The Identity Dynamics of Acculturation and Multiculturalism: Situating Acculturation in Context

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1 We are extremely grateful to David Sam, Ron Fischer, and an anonymous reviewer for their valuable comments on a previous version of this chapter.
Abstract

We discuss the identity processes involved in acculturation and multiculturalism, drawing on insights from various social psychological theories of identity. According to self-categorization theory, people are especially likely to view their cultural values and practices as self-defining in situations of intercultural contact. Social identity theory suggests that members of cultural majorities and minorities will find various ways of maintaining the positive distinctiveness of their cultural identities: for example, migrants may compete directly with receiving-society individuals (e.g., Asian Americans in science and mathematics), or they may find creative ways of affirming cultural differences (e.g., opening restaurants specializing in heritage-culture cuisine). However, multicultural national contexts can be understood not only in terms of intergroup relations, but also in terms of intragroup dynamics by which members of different cultural groups negotiate and defend competing definitions of a superordinate national identity. Drawing on integrated threat theory and on motivated identity construction theory, we suggest that these intergroup and intragroup dynamics will bring a wider range of identity motives and processes into play. Moreover, the elaborated social identity model emphasizes the importance of viewing majority and minority groups’ identity processes as reciprocally related over time, rather than treating them separately. Our analysis helps to explain why migrants and receiving-society members often behave in ways that seemingly contradict the predictions of earlier theories of acculturation and of intergroup relations.

KEY WORDS: Acculturation, international migration, social identity, intergroup relations, cultural identity.
International migration is at an all-time high, with more than 200 million people now residing in a country other than where they were born (United Nations, 2009). Many of these international migrants have left developing countries to settle in post-industrial nations (Steiner, 2009), where the prevailing cultural values, beliefs, and practices may be very different from what they were previously accustomed to. As a result of these differences, not only migrants (who are usually, but not always, smaller and less dominant groups), but also members of the receiving society (who are usually, but not always, the larger and more dominant group), will need to adapt to life in a changed (multi)cultural context – a process known as acculturation (for reviews, see Berry, 1980, 1997; Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Sam & Berry, 2010; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010). Our chapter is guided by an intergroup perspective on acculturation, seeking to understand the acculturation processes among minority and majority members with the help of theories of social identity and intergroup relations (see also Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Rohmann, Piontkowski, & Florack, 2006; Ward, 2001).

We begin with a brief historical review of mainstream perspectives on acculturation. We trace the evolution of acculturation as a target for scholarly attention and illustrate some key trends in the acculturation literature on which we attempt to expand in the current chapter. In particular, we review what we regard as the content of acculturation: changes in the domains of cultural practices, values, and identifications. Although these three domains have been discussed in the literature, only recently have they begun to be integrated under the umbrella of acculturation (e.g., Costigan, 2010; Schwartz, Unger, Zamboanga, & Szapocznik, 2010).

We then discuss the value of adopting a social identity perspective (see Spears, 2011) to examine acculturation processes. Briefly, our argument is as follows: Acculturation contexts are, by definition, contexts of intergroup relations, and are typically characterized by substantial differences in size and status between the groups involved (Berry, 2006). In such contexts, perceived differences in cultural practices and values are likely to become salient, creating a basis for people to categorize themselves as
members of “cultural groups” (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Thus, aspects of culture that previously may have been largely taken for granted are transformed into the components of “cultural identities,” infused with symbolic meaning and affective significance for their members, and subject to motivational dynamics of identity threat and maintenance (Breakwell, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Vignoles, 2011).

This suggests that a crucial determinant of acculturation processes and outcomes will be the extent to which members of the groups involved perceive their cultural identities to be threatened by the presence or the actions of other groups (Licata, Sanchez-Mazas, & Green, 2011; Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999). We review various strategies that migrants and receiving-culture individuals use to maintain their identities against perceived threats in the intergroup space in which acculturation occurs, including cases in which individuals in certain social positions may not categorize themselves neatly into “majority group members” and “migrants.” Majority-group members may feel threatened by migrants whom they perceive as either “diluting” or potentially “taking over” the national ingroup (Caldwell, 2008). Members of smaller or less dominant cultural groups in a given context often have to negotiate multiple cultural identities, based on their membership and participation in both their heritage-cultural group and the receiving society (Huynh, Nguyen, & Benet-Martínez, 2011).

Finally, we emphasize that all of these processes occur within the context of the evolving historical relations between the groups involved, and thus the identity maintenance strategies of one group may often be perceived as undermining the cultural identities of another group. As emphasized by Drury and Reicher (2009), people do not just categorize and position themselves into groups; they also categorize and position each other. These processes may potentially lead to escalating cycles of identity threat and defense in the interactive relations between the groups (Licata, Sanchez-Mazas, & Green, 2011).

**Dimensionality of Acculturation**

**Unidimensional and Bidimensional models**
One of the earliest research programs on acculturation began in Chicago in the 1920s as scholars at the University of Chicago attempted to understand how Southern and Eastern European migrants were adjusting to their new lives in the United States (Park, 1928; Thomas & Znaniecki, 1927). Redfield, Linton, and Hershkovits (1936), in their call for more acculturation research based on the Chicago studies, suggested that immigrants might adapt to contact with the receiving culture in a number of ways, including adopting the receiving culture, integrating the receiving culture with their cultural heritage, or rejecting the receiving culture and maintaining their cultural heritage. Gordon (1964), working almost 30 years later, cast acculturation as a process of assimilation, or “culture shedding,” where migrants acquired receiving-cultural orientations and discarded those from their country or region of origin. More or less, Gordon acknowledged only the “receiving culture adoption” alternative put forth by Redfield et al. (1936). Gordon’s theoretical approach was guided – at least implicitly – by American assimilationist policies that effectively stripped European migrants of their cultural heritage and pushed them to “become American” (Stepick, Dutton Stepick, & Vanderkooy, 2011). Other countries (e.g., Australia; Taft, 1953) also adopted similar policies designed to encourage or enforce rapid assimilation of migrants, as well as of indigenous minorities.

However, assimilationist policies in the United States and elsewhere decreased during the second half of the 20th century, largely in response to the American civil rights movement led by Martin Luther King, Jr. (Caldwell, 2008; Huntington, 2004). More or less, the acceptance of people of color within the existing American social system also led the United States to open its borders to immigrants of color (e.g., Mexicans and Chinese) who had previously been denied entry. Around this same time, many European countries opened their borders to labor migration from former colonies as well as from nations in the Middle East and North Africa. The “melting pot” metaphor, where migrant cultures were largely discarded or absorbed into the dominant national culture, was replaced with a “salad bowl” or “mosaic” metaphor, where a plethora of cultural streams could coexist within a given context (Caldwell,
2008; Stepick, Dutton Stepick, & Vanderkooy, 2011). The stage was thus set for policies to emerge that emphasized pluralism and respect for cultural diversity, which came to be subsumed under the general term “multiculturalism.” Indeed, the term “multiculturalism” entered the common parlance of many Western nations in the 1980s and 1990s, once the new waves of ethnic minority migrants had begun to assert their desires for full recognition and incorporation into the societies where they had settled (Day, 2000; Takaki, 1993; Werbner, 2005).

The last decades of the 20th century witnessed a number of attempts to conceptualize and measure the process of acculturation (see Berry & Sam, this volume, for an in-depth review). Berry (1980, 1997), for example, proposed that desiring contact with the majority culture and wishing to maintain aspects of the heritage culture should be considered as separate dimensions of acculturation. He developed a four-category scheme where desire for contact with the receiving culture and heritage-culture retention were crossed to form four categories: “assimilation” (desires contact with the receiving culture and discards the heritage culture), “separation” (rejects contact with the receiving culture and retains the heritage culture), “integration” (desires contact with the receiving culture and retains the heritage culture), and “marginalization” (rejects both the heritage and receiving cultures). Subsequent approaches have suggested that the “desire for contact” dimension in Berry’s scheme might usefully be replaced by a “desire for majority culture adoption” (Bourhis et al., 1997; Ward & Kennedy, 1994), and there has been some discussion as to whether these two conceptualizations should be regarded as synonymous (Berry & Sabatier, 2008, 2010; Liebkind, 2001; Snauwaert, Soenens, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2003). A great deal of research has been conducted using these models of acculturation (see Sam & Berry, 2010, for a review).

A critical difference between unidimensional and bidimensional acculturation models lies in how biculturalism is framed. Within unidimensional models (e.g., Gordon, 1964), biculturalism – labeled as “integration” within Berry’s (1980, 1997) model – represents an intermediate step between being
completely attached to one’s cultural heritage and being completely assimilated to the receiving cultural context. Compared to biculturalism, assimilation is therefore viewed as a “more advanced” form of acculturation – and biculturalism is not viewed as beneficial to individual migrants. Within bidimensional models, however, biculturalism represents the highest degrees of endorsement of both one’s heritage and receiving cultural streams – in other words, living in both worlds. Within bidimensional models of acculturation, rather than serving as a way station on the route to assimilation, biculturalism is usually regarded as the most adaptive approach to acculturation. Berry (1997) does, however, qualify this conclusion by noting that the adaptiveness of any given acculturation approach may depend on the prevailing cultural climate in question. Berry and Sam (this volume) provide a more in-depth review of the conditions under which biculturalism is most adaptive.

According to Berry (1980, 1997; Sam & Berry, 2010), biculturalism is likely to be adaptive because it permits individuals to interact successfully both with their heritage-cultural community (e.g., family, neighborhood) and with the larger society in which their ethnic group is embedded. Although research suggests that biculturalism is usually adaptive (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013), Rudmin (2003) has argued that biculturalism may be a precarious condition where the person is “caught between two worlds” – pressured against acquiring the receiving culture by the heritage-cultural community, and against retaining the heritage culture by the receiving-cultural community. Such a portrayal is consistent with some anecdotal evidence about the lives of bicultural individuals such as Richard Rodriguez (1982), a Mexican American man who struggled to reconcile his Mexican roots with his American experiences. The men who perpetrated the July 7, 2005 suicide-bombing attacks on the London Underground were born and raised in Britain, and anecdotal evidence suggests that they may have experienced difficulty reconciling their Pakistani Muslim heritage with the secular British context in which they grew up (cf. Bolognani, 2007). Although these men appeared to function well in British society prior to the attacks, conflicts between their British and Muslim identities may have been troubling to them. These two
examples – one from the United States and one from Europe – suggest that biculturalism is not always easy (or possible) to achieve. There thus seems to be some degree of confusion regarding the extent to which biculturalism involves trying to reconcile incompatible identities versus integrating one’s heritage and receiving identities into an adaptive and coherent whole (Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005). We will return to the question of bicultural identity integration later in this chapter.

Although the bidimensional models of acculturation introduced by Berry and others were taken as a clear advance over the unidimensional models formulated in the 1920s and synthesized by Gordon (1964), the focus was still on the experiences of the individual migrant. Berry (1997) has referred to his categories as “acculturation strategies,” which implies that migrants choose how they will acculturate, and that individual differences in acculturation have their roots in individual-level determinants (e.g., age at the time of migration, length of time spent in the receiving country; Cheung, Chudek, & Heine, 2011). Although Berry (1974) had already discussed the importance of public policies and attitudes in the larger society, most early iterations of bidimensional acculturation models paid relatively little consideration to the role of intergroup relations generally, and of the interface between the migrant group and the receiving society specifically. More recently, these dynamics are beginning to receive more attention (Berry, 1997; Brown & Zagefka, 2011; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001).

Interactionist acculturation models increased in prominence during the late 20th century (e.g., Berry, 1997; Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997; Piontkowski et al., 2002). These models considered the extent of match versus mismatch between the acculturation orientations of migrants and the receiving society’s expectations for how migrants “should” acculturate. For example, Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, and Obdrzálek (2000) studied members of the dominant cultural group and migrant group members in Germany, Switzerland, and Slovakia, and they found that each of these countries was characterized by different types of attitudes toward migrants. German respondents were generally most insistent that former Yugoslavians, and especially Turks, conform to the German way of life and discard
their cultural heritage. Swiss respondents appeared to be more supportive of former Yugoslavian migrants maintaining their cultural heritage, as did Slovak respondents regarding Hungarian migrants. However, one consistent pattern emerged across the three receiving countries – the extent of perceived cultural similarity between the immigrant group and the receiving society emerged as a consistent predictor of favorable attitudes toward migrants, and the extent to which migrants were perceived as a threat to the receiving country emerged as a consistent predictor of unfavorable attitudes (see Berry & Sam, this volume; Pfafferot & Brown, 2006).

As a result of these interactionist models, some writers began to understand acculturation processes through the lens provided by theories of social identity and intergroup relations (e.g., Liebkind & Kosonen, 1998; Ward, 2001). For example, Jasinskaja-Lahti, Mähönen, and Liebkind (2012) found that, among Russian migrants to Finland, quality of contact with Finns predicted endorsement of Finnish national identity and attitudes toward Finns indirectly through experiences of discrimination and rejection from Finnish people. From the receiving-society perspective, Leong and Ward (2011) found that it is essential to consider the specific receiving group in question (e.g., Whites versus Maoris in New Zealand) when determining receiving society members’ attitudes toward migrants. In this chapter, we extend the consideration of acculturation as an instance of intergroup relations. The next section reviews some of the domains of acculturation that have been introduced.

**Domains of Acculturation**

As we noted earlier in this chapter, the term “acculturation” has been used as an umbrella for many adjustment-related processes following migration. The majority of acculturation research has focused on public and private cultural behaviors such as language use, choice of friends, ways of celebrating holidays and special occasions, and culinary preferences (e.g., Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2007). Indeed, a great deal of research (e.g., Allen et al., 2008; Caetano, Ramisetty-Mikler, Wallisch, McGrath, & Spence, 2008; Epstein, Botvin, & Diaz, 1998, 2000) has utilized language preference as the only marker
of acculturation. Certainly, language is an essential component of a cultural stream, and studies (e.g., Guo, Schwartz, & McCabe, 2008; Kang, 2006) have found that language use is empirically separate from other types of cultural behaviors. Language is an important dimension of national identity (Schildkraut, 2011) in that it unifies members of a region or nation. In terms of intergroup relations, migrants who cannot speak the language of the country or region in which they have settled often meet with hostility from established residents of that country or region (e.g., Barker et al., 2001; Cornelius, 2002). Nonetheless, language use alone is not sufficient for measuring acculturation, as we discuss in more detail below.

Acculturation is multidimensional not only in the separation of heritage and receiving cultural orientations, but also in the domains in which acculturation occurs. As Sam and Berry (2010) suggest, echoing some early conceptualizations of the phenomenon (Redfield et al., 1936), acculturation represents a change process that occurs following migration. However, what it is that changes as a result of acculturation has rarely been clearly specified. Recent work has begun to move in the direction of greater specificity, and we outline some of this emerging knowledge here.

Broadly speaking, acculturation occurs in three general domains, sometimes labeled as the “ABC’s” of acculturation (Ward, 2001) – affective, behavioral, and cognitive. However, these terms have been used somewhat differently by different groups of authors. For example, Ward (2001) labels “affective” acculturation in terms of stress and coping, “behavioral” acculturation in terms of learning the practices (including language) associated with a given receiving cultural context, and “cognitive” acculturation in terms of intergroup dynamics and attachments to one’s cultural heritage and to the new receiving culture. Castillo and Caver (2009) have used these same labels to index somewhat different domains of acculturation: affective acculturation refers to social identity processes and attachments to one’s heritage and receiving cultural groups; behavioral acculturation refers to acquiring the practices of the culture of settlement and/or retaining the practices of one’s heritage culture; and cognitive
Acculturation refers to specific values and beliefs (e.g., individualism, collectivism, familism) associated with one’s heritage and receiving cultural contexts. Costigan (2010) and Schwartz et al. (2010) have followed Castillo and Caver’s demarcation and have proposed that acculturation is comprised of three general domains – practices, values, and identifications.

**Cultural Practices.** As we stated earlier, the vast majority of acculturation research has focused on cultural practices – language use, culinary preferences, media use, and choice of friends and romantic partners. Research suggests that, among migrants in the United States and elsewhere, endorsement of both heritage and receiving cultural practices is associated with donating to charitable causes, stopping to help others in need, and other prosocial behavioral tendencies (Schwartz, Zamboanga, & Jarvis, 2007), affiliation with friends from both the heritage and receiving cultural communities (Mok, Morris, Benet-Martínez, & Karakitapoğlu-Aygün, 2007), and fewer mental health problems (Bhui et al., 2005). Moreover, among first and second generation migrants, continued engagement in heritage practices (including use of the heritage language and association with heritage-culture friends) has been shown to protect against a number of problematic and health-compromising outcomes, including depressive symptoms (Yoon, Langrehr, & Ong, 2011), drug and alcohol use (Allen et al., 2008), cigarette smoking (Epstein et al., 1998, 2000), physical inactivity (Unger et al., 2004), and poor diet (Corral & Landrine, 2008).

Language may serve as an especially powerful transmitter of cultural lineage and traditions. Indeed, research has identified language as a prime that cues specific cultural mindsets. For example, Lee, Oyserman, and Bond (2010) found that Hong Kong Chinese participants who were assessed in English emphasized competition, whereas those who were assessed in Chinese emphasized harmony and cooperation. Lechuga (2008), in a sample of Mexican Americans, found that those assessed in Spanish scored higher in collectivism compared to those assessed in English. Ramirez-Esparza, Gosling, Benet-Martínez, Potter, and Pennebaker (2006) found that bilingual individuals’ personality configurations
(using the Big Five traits) were different in Spanish than in English. Language may therefore provide an important index of cultural orientation and may be conceptually and empirically distinct from other types of cultural practices (Guo, Suárez-Morales, Schwartz, & Szapocznik, 2009; Kang, 2006). Indeed, commentators (e.g., Huntington, 2004) and empirical studies (e.g., Barker et al., 2001) have emphasized the importance of a shared language in maintaining the cultural integrity of a nation or cultural group.

Cultural Values. A largely separate literature has focused on cultural values – including transcultural values such as individualism and collectivism (Triandis, 1995) as well as group-specific values such as filial piety, saving face, humility, conformity, and self-control in East Asians (Bedford, 2004; Kim, Atkinson, & Yang, 1999; Yeh & Bedford, 2003); familism, machismo, respect, and simpatía (emotional warmth) in Latin Americans (Arciniega, Anderson, Tovar-Blank, & Tracey, 2008; Galanti, 2003; Sabogal, Marin, Otero-Sabogal, Marin, & Perez-Stable, 1987); and communalism (orientation toward social ties over individual achievements) in the African Diaspora (Boykin, Albury, Tyler, Hurley, Bailey, & Miller, 2005). A number of studies (e.g., Schwartz, Weisskirch, et al., 2010; Unger, Ritt-Olson, et al., 2002) have suggested that some of the values from these various non-European-descent groups – such as communalism, familism, and filial piety – are strongly related to one another under the heading of collectivism and interdependence. Dwairy (2002, 2004) has also characterized Middle Eastern cultural streams as collectivistic – and indeed, in Islam, the umma, or community, takes precedence over the individual person. It should be noted, however that the specific types of collectivism expressed in different parts of the world are often quite distinct from one another (Kim, 1994), and that generalities between and among cultures should be drawn with extreme caution.

Although few published longitudinal studies have examined change in cultural values over time, a number of studies have found reliable individual differences in cultural values. For example, supporting the contention that minority ethnic groups in the United States are more collectivistic and less individualistic than White Americans, Schwartz, Weisskirch, et al. (2010) found that Blacks, Hispanics,
and Asians scored significantly higher than Whites on measures of communalism, familism, and filial piety. Collectivistic value systems de-emphasize individual goals and achievements and place emphasis on the well-being, desires, and needs of family members and friends (Triandis, 1995). In contrast, among cultural majority groups in the United States, and in many European countries, “getting ahead” is framed in terms of individual successes and achievements.

Individualism and collectivism are relevant to the intergroup dynamics surrounding acculturation because the majority of the world’s migrants have origins in largely collectivistic cultures, whereas many of the societies where these migrants are settling are mainly individualistic. As detailed in a report by the United Nations (2009), regions from which individuals are most likely to migrate include Latin America, Southern and Eastern Asia, the Middle East, North and Sub-Saharan Africa, and the Caribbean – areas that have been characterized primarily by collectivist and interdependent value orientations. It stands to reason that migrant adjustment includes incorporating at least some of the values of the country or region of settlement – and yet one of the fears expressed by commentators and in public opinion polls both in the United States (Buchanan, 2006; Cornelius, 2002) and in Europe (Bawer, 2004; Bleich, 2009) is that migrants will not integrate themselves into the local culture, but will rather create their own subcultures and eventually “take over” whole regions of the receiving nation or region (Caldwell, 2008; Huntington, 2004). Buchanan (2006) derisively refers to “Eurabia” and “Mexifornia” as examples of such potentially “conquered” territories. Thus, claims about a clash of values, as well as behaviors and identifications, between migrants and the communities that are receiving them, represent an important component of the immigration debates on both sides of the Atlantic.

Cultural Identifications. A somewhat separate literature has emerged for cultural identifications – with the majority of this literature focusing on ethnic or heritage-cultural identity. In this context, heritage-cultural identity refers to one’s identification with one’s (or one’s family’s) culture of origin, whereas ethnic identity refers to identifying with a socially constructed group within the receiving
Acculturation and Intergroup Dynamics  14

society (Helms, Jernigan, & Mascher, 2005; Zagefka, 2009). For example, many Hispanic individuals in
the United States identify with their countries of familial origin (e.g., Cuban, Mexican, Colombian),
whereas others identify with pan-ethnic terms that have meaning largely in the United States (e.g.,
Hispanic or Latino; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Terms such as “Hispanic” or “Latino” are rarely used in
Latin America – indeed, some of the countries grouped together under these headings have engaged in
feuds or wars with one another (e.g., Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador, Chile and Argentina).
We deliberately do not use the term “race,” because the use of this term to describe different groups of
people arises from the commonly held, but scientifically unfounded, assumption that a majority of
differences observed between ethnic and cultural groups have a genetic basis (Hirschman, 2004).

The prevailing perspective on ethnic identity is a blend between social-identity and neo-Eriksonian
perspectives (Phinney & Ong, 2007; Umaña-Taylor, Yazedjian, & Bámaca-Gómez, 2004), where ethnic
identity is assumed to represent a confluence of having considered the subjective meaning of one’s
ethnic group (ethnic identity exploration), deciding on the subjective importance of one’s ethnic group
(ethnic identity commitment), and feeling attached to and proud of that ethnic group (ethnic identity
affirmation: Phinney & Ong, 2007). Ethnic identity is important for migrants and their immediate
descendants because it keeps them psychologically attached to their heritage cultures and communities
(Umaña-Taylor, 2011). Ethnic identity has been studied in a wide variety of ethnic groups and receiving
societies (Phinney et al., 2006), and stronger ethnic identity among migrants is generally linked to
adaptive and health-promoting outcomes (e.g., self-esteem, life satisfaction; see Smith & Silva, 2011, for
a recent meta-analytic review). However, the links between ethnic identity and psychosocial outcomes
tend to be rather modest – in a study of more than 7,000 migrant adolescents in 13 countries of
settlement, Sam, Vedder, Ward, and Horenczyk (2006) found Pearson correlations below |.20| between
ethnic identity and a number of adjustment variables, including self-esteem, life satisfaction, distress,
school adjustment, and behavior problems. Indeed, the association between ethnic identity and
adjustment reported by Sam et al. (2006) is similar to the association between biculturalism and adjustment reported by Phinney et al. (2006) using the same dataset.

Ethnic identity is also the dimension of acculturation that has most often been examined longitudinally. In a sample of Black and Hispanic early-to-middle adolescents in New York City, Pahl and Way (2006) found that ethnic identity exploration tended to level off in middle adolescence – except in cases where adolescents perceived discrimination from their peers (in which case ethnic identity exploration remained high). Ethnic identity affirmation remained high throughout the study period. Syed and Azmitia (2009) found that ethnic identity exploration and affirmation both increased during the college years. Knight et al. (2009) found that ethnic identity affirmation, but not exploration, increased over time in their sample of Mexican American juvenile offenders. In those studies that included majority group members (Whites) as well as migrant and ethnic minority groups, Whites’ ethnic identity scores were significantly lower at all timepoints compared to those of immigrant or minority participants. In any case, ethnic identity tends to be highly endorsed, and to increase over time, for many migrant and ethnic-minority adolescents.

In terms of bidimensional models of acculturation, national identity is the counterpart to ethnic or heritage-cultural identity. In other words, migrants may identify to a greater or a lesser extent with their ethnic or cultural group, and they may also identify to a greater or lesser extent with the nation in which they reside (Phinney et al., 2006). National identity has been somewhat less well studied in migrants and minority group members (for exceptions, see Schildkraut, 2010, 2011). More commonly, national identification has been studied among cultural majority groups, and one finding that has been replicated in several countries is that majority-group members who are highly identified with their nation tend to be the least tolerant of migrants (e.g., Barrette et al., 2004; González et al., 2008; Leong, 2010; Morrison et al., 2010). However, as we discuss later, this appears to be more true of some nations than of others, depending on how the national ingroup is defined (Pehrson, Vignoles, & Brown, 2009).
Differences across Domains. Given our contention (cf. Costigan, 2010; Schwartz, Unger, et al., 2010) that acculturation consists of heritage and receiving cultural practices, values, and identifications, it stands to reason that biculturalism can emerge in any of the three domains. Moreover, the fact that a migrant is bicultural in one domain, such as cultural practices, does not necessarily signify that she or he is also bicultural in terms of values and identifications. A Hispanic migrant in the United States may learn English out of necessity, for example, and associate with some American friends – but still not identify as American or adopt individualistic values. Similarly, as Schildkraut (2011) has found in her national polls of U.S. residents, many Hispanics who cannot speak English nonetheless identify with the United States as well as with their countries of origin. Data collected in the United States, for example, suggest a moderate correlation (between .15 and .40) between cultural values and identifications (Schwartz, Weisskirch, et al., 2011). Practices and identifications were more strongly related (.56 for U.S. acculturation and .47 for heritage acculturation) but were not related strongly enough to suggest a unitary construct. Moreover, each of the three domains was differentially related to health risks such as illicit drug use, unsafe sexual behavior, and drunken driving. So, in our view, acculturation should be regarded as a multidimensional phenomenon – although some domains of acculturation may prompt the consideration of others, as we discuss below (see also Navas et al., 2005).

Processes of Acculturation: An Identity-Based Perspective

The literature reviewed above has demonstrated ways in which conceptions of acculturation have become increasingly sophisticated over the past 50 years, moving away from a single dimension of cultural assimilation to a more nuanced current view that allows for separate dimensions of heritage culture maintenance and host culture acquisition. Moreover, it is now recognized that there may be several different variants of biculturalism – which may be manifested differently across the multiple domains of cultural practices, values and identifications. Furthermore, some individuals will display different cultural profiles in public situations than in their private lives (see Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver,
Acculturation and Intergroup Dynamics  17

2007; Navas et al., 2005). Despite the increasingly complex and sophisticated differentiation of dimensions and domains of acculturation, we contend that an understanding of the social and psychological processes and antecedents underlying acculturation lagged behind (Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, & Cinnirella, 2012; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Leventoglu Martin, 2007). In other words, we believe that a better understanding is needed regarding the social and psychological processes that lead individuals or groups to occupy particular positions on the various acculturation dimensions that have been identified, as well as regarding the processes linking these different forms of acculturation to favorable or unfavorable individual and societal outcomes (Brown & Zagefka, 2011).

Like several previous reviewers of the acculturation literature (e.g., Liebkind, 2001; Ward, 2001), we believe that a valuable a first step towards addressing this knowledge gap is to interpret existing findings from the acculturation literature through the lens of theoretical perspectives on social identity and intergroup relations (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner et al., 1987; see Spears, 2011, for a recent review). Acculturation situations are, by definition, cases of intergroup relations (Berry, 2006; Brown & Zagefka, 2011). The social psychological literature on intergroup relations has much to say about the impact of particular kinds of intergroup contexts on identity construction, and about the complex interplay of identity threat and maintenance processes with intergroup relations. Our discussion of identity construction within intergroup contexts will draw initially on self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), and we will then consider the issue of identity threat and maintenance from a social identity theory perspective (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Going beyond previous identity-based accounts of acculturation, we will also draw on several more recent perspectives within the identity literature, including motivated identity construction theory (Vignoles, 2011), and the elaborated social identity model (Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2009). We briefly introduce each of these perspectives as they become relevant to our identity-based account of acculturation processes.

From “Cultures” to “Cultural Identities”
As a starting point for an identity-based analysis of acculturation, we draw on the insight from self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) that people are especially likely to see themselves as members of particular social groups when they find themselves in situations where their group is compared with other relevant groups—such as when groups come into contact. In such situations, the salience of one’s group identity is predicted to depend on a combination of three factors: perceiver readiness (including one’s pre-existing level of identification with the specific ingroup in question), comparative fit (the extent to which perceived between-group differences are greater than perceived within-group differences), and normative fit (the extent to which observed differences between groups are consistent with prior expectations about the groups concerned) (e.g., Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1991; for a recent discussion, see Spears, 2011). Notably, situations of acculturation commonly involve contact between members of groups that differ markedly in observable practices (e.g., language, food, clothing, music, etc.) as well as in their social values and identifications—although values and identifications may be harder to observe directly. Because differences in cultural practices are often very noticeable when members of different cultural groups come into contact, based on the principle of comparative fit, these differences can be expected to form a basis for members of each cultural group to self-categorize. Moreover, to the extent that these differences are elaborated in social discourse and that they are associated with further real or imagined differences in underlying beliefs and values, the distinction among the groups will also come to represent normative fit—further enhancing the salience of these differences as a basis for self-categorization.

These propositions carry a number of important implications for the acculturation literature. Firstly, they provide a basis for theorizing about relationships among the three domains of acculturation discussed earlier: practices, values, and identifications. Self-categorization theory suggests that the relationships among these three domains will be fluid and dynamic, but that they will function in a predictable way. When people observe differences in practices and values between their cultural group
and others in a given context, they will be more likely to categorize themselves in terms of their cultural group memberships. For example, when coming into contact with North African migrants and observing the migrants’ behavior, French people may strongly classify themselves as “French” and “not North African.” If this intercultural context is maintained over a period of time—as will typically be the case when “migrant” groups and “dominant” groups live together in a shared national context—then individuals will probably come to see themselves more chronically in terms of their cultural group memberships: in other words, they will evidence an increase in cultural identification. Thus, cultural practices and values—to the extent that these are observably contrasted with those of one or more relevant outgroups—will be used to define the content of cultural identities that individuals will use to define themselves.

An important implication of this depiction of the acculturation process is that not only will people’s levels of cultural identification be somewhat fluid and context dependent, but the meanings that people give to their cultural identities—their self-stereotypes as cultural members—will be fluid and contextually dependent as well. In particular, self-categorization theory predicts that people’s stereotypes of their own and of others’ social groups will be influenced by the comparative frame of reference (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997). Thus, when defining the meaning of his/her Indian cultural identity, an Indian migrant in Great Britain is likely to give a greater emphasis to those aspects of Indian culture that s/he perceives to differ from British culture, whereas an Indian migrant in the United Arab Emirates is likely to emphasize those aspects of Indian culture that s/he perceives to differ from Emirati culture. This principle may help to explain why cross-cultural researchers have often found differences in cultural orientation when studying migrant groups within a single nation, whereas the same differences do not necessarily emerge when participants of the same nationalities are studied in their countries of origin (e.g. Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholz, 2002). It may also help to explain why dominant group members and social commentators often perceive the existence of a “clash of values” between
themselves and members of migrant groups (e.g., Huntington, 2004), even when the absolute size of differences in value endorsement among cultural groups may be relatively small (cross-cultural studies typically show much greater variance within groups than between groups, e.g., Fischer & Schwartz, 2011).

Understanding the dynamic nature of self-categorization may also help to explain the surprising emergence of novel cultural identities in highly diverse contexts. An example of this is the emergence of a “pan-Hispanic” cultural identity in the United States that draws together individuals from many highly diverse national origins (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Indeed, the U.S. Census Bureau originally coined the term “Hispanic” to refer to individuals of Spanish-speaking descent – and this term is rarely (if ever) used in Latin America. In their countries of origin, groups such as Mexicans, Colombians, Argentines, Peruvians, and Cubans would be less apt to see themselves as sharing a common identity. Such a categorization only makes sense within the context of ethnic relations in the United States, because these groups share some common differences from the dominant White American culture, and because they are often treated similarly by majority group members.

Perhaps most important of all, self-categorization theory helps to explain why people often display so much investment in defending their cultural practices, values, and identifications. A crucial outcome of the self-categorization process is that what previously may have been taken-for-granted aspects of one’s “cultural background” (i.e., what one does) take on an added symbolic and motivational significance as salient and self-defining properties of one’s “identity” (who one is). This has the important implication that acquiring new cultural practices or shedding old ones is not just a practical question—instead, changes that superficially might seem quite trivial may carry enormous motivational significance because they are perceived as threatening or undermining people’s identities as members of particular cultural communities. Hence, members of both cultural minorities and majorities will often vigorously defend their cultural practices, values, and identifications against change or “contamination”,}
because they see such defense as the only way to maintain their cultural identities—to protect their sense of who they are. It is possible, then, that people’s endorsement of cultural practices, values, and identifications may become more strongly correlated under conditions of perceived identity threats from other cultural groups. We now focus on these processes of identity threat and maintenance, drawing on social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), as well as subsequent extensions (e.g., Breakwell, 1988; Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2009; Vignoles, 2011).

Identity Management in Multicultural Situations: Symbolic Threats and Defense Strategies

Central to social identity theory is the claim that people typically strive for social identities that are characterized by a sense of positive group distinctiveness (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), a process that has subsequently been understood to be driven by identity motives for self-esteem, distinctiveness, and/or meaning (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg, 2007; Spears, 2011). According to Tajfel and Turner, when people experience their social identity as lacking in positive distinctiveness—for example, belonging to a socially devalued minority group—they may respond by using a number of identity management strategies. Depending on specific features of the intergroup context, such as the permeability of the group boundaries, and the perceived stability and legitimacy of the status differences between the groups, they might attempt to move to a more positively distinctive group (individual mobility) or try to improve the positive distinctiveness of their own group, either by engaging in direct competition with the outgroup (social competition), or by seeking to reframe the comparison between the groups in a more positive light (social creativity) (Mummendey, Klink, Mielke, Wenzel, & Blanz, 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

As an example of individual mobility, some migrants – especially those who arrived in the country of settlement at an early age (or who were born in the country of settlement and raised by foreign-born parents) – may try to “blend in” with receiving-society individuals to whom they are phenotypically similar. For instance, some young Haitian migrants in Miami attempt to pass themselves as African
American, believing that African Americans hold a higher social position than Haitians do (e.g., Stepick, Stepick, Eugene, Teed, & Labissiere, 2001). As an example of social competition, many East Asian migrants in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe outperform their host-national peers in math and science (e.g., Lowell, 2010). As an example of social creativity, many Italian and Greek migrants to other countries open restaurants specializing in their native cuisine, rather than competing with majority group members for other types of work. At the same time, other ethnic groups – such as Afro-Caribbeans in the United Kingdom and Turks in Belgium – choose to highlight, rather than disguise or reframe, their cultural identities. It is not clear precisely why some groups use certain social-creativity strategies whereas other groups use different strategies.

Subsequent research and theorizing has extended the range of motives that are thought to underlie social identity processes. Based on a review of multiple perspectives in the identity literature, motivated identity construction theory proposes that, in addition to motives for self-esteem, distinctiveness, and meaning, people are also motivated to establish and maintain feelings of continuity, efficacy, and belonging within their personal and social identities (Vignoles, 2011; see also Easterbrook & Vignoles, 2012; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006). Researchers have also suggested a wider range of identity management strategies (or “coping strategies”) that people may employ when their ability to satisfy their identity motives is threatened or undermined (see, e.g., Blanz, Mummendey, Mielke, & Klink, 1998; Breakwell, 1986, 1988; Carr & Vignoles, 2011; Gregg, Sedikides, & Gebauer, 2011). Hence, a full understanding of the identity dynamics underlying acculturation processes would need to consider a variety of identity threats that might be experienced by migrants, majority group members, and members of other migrant groups (e.g., in many situations, some migrant groups are favored over others; Steiner, 2009), as well as a variety of possible strategies that members of these groups might invoke in response to such threats.
However, as a precursor to such an analysis, we should also emphasize an important feature of the intergroup context in most situations of multicultural contact that differs from how intergroup contexts are more commonly represented within the social identity literature. Classic theorizing and research within the social identity perspective has tended to focus on relations between mutually exclusive social categories defined in terms of some “equivalent” but different characteristics. Such categories include memberships within different nations, ethnicities, genders, or university majors, as well as artificially created “minimal groups” based on letters of the alphabet, colors, et cetera. These categories may be nested within larger, superordinate categories, such as different nations within the European Union or psychology and business students within the same university (see, e.g., Hornsey & Hogg, 2000), but the prevailing theoretical models tend to assume—at least implicitly—that these nested group or category memberships fit within a neat, logical, and hierarchical structure.

In principle, the categories involved in multicultural societies also can be represented in this way: for example, one might think of British Whites and British Indians as subordinate groups (“cultural groups”) within the superordinate group of British people (“national group”). Crucially, however, this neat theoretical model may not be an accurate reflection of how these identities are typically conceptualized in everyday life by the groups concerned. For example, apart from a few members of far-right political groups, most members of the White majority in Britain probably spend very little time thinking of themselves as “British Whites”; more likely, they will label themselves as “British”, as it is common for members of majority ethnic groups more generally to label themselves with national rather than ethnic identities (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos & Heng, 2009). Moreover, the use of a common label may hide substantial differences in how “Britishness” is defined—and this may be done in such a way as to include or to exclude members of migrant groups (Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009). A more exclusive definition of Britishness, based on shared genetic ancestry, would create an ingroup (those people whose families have been in Britain for centuries) and an outgroup (migrants, or those whose parents or
grandparents were born outside of Britain). A more inclusive definition of Britishness, referring to anyone who resides in Britain, would create a superordinate ingroup (cf. the ingroup projection model; Wenzel, Mummendey, & Waldzus, 2007).

Thus, what is at stake here is not simply the social comparison between majority and minority ethnic groups, but also the relationship between the minority ethnic identities (e.g., British Indian) and the superordinate national identity (here, British). In other words, the most salient identity threat posed by a multicultural society for British White majority members lies not in seeing British Indians as a competing ethnic out-group (although this may sometimes be a concern), but in the implications for their sense of British identity of including British Indians (and other migrants) within a shared national in-group. Similarly, although members of cultural minorities may be somewhat more aware than majority members of the status and power differentials between and among cultural groups, they also have to face the task of reconciling their dual identities as ethnic and national members—identities that may often be portrayed as conflicting, or even mutually exclusive, in popular discourse.

We now discuss these issues in greater depth. Although not all of the ideas we propose have been tested explicitly, we aim to illustrate our arguments with findings from the acculturation literature where such findings are available. First, we consider the perspective of cultural majorities; second, we examine the perspective of cultural minorities; and finally, we attempt to create an integrative perspective that considers the dynamic relationships between cultural majorities and minorities, both of whom may potentially be experiencing identity threats and attempting to manage their identities, as these processes unfold over time (for a similar approach, see Licata et al., 2011).

Identity Processes among Cultural Majorities

Hostility towards cultural minorities. In the United States, which has been receiving large migrant flows since its inception, nearly every migrant group has been persecuted – starting with the Irish and Germans in the 19th century (Galenson, 1997) and continuing through the Southern and Eastern
Europeans in the early 20th century (Sterba, 2003) and the current wave of largely non-European migrants (Stepick, Dutton Stepick, & Vanderkooy, 2011). All of these groups were viewed as fundamentally different from the American cultural mainstream and were marginalized, likely as a result of this “otherness”. In Europe, although many non-European migrants in the 1960 and 1970s were from former colonies or had been invited as guest workers, as the migrant populations have increased dramatically in the decades since, many Europeans began to perceive that the migrants pose a threat to the identity and solidarity of the receiving nations (cf. Coenders et al., 2008). Reactions in Europe are, at times, similar to those of Americans, with some elites and liberal-leaning individuals celebrating the growing diversity, but with a substantial proportion of the general public feeling threatened and overrun by the ever-growing presence of “foreigners.” There is evidence that one’s political ideology moderates the extent to which migrants are viewed as enriching or invading the receiving society: compared to individuals with conservative political beliefs, individuals with liberal beliefs are more likely to welcome culturally dissimilar migrants and to advocate for them (Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002).

Yet, notably, hostility does not extend indiscriminately to all migrants. In the United States, individuals of European descent – whether they arrive directly from Europe or from a third country such as Canada, Australia, or Israel – are implicitly regarded as the “highest-status” group because they can blend in with the dominant White American mainstream (Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos & Heng, 2009). Hispanics, especially Mexicans and Central Americans, are regarded as the most “unwanted” group because they are overwhelmingly poor, often enter the country illegally, and send a large portion of their earnings back to their countries of origin (Cornelius, 2002; Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007). In Europe, migration within the European Union generally meets with less resistance (Licata et al., 2011), but migration from outside the European Union – especially from Muslim countries – is viewed as a considerable threat to the cultural and religious hegemony of Europe (e.g., Adida et al., 2010; Bawer, 2004). In one Dutch study, approximately half of the adolescents surveyed reported negative feelings
towards Muslim migrants (González, Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008), and evidence suggests that many Germans view Turkish Muslims unfavorably (Piontkowski, Rohmann, & Florack, 2002). Further, Brüβ (2008) surveyed large samples of Bangladeshi Muslims in London, Turkish Muslims in Berlin, and Moroccan Muslims in Madrid – and he found that many of these individuals reported being verbally harassed or otherwise disrespected on a regular basis.

How can we understand the incidence of hostility towards cultural minorities? A full account is beyond the scope of this chapter (for a more comprehensive treatment, see Brown, 2010). However, we focus here on a subset of identity processes that we believe are especially important antecedents of intergroup hostility. In particular, research suggests that hostility very often occurs as a defensive reaction to the perceived presence of symbolic threats to the identity of the majority group (e.g., González et al., 2008; Stephan et al., 1999).

**Realistic and symbolic threats.** In their integrated threat theory, Stephan et al. (1999) have argued for the importance of considering both realistic and symbolic threats together in studies of intergroup relations. By “realistic threats,” Stephan and his colleagues refer to perceived or actual competition for limited jobs, housing, or political influence that are available within a given national or local context (see also Sherif, 1966). In many cases, perceived realistic threats do not reflect objective reality – for example, undocumented migrants are essential for a number of industries, including meat packing, farming, landscaping, and housekeeping (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007; Ramirez & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2009). “Symbolic threats”, on the other hand, refer to perceived threats to the ingroup identity, largely attributable to beliefs that the ingroup’s core cultural beliefs and values are endangered by those of the outgroup (e.g., the belief that prototypical components of American culture – such as the English language and the country’s Anglo-Protestant heritage – are “under attack” by the mass migration of Hispanics). Some studies (e.g., González et al., 2008) have found that realistic threats do not predict intergroup hostility, after accounting for the influence of symbolic threats (which we discuss below);
others find both to be reliable correlates of anti-outgroup sentiment (e.g., Curşeu, Schoop, & Stalk, 2007; McLaren & Johnson, 2007). Realistic threats may be more potent in some contexts than in others. For example, undocumented migrants might pose the most realistic threat – in terms of competition for jobs – to lower-income majority group members (Stoll, Melendez, & Valenzuela, 2002). In contrast, higher-income majority group members might actually be the employers who are hiring undocumented workers, and thus, far from their interests being threatened, they stand to benefit in material terms from the availability of this cheaper source of labor.

As one can probably deduce, realistic threats differ from symbolic threats in that they are focused on the potential loss of material resources rather than on the potential loss of a positive and satisfactory group identity. However, we should emphasize that realistic threats are nonetheless grounded in identity processes, because they focus on the distribution of resources between socially defined ingroups and outgroups. In other words, irrespective of the objective economic circumstances, a person will perceive that “they” are coming and taking “our” jobs only if they categorize themselves and the incoming workers as members of different—and competing—social groups (“them” versus “us”). Thus, the groups around which judgments of realistic threat are based are subjectively defined, and these definitions change over time. Irish and Italian migrants to the United States in the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup>, and early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries were considered as separate “races” from mainstream White Americans. However, by the middle of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, all of these migrants and their descendants were considered as White Americans (Huntington, 2004). However, a distinction is still made between members of “White” and “non-White” ethnic groups, where these categories are social constructs rather than objective realities – for example, in the United States, even Spanish speakers who are phenotypically White are classified as Hispanic and are differentiated from White Americans. In a public opinion poll conducted in the late 1990s, Simon and Lynch (1999) found that, across several Western nations, White migrants were preferred over migrants from non-White ethnic groups. Thus, even if realistic threats often stem from
the existence of objective conflicts of interest, identity processes still determine whose interests are taken into account, and on which side of the “us vs. them” balance sheet they appear. Depending on which identity categories are important and salient, the same immigrant workers might be represented as “taking jobs away from members of the cultural majority” (i.e., realistic threat) or they might be represented as “helping our country to run more efficiently and compete internationally” (i.e., realistic gain).

Identity Threat. Without denying that realistic threats drive hostility against cultural minorities in some circumstances, we believe that it is especially important to focus on the symbolic threats that the presence of cultural minorities can pose to cultural majority members. In particular, there are several ways in which the mere presence of cultural minorities in a nation may potentially be perceived to undermine the cultural or national identity of the majority group. (As we have discussed above, for majority groups, national and cultural identities may be experienced as more or less interchangeable.) Notably, however, different theoretical perspectives provide conflicting views about what exactly constitutes a threat to the majority identity; and these differences lead to diverging predictions about which types of minority groups and which types of minority behaviors will be experienced as most threatening, as well as how the cultural majorities are therefore likely to react.

As discussed earlier, social identity theory predicts that people will experience identity threat—and thus engage in identity maintenance strategies—to the extent that the positive distinctiveness of their social identities is undermined by a given situation (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). This suggests that people will feel threatened if the image of their group is insufficiently positive and/or insufficiently distinctive in relation to relevant comparison groups. Thus, people would be expected to engage in identity maintenance strategies in situations where their group is compared with a higher-status outgroup (undermining self-esteem), or with a group that is highly similar to their own (undermining distinctiveness—but see below). Thus, members of higher-status cultural groups should be motivated to
avoid such comparisons by preserving the lower status of cultural minority groups in their society and by maintaining clear boundaries between and among the different groups. This seems to entail that powerful majority groups will typically be most comfortable with a segregationist political stance, encouraging a separationist acculturation strategy among minority groups, and thus maintaining the distinctiveness (through the impermeability of boundaries) and the positive evaluation (through the differential social status) of their group identity. Some salient examples of this include events during the segregationist era in the United States, and the apartheid era in South Africa.

In direct contrast with social identity theory, integrated threat theory proposes that people will feel threatened especially by groups that are different rather than similar to their own group (e.g., Stephan et al., 1999). Indeed, in most contemporary multicultural societies, the behavior of cultural majorities does not seem to match the pattern predicted by social identity theory. Seemingly against the interests of preserving positive group distinctiveness, cultural majorities typically seem to be more comfortable with the presence of relatively high-status minority groups, especially those that are similar to themselves in their practices and values. For example, some Slovakian and Romanian communities near the Hungarian border are comprised heavily of Hungarian migrants. Through the end of the 20th century, the Irish were the largest migrant group in Great Britain. However, most of these migrant-majority interactions are characterized by relatively low degrees of threat and animosity (e.g., Piontkowski et al., 2000; Short, 2004).

In contrast, cultural majorities tend to reserve the greatest hostility for those minorities that they perceive as dissimilar to themselves, and they sometimes even require these groups to adopt an assimilationist acculturation strategy that will make them more similar to the mainstream culture. Examples of these differing perceptions on the part of receiving-society members are evident in a number of countries. In many European nations, migration by other Europeans is not viewed as a threat, but migration by individuals from outside the European Union – especially from Muslim nations – is
viewed negatively by many Europeans (Licata & Klein, 2002; Licata, Sanchez-Mazas, & Green, 2011). In France, the influx of North African migrants prompted the French Parliament to ban Muslim headscarves in schools (BBC News, 2004), and in the UK, immigrants are now required to take a “citizenship test” in order to demonstrate their acquisition of what the government takes to be important aspects of British culture (BBC News, 2010).

These observations and findings seem very difficult to reconcile with the “classic” version of social identity theory. If members of cultural majorities were primarily concerned with maintaining the positive distinctiveness of their ethnic/cultural groups, then one might expect a much wider incidence of segregationist social policies, in which cultural minorities would be allowed or even encouraged to maintain their different (and supposedly “backward” or “inferior”) cultural practices and values in order to highlight the distinctiveness and superiority of the cultural majority. So why does this not happen?

As we have suggested earlier, we believe that the crucial point making the difference is that, from the perspective of cultural majority members, immigrant minorities are not simply members of a cultural out-group but they are also members of the national in-group. Thus, what is at stake here is not just the competitive intergroup relations between ethno-cultural groups, but also the intragroup processes of negotiating the meaning and boundaries of membership in a common national group (cf. ingroup projection theory; Wenzel et al., 2007). Viewed from a purely inter-ethnic perspective, immigrant minorities might simply be viewed as out-group members—different and perhaps inferior, but certainly not threatening. However, viewed within the context of national identity, cultural minorities have the status of in-group members. Research into subjective group dynamics (e.g., Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001) has shown very clearly that ingroup members who deviate from the norms of the group tend to be evaluated much more harshly than are out-group members who display the same characteristics or behaviors—the so-called “black-sheep effect.” The black sheep effect is understood to occur because the opinions or behavior of the deviant individual threaten to undermine
the perceived definition or meaning of the group identity in question. Thus, once immigrant minorities are viewed in terms of their status as national in-group members rather than as cultural out-group members, it is much easier to understand why minorities who are more different should be perceived by majorities as threatening (undermining the meaning of the national identity) rather than affirming (supporting the positive distinctiveness of the majority ethnic group), as well as why majority members might seek to restore the clarity of their national identity by pressuring minority members to conform with national group norms—an assimilationist policy.

In this respect, beyond the focus on self-esteem and distinctiveness in social identity theory, we believe that another identity motive—the need for continuity—plays an especially important role in these processes. Various perspectives on identity processes suggest that people typically need, and are motivated to maintain, a sense of connection between past, present, and future in their personal and group identities (e.g., Breakwell, 1986; Chandler, Lalonde, Sokol, & Hallett, 2003; Sani, 2008; Vignoles, 2011). This shifts the motivational emphasis away from social comparison of one’s group with other competing groups towards a focus on temporal comparison between past, present, and possible future identities of one’s own group (see also Brown & Zagefka, 2006). In this case, perceived threat will depend on the extent to which the inclusion of cultural minorities changes (or threatens to change) the perceived meaning of national group membership: Can such changes be reconciled with the historical roots of the national identity in question, or is the identity “changed beyond recognition”? This suggests that cultural groups will feel most threatened to the extent that they feel that the existence of their ingroup per se is endangered, for example following large waves of migration or in situations where there is a perceived danger of a “hostile takeover”, resulting in the in-group as they know it ceasing to exist (González et al., 2008; Wohl, Branscombe, & Reysen, 2010).

If the motivational focus is on protecting continuity of one’s national identity rather than positive distinctiveness of one’s ethnic identity, then the perceived size of the cultural minority becomes at least
as important as their perceived difference from the majority. Thus, hostility towards Hispanics in the U.S. may be exacerbated by well-publicized census projections estimating that, by 2050, White Americans will represent only half of the U.S. population, and that Hispanics will comprise a quarter of the population (Bernstein, 2008). These changing demographics represent a symbolic threat to a country that has long celebrated its Anglo-European roots (Schildkraut, 2007). Notably, both popular anti-immigrant discourse and research findings suggest that this is a salient concern for those who are hostile towards cultural minorities. The presence of migrants is often characterized as resulting in a “cultural clash” that carries risks of transforming the national identity beyond recognition in the future.

In the United States, the “cultural clash” between mainstream American culture and the current wave of migrants centers on ethnicity and language (Buchanan, 2006; Huntington, 2004). Thus, the spread of Spanish is taken as a threat to American national identity, which is closely tied to the English language (Barker et al., 2001; Citrin, Lerman, Murakami, & Pearson, 2007). Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that Hispanic migrants and their descendants are more likely than other U.S. migrant groups to retain their heritage language into the second and even third generation (Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, & Holdaway, 2008; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Suárez-Orozco, Suárez-Orozco, & Todorova, 2008). However, in contrast to the concerns expressed by social commentators, Spanish-language retention does not appear to interfere with the acquisition and use of English (Tran, 2010).

In Europe, the perceived “cultural clash” centers largely on religion and cultural history. The influx of migrants who do not share the cultural history of a given nation – or of Europe as a whole – can represent a threat to the distinctiveness and to the continuity of the majority group members’ sense of identity (Licata & Klein, 2002). Moreover, increases in the size of Muslim immigrant groups pose both symbolic and realistic threats in the minds of some Europeans, especially those who identify strongly with their countries of residence or with Europe as a whole (Verkuyten, 2009), or who perceive their nation to be defined by its Christian heritage (Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Poppe, 2011). These perceived
threats can lead to real consequences for migrants from Muslim groups. For example, Adida et al. (2010) demonstrated empirically that, in France, Muslims are less than half as likely as non-Muslims to receive a callback for a job interview. And following recent terrorist attacks committed by Muslim individuals, many Europeans worry that the influx of Muslim migrant groups into their countries will lead to an increased risk of terrorism (Pargeter, 2008). In turn, the ambivalent reception that these migrant groups have encountered may be responsible for their relatively low levels of identification with their countries of settlement (e.g., Brüβ, 2008; Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2007).

The intergroup dynamics that surround acculturation may also be a function of the size of the migrant flow at any given time. Coenders, Lubbers, Scheepers, and Verkuyten (2008), reviewing Dutch attitudes toward international migration between 1979 and 2002, noted that perceptions of migrants were most negative and hostile during times of heavy migration. Similar trends have occurred in the United States: Huntington (2004) noted that native-born Americans were most hostile toward migrants during years and decades when large numbers of migrants were arriving – most notably the early 20th century, when millions of Southern and Eastern Europeans came through Ellis Island, and the late 20th and early 21st centuries, which have been characterized by mass migration of Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean individuals to the United States.

The degree of perceived threat appears to increase when the migrant flow is seen to be dominated by a single ethnic group. Zolberg and Long (1999) exemplify this principle by drawing parallels between Hispanics in the United States and Muslims in Europe. Although in reality the migrants who are classed in each group may come from very disparate cultural origins, both migrant groups are perceived as representing a cohesive “invasion” in the eyes of many native-born residents of these countries or regions. Indeed, Huntington (2004) warns of the dangers to English as the official language of the United States when he notes that “never before in American history has close to a majority of immigrants spoken a single non-English language” (p. 18). Buchanan (2006) warns of the Mexican “invasion” of the
United States and claims that the United States is “headed toward its death” if the invasion is not stopped. In his book *While Europe Slept*, Bawer (2006) describes the threat of radical Islam in Europe and claims that European cultures could be eradicated if the “Islamic invasion” is allowed to continue. These are all clear examples of perceived threats to collective continuity emanating from mass immigration of individuals from what are perceived to be single ethnic groups.

**Are higher identifiers more hostile?** Clearly, not every majority cultural group member reacts in the same way towards immigrant groups. One likely predictor of reaction to immigrants is the strength of national identification. If an individual does not identify strongly with her nation, then she is likely to feel much less threatened by changes to the meaning of the national identity than would someone who identified more highly. Some research supports this, suggesting that identity threats may be experienced more strongly by majority group members who are most strongly attached to their country’s identity, history, and culture – which they view as “under attack” by migrant cultural streams (e.g., Morrison et al., 2010). Nevertheless, recent research suggests that the link between national identification and anti-immigrant prejudice is far from inevitable. Instead, the presence of cultural diversity may be perceived as more or less threatening, depending on how the relevant national identity and the boundaries of national membership are defined (Pehrson & Green, 2010).

Knowing the strength of someone’s national identification may not be informative about their likely attitudes towards immigrants unless we know also something about the subjective meaning that they give to their national identity—the content that they are identifying with. Pehrson, Brown, and Zagefka (2009) reported two studies conducted in England into the interplay of national identification with national definitions as predictors of attitudes towards asylum seekers. In both studies, they found that identification was linked to more negative attitudes towards asylum seekers only among those individuals who adopted an *essentialist* definition of Englishness—those who felt that Englishness depended primarily on ancestry. This suggests that even people who identify strongly with their nation
will only feel threatened by the presence of immigrants from diverse cultural backgrounds if they define their nation in a way that would be undermined by increasing diversity. Among those who disagreed with an essentialist definition of Englishness, there was no link between identification and negative attitudes, presumably because their view of Englishness would not be undermined by the idea of people of different ancestries and cultural origins being part of the English nation.

Extending this line of research, Pehrson, Vignoles, and Brown (2009) analyzed international survey data from 31 nations, including measures of national identification, prejudice towards immigrants, and endorsement of three different criteria for being a “true” national member: national ancestry (ethnic definition), speaking the national language (cultural definition), and having national citizenship (civic definition). They found that the relationship between national identification and prejudice varied significantly across nations: in many countries, such as Venezuela, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, and the Czech Republic, identification and prejudice were completely unrelated, whereas in other countries, such as Denmark, West Germany, Switzerland, Norway, and Spain, identification was moderately correlated with prejudice. Crucially, these differences could be explained by variation in the criteria typically endorsed for being a “true” national member: in nations where people assigned greater importance to a common language, the link between identification and prejudice was stronger, whereas in nations where people gave greater importance to legal citizenship, the link between identification and prejudice was weaker. Notably, in contrast to the previous studies conducted in England, here the key moderating variables were not individuals’ personal endorsement of the different criteria for membership, but the average endorsement in each nation (although personal endorsement of ancestry as a basis for national membership was also directly related to greater prejudice, irrespective of national identification). This pattern suggests that the meanings and boundaries of national identity are constructed socially, presumably through processes of social discourse, although this is not to deny that individuals will take up different positions within the discursive contexts that are available to them.
Understanding the socially shared meanings of national identities may also help to explain why some groups are considered more acceptable than others—typically those groups that are not perceived to undermine this shared meaning. National identity in the United States, for example, tends to be defined in terms of European heritage, the English language, and the Anglo-Protestant values brought by the Pilgrims who founded the original British colonies (Huntington, 2004; Schildkraut, 2007). Perhaps for this reason, migrants from Europe, Canada, or other parts of the world where European heritage and Judeo-Christian values are prominent—with the exception of Latin America—tend to be regarded as nonthreatening (Steiner, 2009). Similarly, in many European countries, migrants from elsewhere in Europe—excluding Muslim countries in the Balkans—are generally accepted as “one of us” (Caldwell, 2008; Licata et al., 2011). On the other hand, groups who are seen as potentially altering the cultural fabric of a country are labeled as outgroups and as threatening.

Differences in the meaning of national identities are likely to be closely linked to national policies towards cultural diversity. Countries vary in the extent to which they are oriented toward multiculturalism (encouraging migrants to celebrate and remain faithful to their cultural heritage) versus assimilationism (encouraging migrants to adopt the ways and means of the country of settlement). For example, within North America, Canada has adopted an explicitly multicultural policy where (most) migrants are viewed as enriching the country’s diversity (Soroka & Roberton, 2010). The United States, on the other hand, is home to opposing factions—a liberal group that believes in celebrating diversity and a conservative group that views the country in terms of its European roots and sees the current wave of largely Hispanic, Asian, and Caribbean migrants as a threat to, and a drain on, American cultural traditions and economic power (see Schildkraut, 2011, and Huntington, 2004, for reviews of the positions taken by these two factions). Although to our knowledge this proposition has not been empirically tested, it stands to reason that intergroup processes between migrants and majority-group members will be guided—at least to some extent—by the policies adopted by the country in which
these intergroup processes are occurring. This principle may be at least somewhat responsible for the low levels of hostility and discrimination reported by migrants to New Zealand, which is highly welcoming to migrants (Ward, Masgoret, & Vauclair, 2011).

Notably, people in positions of leadership or social influence may be able to harness these identity dynamics in order to influence attitudes and behaviors towards immigrants for better or worse. Reicher and Hopkins (1996; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) describe leaders who use such techniques as “entrepreneurs of identity”, manipulating the meanings of identity categories in such a way as to place themselves in a favorable position within the group and/or to selectively include or exclude different others from group membership. Although we are unaware of any formal research into identity entrepreneurship in the sphere of multiculturalism, anecdotal examples abound, including conservative politicians and writers such as Patrick Buchanan and Samuel Huntington in the United States; and Pim Fortuyn, Jean-Marie Le Pen, and Enoch Powell in Europe. Similarly, The Danish People’s Party, the French National Front, the British National Party, and the Vlaams Blok in Belgium have all campaigned on “protecting” Europe against the Muslim “invasion” and have led efforts to draw sharp distinctions between who is eligible for inclusion in the national ingroup and who is not.

As applied to international migration, the concept of identity threats may also convey the impression that majority group members will automatically display a “knee-jerk” defensive response toward the minority group that is perceived as the source of threat. However, there may be other – and perhaps more constructive – ways of responding to perceived threats. One such possibility is identifying with a superordinate group that encompasses both the host-national and minority groups (Wenzel et al., 2007), and where migrants are treated as individual people, rather than as group members (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Senécal, 1997). Such an individualistic approach to intergroup relations helps to move away from the stereotyping that often occurs when migrants and majority group members come into contact with one another. For example, an American might believe that not all Mexican migrants
are “freeloaders,” or a French person might believe that not all Muslim migrants are intent on turning France into an Islamic state. Research suggests that personal interaction with someone from an outgroup results in decreased hostility and stereotyping toward that group (e.g., Hammack, 2006). Indeed, such personal contact may result in “humanity” being designated as the ingroup – where there is no corresponding outgroup. However, the intergroup context can also backfire if it leads to heightened anxiety. For instance, when contact conditions are “sub-optimal” (unequal status, non-cooperative), they may not result in reduced intergroup anxiety (for an extensive discussion of intergroup contact, see Brown & Hewstone, 2005). It is also worth noting that contact seems to be more effective in changing the attitudes of majorities than those of minorities (Binder et al., 2009; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005).

**Acculturation and Intergroup Dynamics from the Perspective of Cultural Minorities**

Thus far, we have focused on the identity dynamics taking place within the receiving society – such as threats posed by migrants, self-protective strategies enacted by majority group members, and ways in which these intergroup dynamics can be exacerbated or reduced. We now consider the acculturation process from the migrant’s (or migrant group’s) perspective. The identity dynamics that operate for majority group members interact with those that operate for migrants, and in many cases, these dynamics may be different for lower-status or “unwanted” migrants than for higher-status, “desirable” migrants (Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). Because large migrant groups tend to occupy lower-status positions (e.g., Mexicans in the United States, North Africans in France, Turks in Germany, Pakistanis in Great Britain), we will focus primarily on identity processes that take place among lower-status migrants.

Clearly, lower-status migrants are typically faced with a number of realistic threats in their everyday lives, as a result of the demands of living in societies that often do not offer them the same recognition as majority group members in economic, political or legal spheres (Licata et al., 2011). Realistic threats –
such as lack of access to jobs – are often part of everyday reality for migrant groups. For example, in the United States in November 2011, 11.4% of Hispanics, compared to 7.6% of Whites, were unemployed (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011). The situation in the UK is similar. In February 2011, 7.0% of all White Britons were unemployed, compared to a 13.3% rate for all ethnic minorities combined (UK Office for National Statistics, 2011; http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-222445).

However, our focus here will be on the symbolic threats faced by these groups. We argue that members of these minority groups are typically faced with threats to their identities on a number of different levels. Members of these groups very commonly face situations that threaten to undermine the positive distinctiveness and continuity of their cultural identities, as well as their feelings of personal self-continuity and belonging. These identity threats typically lead to the employment of adaptive or maladaptive identity management strategies, and cultural minority group members may engage in a variety of such strategies while attempting to resolve the identity threats that they face.

**Threats to cultural identity.** Adding to the realistic threats posed by their lesser access to material resources, the situation faced by cultural minority members is likely to frustrate a number of identity motives that have been proposed in the literature. As we discussed earlier, motivated identity construction theory (Vignoles, 2011) proposes that people typically strive to construct and maintain identities that are characterized by feelings of self-esteem, continuity, distinctiveness, meaning, belonging, and efficacy. Identity threat occurs when one or more of these motives is at risk of not being satisfied (after Breakwell, 1988). Such threats typically lead to some kind of coping strategy designed to establish or restore satisfaction of the relevant motive(s).

We suggest that the low status position of many migrant groups in their nations of residence is likely to be threatening to several of the identity motives listed above. *Self-esteem* is threatened among migrants by the low status they typically occupy in their respective host cultures (e.g., Major & Eliezer,
This may be especially problematic for migrants from collectivist cultural backgrounds, given the high value and emphasis placed on hierarchy and social status in traditionally collectivist cultures (e.g., Hofstede, 1980). Feelings of efficacy are also likely to be undermined by occupying a low status position, which may lead to feelings of helplessness or incompetence—perhaps especially among migrant men, who often find it harder to find employment than migrant women, thus failing to fulfill their expected gender role as family breadwinner (e.g., Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2007). Lower-status groups are often unwanted and derogated in the receiving society (Kosic & Phalet, 2006), and this experience of social rejection is likely to frustrate the identity motive for belonging.

However, additional pressure is placed on many acculturating minority groups by assimilationist ideologies and policies in their receiving nations, which typically ask them to shed or change important aspects of their ethnocultural identities in order to gain acceptance by the majority group. Such policies and ideologies have become increasingly prevalent in Western Europe (and to a lesser extent in North America) in recent years, fueled in part by recent terrorist attacks by radical Islamic groups. Assimilationist policies and pressures from the majority—even when these are well-intentioned—aim by definition to reduce the distinctiveness of the minority group’s identity (see Berry, 1997; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). These policies and pressures require significant—and often unwanted—cultural change on the part of the minority group, potentially undermining feelings of collective continuity (see Chandler et al., 2002). As a result of these changes, members of minority groups may often end up uncertain of what it means to be a member of their group in the larger national or regional context where they reside, and this uncertainty may undermine the sense of meaning that minority group members might otherwise derive from their cultural-group identity. Thus, Licata et al. (2011) characterize the situation of cultural minorities as a “struggle for recognition”. In addition to a need for recognition in terms of material resources and social status, Licata et al. argue that minority group members need to have their cultural identities acknowledged and supported by the cultural majority if successful integration into
mainstream society is to be possible. Paradoxically, assimilationist policies and pressures often have the opposite effect to that which was intended – minority groups may resist identifying with the majority cultural group. This paradoxical pattern has been labeled as reactive ethnicity (Rumbaut, 2008), and we will return to this concept in the forthcoming sections.

Coping with cultural identity threat. As discussed earlier, a key concern of social identity theory is the implications of membership in a disadvantaged or socially devalued group (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The theory specifies a number of strategies that people can use to establish or restore a satisfactory social identity when such an identity is seen to be lacking: individual mobility, social competition, and various forms of social creativity. Although social identity theory focuses on positive group distinctiveness (i.e. self-esteem and distinctiveness motives), these strategies may also help with reestablishing satisfaction of the other identity motives mentioned above—efficacy, belonging, continuity, and meaning (Vignoles, 2011)—as well as for the more general goal of gaining “recognition” of one’s cultural identity within a multicultural context (Licata et al., 2011). As we discuss below, viewing the acculturation styles of migrants as strategies for coping with identity threats helps to explain which styles they adopt, as well as the emergence of more complex and diverse strategies than the four possibilities initially identified by Berry (1980) and others.

Individual mobility, where a person attempts to become, or be accepted as, a member of the higher-status group, is analogous to assimilation within Berry’s (1980) typology. For example, to the extent to which their physical features and foreign accents will allow, migrants may try to behave like majority group members. This option is available to individuals who can “pass as White” in European countries or in countries where the majority ethnic group is of European descent; but it is less available to visible-minority individuals. This is similar to the situation facing some stigmatized groups, especially those for whom the stigmatizing attributes are “hidden” – for example, one’s sexual orientation and HIV status. As Jones and colleagues (1984) and Crocker and Major (1989) have noted, such “invisible” stigmata can
offer advantages to their members, because they can choose whether or not to reveal these stigmata. But there are also psychological costs associated with such a strategy, given that one is then deprived of potentially valuable sources of ingroup support (Major & Gramzow, 1999). In contrast, among visible-minority individuals, even those who were born in the society of settlement may be treated as foreigners, a phenomenon that Wu (2001) refers to as perpetual foreigner syndrome (see also Huynh, Devos, & Smalarz, 2011). In his book, Wu relates some of his personal experiences of being asked where he was from and what life in China was like – even though he was born in the United States and had never set foot in China. Perpetual foreigner syndrome is a subtle, and often unintentional, form of discrimination, but it reminds the person that she or he is not considered as a member of the larger society (Lee, 2005). This suggests that the mobility strategy may rarely be an option for individuals who can be visually classified into migrant or minority groups.

A variation on perpetual foreigner syndrome is the situation where migrants are mistaken for native minorities whom they physically resemble. An instance of this phenomenon is the case of Haitian, West Indian, and African immigrants to the United States, who are “Black upon arrival” (Waldinger & Feliciano, 2004) and treated as though they were African American. Waters (1999), for example, in her ethnographic research on West Indian migrants in New York, notes how these migrants are viewed with suspicion, followed closely in stores, and assumed to be lazy and illiterate. Stepick, Dutton Stepick, Eugene, Teed, and Labissiere (2001) have found similar trends among Haitian migrants in Miami. More or less, many Black migrants to the United States are marginalized and treated as part of the “underclass” – which may decrease the likelihood that a given migrant will identify strongly with mainstream American culture as well as with her or his culture of origin.

As a result of this stereotyping and stigma process, the “American culture” to which these migrants are most often exposed is most likely to be African American culture rather than mainstream White American culture. This can lead to a phenomenon known as segmented assimilation (Alba & Nee, 2006;
Stepick & Dutton (2010), whereby migrants adopt the practices, values, and identifications of the native ethnic groups to whom they are most similar, or with whom they have the most contact, rather than engaging in acculturation processes and strategies in relation to the “dominant culture”, as is typically assumed in classic assimilation and acculturation literature (including both unidimensional and bidimensional models: e.g., Berry, 1980, 1997; Berry & Kim, 1988; Gordon, 1964). Many migrants, especially those from lower socioeconomic backgrounds, settle in inner-city neighborhoods (Beiser, Hou, Hyman, & Tousignant, 2002; Musterd & Deurloo, 2003). In many urban neighborhoods in the United States and Europe, migrants are more likely to encounter other migrants, and members of ethnic minority groups, than they are to encounter ethnic majority group members. In the United States, for example, a number of ethnic minority groups – such as African Americans – have been established for decades and even centuries. Many migrants are more likely to interact with African Americans and other minorities (e.g., Mexican Americans who have lived in the Southwestern United States for many generations) than they are with White Americans. As a result, many migrants may acculturate to African American culture rather than to White American culture. For example, many inner-city Hispanics use what linguists call “African American vernacular English” (e.g., Dunstan, 2010) rather than standard American English. Similarly, West Indian and Haitian immigrants tend to acculturate to an African American, rather than White American, behavioral and value system (Stepick et al., 2001; Waters, 1999).

Segmented assimilation signifies that there are multiple receiving-cultural streams – not just one – to which migrants can acculturate. However, acculturating toward a given native ethnic group implies that one will be treated and regarded similarly to members of that ethnic group. African American culture has become popular in terms of music and other forms of entertainment, but the use of African American vernacular English is generally considered uneducated, and individuals who use it may be viewed as members of an underclass (Labov, 2010). Nevertheless, assimilation to an ethnic culture that
is more established and more prevalent than one’s culture of origin may provide a greater opportunity to use additional identity maintenance strategies, which we discuss below.

When individual mobility is not a viable option, social identity theory predicts that members of disadvantaged groups will be more likely to use group-based strategies to establish positive distinctiveness, either engaging directly in social competition with the majority group or using social creativity to reframe the social comparison in a more positive light. In terms of Berry’s (1980) model, both strategies involve maintaining identification with one’s culture of origin: hence, they will typically be linked to acculturation styles of integration or separation. However, from a social identity perspective, it can be predicted that those migrants whose identities are under threat—and who are unable to engage in individual mobility—may not just maintain but actually increase identification with their cultural groups. This is the reactive ethnicity phenomenon that Rumbaut (2008) has discussed, where migrants show heightened attachment to their cultural groups as a consequence of actual or perceived rejection by the dominant ethnic group. In a similar vein, Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey (1999) found that perceptions of discrimination led to heightened ethnic identification among African Americans, and that this ethnic identification in turn led to greater well-being – thereby buffering the otherwise negative implications of perceiving oneself to be a victim of discrimination (see also Jetten, Branscombe, Schmitt, & Spears, 2001; Schmitt, Spears, & Branscombe, 2003). Hence, a separated approach to acculturation may be adopted not necessarily because the person does not “want” to be a member of the larger society, but because that alternative is not available to her or him (Schwartz, Unger, et al., 2010). The most reasonable course of action in this case might be to align oneself strongly with one’s ethnic group and to function outside of the mainstream culture.

Given that migrant groups are typically in a disadvantaged position in material as well as symbolic terms, direct competition with the majority group is often very difficult—especially if “success” is measured in terms of re-establishing positive distinctiveness. Nevertheless, salient examples of
disadvantaged cultural or ethnic groups engaging in collective action to improve their social status include the Civil Rights movement in the United States and the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa. Such actions may serve to reduce negative distinctiveness—increasing equality—even if they do not necessarily lead to an inversion of the previous status differential (positive distinctiveness). On a less political note, the increasing academic achievement of Asian Americans provides an example of a minority group competing successfully to achieve positive distinctiveness even in terms of the values of the majority—and this positive distinctiveness seems to be increasingly emphasized in Asian Americans’ discourse about the meaning of their own cultural identity (i.e., the “model minority” stereotype; Chua, 2011).

As an alternative to direct competition, members of minority groups may reestablish their cultural identities through various forms of “social creativity”—essentially reinterpreting the situation so that their group is no longer perceived in negative terms. Social identity theory suggests a number of ways in which people may change the frame of social comparisons with other groups, so that their group comes out as positively distinct. One approach is to change the frame of reference for social comparison: thus, if one belongs to a low status group, one might compare one’s group with other low-status minorities, rather than comparing with the majority group, or one might isolate one’s group in order to avoid intergroup comparison entirely and focus on intragroup comparisons. One way of avoiding social comparisons with the majority group is to adopt a separationist acculturation strategy—or perhaps even to live in ethnic enclaves, where the migrant group has a greater amount of social and political power. Although there is a great deal of variability in the extent to which these enclaves can realistically compete with the host-national group for important resources, the enclave provides residents with a context in which they can function, at least to some extent, as though they never left their countries of origin. For example, in some European cities such as Bradford (England), Marseille (France), and Duisburg (Germany), migrants and their immediate descendants comprise considerable proportions of
the population, and these cities are home to large ethnic enclaves dominated by migrant cultures. Similar cities in the United States include Miami, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Dallas, and Houston. Adult migrants settling in these enclaves can go about their daily business without learning the language of the larger country to which they have migrated (Caldwell, 2008; Portes & Rumbaut, 2006; Schwartz, Pantin, Prado, Sullivan, & Szapocznik, 2006). Ethnic enclaves in these (and other) cities are large enough such that minority groups can challenge policies and decisions enacted by the larger nation in which the enclave is located. For example, in Los Angeles, Mexican migrants held demonstrations to protest Proposition 187, which would have denied health care and education to undocumented migrants and their children; and Cuban Americans in Miami staged violent protests against the U.S. government’s decision to send Elián Gonzalez, a Cuban boy rescued at sea, back to his father in Cuba (Stepick et al., 2011). A number of factors besides minority group size or density have been identified as influencing whether such collective action can be expected (for more on this, see e.g., van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008).

Migrants also might engage in group-based identity management strategies from the position of their new ethnic group, following segmented assimilation. Especially for members of the smallest groups, identifying with a larger “pan-ethnic” group (e.g., Hispanics in the United States, Muslims in Europe) may provide greater opportunities for collective action or “voice” than would otherwise be possible from the position of one’s group of origin. For example, French Muslims in Islamic enclaves in or near Paris have protested, sometimes violently, against various laws and policies that have been adopted by the local and national governments (Caldwell, 2008).

It is important to recognize that intragroup dynamics within migrant communities play an important role here, not just intergroup relations with the majority. As we discussed earlier, group leaders may sometimes act as “identity entrepreneurs”, advocating a particular version of social reality that makes particular social categories salient, or that emphasizes particular intergroup contrasts and thus defines
the ingroup in a way that suits their personal goals or interests (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996; Reicher et al., 2005). Just as leaders within the majority community may attempt to sway public opinion by portraying migrants as a threat to the larger society, leaders within the migrant community may also seek to gain favorable social position by portraying the majority ethnic group as the enemy. For example, after Elián Gonzalez was sent back to Cuba against the wishes of the Miami Cuban community, leaders in the Miami Cuban enclave orchestrated a number of rallies against the United States government. Ultimately, these rallies influenced public opinion to the point where they helped to propel George W. Bush to the U.S. presidency in 2000. So, in cases where migrants have built up sufficient power through the formation of ethnic enclaves, they can exert a powerful influence on the course of events in the larger country.

The distinction between individual (i.e. mobility) and collective (i.e. social competition and creativity) identity management strategies in social identity theory is somewhat reminiscent of the early, unidimensional view of acculturation as a straightforward choice between assimilation and separation. Yet, several decades of acculturation research have shown that this is not the case: it is equally possible—and Berry (2006) and other theorists have argued that it is more desirable—to adopt an integrated (or bicultural) approach to acculturation: participating fully in the majority society while simultaneously identifying with one’s culture of origin and maintaining its values and practices. On the surface, biculturalism may seem to be an obviously preferable strategy, offering the “best of both worlds” to the acculturating migrant. Yet, as we have noted earlier, Rudmin, (2003) has put forth the opposite suggestion: that the bicultural migrant may often find herself “caught between two worlds.” Although social identity theory itself has little to say about these issues, subsequent research within the social identity tradition may be helpful in understanding some of the barriers to adopting a bicultural or integrated acculturation style, as well as some of the pitfalls for those who do adopt such an approach.
Although biculturalism (integration) is often considered the acculturation strategy with the most favorable outcomes in Berry’s model (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2013; Phinney et al., 2006; Schwartz & Zamboanga, 2008), perceived rejection by the majority group will often interfere with the development of biculturalism. It is difficult for a person to identify with a society that discriminates against him or against the group to which he belongs, or with a society that simply does not view him as “one of us”, as is the case with visible-minority individuals experiencing perpetual foreigner syndrome. Equally, especially where migrant groups have adopted a largely separationist or a segmented assimilationist approach, migrant group members who exhibit values, practices or identifications of the majority group may be viewed with suspicion—as impostors or deviants. As we have discussed earlier, a substantial body of research in the social identity tradition has documented how in-group members who are perceived as impostors or who deviate from group norms are often derogated or excluded by other group members, and they are frequently treated more harshly than outgroup members who exhibit the same behaviors, because their actions are seen as undermining the distinctiveness or the continuity of the group’s identity (see, e.g., Hornsey & Jetten, 2003; Marques et al., 2001). Thus, for many people, integrating their heritage and receiving cultures into an individualized mosaic may simply not be a realistic option.

Biculturalism may be especially unlikely to occur in situations where migrants are expected to assimilate – that is, to “leave their cultural baggage at the door.” When assimilationist expectations are present, the distinctiveness and continuity of the migrant group’s cultural identity are threatened (cf. Sam & Berry, 2010; Vignoles, 2011). Hence, not only will the majority group be sensitive to behavior by an individual migrant that might suggest that she is “not one of us”, but the minority group will also be especially sensitized to behavior that deviates from their cultural norms and may potentially reject or punish individuals who exhibit signs of biculturalism in order to protect the continuity, distinctiveness, and meaning of their group membership. For example, U.S. Hispanics who “act American” may be
labeled with the derisive term “Oreo” – brown on the outside but white on the inside. Thus, the “melting pot,” in which various migrant cultural streams are incorporated into the larger receiving culture, can become a “pressure cooker” (Berry, 2006, p. 36). Migrants may react to such stressful receiving contexts by withdrawing from the larger society altogether and interacting largely with other members of their ethnic group, or with members of other minority groups (see Roysircar-Sodowsky & Maestas, 2000). For example, as detailed in Caldwell (2008), many minority groups in Europe identify with the oppressed plight of African Americans – and some have created rap songs (an African American cultural invention) about their experiences with discrimination.

In another sense, however, almost every migrant is forced to be bicultural at least to some extent. In most cases, majority group members expect migrants to adopt at least some of the ways and means of the receiving culture (Piontkowski et al., 2002; Rohmann et al., 2006). Moreover, in many cases, migrants elect to preserve their cultural heritage in their homes and to transmit this heritage to their children (e.g., Juang & Syed, 2010; Umaña-Taylor, Bhanot, & Shin, 2006). In some cases, majority group members may even want migrants to continue their cultural heritage, as long as heritage-culture retention is accompanied by a desire for contact with the majority group (Matera, Stefanile, & Brown, 2011).

Thus, most migrants and their children must straddle two cultures – their heritage culture in the home (and perhaps in the community), and the receiving culture outside the home (Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2007). Of course, the extent to which migrants must interact with the receiving culture depends on the extent to which they reside in ethnic enclaves that insulate them from the larger society – and adults who settle in ethnic enclaves and who do not attend formal schooling in the society of settlement may have little or no involvement with the receiving culture (Schwartz, Pantin, et al., 2006). Nevertheless, in most cases – and in almost all cases involving children, adolescents, and young adults – migrants must reconcile, or at least balance, their “heritage” and “receiving” cultures.
Bicultural identity integration. Although the term “bicultural” indicates that a person endorses aspects of both her/his heritage and receiving cultural contexts, the term does not speak to the extent to which the person is able to reconcile these contexts and to live successfully “in two worlds.” Clearly, some bicultural individuals are better able than others to reconcile and integrate their two cultural streams (e.g., Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002). Perhaps in response to criticisms of the construct of biculturalism (e.g., Rudmin, 2003), as well as to the observed heterogeneity within the bicultural category, a number of researchers have theorized and empirically identified multiple forms of biculturalism (e.g., Chia & Costigan, 2006; LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993; Schwartz & Zamboanga, 2008; Simon & Ruhs, 2008). Generally speaking, these forms of biculturalism can be distinguished based on the person’s ability to integrate the various cultural streams to which s/he is exposed.

Benet-Martínez and colleagues (e.g., Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Haritatos & Benet-Martínez, 2005; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007) have gone a step further, proposing the construct of bicultural identity integration (BII). BII has two facets, representing distinct dimensions of individual variation. Even within the same migrant group, individuals differ in the extent to which they perceive their “heritage” and “receiving” cultures as harmonious or conflicting (BII harmony), and they may also differ in the extent to which they attempt to blend their cultural identities into an integrated whole or try to keep the two identities in separate “compartments” (BII blendedness; for recent reviews, see Benet-Martínez, this volume; Huynh, Nguyen, & Benet-Martínez, 2011). Individuals low in BII harmony tend to see their two cultural streams as opposing and irreconcilable. For example, a Chinese American individual may feel that the family-oriented and collectivist orientation underlying Chinese culture is incompatible with the individualism and self-determination underlying American culture. In contrast, individuals high in BII harmony may find it easier to integrate aspects of their two cultural backgrounds into a unique, individualized mosaic. A biculturally integrated person might, for instance, combine the
interdependent orientation from Chinese culture with the ingenuity and creativity from American culture.

Empirical evidence suggests that high-BII-harmony individuals report more favorable adjustment (e.g., higher self-esteem, fewer depressive symptoms) compared to their low-BII-harmony counterparts (Chen, Benet-Martínez, & Bond, 2008). Moreover, experimental studies suggest that individuals high in BII harmony are better able than those low in BII harmony to respond appropriately to contextual stimuli, for example providing characteristically Chinese cultural responses to Chinese primes, and characteristically American cultural responses to American primes (e.g., Benet-Martínez et al., 2002). In low-BII-harmony individuals, there appears to be some confusion regarding which cultural stream to activate in a given situation, whereas high-BII-harmony individuals do not appear to manifest such confusion. In some cases, then, biculturalism is “greater than the sum of its parts.” Rather than simply representing additive effects of endorsing the heritage and receiving cultural streams, biculturalism – at least in the case of high BII harmony – represents creating an individualized culture using elements from one’s heritage and receiving cultural streams.

The BII construct has also been extended to situations where more than two cultural streams are available (i.e., multicultural identity integration; Downie, Koestner, ElGeledi, & Cree, 2004; Downie, Mageau, Koestner, & Liodden, 2006). Examples of such contexts include multi-ethnic countries and regions such as Quebec, Belgium, Switzerland, South Africa, and Singapore. For example, migrants to Montreal must reconcile their cultural heritage with both Francophone and Anglophone Canadian cultural streams. Although this task may be more difficult than integrating only two cultural streams, the principles and processes through which this integration is achieved – and the consequences of successfully versus unsuccessfully navigating this integration – are thought to be similar to those espoused within the BII model.
Migrants who are high in BII typically seem to fare more favorably on indices of self-esteem and well-being compared to migrants who are low in BII or who do not adopt bicultural approaches at all (Chen et al., 2008; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). However, the mechanisms responsible for the link between integrated biculturalism and well-being are not well understood. Vignoles, Ashforth, and Stubbs (in preparation) conducted two studies among multicultural individuals to try to understand better the motivational dynamics underlying the link between BII and well-being. They were particularly interested in comparing two alternative accounts of why low BII might be problematic for individuals.

On the one hand, living with compartmentalized and conflicting cultural identities might result in a lack of self-continuity or unity in one’s sense of identity (see Amiot, de la Sablonnière, Terry, & Smith, 2007). On the other hand, individuals may be relatively comfortable with shifting identities across contexts (e.g. Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2007; Turner et al., 1987), but those experiencing greater conflict between their cultural identities may experience social difficulties, because they risk being perceived as an impostor or a deviant by both of the cultural groups involved. Replicating the previous studies, in a correlational study conducted among individuals who had lived in more than three cultures, participants lower in BII reported lower psychological well-being across a range of indices and, in an experimental study conducted among individuals of mixed ethnicity, participants who had been asked to recall an instance of cultural identity conflict—when their cultural identities “pulled them in opposite directions”—reported more negative and less positive affect compared to a control group. Crucially, in both studies, Vignoles and colleagues measured two potential mediating variables: perceptions of self-continuity and the sense of belonging. In both studies, effects of perceived identity conflict on well-being were mediated by a lower sense of belonging, and not by lower self-continuity.

**Putting the Pieces Together: Acculturation as a Dynamic Intergroup Process**

In the preceding sections, we have discussed the identity processes operating in multicultural societies – first from the perspective of majority group members and then from the perspective of
cultural minorities. From this discussion, it should already be apparent that the two sets of processes are very closely interwoven, and that in reality it is somewhat artificial to attempt to separate them—despite the fact that doing so may be necessary for the purpose of empirical study. We now attempt to put the pieces together and frame acculturation as a dynamic, historically evolving, intergroup process.

In doing so, we believe that it is useful to draw some theoretical insights from another extension of social identity theory: the elaborated social identity model (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000, 2009). Although developed and tested mainly in the context of crowd events, especially political demonstrations, we believe that this model can be useful for understanding the emergence and transformation of identities in other intergroup settings, including relations between cultural groups. Unlike traditional theories of identity and intergroup relations, which tend to focus separately on the perspective of each group, this model conceptualizes the intergroup relationship as a dynamically evolving “whole,” with its own internal logic and emerging properties. Crucially, this involves re-thinking the nature and role of “context” in social identity processes, as well as the processes by which identity categories emerge and are transformed. In the following paragraphs, we expand on these two key insights, illustrating their relevance to the understanding of acculturation processes.

Re-conceptualizing “context”. Social-psychological theories have often tended to view context in rather static terms—as an “independent variable” constraining and shaping identity dynamics; thus, the analysis of identity processes begins with the individual or group responding to a particular context that is seen as preexisting or external to the identity dynamics that are going on. In contrast, the elaborated social identity model views context as an emerging—and dynamically changing—property of the intergroup relationship itself. Thus, the identity management strategies of the majority provide the context for the identity processes of cultural minorities, and in turn the identity management strategies of cultural minorities create the context for the identity processes in the majority group. The process of intergroup negotiation is iterative rather than static.
Specifically, there are certain group processes that place migrants and majority group members “at odds” with one another and prevent migrants from entering (or being perceived as part of) the receiving culture, and these processes are based on identity threats as perceived by both parties. Earlier in this chapter, we reviewed interactive acculturation models that focus on the match versus mismatch between migrants’ approaches to acculturation and the ways in which majority group members would like to see migrants acculturate (e.g., Berry, 2006; Bourhis et al., 1997; Piontkowski et al., 2002). However, intergroup relations are not a static phenomenon. They change with world events, over generations, and across historical epochs (Licata et al., 2011; Stepick et al., 2011). The ways in which majority group members perceive threats posed by minorities, and the actions that majority group members take based on these perceived threats, serve to establish the context in which minorities live their lives. In many cases, when majority group members perceive threats from migrants or other minority groups, they put into place policies to reduce these threats, but often these policies wind up creating identity threats for migrant or minority groups. In turn, the ways in which minority groups respond to identity threats influence how the minority groups are perceived by majority-group members. So the process is iterative, where threatened majorities impose laws and policies to distance themselves from migrant and minority groups or cultures, and where minority groups respond in ways that either increase or decrease the extent of threat perceived by the majority group. A reactive ethnicity response is likely to inflame tensions between groups, whereas a more peaceful and measured response (such as Nelson Mandela’s nonviolent campaign against apartheid in South Africa) may lead to permanent changes in the dynamics between minority and majority group members.

Reactive ethnicity can be understood as a migrant group’s defensive response to defensive policies or behaviors initiated by the majority ethnic group in response to perceived identity threats. For example, Proposition 187 in California was designed to deny any public services to illegal immigrants or their children. The law was proposed as a way of limiting the “invasion” of undocumented and
unwanted immigrants, who were seen as posing both realistic and symbolic threats to the local population (Lee, Ottati, & Hussain, 2001). In response, Mexicans and Mexican Americans in Los Angeles, San Francisco, and other California cities engaged in demonstrations where they waved the Mexican flag – the flag of a country that they or their ancestors had voluntarily left (Stepick et al., 2011).

Both Proposition 187 and the reaction from the Mexican American community represent clear instances of identity defense. White and Black Americans, who were largely behind the crafting and passage of the law, sought to protect the identity of their country as well as to ensure that illegal immigrants would not bring down wages for – and take jobs from – low-income Americans. Mexican Americans, on the other hand, sought to protect the right for their compatriots to enter the United States and to maintain access to education, health care, and other social services. It can be understood, then, that the goal of each group (White/Black Americans and Mexican Americans) was to protect its own interests, rather than to deliberately harm the other group. Brewer’s (1999) argument that groups seek primarily to reward and protect their own members, rather than to harm other groups, applies here. For White and Black Americans, keeping “them” (illegal Mexican immigrants) out of the United States would serve as a way of protecting the interests of the ingroup (native-born White and Black Americans). That illegal immigrants already residing in California would be denied any and all social services was simply “collateral damage.”

The French ban on Muslim headscarves serves as another example of this iterative process of interacting perceptions of threat. Many Europeans view Islam, and the Muslim “invasion” of Europe, as a threat to their national and pan-European identities (Licata et al., 2011; Pehrson & Green, 2010). To the French parliament, and to many other French people, Muslim headscarves were symbolic of the culture that was threatening to overtake their country without their consent (van der Noll, 2010). In contrast, many French Muslims perceive themselves as targets for discrimination (Adida, Laitan, & Valfort, 2010). Although there have been few, if any, reports of mass demonstrations in Europe
regarding bans on Muslim religious attire, Muslims in Europe have, in some instances, reacted angrily – sometimes violently – to what they perceive as an “unwelcome reception” and overt hostility toward them and their faith (Bleich, 2009). At least some of this anger is rooted in a perceived lack of recognition (Licata et al., 2011) – that is, the dominant society’s unwillingness to legitimize the migrant group and to acknowledge and grant its desires.

We must, however, return to Brewer’s (1999) point that the intent of majority group members is to protect themselves from threat, and not to intentionally harm Muslim migrants. From the perspective of the majority group, the headscarf ban represents an attempt by the French majority to decrease the symbolic presence of Muslim cultures in public spaces. Forcing Muslim women to take off their veils means that French people do not have to look at veiled women, but it does not decrease the women’s religious faith. What is important, from the majority group’s perspective, is not the extent to which Muslim women value or endorse their faith, but rather that the veil – as a symbolic threat – is no longer present in public intergroup space. It is through this iterative process that the boundaries between “French identity” and “Muslim identity” are negotiated and renegotiated over time. Indeed, as the number of Muslims in France continues to grow, the balance of power between Muslims and non-Muslims may change, and the country’s ability to impose anti-Muslim policies like the headscarf ban may decrease.

The construct of reactive ethnicity contraindicates biculturalism and integration with the majority group. Specifically, rejection by the dominant society may lead members of the rejected group to dis-identify with that society. The “failure” of Muslims to integrate into European societies – at least as perceived by many Europeans – may be perceived by Muslims as a lack of opportunity to integrate themselves into the societies to which they have migrated (Hargreaves, 2007). So BII is more than simply an individual-difference construct, as posited by Benet-Martínez and colleagues (e.g., Benet-Martínez & Haritatos, 2005; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). Beyond the individual differences that undoubtedly
exist between and among members of a given ethnic group within a given receiving society, BII can be facilitated or inhibited by dynamics between migrant groups and the societies that are receiving them – especially when these dynamics are highly politicized (as is the case for Mexican Americans in the United States and for many Muslim groups in European countries).

As long as perceived threats to the national ingroup persist, migrants who are seen as posing such threats are likely to be viewed with suspicion – even if the migrants identify with the national ingroup (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001) or if their motives are benevolent (e.g., seeking recognition for their needs and desires; Licata et al., 2011). In fact, migrants who attempt to assimilate, but who are still viewed as threatening, are likely to be viewed with even more suspicion compared to migrants who hold onto their cultural heritage (Guimond, De Oliveira, Kamiesjki, & Sidanius, 2010). Portes and Rumbaut (2001) cite the example of a young Korean American woman who states that she “identifies with Americans, but Americans do not identify with me” (p. 191). Similarly, migrants seeking to become citizens of the countries where they have settled may have their motives questioned – are they just looking to bring their family members here, or are they looking to gain access to our social services? Such mistrust is likely to lead to grievances on both sides. Take, for instance, the 2009 law passed in Arizona that permits police officers to request legal immigration documentation from individuals whom they suspect to have violated laws. Many White Americans view the law as enforcing U.S. immigration policies and keeping illegal immigrants out of the country (Pew Research Center, 2010a). On the other hand, many Hispanics view the law as “racial profiling” and as unfairly targeting individuals of Hispanic descent (Pew Research Center, 2010b). Regardless of which perspective a given individual adopts, it can be agreed that the law has served to exacerbate tensions – and identity threats – in both White and Hispanic Americans.

In turn, identity threats from the larger society may lead migrant groups to feel threatened themselves – and to become defensive toward the dominant/receiving society. Among Turkish Muslims interviewed in the Netherlands by Verkuyten and Yildiz (2007), perceived rejection by majority Dutch
people was associated with rejection of Dutch identity, and with stronger identification with 
participants’ Turkish heritage and with Islam. Likewise, the immigration debate in the United States – 
which largely centers on Hispanics – has led some Hispanic individuals to become more ethnically 
identified (Roehling, Jarvis, Sprik, & Campbell, 2010); and experiences of discrimination may lead 
Mexican American adolescents to more strongly endorse Mexican cultural values such as familism and 
religiosity (Berkel et al., 2010). Simply put, migrants may defensively identify with their cultures of origin 
when they perceive themselves as unwanted or threatened by majority group members.

In essence, the intergroup dynamics that underlie acculturation are guided by (a) the extent of 
cultural differences between migrants and majority group members (i.e., the larger the cultural divide, 
the greater the threats that are experienced on both sides); (b) the size and continuity of the migrant 
flow (the more migrants who are arriving, and the greater their presence, the more threat that is 
experienced on both sides); (c) the extent to which a given migrant group is phenotypically different 
from the host-national group (phenotypic differences tend to exacerbate threats on both sides); (d) 
actions taken by majority group members that increase threats to migrant groups, as well as the migrant 
groups’ responses to these threats; and (e) changing demographics and historical currents that may 
influence who is regarded as being within the national ingroup and who is not.

**Identities as emergent phenomena.** In addition to re-conceptualizing context, the elaborated social 
identity model also views identity categories as emerging from the intergroup relationship. Thus, self-
categories are not simply generated autonomously and in a bottom-up manner by the groups 
concerned—as is suggested by self-categorization theory—it is also the case that groups can *position* 
each other into certain social categories, and that the meanings of the social categories are negotiated 
both within and between the groups concerned. Perhaps the most obvious instance of this is the 
emergence of new cultural identities through segmented assimilation processes, as we have discussed 
above. To the extent that majority group members view and treat cultural minorities from diverse
Acculturation and Intergroup Dynamics

origins as a homogeneous group, members of these cultural minorities will come to experience a sense of common fate, and this common fate may lead them to see themselves in terms of a superordinate group membership—such as Hispanic Americans—that did not previously exist. Thus, initially erroneous perceptions by the majority group can result in a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby a new social category is created (see Drury & Reicher, 2000, for a discussion of similar processes occurring between police and protestors).

Ironically, this very process may be expected to exacerbate the identity threat experienced by majority group members, because members of small, diverse, and relatively powerless immigrant groups are seen—and will thus come to see themselves—as members of a much larger and thus more powerful pan-ethnic group. As we have discussed earlier, this is precisely the kind of group that is likely to be maximally threatening to the cultural majority, because it presents the possibility of a “hostile takeover” of the national identity. Moreover, the elaborated social identity model suggests that the sense of solidarity arising from the newly emerging identity may be experienced by the minority members themselves as empowering, giving them a greater voice in national debates and greater opportunities to effect genuine transformations of the national context in which they find themselves (see Drury & Reicher, 2009).

So how will segmented assimilation affect a country’s cultural profile over time? In the United States, for example, the majority – about 85 percent – of the current migrant stream is from non-European countries (Hernandez, Denton, & Macartney, 2007). According to the principle of segmented assimilation, many of these migrants are acculturating to something other than White America. White Americans are reproducing just above the replenishment rate (2.1 children per family) needed to sustain a population over generational time. In many European countries, however, Whites are reproducing far below the replenishment rate, suggesting that not only will the proportion of Whites decrease in future generations, but their absolute numbers will also decrease (United Nations, 2004). Combined with mass
migration and high fertility rates among ethnic minority groups, these trends suggest that Whites will represent only about half of the population in the United States and many European countries by the middle of the 21st century. The majority-minority balance, at least in terms of population shares, is rapidly changing. White Americans, especially those who define the United States in terms of its ethnic heritage, may consider themselves an “endangered species” (e.g., Buchanan, 2006) and may seek to enact official and unofficial policies to curb immigration and to force those migrants already in the country to assimilate to White American culture. Similar dynamics are occurring in Europe (e.g., Licata et al., 2011). As discussed above, however, such efforts are likely to backfire – and will likely produce even more division between native and migrant groups.

Biculturalism is an important part of acculturation, especially given competing pressures from the receiving-cultural community (to endorse receiving-cultural orientations) and from the heritage-cultural community (to retain heritage-cultural orientations). In migrant families, differential endorsement of the heritage or receiving cultural streams between parents and children or adolescents can lead to family conflict and to behavior problems and substance abuse among the youth (Smokowski, Rose, & Bacallao, 2008; Unger, Ritt-Olson, Soto, & Baezconde-Garbanati, 2009). As a result, it is often essential for youth to be bicultural, so that they can relate both to traditionally-oriented family members and to receiving-culture individuals. It may therefore not be a reasonable expectation for migrant youth to fully assimilate and discard their cultural heritage. Although individuals with bicultural identifications (e.g., Cuban American, Pakistani Briton) are more likely to be accepted by majority group members than are individuals who identify only with their cultures of origin (Verkuyten & Thijs, 2010), hard-line conservatives are likely to insist that migrants identify only with the country of settlement. In the United States, for example, Buchanan (2006) and others have labeled biculturalism as a problem. Their argument is that prior waves of immigrants to the United States did not insist on labeling themselves as Irish American, Italian American, or Jewish American – and, consequently, contemporary migrants
should also discard their heritage-cultural identities. The missing piece in this argument, however, is that earlier waves of migrants to the United States – especially the Southern and Eastern Europeans who arrived between 1880 and 1924 – were subjected to intense Americanization programs at school and in the community, where their cultural heritage was denigrated as inferior and becoming fully American was the only available option (Huntington, 2004). Moreover, at the time when those migrants were arriving, ships were the primary mode of crossing the Atlantic, and visiting the homeland was difficult, if not impossible. Today’s migrants can communicate with their friends and relatives in their home countries by email, through social media and online chatting, and during frequent visits. The “transnational” nature of migration, where many families move back and forth between the heritage and receiving countries and where migrants can remain involved with their countries of origin, has facilitated the rise of biculturalism (e.g., Kasinitz et al., 2008). For example, a recent Dominican election was decided largely by voters in New York City, and the economies of many Mexican and Central American villages are supported almost completely by remittances sent from the United States (Portes & Rumbaut, 2006). Comparing past and present waves of migration is problematic because the circumstances in which migrants live have changed exponentially.

The challenge for biculturalism, in any of its forms, then, is the development of an integrated bicultural self. Rudmin (2003) and others (Knight et al., 2009) have portrayed biculturalism as a difficult condition where the contrasting demands and expectations of the heritage and receiving cultural communities are impossible to reconcile. This depiction of biculturalism calls to mind the classic fairy tale, where the bat is rejected by the beasts because they think he is a bird, and rejected by the birds because they think he is a beast. Although the contrasting expectations of the heritage and receiving cultural communities are likely to be the same for individuals low and high on bicultural identity integration, the difference is the stress (or lack thereof) that the individual perceives as a result of these incompatible expectations (cf. Schwartz & Zamboanga, 2008). Indeed, an integrated bicultural identity is
likely to strengthen both the heritage and receiving cultural identities – for example, in the United States, migrants who identify strongly with their heritage cultures are more likely than other migrants to participate in American civic activities (Stepick & Dutton Stepick, 2010). Further, Schwartz and Zamboanga (2008) found that, among a sample of Hispanic young adults in Miami, participants classified as “full bicultural” according to latent class analytic procedures were more strongly ethnically identified, were more strongly individualistic and collectivistic, and perceived less acculturative stress compared to participants classified as “partial bicultural.” So biculturalism, in its fullest and most integrated form, suggests more comfort with both cultural streams, as well as less perceived pressures from the heritage and receiving cultural groups. As a case in point, Matera et al. (2011) found that Italian majority group members were more favorably predisposed toward highly bicultural migrants than toward those who were less bicultural.

Migrants cannot be fully integrated into the receiving culture until these threats are reduced or eliminated – as the American and European cases have illustrated (see Caldwell, 2008; Huntington, 2004; Schildkraut, 2007, for further discussion). For example, in the United States during the early 20th century, Jewish and Italian migrants were labeled as “foreigners,” “unassimilable,” and the like (Sterba, 2003). These groups were perceived as racially separate from White Americans until the mass Southern and Eastern European migration had stopped, and until the perceived threats to the United States population had passed (Stepick et al., 2011). Indeed, mass migration of individuals from a given country or region is probably one of the strongest predictors of the extent to which dominant group members will label that group as a threat (Coenders et al., 2008).

In the past, migrant groups have been “absorbed” into the national ingroup over time, as the threats posed by the migrant groups declined and, in some cases, eventually disappeared. However, in most of these prior cases, cultural and phenotypic differences between migrants and majority group members were seen as far smaller in past generations than is the case currently in most countries and regions that
are receiving large numbers of migrants. Jewish and Italian migrants to the United States were phenotypically White and shared the Judeo-Christian cultural background underlying American culture. The majority of today’s immigrants are much more phenotypically, religiously, and culturally different from the societies where they are settling. Can Mexican migrants in the United States, Pakistani migrants in Britain, Algerian migrants in France, or Turkish migrants in Germany ever fully integrate into the larger national societies? Although this remains an open empirical question – these migrant flows are still ongoing, and at least in the European cases, most migrants are first or second generation – the “perpetual foreigner” syndrome suggests that full incorporation of these migrant groups will be more difficult and problematic than was the case with European migrants to the United States. Will the majority of British people ever look at a Pakistani Briton and see just another Briton? Research in the United States suggests that the label “American” is reserved primarily for Whites (e.g., Devos & Banaji, 2005; Devos & Heng, 2009). Even Japanese Americans whose families have been in the United States for four generations are nonetheless perceived as foreigners. These patterns suggest that, for visible-minority migrant groups, intergroup threats will continue long after the migrants and their descendants have incorporated themselves into the receiving society. It remains to be determined whether today’s Mexicans become tomorrow’s Americans, whether today’s Pakistanis become tomorrow’s Britons, and whether today’s Turks become tomorrow’s Germans.

Will these intergroup threats become stronger or weaker as minority groups represent progressively larger shares of the American and European populations? Will the growing numbers of cultural and ethnic minorities in Western societies lead to the acceptance of minorities as equals, or will they cause the shrinking White populations to feel even more threatened? Although the answer to this question is not yet known, it may lie in how the national ingroup is defined. If a country’s national identity is defined in terms of shared cultural history or ancestry, then individuals who do not share that history or ancestry are unlikely to be fully accepted into the national ingroup (Pehrson et al., 2009). On the other
hand, if a country’s national identity is defined in terms of current endorsement of a given set of cultural practices, values, and identifications with the nation, then later-generation minority-group members are likely to be accepted into the national ingroup (Flannery, Reise, & Yu, 2001). Of course, the national ingroup is characterized by multiple definitions, and there often are disagreements regarding who is a member of that ingroup and who is not (e.g., Rodriguez, Schwartz, & Whitbourne, 2010). However, as long as a group of migrants represent threats to the distinctiveness and continuity of the national ingroup’s identity – in terms of how that identity is consensually defined (i.e., what the majority of majority group members, or at least those in leadership positions, believe that the national ingroup is) – that migrant group will remain outside the national ingroup.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have argued here that acculturation among migrants is in fact a special case of intergroup relations, and that larger social-psychological forces work to guide the specific acculturation approaches that migrants adopt (and that majority group members expect). Although migrants have a choice regarding some aspects of their acculturation, the reception afforded to them by majority group members, as well as the threats that they perceived as a result of this reception, determine much of how migrants will acculturate (Schwartz, Unger, et al., 2010; Zagefka, González, & Brown, 2011). Individual-level perspectives on acculturation, which focus primarily (or exclusively) on the experiences of the individual migrant, do not capture the richness and complexity of the intergroup relations between migrants and the societies that are receiving them. Even interactional views of acculturation, which focus on the degree of match versus mismatch between migrants’ approaches to acculturation and majority group members’ expectations, assume that these preferences are largely static. We contend that what is needed is a dynamic model of intergroup relations that considers the changing nature of the extent of power held by majority group members, inroads made by the migrant group in establishing a foothold within the receiving society, and the ways in which migrants and majority group
members respond to perceived threats from one another. Will migrants comply with the defensive policies enacted by majority group members, such as Muslim women taking off their veils in France – or will they “fight back,” as in the case of Mexican migrants staging marches and rallies to protest the withdrawal of social services from children of unauthorized migrants in the United States? The specific intergroup dynamics between migrants and majority group members differ between and among countries (Pehrson & Green, 2010; Staerklé et al., 2010), so migrants’ and majority group members’ reactions to perceived threats may not be the same across contexts. Nonetheless, the broader set of principles that we have articulated here may hold in most situations.

Most notably, the casting of acculturation as an intergroup process suggests that group outcomes – as well as adjustment outcomes in individual migrants – should be considered in acculturation research (Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Thus, collective self-esteem may be as important as individual self-esteem, intergroup anxiety as important as personal well-being, and the quality of intergroup relationships as important as one’s interpersonal relationships, when considering the consequences of acculturation orientations, identity threats, discriminatory laws and policies, and other interactions between migrant and host-national groups. Majority group members who support defensive policies vis-à-vis migrants are not only acting to preserve their own individual self-interests, but they are also acting to preserve the interests of their ingroup. Similarly, migrants who protest against policies enacted by majority group members, or who engage in violent behavior toward them, are acting on behalf of their ethnic, cultural, or national group as a whole, not simply on their own behalf. Surely Mohammad Siddique Khan, the leader of the terrorist group that perpetrated the July 2005 bombings in London, was not acting out of self-interest when he blew himself up on a train. Rather, he was probably seeking to defend his cultural and religious group against perceived threats from the non-Muslim British community (see Moshman, 2011; and Post, 2005, for further discussion of group motives in terrorist activities).
In summary, in this chapter we have situated acculturation within the context of intergroup relations. Following Berry (2006), Bourhis et al. (1997), Rohmann et al. (2006), and others, we view the acculturation orientations of migrant groups as interacting with those of the receiving society. However, we take this principle several steps further. First, we have reviewed evidence that this interaction between migrants’ acculturation orientations and the expectations of receiving-society individuals is further moderated by the migrant group and receiving society in question. Second, we have cast acculturation as a social identity process marked by realistic and symbolic threats and by attempts by migrants to manage their identities in relation to the receiving society. The emergence of new groupings, such as “Hispanic” or “Latino,” within the receiving society is one example of this kind of identity management. Third, we have drawn on a wide range of identity theories to illustrate the cultural dynamics between migrants and receiving-society individuals. In particular, we have argued that receiving-society individuals are more likely to perceive migrants as a threat to the extent that they are perceived to undermine the continuity and distinctiveness of the national ingroup – rather than because they represent a competing ethnic outgroup. These perceptions will depend crucially on how the receiving-society defines itself (e.g., in ethnic terms or in civic terms). Where national identity is defined in more ethnic terms, it may be especially difficult for migrants and their descendants to gain acceptance; in contrast, where the national identity is defined in more civic terms, it may be more possible for migrants and their descendants to be accepted as members of the nation.

Finally, our perspective views migrant-majority relations as constantly evolving. Today’s migrants are not acculturating to the same society that existed 100 years ago. Perhaps the clearest indication of this dynamic process is the shift in the groups who are migrating. Whereas much of the world’s migration in the 19th and early 20th centuries involved Europeans moving to the United States, Canada, and Australia, most of today’s migrants are coming from primarily collectivist regions such as Latin America, the Caribbean, Africa, Southern and Eastern Asia, and the Middle East. Further, the receiving
societies in migrant-receiving countries or regions include the descendants of earlier migrants, and many of these societies have adopted more multicultural policies than were in place 100 years ago. Acculturation is a dynamic interplay between migrant and receiving groups, and in some cases the boundaries between these groups are not completely clear. We hope that the perspective that we have introduced here will inspire more research on acculturation as a special case of intergroup relations.
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Acculturation and Intergroup Dynamics


Acculturation and Intergroup Dynamics


