Between a 'global' Mediterranean and Europe's Neighbourhood: transnational cultural networks and the development of cultural relations across Europe and the Mediterranean since the emergence of the Anna Lindh Foundation

by

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Declaration of Authorship

I Alistair Ean Brisbourne hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed: ________________ Date: 18/09/2015
Abstract

The Arab Spring came as a shock to most onlookers. It forced states and supranational institutions to rapidly reconsider their relationships to authoritarian regimes and existing regional cooperation frameworks. The events also threatened to collapse many assumptions about the effectiveness of democracy promotion activities that had effectively stabilized authoritarian regimes. The immediate response from the EU was to adopt a renewed emphasis on supporting regional civil society in the face of a momentous expression of political will. One of the first actions (in September 2011) was to declare a commitment to the Anna Lindh Foundation. This despite the fact that the ALF had encountered heavy skepticism for its lack of independence, limited funding and governmental patronage. In this environment, what role can culture and civil society actually play in the development of EuroMediterranean relations? This research takes a broadly transnational approach to discover the strategic basis behind promoting regional cultural networks, the political limitations on networking, and the subjective experience of participants. It employs qualitative techniques of document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and participant observation as well as tools from social network analysis. The research finds that the condition of cultural relations in the region continues to be a product of the EU’s internal politics and increasingly the influence and advocacy of cultural foundations and their networks. Within a new strategic approach to culture the ALF is a key partner providing a regional frame in complement to bilateral policies. However, the ALF’s effectiveness is still tied to regional uncertainty. Its biases and limitations are borne out in a study of the interactions between its constituent networks which reveals a predominance of European networks and a considerably lower level of interaction between non-European networks. It also suffers from poor visibility and even suspicion. The final section considers the Civil Forum as an encounter between participants. It demonstrates the need for the ALF and EU to adapt their language and approach to account for new perspectives and better provide practical solutions to regional civil societies.
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Glossary

Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF)
Anna Lindh Foundation Head of Network (ALF HoN)
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
Barcelona Process (BP)
Citizens for Dialogue (DAWRAK)
Civil Society (CS)
Civil Society Organizations (CSO)
Council of Europe (CoE)
Directorate-General Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO)
Directorate-General Education and Culture (DG EAC)
Directorate-General External Relations (DG RELEX)
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP)
European Commission (EC)
European Cultural Foundation (ECF)
European Economic Community (EEC)
European External Action Service (EEAS)
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP)
European Network of Political Foundations (ENoP)
European Parliament (EP)
European Union (EU)
European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC)
Global civil society (GCS)
Instituto Europeo del Mediterráneo (IEMed)
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
International non-governmental organization (INGO)
Maison Méditerranée des Sciences de l'Homme (MMSH)
Middle East and North Africa (MENA)
Muslim Brotherhood (MB)
National Endowment for Democracy (NED)
Non-governmental organization (NGO)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity (PfDSP)
Political foundations (PFs)
Society for Intercultural Education Training and Research (SIETAR)
Transnational civil society (TCS)
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)
United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)
Western European Union (WEU)
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Chapter 1: Introduction

In *The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Phillip II*, Fernand Braudel set out a comprehensive and enduring depiction of the social, political, economic and geographical complexities that made the Mediterranean an important area of study outside of the histories and conflicts of nation-states. Braudel’s approach of *l’histoire totale*, which stressed the benefits of multidisciplinarity to engage with the full extent of interrelated phenomena, has led to its continued influence on recent works that attempt to understand the heterogeneous practices and identities of the region (Chambers 2010). In this remarkable work, he also attempts to address a delimitation of the Mediterranean space (most notably identifying the ‘true’ Mediterranean between the olive trees of the North to the great palm groves in the South) (Braudel 1995, 232). However, his approach also drew him to the complex and multidimensional relations that made any simple delimitation of the region inherently problematic. Accordingly, Braudel identified the Sahara as another Southern border and ‘second face’ of the Mediterranean. And yet even here the extensive trade networks along this ‘border’ pulled sub-Saharan peoples and states back into any proper understanding of regional dynamics or explanation of a Mediterranean history. In response to this, he identifies a *global Mediterranean* open to the broader dynamics of capitalist exchange and intercultural mobility. This vision sweeping from “the Azores and the New World, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, the Baltic and the loop of the Niger” (Ibid, 168) reflects Braudel’s attentiveness to physical and natural geography. However his attention is also emphatically human in its concern for the environment and its effects on settlement and exchange. Braudel’s geography laid the basis for a more heterogeneous and relational basis from which to understand historical developments in the Mediterranean. Capturing these historical transnational exchanges has been tied into the political objective of integration observed in the promotion of heritage, translation, artistic, and educational exchange programs. This interlinking of the social, cultural and
economic spheres, however, runs up against a recurring politicization of the region, instances of which tend to downplay complexities in favor of simplified representations. Such representations are, of course, not new or novel features of the political landscape of the Mediterranean. For example, the image/concept of *Mare Nostrum* (Our Sea), a Roman construct, continues to have political life and has in fact undergone some revitalization in the platform of the Union for the Mediterranean. Transforming ‘Our Sea’ into a common Mediterranean lies at the heart of attempts at integration. And power imbalance aside, pulling societies together intuits their globality. The contradiction of a political delimitation of a ‘EuroMediterranean’ space is that it requires the nurture of transnational networks whose existence affects a process of reorientation among practitioners.

With the intention of recapturing some of the essence found in the idea of a ‘global’ Mediterranean while also accounting for more recent political, economic and cultural developments this chapter introduces some of the key ideas that form a conceptual backdrop for the subsequent analytical chapters as well as key events or contexts that have influenced the study. It establishes a basis from which to explore the key research questions that drive the study – namely trying to understand the role of culture and civil society in the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations. In trying to resolve this core problem the research also responds to three sub-questions which are dealt with in separate chapters including the transnationalization of political action, understanding the ways in which regional organizations provide discursive frames for civil society participants, and the ways in which these frames are engaged and contested. As a point of departure the introduction sets forth by establishing the changing environment. The implications of what has been termed the ‘Arab Spring’ for Euro-Mediterranean relations are significant but in many ways also subtle. So the geopolitical changes are considered in the relations between the EU and regional government and institutions. But there is also a notable transformation at the social level, which signals the possibility of new shared understandings and could have an impact on regional dynamics. Picking up on these themes, the next section briefly considers how the Mediterranean itself has been subject to conceptual fluctuation and political manipulation as a way of promoting integration and such constructions can form
the basis of subjective attachments. One of the possible outcomes of building networks of cultural operators and civil society actors under the heading of a Mediterranean citizenship is to generate such attachments. The remainder of the introductory discussion focuses on looking at the development of cultural relations – specifically in relation to the Anna Lindh Foundation – through a transnational perspective that contains three aspects: the politico-strategic motivations linking informal politics and official policy-making, a focus on networking, and the experiential value of transnational practices. The final section engages in a methodological discussion.

Since the 1970s, the European Union (EU) has become increasingly active in the Mediterranean region. Through official and institutionalized discourses the EU has constructed the Euro-Mediterranean for policy consideration (Pace 2006). Based around distinct European forms of political, social and cultural practice the Euro-Mediterranean affirms and legitimizes the dominance of the EU over non-member Mediterranean countries and peoples. Moreover, the Euro-Mediterranean is built upon a complex spatial arrangement, which lends legitimacy to the extension of EU governance practices and the institutionalization of political practices across the Mediterranean region (Jones 2011, 42). Institutionally this has come in the form of an evolving variable geometry that favours economic and then political forms of interaction. Contrary to this, Michelle Pace suggests that the study of developments involving Mediterranean countries should evoke a Mediterranean area rather than presupposing a physical geography of the Mediterranean identity. Importantly, this approach allows for multiple constructions and realities (Pace 2006, 2) and attempts to avoid a representation of the region as a homogeneous unit offering a better way to incorporate the diversity of cultural contexts. Whereas for Pace this involves particular constructions of the region on the part of EU elites and policy-makers, the same is true of non-official actors that take part in interactions across the Mediterranean. What is revealing about this analysis is the way in which the EU’s language actively breaks down the Mediterranean into compartments (Pace 2004, 100). These discursive acts parcel the region into forms fitting the EU’s external capabilities. This is parallel to the EU’s cultural discourse that emphasises the multiplicity of the Mediterranean’s history. What
is missing from this analysis is the role that transnational networks play in developing such cultural discourses and implementing policy. Institutional developments are also at the centre of this issue. Cooperation between regional organizations within the EuroMeditteranean framework and European actors, including the evolving European External Action Service (EEAS), highlight new avenues for cultural relations and, potentially, transformations in the field of cultural diplomacy.

The ‘Arab Spring’ and political identity

The timing of this project could not have been more significant following a set of historic uprisings against authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt and spreading to other countries including Morocco and Bahrain. The transformation of attitudes towards many of the influences discussed in subsequent chapters was undoubtedly affected by the experience of large-scale protest and revolution. These certainly impacted upon the research process, bolstered both by enthusiastic support in some instances and shut down in others as a result of a continually changing political context – the coup d’etat that brought General al-Sisi to power in Egypt led to immediate self-censorship by many. In this uncertain atmosphere, transnational practices and affiliations helped to dissect the political and cultural experience within North African and Middle Eastern societies. Essid and Coleman (2012, 4-5) are correct to suggest that one effect of globalizing processes is to bring into conflict the basic organizing values of different societies. However, they are wrong to assume that opposition necessarily takes place between these principles. Led by a top-down understanding of globalizing process, Essid and Coleman neglect the glocal reality of cultural practice, which eschews any given directionality but navigates a multitude of pressures. The political aspect of the region - through the development of regional governance structures and institutions - continues to represent serious restrictions on movement and exchange and as a result it also signifies the maintenance of national forms of cultural bordering and identification despite the avowal of a common Euro-Mediterranean space. On the other hand, these experience has affected the way in which the Mediterranean
region is thought about and the meanings that it takes on for transnational actors as well as local actors with the desire to express their political subjectivity transnationally.

Civil society and especially organized NGOs are considered in policy circles to be central to the construction (by external and internal powers) of active subjects trained in the language of development, empowerment and citizenship (Challand 2011, 274). Many of these actors may in fact be highly critical of the hierarchy of funding circles but this only reinforces the role of this relationship in the process of subjectivation. Challand (2011, 275) is correct to point out that what was unique about the uprisings was that the implicit norms supported by these funding agencies were not the basis for resistance, rather it was often against this notion of individualism that protests were expressed employing the discourses of social justice and unity (Ibid, 276). In line with this, Sari Hanafi (2012) has pointed out the reflexivity of the individualism expressed by activists based on the “self-reference of an agent that recognizes forces of socialization but alters their place in the social structure and resists their disciplinary power” (Hanafi 2012, 203). In the face of limited representation or ability to influence policy-making the alternative was a form of solidarity through informal networks and actions (Solera 2015, 47). Rather than relying on traditional forms of protest these networks leveraged the visual and performative impact of creative expression for opening up alternative routes (Makar 2011; Tanzarella 2012; Moldo and Soustier 2014). The creative and non-ideological character of local struggles also raised the potential of achieving global solidarity between distant movements helped by the creation of ‘hybrid spaces’ through the use of ICT (Antebi and Sanchez 2012) and bolstered by a common anger at growing inequalities and feelings of economic insecurity (Glasius and Pleyers 2013). As a result, local struggles became regionalized in the form of the Arab Spring and globalized through discursive and imaginative configurations. Whereas unity may have been temporary the politics of being seen, of practicing political opposition publicly and visually, has become essential to the political field. In this vein, the new political subjectivity highlighted by academics like Hanafi and Challand also connects to a longer process of political engagement in the MENA region, a concurrent
transformation of visual culture, and the counter-strategies of ruling elites that has transformed culture into an important battleground.

However, the flipside of this opening up has been the founding of new conflicts (Khalid 2015; Fortiger 2015) and the rekindling of tensions between Islamism and secularism in Tunisia and Egypt, where the tension has at times taken on a militant form with the assassinations of secular politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi in Tunisia and the military coup against ex-President Morsi in Egypt. In both countries the effect was to drive communities apart and saw an increasing use extremist rhetoric.1 In Egypt, following the coup the Muslim Brotherhood came under increasing attack from secular members of society who feared an increasing Islamization of society. Even within the ranks of secular groups divisions began to erupt around those who supported dialogue with Islamists and those who did not (Roque 2015, 48). In the case of Tunisia, the Ennahda Party has shown a political adeptness and flexibility to assuage many of the initial fears amongst secular opponents. On the other hand, Egyptian society continues to deal with deep rifts, which are propagated by the lack of adequate social mechanism to promote cohesion between communities (Ibid, 49).

This new subjectivity and the transformed social and political context provides the basis on which social and political actors engage with their counterparts across the Mediterranean region. It also likely influences their interaction with institutions and foundations that support the development of programmes and projects across the region. Partially this can be linked to the establishment of associations following the uprisings and the easing of restrictions in Tunisia. But new opportunities cannot entirely account for the subjective shift in Egypt where the difficulties of gaining ministry recognition have remained fraught with problems of ministry acceptance, long time delays and ambiguous procedures.2 A telling feature of this landscape can be found in the politicization of the cultural networks supported by the Anna Lindh

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1 This was experienced in Tunisia during the barricading of parliament by leftist parties following the assassination of Mohamed Brahmi. Several protesters expressed the opinion that all Ennahda members and supporters were terrorists and should be locked up.

2 Interview with Egyptian ALF member 7th August 2013
Foundation in Egypt whose communications and meetings, according to some members, have become increasingly contentious between those who maintain different political affiliations and members who believe that the ALF network should be apolitical. Apparent is the essential political basis behind such networks where even the apolitical stance is justified according to a logic of socio-cultural development based on liberalized citizenship and education practices. The picture of fragmentation resulting from current tensions is qualitatively different from what came before. The process of transition across the region is far from complete but along with the various political actors that exist within each society those working within CSOs and NGOs have also been altered by the experience of a rupture with the recent political past. Whether this experience has opened up new routes for local actors to engage in transnational practices is less clear.

**The Mediterranean: place, construct, practice**

The ‘EuroMediterranean’ is a contradictory construct. As Jean Paul-Henry has pointed out, the Mediterranean is made both a ‘peripheral part of Europe and an identity and cultural border’ (Henry 2007, 208) in its construction within the EuroMediterranean framework. It is unsurprising that cultural cooperation - intended to bring regional societies together - has been problematic given the entropy of securitisation, nationalisms and the politicisation of migrants. Any developments towards greater cultural cooperation are likely to be sparse and face several political and economic barriers. However this complex environment also offers insight into the development of cultural cooperation globally.

There has been much debate around the notion of Mediterraneanism. Taken as the existence of either a cohesive region, either geographically or culturally, it is generally recognized as a tendentious, if not irrelevant, concept (Calleya 1999; Heller 2004). As a transformative imaginary any form of Mediterraneanism is limited; the “Euro-Mediterranean dream is very much about a cosmopolitan world, which allows free spirit and movement. However, while the dream of unity in the Mediterranean waters is a dream of a just and equitable world, it is also orientalist by nature” (Lapidot-Firilla 2012, 126). The orientalist nature of
this dream is more than just the basic altruism and essentialism inherent in the necessity of a (EU) project for the development of neighbouring countries but is also in the idea that the Mediterranean is some kind of ideal end-point derived from a Eurocentric history. This can be seen in continued debate around the roman concept of Mare Nostrum which has been rejuvenated to include those arab populations who throughout history were considered as others, not part of the possessive ‘our’. It is questionable that the imperial notion of Mare Nostrum provides a more suitable way to bridge the diversity of experiences across the area. More fruitfully, anthropologist Michael Herzfeld (2005) has noted practical forms of Mediterraneanism that are employed instrumentally by social and political actors in order to place themselves within a global hierarchy of value (Herzfeld 2004, 2005). Such an idea is a valuable contribution to understanding the social life of the idea of the Mediterranean. Treated as the product of ‘performative utterances’ (as per J.L. Austin) this understanding of Mediterraneanism highlights the role of discursive agency within processes of subjectivation (Herzfeld 2005, 50). For example, Andre Azoulay, Former-President of the ALF, when visiting the UK network suggested a broader EuroMediterranean history in Britain by telling the story of his ancestors in Essaouira, Morocco, and their long history of trading through northern English ports. Regardless of any geographical issues there is a powerful performativity to this story that induces the creation of a regional memory and alters the referential markers attributed to these different societies. Politically, this movement overlaps with a Mediterraneanism that acts to unite countries behind a regional hegemon (Ibid.), which legitimates a regional delimiting and bordering process.

This political use of Mediterraneanism acts as a source of justification and discursive framing for the political construction of the region through territorial, symbolic and institutional means (Jones 2011). On top of this it necessitates a strong cultural element to integration, which was recognized as an important though problematic area since the foundation of the Barcelona Process in 1995 (Selim 2003, 166). Nonetheless, cultural partnership has always been of secondary importance (or tertiary if we follow the EMP’s categorization).

3 Interview with UK ALF member 5th July 2012
Following a project-based structure beginning with the areas of cultural heritage and cultural events it has expanded to the establishment of projects such as EuroMed Audiovisual, EuroMed Heritage, the EuroMed Youth Programme, TEMPUS and TRESMED. The establishment in 2005 of the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) strengthened the cultural basket by creating a separate institution (funded partially by the EU Commission and partially by UfM member states) to support interaction between different cultures and societies. Despite great expectations following the 2003 High Level Advisory Group meeting ('Group des Sages'), optimism towards the Foundation remained low among many observers given the difficulty surrounding budgetary negotiations and remaining political constraints (Pace 2006: 86). However, despite immense difficulty, as well as having to withstand an uncertain institutional context and political wrangling over the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, the ALF has evolved in its early years into an intriguing institution and a potential source of development on socio-cultural issues and intercultural dialogue in the region.

**The Anna Lindh Foundation**

The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF), as a regional institution aimed at the development of dialogue between cultures and networking between civil society actors, is an interesting case for considering some of these ideas. The ALF offers a platform to groups and individuals who might otherwise be excluded from regional developments. This approach complements that of the UfM which targets private actors and economic interests in building regional projects. While EU policy towards southern Mediterranean countries broadly consists of a strategy towards region-building it is also infiltrated by a multitude of interests and discourses from EU member states, EU officials and institutions and officials from non-member states who are variously influenced by global politics and discourses. Strengthening the civil sphere through official discourses and actions is a key aspect of engaging in complex international networks and building relations across states. To the extent that private actors and informal networks become more important in regional policies there is also a corresponding
*globalization* of the region as transnational actors more or less rooted in local settings take on greater significance.

It is possible to differentiate the position of the ALF between the variable geometry of the region, whereby it effectively institutionalizes an intercultural dialogue in accordance with the political objectives of the EU commission and national governments, and as the central hub of a network of political, cultural and social actors across the region. The ALF’s ‘intercultural strategy’ goes beyond promoting dialogue between diverse cultures by imposing a set of normative goals and values building upon the original recommendations of the High Level Advisory group in 2003 which suggested that intercultural dialogue; “may then also become a powerful vehicle of democratization” (Report by the High Level Advisory Group 2003, 11). On the other hand, it has constructed a considerable network of independent organizations working across all member states of the Union for the Mediterranean and organizes regional projects, engages in grant-making and lobbies for increased mobility on behalf of its members. Through these actions it provides a unique opportunity space at the regional level but it also integrates a wide variety of different perspectives and identities. While the ALF works within the political context of the Euro-Mediterranean it has also been responsive to alternate representations espoused by member organizations. This complexity makes the ALF an intriguing case study and exploring some of these elements further will lead towards a better understanding of how transnationalism, understood as a social and political phenomenon, plays a significant role in the region.

**Building a transnational perspective on cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean**

The study of cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean received substantial attention following the establishment of the Barcelona Process in 1995. In 2003 the edited volume *A New Euro-Mediterranean Cultural Identity?* explored a novel proposition in the emergence of a common cultural framework uniting all shores of the Mediterranean Sea and demonstrated the tempered optimism captured within the EuroMediterranean Partnership. Amid growing skepticism, a special issue of *Mediterranean Politics* in 2005 demonstrated a diverse but critical
examination of the role and potential of dialogue (Pace 2005), the conceptual underpinning of intercultural dialogue (del Sarto 2005), securitization (Malmvig 2005), socialization (Schumacher 2005), global civil society and human rights (Feliu 2005), and a world-systems approach to culture and dialogue (Stetter 2005). Think Tanks such as the Fondazione Mediterranea, Maison Méditerranée des Sciences de l’Homme (MMSH), and Instituto Europeo del Mediterráneo (IEMed) sustained interest following the deadlock of the EuroMediterranean Partnership and its replacement by the Union for the Mediterranean in 2008. Though important work has been written on the subject since this period (see Fabre and Sant-Cassia 2007; Schäfer 2007, 2014; Cardwell 2011; Kausch and Youngs 2009; Pace and Schumacher 2013), the interest in cultural relations specifically has been relegated to the periphery despite some important developments. Moreover, connecting the developments in cultural relations across the internal/external divide has been limited.

In order to put cultural relations back at the centre of attention it is necessary to account for the changes in political and institutional context as well as the emergence of new actors and discourses. The contention of this thesis is that the state of cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean reveals a tension (both creative and conflicted) between the rejuvenation of Europe’s cultural identity (and competency for culture at the supranational level) and the promise of transnational networking. It presents a novel understanding of cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean as products of the global reach of networks and in direct relation their influence in driving the evolution of cultural narratives at the EU level. There has been a profound correlation between transformations in political practice and discourse that argue for a novel approach to understanding the significance of developments in cultural relations across the EuroMediterranean. There are a few elements that act as a foundation to this approach: 1) A change in political practice associated with the dominance of norms, discourses and practices generally subsumed under the moniker of civil society, 2) increased activity and emergence of new political and cultural foundations, 3) formation of networks connecting foundations and other cultural and political actors across boundaries. These changes have driven developments in cultural relations and influenced new directions in external relations. The
tensions and features of these developments are exhibited in developments in the EuroMediterranean (and under the Union for the Mediterranean): a focus on establishing networks for the inclusion of civil society and a core foundation to support their development, an incorporation of political objectives in cultural dialogue, a widening practice of cultural diplomacy (with respect to the European Union), and the desire to forge (and regulate) a role for civil society in national and regional politics. Together, these factors present a novel understanding of developments, which suggest quite different future opportunities from those suggested in institutional accounts of the EuroMediterranean relationship. Moreover, it places those developments within a global context, which moves beyond the presumptive dualism inherent in approaches to regional politics based on fragmentation vs. unity. For example, whereas some institutional accounts have previously written off the Anna Lindh Foundation citing its funding limitations, visibility and relationship to national governments the emphasis on networks has the advantage of exploring the actual (and essentially hybrid) interactions and exchanges of participants. While the ALF may not be noteworthy in the breadth of its actions, it is a valuable case depiction of how global cultural relations are enacted through the changing practices of cultural diplomacy, political practice and micro-level contributions that suggest alternative ways of understanding the cultural encounter. The ALF is indeed the region’s ‘most symbolic instrument’ (Schäfer 2007, 343) but it also offers insight into the complexity and potential of networking.

**Political practice and the civil society complex**

The Euro-Mediterranean has been constructed in EU policy discourses as a region for EU action. This is manifest in the extension of governance and bordering practices through the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) as well as the functional form of region-building inherent in the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). At the same time, the complexity of these processes opens up spaces for civil society actors to engage in cross-border cooperation and transnational networking. Recent studies have dealt with the development of civil society in the Euro-Mediterranean by focusing on finding a contextually
adaptable yet complex definition of civil society in order to understand networking between civil society actors in the region (Scott and Liikanen 2010; O’Dowd and Dimitrovova 2011). This research has highlighted the extent to which reactions to the operations of particularly Western NGOs are influenced by opposing opinions and understandings of civil society (Dimitrovova 2010). But what is often missing is an exploration of the way in which civil society as a category and as a practice has been transformed by its transnationalization and the extension of governance across state boundaries. One of the initial goals of this study is to provide a theoretically informed and more extensive understanding of civil society and its role at the regional scale. Here it becomes clear that notions of civil society go hand in hand with democratization and democracy promotion strategies.

At the same time the transnationalization of democracy promotion presents a new context in which civil society not only becomes a ‘fetish-object’ (Petric and Blundo 2012) for transnational actors but it also leads to a transformation of the nature and practice of civil society in relation to governance. The concomitant ‘civil societalization’ of politics makes it less useful to discuss civil society as an autonomous sphere, something which is itself reflected at times in official policies and discourses. And yet, it is important to recognize this as a process that has been as much influenced by the work of transnational non-state actors as states and governance structures. Political foundations (PFs) are significant in this regard as they maintain a dual identity first based in their official governmental mandate and internal structure and secondly based in their independent actions abroad during which PFs tend to represent themselves as private actors (Dakowska 2010). Thus they also have been conceived as contributing to the expansion of global civil society around the world (Scott 2003, 8). It is a contention within this research that such conclusions fail to acknowledge their reflexive impact on the way in which civil society (and global civil society) is understood which also entails the risk of failing to distinguish alternative and meaningful forms of interaction. In addition, the work of PFs is increasingly aimed at supporting the development of civil society in target countries (Scott 1999, 153). These actions risk contributing to the narrowing of civil society seen in part by the fact that efforts at promoting
pluralism tend to devolve into limited forms of ‘organizational pluralism’ as a result of an in-built bias amongst grant-makers towards established NGOs as opposed to smaller community groups (Carothers and Ottaway 2008, location 3464). So the civil societalization of politics also points to the way in which governance and civil society are mutually constitutive. The transnationalization of civil society is as much a political as it is a social development. This becomes especially important across a region where ‘civil society’ as a social phenomenon can be understood in dramatically different ways as a result of cultural context and where it is ever more apparent that different meanings do not exist outside of power relations. It is also crucial to acknowledge that civil societalization is not simply a critique of the practice of civil society in relation to governance but also an important characteristic of the globalization of governance and political strategy. Mario Pianta (2003), for example, identifies the growing significance of parallel summits and bottom-up movements that link decision-making to civil society actors. Pianta’s chapter draws attention to the role of global civil society in balancing and providing a democratic alternative to neo-liberal globalization. However, it is also necessary to understand how civil society has become a part of top-down strategies of governance.

**Cultural ‘EU’rope and external relations**

The cultural relations between Europe and its Mediterranean neighbors have been characterized by a lack of development and peripheral position in the EMP framework. This perspective is dominated by an approach, which views developments in the Mediterranean through a regionalist lens. If Europe is “a subregion of the world-system, Europe proposes that the Mediterranean countries be, in their turn, a sub-subregion” (Nair 2003, 298 quoted in Essid and Coleman 2012, 10). Europe has been turned into a world space by EU policies that have increased European competency into areas traditionally reserved for nation-states (Huggins and Axford 1999, 184). The EuroMediterranean Partnership rests upon this imbalance between an integrated and powerful Europe and its fragmented neighborhood. The Union for the Mediterranean, for its part, has been an attempt to foster greater unity amongst Mediterranean
countries and establish, at least symbolically, a more equitable balance. However, this quote raises another important dimension in understanding relations between the two shores and that is the difference between Europe’s agency vis-à-vis its external capacities and the local and global influences that shape the unfolding of institutional developments and ideational support for integration. European cultural policy and the push for a European cultural diplomacy are acting as two of the new drivers of cultural integration in the EuroMediterranean.

The unique development of culture within Europe – what Monica Sassatelli (2009) has labeled a ‘polyvocal process’ due to the participation of myriad voices of civil society and cultural practitioners from the bottom-up – has bolstered the influence of cultural networks tying them to the policy-making process and attributing them an important role in the dissemination of policy output. Many networks involved in the development of cultural competency at the European level have also long been active in promoting cultural relations abroad – as in the case of the European Cultural Foundation and national institutes of culture. This boundary-crossing nature of networks is fundamental to the novel approach being developed for a distinctly European cultural diplomacy distributed across a set of non-state actors and coordinated by European institutions of which the European External Action Service intends to be central (Isar 2015, 504). These developments coincide with the development in the EuroMediterranean of a sole multilateral institution – the Anna Lindh Foundation – designed to promote convergence between societies. It is no wonder that following the initial events of the Arab Spring, one of the first announcements made by Commissioner Stefan Füle, Directorate-General External Relations (RELEX), declared it a priority to establish a closer working relationship between the European Commission and the Anna Lindh Foundation secretariat (Füle 2011). This relationship places the Foundation within the context of a European cultural diplomacy and, as will be discussed in Section 2 on this thesis, leads to some level of convergence between EU interests and organizational objectives.
**Transnational Region: strategic frames, networks and encounters**

Connecting the role of transnational cultural networks to developments within the EU and within the EuroMed region this thesis will forego a geographically delimited analysis of the region either as acting or being acted upon. After all, it is through transnational networks that the region is constructed. In order to do this the thesis will trace the idea of transnationalism and networks, transnational networks as they relate to the development of cultural policy, and existing networks within the region. Indeed, in the evolution of what success has been shared transnational networks are essential - either in practice or as a normative conceit. In practice, such networks have influenced the development of policies and institutions. Networks are also established as functional arbiters of the cultural realm where we find circumscribed transnationalism as a practical solution to conflictual political dynamics and a normative ideal-type as counter to those constraints - practice and discourse.

Networks have been shown to be central to decision-making in the policy-space of the ENP (Lavenex 2008). They also have a deeper significance and more pervasive quality through a process of ‘horizontal socialization’ (Scott & Liikanen 2010) and identity construction (Castells 1997). Networks provide the informal ‘institutions’ necessary for the successful diffusion of various elements of identity within and beyond the streams of official discourse. As such, civil society represents the most important channel through which Europeanization can proceed. On the other hand, the various EU policies represent to many the imposition of Western norms and ideals rather than an offer of equal partnership on socio-economic issues. The opportunistic agendas led by Brussels and official state bodies through traditional geopolitical models often interfere with meaningful participation by civil society elements (Dimitrovoova 2009, Darbouche 2008, Kostadinova 2009). As a result, many organizations choose not to participate in EU-led programmes in order to maintain their local legitimacy (Dimitrovova 2009). There has however been improved and increased mobilization at the local and national levels, which has led scholars to argue for a greater focus on smaller, voluntary organizations (Scott & Liikanen 2010). Many of these organizations maintain ties with actors in neighboring countries and could play a much more critical role than often considered in developing an
alternative sense of regional engagement and in developmental processes. Though democracy promotion has tended to focus on initiatives like building civil society, institutional developments like the Anna Lindh Foundation potentially benefit smaller actors by shifting focus from larger, resource-rich NGOs to smaller organizations.

Using transnational networks as our basis straddles a Euro-Mediterranean that has its basis in official policies, institutions and discourses, and a space of interactions and exchange of ideas, material and people. This space, which necessarily includes regional institutions and the influence of national and international agreements can be represented as a *EuroMediterranean* space; that is, a space implicitly and extensively affected by these developments but not wholly defined by them. It rests more easily upon a *long durée* of historical, cultural, social, economic and political exchange. In this sense, the Mediterranean is indeed a global region in which countries and cultures around the world can find common foundations and it also focuses attention on the question of mobility, exchange and interaction and returns a humanistic element to study of the region. But the form of transnationalism at work is also peculiar. Its peculiarity can be found in the differentiation between a ‘transnationalism from above’ – based around the actions of states and corporations – and the ‘transnationalism from below’ of migrants (Guarnizo and Smith 1998). This ‘transnationalism from below’ might also include transnational social movements and other social actors engaging in regular or intermittent transnational practices. This research draws attention to the ways in which these two categories overlap and coincide. As Steven Vertovec points out: “Transnational social patterns variously condition people’s everyday expectations...moral obligations...institutional structures...and relations to the state (Vertovec 2009, 74). But they also condition the existence of these things in return.

The focus on transnational networks does not necessarily mean that there is an erosion of the importance of place or the nation (Featherstone, Phillips and Waters 2008, 386). As Stephen Calleya (2005) has already pointed out, regional fragmentation means that local identities and national spaces remain central to political and social action in the Mediterranean. This fragmentation, however, is
decisively political in many circumstances and does not account for underlying dynamics of social and political contestation that occur across national constructs. So it is also important to consider the role of common politics and projects in the construction and maintenance of transnational networks. A greater appreciation of the role of networks historically for transnational political action can bring awareness of the ability to evoke or construct a transnational history for particular actors and/or issues (Featherstone 2007). Similarly, Guarnizo and Smith point out that: “Politically organized transnational networks and movements also weld together transnational connections by constituting structures of meaning” (Guarnizo and Smith 2009, 19). Annette Jüenemann’s (2003) analysis of the Civil Forums established under the EMP framework leans towards this idea by calling attention to the potential initiation of a political identity organized around common political issues. Of course, selection processes that are built into these regional projects can put a limit on the involvement of actors and organizations from southern Mediterranean countries but, as Sari Hanafi (2005) points out, the selection process can also benefit transnational networks by engaging with actors and organizations that under normal conditions may be subject to local divisions or clique gatherings. Furthermore, networking at the regional level has the potential of increasing southern actors’ influence through agenda-setting and alliance building (Hanafi 2005). Hanafi’s anthropological approach to North-South civil society relations helps to understand the significance of the regional scale for social actors, especially with regard to the latter possibility of alliance building. As analysis of both the Anna Lindh Foundation networks and attendance at the 2013 ALF Civil Forum point out, influence is mediated by organizational objectives as much as distance between policy-making. And yet, participation reveals a certain creativity and reflexivity that eschews the objective of direct influence at least partially for more politically transcendent purposes.

**Researching cultural networks**

This research project explores the role of civil society in the Mediterranean through the practice of transnationalism. Leaving aside conceptual arguments,
this broadly engages two interrelated forms of transnationalism identified by Steven Vertovec (2000) – as a site of political engagement and as a (re)construction of place and culture. In addition to these concerns this research also queries the role of the meso-link - the role of organizations (or in this case Foundations) in promoting, maintaining or establishing transnational relations. One of the key problems facing my research is that there have been only a few works completed on small civil society organizations participating in regional institutions and programmes in the Mediterranean that seeks to explore their relation to regional cultures or analyze their adoption of transnational practices. As a result, data and experiences related to these specific areas will need to be produced before it can be analyzed further. Table 1 (from Pries 2007) establishes the distinction between transnational research and traditional comparative research based on states and bounded communities and studies of the World System largely influenced by Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches to political economy. This table is useful as a starting point.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Types of international studies</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Units of reference</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>nation states, national societies, boundary fixed containers</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Units of analysis</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>social classes, values, institutions, identity</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Units of measurement</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>individuals, households, rituals, texts, practices</td>
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(from Pries 2007)

One aspect that should be highlighted as it is important for the study at hand is the exclusion of ‘practices’ from the units of measurement within ‘Transnational Studies’. There are undoubtedly unique practices that correlate to transnational ways of living or contesting politics and this has been made clear in the review of current literature that tends to rely rather heavily on identifying these practices. Pries does acknowledge this point in his original discussion of the differences
separating these approaches. Naturally, this table is not exhaustive nor is it to be taken as the finite attributes of each approach but rather sets out some basic differences and highlights the essential frame of reference for the study at hand. The purpose of this section is to explain how I will seek to answer the central questions of this research project: **What is the role of culture and civil society in constructing a Euro-Mediterranean space?** And also secondary questions: **How has transnationalization of politics contributed to new avenues for strategic action and cooperation? How do regional organizations provide frames for civil society actors? How are these frames employed and contested by members and participants?** In pursuance of these questions I will employ the case study approach, which will entail various methods at different points of the project. These are document collection and analysis, interviews and observation/ethnography. My research is intended to explore the actual experiences and practices of civil society actors participating in regional activities, a purpose for which survey research is not best suited (Byrne 2004; Hoggart et al 2002). As I am primarily interested in practices, meanings and understandings the interpretive approach is most conducive as a means to discovering the meaning that people ascribe to their environment(s). As such, the case study will be exploratory and oriented towards description. Throughout the application of these techniques scrutiny of the position of the researcher as a participant and component in the process will be central (Dowling 2000).

The application of the case study approach for a transnationally oriented study is potentially a controversial one. In terms of generating a more global sociology or transnational methodology there has been a great deal of interest in the idea of multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1995; Falzon 2009; Köngeter and Wolff 2010). This approach stresses the actual network from which social phenomena are constructed. Instead of focusing on particular sites it stresses the relations between multiple sites and actors. In Marcus’ original terms it is an approach oriented towards following whether that be in terms of things, ideas, concepts or persons. There is much to be said about this approach and it has direct impact upon the consideration of observation and the application of the case study approach especially in terms of tracing the meaning of particular ideas and identifications (like the ‘Mediterranean’ itself). But the intention of
generating a multi-sited ethnography – to underscore the fluidity and unboundedness of certain relations – can also be ameliorated with the case study approach. As Bill Graham argues, the case is not in itself the context and can never be truly bounded (2000, 1). If we take Graham’s understanding of the case it is possible to view specific units of analysis as elements of a broader context and set of relations but also retain internal coherence for case study. This chapter will discuss the three specific methods being employed justifying their use and also referring to questions of instrumentation. It will then go on to discuss sampling and data collection and analysis in which questions of reliability and validity will be addressed with regard to the qualitative approach.

**Methods**

*Document collection and analysis*

An important technique used throughout the research will be that of document analysis. This will include such texts as official documents, reports, statistics, speeches and other written and visual materials. This will include archived materials and on-going reports as well as texts from conferences, workshops and other events as may be suitable. The collection of these documents will be beneficial for setting up the parameters of particular investigations, exploring the relevance of modes of enquiry and for contributing insight to the significance of specific concepts, ideas and practices. As such, the analysis of documents is the central aspect of the on-going study and will play an important role in each stage of the research. Accessing documents from the European Union and the Anna Lindh Foundation is relatively easy and there are few problems of access. But these are largely official, finished records intended for public record. Access to meeting minutes, unofficial speeches and internal reports can offer much greater insight but these rely on either participation or the ability to make useful connections to participants and practitioners. To benefit this area I will do the utmost to leverage existing contacts that I have from my time working at the European Parliament and new contacts made during initial meetings with members of the Anna Lindh Foundation.
The information contributed by these documents of course cannot be taken for granted. Rather than viewed as expressing facts they should be treated in interpretive fashion as documents - like data – are based on or express representations of political and social constructions (May 1993, 51). The other side of this scenario is the way in which the document is read by the researcher. This relates to the argumentation applied by a researcher in favor of a particular reading whereby the researcher attempts to persuade the reader of its validity (Gerring 1998, 298). Formal logic is important as is framing and clarity. But as Gerring (1998, 298) also points out, this approach is crucially about analyzing the language that is being used and interpreting the significance of language as representing political experience, or practices. In other words, qualitative forms of document analysis are utterly interpretive and argumentative. Critics of this approach suggest that the findings tend to be vague and situational, or worse that they are “conjectural, non-verifiable...arrived at by sheer intuition and individual guesswork” (Cohen 1974, 5). But this harsh criticism can only be valid if the researcher does not practice reflexivity when making an argument or conducting research. Intuition is not an inherently bad thing, nor is guesswork if it can subsequently be backed up by evidence, logical argument, and openness on the part of the researcher with regard to initial assumptions and orientation. Thus, what the researcher aims for is credibility and the production of a believable account (Richerson and Boyd 2004, 411). Document analysis alone, however, cannot provide all of the data necessary to achieve the goals of this research. Documents may be incomplete or only offer one viewpoint on a particular issue. For this reason it will be necessary to use in-depth interviews and observation as supplementary methods.

**In-depth Interviewing**

I would like you to think about experiences you have had of participating in regional activities that have significantly affected your interest, understanding or practice in your own organization or orientation to regional issues. Please describe, in as much detail as you can remember, the circumstances surrounding these experiences. (General opening)

In an interview the answers given by the respondent provide the essential raw data to be analyzed later in the research process (Ackroyd and Hughes 1983, 66). The main task then is to understand the meaning of interviewees’ responses
(Kvale 1996). This essential basis links different interviewing styles that can be appropriate for different methods. I will focus on the semi-structured interviewing style as it offers the ideal balance between general and comparative questions while also allowing space for maximum understanding of the interviewees' perspective(s). This style is more favorable to the structured interview as it offers little room for interviewees to introduce new ideas or considerations in the context of the interview. As a result, it does not offer an adequate basis on which to interpret meanings attributed by actors to specific phenomena. The superior comparability offered by structured interviews is willfully sacrificed for greater depth of understanding and less generalizability. On the other end, the focused interviewing style adds a great deal of benefit in terms of focusing on the individual perspective. In addition to this it allows the interviewee to refer more readily to their own 'frames of reference' when responding to questions (May 1993, 94). The flexibility of this style allows maximum understanding but suffers from a limited ability to compare interviews with each other (Ibid). This limitation makes the semi-structured interview the most ideal as it balances the benefits and shortcomings of both the structured and focused styles. With this in mind, some of the questions for the interviews will be prepared beforehand in order to guarantee a basic level of correspondence and comparison between interviews. As suggested, one of the advantages of pursuing the in-depth semi-structured form is that it allows for both a conversational style and allows for some variation whereby interviewees can expand on their personal experiences (Valentine 1997, 111).

Questions of accessibility and cognition are central to any process of interviewing. Accessibility generally refers to the ability of the interviewee to answer the questions being asked, or to access the information being sought (May 1993, 97). Cognition refers to the interviewee understanding what is being asked of him or her (ibid). Accessibility is, of course, more important in the case of the structured interview whereby specific facts are being sought. But it is also important that questions are designed such that they are appropriate and clear to the interviewee. Köngeter and Wolff’s (2012) discussion of experience (via John Dewey) is useful in considering these two issues together. They note that experience is dependent upon the acting individual doing something with their
experience after-the-fact. Highly significant events can remain unrecognized whereas passing experiences can be taken as highly important. There is no pre-given formula for what may be established as significant. But rather it is entirely contingent. Processing of experience often takes place at what the authors describe as hybrid in-between sites which they define as “sites at which the processor is neither here nor there: eating with colleagues, during a common leisure activity or much later, back at home, at meetings of ‘ex-volunteers’” (Köngeter and Wolff 2012, 7). These hybrid in-between sites exist in a liminal zone where local identities entangle with transnational and global commitments in a similar way to participating in forums and conferences. So the site of the interview is critical when planning. Another important problem relates to the relationship between the interviewer and interviewee. This is an important issue as different cultures, religions, nationalities and personal beliefs will be represented. Interviewees may respond very differently based on their own identity but also based upon how they view their relationship with the interviewer. As a result, each interview will need to be considered individually to ensure that the interviewee is comfortable with the interviewer but without altering the essential style of interview. This can be as simple as style of dress or venue but may also include speech-pattern and use of language. Ultimately, the semi-structured interview offers the most useful way to deal with these problems as it allows flexibility at the same time as a minimum level of standardization and strong reliability. In order to benefit this aim I will employ a set of standard procedures when conducting the interview. This will consist of a basic list of questions based on the funneling approach. This approach initiates the interview with a general introduction and icebreaker question followed by a broad question related to the topic (an example of which begins this section) to get the interviewee comfortable and to allow them to engage slowly. Each question will then be followed up by sub-questions, though there will be room to advance slower or quicker depending upon the experience of each interviewee. Finally, to ensure a high-level of fidelity is maintained across interviews and into the analysis phase I will record interviews with a voice-recording device and transcribe them as soon as possible following each interview’s completion.
**Observation/Ethnography: events and organizations**

This section will discuss the method of observation, as it will be applied for this research. I largely draw upon a limited ethnographic approach to applying observation within the context of specific events and potentially within an organizational setting. Ethnography can be defined as "a certain style of research distinguished by its objectives to understand the social meanings and activities of people in a given field or setting" (Brewer 2000, 11). Furthermore, the ethnographic approach also generally entails a mixture of specific methods such as direct observation, social interaction, interviewing, data collection, documents “and open-endedness in the direction the study takes” (Fielding 1995, 157). As such it colludes nicely with the other methods being employed. The role of observation in this research is inspired by discussions of ethnography because of its centrality in research on transnationalism and because of its comprehensive treatment of the practice and use of observation for research. Inspired by pioneers of this approach such as Boaz and Malinowski, purists would define ethnography as essentially “living with and living like those who are studied’ (Van Maanen 1988, 2). However, the definition offered by Brewer (above) suggests a more flexible relationship to the specific location of research. This is crucial for transnational research in which: “The local, regional, national, and global are not automatic, taken-for-granted social arenas, but rather categories that must be investigated as constructed and contested social facts” (Khagram and Levitt 2005, 26).

Bate (1997) decries the abundance of ‘airplane ethnography’ based on brief trips to-and-fro by the academic or researcher. This is a worthy criticism and one that is fitting to the task at hand. But the intention here is not to engage in a thorough ethnographic technique but to leverage particular aspects of the ethnographic approach for events. The ethnographic ‘being there’ (Yanow et al 2012) is critical for the analysis of particular events or in accounts of organizational life. For events in particular, the time frame is limited and requires the researcher to multi-task in relation to the use of different skills and goals. Effective interviewing and complementary document analysis can then follow up ‘being there’ once particular questions and phenomena have been identified during this experiential phase. As Yanow et al (2012) point out with
regard to organizational ethnography there are two additional benefits that this approach implies: sensitivity to hidden dimensions and to actor-context relations. This sensitivity to hidden meanings can be seen in the discussion of hybrid in-between spaces where practitioners fall into routine or taken-for-granted understandings until confronted by the researcher or placed outside of their zone of familiarity. This can be challenging for the participant as it can be seen as contrary to their beliefs or interpretations. As a result, the reflexivity of the researcher is of critical importance as part of a consideration over the ethical implications (Yanow et al 2012, 338).

In relation to this, role is another important aspect of conducting ethnographic work as it determines the relationship between the researcher and the subjects of study. My role at events would take the role of ‘observer as participant’ whereby I spend time with other participants, get involved in the tasks and workshops but still maintain my identity as a researcher, thus avoiding full immersion (David and Sutton 2011, 158). However, this is also a relationship that is in constant negotiation. For example, workshop scenarios require full participation in order to maintain the integrity of the environment, which could be affected by the presence of a complete observer. Full participation is potentially dangerous if the perspective of the research is not maintained. It would be easy in this situation to become too involved or to compete with other participants, thereby affecting the environment or outcomes, and potentially also internal validity. So as Hammersley and Atkinson (1995, 109) point out, this relationship needs to be managed in order to avoid marginality but also to ensure that the researcher does not lose his/her own perspective based in the research. Another problem is that of access. Gaining access can be difficult in the first place but there is also the risk of introducing bias to the study (David and Sutton 2011, 156) and determining the ultimate direction of the research (though this need to necessarily be a negative outcome). These are problems that need to be considered in terms of sampling and the determination of best practices for the study at hand.

During observation extensive notes will be taken according to three criteria: reflective notes, descriptive notes and demographic information. Notes will be taken in a dedicated notebook and will be typed on a computer as quickly
as possible following the observation phase. Reflective notes will include specific ideas, thoughts, feelings, impressions and speculations of the researcher during the observation (Boglan and Biklen 1992, 121 in Creswell 2009, 182). Descriptive notes will focus on details of the events and people involved including visual and physical criteria. Finally, demographic information is the date, time, place information (Creswell 2009, 182). This practice will be maintained throughout and will help to ensure validity in the final analysis of the data/observation.

**Sampling**

Sampling will be necessary as it will not be possible to involve the entire population for reasons of geographical distance, resources and time. Selecting a limited number of cases will benefit this research as it will allow in-depth exploration of each case rather than employ a thin understanding of many general cases (Moser and Kalton 1983, 57). The units of analysis will be civil society organizations and social and political actors who are members of regional institutions and activities. It will also include people working in regional institutions, like the Anna Lindh Foundation, and officials from regional bodies, including the European Union and Union for the Mediterranean. Ascertaining the actual sample will require a few different techniques applied in conjunction and at different stages of the study (Strauss and Corbin 1998). These techniques will primarily consist of a multi-stage approach of purposive and snowball sampling. Problems of population size and geographic distance as well as financial and time constraints make these two techniques the most effective. The use of these techniques will maximize the samples’ representativeness. Generalizability will be sacrificed for thorough exploration of a limited sample. As the research is focused on subjective experiences this is not a shortcoming. The purpose is not to construct an accurate and general depiction of the entirety of relations but to offer a precise and thick analysis of the impact of regional developments on specific actors through their own roles and experiences.

Purposive sampling will be employed based on the experience of attending events in the UK and France during which potential participants were
identified, approached and given a brief introduction to the topic. Participating in
the events allowed the researcher to observe different actors and gave an idea of
how they fit into organizational and regional politics. This then also made it
possible to evaluate each actor’s relevance and representativeness for the
sample. The purposive technique is appropriate alongside snowballing whereby
selected participants (or cases) introduce the researcher to other possible
participants. This is a beneficial approach to discovering the social networks of
participants and offers an informal way to access a larger sample (Atkinson and
Flint 2001). This approach reflects some of the ideas inherent to the multi-sited
ethnography approach that is important in transnational research as it allows for
a gradual discovery of the networks that exist between actors with common
affinities (or ethnic origins) across boundaries. This networking aspect could be
an important aspect of the study as it can reveal the geographical extent and the
social density of relations among regional actors. In some ways then the positive
aspect for this study outweighs the negatives inherent in the snowballing
technique. This lies in the possibility of introducing bias by reflecting like-
minded or self-selected individuals over a random or more representative
sample. But any mode of sampling for this research will have to contend with the
major constraints of population size, time, resources and geographical distance.
Some of these problems can and will be overcome through the use of Skype,
email and phone calls.

Analysis, Reliability and Validity
The final issues to be discussed pertain to reliability and validity. Qualitative
reliability generally refers to ensuring the consistency of methods (Creswell
2009, 190). Also, as Yin (2003) points out all procedures should be documented
including specific steps that are part of individual methods. This offers the
possibility of replication in the future by either the same researcher or other
researchers in the field. In order to ensure reliability a database of steps for each
method will be created and maintained throughout the research process.
Standard procedures for the interviews in terms of recording, structure and style
will be used as much as possible without affecting the experience of the
interviewee. Also, a standard protocol for note taking during observation will also ensure that steps can be replicated as far as the individual steps go. Validity is a bit more complex for qualitative research and can be divided into the categories of internal and external validity.

Validity broadly refers to the accuracy of the findings. Creswell and Miller (2000) identify validity as being linked to concepts of trustworthiness, authenticity and credibility and they argue that validity is actually one of the key strengths of qualitative research. Internal validity, from a social constructivist approach, is based on the trustworthiness of the work and analysis within the research (Mishler 1990, 419). This requires the researcher to remain dedicated to the experience of the participant and/or the data. Validity in this regard can be reviewed by going back to recordings, tapes and field notes to ensure that the spirit of the case remains central in the analysis. In some cases this may require secondary interviews or clarifications on points. External validity tends to refer to generalizability, which is somewhat compromised in the qualitative approach. However it is important to clearly record descriptive criteria, locations, contexts that would allow other researchers to reliably consider transferring the approach to other cases. External validity also requires an analysis of the representativeness of the sample to the rest of the population.

In order to ensure validity it will be important to exercise a number of strategies through each phase of research. Clarifying bias and discussing discrepant information will be central to the task (Creswell 2009, 191). Bias has already been mentioned as a problem during sampling and gathering data but it will also be dealt with through the analysis where it will be possible to reflect on the impact and significance of instances of bias that may be (or may have been) introduced to the study. Similarly, discrepant information will be discussed during the analysis. Both of these discussions can help to build a realistic and valid account of the case under study. The data will also be approached with the specific strategies in mind of triangulation and thick description (Ibid, 192).

Triangulating findings across multiple sources and types of material can ensure accuracy of interpretation and increase the persuasiveness of the argument. The use of document analysis, interviews and observation in complement will allow for effective triangulation. Thick description ensures that the write-up and
analysis is thoroughly based in the reality, beliefs and lives of the participants (David and Sutton 2011, 20). Validity and reliability will be built into each method and stage of analysis followed by a discussion of any issues or problems that arise. The methods have been selected according to their appropriateness for the study but also for their strong reliability and validity with the use of a clear protocol of procedures for each step.

Conclusion

In studying the Euro-Mediterranean region there exists the opportunity to reflect the transnationalization of Europe as opposed to solely the Europeanization of its ‘neighborhood’. As is commonly noted, the EU's borders do not fit the national mould of distinct sides but are, to the contrary, based on complexity and a certain ‘fuzziness’ (O'Dowd and Dimitrovova 2010; Christiansen et al 2000; Zielonka 2006). The approach taken in this research highlights that this fuzziness is fundamental to the European project and in its relations with its near-abroad. There is a long and complex history between both shores of the Mediterranean, however it is only fairly recently that these relations have begun to be formalized through institutions. Functionally, the EU is limited in terms of external instruments, and opportunism on both the part of EU policy-makers and state leaders has often reduced the scope of cooperation in the region. The purpose of this research is to delve beyond the bilateral relations favored within the ENP framework and investigate the opportunities and realities of networking among societal organizations and social actors on both sides of the Mediterranean; and from this to respond to the question, what role do transnational networks play in constructing cultural relations between Europe and the Mediterranean (specifically as part of the Euro-Mediterranean space)? One assumption being that it is not only through formal and official channels that political, and social, developments evolve. This research examines the role of cultural networks within Europe and networking organizations in the EuroMediterranean in constructing a Euro-Mediterranean space and giving voice to alternative representations.
There are two broad aspects to this study; the first section begins conceptually by considering the process of transnationalization and how it relates to the relationship between culture and politics. It then moves to consider the role that transnational cultural networks have played in the evolution of an external cultural policy within Europe and helped to establish influential discourses of transnationalism within such policy fields. The second major section turns to understanding the realities of networking through a key regional organization – The Anna Lindh Foundation – established in this context of these transformations. This research considers the Euro-Mediterranean within the context of global and transnational change and through evolving forms of political contestation. As suggested above, the symbolic and constructed nature of the Euro-Mediterranean is a problem to be considered throughout and is an important aspect of interrogating the region from multiple perspectives.
Chapter 2: Background Literature: Going beyond fragmentation vs. unity

This chapter expands on some of the ideas and themes discussed in the introduction by reviewing the academic literature that has explicitly analyzed the development of Euro-Mediterranean relations as well as literature that makes a contribution to the understanding of cultures and boundaries, civil society and transnationalism. These latter sections also begin to elaborate key themes that influence the approach taken in this research which aspires to a wider (transnational) perspective on understanding cultural relations. As such it demonstrates the relevance and ongoing significance of the research subject. It also establishes a gap in the discussion of Euro-Mediterranean cultural relations in terms of the subject of study – the Anna Lindh Foundation and its related networks – and in approach by understanding the evolution of such networks in a global context.

The review begins by addressing a theme common to much of the literature in EuroMediterranean relations and moves on to consider some key ideas and concepts that provide an intellectual backdrop to the issues discussed in the remaining sections. The review then moves on to consider cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean. This section is divided into three sub-sections divided temporally and thematically. The first sub-section considers the development of institutional frameworks and their inclusion of culture. The second sub-section reviews the EU’s response to the Arab Spring and its impact on existing frameworks. The final sub-section begins to theorize the cultural impact of the Arab Spring on regional actors and, by extension, their role in regional politics. The third, and final, section of this chapter reviews contributions to the study of transnationalism in order to set out elements of a transnational approach drawing on networking, experiential, and practical accounts. It raises the possibility of incorporating some of the insights from this literature to bear on the development of EuroMediterranean relations and suggests the ability to help illuminate the politico-strategic motivations of
promoting regional networks, as well as way in which participants might experience and engage with overarching narrative frames.

Perhaps one of the fundamental difficulties is how to understand the regionality of the Mediterranean. It is an issue that is bound to produce a variety of interpretations depending on the favored approach or subject. The theme of fragmentation vs. unity dominates the literature that sets out to understand the significance and origins of developments in the region. This is not always explicit but betrays the reliance on a dualism that suggests only two possible avenues for understanding the nature of developments – *good* integration through political and economic cooperation and *bad* fragmentation as a result of cultural difference and resorting to state power. The result leads to an assumption of conflict resulting from difference. Approaches such as regionalization attempt to overcome this duality through the inclusion of civil society as a tertiary factor. However, this approach too relies heavily on economic and state-based interactions that favor an understanding of integration through formal and political means. What this section demonstrates is the need for an approach that recognizes that diversity and hybridity is not a problem but a core element of regional cooperation. Thus, the final section sets out an approach based on a multifold understanding of transnationalism that offers a way to bring hybridity and complexity back in to the study of cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean and a nuanced understanding of how power relations are produced through networked relations.

As Michelle Pace (2006) has pointed out, International Relations literature often treats the ‘region’ is in a holistic manner; that is, the region is assumed to have an identity separate from its parts. Instead, the author proposes the study of a Mediterranean *area*, which supposes multiple constructions and realities (Pace 2006, 2). This approach would avoid a representation of the region as a homogeneous unit and offers a better way to incorporate a variety of cultural contexts. Whereas for Pace this involved particular constructions of the region on the part of EU elites and policy-makers, it would also be beneficial to consider the way in which civil society actors respond to and take part in interactions across the Mediterranean and with these political constructions. Avoiding the reification of a Euro-Mediterranean region will be very important
for understanding the development of cultural interactions and regional identifications. However, it should also be possible to consider the Mediterranean and constructions of the Euro-Mediterranean without breaking it down to the sum of its parts. In addition to these two approaches we can add cross-border cooperation, which incorporates many of the insights of these approaches and offers an understanding of the region in terms of opportunity structures and processes of socialization, thus going beyond a general conception of the 'region'. With the development of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) it is worth reconsidering the form and function of regional developments.

Another important observation is that this concern for creating a more conciliatory space was not only reflected in the EU’s external relations. As Isabel Schäfer points out, the Mediterranean as a concept was somewhat in vogue in the 1990s during which time North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), Council of Europe as well as the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) all created programmes designed to increase cooperation across the sea (Schäfer 2007: 337-338). UNESCO’s Mediterranean program, established in 1994, also put forth the idea that stability in the Mediterranean region relied upon the convergence of cultures and identities (Ibid). It is during the development of these programs that the central theme of fragmentation versus unity becomes a mainstay reflecting both the cultural debate over the *clash of civilisations/dialogue of civilisations* and the political and economic imperatives of region building.

**Key Concepts and Ideas**

**Regionalism, states and civil society**
The EMP can be understood as an emerging *multidimensional regime* establishing links between issue areas rather than separating out areas of interest and dominance (Xenakis 2000; Panebianco 2003; Attina 1996). Approaching the regional framework from the perspective of regimes implicates a form of regionalization that encompasses a wide range of actors – state and
non-state – and includes an important cultural element as a result of interdependence (Chryssochou and Xenakis 2002). Chryssochou and Xenakis argue that we should favor a view of the Mediterranean as constituted ‘between complexity and reality’ and through the ‘enduring influence of cultural distinctiveness and civilizational diversity in the politics of regional order-building’ (2002, 143). The authors are correct in asserting that we must recognize that the Euro-Mediterranean is uniquely constituted between the multiple external and internal regional policies and institutions and that fragmentation that is often decisive in the political sphere. Or, as Joffe (2001) mentions, the Euro-Mediterranean “appears to be part of a dualism, bringing together the structured integration of the European Union itself and the ‘open regionalism…which is said to characterise the Barcelona Process’ (Joffe 2001, 207). Since this observation there has been a significant increase in the number and overall development of institutions in the region and there is perhaps ever more complexity. Joffe’s (2001) analysis definitely points towards the importance of the region for security and perhaps also directs us towards the idea of the security community as the prime regional dynamic (see Adler and Crawford 2005). On the other hand, the problems of security and migration in the Mediterranean are framed in terms of their impact on European countries, not in terms of a regional solution (Joffe 2001, 217). This approach points towards a realist model rather than any regionalizing dynamic. And while it certainly has the ability to produce accurate criticism of EU policy-making in the Mediterranean region it also does not pick up on some of the ways in which regional actors – both governmental and non-governmental actors – influence the direction of cooperation initiatives.

Implicit within the regionalization approach is an understanding of globalization. Stephen Calleya (1997), contrary to these arguments, doubts the regionalization of the Mediterranean due to the politicized nature of interactions (Calleya 1997, 229). While there has been some progress on areas of political interaction it is still largely limited to areas of economic concern and security, despite the numerous initiatives since the Barcelona Declaration. Additionally, the difficulties associated with the EMP have been linked to integration fatigue leaving political elites skeptical of additional proposals. Taking this as our basis,
however, would ignore the important areas of increased interaction and engagement at not only the political level but even in the social and cultural fields that remain underdeveloped in the framework of EU polices. The forms of political interaction are at their very heart globally produced as well as affected by the geopolitics of proximity. The New Regionalism Approach presumes a more nuanced link to global processes (Hettne and Soderbaum 2000; Hettne 1999) offering an understanding of regional development based upon a multidimensional process – economic, social, political and cultural – that suggests a more significant role for non-state actors (Hettne 1999, 17). However, the state-market-civil society triangle limits our ability to engage with non-institutionalised political and social actors through the implicit primacy given to state actors and economic interests and affords relatively little attention to non-official and non-economic civil society actors. Thus, while it can introduce many important factors and can even highlight the existence of various actors it cannot adequately deal with their roles, experiences and influences on the process of creating a Euro-Mediterranean space. The institutional approach can be supplemented by a keener attention to social factors. Due to a relatively narrow definition of globalization in terms of economic expansion and state-driven politics it does not adequately deal with the loci of particular influences or the significance of social and cultural factors. On the other hand, this type of approach suggests that the various policy initiatives and institutions are best seen in terms of an overall institutionalization of political and economic interactions across the region. So to understand a ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ we cannot separate these various aspects but recognize their interconnectedness. The official concept of variable geometry recognizes this interconnectedness but in practice maintains a strict hierarchy between the economic, political and social fields generally favoring economic development.

Some have already questioned whether the UfM represents a turning away from the regional approach inherent in the EMP (Kausch and Youngs 2009; Aliboni 2009). Certainly some of the progress made in terms of civil society engagement under the EMP through the Civil Forums and the development of initiatives such as the Anna Lindh Foundation (a late development) deserve fresh attention in terms of the new geopolitical picture. Geopolitical factors play an
important role for the way in which social relations are structured and the way in which political and social actors relate. As noted by Bicchi (2010) in her analysis of EU-North Africa relations in the context of the European Neighborhood Policy, neighboring states have been capable of separating favorable dimensions from unfavorable ones, such as economic elements from political (Bicchi 2010). Civil society is one area that is generally under significant threat from this possibility. Furthermore, the ability of states to separate these elements is strengthened by the strategy of differentiation as practiced within the ENP. This has further negative consequences for the success of networks and societal actors by increasing the ability of states to inhibit density and intensity of relations for political reasons. The UfM also appears to push national interests to the fore and further threaten the possibility of multilateralism and a cohesive regional approach to socio-cultural issues, democracy promotion, or human rights (Bicchi 2011).

The UfM marks a fundamental change in direction from the EMP and the ENP and the new ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity’ (PfDSP) appears to ferment this new direction in EU Mediterranean policy as it explicitly refers to establishing a greater role for the UfM - alongside “positive elements of the Barcelona Process” - by continuing the strategy of ‘variable geometry’ (COM(2011) 200, 11). This is reflected in the EU’s joint communication on the European Neighborhood Policy wherein the UfM is endorsed as a complement to the bilateral approach of the ENP, which in turn would allow Action Plans to focus on fewer priorities (COM(2011) 303, 18). The development of new and existing cultural initiatives is notably absent, even within discussion of the promotion of ‘partnership between people.’ This new functional – project-oriented - direction posits a uniquely ‘EU’ropean brand of region-building to the contrary of many previous arguments focusing on the role of normative values. However, it cannot be said at this point exactly what direction these developments will take. As Gillespie (2008) noted from the outset, the UfM looks to orient regional policy towards the EU. Moreover, implicit in this approach is a conception of functionally limited cooperation, which establishes a potential basis for economic integration (Calleya 2009). Alun Jones (2011), a political geographer, effectively links region-building and regionalization processes in his
analysis of the region-building imperatives of the EU within the Mediterranean. Jones’ analysis highlights the ways in which the Mediterranean is spatially constructed in order to legitimize EU political actions. This spatial approach focuses upon the territorial, symbolic and institutional constructions that together form the basis behind political constructions of the region. Territorially, EU elites construct the region as lacking any collective identity either politically or ideationally. In response, regionalization practices are justified. Symbolic constructions depict the Mediterranean as politically and economically volatile and threatening to EU democracies and economies. These constructions lend legitimacy to the extension of EU governance practices and the institutionalization of political practices across the Mediterranean region in a process of Europeanization (Jones 2011, 42). This spatial perspective reveals the complex imaginaries that are employed by political actors. What requires further consideration is how the existing institutions and instruments for fostering regional interaction with civil societies are incorporated into these constructions. Building on this will allow a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between civil society actors and regional development. The Anna Lindh Foundation, which has its basis in the EMP and has developed during a period of transition to the UfM, offers a unique institutionalization of the socio-cultural element of Euro-Mediterranean policies. Particular interests are reflected in the development of the Foundation, however it also produces novel opportunity structures and patterns of interaction among civil society actors that were previously limited to the Civil Forums. A stronger analysis of the ALF is thus required to understand its role in the region in fostering regional networking among civil society actors as well as in the promotion of intercultural dialogue. Understanding the role and capacity of civil society actors to engage with the developing institutions and forms of regionalism is perhaps better served by a more focused analysis on the specific opportunity structures.

Concepts of Culture
Returning to cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean requires a sensitive approach to culture that can account for different traditions, practices, and discourses. Pieterse (2009), for example, understands culture as being learned (not instinctual) and shared (not individual) leaving no territorial limits to
culture and opening it up to experience. Thus, he distinguishes between *territorial culture* and *translocal culture* (Pieterse 2009, 48). Linked to the broader idea of hybridization, it is a distinction that is crucial in terms of understanding the context of cultural identities and practices while at the same time linking us directly to the implications of boundary crossing. Ultimately, we cannot pursue an effective intercultural or transcultural agenda without first recognizing the true value and extent of difference. Thus, between an overly static depiction of culture (i.e.: clash of civilizations) or an overly dynamic understanding this approach suggests that there are both more structural elements to culture and more fluid elements (Pieterse 1996, 1392-1393). Communication strategies and the incorporation of technologies are an example of the more fluid aspect of culture however there are also deep-seated understandings and practices which, if misunderstood, may limit any reconciliation between cultures. As a result, this distinction between territorial and trans-local culture is highly beneficial theoretically but for the consideration of cultural interactions and power asymmetries we need to begin with a substantial account of the contents of cultural interactions.

The idea of Multiple Modernities, most closely associated with the work of Schmuel Eisenstadt, offers a useful way to reconsider some of the problems associated with previous accounts of culture in the Euro-Mediterranean area and one that also accounts for the central role of social actors and social movements in helping to determine the course of modern transformation in different societies. Eisenstadt argues that: “the various programmes of modernity that developed in these [western] societies have been continuously crystallized through the process of a highly selective incorporation and transformation in these civilizations of the various premises of Western modernity” (Eisenstadt 2000). In terms of the Euro-Mediterranean this is an intriguing point of departure as it is undoubtedly an EU construction institutionally and also in terms of a regional identity. However, it also incorporates various regional actors that do not share the same sense of state-society relations. As pointed out by Stefan Stetter (2008), there can be said to be an element of cultural path-dependency which shape distinct forms of modernity but which also allow us to
recognize both processes of isomorphization and heteromorphization (Stetter 2008, 23-4).

Isomorphization, the development of common institutions and political and social practices, can be found across the Mediterranean and is a result of the intermingling of societies and governments as well as of power asymmetries and the consequences of colonialism. The emergence of new media stations – Al-Jazeera being the most widely recognized – along with satellite technology and various social media have also influenced isomorphic developments in both institutional and cultural terms through the imposition of market forces and new technologies. Heteromorphization, however, can be seen as the unique historical, cultural and geographical circumstances leading to differentiated developments within individual states and societies. A useful example of this, which also helps us to move away from bounding the idea solely in terms of nations, is the way in which Islamic movements have re-appropriated (not rejected) the common elements of modernity through a process of publicity, professionalization and diversifying (Göle 2002). Contrary to modernization theory, Nilufer Göle’s insight reveals that it is not a question of compatibility between religious movements and ‘modernity’ but rather a question of how they interact. Linked to heteromorphization is the totality of implicit understandings that inform the beliefs and practices in society – the social imaginary (Taylor 1992, 218-219). Values in this sense are continuously transformed by the interaction with and across modernities, however wholesale change is unlikely.

As Charles Taylor (1992) argues with regard to the development of the public spheres in the West, it is the commonly held values, beliefs and practices that make the development of any public sphere possible. This is an idea that will also be picked up on in the subsequent discussion of civil society, but it is informative here as it draws us away from considering Western developments solely in terms of rationalization and individualization, though these were also features in the case of the West, and draws us back to some of the historical and religious beliefs that have undergone their own transformations and have informed developments across time. The social imaginary may be a somewhat vague and difficult term to apply but it is interesting as it allows us to consider
the communal aspect of modernity thus positing multiple interpretations, the Western experience being only one.

In this sense, the multiple modernities approach does allow us to consider what is common across the differentiations of the modern period without referring to a particular ‘global condition’ (Wittrock 2003, 55). Volker Schmidt (2006) criticizes the multiple modernities approach for being overly cultural and as a result for failing to acknowledge the profound socio-economic transformations associated with modern development. He suggests that this approach implies: “that there must be greater variance across civilizational lines than across time” (Schmidt 2006, 81). Though Schmidt is correct to assert that we must be more specific about the nature of differences his temporal criticism only seems to make sense if we limit our discussion to economic (specifically capitalist) development, which asserts the convergence of social and cultural attitudes. On the contrary, as has been discussed in terms of isomorphization and heteromorphization, there is a more complex relationship between the cultural and socio-economic elements. As a result, one of the key aspects of the multiple modernities approach is to avoid the presumption that there is one particular path to modernity (as per modernization theory) and instead suggests the significance of on-going interpretation and interaction. This is not to deny the centrality of the global capitalist market or even the existence of global values changes across different cultures, however these transformations are in large part still culturally determined rather than standardized (Sachsenmeier 2001, 44).

Dirlik (2003) suggests that the theory of multiple modernities ultimately rests upon a reification of cultural identities based upon the nation-state and as a result reinforces a Western cultural bias (Dirlik 2003). The example of Islamic movements offers a counter-argument but this is still an important point. States often portray themselves in cultural terms, though it is usually representative of only a relatively small portion of the overall population and only one among many cultural communities. As a result, Islamist movements can be highly threatening to the state not only in terms of their capacity for mobilization but also as an opponent of the particular state culture. In terms of the territorial – trans-local distinction it might be tempting to characterize these Islamist groups
as evoking territorial forms of culture whereas more secular elites (such as Kemalist elites in Turkey) may represent a trans-local culture. However, this runs the risk of equating trans-local forms with secular or westernized values. Instead, social movements should be seen a crucial actors in determining the direction of modern developments (Eisenstadt 2002). This also requires there to be more than one cultural understanding within any state. As such: “modernity is not one but many; modernity is not new, but old and familiar; modernity is incomplete and necessarily so” (Gaonkar 1999, 18). The modern world should be seen not as homogenization but as a continual constitution and reconstitution of a multiplicity of cultural programs and the Euro-Mediterranean should be similarly considered. Additionally, we should recognize the competitiveness within Arab societies of different cultural and political worldviews (Salem 2002).

Post-colonial approaches have specifically taken up this challenge in considering the Mediterranean as a ‘post-colonial sea’, which stresses the unsettled and imaginary constructions that have served to historically and politically define the region (Chambers 2008). However to understand the Euro-Mediterranean we should also be careful to place policy and institutional developments as key additional factors in the development of interactions. To do this is not to take on the problem of a culturist-universalist divide as has been asserted between the discourse of human rights versus political interests (Biad 2003) but to recognize the cultural content across different representations and discourses. In this context intercultural dialogue represents an ideal of political and social cooperation that goes beyond this divide. In the Euro-Mediterranean intercultural dialogue is both a key aspect of EU policy and a stage in the development of an alternative approach to the Euro-Mediterranean. As a result, the practice of intercultural dialogue can neither be separated from the cultural context nor from the political context, which makes it highly problematic (as demonstrated by Del Sarto 2005) in practice but also very significant for understanding the heterogeneity of the Euro-Mediterranean. It also calls for a better integration of social elements as part of a dialogue. In many ways, the prominence of the nation-state for political struggle limits the applicability of notions such as intercultural dialogue, which would surely require the development of identities beyond the nation-state in order to be more inclusive
and open. Intercultural dialogue, however, when linked to the nation-state establishes an automatic divide between cultural and political units and reproduces existing power structures (Sachsenmeier 2001, 57).

So how can we incorporate the complex political contexts into an understanding of cultural interaction? The concept of the encounter provides the crucial basis for assisting our understanding. Delanty (2011) establishes a typology of the encounter based upon a relational understanding of culture. As such, the encounter focuses on the substance of interaction and the possible consequences of different types of interaction. The typology presented by Delanty portrays a spectrum from conflict and hostility to fusion or syncretism (2011, 644-647). The different types of encounter act as mechanisms that produce different effects (Ibid, 649). This typology offers some useful ways of categorizing historical interactions between cultures. However, a relational approach would seem to preclude the sharp distinction between mechanisms – Delanty would likely agree. As a basis for approaching both ordinary and coordinated interactions between different cultures and identities Maria Rovisco (2013) focuses in on the novelty of the encounter, which stresses its essential hybridity. The effect is to focus on “‘real life’ struggles to bridge borders between self and other” (Nowicka and Rovisco 2009, 7).

**Borders and a Euro-Mediterranean Space**
Borders are increasing in abundance and changing in location (Balibar 2006; Rumford 2010) and this is often taking place at the local level. But in the Euro-Med there is also a more general process of bordering between the EU (Europe) and its ‘neighbors’. A general fencing of relations whereby the Mediterranean becomes the backyard of the EU and, as a result, an area in need of protection and action in order to secure. Culturally, there is also a severe delimiting of the region and this can be found in the pragmatism of intercultural dialogue as a policy instrument. In the Euro-Mediterranean, what is the relationship between the regional context – institutional and relational – and ever-present national boundaries? Within the context of the Mediterranean a global process of border multiplication and transformation (Rumford 2011) is highly significant by virtue of its strategic importance globally as well as being attached to the development
of a European space through region-building practices and historical ties. In the Mediterranean region there is a complex overlapping of political projects, primarily from the EU and the US, marking the (re)construction of legalized state borders alongside the borders of cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and civilizational identities. So are borders, as Iain Chambers (2010) argues, merely the ‘materialization of authority’? And how are they constituted in relation to regional governance and institution building?

This various functioning of borders is highly relevant in the Mediterranean region where different historical trajectories have resulted in differentiated understandings of the concepts of territory, sovereignty and borders. Furthermore, different actors can have very different understandings of borders, which can in practice lead to different relationships with the border. For example, state actors may view their relationship with the border in terms of maintenance and protection where transgressions by migrant communities are seen as a threat to the political community that the borders are meant to protect. Such can be seen in the logic of the ‘Gated Community’ approach to the EU’s bordering practices through the ENP, thus permitting mobility but only for particular interests. Migrants, despite bringing attention to the permeability of borders do not reduce their salience but instead amplify them directly by bringing attention to them and provoking the response of governmental actors, but also indirectly through the production of border imaginaries in which borders are maintained and the physical border is supplemented by theoretical and imaginary considerations linking cultural and political constructions (Brandell 2006, 19). Beatrice Hibou (2004) notes that borders can be seen as: “privileged spaces of observation of fluid and moving forms and of the continuous formation of social and political practices, as well as state practices” (Hibou 2004, 353). Moreover, they are sites of transformation and construction. It is no coincidence that the most explicit and strict border regimes often occur at the incidence of the overlapping of nation or ethnic boundaries with state boundaries. Examples of such practices may include Palestine/Israel and Cyprus.

Conversely, the way in which people define the border has a significant impact on their relation to that border and will in turn affect the type and role of interactions across the space. Within the EU there is the most advanced form of
bordering (de-bordering and re-bordering) taking place between member states through the process of integration. In response to this the process of enlargement has also produced an increased concern with delimiting the European project. The ENP, in this regard, has been discussed in terms of a bordering process (Kramsch 2003; Walters 2004). Walters’ (2004) discussion of EU external borders - networked (non) border, march, colonial frontiers and limes – presents a typology of the different forms that borders can take and the different roles they play in managing the interactions between internal and external actors. In contrast to the relatively static depiction of state borders the borders of the EU are more ambiguous, containing elements pertaining to the maintenance of strict dichotomies alongside decentered, ‘neo-medieval’ formations (Zielonka 2006). From within the EU, using the concept of limes in regard to the Mediterranean evokes the significance of the institutionalization of various asymmetries as evidenced in the bilateral relations of the ENP and the region-building exercise of the UfM. Limes, as such, should be seen as: “a means to protect what has already been domesticated inside, while banishing violence, turbulence and instability outside” (Kramsch and Hooper 2004, xxxiii). However this is a one-sided understanding. Even though it establishes a solid basis from which to understand the EU’s relation to the region it does not consider the historical development of borders specific to SMCs but offers a stark vision of borders established through EU external policy.

Rafaella Del Sarto (2010) argues that the extension of the EU’s variable border geometry to Southern Mediterranean Countries suggests that the Mediterranean is best characterized as a borderland encompassing functional, territorial and symbolic borders. The notion of borderland suggests an area of transition between core areas (Newman 2003: 18) or a “zone of passage from one geographical area, functional regime, and even territorialized identity construct to another (Del Sarto 2010, 152). It goes beyond the standard definition of borders in terms of inside/outside and posits a range of differentiated processes and border interactions. The EU’s institutional development according to the logic of variable geometry suggests that the internal bordering practices of the EU follow a similar path. Externally, this process is replicated through the practice of differentiation, which allows the EU
to establish different levels of integration and openness with individual countries based upon common priorities. Borders may be relatively porous with respect to certain persons or products but highly securitized with regards to others even when originating from the same country. This multidimensionality is a common feature of contemporary border regimes, especially within the EU. The ENP extends some of these practices to neighboring states by bringing them into the governance and legal frameworks of the EU (Del Sarto 2010, 165). The notion of borderland, however, would suggest not only multidimensionality but also multidirectionality in processes of acculturation and even political practice. This is something that remains unquestioned in an overtly political analysis of bordering practices. The notion of borderland suggests the proliferation of political boundaries within it as well as the uncertainty of cultural boundaries. If we refer back to the post-colonial conception of the Mediterranean, in purely cultural terms: “Borders in the Mediterranean are, by definition, mobile and uncertain, closer to the idea of a ‘horizon’ than that of a cartographic projection; indeed, the actual experience of these borders reveals all the limits and contradictions inherent in any topographic approach” (Giaccaria and Minca 2011, 353). Understanding the Euro-Mediterranean as a borderland appears to offer one way of ameliorating the complexity of incorporating such different perspectives. On the other hand, it potentially prevents us from considering the region beyond an inevitable and ultimately compromising mélange of political and cultural interactions with no identity but only a sense of political contingency. As a result, further consideration should be given to how the different types and understandings of borders limit and find representation in the work of civil society actors. Linked to this would be an understanding of the way in which civil society actors relate to political and cultural borders. Certainly, different actors perceive space in very different terms, for example business men in the Middle East tend to view space as networked and much more fluid than less mobile actors (Brandell 2006, 202). As a result, when understanding how people relate to a particular space it should be kept in consideration the role of transnational relations in (re)producing borders as well as overcoming them.
Studies of cross-border cooperation consider the development of institutions and interactions across border regions. With the ENP there was a notable move away from the regional focus that was inherent in the EMP, which combined a form of regionalism with bilateral relations (Del Sarto and Schumacher 2005, 21). Rather than presenting an overarching approach to the region, cross-border cooperation takes specific cases of interaction and institution building across border regions and through this provides an interesting starting point for considering the role of civil society actors in the Mediterranean region. James W. Scott (2006) argues that the ENP should be seen as an attempt on the part of the EU to “rationalize and consolidate policies towards northern, eastern and southern neighbors, enhancing both the effectiveness and regional significance of the EU as a geopolitical actor” (Scott 2006, 18). As such, the policies cannot solely be seen through the lens of integration but must be understood as an attempt to pursue a global presence beyond trade agreements and economic prowess, though these remain critical areas of influence. In this regard, and with the increasing differentiation between policies aimed at Eastern partners and those in the Mediterranean it is this latter region that represents a truly international presence for the European Union. At stake is a process of Europeanization, which traverses the internal-external divide necessitating significant dynamism and highlighting the intrinsic fragility of ‘EU’ Europe and by extension any process of Europeanization beyond those borders (Jones & Clark 2008). In the Mediterranean this largely takes the form of bilateral agreements and defending against the negative effects of market expansion, perhaps to the detriment of civil society engagement (Scott 2006, 30).

As Scott (2006) points out, EU policy initiatives have an important role in constructing the institutional conditions for regional cooperation, however, this attempt at Europeanization of external regions is also subject to previously existing and changing cultural and political conditions, which has led in the Mediterranean to a difficult role for socio-cultural and socio-political engagement. This is enabled, if not exacerbated, by the bordering practices – the ‘gated community’ – of selectivity based upon neoliberal and state-centric political logics that are inherent elements of the Neighborhood policies (Van Houtum and Pijpers 2006, 60). This no doubt captures to some extent the
reasons behind the limited success of the Neighborhood policy to promote increased political integration and engagement with civil societies. On the other hand, as noted by Kramsch and Hooper (2004): “border regions enjoy a partial autonomy from the ‘local’ which displaces them from prior capital restructured crystallizations of the state-guided regionalization/regionalism dialectic” (Kramsch and Hooper 2004: xxiv). Though always in development and only partial this is nonetheless highly important for economic actors and migrants and also for civil society actors who can engage in transnational networking.

The EUDIMENSIONS programme (2006-2009) is a noteworthy examination of the opportunity structures and socialization patterns created by the European Neighborhood Policy in terms of cross-border cooperation with civil society actors. The authors pursue a ‘contextually sensitive’ approach that can understand not only the influence of EU norms and values but also the ways in which they are contested locally (Scott and Liikanen 2010, 3). Furthermore, utilizing a comparative framework and looking at individual cases and instruments offers a great deal of specificity and insight to the ways in which civil society actors can differ greatly in their responsiveness to EU policies not only on a country-by-country basis but also based on different sectors and as a result it highlights the internal variability of civil societies which is a crucial point for understanding the development of regional interactions. However, we do not get full value from the contextual approach being applied. The concept would seem to imply also a greater focus on society-to-society interactions, research on which is lacking in the context of the Mediterranean. The contextual approach employed for the study was beneficial in producing a comparative understanding of practices and roles for civil society actors. Dimitrovova (2010) points to the different understandings of the role of civil society between Moroccan CSOs and European CSOs resulting in problems of cooperation and engagement between the two sides. The study offered useful understanding of the relationship between civil society actors and EU policy instruments especially with regard to criticisms of EU policy as being unilateral, top-down and overly focused on economic and functional areas of cooperation (Dimitrovova 2010, 113). However, the contextual approach would have benefitted from a more complex theorization of the practices and relations.
between civil society with the particular cultural and political settings in mind. This was likely limited due to the broad focus of the study across Northern, Eastern and Southern neighboring countries. In addition, only Morocco and Turkey represented Mediterranean countries. Another step would be to question the impact of such cross-border activities on civil society actors, their purpose for engaging in such activities and the specific practices that comprise these activities.

Understanding cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean

Institutional Developments and Dialogue
The cultural construction of the Mediterranean predates even the Barcelona Process (BP). The end of the Cold War marked a departure from geopolitical frontiers established at the height of East/West tensions. This new era produced a new ideology of threat, of which the pivotal ‘Clash of Civilisations’ thesis is indicative. It was in this environment that Europe's southern boundaries took on greater significance (Henry 1996). In this context, the European Union and other international actors – UNESCO, Council of Europe – established programmes designed to protect against the potential of a clash. These programmes renewed concepts of the Mediterranean, or Mediterraneanism, in order to propose a unity of values and identities (de Puymège 1996). Indeed, in this period the European Union's policy towards its Arab neighbors lacked consistency and in order to stem the growing inequality and potential threat there were growing call for a policy that contained greater cohesion and united political, economic, social and cultural projects (Kader 1994). Out of this atmosphere rose the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which established the first comprehensive but also fatally flawed framework for cooperation between Europe and its Southern neighbors. However, the BP was already dominated by security and economic motives. Even the third basket, dedicated to social, cultural and human partnership, was dominated by concerns over migration, terrorism and trafficking (Balta 1997). In other words, the political construction of the Mediterranean and its institutionalization followed a clear logic that prioritized the goals of stability, economic cooperation and political dialogue. In addition to
this, despite the intention of building a cooperative partnership between regional governments, the EMP remained a reflection of European interests. On the one hand, this was embodied in the 'ideological edifice' of the Mediterranean concept that had little basis in the Arab world and also become apparent in attempts by the European Commission to centralize control over cultural instruments (Bistolfi 2000, 14-22).

Stefania Panebianco (2003) argues that the EMP should be seen as being multi-layered and influenced both internally (from regional elites) and externally (from international and inter-regional relations) offering full picture of regional development that allows for a certain amount of complementarity between political interests on either side and the construction of norms. This political and institutional approach favors an understanding of the region based upon official and economic trajectories. While it is understood that non-state actors – often limited to economic actors - can affect the norms that constitute any particular regime it is unclear how or when this is possible. A New EuroMediterranean Cultural Identity (2003), edited by Stefania Panebianco, goes some way in trying to understand the implications of institutional development on civil society participation and belonging, including a critical attempt to understand the conceptual underpinnings of civil society inclusion (Mouawad 2003). Annette Jünemann’s (2003) chapter on the Civil Forums developed as part of the EMP is enlightening in revealing the complex political interests that both successfully and unsuccessfully influenced the agenda, participants and even organization of the civil society gatherings. It also reveals the complex network of actors and the role of different discourses in presenting an alternative side to the regional process, one which is on-going through various actors and forums. The Civil Forums established under the framework of the EMP provided new opportunities for regional interaction. At the same time, they were seen by some governmental actors as an opportunity to control the forms of interaction and the discourses of engagement. The institutional perspective is valuable insofar as it highlights normative biases, external influences, and opportunities for participation. Yet, there also needs to be the possibility of engaging with the experiential value of opportunity structures surrounding new institutions. As Robert Bistolfi points out, the Civil Forums established under the
BP lacked the direct influence over policy-making, however they were still valuable as a venue for the exchange of aspirations among civil society participants (2000, 21). Whether they can, under the guidance of the Anna Lindh Foundation, continue to provide an open forum for participation will determine how they are perceived by regional civil societies but the implicit patronage of governments continues to be a reason for skepticism (Roque 2005, 117).

Research on the cultural basket of the EuroMediterranean Partnership received due attention in a special issue of Mediterranean Politics in 2005. This issue displayed an array of different approaches to understanding the significance of developments in this area of regional integration as well as a general skepticism towards the potential of intercultural dialogue to break the deadlock being experienced in other areas of the Partnership. Later released with some minor additions in edited book format, this volume represents one of the most comprehensive attempts to understand the potential of cultural cooperation in the EuroMediterranean but also (in its mixture of hope and skepticism) bears the hallmarks of the context in which it was written. Specifically, a few of the authors present some significant observations with regard to the definition and practice of dialogue in the EMP including some early speculation on the role of the ALF. Michelle Pace’s (2005) dialogic approach raises a number of issues that continue to have relevance to understanding the limitations and potential of dialogue as a basis for cooperation. Among other things, this emphasized two points: the need for dialogue to provide a real source of self-criticism and the need for partners on either shore to recognize the concerns of the Other. Yet, this continues to be confounded by the limited reach of the dialogue into regional societies and the influence of regional power relations. Rafaella Del Sarto (2005) added to this critique by focusing on the underlying power structures in the conceptualization of intercultural dialogue. Del Sarto’s article highlighted the problem between the normative appeal and practical shortcomings of intercultural dialogue as a function of high-level politics. Similar to Pace’s observations, Del Sarto expresses hope at the inaugural objectives of the Anna Lindh Foundation. However, the institutional structure (primarily influence of national governments) feeds into concerns over the reach and representation of dialogue. Malmvig (2005), on the other hand, highlights
the impact of securitization on the role of cultural dialogue. This effectively diminishes the potential impact of dialogue by limiting access for the general population. Access and participation continue to be relevant points of criticism where security is often used by authoritarian regimes to control mobility. This issue established an essential foundation for evaluating progress in the objectives of dialogue and regional networking.

In *The Convergence of Civilizations* several leading scholars of the Euro-Mediterranean region have taken up the challenge of conceptualizing the region in terms of an emerging regionalism and regional culture. Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis’ concluding chapter effectively summarizes the several issues that require continued consideration - including a better differentiation between the understanding of culture and civilization and a less statist view of region-building practices. Furthermore, what is necessary is the ability to distinguish among the various norms and strategies being promoted and their origin and purpose. According to the authors, the re-working of the EMP as a post-colonial agenda relies on the ability of the Euro-Med Process to construct a non-territorialized region and the ability to transcend the sense of us/them that predominates, however both the UfM and the ENP return prominence to the state and regimes of strict border control thus inhibiting the ability of civil societies and social actors from engaging across the region both within and outside of policy frameworks (Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis 2006). This does not provide grounds for much optimism for a better relationship with civil society organizations. The need to ‘bring the Mediterranean back in’ is at least as pressing now and should have as its basis a sense of empowerment applied to governments and societies alike (Ibid, 20). As Richard Gillespie has noted, the Union for the Mediterranean means that institutional autonomy is not forthcoming in the region, but rather looks to firmly balance regional initiatives towards the EU (Gillespie 2008). Developing institutions, however, deserve greater scrutiny alongside the transformations that have given rise to more effective levels of social and political engagement across the region by actors often considered ineffectual alongside the rise of transnational actors across the region.
Isabel Schäfer's (2007b) *Vom Kulturkonflikt zum Kulturdialog? Die kulturelle Dimension der Euro-Mediterranen Partnerschaft* charted an ambitious course for understanding the construction of a cultural dimension to Euro-Mediterranean relations. As one of the earliest comprehensive treatments of the cultural dimension, Schäfer's text reviews a number of issues worthy of reconsideration given the changing context of regional relations. As discussed – other contributions considered the impact of international actors and the impact of European politics, especially in integrationist dynamics at the EU level. However, what is so valuable about Schäfer's work is that it endeavors to understand the cultural dimension of the EuroMediterranean as a product of external cultural policy creation rather than solely through a process of regionalization. As a result, it simultaneously considers the politics and development of cultural policy at the EU level and the strategic (international) interest in the Mediterranean region through the 1990s and immediately following the attacks of September 11th, 2001 (Schäfer 2007a). These insights provide fertile ground for reconsideration and while the author explains the international context very well it would also be beneficial to consider some of the developments of cultural policy not just as the result of international dynamics but also through the assistance of non-state actors. Indeed, Schäfer hints in this direction in suggesting the needs to examine private actors and transnational networks (2007b: 254-258). This is a challenge worth addressing especially given the profound changes at the EU-level with the changes introduced in the Lisbon Treaty, potential for fragmentation following the Euro-Crisis and in its response to the Arab Spring and further conflict over the EU and its member states’ response to the ensuing migration crisis. At the same time, this reconsideration should address the influence of democratic narratives in encouraging greater interest in developing stronger ties with the region.

**The Arab Spring and the EuroMediterranean**

As events unfolded across the Arab world, the EU was still trying to come to terms with the new capacities and institutions bestowed by the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty. The obvious need to respond resulted in a mixed array of attempts to remold the foreign policy credentials of the union. The result was a
mixed bag and at times contradictory set of policies. Despite talk of improved use of conditionality (both positive and negative) in its relations with neighbors the EU continued to increase aid to transitioning countries like Tunisia as well as repressive governments in Egypt and Algeria (Schumacher 2014: 569). In the case of Egypt, the EU demonstrated incredible patience ignoring Morsi’s temporary presidential decree, continuing crackdowns on civil society and NGOs, and even following the coup d’état that brought the Egyptian military back into power. On the other hand, the EU gradually committed itself to a regime of sanctions against the Libyan and Syrian governments (Ibid) displaying a bolder foreign policy identity.

The uprisings caught the EU in a moment of institutional flux and certainly caught political actors unaware. The immediate rhetoric refocused attention on the roles of culture and civil society in laying the basis for the uprisings across the region and in providing a fertile ground on which to develop new projects and cooperation. At the same time, the EU’s reaction to the uprisings in the form of the ‘Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity in the Southern Mediterranean’ (PfDSP) has been described as a *mea culpa* for past double standards (Echagüe et al 2011: 330). On one level it marks a gradual shift away from the regional concept in practice and towards the strengthening of bilateral relationships between the EU and other countries based on conditionality and differentiation. Some commentators have noted the recurring limitations of EU policy that can be found in the PfDSP including a relatively uncritical focus on the ‘transformative potential’ of civil society. In this critique, the PfDSP highlights a continuing legacy of liberalism by thematically dividing democracy from development and distinguishing the role of civil society as developing political and civil rights with relatively less emphasis on social and economic rights. On the other hand, the concept of development is less activist or rights-oriented focusing more on aid and technical reform (Teti 2012). Like previous iterations, the policy also fails to deliver specificity regarding the application of negative and positive conditionality (the ‘more for more’ approach). Ultimately, the EU’s response demonstrated minor changes to existing policies – more a change of emphasis than of substance. Rather than presenting a truly coherent strategic direction for regional relations both the
PfDSP and the Neighbourhood Review followed the ad hoc routine of adding further initiatives and instruments while trying to maintain existing structures (Othman 2014: 604). Despite this nominal growth in instruments and actors there has actually been a slight reduction in the availability of funding for the new policy objectives, which suggests not ‘more for more’ but ‘less of the same’ (Bicchi 2014). On top of this, the EU’s remodeled policies have been rapidly overtaken by security concerns related to migration which endangered a unified approach.

There remains the underlying tension between the EU’s strategic mission and the commitment of individual member states (Tömmel 2013; Dennison 2013) thus straddling the old question of whether the EU is a normative or realist power. However, the Arab uprisings also allowed the EU to turn emphasis back to civil society following the failings of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership while also confirming the intention of the EU Commission to continue to play the strategic leader in the ongoing development of regional frameworks such as the UfM (Tömmel 2013). The question then, is how the EU’s renewed interest in creating a partnership between societies can be realized (Cassarino 2012: 13). In a dispersed way the EU has continued to leverage civil society organizations in the pursuit of assistance on civil and political reforms. However, it is also clear that civil society has acted as an empty signifier in policy statements. As Teti (2012) points out, the discussion of civil society in the PfDSP takes up a significant portion of the document and yet offers no clear definition or discussion of its limitations or application in different cultural contexts. In this way democracy promotion is replaced with a more nebulous policy of civil society assistance.

The appointment of a Special Representative for the Southern Mediterranean also subtly moved the EU response away from a regional framework by establishing bilateral task forces to help negotiate and implement policy under the reviewed ENP (Schumacher 2014: 562). This has also been accompanied by a greater focus on relations between the EU and other Arab bodies – for example, the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council – suggesting some commitment to the idea of a variable geometry that is not dependent on the development of Euro-Mediterranean institutions but can
develop through the relations between regional blocs. This has the potential of allowing the EU to cultivate a new relationship with its near abroad that makes better use of its post-Lisbon foreign policy capacities and, potentially, pursue a normative agenda that overcomes some of the regional conflicts and inequalities built into the EMP and subsequent UfM (Johanssen-Nogues 2015). This new orientation is significant. It raises the possibility of an alternative future for the EU’s relations with its Southern neighborhood that is not reliant on past models – such as the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. The question is, to what extent can the EU’s external cultural relations and its related instruments in the region overcome this legacy, and what role does the ‘Mediterranean’ as a unifying concept play in this new atmosphere? Though it is too early to fully respond to these questions it would be impossible to do so without first understanding the current situation and influence of past frameworks.

Theorizing the Cultural Impact of the Arab Spring: new actors, new contexts, new perspectives
For some the uprisings represented little more than business as usual. Another example of the historical and (in some cases) cyclical demonstrations and occasional uprisings that have taken place across middle-income Arab countries as a result of socio-economic circumstances (Sika 2013). However, the events certainly revived myriad debates surrounding democratization and transition to democracy (Pace and Cavatorta 2012). The events clearly put the question of democracy – its values and the question of transition – back on the map (Robbins 2015; Diamond et al 2014). Perhaps ironically though, the way in which democracy has remained an important goal for many citizens is through its almost complete absence as an original objective (Robbins 2015, 88). As Arab Barometer surveys have pointed out, the support for democracy has remained high across Arab populations despite stagnation and a return to authoritarianism in a number of countries. One explanation is that the current hardships are simply not being subjectively linked to a process of democratization (Robbins 2015; XXX and Robbins 2014). Rekindled debates about democratization are clearly relevant. From the standpoint of democracy promotion, the instant verdict was damning – rather than helping these
countries transition to democracy the external environment was found to be contributing to sustaining authoritarianism as a result of an overriding focus on liberalizing reforms (Youngs 2014, 41). The immediate move by some external donors was to refocus on ‘nontraditional’ civil society actors rather than established NGOs (Youngs 2015, 151) demonstrating an implicit shift towards a broader understanding of democracy. Indeed, the dominant, Euro-centric understanding of civil society was at least partially responsible for the state of shock felt by external donors who had committed to supporting professional but often ineffective NGOs (Roque 2015, 19). As proponents of different democratization paradigms attempted to play catchup with events it was also clear (and demonstrated in the Arab Barometer reports discussed by Robbins) that democracy was only part of the conversation.

To truly understand the significance of the Arab Spring it is necessary to redefine the relationship between culture and democracy, and the ways in which culture as a creative force promotes democratic interactions (Moustier and Soldo 2013). This perspective views democracy as an evolving cultural process rather than a particular endpoint. In this way, Moustier and Soldo suggest that we should instead explore creativity and innovation as emergent markers of democratic change (2014). Some of the most compelling evidence being explored did not refer to the expression of a distinctly democratic political will. Rather, it was the use of expression, creativity and art as means of protest and dissent in order to subvert authoritarianism (Makar 2011). Such insights point back to the providence of keen observers before 2011. Given fragile political structures and limited possibilities for participation through defunct party systems new political subjectivities emerged favoring spontaneity and fun in stark contrast to rigid political structures (Bayat 2007, 457). This is not a turn away from democracy but a change of orientation. In fact, the freedom to create should be viewed as equally important to other freedoms as creative expression can act as a means of developing the capacities of active citizenship (Tanzarella 2012). Research into the variety of actors who played a role in the events highlights a need to focus on the emerging power of “newer forces born of a rising generation with different ideas about how citizens and governments should relate” (Dunne 2015, 79). Even remaining within the boundaries of a typical debate that pits
secularism against religion risks missing the reality that secularist parties in the region are just as exclusionary and authoritarian as Islamist parties (Boduszynski, Fabbe and Lamont 2015). On the other hand, Tunisia demonstrates the possibility of Islamic inclusion and moderation that trends towards a distinct form of conservative politics in deference to democratic institutions (Netterstrom 2015). In other words, the emergence of a distinct political culture and identity abounds. These studies imply the need to reconsider the evidence when it comes to judging the quality of particular developments.

The events signaled an emptiness in ideological explanations. The rapid success of protestors in Egypt bound them into a position for which they were unprepared and, for some, uninterested. The protest networks that were so effective did not have the organization or vision to influence the subsequent shape of Egyptian politics (Abdelrahman 2013). But the goal was clearly never state capture for the vast majority of participants. It was not about imposing an alternative ideology but about making the current system more amenable to their needs. In this sense, Asef Bayat’s phrase is apt that the protestors were not revolutionary but ‘refo-lutionary’. They sought to compel the state into reform (Bayat 2013, 599).

Authors such as Benoit Challand and Sari Hanafi were quick to suggest the importance of this trend for understanding the sociological significance of events. Challand (2011, 275), for example, pointed towards the relationship between external democracy funding and values in the form of individualism implicitly supported by funding agencies. However, this was not the basis for resistance, rather it was often against this notion of individualism that protests were expressed employing the discourses of social justice and unity (Ibid, 276). In line with this, Sari Hanafi (2012) pointed out the reflexivity of the individualism expressed by activists based on the “self-reference of an agent that recognizes forces of socialization but alters their place in the social structure and resists their disciplinary power” (Hanafi 2012, 203). In this way, protests and the forms of protest were performative. By virtue of the expressions being public expressions they were given a new significance (Alexander 2011, x). The politics of being seen, of practicing political opposition publicly and visually, became
essential to the political field. In this vein, the new political subjectivity highlighted by academics like Hanafi and Challand also connects to a longer process of political engagement in the MENA region, a concurrent transformation of visual culture, and the counter-strategies of ruling elites that has transformed culture into an important battleground. Such insights have also been supported by more recent studies into diverse actors and the role of culture and especially media.

The experience of crisis established some commonality amongst populations on either side of the Mediterranean Sea. The general sense of insecurity (especially economic) and persisting inequalities contributed to a “global and precarious generation” (Glasius and Pleyers 2013, 552) that was also able to take advantage of new capacities in the form of communication technologies. Protests become hybrid in the sense that they occupied by a physical and virtual space (Antebi and Sanchez 2012). It also allowed protestors to link their struggle to others generating a transitory solidarity witnessed in Tahrir Square, Barcelona and New York, amongst others (Allende and Hattinger 2014, 594). What these studies demonstrate is the importance of looking at how actors interpret their position and employ strategic frames or linkages in order to move beyond their local environment. This was accomplished by invoking and/or extending existing frames and negotiating a new meaning. Recent additions have bolstered this idea and provided an element of diversity to understanding the Arab uprisings contributing an important theoretical advance. One of the effects of these widespread protests was that opportunities emerged for new struggles to be included in regional civil societies at the same time generating new conflicts based around gender and LGBT issues (Khalid 2015; Fortiger 2015). In many cases, such as in Egypt, the authoritarian regimes were able to limit hostilities from boiling over between communities such as between the minority Copt and majority Muslim populations. However, the events left a temporary vacuum that raised the stakes for political representation.

As a concept, the Arab Spring is inherently flawed. But it also serves as an effective means of generalizing a wide range of phenomena. The focus should be on understanding the diverse and everyday struggles that instigated broader protests in different areas (Huber and Kamel 2015). This attentiveness to the
strategic linking by actors of their struggle to dominant discursive frames and
the micro-level origins of momentous events is an important contribution. It
indicates the potential of a transnational perspective that conceptually links local
action to global concepts. Maryam Jamshidi (2014) makes a useful contribution
for considering the participation of educated and middle-class youth by
concentrating on innovation as a crucial byproduct of the revolutionary
experience. Instead of remaining mired in traditional categories Jamshidi’s
account encourages us to listen to and observe the unique ways in which citizens
have sought to mobilize and give voice to their concerns. This led to a growing
number of organizations committed to civic entrepreneurship and has resulted
in a surprising growth in technology startups oriented towards solving everyday
problems (Jamshidi 2014, 2).

Rather than seeking the total transformation inherent to ideas of revolution – and anticipated in many accounts of the Arab
Spring, especially as optimism began to sour – such actions demonstrate that
grassroots and local activists often had much more practical objectives in mind.
Civic entrepreneurship is one instance of the attempt to generate a post-
revolutionary subjectivity (Ibid, 27-28), a new mind-set, that confounds many
assumptions about the nature of revolution but also basic distinctions between
civil, political and economic actors. Understanding the significance of these
events requires more than just a rehashing of old models and concepts whether
that be in relation to transitions to democracy or static cultural models. Instead
it requires an attentiveness to subtle gradations of change and this means also
substituting the desire to bring judgement with a desire to understand the
creative potential found in actors’ circumstances.

Elements of a transnational approach to political and cultural developments

Steven Vertovec (1999) provides a useful breakdown of the themes raised by the
study of transnationalism. He identifies six ways of discussing transnationalism:
as social morphology, type of consciousness, mode of cultural reproduction,
avenue of capital, site of political engagement and as a reconstruction of place
(Vertovec 1999, 2). This characterisation raises not only the multitude of ways in
which transnationalism has been approached but also the essentially contested
nature of the concept (Guarnizo and Smith 1999; Vertovec 1999; Glick-Schiller
While a significant portion of the literature has been oriented towards studying the mobility of migrants and diasporic networks there have also been attempts to generate insight and utilize the concept to understand political projects and identities (Roniger 2011; Featherstone 2008), regional politics (Rogers 2004; DeBardeleben and Hurrelmann 2011), advocacy and norms (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and cultural transformations (Hannerz 1996; Ong 1999). The purpose of this section is not to provide a comprehensive categorization of transnational phenomena or related approaches within the field. Instead it will establish a new starting point for studying the evolution of cultural relations that can account for the quality of cultural relations.

This approach blends together disparate approaches to transnationalism from political and geographical to sociological and anthropological accounts. This position is intentional and is based on the understanding, as argued by DeBarbeleben and Hurrelmann (2011), that these different approaches can be mutually beneficial. Specifically with regard to this research it is suggested that there needs to be a more concerted effort on the part of political studies to engage with the insights provided in a more profound understanding of the systemic, structural and ideational impacts of transnationalism (DeBarbeleben and Hurrelmann 2011, 28-32) all of which contribute to a nuanced understanding of the context in which practices are produced.

An appropriately broad definition to act as a starting point is provided by Victor Roudometof who defines transnational “interactions as taking place among people and institutions in two or more separate ‘containers’ or nation-states” (Roudometof 2005, 119). While there have been some instructive studies of transnationalism across the Mediterranean (Gandolfini 2010) there has been very little attention paid to the interplay between the development of regional institutions and social and cultural programmes and civil society actors engaging in transnational practices. Thinking the Mediterranean region historically, transnationalism provides a uniquely appropriate approach as it is within this region that many of the early forms of transnational interaction and diasporic activity originated. But it also makes up an important part of regional interactions and focusing this will provide an element of social ‘thickness’
(Kurasawa 2007) to understanding of the Mediterranean region and can inform the ongoing development of approaches to further integration and cooperation across the region.

**Studying Networks**

The attractiveness of network approaches lies in the ability to discover ‘sparsely knit and spatially dispersed’ forms of community (Wellman 1999) as well as draw comparisons and learn from other areas of inquiry such as urbanism in the MENA region which suffers from similar problems of low levels of integration, weak ties and sustained hierarchies (Stanley 2005). Following Featherstone, Phillips and Waters, networks are best understood as: “the overlapping and contested material, cultural and political flows and circuits that bind different places together through differentiated relations of power” (Featherstone, Phillips and Waters 2008, 386). If it is the case that multiple realities exist within one or multiple overlapping spaces this will readily be apparent through investigation of the social interactions that take place outside of official programs or through paths of migration. This network approach also offers insight into the types of space and the formation of or resistance to identities through social structure, ideas and relations (Castells 1996). In line with Castells’ thinking, the network offers an effective integration of technological developments within our understanding of social, political, economic and cultural interactions. The network is also a useful way to invoke the social patterns associated with the movements of transnational migrants and diaspora and the maintenance of complex communities across national boundaries through the exploitation of communication technologies. On this basis the discourse and practice of maintaining transnational networks: “can be viewed as affecting the formation of character, identity, and acting subjects at the same time that identity can be seen as fluctuating and contingent, as the contexts through which people move in time-space change and are appropriated and/or resisted by acting subjects” (Guarnizo and Smith 2009, 21). The network provides a useful descriptive category for tracing this transformation of social structure. For example, the weak ties thesis put forth by Mark Granovetter
“suggests ways in which a person’s indirect social connection are often important channels through which ideas, influences or information are reached” (Vertovec 2009: 35). The Strength of Weak Ties (1973) points to the relations beyond primary groups and the diffusion of influence and information between groups. Diffusion in this case travels further and more extensively through weak ties than through strong ties, which are more limited. As a result, removing weak ties limits the distance traveled greater than removal of the average strong link (Granovetter 1973, 1366). This is an important analytical insight to the significance of the network for identifying meaning construction and common practices. Another useful concept appropriated from social network analysis is that of multiplexity – “the degree to which relations between participants include overlapping institutional spheres” (Portes 1995, 9). This is a useful way of identifying patterns in relations. Significantly it can also be useful for establishing border effects. The multiplexity of cross border social networks can bring out interesting insights into the type and extent of connectivities (Woolhiser 2005). Borrowing these analytical tools for analyzing transnational relations can contribute important insights.

Networks in situ
According to Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005), the focus on networks challenges vertical accounts of scale that privilege boundaries between scales and assume greater agency of official channels and state practices. As such, we also move away from the depiction of globalization that focuses on the pervasiveness of global capitalism and the global economy and recognizes the political construction of scale according to dominant interests. That being said this approach does not follow the claim that transnational practices necessarily mean that there is an erosion of the importance of place or the nation (Featherstone, Phillips and Waters 2008, 386). As Stephen Callelya has already pointed out, regional fragmentation means that local identities and national spaces remain central to political and social action in the Euro-Mediterranean. This fragmentation, however, is decisively political in most circumstances and does not account for underlying dynamics of social and political contestation that
occur through national constructs. David Featherstone argues for a greater appreciation of the role of networks historically for transnational political action. Central to this is the ability to evoke a transnational history for particular actors and/or issues (Featherstone 2007). This understanding points towards the role of common politics and projects in the construction and maintenance of transnational networks, which is of significance for the development of regional integration.

Jünemann’s (2005) analysis of the Civil Forums established under the EMP framework points towards the potential initiation of a political identity based on particular political issues for those actors involved. The impact of selection processes can put a limit on the involvement of actors and organizations from southern Mediterranean countries but on the other hand, as Sari Hanafi points out, the selection process can also benefit transnational networks by engaging with alternative actors and organizations that under normal conditions may be subject to local divisions or clique gatherings. Furthermore, networking at the regional level increases southern actors’ influence through agenda setting and alliance building (Hanafi 2005). Hanafi’s anthropological approach to North-South civil society relations helps to understand the significance of the regional scale for social actors. This can be enhanced by considering the significance of different scales of action and the variability of networks such that they consist not only of material flows or of physical migrations but also of common affinities, imaginations, identifications, politics and projects (Featherstone, Phillips and Waters 2008). Furthermore, it may offer the possibility of engaging in ‘relational thinking’ (Paasi, in Johnson et al 2011), that is, to contextualize socialization and bordering practices through emphasis on social interactions. By conceiving of space in terms of social relations (and social relations with regard to space) it is possible to reveal an inherent dynamism and process of transformation at the heart of these interactions (Massey 1992). But in order to progress this type of thinking it is necessary to go beyond the metaphor of the network, whose inherent relationism is important but should be tempered by a focus on the contextual lives of networked actors as well as their contingent experiences within transnational phenomena. Moreover, a network approach puts relationality at
the forefront of analysis whereas the purpose of this research is also to comprehend the agency associated with the adoption of transnationalism by actors and how this is subsequently integrated into different contexts.

Networks are also crucial for understanding the development of cultural policy and cultural relations more broadly. Though largely ignored by scholars of cultural relations, some important contributions demonstrate the importance of networks for understanding current developments. Gudrun Pehn's Networking Culture traced the ‘discrete’ emergence of networking among cultural professionals from indirect influence to increasing legitimacy and finally the creation of a fundamentally new, multidimensional approach to cultural cooperation (Pehn 1999, 7-8). Her empirical account suggests two important points: the essential reflexivity of networks and their influence on cultural narratives and practices at the regional and international levels contributing to new policy in both cases. Two other authors have made less explicit but nonetheless influential contributions. Both Cris Shore (2000) and Monica Sassatelli (2009) have highlighted the central role played by non-state actors in the emergence of cultural identity and cultural policy at the European level. Sassatelli (2009) provides a useful addition acknowledging the unofficial, bottom-up processes of Europeanization working alongside institutional narratives. One of the important aspects of the network approach is the ability to capture these processes and be able to represent the ‘multiple configurations’ of Europe (Axford and Huggins 1999, 186). Moreover, networks are playing a central role in the current development of new competencies for culture at the European level (Isar 2015, 498).

**Experience and transnational networking**

Considering transnationalism as an experience entails the integration of a wide array of considerations on the types of consciousness, cultural impacts and types of engagement pursued by different transnational actors. Anthropologist Ulf Hannerz expresses the impact of transnationalism well: “It is these dispersed institutions and communities, groupings of people regularly coming together and moving apart, short-term relationships or patterns of fleeting encounter, which
offer the contexts in which globalization occurs as the personal experience of a
great many people in networks where extremely varied meanings flow”
(Hannerz 1992, 47). Similarly, John Tomlinson points to the effect of networks
on social life as the fundamental arbiters of globalization (Tomlinson 1999).
What I want to focus on here is the (re)production of culture and meaning
through transnational engagement. Both Luin Goldring (1998) and Robert Smith
(1998) in Transnational from Below point out how transnationalism is not just
local, but is ‘trans-local’ and based in multiple contexts from different points of
origin. However, the primary role of locality in many areas of lived experience
goes against the more forceful suggestion of Arjun Appadurai that
transnationalism and the global cultural economy have led to a ‘steady erosion of
the relationship...between spatial and virtual neighbourhoods” (Appadurai 1995,
213). Yet this insight should not be dismissed immediately. There is a distinctly
transformative potential in the movement of people and ideas between localities
that necessitates a crucial awareness of the ‘trans-local’ production of cultures
and identities. Based on this fact there has been a general move towards
considering the concept of ‘transnational social space’ in order to delimit the
realm of inquiry and to further conceptualize these relationships (Pries 2001;
Faist and Özveren 2004). This is a fruitful exercise for studying the impact of
migrant transnationalism as they form relatively autonomous, reciprocal and
fluid networks but it is perhaps less relevant for the study at hand which is more
politically and practically defined.

It is worth considering the concept of the ‘meso-link’ as it has been
introduced in transnationalism research. This refers to migrant organizations,
supranational organizations, welfare foundations, INGOs, and transnational
social movements (Köngeter 2010), which can act both as a potential site for
political engagement and of collective meaning construction. The organizational
perspective can provide an important link between understanding the individual
(micro) level experiences and the governance (macro) level that structures
transnational interactions (Pries 2008, 18). Smith and Guarnizo (1998) also
point to the importance of identifying the meso-structural level in which
“institutions interact with structural and instrumental processes (Smith and
Guarnizo 1998, 25). Identifying and including this level within transnational
research can help to answer important questions related to how trust and solidity is constructed across borders, the discourses and practices that this entails and the sociocultural basis on which these ties are maintained (Ibid, 26). However, there is a more essential quality to transnational networking that is not captured in these approaches that tend to rely upon the physical mobility of people through networked space. This necessitates a return to a more global perspective. For example, Axford’s systemic approach leans towards the potential of networks to produce some commonality of consciousness (Axford 1995, 86). What the ‘transnational studies’ approaches offer is a level of analytical precision with regard to specific uses of the term which can at times be overly constraining (as in the definition of experience), but can also offer new avenues for consideration (as with the idea of the meso-link). However, they fail to capture the transmission effects of networks.

**Practicing transnationalism**

A complementary approach to transnationalism focuses upon sets of practices. Transnational practices are manifold and engaged in by various actors, which has led to increased interest in the practice of transnationalism. Work on the transnational capitalist class and global capitalism (Skilair 2003), the work of global justice (Kurasawa 2007) and the role of civil society and non-state actors (Koehn and Rosenau 2002; Berry and Gabay 2009) have revealed the importance of understanding transnationalism through practice. Peggy Levitt’s (2001) book *Transnational Villagers* made a step forward in understanding transnationalism by exploring how the transnational becomes integrated into the lives of migrants such that the experiential is built upon the transformation of specific transformations of ideas and ways of living thus producing a tangible change in the everyday practices of these communities. This type of ethnography highlights the importance of paying attention to the consequences to processes and developments, which may originate inside or outside the specific context. The approach undertaken can always be modified for appropriateness. Transnational practices also offer a way to counter the difficulties of understanding different trajectories of transnationalism and to bridge the gap
between ‘transnationalism from below’ and ‘transnationalism from above’ (Smith and Guarnizo 1998) by revealing the way in which strategies are constituted by developments at both the level of institutional politics and communities. Furthermore, we can resist critiques that limit transnationalism to being a social and political phenomenon that is outside the realm of statist and regional politics. On the contrary, states can also participate in transnational practices through intermediary channels and competencies, of course suggesting a change in the strategies of governance. Maintaining the necessary distinction between transnationalism and the state risks uncritically reaffirming the conflation of state with nation whereas one of the major benefits of transnational research is in overcoming this assumption. In fact, states have historically taken part in not only international but also transnational relations by engaging non-state actors such as social movements and private and political foundations.

The conceptual clarification used by Steven Vertovec is useful in this regard. He similarly identifies transnational relations as “referring to sustained linkages and ongoing exchanges among non-state actors based across national borders” but also suggests that transnationalism includes the “processes of formation and maintenance, and their wider implications” (Vertovec 2009, 3). A comprehensive understanding of these aspects would necessarily include the actions and participation of state actors in governance and the promotion and engagement with such networks. This is evident in the Mediterranean region where the EU and regional governments have partnered with civil society actors and regional institutions to foster limited forms of transnational activity. Naturally, this is not the autonomous transnationalism referred to in much of the literature concerned with social movements or migration but it is a significant feature of the regional landscape and potential source of further development. In other words, states are not transnational actors in themselves but can take part in the formation, maintenance or extent of transnationalism. Examples of this are also noted by Vertovec (2009) such as the El Salvadoran government’s provision of free legal assistance to El Salvadoran refugees to remain in the United States, contributing significant annual remittances (Mahler 1998). There is a complex relationship between the worlds of states and transnationalism oftentimes based on a subtle interaction between the two. Another reason to
focus on transnational practices for this research is to avoid conflating the actions and participation of civil society groups across the region with more mobile and essential forms of transnationalism such as migration or to characterize these actors as automatically representative of a transnational (or global) civil society. Practices, on the other hand, are highly contextual and can be employed strategically but they also have a reciprocal effect.

Conclusion

This literature review has introduced some of the key works on different concepts and aspects that will play an important role in this research. The discussions presented here provide a foreground for the analytical chapters to follow, which will pick up on either individual themes or multiple complementary themes. It should be clear from the previous sections that this research picks up from some complex debates that have taken place in different fields of political, sociological, anthropological and geographical research. Combining the insights from these different areas is a tricky task but one that is highly beneficial to properly understanding the role of civil society actors and their diverse understandings beyond an integration inspired approach to the Mediterranean region. First, by exploring the role of civil society actors in relation to transnationalization and political governance suggests a novel way of conceptualizing the relationship between these two phenomena and the way in which civil society is constructed and practiced according to political and cultural criteria. But applying a transnational approach also allows us to focus upon the multiple ways in which transnational relations alter these roles and offer opportunities to social and political actors to engage in a variety of practices and meaning-making activities. Coupling these ideas with a renewed concern for the existence of regional institutions, programmes and activities will provide understanding of the complex, contested and multi-layered existence of the region inside and outside of political constructions.
Chapter 3: Beyond the object of civil society: transnational democracy promotion and the proliferation of Foundations

This chapter elaborates on transnationalization as a process contributing to a change in political practice that is evident in the evolution of democracy promotion through the 1990s and following the millennium. This is the first of two theoretical chapters which place the subsequent research in the context of increasing multilateralism and the growth of cross-border and transnational networks to achieve closer cooperation and pursue state interests. Transnational cooperation is characteristic of non-state actors and has at times been treated as unique to social movements or migrants. Where the state has been discussed is usually in the form of policy networks. This perspective focuses on the organizational politics in governance whereby ministries, committees, trade unions, businesses, civil society organizations may form cross-border alliances in the pursuit of achieving more effective policy solutions and implementation.

The purpose of the chapter is to provide theoretical grounding for the subsequent analysis. It suggests that, in order to understand the ways in which culture and civil society have been incorporated into Euro-Mediterranean relations, we also need to look beyond the region. This is done by exploring the process through which global normative culture has penetrated political strategies and altered the methods through which official actors pursue and contest political objectives. It first off establishes the significance of non-state actors such as political and cultural foundations in helping redefine the practice(s) of democracy promotion. It also demonstrates that the networks that foundations help to generate are not necessarily independent or immune to state influence but often act in complement to official foreign policy instruments. At the same time, they support an increasingly horizontal structure that encourages the participation of other non-state actors thus often prioritizing informal politics and proffering the instrumental value of civil society. The chapter unfolds by examining the relationship between transnationalization and democracy. It examines the role that global normative culture has had on the way in which politics is contested at the local and international level. The
symbolic and real influence of transnational civil society has, thus, influenced a change in political practice that can also be seen in the typically state reserve of foreign policy. The final sections of the chapter explore these theoretical insights in relation to the EU’s democracy promotion activities and connects changes in the field of democracy promotion to the influence of networking amongst states and Political Foundations.

In the context of transnationalizing processes, the focus on civil society in political strategy can be linked in part to the increased role of political and cultural foundations. In the field of democracy promotion this is apparent through the emergence of foundations, nominally connected to political structures, which in their work emphasize the importance of society-oriented programming. A similar approach can be found in other policies that aim to establish connections at the societal level, especially in the realm of cultural relations. Ultimately, the ubiquity of the ‘civil society’ orientation seems to stem at least in part from the post-Cold War practice of democracy promotion and has remained central to other areas of foreign policy – public and cultural diplomacy – as well as in what can be referred to as global cultural policy. This chapter responds to a problem at the heart of understanding the incorporation of civil society in regional institutions – namely, the relationship between states, transnationalism and civil society. But is also provides an essential basis to understand the political value of a Foundation to support civil society networking in the context of weak regional integration.

Wolff and Wurm (2011) have pointed towards the deficiency of theoretical approaches to understanding democracy promotion. This is an important deficiency that deserves much greater attention. Working in this direction necessitates an understanding of the relationship between democracy promotion and global politics as well as the problem of democratization of the global system. Certainly, states have a central role in democracy promotion policies but specific strategies and their implementation are linked to more general trends of political transformation and practice, and political discourses and cultures that exist alongside. There are, of course, clear instrumental logics in the strategic implementation of policies. But there is a limited designation of legitimate courses of action that has followed the backlash against democracy
promotion activities worldwide. This backlash can be observed in the legal and extra-legal actions of authoritarian governments such as the bill passed in July 2012 in Russia requiring NGOs that receive foreign funding to publicly adopt the label ‘foreign agent’ or suffer legal action. On December 27th 2011 Egyptian forces stormed the offices of 17 NGOs, including several linked to the National Endowment for Democracy, and detained numerous employees ostensibly for operating without the proper permits and for not declaring foreign sources of funding. Some methods of democracy promotion have become less clear and less desirable in this context. For example, the use of conditionality in EU external assistance to Southern Mediterranean countries lacks a clear framework for justification and has been deemed ineffectual at times. December 2012 saw additional loans to Egypt despite a period of seemingly anti-democratic political manoeuvring on the part of President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. In addition, the limited effectiveness of EU conditionality in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean as a result of the missing ‘carrot’ of membership further complicates its use and indicates the potential significance of transnational actors and approaches for EU policy.

Understanding the various conceptual underpinnings and the practical implications of the significance attributed to civil society actors in official policies toward democracy promotion should be of greater concern. I intend to pursue this aim by linking this concern with the process of political globalization, which occasions the environment for its proliferation. We need to contextualize the development of democracy promotion within a global politics and through the elaboration of a global normative culture. As we see a growing focus on civil society as both target and mediator of democracy promotion policies there is a simultaneous shift in the type of policy being pursued. This is not to say that these developments are inherently linked but rather to suggest that there is a twofold process including the transnationalization of democracy promotion and its conceptual narrowing. The key concerns of this paper can also be linked to the current concern with conceptualizing various approaches towards and understandings of democracy promotion (Hobson and Kurki 2011). There is a clear link between transnationalization and the study of transnational civil society actors, a link that might appear patently obvious. However there has
been less discussion of the impact of these processes on the actual strategy and goals of democracy promotion activities especially in reference to an increasing focus on civil society assistance. At a time when there is greater skepticism towards the compatibility of narrow conceptions of civil society, why does the role of civil society actors continue to expand? And, who is included in the dominant conceptions of civil society? In order to begin to answer these questions we need to consider the relationship between the discourses of civil society and the way that it becomes practiced in different contexts. One aspect of this is to recover the relationship between 'civil society' and the practice of governance.

This chapter will explore the transnationalization of practices and strategies of state and supranational actors specifically with regard to democracy promotion. By looking at the ways in which transnationalism has impacted upon state-level politics it is possible to understand more effectively the relationship between transnationalism and international politics. Thus, transnationalization and transnationalism have led to the civil societalization of politics. While the capacity to act independently has increased for many actors there is still an intimate link between governments and independent political and non-political actors in pursuing democracy promotion strategies. With regard to the European Union it is important to recognize that many changes have also occurred during a period where the efficacy of democracy promotion has come under heavy scrutiny and during which the number and type of actors involved in democracy promotion has substantially increased. Simultaneously there is a growing shift towards a more flexible form of democracy promotion that focuses on the actors involved as contributing to the input and output legitimacy policies and programmes. The focus on civil society is a key feature of promoting a form of 'low-intensity democracy' (Robinson 1996, 18) or a kind of 'democracy, abridged' and is thus also a structural feature of a global society to the extent that it is linked to transnationalization processes. However, it is also linked to the functioning of cultural and discursive interactions that (re)produce a particular version of civil society and democratic politics. Historically, it is not a coincidence that discourses of both human rights and democracy began to feature in foreign policy around roughly the same time and that this occurred
during a period of increasingly political as well as economic forms of transnationalization (See Guilhot 2005). This paper leans towards a deeper investigation of EU democracy promotion in the EuroMediterranean favoring insights into the complexity and multidimensionality of regional developments (Kurki 2011) and proposes a novel approach to looking at the role of civil society in relation to governance in the EuroMed region through the concept of ‘civil societalization’. The approach favored is more intimately aware of and tied to globalizing processes and a transformation of global politics associated with a movement in the locus of power from traditional, institutional forms to a condition of flexibility and organizational differentiation. In the place of democracy there are a series of new tactics and organizational strategies aimed at producing short-term effects and measurable results and which are legitimized through a global normative discourse. Recent developments in democracy promotion tend to focus on flexible, technocratic and low-cost means. Transnational actors have been one influence in this direction as they play a greater role in defining and implementing policies. But governments and states are also promoting these developments. As such, we can link these developments in democracy promotion to a general ‘civil societalization of politics’ whereby political practice and strategy have been transformed through discourses of civil society. However there is a simultaneous change in the way that ‘civil society’ is understood and practiced as the concept becomes transnationalized as well as (re)constructed by political actors. This paper will focus on one aspect of this process in relation to democracy promotion (specifically in the EU) and the role of political foundations in helping to redefine its practice in the context of an increasingly global politics. In so doing I will show that it is not sufficient to measure or objectify civil society but that we also need to question the ways in which civil society becomes constitutive of governance practices.

**Transnationalization, civil society and politics**

Transnationalization is a phenomenon that requires definition and discussion as it has diverse meanings and interpretations. What I want to focus on specifically is the extension of political governance beyond national boundaries and the rise of transnational civil society actors. With regard to civil society, these new
governance structures are often represented as constructing new opportunity structures for civil society actors and organizations ostensibly to participate in the act of governing and policy-making. However, the relationship between the two is often left relatively unexamined despite the fact that this is a crucial relationship which rests at the heart of political strategies aimed at promoting the growth or involvement of civil society, whether in terms of democratization or for regionalization. A central goal for this section will be to establish the significance of transnationalization as a perspective that reflects on the links between political transformations, social and cultural change, and the emergence of new strategies, organizational forms and discourses of action that legitimize political relationships. These latter aspects will be discussed subsequently in greater detail as they describe a critical relationship between the practice of politics and its normativity in the context of globalizing processes.

The definition of transnationalism offered by Risse (1995) is a useful starting point: ‘regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an intergovernmental organization’ (Risse 1995, 3). However, there needs to be a greater distinction or explanation of the identity of the non-state actor and the relationship with emerging forms of governance. Furthermore, it does not clearly enough specify the transnational as a fragmentary and enduring process. Both of these aspects are of critical importance to understanding the significance of transnationalization. Non-state actors have been attributed an increasingly significant role in the global system since the 1990s. The expansion of international institutions and the growth of regional integration and supranational governance has produced a dramatic shift in the way that states interact and on the ability of new actors to have an impact on global politics. Extensive writings on global civil society (GCS) or transnational civil society (TCS) (Keck and Sikkink 1998, Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000, Clark 2001, Khagram, Riker and Sikkink 2002, Keane 2003, Kaldor 2003) beginning in this decade have sought to illuminate the complexity and range of actors and relations that are critical to understanding global relations since the collapse of communism. Indeed, analysis of the ‘global associational revolution’ (Salomon, Sokolowski and List 2003) has been largely (though certainly not solely)
differentiated along a sort of spectrum of optimism. This spectrum could be said to range from a belief in the innate transformational impact of transnational civil society actors (Kaldor 2003) to a more cautious interrogation of the role of these actors in relation to capital and state power (Higgott, Underhill and Bieler 2000). Nonetheless, most suggest that transnational civil society should not be overlooked when trying to understand global politics and they (at least) implicitly suggest a fundamental transformation in political practice that has given these actors new impetus and opportunities. A crucial difficulty that arises is in understanding the relationship of these new actors to new forms of political governance and in providing an adequate scaling of relations. On this question there is a double-sided problematic that highlights the importance of context for political action and the transformational impact of transnationalization of political identities and actions. None of this suggests that the place or influence of the state is under attack and a crucial understanding is that transnational civil society actors are always locally situated and globally oriented.

Implicitly, we can see this in Keck and Sikkink’s concept of the ‘boomerang effect’ whereby TCS groups target international partners in order to subsequently put pressure on their local governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998). Thus, the global consists of a strategic element for these advocacy networks in order to pursue local goals. But the existence of international organizations and the capability of networking transnationally also gives new significance to the global realm precisely by expanding the range of options and meanings available to these actors. The ‘boomerang effect’ is important because it highlights the impact of transnationalization on the political strategies of civil society actors. But it also points to the ‘domestication of international conflict’ (Tarrow 2001) and that global activism is also connected to an attitude of glocalism by altering actors’ perception of states and borders as “local practices and policies are embedded in transnational processes and ideologies” (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000, Preface). And as Anthony McGrew has pointed out, transnational actors also portend an infrastructural power understood as the way in which globalization amplifies the ability of TCS actors to take advantage not just of the opportunity structures but also through new mechanisms and through the effects of norms and socialization.
The problem of understanding transnational civil society as a phenomenon unto itself requires also a consideration of power and influence. As Florini (2003) argues, instead of wielding material power these actors have proved to be adept at promoting ideas and international norms in order to persuade governments and to influence changes in policies and political identities (Florini 2003, 10-11). Keck and Sikkink (1998) allude to this when they argue that one of the goals of transnational advocacy networks is to promote a change in discursive positions and to change actor behavior. In so doing, they reinforce the role of discourse in producing new political identities and political change – they help to reconstruct ‘structures of power and meaning’ (Price 2003, 583). So behind the power strategies of agenda setting, networking, compliance and mobilization rests a more fluid understanding of power that varies depending on context and issue area. Socialization becomes the primary route to influence. And yet as Richard Price (1998) shows, success in the area of norm promotion tends to be closely linked to pre-existing norms or rules such that new norms can be ‘grafted’ onto existing campaigns (Price 1998, 617). As a result, focusing narrowly on the production of norms and rules can be misleading. An effective strategy invokes existing agreements, discourses or narratives in order to provoke new understandings or to extend an established form of legitimacy to another issue.

Having looked at the ways in which political governance has become more flexible it would seem apposite to also look into ways in which transnational actors have been able to take advantage of these new infrastructures and technologies. In this sense, one could differentiate between transnational actors and global discourses along the lines that action takes place in a particular setting or across particular circumstances whereas discourse is about framing and legitimizing. But this breakdown neglects the global implications of transnationalization and specifically its impact upon the state-system. Moreover, taken as a statement of theoretical explication it ignores the essentially constituted nature of global politics and this makes it necessary to supplement the opportunity structure model of transnationalization by understanding, as Ulrich Beck argues, how transnationalized politics “is not the end of politics but rather its migration elsewhere...Global politics have turned
into global domestic politics, which rob national politics of their boundaries and foundations” (Beck 2006, 249). While the latter argument might seem premature Beck touches on a crucial peculiarity when he refers to a ‘global domestic politics’. In fact, it is in understanding this transformation that we can also move closer to understanding the civil societalization of politics and the constitutive nature of global politics. What is clear from this is that we need to be keenly aware of the emergence of an altogether different relationship between state-society resulting in multifarious actors (state and non-state actors alike) instrumentalizing the idea of civil society. As Petric and Blundo (2012) have argued, civil society has become a fetish-object in the minds of transnational actors and this is propagated by the practice of transnationalization and the emergence of globalizing identities and cultures that reference the categorical traits of civil society actors.

From global normative culture to the civil societalization of politics

In the sense it has been used thus far, transnationalization refers to the institutional and organizational transformation of politics across state boundaries through the emergence of new actors and institutions and the proliferation of cross-border flows of goods, people and ideas. One part of this transformation is the role of non-state actors in the form of NGOs, CSOs, social movements and political foundations. In both the targets of advocacy actions and the issues represented, such as environmentalism, there is an inherently globalizing viewpoint and this is both supported and based around the existence of a global normative culture, which could be associated with the culture of human rights that has developed within international institutions and through international law. Alongside the institutionalization of certain norms and values the work of social movements, NGOs and other civil society oriented groups continues to progress a transnationalization of the public sphere, a space of collective (communicative) action, which acts as a critical resource for a global normative culture. Global normative culture does not refer to the development of normative frameworks, or the establishment of international regimes, such as those referred to in the human rights literature. This culture is a social
phenomenon most clearly linked to the impact of transnationalization on political community and in the social and cultural as well as political responses to the transformation of opportunity and capacity at the local level. The final part of this discussion will introduce the civil societalization of politics and discuss its effect on policy through the analytic of antipolicy.

Public spheres are always subject to conflict and contestation and the communicative capacity provided by globalized media and communications technology ensures a multiplicity of participants and outcomes. But this situation does not create an even playing field. It is also not possible to point towards an existing transnational public sphere but only a process of transnationalizing in response to the various crises of political representation and the national public sphere under globalization and the enduring adaptation of sovereignties. The significance of the transnationalizing public sphere does not necessarily lie in its normative foundations – that is, the ability to produce even exchange and consensus through deliberation – but through the elaboration of alternative discourses and modes of interaction which become powerful tools in their own right as well as being subject to domestication by various micronarratives and re-made (Appadurai 1996, 10). States, political parties, corporations all show a willingness and ability to appropriate such discourses for their own needs as is evident in the proliferation of democratic parties in authoritarian countries or environmentally concerned corporations. But the transnationalizing public sphere is much more of a critical resource:

This transnational public sphere offers a place where forms of organization and tactics for collective action can be transmitted across the globe. It is the medium through which various forms of collective action and social movement repertoires become “modular” and transferable to distant locations and causes (Tarrow 1994, 6). It also provides the space where material resources can be developed and distributed across national boundaries in ways that limit the nation-state’s capacity to sanctify and demonize practices with cries of patriotic and alien influences. (Guidry, Kennedy and Zald 2000, 7)

This points to the influence that non-state actors play in producing change in the practice and legitimization of politics. But the transnationalization of such movements complicates the relationship between institutional and non-institutional actors. What makes the notion of the public sphere a useful construct is in its ability to help us represent the complex relationship between
conflicting interests, “the social construction of cultural meaning, and the institutions of the state” (Castells 2008, 79). Certainly, these relationships become more ambiguous with its transnationalization as evidenced in the proliferation of political foundations that often maintain a tenuous distinction between governmental and private actorhood. And yet as a result of their transnational activity political foundations continually contribute to the globalization of particular norms and ideas (Scott and Walters 2000). So for reasons not associated with their point of origin or political identity the activities of such actors construct new lines of communication and power through the establishment of social networks across state boundaries. As Delanty and Rumford point out: “Global normative culture exists alongside these movements…providing them with a communicative frame of reference with which global politics is increasingly having to define itself” (Delanty and Rumford 2007, 416).

Such a context has led to a fundamental transformation of how particular issues and policies are viewed and contested from the state-level. Such can be seen as a civil societalization of politics to the extent that official politics and policies are operationalized more readily and extensively through the affectations of civil society. Civil societalization can be defined as the contestation of political objectives by governments and official representatives outside the formal political realm. It has impacted upon politics by opening up new avenues for political contestation into areas of societal interaction and culture. The CS of politics can be seen as an element of political transformation associated with the globalization of a normative discourse based around human rights, the increasing significance attributed to the activities of transnational actors and the corresponding scale shifts in governance practices in order to incorporate them. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2007), in their original discussion of the civil societalization of politics, point to the increasing impact of transnational relations and social actors on governance but also in the construction of a global normative culture. The concept of civil societalization highlights the extent to which this culture is subsequently capable of impacting upon politics at various scales of governance. As such; “...the ‘civil societalization’ of politics signifies a commonality of political forms which link the local and the
global, the national and the transnational, and mobilizes a range of actors around common political codes: competitiveness, sustainability, personhood rights and social justice” (Delanty and Rumford 2007, 421). Significantly, the extension of CS into the fields of international relations and foreign policy shows that one of the outcomes of the various debates surrounding civil society and democratic governance is the focus on organizational strategies. As a result, governments may mobilize transnational civil society actors, or actors representative of a global civil society (Ibid). The inherent legitimacy attributed to these actors can then be linked directly to official policies. An important question that remains, however, is following this change in organizational and mobilization strategy, to what extent does the CS of politics also produce or support the construction of particular imaginations and identities?

As a strategy, CS develops around external forms of legitimacy that conform to universalized values and international agreements. The CS of politics infers a process of transformation in the understanding of state-society relations as political actors are faced with new strategic considerations regarding the adoption of new organizational forms and particular discourses of legitimacy. The CS of politics leads political actors to organize around particular discourses or issues and to mobilize networked actors in response to conflict. Transnational actors have taken on more authority through the functioning of a global normative culture but also through complex relationships with states and governments (as well as other international donors exercising unique forms of sovereignty). An important effect of this civil societalization of politics can be found in William Walters’ (2008) analysis of ‘antipolicy’. Treating antipolicy as an analytic helps to interpret the strategies and discourses that are common to democracy promotion policies that are explicitly oriented towards civil society actors. This discussion focuses on antipolicy as ‘an analytic’ as this suggests a route to integrating these insights within a more sociological understanding (Walters 2008). Antipolicy considers the way in which official strategies are developed to counter ‘bad things’. These can be societal or international problems, or both. The study of antipolicy represents an attempt to come to terms with the ways in which ‘anti’ discourses have not only a life of their own but establish their own content and meaning that does not solely rest on a
negation of the issue. On the contrary, these policies entail positive components that contribute to the narrowing of alternative political agendas. This is important precisely because of the political purpose of including civil society groups in these policies. A major factor is that of legitimation – that is, that making civil society either the target of policies or incorporating them within democracy promotion carries with it a certain form of legitimacy that is all the more important with a waning of explicitly political democracy promotion activities and sources of funding for such activities. However, this is not sufficient in itself.

What antipolicy captures is the significance of (re)defining the issue. Therefore, it is not the goals that justify the means but the output, or as Manuel Castells indicates, as “people have come to distrust the logic of instrumental politics, the method of direct action on direct outputs finds increasing support” (Castells 2008, 85). This scenario is intimately linked to the strategy of non-governmental organizations but is replicated in official government policies or by other transnational actors. The suggestion is not that civil society assistance or democracy promotion are antipolicies, or even that they are based upon the prevention of authoritarianism in a general sense of ‘anti’ but the positive aspects of antipolicy are broadly applicable to a change in official policy strategy and coincide with new ways of approaching issues that are problematic or have ambiguous goals attached to them. As Walters (2008) argues: “the things which anti-policy targets do not have a natural existence outside discourse...Anti-policy always deals with racism, terrorism, etc., understood in very specific ways, and is objectified by particular networks of practice” (Walters 2008, 274-5). Democracy promotion could certainly be perceived in such a way and this paper has sought to re-contextualize the EU approach in terms of a narrow understanding of civil society and its legitimacy as well as its link to a narrow conception of democracy both of which are (re)produced in the transnationalization of such policies.

Finally, while depoliticization is not a necessary element of anti-policy there are important links between the two through two factors: 1) the externalization effect and 2) the blackmail of security (Walters 2008, 281). The externalization effect can be understood as a “discursive move by which certain threats come to be understood within the political arena as dangers emanating
from outside the state...[the] involvement of western states in fostering the conditions in which the drug trade, people trade, racism, terrorism and other forms of violence might flourish is made to recede into the background” (Ibid). The externalization effect abounds in sensitive policy areas like democracy promotion. The Arab Spring has brought much greater attention to this effect in the EU’s relations with North African regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, both of which received substantial financial and political support from European countries despite habitually poor human rights records. Policy responses in the form of reconfiguring the ENP, establishing closer links with non-political foundations (like the Anna Lindh Foundation), and establishing a greater role for local actors and civil society groups have all sought to limit criticism based on the externalization effect. The blackmail of security, on the other hand, points to the way in which official anti-policy might tend to play on divisions and evoke particular political agendas. This might mean playing on fear or threat, or by oversimplification. It could be argued that the exclusion of Islamic organizations (whether desired or not) is an inevitable side effect of the ‘blackmail of security’, which inevitably establishes categories of threat that is capable of incorporating whole communities.

**Transnationalization, democracy promotion and the EU**

The goal of this section will be to consider the relationship of civil society actors to regional governance frameworks particularly in the context of democracy promotion strategies and developmental instruments. EU policies and multilateral regional frameworks in the Mediterranean provide an institutional architecture for the region and suggest new opportunity structures for governmental and non-governmental actors and democracy promotion activities form an important aspect (at least rhetorically) through the European Neighborhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean and various instruments such as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights that extend focus to the role of civil society actors in promoting democratic development. But EU democracy promotion strategies are also much more diffuse and manifold. They operate through unilateral and technical instruments
agreements and multilateral forums (European Neighborhood Policy, Union for the Mediterranean) such that it is difficult to characterize them under a cohesive heading. These developments point to a suggestion that claiming the ‘end of democracy promotion’ should stress the ubiquity of strategies rather than their dissolution. It is precisely this abundance mixed with funding shortages, short-termism, and the focus on measurable results that has produced a movement away from the promotion of democracy in procedural and institutional terms as well as through the practice of conditionality.

The international dimension of democracy promotion has received a great deal of attention since the early 1990s (Whitehead 1996). Many studies have focused on the concept of external democratization to refer to the international factors (that is, not domestic factors) that can influence a transition to democratic forms of governance or can promote domestic actors in favor of reform (Beichelt 2012). Yet rather than drawing clear distinctions this move risks muddying the waters between the role of different democracy promoters and the effects of international politics on democracy promotion. Instead, we need to look more deeply into how transnationalization has influenced new strategies and goals by looking at how the goals of democracy promotion have changed in response to transnational actors and political strategies and by considering the role of transnational actors such as political foundations in democracy promotion. The growing significance of civil society-oriented democracy promotion strategies in the EU can be linked directly to the influence of transnational actors and discourses, and the development of political foundations to pursue the objectives of democracy promotion should be seen in the context of the extension of political governance beyond national boundaries. Subsequently, this requires a reconsideration of the discourses of democratization and also of the role of culture and cultural institutes in official policy.

The relation of democracy promotion policies to international and transnational phenomena gained increased attention alongside growing concern for the context of democratization. One of the initial attempts to include the consideration of these factors was by Laurence Whitehead who discerned three
models of external democratization: contagion, control and consent (Whitehead 1996). These three models offered a way to separate the influence of powerful external democracy promoters (such as the US and European countries) from the effects of proximity and position in the international system. The question of contagion appeared especially relevant in the case of Europe with both Southern Europe and Central Europe undergoing their own transitions following decades of authoritarian rule in both cases. The significance of the European cases was reflected in Paul Kubicek's updating of these criteria by substituting consent for convergence and adding a fourth model, conditionality (Kubicek 2003). Working from a similar concern for the international dimensions of democratization, Kubicek's criteria offered more nuance to the picture and a closer link between democracy promoter strategies, domestic democratization actors, and the international environment. His approach also better acknowledged the variation in promoter strategies according to these different variables especially in relation to the goal of accession to the European Union. It is unsurprising that these criteria maintained an important role in explaining the democratizing role of the EU on the continent and was even expanded to debate the global significance and actoriness of the EU (Börzel and Risse 2009). The categories of contagion and convergence were effectively extended, however, through a greater concern with explicating these models by linking traditional rationalist concerns over incentives with that of social learning and new modes of governance (Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005: 18). In so doing, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) introduced a novel way of looking at EU policies towards neighboring countries that was influenced by work on socialization in international relations and the transnationalization of governance. As a result, analysis of EU democracy promotion is often centered on the two factors of conditionality and socialization in evermore-sophisticated understandings. Börzel and Risse (2009) have progressed this analysis further by focusing on criteria as expressing different social mechanisms of democratization: coercion, conditionality, persuasion, and socialization. Instead of using a broadly constructivist label towards the categories of socialization and persuasion they argue that they should be differentiated through the concepts of normative rationality and communicative rationality. Thus, they argue that
socialization can be linked to the question of norms but success usually depends upon a ‘logic of appropriateness’ whereby the effectiveness of particular norms is dependent upon their institutional context (as according to March and Olsen 1989). Alternatively, persuasion follows the logic of communicative rationality whereby consensus is achieved through open dialogue and discourse. It is perhaps indicative of the dominance of integration studies for understanding EU democracy promotion policies that the question of accession continues to weigh heavily on the direction of debate. These studies have answered important questions regarding the ways in which transformative power functions and they have implicitly dealt with the impact of transnationalization on these policies, however we need to move beyond the frame of accession in order to account for a change in strategy and content of democracy promotion policies over the same time period.

Criteria initially discussed by Whitehead (1996), which have evolved and become subject of greater theoretical clarity through the work of Kubicek (2003), Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2005) and Börzel and Risse (2009), reveal a gradual elaboration of the concern for the external and systemic contexts of democratization. What they have in common is the recognition that the outcome of democratization processes results from the combination of regional factors (geography) and the impact of both external and internal factors and which in turn highlights the importance of transnational actors (Grugel 1999, 5). Constructivist approaches have played an important role in clarifying the impact of factors that cannot be explained through rational actor models such as norms and identities. Over the same period constructivist arguments have played an important (if not central) role in explaining the power of transnational civil society actors in global politics as well as reconsidering the basis of the states-system in general (Wendt 1992; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Ruggie 1998). However transnational actors have also had an infrastructural impact on the practice of international relations. Democracy promotion has taken on a global shape through the work of international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF but also by the European Union and the US through the setting up of aid agencies and political foundations. Furthermore, democracy itself has become globalized in the context of democratization with the
development of internal and external standards that stress reform, political pluralism and participation but “also about satisfying powerful international observers...that acceptable political systems are taking shape” (Grugel 1995 quoted in Grugel 1999, 19). This is evident in the negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements that link economic aid to some form of political conditionality. For example, action plans under the European Neighborhood Policy explicitly include criteria for democratic reform under a section titled ‘Democracy and the Rule of Law’. The significance of these criteria does not solely lay in their democratizing credentials but rather in their appropriateness in terms of providing stability for international interests. The external aspect of democratization is also evident in public statements made by US and European officials towards countries undergoing democratic transitions. A recent example of such came in response to President Mohammed Morsi’s controversial decree expanding his powers over the judiciary calling on the US State Department to urge a transition that is “consistent with Egypt’s international commitments” (State Department Press Statement Nov. 23rd 2012). While analysis of democracy promotion has become increasingly concerned with external factors and contexts in producing successful transitions the goals of democracy promotion have also taken on a global purpose and the shift is more than discursive. The impact of non-state, transnational political and civil society actors has been significant on the expansion of democratization agendas and policies. However, they have also tended to organize around particular conceptions and practices of democracy promotion. This needs to be accounted for more explicitly.

**Civil societalization in democracy promotion strategy**

Approaches to development espousing the centrality of civil society for political transformation became dominant in the period immediately preceding and following the collapse of the Soviet Union aided by the influence of global development institutions (Robinson 1995). The United Nations Human Development Programme’s 1993 Human Development Report promoted the strengthening of domestic civil society institutions as a way of increasing social stability in developing states, a call that was repeated in the World Bank's World
Development Report (McIlwaine 1998). With the evolution of neo-liberal policies known commonly as the Washington Consensus, civil society promotion also took on a specific form in official policies depicting civil society as a third sector, inclusive of social activity and market relations, standing in direct opposition to state control and promoting economic development and efficient (i.e.: limited) government. Through this ‘New Policy Agenda’, discussed by Hulme and Edwards (1997), NGOs and CSOs became central to the development of civil society in relation to democracy promotion. This new agenda focused on the role of the market and private actors in ensuring ‘good governance’ (Hulme and Edwards 1997, 6). The focus on good governance, which has dominated EU-led initiatives, views civil society as both a target of funding and as a mediator of programmes. Thus, it takes on a dual role and one of increasing significance in relation to official policy and crucially for the current discussion it also begins along the path towards transnationalizing the concept by understanding civil society through a focus on mediating bilateral and multilateral programmes and initiatives and establishing its legitimacy outside of the local setting. But how did civil society come to play such a central role in the allocation and goals of democracy promotion?

Certainly, governments and organizations working in the field find many practical advantages in civil society. For example as Carothers and Ottaway (2010) point out, a lack of desire to undertake reforms within recipient governments and declining budgets for democracy promotion both prompted a focus on smaller-scale involvement as even the limited amount of funding available appeared significant in relation to the size of CSOs working in the field (Carothers and Ottaway 2010, location 108). Ultimately, the primacy given to NGOs in particular has led to their introduction “as a pervasive associational form, marking a departure from the past” and resulting in an organizational, as opposed to political, form of pluralism (Ibid, location 3464). But their proliferation in this regard should not be separated from the international growth of NGOs since the early 1990s. The geographical unevenness of NGO growth (Smith and Wiest 2005) only increases their strategic importance as Western NGOs become central players in promoting democratization policies and programmes of their own. The transnationalization
of politics has reinforced the centrality of civil society for democratization as a result of the diminishing self-sufficiency of states. In a parallel development the notion of civil society assistance has gained prominence and the role of civil society actors and particularly NGOs and CSOs has multiplied and become much more complex as civil society is simultaneously transformed into an object towards which democracy promotion strategies are pursued. In addition to democratization processes being deeply embedded in global and regional politics there are also important practical advantages to the focus on civil society for democracy promoters. As a result, there is a close link between the process of transnationalization (of political governance and non-state actors) and the strategies of democracy promotion that focus on civil society. Civil society in democracy promotion work has typically been criticized for limiting ‘civil society’ as a category to established NGOs (Carothers and Ottaway 2010, location 3418). This problem of civil society assistance is acknowledged in EU policy where there has been a (at least discursive) shift towards incorporating smaller actors, community groups, artists, academics, minor media and generally smaller organizations including cultural and ethnic groups. In some cases there is a turn towards actors who see themselves, or are represented as being, outside the political field. This can be with regard to culture and art or in terms of exercising technical expertise, observation or monitoring (Petric and Blundo 2012, 13). Such depoliticized actors are looked to in order to pursue a less divisive and overtly political agenda.

In response to the popular protest movements across Europe and the events of the Arab Spring, the Commission released a communication entitled ‘The roots of democracy and sustainable development: Europe’s engagement with Civil Society in external affairs’ detailing the importance of civil society for programmes going forward. This communication identifies civil society as the basis behind successful democratization and development but rather than seeing civil society as a means to democratizing political society, civil society is understood as “an asset in itself” (COM(2012) 492, 3). Of course, civil society is important for promoting effective governance by pushing for transparency and accountability, aiding service provision, engaging in peace-building, promoting inclusiveness and pluralism, and ensuring sustainable growth and the key to
ensuring this multidimensional role for CSOs is independence. But this key criterion is less than clear when the varying contexts of action are considered, for example independence will likely mean something different during partnerships between national authorities and CSOs for service provision than when CSOs take on more of an advocacy or activist role. The multitude of identities that civil society actors assume is neglected. Independence also seems to be defined primarily by the relationship between CSOs and national authorities leaving the impact of the donor potentially under scrutinized. Benoit Challand’s argument that donors should instead focus on ensuring the autonomy of CSOs, which more effectively safeguards their position between international and national context is instructive in this regard. Autonomy is a contextual imperative and crucial to the local success of CSOs as it helps to ensure the appropriateness of actions for the particular context, the credibility and legitimacy of actions locally and the sustainability of programmes. What is significant about the approach pursued in the Commission’s communication is that it reflects a transnationalized understanding of civil society as a depoliticized associational realm whose context is defined by the scale at which it acts rather than its relationship to the political. Thus, local CSOs are characteristically the same but contextually different from transnational actors. This is acknowledged in the broad definition of ‘CSO’ whereby: “The EU considers CSOs to include all non-state, not-for-profit structures, non-partisan and non-violent, through which people organize to pursue shared objectives and ideals...Operating from the local to the national, regional and international levels, they comprise urban and rural, formal and informal organizations” (COM(2012) 492). One of the few things that they have in common is some form of organizational capacity. Civil society assistance increasingly sees civil society as an end in itself by reifying the organizational capacity and democratic value of CSOs and NGOs. This conceptualization underscores the significance of NGOs and CSOs in subsequent policy developments as the concern is no longer focused strictly on ‘civil society’ as it was initially envisaged – as being fundamentally entwined with and co-defined by political society – but rather as being a phenomenon in itself which has innate ‘democratic’ potential.
Focusing on CSOs also offers the ability to avoid overtly political involvement and to pursue democracy promotion in a more technical and/or indirect fashion. In the case of the EU policy changes have been heavily linked to the politics and negotiations unique to the system of governance in the EU. It was only in 1999 that Council regulations 975 and 976 were passed giving the Commission a legal basis for expenditures in support of human rights and democracy and in 2001 the Commission released a substantive communication declaring a strategic approach to democracy promotion. The European Commission (EC) views increasing participation as a fundamental aspect of their approach to good governance, which specifically entails the local ownership of aid programmes and has keenly avoided engagement with political parties or actors with clear political agendas. Through the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) this has meant a central focus on the transfer of funds to CSOs in order to implement policies and pursue the objective of reform. Between 2000-2006 €5.3 billion was channeled through CSOs (COM EVINFO 1259). This number includes funding allocated through EIDHR but also includes transferred funds from additional sources given that the entire EIDHR funding allocation for projects between 2000-2006 consisted of €731.4 million. Some of these activities have led to a limited backlash from groups as the practice (and language) of ‘channeling’, while capturing the importance of transferring funds and the reallocation of funding between projects (seen in the figures above), does not indicate an effective partnership between CSOs and the Commission (Ibid). With these practices there is an increasing centrality of civil society actors in the EIDHR and the Commission’s strategy more generally but also a reduction in their ability to act autonomously.

Political Foundations and (re)defining democracy promotion
Since the introduction of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) in 1983 by the Reagan administration political foundations have become increasingly regarded as important actors in promoting the national interest. On 6th June 1996 Carl Gershman (then President of the NED) addressed the French Senate to promote the establishment of political foundations in France. Paying homage to
the long-established German Stiftungen and the recently created Westminster Foundation (1992 in the United Kingdom) Gershman stressed the need for democratic countries to support the ‘transition to modernity’ in poor and conflict-ridden states (Gershman 1996). His speech, which was primarily aimed at discussing the legitimacy of political foundations, clearly associated these actors with humanitarian assistance and democratic peace, both popular subjects at the time. But it also alluded to their governance role in global politics through the ‘relationship of complementarity’ between governments and political foundations (Ibid).

Political foundations have come to play an important role in promoting democratization both within EU policy and in that of European countries. Certainly, there are exceptions to this recent historical reading especially with regard to the German Stiftungen the oldest of which, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, was founded in 1925. However, discounting these long-standing foundations the average age of national political foundations in Europe is a mere 14 years (Wersch and Zeeuw 2005, 12). Foundations established at the EU level are unsurprisingly even more recent with the European Partnership for Democracy established in 2008, the Anna Lindh Foundation established in 2005, the European Network of Political Foundations in 2006 and the still developing European Endowment for Democracy (to be established under Belgian Law).

Political foundations tend to be independent but also closely connected to governments or governmental institutions either through their governance structure or mandates. Such is the case in EU policy towards democracy promotion and development and stems in part from the unique structure of the EU political system. However, the same trend exists within individual states both in Europe and in North America where political foundations play a significant role in developing policy and in exercising decisions. The National Endowment for Democracy in America, the German political foundations, the newly developed European Endowment for Democracy, European networks such as the ENoP and the ALF all represent different types of political foundation. What they all have in common is a transnational orientation and organizational structure and have some form of control exerted over them by governments, ministries or intergovernmental institutions. In addition to this three common characteristics
make them significant actors in changing the practice of democracy promotion: network structure, ‘glocal’ attitude, and anti-political orientation. The proliferation of political foundations historically follows a distinct economic logic as a corrective for the failings of both government and markets and against the institutionalization of state intervention (Anheier 2001, 21). As transnational actors, they are able to establish partnerships with smaller organizations based upon common values and trust and are able to gain access to ‘functional elites’ and to other leading figures capable of exerting influence at the local level (Mohr 2010, 111). These networks produce alternative sites of power and resources for local actors unable to access policy centers, though this is still subject to the biases of the individual foundation. There is an obvious logic to the proliferation of political foundations as they allow foreign governments to work in highly politicized contexts without having to choose sides. For this same reason, they are often forbidden from directly supporting or funding political parties, as is the case with the German political foundations (Mohr 2010, 94). However, they are still able to support parties in less direct ways by supporting their international position (Ibid). In other words, it is not that political foundations exercise purely technical means or avoid political sensitive issues but they allow governments to re-frame political issues in a depoliticized context. Two ways in which this is used in practice is by acting as intermediaries between donors and recipients by channeling funding or by monitoring programmes: “political foundations generally see their impact through numbers: number of participants at their conferences, number of seminars held, number of meetings organized, number of texts published, number of people trained, and so on” (de Montclos 2012, 236).

James Scott argues that political foundations “and the networks in which they are embedded, have helped to expand the influence of the ‘multi-centric world’ and further erode the autonomy of the state and the ‘state-centric world’” (Scott 1999, 147). The emergence and expansion of non-state actors in the field of democracy promotion has contributed to an abundance of programmes for democratization. But while a multiplicity of different agendas exists there is also a convergence around particular norms and organizational forms that are reinforced through the actual organizational practices of actors like NGOs. And yet such a simple conclusion as suggested by the previous quote does not
capture the complex existence of many transnational actors. The role of political foundations might instead be viewed, in one way, as an outsourcing of certain policies, which might be linked to the historical identity of these actors. On the other hand, they do effectively link states to what Scott identifies as the ‘multicentric’ world and as Scott also notes: “While they are created to serve a purpose which is closely tied to ‘national interests’, they are provided space within which to operate more independently. From the perspective of states establishing them, this provides greater freedom of action…and ability to respond to situations quickly. It also involves fewer or reduced legal and political ramifications concerning intervention and interference” (Scott 1999, 148). This observation is crucial for understanding the significance of not only political foundations but also civil society actors more generally for pursuing foreign policy goals. The fact that the German political foundations tend to represent themselves as private actors when abroad (Dakowska 2005, 2) is exemplary of the way in which the politics and identity of civil society actors has transformed the practice of politics and subsequently the practice and understanding of what constitutes ‘civil society’.

**Conclusion**

While this paper has pointed towards the transformation of democracy promotion strategies and the ubiquity of civil society significant contrasts must be recognized as well. If we compare the actions of EIDHR and EuropeAID (instruments more explicitly aimed towards promoting democracy) and regional programmes such as the UfM it is clear that the former place a much greater emphasis on civil society in the implementation of policies. In the regional frameworks civil society actors remain marginal and outside of policy-making. Even programme implementation falls more often on other avenues whereas in democracy promotion the role of civil society actors has proliferated. As a result, the relationship between civil society and governance is not maintained across policy instruments. One explanation could be that the flexibility of these actors makes them practical in the first instance and symbolic in the second. In the
regional EMP and UfM civil society actors are primarily included in the social, cultural and human partnership and apart from more politically sensitive areas.

The civil societalization of politics provides a useful way to address such observations by focusing on the way in which discourses of civil society have been assumed by political actors. This has led to a change in practice both in terms of what ‘civil society’ entails and in the practice governing. Civil societalization makes us aware of the interconnection between governance and the transnationalization of political practice and discourses, a relationship that is underdeveloped in many approaches to studying democracy promotion and the European Union. As a result, what this chapter has attempted to reveal is the implications of transnationalization for global political pursuits, in this case democratization and democracy promotion, which are increasingly identified as global public goods (Wolff and Wurm 2011, 80). However, it also reveals how civil society has gone from a target of policy to a method of pursuing legitimacy. Initial responses and policy reformulations point towards a greater focus on pluralism and human rights through building the capacity of civil society organizations. The critical stance is not to suggest that the goals of pluralism and human rights are misguided or should not be valued but to clarify the complex relationship between foreign policy, transnationalism and civil society.

Foundations have become sought after participants in policy-making. An important role that these organizations play is in establishing relationships with like-minded organizations, or promoting and supporting the establishment of networks across civil society actors. Following such networks also helps to understand the shift since the 1990s to create a more concrete role for culture in the EU and as part of its external relations.
Chapter 4: Transnational cultural networks and the development of cultural policy

This chapter builds on the insights of Chapter 3 by showing how the work of cultural foundations is comparable to these trends bolstering a renewed significance for culture and cultural policy at the EU level. These developments illustrate a changing landscape in cultural relations with strong cultural actors and a gradual change to the national basis of their actions. Cultural foundations have an essential role in promoting this new cultural landscape. They often act as flexible intermediaries between the public sector and small-scale cultural operators. They are not only active in distributing small grants, but are also engaged in lobbying activities related to cultural policy reform as well as its implementation. One of the objectives of an EU strategy for culture is to ensure that the cultural sector has the capacity to structure itself and develop a continuous dialogue between public authorities and civil society. Though culture has been an important consideration through successive periods of integration the development of a distinct cultural policy has been hampered by legal competency, treaty considerations, competition and conceptualization. Exploring these developments provides an important perspective on developments in EU policy. It draws our attention to alternative actors including national cultural foundations/institutes and other regional bodies – such as the Council of Europe – in the evolution of EU competencies and prefigures a change in the EU’s external relations.

This chapter progresses through the emergence of cultural policy in Europe beyond the state. It indicates that the process of integration (especially in the realm of culture) has been driven by the growth and advocacy of cultural networks formed initially of nationally-based organizations designed to promote and protect national cultures. Networking amongst these actors created opportunities for new shared meanings and areas of cooperation opening the possibility of a strategic role for culture beyond the nation-state. Two notable effects are associated with this process: the emergence of a narrative on transnational networking and attempts to establish a European perspective on
cultural diplomacy. Following on from Chapter 3, this discussion demonstrates how foundations and their offshoot networks reveal a global politics that is increasingly heterogeneous (Scott 1999, 147). It is within the context of these developments that the EU is touting a renewed focus on social and cultural dialogue in its relations with neighboring countries. Certainly, the pursuance of intercultural dialogue is not unique to the Euro-Mediterranean though the form it takes is undoubtedly a response to local and national dynamics. But trends suggest that rather than opting for an overtly institutional model of regionalism the EU’s new focus on culture may rather operate more effectively through global cultural relations based on multilateral cooperation and the establishment of regional networks linking cultural organizations. In this model, the division between EEAS, Council and Commission continue to present the possibility of conflict and contradiction. As Chapter 5 discusses, the Anna Lindh Foundation illustrates the ambiguities of the EU’s post-Arab Spring actions in its relationship with the EU Commission.

This discussion of cultural networks explains how perspectives on transnationalism and culture evolve in the EU’s relations with institutions and networks in its external relations. As the previous chapter argues, there have been a couple of changes in the way that external relations are commonly practiced: 1) there has been a growing focus on targeting and incorporating civil society in achieving foreign policy goals and 2) non-state actors such as political and cultural foundations have become important actors both independently and in cooperation with foreign policy-making when designing and implementing policies. The growth of such foundations has opened up space within the policy sphere for contributing experience, expertise, resources and logistical support. A byproduct of this situation is the growth of transnational networks linking various foundations and smaller organizations across national and regional boundaries. Such networks have come to play a major role in promoting the development of cultural policy within European institutions and their influence can be seen in the transformation of cultural relations between Europe and its neighbors since the early attempts to incorporate culture into EU competency.

Culture, a field in which the EU has long had very limited capacity for maneuver, has simultaneously been put forth consistently as an area where the
EU can exhibit expertise, generate influence and locate questions related to its own existence. The cultural foundations of Europe are complex and despite common allusions to a Judeo-Christian heritage anthropology raises far more ambiguous boundaries between it and the rest of the world (Wolf 1982). Such sociological and anthropological complexity presupposes some uniqueness and the potential for conflict. What is more, diverging global and local influences, globalist and nationalist ideologies, ‘fragmegration’ further raise the significance of culture as a field that needs to be taken seriously by policy-makers and practitioners alike. But as the famous quote attributed to Jean Monnet realises - it is not always at the forefront of developments.

Taking inspiration from Monica Sassatelli’s (2009) more expansive treatment of cultural policy in Europe, which highlighted the role played by the Council of Europe alongside European institutions, this chapter aims at the space in-between a multitude of actors. It explores the development of cultural policy in the context of evolving European institutions and draws together the long-term development of cultural policy in the EU with parallel developments in transnational networks inside the EU and stretching beyond EU boundaries. Thus, transnational networks (foremost between cultural institutions) promote the diffusion of ideas and narratives into European policy frameworks. In other words, EU cultural policy has been the product of a range of actors within EU institutions but is also indebted to the work of other actors such as the Council of Europe, the European Cultural Foundation and national institutes of culture and other foundations who developed practices and policies from which the EU was able to strategize its own role. And, in conjunction with the development of the EEAS a more flexible and networked approach to external relations.

In terms of the development of culture within EU policy it is clear that from the outset, there is both a political and an economic understanding of culture - relevant to the different facets of EU integration. But importantly, culture has always been outward facing - oriented towards the development of relations between members states and external partners, or towards the process of enlargement. As such, culture has always been strategic and yet only through the exertions of cultural networks has that strategy been made possible. The interaction involves a mess of scripts. For example, the promotion of
transnationalism entails specific prescriptions that reinforce, or at least do not contradict, nation-centeredness. This is the institutional discourse of cultural relations. On the other hand, the drive to participate and network is often highly practical. Both sides are ideational and give attribute significance to transnationalism, though policy discourse is becoming more explicit in its application.

Within the policy sphere, the transnational aspect becomes self-referential. There is a strong normative persuasion connected to transnationalism both in academic work and in policy-making. Attempts academically to restrict the notion of transnationalism to pure forms often in reference to migrants risk obfuscating the complex relationships that exist between transnational actors and their political and institutional context. In policy, we see a different, but similar approach whereby transnationalism is discussed as a remedy to global threats.

Transnationalism, as Rumford states, should not be considered a ‘niche concept’ (Rumford 2011). If studies of transnationalism are limited to studying the movement and mobility of particular actors then we risk abandoning understanding of important systemic, structural and ideational changes linked to transnationalism as a process (Hurrelman 2011). To argue that links to governance or governments should disqualify processes as transnational is to willfully create blind spots in our understanding of how these things relate and to construct a neat vocabulary that describes only the most obvious of cases. This paper proceeds from the expectation that exploring general dynamics can subsequently lead to specificity without shutting down the possibility of complexity.

**Culture in early EUrope**

The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the piecemeal history in the development of cultural projects in Europe and cultural policies at the EU level, which can inform an understanding of how culture has been included in EU external policies, especially with regard to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the UfM. To some extent this entails a reconsideration of the criticism
initially directed towards the uneven progress between the different baskets of
the Barcelona Process. Although the EU was and remains to a large extent
functionally limited in its ability to promote culture over economic and political
objectives, what was missing was allusion to the ongoing development of
cultural policy within Europe that was feeding into the EU’s policy-making and
the necessary development of networking and learning across boundaries -
embodying national boundaries within Europe and beyond the ‘gated
community’. Understanding these origins allow us to draw clearer conclusions
and criticisms of the use of culture in external relations and the difficulty and
ambiguity of cultural discourses when applied in a foreign policy setting.

The spread of transnational cultural projects coincides with the rise of
international institutions and with the work of NGOs, and political and cultural
foundations working within and across national boundaries. In this context,
intercultural dialogue - initially oriented solely towards the field of education -
quickly became a topic of importance for European integration where the ability
to communicate across languages and cultures was realised as a central
component of a closer union, and subsequently a ‘People’s Union’. Given that the
EU lacked a proper legal basis from which to act in the cultural affairs of member
states prior to 1992 (Shore 2002, 12) the history of cultural relations in Europe
draws our attention to the dynamics of alternative forms of integration alongside
EU institution building. What is more, these dynamics then come to play an
important role in supporting and/or delineating EU integration in the field of
cultural relations both within the EU and beyond. One important feature for this
is the development of networks, especially in education and training, through the
work of actors, for example the German Stiftungen and the European Cultural
Foundation, who interacted intermittently with the EU institutions conducting
research, writing reports and engaging in limited advocacy for the inclusion of
culture. In order to do this it would be useful to consider the longer-term
practices of key cultural actors - transnational organizations and foundations -
that maintained projects and practices and made it possible to place culture on
the political agenda and, following its recognition, help to develop sets of policies
in the various fields of cultural cooperation within Europe and abroad.
As one starting point, Hans Erik Nass (2010) implicates the organising capacity of UNESCO in bringing together European Ministers of Culture in 1972. The establishment of such conferences held at the international and European levels opened space for the production of new discourses on the role of culture in relation to political and economic integrations. As Nass points out, while there is no evidence to suggest that these meetings or key speeches led directly to the development of European cultural policy it is reasonable to suggest that they had some effect on the political climate (Nass 2010). Given the overlap of actors - national ministers, international bodies and secretariats, cultural producers and advocates - and the proliferation of such meetings and conferences this argument is certainly logical. Cris Shore’s (2006) suggestion that the history of EU cultural policy is exemplary of the way in which EU integration functions in general is also useful in this regard, though not for the reason suggested by the author. Shore’s history focuses primarily on processes internal to EU institutions and does not account for the significant input provided by actors already working in the field, such as the European Cultural Foundation. What is valuable about his position is the observation of the way in which the EU borrows from existing practices, concepts, ideas and redefines them in order to justify or obviate EU action (Shore 2006, 14). The concept of intercultural dialogue is one of these examples. Intercultural dialogue became a concept around which many cultural actors organised their own work and justified new practices for cultural relations starting in the 1990s.

**Many Europes – the cultural field**

This ‘third Europe’ is exemplary of the complexity of networks as they negotiate hegemonic practices and categorizations and the cognitive frames of political and social actors, including those actors who partake in and enact networking activities. More specifically, it speaks to the co-existence of different configurations of ‘Europe’ (Axford and Huggins 1999, 186). The field of culture and cultural policy is intriguing as a case that maintains strictly national boundaries, and yet is global in its aspirations and increasingly in its practice. Moreover, it highlights quite effectively the impossibility of understanding
through solely top-down or bottom-up perspectives. As Papastergiadis (2011) has suggested for the development of cosmopolitan sentiment, the requirement is for both and they are very much contingent upon each other. The cultural field implicates a variety of actors of different political power and position. Furthermore, it is fundamentally an aspirational field in the sense that it incorporates a desire for dialogue and exchange as a basis of relations (though defined in a multitude of ways) even within traditional avenues of influence. This is what makes it an attractive and potentially innovative force for foreign relations.

From early on, culture in Europe was recognised as being a facet of the EU's place in the world and was linked with the development of EU external relations. In 1973 *The Declaration of European Identity* was necessary in order to define the EU's relationship with outside countries (especially significant given the process of decolonisation over the previous two decades) “and the place they [the nine member countries] occupy in world affairs”. This document was the product of a transformation in the EEC following the change towards a more pro-Europe leadership in France under Georges Pompidou and moving towards the first enlargement of the Community. In 1969, the Hague Summit, which brought together the heads of state under the Dutch presidency of the Council, committed to three objectives: completion of an Economic and Monetary Union, deepening of integration by expanding the competencies and powers of the Community institutions, and enlargement (initially to Great Britain, Denmark, Norway and Ireland). The evocation of an initial role for culture in European integration was, as pointed out by Littoz-Monnet (2010), intended to serve the process of Community policy-making. The imperative of establishing relations between the Community and foreign countries and blocs, such as the Euro-Arab Dialogue in 1973 and the expansion of the Global Mediterranean Policy between 1972-1977, at this time were to be served by this new depiction of a European identity. Initial movements towards the inclusion of culture on EU policy-making set up an ongoing tension between the market-logic of community integration and the creation of a broader political union based on a European identity and values - between culture as an economic sector and serving political objectives.
Leo Tindemann’s 1975 report to the European Council furthered the political objective in making an early call for the establishment of a citizen’s Europe designed to promote “a rapprochement of peoples” encouraging solidarity through mobility and exchange (Tindemanns 1975, 26-27). In 1974 and 1977, respectively, the European Parliament and the European Commission established resolutions that supported the establishment of a European-wide cultural sector - essentially to promote cultural products and allow equal access to cultural works across countries. Alongside the drive towards the Single European Act in the 1980s and the enlargements to include southern European Mediterranean countries, two additional reports were produced in 1985 in order to promote the idea of a People’s Europe. The Adonnino Reports (1985) focused back on the political task of culture - as a way to promote further integration and provide a necessary political basis to the forthcoming economic union. From these reports, a wider role for culture was discerned not just a set of symbols that would pull diverse societies together but also in the form of projects allowing for exchanges and contacts across European societies. Initiatives such as the ‘European City of Culture’ came directly from this, at the same time there is the development of important projects now central to EU cultural policy - such as the student exchange programme Erasmus initially devised and run outside of the EU institutions by the autonomously founded European Cultural Foundation. The 1986 resolution on the establishment of transnational cultural itineraries (86/C 44/02) agreed among ministers of culture at the Council confirmed the objectives of the Adonnino Report and committed to building on the work of the Council of Europe and the European Foundation. Of course, until the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the EU institutions lacked the legal basis with which to act in the cultural affairs of member states. As a result, the CoE and European Foundation remained the major European players in culture.

The European Cultural Foundation was established in 1954 the same year that saw the signing of the Council of Europe’s European Cultural Convention. The ECF was intended to promote youth and education, cultural heritage and the environment in order to provide an important cultural basis for the integration of European societies. In order to pursue these objectives, the ECF created Europe-wide programmes, research, development and publications, and it
engaged in advocacy. The intention behind many of these programmes was not simply to symbolize European interconnectedness but to develop spaces in which to create and sustain interactions and exchanges not only between European societies but also between Europe and its neighbors. Many of the projects and concrete practices presented in early EEC documents mirrored the work of actors like the ECF who in the 1970s were pursuing the major issues of student mobility and environmental protection - two of the critical themes established under their major report from 1968 Plan Europe 2000. During this decade, the ECF helped to establish the European Institute of Education and Social Policy and the Institute for European Environmental Policy both designed to generate positions and research for advocacy in their respective fields. In 1987 the ECF established the Erasmus programme promoting exchange among university students and managed the programme until 1995 when it was transferred to EU control. As described on the Foundation’s website – “the Foundation operates where various spheres meet: the European Union, non-EU Europe, the Southern Mediterranean, and the transatlantic.”

Also in 1987, the European Commission communicated the Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community that focused on five areas: creation of a European cultural area, European audiovisual industry, access to cultural resources, training, and dialogue with external countries. Given the problematic status of culture on EU competency under the Treaty of Rome, however, the communication is ambiguous on how it can tackle most of these issues leaning rather heavily on the idea of culture related to the internal market, industry, research and innovation (COM(87) 603, 6-7). Given this limitation, the communication - with regard to generating dialogue with the rest of the world - emphasized the role of national cultural actors as well as member state and Commission representations abroad. This put cultural institutes at the centre but also required continued cooperation and networking. Even following the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, which in article 128 gives the European Union a legal basis to pursue cultural policies the role of foundations and national actors remained (and remains) central. The Treaty, though ostensibly expanding the responsibility of the Union to the field of culture, also severely delimits this role by specifying a ‘supporting’ and ‘supplementary’ role for the EU in this area. At
the EU-level, the 1987 *Fresh Boost for Culture in the European Community* and the 1992 *Treaty of Maastricht* raised the feature of cultural diversity as integral to the European project. They both do so in the framework of promoting national cultures within the European Union and promoting a European culture outside the Union. The Treaty allowed for the development of financial frameworks to support specific projects including the audiovisual industry (MEDIA I), the educational sectors (Socrates I) and in the second half of the decade cultural heritage (Raphael), creativity (Kaleidoscope), and translation (Ariane) all in parallel to the ongoing development of the Barcelona Process. These projects were incremental steps towards a more significant role for culture, however they suffered from elemental setbacks including the institutional and strategic framework and financial independence to ensure long-term sustainability. From the mid-90's, however, a new standard for the development of cultural relations was evolving which incorporated lessons from the transnational experience of the European Cultural Foundation, new European competencies in culture and the development of the EU’s external relations.

**Renewing cultural relations through dialogue**

In the 1990s, culture became a bigger issue for policy-makers and publics alike. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War’s bipolar system identity and culture were immediately raised as new sources of instability given the fragmentation of the superpower blocs that had held together diverse communities and nations for the latter half of the century. Without this great ideological divide, factions were now bound to conflict on the fault lines where cultures made up of inherently irreconcilable differences (especially religious) met (Huntington 1993). While Huntington’s thesis proved contentious it was also influential sparking an endless array of appropriations, defences and rebuttals. Writing in 2001, Edward Said, the author of *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism*, wrote a scathing response to Huntington’s thesis in *The Nation*, which had been expanded to a book-length version in 1996. In his article Said traced the origins of this ‘clash thesis’ to the work of orientalist Bernard Lewis who asserted an endemic feeling of insecurity and superiority in
the Muslim faith (Said 2001). This foundation leads Said to conclude that: “The Clash of Civilizations’ thesis is a gimmick like "The War of the Worlds," better for reinforcing defensive self-pride than for critical understanding of the bewildering interdependence of our time” (Ibid). In other words, the ‘clash thesis’ was operating as a replacement for Cold War doctrine generating new friends and enemies. A proper evaluation of the post-Cold War world required a more critical understanding of how these diverse communities were dependent on each other and interconnected through history as well as through the development of new economic, political, and cultural relations. Intercultural dialogue was not a new concept at this time. It’s origins can be traced back to education and language training several decades prior and the work of actors such as United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and the Society for Intercultural Education Training and Research (SIETAR) in the 1970s. However, its appropriation by governance actors as a way to address the issue of cultural diversity within societies and mediate relations between foreign societies was novel.

It is difficult to ascertain precisely the first use of cultural dialogue in this sense. But in 1995 the Barcelona Process (BP), established to create a new framework for regional cooperation between the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbors, liberally employed the concept of dialogue as central to a new form of partnership between the newly enlarged EU and its neighbors. The Mediterranean has long been considered as a fault line – even before Huntington’s pivotal and controversial ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. Influenced in some part by this new discourse of cultures, the Barcelona Process was envisaged as a way to prevent a possible clash between cultures on either shore (Henry 1996; Schäfer 2007a). The inclusion of the cultural basket alongside the political and economic baskets was intended to institutionalize some form of harmony between Mediterranean cultures and direct the relations towards the impetus of economic and political integration. The cultural basket of the EMP was built on this foundation of loose ties and sector-oriented projects. This implied culture as a support mechanism for regional integration but in practice it lacked the backing of a clearly defined and institutionally embedded strategy for culture (Schäfer 2007a). In other words, this left no central body responsible for
its development, nor did it contain a clear strategy or separate budget. The third basket of the BP explicitly referred to the necessity for promoting dialogue and exchange between the two shores of the Mediterranean (Silvestri 2007). The BP was unique in its intention to place culture at the centre of a regional framework alongside politics (and security) and economics. The Barcelona Declaration (1995) makes numerous mentions of dialogue in all three of the baskets - political and security partnership, economic and financial partnership, and the partnership in social, cultural and human affairs. But it was its inclusion in the third basket - alluding to the development of exchange, understanding and perceptions through the development of dialogues among stakeholders - that generated much optimism. And yet in this format, dialogue was still explicitly described in terms of a structured dialogue that would bring together elites, policy-makers and experts (Schäfer 2007a, 347). So while being celebrated initially for its allusion to the inclusion of societies the third basket was in practice a complement to political dialogue in multilateral forums.

In 1998, President Khatami of the Islamic Republic of Iran proposed a ‘Dialogue of Civilisations’ to counter the impending logic of the ‘clash’. The United Nations and the international community took up this proposal declaring 2001 the ‘Year of Dialogue Among Civilizations’ (GA/RES/53/22). The idea of dialogue as raised by the UN in its ‘dialogue of civilizations’ harkened back to a similar notion of intercultural dialogue found in the Council of Europe’s (CoE) 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. This document articulated an idea of dialogue intended to address the issue of cultural diversity. And while the CoE’s framework explicitly focuses on national policy, the UN and UNESCO raise cultural diversity into the international arena. So whereas the Barcelona Declaration (and early EU application of dialogue) focused on dialogue between political entities the ‘Dialogue Among Civilizations’ proposed a more fundamental diversity across national boundaries. In the evolution of cultural policy within national borders, the EU and external relations, the phenomenon of cultural diversity becomes a common referent in policy discourse. The adoption of dialogue as a tool of policy becomes focused on the objectives of politics and security versus cultural exchange and mobility, the initial struggle in determining the scope of intercultural dialogue. Mobility - a
significant concern amongst cultural operators - also saw some boost mostly outside of official policy routes. For example, the development of the Roberto Cimetta Fund in 1999, with support from the European Cultural Foundation, sought to improve the exchange and mobility of artists across Mediterranean societies.

**Expansion of networking - towards an institutional discourse**

The Culture 2000 programme integrated previous initiatives - Raphael, Kaleidoscope and Ariane - and sought to develop a more streamlined approach to culture within EU policy through the creation of a single programming and financing instrument. The programme was designed to further the development of a common cultural area through the promotion of transnational cooperations projects between individuals, organizations and existing cultural foundations. While effectively filling a gap in the promotion of transnational cooperation and supporting over 1000 projects between the years 2000-2004, in practice it had limited scope and visibility (COM(2006) 666). However, this move towards a more strategic approach to culture was important as it altered the policy landscape towards culture and opened new avenues for existing cultural actors and organizations to network and interact with European institutions. Within this new context a growing impetus for networking between foundations was solidified through the development of umbrella groups such as the network European Union National Institutes of Culture (EUNIC) founded in 2006 and the subsequent development of 85 clusters abroad connected to this network. The expansion of institutional networking helped to solidify a new framework for culture with advocacy from these groups and from individual organizations like the European Cultural Foundation (ECF) which from 2002 onwards turned increasingly to lobbying for the development of a more strategic and robust cultural policy both within the EU and in its external relations. The latter aspect was essential as noted within the ECF’s summary as the development of a common cultural area raised the implicit danger of solidifying an inward looking Union “deaf to the experiences and knowledge of people surrounding it”. Seminars and projects were thus generally followed up with a series of
recommendations to cultural actors and to decision-makers. At the same time, in 2003 the Prodi Commission established a group of experts to offer advice on improving Mediterranean relations - especially with regard to the cultural field. The ‘Groupe des Sages’ report helped to establish a set of objectives in improving the increasingly deadlocked EuroMediterranean Partnership. The development of a EuroMediterranean Foundation for Intercultural Dialogue – the Anna Lindh Foundation - was symbolic of the desire to increase transnational flows, communication, exchange and dialogue between societies. What is more, the report evoked an evolving discourse within the cultural field on the potential of transnationalism as a pragmatic counter to threats emanating from cultural, political and economic relations. In this atmosphere, a consensus discourse on cultural diversity emerged in conjunction with intercultural dialogue. The inauguration of international policies on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue effectively changed the ‘kind of labour’ (Ahmed 2012) involved in doing cultural work. In other words, a specific form of transnationalism became the essential policy tool through which to pursue improved cultural relations and combat negative forms of ‘globalization’ (Griffin and Devereaux 2013).

Culture 2007 followed on from Culture 2000 in its general approach and management establishing three objectives following from the limited success of the initial programme - transnational mobility, circulation of cultural products, and the promotion of intercultural dialogue - simultaneously increasing the budget from 236.5 million to 400 million. With the Directorate General Education and Culture (DG EAC) taking control of the Culture 2007 programme, the EC commissioned a series of EuroBarometer reports around the theme of European cultural values. The purpose of these reports was to feed back into the Culture framework and to offer reflection on how Europeans conceive of culture, level of interest, activities and issues surrounding exchange. But they also served a strategic objective in terms of the role of the EU in the cultural field and the capacities that could be levied in its external relations. The eurobarometer reports on intercultural dialogue in this context can be seen as performative, not just reporting on the state of culture but as bringing it into existence in a particular formation. As argued by Vidmar-Horvat (2012) in her analysis of report 217, the implication of the report’s findings are that diversity can be seen
as a ‘fait accompli’ in Europe. Problematic, for certain, but practically realized. Diversity and Intercultural dialogue are envisaged as features of the European ‘demos’ and features that can be exported as part of a distinctly European cultural diplomacy - a feature that can support the development of such a capacity. Just as diversity becomes a form of public relations for organizations, the EU employs diversity as a form of branding on the world stage. The Eurobarometer functions, in this vein, as internal ‘perception data’ that can subsequently be used to justify or legitimate the extension of particular types of knowledge and expertise beyond the borders of the EU. However, the arrival at this point is not solely the result of energy emanating from EU institutions but the incorporated efforts of networks of individuals and organizations changing the cultural policy landscape. Without these networks the arrival of EU competency and capacity would remain even more limited and the most recent (and most vociferous) attempt to develop a strategic approach to culture bears this out. In 2011, the EC commissioned eight cultural organizations - led by the Goethe Institute and including the European Cultural Foundation, among others - to conduct research and discussions towards the goal of proposing a strategic approach to culture in the EU’s external relations. While following the intentions of competing internationally established in the ‘Communication on a European agenda for culture in a globalizing world’, the final report also clearly attempts to establish a mandate for existing networks crossing EU boundaries in the development and enactment of ‘transversal’ actions.

**EEAS, transnationalism and cultural diplomacy**

The Preparatory Action and its conclusions are significant because it sets out a more formally networked approach to culture but one that also feeds clearly into EU policy-making. Existing cultural organizations help to focus a series of issues connected loosely under the umbrella of cultural diplomacy and provide pre-established networks of actors to enact and further refine initiatives – focus on a series of significant objectives such as culture, exchange, civil society, development, dialogue. In the policy realm, this is beneficial for many reasons, not least of which is the cost associated with establishing such networks from the
ground up and the cost of ongoing maintenance and support, restructuring and funding as intermittently required. Instead, the endeavour becomes a cooperative one where costs can be shared to a larger extent. It also helps to avoid certain legal pitfalls in the case of the European Commission bound by the Treaties that specify the national competence of cultural relations. But there is a clear diffusion of ideas and narratives between cultural institutions and the EC including how transnationalism functions within the policy context.

The development of the European External Action Service (EEAS) - hoped to evolve into an effective diplomatic wing of the European Commission - adds impetus to the environmental context of culture in the EU's external affairs. Organizational cultures tend to focus and contextualize concepts consolidating specific frames that clarify relationships between the various pieces, thereby influencing narratives. But the EEAS is unique in some regards as a result of its still fledgling status and mixture of organizational cultures resulting from it being made up of previously existing departments within the Commission. While this variation in culture may to some extent be exaggerated there remains some lack of cohesion in terms of the EEAS’ identity and function.4 In traditionally institutional terms this can of course be regarded as problematic. However, there exists another possibility. Batora highlights the unique position of the EEAS, what he refers to as its interstitiality - existing in between “organizational fields and recombining physical, informational, financial, legal and legitimacy resources stemming from organizations belonging to these organizational fields” (Batora 2012). The result potentially “paving the way for a new breed of flexible and integrated delivery of external policy” (Batora 2013, 22). The interstitial nature of the EEAS, intended to be the foremost ‘European’ cultural representative abroad and the EU’s diplomatic wing, posits a far more complex role for culture than in traditional forms of public and cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, with the advocacy of the ECF and umbrella organizations like EUNIC as well as the productive role of the European Parliament in pushing for greater complementary between the Council and Commission there exists an institutional environment that is supportive of a more distributed approach (Isar 2015, 504). If the EEAS continues to develop along the lines explained by

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4 Interview with EEAS official 2nd October 2014
Batoras, it feeds into the narrative being established under current guidelines proposed during the ongoing consulting process.

A similar message is expounded in the Discussion Paper leading to the ‘Culture in EU External Relations’ Conference, one step in the process to establish clear directives for greater EU cultural competency. The role of the European institutions and EEAS are summarized in an important way – as contributing to culture “in ways that generate trans-national added value and transmit the overarching European message...” (2014, 5). The allusion is to a distinct European cultural diplomacy but one that is not beholden to the dominance of official agents. On the contrary, European institutions and national governments are essential but not necessarily the foremost actors. In fact, this new narrative endorses the already existing ‘polyvocal process’ made up of ‘bottom-up, unofficial processes’ (Sassatelli 2009, 195). A criticism of previous inability to develop a clear mandate for culture concerned the small, project-financed cultural organizations, which lacked the inter-organizational facility and capacity to communicate lessons to the European Commission (Gerth 2006, 13). Officially embracing the role of governing institutions as offering an organizing capacity offers a fresh perspective. Foundations can also more effectively transmit the messages of smaller organizations through their institutional ties to governments, EU institutions and amongst each other. The focus on capacity-building has gone hand-in-hand with networking thus focusing on building relations across smaller organizations in part by including them in common projects and calls for action. Thus, the EEAS – in its projected form – and the call for a ‘global cultural citizenship’ based upon prosperity, empowerment and dialogue not only coexist but may be complementary as a uniquely European cultural diplomacy. Furthermore, instead of the migration of ‘Europeanness’ outwards there is the potential of a two-way flow of cultural narratives resulting from partnership with existing cultural networks and organizations.

What all of this suggests is that it is wrong to subsume the development of cultural competencies and institutions under the rubric of ‘cultural diplomacy’ in a traditional sense. As Ang, Isar and Mar (2015) point out, such categories have become increasingly blurry. The definition of cultural diplomacy has been broadened to refer to mutual understanding and dialogue obscuring the more
limited objectives of national self-promotion and exchange (Ang, Isar and Mar 2015, 367-8). While the authors lament this situation as an analytical change, in practice they recognize that it has become part of a broader change in diplomacy based on engaging transnational relations and including civil society and business actors (Ibid). This network of actors could more effectively be conceived as part of global cultural relations encompassing the networks of governmental and autonomous actors presuming a certain blurriness in its complexity. Cultural diplomacy, cultural policy and the development of cultural foundations at state and regional levels are key points within this matrix that is built for the objective of building trust between societies and based upon the legitimacy and credibility of non-state actors rather than the traditional governmental agents of cultural diplomacy. Though transnational actors are inevitably and variously restricted from entry into these networks – membership requirements, skill shortages, identity conflicts, and resource shortages – these are areas that can more effectively be addressed through the flexible and context-sensitive approach of networks. Whereas, in traditionally designed programmes, inclusion assumes acceptance of the agenda and can be characterized as reinforcing dominant frames, participation in networks and events should not be seen solely in this subordinate light. Participation may also occur in an agonistic manner whereby frames are not completely rejected but their meaning shifted. By appealing to the same core elements and interests participants inject themselves into a narrative. Section 2 (especially Chapter 8) will pursue this idea further by exploring the position of the Anna Lindh Foundation in this context and its seminal event – the Civil Forum.

**Conclusion**

The path leading towards a distinct constellation of actors intended to collaborate into being a sense of European cohesion is invested with the integrative instincts of European institutions. The Commission has been prominent in advocating for a clearer mandate, most fervently since 2007, but the support of the Parliament and acquiescence of the Council has been crucial. Though it is still early days when it comes to understanding either the future
form of the EEAS or the institutional impact of the proposals established through the Preparatory Action continuity remains in the form of networking across cultural Foundations and those actors brought within their scope of action. By establishing such a diffuse arrangement, the EU may actually be doing what it does best, which is to complement and support the expansion of already existing mechanisms to promote cross-border interaction. Though in many circumstances built in the traditional guise of cultural diplomacy, Foundations show the potential of becoming more diverse and fluid actors. One major reason for this occurrence is likely the effect of continuous networking across borders with like-minded organizations. The case of the Goethe Institut and CulturesFrance bears this out as their abundant common projects have resulted in a great deal of convergence in values, objectives and actions (de Vries 2008, 65). In so doing, the actors involved also become more focused on their European destination rather than national origin. Once again, this appears to be the case with some institutes of culture such as the Goethe Institut and CulturesFrance, which have officially taken on the mantle of promoting a ‘European’ rather than strictly national culture (Ibid). This section has demonstrated the prominence of Foundations in diffusing a new narrative on culture, specifically at the EU level. In the context of already existing platforms for cultural relations in external relations, the shift is also pragmatic. It builds off the current success of actors including the Asia-Europe Foundation and European Union Institutes of National Culture (EUNIC) umbrella organization, in addition to (as this thesis argues) the Anna Lindh Foundation in the Euro-Mediterranean context.

The Foundation as an organizational model finds itself at the heart of cultural relations by being viewed as a flexible and functional actor from the perspective of foreign policy and also offering an image of credibility and legitimacy to outsiders. Their impact, then, is conceptual as well as practical redefining transnationalism in the policy context as well as implementing new practices and avenues for cooperation. Within the figurative boundaries of Europe this is largely unproblematic. However, employed beyond those boundaries to incorporate neighboring societies reintroduces problems of governmental permissiveness, trust, power and the content of values. For these
reasons, the setting-up of multilateral organizations to act as regional Foundations for the promotion of cultural relations is both intriguing and problematic, even given the context discussed in these two chapters. The subsequent section will explore several points arising from this discussion in more detail especially concerning the extent to which such multilateral Foundations can be integrated into established networks and participate in novel forms of ‘cultural diplomacy’ – that is assuming we call these relations ‘diplomatic’. Or should we instead point towards an emergent form of global cultural relations based upon the concept of networking across networks? Through an evaluation of the establishment and progression of a multilateral cultural foundation for the countries of the EuroMediterranean Partnership – the Anna Lindh Foundation – this thesis will address the autonomy of transnational networks, their functional identities, structural position and the realities versus pursuit of transnational networking.
Chapter 5: A ‘Civil’ Euro-Mediterranean: the Anna Lindh Foundation, civil societalization and intercultural dialogue

The many Europes theme suggested in Chapter 4 opens up investigation to the multitude of ways in which Europe and the European Union are represented. Whether that be through official policies and actors, the development of a European public sphere or in the recognition of alternative models within Europe this approach is valuable in its rejection of monolithic understandings. The multiplicity of Europe and the European Union is seen starkly in its relations with the rest of the world and the Mediterranean is an intriguing case as it bridges internal and external visions of the European Union and Europe as a cultural entity. The historical trajectory of the region and the fluctuating relationship between the northern and southern shores of the sea add to the complexity. In terms of EU relations with its near abroad, often discussed in the context of enlargement, the Middle East and North African sub-regions are also genuinely foreign relations in that they (apart from perhaps Turkey) do not represent real aspirations to EU membership (the Moroccan aspiration was quickly deterred). On the other hand, colonial histories and on-going policy developments continue to link EU member states and countries across the region.

This chapter attempts to build on this by reconsidering Europe’s role in the Mediterranean and the development of a ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ space. But rather than starting from an institutional approach, as the previous section has attested, this section will approach the development of a Euro-Mediterranean space from the perspective of cultural relations and transnational networking. This starting point allows for a more global interpretation of developments instead of implicitly bounding the region according to power dynamics between the different shores. The previous section emphasized the significance of Foundations and cultural networks in the development of cultural policy and cultural competency in the EU’s affairs. But these networks rarely end abruptly at the boundaries of regional space. In fact, numerous Foundations from the European Cultural Foundation to national institutes of culture have long been
active in developing projects abroad and, importantly, in creating capacity for networking. Such attempts at creating trust and cohesion have previously been viewed through the lens of either democracy promotion or cultural diplomacy, depending upon the target and project objectives. Yet, as Chapter 4 has discussed, the situation is full of complexity. While there is growing impetus to pursue transnational networking as a policy objective the value for individual organizations and participants is not always clear. In order to gain a better understanding we need to merge the top-down and bottom-up perspectives on network formation. This section pulls together the strategic, institutional and participatory to understand the significance of the Anna Lindh Foundation as a regional body. As will be shown, diplomatic and foreign policy pressures come up against organizational culture and objectives in this context. And though participants and members may be perceived as being passive actors when viewed from top-down, their modes of inclusion suggest the potential for critical dialogue and the ability to construct new opportunities to participate beyond the local context.

This chapter contributes two findings and acts as something of an introduction to the significance of the Anna Lindh Foundation by placing it between the previous EU objective of region building and a shift towards intercultural dialogue as a new basis of cooperation. The result exhibits a period of shift in strategy towards cultural relations at the EU level. Secondly, it demonstrates the political significance of the Foundation in providing a symbolic and coarsely censored space for the inclusion of civil society beyond the boundaries of the nation-state. Over time, the Anna Lindh Foundation has become as a central promoter of a united Mediterranean and an important actor for promoting intercultural dialogue and networking among civil society actors. It brings a crucial social and cultural focus to a region dominated by political and economic interests and carries within its vision a particular image of a Euro-Mediterranean, which to some extent continues to reflect the influence of earlier EU discourses on region-building but also a changing orientation towards cultural relations requiring the ALF to adapt to the shifting objectives of its largest funder – the European Commission.
The purpose of looking at – and rethinking the significance of – the ALF is to reveal the emerging globality that is inherent in the construction of a Euro-Mediterranean space. This chapter will provide an overview of the ALF in terms of its political and institutional context and argue that the ALF’s political role should be recognized as an important transformation of politics in the region. Criticism of political censorship and control over many of the activities should not be overlooked but this does not adequately engage with the political significance of the ALF both in terms of regional development and in terms of civil society promotion. The ‘civil societalization of politics’ suggests that the ALF should be seen not only in terms of civil society development but also in terms of a related transformation of politics. The chapter will begin with an introduction of the ALF and then proceed through an exploration of civil society as it relates to developments in the Euro-Mediterranean. This section will introduce the concept of ‘civil societalization’ which will lay the basis for an attempt to situate the Euro-Mediterranean within a global normative politics and subsequently provide a discussion of the political content of ‘intercultural dialogue’. As such, the paper will chart a political course for the ALF in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean and reveal the inherent limitations in its approach to civil society development and intercultural dialogue. At the same time, the analysis will suggest that the ALF has the potential for promoting alternative forms of regional interaction.

**The Anna Lindh Foundation**
The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) represents a significant achievement in cooperation and partnership arising out of the social and cultural basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP). Despite great expectations following the 2003 High Level Advisory Group meeting (‘Group des Sages’), optimism towards the Foundation remained low among many observers given the difficulty surrounding budgetary negotiations and remaining political constraints (Pace 2006, 86). However, despite immense difficulty, as well as having to withstand an uncertain institutional context and political wrangling over the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, the ALF has evolved in its early years into an intriguing institution and a potential source of development on socio-cultural
issues and intercultural dialogue in the region. Originating out of the considerations and prescriptions of the Report of the High Level Advisory Group ('Groupe des Sages') in 2003, the structure and goals of the ALF contain both a normative and functional basis. The Anna Lindh Foundation functions as a central node in a network of national networks for civil society organizations that exist across European and Mediterranean members of the UfM. Its primary objective is to promote intercultural dialogue, which in practice consists of supporting four fields of action – Education and Youth, Culture and Arts, Cities and Migration and Peace and Coexistence. According to the 2003 report, in contrast to markets and capital in the EU, youth represent one of the most significant assets of Southern Mediterranean countries. Youth also represent a potential threat to the EU in terms of migration flows and through the perpetuation of cultural conflict. Thus, the strategic is not far from socio-cultural considerations. The work of the ALF encompasses a range of events, awards, reports, and calls for proposals. Events often include roundtables and forums where civil society actors and officials from either side of the Mediterranean can meet and discuss new priorities and concerns. Awards vary by theme depending on yearly priorities and target those groups that promoted these priorities most effectively. The ALF also produces an Intercultural Trends Report, which takes a comprehensive analysis of cultural values and trends on either side of the Mediterranean through examining opinion polls, undertaking expert analysis and media analysis and then engaging with proposals for action. As such, the ALF does a significant amount of work in promoting youth development and in promoting the conditions for understanding divisions across the region.

While the ALF contributes to and offers new opportunities to civil society actors across the region a look at the 2010 member survey reveals a desire among a significant portion of members for greater cross-border contacts as well as increased and easier access to funding (Results of the Network Survey 2010). Furthermore, the survey reveals a significant level of dissatisfaction with National networks and the roles and selection of Heads of Network, which are currently approved by national governments. In terms of funding, the survey also reveals discontent with both the level and format of funding. Though the Network survey only represents a small number of all ALF members (with 533
respondents, or approximately 20% overall) the breakdown of these organizations along fields of action reveals the influence of funding priorities towards Education and Youth with 290 respondents working in this field. The High Level Advisory Group meeting in 2003 declared the necessary independence of the ALF in order to achieve legitimacy and neutrality in a highly politicized region. However, the scope of independence attainable by the Foundation would likely always be limited by its reliance upon the EU commission for funding (Feliu 2005) as well as the institutional context of the ALF with the UfM framework. Furthermore, the ALF does not have freedom of action within UfM member states. It acts as an organizational hub for national networks setting strategies for development and implementation as well as deciding upon funding priorities. However funding is often still funneled through official channels and member states remain responsible for selecting Heads of Network. Egypt is one example where Heads of Network are initially voted for by members of the national network and subsequently approved by the Ministry. This maintenance of oversight over national networks potential limits network penetration as well as membership opportunities.

**Civil society promotion and Regional Civil Society**

The concept of civil society is one that is highly contested and fraught with difficulties and yet its use is also widespread in both academic and policy circles. Approaches to development espousing the centrality of civil society for political transformation became dominant in the period immediately preceding and following the collapse of the Soviet Union aided by the influence of global development institutions (Robinson 1995). For example, the United Nations Human Development Programme’s 1993 Human Development Report promoted the strengthening of civil society institutions as a way of increasing social stability in developing states, a call that was repeated in the World Bank’s World Development Report (McIlwaine 1998). In accordance with the spread of neoliberal policies through the Washington Consensus, civil society promotion also took on a specific form in official policies depicting civil society as a third sector, inclusive of social activity and market relations, standing in direct opposition to state control and promoting economic development and efficient (i.e.: limited)
government. Such policies highlight the existence of multiple understandings of civil society. Foley and Edwards (1996) have distinguished two groups: Civil Society I (associated with liberalism) and Civil Society II (associated with resistance movements such as Solidarity in Poland and scholars such as Adam Michnik). The first version of civil society largely reflects a concern for the governance impact of civil society organizations (CSOs) by focusing on organized citizen groups that help to smooth out local political antagonisms. The second notion of civil society is usually attributed to radical agendas and limited to resistance within authoritarian regimes; however, the importance of such a conception for democratic politics should not be overlooked. These two ‘models’ of civil society reflect the normative and contested nature of the concept as it has come to be used in both liberal and leftist discourses to promote alternative routes to political transformation. This fact in conjunction with the increasing salience of transnational relations as a result of deepening neoliberal reforms, speedier mobility and greater access to global communications has given rise to the idea of global civil society, another highly elusive and widespread term.

The use of global civil society in academic and policy circles similarly reflects this division between different conceptions and understanding of roles. Mary Kaldor has advocated global civil society, through the rise of new social movements, as a bulwark against the centralization of power and as a ‘global process’ of negotiation with global governance institutions (Kaldor 2003). As such, global civil society is central to the construction of global norms and is offered an innate legitimacy on behalf of new social movements and non-governmental actors. More skeptical voices point toward the difficulties associated with the promotion of global civil society within frameworks of governance and decision-making. John Keane offers several different types of relationship between non-governmental and governmental groups such as hostility, catalyst, contractors, partnership, co-optation and various groupings thereof. Such a spectrum highlights the necessary interconnectedness of political institutions and civil society (Keane 2003, 108-109). By extension, it also means that the role and significance of civil society depends largely upon political context. Such considerations have led those more skeptical of the inherent legitimacy of global civil society to query the deceiving nature of partnership
where: ‘lack of representational accountability leaves control in the hands of the powerful, while offering the appearance of ‘openness’, ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (Chandler 2004, 44). Such concerns are highly relevant in the politicized context of the Euro-Mediterranean and potentially within the work of organizations like the ALF.

The idea of global civil society is one that is difficult to reconcile with the reality of the Euro-Mediterranean. As Laura Feliu points out, the networks that do exist are of low density and can hardly be referred to as ‘global’ in scale (Feliu 2005, 380). Perhaps unsurprisingly, southern Mediterranean civil societies are noticeably under-represented in global institutions. For example, within the United Nations Economic and Social Council out of 3194 registered NGOs only 162 (or 6%) are from the MENA region placing it second worst in this category. UNESCO, which formally ascribes a greater role to national authorities also maintains official relations with non-governmental organizations, however out of the 369 listed on their searchable database only 10 are listed within the MENA countries of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey. Out of 65 countries listed 7 are within the MENA region and average just over one organization per country. Such observations have previously given play to notions of ‘Arab exceptionalism’, referring to the perceived democratic deficit among states with majority Arab populations. Such simplistic accounts have effectively been countered through various discussions, including allusion to the significant Arab populations living within democracies outside the MENA region. Rather, it would seem that this region is subject to a unique geopolitical environment. Furthermore, lack of democratic development and the resilience of autocratic regimes are very much linked to the “narrow conception of civil society that some international donors make concrete through their activities...and that funding mechanisms potentially increase” (Challand 2006, 20). In this context, the highly normative basis of global civil society is significant. Creative expressions of civil and political participation across the region since 2011 put further strain on the concept if it is considered in an organizational sense. But as Robert Falk (2003) argues, the global discourse owes less to reality and rather is looked upon in the creation of new dynamics and new realities. The lesson that should be learned by donors is that civil
society does not come prepackaged. And in response, there has been some conceptual broadening of the concept in existing instruments (Youngs 2015, 151). The compelling role played by new cultural actors in the Arab world argues also for their incorporation into understanding the dynamics of global attachment (Glasius and Pleyers 2013; Allende and Hattinger 2014) and the embracing of distant frames within everyday, local efforts (Huber and Kamel 2015).

The ALF employs a broad conception of civil society in its activities engaging with universities, NGOs, associations, public institutions, non-profit organizations, private companies and local authorities. The promotion of civil society is a central tenet of intercultural dialogue in the work of the ALF and the new Strategy and Programme Guidelines reinforces this position by contextualizing the promotion of civil society within a broader ‘intercultural strategy’ that relates dialogue, diversity and democracy within the Euro-Mediterranean (ALF Strategy 2011, 11-12). Building upon the idea of intercultural dialogue as a promoter of ‘good neighborliness’ this strategy suggests a more ideological framework for the continuation of ALF operations. Furthermore, according to this new strategy the ALF commits itself to playing a much more significant role in developing the Euro-Mediterranean region in concert with EU policy (ALF Strategy 2011, 12). The regional dimension of the Foundation offers a unique opportunity to overcome some of the problems faced by CSOs in the Euro-Mediterranean. Currently, the transnational links that have been fostered in the region exist primarily through vertical relations (that is between North-South) rather than horizontally (between southern Mediterranean states) (Feliu 2005). These issues raise concern over the conception of civil society that is being favored as a Western and secular model (Schumacher 2005). As such, links between CSOs may be promoted according to the interests and comforts of European groups and at the expense of local actors. In this light, one of the most important contributions of the ALF is in the development of independent spaces of interaction and dialogue through regional activities, forums and meetings. These spaces evoke a regional ‘public sphere’ by providing the institutional setting for civil society actors to engage in dialogue on a more equal footing, though this too is subject to political interference not least
by potentially controlling the mobility and communication of actors across borders.

Politicization of civil society actors can be witnessed in the wake of the Arab uprisings across the region whereby states have actively reintroduced social divisions against budding transverse relations (Harling 2012). On the EU side, the purpose of the ALF clearly also includes a functional element in promoting the development of a core group within the southern non-member states – the youth – which has been identified as a source of potential labor power and migration to the EU and both an economic and security issue for regional governments and EU member states. However, it also represents the key demographic that contributed to the outbreak of discontent across the region. Whether the new strategy encourages a greater centralization of control within the Foundation itself or extends a level of autonomy for national networks might also be significant for the development of regional initiatives. In terms of political handling, centralization may reduce the significance of officially controlled Heads of Network and increase access to funding for some actors. On the other hand, the opposite may also be true depending upon the priorities for action determined by the Board of Governors and the level of access for civil society actors. Political and governmental actors will continue to play an important role in the ALF and this is something which is inherently tied to the debates over civil society and the political nature of regional developments. This should neither be overlooked nor dismissed but instead should itself be understood as a process of development.

The Civil Societalization of EuroMed Politics
Critiques of the ALF may easily arise from normative prescriptions but they would risk missing the inherent (and important) political basis of the ALF. A reconsideration of the ALF first requires an approach that can maintain the fundamental link between culture and politics rather than dividing them into separate categories. This section will take a step towards this goal by contextualizing the ALF and the Euro-Mediterranean within a global politics which opens new roles for local, regional, national and transnational actors. Before discussing the ‘civil societalization of politics’ it would be beneficial to
very briefly consider the concept of ‘civil societalization’ (CS) as a social phenomenon. CS appears as a social process through which the development of a distinct public sphere can occur. David McCrone (2007), for example, argues that CS is a process of social change that occurs in a particular time and space and produces effects of national identity construction through the restructuring of social relations. As a result, the process of constituting a ‘civil society’ leads to a parallel process of identity construction, in this case nationalism and national citizenship. For this reason organizational and liberal approaches towards analyzing civil society do not wholly capture its significance. As McCrone argues: “civil society is more than market relations; it is, if anything, the ‘cause’ of national feeling, not its outcome” (McCrone 2007). This sociological understanding evokes a constructive role for civil society in generating common values and feelings similar to Cohen and Arato’s (1992) ‘politics of identity’ whereby civil society effectively acts upon itself. However rather than focusing on issues of autonomy (from political society) or internal democratization, national identification is central and may be more of a by-product of existing social relations.

Civil societalization has impacted upon politics by opening up new avenues for political contestation. The CS of politics can be seen as an element of political transformation associated with the globalization of a normative discourse based around human rights, the increasing significance attributed to the activities of transnational actors and the corresponding scale shifts in governance practices in order to incorporate them. Gerard Delanty and Chris Rumford (2007), in their original discussion of civil societalization, point to the increasing impact of transnational relations and social actors on governance but also in the construction of a global (normative) culture. The concept of civil societalization highlights the extent to which this culture is subsequently capable of impacting upon politics at various scales of governance. As such; “…the ‘civil societalization’ of politics signifies a commonality of political forms which link the local and the global, the national and the transnational, and mobilizes a range of actors around common political codes: competitiveness, sustainability, personhood rights and social justice” (Delanty and Rumford 2007, 421). Significantly, the extension of CS into the fields of international relations and
foreign policy shows that one of the outcomes of the various debates surrounding civil society and democratic governance is the focus on organizational strategies. As a result, governments may mobilize transnational civil society actors, or actors representative of a global civil society (Ibid). The inherent legitimacy attributed to these actors can then be linked directly to official policies. An important question that remains, however, is following this change in organizational and mobilization strategy, to what extent does the CS of politics also produce or support the construction of particular imaginations and identities?

As a strategy, CS develops around external forms of legitimacy that conform to universalized values and international agreements – a normative global culture. The CS of politics infers a process of transformation in state-society relations in response to which political actors are faced with new strategic considerations regarding the adoption of new organizational forms and particular discourses of legitimacy. However this is not the same as instrumental use. Instrumental uses of human rights and/or democratization in the pursuit of economic gain (as one example) evoke the legitimacy of these discourses without applying the criteria. On the other hand, the CS of politics leads political actors to organize around particular discourses or issues and to mobilize networked actors. The extension of governance programmes across the Euro-Mediterranean plays an important role in changing how regional governments relate not only to other actors in the region and the EU but also potentially to their own constituents and societies. But even governance programmes work on the back of a transnational and globalizing organization of power. The growing significance of transnational actors, including migrants and civil society actors, necessitates a transformation in the way that governments relate to civil societies and social actors. Promoting opportunities and opening new spaces for cooperation across the region is an underdeveloped but key aspect of EU programmes. At an extreme end the extension of the ‘civil’ beyond the nation-state and across borders could produce a sense of citizenship in a broader but still exclusive sense. As the previous section attested, transnational civil society actors are relatively scarce in the Euro-Mediterranean, however as Pertti Joenniemi has argued in relation to the Nordic region, increasing plurality and
the promotion of non-state actors indirectly, or implicitly, favors the ‘civil’ (Joenniemi 2003, 236). With this in mind it would be useful to consider developments in the ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ through the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Union for the Mediterranean.

The ALF and the ‘Euro’-Mediterranean

“Now we want to have much closer relationships with civil society organizations, shifting the focus from relationships with the authorities to relationships with civil society. The time has come to be more ambitious in offering a more solid basis for our relationship.” (Fule 2011)

The Anna Lindh Foundation has evolved through a changing regional and institutional context within the Mediterranean from the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP) to the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and now the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). EU policy towards the Mediterranean region took on a novel form with the Barcelona declaration in 1995. At that point the European Union began to negotiate a path influenced by a concern for development and democratization. The various shortcomings of the Barcelona Process and Euro-Mediterranean Process have been well discussed and documented. However the multilateralism of the EMP and its comprehensive approach towards regional integration as a response to the constraints of economic globalization and neoliberalism had the benefit of emphasizing long-term transformation based on social and political cohesion. In the context of ongoing frustration with the EMP, the ALF was recognized as being able to contribute “decisively to a sense of joint ownership” in virtue of its being truly multilateral and yet independent of the EMP partners (Pardo and Zemer 2005, 67). But on this basis it could also not maintain independence from political influences. The criticism leveled at the ALF by Helle Malmvig (2005), and echoed by Richard Youngs (2006), points towards the influence that governmental actors have in selecting who participates in national networks, potentially either co-opting Heads of Network or handing the work to ministries and thus placing political actors at the center of the cultural forum (Youngs 2006; Malmvig 2005, 360). This scenario places limits on the ability of the ALF to engage independently with civil society actors and promote greater horizontal linkages across the region. In addition, the movement towards the Union for the
Mediterranean means a new context in the form of a more functional and project-oriented framework.

The transition from the EMP to the UfM was an important one in that they mark two different modes of cooperation. The EMP is based upon a more comprehensive and 'communitarian' approach, whereas the UfM is primarily intergovernmental and project-based. In the context of the UfM the perceived shortcomings of the ALF may become more explicit but in this framework it also becomes the main representative of culture (Balta 2009, 298). Roberto Aliboni (2009, 5) reveals the substantial impact of this transition on the ALF as it reflects a broader compromise between the development of socio-cultural issues and European interests:

What is currently happening to the Anna Lindh Foundation – the network for intercultural relations – is an example of such compromise. The Foundation's Board of Governors, which is composed of Member States, has invited the executive boards to cut a number of initiatives which are considered too "political". Before publication of an inquiry conducted in 2009 on perceptions of "the other" in the Euro-Mediterranean area, a series of substantial changes were requested – to put it bluntly, a degree of censorship was used.

Censorship entails a broad consideration of the framing and context of issues in order to then reduce the potential impact of any statement and bring it back in line with what has been deemed acceptable. What this also entails is a considered eye for what is recognized as legitimate and a highly selective appropriation of normative language, such as 'good governance,' ‘participation’ etc. (Scholte 2001, 21). In terms of regional development Aliboni’s analysis reveals a change of focus from the overtly normative concerns of the EMP. This is reflected in the EU’s joint communication on the European Neighborhood Policy wherein the UfM is endorsed as a complement to the bilateral approach of the
ENP by allowing Action Plans to focus on fewer priorities (COM(2011) 303, 18). The development of new and existing cultural initiatives is notably absent, even within discussion of the promotion of ‘partnership between people.’ What is more, the UfM, while offering substantial room for intergovernmental cooperation, places the relationship between EU member states and southern Mediterranean states on a path which reinforces an inherent power imbalance by re-establishing the EU as a regional power broker. Following from Aliboni’s insight, then, it is possible that the ALF could take on the role of a legitimating actor giving credence to member states and the UfM by illustrating a material role for civil society. However, while normative criteria may have been ‘watered down’ a liberal model of economic and political development remains implicit in the functional framework of integration. In some ways, there was an instant fallback to pre-Arab Spring multilateralism (Behr 2013, 80). This functional – project-oriented - direction posits a uniquely ‘EU’ropean brand of region-building in the Mediterranean which removes the question of reform from cooperation - “realistically or cynically” (Aliboni 2008, 12). However, given the relative fragility of regional governments, continued economic struggle and lack of political will it appears unlikely that the EU will continue to rely on multilateral solutions in its relations with the EuroMeditarranean (Behr 2013, 80-81). Instead, the inclusion of civil society will – in the short term – teeter between the continued existence of these regional frameworks and the revitalization of old policies with the addition of new instruments and strategic direction.

The ALF reflects the political salience of social and cultural issues and the transnationalization of civil society actors (whether through mobility or communication technology) creates new problems and opportunities for governments. There is no doubt that national governments play an important role in the ALF from participating in the Board of Governors to working with national networks. In both of these locations they can exert influence and mobilize support for their own interests. During negotiations over the most recent Programme and Guidelines, the Egyptian government rejected the first draft on the basis that it was too political, purportedly pointing towards the language of reform and democratization (a topic of some controversy given the
events unfolding within the country). Politicization is a tricky issue. When it comes to political issues, the ALF headquarters (ALF HQ) is careful to tread on neutral ground in order to avoid controversy or antagonism amongst networks or member states. This was evident during the events of the ‘Arab Spring’ during which the ALF HQ expressly avoided taking part in events or taking sides in the media, despite the urging to do so by some member organizations. In contrast, however, overtly political programmes do exist and are an important part of the work that the ALF undertakes. So whereas the Egyptian government found the language of the negotiations too political it fervently supports inherently political programmes such as Arab Voices. A programme initiated through the UK national network, Arab Voices has quickly become a success in bringing together young people from across the region to debate political, cultural and social issues. Interestingly, with regard to this same programme, we can also highlight the other area of government involvement. Arab Voices was initiated as a project under the UK national network. However, growing interest from the UK government led to the British Council taking over coordination of the programme and taking control of funding. These observations help to reveal the extent to which governmental actors have taken on social and cultural issues based - at least in part - on their transnational impact. But it also raises the question of the direction of development for national networks and the extent of involvement of established cultural institutions with close links to national governments.

The ALF’s ‘realignment strategy’ supposes a more crucial role for the ALF within the region and – taken next to the EU’s PfDSP – the future shape of the Euro-Mediterranean region. Despite the relatively meager budget of the organization the confluence of opinion within the EU commission and the ALF would suggest recognition of the significance of the ALF for preserving and continuing to build a ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ space. It is especially significant in consideration of the content of the UfM, which prioritizes economic development and political cooperation at the expense of social issues (Dimitrovova 2010). Similarly, alongside the revamped European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI) the ALF complements the bilateral negotiations on technical, 

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5 Interview with UK Head of Network 12th September 2012
political and economic issues. When it was first proposed the autonomy of the ALF offered it a unique standing, and led to suggestions that a new – post-colonial - agenda might be possible within the Mediterranean (Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis 2004, 13). This would place cultural alongside political and economic interests when determining regional strategies. However the ALF’s new Strategy and Programme Guidelines 2012-2014 explicitly reflects recent EU joint communications in furthering variable geometry as the functional logic behind regional development. The ALF document declares as one of its priorities: “Applying a strategy of ‘variable geometry’ to act complementarily at the regional, sub-regional, or national level, according [sic] the variety of scenarios coming into view, and the priorities of the ALF donors, which cannot be handled with a one fits all policy” (ALF Strategy 2011, 11). In this sense, the ALF can increasingly be seen within an extension of EU patterns of governance over the region allowing for a highly differentiated set of relations to develop. Moreover, the strategic realignment of the ALF requires a reconsideration of the autonomy of the Foundation in relation to the EU commission given not only the replication of language but also the explicit statement of intent to prioritize the interests of donors, the EU commission being the largest thereof. This means also reconsidering the regional character of the Foundation in light of a changing institutional environment and how the legacy of past regional frameworks continues to influence the ALF’s identity.

The ALF supports the development of a dialogue on Euro-Mediterranean issues and identities that includes civil society groups across the region. Through various regional programmes the ALF offers a platform to groups and individuals who might otherwise be excluded from regional developments. This approach complements that of the UfM which targets private actors and economic interests in building regional projects. While EU policy towards southern Mediterranean countries previously consisted of a strategy towards region-building it is also infiltrated by a multitude of interests and discourses from EU member states, EU officials and institutions and officials from non-member states who are variously influenced by global politics and discourses. Strengthening the civil sphere through official discourses and actions is a key aspect of engaging in complex international networks and building relations
across states. To the extent that private actors and informal networks become more important in regional policies there is also a corresponding globalization of the region as transnational actors more or less rooted in local settings take on greater significance. As a consequence; “the ‘civil’ appears to unfold in space being opened with states that enable such a trend, either explicitly supporting it or simply allowing it to happen by taking an increasingly international approach in order to cope with the various challenges of globalization (Joenniemi 2003, 236). Civil society development in the Euro-Mediterranean has occurred under the supervision or ambivalence of state actors where the role of the government is to approve and facilitate the development of such cooperation. The ALF maintains a core element of region-building by linking identity and culture to a process of political transformation. As such, it also represents an attempt to question the identities and relations within the region through intercultural dialogue. However, whether this regional character remains important rests on the evolving strategic relationship between the ALF and the European Commission. Though practical changes to EU policy have been minimal (Bicchi 2015) the institutional environment has been transformed. Where this is likely to affect relations is in the EU’s desire to constitute a more formidable global presence with a clear and strategic cultural identity and policy. This means an evaluation of how different institutions and frameworks can contribute to this goal. The next section reconsiders the changing meaning and role of intercultural dialogue in this context.

Promoting intercultural dialogue

The civil societalization of politics infers a limited form of intercultural dialogue as a result of politicisation and strategic interaction. It raises the possibility that dialogue will be restricted on a conceptual level in its definition and objectives and in its potential for exclusion. Intercultural dialogue is also potentially threatened by the nature of cultural itself. Culture can be equally misunderstood and can be used to promote the establishment of boundaries between interlocutors. In this sense intercultural dialogue should not rest on culture but on civility (Hélé Béji 2008). However, the ALF’s intercultural strategy rests on ideological baggage.
The concept has become an important concept for debate within many international organizations – such as UNESCO, the Council of Europe, the EU – and a novel approach in place of multiculturalism. In many ways it has become a concept around which the politics of cultural diversity is being organized. At the same time it is in no way immune from political influence. The basis of intercultural dialogue in the Euro-Mediterranean is summed up briefly by the EU Commission as a process through which peaceful coexistence is made possible, as opposed to the transformation of either category of Self or Other (European Commission 2003, Annex 1). This ‘cosy antagonism’ (Bauman 1991, 53) fails to account for the power inequalities between the different regions and cultures in question. The primary location for cultural representation among southern Mediterranean states remains located within the state apparatus and not amongst the populations (Del Sarto 2005). This practice, thus, territorializes the notion of culture within a frame to which it is not naturally limited (Hannerz 1991, 113). Relations between southern Mediterranean states continue to focus on boundary-setting and competition. Political anxiety over border controls is something with which civil societies across the region continue to battle as evidenced by the inability of Palestinian bloggers to obtain visas to attend the Arab Bloggers conference held in Tunisia in August 2011 (Abrougui 2011). In opposition to the position expressed by the EU Commission, a formative cultural dialogue would have to be based upon the re-drawing of boundaries and rigid cultural categories (Del Sarto 2005, 321). However, one of the fundamental problems linked to the intercultural strategy of the ALF in practice is conferring upon government officials the ability to speak in the name of specific cultures: “Thus, while serving as just another tool to strengthen state authority and to promote government policies, the inter-cultural dialogue becomes politicized, thus failing to address the objectives it was meant to address in the first place” (Ibid). This limiting influence can be seen in the ability of national ministries to effectively regulate national networks from the determination of membership to the naming of Heads of Network.

The ALF’s ‘intercultural strategy’ goes beyond promoting dialogue by imposing a set of normative goals and values. Rather than engaging with the ‘other’ the practice of intercultural dialogue manages the relationship between
‘self’ and ‘other’ preserving the dominance and unilateralism of EU policy (Dimitrovova 2010). In this regard, the ALF’s mission has been viewed as hiding strategic interests within a process of socialization towards common values (Bouris 2011, 98). But it also builds upon the original recommendations of the High Level Advisory group in 2003 which suggests that intercultural dialogue; “must be within a context of respect for fundamental rights, and may then also become a powerful vehicle of democratization” (Report by the High Level Advisory Group 2003, 11). This approach would posit the institutionalization of intercultural dialogue as an instrument for democratization. This is potentially problematic in the work of the ALF. As an intergovernmental and multilateral institution the ALF involves actors both within – UfM member states and regional organizations such as the Arab League - and beyond the region – UNESCO, Council of Europe, UN Alliance of Civilizations - through partnerships and engagement in projects. The agreement from the Tunis Exchange Forum on the triadic relationship between intercultural dialogue, citizenship and human rights reflects a conception of the region more amenable to the realization of a multi-leveled dialogue that would engage social and political actors at various scales. In this formation, the concept of citizenship functions as the crucial connection that implies an increased responsibility on the part of both governments and civil societies. However, in contrast, the pursuance of an agenda in accordance with democratization strategies introduces greater politicisation, which alongside continual budget concerns may mean a greater role for the ALF in regional development but reduced independent capacity to support civil society actors. In this sense, intercultural dialogue comes with its own set of political baggage – it is focused on the promotion and contestation of particular political values rather than the development of a true dialogue, which would require a more natural space for different cultures to encounter each other.

However, the ALF’s intercultural strategy, taken in the context of the EU’s actions following the Arab Spring, also implies a subtle transformation of the Foundation’s objectives in the post-Arab Spring context. As Perthes (2011) notes, these events were a considerable challenge to the EU’s foreign policy capacities. It is in response to these and subsequent events that the European
institutions have embarked on clarifying a Global Strategy for Foreign Affairs and a Strategy for Culture in the EU’s external relations. The latter Joint Communication foresees the use of existing instruments to promote cultural objectives cross-cutting economic, political and social spheres – dialogue, economic growth and heritage (JOIN(2016) 29). This implies the potential of a centralization of cultural instruments based on region separated into Enlargement Policy, European Neighbourhood Policy and Development Cooperation. It also specifically identifies the Anna Lindh Foundation as a source of promoting cooperation, dialogue and mobility for “new cultural players and audiences” (Ibid, 11). The commitment to operating as part of a ‘variable geometry’ has already meant adapting to the European Neighborhood Partnership Instrument and moving away gradually from the Union for the Mediterranean. Negotiations over a strategic approach to culture in the EU’s external relations may encourage the ALF to pursue an agenda that complements the economic and political interests negotiated bilaterally between the EU and partner countries. In this way it is feasible that the ALF becomes a ‘strategic partner’ (Ibid, 14) to a European cultural diplomacy – which reconfirms the inherent limitations of intercultural dialogue as a genuine ambition.

**Conclusion**

As a regional actor the ALF highlights the interplay of different approaches to the region supported by EU policy makers and regional governments. Through an increased role for (and significance of) transnational actors in the region there is a corresponding ‘civil societalization of politics’ through which common political codes such as human rights and intercultural dialogue have become grounds for contesting political issues. This marks a process of political transformation but also a strategic shift in policy-making towards the mobilization and support of civil society actors who beget legitimacy not normally bestowed upon governmental actors. In the context of variable geometry it can be said that the ALF is undergoing a role enhancement as it establishes closer links to EU policies. However it also reflects ambivalence within the EU towards the role of culture and between the logic of functionality versus norm promotion. It is possible to differentiate the position of the ALF between the variable geometry of the region, whereby it effectively institutionalizes an intercultural dialogue in
accordance with the political objectives of the EU commission and national
governments, and as the central hub of a network of political, cultural and civil
society actors across the region. This alternative understanding of the ALF points
toward the importance of political strategy in relation to the underlying
influence of normative models. It also posits a more complex identity for the ALF.
The approach taken in this paper opens the door to a subtler understanding of
influence and questions the political significance of transnational links and
interactions among elements of regional civil societies when subject to strategic
positioning.
Chapter 6: ALF Networks – political boundaries, circumscribed transnationalism and belonging

The development of space for civil society and networking within the European Union has been based upon the working logic of the EU, which is respect for the national identities of member states. In practice, what this implies is that European space is divided along national lines rather than sub-national and regional diversities (Kastoryano 2003, 80). The same logic applies for the construction of a EuroMediterranean space where states are even more protective of their status as primary actors and may be inclined to exert control over participation in regional networks. The Anna Lindh Foundation has a difficult job in this context – promoting identity politics without the reference points of already existing integrative measures and solidarities as in the national context. Participation in ALF networks produces a multitude of transnational interactions between different cultures and identities that exist within the EuroMediterranean space. The arrangement of these networks affirms the primacy of national space as the context for political and social action. However, it does two additional things: it suggests the possibility of a space for cultural integration and appeals to the representation of sub-national groupings. These different possibilities make it important to examine the reality of networking as a member of the organization. The ‘circumscribed’ transnationalism promoted in cultural policy discourse may work to organize the scope of cultural networking and legitimize particular participants over others but it also resituates the participants internationally.

The Euro-Mediterranean is a political construction according to territorial, symbolic and institutional approaches (Jones 2011). Civil society actors are integrated into the construction of the region through the work of regional bodies and institutions. In so doing the Euro-Mediterranean space is also ambiguously put forth as the basis of a new (or the recovery of an ancient) transnational imaginary (Wilson and Dissanayake 1996). This experience is constructed through the practice of exchange and interaction between political, social, cultural and economic actors. Ideas of the what the Euro-Mediterranean
space means among participants of regional activities waver between an historical and physical understanding of the Mediterranean, dominated by Europe, and the experience of moving, communicating and exchanging experiences across the region. This chapter explores the role that the Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) plays in developing a limited form of transnational engagement within the Euro-Mediterranean space and the way in which it frames the work of its members. It will also briefly consider how these members exercise this imaginary and how it reflects the various constraints imposed across regional activities. The actorness of the ALF is important but it is also influenced by the identities, goals and values that member organizations bring to it. Moreover, the evaluation of networks raises interesting insights into programming and its effect on network centrality and density prior to the Arab Spring and the shifting objectives following the momentous events. As such, the analysis highlights the need for change to the ALF’s working practices and its need to bolster and prioritize networking across Southern networks by developing programmes that address the needs of these countries, more targeted funding and by adapting requirements on the inclusion of Northern networks in projects.

This chapter makes three essential contributions to the thesis: it demonstrates the role that the Anna Lindh Foundation plays in shaping transnational practices. Organizations are, in fact, important arbiters in the establishment of transnational networks. The Foundation has been successful in producing significant levels of cooperation across national networks. Though there has been some overrepresentation of Europe-based networks due to imbalances to resources, this is being countered through new regional initiatives and a pivot towards promoting networking between non-European networks in order to balance the capacity of networks on either shore. However, this role also includes balancing the interests of governments with the objective of increased mobility and access. The second contribution is in demonstrating how the concerns of both the EU and national governments influence either the shaping of objectives (in the case of the EU) or the outcome of decisions (through veto or limiting mobility across national boundaries). At the same time, given that the ALF is permitted considerable leeway in a country like Egypt where
freedom of association continues to be problematic suggests that the Foundation has political significance for governments as well as participants. The final section contributes a view from participants – a feature that will follow into chapter 7 by exploring the 2013 Civil Forum. Thus, the overview of ALF networks in this chapter reveals how cultural networks are the product(s) of organizational environment, the ability of states to exert control over physical space and the meanings and objectives attributed to networking by participants.

The cultivation of transnational practices is essential to the realization of such a space and it has been put forth as an important part of the ongoing development of regional integration under each of the political, economic and cultural baskets originally delineating the framework of the EuroMediterranean Partnership. Within the cultural basket, however, the developments have been scarce and have certainly not lived up to the grand expectations of the Barcelona Process. As the most significant achievement in this area, the Anna Lindh Foundation provides a unique example of how the imperatives of multilateralism as well as political objectives such as security have come to shape a particular set of transnational practices even within the scope of cultural cooperation. At the same time, the analysis raises several questions regarding the concept of transnationalism itself and it will be argued that the normative content of much transnational theorizing can be tempered through a closer examination of specific examples, such as the Anna Lindh Foundation, that demonstrate clearly the role that states and regional governance plays in promoting and determining how transnational practices develop. So while this may appear to be an inherently limiting case the purpose is to demonstrate the contingency of transnational dynamics and their dependence on different political actors and opportunity structures in a regional context.

Organizations as a meso-link
The role of organizations in the processes and practices of transnationalism is an interesting field as it raises several questions central to the core debates in transnational research regarding the relationship between transnational actors and other political actors and institutions, including states and regional governance. According to Pries “transnational organizations are characterized by
their decentralised resources and, at the same time and opposite to multinational organizations, intense coordination” (2008, 16). Such organizations engage in border-crossing practices while stipulating strict membership rules, structures and display ‘more or less explicit goals and intentions’ (Ibid). In so doing they unify actors into broader networks of common affinities, political orientations or interests providing connections that individual actors may be unable to attain by themselves. In this way, organizations can be essential to the process of developing transnational practices or sustaining practices through the exchange of resources.

In practice there are potential issues with this definition of the transnational organization. The distinction of being both decentralised and highly coordinated does have the benefit of providing an unbiased, non-normative understanding of the most basic characteristics of a transnational organization. On the other hand, it limits us to a distinctly institutional definition of the transnational. This has its benefits for establishing a distinct field of research, however it risks obfuscating from the relationships that determine particular institutional structures. When evaluating specific examples, it also limits the definition to separate boxes ticked off accordingly. In reality, organizations display a mixture of both centralization and decentralization depending largely on the sources and means of funding. Secondly, organizations that may not strictly match the institutional definition of the transnational organization can play a significant role in the process of developing transnational practices among participants.

How do we differentiate between organizations that promote these practices and organizations that embody the transnational institutional structure? Organizations are politically situated and this context can be a prime determinant of key institutional and foundational characteristics, which in some cases may lead to a discrepancy between the structure and goals or purpose of an organization. So in order to contemplate the role of organizations as a ‘meso-link’ it would be necessary identify not only the character of individual organizations but also the work they contribute to developing and sustaining transnational practices – making personal contacts, support for projects, communication and travel, providing common ground etc. So, an important
addition is how they actually reduce many of the costs and risks associated with cross-border activities (Faist 2000, 100). In these ways organizations can play an important role in fostering different types of transnational experience to the extent that they can frame such practices according to their political orientation. Contributing to the establishment of transnational networks they also exercise a selection capacity (Hanafi 2005) and similarly promote the development of particular types of practice over others. As a result, politics should be at the forefront when considering the role of such organizations. These factors are of central importance when the role of the Anna Lindh Foundation is considered. The relative centralization of ALF activities raises possible questions as there continues to be some debate over the organizational structure of the foundation and there have been moves towards both decentralization and greater centralization including recent discussion over the decentralization of funding activities to national organizations.6

The Anna Lindh Foundation: hope for fostering transnationalism?  
The Anna Lindh Foundation (ALF) represents an important and symbolic achievement in cooperation and partnership arising out of the social and cultural basket of the Euro-Mediterranean Process (EMP). Despite great expectations following the 2003 High Level Advisory Group meeting (‘Groupe des Sages’), optimism towards the Foundation remained low among many observers given the difficulty surrounding budgetary negotiations and remaining political constraints (Pace 2006, 86). There is also some question as to whether the ALF has lived up to its original purpose as recommended by the ‘Groupe des Sages’. The meeting of the ‘Groupe des Sages’ – a group of Mediterranean and intercultural experts – put forth a strong argument for the further development of the cultural dimension of Euro-Mediterranean integration at a time when the European Neighbourhood Policy was just being established. In order to promote a new intercultural dialogue and strengthen the human dimension of integration the Groupe argued for the establishment of “transnational institutions and cooperation flows” that were capable of “transcending and defying those states”,

6 Interview with ALF UK Head of Network 12th September 2012
“new relationships between cultural identity and citizenship”, and the “emergence of open and pluralistic public spaces in the countries on the south side of the Mediterranean” (Report of the High Level Advisory Group 2003, 8). The report argued that this was necessary against the background of three transformations – international laws and the spread of democratic ideas, the transformation of the state and the role of international organizations and non-governmental organizations (Ibid, 17). These connected transformations argued for the promotion and development of transnational practices especially through the cultural programmes within the EuroMed framework. However, the proliferation of cultural projects under the various EuroMed instruments merely reflected the insignificance of the basket compared to the political and economic baskets. In order to drive the coordination of a more cohesive and transnationally oriented basket the report put forth the creation of a EuroMediterranean Foundation for intercultural dialogue, which would serve as a central hub promoting the values and guiding principles of intercultural dialogue, “promote, launch and coordinate actions and initiatives”, and “assess the compatibility of initiatives with these principles” (Ibid, 35).

The report also argues that the Foundation should also have financial and administrative independence which in practice means that authorities should not have influence over how the Foundation decides to spend its money or who becomes a member. In order to secure this independence the Foundation should also be allowed to draw of private funding and sponsorship. On top of this the foundation was not intended to a funding organization but would manage activities and networking by providing skills and organizing capacity and should play a lobbying role towards regional governments (Ibid, 36).

The ALF: structure, goals, and partnerships
These recommendations immediately came up against the realities of the geopolitical context of the region where governments largely in support of the creation of a regional institutions also wanted to maintain some control over the direction of developments by turning the Foundation’s Board of Governors into a multilateral forum where states would be able to approve or reject the budget and programme guidelines. As such, the Board of Governors is made up of
representatives of the forty-three countries of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The Board is advised by an advisory council chaired by the Former-President Andre Azoulay and staffed by eighteen experts in the field of intercultural dialogue and regional cooperation. The creation of the Foundation has struggled to live up to one of the recommendations that it be highly visible. However the selection of Alexandria, Egypt as the base of its headquarters was highly symbolic of the presence that countries to the south of the Mediterranean would have in ongoing integration. Similarly, the change of name from the Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to the Anna Lindh Foundation symbolized the mutual respect between both shores of the sea with the Egyptian government honoring the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs who was killed in September 2003.

Despite immense difficulty, as well as having to withstand an uncertain institutional context and political wrangling over the creation of the Union for the Mediterranean, the ALF has evolved in its early years into an intriguing institution and a potential source of development on socio-cultural issues and intercultural dialogue in the region. Originating out of the considerations and prescriptions of the Report of the High Level Advisory Group (‘Groupe des Sages’) in 2003, the structure and goals of the ALF contain both a normative and functional basis. The Anna Lindh Foundation functions as a central node in a network of national networks for civil society organizations that exist across European and Mediterranean members of the UfM. Its primary objective is to promote intercultural dialogue, which in practice consists of supporting four fields of action – Education and Youth, Culture and Arts, Cities and Migration and Peace and Coexistence. According to the 2003 report, in contrast to markets and capital in the EU, youth represent one of the most significant assets of Southern Mediterranean countries. Youth also represent a potential threat to the EU in terms of migration flows and through the perpetuation of cultural conflict. Thus, the strategic is not far from socio-cultural considerations. The work of the ALF encompasses a range of events, awards, reports, and calls for proposals. Events often include roundtables and forums where civil society actors and officials from either side of the Mediterranean can meet and discuss new priorities and concerns. Awards vary by theme depending on yearly priorities and target those groups that promoted these priorities most effectively. The ALF also produces an
Intercultural Trends Report, which takes a comprehensive analysis of cultural values and trends on either side of the Mediterranean through examining opinion polls, undertaking expert analysis and media analysis and then engaging with proposals for action. As such, the ALF does a significant amount of work in promoting youth development and in promoting the conditions for understanding divisions across the region.

The Anna Lindh Foundation also promotes more explicitly transnational practices through different mechanisms designed to support networking across the forty-three countries of the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM). The main formats of work for the Foundation under the Programmes Guidelines 2012-2014 include Calls for Proposals, support for national network development, the Mediterranean Forum, ‘Believe in Dialogue/Act for Citizenship’ Facility, EuroMed Observatory of social trends and cultural diversity, regional campaigns, and resources and communications. In addition to this the ALF has committed to establishing a Mobility Fund for Youth, which would offer support for young people for mobility across the region outside of the existing education-based mobility programmes already established by the European Union and partner countries. The new Programme Guidelines also redirects the attention somewhat by focusing on promoting networking across southern Mediterranean members. It will also devote more funding to national networks that have been most effective in developing cross-border projects. In order to understand the significance of this it will be useful to explore an interaction matrix (figure 1) and table (table 2) which map out the relations between different national networks of the ALF. These are employed here largely for illustrative purposes in the interest of highlighting the real and potential development of transnational network. A separate and supplementary analysis will be needed to explore the complexities that come to light through a more engaged analysis of the data.
Figure 1 provides a basic breakdown of the interactions between national networks. The data has been mined from national network information provided via the Anna Lindh Foundation website and the 2005-2011 Anna Lindh Review and is based on partnerships reported by the national networks. The data represents partnerships established between members of one national network and another national network. These may be the result of projects, participation in regional programmes initiated each year by the ALF, and/or participation in the first ALF Civil Forum. As a result, it measures connections beyond the 1,015 projects funded by the ALF between 2005-2011. In addition, it not only measures actual interactions (those that have taken place within the strictures of a particular project or regular communications on common issues) but also potential interactions (where members of different national networks have had the opportunity to develop material exchanges by determining common actions). What makes this beneficial is that it also demonstrates the extent to which the
ALF operates as a meso-link by creating opportunities for networking and from that engaging in transnational practices. Given the political context, which will be considered in the following section, this is useful for highlighting the constraining factors in generating cross-border interactions. The vertical axis marks countries whose members are the source or co-source (co-partners in establishing a new project) of projects – developed and sought partners – and the horizontal axis marks countries whose members were either targeted for inclusion or requested to become involved in projects established by members in another country. The matrix is coded along the horizontal and vertical axis with colors in order to highlight those countries with more members involved in or developing projects as well as the countries between whom there are a greater (or lesser) numbers of connections. The interaction matrix offers a valuable visualization of the connections that have been established and it also highlights some potential issues or problems for the current strategy.

Given that the time period under investigation also saw the Foundation in its developmental stage on paper there has been some impressive progress in promoting networking between national networks with 2,914 partnerships established across 3,875 members and thirty-nine out of forty-three countries reporting at least one partnership established (membership numbers based on own analysis). There are of course several limitations with this approach. The matrix cannot provide detailed information on the level of activity of each member or the type of activities taking place as part of each project. Similarly, by lumping the projects under country headings the matrix does not account for the relative activity of individual members. So a country that has a limited number of very active members cannot entirely be differentiated from a country that includes a wider range of active members. A supplementary analysis is necessary to account for these important dynamics. But this generalized picture offers a good place to start in terms of understanding the effectiveness of the organization in promoting transnational practices by measuring the quantity and directionality of interactions taking place and by demonstrating the centrality and significance of different national networks. In addition, rather than focusing on the number of projects funded or supported by the ALF this matrix demonstrates the connections (or networks) generated via these projects.
Table 2. Anna Lindh Foundation members, partnerships and projects 2005-2011

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Members</th>
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<th>Partnership Europe</th>
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Something that stands out immediately is the relative dominance of Egypt, Italy and Jordan as sources of partnerships all with over 200 (with Palestine following closely behind with 199). This is also significant given that only Italy is in the top 5 in terms of membership (Italy, Palestine, France, Morocco, Turkey, respectively). Italy, Egypt, France and Morocco also stand out in terms of partnerships established between each other. These four countries
are all among the highest numbers of partnerships established in general, which is likely linked to their high number of members. On the other side, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt stand out as countries that register significantly higher numbers of partnerships than members (see Table 2) demonstrating a higher degree of networking by individual members. What is clear from table 1.1 is that national networks with higher numbers of partnerships also are involved in higher numbers of projects. Exceptions to this are the UK, Tunisia, Belgium and Algeria all of whom have relatively high representation in projects compared to partnerships established (based on less than 100 partnerships). This reveals the practical significance of generating partnerships as they offer the opportunity of building future projects and producing sustained networking. Of significance is also with whom national networks are primarily connected – southern or northern partners. In all cases, southern national networks have more partnerships with northern countries than with southern countries. On the other hand, 14 northern Mediterranean networks have a greater number of partnerships with other northern networks. The predominance of networking among European-based networks and the relatively smaller number of partnerships between southern-based networks is highly significant and raises a number of issues that will be discussed in the following section.

The new Programme Guidelines established by the ALF for the period 2012-2014 sets out to remedy the relative lack of sub-regional networking (across southern networks) and also maintains focus on some key areas of mobility and exchange. Citizens for Dialogue (DAWRAK), initiated in 2011, focuses on the support of CSOs in Southern Mediterranean countries and works towards an exchange of practices and the development of citizenship education. According to the ALF approximately forty percent of ALF national networks in these countries will participate in various projects, forums and meetings associated with DAWRAK. In addition, DAWRAK supports the training of educators in the practice of citizenship and cultural identity. The programme is made up of two different fields: (1) capacity building, agenda setting and advocacy and (2) networking, exchange and civic engagement. The first field consists of incorporating youth in local dialogue, education for intercultural citizenship, and exploring the role of arts in political change. The second field
includes a variety of actions including empowering national networks, increasing twinning and exchange programmes, participating in the ALF Civil Forum, citizen's routes that decentralize activities, and regional conventions. A mobility fund will focus on developing exchanges with a current focus on journalists. The project is largely inspired by a focus on training different national groups in the exercise of liberalized forms of citizenship as opposed to lobbying for the inclusion and translation of different forms of citizenship and engagement. Citizenship education in schools is favored instead of opening up discourses of citizenship to different forms of cultural belonging. This is supplemented by the performativity inherent in the promotion of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and displayed in the 2013 ALF Civil Forum Citizens of the Mediterranean where a hybrid cultural unity is suggested as the basis for developing citizenship.

**Geopolitics, transnationalism and governance**
Looking at the ALF as a transnational organization raises several points: the relationship between states, regional governance and transnational practices (subsuming the imperatives of multilateralism and integration, and security objectives), the use of transnationalism to construct political space, and organizations and social fields. Considering the ALF in this way offers a useful way to explore the link between the social aspect and the political role of organizations as they intervene in transnational activity. So the ALF can be considered as a meso-link connecting actors on all shores of the Mediterranean but this understanding should also be qualified by critiquing the biases and restrictions of the Foundation as well as the way in which members appropriate and reconstruct political discourses and identities. In this function the ALF frames its activities in terms of a shared Euro-Mediterranean space. This conception of the region is part of a broader EU-led political design to develop regional integration on the basis of a distinct 'variable geometry' (COM(2011) 200). The significance of the ALF in this context was revealed in the aftermath of the 2011 arab uprisings during which one of the first actions of the EU commission was to publicly seek to foster a closer relationship with the ALF (ENPI Infocentre 08/09/2011). Even during the events taking place some members of the Commission tried to encourage the Foundation to take more of a
public stance on the events taking place especially in Egypt. Nonetheless, the advisory council opted to take a strictly neutral line during the events (perhaps in deference to members of the Board of Governors).

The Anna Lindh Foundation is valuable to the EU as one of the sole truly regional and multilateral institutions established as part of the EuroMed Partnership. It is highly symbolic given the limited progress in this area and it offers non-European partners a clear role. The Foundation's ability to promote the role of civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations is also a key priority for the EU under the new ENPI and the PfDSP. As a result, regular meetings between members of the ALF advisory council, DG external relations (RELEX), DG development and cooperation (DEVCO), European external action service (EEAS), and DG education and culture (EAC) have been established to coordinate actions across a variety of instruments. The ALF Programme Guidelines 2012-2014 also firmly places the ALF as a key part of the ‘variable geometry’ of the Euro-Mediterranean area. So given that the EU Commission remains the largest overall investor of the Foundation (approx. EUR7 million) it does exercise some influence over the content of programmes. Within the Commission there is a desire to allow the advisory council and administration of the Foundation to set objectives and design new programme outlines independently but within a clear (and limiting) framework agreed upon across the different DGs and with the ALF advisory council. Similarly, in practice the Board of Governors (where states can influence budget priorities) has not been very active in constraining the Foundation during negotiations on new programme guidelines. An exception to this would be a largely symbolic rejection on the part of the Egyptian government during the negotiating phase of the most recent budget on the basis that the document was too explicitly normative in its language and possessed too much political content. Despite this initial protest, the new Programme Guidelines went ahead largely unchanged. While the Groupe des Sages in 2003 declared the necessary independence of the ALF in order to achieve legitimacy and neutrality in a highly politicized region, the scope of independence attainable by the Foundation will always be limited...

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7 Interviews with DG RELEX 15th October 2013 and EEAS 10th February 2014
8 Interview with DG RELEX 15th October 2013
by its reliance upon the EU commission for funding (Feliu 2005) as well as the institutional context of the ALF within the UfM framework. Furthermore, the ALF does not have freedom of action within UfM member states. It acts as an organizational hub for national networks setting strategies for development and implementation as well as deciding upon funding priorities. Funding is in some cases still funneled through ministries (though this tendency has become quite uncommon since the member survey in 2010) and member states often remain responsible for approving Heads of Network and maintaining oversight over national networks, potentially limiting network penetration and membership opportunities through explicit or self-censorship.

When we consider the content and types of actions pursued by the Foundation the influence of both states and the EU, as a regional hegemon, becomes clearer. Through its activities the ALF supports and legitimizes a specific form of transnational interaction, which can be manifest in selection procedures and in the content of supported projects. It also contributes to the development of a precise political imaginary exemplified during the 2013 ALF Civil Forum - Citizens of the Mediterranean. This necessitates a move away from the implicit normativity of many claims made about transnationalism as anti-hegemonic and/or anti-exclusionary. It also raises questions about the democratic potential of transnationalism as it is assumed to provide a counterweight to exclusive policy-making structures. Quite on the contrary, transnationalism is a largely uneven process through which states and supranational institutions “discriminate quite deliberately” (Hurrelmann and DeBarbeleben 2011, 7). And the transnational organization can act as an intermediary through which these actors can exert control over these processes. The ALF in its institutional structure is certainly an example of how states can assert control over the potential of transnationalization. At the same time, and conversely, the ALF operates within a space determined by some EU discourses as a developing social field as well as institutional framework. These two features result in a complex process whereby some borders are re-enforced and re-inscribed and others become less restrictive and more selective. This is clear when considering the directionality of a majority of the partnerships that have been established between the period 2005-2011.
Limitations of mobility are an immediate problem for all members and on this issue the ALF and especially its Former-President Andre Azoulay have been increasingly outspoken calling for the development of better regimes for educational and youth exchange and easier mobility among UfM countries. The foundation has also shown some flexibility in its willingness to support organizations that were unable to obtain the relevant association or NGO status under the strictures of authoritarianism. So the ALF is both political actor and opportunity structure. The relative lack of south-south partnerships established between 2005-2011 reflects to a large extent the priorities of generating network across the northern and southern shores of the Mediterranean. But the incidence of networking across European members versus between southern members also reflects a geopolitical reality in which borders between countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean remain much less porous as a result of sustained political imperatives. It also raises the question of resources and capacity. Whereas there are fourteen European-based networks that have a majority of connections with other European-based networks, this is not the case with any of the southern-based networks. Many grants proposed by the ALF include the requirement that there be at least one European and one non-European organization involved in the project in order to receive funding. However, for some European networks this could be seen more as a formality than a necessity raising the possibility that some partnerships were established on the basis of reliance rather than equality. As a result of these limitations, for many members being a part of the national network is just as important as developing transnational networks and many participants see membership in the ALF as a way to strengthen domestic initiatives. For some this is because the funding themes and goals of the ALF do not provide many opportunities. It is clear from the 2010 members survey that there is general dissatisfaction with the ability to find partners in other countries but many at the Civil Forum 2013 also mentioned the scope and goals of funding which was being influenced by political objectives and agendas established through the interference of the EU Commission. This could be seen as lending to a sense of division between

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9 Interview with Tunisian ALF member 17th June 2013
Southern organizations struggling for funding, partnership and recognition and Northern organizations with more alternative sources of funding.

As a ‘network of national networks’ the ALF insinuates the creation of a transnational social field on the basis of the idealized Euro-Mediterranean space. Transnational social fields “link individuals directly or indirectly to institutions located in more than one nation-state as part of the power dynamics through which institutionalized social relations delineate social spaces” (Glick Schiller 2009, 5). But there are immediate problems for considering the networks of the ALF as contributing to the construction of this social field. Of course, all social fields are highly constructed phenomena subject to the interplay of particular power dynamics and the intervention and influence of institutions on transnational actors. However, the transnational social field is perhaps still less formal and organized by the limits of membership than are the networks of the ALF. On top of this, national networks as supported by the ALF often remain just that – nationally organized – though transnationally connected. The regional dimension is also growing increasingly vague. Its symbolic and rhetorical value is valuable as will be discussed in relation to the 2013 Civil Forum, however the lack of common experiences and institutions will ensure its subordination to political motives rather than becoming a truly shared identity.

Membership, belonging and the Euro-Mediterranean Space
Engaging in transnational networks does not produce an erosion of the importance of place or the nation (Featherstone, Phillips and Waters 2008, 386). As Stephen Calleya (2005) has pointed out, regional fragmentation means that local identities and national spaces remain central to political and social action in the Euro-Mediterranean. This fragmentation is decisively political in most circumstances and does not account for underlying dynamics of social and political contestation that occur across national constructs. For example, networks have historically played a central role in the consolidation of political action and the ability to evoke a transnational history for particular actors and/or issues only strengthens such networks and lays the basis for identity construction (Featherstone 2007). This understanding points towards the role of common politics and projects in the construction and maintenance of
transnational networks, which is of significance for the development of regional integration and common affinities. Annette Jünemann’s (2005) analysis of the Civil Forums established under the EMP framework points toward the potential initiation of a political identity based on particular political issues for those actors involved. The impact of selection processes can put a limit on the involvement of actors and organizations from southern Mediterranean countries but on the other hand, as Sari Hanafi (2005) points out, the selection process can also benefit transnational networks by engaging with alternative actors and organizations that under normal conditions may be subject to local divisions or clique gatherings. Networking at the regional level has the potential of increasing the influence of southern actors through agenda setting and alliance building (Hanafi 2005). Hanafi’s anthropological approach to North-South civil society relations helps to understand the significance of the regional scale for social actors and some motivations for participating in regional actions, supplementing Jünemann’s analysis of the Civil Forums. However both focus solely on the significance of the regional level and as a result miss the interplay of global/local processes of political expression and value formation produce different responses to regional images. Membership in the Euro-Mediterranean space is a tightly controlled phenomenon but it need not be constraining in its importance.

The Mediterranean Forum held in Marseilles, France 6th-9th April 2013 marked only the second regional forum held by the Anna Lindh Foundation, despite the intention to develop an annual forum. Problems of resources followed by instability within national networks caused a series of delays. The agenda of the Forum was determined through a series of consultations involving different national networks on key themes: youth, women, migration, institutional cooperation, and media. During the forum there were repeated calls for the ALF to take the lead in restoring a human dimension to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (echoing the sentiment in the ‘Groupe des Sages’ report from 2003). Some of the official conclusions proposed a more structured dialogue between civil societies and governance, education for inclusive citizenship, building a common memory (uniting both shores of the Mediterranean), and a greater role for mobility especially among students, teachers, journalists and artists. Optimism towards the ability of the Euro-
Mediterranean to help Europe overcome its Manichean identity\textsuperscript{10} contrasted with political identities seeking to place themselves in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean, or trying to locate the Euro-Mediterranean between local and international. During the Civil Forum 2013 a more trivial form of unity represented by a kind of neo-tribalism in which many participants shared an instrumental identity for the duration of proceedings was also present. Finding common ground on the basis of regional characteristics, personalities and gestures made for a pleasing way to partake in networking but also played an important role in finding regional organizations with like goals and commitments. So while making for a genial atmosphere there is also a practical reason for employing such a strategy through the course of the forum.

But among members of ALF networks the Euro-Mediterranean is likely to be given a diffuse range of meanings based on subjective, practical and political dimensions depending on the participants. In the subjective form the Euro-Mediterranean is a cultural and intellectual product that evokes a long history of hybrid relations within the region (Matvejevic 1999). It is less concerned with structure and more with the experience of mobility and interaction as well as participating in regional forums. This personal experience – influenced by the political context – is generated as a representation of the region. And for some the experience of the political uprisings in the region could be linked to a general transformation of the political subjectivities of citizens within countries on the southern shore of the Mediterranean:

Thanks to the revolution we are nearer to the other people, do you understand? From that day we come nearer to other people. We think that we have the same identity, the same mentality – almost the same mentality. And I think the Mediterranean is a point of meeting.\textsuperscript{11}

But this subjective interpretation also opened the door to the actual socio-economic experiences of people living on either shore of the Mediterranean, thus

\textsuperscript{10} Rachida Darwiche referred to the ability of the Euro-Mediterranean idea to help Europe realize its Islamic history that is an essential (but disregarded) feature in the development of many European societies. Thus, she called for recognition of the Judeo-Christian-Islamic identity of Europe.

\textsuperscript{11} Interview with ALF member 3\textsuperscript{rd} July 2013
potentially generating a closer connection with citizens of other less developed
countries rather than European partners.\textsuperscript{12} A practical interpretation can be seen
in the self-ascription that takes the form of particular characteristics, specific
historical encounters or common features in order to maintain some semblance
of regional unity in the pursuit of some instrumental goal. Michael Herzfeld gives
a useful introduction to this idea when he argues that Mediterranean culture
should be treated ‘as performative utterances that can, under the right “felicity
conditions, actually create the realities that people perceive’ (Herzfeld 2005, 50).
Such performances can be wide ranging and there is no ideal type. But what is
also evident in this example is the influence that events have on political
subjectivity. This is significant. It recommends the power of performance for
producing a feeling of commonality. This was also expressed in a more explicitly
political sense.

Politically, the Euro-Mediterranean idea is intriguing and raises the
question as to whether participants of the ALF networks unite based on common
political orientations, or subject the imaginary to their own political interests.
For some, instead of seeing an idealized (Euro)Mediterranean identity as an end
itself it becomes a form of empowerment. This also puts focus on specific
practices that extend across and beyond the region and entail some form of
globality in the sense of embracing the condition of alterity. What is more, this
understanding tends to resist (either actively or passively) dominant
constructions of the region without rejecting common histories. Instead it grasps
the symbolism of a collective memory and uses it to establish a voice beyond
their particular circumstances.\textsuperscript{13} As a result the Euro-Mediterranean also
becomes a site of political engagement transformed by the development of local
subjectivities, and political subjectivities following the Arab uprisings (Challand
2011), and the continued pursuit of social justice, dignity, and freedom. An
activist who participated in the Tunisian revolution and currently working for an
artistic association explains:

\textsuperscript{12} One interviewee noted a much closer feeling of attachment to people from
Brazil, India or Uganda than a ‘Frenchman’ or ‘Spaniard’
\textsuperscript{13} Interview with Tunisian member of ALF 4\textsuperscript{th} July 2013
There is huge difference between creation in the Arab Mediterranean and creation in
the European parts. In the EuroMediterranean region you are all licensed, you can
talk about whatever you want. In the Arab parts you still talk about whatever you
want but you don’t have that right. You need to earn it, strive for it. It [the
Mediterranean] is a bridge that we have started to cross in order to open up to the
international scene.\footnote{Interview with Tunisian member of ALF 18\textsuperscript{th} June 2013}

The separation but convergence of the two shores of the Mediterranean was a
major theme throughout the Forum but whereas many of the official panels
focused on the development of common values and norms (and especially their
development within southern societies) the previous comment expresses the
struggle against disempowerment that does not end with becoming a citizen of
the (Euro)Mediterranean but offers a platform to pursue a real sense of equality.
These expressions only begin to exemplify the ways in which regional
participants employ the imagery supplied to negotiate their own transnational
practices and orientations.

The subjective position reflects a dichotomy between the fragmented
nature of cultural and political identities in the Mediterranean area as it places
the Mediterranean in relation to global power structures. Thus it creates the
possibility of a global solidarity between socio-economically and/or culturally
similar nations and from a normative perspective it can act as a forceful critique
of Western dominance. On the other hand, it also offers the possibility of a
rapprochement between different societies as a result of internal transformation
where the mentality and subjectivity of actors is of central importance as it
reflects changes within society. And yet at its base the coming-together is
necessarily linked to a mutual commitment to similar goals and values. So even
though the Mediterranean becomes a point of meeting it remains a meeting
between not yet equals or equals in becoming. The subjective position
exemplifies the political and cultural complexity of the region as it is caught up in
a reconfiguration of the discourses of nationalism, development,
cosmopolitanism and orientalism. The practical position is similar but it entail a
more implicit process of situating oneself in a static phase of development either
in cultural terms, or may be used by some actors within society in order to
legitimize the recourse to political help from external actors.
The experience of mobility – limited though it may be – is undoubtedly a significant one. All of those quoted do engage in forms of transnational practice such as communication (largely via email and social media) and participation within issue-networks. As pointed out by Szerszynski and Urry (2002, 470) corporeal mobility as well as virtual and imaginative mobility contribute to the development of cosmopolitanism in a variety of contexts. Mobility here does not represent a cosmopolitan ethical standpoint against the parochial local culture from which actors emerge. The experience of mobility is important but does not alone determine a cosmopolitan attitude, which relies upon the political subjectivity and the reflexivity of the actor. Mobility and other transnational practices may in turn help to induce the realization of such desires but do not necessarily determine them. Similarly, contrary to the notion of everyday cosmopolitanism or the latent existence of cosmopolitanism (Delanty 2011) the implication here is expressly political as it functions in opposition to the delimiting of legitimate grounds for political expression within the state. So the regional becomes grounds for pursuing political engagement beyond the national context but also for pursuing a global identity defined by local experience, which is expressly political but not one that rests on a pedagogical nature like that suggested above. Instead it might be seen as an emancipatory version that is the complementary flip-side to humility (see Malcolmson 1998, 236). So the region in this instance is a useful way to link the local to the global without succumbing to a specific ethics or dropping the essentially political problem of existing beyond the nation-state.

**Conclusion**
The construction of a Euro-Mediterranean space in the work of EU instruments and European-led regional institutions and foundations has led to a fundamental delimiting of the region according to specific institutional goals and political and economic practices. Civil society actors are also important actors in the development of a common space and have been incorporated into regimes of regional governance for this purpose (Scott and Liikanen 2011). The ALF, as a regional foundation, was created to support a dialogue between cultures and to increase exchange and interaction between actors across the Mediterranean. To
this end the ALF has increasingly supported the development of a common unity based on a sense of Mediterranean citizenship and culture. However, this is also influenced by the important role of the European commission in supporting the Foundation politically and economically. But rather than being a route to a specific type of transnational activity and identity we should perhaps focus on how the transnational desires and characters of its members is what really gives the ALF significance. For this same reason it is important to bodies like the EU Commission because it can harness some of the influence and sentiments of these groups and funnel them into regional activities and programmes that work towards the goals of intercultural dialogue, democratic consolidation or regional integration. While these are also important for transnationally active members, the role of transnational practices in the Euro-Mediterranean may be viewed as a stepping-stone or route towards becoming more globally active and visible. A thorough analysis of such actors would have to explore this global/local question and the regional as an opportunity structure in the context of global politics.

Conceptually, the resonance of transnational terminology reveals as much as anything the vagueness of a distinct approach of transnational studies. For example, Pries (2008, 3) is wrong to assert that the transnational perspective can be distinguished from a global-local point of view by differentiating between micro-, meso- and macro- units as this assumes a level-based understanding of functions. However, the idea of the meso-link is useful as a way to consider the foundations and organizations that intervene in or promote processes of transnationalism and to explore the ways in which these organizations may incorporate the interests of states or supranational institutions. The scope of transnationalism given the influence of cultural discourses and state interests is limited and participants continue to seek appropriate representation at the national level rather than regional (Kastoryano 2003, 81). But the inclusion in such networks can generate alternative perspectives on identity and politics by approaching the national question both from above and below simultaneously. Looking at these networks from a birds-eye-view reveals the impact of certain strategies and discourses on their organization. As the final section attests, however, the view from the perspective of network members can be quite different. The following chapter pursues this more within the context of the 2013
ALF Civil Forum – the foremost event bringing together members of all of the national networks.
Chapter 7: Constructing Spaces of Dialogue: the organized cultural encounter

Referred to by one member of the European External Action Service (EEAS) as a ‘huge waste of time’, this chapter explores the significance of the 2013 ALF Civil Forum. The quote, which would appear to be a bizarre beginning for any chapter, points usefully in two directions. As the EEAS has officially recognized cultural diplomacy as part of its remit events like the ALF Civil Forum offer an outreach function for promoting a European cultural agenda. Indeed, the EEAS alongside DG RELEX, DEVCO and EAC have had regular meetings with the ALF secretariat in order to effectively coordinate any new actions and programs. As such, the quote raises questions concerning the presentation of a European cultural diplomacy. On the other hand, it also suggests a general cynicism towards the effectiveness of such events. These two sides form the core of questioning in this chapter. The 2013 Civil Forum is significant for the very reason that it offers further insight into the relationships that have been introduced in previous chapters. In order to combine these concerns this chapter presents a unique approach.

Cultural encounters are place-bound experiences between different cultures, identities, religions, ethnicities etc. and can range from conflictual to mundane. Historically, encounters have led to the formation of modern cultures and introduced complexity into traditional nation-state narratives. Different types of encounter can also be related in different ways to functional and intentional types of transnational practice. The notion of cultural encounter is useful insofar as it can account for a range of political contexts. It highlights the fact that cultural exchange is not a unidirectional process as has been suggested by theories of homogenization and cultural imperialism. As demonstrated by authors such as Delanty (2011) and Dallmayr (1996), cultural encounters have a variety of different outcomes and consequences, but they also take many forms and relate in different ways to political contexts. The real benefit of the

15 Interview with DG EAC 27th November 2013
16 Interview with DG DEVCO 18th November 2013 and EEAS 10th February 2014
encounter is that it is not wedded to the assumption of either cooperation or conflict, good encounter vs. bad encounter. It allows us to focus on the actual, characteristically heterogeneous experiences of cultural interaction (Rovisco 2013). But how do cultural encounters work in relation to organized events, especially those forums oriented towards civil society, academics, policy-makers and artists? Is the implied skepticism of the opening quote warranted in suggesting that organized events cannot be considered as authentic forms of encounter?

The ‘organized cultural encounter’ has to be seen among the set of practices that make up global cultural policy. It is an artificially constructed environment given purpose through institutional objectives and meaning through the set of interactions and contributions of participants. Civil societalization has made the organized cultural encounter possible by demonstrating the productive veneer provided by outreach events. The common good of intercultural dialogue is itself an institutional desire, which, like anti-policy, is significant in its practical limitations and particular constellation of networks. Looking at the ALF Civil Forum brings some of these contradictions to light. The political embeddedness of the event stands in contrast to the depoliticized framing of identity and culture in the goal of pursuing intercultural dialogue. Allusions to citizenship, participation and belonging require a rethinking of political and cultural bordering, mobility and access, and organization. Does an event like the ALF Civil Forum contain the potential to pursue such diverse aims? It would be abrupt to occlude any possibility of genuine debate or exchange.

The Civil Forum and Intercultural Strategy

Institutionalization results in a transformation of the encounter from unpredictability, openness and uncertainty towards the logic of ‘promoting diversity’ within a set of hegemonic practices. Civil forums provide space for structured dialogue engendering trust and empathy as well as novel forms of political and cultural exchange. Using the ALF Forum as a specific example of an ‘organized intercultural encounter’ will demonstrate how encounters can be
institutionalized under the imperatives of political and economic cooperation. Such functional imperatives, however, subsequently give rise to alternative frames and experiences making the encounter a productive site where dominant dynamics are reproduced as well as challenged, and cultural dominance is (re)interpreted by participants. The forum as an organized encounter has to be seen as part of a strategic vision for cultural relations. It is an idealized understanding of the encounter that has been built around the common discourse of intercultural dialogue in global cultural policy.

To understand the role of the ALF Forum though we need to understand first the proliferation of intercultural dialogue and then its incorporation into the developing EuroMediterranean Partnership as the discourse of intercultural dialogue has come to provide one basis for the establishment of the organized encounter in transnational and international politics. The organized intercultural encounter essentially stems from the desire to remove the suddenness and unpredictability from the encounter captured well by Ulf Hannerz when he states: “In large part, change is made up of other people's continuities, quite suddenly coming up close to us as well, without necessarily being understood, or fully accepted. ‘Culture shock,’ wherever it occurs, is mostly about this…” (Hannerz 1996, 25). The organized encounter thereby reduces the possibility of conflict and shock. Instead the encounter is preceded by the assumption of openness and acceptance – at least to the encounter itself if not the cultural ‘other’. These organized encounters could possibly be seen as part of what Hannerz labels the ‘culture shock prevention industry’ that sprang up in the latter decades of the twentieth century: “Cross-cultural training programs have been developed to inculcate sensitivity, basic savoir-faire, and perhaps an appreciation of those other cultures which are of special strategic importance to one’s goals” (Ibid, 108). Placing the organized encounter in the field of cultural diplomacy, the term ‘special strategic importance’ is central. In this context, intercultural dialogue has become the primary conception of an idealized cultural encounter and as a set of practices demonstrates the transnationalization of cultural relations and official policy responses. As put forth in the Council of Europe’s White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue – and which has migrated to the EU’s own policies towards promoting culture in the
Mediterranean and its very recent Preparatory Action on Culture in EU External Relations - an important aspect of intercultural dialogue is in the creation of ‘spaces’ conducive to dialogue. One form that these spaces can take is that of the organized encounter.

For the idea of the organized intercultural encounter to be useful when looking in areas of transnational relations we need to contextualize the practice in terms of existing networks of governance. There is something cynical about the idea, of ticking boxes and creating an exclusive and limited understanding of what the cultural encounter should look like, or how it should occur. This is certainly one of the problems that can be associated with official versions and practices of intercultural dialogue which are seen an extensions of a successful European experience of diversity. But on the contrary, it is desperately needed within European societies – not just in conjunction with external development. On the other hand, what also comes to light in such an analysis is the fact that no cultural encounter can be entirely scripted. Performances are not inherently limited by the dominant visions organizing the encounter. As Papastergiadis (2012) suggests, both of these sides are very much intertwined, and perhaps even necessary. The real limits of such an encounter then is the problem of translation, exclusivity and reach. But given the extended contacts that are being formed there are growing networks (across countries, borders) and clusters (within geographical spaces) of like-minded individuals and organizations who variously pursue the goals of intercultural dialogue and understanding.

Encountering the EuroMed: Programming intercultural dialogue

The Mediterranean has long been considered as a faultline – even before Huntington’s pivotal and controversial ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis. Influenced in some part by this new discourse of cultures, the Barcelona Process was envisaged as a way to prevent the inevitable clash between cultures on either shore. The inclusion of the cultural basket alongside the political and economic baskets was intended to institutionalize some form of harmony between Mediterranean cultures and direct the relations towards the impetus of economic and political integration. Following the terrorist attacks on New York in 2001 the cultural dimension took on renewed significance and the European
Commission brought together a group of experts to determine some priorities going forward. Out of this remarkable meeting of some prominent thinkers there were several important and tricky objectives outlined which made intercultural dialogue central to the process of reconciliation and sustained collaboration.

The ‘Groupe des Sages’ Report established a particular framing of transnationalism in order to combat a series of issues facing Mediterranean societies. The Groupe argued for the establishment of “transnational institutions and cooperation flows” that were capable of “transcending and defying those states”, “new relationships between cultural identity and citizenship”, and the “emergence of open and pluralistic public spaces in the countries on the south side of the Mediterranean” (Report of the High Level Advisory Group 2003, 8). And the Anna Lindh Foundation can act as a central institution to pursue these objectives and drive the process of building transnational cooperation. However, when put into action in the geopolitical context and given the organizational structure of the Foundation transnationalism was transformed into something more circumscribed (as discussed in Chapter 6). This interpretation of transnationalism may also have its roots in the 2003 report. As argued by Martin Griffin and Constance DeVereux (2013), cultural policy discourses reflect a dichotomy between globalization and transnationalism. Where globalization is often defined in policy discourses as a negative process of economic struggle and a threat to local processes, transnationalism “may be seen as one effort to correct the consequences of those threats and to circumvent their challenges” (Griffin and DeVereux 2013, chapter 1). This dichotomy of problem-solution is evident in the report. For example, globalization is defined as a process “exacerbating feelings of relegation and marginalization” through the exacerbation of existing societal instabilities, the intensification of financial interdependency, and as a result to the potential conflict between standardization and fragmentation (Report of the High Level Advisory Group 2003, 15). On the other hand, transnationalism – ie: the expansion of cultural cooperation through networking, exchange and common projects – is provided as a corrective to these problems. Of course, it is not expressed as some kind of ‘deus ex machina’ for all of the problems facing Mediterranean societies, however it is an essential ingredient to finding solutions. This framing has consequences for the evolution of policy
especially concerning the relationship between transnational actors and states. For example, within the ALF’s intercultural strategy the national dimension to networking is prominent. The transnational dimension may be put at risk of being effectively limited to the involvement of the national network in regional programmes that require minimal mobility and exchange. Control of the frame is thus very significant in influencing future developments. The organized intercultural encounter provides a potential setting for this struggle where the interests and identities of institutional and transnational actors come together under the aegis of a dominant framing with which participants are expected to interact. This framing affects the way in which key themes and issues are understood such as gender, mobility, networking, development, diversity etc.

The Forum puts into practice and works to clarify some of the ways in which intercultural dialogue functions as a discourse of institutionalization for civil society relations and developing shared ownership among societies across the Mediterranean sea in parallel with already established political and economic agreements. The time and place of the ALF Forum, which coincided with the first meeting of Union for the Mediterranean Heads of Parliament on the 6-7 April in Marseille, was symbolic of the central role and close institutional relationships that the ALF is hoped to assume, certainly among many in the ALF and the European Union. In a promotional article, co-written by Martin Schulz (President of the European Parliament) and Andre Azoulay (Former-President of the ALF), they highlight the necessity of building a “union for the peoples of the Mediterranean”, implying that the ALF can act as a primary advocate for its development within the current political frameworks, a privileged partner for promoting the development of bottom-up initiatives. This is not a radical vision but a highly pragmatic call for inclusion of civil society representatives and a focus on important areas of culture, education, unemployment and other major social and cultural issues. The importance of social and cultural issues is linked not solely to an allusion to abstract common values but to factors such as the impact of economic deprivation:

The debt crisis in Europe has shaken people, politics and institutions and resulted in rampant unemployment that is particularly affecting the continent’s youth. The political costs include an increasing sense of powerlessness, an increasing distrust towards politics, and a worrying increase in intolerance against people of different beliefs or ethnicities. (Schulz and Azoulay 2013)
The political basis of such talk is important because it highlights a tension at the core of ALF programming. There is a desire within the European Commission for the ALF to be a more vocal political actor, however this is limited by the reality of the political contexts within which the ALF and its networks exist. In Egypt, where the ALF HQ is located, the state of political freedoms have regressed rather than improved since the initial uprisings in 2011. What political decisions have been made result from the impact of budget constraints, negotiations, and strategic planning.

**Institutional Context and Citizenship**

The ALF Civil Forum highlights a range of pressures and objectives. Simply within the objectives of the Forum there is a balancing act taking place. In practice, the normative core of intercultural dialogue is important insofar as it hinges upon a critical belief that the horizontal opening of societies can precede and, moreover, contribute towards political cohesion and top-down forms of integration. Here, evoking the existence and role of regional citizens is performative of an alternative approach to regional integration – and one vastly different from the historical European experience. This postcolonial rendering, however, also faces the constraints imposed by budget (and the resulting institutional relationships) and political context. Thus, the reality is something in between where, for example, the hope of transnational empowerment is something tempered but the politics of the resulting interactions are significant. Since the Arab uprisings institutional relationships have changed in response to evolving interests and objectives in both the European Commission and the Anna Lindh Foundation. This is reflected in the broadened notion of ‘intercultural strategy’, which places culture firmly within the objectives of democratization and development establishing a political and economic framing of cultural issues. In terms of the institutional environment, the intercultural strategy designates a role for different Directorate-Generals from the European Commission – DGs DEVCO, RELEX and EAC – where you have organizational division between socio-economic development, external political relations, and cultural and education policy as well as the External Action Service, which to a large extent coordinates
this relationship by organizing routine meetings and maintaining regular exchanges with the ALF secretariat. In other words, the intercultural strategy is an interinstitutional plan insofar as it explicitly demarcates the partner status of the ALF with other regional and international organizations. The organization of the forum reflects these objectives and the inclusion and involvement of EU and other officials during the Forum’s proceedings raise additional considerations about the evolving relationship between the ALF and other regional bodies. This objective is set out clearly in the Foreword to the ALF Civil Forum 2013 Program: “In collaboration with our partners, we facilitated the convergence of the Forum with a Meeting of Regional Authorities and a Summit of Heads of the National Parliaments of the region.” In this capacity, the ALF secretariat has demonstrated a clear willingness to exert the Foundation’s presence at the heart of regional integration. The ALF secretariat appears to have set itself a significant task. Major constraints exist – from budget to political context – however at the heart of the ALF’s programming is the hope that societal opening can precede rather than progress from top-down integration. This hope is expressed in a postcolonial vision of the Mediterranean based on the transnational empowerment of regional societies and a horizontal opening autonomous from liberalization policies (Nicolaidis 2007, 184-5).

The ALF Forum, ultimately, is an opportunity for regional civil societies, academics, NGOs and other transnational actors to engage with the agenda established as a result of these relationships and consultation processes. One of the fundamental criticisms leveled towards the ALF is its conferral upon government officials the right to speak in the name of specific cultures. In order to counter this perception, national network building and member surveys, consultation workshops and regional programmes, and the ALF Forum act as avenues through which participants can inject their own goals and vision. The influence of cultural policy and funding, organizational structure and environment have implications for the quality of networking and representation that is on display at events such as the ALF Forum. However, another key objective of the Forum alters this perspective and that is the allusion to citizenship. The Forum was developed around the idea of a common citizenship – ‘Citizens for the Mediterranean’ – that could be mobilized in support of
‘resisting regressive forces’, ‘contributing to feed the gap of mutual ignorance’
and to boost the Union for the Mediterranean through active participation
(Foreword 2013).

**Forum Program and Overview**
The official schedule was organized into different segments. Over the course of
the entire event an intercultural fair took place in the exposition hall outside the
main auditorium. The fair allowed member organizations to setup displays and
distribute materials presenting projects and initiatives. In most cases displays
were unmanned for the majority of the event but tables provided official
pamphlets, dvds, stickers, reports and other written materials. Coffee breaks and
lunch took place in a long, open-plan room adjacent to the main auditorium. This
space – espace vieux-port – opened out onto a patio area overlooking the port of
Marseille. Other facilities included an artistic point exhibiting different works
each day, a general prayer room, press room, VIP room and networking area. All
panels and exchange events took place during Friday and Saturday sessions
beginning at 9am and ending at 7:30pm. Thursday consisted of a meeting of local
authorities on the topic of ‘youth and change’, an official inauguration and a
musical performance. Sunday consisted of a morning session held from 9am to
1:30pm which presented the official conclusions and some notable observations
on panels made by rapporteurs from the ALF administration This Closing
ceremony coincided with a Summit of the Presidents of the Union for the
Mediterranean Parliaments. This allowed the Former-President, Andre Azoulay,
the opportunity to present the official conclusions to the Summit. Thursday and
Friday were broken down into three different sessions. The mornings consisted
of the Agora. Based upon the Greek origins of the term, the Agora was designed
to be an open space of debate and dialogue divided into two sections. Strategic
debates took place between 9am and 10:30am in one of three auditoriums. Each
day three debates took place simultaneously bringing together academics,
experts, practitioners and institutions to debate topical issues related to regional
prospects. The late morning session – 11am-1:30pm – consisted of thematic
workshops, each organized according to one of the themes established by the
preparatory meetings. These workshops mostly took place in smaller break-out
rooms and were intended to be the arena for identifying proposals for future actions and directions in EuroMed cooperation identifying actions that could be taken by the ALF and its networks.

The objectives of the afternoon session differed between the two days. Both afternoon sessions were organized under an Arabic word – medina – literally translating to 'city' but generally referring to the old walled sections of major cities. The Thursday Medina had several sessions on good practice intended to identify recommendations for practitioners and donors on building sustainable partnerships and effective participation. The Friday Medina aimed to establish a space for presenting project ideas and an opportunity for collaboration and exchange. The Medina sessions, like the Agora sessions, were also organized according to the themes established by the preparatory meetings with eleven simultaneous panels taking place each afternoon (two panels for the civil society theme). As mentioned, the morning sessions took place in one of three auditoriums and the late-morning and afternoon sessions generally took place in smaller breakout rooms on level 1&2 of the Palais, or in one of two smaller rooms immediately outside the main auditorium. However, late-morning and one of the two afternoon civil society sessions each day took place in one of the auditoriums used for one of the strategic debates. These panels were given clear emphasis. Listed as being organized in conjunction with the European Economic and Social Committee, European External Action Service, European Commission and League of Arab States this priority could be seen as being a result of institutional influence, however, they were also popular among attendees.

During the course of proceedings groups formed quite quickly around the variables of age, gender, religious/cultural background and profession. Though there was steady mingling between groups, during breaks and lunch participants often retreated first into a comfortable environment. The Espace-Vieux Port – where lunch was held each day – centered on an invisible boundary across which there was constant flow but a subjectively different makeup. The room held two large serving stations for drinks with food often stationed on additional tables around the exterior walls. Initially it appeared as though the stations might cater to culturally sensitive diets as the participant makeup differed greatly from one
end of the room to the other. This was not the case and did in fact ease to some extent towards the end of Saturday’s proceedings, though preformed groups continued to dominate. Young participants (largely from North Africa and Middle East) were especially prone to grouping, though in some cases were also more prone to do so as a result of attending as part of a larger group like Young Arab Voices. Interactions with younger participants were much more likely to be relaxed, social and inquisitive in most cases concluding with an exchange of email address and/or details on how to find each other on Facebook. Many of the older participants, on the other hand, especially those representing small NGOs and/or community organizations took a more targeted and professional approach identifying specific projects and ideas in order to pursue possible collaboration with representatives. Intersecting these boundaries was a cadre of serial networkers consisting of individuals, social entrepreneurs, media, academics, and representatives of partner organizations – such as the Goethe Foundation – handing out business cards, making small talk and in some cases exchanging small gifts. ALF administrative staff largely stuck together outside of panel discussions and held various duties over the course of the event keeping them occupied. There appeared to be a significantly larger constituency of young people among members from non-European networks than from Europe. Though the focus on youth is a central component of the ALF’s platform, it is problematic if this priority only exists outside European networks as it risks portraying relations as that of teacher-student. Such an age divide at the Forum could have resulted in lower levels of networking and satisfaction among younger participants.

**ALF Forum: Network participation in numbers**

Numbers can offer an accurate account of certain features of an event offering a broad depiction of the constituency and participants, which can be broken up according to individual characteristics. It also offers a benign approach to measuring dominant themes and concepts that arise during the proceedings. In so doing, numbers can be a beneficial starting point allowing a crucial first step in explaining key features and trends over the course of a multi-day event.
Supplemented by thicker description and observation (as will be provided in the subsequent section) these potentially take on even greater significance.

Chart 1. Key Numbers

- 3,400 individuals mobilised in the preparation
- 1,374 participants during the Forum
- 46 countries represented
- 48 sessions and debates over 140 hours
- 214 interventions and contributions
- 110 experts, moderators, and rapporteurs
- 64 good practices and project ideas presented
- 99 stands of civil society and ALF partners
- 7 artistic events throughout the Forum
- 200 partners and institutions
- 191,522 twitter accounts reached
- More than 55 media pieces produced

Graph 1.1 shows the top ten participant countries excluding the largest participant, and host country, France whose high total of 355 skews the results significantly to the high end of the graph. Many of France's 355 participants were also on staff either from the ALF working in various administrative and organizational roles, representatives of local and regional French administrative bodies, local journalists, and politicians. Just over 100 French participants listed in the official programme represented either a city administration (ex: Ville de Marseille), a regional body (ex: Marseille-Provence) or the French government. The total does not reflect the general interest in the French network but demonstrates two additional factors: the local bias of any major event and the decision by the secretariat to have the event coincide with a meeting of Regional Authorities and the celebration of the European Capital of Culture – Marseille.
When the countries are clustered by region (i.e.: Northern Mediterranean and Southern Mediterranean) the numbers are also interesting. The Southern Mediterranean group contains 13 countries (Algeria, Albania, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey) and the Northern Mediterranean group 32 countries (28 EU member states plus Bosnia Herzegovina, Montenegro, Switzerland and Monaco). The larger latter group had 711 participants compared to 296 for the former, exhibiting the larger number of networks. However, the average number of participants for each group is almost precisely equal - 22.77 for the Southern Mediterranean group and 22.22 for the Northern Mediterranean group. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the countries at or near the top of the list in terms of participants also have larger national networks from which to draw participation. Each group is represented in an equitable manner. This likely reflects a clear attempt by the ALF secretariat to select participants in a way that represents the entire network, however it raises its own issues. As one of the central objectives of the ALF programming and guidelines has been to pivot towards networking between the southern countries the Foundation would have been justified in achieving a higher proportion of participants from non-EU members. Moreover, it raises the possibility that potential participants were excluded on the basis of quotas rather than contribution.
### Table 3. Top 20 Total Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Participants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Italy, Tunisia</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Palestine</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>UK</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Germany, Turkey</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Algeria</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Croatia, Israel</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Finland, Greece, Mauritania, Netherlands, Portugal</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is difficult to fully verify the final numbers and types of participant for the event. Some conclusions can be drawn by looking at the official participant list but it should be noted that this is far from a perfect approach. First, it relies upon information provided by the participant at time of registration. The problem of omission is one particular issue where the participant either refuses to provide affiliation details or refuses to be included on the official list (it is not clear whether this was possible, however a discrepancy in official numbers makes it a possibility). This raises a problem when categorizing participants and providing a final count. There are potential problems in categorizing organizations according to their status and function especially where only
abbreviations are provided. In most cases, searching the ALF member database or using a web search helped to clear up uncertainty. Where this was unsuccessful, attempts were made to contact the organization, though this method was rarely used because an inability to find information either via ALF or the web meant it was not possible to locate contact details either. With these issues in mind, looking at the official participant list provides a useful understanding of representation.

Table 4. Civil Forum Participant Breakdown

Table 3 lists total participants from each national network. This is a critical aspect that can clarify who is being represented. The final numbers are interesting because they reveal a balancing of official bodies including ministerial representatives, local authorities and regional/international institutions with private actors and non-governmental organizations. The call for participation consisted of two rounds: the first round, disseminated in December 2012, was exclusive to ALF Network members and resulted in the selection of 220 network members plus an additional 50 members from France. A second
call for participation was sent out in February 2013. This call was open to non-network members and did not specify a final number. As previously mentioned, because of some cases where affiliation was unclear the final numbers are approximate and offer an understanding of dynamics rather than a clear final picture. That being said, grouping private actors, NGOs and individuals together helps to overcome some of the lack of clarity in cases where organizational status was not obvious. Doing so also follows the ALF’s membership criteria and, as a result, is a reasonable approach to grouping Forum participants. Numbers associated with official institutions and project are more accurate as they were clearly affiliated on the participant list. The total number of participants according to the official list is 1282 (see Table 4) – slightly less than the number quoted in the official conclusions. There was at least one ministerial representative from every country except for Switzerland and Bulgaria. If we group together NGOs, individuals (including freelance journalists and academics), and private organizations this represented a little less than half of participants with approximately 615. Government and public actors added up to roughly 208 participants whereas local/regional authorities and international institutions made up 326 participants. The Forum also included 21 participants from the Young Arab Voices project, 96 local volunteers and 16 representatives of the ALF administration. Interestingly, a significant proportion of participants come from some form of official body – national, local, or international. Representatives of governing bodies almost equal the number of ALF members and non-network civil society participants. It is evident that the ALF Forum is not just a space intended to bring together network participants. In practice, it is at least a symbolic foundation for political dialogue by bringing together representatives of national and international bodies. Given the strict selection process for participants, intercultural dialogue stems from this foundational basis. Amidst these agendas, it might also be suggested that an event such as the Civil Forum risks being treated as window-dressing and an opportunity to monitor proceedings while paying lip-service to the objectives of dialogue and exchange. What space does this leave for promoting dialogue?
The Civil Forum: Narratives of encounter

“Convoked every three years Forum is an innovative and participative space for debate, networking and good practice exchange on intercultural dialogue initiatives. The Forum is the first regional gathering of its kind since the historic events of the Arab Awakening and the social impact of the eurozone-crisis” (Day 1 Launch Highlights).

Perhaps the best response to the question ending the previous section comes from a participant reacting to the influence of the European Commission on the Forum’s agenda: “What is important is to advocate for transparency, equal opportunities and accountability. It is then up to people to see what is best they can take from it, how they can influence it and assess its utility and function.” Participants are free to exert their agency within the context provided. This might seem too constraining but it addresses another theme that was apparent among the contributions of participants and it mirrors a key finding from the 2014 Intercultural Trends Report (organized by Gallup and the Anna Lindh Foundation) that youth participating in the polls displayed an attitude that is “more pragmatic, less ideological, and more utilitarian” (Khadri 2014, 53). The previous quote from the Forum participant suggests some attempt to influence the agenda of policy-makers. However, the most important aspect points toward a creative approach to participation not necessarily bound by the desire to exert pressure on governance structures – the traditional civil-political model. For youth, economic issues alongside innovation and entrepreneurship topped the list of possible benefits of dealing with other countries (Ibid). These concerns can be found in the contributions of participants for whom the experience is personal as well as political and relies upon the ingenuity of the participant to uncover opportunity. The encounter realizes this essential hybridity of positions that does not easily fit the bounded cultural categories assumed by intercultural dialogue.

The main theme ‘Citizens of the Mediterranean’ presents the forum in a political context where the participants – in their autonomous interactions – can create the embryonic discourses of a regional public sphere. This section will draw upon observations and analysis of key documents that provide insight into the interests and identities of different actors and how they perceive regional networks and their role within their ongoing development. The forum is a microcosm for networking within a specific institutional context – that of the
Euro-Mediterranean. The forum covered a wide range of topics and themes inspired by the hopes of greater openness and opportunity in the immediate aftermath of massive political mobilization and ongoing conflicts on the Eastern and Southern shores of the Mediterranean. Across these topics the agenda-setting power of dominants frames are evident, which necessitate an understanding of the connection between institutional environment and organizational interests and the narratives, performances and relations of participating members. This approach allows us to recognize the organic emergence of alternative frames within the act of participation. These different opinions, expressions and interests reveal the complexities of defining a singular space and highlight the ways in which alternative frames are articulated through a reference to common interests. This section will discuss four themes that have emerged in the act of observation. Though these themes intersect with the official objectives of the Forum they are not articulated solely on the basis of this agenda. The themes, based upon the critical observations of the researcher, have been articulated with attention to the interactions between participants. They reveal the ways in which those participants engage with, reject and alter existing narratives. Presenting these alternative accounts helps to understand the relative successes of the forum, its shortcomings, and its biases, which are evident when comparing proceedings to official conclusions. The themes presented here also raises issues central to the organized cultural encounter. Can this kind of contained activism lead to real avenues for horizontal opening? How much dialogue takes place between top-down and bottom-up narratives? How does participation affect outcomes and objectives?

There are shortcomings to this approach, based upon participant observation. The subjective nature of observation must be countered by strict methods of note taking, recording, selection and analysis. Though the biases of the researcher cannot be eliminated entirely, these methods provide some measure of objectivity and crucial insight into why specific decisions were taken. In the context of a three-day event, there are additional problems. The high density of panels and events made observing the Forum in its entirety impossible. As a result, the observations are based on a highly selective approach reflecting the core objectives of the research project. For this reason, the
following discussion and resulting conclusions are not intended to disqualify or suggest that other aspects were not important. On the contrary, the goal is to highlight complexity rather than diminish it by neatly summarizing the Forum. The panels/events attended were selected to capture specific criteria: the inclusion of regional bodies, attitudes towards and interpretations of the EuroMed, role of civil society and expressions of diversity. While there is considerable crosscutting of themes this process of selection has led to the exclusion of important issues from this research. The themes of gender, youth, education and media do not receive detailed analysis, as they are peripheral to the narrow objectives of the research.

The main Forum themes originated during the process of consultation prior to the ALF Forum, whereby a series of workshops were organized in different countries around specific issues in order to begin a dialogue. The preparatory meetings began with the theme of youth. Held in Istanbul, the meeting engaged working groups to discuss ways to increase the participation of youth within the ALF’s 4D strategy – Dialogue, Diversity, Democracy, and Development. The conclusions to be further explored at the Forum focused on increasing mobility, developing citizenship projects and promoting the development of exchange through forum and new media. A subsequent meeting held in the Moroccan city of Casablanca explored proposals on how to include the theme of women. Examining successes such as taking a leading role in the field of social media as well as cultural stereotypes and political challenges the meeting sought to provide proposals for the empowerment of women in promoting dialogue. The preparatory meeting on social movements, held in Luxembourg, initiated a lively debate bringing together activists from ‘arab spring’ countries and the European indignado movements. The meeting explored the different contexts of organizing across the region and strategic approaches following the global crisis concluding with a common focus on dialogue and shared experience to promote dignity, freedom and peace. The meeting on the institutional dimension, held in Cairo, sought to place the ALF firmly within the context of inter-institutional cooperation with regional and local authorities including the League of Arab States, the Union for the Mediterranean, the EU and various national and local governments. The meeting provided a clear mandate.
for the inclusion of authorities in each dimension of the forum and reinforced the multilateral character of the organization. The penultimate meeting on *media*, held in Barcelona, aimed at developing a strong network of international and alternative media to counter threats to media freedom promoting increased access for grass-roots citizen journalists. Held in Algiers a month before the Forum commenced, the final preparatory meeting discussed the theme of *migration*. Discussion focused on the issue of diversity in Mediterranean societies and increasing public exposure to and understanding of different identities. Recommendations were provided with regard to education and participation but also legal means for promoting migrant rights. These preparatory meetings established the working structure for the Forum, whereby panels were organized according to these themes. They also established the focus points for advocacy in the official conclusions.

**Word Cloud 1.1 Word Frequency From Official Program**

![Word Cloud Image]

**Critical discourses on Europe**

A theme that emerged during multiple panels concerned the presence and identity of Europe in relation to its Mediterranean neighbors. This critical evaluation of European culture was central to a panel organized under the headline of diversity titled ‘Do we all live on the Mediterranean?’ Organized by the ALF Head of Network, Poland, and a member of the ALF Advisory Council, the panel presented a wide-ranging discussion on heritage, culture and identity. During this discussion a theme was reintroduced, which had also come up in the morning strategic debate. The relationship between Europe and the
Mediterranean (implied in the EuroMediterranean framework) has largely been discussed from one direction – the influence that Europe has on its Southern neighbors. However, over the course of the Forum this relationship was gradually reversed. As expressed during the panel discussion, the EuroMediterranean should focus on helping Europe overcome its ‘Manichean identity’ referring to a dualist image of European culture. Developing new heritage projects focusing on the Mediterranean origins of Northern European peoples and cultures was proposed as an essential component of cultural dialogue within the EuroMediterranean framework. Rather than addressing this system as a political framework for countries south of the European Union, it should also address cultural conflict and heritage within Europe. The morning session had laid a good foundation for this discussion. The debate covered issues including the transformation of language, images of the Mediterranean, and philosophical and cultural exchange. Following a presentation examining exchange between rational philosophers in the Greek and Arab worlds, discussion turned to Islamic roots in European culture. The need to recapture the judeo-christian-islamic origins of European culture instead of the judeo-christian dualism that is typically espoused was expressed in multiple arenas over the three days. While it is a point that was not included in the official conclusions or highlights, it was picked up on by numerous participants from cultural institutes and European organizations as an opportunity for collaboration.

The Mediterranean Heuristic
This discourse on Europe is constructive in seeking to establish a new foundation for understanding cultural boundaries and exploring new political identities. As the final section of chapter 6 attests, members of ALF networks have a critical and often ambiguous relationship with the Mediterranean. This difficulty in addressing the significance of the term continued throughout the Forum discussions. What is clear about the use of the ‘Mediterranean’ as a marker is that it is fundamentally ambiguous. Unsurprisingly, when conducting a content analysis of the primary documents produced for the event it is the most prolific entry with 188 references. However, it is also immediately clear that
there are few common uses of the term. The ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ comes in as the single largest reference with 33 followed closely by ‘Mediterranean region’ and ‘Southern Mediterranean’. In addition, there are numerous references to institutional frameworks (partnership, UfM, ALF, Foundation, Forum, Integration, Parliaments), normative principles (cooperation, cohesion, dialogue), political descriptors and actors (Women, citizens, citizenship, Youth, public, population, media) and geography (area, space, region, landscape). This is just to mention some of the ways in which the term is employed.

Simply, the Mediterranean is a heuristic device whose meaning depends upon the context of the application. The Mediterranean was raised at crucial points over the course of the four days as a cohesive referent be that historically speaking or in the effort of developing a common future. On the first day during a discussion of the possibility for co-existence the general idea was put forth. The debate suggested that in order to achieve co-existence we need shared successes and experiences and the first one of these is the idea of a common Mediterranean. A panel member, who agreed, went on to add that the Mediterranean may also be: “a graveyard for some, and a possibility of co-existence for others”. Our image of the Mediterranean must consist of all these possibilities – that of the migrant as well as the cultural entrepreneur and in order to embrace these different images there must be a cohesive system of mobility. It was concluded that only exposure can transform mental frames and lead to coexistence. The Mediterranean is not constructed according to national cultures and boundaries but through experience and practice.
**Civil Society and Citizenship**

This theme was especially interesting as it coalesced with a number of other significant narratives pertaining to diversity, democracy, development, representation, and innovation. Discussions of civil society especially introduced a desire for innovative approaches to participation and representation. A critical attitude towards the category of civil society was established early on the first day of sessions when a panel member declared: ‘We may be representative of civil society but we do not represent all of society’. This statement was prophetic especially in the case of religious communities who were poorly represented during the Forum. But that is not to suggest that there was not an attempt at inclusion. Mohamed Tolba from *Salafyo Costa* - a network for young Salafi men and women to communicate and discuss the experience of being Salafi in modern Egypt - was scheduled to participate on a panel discussing religious dialogue. Unfortunately, he was not in attendance at the event (and I was unable to make contact to clarify whether this was a decision not to attend or a result of other factors). In any case, the result was that the religious community was not included to the extent that an event proposing dialogue across Mediterranean communities would require to be in some way representative. While it is tricky to draw conclusions from this, it is relevant to observe along with Sara Ahmed...
that: “the very desire for a shared social space can be a desire that restricts to whom an institutional space is open by imagining a social space that is not open to everyone” (Ahmed 2012, 39).

The topic of civil society was a major theme demonstrated by larger number of panels devoted to the theme and the use of the auditorium instead of smaller break out rooms. It was also an important theme because these panels were among the few events during the Forum brought participants into direct dialogue with EU officials. As a result, there was a high-level of discussion that took place on how to develop more effective partnerships between civil society and regional bodies. Given that the European institutions promoted the civil society theme an organizational discourse was prevalent during panels including EU officials. However, there was also a more fluid perspective arising from the discussion. The organizational discourse consisted of establishing civil society as the foundation of democracy and development. As stated by Stavros Lambrindis, EU Special Representative for Human Rights: “civil society is the sine qua non of human rights”. This discourse assumes a particular stage of development and its necessary progression. The same approach was evident during Stefan Füle’s, Commissioner DG RELEX, address which stressed three conditions for civil society to take hold: conditions, capacity, and ability to hold authorities to account. This approach urged civil society into a more organized role (à propos of EU policy established in Chapter 3) and the need for external donors to take stage-based actions based on the three conditions. The discourse on civil society stemming from the EU’s participation at the event diverged quite clearly from the ways in which other participants were interpreting the role of civil society.

Two elements distinguished participants from EU representatives: the existence of civil society was presumed rather than being a first stage in a process of development and the identity of civil society itself was put to the test. These turned to various issues of representation, voice, difference, encounter, and innovation - to name a few. It was a curious but repeated jab that civil society is going off course trying to attend events and secure funding instead of organizing and networking autonomously. One panelist initiated a long discussion by declaring that there is more than enough civil society, pointing towards the hundreds of legally existing but barely active NGOs in Morocco.
alone. This approach is evidently skeptical of the position that seeks to build civil society put forth by EU representatives. A common refrain marked this perspective: “we don’t need to reinvent the wheel”. Civil society should be united and diverse and seek to leverage as many avenues as possible. Rather than modeling new organizations on an institutionally oriented civil society, do whatever works and achieves the objectives set out. Despite the effortless attitude that could be associated with such an approach panelists were not short on ideas most of which focused on forms of social entrepreneurship – projects that attract funding from a much wider range of donors including banks, corporations, media, selling tickets etc. – such as non-profit schools. What was clear across the contributions was that ‘civil society’ is not in development, just in need of partners. Furthermore, given a general problem of a disconnection and lack of effective mechanisms by which civil society actors can influence politics at either national or supranational levels, social actors need to be more flexible and multifaceted.

There is a fundamental difference underlying the contributions from the EU versus those of participants. The EU discourse rests upon an assumption of universalism, stated as much by Stavros Lambrindis who argued that the conflict “is not between universalism and tradition but between the powerful and the weak”. This is true, however it also needs to be acknowledged that the content of universal values are impregnated with those power relations. While the EU’s contribution continued to reflect a hierarchical set of relations implicit in a Eurocentric universalism, participants rejected both the suggestion of relativism and the stage-based understanding of development. Their contributions transgressed those boundaries speaking instead to their multiple influences and transnational opportunities.
Cosmopolitanism, regional identity and the nation-state

"We have many similarities. Nationalism will lead us nowhere. Every local community can keep its national identity, but it will not hold us together” (Day 2 Highlights).

Regional identity is aspirational. As we have seen with the complex narratives of the Mediterranean it is not necessarily which imagery is chosen but the specific practices and experiences that it entails that has the potential to give it meaning. So, a remaining question is whether the ALF Forum facilitates contact with cultural difference and encourages interaction across realms of social and national standing. Despite the institutional baggage faced by participants, does the Forum provide a space in which to nurture the networks and practices conducive to cosmopolitan identity (Kendal et al 2009, 154)? Without more in depth interviews with Forum participants an adequate response is unlikely. However asking the question is relevant given the dichotomy between the experiences and contributions of participants and the overlaying institutional environment. At the very least, if offers a way to catalogue that experience.

Viewed as an organized cultural encounter, Forums such as this can be conceived as an outlet for cosmopolitan performances. Consisting of an arena dedicated to universalism and common values, the Forum provides a context enabling actors to present themselves as open and flexible and to mobilize their own ways of being cosmopolitan (Skrbis and Woodward 2013, 26-7). This is
essential. The agonistic relationship displayed between official narratives and that of participants may not have been a productive debate in terms of influence but those contributions are significant in their expression and in the relationships that are developed in their wake. Underlying much of the debate during the Forum proceedings was a debate about universal values and understandings. The top-down Eurocentric approach was evident in official discourse, however the contributions of participants pointed towards an interpretation of universalism based upon transgression and reflexivity (Said 1993). It is in this critical openness that cosmopolitan sentiment surfaces and which argues for a basis in practice and experience rather than values.

Conclusions:

New subjectivities on display

“It is thus right to emphasize that the new leaderships and people in the region are masters of their own destiny” (Ashton 2011).

This analysis of the ALF Civil Forum has highlighted the influence of the institutional environment and the legacy of regional frames on ALF programming. The relative equality of participants across networks and regions reveals a conscious effort for the event to be viewed as an open and representative space. And in many ways, the Forum consisted of profound dialogue between participants from various parts of the Euro-Mediterranean. At the same time, the agenda and structure of the event privileges an institutional narrative. This narrative is embedded in the organized encounter and participants are constrained in their approach to dialogue. At times this resulted in frustration – such as when discussing Arab identities - or misperception – as a result of differing perspectives. This latter problem was most clear in the contrast between the institutional (EU, ALF) narrative of civil society and that of the participants.

Each of the themes mentioned above provoked the overturning of dominant frameworks. For example, flipping the relationship between Europe and its Southern Mediterranean neighbors served to empower these cultures as a source of positive development. Likewise, the Mediterranean is not instilled with intrinsic optimism nor is it a bulwark against threat and instability. The
view from the South recognizes the multifarious reality of the concept that is inherently impregnated with exclusivist meanings. The heuristic value of the Mediterranean emerges from subjective experiences. The third category was most obvious in its rejection of ideological molds (Bayat 2013) by foregoing the usual debates around different types or impacts of civil society and instead focusing on brainstorming solutions regardless of the normative value or means. If this meant involving private actors such as businesses, banks then so be it. In fact, some of the most critical comments were reserved for external donors who implicitly encouraged particular issues or types of behavior within funding conditions. Instead, the need for innovation and creative answers to solve everyday problems of education, employment, representation were at the forefront rather than the need for more civil society.

**The OCE in institutional context**
Annette Jünemann’s (2003) analysis of the early civil forums prior to the establishment and subsequent development of the Anna Lindh Foundation provides some useful parallels on which to conclude. While this chapter attempted a radically different approach to understanding the significance of the Forum through its influences and participant performances, it shares a desire to understand what these events mean for political practice. Jünemann highlighted contradictions found within the organization and/or functioning of the early Forums. Largely, these stemmed from the relationship to governance structures hindering their critical potential. This inheritance – if it makes sense to call it that – is relevant when considering the ALF Forum and the institutional environment in which it has been organized. Previous Forums attempted to balance a mediating role with the role of critical observer (Jünemann 2003, 7). However, the ambition to build a strong mechanism for civil society conflicted with the desire to represent the heterogeneous nature of civil society (Ibid, 26). This is not a concern with regard to the ALF Civil Forum. The watchdog function of civil society is all but nonexistent leaving the role firmly as heterogeneous.

17 The influence of such conditions was discussed on a number of occasions. Outside the forum one director of an NGO in Tunisia admitted to changing the name and objectives of his organisation in order to obtain necessary funds from an external source.
mediator, in Jünemann's terms. Rather than supplying a critical observation of the Union for the Mediterranean (the watchdog function), the ALF Civil Forum is firmly incorporated into the framework by means of its institutional attachments. What the Forum provides is a mechanism of outreach for governments and international bodies and a means to engage in informal political dialogue. Participants, on the other hand, are provided with a privileged space in which to mobilize their own identities and goals. By shunning traditional models of participation and influence this space can also be made productive through reflexive engagement. So, was the Forum really a 'waste of time'? It depends on how the question is approached. For the European Commission, it initiated a period of consultation with civil society that resulted, a year later, in the launch of a separate forum for social dialogue removed from the multilateral structure of the Foundation. For participants, it likely consisted of a range of experiences between ephemeral and productive.
Chapter 8: Conclusion

The purpose of this concluding chapter is to connect the strands of analysis from previous chapters and to present a conclusion on an empirical and a conceptual level. This thesis has contended that the state of cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean reveals a tension (both creative and conflicted) between the rejuvenation of Europe’s cultural identity (and competency for culture at the supranational level) and the promise of transnational networking. It presented a novel understanding of cultural relations in the EuroMediterranean as products of the global reach of networks and in direct relation their influence in driving the evolution of cultural narratives at the EU level. Empirically, I will assess whether cultural relations, and the EU approach towards culture in the EuroMediterranean, have evolved in part due to the increased advocacy of networks and the parallel development of the Anna Lindh Foundation, and what the consequences of these developments have been for the inclusion of civil society in regional cooperation. This analysis reveals an underlying continuity in the progression of relations through calls for a new approach to the post-Arab Spring environment but it also speculates on the evolving global actor hood of the EU on the basis of an ongoing strategic review within the EU on the nature of its foreign policy and on the role of culture in its external relations. Unfortunately, these developments are too fresh to be included in a more substantial manner but insights into this process have been related to the evolving institutional and geopolitical environment. Conceptually, a few contributions will be made. First, the empirical discussion will be linked to the evolution of political practice in the contentious realms of democracy, development and culture. Second, the significant role played by networks will be reiterated, contributing to an understanding of global cultural relations and novel approaches to cultural diplomacy. Third, observations of participation in regional networks will be reconsidered as a contribution to understanding the experiential value of networking for global politics, thus moving beyond the scope of the politically delimited region. Finally, some possible avenues for further research will be discussed.
Advancing regional relations: foundations, networks and transnationalism

In response to a contentious and unfolding set of mass anti-government uprisings in its Southern Neighbourhood the European Union publicly turned its support to the democratic voices of civil society. The first joint communication issued in response to the uprisings “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity with the Southern Mediterranean” turned its institution-building focus to the issue of creating a facility for the support of civil society and promoting a forum for social dialogue. This document was part of a first step in announcing a new priority to focus on the relationship with civil society in addition to the bilateral relations represented by a revised European Neighborhood Policy. The following year a separate communication, “The Roots of Democracy and Sustainable Development”, issued another small step in setting out the EU’s approach to dealing with post-Arab Spring relations, however it clarified an important point on the significance of civil society as an object of policy. This significance is not solely in the potential effect of civil society organizations on decision-making. Rather, it is the innate democratic character of civil society that makes it “an asset in itself” (COM(2012) 492, 3). This societal approach to democracy, that is encouraging the development of a democratic culture, is only a portion of the diverse and somewhat ambiguous position established in these communications. But part of this asset is also in the ability to pursue (or pressure) political dialogue by other means. Thus, civil society is not only the ‘sine qua non’ of human rights but partner in an effort to hone perception of the EU’s external capacities.

The evocation of civil society – the norms, discourses, practices and organizational models contained therein – by political actors is significant because it undermines the bilateralism of traditional foreign policy. This is evident in the EU’s external relations. Indeed, in one of the first practical responses to the events taking place, Stefan Füle, in September 2011, expressed a public commitment to establish closer relations with civil societies in the region through the Anna Lindh Foundation (ENPI 08/09/2011), as one of its

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18 As declared by Stavros Lambrindis at the ALF Forum, April 5th 2013
representative institutions. Chapter 3 explored the significance of a process through which global normative culture has penetrated into political strategy and altered the methods through which official actors pursue and contest political objectives. Driving such a change is the ability to pursue political objectives through informal or nonpolitical means, appealing to universal narratives in the global public sphere to mobilize support. It is significant in its performativity, for which the Anna Lindh Foundation is a suitable partner. As such, ‘civil society’ is not necessarily intended target. This is corroborated during interviews at the EU Commission. One official in DG RELEX made it clear that the Commission’s positioning following the uprisings (including the release of the previously mentioned communication detailing a new approach to civil society) reflected a desire within the Commission to make an influential public statement and did not actually represent a substantive shift in policy focus. In considering the empirical basis of transnational civil society, Sidney Tarrow raised a crucial question: Is the idea of transnational civil society actually just a moniker for the web-like relations between international institutions, norms, social movements and other non-state actors (Tarrow 2002: 1)? As a point of analytical clarity this is a potentially damning observation, which points to a rather complicated network that overlooks the existence of a discrete ‘civil society’ entity. Though Tarrow remains cautious on this conclusion, the idea of civil societalization is agnostic about the actual entity of civil society. The relations between the elements pinpointed by Tarrow are as important as the object itself. They reveal a process that has impacted upon political practice, demonstrably in the field of foreign relations. It is a process that has privileged non-state actors – like Foundations – in the political arena and integrates political and cultural objectives.

In 1999, Gudrun Pehn laid out a simple depiction of the steady development of cultural networks within European space. Since publishing Networking Culture: The Role of European Cultural Networks, a great deal of advocacy has been undertaken by cultural networks and substantial cooperation has been established across European and national cultural foundations. Foundations have played a prominent role in diffusing a new narrative on culture and development within Europe. The inclusion of culture in the
EuroMediterranean, on the other hand, has followed on the back of the limited capacities available to the EU to maneuver in a field closely guarded by nation-states. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht raised the feature of cultural diversity as integral to the European project both in the framework of promoting national cultures within the European Union and promoting a European culture outside the Union. The Treaty allowed for the development of financial frameworks to support specific projects including the audiovisual industry (MEDIA I), the educational sectors (Socrates I) and in the second half of the decade cultural heritage (Raphael), creativity (Kaleidoscope), and translation (Ariane) all in parallel to the development of the cultural basket of the Barcelona Process. From the mid-90’s, a new standard for the development of cultural relations was evolving which incorporated lessons from the transnational experience of the European Cultural Foundation, new European competencies in culture and the development of the EU's external relations. The migration of staple policies, such as the Erasmus exchange program, from the Foundation to EU competency exhibited the authority and experience of these non-state actors in an emerging matrix of cultural actors.

The Culture 2000 programme altered the policy landscape towards culture and opened new avenues for existing cultural actors and organizations to network and interact with European institutions, reinforcing the functional role of foundations in the development of cultural policy. This initiated a period of boosted advocacy on the part of old and new cultural actors including national institutes of culture (and the umbrella group EUNIC) and the ECF, among others. The development of a strategic role for culture in the EU’s external affairs emerged as a vital priority during this period in order to avoid the image of Europe as a ‘gated community’ and, in the words of the ECF’s summary report, “deaf to the experiences and knowledge of people surrounding it”. This process culminated in the recent Preparatory Action for Culture in EU External Relations initiated in 2011 by the European Commission.

As discussed in Chapter 4, these developments illustrate well the changing landscape in cultural relations since the beginning of the millennium. Cultural foundations have an essential role in promoting the cultural landscape. They can be flexible intermediaries between the public sector and small-scale
cultural operators. They are not only active in distributing small grants, but are also engaged in activities closely related to cultural policy reform. One of the objectives of an EU strategy for culture is to ensure that the cultural sector has the capacity to structure itself and develop a continuous dialogue between public authorities and civil society. The role that Foundations play in fostering this relationship is crucial to this approach.\textsuperscript{19} There have been two notable effects associated with this process: the emergence of a narrative on transnational networking and attempts to establish a European perspective on cultural diplomacy. Foundations and their offshoot networks demonstrate that global politics is increasingly heterogeneous (Scott 1999, 147).

The proposal to create a EuroMediterranean Foundation for intercultural dialogue was a precursor to the official recognition of this narrative in EU policy. In 2003 the Prodi Commission established a group of experts to offer advice on improving Mediterranean relations - especially with regard to the cultural field – in an increasingly stale EuroMediterranean Partnership. The ‘Groupe des Sages’ report helped to establish a set of objectives responding to a fear of conflict and fragmentation and it is clear that the political climate had some influence on the objectives put forth. The report represented a consensus among different intellectuals and academics, and inevitably resulting in the downplaying of aspects deemed crucial to some participants but not others, yet it reflects the narrative of culture being put forth at the time. One of the main priorities in the report referred to the establishment of “transnational institutions and cooperation flows”, “new relationships between cultural identity and citizenship”, and the “emergence of open and pluralistic public spaces in the countries on the south side of the Mediterranean” (2003, 8). This need was directly attributed to the marginalization of Mediterranean societies deemed to be uniquely vulnerable to the ill effects of globalization (Ibid, 14). Transnational cooperation provides a potential solution by increasing the experience of contact and providing an outlet. The inauguration of policies on cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue changed the ‘kind of labor’ (Ahmed 2012) involved in doing cultural work. Through these changes, transnationalism emerged as an instrument in global cultural policy for pursuing political objectives in response

\textsuperscript{19} Interview with representative from DG EAC 27th November 2013
to the negative side effects of globalization such as economic competition, conflict and fragmentation (Griffin and Devereaux 2013). In addition to this, major political concerns – for example migration – have increasingly come to be seen in this context necessitating a regional approach that recognizes the transnational basis of many issues.

The identity building function of cultural policy (Sassatelli 2009) feeds into the materialization of cultural diplomacy. But whereas cultural diplomacy is essentially interest-driven and unitary in its promotion of culture, there is a fundamental ambiguity in its extension to the EU-level resulting from two factors: first, institutional competency and development referring both to the division of labor between the Council and other European institutions and the ongoing development of the European External Action Service, and second, the influence of foundations and their networks in driving policy evolution upwards and implementing cooperation on the ground. These factors complicate the argument that an EU level approach to cultural diplomacy is inherently less interest-driven (Isar 2015). Rather, the interests are conveyed through different actors and the role of culture at the EU level is Janus-faced in that it must also justify its existence. As expressed by Pierre Vimont, then executive secretary-general of the EEAS, during a conference at the European Policy Centre to have a cultural diplomacy at the EU level means that the ‘EU culture part’ must be created.

One of the findings of the report derived from the period of consultation beginning in 2011 as the Preparatory Action for Culture in EU External Relations clarifies this situation. The remit of culture in the external functions of the Commission and EEAS should act “in ways that generate trans-national added value and transmit the overarching European message...” (2014, 5). This added value approach constructs European cultural diplomacy on the back of a multilateral approach to culture.\(^2\) However, it also creates space for a wide range of cultural actors – what Sassatelli (2009, 195) labels a polyvocal process – to participate and contribute, potentially opening the door to the representation of

\(^{20}\) This multilateral approach was one of the crucial points endorsed by Ana Paula Laborinho, former president of EUNIC global, during a conference at the European Policy Centre, December 2011.
alternative European formations (Axford and Huggins 1999, 186). Though it is too early to draw a conclusion on the direction these developments will take there is, as pointed out by Isar (2015), a blurring of the lines between diplomacy – fundamentally interest-driven and unitary - and intercultural dialogue – bottom-up and heterogeneous.

Following the EU’s varied response to the Arab Spring it is still unclear precisely what direction policy will take. However, it appears that the EU is likely to continue to pursue multiple directions at once – promote, or strategically direct, the development of regional institutions, increase ties to regional blocs, and commit to stronger bilateral ties with regional governments. That being said, there is also reason to believe that the EU’s new competencies and ambitions will drive a future European cultural diplomacy. There is already in development a strategic reconsideration of the role of culture in the EU’s external relations but whether this will establish a profoundly new identity and structure, or in practice rely on the skeletons of past frameworks is still to be determined. Issues such as migration, economic inequality, and disagreements over objectives continue to confound attempts to produce a cohesive foreign policy at the EU level (Tömmel 2013). But the EU has started to cultivate relationships with its near abroad based on a more effective use of its post-Lisbon foreign policy capacities, which would imply more centralization and potentially allow the European Commission to pursue a stronger normative agenda (Johanssen-Nogues 2015). If it is able to overcome the current fragmentation among member states, the outcome of ongoing policy reviews could be the starting point for a more activist international identity. In this context, it is clear that the EU already considers the ALF to be a partner in its cultural relations abroad (JOIN(2016) 29).

‘Stuck in the middle’ or Intercultural Agent?: The Anna Lindh Foundation
For its part, the Anna Lindh Foundation, under new president Elisabeth Guigou and Executive Director Hatem Atallah, is entering a period of great activity. But it is also shifting in conjunction with the European Commission’s new agenda by situating itself as part of the new European Neighborhood Partnership. This may be a privileged space for the ALF as it becomes the champion of culture for
related countries (Tanzarella 2012, 292). However, it perpetuates previous limitations. The ALF exhibits the tensions within these developments in its relationship with its regional institutional context of which the European Union is a central actor. It exhibits the political value of a regional foundation when politics is increasingly contested beyond the nation-state and provides a key partner to European institutions during a process of redefinition, symbolizing a different character as well as strategy to regional relations. As Gillespie noted early on in the evolution of the Foundation, the cultural basket during this time was being geared towards a broader political dialogue undergirded by democracy promotion activities. Thus, one hope for the Foundation was that it could aid in overcoming resistance among authoritarian regimes to the normative content of the EMP framework and drive greater inclusion among communities excluded from or skeptical of existing programs (Gillespie 2003). The reality has displayed a struggle between these two sides but it has also been, more than intended, tied to the changing approach towards culture within the EU.

The Anna Lindh Foundation is not a simple representative of a coherent EU cultural diplomacy. In interviews across the European Commission, it was a common refrain that the Foundation’s value lays first and foremost in its existence as a successful multilateral, and (such as it is) independent, regional organization. It is this symbolic value that made it an immediate target for cooperation in response to the ‘Arab Spring’. But this identity also betrays an institutional anxiety that can be implied from its balancing of different agendas. As a multilateral institution the ALF involves actors both within – UfM member states and regional organizations such as the Arab League - and beyond the region – UNESCO, Council of Europe, UN Alliance of Civilizations - through partnerships and engagement in projects. The significant attendance figures for ministry personnel, ambassadors, EU and other representatives of international organizations at the 2013 ALF Civil Forum are a clear reminder of the political interest in the work of the Foundation. While there has been some relaxation of the control that governments exert over the selection of network heads, states continue to exercise influence both through the Board of Governors and through mobility controls. The Egyptian government’s veto of the initial strategy and
guidelines over its normative content is one example, though it could be suggested that this act was as symbolic as it was principled. For some representatives of civil society, this formal relationship is enough to completely reject the idea of membership including participation at the Forum.21

On the other hand, there have also been firm efforts within the Commission to use its budgetary influence to bring the ALF in line with the EU’s external policies. The organization’s intercultural strategy displays this influence. Essential to this strategy is a fundamental realignment towards a more crucial role for the ALF within the UfM and – taken next to the EU’s Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity – the developing Euro-Mediterranean region, echoing the sentiment of Commissioner Füle. During the negotiation phase of the new strategy and guidelines regular meetings were established between members of the ALF secretariat, DG external relations (RELEX), DG development and cooperation (DEVCO), European external action service (EEAS), and DG education and culture (EAC). This period of consultation resulted in a strategy that emphasized the ALF’s function in relation to an evolving institutional context from the cooperative EMP to multilateral UfM to bilateral ENPI.

The strategic realignment of the ALF requires a reconsideration of the autonomy of the Foundation in relation to the EU commission given not only the replication of policy language but also the explicit statement of intent to prioritize the interests of donors, the EU commission being the largest thereof. In this sense, the ALF might be seen within an extension of EU patterns of governance over the region. This situation harkens back to the problems facing the EMP during the conception of the Foundation. For one member of the EEAS22, this is indeed a concern as much for its impact on the image of the Foundation among societal elements as the potential for political resistance from regional governments. The institutionalization of the relationship between the ALF and the EU Commission is contradictory for this reason. There is great concern not to diminish the autonomy of the Foundation but in practice this conflicts with the

21 This view was expressed on multiple occasions in conversation with civil society representatives while in Tunisia
22 Interview with EEAS 2nd October 2014
institutional objective of incorporating a greater role for culture (and civil society) in the EU’s actions abroad. This tension is significant in the context of political events.

Though not officially confirmed, interviews at the European Commission revealed that during the mass protests across North Africa representatives of the Commission had tried to put some pressure on the ALF secretariat to take more of a public position on events. This is surprising for two reasons – first, given that the ALF’s headquarters in based in Alexandria, Egypt it would have placed the Foundation in a potentially precarious relationship with the ruling regime depending upon the outcome of events. Second, the relative silence of the EU during the events was a point of criticism towards a perceived lack of cohesion and capacity.

But is the Foundation merely stuck between these external influences, or can it be viewed as a meaningful agent of change? To paraphrase Mohr, the Foundation demonstrates an important capacity in its ability to establish partnerships with smaller organizations based upon common values and trust, and gain access to ‘functional elites’ who can exert influence at the local level (2010, 111). Reduced controls over national networks in most cases benefits this capacity. Certainly, the 2013 ALF Civil Forum displayed a diversity and strong interest among cultural entrepreneurs from both sides of the Mediterranean. But it also rests on the extent to which the ALF creates opportunities for networking across the diverse communities of European and Mediterranean societies. Chapter 6 explored this from the perspective of networks and partnerships. In this analysis it was clear that the institutional context, discussed prior to this, presents limitations in the form of influence, censorship and also image amongst the public. However, the agency of the Foundation and its value to societal actors as an opportunity structure should also be addressed. There is no doubt that the type of transnational networking supported by the Foundation is an uneven process. It exhibits the ability of states and supranational institutions to “discriminate quite deliberately” (Hurrelmann and DeBarbeleben 2011, 7). The Foundation, to some extent, provides an intermediary function through which

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23 One interviewee made this point clearly declaring, “you will not find this published in the official journal”. 
control can be exerted over the practice of transnational networking. At the same time, the ALF operates within a space determined by the institutional leverage of the EU and the ideational contributions of both institutional and societal actors. Chapter 7 addressed some of the ways in which participants approached this question of value pointing to an attitude to openness and creativity. But as much as anything, this perspective reflects the elite demographic of the Forum for whom access is not an impediment.

Empirically, this analysis cannot completely answer the aforementioned question. A number of crucial changes to the ALF’s approach to networking are still relatively recent and ongoing. For example, the shift towards promoting the development of networks across Southern Mediterranean societies is not captured in the network data presented in Chapter 6. And yet, this is an important change of direction for reasons that are demonstrated in the evaluation, namely the dominance of European networks represented in partnerships and the relative lack of networking between Southern Mediterranean networks. In all cases, southern national networks have more partnerships with northern countries than with southern countries. On the other hand, 14 northern Mediterranean networks have a greater number of partnerships with other northern networks. The predominance of networking among European-based networks and the relatively smaller number of partnerships between southern-based networks is highly significant. Ultimately, the answer to this question lies in the ability of the Foundation to pursue a reorientation to building Southern Mediterranean networks and expand the reach of networks sub-nationally as well as transnationally. The effect that organizations have in constructing the dimensions of transnational activity is evident in this instance. Call for proposals work on a 1+1 partnership basis, which specifies that there must be one European partner and one Southern Mediterranean partner. However, regional campaigns are not bound by this regulation and as a result can be used to pursue significant organizational objectives. Subsequent research into the effects of the Dawrak – Citizens for Dialogue campaign, which ran from 2012-2014 would be a useful next step in understanding as this campaign is at the center of the Foundation’s reorientation. It would also be interesting to pursue this with regard one of the
Foundation’s commonly referenced shortcomings, namely, the ability to take the debate to the public. This could be a side benefit of placing greater focus on developing sub-national constituencies by generating a wider network of dialogue.

**Encountering the EuroMediterranean: the promise of networks**

As of yet there has been no real consideration of the effects of the Arab Spring on regional encounters and the construction of shared regional meaning. This final section will conclude by making a brief connection between the promise and experience of networks represented through encounters and discussions with ALF members and Forum participants. An important feature of participating in transnational networks is the value of the encounter and the possibility of engagement. As a ‘network of networks’ the ALF hints at the emergence of a social space based on the image of a common Mediterranean. This constructed space remains subject to the interplay of particular power dynamics and the intervention and influence of institutions on transnational actors. It is generally accepted that involvement in transnational networks can have an impact on the character and identity of participants. Thus, identity fluctuates as participants move through space (Guarnizo and Smith 2009, 21). This conception rests upon the underlying assumption of corporeal mobility. But many of the interviews conducted with ALF members suggest that a similar fluctuation can appear in acts of relative dislocation where a given participant alters his/her frame of reference in response to an encounter with transnational phenomena. In other words, mobility is shifted from physical act to psychological act. The discussion of narrative encounters in Chapter 7 as well as the discussion of membership and belonging at the end of Chapter 6 illustrates this process well. The regional heuristic exhibits various ways in which participants mold the image of the region to their political identity. These expressions only begin to exemplify the ways in which regional participants employ the imagery supplied to negotiate their own transnational practices and orientations signifying the heterogeneity of the encounter (Rovisco 2013). Similarly, the contributions on civil society and

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24 Interview at ALF Civil Forum 6th April 2013
citizenship rested upon a transnational knowledge underlining the problem of categorizing participants of dialogue according to their cultural or national identity.

Both the experience of crisis and the ability to express an active role in society laid the seeds of commonality amongst populations on either side of the Mediterranean Sea. As Glasius and Pleyers (2013, 552) have pointed out, the general sense of insecurity (especially economic) and persisting inequality contributed to a “global and precarious generation”. Protestors explicitly sought to unify their local struggles with those more distant generating a transitory solidarity witnessed in Tahrir Square, Barcelona and New York, amongst others (Allende and Hattinger 2014, 594). But perhaps the most unifying characteristic was reflected in the creative expression of non-ideological viewpoints (Makar 2011; Bayat 2013). This also manifested a general skepticism towards rigid categories including those of democracy, culture, civil society. It is no surprise that in the experience of conducting this research, on the whole, the presumption of a shared Mediterranean identity was met with equal caution as it was associated with past regional frameworks that were typically too Euro-centric and too friendly with authoritarian governments (Solera 2015). What was significant was that discussions of the Mediterranean tended to look beyond the region rather than to the region.

These contributions reveal an important quality of the encounter afforded by transnational networks. That quality is the essential globality defined simply as a potential consequence of the experience of interaction (Axford 1995, 86-93). Participants largely glossed over the idealized image of a Mediterranean space as an end in itself with some participants identifying with a desire for empowerment. So the regional becomes grounds for pursuing political engagement beyond the national context but also for pursuing a global identity by grasping the symbolism of a collective memory and using it to establish a voice beyond their particular circumstances. To paraphrase Axford (2013, 33-34), it reflects the recognition of a wider context of constraints and opportunities, which may variably lead to a rejection of developments or a

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25 Interview with Tunisian ALF member 3rd July 2013
creative engagement with them. The regional construct becomes a convenient way to link the local to the global without succumbing to a specific ethics or dropping the essentially political problem of existing beyond the nation-state.

**Avenues for further research**

This research presents a novel but partial approach to understanding the state of cultural relations across the EuroMediterranean as embodied in the Anna Lindh Foundation. The thesis is limited in its approach and has left open a couple of intriguing avenues for further research.

One interesting, and immediate, avenue would be undertaking a comparative analysis of the ALF and the Asia-Europe Foundation. This comparison is apposite given the similar institutional structures and objectives, regional context, and relationship to the EU and other regional bodies (ASEAN and the UfM). The lack of existing comparison is somewhat surprising given these similarities. But one of the real fruitful aspects of this comparison would concern the approach taken in this research, especially with regard to the influence of cultural networks and new cultural narratives at the European level. Empirically, this could be intriguing. But it could serve to validate or identify shortcomings in the contentions made in this thesis. Certainly, the immediate differences and similarities indicate that a more in-depth comparison would help to understand the significance of each.

As indicated earlier, pursuing a lengthier ethnographic investigation into the impact of regional campaigns would help to understand the actual value of the Anna Lindh Foundation for regional societies. The benefit of this approach is that it would offer real insight into the constraints experienced by participants at the local and national levels. Also, as mentioned previously, it would also help to understand the outreach capacities included in these smaller community-level events and the possibility of generating a more public debate on Mediterranean relations. One of the limitations of the research presented in this thesis lies in the relative lack of access to the internal and ground level functioning of the Foundation. As a result, it presents a privileged outsider perspective (I say privileged because of my invitation to several events and full participation during the Forum) that would be well accompanied by a more complete image.
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Programme, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 27


## APPENDIX I

**List of interviews (excluding conversations with protestors in Tunisia and participants at ALF Civil Forum 2013)**

<table>
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<th>No</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation and Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
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<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Richard Shotton</td>
<td>ion Creative &amp; ALF HoN UK, Interview at Manchester Metropolitan</td>
<td>5th July 2012</td>
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<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Kareem Khalil</td>
<td>Integrated Community Development, Email correspondence</td>
<td>4th and 6th June 2013</td>
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<td>Takween</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>Ayman Okeil</td>
<td>Maat Peace, Email correspondence</td>
<td>4th June - 8th September 2013</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>Katharina Obenhuber</td>
<td>Former ALF intern, Email correspondence</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Taha Bouchaddakh,</td>
<td>Djerba Solidarity and Development, Skype interview</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Fadi Hadad</td>
<td>Mosaic, Interview in London, UK</td>
<td>19th June 2013</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>Sofiane Ouissi</td>
<td>L’Art Rue, Skype interview</td>
<td>3rd July 2013</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Dhouha Bokri</td>
<td>L’Art Rue, Skype interview</td>
<td>3rd July 2013</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>Dalia Khalil</td>
<td>Egyptian Association for Education Resources, Skype interview</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>Simone Suskind Weinberger</td>
<td>Interview at ambassador’s residence, Tunis</td>
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<td>12</td>
<td>Bernard Brunet</td>
<td>Interview at DG RELEX, European Commission, Brussels</td>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Gyongi Mikita</td>
<td>DG EAC, Email correspondence &amp; telephone interview</td>
<td>20th November 2013 and 27th November 2013</td>
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<td>14</td>
<td>Alberto Cortezon</td>
<td>Interview at DG DEVCO, European Commission, Brussels</td>
<td>25th November 2013</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>Samar Mezghanni</td>
<td>Email correspondence</td>
<td>6th, 13th, 26th February 2014</td>
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<td>16</td>
<td>Thomas McGrath</td>
<td>EEAS, Telephone interview</td>
<td>11th February 2014</td>
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