Music and Minde:
Knowledge Building in Early Seventeenth-Century English Domestic Vocal Music

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Declaration of Authorship

I, Katherine Bank, hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: ______________________
Date: ________________________
Abstract

Natural Philosopher Francis Bacon (1561-1626), in his attempt to revise all of knowledge, observed that ‘the sense of hearing striketh the spirits more immediately than the other senses’, contributing to contemporary dialogues on the relationship between the mind and the senses and the reliability of sense perception in discerning truth. Though music’s role in the so-called Scientific Revolution is well represented in scholarship, most accounts do not consider how individual songs might have contributed to ongoing debates on representation and the nature of reality.

This thesis is an interdisciplinary investigation into the role of music in the development of metaphysical thought in late-Elizabethan and early-Stuart music. First, it considers contemporary understandings of the mechanics of sense perception and the way music presented questions about the relationships between the mind, body, passions, and the soul, drawing out examples of multi-voiced domestic music that explicitly address topics of human consciousness. Next, it demonstrates how music and text could work together in conjunction with mythology and satire to confront assumptions about reality and representation in the music of Thomas Weelkes. Subsequently, it considers the role of dialogue in early seventeenth-century cultural production and discusses how dialogue (in its variety of forms) was linked to changes in knowledge building, focussing on music by John Dowland, Martin Peerson, and William Byrd. Finally, it considers the role of the experience of music (emotion in action) and how this repertoire can contribute to our understanding of the ways contemporary awareness was shaped and structured.

Drawing insights from musicology, the history of ideas, the history of science, and literary theory, this dissertation elucidates the relationship between the texts and practice of domestic music making and the developing changes in approach to knowledge that mark the seventeenth century as one of the most pivotal eras in our intellectual history.
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Editorial Notes


2) Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Francis Bacon’s *Sylva sylvarum* are from the edition by James Spedding et al. to maintain consistency with a majority of Bacon scholarship. It is cited in the following format: (century.experiment number).

3) Editions of four pieces by Thomas Weelkes were transcribed for this thesis by Francis Bevan: clefs have been modernised and regular barring added, but original note values and time signatures have been maintained. Early modern spellings, including irregularities in spellings between parts have been maintained as well. Ties have been introduced where notes split across bar lines. Ficta above the staff is editorial.

4) Modern editions of the music of Martin Peerson were edited for Antico Editions by Richard Rastall.

5) Unless otherwise noted, all primary source music prints, song lyrics, and quotations (excluding critical editions), are from Early English Books Online (<www.eebo.chadwyck.com>). Where possible, I have cited sources with signature numbers. Short Title Catalogue numbers and the host library of the source consulted are cited in the bibliography.

6) I have maintained early modern spelling, except when citing from modernised editions (i.e. Arden Shakespeare, Spedding). In song lyrics, there are occasional spelling discrepancies between parts, so for consistency texts have been taken from the Cantus/Superius part, unless otherwise indicated.

7) Modern and critical editions of texts and music are categorised with secondary sources in the bibliography because I more often cite editorial paratexts.
Introduction

In the introductory preface to Henry Lichfeld’s *First Set of Madrigals of 5. Parts: apt for both Viols and Voyces* (1613), poet Christopher Brooke, a friend of Philip Sidney, contributed two sonnets in honour of the music’s composer, one of which, ‘To the Avthor vpon his Musicall Muse’, states:

Ovr Times so curious, and our wits as nice,  
And all as changing as the Fashion is;  
No Art for any certaine Truth hath price;  
All by Opinion goe: and therefore this  
Which th’ Angell (propper to thy Musicks skill)  
Hath here expos’d to Fashion, Time, and Wit,  
Looke not t’haue simply crown’d for Good, or Ill,  
But as thy humorous Censor shall think fit.  
Fortune in these Things rules; (That all know blinde)  
As blinde are they that censure out of Humor;  
But if some few judicall in this Kinde,  
Shall grace thy Muse; force not the idle Rumor:  
For thy knowne worth, in Their just approbation,  
Shall wage with Wit, with Humor, Time, and Fashion.¹

In this poem Brooke not only acknowledges the fleeting nature of trends, but also addresses pressing questions on subjectivity in artistic meaning. Brooke advises readers to rely on their own judgement and acknowledges the role of sense perception in knowing. He suggests that in self-reliant judgements, the truth in art, or rather, art’s true value, will prove itself.

The potential truth bearing capabilities of the arts was one of the foremost aesthetic questions of late-sixteenth, early-seventeenth century England, particularly surrounding music in worship and the ability of poetry to positively affect society.² At the same time, natural philosophers like Francis Bacon were adjusting metaphysical perceptions of the human mind, and with it, as Jairo Moreno ascertains, the conception of ‘the individual subject as the locus of all representations … emerges with unprecedented capacities for discernment … [these philosophers] ground a kind of knowledge founded in an individual subject defined precisely by full awareness of

² See Ch. 2, 87-88.
these capacities. At the same time this knowledge is objective and universal’. Susan James observes a more general revival of metaphysical interest around the passions in this period, evident in a variety of treatises and fictions. For example, Thomas Wright’s *Passions of the Minde* (1604) contains a list of questions called ‘Problemes concerning the substance of our Soules’. Here he asks questions about the quality of knowledge (‘What is evidence and certitude in Knowledge, and how they differ’ and ‘How knowledge and perfit Science, differ from credulity and opinion, and whether feare be necessarily included in every opinion’), as well as questions about the internal processes related to sense perception and representation (‘How a corporall imagination concurre to a spirituall conceit’, ‘How doth Reason direct and correct Sense?’, ‘What is Arte? what the Idea in the artificers minde, by whose direction he frameth his workes…’ and ‘What is our fantasie or imagination’). In these unanswered questions, Wright demonstrated his own uncertainty about what constituted certain knowledge, how it was formulated, and through what evidence one might prove it. He also touched on the influential role of scepticism in the discernment of truth. After his list of questions, Wright acknowledged

[These Questions I might propound, but GOD knowes, who was, is, or ever shall be able to answere them exactly; I know superficiall Schollers and vngrounded Philosophers, who ... will thinke these easie to bee resolved, because they can say what they know; but that will not suffice, because the Sphere of knowledge doth infinitely exceede the limites of theyr capacities. As much as I have delivered in this matter, might be sayd of touching tasting, and smelling; of laughing, weeping, sighing ... the substance, scituation, correspondence, and vse of all partes of a mans body ... No man, I thinke, can be learned, who may not plainly perceyve what an infinite matter I have propounded here of knowledge, and yet how little, even the wisest know ... Onely I will inferre our extreme Ignorance, that few or none of these difficulties, which conerne vs so neere as our soules and bodies are throughly as yet, in my judgement, declared even of the profoundest wits.]

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6 Wright, *The Passions of the Minde* (1604), sig.V8r.
7 Ibid., sig.V7r, sig.X2v.
8 Wright, *The Passions of the Minde* (1604), sig.X3v-r. Though some have argued that, as a Jesuit, Wright’s perspectives were atypical in Elizabethan England, Erin Sullivan has argued that Wright’s curiosity about the mechanics, quality, and metaphysical relationships between functions of body and mind ‘retained scope
These statements, amongst others on the nature of the passions, the senses, about dreaming and memory, and other physiological and psychological processes, demonstrate the connection between problems of mind and body and the concept of certain knowledge within a fundamentally Aristotelian early seventeenth-century intellectual framework (‘How are the Soul and Body, Spirite and Flesh coupled together, what chains, what fetters imprison a spiritual substance, an immortal spirit in so base, stinking and corruptible a carcasse’). The relationship between art and knowledge is of particular note, as his question on the experience of music contained within it a fundamental mind-body question: ‘For what reason corporal Music and Consorts of Instruments so ravish and abstract a spirit, a soul, transporting it almost into a Paradise of Joy?’. He views music as corporal, of the physical world, yet does not understand how then it might interact with immaterial spirits.

This dissertation addresses how these questions and others were both reflected and addressed through the routine practice of music making. As Lawrence Kramer posits, music is not just a ‘vehicle or reflection of culture, but a form of human agency that shapes and intervenes’. Though music’s important role in this period of intellectual history has been somewhat explored from the perspective of the history of science and mathematics, it has yet to be approached from an interpretive musicological perspective. Through a focused examination of music’s contribution to change in understanding certain truth, as well as its role in the intellectual development of the period, my intention is to show how music not only reflected changes in episteme, but also actively participated in its generation. Though historians such as Steven Shapin have explored changes in approach to knowledge in England at this time, he does not cover the arts in any depth. Similarly, Penelope Gouk has investigated music’s role in natural philosophy and Baconian inquiry, but never took the step to connect any of

for more dualistic and disembodied approaches to emotional experience’ with implications for ‘both local contexts and the influence of multiple intellectual frameworks in the study of early modern emotion,’ as Wright’s Thomist approach to the affections was one of multiple influential strains of thought at that time. Erin Sullivan in Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion: Understanding Affect in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2015), 26, 27.

9 Wright, Passions of the Mind (1604), sig.V7r.

10 Ibid., sig.X3v. John Dee wrote in the ‘Mathematical Preface’ to Henry Billingsley’s translation of Euclid’s Elements (1570), ‘the difference between scientia and ars is reduced to one of procedure, while the knowledge produced by both is shown to be qualitatively the same’, as cited in Judy Hayden, Travel Narratives, The New Science, and Literary Discourse, 1569-1750 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012), 2.

these epistemic themes to specific musical works, nor did she partake in any musical interpretation. With regard to musicological study, my work fills a glaring gap in the existing scholarship on the English domestic genres, as I will explain shortly. Unlike previous studies, this thesis positions the historical experience of music, including the examination of individual songs, within existing literary and historical scholarship on representation, sense perception, and approaches to knowledge in early seventeenth-century England. My aim is to emphasise music’s role as a common practice that readily presented many of the metaphysical problems to ways of knowing that were of importance to the development of English thought from the sixteenth to seventeenth centuries. Through musical case studies, I demonstrate how music was not only a reflection of greater epistemic change, but also subtly contributed to its evolution. The performing arts in particular, as Stephen Greenblatt says, ‘offered men the power to shape their worlds, calculate probabilities, and master the contingent’, a way to ‘theatricalise culture’. As shown here, domestic vocal music, too, could powerfully imply ‘that human character itself could be similarly fashioned, with an eye to audience and effect’, all posited in contrast to an interchangeable Other.

My parameters are approximately 1588-1640, as I limit my project to printed music, beginning with the secular music of Thomas Morley and William Byrd in the late 1580s and ending with Martin Peerson, Walter Porter, and other publications from before the Civil War. It is more difficult, however, to contain intellectual history within such dates—these ideas will draw from a wider and more fluid timeline and geographical area, in line with the idea that practice can both pre-empt and equally lag behind the full articulation of theory. My scope is limited to printed resources with musical notation (excluding, for example, ballad sheets) mostly for practical reasons, though there are conclusions to be extrapolated from what it meant to be published, particularly in terms of wider trends concerning which genres of vocal music were printed (lute song, multi-voice, instrumental, etc.). As I will justify in more detail later in this chapter, I include any music that could have been sung with multiple voices,

14 Ibid.
regardless of any perceived ‘intention’ on the part of the composer or anachronistic ideals of form imposed by later musicologists.15

**Stereotypes of the ‘English Madrigal’**

This study focuses on late-Elizabethan, early-Stuart domestic vocal repertoire, a body of music that is relatively under-appreciated and marginalised in modern performance, recordings, and musicological scholarship. Though the English madrigal usually gets mentioned in undergraduate survey courses on the history of Western music or programmed in a token ‘light’ concert here or there, it has a reputation as less valuable than English sacred polyphony, which is kept alive in both concert choirs and via the Anglican and Catholic cathedral choir traditions. Moreover, English domestic music is often viewed as overly quaint and frivolous when compared with its more ‘serious’ Italian relative, which tends to get more respect, at least in scholarship.16 In this section I will highlight a few issues of historiography that have plagued English domestic music, problems and stereotypes that I argue need reassessing in light of changes within related fields of scholarship.

Firstly, early-twentieth century studies on the English madrigal tended to focus on comparisons between English and Italian madrigals, the latter often regarded by modern scholars as more textually and harmonically interesting than their English counterparts.17 The English madrigal was perceived as the ‘light’ offspring of the more evocative, more mature tradition first set by Italian musicians like Marenzio and Croce, and continued by Gesualdo, Monteverdi, and Vecchi.18 Though Joseph Kerman’s *The Elizabethan Madrigal* (1962) is the only comprehensive monograph-length study dedicated to the English madrigal genre, his work still fixates on a formal musical comparison of the English madrigal ‘in relation to the great Italian development’, without paying due attention to the sociological, cultural, and historical influences.

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15 See Introduction, 23.
18 This view on the matter, however, is not completely a-historicised in that the English had a marked fascination with the foreign and more ‘exotic’ Italian tradition, as demonstrated by multiple textual and musical sources such as Nicholas Yonge’s *Musica Transalpina* (1588). Even Thomas Morley defines the ‘ayre’ as ‘light’ music, an idea to which I shall return. Thomas Morley, *A Plaine and Easie Introduction To Practicall Movicke …* (London: printed by Peter Short, 1597), sig.Aa4v. Also see Introduction, 17.
context in which the traditions existed.\textsuperscript{19} Though his work was seminal in reviving interest in English domestic music more generally, his book still paints the English madrigal as an imitative genre lagging behind the rest of southern continental culture.\textsuperscript{20} Since Kerman’s publication, there have been multiple influential monographs dedicated to the Italian madrigal, but none that explicitly focus on the English form.\textsuperscript{21}

Another stereotype about English domestic music that particularly afflicts the madrigal is the belief that English composers were ‘less literary’ than those in the Italian development.\textsuperscript{22} Kerman argues that for the English composers, musical composition, not the text, was the primary consideration, marking this as one of the major differences between English and Italian multi-voiced music at the time.\textsuperscript{23} On the other hand, Italian composers have been depicted in modern scholarship as poetic geniuses, with a deep understanding of poetry’s relationship with music.\textsuperscript{24} Moreover, Kerman’s rhetoric betrays judgement upon those composers who wrote in a ‘native’ or ‘archaic’

\textsuperscript{19} Though Kerman’s account of William Byrd does attempt to link Byrd’s music to the social-religious realm more so than other composers covered in his book. Joseph Kerman, \textit{The Elizabethan Madrigal: A Comparative Study} (New York: The AMS, 1962), xvi.

\textsuperscript{20} Kerman quotes Edmund Fellowes, who said: ‘[n]othing is more astonishing in the whole history of music than the story of the English school of madrigal composers. The long delay of its appearance, lagging behind the Italian school by no less than half a century: the suddenness of its development … [and] the brevity of its endurance … all these features combine to distinguish the madrigal school as the strangest phenomenon in the history of English music.’ Kerman suggests that this time-lag was closing, however, as more composers wrote lute song, as this ‘backwardness’ was specifically affiliated with the madrigal genre. Kerman, \textit{The Elizabethan Madrigal}, 37, 255.


\textsuperscript{22} Kerman says that one of the reasons Fellowes left Martin Peerson’s \textit{Mottes or Graue Chamber-Musick} (1630) and \textit{Priveate Musick} (1620) out of the English Madrigal School series is because Peerson’s work was a bit too modern, and was ‘as literary a musical publication as one can find anywhere on the Continent’ a style ‘once removed from the madrigal’. Kerman, \textit{The Elizabethan Madrigal}, 14.

\textsuperscript{23} I will discuss the issue of ‘unliterary’ English composers in greater depth shortly in relation to Thomas Weelkes and William Byrd. Ibid., 254.

\textsuperscript{24} According to Gary Tomlinson, ‘[f]or a musician of humanist leanings like Monteverdi, the expressive power of music was a function of its relation to text … The highest goal that music could seek … especially in works from the years around 1600, was to form a syntactic and semantic union with its text so perfect that the distinction of musical and non-musical elements seemed to fade before the heightened oratorical power of a single musical speech. To composers like Monteverdi, musical expression without text must have seemed a contradiction in terms, if indeed they ever conceived of the subject in such terms at all’. Though this is probably an accurate assessment of the ideal, in reality practices like contra facta, replacing the text of a madrigal with a sacred one to make it more marketable and religiously acceptable, was widely practiced. If music and text are so perfectly fused as to become a ‘single musical speech’, how it is possible to replace one text with another? This may be symbolic of the difference between an aesthetic ideal and practical application. Tomlinson, \textit{Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance}, 29.
style versus the vogue ‘foreign’ style.\textsuperscript{25} Though he clearly respects some composers that did not conform to the Italianate madrigal fad, notably Orlando Gibbons and William Byrd, he tends to group most of those who did not adhere to the Italian models as ‘insignificant musicians’ like Richard Carlton, John Mundy, and Richard Alison.\textsuperscript{26} These composers (Gibbons and Byrd included) wrote in what Kerman frequently calls ‘the archaic style’, though he clearly believes some composers wrote ‘old-fashioned’ music through choice, while others wrote this way through incompetence.\textsuperscript{27} At this early stage in his career, Kerman’s form-based judgement of collections or composers he saw as ‘lesser’ was not uncommon.\textsuperscript{28} As will be discussed shortly, the early to mid-twentieth century rhetoric describing the English domestic forms as ‘archaic’ has had, I believe, a lasting effect on the genre’s reputation. Also, the perception that many of the English madrigal composers were incompetent or second-rate musicians has certainly contributed to the lack of scholarship on their music. The time seems overdue to reconsider works by lesser-known composers, as the idea that only the ‘great masters’ have historical value is outdated in current historiography.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{25} Kerman, \textit{The Elizabethan Madrigal}, 221.
\textsuperscript{26} Ibid., 254.
\textsuperscript{27} Kerman says there is ‘no doubt that with Byrd and Gibbons the obstinate use of the old-fashioned English style was a matter of very deliberate choice’. With Carlton, Alison, and J. Mundy, however, ‘no doubt, preservation of the archaic style was less a matter of deliberate choice than of unsophistication; their writing certainly seems more crude than that of any of the Italianate writers, even the least able’. Ibid., 127, 254.
\textsuperscript{28} The valuation of form over expression or interpretation is one of the more divisive aspects of musicological historiography. As Lawrence Kramer explains, most ‘musical analysts will now readily admit (or at least admit when pressed) that statements about form or structure do not represent music positivistically, “as it really is.” Instead such statements constitute descriptions relative to an implicit or explicit, formal or informal theory of musical articulation. The statements are true to the theory more than to the music itself. Yet a positivist ideal is continually reinstated by the assumption that statements about form or structure are more fundamental and more reliable than statements about expressive content. Analytical descriptions are still widely taken to have priority over hermeneutic ones’. Lawrence Kramer, \textit{Expression and Truth} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012), 22.
\textsuperscript{29} In the last several decades, the perceived prominence of the ‘masterwork’ has vastly changed both within and outside musicology, catalysed in part by what is sometimes described as the ‘cultural turn’, encompassing New Historicism and cultural history. Through developments in literary and historical studies, objects and texts previously deemed of little importance have been made relevant in weaving cultural narratives. Historians consider marginalia and personal letters in addition to official treatises, ‘read’ the significance of everyday objects like cutlery or cookbooks, and interpret the works of Shakespeare as historical documents. Though this approach to scholarship has been around since the 1980s, these developments have allowed ‘everyday’ music, from all groups of society, to be re-examined as culturally and musically important, regardless of any modern or contemporary judgements of ‘quality’. I will not be undertaking this sort of ‘vertical’ study, and, for mostly practical reasons, I will be re-examining the more ‘courtly’ domestic music looked at by early twentieth century musicologists, but within broader contexts of the way music was understood and the role it played in contemporary understanding of the world. As Steven Shapin supports, ‘there is no necessary opposition between writing the history of sites and of the masses’ and assuming ‘formal scientific knowledge is made through mundane processes of social interaction, there is no necessary opposition between the study of “high” … forms of elite culture and the study of the everyday
English domestic music is also often seen as less important than English ‘sacred’ music (a problematic moniker in its own right), and this is reflected in domestic music’s scant representation in modern performance culture.30 Firstly, there is a practical issue in the availability of English domestic music scores for public use, which understandably reflects a problem of supply and demand in the economics of publishing. The most readily available source of this repertoire in modern notation is *The Oxford Book of English Madrigals* (1978), which is sometimes used in performance, but is still a rather hefty, unwieldy volume.31 Some of the most frequently performed works are available through crowd-sourced websites like the Choral Public Domain Library (<www.cpdl.org>), though these are of varying accuracy and quality. There is Edmund Fellowes’ *English Madrigal School* series, which I will discuss in more detail shortly, but which until recently has been far too impractical and expensive for performance.32 Modern notation for some domestic collections doesn’t exist, for example, Walter Porter’s *Madrigals and Ayres* (1632), which was never edited by Fellowes.33 Additionally, a lot of domestic music requires specialist instruments, which could be perceived as a barrier to more frequent performance of this music. Though ease or frequency of performance isn’t necessarily commensurate with academic interest, it can be viewed as a marker of perceived importance in the canon.34 Though I don’t have specific data on this, it is my observation that in recordings as well, a similar bias towards sacred English polyphony can be seen, with a majority of albums focusing on church repertory.35 It is my hope that as this music is reassessed and rediscovered, it

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30 For more on issues of genre, see Ch. 4, 185-7.
32 Thanks to Stainer & Bell for recently making this collection available online in a far more affordable and portable PDF format.
33 As far as I can tell, only one of the pieces from this collection has been published in modern notation, ‘Praise the Lord’, which is included in Peter le Huray, *The Treasury of English Church Music 1545-1650* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 232. This piece and its inclusion in le Huray’s collection is indicative of the historiographical problem pertaining to labels of ‘domestic’ or ‘secular’ music. See also Stanley H. Boorman, ‘A critical study and partial transcription of Madrigals and Ayres by Walter Porter (London, 1632)’, unpublished MA Thesis, King’s College, London, 1968.
34 Lute song has a niche following that overlaps with the multi-voiced repertoire, made more visible by early music ‘stars’ like Emma Kirkby. Though ensembles like iFagiolini, Rose Consort of Viols, and Fretwork have taken large steps towards making audiences more aware of this repertory, sacred a cappella polyphony (whether originally liturgical or not) remains the staple repertoire of many professional and amateur early music ensembles.
35 That said, iFagiolini and Fretwork are currently working on an album of Martin Peerson’s *Mottects or grave chamber musick* (1630). Vocal ensembles like The King’s Singers, Amaryllis Consort, Anthony Rooley’s
will stand up against its own reputation, proving itself intellectually significant and worthy of deeper understanding.

**The Issue of Genre: Contemporary and Modern**

Though this analysis only provides a partial insight into how the reputation of English domestic music has developed as it has, many of the problems outlined above point to a larger issue of how this music has been categorised. The problem of genre within this repertoire has roots in contemporary conceptions of music, but it is very much tied to modern historiography. To begin, it is my observation that contemporary voicing and instrumental parts were often published to be as flexible as possible, so domestic music-makers could be successful with whom or whatever they had on hand, allowing for music making to be either a private or social activity. It was common to have interchangeable lines performable by ‘voyces or viols’ (for example, Martin Peerson’s *Priuate Mueicke* [1620]), yet there were many other factors that complicated how domestic music was performed, as songs were frequently composed with optional instruments, optional multi-voiced choral refrains, optional duets, and other possibilities, presumably to maximise both utility and profits. For example, Thomas Ford’s *Musecke of sundrie kinde* (1607) was written so ‘the greatest number may serue to play alone, very easie to be performed’. John Coprario’s *Funeral teares* (1606), was ‘[f]igured in seaven songes, whereof sixe are so set forth that the wordes may be exprest by a treble voice alone to the lute and base viole, or else that the meane part may bee added, if any shall affect more fulnesse of parts. The seauenth is made in forme of a dialogue, and can not be sung without two voyces’. Or Martin Peerson’s *Mottects or Graue chamber musique* (1630), which ‘[c]ontaining songs of fiue parts of seuerall sorts, some ful, and some verse and chorus. But all fit for voyces and viols,

Consort of Musicke, Deller Consort, and iFagiolini, have been integral to propagating this repertory in recorded form. Instrumental ensembles and soloists have also been vital to public awareness of this music, including Emma Kirkby, Rose Consort of Viols, Fretwork, Red Byrd, Phantasm and others. At the same time, English ‘sacred’ repertory has been the staple repertory of vocal ensembles like The Tallis Scholars and Stile Antico (who have one domestic/vernacular album each). Naturally, the repertoire recorded and disseminated by the famous English chapel and cathedral choirs like King’s College, Cambridge, and Westminster Cathedral focus on music that is considered liturgically traditional and useful.

36 For more on issues of genre, see Ch 4. 185-7. Robert Jones’ *First set of madrigals* (1607) was written for ‘viols and voices, or for voices alone, or as you please’. Robert Jones, *First set of madrigals* … (London: printed by John Windet, 1607), sig.A1r.


38 John Coprario, *Funeral teares* … (London: printed by Iohn VVindet, 1606), sig.A1r. For more on Coprario’s dialogue, see Ch. 4, 191-2.
with an organ part; which for want of organs, may be performed on virginals, bass-
lute, bandora, or Irish harpe’. 39 Tobias Hume wrote ‘an inuention for two to
play vpon one viole’.40 To me, this flexibility of instrumentation and voicing suggests
that contemporary approaches to domestic composition appear more concerned with
the practicalities of home use, and less so on the ideal of a specific form or singular
authorial intention.

The flexibility (yet occasional specificity) of this repertoire is intriguing not only
because it complicates subjectivity, but also because it displays some dissonance with
the way modern musicologists have categorised this music, which seems to me an
anachronistic approach overly focused on form. Amongst the canzonets, consort songs,
and madrigals, a lot of the music in this thesis could be broadly categorised as an ‘ayre’.
By Thomas Morley’s definition, the ‘generall named called ayres’ should encompass ‘all
other kinds of light musick saving the Madrigal’.41 This is not to say form did not hold
meaning, or that contemporaries did not acknowledge differences between forms, as
they certainly did. But publications such as Thomas Tomkins’ vaguely titled Songs of 4,
5. or 6 parts (1622) or the way Byrd published multi-voiced underlay for his consort
song collections, challenge some of the stricter categorisations modern scholars have
imposed upon this type of repertory.

When Edmund Fellowes compiled his early-twentieth century 36-volume series,
the English Madrigal School, he choose to include most of the printed, non-liturgical,
 somewhat secular, potentially multi-voiced, (mostly) English language unaccompanied
music from the period, including non-madrigalian imported forms like ballett and
canzonet, as well as Byrd’s consort song collections.42 In addition to volumes
contemporarily titled with reference to those three forms, he also included more
vaguely titled collections, like the one by Tomkins mentioned above, Richard Alison’s
An Howres Recreation in Musicke (1606), and Thomas Vautor’s Songs of Divers Aires and

39 Martin Peerson, Mottects or Grave chamber musique (London: printed by Willaim Stansby, 1630), sig.A3r.
40 Tobias Hume, The First Part of Ayres, French, Polish, and others … (London: printed by John Windet, 1605),
sig.A1r.
41 Morley, A Plaine and Easie Introduction (1597), sig.Aa4v.
42 Though Byrd’s music is no longer published under that series, and is now part of The Byrd Edition instead.
The series changed names from The English Madrigal School, to The English Madrigalists, presumably when re-
released and revised under Thurston Dart. As Philip Brett says in the introductory words to Byrd’s Psalms
sonets and songs (1588), published under The English Madrigalists, ‘Dr Fellowes … could hardly conceal his
disappointment at Byrd’s rather serious non-madrigalian style’. Philip Brett in Preface (1965) to William
Byrd, ‘Psalms, Sonnets and songs’, (eds.) Edmund Fellowes and Thurston Dart (London: Stainer & Bell,
1965), v.
He later began additional series of publications, such as *The English Lutenists*, and *The Byrd Edition*, which attended to some of the combination instrumental-vocal forms that didn’t fit into the madrigal series. Though it is understandable why he had to create series parameters for the purposes of modern publication, it raises some interesting questions about genre, form, and how modern publication forces anachronistic categorisation onto a repertoire that in some ways resists formal and topical categorisation by the meters frequently used by publishers today. For example, the modern divide between secular and sacred music is very difficult to apply to Elizabethan and Stuart music. Modern series like Early English Church Music have been inconsistent in what they consider to be ‘church music’ versus ‘domestic music’. Tallis and Byrd’s *Cantiones Sacrae* (1575), Byrd’s Masses, Tomkins’ ‘When David heard’ settings, and other staples of Anglican church repertory published today through EECM were originally published by the composers for domestic use. Much of the music published contemporarily for domestic use would, by today’s standards, be considered sacred (though perhaps not liturgical).

While early moderns appeared to take a somewhat fluid approach to genre in their publications, Fellowes wished to publish his series in line with a particular form or set of forms, a practice only sometimes followed during the early modern period. Even collections that were advertised as a single genre, like Richard Carlton’s *Madrigals* (1601), weren’t necessarily strictly so. Sometimes composers appeared to have their own ideas about what gave their publications organisation or unity. Byrd’s *Psalms, Sonets, & songs* (1588) is an eclectic book organised on the affection of the text, or as Byrd introduced it ‘[m]usic of various sorts, and to content diuers humors. If thou be

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43 Stainer & Bell added to this series with additional editors after Fellowes’ death, including volumes like Giovanni Croce’s *Musica Sacra* (1608), settings of sonnet-form translations of the seven penitential psalms that were published by Thomas East. Though Croce was contemporarily praised as a madrigalist, the inclusion of this publication in the *English Madrigal School* series still illustrates the problem of genre discussed here.

44 In addition to those collections by Byrd and Croce just mentioned, even texts without overtly religious sources were often moralising, for example nearly every piece in Richard Carlton’s *Madrigals* (1601).

45 I imagine Fellowes immediately ran into problems of what volumes to include in his series. For example, Thomas Morley’s *First Booke of balletts to fiue voyces* (1595), contains mostly balletts for five voices. But then Morley sticks a ‘dialogue to seven voices’ for two choirs in at the end. One example of a contemporary publication that does stick to the form advertised on the cover is Henry Youll’s *Canzonets to Three Voyces* (1608). But more often than not, forms were mixed within contemporary music books, even when a single form was advertised as the primary focus of a publication.

46 Kerman calls Carlton’s works ‘so-called madrigals’ multiple times, as his texts are ‘the most solemn of all the English secular publications’, as the composer’s attempts to emulate the Italian form appear somewhat half-hearted and the texts don’t necessarily follow the expected tropes. Kerman, *The Elizabethan Madrigal*, 119.
disposed to pray, here are Psalms. If to be merry, here are Sonnets. If to lament for thy sins, here are songs of sadness and piety. If to lament for thy sins, here are songs of sadness and piety. Even if most of the publication was consort song (underlayed for all voices), Byrd’s conception of the collection was still as ‘music of various sorts’, raising questions about what Byrd considered in his assessment of variety. Michael East’s Third set of bookes (1610) is exemplary of the ‘genre problem’ as it comprises of ‘Pastorals, Athemes, Neoplitaines, Fancies, and Madrigales, to 5. and 6. parts: Apt for both Viols and Voyces’. Another example would be Orlando Gibbons’ The first set of madrigals and mottets (1612), which Kerman says are ‘neither madrigals nor motets, but mature compositions in the individual idiom which Gibbons developed to great lengths from the basic abstract polyphonic style practiced by Byrd, as well as by a number of second-rate composers’. Without the qualification of ‘second-rate’, there is actually a substantial body of work that falls into this ambiguous ‘abstract polyphonic style’, and called madrigals or ayres or songs, whether formally madrigalian or not. Though the madrigal had its beginnings in a very specific form, style, and type of poem, what a ‘madrigal’ came to mean within a few short years, to consumers, composers, and publishers alike, was very much expanded from that original ideal. It is for this reason that I include many different types of potentially multi-voiced music in this study, regardless of adherence to any form. Furthermore, I assert that domestic

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47 William Byrd, ‘Epistle to the Reader’, Psalms, Sonnets, & songs of sadness and pietie, made into Musick of fiue parts … (London: printed by Thomas East, 1588), sig.B1v. Most would classify this collection, as well as his 1589 Songs of sundry natures, as consort song for single voice and viols. Byrd probably added underlay to some pieces and advertised it as ‘for voices or viols’ for added flexibility and marketability, perhaps piggybacking off the popularity of other multi-voiced genres. As suggested by Philip Brett in the ‘Preface’ to William Byrd, ‘Psalms, Sonnets and songs’, ed. Edmund H. Fellowes, revised under the direction of Thurston Dart (London: Stainer & Bell, 1963), iv. As Jeremy Smith points out, so much in ‘Byrd Studies has been on the musical nature of the songs, i.e., on what they are’. Jeremy Smith, Verse and Voice in Byrd’s Song Collections of 1588 and 1589 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 2016), 7.

48 J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 7-8.

49 In Fellowes’ original edition of this book, he omitted the verse anthems and viol fantasies, an act corrected by Thurston Dart in his revised edition, ‘so East’s book may be seen as a whole’. Reviser’s Note, Thurston Dart in Michael East, Third Set of Bookes, (eds.) Edmund Fellowes and Thurston Dart (London: Stainer & Bell, 1960), ii. There is a similar ‘issue’ in East’s Fourth set of bookes (1618), and verse anthems, motets, and songs (with both pastoral and psalm texts). Those pieces originally cut by Fellowes for being ‘outside the scope of this present edition’ were included in the later editions. As Fellowes says, ‘East’s first two Sets alone of his seven published volumes consist solely of Madrigals, in the strict sense of the term. The fifth, sixth and seventh books lie entirely outside the range of the English Madrigal School Series; but the third and fourth books, which are of a miscellaneous character, contain a considerable number of madrigals’. It is tempting to read East’s progression away from a strict madrigalian form to more miscellaneous collections as illustrative of the progressive diversification of domestic music forms. East, Third Set of Bookes (eds.) Fellowes and Dart, iii.

50 Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 125.
music more generally reflects the legacy of the madrigal’s influence on text setting, and the persuasiveness of its profitability, if not the actual form itself.

This study proceeds with the understanding that in spite of the relatively short-lived publication history of the English Madrigal, its prolific and influential nature helped stylistic tropes of the genre become well known and well established. Its popularity coincided with a surge in music publishing activity towards the end of the sixteenth century, when music publishers expanded their efforts beyond liturgical chant and psalm books to produce collections with a much broader coverage of different musical genres.\footnote{With new technology and availability, features of the madrigal proper permeated other styles of music including lute song, consort song, and even motet. Though the first English madrigals strove to imitate earlier Italian models, the genre morphed, as one might imagine, into something distinctly its own. Even those composers that were writing specifically against the madrigalian fad (Byrd, Ravenscroft, Campion, etc.), were still writing with the influential genre in mind, even if as a model of what not to do. As will be discussed in Chapter Four, English domestic musical forms were highly adaptable, sometimes (to the categorising musicologist) frustratingly so, both in form and instrumentation, as well as textual subject matter.\footnote{An argument could be made that this adaptability stems from composers having to quickly adapt and readapt to changing church music reforms with changing religions and monarchs.} Therefore, if occasionally I refer to a piece as a ‘song’ or ‘domestic music’ or more generally to ‘madrigals’, even if the specific piece in question has a more specific or slightly variant form, it isn’t out of ignorance, but rather a desire to not qualify the parameters of ‘late-Elizabethan, early-Stuart potentially multi-voiced somewhat secular domestic music’ in every instance.}

Revisions of Reputation

This thesis also hopes to begin to reframe the reputation of multi-voiced domestic music as intellectually and culturally significant, a conception sometimes reserved for the ‘inward’ or ‘contemplative’ reputation of solo lute song. In spite of an affiliation between the English madrigal and frivolity, this thesis will demonstrate that many forms, not just lute song, could have highly evocative, emotional, critical, and...
philosophical texts. In spite of Morley’s definition, the ayre and indeed domestic music more generally are not strictly synonymous with ‘light’ music in our modern sense of the word as ‘unthinking’ or ‘not ponderous’. Moreover, this thesis challenges the stereotype that lute song, for example in Sebastian Klotz’s estimation, is ‘the genre best equipped to explore the new economy of the senses’, a stereotype of lute song that seems romanticised. The bias towards solo lute song as the most ‘intimate’, ‘interior’, ‘self-reflective’, ‘poetically sensitive’ genre seems challenged by much of the repertory examined in this thesis. As will be discussed later, perhaps private self-reflection, a lone singer accompanying himself on the lute, is not the best or only way to know the self. I understand, however, that the modern reputation of solo lute song as ‘deeper’ than the madrigal has come partially from contemporary resistance to the foreign madrigalian trend. Kerman notes that the madrigal, renowned for the Italianate device of ‘dittying’ music to text, came under contemporary scrutiny. For example, Robert Jones acknowledged the controversy over word setting in the ‘To the Reader’ of his *First Booke of Songes e5 Ayres* (1600) by conceding ‘I will not saie my next shall be better, but I will promise to take more paines to shew more points of musicke, which now I could not do, because my chiefest care was to fit the Note to the Word.’ And Thomas Campion wrote in 1601:

> there are some, who to appeare the more deepe, and singular in their judgement, will admit no Musicke but that, which is long, intricate, bated with fuge, chaind with sincopation, and where the nature of eurie word is precisely exprest in the Note; like the old exploded action in Comedies … But such childish observing of words is altogether ridiculous, and we ought to maintaine, as well in Notes as

54 Sebastian Klotz, “‘Were Euer Thought an Eye’: Musical Action and the Crisis of Visionary Language in Dowland’s Lute Songs” in Nicole Schwindt (ed.), *Gesang zur Laute: Trossinger Jahrbuch für Renaissancemusik* (Kassel: Barenreiter, 2003), 188.
55 As Daniel Fischlin summarises, ‘the ayre, by virtue of its internalized theatricality, rejects many of the conventions of public spectacle to stage something quite different: the highly accomplished “individual” singing carefully wrought words and music as an expression of the very power of words and music to stage that individual’s voice … The ayre as a performance genre implicitly repudiates mass spectacle, whether musical or theatrical, cultivating instead the staging of introspection, solitude, and dialogical intimacy as part of its aesthetic appeal, even if it does so in public’. I am not arguing that this is incorrect, but rather that the social element of self-knowledge may play a greater role than the ‘interior’ emphasis often given to lute song and ayre might suggest. Daniel Fischlin, *In Small Proportions: A Poetics of the English Ayre 1596-1622* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1998), 21.
in action a manly carriage, gracing no word but that which is eminent and emphaticall.\textsuperscript{58}

Such criticism of the madrigalian trend must be taken with a grain of salt, however, because the genre was still deemed a marketable title for a music collection into the 1630s with Walter Porter’s contribution.\textsuperscript{59} Moreover, it is worth noting that Campion accuses those who prize polyphony as trying too hard to ‘appear more deep’, which is somewhat at odds with modern suppositions about the two forms.

Lastly, though I’ve taken pains to avoid the messy implications that accompany ‘intentionality’ on behalf of individual composers, this thesis will still contribute to recent scholarship that has rethought contemporary approaches to text setting, particularly in relation to Thomas Weelkes and William Byrd. Theories on Byrd’s approach to text setting have changed substantially over the last eighty years, mainly shifting away from a more formalist/modernist approach to musicology.\textsuperscript{60} Early twentieth-century musicologists such as Edward Dent and Bruce Pattison propagated a perception of Byrd as ‘a very unliterary musician’.\textsuperscript{61} But recent scholarship by Kerry McCarthy, John Milsom, Jeremy Smith, David Trendell, and others has convincingly refuted any remaining perceptions of Byrd as ‘unliterary’ through textual analysis, musical interpretation, and further investigation into Byrd’s biography.\textsuperscript{62} As McCarthy summarises, ‘Byrd was acquainted with a wide variety of texts—poetry and prose, secular and sacred, courtly and rustic’, and was, in her opinion, ‘arguably the first

\textsuperscript{58} Note that Campion also emphasises the importance of ‘action’ or the singer’s body, in effectively delivering a piece of music, an idea I shall bring up again later. While it is not certain that Campion is the author of the ‘To the Reader’ in Rosseter’s collection, most agree this is the case, and this is attributed to Campion in the English Short Title Catalogue. See Bruce Pattison, “Philip Rosseter, Poet and Musician”, \textit{The Musical Times} 72.1065 (1931): 986–990; Philip Rosseter’s A Booke of Ayres set forth to be song (London: Printed by Peter Short, 1601), sig.B1v.

\textsuperscript{59} Walter Porter, \textit{Madrigales and Ayres. Of two, three, four and five Voyces} (1632).


\textsuperscript{61} Pattison continues: ‘[Byrd’s] inspiration is entirely musical, as was that of the Netherland masters and the early church school in which he learned his art. If there were no words at all to his songs, the effect would be just as great: one cannot imagine the same of Marenzio’s madrigals’. Bruce Pattison, \textit{Music and Poetry of the English Renaissance} (London: Methuen and Co., 1948), 86.

composer to treat [distinguished Elizabethan poets’] poetry with the art and seriousness it deserved’.  

Many assumptions about Weelkes’s person, on the other hand, have been drawn from his record as a public drunk. Moreover, in the dedication to his 1600 madrigal set, Weelkes wrote, ‘I confesse my consience is vntoucht with any other arts’, which some scholars took for face value. This led Kerman to believe that ‘[Weelkes’s] tendencies seem more English than those of his colleagues. Perhaps on account of his confessed literary unsophistication, the poetry he sets is almost always native in appearance’. Conversely, I support Eric Altschuler and William Jansen’s reading of Weelkes’s dedicatory ‘confession’ as false humility. They argue that Weelkes ‘employs a sophisticated literary language, full of puns on both literary and scholarly topics’, including allusions to Shakespeare. Additionally, they speculate that ‘Weelkes’s lyricist may have collaborated with Shakespeare or someone close to Shakespeare’, and that his texts may ‘have often been prepared for musical setting, rather than just ‘found’ somewhere and subsequently set.’ Their analysis suggests Thomas Weelkes was certainly a ‘man of letters’, and entirely capable of crafting sophisticated art based on text. This thesis will provide further support for the literary sophistication of domestic music composers, particularly of the two individuals discussed here.

**Texts and Multi-Voiced Music**

Though I won’t fully disclose why I chose to focus this study on ‘potentially multi-voiced music’ until the conclusion of this thesis, I’ll admit I was intrigued by the idea

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63 McCarthy, Byrd, 81.
64 According to David Brown, in 1616 Weelkes was reported to the Bishop as ‘noted and famed for a comon drunkard and notorious swearer & blasphemer’. In 1619, his name pops up again in the records as, ‘very often come so disguised eyther from the Taverne or Ale house into the quire as is muche to be lamented, for in these humoures he will bothe curse & sweare most dreadfully, & so profane the service of God … and though he hath bene often tymes admonished … to refrayne theis humors and reforme hym selfe, yett he daylye continuse the same, & is rather worse than better therein’. As cited in David Brown, “Weelkes, Thomas.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press (accessed 1 Jun. 2015).
66 Though in Kerman’s defence, he goes on to state that Weelkes took in ‘the dramatic aesthetic of Marenzio and Gesualdo, which allowed them to break apart a madrigal for poetic effect’, a reading of Weelkes’s style I find quite accurate. Kerman, The Elizabethan Madrigal, 224.
68 Assuming Weelkes wrote his own dedications, he clearly has a way with words as well as a sense of humour, and it seems unlikely to me that the composer capable of so evocatively setting ‘When David Heard’ would thoughtlessly set these subtle, yet unmistakably weighty texts.
that one develops and builds truth socially, as will be discussed in the following chapter. As an avid choral singer, I have experienced what group singing can do to develop the self, and was curious as to how the social aspects of domestic music making were reflected in historical conceptions of self. Focusing this study on multi-voiced music was a way to symbolically ensure multiple human bodies in participation, as one person can play lute or viol and sing at the same time, but two singing voices require another body. Additionally, multi-voiced music also offers a way to look at how one could interpret ‘Self’ and ‘Selves’ (collective and divided) when experiencing music in performance, an idea I shall return to in the conclusion to the dissertation.\(^{69}\) For now, however, it is worth noting that the ‘issue of genre’ within this repertoire adds interest to the meaning of multiple voices, perspectives, and bodies in interpreting music’s role in self-knowledge.

Throughout this study I edge around the question: ‘what does the addition of music bring to a text that oration alone cannot do?’ If, as Susan McClary has argued, the illusion created by music potentially allowed for a wider spectrum of independent responses than other less subjective art forms such as literature, conceivably it is this very quality that helped individuals, including philosophers, contemplate emotion, self, and sensory experience in a way poetry alone could not.\(^ {70}\) One starting place for building an answer to this timeless question is in comparing the similarities and differences between oratory and sung text. Early moderns like Francis Bacon, as well as modern intermediality theorists like Werner Wolf, have reflected upon this aesthetic query. Moreover, the differences in each thinkers’ approach to the same question are highly reflective of early modern rhetorical strategies. Werner Wolf outlines that

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\[\text{The general similarity between musical and verbal literary signifiers which is most frequently commented on consists in their both being originally of an acoustic nature and in the fact that they dynamically unfold on the axis of time rather than in space ... A further similarity is that their acoustic signifiers, which originally necessitate an acoustic channel, may be transcribed into visual ones: both arts can therefore make use of written text as a channel ... The common acoustic nature of both music and literature provides the basis for a whole set of more detailed similarities between the two arts: as is especially clear}

\(^{69}\) Who is the speaker in the moment of performance? The composer? Poet? Singer?

with respect to poetry, their signifiers share the qualities of pitch, timbre, volume, and rhythm (in rhythm an additional temporal element is involved). Wolf believes that music differs from spoken literature in that ‘[g]enerally speaking, the kind of precision often reached in music as to pitch, timbre, volume and rhythm can never be attained in literature’. On the other hand, Francis Bacon observed, as Aristotle did, that ‘there be in music certain figures or tropes; almost agreeing with the figures of rhetoric, and with the affections of the mind and other sense.’ Bacon continued:

First, the division and quavering, which please so much in music, have an agreement with the glittering of light; as the moon-beams playing upon a wave … The sliding from the close or cadence, hath an agreement with the figure in rhetoric which they call praetor expectatum; for there is a pleasure even in being deceived. The reports and fugues have an agreement with the figures in rhetoric of repetition and traduction; the triplas and changing of times, have an agreement with the changes of motions; as when galliard time and measure time are in the medley of one dance.

Though living centuries apart, Wolf and Bacon make a similar set of observations: music is similar to oratory in that both forms have a reliance on metre, rhythm, phrase and cadence, as well as a relationships to time. But the precise differences between the two prove much more difficult to articulate. What is most interesting, however, is that there is something uniquely rhetorical and descriptive about Bacon’s theory that is not shared by Wolf’s, which is clearly of another time and intellectual milieu. Bacon answered this aesthetic philosophical question in a way that was utterly indicative of his New Science—based on observation and method, yet inherently tied to rhetoric. Though this point might initially seem a departure from the topic at hand, this example importantly demonstrates how a ‘musical question’, like how music relates to poetics,

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73 Francis Bacon, *Sylva Sylvarum: The Phenomena of the Universe; Or, The Model of a Repository of Materials; For Erecting a Solid and Serviceable Philosophy, on the Basis of Experiment and Observation*, (eds.) James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denton Heath (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1900), Vii.113. *Sylva* was originally published by William Rawley in 1627, shortly after Bacon’s death. Spedding’s edition is a transcription of Rawley’s publication.
74 It is also worth noting Bacon’s use of metaphor in this passage. For someone sometimes deemed one of the pioneers of the scientific method, this sort of writing is still quite descriptive and poetic. Bacon, *Sylva Sylvarum* (ed.) Spedding, VII.113.
75 For more on Francis Bacon, see Ch. 2, 81-84; Ch. 3, 116-8.
can actually reveal larger developments in knowledge production. The domestic music texts considered in this thesis are not simply passive literary works, reflective of changes in the world, but fiction capable of actively forming the way the world was perceived. As Elizabeth Spiller outlines,

What these texts [like Bacon’s] demonstrate is that early modern science is practiced as an art and, at the same time, that imaginative literature provides a form for producing knowledge. Within this framework, literary texts become more than just topical commentaries on new scientific discoveries or intellectually (but not truly scientifically) interesting examples of the cultural work that literature might produce in the face of changing scientific knowledge. It is not just that fiction serves as a (more or less accurate) record of, as John Donne puts it, how the “new philosophy calls all in doubt.” Rather, literary texts gain substance and intelligibility by being considered as instances of early modern knowledge production … science maintains strong affiliations with poetic fictions because, in ways that are rarely acknowledged, its practice emerges out of a central understanding of art as a basis for producing knowledge.\footnote{Elizabeth Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature: The Art of Making Knowledge, 1380-1670 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 2.}

Moreover, both scientific and literary works from this period should be read in this way, as our distinctions between them are less relevant in contemporary rhetorical traditions. This comparison of Wolf and Bacon demonstrates that it is not only what was said by early moderns that had implications for the epistemic climate of the seventeenth century, but also how it was said. This approach to early modern fictions not only gives us a hint for how to better read early modern texts in general, but also helps make clearer the contemporary connections between fictions and the so-called Scientific Revolution, and how fundamental questions about music contributed to these discussion.

To briefly return to what music added to words that recitation of poetry alone could not achieve, George Wyther described his theories as such in A Preparation to the Psalter (1619):

I would advise touching the Musicke of these divine Hymnes ... that men should be carefull to let it bee such as were graue, & suitable to the quality of those Songs. For, Musicke hath many Species, and is of very different operations: insomuch, as if that been not obserued, and the qualitie of the subject well considered, with what Straines it most naturally requires; the Song and the Tune will as improperly sute together, as a Clownes habit, upon a graue Stateman.
Yea, the inarticulate sounds have, in themselves, I know not what secret power, to move the very affections of mens soules, according to the qualitie of their Straines … And if they would remember themselves, they could truely say, that when they have been eceedingly merily disposed, one deepe solemn Straine hath made them, suddenly and extremely melancholy: And that, on contrary againe, at another time, when they have been oppressed with sadnesse, a touch or two of sprightly Musicke, hath quickly raised their hearts to a pitch of jollity.77

Withers states that text and music must suit each other, lest something more satirical (like a ‘Clownes habit, upon a graue Stateman’) is created. Yet, in spite of this, he observes that music has a quality within itself, a ‘secret power’ to move men’s souls. The rhetoric of this quotation situates the question about the relationship between text and music as not only a part of aesthetic, philosophical, and scientific debates, as described above, but also music’s spiritual connection to the soul and passions.78 Though the author makes attempts to describe music’s affects, ultimately he lacks an understanding of the mechanics of the passions to do so in terms that are more specific and less poetic. This quotation is just one of many that shows how a fundamental understanding of music’s affects on man might lead to broader physiological-psychological questions, to be discussed in Chapter Two. But I introduce the idea here to provide a brief introduction to how music, text, science, and knowledge are interwoven aspects of contemporary thought.

**Musical Intellectual History and Music as Science**

Surprisingly, there is relatively little literature on the connection between individual pieces of music and the intellectual history of seventeenth-century England. That said, some scholarship on John Dowland has extended to ideas of metaphysics and philosophy.79 Also, Daniel Fischlin’s *In Small Proportions* (1998) focuses on literary

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78 As Gallagher and Raman summarise, ‘[t]hat the ways we describe the world shape the ways we experience the world has become a virtual shibboleth for contemporary cultural materialist studies on the senses and the emotions’. Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman (eds.), *Knowing Shakespeare: Senses, Embodiment, and Cognition* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 6.
79 As Harvey Gross’s work argues, ‘the world of Dowland’s song remembers the sixteenth-century-episteme, but, at the same time, aspects of technique and sensibility, as well as historical moment, locate the song as a cultural product of the early seventeenth century’. Klotz also situates Dowland’s music amongst contemporary epistemology, asserting ‘[o]ne could go a step further by saying that Dowland explores a paradoxical or even paralyzing *actio* against the background of a fundamental mistrust of both the senses and of specular language. The will allow him to unfold a new poetic subjectivity of the speaking and singing persona.’ Harvey Gross, “Technique and Episteme: John Dowland’s “Can she Excuse my Wrongs””, Bulletin of Research in the Humanities, USA 86/3 (1983–85), 318–34, 330-1; Klotz, “Were Euery Thought an Eye”,
features of the English ayre, and makes some argument for its role in metaphysical development.\textsuperscript{80} There are excellent resources on the aesthetic conceptions of and practical use of music more generally in England, and even some that draw conclusions for episteme, but not one that considers meaning within particular compositions (rather than treatises).\textsuperscript{81} This thesis builds off important work by Rebecca Herissone’s \textit{Music Theory in Seventeenth-Century England} (2000), as well as the work of Penelope Gouk and her multiple publications on music’s role in the Scientific Revolution, including the perspectives of Francis Bacon, Robert Hooke, and Isaac Newton.\textsuperscript{82} H.F. Cohen has written substantially on the musical-mathematical treatises of Kepler and Mersenne (\textit{Quantifying Music: The Science of Music at the First Stage of the Scientific Revolution} [1984]), but focuses primarily on the mathematical-physical properties of music, rather than the aesthetic-physical aspects.\textsuperscript{83} The late Claude Palisca’s book \textit{Music and Ideas in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries} (2006) shares many thematic similarities to my project, but to a very different end and through very different means.\textsuperscript{84}

\textsuperscript{80} As Fischlin says, ‘lyric was endowed with the not insignificant capacity for moral precept and “natural Problemes.” The latter quality perhaps hints at lyric’s ability to address problems of both human nature and of nature more generally, a concept that had for the Renaissance specific resonances relating to fixed and eternal laws governing the material world’. Fischlin, \textit{In Small Proportions}, 31.


\textsuperscript{82} Herissone’s monograph shares many sources with my study, though as my focus is on aesthetic concepts (\textit{music speculativa}) of music rather than practical music theory (\textit{musica practica}), it is distinctly different from her work in approach. Her thesis states that most of the important aesthetic thinkers came from the continent and England was distinctly lacking in this area (though, as a possible consequence, England made major developments in music theory). She argues that despite translations of theory texts from Ornithoparchus, Descartes, and Alstedt appearing in English translation, English theory was not influenced much by these works. However, I think it an error to assume that just because no major treatises from England survive that these were not problems recognised and negotiated through other means, like fictions. Herissone, \textit{Music Theory in Seventeenth-Century England}, ix. Much of the legwork on the role of music and sound within scientific works of the seventeenth century is indebted to Penelope Gouk and Bruce Smith.


\textsuperscript{84} Published after the author’s passing, but before the book’s completion, Palisca’s work is mostly a summary of music’s intersections with ideas from intellectual history through major figures like Descartes, Zarlino, Kircher, and Mersenne. His survey is broadly sweeping and focuses a lot on the ancient origins of these intellectual themes. The focus of Palisca’s work is more on continental theory’s ancient origins rather than its presence in composition (though he does, for example, connect a piece by Orlandus Lassus with rhetorical themes). Yet the fact that this topic was the ‘summation Palisca’s life work’ reinforces the need for further dialogue on music’s role in the study of seventeenth century intellectual history. As the preface says, ‘the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries present a special opportunity to study the relationship between music and ideas because it was a time when the general ferment of ideas and thinking about music often ran parallel, strongly affecting as well the practical composition and performance of music.’ Claude V. Palisca,
The time seems right for a re-examination of early English domestic repertoire, without the form-based judgement calls that perhaps have limited some of the scholarship of this music in the past. Though there have been persuasive publications on English domestic music in recent years, these have primarily focused on cultural phenomena without analysis of particular pieces or, if addressing individual works, have appeared in shorter article forms or within critical editions. As I will address throughout this dissertation, change in epistemology was not only reflected in works of art, but also actively invigorated through dialogical presentation of this art. In this way, the act of performance is an act of negotiation, dynamically furthering dialogue that evaluated the quality of the self and reality through experience. In Mauro Calcagno’s terms, ‘the performer symbolically subsumes in herself all the other agents [patrons, composers, poets, etc.] by projecting a self that is constantly shifting. The performer’s “I” works as a catalyst of such identity shifting.’ This requires one to look at not only both the music and texts of the works under consideration, but also their potential mode of presentation or experience.


86 Some of the older monograph-length books on Tudor, Elizabethan, or Stuart Music, other than the ones already mentioned, include: David Wulstan, Tudor Music (Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986); David Brown, Thomas Weelkes: a biographical and critical study (London: Faber and Faber, 1969); Diana Poulton, John Dowland, second edition (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982); Edmund Fellowes, Byrd (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948); Peter LeHuray, Music and the Reformation in England 1549-1660 (London: Herbert Jenkins Ltd, 1967); Donald William Krummel, English Music Printing, 1553-1700 (London: The Bibliographical Society, 1975); to name a few. Morrison Comegys Boyd’s Elizabethan Music and Musical Criticism (1940) is primarily descriptive, though it does provide a few textual examples of madrigal and song. Similarly, there are older volumes from the literary side that discuss domestic music texts, but without consideration of the music, like Edward Doughtie, English Renaissance Song (Boston: Twayne, 1986); John Hollander, Untuning of the Sky (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961); some of the shorter articles and critical editions to which I refer are cited throughout this thesis.

87 These more recent monograph-length publications that discuss domestic music have tended to focus entirely on a biographical, cultural, or textual study: McCarthy, Byrd; Herssione, Music Theory in Seventeenth Century England; Jeremy Smith, Thomas East and Music Publishing in Seventeenth Century England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); J. Smith, Verse and Voice; Christopher Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Fischlin, In Small Proportions; Katherine Butler, Music in Elizabethan Court Politics (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 2015); to name a few.


89 Though as Lawrence Kramer cautions, ‘Autonomy, ineffability, and performance … have learned to become dialogical terms rather than absolutes, the better to regain the upper hand. It is hard to sort out the conceptual from the ideological motives in such efforts, though to be fair the same difficulty besets contextual efforts, too, my own of course included. Still, it is helpful to identify the values that shape the thought. We have no choice about being ideological, but we may still have some choice about which ideologies we endorse’. Lawrence Kramer, “Music, Historical Knowledge, and Critical Inquiry: Three Variations on the Ruins of Athens”, Critical Inquiry 32.1 (2005): 61–76, 62.
In order to analyse modes of presentation, one must value the role of expression in the creation of musical meaning. In Lawrence Kramer’s book *Expression and Truth: On the Music of Knowledge* (2012), Kramer points out that recent scholarship in musical aesthetics has focused more on what music is ‘about’ in social, rather than expressive terms. As this thesis is historical, it is mostly a part of the former category, but as an examination of music’s function in the development of early modern thought, it also requires an acceptance of expression’s role in the experience of truth. Kramer explains that this trend ‘connects with the desire for a historically grounded understanding of musical meaning’ yet without the delusion that expression or feelings (or the passions, in early modern terms) are ‘universals unaffected by history’ as former generations of academics may have glibly assumed. As one sees time and again, early modern thinkers struggled just as much as ancient and modern-day philosophers with the ‘gap’ between the capacities of language and musical expression itself. In this, ‘language’ refers to the terms we attempt to use to adequately describe musical expression in contrast to the actual experience of playing or listening. Kramer asserts that, from an hermeneutic standpoint, ‘it is precisely the semantic gap between interpretation and the object interpreted that is constitutive of meaning’, and the ‘gap must be preserved, not closed, to speak effectively of the artwork.’ What my study aims to do is offer a mode for accessing the meaning within *musical experience*, a slightly different focus from

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90 Kramer says ‘[o]nly if we have an adequate understanding of musical expression can we begin to understand the wider role of music in acoustic experience and auditory culture’. He furthers this notion by suggesting that it is only through an adequate understanding of musical expression that we can even begin to understand expression in general, let alone its connection to truth, thus challenging the assumption that ‘that music itself is silent on matters of history and criticism’. Kramer, *Expression and Truth*, 2; Kramer, ”Music, Historical Knowledge, and Critical Inquiry: Three Variations on the Ruins of Athens”, 61.
92 As I expressed earlier, the early modern rhetorical tradition in some ways put contemporary writers at an advantage when attempting to discuss these ineffable topics. This is similar to the seemingly disconnected terminology common in wine tasting compared to what one actually experiences on the palate.
93 ‘Meaning’ is of the utmost concern to both the arts and the social sciences, as it is a uniquely human construction vital to any assessment of aesthetic value. Warren J. Samuels, “‘Truth’ and “Discourse” in the Social Construction of Economic Reality: An Essay on the Relation of Knowledge to Socioeconomic Policy”, *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics* 15.4 (1991): 511–524, 516. The idea that meaning resides in a semantic gap between object and interpretation is similar to an observation by art historian Edgar Wind on renaissance use of mythology to understand the divine, which is worth keeping in mind for Chapter Two. In both musical expression and interpretation of the divine, there is an inevitable yet subjectively meaningful gap between the suitability of words and the object of description itself. As explained by Peggy Muñoz Simonds, *Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1992), 67; Kramer, *Expression and Truth*, 19.
Kramer’s that is, as I envision it, orientated towards the specific cultural variables of a single historical moment. As John Richardson has put it, ‘[b]y minding the gap between expression and re-expression, constructive descriptions have the power to capture something of the qualitative richness of musical experiences while nesting them within a discourse that inscribes its own historicity.’

One possible way of accessing the experience of music historically is through historical phenomenology. As many have problematised, it is difficult to study the history of experience or sensing without an interpretive model that grounds emotional experience in language that can accommodate an appropriately dynamic and speculative line of inquiry. Like meaning in music, phenomenological history requires hermeneutic interpretation because emotions don’t exist in unmediated forms. As Kevin Curran and James Kearney explain, the phenomenological approach developed by Bruce R. Smith is somewhat different from the term’s philosophical origins, as affiliated with mid-century philosophers like Martin Heidegger. To Smith, historical phenomenology is the study of sense experience during a specific historical past. Kevin Curran and James Kearney explain that historical phenomenology ‘stands at the intersection of sensory history, the cultural history of emotion, and the affective turn within the social sciences’. According to Sean McDowell, the ‘goal of historical phenomenology is to reconstruct early modern thinking about self-experience, so that interpreters of literature can interpret representations of the interior life with greater sophistication’. Historical phenomenology is just one hermeneutic tool to help us better access past emotional experience.

Bruce R. Smith first defines historical phenomenology in his MLA article ‘Premodern Sexualities’ (2000). In examining the experience of early modern love, he determines that eros inherently resists objectification. He reasons ‘[i]t can be given a scientific name, sexualitas, and thus be turned into an object of systematic investigation,

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94 John Richardson cautions, ‘Analysts embarking upon constructive descriptions would do well to remain mindful of this encoding function [of language to become saturated with historical assumptions] and the necessity of bridging the distance between first-hand experiences and the recollection of those experiences in writing’. John Richardson, “On Music Criticism and Affect” in Stan Hawkins (ed.), Critical Musicological Reflections: Essays in Honour of Derek B. Scott (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 141.
95 Ibid.
but for the historical subjects who felt it, no less than for the critic who reads its textual record, erōs remains a subjective experience’. Ergo, a mode of interpretation for dynamic experience was required, which Smith terms historical phenomenology. Though we cannot reconstruct historical experience ‘from within’, by casting a mould around the object of inquiry we can get a glimpse of its general shape, an idea he takes from new historicism. Smith asserts that ‘by reading fictional texts against the evidence of diaries, conduct books, medical treatises [etc] … we can surround the unrepresented (perhaps unrepresentable) moment’ of emotion in action. This requires the interpreter to ‘take words, not as symbols, signs with only an arbitrary relation to the thing toward which they point, but as indexes, signs with a natural or metonymic connection with somatic experience’. Only then can we begin to hermeneutically access something as ephemeral, elusive, and subjective as historical experience. Phenomenology is the study of the structures of experience, by which I mean, as Harris Berger defines, ‘the relationships between parts in experience and the ways in which awareness is shaped and organized’. Curran and Kearney demonstrate that,

There are two important premises at work in historical phenomenology. First, that feeling and sensing have a history. The way we feel sad is different from the way Shakespeare felt sad; the way we smell perfume is different from the way Queen Elizabeth smelled perfume. This is because the two experiences occur in distinct cultural, institutional, and discursive contexts. Having said that—and this leads to the second premise—feeling and smelling are not historical artefacts in the same way that we might argue a book, a building, or even an event is since feeling and sensing are embodied, subjective processes. They resist objectification because they are always, in part, inside us, even as they also depend upon social and material environments to occur. Historical phenomenology, therefore, embraces the dynamism and nebulousness of feeling and sensation by thinking in terms of ecologies rather than artefacts, experiences rather than objects, and by abandoning neat distinctions between persons and things. In this way, historical phenomenology has, in the decade or so since the publication of Smith’s article, offered scholars of Shakespeare and

100 B. Smith, “Premodern Sexualities”, 326.
101 Ibid.
102 As Berger points out, ‘That experience has a shape and structure that can be described and analyzed, and that this shape depends on more than individual caprice, is one of the basic ideas of phenomenology’. Harris Berger, *Stance: Ideas about Emotion, Style, and Meaning for the Study of Expressive Culture* (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 2009), x.
103 Ibid., xi.
his world new ways to explore visual, tactile, aural, olfactory, and emotional dimensions of early modern culture, which might otherwise resist critical engagement.

Objects and textual evidence are still of central importance in this sort of reading, but ‘historical phenomenology emphasizes how meaning accrues from the way sensing bodies experienced and perceived objects.’ Smith has argued that recent criticism has unnecessarily divided experiential possibility from traditional history: ‘[t]heatrical phenomena versus social facts, appearance versus reality, imaginative joy versus rational analysis: must we choose between these binaries? Why can’t we embrace both?’ Though we are always outsiders speculating what experience was like in a particular time, Smith believes that through this type of interrogation, we can approach subjective experiences like musical expression in culturally specific and politically aware terms. He does not believe we can replicate what it was like to be a subject in that time, but, still, exploration of phenomena like emotions of the past are worthwhile and scholarly rigorous endeavours.

As seen in this thesis, phenomenology uses text as the core object of interpretation, but, as Berger points out, ‘the meaning scholars seek to study is not the product of texts; it is the product of texts in experience’. As Roman Ingarden has observed, what we hear in a performance is always much more than what is indicated on the score.

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105 Ibid.
107 Ibid., xvi.
108 In this thesis, phenomenology sets a precedent for the more theoretical aspects of performance experience, ideas common in contemporary theatre and literary studies, but less so within historical musicology of this period. Phenomenology shares some points of interest with historically informed performance (HIP), and consequently is at risk for some of the same downfalls or misinterpretations. Practically speaking, ‘authentic recreation’ is the goal of neither mode, as that would be impossible. To Gary Tomlinson, the ‘authentic meaning of a musical work is not the meaning that its creators and first audience invested in it’ as many misinterpret historical performance to be. As Tomlinson outlines, ‘[t]he historian’s conversation, just like the anthropologist’s, aims to widen our understanding of human concerns, beliefs, actions, and so on by juxtaposing our culture with some inkling of another. The conversation is, in other words, an attempt to broaden our own humanity by confronting the foreignness of other modes of thought and action’. Without the juxtaposition with our own experience, we cannot hope to interact with, let alone hypothesise about another’s experience. Both HIP (as theorised by Tomlinson) and phenomenology are modes of shaping musical meaning, that embrace the importance of our own experience in interpreting historical structures of experience. Gary Tomlinson “The Historian, The Performer, and Authentic Musical Meaning”, in Nicholas Kenyon (ed.), Authenticity and Early Music: A Symposium (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 120.
109 Berger, Stance, xi.
This is perhaps even more so in early music, where, by modern standards, so little was indicated in scores and improvisation was a common practice. Moreover, not much is known for certain about contemporary domestic performance practice. Still, the gap between what was written on a score and what occurred in the moment of performance (called Unbestimmtheitsstellen by Ingarden, or ‘places of indeterminacy’)\textsuperscript{111} is often where the ‘magic’ happens. As Bruce Benson says, ‘it is precisely what is not to be found in the score that we often most value’.\textsuperscript{112} This idea is also deeply embedded in contemporary debates about musical poetics and form. As poet-composer Thomas Campion said in Philip Rosseter’s \textit{Book of Aires} (1601), ‘[a] naked Ayre without guide, or prop, or colour but its owne, is easily censured of euerie eare, and requires so much the more inuention to make it please’.\textsuperscript{113} Campion’s defence of the simplicity of the ayre seems to agree with Benson’s observation about the importance of performance in the creation of meaning and affect. To Campion, the ayre allowed the skill of ‘expert masters’ to shine, asserting that the performer’s ‘action’ was as important as the ‘Notes’.\textsuperscript{114} Though as Gary Tomlinson rightly cautions, ‘since the meaning of a musical work does not wholly reside in the work, it cannot be conveyed fully by means of performance’, as meaning is ‘located anew by each perceiver according to the work’s participation in his or her own context of meaning’.\textsuperscript{115} It is through phenomenology that we can begin to approach this subjectivity of meaning and contextualised experience that appears to inherently resist critical engagement.\textsuperscript{116}

The phenomenological approach embraced in this study understands music as a guide into the historical, temporal experience of early modern emotion and thought processes. Historical phenomenology allows for a symbiotic examination of domestic song in its textually-based discursive context, alongside the historical experience of sensory phenomenon. Phenomenology is one way music demonstrates itself to be, as Kramer has said, not just a reflection of culture, but a form of human agency that

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid., 81.
\textsuperscript{112} Ibid., 84.
\textsuperscript{113} For more on this quotation, see Conclusion, 242. Rosseter, \textit{A Booke of Ayres} (1601), sig.B1v.
\textsuperscript{114} ‘For the Note and Tableture, if they satisfie the most, we haue our desire, let expert masters please themselves with better … we ought to maintaine as well in Notes as in action a manly cariage’. Rosseter, \textit{A Booke of Ayre} (1601), sig.B1v.
\textsuperscript{115} Tomlinson in Kenyon (ed.), \textit{Authenticity and Early Music}, 122.
\textsuperscript{116} As Berger says, ‘phenomenology can make a fundamental contribution to the interpretation of meaning in the study of expressive culture’. Berger, \textit{Stance}, ix. For more on phenomenology and expressive cultures, see ibid., vii-xix.
shapes its creation. By positing music as a dialogue between human agents, it demonstrates how this social, discursive process (performance as dialogue) actively contributed to changes in the contemporary conception of knowledge, an idea I shall return to in the conclusion of this dissertation.

**Overview of Chapters**

Chapter One sketches out both the modern theory and contemporary justification for my approach to early modern knowledge building, a vital part of the cultural and intellectual context for my argument. This includes an explanation of my approach to the intellectual history of the period more broadly and provides necessary context for modes of thought in the early seventeenth century, including humanism, Protestantism, travel, and the New Science.

Chapter Two outlines contemporary understanding of the mechanics of sense perception, in addition to ideas on the relationship between the senses and the soul. It explores why there was a resurgence of interest in understanding the basic principles of sense perception around the turn of the seventeenth century. The precise relationship between the body and soul raised many questions about the quality of the soul, and how the senses interacted with the material body as well as the immaterial spirit or soul. It surveys various contemporary understandings of hearing and its special relationship with the spirits. Attention is paid to Francis Bacon and his attempts to understand the hearing-to-soul relationship through observable phenomena. Music and poetry, in particular, were seen to have special abilities to motivate people’s souls and move them to action. Moreover, music, in its ability to resonate with both body and soul, was believed by some to have the power to change not only our actions, but our very selves.

Chapter Two also draws out examples of multi-voiced domestic music that explicitly address topics of human consciousness through discussions of sense perception and its mechanics, limits, and reliability. It considers the state of dreaming, illustrating its metaphorical connection to music in the early modern period. Both the process of dreaming and ‘music’s power’ raised metaphysical questions about external realities and the reliability of sense perception, a recurrent theme in domestic music, as

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35 See Introduction, 10.
well as contemporary drama. These examples demonstrate domestic repertory to be poetically sensitive to the ‘metaphysical turn’ described by Susan James, that included not only a resurgence of interest in the basic principles of sense perception, but also a sceptical re-examination of the realities created by them. Finally, Chapter Two challenges the idea that music, or the arts in general, had no impact on intellectual developments in the so-called Scientific Revolution.

Chapter Three demonstrates two ways music and text could work together to confront assumptions about reality and representation. It introduces domestic music’s strong affiliation with the mythical and pastoral, and how those modes (and fiction more generally) could work to build truth. It highlights Philip Sidney’s *Defence of Poesy* (1595) for evidence on how counterfeits of reality can move men to actions that alter society, and also establishes the importance of self-awareness in the creation of meaning. This chapter also looks at Francis Bacon and his use of fiction in the creation of new knowledge. Like Sidney, he believed *mimesis* was useful to instigate actions of change and reveal hidden truth.

Chapter Three then discusses contemporary and modern use of mythology and the pastoral mode. Using theories by Eero Tarasti on mythology in music, I argue that multi-voiced domestic music’s strong affiliation with the mythical persisted in certain musical forms even when their texts discussed only tangentially mythical (or indeed non-mythical) topics. I outline theory on musical irony using Julian Johnson and Esti Scheinberg, and argue for satire’s role as a discursive practice, an interaction through which we work to define knowledge. I then apply this theory to three case studies from Thomas Weelkes’s *Ayes or phantasticke spirits* (1608).

Chapter Three also looks at Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ (1601), a madrigal without explicit mythological reference, in which mythology still feels very present in its presentation of seemingly fantastical events with real worldly origins. I discuss how travel and mythology melded together in travel accounts, creating an environment in which those who observed phenomena abroad were seen as both providers of new truths, but also as liars. The chapter touches on the relationship between travel and the New Science, as well as the way it changed approaches to knowledge. I argue that all of the images in Weelkes’s ‘Thule’ could have been inspired by a single source: Richard Hakluyt’s *The Principall Navigations* (1589-1600), and
demonstrate how the rhetoric of the poem echoes passages in Hakluyt’s publication. Finally, I analyse how Weelkes’s vivid madrigalisations work to not only provide verisimilitude, but to invoke a sense of wondrous Other. Though not the mythical Other expected from the madrigal genre, the ‘real’ foreign Other of ‘Thule’ proves just as effective in transporting the subject to another place. This madrigal, as do the ayres discussed in this chapter before it, provokes questions about representations of reality presented through a musical medium where musical form is used to stimulate additional meaning not necessarily present in text alone, demonstrating one way musical meaning could interrogate assumptions about the nature of reality.

Finally, Chapter Four considers the role of dialogue in early seventeenth-century cultural production and discusses how dialogue (in its variety of forms) links to changes in knowledge building over the seventeenth century, focussing on the example of Francis Bacon, as well as existing scholarship on dialogues and music by Cristle Collins Judd. I survey the substantial presence of dialectics as a contemporary mode for learning and make an argument for why one needs to approach the study of dialogue dynamically, as it only exists in relation to experience. I then turn to the musical form known as the musical dialogue, and briefly trace its history from its Italian origins to its presence in England. In the case studies, I look at several examples of English musical dialogue and the variety of issues these works invoke regarding form and genre, both within this study and in the historiography of the repertory.

The ubiquitous presence of dialogue in verbal conversation, epistolary exchange, and dialectical literature, had a perhaps unexpectedly large influence over non-dialectical forms. Persistent remnants of the dialogical form allowed for contradiction, alternatives, unfinishedness, and binary possibilities within non-dialectical works. This is seen very clearly in the oeuvre of Philip Sidney, the author of the poem for the case study that follows, William Byrd’s ‘O you that heare this voice’ (1588). Though not in an explicitly dialogical form, dialogue’s palpable influence over this poem helps to explain its most pressing musical curiosity, as I discuss at the end of the chapter.
Chapter 1: Aspects of Early Modern Knowledge Building

In some ways, this chapter is an extension of the introduction, as it surveys contextual aspects of early modern knowledge building that are of relevance to my argument, including both contemporary perceptions and modern theory. It connects the fictive arts with issues of representation and how people probed and established certain knowledge through imagination. As I discuss elsewhere, fictions and the arts contributed to contemporary discourse on the nature of reality and its representations.  

Jonathan Sell points out that any discussion of representation requires ‘slippery’ terms like ‘reality’ and ‘truth’. As it is necessary to define a series of impossibly multifaceted terms in any thesis, I will start with the most glaringly provocative two, namely truth and knowledge. I am primarily concerned with an historical, social conception of truth, one that is dynamic and without strict linear direction. In Steven Shapin’s *A Social History of Truth* (1994), the author describes ‘knowledge’ as a body of shared understanding, a ‘collective good’, that does not stand outside of practical activity, as it is made and sustained through the practices of daily life. He argues that ‘absolutely everything which individuals know about the world—natural and social—is potentially relevant to their assessments of new knowledge-claims’. For the sociologist or historian, truth can be viewed as a social institution, for, as Shapin says, ‘there is no other way of conceiving truth save through the study of what people do collectively’. As such, truth has motion. It is through normal daily activities, like music making, that people

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1 For more on fiction and truth, see Ch. 4, 112-19.
3 This view of history has much precedent in literary studies. For example, Henry Turner explains his use of this methodology in his book *English Renaissance Stage* (2006): ‘Methodologically, the book follows recent work by scholars in the history and sociology of science who have revised the “history of ideas” as it has traditionally been practised in favour of a historical account of epistemology that emphasizes the social and institutional production of knowledge, as well as the representational modes through which knowledge is legitimized and transmitted’. Henry S. Turner, *English Renaissance Stage* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), viii.
5 Ibid., xxvi.
6 Ibid., 6, 7.
negotiate and actively form what knowledge is.\(^7\) Changes to ‘ways of knowing’ (how we acquire knowledge about the world around us) often first appear within the contradictions or dialogues of mundane life. Shapin concedes that the parties need not agree, as ‘knowledge of the world is given its shape as conversation proceeds’.\(^8\) Pragmatist philosophers like William James have noted that, ‘[t]rue ideas are those we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify … truth happens to an idea’.\(^9\) This conception of truth as an action or process is something that is constantly accruing and shedding aspects of itself. As Shapin says, ‘[t]ruth consists of the actions taken by practical communities to make the idea true, to make it agree with reality’.\(^10\) And it is this communal effort of making truth that also builds knowledge, as ‘no single individual can constitute knowledge’.\(^11\) As Andrew Barnaby and Lisa Schnell write, ‘[t]o seventeenth-century thinkers … [q]uestions about how thought functioned, what constituted the conditions of right knowing, or how to attain a certain knowledge of things were inseparable from questions concerning the social contexts in which knowledge could be properly employed’.\(^12\) Not only is the creation of knowledge a social endeavour, it is not simply transferred, it is made. As Elizabeth Spiller summarises, ‘[r]ather than thinking about the “constructedness of knowledge” simply as social fact, one needs to instead ‘see Renaissance literature and science beginning in aesthetic acts’.\(^13\) This is crucial to frameworks of knowledge because ‘knowledge cannot simply be given to

\(^7\) One seemingly separate yet central aspect of knowledge building, however, is trust. Shapin maintains that the thing that bonds together (the ‘moral bond between the individual and member of the community’) the collective in the building of knowledge is trust. As will be addressed in Chapter Two, social, political, religious, and other change around 1600 created an environment of notable scepticism, one evident in the writing styles of the day that almost formulaically or stylistically required its author to attest to the writing’s truthfulness. Ibid., 7.

\(^8\) If knowledge is built upon collective ‘conversations’, how is this process complicated by a medium that relies on a little understood and highly subjective activity like the experience of music? Though scepticism and issues of trust are evident in verbal or written testaments of truth, I intend to explore how ‘conversations’ about truth occurred with and through music, a complicating medium that relied on subjective experience, yet also socially contributed to the negotiation of knowledge. Ibid., 16, 33.

\(^9\) William James, ”Pragmatism’s conception of truth”, in idem, Pragmatism, 88-91 as cited in Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 6.

\(^10\) Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 6.

\(^11\) Ibid.


\(^13\) Spiller, Science, Reading and Renaissance Literature, 3.
readers but must be in some way produced by them’. In this way, common knowledge is a collected body of individual truths, as developed by a group. If ‘knowledge is the result of a community’s evaluations and actions’ as a part of the process Shapin calls the economy of truth, then it is for this reason that I sometimes use the terms interchangeably. As, in Warren Samuels’ words, ‘knowledge equated with Truth is difficult to produce’, the truth I speak of here is not the absolute sort, but a collectively understood version. Samuels also accepts that knowledge is epistemologically and paradigmatically specific; knowledge is sociologically and discursively grounded, and therefore confirmation of truth comes from consonance with that world-view. Ergo, for the purposes of this thesis, ‘knowledge building’ refers to the collective process that an institution or group undergoes to make, create, or establish the truths that contribute to knowledge. The science of hearing and the role of fiction in truth building are crucial to my argument because, as Spiller articulates, ‘early modern literature and science share a language of making that grounds their claims to knowledge’, and the same, I argue, is true of music making.

Another word that needs addressing is ‘episteme’, a weighty term with a long history in philosophy, sociology, critical theory, and intellectual history. To Plato, episteme referred to true or absolute knowledge, in contrast to doxa, which was common belief or opinion, and techne, crafts or the creative arts. Stemming from Plato’s use, epistemology was also of primary concern for twentieth-century theorist Michael Foucault, and it is from him that many modern-day perceptions of episteme are influenced. In his L’Archologie du savoir (1969), he writes,

[b]y episteme we mean ... the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive practices that give rise to epistemological figures,
sciences, possibly formalized systems ... The episteme is not a form of knowledge or type of rationality which, crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the group [ensemble] of relations that can be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses them at the level of discursive regularities.20

As Ian Maclean assesses, this ‘notion of “episteme” offers access to the past, but an untotalizable past characterised by regularities, not rules, and by modes of discourse in which truth, knowledge, and power somehow cohabit but are not mastered by the human subjects who inhabit them rather than use them’.21 Episteme is not a structure, but an ‘ensemble’ without fixed organising principles.22 As the human subjects that develop this ‘group of relations’ are not necessarily masters over their discoveries, this understanding of episteme allows for an examination of the system without concern regarding ‘consciousness’ or ‘intent’ on behalf of the individuals. These changes in episteme are not linear or immediate, but circuitous and gradual, eventually evolving over time as new possibilities.23 In broad terms, the seminal development in intellectual history that unfolded from the late sixteenth century through to its eventual articulation by René Descartes in his Meditations (1641) was a shift from an Aristotelian perception of truth, one established by input from the external senses, to a truth founded on inward intellectual discernment.24

**Before Descartes**

Few would argue with the assertion that the mid-late seventeenth century was a watershed period in Europe for change in approach to knowledge building; this change would be the major marker of modernity in the western canon of

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21 Ibid., 151.
22 Ibid.
23 In 1966, Foucault wrote: ‘What I am attempting to bring to light is the epistemological field, the *episteme* in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having reference to its rational value or to its objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history which is not that of its growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility.’ “episteme, n.”, *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, March 2014 (accessed 30 April 2014).
24 This new attitude, though emerging in earlier texts, is fully articulated in Descartes’s words 'cogito ergo sum’, ‘I think, therefore I am’ (or ‘I think, I exist’) from his Second Meditation; René Descartes, *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume II*, (eds.) John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 17.
intellectual history. Indeed, in philosophical terms, Descartes is often named the father of modernity, or at the very least an important benchmark in the trajectory of the Western philosophical canon.\(^{25}\) In terms of epistemology, the seventeenth century remains a period of robust interest in western intellectual scholarship.\(^{26}\) Though it is necessary to have an idea of the overarching trajectory of the major developments in intellectual history over the course of the seventeenth century, what is of more importance here is not how epistemological change occurred, but that it did occur. For this thesis, figures like Descartes work more as a milestone of epistemic change within the canon, rather than as an individual agent creating it. Change in worldview does not begin with the canonical figures who articulate new possibilities; individuals like Descartes are enabled by the intellectual milieu of those before them. For example, in regards to sixteenth-century humanism and Protestantism, Henry Sussman reminds us that, ‘[t]he philosophy of Descartes is often cited as the herald to objective as well as subjective conditioning in modernity, but I would argue that much of what is treated as most “modern” in Descartes is already conditioned by the arguments concerning freedom, mediation, and political and corporeal corruption in Luther, Calvin, and related theological thinkers of the sixteenth century’.\(^{27}\) Though Descartes articulated these concepts in far more precise terms, his ideas didn’t spring out of nowhere. This study supports the idea that practice pre-empts theory, or as Elizabeth Hanson has superbly expressed, the understanding that ‘new epistemic possibilities began as improvisations around the fissures between the material conditions of life and the conceptual resources already in place in … culture’.\(^{28}\) Hanson’s assertion proposes that the necessary components of Descartes’s theories had already

\(^{25}\) ‘Modern philosophy, we are accustomed to think—or at least to say—begins with René Descartes’s. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds.), *Descartes in Seventeenth-Century England* (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2002), 1.

\(^{26}\) Tad Schmaltz cautions that while ’[t]here can be no doubt that Descartes deviated in some significant ways from the psychology of Aristotle and the later scholastics … the deviations are linked less to epistemological preoccupations with external world skepticism than to a concern to articulate a new metaphysical conception of the mind and its relation to the material world’, or in other words, the *mind-body problem*. Donald Rutherford (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 1, 156.


\(^{28}\) Elizabeth Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 3.
been socially cogitated and negotiated indirectly through seemingly mundane daily practices prior to their full declaration. 29 My intention is not to backdate the development of Descartes’s concepts, but rather to draw attention to the idea that, as Hanson has said, ‘new ways of knowing are often profoundly at odds with the consciously held commitments of the people who began to articulate them, emerging not as principles from which a world order can be derived, but as contradictions in discourse and social practices’. 30 The hermeneutic approach of this thesis examines contradiction and thematic material in the social practice of music making, while still fully aware of the historian’s privileged stance when interpreting the past. 31

I acknowledge that long-term change occurred differently in different parts of Europe, and I am not claiming that Descartes’s work directly influenced writing in late sixteenth-century England. As Sussman says, the work of Descartes was conditioned by significant events and intellectual movements prior to its crystallisation in Meditations and other works. Though Descartes was French, all of Western Europe felt the impact of historical events like the printing press, the Reformation, the wonders of exploration, and humanism. It is the influence of those events and perspectives that came before Cartesian dualism that are of greatest interest to this project. 32

29 Tadié and Scholar agree that aspects of Descartes’s theories in the 1640s came out of the ‘philosophical revolution of the 1630s, the most telling feature of which is the almost simultaneous convergence of several philosophers’ views, echoing Galileo’s discoveries a decade earlier’, an idea that can be seen particularly in theories on optics and vision where ‘the question of likeness is crucial’. This not only supports the idea that practice comes before theory, but also reminds us that a single genius (whether Hobbes or Descartes) cannot claim full responsibility for the ‘great philosophical discovery of modernity—that sensible qualities exist in us alone’. Tadié and Scholar, Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 74.

30 Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, 3.

31 In Gail Paster, Katherine Rowe, et al. the editors emphasise how ‘pre-Cartesian psychophysiology may have affected early modern self-experience’, arguing that ‘the very language of physiology … helps determine phenomenology’. This type of scholarship reminds us how the language of experience can help us understand the discourses and events that contributed to reassessments of the self, though prior to full articulation. Gail Kern Paster, Katherine Rowe, and Mary Floyd-Wilson (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Passions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press), 16.

32 For example, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, dreaming was central to the evolution of Descartes’s theories but also played a significant role in late-sixteenth, early-seventeenth century questions about the role of our minds in establishing reality. Though it would be another twenty years before he would articulate the cogito, young Descartes was shaped in a similarly Aristotelian, dream-obsessed world as the early Stuarts. These formative experiences were of the utmost importance, in spite of the fact they came prior to articulation. For more on the role of dreaming in Descartes, see Gregor Sebba and Richard A. Watson (eds.), Dream of Descartes (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987); see also Ch. 2, 102.
cautions against a view of philosophy separate from influential historical events, as it is out-dated to envision seventeenth-century philosophy as the point where ancient and medieval philosophy turned modern. Rather than just focusing on the ‘great epochs’, it is now acceptable to investigate the transitions between epistemologies. That said, I believe it is useful to have not only a basic understanding of the foundations of sixteenth-century thought in regards to sense perception and truth, but also an idea of where it was headed by the time Descartes articulated many of these changes in the 1640s.

As Sean McDowell reminds us, ‘[t]o write off the discourse of immaterial selfhood as merely a figment of the Cartesian mind/body split is to miss the varying degrees of embodiment described in the soul-body discourse of Elizabethan and Stuart England’. It is generally assumed that the ‘problem of knowledge’ is a fundamental question that forever followed the wake of the Cartesian *cogito*, but as will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter Four, earlier writers like Francis Bacon, arguably less prominent within the philosophical canon, were also rewriting frameworks of knowledge, reminding us that the ‘problem of knowledge’ was relevant before Cartesian articulation.

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34 As Tadié and Scholar remind us that Descartes’s world was, still, a fundamentally Aristotelian one: ‘We need to ascertain what characterises specifically modern philosophy as it is formulated in the 1630s: is it a new mechanistic explanation of nature, which breaks with Aristotelianism by way of its denial of final, material and formal causes and its assertion of the power of efficient causality alone, or is it a dogmatic and rational assertion that the real world in no way resembles the world that we perceive? The choice is perhaps less decisive than some historians of philosophy would have us believe. Why? Because for the philosophers in this pivotal decade, the assertion of the fictional character of the perceived world relies on an attempt to understand the production of our perceptions by means of a mechanistic explanation, within a framework that is still Aristotelian. We have not yet reached Berkeley’s intellectual universe: the hypothesis of a world of sensible qualities without any material substance as their external cause has not yet occurred to any serious philosopher. In other words, if Hobbes and Descartes do share a common view of sensible qualities as strictly representative of external objects, they also share the idea that the world made out of those sensible qualities is the result of a causal production by way of a perceptive mechanism’. Tadié and Scholar, *Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge*, 75.
37 Jean Bodin (1530-1596), Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) and other sixteenth-century thinkers were also concerned with this ‘problem of knowledge’. Ann Blair, “Bodin, Montaigne and the Role of Disciplinary Boundaries”, in Kelley, *History and the Disciplines*, 29.
Thinking With Shakespeare

New Historicism and changes in approach to cultural history over the last several decades have, in spite of their shortcomings, opened doors for literary and non-literary texts to be read interchangeably. Shakespeare is often one of the first figures to receive thorough treatment from new critical perspectives, as his immovable position within the Western canon and his popularly held reputation as a ‘teller of truth’ contribute to a field constantly eager for reinterpretation. Shakespeare studies, therefore, offers a useful starting point for theories on interpretation and new ‘ways in’ to an artistic-historical text. As William Poole and Richard Scholar argue, Shakespeare’s works can be considered ‘philosophical’ in that they deal with ‘ethical, political, epistemological, and metaphysical matters of general human concern’. This view is shared by Lowell Gallagher and Shankar Raman, who further this idea by arguing that ‘[t]he fictive worlds anatomized on the early modern stage disclose a fundamental characteristic of skeptical reasoning: the renewed attention to sense perception as a problem … Correspondingly, natural philosophy examined with new urgency the question of whether human reason and sense perception could provide the criteria for certain and infallible knowledge’. Though Gallagher and Raman look to David Hume as the ‘logical end point of early modern discourses on the senses and cognition’, their study provides precedent that ‘[l]ooking back upon the early modern period from Hume’s perspective allows us to reassemble the body by starting with the senses and the forms of cognition, experience, and discernment they make available’.

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38 These movements have also given value to arts, objects, texts, and peoples that were previously marginalised in traditional history. For more on reading Shakespeare historically, see Lisa Jardine, Reading Shakespeare Historically, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 1996), 17. For the aims of cultural history, see Peter Burke, What is Cultural History? Second Edition (Malden: Polity, 2008).
39 Shakespeare is often quoted in popular culture as a source of proven or time-tested wisdom, much in the same way the Bible and aphorisms attributed to Confucius are often used.
40 For example, there has been excellent research as of late on Shakespeare and the senses and cognition: Holly Dugan, Shakespeare and the Senses; Bruce Smith, Phenomenal Shakespeare; Kinney, Shakespeare and Cognition; Craik and Pollard, Shakespearean Sensations.
43 Unlike Descartes before him, Hume insists ‘on sense perception as the unmitigable basis for knowledge; his assertion of the veracity of belief produced by sensory impressions as the ground for rational judgement; his defence of a probabilistic knowledge resting on inductive inferences drawn
They aren’t asserting that Hume’s theories are pre-conceived in Shakespeare, but that contemporary scepticism of sense perception demonstrated how ‘the sixteenth-century revival of skepticism produced or reconstituted the senses as objects of inquiry and analysis’, in Shakespeare’s plays, focusing on features of Humean scepticism which they believe ‘can be traced to the re-envisioning, over the course of the long sixteenth century, of knowledge and the role of the senses in its acquisition’. This thesis takes a similar approach in its use of late sixteenth-, early seventeenth-century domestic music, by examining their contribution to ongoing contemporary discussions on sense perception and the nature of reality and its representations, contributions that have implications for changes in approach to knowledge articulated by later philosophers. Poole and Scholar say that a useful investigation of Shakespearian literature’s greater philosophical attitudes relies on the belief that literature plays a unique role in wider philosophical discussions, which should be used in conjunction with non-literary texts. They assert that one ‘understands literature best by placing it in dialogue with non-literary, philosophical modes of thinking … [and that] such a project is by no means “unhistorical”’. Though Poole and Scholar aptly point out that in order for such a dialogue to be fruitful, it must address what Shakespearian literature uniquely enhances within an understanding of seventeenth century intellectual development—mainly what fiction allows one to think and express, and how it does so.

The history of philosophy, particularly early modern philosophy, is written in terms of competing traditions and their recurrences; and notions such as ‘Shakespeare could not have thought that’ have come to seem overbold in terms of what is now emphasised about the rhetorical culture of Shakespeare’s age, a culture that prized disputation in utramque a posteriori experience of the world: these distinctive features of Humean skepticism can all be traced back to the re-envisioning, over the course of the long sixteenth century, of knowledge and the role of the senses in acquisition’. Gallagher and Raman (eds.), Knowing Shakespeare, 2-3.

Ibid., 2, 7.

‘Philosophies’ in the loosely defined sense. This includes the questions raised by Shakespeare’s work that also relates to other modes of thinking (theology, law, natural philosophy, etc.). It also includes, however, instances of philosophising that engaged with recognisable philosophical traditions, while ‘at other times they appear innocent of any such frame of reference’. Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 1, 3.

Ibid., 3.

Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 3.
partem, the classroom-originating exercise on why Brutus was right to kill Caesar and why he was also wrong.

Poole and Scholar argue, as others in the fields of history and literature have before, that one can usefully reflect on philosophies in a Shakespearian text that were not yet codified in the playwright’s day. To Poole and Scholar, thinking with Shakespeare means ‘both thinking about the questions that Shakespeare’s work explores and thinking through the modes of their exploration’. The music considered in this dissertation is simply a part of a cultural and philosophical tapestry: negotiating, weaving, and reworking what would eventually and posteriorly be deemed ‘major epistemic change’. The important idea for this thesis, as it is for Gallagher and Raman, is that the relationship between the material under investigation and the eventual change in intellectual history is not a directly causal one, but one that simply demonstrates how fictions like the plays of Shakespeare (or domestic music) could participate in contemporary discourse that would become relevant to later change in theories of knowledge.

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48 ‘In both directions’. Ibid., 3.
49 They argue that ‘the intellectual culture of Shakespeare’s age is robust enough to bear many speculations that we might too hastily deny it, and we can expect historical riches when we do so’. The people and concepts addressed in this thesis are ‘closer’ in time and place than, say a Kierkegaardian reading of a Shakespearian play, but nevertheless, I feel the need to address the main criticism of the ‘exterior approach’ to philosophy, wherein one might be tempted to imply that Shakespeare (or any composer, artist, etc.) ‘anticipated’ the later philosophical system. Though that kind of posterior philosophising certainly has its place, and indeed one could counter argue that all critical theory is doing this kind of posterior exterior philosophising, I’d like to reiterate that this is not the approach I am taking in this thesis. Nor am I, however, applying an explicitly interior approach that attempts to find a codified philosophy within a body of literary works. What Colin Burrow considers the ‘major pitfall of both approaches’ is the ‘extreme modes’ in which they operate. Both modes ‘operate on an understanding of aesthetics that concerns itself with art objects rather than artistic processes’. Colin Burrow, “Why Shakespeare is not Michelangelo” in Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 11; Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 3-4.

50 For example, John Lee has argued that while Shakespeare was ‘profoundly Elizabethan in terms of style’, he was ‘also quite un-Elizabethan in the ways some of his dramatic persons … conceive of their identity’. To Lee, Hamlet is notable in that the character seems to have ‘found the materialist theories of his age unsatisfactory.’ John Lee, ‘Shakespeare, Human Nature, and English Literature’, *Shakespeare*, 5 (2009): 177-90, 184; Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking with Shakespeare, 2.

51 Some have, however, taken the step to state that figures like Shakespeare outright anticipate philosophies articulated later by Descartes and Spinoza. Margherita Pascucci does this in her book *Philosophical Readings of Shakespeare*, but does so from a somewhat outlying philosophical perspective. She claims Descartes’s cogito can be seen as anticipated and also subverted in Hamlet’s self. Margherita Pascucci, *Philosophical Readings of Shakespeare* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8.
Descartes and Music

In order to argue that music’s contribution to contemporary discussions on the nature of reality and its representation had implications for the theories of later philosophers, it seems necessary to at least demonstrate how music, more generally, affected the work of said philosophers. At the very least, this establishes an idea that could easily be assumed—that music making was an important and thought-provoking part of the daily life of philosophers like Descartes, as it was to so many of his contemporaries, throughout much of Europe.\textsuperscript{52} Though for this dissertation Descartes is only a benchmark within the philosophical canon, it is still worth mentioning that music played a role in his philosophical development, and at a time very much contemporaneous to this study. Earlier in his career, Descartes strove to understand music’s effects in mathematical terms, mostly based on the Platonic-Pythagorean idea of the harmony of the spheres. He wrote his \textit{Compendium Musicae} in 1618, a preliminary methodology to the study of the senses, and the physical and psychological manifestations of music, setting the stage for his later work. As Dennis Sepper articulates, this treatise shows that ‘by late 1618 Descartes had already taken at least the first steps toward working out a theory of the communication of proportions from the external world to the senses.’\textsuperscript{53} As music could be conceived in mathematical terms, it seemed logical that music’s effects on the passions could also be understood in quantifiable measure, an important line of inquiry for his later work.\textsuperscript{54} Though Descartes had not yet shown his doubt of the reliability of the senses in this early work, he does determine that the reasons for differing opinions in music are not a physiological matter, but an

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\textsuperscript{52} Perspectives on music by contemporary philosopher, Francis Bacon, will be discussed in greater depth at Ch. 2, 81-4.
\textsuperscript{53} Descartes’s \textit{Compendium musicae} was not published in English until 1653. Dennis L. Sepper, \textit{Descartes’s Imagination: Proportion, Imagery, and the Activity of Thinking} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996), 42.
\textsuperscript{54} It was Descartes’s ‘radical doubt’, articulated in \textit{Meditation 1} that would later question the ability of sense perception in building knowledge. Descartes argues against an Aristotelian perception of knowledge as built off of what is perceived by the senses from the external world. Since one does not know what anything in the external world is like without sense perception, it is possible to doubt the external world. Descartes builds a clear distinction between appearance and reality, suggesting that the world may be nothing like how it appears, denying that the senses reveal the natures of substances. He determined that the human intellect is able to perceive the nature of reality through a purely intellectual intuition. René Descartes, \textit{Meditations and Other Metaphysical Writings}, (ed.) Desmond M. Clarke (London: Penguin Books, 1998), xxix, xxx-xxxi.
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emotional one, asserting the autonomy of the body and hinting at the finality of sense perception. As Larry Jorgensen argues, ‘[t]he way Descartes goes about his study of music represents a fundamental change in approach; he is moving away from a simple study of an object of sense perception towards a study of both the object and the observer’. Reasons for the anomaly of the self in an otherwise material world motivated and evaded philosophers throughout the seventeenth century, a discourse that pervaded many types of artistic and pseudo-artistic creation. The quality of the self remained, in an otherwise observable, measurable world, elusive.

Jairo Moreno’s *Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects: The Construction of Musical Thought in Zarlinno, Descartes, Rameau, and Weber* (2004) includes a chapter with an insightful interpretation of Descartes’s *Compendium Musicae*. He argues that a) the work in *Compendium Musicae* is fundamentally aesthetic and could be thought of as a theory of representation, and b) ‘[a]t stake is not the nature of the object (e.g., whether or not time in music might fit with Aristotelian categories of substance, quality, quantity, relation, and so on), but rather the manner in which that object can be truthfully known … we may say, then, that the *Compendium* and the *Rules* share a conception of the subject that is determined by the epistemological requisite of truth defined as certainty’. Moreover, Moreno’s interpretation of Descartes’s writing demonstrates a consideration of the ephemeral nature of an experience of sense

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57 Moreno says that questions about perception and its representation in the *Rules* and *Le monde* ‘strongly echo a concern made explicit by Descartes at the very opening of the *Compendium*, where he tersely states, “of this [music] the object is sound” (huius objectum est sonos). Uncompromisingly programmatic, the statement not only proclaims the centrality of the external, physical, and empirical manifestation of sound to his inquiry about music, but also, albeit indirectly, makes of perception the fundamental issue about knowledge of music … the *Compendium* is at heart a treatise on aesthetics (understood mainly as a theory of sense perception but one that is dependent on a theory of beauty). The *Compendium*, however, has a broader agenda: (1) the mathematical and physical explanation of sound; (2) the nature of sensory perception and the explanation of the pleasure afforded to the sense of hearing; (3) an account of the rules of counterpoint and a theory of modes.’ Moreno, *Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects*, 55, 67.
perception, which resonates with my phenomenological suggestions.\(^{58}\)

Additionally, Moreno discerns that

Descartes’s manoeuvre entails the intentional representation of sensorial experience by the subject’s imagination. Representation \textit{by} (not merely \textit{in}) the imagination does not constitute a less real and secondary enactment of something more authentically experienced without mediation. This understanding of perception carries an interesting extrapolation, namely, that an unmediated sensorial experience might be intrinsically deficient. It would follow then that all perceptions must become virtual apperception.\(^{59}\)

Such a reading of Descartes’s work is useful in connecting my close readings of domestic music texts (and music in general) to larger issues on the source and quality of truth, as well as to my later discussions on the relationship between music and imagination.\(^{60}\) To be clear, I am not suggesting that this early work by Descartes was read in England around the time of its original creation, as evidence remains elusive either way, but rather that it is at least worth acknowledging the role that music played more generally in his formative work. Moreover, \textit{Compendium musicae} reminds us that even Descartes was raised with the same Aristotelian assumptions as the late sixteenth-century figures considered throughout this thesis, though it was he who eventually articulated the radical doubt that challenged that worldview.

\(^{58}\) As Moreno reasons, ‘Aristotle attributes to the imagination a processual character, as does Descartes when he establishes the imagination as a cognitive conduit bringing together sense experience and the intellect. Similarly Descartes’s account suggests that in dealing with musical time the senses can offer only fragmentary account of experience, and so he assigns to the imagination the responsibility of synthesising the metric proportions in music. Significantly the synthesis that takes place in the imagination does not negate the fact that the “whole melody”, in Descartes’s expression, remains a sonorous and sensorial experience, however much it may be mediated by a mental activity and expressed in the language of musical proportions. Descartes’s account also suggests that he might have been interested in addressing the evanescence intrinsic to our experience of music, albeit indirectly, and thus he summons the imagination to apprehend it in a single act of perceptual cognition. An intentional agent, the imagination elevates the immediacy of sensorial experience to a higher cognitive plane’. Ibid., 65; for more on phenomenology, see Introduction, 30-35; Conclusion, 235.

\(^{59}\) Ibid., 65-66.

\(^{60}\) For more on imagination, see Ch. 2, 84-88.
1.1 Harmony of the Spheres: Mechanical and Metaphorical

This next section will look at various components of music that contributed to contemporary frameworks of knowledge. Though each of these topics are capable of filling a dissertation of their own, these summaries should provide the necessary context for my later arguments on music’s role in debates about sense perception, the body, and the passions. In John Dowland’s 1609 translation of Andreas Ornithoparchus’s *Micrologus* (1519), Dowland translated ‘[t]he worlds musicke is an Harmonie caused by the motion of the starres, and violence of the Spheres’. He goes on to explain that even though we cannot hear proof of this 'Harmonie' with our human ears, we can know it is true through its reflection in earthly weight, number, and proportion, as created by God, reflecting the idea of the harmony of the spheres. As Christopher Marsh summarises, ‘[t]he “music of the spheres” was an ancient concept, strongly associated in western philosophy with Pythagoras and Boethius. In its revised Christian form, it clearly remained something of a commonplace during the early modern period, despite Francis Bacon’s scepticism concerning the “Mysticall Subtleties” that had dominated musical theory for so long’. According to Claude Palisca, in ‘the dominant view at the beginning of the sixteenth century, music existed to give pleasure and solace while leading people to moral behavior. This view was handed down by Plato … Music pleases us because its form resembles the structure of the human soul’. As will be seen in examples introduced at a later point, this conception of music’s mechanics was frequently echoed in plays, musical paratexts, and other readily consumed written records. Musical

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61 I discuss the mechanics and affects of sense perception and the passions in much greater detail in Chapter Two. One point to keep in mind, however, is that, in Rutherford’s words, ‘during the early modern period, “philosophy” does not designate a unitary enterprise’. As we will see time and again in this study, ‘[b]oth diachronically and synchronically, [philosophy] is a constellation of loosely related investigations of fundamental questions about nature, humanity, and God’. Rutherford (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy*, 7.
65 For example Thomas Tomkis’s play *Lingua* (1607); Ch. 2, 75-77.
metaphor became the preferred language to describe the ideal society. But the mechanics behind how music interacted with the body and soul was complicated, as it was related to another unknown relationship, that of the body and soul alone. Yet, as will be discussed in Chapter Two, music seemed to have a particular way of presenting problems of body and soul, one related to the mechanics and reliability of sense perception, and their relationship to the passions.

I am certainly not the first to recognise something special about the years around 1600 in terms of its pivotal position in the trajectory of the arts’ role in the history of ideas and the so-called Scientific Revolution. Elizabeth Spiller also recognises this time period as one in which art accumulated status as a form that could produce knowledge. Regarding music and fiction more specifically, Erin Minear has also observed, as I will explain in greater detail in Chapter Two, that the late sixteenth century was a peculiar time for the nature of sound and its implications for worldly truths: ‘Shakespeare and Milton wrote during a time of transition, where the ancient Pythagorean conception of the universe, with its harmoniously ordered spheres and its concordant microcosms and macrocosms, contended with new theories about the nature of sound and the structure of the world’. Though the terms through which music was discussed remained fundamentally Platonic-Pythagorean throughout the early Stuart period, because the New Science challenged many assumptions about the nature of the world, Minear detects a rhetorical shift that reflects an uneasiness with the old assumptions about the Harmony of the Spheres, even as writers continued to demonstrate an understanding of music in those terms. She

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66 See quotation by Thomas Elyot, Ch. 2, 189.
67 For my definitions and uses of the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ see Ch. 2, 77.
68 As Palisca notes, in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, sound still had a place in physical reality, as ‘Aristotle … defined sound as motion, and the Pythagorean tradition [was one in which] musical sound was sonorous number’. As universal harmony became more of a metaphor to thinkers like Johannes Kepler, Marin Mersenne, Athanasius Kircher, and Galileo Galilei, philosophers began to believe that ‘sound had no physical reality outside the consciousness of hearing animals’, an idea that contradicted the theories of Aristotle and Pythagoras, yet helped to ease some of the mind-body problems presented by music. Palisca, Music and Ideas, 27.
71 For example, John Donne wrote ‘God made this whole world in such uniformity, such a correspondency, such a concinnity of parts, as that it was an Instrument, perfectly in tune’, John
determines that ‘[t]he connection between earthly music and heavenly “harmony,” never entirely certain, was on the verge of a breakdown at the end of the sixteenth century, but even as the conception of the harmonious cosmos lingered between the literal and the figurative: a half-dead metaphor still possessed of an insistent, and sometimes uncanny, life’.\textsuperscript{72} This reminds us of the importance of interpretation in reading early modern ‘scientific’ texts of all sorts, as continued use of older rhetoric is not necessarily an indication of unquestioned faith or an acceptance of literal meaning. As Spiller says, ‘[o]nce science is understood as a practice for creating knowledge, the textual qualities to scientific texts cannot simply be understood as secondary to the scientific work that is at stake. Everything that comprises the physical existence of the text—its literary and rhetorical strategies; its illustrative and textual practices; the authors and the readers who create knowledge by making sense in and through texts—are expressions of the same practices for creating knowledge that define science itself’.\textsuperscript{73}

\textit{Ancient Origins: Legacies of Aristotle and Plato}

Though Renaissance understandings of physical and mental processes were generally of Aristotelian or Neoplatonic origin, one must keep in mind that early modern cognisance of these philosophies was rather different from their ‘original’ form or how one might philosophise about them today.\textsuperscript{74} Even if an early modern writer did directly read the works of Aristotle and Plato, whether in Greek or in translation, often their interpretations were not in line with modern analyses, or even necessarily consistent with other readings of their own

\textsuperscript{72} Minear, \textit{Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton}, 2.

\textsuperscript{73} Spiller, \textit{Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature}, 5.

\textsuperscript{74} Even modern philosophers, for example, find it is essentially impossible to agree on a single ‘Platonic view’ of the soul.
time. More often, it was through reading Ancient-influenced continental treatises on the arts, sense perception, and related topics, that English writers acquired their understanding of the processes. As Anne Sheppard has pointed out, continental writers often read Neoplatonist texts from late-antiquity that combined Aristotelian and Platonic ideas. From these basic conceptions, continental writers selected aspects of various sources in a way that fit their requirements, and indeed Neoplatonists often saw little difference between Aristotle and Plato on many fundamental epistemological matters. Many of the early modern anecdotes by composers and others writing on music speak in generalised platitudes that reflect this broad understanding of ancient epistemology. Therefore, the following is not an assessment of Aristotelian or Platonic writing directly, but an outline of a more general Renaissance understanding of ancient wisdom via basic sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century English conceptions of Aristotelian and Platonic sense perception.

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75 The first English translations of the seminal works by these philosophers do not appear in English until around 1600, it is thought. Lawrence D. Green, *John Rainold’s Oxford Lectures on Aristotle’s Rhetoric* (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1986), 12. Susan James describes how Classical philosophy was adapted by philosophers like Thomas Aquinas to be made compatible with the idea of a Christian God. James, *Passion and Action*, 47-64.


79 For example, composer Robert Jones wrote: ‘Plato and Aristotle, the profoundest of their times, thought the best education to bee defectiue, without knowledge in Musicke, and Cicero reporteth, that although Themistocles was endowed with many graces, yet was hee the lesse esteemed, being ignorant thereof, and such regard hath all antiquity had thereto that wee not onely find them to loue, but practise it, for amongst the rest, Saint Augustine recordeth that S. Ambrose Bishoppe of Millan, who ouerwatcht the Church, (then vnder persecution of the Arrians) intertainde the time with songes and Musicke, and though the death of Nero, was exceeding joyfull to the people, yet was it much lamented, that his excellency in Musicke, should perish with him’. Robert Jones, *The First Set Of Madrigals, of 3.4.5.6.7.8. Parts* (London: Printed by John Windet, 1607), sig.A2r-A3v. Another example of the vague way Ancient knowledge was used is demonstrated by Robert Burton in his *Anatomy of Melancholy*: ‘[m]any men are melancholy by hearing musicke, but it is a pleasant melancholy that it causeth, and therefore to such as are discontent, in woe, feare, sorrow, or dejected, it is a most present remedy, it expells cares, alters their grieued minds, and easeth in an instant. Otherwise, saith Plutarch, *Musica magis dementat quam vinum*. Musicke makes some men mad; like Astolpho horne in *Ariosto*; and Theophrastus right well prophesied, that diseases were either made by Musicke, or mittigated.’ Robert Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy …* (Oxford: Printed by John Lichfield and James Short, 1621), sig.Aa5r.

80 As Dmitri Levitin cautions, ‘[t]o turn texts into “ideologies” and then to chart the play of ideologies through various periods is tempting: it brings a familiarity to the material, and allows for easier descriptions of philosophical “traditions” and their development through centuries of textual Renégotiation. But this is to ignore specificity of reception, and the fact that readers, in our case, seventeenth-century Englishmen and women, have unique and contingent attitudes towards
Though one could argue that many of these early-seventeenth century English conversations on the Ancients were derivative or indeed bastardisations of continental treatises and classical texts, Penelope Gouk concludes that in spite of this, the ‘Cartesian synthesis’ which was born from this type of questioning of the relationship between the senses, the soul, and body nevertheless ‘knitted together threads from numerous existing intellectual traditions … [and still] radically altered the terms of discourse from the middle of the century’ even in England.

Early moderns looked to the ancients to comprehend many aspects of knowledge: for an understanding of the quality of knowledge (and its relationship to sense perception), to understand the mechanics of sense perception, and to understand the function of artistic representations (mimesis) and its potential for building truth. Though a full discussion is outside the focus of this study, in the simplest terms, the main difference between the two philosophers is in their approach to knowledge building: Aristotle believed that the intellect had no innate ideas, and one could not know anything that was not first received by the external senses.

To Plato, however, ‘the senses provided us with no more than shadows in contrast to the reality of Forms or innate Ideas’. Plato believed the senses have the potential to lead one astray from true knowledge, whereas Aristotle understood that, in Alice Sanger and Siv Tove Kulbrandstad Walker’s words, ‘knowledge and virtue may be gained by the correct application for their potential’. Therefore, to Aristotle (as discussed in

philosophical texts’. Dmitri Levitin, Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science: Histories in the Philosophy of England, c. 1640-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 4. One should not, however, discount the influence of medieval beliefs about sense perception as well. Medieval Christians were highly sceptical of the senses, believing that it was through them that sin penetrated the body. Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 300.


Palisca, Music and Ideas, 47; Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 301.

Plato argued his stance in Book VII of The Republic through the Parable of the Cave. As Simonds explains, ‘Here the soul or mind is shown figuratively to reside within a dark cave, which is analogous to the body. Since the soul receives information only through the imperfect senses, any knowledge it acquires can be no more than opinion’. To Plato, Truth lies beyond sensory appearances and can only be accessed by the trained elite through philosophical dialectic. Simonds, Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline, 301.

Sanger and Walker explain, ‘[t]o Renaissance thinkers, as to the Ancients, the senses were the keys that unlocked the doors of knowledge but, as such, they provided potentially hazardous
Poetics, the catharsis provided by the mimetic arts made them worthy pursuits ('productive sciences'). Conversely, there was no need for poets or poetry in Plato’s The Republic and Plato takes what Gouk calls a ‘strongly prescriptive attitude toward the role and function of music in society’. But as John Cocking cautions, Plato’s attitude on art ‘is neither simple nor obviously consistent’.

Consequently, early modern analyses of both Plato and Aristotle could be interpreted or selected to suit the needs of the writer. Those who wished to defend the passions looked to Aristotle, ‘for he recognized their importance to oratory, music, and poetry. As Palisca explains, ‘[i]n the Politics, [Aristotle] observed how the passions could be moved and purged through music, and in the Poetics through tragedy’. On the other hand, Neoplatonic mistrust of the senses sat well with Protestant or indeed Puritanical suspicion of the senses. For example, Sussman notes the ‘uncanny affinity’ between Plato, Luther, and Calvin, though he doesn’t provide exact links. The general conception, however, was that poets (and by extension most any art) seduced their listeners with pleasure, corrupting their souls. Neoplatonic epistemology believed, as John Rastell wrote in 1530 that, ‘the soule of man’ had ‘knowledge … and understanding … without any helpe of the bodye or any of hys v sences’, leaving little space for the arts in the creation of true knowledge. Still,
Neoplatonists (perhaps understandably) sought a way to justify participation in passionate experiences. According to Simonds, ‘Renaissance Neoplatonists attempted to combine these two incompatible views’ to ‘save’ the senses so that ‘artists can exploit it as a vehicle for truth’, further muddying early modern conceptions of ancient wisdom.⁹⁴ In any case, ‘the problem of the senses as easily duped and yet as necessary sources of information for the soul was constantly debated during the Renaissance and depicted through the various arts in England’.⁹⁵

Contemporary discussions on the relationship between perception, representation, and reality took form through discussions of imagination.⁹⁶ The internal sense of imagination (phantasia) was central to Aristotle’s view of mental processes.⁹⁷ Even competing Neoplatonic ideas about sense perception (which tended to divide perception between the intellective and the sensual) placed imagination as a mediator between the two.⁹⁸ As Stuart Clark claims, ‘[w]hat was new in early modern theoretical psychology gave the imagination a unity and a uniqueness that were impossible in the context of late medieval Aristotelianism … it became the single mediator between the incorporeal soul and the corporeal human body’.⁹⁹ Consequently, imagination has had a remarkable presence in recent scholarship on the early modern period, from

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⁹⁶ As Robert Jones explains in his *A Musicall Dreame* (1609), his music was ‘set forth for pleasure, not for purposed payson to infect imagination, no, but as a showre falling in a needfull season’. Robert Jones, *A Musicall Dreame, Or the Fourth Booke of Ayres* … (London: printed by Iohn Windet, 1609), sig. A3v.
⁹⁷ To Aristotle, imagination was vital to dreaming, the grasp of universals, perceiving, thinking, and was an essential step before memory. The internal senses are described in more detail in Chapter Two.
⁹⁹ Ibid.
Nearly every historical discipline. Though imagination was a crucial part of early modern understanding of psychological processes, it has since been recognised as a fundamental part of the contemporary worldview. That said, while contemporaries knew of and wrote about imagination’s importance, they were also wary of its deceitful properties. As Daniel Tuvil said in his *Essaies politicke, and morall* (1608), imagination could be a ‘deceitfull Counsellor, seeking to blinde the eyes of the Iudge’. As will be discussed more in Chapter Two, it was imagination’s duty to translate sense impressions from the external world into mental images for ratio to cogitate. As imagination was capable of both building knowledge and deception, Francis Bacon concluded, in consonance with Aristotle, that imagination, therefore, must be firmly controlled by reason. As David Novitz points out, this understanding of our relationship with imagination was uneasy, as it presented an inherent challenge:

For to insist that our knowledge of nature is the product of our own fanciful imaginings is to allow that what we know, like what we say, does not straightforwardly reflect a settled reality. And it is but a short step from this to many varieties of irrationalism—whether it be cast-iron solipsism, a lapse into inarticulateness, or, which is the same, a surrender to a radical and indefensible relativism.

Many texts from this period, as we shall see, reflect this uneasy relationship with imagination. And as will be discussed in Chapter Two, one of the most thought-provoking aspects of imagination manifested in dreaming, where one could imagine things one had never before seen in waking life, triggering

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101 Clark, *Vanities of the Eye*, 43.
105 Ibid., xi.
107 In Shakespeare’s words from *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (1600), ‘imagination bodies forth, / The forms of things unknown’ (V.i.14-15), as it was through imaginative processing that the mind was able to conceive of things a person had never experienced; something both wondrous and a bit scary.
fundamental questions about the line between imagination and reality.\textsuperscript{108} Imagination was both an essential part of discerning truth, but also the most convincing source of falsity—an uneasy gateway through which our perceptions must pass before knowledge about the world can be built.\textsuperscript{109}

**Humanism, Protestantism, Travel, and the New Science**

The following section considers some of the major ‘events’ or intellectual currents of the sixteenth century (and earlier) that contributed to the worldview of the later sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the advent of the so-called New Science. As Ian Green has observed, perceptions of early modern English humanism have changed markedly in recent decades.\textsuperscript{110} Moreover, what Tudor humanism’s effects were on politics and religious happenings has proved difficult to determine.\textsuperscript{111} In spite of the vastness of this complex topic, however, it is worth highlighting a few points from recent scholarship. As Jonathan Woolfson says, ‘[w]ith its origins deep in the Middle Ages, [humanism] was predicated on the recovery, assimilation, reinterpretation and dissemination of the textual remains of antiquity; and from Italy it spread in the fifteenth century all over Europe, including to England’.\textsuperscript{112} The spread of humanism was greatly influenced by the advent of the printing press with moveable type in Germany.

\textsuperscript{108} For more on dreaming, see Ch. 2, 102.
\textsuperscript{109} Though Gallagher and Raman remind us that Aristotelianism was not the only relevant mode of thought in early Stuart England, as ‘Biblical tradition covered a wide range of devotional and mystical idioms that mobilized variously spiritualized senses of sensation. Notably, Shakespeare’s religious and poetic cultures remained conversant with Pauline, Augustinian, and Thomist intuitions of the mystical envelope surrounding and penetrating the human sensorium … these legacies, though vigorously debated in Reformation and Counter-Reformation strongholds, nonetheless named important branches of the era’s lingua franca of sensory experience,’ Gallagher and Raman (eds.), *Knowing Shakespeare*, 5.
\textsuperscript{110} For example, recent scholarship has been less tempted to produce a single unified ‘humanist movement’ across Europe. Historiographical changes in approach to humanism are explained in detail in Ian Green, *Humanism and Protestantism in Early Modern English Education* (Abingdon: Ashgate, 2009), 9-11.
\textsuperscript{111} Some, like James McConica (1965) and Douglas Bush (1939) believed that the Protestant Reformation in northern Europe was an extension of humanist movements, whilst earlier scholars like Frederic Seebohm (1867) thought the Reformation displaced humanism altogether. For a more complete overview of recent scholarship on humanism in England, see Mary Thomas Crane, “Early Tudor Humanism” in Michael Hattaway (ed.), *A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2000), 13-26.
According to Mary Thomas Crane, English humanism began to emerge in the fifteenth century and northern European humanism was exemplified in English grammar schools. Crane explains that the humanist pedagogical method was ‘especially appealing to Christian humanists … because it provided a way to make classical literature more compatible with Christianity’. It is well known that one of the most influential early figures in the Italian humanist movement was fourteenth-century writer Francesco Petrarca (Petrarch), a scholar whose poetic style was the impetus for the madrigal form in Italy as well as in its later English counterpart. English poets from Chaucer to Thomas Wyatt copied Petrarch and later poets like Sidney imitated Italian poetic style. I support Crane’s conclusion that humanist institutions influenced the course of late Tudor thought as ‘humanism in sixteenth-century England effectively shaped practices of reading, writing, and thought as well as the ways in which subjects imagined themselves and their social and political roles’. Though a full argument in support of this assertion is outside the scope of this project, it is worth noting that with humanism came a sort of cultural relativism: Petrarch in his On His Own Ignorance (1367) said, ‘I certainly believe that Aristotle was a great man who knew much, but he was a human and could well be ignorant of some things, even of a great many things’. This relativism reassessed the ancients as fallible humans. Also, as has been noted before, humanist approaches to the self meshed well with Protestantism’s ‘inward turn’.

The Protestant Reformation certainly shook one foundation of truth for Christian Europeans, that much can be assumed. Its effects were practical, philosophical, physical, theological, political, and physiological. Of relevance to

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113 Crane in Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, 93.
114 Crane also explains the general differences between the Northern and Italian iterations of humanism. Ibid., 98.
115 Doughtie, English Renaissance Song, 80.
116 Crane in Hattaway (ed.), A New Companion to English Renaissance Literature and Culture, 92.
118 It has been suggested that the ‘inward turn of Protestantism may have facilitated the increasing preoccupation with the contents of the mind. In this respect, it may not be accidental the René Descartes was a student of William Ames at the University of Franeker in the 1620s’. William A. Dyrness, Reformed Theology and Visual Culture: The Protestant Imagination from Calvin to Edwards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5.
this study is the effect of Protestantism on the conception of the self, and the self in relation to the physical and spiritual realm. Though the effect of the Reformation on selfhood is too vast a topic to cover thoroughly here, I must still acknowledge the Reformation’s contribution to the development of the seventeenth-century European self.\textsuperscript{119} Henry Sussman puts forth the theory that Protestantism ‘becomes one way of naming the modern ideological framework in which an individual and collective subject is engulfed and tormented by a freedom that has either been won or foisted upon it’.\textsuperscript{120} Perceptively, he ascertains that ‘[t]he issue of the Protestant Reformation that plays a role in this study, then, is not so much the genesis of a new religious or ethnic category as it is the removal of a substantial system of mediation with the Transcendental’.\textsuperscript{121} When the human body and spirit can communicate directly with God, it inevitably provokes questions of human agency, the quality of the soul, and the soul’s relationship with its fleshly body: in short, mind-body problems. Subjectivity is, in Sussman’s words, the ‘the sense of individuality, autonomy, discretion, and agency held by [a] person’, all concepts echoed in the rhetoric of Protestantism.\textsuperscript{122} As will be discussed later, the Reformation had powerful implications for the sensory experience of worship, as Protestants removed or downplayed sounds, smells, tastes, and other sensory aspects of churchgoing.\textsuperscript{123} This, of course, included debate over the place of music in worship, and its capacity to motivate morality or incite sin.\textsuperscript{124} On the grand scale, Diarmaid MacCulloch has made the influential case that the Protestant reformation and the Catholic Counter-Reformation were among the great discontinuities in European and world history, events that changed forever not only religion, but politics, thought, society and culture, at all levels.

\textsuperscript{119} However the Reformation surely influenced domestic music for worship at home, apparent not only in Catholic publications for home use like Byrd’s Masses, but also in works like Martin Peerson’s \textit{Mottets, or grave chamber musick} (1630).

\textsuperscript{120} Sussman, \textit{The Aesthetic Contract}, 36.

\textsuperscript{121} Ibid., 38.

\textsuperscript{122} Ibid., 5.

\textsuperscript{123} Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{124} The threat to the metaphoric arts like music were two-fold, as those who support music’s benefits had to argue with both Puritanical Protestantism, as well as Plato. See Ch. 1, 53-59.
MacCulloch’s scholarship is innovative in that it stresses the power of ideas, rather than politics alone, as a motivator of change.\textsuperscript{125}

Another ‘event’ that influenced conceptions of knowledge building in this period was foreign travel and its accompanying discovery.\textsuperscript{126} Jonathan Sell argues that the move towards empiricism was symptomatic of the onset of scientific materialism—obviously and symbiotically linking science with discovery, meaning public interest in travel was very much connected to the shift towards observation as the foundation of scientific inquiry.\textsuperscript{127} If changes in ways of knowing begin as improvisations around incongruities in life, it is understandable that the ‘discovery’ of the New World and the wondrous treasures (both real and imagined) brought back from the long and treacherous journeys at sea were a persuasive and inspirational source of curious contradiction, as travel inspired new ways of establishing truth based on observation or experience, but also spawned many travel accounts of dubious truth-content.\textsuperscript{128} Tara Pedersen notes ‘that sea voyages and their sometimes fantastic accounts, be they the explicit written records of journeys or artefacts gathered/encountered on those journeys, became critical to Europeans both in terms of their marketability and as an “important epistemological model for knowing” in a world where the lines between the new science, travel, patronage, and the marvellous/exotic were becoming increasingly economically complex’.\textsuperscript{129}

To demonstrate this, one only need glance at an early modern world map to


\textsuperscript{126} The Euro-centric word ‘discovery’ has been deemed problematic out of consideration for Native Americans, who were obviously there first.

\textsuperscript{127} Sell, \textit{Rhetoric and Wonder}, 23.

\textsuperscript{128} Though Christopher Columbus’s ‘discovery’ of the Americas in 1492 was not Europe’s first, his arrival was still significant in that, in Jonathan Hart’s words, his ‘ships left an intellectual and cultural, as well as a commercial wake, that Europeans were, for a while, sometimes slow to identify and comprehend’. Additionally, as Hart points out, Europeans tended to adhere to preconceived ideas about the new continent, assembled from their own folklore tradition and classical mythology, and therefore saw what they wanted to see (the classic example being Columbus, who until his dying day maintained he had landed upon Asia). Jonathan Hart, \textit{Columbus, Shakespeare, and the Interpretation of the New World} (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 2.

visualise the melding of ideas about the Americas that much of Europe experienced during this period of exploration. Giacomo Gastaldi and Matteo Pagano’s 1550 world map shows North America and Asia joined by a land bridge, complete with lions and elephants depicted in what would be Canada (see Fig 1.1).

Figure 1.1: Giacomo Gastaldi and Matteo Pagano, ‘Dell Vniversale’ c. 1550. Used with permission from British Library Maps C7.c.17.

A merman with a shield swims off the coast of modern-day Burma (Myanmar); a crocodile-like creature dips, mouth agape, south east of Madagascar; a reptilian unicorn is placed near Peru; and a dragon-like serpent west of Antarctica. There is also a group of humanoid figures (possibly angels?) that appear to be riding (maybe battling, as two figures have raised clubs) atop two more mermen. Framing the map, famous cosmographers and explorers, holding the tools of their trade, are set upon clouds as if looking down on the world from heaven, including Columbus, Ptolemy, Marco Polo, and Strabone. A
woman bearing a glowing chalice (possibly the Holy Grail) and cross leans in the southwest corner of the map. These icons are typical examples of the blurred lines between myth, religion, and the science of cosmography. Some of the illustrated creatures that dot the open oceans are recognisable as stemming from real animals (i.e. the crocodile, some of the fish, etc.) and others, like the merman, unicorn-lizard, and dragon, were perhaps inspired by popular myth. While the map heralds the progressive mathematical tools used by the masters of cartography and displays faith in a Christian heaven, it also accommodates beliefs in ancient myths. In the preface to the 1606 English translation of Abraham Ortelius’s map of the world, Ortelius says: ‘I hope it will be a thing very well pleasing to all such as are readers and students of old Histories and Antiquities’ before confirming that, where possible, he included both the contemporary and ancient names ‘mentioned by old writers’. In many ways, this gesture exemplifies how early modern scholars (and lay people) accommodated the variety of ideas available to them by understanding both old and new versions of history, an idea that transferred to many kinds of art.

Lastly, I consider the historiography of what has been termed the New Science that began in the seventeenth century. Though the epistemic shift of this traditionally heralded ‘great epoch’, only began to percolate in the period considered in this thesis, I believe pointing out some of its historiographical issues aide in contextualising aspects of my argument. Claude Palisca argues that an ‘important achievement of the Renaissance was to bring music theory and practice back in touch with empirical science, as distinct from magic,

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131 As Dmitri Levitin observes, even by the late seventeenth century, ‘to be able to speak of the philosophical past was a cultural expectation’. Even the most innovative of thinkers ‘were expected to have an automatic familiarity with the history of ancient and medieval philosophy, despite no doubt also being taught, and having an interest in, its modern counterpart’. The idea that the old departed with the advent of the new (moderns vs. ancients) is overly simplistic. Levitin, *Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science*, 31. Also, ideas surrounding advancement in travel infiltrated the arts in many ways, most obviously with the integration of New World rhetoric, metaphors, and imagery. As will be discussed in Chapter Three, paintings or songs that consider items such as tobacco, unicorns, pearls, and marmosets need not directly mention the New World to invoke images and fantasies from what it might be.
numerology, and astrology’. Science has traditionally played a role in the music history of this period because many of the most often studied treatises on speculative music are from the centuries’ most well-known philosophers, like Galileo, Kepler, Mersenne, and Kircher. But these same philosophers working on the mechanics and aesthetics of music were also cultivating a new worldview. For example, Galileo Galilei is often thought of as the first philosopher to clearly draw the lines between primary and secondary qualities—primary qualities being objective inherent bodies that exist in the external world, and secondary qualities, subjective perceptions that occur in the observer’s mind, such as taste or beauty. As a secondary quality would not exist without the primary quality, ‘science’ should, therefore, focus just on those primary things that can be objectively measured, an idea that has, both in contemporary thought and modern historiography, been viewed as an important step for empiricism more generally. Also, some historiography claims that the New Science presented Renaissance thinkers with incompatible intellectual traditions, ultimately resulting in a clash between authorities of truth and modes of discerning knowledge. This is the version of the history as presented by Gary Tomlinson, who writes,

[In the face of the geographical, cosmological, technological, and other discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the scholastic deference to authority sometimes hardened into dogmatism, a turn from observation and practical experience to the security of ancient thought that Galileo would ridicule mercilessly. In an era of rapidly expanding intellectual horizons, sixteenth-century scholastics emphasised the claims of reason and theory over the imperfect conclusions drawn from observation and practice. The inability of these late scholastic thinkers to assimilate novel ideas stimulated important questions about scientific, scholarly, and artistic innovation in sixteenth-century intellectual circles.]

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134 As Henry Turner states, ‘Mario Biagioli (1993) has demonstrated how Italian court culture was fundamental to the legitimization of Galileo’s new science, as well as to Galileo’s own self-fashioning from mathematical practitioner to mathematical philosopher, while Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer (1985) have shown how the emergence of ’experiment’ also required publication—literally a ’making public’—in order to produce consensus among a larger audience of practitioners. In this way ’experiment’ depended as much on a process of epistemological legitimization as it did on the novel definition of traditional natural problems or on greater technical refinement’. Turner, *English Renaissance Stage*, 13.
and ultimately helped to provoke the first querelles of the ancients and moderns.\textsuperscript{135}

Though Tomlinson’s overall point is still valid, his assumption about the seventeenth-century worldview has been challenged, or at least complicated, by recent scholarship. As Dmitri Levitin cautions, it would be folly to assume that interest in the ancients was forgotten with the new science. He argues throughout his book \textit{Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science} (2015) that ‘men and women of letters throughout this period continued to live in a world in which the intellectual landscape was dominated by the past’.\textsuperscript{136} He observes that in the traditional historiography of the history of philosophy, the key markers of change continue to be philosophical works from men like Bacon and Descartes for reasons of \textit{historiography}, rather than because said change began with philosophy.\textsuperscript{137} Throughout his monograph Levitin argues for the following:

the continued vitality of humanist traditions of scholarship; the centrality of historical arguments to debates about natural philosophical methods and doctrines; the importance of the post-Scaliger type of grand history of paganism for ideas about the history of philosophy; the uselessness of categories like \textit{prisca theologia} and “ancients versus moderns” to describe seventeenth-century worldviews; the extreme precariousness of the category of “enlightenment”, at least on this subject; the weak connection between political-ideological aims and historiographical change … not all early modern intellectual history has to be reduced either to politics or to a set of philosophical presuppositions.\textsuperscript{138}

Levitin’s work supports this dissertation because it makes room for older and newer sources of truth to coexist, and indeed for tropes of late humanism to aide in the pioneering of innovative narratives normally attributed to thought that was believed to depart completely from the ancient ways. It muddies the ‘great epochs’ often delineated by traditional views of the history of ideas, and allows for the development and continued use of ancient wisdoms (that dominated the sixteenth-century worldview) in ways that greatly impacted the ‘progress’ of the New Science in England.

\textsuperscript{135} Tomlinson, \textit{Monteverdi and the End of the Renaissance}, 5.
\textsuperscript{136} Levitin, \textit{Ancient Wisdom in the Age of the New Science}, 5.
\textsuperscript{137} Given these works claim to be works of historical scholarship. Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{138} Ibid., 22.
Lastly, I believe we must turn to fictions in order to acquire a more nuanced view of late-sixteenth century English modes of thought, even when dealing in subject matter that would, to us, fall under the umbrella of ‘science’. Henry Turner argues that ‘a movement towards a recognizably modern ‘scientific’ mode of thinking occurs in sixteenth-century England … [a movement that] has been largely ignored in scholarship on the history of science, which has tended to focus on developments within the fields of mechanics, natural philosophy, or astronomy (those fields of inquiry most contiguous with modern science), and their implications for the empiricism and mathematical modelling of the seventeenth century’. Therefore, to get a sense of what the New Science is, one mustn’t be limited to what we would consider now to be fields of ‘science’. As Turner observes,

[i]f we examine the distinctive habits of reasoning that preceded modern experimental method and the mathematical world-view of the seventeenth century, we find ways of thinking that would help to define the “new science” in unexpected places: scattered throughout sixteenth-century poetic discourse; crowded into marginal annotations; mentioned casually in letters about the importance of moral philosophy; motivating simply manuals that sought to popularize geometry among new classes of readers.

Though the New Science traditionally begins with the mathematical, philosophical, and scientific ‘discoveries’ of men like Galileo, it is worth reminding ourselves that evidence of new ways of thinking are often most evident in earlier practices, and are sometimes even made through other aspects of culture by people other than philosophers.

140 Though as Katharine Park and Lorraine Saston discern, ‘[w]hat makes the study of nature during the early modern period so difficult to describe, however, is not so much the gap between this period’s classifications of knowledge and ours, nor the cumbersome lists (natural philosophy, natural history, medicine, mixed mathematics, mechanical arts) and coinages (“chymistry”, “natural knowledge”) that try to bridge that gap, but rather the fact that the gusher of novelty that flooded sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Europe also reconfigured knowledge and careers over the course of the early modern period itself’. Katharine Park and Lorraine Daston (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Science: Early Modern Science Vol. 3* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2005), 6.
Chapter 2: The Music of Sense Perception

This chapter covers the musicalised texts that most explicitly address music’s relationship with questions of body and mind and of spirit and passion(s). Its content deals with music on a conceptual level, rather than ‘the notes’ of any particular case study, but is still important for drawing the links between music and knowledge that are significant to this study as a whole. In order to see how and why music was an ideal vehicle for the contemplation of consciousness, we must first outline music’s relationship with sense perception and the passions. The first part of this chapter will look at the place of emotion in the critical discourse of early modern England, a complicated area of study for many reasons.¹ To some, the study of early modern emotion resists critical inquiry because of the post-modern futility of ‘knowing’ based on ephemeral or subjective evidence requiring innovative modes of interpretation. To others, the arts are assumed to lack the power to influence philosophy, particularly when viewed on a linear model of ‘progress’ from point A to point B, a concept I take to be an out-dated model. For example, in Stephen Toulmin, Douglas Bush, James Ackerman and Claude Palisca’s volume Seventeenth-Century Science and the Arts (1961), Toulmin concludes that

since we are concerned with an interaction between science and the rest of thought and art, the question arises: In what direction did this interaction take place? … Is it really the case that seventeenth-century science developed autonomously, of itself, and then in turn acted as an influence on men’s other ideas and activities? Was science the prime mover, the locomotive, which pulled the other arts along behind it? Or was it a boxcar that moved and changed because it too was being pulled, by philosophy, say, or religion? It is true enough to say that science was at any rate not pulled by poetry or the visual arts. However different the poetry and drama, the music and architecture of the seventeenth century had been, the cosmological revolution would have happened, in all its essentials, exactly as it did; whereas, to mention one example only, if Kepler and Galileo had both died in infancy, Milton’s Paradise Lost would have been a very different poem.²

¹ This is partially to do with the variety of texts addressing the passions as well as the variable terminology used to describe emotion. See ‘Difficulties of Approach’ in Amy M. Schmitter, “17th and 18th Century Theories of Emotions”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/emotions-17th18th/>. The study of emotion has hermeneutic peculiarities that benefit from a discussion of phenomenology: Introduction, 30; Conclusion, 233.
Though I appreciate the words of caution that come with this reasoning, as well as the spirit behind it, I take issue with a few points in this quotation. Firstly, I see the metaphor of a ‘train of episteme’ that chugs along any sort of pre-laid canonical rail as detrimental and misleading, as, in my assessment, seventeenth-century thought is better visualised as a highly intricate, non-linear web. Moreover, the train metaphor implies that 1) one of these areas has autonomous motion without the animation provided by people and 2) that the relationship between philosophy, art, and science is hierarchical, with one pulling the others. Even the assumption that philosophy, art, and science are indeed defined and separable entities is an anachronistic assertion at best.

Lawrence Kramer reminds us that interpretation can be invalidated, but never validated. Just because hermeneutics provide possibility rather than something more material does not mean that possibility lacks tangible meaning to those who engage with history in that way. Kramer believes that ‘[w]hat interpretation seeks to know about the world is not how it is, but how it is recognized, experienced, represented, addressed, and symbolized’. This chapter develops a landscape for how domestic musical texts (and eventually performances) engaged with early modern questioning about the mind, body, senses, and human consciousness. This type of engagement was characterised by intense questioning surrounding reality and its representations as portrayed to us by our passions, our senses, the aesthetics of fiction, how these concepts relate to love and morality, as well as more metaphysical questioning about the meaning of life and death. Though variations on Aristotelian or Pythagorean/Platonic understandings of the mechanics of music still dominated in the period under question (as well as a predominately Aristotelian view of music’s affects), as Susan James argues, pre-Cartesian philosophical suspicion of Aristotle’s understanding of the passions, dating from Thomas Aquinas, had significant implications for episteme over the seventeenth century, and indeed the art created in the process:

The objections to Aristotelianism that rapidly became standard during this period … had grave implications for [Scholastic theories of the passions] which

3 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 29.
4 Ibid.
exercised philosophers of a systematic bent. A discontent with the deep-dyed habits of the Schoolmen first surfaced in natural philosophy, where it stimulated the development of novel accounts of bodies and thus of the relations between bodies and minds. This change in turn generated a revival of metaphysical interest in the passions, and a need to reconsider at the most basic level what they are. What sort of states of the soul are the passions? What sort of states of the body are they? And if they are both, how are these two components related? Attempts to answer these questions were in many cases shaped by the need to avoid Aristotelian doctrines that had become unacceptable.\(^5\)

Though this revival of metaphysical interest, as described by James, was demonstrated in the work of the so-called metaphysical poets, like John Donne and George Herbert, this interest in the quality of the passions was also a central theme in the verse of domestic music, even if often by anonymous authors.\(^6\) We are reminded by Paster, Rowe, et al. that ‘the period’s most categorically “scientific” discourses on the passions are in themselves not only socially invested representations but also cultural scripts’,\(^7\) and therefore metaphysics was of concern to artists and natural philosophers alike.

In addition to demonstrating the multiplicity of ways in which domestic multi-voiced music contemplated elements of consciousness, this chapter hopes to show how music was not only a reflection of culture (an assertion that Toulmin would probably find little argument with), but also played a role in its formation. We cannot recreate the early modern sensory experience. Yet as I will explain by the chapter’s end, there are ways to access the meaning of experience, primarily through art. As Simon Smith, Jackie Watson, and Amy Kenny explain, ‘[d]espite the ephemerality of sensation, artworks … often preserve examinations of the senses, representations of sensory encounters, and even accounts of the sensory experiences that articulated everyday life for early modern subjects’.\(^8\)

\(^5\) James, *Passions and Action*, 65.
\(^6\) I will not discuss the metaphysical poetry tradition further, as that is a whole discipline unto itself. When I use the word metaphysical, I am referring to a more general concept rather than this school of poetry specifically.
\(^7\) Paster, Rowe, et al., *Reading the Early Modern Passions*, 16.
2.1 Early Modern Sensing

In the dedicatory remarks to Robert Jones’s *Ultimum vale* (1605), Jones explained that ‘[a]lmost all our knowledge is drawn through the senses, they are the Soules Intelligencers, whereby she passeth into the world, and the world into her, and amongst all of them, there is none so learned, as the eare, none hath obtained so excellent an Art, so delicate, so abstruse expressed, but done, and done by no skill but its own’. Though it is not surprising that Jones, a composer, would declare the ear as the most learned sense, this passage also exhibits the common belief that knowledge is fundamentally reliant on sense perception. A recurring concept stemming from antiquity, the mechanics of and higher purpose of sense perception was a pervasive and dynamic enigma that persisted in written and creative works throughout the Medieval and Renaissance periods. Contemporary understanding of sense perception surrounded two main questions: firstly, can we trust our senses and can they lead us to truth? And secondly, how do they work? In early modern England, it was generally held that there were five external senses: taste, touch, sight, hearing, and smelling. These external senses appealed to the three internal senses, common sense or reason, memory, and imagination, which resided in the mind. One of the reasons sense perception was such a ubiquitously discussed area of concern was because it was the domain of many intellectual arenas. The mystery that was the mechanics of the senses gripped the attention of all who explored components of human consciousness. Consequently, the five senses were highly allegorised figures, appearing in plays, the visual arts, and music, and often discussed and questioned directly in scientific and philosophical treatises, pamphlets, and religious texts. One can imagine how the practical and conceptual function of the senses was of importance to the anatomist, as a part of our physical body. It was of concern to the natural philosopher, particularly if they were curious as to what sound, touch, sight, taste, and smell tell us about our

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9 Perhaps Jones’s reference to ‘no skill but its own’ is similar to Bacon’s observation that ‘tunes and airs, even in their own nature, have in themselves some affinity with the affections’, as quoted in the next paragraph. Robert Jones, *Ultimum Vale, with a triplicity of musicke* (London: Printed by J Windet, 1605), sig.A4r.

10 And also that the senses are the mode through which the soul is able to interact with the material world.


12 For the purposes of this thesis, I will be using ‘reason’, ‘ratio’, and ‘common sense’ as interchangeable as was often the case contemporarily. Clark, *Vanities of the Eye*, 43.

13 Sanger and Walker (eds.), *Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice*, 3.
selves and the external world. It was of concern to the artist, as each art form worked to justify the passions as a valid part of healthy living, particularly in the wake of Puritan disapproval. The senses were on the mind of the explorer in the New World who saw something wondrous for the first time, and had to testify to the reliability of his sight when reporting his experiences back home.\textsuperscript{14} They were of utmost importance to religious parties on both sides of the Reformation, as Protestantism effectively removed mediation with the transcendental, altering the nature of the body-soul-God relationship.\textsuperscript{15} Conversely, Catholics had to justify their sensory approaches to worship at the Council of Trent.\textsuperscript{16} On a more practical level, the senses’ role in piety was a central point of controversy for reformers. The sight of religious art, the smell of incense, the taste of the Eucharist, and the sounds of music were all issues to undergo reform. As Matthew Milner summarises, ‘in attacking idolatry, reformers attacked sensuality’.\textsuperscript{17} Writers and artists discussed not only the relationship between the senses and the body, but whether the relationships between senses were symbiotic or competitive, and which sense was of the most importance.\textsuperscript{18} Though writing specifically about hearing, many of the contemporary concerns about sense perception outlined here by Penelope Gouk were shared across the senses: ‘the kaleidoscopic variety of sources … outlined, [demonstrate] a small range of shared concerns … How sound is received by the ear and brain, how it affects the mind, soul, or body; and how it is retained in the memory. Such concerns bridge the modern categories of acoustics, perception, psychology, and so forth, and are clearly not quite equivalent with them’.\textsuperscript{19} Though many scholars, both contemporary and modern, have emphasised the role of the eye and the power of observation in connection with the ‘Scientific Revolution’, I would like to extend evidence that the ear also presented many of the most difficult questions that led to changes in the way many perceived the world. Well-known men of natural philosophy, not only those discussed explicitly in this thesis, but also Robert

\textsuperscript{14} As Thomas Harriot had to in his \textit{Brief and True Report of the New found land of Virginia} (1588). As Marsh observes, ‘the rise of scorn and scepticism owed something to the development … of an experimental brand of science that emphasised observation, measurement and precise physical explanation, distrusting the more speculative theorising that had characterised musical philosophy since classical times’. Marsh, \textit{Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England}, 54.

\textsuperscript{15} Sussman, \textit{The Aesthetic Contract}, 38.

\textsuperscript{16} Andrew Casper in Wietse de Boer and Christine Göttler (eds.), \textit{Religion and the Senses in Early Modern Europe} (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 52.

\textsuperscript{17} Matthew Milner, \textit{The Senses and the English Reformation} (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 2.

\textsuperscript{18} Sanger and Walker (eds.), \textit{Senses and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice}, 1.

\textsuperscript{19} Penelope Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk, \textit{The Second Sense}, 95.
Hooke and Isaac Newton, all wrote about music because it wielded undeniable power, complicating the search for truthful knowledge, whether one of mathematical, religious, astronomical, historical, or other foundation. To study the history of Truth in the early modern period, it is necessary to also study the emotional Self, the ‘passion’, that was integral to understanding even the most empirical or observational of sciences. Both natural philosophers and musicians, though to different ends, had an interest in the mechanical and spiritual elements of sense perception.

William Webbe summarised nicely the working parts of musical perception in a poem at the beginning of Thomas Greaves’s *Songes of sundrie kindes* (1604): ‘Straines … Delightes the sences, captivates the braines; / Wrapping the soule in contemplation, / With sweetest musickes delectation’. This phrase lists all the components necessary for understanding music’s effect on the body and soul in contemporary poetic terms, reiterating many ideas that one encounters time and again in rhetoric on the power of music. It was commonly understood that the secret of music’s *affect* somehow involved the senses, the brain, and the soul, yet in what proportion and relation and level of trustworthiness, they did not agree. In grasping the *mechanics* of the senses, however, Aristotelianism remained the foundation for seventeenth-century understanding, though not exclusively. As Gouk outlines, other standout influences for understanding sense perception in England included Galen, the Platonic tradition ‘filtered through Italian Renaissance Neoplatonism’, anatomists like Bartolomeo Eustachio and Giulio Casserio, as well as the work of natural philosophers like Mersenne. While many understandings of music’s mechanics, to be discussed in more detail later, were essentially Platonic-Pythagorean, the common understanding of how hearing worked was primarily Aristotelian. Sound was thought to be created by two

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21 Thomas Greaves, *Songes of sundrie kindes* … (London: printed by John Windet, 1604), sig.B1v. ‘Straines’ could refer to either musical phrases or to lines of verse that are either explicitly musicalised, or at least reference the inherent musicality of poetry. A verse of strophic song from this period is sometimes called a ‘strain’, even in modern performance practice, as it also was by Tobias Hume. He says ‘play one straine with your fingers, the other with your Bow’. Hume, *The First Part of Ayres, French, Pollich, and others* (1605), sig.Q1r: "strain, n.2.", *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 20 January 2016).
22 As Susan James explains, ‘Among the features of Aristotelianism that endure is the centrality and scope of the opposition between action and passion, which, in most cases, continues to underpin physical and psychological explanations, and to span the workings of the body, senses, and intellect’. James, *Passion and Action*, 64.
23 Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), *Second Sense*, 95-96.
material bodies striking one another, which then moved through a medium to the ear.\textsuperscript{24} This meant that sound was viewed as originating from a physical phenomenon, which also suggested its materiality, in spite of being intangible, at least until it went into the ear.\textsuperscript{25}

In line with Aristotle, early moderns found a place in sense perception for ‘animal spirits’, or other similar spirits.\textsuperscript{26} These animal spirits, once set in motion by sound entering the ear, for example, conveyed sensation throughout the body from the external senses, via the brain, to the heart.\textsuperscript{27} As Bruce Smith explains, ‘[t]he older explanation, going back to Aristotle and confirmed by Galen, situated the nexus between external sounds and internal perception in the “implanted air” of the inner ear. Fixed ideas about the soul dictated that this internal air be different in kind from the external air of the listener’s environment’.\textsuperscript{28} The information perceived from the external senses was projected into images (\textit{formes}) through imagination (one of the internal senses), which were then ready for uptake by the mind.\textsuperscript{29} It was through imagination’s ‘translation’ of sense perception that knowledge could be conveyed to the brain.\textsuperscript{30} For example, in a 1621 English translation, Nicholas Coeffeteau explained that the knowing powers are two sorts, that is to say, the Exterior and the Interior … Knowledge, which this sense doth gather from the Objects whose formes are presented vnto it by the Exterior senses, be not lost by their absence, it sends all it hath gathered Compared and Distinguished, to another Power meerely Knowing, which is called the Imaginative; as that wherein are grauen the formes of things which are offerd vnto it by the Common sense, to the end the Knowledge may remaine after they are vanished away.\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{24} Francis Bacon worked off this Aristotelian model when he tackled what he believed to be one of the ‘profound secrets of nature’, the cause of musical sympathy. As Gouk says ‘[n]ow known as sympathetic vibration, this was regarded in scholastic terms as an “occult” or mysterious phenomenon, in that its causes were not manifest to the senses and therefore not susceptible to physical examination’. Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), \textit{Second Sense}, 98-99.


\textsuperscript{26} Gouk in Burnett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), \textit{Second Sense}, 105.

\textsuperscript{27} Ibid., 104.

\textsuperscript{28} B. Smith, \textit{The Acoustic World of Early Modern England}, 103.


\textsuperscript{30} As John Davies said, ‘Thus by the organs of the Eye and Eare, / The Soule with knowledge doth her selfe endue; / Thus she her prison, may with pleasure beare, / Hauing such prospects, all the world to view’. Davies, \textit{Noce teipsum} (1599), sig.G5v.

\textsuperscript{31} Nicolas Coeffeteau, \textit{A Table of Humane Passions With their Causes and Effects} (trans.) Edw. Grimeson (London: printed by Nicholas Okes, 1621), sig.A12r.
The Aristotelian notion that all knowledge is built from sense perception is readily apparent in Coeffeteau’s explanation. Additionally, a conception of the mechanics of sound featuring animal spirits can be seen in Robert Burton’s explanation of music’s physiological effects. He cites the Italian humanist scholar Julius Caesar Scaliger (1484-1588), stating that Scaliger ‘giues a reason of these effects … the spirits about the Heart, take in that trembling and dancing aire into the Body, & are moued together, & stirred vp with it, or els the mind, as some suppose, harmonically composed, is roused vp at the tunes of Musicke’. This explains how sound can interact with both the spirits and corpus, reflecting an Aristotelian conception of sound as a vibrating material that moves the animal spirits through some form of sympathetic vibration. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the fundamental mechanics of sense perception, including animal spirits, remained essentially the same by the late seventeenth century, in spite of other Cartesian ‘advancements’ that questioned the role of the observer in matters of sense perception.33

Though physiological treatises are useful, works of fiction provide us with one of the wealthiest sources for understanding early modern sense perception.34 In Thomas Tomkis’s academic play Lingua, or the combat of the tongue and the five senses (1607), the character of hearing, Auditvs, sings to himself nonsensically, confusing Common Sense, who assumes Auditvs must be mad.35 It is up to Phantastes, the character of imagination, to explain to Common Sense why Auditvs behaves as such.36 Phantastes attempts to quell Common Sense’s confusion, explaining: ‘Let him alone, his musicall head is alwaies full of crotchets’. Still Common Sense ‘know[s] not, what to thinke on him’, as he cannot hear the harmony of the spheres as Auditvs can. Auditvs implores

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34 As Richard Meek and Erin Sullivan argue, ‘If we do want to historicise the early modern passions, then, we need to give more attention to other systems of knowledge and representation that people used to conceptualise and articulate emotional response’ outside of medical theory and humoralism, including works of fiction, religion, rhetoric, and performance. Meek and Sullivan (eds.), *The Renaissance of Emotion*, 6.
36 Common Sense, another character, was thought to be one of the ‘internal senses’ along with the likes of Memory and Imagination.
him ‘Are you then deafe? do you not yet perceive the wondrous sound [?]’57 The character of Memory could once hear the harmony of the spheres, but can no longer, as he explains, ‘Our eares are so well acquainted with the sounde, that we neuer marke it’. At a loss, Common Sense asks, ‘Have you no other obiects to iudge by, than these Audittvs?’, to which Audittvs replies that Common Sense should look to nature, to the babbling of a brook, or the chirping of a songbird, to hear beauty.58 Many commonly held conceptions about the senses and their relationship to inner mental processes can be discerned from this amusing interaction. As many Shakespeare scholars have noted, affiliating music with madness was one explanation offered to fill the gap left by a lack of an understanding of sense perception.59 It was thought that one indication of insanity was an imbalance between ratio and emotion, resulting in hallucinations or similar misfiring of the senses.60 In this scene, the only arbiter between Common Sense and Audittvs is Imagination, emphasising Imagination’s role as communicator between these two forces that don’t seem to understand each other directly. It turns out that Audittvs isn’t mad, he just appears so because he has abilities that Common Sense doesn’t understand. Logically, since Common Sense cannot hear the music of which the others speak, he asks for another object by which he can make a judgement. But the only thing that Audittvs can offer are the sounds of natural beauty, an imitation or a product of the harmony of the spheres rather than the music itself—the next best thing.

Though Tomkis’s understanding of music is clearly Pythagorean that does not mean his understanding was old fashioned. The transition away from a Pythagorean conception of music as the harmony of the spheres was by no means linear, as Bacon’s conception of music was primarily Aristotelian, whilst Isaac Newton’s was largely still Pythagorean. Yet debates surrounding the categorisation of music as a persuasive, mimetic art or physical, mechanical science were central tenets of discussion about the nature of hearing. The way figures from different backgrounds—natural philosophers, composers, and laypeople—tried to understand the sense of hearing is of importance.

58 Ibid., sig.G4r.
to my thesis because of the particular way that hearing, according to some, presented problems about how truth and knowledge are built.

Senses and the Soul

I must address one caveat about the vagueness of the terms ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, particularly when dealing with music. As Erin Minear has also discerned, the exact meaning of ‘spirits’ is rather ambiguous from author to author, or indeed even within a work by a single author.\(^\text{41}\) Sometimes references to ‘spirits’ seem to classify them as entirely physiological phenomena, and at other times they appear to be almost synonymous with the soul.\(^\text{42}\) Minear observes that music’s ‘motions’ were sometimes compared to the movement of the spirits, sometimes directly linked to the movement of the soul.\(^\text{43}\) Indeed, music’s physiological abilities to powerfully move the bodily spirits were not always clearly distinguished from metaphysical accounts of its effect on the soul.\(^\text{44}\) It is commensurate with contemporary approaches to keep these terms vague and interchangeable.

Sense perception is at the crux of metaphysical questions about the nature of reality because of one unanswerable question: how did a substance with material origins (like sound) enter the body and interact with the immaterial soul?\(^\text{45}\) What was at stake, however, wasn’t simply how the body and soul communicated via the senses, but one

\(^{41}\) Minear cites two different uses of ‘spirit’ from The Merchant of Venice as evidence - one suggesting its physiological role, and the other its spiritual. Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 37.

\(^{42}\) As Sean McDowell cautions, ‘[a]t present, however, the emphasis on the body has caused some interpreters to avoid using the term “soul” when discussing Renaissance psychology, even though this term was the predominant one for describing mental and affective operations. No doubt, this emphasis may be a reaction to the older history of ideas approach, which tended to treat the soul as too disembodied. Moreover, it also appears to be a conscious effort to transcend the Cartesian mind-body split. The present influence of Descartes on modern assumptions about these matters, however, does not mean that earlier Western cultures located notions of selfhood exclusively in the material’. McDowell, “The View from the Interior “, 787.

\(^{43}\) Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 37.

\(^{44}\) Though some authors like Bacon had a better-defined differentiation between ‘spirit’ and ‘soul’, most were more ambiguous. For Bacon, ‘spirits’ were somewhat observable and physiological. Collectively, the animal spirits constitute the ‘sensible soul’, this is subservient to man’s ‘rational soul’, which contain Aristotle’s three internal senses, memory, imagination, and reason. In Bacon’s terms, however, the ‘rational soul’ was created by divine intervention at the fall of man, and was therefore not subject to the laws of nature as the ‘sensible soul’ was. This explains, therefore, why things like imagination, in Bacon’s words, ‘which, not being bound by any law and necessity of nature or matter, may join things which are never found together in nature and separate things which in nature are never found apart’. Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 45. Lisa Jardine, Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), 89-91. Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 37.

\(^{45}\) As Bacon observed, sound was known to have material causes. Where it lay on a spectrum of materiality, Bacon tried to discern. Discussed in detail in B. Smith, The Acoustics of Early Modern England, 105-6.
of fundamental importance in approach to religion, science and epistemology in general. Matthew Milner states that ‘[u]ltimately the issue resided in whether the spirit itself was an instrument of the soul, or whether traditional anthropologies had conflated aspects of the immortal soul with the world of spirit’. Was there a mortal ‘organic spirit’ that animated the body in addition to the immortal soul? Or was the only soul the immortal, rational one? As Milner explains, renewed interest during the Renaissance in ‘pure’ Aristotelian and Neoplatonic forms coloured and complicated medieval perceptions of sensation (which were also essentially Aristotelian). To Aristotle, as described in De anima, the soul is by and large not separable from the body, but has a relationship more akin to the one between form and matter. Milner observes that a ‘virtual explosion’ of De anima commentary over the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries led to what would be an overall shift in perception of the soul/body relationship. In addition to semantic debate on the meaning and interchangeability of the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, ‘[t]he ultimate trajectory of these pressures was transition from a tripartite anthropology of the body, spirit and soul, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, to a dualist model of body and mind at the end, eventually finding articulation in Descartes’. It is clear that, in Sanger’s words, ‘the senses continued to be at the heart of questions on the conflict between the body and the dignity of the soul’. When Thomas Wright asked ‘[h]ow a corporal imagination concur to a spiritual conceit’, his questioning reveals the central issue at stake that was presented by (and through) sensory activities like music making, namely how a sensible object could directly affect (or contain) a spiritual faculty.

**Hearing, Knowledge, and the Soul**

Multiple sources deemed hearing the sense best suited for the acquisition of knowledge. For example in Vanitie of the eie (1608), George Hackewell asserted: ‘And

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47 Ibid., 174.
50 Sanger and Walker (eds.), *Sense and the Senses in Early Modern Art and Cultural Practice*, 8.
51 Wright, *The passions of the minde in general* (1604), sig.V7r.
52 Minear, *Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton*, 35.
53 Aristotle acknowledged a connection between hearing and knowledge building through oration and drama, but debates about the interactions between knowledge, hearing, and music were also pertinent, especially
surely for the gaining of knowledge … the eie … in most things ca[n] it not possibly without the helpe of hearing, hunt out the trueth, since as well in the works of art as nature’.  

Hackewell pointed out the Socratic notion that ‘the sense of hearing, makes more to the understanding of the true nature of things, then that of seeing; and in this case one eare witness is of more valew then ten eie-witnesses’.  

Hackewell also noted, as Aristotle did, that blind men still become famous thinkers, but rarely do men born deaf. The deaf are ‘ranged among mad men, lunatike persons, and children’, and cannot be held responsible for their actions. Since knowledge comes with hearing, the deaf aren’t capable of knowledge. Richard Braithwaite, a man sceptical of the effects of unbridled passion upon the Christian soul (though himself a poet), also took from the ancients this idea that hearing is the sense most suited for the acquisition of knowledge. He wrote:

HEARING is the organ of vnderstanding; by it we conceive, by the memorie we conserve, and by our judgement wee revolue; as maine riuers haue their confluence, by small streames, so knowledg her essence by the accent of the eare. As our eare can best iudge of sounds, so hath it a distinct power to sound into the centre of the heart. It is open to receiue, ministring matter sufficient for the minde to digest; some things it rellisheth pleasantly, apprehending them with a kinde of enforced dellight … The eare is an edifying sence, conveying the fruit of either morall or diuine discourse to the imagination, and conferring with judgment, whether that which it hath heard, seeme to deserue approbation.

In Braithwaite’s estimation, hearing’s effectiveness in knowledge acquisition is due to its ability to communicate with both the heart and the mind, though judgement was still needed to filter this input.

In addition to its affinity for knowledge acquisition, hearing was believed by some to have a particular relationship with the soul or spirit. As the following three examples demonstrate, those writing explicitly about hearing and its relationship to the soul come from a variety of backgrounds. I offer the ideas of the moralist, Richard

with texted music. Those who wanted to support the arts or defend the passions often used Aristotle in this way. Palisca, *Music and Ideas*, 182.


55 Hackewell, *The vanitie of the eie* (1608), sig.E6r.


57 Hackewell, *The vanitie of the eie* (1608), sig.E7r.

58 Ancient reliance on hearing for the building of knowledge is connected with rhetoric.


60 As will be discussed later, Helkiah Crooke also believed hearing’s power for building knowledge stemmed from its ability to better effect the ‘heart’ in addition to mind. See Conclusion, 240-41.
Braithwaite, the physician, Robert Fludd, and the natural philosopher, Francis Bacon. Those in favour of using the passions to the benefit of the soul believed that by tempering the passions with ratio, one could use them to the soul’s advantage. Braithwaite wrote:

The *Eare* is one of the actiuest & laborioust faculties of the soule: pitty then it is that the soule should be by her intangled, or by her meanes to such base subjicets enthralled, being for the succour of the soule principally ordained. I haue thought long time with my selfe, how I should imploy this *Sence* best for my soules aduantage: wherein I tooke a suruey of all those subjicets, to which this peculiar sence of *Hearing* was especiallest extended.  

Braithwaite made several common assumptions here that are of note: 1) he assumed that the senses are the faculties of the soul, 2) that the passions needed to be and could be tamed through rational thought, and 3) that the ear’s principal responsibility was the soul (‘ordained’). Interestingly, though Braithwaite pondered how to use the sense of hearing to his soul’s advantage, and elsewhere acknowledged music’s ability to affect the mood and the body, in some parts of his essay he doubts music’s ability to effect real change at all. In spite of Braithwaite’s doubts about music’s permanent benefits, however, what is of note here is how he emphasised the special yet complex connection between the sense of hearing and the soul.

Robert Fludd’s *Mosaicall philosophy grounded upon the essentiall truth* was first published in 1638/9 (Latin), then in English in 1659 (both posthumously). Fludd’s theories were largely controversial and built on the Bible and astrology, and his conception of how music interacts with the soul, like Bacon’s, was largely one of Aristotelian sympathetic resonance. He believed that external music was but an imitation of the spirit, yet it still played a central role in wisdom building (specifically religious enlightenment): ‘all mysticall and miraculous Arts and discoveries, are effected and brought to light by it, confirming that place in Scripture, where it is said, *Caeterae*

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61 Braithwaite, *Essaies upon the senses* (1620), sig.B3v.
62 Music can cure melancholy but only ‘if grounded on the melodie of the heart’. Ibid., sig.B1r.
63 ‘I found the *Eare* much delighted with *Musicke*; but finding it but an ætire accent, breathed and expired in one instant, I thought there was no abiding for my attentius *Sence*; fitter to be employed in a delight more permanent’. Ibid., sig.B3v.
64 According to Rebecca Herissone, Fludd was one of the few English writers contributing to music *speculative*, though it was ‘rarely Boethian in character’. Herissone, *Music Theory in Seventeenth-Century England*, 1-2. Robert Fludd, *Philosophia Moysaica* (Govdae: printed by Petrus Rammazenius, 1638), text from Ghent University, digitised by Google Books.
In a neo-Platonic allegorical tradition, ‘wisdom’ (Sophia) is a given Truth, and the arts are her handmaids. Fludd wrote that ‘[a]fter the imitation of [universal harmony] melodious tunes and concords, all the accord of our externall musick, as well vocal, as instrumentall, are typically framed, which are in respect of the true and essentiaal symphony of this spirit, even as a shadow is unto a true subject, or an image unto a reality’. Though his conception of the mechanics of music are nothing novel, the idea that the arts served a purpose in teaching wisdom is of note, as it shows another conception, mostly built upon ancient authorities, of how the ear works to move the spirits.

Francis Bacon made attempts to understand the hearing-to-soul relationship through observable physiological phenomena. Following an Aristotelian perception of music as a sounding phenomenon, Bacon dismissed music’s wider connections with the harmony of the spheres, believing that the tangible effects of music were too powerful to be immediately deemed inferior to philosophy. He wrote about music and the sense of hearing sporadically throughout several of his treatises, as well as in New Atlantis (1627), but most specifically in Sylva Sylvarum (1627), a work that demonstrated his method for compiling natural histories. Like others, Bacon’s conception of hearing recognised both spiritual and material elements and believed that most natural phenomena, including music and the influence of the stars over man, could be explained by the interaction of spirits and tangible matter. He thought one key to understanding the interaction of the spirits and matter could be observed in sympathetic vibration (observed when a tuned string, plucked, makes another string tuned to the same note vibrate too, even if at a distance from the first string). Bacon wrote, ‘[w]e see also that several airs and tunes do please several nations and persons,

65 Robert Fludd, Mosaicall philosophy (London: printed for Humphrey Moseley, 1659), sig.D1r.
66 Ibid., sig.D1r.
69 Sylva (which included New Atlantis at the end of the volume) was published after Bacon’s death by William Rawley. Francis Bacon, Sylva sylvarum, (ed.) VVilliam Rowley (London: printed by I[ohn] H[aviland] and Augustine Mathewes]. Additionally, Gouk argues that critiques of Bacon’s theories, like the one written by Edmund Chilmead, attest to Bacon’s pervasive impact on English musical theory as early as the 1630s and 1640s. Gouk in Benett, Fend, Gouk (eds.), The Second Sense, 96; Mordechai Feingold and Penelope Gouk, “An early critique of Bacon’s Sylva Sylvarum: Edmund Chilmead’s treatise on sound”, Annals of Science, 40:2 (1983), 139-157, 145.
70 Gouk, Music, Science, and Natural Magic, 165.
according to the sympathy they have with their spirits’, suggesting that the spirits and music have a sympathetic-style relationship.\(^{71}\) Moreover, as ‘it is no marvel if they alter the spirits, considering that tunes have a predisposition to the motion of the spirits in themselves’, Bacon suggested that tunes could ‘alter’ or change the spirits, rather than just move them.\(^{72}\)

As Bacon’s theories were based on observation, he could not escape the idea that the relationship between hearing and the soul was inextricably linked to the passions, as emotion was one of the few observable phenomena Bacon had to work with. The idea that these passions worked in ‘inclining men’s minds’ could be used to man’s advantage.\(^{73}\) Bacon’s writing pointed to a belief that there was something more to discover about the source of music’s power over man’s emotions and behaviours than numbers. Gouk ascertains that Bacon’s fascination with music was not a minor part of his pursuit of Truth, but ‘an essential element of his ambitious scheme to dominate and control the forces of nature and the elements, to tame them for the service of man’.\(^{74}\) In Bacon’s usual ‘manner’, he acknowledged that ‘[m]usic, in the practice hath been well pursued, and in good variety; but in the theory, and especially in the yielding of the causes of the practice, very weakly; being reduced into certain mystical subtleties of no use and not much truth. We shall, therefore, after our manner, join the contemplative and active part together’.\(^{75}\) He discerned:

It hath been anciently held and observed, that the sense of hearing and the kinds of music have most operation upon the manners; as to encourage men and make them warlike; to make them soft and effeminate; to make them grave; to make them light; to make them gentle and inclined to pity etc. The cause is, for that the sense of hearing striketh the spirits more immediately than the other senses, and more incorporeally than the smelling. For the sight, taste, and feeling, have their organs not of so present and immediate access to the spirits, as the hearing hath. And as for the smelling, (which indeed worketh also immediately upon the spirits, and is forcible while the object remaineth,) it is with a communication of the breath or vapour of the object odorate; but hearing, entering easily, and mingling not at all, and coming with a manifest motion, doth by custom of often affecting the spirits and putting them into one kind of posture, alter not a little

\(^{71}\) Bacon, *Sylva Sylvarum*, (ed.) Spedding, II.114.

\(^{72}\) Though he qualifies this by saying ‘generally music feedeth that disposition of the spirits which it findeth’, so tunes can only alter the spirits within a certain range. Ibid.

\(^{73}\) Ibid.


the nature of the spirits, even when the object is removed. And therefore we see that tunes and airs, even in their own nature, have in themselves some affinity with the affections: as there be merry tunes, doleful tunes, solemn tunes; tunes inclining men’s mind to pity; warlike tunes, etc. … But yet it hath been noted, that though this variety of tunes doth dispose the spirits to variety of passions conform unto them, yet generally music feedeth that disposition of the spirits which it findeth … tunes have a predisposition to the motion of the spirits in themselves.76

Notably, Bacon does not explain here how sound, a physical phenomenon, might interact with, let alone ‘ striketh ’ the immaterial spirit.77 Interestingly, Bacon cited physiological reasons for hearing’s strong connection to the soul, a notable divergence from Plato’s, which were ontological.78 To Bacon, sound is communicated through motion, with waves of sound striking the ear’s membrane, thus making it a physical, material phenomenon.79 Bacon suggested that, of the five external senses, it is hearing alone that can directly resonate with the soul because of the shared or sympathetic qualities between the air of sounds and the special air of the spirit.80 In contrast to other contemporary conceptions of music’s effects on the soul as ephemeral (like Braithwaite’s), Bacon hints in the above passage that because of its more immediate access to the spirits, hearing can actually alter the spirits in a more lasting fashion (‘ even when the object is removed’). He does qualify this, however, by stating that the music usually works off some pre-existing disposition of the spirit.81

76 Ibid., II.114. Emphasis my own.
77 Bacon hypothesised that all matter contained ‘ spirits ’ of varying quality and materiality (on a scale from immaterial to material), and even identified eight varieties of transmission or communication between matter. Communication was viewed as a transfer of ‘ spirit ’ from one thing to another. B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 106.
78 Ibid., 103.
79 Ibid., 105.
80 Ibid., 106.
81 The idea that music can be used to ‘ trigger ’ a certain state is a common conception of the benefits of music, an idea Byrd and others call to ‘ content humours ’. Byrd acknowledges such a use in the ‘ Epistle to the Reader ’ in his 1588 set: ‘ here is offered unto thy courteous acceptation, Music of sundry sorts, and to content diverse humours. If though be disposed to pray, here are Psalms. If to be merry, here are sonnets. If to lament for the sins, here are songs of sadness and piety ’ etc. Byrd, Psalmes, sonets, & songs of sadness and piety (1588), sig.B1v.
2.2 Passion's Persuasion

As the anonymous author of *Praise of Musicke* (1586) wrote, young men in Aristotle’s day were instructed in the ‘knowledge of Musicke, not the provocation of wantonnesse … but to the restraining and bridling of their affections, under the rule and moderation of reason’. The passions were a curious thing, as they presented themselves through the physical body, yet were thought to reside in the mind and lack a material form. The imitative arts were seen as the most direct way to elicit specific emotions. As mentioned before, many believed that the passions, through *catharsis*, could be beneficial to healthy living, but also warranted caution. The precise quality of the relationship between the senses, passion, and imagination varied, but it is generally something like what Thomas Wright explained in his *Passions of the Mind* (1604):

> [W]hatsoever we vnderstand, passeth by the gates of our imagination, the cosin germane to our sensitive appetite, the gates of our imagination being prevented, yea, and welsie shutte vp with the consideration of that obiect which feedeth the passion, and pleaseth the appetite; the vnderstanding looking into the imagination, findeth nothing almost but the mother and nurse of his passion for consideration, where you may well see how the imagination, putteth greene spectacles before the eyes of our witte, to make it see nothing but greene, that is, serving for the consideration of the Passion.

‘Understanding’ cannot emerge from the gates of an imagination too clogged by passion, as it blocks knowledge from coming forth. Therefore reason needs to guide imagination from getting carried away by passion. Similarly, Nicholas Coeffeteau added that the passions ‘cannot be held good nor bad, so when as they suffer themselves to be moderated and governed by reason’. But, importantly, he concluded that the *Passions are in the soule, as the sinnews in the body … so by the operations*

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83 For my purposes, assume the modern term ‘emotions’ is synonymous with contemporary terms ‘affect’ and ‘passions’. Meek and Sullivan (eds.), *The Renaissance of Emotion*, 3.

84 Even specific modes were thought to bring out particular traits, as described by Dowland via Ornithoparchus: ‘Dorian, both because it is manly & also doth delight valiant men, & is a discoverer of warlike matters’. Ornithoparchus, *Micrologvs*, (trans.) John Dowland, sig.M1v.

85 For more on catharsis, see Ch. 1, 56.

86 Wright, *The Passions of the Minde* (1604), sig.E2r. For more on the meaning of ‘green’ with regards to the passions, see Bruce Smith, *The Key of Green: Passion and Perception in Renaissance Culture* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

87 Coeffeteau, *A Table of Humane Passions*, (trans.) Grimeson (1621), sig.E2r.
of Passions, wee carry our selues to good or euill’. 88 One can see how this statement, the ‘passions are in the soule’, might provoke questions regarding the quality of the soul, the passions and imagination, and how they can interact between planes of materiality. 89 Moreover, the idea that we can ‘carry our selues’ as a result of feeling emotion was problematic philosophically. 90 As Susan James points out, in spite of the ubiquity of the Aristotelian understanding of the passions, there existed an unease with the fundamentals of that understanding, stemming from the passions’ relationship to will and action, explained in depth in her book Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy (1999). She says that ‘[t]he existence of different orders of philosophical priorities is particularly evident in the range of innovative analyses of the passions developed in the seventeenth century, each of which hits on a different solution to the problem of how to conceptualize the passions as states of both body and soul’. 91 Furthermore, ‘the project of extending the New Philosophy to the passions sometimes ran into problems which cast doubt on the metaphysical and physical positions around which this philosophical system was organized. For some writers, the passions therefore proved subversive, a troublesome afterthought that, true to their character, threatened the order and purity of systematic philosophy’. 92

In the musical world, this scepticism planted by early new philosophers like Galileo acted like an irritating grain of sand in an oyster. As English men like Francis Bacon tended to focus on the physics of music rather than its ‘grander, cosmological aspects’. 93 Marsh has consequently argued that ‘references to cosmic harmony became increasingly superficial’ in England over the seventeenth century, as ‘the focus of attention shifted towards the purely emotional effects of music on humans’. 94 Though references to cosmic harmony are still plentiful in musical paratexts, some of the musicalised texts themselves reflect the unease with existing metaphysical systems and

88 Ibid., sig.E3v.
89 As Erin Sullivan points out, ‘for some of Wright’s contemporaries, the fact that the intellective part of the soul was wholly incorporeal and thus not dependent on the body for its functioning was one of its chief virtues, but for Wright … the intellective soul’s separation from the materiality of the body proves problematic, making it more difficult for communication with God to move beyond mental abstraction’. Erin Sullivan, ‘The passions of Thomas Wright’ in Meek and Sullivan (eds.), The Renaissance of Emotion, 32.
90 James explains that much attention was paid ‘to the complex antecedents of action, and a variety of forms of conflict and dislocation are worked out in terms of the tripartite soul, and the divisions within its sensible and rational parts’, James, Passion and Action, 255.
91 Ibid., 81.
92 Ibid., 66.
94 Ibid., 25.
a scepticism toward the mechanics of sense perception as described by James. One could say that a pearl took form in the resurgence of art and writing from the late sixteenth and early seventeenth-centuries that cogitated and reconsidered the fundamental nature of the passions.\textsuperscript{95}

**Music and the Passions**

In the commentary that accompanied George Sandys' translation of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* (1632), Sandys noted, as many others did, that 'musick in it selfe most strangely works vpon our humane affections ... the sence of hearing stricking the Spirits more immediately, then the rest of the sences'.\textsuperscript{96} Robert Burton observed in 1621 that '[i]n a word [music] is so powerfull a thing, that it ravisheth the Soule, and carries it beyond it selfe, helps, eleuates, extends it'.\textsuperscript{97} Its power over the passions was so effective that it could calm babies, could incite bravery in soldiers prior to a battle, and 'extenuate feares and furies, appeaeseth cruelty, awakeneth heauinesse, and to such as are watchfull, it causeth quiet rest, it takes away spline and hatred, and cures all irksomnesse and heavinesse of the Soule'.\textsuperscript{98} In matters of the soul, one was often presented with what was, in effect, a rhetorical problem in describing the relationship between music and the soul. For example, John Dowland's translation of Andreas Ornithoparchus's *Micrologus* (1609) stated that '[h]uman music is the concordance of diverse elements in one compound, by which the spiritual nature is joined with the body, and the reasonable part is coupled in concord with the unreasonable, which

\textsuperscript{95} James, *Passions and Action*, 65.  
\textsuperscript{96} I cannot be certain Sandys read Francis Bacon’s *Sylva sylvarum* (1627), but it appears they knew of each other. The rhetorical similarities between their conceptions of hearing as 'striking the spirits more immediately than the other senses' is worth noting; regardless of whether one influenced the other, they were both drawing from an earlier tradition, or it was independently conceived. James Ellison, *George Sandys: Travel, Colonialism, and Tolerance in the Seventeenth Century* (Cambridge: D.S Brewer, 2002), 91. Sandys rejected the universal harmony embraced by many of his contemporaries as the source of music's power, resonating more with a Baconian or Aristotelian conception of sympathetic vibration. Sandys wrote, 'Yet musick in it selfe most strangely works vpon our humane affections. Not in that the Soule (according to the opinion of the Platonists) consisting of harmony, & rapt with the sphearicall musick before it descended from Heauen to inhabit the body, affects it with the like desire (there being no nation so barbarous, or man so austere and stupid, which is not by the melody of instruments and numerous compossures, either incited to pleasure or animated to Virtue) but because the Spirits which agitate in the heart, receaue a warbling and dancing aire into the bosome, and are made one with the same where with they haue an affinity; whose motions lead the rest of the Spirits dispersed through the body, raising or suppressing the instrumantal parts according to the measures of the Musick; sometimes inflaming: and againe composing the affections'. George Sandys, *Ovide Metamorphosis Englished* … (Oxford [and London]: printed by John Lichfield [and William Stansby], 1632), sig.Tt2v, Tt5v.  
\textsuperscript{97} Burton, *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621), sig.Aa4r.  
\textsuperscript{98}Ibid., sig.Aa4r.
proceeds from uniting body and soul’.\textsuperscript{99} To this author, music is the reflection of universal harmony, which acts as a bow, tying together body and soul, allowing for the coexistence of rational thought and irrational passion. In this way, music is viewed as the harmonious by-product of the fissure between body and spirit. Similarly, Thomas Wright observed that ‘musicke hath a certaine secret passage into mens soules, and worketh so divinely in the mind, that it elevateth the heart miracuously, and resembleth in a certaine manner the voices and harmonie of heaven’.\textsuperscript{100} In this explanation Wright acknowledged both the divine and fleshly aspects of music’s power, in spite of the fact that his conclusion seems to be the easy way out, resorting to the metaphor of a secret passage. In a rather unsatisfactory conclusion, Wright determined that some musical ‘experience is so sensible’, and therefore so real, there is little point in trying to prove its realness through words.\textsuperscript{101} As demonstrated by both of these anecdotes, early moderns often resorted to musical metaphors for metaphysical concepts that were little understood, like the experience of music.\textsuperscript{102} As precise words frustrated, metaphors or poetic imagery took their place.\textsuperscript{103} As Shakespeare’s Benedict says, ‘Now divine air! Now is his soul ravished! Is it not strange that sheep’s guts should hale souls out of men’s bodies?’ (\textit{Much Ado About Nothing}, II.iii.57-59).

Music’s effect over soul and body was viscerally felt by so many, and although the mechanics were left a mystery, music’s positive effects were thought to be harnessable through its ability to move men to action. It was through action, perhaps, that the arts could make a tangible mark upon society.\textsuperscript{104} As Susan James summarises,

\begin{quote}
Alongside the view that passions can motivate us to acquire knowledge, and that intellectual activity is itself accompanied by pleasurable affections, we find in seventeenth-century philosophy a further, internally complex conception of knowledge which is still more closely linked to emotion. To know something,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{99} Ornithoparchus, \textit{Micrologus}, (trans.) John Dowland (1609), sig.C1r.
\textsuperscript{100} Wright, \textit{The Passions of the Minde} (1694), sig.M3v.
\textsuperscript{101} The effeminising effects of some music are so obvious, and ‘the experience is so sensible, that it were superfluous to proceed any farther in proofe’. Wright, \textit{The Passions of the Minde} (1694), sig.M4v.
\textsuperscript{102} Often in the form of mythological tropes, for example Bacon casting Orpheus as Universal Harmony in his \textit{Wisdom of the Ancients}. Metaphor allowed for what Michael Spitzer calls ‘the relationship between the physical, proximate, and familiar, and the abstract, distal and unfamiliar’. Michael Spitzer, \textit{Metaphor and Musical Thought} (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 4.
\textsuperscript{103} Perhaps this is what the anonymous author of \textit{The Praise of Musicke} was referring to when they said that music ‘hath a certaine divine influence into the soules of men, whereby our cogitations and thoughts … are brought into a celestiall acknowledging of their natures’. Anon., \textit{Praise of Musicke} (1586), sig.C5v.
\textsuperscript{104} Lod\’i Nauta and Detlev Pätzold (eds.), \textit{Imagination in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times} (Leuven: Peeters, 2004), 72.
according to this account, it is not enough to understand it or be able to prove it—one must also be capable of acting on it. The ability to act, however, depends on the possession of appropriate volitions, which are in turn conceived as identical with emotions, or as so closely connected that the two always occur together. Either way, action and emotion are both intrinsic to knowledge, and can be used as criteria for distinguishing it from epistemically inferior states. The fact that people may be incapable of acting on claims they profess to know is an indication that they have not attained knowledge after all. Equally, the presence of certain emotions (typically love) can be evidence for the correctness of a particular view.  

James reminds us that in order to understand the fickleness of passion-motivated action (sometimes we can control ourselves, sometimes we cannot), one need examine how the passions relate to other kinds of thought, and how we might temper our emotional urges. As will be seen throughout this thesis, the problem of self-control is often embodied or allegorised in poetry in terms of Beauty (the passions) and her complicated and antagonistic friendship with ratio (which is also referred to as the mind), or its personification, Reason.

(Re)Creating the Self Through Music

Perhaps the action best elicited through music was an action towards self-change. In Martin Fotherby’s words from 1622, music possessed not only a ‘kindred with the soule’ but ‘a kind of affinitie with the Body’. Though there was a variety of ways music’s power was thought to affect the body, mind and soul, for good or for evil, I will here focus on how the power of music was thought to change, create, and mould the self. Music’s medicinal applications for the body and mind were well documented. Of utmost relevance here was the belief that the arts could work to move men to actions of social good. As Sidney argued in his Apology for Poesy (1595), it was believed

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105 James, Passion and Action, 225.
106 Ibid.
108 Though one might assume that a basic understanding of the mechanics of music and how music influences the body and soul would be reserved for philosophers and those with formal educations, Christopher Marsh points out that this was not necessarily the case. He makes an argument for other channels of education, such as the theatre, as evidence that ‘sophisticated ideas about the power of music circulated among a substantial cross-section of the population’. He reminds us that Shakespeare, while exceptional, did not come from the gentry and still demonstrates a grasp of contemporary philosophical ideas on music. Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 53.
109 It was commonly believed that listening to certain types of music (and indeed in certain modes) could affect one’s body and health. Marsh, Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England, 64-70.
that the mimetic arts could be used to sculpt society, thus having a physical impact upon the material world.\footnote{This is echoed by composer Robert Jones, who stated that a commonwealth is 'but a well tunde Song where all partes doe agree'. Robert Jones, \textit{Vltimum Vale, with a triplicity of musicke} (London: Printed by J Windet, 1605), sig.A1r.} This also applied specifically to music, as demonstrated by Thomas Elyot, who believed that ‘the perfecte understanding of musike’ was required ‘for the better attaynyng the knowledge of a publike weale’.\footnote{Thomas Elyot, \textit{The Boke Named the Governour} (London: Printed by Thomas Berthelet, 1537 [1534?]), sig.C7r.} This practical connection between music and the health of the body reinforces the idea that, as we shall see in greater detail later, the act of music making was believed to have abilities capable of affecting both physical and spiritual entities, suggesting music’s power might span the material and spiritual worlds.\footnote{For more on the medical aspects of music’s power, see Craik and Pollard (eds.), \textit{Shakespearean Sensations}, 6. Marsh, \textit{Music and Society in Seventeenth-Century England}, 50-59, 64-70.}

One undeniable recurrence in the primary literature describes music’s ability to move ‘inward’ or ‘inside’ the body and thus affect our very self. Braithwaite described the ‘inward operation’ of the ear.\footnote{Braithwaite, \textit{Essaies vpon the fiue senses} (1620), sig.C2v.} This was related to the idea that hearing, other than smell, was the only sense that required a physical material to enter the body.\footnote{B. Smith, \textit{The Acoustic World of Early Modern England}, 106.} As Erin Minear has constructed, discussion of music’s power ‘tended to require language of depth’.\footnote{Minear, \textit{Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton}, 34.} Richard Hooker said music could ‘expresse and represent to the minde more inwardly than any other sensible meane the very standing rising and falling, the very steps and inflections every way, the turnes and varieties of all passions whereunto the minde is subject: yea so to imitate them’.\footnote{Richard Hooker, \textit{Of the Laws of Ecclesiasticall Politie: The Fift Booke} (London: printed by John Windet, 1597), sig.H2r.} Calvin, too, used this rhetoric of inwardness when he expressed that it ‘is true that, as Saint Paul says, every evil word corrupts good manners, but when it has the melody with it, it pierces the heart much more strongly and enters within; as wine is poured into the cask with a funnel, so venom and corruption are distilled to the very depths of the heart [\textit{au profound du coeur}] by melody’.\footnote{As quoted (and emphasised) by Minear, \textit{Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton}, 35. From John Calvin, Preface to \textit{The Geneva Psalter}, in \textit{Source Readings in Music History}, (eds.) Oliver Strunk and Leo Treitler (New York: Norton, 1998), 366.}

Moreover, some believed that polyphonic vocal music or ‘artificiall singing’ exceeded ‘plain Musicke, for it striketh deeper, and worketh more effectually in the hearers’.\footnote{Anon., \textit{The Praise of Musicke} (1586), sig.I8r.}
Though I shall return to this quotation in my discussion of multi-voiced music in the conclusion to this thesis, it is worth noting that it is the depth of polyphonic music that makes it so effective.

In 1599, Richard Alison framed devotion as a full-body, fully sensory experience when he wrote,

[a]nd that our meditations in the Psalms may not want their delight, we have that excellent gift of God, the Art of Musick to accompany them: that our eyes beholding the words of David, our fingers handling the Instruments of Musicke, our eares delighting in the swetenesse of the melody, and the heart obseruing the harmony of them: all these doe ioyne in an heauenly Consort, and God may bee glorified and our selues refreshed therewith.\textsuperscript{119}

As sound entered in our bodies via the ear, this inwardness and directness (as perceived by some) allowed for music to not only renew us, but to change us. In John Dowland’s translation of Ornithoparchus’s \textit{Micrologvs} (1609) the author argues against those who disapproved of music’s use in church: ‘Now farewell they that forbid Church-men to use Music; what solace (setting singing aside) can they have either more healthful, or more honest? For whilst we recreate our selves with singing, all evil thoughts, and speech, all back-biting, all glutteny, and drunkenness, are avoided’.\textsuperscript{120} I will return to why I interpret ‘recreate’ as ‘re-create’ rather than as simply ‘recreate’ (as in recreational) in the conclusion of this thesis.\textsuperscript{121} I ask that you keep in mind music’s potential to aid in the formation of selves when considering how music interrogated issues of human consciousness, as it does in the following examples.

\textbf{2.3 Contemplating the Senses in Song}

The following section surveys multi-voiced domestic music texts that contemplate all aspects of sense perception, whether it involves acknowledging their capacity for deceit, or questioning the relationship between the passions and reason. These examples fall into two larger categories, texts that cogitate sense perception directly, and texts that contemplate the senses via sleep and dreaming, a state in which one’s

\textsuperscript{120} Ornithoparchus, \textit{Micrologvs}, (trans.) Dowland (1609), sig.V2v. Emphasis my own.
\textsuperscript{121} As Paster, Rowe, and Floyd-Wilson state, ‘[e]arly modern subjects experienced strong passions as self-alteration’. Paster, Rowe, et al (eds.), \textit{Reading the Early Modern Passions}, 16.
senses are at rest, yet one’s imagination is bursting with activity. Though these are often poems about love, it was often through this powerfully passionate aspect of human consciousness (which included, but was not exclusively, romantic and Godly love) that man was thought to be motivated to seek knowledge. I demonstrate that musicalised poetry cogitating the reliability of the senses is a particularly effective representation of how epistemic conversation could occur within a seemingly mundane daily practice, even at the surface level. The words overtly contemplated the reliability of sense perception via love, a powerful element of human consciousness, while the music brought the affect that struck to the core of one’s body and spirit, physically presenting related questions about the passions and sense perception that were pondered in the text. And, vitally, this music-making process was self-reflective, as it was experienced in an utterly sensorial and temporal event, an idea to which I shall return.

As Susan James suggested, the beginnings of the New Philosophy paved the way for a revival of metaphysical questioning that sought to reconsider our understanding of the passions on the most basic level. The questioning in these musicalised texts does not take any grand philosophical leaps, yet they are notably contemplative about relevant topics of philosophical concern to the more canonical thinkers. Tom Sorell reminds us that though Bacon and Descartes are routinely named as the first exponents of the new methods that founded modern philosophy, the ‘the dividing line between Aristotelians and partisans of the new science was blurred by some seventeenth-century philosophers … [and] it is even a question whether Descartes or Bacon themselves … really broke as decisively from Aristotle or Aristotelianism as is

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122 As James explains: ‘This heady analysis draws on two palimpsestic traditions—Platonism and Augustinianism. From Plato, early-modern philosophers inherit a hierarchical conception of knowledge as love, which many of them put to work in their interpretations of the relation between natural and moral knowledge. Superimposed on this is the influence of Augustine (famous for his remark that Plato is the most nearly Christian of the pagan philosophers) whose doctrine of the will lends authority to the association between emotion and volition. Error, as Augustine sees it, lies not so much in misperception as in the disorder of the human will, in our inability to keep our volitions, and hence our actions, in line with our understanding. But since we experience volitions as emotions, this failing is simultaneously an emotional one, an inability to feel appropriate loves and hatreds. To bring order to our wills, we must do our best to redirect our emotions so that we love and hate the right things, and although Augustine thinks that our ability to achieve this end is limited, he nevertheless believes that we have a responsibility to make whatever progress we can. Only by learning to reshape our feelings, then, can we produce the orderly volitions that are intrinsic to knowledge’. James, *Passion and Action*, 225-6.

123 Ibid., 65.
often assumed’.124 This muddiness is important to keep in mind because it reinforces the idea that change in episteme can be gradual, serpentine, and messy, and Sorrell’s caution can go both ways. In other words, precursors to articulated change can be present in types of metaphysical questioning, even if the rhetoric of that inquiry remains fundamentally chained to assumptions belonging to old or current understanding.

The intellectual climate described by James and Sorrell suggests a subtle dissatisfaction or unease with an Aristotelian foundation for sense perception and the role of the passions, resulting in a surge of metaphysical questioning in works of art, well before the canon-changing Cartesian works heralded as the beginnings of modernity.125 Surely these articulations of the new philosophy did not, as Toulmin seemed to suggest earlier, suddenly appear out of the ether.126 Furthermore, this was not an urge relegated to philosophers, but many people who tried to understand what motivated mankind to action, including poets and musicians defending their trades.

One might note that the following texts come from a variety of potentially multi-voiced domestic genres, including the madrigal, consort song, canzonet, and ayre, and that the ‘introspective’ or metaphysical topics are not exclusive to any one form.

**Singing Sense Perception**

The most common trope involving the passions and the senses posits beauty (usually representing carnal desire) against reason. Examples of this sort of juxtaposition include Weelkes’s ‘Like two proude armyes’ (1600), Giles Farnaby’s ‘Ay me poor heart’ (1598), Richard Carlton’s setting of Edmund Spencer’s ‘Nought under heaven’ (1601), or Thomas Tomkins’ ‘Fond men that do so highly prize’ (1622).127 To show just one example, Weelkes’s ‘Like two proude armyes’ states:

Like two proude armyes, marching in the field,

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125 James, *Passion and Action*, 65.
126 Though sense perception was questioned in previous centuries, C.M. Woolgar argues that ‘[f]rom the late medieval period comes considerable evidence for change in the day-to-day realities that intertwined with beliefs about perception’. C.M. Woolgar, *The Senses in Late Medieval England* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 270.
127 All of these texts are found with modernised spellings in Edmund Fellowes, *English Madrigal Verse* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1920), 220, 95, 70, 193.
Ioyning a thundring fight, each scorns to yeeld,
So in my heart, your beautie and my reason,
one claims the crown, the other sayes its treason.
But oh your beautie shineth as the Sunne,
And dazled reason yeelds as quite vndone.\(^{128}\)

Some of these ‘beauty versus reason’ examples specifically draw out the senses’ role in this debate, often the eye for falling for beauty’s charms, as do Byrd’s settings of ‘O you that heare this voice’ (1588) and ‘Where fancy fond for pleasure pleads’ (1588).\(^{129}\)

In ‘Where fancy fond’, for example, the poet positions the personifications within a trial-like situation (the bar of sweet delight). Beauty, arguing powerfully for Fancy, is a persuasive lawyer thus making the ruling seem obvious.

My eyes presume to iudge this case,
whose judgement reason doth disdaine:
but beautie with her wanton face,
stands to defend, the case is plaine:
and at the barre of sweet delight,
she pleads that fancie must be right.\(^{150}\)

In other examples, love or the passions are accused of confounding man, leading him astray from ratio or moral truth, as is the case in Thomas Bateson’s ‘Loue is the fire that burnes me’ (1618)\(^{131}\) and in several moralising examples by Byrd, including ‘All as a sea’ (1588) which states ‘Our passions be the Pirates still that spoyle, / and ouerboard cast’s out our reasons fraight’, or his ‘If in thine hart’ (1589), which argues that reason

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\(^{129}\) ‘O you that heare this voice’, which proceeds directly after ‘Where fancy fond’ in Byrd’s 1588 collection, is discussed in detail in Ch. 4, 221-35. Though the author and source of the ‘Where fancy’ text remains uncertain, Phillip Brett has suggested that it could have been from ‘Four Foster Children of Desire’, a play that some, including Katherine-Duncan Jones, believe to have been the conceptual or actual work of Sidney, possibly with three of his compatriots, Greville, Windsor, and Arundel. Plus, within the context of Byrd’s publication, it shares many themes with the Sidney text before it, though the strongest argument against it being by Sidney is that nobody attributed it to him, given contemporaries were quick to attribute works to the courtier. Woudhuysen, *Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts*, 250; Katherine Duncan-Jones, “‘Melancholie Times’: Musical Recollections of Sidney by William Byrd and Thomas Watson”, in Caldwell, Olleson, Wollenberg (eds.) *The Well-Enchanting Skill*, 170-180.

\(^{130}\) Verse two only. For the whole song, see Appendix I(a). ‘Where fancie fond’ in Byrd, *Psalmes, sonets, e\(^{5}\) songs* (1588), sig.D5r.

\(^{131}\) ‘Loue is the fire that burnes me / The smoakes are thoughts confused / Which dimmes my soule And hath my sense abused’. ‘Love is the fire that burns me’ in Thomas Bateson, *The second set of madrigales to 3, 4, 5, and 6. Parts* (London: printed by Thomas Snodham), sig.B1r.
must rule the heart. Some pieces discuss more generally the inner workings of the passions and senses, such as Martin Peerson’s tripartite setting of Fulke Greville Lord Brooke’s ‘Loue the delight of all well thinking minds’ (1630), which states:

Loue the delight of all well thinking minds
delight, the fruit of vertue deerly lou’d
vertue the highest good, that reason finds;
reason, the fire where in mens thoughts bee prou’d,
are from the world, by natures power bee reft
and in one creature, for her glorie left,

Beautie her couer is the eyes true pleasure
in Honour’s fame shee liu’s, The eares sweete Musick,
Excesse of wonder growes from her true measure,
her worth is passions wound and passions Physicke,
From her true heart Cleere springs of wisdome flow,
which imaged in her words and deeds men know.\

John Coprario (Cooper)’s ‘Deceitful Fancy, why delud’st thou me’ (1606) contemplates imagination’s capacity for deceit.

Deceitfull fancy, why deludst thou mee,
the deade aliue presenting?
My ioies faire Image caru’d in shades I see,
O false yet sweet, contenting?
Why art thou not a substance like to mee,
or I a shade to vanish hence with thee?

Stay gentle obiect, my sense still deceiue
With this thy kind elusion:
I die throug madnes if my thoughts you leaue.
O strange? yet sweet, confusion?
Poore blisselesse harte that feels such deep annoy,
Only to loose the shadowe of thy ioy.

Though the speaker rationally knows his lover has not returned from the dead and remains within the immaterial realm of imagination, he is still comforted by her false and substance-less presence. He wishes he too were of an immaterial substance, so that

\(^*132\) ‘All as a sea’ can be found in William Byrd, *Psalmes, sonets, c5 songs* (1588), sig.F2v. For ‘If thine hart’, see William Byrd, *Songs of sundrie natures some of grauitie, and others of myrth, fit for all companies and voyces* (London: printed by Thomas East, 1589), sig.H2r.
then he could at least exist on the same plane as she. The speaker is in a problematic situation, as without this delusion, he fears he will ‘die through madness’, as if he is not already presenting signs of madness through visions of his departed lover. Fancy is so powerful a force that his passions are temporarily contented, even though he knows his visions are not real. In this way, Fancy, not the passions, is portrayed as more powerful than reason.

Even by this time, the idea that ‘love is blind’ was a common adage, and a recurrent theme in musicalised poetry. A couple of exemplars include Giles Farnaby’s ‘Blind Loue was shooting’ (1598) and Thomas Morley’s ‘Ioy, ioy doth so arise’ (1593). On the other hand, some examples take issue with the proverb, adding nuance to its presumption that it is Love itself that is blind. In Michael Cavendish’s ‘Loue is not blind’ (1598), the speaker acknowledges their active role in choosing their own path when they state ‘Loue is not blind, but I my selfe am so / with free consent blind-fouled by desire, / that guides my will along the paths of woe / to seeke refreshing for a needeless fire’. In Bateson’s ‘If loue be blind’ (1604) this speaker, too, takes personal responsibility for passion’s persuasion, excusing Cupid from blame.

If loue be blind, how hath he then the sight,
with beauties beams my careless heart to wound:
Or if a boy, how hath he then the might,
the mighti’st conquerors to bring to ground.
O no, he is not blind, but I that leesse
My thoughts, the wayes that bring to restless feares:
Nor yet a boy, but I that liu in dread,
mixed with hope, and seeke for ioy in teares.

These examples demonstrate interesting variations in thought about personal responsibility and action when dealing in matters of the passions. Do we rely on ancient tropes like Cupid and accept that we are powerless in the face of the passions,

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135 ‘Blind Cupid’ is another common variation on the theme. Farnaby’s text with modern spelling can be found in Fellowes, *English Madrigal Verse*, 95.
137 Michael Cavendish, *Ayres in tablature to the late expressed with two voyces* (London: printed by Peter Short, 1598), sig.C1r.
or should we focus our analysis away from external allegory, and reinsert the
responsible self (or, in Cavendish’s potentially weighty terms, the ‘free consent’ of the
‘will’)? It is clear that these texts have weighty metaphysical implications. They are not
simply descriptions of romantic love, or how romantic love makes one feel, but texts
that interrogate fundamental assumptions about autonomy, free will, and the material
nature of human consciousness and reality.

**Walter Porter: ‘Tell mee where the beautie lyes’**

Walter Porter’s madrigal ‘Tell mee where the beautie lyes’ (1632) takes this idea a step
further by addressing the question of Beauty’s ‘seat’, whether in the object or the eye of
the beholder.

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Tell mee where the beautie lyes,
In my Mistress or in my eyes
Is she fair? I made her so.
Beautie doth from liking grow,
Bee she fayrer whiter than
Venus Doues or Leda’s Swanes,
What’s that Beauty if neglected,
Seene of all of none respected,
Then tell my Mistresse that I loue her,
Think her faire, cause I approue her.139
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The subjective version of beauty described in this text looks not towards the object of
sense perception to find the quality of beauty, but to the role of the observer, even
implying that the only reality is the one created by the observer (‘I made her so’). This
is portrayed as more real than external measures of beauty like skin colour, which are
measured by mythical (and therefore fantastical) rubrics, rather than anything rooted
in reality. The line ‘What’s that Beauty if neglected’ questions whether beauty even
exists outside of the mind that believes it. Though the overarching message of the poem
is just a variation on the idea that ‘Love is blind’ (not that love is blinding as in the
other examples, but that one can love in spite of the faults of the object of affection), as
well as an argument for the subjectivity of beauty, the way it posits the first question is

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1632), sig.C2r. Italicised text is not in the tenor partbook, and was taken from Fellowes, *English Madrigal
Verse*, 581.
of note here: ‘Tell me where the beautie lyes / In my Mistress or in my eyes?’. The poet notably does not call it ‘her beauty’, but a more objective ‘the beauty’. Furthermore, the two options are clear: either beauty lies in the object of perception, or in the eyes of the beholder. This is reminiscent of the type of questioning that would become of pertinence to the Cartesians, who moved away from an Aristotelian perception of truth built off external objects of sense perception, to a truth elicited from within the observer. This example by Porter demonstrates the subtle ways questions about love and perception could negotiate ideas about the nature of reality and representation in ways that don’t appear to depart from topical norms like romantic love.

**John Dowland: ‘Tell me, true Loue’**

In this anonymous text from John Dowland’s *Pilgrim’s Solace* (1612), the speaker addresses a personification of True Love (whether romantic or religious), asking ‘what is the quality of Love? Where does it exist?’ Though at first blush this poem could be discussing romantic love, the True Love sought by this speaker is of a more Godly sort, and moreover, a type of knowledge.

The following is a Neo-Platonic reading of Dowland’s text that requires a brief step back into some theory that is specific to this example. Susan James explains:

> For some philosophers, the distinction between knowledge of nature and knowledge of God belongs within a hierarchical order of stages through which the soul can ascend in its search for perfection. A number of versions of this doctrine were espoused during the seventeenth century. One cluster of interpretations is basically Platonist in allegiance, and draws from chronologically scattered sources the common conviction that because reason yields only one, relatively poor kind of knowledge, the mind must move out beyond it to a knowledge more akin to feeling. Only love or knowledge of the...

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140 Though the text author is anonymous, I will refer to this as ‘Dowland’s text’ because it was Dowland who set it to music. The same caveat goes for the anonymous texts set by Thomas Weelkes that I discuss in Chapter Three.

141 This poetic ambiguity could reference the knowledge gained by the fall. James describes more generally ‘a desire to resolve the dilemma created by the recognition that, in order to acquire knowledge, we must run the risks to which the passions expose us, while knowing at the outset that we are unlikely to be able to resist their strength and cunning. Milton’s reading of Genesis tells the history of this flaw; Adam’s insufficiency and desire for love can only be satisfied by Eve, who brings about his Fall, and with it the uncontrollable human passions that stand in the way of knowledge’. James, *Passion and Action*, 252.
heart can yield true insight into the nature and commands of God, and thus into the good.¹⁴²

This approach to knowledge building led most seventeenth-century philosophers to ‘draw a distinction between two kinds of knowledge—the demonstrative knowledge we can attain through the human power of reasoning, and the emotional knowledge lying at the very edge of our natural capabilities’.¹⁴³ This latter kind is the key to understanding true love, or the nature of God, and was categorised as a love or knowledge of the heart. Dowland’s 1612 composition reflects the emotional dimension of knowledge via True Love, an idea that ‘made space’ for later philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza to craft a conception of knowledge as feeling, but in more explicit terms.¹⁴⁴

Tell me, true Loue, where shall I seeke thy being.
In thoughts or words, in vowes or promise making,
In reasons, lookes, or passions neuer seeing,
In men on earth or womens minds partaking.
Thou canst not dye, and therefore liuing,
tell me where is thy seate, Why doth this age expell thee?

When thoughts are still vnseen, and words disguised;
vowes are not sacred held, nor promise debt:
By passion reasons glory is surprised,
in neither sexe is true loue firmely set.
Thoughts fainde, words false, vowes and promise broken
Made true Loue fly from earth, this is the token.

Mount then my thoughts, here is for thee no dwelling.
since truth and falsehood liue like twins together:
Beleeve not sense, eyes, eares, touch, taste, or smelling,
both Art and Nature ’s forced: put trust in neyther.
One only shee doth true Loue captive binde
In fairest brest, but in a fairer minde.

O fairest minde, enrich’d with Loues residing.
retaine the best; in hearts let some seede fall,
In stead of weeds Loues fruits may haue abiding,
at Harvest you shall reap ecrease of all.
O happy Loue, more happy man that findes thee,

¹⁴² Ibid., 234.
¹⁴³ Ibid., 240.
¹⁴⁴ Ibid.
Most happy Saint, that keepes, restores, vnbindes thee.¹⁴⁵

‘Being’ is a multifaceted state, encompassing not only the dwelling, essence, or condition of a subject, but also the ‘existence, the fact of belonging to the universe of things material or immaterial’.¹⁴⁶ The ending of the first stanza is a rhetorical question, as it is revealed in the second stanza that the speaker knows that promises can be broken, words carry lies, and thoughts cannot be seen.¹⁴⁷ If passions and thoughts cannot be seen, are they real? The idea of ‘never-seeing’ might be interpreted as the ‘blind passions’—a fairly standard image, but alternately, this context seems to remind readers that emotions are immaterial mental processes and therefore never seen. The speaker seems conflicted about the material quality of True Love, portraying it both as eternal (‘thou canst not dye’), somehow belonging to the realm of the spiritual (or a non-living unseen material, perhaps), but also as a substance of the corporeal (‘and therefore liu’ing’). This sort of contradiction embodies the rhetorical question of the text as a whole, which questions the nature of passionate substances like True Love, that we simultaneously ‘know’ to be real, yet cannot describe in quality.¹⁴⁸

As is so often the case, it is through the mode of poetry, the pinnacle of ‘words disguised’, that the speaker questions metaphoric form as a potential bearer of truth. Passion’s potent powers of persuasion challenge Reason’s reign. The second stanza concludes with the assertion that uncertainty and deception have led Love to flee the earth, upholding a sceptical view of modern life. Though upon first appearance the image of True Love flying from the earth seems purely metaphorical, it might be worth keeping in mind the question of whether passions like love could exist without a body. This is the second reference in this poem that acknowledges True Love’s qualities as akin to those of an autonomous, spiritual substance like the soul (along with the idea that it ‘canst not dye’). Love’s departure is our ‘token’, which is possibly a reference to the boils from plague as a metaphor for God’s judgement, our payment for the dishonest modern way of life. Perhaps this suggests that the sensory knowledge

¹⁴⁷ Twice in the poem the speaker uses ‘seeing’ as a mode of commonly accepted tangible ‘proof’, in spite of the fact the poem is questioning the reliability of all the senses.
¹⁴⁸ One can describe what true love feels like in metaphoric and physiological terms (butterflies in the stomach), as well as through the actions that ensue from the feeling of true love (the giving of gifts or praise), yet the substantive makeup and location (seat) of such powerful affection proves much more difficult to determine.
employed by unbridled passion obfuscates our perception of God’s true nature, as we had before earthly knowledge.

In the third stanza the speaker declares ‘Mount then my thoughts, here is for thee no dwelling’, as the speaker tells his or her thoughts to ascend to a higher level, most likely a heavenly one, as, if the senses are unreliable, how is truth to be found on earth?149 This is one of the most overt lines that suggest a Godly rather than romantic True Love, as the speaker commands his thoughts to rise above corporeal sense perception. In rejecting the knowledge attained from sense perception, the speaker supports the idea that, in James’s words, ‘the emotions that constitute knowledge are not passions deriving from our sensible perceptions of the relations between our bodies and external things. Instead, they are the fruit of our capacity to withdraw from sense, to rise above the order of the flesh, and to love not just what appears beneficial to our embodied natures, but the true good’.150 Only one ‘she’ can capture True Love, and it is not just her fair breast (both physical attractiveness but also the place where the heart resides) that holds love, but the ‘fairer mind’, which it is tempting to read as a knowledge of the heart, but I will return to this idea with further explanation shortly.151

The fourth stanza concludes that Love resides in the mind, and the sensible person will be sure to keep it mostly there, as the mind is enriched by love’s presence. Furthering the agricultural theme from the previous stanza, it advises that one must take a risk on passion and the heart, however, by allowing a little love to spill into the heart, which acts like a soil, allowing it to spring into fruition, multiplying one’s love.152 Like some Christian Platonists, Dowland’s text author searches for an explanation for the aspects of passion that cannot be controlled through attempts to separate

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149 The ‘earthliness’ is reinforced through a horticultural pun. ‘Both Art and Nature’s forced’ or manufactured: as man counterfeits nature through art, he also ‘forces’ nature (the process of manipulating/trimming a plant—often rhubarb—so it grows properly. This term was also applied to the shearing of wool sheep).”† force, v.2”, OED Online. Oxford University Press. September 2014. (accessed September 19, 2014).

150 James, Passion and Action, 240.

151 Alternately, this could simply be a reference to a more standard Aristotelian understanding of the passions requiring guidance from ratio. But as these matters need not be exclusive to one vein of thought, I believe either reading is possible in this case.

152 See James quotation, Ch. 2, footnote 141.
knowledge of nature from the ‘heart knowledge’ of God. Decades later, Blaise Pascal had still not determined the relationship between reason and knowledge when he wrote, ‘[w]e know the truth not only through our reason, but also through our heart. It is through the latter that we know first principles, and reason, which knows nothing about them, tries in vain to refute them … Principles are felt, propositions proved, and both with certainty though by different means.’ The problem of reconciling knowledge known by reason from the knowledge ‘felt’ via the heart is captured poetically by Dowland’s final verse, though the author relies on metaphor to avoid too bold a statement. The final couplet of text readdresses ‘Love’ as happy, as it was widely thought that with knowledge of the heart came happiness. Moreover, the man that cultivates or unlocks knowledge of the heart has a chance at holiness. As James summarises, ‘[t]he acquisition of knowledge is, as we have seen, widely held to release powerful emotions. Knowledge changes us and, with or without the help of divine grace, makes us happier than we were’, an idea supported by Dowland’s final text couplet.

2.4 Dreaming and Sensing in Song

A secondary substantial theme worth highlighting that poetically connected sense perception to music was the act of dreaming. Composer Robert Jones seemed to understand, and use to his advantage, the idea that music and dreaming are mentally and metaphorically linked. Writing in the introduction to his fourth collection of ayres, *A Musickall Dreame* (1609), the composer asserted that his musical offering should be approached subjectively, as a dream. Through a play on words, he pondered: ‘what

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153 As James summarises, ‘[h]umans are thus burdened by emotional and cognitive dispositions which make it extremely difficult for them to reason, so much so that it would be fruitless to try to explain their behaviour as the outcome of rational judgement’. James, *Passion and Action*, 257.


155 And ultimately, Dowland’s text author maintains that the seat of knowledge is in the mind, rather than the heart as was suggested by some Christian Neo-Platonists like Richard Hooker (1554-1600). James, *Passion and Action*, 235.

156 In her book, James explores the various ways happiness is portrayed by various philosophers in order to gain insight into their conceptions of knowledge. Ibid., 243.

157 Ibid. Though I won’t be considering song in performance until the end of this chapter, it is worth pointing out that Daniel Fischlin was right when he surmised that ‘[s]uch questioning [in this poem] may elicit from the respondent, the idealized courtier with highly developed discursive skills, a form of gnosis that emerges from the metaphysics of linguistic and musical ordering’, Fischlin, *In Small Proportions*, 64.

158 As with music, dreaming has long been linked with self-deception. In *De anima*, Aristotle saw dreams as a product of imagination without regulation from the senses, and ascertained that it is generally only upon
are dreames, but airie possessions, and seuerall ayres, breathing harmonious whisperings, though to thee discord, yet to others indifferent’, allowing for individual response (though only to an extent, because as he also not so subtly suggested ‘I will not say excellent, because it is an others office not mine’). This reflects an understanding (poetic or otherwise) of both ayres and dreams as ‘aerie’ intangible materials that nevertheless affect us greatly. Jones capitalised on the idea of a dream-inspired collection as he wrote:

where upon I betooke me to the ease of my Pillow, where Somnus hauing taken possession of my eyes, and Morpheus the charge of my senses; it happened mee to fall into a Musical dreame, wherein I chanced to haue many opinions and extrauagant humors of diuers Natures and Conditions … all these I hope, shall not giue any distaste to the eares, or dislike to the mind, eyther in their words, or in their seuerall sounds, although it is not necessarie to relate or diuulge all Dreames or Phantasies that Opinion begets in sleepe, or happeneth to the mindes apparition.

Adding to the drama of the account, Jones invoked Somnus, the mythical god of sleep, and Morpheus, the god of the dream, who steal his eyes and other external senses, allowing the musical dream to occur, providing a mythological explanation for the incapacitation of the senses. Jones wouldn’t be the first artist to claim his work came to him in the state of dreaming, nor the last artist to believe his work to be of an otherworldly inspiration. Whether Jones’s account of how this collection came into being was fabricated for marketability, rooted in a real experience, or some poetic embellishment on the latter, it highlights a particular aspect of the way this composer tried to explore the curious intermingling involving the senses, imagination, and the subject that are presented through both musical affect and the experience of dreaming.

The early modern curiosity about dreaming is particularly familiar territory within literary scholarship. Dreaming was another subjective faculty of the mind, which, like music, was little understood in mechanical terms, though known to be linked to waking that one can decide that the images seen in a dream are a dream and not reality. Therefore without input from the external world through the senses, dreams could not be true, but were ‘after images’ of remembered sense perception coupled with imagination. B.R. Hergenhahn, An Introduction to the History of Psychology, Sixth Edition (Belmont: Wadsworth, 2006), 55-56.


Ibid.

Somnus is the Roman equivalent of Hypnos, the Greek god or personification of sleep. Somnus is also the Latin noun for sleep.
imagination. Consequently music and dreaming were often poetically conflated. It was understood that through the stimulation of imagination, both music and dreams mislead the senses, causing individuals delusion, confusion, or to rise to action. With so much mystery surrounding the influential power of dreams and music, perhaps it is no surprise that music played an active role in metaphoric discussions of sleep and its mysteries. In Shakespeare’s *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* (1595), Titania wakes after a vivid dream to Oberon, who orders, ‘Titania, music call, and strike more dead / Than common sleep of all these five the sense’ (IV.i.80-81), alluding to music’s power over the senses as not only similar to, but stronger than, that of sleep. Titania replies ‘Music, ho! music, such as charmeth sleep’ (IV.i.82), one of several reminders in this play of the soporific potential of some music, inducing a sleep that removes sensory input from the body and reality. It is often through music and dreams that Shakespeare creates spaces like Fairyland or Prospero’s island, places in which he could question our very understanding of a reality based upon sense perception. Thus, through theatre, a transportive, sensory art form, Shakespeare could demonstrate several of the agents that were to play major roles in the development of philosophical issues that had yet to be codified in his day.\footnote{As S.J. Wiseman points out in *Reading the Early Modern Dream*, ‘[d]uring the seventeenth century what the dream said about the self became significant’, as the quality, cause, and meaning of dreams baffled writers of all sorts, as they had in medieval times.\footnote{The way thinkers (including poets, artists, and natural philosophers) interpreted dreaming, however, would prove to shift significantly over the course of the century. As Mary Baine Campbell addresses, the dream was sometimes thought of as ‘a motion or fiction of the soul.’\footnote{She argues that the early modern fixation with the}}

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dream is yet another instance of the relationship ‘in this period of epistemological transformation, between sensational experiences of wonder and the production of conditions of knowledge. Enthusiasts and rationalists, scientists and girls in love, were likely to remember dreams, narrate them to others, even publish them’. In the seventeenth century, as in earlier times, dreaming played an important role in understanding the quality of the soul and, therefore, determining certain knowledge. Much like music’s effects on the soul, dreaming democratically presented fundamental questions about the senses and certain knowledge, even if people didn’t conceive of them in those terms. The musicalised poetry assessed in this chapter is a part of a larger body of writing from this period on the dream, its relationship to the body, and its connections with or influence over waking life. As Wiseman explains, ‘interest in the dream as a potential source of self-knowledge is an index of the shift in the emphasis in dream theory during the seventeenth century’. As ‘the interpretation of dreams … required the interpreter to make a judgement on the relationship between body and soul, body and mind’, pieces of music that discuss dreaming present this question two-fold. In musical performance, these texts on dreaming and the senses are actively engaged, physically enacting discussion about the relationship between mind and body, and ultimately between reality and representation.

**Dream Music**

Dream and sleep texts abound in contemporary domestic music. In the most basic of metaphors, John Attey’s ‘My dearest and diuinesst love’ (1622) compares the speaker’s love to the sun, a blinding force which blocks out all other sights from his eyes (‘for my

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165 Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), *Reading the Early Modern Dream*, 20.
166 Though philosophy of dreaming in relation to sense perception and reality can be traced back to the Aristotle. For more in Aristotle and dreams, see: Juliette Harrisson, *Dreaming and Dreaming in the Roman Empire: Cultural Memory and Imagination* (London: Bloomsbury, 2015), 28-32.
168 Sometimes the answers are poetic; for example in Spencer’s *Faerie Queene* (1596), the cause of misleading dreams are ‘Legions of Sprites’ sent to ‘forge true-seeming lyes’ which ‘trouble gentle sleep’, but other times the causes were seen to be more practical, like diet. Like with music, explanations for dreaming ranged from the spiritual, to the supernatural, to the physiological. Spencer, *The Faerie Queene*, (ed.) Roche, I.i.38.
169 For example, Thomas Hill wrote his *Most pleasant Arte of the Interpretation of Dreames* (1576), and attributes the function of dreaming ‘to the Imaginative parte’ understanding them as ‘a passion of the inner partes, and not of the memorative, nor cognitive’. Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), *Reading the Early Modern Dream*, 2, 13.
170 Ibid., 6.
sense sees no other Sunne’), but it turns out his ‘comforts are but dreams.’\textsuperscript{171} The speaker’s handicap in sensory perception is not from the power of his love, as he hoped, but from the delusion of his dream, expressing a common fear of waking when in a happy dream (or indeed a happy reality).\textsuperscript{172} Similarly, John Ward’s ‘Retire, my troubled soule’ (1613) succinctly cogitates the end of life and the mental processes that moved us:

Retire, my troubled soule,
Rest, and behold, thy dayes of dolour, dangers manifold,
See, life is but a dreame, whose best contenting,
Begun with hope,
Pursu’d with doubt,
Enjoy’d with feare,
Ends in repenting.\textsuperscript{173}

Like the text in Byrd’s ‘Where fancy fond for pleasure pleads’, the emotional concepts of hope, doubt, and fear are juxtaposed by somewhat opposing physical actions.\textsuperscript{174} It is worth pointing out the declamatory ‘See’ is of particular interest, as one cannot see dreams yet sight is the sense often affiliated with the dream state.\textsuperscript{175} Yet ‘see’ seems to be the most appropriate verb when describing the process of beholding in imagination.\textsuperscript{176} Additionally, in the colloquial sense, ‘see’ used in this way is often a way of advising ‘I can prove to you’, which presupposes that seeing is a form of objective truth. The idea that ‘life is but a dream’ resonates with the fleeting experience of waking life compared to an eternal afterlife, but also the general uncertainty (hopes, doubts, fears) through which we experience life via our emotions. Experience comes with such uncertainty that we are forced to question whether our experiences are ‘real’ or imaginative and akin to a dream. It is worth noting that this poem shares sentiment

\textsuperscript{171} John Attey, The First Booke of Ayres of Foure Parts (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1622), sig.D1v-r.
\textsuperscript{172} For the full text see Appendix I(c).
\textsuperscript{173} John Ward, The First Set of English Madrigals to 3.4.5.and 6.parts ... (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1613), sig.D2r.
\textsuperscript{174} See Appendix I(a) for text.
\textsuperscript{175} Imagination and dreams are pictures in the mind. Another example will be discussed shortly in Dowland’s ‘Praise blindness eyes’, where the subject ‘watched [the dream] amazed’. For more on dreams as images, see Cocking, Imagination, viii; Hodgkin, O’Callaghan, Wiseman (eds.), Reading the Early Modern Dream, 2.
with Robert Jones’s ‘Life is a Poet’s fable’ (1600) and Byrd’s ‘Retire, my soul’ (1611).177

Similarly, Jones’s ‘Dreames and Imaginations’ (1601) considers that dreaming alone is not an action in itself, at least not one that would win back a straying love. It states, ‘Dreams and Imaginations are all the recreations absense can gain me.’ Though it concedes that ‘dreames when I wake confound me, thoughts for her sake doth wound me’; even thoughts of her make the speaker feel emotional pain, ‘least she disdain me’.178 But ultimately, dreams are the coward’s response, as they don’t actually change the situation or translate to physical action (‘Dreames are but cowards and doe, / Much good they dare not stand too, / Asham’d of the morrow’). The speaker reiterates ‘Dreams with their false pretences, / And thoughts confound my senses’, yet in spite of the dream’s supposed falseness, the dream ‘In the conclusion, / Which like a glass did shew mee, / What came to pass and threw mee / Into confusion’, as the speaker’s imagined prediction for the relationship came true. Though the poem seems to discount the dream’s ability to inciting men to action, it still leaves open the possibility for dreams to represent a kind of predictive or ironic truth.

John Wilbye’s madrigal ‘I liue, and yet me thinks I doe not breath’ (1609) cogitates the confusion of discerning waking life from a dream, and indeed the paradoxical emotions experienced by the fleshly body.

I liue, and yet me thinks I doe not breath;
   I thirst, and drinke; I drinke and thirst againe;
I sleep & yet I dreame I am awake;
   I hope for that I haue; I haue and want,
I sing & sigh; I loue and hate at once.
   O tell me, restlesse soule, what vncouth iarre
   Doth cause such want in store, in peace such warre?179

Like in the examples by Attey, Jones, and Ward above, Wilbye’s madrigal portrays sleep and dreaming as one of the paradoxical elements about human consciousness of

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177 As observed by Joseph Kerman in Alan Brown, Richard Turbet (eds.), Byrd Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 125. For Byrd’s and Jones’s texts respectively, see Fellowes, English Madrigal Verse, 65, 496.
178 Robert Jones, The Second Booke of Songs and Ayres … (London: printed by P[eter] S[hort], 1601), sig.D1v-r. For full poem, see Appendix I(d).
importance to internal sense perceptions and discerning reality. The paradox experienced by sense perception makes little rational sense, which, in this madrigal’s case, manifests in frustration with the ‘uncouth jar’ of the body, which is clearly to blame for these mixed messages. Other musical texts draw an even clearer line between external sense perception and dreaming, however.

**Thomas Vautor and Martin Peerson: 'Lock vp fair lids'**

Composers Martin Peerson and Thomas Vautor both set Philip Sidney’s sonnet 'Lock vp fair lids' from Book III of *Arcadia*. Vautor’s setting is found in his *The first set: Beeing Songs of diuers Ayres and Natures* (1619) and Peerson’s in his *Priuate musicke* (1620). Peerson sets the entire poem in one piece, in a strophic setting for four voices, viols, or combination of the two. Vautor’s setting is through composed for voices, and bipartite, setting the two quatrains of Sidney’s text separately from the two tercets.

Locke vp, faire lids the treasures of my heart,
Preserve those beames, this ages onely light,
To her sweet sense, sweet Sleep, some ease impart,
Her sense too weake to beare the spirits might,
And while (O sleepe) thou closest vp her sight,
Her light where love doth forge his fairest dart,
O harbour all her parts in easefull plight,
Let no strange dreame make her faire body start.

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180 For this reading, however, I’ll only be viewing the poem in its stand-alone context. Fellowes says that Vautor’s text compared with that of the Arcadia shows signs of careless transcription, but he doesn’t state which edition of *Arcadia* he was using. Thomas Vautor, *Songs of Divers Airs and Natures* (1619), (ed.) Edmund Fellowes (London: Stainer & Bell, 1924), xi. As discussed elsewhere, a single authoritative text of *Arcadia* is a very complicated topic: see Ch. 4, 215-16. Compared to each other, Vautor’s and Peerson’s texts have few inconsistencies minus a couple of spellings and punctuation marks, none of which should be of matter here. One of note, however, is that Vautor’s second part begins ‘And yet o dreame’ while Peerson’s says ‘But yet, O dreame’. Also, Vautor’s says ‘beare the spirits might’, while Peerson’s says ‘beare her spirits might’. Martin Peerson, *Priuate Musicke* (London: printed by Thomas Snodham, 1620), sig.D3v-r. Philip Sidney, *The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney*, (ed.) William Ringler, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), 79, 407-08.


182 Though this reading focuses mainly on the text, I would like to address two points of form. In Peerson’s setting, the strophic musical setting doesn’t allow for an exact repetition of the text, as the quatrains require a repetition of two lines of text to ‘fill’ the six lines of music. For the two tercets, no instructions are given, but if one just replaces the two repeats from the way the quatrains are set, one can accommodate the six lines of the two tercets, for a total of three iterations of the music. In Vautor’s setting, the composer uses a particularly clever madrigralisation on ‘I live in darkest night’, which is set in black notation to look like dark eyes on the page. Though one wouldn’t necessarily hear this trick, one would see it on the page.
And yet, O dreame, if thou wilt not depart
from this rare subiect from thy common right,
But wilt thy selfe in such a seate delight,
then take my shape, and play a louers part;
Kisse her from me, and say vnto her sprite,
Till her eyes shine I liue in darkest night.

Though obviously poetic or metaphoric, Sidney’s poem demonstrates several aspects of an early modern understanding of sense perception and its internal mechanics. In closing her eyes, the speaker’s ‘treasure of my heart’ is trapped inside her body, suggesting her body is a shell, which contains her true being, her spirit within. Here, Sidney suggests an understanding of sight as beams emitting out of eyes which, when closed, are preserved (mechanically, but also ‘saved’ for her lover). He reminds us that although sleep can bring her mind and external senses rest, imagination, in the form of dreaming, can still have a physiological effect on the body. In the second stanza, the speaker turns to address the Dream, and asks it to speak to her spirit, suggesting the imagination’s (poetic) ability to communicate with the spirit. As a poet, Sidney could leave the mechanics of sense perception in their metaphoric states without a need for further understanding. This is not only an incredibly intimate poem on love (if not overly so), but also a metaphorical exploration of the fundamental relationships between sense perception, the ‘seat’ of being, and emotion.

John Dowland: ‘Praise blindnesse eies’

One setting that focuses exclusively on the unreliability of sense perception was John Dowland’s ‘Praise blindnesse eies’ (1600). The anonymously authored text considers the deception of the senses in matters of love and passion, with special emphasis on hearing’s role as ‘false Haralds to thy hart’.

Praise blindnesse eies, for seeing is deceit,
Bee dumbe vaine tongue, words are but flattering winds,
breake hart & bleed for ther is no re-ceit,

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183 A common Christian understanding that is also reminiscent of Thomas Wright’s question of how the immortal soul is contained within the stinking carcass. See Introduction, 10.
184 The mechanics of sight were little understood, and many like Thomas Wright pondered, ‘How doth our eyes see, admitting something into them or emitting something out of them’. Wright, The Passions of the Minde (1604), sig.X2v.
185 John Dowland, The Second Booke of Songs or Ayres … (London: printed by Thomas Este, 1600), sig.F2v-r.
to purge in-constancy from most mens mindes.

And if thine eares, false Haralds to thy hart,
Conuey into thy head hopes to obtaine,
Then tell thy hearing thou art deafe by art,
Now loue is art that wonted to be plaine,
Now none is bald except they see his braines,
Affection is not knowne till one be dead,
Reward for loue are labours for his paines,
Loues quiuer made of gold his shafts of leade.

Lenuoy:
And so I wackt amazd and could not moue,
I know my dreame was true, and yet I loue.

The ‘enuoy’, or conclusion of the poem, suggests that the message contained in this poem is in itself a dream. A dream that contains truth, in spite of the common understanding that dreams are born from imagination.186 Through a metaphysically aware situation (a knowing dream) Dowland’s poet questions and conflates sense perception, the truth-bearing capabilities of dreams and imaginary visions, the relationship or communication between the ears, mind, and heart, the metaphysical purpose of art, as well as the reality (versus the presentation) of emotions like love.

Writing about this ayre, Sebastian Klotz says, ‘[i]f vision fails, there seems to be just one ultimate source of certainty: it is the body not contaminated by the decorum of speech and of ambivalent gesture’.187 Klotz, too, picked up on the ‘interplay between visionary allegorical speech and first-hand tactile and sensual knowledge’ in this text.188 He argues that

186 Perhaps the most interesting phrase is ‘I know my dream was true’, as an example of a posteriori knowledge. See George Bealer’s chapter “The A Priori” in John Greco and James Sosa (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1998).
188 Ibid., 181.
that the transcendental grasp of an ideal, specular language holds no longer true. 189

Though Klotz’s analysis focuses on the text’s use of the physical body to make its point, his argument harmonises with my own reading in articulating the poem’s doubt of sense perception. The text interrogates reality through the consideration of uncertainties—these include both internal processes like dreaming, as well as external processes of discerning knowledge through sense perception.

2.5 Conclusion

Performance is a sensory activity that requires embodiment or a visceral experience that necessarily engages sense perception and the passions, both for historical subjects and ourselves. Though this chapter covers a wide range of topics, they are all indispensable components of understanding this repertory as a part of an early modern ecology of interior somatic experience. A contemporary understanding of sense perception and the relationship between passion and action are necessary for revealing structures of experience in the phenomenological sense. It is the historical context crucial for understanding how contemporary awareness was shaped and organised. In musical performance that textually addresses sensation explicitly, the words surround the ‘unrepresentable’ moment of somatic experience, revealing meaning that is the product of texts in experience. 190 As we will see moving on from here, in addressing the historical context of musicalised texts that address the fundamentals of human consciousness, it is only through a phenomenological lens that music can be approached historically as subjective experience rather than as a static object.

189 Ibid., 182.
190 David Carr has outlined that ‘[t]he problem of how language represents the world is of course not limited to history; it has consumed philosophers since the linguistic turn and long before. How indeed does language represent anything? The peculiarity of historical language is not only that the objects it represents are past rather than present, but also that they are primarily people and actions and events, rather than things and their properties (the traditional paradigm for representational theories of language). The primary linguistic form in which such things are represented is narrative, and narrative is … altogether different in form from the reality it purports to represent’. David Carr, Experience and History: Phenomenological Perspectives on the Historical World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 3-4.
Chapter 3: ‘Madrigals’ and Myths: Confronting Representations and Realities

In 1640, bishop-writer Edward Reynolds wrote that God gave us ‘Musicall, Poeticall, and Mythologicall perswasion’ to arouse our imaginations, with an end to teach and moralise. He saw music, poetry, and myth as means to make lofty spiritual matters tangible to mortals, as these three fictions ‘best affect the Imagination’. He justified this in Biblical terms, explaining,

wee finde some roome in the Holy Scriptures for Mythologies; as that of the Vine, the Fig-tree, and the Bramble, for Riddles, for Parables, Similitudes … whereby heavenly Doctrines are shadowed forth, and doe condiscend unto humane frailties.¹

He described how these arts work in subtle ways by ‘secretly instilling [morality] into the Will, that it might at last finde it selfe reformed, and yet [we] hardly perceive how it came to be so’.² Reynolds explained that imagination worked to ‘open and unbind the Thoughts’, as imagination is freer than the ‘rigor and strictness’ of Reason or the ‘severity of Truth’.³ Like many of his contemporaries, Reynolds upheld an essentially Aristotelian approach to the arts, maintaining that as long as music, poetry, and myth worked to teach us virtue, these imitative, metaphoric arts were worthy pursuits.⁴ Whether a force for gaining knowledge or for deception, myth, music, and poetry were thought to be the key modes for accessing and stimulating imagination, the internal sense responsible for feigning reality.⁵ As a central part of determining what reality exists in the external world, as well as the reliability of the senses in perceiving that world, imagination, as many have observed, played a key role in the so-called Scientific Revolution. As Dennis Sepper points out, imagination ‘compounds the uncertainties the meditator discovers in sensation’ and ‘produces possibilities rather than certainties’,

¹ Edward Reynolds, A Treatise of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man (London: printed by R.H[earne], 1640), sig.D3r.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid., sig.D4v.
⁴ William Webbe used pastoral justifications to support the arts by stating: ‘If that the Shepheards God did merit prayse’, then ‘Why should the feare of base detraction / Bury thy Arte in blacke oblivion?’ Thomas Greaves, Songs of sundrie kindes (1604), sig.A3v.
⁵ See Chapter Two.
thereby acting as a crucial point of contrast to later seventeenth-century philosophers like Descartes and Hobbes in establishing certainty. As will be discussed shortly, imagination, and its partner fiction, played an important role in the (non-linear) movement away from a belief in Aristotelian knowledge, one that assumed the outside world was how the senses perceived it, to one in which the only certain truth was the self. This opening section will outline more generally how fiction builds truth before addressing how early modern fictions, particularly mythology, worked to refine conceptions of truth in a wide spectrum of writing from the explicitly fictive to the ‘scientific’. Subsequently, I look at two sets of case studies, primarily by Thomas Weelkes, that examine how stereotypes or expectations attached to musical form could be used in ways that interrogated the tension between reality and its representations.

**How Fiction Builds Truth**

Many writers of the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries, including Sidney and Bacon, contributed to a timeless aesthetic question: can art, as representations of life, ever bear truth in the way some believed logic and philosophy could? Or will representations always just be imitations? As mentioned earlier, controversy over the truth-bearing capabilities of the arts was rooted in interpretations of Plato and Aristotle, with Plato of the belief that only logic or reason can bear truth. In response to this Platonic assertion, brought to a head by Protestant suspicion of the passions, many early modern thinkers wrote in the defence of the creative arts, arguing for their validity and positive utility. These writers included Philip Sidney, George Puttenham, William Byrd, in addition to other poets and composers. Although practically speaking artists were justifying their trade by defending *mimesis*, the philosophical problems presented by art’s power were significant, even if they were not explicitly

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6 Sepper, *Descartes’s Imagination*, 1-2.
7 But the way music in particular interrogates or presents issues of representation was apparent in musical treatises as well, as in Descartes’s *Compendium Musicae* (1618). Moreno, *Musical Representations, Subjects, and Objects*, 76.
8 Art’s purpose had important practical implications in addition to aesthetic ones, for example the controversy over the place of music in worship.
9 As Cocking says, ‘[t]here is no conception of the “truth of imagination” in Plato, and no role in his world for “imaginative art” as it was later conceived by those who considered themselves his followers’, Cocking, *Imagination*, 12, 21. Also, Kelley and Sacks (eds.), *The Historical Imagination in Early Modern Britain*, 3.
10 For example, as Byrd wrote, ‘[s]ince singing is so good a thing, I wish all men would learner to sing’, explaining how singing is good for praising God. William Byrd, *Psalms, sonets, and songs* (1588), sig.A4v. See also Sidney, *A Defence of Poesy* (1595) and Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesy* (1589), or the anonymously authored *Praise of Musick* (1586).
discussed as philosophical treatises, but in other types of writing like fiction. As Tadié and Scholar have argued, fiction played an array of roles at the ‘frontier of knowledge’ in the early modern period.\textsuperscript{11} Though contemporary opinions asserted that imagination was absolutely imperative for the fictive arts, recent scholarship has often concluded that it was equally imperative for non-literary texts.\textsuperscript{12} Stephen Greenblatt reminds us that issues of representation are rarely straightforward: ‘representations are not only products, but producers, capable of decisively altering the very forces that brought them into being’.\textsuperscript{13} Greenblatt warns the scholar that it is ‘a theoretical mistake and a practical blunder to collapse the distinction between representation and reality’, since ‘[t]hey are locked together in an uneasy marriage in a work without ecstatic union or divorce’.\textsuperscript{14} Contemporaries like Sidney and Bacon, for example, acknowledged the resemblance between history and fiction in the manner of its making, though fiction differed from history in that history relied on memory, and fiction on imagination.\textsuperscript{15} Yet because fiction was based on imagination, it belonged to the structures of knowledge.\textsuperscript{16} Bacon believed fables were a recoverable presentation of ancient knowledge that could promote certain types of philosophical knowledge.\textsuperscript{17} Sidney asserted in his \textit{Defence of Poesy} that fiction could more easily impose upon the mind of a reader than philosophy or history, which was ultimately an argument for the truth bearing capabilities of the arts.\textsuperscript{18}

The following section will briefly survey Philip Sidney’s and Francis Bacon’s approaches to fiction and knowledge. Though one was a courtier-poet, and the other a natural philosopher, their approaches to fiction’s role in building knowledge are central

\textsuperscript{11} Tadié and Scholar (eds.), \textit{Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge}, 10.
\textsuperscript{12} For example, as Tadié and Scholar point out, ‘fiction … is fundamental to the making of literary texts in early modern Europe, it has an equally important—and controversial—role to play in the formation of legal and philosophical ideas’. Tadié and Scholar (eds.), \textit{Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge}, 1.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 7. Work by modern theorists reinforces Greenblatt’s assertions. For example, George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s \textit{Metaphors We Live By} (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1980), explains how metaphors structure our most basic understanding of experience and how they shape our actions and perceptions, making literature central to understanding human psychology. For more modern theory on how fictions build realities, see also: John Gibson, Wolfgang Huemer, Luca Pocci (eds.), \textit{A Sense of the World: Essays on fiction, narrative, and knowledge} (New York: Routledge, 2007).
\textsuperscript{15} Tadié and Scholar (eds.), \textit{Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge}, 9.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{18} As Peter Mack summarises, to Sidney ‘[i]t is this effect in the world of the audience which justifies the making of images, and poetry itself’. Peter Mack in Nauta and Pätzold (eds.), \textit{Imagination in the Later Middle Ages and Early Modern Times}, 71-72.
to this study because they provide contemporary insight into the function of the fictive arts in the production of truth. As both authors and their works are well-established objects of study in modern scholarship, the proceeding section will provide only a summary of modern scholarship on their philosophies towards fiction.\textsuperscript{19} Though the seventeenth century is thought to be the period from where we get our modern sense of ‘truth’ or ‘fact’ as an opposing force to fiction, contemporary debates on fiction’s role in establishing reality has as much relevance in the post-modern day.\textsuperscript{20}

\textbf{Fictions of Sidney and Bacon}

The writing of Philip Sidney has bearing on this thesis not only because he was a salient courtier within circles of musical patronage whose poetry was often set to music, but also because he is an influential figure in our understanding of contemporary views on representation.\textsuperscript{21} In his \textit{Defence of Poesy} (1595), Sidney focused on the utility of representation to inspire action.\textsuperscript{22} Sidney reasons, ‘sometimes, under the pretty tales of wolves and sheep, [pastoral poetry] can include the whole considerations of wrong-doing and patience; sometimes show that contentions for trifles can get but a trifling victory’.\textsuperscript{23} Sidney challenged the Platonic supremacy of philosophy, arguing that fiction is actually a stronger force for change than philosophy because didactic philosophy is often discursive and lacks the emotion to move the reader to action. He believed that the poet moves his readers by providing them with engaging sensory experiences:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Both figures and their work will be referred to repeatedly throughout this thesis, whether in their explicitly philosophical works (i.e. Bacon’s \textit{Sylva sylvarum}, Sidney’s \textit{Defence of Poesy}) or philosophy as interpolated from their fictional work (i.e. Bacon’s \textit{New Atlantis}, or Sidney’s \textit{Astrophil and Stella}, etc.).
  \item As David Novitz explains, many modern assumptions about the nature of fact and truth stem from epistemic changes that occurred in the seventeenth century: ‘fancy, we have been told time and time again, tends to mislead rather than inform. If we must have information about our world, it is to empirical science, not the literature of fiction, that we should turn. For it is empirical science that is the source of all useful knowledge: knowledge on which we can depend, and in terms of which we can organise our world. This attitude to fiction is, of course, a by-product of the scientific revolution in the seventeenth century.’ Novitz, \textit{Knowledge, Fiction & Imagination}, 1.
  \item Sidney’s persona and biography is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. \textit{Defence of Poesy} was probably written around 1581, then after his death, two editions of \textit{Defence of Poesy} were published in 1595, one with the title \textit{An Apology for Poetry}. Katherine Duncan-Jones in Philip Sidney, \textit{Sir Philip Sidney: The Major Works}, (ed.) Katherine Duncan-Jones (Oxford: Oxford University Press, xxii-xxiii).
  \item Diana B. Altegoer, \textit{Reckoning Words: Baconian Science and the Construction of Truth in English Renaissance Culture} (London: Associated University Presses, 2000), 68.
\end{itemize}
Now doth the peerless poet perform both: for whatsoever the philosopher saith should be done, he giveth a perfect picture of it in some one by whom he presupposeth it was done, so as he coupleth the general notion with the particular example. A perfect picture I say, for he yieldeth to the powers of the mind an image of that whereof the philosopher bestoweth but a wordish description, which doth neither strike, pierce, nor possess the sight of the soul so much as that other doth.24

Sidney wrote that poetry was different from other forms of rhetoric because it was a ‘truthful counterfeit’. To him, historians cannot help but lie, but in poetry the author ‘never affirmeth’.25 For Sidney, poetry is an art of imitation, ‘a representing, counterfeit, or figuring forth—to speak metaphorically, a speaking picture—with this end, to teach and delight’.26 As poetry is inherently a representation or counterfeit of reality, it cannot possibly attest to be actual reality, and therefore it is safe from accusations of falsehood. Yet it can still motivate ‘profitable invention’.27 Diana Altegoer discerns that, for Sidney, ‘[s]ignificance does not come from an authorized source beyond the historical task … [a]ll words contain nuances and subtleties of meaning that make an unproblematic and unambiguous assignment to things virtually impossible … Instead, meaning and signification are related to the reading process, to the stages of self-awareness through which the poet asks himself and his readers to pass’.28 As Gavin Alexander attests, ‘[a]s a theory of literature, the Defence is all about the reader’.29 As such, the ‘Defence tells us that poetry (which means fiction in verse or prose) has the power to change us’.30 Sidney’s work is vital to this thesis because it establishes contemporary precedent that emphasised the importance of process and experience in the creation of meaning, and the positive effect that mere representations of reality could motivate: action that he thought shaped reality itself. Sidney’s approach to the process of reading relies on self-awareness, thus emphasising the individual’s role in establishing reality by defining the self.31

24 Sidney, An Apology for Poetry, (eds.) Shepherd and Maslen, 86.
25 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 72-3.
26 Ibid., 30.
27 Sidney says, ‘[a]nd therefore, as in history, looking for truth, they may go away full fraught with falsehood, so in poesy, looking but for fiction, they shall use the narration but as an imaginative ground-plot of a profitable invention’ (Defence, 52-53), as quoted in Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 73.
28 Ibid., 70.
29 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, xxviii.
30 Ibid., xxvii.
31 I will return to a discussion of Sidney and the centrality of the self in Chapter Four.
Francis Bacon’s approach to fiction is of importance here not only because he provides a link between the study of music’s physical properties and overt efforts to change knowledge, but also because he, like Sidney, demonstrates how fiction could actively shape realities, rather than merely reflect them. Bacon’s work on sound and music demonstrate how the arts played a central role in contemporary debates about representation’s capacity to construct reality. Furthermore, Baconian science emphasised the verbal and political construction of knowledge. Yet the historiography of his work is complicated. Bacon played a role in the inauguration of ‘empirical science’ by arguing for a conceptual split between the language arts (words) and the study of natural philosophy (things) in order to better understand the mechanics of nature. Consequently, nineteenth and early twentieth-century historians often viewed him as an empiricist, a title that has in more recent scholarship been problematised. In spite of Bacon’s outward belief in the separation of words from things, Diana Altegoer argues that a rhetorical examination of Baconian science is necessary because of the contradictions and complexities within his scientific reasoning, ‘problems’ earlier historians who cherished Bacon’s ‘mastery of nature’ did not know how to solve, as it did not seem a sufficiently ‘scientific’ trait by nineteenth-century standards. Altegoer says that despite Bacon’s arguments for separating res from verba in establishing truth, ‘the continued employment of myth, paradox, and fable in his philosophical writings shows that Bacon was still enmeshed in that rhetorical frame of mind which constantly reassessed philological possibilities in order to discover mental processes and therein the reflected truths of nature’. Furthermore, it is Altegoer’s belief that ‘[i]his intellectualising of myth proved to be Bacon’s greatest influence on subsequent philosophers’, as imagination and fiction were to play a similarly substantial role in the works of later thinkers like Thomas Hobbes. She

32 For Baconian sensing, see Ch. 2 81-84.
33 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 13.
34 Ibid., 15.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 14.
37 Ibid., 23.
38 As Altegoer outlines, Bacon’s opinion on the usefulness of mythology hadn’t always been in favour of their use. But by his De Sapientia Veterum (1609), he is ‘firmly convinced that the veil or dense mist of fable facilitates the modern advancement of learning’. Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 80.
argues, contrary to other interpretations of Bacon’s work, that myth was of ‘pervasive importance’ to ‘Bacon’s general reform of science and philosophy’.  

Like Sidney, Francis Bacon also believed that mimesis served to, in Bacon’s words, ‘strengthen and establish’ reason. As Altegoer says, ‘[p]oesy, aligned with imagination, held a pivotal place in Bacon’s scheme to advance learning; by linking reason with the will and appetite, the poetic imagination creates a pleasurable imitation of history and serves to interpret the hidden wisdom of ancient fables. In grasping the basic principles of imitation, the scientist was able to unveil the figure and reveal the transcendent truth hidden beneath’. Thus, to Bacon, fiction presented ancient knowledge, but also promoted a kind of universal philosophical truth that stretched across the disciplines. To reconcile Bacon’s sometimes contradictory writing on the nature of the relationship between knowledge and fiction, Scholar and Tadié surmise that, to Bacon, ‘[a] fable is thus both a presentation of ancient knowledge that may be recovered, and a tale that promotes a certain type of philosophical knowledge. This leads, in the Baconian corpus, to two kinds of activity: the interpretation of fables, of which De Sapientia is a perfect example, and the writing of (philosophical) fables, in Bacon’s case, the New Atlantis. Thus, the very existence of New Atlantis supports fiction’s place in Bacon’s new science and the organisation of knowledge as a persuasive representation of reality with the power to motivate change. In spite of its connection to imagination, Bacon valued fiction as a mode capable of unveiling transcendent truth, and in its potential to motivate change, fiction was considered a fundamental player in Bacon’s new structure of knowledge, giving contemporary justification for the arts’ ability to construct reality. Moreover, Bacon’s writing style, which included the use of mythology and paradox, exposes the inescapably rhetorical and dialogical intellectual milieu within which Bacon was fashioned.

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39 Ibid., 81.
41 Altegoer, Reckoning Words, 22.
42 Tadié and Scholar (eds.), Fiction and the Frontiers of Knowledge, 10.
43 Ibid., 11.
45 For further discussion on dialogue in the work of Francis Bacon, see Ch. 4, 175-6.
A Caveat: Words in Practice

Though Bacon and Sidney made rhetorical claims that separated history from poesy, fact and fiction, in practice their respective writings allowed for much conflation of the two, an inconsistency of notable significance in other contemporary areas of study. This muddiness between rhetorical ‘intent’ and practice extended even to objects like scientific instruments. In their book *Instruments and Imagination* (1995), Thomas Hankins and Robert Silverman trace inventions and instruments of science that ‘moved easily from natural philosophy to art to popular culture’.46 They observe that even though the rhetorical aims of natural magic and experimental philosophy seemed to diverge rather sharply, the instruments created in pursuit of those goals demonstrates a fuzzier demarcation between them, particularly in objects that were meant to ‘replicate or investigate in some way the phenomena of sight and sound’.47 In use, these instruments were of both magic and natural philosophy, and Hankins and Silverman conclude that the boundaries between natural science and ‘other human activity’ was far from acute, particularly in matters surrounding the nature of sense perception.48 This example demonstrates how inconsistencies between rhetorical aim and practice, even within a single text or object, require further interpretation and investigation to reconcile meaning. This helps to explain the inconsistencies between the rhetoric and practice of both Bacon and Sidney, within their literary and non-literary works. I interpret these inconsistencies as indicative of Greenblatt’s ‘uneasy marriage’ between reality and its representation (whether rhetorical or not). If representations like fiction are not only products of culture but producers of it, then inconsistencies between rhetorical aim and practice can be read as the type of contradiction in discourse and social practices that could indicate new ways of knowing.49

It is for this reason that this thesis proceeds with the understanding that, in Novitz’s words, fiction ‘affords … genuine cognitive experiences which are of considerable heuristic value’ giving us candid insight ‘into the world within which we

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48 Ibid., 5.
49 See quotation by Elizabeth Hanson in Ch. 1, 42.
live’.\textsuperscript{50} This is demonstrated both in modern theory and in analysis of early modern writing. Shakespeare’s Touchstone knows fiction’s power of verisimilitude in producing tangible change when he says ‘the truest poetry is the most feigning’ (\textit{As you like it}, III.iii.19-20).\textsuperscript{51} Though empiricism was to eventually take over as the foremost mode for establishing truth after the seventeenth century, Scholar and Tadié observe that in that period, imagination and fiction participated ‘fully in this effort to transform former perceptions of the world’ and fiction indeed played a role in the ‘relationship of the scientific observer to objects’.\textsuperscript{52} Not only was fiction’s role in establishing reality a subject of great concern for natural philosophers like Francis Bacon trying to reform all of knowledge, but also for every musician, poet, artist, and playwright who felt they had to justify their craft against naysayers.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{The Function of Mythology and the Pastoral}

The history of mythology and the pastoral mode (its literary presence, theoretical functions, origins, etc.) and its appearance in music has earned multiple volumes unto itself.\textsuperscript{54} Though the pastoral mode is a literary, scholarly, and artistic force wholly its own, for this chapter, the use of the pastoral is in terms of the mythological figures it commonly employs, like Cupid, Diana, nymphs, etc.\textsuperscript{55} Therefore, I will be using theory

\textsuperscript{50} Novitz, \textit{Knowledge, Fiction & Imagination}, 11. Moreover, as Gibson et al. state, understanding our human need for fiction ‘to explain why we turn to literature with the expectation of having our understanding of the world refined, augmented, even shocked; to give support to the perhaps vague but nonetheless pervasive belief that in literary experience we often come to know ourselves and our world better’. Gibson, Huemer, Poci (eds.), \textit{A Sense of the World}, 1.

\textsuperscript{51} Cocking, \textit{Imagination}, xi.

\textsuperscript{52} Tadié and Scholar (eds.), \textit{Fiction and the Frontier of Knowledge}, 72.

\textsuperscript{53} Moreover, it is worth pointing out that although the present day West still holds a general faith in objective science, we often turn to fiction, like the work of Shakespeare, for anecdotes of truth of a different sort, as I just did above.


\textsuperscript{55} Many of the English domestic music books published in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries are of an explicitly pastoral nature, rife with figures from classical myth, skipping nymphs, kissing shepherds, fields of daisies—the pleasures of ‘the simple life’ that is ‘remembered’ in a perceived past that exists not in history, but in the mind. As Kerman outlines, the pastoral involved a scene in which a woman frolics ‘amongst a group of Nymphs, Shepherds, Satyrs, and Fauns, who weave her garlands of rose and myrtle, and dance gracefully to the singing of dolci concerti, while birds twitter in the trees and the woodland beasts play among cool brooks and shady green banks. Sometimes Cupid or Venus joins them’. This quaintness readily invokes a sense of nostalgia for simple country life, even if the person experiencing the nostalgia has never actually lived such a life. Even though the pastoral permeated basically all forms of art in the Renaissance (along with its partner humanism), the influence of the pastoral mode was often more subtle than sometimes assumed. Kerman, \textit{The Elizabethan Madrigal}, 200; Lerner, \textit{TheUses of Nostalgia}, 41.
from myth and the pastoral interchangeably, though I acknowledge there are nuances that differentiate their histories. The following will look into contemporary and modern theories on mythology’s function before analysing how these functions were adopted and adapted in musical forms often affiliated with the pastoral. The mythological characters of the pastoral mode brought with them allegory, ideas, and traits that were ingrained into children from a young age in English grammar schools. According to Jane Kingsley-Smith, ‘sections of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses* were learned by heart as a stylistic model’ and students imitated Ovid’s *Heroides* in order to practice composing rhetoric appropriate to the mythological character’s circumstances and persona. Consequently, England’s educated classes could easily pick up on mythological allusion in plays, music, and poetry, and it was common for elites to fashion themselves with ‘mythological self-images’ in portraits, civic plays, masques, etc. But, as Angus Vine discerns, ‘myth and legend was not only the preserve of those who had had the benefit of a university or even grammar school education’, as there also existed a wider interest in mythology that extended to popular entertainment like pageants and theatre that were not reserved only for the schooled.

Practically speaking, myth is a highly metaphorical form, and it thus allowed authors to use the pastoral ‘palette’ to veil and colour a variety of themes, often topical, political, erotic, or of religious and moral allegory. Contemporary understanding of the power of mythology, however, was similar to other theories derived from an Aristotelian understanding of the arts, namely that if mythologies could be harnessed for good, they served a moral purpose (as Edward Reynolds was quoted stating at the beginning of this chapter). The veil offered by mythology was particularly useful when trying to describe abstract and little understood ideas, like the power of music over our

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56 Richard Andrews suggest that characters from classical mythology infiltrated pastoral drama by 1500, a period which saw an increase in texts that mingled the two traditions. Richard Andrews, “Pastoral Drama” in Peter Brand and Lino Pertile (eds.), *The Cambridge History of Italian Literature, Revised Edition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 292.
57 Indeed, Erasmus’s *De ratione studii* of 1512 was a foundation text for the curriculum of the St Paul’s School London. In it, Erasmus wrote of the importance of mythology to learning and knowledge. Angus Vine, “Myth and Legend” in Andrew Hadfield, Matthew Dimmock and Abigail Shinn (eds.), *The Ashgate Research Companion to Popular Culture in Early Modern England* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 104.
59 Ibid.
61 Ibid., 111.
bodies, passions, and spirits. Even to a composer-vicar like Richard Carlton, music commanded an almost magical power that lay somewhere between humanity, mythology, and God. In the Latin dedication to his *Madrigals to Five Voyces* (1601), Carlton wrote: ‘We may read of [music’s] power, that it once called back the dead from the underworld, and touched not only the sensible, but even those bereft of their senses in wondrous ways. Today, too, we still see that it incites the sad to joy, the immoderate to moderation and the unfaithful to piety.’ Even as a man of the cloth, Carlton resorted to mythically-veiled justifications as he explained music’s ancient power, with its transportive, even transfigurative effects upon our persons that somehow transcended the sense perception it was commonly thought to rely upon. George Puttenham wrote in his *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589) that pastoral verse was considered by many to be ‘the first familiar conversation’. But he also stated that the pastoral was later devised by men who saw its powerful function as a means to change behaviour: ‘but under the veil of homely persons … These Eglogues came after to containe and enforce morall discipline, for the amendment of mans behauiour, as be those of Mantuan and other moderne Poets’. Puttenham believed that when the passions were moved by myth, they could motivate change. Altegoer points out that even Bacon saw myth as a means to efficiently reveal truths:

Basing his experiential method on a similar, instinctive comprehension of truth, Bacon intended his Instauratio to redeem knowledge and restore learning to its primitive (prelapsarian) purity … in this scheme, metaphor, schemes, tropes, including myth and allegory, were employed to … challenge the receiver into strenuous efforts of discovery, and to render truth, once discovered the more dearly held for the effort.

For Bacon, truth comprehended through myth was a redemption of knowledge; for Reynolds, it was God. Regardless, Reynolds was in good company in believing that myth worked to veil the truth, thus making tangible holy or meta truths otherwise

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64 Eglogues are the mythological, pastoral works by the poet Virgil. Puttenham, *The Arte of English Poesie* (1589), sig. F4r.
incomprehensible to normal man.\textsuperscript{66} Though it seems curiously counterintuitive, in order to reveal higher truth, we must first veil truth.

Modern theorists, too, have contemplated myth and the pastoral’s pervasive function throughout human cultures. Eero Tarasti reports that anthropological approaches to myth theory believe ‘there is no doubt that the main cultural function of mythology is the establishment of precedent, the vindication of the truth of magic, of the binding forces of morality and law, and the real value of religious ritual by referring to events which have occurred in a dim past, in the Golden Age’.\textsuperscript{67} One might argue that mythologies and pastorals, by rooting present behaviour in an ahistorical past, urge people to question the nature of knowledge through self-examination. Giuseppe Gerbino argues that in the fantasy experienced through pastoral ‘the real issue is not self-deception, but self-representation. Pastoral did not offer an easy way out from oneself, but a symbolic space within which to play oneself.’\textsuperscript{68} To Vanda Zajko and Ellen O’Gorman, myth ‘becomes one of the means of narrating, comprehending, but also elevating human experience. It thus finds a place in the disciplines of science and medicine, as well as of the human sciences, which have as their common ground the understanding of the self in its various dimensions’.\textsuperscript{69} Gerbino points out the irony in our historical perspective on pastoral as quaint and innocent, when it was often seen contemporarily as a subversive form.\textsuperscript{70} Yet, as Gerbino argues, ‘Western culture used pastoral fiction as a metaphor of human existence, as a way to articulate discourses about human nature and its relation to the world’.\textsuperscript{71} To a group with a shared experiential context, myth works as a sort of shorthand, immediately invoking a strain of meaning. Zajko and O’Gorman surmise that ‘[e]ven the very name of a mythic figure can function as a profoundly intertextual moment, which connects a text to a well-known set of important issues’.\textsuperscript{72} And, as I will argue over the course of this

\textsuperscript{66} ‘As Dionysius says, ‘the divine ray cannot reach us unless it is covered with poetic veils’, as quoted in Simonds, \textit{Myth, Emblem, and Music in Shakespeare’s Cymbeline}, 68.
\textsuperscript{68} Giuseppe Gerbino, \textit{Music and the Myth of Arcadia in Renaissance Italy} (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 4-5.
\textsuperscript{70} Gerbino, \textit{Music and the Myth of Arcadia in Renaissance Italy}, 2.
\textsuperscript{71} Ibid., 4.
\textsuperscript{72} Zajko and O’Gorman (eds.), \textit{Classical Myths and Psychoanalysis}, 3.
chapter, a variation on this sort of ‘intertextual moment’ also happened with the madrigal and related genres, so strongly associated with the mythological and pastoral, that effects of those modes could be harnessed even without strong or indeed any textual mythological references.

The function of mythologies in the fashioning of the self was related to the idea that contemplation of an Other necessarily reflects or draws attention to the self, and it is perhaps for this reason that mythology and the pastoral recurred so frequently throughout our literary past—often when one seeks to understand the individual experience or contemplate elements of human consciousness. As many have argued, there is no objective pastoral, only what it ‘was thought to be’—nostalgia for an ahistorical place remembered fondly as if it once existed, not in pure fantasy, but in an alternate past that may have never occurred.

_Eero Tarasti on Myth and Music_

Eero Tarasti explains that mythologies ‘signify a sacred, traditional knowledge, a primitive belief, which naturally prompts one to ask the nature of this knowledge and belief’. It makes sense, then, that mythological tropes provide a suitable mode of dialogue for furthering the nature of knowledge. Gerbino knows that ‘music played a fundamental role in the construction and preservation of this collective illusion’ known as Arcadia. But as I argue in this chapter, it appears possible that music, too, might have been altered by this significant affiliation with the pastoral. Tarasti argues that ‘[m]yth and music constitute two forms of discourse which are closely related’. He suspects that ‘[t]here are compositions wherein only the code of myth is reconstructed’ as ‘[t]he influence of myth upon music is … ascertainable in the stylistic features of musical discourse’. One challenge for Tarasti, who is looking primarily at the music of Strauss and Wagner, is that ‘in order to see how musical thematics are involved in the mythical, one must find several musical realizations of the same myth or sufficiently similar myths’. This is certainly not much of a challenge in the madrigalian genres. A simple ballett-like ‘fa-la’ or a word-painted ‘aye me’ acts as a signifier that might as well

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73 Tarasti, _Myth and Music_, 18.
74 Gerbino, _Music and the Myth of Arcadia in Renaissance Italy_, 1.
75 Tarasti, _Myth and Music_, 11.
76 Ibid., 15-16.
77 Ibid., 16.
invoke Diana and her train of dancing nymphs. Tarasti hypothesises that because music possesses a formal world, history and rules of its own … in the hands of myth it acquires a new function and its original properties are put in “brackets” because its only task now is to support the mythical meaning and content. Does not this explain the structural paucity and a certain syntactical scarcity of musical discourse during those periods when music was closely allied with myth? To this end, he concludes that ‘music in some cases could entirely replace a mythical text’, suggesting that because music is like language without semantic meaning, the notes could indeed detach themselves from their verbal foundation, whilst retaining myth’s cultural function. This is an idea to which I shall return by the end of the chapter.

In this chapter’s case studies, I examine how the domestic genres’ dynamic partnership with the mythological influenced textual and musical meaning through compositional tropes, particularly as texts evolved away from strictly pastoral topics. First, I focus on satire and the music of Thomas Weelkes in three pieces from his Ayers or phantastike spirits (1608). This analysis draws on work by Julian Johnson and Esti Sheinberg on musical irony. The subsequent case study, on Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the period of cosmographie’, draws on modes of inquiry common to scholarship on travel writing, early modern utopia, and Shakespeare studies. As Allison Kavey says, ‘[t]he early modern tension between imagination and belief was a symptomatic anxiety concerning the limits of human credulousness and the nature of the equivocal space between reality and appearance, reason and delusion, literal and figurative representations of things’. Though these two sets of examples by Weelkes rely on rather different modes for interpretation, they have in common the way that musical

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79 Tarasti, Myth and Music, 27.
80 Ibid., 30.
81 Tarasti argues that such ‘transfer of structures from the area of one to that of the other is based on the fact that myth and music as discourses have similar functions, as a result of which they can, in certain cases, substitute for each other’. Ibid., 33.
form and text can work together to interrogate the tension, the ‘equivocal space’ between realities and their representations.

3.1 ‘Phantasticke Spirites’: Myth and Satire

Both the pastoral mode and satire were strongly embedded in early modern English culture. But more importantly, they served a common function as fictions that create spaces of ambiguity in which subjects could engage in significant and challenging discourses. Perhaps it is no coincidence that the half-goat, half-man Arcadian Satyr made a common appearance in madrigalian texts, and was sometimes confused with ‘satire’, as they were often spelled interchangeably. Like the pastoral, satire forces the hearer to contemplate the relationship between reality and fiction. The following considers the satirical possibilities created by the frequent use of mythology in domestic Elizabethan and Stuart vocal music, as well as satire’s role in formulating new conceptions of credible knowledge. Though it is well established that mythological figures in domestic music were often used as political allegory, the malleability of these well-known mythical tropes allowed for the genre to take on and discuss a variety of meaningful topics. As will be demonstrated shortly, Thomas Weelkes engaged with fictional and musical tropes of the domestic genres in a very similar way, highlighting satirical texts through literal musical imagery. In doing so Weelkes’s ayres contributed to a musical discussion that inherently interrogated the relationship between reality and appearances.

Satire is a discursive genre that was as popular in seventeenth century England as it is today; in spite of attempts at censorship, satire remained a definitive literary genre of the time. As Andrew McRae explains, Thomas Scot wrote that:

“This is a wondrous witty age that sees / Beyond the truth of things, forty degrees”. Seeing “beyond the truth”, as this poet anxiously begins to perceive,

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83 It is for this reason that in Greek drama Satyrs are often the characters attributed with giving satirical speeches. “satyr, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, June 2014 (accessed 24 June 2014).
84 For an overview of political allegory in the poetry of this period, see: David Norbrook, Poetry and Politics in the English Renaissance, Revised Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
85 Under Elizabeth I, satirical publications were so widespread that the so-called ‘Bishops’ Ban of 1599’ was enacted to censor satire and epigram specifically, though it was not well enforced after its initial push. Andrew McRae, Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 29.
involves accepting that literature shapes realities as much as it merely reflects them, and that satire might now be revealing itself as interested and polemical rather than disinterested and aloof.\endnote{Ibid., 6.}

In his \textit{Skialethia or A Shadowe of Truth, in Certaine Epigrams and Satyres} (1598), Everard Gulpin wrote that the Satirists’ aim was to ‘speake the truth’.\endnote{‘Satyre Preludium’, lines 76, 71; in Everard Gulpin, \textit{Skialethia or A Shadowe of Truth, in Certaine Epigrams and Satyres}, (ed.) D. Allen Carroll (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1974), 61.} Though satire can exist in a strictly textual context, often it is through appropriate performance or delivery that satirical elements are asserted. Henry Peacham explained that ‘ironia’ is when a sentence is understood by the contrary, or thus, when our meaning is contrary to our saying, not so well perceaved by the wordes, as eyther by the pronunciation, by the behavyor of the person, or by the nature of ye thing … \endnote{Henry Peacham, \textit{Garden of Eloquence} (printed by H. Jackson, 1577), sig. D2r.} [B]y this fygure we doe forbid by a mocking graunt, and commaunde by a frumping forbidding, and also commend that, that is worthy of disprayse, and dispraise that, that is worthy of high commendation.\endnote{Henry Peacham, \textit{Garden of Eloquence} (printed by H. Jackson, 1577), sig. D2r.}

Particularly in sarcastic or ‘deadpan’ performance, true meaning of the words is unclear until the ‘behavyor of a person’ imbues the text with satirical meaning, ready for uptake by the savvy hearer. The performer’s role in properly portraying satirical uptake is of note.

It is difficult to draw a concise and authoritative taxonomy of satire, as the precise relationships between its common elements are debated amongst linguists and philologists. For example, some categorise satire as a subset of irony whilst others see irony as a common satiric device.\endnote{For these views, see respectively Ellen Berland, “The Function of Irony in Marston’s Antonio and Mellisa”, \textit{Studies in Philology}, LXVI (1969): 739-55 and Gilbert Highet, \textit{An Anatomy of Satire} (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962).} For this reason I will use the terms satire and irony interchangeably. Generally, there are two basic features of satire: an object of attack and an element of the grotesque, fantastical, or absurd.\endnote{Katrin Trüstedt, “Secondary Satire and the Sea-Change of Romance”, \textit{Law & Literature}, 17.3 (2005): 345–64, 347.} Satire relies on a distortion of meaning, often through exaggeration or understatement.\endnote{Esti Sheinberg, \textit{Irony, Satire, Parody and the Grotesque in the Music of Dmitrii Shostakovich} (Burlington: Ashgate, 2000), 28.} As Gilbert Highet succinctly states, parody, another subset of satire, is ‘the difference between a portrait-sketch and

\endnote{86 Ibid., 6.}
\endnote{88 Henry Peacham, \textit{Garden of Eloquence} (printed by H. Jackson, 1577), sig. D2r.}
a caricature'.

Replacement of one component (like a normal-sized nose) with something absurd is a common satirical trope, resulting in ironic or parodical meaning. Overly sincere or seemingly unconscious 'deadpan' performance could be considered the absurd element in some satirical utterances. Sarcasm, on the other hand, is a form of irony that states one thing, but implies the opposite through tone and expression. Sarcasm often requires a body to hint at its existence via facial expression, gestures, vocal tone, etc. For our purposes here, it is useful to view all satirical features as Simpson defines them: '[s]atirical texts are understood as utterances which are inextricably bound up with the context of situation, with participants in discourse and with frameworks of knowledge'.

Though satirical humour is ostensibly comical, it plays a significant role in truth-building. Paul Simpson reminds us that, amongst other things, humour ‘rehearses and redesigns the categories and concepts of serious discourse’. Simpson views satire as a discursive practice, in the Foucauldian sense—a process through which cultural and social significance is built through routine daily interaction and, ultimately, works to define collective knowledge. Satire is critical and functions as a discourse that challenges representation and its ability to ‘straddle the poles of truth and falsity’; this suggests that one way music could participate as an active agent in discourses of knowledge was through satire.

Julian Johnson defines musical irony as the process through which ‘the expected sense of the music’ is then ‘inverted by presenting familiar conventions of a genre

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92 Not to be confused with a parody mass, which I am not discussing here. Higet, An Anatomy of Satire, 69.
93 Sheinberg, Irony, Satire, Parody and the Grotesque, 28.
94 Randall Knoper explains how the deadpan style reveals truth through ‘states of unselfconsciousness’ or ‘a quiet subjectivity’ posited against ‘calculated posing’. In deadpan there is always an unease between ‘an intentionally blank face and idiocy, or between cunning and naivety’. Randall K. Knoper, Acting Naturally: Mark Twain in the Culture of Performance (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 57.
96 Perhaps it is for this reason that this repertoire’s satirical element is often lost on modern performers and audiences. Paul Simpson, On the Discourse of Satire: Towards a Stylistic Model of Satirical Humor (Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing, 2005), 1.
97 Irony need not induce laughs, however. For example, it is irony that makes an evil clown particularly creepy, as the juxtaposition between a clown’s apparent intended purpose (to make children happy) is discordant with the evil clown’s actions (murder, for example). The resulting feeling is not one of humour, but of unease—an uncanny eeriness that pervades a particular figure (killer clown) or a particular space, like the haunted circus.
98 Simpson, On the Discourse of Satire, 2.
99 Ibid., 5.
(waltz, march) but conspicuously deformed’. Consequently, ‘the powerful expressive effect arises from the cognitive dissonance of normative meaning in a non-normative context’. He observes that there are remarkably few studies devoted to musical irony; of those there are, almost all are written in relation to individual composers. Perhaps the lack of any overview tells its own story: until quite recently, it seems, discourse about music has been unwilling, to the point of denial, to treat music as anything less than a form of sincere, authentic and direct expression.

Johnson importantly concludes that ‘[t]he authorial interruption of the music’s formal and grammatical logic inscribes the presence of a divided self-consciousness, one that both creates the work and, at the same time, underlines its own awareness of the fictive and constructive nature of that creation’. Moreover, he supposes that ‘[t]he significance of this far exceeds questions of musical style or familiar accounts of idiosyncratic composers “playing” with musical conventions’. Though Johnson’s survey doesn’t extend to the early modern period (as his conclusion is that irony has implications for modernity via the self-aware subject), my discussion of Weelkes’s engagement with irony will explore the presence of musical satire within his contemporary cultural-historical situation.

Musical satire has some hermeneutic challenges unique to its form, however. As Esti Sheinberg shows, there is often ambiguity in satire, as it has two coexisting meanings, one explicit and one concealed. This much seems obvious in literature, but it is a more complicated relationship when it comes to music. As she points out, ‘how can a musical message be “concealed” or “explicit”’ as music does not have ‘true’ and ‘false’ statements? Though perhaps frustrating for the modern scholar who seeks a definitive thesis for ‘music’s purpose’, perhaps it is music’s partial subjectivity that allows it to so aptly contribute to inconclusive discourses, such as the nature of the relationship between perception and reality. Ambiguity, as Sheinberg states, ‘is an

101 Ibid., 239.
102 Ibid., 240.
103 Ibid., 257.
104 Ibid.
105 Sheinberg, Irony, Satire, Parody and the Grotesque, 15.
106 Ibid.
autonomous reflection on unsolvable paradoxes’. In other words, it is musical meaning’s inherent elusiveness, combined with ironic ambiguity, which creates a space for dialogue on life’s most intangible questions.

My argument relies on the premise that, by 1600, the structural and topical tropes of the domestic genres were well known to Weelkes and his contemporaries, and therefore could be employed satirically. Perhaps it is not coincidental that the English madrigal, a genre born from imitation, could become so swiftly and easily satirised. McRae observes that ‘a study of satire highlights kinds of texts and textual practices which were utterly familiar to contemporary readers and writers, but which are often overlooked by forms of history that prioritise reason and clarity in political expression’, and this is also true within modern studies of Elizabethan and Stuart song. Joseph Kerman was possibly the first to pick up on, in his words, ‘a little satire in the madrigal style’, particularly in ‘later madrigal books’. He attributes this satirical treatment to a more general rejection of the Italianate styles in favour of the ‘native’ tradition of lute song. Kerman does not, however, engage with the musical treatment of these satirical texts nor make further propositions for satire’s social function. This chapter’s case studies hope to demonstrate how tropes of mythology and music worked together in the creation of a satiric discourse with significant implications for impending changes in episteme, also suggesting the need for a reconsideration of the same domestic music’s vapid reputation.

Thomas Weelkes: Satirical Subversion of the Pastoral
If musical irony relies on a disturbance in common musical form, it is necessary first to understand that form. Ostensibly, Weelkes’s *Ayeres or phantaosticke spirites* (1608) is no different from many others of its day, combining elements of canzonet, ballet, and other ‘light’ forms of Italian derivation. In both Weelkes’s collection and Morley’s

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107 Ibid.
108 Particularly given the hostility towards the form expressed by some like Campion and Jones. See Introduction, 21-22.
109 McRae, *Literature, Satire and the Early Stuart State*, 86.
111 Ibid., 37.
112 This section hopes to validate a collection of music that has been much neglected in scholarship. David Brown states that Weelkes’s 1608 collection ‘is a disappointment’, for structural-musical reasons. His only comment on the texts are that some ‘have clear topical references; indeed, some may have been occasional pieces’. David Brown, “Weelkes, Thomas.” *Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online.* Oxford University Press (accessed 1 June 2015) <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/30007>. 
Canzonets or little short songs to three voices (1593), for example, each piece is composed for three voices, some strophic and some through composed, and often with repeated sections. When possible, Weelkes takes opportunities to musically illustrate suitable words in the madrigalian fashion (see ‘The nightingale’ and its chorus of descending minor third ‘cuckoo’ noises), as does Morley in his collection (semiquaver runs to illustrate a ‘full’ laugh in ‘Deep lamenting’). Though in his 1608 book Weelkes does not musically diverge drastically from the formal precedents for the ayre (as exemplified not only by Morley and Weelkes’s earlier collections, but also by Youll, Pilkington, and several others), it is in his choice of texts that the traditional model is disturbed. Mythological figures were invoked, but, as will be shown shortly, to a distinctly different effect than the way Morley used them.

In Weelkes’s dedication to Ayres or phantasticke spirites, the composer wishes his patron Edward Denny ‘happines of both worldes’. Though clearly wishing him well in this world and the spiritual afterlife, perhaps ‘both worldes’ could also imply interplay between the real world (‘ayre’, with its double meaning, is a somewhat material object) and the imagined or otherworldly (‘phantasticke spirites’) addressed by various pieces in this collection. It is perhaps for this reason that Edmund Fellowes thought that the pieces in this collection with ‘political or topical meaning, the explanation of which has been lost’ are ‘aptly styled by the composer Fantastic Spirits’. If Fellowes is right, then there is no structural difference between ‘ayres’ and ‘spirites’ in musical terms, the distinction is in the poetic content (if there even is a conscious distinction at all). It seems curious, however, that Weelkes would name his topical pieces ‘phantasticke spirites’, as the reverse seems more logical. It is clear, however, that the deeply embedded connection between music and myth in this genre allowed for meaningful conversation to occur through both the presentation and absence of formal and poetic tropes.

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113 There are a few madrigalian six-voice works at the end of Weelkes’s collection, including his remembrance for Thomas Morley and his inclusion from the Triumphs of Oriana (1601), ‘As Vesta was from Latmos hill descending’. Thomas Weelkes, Ayeres or Phantasticke Spirits (London: printed by [John Windet], 1608).

114 It is written as such in both of the two extant print versions of this collection. They are similar but with slight variations of wording. See Fellowes/Dart edition for a side-by-side comparison). Thomas Weelkes, Ayres or Fantastic Spirits (1608), (eds.) Edmund Fellowes and Thurston Dart (London: Stainer & Bell, 1965), xx.

115 Ibid., iii.

Weelkes: ‘Ha ha! This world doth passe’

In the three case studies addressed here, Thomas Weelkes and his anonymous text authors don’t completely do away with textual inference to traditional mythology, but in each instance, the classical pastoral is in some way perverted, indicating that appearances may prove more complex than they are immediately presented. In Weelkes’s ‘Ha ha! This world doth passe’, the composer set a seemingly whimsical text to a seemingly whimsical tune (see Fig. 3.1):
Figure 3.1: Weelkes, 'Ha ha' from Ayeres or Phantaeticke Spirites (1608), sig.D2r.
Huntington E. Library and Art Gallery STC / 1046:04.
On first examination of the poem, it appears to be a silly strophic ditty without much interpretive potential. Indeed, multiple modern readers have called this text ‘nonsense’. The poem juxtaposes objects from the New World with classical mythology: Leda and Tullia are both characters stemming from Greek myth and they appear in company with marmosets, Indian asses, as well as the ever-ambiguous Unicorn, all figures with equivocally mythical and real origin. Yet the irony of Weelkes’s capricious setting is substantial. When read literally, the text may come across as nonsensical, though perhaps amusing in its social commentary, and the musical setting appears to support this. Though the music is strophic (with the repeated refrain of ‘Faradiddle’), the music’s word painting works well on all three strophes of text, a rare occurrence in this repertoire. In spite of the strophic form, however, ‘Ha ha’ manages to accommodate both overt word painting and multiple verses. To do this, the poet has opened all three verses with laughing pseudo nonsense-syllables (haha, haha / teehee, teehee / so so, so so), the effect of which is exaggerated by the musical setting which repeats them even more, to almost ridiculous effect. It begins ‘slowly’ with the hocket-like staggered entries, doubling the frequency of each iteration within the first three bars, culminating in successive crotchetts. After this opening sequence, it then falls into a dance-like sense of three, which continues for most of the piece in relative homophony, making the text very understandable. The ‘faradiddle’ refrain may be an indication that whoever wrote the text intended it for

117 Though outside the scope of this study, it is worth considering that just because the syllables are ‘nonsense’ does not mean they do not have meaning. See Christopher Wilson’s review of Doughtie’s English Renaissance Song: Christopher Wilson. *Music & Letters* 88.3 (1987): 266–268, 267.
118 When Marco Polo first beheld a rhinoceros in the late-thirteenth century, he lacked the relevant terminology to describe the animals to people back in Europe who had not seen one themselves. Naturally, he turned to analogy and likened the animal to buffalo, elephant, and boar, and called it a Unicorn. Of course, what we know a rhinoceros to look like now is not exactly the beautiful horse-like stallion with a goat’s beard, pearl-white mane, and a single spiralled-horn as depicted in Dominico Zampieri’s 1604 fresco *Virgin and Unicorn*. The Unicorn can be viewed as a symbol of the ambiguity between myth and ‘reality’ witnessed by travellers. Jonathan Sell, *Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 1560-1613* (London: Ashgate, 2006), 3.
119 Fellowes believed this was ‘undoubtedly’ a political text, and I would agree that certain figures, particularly ‘the Coachman’ could possibly reference a specific political or social figure. There is possible sexual innuendo with this figure as well, as the Coachman is the one who ‘drives’ and ‘whips’ the horses. Gordon Williams, *A Dictionary of Sexual Language and Imagery in Shakespearean and Stuart Literature: Volume I A-F* (London: The Athlone Press, 1994), 410.
120 For a discussion on the problems of interpreting strophic music, see Ch. 4, 220.
musical setting, and perhaps it was with that in mind that they wrote a text that worked well for a strophic yet still madrigalised setting (see Fig. 3.2).①

![Figure 3.2: Weelkes 'Ha ha', transcribed by Francis Bevan.](image)

The close connection between truth and deception lies at the heart of the ‘Ha ha’ poem and the self-conscious musical setting amplifies this haziness yet further. The overall musical effect of the madrigalised laughter, skipping rhythms, major mode, and transparent homophonic writing may initially give the impression of a more stereotypical pastoral English work. Yet in conjunction with the pointed words, these self-conscious musical features lack sincerity. Though the music laughs along with the text, it doesn’t take a deep reading to realise the message of the poem is darkly cynical. When interpreted as a piece of irony, a different impression emerges from the work,

①For full score, see Appendix II.
one which highlights the sceptical environment in which ‘false play is no reproch’, a place where there are neither consequences for deception nor rewards for honesty. It notes the role of the gullible as well as that of the scammer, as it takes two to sell a donkey for a unicorn. As the onlooker watches life, and all its falsities, he cannot help but chuckle to himself. Objects from the New World are somehow portrayed as more ‘real’ than the ones from myth—but also more mundane than the vivid English imagination might desire.

Moreover, the text is ironically self-aware, as the first way the poet justifies his truth claims is with ‘Ille bee sworne’, the very sort of self-testament of truth he is criticising. Kingsley Amis, editor of *The New Oxford Book of English Light Verse* (1978), thought that the fourth line of the second stanza implies one ‘[c]all Audrey’s goose Leda’s swan’, and this was just a poorly worded poem. Edward Doughtie is correct in criticising Amis for this assumption, asserting that ‘the poet is merely citing another example of flattery, and that what we call Leda’s swan was always a goose’.122 But Doughtie is underestimating the poem as well in assuming that the text is simply a ‘satire on flattery’, as it has a much heftier subject of ironic criticism, manipulation and false representation.123 Taking this a step further, one might suggest that the poet was not only correct in ordering the phrase ‘Leda’s goose a swan’, establishing that the object has always been just a goose, but that this stanza questions a more general reliance on mythological truths. The text’s scepticism works like a pin, popping the bubble of the Golden Age, thereby revealing an uglier truth (a goose), a motion that suggests doubt in myth’s authority as the ideal past. It recognises myth’s capacity as a medium of delusion and fantasy. This criticism is both self-conscious and divided, in that it is denouncing misrepresentation through myth, and via the ayre, a musical form often allied with mythology.

In this, the musical form adds to textual meaning as the ironic criticism relies on the ayre’s established relationship with mythology. To this effect, Weelkes’s chirpy setting adds a further layer of false impression to poetic meaning, one that thrives on the ironic use of expected musical tropes, rather than sincere representation. The cheerful and sprightly musical setting enhances a contrast already hinted at in the poem alone, one

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123 Ibid.
that juxtaposes the ostensibly carefree musical presentation of the text with the actual message of the poem, one wary of manipulation and deception in modern life. And through a word-painted yet strophic setting, Weelkes’s composition drives home eeriness existent in the poem, one of redundancy in a world of human nature that doesn’t change. The repetitive, strophic setting emphases the incongruity between the poem’s meaning and its outward appearance, as the music remains unmoved with each verse in spite of textual alterations. Though this work is from Ayeeres or phantastickke spirites, the fantasy lies not in the realistic representation of a fantastic mythological text, as one might expect from a typical example from the genre, but rather through the satirical exposure of an uncertain reality in a dubious world. Perhaps the ‘ha ha’ laughs are a version of what Highet calls ‘the happy perception of incongruity’, between appearances and meaning, as ‘the satirist, though he laughs, tells the truth’.124

Weelkes: ‘Aye me, alas’

Weelkes’s ‘Aye me, alas’, features a pseudo-historical ancient character, Messalina (see Fig 3.3). As the third wife of Roman Emperor Claudius (who ruled from 41-54 AD), Messalina is technically an historical rather than mythological woman, yet in early modern England her literary and artistic reputation as a stock character for ‘the adulteress’ falls somewhere between antiquity and myth.125 Though all mythological tropes are thought to exist in an ahistorical ‘Golden Age’, when an ancient figure from ‘real’ history is invoked, it complicates the traditional ahistorical ‘memory’ invoked by conventional pastoralism.

125 ‘As Richard Rainolde reported in 1571, Messalina ‘was so beastlye that she vsed her adulterous lust openlye, for the which abhominable facte many good men withdrewe themselues, from thence and therefore they were murthered’, Richard Rainold, A chronicle of all the noble emperoures of the Romaines (London: printed by Thomas Marshe, 1571), sig.E5v. For the history of Messalina the symbol of insatiable female sexuality, see Judith P. Hallett and Marilyn B. Skinner, Roman Sexualities (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), 222. For more on early modern English appropriation of all things Roman, see Lisa Hopkins, Cultural Uses of the Caesars on the English Renaissance Stage (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 2. For a description of the early modern use of Livy as a source of Roman history, existing somewhere between myth and history, see Warren Charniak, The Myth of Rome in Shakespeare and his Contemporaries (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 25-34.
Ye me alas, hey hoe, hey hoe. ii. ii.

thus doth Messalina go vp and dawne the house

a cry-ing. ii. a cry-ing, for her Monkey, lyes a
dying. ii. death thou art too cruel, to bereave

her Jewell, or to make a feature of her only treasure, if her Monkey die

she will sit and crie, fie fie fie fie fie fie fie fie.
Musically, the piece adheres to many tropes of the canzonet style: it opens with a descending semi tone on ‘aye me’, an Anglicisation of the Italian sigh ‘ohimé’. Weelkes illustrates the words ‘up and down’ with descending octave leaps in all voices and ‘crying’ with an ascending and returning semi-tone movement, aptly depicting recurring cries (see Fig. 3.4, bars 1-8). He demonstrates animated monkey-like swinging with dotted skips on ‘for her monkey’, which seems irreverent (and overly literal) considering this particular monkey is not very lively (Fig. 3.4, bar 9). The ‘lively monkey’ word painting is a persuasive indicator of satire within the music, as a more apt illustration of a dying monkey would be akin to ‘morire’ tropes, with longer lines, suspensions, or descending semitone movement. Here, the ‘monkeying’ is contrasted with a homophonic declamatory statement (in the Italian tradition) on ‘death thou art too cruel’, a dramatic move akin to comic overacting, considering that the death here is not a terribly tragic one (though it seems that way to Messalina—Fig. 3.4, bar 13).
Aye me alas

Thomas WEELKES
(1576 - 1623)

Cantus
Aye me alas, hey hoe, hey

Tenor
Aye me alas, hey hoe, hey

Bassus
Aye me alas, hey hoe, hey

hoy, hey hoe, hey hoe, thus... doth Messa-li-na go vp and downe the house a
hoy, hey hoe, hey hoe, thus... doth Messa-li-na go about the house a crying vp...

hoy, hey hoe, hey hoe, thus... doth Messa-li-na go vp and downe, vp...

crying vp and downe the house a crying, a crying,

and downe the house a crying, vp... and downe the house a crying,

and downe, vp and downe the house a crying, a crying,

dy... for her Mon- key lyes a dy... for her Mon- key

dy... for her Mon- key lyes a dy... for her Mon- key lyes a...
Figure 3.4: Weelkes 'Aye me alas', transcribed by Francis Bevan.
In fact, the exaggerated drama of the musical setting, complete with tropes like ‘aye me’ and ‘alas’ and a minor mode, must be ironic when one considers the absurdity of her reaction to the ‘death’ of a silly object of affection, a monkey. In Sheinberg’s terms, this is satire achieved through ‘quantitative exaggeration by accumulation’ in that it is through the inclusion of so many of the expected madrigalisations that a satirical effect is achieved.

The monkey is Messalina’s thinly veiled object of desire, and could equally refer to a man or just his phallus. As a generally unfavourable character (though perhaps sexually fascinating) sympathy for Messalina’s sexual habits was probably rather sparse. She was a stereotypical hysterical woman, helpless to do anything but mourn her fate and cry an indignant (and ineffective) ‘fie’ at Death. One must also wonder about her responsibility in her monkey’s ‘death’. The bawdiest reading would be that this is a flaccid penis metaphor and her sexual insatiability has spent all her lover’s energy, leaving her pouting in self-pity. The jewel is ostensibly her monkey/lover, taken by death (the ‘monkey’ is sexually spent). Yet the poem somewhat awkwardly states the same thing twice by saying that Death ‘bereave[s] her of her jewel’ and also ‘make[s] a seizure of her only treasure’. This doubled use of the same metaphor gives reason to suggest that the poet is also implying that her ‘jewel’ or ‘only treasure’ is not just her lover, but also her sexuality. Her behaviour at the potential death of her ‘lover’ isn’t one of a grown woman in love, it is the reaction of a child who has lost a plaything.

In both continental and English music, there was certainly precedent for non-satirical pastoral madrigals that set highly sexual topics, as erotic desire was one of the foremost actions played out through mythological allegory, stemming from works like Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*. Thomas’s setting ‘My lovely wanton iewell’ draws allusion
between death and orgasm with ‘I could never wish a sweeter dying’, a fairly common insinuation. But there is sincerity in both the poem and ballet/canzonet musical structure that leave the ‘dying’ veiled as simply possibility. In ‘Aye me, alas’, the monkey is the key absurdity that other sexualised settings lack, and it is this farcical feature that demarks Weelkes’s trope-filled musical setting as satire. There are plenty of madrigals about unfulfilled or unattainable love, even with extreme, dramatic, and somewhat romanticised consequences, like dying of a broken heart. But the use of the pseudo-mythological Messalina and the absurdity of her monkey suggest that the subject of mockery here is self-reflective, as it parodies the Italianate musical-poetic trend in England more generally. By extension, Weelkes could be seen to be parodying himself, or at least a tradition that he was very much a part of. In this sense, Weelkes’s ‘Aye me, alas’ embodies the kind of self-awareness in musical irony that Julian Johnson has characterised as fundamentally indicative of a type of modernity.

**Weelkes: ‘Since Roben Hood’**

Though ostensibly a short ditty about a folktale, ‘Since Roben Hood’ isn’t a piece about Roben Hood at all, but a more general rejection of idealised heroes and fondly remembered traditions in favour of commercial gain. Topically, it is perhaps no coincidence that Weelkes’s ‘Since Roben Hood’ follows ‘Ha ha’ in Weelkes’s 1608 collection, as the cynicism about ‘modern’ life continues in this setting (see Fig.3.5). Though there are plenty of secular songs that question or show wariness of contemporary life (particularly by Byrd, Carlton, and even Weelkes), usually these are paired with minor modes and longer rhythms that are, in Byrd’s words, ‘framed to the life of the words’.

In ‘Since Roben Hood’, however, Weelkes’s setting uses musical contrast to highlight textual irony.

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132 Kerman states that Francis Pilkington’s 1613 setting ‘All in a cave’ is satirical because the long iambic heptameter allows for the author to go a bit ‘over the top’ in illustrating an inexperienced lover’s attempts at seduction. The poem reflects the awkwardness of the encounter by abandoning the obvious iambic option of ‘Oh no! Said he’ for the less wieldy ‘Oh no! He said’. Though perhaps parodying metaphysical poetry, as Kerman suggests, Pilkington’s setting doesn’t appear to enhance or play off of any humorous elements in the poetry. Though one can only guess, one would think if Pilkington had wanted to emphasise the parodical elements in the poem, he could have. Kerman, *The Elizabethan Madrigal*, 56.

133 See Byrd quotation in Ch. 4, 220. For an example of a more expected contemplative setting, see Carlton’s madrigal ‘The love of change’ (1601). Fellowes, *English Madrigal Verse*, 68.

134 Which begs the question, what is the ‘life of the words’ when setting ironic texts, that inherently contain a double, and often contrasting meaning. Does one musically attend to surface (‘explicit’) or ironic (‘concealed’) meaning? Can one attend to both?
Roben Hood was a common hero in ballad lore, and a character, along with compatriots Little John and Maid Marian, common in May Day celebrations involving
Morris dancing. Though a short text, the poem is brimming with references to contemporary popular culture. The first stanza ‘sets the scene’: nostalgic figures of folklore are deemed no longer relevant, and the hobby-horse, a symbol of a more innocent past, is also forgotten. Mary Ellen Lamb argues that the forgotten hobby-horse, widespread in plays and literature of the period, was a symbol of nostalgia for the old ways. Though her full argument is too lengthy to explain here, the result is that by the late sixteenth-century, the hobby-horse, a formerly ‘much loved’ figure of legitimate entertainment, became sexualised, a process related to the commercialisation of popular culture. As late Elizabethans remember both a more innocent, delightful hobby-horse and also its vulgar evolution, the phrase ‘the hobby horse was quite forgot’, indicates a nostalgia for a recent past, one that problematises culture-for-profit.

The last line of the first stanza mentions William Kemp, one of Shakespeare’s original comedians, who made headlines in 1600 by Morris dancing over 100 miles from London to Norwich. As an actor, Kemp played clown roles, like Bottom in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, and is thought to have played, and even been the inspiration for, Falstaff. As Lamb points out, however, Kemp was also the face of lowbrow popular culture, one side of a cultural tension within early modern theatre companies. Eventually, ‘Kemp’s very ability to draw a crowd no doubt constructed him, like the once popular hobby-horse, as an object of contempt to those defining themselves by a discerning aesthetic taste’. Perhaps it was tension between forms of cultural value in the theatre that drove Kemp to attempt his Nine daies wonder (1601), as the pamphlet documenting his journey was called. As a freelance entertainer, he could make money in any way he preferred, though as Weelkes’s text suggests, Kemp probably didn’t ‘gain’ much from his publicity stunt, despite his attempt to charge onlookers a fee. He probably died of plague, as many did, in 1603 and without much to his name. Thus Weelkes’s text cynically describes the death of the folk tradition

136 Ibid., 158.
137 Ibid.
138 William Kemp, Kemp’s nine daies wonder ... (London: printed by E. E[lde], 1600).
139 Ibid., 76.
and the folk hero, a role replaced by entertainers like Kemp, a fame and money-seeking professional clown.

As one can see, Weelkes’s seemingly light-hearted poem is only outwardly so, with a cynical underlying message. The illusion of light heartedness is reinforced in the text through the forced rhyme scheme (alone-a), nonsense syllables, and the alteration of rather well known details of the event. Though France clearly rhymes with dance (certainly more so than Norwich), perhaps this isn’t just an expedient of rhyme, but an indication that Kemp sought fame abroad through his antics. Either way, it would be physically impossible to dance to France, yet exaggeration of detail is almost expected in the retelling of this type of event. As he did in ‘Haha’, Weelkes wrote a cheery setting that is literally word-painted and highlights the text’s overt rhyme scheme, illustrates dance rhythms (for example, the use of triple time at ‘he did labour’), and skips and trips where appropriate, as expected from the genre (see Fig.3.6).
Since Roben Hood

Thomas WEEKES
(1576 - 1623)

Since Roben Hood, maid Marian, and little John are

Cantus: gone a, the hobby horse was quite forgot, when Kempe did daunce alone a,

Tenor: gone a, the hobby horse was quite forgot, when Kempe did daunce alone a,

Bassus: gone a, the hobby horse was quite forgot, when Kempe did daunce alone a,

he did labour after the tabor for to dance then into...

he did labour after the tabor for to dance then into...

he did labour after the tabor for to dance then into...

France, for to dance then into France he took pains, took

France, for to dance then into France he took pains
Figure 3.6: Weelkes, ‘Since Roben Hood’, transcribed by Francis Bevan.

Though the events described in this poem seem quite ballad-like, and Roben Hood is a figure that made frequent appearances in ballads, by through-composing the text, Weelkes sets the poem within a fixed musical framework that is not transferrable to other lyrics in the way a traditional ballad would be, thus reinforcing the musical
setting’s important role in the text’s interpretation. Though the music is a literal depiction of the poem’s words, the meaning of the poem is enhanced through the overtly straight representation of text, one similar in effect to deadpan humour.

What is interesting about this masked cynicism, however, is that at its core, the speaker of the song is still longing for a past, as indicated by the nostalgic figure of the hobby-horse, much like a traditional pastoral madrigal. But it is not a naive self, longing for a place and time that never was, but one more aware of its own history. This self demonstrates the split self-consciousness described by Johnson, one that creates through a particular medium but simultaneously demonstrates awareness of the constructive nature of that medium. In a way somewhat similar to contemporary utopian fiction, Weelkes uses the space of ambiguity created by mythologically-allied music to explore a self-aware scepticism about the sources of true knowledge and their representations. This is not dissimilar to the spaces represented by the islands of Shakespeare’s Tempest or Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis. In Allison Kavey’s words, the ‘eerie opaqueness’ or ‘precarious poise’ that surrounds these types of spaces, is due to a skillful mixing of real events, idealized reality, and suspended imagination [and] is reinforced by the use of ironic, ambivalent, and tragicomic effects … for the sense of suspended tension between reality and appearance is constantly heightened by stylistic devices that deliberately subvert established relationships between truth and its representation.

But in Weelkes’s case, irony and subverted perspectives are reinforced through musical rather than purely literary devices. In these ayres, the integration of the ‘real’ into a space of fantasy relies upon a music that attends only to the, in Sheinberg’s terms, ‘explicit’ half of textual irony to achieve the desired effect, making even more defined the dissonance between ‘explicit’ and ‘concealed’ poetic meanings. This dissonance is indicative of the discursive process, as described by Simpson, through which satire questions the fundaments of knowledge. Though both poetic meanings

141 Johnson in Downes, (ed.) Aesthetics of Music, 257.
142 This is probably why it was common in both pastoral and utopian modes for the reader to be taken to another place, like Arcadia.
143 Kavey (ed.), World-Building and the Early Modern Imagination, 94.
144 See Ch. 3, 127.
are existent in the texts alone, one should not underestimate the powerful meaning contributed by music and performance.

In his book *English Renaissance Song* (1986), Edward Doughtie rightly cautions against textual analysis of these lyric works apart from their musical context. Though the poems examined here outwardly or topically appear to adhere to poetic tropes of the genre by invoking mythological figures, in each case this appearance is misleading when one stops to contemplate actual textual meaning. The music contributes to this false outward appearance, as the ‘packaging’ for the text seems directly in line with expected musical forms. Music’s lack of traditional semantic meaning makes it well suited for questioning inherently ambiguous and paradoxical concepts, like that of the relationship between appearances and truth.¹⁴⁵ Through these ‘phantasticke spirites’, Weelkes was able to use tropes of the light genres to contribute to discourse on the reliability of exterior perception. Though the sceptical caution against modern life articulated by Descartes only a few decades later, it is through this type of self-aware processing that discursive practices like irony are able to engage in the negotiations of relevance to episteme. These examples demonstrate how mythology and music laboured actively and jointly to challenge assumptions about reality. However, they also require us to rethink our modern expectations of the ‘light’ domestic genres as frivolous.¹⁴⁶ Though little is certain about the contemporary performance practice of these pieces, we can safely assume that the performer also played a role in satirical uptake, as ironic elements would have been enhanced by an aware and engaged performance of these pieces. As Henry Peacham knew, the ‘behavyor of a person’ in performance, whether in an official capacity or in casual conversation, was, and still is, ¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁵ Though his is only one opinion within a divisive aesthetic debate, Lawrence Kramer believes it a folly to assume music is either nonsemantic or all semantic, leaving its precise quality open for debate. If, as Kramer asserts, there is always a semantic gap between interpretation and the object interpreted, it makes sense to me that the semantic opacity of music might effectively interrogate ideas with similarly complex relationships. Kramer, *Interpreting Music*, 15; Kramer, *Expression and Truth*, 19.

¹⁴⁶ David Brown wrote that ‘for Weelkes’ limited potentialities as a composer of lute ayres, we have only to compare some of the more melodic of his *Ayres* of 1608 with the best of Campion’s to see just how inferior Weelkes was in this particular field to the lesser composer. It is not only that the individual phrases of Weelkes’ ayres are mostly less distinctive … Weelkes’ tune are made to grow largely through sequences which can all too easily become mechanical’. Brown, *Thomas Weelkes*, 205-4. Brown, assessing only the ayres’ musical form, is perhaps missing out on musical meaning apparent in an assessment of music and lyric together, the exact opposite problem described by Doughtie from literary scholarship, which only considered text.
key to satirical understanding. The centrality of performance in the creation of meaning here suggests that a phenomenological approach, one that considers the importance of expression not found in the score, is essential to historically understanding satirical music, as the meaning of the music is inherently reliant on the experience of the music.

3.2 Thule and Truth in Travel

In the next part of this chapter, I demonstrate how the madrigal’s tenacious association with the pastoral and mythical was maintained through tropes of the musical form, even when its text was, at its core, not mythical at all. Thomas Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the period of cosmography’ (1601) proves to be a fascinating example of a madrigal that cogitates the semi-fantastical (but ultimately ‘real’) events witnessed in travel abroad. But before addressing the case study, I must outline some relevant material on travel writing and the influences of travel writing within domestic music. Early modern fixation on travel and foreign spectacle is of particular interest to this thesis not only because of frequent references to travel-related imagery in contemporary domestic song, but because, in Jonathan Sell’s words, ‘[t]he textual transcription of new worlds pushes the problem of credible representation to its limits’, presenting a rhetorical challenge with significant implications for how all knowledge is built. During Weelkes’s lifetime the focus on outward exploration and the accumulation of undiscovered knowledge grew substantially. While the composer did not collect his observations himself, by writing about foreign travel and the observation of natural phenomena, his music expresses an idea that was at the forefront of the national (and greater European) mind, providing an experiential dialogue that cogitated issues of appearances and reality in relation to the wonder of travel.

A relatively robust field, early modern travel—in practice, symbol, and theory—played an important role in changes to knowledge building throughout the seventeenth

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147 Peacham, *Garden of Eloquence* (1577), sig. D2r.
Travel literature was a significant contributor to travel’s influence at home in England. As William Sherman suggests, ‘the number of new titles printed (and old titles reprinted) during the early modern period suggests that there was a significant audience for travel writing, eager to hear news of the wider world and to reflect on England’s place in it’. Some accounts were second (or third, or fourth)-hand, like Richard Eden’s *Decades of the Newe Worlde* (1555), which will be discussed in more depth shortly, and some were written by those who had travelled abroad, such as Coryat’s *Crudities* (1611) or Walter Raleigh’s *The Discoverie of the Large, Rich, and Beautifull Empire of Guiana* (1596), relating his adventure seeking the mythical El Dorado. Raleigh’s work was written within a few weeks of his return to England, and was reprinted twice the same year, demonstrating the popularity of these types of volumes. As Elizabeth Spiller discusses, ‘New World travel narrative clearly stands on the border between the fabulously fictive and the scientifically exemplary’. Consequently, travel narratives were also caught up in wider aesthetic debates about the moralising or sin-inducing possibilities of fiction. Additionally, the positives and negatives of travel for gaining knowledge proved to be a matter of discussion. For example, Roger Ascham, tutor to the young Elizabeth I, propagated the benefits of learning from home, when he said: ‘one yeare at home in England, would do a yong intlemans more good, I wisse, then three yeares trauell abrode spent in Italie’. Though Ascham clearly had personal incentive to prefer tuition at home, this still hints at the affiliation travel had with knowledge and learning, even by the mid-sixteenth century. The relationship between humanism, the new science, and travel writing was a highly complex one, but it has been established by other scholars that travel, particularly travel metaphor, was a fundamental aspect of the rhetoric of new knowledge, both within late-humanist works and in the new science.

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149 For more on contemporary attitudes towards experiential forms of learning as related to travel, see Melanie Ord, *Travel and Experience in Early Modern English Literature* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).
151 Tim Youngs in Hulme and Youngs (eds.) *The Cambridge Companion to Travel Writing*, 33.
153 As discussed at the beginning of Chapter One.
155 Melanie Ord observes that while ‘humanist pedagogical texts are frequently anxious about the purpose of travel, the nature of the travel experience, and the relationship of travel to book learning, the new science makes dynamic use of travel observation and travel writing in establishing its own program’. Descartes saw
Although travel was affiliated with the beginning of scientific materialism, there remained, however, a fantasy element so persuasive that it would be a blunder to assume the epistemic path towards empiricism was anything but serpentine.\textsuperscript{156} As Tadié and Scholar remind us, '[i]n order to better understand this remarkable to-and-fro between myth and history … we must remember that the discovery of America was often perceived in the Renaissance as confirmation of the truth in legends'.\textsuperscript{157} Mythological or fantastical elements had a strong function in travel-related language, not only as useful and familiar rhetorical tools pregnant with symbolic significance, but because of myth's wonder-provoking qualities. Travel writers like Walter Raleigh could use a word like 'labyrinth' and with it imply not only a maze, but also invoke the wonder of a mythological tale, rife with familiar story.\textsuperscript{158} As Patrick Holland and Graham Huggan argue: '[t]he transformation of 'history' into 'private or collective mythology' suggests the presence of powerful fantasy elements in travel writing, and indeed the close relationship between travel writing and the remembered and regretted exercise of power'.\textsuperscript{159} This echoes strongly Giuseppe Gerbino's description of the 'collective illusion' of Arcadia in Italian madrigals.\textsuperscript{160} It is for this reason, perhaps, that the ambiguously fantastical and foreign spaces mentioned before (the island of Shakespeare's \textit{Tempest}, Arcadia, or Bacon's Bensalem from \textit{New Atlantis}) were powerful and relevant symbols, abounding with contemporary meaning that entangled together foreign travel, myth, politics, and fantasy, spaces that contemplated the blurry lines between fiction and reality.

Before taking a look at the influence of travel literature on publications of domestic vocal music, I would first like to consider the contemporary reputation of the traveller
as a liar, which might appear at first rather contrary to the assertion that discoveries made during travel helped to usher in new empirical approaches to knowledge. Richard Braithwaite, writing in 1631, believed that ‘travellers, poets, and liars are three words of one significance’. The epistemological significance represented in these typologies was probably even more entwined than even Braithwaite was aware. Spiller asserts that for ‘early modern writers, the existence of science depends on the possibility of fiction’. Travellers were a source of fascination and scepticism because they expanded knowledge about the world, but like any human being, they liked to tell stories and sell books, with some accounts veering more towards fiction than experiential ‘truth’. A part of and by-product of this negotiation of ‘truth in experience’ was the need to promote self-testaments of truth.

For example, in 1588, explorer-astronomer Thomas Harriot wrote A briefe and true report of the new found land of Virginia, including this testament to his honesty: ‘[t]hus much vpon my credit I am to affirme: that things vniuersally are so truly set downe in this treatise by the author thereof, an Actor in the Colony & a man no lesse for his honesty then learning commendable: as that I dare boldly avouch it may very well passe with the credit of truth euen amongst the most true relati’.

Even though Harriot is now considered one of the first champions of the empirical method (along with Francis Bacon), his assertion of truth in this introduction is not based on any empirical technique, but on a personal testimony of his own quality of character, as trustworthiness became linked with social stature. Harriot’s assertion also highlights a more generally perceived mistrust of other travel writers and their accounts of the New World (an assertion that comes with clear financial perks to his own account). As Judy Hayden points out, ‘[a]s fact, witness, and credibility were essential concerns for the travel narrative, so too did they become an integral part of the wider literary

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161 As Spiller says, ‘the early modern period is an age of discovery: these discoveries include not simply new knowledge but new definitions of knowledge’. Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 1. Moreover, travel accounts highlighted the reliability of the senses, particularly in regard to testaments of what one saw or claimed to have seen. Self-testaments of truth were exceptionally uncertain in this period. Clark, Vanities of the Eye, 2.

162 Sell, Rhetoric and Wonder in English Travel Writing, 23.

163 Spiller, Science, Reading, and Renaissance Literature, 1.

164 For more on suspicions of travel writers/writing, see Andrew Hadfield, Literature, Travel and Colonial Writing in the English Renaissance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5-4.


culture’.  Clearly Braithwaite was concerned with the epistemological implications of his reading material, but the popularity of early modern travel accounts suggests he was in a minority. Like consumers of today’s tabloids, perhaps actual truth did not matter to the average early modern readers—it was the perception of truth that sold copies, which is why these travel accounts underwent so many reprints and retranslations. When it came to the economy of print, perhaps it was just the ability to be perceived as true that counted as much as what actually happened on a journey. Travel literature provided readers with a space that functioned not unlike that of a tabloid—a fictive Other world that was even more engaging and wondrous because it was rooted in reality providing verisimilitude. Those who enjoyed the genre suspended disbelief when reading it and allowed the ‘reality’ to transport them, whilst sceptics like Braithwaite stood nearby, glaring disapprovingly.

**John Wilbye on Travel**

As travel and travel literature were at the forefront of public awareness, it is to be expected that objects affiliated with the New World, travel, and exploration made their way into domestic music texts. Moreover, the madrigal’s existing affiliation with myth made the form a particularly conducive environment for a blending of Others: mythical figures of a ‘remembered’ nostalgic past, with New World figures of ambiguously ‘real’ origin. One can observe this mix of Others in the following examples: John Wilbye’s ‘Lady Oriana’ (1601), ‘What needeth all this travail’ (1598), ‘There is a iewell’ (1609), in addition to those examples already discussed by Thomas Weelkes, like ‘Ha, ha, this world doth passe’ (1608) and ‘Since Roben Hood’ (1608). In each of these examples, mythological figures or tropes are juxtaposed with objects associated with travel or the New World, creating a fictive experience enhanced by foreign elements that are possibly real. I observe that this type of text utilises the ambiguous truthfulness of travel narratives by bringing objects from those narratives into a musical-poetic form traditionally used for the playing out of pastoral fantasies. It is not an unreasonable conclusion, then, that the fictive space created by this melding

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167 Ibid., 11.
168 New World references included mentions of places, animals, objects, or, less specifically, travel rhetoric more generally.
of New World and pastoral Otherly tropes could further discussion on the tensions between truth, perception, and appearances.\(^{169}\)

In John Wilbye’s ‘Lady Oriana’, from Thomas Morley’s 1601 compilation *Triumphs of Oriana*, Wilbye set a poem that blends overt images of Elizabeth I and her interests in the land of Guiana, the South American region famously explored by Walter Raleigh. Raleigh published an exaggerated account of his travels in *The discovery of Guiana* (1596), and was well-known to be a favourite of the Queen.\(^{170}\) Knowing the world through exploration was demonstrative of wealth and power; therefore praising Elizabeth in relation to a sought after and supposedly rich New World conquest (and importantly, one with Spanish affiliations), was a way to demonstrate her power. Raleigh’s accounts of Guiana contributed to what became the myth of the golden city of El Dorado, an idea that instigated the exploration of more territory than any other single reason.\(^{171}\)

The Lady Oriana
Was dight all in the treasures of Guiana,
And on her Grace a thousand Graces tended:
And thus sang they, faire Queene of peace and plenty;
The fairest queen of twentie,
Then with an Oliue wreath, for peace renowned,
Her virgin head they crowned,
Which ceremony ended.
Vnto her Grace the thousand Graces bended.
Then sang the shepherds & Nymphs of Diana,
Long liue faire Oriana.\(^{172}\)

Wilbye’s musical setting is through composed and aligns musically with the cadence and line of the text, introducing new musical ideas where grammatically and poetically appropriate (for example, a more homophonic statement on ‘And thus sang they’, and charming duets at ‘Then with an olive wreath’). Though the poem praises Elizabeth in terms of ‘real-world’ accomplishment (as reported by Raleigh), the language of the

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\(^{169}\) The type of space I’m describing here is not unlike the mixing of travel and New World allusion with the magical and mythological in Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*.


setting agrees with tropes of the pastoral genre: with a thousand ‘graces’ singing of peace and plenty, the naturalistic and mythologically significant element of the olive wreath, and the ceremony of a pastoral gathering. The final couplet, ‘Then sang the shepherds & Nymphs of Diana, / Long liue faire Oriana’, is shared amongst each contribution to the Triumphs collection, and anchors this poem in both the political and pastoral realm, since Oriana was politically allegorical.\textsuperscript{173}

In Wilbye’s ‘There is a jewel’, the juxtaposition is not just between mythology and reality, but also between newer and older or more established sources of truth. References to Biblical-style stories and mythology represent more established forms of truth, whilst new science/alchemy and New World objects represent newer forms of truth.

\begin{verse}
There is a iewell which no Indian mines
can buy, no Chymic art can counterfaite;
It makes men rich in greatest pouerty;
Makes water wine, turnes wooden cups to gould,
The homely whistle to sweet musicks strain,
Seldom it comes, to few from heauen sent,
That much in little all in naught,
\end{verse}

The first line declares the subject (the spiritual ‘iewell’) superior to any real foreign gem, or anything created by modern science or alchemy (a coupling of new truth-bearing figures).\textsuperscript{174} Biblical references of ‘water into wine’ are meshed with, perhaps, a reference to the King Midas myth (wood into gold—a coupling of older sources of truth). This free melding of popular images raises the question of what counted as a tangible truth for early modern English people, as the juxtaposition of new and old truths negotiate the measurement of another intangible force, love.

Finally, Wilbye’s bipartite madrigals ‘What needeth all this travail’ and ‘O Fooles, can you not see a traffick neerer’ (1598), mix images of myth and travel, but in a notably subtle way. Frequent poetic use of Phoebus, another name for Apollo (god of

\textsuperscript{173} Though which political woman this collection was originally intended for has been recently challenged. See Jeremy Smith, “Music and Late Elizabethan Politics: The Identities of Oriana and Diana”, Journal of the American Musicological Society, 58.3 (2005): 507–558.

\textsuperscript{174} Wilbye, The Second Set of Madrigales, sig.C1r.

\textsuperscript{175} Though alchemy had existed for a long time prior to the seventeenth century, prominent Elizabethan figures like John Dee helped to reinvigorate the significance of the art throughout this period. See Bruce Janacek, Alchemical Belief: Occultism in the Religious Culture of Early Modern England (University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2011), 4.
music, poetry, and the sun), transformed the figure into a more generalised embodiment of the sun personified, somewhat removed from its mythological origins. In this time, Phoebus could have represented either the mythological god or the sun personified, but given the form of the reference (musicalised poetry of the madrigal type), I am inclined to suspect the former. Regardless, this piece demonstrates a gradation of mythological inferences in the madrigalian repertory, with content focused instead on an Other represented by travel and figures of foreignness rather than the strictly mythological or pastoral.

What needeth all this travaile and turnoyling,
Shortning the lyfes sweet pleasure.
To seeke this far fetched treasure,
In those hot climates Vnder Phoebus broyling.

O Foole, can you not see a traffick neerer
In my sweet Ladyes face, Where Nature showeth
what euer treasure eye sees or hart knoweth?
Rubies and Diamonds daintie
And orient Perles such plentie,
Corral & Ambergris, sweeter and deerer,
Then which the South seas or Moluccas lend vs,
Or either Indies, East or West, do send vs.\textsuperscript{177}

It is no mistake that the author of this text plays off the similarity between the words ‘travel’ and ‘travail’, as the poem expresses hesitancy towards the seeker, symbolised by the traveller’s complicated life. The speaker prefers the local beauty of his lover’s face over all the exotic riches found abroad. The beauty of the ‘lady’s face’ is declared to be natural, positing the foreign gems as somehow less so. The ‘eye sees’, but the ‘heart knoweth’, as his love for her feels assured and true, and those who do not immediately ‘see’ this, are ‘fools’. In spite of all the ‘far-fetched treasure’ to be found in Asia, the speaker seems to have all his wants from his lover’s face, all posited against a foreign Other accompanied by a tinge of the mythological.

In each of these brief examples by Wilbye, objects from the ‘real’ New World serve multiple functions, as they provide verisimilitude, but also demonstrate a blurred

\textsuperscript{176} “Phoebus, n.”, \textit{OED Online}. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 2 January 2016).

distinction between Others, as older myths meld with images from the New World. In each piece, the riches of the Other serve a metaphoric point of contrast to make the wealth experienced by the human heart in love even greater, a perfect opening for dialogue on sources of truth and their relationship to human consciousness.

‘Thule’ and Richard Hakluyt

The following section will consider Thomas Weelkes’s anonymously texted bipartite madrigals ‘Thule, the period of cosmography’ and ‘The Andalusian merchant’ (1600) in relation to one particular work of travel writing, Richard Hakluyt’s *The Principall Navigations, Voiages, and Discoveries Of The English nation* (1589, 1590-1600). Weelkes paints a scene of strange spectacle complete with merchants from far off places, flying fishes, treasures and goods from abroad, foreign islands, and exotic volcanoes. At first glance, this could be a madrigal like many others of its kind, full of light-hearted fantasy and myth. Although it appears in the same printed collection as more traditional pastoral examples such as ‘As Vesta was from latmos hill descending’ and ‘When Thoralis delights to walk’, perhaps the most curious thing about ‘Thule’ is that, in addition to the notoriously clever musical illustrations, the ‘fantastical’ elements and events described in the text are only outwardly of mythological origin, as all of the features described in the work in fact stemmed from global exploration and were indeed ‘real’. I have determined that each image in Weelkes’s madrigals is mentioned in Hakluyt’s substantive volumes.

First printed in a 1589 folio edition, Hakluyt’s *The principall navigations*, published by George Bishop and Ralph Newberie, is a collection of travel writing in English covering nearly every area known by and explored by European travellers, from the Americas to Persia, the Indies and Africa. It includes travel accounts by Walter Raleigh, Martin Frobisher, Francis Drake, and others. Hakluyt’s work preserved and promoted English travel accounts through his work as an editor, translator, and seller of travel writing. The much enlarged second edition first appeared in 1598, followed by additional editions in 1599 and 1600, to create what amounted to a multi-volume

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set. Though it cannot be proven that Weelkes’s text author (or indeed Weelkes himself) read this volume, Hakluyt’s influence at court as well as his work on The principall navigations, made him, in Daniel Carey and Claire Jowitt’s estimation, ‘perhaps the most significant figure in the history of English travel writing’, a reputation which mostly rests on The principall navigations. Though this is only one example of the type of travel writing available to Weelkes’s text author, it is perhaps no coincidence that each image within Weelkes’s poem is mentioned in Hakluyt’s widely-read publication on, in his words, the ‘sweet studie of the historie of Cosmographie’.

The following is a comparison of the textual images in ‘Thule, the period of cosmographie’ and ‘The Andalusian merchant’ as described in Hakluyt’s volume. In his ‘Epistle Dedicatorie’ to Robert Cecil, Hakluyt mentions that Seneca predicted that one day the known world would expand, and the ‘yle of Thule would no more be the vttermost limite of the earth’. Thule (also known as Iceland) was the northernmost region of the habitable world to ancient Greek geographers, and was first mentioned in Polybius’s account of the voyage of Pytheas. The phrase ‘Period of cosmographie’ refers to the end of the mappable universe, making this an apt title for a piece in which Weelkes musically reports on marvellous phenomena from around the world.

Thule, the period of Cosmograpie,
Doth vaunt of Hecla, whose sulphureous fire
Doth melt the frozen Clime, and thaw the Skie;
Trinacrian Ætna’s flames ascend not higher:
These things seem wondrous, yet more wondrous I,
Whose hart with fear doth freeze, with loue doth fry.

The Andalusian Merchant, that returnes
Laden with cutchinel and China dishes,
Reports in Spaine how strangely Fogo burnes
Amidst an Ocean full of flying fishes:
These things seem wondrous, yet more wondrous I,

180 Explained in more detail in Carey and Jowitt (eds.), Richard Hakluyt and Travel Writing in Early Modern Europe, 1-2, footnote 3.
181 Hakluyt’s work was largely influential—continental editors tried to emulate and develop similar collections after Hakluyt’s model. Anthony Payne in Carey and Jowitt (eds.), Richard Hakluyt and Travel Writing in Early Modern Europe, 15; also Carey and Jowitt in ibid., 1, 6.
182 Hakluyt, The Principall Navigations (1599-1600), sig.A2r.
183 Ibid., sig.A2r-A3v.
Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with loue doth fry.\(^{185}\)

As a source of intense fascination, fear, and allegory, many writers included within Hakluyt’s volume dedicate words to the description of volcanoes. Ætna and Hecla, known to many from their description in Virgil, made frequent appearances in travel writing, both in descriptive contexts and as allegory for the fires of hell. Hakluyt includes both the Latin and an English translation of ‘A Briefe Commentarie of Island’, attributed to Arngrimus Ionas ‘of Island’.\(^{186}\) Though Hecla and Ætna are mentioned dozens of times individually within Hakluyt’s greater work, this passage makes a direct comparison between the two volcanoes. As ‘Ionas’ says ‘[t]here is Hecla a mountaine in Island, which burneth like Ætna at certain seasons, & hereupon the comon people haue conceiued an opinion this long time, that soules are there purged’.\(^{187}\) In the ‘seventh section’, the author describes the ‘flame of mount Hecla’, as ‘by the same force that bullets are discharged out of warlike engines’.\(^{188}\) The discharge from the volcano is a ‘mixture of colde, and fire, and brimstone’ or ‘ex frigoris & ignis & sulphuris commixtione’, a sulfurous mixture.\(^{189}\) In an account attributed to Edward Cliffe Mariner, ‘[t]he voyage of M. John Winter into the South sea by the Streight of Magellan, in consort with M. Francis Drake, begun in 1577’, the author describes a jaunt past the isle of ‘Fogo, so called, because it casteth continually flames of fire and smoake out of the top thereof, all the whole island being one high mountaine’.\(^{190}\) On the same page, the writer describes nearby sea life:

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\(^{185}\) Weelkes, _Madrigals of 5, And 6. Parts_ (1600), sig.D2r.

\(^{186}\) Also known as Arngrímur Jónsson ‘the Learned’, an Icelandic scholar who lived from 1568-1648. He published his _Brevis commentarius de Islandia_ in 1593, and this volume was subsequently republished in Hakluyt’s collection. Hakluyt explains that he ‘procured’ the Icelandic scholar ‘to make answere to the errors of historiographers’ and it was his job ‘to peruse the works of authors, that haue written any thing concerning Island, and by sound reasons to detect their errors, & falshoods’ to compile this commentary drawn from other sources. Hakluyt, _The Principall Navigations_ (1599-1600), sig.Zz6v, sig.Aaa1v.

\(^{187}\) It also described Hecla, ‘in regard of the frozen top, and the firie bottome’, which is a similar image (though a common one) to Weelkes’s depiction of fire contrasting with ‘frozen clime’. Ibid., sig.Aaa6v.

\(^{188}\) The flame of mount Hecla will not burne towe (which is most apt for the wieke of a candle) neither is it quenched with water: and by the same force that bullets are discharged out of warlike engines with vs, from thence are great stones cast forth into the aire, by reason of the mixture of colde, and fire, and brimstone.’ Ibid., sig.Aaa4v.

\(^{189}\) Ibid., sig.Aaa4v, sig.Xx4v.

\(^{190}\) Ibid., sig.Rrr2v. Fogo refers to a volcano and island in Cape Verde, which at Weelkes’s time was a territory of Portugal. Eric Lewin Altschuler and William Jansen, “Thomas Weelkes’s Text Authors: Men of Letters”, _The Musical Times_ 143, no. 1879 (July 1, 2002): 17-24, 17.
Here we saw flying fishes in great abundance, some a foote long, some lesse. Their fynnes wherewith they flye be as long as their bodies. They be greatly pursued by the Dolphine and Bonitoes, whom as soone as the flying fishes espie, immediatly they mount out of the sea in great numbers, and fly as long as their fynnes continue moyst: and when they bee dry, they fall downe into the sea againe.\textsuperscript{191}

Though Hakluyt’s collection does not mention Andalusian merchants as such, it does mention ‘Andaluzia’ many times as a busy port and discusses the activities of Spanish merchants thoroughly.\textsuperscript{192} In Edward Wright’s ‘The voiage of the right honorable George Erle’, the author describes the capture of a foreign ship that had recently returned from the New World: ‘[t]his ship was of some three or foure hundred tunnes, and had in her seuen hundred hides worth tenne shillings a piece: sixe chests of Cochinell, every chest houlding one hundred pound weight, and every pound worth sixe and twentie shillings and eight pence, and certaine chests of Sugar and China dishes, with some plate and siluer’.\textsuperscript{193}

It is difficult to specifically attribute many of the accounts in Hakluyt’s collection, as most of his reports were compiled from earlier foreign sources, which had already been borrowed, adapted, or translated from other sources. For example, Italian-born Spanish historian Pietro Martire d’Anghiera’s \textit{The history of trauayle in the West and East Indies, and other countreys lying eyther way} was first translated into English by Richard Eden in 1555, from the Latin original (published by Anghiera between 1511-1530).\textsuperscript{194} Eden’s translation was subsequently republished several times, for example a 1577 edition which was ‘Gathered in parte, and done into Englyshe by Richarde Eden. Newly set in order, augmented, and finished by Richarde VVilles’. One can perceive

\textsuperscript{191} Hakluyt, \textit{The Principall Navigations} (1599-1600), sig.Rrr2v.

\textsuperscript{192} For example, ‘A notable discourse of M. Iohn Chilton’ explains how he ‘embarked my self in the bay of Cadiz in Andaluzia’ in a ship eventually bound for Nova Hispania. On his way, he ‘journeyed by land to a towne called Vera Cruz … where all the faccours of the Spanish merchants dwell’. Ibid., sig.Pp4r-Pp5v.

\textsuperscript{193} Ibid., sig.Ooo4v.

\textsuperscript{194} Though Anghiera’s first ‘decade’ was published in 1511, there were three close adaptations that had appeared in print before this account. In 1504 there was published an anonymous \textit{Libretto de tutta la Navigazione de re de Spagna de le isole terreni nuovamente trovato}, which then appeared with some augmentation in Fracanzano da Montalboddo’s \textit{Paesi novamente retrovati} (1507), which may have come from manuscript copies of Anghiera’s decade, which had circulated since 1501, with sections of it in manuscript form circulating as early as 1493. The eighth and final ‘decada’ was published in 1530, after Anghiera’s death in 1526. Peter Martyr, \textit{Selections from Peter Martyr Volume V} from \textit{Repertorium Columbianum}, (ed.) Geoffrey Eatough (Belgium: Brepols, 1998), xi.
the shared language between this edition from 1577 and the one compiled by ‘Ionas’ in Hakluyt, though the language is more detailed:

Islande is interpreted the land of Ise, and is called of the olde wryters Thyle … This Ilande is famous by the strange myracles of nature. There are in it three mountaynes of marueylyous height, the toppes whereof are couered with perpetuall snowe: but the nether partes of them, are of lyke nature to the mountayne Etna, in the Ilande of Sicilie, boylyng with continuall flames of fyre, and castyng foorth brymstone … Hecla, whose flames nether consume flaxe or tow, matters most apte to take fyre, nor yet are quenched with water. And with lyke force as the shot of great artillerie is driuen foorth by violence of fyre, euen so by the commixtion and repugnance of fyre, colde, and brymstone, great stones are heere throwne into the ayre.195

The descriptions of Hecla in Hakluyt are particularly similar to Eden/Wolles’s translation of Anghiera in likening Hecla’s discharge to firing bullets. It is probable that Anghiera was Hakluyt’s source, as Hakluyt explicitly uses accounts from Anghiera elsewhere in his compilation.196 Similarly, there were other publishers of Francis Drake’s expedition that included descriptions of Fogo that have notable rhetorical similarities to the description in Hakluyt. G. Miller’s The vvorld encompassed by Sir Francis Drake printed in London (1628) shares a basic narrative with Hakluyt, though adds that Fogo ‘giueth light like the Moone a great way off’ and that pumice stones spill out ‘with other grosse and slimy matter vpon the hill’.197 Regardless of whether or not Weelkes’s text author for ‘Thule’ was informed by Hakluyt’s collection specifically, it is clear that several examples of similar travel literature could have sparked the poet’s imagination, providing the palette of language for colouring this other-worldly scene. Moreover, the similarities between different accounts demonstrate a fluid adoption of supposedly ‘first hand’ experiences between historians and translations.

196 For example, Hakluyt cites ‘Another testimonie of the voyage of Sebastian Cabot to the West and Northwest, taken out of the sixt Chapter of the third Decade of Peter Martyr of Angleria’. As Hakluyt was one of Anghiera’s early English publishers, there are certainly links to be made here that are beyond the scope of this thesis. Hakluyt, The Principall Navigations (1599-1600), sig.A5v.
In the light of pressing concerns about truth, knowledge, and fiction in relation to travel literature and its encounter with other worlds, a discussion of the specific roles played by music in settings such as Weelkes’s ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ seems highly desirable. I would argue that much is to be gained from examining the music as a crucial signifier in the semantic content of this work, whose text is so intimately bound up with contemporary arguments around epistemology. Denis Arnold observes that ‘[Weelkes] always delights in finding poems where the music can portray literally the meaning of the words.’ But I offer here the argument that a literal portrayal can indeed be wrought with meaning not engaged by the text alone.

Initially, Weelkes’s setting might appear to take the poem at face value, as just another fantastic vignette, ambiguously located between fantasy and reality, as suited a typical work in the madrigal genre. Yet the vivid musical illustrations, though indeed literal, cannot help but create a deeper wonder. I will reflect on the idea that in Weelkes’s ‘literalness’ is a type of subversion, using the musical tropes of a genre he knew intimately to interrogate the lines between reality and appearances at a time when reports from abroad were both a sought after commercial object and questioned as untrustworthy fabrications. This case study highlights the lingering impression of illusion that remained affiliated with the madrigal form, even when paired with a pseudo-mythical or indeed non-mythical text.

Donald Tovey imagines that the first word, Thule, ‘looms in semibreves at the top of the octave as large as Iceland (magnified by the exigencies of Mercator’s projection) straddling at the top of the cosmographies of Elizabethan and Jacobean days.’ Weelkes’s semi-quaver illustration of Hecla’s ‘sulphureous fire’, drastically changes the rhythmic texture from the preceding relaxed counterpoint (Fig. 3.7). The musical depiction of ‘sulphureous fire’ resonates with Haklyut’s description of Hecla’s discharge as ‘ex frigoris & ignis & sulphuris commixtione’ that sounds or looks like

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bullets or artillery shooting in quick succession. Weelkes then illustrates the melting of snow through a contrastingly homophonic rhythm, which comes together on a sustained semi-breve on ’melt’ (as melting can appear as the merging of separate particles into a single liquid body—see Fig. 3.7).

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200 Though the writers in Haklyut’s collection are often not Haklyut himself, for simplicity I attribute the comparisons in the following section to Haklyut, though I acknowledge that the ’original’ authors are not necessarily the editor’s words, though they are in some instances his translations.
Figure 3.7: Weelkes, ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ bars 13-19, transcribed by Francis Bevan.
Weelkes’s image of vigorous fire melting the ‘frozen clime’ loosely echoes Hakluyt’s description of Hecla’s ‘frozen top, and the firie bottome’. ‘Trinacrian’, in triple time, cleverly references Sicily’s triangular shape.  

Through the words ‘ascend not higher’, Weelkes’s poem, like Hakluyt’s description (‘Hecla … burneth like unto Ætuna’), draws a comparison between the fires of Hecla and Ætna, which is also echoed in Weelkes’s musical depiction. The phrase ‘ascend not higher’ appropriately ascends, with the highest note in the canto and tenor lines reaching a high A. The only other place that A occurs is during the ascending semiquaver runs on Hecla’s ‘sulphureous fire’. Those As are the highest notes in the piece, and the only two places they are used are atop each mountain, musically drawing a comparison between the two fires. In the second part, there is another clever madrigalism on the phrase ‘full of flying fishes’, where the percussive off-set ‘fh’ and ‘sh’ sounds phonate like a school of fish jumping in and out of water. The most striking section of the madrigal is ‘how strangely Fogo burns’, which crawls in descending chromatic lines, like molten magma, a beacon to ships as the ‘burning Island’ glows in the dark. This musical depiction is in line with Fogo’s unexplosive continual burn, and is harmonically unlike anything else by Weelkes’s English contemporaries.

David Brown says ‘Thule’ is a work of ‘Radical aesthetic’.  

He notes, ‘[c]romaticism relies for its emotional impact upon the inflection it makes against a firm, perceptible diatonic background … [how strangely Fogo burns] presents no such diatonic background; the chromatic passage, once entered, never promises cadence. Chromaticism is not pulling against diatonicism, and the listener, remaining passive, can only wonder at the “strangeness” of it all.’ I disagree with Brown’s conclusions, however: ‘[i]t is all too unusual, and the strange phenomena of the text and music finally tend to overshadow the human feelings expressed in the final couplet of each madrigal’. As in the examples by Wilbye where the speaker proclaims his love more beautiful than all the treasures of the New World, one could argue that the outstanding ‘strangeness’ of this passage promotes, even more, the greatness of the self that wonders, which I will discuss shortly. Additionally, I find it interesting that Brown

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201 For full score, see Appendix III.  
204 Ibid., 115.
resorts to hypothesising about this passage’s effect on the listener, given he normally focuses strictly on formal description and function. Perhaps this reveals a deficiency of formalism in discerning meaning from such striking ‘strangeness’, invoking the need to consider the human listener.

The Couplet

Despite Brown’s observation about it, perhaps the most interesting part of Weelkes’s setting is the repeated couplet at the end of each verse: ‘these things seem wondrous, yet more wondrous I, / Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry’.\(^{205}\) The refrain dismisses all the marvellous places and events described in the madrigal, reinserting the self as the most wondrous, most central figure. The self-awareness of the singing bodies is accentuated by the turn to a first-person ‘I’. Weelkes emphasises this verse as a moment of contemplation, markedly interrupting the overall active counterpoint with a more homophonic section of clear, sustained triads, emphasised by the move to the triad on the flattened seventh in the first ‘wondrous’, which gives a sense of arrival with a plagal cadence. The second ‘wondrous’ pauses on the resolution with an interrupted cadence, followed by a perfect cadence on the third iteration of ‘yet more wondrous I’. The same unexpected harmonies are repeated nearly identically in each instance of the text couplet (see Fig.3.8).\(^{206}\)

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205 Kerman suggests this section as the most uncharacteristic attribute of the work, as the ‘formal fibre’ of the repeated refrain was ‘not desired by any Italian madrigalist’. Kerman, *The Elizabethan Madrigal*, 232.

206 Note the last three bars are not musically identical.
Figure 5.8: Weelkes, ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ bars 28-33, transcribed by Francis Bevan.
A hint of uncertainty in Weelkes’s use of the word ‘seeme’ is also detectable — ‘these things seeme wondrous’. ‘Seeme’ simultaneously diminishes the wonder of the outside world as it draws attention to the idea that reports based on eye-witness testimony can always be doubted. How something appears, or seems, is not necessarily how it is, as it relies on fallible human perception and assessment. Ultimately, the poem and musical setting take comfort in the centrality of Self, with its distinctly human heart and emotions, in lieu of change and the strange foreign phenomena of the outside world, much in the way Wilbye’s madrigals demonstrate certainty in the superior greatness of their love. Late sixteenth-century discourse on sense perception grew increasingly aware of how easily mental processes like ‘common sense’ were swayed by the powerful passions. This example by Weelkes hints at a similar kind of scepticism, one that acknowledges the tension between the power and quality of truths experienced internally (including the passions), and external sources of knowledge transmitted via mediums like travel narrative.

As an example of writing that discusses tension between inner and outer truths, or self and Other, the piece thereby could be viewed as a form of self-fashioning, most famously explored by Stephen Greenblatt, which presupposes a division where the self is defined against a hostile Other that must first be discovered or invented in order to be defeated.207 Once this Other has been identified, ‘the “exotic” not only embraces … the New World and the Old, but touches all with “wonder” and treats the ancient and Renaissance versions of otherness … as interchangeable.’208 Moreover, it is worth drawing attention to the similarity between the juxtaposition at the heart of Greenblatt’s self-fashioning and the way that knowledge was made from a juxtaposition of ‘fact’ with fiction, as explored by Elizabeth Spiller in her book *Science, Reading and Renaissance Literature* (2004). She argues that ‘literature acquires meaning and validity against the framework of fact’ through the process of *making*, a process that is necessary to both science and fiction in the production of knowledge.209 Ultimately, knowledge of the self is still a type of knowledge, so it makes sense that the process through which we build consensual truth about the world and the process by

which we form ourselves are mechanistically similar. Both require, first, the identification of a ‘hostile’ Other as a contrastive body upon which to formulate truths and identities. The ‘hostility’ perceived in that Other manifests in what we observe in this period as a scepticism or mistrust of poets and travellers, but also in the vast wonder experienced by those who sought to understanding the foreign whether through fiction, travel narratives, or philosophy.

Weelkes’s musical setting draws attention to the ambiguity between appearances and reality by juxtaposing a text based on ‘real’ events with a musical form typically affiliated with mythology and fantasy. By using ‘literal’ and expected madrigalian compositional techniques, Weelkes’s setting raises questions about the nature of the self with clearly epistemological implications. It is well established that contemporary vocal music often discussed ‘true’ topics veiled under a façade of allegorical story. ‘Thule’ is different from these examples because there is no allegorical veil in its discussion of the tension between inner and outer truths, only the appearance of one. Moreover, if Tarasti is right in thinking music can retain the transportive function of mythology, even without its textual antecedents, this is demonstrated in Weelkes’s coupling of a mythologically-affiliated musical style with a text that surveys the wonders of the ‘real’ external world. The compositional tropes of the madrigal form bring the ‘reality’ of the text into the realm of fantasy (without the need for allegorical veil), musically rendering the New World as a suspended space of imaginative possibility, neither of fact nor fiction, thus demonstrating one way music actively worked as an agent through which people could play out—and re-play out—ideas about reality.

210 For example, Byrd’s use of biblical texts as political allegory in his Cantiones Sacrae (1589) is thought to express the plight of the Catholics in England through texts mourning the destruction of Jerusalem. Or in secular music, the entire Triumphs of Oriana (1601) could be seen as politically-charged, as it is rife with allusions to Elizabeth I, via references to mythological Diana. In Weelkes’s own ‘The ape, the monkey and the baboon’ (1608), the poet references London locations and potentially courtly individuals, personified by the various animals. Through the ‘veil’ provided by mythological or biblical allegory, composers set texts that carried ‘truths’ about the external world, whether praising a monarch, partaking in courtly gossip, or commenting on the current politico-religious situation, in addition to the contemplation of inner experiences, like love. For more on political allegory in Byrd, see Trendell, “Aspects of William Byrd’s Musical Recusancy”. As mentioned earlier, Jeremy Smith has convincingly argued that Triumphs was originally written with Anne of Denmark in mind. See Ch.3, footnote 173.

211 The ‘freezing and frying’ of the heart aside.
3.3 Conclusion

Though the meanings extrapolated from the case studies in this chapter rely on form, meaning is also constituted in self-aware performance. One can imagine how the uptake of meaning in a contemporary experience of performance (from either a musician or a hearer) would vary from person to person, perhaps even more so in these examples than it would more generally. As Julian Johnson says, ‘[T]he communication of the voice itself is always prior to whatever is spoken’ and meaning ‘lies partly in the words. But much more, it lies in the physicality of the voice and its mode of performance’.212 This much is clear for the satirical case studies, for as Peacham said, it is the ‘behaviour of the person’ that elucidates truth.215 A knowing wink, naughty hand gesture, facial expression, or overly dramatic sighing would completely alter reception of ‘Aye me, alas’. The singers’ dynamics and stresses would enhance ulterior meaning in ‘Ha, ha’. Moreover, contemporaries would have had immediate and relevant knowledge on topical references like Kemp’s dance and the widespread enthusiasm for travel narratives like Hakluyt’s. As these examples interrogate reality through representation, they simultaneously ask fundamental questions about certain knowledge. I believe that in analysing these works we can embrace both a rational analysis of the historical context and musical form alongside the emotional possibilities inherent in a performance of wonder, love, fear, or other aspects of human consciousness. Particularly in the case of ‘Thule’ (though relevant to all the examples in this chapter), one could argue that it was the ephemeral experiential aspect of ‘wonder’ viscerally presented to the body through musical performance (text in experience), which contributed to the way awareness was shaped and organised. The self-awareness brought by the ‘I’ in the final text couplet of ‘Thule’ is complicated by the multi-voiced setting, which suggests that self-formation could be a social endeavour, an idea to which I shall return at the conclusion of this thesis.

215 Se Ch. 3, 126.
Chapter 4: Dialogues of Knowledge

‘Conversation … is the medicine for a burdened spirit’ - Erasmos

The first part of this chapter considers the role and experience of dialogue in early seventeenth-century cultural production. It demonstrates dialogue as a prominent form through which knowledge was built, as well as music’s role in the performance of dialogue. As a part of the English grammar school education, dialectic literature was so widespread that it formed a fundamental aspect of European intellectual life. Ongoing dialogue—and the incompleteness, paradoxes, binaries and alternatives it fosters within modes of thought—served a functional part of cultural production in the late sixteenth century. Additionally, epistolary dialogue played a central role in the development of contemporary intellectual practices. Whether imagined or real, letter writing was a form of intellectual negotiation that produced tangible results. In philosophy, for example, epistolary dialogue was a major contributor to intellectual development. For example, Lisa Jardine discusses a series of letters between Francis Bacon and Henry Wotton in which they consider intellectual developments on the continent that directly affect Bacon’s project to reform knowledge. Bacon articulated the intellectual benefits of epistolary conversation in his 1597 essay ‘Of Negotiating’: ‘Letters are good’, he wrote, ‘when a Man would draw an Answer by Letter backe againe; Or when it may serve, for a Mans Justification, afterwards to produce his owne Letter’. Later philosophers like Descartes also participated in well-known letter exchanges with colleagues through which they debated and refined their ideas, such as Descartes’s correspondence with Princess Elizabeth Stuart of Bohemia. Arguably, it was in these conversational exchanges that his most innovative work was crafted.

3 Chloe Porter, Making and Unmaking in Early Modern English Drama: Spectators, Aesthetics and Incompletion (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 98.
4 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 7.
7 The letters by both parties have been translated in their entirety by Lisa Shapiro (ed.), The Correspondence between Princess Elisabeth of Bohemia and René Descartes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007).
rather than his more monologic treatises that state the results of such exchanges. At the same time, dialogue played an important role in the foundations of sixteenth-century musical culture as a musical form of its own, which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. The performance of music was one way through which early modern people could enact conversations about the nature of consciousness, whether explicitly or through the discussion of consciousness’s related elements: the purpose of life, labour, feelings, behaviours, beliefs, dreams, fears, and so on. Not only did the dialogical structure translate into a musical form, but it was also present in the social mechanics of musical and print culture. In her discussion of the Venetian madrigal, Martha Feldman provides links between musical culture in Venice and ‘new mechanisms of literary exchange’, which developed out of advances in the vernacular press. She notes that many of those mechanisms took form as ‘dialogic genres’, meaning letters, poetic addresses, fictional interchanges, dedications, and other modes that ‘involved speaking to and among others—to patrons, lovers, enemies, and comrades; among teachers and students, scholars and mentors, authors and patrons, courtesans and clients’. She draws a clear relationship between a social phenomenon she calls the ‘urge to dialogue’, and the ‘unorthodox forms’ of dialogue (‘broadly conceived’) that took place amongst musicians and patrons at that moment.

The ‘hermeneutic window’ applied in this chapter takes into account the field of discourse analysis, an approach to language which, in Lynne Magnusson’s words, ‘places its accent on dialogic interaction and on the situated use of language in its varied contexts and which chooses conversational discourse and other types of socially situated verbal exchange as its object of study in preference to decontextualized sentences from written texts’. Applied to music, I ask ‘what were they doing when they engaged or performed music in a dialogical fashion’? Music’s appearance as dialogue goes against a commonly held assumption about the nature of Renaissance dialogue: that it became, with the advent of print, monologic. My argument harmonises with Cristle Collins Judd’s observation that, ‘music in dialogue insists on

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8 A process akin to ‘showing your work’ in school maths.
10 Kramer, Interpreting Music, 27.
utterance and opens the possibility that the spatial becomes temporal, the visible audible, and that the didactic becomes conversational, and the conversational, in turn, musical’, challenging a reductive presumption that the history of the Renaissance dialogue transformed simply from an oral tradition to one based on sight alone.  

Debates over the function of dialogue have contemporary context that resonate with Mikhail Bakhtin’s idea that language is a living act, that, in Martha Feldman’s words ‘thrives[s] in the face of potential contestations that always reside somewhere between immediate uses and other possible uses. Language always asserts itself against the alien terrain of a listener—or in one of Bakhtin’s most famous phrases, it “lies between oneself and another”’. Bakhtin’s discourse is fundamentally social in that it is dialogic. Furthermore, the speaking subject is partly formed out of this dialogical process, as the self is engaged and built in relation to another. Bakhtin’s theories resonate with performance theorists because of the parallels between the relational space within Bakhtin’s concept of language and the relational space created through the act of performance.

For my purposes here, I use the term ‘discourse’ to describe a more general system of thought through which truths and selves are constructed. This can be written, spoken, or expressed through ideas, actions, practices, and beliefs, and negotiated through conversation. ‘Dialogue’ is viewed as a more definite conversation between two or more interlocutors, a ‘back and forth’, either written, spoken (or thought within a single subject), and can contribute to broader considerations of discourse. Later in this chapter, I also include the ‘musical dialogue’, which was a form of poetry and music where multiple perspectives were set antiphonally, either with two singers or a single singer voicing two different perspectives. ‘Conversation’ is simply the interchange of thoughts and words. ‘Dialectic’, on the other hand, is a more contemporarily specific term that applied to investigations of truth; a ‘critical

14 Bakhtin’s theories have influenced several authors mentioned in this thesis, including Judd, Feldman, and Alexander.
15 Michael Foucault discusses this in The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). For an approachable discussion on Focaual and non-Focaual approaches to discourse, see Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace, A Foucault primer: Discourse, power, and the subject (Melbourne: University of Melbourne Press, 1993), 26-31.
18 My later discussion of musical dialogue will explain why it is difficult to describe the musical form simply. This is sometimes shortened to ‘dialogue’, but it should be clear within the context.
investigation of truth through reasoned argument, often by means of dialogue or discussion.’ Though all these words can be colloquially conflated, I will stick to these uses to avoid unintentional misuse of these weighty and potentially slippery terms.

From epistolary exchanges to lessons in dialectic, there was a lot of dialogical exchange around 1600 and it was through this process that ideas were developed and exchanged. How precisely dialogue builds knowledge, however, is unsurprisingly still a matter of discussion. In the early modern period, dialogues of all sorts played a practical role in the developments of knowledge and indeed in discerning what knowledge is. Lisa Jardine argues that the influence of dialogue upon the written corpus of Francis Bacon is not only in relation to dialectic’s power as a teaching tool, but also as, in Jardine’s words, ‘a logic of discovery’, also understood as the process through which one reveals ‘new’ knowledge. In her book *Francis Bacon: Discovery and the Art of Discourse* (1974), Jardine explains that Bacon was more concerned with the extension of knowledge rather than the efficacy of its presentation. Jardine posits the development of Bacon’s so-called ‘scientific method’ amongst contemporary debates within dialectical tradition, demonstrating dialogue’s central role in Bacon’s ‘striking intellectual innovation’ in reorganising classifications of knowledge. Jardine demonstrates how Bacon’s inventions were closely linked with contemporary debates within dialectic. She maintains, however, that Bacon was not entirely conscious of the influence the dialectical background of his intellectual upbringing at Cambridge had on his work. Jardine’s argument draws a clear connection between dialectic forms, dialogue, and developments in approaches to knowledge over the seventeenth century, even if not consciously held as such by the agents themselves. From Jardine’s work, I take the theoretical and methodological precedents that a) within particular spheres of influence, agents need not be aware of contemporary theory on thought processes to be influenced by them, b) in Bacon’s time, the link between knowledge building and dialogue was a strong one regardless of the precise nature of that link, and c) dialectic

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23 In Jardine’s interpretation, Bacon ‘insists that no amount of displaying and arranging of received pedagogic material will yield the fundamental principles of knowledge’. Ibid., 6.
24 Ibid., 1.
25 Ibid., 7.
26 Ibid.
was an integral part of a gentlemanly worldview and played an influential role in contemporary thought processes. The example of Francis Bacon shows how dialectic, a form of dialogue, worked to build knowledge. Bacon’s educational foundation in dialectic demonstrates one way that dialogue, more generally, came to function as a mode of knowledge building, even if in ways less explicit than in dialectic.

As many scholars have noted, didactic literature in the classical style, which takes form as conversation, enjoyed a period of development in the mid-sixteenth century, continuing for some time throughout the seventeenth century. Dialectic, one of the three arts of the trivium, along with grammar and rhetoric, was a central part of a gentlemanly education and accordingly influenced traditions of thought in sixteenth-century England. The trivium occupied a central position within early modern schemes of learning, viewed as a prerequisite to other types of learning as it taught students how to build an argument, handle language, and express one’s views in a coherent manner. The precise use and nature of the dialectical method, however, was a subject of controversy, as there was disagreement about both the process of the acquisition of knowledge as well as how knowledge should be taught. Still, dialectic’s contemporary influence, as well as its sway on the historiography of contemporary thought processes, asserts its importance to the study of the period more generally. For example, K.J. Wilson’s study examines Aristotle, Cicero, and Plato within the works of Thomas Elyot, Roger Ascham, and Thomas More, with an eye towards the dynamic process of question-and-answer that moulded the ‘inward experience of art which encompasses not only ideas but the responses they generate’.

Though there are significant hermeneutic problems regarding how to measure the response of historical subjects, Wilson concedes that dialogue has, as a form, always presented a problem to literary theory as it retains an ambiguous position between

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27 As Kenneth Wilson says, ‘the sheer number of humanist dialogues testifies to their popularity’. Kenneth Jay Wilson, Incomplete Fictions: the formation of the English Renaissance dialogue (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1985), ix. Though many early modern scholars have been quick to draw connections between early modern didactic literature and its classical ‘origins’, it is worth noting, however, that medieval philosophers carried dialogical forms throughout the centuries before the Renaissance. See Steven Kreuger “Dialogue, debate, and dream vision” in Larry Scanlon (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Literature 1100-1300 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 71-82.


29 Jardine, Francis Bacon, 18.

30 Ibid., 59.

31 Wilson, Incomplete Fictions, x.
narrative and drama. But the verisimilitude invoked by this ambiguity is precisely what makes dialogue an effective didactic form. Dialogues centre on ideas and responses, or, in Wilson’s words the ‘mental events they create’. They allow for the enactment of multiple perspectives within a single work and for the learning process to unfold in a natural way. Wilson states that the humanists saw their art as a ‘pedagogic duty’, and it is for this reason that the dialogical form was particularly well suited to their purposes: ‘Dialogue could re-create an almost limitless variety of mental processes, and in so doing it could place the reader in an intimate, sophisticated relation to his intellectual ancestors’. This format was adopted in sixteenth-century English schools and was thought to be, in Thomas Morley’s words, ‘most conuenient for the capacitie of the learner’. Morley’s *A plaine and easie introduction to practicall musicke Set down in forme of a dialogue* (1597) takes form as a conversation between student and master. One can see echoes of a dramatic narrative in the opening lines:

**Polymathes.**
Staye (brother *Philomathes*) what haste? Whither go you so fast?

**Philomathes.**
To seeke out an old friend of mine.

**Pol.**
But before you goe, I praie you repeat some of the discourses which you had yester night at master *Sophobulus* his banket: For commonly he is not without both wise and learned guestes.

**Phi.**
It is true in deede. And yester night, there were a number of excellent schollers, (both gentlemen and others:) but all the propose which then was discoursed vpon, was Musicke.

Once the form is established, the conversation quickly veers towards a review of music theory, often with openings or invitations for the reader to respond to the master as the student does (see Fig.4.1). Thus through the dialogical form, Morley engages the reader/performer in an active practice, eliciting a mental or even physical response via

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32 Though dialogue appears to be a ‘discursive experience’ akin to drama, there are a few problems with this response, as outlined by Wilson. Wilson, *Incomplete Fictions*, ix, 19. Gavin Alexander assess well the problem of measuring dialogic response in a quotation found in Ch. 4, 217.


34 Ibid., 2.


conversation. In doing so, dialogue, an unfolding argument, draws attention to the elements of consciousness that accompany the experience of that unfolding. As Wilson reminds us, not all of these mental events are rational: ‘doubts, fears, objections—in short, the elements of consciousness—each prompted by its own particular cause’. It is by this reasoning that Wilson calls dialogues ‘incomplete fictions’, as the response, in its multitude of forms, is a necessary and integral part of engaging in this sort of narrative, a part of the fiction not present in a text alone. The relationship between didactic dialogue and incompleteness is inherent to the form, but it is simultaneously a metaphysical link, implied by the enactment of the dialogue, and elicited by the very act of reading. Without the agent reading the text, the text alone is inherently incomplete.

37 Wilson, Incomplete Fictions, 19.
38 Ibid., 20
Figure 4.1: Morley, *A plaine and easie introduction to practicall musick* (1597), sig.B5v.
Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery STC / 440:04.
As Cristle Collins Judd summarises, ‘dialogues engaged almost every aspect imaginable of literary life’, and although there has been substantial output from non-musicological scholarly fields on early modern dialogical writing, the topic has barely been touched on in relation to music. In her 2008 *Journal of Music Theory* publication ‘Music in Dialogue: Conversational, Literary, and Didactic Discourse about Music in the Renaissance’, Judd examines musical treatises in dialogical format, particularly Morley’s *A plaine and easie introduction*, as a means for understanding music’s role in the broader history of the dialogue, particularly as a temporal act that creates verisimilitude. Rather than approaching the book as a fixed typographical object, Judd asserts that dialogical treatises on music ‘reopen the question of aurality and reader participation’. She effectively argues that, readers of Morley’s dialogue … take control of the sounds represented, whether they are imagined or actualized in or out of real time, completely or partially. What is implicit in dialogue and especially notable in Morley’s treatise is the degree to which a mask of verisimilitude attempts to disguise the rupture of words and notation … *A Plaine and Easie Introduction* reveals an overarching self-consciousness that places it squarely in the communicative sphere of the dialogue. At the heart of *A Plaine and Easie Introduction* is the juxtaposition of a written treatise on practical music with the form of an oral dialogue that is constrained by its physical presentation and the music notation it contains … Characters are instructed to “sing”, “peruse”, “see”, “hear”, and “mark” examples given to them … Thus, Morley’s readers not only observe a fictional exchange between a master and student, but are also invited to participate in it.

This chapter builds on Judd’s foundation, expanding upon her position that music in dialogue insists on utterance, highlighting the temporal, active, and conversational nature of musical performance. Therefore, my hermeneutic approach considers that dialogue is found not only in the physical institutions or printed documents of the past, but like musical experience, in those things less easily preserved in tangible and lasting forms. Additionally, interpretation of a dialogue exists in between formal and historical mode. As Charles Trinkaus maintains, it is through an examination of experience that

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40 Most of the existing literature is cited in this chapter. Ibid., 43.
41 Ibid., 41.
42 Ibid., 45.
43 Ibid., 65-67.
literature like dialogue can be more fully understood. Though speaking about cultural formation more generally, Trinkaus believes that it is ‘only through conceptions, purposes, moods, feelings of the living humans who enact and suffer them’ that institutions can be understood.\textsuperscript{44} When dealing with elements of consciousness, the dynamic aspect of experience is key because the experiences of musical performance, emotions, and dialogical response, are all fleeting. Trinkaus says elements of consciousness ‘must be grasped … dynamically because they are evanescent and only exist in relation to and interaction with experience’.\textsuperscript{45} Ergo, this study views musical dialogue as not a form, but a process through which one can better understand the functions of language in culture, and the elements of consciousness that animate textual objects.

Mauro Calcagno asserts that ‘[i]t is the same subject, the same body, that performs … whether it is poetry or texted music: a subject that performs to someone and is thus located in a dialogic, relational situation’.\textsuperscript{46} Dialogical response is complicated in musical performance, however, because of the multiple layers of selves interpreting and responding to any particular event. Musical dialogue can take place in a wide variety of scenarios, involving composer, musicians, and audience.\textsuperscript{47} A reader of Morley’s treatise may sing to him- or herself in the same way a lutenist may strum and sing solely to themselves or to another. Or one singer may sing to a consort of viol-players, who are also taking part in the music-making, but less overtly so in regards to the textual animation. Or a performer may play to his or her friends in an intimate domestic setting, or equally on stage to a full Globe Theatre amidst a full-length drama. The possible combination and make-up of ‘speakers’, listeners, and responders seems limitless. As an act, performance itself imitates the response-seeking function of a textual dialogue. Perhaps it is no coincidence that, as Calcagno has also noted, one

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{46} Calcagno, \textit{From Madrigal to Opera}, 4.
\textsuperscript{47} Consort song was for domestic use; therefore audience and player are often one and the same, complicating this relationship in this repertory. Milsom explicitly unpacks the possible performance contexts of this type of song in Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 445. Also see, Fischlin, \textit{In Small Proportions}, 249.
contemporary meaning of ‘perform’ was ‘to complete; finish’. Performers are agents that both contemplate a text for themselves, but also interpret it for others. They are sometimes seen as an intermediary between the initial speaker or writer and the listeners experiencing, but in taking up a narrative role, the musicians inevitably leave a print on a work when conveying it to their listeners; in addition to being contemplative subjects themselves, they are actively involved in furthering the dialogue. Undoubtedly, musical performance complicates the relationship between text and reader, as multiple selves participate in dialogues through the sheer act of performance. Though Judd’s article on dialogical musical treatises explores the ‘incomplete’ aspects of music in dialogue that insist on utterance, she does not address the dialogue as a musical form, a popular type of domestic music that has been somewhat neglected in scholarship. While the existing studies mentioned in the next section of this chapter survey the form’s presence in published volumes, few consider in any depth the practical and philosophical implications of inconsistencies within the ‘genre’. A musical dialogue carries with it an implied performance involving multiple agents, markedly different in some ways from the dialogue implied by a treatise. How does the presence of multiple perspectives, bodies, selves, speakers, or agents required for musical dialogue complicate the discourse of performance? I will address these pertinent questions at a later stage. For now, I turn to a discussion of the dialogue as a musical form.

The Musical Dialogue

According to Denis Stevens, the Renaissance dialogue as a musical form appears to have originated in Venice in the 1530s. In sixteenth-century Italian music, there was a long tradition of explicitly dialogical polyphonic choral music featuring composers like Giovanni Croce, Orazio Vecchi, Giovanni Gastoldi, and Adriano Banchieri. In

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49 Sebastian Klotz touches on Renaissance tension between visionary and vocal language, with attention to the moment of musical delivery in Klotz, “Were Euery Thought an Eye”, 179-189.
50 Is a dialogue still a dialogue when it is more of a ‘telephone game’ (to use the more politically correct term for what the British would call ‘Chinese whispers’) or when there are more than two agents in a chain?
structural terms, a polyphonic dialogue can be defined as a piece written by a single poet in which a) two or more characters converse, and b) the music emphasises the conversation through differentiation of the characters. Usually separate higher and lower antiphonal choirs each represent one speaking party, often one female with higher voices and one male with lower voices, as in Vecchi’s *dialogo* ‘Lucilla, io vorrò morire’ (1611), where the male pursuer is sung by the three lower voices, and Lucilla by the upper voices. This is not necessarily a divide between male and female singers, however, as madrigal comedies, taking after the *commedia dell’arte* tradition, were often played by men singing in falsetto. As David Nutter points out, the polyphonic dialogue ‘was eminently suited to court festivities requiring music that could convey, by reason of its volume of sound, its clear harmonic structure and its contrasting ensembles of voices, a sense of pomp and grandeur’. In a domestic situation, sometimes settings for fewer voices were preferable, as was the case in Banchieri’s madrigal comedy for domestic use, *La pazzia senile* (1598), which uses *alla bastardă* style singing that requires the same set of men to sing both male and female characters within a single dialogue, jumping, to comic effect, between falsetto and chest voices. These polyphonic dialogues raise many practical and aesthetic questions, particularly regarding the role of the individual when acting as a collective group representing a singular perspective or persona. Moreover, it demonstrates how the domestic setting for group music making requires a certain level of practical flexibility when representing selves, whether in representing gender(s) or the number of voices involved in representing a single perspective. Though the polyphonic dialogue’s appearance in England would prove brief, its history in Italy demonstrates the complexity of representation in musical dialogue that would become relevant to the English versions as well.

Though the polyphonic musical dialogue was not ubiquitous in England as it was in Italy, the Italian version trickled into England by 1595, as seen in Thomas Morley’s

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'Phillis, I faine wold die now' from his *First booke of balletes* (1595), which Thurston Dart has discerned is related to an example that appears last in Croce's *Il Secondo Libro de Madrigali* (1588). Like Morley’s imitation, Croce’s model features conversation between two pastoral lovers, Amintas and Phillis, and is scored for seven voices, with Phillis voiced by three upper voices, and Amintas by the four lower voices. Morley’s setting is a singular example of the Italian-style polyphonic dialogue by an English composer, however.

More common in the English repertory were accompanied duets in a dialogical format. Though set for instrumental accompaniment, rather than in a strictly choral fashion, in most cases the two voices engage contrapuntally or end up in harmony for a final verse or choral refrain, requiring multiple singers rather than a single person playing two roles. Early seventeenth-century examples of dialogical duets can be found in the works of William Byrd (1589), John Dowland (1600 and 1603), John Coprario (1606), Thomas Ford (1607), Alfonso Ferrabosco (1609), and Martin Peerson (1620), amongst others. Perhaps significantly, the popularity of the dialogue seemed to explode in the latter half of the seventeenth century, with multiple examples from nearly every major restoration composer, but most notably Henry Lawes, John Gamble, John Hilton, Henry Purcell, and John Blow. Spink points towards the advent of English opera and recitative forms as one possible answer for this increased interest in dialogical domestic forms over the course of the century. Another hypothesis is that, practically speaking, dialogues allowed for increased participation amongst amateur music makers, as the additional voice and choral refrains at the end of each verse allowed for, in Richard Rastall’s estimation, those with less experience to contribute to the least musically demanding parts. Moreover, the dramatic interaction

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60 Iain Spink’s article surveys the English musical dialogue, and lists all the examples I use here, though I doubt his survey is exhaustive, as this would be a substantial project. His definition of dialogue, however, appears to be a form that is musically antiphonal and does not consider the possibilities of musical dialogue discussed later in this chapter. For example, Spink doesn’t mention John Coprario (also known as John Cooper) and his dialogue ‘Foe of mankind’ from *Funeral teares* (1606). Iain Spink, "English Seventeenth-century Dialogues", *Music & Letters*, 38.2 (1957): 155–163.
61 Surveyed in Spink, "Early-Seventeenth Century Dialogues".
62 Ibid., 163.
between characters seems a sociable form of entertainment for domestic music making.\textsuperscript{64}

\textit{The Problem of Genre}

There is a variety of dialogical or potentially dialogical repertoire that is somewhat problematic when considering the scope of this study for one reason or another, making the issue of genre particularly tricky in this chapter. One dilemma lies in how to categorise ‘multi-voiced’ music. Does a duet for two voices in a polyphonic manner count? Does the inclusion of a choral refrain? Moreover the issue of genre raises questions about the poetic traditions linked to different musical forms. If the piece has solo duet, choral refrain, lute, and viol, is the poetic tradition more aesthetically linked with lute song, consort song, the madrigal, or is it a tradition of its own? Significantly, how much has historiography influenced our approach to genres in the period? If dialogue were considered a genre of its own, how might one define ‘A Dialogue’?

For example, Thomas Ford’s ‘Shut not sweet brest’ (1607), is simply titled ‘A Dialogue’ on his title page.\textsuperscript{65} Though the pair of singers join together at the end of Ford’s setting, ultimately, this dialogue is for two lutes and two voices, and, like the examples by Ferrabosco discussed later, is arguably slightly outside the scope of this study.\textsuperscript{66} John Barlet (1606) has four ‘songs for two trebles’, accompanied by one lute (and sometimes bass viol), but both voices sing the text throughout, more in duet than dialogue.\textsuperscript{67} There are multiple examples of lute and consort song with texts that present


\textsuperscript{65} Fellowes didn’t include the dialogue in his edition of Ford’s ayres because it ‘falls far below the other songs in artistic value’. Fellowes in Thomas Ford, \textit{The English School of Lutenist Song Writers: Thomas Ford}, (ed.) Edmund Fellowes, (London: Winthrop Rogers, 1921), ‘preface’. Though Ford or someone else involved in its contemporary publication found ‘dialogue’ worthy of the volume’s title page: Thomas Ford, \textit{Mvsicke of Sundrie Kindes, Set forth in two Bookes. The First Whereof Are Aries for 4.Voices to the Lute, Orphorion or Basse-Viol, with a Dialogue for two Voices, and two Basse Viols in parts, tunde the Lute way} (London: printed by Iohn Windet, 1607); score found at ibid., sig.G1v-r. The text also appears in Francis Davison’s \textit{A Poetical Rapsody} (1602) and it is possible this publication is Ford’s text source. In Davison’s publication, the poem is credited to Francis and Walter Davison, and is described as ‘A Dialogue betweene a Louers flaming Heart, and his Ladies frozen Breast’. Francis Davison, \textit{A Poetical Rapsody …} (London: printed by V.S[iimes], 1602), sig.E8v.

\textsuperscript{66} Later I make an argument for why it is necessary to consider non-choral examples in this section, however.

\textsuperscript{67} Though Bartlet never explicitly calls these examples dialogues, they are somewhat similar to examples by Peerson looked at later in this chapter. Examples like Bartlet’s demonstrate how complex issues of genre can be with this repertory. Bartlet also has a tripartite work which he calls ‘Songs for Lute Viol de Gambo and Voyce’ set for Cantus and Basso. Though Barlet specifies on the cover that these three pieces are for ‘one Voyce’, he fully underlays the basso part with text. John Barlet, \textit{A booke of ayres vvith a triplicitie of musike …} (London: Iohn WVindet, 1606), sig.A1r.
multiple perspectives, but without any musical differentiation between the two perspectives. For example, Thomas Morley’s ‘Who is that this darke night’ (1597) is a lute ayre with a dialogical text by Philip Sidney, though there is no indication in Morley’s musical paratext that it was conceived for dialogic performance. Another example of a setting with multiple perspectives that are not given musically differentiated voices by the composer is William Byrd’s contemporarily unpublished consort song ‘Triumph with plesant melody’, the text of which is a dialogue between Christ and a Sinner. It too is often recorded as a dialogue with two singers, though in ‘the score’ it is not musically dialogical. In the manuscript sources, the Dow Partbooks (Oxford, Christ Church Mus. 984-988) and Hammond Partbooks (BL Add. MSS 50480-4 and Bod MSS Mus. f. 20-24), the scribes give no indication that Byrd composed it (or they thought it) to be sung by two parties, as it was edited in The Byrd Edition vol. 15 (1970). Would contemporary performers acknowledge the ‘voices’ present in the poem without instruction? This seems plausible. Furthermore, this raises a pertinent question of how one approaches the creation of modern editions of this type of dialogical repertory. Should a performance—or even a modern edition—acknowledge the multiple speaking parties even if Byrd or Morley (or the copyists whose work we have preserved) did not give them explicitly separate voices?

If we consider the aim of the musical ‘Dialogue’ (rather than form, without any implication for authorial intent) as the codifying element in categorising this music, the name alone implies two possibilities. Firstly, it could be music that has multiple perspectives, as one would find in dialectic or dramatic conversation, and secondly, it

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68 ‘Who is that this dark night?’ is the eighth song from Sidney’s Astrophil and Stella, a collection of poetry that shall be explained in more depth later in the chapter. Sidney’s text is printed in full in Morley’s publication. Thomas Morley, The first booke of ayres … (London: printed by VVilliam Barley, the assigne of Thomas Morley, 1600), sig.C2v-r.
70 Moreover, does modern scholarship on Sidney’s propensity for dialogue and binary justify or give any indication that a dialogical performance of Morley’s ayre might have been considered in contemporary performance? Or should be considered in modern performance? What can scholarship on text authors bring to modern ‘informed’ performance practice?
72 Examples of dialogically performed recordings of ‘Triumph’ include: iFagiolini and Fretwork, ‘The Early Byrd’ (Chandos, 1999) and Rose Consort of Viols and Red Byrd, ‘Byrd’ (Naxos, 1994).
73 As of now, the ‘new’ Byrd Edition (Stainer & Bell) has only re-edited up through volume 13, and there don’t appear to be plans to re-edit volumes 14-17, according to their website. <http://www.stainer.co.uk/shop/byrdedition.html> (accessed 14 April 2016).
could be music that accommodates two speaking parties, regardless of textual perspective. It has been suggested that in the Renaissance, the word ‘dialogue’ sometimes came to be used more generally as a term for antiphonal choral music, divorced from the explicit dramatic ‘roles’ of the Italian dialogues,74 but perhaps a more nuanced examination is needed. The following case studies are examples of musicalised English dialogues that represent what I observe to be representative of their composers’ complex and uncodified approaches to dialogical musical setting. Though a couple of these examples are only tenuously a part of this study of ‘potentially multi-voiced music’, it seems necessary to briefly mention some atypical examples to get an overview of the variety of ways dialogue was conceived, particularly when explicitly described as ‘A Dialogue’ by the composers (through title or paratextual material from the same collection). Secondly, these examples further cement the need—already identified in this study—to rethink the traditional way of categorising music by form.

**Early English Musical Dialogues**

Of the examples of English dialogue with instrumental accompaniment, the uses of dialogue seem to stratify into a few generic uses. A large number of the examples are pastoral in content, as pastoral dialogues were a popular literary form.75 Some use dialogue to represent multiple perspectives from clearly defined and separate characters, sometimes in a question and answer format along the lines of a dialectical treatise. Some use dialogue more generally for an antiphonal effect, in echoes or word painting. And others use it to discuss multiple perspectives within a single poetic train of thought. The following will give some examples of each use of the dialogical form when explicitly named ‘dialogue’ by the composer in the musical paratext.

Byrd’s dialogue, ‘Who made thee Hob’ (1589), echoes a didactic dialectic in its emphasis on question and answer between one knowing figure and one learner. A nameless shepherd asks Hob, ‘who made thee Hob, forsake the Plowe’, to which Hob replies, ‘Sweet beautie which hath powre to bowe the gods above’, and the conversation ensues as the shepherd asks a question and Hob answers it: a straightforward pastoral dialogue. Curiously, this dialogue is one of the few pieces

75 Alexander, *Writing After Sidney*, 2, 35.
from the 1589 collection that Byrd decided to leave without text underlay for multiple voices. Kerman surmises this was to preserve the ‘clownish’ effect of the instrumental parts, though more practically speaking, it would be very difficult to preserve the effect of dialogue at all if the viol parts were underlaid with text without some other musical indicator (such as an antiphonal double choir of higher and lower voices) to define the multiple characters. A rewrite like that would have taken much more effort on Byrd’s part. Iain Spink observes that the texture of ‘Hob’ is essentially polyphonic, and considers this work a member of the ‘transitional form’ between the choral dialogues and the solo examples by the later seventeenth century lutenists. Though perhaps an oversimplification, this example by Byrd demonstrates an earlier English use of the dialogue form, one within a consort song collection of nearly all potentially multi-voiced settings.

John Dowland’s _Second booke of songs or ayres_ (1600) and _Third and last booke of songs or aires_ (1603) each conclude with a single dialogue, named as such on the page itself. ‘Come when I call’ (1603) is scored for ‘cantus prima’ and ‘secunda pars’ as the two dialogical voices of equal tessitura (C1 clef), lute, bass lute, and three viols. The texture is antiphonal, with the lute and ‘cantus prima’ working collectively as one speaking voice and the ‘secunda pars’, bass lute, and viols speaking together, so each voice has their own instrumentation. This is probably to help differentiate between dialogical voices in the same range, regardless of the gender of the singers. The chorus in five-voice texture enters when the text turns collective on the objective, first-person pronoun ‘us’, when the debate seems to approach agreement. The poem is banter between eager lovers, and is conducive to the antiphonal instrumental scoring and dialogical vocal setting, musically placing it firmly in the category of dialogues containing multiple perspectives from two clearly defined characters.

_Cantus prima:_ Come when I cal, Or tarrie til I come,
if you bee deafe, I must proue dumb

Secunda pars: Stay a while my heau’ly ioy, I come with wings of loue, when enuious eyes time shall remoue.

*Cp*: If thy desire euer knew the griefe of delay, no danger could stand in thy way.

*Ce*: O die not, ad this sorrow to my griefe that languish here, wanting relief.

*Cp*: What need wee languish? can loue quickly flie: feare euer hurts more than iealousie.

*All*: Then securely enuie scorning, let vs end with joy our mourning, iealousie still defie, and loue till we die.80

‘Humour, say’ (1600) is scored for two voices, *canto* and *basso*, with four-voice ‘chorus’ refrain (called so in Dowland’s edition), lute, and viols.81 The treble viol (*quinto*) remains untexted throughout, whilst the other viols become the chorus when they reach the refrain. The poem maintains an ababcc (+dd refrain) rhyme scheme, sung strophically with three verses of text. Unlike in ‘Come when I call’, the vast difference in range between the two voices in ‘Humour, say’ allows for the same instrumental texture throughout whilst still preserving the musical differentiation between dialogical voices. Thus in both of these examples by Dowland, the style of the musical setting draws out and highlights the dialogical nature of the text, whether through differentiated registers for the speaking voices, or through contrasting instrumental accompaniment for each speaker. Set within collections of ayres for four voices plus lute, these dialogues are aesthetically positioned somewhat uncomfortably between multi-voiced and lute song traditions.82 The romantic duets, particularly ‘Come when I cal’ have a sort of intimacy more often stereotypically associated with lute song, particularly since the *cantus prima* could feasibly be a single person both playing lute and singing. When the chorus voices enter on ‘then securely envy’, it almost feels like an interruption of a moment between lovers by a crowd, echoing in mostly homophonic blocks with staggered entrances. The chorus refrain seems to draw

80 Ibid.


82 It is my sense that the dichotomy between the poetic traditions of lute song and multi-voiced domestic genres tradition (often using the catch-all term ‘ayre’) has contemporary justification, but has been aggravated into extremes by modern scholarship. Practically speaking, perhaps there was less of a distinction. I will return to this idea later.
attention to the universality of the final message, drawing focus away from a singular moment, and making larger observations about love more generally. Why does Dowland bring in a chorus at the end of these two otherwise far more vocally soloistic pieces? Just because they are published within collections for four voices? Is it a chorus in a purely musical sense, or does it derive in some sense from the theatrical use, where the chorus is a single person who exists outside of the main plot and speaks the prologue or offers commentary on the course of events? Or is there a practical reason for its inclusion, in that easy refrains include more bodies in the music-making? Choral refrains where all join in are common in works by other composers like Martin Peerson, but in Dowland’s example the contrast between lute song and multi-voiced styles within a single piece is certainly a curiosity whose implications are worth considering.

Of Alfonso Ferrabosco’s three dialogues in his 1609 set, two are conventional pastoral dialogues between a shepherd and a nymph (‘Faire cruell Nymph’, ‘Tell me, O Loue’) set for a higher-voiced nymph and a lower-voiced shepherd plus lute. ‘What shall I wish’, on the other hand, is a dialogue for two equal voices (plus bass viol and lute). Though technically multi-voiced (as one singer cannot sing both parts when they overlap at the end), this piece is the only example of an early English musical dialogue (named and scored as such) that appears in a published edition exclusively with lute song, rather than one comprised primarily of potentially multi-voiced music. As will be discussed later, most of the examples in this chapter are arguably neither wholly of one tradition or the other (though this example is still exceptional in this chapter, as it does not have a choral refrain). But complicated issues of genre aside, it is worth considering this dialogue’s ‘voices’ as an example of the variety of ways musical dialogues could approach a text.

1: What shall I wish?
   what shall I fly?
2: True Loue I seeke,
1: False I defie,
2: Wordes haue their truth,
1: Such euer speake,

84 They are described as such on the ‘table of all the songs contained in this Booke’. Alfonso Ferrabosco, Ayres (London: printed by T. Snodham, 1609), sig.K2v.
2: Deeds haue their faith,
1: Such neuer breake,
Both: Flattery yeelds pleasure,
1: Onely truth (onley truth) yeelds waight,
Both: Happy are they that neuer knew deceit.\textsuperscript{85}

Other than in the repeated refrain of the last line, shared by both voices, only one other phrase’s text is repeated and that is voice 1 on the words ‘onley truth’, leading one to suspect Ferrabosco found these words worthy of emphasis. The poem could easily demonstrate conflict within a single speaker, though the ‘question and answer’ opening gives one potential indicator of why the composer set this text as in dialogical musical setting. Moreover, the syntax turns from the singular ‘I’ of the beginning of the text to the ‘Happy are they’ concluding line, giving reason for both singers to sing at the end.\textsuperscript{86} But overall, this text could have easily been set for a single voice, as it describes a situation that could be explained by internal conflict and questioning, rather than through conversation between two people. The multiple perspectives defined here are discussing the nature of falsity and truth (as ‘only truth yields weight’), and how one determines truth. No conclusion on how to discern truth is given, but the last two lines reinforce how important truth is to happiness.

Another dialogue that works equally well to demonstrate this sort of potentially ‘internal’ dialogue was John Coprario’s ‘Foe of mankind’ (1606). In a collection of ayres set for lute, bass viol, and two polyphonically written voices (Canto and Alto), this dialogue discusses the relative merits of earthly reputation and fleshly love versus man’s true being in the eternal, spiritual realm.

\begin{center}
\textit{Canto.} Foe of mankind, why murderest thou my loue  
\textit{Alto.} Forbeare he liues.  
C. Oh where?  
A. In heauen aboue.  
C. Poore wretched life that onely lives in name.  
A. Man is not flesh, but soule, all life is fame:  
C. That is true fame which liuing men enjoy.
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{85} The two parts are of the same clef (C3) and not explicitly named in Ferrabosco’s edition. Ferrabosco, Ayres (1609), sig.I2v-r.

\textsuperscript{86} This is different from my earlier example with Dowland’s ‘Come when I call’, as this poem switches not to ‘us’, but outside the characters within the text altogether, as ‘they’, not unlike the function of a dramatic chorus. Given the tradition set up by Dowland and Peerson and others of a chorus joining in at the last refrain, though Ferrabosco makes musical indication here, it wouldn’t be outside the realm of possibility in text nor performance tradition.
A. That is true life, which death cannot destroy.
Chorus. Liue euer through thy merited renowne.
Faire spirit shining in thy starry crowne.\[87\]

The text is laid out in this format below the music. The dialogical voices come together in imitative counterpoint for the Chorus, which functions as a dramatic chorus does, stepping outside the world of the play to explain the moral of the story. It also gives the voices a textual reason to end their dialogue and unite. The poem discusses key elements of human consciousness, such as the nature of love, and the quality of (‘flesh’ or ‘soule’) man’s being. Similar to the Ferrabosco example, the two voices in ‘Foe of mankind’ represent two perspectives, but could arguably represent an internal conflict within a single speaker, debating or consoling his- or herself through internal dialogue. These two works by Ferrabosco and Coprario demonstrate a contemporary understanding of dialogical musical setting that was not always a ‘he said, she said’ conversation. This opens the door for a broader contemporary interpretation of the content of the musical dialogue, one that engages in dialogue between multiple perspectives rather than just speakers.

**Dialogues of Martin Peerson**

The following considers Martin Peerson’s *Private Musicke. Or the First Booke of Ayres and Dialogues: Contayning songs of 4, 5 or 6 parts, of severall sorts and being verse and chorus, is fit for voyces and viols* (1620).\[88\] In the dedicatory preface, Peerson explains his reasoning for publishing this volume, the first reason being ‘the wandring of divers of these Dialogues from hand to hand in unperfect Coppies, neither as I meant, or made them’.\[89\] He uses ‘dialogues’ in such a way that suggests a more generalised and commonly understood term of genre, in the way ‘ayre’ is often used. Though Peerson describes *Private musicke* as containing ‘dialogues’ on the title page and in the dedicatory material, the composer does not denote each ‘dialogue’ as such, as so many other composers have done, by printing ‘A Dialogue’ or the like at the top of the page of

\[87\] Coprario, *Funeral tears* (1606), sig.E2r.
\[88\] ‘And for want of viols, they may be performed to either the virginall or lute’.
\[85\] Peerson, *Private Musicke* (1620), sig.A2r.
music. This has led to some speculation about what Peerson precisely meant by describing his music as ‘dialogues’. Richard Rastall points out that songs 15-23 are for two voices, 15-19 for two trebles, and 20-23 for treble and tenor. In his preface to his critical edition of Peerson’s work, Rastall summarises existing thoughts on which pieces were intended as ‘dialogues’. He states that Julia Jeanne Heydon, in her DMA dissertation (1990, Oregon) concluded that these works for two voices are what Peerson intended as his ‘dialogues’, whereas Audrey Jones, in her M.litt thesis (1957, Cambridge), took a broader look at what Peerson meant by ‘dialogue’, suggesting that they are the poems with more than one textual voice, like ‘Open the dore’. In ‘Open the dore’, the first verse is sung by one speaker trying to persuade his lover to open the door. There is no indication in Peerson’s music that another individual need sing the second verse, yet textually, this second verse is clearly a response from the other side of the door. The two verses of music are set strophically.

Open the dore,
whose there within?
The fairest of thy Mother’s kin,
O come, come, come abroad,
And heere the shrill birds sing,
The Ayre with tunes that loade,
It is too soone to goe to rest,
The Sun not midway yet to West,
The day doth misse thee,
And will not part untill it kisse thee.

Were I as faire as you pretend,
Yet an unknowne sild-seene friend
I dare not ope the dore.
To heare the sweet birds sings,
Oft proves a dangerous thing.
The Sun may run his wonted race,
And yet not gaze on my poore face,
The day may misse mee:
Therefore depart,

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90 Every other dialogue in this chapter is described as such specifically by the composer/editor on the page of music directly or in the table of contents. In Peerson’s dedicatory material, the generic terms of genre (to describe the contents of the collection, rather than the collection itself) used by the composer include ‘Dialogues’, ‘Songs’, ‘Labours in this kind’, ‘Tones’, and ‘Compositions’. Peerson, Private Musicke (1620), sig.A2r.
91 Rastall in Martin Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, vi.
92 Ibid.
93 ‘Sild-seene’ means ‘seldom seen’. Robert Nares, A Glossary Or Collection of Words, Phrases, Names, and Allusions to Customs (Stralsund: printed for Loeffler, 1825), 726.
You shall not kisse me. ⁹⁴

At this point, both Heydon’s and Jones’s assessments seem plausible. It is possible ‘Open the dore’ is not a dialogue, as it is set on a single vocal line in C1 clef (except for choral refrain, which is underlaid for all voices), but on the other hand, perhaps its dialogical text is so obvious that it need not be musically drawn out as such to be interpreted as dialogical.⁹⁵ But the idea that Peerson’s concept of ‘dialogue’ is merely textual is complicated by the composer also including duets that are antiphonally voiced, but not textually dialogical.

For example, in ‘Then with reports’, the second part of ‘Come pretty wag’, the dialogue is entirely unconversational. Cantus [1] mostly echoes Cantus [2], and the echo is used antiphonally for a madrigalian effect of a cuckoo’s call (see Fig.4.2).⁹⁶ The text varies a couple times between the two Cantus voices, though it is uncertain if this is intentional or a printer’s error. For example, Cantus 1 sings ‘And sing’ and Cantus 2 echoes ‘O sing’ (bar 5) and after C1 sings ‘so prettily’ C2 sings ‘so wittely’.⁹⁷ If this setting wasn’t affiliated with part I, ‘Come pretty wag’, there would be no indication at all that two voices were textually meaningful.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ ‘Open the dore’ is recorded with male and female voices each taking a verse by the Wren Baroque Soloists. Wren Baroque Soloists, ‘Martin Peerson’, (Collins Classics, 1994).
⁹⁶ Peerson calls each voice ‘Cantus’, the bracketed distinction between the two is my own.
⁹⁷ The difference between ‘prettily’ and ‘wittely’ is not likely to be an error, but I am not certain about ‘And sing’ vs. ‘O sing’.
⁹⁸ In ‘Come pretty wag and sing’ (part I), the dialogical setting seems mostly textually inconsequential, except for the reference of ‘let us both’, inferring that there are two people. So even with its affiliation to part I, the dialogical setting in ‘Then with reports’ makes little sense outside of the madrigalian antiphony. For the text of ‘Come pretty wag’, see Appendix I(e); Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 25-26.
16. Then with reports

Second part

Martin Peerson

Edited by Richard Rastall

Then with reports most sprightly,
Trip with thy voice most sprightly.

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Antico Edition, P. O. Box 1, Moretonhampstead, Newton Abbot, Devon TQ13 8UA, England
pret-tely, For now, for now the Cuc-koo
so wit-te-ly, for now, for now the Cuc-koo

sings, cuc-koo, cuc-koo, cuc-koo, cuc-koo, cuc-koo,
sings, cuc-koo, cuc-koo, cuc-koo, cuc-koo, cuc-koo,

that ec-cho, that ec-cho, that ec-cho doth re-
that ec-cho, that ec-cho, that ec-cho doth re-

Cuc-koo, Cuc-koo,
Cuc-koo, cuc-koo,

that ec-cho doth re-
Similarly, there is little hint of dialogue within the text of Peerson’s ‘Pretty wantons, sweetly sing’, which also uses the two voices for an imitative effect of bird noises, and has no textual indication that two voices are necessary.

Altus: Pretty wantons, sweetly sing,
   In honour of the smiling spring,
Cantus [2]: Looke how the light-wing’d chirping quire
   with nimble skips, the Spring admire,
Both: But O, harke, harke how the Birds sing,
   Or marke that Note
   Jug, jug, jug

Figure 4.2: Peerson ‘Then with reports’, edited by Richard Rastall for Antico Editions in Peerson, Private Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, 26-28.
Terew, terew, terew
O prett’ly warbled from a sweet throat.⁹⁹

Unless Peerson considered birdsong a form of conversation, it is hard to believe that this type of setting was believed a dialogue, in spite of its duet-like or antiphonal characteristics requiring two singers. Though it makes little logical sense, however, one cannot entirely disregard the possibility that Peerson or his contemporaries may have felt differently about this meaning, and perhaps the connotations of ‘dialogue’ had expanded to mean song for two voices, regardless of textual perspective. But before making any conclusive remarks on this inconsistency, it is worth looking at a few other examples from Peerson’s collection that further complicate a definition of ‘dialogue’ (see Fig.4.3).

Examples of ‘antiphonal dialogues’ from Peerson’s *Private Musicke* (1620)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No &amp; Title</th>
<th>Dialogical Voice Names and Clef</th>
<th>Ranges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17. ‘Pretty wantons, sweetly sing’</td>
<td>Cantus (G2) / Altus (C⁰)</td>
<td>Cantus [2] D₄-G₅ / Altus C₄-D₅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18. ‘Sing, Loue is blinde’</td>
<td>Cantus (G2) / Altus (C1)</td>
<td>Cantus C₄-F₅ / Altus C₄-D₅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19. ‘What neede the morning rise?’</td>
<td>Cantus (G2) / Altus (C1)</td>
<td>Cantus F₄-F₅ / Altus [1] E₄-C₅</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20. ‘Gaze not on youth’</td>
<td>Cantus (G2) / Contratenor (C₃)</td>
<td>Cantus D₄-E₅ / Contratenor E₃-E₄</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

21. ‘I onely seeke to please mine eye’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composer and Title</th>
<th>Dialogical Voice Names and Clef</th>
<th>Ranges</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dowland: ‘Humour, say, what mak’st thou here?’</td>
<td>Canto (C1) / Basso (F4)</td>
<td>Canto G4-E5 / Basso G2-B3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowland: ‘Come when I cal’</td>
<td>Cantus prima (C1) / Secunda pars (C1)</td>
<td>Cantus prima D4 -D5 / Secunda pars D4-Bb4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coprario: ‘Foe of mankind’</td>
<td>Canto (C1) / Alto (C3)</td>
<td>Canto D4-F5 / Alto G3-Bb4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Ferrabosco doesn’t name his voice parts, or otherwise differentiate them other than through layout on the printed page.

Other ‘Dialogue’ examples in Chapter 4:

*The C clef is on the first ledger line below the staff. I do not know why he didn’t just use a G2 clef as he did elsewhere.

The following examples raise significant questions about dialogical meaning and gender, issues which relate to perspective, gender stereotypes, and clefs—a major area of exploration largely outside the scope of this thesis. But I will present some of these questions nevertheless, with the caveat that any hypotheses resulting from them will remain preliminary. ‘Gaze not youth’ is a short setting which doesn’t amount to much conversation, but nonetheless still presents two perspectives, represented by two
voices. One might assume that it would be the lower voice that would defend a wandering eye, and the higher voice would be the perspective pleading for fidelity. Contrary to other settings which have overtly gendered higher and lower voices, the stereotypically ‘male’ perspective in this setting is the Cantus, rather than the lower Contratenor voice. This assumption, of course, relies on other hypotheses of performance practice that remain uncertain. For example, is clef an indicator of gender? Would a singer of either gender sing from all or only some clefs? Moreover, would this be transposed to a comfortable octave, or at pitch? Gendered dialogues, like those between a shepherd and nymph, tended to be overtly gendered through clefs, for example in Peerson’s ‘Is not that my fancie’s Queen?’, in which the ‘Shepheard’s swaine’ is voiced by ‘Contratenor’ in C3 clef, and the ‘Queene’ by ‘Cantus’ in G2 clef. But what about for voices with more similar tessituras? If there even is an association between clef and gender, is this association fixed or flexible in performance? One might consider, then, that the dialogue in ‘Gaze not youth’ is not between lovers, but perhaps simply a presentation of multiple perspectives. In some ways, as a full conversation this setting seems truncated or incomplete, as the Contratenor voice concedes its position all too quickly by joining the Cantus part on what should be the rebuttal rather than the solution to the discussion. Curiously, the eye is ‘on the face’ rather than ‘her face’ or ‘your face’, which would help the reader discern more clearly whom the speakers are or whom they are speaking about. The two voices conclude that ‘when the eye is on the face’, whether speaking about the eyes located on one’s own face, or in the act of gazing upon another’s attractive face, one cannot help but get distracted due to the proximity of eye and mind. Though multiple perspectives are present in the text, it is not necessarily two speakers, as this could easily represent conflict within an inner dialogue.

Contratenor: Gaze not on youth, let age contain
Thy wand’ring eye, thy eye from objects vaine.

Cantus: No, no, I must look about and see,

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100 As Jeremy Smith points out, ‘[i]n his 1588 “Epistle” Byrd … mentions the matter of compass. “If thou desire songs of smal compass & fit for the reach of most voyces, here are most in number of that sort.” By “smal compass” is meant a total range accommodated either within a “low clef” combination (typically with superius c1 and bassus F4) or a “high clef” one (g2 to F3), the former offering scope for upward transposition, the latter for downward’, indicating a procedure for transposition, at least in the work of Byrd. J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 8.
In loue what heau’nly objects be

Both: But when the eye is on the face,

The minde (Choral refrain) is in another place.\textsuperscript{101}

‘Sing, Loue is blinde’ is another example of a piece set dialogically that could textually represent a single speaker with multiple perspectives. There is however a hint of dialogue within the speaker’s inner reasoning, seen as the two voices contribute points towards a resolution. The dialogue is between Cantus and Altus voices, so it is not so clearly between a man and a woman (given the topic is love), but perhaps something closer together.\textsuperscript{102} At the same time, Peerson could have set this work as two equal voices as he did in ‘Then with reports’, yet chose not to. This setting presents queries about clef, gender, and performance practice, as it leads one to wonder about the meaning behind setting dialogical texts in particular clefs.

\textsuperscript{101} Peerson, Private Musike, (ed.) Rastall, 38-39.

\textsuperscript{102} Though men probably sang alto, the tenor/cantus split one usually finds in love dialogues is more overt than what is presented here. That said, this could still be a dialogue between a man and a woman, like in Dowland’s ‘Come when I call’, which is set for alto and cantus.
Yet in the darke, Love light can finde,
now is Love’s La-dy.

Love’s a good Clarke, Reads per-fit-ly, per-fit-ly, and puts to-

Then tell me, then tell me whe-ther hee’s not a foole, whe-ther hee’s not a foole that

Then tell me, then tell me,
cryes to hit the marke, to

hit the marke?

to hit the marke? Cupid wants eyes, and is a

O no, O no, O no, though Cupid's young and blind with all,

ba - by, O no, O no, O no, O no,

Yet
The two voices are used in a combination of ways (see Fig.4.4). First they appear dialogically, as the speakers present complementary points. For example, Cantus furthers or alters Altus’s first statement with the adverb ‘yet’, qualifying or adding to Altus’s first point. But from ‘then tell me’, the voices are much more intertwined, used for echoes in an imitative fashion. The antiphonal usage isn’t madrigalian, however, as it is in ‘Pretty wantons’ with the bird noises. The dialogical antiphony comes back briefly on Cantus’s point ‘though Cupid’s young and blind with-all’, which is once again furthered by Altus’s adverb ‘yet’ on ‘Yet he can with the strongest fall’, adding to
Cantus’s reasoning. Unlike other examples, the two perspectives aren’t really presenting two sides of an argument, but rather conversationally contributing to a single line of reasoning as one might through an internal decision-making process. Moreover, though this text is discussing love as a topic, one cannot say that this is a dialogue between two lovers. In both ‘Sing, Loue is blinde’ and ‘Gaze not on youth’ the dialogical voices have closely aligning tessituras, though in differentiated clefs.105 Does this closeness carry meaning for the textual situation? Each piece discusses love, an element of consciousness, yet they are not necessarily conversations between lovers, as one might expect from a more pastoral dialogue. Might the close tessitura imply an internal dialogue, at least in this collection? And what might this mean for an example like ‘Open the dore’, which is not set dialogically by the composer, yet is clearly textually dialogical between two separate speakers rather than a single undecided one? There are multiple questions of performance practice as well: Why (and how) might one perform a piece for two speakers with a single singer (‘Open the dore’, Byrd’s ‘Triumph’, etc.)? Similarly, why might one perform a piece of internal dialogue with two singers? Perhaps because ‘Open the dore’ is so overtly dialogical, a dialogical musical setting wasn’t required. But in the cases of ‘Gaze not’ and ‘Sing, Loue’, the dialogical elements of the poem are highlighted through the musical setting in a way that cannot be emphasised by the poem alone. And what is the role of the choral refrain, which at times seems to ‘interrupt’ a discussion between two with the cries of a crowd?104 Of course it is possible that Peerson was just inconsistent in his voice setting. Regardless, these examples by Peerson indicate an uncodified approach to the setting of multiple perspectives and speakers, one that certainly deserves more time in a future study of the early dialogical ‘form’ and its performance.

The Aesthetic Function of Musicalising Dialogue

This survey is intended to give an overview of the variety of ways the concept of ‘dialogue’, in diverse form, was present in vocal music around the turn of the

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105 See Figure 4.3.
104 Indeed, it is interesting to consider the three uses of the refrain demonstrated in these examples and their implications for perspective or voice. Sometimes the refrains are just the two speakers joining together at the end (‘What shall I wish?’), sometimes they are choral refrains for all voices that seem to interrupt the dialogue with a crowd (‘Gaze not on youth’), and sometimes they function as a chorus in a Greek play, stepping outside the dialogue to provide outside commentary or a summary (‘For of mankind’).
seventeenth century. But the analysis of this body of repertoire is necessarily two-fold. Firstly, there is an historiographical question regarding genre and the classification of this repertory, which appears to be muddier than traditional understanding might admit. This is a significant area that needs critical reassessment, as my examination has raised more questions than it has provided answers, though I will return to some of these questions in the conclusion. Secondly, and of greater significance to this thesis, is the aesthetic analysis of this repertoire, which will necessarily draw on some of the problems of genre and historiography, but relates more significantly to how this repertoire can be linked to ‘problems of knowledge’.

Putting the issues of vocal scoring aside for a moment, the above demonstrates that there are examples of courtly domestic music which are explicitly called dialogues, set for two or more voices, and have dialogical texts involving two people (Byrd’s ‘Hob’, Dowland’s two dialogues), as well as examples of pieces not explicitly called dialogues or musically set as such that have clearly dialogical texts involving two speakers (Byrd’s ‘Triumph’, Morley’s ‘Who is it that this dark night?’). The example by Ferrabosco suggests there is precedent for dialogues, at least within lute song, that are of two perspectives, but arguably within the same speaking voice; an internal dialogue represented externally through multiple selves. Finally, there is the case of Peerson’s dialogues, which are called dialogues, though it remains unclear what precisely the term meant to him, as his collection contains (a) explicitly dialogical pastoral pieces set in a musically dialogical manner (‘Is not that my fannie’s Queene?’), (b) pieces for a single voice that textually contain two perspectives (‘Open the dore’), (c) songs for two voices used imitatively or for word painting (‘Pretty wantons’, ‘Then with report’) but with a single textual perspective, as well as (d) settings for two voices that would also work as a single internal dialogue conveying multiple perspectives from within the same speaker (‘Sing, Loue is blinde’, ‘The spring of ioy’). The purpose of this survey was to illustrate the muddy contemporary approaches to the musical dialogue, and the broad versatility of the word at a time when the English musical dialogue was still in its formative years.105

105 It is worth noting that there are a few manuscript sources that Rastall has identified as fully texted versions of some of Peerson’s songs discussed here; some of these were amateur attempts at underlaying the instrumental parts to make vocal settings. Rastall in Peerson, Private. Musicke, (ed.) Rastall, ix-x.
The dialogues, perhaps more so than some other English forms, are caught in a sticky, historiographically-induced tangle of ambiguous genre classifications and musical traditions. Since Morley’s singular poly-choral example, the early English dialogue seemed to resist formal musical and poetic codification. Dialogues are published for lute, viols, a combination of the two, virginals, and in a cappella arrangement. As was common, flexibility of instrumentation allowed for a variety of combinations and possibilities within a single setting. Poetically, these dialogues come in a range of structures and metres. Their varied forms and publication contexts present questions about which musico-poetic traditions these ‘dialogues’ inherited, and from where. The multiple manifestations of the musical dialogue in early modern England inherently resist both generic categorisation, and any attempt to demonstrate a genealogy of the genre. A plethora of questions about the musical dialogue remain: What was ‘a Dialogue’? Need the composer explicitly set it for multiple vocal lines? Or are multiple perspectives enough for the possibility of a two-voiced performance? Why are dialogues often ‘tacked on’ to the end of publications that are largely compromised of other musical forms, as they were in Ferrabosco’s and Dowland’s collections? And does this association with another form shed any light on the traditions of the dialogue genre? Dialogues do require, however, at least at this point in time, a singing voice and text, whether in single, duet, or choral voicing.106

In each of the ‘Dialogues’ examined above that are explicitly called so by the composer, the examples by Ferrabosco are the only early dialogues (‘early’ here meaning prior to Henry Lawes’s 1653 *Aires and Dialogues*) that appear in a publication of solely lute-based solo song.107 The rest, including the Dowland, appear in collections nearly entirely comprised of multi-voiced or potentially multi-voiced music.108 Spink claims that an English taste for Italian-style declamatory music marked a shift in the dialogue genre in the publications after Peerson’s in 1620, making the collections from Lawes on a slightly different genre that he calls *recitative-dialogues*, which slowly

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106 As differentiated from later interpretations of musical or instrumental ‘dialogue’, for example as explored by Simon Keefe in *Mozart’s Piano Concertos: Dramatic Dialogue in the Age of Enlightenment* (Rochester: Boydell, 2011).
107 Spink points out that the only secular vocal music printed in England between 1632 and 1651 was an edition of Porter’s *Madrigales* in 1639 (now lost), of the 1632 first edition. Spink, “English Seventeenth-century Dialogues”, 159.
108 Perhaps because multi-voiced settings assume that there are other singers around, rather than a solo singer/lutenist.
influenced both English madrigalian and lutenist song-writers alike. These recitative-dialogues were to become a significant genre in the latter half of the seventeenth century. Spink identifies much of the repertoire discussed in this chapter as a ‘transitional form’ between the choral dialogues of the late sixteenth century and those of the lutenists of the later seventeenth century. Though I might take semantic issue with Spink’s use of ‘transitional’, it seems likely that the early English dialogues were a form ‘in motion’. Publication with otherwise potentially multi-voiced music might suggest an affiliation between the dialogue and the multi-voiced genres, though the added instrumentation would seem to indicate that they were not entirely divorced from lute song either.

Overly-simplified historiography which portrays the early seventeenth century as a time that saw the death of the madrigal and the rise of the lute song is complicated by secular social music like the dialogue or the ‘ayre’ that seems to fit into neither category entirely. Perhaps this point seems obvious, but it is one worth making to defend against the potential criticism that my approach to genre in this chapter has been too fluid. Certainly there are major differences, particularly regarding approach to poetics, between the lute, madrigal or consort song genres in their most absolute forms. That much was obvious both in contemporary debates (such as Thomas Campion’s arguments against the madrigal) and in modern analysis of these works. The term ‘ayre’ often worked as a catch-all that could describe a variety of forms, and, as Fischlin points out, there has been a lack of modern critical attention given to the poetics of the ayre. What is presented here, however, suggests that secular forms like the dialogue have been influenced by multiple traditions, practically accommodating the demands for instrumentally versatile social music, and therefore exist outside the more generalised binary of solo accompanied vs. choral repertory that has been imposed upon secular music of this period.

In his discussion of the Italian frottola form, consisting of a single vocal line with three accompanying viols, Denis Stevens raises questions of performance practice are

110 As Daniel Fischlin observes, ‘In literary terms … the distinction between the madrigal and the ayre consists in the former’s reliance on the Petrarchan repertoire of literary conceits (defined as poesia per musica) and the latter’s development of a more autonomous English tradition that had been influenced by Petrarchism but was fast abandoning that influence’. Fischlin, In Small Proportions, 43.
111 Ibid.
relevant to the English dialogues, particularly those that appear in manuscript by Byrd and some examples by Peerson, where dialogical performance with two singers is only inferred. Stevens observes that ‘[i]f dialogue is to be performed dramatically, the vocal line must be divided between two singers, although this method is never expressly suggested by the earlier prints and manuscripts. This was entirely a matter for the performers, and it is quite possible they shared the declamation between suitably contrasting voices, in spite of the relatively limited tessitura’.¹¹² When there is a single singer portraying two ‘characters’ or perspectives, several decisions of how to enact the music are left up to the performer(s), echoed by the idea that music-making itself is a dialogical, relational process. In the case of Byrd’s ‘Triumph’, does the singer use different timbres or characterised ‘voices’ for Christ and the Sinner, for example? It appears that in many cases of musical dialogue, performers are the ones left to decide how to emphasise (or not) dialogical text.¹¹³ Moreover, it highlights the performer’s or a performance’s role in analysing the implications of dialogue in music, as it pertains to issues of self representation and multi-voiced music, an issue I will come back to in the conclusion of this dissertation.

But in instances where the music dictates that performance with two singers is necessary, what is the possible function of music in performing a dialogue? This question is particularly pertinent when the text alone does not demand multiple voices, as it does not in Ferrabosco’s ‘What shall I wish?’ and Peerson’s ‘Gaze not’ amongst others. Judd surmises that in the case of the musical treatise via dialogue, music assists in conveying verisimilitude, as ‘the spatial becomes temporal, the visible audible … the didactic becomes conversational, and the conversational, in turn, musical.’¹¹⁴ In the musical dialogues, further parallels occur between the verisimilitude offered by the dialogical form and the dialogical experience of musical performance to other hearers, a layer that may or may not be present when singing from Morley’s treatise. A performance of this repertoire requires other listening bodies (in the form of the instrumental consort members) to be present, unlike solo lute song or engaging with a musical treatise. Moreover, each instrumentalist in much of this repertory could potentially also be a singing voice. A lutenist can sing, viols and voices are frequently

¹¹² Stevens, “Choral Dialogues of the Renaissance”, 216.
¹¹³ We are reminded of Campion’s words about a performer’s ‘action’ or ‘inuention’, which were just as important as the ‘Notes’. See Introduction, 34.
interchangeable or play and sing at the same time, and even more passive ‘hearers’ could partake in the choral refrains. Nearly everybody involved is a potential ‘voice’ in participation with this kind of domestic music.

On their own, the writer of a dialogical text has an ambiguous narrative position which, through the dialogical form, asserts that it is conveying a real experience, thus maintaining an uncertain relationship with truth (as, why would truth need to provide testament?). In some ways, however, musicalisation of a textual dialogue would seem to detract from verisimilitude, as normal conversation isn’t usually set to viols. As Mark Ringer points out, early practitioners and theorists of opera in seventeenth century Italy were ‘keenly aware of the violations of verisimilitude presented by singing characters’, a problem mollified by using inherently musical characters like Orfeo in the first operas. This violation of verisimilitude does not seem to present much of a problem to Peerson or his English contemporaries, however, separating these early dialogues fundamentally from early operatic forms. Though further investigation is needed, perhaps this illuminates the heritage of the English musical dialogue as related to the multi-voiced traditions (in spite of the fact there is only a single surviving English example of a polychoral dialogue), rather than a simple precursor to recitative. This suggests that, in effect, the dialogue’s ‘problem of genre’ is inherently linked to its aesthetic function in approach to verisimilitude, and the dialogue might be best defined through aesthetic tradition rather than through codified musical structure. Though one cannot be certain, perhaps the early English musical dialogue, like the madrigal, created a space in which to play one’s self through relational exchange. Elements of consciousness, the most abstract of feelings and thoughts that make us human, are fashioned not only in relation to outside opinions, but through multiple perspectives within our own minds, sometimes illustrated in a tangible way through multiple singers who represent multiple perspectives as done by Ferrabosco and Peerson. The parallels between musical performance and dialogue

116 This is supported by work on the Italian madrigal comedies that were once thought to be precursors to opera, but have more recently been reassessed as having more in common with sixteenth century polyphony. William R. Martin, “Vecchi, Orazio.” Grove Music Online. Oxford Music Online. Oxford University Press (accessed 21 Dec 2015). <http://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/subscriber/article/grove/music/29102>.
present questions about perspective’s role in self-creation, and also how musical performance can enact and therefore interrogate the space between representation and reality, particularly in understanding elements of consciousness like love. Though it might seem a distant leap from this to the traditional dialectical treatises taught at Cambridge and the early English pastoral dialogue on love, both forms of dialogue worked toward an understanding of the world around us and its relationship to the spiritual force inside of us, whether a force of mind or passion.

4.1 Dialogues and Incompleteness

The next section of this chapter outlines how the early modern dialogical tradition influenced writing beyond the didactic genres, even when the dialogical format went out of style or was no longer present, an idea briefly introduced at the beginning of this chapter. This is followed by a case study that applies these theories to a musical example, William Byrd’s ‘O you that heare this voice’ (1588).

The early modern dialogical tradition allowed for contradiction, alternatives, unfinishedness, and binary possibilities, as remnants of a dialogical worldview could manifest in subtle ways, even when the form was not present. For example, in her monograph *The Renaissance Utopia: Dialogue, Travel, and the Ideal Society* (2014), Chloë Houston argues that utopian literature of the same period was ‘characterized by an engagement with dialogue … and that the concept of dialogue continued to be central to utopian literature even as it ceased to employ the conventional forms of dialogue, and, eventually, utopia itself.’ She follows the utopian genre through a transition in the mid-seventeenth century, away from dialogue and towards a more straightforward narrative, influenced by travel literature. Though authors of utopian literature start to ‘close down the dialogue form’s capacity for multiple voices’, Houston traces how authors like Francis Bacon still incorporated elements of dialogue in their works, as Bacon did in *New Atlantis*. She concludes that even though eventually ‘utopias rejected the traditional utopian form, through the concept of dialogue, through the use of conversation as narrative device and metaphor, [dialogue] continued to remain an

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117 This is not unlike how poetic tropes of the madrigal genre was able to linger even in settings like Weelkes’s ‘Thule’, where there is not a nymph or shepherd in sight.
119 Ibid., 11.
important feature of utopian literature’, even if it was in a narrative form. I contend that dialogical features are also preserved in non-dialogical music and poetry. The wake of the dialogical tradition carved a path that allowed for, amongst other things, paradox and contradictory perspective within one body of writing, providing alternatives against which our perceptions can be formed.

This dialogical imprint is exemplified by the life and work of Sir Philip Sidney, the poet who wrote the text set to music by Byrd in the forthcoming case study. Gavin Alexander explains that ‘[i]t is characteristic of Sidney’s humanist mind-set that he sees options as alternatives and discussion as dialogue. The world he makes sense of operates according to a binary logic. His works are consequently built on pairings and oppositions, with plot, character, and language partitioned into binaries’. As William Poole and Richard Scholar remind us, this inclination towards pseudo-dialogue was not unique to Sidney or utopian genres, as ‘paradox was a flourishing genre in the academe, a form that reminded its users of the provisionality and ductility of apparently stable systems of thought’. Hamlet’s ubiquitous ‘To be or not to be’ soliloquy exemplifies dialogue’s influence on modes of supposedly internal thought. The elements of incompleteness, binary, and paradox that Jardine, Houston, and Alexander identify within early modern English writing are concepts strongly linked with the process through which one discerns truth, providing the conversation and alternatives which fashion knowledge. As Shapin remarks, the conversation need not end in agreement, because ‘[k]nowledge of the world is given its shape as conversation proceeds’.

Applied to music, one might be tempted to see a linear transition of some sort, or perhaps a decline of the dialogical musical form in England, but the surge in popularity of the musical dialogue (in antiphonal form) after the Civil War (though, as Spink shows, in a recitative style) calls this into question. The multiplicity of ways that dialogical concepts show their presence in musicalised text (whether explicitly dialogical, or just implied through concepts like contradiction) are about as muddy and

120 Ibid., 12.
121 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 2.
122 Poole and Scholar (eds.), Thinking With Shakespeare, 3.
123 Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 35.
varied as its musical form, at least in the early examples. Still, one can see how the dialogical worldview persisted in a variety of texts as a mode of processing thought. If music’s temporal, visceral, and dialogical nature inherently insists on utterance, as Judd suggests, it also insists on experience, making music particularly apt for experiencing and cogitating the sometimes contradictory elements of consciousness explored in contemporary poetry. For the remainder of this chapter, I examine a work by William Byrd and Philip Sidney that demonstrates these lingering elements of dialogue and overtly discusses components of consciousness and sense perception.

**Philip Sidney Unfinished**

Amongst William Byrd’s English-language domestic repertory, Byrd set three texts that have been attributed to courtier poet Philip Sidney. Two of these poems are from *Astrophil and Stella*, a sequence of 108 sonnets with 11 ‘Songs’ in a range of poetic metres. Both settings contain textual variants from the subsequently published editions of Sidney’s work, and it is not known from where or whom Byrd received manuscript copies of the text, as Byrd’s settings were published before Sidney’s full cycle went to print. It has often been assumed that the ‘songs’ within Sidney’s *Astrophil and Stella* were not intended for musical setting, but rather played a structural role in the cycle; the songs ‘do not expect to be sung’ and ‘actual music is not called for’, as Winifred

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124 There is no progressive timeline, as Houston is able to demonstrate within utopian literature, for when dialogical music went from explicitly dialogical to abstractly so. Both forms seemed to coexist throughout the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. Composers like William Byrd and Martin Peerson, thirty years apart, both produced explicitly dialogical compositions, in addition to setting dialogical texts for single voices, as did other composers like Morley, Ferrabosco, and Dowland.


126 Byrd’s settings are amongst the earliest known excerpts from the sequence to be published, and a musical manuscript source of Byrd’s setting of ‘O you’, is thought to be dated to the mid 1580s, prior to Byrd’s print publication, and therefore may have been transcribed while Sidney was still alive. Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 439. For more on the manuscript, see David Mateer, “William Byrd, John Petre and Oxford, Bodleian MS Mus. Sch. E. 425”, *Royal Musical Association Research Chronicle*, no. 29 (January 1, 1996): 21–46. John Milsom claims *Astrophil and Stella* did not spread widely in manuscript, though Sidney’s full cycle was published by Thomas Newman in an unauthorised and error riddled quarto edition in 1591. Woudhuysen, *Sir Philip Sidney and the Circulation of Manuscripts*, 264, 567-71. For more on textual variants in these works, see Sidney, *The Poems of Sir Philip Sidney*, (ed.) Ringler, 225, 485.
Maynard asserts.\textsuperscript{127} John Stevens challenges this idea by considering that ‘far more [songs] were in fact sung than we know about’,\textsuperscript{128} suggesting that some poems could have been created to fit existing melodies.\textsuperscript{129} Additionally, Alexander notes that Sidney ‘quite clearly wrote poems to fit the tunes of songs’ in various languages (\textit{contrafacta}) and ‘he equally clearly intended his own poems to be set to music’.\textsuperscript{130} Alexander cites the poet from Sidney’s \textit{Defence of Posey} (1595), who ‘cometh to you with words set in delightful proportion, either accompanied with, or prepared for, the well enchanting skill of music’.\textsuperscript{131}

Musical analysis of Byrd’s settings of Sidney’s work has proven to present significant hermeneutic challenges familiar to those who study or perform strophic song.\textsuperscript{132} Strophic form doesn’t allow for the composer to, in Robert Jones’s words, match ‘the Note to the Word’ as precisely as one would be able to in a through-composed form like the madrigal.\textsuperscript{133} In addition to musical hermeneutic obstacles, Philip Sidney’s work is notoriously rife with its own challenges of interpretation, both within his literary output and extra-literary life, which will be discussed in further detail shortly. In spite of these issues, this case study presents an observation of an anomaly within one of Byrd’s settings. Significantly, this little curiosity in Byrd’s music echoes many similar challenges Sidney scholars have encountered when analysing the poet and his work in its unmusicalised form. This incongruity in Byrd’s setting of Sidney’s verse can be read as related to contemporary concern regarding the role of the arts in understanding sense perception, as well as the role of the performer(s) in the creation of musical meaning.

One sees time and again in the life and works of Philip Sidney that the world order of the time was viewed through a dialogical lens, was one in which gaps and

\begin{footnotes}


\textsuperscript{129} Ibid., 163.

\textsuperscript{130} Alexander, \textit{Writing After Sidney}, 197.

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid. There were several poetic miscellanies printed without music frequently set to music, for example Richard Tottel’s \textit{Miscellany} (1557) or Richard Edward’s \textit{The Paradawe of daynty deuises} (1576) which contained verses ‘so aptly made to be set to any song in .5. partes, or song to instrument’. Both amateur and professional musical settings of these poems existed in manuscript; a reminder that print evidence gives only a partial picture of textual/musical circulation. Richard Edward, \textit{The Paradawe of daynty deuises} (London: printed by [R. Jones for?] Henry Diale, 1576), sig.A3v. Eric Nebeker, “Broadside Ballads, Miscellanies, and the Lyric in Print”, \textit{ELH} Vol. 76, No. 4 (Winter, 2009), 989-1013, 991.

\textsuperscript{132} All of Byrd’s musical settings with texts by Sidney are strophic.

\textsuperscript{133} Jones, \textit{The First Booke of Singers & Ayres} (1600), sig.A4r.
\end{footnotes}
inconsistencies within a single body of writing were perfectly comfortable. Efforts have been made to reconcile Sidney’s often-contradictory philosophical influences, but such attempts tend to be frustrated by Sidney’s own language, centred as it is around paradox, contradiction, and aprosopesis.\textsuperscript{134} Gavin Alexander maintains that one need accept this aspect of Sidney’s biography and work in order to engage properly with it. As a thinker raised within the dialectic tradition, one can see more than traces of a fundamentally dialogical thought processes even in his seemingly monological works and treatises.\textsuperscript{135} For these reasons, Sidney should be viewed as a figure that embraces on-going dialogue. Though a singular example, it is argued that he is demonstrative of a wider development in approaches to and perceptions of selfhood, and therefore this analysis seeks to enrich the picture of contemporary mental processes by exploring the contribution of music to complex systems of thought.\textsuperscript{136}

With this perception of Sidney’s work in mind, consider Gavin Alexander’s characterisation of Sidney as ‘himself a figure of incompletion’,\textsuperscript{137} as ‘[t]he gap between what we know of his life and what we find in his literary works remains something of a paradox’.\textsuperscript{138} Though known today as a poet-courtier, perhaps most famously for \textit{Arcadia} and his treatise on poetry \textit{Defence of Poesy}, most of his writing is difficult to date and none of Sidney’s work was published until after his sudden death at age 31.\textsuperscript{139} Both within his literature and in his life one sees a trail of incompleteness, binary, and paradox.\textsuperscript{140} Within his writing, plots and relationships within his fictions are sometimes left unresolved, binaries coexist within a single work, and conclusions are left open-ended.\textsuperscript{141} He was known to continually revise his work, reworking and expanding \textit{Arcadia} around 1583, rearranging and expanding the existing narrative, in addition to

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item\textsuperscript{135} Alexander, \textit{Writing after Sidney}, 3.
\item\textsuperscript{136} Daniel Fischlin concurs that paradox is a frustratingly common element of English song more generally, stating that the cultural context in which this form blossomed was ‘burdened with contradictions’ from the ‘banal and stereotypical Petrarchisms to those of startling insight, beauty and novelty’. Fischlin, \textit{In Small Proportions}, 19.
\item\textsuperscript{138} Alexander, \textit{Writing After Sidney}, xxix.
\item\textsuperscript{139} Sidney died from infection after an injury in the Battle of Zutphen, fought in the Netherlands. Duncan-Jones in Sidney, \textit{Sir Philip Sidney}, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, xxiii.
\item\textsuperscript{140} Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, 184-185.
\item\textsuperscript{141} Duncan-Jones in Sidney, \textit{Sir Philip Sidney}, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, xii. Also see Alexander, \textit{Writing After Sidney}, 2-3.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
adding fresh verse and new prose. Curiously, he nearly finished an entirely new section of *Arcadia*, Book III, but stopped mid sentence. After Sidney’s death, his friend Fulke Greville supervised a published version of the revised *Arcadia* in 1590, which printed the incomplete text from the three revised books and some of the poetry. Alexander explains that, in 1593, the Countess of Pembroke supervised a new edition of the original *Arcadia* that was ‘completed by the addition of a revised text of the last three books of the original … These are much shorter in length than the revised books, but they do provide the ending that remains predicted throughout the revised version’. Contemporary readers were, as modern scholars are, left to decide which version of *Arcadia* is most authoritative, Greville’s ‘incomplete’ version as Sidney left it, or Mary’s ‘completed’ version as perhaps the author intended it. His sudden death, as well as the lore surrounding these multiple versions of *Arcadia*, only contributes to the intrigue surrounding Sidney’s propensity for unfinishedness.

As mentioned earlier, Alexander sees a basic dialogical foundation in Sidney’s language. Alexander quotes Bakhtin, who explains that if we view every word as ‘directed by an answer’ then one ‘cannot escape the profound influence of the answering word that it anticipates’. By extension, Alexander uses this as justification to extend this relationship to Sidney’s readers, not unlike my own approach extending to musicians and listeners, both contemporary and modern. When reading a text, ‘[i]nterpretation requires an active contribution from the reader, which is why dialogue is an appropriate metaphor’. He acknowledges a potential criticism, however, one also very relevant to my thesis, particularly to this chapter in that:

To do this will be to utilise a critical metaphor for the hermeneutic process rather than to describe an actuality, but it is often in metaphors that our most searching glimpses into literary processes and meanings are achieved, especially when those metaphors are developed from the texts under discussion, and glimpsed by their authors, as I believe is the case here.

143 Ibid., xxii.
145 Mary, Sidney’s sister and the Countess of Pembroke finished several of Sidney’s other works as well, like his Metrical Psalms. Alexander, *Writing After Sidney*, xxiii.
146 For a discussion of the historiography surrounding this work, see: ibid., xxv-xxvi.
147 Ibid., 5.
148 Ibid., 4.
149 Ibid., 3.
I agree that it is through this sort of hermeneutic investigation that textual meanings are both contextualised historically and renewed for modern readers through a look at the dynamic aspects of experience, embracing both experiential possibility and traditional history. With this approach to reader experience in mind, Alexander proposes a critical challenge:

We therefore have a complex choice when we encounter the aposiopesis in fictional, non-rhetorical situations: do we analyze it as if it is on some level rhetorical, intentional, a pretense, do we question the motives of speaker or writer, do we expect something to be implied by it; or, conversely, do we hear an eloquent silence? Do we on some level complete the sense, or do we just find the incompleteness expressive? He challenges us to consider whether we should leave incompleteness as expressive (as being moved by the incompleteness could be seen as an end in itself) or whether it inherently, on some level, invites us to ‘complete the sense’. At the end of this case study, I will examine how Alexander’s rhetorical questions change when the aposiopesis is musicalised.

**Interpreting Byrd**

Byrd’s musical-poetic relationships are sometimes overt, as in his elegy for Sidney, ‘Come to me, grief’ (1588). As Alexander points out, ‘this poem [possibly by Watson or Dyer] is written in sapphics, a classical stanza used by Sidney in OA 12 and CS 5, and is set to musique mesurée, as described by Sidney in the debate on metrics and music between Dicus and Lalus found in some manuscripts of Arcadia (OA, 89)’. Though Byrd demonstrates aptitude in following Sidney’s poetic directives, it is worth mentioning that Byrd probably didn’t hold Sidney’s work to any modern ideal of textual fidelity. Still, it does seem inconsistent for the same composer who paid such close attention to Sidney’s poetic edicts in one instance to then truncate one of his

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150 One is reminded of Charles Trinkaus’s argument mentioned earlier in this chapter. He claims that is it through an examination of experience that literature like dialogue can be more fully understood. When dealing with elements of consciousness, the dynamic aspect of experience is important because the experiences are ephemeral. Trinkaus, “Humanism, Religion, Society: Concepts and Motivations of Some Recent Studies”, 687.

151 Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, 188.

152 Alexander, Writing After Sidney, 59.

153 One might argue that Byrd was the type to do something once or twice to prove he can, then return to his own style of composition, as he did with musique mesurée, and his singular true madrigal ‘This sweet and merry month of may’ from Thomas Watson’s The first set of Italian madrigals Engleded (1590).
poems in another setting. As discussed by John Milsom, Byrd included only three of the eight stanzas of ‘O Deere life’ in his 1589 publication.  

Milsom surmises that the sexual content in the missing text might be one possible reason for omission, particularly in the potentially mixed company of a part-song performance. But Milsom is quick to caution that the inclusion of a partial text is not necessarily evidence that the whole poem wasn’t performed. There may be, of course, pragmatic explanations for this, such as space or layout on the printed page, or a lack of access to the complete poem in manuscript copy (see Fig.4.5). But equally, Byrd’s version of ‘O Deere life’ can legitimately be seen to raise questions concerning contemporary conceptions of textual fidelity particularly in relation to this composer and poet.

155 Like Byrd’s 1588 set, his 1589 set was also probably originally consort song, set as partsong for publication. Though unlike ‘O you’, no consort song version of ‘O Deere’ is left in existence. Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 439.
156 He observes that in manuscript copies of consort and partsong, often only the first verse is printed, so it is possible singers memorised or read texts from other sources. Ibid., 442.
Figure 4.5: Byrd, 'O Deere life', from Songs of sundrie natures (1589), sig.G1v. Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery STC / 185:10.
As Byrd said in the Latin introduction to his 1605 Gradualia I, ‘[i]n the words themselves, as I have learned from experience, there is such obscure and hidden power’. One cannot help but wonder what role music played in Byrd’s ‘experience’ discovering that power. Yet a challenge still remains in how one might evaluate Byrd’s approach to text setting given his propensity for writing music that is, as he said in his Psalms, songs, and sonets (1611), ‘framed to the life of the words’, rather than following the madrigalian trend of musically illustrating each word literally. If Byrd understood the ‘obscure and hidden power’ of word, it is surely pertinent to enquire how he might have handled that power through the medium of music, particularly when the connection is less obvious than in musique mesurée or madrigalian word painting. If Byrd wrote his music ‘framed to the life of the words’, what does this look like in practice? Though Byrd demonstrates a penchant for setting classical poetic metres and a keen sensitivity to points of drama in his through-composed sacred music, which Kerry McCarthy claims ‘owe[s] much to Italianate and humanistic ideals of clear, accurate text-setting’, much of Byrd’s secular output was strophic. So how might one ‘frame’ music ‘to the life of the words’ in a strophic setting? The problem of musical interpretation with strophic poetry is well presented by McCarthy:

A long strophic song makes special demands on its composer. There is no room here for the illustrative gimmicks cultivated by the English madrigalists, who usually set their texts through from A to Z with no musical repetition. A clever piece of word-painting in one verse may well sound ridiculous when the music recurs in the next verse. Even the basic issue of poetic meter can be a minefield when a single tune has to serve for many stanzas. The composer risks problems as soon as the poet begins to use variable rhythm or reversal of accent, as Sidney does with the all-important words “music” and “beauty” set by Byrd in O you that hear this voice. Rather paradoxically, the tune of a strophic song must not be too well suited to any individual verse. What is required is a well-wrought piece of music that can stand up to multiple performances and accommodate subtle (or not so subtle) changes in diction and mood.

In a way, strophic music also makes special demands of its performers, as they often get less assistance from the composition to guide them on an interpretation of the

157 As translated in McCarthy, Byrd, 74.
158 Ibid., 66, 113.
159 Ibid., 205.
160 Ibid., 88.
As mentioned before, poet-composer Thomas Campion wrote, ‘A naked Ayre without guide, or prop, or colour but its owne, is easily censured of everie eare, and requires so much the more invention to make it please’. Campion realised the central importance of persuasive *performance* to strophic repertory, as it relies on the musicians to bring engaging interpretation or ‘invention’ to the verse (this is in contrast to, in his words, ‘vulgar’ music, that is unnecessarily complex). We ‘ought to maintaine as well in Notes, *as well as action* a manly cariage’, as he believed word painting to be ‘childish’, as mentioned earlier. While there is always nuance in musical interpretation that affects a work’s effectiveness to an audience, a performance of ‘O you’ presents an idiosyncratic moment amongst Byrd’s strophic material. Though this case study does not promise an hermeneutic model that can be easily transferred to other strophic settings, the following section will look at how Byrd and Sidney’s song ‘O you that heare this voice’ contributes to contemporary dialogue on the musical-textual relationship and the hierarchy of the senses, with implications for how musical performance, a mundane daily practice, might contribute to gradual change in a collective understanding of truth.

**William Byrd: ‘O you that heare this voice’**

‘O you that heare this voice’, the sixth song from Sidney’s *Astrophil and Stella*, describes a trial-like setting, reminiscent of the Judgment of Paris, for a discussion about which aspect of Stella, her voice or face, ‘may have the former place’ (see Fig.4.6). As the text’s narrative is self-contained, it allows the poem to stand alone from the context of the cycle, rendering it particularly appropriate for musical setting. Alexander notices that, just as Robert Sidney did in his own song works, Philip Sidney constructed the *Astrophil and Stella* songs with a ‘masterful grasp of song form and what makes words

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161 There are exceptions to this, such as Thomas Weelkes’s ‘Ha ha this world’ (1608), discussed earlier, which manages to accommodate madrigalian word-painting with a strophic structure by setting a text that contains similar ‘sentiments’ in each line of text.


163 Emphasis my own. Ibid. See Introduction, 34.

164 As William Poole and Richard Scholar explain, this trope is sometimes called by scholars a ‘false trial’, ‘a trial in which one person is subjected to quasi-legal testing … false trials also exploit movements in the legal philosophy of the time, especially the shift in the common law towards a probabilistic, precedent-based procedure, where civil law and legal philosophy still held to the idea of a demonstrable certainty’. Poole and Scholar, *Thinking with Shakespeare*, 5.
apt for setting to music’. For the purposes of this chapter, I will only be looking at Sidney’s text as presented by Byrd’s 1588 publication (see Fig. 4.6).

Figure 4.6: Byrd, ‘O you that heare’, from _Psalms, sonets, and songs_ (1588), sig.D4v. Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery STC / 413:05.

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From the first stanza, it is clear that the two parties, the voice and face, are in an amicable dispute, as the debate is ‘void of hate’. In a way, the real judgment throughout the poem is not between the two parties being represented (voice and face), but actually between the abilities of their legal representation. The ‘lawyers’ are music and beauty; the ‘witnesses’ are the ear and the eye. The ‘character witnesses’, as William Ringler calls them, show love is partial to beauty, but wonder is the domain of music. Both beauty and music are equally persuasive in their own ways, and often work in a symbiotic fashion. In verse two Sidney presents the well-suited lawyers as, ‘orators to make the strongest judgments weak’, a reminder that even logic is no match against passion’s persuasion. This echoes Sidney’s defence of rhetoric against the Platonic assertion that only philosophy can bear truth, thus adding to an ancient and on-going debate regarding the Truth-bearing capabilities of the arts and reason, which Sidney discussed in more detail in his *Defence of Poesy*. The juxtaposition set up in stanzas four to seven alternate between paradigms of beauty then music, music then beauty, and so forth, symmetrically demonstrating their equally persuasive power. In stanza four, attention is drawn to the conceit of ‘harmony’, a word frequently used to describe both music and beauty, as a sort of circular bond between them: ‘while each contends, it selfe to other lends’, meaning that a beautiful face (like Stella’s, or indeed, the singer’s) not only enhances the ‘heavenly harmonies’ of melody, but also reflects a vision of harmonious perfection through its ‘flawless’ beauty.

The moment it is sung, this relationship springs to life as a performance of harmony: the coming together of parts to form an orderly whole. The face of the singer, singing a part of Byrd’s heavenly concord, becomes more beautiful through the visual expression of singing beautiful music. Moreover, the ‘harmonised’ face is vital to one’s experience of this kind of repertoire, as the singer is the only figure capable of imbuing the music with words. The result of this coming together of parts is an

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168 In John Case’s words, ‘although every kind of music has its very just praise, nonetheless that which is called the mixed, i.e., that achieved by hand and voice, should be deemed by far the most divine, since in it both art and nature sing. For nature has given the voice, art the instrument, and wonderful is the agreement and harmony of art and nature in voice and instruments’. John Case, *Apologia Musices tam Vocalis Quam*
experience (and enactment) of the very harmony described in the poem, conveyed in the moment of performance through dialogue between subjects. Contemplation on this type of symbiosis through performance continues in verse five, with ‘Musicke more loftie swells, / in phrases finely plac’d, / Beautie as farre excels, / in action aptly grac’d’. Music’s ability to sound up to the heavens is only heightened by phrases of well-crafted verse, again emphasising the mutually bolstering relationship between words and music, as well as drawing attention to the individual who delivers it. Only through ‘action’—like performance ‘aptly graced’ by the coming together of musicians, text, and music—is beauty, too, able to reach such lofty heights.169

In his opening invocation, ‘O You’, Sidney challenges the reader or listener as well as those in the courtroom to take a stance (‘who dare judge this debate’), drawing attention to one’s role as observer through anacoenosis. It is revealed that the most likely arbiter, Common Sense, one of the three internal senses, who is here cast as male, is not very useful in breaking the tie, as he is too partial to both parties.170 And even though ‘princess’ Reason can conceive of the mathematical harmony of the spheres and identify beauty (‘and Musicke can in skye, / with hidden beauties find’), Sidney leaves unresolved the question of whether she can make logical sense of the passions and therefore reach a decision. Casting Reason as a royal authority (but notably not a Prince or Queen) makes her lack of a ruling even more poignant, suggesting doubt in Reason’s ultimate reign, as she is left without an opportunity to answer. Sidney’s inferred doubt of Reason conceivably stems from his belief that poetry, rhetoric, and music are persuasive arts whose moralising properties engage through emotion rather than by logic—tangible effects too powerful to be immediately deemed inferior to philosophy.171 In leaving the ruling open-ended, Sidney leaves the reader/listener to contemplate an answer, thereby framing the poem as a whole with acknowledgements of ‘you’, the observer.

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170 The ‘internal senses’ are common sense, memory, and fantasy—as they were to many like Edmund Spencer, Thomas Tomkis, etc. Jonathan Walker and Paul Streufert, Early Modern Academic Drama (Farnham: Ashgate, 2008), 135.
171 Michael Dickreiter in Gozza (ed.), Number to Sound, 143.
The device of rhetorical questioning is normally used to affirm or deny a point, rather than to lead the reader to genuine contemplation of an answer.\textsuperscript{172} By contrast, in Sidney’s poem, as Alexander has pointed out (through his own unanswered questioning), ‘we’ the readers have a choice to make when presented with this inconclusive ending: ‘Do we on some level complete the sense, or do we just find the incompleteness expressive?’\textsuperscript{173} When poetry is set to music and performed, however, the ‘we’ in Alexander’s contemplation shifts from ‘we’ the readers to a more complicated double-layered ‘we’. First, a text is interpreted by the singers and musicians who translate the text into musical performance, which is in turn transmitted in time to ‘we’ the hearers, complicating the relationship, or indeed highlighting the space between the rhetorical device and the individual(s) contemplating the text.

William Byrd’s musical setting is crucial to such a reading of this verse, however, not only because of the obviously self-reflective element of ‘Musicke more loftie swells’, with semantic guidance ‘in phrases finely plac’d’, but because of a curious anomaly in Byrd’s setting. In standard practice for Byrd’s consort songs, the music is printed with the first verse of text under laid to it, and the additional stanzas printed separately at the end of the music; by convention these additional stanzas were sung to the same music, repeated as many times as necessary. In ‘O you’, however, the music is bipartite: part (a) in duple metre, and part (b) in triple metre, each of which takes one verse of text; the anomaly is that the text’s nine stanzas do not divide evenly between these two sections of music. While it is very possible the composer didn’t intend for all the verses to be sung, recent scholarship on Byrd’s text setting, as well as evidence of his support of the poetic directives of Sidney, make this seem suspect.\textsuperscript{174} If the piece is sung through all the way, performers need to make a musical accommodation to complete the text. In the simplest scenario, the musicians continue to alternate the two musical parts, thus ending the song at the conclusion of part (a):

\textsuperscript{172} See definition 4 in “rhetorical, adj.”, \textit{OED Online}. Oxford University Press, December 2014 (accessed 10 March 2015).
\textsuperscript{173} Alexander, “Sidney’s Interruptions”, 188.
\textsuperscript{174} More broadly, this is an issue of performance practice with lengthy texts: did a singer memorise their texts? Read from a part book? Or perhaps from a separate copy of the poem? Were all published verses meant to be sung? Moreover, are readers/performers familiar with Sidney’s whole poem outside of Byrd’s publication supposed to ‘finish the sense’, either internally or vocally? Though in domestic works such as these, ‘audiences’ and ‘performers’ were often one and the same, there are a lot of unanswered questions in the performance practice of these works. Milsom, “Byrd, Sidney, and the Art of Melting”, 441-2. Fischlin, \textit{In Small Proportions}, 249.
Though harmonically both (a) and (b) cadence to the tonic, this has the effect of feeling unfinished, since part (b) has established the pattern of repeating the last couplet of its verse, in a conventional concluding gesture. Though the ‘unfinishedness’ of an unaccommodated performance would eloquently fit the ethos of this reading, it is only one possibility. Alternative scenarios would involve ending the song with an immediate repetition of part (b):

Text verse:    123456789
Musical part:  ababababa

Or as one significant recording has done, repeat part (a) at some point earlier in the song to end up on the final part (b) by the last verse.

Text verse:    123456789
Musical part:  ababababb

One could also just repeat the text of the last verse twice, first with music (a) and then with (b), as suggested by editor Jeremy Smith in The Byrd Edition (2004). Directions for how to end the song are not given in Byrd’s printed edition, which is, barring a mistake or omission in typesetting, somewhat curious given that none of the other similarly lengthy settings in this collection, even ones with an odd number of verses, present the same problem of co-ordination.

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176 In their recording, Fretwork and Emma Kirkby repeat music (a) after ‘For beautie beautifies’, perhaps because the ‘for’ allows for a continued thought from the previous stanza. William Byrd, Fretwork and Emma Kirkby, Byrd: Consort Songs (Harmonia Mundi Fr., 2005). Jeremy Smith says this choice is undesirable, as it too smoothly closes an ending that should perhaps be left inconclusive. J. Smith, Verse and Voice, 75.
The practical explanation for the anomaly is that, very simply, this sort of occurrence wasn’t a problem for contemporary musicians. In the metrical psalm tradition, text was often paired with existing, transferrable music and half-stanzas and uneven verse numbers in text were frequently encountered.\textsuperscript{178} As the metrical psalm book \textit{Form of prayer} (1560-61) notes after Psalm 47: ‘The last verse is sung with the last two clauses’, \textsuperscript{179} suggesting that the last two lines of text from the half stanza are repeated for the duration of the remaining music (a technique that echoes the repeated couplets already common at the end of Byrd’s settings). Alternately, singers could repeat other lines of the last stanza, if it made poetic sense, taking into account masculine and feminine endings. In his own psalm settings, it appears that Sidney preferred the poetic closure provided by asymmetrical endings, as, in Alexander’s estimation, one-fifth of the 43 psalms phrased by Philip Sidney have irregular endings, or ‘formal deviation for closural effect’.\textsuperscript{180} The idea that the problem presented by Byrd’s musical setting has a common practical solution already in practice in other musical-poetic traditions like the metrical psalm does not weaken hermeneutic interest in this presentation of text and music, however. Through Byrd’s open-ended setting, a performance of this piece irrefutably draws attention to the open-ended suggestion reached in the same ‘troublesome’ last verse of the poem’s text and indeed Sidney’s own penchant for ‘unfinishedness’. Byrd’s setting, the conclusion of the trial, and indeed the story of \textit{Astrophil and Stella} on the whole ends in what Katherine Duncan-Jones deems an ‘emotional impasse’, Astrophil’s ‘dialogue with [Stella] unresolved’.\textsuperscript{181}

\textbf{Unfinished Dialogue}

The prevalence and influence of dialogue and the place of paradox within early modern English literary forms is a well-explored aspect of scholarship on this period, as discussed earlier in this chapter. The musical idiosyncrasy described in this case study aligns with the influence of dialectic thought within Sidney’s poem, even though the

\textsuperscript{178} A similar ‘uneven divide’ of text also happens in Byrd’s setting of Psalm 119, ‘How shall a young man’ (1588), as the last verse is a half stanza. But as the music is not bipartite, the only reasonable ‘completion’ here is to repeat the last half stanza as preceded by the metrical psalm tradition, leaving the performer with no choice.

\textsuperscript{179} Timothy Duguid, \textit{metrical Psalmody in Print and Practice: English "Singing Psalmo" and Scottish "Psalm Baiks", C. 1547-1640} (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014), 47.

\textsuperscript{180} Alexander, \textit{Writing After Sidney}, 92.

\textsuperscript{181} Sidney, \textit{Sir Philip Sidney}, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, xii.
dialogical form is not present. Moreover, through Sidney’s textual discussion of the hierarchy of the senses, this case study highlights the dialogue that occurs during the act of performance as an important link between attempts to understand the effects and mechanics of sense perception as presented by Sidney’s text and impending change in ways of knowing truth that culminated in the work of the mid-century Cartesian philosophers. The act of performance engages the listener in a dialogue, viscerally presenting questions of mind and body through the sensory experience of musical performance. The trial-like setting, reminiscent of the dramatic form implied by dialectic literature, provides verisimilitude whilst accommodating multiple perspectives, even though Byrd did not compose the music dialogically.

But it is only when the text is set musically in the way Byrd has done that performers are left to decide how to conclude the piece, as recitation of the poetry alone does not present the same issues of completion. Indeed, a discussion must be had amongst the musicians prior to even a casual performance of the work in order for them to decide how the piece should proceed and end. Regardless of which completion they choose, however, the dialogue animated by the musicians effectively reflects upon the idea that few things are certain in matters involving the passions. Though Sidney’s poem does not doubt the witness testimony of the ear and the eye, it still effectively contemplates the nature and mechanics of sense perception and its relationship to reason. Moreover, Sidney’s open ending from ‘Princess’ Reason and Byrd’s incomplete setting leave only one ‘sure thing’: a sense of wonder, which is in Descartes’s view our response to those features of the world most worthy of our consideration, even if we don’t recognise them as such right away. Though Descartes was a rationalist, in order to establish reason as the foundation of truth, he had to initially doubt even reason itself. Within the context of this poem, Sidney’s tentative trust in reason is demonstrated by casting her as a princess without a ruling. Though this doubt of reason is primarily in defence of the persuasive emotional arts, it also adds to an interpretation of this setting as a performance that assesses the nature of the relationship between mind and matter.

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182 For more on recitation vs. the silent reader, see Elspeth Jajdelska, Silent Reading and the Birth of the Narrator (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007).
Even though performers, not philosophers, are left to navigate this problem presented by Byrd’s setting, it seems only appropriate, still, to set such a text to music, as, if according to the poem music’s domain is wonder, then these philosophical questions can only be heightened by music employing its power. Socrates and others in the Platonic legacy have called wonder the ‘beginning of philosophy’. 184 Descartes, too, believed wonder’s primary concern was to prompt us to seek knowledge. 185 And according to Sidney in ‘O you’, what better way to invoke wonder than with music? Wonder, like the power of music over the passions, was a force of both fascination and great fear: for in wonder, knowledge is fundamentally incomplete, a concept echoed in Byrd’s unusual setting of Sidney’s poem. Francis Bacon thought of wonder as ‘broken knowledge’, 186 and if music wields the power of wonder, as Sidney suggests in his song, it is not surprising that philosophers such as Bacon and Descartes saw music as a central tenet in understanding the role of the self in the philosophy of nature. 187

Both William Byrd and Philip Sidney seem to look ‘inside’ to find inspiration, though in slightly different ways. 188 Throughout his works, Sidney implies that the best way to write is to, as the Muse states in Astrophil and Stella, ‘look in thy heart, and write’, maintaining that those who simply imitate foreign trends ‘bewray a want of inward touch’. 189 Byrd similarly rejects imitation of Italian musical trends in his compositions, looking inside, and to God, for inspiration. Byrd writes that when poetic sentences and ‘divine things’ are turned ‘over attentively and earnestly in his mind, the most appropriate measures come, I know not how, as if by their own free will, and

187 Descartes wrote about music early in his career, mainly in Compendium musicae (1618). Music plays a role throughout Bacon’s written work, including Sylva (1627), New Atlantis (1627), and Advancement of Learning (1605).
188 On a related tangent, Rebecca Wiseman views Astrophil and Stella as a contribution to the revisions of subjectivity that occurred over the course of the seventeenth century, reminding us that the humanist self of sixteenth-century England is more compatible with later Cartesian conceptions of self than is sometimes supposed. In line with this idea, Wiseman looks at the character of Astrophil, as well as Sidney’s sequence as a whole, and asserts that Astrophil’s introspection is the jurisdiction of the ‘self-aware subject who subjects his sensations to scrutiny, and by considering it a psychological process that entails a distinction between perceiving and thinking, Sidney hints at a model of subjectivity that links self-knowledge with a critical engagement with one’s soul’. Wiseman, “Introspection and Self-Evaluation in Astrophil and Stella”, 51.
189 Sidney, Sir Philip Sidney, (ed.) Duncan-Jones, 158.
freely offer themselves to his mind if it is neither idle nor inert’. It seems curiously appropriate that one artist look to his heart, and the other to his mind to stimulate imagination, as imagination was often seen as the immaterial link between heart and mind and between sensation and reason.

Sidney bookends his poem between the invocation ‘O you’ and the wanting ‘conclusion’, and in doing so markedly draws attention to one’s role as observer, a self-awareness belonging to contemporary tradition, but also indicative of something to come. The shift away from a straightforward study of an object of sense perception (like voice/face), to one that studies both object and observer (voice/face and you), represents a fundamental change of approach to knowledge building visible in Descartes’s early work on music (Compendium musicae, 1618), an adjustment that proved integral to his later work. What is presented in this case study is an example of contemporary self-awareness that demonstrates how music could play an active role in the questioning that led to change in ways of establishing truth. Awareness of one’s role as observer is viscerally augmented through performance, where a singer essentially calls ‘you’ to action, dynamically demanding contemplation of the self.

To reiterate, this analysis is not claiming that this song by Byrd and Sidney is a preemptive allegory for Cartesian truth and knowledge. Music making was a practical and significant part of daily life enjoyed by Descartes and his circles, as it was in Sidney’s circles in the generation before. This is simply a reading of an inconsistency in a common practice: incompleteness interpreted as an on-going dialogue understood here as a negotiation of ideas relevant to looming transformations in ways of knowing. Though both the text and music of ‘O you that heare this voice’ ostensibly draw upon earlier compositional traditions and contemporary aesthetic debates, it is the inconsistent aspects of the piece that imply change in approach to establishing truth. The act of performance, in itself a kind of dialogue, is key to understanding how music actively shaped collective knowledge, as most subjects cannot experience the aesthetic features of a song completely when mediated by a piece of paper. The singer’s

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191 Jorgensen, “Descartes on Music”, 410. Also, see Wiseman, “Introspection and Self-Evaluation in Astrophil and Stella”.
192 As Elizabeth Hanson asserts, the period around 1600 can be viewed as ‘a redrafting of the terms on which the subject relates to the world’. Hanson, Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England, 2.
performance is the essential link to this reading, providing the animated body and spirit—the self that wonders—that the musical notation and text alone cannot enact.
Conclusion

In Robert Jones’s ‘Life is a Poets fable’ (1600), the speaker presents the pervasive idea that life is but an imagined fiction. This text is notable, however, for its unusual self-referentiality, not to the poem’s own form or words, but to the idea that this poem would be set to music, and the text contemplated within musical performance. The fourth verse explicitly articulates the concurrent process of musical utterance, drawing attention to the idea that life, too, is proceeding towards expiration just like a song in progress:

This instant of my song,
A thousand men lie sicke,
A thousand knels are rong:
And I die as they sing,
They are but dead and I dying.  

This verse draws poignant attention to the musical nature of this piece, as a text inseparable from its musicalised performance context, which puts the moment of musical utterance at the forefront of its interpretation. When confronted with a self-aware piece of music like this, one that inherently resists objectification as a static historical object, it seems necessary to adopt a mode of interpretation that appreciates the dynamic quality of musical utterance, even if in the past; one that, in Bruce Smith’s words, ‘attends to the materiality of the evidence they have left behind’ but also ‘acknowledges the embodiedness of the investigator in the face of that evidence’. Jones’s self-aware setting commands what the other musicalised texts in this thesis have only firmly recommended—that one must properly engage with the dynamic aspect of musical experience in order to access music’s active contribution to dialogues on knowing. It is with this idea in mind that I explain why I chose to focus this study on multi-voiced vocal music.

1 The song also has several musical puns. For example, ‘death times the notes that I doe breake’ might refer to the temporality of both life and music. ‘Each age of death makes one degree’ might be a musical pun on scale degrees. The ‘worlds arithmetick’ is possibly a reference to mathematical harmony of the spheres. Morley is the earliest use of musical ‘degree’ listed in the OED. “degree, n.”, OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2015 (accessed 8 February 2016). For the poem’s complete text, see Appendix I(f).

2 Jones, The First Booke of Songes & Ayres (1600), sig.E4v-r.

3 B. Smith, Key of Green, 8.
Phenomenological ‘Striking’

As contemporary writers supported again and again, the reason I chose to focus this study on multi-voiced music is because of the deep feelings group singing elicits. In 1617, Robert Robinson believed that singing exceeded instrumental music in pleasing: ‘melody is made most pleasing, and thereby it commeth to passe, that the voice of man is worthily accompted more excellent, then any artificiall musicke hitherto inuented’. Not only did some contemporaries feel something special in the human voice, but particularly in polyphonic singing. Martin Fotheby, writing in 1622, echoed Robinson’s sentiments, reasoning:

Now, for Man: hee hath not onely a naturall delight in Musicke, as other Creatures haue; and a naturall abilitie, to expresse all the parts of it, more then other Creatures haue, by the sweetenesse of his tuneable and melodious voice, farre excelling the sweetenesse of all musicall instruments: But he hath also inlarged his naturall Musick, with all the seuerall kindes of Artificiall Musick, both Vocal, and Organical.

Like Robinson, Fotheby argued that man’s voice was the utmost instrument, but he also believed it was special because he had ‘inlarged his naturall Musick’ with polyphonic composition and instruments. As quoted earlier, the author of *Praise of Music* believed that polyphonic vocal music or ‘artificial singing’ exceeded ‘plain Musicke, for it striketh deeper, and worketh more effectuall in the hearers’. In 1625 David Lindsay reiterated this idea, and asked ‘what mans eares are not transported, when he heares a number of sweete voyces, singing artificiall musicic in diuerse parts formerly and melodiously’. Hear this, and you should ‘find thy selfe wonderfully transported’.

Anecdotes seem to support Erin Minear’s argument that vocal music, and indeed polyphonic vocal music, affected some more greatly than instrumental

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7 David Lindsay, *The godly mans iourney to heauen containing ten seuerall treatises* (London: printed by R F[ield], 1625), sig.Nn7r.
8 As discussed in Chapter Two, this ‘transportation’ could be figurative (as probably implied by Lindsay here) or literal, as argued by men like Bacon and Sidney, who believed that the mimetic arts could elicit action that leads to social change.
music or music for a single voice because of the ‘inwardness’ or ‘deepness’ of music’s penetration. This focus on ‘inwardness’ is in line with contemporary physiological conceptions of hearing. Bacon, Davies, and others noted how hearing, unlike some other senses, occurred when a physical object, sound, entered the inside of the body. I came to realise that what I was after in focussing this study on vocal music was an expanded explanation for what early moderns felt as multi-voiced singing ‘striking deeper’ than plain music. Though this ‘striking deeper’ was and is subjective, it is what I feel when I sing polyphony. Historical subjects share with me the materialism of a human body. It is as subjective an experience to me, to my body today, as it was to Robinson, Fotheby, or Lindsay in the Stuart period. The inward or deep ‘striking’ feeling, mentioned time and again in relation to the sense of hearing and music is, I argue, a rhetorical attempt at the articulation of the bodily experience of music. Bruce Smith asks us to negotiate ‘the difference between ontology, which assumes a detached, objective spectator who can see the whole, and phenomenology, which assumes a subject who is immersed in the experience she is trying to describe’. What some early moderns articulated as a ‘striking’ feeling might be an attempt at objectifying an experience that resists objectification, the moment of musical experience.

Though ‘potentially multi-voiced music’ might seem an arbitrary limit (and nearly any thesis necessarily accommodates some of these), I believe a study of multi-voiced

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9 Minear, Reverberating Song in Shakespeare and Milton, 35.
10 See Chapter Two.
11 Though there were also those that fought for solo-voiced music as the foremost form, like Thomas Campion.
12 As Smith says, human experience is about people: ‘people whose voice-based cultures are available to us only if we come at them by indirections’. B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 29.
13 This is not an argument for some sort of romantic notion of universal humanity. As Nicholas Cook points out, any sense of communality from a music as a ‘language of feeling’ would lead to a more limited form of musical meaning across time and cultures than would be shared between subjects who were ‘fully enculturated’. I am not arguing that my bodily experience is in any way the same as an early modern subject’s experience would be, but that historical phenomenology is inherently, in Smith’s words, ‘an amalgam of biological constants and cultural variables’. Cook, "Theorizing Musical Meaning", 187. B. Smith, The Acoustic World of Early Modern England, 8.
14 In addition to the examples of immediate ‘striking’ in Praise of Music, George Sandys, and Francis Bacon, one also sees the word ‘strike’ in relation to the experience of music in Shakespeare’s The Tempest: ‘Music, awake her; strike’ (V.iii.99). Perhaps there is some connection between interior striking, and the verb used when one ‘strikes’ a lute. See Ch. 2, 85, 86, 90.
16 Smith asks you to take words of experience, as I take ‘striketh’ to be, ‘not as symbols, signs with only an arbitrary relation to the thing toward which they point, but as indexes, signs with a natural or metonymic connection with somatic experience’. Another word frequently found in early modern descriptions of the effect of music that could work instead of ‘striketh’ would be ‘ravisheth’, as quoted by Shakespeare, Wright, and Burton. In some ways, ‘ravish’ better captures the involuntary nature of musical experience. See "Passions and Music", Chapter Two. B. Smith, "Premodern Sexualities", 326.
music resonated with me because of the aspect of music making that is inherently collaborative in its dialogical nature. Multi-voiced music, in all its forms, makes this most obvious. Even in private contemplation of the self, we are necessarily creating those selves against some form of Other. Ergo, though subjectivity is about the individual, it can be discerned or formed in social ways. The performance of multi-voiced music makes the process of self-creation physical and sensory as those qualities are enacted and represented through multiple human bodies experiencing performance together. Multi-voice music performs the very idea that the creation of the self is collaborative and dialogic. Though in solo/instrumental music there are often multiple bodies working together, perhaps it is only through the addition of another human voice that an experience absolutely draws attention to these collaborative, dialogic processes of human consciousness simultaneously: those of music-making and of knowledge building.

**Social Acts**

If a performance of multi-voiced music can enact the dialogic process of knowledge building, this affinity is supported by the notion that the Cartesian subject was highly social. It is a misconception that self-knowledge is an inward and solitary act. Though in articulating ‘cogito ergo sum’ Descartes determined absolute certainty through immediate intuition, a seemingly solitary act, the events, processing, and most importantly, the emotions experienced before that articulation required dialogical and collaborative exchange. Susan James explains that:

> Because knowledge of our power includes knowledge of its limits, it contains both the promise of ataraxia and the curse of melancholy and despair. The philosopher's strength is simultaneously a weakness, and his ability to control nature is threatened by passions which remove his ability to control himself. An understanding of our own fragility has many manifestations which undercut the confident assertions of independence that can be traced in the work of Bacon and Descartes. Most winningly, perhaps, Descartes's haughty rejection of the idea that anyone can help him is the prelude to an admission that he has

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17 This is in spite of the complications for ‘voice’ and perspective within multi-voiced music that accompany a fundamentally collaborative view of self-knowledge. As will be explained shortly, even Descartes had to concede that all knowledge building is a collaborative process.

18 As Shakespeare’s Richard II says, ‘Thus play I in one person many people, / And none contented’ (*King Richard II*, V.v.31-32).

changed his mind. If he does not publish his work, people may think his reasons for withholding it are discreditable. “I am not excessively fond of glory”, he protests. Nevertheless, silence is not a sufficient defence against the meddling savants, who are liable to put a damaging construction on it. In addition, Descartes confesses, “I am becoming more and more aware of the delay which my project of self-instruction is suffering because of the need for innumerable observations which I cannot make without the help of others.” The acquisition of knowledge must, after all, be to some extent a collective enterprise.20

If knowledge was determined to require interpersonal exchange, an idea reinforced in modern times by social history and a resurgence of the sociology of knowledge, it seems reasonable that social collaborations, like that of music making—a collaborative activity that stimulated the passions, the mind, and moved men to action—would be the very sort of mundane activity that contributed to changes in episteme.21 The idea that knowledge building was a social, rather than a purely philosophical one, is echoed in Andrew Barnaby and Lisa Schnell’s assessment of Baconian inquiry as one in which knowing was remade in order to ‘reconstruct the very notion of the political community as a community of shared inquiry’, rooting the social conception of knowledge in contemporary theories as well.22 Also, Peter Burke wouldn’t want us to forget that ‘[i]ntellectual debates owe a good deal to the forms of sociability and so to the social frameworks in which they take place, from the seminar room to the cafe’, and, might I add, the music room.23

As I have argued throughout this thesis, not only could musical form and beliefs about music reflect and shape episteme, but so could the practice of music making. In Chapter Four, Martha Feldmen and Cristle Collins Judd support the idea that music and musical treatises reflected an intellectual milieu influenced greatly by dialectics and dialogical forms, which thereby highlighted music’s own dialogical character. Lisa Jardine’s work demonstrates how Francis Bacon’s dialectically-focused education influenced his advancement of knowledge, even if he wasn’t writing in an explicitly dialogical form. Jardine’s scholarship on Bacon draws links between dialectics/dialogue and knowledge building, while Feldman and Judd assert that the

20 James, Passions and Action, 247-8.
21 Support for social conception of knowledge can be found in Shapin, A Social History of Truth, 6. Burke, Social History of Knowledge, 6.
23 Burke, A Social History of Knowledge, 44.
traditions of dialectic and dialogue were embedded in contemporary thought processing, through what Judd calls the ‘original conversation’ or ability to sing, drawing links between music and dialogue (see Fig.5.1). \(^{24}\)

![Diagram](image)

**Figure 5.1**

What remains, is the bottom arrow on this diagram: the arrow connecting music and knowledge, which I have tagged as ‘performance acts’.

Though music played a formative role in the theories of Descartes and Bacon, it is not exclusively for these reasons I determine music also played an active role in changing structures of knowledge. In Chapter Three I explored how musical form could effect and change textual meaning, form being the most traditional way music could work ‘independently’ to create meaning that contributed to ongoing dialogues on the nature of truth and its representations. \(^{25}\) But aside from form, the most tangible way that music was able to contribute to ideas about knowledge was, as discussed in this thesis’s introduction, through performance. Social historians and performance theorists alike would agree that knowledge is formed by daily activities. This study highlights one such activity that is not only a practice of daily life, but one that is inherently dialogical, and used texts that directly contemplated the reliability of the

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\(^{24}\) Judd, “Music in Dialogue”, 72.

\(^{25}\) What Cook calls the ‘problematic Hanslickian inheritance’, which he claims ‘is most evident in the work of those philosophers and, more recently, music theorists who have readmitted issues of meaning within academic debate, but on terms which maintain the underlying values of formalism’. Cook, *Theorizing Musical Meaning*, 174.
senses, states of consciousness like love and dreaming, and interrogated, through its very performance and degrees of verisimilitude, representations of reality. It could strike straight to the heart of people in a way little understood in mechanical terms, yet presented fundamental questions about the quality of the body and spirit or soul. This evidence suggests that this is not a question of ‘whether or not’ music can build knowledge, but ‘to what extent’. As Angela Esterhammer says, our new question is about ‘how deeply knowledge is conditioned by being represented in public contexts’.26 Moreover, she argues that ‘[p]erformance affects not only the way knowledge is transmitted, but even the way it is produced. Whenever knowledge is being performed it is also, to some extent, being formed’.27 This would fall under what Mary Helen Dupree and Sean Franzel call ‘how certain kinds of speech acts “do” rather than “say” things, seeking less to assess propositional statements about certain states of affairs and more to describe how certain “performative” utterances or actions create new states of affairs in the first place’.28 If Judith Butler has successfully demonstrated how ‘fixed concepts like gender can be destabilized even as they are foregrounded in the act of performance’,29 as in a drag show, surely this concept could transfer to similarly ‘fixed’ historical concepts like Aristotelian conceptions of truth. Additionally, the dialogical tendencies within musical performance curiously echo the ‘collective enterprise’, in James’s words, necessary for the acquisition of knowledge. Therefore, a performance of music about the nature of human consciousness is, inherently, presenting issues of knowledge in a physical, social, and dialogical manner, that, in its moment of utterance, engages with issues of mind and body both in text and through physical experience (singing, hearing, playing, etc.). The physical phenomenon works as a destabilising agent for the ‘fixed’ metaphysical concepts discussed in the music’s texts, potentially exposing a gap between what is ‘known’ in the text and what is ‘understood’ in the moment of experience. It was through this process that a performance of this music was able to contribute actively to the trajectory of episteme.

As Dupree and Franzel assert (though discussing the eighteenth century specifically), ‘[i]t is our conviction that these literary, theatrical, and scientific events

27 Ibid.
28 They derive some of their theory from the work of Judith Butler and John Langshaw Austin. Ibid., 8.
29 Ibid.
are not mere epiphenomena of an intellectual-historical tradition or of abstract scientific propositions, but rather that they serve as vital conduits in the larger process of generating, differentiating, and circulating knowledge in this period.\textsuperscript{30} In the moment that music, in early modern terms, ‘striketh’ the soul or heart, the power of the passions are not only experienced dynamically, but the subject is physically presented with a fundamental question of mind and body, an act that contributed to ongoing discourse about sense perception that would prove crucial epistemic shifts in the seventeenth century. In this thesis, meaning is built through the coming together of parts: a text cogitating elements of human consciousness, the dialogical exchange between voiced bodies, the wonder and passions invoked that could move man to (re)create his very being, the experience of fundamental questions on the quality and mechanics of the senses, body, and soul, as well as the often blurry juxtaposition between realities experienced and realities represented in musical performance. Perhaps the musical performance of an element of consciousness enacts the gap between truth and its representation in a most self-reflective form. Or in other words, feasibly it exposes the cracks and contradictions in discourse and social practices that lead to ways of knowing.\textsuperscript{31} But in order to access these moments of performance historically, I turn again to the concept of historical phenomenology, as performance, like dialogue more generally, must be grasped dynamically as it only exists in relation to experience.\textsuperscript{32}

**Phenomenology and Dialogue**

If we can, as Dowland/Ornithoparchus discerned ‘recreate our selves with singing’, perhaps that is precisely what early moderns were (as we are) doing when they engaged in musical experience. Changing the self through music isn’t just about lifting a sour mood with a sprightly galliard. As Sidney and Bacon discerned, there was something more permanent about the change that could be elicited through art.\textsuperscript{33} The experience of human communication through performance is what makes the experience of performance/playing/enacting such a powerful tool for self knowledge.

\textsuperscript{30} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{31} Hanson, *Discovering the Subject in Renaissance England*, 5.
\textsuperscript{32} Trinkaus, “Humanism, Religion, Society”, 687. Quoted in Ch. 4, 181.
As mentioned in Chapter Two, I have read Dowland/Ornithoparchus’s anecdote as having multiple meanings. It clearly implies ‘recreate’ as ‘to refresh or entertain oneself’ through a pleasurable or interesting pastime’, as well as ‘to refresh, reinvigorate’ more generally. But I believe the most significant meaning of ‘recreate’, when it comes to singing, is ‘to create again or in a new way’. As Bruce Smith ascertains, Helkiah Crooke answered his own question ‘How it comes to passe that we are more recreated with Hearing than with Reading’ with primarily phenomenological reasons. Though principally discussing theatre, Crooke observed that a live performer’s voice is more affecting ‘by reason of his inflexion and insinuation into our Sense’. Therefore, ‘those things which be heard, take a deeper impression in our minds, which is made by the appulsion or ariuall of a reall voyce’. Furthermore, Crooke noted that performance is a social activity: ‘there is a kind of society in narration and acting, which is very agreeable to the nature of man, but reading is more solitary. Moreover, Crooke observed that there is an improvisatory element present in performance that is lacking in reading: ‘[b]ooke cannot digresse from their discourse for the better explication of a thing, as those may which teach by their voyce. For in changing of words or mutuall conference, many plesant passages are brought in by accident … and by these sauces, as it were, of discourse, is the Hearing more sumptuously feasted’. Hearing is more effective than reading because of the re-creation of experience enacted by another human body. This recreational re-creation is also a social dialogue that, in affecting us deeply, has the potential to change the self. Though Crooke was writing about dramatic improvisation, philosopher Bruce Benson has argued for an interpretation of music as inherently improvised and dialogical, even when read from a score.

Benson describes ‘musical phenomenology’, a different use of phenomenology than the historical type described by Bruce Smith. Benson argues that, until the end of the Baroque period, music was conceptualised differently than it is today in that ‘the

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37 ‘Collected and translated’ by Helkiah Crooke, Mikrokosmographia A Description of the Body of Man (London: Printed by W. Iaggard, 1616), sig.Ooo2v.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
principal focus of music making was the *performance itself*.\textsuperscript{42} He interprets this as a muddier separation between composer and performer, as the score was a guide, rather than a precise recipe from which to recreate an idealised reproduction of a score.\textsuperscript{43} He argues that even in later music, in all musical performance, in fact, ‘performers—even when performing music that is strictly notated—do not merely “perform” but also “improvise” upon that which they perform’.\textsuperscript{44} As mentioned in the Introduction to this dissertation, I wrote that Ingarden determined that there is always something incomplete about a printed score compared with a performance.\textsuperscript{45} Ingarden’s term *Unbestimmtheitsstellen*, or ‘places of indeterminacy’ within notation, demands that performers improvise, for, in Benson’s estimation ‘there can be no performance without *Unbestimmtheitsstellen*.\textsuperscript{46} Daniel Leech-Wilkinson echoes this sentiment when he writes, ‘[p]erformance can change the character, even the nature, of a score to a much greater extent than we allow’.\textsuperscript{47} Benson points out the importance of the nuance provided by this type of improvisation.\textsuperscript{48} It is what makes a listener utterly moved by one recording of a piece, yet bored when listening to another performance.\textsuperscript{49} Leech-Wilkinson argues that it is precisely those elusive elements of performance that Benson would consider ‘improvised’. It is this nuance of performance, ‘invention’ in early modern terms, that generates musical meaning to most listeners (rather than any sort of structural perception). Leech-Wilkinson says, ‘musical communication is effected between performer and listener at the level of the musical surface as it changes in sound and character from moment to moment. How that communication works, how character is represented in or suggested by sound, what performers do with notes to

\textsuperscript{42} ‘Rather, pieces of music (to whatever extent they had an identity) were things that facilitated the activity of music making, not ends in themselves’. Benson, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue*, 22. As Daniel Leech-Wilkinson surmises, ‘[p]erhaps it is for exactly this reason that music theory and musicology have traditionally found performance so hard to handle. Failing to recognize the large extent to which “the music” is formed only in the performance, and in listeners’ responses to what performers do, has been a fundamental error preventing much about music’s identity and operation from being theoretically comprehensible’. Daniel Leech-Wilkinson, “Compositions, scores, performances, meanings”, *Music Theory Online* 18/1 (2012), 8.

\textsuperscript{43} Benson, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue*, 18-19, 22.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., 26.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 80.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 82.

\textsuperscript{47} Leech-Wilkinson, “Compositions, scores, performances, meanings”, 4.

\textsuperscript{48} As Leech-Wilkinson argues, ‘[i]t follows that much of what is said about pieces is actually about performances of pieces: manners of performance have become absorbed into the scholarly imagination of scores. One does not need recordings for this to happen: scholars of music absorb from their performance-surroundings ways of understanding the nature of compositions and of their composers; presumably they always have’. Ibid., 3.

\textsuperscript{49} Benson, *The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue*, 85.
generate meaning, are the most pertinent questions for those who wish to understand music.\textsuperscript{50}

Though Benson and Leech-Wilkinson argue for the importance of performance as the principal force of meaning in music making, as well as the ‘improvisation’ and ‘affect’ generated by performance (not scores), we are reminded that this is also a contemporary notion. As quoted in the Introduction, Thomas Campion said in Rosseter’s \textit{Book of Ayres} (1601), ‘[a] naked Ayre without guide, or prop, or colour but its owne ... requires so much the more inuention to make it please’, citing the importance of emotive or effective performance, or the ‘action’, as he calls it, in the creation of musical meaning.\textsuperscript{51} As discussed earlier, it seems that a term, however insufficient, is necessary for phenomenological discussion of the contemporary somatic experience of music. I have chosen the word ‘striketh’, which acts as an index of that type of musical experience. Whether music works to ‘striketh the spirits more readily than the other senses’ as Francis Bacon discerned, or polyphonic music ‘striketh deeper’ as the author of \textit{Praise of Music} determined, the verb ‘to strike’ can be useful in applying modern philosophy on the creation of musical meaning to early modern experience.\textsuperscript{52} ‘Striking’ acknowledges the embodiedness of the historical subject, as well as the textual evidence they left behind.\textsuperscript{53} If musical meaning was experienced by early moderns through a ‘striking’, that moment of experience could be translated as the ‘what performers do with notes to generate meaning’ outlined by Leech-Wilkinson above. The improvised \textit{je-ne-sais-quoi} added by the person(s) that performed, breathed life into otherwise static notes on a page and thereby created meaning, an experience, a ‘striking’, that actively altered contemporary understanding of certain knowledge.

\textsuperscript{50} Leech-Wilkinson, “Compositions, scores, performances, meanings”, 10.
\textsuperscript{51} Rosseter, \textit{A Booke of Ayres set fourth to be song} (1601), sig.B1v.
\textsuperscript{52} Or George Sandys’ variation, ‘the sence of hearing stricking the Spirits more immediately, then the rest of the sences’. Ch. 2, 86. Sidney likens ‘well-weighted verse’ to music, explaining that the ‘rime striketh a certain music to the ear; and, in fine, since it doth delight, though by another way, it obtaineth the same purpose; there being in either, sweetness, and wanting in neither, majesty’. Sidney, \textit{An Apology For Poetry} (eds. Shepherd and Maslen), 115.
\textsuperscript{53} B. Smith, “Premodern Sexualities”, 325.
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Appendix I
Additional Song Texts

a) William Byrd: ‘Where fancie fond’ (1588)

Where fancie fond for pleasure pleads,
& reason, keeps poore hope in layle:
thre time it is to take my beads, & pray,
that beautie may preuaile,
or else dispaire, wil win the field,
where reason, hope & pleasure yeeld.

My eyes presume to iudge this case,
whose iudgement reason doth disdaine:
but beautie with her wanton face,
stands to defend, the case is plaine:
and at the barre of sweet delight,
she pleads that fancie must be right.

But shame will not haue reason yeeld,
though griefe do sweare it shall be so:
as though it were a perfect shield,
to blush and feare to tell my woe:
where silence force will at the last,
to wish for wit when hope is past.

So farre hath fond desire out runne,
the bond which reason set out first:
that where delight the fray begunne,
I would now say, if that I durst:
that in her stead ten thousand woes,
haue sprong in field where pleasure grows.

O that I might declare the rest,
of all the toies which fancy turnes:
like towrs of wind within my brest,
where fire is hid that never burnes
then should I try one of the twaine,
either to loue, or to disdaine.

But fine conceit dares not declare,
the strange conflict of hope and feare:
least reason should be left to bare,
that loue durst whisper in mine eare,
and tell me how my fancie shall,
bring reason to me beawties thrall.
I must therefore with silence buylld,
the Laborinth of my delight:
till loue haue tri’d in open field,
which of the twaine shall win the fight:
I feare mee reason must giue place,
If fancie fond winne beauties grace.

b) Thomas Morley: ‘Ioy, ioy doth so arise’ (1593)

Ioy, ioy doth so arise and so content mee,
when I but see thee, ô my lifes faire treasure.
Ioy, ioy doth so arise and so content mee,
That seeing makes mee blind (alas) through too great pleasure.
But if such blinding, sweet Loue, doth so delight thee,
Come, Loue, and more thus, and yet more, blynd mee still and spight mee,
I doe and spight mee.

c) John Attey: ‘My dearest and diuinest love’ (1622)

My dearest and deuinest loue.
Imagine my distresse,
When thou retir’st from my desires.
And sorrowes me oppresse.

For my sences no other Sunne,
But that which in thine eyes,
That in another Spheare doth runne,
And clowds thy natuie skyes.

Then come againe,
Display thy pleasing Beames,
Else all my pleasures are but paine,
My comforts are but dreames.

d) Robert Jones: ‘Dreames and Imaginations’ (1601)

Dreames and Imaginations
are all the recreations
absence can gaine me
dreames when I wake confound me,
thoghts for her sake foth wound me
lease she disdaine me,
then sinking let me lie,
or thinking let mee die,
since loue hath slaine me.
Dreames are but coward and doe,
Much good they dare not stand too,
Asham’d of the morrow,
Thoughts like a child that winketh,
Hee’s not beguiled that thinketh,
Hath peir’st me thorow,
Both filling me with blisses,
Both killing me with kisses,
Dying in sorrow.

Dreames with their false pretences,
And thoughts confounds my senses,
In the conclusion,
Which like a glasse did shew mee,
What came to passe and threw mee,
Into confusion,
Shee made mee leave all other,
Yet had shee got another,
This was abusion.

e) Martin Peerson: ‘Come, pretty wag’ (1620)

_Cantus 2:_ Come pretty wag and sing,
   The sun’s all-ripning wing,
   Fans up the wanton spring
_Both:_ O let us both goe chant it.
_Cantus 1:_ Dainty, dainty flowers,
   Sproute up with Aprill showers,
   And decke the summer bowers,
_Both:_ O how fresh May doth flant it.

f) Robert Jones: ‘Life is a Poets fable’ (1600)

Life is a Poets fable,
& al her daies are lies stolne
from deaths reckoning table,
for I die as I speake.
death times the notes that I doe breake.

Childhood doth die in youth,
And youth in old age dies,
I thought I liu’d in truth:
But I die, ii. now I see,
Each age of death makes one degree.
Farewell the doting score,
Of worlds arithmeticke,
Life, ile trust thee no more,
Till I die, ii. for thy sake,
Ile go by deaths new almanacke.

This instant of my song,
A thousand men lie sicke,
A thousand knels are rong:
And I die as they sing,
They are but dead and I dying.

Death is lifes decay,
Life time, time wastes away,
Then reason bids me say,
That I die, though my breath
Prolongs this space of lingring death.
Appendix II
Thomas Weelkes: ‘Ha ha’ (1608), transcribed and edited by Francis Bevan.

Ha ha ha

Thomas WEELKES
(1576 - 1623)
2. Tygh hygh, tygh hygh, O sweet delight,
he tickles this age that can,
call Tulliaes Ape a Marmasyte.
And Ledaes Goose a swan,
Fara diddle deyno,
this is idle fyno.

3. So so so so fine English dayes,
for false play is no reproach,
for he that doth the Cochman prayse,
may safely vse the Coch,
fara dyddle deyno,
this is idle fyno.
Appendix III
Thomas Weelkes: ‘Thule, the period of Cosmographie’ and ‘The Andalusian Merchant’ (1601), transcribed and edited by Francis Bevan.

Thule, The Period of Cosmographie

Canto
Thule, the period of Cosmographie.

Quinto
Thule, the period of Cosmographie.

Alto

Tenore
the period of Cosmographie, of

Sesto

Basso

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mo - gra - phie, Thu - le, the
the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie,
Thu - le, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, of
of Cos - mo - gra - phie, Cos - mo - gra - phie, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, of
Cos - mo - gra - phie, Thu - le, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, Cos - mo - gra - phie, the per - iod of Cos - mo - gra - phie, of Cos - mo - gra - phie, of
Cosmo-graphie, of Cosmo-graphie,
Cosmo-graphie, Doth vaunt of Hecla,
period of Cosmo-graphie, Doth vaunt of Hecla,
period of Cosmo-graphie, Doth vaunt of Hecla,
the period of Cosmo-graphie,

Cosmo-graphie, Doth vaunt of Hecla,
doth vaunt of Hecla, whose sul-
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phu-rious fire, whose sul-
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Doth melt the
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phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire

phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire
phu-rious fire

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hi-er, a-scend not hi-er, a-scend not hi-er,
a-scend not higher, a-scend not higher, a-scend not higher.
a-scend not higher, a-scend not higher, a-scend not higher,
a-scend not higher, a-scend not higher, a-scend not higher.
These things seeme won-drous, yet more
These things seeme won-drous, yet more
These things seeme won-drous, yet more
These things seeme won-drous, yet more
These things seeme won-drous, yet more
These things seeme won-drous, yet more
won - drous I, more won - drous I, Whose hart with feare doth
won - drous I, yet more won - drous I,
won - drous I, yet more won - drous I, Whose hart with feare doth
won - drous I, yet more won - drous I,
won - drous I, yet more won - drous I,

freeze, Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry, doth fry,
woe, Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth ___
freeze, Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry,
woe, Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth ___
freeze, Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth ___

with love,

fry, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with

whose hart with feare doth freeze, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth fry.

Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with

fry, with love doth fry.

fry, with love doth fry.

fry, with love doth fry.

fry, with love doth fry.

fry, with love doth fry.

love doth fry, with love doth fry.
The Andalusian Merchant

The Andalusian Merchant

That returns, that returns,
That returns, Laden with Cutchinele and

Merchant that returns, that returns, returns, Laden

turnes, that returns, Laden with

Andalusian Merchant that returns, that returns, Andalusian Merchant that returns.
strangely Fogo burns, how strangely Fogo burns, how
strangely Fogo burns, how strangely Fogo burns, how
strangely it burns, how strangely Fogo
strangely Fogo burns, how strangely Fogo
Ago burns, A midst an Ocean full of flying-fish-es,
Ago burns, A midst an Ocean full of flying-fish-es,
Ago burns, A midst an Ocean full of flying-fish-es,
fishes, full of flying fishes, full of flying fish
es, full of flying fish, full of flying fish
-full of flying fish, full of flying fish, full of flying fish,
full of flying fishes, full of flying fish-
full of flying fishes, full of flying fish-

These things seem wondrous, yet more
These things seem wondrous, yet more
These things seem wondrous, yet more
These things seem wondrous, yet more
These things seem wondrous, yet more
wondrous I, yet more wondrous I,

wondrous I, more wondrous I, Whose hart with feare doth

wondrous I, yet more wondrous I, Whose hart with feare doth

wondrous I, yet more wondrous I, Whose hart with feare doth

wondrous I, yet more wondrous I, Whose hart with feare doth

Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth

freeze, with love, with love doth frye,

freeze, whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love doth frye,

Whose hart with feare doth freeze, with love, with love doth

freeze, with love doth
frye, whose hart with feare doth freeze,

Whose hart with feare doth freeze,

With love doth frye.

freeze, with love doth frye, with love doth frye.

freeze, with love, with love doth frye.

freeze, with love doth frye.