

Fairness and group-strategyproofness clash in assignment problems

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Abstract

No group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism treats equals equally. Every mechanism that arises out of the randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms is non-bossy. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of the randomization over deterministic serial dictatorships is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.

KEYWORDS: random matching mechanism, non-bossy, group-strategyproof, random serial dictatorship. *JEL Classification Numbers*: C78.

1 Introduction

An ideal mechanism would be impossible to manipulate, efficient and fair. For house matching problems, where a finite set of agents with linear preferences over houses needs to be matched to these houses, there exists no group-strategyproof and ex-post Pareto optimal random matching mechanism that treats equals equally. So group-strategyproofness, one of the strongest non-manipulability requirements, clashes with some of the weakest efficiency- and

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fairness-criteria: ex-post Pareto optimality and equal treatment of equals. A mechanism that maps every profile of preferences to a lottery over Pareto optima is ex-post Pareto optimal. The mechanism treats equals equally, if any two agents who submit the same preference face the same lottery over houses. It is group-strategyproof if no group can improve their outcomes by lying about their true preferences. Group-strategyproofness strengthens strategyproofness which only requires that no agent is ever harmed by truthfully revealing his preference.

My result complements Bogomolnaia and Moulin's [1] theorem that no strategyproof and ordinally efficient matching mechanism treats equals equally. While Bogomolnaia and Moulin and I use the same weak criterion of fairness, our efficiency and non-manipulability requirements differ: where I only impose ex-post Pareto optimality, Bogomolnaia and Moulin require ordinal efficiency; where they only impose strategyproofness, I require group-strategyproofness.

Papai has given a very useful characterization of group-strategyproofness: a deterministic matching mechanism is group-strategyproof if and only if it is strategyproof and non-bossy, in the sense that no agent can change another agent's outcome without also changing his own. While, Barbera, Berga, and Moreno [2] shows that this equivalence extends far beyond house-matching problems, Thompson [9] provides an overview on where the equivalence holds (and where it fails). I apply Theorem 1 to the question whether this equivalence carries over to random matching mechanisms. Random serial dictatorship, which arises out of a uniform randomization over the order of agents as dictators in serial dictatorship, is ex-post Pareto optimal and treats equals equally. By Theorem 1, random serial dictatorship is not group-strategyproof. To show that Papai's equivalence result does not extend to the random matching context it only remains to show that random serial dictatorship, which is known to be strategyproof, is non-bossy. To this end, I show in Theorem 2 that any randomization over a set of non-bossy and strategyproof mechanisms yields a non-bossy random matching mechanism. Since any serial dictatorship is non-bossy and strategyproof, random serial dictatorship is non-bossy.

The results presented here cover matching problems with and without

outside options. In fact, only minor changes are necessary to extend the proofs from one case to the other. In contrast the presence or absence of outside options plays a crucial role in parts of the matching literature: Svensson's [8] characterization of serial dictatorship does not extend to the case with outside options. Kesten and Kurino [4] shows that while deferred acceptance is an optimal mechanism when considering the full domain of preferences with outside options, improvements upon deferred acceptance are possible if (at least some) agents have no outside options. Erdil [3] constructs a random matching mechanism that ex-ante Pareto dominates random serial dictatorship when agents have outside options.

2 Definitions

There is a set $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ of agents and a set of houses H . The option to stay homeless (\emptyset) is always available $\emptyset \in H$. Generic elements of H (including \emptyset) are denoted h . A matching is a set of agent-house pairs denoted as a vector $x \in H^n$ where $x_i = x_j$ and $i \neq j$ imply $x_i = \emptyset$. Under x agent i is unmatched if $x_i = \emptyset$, otherwise house x_i is agent i 's match. The set of all matchings is X . Agent i 's preference on H is a linear order \succsim_i . So \succsim_i is complete, transitive and $h \sim h'$ implies $h = h'$. A profile of all agents' preferences $(\succsim_i)_{i \in N}$ is denoted \succsim , where \succsim_G and \succsim_{-G} are the preferences of all agents in some group $G \subset N$ and outside that group, so $\succsim = (\succsim_G, \succsim_{-G})$. The set Ω is the set of all profiles of linear orders on H . Agents are selfish in the sense that they only consider their own houses when ranking different matchings.

The grand set of matching problems, described by Ω and X allows for outside options: matchings may leave some agents and houses unmatched and agents may prefer homelessness to some houses ($\emptyset \succ_i h$ holds for some $\succsim \in \Omega$, $i \in N$ and $h \in H$). Throughout the text $\emptyset \neq \tilde{\Omega} \subset \Omega$ stands for an arbitrary, non-empty, domain of linear orders, with $(\succsim'_G, \succsim'_{-G}) \in \tilde{\Omega}$ for any $\succsim, \succsim' \in \tilde{\Omega}$ and $G \subset N$. The domain for which all agents rank homelessness \emptyset as their worst option is denoted $\hat{\Omega}$. The subset $\hat{X} \subset X$ of matchings without outside options, is such that the number of unmatched agents under any $x \in \hat{X}$ is minimal. Together $\hat{\Omega}$ and \hat{X} describe the set of matching problems without outside options.

A **mechanism** ϕ maps $\tilde{\Omega}$ to the set of matchings X and agent i obtains $\phi_i(\succsim)$ under ϕ at the profile \succsim . A **random mechanism** ρ maps $\tilde{\Omega}$ to ΔX , where the set of all lotteries on some finite S is denoted ΔS . Under ρ agent i faces the lottery $\rho_i(\succsim) \in \Delta H$ at \succsim where $\rho_i(\succsim)(h) = \rho(\succsim)(\{x \mid x_i = h\})$ is the probability that i is matched to h under $\rho(\succsim)$.

The mechanism $\rho : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ is **(ordinally) group-strategyproof** if any group-deviation that changes the outcomes for this group, renders some group-member ordinally worse off, in the sense that his probability to receive a house better than h' weakly decreases for all h' and strictly decreases for some h^* . So ρ is group-strategyproof if for all $(\succsim, \succsim'_G, G)$ with $\rho_i(\succsim) \neq \rho_i(\succsim'_G, \succsim_{-G})$ for some $i \in G$, there exists some $i^* \in G$ and $h^* \in H$ such that $\sum_{h \succsim_{i^*} h^*} \rho_{i^*}(\succsim)(h) > \sum_{h \succsim_{i^*} h^*} \rho_{i^*}(\succsim'_G, \succsim_{-G})(h)$ and $\sum_{h \succsim_{i^*} h'} \rho_{i^*}(\succsim)(h) \geq \sum_{h \succsim_{i^*} h'} \rho_{i^*}(\succsim'_G, \succsim_{-G})(h)$ for all $h' \in H$. Restricting attention to singleton groups G , (ordinal) group-strategyproofness reduces to **(ordinal) strategyproofness** and ρ is ordinally strategyproof if $\sum_{h \succsim_i h'} \rho_i(\succsim)(h) \geq \sum_{h \succsim_i h'} \rho_i(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})(h)$ holds for all $(\succsim, i, \succsim'_i)$ and $h' \in H$. The mechanism $\rho : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ satisfies **equal treatment of equals** if any two agents who announce the same preferences face the same distribution, so $\rho_i(\succsim) = \rho_j(\succsim)$ if $\succsim_i = \succsim_j$. A mechanism ρ is **ex-post Pareto optimal** if $\rho(\succsim)(x) > 0$ implies that x is Pareto optimal at \succsim .

3 Group-Strategyproofness

Group-strategyproofness clashes with even the mildest criteria of fairness and efficiency.

Theorem 1 *If there are at least three agents and three houses, then no ex-post Pareto optimal, group-strategyproof mechanism $\rho : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ treats equals equally.*

Proof Suppose the ex-post Pareto optimal and group-strategyproof mechanism $\rho : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ did treat equals equally. Let $\{a, b, c\} \subset H \setminus \{\emptyset\}$. Say the preferences \succsim_i , \succsim'_1 , and \succsim_2° all rank a , b , and c above any other house. The three preferences agree on all houses other than a , b , and c (so \succsim_i , \succsim'_1 , and

\succsim_2° coincide on $H \setminus \{a, b, c\}$). Their different rankings of a , b , and c are given by the following table

\succsim_i	a	b	c
\succsim_1'	b	a	c
\succsim_2°	a	c	b

Let \succsim be such that each agent has the preference \succsim_i . At \succsim , $(\succsim_1', \succsim_{-1})$, and $(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})$ all $n \geq 3$ agents prefer a , b and c to all other houses (and to homelessness) and a , b and c must, by the ex-post Pareto optimality of ρ , be matched with probability 1 under $\rho(\succsim)$, $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_{-1})$, and $\rho(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})$. By equal treatment of equals each agent obtains a, b, c with probability $\frac{1}{n}$ under $\rho(\succsim)$. Since ρ is ex-post Pareto optimal, agent 1 may never get a under $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_{-1})$. Equal treatment of equals then implies that each agent $i \neq 1$ receives a with probability $\frac{1}{n-1}$ under $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_{-1})$. Since ρ is strategyproof, agent 2 must obtain a with probability $\frac{1}{n}$ under $\rho(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})$. By equal treatment of equals all other agents must equally share the remaining probability mass $\frac{n-1}{n}$, implying $\rho_i(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})(a) = \frac{1}{n}$ for all $i \in N$. Since ρ is ex-post Pareto optimal agent 2 may never get b under $\rho(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})$. Equal treatment of equals then implies that each agent $i \neq 2$ obtains b with probability $\frac{1}{n-1}$ under $\rho(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})$.

Finally consider $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-\{1,2\}})$. Since \succsim_1' and \succsim_1 both rank a and b at the top agent 1 must, by strategy-proofness, get a or b under $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-\{1,2\}})$ with the same probability as under $\rho(\succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-2})$. Since \succsim_2° and \succsim_2 both rank a at the top agent 2 must, by strategy-proofness, get a under $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-\{1,2\}})$ with the same probability as under $\rho(\succsim_1', \succsim_{-1})$. In sum we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \rho_1(\succsim_1', \succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-\{1,2\}})(a) + \rho_1(\succsim_1', \succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-\{1,2\}})(b) &= \frac{1}{n} + \frac{1}{n-1} \\ \text{and } \rho_2(\succsim_1', \succsim_2^\circ, \succsim_{-\{1,2\}})(a) &= \frac{1}{n-1}. \end{aligned}$$

So when agents 1 and 2 declare \succsim_1' and \succsim_2° at \succsim agent 1's probability to receive one of his two most preferred houses and agent 2's probability to receive his most preferred house respectively increase from $\frac{2}{n}$ to $\frac{1}{n} + \frac{1}{n-1}$ and from $\frac{1}{n}$ to $\frac{1}{n-1}$. Consequently, ρ is not group-strategyproof. \square

The proof goes through unchanged if we only consider matching problems without outside options $(\hat{\Omega}, \hat{X})$. For $x \in X$ to be Pareto optimal at some $\succsim \in \hat{\Omega}$, x must match as many agents as possible. So if $\rho : \hat{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ is ex-post Pareto optimal, then any x in the support of some $\rho(\succsim)$ is a matching without outside options ($x \in \hat{X}$) and we obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 1 *If there are at least three agents and three houses, then no ex-post Pareto optimal, group-strategyproof mechanism $\rho : \hat{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta \hat{X}$ for matching problems without outside options treats equals equally.*

Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 stand in the tradition of impossibility results on fair, efficient, and non-manipulable mechanisms for matching problems. As already discussed in the introduction, Bogomolnaia and Moulin's [1] impossibility result imposes a weaker notion of non-manipulability (strategy-proofness), a stronger notion of efficiency (ordinal efficiency), and the same criterion of fairness (equal treatment of equals). Nesterov [5] combines the weaker notions of non-manipulability and efficiency discussed here with a stronger criterion of fairness to show that no envy-free mechanism is ex-post Pareto optimal and strategyproof.

4 Non-Bossiness under Randomization

Following Satterthwaite and Sonnenschein [7] $\rho : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ is **non-bossy** if $\rho_i(\succsim) = \rho_i(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i}) \Rightarrow \rho(\succsim) = \rho(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$ holds for all triples $(i, \succsim, \succsim'_i)$. Let there be a set of mechanisms $M = \{\rho^1, \rho^2, \dots, \rho^K\}$ with $\rho^k : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ for all $1 \leq k \leq K$. Then the mechanism $\rho^* : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ **arises out of a randomization** over the set M if there exists a lottery π on $\{1, \dots, K\}$ with $\pi(k) > 0$ for all $1 \leq k \leq K$ and

$$\rho^*(\succsim)(x) = \sum_{k=1}^K \pi(k) \rho^k(\succsim)(x) \text{ for all } x \in X.$$

If π is the uniform distribution on set M , then ρ^* **arises out of uniform randomization** over M .

Theorem 2 Let $\rho^* : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ arise out of a randomization over $\{\rho^1, \dots, \rho^K\}$ where each $\rho^k : \tilde{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta X$ is strategyproof and non-bossy. Then ρ^* is non-bossy.

Proof Fix $(i, \succsim, \succsim'_i)$ such that $\rho_i^*(\succsim) = \rho_i^*(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$. Suppose $\rho_i^{k^*}(\succsim) \neq \rho_i^{k^*}(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$ held for some $1 \leq k^* \leq K$. For h^* the \succsim_i -best house where the two lotteries differ, we have $\sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^{k^*}(\succsim)(h) \neq \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^{k^*}(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})(h)$. Since all ρ^k are strategyproof, $\sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^k(\succsim)(h) \geq \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^k(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})(h)$ holds for all $1 \leq k \leq K$. In combination with $\pi(k^*) > 0$ (as required by ρ^* arising out of a randomization over $\{\rho^1, \dots, \rho^K\}$) we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^{k^*}(\succsim)(h) &> \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^{k^*}(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})(h) \Rightarrow \\ \sum_{1=k}^K \pi(k) \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^k(\succsim)(h) &> \sum_{1=k}^K \pi(k) \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^k(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})(h) \Rightarrow \\ \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^*(\succsim)(h) &> \sum_{h \succsim_i h^*} \rho_i^*(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})(h), \end{aligned}$$

a contradiction to the assumption that $\rho_i^*(\succsim) = \rho_i^*(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$. So $\rho_i^k(\succsim) = \rho_i^k(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$ holds for all $1 \leq k \leq K$. Since every ρ^k is non-bossy, $\rho^k(\succsim) = \rho^k(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$ holds for all $1 \leq k \leq K$, implying $\rho^*(\succsim) = \rho^*(\succsim'_i, \succsim_{-i})$. In sum, ρ^* is non-bossy. \square

Since Theorem 2 holds for the arbitrary domain $\tilde{\Omega}$, it holds in particular for Ω and $\hat{\Omega}$, housing problems with and without outside options. Theorem 2 also applies if we replace the set of all matchings X with any other discrete space of allocations Y . To see that strategy-proofness cannot be dropped from Theorem 2 consider a matching problem with $n = 3$ and $H = \{a, b, c\}$ and three (deterministic) mechanisms α, β and γ , defined by the following table (where \succsim_1^* is such that $a \succ_1^* b \succ_1^* c$):

	$\alpha(\succsim)$	$\beta(\succsim)$	$\gamma(\succsim)$
$\succsim_1 = \succsim_1^*$	(a, c, b)	(b, c, a)	(c, b, a)
$\succsim_1 \neq \succsim_1^*$	(b, a, c)	(c, a, b)	(a, c, b)

Agent 1 alone determines the matching in these mechanisms; agent 1's match under α, β or γ changes if and only if the others' matches change

and α, β and γ are non-bossy. However the mechanism $\rho^\circ : \Omega \rightarrow \Delta X$ that arises out of the uniform randomization over α, β and γ is bossy. For any \succsim , agent 1 faces a uniform lottery over $\{a, b, c\}$ under $\rho^\circ(\succsim)$. However, the other agents' lotteries over houses depend on agent 1's announcement. Agent 2, for example, never gets house a if agent 1 announces \succsim_1^* , but gets a with probability $\frac{2}{3}$ if agent 1 announces any other preference. In a similar vein, non-bossy mechanisms might arise out of the randomization over bossy mechanisms. Theorem 2 does not extend to a larger domain of preferences that allows for indifferences. Examples to prove the latter two claims are available on request.

5 Random Serial Dictatorship

Papai [6] showed that a deterministic mechanism is group-strategyproof if and only if it is strategyproof and non-bossy. I use random serial dictatorship as an example to show that this equivalence does not hold for random mechanisms. For any permutation $p : N \rightarrow N$ define the serial dictatorship sd^p as the deterministic mechanism that uses p to sequentially entitle agents to choose houses. So $sd_{p(1)}^p(\succsim)$ is agent $p(1)$'s most preferred house according to $\succsim_{p(1)}$, $sd_{p(2)}^p(\succsim)$ is the $\succsim_{p(2)}$ -preferred house among all remaining ones and so forth. Random serial dictatorship $rsd : \hat{\Omega} \rightarrow \Delta \hat{X}$ arises out of a uniform randomization over all serial dictatorships $\{sd^p \mid p : N \rightarrow N \text{ a permutation}\}$. Any sd^p is strategyproof, non-bossy, and Pareto optimal. Random serial dictatorship treats equals equally. Theorems 1 and 2 therefore imply that random serial dictatorship is non-bossy but not group-strategyproof.

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