Abstract—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) fleets are becoming more apparent in both military and civilian applications. However, security of these systems still remains unsatisfactory if a strong adversary model with a high attack potential (i.e., the adversary has capabilities and knowledge to capture a UAV, to perform side-channel or fault injection or other physical, software or combined attacks in order to gain access to some secret data like cryptographic keys, mission plan, etc.) is considered. The aim of this position paper is to draw security requirements for this kind of adversaries and to propose theoretical solutions based on an embedded Secure Element (SE) that could help to accommodate these requirements. Finally, our proposal on how to use these SEs to secure Autonomous UAVs fleets is presented.

1. INTRODUCTION

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly used in military and civilian applications. For instance, in the civilian applications they can be used for monitoring forest fires, searching missing people in avalanches, etc. However, most of UAVs being small and light they cannot be equipped with heavy equipments (e.g., heavy sensors or many sensors at the same time). Therefore, as illustrated Fig. 1, UAVs often embed very few dedicated sensors and they have to collaborate together and fly in a swarm to provide all the features. Swarm formation helps simple UAVs to collectively form a complex multi-feature fleet; however, if there is no redundancy in the fleet it might become heavily dependent of each and every UAV of the fleet. In addition flying in swarm is helpful and efficient to cover a larger geographic area for the aforementioned applications. Such flights require a collaboration between UAVs which lead them to communicate in a way similar to Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANet) or Delay/Disruptive Tolerant Network (DTN) and as a result become exposed to the same security concerns.

In some contexts (like the civilian applications) security issues might not be of high significance or their exploitation might not have a high impact. However, in military applications it is crucial to address them. For instance UAVs need to securely store data like flight-plan for the mission, photos, coordinates of points of interest (enemies or allies) which are invaluable assets for an opponent. Similarly to avoid attacks at network level, routing (if applicable) must be secured. Nevertheless among all of the potential security problems, capture of UAV will be particularly discussed in this paper. The Fig. 2 illustrates the interests for an attacker that will be described in section 2.

1.1. Contribution

In this paper, our main focus is on the enhancement of the security of UAVs fleets. The salient contributions of this paper are as follows:

1) discussion on the adversary model for UAVs fleets;
2) definition of a list of security requirements, which are derived from functional requirements and address the relevant adversary model;
3) proposals of candidate Secure Elements (SE) that can help a UAV to support the identified functional and security requirements;
4) comparison with existing works that proposed the deployment of “secure elements” on unmanned vehicles;
5) proposal to secure autonomous UAVs fleets using the proposed SEs.

![Figure 2. Interests of an attacker.](image)

1.2. Structure of the Paper

Section 2 discusses the strong adversary model that we consider for UAV fleets. In section 3, we list the requirements that a UAV equipped with a SE should satisfy to address the defined adversary model and we present a list of candidates for the SEs. Section 4 compares our proposal with the related work. The proposal to secure autonomous UAVs fleets using the proposed SEs is presented section 5. Then section 6 presents our future works for implementing our proposal along with our concluding remarks.

2. ADVERSARY MODEL

In this paper we consider a strong adversary model with a high attack potential. For instance the adversary has capabilities and knowledge to capture a UAV, to perform side-channel or fault injection or other physical, software or combined attacks in order to gain access to (or to modify for his profit) some secret data (e.g. cryptographic keys), software or hardware.

2.1. Capture of UAV by an Attacker

In this section we assume that the attacker can capture a UAV that is in functional state (i.e. there is no difference between the captured UAV and one in flight). It means that if there are self destruction mechanisms like the ones we will mention in section 4 the attacker is able to bypass or deactivate them. Even worst the attacker might perform attacks during the flight.¹

2.2. Attacks on a “Captured” UAV

Once a UAV is captured, the opponent can perform various well-known attacks studied and applied during past decades mainly in the world of smart cards. Even if a smart card (under its different form factors) is considered without any doubt, one of the most secure devices which runs successfully in the worst adversary conditions (where even its owner can be malicious), it has been and is still subject to very advanced attacks like:

- Side-channel attacks [15], [18], [33], [51], [54]. This kind of blackbox attacks consists in observing some information leakage from algorithms running on the target. From these leakages, different kinds of information can be retrieved (e.g. cryptographic keys [44], sequence of opcodes executed [63]). The nature of leakages can be time-based [43], the power consumption with several families of attacks (Simple Power Analysis [44], Differential Power Analysis [44], High-Order Differential Power Analysis [48], Correlation Power Analysis [24]), the electromagnetic radiations with the same declination of families of attacks (Simple Electromagnetic Analysis [36], [56], Differential Electromagnetic Analysis [5], [36], High-Order Differential Electromagnetic Analysis, Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis) or combination of different sources [6], [65]. There also exist some other powerful attacks using side-channels like Template-Attacks [25], [57].
- Fault injection attacks [16], [22], [37], [38], [45], [60]. This kind of attacks consists in perturbing, usually during a short time, the execution of a process for instance by using a laser or voltage glitches to reach a state the attacker can take advantage of. For instance, using fault injection at the right time on a RSA signature process, an attacker can recover very quickly the private key used [22] in exploiting the erroneous signatures delivered by the blackbox system signing the message. With Differential Fault Analysis, secret key cryptosystems like DES [21] or AES [35] are also vulnerable.
- Physical attacks [45], [59]. This kind of attacks encompasses microprobing, circuitry modification with a Focused Ion Beam system or a laser cutter, etc.
- Software attacks. This kind of attacks is highly dependent on the possibility to load applications on the target. The loading can be or not protected by an

¹ It is important to underline that the operating attacks mentioned in section 2.2 on a flying UAV (even if it should not be easy) are equivalent to have captured the UAV.
authentication mechanism (but it can still be circumvented by another attack). However, if application loading is possible, it can be feasible to perform and sometime achieve some attacks from inside the target against other hosted applications or against the platform of the target [31], [50].

- Combined attacks [17], [64]. These attacks often combine fault injection during execution of a code loaded or already present in the target to alter the application execution in order to gain additional access privileges.

These attacks are not only applicable to smart card but also to any processor [15], [18], [38], [54], [61] and thus to a UAV.

2.3. Attacks on a UAV in a Network

At the best of our knowledge, there is no paper specifically addressing attacks that a UAV can be subjected to through the network in a fleet or a swarm. We thus consider that the adversary can perform similar attacks to those existing in MANets, DTN and Wireless Sensors Networks. In particular, the attacker can perform the easiest attacks on a wireless link: a Denial-of-Service (DoS) [66]. This attack can be achieved:

- at the physical level by interfering on radio frequencies used by the UAVs (jamming attack);
- at the link level by exploiting the medium access control backoff and retransmission procedures (collision attacks);
- at the network level by using routing loop attacks [47];
- at the transport level using a flooding attack or a desynchronization attack [34].

If communications are not ciphered, the opponent can perform eavesdropping, packet injection or corruption and he can even attempt Man-in-the-Middle or relay attacks.

The attacker can also build a rogue UAV to attempt some attacks on routing protocols [23], [32], [41] like: blackhole attack, selective forwarding attack, sinkhole attack, rushing attack, sybil attack, wormhole attack, etc.

Some application specific attacks can also be performed but they are beyond the scope of this paper.

2.4. Rationale for the Adversary Model

In recent work, some academic researchers have done a Correlation Power Analysis [49] on Virtex-4 and Virtex-5 family, i.e. Xilinx FPGAs that are widely used in UAVs (including the Predator [67]). They shown that the encryption mechanism can be completely broken with moderate effort. Thus, a strong adversary model makes sense, especially in the context of military usage of UAVs fleets since the opponent can be a government-controlled organization capable of performing forensic analysis or attacks of the UAVs.

The reader should note that for all of the aforementioned attacks there are corresponding countermeasures which are well known to the industry and academia. The countermeasures that are implemented must not impact the real time capacities of the UAV, especially regarding its autopilot and its responsiveness to external, GPS and Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) events. It is even more important because we are considering fleets of UAVs and not a single UAV.

3. REQUIREMENTS

This section describes the functional requirements that a UAV equiped with a SE should satisfy. Thereafter, based on the functional requirements and adversary model, we stipulate the security requirements.

3.1. Functional Requirements

For a wide adoption, UAVs fleets should satisfy some functional requirements.

- (FR1) The fleet should be autonomous and should not rely on communication with its base/user to be more stealthy in the adversary conditions of the mission (e.g. intensive long RF communication with the base may be easier to locate than short range communication between UAVs).
- (FR2) The fleet should be easy and transparent to manage both in terms of functionality and security and management should be possible prior or during the fleet operations. For instance, at a scheduling step, the user just needs to define the mission she wishes the fleet to perform. Then, when rescheduling the mission is needed, (for instance if user wants to include new objectives like new measurements from embedded sensors), the update of the mission may be done during the refuelling in energy (e.g. in air from more powerful UAVs) or with new UAVs joining the current fleet to transmit the new mission. In addition, the user should not have to worry about the underlying security architecture for communication and management of the fleet.
- (FR3) The fleet should be reliable. It means that each UAV can have a dedicated mission but, if needed, for some reasons (e.g. failure, too low energy level to achieve the mission), it may decide to entrust its mission to another UAV according to the capabilities in term of equipments (e.g. sensors) and software stack of this UAV.
- (FR4) A UAVs fleet has to perform optimally in the adversely territories/environments. It thus must be able to analyze the situation and make decisions in real-time. Therefore, any hardware included in the system should not incur unnecessary performance penalties.

From these requirements, it means that the fleet should be self-organized and should be equipped with some sort of swarm intelligence.
3.2. Security Requirements

According to the adversary model defined in section 2 and from the functional requirements defined above, UAVs of the fleet should satisfy the following security requirements.

- **(SR1)** The UAV should be SE-driven to ensure security and privacy of its missions. In addition, the security architecture of the UAV system should not incur performance penalties. Therefore, any proposal for the UAV system should be robust and optimal in both security and performance — preserving a real-time processing environment with high level of assurance.

- **(SR2)** The whole UAV should be tamper resistant, or at least a part of it (the SE).

- **(SR3)** The UAV should provide assurance in implemented security mechanisms to its user. For instance, it, or more precisely its SE, has to be subjected to a security evaluation and certification to prove that it can resist an attacker compliant with the strong adversary model defined above. The certification can be Common Criteria evaluation [2] with a minimum in the Evaluation Assurance Level of EAL4+, where ‘+’ means ‘augmented’ with security assurance requirement component AVA_VAN5 (i.e. the highest assurance component of the vulnerabilities analysis family of the vulnerability assessment class).

- **(SR4)** The UAV at a very basic level should provide a secure unique ID on which the whole fleet can rely for its management and networking operations.

- **(SR5)** The UAV should provide secure key management and cryptographic features to protect communication integrity and confidentiality among the members of the fleet.

- **(SR6)** UAV should provide a secure storage for data collected (e.g. measurements, photos) and/or those used for the purpose of the mission (e.g. flight-plan for the mission, coordinates of points of interest).

- **(SR7)** The UAV should provide a secure multi application platform. This requirement is justified since in the context of SE-driven UAV there will be installation of new applications (for new purposes according to FR2) or transfer of applications between UAVs (when an entrustment of a mission from a deficient UAV to another one occurs according to FR3). Update of already embedded applications containing flaws with new versions covering the threats can even occur. This SR facilitates a scalable and flexible design, where new sensors can be added to individual UAVs depending upon the mission and the associated sensor management application can then be loaded onto the SE. Note that installation or update can occur for instance during air refuelling.

An additional functional requirement may be optionally added if the context of SE-driven UAV is accepted: **(FR5)** the SE may have its own communication capabilities to communicate with other SEs which can form an overlay network (for specific control operations) parallel to the one that already exists between UAVs (i.e. the SE can communicate with its own RF communication module operating with a dedicated part of the RF spectrum).

These requirements define a secure Machine to Machine (M2M) platform over a fleet of UAVs.

3.3. Candidate Secure Elements

In this section, we present several candidates for the SE. As none of them is satisfying all of the requirements defined above, we are defining our SE, that we will develop in our future activities.

3.3.1. Wireless Sensor Node. A Wireless Sensor Node (WSN) has communicating capabilities that would satisfy FR5. However as it has been shown in [32], in its current “form” a WSN cannot be the SE because in case of capture it fails to satisfy SR2 to SR7 and thus SR1. However it should be noted that some work is in progress to design, evaluate and certified WSN in very specific contexts [19], [20] or to add to it a Trusted Platform Module (that is a candidate for being a SE discussed below) to enhance its own security [40].

3.3.2. Trusted Platform Module. A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is an interesting candidate since it can partially satisfy SR2 to SR6. TPM may fail to satisfy SR3 for which the device has to provide an assurance of its own security. Indeed there is no compulsory requirement that a TPM has to be subjected to security evaluation and certification. Since in the traditional deployments, TPMs are going through the security evaluation, they are intrinsically considered to be trusted and secure. Therefore, they are used to provide a trusted measurement of the individual applications and Operating System (OS). However, a TPM itself cannot verify whether an application or the OS is secure or not. This decision has to be taken by the user based on the (trusted) integrity measurement provided by the TPM. Similarly, the TPM partially satisfies the SR6 as it does have small (secure) storage but mostly for cryptographic material. The TPM storage can potentially be increased or data can be stored in encrypted form outside the TPM where the encryption key remains securely stored. However, the later scheme will only incur additional computational requirements, thus adding performance penalties. However it cannot execute code, thus it fails to satisfy SR1, and SR7. As the UAVs fleet, once in a mission, should not be constantly required to provide state attestations by the base station or peer UAVs because it will incur unnecessary performance penalty violating both FR1 and FR4. Including a TPM will only be useful if the UAVs fleet is grounded, or in instances where the base station requires to verify the state of the system before the mission starts. In addition, since a TPM does not have standalone decision capabilities it would fail to satisfy FR3 and FR5.
3.3.3. Smart Card. Smart cards are designed with a strong adversary model in mind which assumes that they are in the possession of a potentially malicious user. Under such an adversarial model, the smart cards are required to provide a secure and trusted execution environment. Therefore, the smart card platform has a matured architecture that can adequately support the functional and security requirements given in the previous sections. As a result, smart cards intrinsically support SR2 to SR6.

To comprehensively support SR7, the ownership model for the deployment of smart card based SE in UAV should support User Centric Smart Card Ownership Model (UCOM) [9] which provides a dynamic, scalable and flexible architecture for multi-application platforms. In addition, the UCOM proposal of Trusted Execution and Environment Manager (TEM) [14] has the potential to provide a strong trusted device and (application) execution architecture. Furthermore, UCOM based smart cards also support remote attestation and validation mechanisms [8], [12], [13] along with a secure architecture for application migration [11] between different smart cards.

For a collaborative and dynamic capability to reassign resources to accomplish a mission (FR3), the UCOM based smart card architecture provides a solid foundation as per the proposal for a secure and trusted application sharing mechanism between two or more smart cards [10]. Thus the UCOM smart card with TEM has all qualities to withstand SR1. Although, it can be argued that smart cards do not possess the RF communication capabilities, such a functionality can be built around it as a standalone module.

3.3.4. Active RFID. Active RFID are difficult to categorize because a mobile phone could be considered as a long range RFID with additional functionalities (by the way it can also be considered as a big WSN). In our vision, we are more considering as Active RFID devices like the OpenBeacon Tag [1] but with a secure chip.

However, even if there exist some active RFIDs (e.g. remote control keys for cars), initial experiments seem to show they are vulnerable to several attacks [42], [53]. However, it must take into account the active RFIDs studied are necessarily vulnerable because they are not designed to withstand a high potential attack.

At best, current Active RFIDs are only supporting SR4, SR5 and FR5.

3.3.5. Our proposal. Our proposal of SE consists in bringing together the best of active RFID, WSN and smart card in what can be called an Active Radio Frequency Smart Secure Device (ARFSSD) to address the only features that the smart card fails to satisfy: the optional FR5. Then ARFSSD would then satisfy all the above requirements.

As illustrated in figure 3 our first prototype will be based on an ARM-based platform as the ubiquitous Raspberry Pi embedding Linux and the PC/SC middleware to support a smart card reader. These components will only serve to interface between the UCOM smart card and the RF communication module that we will use. The dotted line represents communication level between the smart card and the RF communication module whereas the plain arrows represent the real communications between the different subsystems of the prototype. We have not yet decided which RF communication module we will use since making a final decision requires to run some experimentations. However we have in mind, the NRF24L01 from Nordic Semiconductor, the Xbee module (a ZigBee implementation) from Digi International or the Wifly module (a Wi-Fi implementation) from Roving Networks.

3.3.6. Summary. As shown in table 1, smart card is actually the most serious candidate. However, ARFSSD should fullfil the only missing smart card functional requirement to be the ultimate solution.

| TABLE 1. REQUIREMENTS FULLFILLED BY THE CANDIDATE SE |
|-------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|                | SR1 | SR2 | SR3 | SR4 | SR5 | SR6 | SR7 | FR5 |
| WSN          | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   |     | x   |
| TPM          | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   |     |     | x   |
| Smart Card   | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   |     |     |     |
| Active RFID  |     | x   | x   | x   |     |     |     |     |
| Our proposal | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   | x   |

4. RELATED WORK

There is very little work in publicly available literature related to the security of identity in fleets of UAVs. This must be explored further because it is on the security of data involved in the authentication mechanisms that the trust for future transactions between UAVs (data exchange, routing in the cases where it is used, etc.) relies. In security architectures for fleets of UAVs supporting group communications (e.g. [55]) or collaborative work (e.g. [58]), the possibility of an attacker with high attack potential (i.e. for instance being able to physically access a UAV after its capture) is almost never considered. In the few studies considering this kind of attacker model, the physical security of the elements used to support identification, i.e. the heart of security, is relegated to the assumptions on the equipment used or additional countermeasures such as self-destruction of the UAV [46], [68]. However attacks can occur during flights which can defeat the physical protection. The only papers that actually consider to protect the identifiers are those initiated by Chaumette et al. through the use of Java Card [26], [27]. Some other papers [28], [39] are considering a secure token (i.e. a smart card) in swarms of UAVs but
without giving details except it is used to securely store some data and perform some ciphering operations.

Since our proposal of ARFSSD can be seen as an extension of these works through the use of active RFIDs, it is interesting to survey the use of RFIDs in nearby contexts. In the area of fleets of robots, passive RFIDs are used to make a sort of communication between robots for the allocation of tasks [62] or for synchronization [69]. However, in no case these papers address any security concerns. Other papers related to the use of RFIDs for UAVs include an inventory of goods with a UAV carrying a RFID reader in a warehouse [4] or an hypothetical future RFID injection under the skin of people with cyber insects [3] which is far from our concerns.

5. TOWARD SECURE AUTONOMOUS UAVS FLEETS

In a common standalone UAV fleet, as depicted Fig. 4, when the application (1) on the UAV A sends a message to application (3) on UAV C, the message is routed by the UAV B to C, since C is outside of the A’s radio coverage, and is, thus, not reachable. However, even if UAVs are in the same fleet, it might be possible to consider that different UAVs have different privileges and that some information (even like the destination, for instance for privacy reasons) should not be accessed by some intermediary UAVs.

Our solution, depicted in Fig. 5, using the proposed secure elements embedded on each UAVs enables to ensure kind of security properties since, for instance, the destination address can be ciphered and the deciphering process is done in the secure element which will decide if the message is for its UAV or if it must be forwarded. Indeed, altogether these secure elements build a control network layer providing high level of security for any exchanges in the network. They also offer security services (like cryptography, secure storage and processing capabilities) to the application layer. Thus, they satisfy all the security requirements drawn in section 3 for any missions requiring a high level of security.

6. FUTURE WORKS AND CONCLUSIONS

From the requirements listed in section 3, we are still developing a first prototype of ARFSSD as a Secure Element for UAVs fleets. It is interesting to observe that UAVs fleets equipped with our SE, like the one presented in section 5, raise problems close to those we are addressing in other contexts (e.g. Multilevel Mobile Java Card Grid [29], [30] and multilevel, secure (smart card), communication based services on a fleet of mobile phones [52]). Based on our experience in these areas, our next step will be to develop such a UAVs fleet to perform some practical tests.

Acknowledgements

This work is supported by:

- the SFD (Security of Fleets of Drones) project funded by Région Limousin;
- the TRUSTED (TRUSted TEstbed for Drones) project funded by the CNRS INS2I institute through the call 2016 PEPS (“Projet Exploratoire Premier Soutien”) SISC (“Sécurité Informatique et des Systèmes Cyberphysiques”);
- the SUITED (Suited secUrIty TEstbed for Drones) and UNITED (United NetworkIng TEstbed for Drones) projects funded by the MURES (Mathématiques et leurs Interactions, Images et

2. A shorter version of this paper, entitled “Improving Security of Autonomous UAVs Fleets by Using New Specific Embedded Secure Elements. A Position Paper” [7], has been presented at the 2nd AETOS international conference on “Research challenges for future RPAS/UV systems” which did not publish formal proceedings.
information numérique, Réseaux et Sécurité) CNRS research federation;
• and the SUITED-BX and UNITED-BX projects funded by LaBRI and its MUSE team.

The authors would like to thank anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments that help us improve the paper.

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