A Commentary on the *De Constantia Sapientis* of

Seneca the Younger

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Submitted for the degree of PhD
Declaration of Authorship

I, Nigel Royden Hope, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: ______________________

Date: ________________________
Abstract

The present thesis is a commentary on Seneca the Younger’s *De constantia sapientis*, one of his so-called *dialogi*. The text on which I comment forms part of the Oxford Classical Texts edition of the *dialogi* by L. D. Reynolds.

The thesis is in two main parts: an Introduction and the Commentary proper.

Before the Introduction, there is a justificatory Preface, in which I explain why this thesis is a necessary addition to the scholarship on *De constantia sapientis*, on which the last detailed commentary was published in 1950.

The Introduction covers the following topics: Date; Genre (involving discussion of what is meant by the term *dialogus* and the place of *De constantia sapientis* in the collection of Seneca’s *Dialogi* as a whole); Argumentation: Techniques and Strategies (including a discussion of S.’s views on the role of logic in philosophy); Language and Style; Imagery; Moral Psychology (an analysis of Seneca’s account of the passions); The Nature of Insult (including types of insult, appropriate responses to insults, and interpretation of the meanings of two of the verbal insults presented by Seneca); and Legal Aspects (the question of the distinction between *iniuria* and *contumelia* in legal terms and what sorts of actions were pursued by an *actio iniuriarum* in Seneca’s day).

The commentary itself discusses individual passages in detail. The entries cover the following aspects: literary, philosophical (including an analysis of the syllogisms in the first half of the work), and historical (e.g.
an examination of Seneca’s portrayals of Cato the Younger and Caligula).

There is also discussion of textual questions (e.g. the crux at 18.18-19); disagreements with the text of Reynolds are aired at the relevant points.
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PREFACE

This thesis is a commentary on Seneca’s *De constantia sapientis*. I think that such a work is very necessary given that existing commentaries are in one way or another inadequate. Although Viansino produced a commentary (part of his two-volume set of commentaries on the *dialogi*, following an earlier, shorter work in 1968) in 1988, this is a relatively short work and leaves much unsaid. A more recent commentary (with translation) by Lana (1999) is also brief and not particularly interesting. The most thorough of the published commentaries is that by Wichem Klei, written in Dutch and published in 1950, which also provides an edition of the text. It is very good on the line-by-line commentary and particularly concerning language and style, but does not discuss much that needs discussing more generally, and of course, given its date, cannot take account of recent work on Seneca. I list published commentaries in the Bibliography.

Although *CS* is not one of Seneca’s better-known works, there is much in it that is of interest. Its addressee, Annaeus Serenus, possibly a relative of S. and younger than him (according to *Epistle* 63), is also the addressee of *De tranquillitate animi*, and possibly of *De otio*. It is a justification of the Stoic paradox that the sage does not accept injury or insult (*Nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem*). Among the argumentational techniques S. deploys there is, in the first half of the work,
a series of syllogistic arguments designed to show the invulnerability of the sage to *iniuria*. This extensive use of syllogisms is, despite the well-known fondness of Stoics for logic, very rare in S. It provides a good example of the actual use to which syllogisms were put in a Stoic work. My analysis of the form of the syllogisms is something which has never been done before in previous commentaries on this work.

I mentioned legal imagery, but law, primarily as concerns the *actio iniuriarum*, has central relevance to an interpretation of *CS*. At *CS* 10.1, S. says that *Est minor iniuria, quam queri magis quam exequi possumus, quam leges quoque nulla dignam uindicta putauerunt*. It seems that we may have here in *CS* a snapshot of a particular stage in the development of the *actio iniuriarum*, at which it has moved beyond the purely physical *iniuria* dealt with in the Twelve Tables, via the extension of the remit in the *actio* by the Praetorian Edict, whereby the loss of property and also some forms of diminution of social standing could be prosecuted under an *actio iniuriarum*, but not *contumelia*. I devote an excursus to discussing the legal implications of this. As far as I know, no earlier scholar has given much attention if any to the legal aspects of this work.

To conclude, I hope I have shown the main points of interest in the thesis I am writing. *CS* has been neglected work and deserves much more attention. This thesis is intended to redress that imbalance.
ABBREVIATIONS

Prose Works by Seneca [S.]

Breu.    De breuitate vitae

BV       De beata vita

CS       De constantia sapientis

Ep.      Epistle

Epp.     Epistles

Helv.    Ad Helviam

Ira      De ira

Marc.    Ad Marciam

NQ       Naturales quaestiones
In the Introduction and Commentary, Seneca the Younger will be referred to as ‘S.’ and *De constantia sapientis* as ‘CS’.

**Modern Works and Editions**

| ANRW | Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt |
| H–S | J. B. Hofmann and A. Szantyr, |
Lateinische Syntax und Stilistik.
Munich: Beck. 1972

K–S
Kühner, R. and Stegmann, C.,
Ausführliche Grammatik der
lateinischen Sprache: Satzlehre. 2
vols. 2nd edn. Hanover. 1912-14

Kirk, Raven and Schofield
G. S. Kirk, J. E. Raven and M.
Schofield (eds.), The Presocratic
Philosophers. 2nd edn. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.

L–S
C. T. Lewis and C. Short, A Latin
Press. 1879

Long–Sedley
A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley (eds.),
The Hellenistic Philosophers. 2 vols.
Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press. 1987

OCD
Sander Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford
Oxford: Oxford University Press

OCT
Oxford Classical Texts

OLD
P. G. W. Glare (ed.), Oxford Latin
University Press. 1968-82

*PIR*²

*Prosopographia Imperii Romani,*


*SVF*


*TLL*

*Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*

W–H

A. Walde, rev. J. B. Hofmann,

*Lateinisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch.* I (A–L). Heidelberg:

Carl Winter, 1938; II (M–Z).

Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1956

**TRANSLATIONS**

Unless otherwise stated, all translations are my own.
INTRODUCTION

I. DATE

The date of CS is not certain. However, the text does provide some pointers.¹

First, the extensive description of Caligula’s insults at 18 shows that it was written after the death of that emperor, which took place in AD 41.

Second, according to Miriam Griffin (1992: 316 n. 2), it is unlikely that the account of Valerius Asiaticus’ outward tolerance of Caligula’s boasting of his adultery with Valerius’ wife can have been written before the death of Valerius in 47. Griffin does not give reasons for her belief that it is unlikely, but possibly the character of Valerius as described by S. (ferocem uirum et uix aequo animo alienas contumelias laturum) makes it unlikely that S. would dare to write anything about his wife’s adultery while he lived.

Third, the addressee, Annaeus Serenus, died in the reign of Nero, probably in the early 60s. Epistle 63.14-15, dating to 63 or 64, mentions the death of Serenus.² Assuming the death to be recent, Serenus may be

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¹ For an exhaustive examination of the arguments put forward for different dates for the work, see Klei 5-24.
considered to have died in 62 or 63. According to Pliny the Elder (NH 22.96), Serenus died of eating poisoned mushrooms, along with ten other officers of the vigiles, of which Serenus was praefectus. If Serenus succeeded Tigellinus as praefectus vigilum in 62, his death is likely to have been in 63, very close to the composition of Ep. 63. Griffin (1992: 447-8), however, thinks it more likely that Serenus actually became praefectus vigilum in 54, succeeding Laelianus in that post, and that Tigellinus was praefectus vigilum by 62, because otherwise he would not have enjoyed the influence with Nero to cause the restoration to the Senate of Cossutianus Capito, who had been condemned for extortion in 57. If Griffin is right, Serenus’ death would have been before 62, perhaps in 61 or 60. In any case, we are left with a possible date of Serenus’ death between 60 and 63. It is unlikely then that CS was composed at the very latest after 63.

In Ep. 63, S. describes Serenus as multo minor (much younger) than S., which makes his death hard to bear. It may also suggest a possible lower limit to the composition of CS. How much minor than S. was Serenus? S. was born in 1 BC. For someone to be multo minor than S., he would probably have had to be born at least when S. was 20. Assuming Serenus was born c. AD 20, he would have been about 42 when he died, an age that is quite compatible with being a senator and having held the post of praefectus vigilum. Moreover, if we take 47 as the earliest possible date for

_issidue cogitemus de nostra quam omnium quos diligitus mortalitate. Tunc ego debui dicere, ‘minor est Serenus meus: quid ad rem pertinet? post me morti debet, sed ante me potest’. Quia non feci, imparatum subito fortuna percussit. Nunc cogito omnia et mortalia esse et incerta lege mortalitam; hodie fieri potest quidquid umquam potest._
the composition of CS, then Serenus, if born in 20, would have been 27 in AD 47.

We have a broad span of possible composition dates between 47 and 63. However, the later we set the composition of CS, the more problems we get into if we consider the other works written for Serenus, *De tranquillitate animi* (Tranq.) and *De otio* (Ot.). First, *Tranq.* reveals Serenus at a later stage of his spiritual development. Whereas in CS, it seems he is (possibly) an Epicurean and sceptical about Stoicism, in *Tranq.* he seems to have embraced Stoicism and is worried about his uncertain progress on the path to Stoic virtue. If the relevant dates of composition of CS and *Tranq.* reflect the development of the historical Serenus, then *Tranq.* is later than CS. Assuming that the works addressed to Serenus were written for him while he lived, then an earlier date for CS is likely, perhaps in the late 50s. Then there is the problem of the incompletely preserved *De otio*. Although it is commonly thought to have been addressed to Serenus, nowhere is his name to be seen in the surviving text and the name of the dedicatee has been erased in the Codex Ambrosianus. The empty space would admit ‘Ad Serenum’, but it could equally admit another name. Arguments have been made to connect it with the other Serenus dialogues, but nothing is conclusive. For a detailed discussion see Williams (2003: 12-18). If, though, it is to Serenus, and if, as some think, it dates to S.’s period of exile (post-62), it is the latest of the three works to Serenus and cannot be later than 63. Again, too, this would suggest the late 50s for the composition of CS at the latest.
However, there is no guarantee that S. was composing the Serenus dialogues in chronological order of the historical Serenus’ moral development. Indeed, if the Serenus addressed is rather, as Griffin thinks he might be (contra Abel), who thinks the dialogues reflect actual conversations between the two men), a literary persona, S. could have composed *Tranq.* before *CS.*

Another pointer for dating is the reference to Corbulo insulting Fidus Cornelius in the senate (*CS* 17.1). S.’s *vidimus* might indicate the event was quite recent at the time of writing. It certainly suggests that Serenus and S. were both present in the senate when it happened. If this is the famous Corbulo, the general of Nero, a Neronian dating is quite possible. Griffin (1992: 44 n. 4) thinks the bare mention of ‘Corbulo’ in S.’s text makes it more likely that the younger Corbulo is referred to and that the father was already dead. Otherwise, she thinks, the reference would be ambiguous. However, in saying this, she contradicts her earlier statement in the same notes in which she says that ‘Seneca rarely mentions the living’. This will have to be a rare instance of mentioning the living. In Dio 59.15.3 we read of a Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo, who was road commissioner and in return for his services was to be made suffect consul in AD 39. *PIR* (141) has this man as the general’s father, but Griffin (ibid.) thinks the consul ‘must be the younger’. There is a possibility, argued by Syme (cited in Griffin) that the road commissioner could have been the father and the consul the son. However, Dio’s text does suggest that the same person is road commissioner and suffect consul.
Unfortunately, we have no information on Fidus Cornelius apart from CS 17.1 (see Klei 169). Ovid’s daughter, according to Tristia 4.10.75, was twice married with children from each marriage. If one of these husbands was Fidus Cornelius, and assuming that he was the more recent one, they will have been married at the latest by AD 12 (the date of the last of the Tristia poems). It is quite possible then that Fidus Cornelius was still alive in the reign of Caligula and maybe into the reign of Claudius. He is much less likely to have been alive in the reign of Nero. The incident in the senate could well have been early Claudian, then, which is quite compatible with a date after 47 for CS, given that the incident may be assumed to be fairly recent. In that case, it matters less whether the ‘Corbulo’ is the father or the son, for the father could have still have been in the senate up to AD 46 (assuming he was 40 in AD 21 and the retirement age for senators of 65).³

The CS 17.1 passage, then, cannot yield firm indications as to the date of CS, but certainly is compatible with a post-47 composition.

A Neronian date might be suggested by the reference to Vatinius at 17.3. Of course, the Vatinius referred to is the Vatinius who was the contemporary of Cato the Younger and Cicero. However, Tacitus, Annals 15.34 mentions a Vatinius, whose body was deformed and who was given to the witicisms of a scurra.⁴ Given that S. describes the first-century BC Vatinius as a scurra, the combination of facetiae scurriles and physical

³ Griffin (1992: 44 n. 4).
⁴ Vatinius inter foedissima eius aulae ostenta fuit, sutrinae tabernae alumnus, corpore detorto, facetitis scurrilibus; primo in contumelias adsumptus, dehinc optimi cuiusque criminatione eo usque valuit ut gratia pecunia vi nocendi etiam malos praemineret.
deformity is striking. There are differences: Tacitus’ Vatinius seems to be fond of making insults, while S.’s Vatinius is portrayed as more assured in warding off insults than giving them. Still, were CS to be of Neronian date, there would be resonances between the republican Vatinius and the present-day scurra. Given that the republican Vatinius was prominent among Cato’s enemies, it is more likely to be a coincidence than an intentional allusion to contemporary events.

To conclude, as I said at the beginning the date of CS is not certain. From the indications I have reviewed, it is very likely that it was not written before 47, and may be as late (though I think that less likely) as 62.

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5 See further, Commentary ad loc.
II. GENRE

CS is included in a collection of S.’s works called the Dialogi. However, with the possible exception of De tranquillitate animi, none of the works included in this collection is a dialogue in the sense that the philosophical works of Plato and Cicero are. There are no parts assigned to two or more speakers. De tranquillitate animi comes the nearest to a dialogue in that it consists of two parts, the first ‘spoken’ by Serenus in propria persona, the second (and much the longer part) being S.’s reply to him. However, the two parts are monologic, and read more like an epistolary correspondence. Clearly, if the description of these works as dialogi is more than a mere error on the part of whoever collected them for publication, S.’s idea of a dialogue differed somewhat from the ‘traditional’ one.

First, though, we must note that the dialogi, for all their superficially monological form, do contain the elements of a dialogue, if we look in the right way. First, there is a named addressee (we do not know who that is with De otio). This person is not merely addressed at the beginning, but S. intersperses his arguments with further addresses to the person, sometimes calling them by name, often addressing them by tu. There is thus a sort of conversion being conducted, even though it has the outwards appearance of a lecture. Sometimes S. conjures up imaginary objections that the addressee might make to his argument, often introducing the objection by inquis (e.g. Prov. 3.2). At times, it is not clear that the second-person objector actually
is the addressee of the work, or someone else, some ‘general’ objector. At other times, an imaginary objection in the third person (introduced by *inquit*) is cited (e.g. *CS* 7.3). At still other times, S. addresses *vos*. In the case of the latter part of *CS*, *vos* are probably Serenus and his Epicurean friends. In other places, for instance *CS* 9.4 and *BV* 6.4 and 7.7, it is not so clear who *vos* refers to. For *CS* 9.4, Abel (1967: 127) suggests ‘die allgemeine Leserschaft’. For the *BV* passages, it seems that the addressees in 6.4 may be the *plures* of 6.3, who appear fortunate to others, but in reality hate their lives. For 7.7, it is the *occupati*, the people whose lives are taken up with everyday concerns, leaving them no time for philosophy. It is as if S. is addressing, beyond the named addressee of the work, others who are sitting and listening and being brought into the discussion. We might think here of a seminar or class, in which one of the students (the addressee) is singled out for special attention, while the others watch and listen to the moral therapy applied to him (or her). A modern, non-academic and non-philosophical, analogy might be that of the chat show, in which a guest is

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7 *Vestra me hercules uita, licet supra mille annos exeat, in artissimum contrahetur: ista uitia nullum non saeculum deuorabunt; hoc uero spatium, quod quamuis natura currit ratio dilatat, cito *vos* effugiat necesse est; non enim *apprenditis* nec *retinetis* uel ocissimae omnium rei moram facitis, sed abire ut rem superuacuam ac reparabilem *sinitis*.
8 *Superuacuum est commemorare plures qui, cum aliis felicissimi uiderentur, ipsi in se uerum testimonium dixerunt perosi omnem actum annorum suorum; sed his querellis nec alios mutauerunt nec se ipsos: nam cum uerba eruperunt, affectus ad consuetudinem relabunt.*
9 For a discussion of S.’s switching of the scope of personal address in *BV* and other works, see Williams (2003: 27, 154).
asked questions by the host, while the studio audience looks on and is sometimes addressed by the host and asked to make their views known (albeit in a perfunctory way, like a show of hands, acclamation, etc.). As Williams (2003: 27(ii)) says, with specific reference to the shifts in addressee in BV: ‘This free-ranging technique allows him to engage his wider readership [. . .] while still addressing Paulinus [the addressee of BV] as well as the individual reader [. . .] He thus extends the “personal” relevance of Breu. to a universal as well as a more private audience, while the intrusive persistence of his second-person imperatives in particular guides each reader to self-scrutiny’.

Looked at in this way, we could say that the dialogues of Plato and Cicero are binary dialogues, modelled ultimately on the stage play (although also reflecting in stylized fashion the nature of philosophical debate, dispute and discussion), the interlocutors being actors with their parts to play and lines to deliver. By contrast, the dialogi of S. are dialogues in a more subtle, multilayered way. Although ‘delivered’ by one person, this speaker alludes to, or sometimes directly quotes, the contributions of the addressee and possibly the audience. Hirzel calls them ‘Halbdialoge’.¹⁰

Until the second half of the twentieth century, there was a view that S.’s dialogi were examples of a genre of moral-philosophical work called a ‘diatribe’, dialogus being a loose and inaccurate transliteration of διατριβή. The general scholarly consensus now, however, is that there was no such

genre, and that Oltramare, the advocate of the ‘diatribe’ thesis, was wrong. The Greek word διατριβή applied only to an informal conversation held by a philosopher with his pupils, for instance Epictetus’ *Diatribai*, which were copied down by his pupil Arrian.

The ‘conversational’ elements in S.’s works have led commentators such as Miriam Griffin (1992: 412-15) to argue that S.’s *dialogi* are so called because διάλογος was an alternative term for προσωποποία, or personification, the attribution of speech to real or fictive persons or even things, whose Latin term is *sermocinatio*. So Quintilian (9.2.31):

> Ac sunt quidam qui has demum προσωποποίας dicant in quibus et corpora et verba fingimus: sermones hominum adsimulatos dicere διαλόγους malunt, quod Latinorum quidam dixerunt *sermocinationem*.

Although *dialogus* strictly speaking in this context applies to the figures of speech, in which S.’s works abound, the very abundance in S.’s *dialogi* of such figures as *inquit/linquis* statements led someone (Seneca?) to name them *dialogi*, by a form of terminological synecdoche. According to Griffin (1992: 415), to call (some at least of) his works *dialogi* may have made it easier for them to be accepted into the canon of great philosophical works, such as Plato’s and Cicero’s real dialogues.

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11 Although Schenkeveld (1997) does use the term and thinks that it is useful. See especially pp. 230-1.
However, to base the designation *dialogus* on the use of *sermocinatio* may be too restrictive. Certainly, in another passage, Quintilian (10.1.29) says that S. wrote dialogues: *nam et orationes eius et poemata et epistulas et dialogos*. As Griffin says (1992: 413 n. 2), *dialogi* here seems to cover all the rest of S.’s philosophical oeuvre besides the *dialogi*, so: *Naturales Quaestiones, De Clementia, De Beneficiis*, as well. Indeed, it might be that *dialogus* was used, perhaps somewhat loosely, to designate a philosophical treatise in general, and not specifically one divided into speakers' parts in the manner of Plato. Certainly, the *dialogi*, looked at individually, do seem to present a varied collection of works. We have the three consolations, addressed to Polybius, Marcia and Helvia. There are the three books of the *De Ira*, 89 pages in the OCT, which seems as if it could stand as a separate book itself. There are the two Stoic paradoxes of *CS* and *De providentia*. Moreover, the latter, which is addressed to Lucilius, does look as if it could have formed one of the letters in the *Epistles*, despite the paradox that is its title in the Codex Ambrosianus. As said before, *De tranquillitate animi* has the character of correspondence between Serenus and Seneca. Unlike the *Epistles* and *Naturales Quaestiones*, which stem from the last three years of S.’s life, the *dialogi* seem to have been composed at various points in his life, the *Ad Marciam*, the earliest one of them, in the reign of Caligula. The consolations, although like the other *dialogi* they advocate the Stoic philosophy and attitude to life, do nevertheless have a specific function of consolation, whereas the other *dialogi* concentrate on a particular topic, the
Stoic take on which S. seeks to explain to the addressee. Moreover, there are striking stylistic differences between some of the *dialogi*: *Ad Helviam*, for instance, has no *inquit/inquis* objections, whereas *De Ira* has nearly fifty. This kind of diversity within the Senecan *dialogi* may suggest that *dialogus* was used as a portmanteau term for a philosophical work in general, a treatise, rather than a specific genre in particular.
III. ARGUMENTATION: TECHNIQUES AND STRATEGIES

In CS, S. seeks to demonstrate the following proposition which is stated before the main text commences: \textit{nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem}. It is repeated throughout the work, with slightly different wording each time, so that it is syntactically integrated with the surrounding text. Through repetition, it is kept before the mind of the reader and thereby also contributes to the unity of the work.

The work itself has a clear structure, comprising an exordium (1), \textit{narratio} (2-4), and a division (5.1-2), which introduces the discussion of \textit{iniuria}-part (5.3-9.3), which is rounded off by an internal, ‘false’ peroration (9.4-5). Then comes the \textit{contumelia}-part (10-18), rounded off by the full peroration (19). What is striking about the \textit{iniuria}-part of the argument is the dominant role that syllogisms play in it. This in itself is hardly remarkable in a work of Stoic philosophy, for the early Stoics in particular were famous for their interest in and development of propositional logic. Syllogisms are also used in \textit{Ben.} 4.1.3, 5.12.3-14, 7.4-11 (see Griffin (2013) ad loc.) and \textit{Ep.} 87 (see Inwood (2007b: 239-60)). Given that Stoic paradoxes are being

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
  \item[13] It was probably the original title of the work: See Introduction, § II.
  \item[14] See the note in the Commentary on the \textit{propositio} that forms the title of CS.
  \item[15] Grimal (1949) proposes a slightly different analysis, taking the first four sections as a unity.
\end{itemize}
justified in CS and also the passages of *De beneficiis* just cited, it is not surprising that syllogisms are used in these works; however, it is at variance with S.’s prevailing attitude to syllogisms in other works, which is predominantly sceptical (cf. *Epp.* 48, 85, 87). In *Ep.* 48, for example, S. ridicules Lucilius’ attachment to the methods of *istis subtilibus* (‘those subtle dialecticians of yours’, tr. Gummere (Loeb)), which he thinks is incompatible with the high and true aims of philosophy. At *Ep.* 48.6 he provides a caricature of syllogistic reasoning: “Mouse” is a syllable. Now a mouse eats cheese; therefore, a syllable eats cheese’ (tr. Gummere (Loeb)). What S. seems to be criticising here, and in several other passages in the *Epistles* that are apparently hostile to logic, may be, as Barnes (1997: 14ff.) argues, not syllogisms and logic altogether, but rather the use of trivial syllogisms and conundrums of the kind just quoted from *Ep.* 48, where a valid deduction can nevertheless have a perverse conclusion. In this, Barnes thinks, S. is following Cicero, who also disdained what he called *ratiunculae* (*Tusc.* 2.12.29; ‘foolish syllogisms’, tr. King (Loeb)). Similarly (but not mentioned by Barnes), in the preface to his *Paradoxa Stoicorum* (proemium 2), Cicero rejects Cato the Younger’s practice of using proofs of *minutaie interrogatiunculae* (‘tiny little interrogatory pin-

17 *Mus syllaba est. Mus autem caseum rodit; syllaba ero caseum rodit.*
18 The hostile attitude is particularly to be found in the *Epistles*. Wilson (2001: 186 n. 43), in addition to *Ep.* 48 passage discussed, lists *Epp.* 45.5-13, 49.8-10; 82.8-10; 83.8-12; 85; 87.41; 88.42-5; 102.20; 106.11; 111.18-20 as passages apparently hostile to logic. For a recent discussion of S.’s ambivalence to logic, see Griffin (2013: 133-4).
19 Barnes (1997: 13) thinks S. may be trying to counteract an excessive predilection on Lucilius’ part for such trivial syllogisms.
pricks’, tr. Rackham (Loeb), which should probably be taken to refer to syllogisms, in favour of a rhetorical, persuasive style without syllogisms. In this, Cicero is not at variance with the Stoic view of logic, which is broader than the modern one. For Stoics, logic consisted of both rhetoric and dialectic, of which syllogisms (part of what we call logic) formed a part. So if one dispenses with dialectics, including syllogisms, in favour of an exclusive use of rhetoric, one is still doing ‘logic’.

However, that fact remains that, if S. follows Cicero in the Epistles, in the earlier work CS he seems to follow Cato’s practice and makes extensive use of syllogisms. S.’s syllogisms certainly cannot be said to be trivial interrogatiunculae, but are integral to the argument of the first part of CS. Why this should be so cannot be answered conclusively, but it may have to do with Serenus’ sceptical attitude to Stoic paradoxes as expressed in CS 3.1, where he ridicules what seem to be paraphrases of the paradoxes that (a) only the sage is rich, (b) only the sage is sane, and (c) only the sage is free. As the subject of CS is one such Stoic paradox, S. may have through it appropriate to demonstrate its truth to Serenus using syllogisms. Abel’s

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20 *minutis interrogatiunculis, quasi punctis, quod proposuit efficit. OLD translates the word *interrogatiuncula as: ‘An insignificant question or argument’.
21 So Wright; however, her bare translation ‘syllogisms’ ignores Cicero’s disparaging tone.
22 Another explanation is offered by Brad Inwood (2007b: 218-19), who in his discussion of the ‘dialectical’ Epistles 82, 83, 85, 87, suggests that S. may be being ironic (as is his wont) in his dismissal of dialectic. Inwood is talking issue in particular with John Cooper (2004), who, on the basis of the general non-use of hard logical argumentation in his works, and a prevalent overt hostility to logic in the Epistles in particular, questions S.’s entitlement to be considered a philosopher at all, rather than a moralist or ‘spiritual adviser’.
24 See Commentary ad 3.1-3.2.
(1967: 140) suggestion, that S. is using syllogisms to impress the young and inexperienced Serenus, would carry more weight if S. used logic heavily elsewhere – after all, his other addressees are hardly experienced philosophers. Another possibility may be that S. is following the practice (mentioned earlier) of the hero of CS, Cato the Younger, who demonstrated the truth of paradoxes by means of syllogisms. The prominence of the Megarian philosopher Stilbo in CS could provide another clue. The Megarians were also interested in logic and influenced Stoics in this respect. 25 Perhaps, therefore, the presence of these syllogisms was considered by S. appropriate in a work highlighting a Megarian philosopher as a moral exemplar. Another possibility may be that S. is drawing on a source now lost which does deploy logic in this way, possibly a work by Chrysippus, who systematised Stoic logic. 26 Although certainty is not attainable in this matter, I think that S. has syllogisms in CS because they are the traditional method by Stoics sought to justify their paradoxes.

The second part, by contrast, which deals with insult, does not employ syllogisms. In part, this can be explained by the fact that contumelia is, as S. says, a minor iniuria. As insult is a lesser injury, and as it has already been demonstrated that the sage is immune to injury as the two are logically incompatible, it follows that he must also be immune to the lesser

26 He does cite Chrysippus (17.1), but this is in the second part of CS, on insult, which does not employ syllogisms, so there may not be a connection. For a detailed analysis of the syllogisms, see the Commentary. For Chrysippus; and Stoic logic, see Frede (1974).
injury which is insult. It would therefore be superfluous to prove what had already been proved earlier. Therefore, to employ syllogistic reasoning for *contumelia* would be unnecessary.

S., however, has at his disposal other tools of persuasion and explanation that enable him to sustain the argument into the second half of *CS.* Towards the end of the *iniuriae*-part (9.3), S. introduces an explanation of the sage’s immunity to *iniuria* that seems to be based on the Stoic moral psychology of assent to impressions and the correct tension (*tonos*) in the soul between contraction and expansion. This passage plays an important twofold role in the argument of *CS.* First, it provides an additional, fresh justification of the *propositio*, one which appeals to Stoic moral psychology and physics, and takes the argument in a different direction from that of the syllogisms, opening a second front, as it were, in the campaign to persuade Serenus. Second, the moral psychology argument bridges the two parts of the work. For the moral psychological discussion is continued, and amplified, in the first two sections of the *contumelia*-part (particularly, 10.2-3 and 11.1-2). Given that *contumelia* is a ‘lesser injury’ (10.1), the moral psychology underlying it is the same as that for injury, although the degree of *perturbatio* is less acute for insult than for injury. In the *contumelia*-part, the language of contraction (*non contrahitur*, 9.3) from the *iniuriae*-part is developed into a contrast between the *humilitas* of soul (which contracts itself) of the non-sage who accepts an insult and the *magnitudo animi*/*magnanimitas* of the sage, who does not even notice an insult (11.1).

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27 See Introduction, § VI.
The greatness of soul of the sage is not, however, something that S. plucks out of thin air at the moment when he discusses it. Already he has introduced it gradually; first at 3.3 (*magnitudinem*), without reference to the soul of the sage specifically, where S. says that despite the invulnerability of the sage, there will still be those who will attempt to attack his greatness. The next mention of the sage’s greatness, at 6.2 (*tantam animi magnitudinem*), where S. introduces Stilbo’s big speech (on which see below), does specifically mention of his soul. Stilbo’s greatness of soul, we are to infer (S. does not specifically explain why), is shown by his indifference to the loss of externals (e.g. property) and defiant declaration in his speech to Demetrius Poliorcetes that nothing Demetrius can do will harm him (6.3-6.7). Importantly for the unity of *CS*, when he introduces Stilbo’s speech he mentions his *magnitudo animi*, a quality of the sage that will be explained in the *contumelia*-part of *CS* (8.5, 15.3). He mentions also *firmitas*, which had already been mentioned (3.3, 13.1, 17.1); *magnitudo animi* too, the synonym of *magnanimitas*, occurs just before the end of the *iniuria*-part (9.4), providing another link between the two parts.

To explain the nature of insult and why the non-sage shows *humilitas* in accepting an insult S. makes use of an etymological argument, stating that *contumelia* is derived from the word *contemptus*. This is because the person who insults someone is motivated by contempt for that person.
Etymology was commonly used by Stoics in argument. Given the Stoics’ belief in the interconnectedness of all things in nature, they saw language as a reflection of nature, and hence analysis of the meanings of words, as in etymology, could aid understanding of the true nature of reality.

Notable is the use of exempla, which are anecdotes taken from history which exemplify behaviour or qualities to follow and copy (positive exempla) and those to avoid (negative exempla). Indeed, there are three major exempla in CS which help to define the structure of the entire work. First, in in section 2, there is the exemplum of Cato the Younger. His maltreatment by the mob is the occasion of Serenus’ indignation and thus the starting point for the discussion in CS. The exemplum of Cato serves a crucial role in that gives a concrete illustration of the sage being unaffected by injuries or insults, and thereby allows the reader to visualize on an immediately comprehensible level what will later be argued for on a more abstract level later. Of importance is the fact that Cato is a Roman exemplum, whom S. considers more appropriate as a model of a sage than the heroes of myth (2.1). He is a figure admired by Serenus, who is indignant at his maltreatment by the mob. He is therefore a very suitable example to use in order to introduce Serenus to the propositio whose truth

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28 Chrysippus, for instance, wrote a seven-book treatise Περὶ τῶν ἐτυμολογικῶν πρὸς Διοκλέα (D.L. 7,200). Cf. Cic. ND 3.62, where the Stoic practice of providing etymologies for gods’ names is held up to ridicule.
29 See Mayer (2008) for a general discussion of the use of historical exempla in S. Turpin (2008: 363-73) for the Roman Stoics’ use of exempla, with particular emphasis on S. Also, for pre-Senecan background, see van der Blom (2010) on Cicero’s use of exempla.
30 On the question whether it is just contumelia that Cato is subject to, see the Commentary on 1.3.
will be argued for in *CS*. Serenus’ admiration for Cato does not exist in a vacuum, however. In the course of the reigns of the Julio-Claudian emperors, Cato came to be seen and admired as a model of Republican virtue, both for Stoics, of whom he was one, and for non-Stoics who admired his courageous defence of the Republic in its dying days.\(^{31}\)

The next three sections (3-5.5) are free of exempla as S. responds to Serenus’ objections to the claim that the sage is immune to injury and explains, after the *divisio* (5.1), what *iniuria* is; and at 5.3 the syllogisms start. Then, at 5.6, after the passage (5.4) in which he asserts that the sage cannot lose anything (injury involving loss), because he has his virtue, S. introduces another exemplum, that of Stilbo and his confrontation with Demetrius Poliorcetes. Its function is to illustrate the claim that the sage, whatever other physical and personal possessions he may lose, can never lose his virtue, his defining and inalienable possession. Although essentially a *chria*, a type of moral example that is usually short, S. expands the Stilbo anecdote into an extensive portion of *CS* (5.6-6.7), which forms a dramatic rounding-off of the rather sober syllogisms of the first section of the *iniuria*-part. It is itself divided into parts. After the initial short narrative outlining the situation and containing Stilbo’s reply to Demetrius, S. draws out the lesson (5.7-6.2), viz. that, though defeated, Stilbo has defeated his conqueror Demetrius by showing himself unconcerned at the loss of his material and external goods, which are given him by fortune, because he still possesses his virtue (his true goods). At 6.1, S. draws out the relevance

\(^{31}\) See Gowing (2005: 76-81), Wirszubski (1950).
of the exemplum to the *propositio*: if the master of siege warfare cannot
inflict an injury on Stilbo, how much less a thief, slanderer, or a rich man
without issue who lords it over those who seek to be named in his will. S.
thus brings the discussion down from the horrific heights of the sacking of a
city – one of the worst things a person could experience in the ancient
world, with the attendant loss of property, liberty, and potentially life itself –
to the mundane vexations of everyday life. In an age of almost universal
political peace, as the first half of the first century AD was, such everyday
inconveniences were commonplace, whereas being the victim of a siege was
very rare.

The exemplum of Stilbo would seem by now to have served its
function, but S. prolongs it with the long speech of Stilbo. This speech does
not add much more to what has already been said, but rather amplifies it.
The horrors of the sack of Megara are vividly brought to life (e.g. 6.3:
* dolores . . . frementium*; 6.5: *ruinis . . . sanguinem*; 6.7: *qui flent . . . fugiunt*)
in an amplification of 6.2 (*Inter micantis . . . cadentium*). Again, 6.6-7
(*Caduca . . . habeo*) amplifies 5.7 (*habebat enim . . . possessio est*). Also,
the listing of types of siege engine and techniques at 6.4 (*arietis . . .
aggerem*) amplifies and illustrates *egregiam artem quassandarum urbiurn*
(6.1). The function of the speech seems to be to embed the content of 6.1-2
more firmly in Serenus’ and the readers’ minds. It also forms a kind of
peroration to the Stilbo exemplum.

The exemplum of Stilbo has provided an intense and highly dramatic
episode giving a vivid concrete illustration of the invulnerability of the sage
to injury. With its association of sage with siege, it provides the springboard for a set of very short, almost allusive, exempla in 6.8, where S. uses the stories of impregnable cities that were nevertheless entered by enemies – Babylon, Carthage, Numantia, and the Roman Capitol itself – in order to support the image he introduces of the sage’s *bona* being protected as if by impenetrable fortifications. Unlike these places, his citadel will never be captured. Finally, at 7.1, S. rounds off the sequence of exempla (which started at 5.6) by bringing the discussion back to Cato, the exemplum with which *CS* began (*a cuius mentione haec disputatio processit*).

Hereafter, with the possible exception of the small anecdote about Cato’s response to a cuff in 14.3, exempla play no further part in *CS* until very near the end when a number of them – some very short – appear in rapid succession (17.1-18.6). Broadly, their theme is response to insult, some showing the incorrect way to respond (i.e. to react to the insult), others showing the correct response.

The first of them concerns Fidus Cornelius (17.1), the man who burst into tears on being called a depilated ostrich.\(^{32}\) This negative exemplum shows how weakness of mind (*animorum inbecillitas*) leads a man to take an insult to heart in a ridiculous (*hoc tam absurdum*) and irrational (*ubi ratio discessit*) manner.

The next exemplum, that of Vatinius, provides a positive example of an effective and appropriate way of dealing with insults that are directed at

\(^{32}\) Here S. supplements the anecdote related by Chrysippus, of the man who was angry at being called a marine goat, with a recent Roman exemplum. He updates the tradition, as it were.
one’s physical appearance. Vatinius’ unusual physical appearance made him a natural butt of insults, but his strategy was to pre-empt insults by drawing attention to his physical defects, thus denying his enemies the opportunity of insulting him. Although S. approves of Vatinius’ methods, the exemplum is rather ambivalent in tone, inasmuch as Vatinius is a man ‘born for ridicule and hate’, and a *scurra*.

In this, he is a contrast to Fidus Cornelius, who, despite his weakness in bursting into tears at Corbulo’s insult, had up to then shown *firmitas* in the face of adverse comments on his character. So we have two flawed individuals, one of whom has shown strength of character in the past but who has a moment of irrationality and weakness; the other of much more dubious character, but who knows how to deal with insults. There is an advance in competence in handling insults from one exemplum to the other.

These two exempla, however, are the preliminaries to the group of exempla concerning the emperor Gaius Caligula (18.1-5). Just as the exemplum of Stilbo formed the highlight of the *iniuria*-part, so the Caligula exempla form the culmination of the *contumelia*-part. Whereas the exemplum of Stilbo was positive, that of a sage immune to injury, by contrast the Caligula exempla are entirely negative. Through these exempla S. presents a portrait of a *contumeliosus* man, who delighted in dishing out insults but couldn’t take them himself (18.4). S. subtly differentiates the three examples. The first two examples show Caligula gratuitously insulting people, without apparent provocation. First, there is Caligula’s cruel teasing

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33 See Commentary ad loc.
of Valerius Asiaticus by commenting in public on the sexual performance of Valerius’ wife, with whom he was having an affair (18.2). Second, S. relates how Caligula insulted the tribune of the Guard Chaerea by giving lewd watchwords that hinted at Chaerea’s effeminate voice and bearing (18.3). The third example, by contrast, shows Caligula taking offence at something someone has said. He is angry with Herennius Macer, who addressed him by his formal name of ‘Gaius’, while by contrast a centurion was punished for addressing him by his nickname ‘Caligula’ (18.4). In both cases, there was no intention to offend – to address him by his formal name was presumably considered a mark of respect by Herennius Macer and the centurion merely used the nickname by which Caligula was accustomed to being called by soldiers.

The set of anecdotes of Caligula show up different facets of his warped character and thereby help to sum up in concrete fashion the various small examples (generic, with anonymous participants) of the contumelia-part. The first two anecdotes show his sadistic malice. The last two anecdotes show up Caligula’s inconstantia (inconsistency), attributed to him by S. at Pol. 17.5, and hence the fundamental irrationality of the contumelious person. Whatever name one addressed him by, it was the wrong one. Caligula’s badness is also brought out by the stress on his

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34 One could say the third and fourth examples, as there are two separate anecdotes. However, given that they both relate to ways of addressing him, I consider them together as one exemplum.

35 This receives its most horrible illustration in the anecdote of Caligula and the eques Pastor (Ira 2.33.3-6), who had to smile at a dinner with Caligula, in order to save the life of his remaining son, the other son having been executed at Caligula’s orders earlier that day.
physical appearance. S. was influenced by the views of Polemon and other physiognomists, who held that physical appearance reflected the state of the soul. Thus, physical deformities, such as those in S.’s portrayal of Caligula, indicated a depraved soul.

Structurally, the exempla of Stilbo and Caligula are parallels. They are the highlights of their respective parts. They are counterparts as exempla in that one is highly positive, the other highly negative. There are other points of contrast, too. The Stilbo exemplum comes very soon after beginning of the iniuria-part; by contrast, the Caligula, exempla come almost at the end of the contumelia-part. Stilbo is given a lengthy speech, through which at times S. himself seems to address the readers. Caligula is given no speech. Stilbo is also given more ‘air time’ than Caligula inasmuch as his exemplum, which is based on a single anecdote, takes up 9 sub-sections (5.6-6.8), bulked out with a speech of 5 sub-sections, whereas Caligula is given just 5 sub-sections.

Pace Rosemary Wright (1974: 63), therefore, I think that the use of Caligula as an exemplum is not ‘disproportionately long and only partially relevant’ to the argument. First, as I have outlined in the previous paragraph,  

36 Vatinius is no paragon of virtue, but he does at least deal with insults in the right way, and does not make them.
38 18.1: pallor betraying insanity (tanta illi palloris insaniam testantis foeditas erat); savage eyes under an old women’s brow (tanta oculorum sub fronte anili latentium toruitas); baldness; bristles on his neck (like a wild boar?); thin legs and over-sized feet.
39 See Commentary ad 6.4.
it performs an important balancing function in the structure of CS, providing a foil to the positive exemplum of Stilbo.⁴⁰

Second, while the Stilbo exemplum shows the lofty ideal of the sage, the exemplum of Caligula and Chaerea, with S.’s commentary on it, offers much more practical guidance on how Serenus should deal with insults. Indeed, it really a positive exemplum, in that it commends the behaviour of Chaerea, who does not react immediately to the Caligula’s insults, but bides his time.⁴¹ He responds to the insults of Caligula later, by taking part in the successful conspiracy to murder him. S. approves of the action of the conspirators, whose swords he characterises as ‘avenging public and private wrongs’ (publicas ac priuatas iniurias ulciscentium gladiorum, 18.3).

S.’s attitude here, though, is problematic. So far, he has argued that insults should be ignored, not avenged, or at least the people delivering them should be gently chided.⁴² Here, though, S. goes against that advice, inasmuch as he approves of Chaerea’s leading participation in a plot to assassinate Caligula. There was no love lost between S. and Caligula,⁴³ and S. clearly cannot help himself in eschewing his Stoicism and commending vengeance.

There may be another reason for S.’s attitude here too: a desire to create irony. As Wilcox (2008: 464-73) has argued, Caligula is seen in these

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⁴⁰ Cf. the two exempla of Octavia and Livia in Marc. 2.2-3.2. The one is presented by S. as a negative exemplum of reacting to the death of a son, the other as a positive exemplum. See Wilcox (2006: 82-7); Edwards (2007: 189-91).
⁴¹ See Wilcox (2008: 467) on this.
⁴² Cf. CS 12.2.
⁴³ Nowhere in his extant writings does S. speak well of Caligula. See also Introduction, § IV, on their literary rivalry.
exempla as an ironist, but one whose efforts at irony at others’ expense are his undoing. Thus, he insinuates that Chaerea is effeminate while dressed like a dancer or a prostitute. He wears tragic buskins (*coturnatus*, 18.4) but is soon to become the hero of his own tragedy, struck down by those he has toyed with.

Structural balance is provided again by two brief, but pertinent, exempla of *patientia* in dealing with an insult. Socrates merely smiles when his wife pours dirty water over him; Antisthenes, in response to the accusation that his mother was a barbarian and a Thracian, replies that even the mother of the gods was Idaean (i.e. Thracian). They follow the Caligula exempla in the same way as the climax of the Stilbo exemplum was followed by the three very brief examples of cities that had been taken.

Having examined techniques of argument in *CS*, I now wish to examination two recent interpretations of *CS*, those of Liebersohn (2005) and Baraz (2016) respectively.

First, Liebersohn. His position is that *CS*, although it has iniuria in the *propositio*, is not actually about iniuria, but about contumelia. He thinks that the discussion of iniuria is really an indirect way of getting at the real subject, viz. contumelia: S. is physician who treats the patient for a more serious condition in order to make him completely invulnerable to a less serious ailment. He considers that for a man like Serenus who aspired to a career in public life, contumelia (e.g. ‘an unpleasant word from the emperor’; Liebersohn (2005: 380)) can be much worse than iniuria (e.g. dying), which would normally be considered more serious.
The starting point of his argument is the absence of any mention of *iniuria* in 1.3, where the indignities (*uoces inprobas et sputa et omnis alias insanae multitudinis contumelias*) heaped upon Cato are described. I agree that these treatment described amount to insult rather than injury, inasmuch as they are of such a trivial nature (although unpleasant) that it is unlikely either that someone in Cato’s position would consider taking out an *actio iniuriarum* or that an urban praetor would allow it to come to trial.\(^{44}\)

Multum autem interest utrum sapientem extra indignationem an extra iniuriam ponas. Nam si dicis illum aequo animo laturum, nullum habet priuilegium, contigit illi res uulgaris et quae discitur ipsa iniuriarum adsiduitate, patientia; si negas accepturum iniuriam, id est neminem illi temptaturum facere, omnibus relictis negotiis Stoicus fio. (3.2)

This refutes Liebersohn. Serenus is here talking of *iniuria*, not *contumelia*.

Now I shall consider the interpretation of Yelena Baraz (2016). Baraz sees in CS a tension between two hierarchies: the true hierarchy of Stoicism, with the sage at the apex, and the traditional social hierarchy. The exemplum of Demetrius, who is a king, and Stilbo, who is now his slave, undermines the validity of the traditional hierarchy, because it is actually Stilbo who is superior to Demetrius (Baraz 2016: 163). Although S. holds up the sage, who is possessed of greatness of soul, as the ideal which

\(^{44}\) For legal considerations see Introduction, § VIII.
Serenus must strive to become like as he makes his upward progress towards virtue, S. cannot, according to Baraz (2016: esp. 167-70), avoid thinking in terms of the traditional Roman social hierarchy as he offers his advice to Serenus, and this undermines his position. For instance, Baraz cites 13.4, where S. expresses his contempt for slave dealers and thereby indicates to Serenus that rudeness on their part is nothing to be concerned about. In other words, according to Baraz, S. employs traditional social attitudes in the service of a moral stance that does not recognise such things as morally relevant. I do not think this is a convincing criticism. Serenus must live in the Roman society into which he is born. His moral progress must therefore be achieved within that society. If, then, his social prejudices (against slaves, for instance) can be brought into service to help him immunise himself to insults, then I do not see that this is an objection to S.’s advice. Serenus’ task is to achieve the mountain peak that is virtue, but to make that journey he must still walk first on the unvirtuous foothills.
IV. LANGUAGE AND STYLE

Where the bee sucks, there suck I

William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*

Ariel’s words are more relevant than they may at first appear to a discussion of S.’s language and style. In *Epistle 84*, where S. recommends that Lucilius read widely, he likens his approach in composition to that of a bee which gathers pollen and other things from various sources and forms them into a new, but coherent whole. So, too, in *CS*, S. creates a stylistic unity from disparate ingredients, giving ample evidence of his wide reading and learning gained from varied sources.

As we read *CS*, we see changes of stylistic register as the argument unfolds. So, in the exordium epic-historical elements express the magnitude of the task that confronts Serenus as he begins his ascent to the mountain-top of virtue. This epic and historical vein is picked up again in the Stilbo exemplum, which has stylistic elements that are resonant of ‘tragic history’.

In the insult-part that follows, the world of sieges, war and destruction, gives way to the everyday, humdrum world of the petty insult. Different stylistic influences seem to come into play here. So, the obduracy of the *ostiarius* is described in language that recalls that of Latin elegy. The world of haughty doorkeepers, disdainful name-callers, the humiliation of
not being admitted by one’s patrons are elements in the world of Latin satire (*satura*), and are to be found in the works of Horace, Persius and Juvenal.

Another stylistic influence is that of Roman comedy. The word of Roman comedy can be seen in the discussion immediately following the *divisio* (5.1). Here S. mentions slaves who prefer to be beaten with whips than to receive cuffs (*colaphi*). Slaves and their efforts to avoid beatings are part and parcel of Roman comedy, and this is reflected in the use of the word *colaphus*, which occurs frequently in comedy, and before S. is only found in prose in Valerius Maximus (3.1.3).

Another notable feature of *CS* (and of other works by S.) is the direct speech by named or unnamed interlocutors or imaginary objectors. As S. says in *Ep.* 38, he sees his role as offering advice (*consilium*) to his interlocutor, and conversation (*sermo*) as the best way to do this, ‘because it creeps by degrees into the soul’. In my discussion of the genre of *CS*, I argued that there is an implicit conversation going on in *CS* and some of the other of the so-called *dialogi*, which may be a reason why the term was applied to them. Certainly, the general style of parts of *CS* is an informal, conversational one, although the syllogisms of the *iniuria*-part do bring a more formal, disputational tenor. As in his other works, S. addresses a named individual in the second person singular, in this case Serenus. From

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46 For more on this word, see Commentary ad 5.1 and 14.3.
47 In *CS*: 1.1, 4.1, 7.3, 10.2, 12.3, 14.2, 14.3, 17.4 (unnamed); 3.1-2 (Serenus); 3.3, 4.1, 4.3 (possibly Serenus); 5.6, 6.4-7 (Stilbo); 13.4 (sage); 16.3 (*consipiens*).
48 Tr. Gummere (Loeb); *Plurime proficit sermo, quia minutatim inrepit animo* (*Ep.* 38.1).
49 See Introduction, § II.
the very beginning of the work, S. addresses Serenus directly by name
(Serene, 1), and two more such addresses are to be found at the beginning of
the divisio (5.21) and at the end of the Stilbo exemplum (6.8). The second-
person singular addresses are occasionally interrupted by second-person
plural addresses (e.g. 9.4), which should probably be imagined as S.
addressing an audience listening to the conversation.

This conversational style in S. may be the result of two different
influences. First, philosophy from Plato onwards was seen as a conversation
between two or frequently more people, with one of the interlocutors taking
the leading role, as teacher. So, in Plato, Socrates takes on this leading role,
refuting the claims of his interlocutors through dialectic, and increasingly in
the late works also expounding Plato’s own doctrines. Dialogue was
favoured by Cicero, but a conversational style seems to have been used by
Greek philosophical writers of the Stoic and Cynic schools. So, the Cynic
(ex-Academy member) Bion of Borysthenes pioneered a form of
philosophical writing called ‘diatribe’, which employed a conversational
style.50 The early Stoics (and middle ones too) also favoured a simple style
of writing, more akin to the everyday speech, in order to be able to put
across their philosophical positions more effectively than by using abstruse
and technical writing.51

50 See Kindstrand (1976), Schenkeveld (1997), Trapp (2007). S. quotes Bion at
Tranq. 8.3, 15.4, in both cases favourably. In the first passage he praises Bion’s
elegance of expression (eleganter ait).
The second influence on S.’s conversational style is almost certainly Latin satire. Exponents of this genre, particularly Horace and S.’s younger contemporary Persius, have a chatty style,\(^{52}\) usually addressed to a named (or sometimes unnamed) interlocutor, often containing pieces of direct speech supposedly uttered by this interlocutor or by someone else.

A good place to start a discussion of S.’s style in \textit{CS} may be the observations of the emperor Caligula, who not only figures prominently in \textit{CS}, but also has the distinction of being probably the first recorded critic of S.’s prose style outside S.’s own family.\(^{53}\) Condemning S. for composing ‘mere display pieces’ (\textit{commissiones meras}),\(^{54}\) he famously characterized his style as ‘sand without lime’ (\textit{harena sine calce}, Suet. \textit{Cal.}, 53.3).\(^{55}\) The allusion seems to be to the ingredients of builder’s mortar.\(^{56}\) The implication seems to be that the style lacks cohesion; that the building on which it is

\(^{52}\) Indeed, in the manuscripts the title for Horace’s satires is \textit{sermones} ('conversations'). See Coffey (1976: 68-9); Gowers (2012: 12). It is disputed whether Roman satire was influenced by Greek diatribe (e.g. whether \textit{sermo} is a translation of \textit{diatribē}). So, Pennacini (1983) thinks there is a connection, while Jocelyn (1982) is highly sceptical.

\(^{53}\) S.’s father, who criticizes his S.’ stylistic preferences in \textit{Contr.} 1, preface, died in AD 39/40. His criticisms thus may possibly have predated Caligula’s.

\(^{54}\) My translation. The interpretation of this phrase varies. Wardle (p. 343 ad loc.) lists a number of them.

\(^{55}\) The passage in full reads: \textit{Peroraturus stricturum se lucubrationis suae telum minabatur, lenius comptiusque scribendi genus adeo contemnens, ut Senecam tum maxime placentem "commissiones meras" componere et "harenam esse sine calce" diceret. Solebat etiam prosperis oratorum actionibus rescribere et magnorum in senatu reorum accusationes defensionesque meditari ac, prout stilus cesserat, vel onerare sententia sua quemque vel sublevare, equestri quoque ordine ad audiendum invitat per edicta.}

\(^{56}\) For a detailed description of the production of mortar see Vitruvius 2.5.5-9 and the discussion in Adam (1999: 74-6, 337-8). An alternative view (that of Müller), cited with reservations by Wardle (p. 344 ad loc.), is that Caligula was referring to a racetrack, and meant that S. did not know when to stop (lime marking the edge of track). I agree with Wardle that the mortar metaphor is the more plausible interpretation, not least because it fits in better with \textit{lenius comptiusque}. 
used will collapse, because it lacks an essential component. What this component was may be explained by Suetonius’ words earlier in the passage, when he says that Caligula despised S.’s ‘gentler and more elegant kind of writing’ (lenius comptiusque scribendi genus). It could be that the emperor took exception to (and was envious of) a style that contrasted with his own functional and less polished one.\(^57\) He could be saying that S.’s style lacked power and vigour, in comparison with his own, which he referred to as a weapon (telum).\(^58\)

Certainly, gentleness and elegance (and with it possibly lack of vigour) could accurately describe some aspects of the style of CS and of many other works by S. He is speaking to a friend rather than an enemy. He is trying to develop and strengthen Serenus’ rather lukewarm interest in Stoicism. The tone is, at least at the beginning, has the intimacy of a one-to-one conversation or even epistolary address.

More specificity is needed. Moreover, Caligula’s jibe almost certainly does not apply to any of the surviving works of S., which (with the exception of Ad Marciam) postdate his reign. It is thought, also, that Caligula had in mind S.’s speeches rather than prose works intended mainly for reading. There is certainly evidence of elegance and careful composition in CS.

Another interpretation of ‘sand without lime’, which I think the context of the Suetonius passage makes less likely, may chime more

\(^{57}\) Functional style: Wardle, p. 342 ad 52.3 (peroraturus ... minabatur).

\(^{58}\) Suet. Gaius 53.
harmoniously with other criticisms of S.’s style. Caligula’s jibe, then it might point to an aspect of S.’s style that is evident in CS: its diversity and variety. Indeed, to speak of the language and style of CS is in part misleading, for it implies a single, monolithic style. As I attempt to show here, however, it would be truer to speak of the styles of CS. This work exhibits a range of registers and styles, which yet in combination seem to create a harmonious whole.
V. IMAGERY

CS, like other writings by S., is rich in imagery. How we interpret S.’s use of imagery in CS and other works is intimately linked with how we interpret him as a philosopher overall. His fondness for imagery, together with the sparseness of recognisable logical argumentation, has proved troublesome for some modern scholars of ancient philosophy who have been educated in the analytic tradition. For some of them, for example John Cooper, this is one more reason to doubt S.’s right to be considered a philosopher in the truest sense, rather than a mere writer, or at best a ‘thinker’. This suspicion of the use of imagery, and in particular metaphor, in philosophy has long roots. It remained the prevailing view until quite recently among Anglo-American analytical philosophers, for whom philosophy should be concerned solely of logically based argumentation, and all words and propositions used should have their literal, not metaphorical, meaning. This attitude, however, has been challenged, both within the analytic tradition, for instance by Max Black (1962), and outside it, most notably by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Moreover, this growing revision of long-established

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59 For a detailed listing of the images in S., see the ‘Catalogue de images’ in Armisen-Marchetti (1986: 69-201).
60 CS may be an exception here: see Introduction, § III.
62 For more detail on John Cooper’s attack on S., see Introduction, § III.
63 For instance, in the early modern era, Thomas Hobbes said that metaphor has no place in philosophy (see David E. Cooper 1986: 17).
64 For a later articulation of their work, see Lakoff & Johnson (1999).
prejudices against the use of imagery and metaphor in philosophy has been reflected in an increased and increasing interest in Roman philosophers, particularly in S., for the interpretation of whose work the traditional approaches are considered both restrictive and irrelevant.⁶⁵

Fundamentally, this is a question about the aims of philosophy. Is philosophy a purely theoretical activity, an exercise in conceptual analysis? Or is it a guide to life and a discipline whose aims – any theoretical content notwithstanding – are ultimately practical? In the case of S., the Stoics generally, and indeed the Epicureans and (probably) the Sceptics (the three main Hellenistic schools), their aims were ultimately practical, although there was solid theoretical underpinning. S.’s intention is not to do conceptual analysis, which is what analytic critics expect of a philosopher, but rather to urge the merits of a particular philosophical school, Stoicism, as a guide to the moral life, and to make the doctrines and positions of this philosophical school attractive to the would-be ‘convert’ or to strengthen the commitment of the neophyte.⁶⁶ That is, S.’s aim is paraenetic, practical, not theoretical. This is the defence of S.’s use of imagery adopted by Mireille Armisen-Marchetti in her Sapientiae facies (1989). Although S. does at times discuss Stoic theory and does engage in disputes with theoretical positions taken by other (mainly Stoic) philosophers,⁶⁷ he is above all concerned to persuade his addressees of the rightness of Stoic philosophy and that its doctrines are the ones that should govern their lives. He is trying

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⁶⁵ So, the essays in Griffin & Barnes (1989).
⁶⁶ On this see Nussbaum (2009).
⁶⁷ Cf. e.g. Ἐπ. 58, 65, 121.
to make abstract concepts ‘come alive’ in the mind of the addressee, so that he or she comes to see what they are ‘about’ in practical terms and (S. hopes) begins to form his or her life in accordance with them.\textsuperscript{68} In order to make Stoic doctrine comprehensible to novices (such as Serenus), S. seeks to turn abstracts into concretes. It is not merely the reason of the addressee to which he appeals, but also the imagination.\textsuperscript{69}

In this, S. is following the practice of some previous Stoics who laid stress on the usefulness of images as a means by which the student could be introduced to Stoic arguments and concepts. So Ariston of Chios (3\textsuperscript{rd}–4\textsuperscript{th} c. BC), a pupil of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school, thought up a number of Homoiōmata (likenesses, analogies),\textsuperscript{70} most notably his comparison of the sage to a good actor, who could interpret his role in the way most appropriate to the situation.\textsuperscript{71} Ariston was an unorthodox Stoic, who deserted the Stoa when Zeno was ill, having met Polemo, the head of the Academy, and recanted his Stoic views.\textsuperscript{72} Ariston argued that only ethics mattered and rejected the importance laid on logic and physics by Zeno;

\textsuperscript{68} This might be a deliberate stylistic choice of the Roman Stoics in particular. Cf. Reydams-Schils (2005) on how Roman Stoics adapted the Greek Stoic tradition to make it relevant to Roman social practices.
\textsuperscript{69} Cf. Lucretius (1.933-50), who likens his use of poetry as a medium for presenting philosophy to the practice of healers who smear the rim of a cup of wormwood with honey, in order to make the bitter medicine palatable to children.
\textsuperscript{70} SVF III.383-403.
\textsuperscript{71} See Protopapas-Marneli (2002: 70-5).
\textsuperscript{72} See Curnow (2006: 45).
‘dialectical reasonings’ (i.e. logic) he likened to spider’s webs, on the (incorrect) grounds that, like spider’s webs, they were useless.73

Nor was this practice unique to Stoics. The use of concrete images to help understanding of philosophical arguments and concepts had been well established in philosophical discourse long before S. For instance, in Plato’s Republic (436a–e), for instance, Socrates, who is trying to convince his interlocutors that the soul is tripartite, and that it can therefore undergo opposites at the same time, uses the analogy of a spinning top, which is both at rest (i.e. it does not move from its position) and moving (i.e. it spins). The Form of the Good (Rep. 508a) is compared to the sun, in that it, like the sun in the sensible world, is the source and origin of all that is (i.e. of the other Forms in the intelligible world, which are the basis of all that is in the sensible world) and enables us to see (i.e. understand).

Nevertheless, one should be wary of equating the restrained use of analogies and comparisons, such as those just cited from Plato, which serve to illustrate arguments that had already been expounded and developed through the dialectic, with the much more extensive use of imagery that we find in S., whose images seem to take on a life of their own and become the driving force of his argument. For S.’s imagistic argumentation, the approach of Lakoff and Johnson mentioned earlier is interesting. They argue that there is a logical coherence underlying the metaphors that human beings use in their everyday language, and that, far from being decorative, such

73 D.L. 7.161; SVF 1.389 and 352; S. Ep. 89.13. S. seems to be of this view in Ep. 48, although the inclusion of syllogisms does seem to indicate a more orthodox approach; see Introduction, § III.
metaphors indicate reasoning (albeit of a different kind from the strict logic of analytic philosophy) taking place. Given the prevalence of images in S.’s writing, their approach could help us in interpreting his work in a more sensitive and charitable way than some scholars have hitherto done. For instance, according to Lakoff and Johnson, the spatial word ‘up’ can be used metaphorically to imply ‘good’, while its antonym, ‘down’, can connote ‘bad’. Thus, ‘he’s on his way up’ can literally mean someone ascending to a higher physical level (e.g. in a higher storey in a building) or can metaphorically mean ‘he is enjoying success’ (perhaps in the form of achieving promotion to a superior position in the company he works for); ‘he’s on his way down’ can mean the physical opposite of ‘he’s on his way up’ (e.g. he’s coming down from the fifth floor to the second floor (where the speaker is)) or, metaphorically, that his career is failing and he is facing dismissal or demotion. In evolutionary terms we talk of ‘ascending the evolutionary ladder’; in biology generally (before Darwin) one talked of the ‘higher animals’ (humans, mammals) as opposed to the lower ones (fish, worms, etc.).

Another example is ‘forward’ and its antonym ‘backward’. Apart from the literal meanings (simply moving forwards or backwards), there can be an implication of making progress or regressing (‘he is going forward’ or ‘he is going backward’) in some project. So we have ‘forward-looking’ (progressive, interested in future improvement, bettering things) and ‘backward’ (on a lower level of culture or intelligence, retarded).
The danger in this approach is that the metaphors are often so well used that they have become dead metaphors. A dead metaphor is one whose metaphorical force has been lost by frequent use. The metaphorical meaning is considered as just another literal meaning of the word or phrase. So, a resentful colleague may well not be thinking of physical elevation in the office block when he says ‘he’s on his way up’; rather, he is using the ‘metaphorical’ expression as a more colourful (and maybe simpler) version of ‘he’s (constantly) getting promoted’. Certainly the ‘lip’ of a jug and the ‘mouth’ of a river are dead metaphors.74

After these preliminary general remarks, I now turn specifically to S.’s use of imagery in CS. S. uses four main categories of imagery in CS: (1) height; (2) military/combat; (3) legal; (4) medical.75 I shall discuss these categories individually.

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74 For a discussion of dead metaphor, see David Cooper (1986: 119-39). It should be noted, as Cooper discusses, that some philosophers are dubious about the notion of ‘dead metaphor’ because they are dubious about the motion of metaphor altogether. So, for Donald Davidson, ‘dead metaphors’ are just instances of polysemy, of the same word having different meanings. Of course, dead metaphors can be revived in certain contexts (e.g. by writers or poets).

75 Armisen-Marchetti (1986: 315-19) has a different classification: (1) images of aggression (including military); (2) ‘the sage magnified’ (which includes my category of height); (3) images of derision (both insults directed at the sage and S.’s own disparagement of certain groups of people, e.g. women). I do not consider her third category as a valid image category in itself, because it seems to me a psychological rather than imagistic category. The unifying factor behind the ‘images’ of insult (the only ones I can think of being images are ‘marine wether’ and ‘deplated ostrich’) is the intention to insult.
Imagery of height is used by S. in the exordium, where he likens the path that Serenus must take to attain virtue as a difficult and hard ascent up a mountain. Virtue is the goal at the top of the mountain (1.1-2).

1. [. . .] Stoici uirilem ingressi uiam non ut amoena ineuntibus uideatur curae habent, sed ut quam primum nos eripiat et in illum editum uerticem educat qui adeo extra omnem teli iactum surrexit ut supra fortunam emineat. 2. 'At ardua per quae uocamur et confragosa sunt.' Quid enim? plano aditur excelsum? Sed ne tam abrupta quidem sunt quam quidam putant. Prima tantum pars saxa rupesque habet et inuii speciem, sicut pleraque ex longinquo speculantibus abscisa et conexa uideri solent, cum aciem longinquitas fallat, deinde propius adeuntibus eadem illa quae in unum congesserat error oculorum paulatim adaperiuntur, tum illis quae praecipitia ex interuallo apparebant redit lene fastigium.

The image of the path to virtue being arduous and steep is a very old one, and goes back to Hesiod (see Commentary ad loc.). The connection of the image of the road with philosophical activity is very old and can be seen in Parmenides (fr. 2 DK; Kirk, Raven and Schofield 344), where the goddess shows him the two ways: the way of truth and the way of falsehood. There is also the choice of Hercules (Xen. Mem. 2.1.21): faced with a choice between a long life of ease but without virtue, and a short, arduous life of
virtue, he chose the latter. In *Epistle 51*, S. associates virtue with the image of being on a mountain top, and moral decline being on the plain. He exemplifies this conceit through Hannibal, who (he claims) was virtuous when crossing the Alps, but whose moral character declined once he gained control of the decadent city of Capua. Being in the mountains is associated with not shirking difficulties, testing oneself by overcoming obstacles, and hard training. Soldiers (like Hannibal) who have trained in the mountains are tougher and more effective than those who have been on garrison duty in the towns.

In addition to being associated with virtue, which is attained by a long and arduous ascent, height is also associated by S. in *CS* with the notion of divinity. The sage, the virtuous man, is similar to a god and as such is as invulnerable to the attacks of non-sages as gods are to those of mortals. So, at *CS* 4.1, the metaphorical distance between sage and non-sage is expressed in terms of images of height. The sky, where the gods live, cannot be reached by the missiles of earthly potentates. Just as the destruction of a temple does nothing to impair the divinity of the god whose temple it is, so any attack on the sage (however much physical damage may be done to him we are to infer) will be in vain, because (here again we must infer this from the passage) it will not affect his virtue.

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76 Cf. Livy 39.1 (and Commentary on *CS* 1.1-2).
77 *Ep*. 51.5-8.
78 An interesting variation of the height image is the depth image to denote the similar inability of oriental tyrants to attack Neptune, god of the sea (*CS* 8.2).
This imagery of height is continued at 6.4, in the exemplum episode of Stilbo and Demetrius Poliorcetes (5.5-6.8). Stilbo’s city, Megara, has been besieged and taken by Demetrius Poliorcetes (‘the Besieger’). Here, though, the vocabulary of height is used literally, not metaphorically, to describe high city walls. Demetrius may (literally) be able to make high towers (turrium altitudinem) totter by undermining them, or to raise an earthen ramp that will equal the height of the highest citadels (editissimas arces), but no siege engines can (metaphorically) shake the bene fundatu[s] animu[s] of the sage. Fundatus literally means ‘having secure foundations’, ‘securely established’, ‘firmly founded’ (OLD). The sage’s soul has sound foundations, like a strong building, which is contained in the final section of the Stilbo episode. Here, there is a move from the imagery of height to the imagery of siege warfare, and in 6.8, S. draws the moral of Stilbo’s words, this time applying siege imagery directly to the sage. He cannot lose anything because he is ‘full of divine and human virtues’. His bona are ‘encircled by solid and insurmountable fortifications’ (bona eius solidis et inexsuperabilibus munimentis praecincta sunt). Unlike the walls of Babylon, Carthage and Numantia, which did not prevent the capture of their cities, the fortifications that protect the sage’s soul allow no entry: they are high, impregnable, on a level with the gods (excelsa, inexpugnabilia, dis aequa).
The image of the soul as a high citadel (or fortified temple) had been used by Roman philosophers (Epicureans as well as Stoics) before Seneca.\(^79\) It certainly evokes the tranquil self-sufficiency of the sage (whatever his school), fortified by his virtue. However, it also evokes the idea of the Stoic city, the ideal polity whose citizens are Stoic sages and the gods, with the other humans being inhabitants, rather like the non-citizens (women, children, slaves, resident aliens) of the actual Greek or Roman city.\(^80\)

The thought is found again at CS 8.2. The sage stands as a neighbour and closest to the gods (*uicinus proximusque dis consistit*) (a locational image). He proceeds towards (*pergens*) things that are high (*excelsa*; amongst their other qualities). He will desire nothing that is *low* (*humile*: literally ‘of earth’).

Imagery of height reoccurs (though less intensely) in the second part of the *divisio*, which deals with insult. Here S. speaks of the *humilitate animi . . . supprimentis se ac descendentis* (10.3): the person who accepts an insult for himself to be lowly, lower than the person who is insulting him. The *magnanimitas* of the sage means that he considers that no one will have the audacity *tanto excelsiora despicere* (11.2).

S.’s choice of imagery of height in *CS* is appropriate to the subject matter. In Stoicism, the association of the sky with divinity had special resonance, in that the divine fire or breath (*pneuma*), the rational, ordering principle that pervades the universe, including the soul of man, dwelt in its

\(^{79}\) Lucretius (2.6-7); Cicero (*PS* 27; *Div.* 1.45 (interpretation of the dream of Tarquinius Superbus); *Tusc.* 2.58).

\(^{80}\) According to the interpretation of Vogt (2008).
pure, unmixed form in the empyrean, beyond the orbit of the moon. In that region of the universe were to be found the planets, which were gods or goddesses (hence their names). Elsewhere, we find S. interested in the connections between the divine and the heavens. The choice of celestial phenomena as the focus of his *Natural Questions* is justified in the Preface to Book I of that work by the consideration that contemplation of the heavens encourages the development of the soul in the direction of virtue. Contemplation of the sereneness of the heavens will inculcate sereneness (an aspect of virtue) in the soul of the contemplator. Moreover, the contemplator of the heavens will come to realize how insignificant human concerns are.

However, the Stoics adapted imagery that was already common and well established. In Greek culture, for example, Mount Olympus was thought to be the abode of the gods. Leaving aside ancient cultures, in much human language and thought goodness and height generally seem to be associated, as are authority and height.

II

The most frequent type of images in *CS* is military combat, and also combat more generally (including boxing and gladiatorial combat);\(^{31}\) indeed, we have already seen military imagery (e.g. impregnable city walls) combining with height imagery in the examples given in the previous section. The

\(^{31}\) Armisen-Marchetti (1989).
ground is prepared for this almost from the very beginning of the treatise in
the two sections devoted to Cato and his efforts to resist the faction of
Caesar and finally holding up the tottering Republic as Atlas does the world:
an allusion to the civil war. The mention of people who destroy temples
(4.2), coming as it does after a reference to Xerxes (4.2), probably suggests
the destruction of Greek temples by Xerxes in the invasion of Greece.
However, the first explicit mention comes at 4.3 when the sage invulnerable
to injury is compared to a general of a strong army in enemy territory.
Thereafter military images occur frequently. 82

S.’s fondness for military images is not confined to CS. 83 An
interesting use of it appears at Ep. 59. In the context of a broader case for
the appropriateness of images in philosophical discourse, he cites with
approval the use of a military image by the Stoic/Pythagorean philosopher
Sextius, the teacher of S.’s own teacher Sotion, saying that Sextius uses
‘Greek words, but Roman customs’
(Graecis verbis, Romanis moribus, Ep. 59.7). S. Quotes Sextius directly:

’Idem’ inquit ’sapiens facere debet: omnis virtutes suas undique
expandat, ut ubicumque infesti aliquid orietur, illic parata
praesidia sint et ad nutum regentis sine tumultu respondeant.’

82 See principally 5.6, 6.6, 6.8, 8.3, 9.4, 15.4, 19.3, 19.4.
83 See the ‘Catalogue de images’ in Armisen-Marchetti (1986: 69-201); Sommer
(2005). 
Apart from the similarity of the imagery with that found in CS 4.3 of the
general in enemy territory, what is notable is S.’s explanation of how an
image can serve as an integral part of philosophical paraenetic.\textsuperscript{84} From the
translated quotation from Sextius, we can see that S. is following a tradition
of philosophical discourse that uses an image as an illustration of an
approved mode of behaviour that is expounded on by the writer/speaker. Of
course, we do not have the full quotation of Sextius from which the image is
taken, and Sextius may have used other images too, perhaps also used by S.

Another point of interest is the phrase \textit{Graecis verbis, Romanis}
\textit{moribus}: Sextius philosophised (whatever the medium – spoken word or
writing) in Greek (the standard language of philosophy), but ‘with Roman
mores’. In other words, the subject matter of his philosophical discourse was
Roman. What this meant is suggested by the next sentence, which presents
the military image of the army advancing in square formation, ready for
battle. From this passage, therefore, it would seem that military imagery, to
S.’s mind at least, was something appropriately Roman. This is not to say
that military imagery may not have been in the earlier, non-Roman tradition
of Stoic writing. Socrates, who was much admired by the Stoics as a
paradigm of the virtuous man, did distinguish himself as a soldier.\textsuperscript{85}

However, the scarcity of surviving Stoic writing before Seneca precludes a

\textsuperscript{84} [6] \textit{Invenio tamen translationes verborum ut non temerarias ita quae periculum
sui fecerint; invenio imagines, quibus si quis nos ui vetat et poetis illas solis
iudicat esse concessas, neminem mihi videtur ex antiquis legisse, apud quos
nondum captabatur plausibilis oratio: illi, qui simpliciter et demonstrandae rei
causa eloquebantur, parabolis referti sunt, quas existimo necessarias, non ex
eadem causa qua poetis, sed ut imbecillis nostrae adminicula sint, ut et dicentem
et audientem in rem praesentem adducant.}

\textsuperscript{85} See D.L. 2.23.
secure judgement on how frequent military imagery was in early and Middle Stoic texts. We therefore cannot be certain how far S. is providing something distinctively Roman when he uses military imagery, or is following the Stoic tradition(s) he inherited. Perhaps he is doing both simultaneously.

The function of the military imagery in CS has more than one strand. The central exemplum of Stilbo shows the sage unaffected by the belligerence around him. In the midst of the chaos and violence of the sack of Megara, he alone is at peace (*pax*). His indifference to what is going on about him (including personal loss – the rape of his daughters) shows his virtuous recognition of what is important: his bona are his virtue, which is intact; the other bona (personal possessions) are *fortuita* and unimportant. Here, the military imagery provides the background, the foil, against which the sage’s virtue is demonstrated. Stilbo is not a soldier, but a non-combatant, who is unfazed by the presence of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Virtue here is exemplified *against* military activity.

Elsewhere, the military imagery is used positively, to illustrate behaviour or a state of mind that should be striven for. Thus, as we have seen, at CS 4.3 the sage is like a general (whereas in the Stilbo-exemplum Demetrius, the general, is the antithesis of the sage) in enemy territory, invulnerable to attack. The sage’s invulnerability is emphasized at the end of CS (19.3) by the image of the soldier withstanding the spears and stones that rattle upon his helmet.
A similarly defiant and positive view of combat (if not specifically military activity) is provided by the imagery at 16.2, where S. contrasts the passivity of the Epicureans with the more positive and active attitude of the Stoics. The ‘Epicurean’ gladiator, on receiving a wound, halts and presses it. The ‘Stoic’ gladiator, by contrast, ignores it, declaring that it is nothing and refusing help; he carries on the fight. Overall, though, the military imagery does emphasize the ‘passive’, enduring aspects of warfare, rather than the ‘active’ aspects (e.g. killing). In this, it reflects the purpose of the dialogue: to show that the sage does not accept injury or insult. The central quality being demonstrated is (metaphorical) invulnerability.

In this respect, the image of the invulnerable citadel unites the images of height as virtuous (discussed earlier) and the notion of invulnerability, which is expressed through military imagery. The citadel (a military image representing the soul of the sage) is invulnerable to attack from (metaphorical) siege engines of all kinds because of the height of its walls (i.e. by the virtue of the sage) (6.4).

Invulnerability, besides being expressed through military images, is also suggested by individual words, for instance: *firmitas* (1.3, 6.2, 13.1, 17.186), contrasted with *infirmus* (7.2, 10.3); *solidus* (3.5, 5.4, 6.8,87 11.1); *robur* (3.4, 4.5, 88 9.589). They could equally well apply to the subcategory of

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86 *This time of Fidus Cornelius, who although no sage, had confronted many* *maledicta* *before he wept at Corbulo’s jibe.*  
87 *Bona eius solidis et inexsuperabilibus munimentis praecincta sunt.*  
88 *... ita sapientis animus solidus est et id roboris* *collegit ut tam tutus sit ab in iuria quam illa quae re tulti.*  
89 *Here an image from boxing: Sic in certaminibus sacris plerique uicerunt caedentium manus obstinata patientia fatigando: ex hoc puta genere sapientem,*
‘hardness’ images and metaphor applied to the sage; for instance where he is likened to adamant or jutting rocks that withstand the assault of the seas at CS 3.5.

III

A very interesting, but restricted (limited?), use of imagery is the use of legal imagery that occurs mainly in the main discussion of injury (particularly 5.4-8.1). From this discussion, we can see that legal language and imagery is largely restricted to the specific treatment of iniuria in sections 5-9. Although it does not drive the argument, it is integral to the discussion of the nature of iniuria, which is an offence under the law, and the sage’s immunity to it. S.’s choice of imagery is here seen to be appropriate to the subject matter, something that is confirmed by the scarcity of legally charged words in the second half of the treatise, which concerns insult.

As S. says at 5.4, injury involves loss of social standing, health, and physical possessions. These things are the gifts of fortuna and as such are unstable; she can take them away as easily as she has bestowed them. The sage may possess any or all of the above things, just as may the non-sage; and just as the non-sage may lose these things at any time in his life, so may

eorum qui exercitacione longa ac fidelis robur perpetiendi lassandique omnem inimicam uim consecuti sunt.
the sage. By contrast, virtue, the unique distinguishing feature of the sage, is securely possessed; once attained, it cannot be lost.

At this point legal imagery appears:

Itaque nihil perdet quod perire sensurus sit; unius enim in

**possessione** uirtutis est, ex qua depelli numquam potest, ceteris

**precario**\(^{90}\) utitur: quis autem iactura mouetur alieni? (5.5)

The contrast between virtue and other ‘goods’ is seen in terms of legal possession. Virtue alone is what the sage possesses (it belongs to him). The other things he ‘possesses’, by contrast, he holds by the say-so of another *(precario)*, in this case fortune, who could ask for it back when he or she wishes.

The encounter between Stilbo and Demetrius Poliorcetes illustrates this contrast between two concepts of possession, the legal/societal and the moral. Demetrius, who has besieged Megara and whose troops are sacking it, asks Stilbo (doubtless ironically) if he had lost anything. Stilbo says he has not: ‘omnia mea mecum sunt’, this despite the fact that *patrimonium in praedam cesserat . . . et patria in alienam dicionem peruenerat* (5.6).

The point is reinforced at 5.7, which is rich in legal vocabulary:

\(^{90}\) For discussion of this and other legal terms, see the relevant places in the Commentary.
At ille uictoriam illi excussit et se urbe capta non inuictum tantum sed *indemnem* esse *testatus est*; habebat enim *uera secum bona*, in quae non est *manus iniectio*, at quae dissipata et direpta ferebantur non iudicabat sua, sed *aduenticia* et nutum fortunae sequentia. Ideo ut non propria dilexerat; omnium enim extrinsecus adfluentium lubrica et incerta *possessio* est.

Stilbo ‘bore witness’ that he had ‘suffered no loss’. His ‘true goods’ (his virtue) lie beyond the ordinary means by which possession is established (e.g. *manus iniectio*). The goods that were said to be have been taken from him he did not judge to be his, but things that had come to him by accident; possession of them was uncertain.

Finally, in his speech, Stilbo says (6.5-6):

> solus et senior et hostilia circa me omnia uidens tamen integrum incolumemque esse *censum* meum profiteor: teneo, habeo quidquid mei habui. 6. Non est quod me uictum uictoremque te credas: uicit fortuna tua fortunam meam. *Caduca* illa et *dominum mutantia* ubi sint nescio: quod ad res meas pertinet, mecum sunt, mecum erunt.

His property may have passed into another’s possession; such things are transitory, like inheritances that cannot be taken up by the legatee and fall
into the possession of the treasury (caduca); but what is truly his remained with him.

Throughout this passage, reinforced by the use of legal imagery, there is interplay between the notion of the possession of ‘worldly goods’ and the possession of the true goods of virtue. Legally, Stilbo has lost everything; morally, he has lost nothing. Legally, he has suffered (accepted) iniuria; morally, he has not, for the legal concept of iniuria has no purchase in the life of the sage qua sage.

Technical legal imagery is not used for the next two sections (7-8), which are concerned with syllogisms demonstrating the impossibility of the sage accepting injury. However, there are general hints: at 8.1 the syllogism that ‘proves’ the logical incompatibility of the sage with injustice (and its cognate iniuria), although concerned with very abstract moral terms, does hint at the legal realm. And among the mala and false iniuriae that fortune can inflict are iratae leges and saeuissimi domini (8.3) and the machinations of illis per quae periculum nobis quaesitum est, ut accusatore summisso aut criminatione falsa aut irritatis in nos potentiorum odis quaeque alia inter togatos latrocinia sunt (9.2). They remind the reader of the point made earlier that the legal system is part of the realm of fortuna.

From section 10 onwards, we are in the part of the treatise that deals with insult. Here, not unexpectedly, legal imagery plays little to no part,
since S. says that *contumelia*, the *minor iniuria*, is not punishable by law (10.1).

At 12.3, however, the word *contumacia* (‘disobedience (of a legal summons)’) occurs in the context of the sage good-humouredly admonishing adults who try to insult him, just as humans correct horses, without taking offence at what they do: *sic enim et pecora uerbere domantur, nec irascimur illis, cum sessorem recusauerunt, sed compescimus, ut dolor contumaciam uincat*. Here, however, the legal sense of the word seems to be less in play; rather, the more general sense of ‘disobedience’ is intended.

Underlying S.’s use of legal imagery in CS is the Stoic notion of natural law: a cosmic law that is the rational principle immanent in the universe. This natural law is distinct for the laws of individual cities and countries, which may differ from each other. By contrast, the natural law is the same for all men at all times. On the traditional Stoic view of natural law as set out by Zeno in his *Republic*, only the sages, owing to their perfect reason and virtue, could be citizens in the perfect city. As hardly anyone was capable of attaining perfect virtue anyway, this divine city was probably viewed by Zeno and the early Stoics as an ideal rather than a realistic blueprint for a future society (see Schofield 1999; Vander Waerdt 1994; Vogt 1998).

IV
Another category of images that S. uses in CS is the medical. Medical imagery and analogies are very common in all the main schools of Hellenistic philosophy, and not just the Stoic. In all the schools the philosopher is seen as a doctor to the soul; his brand of philosopher – whether Stoic, Epicurean or Sceptic – is a purveyor of spiritual medicine who purpose is to heal the sick soul of the philosophical neophyte. (See Nussbaum (2009) for a full discussion.) The occurrence of medical imagery in CS therefore comes as no surprise.

At CS 1.1 uses medical imagery to contrast the Stoic sages with other ones (maybe Epicurean). The ‘other wise men’ (ceteri sapientes) are like doctors attached to a household who give soft and bland treatments to sick bodies, not because that is the best and swiftest cure, but because that is only what they are permitted to do. By contrast, the Stoics offer a virile way to virtue. The medical imagery of the house doctors, which is an analogy not a metaphor, is not continued when the hard Stoic path is introduced. Of more interest to S. is the male/ruling v. female/subservient contrast, which is introduced in the first sentence of CS.

Medical analogy recurs at CS 13.1-2, where S. discusses the correct response to insults, i.e. not to be offended, as exemplified by the sage. The non-sages who insult the sage are like feverish patients who insult their doctors. As the doctor is not provoked by the provocations of sick men, so the sage does not get rattled by the insults of the ignorant non-sages. Moreover, he behaves towards all non-sages as a doctor behaves with his
patients: not being offended by their insults and provocations but firmly applying the cure.

In his description of Caligula’s physical appearance, S. refers to his paleness: *tanta illi palloris insaniam testantis foeditas erat* (18.1).\(^{92}\) Pallor is used as a medical term by Celsus (e.g. 3.6.7).\(^{93}\) However, S. might also be alluding to Caligula’s effeminacy (cf. 18.3 for Caligula’s effeminacy in dress: *perlucidus, crepidatus, auratus*). Pliny, for instance (*Pan*. 48.4), speaks of Domitian’s *femineus pallor in corpore* when angry.

In the last section of the works (19.3) the medical analogy recurs: *Diuerso autem remedio utetur sapiens adfectatorque sapientiae*. However, *remedium* here may well be a dead metaphor. In the comparison between the strategies the novice may use to deal with insults and the sage’s already attained victory over insults (19.4), medical analogy or imagery plays no role; military imagery predominates. Overall, in *CS*, medical imagery plays a secondary role, in comparison with military and legal imagery.

\(^{92}\) C. Caesar, inter cetera uitia quibus abundabat contumeliosus, mira libidine ferebatur omnis aliqua nota feriendi, ipse materia risus benignissima: *tanta illi palloris insaniam testantis foeditas erat*, tanta oculorum sub fronte anili latentium toruitas, tanta capitis destituti et ~emendacitatis~ capillis adspersi deformitas; adice obsessam saetis cereicem et exiliatem crurum et enormitatem pedum.

\(^{93}\) Langslow (2000: 195) lists it among the 28 Latin words ending in *–or* used by Celsus.
VI. MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

The moral psychology underlying the sage’s immunity to injury and insult has to be reconstructed principally from two passages, CS 9.3 and CS 10.3. I should say at the outset that the discussion which follows is intended to explain the rather brief and sketchy analysis offered by S. in CS. These passages in themselves are not, in my view, very helpful in illuminating Stoic moral psychology; rather, they are themselves in need of illumination in the light of our established knowledge of Stoic moral psychology from other works of S. and other ancient writers and from modern scholarship. To my knowledge, this is the first detailed discussion of these passages using modern scholarship.

The two passages I shall discuss straddle the end of the first part of the divisio, which deals with injury, and the second part, which is concerned with insult. The first passage comes at the end of the first half of the section (9.3), immediately before the peroration that rounds off that section (9.4); the second passage comes almost at the beginning of the insult section. Although they deal respectively with injury and insult, it is appropriate that they are placed close together as injury and insult are close relatives and the moral psychology underlying them is much the same.

I shall now provide a close paraphrase of both passages, followed by an analysis.
In *CS* 9.3, S. says that no one accepts an injury *inmota mente* (‘unmoved mind/soul’): he is disturbed (*perturbatur*) by the *sensus* of the injury (*eius*). By contrast, the sage lacks disturbance (*caret autem perturbatione*); he is ‘snatched away’ from errors; he is his own master; he is calm and at peace. This is because (*Nam*) if injury ‘touches’ (*tangit*) him, it also moves and ‘impels’ him; however, he lacks anger, for he only has anger if he also has injury, but he knows that injury cannot be done to him. Because of this, he is ‘upright’ and happy, raised up by continuous joy.

However, he is so far from being depressed (*contrahitur*) at the shocks produced by things and by people that he finds injury useful, a means of testing himself and his virtue.

At 10.2, having just described insult as a ‘lesser injury’, S. then says that ‘this emotion is moved by the lowliness of a soul that is contracting on account of something said or done that is disrespectful’ (*Hunc affectum mouet humilitas animi contrahentis se ob dictum factum inhonorisicum*). After citing some imaginary complaints at insulting behaviour, which he dismisses as the complaints of a seasick mind (*quae quid uocem nisi querellas nausiantis animi*), uttered by people who are self-indulgent and fortunate (*delicati et felices*), who are too leisured to have worse things to worry about; their minds are weak by nature, effeminate, playing around in the absence of real injury; and most of these things are the result of the fault of the interpreter. Whoever is affected by insult shows want of good sense or self-confidence, for he judges that he is despised and this biting occurs in conjunction with a certain lowliness of a mind that is depressing itself and
sinking down (*hic morsus non sine quadam humilitate animi euenit supprimentis se ac descendentis*). The sage, however, is despised by no one; he knows his own greatness and says to himself that no one is allowed to have so great power over him; and all these things, which I would call not miseries of the mind but annoyances, he does not defeat, but rather does not even feel them (*non uincit sed ne sentit quidem*).

Several things emerge from these passages. First, to accept an injury involves some sort of mental movement and disturbance (cf. *inmota mente* and *perturbatur*, 9.3). *Mens* generally in Latin refers to the reasoning faculty, the intellect; also, design and purpose. It is the rational, cognitive capacity, the ability to make judgements. From S.’s account it seems that the mental movement is accompanied by a disturbance (*perturbatio*) prompted by some sensation (*sensus*). S. is not specific about what this sensation could be, but, given the tripartite definition of *injuria* given earlier (5.1: detriment of status, body, or things placed outside us), it could involve physical injury (e.g. feeling a blow), the visual sensation of (e.g.) seeing one’s property damaged, or the auditory sensation of (e.g.) hearing a libel against oneself. The person who accepts the injury is disturbed at this and his mind is moved.

When S. speaks of *perturbatio*, he is using the Latin term that Cicero uses in the *Tusculan Disputations* to translate the Greek *pathos*, which is

94 *OLD* 1, 7.
95 S. may be referring to the *hegēmonikon* (which he translates as *regium principale* at *Ira* 1.37), the ‘directive faculty’ (the translation of the Greek used by Graver (2007: 21)), but we cannot be sure.
translated in English as ‘passion’ (or ‘emotion’, in modern English, although ‘passion’ is very frequently used in modern discussions of the emotions in ancient philosophy). The passions, of which there are four main categories (grief (*lupē*), fear (*phobos*), appetite (*epithumia*) and pleasure (*hēdonē*)), are held by the Stoics to be morally dubious, unvirtuous, because they are the product of wrong reasoning. Cicero’s translation is more vivid and stronger than the Greek, which could just mean ‘experience’; *perturbatio* makes explicit the dysfunctional nature of passions in Stoic moral psychology. S. often uses the word *adfectus*, too, to denote *pathos*, as at *CS* 10.2 and in the *De Ira*. The particular *perturbatio* that S. has in mind here is anger (*ira*), which seems to fit under grief in the list of the four main categories given above. It is also the standard example of a passion used both by Stoics and by philosophers of other schools. The sage, by contrast, does not experience anger or any other *perturbatio*, but rather is calm and experiences continuous joy. Here S. is referring to the ‘good passions’ (*eupatheiai*), which are exclusive to the sage. I shall discuss the ‘good passions’ in details later.

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96 Andronicus, *De Passionibus* 1 (*SVF* 3.391, part = Long and Sedley 65B). Note that *lupē* and *phobos* relate to things perceived as bad in the present and future respectively, while *hēdonē* and *epithumia* concern goods in present and future respectively.

97 See Busa—Zampolli for listings of the occurrences of both terms.

98 This is implied by *CS* 10.3 (*Nam si tangit illum inuria, et mouet et inpellit; caret autem ira sapiens, quan excitat inuria species, nec aliter careret ira nisi et inuria, quam scit sibi non posse fieri*). Cf. 12.3 (*irascimur*), 13.1 (*irascitur*), 16.4 (*irascimur*), 18.4 (*iratus fuit*), 19.2 (*Aliquando etiam obirati potentibus detegemus hunc adfectum intemperanti libertate*) as a reaction to perceived insult.

99 In addition to S.’s *De Ira*, cf. Plutarch’s *De cohibenda ira*.

100 Concerning the present: *gaudium*, joy. Concerning the future: *eulabeia*, caution (bad); *boulēsis*, wish (good). Note that there is no equivalent of distress/pain
For now, I would like to discuss the motions of the soul that take place both in the person accepting an injury and in the sage. It should be clear by now that the soul of the person accepting an injury is moved by the sensation of whatever the injury is. However, to understand this fully, we need also to examine what is happening, or rather not happening, to the sage in a similar situation. For, it seems the sage does experience something when someone seeks to do him an injury. The crucial sentence is this one:

Nam si tangit illum iniuria, et mouet et impellit; caret autem ira sapiens, quam excitat iniuriae species, nec aliter careret ira nisi et iniuria, quam scit sibi non posse fieri. (10.3)

[For if injury touches him, it also moves and pushes him; whereas the wise person is without anger, which is aroused by the appearance of injury. Nor could he have been without anger if he were not also without injury, which he knows cannot be done to him. (Ker’s translation)]

Most important is the verb tangit. The injury touches, the sage, i.e. something impinges on him from outside. That is quite credible, given that injury involves someone doing something to one’s body or property, or saying something about one or to one. But et movet et impellit is more puzzling: there is some movement, apparently even an impulse to it, but as

among the eupatheiai concerning the present: the sage is never distressed. See Brennan 2005: 97-100; Graver 2006: 50-53.
the sage lacks anger, nothing further happens. Also, *iniuriae species* is puzzling: what exactly would the ‘appearance of injury’ be?

*De ira* 2.3-4 may help us here. Here S. lays out in detail what he takes to be the process by which a passion, in this case anger, takes root in the mind. The process consists of three consecutive movements of the mind. The first type of movement is involuntary, prompted by ‘impressions presented to us’ (Kaster’s translation: *oblatas rerum species*, *Ira* 2.3.1).101 *Species* is usually taken to be a translation of the Greek technical term *phantasia*, a mental impression of something external.102 Now, many impressions are quite neutral in respect of their influence on action (a tree in the distance, perhaps), but some have a bearing on our actions. These latter are the type of impression that Stobaeus terms ‘impulsory’ (*phantasian hormētikēn*), that is, their content includes the idea that some action would be appropriate.103 Thus, in the specific case of anger, the *species iniuriae* (*Ira* 3.5; cf. *CS* 9.3) suggests that one has been wronged and that one should be angry and seek to avenge oneself. Such *species rerum* often involve instinctive bodily reflex responses to stimuli, such as blushing, hair standing on end, trembling, and so on. They can also be quite at variance with the normal behaviour of the individuals who experience them; so a brave man will tremble when he hears the signal for battle (*Ira* 2.3-2-3). So, to extrapolate from S., if someone receives a blow to the face, he will feel the pain of the blow and will feel an initial, instinctive flash of annoyance,

101 Cf. *species iniuriae* (*Ira* 2.3.5).
103 Stobaeus 2.7.9 (86 Wachsmuth).
perhaps accompanied by an inclination to retaliate.\textsuperscript{104} These first movements are involuntary and not under the control of the person experiencing them: he cannot help being moved by them, for instance, jolted by the impact of a blow. In other words, it has a bare sensory quality (\textit{sensus} in Latin): the impact, the burning sensation. In modern parlance, they can be said to provoke ‘fight-or-flight’ responses. What action that may provoke will depend on the state of soul of the individual. However, as S. says, these initial movements are not themselves passions, but the preliminaries to passions.\textsuperscript{105}

There has been much recent scholarly discussion about the precise nature of the so-called ‘pre-emotions’, for which the usual Greek term is \textit{propatheia}.\textsuperscript{106} If one does not assent to this impression, then this is a ‘movement of a mind still obedient to reason’ (\textit{Ira} 3.4 (Kaster’s translation): \textit{motum animi rationi parentem}). If one assents to the impression, one experiences anger, which is ‘the arousal of a mind that moves willingly and deliberately toward the goal of vengeance’ (\textit{Ira} 3.5 (Kaster’s translation): \textit{concitatio animi ad ultionem voluntate et iudicio pergentis}). Finally, after the assent to the impression of injury, there comes the third movement, which S. characterizes as ‘out of control, it desires vengeance not if it’s appropriate but come what may, having overthrown reason’ (\textit{Ira} 4.1

\textsuperscript{104} Sorabji (2005: 145-50) thinks that this is very similar to the amygdala responses to potentially threatening situations that has been identified by modern neuroscientists.

\textsuperscript{105} sed omnia ista motus sunt animorum moveri noleantium nec affectus sed \textit{principia proludentia affectibus} (\textit{Ira} 2.2.5).

To sum up, on the De ira account, there are three movements: (1) an involuntary impression; (2) assent to the impression (a voluntary act of reason, but an error, the passion of anger); (3) complete and irrational dominance by the passion. I shall next compare this account with what we find in CS, then examine both accounts in the broader context of recent scholarship on the passions in Stoicism.

However, for the person to become angry, he must assent to the impression that an injury has taken place. In other words, it must exercise its reason and make a judgement. The particular judgement in this case is that harm has been done to him and that retaliation is appropriate. The person decides to take action. However, this is where the person who accepts an injury is in error and the sage is not. For, as S. has already said at CS 5.4, to accept an injury is to judge that one has suffered loss, in respect of one’s social standing, body, or externals. Examples of these are (respectively) good reputation, health, and wealth. Their loss leads to (respectively) ill-repute, illness, and poverty. However, all these things which non-sages consider good or bad are neither good nor bad in themselves but instead are ‘indifferents’ (Gk adiaphora, Lat indifferentia). Although, according to the circumstances, some indifferents may be preferred (‘promoted’: Gk proēgmena; Lat promota) over others, which are relegated (Gk aproēgmena; Lat remota), indifferents have no intrinsic value. Therefore, their loss is no loss. The sage does not accept injury or insult because he
knows that they concern only indifferents, not genuine goods. On the Stoic view, the only thing that is good is (Stoic) virtue, which is the sole possession of the sage, and the only thing that is bad is vice, the opposite of virtue. The sage knows this, and consequently he does not err in his judgements concerning indifferents. By contrast, the non-sage holds indifferents to have intrinsic value and thus be worth pursuing or avoiding for their own sake.

The judgements informing the sage’s actions are, according to S. (CS 9.1), consilia (deliberations). The non-sage, by contrast, does not have consilia but is instead prompted to act by fraudes et insidia et motus animorum inconditi (‘deceptions and treachery and unconsidered motions of the mind’, tr. Ker); in other words, he assents to the species. So, the sage acts on the basis of good judgement and deliberation, whereas the non-sage is the prey of deceptions and (moral) snares. His motus animorum inconditi are the opposite of consilia, being disorderly, irrational impulses, a poor basis for action. The sage considers these impulses to be casus (quos casibus adnumerat, 9.1), chance, fortuitous occurrences, things that he cannot control but which do not affect him in any way; he, by contrast, relies on reason (rationi innixus; 8.3).

CS 9.3 and the De ira passage cited seem to present the Stoic view, originating with Chrysippus (Long 1999; Wildberger 2006), that any judgement (moral or otherwise) consists of assent (Gk sunkatathesis; Lat assensio; cf. adsensu[s] mentis at Ira 2.3.4) to an impression (Gk

107 Cf. CS 5.4: omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunae credit.
phantasia). It is likely that species corresponds to the Greek term phantasia.

An impression is a movement or imprinting of the soul (tupōsis) on the basis of which a person forms beliefs (Graver 2007: 24). To assent to an impression is to believe that it is true; to withhold assent is either to reject the impression as false or to suspend judgement as to its truth or falsehood pending further information. Impressions are not under the control of the person receiving them; what is under the person’s control is whether to assent or not to the impression that he has been suffered an injury. So, in the case under discussion, the sage and non-sage alike have no control over the occurrence of an injury (e.g. a blow to the mouth), but they do have control over whether they assent to the impression or not. So, in the present passage, to say that the mens is moved is to say that the non-sage has assented to the impression that an injury has been done to him. His act is rational, but an error; reason is still in control.108

Having made the error of judging that anger and retaliation are appropriate, the non-sage compounds his error by giving full rein to the movement of his soul that has been initiated by his decision that anger is appropriate. At this point the movement acquires impetus. At this point, full-blown anger is achieved, and the action of retaliation follows. The second movement, assent to the impression of injury, was still rational, albeit a cognitive error. However, it was not anger, because the movement of the soul was exercising its judgement. But anger is something that goes beyond

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108 Ira 2.4.1: cum voluntate non contumaci. The word contumax ('obstinate', 'stubborn') is often used by S. (CS 12.3; De ira 2.26.5, 3.34.1; Clem. 1.16.4) with reference to unruly animals which disobey their herdsman.
reason (cf. *Ira* 2.3.4). So, to accept an injury is a three-stage process, involving the initial impression or sensation of harm (the *species iniuriae*), then the assent to this impression, and finally the full-blown expression of anger.

The interpretation I have given of the *De ira* 2.3-4 passage is that followed by most scholars, including Sorabji (2005). However, Margaret Graver (2006: 125-32) thinks this interpretation is wrong and that the *impetus* is already included in the second movement, while the third movement is the brutishness of people like Phalaris (described at *Ira* 2.5), whose behaviour has passed beyond any sort of reason altogether and is savagery (*feritas*). In this connection she points to *Ira* 2.1.4, citing in translation the words (Graver 2006: 129-30) I have put in bold below:

Nobis placet nihil illam [sc. iram] per se audere sed animo adprobante; **nam speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec laedi debuisse et uindicari**, non est eius impetus qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur. Ille simplex est, hic compositus et plura continens: intellexit aliquid, indignatus est, damnauit, ulciscitur: haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus tangebatur adsensus est.

Although Graver does not cite them, the words immediately following the words **non est eius impetus qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur** do support
her argument that the second movement is sufficient for the realization of anger, for according to Ira 2.1.4 the second movement contains both the judgement that an injury has been done and the judgement that it is appropriate, in addition to the impetus. However, Graver’s explanation of the third movement is more problematic. She claims that their movement mentioned at Ira 2.4.1 (tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult, sed utique, qui rationem euicit) is not part of the anger but anticipates the feritas that is depicted in Ira 2.5, as does illa est ira quae rationem transsilit, quae secum rapit (2.3.4). She argues that the closeness of the expressions rationem transsilire and rationem euincere (although the latter is definitely stronger) reinforces this link. However, Graver’s interpretation is refuted, I think, by a closer reading of Ira 2.5, for although the feritas has its origins in the frequent exercise of anger (Origo huius mali ab ira est, quae ubi frequenti exercitatione et satietate in obliuionem clementiae uenit et omne foedus humanum eiecit animo, nouissime in crudelitatem transit), it is clearly not anger, and the connection with accepting injury, which is the cause of anger, is not present here, as S. himself says: Haec non est ira, feritas est; non enim quia accepti iniuriam nocet, sed parata est dum noceat uel accipere (2.5.2). While feritas may have its origins in proneness to anger, I think Graver is wrong to identify the third movement in S.’s earlier discussion of feritas, I think it belongs firmly in the explanation of anger.

If we take as correct therefore the interpretation that De ira presents a three-movement explanation of anger, can such an account be discerned in
CS 9.3? The passage itself is probably too sketchy to give a clear indication of which interpretation of the movements adumbrated in De ira is appropriate here. The key words are: *Nam si tangit illum iniuria, et mouet et inpellit; caret autem ira sapiens, quam excitat iniuriae species*. What is striking is that the *iniuriae species*, the first movement (the impression of injury), is placed after *mouet et inpellit*, which probably refers to the second and third movements respectively; *inpellit* probably refers to the *hormē* (*appetitus* in Cicero’s terminology), which moves the non-sage to react to the injury, e.g. to strike back if someone has hit him. S.’s translation of *hormē* may be *impetus*, as may be suggested by *CS* 5.2: *(alia quae impetu quodam erroris inprouidi refugiunt).*

The *et . . . et* syntax probably suggests that two separate movements are being discussed. Certainly, unsystematic and sketchy as the *CS* account is, it is probably compatible with the three-movement account explained above.

Leaving aside the applicability of the three-movement account to *CS*, another difference between sage and non-sage in respect of accepting injury is that the non-sage’s *perturbatio* involves contraction: *adeo autem ad offensiones rerum hominumque non contrahitur.*

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109 The full passage reads: *Ad tantas ineptias peruentum est ut non dolore tantum sed doloris opinione uexemur, more puerorum, quibus metum incutit umbra et personarum deformitas et deprauata facies, lacrimas uero euocant nomina parum grata auribus et digitorum motus et alia quae impetu quodam erroris inprouidi refugiunt.* Here, of course, S. is talking about *opinio doloris*, in effect the confusion by *delicati* of *contumelia* for *iniuria*.

110 Cf. Cicero: *Praesentis autem mali sapientis adfectio nulla est, stultorum aegritis ffectio est, eaque adfictuntur in malis opinatis animosque demittunt et contrahunt rationi non obtemperant.* Itaque haec prima definitio est, ut aegritis sit animi adversante ratione *contractio* (TD 4.6.14); *Est ergo a e g r i t u d o opinio recens mali praesentis, in quo demitti contrahique ano rectum esse*
passage should be read in conjunction with CS 10.2-3, in particular these words: *Hunc adfectum mouet humilitas animi contrahentis se ob dictum factum inhonorificum* (10.2); *non dubie enim contemptum se iudicat, et hic morsus non sine qudam humilitate animi euenit supprimentis se ac descendentis* (10.3).

In these passages S. refers to the Stoic view of mental processes as physical processes. The Stoics believed that the universe was predominantly physical,\(^{111}\) composed of the four elements of earth, air, fire and water, held together by God, who is fire in its purest, least material form, i.e. heat.\(^ {112}\) Each of the elements has *tonos* (tension; Lat. *intentio*), which varies from element to element according to the proportion of God in it. So fire, which is nearly all composed of God, has the highest tension; air next-highest tension; water less tension than air; and earth the least tension.\(^ {113}\) The less tension an element has, the denser it is; so fire, which has most tension, is the most attenuated, while earth, which has the least tension, is the thickest.

The elements can transform into one another through contraction (*sustasis*) and expansion (*chusis*). So, fire (dry and hot), when it contracts, becomes

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\(^{111}\) With the exception being the ‘incorporeals’ (*asōmata*): see Brunschwig (2003: 212-20).

\(^{112}\) So Chrysippus, who modified Zeno’s view that God was ‘creative fire’ (*pur technikon*). See Wildberger (2006: 71).

air (moist and hot). Air, when it contracts, becomes water (moist and cold); while the contraction of water forms earth (dry and cold). The reverse process occurs when an element expands. So, the densest element, earth, transforms into water, etc., until the thinnest element, fire, is formed.\(^\text{114}\)

*Pneuma* (breath), a combination of the two active elements, fire and air, forms the active guiding force in the universe. It drives change and movement, including the growth and generation of living beings. The force of *pneuma* is provided by the ‘good tension’ (*eutonia*) between fire and air. Thus, movements of the soul are literally movements of the body of the person; the heart was considered by the Stoics to be the seat of the soul and the origin of psychic movements.\(^\text{115}\) So, when someone accepts an injury, that is, undergoes the second and third movements discussed above, his soul undergoes contractions; and likewise when he accepts an insult, which is a ‘lesser injury’ according to S.

The phrase *humilitate animi evenit suprimentis se ac descendentis* echoes *humilitas animi contrahentis* se at *CS* 10.2. In the discussion, the vocabulary of contraction seems to occasion a metaphorical contrast between the *magnanimitas* of the sage (who does not accept insult) and *humilitas animi contrahentis* of the non-sage (who does accept insult). So great is the *magnitudo animi* of the sage that he does not even feel an insult, which is a *minor iniuria*, let alone accept it. By contrast, the non-sage experiences a *morsus* (‘biting’). ‘Bitings’ are associated with the sensation

\[\text{114}\text{ See Wildberger (2006: 62-66, and Abb. 4) for a full discussion of expansion and contraction.}\]

\[\text{115}\text{ See Graver (2006: 22-3).}\]
of pain (i.e. an injury) in Cicero’s account in the *Tusulan Disputations*, which is influenced by Stoicism:

Itaque et dolor corporis, cuius est morsus acerrumus, perferetur spe proposita boni, et acta aetas honeste ac splendidè tantam adfert consolationem, ut eos qui ita vixerint aut non attingat aegritudo aut perleviter pungat animi dolor. (*Tusc. 3.25.61*)

Here, the *morsus* is that of physical pain, which is very acute (*acerrumus*). In *CS 10.3*, however, the lesser injury insult is at issue, and the following passage of Cicero, which concerns the *aegritudo* of grief, is more relevant:

Hoc detracto, quod totum est voluntarium, aegritudo erit sublata illa maerens, morsus tamen et contractiuncula quaedam animi relinquetur. (*Tusc. 3.34.83*)

Here, mental anguish, as opposed to physical pain, is associated with contraction of the soul, but a small one (*contractiuncula*). As Graver (2002: 125) notes, it is ‘a natural but minuscule emotion corresponding to the miniscule [sic] significance of external goods’. From the second passage, we can infer that the biting sensation which is associated with contraction belongs to the first, involuntary movement of the soul. Although S. does not discuss *morsus* in *CS 9.3*, I think that the two Cicero passages quoted above suggest that it would be equally applicable to the *iniuria*-account, the
morsus there being more acute, in proportion to the greater seriousness of iniuria.

We may ask why S., although he mentions contractions at CS 9.3, postpones a fuller discussion of them to the section on insult, although they apply equally much to injury. My own view is that he thought the metaphorical quality inherent in *contrahere* and its cognates was better suited to his discussion of insult, which, on his view, is only accepted if the insulted party judges himself to be inferior to the person issuing the insult. His *low* self-esteem and sense of moral and social smallness are suggested by contraction, which involves something becoming smaller than it was before.\(^{116}\) However, the metaphorical potential in contraction would fit very well with his definition of *iniuria* at CS 5.4: *Omnis iniuria* *deminutio eius est in quem incurrit*. I think the answer lies not in S.’s view of moral psychology, but rather in the fact that he views insult as a lesser form of injury. Given this, and that once he has proved that the sage cannot suffer injury in the first part of the treatise, the section on insult almost becomes superfluous, unless he can keep some of his material back in the first section in order to present new material in the second section. This is what he does with *morsus*, and to some extent with contraction.\(^{117}\)

So much for the state of soul of the person who accepts injury or insult. In the soul of the sage, the only motion that has occurred has been the first movement (described at *De ira* 2.3), the bite and *contractiuncula* (to

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\(^{116}\) It is interesting that S.’s imagery mirrors Stoic psychophysical theory, although it does not discuss it directly, but merely alludes to it.

\(^{117}\) See Williams (2003: 27) for this method in S.’s writing.
use Cicero’s term). However, it would be misleading to say that nothing happens at all in the sage’s soul. The sage’s emotional state is quite different. He lacks both anger and injury, which are linked: *nec aliter careret ira nisi et iniuria, quam scit sibi non posse fieri* (9.3). The knowledge that an injury cannot be done to him means that he will not get angry.\(^ {118}\) Far from being angry, he is *erectus laetusque est, inde continuo gaudio elatus*. The word *elatus* (‘raised up’/’elevated’) seems to correspond to the Greek *eparsis* (‘raising’/’elevation’), which is the opposite psychic motion to contraction and accompanies ‘positive’ emotions like joy and pleasure, just as contraction accompanies distress.\(^ {119}\) As we see in CS 9.3, the sage’s joy is also continuous. The non-sage usually alternates between distress and joy.

Whereas the non-sage is experiencing a *pathos* (passion), the sage is experiencing continuous (or continually – *continuo* is ambiguous here) joy (*gaudium*). On the face of it, *gaudium* would seem to be no more or less an emotion than anger. The non-sage surely experiences joy from time to time as well as anger. But the sage’s emotional constitution is different from that of the non-sage. He does have emotions, but a special category of emotions that the Stoics termed ‘good passions’ (Gk *eupatheiai; constantiae*

\(^{118}\) As S. explains later, (16.2): *Nec enim est quod dicas hoc naturae repugnare: non negamus rem incommodam esse uerberari et inpelli et aliquo membro carere, sed omnia ista negamus iniurias esse; non sensum illis doloris detrahimus, sed nomen iniuriae, quod non potest recipi uirtute salua.*- how does this help? Do you need it here? If it is saying something important, should an English explanation making the point clear occur in the main text?

\(^{119}\) See the discussion in Graver (2006: 32-33).
(‘consistencies’),\textsuperscript{120} in Cicero’s translation in \textit{TD}. Stoic joy (Gk \textit{chara}; Lat \textit{gaudium}) is, according to S., ‘true’ joy, but unlike the non-sage’s joy (which is usually termed \textit{laetitia} by Cicero, although the sage in \textit{CS} 9.3 is said to be \textit{laetus}), it is a rather severe, serious, solemn joy (\textit{Ep}. 23.4: \textit{verum gaudium res severa est, [etc.]}):

The sage welcomes all attempts to injure him as a test of his virtue (\textit{ut ipsa illi iniuria usui sit, per quam experimentum sui capit et uirtutem temptat}).

The distinction between the \textit{constantiae} of the sage and the \textit{perturbationes} of the non-sage is outlined by Cicero at \textit{Tusc}. 4.6.14: \textit{Sic quattuor perturbationes sunt, tres constantiae, quoniam aegritudini nulla constantia opponitur}. This difference between the sage and non-sage is usually illustrated in the scholarship in the following tabular form:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Emotions/passions (\textit{pathē})</th>
<th>\textit{Eupatheiai}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Bad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Pleasure</td>
<td>Pain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Joy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future</td>
<td>Desire</td>
<td>Fear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Volition</td>
<td>Caution</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{120} S. uses \textit{firmitas} in \textit{CS. Constantia} occurs only in the MS title.
To each of the passions experienced by the non-sage, there corresponds a *eupatheia* of the sage, with the exception of pain or distress, for the sage is never distressed, but is continually joyful, as we have seen.

To sum up, despite its brevity and sketchiness, the moral psychology of *CS* seems reasonably clear and coherent if it is read in conjunction with the very full account in *De ira.*
VII. THE NATURE OF INSULT

For S. insult (*contumelia*) is a lesser form of injury, inasmuch as someone who is insulted is offended, whereas the person injured is harmed:

Prior illa natura grauior est, haec leuior et tantum delicatis grauis, qua non laeduntur homines sed offenduntur. (*CS* 5.1)

[The former kind of injury is more serious, the latter lighter and serious only to tender people, inasmuch as they are not harmed by it but offended.]

For S. insult comprises something said or done that is *inhonorificum*,¹²¹ ‘dishonourable’, ‘disrespectful’, that is, it is an attack by one person on the *honos* of somebody else. From the definitions of *honos* in the *OLD*, principally ‘**1** High esteem or respect accorded to superior worth or rank, honour. **b** (as enjoyed by the recipient)’, it is clear that *honos* is relevant principally to the higher classes of society, the *nobiles* and equestrians, who usually were holders of public office (definition 5 in *OLD*). Indeed, as J. E. Lendon has argued, honour (however it may be termed – Lendon gives *auctoritas, dignitas, and gloria* as other Latin synonyms: 2005: 30-31) was a

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¹²¹ *Hunc adfectum mouet humilitas animi contrahentis se ob dictum factum inhonorificum* (10.2). Also 10.3: *non dubie enim contemptum se iudicat, et hic morsus non sine quadam humilitate animi evenit supprimentis se ac descendentis*. You could get away with just saying ‘see also 10.3’ if word count becomes an issue.
vital element in the functioning of administration and society more
gerenerally in the Roman world. The more honour one had, essentially the
higher the esteem in which was held, the greater one’s social and political
influence. An insult, something which according to S. impugns someone’s
honour, could therefore be perceived as a serious assault on a person’s
social standing and respect, and hence his ability to function successfully as
a social being. Diminution of honour could lead to a reduction of the
existimatio in which a person was held.\textsuperscript{122}

As Lendon notes (2005: 32), honour is important in societies where
the state is remote or weak, as in modern Mediterranean ones (see ibid. n. 4
for references), and disputes have to be settled by the parties without
recourse to law or the intervention of the state. Although one hesitates to
call the state of the Roman Empire remote or weak, it was not characterized
by the all-pervasive and sometimes intrusive bureaucracy that is a common
feature of most modern states. Indeed, in modern welfare states, a great deal
of everyday life is regulated or overseen by the state to a degree that was
unknown in the ancient world, even in autocratic polities. Certainly, the
extra- legality of insult is remarked on by S. when he says that contumelia is
not covered by the laws as iniuria is.\textsuperscript{123} I discuss the legal aspects of insult
in section VIII, where I argue that insult was often the subject of an actio

\textsuperscript{122} When we talk of honour in the context of Roman society we must be careful not
to confuse it with honour-codes of the kind that were common in early modern
Europe. For instance, there seems to have been no equivalent of the early modern
European institution of duelling, which chiefly among aristocrats and army officers
was a standard way of settling disputes that arose from insults. See Kiernan (1988)
for a full treatment of duelling in European history.

\textsuperscript{123} CS 10.1: \textit{Est minor iniuria, quam queri magis quam exequi possumus, quam
leges quoque nulla dignam uindicta putauerunt.}
iniuriarum in S.’s day, although there was no formal lex covering it. However, this legal ambiguity means that insult and reaction to it are as much subject to regulation by society as by the courts, and hence is an area where honour plays the major role.

With notions of honour and its impairment went certain emotions. For instance, pudor (shame or embarrassment), a sense of having done something wrong, could be felt by someone whose own inadequacies were made publicly evident, for example by an insult (Kaster 2005: 35-38). Closely associated with pudor, of which it is sometimes used as a synonym, is uerecundia (‘a disposition to respect’). The uerecundus person would show respect for others, whatever their social status, ‘by avoiding offense to others, by avoiding improper assertion of the self’ (ibid. 17), but would also have a sense of self-respect and would not expect to be treated by others in a way that he would not wish to treat them. It is also akin to modesty. By contrast, Caligula, who was contumeliosus (prone to insult people), is seen as the opposite of uerecundus. So Suetonius (Gaius 29.1) recounts how Caligula boasted of his ‘ἀδιατρεψίαν, hoc est inuerecundiam’ (the gloss is Suetonius’). We can see Caligula’s inuerecundia in CS in his cruel and tasteless comments to Valerius Asiaticus on the sexual performance of Valerius’ wife. Clearly Caligula would not

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124 On this, see also Barton (2001). What does Barton add to the discussion?
125 Cf. VB 12.5: peccandi uerecundiam (shame at wrongdoing). See OLD for the range of possible meanings.
126 See Mayer on Hor. Ep. 7.37.
127 Rolfe’s Loeb translation of inuerecundiam is ‘shameless impudence’.
expect to be addressed in this fashion himself; nevertheless, he does not hesitate to do it to others.

By the time of S., many traditional Roman social norms had been incorporated into Stoicism through the work of middle Stoics, principally Panaetius (see Brunt 2013). So, Cicero, in De officiis, a work strongly influenced by Panaetius, lists uerecundia as one of the parts of honestas (‘honourableness’, ‘moral rectitude’).\textsuperscript{128} S.’s discussion here seems to conflate two levels of debate, the Stoic one and the conventional Roman social one.\textsuperscript{129}

Despite the desirability of behaving uerecundae, there was a type of abuse – invective – that was commonly practised by advocates (usually for the prosecution) in trials as a means of undermining the opponent and his case. Cicero (Cael. 6; see Corbeill 2005: 17) argued that, provided that it avoided slander (maledictio), it was acceptable; otherwise it was merely contumelia.\textsuperscript{130} The tradition of mocking physical appearance and mannerisms was well established by the late Republic. As Cicero said in the De oratore, deformity and faults of the body provided material for jokes in speeches.\textsuperscript{131} Indeed, Cicero’s prosecution speeches In Verrem, In Pisonem, In Vatinium, and the Philippica contain withering personal abuse of the

\textsuperscript{128} Sequitur ut de una reliqua parte honestatis dicendum sit, in qua uerecundia et quasi quidam ornatus vitae, temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur. hoc loco continetur id, quod dici latine decorum potest; Graece enim prepon dicitur (Off. 1.93).

\textsuperscript{129} On ‘two-level’ discourse, see Inwood (2005: 90).

\textsuperscript{130} He is implying that the opposing advocate is merely slandering the character of his client, Clodius.

\textsuperscript{131} Est etiam deformitatis et corporis uitiorum satis bella materies ad iocandum (Or. 2.239).
accused. Corbeill (2005: 23-25) suggests that such abuse had an ethical function, of exposing the evil characters of bad citizens.\footnote{Isak Hammar (2013) examines in detail the importance that late Republican politicians laid on trying to prove the alleged immorality of their opponents.} Attitudes to insult in the Roman society into which S. was born therefore seem to have been complex. On the one hand, morally upright people should not indulge in it; on the other hand, it was permissible in certain contexts like trials.

Despite these complexities, S.’s attitude to insult is that it is unimportant and that both the person making the insult and the person who accepts it are in error. The motivation for making an insult, according to S., is the contempt felt by the insulter for the insulted, and is thus an expression of the insulter’s sense of his superiority to the insulted. The insulter does not show the insulted the respect that the latter (one assumes) would consider his due. Likewise, on S.’s ‘strong’ interpretation of accipere, the insulted does not simply ‘accept an insult’ in that someone simply says something uncomplimentary to him, i.e. it is said to him, done to him, whatever his own view of the matter (just as on the weak interpretation of accipere as he would accept an injury because it had been done to him). On the contrary, S. in CS has a strong sense of accipere, which is connected to the Stoic notion of assent,\footnote{It should be noted, though, that this is not ‘strong assent’. See Section VI.} for the insulted person to be offended, i.e. to accept the insult, he needs not only to have been addressed or treated disrespectfully, but he must also both believe that he has been insulted and also agree with the insulter’s low opinion of him. He does not have any practical intelligence (prudentia) or self-assurance (fiducia). In a sense, then, the acceptance of an
insult involves a kind of collusion between insulter and insulted. The insulted accepts the insulter’s high self-opinion and correspondingly accepts the insulter’s low opinion of the insulted himself. Whatever the insulter’s social status, in respect of the insult at least, the insulter is someone whose opinion matters for the insulted, but not necessarily vice versa (we assume). As S. says at CS 13.5, the man who accepts an insult would be equally delighted if the insulter had shown him respect.\footnote{CS 13.5: necesse est enim, a quo quisque contemni moleste ferat, suspici gaudeat.} The person who accepts an insult shows his *humilitas animi*.\footnote{To use modern psychological jargon, he could be said to have an ‘inferiority complex’ or ‘suffers from low self-esteem’, often as a result of adverse experiences in early childhood. However, we should be wary of applying this type of terminology of to S.’s moral psychology. The *humilitas animi* of the man who accepts an insult is caused by the physical contraction of his body (see section V on ‘Moral Psychology’).} By contrast, the sage, who does not accept insult, exhibits *magnanimitas* (*magnitudo animi*). He does not even feel the insult, let alone accept it. Conversely, the person who is most likely to accept an insult is also most likely to want to make one, as exemplified by Caligula.\footnote{CS 18.4: At idem Gaius omnia contumelias putabat, ut sunt ferendarum inpatientes faciendarum cupidissimi.} Rather than simply think that the insult should not have been directed at him given his status.

The context in which an insult is made can influence the way we deal with it. So, insults spoken to guests and host at a dinner party by slave boys specially trained for this purpose are taken as witticisms (*argutiae*) and laughed off, whereas if spoken by a friend such remarks would cause offence (11.3). Likewise, ‘in the presence of one person’ (the insulter?) we merely laugh at something said; but ‘in the presence of more people’ we are
So, an insult often has a wider societal dimension. The public aspect of insult is closely connected with the notion of honour. Although many insults are intended, some are unintentional and whatever has been said or done (or not done) may be interpreted as an insult by the insulted party. Examples of this include someone not returning the greeting because he has not noticed the greeter or knocking against someone in a crowded room.

What such disrespect involved may be seen from the many examples of insult that S. offers in CS. These range from snubs (deliberate or intentional) to outright verbal abuse and name-calling. They include, in Stewart’s (1994: 54-63) terminology, both horizontal insults, i.e. those aimed at social equals, and vertical insults, i.e. those aimed at either social superiors or social inferiors.

We can tabulate Stewart’s terms in this way:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>intentional or unintentional</th>
<th>Vertical</th>
<th>Horizontal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>superior → inferior</td>
<td>inferior → superior</td>
<td>between equals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

137 CS 16.4: *Coram uno aliquid dictum ridemus, coram pluribus indignamur.*

138 For not noticing a greeting, see CS 13.2.3: [...] *nec contumeliam iudicabit, si illi homo plebis ultimae salutant salutatem non reddiderit, sic ne suspiciet quidem, [...].* For knocking against someone in a crowd, see *Ira* 2.32.2: *M. Catonem ignorant in balineo quidam percussit imprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? Postea satis facienti Cato, ‘non memini’ inquit ‘me percussum.’ Melius putuit non agnoscere quam uindicare.*

139 For a discussion of terms of abuse and name-calling in Latin see Dickey (2002: 163-85). The practice of name-calling is pretty universal across cultures. See (e.g.) the list of insults in Shakespeare cited in Neu 2009: 118-19.
The first category of vertical insult, viz. from social superior to inferior, is somewhat problematic, because in most societies the respect due to a social superior from an inferior is greater than vice versa. However, there are limits to how far a superior can ‘lord it’ over an inferior. These limits are clearly exceeded in the case of Caligula. His behaviour as depicted in CS 18 is an abuse of the position of \textit{primus inter pares} of the \textit{princeps}. Thus, having slept with the wife of Valerius Asiaticus, he comments on her sexual performance in the presence of her husband and all the other guests at a banquet.\(^{140}\) Valerius, who is \textit{ferox} and not a man to put up with insults, cannot retaliate. Such humiliation of dinner guests is characteristic of kings and tyrants,\(^{141}\) the classic case being Dionysius I of Syracuse as exemplified in his treatment of Damocles. Thus at CS 15.1 the imaginary interlocutor asks what the sage will do if a king seats him below the table so that he has to eat with the slaves. Slightly lower down the social scale, at 10.2 we have an unspecified person (probably a client) complaining that an unspecified man (probably his patron) did not admit him to an audience, although he admitted someone else. Many wealthy people may look down on the sage (13.3).

Examples of the second type of vertical insult often involves the failure (perhaps deliberate) of an inferior to show due deference to a superior. So at 13.3 a man of the \textit{ultima plebs}, the lowest rank of citizen, may fail to return a sage’s greeting; and a slave dealer may not address the

\(^{140}\) 18.1: \textit{in convivio, id est in contione}.
\(^{141}\) E.g. Caligula’s cruel humiliation of Pastor (\textit{Ira} 2.33.6) and Cambyses’ of Praexaspes (\textit{Ira} 3.14).
sage by name. Some people are offended by the behaviour of slaves (14.1). Thus a slave responsible for curling hair may knock against them (probably unintentionally); a doorman may be awkward and refuse entry (and at 14.2 we have the *durus ianitor*, again who refuses entry); an announcer of names may be arrogant (how?); and a chamber-slave may be supercilious. Notably, perhaps reflecting the relative inarticulateness of these social inferiors, the offences they can cause arise from actions (or non-actions, such as the failure to carry out tasks effectively), rather than from verbal insults.

Some men may even take offence from women, all of them *animalia* *inprudentia*, whatever their accomplishments (*CS* 16.1). S. does not detail the types of insult one could receive from women. I have not been able to find any. Given the relative paucity of written evidence for the views of women in ancient Roman society, this is not surprising. S. may have had in mind rebukes and reproaches of husbands by their wives, which would not usually become known outside the home and which could doubtless (as in all cultures) be very wounding and upsetting for men of a sensitive nature.

S. provides fewer examples of horizontal insults. However, at 10.2 we have someone complaining that he was placed at dinner in the *imum lectum*, not the *medium lectum*. The host is unspecified, but it could be a

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142 *A cubicularius* was a slave of the bedchamber (*cubiculum*), which was also used for receiving visitors, for example clients at the patron’s morning levee (*salutatio*). See Goldbeck (2010: 100).

social equal. At 17.1 Fidus Cornelius is called by Corbulo a ‘depilated ostrich’ and Vatinius is described as victim of Cicero’s wit at 17.3 (although this may be a case of vertical insult as Cicero was a former consul and hence a more distinguished senator than Vatinius). Characteristically, insults between equals are more likely to be verbal than those between people of different social levels.

So much for the direction of insult. I shall now focus on the content of verbal insults. Broadly, verbal insults can concern someone’s physical appearance, or character, or social status, or a combination of all three. At 16.4, S. mentions thinning hair, poor eyesight, thin legs and lack of height as possible occasions for mockery; while at 17.2 imitation of someone’s manner of speaking, gait, and impairments of body and speech are possible causes of offence. Indeed, these attitudes seem to have persisted into the first century AD, as we see in S. in Ep. 52.12 opining that physical gestures and mannerisms are an *argumentum morum*, as *omnia rerum omnium*... *indicia sunt*. This physiognomist view, which was presented by Cicero in his *Laws* (1.27-29; see Corbeill 1994: 30-35), is close to the Stoic view that nature is a rationally coherent whole and that parts of it can, if properly interpreted, lead us to a broader understanding of the whole. However, at CS 17.2, S. seems to cast doubt on the validity of this physiognomist outlook (*Quid quos offendimus, si quis... imitatur... exprimit*?), and approves of the example of Vatinius, a man ‘born for ridicule and hate’ on account of his

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144 *Omnia rerum omnium, si observentur, indica sunt, et argumentum morum ex minimis quoque licet capere: impudicum et incessus ostendit et manus mota et flexus oculorum; inprobum risus, insanum vultus habitusque demonstrat.*
physical appearance and the butt of Cicero’s jokes, who pre-empted mockery of his feet (S. does not specify what was wrong with them) and fauces concisae (‘scarred jaws’ (Loeb)) by joking about them himself. Clearly, for S. in CS, physical peculiarities are not all that important as a guide to character and that it is the attitude one takes towards them which shows one’s true character.

In the male-dominated elite culture of late Republican and early imperial Rome a particular source of offence could be an imputation of effeminacy. In particular, depilation was thought to betoken effeminacy, this being a favourite practice of cinaedi, or passive male homosexuals (catamites). The ‘depilated ostrich’ taunt directed at Fidus Cornelius in the senate (see above) may well contain an imputation of effeminacy (17.1; see Commentary ad loc.), no doubt confirmed by Fidus’ tearful reaction. Throughout his career Julius Caesar was dogged by insinuations that he had been the passive lover of King Nicomedes of Bithynia. And Caligula makes innuendos to Chaerea, a tribune, alluding to his high-pitched voice and insinuating that he is effeminate. Chaerea, by virtue of his position, cannot retaliate, although he does get his own back later (18.3).

**Dealing with insults**

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145 Suet. Iul. 49.
The sage has no problem with insults: he does not even notice them. He feels no shame – internally because he is morally perfect and had nothing to reproach himself with; externally because taunts about his appearance etc. concern only externals and have no bearing on his intrinsic moral worth. However, because of this, he cannot serve as an exemplar for dealing with insults. To ‘despise insults’ a sage is not needed, but a consipiens, a man of sound mind. When he is insulted, he asks himself: utrum merito mihi ista accidunt an inmerito? Si merito, non est contumelia, iudicium est; si inmerito, illi qui iniusta facit erubescendum est (16.3). That is, he first considers whether he is ‘deservedly’ or ‘undeservedly’ insulted. It is not entirely clear what S. means by ‘undeservedly’ and ‘deservedly’ here, but I think it likely that they concern the truth of the content of the insult. If true, then the insult is deserved, and the insulted should consider the insult a correct judgement on his character, or physique, or social standing; if untrue, the person making the insult is at fault and should be ashamed of himself. The burden of shame rests with the insulter, not the person he is seeking to make ashamed by means of insult. So, if someone mocks one’s physical appearance, it is no insult, because it concerns what is obvious to see (quod apparet, 16.4). S. amplifies this thought at 17.1: if someone imitates one’s speech or gait, one should not be offended, because another’s imitation does not make better known something we do ourselves.

Moreover, some people don’t like to be called old or white-haired, although many pray to live to a great age. And it is only the man who wants to hide
his poverty (because he is ashamed of being poor) who is upset at being taunted with poverty.

The prime example of not being troubled by insults aimed at one’s physical appearance in CS is, as we have seen, Vatinius, who pre-empted comments on his ugly features by joking about them himself. As S. says, you take away the opportunity for those who would insult you by seizing it yourself beforehand. This approach is similar to that adopted by the pimp Ballio in Plautus’ Pseudolus (359-70, 1080-86), who happily accepts the names that he is called by Calidorus and Pseudolus, for example (359-363):

CAL. Ingere mala multa. PS. Iam ego te differam dictis meis.
impudice. BAL. Itast. CAL. Sceleste. BAL. Dicis vera. PS.
Verbero. 360
BAL. Quippini? CAL. Bustirape. BAL. Certo. PS. Furcifer.
BAL.
Factum optume.
CAL. Sociofraude. BAL. Sunt mea istaec. PS. Parricida. BAL.
Perge tu.
CAL. Sacrilege. BAL. Fateor. PS. Periure. BAL. Vetera
vaticinamini.

Ballio not only freely admits that he is all the things that his interlocutors hold him to be, but he even (ll. 360ff.) suggests names that they can call him. He is not angry at being called bad, wicked and a liar, because he
knows that he is all those things. (Admittedly, as a pimp, he has no reputation to lose.)

Vatinius’ and Ballio’s pre-emptive technique is an extreme form of handling insults. It is perhaps akin to the more recent tactic employed by minority groups of adopting the names they are called and using them as terms of honour (so ‘queer’). More common is waiting for an insult to be made, and then deftly deflecting it or even turning it back on the insulter. An example of this in CS is Antisthenes, who, taunted with having a barbarian and Thracian mother, does not deny it (he could not, realistically), but declares that Cybele, the mother of the gods, was also from Mount Ida (which is in Thrace) (Antistheni mater barbara et Thraessa obiciebatur: respondit et deorum matrem Idaem esse, 18.6). The insult is thus turned: Thracian origins can mean divine origins too, not solely servile ones.

A similar example can be found in Suetonius (Iul. 22). When Julius Caesar as proconsul had obtained from the senate the extended province of Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and Gallia Comata, he boasted in the senate that he would ‘jump on all their heads’ (‘insultaturum omnium capitibus’) in a few days’ time. A senator responded ‘per contumeliam’ that that would be difficult for any woman to do. He thereby hints that Caesar is a passive homosexual (‘femina’), this no doubt being an allusion to the story that Caesar slept with King Nicomedes of Bithynia in his youth. Caesar’s response is not to deny the slur, but, accepting it implicitly, to comment in

146 See Culler (1997).
jest (*quasi adludens*) that Semiramis (i.e. a woman) was a queen and that the Amazons once possessed a great part of Asia.\(^{147}\)

A related example comes from *De ira* 3.23.2. An Athenian, Demochares, who was notoriously outspoken, was a member of an embassy to Philip of Macedon. When Philip asked them what he could do to please the Athenians, Demochares replied ‘hang yourself’. Although the bystanders were indignant, Philip told them to be quiet and send ‘that Thersites’\(^{148}\) away. He asked the other delegates to tell the Athenians that those who say such things are much more arrogant than those who hear things said with impunity.

From the above examples, we can identify a standard approach to dealing with verbal insult. First, the insult is delivered; next, the insulted person does not deny the content of the insult (whether it concerns his appearance, or behaviour, or whatever) as might be expected, but accepts the truth of the content. He then highlights a good aspect of this true content, so turning an intentional insult into an unintentional compliment. In this discussion we can make use of the distinction formulated by J. L. Austin (1955) between ‘constative’ and ‘performative’ utterances. The former are statements of fact, which may or may not be true. The latter are ‘speech-acts’, which, like constatives, may or may not be true, but are

\(^{147}\) *quo gaudio elatus non temperauit, quin paucos post dies frequenti curia tactaret, inuitis et gementibus adversarís adeptum se quae concupisset, proinde ex eo insultaturum omnium capitibus; ac negante quodam per contumeliam facile hoc ulli feminae fore, responderit quasi adludens: in Suria quoque regnasse Sameramin magnumque Asiae partem Amazonas tenuisse quondam*. See Corbeill 1996: 196 and Williams for further discussion of this passage.

\(^{148}\) An allusion to the insolent Greek common soldier in the second book of the *Iliad* who spoke impudently to Agamemnon and was thrashed by Odysseus.
intended to have some effect on the person addressed. The philosopher Paul Grice provides a modified form of this view when he draws a distinction between ‘natural meaning’ and ‘non-natural meaning’ (Grice 1989: 213-23). The former concerns utterances whose meanings hold independently of the context of utterance and whose elements together form a logical entailment; here meaning is purely semantic. The latter, by contrast, are dependent on the context of utterance for their interpretation; here ‘meaning’ is not so much semantic as related to intention and the intended effect on an audience (which in Grice’s view could be just one interlocutor) of an utterance. The audience must recognise the speaker’s intention if the desired effect is to be produced.

On Austin’s terminology, then, an insult is a performative, whose purpose is to offend the addressee. Let us suppose that someone is bald, and someone else taunts him about this (‘Baldy!’). The insult, taken as a constative, is true, because the person is bald. It is also a performative, because it is intended to offend. If the addressee is offended, then the insult has achieved its purpose. However, if the addressee is not offended (leaving aside for the moment how this lack of offence may be manifested) the insult has failed to achieve its purpose; in Austin’s terminology, it has ‘misfired’. The addressee has accepted the insult as a constative that is true, but has refused to accept its performative force. Another way to look at it might be to say that the addressee has converted a performative into a constative.149

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149 For a discussion of the interplay between constatives and performatives and how they may be interchanged, see Culler (1997: 100-2).
So far I have discussed responses to verbal insults. What of physical insults? Two examples of physical insult can be seen at *De ira* 3.38.1.  

In the first case, the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, lecturing on anger, is spat at by an impudent youth (*adulescens proteruus*), who presumably wants to make him angry. Not provoked, he says he is not angry, but doubts whether he should be angry anyway. The implication is probably that being spat at is a matter of no importance (particularly not for a Cynic philosopher, who would be indifferent to physical uncouthness and would despise those who think it a matter for concern).

The second example concerns Cato the Younger, who is spat at by the *factiosus et inpotens* Lentulus. Again, Cato is not provoked, but wipes the saliva off his face and declares that those who say Lentulus has no cheek (a pun on a transferred sense of *os* ‘mouth’) are wrong. S. finds Cato’s response better, perhaps out of Stoic loyalty (Cato is *noster*), or because he generally finds Cato superior to most other people, or maybe because the reply is wittier and also contains more of a dig at the insulter. One can imagine that the response drew some laughter.

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150 *I. Contumeliam tibi fecit aliqúis: numquid maiorem quam Diogeni philosopho Stoico, cui de ira cum maxime disserentí adulescens proteruus inspíuit? Tulit hoc ille leníter et sapíenter: ‘non quidem’ inquit ‘irascor, sed dubíto tamen an oporteat irascí.’* 2. *Quanto <Cato> noster melius! qui, cum agenti causam in frontem medium quantum poterat adtracta pingui saliua inspuisset Lentulus ille patrum nostrorum memoria factiosus et inpotens, abstersit faciem et ‘adfirmabo’ inquit ‘omnibus, Lentule, falli eos qui te negant os habere.’*

151 (‘factious and unruly’, tr. Basore (Loeb); ‘seditious and turbulent’, tr. Davie).

152 Being spat at is one of the things Cato has to endure at *CS* 1-2.

153 Cf. *CS* 2.1: *Catonom autem certius exemplar sapientis uiri nobis deos immortaliis dedisse quam Vlixem et Herculem prioribus saeculis; 7.1: Ceterum hic ipse M. Cato, a culius mentione haec disputatio processit, uereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit.*
A third related example, but with a more retaliatory character to the response to the insult, is to be found at *Helv.* 13.7.\(^{154}\) Aristides the Just is being led to execution, when someone spits in his face. Instead of taking offence, Aristides wipes his face and smiling asks the accompanying magistrate: ‘Warn that man not to yawn so fouly in future’\(^ {155}\). As S. comments: ‘This was making an insult to insult itself.’ In other words, an insult is responded to with a counter-insult.

Two things are noteworthy here. First, in each case the response to the physical insult is not physical, but verbal. The insult is turned back upon the insulter by means of verbal wit. The insulted shows himself to be superior to the vulgar insulter by not replying to him in like coin: he does not ‘spit back’\(^ {156}\). Second, S. considers Cato’s handling of the physical insult to be better than that of Diogenes: *Quanto <Cato> noster melius!* S. gives no explicit reason for this judgement.

Another thing to note about S.’s examples of successful retorts to insults is that they involve to a two-stage process: insult, followed by retort. There are no examples (as far as I can see) that involve a multi-stage

154 *Ducebatur Athenis ad supplicium Aristides, cui quisquis occurrerat deiciebat oculos et ingemescebat, non tamquam in hominem iustum sed tamquam in ipsam iustitiam animaduerteretur; inuentus est tamen qui in factem eius inspueret. Poterat ob hoc moleste ferre quod sciebat neminem id ausurum puri oris; at ille abstersit faciem et subridens ait comitanti se magistratiui: ‘admone istum ne postea tan inprobe oscitet.’ Hoc fuit contumeliam ipsi contumeliae facere.*

155 Translation based on Costa (Penguin): ‘Warn that fellow not to give such a vulgar yawn another time’. Compare Basore (Loeb): ‘Remind that fellow not to open his mouth so offensively another time’.

156 Except metaphorically: at *CS* 11.1 S. says that the sage’s magnanimity is a means by which he can ‘spit back’ (*respuat* istum aeductum inflatum of the *superbi insolentesque* who seek to insult him.
sequence of insult and response, a bit like the Ballio scene in Plautus’ *Pseudolus* cited above.
VIII. LEGAL ASPECTS

Some aspects of Roman law, in particular the question of the circumstances in which a plaintiff could take out an actio iniuriarum, must be considered in relation to CS (a) because S.’s distinction between iniuria and contumelia depends, in part at least, on the latter not being a legal offence, and (b) because legal imagery occurs in the first half of CS. I consider legal imagery in the excursus on imagery (§ V). Here, I discuss the legal aspects of iniuria and contumelia. I think such a discussion is very necessary, not only because the legal background to CS has been ignored by previous commentators, but also because Roman law has been receiving more attention recently as an important influence on the ways in which Roman philosophers articulated philosophical concepts.\(^{157}\)

In his introduction to the discussion of contumelia (CS 10.1) S. defines contumelia so:

\[
\text{Est minor iniuria, quam queri magis quam exequi possumus, }
\]

\[
\text{quam leges quoque nulla dignam uindicta putauerunt.}
\]

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\(^{157}\) On this, see Griffin (2013a).
Insult is a lesser injury, which we can complain about more than we can pursue, and which the laws too have not thought worthy of any punishment.\textsuperscript{158}

This definition is an amplification of the initial one given at CS 5.1:

haec [sc. contumelia] leuior et tantum delicatis grauis, \textit{qua non laeduntur homines sed offenduntur}.

Insult is lighter and serious only for those who are soft; people are not harmed by it but offended.

I shall start with the 10.1 definition first, as this brings up the question of the legal relevance of \textit{contumelia}, with which this section is concerned. So, for S. \textit{contumelia} is a kind of \textit{iniuria}, but a lesser one which is not punishable in law. It is, as he says, a matter for complaint rather than prosecution.\textsuperscript{159} This could mean that there was no offence of \textit{contumelia} recognised by Roman law in S.’s day. Another possibility is that ‘leges’ refers specifically to the body of formally enacted statute law, the \textit{ius civile}, of which the fifth-century BC Twelve Tables are the first example. Since 367

\footnote{\textsuperscript{158} Ker translates ‘lesser than injury’, which I argue against in the Commentary ad loc.\
\textsuperscript{159} For \textit{exsequi} in the sense of “prosecute”, cf. \textit{Ira} 1.12.1: \textit{Pater caedetur: defendam; caesus est: exequar, quia oportet, non quia dolet}; Livy 5.11: \textit{publici priuatique doloris exsequendi ius}; Pl. \textit{Ep}. 3.4.5: \textit{Veniebat in mentem priores nostros etiam singulorum hospitum iniurias voluntariis accusationibus executos}; Just. \textit{Dig}. 29.5.3.3 (Ulpianus 50 ad ed.): \textit{Si tamen maritus in adulterio deprehensam occidat, quia ignoscitur ei, dicendum est non tantum mariti, sed etiam uxoris servos liberandos, si iustum dolorem \textit{exsequenti} domino non restiterunt}; 34.9.22.}
BC, the exercise of the law was administered by the urban praetor. The job of an urban praetor was to decide whether lawsuits (legis actiones) brought before him should be admitted for trial or rejected. If the actio was covered by one of the leges, then he was obliged to admit the actio. If, however, the actio was not covered by any existing lex, then the praetor had to make a decision, which would be recorded in the Edict. The urban praetorship was an annual magistracy, and the Praetorian Edict was a listing of the actiones (together with suggested remedies) approved by the urban praetors; each new praetor would add to it in the course of his year of office. Faced with an actio not covered by the leges, a praetor would consult the Edict to see whether a similar actio was recorded there. If he found a relevant actio, he would follow the Edict and approve the actio before him; if he found no previous relevant actio in the Edict, he would make a decision of his own; if he approved the actio before him, it would be recorded in the Edict. The Praetor’s Edict thus provided a supplementary body of law apart from the statute law.\(^{160}\)

To return to CS, it has been suggested\(^ {161}\) that when S. says that the ‘laws’ do not think an insult worthy of prosecution he does not necessarily mean that contumeliae were not actionable, but rather only that there was no lex covering them, but that an actio iniuriarum might be permissible under the Praetor’s Edict. I shall return to this suggestion when I discuss 5.4, but I think that it may be too forced.

\(^{160}\) For more on the development of statute law and praetorian law see Riggsby (2010: 25-33) and Du Plessis (2015: 29-35).

\(^{161}\) By Professor Jonathan Powell (personal communication).
From 5.1 we see that the crucial distinction is between harm and offence. Given that he says that *contumelia* is covered by the laws, we are justified in thinking that this distinction was reflected in Roman law too.

Although the two verbs can sometimes overlap in meaning, with *laedere* sometimes meaning ‘displease, offend, vex’ (*OLD laedō* 2) and *offendere* sometimes meaning to harm (*OLD offendō* 5), generally *laedere* refers to either physical harm, damage, or injury to a person or thing (*OLD laedō* 1), or harm to someone’s interests (*OLD laedō* 3; also verbal castigation: 4), whereas *offendere* has connotations of hurting feelings (*OLD offendō* 7: ‘To give offence to, displease, annoy, vex’). Although both *offendere* and its corresponding nouns *offensa* and *offensio* can refer to the infringement of a law,\(^{162}\) usually it has no legal sense. Nor does *laederellaesio* form a legal category in itself, although it appears twice in the *Digest* in the context of *iniuria*.\(^{163}\) Nevertheless both words do have distinct meanings, and S. is clearly describing two fundamentally different things when he distinguishes *iniuria* and *contumelia* in the two passages discussed above.

The legal relevance of *iniuria* becomes clearer when we consider 5.4, where S. gives a full definition of *iniuria*:

\(^{162}\) *OLD offendō* 6; *offensio* 5; *offensa* 4a ‘An offended committed agains a person, injury, wrong’, 4b ‘an offence against a law, misdemeanor, transgression’.

\(^{163}\) *Digest* 47.7.8 pr. (Paulus 39 ad ed.): *faccienda aestimatione, quanti domini intersit non laedi*; 47.10.15.27 (Ulpian 77 ad ed.): *aut si carmen conscribat uel proponat uel cantat aliquod, quod pudorem alicius laedat.*
Omnis iniuria *deminutio* eius est in quem incurrit, nec potest quisquam iniuriam accipere sine *aliquo detrimento uel dignitatis uel corporis uel rerum extra nos positarum.*

All injury is a diminishing of that which it assails, nor can anyone receive an injury without some damage to status, or body, or to things placed outside us.

The second type of *iniuria* in S.’s list, *detrimentum corporis*, is covered by the fifth-century BC codification of Roman law, the Twelve Tables (Tabula VIII, 2-4 Schoell, Bruns (*FIRA*); I, 13-15 Crawford):\(^{164}\)

I, 13: Si membrum rup<it>, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto.

I, 14: Si os fregit libero, CCC, <si> seruo, CL poena<e>

su<nt>o.


(Crawford 1996: 2.578)

I, 13 (VIII, 2) If he has maimed a part (of a body), unless he settles with him, there is to be talion.

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\(^{164}\) The reconstruction of the text of the XII Tabulae is by no means certain or agreed upon. For instance, Hagemann (1998: 2, reference on p. 1 n. 2) gives the text of Bruns (1909), reads:

Tab. VIII, 2: Si membrum rup[s]it, ni cum eo pacit, talio esto.

Tab. VIII, 3: Manu fustive si os fregit libero, CCC, si seruo, CL poenam subito.

Tab. VIII, 4: Si iniuriam [alteri] faxsit, uigintiquinque poenae sunto.

Tab. VIII, 4 is the essentially the same as Crawford’s I, 13, although Bruns has ’[alteri]’ and Crawford ’?alteri?’’. Hagemann makes no mention of Crawford (1996) in his book and does not cite it in his bibliography.
I, 14 (VIII, 3) If he has broken a bone of a free man, 300, if of a slave, 150 (asses) are to be the penalty.

1, 15 (VIII, 4) If he do (any other) injury to another?, 25 (asses) are to be the penalty. (Translation: Crawford 1996: 2.579)

Essentially, this is a set of regulations compensating varying degrees of physical injury. The breaking of a part of the body is the most serious. There is the option of coming to an agreement (pactio), whether monetary or some other kind of compensation, or, if that fails, breaking the defendant’s limb in return as compensation in kind (taliio). The second clause is vaguer in respect of the injury and also presents problems of interpretation – is it a bone or a face that is supposed to have been broken? Given that the injury in question could apply to either a free man or a slave, I am inclined to take a broken bone (probably to a limb) to be the injury in question, given that this would prevent someone from working. The third clause, the only one to use the term iniuria, is even vaguer than the preceding one as to the injury in question. The fact that the penalty is only twenty-five asses clearly indicates that the level of injury in question is considerably less than that those in I, 13 and I, 14, which involve breakage (rup <s>it, I, 13; fregit, I, 14). The testimony of the second-century AD

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165 In Crawford’s view (Crawford 1996: 607), these should all have been understood as deliberate actions intended to cause injury, although none of the three delicts as presented indicates this.

166 It is disputed whether membrum should be taken narrowly to refer specifically to a limb, or widely to refer to any part or organ of the body (see Hagemann 1998: 10-11).

167 This is the view of the scholars cited by Hagemann (1998: 12-13). The level of injury would have to have been high and not just a broken toe for instance.
writer Gellius,\textsuperscript{168} who relates how one Veratius went around the Forum slapping any citizen he chose in the face and offering him 25 asses in compensation from the sack of coins his slave carried, suggest that the injury envisaged was certainly physical, but was unlikely to have involved serious damage (like a broken leg).\textsuperscript{169}

In addition to the Twelves Tables, by S.’s day there was another piece of statute law covering physical injury. This was the \textit{Lex Cornelia de iniuriis}, passed in 81 BC, which covered physical assault involving beating or thrashing, or breaking and entering.\textsuperscript{170}

The third of the elements in S.’s definition of \textit{iniuria} is damage to \textit{res extra nos positae}. The word \textit{res} has many meanings in Roman law (see Berger 1953: 676 on \textit{res}), but a very important one is that of ‘property’, and I think it is the intended meaning here. One should compare S. \textit{Tranq.} 11.1, where S. explains how the sage counts slaves, possessions, dignity and body as \textit{precaria}. Given the closeness of S.’s list of indifferents at \textit{Tranq.} 11.1 to \textit{CS} 5.4, and also the language of legal possession that follows in \textit{CS} 5.5,\textsuperscript{171} I think S. means possessions – both slaves and animals, and inanimate possessions – when he talks of \textit{res extra nos posita}. Assuming that S. is talking of possessions in the context of \textit{iniuria} here, it is likely that he has in mind the delict of \textit{damnum iniuria datum}. Although this delict was covered

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{168} Noctes Atticae 20.1.}\\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{169} The purpose of Veratius’ action was to show up how ridiculous the penalty of 25 asses was in proportion to the crime, given inflation.}\\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{170} Digest 47.10.5 pr. (Ulpianus 56 ad ed.): \textit{Lex cornelia de iniuriis competit ei, qui iniuriarum agere volet ob eam rem, quod se pulsatum verberatum ve domumve suam vi introitam esse dicat}. On this law, see Du Plessis (2015: 351-2).}\\
\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{171} See Commentary ad 5.5 (precario).}
in the Twelve Tables, the most important development was the passing of
the *Lex Aquilia* in 287 BC.\footnote{For an outline of the history and provisions of this law, see Nicholas (1962: 218-22), Du Plessis (2015: 327-37).}

From the foregoing discussion, it should be clear that damage to the
body and to external things was covered by statute law. With *dignitas*,
however, matters are more complicated.

*Dignitas* means ‘(social) standing’ or ‘rank’ (*OLD* 3) and also
honour or esteem (*OLD* 4). So loss of *dignitas* indicates something more
subtly harmful to a person than a (mere) physical injury or loss of property.
It is interesting that S. puts it first in the list, as if to indicate that it is the
most serious type of *iniuria* that someone can suffer. Indeed, for a Roman
citizen involved in public life, loss of honour or status was likely to be more
serious than the other two elements in S.’s definition.\footnote{A point made by Liebersohn (2005: 374).}
Indeed, the
development of the scope of the *actio iniuriarum* in the four centuries from
the promulgation of the Twelve Tables to S.’s day testifies to this. As
Hagemann (1998: 59) explains, four special praetorian edicts are examples
of this expansion of the *actio iniuriarum* to include social harm. They are:

1. *De convicio* (Ulpian, *Digest* 47.10.15.2):

Ait praetor: ‘qui *adversus bonos mores* convicium cui fecisse
cuiusve opera factum esse dicetur, quo adversus bonos mores
convicium fieret: in eum iudicium dabo.’

\footnote{A point made by Liebersohn (2005: 374).}
The praetor says: ‘One who is said to have loudly shouted at someone contrary to sound morals or one through whose efforts such shouting is effected contrary to sound morals, against him I will give action.’ (tr. Watson, in Mommsen & Krueger 1985: 776-7)

2. De adtemptata pudicitia (Lenel’s reconstruction of a lost text: Lenel, p. 400, § 192):

Si quis matrifamilias aut praetextato praetextataeue comitem abduxisse siue quis eum eamue aduersus bonos mores appellare adsectatusue esse dicitur.

If any mistress of a household is said to have seduced the companion of a male or female citizen, or if anyone is said to accuse him or her of acting against sound morals or to have been a companion.

3. Ne quid infamandi causa fiat (Ulpian, Digest 47.10.15.25):

Ait praetor: ‘ne quid infamandi causa fiat. Si quis adversus ea fecerit, prout quaeque res erit, animadvertam.’

The praetor says: ‘In order that nothing be done that is shaming, if anyone act to the contrary, I will deal with it according to the nature of the issue.’ (tr. Watson, in Mommsen & Krueger 1985: 778)
4. *Qui servum alienum* (Ulpian, *Digest* 47.10.15.34):

Praetor ait: ‘Qui servum alienum *adversus bonos mores* verberavisse debe eo iniussu domini quaestionem habuisse dicetur, in eum iudicium dabo, item si quid aliud factum esse dicetur, causa cognita iudicium, dabo.’

The praetor says: ‘Where a man shall be said to have thrashed another man’s slave or to have submitted him to torture, contrary to sound morals, without the owner’s consent, I shall give an action. Equally, if it be said that something else be done, I will, having heard the circumstances, give an action.’ (tr. Watson, in Mommsen & Krueger 1985: 778)

There is a common concern here with things said and done that are *aduersus bonos mores*. It is not immediately obvious precisely to what this phrase refers. Is it the *boni mores* of the person who is the target of the alleged offence, or is it more broadly an infringement of public morals generally, to lessen by the very act the overall level of morals in society?

A helpful example may be found in Seneca the Elder, *Controversiae* 10.1. Here, an *actio iniuriarum* is prompted by behaviour that the plaintiff considered harmful to his political career:

Lugens Diuitem Sequens

1. INIVRIARVM SIT ACTIO.
Quidam, cum haberet filium et diuitem inimicum, occisus inspoliatus inuentus est. Adulascens sordidatus diuitem sequebatur; diues eduxit in ius eum et postulauit ut si quid suspicaretur accusaret se. Pauper ait: 'accusabo cum potero' et nihilominus sordidatus diuitem sequebatur. Cum peteret honores diues, repulsus accusat iniuriarum pauperem.

The Grieving Poor Man’s Son Who Followed the Rich Man

An action may lie for injury.

A man who had a son and a rich enemy was found killed, though not robbed. The youth, dressed in mourning, began to follow the rich man about. The rich man took him to court, and demanded that if he had any suspicions he should accuse him. The poor man said: ‘I shall accuse when I can,’ and continued to follow the rich man in mourning clothes just the same. The rich man stood for office, but was rejected; he accuses the poor man of injury. (tr, Winterbottom (Loeb))

Presumably, the young man held the rich man responsible for his father’s murder and wanted to make his suspicions publicly known (or perhaps to prick the rich man’s conscience so that he might admit to being behind the murder). The rich man clearly thought the young man’s behaviour impaired
his reputation. This is therefore probably a case of *detrimentum dignitatis*.

From the *colores* on the *controversia* it is clear that Seneca the Elder thinks that the charge *contra/aduersus bonos mores* is at issue in this *controversia* (10.9):

> Latro sic diuisit: an in re iniuria sit. nulla, inquit, iniuria est *<si>* sordidatus sum: quam multi faciunt! Omnia iniuriae genera *<lege>* comprehensa sunt: pulsare non licet, conuicium facere contra bonos mores non licet.

> Hoc loco Scaurus dixit: nova formula iniuriarum componitur:

> 'quod ille contra bonos mores fleuit.'

Latro’s division went like this: Is there any injury in the case?

‘There is no injury if I am in mourning: how many do it! The law specifies all the types of injury: one cannot strike another, one may not abuse contrary to good morals.’

It was at this point that Scaurus said: ‘A new wording for injuries is being formulated. That he did weep contrary to good morals.’ (tr. Winterbottom (Loeb))

Latro thinks that *contra bonos mores* does not apply; Scaurus by contrast thinks that a new formulation of *iniuria* is being created.

This is an example of the sort of case that would have to be decided on by the urban praetor. He would have to decide whether it was admissible
under the principle *contra bonos mores* in the Edict, and it not, whether he should modify the formulation to let the case come to trial. I think that this example from his father helps us understand the kind of case that would come under the category of loss of *dignitas* that S. included in his tripartite definition of *iniuria*. 
COMMENTARY

NEC INIURIAM NEC CONTUMELIAM ACCIPERE SAPIENTEM:

‘That the wise man receives neither injury nor insult’: the paradox which is the subject of the treatise. This sort of accusative/infinitive clause is found at the head of the last three of Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum. Nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accipere sapientem is repeated with variations at intervals throughout the treatise (e.g. nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere nec contumeliam posse, 2.1; Tutus est sapiens nec ulla adfici aut iniuria aut contumelia potest, 2.3).

The two key concepts of iniuria and contumelia (insult) are here introduced. Iniuria is physical injury, often as a resultant of physical violence (cf. Greek ὕβρις). Contumelia in this treatise means mainly verbal insult and abuse, although see LSJ for instances of it meaning almost the same as iniuria. At 5.1, S. says that iniuria is ‘gravior’ and contumelia ‘levior’, although many men think contumelia is worse. For a fuller discussion of iniuria and contumelia, see Introduction, §§ VII, VIII.

1.1-1.2: Exordium

S. asserts the difficulty of starting on the path to virtue, but the worthwhileness of attaining the goal.
As Abel (1967: 135) points out, this exordium is what rhetoricians termed an *exordium uulgare* (‘general exordium’) (Ad Her. 1.7; Cic. *Inv.* 1.18.26; Quint. *Inst.* 4.1.71), which has no direct or obvious relevance to the subject to be discussed.

### 1.1: ceteros sapientiam professos: ‘others who have taught wisdom’.

Participial phrase of the kind used in Greek, where it is usually introduced by the definite article. Other examples in S. are: *prospicienti senectutem* (*Ep.* 33.7); *liberalia professi* (*Ep.* 95.23); cf. *Stoici uirilem ingressi uiam.* However, mostly, this usage is confined in S. to neuter singular and plural: see Summers, pp. lix–lxii.

Ciceronian Latin would normally use a relative clause, e.g. ‘ceteros, qui sapientiam professi sunt’. Minissale (p. 49) suggests the participial phrase is equivalent to *ceteros professores sapientiae* (‘other teachers of wisdom’). She thus interprets *profiteri* here to mean ‘teach’. The example from *Ep.* 95 cited above (but not cited by Minissale) supports this interpretation. However, this may be too strong an interpretation for the present passage. It would imply that the non-Stoic philosophers actually taught wisdom, i.e. that they actually knew it, but from a Stoic point of view they cannot know what wisdom is. For this reason, I think ‘lay claim to’ is the better interpretation: cf. Cic. *Pis.* 71 (*quam (sc. philosophiam) si profitetur gravissimam mihi sustinere personam uidetur*, cited in *OLD profiteor* 4; neither *OLD* nor *TLL* X.2, fasc. XI cites the *CS* 1.1 passage). They may claim they have wisdom, but they are wrong.
1.1: feminas et mares: ‘females and males’. Although the phrase *feminae et mares* (and variants thereof) is often used of men and women (e.g. Plaut. *Rud*. 104; Most. 1047; Hor. *Carm*. 1.21.10; Plin. *NH* 20.114), it can refer to male and female animals (e.g. reindeer at Caes. *Gal*. 6.26.2). On its own, besides denoting human males (e.g. S. *NQ* 7. 33. 2), *mas* is used of male horses at Lucr. 4.1198, of a male dove at Ov. *Am*. 2.6.56, and of a sacrificial bull at Lucan 1. 609; it can be applied to plants too (e.g. Plin. *NH* 16.47 (trees); 20.114, 27.78 (ferns); see *OLD c* for more examples). Likewise with *femina*, which can denote female plants (e.g. parsley: Plin. *NH* 20.114; see *OLD 3b* for more examples). From his vocabulary here, then, S. seems to be thinking of a general distinction between male and female throughout the universe, one which is not confined to humans. The contrast between male and female/men and women/virile and effeminate recurs throughout *CS*. Viansino (1988: 381) thinks there may be an echo of Sallust’s *Catilinae coniuratio* 1.2, where Sallust says humans employ the mind to rule, the body to serve.

1.1: utraque turba: ‘each group’, i.e. both females and males. S. seems to use *turba* here in a non-pejorative sense, as at Ov. *Am*. 1.1.5 (*Pieridum uates, not tua, sum*; see McKeown ad loc. for parallels); cf. also *Ep*. 65.11 (*turba causarum – many causes*). The pejorative sense of ‘mob’ is found frequently in S. (e.g. *Ep*. 7. 1; 40. 4); in this sense it is equivalent to *vulgus*. 
1.1: *uitae societatem:* ‘partnership of life’, possibly marriage (Germans might say ‘Lebensbündnis’). Stoic and non-Stoic philosophers are complementary, as the man and wife are in a relationship, but the man is born to command, the women to obey: *altera pars ad obsequendum, altera imperio nata sit* (1.1). However, *uitae societatem* may have a more specific reference, perhaps including brothers and sisters, and legal guardianship of women. In this sense, it may mean something like ‘the fabric of society’.

The association of non-Stoic schools of philosophers, especially the Epicureans, with women and effeminacy can be seen in S.’s discussion of the Epicureans in *De Vita Beata*, in which he compares the school to a man’s body (Epicurus himself) dressed in women’s clothing (the followers of Epicurus) (*VB* 13.2).

1.1: *Ceteri . . . licet:* an adaption of the analogy in Plato’s *Laws* (720b–e, 857c–e) where Plato contrasts the methods of doctors’ assistants (mostly, but not exclusively, slaves themselves, 720d), whose skill is based on experience only and not on systematic medical knowledge and training, and who treat slave-patients, with that of free doctors, who have a proper medical education, and treat free patients. The former are brisk with their charges, prescribing treatment without having listened to the patients’ accounts of their illnesses and giving no explanation for the treatments they prescribe. The free doctors, by contrast, learn what they can about the patient’s condition by talking to the patient and his family. They try to agree a course of treatment with the patient and explain why the treatment is
appropriate. They behave almost like a philosopher with their patients (857d). S. turns the Platonic analogy on its head, by having the slave doctors (who are analogous to non-Stoic philosophers) treating free patients (their masters) and being very attentive to their wishes, rather as the free doctors are to the free patients in Plato. Stoic philosophers, we are to infer, behave to their charges in the brisk manner of Plato’s slave doctors (*qua optimum et celerrimum est*), and he approves of this approach. On this passage, see Baraz (2016: 165).

Plato’s analogy of the philosopher with a doctor and philosophy as therapy was a favourite trope with Hellenistic philosophers, not just Stoics (see Nussbaum 2009: 13-47), but S.’s use of it points up a particular aspect of Epicurean practice. In his characterisation of non-Stoic philosophers as pandering to the patient S. alludes to the Epicurean practice of moral education of the student, as described by Philodemus of Gadara in his Περὶ παρρησίας (‘On Frank Criticism’). In this form of moral therapy, the student informs the teacher about his moral progress and the teacher in his turn offers candid advice and criticism. The actual Epicurean approach is much more nuanced than S. implies, involving a subtle adaptation of the moral criticism to the character of the student. It is true that less confident and more timid students will be given gentler criticism, whereas the stronger-minded students will be exposed to more direct and forthright, even aggressive, criticism. Perhaps this is S.’s point: that some students will be given a relatively easy time. For more on Epicurean frank criticism, see the edition and commentary on Philodemus’ Περὶ παρρησίας by Konstan et al.
(1998) and Tsouna (2007: ch. 4). Gigante (2000: 40) thinks that S. may have known the Περὶ παρρησίας. He thinks that Tranq. 1.1-3, where Serenus confesses his lack of moral progress to S., reflects the openness that was expected between teacher and student amongst Epicureans.

The phrase molliter et blande (‘softly and gently’) has a counterpart at Ira 2.21.6, where S. says that irascibility is principally a product of a soft and gentle education: nihil enim magis facit iracundos quam educatio mollis et blanda. In both passages, S.’s position is that soft teaching weakens the character of the student. The supposed association of softness with Epicurean teachings is further enunciated at 15.4 (mollia ac desidiosa praecipere), although S. (with reservations) exempts Epicurus from this charge. See Commentary ad 15.4.

1.1: ut supra fortunam emineat: ‘so that he may rise above his lot’.
According to Viansino (1968), the expression ‘supra . . . eminere’ is Livian and Ovidian (p. 118, with examples). Here fortuna has the sense of the circumstances in which one finds oneself, whether favourable or adverse. This fits into the wider portrayal of the sapiens as unaffected by external circumstances. They are indifferentia, of no importance to the sage, except inasmuch as they may function as a test of his virtue.

1.2: ‘At ardua per quae vocamus et confragosa sunt’: interjection by an imagined interlocutor (here Serenus) of a type common in S. Frequent examples in this treatise, e.g. 3.1, 4.1, etc.
This style of sentence in which a pronoun (ea or illa) corresponding to quae is omitted, is common in both Senecas: et ipse iram fassus est . . .

sed irae causam non dixit, quam Fuscus [= non eam dixit, quam Fuscus] (Sen. rhet. Contr. 1.7.15); quaerere, num cometae condicionis sint, cuius superiora [= eiusdem condicionis . . . cuius] (Sen. phil. NQ 7.2.1). ‘At illa loca, per quae uocamur, ardua et confragosa sunt’ would be a more formal, Ciceronian version of the sentence. However, S.’s word order, involving the rhetorical figure of coniunctio, emphasises ardua (the task Serenus faces will be difficult). The use of neuter plural adjectives as substantives, which already occurred in poetry (e.g. dubia at Plaut. Epid. 544; mollia at Manilius 5.153), was to become increasingly common, and ‘very productive’ in Late Latin (H—S II.1.2, §90, p. 154).

According to Grimal (p. 34), confragosus (hard, difficult, uneven) is ‘aimé de Sénèque’. He cites Ep. 84. 13 (Confragosa in fastigium dignitatis via est); as here, confragosus is used in the context of a difficult route to be traversed to achieve a worthwhile end. The word does not seem to be restricted to a particular register or genre (see TLL IV and OLD). It is found first, with the general meaning ‘dangerous’ or ‘difficult’, in Plautus (Cist. 614, Men. 591). Its use in the context of difficult terrain (‘rough’, ‘uneven’, ‘broken’) goes back to Varro (Rust. 1.18.4: [ager] confragosus et arduis clivis). Most relevant for the passage of CS under discussion here is Livy, who uses it of mountainous terrain specifically. So, at 21.32.9, he describes how Hannibal pitched his camp in the most extensive valley possible inter confragosa omnia praeruptaque (‘amidst all the broken and steep places’);
at 28.2.1 he speaks of *confragosa loca*. In this connection it is very instructive to compare *Ep.* 51, in which S. develops the imagery of the hard, high mountainous regions being associated with the life of virtue and the low-lying, soft plains with vice and degeneracy. Hannibal is presented as an exemplum of a man whose virtue is lost when he leaves the mountains (the Alps) and the rigours of the military life for the decadence of low-lying Campania. The moral is summed up at *Ep.* 51.10: *Et fortior miles ex confragoso venit: segnis est urbanus et verna.* Again, the connection with Livy is close. At 39.1 (but without using *confragosus*), Livy contrasts the comfort (*amoenitas*) and opulence of Asia, which produced softness (*mollitia*) in its inhabitants, with the rugged terrain of Thrace and Liguria, which produced hardy warriors who could inflict defeats on Roman armies.

1.2: **plano . . . fastigium:** S. modifies the earlier sentiment. The difficulty of the path to virtue is an error in the mind of the novice, analogous to an optical illusion, whereby places seen at a distance seem more difficult to traverse than they actually are. Viansino (1968: 119) cites *Ep.* 113.3, *Ben.* 7.1.5, and *NQ* 1.39 1.3.10 as parallels.

1.2: **plano aditur excelsum?:** the interrogative *num* is omitted, according to Grimal (p. 47) to indicate impatience, to Minissale (p. 53) to be ironic. Neither of these explanations seems to make sense in this context. The omission of the interrogative may just be a colloquialism, conversational style.)
1.3-4.3: narratio. This starts with a recollection of Serenus’ previous indignation at the treatment of Cato by a mob of political opponents. S. extols Cato as superior to the heroes of myth and the last defender of the Republic (1.3-2.3). This part of the narratio is rounded off with the first statement of the propositio. Then Serenus’ misgivings about Stoic claims are set out in direct speech (3.1-3.2), followed by S.’s responses (3.3-4.3).

1.3: Nuper . . . pertulisset: the occasion for the treatise. Serenus has complained that Cato, the prime Roman example of a Stoic sapiens, was subjected to contumeliae by the Roman mob (multitudo), something which never happened to the worst of Caesar’s and Pompey’s henchmen. It is to allay Serenus’ worries (pro ipso quidem Catone te securum esse iussi, 2.1) that S. discourses on the invulnerability of the sapiens to iniuria or contumelia.

1.3: ‘Pompeios et Caesares . . . Vatinios: ‘the likes of Pompey and Caesar . . . the likes of Vatinius’. For other examples of this use of the plural of a proper name in S., see the examples cited in Viansino (1968: 119). It is not confined to S.: see Powell ad Cic. Sen. V.13 (p. 129) for parallels from Cicero and others. As Powell notes: ‘This use of the plural of proper names is quite common, and does not seem to have the colloquial flavour of the English plural (“we can’t all be Einsteins”)’. Publius Vatinius, the object of
Cicero’s vituperation in the *In Vatiniwm* (although the two men were later reconciled), was an ally of Caesar and used by him as a political enforcer. He is mentioned again at 2.1, together with Clodius. Vatinius features later at 17.3 where S. commends his method of parrying insults aimed at his physical appearance.

**1.3: dissuasuro legem:** ‘about to oppose a law’. It is not clear precisely which law is meant here. It may be Pompey’s *lex agraria* of 59 bc, which aimed at providing his veterans with portions of *ager publicus* in Italy. Caesar, Pompey’s fellow-triumvir and consul for 59 bc, drove this law through in the teeth of senatorial opposition, led by Caesar’s co-consul Bibulus and Cato the Younger. However, in the account of Plutarch (*Cato minor* 31-33) it is Bibulus, not Cato, who is maltreated by the mob and pelted with ordure. If this is the incident referred to, the forefronting of Cato rather than Bibulus may go back to the favourable account of his career in Cicero’s *Laudes Catonis* (Cic. *Top*. 94 with Reinhardt ad loc.). Likewise, the forefronting of Bibulus in Plutarch may be due to Caesar’s hostile *Anticato* (45 bc; Cic. *Top*. 94). Another possibility for the incident may be the *Lex de provinciis consularibus* of 56 bc (ibid., 43), when Cato was ejected from the rostra. See Millar (1998: 126, 131, 170) (he does not mention S.).

**1.3: a rostris ad arcum Fabianum:** the arch of Fabius was a triumphal arch dedicated to the victory of Q. Fabius Maximus over the Allobrogi in
121 BC. Here for the first time it is referred to as *arcus Fabianus*, having previously been referred to as *fornix Fabianus*. See L. Chioff, in *LTUR* II.264-6.

**1.3: contumelias: iniuriae** are not mentioned here. This could pose problems of interpretation, given that the *propositio* includes both *iniuria* and *contumelia*. If the anecdote of Cato, which provides the occasion for the subject of *CS*, contains only instances of *contumelia*, then we might doubt, as does Liebersohn (2005), that *CS* is really not about iniuria but about *contumelia*. For an assessment of Liebersohn’s arguments, see Introduction, § III.

**2.1: P. Clodius:** another late Republican politician who, like Vatinius, was considered by many (and certainly by Cicero) as an unscrupulous and immoral operator. S. expatiates on his vileness in *Ep.* 97. 4-7: when put on trial he bribed the jurors by offering women (some of them senators’ wives) and youths (cf. Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 1. 16. 5). S.’s unfavourable portrayal of both Clodius and Vatinius here seems influenced by Cicero, who was not well disposed to either man.

**2.1: nullam enim sapientem nec iniuriam accipere nec contumeliam posse:** the first mention in the main text of the paradox *propositio* that probably formed the actual title of *CS* (see Introduction, § II). The main verb governing this *propositio* is not given, but must be understood.
Possibilities are *respondi* from the beginning of the section or some word like *dixi*.

### 2.1: *caeca cupiditate correpti*: for similar alliteration of *caecus* (and other words formed with *caec-*) with *cupiditas* cf. Lucr. 3.59 (*caeca cupido*);

Cicero: *caecum cupiditate et avaritia fuisse* (*Quinct. 83.10*); *ne ipsos caecos redderet cupiditas et avaritia et audacia* (*Rosc. Am. 101.8-9*); *o caecam cupiditatem* (*Sull. 91.3*); *cupiditate esse caecatum* (*De Domu sua 60.8-9*); *cupiditas tam caeca* (*Pis. 58.1*); *obcaecati cupiditate* (*Fin. 1.33.4*); S.: *Pol. 9.5* (*caeca cupiditas*), *Proiv. 6.1* (*caecam . . . avaritiam*), *Ep. 15.9* (*caeca cupiditas*), *Ep. 16.9* (*caecam cupiditatem*) Cf. *Ep. 119.8* (*caecitas mentium*).


### 2.1-3: *Catonem . . . potest*: Cato is a surer exemplar (*certius exemplar*) of a *sapiens* than Ulysses or Hercules, because he did not contend with beasts or monsters, but had the unique task of holding back the fall of the Roman Republic, a task greater than the Labours of Hercules, the ordeals of Ulysses and the burden of Atlas, which were in any case fictions believed by credulous ancients. According to Tatian, *Address to the Greeks*, 3.2, Zeno viewed ‘Hercules and a few others’, in addition to Socrates, as sages. As S. says, the Stoics viewed these heroes as sages, because they were *invictos*
laboribus et contemptores voluptatis et victores omnium terrorum. S.’s reasons for putting Cato above Hercules and Ulysses (Cato non cum feris manus contulit, quas consectari uenatoris agrestisque est, nec monstra igne ac ferro persecutus est) is very similar to the Epicurean/euhemerist argument holding up Hercules as an exemplar of virtue proposed by Lucretius (5.22-54), a passage discussed in detail by Galinsky (1972: 130-1). For Lucretius, the truly virtuous man is he who banishes troubles from his mind, rather than killing beasts. S.’s position here contrasts strongly with his praise of Hercules at Ben. 1.13-14, where he is compared favourably with Alexander for performing his labours for the benefit of mankind, rather than for personal glory. Like Hercules, Ulysses (Odysseus) did kill monsters during his return home from Troy. However, it is his more passive endurance of hardship and humiliations which is prominent in his story. (See Stanford (1963: 118-45) for a full examination of the Hellenistic and Roman (including Stoic) tradition around Ulysses.) So Cicero (Off. 1.113): Quam multa passus est Ulixes in illo errore diuturno, cum et mulieribus, si Circe et Calypso mulieres appellandae sunt, inserviret et in omni sermone omnibus affabilem [et iocundum] esse se vellet! Domi vero etiam contumelias servorum ancilarumque pertulit, ut ad id aliquando, quod cupiebat, veniret. And indeed, S. does highlight Ulysses’ moral strength in resisting the temptation of the Sirens’ song at Ep. 123.12. However, what is interesting in the Cicero passage just quoted is its last sentence, which I have put in bold. Ulysses showed self-control in refusing to be provoked by the insults directed at him by the slaves in his own house. Given that half of
CS is devoted to an examination of insult, it is surprising that S. does not make use of this aspect of the Ulysses legend. Indeed, the behaviour of Chaerea, who is not provoked by Caligula’s insults, in order to get his own back on him later, is very similar to that of Ulysses as presented by Cicero. What S. is doing in CS, by presenting Cato as the exemplar of a sage, is to give the discussion a specifically Roman as well as Stoic colour. Likewise, Chaerea replaces Ulysses as the exemplum of a man who withstands insults and keeps his cool in the face of provocation.

This replacement of ancient legendary figures with real and recent Roman as exempla is seen in the (implicit) comparison of Cato with Atlas (nec in ea tempora incidit quibus credi posset caelum umeris unius inniti: excussa iam antiqua credulitate . . . diuidi). S. attributes the story of Atlas to ancient credulity (on which cf. Cic. Rep. 2.18; Verr. 2.3.78.132), contrasting such tales with the real-life (if metaphorical) image of Cato sustaining the Republic, fighting to save it against the threat posed by the triumvirs and their followers.

The tenor of the passage is a little reminiscent of Horace, Odes 3. 3. 1-8:

Iustum et tenacem propositi virum
non civium ardor prava iubentium
non vultus instantis tyranni
mente quatit [. . .]
si fractus illabitur orbis,
impavidum ferient ruinae.

The theme of the collapsing Republic is also found at Horace, Epode 16.1-2: *Altera iam teritur bellis civilibus aetas, suis et ipsa Roma viribus ruit*. The man of virtue sticks to his plan in the face of the mad demands of the citizenry (cf. the ordeal undergone by Cato at the hands of the *multitudo*) or the threatening visage of the tyrant (cf. later in the treatise Chaerea standing firm against Caligula’s insults).

The verb *sidere* is rarely found before the Augustan age (*OLD* ı-4; pre-Augustan: prose, Nep. *Cha*. 4.2; verse, Lucilius 176 Marx). Combined with *pessum*, it has the sense ‘to be destroyed or ruined’ (lit.: ‘to sink to the bottom’, of a ship; see *OLD* *pessum* b), almost a passive of *pessum dare* (‘to send to the bottom’, (fig.) ‘to destroy or ruin’, on which see *OLD* *pessum* c).

*pessum* occurs in prose only after the Augustan age, although it is found in verse as early as Plautus (see *TLL* X.1, fasc. XII). The register seems to be epic, in keeping with the momentousness of the fall of the Republic: cf. Lucr. 6.589-90 (*multae per mare pessum | subsedere suis pariter cum civibus urbes*), Luc. 3.674-5 (*sidentia | corpora caesa tenent spoliantque cadauera ferro*).

2.2: *multiformi malo*: *multiformis*, ‘taking many forms’, only appears once, in Cicero *Ac*. 1.26, before S. (*TLL* VIII). In S., also at *Ep*. 120.22, referring to the varied characters of non-sages. For the adjective used of bad
or evil, as at CS, cf. Apul. Met. 10.34 (*multiforme scelus*; Loeb: ‘manifold crimes’).

2.2: *neque enim Cato post libertatem uixit nec libertas post Catonem*: memorable chiasmic *sententia*.

2.3: *Huic tu putas iniuriam fieri potuisse a populo quod aut praeturam illi detraxit aut togam, quod sacrum illud caput purgamentis oris adperssit?:* having referred to the mob’s treatment of Cato previously as *contumelia*, but not *iniuria* (1.3), S. now refers to it as *iniuria*, but not *contumelia*.

2.3: *Tutus est sapiens nec ulla adfici aut iniuria aut contumelia potest*: here the *propositio* is repeated (with variations), but to it is added a mention of the safety of the sage. The safety of the sage (which also implies his freedom from anxiety) is developed later at 4.3 and 13.5.

3.1-3.2: Serenus’ attack on the claim that the sage cannot suffer injury or insult has two prongs: (1) They claim to be different from non-Stoics, but they just use different words to cloak their similarity to them. (2) If the Stoics are really no different from others, why should Serenus accept their claim that the Stoic sage, unlike non-sages, cannot suffer injury or insult?
3.1-3.2: S. ‘quotes’ a possible objection that he thinks Serenus is about to make (paras adclamare, 2.1).

3.1: incensum et efferuescentem: Serenus is angry, which is not the act of a sage, who should show tranquillitas inter lacescentia (4.3). It is ironic that Serenus, given his name, is angry. The sage is always serenus. Serenus is therefore both acting out of character with his name and falling far short of the moral ideal to which he should aspire.

3.1: praeceptis uestris: praecepta (Gk. παραινεσεῖς) are instructions or rules guiding the behaviour of individuals in particular situations. As such, they are to be contrasted with decreta (Gk. δόγματα), which are the broad doctrines or principles of Stoicism. See Ep. 94 for a discussion of decreta and praecepta. The use of uestris shows: (a) that Serenus is addressing the Stoics in general, not just S.; (b) that he has not fully accepted Stoicism – otherwise he would use nostri, as S. does when referring to the Stoics (among whom he counts himself), e.g. VB 3.2 (‘nostram [sc. opinionem] accipe’), Ep. 65 (‘Stoici nostri’).

3.1: Deinde . . . ministeria: this long first part of the sentence is structured on the basis of three sub-sentences introduced by a concessive cum-clause: cum . . . negastis . . ., non negatis . . .; cum . . . negastis . . ., non negatis . . .; cum . . . negastis . . ., idem non itis infitias . . . The final non itis infitias provides variatio after five instances of negatis. For concessive cum +
indicative (not the more normal subjunctive), cf. Phaedrus 4.23(24).4: *qui*, *magna cum minaris, extrices nihil!*; Pliny, *NH* 11.227: *cum tamen . . perhibentur*; Vitruvius 8.3.2: *Hi autem, cum sunt frigidi, ideo uidentur fervere*.


3.1: *cum pauperem negastis esse sapientem*: Serenus alludes to the Stoic paradox that only the sage is rich (cf. Cic. *Par.* 6: *Solum sapientem esse diuitem*). Serenus’s response *non negatis solere illi et seruum et textum et cibum esse* misses the point.

3.1: *cum sapientem negastis insanire*: here Serenus alludes to the Stoic paradox that the sage alone is sane; or, as Cicero expresses it in the title to his fourth paradox, that every foolish man is mad (*Omnem stultum insanire*). Again, Serenus’ response (*non negatis et alienari et parum sana uerba emittere et quidquid uis morbi cogit audere*) misses the point.

3.1: *cum sapientem negastis seruum esse*: finally, Serenus alludes to the paradox that only the sage is free and every foolish man is a slave (Cic. *Par.* 5: *Solum sapientem esse liberum, et omnem stultum seruum*). As with the two paradoxes previously alludes to, Serenus’ reply (*idem non itis infinitias et*
ueniturum et imperata facturum et domino suo seruilia praestaturum ministeria) misses the point.

3.1: itis infitias: *ire infitias* = *negare*, instead of the more usual *infitiari* (which is found in Cicero: see *OLD*, *infitior* 1-2), does not occur in prose before Nepos (*Ep*. 10.4) and Livy (e.g. 9.9.4), although it occurs in Plautus and Terence (*TLL VII.1, infitiae* 1). Not used elsewhere in S. See Minissale (p. 70) for fuller discussion and many Livian parallels. It was used in legal language, as Gaius (*Inst*. 4.172) quotes a praetorian ruling: *non calumniae causa infitias ire*. The date of this particular ruling is not known, apart from its being no later than Gaius’ death (? c. AD 179).

3.1: alienari et parum sana uerba emittere: Viansino (1968: 123) thinks that this passage relates to drunkenness (‘ubriacchezza’), Zeno having claimed that the sage was incapable of drunkenness (see *Ep*. 83.9). However, the words here make no specific references to drunkenness, and I see no reason not to take the words at face value, i.e. as referring to madness (drunken or otherwise). Since the sage was the only truly rational person, the Stoics claimed that all non-sages were mad (see *SVF*, pp. 164-8, nos. 657-70; Cicero: *omnes stultos insanire, Tusc*. 4.24 [54]).

3.2: nec iniuriam nec contumeliam accepturum esse sapientem: here Serenus repeats the *propositio* that was first enunciated at 2.1. It is
integrated into the rest of the sentence by the use of the future participle of *accipere*. This is the second repetition, S. having repeated it at 2.3.

3.2: *privilegium*: in classical usage, according to L–S, ‘a bill or law in favor of or against an individual’. Here it has the post-Augustan meaning of a ‘prerogative’ or ‘an ordinance in favour of an individual’ (e.g. *Ben.* 3.11.1).

3.2: *patientia*: the *res uulgaris* of being able to put up with hardship, e.g. Cic. *Inv.* 2.54.163: *patientia famis et frigoris*; *De lege agraria* 2.24.64: *patientia paupertatis*. S. uses *uulgus*, like *turba*, to denote non-Stoics, cf. *VB* 2.2.

3.2: *si negas accepturum iniuriam*: here, in a partial repetition of the *propositio*, Serenus omits *contumelia*. This is possibly because, as S. says at 5.1, it is a *minor iniuria*, really a subcategory of *iniuria*.

3.3: *sacrum*: cf. 2.3: *sacrum illud caput* (of Cato). The sage is ‘sacred’.

Indeed, in ancient philosophy, reason, which the Stoic sage exemplifies *par excellence*, is divine, a quality which men share (albeit imperfectly) with the gods. Cf. 6.8: *illa quae sapientem tuentur . . . dis aequa*. Those who seek to harm him (like the *populus* in 2.3, who attacked Cato) are *sacrilegi*. The sage is sacred because he personifies the divine reason that pervades the
universe. Lucretius refers to Epicurus as a god: 5.8: *deus ille fuit, deus*; 5.19: *quo magis hic merito nobis deus esse uidetur*. Also, *Ep*. 74.

3.3: inulnnerabile . . . exibeb: *inuulnerabilis* is found elsewhere in *S*. at *Ben*. 5.5.1, *Helv*. 13.2, *Ep*. 9.2, in the latter two cases qualifying *animus*, but in *de Beneficiis* qualifying *hostis*. *Grimal* (p. 42) declares it to be a 'Métaphore militaire', but only the *Ben*. passage really justifies that claim: presumably *uulnera* can be received outside warfare, for example in a robbery.

Here *nota* means ‘distinguishing mark’ (*OLD* 1).

3.4: firmites: near-synonym for *constantia*, also at 6.2 (*tantum firmitatis in hominem . . . cadere*). Besides providing *variatio*, *firmitas* also reinforces the metaphors of sturdy physical objects that have been employed to describe Stoic *constantia* (cf. 3.5: *sapientis animus solidus est*).


3.4: desides populos: possibly orientals (cf. *Pliny*, *Panegyricus* 31.5 has *desidem Aegyptum*), although this is not specified. Another possibility could
be the Campanians, among whom Hannibal took a break from his military exploits and, according to S., went to seed (cf. Ep. 51.7: *Si faceremus quod fecit Hannibal, [...] nemo non intempestivam desidiam, victori quoque, nedum vincenti, periculosam, merito reprehenderet*).

3.5: *sapientem nulli esse iniuriae obnoxium; itaque non refert quam multa in illum coiciantur tela, cum sit nulli penetrabilis*: Here, S. narrows down his attention to *iniuria*, which, as he explains later (5.4), can involve *detrimentum corporis*, for instance, as here, produced by spears. For the image, cf. S. *De ira* 3.5.8: quanto pulchrius uelut *nulli* (sc. animum) *penetrabilem telo* omnis iniurias contumeliasque respuere’; Ovid, *Met.* 12.166: *corpus nullo penetrabile telo*. Perhaps a pun on *penetrare*, the innermost sanctum of a temple.

3.5: *Quomodo . . . adamas . . . conservant*: The sage’s virtue makes him invincible to fortune, just as adamant is invincible to fire and other forms of physical assault. Adamant was reputedly the hardest stone (diamond) and virtually indestructible, cf. Pliny NH 37.57 (cited by Austin, in his commentary on *Aeneid* 6.552, p. 181). There may be an echo of the *adamantinoi logoi* in Plato, *Gorg.* 509a, the ‘steel and adamantine arguments’ (tr. Irwin; see his note ad loc.) that ensure the stability of knowledge as opposed to mere opinion, which is not solidly grounded. The virtue of the Stoic sage is based on infallible reason too. (Cf. Commentary on 10.2, 17.1.)
Although *adamas* is a Greek word, S. gives it in Roman script, not Greek. As Bickel (1906) argues, S. usually gives in Roman script foreign (principally Greek) words that have been assimilated into Latin, reserving Greek script for those words which had not been firmly established in Latin writing by his day, and which he considered he was introducing to a Latin readership. So, in the case of *adamas*, S. was using a word that had already appeared in Virgil (*Aen.* 6.552), Ovid (*Met.* 4.453) and Propertius (4.11.4), and so he gives it in Roman script. It is thought that it appears in Latin prose for the first time in this passage in *CS* (Albrecht (2014: 704)).

3.5: *inexpugnabilis*: military metaphor, to be developed at greater length at 6.8 (*inexpugnabilia*). The image of the soul of the *sapiens* as an impregnable fortress is found at Cicero, *Paradoxa Stoicorum* 4.27.

4.1: ‘Quid ergo? non erit aliquis qui sapienti facere temptet iniuriam?’: the identity of the person speaking is not clear. Is it Serenus with another objection? Or the ‘imaginary objector’ so often found elsewhere in S.? I am inclined to say the latter, not least because of the brevity of the objection, which is characteristic of such objections by the imaginary interlocutor in contrast to Serenus’ lengthy speech.

4.1: *inferiorum*: can be interpreted as neuter, following Viansino (1968) and Minissale (neither of whom gives reasons for their interpretation), but the context might also favour a masculine interpretation, as the first few
lines of the section concern the question of whether someone (‘alquis’ – not something, ‘aliquid’) can harm the sapiens. This would fit better with the general discussion of CS, in which it is clear that injuries and insults are inflicted by humans on other humans. Cf. S. Ben. 14.19: Hunc . . . diuisum a contactu et a conspectu mortalium.


4.2: stolidus ille rex: Xerxes. Presumably not named because by then he was a standard rhetorical topos of the stupid, deluded tyrant. See Seneca rhetor, Suas. 2.18: terras armis obsidet, (Xerxes) coelum sagittis, maria vinculis. For parallels in S. and elsewhere see Klei (91), Viansino (1968: 126; 1988: 392) and Minissale (p. 83). The second episode is recounted in Herodotus (7.35). Costa (p. 200) thinks that the first may be based on Hdt. 5.105, where Darius is described as shooting an arrow into the air. The third episode, where Xerxes, angry at the destruction of his great bridge across the Hellespont in a storm, has the sea whipped with chains, is recounted at Hdt. 7.33-5. Possibly, there is an allusion here to Caligula’s building of a bridge across the Bay of Naples from Baiae to Puteoli, which, Suetonius
says, some people thought was an attempt on his part to emulate Xerxes
(Suet. Gaius 19). Caligula figures prominently in the second half of CS
(18.1-5) and this may be a hint at what is to come. Those who remembered
Caligula’s exploits might think of him (even subconsciously) at the mention
of Xerxes.

4.2: **Neptunum:** personification, more vivid than *mare*, and giving the
comparison between sea and *sapiens* more point, as chains are the sort of
tortures that a *sapiens* might have to endure at the hands of a tyrant.

4.2: **his:** one would expect *iis*, which is the emendation of Wesenberg (cited
in Waltz’s edition), but is not cited in Reynolds’s apparatus criticus. *his* is
the reading of A, while according to Viansino (1968) *iis* is the reading of
F3.

4.2: **qui templa diruunt ac simulacra conflant nihil diuinitati nocetur:**
probably an allusion to Xerxes’ destruction and despoliation of the temple
of Athena on the Acropolis at Athens, which would continue the analogy of
the eastern king seeking to harm what is divine or connected with the gods.
Despoiling temples of their statues and other valuable contents including
money was one of the accusations laid against Verres by Cicero (*Verr.*
5.184-7). For a discussion of sacrilege in the broader context of accusations
of personal immorality in Ciceronian oratory, see Hammar (2013: 142-4).
4.2: proterue, petulanter, superbe: tricolon, not crescendo, but with the second element longer by one syllable than the first and third. The first two elements begin with ‘p’, leading is to expect the third element to begin with ‘p’ likewise, but it begins with ‘s’, producing variatio.

4.3: 'At satius erat neminem esse qui facere uellet': again, it is not clear whether we are intended to understand this objection as expressed by Serenus or by someone else. The second-person singular (optas) in S.’s response could equally be Serenus, or just one of the imaginary interlocutors who are addressed in the second person by S. (inquis).

4.3: magnum argumentum . . . pollentis: argumentum is here probably just ‘evidence’ or ‘proof’ in the general (OLD 1), rather than ‘proof’ in the legal sense, as Minissale (p. 86, with examples) suggests.

4.3: armis uirisque: possibly an echo of Virgil, Aen. 1.1: Arma uirumque. However, the collocation armis virisque is found in Sallust, BJ: [57] Id oppidum, in campo situm, magis opere quam natura munitum erat, nullius idoneae rei egens, armis virisque opulentum; [62] Igitur Iugurtha, ubi armis virisque et pecunia spoliatus est, cum ipse ad imperandum Tisidium vocaretur, rursus coepit flectere animum suum et ex mala conscientia digna timere. (I owe these references to Dr Fiachra Mac Góráin (personal communication).) So S. may be using an expression that pre-dates Virgil, without any intended Virgilian echo. However, given his fondness for
quoting from Virgil throughout his prose works, it is more likely that he is echoing Virgil.

4.3: tuta securitas: having already commanded Serenus to be free from care (securum) because Cato, as a sage, does not accept injury or insult (2.1), and stated that the sage is safe (tutus) from injury and insult (2.3), S. now brings the two concepts of safety and freedom from care together here. He reinforces (and amplifies) the point by later, at 13.5, saying that freedom from care is the ‘characteristic good’ (proprium bonum) of the sage. The two are linked elsewhere in S., e.g. Phaedra 164 (scelus aliqua tutum, nulla securum tulit: see Coffey & Mayer ad loc.), Clem. 19.5, and Ep. 105.8 (tutum aliqua res in mala conscientia praestat nulla securum) cf. Ep. 97.3.

5.1-5.5: divisio and definition of iniuria

5.1: Diuidamus . . . contumeliosa uerba: the divisio. S. makes a distinction between iniuria, which is natura grauior, because it involves harm to the one injured, and contumelia, which is (natura) leuior (except to the sensitive), because it offends the object of the insult. The definition of contumelia is expanded at the start of the second part of the treatise (10.1). For a fuller discussion of contumelia, see Introduction, §§ VII–VIII.

The distinction is important for S.s’ argument, at least as far as as responding to and allaying Serenus’ indignation Cato’s rough treatment at
the hands of the mob is concerned. As Liebersohn (2005) argues, what Cato experiences is not full-blown injury but merely insult, the lesser injury.

5.1: Tanta . . . uerba: Here S. explains why contumelia can be grauis delicatis. The dissolutio or uanitas of some men’s souls leads them to think that nihil acerbius, presumably than insult. S. amplifies this thought by the example of a slave who (a) prefers to be beaten with whips rather than with blows of the fist and (b) believes death and blows to be more tolerable than insulting words. (a) implies that blows of the fist are to be understood as being on the level of insults rather than injuries: they are cuffs that give no physical injury, and are just humiliating to receive, unlike the ‘proper’ punishment of a whipping. Flagellum (perhaps mock-affectionate here?) is the dimunitive of flagrum (L–S; OLD), which was, according to Lilja (1965: 55), ‘a whip of knotted cords with spikes in them’. To be beaten with the flagrum was the severest form of whipping a slave could undergo (ibid.). Maybe they are delivered in conjunction with verbal insults. So, insult may be either verbal or physical. Thus the original ‘objective’ definition whereby iniuria is gravior than contumelia is undermined by the consideration that an individual subject may find that it is contumelia that is gravior.

The thought that insult is worse than injury is found expressed in Nonius Marcellus (430, 10-15; p. 694 Lindsay): INIURIA A CONTUMELIA HOC DISTAT. Iniuria enim levior res est. He cites in support a line from the Periboea of Pacuvius (c. 220-130 BC):
Nonius also cites the *Fallacia* of the comic poet Caecilius Statius (c. 230/220-168 BC):

fácil aerumnam férre possunt, si índae abest iniúria;  
étiam iniuriám, nisi contra cónstat contuméliam. (47-48 Ribbeck; Manuwald (2003: 84) considers Caecilius to be citing Pacuvius)

Although the quotations do not quite support Nonius’ assertion that injury is *levior* than insult (rather, they imply that insult exacerbates injury; cf. the English proverb ‘to add insult to injury’), it is clear is that the view that insult could be a worse thing to experience than injury was known to Roman theatre audiences of the second century BC. And S. may very well have known the plays in question. The Caecilius fragment might refer to the attitudes of slaves (so Guardì 1974: 129), but the lack of a context for the quotations precludes further discussion. S. could equally have observed such behaviour in slaves, without taking it from literature.

The context in their respective plays and the speakers of each of these fragments are unknown; it may be that the sentiments they express are taken from Greek models. The Caecilius fragment might refer to the attitudes of slaves, but we cannot know.
5.1: **colaphis**: ‘blows of the fist’, ‘cuffs’ (Gk. κόλαφος). Viansino (1968: 128) is incorrect when he says that it is only found in comic poets (‘usato solo dai comici’; apart from S., he presumably means), for Valerius Maximus also uses it (3.11.2). Instances in comedy include: Plaut. *Capt.* 88; *Poen.* 494; Ter. *Andr.* 199; Pompon. *Atell.* 178. According to Martin on Terence, *Adelphoe* 200, it is used mostly in Terence by people of low social standing, so by a pimp (*leno*) at *Adelphoe* 200 and 245. S. is therefore using it here to give a register appropriate to slaves. It is used again in *CS* at 14.3 and is also found in S. in *Ira* 3.11.2, *Ep.* 13.5, *Apoc.* 15.

5.2: **non dolore tantum sed doloris opinione uexemur**, **more puerorum**, **quibus metum incutit umbra et personarum deformitas et deprauata facies**: the thought goes back to Plato, *Phaedo* 77e. See Viansino (1968: 128) for Greek references.

5.2: **personarum deformitas**: probably masks with deformed faces, such as those used in the theatre – cf. *De ira* II, 11, 2; *Ep.* 24.13.

5.2: **depraauata facies**: grimaces, probably not qualifying *personarum*, but referring to real faces, being distorted by their owners. Cf. Cic. *De Or.* 2.252, *De Fin.* 5.35.

5.2: **nomina parum grata auribus**: see Grimal, p. 48, for citation of names that sound bad to infants.
5.2: **digitorum motus**: perhaps shadow pictures.


5.62: *... se adulescens improvida aetate inretierat erratis.*

5.3: **Iniuria**, which is *gravior* than *contumelia* (5.1), he defines as having the following purpose (*propositum*): *aliquem malo adficere* (to inflict bad on someone). However, S. argues, this cannot be done to a sage, because *malum* is incompatible with *sapientia* (*malo autem sapientia non relinquit locum*). This is because one example of *malum* is *turbitudo*, which is the opposite of *virtus*. However, as *virtus* (S. has *virtus honestumque*, 5.3) is the defining quality of the sage, he cannot exhibit its contrary, *turbitudo*, without (which is the implication of the argument) ceasing to be a sage. S. presents the argument in the following syllogistic form:

1. *(si)* *iniuria sine malo nulla est, malum nisi turpe nullum est,*
2. *turpe autem ad honestis occupatum pervenire non potest,*
3. *(therefore) iniuria ad sapientem non pervenit.*

Here, in premise 1, there is an equivocation between *malum* used in its ordinary sense as (1) a misfortune or hurt/harm (as in *sine malo*) and (2) the
limited, Stoic sense (in *malum nisi turpe nullum est*) of *malum* as lack of virtue, as what is base (*turpe*).

The argument is restated using another syllogism:

(1) *Nam si iniuria alicuius mali patientia est,*
(2) *sapiens autem nullius mali est patiens,*
(3) (therefore) *nulla ad sapientem iniuria pertinet.*

This time, there is another equivocation, on *patientia/patienst*, as (1) endurance/undergoing something and (2) tolerance/tolerant of something.

The slide takes place between premises 1 and premise 2, the first sense (together with the first sense of *malum*) being present in premise 1, and the second sense (together with the second sense of *malum*) present in premise 2.

S. amplifies this by explaining precisely why the virtue of the sage does not allow him to suffer *iniuria*: *Omnis iniuria deminutio eius in quem incurrit, nec potest quisquam iniuriam accipere sine aliquo detrimento vel dignitatis vel corporis vel rerum extra nos positarum*. So *iniuria* involves loss, whether diminution of status, bodily damage, or loss of externals (e.g. property). However, the sage cannot suffer loss, because these things are *fortuita* (bestowed by *fortuna*) and are not essential to virtue. The sage already has everything: *omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunaec credit*. He is *contentus virtute* (5.4), which is the only thing he securely possesses; the rest are possessed at the whim of fortune (*unius enim in possessione virtutis*
est, ex qua depelli numquam potest; ceteris precario utitur, 5.4), and if ‘lost’, they are not his loss, as they belong to another, fortune.


5.4: Omnis iniuria deminutio eius est in quem incurrit, nec potest quisquam iniuriam accipere sine aliquo detrimento uel dignitatis uel corporis uel rerum extra nos positarum: deminutio is a legal term, for instance in the phrase deminutio capitis (loss of legal personality). The loss of indifferent is thus likened to a diminution of legal status. As Grimal points out (p. 51), S. does not include dignitas (doxa) among the res extra nos positae as, according to Diogenes Laertius, Zeno did (D.L. VII.106).

5.4: omnia in se reposuit, nihil fortunae credit, bona sua in solido habet contentus uirtute: the two outer cola contain financial imagery (reposuit, bona sua in solido habet), but the middle colon (nihil fortunae credit) has the general, not specifically financial sense of ‘he puts no trust in fortune’. However, Wölfflin’s emended to credidit. The perfect tense gives the more financial sense of ‘has entrusted nothing to fortune’, in the sense of laying down a deposit with fortune (cf. omnia in se reposuit). Wölfflin’s emendation therefore integrates the middle colon better with the financial
imagery of the other two elements of the tricolon, and for this reason I am inclined to accept it. ‘di’ could be a haplography.

For the expression fortunae credere, cf. Ad Helviam 5.4 (Numquam ego fortunae credidi); Ep. 76.34 (stultis et fortunae credentibus). Also, DL 6.105: τὸν σοφὸν . . . τύχῃ μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν.

5.4: in solido: ‘in safety’, V. Aen. 11. 427. Sen. Ben. 3. 4. 2: praesentia bona nondum tota in solido sunt. Again, this continues the ‘imagery cluster’ of firmitas, adamant, citadels, rocks, etc.

5.4: libera est, inmota, inconcussa: like the sage, who exemplifies it, virtue is unmoved and unshaken by fortune, in contrast to the non-sage. cf. Ep. 59.14: sapiens . . . inconcussus; De ira 3.25.3: Qui non irascitur, inconcussus iniuria perstittit. For similar vocabulary in S.’s depiction of the state of soul of the sage, who has attained perfected virtue and the summum bonum, see Ep. 71.27 (altera pars rationalis est, haec inconcussas opiniones habet . . . cum vero perfectum est, inmota illi stabilitas est).

5.5: Itaque nihil perdet quod perire sensurus sit: abrupt change of subject from virtus to sapiens.

5.5: precario: legal term, a precarium being a concession that can be revoked at the wish of the person making it; cf. Tranq. 11. 1: sapiens corpus suum, seque ipsum inter precaria numerat.
5.5: quia <salua> uirtute sua salua sunt: as far as I can tell from
Reynolds’s and Viansino’s (1968) apparatus critici, the MSS read quia
uirtute sua sunt, ‘because his possessions are/exist by (means of) virtue’,
which gives poor sense, and Lipsius added salua between sua and sunt.

Lipsius’s conjecture is generally accepted. The sense now is: ‘because his
possessions are safe by (means of) virtue’. I think the sense given by
Lipsius’s conjecture is good, that the sage’s actual possessions, those
appertaining to his virtue, are intact. The point that Stilbo’s actual
possessions, those appertaining to his virtue, are intact, is reinforced by his
reply to Demetrius at 6.1: ‘. . . omnia mea mecum sunt’. It points ahead to
Stilbo’s reply to Demetrius at 6.1: ‘. . . omnia mea mecum sunt’. However,
Gertz and Madvig thought that uirtute needed salua to qualify it too. Gertz
conjectured salua before uirtute, and this is accepted by Reynolds. Madvig
inserted it after uirtute, citing (according to Reynolds’s apparatus) CS 16.2
(sed nomen iniuriae, quod non potest recipi uirtute salua). The second salua
does reinforce the inextricability of the sage’s virtue with the possessions
that really matter to him: if his virtue is safe, so are they. Moreover, Getz’s
word order gives a neat chiasmus, which Madvig’s does not (cf. the
chiasmus at 2.2: Cato post libertatem uixit nec libertas post Catonem).

Viansino (1968: 33), however, accepts Madvig’s word order. On balance, I
think the OCT is preferable to Viansino’s (1968) text, principally for the
chiasmus. However, some doubts must remain about Gertz’s and Madvig’s
conjectures. If there had been only one salua in the text, as Lipsius thought,
it is easy to see how a careless scribe could have missed it out in haste or inadvertency. Indeed, the scribe of A did miss out a portion of the text (5.6-7; see Reynolds’s preface, p. xv), which had to be supplemented from γ. However, if there were two salua, it seems less likely that both of them would have been omitted.

5.6-6.7: the chria (exemplum) of Stilbo’s encounter with Demetrius

Poliorcetes

This anecdote is an example of a chria. The chria here would seem to be of the second type of chria as given by Quintilian 1.9.4: ‘another includes an answer (“being asked” or “when this was said to him, he answered”)’ (tr. Russell (Loeb); alterum quod est in respondendo: ‘interrogatus ille’, vel ‘cum hoc ei dictum esset, respondit’). For more on chriae, see Russell (Loeb), vol. 1, pp. 211-12, nn. 6-9. What is notable in CS is the expansion by S. of the simple chria form (Ab hoc . . . ‘omnia mecum mea sunt.’) into a full-blown narrative topped off with a long speech.

This anecdote of Stilbo has great similarity with that of Bias of Priene, one of the Seven Sages of Greece (see New Pauly, pp. 622-3) as related in Cic. Par. 1.8 and Valerius Maximus 7.2, exc. 3. Like Stilbo, Bias’s home city has been captured and sacked, and his fellow citizens are fleeing with what possessions they can carry with them. Asked by some unspecified individual, according to Cicero, why he was not doing the same, he replied: ‘I am indeed doing the same; for I am carrying all my goods with
me’ (cum esset admonitus a quodam, ut idem ipse faceret, 'Ego vero', inquit, 'facio; nam omnia mecum porto mea'). Valerius’ version is roughly similar: 'interrogatus quid ita nihil ex bonis suis secum ferret 'ego vero' inquit 'bona mea mecum porto' (text Briscoe’s, as given in Loeb, with alterations by Shackleton Bailey). S.’s account of Stilbo is much more vivid than Cicero’s and Valerius’ of Bias. In addition to his reply in direct speech at 5.6, which recalls Bias’ direct speech in Cicero and Valerius, Stilbo is given a full-scale speech (6.3-71.1). Moreover, as Traina (1974: 14-15) points out, the initial direct-speech reply (‘nihil,’ inquit, ‘omnia mea mecum sunt’) at 5.6 is supplemented by two varied repetitions in Stilbo’s own long oration, one in indirect speech at 6.3 (nec quicquam suum nisi se putet) and the other in direct speech again at 6.5 (teneo, habeo quidquid mei habui). The anecdote occurs again in Ep. 9.18-19, illustrating the self-sufficiency of the sage.

Again, there is the reply of Stilbo, in direct speech (‘omnia’ inquit ‘bona mea mecum sunt’, 9.18), word-similar to that of CS 5.6 except for the addition of bona to go with mea. Again, it is repeated with variations, with comments by S. in 9.19: ‘Nihil’ inquit ‘perdidi’: dubitare illum coegit an vicisset; ‘Omnia mea mecum sunt’; iustitia, virtus, prudentia, hoc ipsum, nihil bonum putare quod eripi possit. In both passages, the repetition of Stilbo’s reply hammers home the point that only virtue is securely possessed by the sage. In other respects, though, the passage in Ep. 18-19 is much less dramatic than that in CS, and more reminiscent of the matter-of-fact accounts of Bias of Priene in Cicero and Valerius Maximus. This is no
surprise, given the important structural role that the Stilbo episode plays in CS, as discussed above.

The dramatic character of the episode in CS is increased in other ways too. For instance, as Döring (1972: 141) argues, S. raises the level of pathos by giving Stilbo daughters (plural) rather than the single daughter recorded by Diogenes Laertius (2.114), hence increasing his loss in all eyes except his own. Also, rather than being quizzed by an unnamed fellow citizen, as Bias is, Stilbo is brought into confrontation with the leader of the enemy, the man responsible for the destruction of Megara. Victor and vanquished face each other, and in S.’s view the true victor is not Demetrius, but the supposedly vanquished Stilbo. In this respect S.’s account is reminiscent of that between Alexander the Great and Diogenes (D.L. 6.38). In each case the king asks the philosopher a question, the reply to which indicates the philosopher’s indifference to worldly power and wealth. So Alexander asks Diogenes to ask for anything he wants. Diogenes asks Alexander to stand out of his light. Cf. Demetrius’ defiance before Nero in Epictetus 1.25.23: ἀπετλεῖς μοι θάνατον, σοι δ’ ἡ φύσις (‘You threaten me with death, but nature threatens you’). Here in CS, Demetrius asks Stilbo whether he is missing anything, to which Stilbo replies: nothing, he has everything with him. That is, he has virtue, which is all he needs. According to Diogenes Laertius (2.115), Demetrius took measures that Stilbo’s house be preserved and his plundered property restored to him, but that when Stilbo was asked to give a list what he had lost, he he ‘denied that he has lost anything which really belonged to him, for no one had taken
away his learning, while he still had his eloquence and knowledge’ (Loeb translation). Plutarch recounts this episode at *Dem.* 9.5-6. In Plutarch, the question Demetrius asks is whether anyone had robbed him of anything, so which he replies: ‘No one ..., for I saw nobody carrying away knowledge’ (Loeb translation).

The sacking of cities was one of the means by which the Hellenistic rhetorical and ‘tragic’ historians, such as Duris of Samos, sought to arouse the emotions of their readers and audiences and hence make them engage sympathetically with the actors in the events they were narrating. See Walsh (1961: ch. 2) for the influence of the ‘tragic historians’ on Livy. As Klei (103) remarks, the *captarum urbium forma* was a favourite subject in the rhetorical schools. On descriptions of the sacking of cities as touching the emotions, see Quint. *Inst.* 8.367-70. Cf. Keitel (2010: 337-52) for a discussion of narrative of the sacking of cities, specifically in Tacitus.

5.6: Stilbon philosophus: for exhaustive testimonia for this Megarian philosopher, see Döring (1972: 46-61, 140-56). According to Diogenes Laertius, the Megarian Philippus (2.114; Döring fr. 165) and Heraclides Lembus (2.120; Döring fr. 167; *FHG* 170-1), Stilbo was a teacher of Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoa. This may account for the use of Stilbo as an exemplar of Stoic virtue. Through his connection with Zeno, he was considered one of the Stoics, as was Crates, who also allegedly taught Zeno (D.L. 7.2, Döring fr. 168; 7.24, Döring fr. 169). Indeed, the Megarian school, to which Stilbo belonged, was fond of logical puzzles, as were the
Stoics, who may have got it from them through Zeno’s being a pupil of Stilbo. Given that CS is concerned to prove a Stoic paradox and uses many syllogisms to do this in the first half, this could be a further reason why Stilbo might be suitable as an exemplum.

5.7: se . . . indemnem esse testatus est: *indemnis* means ‘suffering no damage or loss’ (*OLD*), ‘secure from loss, incurring no loss’ (Berger 498). Interestingly in the light of the similarities between 5.6-61 and *Ep.* 9.18-19 discussed above, it occurs at *Ep.* 9.19 (*quanto hic mirabilior vir qui per ferrum et ruinas et ignes inlaesus et indemnis evasit!*). In both passages, the term has a metaphorical sense, because in purely legal terms Stilbo has suffered property loss and damage in the sack of Megara. In respect of his true possession, his virtue, he has suffered no loss.

*Testari* means ‘To affirm or declare solemnly (esp. before witnesses), testify to, etc.’ (*OLD* 2; cf. Berger 735), here used in a transferred sense (‘To give evidence of, demonstrate (something) by one’s action or condition’ (*OLD* 4)).

5.7: *habebat enim uera secum bona, in quae non est manus iniectio*: *bona* means ‘(usu. pl.) Possessions, property, estate’ (*OLD* 8); ‘The whole a person’s property’ (Berger 374). The term *manus iniectio* refers to the procedure of laying a hand or hands on a person or object in order to claim ownership of him/or/it. See Berger 542 (‘Legis actio per manus iniectionem’); cf. Berger 577 (‘Manus inietio (manum inicere’)’). As
Stilbo’s true possessions (his virtue) cannot be taken from him and so lie outside legal procedure, *manus iniectio* will not apply to them. The term is not used in a transferred sense here, but S. makes it clear that the procedure cannot apply to Stilbo’s virtue.

5.7: *non iudicabat sua, sed aduenticia et nutum fortunae sequentia*: (1) *iudicare* is used in a transferred, non-legal sense here, as elsewhere in *CS* (6.2, 9.1, 10.3, 13.3, 13.5, 14.4, 18.4). (2) *aduenticius* can mean ‘(of property) obtained otherwise than by direct inheritance from one’s parents, coming by an accident of inheritance; accruing accidentally or as a windfall’ (*OLD* 4). S.’s gloss, ‘following the approval of fortune’, is not strictly necessary for the argument, but rounds off the sentence better than the bare *adventicia*.

5.7: *nutum fortunae*: personification, fortune nodding her approval. The expression is only found here before Apuleius (*Met*. 4.12.3, 7.20.1, 10.24.2). Given the well-established cult of the goddess Fors Fortuna at Rome (see Fears 1981: 846ff.), such a personification would have seemed natural to S.’s readers.

5.7: *Ideo ut non propria dilexerat; omnium enim extrinsecus adfluentium lubrica et incerta possessio est*: crucial to understanding this sentence is the distinction in Roman law between ownership (*proprietas*, *dominium*) and possession (*possessio*) as summed up by Ulpian: *Nihil*
commune habet proprietias cum possessione (Digest 41.2.12.1, p. 507 Mommsen/Krueger/Watson); not 21.2.12.1, as in Berger 637). As du Plessis (2015: 176) explains: ‘Possession was regarded essentially as physical control of the sort that was protected by possessory interdicts, whereas ownership was the ultimate entitlement to property’. Here we have the adjective *propria* (referring to the *qua dissipata et direpta ferebantur* of the previous sentence) contrasting with the noun *possessio*. So Stilbo had not held dear what he had lost as his own property. The explanation S. gives is that of all things that ‘flow’ to (person or persons unspecified) from outside, there is only unstable and uncertain possession, not ownership. In terms of human law, Stilbo did have ownership, and not merely possession, of his house and many other things. But (and I think this is probably S.’s implication) in the broader scheme of nature, he had merely possession of his physical property, but secure ownership of his virtue.

**6.1: dives aliquis regnum orbae senectutis exercens:** a rich old person who has no heirs can exercise considerable power over legacy hunters or relatives, who feel obliged to follow his or her every whim (cf. *regnum*) in the hope of receiving an inheritance. For the manipulative power exercised over legacy hunters, see also *Marc.* 19.2: *in civitate nostra plus gratiae orbitas confert quam eripit, adeoque senectutem solitudo . . . ad potentiam ducit ut quidam odia filiorum simulent et liberos eiurent, orbitatem manu faciant*; *Breu.* 7.7: *quot illa anus efferendis heredibus lassa* (the old woman outlives her legacy hunters) and Williams’s note ad loc. In these passages,
as Williams notes, S. is giving an interesting alternative slant on the theme of legacy-hunting, by emphasizing the attitude of the person whose wealth is coveted by the *captator*, rather than concentrating on the *captator*. For a full discussion of captation see Champlin (1991: 87-102); ibid., App. IV gives a list of passages. However, at 9.2 S. speaks of *magno labore adfectata hereditas*, which is more in line with the satirists’ concentration on the *captator*.

**6.1: egregiam artem quassandarum urbium professus:** sarcastic. The participial phrase *artem . . . professus* parallels *sapientiam . . . professi* of 1.1. S. is contrasting the *sapientia* of the philosophers at 1.1 with the mere *ars* of Demetrius Poliorcetes. This is the old distinction between σοφία and τέχνη found in Plato’s *Gorgias*. The use of *quassandarum* continues the moved/unmoved imagery.


**6.2: Inter micantis ubique gladios et militarem in rapina tumultum, inter flammases et sanguinem stragemque impulsae ciuitatis, inter fragorem templorum super deos suos cadentium uni homini pax fuit:**

reminiscent of scenes of the sacking of cities, such as the account in *Aeneid* 2 (cf. *tumultus: Aen*. 2.122, 2.485; *flamma: 431, 478, 587, 632, 633, 757; cadentem patriam, 575-6; *sanguis: 72, 367, 501-2, 530, 551, 582, 662, 667;*
stat ferri acies mucrone corusco | stricta, 333-4; et in multo lapsantem
sanguine nati | implicitique comam laeua, dextraque coruscum | extulit ac
lateri capulo tenus abdidit ensem, 551-3; iam flammae tulerint inimicus et
hauserit ensis, 600), and many such in Livy (see Walsh 1961: 191-7). The
scene depicted in CS 6.2 contains many of the stock aspects of descriptions
of captured cities outlined by Quintilian 8.3.68-9.

5.48: semper in animo eius (sc. sapientis) esse placidissimam pacem; Lucr.
3.23-4: neque ulla | res animi pacem delibat tempore inullo. According to
Plut. Dem. 9.5, Stilbo was ‘famous for his election of a life of tranquillity’
(δόξαν ἐχοντος ἄνδρος ἡρμημένου πως ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ καταβιώναι). Stoicism and
Epicureanism had peace of the soul as the ultimate aim. The other dialogus
addressed to Serenus, De tranquillitate animi, is a discussion of how to
attain and retain spiritual calm. Here, the use of pax rather than tranquillitas
is particularly apposite as the scene is one of war and Stilbo is yet at peace.

6.4: En adsum hoc uobis probaturus, [. . .] agitent: having started his
speech by addressing Demetrios in the second person singular, Stilbo now
addresses unnamed persons in the second person plural. (For a broader
discussion of tu and uos addressees in S. in relation to questions of genre,
see Introduction, § II.) Who these persons may be is uncertain. They may be
the Macedonian army as a whole, or the people of Megara. It seems, though,
as if S. is speaking through Stilbo, reaching out beyond the confrontation
between Stilbo and Demetrius, beyond also his immediate conversion with Serenus, to a broader public, perhaps an audience that is supposed to be observing the conversation, or the readership in general. In this regard, the future participle *probaturus* used in place of a final clause is interesting. Not only does it streamline the sentence, avoiding a more cumbersome purpose clause with *ut*, but it is also an expression of S.’s expressing his intention through the words of another, here Stilbo. For a discussion of this motivating use (‘Motivierender Gebrauch’) of the future participle, see Westman (1961: 92-8).

For more on the use of future participles (not just as final clauses) in S., see Summers, p. lxvii; see also Williams, p. 31, for examples in *De otio* and *BV*. On future participles used in place of final clauses, see Woodcock (1959: 73, § 92).

6.5: *an peior publico, nescio*: rhyme of ending and alliteration on initial *p*.

6.5: *teneo, habeo*: repetition with asyndeton, for emphasis. Cf. 6.6 (*mecum sunt, mecum erunt*), 7.1 (*exhibuimus, exhibebimus*).

6.6: *Non est quod me uictum uictoremque te credas: uicit fortuna tua fortunam meam*: a neat sentential formulation of the insignificance of Demetrius’ victory over Stilbo: all that has happened is that Demetrius’ *fortuna* has defeated Stilbo’s *fortuna*. The point is emphasised by the
repetitions *me uictum uictoremque te* (a chiasmus) and *fortuna tua fortunam meam*.

**6.6: Caduca illa . . . nescio**: *caduca illa* picks up the two *fortunae* of the previous sentence. However, the stress is rather more on Stilbo’s *fortuna*, as *illa* (‘those’, possibly ‘the latter’) seems to express. Also, *illa* marks a shift in attention from Stilbo’s *fortuna* overall to the individual, but unspecified things (expressed by the plural *illa*) that comprise his *fortuna*. They are fleeting and transitory (*caduca*, *OLD* 9). *Caducus* also has a legal sense, referring to property that ‘is not, or cannot be, taken up by the heir or legatee and consequently falls to the treasury’ (*OLD* 10). The specific legal sense seems not to be in play here, although S. clearly intends some allusion to property as he adds after *caduca*, almost by way of a (loose) gloss, *et dominum mutantia*: the ownership of these things changes.

**6.6: quod ad res meas pertinet, mecum sunt, mecum erunt**: *res meas* (my things, my (true) property) denotes Stilbo’s virtue, not his *fortuna*; *meas* needs stressing when translated into English (my things), and is reinforced by the subsequent repetition of *mecum*, which further emphasises the inseparability of Stilbo from his true possessions (his virtue). The polyptoton *sunt . . . erunt* is not merely there for *variatio*, but the present tense, followed by the future, shows that what Stilbo has now will be his in the future as well (and, we may assume, for as long as he lives).
6.8-7.1: lessons to be drawn from the Stilbo exemplum.

6.8: una manu: synecdoche, the hand being that of Scipio Aemilianus. His fame as the destroyer of Carthage and the taker of Numantia presumably justified this allusive mention. Cf. Ira 3.11.7, where he is mentioned as the taker of both Carthage and Numantia; also Cic. Mur. 58: Bis consul fuerat P. Africanus et duos terrores huius imperi, Carthaginem Numantiumque, deleverat cum accusavit L. Cottam.

7.1: hunc sapientem nostrum nusquam inueniri: a common criticism against the Stoics, that their sage is an unattainable ideal, and hence that their conception of virtue is unrealistic. See Viansino (1968: 137), for a copious listing of examples, among them Cic. Div. 2.28.61: (sapientes) qui omnino nusquam reperiuntur; Cic. Laelius 18: sed eam sapientiam interpretantur, quam adhuc mortalis nemo est consecutus. Indeed, Stoics themselves admitted that sages were rarely found (see the passages cited in Brouwer 2014: 164).

7.1: exhibuimus, exhibebimus: asyndeton, common in S., e.g. Ep. 33.1 (ubi aliqua eminent, notabilia sunt); BV 17.5 (operose assequuntur quae uolunt, anxii tenent quae assecuti sunt). See Summers, pp. xcii–xciii; Williams, p. 231. It is also a polyptoton, the tense being different in the repetition. The shift from perfect to future serves to emphasise the continuity of S.’s instruction of Serenus: he has shown him already the Stoic
picture of the sage, and he will continue to do so. For polyptoton elsewhere in CS, cf. 6.6 (mecum sunt, mecum erunt; and note ad loc.).

7.1: raro forsitan magnisque aetatium interuallis unum; neque enim magna et excedentia solitum ac uulgarem modum crebro gignuntur: cf. S. Ep. 42.1: nam ille [=vir bonus] tamquam phoenix semel anno quingentesimo nascitur. Nec est mirum ex intervallo magna generari: mediocria et in turbam nascentia saepe fortuna producit, eximia vero ipsa raritate commendat. This image was relayed by the second-century AD Aristotelian philosopher Alexander of Aphrodisias (199.16-17). The view that the sage is an extremely rare occurrence was held by the early Stoics (e.g. Chrysippus, apud Diogenianus apud Eusebius of Caesarea, Preparation for the Gospel 6.8.14).

7.1: uulgarem modum: uulgus is often used by S. to describe the non-Stoic majority, e.g. VB 2.2. Cf. Hor. Od. 3.1.1: Odi profanum vulgus et arceo. Also, turba.

7.1: Ceterum hic ipse M. Cato, a cuius mentione haec disputatio processit, uereor ne supra nostrum exemplar sit: picking up the hyperbolic and lengthy praise of Cato at 1.3-2.2, S. claims that Cato surpasses in virtue even the almost unattainable standard that the Stoic sage sets, but gives no reason why this should be so. Here nostrum means ‘our [i.e. Stoic]’.
Klei (111), however, disagrees with this interpretation of the passage. He thinks that it is Stilbo who is referred to by *nostrum exemplar*. He thinks that S. would not, even for rhetorical effect, have Cato rise above ‘the pure ideal’ (‘het zuivere ideaal’) of the Stoic sage, which by definition cannot be surpassed. Certainly, given the near-impossibility of becoming a Stoic sage, let alone surpassing it, it does seem a gross exaggeration to speak of Cato, no matter how distinguished he was, in these lofty terms. Nevertheless, *pace* Klei, the words of this passage do point in that direction. At the beginning of 7.1, S. has: *Non est quod dicas, ita ut soles, hunc nostrum sapientem nusquam inueniri.* This clearly concerns the Stoic sage, not Stilbo. And what follows, in which the rarity of occurrence of the sage is discussed, also clearly concerns the Stoic sage. Since the end of Stilbo’s direct speech at 6.7, there has been mention of Alexander the Great, Scipio Aemilianus, and now the Stoic sage. In other words, two sections have passed since the end of the Stilbo digression; if he was meant here by *nostrum exemplar*, surely S. would have made this clearer, probably by introducing the name again. As I said at the beginning of this note, the sentence in the lemma continues the hyperbolic manner of referring to Cato, who held up the tottering Republic like Atlas holding up the world. Moreover, S. does not seem to be seeking to make a strong distinction between Stilbo and the Stoic sage. Stilbo serves here quite adequately as an example of the sage (Stoic or not) who is unconcerned by the misfortune he has suffered. And his stated indifference to the loss of his property is in keeping with Stoic doctrine, as we have seen. Therefore, I think Klei is wrong.
More recently, Yelena Baraz (2015: 169-70) has taken *nostro* *exemplar* to refer to Stilbo. She gives no reason for this reading, which I have argued above is wrong. That said, she finds it problematic that Cato is given priority over Stilbo as this undermines ‘their very position as *exemplaria sapientis*, a position crucial to Seneca’s task in this text’ (ibid. 170). Also problematic, for Baraz (ibid. n. 27), is *CS* 2.1, where Cato is elevated above Ulysses and Hercules as a ‘surer’ exemplar of the sage, although, as she says, the ranking is justified by S.’s subsequent discussion (2.2). While she is right to find this hierarchising of sages troublesome (can anyone who has attained moral perfection be ‘more perfect’ than another in the same position? – my question, not Baraz’s), and does feed into the general problem (pounced on by Stoicism’s opponents) of the reality and feasibility of the sage, S. *does* elevate Cato above other moral exemplars in *CS*.

The reason for this, I think, can only be rhetorical, despite Klei’s and Baraz’s reservations. [‘While this instance of ranking may be easier to justify as rhetorical, the recurrence of this procedure in the comparison of Stilbo and Cato shows its consequences once it becomes a structuring model in Seneca’s thought and presentation’ (Baraz 2016: 170 n. 27).] From *CS* 1.3 it is clear that Serenus, who is not yet committed to Stoicism, is an admirer of Cato and is outraged by his rough handling by the mob. Given that Cato was a Stoic, S. sees a way to exploit Serenus’ admiration for Cato in order to move him into the Stoic camp. S., whose own admiration for Cato is clear from other works, puts him on a pedestal, way above the other
(non-Roman) moral exemplars, by this rhetorical exaggeration playing on Serenus’ emotions and thus making him more susceptible to the Stoic message S. is trying to impart.

7.2: bonis inter se pax est, mali tam bonis perniciosi quam inter se: the association of the sage with peace, introduced at 6.2, is developed further here. The idea that good men and sages are friends with each other is a very common one in Stoicism; see Viansino (1968: 138) and Banateanu (2001: 155-81) for references. The thought seems to be that the sage has no desire to harm anyone, and qua sage cannot be harmed even if the attempt is made to harm him; so between sages peace reigns; the inner peace of the sage is matched by his peaceful intentions in his dealings with others, sages and non-sages alike. By contrast the non-sages (the bad), who have no inner peace, are disposed to do harm both to sages and to each other.

The thought expressed here is akin to that found at Diogenes Laertius 7.124, according to whom the Stoics say that friendship exists only among the virtuous (spoudaioi) because of their similarity to each other; the bad (phauloi), by contrast have no friends. This is because, according to Diogenes, the Stoics view friendship as common use (koinōnia) of the ‘things to do with life’ (ta kata ton bion), treating their friends as they would treat themselves, as valuable for their own sakes. There may be an allusion here to the Old Stoic account of the cosmic city, as expounded by Zeno of Citium in his Republic (D.L. 7.33 = SVF 1.122). According to Diogenes Laertius (loc. cit.), Zeno held that only sages can be citizens, friends,
household members and free men, and that even their parents, who are not sages, are enemies. There is dispute over what the cosmic city was supposed to be. Some interpretations take the city to be an ideal city, rather like Plato’s ideal city, which is incapable of realisation. Vogt (2008), by contrast, considers the cosmic city to be the world as it is, but that only certain people (the sages) could be citizens of it, just as in Greek cities of the time the citizen body was restricted to adult free males. That did not mean that others (slaves, women, children and resident aliens) did not live in it. From this, Zeno would seem to have envisaged an ideal city consisting solely of sages.

7.2-8.1: logical proofs of the impossibility of the sage accepting injury.

After a short section on the objection that the sage is an unattainable ideal, S. argues that the sage cannot be harmed, because what harms must be stronger than what is harmed; and as wickedness (nequitia) is not stronger than virtue, the sage cannot be harmed (the term bonus is synonymous with sapiens (cf. later in this section, Illud enim iam non es admonendus, neminem bonum esse nisi sapientem):

(1)  Denique ualidius debet esse quod laedit eo quod laeditur;
(2)  non est autem fortior nequitia uirtute;
(3)  non potest ergo laedi sapiens. (7.2)
Here there is an equivocation on ‘stronger’ reflected in the slide from  
ualidius in premise 1 to fortior in premise 2. Although ualidus sometimes 
has connotations strength of character or purpose (see OLD 8a), it usually 
refers to physical strength and power (including good health). Fortis, by 
contrast, in addition to meaning physically strong, often has a more moral 
sense of brave and resolute etc. There has therefore been a shift from a non-
moral to a moral sense. This is not surprising, given the essentially morally 
neutral content of premise 1 and the clearly moral content of premise 2. 
However, the use of a different word in premise 2 does impair the logical 
validity of the syllogism.

Moreover, good men (i.e. sages) do not wish to harm one another, 
only wicked men wish to harm good men. However, if what is stronger 
cannot be harmed by what is weaker, and the wicked man is weaker than the 
good man, and the good man cannot fear injury unless from his inferiors, 
then the sage cannot be injured:

(1) Quodsi laedi nisi infirmior non potest,
(2) malus autem bono infirmior est,
(3) nec iniuria bonis nisi a dispari uerenda est,
(4) iniuria in sapientem uirum non cadit. (7.2)

Here, the underlying assumption is that good is ‘stronger’ than bad. Perhaps 
there is some influence from Greek κρείσσων, which can mean both 
‘stronger’ (cf. Plato, Rep. 338c) and ‘better’. See the discussions of Plato,
Gorgias 488c—d on whether ‘stronger’, ‘superior’ and ‘better’ are coterminous (Dodds (pp. 284-5 of his commentary) and of Gorgias 488cd by Irwin (pp. 184-5 of his commentary)). If 7.2 contains an echo of this sort of discussion in Plato (and possibly in earlier Stoic philosophers), then infirmior in premise 2 has, besides its basic meaning of ‘weaker’, also a connotation of ‘morally inferior’.

At this point, S. counters the imagined objection that if Socrates was unjustly condemned, he accepted an injury (7.3). There is a distinction, S. maintains, between doing an injury and accepting that one has been done, that is, between seeking to harm someone and actually harming them. He illustrates the point by several short examples, for instance that poison may be administered, but be harmless because the intended victim has eaten, so neutralising the poison (7.4). This is a matter of logic: A can occur without B occurring; but B cannot occur without A occurring. Thus, I can move my feet (A) without running (B); but I cannot run (B) without moving my feet (A). Likewise, in order for me to accept an injury, someone must have done an injury; but if someone has done me an injury, I do not have to accept it. (7.6.) Here again is the equivocation on two meanings of accipere: (a) receive (nolens volens), (2) accept willingly, take on board.

A syllogism picks up the imagined objection about Socrates being unjustly condemned (8.1):

(1) Praeterea iustitia nihil iniustum pati potest, quia non coeunt contraria;
(2) *iniuria autem non potest fieri nisi iniuste*;

(3) *ergo sapienti iniuria non potest fieri*.

Here there may be an equivocation on two possible meanings of *coeunt*: (1) to come together to form a whole (*OLD* 7), (2) to come together so as to affect each other (e.g. join battle, or have sexual intercourse).

So, in addition to the logical distinction between an injury being made and an injury being accepted, there is the further logical argument that injury, which is an injustice, cannot be done to the sage, who is just.

7.3: 'Si iniuste' inquit 'Socrates damnatus est, iniuriam accepit.': here, an imaginary objection in the third person (*inquit*).

7.3: *Hoc loco . . . perdiderim*: S., to counter the objection that Socrates accepted an injury by being unjustly condemned, S. needs to establish that an injury may be intended but the intended victim may not accept it. The example he gives, of an inept thief burgling an item from a man’s country house and putting it in his town house, is not entirely convincing. The owner has lost the item for as long as it is in transit between his villa and his town house; the loss is temporary, but there is still a loss.

7.4: *Potest . . . perfecta sunt*: S. first asserts that someone can be harmful without actually doing harm. There is a play on different meanings of *nocens* here. First, it is simply the present participle of *nocere*: harming (i.e.
actually doing harm). Secondly, however, *nocens* can mean ‘injurious’ or ‘noxious’ (*OLD* 1, i.e. in the sense of predisposed to cause harm), or even ‘stained with crime, guilty’ (*OLD* 2). I think S.’s argument depends on the meaning ‘guilty’ being understood. After giving examples to illustrate the point, he sums up his position with the following words: *Omnia scelera etiam ante effectum operis, quantum culpae satis est, perfecta sunt* – the intention motivating a wicked act, not only the act itself, determines guilt. Cf. S. *Ben.* 5.14.2: *sic latro est etiam antequam manus inquinat*; *Cic.* *Fin.* 3.32: *Nam ut peccatum est patriam prodere, parentes violare, fana depeculari, quae sunt in effectu, sic timere, sic maerere, sic in libidine esse peccatum est etiam sine effectu*. Minissale (p. 117) also cites Seneca rhetor, *Contr.* 4.7: *scelera quoque quamuis citra exitum subsederint, punitur.*

**7.4: Si quis cum uxor e tamquam cum aliena concumbat, adulter erit, quamuis illa adultera non sit:** The sense of *tamquam* here is probably that in *OLD* 4c (*as if, as though [...] without finite vb.*). Ker translates *tamquam cum aliena* as ‘thinking she is another man’s wife’. A parallel in S. (given in *OLD* loc. cit.) is *Ben.* 1.7.1: *qui dedit tamquam non recepturus* (*‘who gave it in the belief that he would not receive it back’*). Ker’s translation implies that the husband actually believes that his wife is another man’s wife. Another interpretation could be that the husband *thinks of* another man’s wife whom he covets while he has sex with his own wife, knowing her to be his own wife. In other words, he can only achieve sexual union with his own wife if he thinks of another man’s wife while doing so.
Either interpretation would fit with the view of completed crimes presented in the previous note: it is enough for him to think of adultery to have committed it.

7.6: **Ex hac sorte . . . accepisse me**: *Ex hac sorte* is interesting. Both Grimal (p. 63) and Minissale (p. 118) says that it is equivalent to *ex hoc modo*, probably understanding the phrase in the sense ‘in this manner’ (cf. *OLD* ‘modus’ 11e). Ker, however, translates it ‘in this category’ (cf. *OLD* ‘sors’ 9), as it occurs in S. *Epp*. 36.4 (*non dubie primae sortis*), 52.3 (*secundae sortis ingenium*), 117.8 (*concedo ista alia esse, sed non sortis alterius*). I think Ker is correct.

8.1: **Praeterea**: introduces a new, additional aspect of the argument.


Here there may be two possible interpretations of *coeunt*: (1) to come together to form a whole (*OLD* 7), (2) to come together so as to affect each other (e.g. join battle, or have sexual intercourse).

8.1: **loco muneris**: *loco* + genitive is common in S. See Viansino (1968: 140) for copious examples.
8.2-9.3: general examples of the everyday misfortunes, including death, which do not affect the sage.

8.3: *Qui rationi innixus:* the standard view of the sage (shared by Platonists and Stoics), that his virtue is based on reason. Armisen-Marchetti (1989) thinks it may be a metaphor based on the image of a man leaning on a walking stick.


8.3: *nedum ut . . . maereat:* *nedum* with *ut* + subjunctive, ‘still less (is it true that)’ (*OLD* 1), is Livian (e.g. 3.14.6) and post-Augustan, according to Williams (p. 158) ad *Breu. 7.4* (*nedum ut isti sciant*).

9.1: *motus animorum inconditi:* by contrast the *animus* of the sage is *bene fundatus* (6.4: *at nulla machinamenta posse reperiri quae bene fundatum animum agitent*).

9.1: *nos:* the scope of *nos* here is probably ‘we Stoics’, as often in S., or possibly humanity as a whole. See the next note.
9.1: omne autem fortuitum circa nos saeuit et in uilia: this is a problematic passage, because of the final seven letters, which read *inuitia* in A, and *iniuria* in γ. A’s reading is meaningless. The reading of γ gives a recognisable word. If we were to accept it, the passage could be translated: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune and injury rages around us’. Although *iniuria* is appropriate to the subject matter of *CS*, *iniuria* is not found with *saeuire* before Quintus Serenus Sammonicus (d. 212), *Liber Medicinalis* 24.448 (*cum saeuit penitus haerens iniuria lumbis*). One solution is Madvig’s *in uilia*, which is accepted by Reynolds. The verb *saeuit* is to be understood as governing *in* as well as *circa*. The passage should then be translated as: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune rages around us and against worthless things’. Madvig cites in support of *uilia*, in connection with *fortuita*, *Tranq*. 11.4: *Huic [sc. who doesn’t know how to die well]*

*itaque primum rei pretium detrahendum est et spiritus inter uilia numerandus*; *Helv*. 8.3: *id, inquam, actum est ut in alienum arbitrium nisi uilissima quaeque non caderent*; *Ep*. 66.35: *Ratio ergo arbitra est bonorum et malorum; aliena et externa pro uilibus*. These parallels suggest that he takes the *uilia* to be indifferents, and that he interprets *nos* as humanity in general, rather than Stoics in particular. I am not entirely convinced by Madvig’s emendation.

Another approach is suggested by Viansino (1988: 94). He writes ‘*infra*’. If this emendation accepted, the sense would be: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune rages around us and beneath us’. That is, everything that fortune sends surrounds us almost completely. This certainly fits with
the imagery of *CS*, in which the sage’s soul is compared to a city with walls so high that no-one can scale them.

Viansino (1968) cites in his apparatus (without giving the Latin) in support the following passages from S.: *Ira* 3.6.1; *Pol*. 16.1; *Ben*. 5.4.4; *Ben*. 7.3.2; *Med*. 520. (In his commentary (p. 409) he also cites *Prov*. 1.3, but I cannot see the relevance of this passage to the present discussion. Also, his reference to *Thy*. 351 doesn’t make sense – he must be using a different edition from Zwierlein’s OCT. Perhaps he means (using the OCT’s lineation), l. 365-8: *Qui tuto positus loco | infra se uidit Omnia | occurritque suo libens | fato nec queritur mori."

I think the passages cited by Viansino provide strong corroboration for reading *infra*. They all capture the image of the superiority, the physical elevation above possible torments, that is associated with the sage in particular, but also with those, like Antonius and Medea, who rise above adversity.

Powell (personal communication) suggests *inuitos*. It is certainly easy to see how this could have been corrupted into *inuitia*. It gives the following sense: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune rages around us even against our will’. However, the sense does seem rather bland, if not a truism. Everyone, Stoic sage and non-sage alike, has to confront the ‘slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’. There seems no need to stress this.

I can think of another possible reading. A’s *inuitia* may be a corruption of *inuidia*. This will give the following sense: ‘but everything that is sent by fortune rages around us and envy too’. Attestation for the
combination of *fortuna*/*fortuitum* with *inuidia* in S. is admittedly sparse, but cf. *Marc.* 5.6: *Nulla re maior inuidia fortunae fit quam aequo animo.* On this reading, in addition to *omne fortuitum* in general, the malice of others is considered. This is quite apposite given that *iniuria* is inflicted by somebody on someone else. Here we should consider the malice of the mob who are attacking Cato at *CS* 1.3 and also the fact that everything *sacrum* will also find some *sacrilegus* who will wish to harm it (*CS* 3.3). These two examples concern the sage, but non-sages are equally liable to be the object of envy or malice. Cf. Kaster (2005: 88 and n. 15) on *inuidia uirtutis*.

However, I think there is yet another possibility: that the text is incomplete, and that originally something followed after *iniitia*. As we have seen in the discussion on *<salua> uirtute* in 5.5, A did miss out a couple of lines of text. In that case, the missing portion was supplied by γ. This might have happened here, only in this case γ failed to include the missing text too. The reading of γ, *iniuria*, could then have been the subject of the missing verb.

**9.2: quaeque alia inter togatos latrocinia sunt:** S. is talking here of the kinds of crimes that are equivalent among (supposedly) respectable Roman citizens to banditry or brigandage (the principal sense of *latrocinium*: *OLD* 1; secondary sense ‘forcible seizure, plundering, pillage; lawless action, coercion’: *OLD* 2). These may be ‘white-collar’ crimes like embezzlement of public funds and fraud, or perhaps legacy-hunting.
9.2: *quaestuosae domus gratia erepta*: the situation to be imagined is a patron’s withdrawal of favour from a client. The adjective *quaestuosus* can mean both ‘wealthy’ and ‘lucrative’/’profitable’ (Cato *Agr.* 6 of a field; Cic. *Phil.* 2.35, of an *officina*). So the patron’s *domus* (his household) is wealthy, but it is also lucrative to the client.

9.2: *qui nescit nec in spem nec in metum uiuere*: (1) hope and fear are the two characteristic passions relating to the future. (2) Double negative with *nescio*: not found elsewhere in S. Although he is fond of double negations to add emphasis (see Traina (1987: 29-30)), these tend to be combinations of a negative pronoun or adverb followed by *non* (e.g. *nemo non*, Breu. 14.5 (with intervening word), 20.5; *numquam non*, Breu. 2.1; *nullum non*, Breu. 6.4, 7.9; *nihil non*, Breu. 15.4: see Williams ad locc.; *nullius nec hominis nec dei timor*, Ep. 17.6; *nullius . . . nec . . . nec*, Tranq. 1.7). The use of *nescio* followed by *nec ... nec* is unusual. See Stolz-Schmalz, 5th edition, 1926, p. 832 (cited by Klei ad loc., p. 123). It is similar to the double negatives found at Petronius 58.5 (*nec sursum nec deorsum non cresco, nisi dominum tuum in rutae folium non conieci*) where a verb is also involved.

Whether S. is using colloquial style where he uses double negatives can be disputed. Hofmann (1951: § 92) adduces several examples of double negatives, including one in Cicero (*Verr.* 2.60 [he incorrectly has ‘3’ not ‘2’]: *debebet . . . nummum nullum nemini*), as instances of colloquialisms. Setaioli (2000: 36-7) certainly thinks that such pleonastic negations with an infinitive following a negative verb may be evidence of the influence of
colloquial speech. The Cicero example is disputed as an instance of colloquialism as two commentators on Petronius 42.7 (*neminem nihil boni facere oportet*) – Smith, p. 102 and Schmeling, p. 167) – cite it as a *refutation* of the view that Petronius is exhibiting *semo plebeius* there. The other Cicero passage cited by Smith and Schmeling as evidence that a double negative might not be colloquial is *QF* 3.4. 1 [24.1 Shackleton Bailey]: *nullam in nullo nostrum dignitatem*.

**9.3: Adice . . . temptat:** state of soul of the sage.

**9.3: inmota mente:** a phrase found at *V. Aen.* 4.449: *mens inmota manet*, *lacrimae volvuntur inanes*. See Austin ad loc. Austin cites Augustine, *CV* 9.4, who takes the phrase to be typical of the Stoic sage’s imperturbability of soul. Williams (ad loc.) takes it as ‘the Stoic attitude (not unfeeling but resolute)’, citing *Prov.* 2.2 and *Ep.* 9.3, which are reminiscent of *CS* 16.2. For a discussion of the moral philosophical implications of *inmota mente*, see Introduction, § VI.

**9.3: uir erroribus ereptus:** the sage cannot err, because he has knowledge.

**9.3: altae quietis:** perhaps a play on different meanings of *altus*: deep (peace) and high (i.e. exalted or godlike? – cf. *CS* 6.8: *excelsa*, *inexpugnabilia*, *dis aequa*). Cf. *Breu.* 19.2: *alta rerum quies* (of the life of virtue). *Ep.* 71. Again, as with *inmota mente*, there may be an echo (whether
conscious or not) of poetic diction, e.g. Aen. 6.522: pressitque iacentem |
dulcis et **alta quies** placidaeque simillima morti; Ov. Met. 7.185-7 (OCT): |
hominès uolucresque ferasque soluerat **alta quies**; nullo cum murmure |
saepes | | [sopitae similis, nullo cum murmure serpens;] | | **inmotaeque silent** |
frondes, silet umidus aer; Luc. BC 1.249-50: pax alta per omnes | et |
tranquilla quies populos. Note the close association of **alta quies** and |
inmotus (**inmotae** . . . frondes) in Ovid, which is also found in **CS** 9.3. |
Unlike Vergil’s and Ovid’s **alta quies**, however, S.’s **alvae quietis** does not |
scan.

**9.3: ipsa illi iniuria usui sit**: cf. Prov. 2.9 for the view that adversity |
generally (and not just **iniuria**) tests, but in a beneficial way, the sage’s |
virtue.

**9.4-9.5: rounding off of the first part of the divisio.**

**9.4: Faueamus, obsecro uos, huic proposito aequisque et animis et** |
**auribus adsimus**: A combination of the first-person plural jussive |
subjunctive (**faueamus** and **adsimus**) with a parenthetic address (for |
parenthesis in S., see Bourgery, p. 335) in the second-person plural (**obsecro** |
vos), either to non-Stoics (cf. **petulantiae uestrae** . . . **saluis uitiis uestris**) or |
to the plural readership (whether Stoic or non-Stoic). The subject of the |
first-person plural **faueamus** is probably the inclusive ‘we’, i.e. ‘you and |
me’; otherwise, the combination of first-person plural verb followed by a
second-person plural address is awkward. With the exception of 3.1, where Serenus is imagined to be addressing the Stoics, *uos* and *uester* are used in this treatise of non-Stoics, or at least the plural readership, Stoic or not (*uos*: 9.4, 15.2, 15.4, 16.3, 19.4; *uester*: 9.4 (x 2), 15.2, 15.4, 19.4). The first-person plural presumably refers to everyone (including of course S.) who is not a sage.

Grimal (p. 70) thinks that the language here is ‘religieux’, citing *VB* 26.7 (*favete linguis*, also found in Hor. *Carm*. 3.1.2). *Faueamus* governs *huic proposito*, and so on this interpretation, we should have to translate ‘let us be silent in the presence of this proposition’ (Basore in the Loeb translation, p. 77), with *linguis* understood. At *Ep*. 52.10 we find *favere* without *linguis* but meaning *fauere linguis*: *tacete, fauete et praebet uos curationi philosophi tamquam medici*. Moreover, the religious character of the language here seems to be reinforced by *obsecro* and *adsimus*; for the latter cf. Tib. 2.1.1: *quisquis adest, fauet*. The language of the passage is very close to that of Terence, *Andria*, prol. 24: *fauete, adeste aequo animo et rem cognoscite*, and *Hecyra* 28: *aequo animo attendite*. However, *favere* may not be being used here in a religious sense, but rather in the sense of ‘let us favour this proposition’. The phrase *fauere proposito*, which has no inherently religious connotation, is found at Ovid, *Fasti* 1.468 (*ipsa mone, quae nomen habes a carmine ductum, | propostoque faue, ne tuus erret honor!*); Pliny *Pan*. 95.3 (*uos modo fauete huic proposito*). It can be interpreted as looking forward to *aequis* later in the sentence, which may mean ‘sympathetic’. It can be argued that *obsecro vos* is religious language.
(but so weakened that it doesn’t carry much weight), which reinforces Grimal’s view. But obsecrare is used frequently of imploring, without any religious connotation, for instance in an appeal to an audience or panel of judges in the peroratio of a speech, as at Cic. Mur. 86: oro atque obsecro, iudices, ut ne... obruatis; S. Ben. 3.38.3: certate, obsecro vos. Moreover, there is some dispute as to the correct interpretation of the line of the Andria prologue cited in the previous paragraph, Shipp (p. 121) thinking that favete is not religious but legal language, as in Quintilian 4.1.73: iudices... ut faveant rogamus. Such an interpretation would certainly fit with the frequent use of legal language in this treatise. It seems, then, that favere and obsecrare can be both hieratic and legal in register, and that S. may be exploiting both levels of meaning here.

_aequisque et animis et auribus_ is probably a zeugma, with _aequis_ governing both _animis_ and _auribus_, with a different meaning each time. _aequis animis_ seems to be a plural variant on the common Latin phrase _aequo animo_ (‘with a calm soul’, ‘level-headedly’). But one might ask why the audience should keep their heads in the presence of the _propositum_. Is it likely to enrage them? It might, given that S. mentions _petulantiae uestrae_. . . _caecae temeritatis_ in the next sentence; it certainly would support the interpretation of _faueamus_ as ‘let us be silent’: if you are keeping quiet, you are (probably) calm of soul. Support for this interpretation may be found at 2.8.3: _aequo placidoque animo_. Alternatively, and surely correctly, one could interpret _aequisque animis_ as ‘with impartial minds’, i.e. the nonsages are to give the _propositum_ a fair hearing. However, this latter
interpretation of *aequis animis* runs into trouble when we come to the interpretation of *auribus*. This word is redundant unless it is taken with *aequis*: if one attends (*adesse*), whether in the sense of listening or in the sense merely of being present, one will have one’s ears with one. So, we must take *auribus* with *aequis*, and *aequis auribus* (and variants of it) is indeed a very common phrase, meaning ‘with sympathetic ears’ or ‘impartial ears’, i.e. giving someone a fair hearing. [For example, Cic. *Fam.* 7.33.2: *meis aequissimis utuntur auribus*; Sen. rhet. *Contr.* 7.1.4: *aequos praebete aures*. For exhaustive examples of *aequis auribus*, see *TLL* I.1037.] But what is it to give an impartial hearing if not to be fair-minded? If we take *aequis animis* to be ‘with fair minds’, then we have S. has repeating himself: ‘with fair minds and fair ears’. We can smooth over the difficulty and preserve the zeugma by translating ‘with impartial minds and sympathetic ears’, but the difficulty remains. I think it would be preferable to interpret *aequis animis* as ‘with calm souls’.

9.4: *saluis uitiis uestrís haec sapienti libertas quaeritur*: the thought seems to be that the moral flaws of others provide the opportunity for the sage to attain freedom through virtue. They are a foil to the sage. In *saluis uitiis* there is possibly an ironic allusion to the Stoic term *salua virtute*. There may also be a parody of legal terminology relating to property or legal rights, e.g. *quibus casibus saluam manere tutelam patrono* (Gaius, *Inst.* 1.181).
9.5: *Sic in certaminibus sacris* . . . *consecuti sunt*: the comparison of the sage with an athlete may go back to Panaetius, cited in Latin translation by Gellius (AN 13.28, cited by Grimal (p. 42) in his discussion of CS 3.3.). However, it is the *vir prudens* (man of practical wisdom), not the *sapiens*, who is described by Panaetius. S.’s boxing imagery here does not reflect approval of athletics as a means to attaining virtue. He is generally sceptical (e.g. *Epp.* 15 and 80) about the value of athletics in training the soul, while admitting (in *Ep.* 15) that some forms of light physical exercise are not incompatible with philosophy (see Koenig 2005: 137-40 on *Epp.* 15 and 80).

9.5: *in certaminibus sacris*: these may be the ἱεροὶ ἀγῶνες (Olympic, Pythian, Nemean, Isthmian) of Greece. Minissale (p. 136) considers that there may be an allusion to Roman quinquennial games established by Augustus at Naples (Suet. *Aug.* 98) and Nero at Rome (Suet. *Nero* 12). However, it may be that a reference to sacred games in general, both Greek and Roman, is intended.

10.1-11.2: *introduction of the second part of the divisio*, which includes a definition of *contumelia* and an explanation of the moral psychology underlying it.

10.1: here begins the second part of the treatise, which considers *contumelia*. Picking up on the preliminary distinction made between *iniuria*
and *contumelia* at 5.1, S. defines *contumelia* as a lesser *iniuria* that cannot be redressed by law, because there is no law against it (*Est minor iniuria . . . putauerunt*, 10.1). Whether a *contumelia* has been made is a subjective matter, and depends on the state of soul of the person allegedly insulted. The *affectus* (passion, emotion) of offence at words or deeds is caused by the *humilitas animi contrahentis se* (‘the humility of a soul which lessens itself’). This picks up 5.1: *Prior illa natura grauior est, haec leuior et tantum delicatis grauis, qua non laeduntur homines sed offenduntur*. The phrase *humilitas animi contrahentis se* explains why *delicati* should be so: they have an inferior soul. The sentiment is similar to that at *Helv*. 13.6.

10.1: *Quoniam priorem partem percucurrimus, ad alteram transeamus, qua quibusdam propriis, plerisque uero communibus, contumeliam refutabimus.*

It is by no means obvious what the *quaedam propria* and *pleraque communia* are, more specifically, what it is it to which they are *propria* or *communia*. Leaving aside for the moment the interpretation of *quibusdam* and *plerisque*, there are two possibilities for the referents of *propriis* and *communibus*, both of which have been suggested in the literature. One possibility is that *quaedam propria* are arguments (*argumenta* understood in the Latin?) that are distinctive to the Stoics, but not to other schools, and that the *communia* are arguments that Stoics and others both use. The problem with this interpretation is that there is very little evidence of any
argument deployed by S. that is not distinctively Stoic. At 15.4, S. does cite with approval (Quam paene emisit uiri uocem!) Epicurus’ saying ‘raro sapienti fortuna interuenit’, only to make clear the distinction between the purport of Epicurus’ remark and the true Stoic position. Again, at 16.3, S. does admit that the differences between Stoics and Epicurus are slight (Non est quod putes magnum quo dissidemus). Moreover, utraque exempla (‘exempla from each side [i.e. Stoic and Epicurean]’ urge contempt of injuries and insults, which can be tolerated/endured by a person who is not a sage, viz. a consipiens. Nevertheless, they do disagree; as with much moral philosophy, the ends are the same, but the explanations and approaches to the ends adopted by different philosophers are not the same.

Another interpretation is offered by Basore in his Loeb translation: ‘Having touched upon the first part of the discussion, let us now pass to the second, in which by arguments – some of them our own, most of them, however, common to our school – we shall disprove the possibility of insult’ (p. 77). Here, propria is taken to refer to arguments devised by S. himself, while communia refers to arguments held by all Stoics. [It is also attributed by Viансино (1988: 412) to Charpentier (‘prove trovate da Seneca’ and ‘prove tradizionali’). I take it that Basore’s ‘our own’ refers to S., who is in any case using the ‘royal we’ in this sentence (refutabimus).] While this is an interesting interpretation, it is not easy to identify the propria. From his other works, particularly some of the Epistles, it is clear that S. had a mind of his own and did not just accept the Stoic tradition uncritically. However, in the Epistles he does make it clear when he is departing from tradition or
disagreeing with a predecessor. In *CS*, by contrast, there is no such open
disagreement with tradition, if indeed there is any disagreement. The tenor
of *CS* does seem fairly traditional in Stoic terms, which makes this
interpretation hard to prove. I therefore think we should consider other
interpretations of this passage.

Friedrich (1902), according to Viansino (1988: 412), takes *propria*
to refer to arguments that concern the sage specifically (‘riguardanti il
saggio’), while *communia* are arguments that are applicable to all people
(‘riferabili a tutti’). Certainly the focus is on the sage in the immediate
discussion following 10.1, in particular his *magnanimitas* (11.1). And then
S. shifts his attention in this second part of *CS* away from the sage
specifically to the *consipiens*, the ‘middle case’, as it were, between the
near-unattainable ideal of the sage and the beginner’s state in which Serenus
finds himself at present. The *consipiens* is an ideal to which most ordinary
people can aspire with some expectation of attaining it; hence he is
*communis*. The sage does crop up again in the discussion at 15.1-5, but then
it moves away from him specifically. I think this interpretation has more to
commend it than later commentators have given it credit for. Klei (1950:
128) and Abel (1967: 144) accept without comment Albertini’s (1923: 75-6)
objection, which reads as follows: ‘les ch. 10-14 corresponderaient aux
*propria*, les ch. 16 (§ 4), 17 et 18 aux *communia*; les 15 et 16, 1-3, seraient
mixtes et serviraient de junction. Mais il faut une exégèse compliquée et
pénible pour que les deux adjectifs à être ainsi chargés de sens.’
In place of this ‘exégèse compliquée et pénible’ Albertini offers an interpretation based on nineteenth-century works by Rabbow and Bouillet. It is that *propria* refers to arguments applicable to *contumelia* alone, while *communia* refers to arguments that are applicable to both *contumelia* and *iniuria*. On this interpretation, he argues, only *contumelia* is under discussion in chapters 10-14, while *iniuria* reappears in chapters 15 and 16, and then again in chapter 19. In my view, Albertini’s suggestion is just as ‘complicated’ as Friedrich’s. Indeed, whatever the interpretation of *propria* and *communia* adopted, there will be a shift between the two in the second half of the treatise; that is unavoidable, from S.’s very words.

I shall discuss two further interpretations. Viansino (1988: 411-12), without specifying the scholar (perhaps it is himself) suggests that *propria* may refer to ‘consigli pratici’ and *communia* to ‘consigli di carattere generale’, equivalent to the distinction between *praecpta*, which are *specialia*, and *decreta*, which are *generalia* that S. offers in Ep. 94.31: *Quid enim interest inter decreta philosophiae et praecpta nisi quod illa generalia praecpta sunt, haec specialia? Utraque res praecipit, sed altera in totum, particulatim altera.* He also cites in support Clement of Alexandria’s *Protrepticus* 11.113, glossing: ‘consigli su punti particolari; consigli validi per insieme della vita’. I do not find this interpretation convincing. First, it requires us to interpret the entire discussion of 10-19 as concerning *contumelia*, which it patently does not, as *iniuria* figures in it too. Second, I am not sure that *propria* and *communia* are synonyms of *specialia* and *generalia*, as this interpretation requires. Probably, *communia*
could be interpreted in the sense of *generalia* (i.e. *decreta*) that concern insult generally, in all its manifestations. But I think Viansino’s interpretation becomes more difficult when we consider *propria*. Surely, on the subject of *contumelia*, there could be *decreta* that prescribe a general attitude to insult and *praeepepta* that prescribe a particular form of behaviour in response to a particular insult. But they will both be *propria*, in that they concern the subject of *contumelia*.

The final interpretation I shall discuss is that favoured by Grimal (1949: 252, cited in Abel 1967: 145), who cites the distinction made by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1.1.1355b24-29) and found later in Cicero’s *De oratore* 2.315, between *idia/propría* (arguments intended for specialists, here Stoics) and *koina/communia* (those intended for laymen). This is a variation on the first interpretation I considered, with the laymen standing instead of the other philosophical schools: *communia* now means ‘common to all people’, whereas earlier it meant ‘common to all schools’. Certainly, the *consipiens* is something that it is possible for non-sages to become, whereas sagehood is a rare accomplishment indeed. To that extent, the insult-part of *CS* opens up the discussion to lay people and their potentialities, if properly guided; Stoics, even budding ones like Serenus (if he really is a Stoic at the stage, rather than a sceptical Epicurean), can also benefit, of course.

After reviewing these interpretations of *propria* and *communia*, I think that the most likely to be correct are Friedrich’s and Albertini’s, but I think that neither is conclusive. Clearly, there is a mixture of arguments in the second part of *CS*. Certainly, the title(s) of the work notwithstanding,
there is a move away from the exclusive concentration on the sage and his vulnerability to the possibilities for self-improvement of the non-sage, who can make a start on the path to virtue by learning to handle insults in a Stoic way. There is also a mixture of discussion on *contumelia* and *iniuria* (not surprising perhaps as the one is a subset of the other).

**10.2: dictum factum:** asyndeton. However, A<sup>3</sup> reads *factumque*; and –*que* or –*ue* may easily have been omitted.

**10.2: inhonorisicum:** according to Grimal (p. 73) a ‘néologisme, peut-être creation de Sen.’. Minissale (p. 138) cites ἄτιμος as its Greek model.

**10.2: 'ille me hodie non admisit, cum alios admitteret', et 'sermonem meum aut superbe auersatus est aut palam risit', et 'non in medio me lecto sed in imo conlocuit':** examples of supposedly insulting behaviour, recounted in direct speech from the point of view of the offended party. For supposed cause for offence provided by seating and other arrangements at dinner parties, see *De ira* 3.37.

**10.2: alia huius notae:** ‘other things of this stamp/character’. Cf. *Clem.*

2.2.2 for the same expression and Braund ad loc.

**10.2: nausiantis animi:** a soul suffering from *nausea* (sometimes spelled *nausia*: *Ep.* 16.3), according to *OLD* the verb being used in its transferred
sense, so: ‘a soul feeling disgust/loathing’. In its literal sense, nausea means sickness or vomiting, e.g. *Ep.* 16.3, *Tranq.* 1.17. Here the familiar metaphor of the sick soul of the non-sage reappears.

As with *adamas* (3.5) and *struthocamelus* (17.2), this is a Greek word that had been assimilated into Latin by S.’s day (it is found e.g. in Plautus (*Amph.* 329: *nausio*) and Cicero (*Att.* 5.21.3: *nausians*; *Fam.* 7.26.2: *nausiantem*): for other examples, see *TLL* under *nauseo*), and which he therefore reproduces in Roman script. See Bickel (1906) and cf. Commentary on 3.5 and 17.1.

**10.3: ingenia natura infirma et muliebria:** picks up the theme of female infirmity introduced at 1.1, and picked up again at 14.1, though with some concession to possibility of improvement by education: *imprudens animal est et, nisi scientia accessit ac multa eruditione, ferum, cupiditatum inontinens.* See Viansino (1968: 145) for copious references for Senecan ‘misoginia’; also Minissale, pp. 139-40. A recent discussion is Wilox (2006), which argues that, although in general *muliebritas* is pejorative, women can show virtue by the way they mourn.

**10.3: uitio interpretantis:** reiterates the view that insult is a matter of incorrect interpretation of others’ deeds and words. It thus builds on the idea that it is possible to choose not to accept a *contumelia* even if one is meant, just as it is possible to see an insult where none is intended. cf. *De ira*

3.11.1: *quaedam interpretatio eo perdecit ut uideantur iniuriae* (on taking
maligni sermones to be iniuriae). Again, it is a question of knowledge, which the sage possesses and the non-sage does not. The sage knows his worth and will not pay attention to words and deeds that seem to diminish him, even if they were not intended as such; he interprets correctly, the non-sage does not.

10.4: **Alia sunt . . . haec non nego sentire sapientem:** a reiteration of the point that the sage does not accept injuries, but here with emphasis on the fact that he does actually feel the hurt. He demonstrates his virtue by not minding the pain and not accepting that any injury is done to him. This consideration might have been better placed earlier, where the lengthy expatiation on the invulnerability of the sage to harm gives the impression that he does not even feel pain, let alone accept it as injury (Graver 2007: 86-108). **Ep. 99.18:** he doesn’t criticize the wise man who weeps at the funeral of a loved one, for these tears are involuntary. For variations on this theme, see **Ep. 85.29:** *Iste vero dolet (sensum enim hominis nulla exuit virtus), sed non timet: invictus ex alto dolores suos spectat.* At **Ep. 9.3,** S. contrasts the sentience of the Stoic sage with the insentience of the Epicurean, thereby showing the Stoic’s superiority inasmuch as he has to overcome pain whereas the Epicurean does not: *Hoc inter nos et illos interest: noster sapiens vincit quidem incommodum omne sed sentit, illorum ne sentit quidem.*
11.1: pulcherrimam uirtutem omnium [animi], magnanimitatem: The word *magnanimitas*, which seems to have been coined by Cicero (*Off.* 1.152), presumably by analogy with words like *aequanimitas*, which itself already occurs in Terence (*Phormio* 34), is a translation of the Greek word *μεγαλοψυχία*, which is used by Aristotle (*NE* IV.3) to denote the virtuous man’s sense of self-worth, by which he correctly recognises his moral superiority and expects that the less virtuous will pay him due honour (including external goods such as political offices and wealth). See Grimal 77-8 for a full discussion of this concept; also Viansino (1968: 146-7) and Minissale 144-5.

In S. the term, and its sonorous synonym *magnitudo animi* (cf. 6.2; 9.4), still denotes the correct judgment of self-worth on the part of the virtuous person, but the Stoic sage holds external goods to be *adiaphora* (*indifferentia*), of no intrinsic moral value. The differences (and similarities) between Aristotle and S. can be seen in Aristotle’s *Posterior Analytics* 97*a*15-26 (adduced by Braund in her note on *magnanimitas* in *Clem.* 1.5.3), in which *megalopsuchia* is defined as either ‘not to put up with an [physical?] insult (*hubrizomenoi*)’ (exemplified by Alcibiades, Achilles and Ajax) or ‘indifference to good or bad fortune’ (exemplified by Lysander and Socrates). [I am using Braund’s translation of the Greek here, with aspects of the first queried and the second slightly modified.] In the Stoic view, these two Aristotelian aspects of *megalopsuchia* are incompatible, because the man who is immune to the vicissitudes of fortune (the sage) will not even *see* that an insult has been directed at him, as S. argues in *CS*. It is
through his ‘greatness of soul’ that the sage surpasses all non-sages. The thought is well expressed at Ep. 74.13: *perit magnanimitas, quae non potest eminere nisi omnia velut minuta contempsit quae pro maximis vulgus optat.*

The sage’s correct judgement of the unimportance of the things which ordinary people hold dear originates from his superior, godlike rationality, by which he understands the true nature of the universe and man’s place in it. Compare De *ira* 3.5.7-8, where S. says that greatness of soul is ‘the most beautiful virtue of all’, with which compare Ep. 115.3: *ex istis [sc. virtutibus] magnanimitas eminentissima.* [Cf. also Fragment 78 Voterro (29 Haase), a quotation by Lactantius, *Divinae institutiones* 5.13.20, p. 443, 5-8 Brandt: *Recte igitur Seneca incongruentiam hominibus obiectans ait: ‘Summa virtus illis videtur magnus animus, et idem eum qui contemnit mortem pro furioso habent: quod est utique summa perversitatis.*’] In giving this high position to *magnanimitas*, S. may be following a strand of Stoic tradition that goes back to Panaetius. According to Cicero in *Partitiones Oratoriae* 77, which Pohlenz (cited in Knoche (1935: 53) and Gauthier (1951: 159)), thought based on Panaetius, greatness of soul comprises the whole category of practical virtues: *Quae autem haec [sc. practical virtues] uno genere complectitur, magnitudo animi dicitur: cuius est liberalitas in usu pecuniae, simulque altitudo animi in capiendis incommodis et maxime iniuriis, et omne quod est eius generis, grave, sedatum [non turbulentum].* [The division between theoretical and practical virtues set out in *Part. 76 (Est igitur vis virtutis duplex: aut enim scientia cernitur aut actione*) is due to Panaetius, according to Diogenes Laertius 7.92.] The other practical
virtues are: temperantia (Gk. sōphrosunē, temperance), prudentia (Gk. phronēsis, practical wisdom), and fortitudo (Gk. andreia, courage in facing future evils)/patientia (Gk. karteria: endurance of present evils). See the detailed discussion in Gauthier (1951: 157-64).

In S.’s thinking greatness of soul is connected with goodness of soul, e.g. De ira 1.20.6, where S. disagrees with Livy’s judgement of someone that he is a uir ingenii magni magis quam boni.

It is interesting to compare here Pliny’s Panegyricus of the emperor Trajan, which draws a much fuller connection between the magnitudo (animi) of the emperor and height. For instance, at Pan. 56 he says: Accidit quidem, ut corpora quamlibet ardua et excelsa, procerioribus admota, decrescant; item, ut altissimae civium dignitates collatione fastigii tui quasi deprimantur, quantoque propius ad magnitudinem tuam adscenderint, tantum etiam a sua descendisse videantur. Illos tamen tu [...] adeo in edito collocasti, ut tantum super ceteros, quantum infra te cernerentur. Si unius tertium consulatum eundem in annum, in quem tuum, contulisses: ingentis animi specimen haberetur. Ut enim felicitatis est, quantum velis, posse: sic magnitudinis, velle, quantum possis. And at Pan. 94.3 in his closing prayer to Jupiter calling upon him to protect the emperor in the future, he thanks the king of the gods for his past protection of Trajan: Neque enim sine auxilio tuo, cum altissima quaeque quaterentur, hic, qui omnibus excelsior, inconcussus stetit. Here, like the sage the emperor is not only higher than the rest of men, but also is unshaken, like the city walls of the sage’s soul in CS. As for S. the Stoic sage is close to godhood, so also is the emperor
Trajan for Pliny. Given the similarity between S.’s language in CS and Pliny’s language in his Panegyricus, there is some justification for thinking that Pliny may have been influenced by S.’s language in CS here. Griffin (2000: 543-5) thinks that he may have used S.’s De clementia when composing the Panegyricus. Pliny studied philosophy as a young man, and he knew and admired the Stoic philosopher Euphrates of Tyre (Plin. Ep. 1.10), who, according to Fronto (Ad Verum 4), had been a pupil of Musonius Rufus. [For a full discussion of Euphrates, see Frede (1997).]

Although Pliny admits (perhaps with excessive modesty) in Ep. 1.10 that his philosophical understanding was slight, and indeed only mentions S. once in his extant writings (in Ep. 5.3.15, where his name appears in a list of famous men who wrote light verse as a diversion), CS 11.1 suggests that his acquaintance with S.’s works may have been deeper.

11.2: Contumelia a contemptu dicta est, quia nemo nisi quem contempsit tali iniuria notat; nemo autem maiorem melioremque contemnit, etiam si facit aliquid quod contemnentes solent: the etymology on which S. bases his analysis of the nature of contumelia – the derivation from contenneo – is generally considered to be a false one: see E–M 140 and W–H 267-8, who prefer a derivation from tumeo, to swell (with self-importance and overweening arrogance?). Interestingly, this etymology, although it is not S.’s, is also relevant to his view of contemptus, which he describes as istum adfectum inflatum at 11.1. Also, as W–H note, this etymology links the word with contumax/contumacia (see note below).
11.2: tali iniuria notat: here S. refers to contumelia as an iniuria, which may give support to Grimal’s interpretation of minor iniuria at 10.1 as ‘a lesser injury’ (with iniuria in the nominative) rather than ‘lesser than injury’ (with iniuria in the ablative), which Ker has in his translation. Interesting is S.’s use of notare here. Although it basically means to mark with an insult here, there may be an underlying allusion to the censor’s putting a mark against the name of an infamosus citizen, and hence stigmatizing him (see OLD 3a, 3c). It hints at the likely intention of insult in many cases, viz. to diminish someone’s social standing (see Introduction, § VII). Of course, the sage is not bothered by this.

11.2: Nam et pueri os parentium feriunt et crines matris turbauit
lacerauitque infans et sputo adspersit aut nudauit in conspectu suorum
tegenda et uerbis obscenioribus non pepercit: these examples of the typical behaviour of unsocialised children are similar to the behaviour of adults who commit iniuriae or contumeliae. On the socialisation of children, S. recommended a firm but not overly restrictive approach (see Ira 2.21.1-6).

11.3: mancipiorum nostrorum urbanitas in dominos contumeliosa:

mancipium is here a synonym for servus, as at S. rhet. Suas. 7.6: Lepidus . . .

utriusque collegae . . . mancipium; S. Ben. 3.28.4: adulterarum commune mancipium. In connection with the ‘insulting wittiness’ Grimal (79) cites S. Ep. 50.2, where S. discusses Harpaste, his wife’s fatua (‘clown’, in Gummere’s Loeb translation). However, there is no evidence that Harpaste insulted her mistress. For the licence allowed to slaves, particularly for purposes of entertainment, see Petronius, Satyricon 64.11ff., where Trimalchion encourages his deliciae, the slave boy Croesus, to mount him as if he were a horse and beat his shoulder-blades with the flat of his hand.

Here audacia . . . coepit a domino, and the play does resemble that between parents and children (cf. the indignities meted out to their parents by children at 11.1), as when a father allows his child to ride him like a horse. For the contrast between the modestia expected of free boys and the licentia allowed to slave boys born in the household, cf. Prov. 1.6 (cogita filiorum nos modestia delectari, uernularum licentia, illos disciplina tristiiri conitineri, horum ali audaciam). On this contrast, see the discussion in Mencacci (2010).

11.3: seruulo: the diminutive is probably colloquial language (see Minissale 149), appropriate in the context of slaves. Cf. the use of colaphus at CS 5.2 and 14.3.
11.3: ioculare conuicium: ‘insulting talk’, ‘mockery’ (OLD conuicium 2).
Not intended to be taken seriously, as the adjective indicates. Conuicium can have a legal sense, as Berger (1953: 416) explains: ‘A verbal offence against a person’s honor. It is considered an iniuria when committed by loud shouting in public (vociferatio).’

12-13: explanations of the sage’s total indifference to attempts to insult him.

12.2: talorum nucumue et aeris minuti: knucklebones (tali) of animals were used for gaming. Cf. Martial 14.14.1: Cum steterit nullus vultu tibi talus eodem; Quint. Inst. 6.1.47: qui pueris in epilogum productis talos iecit in medium. Presumably nuts were also used as counters in games. For the importance of nuts to children, cf. S. Ira 1.12.4: non pietas illam iram sed infirmitas mouet, sicut pueris, qui tam parentibus amissis flebunt quam nucibus. For the pairing of tali and nucis, cf. Hor. Serm. 2.3.170-1: postquam te talos, Aule, nucuesque | ferre sinu laxo, donare et ludere vidi . . . aeris minuti refers to small change (‘little copper coins’ in Ker’s translation). The phrase aes minutum occurs rarely (TLL I.1075, aes III.1): here in CS for the first time, and then in Juv. 6.546 (aere minuto); also the Gospel of Luke, Vulg. 21.2: aera minuta duo (λεπτὰ δύο in the Greek).

Note also the asymmetric correspondence . . . ue et . . . (on which see H–S, vol. 2, p. 522, § 285 fu). Also found at Hor. Serm. 2.6.75-6 (quidue [. . .] et quae [. . .]), Tac. Agr. 33.4 (montesue et flumina).
For the wrong priorities of children, cf. S. Ep. 115.8: *simillimi pueris, quibus omne ludicrum in pretio est; parentibus quippe nec minus fratribus praefuerunt parvo aere emptam monilia.*

**12.2: orbium:** so Reynolds, following a suggestion of Ageno (1922: 25).

*Orbes* were round tables whose tops were made from the section of a tree, usually the citron tree (*OLD* 2f). They were often put on legs of ivory: Lucan 10.145; Martial 2.43.9; 14.139(138). For the use of *orbes* in banquets, cf. also Martial 9.59.7; Juv. 1.137. (For further passages see Ageno (1922: 26). The only two passages of S. he adduces – *Ben.* 7.9 and *Tranq.* 1.7 – do not contain the word *orbis*, but only *mensa*, although the tables in question are wooden.) Reynolds cites in his apparatus *Helv.* 11.6, presumably meaning these words: *lapides aurum argentum et magni leuatique mensarum orbes.* Although this passage is not cited by Ageno, it offers some corroboration for his reading, with its juxtaposition of gold and silver and round tables. Lana (ad loc., p. 197 n. 5), in support of *orbium*, cites Dio Cassius (61.10.3), who says that S. possessed 500 round tables of citrus wood with ivory legs, all identical, on which he served banquets. If true (Dio was hostile to S.), this still does not mean he wrote *orbium* and not *urbium* here, unless he was being self-critical. Like Klei, I see no need to alter the text in this fashion, and disagree with Reynolds’s text at this point.

**12.2: quod illi inter ipsos magistratus gerunt et praetextam fascesque ac tribunal imitantur, hi eadem in campo foroque et in curia serio ludunt:**
for boys imitating adult political life cf. Plut. *Cato min.* 2.5: as a boy Cato the Younger and his friends played at ‘actions at law, accusations, and the conducting of the condemned persons to prison’ (Loeb translation). Such games helped in the socialisation of children. See Harlow & Laurence (2002: 49) on children reflecting in their games the roles they were to play in adult life. The oxymoron *serio ludunt* brings out the trivial nature of much adult activity, from the sage’s viewpoint, but the seriousness with which it is pursued.

**12.2: illi in litoribus harenae congestu simulacra domuum excitant:** the use of children making sandcastles as a comparison for adult human activity goes back as far as Homer (*Il.* 15.361ff., Hector pulling down the Achaean wall as easily as a child kicks and pulls down a sandcastle he has just built; cited by Klei 139). *Harenae congestu(s)* is paralleled in *Lucr.* 6.724 (also cited by Klei 139); cf. also *Hor. Serm.* 2.3.247: building little houses (*Aedificare casas*) is a childish pastime. For a discussion of Roman children’s games, see Harlow & Laurence (2002: 46-51). An interesting philosophical use is by Heraclitus (D–K 52), who compares Zeus creating the world to a child building a sandcastle. However, S.’s intention is quite otherwise here, for he likens non-sages, who unlike the sage are certainly not *similis deo*, to children playing in the sand.

**12.2: in lapidibus ac parietibus et tectis moliendis occupati tutelae corporum inuenta in periculum uerterunt:** a common theme in S. and
others (see Viansino (1968: 149) for references), the sentiment is that the construction of elaborate but structurally unsound buildings perverts the purpose of buildings, which is to provide shelter and protection. For copious references to the collapse of buildings, which was a common problem in Rome, see Klei 139-40; Viansino (1968: 149); also Carcopino (1991: 43-4). The word *tutela* here means ‘protection’ (*OLD* 2). However, given the context in which it appears, in a passage that compares children making sandcastles with adult builders whose constructions are also often flimsy, there may be some resonance of the legal meaning the word, i.e. ‘guardianship’, ‘tutelage’ (*OLD* 1), whereby a widowed mother exercised guardianship over her children through a tutor. On *tutela* as guardianship, see Gardner (1991: 146-54).

12.3 *contumelias sapiens ut iocos accipit*: just as the master is not troubled, indeed is pleased by, the mock-insults of his witty slave boys, so the Stoic sage takes the insults of adult non-sages as jokes.

12.3: *et aliquando illos tamquam pueros malo poenaque admonet* [adficet], *non quia accepit iniuriam, sed quia fecerunt, et ut desinant facere; sic enim et pecora uerbere domantur*: the sage’s consideration of adult non-sages as children extends to occasional corporal punishment as a deterrence against insults. S. is not specific here whether the men the sage occasionally beats as a punishment and deterrence for insolence are slaves or free, or of either category. If they are free men, then this would be a great
dishonour and indignity, inasmuch as they would be being treated not only as children but as slaves. On the unacceptibility of beating as a punishment for free men, by contrast with its acceptability when used to correct slaves and children, see Saller (1991: 151-65). On the need to beat children as a punishment S. is in agreement with Chrysippus (SVF III 736, as cited by Quintilian (1.3.14), who disapproves of beating children).

The Codex Ambrosianus (A) has admonet adficit, while the γ group has admonet et adficit. Fickert reads admonet [et adficit], while Reynolds has admonet [adficit]. Given the frequency of asyndeton in CS (e.g. 6.5 teneo, habeo; 7.1 exhibuimus, exhibebimus), I see no reason not to accept A’s reading, and to add a comma between them, as does Klei, in order to bring the style into line with that at 6.5 and 7.1.

12.3: pecora: usually used of herds of farm animals (e.g. sheep and cattle), but in poetic usage extended to other animals (e.g. horses). sessorem (‘rider’) implies that the animals are horses, and therefore that the usage is poetic here. The analogy of non-sages and non-Stoics with animals is very common in S. See e.g. VB 1.3 (ne pecorum ritu sequamur antecedentium gregem), Ep. 90.4.

12.3: contumaciam: contumax is used of unruly animals by S. at De ira 2.26.5, 3.34.1 (uerba contumeliosa, motus corporum parum honorificos, contumacia iumenta et pigra mancipia), and Clem. 1.16.4.
Besides its main sense of ‘obstinacy’ or ‘stubbornness’, the word has a legal sense, viz. ‘wilful disobedience to a judicial order’ (OLD 2). Berger (1953: 415): ‘Non-obedience to an order of a magistrate in general, to a judicial magistrate or a judge in particular, the refusal to answer or another form of contempt of court. A specific form of contumacia is non-appearance in court in spite of a summons or hiding to avoid a summons.’ It also has a military sense of disobedience of a superior’s order (ibid.), although as many commanders (e.g. praetors) also had legal functions, there may be little difference between the two usages. Examples: *si in contumacia perseverassent* (CIL 10.7852.12); *contumaciam ligatoris arbiter punire poterit* (Javolenus, *Dig.* 4.8.39); *Neque enim sufficit eum poenae restitui, quam contumacia elusit* (Trajan to Pliny: Plin. *Ep.* 10.57.2; see Sherwin-White 639 ad loc., citing *Dig.* 48.19.5). I think it is unlikely that the legal sense is the prime meaning in *CS* 12.3, but there may be a hint of it. Non-sages disregard the laws of God and nature, just as contumaces disregard the summons of the magistrate.

12.3: Ergo et illud solutum scies quod nobis opponitur: ‘quare, si non accepit iniuriam sapiens nec contumeliam, punit eos qui fecerunt?’: another objection by an imaginary interlocutor.

13.1: Quis enim phrenetico medicus irascitur? Quis febricitantis et a frigida prohibiti maledicta in malam partem accipit?: S. compares the sage to a doctor and those who insult him to insane or feverish patients. Cf.
S. Ira 1.15.1 *quis enim cui medetur irascitur?* This continues the medical theme, which was introduced at 1.1. The doctor is not angry at the madman because he cannot be reasoned with, nor is he troubled by the feverish patient’s abuse because he recognises that the patient is sick and not fully responsible for his or her actions, rather as the children at 11.2 are not fully responsible for their actions. Also, the feverish patient might not understand the reason for being denied cold water when he is hot and is angry at being refused what he thinks is a reasonable request.

The word *phreneticus*, a Latinization of the Greek medical term φρενητικός, was already well established in Latin usage by S.’s day, having been used by Cicero (*Div. 1.81*) and Celsus (2.4.8). For this reason, he does not use Greek script: see Bickel (1906). Cf. the other Greek borrowing in *CS: adamas* (3.5), *nausians* (10.1) and *struthocamelus* (17.1) and Commentary ad loc. Viansino (1968: 151) gives copious examples. Likewise with *febricitans*: the medical term *febricitare* was a relatively new coinage, introduced, according to Viansino (1968: 151), by Celsus: see Celsus 2.1.15 (*insania febricitantium*) and *TLL* VI.1.406-7; cf. S. Ben. 4.39.3 (*non (surgam) si febricitauero*). The phrase *a frigida [sc. aqua] prohibiti* (cf. S. Ben. 2.14.2: *frigidam aegris negamus*) refers to the kind of treatment given to feverish patients. For instance, Celsus (3.15.1-3), in his discussion of the treatment of quartan fever, recommends that patients should only drink hot water in the seven days after the remission of the paroxysm. Other aspects the language of this passage, although not specifically medical, do take on a medical hue from the context. So,
reliquias et effusa, which Ker translates as: ‘excrement and urine’. Although reliquiae often means ‘remains’/’scraps of food’ (Ep. 77.8), here, given the medical context, I agree with Ker that it should be taken to mean ‘excrement’ (or ‘stools’). Likewise effusa should be taken as denoting urine rather than bodily discharges in general (see OLD effundō 3b); cf. Celsus 7.7.1b: vesica . . . effundit . . . umorem.

13.2: adfectum: normally in S., adfectus refers to a passion, something that a sage does not experience. For instance, at 11.1 istum adfectum inflatum refers to contemptus, the cause of the urge to insult. Here, however, it cannot have that meaning; otherwise S. would be saying that the sage has a passion. To get round this dilemma I think we should follow Minissale (p. 157) in taking adfectum here to mean ‘disposition of the mind’ rather than ‘passion’, but not for the reasons she gives. Minissale cites in support of her interpretation Quint. Inst. 6.2.8 (which she cites incorrectly as 6.2.7), which says that there are two types of affectus, the one corresponding to the Greek word πάθος, which the Romans call affectus, the other corresponding to the Greek word ἔθος, which the Romans call mores (for want of a better word). The passage Minissale cites does not really help us in interpreting CS 13.2, because mores is not a credible interpretation of adfectum in CS 13.2. Moreover, in the following section, Inst. 6.2.9, Quintilian expands the discussion by arguing that πάθος describes the violent emotions, which are momentary, while ἔθος describes the gentle emotions, which are continuous. The sage of course cannot experience emotions (‘passions’); see
Introduction, § VI. I think it is much more like that S. intended adfectus to have the meaning ‘disposition’ (of the soul), as it does at Cic. *Tusc. 5.47* (*adfectus autem animi in bono laudabilis*). Here, oddly, S. abandons strict Stoic terminology and uses a stoicised word in a non-Stoic way.

13.2: *obscena*: private parts, both sexual and excretory (*OLD obscena*¹ 3).

13.2: *togati purpuratique*: Roman citizens and courtiers of eastern potentates (see *OLD purpurātus* ²). See Livy 31.35.1 and Briscoe ad loc., who notes that it does not necessarily mean that the people so designated are actually wore purple. The mention of *purpurati* looks ahead to the eastern potentates (the King of the Medes and Attalus of Asia) in 13.3.

13.2: *ualentes colorati*: Reynolds, following Viansino (1968): *dubitanter*. All MSS have *ualentes coloratos*. The MSS give the sense: ‘The sage knows that all these who walk proudly clad in toga and the purple, are strong and with healthy colour, but not quite healthy . . .’. According to the MSS, *ualentes coloratos* is thus part of the sage’s judgement of the *togati purpuratique*. If we follow Viansino (1968), *ualentes colorati* are additional attributes of the *togati purpuratique*, whatever the sage may think of them. Much depends on our interpretation of the meaning of *coloratus*. It is a medical term (‘of good colour’), as at Celsus 2.2: *si plenior aliquid et speciosior et coloratior factus est*; and less technically it can mean ‘tanned’ (*S. Ep. 86.8: colorantur*), which in an outdoor culture such as the Roman
had connotations of health too (cf. VB 7.3: *Virtutem in templo conuenies, in foro in curia, pro muris stantem, puluerulentam coloratam, callosas manus habentem*). The problem with the MSS reading is that it seems to contradict *male sanos*. The sage seems to think that the men are strong and healthy-looking, but not healthy. If this is what S. is saying, we might expect *sed* before *male sanos* (although asyndeton is common in S.: see Summers, pp. xcii, 198-8). Viansino’s (1968) emendation restricts the sage's judgement of the men to *male sanos*; the corruption presumably arose by assimilating *colorati* to *sanos*. Like Reynolds, I have reservations about Viansino’s (1968) *ualentes colorati*.

13.2: **male sanos esse**: ‘not quite healthy’. For this usage of *male* as a quasi-negation (‘not properly’ or (with an adjective of health) ‘ill’) see OLD 6 (cf. Mayer ad Hor. Ep. 1.3.31; Bömer ad Ov. Met. 3.474 and Fast. 1.559). People who appear healthy are not really so in respect of their mental health, unless they are Stoic sages. The expression is also found at Tranq. 11.1: *Ad imperfectos et mediocres et male sanos hic meus sermo pertinet, non ad sapientem*. It is common in Ovid: Met. 3.474, 4.521, 9.600; AA 3.7.13; Am. 3.7.77. It is also found at Hor. Ep. 1.19, V. Aen. 4.8, Sen. rhet. Con. 2.1.4.8; Quintus Curtius 6.7.15.1.

13.3: **rex Medorum**: recurrence of the theme of the irrational Asiatic monarch (cf. 4.2), this time emphasising his pride. Gertz emending to ‘<Xerxes> rex’ (Reynolds comments ‘forte recte’), which would reinforce
the link with section 4, where *stolidus ille rex* is almost certainly Xerxes (see my commentary ad loc.). However, given the lack of explicit naming at section 4 and also the allusiveness in the mention of Scipio Aemilianus at 6.8, I think there is no need to follow Gertz. Besides, a general reference to the behaviour of Great Kings of Persia may be intended, without Xerxes specifically being intended. Cf. Cambyses’ cruel treatment of Praexaspes as related at *Ira* 14.1-2.

**13.3: Attalusue Asiae:** probably Attalus III Philometor Euergetes (d. 133 BC), the last king of the wealthy kingdom of Pergamum, which he bequeathed to Rome in his will. According to Justin—Trogus (36.4), when he ascended the throne he had some friends and relatives killed on the fictitious charge that they had murdered his mother and wife by sorcery; behaviour typical of an oriental despot.

**13.3: salutantem silentio ac uultu adroganti transierit:** Silence and unapproachability – undemocratic qualities – were considered characteristics of many oriental peoples, in contrast to the talkativeness and affability of Greeks and Romans. Trogus (in the epitome of Justin), for example, notes the natural taciturnity of the Parthians and their preference for deeds over words (*natura taciti, ad faciendum quam dicendum promptiores; proinde secunda adversaque silentio tegunt*; 41.3). They certainly found the Greek-style approachability and affability (*prompti
aditus, obvia comitas; Tac. *Ann.* 2.2) of their new king Vonones (a Roman candidate to the throne sponsored by Augustus) uncongenial.

13.4: *ad Castoris:* *ad aedem* [or: *templum*] *Castoris.* The temple of Castor stood in the south-eastern corner of the Forum Romanum. Part of it was clearly set aside for shops (see also Plin. *NH* 10.121). See I. Nielsen, in *LTUR* I.242-5.

13.4: *humanitatem inhumanitatemque:* ‘courtesy or [sic] discourtesy’ (Ker). The sage is indifferent to both civility and incivility.

13.4: 'habes sub te Parthos et Medos et Bactrianos, sed quos metu contines, sed propter quos remittere arcum tibi non contigit, sed hostes taeterrimos, sed uenales, sed nouum aucupantes dominum.’: here the sage addresses someone directly. This is reminiscent of Stilbo’s speech (6.3-7), when he addresses Demetrius Poliorcetes. There may be an allusion to recent Parthian history here. Bactria, a far-eastern part of the Parthian empire, featured in the fight for the Parthian throne between the sons of Artabanus III, after his death in AD 38: Vardanes, to whom he had bequeathed his kingdom, and Gotarzes, who disputed this. According to Tacitus (*Ann.* 11.8), Gotarzes forced Vardanes to withdraw and pitch his camp *Bactrianos apud campos* (date uncertain, possibly c. AD 47). See Koestermann ad loc. and Bivar (1983: 75).
The Bactrians are only mentioned once elsewhere by S., at *NQ* 5.18.10 (*Bactris*), in the context of Alexander the Great’s campaigns. The long form *Bactrianos* makes a tricolon crescendo after *Parthos et Medos*.

**13.4:** *nouum aucupantes dominium*: certainly an allusion to the frequent palace revolutions in Parthia, as Grimal and Minissale ad loc. point out. However, I see no justification to assume, as they seem to, that events under Nero and the Parthian campaigns of Corbulo are alluded to. Klei ad loc. (on ‘sed quos metu contines’) is non-committal about which (if any) particular events in Parthian history are alluded to.

**13.5:** *Nam . . . securus; securitas autem proprium bonum sapientis est*: see note on 4.3 (*tuta securitas*).

**14.1:** *Tanta quosdam dementia tenet ut sibi contumeliam fieri putent posse a muliere*: the withholding of *a muliere* to the end of the sentence adds point. The sentiment seems almost complete without the last two words, which set the argument on a new path. There is an element of surprise, as nothing hitherto has prepared the reader for this discussion of women.

**14.1:** *Quid refert quam <beatam> habeant, quot lecticarios habentem, quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam?:* The MSS have: *Quid refert quam habeant, quot lecticarios habentem, quam oneratas aures, quam*
laxam sellam? There is a problem with quam habeant. The subject is presumably the quidam who think they can be insulted even by a woman. The MSS reading gives the sense: ‘What does it matter which woman they may have, how many litter-bearers they may have, how burdened ears, how capacious a travelling chair?’ The close repetition of habere, first as subject, then as participle qualifying the object, and in each case with the same meaning, is awkward and gives poor sense. Possible solutions up to now have involved: (1) changing quam, (2) changing habeant, or (3) changing habentem.

Adopting strategy (1), Reynolds suggested adding <beatam> after quam, so giving the sense ‘how fortunate they may consider a woman’. This certainly solves the difficulty posed by having habere repeated with the same meaning, and the sense produced is not bad. However, there is no warrant for beatam in the MSS, except inasmuch as a woman with all the things listed might seem beata to the popular mind. Karsten, whom Reynolds cites in his apparatus, likewise thought that something had fallen out after quam, and suggested the lengthy diuitem nobilem formosam, whose three elements presumably mirror the three objects of habentem. However, the MSS provide even less justification for this conjecture than they do for MSS, in other words less than no justification.

Approaches that adopt strategy (2) include Viansino’s (1968) change of habeant to adeant. The sense given is: ‘What does it matter which woman they approach, having how many litter-bearers, how burdened ears, how capacious a travelling chair?’. This certainly deals with the habeant . . .
habentem problem and gives good sense. Given that offence is usually caused through interpersonal contact, it seems logical to stress the physical approach to someone that adeant implies. It also has the merit of sticking much more closely to the MSS than do Reynolds and Karsten.

As for strategy (3), Shackleton Bailey’s beata . . . habente is included in Reynolds’s apparatus. I cannot comment too much on this at the moment, because it is not clear to me from the apparatus just how of the MSS Shackleton Bailey intends changing and how much retaining.

I would like to suggest another possible analysis of the problem. With the exception of Viansino (1968), most of the commentators assume that the problem lies in the omission of material between quam and habeant. Viansino (1968: 151), rightly I think, identifies the repetition of habere as the problem. However, another solution would be to excise habentem and change quam, perhaps to quae, so: Quid refert quae habeant, quot lecticarios, quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam? (‘What does it matter what things they may have, how many litter-bearers, how burdened their ears, how capacious a travelling chair?’). The subject of habeant now becomes mulieres. The corruption could have arisen through quam instead of quae being rationalised by adding habentem after lecticarios. An alternative, albeit more high-handed, solution would be to change habentem to habeant and excise quam habeant altogether, so: Quid refert quot lecticarios habeant, quam oneratas aures, quam laxam sellam? (‘What does it matter how many litter-bearers they may have, how burdened their ears, how capacious a travelling chair?’).

Regarding the number of *lecticarii (quot lecticarios)*, these could be as many as eight: see Suet. *Gaius* (43) on Caligula’s *octaphoron*. Eight bearers mean that the litter would be about three times the size of a normal four-bearer litter. The adverbs *segniter delicateque*, which imply that such a form of transport was a mark of effeminacy. The *sella* or *sella gestatoria* was a travelling chair carried by slaves by means of poles, like a modern sedan chair. According to Suet. *Otho* 6.3, it was favoured by women: *Tunc abditus propere muliebri sella in castra contendit ac deficientibus lecticariis*. . . . Note that the bearers of a *sella* are also called *lecticarii* here. *Lecticae* and *sellae* were the only modes of transport allowed in Rome in daytime after Julius Caesar’s edict, and Claudius extended it to the rest of Italy: *uiatores ne per Italie oppida nisi aut pedibus aut sella aut lectica transirent*, *monuit edicto* (Suet. *Claud.* 25.2). Cf. also Martial 10.10.7: *lecticam sellamue sequar?* (spoken by a *pauper* in search of a *patronus*). *Laxam* probably refers to the roominess of the *sella*, and by extension to the high status of the occupant.

flexerunt; Ben. 9.4: uideo uniones non singulos singulis auribus comparatos; iam enim exercitatae aures oneri ferundo sunt; iunguntur inter se et alii binis superponuntur. Nec satis muliebris insania uiros superiecerat nisi bina ac terna patrimonia auribus singulis pendissent.

14.1: aeque inprudens animal est et, nisi scientia accessit ac multa eruditio, ferum, cupiditatum incontinens: for S.’s views on women, see Motto 235; also note on 10.3 above. On virtuous female exceptions, including S.s own mother Helvia, see Edwards (2007: 189-91). Although disparaging here, as evidenced by the qualifying adjective inprudens, the word animal did not always have this sense. Inprudens could apply to men as well. For instance, in Ep. 113, S. discusses at length whether virtues were animalia. Moreover, at Clem. 3.2, S. echoes Aristotle’s description of the human being as a politikon zōon: hominem sociale animal. inprudens (‘without practical reason’, ‘without foresight’) is used by S. elsewhere to denote non-sages generally, not women specifically; CS 19.1. So, at Ira 2.32.2: M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit inprudens: quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? At Breu. 1.1.5 we have inprudens vulgus.

According to Klei (151), scientia denotes philosophical knowledge (‘wijsherige kennis’). The view that women could be suitable for a philosophical education was put forward by Plato (Rep. 451c–457c, 540c). This favourable view of women’s potential was advocated by Musonius Rufus. See, for a full discussion of the education of women in Rome, Hemelrijk (1999: ch. 3).
14.1: Quidam se a cinerario impulsos moleste ferunt et contumeliam uocant ostiarii difficultatem, nomenclatoris superbiam, cubiculari supercilium: more members of the households so the rich. The cinerarius is the hairdresser or hair-curler (using tongs heated by ashes); cf. Varro LL 5.129: qui ea (sc. calamistra) ministrabat, a cinere cinerarius est appellatus; Cat. 61.131: nunc tuum cinerarius | tondet os; Lucilius 249: quem neque Lucanis oriundi montibus tauri | ducere protelo validis cervicibus possent, | zonatim circum impluuium cinerarius | cludebat.

The ostiarius is the doorman or porter who decides who shall enter the house. The obstructiveness of ostiarii was clearly a commonplace, so that Pliny can praise Trajan for being ready to grant audience: Plin. Pan. 79.6: nulla in audiendo difficultas. This use of difficultas to denote awkwardness of character is quite rare, apart from here and in the Pliny quoted above, being only found in Cic. Mur. 19, where it is closely associated with arrogance (adrogantiam pertulit, difficultatem exsorbuit) in a list of tribulations that Servius had to endure at the hands of his legal clients.

The nomenclator/nomenclator was the announcer of the names of clients and guests; for their oddities cf. S. Breu. 14.4-5; S. Ep. 19.11; Ep. 27.5; Plin. Ep. 2.14.6.

14.2: 'Quid ergo? sapiens non accedet ad fores quas durus ianitor obsidet?' Another objection by the imaginary interlocutor. In durus ianitor,
there may be an allusion to the topos of the paraklausithyron, found in love
poetry, where the lover is denied access to his beloved’s house by the
locked door. *Durus* is applied to a *ianitor* in Ovid *Am.* 1.6.62 (*o foribus
durior ipse tuis*), a transference of its normal usage to describe the door
(Opelt 1965: 52). When it is used of a person, it is usually applied by one of
the lovers to the other as a reproach for his or her unfeelingness (Opelt
1965: 30). In this case, the *durus ianitor* takes the place of the door as the
thing barring the client from his object of desire, viz. an audience with his
patron. Cf. the characterisation of the obstinate *ostiarius* at S. *Herc. Fur.*
164-6: *ille superbos aditus regum | durasque fores exprs somni | colit.*

For *durus* applied to people see *OLD* 4-5. For another instance of a
transferred epithet in the context of the difficulty of access to the house of a
patron, cf. Hor. *Epod.* 2.7-8: *et superba ciuium | potentiorum limina.* As
Watson ad loc. (p. 91) notes: ‘the *limina* are *superba* by transference, on
account both of the arrogant treatment often meted out to the *clientes* by the
various slave-functionaries who governed admission to their master, and the
despiteful way in which the powerful *patroni* whose houses the *limina
fronted might receive the *salutatio* of the *cliens’*. The difference in respect
of the transference the Horace and the passage in *CS* is that in Horace the
adjective normally applied to the doorkeeper is transferred to the doorway
of the house, whereas in S. the adjective normally applied to the door is
transferred to the doorkeeper.
14.2: **obsidet:** military imagery. Compare *Ira* 3.37, where the *limen* is *obsessum* by the *turba litigatorum*.

14.2: *Ille uero, [...] tamquam canem acrem obiecto cibo leniet[...]*

dari: cf. *S. Ira* 3.37.2. Grimal 86 thinks there may be an allusion to Cerberus at Virg. *Aen.* 6.419ff.: *cui uates horrere uidens iam colla colubris | melle soporatam et medicatis frugibus offam | obicit*. I see no reason to suppose this here. It could be any guard dog. Rather, the comparison of a doorkeeper with a guard dog is in harmony with S.’s likening of non-sages to animals elsewhere in *CS* (e.g. 12.3).

Grasping *ostiarii* and other slave-functionaries, and the need to bribe them in order to gain access to a patron or other favours, seem to have been usual features of the *salutatio*: Hor. *Serm.* 1.9.57, Juv. 3.183-9, Columella, praef. 9 (*mercenarii salutatoris*), Amm. Marc. 14.6.15: *et nomenclatores, assueti haec et talia venditare, mercede accepta, lucris quosdam et prandiis inserunt subditarios ignobles te obsuros*).

14.2: *et, ut uincat, par fuit:* possibly gladiatorial imagery; cf. *Ira* 3.34.5: * nisi paria non pugnant*; Motto 91. For more gladiatorial imagery in *CS*, see 16.2.

14.3: 'At sapiens colapho percussus quid faciet?' *Quod Cato* ... ignouisset: the language of the imaginary objector recalls S.’s assertion at 5.1 that some slaves prefer being whipped to being cuffed (*colaphis caedi*)
and prefer blows to insults. S. probably also intends the reader to think back to the mob’s assaults on Cato in 1-2. He may be implying that being cuffed is the sort of treatment inflicted on a slave by a master and would thus be very demeaning to a free man, particularly if delivered by another free man (and a lower-class one at that). It is interesting to compare the anecdote about Cato given at *Ira* 2.32.2: *M. Catonem ignorans in balineo quidam percussit inprudens; quis enim illi sciens faceret iniuriam? Postea satis facienti Cato, 'non memini' inquit 'me percussum.' Melius putauit non agnoscere quam uindicare.* Cato’s response of forgiving the *iniuria* is the same in both cases. He denies it has been done (*CS*: *factam negauit* ~ *Ira*: *'non memini' inquit 'me percussum'*) and forgives it. However, the cause of the *iniuria* is different in each case. In *CS*, we are to assume that the cuff is deliberate, intended to humiliate. In *De i ra*, by contrast, the blow is accidental, a case of some fool unintentionally knocking against in Cato in a bath house. (This is stressed by the adjectives *ignorans* and *inprudens* framing the words describing the action, and by the comment that no one knowingly (*sciens*) would seek to harm Cato.) Moreover, in *De i ra* the man apologised (*satis facienti*).

The anecdote looks ahead to the indignity deliberately visited upon Socrates by his wife Xanthippe at 18.6.

14.4: *Non respicit quid homines turpe iudicent aut miserum, non it qua populus, sed ut sidera contrarium mundo iter intendunt, ita hic aduersus opinionem omnium uadit:* cf. *S. Marc.* 18.3: *Videbis quinque*
sidera diversas agentia uias et in contrarium praecipiti mundo nitentia. The stars (both planets and fixed stars) were considered divine by the Stoics, as indeed was the entire universe: Cic. *ND* 2.39 (*Atque mundi divinitate perspecta tribuenda est sideribus eadem divinitas*), 3.40 (*singulas enim stellas numeras deos*). The comparison of the sage with divine heavenly bodies is in keeping with the general portrayal of the sage in *CS* as near-divine, as at 6.8 where the *munimenta* girding the sage’s *bona* (his virtue) are said to be *dis aequa*, and as at 8.2 where he is said to be closest to the gods and like a god, except for his mortality. This view goes back to Plato (*ND* 1.30) and Aristotle (*ND* 1.33). Probably here S. is referring to the five planets, as he is in the *Ad Marciam* passage cited. The words *in contrarium mundo iter intendunt* allude to the theory that the spheres containing the planets (and also sun, moon, and earth) moved in the opposite direction to the sphere containing the fixed stars which enclosed the other spheres and was the limit of the *mundus*. See Cic. *Rep.* 6.21 (*Somnium Scipionis*): *cui subiecti sunt septem* (sc. *globi*) *qui versantur retro, contrario motu atque caelum*. For a simplified modern account of this system, see North (1994: 66-92); for a technical account, see Neugebauer (1975: vol. 2, pp. 677-85), and for a collection of translated sources, see Irby-Massie and Keyser (2002: 47-81).

15.1: Desinite itaque dicere: 'non accipiet [...] possunt?' [*...*] *uobiscum commune habentem*: for the first time since 9.4, S. addresses unnamed plural persons. The address to a plural interlocutor continues for the whole
of 15.1-2, but then in 15.3 S. shifts back to addressing a singular interlocutor (Serenus, we may assume).

15.1: *si obscenorum uocibus inprobis per forum agetur*: here *obscenus* is a noun, referring to foul-mouthed people (*OLD obscenus*). The use of the adjective as a masculine noun occurs first in Seneca rhetor, *Contr*. 4, praef. 10, where it has the meaning ‘obscene’ (tr. Winterbottom (Loeb)) rather than ‘foul-mouthed’; cf. S. *Ben*. 2.21.1: *Vivam cum obsceno?* (‘Shall I live with a lewd fellow?’ (tr. Basore (Loeb)). As the verbal abuse is taking place in the Forum, S. may intend a back-reference to the verbal and physical indignities inflicted on Cato by the *populus* in *CS* 2.

15.1: *si in conuiuo regis recumbere infra mensam*: cf. 10.2: ‘*non in medio me lecto sed in imo conlocauit*. By *rex* S. may be referring to some hypothetical or tyrant king such as an like Dionysius (I or II) of Syracuse, who toyed with his dinner guests, most notably Damocles; or perhaps we are to understand an oriental despot (cf. the previous references to Xerxes or the *rex Medorum*). Another possibility, which I think is more likely given the context of placement at dinner tables, is that the *rex* in question is a grandee who is throwing a dinner party for his clients. The word *rex* is used of a rich patron in comedy (Plaut. *Stich*. 455; Ter. *Phorm*. 338), and in Horace (*Epist*. 1.17.3) and Juvenal (1.136, 5.14). *OLD* (‘rex’ 8) takes this to be meaning.
15.2: at illum in aliis mundi finibus sua uirtus conlocavit, nihil

uobiscum commune habentem: recapitulates the point (that the sage is set apart from ordinary mortals): cf. 6.8-7.1; 8.2: *sapiens autem uicinus proximusque dis consistit, excepta mortalitate similis deo*; also cf. *Ep.*

59.16: *talis est sapientis animus qualis mundus super lunam: semper illic serenum est.*

15.3: Quaere [ . . . ] uincitur: here, after two subsections of a plural addressee, the addressee is again in the singular.

15.3: *illud tolerabile sapienti, illud intolerabile:* for the juxtaposition of a word with its privative, cf. 13.4: *humanitatem inhumanitatemque.* Again, the point is emphasised with anaphora, this time of *illud:* cf. note on 15.5 below.

15.3: *uincit nos fortuna, nisi tota uincitur:* for the Stoics virtue is an ‘all-or-nothing’ matter; there are no degrees of virtue. Cf. *Helv.* 13.3: *Non singula uitia ratio sed pariter omnia proternit: in uniuersum simul uincitur.* For the polyptoton of *uincere,* cf. *Ep.* 73.3: *Adice nunc quod nemo eorum qui in re publica versantur quot vincat, sed a quibus vincatur,* aspicit.

15.4: Ne putes istam Stoicam esse duritiam, Epicurus, quem uos patronum inertiae uestrae adsumitis putatisque mollia ac desidiosa praecipere et ad uoluptates ducentia, 'raro' inquit 'sapienti fortuna
interuenit.' Quam paene emisit uiri uocem! Vis tu fortius loqui et illam ex toto summouere?: a rapid change of number of interlocutor, (1) from second-person singular (putes – itself a switch from the plural of 15.3), (2) to second-person plural (uos [...] uestrae adsumitis putatisque), (3) to third-person singular interlocutor (inquit), and finally (4) back to singular second-person addressee (Vis tu). The singular second-person addressee is presumably Serenus. The plural addressees are certainly Epicureans in general (Epicurus, quem uos patronum inertiae uestrae adsumitis putatisque). What is striking is the abrupt transition from singular to plural second-person addressee in the same sentence, with the name Epicurus forming the pivot.

15.4: Ne putes istam Stoicam esse duritiam: Serenus, one may assume from the second-person singular, is the addressee, but istam needs comment. It could either refer to something Serenus has said before (‘that which you mentioned’, OLD 2) or be neutral with respect to the second person (‘this’, OLD 4). For the former sense, there is the difficulty that only S. has previously used duritia and related words (at 3.5, 5.5, 6.3, 10.4 (x 2)). Serenus, in his speech at CS 3, has only spoken of the patientia of the sage (3.2). For this reason, I think it is preferable to interpret istam as plain ‘this’, as does Ker in his translation (‘this hardness’).

‘raro’ . . . interuenit . . . uocem!: S. quotes Epicurus (sent. 16, p. 74 Usener) directly, as an authority (see Trillitzsch (1962: 73-8) on appeals to
authority). Having done this to support his earlier claim that Epicurus, and not just the Stoics, shows *duritia*, S. undermines him in the next sentence by saying that he almost (*paene*) uttered a manly word. S. notes the similarity in thought between Epicurus and Stoics in respect of their views on *fortuna*, but is careful to assert the distinction between the two schools. Again, the contrast running through CS between the supposed manliness of the Stoic philosophy and the femaleness of Epicurus’ philosophy is continued.

**15.5: Domus . . . est:** the sage, who knows that wealth and show are indifferenters, will live in a small, modest house and in general have a modest lifestyle, without vexatious doorkeepers. S. may be speaking metaphorically here, although there are examples of philosophers (e.g. Diogenes and Cynics generally, rather than Stoics; cf. the praise of Diogenes and primitive humans in *Ep*. 90) who eschewed wealth. For the unimportance of domestic wealth for Stoics see also *Ep*. 5.6 and *Ep*. 8.5. Of interest at CS 15.5 is the double meaning that *fortuna* bears. Principally it denotes fortune in the sense of one’s lot, the circumstances in which one finds oneself at a given time (*OLD* 8). Secondarily, though, it denotes wealth and property (*OLD* 12). Again, there is the personification of *fortuna*: see the note on *nutum fortunae* (5.7).

**15.5: sine cultu, sine strepitu, sine apparatu:** tricolon crescendo (2 syllables, 3 syllables, 4 syllables) with anaphora (repetition of *sine*) and asyndeton. The anaphora emphasises the point that the sage’s house lacks
all these appurtenances of *luxuria*. The lack of clamour (*sine strepitu*)
contrasts the simple house of the sage with the busy house of the rich man
that is besieged by clients. There may be a back-allusion to the tranquillity
of the soul of the sage that has already been mentioned (*altae quietis et
placidae*: 9.3); this house has peace and quiet, unlike that of the rich man.

16.1-16.2: *Quodsi Epicurus . . . non patitur*: an amplification of the
distinction between the Stoics and other schools of philosophy which was
first adumbrated in 1.1, and which was continued at 15.4.

16.1: *hoc naturae repugnare*: the Stoics claimed that they lived *secundum
naturam*, so one line of attack from a philosophical opponent would be to
show that they in fact lived *contra naturam*.

16.2: *gladiatores*: gladiatorial imagery abounds in S. See Edwards (2007),
Gen. Or*. 17.

16.2: *stat in gradu*: *in gradu stare* is a technical, military term, meaning ‘to
hold one’s ground’, ‘keep one’s position’; see Livy 6.12.8: *obnisos vos
(velim) stabilis gradu impetum hostium excipere*; Livy 8.38.11: *in suo
non cedere* (and see Bömer ad loc.). A variant on the image is to be found at
S. *Pol*. 6.2: *omnes scient, quomodo te in isto tuo gesseris vulnere, utrumne*
statim percussus arma summiseris an in gradu steteris. Here, though, it is standing one’s ground that is the laudable and courageous response to being wounded; the cowardly response is immediate surrender of one’s arms. The context is clearly military, rather than gladiatorial.

16.2: non sensum doloris detrahimus: an important point. The sage does feel pain, as everyone else does, but unlike everyone else, he does not accept that pain constitutes an injury. His invulnerability consists in his attitude to the sensation of pain, not his inability to feel pain. This is a recapitulation of the point made at 10.4: haec non nego sentire sapientem. Gellius provides a story illustrating the point at NA 12.5.

16.3: consipiente: Rubenius suggested consipiente to replace the MSS’ conspicient, which is meaningless in the context. The rare word consipere (most of its attestations are for Late Latin; see TLL 4.463) is attested, shakily, at S. NQ 6.29.2: non est facile inter magna mala consipere (according to the Loeb text, MSS ABV read concipere, ET desipere, but Hine’s apparatus includes no information on this word or variants); Ira 3.13.4: contra [nos] potens malum et apud nos gratiosum, dum consipimus, dum nostri sumus, aduocemus (ω: conspicimus; Gronovius: consipimus); Gell. 6(7).3.12: ne . . . de statu mentis suae deturbati non satis consiperent. Given the rarity of consipere, it is highly likely that it was corrupted, and Rubenius’ emendation has generally been accepted by modern editors. It seems that the word is not attested before S., although some editors,
following Lipsius, have read it instead of the MSS’ *concipere* at Livy 5.42.3. However, Ogilvie ad loc. rejects Lipsius’ conjecture and gives arguments in favour of keeping the MS reading.

The use of *concipere*, which is related to *sapere* (hence to *sapiens*: see E–M 594, W–H II.477), is in keeping with S.’s liking for argumentation based on etymology, as seen in his remarks at 11.2: *Contumelia a contemptu dicta est.*

16.4: *In capitis mei leuitatem iocatus est et in oculorum ualetudinem et in crurum gracilitatem et in staturam:* mei suggests that S. is referring to his own physical defects, although they are common enough in many men. For baldness, cf. CS 18.1: *tanta capitis destitutis et †emendacitatis† capillis adpersi deformitas* (of Caligula); Suet. *Cal.* 27.1, 50.1. For weakness of the eyes, Viansino (1968: 161) provides many references in S.

Although S. refers to Caligula’s *exilitatem crurum* later (18.1), there is probably no comparison between him and S. intended here by *crurum gracilitatem*. S. hardly likens himself to Caligula in other places (who would want to be thought like him?) and there was no love lost between them. All the physical defects S. lists were (and are) common to many men, and so S. probably is not thinking of Caligula here. Rather, compare the passage at the beginning of *Ep.* 66, where S. discusses his friend and *condiscipulus* Claranus, whose physical deficiencies and general modest lifestyle belie his moral qualities.
16.4: Coram . . . irascimur: the sentiment is that an insult, if delivered in company, is more damaging than the same words solely to the object of the insult. This is presumably because of the subjective nature of insult and also its social nature, inasmuch as the object of the insult will feel embarrassment at a public humiliation. Cf. 10.3: quorum pars maior constat uitio interpretantis. See Introduction, § VII.

16.4: Coram . . . coram: more anaphora. See other examples discussed above.

17.1: Chrysippus . . . dixerat: this sentence constitutes SVF II.11. We do not know in which work of Chrysippus the anecdote is related, or the context of the anecdote. For a list of some suggestions for a possible provenance, see Setaioli (2000: 326 n. 10). marinus uervex seems to be a translation of the Greek insult θαλάσσιον πρόβατον (‘marine sheep’).

Demetrius, On Style 172 explains the insult as τὸν μόρον τὸν ἐν τῇ θάλασσῃ, ‘the idiot in the sea’, possibly an incompetent sailor. However, I think that the insult could also imply that the person so described is a freak of nature, a monstrum, there being no such thing as a sheep in the sea. Klei (169), however, thinks it may be a translation of κριός θαλάσσιον ἐκτετμημένον, lit.’ marine wether’.

Both πρόβατον and uervex on their own are also insults, meaning ‘blockhead’, ‘dullard’, etc.; for the former see Ar. Nub. 1203, for the latter, Plaut. Merc. 567, Cas. 535; Petr. Sat. 57.1, Juv. 10.50. Dickey (2002: 176)
lists it as a ‘low-register’ insult, citing the Plaut. *Merc. 567* and *Petr. Sat.* 57.1 passages (Dickey 2002: 363). She does not, however, discuss or mention the *CS* 17.1 passage. The Latin *ueruex* is less neutral than the Greek πρόβατον, inasmuch as it has connotations of uselessness, impotence, ineffectuality, and lack of virility; whereas the Greek merely seems to suggest stupidity and lack of independent motivation. Opelt (1965: 86 n. 22) cites Marmorale, who thinks that *ueruex* may mean ‘eunuch’ (‘castrone’), presumably based on the alternative meaning of ‘wether’ for *ueruex*; if this is correct, then the insult may have been an imputation of effeminacy.

In any case, S.’s translation seems to add more to the original Greek than merely *marinus ovis* would have done; the insult is on two levels, an insult within an insult, as it were. See the note on *struthocamelum depilatum* below for a discussion of noun + adjective insults.

Janssens (1974: 76) takes *marinus ueruex* to be a direct reference to the fish called in Greek *probaton thalassion*, which was known for its cunning in luring prey to its lair (Oppian, *Hal.* 1.145ff.; paraphrased by Aelian, *Anim.* 9.38). It is not possible to identify with any certainty which fish Oppian refers to, but Mair (Loeb edition of Oppian, pp. 218-19 n. d) suggests it might be a member of the cod family (*Gadidae*). The adjective (*marinus*) in S. is thus, for Janssens, not part of the insult, indicating something odd or incompatible with a *ueruex*, and hence something odd or freaky about the insultee; rather, it is to indicate this particular fish, as opposed to a land animal. On this interpetration, the insult involves an accusation of deceitful or fraudulent character, like that of the fish, rather
than stupidity or effeminacy. Janssens thinks the insult was probably addressed to a politician (1974: 76), citing in support of his view the characterizations of Catiline by Sallust (Cat. 5.1-4 and 14.4-5), a bad and deceitful character (*ingenio malo prauoque; Animus ... subdolus, uarius ... simulator ac dissimulator*) who easily ensnared upright and honest men (*dolis haud difficulter capiebantur*) with his wiles (Janssens 1974: 77). Cf. Robin (1983), who argues that the emperor Claudius is likened to a harbour seal (‘veau marin’) at *Apoc*. 5.3, which he thinks is an allusion to Claudius’ unintelligible speech, somnolence and corpulence (Robin 1983: 188).

Setaioli (2000: 325-30), in contrast, sees the explanation of the insult in an anecdote related in the *Vita Aesopi* (24 Westermann). This anecdote is found in MS G of the *Aesopica*; the other MSS omit it. I have consulted the edition of Ben Edwin Perry, *Aesopica* (Urbana, IL, 1952), which uses Westermann’s text. Aesop is offered for sale as a slave together with two handsome young male companions. When the philosopher Xanthus asks what one of the boys know how to do, he replies ‘Everything’, whereupon Aesop bursts out laughing. When one of pupils of Xanthus asks why he is laughing, Aesop says: ‘Go away, marine sheep!’ When Xanthus asks the second companion of Aesop what he can do, and again he replies ‘Everything’, again Aesop laughs. When a disciple of Xanthus again asks Aesop whey he is laughing, another disciple says to him: ‘if you want to be called a “marine goat” (*thalassios tragos*), ask him.’ Later, Xanthus himself asks Aesop what he knows how to do. Aesop replies ‘nothing at all’. When Xanthus asks him why, he replies: ‘these [lads?] announced to you that they
knew everything.’ The pupils of Xanthus say: ‘Well defended, for no man knows everything; this is why he laughed.’ There seems to be some play on the two meanings of ‘know’ as ‘know-how’, which the companions of Aesop had in mind when the answered Xanthus, and ‘know-that’ as (theoretical) knowledge, which Xanthus’ pupils were aware of (and surely Xanthus himself, although he presumably had the first meaning in mind when he asked his questions). In this passage, Setaioli thinks, the insults ‘marine sheep’ and marine goat’ refer to the stupidity of the person who is the object of the insult. He cites in support of his argument Demetrius, *Peri hermeneias*, 172 (Setaioli 2000: 327, esp. n. 11), where Demetrius says relates a ‘conjecture’ (*eikasia*) that ‘thalassion probaton’ is used in banter (*peri skōmmatōn*) to refer to ‘ton mōron [en tēi thalassēi]’. Setaioli dismisses the view that *probaton* refers to a kind of fish, as found in the pages of Oppian and Aelian and accepted by Janssens (see above), which he however understands (should the insult be alluding to the fish) as a reference to its being sluggish (Aelian: *nōthes*; Oppian: *nōthros*), hence stupid (the word can also mean this: see LSJ) (Setaioli 2000: 328). On this ‘old’ interpretation of the *Vita Aesopi* passage, then, the adjective merely indicates that the fish called the *probaton* is indicated by the insult, not the land sheep. On the interpretation favoured by Setaioli, the adjective is integral to the insult, it has ‘significato scoptico’ (‘mocking meaning’, ibid.): it links what is normally thought of as a land animal (and a stupid one at that) to the sea, emphasizing and intensifying the sense of its stupidity, and its ridiculousness (ibid. 329). The second insult uttered by Aesop
(‘marine goat’) Setaioli takes to be a variant on the canonical (in his view) ‘marine sheep’. It intensifies the original insult: whoever asks this question of Aesop again is not only a marine sheep, but a marine goat (i.e. an even bigger fool). As the goat is a stronger and fiercer animal than the sheep, it represents a higher degree of folly (ibid.). In support of his interpretation of the integrality of the adjective to the insult, Setaioli cites Archilochus (fr. 74 Diehl = 122 West, line 7), who tells of an upside-down world where ‘quadrupedi’ (thēres in the Greek) and dolphins exchange dwelling-places – a trope reproduced (with variation) in Horace, AP 29-30: *qui uariare cupid rem prodigaliter unam, delphinem siluis appingit, fluctibus aprum.*

Setaioli (ibid. 329-30) thinks that the Horatian variation, which replaces ‘wild beasts’ with the more concrete wild boar, an animal that is more agile and lively in its own element and yet correspondingly more inept and clumsy in an alien element, parallels the replacement of the sheep with the second pupil’s goat in Aesop. I am not convinced that a wild boar is necessarily more lively, and so on, than some of the other beasts covered by the category thēr (which could include the lion: see LSJ), and his argument is circular anyway.

It seems, then, that interpretations of this passage fall into two main categories: that a particular sea creature (also called a ‘sheep’) is referred to, the adjective *marinus* being an indication that the creature is a sea creature, a ‘sea sheep’ (on the analogy of our ‘sea cow’, ‘sea cucumber’, etc.); the other that a land animal, a sheep, is referred to, and that the adjective intensifies the stupidity with which the animal is associated, giving the
impression that it is out of its element and hence doubly stupid and inept, and indeed freakish.

In the absence of a context for this insult, it is hard to decide which of these two types of interpretation is correct. On balance, I incline to the second, not least because of the passages cited by Setaioli (Demetrius and Aesopica), which do indicate that ‘marine sheep’ (and variants thereof) was a familiar term of insult in Greek culture.

17.1: In senatu flentem uidimus Fidum Cornelium, Nasonis Ouidi generum, cum illum Corbulo struthocamelum depilatum dixisset:

uidimus suggests that the event related may be quite recent. We have no information on Fidus Cornelius apart from CS 17.1 (see Klei 1950: 169). The identity of the Corbulus referred to is uncertain. It could either be the famous general of Nero, who was famous also in Claudius’ reign, or it could be his father. Griffin (1992: 44 n. 4) thinks that the general’s father may be referred to, arguing that ‘Seneca rarely mentions the living’ (Corbulo the general outlived S.). From what we know of the father’s character, he was certainly not averse to getting involved in altercations and confrontations. Tac. Ann. 31.3 (cf. Koestermann I.479 and Woodman & Martin 280-1 ad loc.) relates how in AD 21 Domitius Corbulo, who had praetorian rank, was involved in an angry dispute for precedence with a young senator, L. Sulla. And at Ann. 31.5 (cf. Koestermann I.480 and Woodman & Martin 282-3 ad loc.), Tacitus relates how he complained about the poor state of the roads in Italy, and personally undertook the prosecution of those responsible, many
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of whom were ruined financially. AD 21 is a long time before the likely date of composition of *CS* (post-41), however, and we cannot be sure that Corbulo *père* was still alive when Fidus Cornelius was insulted. Dio (59.53.3-4) relates that the Corbulo who complained about the roads in Tiberius’ reign was used by Caligula to attack the highway commissioners (both serving and former) in 39, and was made consul as a reward. Dio continues that later on, in the reign of Claudius, Corbulo was prosecuted and punished, and Claudius reimbursed the moneys taken from those who had been fined by Corbulo earlier. So, if Dio is correct, Corbulo *père* could well have been the man insulting Fidus Cornelius, and might well have been dead when S. wrote (as Griffin thinks probable). Syme (1979: 810), however, thinks it doubtful that the consul in 39 is Corbulo *père*. Clearly, no certainty is attainable on this matter.

For more on both Fidus Cornelius and Corbulo, and the implications of this passage for the dating of *CS*, see the Introduction, § I.

17.1: *struthocamelum depilatum*: *struthocamelus*, a Greek word originally, was presumably assimilated into Latin by S.’s day, hence the Roman script (see Bickel (1906) and Commentary on 3.5 and 10.2). Also, the insult would (one assumes) have had less bite had an unfamiliar Greek term been used. Here, as with *ueruex marinus*, we have a noun with accompanying adjective. A bird that is *depilatus* has been plucked (cf. Apicius 6.3 (cited by Klei 1950: 169)). [Syme (1979: 820) has this translation, although he does not discuss the passage further.] But what does
it mean to call a man a ‘plucked ostrich’? To call someone an ostrich is an insult in itself (as calling someone a lion would not be). The ostrich was thought to be stupid for its habit of burying its head in the sand (see Diodorus 2.14 (who incidentally, disagrees with the view that it is a sign of stupidity) and Pliny the Elder, *NH* 10.1), a view of the bird that is proverbial today. So Corbulo may be referring to Fidus Cornelius’ alleged stupidity, or imputing stupidity to him. Or calling him an ostrich might be an allusion to Fidus’ (if he had these characteristics) strutting gait, or long and scrawny neck, a big body supported on long thin legs, for example, Janssen (1974: 79) thinks that the insult may allude to the small head of the ostrich. Its name – meaning ‘sparrow-camel’ in Greek – may originate in the smallness of its head in comparison with the large size of its body. He cites the compound word *strouthokephalos* (‘sparrow-head’), found in Plutarch, *De curiositate* 520c to describe people with unusually small heads, who (with other freaks) were paraded in the marketplace for the amusement of the populace. He cites too Galen 19, p. 454 (Kühn), who cites *strouthokephala* as examples of *terata* marked by diminution and *megalokephala* as those marked by enlargement. And according to Claudian, *Eutr.* 2.315 (another passage cited by Janssens – see also the later discussion in this note), the ostrich had a *ridendum . . . caput*: a head worthy of ridicule.

The adjective *depilatum* adds another level to the insult. Minissale (185) thinks the insult may indicate that Fidus had a long narrow neck and bald head. Certainly, ostriches’ necks and legs are bare except for a few sparse hairs. But as these are well-known characteristics of an ostrich, it
would seem unnecessary to stress them by using the adjective ‘plucked’, which would actually imply that the ostrich’s body feathers had been removed. More likely, I think, there is an allusion to the practice of some men in Rome of shaving their bodies, a practice that was considered a sign of effeminacy (Corbeill 1992: 43-5), even homosexuality (Williams 2010: 129-32). So, the insult may have been aimed at Fidus’ ostrich-like appearance and gait, or his stupidity (or both), allied to his effeminate habit of shaving his legs and other parts of his body. We cannot know for certain, because we have no other information on Fidus Cornelius except for the present passage of S., but it seems likely. Certainly insults, then as now, were aimed often at the victim’s physical appearance. So, an Athenian jester (gephuristēs) mocked Sulla’s blotchy face: ‘Sulla is a mulberry sprinkled o’er with meal’ (Plut. Sulla, 2.1; Loeb translation).

In addition to the ostrich’s physical appearance and stupidity, Janssens (1974: 78-9) thinks that there may also be an allusion to its alleged cowardice. He cites another passage of Pliny (NH 10.73.142), in which the author opines that birds that are timid (fugaces) are ‘more prolific’ (Loeb translation of fecundiores) than brave ones (fortes). Among fertile birds he lists ostriches, hens and partridges. As an example of the alleged cowardice of the ostrich being used in a personal attack, Janssens (78) cites Claudian’s usage at In Eutropium 310-16. Here, Eutropius, who declines to resist the revolt of the Getae in Phrygia and shuts his mind to its seriousness, is compared to an ostrich, which flees from its hunters and then buries its head in the sand when they catch up with it, hoping they will not see it.
17.1: aduersus alia maledicta mores et uitam conuulnerantia frontis illi
firmitas constitit, aduersus hoc tam absurdum lacrimae prociderunt:

Nothing is known about Fidus apart from what is said by S. here, so we
cannot know the content of the *maledicta* made against him. Perhaps they
had some connection with his father-in-law’s alleged looseness of morals
and exile.

The reading *uitam* is Erasmus’ emendation of the MSS *uitia* (Klei 170), and is accepted by most editors, including Reynolds, on the grounds
that the immediately following *convulnerantia* influenced the scribes to
expect a (second) neuter plural subject. Klei (ibid.) disagrees, citing in
support *Tranq. 15.5: sed satius est publicos mores et humana uitia placide
acciipere*. The pairing *mores et vitia* might support the MSS *vitia* in CS, but
otherwise the MSS give poor sense. S. would be saying either (1) ‘against
other slanders and the vices that wounded his morals’ or (2) ‘against other
slanders that wounded his morals and vices’, or (3) ‘against other slanders
and the vices that wounded his morals’. The first sense implies a double
attack on his *mores*, from others and from his own viciousness. This seems
unlikely, and indeed contradictory, as he is maintaining a firm front against
these things, and if he maintained a firm front against his *uitia*, he would
presumably not have any *uitia*. The second sense is little better, with the
slanders wounding not only his morals but also his *vices*. The third is more
probable, and may be what Klei had in mind, for he cites in support Seneca
rhetor *Con. 2.1(9)6: extremis conuulneratum libidinibus*. The text of Seneca
rhetor that Klei cites is presumably Bornecque’s edition (1902, rev. 1932), which is listed in his bibliography, and whose French translation he gives; the Latin, translated into English, reads: ‘corrupted to the marrow by the most shameful passions’. The other editions I have consulted (Bursian, 1857; Kiessling, 1872; Müller, 1887) read *conuulneratum libidinebus* (i.e. no *extremites*), which Winterbottom (whose Loeb text is a corrected version of Müller’s (Winterbottom, p. xxvii), translates ‘crippled by lusts’. On this interpretation, Fidus is fighting double battle against the slanders of others and his own vices, which conspire to wound his morals. I am not convinced by the arguments to retain *uitia*, and I am happy to follow Reynolds.

17.1: *conuulnerantia*: *conuulnerare* literally means to damage by cutting or perforate. S. here uses it figuratively, as he does in the metaphor at *Tranq.* 11.5: *Eo magis conuulneraberis et confodieris, quia nescis praebere iugulum*; cf. Seneca rhetor, *Contr.* 2.1.6: *conuulneratum libidinebus* (cited by Klei 170: see previous note).

17.1: *tanta animorum inbecillitas est, ubi ratio discussit*: characteristically for S., a *sententia* sums up the point of the examples.

17.2: *Senectutem quidam inviti audient*: the A group of MSS read *quidem*. The reading *quidam* is almost certainly right; *quidam* could easily have been corrupted to *quidem*. 

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17.3: Vatinium . . . peruenerit?: picks up the allusion at 1.3 (infra Vatinios). The presentation of Vatinius here has some similarities with Tacitus’ description of another Vatinius, who became notorious in the later part of Nero’s reign: corpore detorto, facetiis scurrilibus (Tac. Ann. 15.34; cf. Dial. 8.3, 11.2; see also PIR III.389, no. 209). However, there is no evidence that S. intends an allusion to the Neronian Vatinius. If such an allusion were intended, that would point to a later date for CS than I consider likely, however (see Introduction, § I). Possibly the Neronian Vatinius adopted the name ‘Vatinius’ as an allusion to the Vatinius of Cicero’s day, given his own physical deformity and liking for playing the scurra.

17.3: scurram fuisse: the word scurra denoted (a) ‘a fashionable city idler, a “man about town”’ (OLD) and, by extension, (b) an urban wit or jester, even a buffoon. (See L–S and OLD.) As Cynthia Damon (1997: 108-12, 138-41, 202-6) shows, the scurra, although present in Plautine comedy as a gossip or wit, came to be identified from Horace onwards with the figure of the parasite. On the scurra, see also Beard (2014: esp. 152-5).

For previous scholarship on the scurra, see Damon (1997: 109 n. 11). Corbett’s (1986) monograph has been criticized for its poor methodology, most notably by Fowler (Greece & Rome 34 (1987): 90). However, Fowler’s remark that ‘I find it unthinkable that this kind of study should, be done without consulting the TLL’ is undermined by the fact that
TLL has at the time of writing (2016) only reached ‘P’ and so Corbett could not have consulted it for *scurræ* (if that is what Fowler meant).

17.3: *uenustum*: ‘attractive in appearance or manner, charming’ (*OLD*).
Presumably, Vatinius’s character is intended here, rather than his appearance.

17.3: *dicacem*: ‘having a ready tongue, given to making clever remarks at another’s expense’ (*OLD*).

17.3: *pedes suos . . . fauces concisas*: according to Quintilian 6.3.77, Vatinius had a foot ailment (*pedibus aeger*); according to Plut. *Cic.* 9 and 26, his neck was covered in swellings (possibly goitre). For Cicero’s comments on his appearance, likening him to a snake, see Vat. 2.4: *Repente enim te tamquam serpens e latibulis oculis eminentibus, inflato collo, tumidis cervicibus intulisti* . . . See Pocock for full discussion of the *In Vatinium*.

17.3: *in primis Ciceronis urbanitatem effugerat*: S. may be referring here to the rapprochement between Cicero and Vatinius in 45 BC when Cicero agreed to act as an advocate for Vatinius. See their correspondence in Cic. *Fam.* 5.9 (255 Shackleton Bailey = SB), 5.10a.1-2 (259 SB), 5.10a.3 (256 SB), 5.10b (258 SB), 5.11 (257 SB). Vatinius had certainly been the target of Cicero’s witty invective in the *In Vatinium*. 246
17.4: fructus . . . uindicet: these two words give a slightly legal tone to the passage, although it is unlikely they are being used in their strict legal senses here. Fructus can mean either, in a non-legal sense, the enjoyment or pleasurable possession of something (see OLD 1), or, in its legal sense, the right to enjoy the profits from something (OLD 1b). Here, there is a hint of the legal meaning, in that the insulter profits from the insult if it hits home, although the primary meaning of enjoyment without a specifically legal connection seems prevalent. The word uindicare can have the legal sense of laying legal claim to something as one’s own property that is in possession of another (uindico OLD 1) or claiming a slave free in an act of manumission (OLD uindico 3). However, it seems better to understand the word here in the sense of ‘avenge’, i.e. as a synonym of the non-legal ulcisci (OLD 5). This seems to be more in keeping with this part of CS, where we have ultionis (17.4), ulciscentium (18.3) and ultionem (18.5).

18.1: C. Caesar, inter cetera uitia quibus abundabat contumeliosus: for detailed accounts of Caligula’s vicious character elsewhere in the Dialogi, see e.g. Breu. 18.5-6, Ira 1.20.8-9, 3.33.3-6, 3.18.3-19.5, Pol. 17.4-6, Tranq. 9. 14.4-6.

18.1: mira libidine ferebatur omnis aliqua nota feriendi: here basically nota means ‘mark’ or ‘stain’, but again, as with notare at 11.2, there may be an underlying meaning of ‘black mark’, ‘stigma’.
18.1: *tanta . . . pedum:* for Caligula’s appearance is presented in bestial, grotesque terms. For *saetis*, and a discussion of the description of Caligula in Suet. *Cal. 50*, see the note by Minissale 192; also Grimal.

18.1: †emendacitatis†: the reading of A¹, which does not correspond to any known Latin word, any more than does *emendicitis* of A³. The reading of ζ is *emendicatis* (attested at Suet. *Caes. 54* and Aug. 91), which gives the sense ‘obtained by begging’. Begging for hair is consonant with Caligula’s base nature. Indeed, we are told that Caligula used to have the backs of the heads of handsome long-haired men shaved, although we are not told what was done with the shorn hair: *Pulchros et comatos, quotiens sibi occurrerent, occipitio raso deturpabat* (Suet. *Cal. 35*).

Of the emendations listed by Reynolds, Pincianus’s *medicatis* (‘doctored’, ‘besprinkled’, ‘dyed’) gives reasonably good sense. We are to imagine Caligula treating his remaining hairs with lotions, to prevent them falling out, or dying them, to preserve their colour. The problem is that all the MSS readings start *emend-*, their disagreements being concerned with what comes after these initial five letters. I think that any emendation should preserve *emend-*, and therefore we should not accept *medicatis*, whatever its other merits.

Gertz’s *emendicaticiis* is a hapax. I do not think it is a good method to propose hapax legomena as emendations, although *OLD* include it without comment. I have followed OLD’s translation of ‘borrowed’
(although they translate *emendicare* as ‘to obtain by begging’), rather than Basore’s ‘beggarly’, which is ambiguous: ‘beggarly’ in the sense of ‘sparse’ or ‘in need of replacement by begging’ (but see my earlier objections to ‘begged’)?

A more promising approach might be to adopt a form of the verb *emendare*, which can mean to correct in a medical sense, i.e. to cure. See *LS* and in particular Pliny Maior 20, §129: *Sextius adicit* . . . *alopecias emendari addito sinapi* . . . *porriginem et ulcer a capitis cum adipe anserino* (curing various afflictions, including baldness, dandruff and head sores); 34, §58: *capillum et pubem emendatius fecisse* (to dress hair faultlessly). We could imagine Caligula ‘correcting’ or ‘curing’ his baldness by applying false or replacement hairs. The question then would be which form of *emendare*? The unattested form *emendaticiis* would certainly fit, but again this would introduce a hapax.

Another possibility would be to read *emendationis*, so giving the sense ‘hairs of correction’/’corrective hairs’, i.e. hair used to ‘correct’ baldness.

Yet another possibility might be to posit an erroneous scribal addition of an initial ‘e’ to *mendacitatis* (‘hairs of falsehood’, ‘hairs that lie’). However, according to *LS*, *mendacitas* is ecclesiastical Latin, and we should not assume an earlier occurrence in S.

However, all this is speculation, and I think no entirely satisfactory emendation has been proposed yet. As Gertz (68) says: ‘dubito, an verum nondum repertum sit; equidem scripturam vulgatam non intelligo’.
18.2: **Asiaticum Valerium:** for information on this man, see the note by Grimal (96) and Barrett, *passim.* Tacitus reverses the order of the names, e.g. *Ann.* 11.1. PIR².

18.3: **Chaereae . . . auratus:** the whole passage contrasts Chaerea, whose voice did not match his otherwise manly and soldierly bearing, with Caligula, whose effeminate dress gave him no cause to insult Chaerea because of his voice.

18.3: **sermo non pro manu erat:** ‘his speech did not match his deeds’.

Here *manus* means ‘action’, as opposed to words, as at *Ira* 1.4.3 (*quaedam [sc. irae] saeuae manu uerbis parciores*).

18.3: **armato mollitiam:** the juxtaposition of the *armato* and *mollitiam* indicates the incongruity of softness with being a soldier, and thus the inappropriateness of Caligula’s insults. Softness (*mollitia*) was frequently used to describe people who were considered morally suspect. See Edwards (1993: ch. 2).

18.3: **haec ipse perlucidus, crepidatus, auratus:** asyndetic tricolon, with the last element one syllable shorter than the preceding two, which with its three long syllables, as opposed to the mixture of short and long syllables of the preceding two adjectives, gives it emphasis and slows down the sentence.
at the end, rounding it off decisively. The word *perlucidus* (usually ‘transparent’), here means ‘wearing transparent clothes’ (OLD 1). Caligula, although clothed, wishes his body to be visible, as if he were naked. In this, he is like a dancer, a class of person, usually servile, who frequently performed half-naked. He is *crepidatus*, i.e. wearing *crepidae*, which OLD defines as: ‘A kind of footwear consisting of a thick sole attached by straps to the feet, characteristically worn by Greeks and usu. regarded as an affectation when worn by Romans’. Cf. Cic. *Pis.* 92: *crepidatus veste servili navem conscendit*; Suet. *Dom.* 4.4: *Certamini praesedit crepidatus purpureaque amictus toga Graecanica*. It was considered unsuitable footwear for a *sapiens*, according to a character in Hor. *Sat.* 1.3.127-8, citing Chrysippus:

[. . .] ‘non nosti quid pater’ inquit

Chrysippus dicat: sapiens crepidas sibi numquam

nee soleas fecit; sutor tamen est sapiens.’ [. . .]

sapiens crepidas sibi numquam | nec soleas fecit

The last adjective in the sequence, *auratus*, depicts Caligula either wearing gold jewellery or clad in gilded clothes, or both. This is ostentation of an un-Roman manner, more associated with orientals. Also, there may be a comparison of Caligula with a sacrificial animal (see also next note on *uno ictu*). The horns of sacrificial victims were often decked with gold; cf. Livy 25.12.13 (*Apollini boue aurato et capris duabus albis auratis*), [S.]
Hercules Oetaeus 784-5 (Vt stetit ad aras omne uotium pecus | totumque tauris gemuit auratis nemus).

18.3: *ille ceruicem mediam uno ictu decidit*: an ironic allusion to Caligula’s wish that the Roman people had one neck, so that he could kill them all with one blow and on one day (*Ira* 3.19.2). Also, as Wilcox (2008: 468 n. 34) points out, with the words *uno ictu* S. likens Caligula to a sacrificial animal, which had to be slaughtered with a single blow. For irony as used by S. in the Caligula passages in *CS*, see also Wilcox (2008: 464-73).

18.4: *Herennio Macro*: Herennius Macer is elsewhere unattested: *PIR*² IV, p. 75, no. 111.

18.4: *coturnatus*: wearing buskins, the footwear of tragic actors, and inappropriate for a *princeps*.

18.5: *Ergo hoc . . . consumuntur*: reflecting on (presumably) the murder of Caligula, S. expresses a rather strange view here. Although the lenience of Stoics (*nostra facilitas*) does not permit revenge, S. will nonetheless be consoled by the fact that there will be someone (presumably not a Stoic) who exacts punishment from a man who is ‘wanton, arrogant, and revels in doing injury’ (tr. Ker). He seems to condone in non-Stoics what he and other Stoics would not consider doing themselves. Also noteworthy is the
future tense. S. apparently looks forward to similar tyrannicides in the future. Given the danger of publishing or expressing such sentiments, I think it unlikely that S. has post-quinquennium Nero in mind.

18.5: procace et superbo et inurioso, quae uitia [. . .] consumuntur: an interesting construction, whereby the abstract nouns that correspond to the adjectives (procace ~ procacitas; superbo ~ superbia; inurioso ~ iniuria) are assumed in the following relative clause (quae uitia [. . .]).

18.6: ut Socratis . . . accepit: presumably, comoediarium refers to Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, which ridiculed Socrates, among other philosophers and sophists. Cf. *VB* 27, esp. the beginning of 27.2 (Socrates is speaking from prison): *Praebui ego aliquando Aristophani materiam iocorum, tota illa comicorum poetarum manus in me uenenatos sales suos effudit:* *inlustrata est uirtus mea per ea ipsa per quae petebatur.* See further the references given in Grimal: Cic. Tusc. 3.31; S. *Ira* 2.7.1; *Ep.* 104.28; *Helv.* 13.4. For the story of how Anytus and his cronies persuaded Aristophanes to lampoon Socrates in a play, see Aelian, *VH* 2.13.

18.6: risitque . . . perfunderetur: the full story, with the addition of Socrates’ witty comment, is given in S. Fr. 62 (Haase): *Quodam autem tempore quam infinita conuicia ex superiori loco ingerenti Xanthippe restitisset, aqua perfusus immunda nihil amplius respondit quam capite*
detero: ‘sciebam,’ inquit, ‘futurum, ut ista tonitrua imber sequeretur’. The story, together with Socrates’ comment, is given at D.L. 2.36.

Antisthenes was considered by some to be the founder of the Cynic school.
Cynics were commonly spoken of with approval by Stoics (cf. Diogenes in Ep. 94), not surprisingly, given that Zeno was a Cynic before he founded his own, Stoic school. For a discussion of the insult, see Introduction, § VII.

19: after the false peroration of 15, we now have the actual peroration.

19.1: rixam conluctationemque ueniendum: Grimal thinks that conluctatio is military language, but it seems to denote struggle physical struggle generally, and metaphorical struggle (see OLD). In Dig. 9.2.7.4 (Ulpian) it denotes wrestling (in colluctatione uel pancratio). At Quint. 17.8 it refers metaphorically to a ‘struggle’ at law: redeuntis in damnatam colluctationem; and at S. QN 3.18.1, it refers to the ‘struggle’ of a dying mullet: ipsa colluctatione deficientis animae. It does not occur before S. (see TLL III.1656).

19.2: obirati: according to LS, obirascor is ‘mostly post-Aug.’, and according to Bourgery it is not found before S. (249). It is fairly frequent in S.: Tranq. 2.11 (obirascens fortunae animus), Ep. 56.9 (obirata), Ira 3.40.1 (obirasci), Ben. 5.24.2 (obiratus).
19.3: **memor in prima acie altos ordines stare**: military imagery. The best soldiers (the *alti ordines*) stand in the front ranks, the weaker troops in the rear. Ker translates ‘tall ranks’. Here, the imagery of height is combined with military imagery (‘high ranks’).

19.3: **Contumelias . . . uiri**: extended military imagery. The sage is stands at his post in the battle of life, unbroken and unbowed by the assaults of the enemy. Compare the likening of the soul of the sage to an impregnable fortress at 6.8.

19.3: **saxa sine uulnere circa galeas crepitantia**: vivid imagery of rock rattling off helmets. For the invulnerability of the sage to the ‘slings and arrows of outrageous fortune’ cf. *Ep*. 45.9; *Ira* 3.5.8. For *crepitare* used of the rattling of weapons and arms, see *Ov. Met*. 1.143: *crepitantia concutit arma*.

19.4: **Sapienti aliud auxilium est huic contrarium; uos enim rem geritis, illi parta uictoria est**: the contrast between the sage and the *adfectatores sapientiae*. He has already obtained the victory in life which the others are striving to attain; and *huic contrarium* hints at the *contrarium mundo iter* of the sage at 14.4.
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Notes

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