

Changing Manners of Displaying Loyalties through Ideological Campaigns in post-Deng China

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Abstract: Ideological campaigns in post-Deng China have a strategic function of discerning loyalties of local leaders. Previous empirical studies find that Jiang Zemin's followers are more likely to echo Jiang's ideological campaigns. Through a content analysis of provincial newspapers between 2005 and 2012, this study suggests that the manner of displaying loyalties has completely changed. By employing a PCSE estimation, this study finds that protégés of both Hu Jintao and Jiang Zemin are *less* likely to echo their patron's ideological campaigns, suggesting the shifting function of ideological campaigns from monitoring identified followers' loyalties to recruiting new followers. This article argues that this is a result of changing elite politics and – more importantly – the different strategic use of ideological campaigns.

Introduction

Thirty years of spectacular economic growth suggests that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has got its market reforms right. It has prompted a sizable political science literature to contend that the economic miracle led by market reform has become a principal if not the sole pillar of legitimacy in China on the one hand¹ and the market reform has also rendered ideology obsolete on the other hand.² As such, the issue of ideological changes in post-Deng China is under-researched.³

Yet, in China, ideology is still considered as crucial nowadays. My study of the Chinese elites' debate on legitimacy – based on 125 articles in party school journals, university journals, and public policy journals between 2008 and 2012 – finds that ideology is

¹ E.g. David Shambaugh, "The Dynamics of Elite Politics During the Jiang Era," *The China Journal*, no. 45 (2001); Zhengxu Wang, "Political Trust in China: Forms and Causes," in *Legitimacy: Ambiguities of Political Success or Failure in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Lynn White (World Scientific Pub Co Inc, 2005); Dingxin Zhao, "The Mandate of Heaven and Performance Legitimation in Historical and Contemporary China," *American Behavioral Scientist* 53, no. 3 (2009); André Laliberté and Marc Lantaigne, "The Issue of Challenges to the Legitimacy of Ccp Rule," in *The Chinese Party-State in the 21st Century: Adaptation and the Reinvention of Legitimacy*, ed. André Laliberté and Marc Lantaigne (London: Routledge, 2008); Zhengxu Wang, "Before the Emergence of Critical Citizens: Economic Development and Political Trust in China," *International Review of Sociology* 15, no. 1 (2005).

² E.g. Kalpana Misra, *From Post-Maoism to Post-Marxism: The Erosion of Official Ideology in Deng's China* (London: Routledge, 1998); David Lynch, *After the Propaganda State: Media, Politics, and "Thought Work" in Reformed China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999):10; Joshua Cooper Ramo, *The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power* (London: Foreign Policy Centre, 2004); June Teufel Dreyer, *China's Political System: Modernization and Tradition*, 8th ed. (Boston, MA: Longman, 2012): 330, 360; Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen, "Introduction: Popular Protest and State Legitimation in 21st-Century China," in *State and Society in 21st-Century China: Crisis, Contention, and Legitimation*, ed. Peter Gries and Stanley Rosen (New York and London: Routledge, 2004):16

³ Although many studies have been focused on nationalism, this article does not consider them ideology. As Breslin argues, Chinese nationalism "lack (s) sufficient coherence and guiding principles to be counted as an ideology as such- it is not a 'science of ideas'". Shaun Breslin, "Democratizing One-Party Rule in China," in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter Burnell and Richard Youngs (London: Routledge, 2009).

³ although the topic of ideology has been studied by a few western scholars such as Heike Holbig, Peter Sandby-Thomas, William Joseph, Yih-jye Hwang, and Florian Schneider among others

considered a leading strategy to maintain the party's monopoly on power.⁴ The party-state in China has invested great amount of energy and human capital in modernizing the ideology of the CCP from Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents", Hu Jintao's "Scientific Outlook of Development" and "Harmonious Society" to now Xi Jinping's "China Dream". In the meantime, both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have launched waves of ideological campaigns – involving a great amount of government instructions, numerous meetings, and mobilization of thousands of propaganda units from the central government to the very bottom – to promote their new ideological banners, following by a series of major policy shifts.

What are the functions of the ideological campaigns in post-Deng China? Previous literature suggests that a key function of ideological campaigns is to discern the loyalties of local leaders.⁵ Shih's empirical study, based on provincial official newspapers between 2000 and 2004, finds that provincial units that are governed by Jiang Zemin's protégés are more likely to echo Jiang's "Three Represents" campaigns.⁶ Building on Shih's pioneering work, this study examines the manner of displaying loyalty through ideological campaigns in Hu Jintao's era by analyzing the impact of factional ties on the provinces' zeal to echo those campaigns.

This study departs from the previous study in four ways. First, instead of studying the reaction of a single political group, this study examines how major dominant political groups – including Hu Jintao's protégés, the "Shanghai Gang"⁷ and princelings⁸ – echo ideological campaigns. Second, instead of focusing on a single campaign, this study examines three ideological campaigns – including Scientific Outlook of Development, Harmonious Society, and Three Represents⁹ – in order systematically to study the strategic functions of ideological campaigns in post-Deng China. Third, while the previous study observes only five periods of time (2000-2004) with 22 provinces, missing important objects such as Tianjin, Guangdong and Guizhou, this study is based on eight periods of time (2005-2012) with all 31 Chinese provincial units except Shandong.¹⁰ Finally, this study also analyses whether the volume of patron-client ties with senior leaders have an impact on provincial leaders' zeal to echo ideological campaigns. For example, if both the party secretary and governor of a given province are Hu Jintao's protégés, this province may act different from others provinces that only have a leader who is a Hu Jintao's protégé and different from the provinces that are governed by Jiang Zemin's protégés.

When I examine the data between 2005 and 2012, this study finds that Hu Jintao's protégés are less likely to echo Hu's Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns and the "Shanghai Gang" are less willing to echo either Jiang's Three Represents or Hu's Scientific

⁴ Jinghan Zeng, "The Debate on Regime Legitimacy in China: Bridging the Wide Gulf between Western and Chinese Scholarship," *Journal of Contemporary China* 23, no. 88 (2014). A similar study of Gilley and Holbig, based on the data between 2003 and 2007, also finds that ideology is a leading prescription. Please see Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, "Reclaiming Legitimacy in China," *Politics & Policy* 38, no. 3 (2010).

⁵ Didi Tatlow, "Allegiance, the Privilege of the Party," *New York Times* (2013); Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008); Xiangwei Wang, "Xi Follows in Mao's Footsteps on Path to Consolidate Power," *South China Morning Post* 2013; Andre Lieber, "The Chinese Ideology: Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform," *Journal of Chinese Politics Science* 18, no. 4 (2013).

⁶ Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008).

⁷ This study uses Li Cheng's definition of "Shanghai Gang" which is "current leaders whose careers have advanced primarily owing their political association with Jiang Zemin in Shanghai". See Cheng Li, "The "Shanghai Gang": Force for Stability or Cause for Conflict?," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 1 (part 2) (2001).

⁸ In this study, princeling refers to state/party/military leaders who come from families of senior party leaders (vice minister or vice governor level or above) or military generals (deputy military region level or above).

⁹ The case of Three Represents in this article is quite different from Harmonious Society and Scientific Outlook of Development because Jiang had already stepped down for several years, thus the reactions of "Shanghai Gang" and the variation of Three Represents during 2005 and 2012 are not my major interests. The major aim of this article is to compare the reaction of Hu's followers to Scientific Outlook of Development (2005-2012) with that of Jiang's follower to Three Represents (2000-2004).

¹⁰ The CNK database does not include the data of the Shandong provincial official newspapers *Dazhong Daily* during the relevant period.

Outlook of Development campaigns. In other words, all identified factional members are less likely to echo ideological campaigns – either Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development or Jiang’s Three Represents – than those who have fewer connections with Jiang or Hu. These results indicate changing manner of displaying loyalty through ideological campaigns. Nowadays, ideological campaigns play a role of “recruitment” (recruiting new protégés) rather than “maintenance” (monitoring the loyalty of existing protégés).

This article argues that the shifting function of ideological campaigns is a result of changing elite politics and – more importantly – a different strategic use of ideological campaigns. Through ideological campaigns, Jiang Zemin intended to maintain influence after retirement, while Hu Jintao had less desire to do so. Notably, the purpose of this article is not to dispute the major functions of ideological adaptation and campaigns. Ideology, of course, has many functions and it has been playing a highly ambiguous role in China. The main purpose of this article is to uncover and analyse the pragmatic power motivation through ideological campaigns – how factional affiliations of local leaders have influenced their zeal to echo top leaders’ ideological banners in post-Deng China – that have not been discovered before.

Ideological Campaigns in Contemporary China

In Mao Zedong’s era, communist ideology used to be the lynchpin of legitimation in China for a couple of decades until a series of political campaigns and policy failure led to certain kinds of legitimacy crises. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, ideology and politicisation became the problem rather than the solution because people were sick of mass campaigns and ideology. Recognising people’s changing views, Deng Xiaoping capitalised on a less political approach after the death of Mao Zedong and the fall of the Gang of Four. Deng and his supporters chose to build state legitimacy on socialist democracy (democratic centralism) rather than ideology and political campaigns – and perhaps more clearly simply by placing economic reconstruction first.

In the post-Deng era, however, ideology has returned to the agenda of the party-state. The party-state has put great efforts – with enormous money and human capital – in reinvesting its ideology. Both Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao launched costly ideological campaigns to promote their ideological banners. So, what did motivate the return of ideology in post-Deng China? So far, the existing literature roughly offers two interpretations. The first view argues that the ideological adaptation has served as a legitimizing device for communist regimes,¹¹ while the second view approaches ideology from a factional perspective that ideology is a factional tool to struggle for power.¹²

¹¹ Heike Holbig, "Ideological Reform and Political Legitimacy in China," in *Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Institutional Change and Stability*, ed. Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert (Routledge, 2009); Maria Bondes and Sandra Heep, "Frames We Can Believe In: Official Framing and Ideology in the Ccp's Quest for Legitimacy," (available at http://www.giga-hamburg.de/dl/download.php?d=/content/publikationen/pdf/wp187_bondes-heep.pdf access on April 24, 2013; German Institute of Global and Area Studies, 2012); Heike Holbig, "Ideology after the End of Ideology. China and the Quest for Autocratic Legitimation," *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013); Anne-Marie Brady, "Mass Persuasion as a Means of Legitimation and China's Popular Authoritarianism," *American Behavioral Scientist* 53, no. 3 (2009); Bruce Gilley and Heike Holbig, "Reclaiming Legitimacy in China," *Politics & Policy* 38, no. 3 (2010); Nora Sausmikat, "More Legitimacy for One-Party Rule? The Ccp's Ideological Adjustments and Intra-Party Reforms?," *Asien* 99, no. 5 (2006); Xiaobo Su, "Revolution and Reform: The Role of Ideology and Hegemony in Chinese Politics," *Journal of Contemporary China* 20, no. 69 (2011); Peter Thomas, *Legitimizing the Chinese Communist Party since Tiananmen: A Critical Analysis of the Stability Discourse* (Oxon: Routledge, 2011); Yih-Jye Hwang and Florian Schneider, "Performance, Meaning, and Ideology in the Making of Legitimacy: The Celebration of the People's Republic of China's Sixty-Year Anniversary," *The China Review* 11, no. 1 (2011).

¹² Joseph Fewsmith, "Studying the Three Represents," *China Leadership Monitor* (2003); Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, "Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 8, no. 1&2 (2003); Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70,

The above cleavage lies in the *primary audience* and *function* of the CCP's ideological discourses. I argue that there are two types of ideological discourses in China: formal ideology and informal ideology.¹³ Formal ideology refers to official ideological discourses that are narrowly concerned with the CCP's discipline and the socialist doctrines, which were incorporated in the CCP constitution such as Jiang Zemin's Three Represents, and Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook of Development. Informal ideology refers to those popular ideations that are broadly concerned with the justification of the one-party rule to the entire society, such as the promotion of nationalism/patriotism and the emphasis on virtue.

The most important function of formal ideology is to redefine what is meant by socialism at that moment in time, and thus to provide an *ex post facto* justification of explaining why the current political economy is not *incompatible* with the CCP's commitment to socialism.¹⁴ For example, Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents" – "representing the demands for the development of advanced social productive forces, the direction of advanced culture, and the fundamental interest of the greatest majority of the people"¹⁵ – aimed to use these "represents" to redefine the CCP's commitment to socialism and thus justify why the CCP's quasi-capitalist economic policies were not incompatible with this commitment. In this sense, formal ideology is primarily produced for justifying the CCP's existence to itself. When it comes to legitimizing the CCP's authoritarian rule as a whole, this is the arena in which informal ideology takes place. In this way, formal ideology and informal ideology deals with the internal stability (party cohesion) and external stability (popular legitimacy) of the CCP respectively.

Formal ideology also establishes ideological orthodoxy and a leader's credentials. As formal ideology is clearly identified with specific leaders, it reflects the personal authority of Chinese leaders and thus carries a special meaning to assert their power. In this paper, ideological campaigns mainly refer to the promotion of formal ideology and I will focus on how those campaigns are used for power.

Within the factional perspective, many argue that the adaption of ideology is an attempt to put a leader's stamp on history and on the party.¹⁶ In this sense, the return of ideology is more about creating political legacy and maintaining senior leaders' influence after they step down. However, it still leaves many questions unanswered. A single grand campaign is sufficient to create political legacies; so, why were ideological campaigns launched with such high frequency in post-Deng China? In addition, Scientific Outlook of Development alone was sufficient to preserve the influence of Hu Jintao, so why did the regime take the trouble to launch other campaigns such as Harmonious Society?

Shih provides an additional dimension to the factional perspective. It is argued that political allegiance is a key function of ideological campaigns.¹⁷ Through ideological campaigns, local political actors can pander to the top leader by praising his ideological banners. Local political actors take both political and social costs to pander to top leaders

no. 4 (2008); Andre Lieber, "The Chinese Ideology: Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform," *Journal of Chinese Politics Science* 18, no. 4 (2013); Zhiyue Bo, "Hu Jintao and the Ccp's Ideology: A Historical Perspective," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 9, no. 2 (2004).

¹³ Jinghan Zeng, *The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).

¹⁴ Jinghan Zeng, *The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion* (Palgrave Macmillan 2015).

¹⁵ English translation: Heike Holbig, "Ideological Reform and Political Legitimacy in China," in *Regime Legitimacy in Contemporary China: Institutional Change and Stability*, ed. Thomas Heberer and Gunter Schubert (Routledge, 2009).

¹⁶ Joseph Fewsmith, "Studying the Three Represents," *China Leadership Monitor* (2003); Yongnian Zheng and Liang Fook Lye, "Elite Politics and the Fourth Generation of Chinese Leadership," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 8, no. 1&2 (2003).

¹⁷ Didi Tatlow, "Allegiance, the Privilege of the Party," *New York Times* (2013); Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008); Xiangwei Wang, "Xi Follows in Mao's Footsteps on Path to Consolidate Power," *South China Morning Post* 2013; Andre Lieber, "The Chinese Ideology: Reconciling the Politics with the Economics of Contemporary Reform," *Journal of Chinese Politics Science* 18, no. 4 (2013).

publicly.¹⁸ After Mao Zedong died, the CCP formed certain rules to against cults of personality; political actors who shamelessly praise a senior leader and thus violates this norm might be despised as a boot-licker. More importantly, junior leaders who pander through public grovelling to a senior leader suffer politically because they are unlikely to be recruited by another rival coalition if their patron falls from power. By bearing the cost of being despised by others and closing the door to alternative factions, the public grovelling through ideological campaigns sends creditable signals to senior leaders about political actors' loyalties. In this way, senior leaders can identify which followers are truly loyal. In this sense, ideological campaigns serve as a way for local leaders to pander to senior leaders in order to win their trust and for senior leaders to discern loyalties of the local leaders.

The above theory is evidenced by Shih's empirical study. By using content analysis to study provincial newspapers between 2000 and 2004, Shih finds that provinces that were governed by Jiang Zemin's protégés were more likely to echo Jiang's Three Represents campaigns. Thus, Shih contends that Jiang Zemin's ideological campaigns have a function of monitoring followers' loyalties so that the ruler can better prevent a coup.¹⁹ How about Hu Jintao's ideological campaigns? Did Hu's campaigns also have a function to monitor followers' loyalties? There are good theoretical and empirical reasons to hypothesize that Hu Jintao's ideological campaigns have different functions.

Theoretically, identified factional members might have other ways of displaying loyalties, such as supporting their patron's action in the Central Committee by voting and protecting the family business of their patron in their governed areas.²⁰ They do not have to risk the political and social cost of over-praising their patron through ideological campaigns. To those officials who are not the top leader's protégés and thus have far fewer connections to the top leader, ideological campaigns might be one of the few great opportunities to pander to the top leader in order to win their favour. It is reasonable that they will be more active than identified followers in echoing ideological campaigns. If so, ideological campaigns can function as a way for local officials to pander to senior leaders in order to be recruited into a coalition. In this sense, it is theoretically possible for ideological campaigns to play the role of recruiting new followers rather than monitoring existing followers' loyalties.

Empirically, Jiang Zemin's Three Represents campaigns are different from that of Hu's. First, obtaining information about followers' loyalties was much more important to Jiang Zemin than to Hu Jintao. Elite politics during Hu Jintao's era has been far more stable than that of Jiang. Jiang Zemin was appointed by Deng Xiaoping as the top leader in a sudden decision because of the protest of 1989. At the beginning of Jiang's appointment, many considered Jiang to be a temporary leader who would soon be removed. This was because Jiang, as a party bureaucrat without any power bases, was too weak and vulnerable to be surrounded by his veteran colleagues, such as Yang Shangkun who was a revolutionary leader, the President of the People's Republic of China, and the vice chairman of the Central Military Commission. Arguably, Jiang had to rely more heavily on loyal followers in order to stay in power; otherwise, he might be overthrown by powerful rivals.

On the contrary, Hu Jintao's position as the party head had never been seriously challenged, although factional struggle remained intense in Hu's term. Nowadays, factional

¹⁸ Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008).

¹⁹ Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008).

²⁰ Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008).

groups are neither willing nor able to defeat their rivals completely because of the equal balanced power and the necessity of power-sharing to maintain stability.²¹ Because of the more stable elite politics, Hu Jintao might be less eager to monitor followers' loyalties through costly ideological campaigns than Jiang Zemin was.

Moreover, an institutionalized power succession system also leads to less demand in monitoring followers' loyalties through ideological campaigns as well. In the past three decades, the CCP has taken impressive efforts to institutionalize its power succession system.²² As explained earlier, Jiang Zemin was appointed as the top leader by a sudden decision; however, both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping were scheduled as heir apparent for years in advance. Thus, they have more opportunities to obtain the knowledge of their existing followers before they take power than Jiang Zemin did.

Most importantly, the timings of launching ideological campaigns are very different. Jiang Zemin began to propose Three Represents and launch relevant campaigns nearly at the end of his term. As a departing leader, to maintain rather than to expand his power base was perhaps more rational to Jiang. At this time, Jiang might be less interested in using ideological campaigns to recruit new followers as it would not have been cost-effective. It was not very rational for provincial leaders to pander to the departing Jiang Zemin either because no-one knew the durability of Jiang's influence after his retirement. It explains why non-Jiang protégés were less motivated than Jiang's protégés to echo Jiang's campaigns, as Shih's study finds.

The campaigns of Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook of Development and Xi Jinping's "China Dream", however, were launched in the first few years of their terms. Both of these ideological banners clearly indicated the new leaders' attempts to carry out a new vision and walk out of the shadow of their predecessors. At this time, as new top leaders, they might have been motivated to build their power bases for their rule; thus, recruiting new protégés through ideological campaigns matches their interests. For provincial leaders who are not new leaders' protégés, they might be more willing to pander to new leaders. Thus, they might have been more motivated than those identified protégés to echo Hu's ideological banner. In this sense, the different timing of launching ideological campaigns might completely overturn the manner of displaying loyalties in Hu Jintao's term.

In short, the manner of displaying loyalty through ideological campaigns in Hu Jintao's era might be very different from that in Jiang's era because of the different timing of ideological campaigns and the changing elite politics.

Measurement and Data

Given the above conjectures, this study tests the hypothesis of allegiance with the data between 2005 and 2012. In order to purge the possible effects of methodological difference, this study employs the similar research method and data analysis techniques to the Shih's study. This study observes the number of ideological articles that were published on official newspapers (机关报) from all Chinese 31 provincial units except Shandong. As provincial official newspapers are directly controlled by provincial propaganda departments and their

²¹ Cheng Li, "The Powerful Factions among China's Rulers," (2012); Cheng Li, "The Battle for China's Top Nine Leadership Posts," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2012); Cheng Li and Eve Cary, "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?," *China Brief* 11, no. 23 (2011); Cheng Li, "China's Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?," *Asia Policy*, no. 6 (2008).

²² Jinghan Zeng, "Institutionalization of the Authoritarian Leadership in China: A Power Succession System with Chinese Characteristics?," *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 3 (2014).

content is closely supervised by the provincial standing committee (省委常委),²³ the frequency of relevant articles captures the willingness of provincial leaders to publish relevant items.

The campaigns of Scientific Outlook of Development and Harmonious Society are chosen because they are the most influential ones in Hu Jintao's era and the most representative in reflecting Hu's personal authority. The time period between 2005 and 2012 is chosen because it covers the life of these two campaigns. In addition, this study also observes Three Represents articles during the period of interest. The numbers of articles containing the phrase "Scientific Outlook of Development" (科学发展观), "Harmonious Society" (和谐社会), or "Three Represents" (三个代表) during the period of interest are collected from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (中国知网).

Dependent Variables

The unit of analysis in this study is a province-year (it) covering 2005 to 2012. Similar to the previous study, I set the Z-score of the actual amount of articles published in a given province-year (it) observation as dependent variables. As indicated in Figures 1, 2 and 3, all three ideological campaigns have gone through a process of ups and downs. There are substantial annual fluctuations in the numbers of ideological articles published every year. If we do not take this effect into consideration, the annual difference rather than the effects of observed independent variables would explain the variation in article numbers. This paper uses Z-score to eliminate the effects of the annual difference in article numbers.

$$\mathbf{Z\ score- SOD}_{(it)} = (\mathbf{SOD}_{it} - \mathbf{u}_{it}) / \sigma_t$$

In the above equation, i is province and t is year. \mathbf{SOD}_{it} is the actual article count of Scientific Outlook of Development in a given province-year observation and \mathbf{u}_{it} is the mean number of Scientific Outlook of Development articles across all provinces. σ_t is the standard deviation of the article count in a given province-year observation across all provinces. The setting of dependent variables in Harmonious Society and Three Represents campaigns is the same: $\mathbf{Z\ score- HS}_{(it)} = (\mathbf{HS}_{it} - \mathbf{u}_{it}) / \sigma_t$ and $\mathbf{Z\ score- TR}_{(it)} = (\mathbf{TR}_{it} - \mathbf{u}_{it}) / \sigma_t$.

²³ Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008); Guoguang Wu, "Command Communication: The Politics of Editorial Formulation in the People's Daily," *The China Quarterly* 137 (1994).

Figure 1: Median Numbers of Articles Mentioning “Scientific Outlook of Development” 2005-2012




Figure 2: Median Numbers of Articles Mentioning “Harmonious Society” 2005-2012





Figure 3: Median Numbers of Articles Mentioning “Three Represents” 2005-2012



Main Variables of Interest

This study observes three political groups, Hu Jintao’s followers, the “Shanghai Gang”, and princelings. In order to study the volume of patron-client ties, I set up two statistical models – the ALLTIES model and the SUMTIES model – for each group. In the ALLTIES model, I use a dummy variable ($ALLTIES_{(it)}$) to record patron-client ties. In a given province-year, if the party secretary or governor belongs to a political group, this province-year is recorded as “1”, or “0” otherwise. For example, in 2009, the governor of Hunan province is Hu Jintao’s protégé but the party secretary is not, therefore, “ALLTIES with HJT_(it)” in the “2009-Hunan” is recorded as “1”. If both of them are, it would still be recorded as “1”.

If both the party secretary and governor in a province are, for example, Hu Jintao’s followers, this province might act differently from a province in which only one of them is Hu’s follower. The second statistical model helps to capture this dynamic. In the SUMTIES model, I develop an accumulative variable ($SUMTIES_{(it)}$), which sums up the patron-client ties of both the governor and the party secretary in a given province-year. For example, if both the governor and the party secretary belong to the “Shanghai Gang”, then “SUMTIES Shanghai Gang_(it)” in this province-year is recorded as “2”. If only one of them belong to this group, then it is recorded as “1”. If none, then “0”. The $ALLTIES_{(it)}$ variables measure whether or not patron-client ties have an impact on the provinces’ zeal to echo ideological campaigns and $SUMTIES_{(it)}$ gauges whether the volume of patron-client ties matters.

For those who favour factional conflicts between the “Shanghai Gang” and Communist Youth League, it can be argued that these two groups have different interests in publishing relevant ideological items. For example, if the governor of a province belongs to the “Shanghai Gang” and its party-secretary is Hu Jintao’s protégé, how will this province react to Three Represents and Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns? For the spirit of experimentation, I develop another accumulative variable called “Ties Shanghai Gang vs CCYL”. If one of the provincial leaders belongs to the “Shanghai Gang”, this variable will be recorded as “-1”; if both, then “-2”. If one of them belongs to Hu Jintao’s protégés, then record “1”; if both, then “2”. If the top two provincial leaders belong to “Shanghai Gang” and CCYL respectively, this variable will be recorded as “0”. This variable attempts to capture whether the offset of patron clients ties has an impact on provincial leaders’ zeal to echo ideological campaigns. The assumption of this variable is potentially flawed in a few aspects. First, it assumes that the “Shanghai Gang” and Hu’s protégés have completely different interests in publishing the ideological banners of Hu and Jiang. However, there is no clear line between the “Shanghai Gang” and Hu’s protégés. Li Yuanchao, for example, belongs to both groups. In addition, those two groups might not be mortal enemies in such a manner. Second, it assumes that both the top officials will make the same effort to endorse their patron’s ideological item and reject that of their patron’s rival, which might not be the case.

Notably, China certainly does not have a factional politics like western democratic parties which show clearly who belongs to which faction.²⁴ There is also a distinction between the importance of patronage and the formation of factions.²⁵ Political faction implies ties between members including horizontal ones, but patronage is more based on hierarchical relationships with loose or no contacts horizontally at lower levels. Factionalism also implies that people are aware that they are in a group together. As such, in this article, factional ties indeed refer to patron-client ties that created vertical links rather than horizontal ones. The patron-client ties data of this study rely on Li Cheng’s extensive studies of Chinese elite politics.²⁶

Key Hypotheses

For the purpose of this study, I test the key hypotheses and alternative hypotheses to show whether provincial leaders’ factional ties have an impact on their zeal to echo ideological campaigns.

Hypothesis 1 (Null Hypothesis): According to this hypothesis, none of the patron-client ties variables can explain the variations in ideological articles. The implication of this hypothesis is that strategic political consideration is not a reason why those campaigns are launched.

Hypothesis 2 (Signaling Loyalty): According to this hypothesis, the variations in ideological articles are explained by the indicator of patron-client ties. This is to say, ideological campaigns provide a way for provincial leaders to signal their loyalty to central leaders by actively echoing those campaigns.

Hypothesis 2a (Monitoring Loyalties): As the previous study suggests, factional patron uses ideological campaigns to monitor the loyalty of existing followers. If this is true, existing followers should be more active to echo the ideological campaigns of their factional patrons.

²⁴ Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 18, no. 3 (2013):227-228

²⁵ Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 18, no. 3 (2013):227-228

²⁶ Cheng Li, "After Hu, Who? : China's Provincial Leaders Await Promotion," *China Leadership Monitor* 1 (2002); Cheng Li, "China's Midterm Jockeying: Gearing up for 2012(Part 1: Provincial Chiefs)," *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 31 (2010); Cheng Li, "Hu's Followers: Provincial Leaders with Backgrounds in the Youth League," *China Leadership Monitor* 3 (2002).

Thus, we might expect a positive and significant relationship between the indicator of Hu Jintao's protégés and the frequency of Scientific Outlook of Development articles, between the indicator of Hu Jintao's protégés and the frequency of the Harmonious Society article, and between the indicator of the "Shanghai Gang" and the frequency of the Three Represents article.

Hypothesis 2b (Recruiting New Members): As explained earlier, for those identified protégés who have other ways of signalling loyalties, they do not have to grovel publicly to their patron through ideological campaigns. Ideological campaigns, however, are one of the few opportunities for those officials who have fewer connections with top leaders to which they can pander. In order to join the top leader's coalition, they might be more motivated to echo ideological campaigns than identified protégés. If true, it will produce a negative and significant relationship between the indicator of Hu Jintao's protégés and the frequency of Scientific Outlook of Development articles, between the indicator of Hu Jintao's protégés and the frequency of Harmonious Society articles, and between the indicator of the "Shanghai Gang" and the frequency of the Three Represents articles.

Hypothesis 2c (Political Struggle): According to this hypothesis, political conflict plays a role in explaining the variation of ideological articles. If we assume the coalitions of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have conflicting interests, their protégés might tend to discourage them from publishing ideological items belonging to their patron's rival. As they have already been protected by a powerful coalition, they do not have to pander to their patron's rival. In addition, besides the normal cost of public grovelling as explained earlier, they might bear extra costs of betraying the original coalition if they choose to over praise their patron's rival. If this is the case, we might expect a negative and significant relationship between the indicator of Hu Jintao's protégés and the frequency of Three Represents articles, between the indicator of the "Shanghai Gang" and the frequency of the Scientific Outlook of Development articles, and between the indicator of the "Shanghai Gang" and the frequency of the Harmonious Society articles.

Three Control Variables

In addition to patron-client ties, Shih's study finds that the level of economic development, professional experience in propaganda work, and fiscal dependence of a province also play roles in affecting the provinces' zeal to publish ideological item.²⁷ As ideological shift is often followed by a series of policy changes, new ideological banner is often related to new economic policy. Thus, the level of economic development might affect the provinces' zeal to echo certain ideological campaigns. Provincial leaders' professional experience in propaganda unit also plays a role as they may tend to publish more ideological items simply because of their expertise and experiences no matter whose ideological banners are. Fiscal dependence of a province also matters as it may affect the province's zeal to support policies from the central government. As those variables might affect the frequency of ideological articles in a given province-year, it is highly necessary to control their effects so that we can know the actual impact of patron-client ties.

For example, if we find that the provincial units of "Shanghai Gang" are less likely to echo ideological campaigns, we cannot reach the conclusion that this is owing to "Shanghai

²⁷ Victor Shih, "'Nauseating' Displays of Loyalty: Monitoring the Factional Bargain through Ideological Campaigns in China," *The Journal of Politics* 70, no. 4 (2008).

Gang” membership matters unless we purge the effects of economic development. As most of the “Shanghai Gang” members are governing affluent areas, their provinces’ willingness to echo ideological campaigns are not only affected by their patron-client ties but also the level of economic development in their governed regions. Similarly, as most of Hu Jintao’s protégés who rose from the Communist Youth League have usually worked in the propaganda area,²⁸ their desire to publish ideological items might be affected by their past work experience. Thus, it is important to purge this effect for capturing the actual impact of their ties with Hu Jintao.

In order to capture the actual impact of patron-client ties, this study retains all those control variables for eliminating the effects of other variables. The collection of relevant data strictly follows the method of the previous study in order to eliminate the effects of methodological difference.

Data

Table 1 lists the summary statistics of the relevant variables. For the dependent variables, the mean and the standard deviation of all Z scores should be 0 and 1 respectively. The category of the actual account of articles lists the numbers of relevant ideological articles. The average numbers of articles mentioning “Three Represents”, “Scientific Outlook of Development”, and “Harmonious Society” in provincial official newspapers between 2005 and 2012 are 93, 459, and 226 respectively. The mean of GDP per capita in our observation is 26,104 yuan while the standard deviation is 17,090 yuan. Fiscal dependence is counted by local revenue minus local expenditure divided by local revenue in a given year. The average province ran 169% fiscal shortfall (Fiscal Dependence_(it)) in a given year, while the standard deviation was 2.42109. The variable of propaganda is the combined years of the governor and the party secretary’s experiences in areas of propaganda work.²⁹ While the average of this variable is 3.1 years, that of Henan province from 2005 to 2012 is 30 years. Finally, the variable “ALL TIES with HJT_(it)” shows that 51% of the observed provincial leadership (province-year) has existing ties with Hu Jintao. The provincial leadership in 6.6% and 11% of the observation (province-year) belongs to the “Shanghai Gang” and princelings respectively.

Table 1: Summary Statistics of Relevant Variables

Variables		Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.
Actual Account of Articles	TR _(it)	240	93.42083	82.53267
	SOD _(it)	240	459.0583	251.3672
	HS _(it)	240	226.0833	179.7312
Dependent Variables	Z score-SOD _(it)	240	-1.28e-07	.9852469
	Z score-HS _(it)	240	-6.34e-09	.9852468
	Z score-TR _(it)	240	-7.07e-09	.9852468
Main Variables of Interest	ALL TIES with HJT _(it)	240	.5166667	.5007665
	SUM TIES with HJT _(it)	240	.5708333	.6026296
	ALL TIES Shanghai Gang _(it)	240	.0666667	.2499651

²⁸ Cheng Li, “Hu’s Policy Shift and the Tuanpai’s Coming-of-Age,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 15 (2005).

²⁹ It includes experiences of various propaganda units (宣传单位).

	SUM TIES Shanghai Gang _(it)	240	.0916667	.3658162
	ALL TIES Princeling _(it)	240	.1125	.316641
	TIES Shanghai Gang vs CCYL _(it)	240	.5166667	.7024563
Control Variables	GDP per capital _(it)	210	26104.04	17090.01
	Fiscal Dependence _(it)	210	1.694619	2.420879
	Sum Propaganda _(it)	240	3.1125	5.726676

Data Analysis: PCSE-AR 1

Similarly to the Shih's previous study, I employ estimations with panel-corrected standard errors and first order autocorrelation (PCSE-AR 1) to test thoroughly the ALLTIES model and SUMTIES model. PCSE provides more accurate results than ordinary least squared (OLS) when dealing with time-series cross-section data. Given the panel nature of my dataset, OLS is not optimal because it assumes there are no serial correlation and spatial correlations of the dataset.³⁰ Thus, Beck and Katz's PCSE is employed to correct within the group heteroskedasticity and cross-section of error.³¹ The first-order autocorrelation coefficient (AR1) is used to deal with serial correlation of the data.

Finding

Table 2, 3, 4, and 5 report the estimated effects of provincial leaders' patron-client ties on their zeal to echo ideological adaption between 2005 and 2012. First and most importantly, this study finds a negative relationship between the patron-client ties of provincial leaders and their zeal to echo ideological campaigns. Table 2 reports the robust and striking patterns. The ALLTIES model shows that provincial leadership's ties with Hu Jintao significantly *reduce* their zeal to echo the Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns. If one of the provincial leaders is Hu Jintao's follower, the main provincial newspapers will produce on average 22.6% Scientific Outlook of Development articles *fewer* than the province in which none of the provincial leaders is Hu Jintao's follower, all else being equal. This finding remains robust at the 0.05 level even if I remove all other control variables save only the variable of GDP per capita.³² The SUMTIES model shows that the volume of patron-client ties with Hu Jintao did not have a significant impact on provincial leaders' zeal to echo Scientific Outlook of Development.

Table 3 reports the estimated effects of provincial leaders' membership of the "Shanghai Gang" on their provinces in publishing Three Represents articles. The negative coefficient of the "Shanghai Gang" denotes that provincial leaders of the "Shanghai Gang" are *less* likely to publish Three Represents articles. If one of the provincial leaders belongs to the "Shanghai Gang", the main provincial newspapers on average will produce 43.77% *fewer* Three Represents articles in a given year, all else being equal (ALLTIES model).³³ In addition, the volume of the "Shanghai Gang" membership has a significant impact on their zeal to echo the Three Represents campaigns. If both the party secretary and governor belong to the "Shanghai Gang", the main newspaper of this province will produce 23% Three

³⁰ Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "What to Do (and Not to Do) with Time-Series Cross-Section Data," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 3 (1995).

³¹ Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan Katz, "Time-Series--Cross-Section Issues: Dynamics 2004."

³² The statistical outcome is available at my research page.

³³ This finding has taken the level of economic development as a control. Most members of the "Shanghai Gang" are based in affluent areas; the control variable GDP per capita helps to eliminate the effect of economic development.

Represents articles *fewer* than the province in which only one of its leaders is a “Shanghai Gang” member (SUMTIES model).

The above two findings confirms the previous conjectures that the manner of displaying loyalty had changed in Hu Jintao’s term. Hu Jintao’s followers were less likely to echo Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development campaign and the “Shanghai Gang” was less motivated to praise Jiang’s Three Represents campaign. In other words, the role of ideological campaigns had shifted from “maintenance” (monitoring loyalties of followers) in Jiang Zemin’s era into “recruitment” (recruiting new protégés) in Hu Jintao’s era.

In addition to clients’ responses to their patron’s campaigns, I also examine their reaction to the ideological innovation of their patron’s rival. Table 4 reveals the impact of “Shanghai Gang” membership on the provincial leaders’ zeal to echo Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns. It shows that provincial leaders of the “Shanghai Gang” are *less* likely to echo Hu’s Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns.³⁴ The ALLTIES model shows that if one of the provincial leaders is a “Shanghai Gang” member, the main provincial newspaper on average publishes 46.23% fewer Scientific Outlook of Development articles than a province which does not have a leader belonging to the “Shanghai Gang”. The SUMTIES model denotes that the volume of “Shanghai Gang” membership has a significant impact as well. If both provincial leaders are members of the “Shanghai Gang”, the main provincial newspaper on average publishes 24.72% fewer Scientific Outlook of Development articles than the province in which only one of its leaders is a “Shanghai Gang” member. This pattern matches the previous conjecture that protégés of a senior leader do not have to pander to other senior leaders at their own expense because they have already received their coalition’s support.

In addition to the impact of factional factors, the policy preference perhaps also discourages “Shanghai Gang” leaders’ zeal to echo Scientific Outlook of Development. Scientific Outlook of Development promotes a fairer distribution of resources among Chinese provinces. Under Scientific Outlook of Development, the administration of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao intended to promote regional equality in order to achieve more sustainable development. Specially, they designed many economic and social policies to increase the flow of resources to poorer inland provinces and thus lead to a more redistributive overall budget.³⁵ This rebalancing of resources has led to some discontent of leaders in affluent areas, especially those who rose from Shanghai. For example, the fall of the former head of Shanghai Chen Liangyu is known for his opposition to the macro socio-economic policies of Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao that are less favoured in coastal regions.³⁶

The variables “Ties Shanghai Gang vs CCYL_(it)” and “ALL TIES Princeling_(it)” do not show significant impacts on either Scientific Outlook of Development or Three Represents.³⁷ Provincial leaders’ ties with Hu Jintao also do not have a significant impact on their zeal to echo the Three Represents campaigns.

Moreover, Table 5 reports the impact of patron-client ties on the standardized frequency of Harmonious Society articles. It finds that there is no evidence that provincial leaders’ patron-client ties play a role in affecting the variation of Harmonious Society articles.

³⁴ This finding has taken the level of economic development (GDP per capita) into consideration.

³⁵ Naughton, Barry, “China’s Left Tilt: Pendulum Swing or Midcourse Correction?,” in *China’s Changing Political Landscape*, ed. Cheng Li (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2008).

³⁶ Cheng Li, “Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied? The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin’s Faction,” *China Leadership Monitor*, no. 20 (2007).

³⁷ Statistical outcome is available on my research page.

This finding suggests that strategic political consideration is not a reason why Harmonious Society campaigns are launched. Then why did patron-clients with Hu Jintao and “Shanghai Gang” membership matter to Scientific Outlook of Development but not to Harmonious Society? A possible interpretation is that Hu Jintao stakes more of his personal authority on Scientific Outlook of Development rather than Harmonious Society as demonstrated by the fact that the CCP Constitution incorporated Scientific Outlook of Development instead of Harmonious Society in 2012.

Table 2: The Impact of Ties with Hu Jintao on the Standardized Frequency of “Scientific Outlook of Development” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012)

	ALLTIES model	SUMTIES model
<i>Dependent Variable: Z score-SOD_(it)</i>	Coefficient (Standard Error)	
All Ties with HJT_(it)	-0.2261232* (0.1132055)	-----
Sum Ties with HJT_(it)	-----	-0.1013375 (0.0925824)
GDP per capital _(it)	-8.98e-06* (3.92e-06)	-8.18e-06* (3.81e-06)
Fiscal Dependence _(it)	0.0001795** (0.0155864)	0.1303515** (0.0477479)
Sum Propaganda _(it)	0.0001795 (0.0155864)	-0.0003309 (.0155022)
CONSTANT	0.1357196 (0.1267269)	0.0531882 (0.1132999)
	N=210 Rho= 0.5927615	N=210 Rho= 0.5883423

Note: *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table 3: The Impact of “Shanghai Gang” membership on the Standardized Frequency of “Three Represents” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012)

	ALLTIES model	SUMTIES Model
<i>Dependent Variable: Z score-TR_(it)</i>	Coefficient (Standard Error)	
All Ties Shanghai Gang_(it)	-0.4377569* (0.1949907)	-----
Sum Ties Shanghai Gang_(it)	-----	-0.2396642* (0.1169595)
GDP per capital _(it)	5.50e-06 (3.56e-06)	4.84e-06 (3.49e-06)
Fiscal Dependence _(it)	0.2829655** (0.033309)	0.2825434** (0.033776)
Sum Propaganda _(it)	0.0297698* (0.0135261)	0.0257952* (0.0125662)

CONSTANT	-0.6809872** (0.1397268)	-0.6576854** (0.1367641)
	N=210 Rho= 0.4855273	N=210 Rho=0.4981485

Note: *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table 4: The Impact of “Shanghai Gang” membership on the Standardized Frequency of “Scientific Outlook of Development” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012)

	ALLTIES model	SUMTIES Model
<i>Dependent Variable: Z score-SOD_(it)</i>		
	Coefficient (Standard Error)	
All Ties Shanghai Gang_(it)	-0.4623632** (0.203747)	-----
Sum Ties Shanghai Gang_(it)	-----	-0.247273* (0.1166842)
GDP per capital _(it)	-6.43e-06 (3.63e-06)	-7.07e-06 (3.73e-06)
Fiscal Dependence _(it)	0.1308801** (0.0488001)	0.1300964** (0.048087)
Sum Propaganda _(it)	0.0078109 (0.0162017)	0.004347 (0.0158783)
CONSTANT	-0.040598 (0.1043766)	-0.0198136 (0.1063964)
	N=210 Rho= 0.5779312	N=210 Rho=0.5677991

Note: *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Table 5: The Impact of Patron-client Ties on the Standardized Frequency of “Harmonious Society” Articles in Provincial Newspapers (2005-2012)

<i>Dependent Variable: Z score HS_(it)</i>		
	Coefficient (Standard Error)	P value
All Ties with HJT_(it)	.0985304 (.1336957)	0.461
All Ties Shanghai Gang_(it)	-.1068175 (.2611175)	0.682
ALL TIES Princeling_(it)	.2588506 (.1656429)	0.118
GDP per capital _(it)	-1.42e-06 (4.19e-06)	0.735
Fiscal Dependence _(it)	.1667347* (.0740597)	0.024
Sum Propaganda _(it)	.0159225 (.0167762)	0.343

CONSTANT	-.2661044 (.1621296)	
	N=210 Rho= .5691604	

Note: *p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01

Conclusion

This article studies the manners of displaying loyalties through ideological campaigns in Hu Jintao's era. Through a content analysis of provincial official newspapers between 2005 and 2012, it finds a completely contrary impact of patron-client ties with the previous study. Several key findings can be highlighted. First, Hu Jintao's protégés are *less* likely to echo Hu's Scientific Outlook of Development campaign. Second, "Shanghai Gang" members are *less* willing to praise both Jiang Zemin's Three Represents and Hu's Scientific Outlook of Development. Third, the volume of "Shanghai Gang" membership has a significant impact on the variations of Three Represents and Scientific Outlook of Development articles. These findings suggest that the strategic function of ideological campaigns has completely changed from monitoring the loyalties of existing followers in Jiang Zemin's era into recruiting new followers in Hu Jintao's era. Finally, the variables of patron-client ties cannot explain the variation of Harmonious Society articles. This is to say, unlike the campaigns of Three Represents and Scientific Outlook of Development, there is no empirical evidence to support that the Harmonious Society campaign was launched to discern local leaders' loyalties.

This article argues that the decreasing need to monitor followers' loyalties because of a more stable elite politics on the one hand, and the increasing need to recruit new protégés owing to top leaders' different strategic uses of ideological campaigns on the other hand, led to the changing manners of displaying loyalties through ideological campaigns in post-Deng China. The weakness of authoritarian regimes lies in their power distribution. The majority of authoritarian leaders are overthrown by the ruling elites rather than the masses.³⁸ The CCP knows its weakness well. Since the 1980s, the CCP has made impressive efforts to institutionalize its power succession system in order to ensure a smooth cycle of political elites and reduce the negative effects of power struggles.³⁹ Institutional development has dramatically changed China's elite politics, as evidenced by the second smooth and orderly leadership transition in the history of the People's Republic of China in 2012. My empirical study on the selection bias of the 18th Politburo Standing Committee members demonstrates that institutional rules have become a key factor in selecting Chinese top leaders.⁴⁰

Arguably, the institutionalization of power succession has produced more stable elite politics in Hu Jintao's era. Jiang Zemin was forced to put his protégés into the vital sectors in order to stay in power. By contrast, Hu Jintao was known as a master of maintaining consensus among factions. This is because a more stable elite politics had allowed Hu to do so. Unlike Jiang, Hu Jintao's position as the party head had not been seriously challenged, although power struggle remained intense during his terms. Nowadays, factional groups are neither willing nor able to defeat their rivals completely because of the equal balanced power

³⁸ Milan Svobik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge University Press, 2012):5

³⁹ Jinghan Zeng, "Institutionalization of the Authoritarian Leadership in China: A Power Succession System with Chinese Characteristics?," *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 3 (2014).

⁴⁰ Jinghan Zeng, "What Matters Most in Selecting Top Chinese Leaders? A Qualitative Comparative Analysis," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 18, no. 3 (2013).

and the necessity of power-sharing to maintain stability.⁴¹ As a consequence of a more stable elite politics, Hu Jintao did not have to rely on his coalition as heavily as Jiang Zemin did. It dramatically led to the decreasing need to identify loyal followers through costly ideological campaigns.

More importantly, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had very different strategic goals in launching campaigns for their ideological innovation: Jiang wanted to maintain his influence after retirement, whilst Hu was less motivated to do so. As explained earlier, Three Represents was first proposed by Jiang Zemin in 2000 and Jiang handed over the top positions of the party and the state to Hu Jintao two years later. Towards the end of his term, it was important for Jiang to select loyal followers to put into the top authority in order to maintain his influence. To achieve this goal, promoting identified protégés was more effective than promoting junior protégés who only joined Jiang's coalition because of reliability and political capital.

As identified protégés followed Jiang Zemin for many years and Jiang knew their weakness well, they would pay higher cost than junior protégés if they betray Jiang. Thus, generally speaking, identified protégés tend to be more loyal and reliable than junior protégés. In addition, identified protégés tend to have more political capitals than junior protégés because they usually have higher party ranks and more experiences in dealing with political conflicts, so promoting those identified protégés into top positions of authority usually leads to less resistance. In this sense, at the time of launching the Three Represents campaign, Jiang might be more interested in monitoring the loyalties of identified protégés who were more reliable and eligible for the top leadership, rather than recruiting new follower who still needed Jiang's protection.

Observing followers' reactions to Three Represents campaigns provides a way to identify who is loyal. As explained earlier, followers bear the social cost of being dispersed by others and – more importantly – the political cost of forgoing the opportunities of joining other coalitions. Thus, their echoing of Three Represents campaigns sent credible signals to Jiang Zemin. Those identified protégés might have taken this as an opportunity to win Jiang's trust so that they could be promoted to a higher position. From the perspective of provincial officials who were not Jiang's protégés, to praise Jiang's Three Represents was costly because Jiang Zemin was retiring soon and no-one knew the durability of his influence after his retirement. For those who had not joined any coalition, to pander to the coming leader rather than a departing leader was more rational. It explains why Jiang Zemin's protégés are more likely to echo Three Represents campaigns in the previous study.

The factional calculation of Hu's ideological campaign is different from that of Jiang. Scientific Outlook of Development was mainly proposed after Jiang's full retirement in 2004. At this time, by promoting Hu's own formula of the party's guiding ideology, Hu Jintao intended to build his personal authority as the new leaders. The ideological campaigns of Hu's Scientific Outlook of Development serve as a tool to carry out a new vision and walk out of the shadow of the predecessor Jiang Zemin. To Hu Jintao and his coalition, Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns helped to identify the political stance of local officials and to recruit active respondents selectively. Identified protégés of Hu Jintao have many connections with Hu, so they have many other ways of displaying loyalties. Thus, they do not have to over-praise Scientific Outlook of Development in public at their own expense. Those who have not joined Hu's coalition, however, have far fewer connections, and thus

⁴¹ Cheng Li, "The Powerful Factions among China's Rulers," (2012); Cheng Li, "The Battle for China's Top Nine Leadership Posts," *The Washington Quarterly* 35, no. 1 (2012); Cheng Li and Eve Cary, "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?," *China Brief* 11, no. 23 (2011); Cheng Li, "China's Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?," *Asia Policy*, no. 6 (2008).

ideological campaigns are one of few channels through which they can pander to the new leader Hu Jintao. Thus, they are more motivated to echo Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns.

"Shanghai Gang" members' identity undermined their willing to pander Hu because of the risk of losing trust in Jiang's coalition and their close ties with Jiang would make it harder for them to win Hu's trust. Thus, "Shanghai Gang" members are less likely to echo Hu Jintao's Scientific Outlook of Development campaigns. Similarly to the pattern of Hu's protégés' reactions to Scientific Outlook of Development, the "Shanghai Gang" has already been identified as members of Jiang Zemin's coalition, and they have many other ways to signal their loyalties to their coalition. On the contrary, for those who wish to join Jiang's coalition, they might be more active in publishing Three Represents items. As such, "Shanghai Gang" members are less likely to praise Jiang's Three Represents item in Hu's era.

All in all, the strategic function of ideological campaigns has changed in Hu Jintao's era. While Fukuyama's "The End of History" essay predicts the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution",⁴² ideology has been constantly adapting in China. The party-state has put great amounts of energy and human capital in modernizing ideology from Jiang Zemin's "Three Represents", Hu Jintao's "Scientific Outlook of Development" and "Harmonious Society", to Xi Jinping's "China Dream". As this study suggests, ideology is by no mean obsolete. In addition to its legitimating function, Chinese top leaders rely on it to build the authority of the new leadership and to claim their right to rule. Future research could look into the strategic use of Xi Jinping's ideological banners.

⁴² Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?," *The National Interest* Summer 1989 (1989).