TITLE: Victoire in Kigali, or: Why Rwandan elections aren’t won transnationally

AUTHOR: Will Jones, Departmental Lecturer in the Politics of Forced Migration, Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford

ADDRESS: 19 Thackley End, Oxford, OX26LB. Email: will.b.jones@gmail.com

ABSTRACT:

This article brings together the literature on ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’ with the sub-fields of diaspora studies and transnationalism to evaluate the potential of political parties in exile to be forces for positive change in Rwanda. With this in mind, this article asks one simple question: is the participation of the Rwandan opposition in exile in electoral processes back home likely to be a positive force for change? It concludes that, in Rwanda at least, elections cannot be won transnationally. As such, those hoping for a more democratic Rwanda should look elsewhere. Operating in a transnational space appears to make life harder for the opposition, but not the Rwandan state. Further, the division, inconsistency, sudden shifts, splits and volte-face of Rwanda’s diasporic opposition is produced, at least in part, by the competitive authoritarian nature of Rwanda. What the Rwandan case reveals, then, is at least one instance where unfair elections do not make future liberalisation more likely.

KEYWORDS: Rwanda, Diaspora, Competitive Authoritarianism, Transnationalism, Elections, Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Politics

Victoire in Kigali, or:

Why Rwandan elections aren’t won transnationally

### Introduction

Two research frontiers clash in this article. Firstly, the excellent work on ‘electoral authoritarian regimes’.[[1]](#endnote-1) This literature has produced impressive results, but remains – with honourable exceptions[[2]](#endnote-2) - dominated by large-n statistical studies. A key question it raises is whether and under what circumstances *elections* may ‘subvert’ authoritarianism rather than reinforce it. A further question concerns ‘linkage’:[[3]](#endnote-3) the ways in which the state’s relationship to the rest of the world conditions the durability of the regime.

Secondly, the sub-fields of diaspora studies and transnationalism have produced superb work on political mobilisation and activism across borders.[[4]](#endnote-4) This literature reveals the *potential of political parties in exile* to be forces for substantial change. In some cases, diasporas become hugely significant, such as Kurds.[[5]](#endnote-5) Diasporas can aid post-conflict reconstruction, as Laura Hammond argues in the Somali context,[[6]](#endnote-6) the mainstay of the democratic opposition, as in the Zimbabwean case,[[7]](#endnote-7) or both perpetuators of conflict and agents in reconstruction, as Camilla Orjuela shows for Tamils.[[8]](#endnote-8) In other cases, such as Ethiopians[[9]](#endnote-9) and Eritreans,[[10]](#endnote-10) the story is one of weak, divided and ineffective movements. This literature reveals that diasporic oppositions face advantages and disadvantages: on the one hand, mobilisation is made harder by distance from local populations, lower levels of information about local conditions, coordination problems across diaspora communities, and strategic clashes with domestic groups. On the other, mobilisation is made easier by the safety distance brings, civil liberties in host countries, access to foreign governments and NGOs, and access to new resources.

Rwanda exemplifies both these advantages and disadvantages. As such, the Rwandan opposition in exile can be regarded as a typical case – it is distinctive in terms of its size relative to that of the opposition in general, but it can otherwise serve as a useful paradigm case for evaluating opposition across borders. For Rwandans, politics takes place across borders, from remnants of armed rebel movements in the forests of North Kivu to civilian political parties. There is a steady trickle of senior government figures into exile to join political parties, and the Rwandan state itself reaches out to monitor and mobilise Rwandan migrants through its ‘Diaspora General Directorate’. However, we lack scholarly writing on Rwanda’s transnational politics.[[11]](#endnote-11) A few authors have identified the Rwandan opposition in exile as a source of democratic change,[[12]](#endnote-12) but have not evaluated the effectiveness of these movements in fighting elections.

With this in mind, this article asks one question: is the participation of the Rwandan opposition in exile in electoral processes back home likely to be a force for change? It concludes that, in Rwanda at least, elections cannot be won transnationally. As such, whilst it is likely that Rwandans in the diaspora will continue to attempt to influence the politics of the homeland state, we should not be too optimistic about the prospects of such campaigns. As the role of the diaspora in Rwanda’s opposition is extremely large, this has gloomy implications for the aspirations of diasporic oppositions on the continent in general.

This article briefly reviews the Rwandan electoral system, before launching into a detailed account of the 2010 election to unpack the possibilities (or lack thereof) for transnational political change.

### 1. The Rwandan Electoral System

Rwanda is conventionally thought to have one of the most pluralist and inclusive constitutions on the continent, with proportional representation, guaranteed seats for women, youth, and the disabled, extensive decentralisation to local councils, etc. It also has one of the most hegemonic and tightly centralised ruling parties anywhere in the world in the form of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) of Paul Kagame. These aren’t usually expected to go together, and the conventional answer is that Rwanda’s constitutional rules, and institutions more broadly, don’t matter. This is a cheap answer: it relies on our willingness to accept dated stereotypes about African governance, and it is false. The RPF is not dominant in spite of its constitution, but in part because of it.

Rwanda has held twelve elections in its post-genocidal history (see figure one). In no election in Rwanda has there been a serious possibility of the ruling elite being defeated. They have all been run on time, more competently than many African states (on purely technocratic measures), and – in contrast to many other states with tarnished democratic reputations – the voting itself, the counting, and its aftermath have not been characterised by large-scale protest or violence. Whilst commentators disagree on the extent of pre-electoral violence and electoral malpractice, the consensus of observation missions and competent observers is that, firstly, what violence exists is targeted against a small cadre of counter-elites and RPF defectors, rather than the population in general; secondly, that such violence is controlled exclusively by the state security services, and, thirdly, that the general results would not have been seriously altered by the absence of rigging.[[13]](#endnote-13)

Most simply, Rwanda’s electoral code is complicated. Rwanda has a near constant electoral cycle, the effect of staggering the elections to five-year positions (localities and the Chamber of Deputies), seven year Presidential terms, and eight year Senatorial terms. The system combines a mixture of direct and indirect elections at national and local levels. Different electoral systems exist at the different levels and in parallel at the same level. This complexity is part-and-parcel of the consociational medicine: the multiple tiers of governance with independent elections are supposed to provide plenty of routes to inclusion for different groups. The necessary flip-side of that complexity, however, is obscurity. The more intricate an electoral code gets, the harder it is for ordinary citizens to monitor its workings. For example, directly-elected candidates to the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate operate on a national list system. How individuals end up on lists is unclear, but selection is conducted at the national level for a single constituency. Entry to said lists is non-participatory (the constitution does not require open competition for such slots), and mired in accusations of corruption and backhanders. What is absolutely clear about the process is that it centralises the decisions about who is a candidate, and denudes it of accountability or independence. As such, the RPF and other parties lack fair, transparent, and democratic mechanisms for choosing candidates to represent them, and it is extremely difficult for citizens to hold that process to account.

Figure 1: Elections in Post-Genocidal Rwanda

|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Year | Type | Date | Winner | Vote % | Electoral System |
| 1999 | Local | 29-30/03 | No-party1 | N/A | Mix of elected and appointed |
| 2001 | Local2 | 06/03 | No-party | N/A | Mix of elected and appointed |
| 2003 | Constitutional Referendum | 26/05 | ‘Yes’ | 89.9 | Direct, mass suffrage |
|  | Presidential | 25/08 | Paul Kagame | 95.1 | Direct, mass suffrage |
|  | Chamber of Deputies | 29-30/09 | RPF3 | 73.78 | Mix of elected and appointed4 |
|  | Senate | 02/10 | RPF5 | N/A | Mix of elected and appointed6 |
| 2006 | Local | 06/02-04/03 | No-party | N/A | Mix of elected and appointed |
| 2008 | Chamber of Deputies | 15-18/09 | RPF | 78.76 | Mix of elected and appointed |
| 2010 | Presidential | 09/08 | Paul Kagame | 93.08 | Direct, mass suffrage |
| 2011 | Local | 04/02-05/03 | No-party | N/A | Mix of elected and appointed |
|  | Senate | 26-27/09 | RPF | N/A | Mix of elected and appointed |
| 2013 | Chamber of Deputies | 16-18/09 | RPF | 76.22 | Mix of elected and appointed |
| 2015 | Constitutional Referendum | 18/12 | ‘Yes’ | 98 | Direct, mass suffrage |

[1] Officially. In practice there are no local authorities which have engaged in any open opposition to the RPF

[2] The two-year margin between this and the preceeding local elections was necessitated by the decentralisation reforms, which radically altered the structure of local authorities.

[3] Inclusive of the five satellite parties: Christian Democratic Party (Parti démocratique chrêtien), Islamic Democratic Party (Parti démocratique islamique), Rwandese Socialist Party (Parti socialiste rwandais), Prosperity and Solidarity Party (Parti de la Solidarité et du Progrès), Party for Progress and Concord (Parti du Progrès et de la Concorde), Democratic Union of the Rwandese People (Union démocratique du People rwandais)

[4] The Chamber is made up of 80 deputies. Of these, 53 are elected for five-years term by proportional representation and 24 are elected by provincial councils; of the remainder, two are appointed by the National Youth Council, and one by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled.

[5] Although partially no-party, of those with a party affiliation, the RPF and their satellite parties are the clear winner

[6] The Senate has 26 members elected or appointed for an eight-year term: 12 elected by provincial and sectoral councils, 8 appointed by the President “to ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities”, 4 by the Forum of Political Parties and 2 elected by the staff of the universities. Additionally former presidents can request to become a member of the senate. Originally, the elected members of the senate faced a two-round system, where if no candidate received an absolute majority, the two highest ranked proceeded to a run-off. In 2011 this was omitted.

Secondly, legislators lack specific constituencies. The proportional system returns 53 seats from closed lists in one single national constituency. The idea is that regional conflict (classically, between the north and the south, and increasingly between Kigali and everywhere else) has historically undermined peace and stability in Rwanda. Therefore, the constitution mandates that a majority of national parliamentarians do not have regional seats (there are still some, through the indirectly elected seats). Further to this, the proportionality serves the interest of the elite in presenting the political system as pluralist. Were the system was done on FPTP with one-member constituencies, it is almost certain that the RPF would have won 100% of the seats in both elections. This would not be a gain in political pluralism, but would make the reality of RPF hegemony more readily apparent: the democratic façade of the state would be considerably damaged.

Thirdly, the system disadvantages small parties considerably. Were the system to not be based on one national list, but rather local constituencies, small parties would be able to concentrate on building regional constituencies, which is cheaper and easier. This would in particular have benefited the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties (PL and PSD), with their traditional support bases in the educated middle classes of the south, but would also have been easier for small parties in general. Instead, the current system mandates that any given party must exceed 5% of the national vote in order to achieve any representation at all. This practically excludes some parties, and it is likely that the six parties which entered the elections under the RPF umbrella were in this category (in theory, the RPF competes in elections as one party in an alliance of seven. In practice, this is barely remembered. The National Election Commission even forgot to mention this on the ballot in 2008, giving only an option to vote for the RPF). Entering into the alliance for the minor six parties entailed giving the final decision as to which candidate was placed where on the ‘alliance’s’ list to the executive committee of the RPF. Whilst minor in effect thus far, it is worth noting that there is more than one formula for counting the votes PR systems can use, and the one the RPF have picked (the Hare-Niemeyer method) tends to favour slightly smaller parties that do pass the threshold, to the disadvantage of everyone else.[[14]](#endnote-14) The system therefore dramatically increases the incentives for cooperating rather than competing with the ruling party.

Fourthly, the national-list centralised approach makes it easier to manipulate the vote on Election Day. Most famously, *Umuseso* (a Rwandan paper often extremely critical of the regime) and the EU both reported in 2008[[15]](#endnote-15) that it seemed to clear observers at the polling stations during the vote count that neither the PL nor the PSD would have passed the 5% threshold. In the end they received 7.5% (four seats) and 13.12% (seven seats) respectively. One hypothesis is that the RPF reverse-rigged the results in order to make the polity appear more plural than it really is. Local results aren’t published though, so it is very difficult for citizen activists or observers to spot deviations to complain about national totals. Whether or not fraud took place is only part of the point, the more important point is that it is nigh impossible to know whether fraud is taking place or not because counts at local booths are not related to national results in any straightforward way which is independently verifiable. This also contributes to the febrile atmosphere of rumour for which Rwanda is notorious.

Fifthly, the appointed members entrench incumbent hegemony. Constitutionally speaking, the disabled representative in the Chamber of Deputies is elected by the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled, the two youth representatives by the National Youth Council, and the 24 women’s representatives by Electoral College of the provinces. In practice, these posts are often not contested, and the electing organs are happy to follow the direction indicated by the RPF Secretariat or the Presidency. In the Senate, alongside the twelve elected by provincial and sectoral councils, 8 Senators are simply appointed by the President “to ensure the representation of historically marginalized communities”, a further four by an official state organ called the ‘Forum of Political Parties’, and two elected by the staff of the universities. This obviously reduces the accountability of both Houses to citizens, and the lack of transparency in these appointments further increases the power of the central elite. The Forum itself is empowered to recall parliamentarians (i.e. dismiss them). Thus far, a significant proportion of legislators have always been recalled before the end of their terms. Between the 2003 and 2008 elections, fourteen deputies were replaced, approximately 25% of the Chamber of Deputies.[[16]](#endnote-16) This has the obvious effect of removing any trouble-makers that do appear, and making sure as few as possible manifest in the first place.

### 2. Background to the 2010 Election

Flight after the genocide and in response to subsequent repression leading to further migration meant that by 2010 almost all major Rwandan opposition figures were in exile. The immediate period preceding the election was one of relative inactivity in public but important transition behind the scenes for the Rwandan diaspora. These changes were sociological, organisational, and strategic.

Sociologically, the older parties of the diaspora underwent a changing of the guard, with the recycled elites from the era of Juvenal Habyarimana’s ‘Second Republic’ (1973-‘94) largely replaced by a younger generation unwedded to the loyalties of past movements and considerably more fluent in the liberal pieties of the post-Cold War era. On the other hand, the ranks of those opposing the government from abroad were swelled by the steady exodus of middle to high-ranking elite RPF officials into exile, fundamentally altering the ethnic, linguistic, and class composition of the diaspora.

Organisationally, the last four years saw the emergence of two broad and consolidated global parties opposing the RPF from abroad, FDU-Inkingi, which had been pieced together from the more substantial Hutu populist parties in 1996,[[17]](#endnote-17) and the RNC, founded in 2010 in Bethesda, Maryland, by the ‘Gang of Four’ of high-profile RPF exiles[[18]](#endnote-18) and associated figures.[[19]](#endnote-19) These two organisations have formed alliances with most of the extant parties of the diaspora, such as Déo Mushayidi’s PDP-Imanzi, Emmanuel Habyarimana’s CNR-Intwari, and the Amahoro People’s Congress in Canada, although there are exceptions, notably Father Thomas Nahimana’s *Ishema,* and Faustin Twagiramungu’s new party, the *Rwanda Dream Initiative* (RDI). Their creep towards unity, though punctuated by false-starts, set-backs, and wrong turnings, represents the best chance for a unified interlocutor with Kigali since the ill-fated CPODR founded to contest the 2003 elections.

Strategically, substantive military options had been largely taken off the table by the failure of attempts to restart the insurgency in the North-West of Rwanda in the early 2000s,[[20]](#endnote-20) and successive defeats for Hutu radical militants in Eastern DRC.[[21]](#endnote-21) This led to a shift in the *modus operandi* of these organisations to a series of attempts to field and support candidates for the Presidential election in 2010. All of them ultimately proved abortive, and in some cases seriously damaged the organisations in question. Both Victoire Ingabire and Déo Mushayidi were imprisoned upon their return to Rwanda, and in all cases the resources sunk into campaigns proved fruitless. In a re-run of the 2003 elections, where attempts to unify behind Faustin Twagiramungu fell apart almost before they began, leading to him receiving a dismal 3.6% of the vote, diasporic political parties in 2010 proved too weak and disunited to form a joint platform to face a hegemonic, wealthy, well-organised RPF with the will and ability to repress their efforts.

I now move to the various diasporic attempts to fight the 2010 elections, with a view to explaining in more detail why exilic political organisation proved unable to make a breakthrough, and – more generally – why Rwandan elections cannot be won transnationally, and the optimism of those who see ‘politics from abroad’ as a panacea for liberalisation is misplaced.

### 3. The formation of FDU-Inkingi

The Forces for Democratic Unity (FDU) present themselves, with a degree of accuracy, as the most prominent political party opposing the Rwandan regime from exile operating today. Part of their discourse is that they, in contrast to the earlier generation of political parties in exile, are a moderate, multi-ethnic, broad-based coalition genuinely committed to democracy, non-violence, and ethnic co-existence. Their credentials as advertised on the website are scrupulously unobjectionable, to the point of meaninglessness:

The United Democratic Forces (UDF-INKINGI) are a political party formed by citizens united around shared ideals and a common conviction for a vision of promoting the social welfare of all citizens and their country’s development.

The UDF are determined to offer to Rwandans a credible and democratic solution, and a peaceful coexistence with neighbouring populations and countries. A country where the law prevails is characterized by the rule of law, prevalence of the judiciary, equality before the law, fairness, respect and human treatment of every individual. As the population is the ultimate holder of a country’s sovereignty, the government has an obligation to work towards promoting its wellbeing and protect each citizen against arbitrariness and discrimination.[[22]](#endnote-22)

Their ‘Values and Principals’ is a similarly ordinary list of liberal tropes, viz.: 1. The rule of law, 2. Equality and Freedom, 3. Individual autonomy, 4. Solidarity, 5. Right to remembrance, 6. Population’s participation, 7. Decentralization, 8. Sustainable development[[23]](#endnote-23).Point 5, the only potentially disagreeable item on the list, explicitly mentions the Genocide of 1994, even if it refrains from the Rwandan government’s preferred formulation of ‘Genocide *against the Tutsi’*, and tantalisingly adds ‘and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda’. In general, FDU are assiduous in denying any hint of genocide denial in their discourse, and are at pains to distance themselves publicly from those that do. For example, when on April 10th 2011 CNR-Inwari, another ‘new’ opposition party of the diaspora, issued a statement claiming of the 1994 Genocide that “the ruling party RPF and other west super powers planed [sic] and implemented it.”[[24]](#endnote-24) The statement went on to say that “the coalition [i.e. of CHR-Intwari, FDU, and the RNC] supports and speaks for the fighting militia which is based in Eastern Congo FDLR”.[[25]](#endnote-25) The first claim is unambiguous genocide denial under Rwanda’s law, the latter claim amounts to saying these groups have ongoing links with a group widely accused of war crimes, a deeply unsavoury discourse of Hutu populism, and committed to an armed return to Rwanda. Both claims are sufficient to get an organisation banned within Rwanda, and lose the groups almost all potentially sympathetic ears in the West. FDU was near instantaneous in releasing a counterstatement absolutely denying both these claims.[[26]](#endnote-26) CNR-Intwari themselves have since backed away from such claims, although their website still includes much more inflammatory language than FDU are generally comfortable with, such as ‘Le CNR INTWARI regroupe toutes les personnes qui ont fermement décidé de se lever comme un seul homme pour mettre fin au génocide planifié par des membres du FPR-Inkotanyi et mis en œuvre par des membres de l'APR sous les ordres de Kagame.’[[27]](#endnote-27)The FDU’s preferred claim about the genocide, that it was ‘real but cynically exploited’, is considerably more sophisticated and likely to get past RPF censors.

However, the historical roots of FDU reveal deep links to the earlier generation of Rwandan opposition movements they are at public pains to distance themselves from. The first meeting of what became FDU was convened by Victoire Ingabire and JMV Ndagijimana in Amsterdam in 2004 on the 26th and 28th of November.[[28]](#endnote-28) Over the next three years, at a series of meetings convened across continental Europe,[[29]](#endnote-29) a constellation of older parties came together which would form the basis of a new coalition ultimately founded in April 2006: the RDR, now under the leadership of Victoire Ingabire,[[30]](#endnote-30) the CDA, under the leadership of Jean-Baptiste Mberabahizi,[[31]](#endnote-31) and the FRD, the old party of Faustin Twagiramungu and Seth Sendashonga (although Twagiramungu himself had by this point distanced himself from the opposition parties).[[32]](#endnote-32) Combining all these elements, it is clear that the new coalition was genuinely multi-ethnic, if dramatically skewed towards Hutu, and contained a wide spectrum of views from across the diaspora. The FRD themselves were formed by moderate Hutu exiles from the transitional government in 1996. The CDA had originally split from FRD over the issue of cooperation with what they regarded as an insufficiently demilitarised RDR and joined the multi-ethnic ADR-Isangano in 2001. The RDR themselves by this point were the Europe-based and demilitarised descendants of the earlier movement of the same name which had been devastated when the RPA entered the refugee camps of Eastern Zaire in 1996, which had also ultimately given birth to the FDLR.

As such, it should be clear that the FDU recycled many of the older organisational forms of the alliances which had collapsed under the weight of trying to form a joint programme in 2003. Furthermore, it also inherited the advantages of its three founding partners: the three hierarchies brought together the best set of connections and financial resources of any exiled Rwandan party of opposition. However, by this point two factors made life easier for FDU. Firstly, the leadership itself had undergone a degree of generational replacement: Ingabire, Ndagijimana, and Mberabahizi were joined by figures such as François Nzabahimana, Dr. Nkiko Nsengimana, Boniface Twagirimana, Theophile Murayi, and Sixbert Musangamfura. If these individuals were not exactly youthful (and often long-standing members of the elite of the parties which became FDU), neither were they the leaders of the first raft of parties formed in exile after 1994. Secondly, military options looked unfeasible to all but the most hubristic. As such, some of the pressure which led the earlier coalitions to fragment had dissipated. Unable to countenance military action, building consensus around the pursuit of a non-violent electoral strategy was considerably easier, and FDU successfully held together for the four years between 2006 and the Presidential poll of 2010, where they intended Victoire Ingabire to stand against Kagame and successfully mobilise the great mass of the ‘rural majority’[[33]](#endnote-33) to vote in an FDU government.

### 4. Victoire– the arrival

After 2003, the RPF’s control over political space within Rwanda went largely unchallenged. Although technically the RPF ruled in coalition with several other opposition parties,[[34]](#endnote-34) these parties were minnows completely dependent on the RPF for their continued survival, and in no sense constituted an opposition. In a meeting of the *Parti Libéral* in 2008, one speaker had gone as far as to say ‘we are not here to oppose President Kagame but to build a nation. Rwanda does not need a European-style opposition’.[[35]](#endnote-35) They are so unimportant that for the legislative elections of 2008, National Electoral Commission even forgot to put them on the ballot.[[36]](#endnote-36) Nonetheless, the elections of 2010 were not regarded by the RPF by the complacency they might appear to have merited. The attempts by several genuine opposition groupings to run in the presidential poll were regarded as a real threat, and correspondingly the extent and frequency of actions (both ‘legal’ roadblocks and illegal repression) directed at countering and dismantling opposition politics increased dramatically.

As such, it might appear that the FDU’s electoral strategy was doomed to failure in advance. However, at that point they represented a diasporic political force more united (at least on paper) and better funded than at any point since the Genocide (excluding armed movements). Furthermore, they had not been prohibited from operating within Rwanda, nor could they have had evidence that Ingabire would not be permitted on to the ballot as Twagiramungu had managed seven years before. What happened when Ingabire arrived in Kigali on the 16th of January 2010 has elements of farce and tragedy. Ultimately, the FDU electoral machine was hopelessly outmatched by the RPF’s organisational and financial muscle, and their tight grip over an extremely strong state apparatus. However, even within those constraints, their conduct reveals much about the limitations of Rwandan diasporic politics.

Ingabire’s first act upon arriving in Kigali was to go to the Gisozi Genocide Memorial Centre (the Rwandan Yad Vashem) and make a speech in which she called for Hutus killed in 1994 to also be buried there alongside Tutsi. In her own words:

‘…if you look around you realize that there is no real political policy to help Rwandans achieve reconciliation. For example, if we look at this memorial, it only stops at people who died during the Tutsi genocide. It does not look at the other side – at the Hutus who died during the genocide. Hutus who lost their people are also sad and they think about their lost ones and wonder, ‘When will our dead ones be remembered?’[[37]](#endnote-37)

Although this may seem politically innocuous to non-Rwandans, this suggestion is extremely inflammatory. It is not just the crassness of the suggestion (by way of contrast, try to imagine Angela Merkel flying to Israel to ask why Germans killed in the Second World War are not also commemorated in Yad Vashem), although that might be thought enough to upset many. It is also that this call resonates with a current of genocide denial known as the ‘Double-Genocide hypothesis’, notably promulgated in the controversial book *Black Furies, White Liars* by French investigative journalist Pierre Péan,[[38]](#endnote-38) although it was endorsed by Alain Juppé, then Foreign Minister of France as early as June 1994, and by President François Mitterand a month later, who both insisted on pluralising the G-word.[[39]](#endnote-39) It resurfaced in the work of Abdul Ruzibiza, a former RPF captain who fled into exile and published a work alleging the RPF planned the shooting down of the Presidential Plane.[[40]](#endnote-40) The verdict of the foremost scholar of Rwanda, Rene Lemarchand, is unequivocal:

What his book [Péan’s] and Ruzibiza’s have in common is their unambiguous adherence to the notion of a genocide of Hutu every bit as horrendous as that committed against the Tutsi. “Why has this situation remained unacknowledged?” asks Ruzibiza (347). The short answer is that it fails to convince. More specifically, and notwithstanding statements to the contrary, the fact is that the scale of the massacres of Tutsi civilians far exceeds that of the killings of Hutu in Rwanda at the hands of the RPA[[41]](#endnote-41)

However, the double-genocide hypothesis, despite lacking credibility, continues to be a fertile source of Rwandan genocide denial. Ingabire’s speech at Gisozi is, of course, carefully modulated. It remains strictly ambiguous between multiple interpretations: is Ingabire referring to commemorating moderate Hutu which resisted the genocide (rather in the style of the Avenue of the Righteous Among the Nations)? Or commemorating Hutu qua victims of a genocide directly against Hutu? As such, it functions as a archetypal piece of political dog whistle: a message employing coded language which will be regarded as innocuous to the world in general, but which will have an additional resonance to a certain subset of Rwandans. Victoire Ingabire can claim (as she repeatedly has) that all she seeks to do is reopen a debate on Rwanda’s history, which sounds eminently reasonable to her defenders in the West. She can’t seriously be unaware, however, that her message will be heard by others very differently. Other examples of such behaviour abounds. For example, Ingabire hinted darkly in one speech that she would win the vote were it held tomorrow, because people ‘know who we are’. [[42]](#endnote-42) Given, as Christoph Vourlias points out, Ingabire had by that point engaged in no campaigning in the country, most voters knew only that she was a Hutu, and much of her campaigning was directed at finding not-so-subtle ways to remind voters of that. Of course, none of this is to endorse Rwanda’s simultaneously strict and vague freedom of speech laws. Rather, it is to explain the anger and alarm of the RPF at Ingabire’s arrival in Kigali.

If that was not enough, soon afterwards FDU released a joint press statement with two other putative opposition parties within Rwanda, the Democratic Green Party of Rwanda (DGP) and *Parti Social-Imberakuri*, signed by all three party leaders, saying “In view of the many barriers, both legal and administrative, that the regime has put in place to prevent political parties from being formally registered we have decided to form a common political platform called the Permanent Consultative Council of Opposition Parties...The main objective of our platform is: to articulate a common political platform and carry out the work of lobbying and advocacy at the national and international levels.” Frank Habineza, the leader of the DGP, speaking after the release, went so far as to say that they had not ruled out the possibility of fielding a joint presidential candidacy.[[43]](#endnote-43) Which is to say: within a month of Victoire Ingabire’s arrival in Rwanda it looked like there was an opposition candidate who was well-funded, fluent in language which escaped the criticism of donors yet spoke to the populist desires of the Hutu peasantry, and may even successfully unite all the relevant opposition forces.

Despite this, there are some indications that the RPF were, at that point at least, keen to try and allow Ingabire to run, in order to provide the simulacrum of a pluralistic democracy which Twagiramungu had so usefully provided in 2003. For example, Ingabire was given a (relatively) free hand to espouse her opinions to the foreign press, once in Kenya,[[44]](#endnote-44) and once in Canada.[[45]](#endnote-45) However, Ingabire and FDU systematically mismanaged their election campaign, ruining their chances of participating, and exposing the weakness and inexperience of those posing as the diasporic political class.

Which goes some way to explaining the subsequent reaction of the RPF. What they did went on to become a recognisable RPF playbook deployed in such instances, which has been wheeled out at successive elections. In most general terms, a variety of tactics ranging from bureaucratic obstruction to plain clothes thugs breaking-up meetings befell the FDU. The general intent was to weaken the party so much it either withdrew from the elections, or would be crushed in them, without necessitating overt repression of the sort that would force donors to withdraw support for the regime. The less overt repression is documented by Kris Berwouts:

…on March 13th 2010 she [Ingabire] received a letter from the communal authorities which forbade her from organising political meetings since she was subject to police investigation. She wanted to react by holding a press conference but all the hotels where she had booked meeting rooms were threatened and cancelled the bookings at the last minute. When UDF tried to organise its constituent assembly, the municipality was willing to authorise this on the condition that the police would confirm that they would be present to ensure security. The police would be happy to ensure security provided that the commune gave its written authorisation.[[46]](#endnote-46)

This sort of thing shortly became the least of Ingabire’s worries. On February 3rd Ingabire was attacked by a group of men as she attempted to register FDU to compete in the election.[[47]](#endnote-47) Police spokesman Spt. Eric Kayiranga said Ms Ingabire had jumped the queue at the local government office in Kigali. He alleged a group of local men unknown to him attacked her because they were angry that a person who "negates the genocide" could be served before them. Ingabire’s claim, but contrast, is that the office was unmanned, and that the men were waiting for her when she arrived. [[48]](#endnote-48) In a demonstration of how unprepared they were for this kind of reaction, Ingabire was alone except for FDU’s Executive Secretary of Kinyinya Sector, Joseph Ntawangundi, and without any technology to produce a record of the event (finding a phone with a camera in Kigali is not hard). Despite the alleged professionalism and experience of FDU, and the well-worn history of obstructing opposition party registration in Rwanda they were woefully unrehearsed for the possibility of such difficulties. Ingabire’s response, that she would write to Paul Kagame appealing to him for protection, was positively surreal.

By February 10th Human Rights Watch issued a press release condemning the continuation of this campaign of intimidation directed against FDU, about which the party appeared to be doing precisely nothing.[[49]](#endnote-49) Three days after Ntawangundi’s beating he was picked up and arrested on charges of participation in the genocide. He was told at the police station in Remera, Kigali that he had been tried and convicted *in absentia*, and was transferred to prison two days later. Between March 17th and 24th Ntawangundi appeared before a *gacaca* court.[[50]](#endnote-50) Although originally entering a not guilty plea, he eventually confessed to participation in the genocide and was sentenced to 17 years in prison.

On February 22nd the government owned newspaper, *The New Times,* devoted its editorial to alleging that Ingabire has

“…earned herself the most vicious distinction for being the first and only person to publicly espouse a revisionist and Genocide denial position, in relation to the Genocide against the Tutsi, on the Rwandan territory.”[[51]](#endnote-51)

It then went on to deploy a rather tired trope of authoritarian regimes, by darkly hinting that Ingabire’s diasporic connections and time in exile indicated links with foreign powers seeking to destabilise the country. As rather preposterous evidence for this, it cited her recent interview with Nairobi’s *The East African*:

Reports that Ingabire’s interview with *The East African* was masterminded by some intelligence organizations within the region, with a long history of using journalists as agents and assets, if true, do not augur well for regional stability.

What reports, with which evidence, and for which intelligence agency, was never fully explained. As Vourlias notes:

The suspicion that this is all an elaborate conspiracy, as opposed to just an earnest bit of reporting on a controversial figure, offers a revealing snapshot of how the Kigali junta views the role of the press in an ostensibly free society[[52]](#endnote-52)

Vourlias takes the suspicion articulated by *the New Times* to be an accurate representation of the views of the elite. It is at least as plausible, however, that those who directed the publication of this story knew perfectly well that the story was unlikely, but that sufficient mud might nonetheless stick. The interview itself, however, only raised the temperature. In it, Ingabire equivocates about her relationship to the FDLR, in stark contrast with FDU’s earlier controlled rhetoric. When asked about the FDLR, she responded:

The FDLR claims to be fighting for peace. They also accept that some of their members took part in the genocide. Everybody involved in genocide and crime against humanity committed in Rwanda has to be judged. Our argument is political space – it would solve the problem.[[53]](#endnote-53)

Whilst the desire to open up political space is unobjectionable, Ingabire seems to skirting dangerously close to suggesting that some sort of political deal with the FDLR could be reached, and – crucially (and accurately) – that many FDLR cadres are not directly implicated in crimes of genocide. Whether or not this is a sensible idea is controversial – it does have some academic supporters,[[54]](#endnote-54) although not many. However, it is an astonishingly ham-fisted move for an opposition politician seeking to be permitted to run in a Rwandan presidential election. Given her prior speech at Gisozi, and her questionable friends from her early days in the RDR, it was extremely unwise. As at other points, it is an astonishing indicator of the political naivety of FDU’s diasporic political machine, and their distance from the concrete realities of politics inside Rwanda.

Matters only got murkier when, on February 22nd, FDU’s facebook page alleged that Ingabire was ‘seeking protection and refuge’ at the British High Commission, alleging the threat of her immediate arrest:

Following confirmed information of an imminent arrest, detention in a solitary confinement, physical and mental harassment and psychological torture, Ms. Victoire Ingabire, the Chair of UDF INKINGI, managed to reach the British High Commission in Kigali for a temporary refuge[[55]](#endnote-55)

Much is odd about this, not least that Ingabire had no historic connection to the UK, no reason to believe that the British state was at that point anything but very sympathetic to the Kigali regime, but she had been a documented resident of the Netherlands for sixteen years by that point, and the large Dutch Embassy can be found less than five minutes’ walk up the same street. Ambassador Frans Makken was quoted by the New Times saying ‘No, she did not come here, instead she went to the UK High Commission’,whilst Nick Cannon, the High Commissioner, refused to confirm or deny rumours she had arrived before being thrown out.[[56]](#endnote-56) By February 23rd, Ingabire issued a new statement denying she had ever sought asylum at the UK High Commission or anywhere else.[[57]](#endnote-57) The following day, *The New Times* issued its own crowing account:

Nothing demonstrates Ingabire’s double-faced [sic] character than her attempt this week to grab headlines while continuing her smear campaign against the government, when she stage-managed a supposed request for protection in the UK High Commission.

When the embassy threw her out, on the ground that they did not for one minute believe her story, she immediately hit her computer keyboard, shifting the blame on what she referred to as “my political organisation”, which put out an incorrect statement announcing that she had sought protection.

She told the BBC and the VOA radio stations that she had not attempted to seek asylum but had gone to discuss with the diplomats “the current political situation”….

When the British slammed the door in her face, the message was loud and clear, if only Ms Ingabire could discern it: You can’t have your cake and eat it.[[58]](#endnote-58)

Other events in late February did nothing to improve matters. On the same day, a court in Kigali found three journalists from *Umuseso* guilty of defamation – the editor Didas Gasana, the former editor Charles Kabonero, and a reporter, Richard Kayigamba. Kabonero was sentenced to a year in prison, Gasana and Kayigamba to six months. All three were fined one million Rwandan Francs (roughly 1,500 USD). Although the case related to an article published in 2009, the timing of the judgment and the punitive fines effectively paralysed the most independently-minded, critical, and FDU-sympathetic voice with a mass circulation within Rwanda at a crucial juncture. Faustin Kayumba Nyamwasa, a general who was Chief of Staff in the ‘90s, and rumoured to have been behind an abortive coup in 2004, finally went into exile in South Africa on February 28th. Speaking to the *Kampala Independent,* the Rwandan High Commissioner to Uganda, Frank Mugambage, alleged that Nyamwasa had been building his own ‘power-base’ within the army and had been engaged in financial impropriety. When found out, he had therefore fled.[[59]](#endnote-59) In response, Nyamwasa gave an interview to *Upfront Africa* on the radio station *Voice of America*[[60]](#endnote-60) in which he dismissed the allegations as ‘pure propaganda’, and claimed he had been forced to leave the country because he was being harassed by the security services, and because he had become convinced the country was descending into dictatorship. This war of smear and counter-smear would continue over the international airwaves for the duration of the election cycle, and only worsened the febrile atmosphere.

### 5. Déo Mushayidi and PDP-Imanzi

Whilst these battles raged, a smaller diasporic political project was killed almost before it had begun. Their case is informative because it reveals further structural barriers to diasporic political mobilisation on the part of ex-RPF splitters, and as such may anticipate much of the barriers likely to confront the current version of that strategy, the Rwandan National Congress. *Pacte Démocratique du Peuple* (PDP-Imanzi, originally *Pacte de Défense du Peuple,* but ‘défense’ was deemed to militaristic for the RPF’s censors to let pass) had been created in 2009 by a circle of Europe-based Rwandans. It reconstituted much of the ‘Partenariat Intwari’, an older alliance formed from the odd union of PDN-*Igihango* and RUD-*Urunana*, led by Emmanuel Habyarimana, who had briefly served (2000 to 2002) as Minister of Defence in Rwanda’s Transitional Administration (1994 to 2003) before falling foul of one of the RPF’s period purges of the leadership. By 2010, it was led by Déo Mushayidi.

Mushayidi had been the RPF’s Representative in Switzerland during the struggle period, and remained supportive of the RPF in the initial years of the transition period. Mushayidi enjoyed an ambiguously insider status: he was an RPF-supporter of long-standing, who had done invaluable lobbying work in Geneva for the RPF during the ‘struggle period’ (i.e. the RPF’s time in exile), and he was a Tutsi. On the other hand, he was a civilian, was not from Uganda (as all the RPF top brass were) and had hardly been suffering in Geneva whilst others cowered in trenches during the struggle. After the genocide, he had become a journalist, and was briefly the President of the post-genocidal journalists association, before going into exile in France in March 2000. He then became involved briefly with the monarchist *Nation Imbaga,* and collaborated with the exiled author Charles Onana on his volume, *Les Secrets du Génocide Rwandais,*[[61]](#endnote-61) a pro-Hutu account of the genocide. This work is described as ‘highly selective’ by Rene Lemarchand, the pre-eminent academic working on Rwanda and no friend of the RPF, who continues:

Stating at the outset that since “numerous works have been written about the Hutu and their responsibilities in the genocide, we do not see the need for another book on the accusations leveled against them” (p. 12), the author reveals few secrets and not a few biases. Many of the accusations directed at Belgium, the US and the United Nations Missions in Rwanda (UNAMIR) are unsubstantiated.[[62]](#endnote-62)

Mushayidi was then selected to be the Secretary-General of the ill-fated *Igihango* alliance in 2004, moving to the same post at *Intwari* in 2008, by which time he was co-authoring (uninvited) memoranda to the UN Security Council alleging Paul Kagame’s involvement in the shooting down of the Presidential plane, and war crimes in Eastern Congo throughout the late ‘90s. He became leader in 2009.

By 2010 *Intwari* was probably the most credibly liberal and multi-ethnic political party of the diaspora seeking to participate in the elections. However, it was also much smaller, and more poorly resourced than FDU. A brief survey of *Intwari*’s mentions in the media during the initial stages of the election period reveals a depressing failure to break into the media spotlight. There were a few press releases not picked up, as far as my research reveals, by any outlets whatsoever. The first mention of Déo Mushayidi or his party to hit the international wires was on March the 7th, when he was arrested.[[63]](#endnote-63) This arrest is interesting because it is one of the clearest cases of the RPF reaching out to contest transnational elites beyond their borders, in this case by leveraging the legal powers of other states.

Mushayidi’s arrest was in Burundi, from which he was almost immediately extradited to Rwanda. He appeared before Nyarugenge Intermediary Court on the 18th of March charged with using false documents (a fake Burundian passport), collaborating with a terrorist group (the FDLR), and ‘genocide ideology’. He pled guilty to the first charge and not guilty to the others. Beyond that, the story becomes considerably murkier. It is agreed that Mushayidi was deported to Burundi from Tanzania some weeks before for ‘suspicious activity’ in a town near the Rwandan border. If accounts in the Rwanda press are to be believed, the Burundian police then simply discovered who Mushayidi was simply by accident. These accounts are hilariously implausible, given credibility only by the bizarre admission of how badly they violated basic standards of journalistic integrity:

A high-ranking officer of the Burundi Police who was among the officers who apprehended the badly-wanted Mushayidi and whom we will not name informed *The Rwanda Focus* (he did not know he was talking to reporters) that when they had Mushayidi in custody he – the officer – began talking politely and pleasantly to Mushayidi to gain his confidence. It is an old policing trick – when a frightened, wanted man is under arrest he expects the worst, so when a figure of authority becomes friends it has the effect of lowering the relieved fugitive’s guard who may then say more than he may want.

After a couple of days with the officer, Mushayidi divulged to him that he was operating in Belgium where he was working with groups of anti-Rwandan government dissidents including the FDLR.

“But Sir”, Mushayidi confided to the officer, “I felt I had to be close to Rwanda to be more effective in my plans to topple the regime there”[[64]](#endnote-64)

It is unclear how we are supposed to believe, on the one hand, that Déo Mushayidi used his experience as a Swiss journalist to become a seasoned terrorist and militant, but, on the other, that he admits working with the FDLR and seeking to topple the regime to any random policeman who is nice to him. Nor is it obvious why he would be detained ‘for a couple of days’ on a passport infraction. Nonetheless, what can be inferred from this case in the first instance is that the Rwandan state’s ability to fight back against diasporic political actors in the clef is not simply a matter of either ‘soft power’ or extra-judicial tactics (of the sort allegedly deployed in the assassinations of Seth Sendashonga and Patrick Karegeya), but also through their privileged access to institutional and judicial powers of other states (in this case, the Burundian police force). As such, diasporic political action does not, for Rwandans at least, operate in a safe haven insulated from the power of the homeland state. As such, Rwandan exile political projects inherit the disadvantages of operating outside the homeland, but without the key benefit of security.

### 6. The Democratic Green Party

The DGP represent a different strand of diasporic mobilisation: based in the countries neighbouring Rwanda, rather than Europe, drawn from ex-RPF splitters and civil society activists, assiduously multi-ethnic and liberal, and without the unsavoury historical bedfellows which bedevilled FDU. Their ultimate fate in these elections, however, was very similar. Hence, they give strong evidence for considering the RPF’s strategy the crucial explanatory variable, which is itself strong evidence that the poor record of diasporic political mobilisation in this election is not predominantly the result of mistakes or incompetence on the part of diasporic political elites, but rather than the dice were so heavily loaded against them that no strategy was likely to result in a breakthrough.

The Green Party was formed in Kampala in October 2009. It’s composition was an odd mix of two elements; radical activists and journalists from extremely critical publications like *Umuseso*, including their President, Frank Habineza, who had been an *Umuseso* journalist and President of the Rwandan NGO Forum on Water, Sanitation, and the Environment; and ex-RPF elites, some of whom were reasonably senior (if not central) members of the struggle, such as André Kagwa Rwisereka, the Vice-Chairman, a ‘59er[[65]](#endnote-65) who was fled aged ten into Zaïre, and been a senior organiser in South Kivu in the early ‘90s. The stated reasons for the party’s founding were a broadly conventional environmentalist agenda, coupled with concerns over dictatorial tendencies, over-centralisation, and the exclusion of moderates and ‘non-Ugandans’ from decision making.[[66]](#endnote-66)

Formation in Uganda is, obviously, no guarantee of legal status within Rwanda. Over 2009 the DGP made three attempts to hold their ‘Founding Congress’. Part of the law on political parties mandates that any group intending to form a political party must call a founding congress attended by at least 200 people, with at least five from every district of the country. This is obviously extremely difficult, given the ban on local structures for political parties, and *any* structures before registration. 200 signatures must then be taken, verified by a Public Notary, and then submitted to the NEC, along with a panoply of other documentation (a constitution, minutes of meetings, committee structures, addresses, registers of property, etc). On each occasion, the DGP allege that they were unable to hold the meeting. This was either because permission was not granted (holding a meeting requires the consent of the local Mayor), they could not get a venue (one activist claimed ‘‘Every time we get a room, officials from Minaloc call hotel owners telling them not to host us claiming we are bad people fighting the government’), or, most seriously, that plain-clothes individuals entered and forcibly broke up the meeting, beating anyone who tried to resist and smashing cameras (which, of course, means there is little by way of verifiable evidence).

In April 2010, three leading members of the still unregistered party resigned citing disagreements with Habineza. In particular, that he was being manipulated by ‘foreign agents’, and that he had falsely accused the Rwandan government of deploying troops in Eastern Congo in order to assist the UK and the US illegally plundering timber. The retort given at the time was that these agents had been inserted into the party by the RPF as fifth columnists in order to undermine it from within. As the 2010 Presidential poll drew closer the temperature deteriorated rapidly. Government ministers openly called the party divisionist, Habineza courted huge controversy by contending that as no party is required to join the Forum by the constitution, the DGP was not required to, and wouldn’t.[[67]](#endnote-67) The nadir was reached on the 14th of June 2010 when Rwisereka was found murdered and partially beheaded near a wetland in Butare. The formal investigation announced he had been the victim of a failed carjacking. Habineza and others unsuccessfully called for a further independent legal investigation, and shortly afterwards went into exile in Sweden, where he remained for the next two years. Left leaderless, bureaucratically impeded at every turn, and wracked with internal struggle, the DGP still tried. On their eleventh attempt, the party finally held a Congress in July and was granted registration on August 5th, one week before the elections. The NEC went on to announce that this was too late to put them on any ballots.

One event after 2010 is worth mentioning here as further illustration of the surreal quality of interactions between the Rwandan state and the opposition. Habineza returned in September 2012 to contest the parliamentary elections the following year. When the DGP tried to hold their congress in Gasabo in early 2013, the major (Willy Ndizeye) refused on the grounds that a parallel request had been filed by Alex Mugisha, the (possibly former) Commissioner-General of the DGP, and he couldn’t grant permission whilst there was clearly an internal war over who controlled the party. It is very unclear what happened then. The DGP’s account was given in a press release[[68]](#endnote-68) the following day:

DGPR’s tenth request was submitted on 6th May to the Major of Gasabo District. It was also an official response to the Major’s letter dated 3rd May, where we had clearly stated that the party had no issues to sort out with Mr Mugisha Alexis, since he had voluntarily resigned from the party on 2nd July 2010, his resignation letter was also attached. We therefore requested the Major to grant us permission to hold our founding congress on the 21st of May.

Surprisingly, Mr Mugisha Alexis also submitted in [sic] a new request the same day and requested to hold the same congress on the 21st May by at a different location

On 14th May 2013, while we were meeting the mayor at his offices, we were treated to a great surprise when Mr Mugisha Alexis majestically entered and then the Mayor requested us to sit down together and solve the confusion we are causing

This was not part of our plan but we respected the Mayor’s request and later asked Alexis what he wanted and why he chose to do what he was doing yet he knew that he has resigned from the party. He made is clear that he wants to be brought back into the party and hold a senior position than he held before. We explained to him that we have lost all trust in him and that it won’t be possible and thus advised him to start a new party with a different name. He did not accept our proposal and we are not ready to bring him back in the party

The rumours at the time were that Mugisha and Jean-Claude Ntezimana, the Organising Secretary, were the leaders of a plot to unseat Habineza and replace him with someone more friendly to the RPF regime.[[69]](#endnote-69) Mugisha himself denied having resigned, and by late October, everyone involved was publicly complaining it had all been a giant misunderstanding.[[70]](#endnote-70) Habineza went so far as to add that RPF politicians had been spreading rumours about these divisions in order to destroy trust within the party. At the time, however, it was also alleged that Mugisha and Ntezimana had made a more formal deal with the RPF (i.e. registration in return for removing Habineza) or were even ‘RPF agents’ on the payroll of the security services.[[71]](#endnote-71) One dissident blog wrote:

Unverified information from our sources claim RPF senior cadres, local government officials, and some security personnel are pushing hard to foil Green Party registration. The mentioned group is believed to be using one Alex Mugisha to sabotage the party registration pausing to lead unexciting faction [sic][[72]](#endnote-72)

Allegations of this form have been levelled before: in 2010, whilst PS-Imberakuri founder Bernard Ntaganda was held up in court battling divisionism charges, a new faction led by Christine Mukabunani emerged and registered a rival party – it was admitted almost immediately into the Forum with no issues.

### 7. Victoire – the endgame

On the 21st of April, only three months after her arrival, Ingabire was placed under house arrest. The following day she appeared in court and was formally charged with genocide denial and links with a terrorist organisation (the FDLR).[[73]](#endnote-73) FDU’s commitment to participating in the elections as a legal, non-threatening, non-anti-system party prevented them from engaging in disruptive protest action within the country (as they were still unregistered, any overt political activity at all would be considered criminal), and in any case they probably lacked the organisational strength internally. The only outlets which could have helped them, the critical tabloids *Umuseso* and *Umuvugizi*, were already reeling from a series of fines, arrests, and disappearances which left them stripped of their core staff and resources. Just to be sure, on April 13, 2010, the High Media Council had suspended both papers.[[74]](#endnote-74) The High Media Council accused *Umuseso* of insulting Rwandan President Paul Kagame, inciting the police and army to insubordination, and frightening the public. The first charge is undeniably true (insulting Paul Kagame was one of their core missions), but hardly that serious, and not something which had led to a paper being suspended before. The latter charges were extremely poorly substantiated, and relied on a dubious elision between *predicting* an outbreak of violence if the regime did not acknowledge Hutu grievance (which the paper certainly did say) and actively *inciting* it (which they did not). The suspension lasted six months, exactly the right time to exclude it completely from the election cycle. Although their online versions remained operational, this was limited use in a country with as low rates of internet use as Rwanda’s. As *Umuvuzi’s* editor Jean Bosco Gasasira pointed out at the time, "Almost 70% of Rwandans speak only Kinyarwanda, not English or French, and only 3% have internet access, so without these tabloid newspapers, they will have no independent news for the next six months. All they will know of the election is what the government newspapers tell them".[[75]](#endnote-75) On the same day as Ingabire’s arrest, Didas Gasana of *Umuseso* fled the country for good. Effectively, FDU was left without the capacity to contest what was happening to Ingabire within Rwanda.

As such, FDU’s only real course of action was to try and mobilise enough international outrage to force the Rwandan government to release Ingabire. The day of the arrest, Eugene Ndahayo, appeared in Brussels presenting himself as the President of something called the UDF-Inkingi Support Committee, to condemn the arrest as a "barbaric and unlawful act." He added:

It is a tragedy for Rwanda that a call for justice for all Rwandans irrespective of political and ethnic affiliation and for an all-inclusive national dialogue to give their views on how to put in place institutions that reassure every Rwandans is turned into accusations of genocide ideology, divisionism and collaboration with a terrorist organisation FDLR.[[76]](#endnote-76)

Attempts to transform Ingabire into a Rwandan Aung Sang Suu Kyi, failed completely. International Press coverage was extremely muted. The story made headlines at the time in *Le Monde,*[[77]](#endnote-77)the *New York Times,*[[78]](#endnote-78)the *Independent,*[[79]](#endnote-79)and the Dutch *Volkskrant* and *Telegraaf.*[[80]](#endnote-80)This is not unimpressive by the standards of international news coverage of Rwanda, but it is not clear the FDU got the headlines they wanted. The emollient Augustin Nkusi, spokesman for the Rwandan prosecutor general, had appeared on Radio Netherlands claiming that Ingabire collaborated with a genocidal militia. He added:

There is also evidence that she is busy creating an irregular armed force parallel to the regular national forces to come destabilize the country[[81]](#endnote-81)

In the context of a Netherlands convulsed with the ongoing legal proceedings concerning the Dutch government’s responsibility for the genocidal massacre of Srebrenica, such accusations were extremely sensitive, and there was no appetite for being seen to be taking the side of a suspected genocidaire. Similarly, all coverage of Rwanda in the Canadian press that week was devoted to the Governor General’s visit to Rwanda and apology for inaction during the genocide.[[82]](#endnote-82) No international coverage of the incident supported FDU’s claim that the charges were baseless, if they mentioned it at all. Articles were too short to contextualise the arrest with past incidents of politicised arrests, other restrictions on political space in Rwanda, or the toxic politics of accusation and counter-accusation surrounding genocide ideology. Given almost no media outlet outside the Netherlands quoted Eugene Ndahayo, it is extremely doubtful that this story was even being reported due to the efforts of FDU, rather than the brief mentions in the wires of the BBC and AFP. For the FDU itself, Ingabire’s arrest is a totemic moment establishing beyond doubt the dictatorial character of the regime and the justice of their cause. However, attempts to generate broader criticism of Rwanda through transnational advocacy around this incident must be regarded as a failure.

On Friday 23rd, another potential transnational voice for FDU disappeared. Carina Tertsakian, Human Right’s Watch’s in-country Rwanda researcher, was informed by immigration officials that her work permit was not to be renewed, alleging the presence of ‘anomalies’ with the signatures on her form.[[83]](#endnote-83) Human Rights Watch apparently then asked for a meeting immediately to try and rectify the anomalies, which was refused. By the end of the day, Ms Tertsakian had been formally expelled and was on a plane out of the country.[[84]](#endnote-84)

On the same day, Ingabire was released on bail.[[85]](#endnote-85) Others who had also been arrested were not.[[86]](#endnote-86) On the 30th, two senior FLDR Generals, Lt. Col Tharcisse Nditurende and Lt. Col Noel Habiyambere, appeared in court ‘admitting’ to having worked with Ingabire to overthrow the government.[[87]](#endnote-87) Ingabire allegedly attended a series of meetings in Goma and Kinshasa around planning a new armed group formed out of FDLR defectors and the political structures of FDU and Paul Rusesabagina’s PDR-Ihumure. That Ingabire had met with FDLR leaders is not in dispute (although throwing Rusesabagina into the mix is). Kris Berwouts’ sympathetic account is as follows:

She had met with the FDLR in July 2009, in the form of Aloys Ntiwiragabo, one of its leaders. Some weeks earlier, the Congolese Minister of information, Lambert Mende, made use of a visit to Belgium to visit Victoire Ingabire in Zevenhuizen near The Hague, where she lived with her family. He invited her on behalf of President Kabila to Kinshasa, because the Congolese government wanted her to talk to the FDLR leadership and convince them to give up their armed struggle and join her political approach. She accepted the invitation, was received by Kabila and talked to Ntiwiragabo. Unfortunately, the FDLR did not follow her advice.[[88]](#endnote-88)

Of course, Berwouts’ claim to know the content of the discussion is as assertive as the Rwandan government’s – both rely on testimony from individuals with clear incentives to misrepresent the facts. Both versions of events are plausible, given Ingabire’s past links with militant organisations based in DRC on the one hand, and her consistent advocacy for a non-violent strategy on the other. Nonetheless, plausibility is not sufficient for a conviction, and the timing and manner of arrest makes the conclusion that this was a politicised prosecution hard to avoid.

Ingabire was re-arrested two months after the elections, on October 14th 2010. Her trial finally began eleven months later in September 2011 and ended in April 2012 with Ingabire being found guilty of conspiracy to undermine the government and genocide denial, and sentenced to eight years in prison. The general consensus of human rights advocates is that the trial itself was seriously flawed. Sarah Jackson, Acting Deputy Africa Director for Amnesty International, wrote that “the trial was marred by the court’s failure to ensure that evidence was properly tested, combined with the prosecution’s disregard for due process in some instances”[[89]](#endnote-89) Human Rights Watch issued a concurring opinion.[[90]](#endnote-90)

### Conclusion: why Rwandan Elections Won’t be Won Transnationally

There is much in this gloomy picture worth noting. Most obviously, a variety of different tactics have been tried, and all with the same underwhelming results. Although it is possible to attribute some of these failures to incompetence, strategic miscalls, or bad luck, their number and diversity builds the case that the Rwandan regime was (and remains) fantastically good at deploying ‘the menu of manipulation’.[[91]](#endnote-91)

The Rwandan case indicates that operating in a transnational space appears to make life harder for the opposition, but not the state. Far from being a safe haven where opposition political activity can take place sheltered from the long reach of the state, the Rwandan government leverages its connections to other states extremely adroitly, and *in extremis* will happily operate extra-territorially itself. The Rwandan government has developed a sophisticated strategy of actively dismantling the diaspora, not just within the Great Lakes region but across the continent and in Europe. This approach used a combination of espionage, threats, and violence. The Rwandan state kept up an unremitting campaign against its politically active diaspora on a variety of fronts: overt military action against them, the arming of proxies in eastern DRC to destroy them, the alleged deployment of intelligence agents to conduct extra-judicial hits anywhere in the world (those most commonly alleged would include: Seth Sendashonga in Nairobi in 1999, Charles Ingabire in Kampala in 2011, Patrick Karegeya in Johannesburg in 2014, and a failed attempt against Jonathan Musonera and David Rutatina in London in 2010), and legal activism aimed at getting any such organisations banned, entered onto terror lists, or officially classified as hate groups (as when the US government agreed to classify the FDLR as a terrorist organisation in 2005). This campaign of political dismantling has been unremitting and extremely effective. It has guaranteed that oppositional diaspora activity is decentralised, unfunded, bereft of political or organisational expertise, and confined to online activity and the occasional ineffective protest outside wherever Kagame is picking up his latest honorary degree.

Furthermore, there are also more familiar problems for oppositions in competitive authoritarian regimes, which are unaltered by diasporic political mobilisation. The institutions of Rwanda (particularly the electoral code, the security apparatus, and the hegemonic power of the RPF party machine) make any opposition victory extremely unlikely, as I and others have argued elsewhere.[[92]](#endnote-92) For many ordinary Rwandans, there is probably still a peace dividend. This is not to say people are not aggrieved with the government of Rwanda – they undoubtedly are, even if the constraints within Rwanda make oppositional speech muted and in code.[[93]](#endnote-93) However, for many, particularly those with a clear memory of how the RPF scourged the countryside of insurgency last time round,[[94]](#endnote-94) that discontent is not sufficient to risk overt political disobedience.

In this context, there is an air of unreality about these campaigns, reinforced by the seeming unwillingness of the diasporic opposition to either carefully negotiate the managed politics of Rwanda in the manner of the co-opted internal opposition, nor the total militant opposition of groups such as the FDLR. That ambivalence is a reflection of a structural reality of competitive authoritarian polities: the way such systems lead the door partially open continually present counter-elites with a tortuous choice between radical and accommodative strategies. Because that choice is so difficult, individuals will undoubtedly continue to choose differently. In this sense then, the division, inconsistency, sudden shifts, splits and *volte-face* of Rwanda’s diasporic opposition is produced, at least in part, by the competitive authoritarian nature of Rwanda. What the Rwandan case reveals, then, is a structural condition *all* oppositions in exile are likely to face.

1. Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*; Lindberg, *Democracy and Elections in Africa*.Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Bellin, ‘The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective’. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)
2. Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*. [↑](#endnote-ref-2)
3. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War*. [↑](#endnote-ref-3)
4. Lyons and Mandaville, *Politics from Afar*; Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics*; Salehyan, *Rebels without Borders*; Sheffer, *Diaspora Politics*. [↑](#endnote-ref-4)
5. Østergaard-Nielsen, *Transnational Politics*. [↑](#endnote-ref-5)
6. Hammond, ‘Somalia Rising’. [↑](#endnote-ref-6)
7. McGregor and Primorac, *Zimbabwe’s New Diaspora: Displacement and the Cultural Politics of Survival*; Crush and Tevera, *Zimbabwe’s Exodus: Crisis, Migration, Survival*; Mbiba, ‘Zimbabwean Diaspora Politics in Britain’. [↑](#endnote-ref-7)
8. Orjuela, ‘Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers?’ [↑](#endnote-ref-8)
9. Lyons, ‘Conflict-Generated Diasporas and Transnational Politics in Ethiopia’. [↑](#endnote-ref-9)
10. Bernal, ‘Eritrea Goes Global’. [↑](#endnote-ref-10)
11. Again, there are honourable exceptions, e.g. Rafti, Marina. “The Dismantling of the Rwandan Political Opposition in Exile.” In *L’Afrique Des Grands Lacs Annuaire 2003-2004*, edited by Filip Reyntjens and Stefan Marysse, 23–44. Anvers: Centre d’Etude de la Région des Grands Lacs d’Afrique, 2004. Turner, Simon. “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: The Politics of Performance.” *African Studies* 72, no. 2 (2013): 265–84. [↑](#endnote-ref-11)
12. Rafti, ‘The Rwandan Political Opposition in Exile’; Marijnen, ‘Exister Cest Rèsister - Resist to Exist’. [↑](#endnote-ref-12)
13. For illustrative reports on the first elections of Rwanda’s transitional period, see HRW, ‘No Contest in Rwandan Elections: Many Local Officials Run Opposed’; ICG, ‘“Consensual Democracy” in Post-Genocide Rwanda. Evaluating the March 2001 District Elections’; EU, ‘Mission d’Observation Electorale de l’Union Européenne. Elections Présidentielles et Législatives. Rwanda 2003. Déclaration Préliminaire’. [↑](#endnote-ref-13)
14. Stroh, ‘Electoral Rules of the Authoritarian Game’. [↑](#endnote-ref-14)
15. EU, ‘Final Report: Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies, 15-18 September, Republic of Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-15)
16. Stroh, ‘The Effects of Electoral Institutions in Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-16)
17. RDR (apart from the splitters who went on to found ALiR, and then the FDLR), FRD, and CDA [↑](#endnote-ref-17)
18. Patrick Karegeya, Kayumba Nyamwasa, Théogene Rudasingwa, and Gerald Gahima [↑](#endnote-ref-18)
19. Also present at the original meeting were Jerome Nayigiziki, Jean Paul Turayishimiye, Gervais Condo, Emmanuel Hakizimana, Jonathan Musonera, and Joseph Ngarambe. The unapologetic androcentrism of this group should not be understated. As Rudasingwa said of the opening meeting, *‘Dorothy Rudasingwa and Anne Gahima witnessed the birth of the organisation, and made sure food and refreshments were available to us’,* Rudasingwa, *Healing a Nation: A Testimony: Waging and Winning a Peaceful Revolution to Unite and Heal a Broken Rwanda*., p393 [↑](#endnote-ref-19)
20. Jackson, ‘Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-20)
21. Turner, *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*. [↑](#endnote-ref-21)
22. http://www.fdu-rwanda.com/en/principes-de-base/programme-politique/ [↑](#endnote-ref-22)
23. http://www.fdu-rwanda.com/en/principes-de-base/principes-de-base-2/ [↑](#endnote-ref-23)
24. Mugabe, ‘Rwanda Opposition Coalition in the West Divided Over Genocide Denial’. [↑](#endnote-ref-24)
25. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-25)
26. Ibid. As were the RNC, who will be discussed more in the following section. [↑](#endnote-ref-26)
27. ‘CNR-Intwari includes all persons who have firmly decided to stand up as one to end the genocide planned by members of the RPF-Inkotanyi and implemented by members of the RPA under the orders of Kagame’ (author’s translation). http://www.cnr-intwari.com/index.php/plateforme-politique [↑](#endnote-ref-27)
28. Ndagijimana, Interview. [↑](#endnote-ref-28)
29. Our interviewees mentioned meetings in the Netherlands, Belgium, France, and Germany [↑](#endnote-ref-29)
30. Rassemblement Républicain pour la Démocratie au Rwanda. The RDR had been founded in North Kivu in April 1995, and rapidly become associated with the remnants of the genocidal government of the Second Republic. [↑](#endnote-ref-30)
31. The CDA was formed by a splinter cell of the FRD sceptical about the alliance with the RDR, both for strategic reasons and because they suspected the RDR of having failed to adequately purge genocide ideology from its ranks. They were founded, also in Brussels, in September 1998, where they were joined by some former members of an organisation called Rwanda Pour Tous (RPT), another Brussels organisation that had been founded in 1995. RPT was stuffed with senior former government men (including a former Prime Minister, Dismas Nsengiyaremye) as an alternative to the RDR, which would, in contrast, espouse a highly inclusive ideology, despite being 100% Hutu in composition, and concentrate on links with NGOs from the Benelux community. It was in essence a network of notables, and as such lasted less than a year, but its membership roll included many who would go on to hold ostensibly senior positions in the diaspora, of whom several joined the new CDA. [↑](#endnote-ref-31)
32. The FRD, on the other hand, was formed in March 1996 by Seth Sendashonga and Faustin Twagiramungu. Both were moderate Hutu with a record of opposition to the genocide and had served in top positions in the post-genocide transitional administration (Sendashonga as Minister of the Interior, Twagiramungu as Prime-Minister). It had a leadership split between Europe (Twagiramungu in Brussels) and Africa (Sendashonga in Nairobi). From the start, the FRD was an unarmed movement espousing a sophisticated discourse of democratic pluralism, liberal constitutionalism, and ethnic reconciliation. After the RDR definitively split from its armed elements and relaunched itself as a civilian, Europe-centred movement in Paris in August 1998, the FRD extended an invitation to the FRD (along with two minor monarchist parties) to form an alliance [↑](#endnote-ref-32)
33. This is usually, as it is here, a coded reference to Hutu [↑](#endnote-ref-33)
34. PSD, PL, PSP, PPC, PSR, PDI, PDC, and the UPDR [↑](#endnote-ref-34)
35. Quoted in Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*., p47. [↑](#endnote-ref-35)
36. EU, ‘Final Report: Legislative Elections to the Chamber of Deputies, 15-18 September, Republic of Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-36)
37. Translation courtesy of the Proxy Lake, available at http://www.theproxylake.com/2011/10/ingabire-divisionist-speech/ [↑](#endnote-ref-37)
38. Péan, *Noires Fureurs, Blancs Menteurs: Rwanda 1990/1994*. [↑](#endnote-ref-38)
39. Lemarchand, ‘Rwanda: The State of Research’., unpaginated version [↑](#endnote-ref-39)
40. Ruzibiza, *Rwanda, l’histoire secrète*. [↑](#endnote-ref-40)
41. Lemarchand, ‘Rwanda: The State of Research’., unpaginated version [↑](#endnote-ref-41)
42. Vourlias, ‘Strange Times in Kigali.’ [↑](#endnote-ref-42)
43. ‘Rwandan Opposition Parties Join Forces’. [↑](#endnote-ref-43)
44. ‘Agent Provocateur Emerges in the Kingdom Kagame Built’. [↑](#endnote-ref-44)
45. ‘Rwanda’s Blood-Soaked History Becomes a Tool for Repression’. [↑](#endnote-ref-45)
46. Kris Berwouts, “Lady in Pink: Victoire Ingabire Faces Her Judges in Appeal,” *African Arguments*, May 1, 2013, http://africanarguments.org/2013/05/01/lady-in-pink-victoire-ingabire-faces-her-judges-in-appeal-%E2%80%93-by-kris-berwouts/. [↑](#endnote-ref-46)
47. ‘Genocide-Row Politician Attacked’. [↑](#endnote-ref-47)
48. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-48)
49. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: End Attacks on Opposition Parties’. [↑](#endnote-ref-49)
50. *Gacaca* is a neo-traditional informal community justice mechanism with some similarities to South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It was created by the government to deal with the massive backlog of those accused of genocide. [↑](#endnote-ref-50)
51. Vourlias, ‘Just When You Thought It Was Safe to Leave Burundi...’ [↑](#endnote-ref-51)
52. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-52)
53. ‘Agent Provocateur Emerges in the Kingdom Kagame Built’. [↑](#endnote-ref-53)
54. Perera, ‘Alternative Agency’. [↑](#endnote-ref-54)
55. ‘Victoire Ingabire (does Not) Seek Refuge at UK High Commission | Kigali Wire’. [↑](#endnote-ref-55)
56. Karuhanga, ‘UK High Commissioner Rejects Ingabire’s Refuge Claims’. [↑](#endnote-ref-56)
57. Vourlias, ‘The Curious Case of Victoire Ingabire.’ [↑](#endnote-ref-57)
58. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-58)
59. Mwenda, ‘Lt. Gen. Nyamwasa Was Building Own Power Base’. [↑](#endnote-ref-59)
60. ‘Exclusive--Interview Gen. Kayumba Nyamwasa | Upfront Africa’. Transcript available here: http://www.jamiiforums.com/international-forum/55190-interview-lt-gen-kayumba-nyamwasa-why-i-fled-rwanda.html [↑](#endnote-ref-60)
61. Onana, *Les secrets du génocide rwandais.* [↑](#endnote-ref-61)
62. Lemarchand, ‘Rwanda: The State of Research’. [↑](#endnote-ref-62)
63. France 24, ‘Africa - Police Arrest Main Suspect in Kigali Grenade Attacks’. [↑](#endnote-ref-63)
64. ‘How Mushayidi Was Captured’. [↑](#endnote-ref-64)
65. The ‘59ers are the generation who fled Rwanda in 1959 following pogroms directed largely against Tutsi, who went on to settle largely in Southern Uganda (although not in Rwisereka’s case). [↑](#endnote-ref-65)
66. I believe Jean-Claude Ntezimana, the Organising Secretary, is also ex-RPF, but this has not been possible to verify. [↑](#endnote-ref-66)
67. I am not a lawyer and won’t pretend I know whether or not this is true. It is at least ambiguous, given that there is a mention in Arusha that some sort of forum for political parties will be set up. [↑](#endnote-ref-67)
68. Habineza, ‘Press Release: Opposition Party Registration Becoming Impossible in Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-68)
69. Mugabe, ‘Conspiracy to Oust Frank Habineza from Green Party in Pipeline’. [↑](#endnote-ref-69)
70. See comments by Habineza, Mugisha, and Ntezimana in Reporter, ‘There’s a Plot to Finish Us, Alleges Rwanda’s Green Party Boss’. [↑](#endnote-ref-70)
71. Author’s fieldnotes [↑](#endnote-ref-71)
72. Reporter, ‘Opposition Party Registration Is Impossible Say Green Party Boss’. [↑](#endnote-ref-72)
73. Kagire, ‘Rwanda’, 22 April 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-73)
74. ‘Rwanda Shuts down Independent Press (Includes Interview)’. [↑](#endnote-ref-74)
75. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-75)
76. Press Release available at <http://www.victoire2010.info/index.php?ApplID=V2010&Release=02&DocID=0000000214> [↑](#endnote-ref-76)
77. ‘Arrestation au Rwanda d’une opposante à Paul Kagamé’. [↑](#endnote-ref-77)
78. Gettleman and Kron, ‘Presidential Candidate Is Arrested in Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-78)
79. Howden and Correspondent, ‘Presidential Candidate Is Arrested in Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-79)
80. ‘Oppositieleidster in Rwanda Verdacht van Steun Aan Terrorisme’., ‘Oppositieleidster in Cel; Rwandese Die Jarenlang in Nederland Woonde Gearresteerd’.

N.B. This list is not exhaustive – other media outlets did not cover the story. [↑](#endnote-ref-80)
81. Kagire, ‘Rwanda’, 22 April 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-81)
82. ‘GG Apologizes for Rwandan Genocide Inaction’; MacCharles, ‘The Governor General Tells Rwandans Canada Takes Responsibility for Failing to Respond “soon Enough,” in the First State Visit since 1994 Genocide.’

However, credit must be given to the Guelph Mercury and the New Glasgow News, who both published a considerably longer piece with much more detail on press freedom in Rwanda (if still no mention of Ingabire’s arrest), Cf. ‘GG Delves into Free-Speech Debate amid Crackdown in Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-82)
83. Baldauf, ‘Rwanda Crackdown’. [↑](#endnote-ref-83)
84. Ibid. [↑](#endnote-ref-84)
85. Baldauf, ‘Rwandan Opposition Leader Ingabire Released on Bail’. [↑](#endnote-ref-85)
86. ‘Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-86)
87. Kagire, ‘Rwanda’, 30 April 2010. [↑](#endnote-ref-87)
88. Berwouts, ‘Lady in Pink: Victoire Ingabire Faces Her Judges in Appeal’. [↑](#endnote-ref-88)
89. ‘Rwanda: Ensure Appeal After Unfair Ingabire Trial’. [↑](#endnote-ref-89)
90. ‘Rwanda: Eight-Year Sentence for Opposition Leader’, -. [↑](#endnote-ref-90)
91. Schedler, ‘The Menu of Manipulation’. [↑](#endnote-ref-91)
92. Reyntjens, *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda*; Jones, ‘Between Pyongyang and Singapore: The Rwandan State, Its Rulers, and the Military’; Straus and Waldorf, *Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human Rights After Mass Violence*. [↑](#endnote-ref-92)
93. Thomson, *Whispering Truth to Power*. [↑](#endnote-ref-93)
94. Omaar and Waal, *Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest*; Jackson, ‘Legacy of Bitterness: Insurgency in North West Rwanda’. [↑](#endnote-ref-94)