Critical Trust in European Institutions: The Case of the Russian-speaking Minorities in Estonia and Latvia.

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1. Introduction

This article analyses the effects of changing Europeanization pressures over minority activism. We look at the ways in which minority political actors interpreted the changing relevance of European organizations for minority policy-making and how they responded to it. Through a combined quantitative–qualitative approach, we trace the trajectory of minority attitudes to European institutions in Estonia and Latvia before and after 2004 (when these countries joined the EU and NATO), and then explore the ways in which minority activists interpreted these changes. We conclude that minority activists do not any longer have great expectations that international organizations will be able to “do something” about minority issues, such as that of non-citizenship. Meanwhile, European institutions remain relevant (in perhaps unintended ways), as minority activists use both European values and principles, and European-level lobbying as domestic tools to put pressure on their own governments, not least by trying to “shame” them internationally.
In a social climate of increasing minority distrust towards European institutions, it is perhaps surprising that minority activists have not considerably changed their repertoire of actions involving European institutions lobbying. However, we find that their motivations, expectations and ultimately the content (if not the form) of their actions has changed significantly. Minority activists’ approach to European institutions is now increasingly grounded in a pragmatic understanding of the limit of European institutions’ capacity (and willingness) for intervention on behalf of minorities, what we call “critical trust”.

Much of the debate on the effects of Europeanization on minority policies in new member states has focused on the top-down effects of European pressures over minority politics, in particular on European institutions’ effectiveness in ensuring compliance and determining minority policies before and after accession. While this top-down approach has been arguably dominant, another strand in the literature has looked at the indirect effects of Europeanization, especially through processes of socialization. This article builds on this second strand of Europeanization literature, in that it focuses not on the agency of European institutions but on the agency of domestic political actors, positing European institutions as part of the existing political opportunity structures. From this perspective, EU accession can be understood as a change in the political opportunity structures for both majority and minority political actors. While attention has typically been on the impact of Europeanization over majority elites, we shift the focus to the minorities. By focusing on the minority actors, we show how minorities — rather than being passive objects of policy — actively adapt and respond to the changing dynamics of international pressures.

Estonia and Latvia present two interesting cases for our analysis. In both countries, before EU accession the external pressures of Europeanization entered into conflict with domestic pressures of state-building and minority exclusion. Indeed, the political doctrines of Estonia and Latvia after they regained independence advocated legal restoration of the countries’ status before the Soviet occupation, underpinning exclusionary policies towards the sizeable Russian-speaking minorities that had settled in these countries mostly during Soviet times (Pettai and Kallas 2009; Mole 2012). The citizenship policies,
which left a majority of Russian-speakers without citizenship – creating the peculiar status of “non-citizenship” – were particularly problematic, as they deprived a large portion of the minority population of basic political rights, at a time in which the main state-building decisions in Estonia and Latvia were being made (Järve 2009; Krūma 2009). This confirmed the ownership of the state by the “titular” nations and meant that the ethnic Estonian and Latvian elites entrenched themselves in all the major positions in the state.

The potential tensions deriving from this situation meant that, in the years before EU accession, majority–minority relations became a priority for European institutions’ pressures on the Estonian and Latvian governments. However, pressures on these issues significantly diminished after accession, notwithstanding the fact that minority grievances – in particular regarding the persistence of non-citizenship – remain high. The downward trajectory of European pressures on minority issues and the persistence of strong minority grievances make Estonia and Latvia particularly illustrative cases of how changes in European pressures are received by minorities and influence their political activism.

In this study, we make use of a combined quantitative–qualitative approach to better understand Russophone minorities’ changing perceptions of European institutions, and what that means for minority activism. This mixed method was chosen in order to take advantage of the strengths of both quantitative and qualitative methods and offset some of their respective weaknesses (Lieberman 2005; George and Bennett 2005; Fearon and Laitin 2008). The quantitative element of our research allows us to identify general trends and empirical regularities in minority attitudes towards European institutions; the qualitative element builds on semi-structured interviews with minority activists in order to understand the causal mechanism and rationale behind such trends and regularities. The quantitative analysis on the Russian-speaking minorities’ perception of European institutions reveals a seeming contradiction: trust for European institutions has significantly declined among Russian-speakers after accession but at the same time a

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1 The portion of Russian-speakers who acquired citizenship by birth upon independence was an estimated 20% in Estonia and 40% in Latvia (Mole 2012, 88; Smith, Galbreath, and Swain 2010, 119).
correlation emerges between minority political activism and trust in European institutions.

The interviews help us make sense of our statistical findings. Ten members of prominent Estonian and Latvian civil society minority organizations were selected as interviewees. Among other questions related to their aims and strategies, the activists were asked to evaluate the importance of European institutions in pushing forth their minority rights agenda. Interviewees were chosen from all the most relevant minority grassroots organizations in order to present a comprehensive picture of how the most politically active members in the Russian-speaking communities interpret the role of European institutions, define their expectations vis-à-vis them, and strategically respond to these evaluations and expectations.

Our qualitative analysis makes sense of the puzzle posed by the statistical findings: what the quantitative data show as higher trust for European institutions among minority activists is in fact revealed as a rather critical (and perhaps even cynical) form of trust. Our findings suggest that minority activists responded to what they perceived as the European institutions’ betrayal of initial promises on minority rights. They did so not by abandoning the European arena, but by shifting the way they understand such arena. Starting from an attitude of critical trust, minority activists do not expect European institutions to intervene directly on their behalf, but try to use the resonance of the European arena to shame their own governments.²

² Of course, whether this is actually effective is a moot point and is beyond the scope of this article. In fact, in a context of political marginalization, arguably few minority actions are effective. What is important here is how minority activists perceive Europeanization and how they react to changing circumstances.

2. Europeanization and Minority Activism

Much of the debate on the effects of Europeanization on new member states with regard to minorities has been concerned with European institutions’ effectiveness in pushing for liberal, minority-friendly policies, in keeping with European norms on minority rights. On the one side of this debate, scholars found that the top-down influence from European institutions (EU, Council of Europe, and OSCE), especially when linked
to accession conditionalities, played a fundamental role in softening new member states’ attitudes towards minorities and at least partially liberalizing minority policies (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004; Kelley 2004; Vachudova 2005). On the other side, several authors have questioned whether the impact of international pressures — arguably effective on economic policies — also extends to minority policies and inter-ethnic relations (Agarin and Brosig 2009; Galbreath and McEvoy 2012). Others showed that the liberalizing effects of Europeanization pressures did not extend much beyond formal compliance, and that European-led policy changes did not have long-lasting effects after EU accession, when European institutions lost their main bargaining chip and their direct impact on these issues greatly diminished (Agarin and Regelmann 2012; Sasse 2008; Schulze 2010).

While they come to different conclusions as to Europeanization’s effectiveness in determining minority policies, both sides to the compliance debate have been primarily interested in how governments responded to international pressures and, consequently, have treated minorities as objects of policy rather than political actors in their own right. In the resulting depictions, policymaking on minority issues appears as a bargaining process between international institutions on the one side and domestic majority elites on the other, with little or no input from minority actors. While this debate has been crucial in advancing our understanding of the effectiveness of top-down Europeanization in new member states, it is important to complement it with a deeper insight on the direct and (perhaps most importantly) indirect ways in which Europeanization has influenced minority political actors. This is particularly important in post-accession countries, where direct influence from European institutions on minority issues has significantly decreased (if not ceased).

The role of European institutions in processes of Europeanization is often understood as direct: European institutions actively engage in pressuring, advising, and bargaining with political actors in new member states in order to promote specific policies. Much of the literature – including that on minority rights in new member states – has been concerned with this direct aspect of Europeanization. However, the
effects of Europeanization can also be indirect. In this wider sense, Europeanization does not happen only as a result of European institutions’ deliberate acts of “coercion, conditionality, socialisation, and persuasion” but can also happen indirectly “through normative emulation, lesson-drawing, and competition” (Börzel and Risse 2012, 3). More broadly, the very presence of European institutions and of the European political arena can create expectations among domestic political actors that then indirectly transform their incentives and disincentives, strategies and possibly even political outlook.

A strand of the literature on Europeanization that has been more interested in indirect effects has been that on European socialization. In particular, European socialization has been understood as bringing about value changes through processes of bargaining, emulation, reinforcement and internalization of norms (Beyers 2010; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006; Schimmelfennig 2005; Checkel 2005). Socialization does include direct efforts by European institutions to “teach” norms, but it is mostly based on the indirect effects of repeated interactions on actors’ values and preferences. Compared to the compliance literature, socialization literature has widened the focus from Europeanization’s policy outcomes to its broader political outcomes; from how legislations have (or have not) been adapted to European norms, to how actors have (or have not) changed as a result of their contacts with European norms and institutions. This shift showed that Europeanization can have broad (and even unintended) effects, as European norms and structures are not simply received passively by domestic actors, but go through “active processes of adaptation, change, interpretation, and resistance” on the part of the recipients (Börzel and Risse 2012, 8). This literature highlighted how Europeanisation is therefore not only a top-down process, but also a bottom-up one, that sees domestic actors actively engaging with European institutions, responding to European norms and constraints, and using the structural and discursive resources offered by the European political arena (McCauley 2011, 1021–1022; Spirova 2012).

While this growing body of literature has advanced our understanding of the indirect effects of European institutions, once again its predominant focus has been on majority elites. Since majority elites
hold institutional positions that put them in closer contact with European institutions, studies that have tried to understand the extent to which repeated contacts have triggered processes of socialization and internalization of European norms – including on minority rights (e.g. Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel 2006; Kelley 2004) – have mostly concentrated on majority actors. Minority actors have once again remained marginal.

The literature on social mobilization has had a clearer focus on non-elite actors (including minorities) and has also engaged with the role of the international arena. For instance, Sikkink (2005, 152–159) argues that – when their domestic opportunity structures are repressed or blocked – contentious movements can campaign against their state by using the opportunities offered by international institutions, especially seeking out international allies to put pressure on their governments. Other authors have referred to a “boomerang effect” (Keck and Sikkink 1998), “scale shift” (Tarrow and McAdam 2005), or “externalization” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005) when social movements target international organizations “in attempts to put pressure on their own governments for material or symbolic resources” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 5). In this sense, international organizations become part of the political opportunity structures for social mobilization.

While a thorough account of the debate on political opportunity structures is outside of the scope of this article, it is important to note here that distinctions have been made between the institutional and cultural dimensions of such structures (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996), or the “structural” model and “signal” model of opportunities (Meyer and Minkoff 2004, 1464). In other words, there is a difference between actual changes in opportunities (for example EU accession and the consequent retreat of European institutions from minority rights bargaining) and the wider signals activists receive from the political system. In the case of European minority activists, these “signals” could be understood as the prominence of minority rights discourses as part of European socialization and what is understood as European values. Both structural and cultural (“signals”) dimensions must be taken into account to understand the
environment minority activists operate within and the ways in which they respond to it.

This article builds upon the existing literature on Europeanization, and in particular on its indirect socialization effects, but shifts the focus of attention from majority elites to minority communities and minority political activists. In so doing, it aims to explore the effects on minority mobilization of the changing levels of European pressures on minority rights in new member states. It also builds upon social mobilization literature, borrowing its multi-dimensional understanding of political opportunity structures. The starting point of our enquiry is the widely recognized diminished centrality of European institutions in directing new member states’ minority policies after accession (that is, reduced structural opportunities at the European level). Taking stock of these changed circumstances, our interest lays not so much with the actions minority actors put in place, as these are expected to be contingent upon domestic factors such as the structures of minority communities and their human, economic and social resources. Rather, we are interested in understanding how minorities have interpreted the changing external opportunity structures (both structures and signals) after EU accession, and whether minority activists have reacted to it by changing their understanding of European institutions as an arena for mobilization.

3. The Changing Perceptions of European Institutions among Russophone Minorities

The centrality of European institutions in the post-independence political development of the Baltic States has had multiple and at times contradictory implications for majority and minority communities alike. On the one hand, the progress of European integration of the Baltic republics diluted their political and economic ties with their Eastern neighbor state, placing these countries safely “back to Europe”. At the same time, European integration also came with a host of organizations pressuring the Estonian and Latvian governments to ease up their ethnocentric citizenship, language, and educational policies. Therefore, for
majority communities the value attached to “returning” to Europe came together with (European) minority rights norms that were at odds with their countries’ early nationalizing policies. For minority communities, Europeanization came with the promise of increased minority rights but also with the need to redefine their identities away from Russia. These different ambivalent feelings towards European integration can be expected to play a role in majority and minority’s attitudes and trust towards European institutions.

In her study of trust in European institutions, Piret Ehin (2001) found no correlation between ethnicity and the evaluation of European institutions in the Baltic States, based on surveys conducted at a single point in time (in 1997). However, if we extend the observation over a longer time, we find that minorities and majorities’ opinions about European institutions followed significantly different trajectories. Majority communities’ opinions tended to improve over time. Russophone minorities, instead, initially had a more positive evaluation of European institutions than the “titular nations”, but subsequently became disillusioned and showed a more skeptical attitude towards European institutions than ethnic Estonians and Latvians in the 2000s.3

Figure 1 demonstrates the inter-temporal fluctuation of the proportion of majority and minority respondents who evaluate the EU positively. As the figures show, from the 1990s to the early 2000s, Russophone minorities tended to evaluate the EU more positively than ethnic Estonians and Latvians. Then, their positive attitude and trust for the EU decreased over time. Finally, after the mid-2000s, when Estonia and Latvia completed EU accession, positive evaluation from the Baltic “titulars” surpassed the level of their Russophone counterparts. There is little difference in the general trend between Estonia and Latvia: Russian-speakers’ trust for the EU was initially high before decreasing and sinking below that of Baltic

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3 For the estimation, we use the Central Eastern Eurobarometer (CEEB), the Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CCEB), and the Eurobarometer (EB) in combination. They continue to provide the information about respondents’ language choice in only a few countries, including Estonia and Latvia. This makes it possible for us to distinguish between majorities’ and minorities’ intertemporal change of trust towards European institution. Although these barometers have partial differences between their questionnaires, they share basic components and methods, and taken together can provide a good approximation of a consistent social survey. The CEEB asked respondents for their impressions on the EU, providing them with three options; Positive, Neutral, and Negative. The CCEB and the EB asked respondents about their trust in the EU, with three options; Tending to trust, No opinion, and Tending not to trust.
“titulars”.

Figure 1. Change of European Trust by Ethnic Groups in Estonia and Latvia

Estonia

Latvia

Sources: CEEB2, 3, 6; CCEB 2001, 2002; EB 62.0–80.1

These opposed trends in majorities and minorities’ perception of European institutions reflect the different expectations and fears that Russophone and “titular” communities had before EU accession and whether these were met in reality. Initially, the minority rights principles advocated for by European
institutions and the international recommendations that the Estonian and Latvian governments liberalize their minority policies encountered an ambivalent response among the national elites and the “titular” populations. On the one hand, pressures from international organizations were felt strongly by the Estonian and Latvian elites, who had enthusiastically adopted the rhetoric of the return to Europe (Smith 2003, 9). Joining the EU and NATO was framed as the obvious continuation of the independence struggle, putting Estonia and Latvia safely within the European community of nations and away from Russia. On the other hand, however, the European demands contradicted the restorationist and ethnocentric discourses that had prevailed after independence, and were therefore also perceived as a threat to “titular” identity preservation (Schulze 2010, 374). European institutions were seen as indirectly advocating for Russian-speaking minority inhabitants, which some interpreted as proof of the fact that European advisers were listening too much to Russian propaganda.4 The words of a nationalist Latvian MP criticizing European efforts to amend the citizenship law – “we must not go so quickly to European society”, and “we have many problems in our state and they have to be addressed before EU and NATO membership” (Johnson 1998) – represent well this ambivalence at that time. This can explain the initial lack of enthusiasm about EU institutions among Estonian and Latvian nationals.

As for the Russophone minorities, opinions on EU also showed a measure of ambivalence, but before accession expectations tended to be high. For instance, a survey conducted in 2000 as part of the Estonian integration monitoring report showed that while about half of the ethnic Estonian population was in favor of EU accession, the support among Russian-speakers reached almost two thirds (Lauristin and Vetik 2000, 54). Although not as impressive, subsequent pre-accession surveys confirmed high expectations among the Russian-speakers (Järve 2005, 7). In Latvia, two prominent Russian-speakers’ parties supported EU accession, which was seen as an occasion to provide a clear framework for the promotion of minority

4 For example a Latvian nationalist MP showed his irritation at OSCE’s pressures to liberalize minority language policies by referring to the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities as “your Van der Stoel” when talking to the Russophone MPs during a parliamentary debate on 29 April 1998. The transcripts of Latvian parliamentary debates can be found (in Latvian) at www.saeima.lv.
rights in the country (Zepa 2006, 115). In the words of Latvian political scientist Brigita Zepa, “EU citizenship offered a new chance to receive equal rights” (Zepa 2006, 108).

After EU accession in 2004, the attitudes towards EU institutions changed for both majorities and minorities. With no accession conditionalities as bargaining tool, after accession the EU lost effective political pressure on the Estonian and Latvian governments to ease up their minority policies, including on citizenship, language, and education laws. In fact, already in the last period before accession it had become clear that accession would have not been blocked on account of the Russophone minorities’ rights, and even the most controversial issue (the presence in the two countries of unprecedented — for Europe — numbers of non-citizens) was not considered a stumbling block. This contradicted the initial strong rhetoric on minority rights (Hughes 2005, 751), disappointing Russophone expectations.

In this context, EU accession was welcomed by the national elites as an authoritative seal on the successful consolidation of the Estonian and Latvian democracies. National elites saw the accession as proof that their minority policies did not need to be justified any longer (Schulze 2010, 376, 381), and eagerly promoted the impression that accession meant that all issues concerning the Russophone minorities had been solved or were on route to be solved (Sasse 2008, 849). Russophone elites were of a different opinion, and they typically did not see EU accession as proof that minority issues had been solved (Schulze 2010, 381). Therefore, the conditions in which accession took place likely caused disappointment among the Russian-speaking minorities, and disillusionment with European institutions as guardians of minority rights.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, politically active Russian-speaking minorities followed a similar downward trend in trust for EU institutions as the rest of their ethnic communities. The European Value Survey (EVS, held in 1999 and 2008 in the Baltic States) asked respondents about their confidence in the EU, their language background, and their experience of political activism. The results show that confidence in the
EU decreased among politically active Russian-speaking minorities after EU accession (Table 1).

Table 1. Attitude toward EU of politically active Russophone minorities in 1999 and 2008.

<table>
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<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q: How much confident in European Union? (%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A great deal</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>0.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>quite a lot</td>
<td>40.0%</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not very much</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>35.7%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
<td>43.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>none at all</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>29.0%</td>
<td>32.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Values Survey 1999, 2008
Unit: Russian-speaking minority, who have attended demonstrations in the past

These results are in line with the general downward trajectory of trust among Russophone minorities, and were also reflected in the assessments of Russian-speaking minority activists in both Estonia and Latvia. Indeed, Russophone activists in both countries showed a clear understanding of the fact that European institutions had much less power over their governments’ minority policies after accession, and expressed disappointment and frustration with the post-accession situation. For example, a respondent from Latvia’s Non-Citizens Congress (an organization lobbying for non-citizens’ rights and an end to non-citizenship) recognized that

*Unfortunately, in the European Union questions of human rights – including national minority questions – are very weak. EU looks at these issues very closely during the accession period, but after that, as we can see in Hungary […], they cannot do anything apart from some weak political measures like boycotts and public condemnations.* (Interview, Latvia, 2013).

Other activists expressed their disillusionment with the European institutions’ capacity (and

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5 We use respondents’ experience with political demonstrations as a proxy of respondents’ political activeness.
willingness) to push for minority policy changes in even stronger terms. Another respondent from Latvia complained that the EU plays “the role of the hypocrite, who in words understands the problem” but is not willing to do much in practice to solve it (Interview, Latvia, 2013). The same activist described in clear terms the change in expectations regarding a EU-driven solution to minority issues that took place among the Russophone minorities: ‘Many Russians voted in favor of access to the EU, I also did – hoping that the EU would not accept to have apartheid happening inside its borders’ (Interview, Latvia, 2013). Another activist from Latvia’s Non-Citizens Congress put this even more forcefully:

*Are we Europeans or not? Are we Russian-Europeans or not? [...] The EU evidently does not consider us Europeans otherwise they would have taken care of us as they do with the rest of the Europeans.* (Interview, Latvia, 2013)

Several respondents claimed that the fact that recommendations on minority issues (especially on citizenship) did not have to be fulfilled for Estonia and Latvia to be accepted in the EU was a disappointment. After accession, minority activists were losing a precious ally and their domestic position was also weakened by the national elites’ contention that accession meant that all outstanding minority issues had been solved. According to a respondent from Latvia, the government refused to acknowledge criticism after 2004, claiming that “you accepted us into the EU; it means that you recognized that in Latvia everything is ok” (Interview, Latvia, 2013). An example of this disappointment in Estonia is provided by Vadim Poleshchuk (2009, 7), a scholar and Russophone minority civil society activist, in the foreword to his book on minority rights in Estonia and Latvia: “Unreceptive to the recommendations of various international organisations, the Estonian and Latvian administrations would have readily embraced any suggestions made by Brussels whenever these helped accelerate their accession to the EU. The EU, however, extracted little from the opportunity. Now this resource has been exhausted.” A Russophone activist in Estonia expressed his low expectations towards a EU-led solution to Russian-speakers’ problems in these terms:
Unfortunately the European institutions look with indifference at what happens in the country, in Estonia and also in Latvia. This is strange. Similar situations in other countries provoke some reaction but here for some reason all stays silent, nobody raises these themes... That is, we are confronted not with European solidarity, but with a cover up. [European institutions think:] “We have these bad boys, but they are our boys [...] as long as there is no unrest it's fine for us”. (Interview, Estonia, 2013)

Therefore, in both Estonia and Latvia minority activists openly recognize that their initial expectations about the EU’s involvement in forwarding a minority rights agenda have been disappointed. In no case Russophone activists showed the expectation that EU institutions could (or in fact would be willing to) impose significant changes in minority policies onto the Estonian and Latvian governments after accession. This is in line with the general fall in trust in EU institutions among Estonia’s and Latvia’s Russian-speaking minorities.

4. Trust in European Institutions and Minority Activism: A Puzzle?

In the general context of disappointment with Europeanization among minority communities as well as minority activists, we would expect that European institutions should play little role in Russophone activists’ mobilization strategies. However, our statistical and qualitative data on minority political activism and EU trust presents a more complicated picture, which suggests that our understanding of what constitutes trust should be revised. Further statistical analysis reveals a somewhat unexpected positive relation between the level of political activism of minority members and their trust for EU institutions. We found that – although levels of trust have decreased among both politically active and politically inactive minority members – someone who belongs to the Russophone minority group and engages in political activism,
tends to have a more positive attitude towards European institutions, than people who do not engage in activism.

This relation emerges from our regression analyses based on the European Social Survey (ESS) fourth module, conducted in 2009 in Estonia and Latvia. We concentrated our analysis on individuals, who answered that they use the Russian language as their mother tongue. The main dependent variable in this analysis is the respondents’ trust in the European Parliament, on a continuum from “No trust at all [score 0]” to “Complete trust [score 10]”. We used five indicators from the Survey to determine Russian-speakers’ level of domestic political activism as independent variables: signing petitions in the past twelve months; contacting politicians or government officials in the past twelve months; working with political parties or other action groups in the past twelve months; taking part in lawful public demonstration in the past twelve months; and a feeling of closeness to a specific political party. All five indicators are coded as dichotomous. We also controlled for the effect of the following factors: interest in politics, citizenship status (non-citizen dummy), household income (decile scale), age, gender (female dummy), and educational level. In addition, by considering trust in the national parliament (also on a 11-step scale), we control the effect of respondents’ general trust for national decision-making bodies. This controlling makes the meaning of the effect of independent variables for European institutions clearer in the subsequent analysis.

We used simple ordinary least square linear regression, with robust standard error to reduce heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problem in our estimation.

The results demonstrate that Russian-speaking respondents’ positive evaluations of European institutions have a meaningful correlation with their political actions. The respondents with the experiences to have participated in political activities tend to have significantly more positive opinions of the European

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6 Unfortunately, its fifth and sixth modules were not conducted in Latvia. Then this fourth wave is the newest one for both countries. The seventh module will be conducted in both Latvia and Estonia, but its data have not been released yet.

7 Questions are “[In Estonian] Millist keelt või keeli räägite kodus kõige sagedamini? [In Latvian] Kādā valodā vai valodās Jūs pārāk tālāk runājat mājās? [In Russian] На каком/ каких языках Вы в основном общаетесь дома?”

8 Based on the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) scale.
parliament than those without such political activism. For instance, if two persons who have the same level of political interest, income, education, age, and gender were compared, an individual who has engaged in domestic political actions demonstrates a significantly higher probability to have positive perception of European institutions in Latvia and Estonia than someone without political activities.

Table 2. The determinants of trust for Europe by Russian minorities in Estonia and Latvia

DV= Trust for European Parliament

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estonia model 1</th>
<th>Estonia model 2</th>
<th>Latvia model 1</th>
<th>Latvia model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Political interests</td>
<td>0.296</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.245</td>
<td>0.463**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.192)</td>
<td>(0.169)</td>
<td>(0.184)</td>
<td>(0.175)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income (decile scale)</td>
<td>0.00622</td>
<td>-0.00940</td>
<td>0.0290</td>
<td>0.00321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0580)</td>
<td>(0.0498)</td>
<td>(0.0611)</td>
<td>(0.0570)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship = no</td>
<td>-0.0246</td>
<td>0.184</td>
<td>0.137</td>
<td>-0.0911</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.266)</td>
<td>(0.238)</td>
<td>(0.317)</td>
<td>(0.293)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.000111</td>
<td>-0.0101</td>
<td>-0.0169</td>
<td>-0.0151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00809)</td>
<td>(0.00723)</td>
<td>(0.00905)</td>
<td>(0.00840)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender = female</td>
<td>0.282</td>
<td>0.134</td>
<td>0.273</td>
<td>0.209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.258)</td>
<td>(0.228)</td>
<td>(0.282)</td>
<td>(0.267)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational level (ISCED)</td>
<td>-0.0636</td>
<td>0.0493</td>
<td>-0.0574</td>
<td>0.0178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0867)</td>
<td>(0.0776)</td>
<td>(0.0759)</td>
<td>(0.0704)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted politician/officials</td>
<td>-0.515</td>
<td>-0.967</td>
<td>1.944***</td>
<td>1.517***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.534)</td>
<td>(0.497)</td>
<td>(0.426)</td>
<td>(0.437)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed petitions</td>
<td>1.488**</td>
<td>1.555**</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.0529</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.522)</td>
<td>(0.491)</td>
<td>(0.631)</td>
<td>(0.612)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took part in demonstrations</td>
<td>-0.0731</td>
<td>0.0857</td>
<td>-0.810</td>
<td>-0.854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.009)</td>
<td>(1.012)</td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td>(0.457)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in party</td>
<td>-0.892</td>
<td>-0.430</td>
<td>0.250</td>
<td>-0.190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.989)</td>
<td>(0.998)</td>
<td>(1.071)</td>
<td>(1.084)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel close to a particular party</td>
<td>0.785**</td>
<td>0.722**</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.268)</td>
<td>(0.242)</td>
<td>(0.308)</td>
<td>(0.289)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust for national parliament</td>
<td>0.426***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
<td>0.507***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0476)</td>
<td>(0.0549)</td>
<td>(0.0549)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>4.967***</td>
<td>3.351***</td>
<td>4.422***</td>
<td>4.337***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.095)</td>
<td>(0.952)</td>
<td>(1.047)</td>
<td>(0.999)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N 309 303 403 401
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.

Figure 2. The effect of each parameter onto the trust for European parliament.

![Diagram showing the effect of each parameter onto trust for European parliament.](image)

Note: Each bar indicates 99% and 95% confidence intervals. If those bars cross over zero line, it means that we cannot say that that parameter’s effect is neither positive nor negative.

Table 2 shows the results of our statistical analysis, and figure 2 visualizes each IV’s effect onto the level of trust for European parliament. In both countries, Russian speaking minorities who have engaged in political activities tend to have higher trust for European parliament, even after controlling for the effect of respondents’ interest in politics, age, citizenship, and other socioeconomic parameters. These effects are stable if we control the effect of trust for the national parliament. The type of political activities relating with trust for European institutions differ between Estonia and Latvia. In Estonia, the respondents who
signed petitions and feel close to a specific party are significantly statistically more likely to have higher trust for the European Parliament. At the same time, in Estonia, trust in the EU does not correlate with much direct political action, such as contacting politicians, and working in parties or action groups. In Latvia, trust in the European parliament significantly correlates with active forms of political participation, such as contacting politicians or government officials. Participating in public demonstration has negative covariance but this effect is not statistically significant. Although the kind of activities they engage with is different, we can say that – like in Estonia – also in Latvia Russian speakers’ positive evaluation of European institutions has a systematic connection with their political activism in domestic affairs.\(^9\) Interestingly, in both countries, citizenship status also does not have a systematic effect on trust for European institution.

These results leave us with a puzzle. First of all, the covariance between trust in the EU and political activism stands in contradiction with the general trend of falling trust in European institutions among minority members. Are politically active Russian speakers simply a (shrinking) minority of optimists? Moreover, the statistical analysis reveals a strong correlation between trust in the EU and political activism, but cannot explain the implications of such trust. In order to shed light on these questions, we conducted interviews with Russophone activists to interpret qualitatively the meaning of our statistical findings.

Before turning to our qualitative analysis, however, we will briefly highlight some of the main differences between Estonia and Latvia that emerged in our statistical analysis. In this study we are mostly interested in the common trends between the two cases and what they can tell us about minority mobilization and Europeanization in post-accession countries. However, differences can also shed some light on the contingent domestic factors that influence and modify the relationship between Europeanization and minority activism.

The most important difference that emerged is that Russian-speaking minorities in Latvia tend to

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\(^9\) In a robustness check in which we limit the unit of analysis only to Russian-speaking minorities without citizenship, we got similar results. One notable difference is that Russophone non-citizens who have participated in demonstrations in the past twelve months tend to show low trust for European parliament in Latvia.
connect direct political actions (contacting politicians or public administrations) with a positive evaluation of European institutions more often than their counterparts in Estonia. So, although in both countries Russophone respondents who engage in political actions in a domestic context tend to have a more positive evaluation of European institutions than those without political activism, Russophone residents in Latvia seems to choose more active strategies (e.g. lobbying) than their counterparts in Estonia (e.g. signing petitions, feeling close to a specific party). This difference is in line with existing analyses of minority activism in the two countries. Because of a combination of more resources and domestic opportunity structures that are more conducive to direct action (including more formal minority representation in domestic institutions), Latvia’s Russian speakers have generally been more politically active and better organized than their Estonian counterparts (Cianetti 2014a).

At state level, in Estonia the Russian-speakers’ parties that had been created in the 1990s disappeared by the end of that decade, and the Russophone vote shifted mostly to the Estonian Centre Party. Although the Centre Party is not an ethnic minority party and its leadership is overwhelmingly ethnic Estonian, its liberal views about minority issues and the appeal among Russian-speakers of its controversial leader, Edgar Savisaar, have made the party dominant among the Russophone minority for many years (Jeffries 2004, 160–1; Nakai 2014). The Centre Party accounts for most of the Russophone MPs in the Estonian parliament, but these are still disproportionately few both compared to the size of the Russian-speaking minority and to the size of Centre Party’s Russophone electorate. In Latvia, Russian-speakers’ parties have become increasingly successful over the years and they have mostly consolidated in the moderate ethnic party Harmony. Harmony has been electorally very successful and has become the biggest party in the Latvian parliament since 2011, guaranteeing the almost proportional representation of Russian-speakers. However, although in some occasions there have been talks about including Harmony in the governing coalition, the party has so far always been left in the opposition, with little direct impact on policymaking.
As for local-level politics, in Estonia, the Centre Party is dominant in municipalities with large Russophone populations, especially the northeastern region of Ida-Virumaa and the capital city Tallinn. While city-level politics can provide an additional avenue for Russian-speakers’ political participation and mobilization, the advantages of this in terms of minority empowerment are disputable and Savisaar’s mayorship of Tallinn often resembles patronage rather than minority representation (Cianetti 2014b). In Latvia, Harmony has gained power in Riga since 2009, and its leader Nils Ušakovs has been the first Russophone mayor of the capital city. While in the short term this does not provide any guarantees for minority voices to have an effective impact on national policymaking, Ušakovs’s mayorship has an important symbolic meaning for Latvia’s Russophone minority and might in the longer term normalize the presence of Russian-speakers in position of power (Cianetti 2014b).

As for other, non-institutional ways to influence policymaking, the development of an active civil society in Latvia and Estonia is quite limited among both majorities and minorities (Bartkowsky and Jasińska-Kania 2004; Heidmets 2008, 59–61; Rozenvalds 2005, 140 ff.; Rozenvalds 2007, 91), a feature that they share with most post-communist countries (Howard 2003; Kostelka 2014). However, the Russophone civil society has been particularly weak and demobilized in Estonia, whereas in Latvia it has shown more pronounced mobilization and organizational capacities (Table 3).

10 It is important to note that, differently from Latvia, in Estonia non-citizens and third country nationals (which constitute about half of Estonia’s Russophone population) have the right to vote in local elections.
Table 3. The Proportion of Residents who have participated in political activism (2009).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>language group</th>
<th>Estonia</th>
<th>Latvia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contacted politician or government official last 12 months</td>
<td>6.17% (citizen) 7.32% (non-citizen)</td>
<td>13.08% (citizen) 10.82% (non-citizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in political party or action group last 12 months</td>
<td>1.49% (citizen) 1.96% (non-citizen)</td>
<td>3.57% (citizen) 1.22% (non-citizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed petition last 12 months</td>
<td>4.26% (citizen) 3.00% (non-citizen)</td>
<td>9.42% (citizen) 5.95% (non-citizen)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taken part in lawful public demonstration last 12 months</td>
<td>2.13% (citizen) 2.45% (non-citizen)</td>
<td>1.91% (citizen) 9.95% (non-citizen)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: European Social Survey, fourth module.

Reasons for the inability of Estonia’s Russian-speakers to consistently act as a collective force are multiple. Most often observers have highlighted the fact that the group is not ethnically homogenous, that Russian-speakers arrived in Estonia in different waves of immigration, that they tend to have a weak sense of roots, and that they are mostly urbanized which adds to their atomization (Daatland and Svege 2000, 260; Poleshchuk 2009, 17). These characteristics, however, apply also to Latvia, where they did not bring to the same results. Lower political participation among Estonia’s Russian-speakers might be linked to their lower average socio-economic status, and thus fewer socio-economic resources in Estonia’s Russophone community than in Latvia’s. The higher level of minority formal representation and the success of Russian-speakers’ parties in Latvia might also contribute in enhancing Latvia’s Russian-speakers’ capacities for mobilization.

Beyond these differences, the statistical analysis presents a puzzle: while trust on European institutions is falling throughout the minority communities (as shown in the previous section), minority members who are politically active still retain a higher trust than their non-active counterparts. This is surprising, as these are the people who have the higher chances of having engaged with European institutions and of having been disappointed by the scarce results. The following section rests on qualitative,

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11 Ethnic-based socio-economic inequality is more pronounced in Estonia than in Latvia (Rozenvalds 2007, 37).
in-depth interviews with Russophone activists in Estonia and Latvia, in order to provide a deeper insight on this seeming paradox. In particular, we want to understand how politically active Russian-speaking have negotiated the post-accession disillusionment with European institutions.

5. Russophone activists after EU accession

Our statistical model shows that politically active Russian-speakers tend to have a higher trust in European institutions, which seems at odds with the general declining trust in the EU among the minorities. Our interviews with minority activists confirm both the trend of falling trust and the persistent connection between political activism and trust in the EU. They also reveal, however, something that would otherwise remain undetected in the quantitative analysis: that the quality of minority activists’ trust for the EU has changed significantly over time.

As shown above, the minority activists we interviewed are deeply disappointed with European institutions and have no expectation that these institutions are capable (or even willing) to intervene directly to improve minority rights in Estonia and Latvia. This change in expectations, however, does not mean that minority activists abandoned European institutions as a potential (or even key) arena to promote their domestic agendas. First of all, most activists still made reference to “European values” as the basis for their domestic claims. In fact, their own criticism of the European institutions is based on the fact that the EU acted according to other strategic priorities rather than following its own values of minority recognition and human rights. What most activists reproach the EU for are its “hypocritical” approach and its “double standards”. In the words of a Russophone activist: “How long can they go on recommending? These recommendations must eventually be fulfilled otherwise all is meaningless!” (Interview, Latvia, 2013). In general, notwithstanding the disappointment with European institutions, European values and the language of minority rights promoted as part of European integration still provide useful rhetorical and moral tools for minority activists to justify their demands and inform their political actions. This shows that there is no
contradiction in our statistical results: European institutions have disappointed early minority expectations — hence the general fall of trust among minority respondents — but still provide useful tools and a strong moral basis to advance minority demands, hence the higher recognition of European institutions among politically active minority members.

The most important trait that emerges from the interviews is that the consistently low expectations on the EU’s willingness to do anything in practice to promote minority agendas in Estonia and Latvia is not followed by an abandonment of European institutions as an important arena for minority mobilization. On the contrary, falling trust in the EU is accompanied by the pragmatic recognition that European institutions can still be a useful arena to make minority agendas visible and to legitimate them domestically. And this goes beyond the internalization and use of minority rights and human rights discourses. Minority activists do not limit themselves to using references to “European values”, but also actively lobby European institutions to recognize their minority demands as legitimate. This, however, is done not with the expectation that European institutions have the power to influence domestic legislation on minorities or would even be willing to intervene on behalf of Russophone minorities. Rather, European institutions are framed by Russophone activists as an important tool (albeit not the only one) to put pressure on domestic actors.

While this did not result in a significant shift in the kind of activities minority activists engage in on the European arena, it signals an important change in minority activists’ understanding of such arena. In other words, there is little expectation for a EU-led solution: the solution is domestic, the tool (or, rather, one of the tools) is European. This strategy was described clearly by a Russophone activist in Latvia, according to whom the EU cannot do much to change Latvia’s minority policies:

*But we can use its lobbying mechanisms, so we actively talk with the EU press in English and French in order to put this problem on the agenda, in order to put pressure on our domestic politicians. [...] Therefore, the question itself remains domestic, and our international
activities are linked with strengthening the pressure on the Latvian government, and also to make it so that this question enters also the Latvian information space. (Interview, Latvia, 2013)

Similarly, according to another activist: “The significance of the EU is not that high, but it’s one of the means to exert political influence domestically” (Interview, Latvia, 2013).

In the interviews, as with the statistical data, a difference between Estonia and Latvia emerged in terms of Russophone activism. While Russophone activists in Estonia described a similar change in their expectations regarding European institutions as their counterparts in Latvia, they appeared to have fewer actual contacts with European institutions and thus their appeals to “European values” were less embedded in concrete EU-level strategies. This could be partially due to the fact that Russophone organizations in Estonia have fewer resources, which makes it more difficult to develop a more expensive international strategy. It can also be linked to the fact that Russophone minority activists in Latvia can count on the support and access offered by a Russophone MEP, Tatiyana Ždanoka, from the Russophone ethnic party For Human Rights in a United Latvia (renamed Latvia’s Russian Union in 2014), a party that is not represented in the Latvian parliament but has been able to secure a seat in the European Parliament since 2004. Ždanoka has been active in promoting Russian-speakers’ issues in the European Parliament and was often mentioned by our Russophone activists respondents from Latvia as a resource they could use to get access to EU discussion forums. The election of the Russophone Yana Toom from the Estonian Centre Party in the last European elections in 2014 may come to play a similar role for Estonia’s minority activists.

Notwithstanding differences in terms of resources and levels of activism, in both Estonia and Latvia minority activists responded to the changed role of EU institutions on minority rights after accession by readjusting their expectations and rethinking their strategies. While there has been no significant change in the quantity (relatively low) and to some extent the form of minority mobilization on the European arena, the quality and meaning of such mobilization have changed. Therefore, while politically active Russian-
speakers might have a higher level of recognition of European institutions, there has been a significant change in the quality of activists’ trust in European institutions, which goes hand in hand with the quantitative decrease in general trust in the EU among Russian-speakers.

Our qualitative data show that a more positive evaluation of European institutions does not per se cause more activism. Rather, Estonia and Latvia’s minority activists share the same evaluations as the rest of the Russophone minorities regarding EU institutions’ willingness and capability to “do something” about minority rights. Therefore, activists are not a shrinking minority of incurable optimists: they consistently show a clear understanding of the limits of the EU and have no expectations for a EU-led solution to minority grievances. At the same time, however, they can be said to still trust the EU in the sense that their low expectations for what European institutions can and will do does not cancel out for them the possibility to use EU institutions, norms and discourses as political tools. Activists still consider European institutions as a relevant arena for mobilization and use Europeanization discourses about minority rights, human rights and the more nebulous “European values” as moral and normative support for their political claims.

The interviews suggest, therefore, that – in a context of generalized disenchantment with the EU as promoter of minority rights – activists’ trust in the EU remained higher but changed in quality. If before EU accession this trust, as admitted by several interviewed activists, rested on high expectations about the European institutions’ active promotion of minority rights, the post-accession trust is significantly more critical.

Two elements can be distinguished in this “critical trust”: one rests in the political pragmatism of minority activists, and the other in their European socialization. Firstly, activists pragmatically use European institutions as relevant arenas for minority activism. European institutions became a fundamental part of the political opportunity structures for minority activism soon after Estonia and Latvia’s independence, and remain so also after accession. In a context of domestic political marginalization,
minority activists habitually use European venues to put pressure on domestic governments and to gain media visibility. Activists described their strategy as “shaming” their own governments on the European stage in order to gain political currency domestically, hence the strategic focus on media visibility. “Naming and shaming” has been recognized as a key tool in organizations and movements’ repertoire to promote human rights from external (international) platforms (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013; Friman 2015; Lebovic and Voeten 2006; Meernik et al. 2012). Russian-speaking minority activists seem to have opted for this strategy in a context in which they confront limited political space domestically and decreasing support from European institutions. They sign petitions to European institutions, promote debates with European Parliament groups, participate in international conferences, and hold meetings in Brussels. As their national governments are still strongly invested in the European integration process, they expect that shaming them in the European arena might – if nothing else – at least catch their attention. The success of this strategy will depend on contingent domestic factors, such as resources, the specific dynamics of domestic political debates and their relative openness or closure. However, it is clear that, given the marginalization of minority political voices domestically, activists still see European institutions as providing at least a potential avenue for inclusion.

A second element of the activists’ critical trust in European institutions has less to do with their pragmatic considerations and more with their socialization within the general (if somewhat vague) framework of “European values”. These values offer a tool to legitimate minority demands against prevalent nationalizing discourses in the domestic political arena. The fact that minority activists uphold such values even in the context of falling trust for European institutions, suggests that Europeanization still holds a strong (if indirect) effect on minorities. While European institutions have mostly retreated from Estonia and Latvia’s domestic debates on minority rights, their previous involvement and, in fact, their very

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12 For example, Latvia’s Congress of Non-Citizens held a series of meetings and talks in Brussels in August 2013 and then organized a small sit-in action near the European Parliament in November 2013 (Latvian Centre for Human Rights 5 August 2013, 29 November 2013).
existence still has relevant indirect effects on minority mobilization. Since independence, minority activists have (more or less successfully) attempted to lobby European institutions and have participated in political debates in which European norms and values take center stage. These interactions functioned as processes of socialization for minority activists, who internalized European norms but also learned to critically engage with European institutions. In this sense, the shaming strategy is also directed towards the European institutions, which are reminded of minorities’ pre-accession expectations and of their own promises.

6. Conclusion

Our study shows the importance of looking at the European Union (and international institutions in general) not only from the perspective of whether they are effective in pushing through certain minority policies, but also in terms of their indirect effects on minorities and their political mobilization. The literatures on compliance with European norms on minorities and on socialization tend to treat minorities as the objects of minority policies, focusing on the relationship and negotiations between majority elites and European institutions. Our study adds to this picture by focusing on minorities and asking how minority communities responded to the reduced emphasis on minority rights by European institutions after Estonia and Latvia’s EU accession. We also contribute to the debate on the international (European) dimension of opportunity structures, showing how minority actors can respond to changing opportunities.

We found that positive evaluations of European institutions have declined significantly among Russian speakers, both among activists and the general minority population. At the same time, Russian-speaking activists display what we called a “critical trust” towards the EU. That is, they share their communities’ disillusionment with European institutions’ capacity and willingness to do something about minority rights in Estonia and Latvia, but this is not accompanied by the abandonment of the “European route” to pursuing minority agendas. On the contrary, activists still perceive the EU as an important political tool and also as a moral reference point for minority political activism.
In this sense, activists’ “critical trust” in European institutions can be understood as a function of their European socialization, and so as an indirect effect of Europeanization. “Europe” offers valuable discursive tools to minority activists to justify and legitimate their own demands within a wider European discourse on human and minority rights. Once framed in those terms, minority grievances acquire a European dimension and European institutions become a natural arena for minority mobilization. At the same time, activists recognize the limitations of such arena (which they blame on the EU’s “hypocrisy”) and therefore they do not base their activism (for example, lobbying at the European level) on the expectation that European institutions will be able (or willing) to do something. Rather, they see creating European-level resonance on minority issues as a way of shaming domestic governments and increasing visibility in domestic media. In this sense, European institutions are seen pragmatically as offering additional tools for minority activists to enter domestic debates on minority policies.

The “critical trust” displayed by Estonia and Latvia’s minority activists is in line with the literature on the indirect effects of Europeanization that sees domestic actors as not simply absorbing European norms, but adapting them and actively responding to changing opportunities and circumstances. Our study adds to that literature by highlighting the ways in which minority activists (and not only majority elites) respond to the changing pressures of Europeanization. Estonia and Latvia are unique cases, in particular given the size of their minorities and the number of non-citizens among them. Even so, we expect a similar “critical trust” effect to be displayed by other minority rights activists across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), especially given the fact that minorities across the region shared the same initial high expectations on European institutions as Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. While majority–minority data are more elusive for other CEE countries, there is reason to expect that a similar trend of

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13 Pre-accession barometer data (CCEB and CEEB) show that in countries such as Slovakia, Romania, and Lithuania minorities tended to have a high trust towards European institutions. Unfortunately, these countries’ datasets from post-accession years (Eurobarometer) do not make a distinction between minorities and majorities, as the question about their mother-tongue was dropped, which makes it impossible to verify similar downward trends in European trust in these countries.
disappointment emerged there as well. Moreover, our regression analysis found that Russian-speakers’ citizenship status in Estonia and Latvia – which could constitute a significant comparative difference with other CEE countries – does not directly affect their trust toward European institutions. This reinforces our expectation that trends observed in Estonia and Latvia are shared with the other CEE countries.

More widely, our findings serve as a warning to other researchers that trust statistics cannot be taken at face value, as they might hide a more complex reality. Indeed, a superficial analysis of trust statistics risks hiding the complex structure of trust among minorities. In-depth analysis is needed to uncover the ways in which not only the quantity of trust towards institutions can change but also its quality.

### Appendix: Descriptive statistics of ESS4

**Russian speakers in Estonia**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust for European Parliament</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>4.77</td>
<td>2.31</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Politicians/Officials</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed Petition</td>
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<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feel Close to Specific Party</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worked in Party/Action Group</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Took part in Demonstrations</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust for National Parliament</td>
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<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.60</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Interest</td>
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<td>0.83</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>Household Income</td>
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<td>5.28</td>
<td>2.49</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
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<td>Citizenship Status (2=No)</td>
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<td>1.56</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>49.32</td>
<td>19.07</td>
<td>15.00</td>
<td>89.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender (2=female)</td>
<td>472</td>
<td>1.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Educational Level</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>3.77</td>
<td>1.57</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>7.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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14 Cf. studies of pre- and post-accession minority rights in other CEE countries (Spirova 2012; Agarin and Brosig 2009; Szöcsik 2012), as well as Myra Waterbury’s contribution in this Special Issue.

15 At the same time, there might be differences about what type of activism correlates with minorities’ perceptions of European institutions. For example, while our analysis demonstrates that participating in public demonstrations by minorities did not have substantial effects on their formation of (dis)trust for European institutions in Estonia and Latvia, this does not imply that the same must be true for all the other CEE countries as well. For example, for the importance of public demonstrations for democracy in Slovakia and Romania, see Sherrill Stroschein (2012).
Russian speakers in Latvia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Trust for European Parliament</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>2.87</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>10.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contacted Politicians/Officials</td>
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<td>0.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signed Petition</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feel Close to Specific Party</td>
<td>557</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.47</td>
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<td>Worked in Party/Action Group</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>Took part in Demonstrations</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.30</td>
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References


**Datasets**

Eurobarometer (Central Eastern Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer)
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm

European Social Survey
http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/
European Values Survey

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http://www.cspp.strath.ac.uk/catalog2_0.html