UK Film Policy, Cultural Capital and Social Exclusion

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The article will begin with a brief discussion of Bourdieu’s writing on film and the ambivalent cultural status occupied by film in his model of cultural hierarchy. This is followed by a brief discussion of the competing strands, industrial, social and cultural, surrounding film policy in the UK. The article then concludes with an overview of the policies of the UK Film Council, focusing in particular on the ways in which these policies have sought to address the issue of social exclusion and how these policies may be seen to relate back to the concept of cultural capital.

Keywords: Cultural capital; Film policy; UK Film Council; Social exclusion

Introduction

In a recent article on government funding of the arts, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, Tessa Jowell, lays out some arguments concerning the value of the arts and the reasons for government funding of them. It is, in many respects, an interesting discussion, indicating a willingness to rethink the underpinnings of government policy and to evaluate ‘culture on its own terms’. From the perspective of film policy, however, the document also raises some questions. Although the Department for Culture, Media and Sport possesses a responsibility for film, there is no reference to film in Jowell’s article despite numerous allusions to drama, painting, music, museums and opera. One likely explanation for this is the uneasy cultural position that film occupies in comparison to the traditional arts. Although Jowell rejects a simplistic distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ culture, her discussion nonetheless establishes a firm opposition between ‘entertainment’ on the one hand and ‘cultural engagement’ on the other (Jowell, 2004, para 3). This puritanical (and historically selective) account of ‘culture’ clearly creates problems for the cultural defence of film when so much of it is shamelessly devoted to the entertainment of large audiences.
Thus, while many of Jowell’s remarks do seem to possess a relevance for film, there is also an implicit sense that film is not really a ‘complex art’ and therefore that the government’s reasons for funding film are not ‘cultural’ in the same way as might be the case with other arts. Jowell’s remarks, in this regard, provide a useful entry-point to the argument that follows. This begins with a discussion of the work of Pierre Bourdieu and an assessment of its relevance to an understanding of the cultural status of film. Just as Jowell’s article appears unwilling to include film fully within the domain of ‘complex art’, so film is also seen to occupy an ambivalent position within Bourdieu’s model of cultural hierarchy. This, it is argued, relates to the variety of grounds upon which UK government support for film has traditionally been premised. For while Jowell may seek to justify support for culture ‘on its own terms’, the ambivalent cultural status of film has meant that it has, in fact, tended to be supported on grounds other than the cultural. The discussion, therefore, traces the historical development of the three main strands of government film policy—the industrial, the social and the cultural—and indicates how these, in turn, have fed into the policies of the UK Film Council (established in 2000). The discussion then focuses on one aspect of film policy concerned with social exclusion before linking this back to arguments relating to culture and cultural capital. This involves an assessment of some of the strengths and weaknesses of investing film policy with this kind of ‘social’ dimension, which despite Jowell’s invocation of the ‘intrinsic value’ of culture, continues to survive in her defence of art as ‘an important investment in personal social capital’ (para 31).

Part 1: Bourdieu and the Cultural Status of Film

Although he makes a number of allusions to film in his writings, Pierre Bourdieu does not write systematically about cinema. This is partly the result of the uncertain position that film is seen to occupy in relation to the other arts. As Bourdieu (1990, p. 95) explains, in an early work on photography, not all modes of cultural expression are accorded equal ‘dignity and value’ in a given society but are ‘organized according to a hierarchy independent of individual opinions, which defines cultural legitimacy and its gradations’. Located at the top of this hierarchy are the ‘fully consecrated’ high arts of theatre, painting, sculpture, literature and classical music; at the bottom, are ‘vulgar’ cultural practices such as cookery, decoration and sport. For Bourdieu, cinema, jazz and photography are positioned in between these extremes, neither ‘fully legitimate’ nor completely abandoned to the ‘the arbitrariness of individual taste’. Thus, while clearly suspicious of the ‘coterries of professional critics’ assuming the ‘tedious tone of university criticism’ in order to elevate the standing of film or jazz, Bourdieu nevertheless locates film as an expressive form with the potential to become recognized as ‘art’, occupying, as he describes it, the sphere of the ‘legitimizable’ (pp. 96–97).

However, as Bourdieu also recognizes, the field of film is itself differentiated and subject to internal cultural hierarchies or ‘oppositions’. Thus, in his brief discussion of film in Distinction, he distinguishes a taste for ‘ambitious’ works that require ‘a large cultural investment’ from a liking for the ‘most spectacular feature films,
overtly designed to entertain’ (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 271). Thus, while in Bourdieu’s model of the cultural sphere cinema is perceived to occupy a place broadly analogous to photography as a ‘middle-brow art’, individual films are also seen to require differing kinds of aesthetic disposition and to enjoy different levels of cultural standing. This hesitation about how to place film in terms of ‘legitimate’, ‘middle-brow’ and ‘popular’ tastes is perhaps not surprising. Bourdieu conceives of ‘the field of cultural production’ in terms of a conflict between competing principles of hierarchization: the heteronomous and the autonomous. While the relations between the two may fluctuate, Bourdieu’s analysis suggests how the ‘consecration’ or legitimization of culture is, in turn, strongly identified with the ‘autonomy’ of art from economic influence (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 40–43). However, even the most culturally ‘ambitious’ films identified by Bourdieu in his survey were made within the constraints of a commercial industry and, thus, are heteronomous rather than autonomous in character. As a result, Bourdieu’s model of cultural hierarchy (and its reliance upon an opposition between art and commerce) has not always been fully attuned to the complexities of mass production and of the consumption and critical reception of ‘low’ cultural forms (see, for example, Frith, 1996).

This uncertainty about the position of cinema has also characterized what might be called the history of ‘classification struggles’ over the ‘consecration’ or ‘legitimization’ of cinema as an art form. As Bourdieu (1984, p. 27) notes, awareness of film directors, rather than stars, has been a key indicator of cultivated taste. The history of cinematic consecration, therefore, has partly depended on the adoption of the criteria of the legitimate arts and a demonstration of the director as the key creative personality involved in film making. This was certainly so of what might be regarded as the heyday of ‘art cinema’ in the late 1950s and early 1960s when directors such as Michelangelo Antonioni, Ingmar Bergman, Federico Fellini, Jean-Luc Godard and Alain Resnais acquired an international reputation and cultural cachet for their often demanding, and aesthetically self-conscious, work.

However, at the very time that ‘art cinema’ was achieving a new-found distinction, the basis of its ‘legitimization’ was in the process of being challenged by the ‘heterodoxics’, as it were, who sought to identify ‘film art’ with the products of Hollywood cinema (albeit that they did so through recourse to the same concept of individual authorship). The implications of this for the ‘legitimization’ of cinema may be seen in relation to Bourdieu’s survey of cinema tastes. In Distinction, the Hollywood film 55 Days at Peking is identified with ‘box-office movie-making’, and ranked well below Divorce Italian Style (Pietro Germi, 1962) by both professors and school teachers (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 271). However, the director of 55 Days at Peking, Nicholas Ray, was precisely the kind of Hollywood director then being identified as an authentic auteur by a new breed of film criticism (initially associated with Cahiers du Cinema but spreading quickly to the US through the writings of Andrew Sarris and to Britain through the magazine Movie). Thus, while it is manifestly not Ray’s best work, there would be few ‘cinephiles’ today who would confidently rank a slight Italian comedy above Ray’s flawed epic (and virtually no-one who would consider Germi to be a director of greater consequence than Ray).
This uncertainty about the cultural ranking of cinema, and individual films, has, if anything, intensified since then. Bourdieu’s initial discussion of the culturally ambivalent position of cinema took place against a backdrop of what was perceived to be a much more settled system of ranking among the traditional arts. Since then, however, the distinctions between ‘low’ and ‘high’ culture, as well as the certainties concerning cultural value, that were once a feature of the cultural field have been seen to weaken. This has meant that while it may have become less unusual for cinema to be accepted as an ‘art’, there has also been a proliferation of the types of cinema for which cultural legitimacy has been claimed and of the grounds upon which this legitimacy is claimed. If cinema was initially validated along the same lines as the traditional arts (in terms of authorship and freedom from economic constraints), this has become much less common than before given the more general critique to which the category of ‘art’ has been subject. This is particularly evident in the growth of subcultural groupings with a strong investment in ‘cult’ films or films that defy the norms of ‘good taste’ which clearly cut across the conventional categories of cultural distinction (Jancovich, 2002; Tudor, 2004).

Part 2: UK Film Policy

The ambivalent status of film—as industry, entertainment and, in some cases, ‘art’—has also been evident in the application of film policy in the UK. Unlike the traditional arts, the cultural value or aesthetic worth of cinema has not been a given and film has therefore not automatically fallen within the domain of ‘arts policy’ (or, following its establishment, the Arts Council). As a result, government policy and legislation directed at film has been driven by a variety of imperatives. Historically, government film policy has been pre-eminently an industrial policy concerned with the preservation and support of commercial film making. The Cinematograph Films Act of 1927 established quotas that survived in varying forms until the early 1980s. In the post-war period, the National Film Finance Corporation and the British Film Fund Agency (funded through a levy on exhibitors) also laid the basis for a system of public support for the financing of British commercial films. Such measures were primarily protectionist in impulse, intended to provide support for British films in the face of competition from Hollywood. From the 1980s onwards, however, when the Thatcher Government abolished the quota system and ‘privatized’ the NFFC, film policy moved more in the direction of ‘pro-market’ incentives such as tax reliefs intended to increase private, rather than public, investment in the industry.

However, while these policies may have been primarily industrial in character and driven by a desire to support the commercial production sector of the local film industry, the economic rhetoric characteristic of UK film policy has nevertheless been sustained by a sense that film is not solely an industrial matter and that, in the words of the Palache report of 1944, it ‘represents something more than a mere commodity to be bartered against others’ (Board of Trade 1944, para. 7). Thus, despite the staunch ‘free trade’ rhetoric of the 1980s, even the Conservative Government, under John Major, was persuaded to make lottery funds available for the support of film
production in the 1990s. In this respect, UK film policy, for all its apparent industrial hard-headedness, has typically possessed implicit cultural underpinnings. The beginnings of an explicit cultural policy, however, can probably be traced to the establishment of the British Film Institute in the 1930s. This followed the publication of the report *The Film in National Life* which recommended *inter alia* that the new organization 'act as a national clearing-house for information on all matters affecting the production and distribution of educational and cultural films' and seek to 'influence public opinion to appreciate and demand films which, as entertainment, are really good of their kind or have more than entertainment value' (Commission on Educational and Cultural Films, 1932, para. 238). In line with these proposals, the BFI assumed responsibility for *Sight and Sound* and launched the *Monthly Film Bulletin*, nurtured the Film Society movement and established the National Film Library (later Archive). In subsequent years, it also became directly involved in cultural film production and exhibition following the establishment of the Experimental Film Fund (later Production Board) and the National Film Theatre in London.

However, it is significant that this cultural policy has itself been shaped by sociological as much as aesthetic concerns. Due to its mass appeal (especially among the young), the cinema has been seen not only as a social threat in need of regulation and censorship but also as a potential vehicle for education and social improvement. Thus, the sub-title of *The Film in National Life* identifies the report’s purpose as an enquiry into ‘the service which the cinematograph may render to education and social progress’. In a sense, this desire to place film at the service of broader social objectives has been a feature of British film policy and British film culture more generally. This, in turn, has been linked to the enthusiasm within British film culture for documentary and its use as an instrument of information, education and propaganda. This dates back to the establishment of the Empire Marketing Board Film Unit, under the ‘father’ of documentary John Grierson, in the late 1920s, becoming a key element of government policy during the Second World War when the Ministry of Information was directly involved in the production and promotion of films in support of the war effort. This emphasis upon the social utility of film within British film policy may itself be linked to the low levels of ‘legitimization’ of film as an art within British culture. Thus, precisely because of its insecure position as an ‘art’ there has always been within British political life a strong bent towards the cultivation of film as a vehicle for information, instruction and the construction of citizenship, rather than as an end, or valued cultural good, in itself. Thus, as recently as May 2004, the government minister responsible for film in the UK, Estelle Morris, has praised the educational role of film as a ‘powerful advocate’ and ‘message carrier’ (Milmo, 2004).

While this is, of necessity, a simplification of the ebb and flow of UK film policy, it does seem to capture successfully its broad contours. Moreover, it is still possible to see how these three discourses, the industrial, cultural and social, continue to predominate, and jockey for position, within current practice. Given the centrality of the UK Film Council to current film policy, there will now be a focus on its activities and a discussion of some of the ways in which these discourses have been operationalized.
Part 3: UK Film Council

Following the election of a new Labour government in 1997, the then Minister for Culture, Media and Sport, Chris Smith, established a working party to produce an agenda for action in support of British film. The Film Policy Review Group’s report, *A Bigger Picture*, was published in 1998 and recommended, among other things, the rationalization of the various public bodies supporting film. This led to the establishment of the Film Council (subsequently UK Film Council) in April 2000 as the strategic body responsible for the development of both ‘a sustainable UK film industry’ and the support of UK ‘film culture’. Under this new dispensation, the Film Council replaced the Arts Council of England as the distributor of lottery funds for film production as well as taking over British Screen (the successor body to the old National Film Finance Corporation) and the British Film Commission (the body responsible for promoting Britain as a film location and attracting inward investment). Given its charitable status, the British Film Institute retained its independence but is now funded by the Film Council.

The core aim of the Film Council is: ‘To stimulate a competitive, successful and vibrant UK film industry and culture, and to promote the widest possible enjoyment and understanding of cinema throughout the nations and regions of the UK’ (UK Film Council, 2004). Given the merging of previously separate bodies and the integration of policy strands that this involved, it is not, perhaps, surprising that this core aim appears to embrace all three variations of film policy as it has historically developed within the UK: the promotion of a commercially successful film industry, the support for film culture and the encouragement of access and social inclusiveness. In terms of ‘industrial policy’, this has involved the promotion of the UK as a centre for film making and the advocacy of fiscal incentives; the promotion of UK films abroad; and support for training, script development and the production of commercially-oriented films. Indeed, given the press-inspired campaign against the Arts Council’s use of the ‘people’s lottery’ to fund British films that failed to achieve distribution, it might be said that there has been a self-conscious concern on the part of the Film Council to back films (via its Premiere Fund) that have seemed likely to reach a mass audience. This, in turn, has led to criticisms of the Film Council’s apparent ‘populism’, particularly given the organization’s chairmanship by the film director Alan Parker and his record of opposition to cinema that smacks of ‘art’. These concerns regarding the Film Council’s direction were also in evidence in the wake of the release of the lottery-supported *Sex Lives of the Potato Men* (Andy Humphries, 2003) in 2004. Denounced in some quarters as ‘the worst British film ever made’, the film was seen by some to put into question the propriety of the Film Council’s funding policy. Although accepting that the film was not without its flaws, the Film Council nevertheless publicly defended it on the grounds that it was not only likely to make money but also to appeal to audiences who, unlike many middle-class critics, actually purchased lottery tickets.

Despite the robustness with which the Film Council has pursued its objective of encouraging ‘a sustainable film industry’, this has not, of course, been the whole story.
The organization also possesses a clear cultural remit that includes promoting ‘education and an appreciation and enjoyment of cinema’, ‘giving UK audiences access to the widest range of UK and international cinema’ and supporting UK ‘film culture and heritage’ (UK Film Council, 2003a, p. 7). In pursuit of these objectives, the Film Council not only funds the British Film Institute (which itself sustains the National Film and Television Archive, a major library, the National Film Theatre and education and publishing divisions) but also supports a Regional Investment Fund, educational initiatives such as First Light and a New Cinema Fund devoted to the encouragement of ‘innovative filmmaking’. It has also embarked upon a strategy to encourage the distribution and exhibition of what might be regarded, for want of a better term, as ‘cultural’ films. In line with the shifting cultural position of film, these policies have tended to achieve validation on the basis of more than one discursive construction of ‘value’ (or understanding of the ‘public good’). However, for the purposes of this article, attention will be given to the way in which both the cultural and industrial dimensions of the Film Council’s policies have also been interwoven with socially utilitarian concerns.

**Part 4: Social Inclusion**

In line with the strategic priorities of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (which have in turn been agreed with the Treasury), the Film Council has made ‘social inclusion’ and the promotion of ‘diversity’ core principles. In a sense, it could be argued that for all its New Labour gloss, this role for film follows a traditional emphasis upon film’s potential or actual contribution to national well-being and the construction of citizenship. While defenders of the traditional arts may have lamented the harnessing of art to social purposes, this emphasis, as previously suggested, has been a longstanding feature of government policy towards film. Nevertheless, the discourse of ‘social inclusion’ does inflect the social bent of film policy in specific ways.

In terms of industrial policy, it has led to a concern to expand the workforce in the film industry which surveys suggest remains dominated by white able-bodied men. Thus, while minority ethnic groups account for around 9 per cent of the UK population (and nearly 30 per cent of the population of London where the film industry is concentrated), they account for only 1.6 per cent of the film and video production workforce. Women account for only 32.6 per cent of the production workforce and considerably less in specific occupational areas (accounting, for example, for only 8 per cent of lighting technicians). While both women and ethnic minority groups are under-represented within the industry as a whole, they are nonetheless over-represented in the least well-rewarded occupations. Hence, women make up 77 per cent of cinema cleaners while minority ethnic groups account for 22 per cent of cleaning staff and 18.4 per cent of box-office attendants (UK Film Council, 2003b, pp. 75–76). In the light of this, the Film Council has adopted policies, including a new code of practice and access schemes, intended to help remove barriers to entry to the industry and broaden the social composition of the workforce. Given the Council’s commitment to working with ‘the grain of the market’, it is significant that the
Film Council’s case for social inclusion in the workforce has not just been premised upon a commitment to social equity but also its good business sense given the changing social character of the workforce across the UK. While this alignment of ‘social inclusion’ with a ‘business imperative’ is clearly in tune with the prevailing political climate, it would also be unrealistic to expect a major restructuring of the workforce within the film industry without government attention to the more fundamental economic and educational factors affecting the differential achievements of minority ethnic groups and other disadvantaged social groups not just in the film industry but also the labour market more generally.

A second key aspect of Film Council thinking on ‘social inclusion’, and the one most relevant to Bourdieu’s concerns, also involves access, but in this case to the cinema experience rather than the actual workforce. Given the relative popularity of cinema-going, this, however, is clearly not quite the same issue as that posed by museum attendance or going to the opera. Whereas much of the preoccupation with the traditional ‘high’ arts has been the issue of who has access in the case of film it is also an issue of what citizens have access to as well.

In terms of audiences, there are, of course, significant patterns of social use. Unlike many other arts, cinema-going is heavily dominated by the young. The under-35s account for around 70 per cent of cinema attendances while constituting about only 35 per cent of the population (KPMG, 2001, p. 124). Like other arts, cinema-going is also heavily dominated by better-off social groups with groups ABC1 accounting for double the admissions of groups C2DE despite being of roughly the same size (KPMG, 2001, p.126). Thus, if cinema-going was ever a working-class leisure pursuit, it could hardly be said to be so now (although this picture is partly complicated by the viewing of films on video and DVD).

However, for film policy there has also been the issue of what the audience is obtaining the opportunity to see. Although, thanks to the growth of multiplexes since the mid-1980s, audiences for film in the UK have been growing, it is Hollywood films, rather than any other kind, that have accounted for the lion’s share of the box-office. Thus, in recent years, Hollywood films have typically accounted for over 70 per cent and sometimes over 80 per cent of UK box-office takings. This, in turn, reflects a domination of the UK distribution sector by subsidiaries of the Hollywood majors—UIP (which is jointly owned by MCA/Universal, MGM and Paramount), Warner Distributors, Columbia, Buena Vista and Fox—which collectively command around 80 per cent of total UK box office (UK Film Council, 2003b, p. 28).

It is against this background that the Film Council has not only sought to widen the social base of cinema-going but also to broaden the range of films available to audiences across the UK. It has done so partly through its funding of the BFI but also through the launch of a Specialized Distribution and Exhibition strategy intended to support the distribution and exhibition of non-mainstream films through the establishment of a ‘digital screen network’ and Prints and Advertising (P&A) Fund. The choice of the term ‘specialized cinema’ is in itself a significant one. While it refers to a variety of film types that includes ‘innovative’ and ‘challenging’ English-language, foreign-language and minority indigenous language features, documentaries and shorts as well as ‘classics’
and restored archive films, the label was deliberately adopted in preference to terms such as ‘art cinema’ or ‘arthouse films’ (UK Film Council, 2003a, p. 25). While this partly reflects the Film Council’s ‘industry-friendly’ stance, it also suggests a consciousness of the lack of a clear cultural hierarchy in relation to contemporary cinema as well as the decreasing potency of the very idea of art cinema itself (Hill, 2000).

As the strategy has yet to unfold fully, it is too early to gauge how successful it will prove. However, in terms of the objective of social inclusion, it will inevitably face one major obstacle. The Film Council’s strategy is designed to widen the range of films available across a broader range of locations than hitherto. Early results from the P&A Fund suggest that this is in the process of being achieved. The Fund’s investments in films such as Good Bye, Lenin! (Germany, Wolfgang Richter, 2003) and Zatoichi (Japan, Takeshi Kitano, 2003) have permitted these to be shown more widely and to a larger audience than would otherwise have been the case. However, just as the mere existence of a local museum does not guarantee its use by certain social groups so the opportunity simply to see a foreign-language movie, for example, will not necessarily deliver a more socially diverse, or inclusive, audience. Indeed, there is risk that the Film Council’s policy will simply deliver increased opportunities to see films for those groups—the economically advantaged and well-educated—that already predominate within this sphere. In a sense, this returns to the issue of ‘cultural capital’.

It is, of course, central to Bourdieu’s sociological conception of taste and discrimination that the comprehension of ‘art’ is not immediate or spontaneous but dependent upon a set of competences acquired through education and other forms of socialization. As he suggests, a work of art only has ‘meaning and interest’ for those with the culturally acquired competence or ‘capital’ to understand and appreciate it (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 2). In the same way, films do not exist in some innocent state but are always constructed within various circuits of meaning and interpretation sustained by informal and formal education, critical writing and reviewing, public discussion and debate. This is, of course, true of all films, and not just ‘art films’. However, the more that films depart from the conventions of mainstream cinema, the more ‘challenging’ and ‘innovative’ that they become, so will they rely more upon specialized codes and competences for their comprehension and enjoyment. This remains so despite the increased blurring of boundaries between ‘high’ and ‘low’ in film culture (and the cultural field more generally). For, as Gripsrud (1989, p. 199) indicates, this ‘postmodern’ cultural condition is inhabited differently by differently located social groups and it is only those groups with the most education and/or income who have the opportunity to move across the full range of the cultural spectrum. As such, the Film Council’s goal of extending social access to a wider range of films is unlikely to be achieved on the basis of improved circulation of films alone but will also depend on the more equal distribution of the cultural competences associated with the understanding and appreciation of diverse kinds of film. While the Film Council would probably not identify the problem in quite this way, it has nonetheless shown awareness of the issue through the establishment of an Education Fund as part of its Specialized Distribution and Exhibition strategy and, in tandem with the BFI, the promotion of media literacy, and media-literate audiences, more generally.
However, the widespread dissemination of media literacy is hardly a task which the Film Council could be expected to accomplish on its own and success will ultimately depend on the effective incorporation of media education into the school curriculum along with other developments.

The importation of the discourse of social inclusion into film policy, as in arts policy more generally, may therefore run the risk of inflated expectations. The emphasis upon the role that the arts and cultural capital might play in securing social inclusion has rightly been criticized on the grounds that it is a relatively ineffective means of tackling the root causes of social exclusion such as poverty. It also downplays the value of the arts and cultural capital as ends or ‘goods’ in themselves in favour of their social utility (or means to other ends). Instrumental thinking of this type may be seen to derive in part from Bourdieu’s own emphasis upon the ‘exchange value’ of cultural capital in the consolidation of social status. Whereas Bourdieu (1973) emphasizes the role that cultural capital plays in reproducing patterns of social inequality, others have suggested how the acquisition of cultural capital (by individuals rather than, as in Bourdieu, groups or classes) may in turn become a resource with which to escape social disadvantage. However, while cultural capital may possess an exchange-value, it is not reducible to it and offers ‘advantages’ independent of its ‘convertibility’ into social status. In this respect, the opening-up of access to a wider range of films (through improved distribution and education initiatives) should not be expected to carry the full burden of a social purpose that it is not necessarily capable of fulfilling.

As has been suggested, the Film Council has often been associated with a strong pro-market, and populist, stance. This has been particularly so of its industrial policy which has sought to fulfil its responsibility for developing ‘a sustainable UK film industry’ through the encouragement of commercial films aimed firmly at a popular audience. However, in line with its other commitment to develop UK film culture, it could also be argued that the Film Council has evolved policies in distribution and education that seek to go against the grain of the market and demonstrate a number of much less populist features. This is not, of course, straightforward. The Distribution and Exhibition strategy is partly defended on the grounds that it will contribute to an economically healthier distribution and economic sector in the UK; the cultivation of media-literate audiences is seen to have a long-term benefit for the economic viability of the film industry. However, the council’s commitment to the provision of a more diverse and varied range of film output than the market currently provides, and encouragement of film education, is clearly not reducible to either simple economic objectives or the goal of ‘social inclusion’.

Conclusion

It is, of course, the case that discussions of UK film policy, and of the UK Film Council, would not normally (or, perhaps, naturally) begin with consideration of the ideas of cultural capital and social exclusion. Indeed, the recent report of the House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee on the British Film Industry ignored the issue of social inclusion altogether despite the role that the idea has
played in both DCMS and Film Council thinking (House of Commons Culture, Media and Sport Committee, 2003). Nevertheless, these ideas have provided a useful way into thinking not only about the ambivalent cultural attitudes surrounding film in the UK but also the competing drives of UK film policy and the ways in which these both converge and diverge. This in turn suggests how policies and their implementation do not simply shape the relevant cultural field but are themselves shaped by the contexts in which they are employed. In this respect, the field of policy necessarily involves its own legitimation struggles (over priorities and objectives) in accordance with the economic, political and institutional conflicts of the time.

References


