS LOTES SAN JACINTO, SHIBIYACU, TAPAHUARI SUR.

3.- LA INVESTIGACIÓN, CONCERNIENTE A ¿QUE ESTA HACIENDO EL ESTADO PARA REMEDIAR LOS DAÑOS OCASIONADOS POR LAS PETROLERAS DE TURNO? ¿SI LAS PETROLERAS DE TURNO CUMPLEN CON LA LEY DE CONSULTA PREVIA Y CON OTORGAR EL PAGO POR LOS DERECHOS DEL USO DE SUS TIERRAS?

4.- LA INVESTIGACIÓN RESPECTO A LOS EXTRABAJADORES PETROLEROS – OXY, ¿SI SUS DERECHOS Y BENEFICIOS FUERÓN REIVINDICADOS, A RAIZ DE LA
INVESTIGACIÓN DIRIGIDA POR EL CONGRESO DE LA REPÚBLICA EN EL AÑO 2006, CON UN DICTAMEN FAVORABLE A LOS EXTRABAJADORES, AL INCUMPLIR CON EL PAGO TOTAL DE SUS OBLIGACIONES SOBRE SUS UTILIDADES Y BONIFICACIONES ESTIPULADO EN LOS CONTRATOS TRIPARTITOS?

Este pedido tiene carácter de premura, en el entendido que DICHAS INVESTIGACIONES AYUDARAN A VERIFICAR SI EN ALGO ESTAMOS FALLANDO RESPECTO AL MEDIO AMBIENTE Y EL RECALENTAMIENTO GLOBAL, A SOLUCIONAR CONFLICTOS CON NUESTROS HERMANOS DE LAS COMUNIDADES NATIVAS, A CUMPLIR Y HACER CUMPLIR CON NUESTROS HERMANOS EX TRABAJADORES PETROLEROS, QUE SE ENCUENTRAN DESPROTEGIDOS POR EL PODER JUDICIAL, sin que hasta la fecha, se haya emitido una resolución favorable, otorgándoles sus derechos a los comunidades nativas asentadas en las diferentes cuencas de Loreto y ex trabajadores petroleros de OXY.

POR LO EXPUESTO:

A Usted Sr. PRESIDENTE DEL GOREL, conocedores de su amplio espíritu altruista y de su ayuda a las INVESTIGACIONES DE LA UNIVERSITY OF LONDON – REINO UNIDO, referente al CALENTURA DEL MEDIO AMBIENTE, le pedimos acceder a nuestro pedido.

Iquitos, 20 de Marzo 2015.

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ADRIAN ALBERTO GONZALEZ